aA »^ • '■-■■■ . -.^. '5 ' ,* ^fS>-W:.% \>^4 r-^:|; CiK r^'»€k^ -■■■ ^■^', St*-' l*-^'.l:-: - DP W3n BOUGHT WITH THB INCOME PROM THE SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND THE GIFT OF Henrg M. Sage 189X 4>^i-5-.^£ ^^^^ J ■--e... > '"C^^.^ DATE DUE ^^^<^^^0^ P P -^ AJG GAYLORD PRINTED IN U.S.A. Cornell University Library DF 81.W57 Greek oligarchies their character and o 3 1924 028 258 204 Cornell University Library The original of tliis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924028258204 OEEEK OLIOAECHIES THEIR CHARACTER AND ORGANISATION Cambrioge; PRINTED BY J. AND C. F. CLAY, AT THE UNIVEESITY PKESS, GREEK OLIGAECHIES THEIE CHABACTEE AND OEGANISATION BY LEONARD ^HIBLEY, M.A. FELLOW OF PEMBROKE COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE. New York: G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS London: METHUEN & CO. 1896 A-( 1 ^^7^? PREFACE THE following dissertation was awarded the Hare Prize in 1894. The pressure of other work obliged me to postpone the preparation of it for the press until last year. For the study of Oligarchic Constitutions in Greece there are no adequate materials. No oligarchic state has left us any historical literature ; nor have we the record of the internal working of any oligarchy : in this inquiry, as in most branches of Greek history, we realise how little we know of any Greek states other than Athens. Our conception of oligarchic government, its character and its method, cannot fail to be partial and incomplete. If we except Aristotle's masterly treatise on political ideas and political forms, information on oligarchic constitutions is scattered over a very wide field, extending from the Lyrical poets to Plutarch. Inscriptions yield less that is valuable than we should expect or desire. The lack of positive knowledge induced me to devote the first chapter to an examination of the place occupied by Oligarchy and Aristocracy in the Greek classification of constitutions. By a study of the definitions, which are, like the political terminology of the Greeks, too often vague and uncertain, we are able to arrive at the im- pression produced on the minds of the Greeks by the different governments, and thus we catch a reflection of their real character. In the second and third chapters I VI PREFACE. have briefly discussed the causes of constitutional change and traced the development of constitutions, in order to show the place occupied by oligarchy in this process. Two Appendices deal with some problems of early A- thenian history. In the fourth chapter the varieties of Oligarchy are discussed, and the last chapter is devoted to the organisation of oligarchic government. It is followed by an Appendix on the revolution of the Four Hundred at Athens. Of modern books, I have made constant use of the second volume of Gilbert's Handbuch der griechischen Staatsalterthiimer, which contains an invaluable collection of material. Mr Newman's Introduction to the Politics of Aristotle I have found most useful and suggestive. I have cited in my notes the other modern works to which I am indebted. In preparing the work for press it is my pleasure to acknowledge most gratefully the help of Mr W. Wyse, of Trinity College, one of the adjudicators for the prize, who put many valuable notes at my disposal, and the kindness of Mr R. A. Neil, of Pembroke College, and of Mr J. W. Headlam of King's College, who read my proofs and gave me the benefit of many criticisms and suggestions. LEONARD WHIBLEY. Pembroke College, Cambeidge. February 3, 1896. [In the citations of Aristotle's Politics I have followed the text of Susemihl's small edition, as well as his numbering of the books. The first volume of Mr Newman's Politics is cited as 'Newman, Introduction.' Eeferences to Dr Gilbert's Handbuch are to the second German edition.] CONTENTS CHAPTER I. The Classification of Constitutions : the Claims AND Character of Oligarchy. SECT. PAGE 1. The Popular Classification of Constitutions .... 1 2. Classification of Constitutions by the Philosophers ... 6 3. Oligarchy in a general sense . 15 4. Oligarchy in a special sense 20 5. Polity 22 6. Aristocracy 24 7. Aristocracy, Oligarchy and Polity 30 8. The basis of Oligarchy and Democracy 31 9. The character of Democracy 33 10. The character of Oligarchy . 35 11. Material claims of the Oligarch 38 12. Moral claims of the Oligarch 39 CHAPTER II. The Causes of Constitutional Change. 13. The Variety of Greek Constitutions 45 14. The Causes determining the form of a Constitution ... 46 15. Changes of Constitutions effected from within .... 48 16. Changes of Constitutions effected from without ... 61 17. Constitutions in the Colonies 53 18. The influence of Athens and Sparta 54 19. The admiration for the Spartan Constitution . ■ . . .57 20. Lawgivers 59 CHAPTER III. The Historical Development of Constitutions. 21. The origin of Constitutions 62 22. The Heroic Monarchy 63 23. Transition from Monarchy to Aristocracy .... 68 24. Changes of Government incident on the Establishment of Aristocracy 71 vm CONTENTS. SECT. PAGE 25. Transition from Aristocracy to Oligarchy .... 72 26. Development of Constitutions in the fifth century ... 83 27. Development of Constitutions in the fourth century. . . 85 Appendix A. The formation of the united Athenian state . 89 Appendix B. The Athenian yiv-q and their importance in the early Constitution 95 CHAPTER IV. Varieties of Oligarchy. 28. Principles of Classification 105 29. Aristotle's Division of Oligarchies 107 30. Aristocracy of Birth and Land Ill 31. Aristocracy of ' Original Settlers ' 115 32. Aristocracy based on Conquest 117 33. Aristocracy of the Kingly Family 120 34. Aristocracy of Heads of Families 122 35. ' Dynastic ' Government 124 36. Oligarchy of Wealth 126 37. Oligarchy of The Knights' and of 'The Hoplites'. . . 132 38. Aristocracies and Oligarchies of Fixed Number . . . 134 CHAPTER V. Organisation of Oligarchic Government. 