DEMOCRACY AlsfDWORLD RELATIONS David Starr Jordan (^otttcU Ininerattii Sitbrarii SttfattL, SS'ctn ^otk Hie date shows when this volume was taJcen. To renew this book copy the call No. and give to the kbrariaa. HOME USE RULES All Books mbject to Recall All b orrowws iniut reg^. ter in th« library to bocrow hooka for hooia turn, M - All books must be re- - tamed at end of college '^Y y**^ ^ inapectiott and *y repain. Limited books nmst be re- tained within the four week linut and not renewed. Students must return all books before leaving town. Officers should arrange for the return of books wanted during their absence from _ town. Vefaunes of periodicals - and of pamphlets are held in the library as much as ""* possible. For special pur- poses they arejjiren out for a limited time. Borrowers should not use their library privileges for the benefit of other persons. Books of special value and gift Ijooks, when the giver wishes it, are not allowed to circulate. Readers are asked tore- port all cases of books marked or mutilated. Do not deface book* by marks and writing. ._ Cornell University Library JC423 .J82 Democracy and world relations olin 3 1924 030 448 132 Cornell University Library The original of tliis book is in tlie Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924030448132 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS T By David Starr Jordan Yonkers-on-Hudson, New York WORLD BOOK COMPANY 1918 WORLD BOOK COMPANY THE HOUSE OF APPLIED KNOWLEDGE Established, 1905, by Caspar W. Hodgson Yonkeks-on-Hpd80n, New York 2126 Praikie Avenue, Chicago The publication of books that apply the world's knowledge to the world's needs is the aim of this House. The year 1918-1919 seems a fitting time to put forth books which may contribute toward solving the puzzling problems of reorganizing government, in- dustry, and human relationships generally, in a new-born world, by applying scientific knowledge to their'solution. Democracy and World Belatums is such a book, and it is one of a number treating of these problems which have been planned by this House to meet the needs of the reorganization period JDWR-l Copyright, 1918, by World Book Company Copyright in Great Britain All rights reserved On toil bien que h vieux monde sera ckangS par V alliance que bdtiront un jour entre eux ceux dont le luymbre et la mis^e sont infinis. — Barbubse, Le Feu, 1917 Let Truth and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth to be put to the worse in a tree and open en- counter? — John Milton PREFATORY NOTE MY readers will perhaps accept a word of personal explanation. In 1916, Mr. Caspar W. Hodgson, a former student, now manager of the World Book Company, asked me to write for his purposes an elementary exposition of Democracy as related to the community of nations and to the problems of War and Peace, to be available as a basis for study in schools. Most of this volume was prepared with that end in view. Its aim was to show that self- government is essential to freedom, order, and jus- tice, and that the permanence of Democracy is bound up with international peace, while the dynastic system is antagonistic to both democracy and peace. At the same time, the argument recognizes that peace itself is not a finality but rather a requisite of civiUzation. Its maintenance may not be at all times a duty, even to itself. Peace is a natural re- sultant of freedom, order, and justice. When these are established, by whatever means, peace follows as a matter of course. Moreover, peace cannot be se- cured by mere submission. To lie down before aggres- sion is to accept its doctrine that might makes right, and further to throw open the door to new assaults. Our stand in the present conflict is plain, — it had to be done. There were but two alternatives from the day the invading hosts entered Belgium. At once we were deeply involved. Whether as mediator or as combatant did not immediately appear; the German war-makers, however, progressively removed all doubt. From the first there was no room for moral neutrah'ty ; legal neutrality was at last pushed to the wall. vi PREFATORY NOTE In these pages I have avoided discussion of war itself except in so far as a study of German aflEairs seems vital to the comparison between government hy the people as responsible individuals and government of the people as components of a herd. I am under special obligations to Professor Edward Krehbiel, and to his admirable volume. Nationalism, War, and Society. Both that work and the present one are in some sense outgrowths of a course of lec- tures on International Conciliation given by us jointly in Stanford University, from 1909 to 1916. To my colleagues, Vernon Kellogg, William H. Carruth, Edgar E. Robinson, Victor J. West, and Edward M. Hulme, to David S. Muzzey and David Snedden of Columbia University, and to John W. Ritchie of the College of William and Mary, I am indebted for a reading of parts of the manuscript; and to my wife, Jessie Knight Jordan, for continuous critical and constructive aid. David Stakk Jordan Palo Alto, CALI^OB^r^A 1 August, 1918 CONTENTS FAGS I. Foreword 1 n. General Considerations .... 6 III. Nationalism 12 rV. The Dynastic State 37 Note A. Altruism 55 Note B. The Superman .... 68 Note C. The Dynastic State in History . 64 V. Imperlalism and Trade ... - . 66 VI. Nature of Democracy 91 VII. Internationalism and Federation . . 101 VIII. International Law, Arbitration, and Con- ciliation 115 IX. A New Order 132 Appendix : Pangermanism 139 Index 151 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS I FOREWORD There will never be a free and enlightened state until the state comes to recognize the individual as a higher and independent power from which all its own power and authority are derived, and treats him accordingly. — Thobbau 'TTIHE peoples are nothing; they should be every- X. thing." ^ This epigram of the French soldier may well be a watchword of democracy. The modern world, to accept the current paraphrase from Lincoln, "cannot endure half -slave, half -free," that is, half of it under government "of the people, by the people, for the people," half of it subject to irresponsible oligarchies, parasitic on the people through the "divine right of kings." Wherever arbitrary power exists, it will be used in arbitrary ways. The only antidote to its abuses is to be found in government by the people. This is no instantaneous remedy, to be applied once for all. It is a process of growth. The people must feel their way, learning from their own mistakes, build- ing their loftier ideals on the wreckage of past hopes. It matters little what the shortcomings of democ- racy are. The essential thing is progress in enlight- ' "Let peuplei, c'est rien; et ga devrait etre tout; une phrase historique vieitle de plus Sun siicle." (Henri Barbusse, Le Feu.) The historic phrase, more than a century old, refers to the noted pamphlet of SieySs in 1788, entitled "Qu'estce que le tiers 6tat? Tout! Qu'a-t-il 6t«? Rien! Que desire-t-il? Devenir quelque chose." (What is the third estate? All! What has it been ? Nothing! What does it want? To become something.) 1 2 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS enment and justice; the way leads through freedom. No people ever had a government better than it de- served. It is a quality of democracy always to deserve something better. A perfect government would be superfluous. As Goethe once observed, "The best government is that which renders itself unnecessary." The besetting sin of most governments which endeavor to be good is that they attempt too many things the people should do for themselves. The highest duty of government is to keep the road unobstructed so that each man can make his own way for himself. In the pages which follow I have tried to make clear certain principles in the mutual relations of nations. It is no part of the plan to discuss the application of these principles to internal problems of government. Yet it is manifest that the same doctrines apply to national and international relations aKke. Conquest, monopoly, and cut-throat competition are just as disastrous in economic systems as in affairs of state. In democracy the freedom of the individual is vital, — equally so its necessary limitation, non-interference with the liberty of others. The same principle should obtain in financial and commercial relations as well. The freedom for which our fathers contended was freedom of the soul, not unrestrained license to control or oppress, whether through accumulated wealth or wide-ranging combination. By some means, labor must become as free as the wealth it produces, and human life must be as highly cherished as property. It is certain that the war will bring many changes inside and outside the various nations. Nevertheless, it is to be hoped that the inevitable upheavals, bidding FOREWORD 3 fair to stir society to its depths, shall be bloodless, and yet sweep away precisely those institutions which most impede social advance. Democracy may not necessarily build up great states, but permanent greatness can rest on no other foundation. In the future the people must indeed be everything. As the war goes on, we glimpse the dawn of a larger freedom. "War to end war" now looks forward to the achievement of a "clean peace" on the basis of a "new morality" among nations, a settlement in which no selfish interests, national or personal, shall prevail, and no political or territorial advantage be gained by military invasion. Such an ending will find few prec- edents in history.^ It is the part of democracy to create precedent. In ringing words President Wilson has defined the purposes of the United States and of allied liberalism : We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensations for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. If this stoutly remains our aim, we shall open the door to a new world-outlook as inspiring as that dis- closed by the Renaissance, by oin- own Revolution, or by the Emancipation Proclamation. Deeds, not words, must decide. Yet we are leading the way forward to the open fields of a broad humanity. From the first impulse to go to the rescue of Belgium, iThe Treaty of Ghent, closing the War of 1812, may be a case in point. 4 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS on to the last grapple with a dynastic state, the purpose of democracy everywhere has been unflinching and must be continuous. The old morality of nations was limited in scope, with no higher ideal than national advantage.! It relied on force and boasted of its triumphs. This point of yiew was an outgrowth of the mediaeval conception of the sovereign state, an ideal entity inherent in a moral vacuum. The germ of the "new morality" inheres in the spirit which called us into the war. Its essence, international and unselfish, is the appeal for a new world-order. "Without that new order," says President Wilson, "the world will be without peace." We would base the liberties of all on the same stable foundation as our own. We crave no triumph except to block aggression. We mean to allow no considerations of force to affect the final adjustment. In "fruits of victory" or "dust of defeat," our efforts shall inure alike to the well-being of the whole world. Out of these purposes rises a new moral might which cannot fail to appeal even to our adversaries. Once understood, it must become the standard around which free men of all nations shall rally. "The force of America is the force of moral principle." The new morality inheres in the four imperatives proclaimed by President Wilson on February 11, 1918. He insists 1. that each part of the final settlement must be based upon the essential justice of that particular cause, and upon such adjustments as are most likely to bring peace that will be permanent ; FOREWORD 5 2. <^a< peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance of power ; but 3. that every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made iu the interest and for 1;he benefit of the popu- lations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjust- ment or compromise of claims amongst rival states ; and 4. that all well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them with- out introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently of the world. On a basis such as this, international order must rest ; modern civiHzation will be content with nothing less. The acceptance of these principles would mark the end of the mediaeval era in world-politics. It would square international relations with the advances already achieved by science, ethics, and religion within the social order. n GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS All institutions which . . . compress men together into vast uniform masses are now far more hurtful than in the earlier ages of the world. — WiLHEiiM VON Humboldt HERE it may be desirable to present briefly a few general considerations of governmental systems in advance of more extended discussion. THE STATE The conception of "the state" has come down through the ages, changing much from time to time with the varied conditions of society. During some periods the civilized world has been divided into many states, some entirely independent, the rest submitting to various degrees of subjugation. At other times one state or empire has compelled or assumed to compel the allegiance of all. A single temporal ruler with a single spiritual head was an early ideal of Chris- tendom. This ideal, partly realized in Roman and also in mediaeval times, recedes into the background in recent centuries. The present era is one of many states. These are usually recognized as forty-eight in number, not count- ing numerous suppressed nations or "nationalities" included within the grasp of empire. In political theory and practice, each of the forty-eight which maintain absolute independence is known as a "sover- eign state." This may be defined as a political unit in which the people, whatever the agglomerate, sub- mit to a common government free from the control 6 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 7 of any other state. Freedom from outside direction is held to be the essence of "sovereignty."^ In monarchical usage, the term "state" applies to an ideal entity superior to the people and the nation ; from this source government derives its authority. State and government, according to this view, vir- tually coincide, — if not in theory, at least in fact. In a democracy, government being itself a crea- tion of the people, the terms "state," "nation," and "people" become more or less definitely synonymous. The two types of organization, the "state created by force" and the "state created by law," have existed side by side in history ; advancing centuries show a gradual transformation of the one into the other, parallel with the rise of the people. Movements toward democracy, however, meet with occasional interruption and reaction due to a recrudescence of monarchical ideals. In monarchical theory, the state, acknowledging no authority above itself, is therefore superior to all questions of right and duty; the monarch is at once the symbol of the state and the medium through which it acts. The original doctrine of absolutism, " The king can do no wrong," ^ is an early form, " now 'The word "sovereignty" is often used in a different sense as applied to internal affairs of the state, being the supreme right of the state to control its own members. ' "L'&at c'est moi " (I am the state) is attributed to Louis XIV, king of France. In the museum at Petrograd may be seen a copybook written by him when a child. One of the sentences reads : "Le Toifait ce gu'U veut" (The king does what he wants to). Similar assertions have been made by kings of Prussia. For example, "We are after all the king and we do what we please." (Frederick 1, 1722.) "Like my imperial grandfather, I represent the crown by divine right." (William II, 1894.) Said Charles I, •* The Sovereign and the people are clean different." 8 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS painfully archaic," of the more intangible axiom, "The state can do no wrong." OEGANIZATION FOR PEACE OE WAK States in modern times have been organized on one of two systems, for war or for peace. The war system represents the traditional form of development under dynastic rule, through force and conquest. The peace system represents the culmination of voluntary association or federation. The one is embodied in kingdom or empire, the other in democracy or repubhc. Under the war system the first consideration of the state is national prestige and mihtary power. Its dominant note is force, and its special stress is laid on the principles of nationalism, especially in its aspects of international rivalry. In monarchical theory a sovereign state is guided only by interest or policy, the common welfare of its subjects being wholly secondary. The effort to bring the state into line with the needs of the people at large is of relatively modern origin. Under the peace system, the first consideration is the welfare and security of the "people," with the fostering of education, sanitation, natural resom-ces, and friendly relations to the rest of the world. Here the dominant note is individual freedom, its culmina- tion cooperative nationalism and internationalism. The two types of organization were defined long ago by Francis Bacon as "the empire of man over man" and "the empire of man over nature." By the "em- pire of man over man" great historical organizations have been built up on the basis of force. Having no GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 9 cement other than force, each in its time has disinte- grated. The empire of man over nature leads to that form of cooperation from which spring science, per- sonal initiative, and human enlightenment. The bond of good-will and common interest alone gives perma- nence to society. These two systems are nowhere wholly separated in modern times. There is as yet no nation organized wholly on the peace system, for no democracy can claim to be perfect and no nation is yet free from fear or insecurity because of neighbors addicted to the use of force and likely to employ it as an argument in international business or politics. The war system has its foundation in dynastic de- mands, more or less openly allied with commercial spoliation; the peace system rests on the theory and practice of mutual aid. PEACE AND WAK Peace is the ideal condition of mankind. It rep- resents the duration of accepted law and order, the condition under which proceeds the normal flow of intercourse and trade, with movements toward social progress. War is the breach of peace, the rupture of friendly activities either within a country or as related to another nation or alliance of nations. As peace demands the avowed recognition of or- ganized rules of conduct, war tempts nations to their rejection and defiance. Among civilized men the supremacy of law in individual relations is now every- where accepted. All forms of individual or class violence within the nation are drastically suppressed. 10 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS such manifestations in our time being only sporadic and temporary. But as yet laws governing sovereign states have not achieved equal binding force. Under a regime of peace, all men have "the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," in so far as this does not interfere with the common rights of others. The individual then rests secure in the possession of his property, in the safety of his family, and in the enjoyment of all activities necessary to his welfare. No nation, however, has ever yet established relations of absolute justice in the social order, for each government is conditioned by the fairness and intelligence of the fallible men and women who main- tain it. But every nation in time of peace registers advance in this direction. With peace, enlightenment spreads and the higher human faculties find expression. Science is expanded and intensified; its applications to the social welfare are made vital. Each succeeding generation achieves deeper knowledge, broader interests, and greater efficiency, accompanied by a wider range of personal satisfactions. The progress of civilization depends on such forward movement in human relations. Peace is not "merely a pale negation" — the passive condition of ceasing to fight : it opens the door to positive effort. The glory of peace lies in the con- structive endeavor that security makes possible. Peace is vital to every activity which advances human well- being. War means insecurity. In war-time, normal rela- tions of men are harshly broken, movements for in- dividual or social betterment are frustrated, and the GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 11 achievements of science and industry are turned into unnatural channels. The general effect of all breaches of the peace (of whatever kind) is to check social prog- ress and to turn back the hands on the dial of civili- zation. Nevertheless war, involving present iusecurity and confusion, may be the only road to ultimate secur- ity. The dynastic state chooses its own weapon, the force of arms, and at times no other defense avails against it. Ill NATIONALISM So I returned and did consider all the oppressions that are done beneath the sun. — Ecclesiasteb A NATION is an assemblage of people bound together by some common impulse and subject to a common government. Nationalism as a political principle is the exaltation of the nation in all its varied aspects and relations. It inclines to spell nation with a large N, and to uphold its own interests as above all other human concerns. The term thus tends to become synonymous with state. Parallel with the expansion of nationalism has gone the extension of the idea of patriotism. This form of "national spirit," which had its roots in loyalty to family, tribe, feudal chief, or city, widens by degrees to the breadth of governmental jurisdiction. The principle, admirable in itself, has been vitiated by nativistic limitations. Under the narrowing aims of the war-system, it degenerates at the frontier into contempt, suspicion, and hate. THE EISE OF NATIONALISM ^ In recent times a definite movement to intensify nationalism followed the Conference of Vienna in 'The acceptance and meaning of the words "nation," "nationalism," "nationality," vary in different languages and with different authors. I have applied the term "nation" to those aggregates included under a single central government. So considered, the United States is a single nation. A nation is sovereign in the sense that it is subject to no outside control other than that voluntarily assxmied in treaties or agreements. The na- tion, or any part of it, may have internal sovereignty, that is, dominion 12 NATIONALISM 13 1815, just before the battle of Waterloo. The dynastic rulers of Europe, the "gouty old kings" whose thrones Napoleon had shaken, banded together to prevent any similar popular upheaval. The French Revolution marked a "Reign of Terror" to royalty everywhere. Napoleon's career began in contempt of dynastic principles, the claims of hereditary rulers, and the "rights of sovereign states." He was himself a man without a country, caring as little for nationality as for legitimacy, the watchword of diplomacy at that period. Rights of peoples or even of nations were rarely considered except as peoples and nations were regarded as the legitimate property of ruling princes. Under the regime of legitimacy the various European provinces had been treated in general not as integral parts of a state but as personal belongings of the dynasty, slipping from one fealty to another in payment of royal debts, as the result of intermarriage, or according to the fortunes of war. The empire was composed of the holdings of those feudal princes who by financial tribute or by lip-service acknowledged the imperial rule. With the downfall of Napoleon the regime of legitimacy returned, though it soon lost much of its force through the rise of the relatively new over its own people, from which there is no appeal. The evils of nationalism may arise from abuse of either form of sovereignty, external or internal. The agony of Belgium may illustrate the one, the tormenting of Alsace or the massacre of Armenia the other. "Nationality" I use in the sense of the French " nationaliti," as a term describing national or race groups embraced willingly or unwillingly within the boundaries of a nation. Small nationalities, minority nationalities, subject nationalities, oppressed nationalities, all these terms are currently applied to minor groups, the forcible interference with which for political, economic, or social reasons is a great cause of popular unrest. 14 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS spirit of Nationalism. Peoples everywhere felt the new spell of symbolic kinship, the tie which has its roots in common sufferings and common hopes. Nationalism is not a matter of like language or like religion; these elements tend to preserve unity, but the real source of national feeling lies deeper. In the early nineteenth century, "the spirit of na- tionality was in the air." Historians and poets wel- comed it, and great statesmen used it as an instriunent of political unity. It is said of Baron vom Stein that he conceived the idea of "quickening the taste for German history in the schools." Eloquent his- torians (Michelet and J. R. Green, for example) emphasized "the personality of the nation," while others exaggerated "the antiquity of national unity." The fundamental righteousness of the national idea was as clear as the truth of the Christian religion was to the chroniclers of the Middle Ages. They did not argue about it, for it needed no arguments ; they felt and expressed their feeling. . . . From them . . . comes the conviction . . . that every nation owes it to the world to extend, by force if necessary, its particular brand of civilization to alien and therefore inferior peoples. National patriotism be- came the national creed. It filtered through the entire educational system of modem states. However excellent patriotism may be in itself, it has had some startling effects when based upon nation- alist histories. The idea of a common Christianity binding all Christian peoples together in one religion has disappeared; the belief in the brotherhood of man has no chance. (Henry Morse Stephens, Nationality in History, 1916.) By degrees, the sovereign state assimaed a more or less mystic personality, becoming the true unit in world relations. National operations, national boimd- aries, and national patriotism assumed an unexampled NATIONALISM 15 and often undue prominence. Loyalty was transferred from the person of the prince or king to the state itself, of which the ruler, like the flag, served as a visible symbol. RIVAL CONCEPTIONS OF THE STATE In relation to government two rival theories have striven for mastery; that is, the claims of the state on the one hand or the rights of the individual on the other must be paramount. The two conceptions correspond to Bacon's two categories already noted, the empire of man over man and the empire of man over nature, the "rule of the powers of the air" and the "rule of the powers of the earth." The one leads to autocracy and oligarchy, the domination of force; the other implies democracy, that is, govern- ment by cooperation. The imperial state has been defined as a creation of force; the democratic state, the creation of law.^ The imperial state is defined by Professor Kuno Francke as "a spiritual collective personality, leading a life of its own above and beyond the life of the in- dividual." Professor Eduard Meyer expresses the same thought in these words : " The state eventually is of infinitely more value than the sum of all the in- dividuals within its jurisdiction." ^ Such a political entity, divinely sanctioned, knows no moral standard, there being no superior power to lay down rules for its guidance. Its will, backed by force, is supreme; the people owe it absolute allegiance in body and soul. » David J. HiU. » See Chapter IV, "The Dynastic State." 16 DEMOCEACY AND WORLD RELATIONS Its sole and unpardonable sin lies in failure. The most powerful must and shall survive; to be weak, small, backward, unable or unwilling to fight, is ac- cording to this view a state's own destruction.^ But such a paramoimt state as here conceived, influenced by no control by its subjects, cannot actually exist. In this sense "the state" is merely a cloak under which privileged classes conduct operations in their own interests. The democratic state is a cooperative organization of the people, created by the people, to serve the people.^ It has no power or prestige not derived from them, and it can have no success not conditioned on the welfare of its individual units. The right or wrong of its acts must be judged by motives and results; that is, by the ordinary standards of morality. The democratic conception is that of republics such as the United States, Prance, and Switzerland. In general, also, it is the working principle of Great Brit- ain and her self-governing "colonies," though not of the British Empire as a whole. Across the statute 1 As a matter of fact, it is only in the abnormal relations of war-time that small civilized states are placed at a disadvantage. Federation, but not absorption, may enhance their welfare. In a great war, to stand alone is a matter of difficulty and danger. To enter into alliance with either side in a balance of power is equally precarious. In normal times, the individual man fares better, other things being equal, in the smaller states. For example, the average financial status in Holland or Denmark has been distinctly more favorable than in England or Germany. That any small nation should have persisted through the lawless ages of dynastic rivalry without being conquered or absorbed is convincing evidence of its racial vigor. 2 The word "state" is used in America and Australia to mean one of the units of federation in a democracy. This distinction was indicated by Lincoln : "The States have no status outside the Union." NATIONALISM 17 books of Parliament, Cromwell once wrote these words: "All just powers under God are derived from the consent of the people." And in the same spirit Richard Rumbold of Somerset, in 1685, could "never believe it right that some men should be born into the world ready booted and spurred, and others ready saddled and bridled to be ridden." The democratic system rejects all caste distinc- tions, demanding equality before the law, justice for all, exclusive privileges to none. Its economic func- tion is to better "the earth-hold" of its people, "to make goods cheap and men dear." ^ Democracy looks forward to broader freedom on the one hand and to higher achievements and more exalted purposes on the other. Autocracy can promise nothing new. Its highest efficiency can yield only the old tyrannies in interminable variation, while it is at the same time successful only in the degree in which it is able to bind the people body and soul under its control. LEGAL SOVEREIGNTY OF THE STATE* The sovereignty of a state as hitherto understood is its attribute of complete independence. Legal sovereignty implies supreme and effective jurisdiction over a given area and its inhabitants. This includes the authority to raise funds by taxation, to maintain ' Charles Ferguson, The Great News. * The following reveals an interesting view of the attribute of state sover- eignty : "The United States of America has no sovereign. Therefore it has no sovereignty. Therefore it is not in the proper sense of the term a state. Therefore it is not entitled to the full rights of a state among states." (Pro- fessor Gneist, Berlin University, quoted by Professor A. W. Small.) 