Cornell University Library The original of tiiis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924020414292 Why the PendingTreaty with Colombia Should be Ratified A Summary of the Incontestable Historical Facts By HANNIS TAYLOR WASHINGTON low ' t V ^ h •^«\?? (b3 Why the pending Treaty with Colombia should be Ratified A Summary of the Incontestable Historical Facts. By HANNI8 TATLOR In its issue of June 29, 1914, The Washington Post, despite its many hostile expressions to the contrary, said: "The people would like to know why the United States must pay $25,000,000 to Colombia and $3,000,000 to Nicaragua. They may approve of both treaties if they know all the details, but they will never approve of either if this information is withheld." As it is emi- nently just and proper that the people of the United States should "know all the details," the purpose of this paper is so to restate them that he who runs may read, so far as the controversy with Colombia is concerned. The dominating fact, which throws more light than all others upon the real nature of the tran- saction, was thus stated by Colonel Roosevelt himself in a notable speech made at the Univer- sity of California, on March 23, 191 1: "I am interested in the Panama Canal because I started it. If I had followed traditional conservative methods I should have submitted a dignified state paper of probably 200 pages to the Con- gress, and the debate would have been going on yet. But I took the Canal Zone, and let Congress debate, and while the debate goes on the Canal does also." The Taft administration, knowing that Presi- dent Roosevelt "took the Canal Zone," made an earnest effort to settle the damages thus oc- casioned upon a just and honorable basis. On March, i, 1913, President Taft, as one of his very- last oficial acts, sent to Congress a message, in- dorsing a communication from the then Secreta- ry of State, Mr. Knox, which concludes as follows : "The very latest telegram from Mr. Du Bois shows that in a subsequent interview he took it upon himself informally to ask whether if the United States should, without requesting options or privileges of any kind, offer Colombia $25,000,000, its good offices with Panama, the arbitration of the question of reversionary rights in the Panama Railway, and preferential rights of the canal, the Government would accept; to which he was answered in the negative. "Included in this most recent telegraphic cor- respondence is a statement of the impression of the legation at Bogota that the Colombian Go- vernment cherishes the expectation that the in- coming administration will arbitrate the entire Panama question, or will directly compensate Colombia for the value of the territory of Pa- nama, the Panama Railway, the railroad annuit- ies, and the contract with the French Canal Co." Senator Bacon's Speech Upholding Colombia's Right to Arbitration. After the present administration had accepted the legacy thus bequeathed, coupled with the declaration that "the Colombian Government cherishes the expectation that the incoming ad- ministration will arbitrate the entire Panama question," the Colombian Government did, in solemn form, present its case to the Government' of the United States, coupled with an earnest ap-* peal for arbiti'atiori. At that moment the Ghair" man of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela- tions was the late and lamented Senatov*' Aa^ust O. Bacon of Georgia, who on Januai-y 29, 1904^ had made a famous speech in the Senate in which he advocated the making "of a treaty with the Republic of Colombia submitting to the Perman-* ent Court of Arbitration at The Hague or to some other tribunal to be agreed upon, for im- partial arbitrament and peaceful determination^ all questions between the United States and the Republic of Colombia growing out of the mat- ters herein recited." After an exhaustive revievp; of every question of fact and law involved in the taking of Panama, Senator Bacon made this declaration : "I am content with anything which shall com- mit the Government of the United States in the face of the world to the proposition that, v/hat- ever there may be of difference between the United States and Colombia, the United States, as a great overshadowing power which caanot be compelled by this feeble power to do any- thing, will voluntarily endeavor to agree with it in the settlement of existing differences ; and that if it cannot come to an agreement by peaceful negotiations it will not assert its great and resist- less power, but that it will endeavor to have a determination of such differences and the claims growing out thereof by some impartial tribunal." . In the light of these antecedents the present administration determined to strive to "come to an agreement by peaceful negotiations," rather than yield to Colombia's demand for arbitration. The outcome is embodied in the pending treaty whose merits depend largely upon the follow- ing facts : The "Treaty of Peace, Amity, Navigation, and Commerce," Negotiated in 1840. - When the time arrived to develop our priceless yet remote territory on the Pacific coast it be- came necessary for us to appeal to Colombia, then called New Granada, for a free passage through her limits to California, which otherwise could only be reached by a nine months' voyage around the Horn, or by the even more dangerous wagon trail across the Rocky Mountains and the West- ern Desert. The all-important advantage of a shorter route we secured through "A treaty of peace, amity, navigation, and commerce," nego- tiated in 1846, in which it was stipulated