39. General Principles of Oligarchic Government .... 139 40. Powers of Magistrates, etc., in Oligarchies . . . ". 142 41. Appointment and Qualification of Magistrates .... 144 42. Tenure and Responsibility of Magistrates 149 43. Single Magistrates and Boards of Magistrates .... 152 44. Constitution of the Council 157 45. Powers of the Council 161 46. Subdivisions of the Council 163 47. The Assembly 165 48. Judicial Affairs 170 49. Tribal divisions 177 50. Class divisions in Aristocracies and Oligarchies . . . 181 51. Summary 187 Appendix C. The oligarchic revolution in Athens : the pro- visional and the projected constitution .... 192 Index 208 CHAPTER I. The Classification of Constitutions: the Claims AND Character of Oligarchy. § 1. The Popular Classification of Constitutions. The genius of the Greeks, which has given them a sure and lasting preeminence as political inventors and political theorists, made them conscious at a comparatively early date of the variety of governments under which they lived. The ruling element, as Aristotle says, must be one man, or a few men, or the multitude': and this distinction, which has served ever since as the basis of classification, is recorded for the first time by Pindar in language that is neither technical nor precise^ In his words ' tyranny, the ravening host and the wise wardens of the city' denote monarchy, democracy and oligarchy : and the poet reveals his preference for the government of the few by the choice of the epithets that he employs'. Thus from ' Pol. iii 6 1279 a 25 -iroKlTev/m 5' icrrl ri laipiov tQv irAXewK, ivdyxr) 5' elpat K^piov ^ ^va rj d\iyovs ri Toiis ttoXXoiJs. ^ Pyth. 2 86 ^K wdfTa Si vbti.ov | Trapd rvpavviSi, xiiirln-av i Xd/Spos ffrpards, \ X'«"'o>' irSXiv ol (ro for a somewhat frigid passage in which the two forms are compared occurs both in xxii 51 — 2 and xxiv 163 — 4. 1 Mem. iv 6 12. 2 Rep. V 449 A ; Pol. 291 ff. ; Laws, 710 e. 2 The scheme in the Rhetoric (i 8 1365) has a great resemblance to the scheme in Xenophon, while it differs considerably from that in the Politics (iii chs. 6 — 9), wherein Aristotle adopts in the main the classifi- cation of Plato in the Politicus. There is a third scheme in the Ethics (viii 12 1160) resembling the classification of the Polities with some slight variations in the definitions. * vi chs. 8 — 10. 5 De unius dom. 3. 6 iii 45—9. § 2] CLASSIFICATION OF THE PHILOSOPHERS. 7 tion, in so far as it differs from the popular theory, is based primarily on ethical considerations. The classifica- tions of Plato and Aristotle must be discussed in some detail. The speculations of both writers are intimately connected with attempts to construct ideal states on the Greek model. Both of them observed the conditions that prevailed in the ordinary Greek communities ; neither of them conceived of anything beyond the city-state. Even Plato's Republic, however impossible of realisation, does but depict the government of philosophers on the basis of the Lacedaemonian state'. Hence we may often discern real institutions underlying the ideal, and the Utopias of Plato and Aristotle, in so far as they reflect the political theory of the Greeks, have their value in the study of actual constitutions. At the same time the introduction of the ideal state, as the end of political enquiry, tended to divorce the classification of ordinary states from reality. To Plato ' the ideal view of politics probably seemed the only view worth taking. Politics is to him a more concrete sort of Ethics' ' and ' the construction of the ideal state is to him more or less an episode in an ethical inquiry'.' The ideal state of the Republic embodies a constitution for Mars or Saturn, or, as Plato himself says, ' it exists nowhere on earth, but a pattern of it is laid up in heaven""; 'it is suited only for gods or the sons of gods".' Real constitutions, when compared with this political paradise, can only appear ludicrous perversions of justice, and they are estimated fancifully enough in their ' Jowett, Plato^, V p. xxxviii. ^ Newman, Introduction p. 486. 9 16. p. 455. i» Bep. ix 592 A, e. 11 Laws, V 739 D ; ix 853 o. 8 CLASSIFICATION OF CONSTITUTIONS. [CH. I. supposed order of deviation from the ideal. Thus 'the government of honour,' the description of which is based on the Cretan and Lacedaemonian states, ranks first of the perversions^^: next comes oligarchy, the government of wealth, 'laden with divers evils",' and below these are democracy and tyranny. No attempt is made to distin- guish the better forms of these constitutions from the worse : all are included in the condemnation. In the Laws, a work written in all probability within the last ten years of Plato's life, when he had realised the hopeless impossibility of his ideal, we have his final thoughts on politics". His classification of ordinary govern- ments is not so clear as in the Republic. In one passage monarchy and democracy are ranked as ' mother forms ' above other constitutions'^ : in another passage the rule of a perfect tyrant is said to be best", and existing govern- ments are considered, according as they are capable of being transformed into this form'''. He thus ranks them in the order of tyranny, monarchy, democracy and oli- garchy. It seems that Plato had really changed his opinion of democracy and now set it above oligarchy, but he is still in irreconcilable hostility to ordinary forms of government. They do not deserve the names of 'con- stitutions,' they are factions governing without justice in the interest of the rulers". The state that is to remedy the prevailing defects, if less ideal than the state of the Republic, is not more possible 'I It is a government of 12 Eef. viii 547—8. 1^ Ih. bii A. It is described in 550 o. " Newman, Introduction p. 434, n. 2. 15 iii 693 D. 16 iv 709 e. " iv 710 e. 18 iv 715 B. 1' See Jowett, Plato^, v p. xxxvii. § 2] CLASSIFICATION OF THE PHILOSOPHERS. 