18 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD. RELATIONS military establishments, to declare war and peace, to make and to denounce or abrogate treaties. Usually, also, the right to coin money, to fix terms of citizenship, and to control the postal and telegraph systems are matters reserved by the central government and denied to the component districts and nation- alities. PERVERSION OF NATIONALISM Nationalism is the intensification of civic conscious- ness in the people of a sovereign state. The spirit of nationalism has been extended and vivified by growing facilities of travel and association among people speak- ing the same language, as well as by the tendency of chm-ch and school to insist on national patriotism as the first of all virtues. Such influences, added to the growing centralization of governments, have brought about a kind of nation-worship, with a good as well as a bad side in its relation to human development. "Nationalism faces both ways." It may serve the ends of autocracy and war, or of democracy and peace. It may be political or social, the one directed to rivahy abroad, the other to advancement at home. In the latter case, it furnishes a great stimulus to education, invention, justice, and helpfulness. It is the basis of national and local pride and of the healthy rivalry which will naturally exist among communities and nations. But a perverted or exaggerated spirit of nationalism, drawing its impulse from dynastic demands, tends to ride roughshod over international rights and duties equally essential to human welfare. The slogan "My NATIONALISM 19 country right or wrong" scorns all fine distinctions of truth and justice. The plea "Necessity knows no law" serves as a cloak to acts rankly and utterly criminal. If all states are regarded as engaged in a continuous struggle for prestige and domination, it is logical that each should grasp every possible advantage. In current practice some states admit no limit to this principle. Their social and industrial adjustments being confessedly perfect, it becomes a duty, they argue, to confer the same blessings on their neighbors. Any temporary suffering which may ensue through enforced participation is held as trivial in face of the ultimate benefits. A civilized state may diffuse its enlightenment "by every proper means, such as armed conquest, commerce, or diplomacy." Hence, "self- restraining pledges" not to add territory or to reap "fruits of victory" are held to be fundamentally wrong, not to say absurd. Moreover, the claim is made that no state can stand still, either economically or geographically. Should a people find itself crowded, it must of necessity appeal to the supreme "divine test of nations" and forcibly eject or suppress any races which may hem it in. In the great international "struggle for existence" imagined by political philos- ophers, the weak must "fall in the press," to lie there "to be trampled broad." "After every war, and as the purpose of the struggle, the victorious nation must enlarge its borders." The democratic state, in theory at least, must re- pudiate these precepts, regarding itself as more or less subject to the higher law of justice as determined by 20 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS public opinion. In so far as it is true ^ to itseK, it rejects all pleas of "manifest destiny," "a place in the sun," or any other of the fatalistic sophisms by which great states have justified predatory activities. Meanwhile, in spite of the recrudescence of outworn conceptions incident to war, the tendency of modern life is to abate the abuses of nationalism, to wear off its rough edges, and to conceive of the nation as simply one among many coordinate centers of cooperative effort. This drift will show itself in the extension of international agreements in recognition of economic justice ^ and the elimination of that idea of the state which finds stability only in military force with its resultant offensive and defensive alliances. In a very real sense the struggle for democracy against absolutism is the struggle of progress against perfection. Under autocracy every institution — state, school, church, army, discipline, society — claims ab- solute perfection. The system can justify itself in no other way. But by this very fact, it excludes all hope of social advance. In autocratic philosophy it is ' It is of course evident that democracy has not always been "true to itself." It has been at times the slave of the "crude young giant of Big Business" which makes "tools and weapons of cities, states, and empires." Too often, to quote again from Charles Ferguson, it has appeared as "stark ofiScialdom, excited and distracted by demagogues, by periodic pollings, and a plutocratic press." But in this case, as in all cases of the failure of democracy, the remedy lies with the people and in time it can and will be applied. ^ Economic justice is defined as "the principle that whenever theii enterprises visibly affect the interests of other men and other nations, civ- ilized men, whether individuals or groups, are bound to prefer legal and rational to violent means of promoting their interests." (Albion W. Small, Americans and the World-Crisis.) NATIONALISM 21 urged that a state cannot stand still. The conception of " Starrheit," or static rest, is indignantly repudiated. But the dynastic ideal of progress means conquest, expansion of boundaries, wealth through indemnities or exploitation, military prestige in general, never the enhanced welfare and freedom of the people. A democracy, on the other hand, can never claim per- fection. It is the reflex of the changing will and varying intelligence of its multitude of units. Its own experiences tend to constant betterment. Its faults and fluctuations, its aspirations and ideals make up the very essence of progress. The strength of democratic institutions lies in the fact that they are neither perfected nor permanent. The scope of democracy is twofold. On the one hand it involves personal freedom; on the other, obedience to law. Statutes are often imperfect, un- just, or even in themselves illegal. Directly or in- directly, however, statutes are the work of the people, and the power that made can unmake, and by peaceful methods. NATIONALISM AND MIGHT In ruder times it was bluntly asserted that might makes right. In later days the dictum has been softened to read, "Might creates need and need makes right." A further paraphrase maintains that "The business of ideal right is to gather might to itself in order that it may cease to be merely ideal." Behind all this stands the old practice of "blood and iron." "No fatherland," says Professor Herrmann Fernau, "can be cemented by blood and iron. Blood and 22 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS iron can be renewed and cemented only by more blood and iron." It may be that "God is on the side of the heaviest battalions," as Napoleon cynically asserted. Or, ac- cording to Bismarck, that "A man is always right if he can command a majority of the bayonets." But not forever ! An empire is at best a crumbling edifice. Cavour, who brought about the union of Italy, is quoted as saying: "One can do anything with bay- onets, except to sit on them." Force may bring order by resisting and restraining other forces. Peace can be maintained only by the will to preserve freedom, order, and justice. NATIONALISM AND DIPLOMACT Diplomacy concerns itself with the mutual relations of nations. In this function of government the dead hand of tradition keeps its most enduring hold. Aris- tocracy, suspicion, and secrecy still obtain in the field of foreign relations. Like the military service, diplo- macy has been the special preserve of the privileged classes. Usually a prerequisite for entrance into even the lowest grade of foreign service is an assured in- come for life, a device to protect the dignity of the service, assuring the manners of the gentleman as against the "underbred" ways of the ungraded masses. Diplomatic training, indeed, consists largely in a knowledge of the customs of foreign courts. The diplomacy of the world has traditionally concerned itself with dynasties and courts, to the utter neglect of the opinions and aspirations of the common people. This is a more or less natural result of the fact that an NATIONALISM 33 ambassador at a foreign court deals with oflficials only, not with parliaments, still less with the people at large. The diplomat's historic duty is to advance the in- terests of his own state. He is usually controlled by tradition and not by any agreed code of morals. The notable dynastic diplomatists of the last century, Bismarck, Disraeli, Metternich, Talleyrand even, knew no limiting considerations. Achieving their purposes, the end was held to justify the means. The existence of individual exceptions, men whose char- acter rose above their official duties, does not modify the general rule. Diplomatic history is, as a whole, a record of per- sistent futihty and intrigue, checked mainly by the fear that a diplomatic slip will be followed by im- mediate disaster. At the best, diplomatists are not judges of equity but advocates employed to win. The tragedy is that the fate of millions may hang on a single sentence. Men whose personal opinions are of no high consequence often conduct diplomatic exchanges which raise issues to imperil a continent. And it is unfortunately true that many diplomatic notes assume the form of veiled threats. The essential danger in modem diplomacy lies in the fact that disagreements between diplomatists may be construed as quarrels between nations. Ac- cording to the duelist's code (by which governments have been thus far largely actuated), diplomatic dis- putes, especially in dynastic states, lead toward ordeal by battle. The results of international differences may thus be terribly disproportionate to the alleged causes. 24 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS The greatest need in Europe today is the candid diplomacy wMch is the tradition of the United States.^ The peoples will never have justice until they have made themselves masters of the little group of mystery-makers whose intrigues in the name of diplomacy deal with the issue of war and peace as the gods of old played with the fate of mortals. (Alfred G. Gardiner, Pillars of Society.) Modern diplomacy is blamed for its secrecy. In secret, a few men may dispose of the fortunes, happi- ness, and lives of millions not consulted at any time. Even public treaties have been emasculated or unduly extended by private understandings between diplo- mats. Nations have been committed to unwelcome or even ruinous policies by secret deals. While open diplomacy might sometimes be embarrassing or fail in critical cases, secret understandings in the hands of narrow-minded men may bring on world calamities. It is, of course, urged that international bargaining would be impossible if every stage of the process were open to the world. A well-known diplomatist is quoted as saying, in effect: "Secrecy is necessary, because if I do not keep my diplomacy secret from the British nation, no foreign diplomat will ever again tell me his secrets." The evil goes deeper than the surface. The details must be kept from the people when the people are to be betrayed. Or it may be that some unexpected or ■ The term "shirt sleeves diplomacy" as applied to frank statements of fact by Americans arose in connection with a note written in 1895 by Hon. John W. Foster and signed by the Secretary of State, calling the atten- tion of the British Government to the actual conditions of the Alaska Fur Seal Herd, tor the depletion of which British (Canadian) citizens were re- sponsible. NATIONALISM 25 unfair advantage over one's rivals is contemplated. But sound international relations cannot be built up in this way. Any real advantage must be mutual gain.. Friendly relations demand cooperation, and cooperation requires openness. Competition re- quires secrecy. But cooperation and mutual trust are essential to real statesmanship. In the modern revolt against secret diplomacy it is of course not expected that every conversation should be made public. Delicate adjustments cannot be made through the megaphone. But all decisions which pledge a nation's future should not only be made public, but also be approved by a body representative of the people. For while several good treaties have been frustrated by the non-concurrence of the United States Senate, doubtless as many bad ones have been swamped in running the gantlet of publicity. In Europe, however, no similar provision has been made, and secret treaties have often caused wide- spread dismay when brought to light. Were they just, they need not have been secret. "It is not the secrecy of the diplomacy but the diplomacy which has to be kept secret with which we are concerned. . . . Whether a man can tell the world what he is after depends entirely on what kind of thing he is after." ^ Not long ago there were published certain telegrams which passed before the war between the Emperor of Germany and the Czar of Russia. In their trickery, selfishness, and futility, these interchanges, signed by the childish names of "Willy" and "Nicky," il- lustrate alike the evils of secret diplomacy and of 1 Editorial, War and Peace, December, 1917. 26 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS dynastic control. Were it not for the terrible issues involved, one might assert that nothing more comical has appeared in history. The fundamental fault of current diplomacy, however, does not Ue at all in its temporary concealments, but rather in the fact that most of its traditions are drawn from autocratic re- gimes, in which the diplomatist is the servant of a single individual with no responsibility to his own nation or to humanity. At the same time, it must be admitted that the diplomatic record of democratic states is by no means free from blunders, confusions, and even secret schemes, but open discussion tends to clear the air. In traditional diplomacy an action unquestionably wrong is often diplomatically held to be right as a function of the state. Such a dual standard of morals cannot longer be accepted. It springs from the old conception of the state's absolute sovereignty, which is held to raise it above all moral questions. In the words of Gladstone, "What is morally wrong cannot be politically right." Supplementing the ordinary resources of recognized diplomacy, every dynastic state has found necessary an elaborate system of underground intrigue. Secret agents are supposed to fear nothing and to have no moral scruples. These individuals have been of all types, — men, women, courtiers, scholars, men of the world, common brigands, or murderers. Their value is conditioned on success. As a rule they know no nationality, and their services are at the disposal of those who can pay most. NATIONALISM 27 At the outbreak of the present war, this branch of the dynastic spy-system was almost as highly developed as the military organization which it supplemented. Its general purpose, in peace as in war, is to stir up dis- cord in other nations, to win advantage of any sort, to worm out secrets, and to gain possession of state papers. To attain such ends the commission of any crime was justified by success. Accredited ambas- sadors and consular agents of dynastic nations, the recognized channels of diplomacy, were often in charge of lawless secret operations. NATIONALISM AND PATRIOTISM In feudal days patriotism consisted mainly in loyalty to chief or lord. As time went on, the growth of cities and the grouping of feudal holdings into the provinces extended correspondingly the range of patriotism. Later, as by alliance and conquest variously related holdings ripened into nations, so loyalty and patriotism became by degrees not personal, local, or provincial, but national. For with the extension of travel and experience and the expansion of governmental units, has developed that community of feeling and comradery of effort which forms the basis of patriotism. War has been defined as the clash of rival patriot- isms. There is, however, no inherent reason why patriotism should be an incentive to war or be expressed in terms of unfriendliness to other nations. It is, moreover, no part of true patriotism to condone the shortcomings of one's own nation or to be blind to its mistakes. An adequate expression of patriotism was that of Carl Schurz in 1848: "For my country when 28 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS: she is in the right ; if wrong, then every effort to make her right again." Patriotism naturally begins at home, involving primarily good-will toward one's neighbor. But it should extend and entrench itself beyond the boimd- aries of city or province, to embrace the whole nation and in a degree the whole world. Love of home and family does not preclude devotion to the state. Nor does the most whole-souled love of country abridge the broadest humanitarianism. Thus "planetary patriotism" must be the final goal, and the boundaries set up by a narrow nativism must be considered temporary and crude. This process of widening sympathy, begun so long ago, acquires a steadily increasing momentimi, and nationalism, itself the successor of feudalism, becomes in reality a step- ping-stone toward the broader relations of interna- tionalism and federation.^ We are moving on from the English race, the Irish race, the German race, the Russian and French and all other races, and we are advancing slowly but surely to the Human race. (Michael Monahan.) ' Says Heinrich Heine : "We were ordered to be patriots and we were patriots, for we did all that our rulers bade us. But this patriotism must not be confounded with the feelings which bear the same name in France. To a Frenchman patriotism means that his heart is warmed, that this warmth extends and diffuses itself, that his love embraces not only his immediate belongings, but the whole of France, the whole of the civilized world. A German's patriotism . . . means that his heart contracts, that it shrinks like leather in the cold, that he hates all that is foreign, that he is no more a citizen of the world, no more a European, but only a narrow German. . . . Thus began that mean, coarse, uncultured opposition to a sentiment, the highest and noblest Germany has begotten, that (of) uni- versal brotherhood." (Quoted by Holme, The Nemesis of Docility, page 84.) NATIONALISM 29 Thus shall be realized the noble words of Goethe : "Above all nations is humanity." CULTTJRE MORE THAN NATIONAL The spirit of national solidarity sometimes degen- erates into mere racial prejudice and embitterment. This is likely to be especially pronounced when peoples of diflEerent race or custom inhabit a common district. For in such case the differences are matters of daily observation and friction. Race prejudice is often most virulent when it begins at home. Racial tolerance demands a certain degree of breadth of mind. One of the chief elements in culture is the maintenance of friendly relations with people different from ourselves. The best evidence of culture, as Schiller asserts, is respect for the liberty of others, with the capacity to put oneself in another's place. European culture is essentially a unit with many branches and many roots, each nation, large or small, contributing its part, the whole having deep sources in the theology of Palestine and the philosophy of Greece. Civilized peoples all over the world form a fellowship from which no element could be spared. NATIONALISM AND "NATIONALITIES" One of the most perplexing modem problems is that of the proper adjustment of the rights and claims of subject nationalities. Every empire contains subju- gated groups whose national existence has been sup- pressed by the progress of imperial expansion. The great diflSculty arises from the supposed necessity of 30 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS assimilation by the larger or imperial group and the assumption that this is to be accomplished only by enforced uniformity. Such a process involves the overriding of the rights of minorities and disregard within the nation of the basic principle of justice; that is, equality before the law. Almost every sub- jugated nationality has had its ideals submerged or perverted, even its language and its ordinary customs being forcibly repressed. Insistence on uniformity has been taken for granted in almost every empire. The consequent unrest of subject nationalities is due not wholly or even chiefly to ambition for political independence, but rather to the compelling instinct for local home rule. The situation is usually aggravated by rankling indig- nities, ranging in importance from the "pin-pricks" suffered for forty years by Alsace-Lorraine (terribly aggravated since the war began) to the recurrent massacres which have desolated Armenia and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire. If a minor nationality can be made to feel that the government under which it lives is in some large sense its own, most forms of unrest will disappear. Difference of race is not a primary cause of dissension, nor difference in language or religion, but inequalities in relation to the governing power. Give the people some stake in the administration, and their political loyalty will be aroused. There are at present upwards of a score of national- ities calling more or less coherently for relief.^ Among ' The case of Ireland differs from any of the others because her obstacles to home rule arise from within, in persistent discords among her own people. NATIONALISM SI them are Poland, Lithuania, Jugoslavia (Croatia, Slavonia, etc.)> Alsace-Lorraine, Finland, Ukrainia (Ruthenia), Bohemia, Armenia, Syria, Palestine, Persia, Macedonia. Albania, Arabia, Morocco, Egypt, India, Korea, and the PhiUppines stand in a different category as unstable or backward countries which have been held to need a degree of restraint for their own good. To grant national independence to all these under present conditions might throw Central and Eastern Europe into the anarchy of the Middle Ages. The real remedy in most cases is to be found in autonomy, local self-government, freedom of language and reli- gion, — in a word, equality before the law. Every great war of the past has left an aftermath of oppression and injustice. Most imrest is the re- sult of some previous effort to bring order through force. Political wrongs can be remedied in one of two ways, — by restitution or by conciliation. The first looks backward to the removal of causes, the second forward to the elimination of effects. The first is not always possible, the second is contrary to the usual nationalistic spirit. But one or both are necessary for permanent peace, which requires that old wounds, if not healed, must be soothed in new tolerance and justice. Every sincere effort to give people the form of government they covet will tend to make the world a more orderly and livable place. Trouble is threatened whenever one group considers itself oppressed by foreigners. It is Utopian to hope to eradicate all the discontent which has grown up about these aspirations for national unity, . . . but an immense amount might — with sincere effort — be accomplished. (Bullard.) 32 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS For fifty and more years the Germans have tried in vain to assimilate the Alsatians, the Danes in Flens- burg, and the Poles in Posen. The reason for failure is that the Prussian government has offered dis- cipline instead of freedom. The fatal word "Ero- berung" (conquest) has always stood in the way of understanding. There can be no loyalty under the lash. Germans as a rule fail to understand the loyalty of South Africa to the British Empire after the un- fortunate and unjustified Boer War of conquest. As a matter of fact. South Africa was treated humanly and thus bound by the cement of good-will instead of by force and discipline.^ It is not natural to the dynastic system to develop a Stein, a Humboldt, or a Turgot. It is a strange men- taHty which finds "honor and glory" in holding a fine- spirited, highly civilized body of people against its will in political and social subjugation. In a recent international conference at Berne, in November, 1917, referring to the existence of mixed nationalities as in Switzerland and Austria, it was unanimously declared that these states with mixed populations might even present advan- tages above those consisting of but one nationality and might contribute largely to the establishment of friendly terms between ' " ' Cricket and football, not too patriotic, and a vote, and let them con- spire if they want to, and the soldiers are chummy.' 'Ach, we cannot do that. It is a matter of national temperament, I suppose ; but it is sad, very sad. Here in five years you pacify your enemy and in forty years we have not begun to pacify ours ; it is a constant fear, a constant terror, one expects every day to hear that war has broken out.' " (Remarks of a Ger- man lady, quoted by Anne Topham, Memoirs of the Kaiser's Court, page 148.) NATIONALISM 33 various nationalities. It is, however, of vital importance for the development of a state with mixed populations that none of the nationalities residing there should be oppressed. In other words, their manners, rehgion, and language should be respected and force should not be used to bring them into conformity in speech or discipline with the dominant group. The plea of the absolute necessity of conformity made by the dynastic states is incompatible with justice or freedom. The theory of the rights of nationaUties or even of nations is a new factor in international affairs. The rights of nations were not even mentioned at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. The idea has grown to the point where it has forced itself on the attention of practical statesmen. Some of them, with every show of sincerity, have accepted it as a watchword. But it. has not grown to full maturity. No government of Europe accepts it without qualifications. . . . Violations of it by the dip- lomatic map-drawers, instead of being the rule, will be the ex- ception.i To every rational proposition for the relief of re- pressed nationalities, the objection is traditionally made that this would be "an intolerable violation of sovereignty." Says Brailsford: That may be true, but sovereignty in the old obsolete sense of the word is the very principle of anarchy, and no reading of it which in the last resort forbids the intervention of the collective con- science to redress gross wrongs to nationaUty can on a long view be consistent with European peace. To forbid intervention today is to invite war tomorrow. The settlement of all the present nationality prob- lems in Europe might be made possible through the adoption by all nations of Brailsford's formula : 1 Arthur Bullard, Diplomacy of the Great War, pages 176-177. 34 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS The signatory powers, convinced that the interests of peace require the free cultural development, irrespective of politi/c^l allegiance, of all the races of Europe, hereby declare that they will not in their European territories impose any political or civil dis- abilities on the ground of race or religion, and further, that in their European territories they will accord to every race reasonable facilities and rights for the use of its language, for the development of schools in which its language is the chief medium of instruction, for every form of association consistent with the order of the state, and for the free exercise of its religion. On June 29, 1916, the "Union of Nationalities" in session at Lausanne sent the following telegram to President Wilson : No peace may last or deserve to last which does not recognize and accept the principle that governments receive all their powers from the consent of the people governed. There exists no right anywhere permitting the transfer of people from potentate to po- tentate as if they were a property. At this meeting twenty-three nationalities were repre- sented, those already enumerated above and several others. Their message involves the application of dem- ocratic ideas to repressed nationalities. Its adoption would be in the interest of justice and peace, although reversing all historic precedent. NATIONALITIES AND THE RIGHT OF CONQUEST The assumed "right of conquest" is a dynastic conception which rational society must reject. It rests on the precept that might makes right or on its sophistical equivalents, and is repugnant to the unperverted moral sense of mankind. As war is manslaughter on a large scale, so forcible annexation is an expanded form of robbery. NATIONALISM 35 The right of a people to reject the demands of mili- tary necessity and the outcome of the fortunes of war is rigorously upheld by the greatest of German philosophers, Immanuel Kant. Says Kant : A state is not a possession or a patrimony like the soil on which it has its seat. It is a human society, subject to the authority and disposition of none but itself. Since it has its own roots, to incorporate it as a graft into another state is to take away its ex- istence as a moral entity and to make of it a thing. This contra- dicts the idea of the original compact, without which no authority over a people can be conceived. Everybody knows into what danger, even in the most recent times, the supposed right of thus acquiring territory has brought Europe. This has been looked upon as a new Mud of iudustry. The great argument against this "industry" lies in its fundamental injustice, besides which, moreover, it threatens the very stability of society. The con- quest and retention of any civilized state involves an assault on the well-being of all. The conquered people at once encounter serious interference with their man- ners and customs. This they naturally resent, and their resentment intrudes on the established discipline of the victor. Both these conditions resulted from the seizure of Alsace-Lorraine, making the region on the one hand "the nightmare of Europe" {le cauchemar de r Europe) and on the other "the wound in the side" (la plaie dans les flancs) of the great empire to which it was forcibly imited. Whatever the motive of such annexations, the re- sults are disastrous. It leads to dissatisfaction in the smaller group and to disunion in the larger. The argiunent for forcible annexation often assumes that 36 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS to guarantee future peace, a fringe of alien territory must be held to safeguard the border. The creation of so-called buffer states may indeed from a mili- tary and strategic standpoint serve the ends of securing the national boimdary, but the experiment of securing peace by such conquest has been tried several times in history and it has failed each time. . . . Peace insurance by conquest is one of the greatest fallacies in history. It is distinctly and naturally disadvantageous to both victor and vanquished. Instead of insuring the peace, it neces- sarily defeats that end, since out of it grows the inevitable desire for wars of revenge. . . . To make a country secure from attack is a shallow phrase used over and over again as an excuse for the crime of large-scale robbery. (Dr. John Mez.) The attempt at adjusting a scientific frontier leaves a boundary marked by dissatisfaction, suspicion, and hate. The map of Europe must be changed, no doubt; that is not the main thing, however, but the change in the inner organization of the States ; for on this, not on the map, hangs the welfare of the people. ("Siegfried Balder.") The general law which should govern the disposi- tion of disputed territories, I have elsewhere formulated as follows : No right of conquest shall be recognized and no military neces- sity to the prejudice of neutral people or neutral nations. No annexation nor transfer of territory shall be made by force or as a result of war or conquest. In case a problem of transfer of allegiance should concern a homogeneous civilized district accustomed to self-government, no transfer shall be made except in accordance with the will of the people expressed by secret ballot and without duress, the basis of suffrage being preferably "one man, one vote." In due time, such proceeding must involve the votes of women as well.' • Annexation and Conquest : RecueU dea Rapporti. Organisation Cen- trale pour une Paix Durable, I, page 28, The Hague, 1916. IV THE DYNASTIC STATE It is hard to free fools from the chains they revere. — Voltaibe IN contrast to the democratic organization toward which civilization is tending is presented in the following pages a brief analysis of the dynastic state as represented in its most exalted modern development, the German Empire. The term dynasty is applied to a series of indi- viduals who by inheritance rule over the lives, prop- erties, and destinies of other men. In general, in- heritance accords with the law of primogeniture, all hereditary rights and privileges being allotted to the eldest son, the people concerned having, usually, no voice in the matter of the succession. Under the term dynastic caste should be included, as Fernau has pointed out,^ not only those who by inheritance control their fellows but in addition all others dependent on dynastic support or favor. The dynastic state comprises, therefore, all the various satellites, parasites, favorites, princes, princelings, lords, and junkers who bask in "the divine prerogative" of the throne or lurk behind it. Inherited power maintains itself by force, its hold being strengthened by victory, and waning in inaction. Hence foreign war, actual or threatened, is to the dynasty a perennial necessity. It is the ".swift remedy for disunion or waning patriotism." It uproots the "noxious weeds" (democracy, socialism, internation- ' For an illuminating discussion of dynastic operations, see Fernau : The Coming Democracy (Durchl Zur Demokratie), Chapters II, III, V. 37 38 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS alism, anti-militarism) which spring up profusely in the soil of peace and choke the dynastic garden. Ab- solutism and war can never be dissociated. "The use of force goes hand in hand with the autocratic state." "So long as entrenched power exists, it will use the state for its own purposes." To pick a quarrel out- side arouses within a multitude of primitive passions of which a despot can make use. THE DYNASTIC SYSTEM At the present day, the dynastic system exists in perfect development in Germany alone. Under strong hands, notably those of Bismarck, it has gathered to itself all the accumulated resources of science, making even the highest arts of peace contributory to war. Determined to insure the permanence of what he called "monarchical order," — that is, dynastic control be- yond the reach of popular movements, — Bismarck developed the present organization of Germany, made possible by the prestige of military success at Sedan and Paris. As a final result, matters are so adjusted that under a show of popular suffrage the people, nevertheless, have legally no power to accomplish anything against the will of the king of Prussia ; that is, every movement not originating with the ruling class is checked somewhere by veto. The German state was armed for offense and defense against outside force as no nation was ever armed before. It is equally buttressed within against its own people. It cares nothing for majorities or minorities, for both are alike politically helpless. Never before has absolutism been so effectively fortified. THE DYNASTIC STATE 39 With the hereditary ruler rests the final right of veto. The Bundesrat or Federal Council, the actual legis- lative body, is a creature of the Prussian king and his associates, kings, princes, and princelings. The Reichs- tag or Imperial Parliament, elected by popular vote, has only a semblance of authority. It is, ia fact, scarcely more than a debating society, a sort of safety valve by which the oligarchy may determine the amount of pressiure the people will stand. The Prussian Parliament or Landtag represents money, not manhood, and is as little like a popular assembly as any voting organization could possibly be. It is understood that popular or constitutional rights, of whatever sort, arise not from the people but as grants of the crown, favors handed down by the invisible state, through its visible representative, the king. In no other nation would a popular revolution be beset with so great difficulties. Revolt within the law is impossible, because, all acts of the government being legalized beforehand, every effort at opposition becomes unlawful. Revolt outside the law, to succeed, must be almost a universal uprising. The army, with its machine guns to bark in every city square, leaves small chance for insurgence. As a matter of fact, the Supreme State itself passes under the control of the force it creates ; the dominant power for the most part lies with the army. Civil authority lapses wherever and whenever it conflicts with the military. The king of Prussia is perforce a "war-lord," his General Staff being the real power behind the throne in international affairs; the Kaiser is thus at once the agent and the victim of the situa- 40 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS tion. An autocratic state is perforce always more or less under martial law. Other lands may possess an army (said a Prussian oflScer), the army possesses Germany. (Even) the Bundesrat is hardly, if at all, more powerful than the General Staff. ... It (the latter) stands outside and it stands above (civil authority). In Prussia, the army is a kingdom within a kingdom. . . . No authority can inter- vene between the army and the sovereign. . . . The army is not the army of the nation, but is the king's army.