as follows : "The Government of New Granada guarantees to the Government of the United States that the right of way or transit across the Isthmus of Pa- nama upon any modes of transportations which now exist, or that may be hereafter constructed, shall be open and free to the Government and citizens of the United States, and for the tran- sportation of any articles of lawful commerce Ijelonging to the citizens of the United States. . As compensation for that privilege (priceless at that time) the United States promised "as an especial compensation for the said advantages. and for the favors they have acquired by the 4th, ,5th and 6th Articles of this treaty (articles which secure to the United States reciprocal privileges of importation and tonage dues, and equal cus- toms duties), the. United States guarantee, posi- tively and efficaciously, to New Granada, by the present stipulation, the perfect neutrality of the : "before-mentioned Isthmus, with the view that the free transit froni the one to the other sea may not be interrupted or embarrassed in any future time while this treaty exists ; and, in con- •sequence, the United States also guarantee in the same manner, the rights of sovereignty and property which New Granada has and possesses .over the said territory." In the message in which President Polk sub- mitted the treaty in question to the Senate he said in regard to the rgiht of transit thus won: ""Te importance of this concession to the com- mercial and political interest of the United States •cannot be overrated;" and in a special message ■ of February 10, 1847, only two months after the initiation of the treaty, he said: "There does not appear any other effectual means of securing to all nations the advantages -of this important passage, but the guarantee of . ^reat commercial powers that the Isthmus shall be neutral territory. * * * The guarantee of the sovereignty of New Granada over the Isthmus is a natural con- j sequence of this neutrality. * * * New Granada would not yield this province that it might become a neutral State ; and if she should, it is not sufficient populous or wealthy to estab- lish or maintain an independent sovereigtiy." Thus by the most solemn guarantee known to ;the family of nations the United States pledged 5 itself, by express contract, to respect and uphold the sovereignty of New Granada over the Isth- mus of Panama, a plain duty already due to New Granada under the general principles of inter- national law. In emergencies other than the disturbance of interoceanic transit or peril to the persons and possessions of American citizens, there might be no intervention in the affairs of New Granada, re-established as the United States of Colombia in 1863. By the terms of the treaty, and by the principles of international law, Colombia, as the successor of New Granada, was the sovereign peer of the United States, which, save for the purpose of protecting free transit, might no more land forces on Colombian soil, or even threaten such landing, than she might land such forces on the shores of France or England. After a careful examination of the subjet a competent expert has said that, during the 40 years that intervened between the establishment of Colom- bia in 1863 and the Panama imbroglio of 1903, United States forces were employed in only seven instances and for a total period of 164 days, and in each instance with Colombia's approval. In no case was there fighting, the mere precautionary measures being sufficient. The Spooner Act of 1902 and Hay-Herran Convention of 1903. In 1902 was passed the "Spooner Act," provid- ing for the construction of an Isthmian canal, and arming the President with power to obtain irom Colombia perpetual control (not cession) 6 for canal purposes of a strip of land from ocean to .ocean. Then followed the "Hay-Herran Con- vention" of 1903, in which it was expressly stip- ulated that "the convention, when agreed to by the contracting parties, shall be ratified in con- formtiy with the laws of the respective coun- tries," and further "the Government of Colombia authorizes the New Panama Canal Company to sell and transfer to the United States its rights, privileges, properties and concessions, as well as the Panama Railroad and all the shares or parts of the shares of that company." The first grave indignity offered to Colombia was embodied in a series of threats, which warned her that her Senate would not, as an independent Legislature, be permitted to discuss all necessary amendments to the treaty in question. Colonel Roosevelt did not hesitate to declare: "when in August, 1903, I became convinced that Colombia intended to repudiate the treaty made the preceding Jan- uary, under cover of securing its rejection by the Colombian Legislature, I began carefully to con- sider what should be done. By my direction, Secretary Hay, personally and through the Min- inister at Bogota, repeatedly warned Colombia that grave consequences might follow her reject- ion of the treaty." A cable was sent to Bogota sgy^ing: "tre treaty must not be modified or amended;" and then followed a mandate "ratify the treaty or you will regret it." Imagine Great Britain addressing such threats to the Senate of the United States when it was about to consider a. treaty signed, subject to the approval of that body, between the British Ambassador at Wash- 7 ington and our Secretary of State ! Is it strange that under the sting of such threats the Colom- bian Senate should have refused to ratify the treaty in question on August 12, 1903? On August 31, Mr. Beaupre sent to