9 mixed aristocratic and democratic elements, but Plato cannot overcome his distrust of the people. He wishes to give the control of the government to a few wise men, and to leave to the multitude only such a semblance of power as shall soothe their discontent and prevent them from being dangerous. Plato's description of actual constitutions in the Politi- cus is incidentally introduced to show how worthless they are in comparison with the rule of the perfect statesman. His enumeration is therefore intended to be complete, and it is certainly based on far more scientific principles than the classification in either of the other works. Starting with the criterion of number™ he adds the ideas of force and consent (already mentioned in Xenophon's definition of monarchy^'), of poverty and wealth"'', of lawlessness and respect for law"". These principles serve to divide consti- tutions into kingship and tyranny, aristocracy and oli- garchy, and the two forms of democracy, both described by one name. Of these six governments monarchy and aristocracy have the first place, then come the two demo- cracies, lastly oligarchy and tyranny. In the Politicus, as in the Laws, the philosopher deviates from the order of the Republic and gives a preference to democracy over oligarchy. Plato, then, adopting the popular classification, adds certain ethical considerations, which serve to divide the better forms of each type from the worse. ^ 291 D {fiovapx^i V •^"'6 Twf dXiyuv Swatrreia, 7; toO •jr\T}6ovs dpxri). ^' Mem. iv 6 12 ^atrCKela is iKbvTwv ruiv avdpibvav /col Kari, vdfiovs; Tvpavvls is the opposite. '^ It is not easy to see how poverty or wealth would serve to differen- tiate one kind of democracy from another. ^ This principle also appears in Xenophon, I. e. 10 CLASSIFICATION OF CONSTITUTIONS. [CH. I. Aristotle followed Plato in the division of constitutions into six main forms. In the Rhetoric and the Ethics the discussion of the subject is incidental and subordinate to the main topic, and we may accept the scheme in the Politics as representing the more accurate and the more mature thought of the philosopher ; the definitions in the other works we need only discuss in so far as they differ. In the Rhetoric — the earliest of the three works — where he argues that the orator must take into account the €07] Kal vofiifia of the constitution, he practically adopts the classification of Socrates as it is recorded by Xenophon'*. Besides the double forms of monarchy and oligarchy he only mentions one form of democracy and defines it some- what arbitrarily as ' the government in which office is assigned by lot.' In the Ethics^^, where he discusses varieties of friendship, the six forms of government are mentioned with the titles they bear in the Politics''^, but with slight variations in the definition. The principles of classification, finally adopted by him, lead him to distin- guish three ' normal constitutions ' and three ' perversions ' or ' corruptions^'.' The perversion is distinguished from the normal type by a difference of end. In the perversion the rulers rule 2* Rhet. i 8 1365. The definition of dpurTOKparla corresponds to that given by Xenophon (Mem. iv 6 12). I discuss it below § 6. ^ viii 12 1160. The definition of iroXireia as nfioKpanK'q differs from the definition of the Politics. See below § 5. 28 iii chs. 6—9. ^ Cf. Eth. I. c. ToXiTeias S' iffrlv eiSt] rpia, tipovTos. The distinction is drawn by Plato in the dialogue between Socrates and Thrasymachus (Rep. i 338 D and 342 e). Cf. Laws iv 715 b TaiTas...ap.ei/...ovT' etvai ToXiTciai ovt' 6p9oii! v6fwvs, oVot fii] ^vfiirdcrris rrjs TriXews hexa toS KoivoO iTidi}tsav. Cf. also Isocr. xii 132. '" Quoted by Newman, Introduction p. 33. '1 See Bes Idees NapoUoniennes (English Translation 1840) p. 21. Aristotle is not so precise in hia definition, he does not distinguish the temporary and the permanent interests. ' He does not appear to note that the rule must be exercised not merely for the common advantage of the existing generation, but for the advantage also of the unborn of future generations.' (Newman, Introduction p. 252, n. 1.) 12 CLASSIFICATION OF CONSTITUTIONS. [CH. I. on it. But tlie motive of the ruler scarcely offers a satis- factory criterion to determine varieties of constitutions. Montesquieu says of Aristotle's definition of monarchy ' he makes five species ; and he does not distinguish them by the form of constitution, but by things merely accidental, as the virtues and vices of the prince; or by things extrinsic, such as tyranny usurped or inherited'^' We cannot tell a priori what ethical character a constitution possesses; governments must be classified in accordance with the form of their institutions, not the character of their rulers. Moreover the principle leads Aristotle into inconsistency '', and he himself seems to have realised its inadequacy, for in his detailed account of constitutions he applies formal, rather than moral, principles of classifica- tion^. Aristotle supplies us with another test by defining the common advantage to be identical with justice^^; and the normal states are those that pursue justice, the perversions those that disregard it. If we define justice with Mill as 'the impartial administration of law,' we arrive at the separation of states ruling with due observance of law from those which rule absolutely without regard for law^". ^^ Esprit des Lois, Bk xi § 9. ^ Thus alavixvriTda, whioli was essentially a government for the com- mon good, is classed by Aristotle, Pol. iii 14 1285 a 31, with rvpavvls. ^ Thus iroXiTela (the ' normal ' democracy) is defined, either as the government of those possessing arms, or as a constitution of mixed democratic and oligarchic elements. Even dpurTOKparla can be brought within formal definitions. See below § 6. S5 Pol. iii 12 1282 b 17 ; ib. 13 1283 b 40. Thuc. and [Xen.] also identify them. See above n. 29. 