* "The dearest desire of every Prussian," said Von Bethmann-HoUweg, " is to see the king's army remain completely under the control of the king and not become the army of Parliament." As long as this condition endures, German civil authority yielding under the weight of militarism, itself in turn in full alliance with "big business," the peace of the world cannot be secure. The Germany of 1914 was an autocratic state perfectly organized with all the resources of science available for its purposes, and dominated by a single aim, the resultant of an alliance between unbounded greed and invincible militarism. The German state, bound by statutes and constitution (not law, but semblances of law decreed from above) more tightly than was ever nation before, stands by this very fact in opposition to all (positive or man-made) law.* It constitutes a sort of anti-law, comparable to the Antichrist imagiaed by theologians as a gigantic power opposed to Christianity. ' Charles Downer Hazen, The Government of Germany. 'Kant has expressed a similar thought: "Every form of government which is not representative is, properly speaking, not a form of govern- ment at all, because one and the same person (cannot) be a lawgiver and at the same time the executive administrator of the lawgivers. . . ." THE DYNASTIC STATE 41 To justify this inordinately concentrated system, the German mind demands a philosophic basis. Accord- ingly, in the interest of special pleading for a fact ac- complished, three philosophical conceptions have been conjured up. These are Der Stoat, or Supreme Dominion ; Kultur,^ or Supreme Discipline ; and Social Darwinism, or, as it may be termed, The Supreme Call to Action. "der staat" The Supreme State of Hegel and his followers is figured to exist as an radependent entity, over and above the people subject to it. It is a sublime and eternal reality which can do no wrong because above it sits no lawgiver or master. It overarches the nation as the sky spans the earth. To its people it guarantees prosperity and justice through its own perfection. " The state protects and embraces the life of the people, regulating it externally in all directions." It is the benevolent shepherd who sees that his sheep are well cared for, housed, cherished, and defended with no effort or anxiety on their part. In all this they are not consulted; neither are they when duly shorn. That the dynastic view of the state may be justly set forth, I quote the following detailed presentation from Dr. Eduard Meyer,^ professor of history in the University of Berlin : ' Kultur must not be confounded with "culture" (derived directly from the French), which implies that refinement of manner and mind induced by an intelligent and sympathetic familiarity with the thoughts and achieve- ments of lands and ages other than one's own. * England, Its Political Organization and Development; part of the trans- lation being from the original by J. M. Robertson, the rest from the Amer- ican edition. 42 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS England and the United States have no conception of the idea of the state as it has been evolved on the Continent in relation to the regal power. For us, not only in political thought, but inti- mately in the experience of every citizen, the state is the highest expression of the collective unity of all the powers of the people included in the boimdaries of the realm in active eflSciency, the indispensable expression of the life and activity of every individual, and therefore entitled and bound to secure from each the fullest devotion for the carrying out of its task. . . . To us the state is the most indispensable as well as the highest requisite to our earthly existence, not with regard to oiu" political welfare alone, but to the daUy life and activity of the individual as well, uniting, as it does, the entire population dwelling within the utmost limits of its jurisdiction in wholesome activity for the general good; we therefore believe it to be worthy of as well as entitled to the entire devotion of every citizen, in honorable effort to further its purposes. All individualistic endeavor, of which there is no lack with us too, as well as the aspirations of those shattered foreign nationalities that are included within the bound- aries of our state, must be unreservedly subordinated to this lofty claim. On the other hand, the state, through its organ, the government, also has its high obligation to fulfill, i.e., to hold itself free and unprejudiced, above the influence of the individualistic aspirations of persons and classes, of industrial combinations and political parties, and, unaffected by these, to promote the interests and solve the problems that concern the entire nation, and to carry them to a successful issue in spite of the antagonism of all opposing elements. ... It is something much higher than any of these groups and infinitely more than merely the aggregate of all the individuals included in it; it has a life of its own; its task is unending; its existence is in theory — if it be not destroyed by force from outside — eternal, all generations, backwards and forwards, cooperating toward a unity, to a mighty historical entity. This idea of the state, which with us is boimd up with our flesh and blood, is not only unknown to the English constitution, but is wholly alien to the thought of the Englishman and also of the American.* ' " The British care much for their country, little for their state." (Ches- terton.) THE DYNASTIC STATE 43 As a matter of fact, the state thus philosophically conceived can have no real existence. Its people are at the mercy of those dynastic favorites who have in one way or another gained control of the reins of power. Theoretically impersonal, it becomes, in actual prac- tice, intensely personal and correspondingly selfish. Rule by divine right is a phantom without objective reality. If such right exists, there are no tests to prove it, and in all the ages its claim has been the shelter of the grossest sins of pretense, brutality, and sensuality. While a dynastic state may provide for rigid justice within any one caste, it provides no assurance of justice between one caste and another held below it in political stratification. There can be no real peace within the state so long as it recognizes the presence of distinct classes, each entitled to a diflEerent sort of justice. It is a curious fact of human nature, that the populace will be willing to go to extremes in defense of a philosophical formula it may not understand (and which may in fact have no meaning at all) rather than for some rational or tangible demand for action. The divine prerogative, especially as it concerns the state, appeals to the average man, and with more force than the realities of social justice or even of personal in- terest. There still remains in each nation some trace of the instinct to follow a leader of the in-group against all out-groups. Thus the "opinions of a sovereign have a mystical importance" out of all pro- portion to their actual worth. A cloud of words and a flurry of hereditary emotions befog our thinking so long as we use metaphors which belong to the dynastic period of European history. (H. W. Massingham, 1912.) 44 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS The modernizing of the philosophy of the dynastic state, according to Professor Herman Fernau, was largely the work of the philosopher Hegel. He did not attempt to reestablish on earth the gods that the French encyclopedists and Kant had hurled to the ground. Hegel's doctrine that the state is a divine entity and that man is not an end in himself, but only a brick in the state fabric that does not know what it wants, became the root idea of that Prussianism which finally triumphed under Bismarck. In his learned and elegant though obscure style, Hegel supplemented to such good purpose the somewhat brutal and mediaeval principles of Mettemich, that he was made a Prussian state philosopher and overwhelmed with honors. ... A doctrine may be ever so obscure and ever so pedantic, yet if it obtains official sanction, it is sure to find a host of youthful enthusiasts and be proclaimed in the journals, univer- sities, and drawing-rooms as the acme of political wisdom. . . . All those German intellectuals who sympathized with the French Revolution and regarded the individual as an end in himself and political freedom as the foundation of all culture were outlawed and persecuted. . . . Young Germany never reached man's estate. (Fernau, The Coming Democracy, 1917, pages 161, 162.) Says Vernon Kellogg, — The individual official in the autocratic state in matters of ad- ministration must give up all of the thinking, all of the feeling, all of the conscience that might be characteristic of him as an indi- vidual, a free man, a separate soul made sacred by the touch of the Creator. And this to accept the control and standards of an impersonal, intangible, inhuman, great, cold fabric made of logic and casuistry and utter cruelty called the state — or often, for purposes of deception, the Fatherland. There is a Fatherland in Germany, but it is not the German state. It is German soil and German ancestry, but not the horrible desensualized, superorganic state machine built and managed by a few ego-maniacs of incredible selfishness and of utter callousness to the sufferings, bodily and mental, of their own as well as any other people in their range of contact. {Headquarters Nights.) THE DYNASTIC STATE 45 " Siegfried Balder " thus appeals to his fellow citizens : Your German Fatherland does not fall even if the Imperial Government and the governments of the twenty-six federated states should go to the devil. There are strong men enough for defense in every storm. To act against its government is far from opposing one's Fatherland.' The Hegelian conception of the state as a cold- hearted monster is very far removed from the demo- cratic view of a group of cooperating communities held together for mutual welfare and rided by shifting majorities to whom the minorities yield their wills but not their opinions. The Supreme State knows nothing of majorities or minorities. If the people are satisfied, well and good, but contented or not, they are both fed and shorn. To the Hegelians the demo- cratic state seems weak and sordid, with no trace of supernal origin. Its ideals and purposes are those of the market-place, they assert. Perhaps so; its de- fects are inherent in its individual units. No govern- ment can be better than the people demand. But as men build up the state, the state in turn builds up men. For democracy is the great training school in civics, a laboratory in politics, through which alone just government may be finally possible. Democracy is not a set of devices. ... It is not a thing to be enacted, not a goal to be attained and enjoyed. . . . Democracy is a method of progress. It is faith, unproved like other faiths, but with heartening gleams of promise, a faith in a common humanity. (Frederick D. Bramhall, Democracy, the Basis for World Order.) 1 "Eiier deutsehes Vaterland stiirtzt nicht wenn avch die Reiehsregierung und die seeks und zwanzig Bundesstaatsregierungen zum Teufel gehen. Es hat noch Starke Manner genug, die es in alien Stiirmen zum Trotze halten werden. Wer gegen seine Regierung handelt desshalb noch lange nicht gegen sein Vaterland." 46 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS Bad as government by the people may sometimes be, — lax, tyrannical, corrupt, — no other system dealing with the same elements could be any better. Where the people fail to control, some one else does, seizing the lapsed sovereignty for his own personal advantage. No dynastic government, however orderly or eflScient in appearance, was ever just in fact. Rule by privilege is fair on the surface only. At heart it is selfish, sensual, and corrupt. In the Supreme State, the people impinge nowhere on authority. But the "mighty historical entity" would be only a futile abstraction were there no way by which it could impinge on the people. The Dynasty forms the necessary intermediary. This must be absolute, else not infallible; infallibility and impec- cability must inhere somewhere, otherwise the con- ception falls of its own weight. A superhuman state cannot be imagined as wicked or foolish. Whether perfection finally resides in the ruler or in the state itself has long been a disputed question. One or the other, the king or the state, can do no wrong. But all this is a matter of words. The state in any case executes either the will of the throne or of the power behind it, and neither the one nor the other is all-wise or unselfish. As a matter of fact, the Supreme State, however exalted in theory, becomes in practice only the cloak to cover the follies and sins of the abso- lute monarch and the sycophants, satellites, and " saber- rattlers" by whom he is surrounded and smothered. TJnser Kbnig absohd Wenn er unseren WiUen thiit. • * Out King absolute If he does our will. THE DYNASTIC STATE 47 The stronger a government in the conventional sense, the weaker it must be in consistent civic purpose. For absolutism, constantly honeycombed by intrigue, like a pier honeycombed by Teredo, finds its opponents within its own environment. The Supreme State loses all dignity when one looks behind the scenes to the machinery by which it wreaks its poUcies. The real political struggle in an absolutism goes on in the shadow of the throne. (F. J. Bramhall.) But this machine is a Frankenstein that will turn on its own creators and work their destruction, together with its own. Such sacrifice and stultification of human personality as national control by such a machine requires, can have no permanence in a world moving certainly, even if hesitatingly and deviously, toward in- dividualism and the recognition of personal values. (Kellogg.) The "efficiency" commonly ascribed to the dynastic state is by no means a necessary or permanent resultant of that form of government. Seldom is an able des- pot succeeded by another of his kind. Frederick the Great was followed by Frederick William the Fat; Louis "XTV the Magnificent by Louis XV, feeble and dissolute, the Well-Beloved to his parasites and syco- phants. William II is likely to be succeeded by a young man admirably fitted by nature and education to be the last of a dynasty. Here enters the indispensable doctrine of "Legiti- macy," older than any particular theory of the state, but always using for its support some form of the conception of Divine Right. Its essence is the es- tablishment of the right to supreme rule on the part of the heir of the preceding monarch. Notwithstanding its dynastic application, the doc- 48 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS trine of legitimacy belongs to the domain of "Positive Law" (that is, man-made legislation) and represents an effort to preserve the people at large from the rule of force. It was manifest that an arbitrary choice of ruler would be better for everybody than to let the land become the battleground of reckless aspirants. KULTUB The philosophy of Kultur or Supreme Discipline, the ideal of Aristocracy and Plutocracy alike, has found its most notable advocate in the late Professor Heinrich von Treitschke of the University of Berlin. It involves the care and regimentation of the people, as wards of the state, in industrial as well as in military relations. It requires a social system in which each man has a place, is officially protected therein, and aspires to no other. Each does his part, knowing nothing of the final purpose to which he contributes. The system represents the military ideal brought over into civil life. Under it the government undertakes to train each male for a suitable vocation (commonly that of his forebears), to place him then in a position of usefulness, and, further, to make stu-e that he stays put. For the common man it means patient service at low wages without hope of advancement, but with the final reward of insurance and old-age pension, the cost of which, however, is deducted in installments from his regular earnings and will be more or less com- pletely forfeited if he breaks loose anywhere. In a word, he gives up freedom for security, while the in- crement from his work goes to exalt the "privileged classes " in their system of predatory paternalism. THE DYNASTIC STATE 49 The keynote to the whole system is found in the phrase, "Dienst, Ordnung, Kraft," — "Service, Co- ordination, Power," or, as Professor Patten interprets it, "Service, Conformity, and Achievement." Each one is expected, nay forced, to serve ; impulse to serv- ice comes from above. Each one conforms to the prearranged or traditional status and methods of his class. The final result is mass-eflSciency, the eflSciency of regimented numbers, in industry as well as in war. Mass-efficiency of this type demands insistently the docility of the populace. Such a reaction to au- thority is at once the cause and the symptom of in- dividual dullness, and by its lack of emphasis on self- restraint lends itself readily to lawlessness when the bars are removed. Moreover, the more docile a people under orders, the more tyrannical they are as individuals to those below them or in their power. It is a common tendency to "pass the kick along." Docility does not mean gentleness ; the docile army commits the most atrocities. For when moral responsibility is assumed by authority,^ the lid once off, the tendency of the individual is to follow his own passions. "Violence is the tragedy of the will." Many of the bloodiest tyrants in history have been personally weak and vacillating, unable to make up their minds to any rational plan of action. The mass efficiency of Supreme Discipline stands in sharp contrast to personal efficiency, the skill and ^ "Under such i^gime the morals of a nation might well sink at last to the level of those of a well-disciplined pirate crew, who served their captain with such zeal and devotion that they were ready to rob and ravish and murder at his bidding.'' (Holme.) 50 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS initiative which make ready for all adventures, through the discipline which the individual voluntarily enforces on himself. To take a concrete illustration, the work done in Belgium by Herbert Hoover and his associates, American university men, the greatest ever accom- plished by members of one nation for another, could not have been conceived or carried out or even un- derstood by men reared in the "brassbound and hide- bound " system of Kultur. It is the individual man who moves the world, not the class or the mass, how- ever perfectly either may be regimented. Industrial regimentation serves the same purpose as military, from which it is inseparable. Without it, no military domination can be complete. It substitutes mass- power for initiative, and satisfied docility for that freedom which each man must win for himself, and which is the first essential in democracy. A static condition of industrial content in which personal de- velopment remains the restricted privilege of the few is (however disguised) a servile conception. No degree of mass-eflSciency can atone for its cramping effect on personality and its repression of individual initiative. Through individual freedom and self-imposed obedience democracy reaches its final aim of justice. Contrasted with the democratic ideal stand the three duties of the German citizen, "Soldat sein, Steuer zahlen. Maul halten." (Be a soldier, pay taxes, hold your tongue.) Efficiency through conformity enforced from above is not confined to the laborers and peasants of the land : it runs through all the varied castes in German society. A junker must grow up a junker, with the manners, ambitions, and methods of his caste. Eveni THE DYNASTIC STATE 51 kings are held to their r6les. The Kaiser himself breaks with tradition at his own risk. "Every man in Germany is like a dog on a long chain ; let him bark or jump, the chain is there." The heart of Kultur is national efficiency and mass-power, coordinated and subordinated teamwork, never individual devel- opment. When people are heavily governed, where their lives are com- pulsorily regulated in minute detail, when commands and pro- hibitions meet them at every turn and when the state in order to facilitate the work of admmistration tries to get control of the organs of public opinion and the springs of social and moral action, then indeed the loss of public freedom may mean the loss of inward freedom, and the loss of inward freedom may mean spiritual death. (Edward Holme, The Nemesis of Docility.) Public opinion in Germany has only a relative importance. It is, moreover, created by the men in command. ... It is an orchestra of which the conductor is the government itself, and the Pangermans, the most stirring element in it, are allowed only a limited sphere of action. (Alfred Kerr ; quoted by Bourdon.) SOCIAL DARWINISM The third element in dynastic philosophy is Social Darwinism,^ implying not only the survival of the fittest state, but, in addition, its supreme duty to sub- due or destroy inferiors. This gives to Kultur its motive purpose. It begins with a series of scientific assumptions, then turns on them the "categorical * "D'un c6U Darwin mal interpriU, de V autre la prestige deM.de Bis- marck ont fait nattre une nouvelle icole de thioriciens qui refomt I'histoire d lew maniire. . . . Voili pourquoi on trouve dans I'histoire la confirmation des ays^mes les plus itrangea ielos dam Vimagination la plus Mzarre." 52 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS imperative," thus transforming alleged facts of ex- istence into national duty. Social Darwinism or call to duty is related to real Darwinism only in name. The theory which Darwin set forth estab- lishes the descent of present-day organisms — men, animals, and plants — from types of bygone eras, their mutual resemblances being due to common he- redity, their divergences having been regulated and adjusted through natural selection. Those who have proved adaptable to the conditions of life have sur- vived and left descendants like themselves. All living forms change from generation to generation, and through the ages the unadaptable have faded away. Social Darwinism applies the law of survival to races and nations, and makes it a national duty to assist evolution by war and conquest. The doctrine is energetically set forth by German militarists as in- dicating the prime duty of the growing state. Darwin, on the contrary, affirmed that war is a potent element in the destruction of the strong, leaving a necessary heritage of weakness, because by process of war it is mainly the weak who survive for parent- hood. In spite of this, however, certain writers, hiding behind his name, assume that war is "God's supreme test of the nations," that all tribes or states which are small, weak, peace-loving, or backward are thereby marked for absorption, subjection, or extermination. Inasmuch as the Prussian system of discipline is the ideal of human social perfection (so these writers assert), ^11 nations must come to it in time. Peoples of Germanic race (British, Scandinavian, Dutch, THE DYNASTIC STATE 53 Flemish) will adopt it spontaneously, or with adequate persuasion may be forced into it. The rest must be vassals of one sort or other, holding to fragmentary or imperfect systems until they can be brought into proper relations to the governing powers. The barbarous Slavs, whose day has not yet come and will not come because they were perverted at the outset, and the degenerate Latins whose day is past, furnish material to be dominated by the virile races possessed of coher- ent discipline and the will to power. As against the absolute right of the "present bearer of the world spirit, the spirits of the other nations are absolutely without right. The latter, just like the nations whose epochs are passed, count no more in universal history." (Quoted by Dewey, German Philosophy and Politics, page 191.) Bismarck recognized clearly that what he termed "the monarchical order" could not maintain itself in Europe unless the three great dynastic powers, Ger- many, Austria, and Russia, should act in harmony. Hence his strenuous efforts to maintain the Dreikaiser- bund or "Three Emperors' Union." To this alliance he wished also to attach "monarchical Italy," and his utterances show plainly the hope that France would once more become a monarchy, hence fit to enter the combination for enforced order. But his efforts were not successful so far as Russia was concerned, and the rising tides of democracy carried Italy and France another way. From the biological side, certain facts contradict the whole dogma of Social Darwinism. Natural selection concerns the survival of individuals rather 54 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS than races. The struggle for existence is threefold: (o) rivalry with like organisms, (6) competition with unlike, and (c) resistance to conditions of life. But, in fact, these three aspects of selection are resolvable into one, the ability to survive. Those most adaptable live and repeat their kind. The requisites of survival are not mainly courage, ferocity, or strength. There is a bounty on the head of wolves, hawks, and hyenas, beast or human, of whatever race or breed. The philosophy of Social Darwinism has in it a modicum of truth. But as Professor De Hovre of Louvain has observed, "The power of truth is so great that half-truths are more dangerous than errors." The dogma recognizes in a perverted fashion certain facts in the struggle of humanity which result in the elimination of the unfit or unadaptable. Its advocates jump the track by insisting that the struggle is not personal but racial, dependent on coordinated force, and that the strong and regimented must, as a matter of duty, get behind evolution to enslave or eliminate weak or individuaUstic races. According to the doctrines of Social Darwinism, if a nation succeeds in the rigorous and ruthless struggle for existence, its might has thereby become right. This struggle should occur precisely that the various types may be tested, and the best not only preserved, but put into position to impose its kind of social organization, or Kultur, on the others, or alternatively to destroy and displace them. The menace of this philosophy is that its adherents believe what they say, and act on this belief that war is necessary as a test of their position and claim. Hence they oppose all mercy, all compromise with human soft-heartedness.' 