Mr. Hay ' the following telegram, recently published i» "Diplomatic History of the Panama Canal" (Sen. Doc. No. 474, 6^ Congress, 2nd Session), p. 438.. Mr. Beaupre to Mr. Hay. (Teleerom) •United States Legation, Bogota, August 31, 1903. (Received September 5). August 31, 1903, 2 p. m. I had an interview with Senator Obaldia to-day. He informed me that he is willing to remain so long as there is hope for the treaty, but he is convinced that there is none, and will leave, therefore, on the 6th proximo. Confirms General Reyes statement concerning presidential candidate, and says that the next Senate was made certain for the treaty ; that he bears instructions to Governors Insig- nares and Barrios concerning the elections which' will be held next December; that in accepting governorship of Panama he told the President that in case that the department found it neces- sary to revolt to secure canal, he would stand by Panama; but he added if the Government of the United States will wait for the next session of Congress canal can be secured without a re- volution. Senator Campo, from the Cauca, is about to leave, thinking the treaty gone. Confidential. My opinion is that nothing satis- factory can be expected from this Congress. Caro's party has been joined by Veloz and Soto and their followers, constituting a decisive ma- jority against the treaty. General Reyes seems, to still entertain hopes. — Beaupre. 8 • And here the fact should be emphasized thaf the Constitvition of Colombia expressly forbade the alienation of any part of the national domain until the Congress had first expressly authorized the same. In the light of the evidence now available, if cannot be douted that only President Roosevelt's unreasonable haste prevented the ratification of the treaty by the Colombian Senate. He has him- self quoted a high official of Colombia who, on November 6, 1913, said in a note to the American Minister at Bogota, that on certain conditions: The Colombian Government will declare mart- ial law and, by virtue of vested constitutional authority when public order is disturbed, will approve by decree the ratification of the canal treaty as signed; or, if the Government of the United States prefers, will call an extra session of Congress, with new and friendly members next May, to approve the treaty. The Opera Bouffe Revolution of November, 1903. The delay occasioned by the exercise of Co- lombia's constitutional right to deliberate upon a treaty before its ratification precipitated the opera bouffe revolution of November, 1903. Colombia had been at that time an independent state for 93 years, and for yj years had been so recognized by us. On November 3, 1903, the Republic of Colombia was at peace with the United States, and "the treaty of peace, amity, navigation, and commerce" of 1846, expressly guaranteeing, in a very solemn manner, her 9 sovereignty over the Isthmus of Panama was in full force. But despite all those things, the time had now arrived when the pen was to be superseded by the sword. An opera bouffe re- volution was being manufactured at Panama, and a dummy republic was on the way. From his published admission it is hard to doubt that as early as August, 1903, President Roosevelt vv^as aware that the secession of the province of Panama was being secretly fomented ; and he has •openly declared that toward the end of October the attempt appeared to be an imminent prob- ability. In order to make that result possible it was absolutely necessary so to arrange the naVal forces of the United States that they could be on the spot to prevent the suppression of the so- called revolution by the military forces of Co- lombia. To that end was issued the famous ""fifty miles order" of November 2, 1903. In his message to Congress of January 4, 1904, Presi- dent Roosevelt said : "In view of these facts I directed the Navy Department to issue instructions such as would insure our having ships within easy reach of the Isthmus, in the event of need arising." * * * On November 2 the following instructions were sent to the commanders of the Nashville, Boston and Dixie: "Maintain free and uninter- rupted transit. * * * Prevent landing of any armed force, either government or insurgent, within fifty miles of Panama." ^ On November 3, 1903, the following order was sent' to the commander of the Nashville at Colon : "In thfc interest of peace make every effort to prevent government troops at Colon from pro- 10 <:eecling to Panama. The transit bf the Isthmus must be kept open and order maintained." Thus, while the solemn treaty was in full force and profound peace existing, President Roose- velt issued a military order, preventing Colombia from moving her own troops over her own rail- way from her own Colon to her own Panama in order to put down an opera bouffe revolution, representing less than one-tenth of the popula- tion of the province of Panama, which the 400 troops of Colombia landed at Colon could have instantly suppressed. Under such circunstances the final act of the comedy was conclude. On November 3, at 6 o'clock, the emeute, chiefly promoted by "the fire department," took place, the total death roll being one chinaman killed by one of the three shots fired from the Bogota on the night of the "secession." The report of the success of the revolution was received at Washington at 9:50 p. m. of November 3, and at 11:18 word was returned directing the com- mander of the Nashville to "make every effort to prevent government troops at Colon from proceeding to Panama." On November 4 a tele- gram was received from the Panama Consul, saying