36 Aristotle argues for the supremacy of law (Pol. iii 11 1282 b 2). Thrasymachus (in Plato, Rep. i 338 c) defines justice as ri tov KpdrTovos § 2] CLASSIFICATION OF THE PHILOSOPHERS. 13 This distinction had already been drawn by other writers^, and serves to distinguish absolute forms of government from constitutional forms, observing equal laws^^ Thus tyranny, extreme oligarchy and extreme democracy con- tain despotic elements, alien from the idea of law, while kingship and the more moderate forms of oligarchy and democracy (including aristocracy and ' polity ') are charac- terised by respect for law and justice'". Another test has to be considered before our classifi- cation is complete. A constitution might be mixed, might contain elements which were characteristic of more than one of the main types of government. Such constitutions were warmly praised by the political philosophers. The general tendency of constitutional development in Greece was towards the intensification of oligarchy and democracy, and in the fourth century the extreme forms were found almost everywhere^". But in the gradual evolution of democracy the constitution passed through a stage in which the old aristocracy was tempered avjupipov (i.e. the interest of the ruler, not of the state). Plato, Rep. iv 433 A defines it as rd ain-ov irpdrreLv Kal fz/rj iroXvirpa/ypioveiv (i.e. the correct apportionment and performance of special functions). 37 Thuc. iii 62 contrasts SXiyapxia labvop-os with Swaareia pH] pi-era vbp.03v. Cf. Xen. Mem. iv 6 12. 'Sbp.os and d.vopt.la differentiate constitu- tions in Plato, Politiem 291 e. ^ The distinction is made clear in Aristotle, Pol. vi 4 1292 a 32 Sirov y&p p,T] vbpioi S,pxov(nv, o6k iari TroXireio. Sei yap t6v piv vbptov fipx"" '"'dvTuy, Tuv Si Ka9' SKOffTo, t&s apxiis Kal t^v iroKireiav Kplvav. In iii 4 1277 b 9 i&pxri ToXiTiKi]) and 8 1279 b 16 {dpxv SeffironKri) the two forms are de- scribed by the names usually employed. " Constitutions according to law are not necessarily normal. The basis of government may be bad, and the respect for law will then only distinguish degrees of perversion. « See chapter u § 27. 14 CLASSIFICATION OF CONSTITUTIONS. [CH. I. with the new democracy, and for a time a moderate form of government was maintained. Thus the Solonian con- stitution at Athens was described with universal approval" ; and the same consideration will explain much of the admiration that was lavished on the institutions of Ly- curgus*^ Thucydides departs from his usual attitude of absolute impartiality to praise the mixed constitution established at Athens in 411^ ; Plato made the ideal state of the Laws a mixture of democracy, oligarchy and aristo- cracy ; Aristotle devotes a large part of the sixth book to the discussion of mixed forms and argues for their greater justice and stability". This consideration need not cause us to enlarge our classification. Although some constitutions like that of Solon might involve so even a balance of diverse elements, that it would be difficult to define their character, we find in most governments some one social element predominant; and we are thus able to assign each to one of the ordinary classes. To sum up; we may accept in the main Aristotle's classification. The ruling element will be one man, or «i Of. Ar. Pol. ii 12 1273 b 38; Isoor. xii 131 {SruMKparla ipuTTOKpaHq. Xpaniv-q), Plato, Laws iii 698 b. ^2 The Spartan constitution was regarded as a combination of all other forms. See below § 3 nn. 15—20 and of. Isoor. xii 158 (StifioKparla apiaTOKparlg. fieniyij,4vri) ; Polyb. vi 10 6. 43 viii 97 2. « Pol. vi 8 1293 b ; i6. 9 1294 a. Cf. ib. 12 1297 a 7 oVv S' &v &/Lewov ri TToXirefo /J.ix^v> to(toijt

^0'^at ol (rffTopes M ri}! Sri/j-oKpaHas ; Dem. xv 20 ; Isocr. iv 125. '" Hdt. iii 80 uses SKiyapxi-q of the government of the dpiaroi,. Ar. Pol. viii 1 1306 b 24 defines aristocracy as a sort of oligarchy : vi 3 1290 a 16 the popular definition included aristocracy under the title Skiyapxla. Plutarch I.e. uses Skiyapxia to denote the good form. " Thrasymachus in Plato, Rep. i 338 n. Thuo. iii 82 says that apurro- Kparla o-iii^pux was a party catchword of the oligarchs : but he himself uses apta-TOKparla in a general sense in viii 64. Cf . Xen. Hell, v 2 7 oi ^ovres ras oiaiat...d,pL(noKpaTii} ixP^^'^^' w. 2 18 CLASSIFICATION OF CONSTITUTIONS. [CH. I. 'dynasty' was also employed in a general sense ^^ The writers, however, who differentiated constitutions by their ethical qualities used aristocracy to denote the good form of the rule of the few and oligarchy to denote the bad, though even in this respect the usage was not consistent *l Taking number only into account, we may define oli- garchy as a form of government in which supreme power is held by a privileged class, small in proportion to the total number of free men in the state '^ To complete our definition we must take into account the basis of privilege and of exclusion, a subject discussed in the following sections. The classification of Greek constitutions is com- plicated by the class divisions, which generally existed. The slaves or serfs may be omitted from consideration, but there existed in many states a class of free subjects, and this class w^e must regard in defining the character of a constitution. In so doing we may conflict with the usage of some Greek writers. The political theory of the Greeks was not clearly or consistently formulated, and we have a striking instance of the vagueness of Greek writers in their treatment of the Spartan constitution. The Spartiates were a comparatively small part of the free population of Laconia, ruling not only over the Helots 1* Plato, Politicus 291 d. It generally denotes a narrow and absolute oligarchy. ^3 Aristotle uses these terms in all three passages (quoted above). Plato, Politicus 301 A, also does so. In the Bepublic vi_ii 545 c he uses nnoKparla to denote the first deviation from the ideal apiaroKpaHa. Xen. Mem. iv 6 12 denotes the ordinary oligarchy by irXovTOKparla; Plutarch I.e. uses 5vva(rTeia, " Professor Freeman, Comparative Politics p. 194, defined oligarchy as the constitution ' in which political rights belong to only a part of those who enjoy civil rights'; he should at least have said a minority. § 3] OLIGARCHY IN A GENERAL SENSE. 