1 Vernon Kellogg, Headquarters Nights; slightly condensed. THE DYNASTIC STATE 55 Their contention overlooks four vital truths: (a) the struggle for existence is primarily not a matter of competition but of persistence or disappearance under varied life-conditions; (6) the competition involved is a fact of nature, not a divine call to men or nations to obliterate the weak ; ^ (c) the argument totally ignores the law of mutual aid and the es- tablished fact that altruism is itself one of the most potent factors in natural selection; (d) it further overlooks the fact that force does not mean endurance nor does it mark any high type of superiority. The persistence of type in animals or man depends, not on physical prowess or ferocity, but on the capacity for adaptation and combination. Law-abiding commimi- ties unite to suppress predatory tribes, and empires held by force dissolve in the stress of history. To secure "a place in the sun" in equatorial Africa or in "the stakes of diplomacy" may be a legitimate aspiration, if approached in a law-abiding way, but science made to order creates no supreme duty of conquest. NOTE A : ALTRUISM In view of the importance of a clear understanding, we may here briefly discuss some elements involved in the factor of mutual aid, or altruism. This in its ' Says Romain Rolland : " Such a policy, as Benan points out, in his beautiful letter to Strauss, can lead only to zoological wars, wars of extermination similar to those in which various species of rodents and carnivorous beasts fought for their existence. This would be the end of the fertile mixture called humanity, composed as it b of such various necessary elements." (Audesnu de la MMU.) 56 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS biological sense represents in general that relation of one organism to others of its own type most favorable to the development of each. It is the quality of neigh- borliness, of combination in the midst of competition. Altruism is by no means a purely human attribute. There is no part of the animal kingdom in which it is not evident, and its elements appear among the plants as well. Wherever life exists we find conditions of environment to which living things must adapt them- selves. Altruistic social adjustments are powerful factors in the struggle for existence in the Ufe of animals as well as of man. Care of the yoimg, for instance, is an agency far more effective in race-preservation than the tooth and claw of competitive struggle. The readi- ness of the parent to die, if necessary, for its off- spring is a guarantee of race-survival. In the beginnings of life altruism appears. The union or conjugation of two one-celled animals con- sists in the advantageous interchange of hereditary cell-structures, after which neither the one nor the other is exactly what it was before. The change af- fects also the descendants, involving the law of varia- tion whereby no organism that exists is ever an exact or slavish copy of any other, not even of parent, brother, or sister. A constantly widening range of variation pro- vides for a vastly greater occupation of the earth than would be possible under the monotonous perpetuation of uniformity. The primal purpose of sex is variation. When the universe was young. Thine was the Perfect Thought That life should be bound in one By the strand of love inwrought. THE DYNASTIC STATE 67 Altruism appears under another form in the ag- gregation of cells. A one-celled animal or plant is an organic unit. When the new cells produced by the processes of cell-division remain joined to each other, a complex organism is built up. By such means the germ-cell in the higher animals develops into the embryo, and the embryo passes through stages of infancy and youth into the complicated structure of maturity. Specialization, differentiation, organiza- tion, sensation, will, intellect, — all are resultants of altruistic cell-cooperation. As individual men unite to form societies, so do individual cells group together to form the human body, except that while the individual man is capable of separating himself from society, each cell, on the contrary, remains bound to the fate of its associates. Nevertheless, among men the growth of society also abridges individual freedom by making freedom worth having. Mutual help leads everywhere to mutual dependence. It gives a security and strength forever impossible under purely individualistic conditions. As Adam Smith long since pointed out, sympathy is, even from an economic point of view, a factor which out- weighs selfishness. Altruism, therefore, is a robust impulse set deep in the heart of living organisms beyond all danger of extinction. It is as old as selfishness and as hard to eradicate. It needs coddhng no more than hunger does. It asks no external sanction, for individuals without it pass away leaving no descendants. It ex- presses itself in all that makes human life sane, joyous, effective. Science is the consummate fruit of the 58 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS altruism of the ages. Art, literature, music, religion, all arise and are developed through mutual help. No man's experience belongs to himself alone, but is part of the heritage of those that follow. Human institu- tions grow out of the social instinct. Th&j are fossils of past altruism. "No people ever lost its liberties through excess of brotherly love." ^ "The world is not the abode of the strong alone : it is also the home of the loving." ^ NOTE B : THE SUPERMAN The origin of the German philosophy of Social Darwinism is not to be found in the writings of Dar- win, but rather in the political necessity which de- manded a sanction for warfare and conquest as expounded by Clausewitz and practiced by the Gen- eral StaflE. Thoroughly to buttress the doctrine, it seemed only necessary to demonstrate the superiority of the German mind and its resultant Kultur as a foundation on which manifest destiny might build. To this end was evolved the conception of the Teu- tonic Superman {Uebermensch), the natural successor of the long-extinguished Hellene, each type alike nobly planned to "beat out the higher civilization on the anvil of war," and at the same time, through inherent idealism, "to light up the darkness of his- tory." In support of the general thesis, two series of amusing myths have been put in operation, the one derived from anthropology, the other from his- tory. Ethnologists recognize that two well-marked forms of skull appear among European peoples, the ' Amos G. Warner. ' 3. Arthur Thomson. THE DYNASTIC STATE 59 long-headed (dolichocephalic) of the north, and the short-headed (brachycephalic) of the Alpine tribes of the south and their ramifying descendants. To German ingenuity it has been left to show that the dohchocephaUc type is identical with Huxley's xan- thochroics, or fair-skinned race, as distinguished from the brunette melanochroics, as also to point out that the flaxen-haired, blue-eyed, long-headed "blonde beasts" form the natural aristocracy of Europe, and especially of Germany itself. In this favored region, moreover, all the people are held to partake in some degree of the upper racial excellence. By way of scientific evidence is adduced the presence of certain fossil skulls of the long-headed type in Neolithic deposits within the German Empire. These, it is contended, easily establish the antiquity of the Teutonic race, as well as its persistence through all the vicissitudes, historic and prehistoric, of Central Europe. The trivial fact that long-headed skulls are found also in the Neolithic deposits of many other parts of Europe need not perplex us. They belonged to Prussian tourists, perhaps, or to prehistoric Vandals slain in forgotten raids. Neither need we balk at the discovery that Eskimos, as well as certain races of negroes, have long skulls. However, these are not xanthics; besides, the superman is yellow-haired as well as long-headed. Nor need we be detained by the fact that no pure race (Gypsies and a few localized strains perhaps excepted) exists anywhere in Europe, least of all in the "ethnic chaos" of Germany. The idea that the long-headed, flaxen-haired races 60 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS were the makers of history did not originate in Ger- many, but was built up on speculation imported from France. In Paris, fifty years ago, Durand de Gros tried to show that city dwellers have longer heads than country people and the upper classes longer heads than the lower. This difference, he thought, was due to influences of environment. German authorities made it a matter of the breed, a result of heredity and selection. What, indeed, more natural than that Germanic blood should rise to the top.? "This," says Balzarotti, "was the little spring from which the great river flowed." All that was necessary was to make the dolichocephalic the parent of the evolving Superman. And the qualities of the hypothetic in- dividual were broadened to embrace the whole nation, a superstate destined to become "master of the uni- verse." Here came to the rescue Gobineau, another French- man, arguing that the makers of history through the ages had been men of fair skin. The Homeric heroes, to begin with, were all depicted as fair-haired; men of like stuff are everywhere the natural leaders of civilization. To Gobineau, the glories of the varied white race appeared as shining strands, some of silk, some of silver, some of gold, running through the web and woof (otherwise dusky) of humanity. In the golden threads, giving luster to the otherwise monotonous fabric, his German commentators saw their xanthic selves. Thus the chain of argument was complete. More impressive than the ethnological argument, even if no better supported by tangible fact, is the THE DYNASTIC STATE 61 assertion that throughout modern Europe genius and talent run with Teutonic blood; that in science, art, and literature, as well as in warfare, the Teutonic race is "fated to conquer." Racial pride is not a rarity. Most races have regarded themselves as in some degree "a chosen people," and no country is free from examples of overweening self-conceit; but in no other land but Germany has this become "gran- diose and menacing," because nowhere else has it been built into the framework of political organization. Otherwise the claim that genius from Theodoric to Shakespeare and on to Garibaldi was mainly a Teu- tonic product might be looked on as the entertaining byplay of fatigued pedants. The roots, ethnic and historic, of the myths we have here met are traced back by an Italian critic, Alfredo Nicefero, in a brochure entitled / Germani} Accord- ing to this author the idea in its historical relation was first developed in Mommsen's Introduction to the History of Rome, which "deliberately denies the existence of any connection between ancient and modern civilization, or any influence of the one on the other." The Mediterranean people, argues Momm- sen, flourished and died out. The Teutonic race, "coming from afar," were "creators of a new and quite independent civilization, the modern." It thus appears that the Italian culture of the mediaeval cen- turies was by no means of Roman origin, as the lan- guage of the people, a modified Latin, might seem to indicate, but was, on the other hand, really German. ^ Summarized by Balzarotti and Stock in the Eugeaica Reneic, London, April, 1918. 62 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS For the Ostrogoths and Lombards, in creating the commune in northern Italy, started a new era in his- tory — the Renaissance, or "Revival of Learning," being "not a rebirth of Graeco-Roman civilization, but simply the birth of a new civilization — the German." When this argument is fully assimilated, it will be found easy to accept the corollary that all great Italians were really of Germanic origin. It then naturally becomes evident, as has been seriously claimed, that Leonardo's real name was Winke, not Vinci; Giotto was Jotte; Boccaccio, Buchatz. Michelangelo Buon- arrotti was Bohnrodt ; Raffaeolo Sanzio, Sandt. Gior- dano Bruno was obviously Braun; Tasso apparently Dasse, and in later times Werth became Verdi and Kerpolt, Garibaldi. One who can believe all this is capable of anything, but certain philologists have expected it of their German readers. By the same methods, however, the Italian origin of Bernhardi, Caprivi, and Capelle could easily be shown. Tirpitz is plainly Turpezza (Turpitudo), with the syllables crushed together after the vigorous Teutonic fashion. Yet more significant than any of the foregoing "discoveries" is the claim for the German ancestry of Dante. The poet was not only one of the greatest of world poets, but he went even "farther than Charle- magne in his ideas as to the modern relationship be- tween Church and State, and in him and not in the fall of the Roman Empire they find the turning point from ancient history to modem." Dante's family name of Alighieri certainly suggests a virile Northern origin, although, so far as I know, no German scholar THE DYNASTIC STATE 63 has yet feri^ted out its original Teutonic form. Ap- plied science, however, has resources outside of phi- lology, and Balzac's description of Dante shows clearly that he had a dolichocephalic skull. Houston Stuart Chamberlain, a Prussianized Englishman, leaves no question as to Dante's being of Germanic descent. "It is simple enough," says he, "to walk through the Berlin museums to see this." Indeed, he finds a close Resemblance between Dante and Luther, for "Dante had very expressive features crowned by a cupola-like forehead, while Luther had also a very expressive countenance set upon a strong-willed jaw." "Thus," says Balzarotti, "though the two faces are perfectly dissimilar, . . . they are shown to possess great racial affinity, and between the two Houston Chamberlain places all intermediate German types." From this we infer that "very expressive features crowned by a cupola-like forehead" constitute a trait confined almost solely to Teutons. Into the propaganda of Social Darwinism, with its bullying superman, a great name has been unfairly drawn, and that by Germans who have framed for their purposes a Nietzsche that never existed. In the first place, it is clear that Nietzsche was no true Prussian, stressing on the contrary his Polish blood and being, as he said, "an accident among Germans." Nationalistic conceit he detested. Furthermore, he asserted that "to be a good German one must become 'ungermanized'; Germans have in general no fingers, only paws." Nietzsche's Superman as finally portrayed by him 64 DEMOCEACY AND WORLD RELATIONS was a being superior in artistic perception, in self- devotion, in breadth of mind, — a saint and sage fitted for sacrifice as for leadership, not a "blonde beast" of a warrior, still less a ruflSan with unbridled passions. But from Nietzsche's writings, dramatic, contradictory, "breathless in his search for truth," an ideal which the lonely poet would repudiate in dis- gust has been framed for emulation by German youth. He contended that he had given Germany her deepest books, reason enough for the Germans' not understand- ing a word of them. Out of disconnected fragments has been built up an apparently coherent basis for world hegemony, the dream of the war-lords of Prussia. NOTE C: THE DYNASTIC STATE IN HISTORY Those whom universal slavery clothes with magic power, stand, here and there, above the prostrate human race. — Bakbusse The dynastic system is the historical root of war. It rests on force, treachery, and superstition, and there can be no absolute certainty of lasting peace until all civilized nations cast aside its theory and its practice. The quotations which follow indicate the nature of the dynastic state as shown in Roman times. Some twenty centuries ago, the Caledonian chief Galgaeus thus describes the Roman conquerors of Scotland : Robbers of the world, having by their universal plunder ex- hausted the land, they rifle the deep. K the enemy be rich, they are rapacious ; if he be poor, they lust for dominion ; neither the east nor the west has been able to satisfy them. Alone among men they covet with equal eagerness poverty and riches. To robbery, slaughter, plunder, they give the lying name of empire; they make a desert and call it peace. THE DYNASTIC STATE 65 Britain suflFered in the same way. The British chiefs thus complain : All we get by patience is that heavier demands are exacted from us, as from men who will readily submit. A single king once ruled us ; now two are set over us : a legate to tyrannize over our lives, a procurator to tyrannize over our property. Their quarrels and their harmony are alike ruinous to their subjects. The cen- turions of the one, the slaves of the other, combine violence with insult. Nothing now is safe from their avarice, nothing from their lust. In war it is the strong who plunders ; now, it is for the most part by cowards and poltroons that our homes are rifled, our chil- dren torn from us, and conscription enforced. (Tacitus, Agricola.) IMPERIALISM AND TRADE One does not keep faith with fur-bearing animals. — Veblen THE progressive nations of the world have gradually expanded the range of their control (a) by settle- ment of available regions in the temperate zone or (6) by domination of one sort or another over tropical lands not regarded as suitable for general European habitation. By the method of settlement self-govern- ing colonies have grown up. Among them, four British commonwealths (Canada, Australia. New Zealand, and South Africa) remain attached to the mother country. The United States long since achieved its independence. The colonies of Spain and Portugal, one by one, also gained their freedom. There still remain, however, dependencies of varying kinds under control of one or other of the several nations. This category embraces the greater part of Africa and of Southern Asia. Certain British dependencies are crown colonies, governed directly in the name of the king. Some other holdings are mere naval stations, while still others have a varying degree of home rule. Collectively they are often spoken of as empire over- seas. In general, empire overseas is a product of asso- ciated commercialism supported by national force, the seizure of backward districts in the interest of order, exploitation, or more often both. The system by which this is accomplished is now known as imperial- ism, and those who profit from or glory in far-flung domination are known as imperialists. The trade ventxu-es of European nations in the 66 IMPERIALISM AND TRADE 67 tropics were very early infected by commercial rivalry, — the idea that the prosperity of one country was to be attained at the expense of another. In some de- gree this was true; nations therefore came to regard each other as natural enemies. (Their mutual be- havior, it may be said, fully justified the opinion.) Accordingly it became common to speak of each as competing with every other; for instance, Spain against Portugal, England against Prance, thus per- sonifying the nation, as though the state itself, not merely individual adventurers, engaged in trade. In the sixteenth century commerce consisted largely in the acquisition, by barter or robbery from uncivilized peoples, of gold, silver, gems, spices, and woods. At the royal courts of the ambitious though impecunious Europe of three and four centuries ago such treasure was highly valued. Commercial success thus brought sudden wealth. Preebooting, moreover, proved as satisfactory as trading and equally respectable, besides enjoying a glamour of romance. Hence the Spanish Main became the scene of sanguinary sea-fights and daring enterprise. ETHICS AND ECONOMICS OF EMPIRE The ethics of empire has been the subject of much discussion. The vast British Empire was built up almost by accident, through trade demands and at- tempts to bring order, with no continuous national purpose. England had early carried to backward lands her missions and her trade. In her pohcy of British Peace (Pax Britannica) with its enforcement of order and decency, she mingled enough of justice 68 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS and freedom to give a degree of permanence. Says John Bright: "We may not build an empire on the basis of freedom, but we may be sure that we cannot build it on any other basis." Long experience and native talent have given the British an increasing degree of skill in dealing with subject peoples. The fact remains, however, as Lin- coln once observed, that there is no man good enough to govern another against his will. In this regard a democracy, being ill-informed and careless of details and responsible to its own public opinion only, may be as tyrannical as an autocracy forced to consider its self- preservation. The economic side of empire is relatively simple. A comparatively small number of individuals reap the profits, a much larger number find employment, while the nation at large pays the cost and from its best life is taken heavy toll of civil and military service. According to Benjamin Franklin, "The profits of no trade can ever be equal to the cost of compelling it by force of arms." "To make war with those who trade with us," said Thomas Paine, "is like setting a bulldog on a customer at the shop-door." Those nations (less wise than Great Britain) which by means of trade restrictions or otherwise have per- mitted the bleeding of their colonial possessions have found the process financially unprofitable as well as ruinous to native populations. In the imperial colonial policy colonies are conceived to stand to their imperial guardian or master in a relation between that of a stepchild and that of an indentiired servant : to be dealt with summarily and at discretion and to be made use of without scruple. IMPERIALISM AND TRADE 69 The like attitude towards colonies was once familiar matter-of- course with the British and Spanish statesmen. The British found the plan improfitable and abo unworkable and have given it up. The Spanish, having no political outlook but the dynastic one, could of course not see their way to relinquish the only purpose of their colonial enterprise except in relinquishing their colonial possessions. The Gierman (imperial) colonial policy is and will be necessarily after the Spanish pattern and necessarily, too, with Spanish results. (Veblen, The Nature of Peace.) As a matter of fact, the German colonies have been mainly armed camps, whose ojEcers have usually (though not always) treated the natives with a harsh- ness almost unexampled among civilized peoples.^ The Hereros of Southwest Africa, one of the most competent and advanced of native tribes, were virtually extermi- nated in 1904, for a minor outbreak after some act of wanton cruelty. In the interest of a "healthy egoism," the remnant was forced into slavery. For the sake of practical politics (Recdpolitik) it was urged that "the sentiments of Christianity and philanthropy with which the missionaries work must be repudiated with all energy." It is but just to note that under the eflScient colonial administration of Dr. Bernhard Dern- burg this condition was later largely remedied. Yet in Germany's colonial history, as in that of every imperialistic nation, there have been many episodes which the people at home are glad to ignore or forget. ' Atrocities of like character are recorded from the Belgian Congo. But the district at the time was regarded as a personal asset of the greedy and vulgar King Leopold II, "One whose crown shed many a pearl When his beard was tweaked by a dancing girl." These scandals ceased after the Belgian government assumed control, follow- ing the death of Leopold. 70 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS "The imperialist is a business man armed to the teeth like a pirate," says Massingham. Indeed, as Lord Bryce has observed : " The work of bearing the 'white man's bm-den' takes the form of filling the white man's pockets." COLONIAL EXPANSION A colony as ordinarily understood is a subjugated district, usually with a sparse sprinkling of traders and oflScials, backed by an army of occupation in addi- tion to the native population. The seH-goveming colonies or dominions of Great Britain belong in an entirely different category. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa are bound to the parent nation by imbreakable ties of blood, respect, and affec- tion, but not by force of arms. Certain nations of Europe have devoted themselves eagerly to colonial expansion. For this there have been four main reasons : (1) national prestige, the "mirage of the map," (2) the pressure of surplus popu- lation, (3) the need of raw materials in manufacture, (4) the need of markets for the sale of goods. It is not clear that any tropical colonial possessions have ever repaid (the public at large) the cost of main- tenance,^ while at the same time they have compli- cated national politics both internal and external, 1 "Commercial interests can apparently always be made to believe that tn extension of imperial dominion will bring correspondingly increased op- portunities of trade. This is doubtless a mistake, but it is commonly be- lieved by the interested parties, which is just as good for the purpose as if it were true. The costs are paid by some one else, which brings the matter under the dearest principle known to business men, that of getting something for nothing." (Veblen, The Nature of Peace.) IMPERIALISM AND TRADE 71 creating the larger part of current diflficulties among nations. British politics, for example, have long revolved around the problems of India, although the maintenance by force of the British Empire in Asia is to most of the British people a burden rather than a source of strength. The "last frontier" has now been reached. There are no more new colonies to be peopled or exploited. Expansion by force consequently involves friction with some other nation previously expanded. In this connection it is often urged that Germany, coming late into the imperial circle, was unjustly debarred from expansion because all land fit for useful colonies had been previously taken up.'^ There is truth in this statement, but it must also be conceded that war, "Prussia's special industry," is no legitimate remedy for geographical defects. Absence of good harbors, inability to control the whole course of navigable rivers or trade channels, are, of com-se, unfortunate. Solu- tion is to be sought in reciprocity ; apparently there is no other. There are (said Elihu Root, in 1908) no international contro- versies that cannot be settled peaceably if both parties really de- sire peaceful settlement, while there are few causes of dispute so trifling that they cannot be made the occasion of war if either party really desires war. The matters in dispute between nations are nothing ; the spirit which deals with them is everything. • Germany began to feel its limitation along these lines just before the last frontier had been reached. Bismarck's policy demanded a compact Germany, held together by fear of its neighbors. He had no interest in outside holdings. He is reported as saying that Germany with colonies would be like those Polish noblemen who wear costly furs but no shirt. In recent times a new point of view has evolved and Germany has been even more eager than others to acquire foreign and imwilling nationaUties. 72 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS SPHERES OP INFLUENCE The invasion of backward nations by foreign credi- tors supported by force of arms is a source of the great- est danger to the peace of the world. Egypt, Persia, Turkey, China, the Balkan States, and the smaller states of Africa and South America have been specially exposed to this combination of spoliation and intimi- dation. The sphere of influence is a district, notably in China or Africa, set apart by a European nation for exploitation by its financiers or adventurers. Spheres sometimes intersect or clash, causing diplomatic fric- tion or threatened war. More often their extension provokes the resentment of the natives. This may involve suppression by force of arms, leading usually to annexation, either partial or complete. In this way spheres of influence can be turned into colonies, "trade strategy" and "dollar diplomacy" Points of friction are greatly increased when a government makes itself a financial partner in exploita- tion. By sharing the profits and guaranteeing investors against loss, certain states have gained, or tried to gain, a special foothold in backward countries. Such a policy invites rashness on the part of promoter or entrepreneur. Only in comparatively late years has diplomacy concerned itself with investments of capital in foreign lands. But in drawing national lines more tightly in a narrowing world, considerations of trade-control become more and more important. Hence arise the problems of tariff, cost of production, and trade de- IMPERIALISM AND TRADE 73 velopment. Use of national backing to help exporta- tion of manufactures or export of capital in foreign investments has become known in America as "dollar diplomacy." "Trade strategy" means much the same thing, but it further concerns itself with securing supplies of raw materials and with the development of trade-routes. Most of the nations of Europe suffer from geo- graphical limitations. But natural embarrassments have been greatly aggravated by means of unfriendly or cut-throat tariffs. Trade strategy may have a most paralyzing effect on landlocked or wititer-bound regions, — Serbia, Bulgaria, Russia, for example. For the irritations thus induced there is but one remedy, and that is reciprocity. Freedom of trade woidd not cure all the serious ills of Europe, but it would go a long way in that direction. There has been no inter- national war of importance in the present century or any other, in which, on one side or both, hope of eco- nomic gain did not play a prominent part, whatever the original incentive. THE STATE AND BIG BUSINESS The abuses of colonial domination as well as the danger of friction are aggravated when the government of a nation itself becomes an active partner in ex- ploitation. By such means, reckless and powerful commercial organizations may be built up, either for purposes of perpetuating injustice or of monopoly of some form of trade. Under the shelter of the German Empire, through the use of force, through interlocking directorates, state subsidies, and state partnerships, 74 DEMOCRACY AND WOBLD RELATIONS great combinations were built up in Germany. Some of these furnished the backbone of aggressive Pan- germanism. One of the most powerful was the trust which controlled the world's metal market, so far as production was concerned, while the London Metal Exchange through its fixing board adjusted prices for the world. Thus through banks, holding-companies, affiliations with syn- dicates and kartels, interlocking directorates, joint share holdings, and other means of interrelation, a world-wide ramification has taken place in the metal trade."^ Similar combinations occur in regard to every ex- ploitable commodity, and the clashing of trusts in backward nations tends to trouble the politics of the world. To operations of this sort, the term "frenzied finance," first used for similar efforts in New York, has been justly applied. THE OPEN DOOB The term " open door " as used by John Hay means equality of trade-access. Economists, notably Henri Lambert of Charleroi, Belgium, urge that freedom of trade and equality of access to the so-called colonies are indispensable to any permanent agreement. It is accordingly claimed that colony-holding nations should open the door equally to all, as to a large degree Great Britain has of late consistently done. Such a system, says the Belgian economist, would 1 From the report of the Federal Trade Commission on "CoBperation in American Export Trade," June 30, 1916. Quoted by Courtney DeKalb, Mining and Scientific Press, January 19, 1918, page 85. An elaborate chart showing these interlocking metal-buying combinations accompanies this report. IMPERIALISM AND TRADE 75 be the equivalent of the internationalization of the colonies. . . . It would go far to remove the mutual jealousies that generated the explosive gas that caught fire so suddenly in 1914. . . . The great lesson in justice and civilization that would result from such an adjustment (on the part of France) would be calculated to make a profound impression on Germany, where, after all, men with minds capable of embracing new ideas of liberty and justice remain in a vast majority. RIGHTS OP NATIONALS ABROAD Lord Palmerston, boldest and most reckless of recent British prime ministers, introduced into national practice the official obligation to safeguard foreign loans and concessions by force of arms. This policy, though without sanction either in morals or in inter- national law, has met with large acceptance in dip- lomatic procedure. The forcible collection of ques- tionable debts by a government gives a military hold which is readily extended into annexation. By such means European states have secured vast districts in Asia and Africa. In opposition to the Palmerston Doctrine, the recent Drago Doctrine was urged at the Hague Conference by Luis Drago, a jurist of Buenos Aires. This proposes the addition to international law of the inhibition of force for the collection of private debts in a foreign nation, such matters to be left to regular court pro- cedxire. But both these doctrines are still in abeyance. Nevertheless, the Palmerston procedure has been per- sistently maintained, and as it is one not likely to be reversed, its practice should be regulated by general agreement. Some legal distinction needs to be made 76 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS between legitimate investment, more or less, and dis- honest spoliation.