a proclamation of independence has been issued by the insurgents, and three deputized to draw up a constitution. On November 6 this Government sent the following message to *our Panama Consul: "The people of Panama have by an apparently unanimous movement dissolved their connection with the Republic of Colombia and resumed their independence. When you are satisfied that a de II facto government, republican in form and with- out substantial opposition from its own people,, has been established in the State of Panama, you will enter into relations with it as the responsible government of the territory." Thus a mere consul was endowed with the august function of recognizing the new republic when satisfied that a de facto government, re- publican in form and without substantial opposi- tion from its own people, had been established in the State of Panama. A little later in the day the President of the United States recognized the new nation, the Republic of Panama! And on the same fateful day was appointed Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary from the Republic of Panama Buneau Varilla, a non- resident alien, whose only interest was the valor- ization of the shares of a speculative company. On November 13 he was officially received by the President, the earliest date at which his letters could arrive by steamer from the Isthmus, and five days later the Canal Treaty was signed. It is hard for one at all familiar with the rules of international law to record the details of this strange transaction with a straight face. It is hard not to gasp at this unprecedent process of nation making, a process whereby "the President of the guaranteeing nation, itself unavoidably included in the treaty's provision, forcibly dis- abled Colombia from taking the slightest precau- tionary measures against secession; continued and expanded his hostility, and, then, in one day,^ 17 hour and 41 minutes from the issuance in the one city of Panama of an insurgent proclamation of independence, recognized a new sovereignty." 12 A Vital Principle of International Law. During the Civil War the United States be- came the special champion of that rule of inter- national law which declares that a premature or unjustifiable recognition either of belligerency or independence of a community in rebellion against the parent state is really an act of intervention which the parent state may meet by a declaration of war. In a note on that subject, written to- Mr. Adams in 1861, Mr. Seward said: "On the other hand, we insist that a nation that recognizes a revolutionary state, with a view to aid its effecting its sovereigny and inde- pendence, commits a great wrong against the nation whose integrity is thus invaded, and makes itself responsible for a just and ample redres." In the history of the law of nations no near ap- proximation can be found to the process through- which the military and naval power of the United States prevented the military forces of Colombia from supressing a revolution upon her own soil. And the political power of the United States then, within less than two days, recognized the outcome of such a revolution as an independent member of the family of nations. Such conduct upon the part of the United States rendered it "responsible for a just and ample redress," first, because it was a conspicuous violation of the rule of international law, recognized by all states-; second, because it was a conspicuous violation of the treaty of 1846 in which that rule was em- bodied as one of the leading stipulations in an express contract. The double liability resting. upon the United States for "just and ample re- 13 dress" is beyond all controversy so far as inter- national law is concerned. There never has been but one open question in the case: After Presi- the contract with the French Canal Co., 17 and other advantages exceeded twofold the pec- uniary sum agreed upon in the pending treaty. Not until after her right to have the amount of the damages due her ascertained by an arbitral court had been denied her, was the settlement embodied in the pending treaty entered into. An attempt has been made to create prejudice against the treaty by the false statement that Colombia has agreed to pay me a contingent fee of $1,000,000, upon its ratification. I am her only counsel and our contract is in writing, and sub- ject to inspection by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations whenever that body may see fit to call for it. It simply provides that I am to receive just and reasonable compensation for my services, when they are concluded; and, in the event of a difference between us as to the amounty such difference shall be adjusted by arbitration. And here, in conclusion, I feel it my duty to say that my zeal in this matter as counsel for Colom- bia has been increased by the fact that after an exhaustive study of all the antecedents I have been as profoundly impressed, as I could ever be of anything, of the justice of her cause, not only in morals, but under the principles of internat- ional law. Therefore, as an American citizen, I feel that a great good has been accomplished for my country in this grave matter by the making of a settlement which will re-establish the ancient and cordial friedship with a neighbor- ing state in which the commerce and industry of the United States will find a region most favor- able for its development. HANNIS TAYLOR. 18 3tn{i. "Hail ^bebalieft' 225 W. 39TH ST. NEW YORK ClXy Cornell University Library E 183.8.C7T24 Why the pending treaty with Colombia sho 3 1924 020 414 292