19 who were serfs, but over the Perioeci who were subject but not enslaved. Greek writers, in their general ignorance of Lacedaemonian institutions, formed different concep- tions of the constitution. Some excluded the Perioeci, others took them into account". Aristotle tells us that many wished to call the government a democracy, others an oligarchy": it was said to be compounded of oligarchy, monarchy and democracy", and he defines it himself as a mixture of aristocratic and democratic elements '^ Isocrates in the Panathmaicus defines the constitution of Lycurgus as democracy mixed with aristocracy"; but in another treatise he says that the Lacedaemonians were governed by an oligarchy^". The uncertainty and inconsistency of the Greek writers leaves us to form our own definition, and in the light of present knowledge we conclude that the Spartan constitution, so peculiarly compounded of diverse elements as to eyade exact definition, must alike from the form of its institutions, the spirit of its ad- ministration, and the exercise of sovereign power, be included among the oligarchies of Greece. It is distin- guished more particularly below as an aristocracy". .i* Isocrates xii 178 calls the perioeci S^nos, as if they were part of a Spartan oligarchy. Aristotle on the other hand {Pol. ii 6 1270 b 18) confines this term to the Spartiates. '« Pol. vi 7 1294 b 19. " lb. ii 6 1265 b 35. w lb. vi 7 1293 b 16; cf. ii 9 1270 b 16 (owing to the power of the Ephors) SrjiiOKparia i^ aptaTOKparias awi^aivev ; Plato, Laws iv 712 D. In Pol. yiii 7 1307 a 34 and 12 1316 a 33* Aristotle describes the Spartan constitution as an aristocracy. »9 xii 153; cf. vii 61, xii 178. 2» iii 24. 21 See §§ 6 and 32. 2—2 20 CLASSIFICATION OF CONSTITUTIONS. [CH. I. § 4. Oligarchy in a special s'ense. I proceed to the more precise definition of the ' Govern- ment of the few.' Oligarchy in general includes both oligarchy in a special sense and aristocracy, while polity, although classed by Aristotle with democracies, sometimes denoted the government of a minority, and must not, therefore, be omitted from consideration. Aristotle recognises that oligarchy is distinguished from democracy by other principles than those of number, and at the outset he corrects his definition by adding the test of poverty and wealths Any constitution, in which wealth confers the privileges of citizenship'', whether the rulers be few or many, must be regarded as an oligarchy'. He even argues that if a constitution existed in which a thousand wealthy men ruled over three hundred poor men, excluded from the rights of citizenship, no one would call it a democracy ^ At the same time economic 1 The difficulty of including the idea of both number and wealth in the definition of oUgarohy and democracy is discussed in Pol. iii 8 1279 b. 2 I use citizen throughout this essay in the strict sense given to the ■word by Aristotle, as one possessed of political privilege : ttoXItijs d' dirXffis oiSevl Twv S.'KKwv ipiferai /mWoy t] ti? fjierix^iv apxvs {Pol. iii 1 1275 a 22). Aristotle quotes other definitions, which he rejects. In iii 7 1279 a 31 he regards participation in the weal of the state as essential, but in iv 13 1322 a 33 he refers to ' citizens who share in the constitution ' as if the title included others who were excluded. As he says (iii 1 1275 a 3) the citizen in a democracy would not be a citizen in an oligarchy. Whether the title would have been conferred on the unprivileged class in an oligarchy we do not know. ** Pol. iii 8 1280 a 1 avayKotov oirov av Ap^wtri 8cair\ovTov &v r' Airrous,! 8,v re TrXelous, elvai TairTiv d^iyapxla,". ■* Pol. vi 4 1290 a 30; at the same time Aristotle {ib. b 15), citing the § 4] OLIGARCHY IN A SPECIAL SENSE. 21 forces lead to the concentration of wealth, and it may be assumed as a safe general rule that the rich are the few, the poor the many'. There is, perhaps, no absolute reason why wealth should be so important an element in the classification of constitutions ; but, as a matter of history, power in the Greek cities had passed into the hands either of the rich or of the many, and if we except the old, traditional aristocracies, all the constitutions known to Aristotle were based either on wealth (the defining principle of oligarchy) or liberty (the defining principle of democracy) ^ The definition given in the Politics is consistent with the general theory of the Greeks. In the Ethics'' Aristotle says 'wealth and ascendency'' are the basis of oligarchy : in the Rhetoric it is the government in which ' those who have the assessment' rule'. Xenophon, who uses the ' term plutocracy, gives the same definition. Plato in the Republic uses the same description and further says ' the case of Colophon, where there was a majority of rich men, refuses to the constitution the title of oligarchy. " lb. 1290 b 2 "KeKTiov on 5%os piv iariv orav ol iXeidepoi Kipiot ucriv, 6\iyapxia Si &Tav ol irXoiiffioi, aXKh ffv/ipatvei Tois fiiv irXeious chm, tous S' SKiyovs. This may be accepted as the final definition. No rule can be laid down either for the amount of wealth required, or for the proportion of the 6X^701 to the rest of the population ; but it is clear that the ordinary oligarchs expected the government to be in the hands of a small minority. Thus Thuc. viii 92 11 says the 400 at Athens would not appoint the 6000 t6 Ko/ra^TTJaaL fierdxovs roaoiTovi &vTLKpus drjixov ijyoi^fievoi, i.e. to impart the government to about a fourth of the total citizen population would be ' downright democracy. ' See also the next section. 