^ In case of injury to person or property of nationals abroad, the lawful first remedy lies in the courts or in official protest, to be followed, if necessary, by arbi- tration. No alien, however, has rights beyond those enjoyed by a citizen of the country in which he is a guest. In times of war or revolution all rights, whether of citizens or of aliens, are naturally precarious. Under recognized international law no state can legitimately invade another sovereign state for any purpose whatsoever, not even to save life or property. To do so is an "act of war." Yet nations will not often submit patiently to injm-y incurred through anarchy or revolution in a neighboring or associated state. There can be no universal rule in such cases. Each must stand on its own merits, with due regard to causes of disorder and effects of interference. No easy formula such as "making our name respected abroad," "defending national honor," or "peace at any price" can cover all cases. To adhere invariably to the policy of non-interference has its own dangers. Such a course may leave the field open to private 1 " Lord Palmerston bestowed nationality on money. He lent the shelter of the flag to investments. We have seen how the whole evolution of imperialism has proceeded from this premise. From the coercion of Greece because a Levantine money-lender had a claim against her, we have advanced to the modern practice of using diplomacy to back the financier who is engaged in concession hunting. To some of us this whole develop- ment seems wrong and mischievous from start to finish, both in morals and economics. . . . We back some ventures at present and ignore others, but what the principle of selection may be, is a mystery unknown to unofficial persons. It should certainly be so controlled as to discourage and handicap disreputable enterprise." (Brailsford, War of Steel and Gold.) IMPERIALISM AND TRADE 77 marauders, as in the "Red Rubber" atrocities of recent infamy. On the other hand, certainty of mil- itary support by the home government in defense of foreign loans and concessions may encourage exploiters to reckless adventure. CONTINUITY OF FOREIGN POLICY In our day foreign policy has largely concerned matters of trade and finance. "Continuity of foreign policy" is a device intended to prevent sudden changes in these affairs. By custom in most nations each succeeding cabinet or foreign oflSce is bound, in general, to carry on the tactics of its predecessors. This method has obvious advantages. Each minister in turn is "keenly alive to his duties as the steward of a great inheritance." Its tendency in the long run, however, is to lower the tone of morals and intelligence in foreign relations. It may even put the nation at the mercy of its most aggressive elements. By its operations, artificial friendships and meaningless enmities have often been needlessly perpetuated. For reasons like this it has been urged that a democracy should not attempt to maintain a continuous foreign policy. It should leave an open door to change of conditions without and change of temper within. BACKWARD RACES It is necessary to face the fact that backward races do exist, that humanity the world over is not of like grade in relation to advancement and capacity for progress. It is also true that whatever the perils 78 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS and sufferings incident to life in civilization, the in- ferno of savagery is much more severe. In dealing with untutored peoples, the world has its choice of three courses, — to let them alone to be ruled by tribal customs, to organize them into monarchies or republics, usually disorderly, or to put them frankly under the control of outside force. The first method has become impossible ; the world will let nobody alone. Missionaries, explorers, and traders will invade Thibet, Ashantee, and Timbuctoo ; no region can be fenced off from intrusion. More- over, as already intimated, for civilized states to keep their hands off may open the way to private adven- turers, the more lawless and bloody because their harvest time is short. Backward republics are often farcical, but the introduction of a king is no remedy. Order established by a royal court or its equivalent usually means only postponed revolution. The dis- orderly parts of tropical America would not be tran- quilized by monarchical institutions. PoUtical order in many parts of the tropics has been largely due to the repressive arm of European nations. To be otherwise than mischievous, such control should have an eye single to the development of the natives, and provide an increasing degree of education and home rule, with the prospect of ultimate independence. The American management of the Philippines and in general the relatively recent colonial operations of Great Britain fairly meet this requirement. Nevertheless, the helpfulness of colonial adminis- tration is lost if it be made subservient to commercial demands. Occupation in the interest of trade and IMPERIALISM AND TRADE 79 manufacture at home, of cheap raw materials and assured markets, with the associated purpose of do- minion for dominion's sake, may produce an intolerable condition as hopeless as savage anarchy. That many native races are unfit for self-govern- ment in a civihzed sense may be freely conceded, but, as John Hay once remarked, "people unfit for self- government are unfit for anything else." A degree of responsibility is essential to progress in self-respect and self-control and no race is too brutal or too de- graded to profit by it. As already stated, there can be no single rule ap- plicable to all .cases. There are gross evils in anarchy and others equally gross in tyranny ; the statesmanship of the world must find a middle course. THE MONEOE DOCTRESTE In the Monroe Doctrine, promulgated in 1823, the United States protested against the extension of im- perialism and the dynastic system on the American continent by exploitation, conquest, or colonization. The southern nationalities, formerly subject to Portu- gal and Spain, had, one after the dther, freed themselves by revolution. Our sympathies and interests were strongly engaged in their struggles. The Monroe Doctrine, therefore, oflScially voiced our determination to forestall dynastic encroachments in Latin America. President Monroe's declaration laid down the following principles : The political system of the allied powers is essentially different . . . from that of America. . . . We should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere 80 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and have maintained it, and whose independence we have acknowl- edged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of op- pression or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States. ... It is im- possible that the allied powers should extend their poUtical system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness ; nor can any one believe that our Southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. In another paragraph Monroe proclaimed that The American continents, by the free and independent condi- tion which they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any Euro- pean powers. In 1848, President Polk declared that the Monroe Doctrine bound the United States to occupy territory if such action should be necessary to prevent the intro- duction of the European political system. President Cleveland carried the principle still further in demanding arbitration of a boundary dispute be- tween Venezuela and British Guiana. And speaking in behalf of Cleveland in 1895, Richard Olney, Secre- tary of State, said: The United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its inter- position. Extensions of the original Doctrine have confused the popular idea as to its purpose.* It has been mis- • "Never having been formulated as law or in exact language, the Mon- roe Doctrine has meant different things to different people at different times. IMPERIALISM AND TRADE 81 construed as involving special trade advantages, and a certain "patronizing" air ascribed to it has some- times been offensive to the Latin American states, who regard themselves as quite strong enough to look after their own interests. Because of these facts and be- cause of the closer association of each of the two Ameri- cas with Europe than with each other, Professor Hiram Bingham has declared the Monroe Doctrine to be "an obsolete shibboleth." It is quite certain, however, that the United States would look with great displeasure on any move to extend colonial or monarchical institutions in America. It is also fair to say that there has been no serious sug- gestion of such an attempt since the tragic experience of Maximilian as Emperor of Mexico.^ Going much farther than his predecessors. Presi- dent Wilson has proposed to extend the Monroe Doc- trine to the whole world, prohibiting the further spread of the dynastic system anywhere. The Monroe Doctrine was originally suggested or at least approved by George Canning, prime minister of Great Britain. Its actual wording was largely the work of the Secretary of State under Monroe, John Quincy Adams. It arose in connection with the withdrawal of Great Britain from the reactionary Holy Alliance It has become rooted in the American heart and a prominent part of the foreign policy of the United States. It tends to change into the principle that every portion of the American continents must be free from European control. It is still coupled with the converse principle that America takes no part in European politics." (Professor Theodore W. Woolsey, Ency- clojxBdia Britannica.) ' Recent intrigues on the part of foreign agents in Southern Brazil may constitute a partial exception. 82 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS established at Paris after the Conference of Vienna and in opposition to the subsequent dynastic Pact of Verona.^ In effect it declared that if democracy was to be suppressed on the continent of Europe, absolutism should gain no further foothold on the continent of America. It was regarded at the time, ^ The Holy Alliance of 1816, with its mystical purpose of uniting "the ruling princes of Europe into a religious brotherhood, pledged to guide themselves wholly by Christian principles," was followed in 1822 by the "Treaty of Verona," designed especially to prevent the further extension of popular government. In this document, signed November 22, 1822, by Mettemich for Austria, Chateaubriand for Prance, Bemstet for Prussia, and Nesselrode for Russia, the Duke of Wellington, representing Great Britain, refused to join. The result of this attitude on the part of England was the Monroe Doctrine, a direct blow at the purposes of the Holy Alliance. In this connection Canning observed : "The harmony of the political world is as little disturbed by a variety in the forms of states as the harmony of the planets." The first three articles of the agreement read as follows : Article 1. The high contracting powers being convinced that the system of representative government is equally incompatible with the monarchical principles as the maxim of the sovereignty of the people with the divine right, engage mutually, in the most solemn manner to use all their efforts to put an end to the system of representative government in whatever country it may exist in Europe, and to prevent its being introduced in those countries where it is not yet known. Article S. As it cannot be doubted that the liberty of the press is the most powerful means used by the pretended supporters of the rights of nations to the detriment of those of princes, the high contracting parties promise reciprocally to adopt all proper measures to suppress it, not only in their own states but also in the rest of Europe. Article S. Convinced that the principles of religion contribute most powerfully to keep nations in the state of passive obedience which they owe to their princes, the high contracting parties declare it to be their intention to sustain in their respective states those measures which the clergy may adopt, with the aim of ameliorating their own interests, so intimately con- nected with the preservation of the authority of the princes ; and the con- tracting powers join in offering their thanks to the Pope for what he has already done for them, and solicit his constant coSperation in their views IMPERIALISM AND TRADE 83 by Monroe, Adams, and Jefferson, as a "declaration of support by Britain" — in Jefferson's words, "the nation which can do us the most harm of any one or all on earth, and with her on our side we need not fear the whole world." It is just to say, in this con- nection, that the Monroe Doctrine has been scarcely less British than American, deriving much of its strength from the continuous support of Great Britain and her presumed willingness to uphold it with her fleet. To be fighting side by side with Britain in the same cause, the cause of the secure establishment of freedom in the world — this seemed to the democrat Jefferson, as an object to be aimed at.' COLONIAL COOPERATION The time is coming soon (if not already at hand) when the whole colonial system must be revised. Control of tropical regions should no longer be a matter of prestige or profit to individual nations. The whole world is interested in the just treatment of native races and in the equal access to raw materials. To this end international cooperation is a necessity. It is true that the arrangement has worked wretchedly in most cases where it has been tried, as for instance in the joint control of Samoa, in the events following the Boxer movement in China, in the Concert of of submitting (iic) the Nations. ("The Secret Treaty of Verona" ; quoted from Elliott, American Diplomatic Code, II, 179.) Article 4 pledges to France the support of the signatory monarchs in the quelling of republican uprisings in Spain and Portugal. Article 6, "rejecting all other ideas of utility," binds the four powers "to establish connections tending toward the accomplishment of the objects proposed." 1 Bamsey Muir, Exparmon o/ Europe, page 101. 84 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS Powers at the end of the first Balkan war, and perhaps most strikingly in the Algeciras Convention which attempted to establish order in Morocco. But in each of these cases the cause of failure lay in selfish intrigues of the participants, "unloyal, uncontrollable, and destructive." We must, I believe, hope for a new world-attitude by which colonial matters shall be treated as honestly as matters of world-postage or international exchange. Colonial wrangling is only an evil tradition, likely to cease when greedy individuals can gain nothing by it. Colonial policy (says the New Republic) can no longer be con- sidered a matter of purely national concern. At least, nations that are fighting for humanity and democracy cannot morally hold territories inhabited by races alien in blood, in language, in culture, except as trustees for humanity. And this trusteeship is not com- patible with a policy of selfish commercial monopoly. Nations that are fighting to establish peace cannot rationally pursue a colo- nial pohcy that leads directly to war. For reasons given farther on, the present writer does not believe that colonial differences are often fundamental causes of war, but rather excuses, in- centives, or aggravations. The evils of the system are largely inherent iu control by dynastic influences, as irresponsible and arbitrary in dealing with colonial matters as with any other in the range of politics and diplomacy. An honest cooperating effort to promote the general welfare would find the problems easy. Such aims are bound to fail if burdened with the traditional rivalries on which dynastic dominion and its war system depend for their continuance. The stakes of diplomacy, as defined by Walter IMPERIALISM AND TRADE 85 Lippmann, consist in control of backward districts for trade-advantage. Mr. Lippmann urges convincingly that the efforts for cooperative control must persist: There should be in existence a permanent international com- mission to deal with these spots of earth where world crises origi- nate . . . wherever the prizes are great, the territory unorganized and the competition active. . . . Algeciras, though a failure, is a great precedent, the most helpful effort in world-organization made up to the present. . . . Algeciras grasped the problem of diplomacy, the conflict of empires in weak territory. Algeciras gallantly tried to introduce a world government to control it. The men at Alge- ciras failed. If we caimot succeed where they failed, the outlook for the future is desperate. (Stakes of Diplomacy.) In time, an raternational organization such as is above proposed would develop a patriotism of its own, through appealing to the sense of justice of all concerned. This has been the case with every well-planned inter- national effort, a fact of the highest import to future world-organization. It should be said that in the varied and almost haphazard growth of the British Empire, built up through the exigencies of trade and of missionary zeal, there has been a steady movement from the idea of dominion towards that of trusteeship. Admin- istration of backward states is more and more looked upon as a temporary trust in behalf of civili- zation and of the peoples controlled. The essential is that nowhere again should a backward nationality be treated as the closed preserve of another nation. TRADE NOT THE CHIEF CULPRIT Primal motives of war, in the author's judgment, go deeper than commercial rivalries. Froude once as- 86 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS serted that "fear of the loss of power" was the chief underlying cause. Apparently this is true. Dynas- ties crave wealth, because wealth gives power ; power again is craved as the producer of wealth. This vicious circle dominates imperialism, — greed and force together constantly forming an interlocking direc- torate. It is a matter of observation that robbery, prospec- tive or competitive, appears in the background of every war, giving rise to manifestations of distrust, envy, and greed. But primary motives are mainly internal and political, rather than external and economic. The cause of most modem wars may well be defined as a conspiracy of the privileged classes to revive their waning power. The gray old strategists who look to war to place their names in history are the ready allies or tools of privilege; young men are their sac- rifice. Very few wars are, in a strict sense, interna- tional. Each side has its own war castes, — these play into each other's hands. But only under dynas- tic rule can the war-makers actually dominate, and even then their control is precarious. In democracies the war-spirit, such as it is, arises maialy from outside provocation, sometimes from "sheer vulgarity," to quote a phrase of Goldwin Smith. It tends to fade away with the advent of genuine peace. "Stakes of diplomacy" in tropical regions will still persist, whatever the form of government by which civilization may encumber itself. But under demo- cratic control it will become progressively easier to establish justice, to abate rivalries, and to widen the scope of international cooperation. Democracy is IMPERIALISM AND TRADE 87 not a universal remedy for political evils, not in fact for any evils, but it is the only form of national or- ganization that renders the application of any remedy possible. It is of course undeniable that states demo- cratic in their internal organization, like France, Great Britain, and even the United States, have shown an incongruous imperialistic greed for colonies, ex- ploitable and held by force. The colonial policies of France^ for instance, have been scarcely more lib- eral than those of Germany. Yet imperialism in a democracy is a vanishing tendency. It is revived by unnatural rivabies and by false notions of national prestige. It is a dynastic habit from which democracy hias not yet freed itself. In a democratic state, mil- itarism is itself unnatural, though an imperialistic spirit grows out of the alliance of money with militarism. Plutocracy is likewise a menace to freedom, but is itself of democratic origin. It does not create armies and navies, though it may use them, once created, without scruple. Most modem wars have involved colonial ambi- tions of one sort or other, and the blame for them is often cast on "capitalism." But the real culprit sits higher up, in the dynastic system itself. No doubt national self-assertion (with the economic limitations and political obstructions it encounters) is productive of discord; it is equally true that personal ambition and economic embarrassment often furnish impelling incentives to burglary. But there exists no logical reason why national discontent should ripen into war or individual unrest into robbery. The remedy in either case, if remedy there be, must be sought within 88 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS the bounds of law and order. Reciprocity is the natu- ral cure for national economic ills. Resort to arms for economic reasons has its origin in tradition, and its availability lies in the fact that the instruments of dynastic militarism are everywhere within grasp. Big business, however, has no natural love for war or war-makers. It uses them for prospective gain, but even then with misgivings. A noted New York banker once remarked, "War destroys property; bankers do not look with favor on destruction of wealth." Capitalism is not the taproot of the evil. Its alliance with militarism persists only so long as autocracy keeps militarism alive as its chief bulwark. Yet while the primal motive of war-making seems to rest with the dynastic caste rather than with greed of possession, nevertheless the latter motive may domi- nate at any given period. The present writer once heard Bernhardi say that "Because Germany is so confined, war is a necessity." ^ In other words, a crowded state must enlarge her borders, dispossessing her neighbors in the fashion of the highwayman. It also is true that the aristocratic caste, otherwise waning in substance and influence, strengthens itself in every country by accretions from below. The successful climber allies himself, by marriage or other- wise, with the blue-blooded aristocrat, and in general, those who rise to wealth and its resultant power through their own energy and adroitness are much more capable than those whose prominence rests on inheritance. For this reason, desire for wealth may be the strongest ^"Weii DeutscMand to beschrSnlct ist, so ist der Krieg eine Notwenr- IMPERIALISM AND TRADE 89 motive among the mingled causes which impel toward war for conquest. It is fairly clear that the passing of the dynastic regime will in due time carry militarism with it, leaving democracy free to settle accounts with plutocracy. But "money power" is, as we have said, in large degree a product of democracy. Its leaders rise from the mass by their own exertions. Wealth is accumulated, and latent power. Those who gain it fairly should be entitled to its use in ways not prejudicial to society. Democracy encourages thrift, and thrift opens the avenue to wealth. The problem is to safeguard hold- ings and at the same time prevent holders from over- reaching and interfering with the rights of others. In the hands of free people this problem is not insoluble. The fading of dynastic illusions will clear the way for the working out of the further economic questions of poverty, incompetence, and malemployment. Wealth and poverty are inevitable in a degree, and permanently so. There is no final panacea for the ills of either. Weakness is as menacing as strength. But problems of wealth and poverty alike, internal or external, may be solved through mutual aid and ap- plied intelligence, — the essentials of a democratic state. The present war may be properly seen as the cul- mination of the age-long effort of privilege to main- tain itself against the rising tide of popular will. Little by little democracy has limited the range of privilege. Freedom slowly broadens down From precedent to precedent 90 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS and with the broadening of freedom must be narrowed the demesne of aristocracy. The fact that every year of peace marks an advanc- ing stage, from privilege to equahty, from dynastic oligarchy to democratic control, has thrown on reaction the responsibility for upheavals. VI NATURE OF DEMOCRACY The greatest thing in the world is for a man to know that he is his own. — Montaigne IT must be constantly recognized that democracy does not insure freedom or justice. It merely enables the people to secure these if they are deter- mined to have them. It leaves them free to frame their own statutes and control their own administra- tion. It gives the people their chance; to utilize this successfully demands a high degree of intelligence and public spirit. Almost every type of tyranny — autocracy, aristocracy, plutocracy, military control, mob rule — has masqueraded under the name of democracy. The lid oflf, there is no limit to possible abuses. It is therefore democracy's insistent duty to keep the lid on, to obey the laws created by its own machinery. If any form of government could of itself guarantee justice and freedom, it would defeat its own ends through weakening of incentive. Government can never take the place of initiative ; in this fact lies the inherent evil of benevolent paternalism. INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY Most important in this connection is training in per- sonal responsibility, — that discipline which arises within and is in no way imposed from without. This lies at the very heart of democracy and leads to the highest civic devotion, the impulse to consecrate one's 91 92 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS individual powers to the social good. No discipline worthy of free men can be brought about by force. The sanction and impulse of discipline must come from within. Says Professor L. T. Hobhouse : To try to form character by coercion is to destroy it in the making. . . . Personality is not built from without, but grows from within, for the function of the outer order is not to create it but to provide for it the most suitable conditions for growth.' Self-reliance is a function of democracy. Its true units are its independent minds. The man who thinks and acts for himself, regardless of tradition, prejudice, and calumny, becomes, in the words of Thucydides, "part of the possession of men forever." Says Emerson, "The highest compliment man ever receives from heaven is the sending to him its dis- guised and discredited angels." The conflicting tendencies which lead on the one hand towards democracy and freedom, and on the other hand towards autocracy and conformity, exist 1 That form of discipline derived from absolute subservience to the state is indicated in the following : " Instill from his earliest infancy into a man the idea that he belongs to another, is the property of another; let everything around proceed upon this idea ; let there be nothing to interfere with it, or rouse suspicion in his mind to the contrary, and he will yield entirely to that idea. He will take his own deprivation of right, the necessity of his own subservience to another, as a matter of course. And that idea of himself will keep ^im in order. He will grow up with the impression that he has not the right of ownership in himself, in his passions, any more than he has in his work. He will thus be coerced from within himself, but not hy himself; i.e., not by any active faculty of self-command, but by the passive reception of an instilled notion which he has admitted into his own mind, and which has fastened upon him so strongly that he canflot throw it off." (Mozley, Ruling Ideas in Early Ages; quoted by J. M. Robertson.) NATURE OF DEMOCRACY 93 in every society. "Mankind," says Charles L. Sprad- ing, "is divided into two groups, the Authoritarian and the Libertarian." The first receive their thoughts and corresponding impulses to action from the outside, the second from within. The authoritarian believes in compelling people to be good, or at least docile. The libertarian would give them the chance to be good, trusting to freedom to convince them that being good is the part of wisdom as well as of strength. DEMOCRACY AND MAJORITIETS In a republican government, as already stated, the minority yields to the majority its will but not its opinions. The legal majority represents very often an actual minority of opiaion, but in that case the true majority respects the law, for it has the power to change it. All majorities must realize that the minority of today may be the majority of tomorrow. The country belongs to all. Every majority will itself divide as new issues arise. Two great parties tend to form in every free nation, the one holding fast to past achieve- ment, the other looking forward to new adjustments, — the one speaking in the name of caution, the other in terms of action. Besides these, there crystallize smaller groups more or less radical than the others, shifting from side to side and changing the equilibrium. No party can hope to be permanent. One man even, standing alone, may be the rallying point of future majorities.' ' "I hear many condemn these men because they were so tew. When were the good and the brave ever in the majority? Would you have him 94 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS A republic is no more infallible or impeccable than a monarchy. Its aims may not always be wise or righteous, and its motives are certainly always mixed. On some issue at least the good citizen will be in the minority. The ones who are never in a minority do not count. Every minority holds together in the hope that it may sometime be a majority. If the minority represents folly, as is often the case, in free air it soon evaporates and a new line of cleavage is established. The red flag of anarchy is woven where the people feel and think but cannot speak. Though "all the winds of doctrine," to use Milton's words, " were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field," we may not doubt her ability to hold her own. DEMOCRACY NOT PRICTIONLES8 A special merit claimed for autocratic government is that "it runs smoothly" without the friction in- separable from parliamentary rule and every other democratic form. Divided opinion leads to irresolute action ; the autocrat alone is absolutely resolute. Ad- mitting the reproach, however, we must deny that absence of friction is a real advantage. An autocrat decides once for all, but a wrong decision may be fatal. In a democracy the people must be consulted at 9.11 stages, the administration must keep open books and be prepared to justify itself at every point. In Great Britain, where Parliament is supreme, the ad- wait till that time came ? Till you and I came over to him ? . . . His com- pany was small indeed because few could be found worthy to pass muster." (Thoreau, A Plea for Captain John Broren.) NATURE OF DEMOCRACY 95 ministration itself is changed whenever a lack of con- fidence is voted. In the United States, executives and legislators alike are chosen for fixed terms, which gives them a certain temporary freedom ; nevertheless, they must cooperate with the people, the final judge, to whom in the end all questions are referred. This involves risk of divided opinion and sudden changes of policy, with a certainty of cross-purposes in critical times. All these, however, are safer than arbitrary and one-sided decisions. For affairs to run smoothly under stress, criticism must be paralyzed. Any form of unchecked rule turns toward selfish purposes; no autocrat ever yet saved his soul. It is never safe to allow any man, great or small, to take the law into his own hands; in private hands, however exalted, it ceases to be law. Under personal and therefore irresponsible rule, a nation becomes a derelict on the political sea. Strength of enginery only augments the danger, and well-oiled bearings of themselves will not keep a ship off the rocks. However faulty the direc- tion by ungraded masses, we may depend on them for a keen lookout. Democracy learns from its own mistakes, which autocracy and oligarchy seem fated never to do. Increasing friction serves as a warning bell against policies which may be inadequate, head- long, or unjust. One of the greatest needs of democracy, and one which it is unfortimately slow to feel, is that of expert service, the application of exact knowledge in all its varied collective activities. Trained rulers constitute a secondary matter. In democracy there are no rulers, only servants and advisers. 96 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS FUNCTION OF DEMOCRACY The only remedy for the failure or the abuses of freedom is to be found in more freedom. As Sir Horace Plunkett observes ia regard to Ireland, "The less fitted a people to govern themselves, the greater their need of self-government." For the art of home rule, like other arts, demands practice. The imme- diate purpose of democracy is not good government, but the forming of a school of civic training which will in time make good government actual. The question of how well government is administered at any given time is a secondary consideration. That administration is best which leaves the people freest to promote their own welfare, at the same time safe- guarding and coordinating their common needs. The main function of government is to provide justice and to undertake the promotion of those public neces- sities which can be better handled collectively than through private enterprise. This definition is vir- tually that laid down by Aristotle, and afl&rmed inde- pendently twenty-three centuries later by Abraham Lincoln. DEMOCRACY AND EQUALITY Democracy does not imply or look forward to equal- ity in the sense of uniformity of final achievement or reward; quite the reverse. As a matter of fact, it should give play to the development of every varied talent, making each individual the creature of his own genius and effort, and thereby more unlike his neigh- bor. Democracy involves equality before the law, — equality of opportunity so far as may be, but no more. NATURE OF DEMOCRACY 97 Legislation may provide for education and normal living, but primal differences arising from heredity cannot be erased by any kind of statute. "All men are born equal, but get over it before they die." The social system that bids men to rise also lets fall those that cannot maintain themselves. The weak- willed, the incompetent, the untrained, the dissipated, these do not hold their own in a democracy. No legislation can modify this fundamental fact. Democracy, of course, intensifies natural inequali- ties. In competition with men alert, skilled, and creative, the untrained are virtually condemned to a lifetime of hard labor, often through no fault of their own. The social condition which would give all men equal reward, equal enjoyment, equal responsibility, is a dream not t6 be realized in democracy. Sir Henry Maine defines the process of civilization as the "move- ment from status to contract " — that is, the transi- tion from niass-relation to individual responsibility, from tradition to democracy. "For the few the human race should live" {paucis vivat humanum genus) is the discredited motto of another age. Better that the few should live for the many, better that the clean and strong should enrich the life of all. In the advance of the common man, and in the rise from the ranks of the man uncommon, ap- pear two main factors in the march of history. The democratic state is a mutual adjustment for the collective benefit of its members. It is no part of the state's duty, therefore, to promote the special pros- perity of any individual or any group.- Special aid or privilege can be extended to the one only at the expense 98 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS of the many. Government is for the most part the umpire deciding questions of justice, the collective servant of the many. Governments in general cannot be generous, merely just. When a government goes out of its way to favor rich or poor, enterprise or poverty, it tends to justify Voltaire's cynical remark that "the art of government consists in taking the most money possible from some citizens and giving it to others." AMERICAN DEMOCRACY INDIVIDUALISTIC As the founders of the American republic were frontiersmen scattered far and wide, without cities or great collective utilities, our form of democracy was intensely individualistic from the first. Demands of society, of collective action, of national power, called for little attention, as they then scarcely ex- isted among us and even yet do not appear to the extent prevailing in Europe. Men of pioneer type, Roundhead, Pilgrim, Puritan, American, have detested favor and privilege and pre- cedence of every kind. The toll of the rich and the dole to the poor are alike repugnant to them. John Hay once said of the people of the new state of Ohio, "They knew no want they could not fill for them- selves. They knew none to whom they regarded themselves as superior, and none to whom they were inferior." To this, Senator Bayard added further, "They are too self-willed, independent, and self-centered to be ruled by anybody but themselves." "No more, no less," says Justice Marshall — "just citizens." NATURE OF DEMOCRACY 99 The fact that America has been preeminently the land of pioneers still influences all her institutions. In an equal start, in equality before the law, in equal access to the land, to education, to legislation, her people find their political ideals. DEMOCRACY ANX> COLLECTIVISM Democracy is a cooperative association in which minorities yield to majorities their will, but not their personal rights or their opinions. Respect for rights of minorities is therefore fundamental. But it is evident that individualism must also be intelligent and coopera- tive. As population grows more dense and society more complex, the necessity for conciliatory adjust- ments will become more pressing. No man is strong of himself alone. The community contributes to his strength and calls for return in kind. Nations and communities are held together not by force, but by good-will and common interest. The permanence of good-will demands the suppres- sion of all menace arising from within society itself. Money power, for example, should not be allowed to imperil freedom and justice. As a protection against such (possible) domination, various plans have been proposed, some of them resting on the principle of common ownership of sources of profit, whether of land, machinery, or means of transportation. It is a problem for statesmanship to protect the state from individualism turned predatory on the one hand and from the repression of initiative on the other. A characteristic of the American people is to distrust theoretical extremes and to follow more or less consist- 100 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS ently a middle path between individualism and state socialism. If the trend of the centiu-y is toward en- forced collectivism, this nation is likely to be one of the last to hold out. DEMOCRACY AND WOMANHOOD In a perfected democracy, women will naturally acquire a political voice. This by no means implies release from duties and responsibilities inherent in motherhood, but rather relief from burdens imposed by man by virtue of superior physical force. It is true that in civilized life most interests of men and women coincide. But not aU, and a poUtical society exclusively "man-made" may be unbearable in its finer aspects. No interest public or personal can in justice be left unrepresented. Moreover, the use of the ballot is of itself an education. The future of democracy is in the largest degree dependent on home influences, and in its development the enfranchise- ment of women must form an integral part. VII INTERNATIONALISM AND FEDERATION Washington warned us against entangling alliances ... I should never . . . consent to an entangling alliance, but I would gladly assent to a disentangling alliance which would disentangle the peoples from . . . separate and private interests and unite the people of the world to pre- serve the peace of the world upon a basis of right and justice. There is liberty then, not limitations. There is freedom, not entanglement. — WooDBOw Wilson AT present the world community of nations con- sists of about forty-eight states claiming to be sovereign. "But the social activities of the human race do not permit of partition into water-tight national compartments." The interests of society, even those of the individual, overflow such narrow boundaries. The functions of states as now recognized rest on traditions established before travel and communica- tion became general. For while other institutions have become adjusted to the fluidity and speed of the modern world, the state has lagged behind, enveloped in a fog of superstition, and beset by nativism and hysteria, a heritage from the unscientific Middle Ages. It is usually assiuned that modern states, demo- cratic or otherwise, represent the last word in political organization. But the theory of the state has under- gone fundamental changes in the course of history, and the present impulse towards federation and arbi- tration presages still greater ones to come. Nation- alism is on trial. Federation, successfully demon- strated in our own country, points the way forward. Out of the varied relations of men and nations arises a spirit of cooperation, mutual trust, and mutual 101 102 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS dependence extending far beyond the borders of any sovereign state. This world-feeling is known as inter- nationalism, a widening of nationalism to embrace the general welfare of humanity. It is not opposed to nationaUsm except in narrow and selfish aspects. It makes patriotism planetary instead of nativistic. All important human interests — science, education, literature, art, trade, transportation, banking, .justice — overflow every geographic boundary. All men of extended activities have now become in a degree citizens of the world. Only political affairs, internal and foreign, remain rigidly national. Internationalism is not identical with cosmopoli- tanism. The cosmopolitan claims to be at home in all regions alike; he is "a man without a country." The internationalist's point of view involves no denial of home or race. To shed all trace of nativity, is to lose, not to gain. Something should be added to love of country, not be taken away. THE WORLD GROWN BOTH SMALL AND LARGE The relative freedom of the world from war in modern times has made possible great advances in the applications of science. In no respect has this been more remarkable than in the matter of communi- cation and transportation. On sea and land, distance has been armihilated and remote peoples are closer together today than were the various parts of a small kingdom a century ago. Instead of its taking three months or more to cross the Atlantic, one may now make the voyage in less than a week and can send ahead of him a message consuming but a few moments INTERNATIONALISM AND FEDERATION 103 in transit. In ordinary times, a day will suffice to send word to almost any part of the civilized globe. Everywhere the inventions of science now maintain a compelling hold. The result is seen in the extension of commerce, trade, education, missionary activities, — in short, of all efforts which bring together remote regions and divergent races. Furthermore, the extension of railway, steamship, telegraph, and banking service to all parts of the world has made the whole earth an economic unit. Currents of trade set far beyond national boundaries. Capital goes wherever it sees a prospect of profit. Even labor, less mobile than capital, becomes also fluid in its degree. Information conveyed almost instantaneously around the world becomes common property. Our resultant outlook over the affairs of men and nations adds much to the complexity of life as well as to its interest, but equally also to its effectiveness. The interrelations of financial adjustment give to the economic world a sort of sensory system. Whatever affects one part of it is instantly felt by all the others. In morals, even, the world is fast becoming a unit. Broadly speaking, the same essential code prevails throughout civilization, because it is everywhere the result of like experience. Enlightened individuals of all races have the same moral outlook. Reactionary exceptions develop in connection with the war system and particularly in those phases termed "dynastic," but the spirit of the times is setting more and more strongly away from dynastic and purely nationalistic ideals. "True patriotism demands a nation without frontiers." 104 DEMOCEACY AND WORLD RELATIONS As we have said, the world is now very small. Every caravan goes through our front yard. At the same time, by virtue of internationalism, the small world has become very large. We live, not in a corner with a few thousand neighbors at the most, but among untold millions of souls with countless diverging in- terests. Nations have no longer natiu-al boundaries. Roads, railways, telegraphs, common interests, common speech cross every border. No state truly enlightened now . enforces uniformity in race, language, or religion within its confines. Even the most isolated nation is becom- ing in its degree a melting pot of races. World-trade crosses every frontier freely imless checked by a costly system of protective tariffs. POWERS OR JURISDICTIONS The current conception of a state has long been that of a "power," its importance being measm-ed by the degree of harm it can inflict on others. The theory which must ultimately prevail will be that of a simple "jurisdiction," boundary lines representing merely the extent of local legislation and administration. Where one jurisdiction ceases, another will begin. The Canadian boundary ^ is an example of the contact of nations not as powers but as jurisdictions. ' The history of the Rush-Bagot convention of 1818, its origin and its effects, furnishes the most significant illustration of the way in which bound- ary defense will be naturally treated by democratic states. Whether the Great Lakes should permanently divide or unite two great conmionwealths was settled summarily by the agreement that ships of war should not be placed on them. It is a long road from this precedent to the freedom of the seas, but one that has no turning. INTERNATIONALISM AND FEDERATION 105 This four-thousand-mile Hue, ranging through the most diversified conditions, disputed nearly all the way "with all the brutal frankness common to blood rela- tions," has for nearly a hundred years not known a fortress, a soldier, a warship, or a gun. It is a peace boundary, the limit of one republic, the beginning of another. It furnishes also the best precedent in the method and results of disarmament. The component parts of our Union sustain to each other just this kind of relation. Each of the forty- eight included commonwealths makes its own local laws, collects taxes and executes justice, subject to the general provisions of the Federal Constitution. These "United States" can indulge in no serious rival- ries or conflicts because under the articles of union they cannot prey on each other either by obstructive tariffs or by military operations, while in all contro- versies, they (and their individual citizens) have equal access to final justice through the Supreme Court of the nation. Disputes between states are, as a matter of fact, very rare, such as have occurred having been settled by friendly suits for final judgment.^ International cooperation, close friendship, political understanding, and free business intercourse serve the best interests of every people. Reciprocity is the word of the future in international affairs. This in- volves a degree of cooperation pointing directly toward the transformation of nations from "fighting units" into associated jurisdictions. ■ This should "reduce ' The difficulties leading to the Civil War were not between the individual states as such, but were in theory a struggle for the assertion of States' Rights, as opposed to Federal control. 106 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS the frontier from a monstrous chasm to a convenient administrative division." ^ THE LAND WHERE HATRED DIES European peoples bear a heavy burden of historic remembrance. Scarcely a province or city has escaped sack or ravage by alien soldiery. Racial memories are long; bitterness and revenge have been trans- mitted from generation to generation. Internation- alism tends slowly to heal the ancient scars, but traces of old wounds still vex the public policy of every nation. The American republic is the one great cosmopolitan state. Its political ideals, from the first, have been those of British freedom, with a philosophical inspi- ration from France. Its citizens, primarily English, have been reinforced by freedom-loving strains from almost every quarter of the globe. Under the new conditions, all these have been more or less perfectly assimilated, and traditional antipathies have been largely forgotten in new duties. Assimilation has fairly kept pace with freedom. The repubKc has no loftier ideal than to remain the land where hatred dies away. "The essence of a nation," according to Ernest Renan, is "not only to hold many things in common but also many in ob- livion." Not in an obscure corner, not in a feudal Europe, not in an anti- quated appanage where no onward step can be taken without rebellion is this seed of benevolence laid in the furrow with tears of hope; but in this broad America of God and man, where the ' Walter Lippmann, Stakes of Diplomacy, INTERNATIONALISM AND FEDERATION 107 forest is only now falling, and the green earth opened to the inun- dation of immigrant men from all quarters of oppression and guilt, here where not a family, not a few, but mankind shaU say what shall be ; here w^tsk, Shall it be war or peace ? (Emerson.) INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION Peace and democracy alike demand internationalism. But internationalism as a live force compels some meas- ure of cooperative organization. This will involve a repudiation of the theory that the state exists as a divinely appointed and spiritual collective entity above and beyond the individuals which compose it."^ The claim of absolute sovereignty on the part of any nation must be abandoned. There is no more funda- mental reason for it than for absolute sovereignty on the part of the individual. Government must be recognized as the cooperative effort of human groups for mutual help and without animus against the lives and property of others. Promising beginnings of official international co- operation are found in the Universal Postal Union, Universal Telegraph Union, monetary unions, sanita- tion conventions, and the like. All these imply a relaxation of absolute sovereignty and point toward a loose form of federation adequate to prevent tariff- warfare and to abate rivalries in armament. The framework of society is made up of concessions on the part of the individual. International organi- zation requires parallel concessions by the nations. Such an organization is already forming itself naturally in the course of events ; it will succeed unless pushed » See Chapter IV, "The Dynastic State." 108 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS too urgently. It consists simply in the process of adapting national policies to social and economic rela- tions already existing. The many plans of international government thus far proposed all bear some resemblance to that of the United States, though naturally with much less cen- tralization and a far higher insistence on States' Rights. The basis of all these propositions is "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind," as phrased in the Declaration of Independence of 1776. The proof that the wind no longer blows towards imperialism is that the governments themselves have begmi to speak a new language. We hear no longer in any responsible quarter the old talk of seizure of territories, imposition of indemnities, bleeding the nations white, paralysis of commerce and industries. Even while the great states are busy with the havoc of destruction, we may see through the sorrows of today, a brighter tomorrow, the signs of return to wisdom and common sense. (H. Hodler : Geneva.) A LEAGUE OF NATIONS The conception of an international league of peace is a very old one, revived and much debated in recent times. It is in itself most attractive. Some such arrangement, accompanied by reduction of armament, seems near at hand. Its importance is tremendously vital, but half-measures will not secure it. None of the great nations should be arbitrarily excluded; all must accept the scheme whole-heartedly, and on the same essentially democratic terms. As Kant observes, "In lasting peace . . . the civil constitution of every state must be republican." Certain obstacles in the way of the most recent INTERNATIONALISM AND FEDERATION 109 proposition, that of "The League to Enforce Peace," may be here considered. By this scheme it is proposed to prohibit any state from initiating war without first appealing to the methods of conciliation and arbitration. Furthermore, it is assumed that any party or parties guilty of infraction of the general agreement shall be subject to punishment in which all the other members must participate. Such dis- cipline is first to take the form of economic boycott or other methods of ostracism, to be followed, if neces- sary, by actual war on the offender. The chief inherent difficulties naturally arise in the theory of the sovereign state and in the varying rela- tions of state and people. By the necessary articles of organization, no nation could be paramount; all must be equally subordinate to the general purpose. It is to be feared, however, that an effort to coerce a powerful member of the league, no matter what its transgression, might result in such alUances as would disrupt the general organization, leaving the old pre- dicament, of the balance of power. At the same time, nations whose duty it would be to inflict the penalty would be obliged to serve at once as "judge, jury, and executioner." Moreover, as already said, though force of arms may secure order, it cannot maintain peace. The most to be said for compulsion is that it may check aggression, a matter sometimes, of course, of the highest importance. It has in itself no creative impulse. Its function is restraint. In some cases restraint is the one thing most needed until the in- fluence of higher motives can be made to prevail. The exact and final purpose of a wholesome league of 110 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS nations is to bring moral force to bear on the main- tenance of justice among nations, parallel with the demand for justice among men. It must further be remembered that a league of peace depends for its permanence on devotion to aims higher than nationahstic ones. It must have its foun- dation in Ukemindedness rather than in statutes or decrees. In the past, such efforts as those of the Holy Alliance a century ago have degenerated into devices to support autocracy. From the dynastic point of view, peace has been used as a method of repressing revolution and forestalling reform. Even in demo- cratic countries similar conceptions aboxmd. There is danger that a league of peace, by obstructing necessary political readjustments, really might stand in the way of democratic advance. The Holy Alliance of 1815, following the Conference of Vienna, was made up of the "brotherhood of sover- eigns ruling by divine right"; its watchword, as al- ready noted, was legitimacy, the nearest approach to the ideal of liberty which Talleyrand was able to secure. This alliance became, through Metternich's Pact of Verona in 1822, "a conspiracy against popu- lar liberty." ^ It is evident that a league made up of both autocratic and democratic states could not endure; an alliance is always at the mercy of its weakest or most violent members. A state which acknowledges no obligations to the world at large and which is further controlled by an irresponsible dynasty, buttressed against its own people and armed to the teeth against all others, can 1 See Chapter V, " Imperialism and Trade." INTERNATIONALISM AND FEDERATION 111 have no permanent place in world councils. On the other hand, if dynastic elements are excluded, the con- dition is at once that of the armed peace, with its perilous and fallacious balance of power. But even this, however precarious, is a step forward from the world-anarchy of the past. Moreover, the inevitable abatement of armament will reduce correspondingly the power and the menace of absolutism. The necessity of an effective international organiza- tion which may abate armament can hardly be ques- tioned. But no league of peace can endure, if based on the old traditions, "with all the old inflammable material lying about." The conception of a commu- nity of nations as developed in England by the Society of Friends must be the ultimate form assumed by any permanent league of peace. In the fine practical vision of Mr. Asquith, the league of nations must be not merely an organization to prevent war, but a partnership of the nations in the joint pursuit of a freer and fuller life for the countless millions who, by their efforts and their sacrifices, generation after generation, maintain and enrich the inheritance of humanity. John Spencer Bassett has well stated the final world problem : The law of unification is working so strongly in these days of international relations that we are at last at the point at which we can no longer elect to remain distinct in our national activities. We must choose between a world-state through conquest and a world-state through mutual agreement. Which shall we take? To try to go on with the states entirely distinct is to invite their conquest by a world-state. {.The Lost Fruits of Waterloo.) 112 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS THE UNITED STATES OP EUROPE One aspiration towards international government is embodied in the conception of the "United States of Europe." In the formation of the American Union, the indi- vidual states each relinquished its sovereignty, its right to make war and to levy tariffs, — accepting at the same time the principle of interchangeable citizen- ship, and thus becoming xmits in a great federated system. A similar condition is already foreshadowed in Europe. It may actualize as soon and in so far as the various peoples take possession of their national governments. But states under autocratic domination cannot readily affiliate with democracies, for autocracy and democracy are, as already indicated, each in a degree a menace to the other. It is also evident that the political and social changes which make federation possible must arise from within the state itself. Nevertheless, it is certain that the materials for some form of international federation already exist in Europe, if only they can be brought together. Free trade and the suppression of rival armaments and of secret diplomacy (with ultimate interchangeable citi- zenship) would make real the " United States of Europe." Something less than this would give a workable agree- ment. It is likely, indeed, that federation may exist in fact before it does in name. The fact, however, is the important thing. It is not the form but the animating spirit that counts. Nationalism need not be sup- pressed, only checked in its extreme manifestations. INTERNATIONALISM AND FEDERATION 113 Nations and nationalities will still remain, eacTi con- trolling its own tatimate affairs. The less the central government interferes with local customs and adjust- ments, the better. Each national group, like each individual, should enjoy all possible freedom that does not interfere with the freedom of others. A WORl© PARLIAMENT The conception of a universal Parliament of Man, the Federation of the World, occurs frequently in modern philosophy and poetry. As a moral ideal it is worthy of the highest respect, but as a practical adjustment it seems neither desirable nor possible. An assemblage of representatives gathered at one capital to make laws for all humanity offers no great promise. World congresses should deal with world needs only, all ordinary legislation being left to home rule.^ Indeed, local self-government needs to be much more widely extended than is now the case. Humanity needs more self-control, more personal responsibility, more initiative and more freedom, more of willingness to live and let live, not universal parliamentary statutes. Such general legislation as may be necessary will be established through its own precedents, by a perfected Supreme Tribunal of the World. Special agreements, constituting a framework of positive international law, ^ "Mutual fructifying cannot take place without national individuality. I cannot look forward with any enthusiasm to a time when the world may become one great community with but one language. I am afraid it would be a drab-colered world." (Professor Pridtjof Nansen.) "I should never like to see the world rolled out flat.'* (Goldwin Smith.) 114 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS should be achieved through conferences at stated peri- ods like those at The Hague in 1899 and 1907. Nationalism, as already noted, is not the last word in government. It registers merely an advance, a great one if you please, from outlawry towards organized civilization. Nationalism involves orderly relations among individuals ; federation implies orderly rela- tions among states. The trend of history seems plain. Just as feudalism gave place to nationalism, so must nationalism merge into federation, each transition marking a movement from anarchy toward law. VIII INTERNATIONAL LAW, ARBITRATION, AND CONCILIATION The Game of Life demands the same freedom of movement on the part of every player. — Stephen Peakl Andrews ALL law arises in the effort to protect society against force. It is in a sense an alliance of the many against the few, of the law-abiding against the turbulent, of the feeble against the powerful. This fact is frankly recognized by the advocates of monarchical order. Bernhardi, for example, asserts : "Law is only a makeshift, the reality is force. Law is for the weak ; force is for the strong." This state- ment contains a large element of historical truth. The original purpose of all law is to protect the people at large against unrestrained violence. This is accom- plished through processes of order or methodical regu- larity. Without law, progress in civilization would be impossible; there can be no advance in a society cowed by violence or beset by marauding bands. The generalization holds true whether the marauders be isolated highwaymen, bandit soldiers of fortune, or an empire pledged to international freebootery. Even dynastic legitimacy, a stumbling-block in the way of democratic advance, arose, as already stated, in relief of popular distress. TEIBAL LAW^ Apparently the most primitive human society was at no time absolutely lawless. Custom, tradition, reH- ' In the discussion which follows, certain paragraphs have been arranged or abridged from Erehbiel. 115 116 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS gious observances, all are forms of regulated cooper- ation. In all primitive groups a supernatural origin was assumed for law as interpreted by priests, prophets, or chieftains. Each group recognized its own tribal god as the original law-giver. Oracles, ordeals, and portents were manifestations of the will of this deity. Relations within the tribe gradually became adjusted in accordance with purposes assumed to be binding because of supernatural origin. Outside matters enjoyed no such simple adjustment. With no general alliance and no mutual agreements as to morals or right, tribal groups were to each other as wild beasts. Hence to the "in-group " all others — "out-groups" — were barbarians. This point of view has by no means disappeared from history. From it is derived "the hyena theory of nations," to use a phrase of Pierre Loti. NATURAL LAW AND POSITIVE LAW Throughout the various mutations of imperialism and feudalism, the overlord acted as law-maker and dispenser of justice as well. Decrees were held to be of divine origin, whether originating nominally with the emperor or with some one of his vassal princes. Divine sanction attached to state, ruler, and decree alike. The common man was held in absolute sub- servience. Questions under dispute, when not settled by arbitrary decision or by favoritism, were often tested by ordeal. Trial by battle was the supreme form, it being assumed that one having his quarrel just was thrice armed and sure of divine interposition. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARBITRATION 117 In feudal days war was chronic, its virulence being sometimes mitigated by the Imperial Peace at the intervention of the emperor, or the Truce of God im- posed by the church. As the Crusades and other adventures extended the range of experience, faith in the tribal God, watch- ing over the affairs of his pet clan, began to wane. The wars that accompanied and followed the Ref- ormation and which were carried on in the name of religion had their source, like other wars, in highly mixed motives and purposes — political, social, and economic as well as religious. The hideous devastation incident to their operations convinced rational men that religion could not be safeguarded or promoted by slaughter, or, in Luther's words, that "the force of arms must be kept far from matters of the Gospel." The failure of religious warfare tended to discredit assumptions of divine right, opening the way to "natu- ral law" — that is, law resting on conditions and obligations inherent in human nature. This idea, though never accepted by the masses, has compelled the attention of jurists. It led toward positive law based on legislation — that is, on agreements of the people in the safeguarding of justice against force. Positive law with its nucleus of natural law forms the keystone of modem judicial organization. Positive law points directly toward democracy. Discrediting the divine validity of royal decrees or baronial edicts, the people began in one way or another, especially in free cities, to make their own adjustments and to create their own political machinery. The ballot once devised, its usage was gradually extended 118 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS and perfected. Deliberative assemblies were formed of duly chosen representatives, and methods were devised for the selection of administrative officers. In main- taining local order, police imder civil control tended to displace the army, while loyalty to a personage largely gave way to national patriotism. RISE AND GROWTH OP INTERNATIONAL LAW The acceptance of positive law, or human agreements controlling individuals, led naturally to the conception of international law, or agreements as to the mutual behavior of nations. International law is necessarily incompatible with the idea of absolute national sover- eignty, just as the rules of common decency interfere with the absolute freedom of the individual. Nations, like men, must abate their rough angles. International law is the expression in statutes of the spirit of inter- nationalism. And just as personal and tribal law arose for the defense of the individual and of society, so inter- national law has been evolving for a similar purpose in the comity of nations. Concurrently arise methods looking toward constructive adjustments of differences between states, through conciliation and arbitration. Until all the nations realize that a nation is to a nation what an individual is to an individual within a nation, a fellow bound by a law of reciprocity, there is no safety for mankind.'^ During the Middle Ages free cities, municipalities, and kingdoms existed side by side, under subjection, real or nominal, to the emperor and the church, and all of them usually in a condition of war. ' J. M. Robertson, Britain versus Oermany. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARBITRATION 119 In this riot of confusion, some method of bringing order became a crying need, and one voice after another urged the necessity of regulated agreements leading toward what is now called "international law." Among the many who gave expression to the need of order the leading place must be assigned to Hugo Grotius (Hugo de Groot, 1583-1635) of Delft in Hol- land, the "Father of International Law." His chief work was On the Law of War and Peace {De Jure Belli ac Pads). The primacy of Grotius is thus eloquently indicated by Andrew D. White : ^ In the very midst of the welter of evil, at a point in time to all appearances hopeless, in a nation in which every man, woman, and child was under sentence of death from its sovereign, was bom a man who wrought as no other has done for a redemption of civili- zation from the cause of that misery ; who thought out for Europe the principles of right and reason in international law, who made them heard, who gave a noble change to the course of human a£Fairs, whose thoughts, reasonings, suggestions, and appeals pro- duced an environment in which came an evolution of humanity which still continues. This man thus made appeal from the intolerance, selfishness, and terrorism of his time to "the great court that sits in silence, the heart and conscience of universal humanity" as against "imreason, bigotry, party passion, individual ambition, all masquerading as saving faith." The work of Grotius (written mainly in prison) found wide acceptance, though only after his death. On his labors and those of his co-workers and successors ' Seven Oreat Statesmen. 