6 Ar. PoJ. vi8 1294al0. 7 I refer throughout to the passages cited above § 2 n. 3. 8 Siva/us (which I translate 'ascendency ') is used in a special sense, which I discuss below, § 35 n. 7. ' ol aTb Ttfi7jfJ.aT0}v. 22 CLASSIFICATION OF CONSTITUTIONS. [CH. I. rich rule and the poor man has no share".' In the Politi- cus he defines both aristocracy and oligarchy as the govern- ment of the rich. The element of wealth was therefore generally recognised as an essential condition of oligarchy. § 5. Polity. Of course there were governments based upon a money qualification which the Greeks did not regard as oligar- chies. We are not able to determine the minimum amount of property qualifying for privilege in an oligarchy, but it is necessary to discuss how far we should include the polity within our general definition. The polity forms the link between oligarchy and democracy^ and inter- mediate forms are naturally difficult to classify. But there is no doubt that, however he defines it, Aristotle ranks polity with democracy and not witb oligarchy. In the first place it denotes the normal democracy, in which ' the multitude rules for the common interest^.' Secondly, it denotes a mixed constitution inclining more to demo- cracy than to oligarchy^, or a mixed constitution of rich and poor^ Neither of these descriptions justifies us in associating it with oligarchy, but another definition em- ployed by Aristotle shows that he conceived it to be a 1° viii 550 c i] atrd nfnnjfj.dTiai' TroXirefa ^j" ^ oi fjiiv ttXoi/o-ioi apxovci., Tivrin 5' oi ijATe Tiix-qix&Tav ixaKpdv al /jteB^^eis Tuv apxuv. See ahove § 4 n. 5. 1 See above § 3 n. 11. ^ Plato Rep. iv 445 n applies the term 6,pi6/i.iav ylvovrai. On v6iuiia, cf. the passages quoted in note 28, and the descriptions of Sparta quoted below § 32. ^ Omitting the particular evidence of Sparta (on which see § 32 below), Ar. Pol. vi 7 1293 b 12 talks of states that make koivt) infiiXeia dperijs. Cf. iii 12 1283 a 25 on the association of Triudda and dperii. Mr Hicks in his note says that Aristotle uses the words interchangeably. ^ Xen. Mem. iv 6 12. In an aristocracy offices are appointed ix tuv TO, v6/ufia (inT€\oivTu>v. (These are the rules of training.) Ar. Rhet. i 8 1365 b 34 adopts and enlarges this definition. dpt^ToKparia h y ol Kara iratdday {SLav^fwvrac t&s dpxds). TraiSeLttv d^ \iy(a t^v vtto tov v6fj,ov Knuh-qv. ol ydp i/i/ie/Mi/'riKiiTes iv Tois fo/u/wis iv Ti? dpiffTOKparlg, &pxovipav 4k tSv ISitav otKtav '!rpodiiJLUis...oit oiKin SWois ^ l(nv airots TokaiivwpovvTat (Thuo. viii 63). The claim is very prominent in the speech of the Boeotians (Thuc. iii 65) ; they argue that a minority of rich men, having a greater stake in the city (wXela Trapa^aWdfiepoi) had a right to betray it in order 7-a ajio ^x""- Of. Ar. Pol. iii 12 1283 a 31. § 12] MORAL CLAIMS OF THE OLIGARCH. 39 seemed to the oligarch an unanswerable argument for his permanent exclusion from privilege'. Even to-day the ability at need to serve in the army is regarded by many as an essential condition of political enfranchise- ment*, and in the city state of Greece, which was ever prepared for war, there was even stronger reason for such a provision'. But though the argument might be used against the poor, we must not forget that the ordinary oligarchy excluded from power many men who served as hoplites, and it was only in the polity that the qualification was sufficiently low to admit this class. § 12. Moral claims of the Oligarch. The oligarch based his claim on other grounds. He argued, in effect, not only that he had a better right, than the poor man, to govern the state, but that he was better qualified to do so; while other classes were disqualified, alike physically and morally, from discharging political duties. I have pointed out that the oligarch assumed a moral and mental superiority, and there were, of course, elements of culture to which only the rich man could ^ The satirical pamphlet on the Athenian Constitution practically assumes that public service should mean political power, and the author explains that the principle is really recognised at Athens, for the S^/ios are the source of the city's power more than the yevvaioi, and irKoinoi and otXitoi ([Xen.] Besp. Ath. 1 2). * We may compare the conscription. The inability to serve furnishes a common argument against the enfranchisement of women. 5 Cf. Freeman, Comparative Politics, p. 197 'In all primitive societies the distinction between soldier and civilian is unknown. Hence the army is the assembly, the assembly is the army.' Of. the same author Sicily ii p. 62 where he argues (from Diod. xii 19) that it was originally the custom to wear arms in the assembly as a badge of citizenship. 40 CHARACTER OF OLIGARCHY. [CH. I. attain': but the great advantage (according to the ideas of the Greeks) possessed by the man of property lay in his having leisure to practise the arts of war and of govern- ment, while the poor man not only lacked leisure, but was obliged to follow employments, which were disqualifying and degrading to body and mind. This subject is so intimately connected with the attitude of the Greeks to industry and commerce that we must briefly consider it. In this matter we must distinguish the sentiment of the old military aristocracies from that of the commercial oligarchies. It has been suggested that the origin of the contemptuous feeling for industry and trade should be traced to the age of the migrations when the victorious invaders possessed themselves of the best land and left menial occupations to the subject-races^ Hence a general characteristic of the old military aristocracies was a definite division of classes, which resulted in the practical exclusion of the artisan and trader from the government. Some states actually made 'money-making' a disqualification, or