120 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS has been built the framework of international law, — still far from complete. In its development, three distinct schools or types of thought have appeared. The natiiralistic recognizes natural law, that which is inherent in the very nature of things and which when understood cannot be modified or extended. The positivist deals with man-made law, those agreements which have been or may be actually accepted among nations. The school of Grotians recognizes natiu-al law as far as it goes, with the additions which positive law, an outgrowth of human experience, has achieved. Within the last hundred years international con- ventions have made large contributions to positive law. A considerable part of the work of the two Hague Conferences was to unify and codify these vary- ing agreements. The work is still unfinished, and un- happily many of the accepted articles have been lately ignored by the German Empire. The Declara- tion of London, drawn up by accredited delegates, is the chief codification of the laws of marine relations. It was, however, not accepted by Great Britain, and at present has no recognized validity. Such attempts at alleviation in warfare seem to the writer not properly part of international law. The effort to include them in a world-code is one cause of the relative failure of International law at the present day. To reduce warfare to a system is to legaKze it, an effort certain to inure to the advantage of the least scrupulous belligerent. To grant equal belliger- ent rights to the burglar and to the householder makes legal neutrality impossible. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARBITRATION 121 SANCTIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW International law as now existing arises out of cus- tom and tradition, agreements between states, labors of jurists, and precedents set by arbitral courts. It may be regarded as a World Constitution, the basal framework on which statutes and agreements must rest. Thus a substantial foundation has been laid, but the code has never become imiversal and still lacks uniformity. The main inherent difficulty again naturally centers in the dynastic assumption of un- limited state sovereignty. Nations do not yet acknowledge obedience to a universal code. They can be held, if at all, only by those agreements they actually accept and sign. Even then they are bound only so long as they choose. Thus far no recognized force exists to compel a state to observe its obligations. And the complete sovereignty which enables it to sign a treaty is held in certain quarters also to imply the right to abrogate at will. Inability to break promises would, it is claimed, de- tract from national prestige. A further handicap in connection with legal settle- ments of international disputes lies in the tardy mobili- zation of public opinion, on which the efficacy of all statutes depends and which does not quickly rally to the support of an international code. In many nations diplomatists count on the immediate popular accept- ance of any nationalistic claim as against the validity of international agreement. Sober thought may come too late. It is to be presumed that whenever and wherever public opinion shall acquire lucidity and 122 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS courage adequate to rise above partisan nationalism, the decrees of international law will stand unquestioned. The promotion of a universal code demands patience. It requires time and experience to ripen public opinion. Moreover, "in war, laws are silent," and law-makers also. It is difficult for law to hold its own in the face of hostile armament, equipped for breaking the peace. The maintenance of international law seems to demand some form of peace alliance, perhaps with a world-police force or organized body under the joint control of all cooperating nations. But when the civilized world honorably desires to avoid war and military dominance, a formal alliance may cease to be necessary. All that may then be needed is the completion of the arbitral court. INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION Personal differences between civilized men are no longer settled by the "ordeal of combat." A juster and more humane method, the appeal to law, is natu- rally chosen. The same rule should apply between nations whenever practicable. The theory of arbitration is as old as civil govern- ment itself. Personal and individual at first, then tribal, with the development of intercommunication it was gradually applied to larger and larger units, becoming finally an affair of nations. The earliest official arbiters were mainly princes or potentates, very frequently the Pope.^ On occasion free cities were ' The most important arbitration in earlier times was the establishment of the Line of Demarcation by Pope Alexander VI, in 1493. Under that INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARBITRATION 123 called upon to act. In modern times bodies of jurists have been usually, though not always, chosen. In general, the peaceful adjustment of international differences takes one of three forms, — conciliation, arbitration, or judicial determination. Conciliation is a method of friendly adjustment out- side of court and initiated usually through the media- tion of some neutral. Certain conciliation agreements effected by the United States with individual nations have been termed "cooling-off treaties." These pro- vide a period of time for investigation and mediation between the assertion of a grievance and a lapse into war. Arbitration is a court procedure by which the settle- ment of the difference in question is left to an unpreju- diced judge or tribimal. Of late years, since the partial establishment of the International Tribunal at The Hague, most cases of this kind have been brought before it. Thus far the weakness of arbitra- tion has lain mainly in a tendency to "split the dif- ference" between two contending parties rather than to render absolute justice. In judicial determination the court gives no con- sideration to mediation or compromise, but adheres rigidly to the letter of the law as accepted by both parties. In cases laid before an arbitral court the testimony of witnesses in evidence should not be required, but all details as to fact should be agreed upon in advance by the parties concerned, leaving the question of decision all new-found lands and seas east of a line crossing the middle part of modern Brazil were assigned to Portugal, all west of it to Spain. 124 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS judicial equity the sole one to be decided.^ No im- portant international case has yet been subjected to rigid judicial determination, most nations seeming to prefer to risk a degree of compromise rather than to insist on absolute justice. Recent jurists, however, tend to make no distinction between arbitration and judicial determination. The advance in arbitral meth- ods is likely to obliterate discrepancies in the two ideals of procedure.^ Arbitration is not, under present conditions, a final remedy for international discord. For one reason, we have as yet no means of compelling a resort to it. Only minor diflFerences not rendered acute by diplo- matic intrigue or the clamor of the press have as a rule been submitted. Thus far no nation has ever suggested arbitration of an issue on which it proposed to fight. Furthermore, large nations do not deal with small ones on equal terms in this regard. When no ulterior motive exists, differences as a rule may be readily settled by conciliation or by arbitration. Of course, a quarrel deliberately provoked for some financial or political end is not likely to come up for adjustment. And a nation wantonly invaded can hardly expect to secure relief through an appeal to arbitration. ' The only alternative to this would apparently be to grant to the arbitral court the same right to summon and to cross-examine witnesses and to punish perjury as is now exercised by the highest national courts. Occasional notable aberrations of justice in arbitral courts have resulted from failure to adopt such procedure. The Paris Fur Seal Arbitration of 1891 is a case in point. Much of the testimony presented before the court was wholly untrustworthy, consisting of affidavits known to be perjured. (See Jordan, Imperial Democracy.) 1 See John Bassett Moore, World Court, 1917. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARBITRATION 125 ARBITRAL TREATIES AND DECISIONS^ Arbitral treaties have been of several different kinds. Those of occasional arbitration are framed to end an existing dispute. Agreements for permanent arbitra- tion have to do with possible future differences, from which are usually excepted matters concerning the constitution of the state, " questions of vital interest, independence, national honor, and those which concern the interests of third parties." The phrases vital interest and national honor having no definite mean- ing, it has been proposed to abandon their use. Certain questions, it is however agreed, are non- justiciable — that is, not subject to arbitration, be- cause they concern internal affairs or matters not to be stated in accepted terms of law or equity. For instance, the question of granting citizenship to Asiat- ics in America is an internal affair, not to be considered by an outside tribunal. Other non-justiciable matters deal with real or assumed policies of the state as such. Of these, the Monroe Doctrine may serve as an example. Treaties of "compulsory arbitration" cover all topics not expressly excluded. "Unlimited arbitra- tion" includes further all questions which are truly international and outside the range of local admin- istration. Arbitration agreements may be temporary only, running for a specified term of years (usually five or ten), or they may be permanent — that is, operative until abrogated by one side or both. ' The following paragraphs are largely condensed from Krehbiel, No- tvmolism. War, and Society. 126 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS In fact, in modern times the principle of arbitration has been generally approved, except when an insistent faction has led the populace to call too loudly for war. Hundreds of treaties involving partial or total arbitra- tion have been signed by different nations, and 243 cases have been finally adjusted, since 1800.^ Accord- ing to Gaston Moch, 194 arbitral treaties were in actual force in 1909. Occasionally an arbitral decree has been later shown to be partially unjust. This is a matter of very slight importance as compared with the cost, losses, and dangers of a resort to force. Subjects of disagreement cover almost the entire range of possible angles of friction. The most common source of contention has been that of boundary lines. Thus far every arbitral decision has been accepted, though one or two of them with some hesitation or delay. This seems to indicate the strength of world opinion in international affairs. THE HAGUE CONFERENCES The two Hague Conferences (1899, 1907) were of the nature of a parliament of nations. Their work was achieved with much doubt and difficulty. The 1 During the nineteenth century Great Britain submitted 70 cases to arbi- tration ; the United States, 56. The most important recent ones have been the following : Alabama Case (United States and Great Britain) 1871-2 ; Carolines (Germany and France) 1885; Fur Seal Arbitration (United States and Great Britain) 1891 ; Samoan Case (Germany, Great Britain, and United States) 1899; Guiana Boundary (Great Britain and Vene- zuela) 1899; House-Tax Case (European nations against Japan) 1905; Newfoundland Fisheries (United States and Great Britain (1909) ; Casa- blanca Case (Germany and France) 1909. mXERNATIONAL LAW AND ARBITRATION 127 remarkable fact about them is that they achieved anything at all, so many of the delegates being pledged in advance against various proposed agreements. The three most important results were the following: (a) the partial codification of international law, (6) the establishment, as yet incomplete, of an international tribunal,^ and (c) the provision for official world con- gresses at intervals of eight years. The meeting due in 1915 naturally could not take place, but it is believed that regular sessions will follow the close of the Great War. The first conference (1899) was called by the Tsar of Russia under the influence of the monumental work on war by Jean de Bloch. Efforts for conciliation and many unofficial world peace congresses had prepared the way for this historic meeting. The second con- ference (1907) was also called by the Tsar, but at the invitation of President Roosevelt, the initiative having come from the Interparliamentary Union. The Interparliamentary Union is a quasi-official gathering of legislators of all nations carrying on a work of conciliation akin to that of the Hague Con- ferences. It was founded in 1889 by Frederic Passy of Paris and Randall Cremer of London. It had, in 1912, 3640 members, approximately one fifth the total number eligible. It holds its meetings in various cities, one of them having been convened at St. Louis. It is a most important medium for mutual understand- ' At present a certain number of potential judges have been named in each of the leading nations. From these, at need and by agreement, the court is made up. Governments have not yet fixed on a method of selec- tion for a standing international tribunal to serve as a World Supreme Court. 128 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS ing among representative bodies and seems destined to exert a powerful influence on the side of conciliation and international law. MEASURES OF CONCILIATION Modern history has been rich in plans for the abate- ment of war through conciliation as well as through arbitration. Along this line are prominent propositions for leagues of peace, freedom of the seas, unobstructed trade, reduction of armament, neutralization of small nations or of particular districts, adjustments by joint high commissions, and "cooling-off treaties" to delay the onset of war. Several of these projects have already been discussed in preceding pages. One of the most important of all looks toward free trade, including the "open door" to colonial depend- encies.^ The chief obstacle to freedom of trade hes in the tariff system.^ ' See Chapter IV, "Imperialism and Trade." ' A tariff or customs duty is a special tax placed upon impori;s. This may have in general one of four purposes : (o) to injure competitors, (6) to favor particular commercial groups, (c) to promote home industries, or (d) to raise revenue. A cut-throat tariff (o) is a tax levied with the definite pmpose of crippling the commerce of some other nation. States like Serbia and Bulgaria, with imperfect access to the sea, have often suffered bitterly from tariff limitation. A preferential tariff (6) is one in which special re- ductions are made in favor of certain trade groups ; it is a matter chiefly of colonial dependencies. A protective tariff C") is levied for the purpose of helping producers to control the home market by raising or steadying the price of competing foreign goods. Its general effect and intention are, of course, to raise the price of goods at home, at least until stimulated home-production may shut out competitors. Tariff for revenue only (d) is a tax on commerce for the raising of money and with no ulterior end. As to these various forms of taxation, it may be said that the first and second are serious incentives to international discord; the third is usually INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARBITRATION 129 "Free trade," says Cobden, "is the best peace- maker." Many authorities, including George Brandes and Henri Lambert, claim that it is the only sure one. President Wilson has expressed himself similarly in the following: The establishment of selfish and exclusive economic leagues . . . we deem no proper basis for peace of any kind — least of all, for an endxu'iag peace. . . . The essential principle of peace is the actual equality of nations in all matters of right and privilege. (Woodrow Wilson.) Limitation or rather abolition of armament is also a requirement for permanent peace. This, however, must await a general agreement, as one-sided reduction would be of no avail. Under the "balance of power" any limitation was impossible. Under the dynastic system it is possible bnly as bankruptcy may neces- sitate it. All pressure, political, economic, and mili- tary, has tended toward imchecked expansion. Never- theless, there is now reason to believe that reduction of armament is inevitable, for the unparalleled drain of resources seems to leave no other alternative. Ap- parently no nation will have the men, the money, or the disposition to continue the "armed peace," what- ever the temper of ruling factions may be. a matter of domestic policy, not necessarily involving foreign affairs, while the fourth, tariff for revenue, is undemocratic, because, being added to the general cost of living, people do not know what they are paying, nor for that matter what becomes of it afterwards. "Any system of raising state revenues, whatever its defectiveness, . . . is preferable to customs duties. The only merit of this system is that it makes it possible to raise taxes without the knowledge and consent of the people taxed." (Henri Lambert.) 130 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS The neutralization of small states seems on the whole a promising measure of conciliation, notwithstanding the recent experiences of Belgium and Luxemburg. Switzerland's neutrality, for instance, has been re- spected for more than a century. In independence with guaranteed neutrality may lie the solution of the problems of certain districts. In such case a neutral- ized state should apparently be required to dismantle its fortresses. The joint high commission is one of the most prac- ticable means of dispelling international misunder- standings and thereby of averting war. Such a body consists of members chosen from each nation concerned and to whom is intrusted the duty of investigation and adjustment of unsettled questions. By this device war has been many times averted. It was used by Washington, Lincoln, and Cleveland to avoid con- flict with Great Britain, and by John Adams to avert war with France. During the nineteenth century 247 such commissions were in operation, the United States participating in 82 of them. Matters that may acquire great complexity through the medium of diplomatic notes and the comments of a venal or partisan press become readily clarified when men with authority meet face to face. It is interesting to note that the joint high com- mission goes far back into history. Apparently the earliest on record appears in the Book of Joshua, Chap- ter XXII. Here is described the establishment of a joint Altar of Concord on the banks of the river Jordan, henceforth to serve as boundary between the lands of INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARBITRATION 131 the Children of Israel and those of the tribes of Reuben, Gad, and Manasseh. This monument is the proto- type of the Christ of the Andes, reared on the lofty boundary between Chile and Argentina as a symbol of enduring peace between the two republics. The sympathy of neighboring countries is for nations no empty somid. ... It furnishes . . . that gigantic buoyancy which, like a power of Providence, helps the victory of freedom and justice. It is the nature of all men and peoples to look around ... for friends and brothers, to provide themselves with new courage and steel themselves with new strength. (Johann Philipp Becker, 1862.) IX A NEW ORDER Justice is not something that was or is — but is to be. — Chables L. Spbadino THE end of the war must in some way disclose or bring about a league of peace or a community of states associated to maintain freedom and order as es- sentials toward the final end of justice among men and among nations. By justice I mean fair play. Justice to nationalities is of the same nature as justice to the individual man. Without it there is no enduring peace in the world-order. Injustice, in whatever form, is the blood poison of society. Just as among men, so in a community of states, freedom, order, equality before the law are vital factors. They involve the right and duty of each enlightened nationality to develop its own culture in its own way, unhampered by any form of forcible repression. With the advent of justice, lasting peace is bound to follow, — not static peace, merely holding its own, but the real peace of social progress which can be had on no other terms. In his most illuminating volume. The End of the War, Mr .Walter E. Weyl shows conclusively that "not every peace will do," and that "it must grow with the growth of the nations it holds together. It is not a glass case, rigid and fragile, but a living container, a web of the nature of the things it holds, growing, changing, alive and mortal. ... It is a part of the enveloping atmos- phere of the nations, and the nations may grow up 132 A NEW ORDER 133 healthy in its atmosphere, or they may stifle and die." . . . We have also learned that no nation nor all the nations together can proclaim " Let there be peace" and there will be peace, for that peace which the world deserves is an organic and vulnerable thing, which must be better or worse, which must die day by day and be renewed day by day as our skin dies and is renewed. We have only begun to learn the vast toxicology of peace, the virulent recon- dite poisons that destroy it, poisons not placed there by wicked men but, like fatigue germs, generated by the international body itself. NEED OF A COMMON PURPOSE A community of states must rest on common piu"pose, unity of aspiration and to some extent unity of experi- ence, else it will not hold together. But organized world- order will soon develop a loyalty of its own, even as the American Republic has drawn to itself the loyalties of its individual units. The spirit of political union develops a momentum which becomes irresistible. It puts forth an appeal at once material, emotional, and intellectual, to which all in their degree respond. Something of these elements inevitably enters into the framework of genuine patriotism. The final outcome will rest not primarily on treaties and statutes, but on the spirit and purpose which lie behind. Given a common will, any one of several of the many elaborate plans will serve. Without it, all would fail. The world is less in need of more machinery than of more self-control, more serious attention to de- tails of minding one's own business, and more patience and sympathy with the problems of others. To co- operate in large matters and to intrust details to those 134 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS nearest them is the essential principle of federation. The nearer local control comes to the hearts of the people, the more sincere will be their far-flung patriotism. On this fact the success of federation as distinct from centralization largely depends. A strongly centralized state, whether monarchical or sociahstic or both, cannot fail to be tyrannical, measuring, as it would, all prob- lems by the same yardstick. Justice is distributive. In creating a world-order, we cannot ignore the facts of geography, industry, and history. FUNDAMENTAL NECESSITIES In the community of states, whatever its official title, certain conditions are necessary. These I may sum up as 1. Limitation of sovereignty in the common interest. 2. Denial of all right of conquest. 3. Control of backward peoples in their own interest and in that of civilization. 4. Open diplomacy, with democratic control of foreign policy. 5. Abatement of national armament and its essential feature, compulsory military service of the Prussian type, maintained un- diminished in time of peace. Let us consider these points in turn. As to the first, it is evident that no world-order can recognize the dynastic claim of absolute sovereignty, a conception which must be relegated to the scrap heap of history. In every wholesome or effective civil or- ganization, the absolute sovereignty of the individual yields in a degree to the common need of order. A community of nations finds its close parallel in the com- munity of men. A NEW ORDER 135 As to the second proposition, the epoch-making words of President Wilson, spoken on February 11, 1918, in relation to final terms of world-peace and already quoted, require no further comment. Our third condition deals with colonial control. Next to the evils of absolutism itself and the dynastic system which centers in it, the treatment of backward races and the territory they occupy has been the most fruitful source of discord and abuse. The majority of the inhabitants of the world have made little progress in the amenities of life, some of them being incapable of progress in the mass, many of them falling easy victims to the incursions of liquor and disease incident to per- verted civilization. For their own welfare, for a time at least, such peoples need a degree of help from more ad- vanced races. The much abused phrase, "the white man's burden," has its legitimate interpretation. No solution of this problem can be found in treating colonies as closed preserves for group exploitation. The open door is necessary alike to the world at large and to the native races. "Dominion over palm and pine" must be regarded as a trust, not as an asset of privilege. The most hopeful prospect is that involved in the cooperative control of backward states by joint commissions elevated above all schemes of personal enrichment or national prestige. The "open door" would then become not a mere unguarded gate, but an international highway of natural trade. Our next point, open diplomacy with democratic control of foreign policy, involves the throwing of re- sponsibility for foreign as well as for domestic affairs on the people at large, of whom the diplomatists should 136 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS be merely the temporary agents. The main evil of secret diplomacy lies in its being used to cloak personal schemes under the guise of national interest. Diplo- matic problems are intricate and diflBcult at the best, but much of the complexity arises from the supposed neces- sity of hiding from the people not only the items under discussion, but also the agreements by which they are finally bound. As to our final condition, it may be said that abolition of armament, offensive and defensive, will follow natu- rally when all nations consider seriously their financial future. In war time the laws even of economics and finance are apparently suspended. In due season they take their revenge. It is, however, clear that disarma- ment must be general. No state or group of states would consent to remain wholly unarmed in the face of neighbors equipped for war. The main purpose of an alliance of nations must be to do away with force as an international argument in finance or politics. FREE PEOPLES TO RULE We have seen in our day the practical unification of the world of humanity as distinguished from that of courts and courtesans. Either the people or the kings must rule, the unit of power be either the man or the sovereign, — sovereign king or sovereign state makes no difference. Man exists as a tool of the state or the state as a creation of man. Towards the control of the world the people have been steadily moving. States differ mainly in their relation to this trend. The Great War, consciously or not, has become the supreme effort of privilege to check advancing humanity. A NEW ORDER 137 Whatever form the league of free peoples may assume, peace, conciliation, freedom, and justice shall be no empty words. The various elements in European civi- lization must still live together. But behind all con- ventions and adjustments lies the perennial necessity of likemindedness, a will for world-order founded not on rivalry and greed, but on ideals of cooperation and mutual aid. In 1871, the Treaty of Frankfort reduced nearly two milhons of free men and women in Alsace and Lorraine to the status of a flock of sheep. In 1878, the Treaty of Berlin turned over ten milhons or more of Christianized people of the Near East to be hunted as vermin by barbarian hordes. Through its consent to these demonstrations of monarchical order, Europe laid broad and deep the foundations for the world anarchy of today. They enslave their children's children who make compromise with sin. APPENDIX Pangermanism If we hate Prussians and Prussianism now, it is because they have taught us to hate Prussians and Prussianism. Whom have they ever taught to love them ? — Vernon Kellogg Of the several combinations in Germany looking at once towards monopoly, exploitation, nationalism, and war, the most noted as well as the most powerful is the Alldeutschtum Verband, Pangermanist Union or League. This was founded in Berlin, April 9, 1891. The immediate occasion was the exchange (at the instance of the young Kaiser) of the island of Zanzibar, key to a vast colonial empire, for Heligoland, useful potentially as a naval shelter. At the time, the transaction appeared to many Germans as a sacrifice of great colonial interests to a secondary matter of coast defense. On the other hand, the exchange was sharply criticized in England because the British citizens of Heligoland were in no way consulted as to the transfer. The aims of the union, some of which were legitimate enough in themselves, were all vitiated by its methods, at the best those of cut-throat competition, at the worst those of the highwayman. In brief, it proposed to extend Ger- man control and German business by five main lines of operation : (1) imdercutting, (2) government partnership with adventurers, (3) double-citizenship, (4) bribery through secret agents, (5) force of arms. Through all these methods German officialism the world over became recognized as a bad neighbor and finally as the center of the world's greatest menace. By undercutting or dumping, German manufacturers sold goods in South America and elsewhere at less than the cost of production, thereby driving competitors from the field, losses being made good by other dealers or at public expense. 139 140 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS Before the war, government rebates to Prussian Junker landholders enabled them to furnish beet sugar to Europe at less than cost of production. Government partnership in foreign business gave German adventurers a special advantage, as they could proceed boldly, letting the people shoulder the losses. Through the Delbriick Law of 1913, a German naturalized in a foreign land might retain his home citizenship. The value of such a scheme of reclaiming the "lost Germans" is evident and its menace to other nations is equally plain. The German government had its secret agents the world over. Their purpose was to help any German scheme and to stir up trouble generally. No German propaganda has succeeded anywhere except as it has been built on money. Bribe money has been lavishly spent the world over, much of it without returns. Behind the Pangermanist propaganda, however carried on, has lain the threat of war, — no idle bluff, as it appears. It is now understood that the German dynasty of today, as in the Middle Ages, knows no scruples, but strikes always to kill. The Pangermanist Union was from the beginning averse to all policies of conciliation of whatever kind ; this placed it in continuous opposition to the ministry in power, for no government can exist without a certain degree of concilia- tion and compromise. Its center was found among the agrarian nobility. With these were associated a large fol- lowing composed of the great iron-manufacturers, various exploiters of Asia and Africa, the military generally, a large group of "intellectuals" (professors, editors, travelers, clericals, and the like), as well as imperialists, expansionists, annexationists, militarists, titled gentlemen of leisure, and the numerous supporters of a "vigorous foreign policy." The actual headship of the League has never been made prominent — usually some Jimker officer, sometimes a APPENDIX 141 civilian, being thus honored. Professor Carl Hasse of Leipzig was followed in 1908 by Heinrich Class, an attorney of Mainz, a "saber-rattler" not otherwise notable. Some financial irregularity leading to Class' retirement in 1917, a retired admiral. Max Grapow, succeeded. In 1897 the society included about 12,000 members; in 1902, 22,000; in 1912, 30,000. Ten or twelve years ago it was said that 2300 members were resident outside of Germany, part of them naturalized, part remaining alien. Twenty-three of the 217 chapters forming the Union had then been established in foreign countries, largely to bring expatriates, wherever placed, into direct service. The primary conception of the Pangermanist Union was the exaltation of the German world-state, the control of education in the interest of world-politics, the support of nationalistic movements at home and abroad, especially the advancement of German financial interests, and the determination of foreign policy towards "practical results." The avowed purpose of the Union was to deepen national feeling and to force the German people to recognize their responsibilities as a "world-power" to nations overseas. The society has also strenuously upheld the doctrine that for the state there can be no question of morals, because above it exists no authority to compel obedience; hence the need for one "supreme world-state," strong enough to ignore balances of power, and wise enough to serve as a complete overlord.' The immediate aims sought were as follows : 1. A strong colonial and emigration policy for Germany. 2. The promotion of German schools in foreign countries. ^ "The Pangermanist professes to want peace, but it must be his own kind of peace, after the pattern of the Persian satrap who, out of love for peace and concord, throws to the lions every one who dares oppose him." (Bourdon.) 142 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS 3. The furtherance of patriotic feeling and the suppression of all tendencies opposed to nationalism. 4. The control of all education in the interest of national policy. 5. The cultivation and support of aU nationalistic movements among Germans at home and abroad. 6. The funrtherance of an energetic political movement in behalf of German financial interests (Irderessen-politik) both in and out of Europe, always directing the trend of foreign policy towards "practical results." By "practical results" we must understand not national glory, but the purpose for which national glory is mainly evoked — that is, financial gain. The early work of the League was carried on chiefly in three directions : 1. Propaganda for naval expansion resulting in the formation of the Navy League {Flotlenverein) and Army League {Wehrverein). 2. Propaganda in favor of the Boers during the war in South Africa. 3. Attacks on the administration of the Chancellor, Count von Caprivi, because of his conciliatory attitude toward the Poles. To these may be added : 4. The Emperor's appeal for "the union and conservation of all the German tribes." 5. The necessity, urged by Von Moltke, of "freeing the mouths of Germany's great rivers." At home, projects of expansion, exploitation, and military expenditure were forwarded. Abroad, the purpose was to lay special stress on "Foreign Germanism" {Deutschtum im Auslande) and to foment international discord. At all times, the League has stood for "war-at-any-price" as the basis of national virility, and for those uncompromising policies which have made Germany feared or hated by other nations. APPENDIX 143 Among the notable catchwords or slogans of the Pan- german propaganda are the following: "World concerns" iWelt-Politik), "Big business" (Real-PolUik), "World war," "Slavic peril," "Anglo-Saxon menace," "British world- monopoly," "French revenge." Geographical aims are summed up in "Berlin-Calais," "Berlin-Riga," "Hamburg- Salonika," "Hamburg-Bagdad-Persian Gulf." Along the title page of Heimdall, organ of the Pangerman Language Association, runs an inscription in late Runic characters said to mean: "From the Skaw to the Adriatic! From Boulogne to Narva! From Besangon to the Black Sea!" The work of the League abroad is described by General von Bernhardi as follows : It should provide that the German element is not split up in the world but remains in compact blocks, thus forming, even in foreign countries, political centers of gravity in our favor, markets for our exports, and centers for the diffusion of German culture.' The number of "lost Germans" who could thus be "re- covered" and used in Pangermanist operations was reckoned in millions. It was claimed that the expatriated German element amounted to ten millions in the United States, to ten millions more in the rest of the world. The calculation, greatly exaggerated in the first place, proved very disappoint- ing. The number of individuals controlled by secret agents was probably relatively small, not many thousands at the most, and their ill-timed services have been very costly in other countries as well as in the United States. But beyond question, men controlled by the Pangermanist League have permeated every part of the world, and were a large factor in bringing the name of Germany into disrepute even before being called into special activity by the demands of war. A concurrent purpose of Alldeutschtum has been to compel the use of the German language wherever Germans congre- 1 Deutsehland und der ntichste Krieg, 1913. 144 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS gate. It demands the complete extirpation of foreign words in German speech * as well as the suppression of all other tongues, French, Polish, Danish, or Flemish, among those aUen peoples whose territories the Empire has absorbed. Pangermanism pushed to the limit the ideal of Kvltur or mass-discipline through subordination and coordination. To the people at large it disclosed the spectacle of a gigantic, unified empire, whose forces "in shining armor" should maintain the peace of the world by making all other states incapable of even a show of resistance. Thus it expected to hold rivals as well as vassals at peace through its own industrial and military supremacy, and through that unity and continuity of purpose which come from autocratic as distinguished from parliamentary government. The ac- companying advantage to the world would, it held, outweigh and justify the sorrow and desolation which might be in- cidentally caused in the process of extending the salutary and profitable methods of Kultur? The aggregate efforts of the Pangerman Union pointed towards the condition in which Germany found herself at the outset of the war. In brief, the nation became a huge business corporation in which every force, internal and external, was directed towards the advancement of certain favored groups, agrarian, industrial, commercial, financial. To this end were devoted all available agencies, — rebates, 1 In 1913, an effort was made to induce German tourists to use only German (or at least Flemish) names, instead of the prevailing French, for Belgian towns. For example, Louvain was to be always Lirwen, and Malines, Mecheln, thus in a way anticipating events of the following year. ' " Country for them (the Pangermanists) is an isolated organism, and . . . they live and breathe in an atmosphere of haughty contempt for their neighbors. Or rather, they conceive their country as a permanent element of dissolution like a devouring and insatiable monster, a beast of prey, whose one function is to plunder. All that it does not possess it has been robbed of. Whoever attempts to escape from its tyranny is a rebel." (Bourdon, L'Enigme Allemande.) APPENDIX 145 subsidies, interlocking directorates, tariffs, underselling in foreign markets at rates lower than the cost of production at home, crushing of rivals native or foreign, and special paternal care of workmen, with corresponding repression of vmrest and ambition.* The preferred stock in this great corporation — very much preferred indeed — rested in the hands of the privileged classes, comprising those who had inherited wealth and those who in one way or another had gained it. The whole gigantic system rested largely on bor- rowed capital. So large a part of its transactions consist- ing of sales at less than cost, subsidies and kartels being used for undercutting of rivals, that its methods necessitated con- stant and rapid extension. This "frenzied finance" has had its parallel in some other nations, but rival combinations are less efficient and less bold, with far weaker hold on governments or people. Yet for years the chancelleries of Europe in general have been only the "firm names" under which exploiters of Asia and Africa have carried on their depredations. One important outgrowth of Pangermanism was the Mitteleuropa scheme,^ that is, the consolidation of Central Europe. This project might be regarded as a worthy de- velopment of nationalism, except that it contemplated the annexation by force of all Teutonic peoples that should re- 1 "The Gennan people, which now is wholly delivered over to the Pras- torian Guard of its agrarians and its big business, enjoys the right to hunger, to starve, to let its sons be butchered, but the right to express its will is taken away from it." ("Siegfried Balder"; pamphlet secretly circulated, 1918.) ' Mitteleuropa, according to Brailsford, "lives in the mind like a well- constructed nightmare.'' Yet it was apparently doomed by its initial step, the seizure of Belgiimi. And as the fear of despotic Bussia has been the main bond of adhesion in the unequal alliance of Germany and Austria, the nightmare will hardly endure. Meanwhile the fall of the dynastic order in Bussia must have a disintegrating effect on the autocracies which remain. The world is "tired of kings." 146 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS sist. It meant, therefore, the seizure, one after another, of Belgium, Holland, German Switzerland, and Denmark, though with the completion of the Kiel Canal, Denmark was erased from the Ust for the time being. Further, when opportunity should oflEer, the departments of Nord and Pas-de-Calais, with the iron district farther southeast, were to be wrenched from France, and the port of Boulogne was to be made the great naval station of Germany as well as her chief commercial outlet. Mitteleuropa expansion seemed guaranteed by past suc- cesses. In this connection General Colmar von der Goltz has indicated the development of Prussia's growing prestige and audacity. Bismarck, having (with Austria's help) succeeded in wresting Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark, foimd courage to attack Austria in turn, throwing her out of the German Confederation, because, as he put it, she had "too many Ultramontanes for Prussia to digest." His victory in the Seven Weeks' War (1866) emboldened him to test con- clusions with France (1870-1), a course of action rewarded by the acquisition of Alsace and Lorraine, after which the prestige of Prussia, Bismarck, and War rose in Germany to an unprecedented height. Von Treitschke exclaimed truthfully: "It is actually the fact that every square foot of earth which has been conquered for Germany during the last two hundred years has been conquered by Prussia." Nearly all of it, in fact, has been also annexed to Prussia, wherein abides the saying that "War is Prussia's chief in- dustry," — also the obvious fact that the "manifest destiny" of Prussia is to swallow Germany itself as well as the small outlying nations reputed to be of Germanic stock. A notorious plan of Pangermanism contemplated the prac- tical absorption of Turkey, through the extension of the Bagdad railway and the redemption and colonization of Mes- opotamia. The district was to be filled with Hindus and Arabs under German masters, and certain eager spirits APPENDIX 147 looked with anticipation to a renewed glory of Junker nobility in future dukedoms in Bagdad, Nineveh, and Babylon.' As a scheme of investment and rehabilitation, the general plan had its nierits. But the fact that its completion de- pended on the force of arms and the bribery of kings and politicians along the way took it out of the line of legitimate venture. It is, moreover, commonly believed that the ultimate objective was the seizure of India. Of this even- tuality, the bugbear of many Englishmen, there seems, however, to have been little real danger. In India, all roads lead outward. In general, the schemes of Pangermany, involving risks no prime minister would venture to undertake, found little favor with the German government. Hence it devolved on their backers to develop from time to time a crisis (or a "stream of events") which would leave government no choice. Brailsford asserts that it is "the function of the prime minister to have his hands forced." Almost every German prime minister since 1891 has had this experience at the hands of the Pangermanists. In 1913, their jour- nalistic organs seemed to gain confidence, and some of them spoke in guarded tones of the cowardice of the Kaiser, "a valorous poltroon" incapable of realizing that "the hour had struck" in which Germany must break the iron ring with which her enemies had encircled her. Compared with Wilhelm, the vacuous Crown Prince was hailed as the patriotic leader of action. It may, nevertheless, be said that before the war the German people at large, and outside of military circles, paid little attention to Pangermanist agitation. Few ordinary 1 "Certain youths of the ruling caste of Prussia, living Spartan lives upon a nominal salary, driven by poverty and with no escape save by marry- ing the daughters of rich merchants whom they despised, conceived a dream of themselves as proconsuls lolling upon silken couches and drinking wine from golden cups in Mesopotamia and in the Punjab." (Upton Sinclair.) 148 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS citizens were more than vaguely interested in foreign affairs, enjoying a pathetic trust in the wisdom of the government and the invincibility of the General Staff. Opposition to war in Germany, as often in other countries, was paralyzed by dull bromisms such as "War is inevitable; the sooner it is over the better," and "After all, war is a tonic which will clear the air and brace up the nation." While the writer was in Southern Germany in 1913, General Bemhardi was described to him as a "disgruntled cavalry officer who had failed of promotion." Not much stress was laid on his utterances, and even his startling book, Germany and the Next War, was little noticed by the intel- lectuals. The land was prosperous and peaceful, endan- gered only remotely by the alleged jealousy of commercial rivals in England and the menace of assumed enemies in France and Russia. The Kaiser himself, obviously devoted to war-display and to the heroics and- romanticism of force, posed as a peacemaker while feverishly preparing for war. He schemed for a united continent of Europe, dominated by German force even as Germany herself was ruled by Prussia. The Chancellor and the Foreign Minister were regarded as distinctly men of peace, the latter especially.^ It was generally stated that the Pangermanists were a "mere handful of theorists," "extremists, dreamers of world-power, hardly to be taken seriously." Their efforts seemed to fall into the stream of events, which few saw clearly to be largely of Pangermanist creation. Since the revelations of Prince Lichnowsky and of August • "The jingo party against . . . the tendencies of the Kaiser's and the Chancellor's policies thus succeeded at last, . . . although the manifest in- terest and doubtless the inclination of the masses . . . were for the main- tenance of peace. (This) is explicable only by the German's amazing lack of understanding of the deeper qualities, sentiments, ideals, modes of thought, and characteristics of other nations as distinguished from their outward peculiarities." (Otto H. Kahn, letter written in 1915.) APPENDIX 149 Thyssen, no intelligent man in Germany can assert that war was brought on by a British plot. The favorite phrase' since then has been that it was "the result of a concatena- tion of circumstances," a chain of incidents. This is true, but it is also true that every link in this chain, every move- ment in the "stream of events," was carefully prepared by the Pangermanist Society with the knowledge and ap- proval of the Kaiser. Whatever criticism may attach to the diplomacy of other coimtries, this fundamental fact re- mains. A world war was not possible unless Germany began it; the German General Staflf did actually begin it, the first step being the seizure of Belgium, not alone to get at Paris, as was alleged, but to secure Belgium and ulti- mately Holland, a plan openly proclaimed in the summer of 1913. For the general situation, however, the German people as a whole cannot be held blameless. Says Journelle, with justice : Grafted on a sound trunk, the Pangermanist heresy would never have sprouted. Never would Germany, leaders and flocks, have been able to sink so deep into her violent self -worship, her terrorism and her unmitigated brigandage in war, if she had not glided by degrees through weakness of conscience and latent criminality. {Atlantic Monthly, May, 1918.) Pangermanism is sometimes described, though hardly with complete accuracy, as a "secret plot " for the domination of Europe or the world. But while the general scheme was of the nature of a conspiracy, one could hardly call it "secret," as its purposes were proclaimed from the house-tops by retired officers and a subsidized press. Its aims, some in themselves legitimate, were all poisoned by the use of military force and financial corruption for their accomplish- ment. Apparently their propaganda made little headway in any part of the world save through lavish use of money. 150 DEMOCRACY AND WORLD RELATIONS "Annexation-lust" was the avowed inspiration of the League. The machinations of this group, operating under the shelter of dynastic power, were directly responsible for the inception of the world-war. In the nation in arms and the overgrown navy they found instruments ready to their hand. After a period of uproar and falsehood, pro- moted by a subservient press, impelled by militaristic intrigue and by the uncompromising obstinacy of the General Staff, "persistently disloyal to the civU authority," the deluded German people were flung, exulting, into war. It does not seem likely that the Pangermanist League can survive the economic wreckage of the war it has had so large a part in promoting. In such case, its best epitaph is found in these words of Anatole France : They have taken from the art of arms all that it kept of himianity. They have killed peace. They are killing war. They have made it a monster that cannot live. INDEX Absolutism, 46. Adams, John, 130. Adams, John Quincy, 81. Albania, 31. Alexander VI, arbitrator, 122. Alldeutschtum Verband, 139. Alsace, in torment, 13. Alsace-Lorraine, 31, 32, 137. as a wound in the flanks, 35. nightmare of Europe, 35. pin-pricks of, 30. Altar of Concord, 130. Altruism, 55. of human institutions, 58. American democracy individualistic, 98. Anarchy, foundations of, 137. of sovereignty, 33. Andrews, S. P., on the game of life, 115. Annexation-lust, 150. Arabia, 31. Arbitral cases, 125, 126. Arbitration, 123. in Bible times, 130. Aristotle, on purpose of government, 96. Armament, abatement of 134, 135. Armed peace, 129. Armenia, 13. an oppressed nationality, 31. desolation of, 30. Arms and the Gospel, 117. Asquith, on partnership of nations, 111. Austria, 146. Authoritarians, 93. Autocracy inevitably selfish, 95. Babylon, 147. Backward races, 77. Bacon, Francis, on empire, 8, Bagdad, 147. "Balder, Siegfried," on the Father- land, 45. Balzarotti and Stock, on the Super- man, 60, 61. Barbusse, Le Feu, 1. on universal slavery, 64. Bassett, J. S., on unification. 111. Bayard, Thomas H., on independ- ence, 98. Becker, J. P., on international sym- pathy, 131. Belgium, agony of, 13. German designs on, 146. neutralization of, 130. relief of, 50. Berlin, Treaty of, 137. Berlin-Bagdad Railway, 146. Bernhardi, and Germany's next war, 148. on law as a makeshift, 116. on lost Germans, 143. on the necessity of war, 88. Bethmann-Hollweg, on the king's army, 40. Bingham, H., on futility of Monroe Doctrine, 81. Bismarck, and absolutism, 38, 44. and Prussia's conquests, 146. on majority of bayonets, 22. on monarchical order, 53. policy as to colonies, 71. Bloch, Jean de, on the future of war, 126. Blood and iron, 21. Boccaccio as a Teutonic wit, 62. Boers, conciliation of, 32. German propaganda for, 142. Bohemia, 31. Boulogne, as a German naval station, 146. Bourdon, Georges, on Fangermanism, 141, 144. Boxers in China, 83. 161 152 INDEX Brachycephalic skulls, 59. Brandes, George, on free trade, 129. Brailsford, H. N., on forcing hands of chancellors, 147. on Mitteleuropa, US. on Palmerston Doctrine, 76. on sovereignty, 33. Bramhall, F. D., on democracy, 45. on power behind the throne, 47. Bribery, 139. Bright, John, on empire-building, 68. Britbh Empire, growth of, 85. British peace, 67. Bruno, as a German product, 62. Bryce, James, on the "white man's burden," 70. Buffer states, 36. BuUard, Arthur H., on oppression, 31. Bundesrat, 39. Canadian boundary, 104. Canning and the Monroe Doctrine, 81. Capitalism not alone to blame, 87. Caprivi, chancellor of Germany, 142. Categorical imperative, 51. Cavour, on use of bayonets, 22. Chamberlain, H. S., a Prussianized Englishman, 63. Charles I and absolutism, 7. Chesterton, G. K., on the state, 42. Christ of the Andes, 131. Citizenship of Asiatics, 125. Class, Heinrich, president of Pan- germanist League, 141. Clausewitz, 68. Cleveland, Grover, use by, of joint high commission in Venezuelan dispute, 80, 130. Cobden, Richard, on free trade, 129. Code not universal, 121. Colonial control, 135. coiiperation, 83. expansion, 70. international policy, 84. Community, of nations. 111. of states, 133. Compromise with sin, 137. Conciliation, 123. Conference of Vienna, 111. Congo, 69. Conquest, as a kind of industry, 35. assiuned right of, 34. fatal to coSperation, 32. Continuity of foreign policy, 77. Cremer, Randall, 127. Cromwell, on political authority, 17. Crown Prince as a patriotic leader, 147. Culture, and KvMur, 41. more than national, 29. Dante, and Luther, 63. German origin of, 63. Declaration of London, 120. DelbrUck law, 140. De Gros, Durand, on city dwellers, 60. De Hovre, on truth, 54. De £alb, Coin^ney, on karteb, 74. Democracy, and collectivism, 99. and equality, 96. and majorities, 93. and womanhood, 100. individualistic, 98. not a set of devices, 100. not frictionless, 94. opportunity, not achievement, 96. Denmark, designs on, 146. Dernburg, Bernhard, colonial ad- ministrator, 69. Desert called peace, 65. Designs of Pangermanism, 143. Dewey, John, on German philosophy, S3. Dienst, Ordnung, Kraft, 49. Diplomacy, historic duty of, 23. nationalism and, 22. secrecy of, 24. Disraeli, 23. Divine right, 43, 47. INDEX 153 Docility, nemesis of, 61. Dolichocephalic skulls, 59. Dollar diplomacy, 73. Double citizenship of Germans, 139. Drago doctrine, 76. Dreamers of world-power, 148. Dreikaiserbund, 63. Dumping, 139. Dynastic state, history, 64. purposes, 37. system, 38. wars and the, 87. Earth-hold of people, 17. Ecclesiastes, quotation from, 12. Economic justice, 20. EflSciency, individual, 60. not a result of absolutism, 47. Egypt, 31. Emerson, on American future, 106. on disguised angels, 92. End of the war, 132. Entangling alliances, 101. Era of many states, 6. Eroherung, 32. Ethics and economics of empire, 67. Ethnic chaos of Germany, 59. Extension of German control, 139. Federation, replaces nationalism, 101, 114. Ferguson, Charles, on democracy, 20. on officialism, 17. Finland, 31. Flensburg, 35. FhUenverein, 142. Force, as creator of states, 7. aa reality, 116. Foreign Germans, 142. Foreign languages, suppression of, 144. Foster, J. W., on fur seals, 24. France, Anatole, on the killing of war and of peace, 160. France, German designs on, 146. Frankfort, Treaty of, 137. Franklin, on profits of trade, 68. Frederick I and absolutism, 7. Frederick the Great and his successor, 47. Frederick William the Fat, 47. Freedom broadens down, 89. Free peoples to rule, 136. Free trade as a cure for dissension, 74. Frenzied finance of Germany, 145. Friends, Society of. 111. Fundamental necessities, 134. Fur seal arbitration, 124. Galgaeus, on Boman rule in Scotland, 64. Gardiner, A. G., on candid diplomacy, 24. Garibaldi as a Teuton, 62. General Staff of Germany, 39, 148. Geographical limitations of Germany, 72. Germany, as a business aggregation, 144. flung into war by Pangermanbts, 150. limitation as to colonies, 71. Ghent, Treaty of, 3. Giotto as a German, 62. Gladstone, on moral wrong, 25. Gneist, on lack of sovereignty in America, 17. Gobineau, 60. Goethe, on ideal of humanity, 29. on the best government, 2. Government guarantees to adven- turers, 72. Government partnership, 139. Grapow, Max, president of Pan- germanist League, 141. Green, J. R., 14. Grotius, 119. Hague Conferences, 120, 126. Hague Tribunal, 123. 154 INDEX Haase, Carl, president of Pangennan- ist League, 141. Hay, John, on fitness for democracy, 79. on independence of people of Ohio, 98. on trade access, 74. Hazen, C. D., on German govern- ment, 40. Hegel, on the State, 41, 44, 46. Heimdall, 143. Heine, on patriotism, 28. Heligoland exchanged for Zanzibar, 139. Hereros, extermination of, 69. Hobhouse, L. T., on character forming, 92. Hodler, H., on reaction from im- perialism, 108. Holland, designs on, 146. Holme, E., on nemesis of docility, 28. on patriotism, 49. on private morals, 51. Holy AUiance, 81, 110. Hoover, Herbert, and Belgian relief, 60. Humboldt, William von, 32. on mass institutions, 6. Huxley, on hair colors, 69. Hyena theory of nations, 116. Imperatives of new morality, 6. Imperial democracy, 124. Imperialism and trade, 66. Imperialist an armed merchant, 70. India, 31, 147. Individual responsibility, 91. In-groups and out-groups, 116. Interessenpolitik, 142. Interlocking directorates, 72. Internationalism and federation, 101, 102. International law, arbitration, and conciliation, 116. Interparliamentary Union, 127. Ireland, 30. Jefferson, T., on alliance with Britain, 83. Joint high commission, 130. Jordan River, seat of Altar of Con- cord, 130. Joshua, book of, 130. Journelle, C, on German character, 149. Judicial determination, 124. Jugoslavia, 31. Jurisdictions versus powers, 104 Justice, distributive, 134. Kahn, Otto H., on Grerman jingoism 148. Kant, 35, 108. Kartels, 74. Kellogg, Vernon L., on Prussianism, 139. on Social Darwinism, 54. on the German state, 44. on the state as a Frankenstein, 47. Kerr, Alfred, on public opinion, 51. Kiel Canal, 146. King doing no wrong, 7. Kings no remedy for anarchy, 78. Korea, 31. Krehbiel, Edward, 115, 126. KuUur, and culture, 41. as supreme discipline, 48. Lambert, Henri, on freedom of trade, 74. on tariffs, 129. Landtag of Prussia, 39. Land where hatred dies, 106. Last frontier, 71. Law, a creator of states, 7. a makeshift, 116. League, of nations, 108. to enforce peace, 109. Legitimacy, 47. Leopold II, 69. Libertarians, 93. Lichnowsky, Prince, revelations of, 149. INDEX 155 Life more than property, 2. Limitation of sovereignty, 134. Lincoln, Abraham, on tie American state, 16. on the purpose of government, 96. Lippman, Walter, on frontiers as chasms, 106. Lithuania, 31. London, Declaration of, 120. Lost fruits of Waterloo, 111. Lost Germans to be rescued, 143. Loti, Pierre, hyena theory of nations, 116. Louis XIV, as the Magnificent, 47. as the state, 7. Louis XV, feeble and desolate, 47. Loyalty, from political union, 15, 133. Luther, on the futility of arms, 63, 117. Luxemburg, neutrality of, 130. Macedonia, 31. Manifest destiny, 20, 146. Marshall, J., on citizenship, 98. Mass-eflSciency, 60. Massingham, H. W., on dynastic emotions, 43. on imperialism, 70. Maidmilian in Mexico, 81. Measures of conciliation, 128. Melanochroics, 59. Mesopotamia, redemption and re- peopling of, 146. Metternich, 23, 44. Meyer, Eduard, on the state, 15, 41. Mez, John, on buffer states, 36. Michelangelo, as a German artist, 62. Michelet, 14. Might and right, 21. Milton, John, on winds of doctrine, 94. Mirage of the map, 70. Mitteleuropa a nightmare, 145. Moch, G., on arbitral treaties, 126. Moltke, on freeing German rivers, 142. Mommsen on Teutonic culture, 63. Monahan, Michael, on patriotism, 20. Monarchical order, 38. Monroe, James, on American de- mands, 80. Monroe Doctrine, 79, 125. Montaigne, on freedom, 91. Moore, J. B., on arbitration, 124. Moral vacuum of Germany, 4. Morocco, 31. Mozley, on ruling ideas, 92. Muir, R., on Monroe Doctrine, 83. Nansen, F., on a diab-colored world, 113. Napoleon, 13, 22. Nationalism, 12. and diplomacy, 22. and might, 21. and nationalities, 29. and patriotism, 27. and right of conquest, 34. facing both ways, 18. meaning and spirit of, 12. not the last word, 114. Nationalities, 29. Nationality, spirit of, 14. Nation without frontiers, 103. Natural law, and positive law, 116, 120. Natiu'e of democracy, 91. Necessity ignorant of law, 19. Need and right, 21. Neolithic Teutons, 59. New morality, the, 4. New order, lie, 132. Nicefero, Alfredo, on claims of the Superman, 61. Nietzsche, 63, 64. Nineveh, 147. Olney, B., on hegemony of United States, 80. Open diplomacy, 135. Open door, 74, 135. 156 INDEX Ordeals, 116. Organization for peace or war, 8. Palestine, 31. Palmerston, and nationality of money, 76. Palmerston Doctrine, 75. Pangermanism, 130, 139, 149, 150. Pangennanbts, as theorists, 140, 148. Parliament of man, 113. Passy, P., 127. Paternalism, never just, 38. Patriotism, 27. Patten, S. N., on service and order, 49. Pax Britannica, 67. Peace, an organic and vulnerable thing, 133. not enforceable, 109. not a pale negation, 10. Peace system, the ideal conception of, 8, 9. People or kings must rule, 136. Persia, 31. Perversion of nationalism, 19. Philippines, now well managed, 31 , 78. Pioneer spirit of America, 99. Place in the sun, 20, 65. Planetary patriotism, 28. Poland, 31. Polk, J. K., on extension of Monroe Doctrine, 80. Posen, 32. Positive law, 116, 120. Postal Union, 107. Powers or jurisdictions, 104. Predatory paternalism, 48. Prussia, cannot digest Ultr mon- tanes, 146. conquests of, 146. ruling caste of, 147. special industry of, 71. Prussianism hateful, 139. Public opinion inconsistent with Kidtur, 67. Purposes of Pangermanism, 141. Qu'est^e que le tiers Stat? 1. Raphael, of German origin, 62. Bealpolitik veriut Christianity, 69, 143. Reciprocity, 104. Red rubber atrocities, 77. Reichstag, a debating society, 39. Renan, Ernest, cited and quoted, 55, 106. Right, divine, 43, 47. Bights, of nationals abroad, 75. of nations, 33. Rise and growth of international law, 118. Rival conceptions of the state, 15. Robertson, J. M., on the state, 41. RoUand, Romain, on military ex- termination, 55. Roman imperialism, 65. Roosevelt, T., and the Hague Con- ference, 127. Root, Elihu, on international con- troversy, 71. Rumbold, Richard, on privilege, 17. Rush-Bagot convention, 104. Ruthenia, 31. Saber-rattlers, 46. Samoa, joint control of, 83. Sanctions for international law, 121. Schiller on culture, 29. Schleswig-Holstein, 146. Schurz, Carl, on patriotism, 27. Secret agents of diplomacy, 25. Secret diplomacy, 24. Sedan, prestige of, 38. Seven Weeks' War, 146. Shirt sleeves diplomacy, 24. Sieyfa, on the third estate, 1. Sinclair, Upton, on the ruling caste of Prussia, 147. Skulls, long and short, 59. Slogans of Pangermanbm, 143. Small, A. W., on economic justice, 20. Smith, Adam, on altruism, 57. INDEX 157 Smith, Goldwin, on the world rolled flat, 113. on vulgar imperialism, 86. Social Darwinism, 51. Social institutions fossils of past al- truism, 68. Soldat sein, etc., 50. South Africa, 32. Sovereign state, 14, 17. Spheres of influence, 72. Sprading, C. L., on justice, 132. on the libertarian, 93. Spy system, 27. Staat, der, 41. Stakes of diplomacy, 65, 84. "Starrheit" of states, 21. State, the, a cloak for privilege, 16. and Big Business, 73. doing no wrong, 8. nation and people, 4. supreme, 16. two types of, 16. under democracy, 16. States, and the duelist's code, 23. controlled by necessity, 19. in predatory paternalism, 19. Stein, Baron vom, 32. Stephens, H. M., on nationalism, 14. Stream of events prepared by Pan- germanists, 148. Subsidies, 72. Superman, 68. Supernatural origin of law, 116. Supreme state, 41. Supreme world tribunal, 113. Switzerland, designs on, 146. neutrality of, 130. Sympathy between nations, 131. Syria, 31. Tacitus, on Roman rule in Britain, 65. Talleyrand, 23. Tariffs, kinds of, 128. Tasso, as a Teutonic poet, 62. Territories under dispute, 36. Teutonic origin of genius, 61, 62. Third estate, 1. Thompson, J. A., on altruism, 58. Thoreau, on John Brown, 93. on the enlightened state, 1. Thyssen, August, revelations of in- demnity promises, 148. Tolerance, 29. Topham, Anne, on the conciliation of the Boers, 32. Toxicology of peace, 133. Trade, ejqpanded through force of arms, 139. not the chief culprit, 85. strategy and dollar diplomacy, 72. Treaties and publicity, 24. Treaty, of Berlin, 137. of Frankfort, 137. Treitschke, Heinrich von, on con- quest, 146. Trial by battle, 116. Tribal law, 115. Tribunal, supreme, 113. Truce of God, 117. Turgot, 32. Turkey, absorption of, 146. Uebermensch, 58. TJkrainia, 31. Ultramontanes in Austria, 146. Underbred ways, 22. Undercutting in prices, 139. Ungraded masses, 22. Union of nationalities, 34. United States, of America, 112. of Europe, 112. Veblen, Thorstein, on colonial con- trol, 68. on commercial interests, 68. on fur-bearing animals, 66. Venezuela boundary dbpute, 80. Verdi, as a German, 62. Verona, Pact of, 82, 111. Vienna, Conference of, 12, 111. Vinci, as a Teuton, 62. 158 INDEX Voltaire, on art of government, 98. on revered chains, 37. War, as a breach of peace, 9. as a tonic, 148. Prussia's chief industry, 146. Warner, A. G., on altruism, 58. War system, 8. Washington, on entangling alliances, 101, 130. Waterloo, lost fruits of. 111. Wealth, as latent power, 89. Wehrverein, 142. Welhnan, W. E., on stakes of di- plomacy, 84. Weltpolitik, 143. Weyl, Walter E., on the end of the war, 132. White, A. D., on Grotius, 49. White man's burden, 70. Wilhelm II, 47, 147, 148. WiUy-Nicky telegrams, 25. Wibon, Woodrow, message of, 34. on alliances, 101. on terms of world peace, 135. on war aims, 3. Womanhood in democracy, 100. Woobey, T. W., on the Monroe Doctrine, 81. World community, 101. World Constitution, 121. World grown both large and small, 102. World parliament, 113. Xanthochroics, 59. Zanzibar, exchanged for Heligoland, 139.