forbade the ' banausic ' arts to their citizens ; an aris- tocracy, according to Aristotle, would render it impossible for the labourer or mechanic or trader to be a citizen' ; ^ Cf. At. Pol, vi 8 1293 b 37 t4 fnaWov &Ko\ov$eiv TraiSelav Kal eiyiveiav Tots eiiropoiripois, ^ Cf. BuchBensohiitz, Besitz und Erwerb pp. 255 fi. See also Goll, Kulturbilder^ pp. 162 ff. and Newmau, Introduction pp. 98 £f. ' At. Pol. iii 5 1278 a 19 ' In an aristocratic state, in which power is given (car' apeTifv and Kar' dfiaK, the pivaviros and the Bti^ cannot be citizens,' oi5 yap olbv t' iinT-qSeSaai rb, Trjs dpeTrjs ^uvra ^lov pAvavffov tj BijnKbv, Cf. viii 12 1316 b 2 ^;' ivoKKais re SXiyapxlais oix l^eari xP1M'''''^ff "■^f. Xen. Oec. 4 3 ^K ivtais nkv tS>v irSkiUiv, fidXiffra Si ii> rais eivTroX^/toi! SoKoiaais etrai, oi55' ^^curt Twv toXltQp oOSej^l ^avavtrLKhi t^x"^^ ipyd^eaSai. Cf. Hdt. ii 167. For the few known particular instances of this prohibition see ch. v§50. § 12] MORAL CLAIMS OF THE OLIGARCH. 41 and in the ideal states of Plato and Aristotle the separa- tion of the ruling class from those engaged in trade or the manual arts was rigidly carried out^ On the other hand the oligarchies of wealth could not exclude the rich traders and craftsmen^, for they were commercial communities bent upon money-making and probably holding trade higher in esteem than it was held in a democracy of aristocratic feeling like Athens* : but for the artisan working for a wage the oligarch had the utmost contempt. The Greeks regarded leisure as a necessary condition of a good life, and as in itself a source of happiness'. They had no feeling in favour of ' work for work's sake ' : work was for them only the means and leisure the end^ Leisure was a necessity, not only for the proper training of the hoplite, which must have required constant prac- tice", but above all for the due discharge of political duties'". The philosophers tended to make government * The assignment of special functions to different orders in the state is the keynote of the BepuWic. Of. especially iii 415 b o. In the Laws v 741 B Plato forbids money-making to the citizens ; while Aristotle forbids the citizens of his ideal state to live a /Sios p&vavaos or d,yopa1oi or even to be yewpyol (Pol. iv 9 1328 b 39). Cf. Pol. iii 5 1278 a 8 ^ S^ pe\H<7TV 7r6\is oi TTOiTiffei ^Avavaov toKIttiv. " Cf. Ar. Pol. iii 5 1278 a 21 h Si rofs 6\i7opx'o's 9ijTa niv ovk ivdi- X^rai elvai. iroXlrriP.,. pdi>av(roi> Si ivSix^ai: irXovTOvffi yap xai oi jroXXol tQv rex"''''''''''. " Cf. S. H. Butcher Aspects of the Greek Genius^ p. 73. ' Pol. V 8 1838 al rb Si o'xoXii^o' ?xeiv airi SoKei T-rjv iiSoviiv Kal TTfi eiSaifwvlav xal rb ^v yuaxaptus. ^ Pol. iv 14 1384 a 14 tAos y&p ffxoMi &(rxo\ias. * Plato Bep. ii 374 bod asks ^ repl rbv trSkefwv Ayuvla oi TexwxT) SoKei etvai; Cf. Newman, Introduction p. 113. " Cf. Aelian V. H. x 14 •^ Apyla dSeKifiii rijs iXevdeptas. Ar. Pol. iv 9 42 CHARACTER OF OLIGARCHY. [CH. I. and even citizenship a profession"; and though we need not suppose that any state reached this ideal, yet the rich man was able to find leisure for the discharge of his political duties, while the poor man could ill afford to sacrifice the time^^. The quality which the Greeks called ^avava-ia in- volved more than the denial of leisure ; it implied positive defects which degraded the banausic man. Aristotle gives a definition of the term. 'That work or art or science must be considered banausic, which unfits the body or mind of free men for the employment and practice of virtue. Wherefore such arts as cause a worse condition of the body and works done for profit, we call banausic. For they deprive the mind of leisure and debase it^'.' In their effects on the body banausic arts were re- garded as a positive disqualification for the practice of warlike pursuits". To this feeling, combined with the natural feeling of superiority felt by the rich towards the poor, we may attribute to a great extent the contempt of the higher classes for the lower orders". 1329 a 1 Sei yap (T^oX^s Kal Trpbs ttjv yheaai t^s dper^i koX vpos rhs TrpA^eis tAs TToXtri/cds. " Plato Mep. 374 e ; Laws 846 d e. '2 This explains the importance to democracies of pay in the law courts and assembly. 13 Pol. V 2 1337 b 8 : cf. iv 9 1329 a 20. " Cf. Plato Rep. ii 374 o D and especially ib. vi 495 D ; Xen. Oec. 4 2 a'i ye papavaiKcd KaXoi/xevai, (T4xvii,i,)...KaTaKv/iali>ovTat ri, aiSiiui,Ta...avayK6.- ^ovaaL KadrjcdaL Kal crKi.aTpaiv Kal iJTTOva Twv &pxoiJ.hiuv KaracTKeva- 2 Sir J. P. Stephen, Liberty Equality amd Fraternity'^, p. 239. ' Representative Government eh. 1. 48 CAUSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE. [CH. II. and apply the principle. Aristotle was not far from realising the same theory. He, also, traces the varieties of constitutions to varieties in the social system ; every city has different elements and classes*: there are rich and poor ; some are armed, some unarmed ; there are differences in the working classes, differences in the notables'; and changes in the strength of social classes tend to bring about changes in the constitution^. § 15. Changes of Constitutions effected from within. Constitutional changes either proceed from within the community or are imposed from without : they are caused either by the conflict of social forces or by the violent in- terference of a foreign power^. To consider first the changes promoted from within, it is obvious that the history of constitutions reflects the general history of the race ; and constitutional developments must be traced to the movements, social and economic, military or religious, which mark the progress or decline of a nation. These movements will be alluded to more fully in the next chapter, but a few general points may be noticed. It follows from the definition of oligarchy and demo- cracy as the governments of the few rich and of the many * Pol. vi 12 1296 b 16 iari 5c irasa irb'Kii Ik re toO ffoioC xal rod TotroO. X^w 5^ troLbif liMv ^Xevdepiav ttXoutov TraiSeiav eOyivcLaVj iroirbv S^ ttjp tov TrX'^dovs vTepox^v. » Pol. vi 3 1289 b 27. 6 Pol. viii 3 1302 b 33. What Aristotle says (ib. vii 1 1317 a 20) of varieties of democracy, is true of other constitutions also. Variation is due (1) to difference in the population, (2) to different combinations of the elements of government. ^ Ar. Pol. viii 7 1307 b 20 TrSirai S' al iroXiTcicu \iovTai ori nkv i^ airwv, oTi «' i^wBev. Of. also Plato Rep. viii 556 e. § 15] CHANGES FROM WITHIN. 49 poor that economic changes must have been the most frequent cause that gave birth to these constitutions and effected revolutions in them. Originally land wras the sole source of wealth and each state was for the most part self-sufficient and self-supporting. While this con- dition prevailed power remained with the landowners, but the diffusion of the Greek race in colonies, the spread of commerce and navigation, the introduction of money as a medium of exchange, altered the distribution of wealth and tended to raise the commercial and industrial classes to an equality with the landholding aristocracy. Hence- forth economic forces had free play, and to these forces the changes in the strength of classes must be chiefly at- tributed. Aristotle mentions the narrowing of oligarchies caused by the concentration of property in the hands of a few"; and the gradual development of democracy, as a consequence of the alteration in the value of moneys. Another cause of change lay in the actual decrease of the numbers of different classes. Instances are quoted of the loss suffered by the better classes in war leading to democracy*, while the tendency within governments based on birth was to narrow the number of the privi- leged. Military changes have often been instrumental in effecting political revolutions. On the one hand the 2 Pol. viii 7 1307 a 29. 3 Pol. viii 6 1306 b 9. * Pol. viii 3 1302 b 33 ylvovrai. Se koI 5i' atfli^iru' rijv irapk rb dvdXoyop jCierajSoXai rue roXiTeiuv. He refers to the disproportionate increase of the Sijiios and cites instances of the losses of the yvibpi.iJ.oi in war ; and then says ffiii^auiei. Si Kal iv rats dri/ju>KpaTlai.s, ^ttov Si' irXeidviai' yiip Si] twv iiirbpiav yivopAvav fj tSiv oinwv ai^avoiUviav jj,eTapdWov Tratra TroXtreta /zerajSaXXet i^ aiJroG tov ?x**''^**s Tcts dpx^Si orav iv a{rr^ (rriffii iyy^vTjrau Thucydides (iii 82) gives the most forcible and incisive description of ariuLS. "> This was the case at Athens for almost the whole history of her democracy. There was, of course, the antithesis of oligarchs and demo- crats there (cf. Plut. Per. 11), but as I have argued in a previous essay. Political Parties, pp. 34 — 5, parties there were divided more by questions of the day than by fixed principles. ^^ Thuc. iii 82 ot yhp ie reus iriXetrt wpoiTTdvTes /xer' dvifiaros iKarepoL evirpeTTOvs, irXridous re Iffovofiias Tr6\LTLiajs Kal apuTTOKparias crilf^povos irpoTi- fi-^(reif TO, ^h Kotva "Xiycp 6epaTre6ovTes a6\a kiroiodvTO. . 4—2 52 CAUSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE. [CH. II. and established their own power, as an aristocracy, ruling in virtue of their conquest and of their power to maintain what they had won. In later times there are few instances in which conquest reduced a people to a state of absolute subjection, but in many cases the form of the constitution was determined either by the active interference of a foreign power or by the support given to one faction in the state against the other^. Hence the constitutional changes of the weaker states were closely connected with the supremacy of different powers, and Persia, Athens, Sparta, Thebes and Macedon all had their influence oa the constitutions of many cities'''. This is but one instance of the assimilation of constitu- tions, which tended to introduce some unity of form into the numberless states of Greece. Besides the assimilation of subject to ruler, we may note the influence of the same tendency in tribal federations, like those of Thessaly, Boeotia or Crete', in political alliances*, in towns not ^ Cf. Plato Rep. viii 556 e ^ ir6\is...i^iii6ei' iirayoixivav fi twv iripav i^ SKi.yapxoviihT]S irSXeois ^v/j-naxia" V tQ" iripuv iK STifiOKpaTOViiivT]S...avTij airy n&xerai. Ar. Pol. viii 7 1307 b 20 ai xoXiTBoi...XiiovTai...?{u96c, l^Tdv ^vavria -jroXiTeia y, ^ ir\'/i{7iov 7J irbppw fi^v ^x^^^^ ^^ S6vafiiv, The Peloponnesian war affords many illustrations of this. 2 Cf. Ar. Fol. vi 11 1296 a 32 in Si koX tQv ev riye/ioflq, y^voiiivav ttjs 'EXXdSos Trpbs ttjv irap airdis ^KdrepoL TTo\t,rcla,v a-jro^X^irovTes ol fihf Sij- fWKpaTLas iv rats iroKeai Kadiffraffav, ol 5' 6\Lyapx^o.s. For the particular influence of Athens and Sparta see below § 18. 2 Crete offers a good instance. Although there was no permanent union of the Cretan cities, their constitutions were so homogeneous that Aristotle and other ancient writers habitually talk of ' Cretan ' magistrates and institutions. Swoboda, Griechische Volksbeschl&sse p. 30, calls atten- tion to the 'local style' of the Cretan decrees. * Athens and Sparta afford the best illustration. See below § 18 n. 3. There was a double Influence at work, for states sought the alliance of § 17] CONSTITUTIONS IN THE COLONIES. 63 connected by any bond save that of locality^ and in colonies. § 17. Constitutions in the Colonies. The constitutions of the different colonies were new creations, not developed from preceding historical con- ditions, but instituted concurrently with the foundation of the state. Colonies were cities without a past and offered therefore the best ground for constitutional ex- periments. Under normal circumstances it would be natural for the colonists to transfer to their new home the political ideas and institutions of the mother city. It is easier to reproduce than to innovate ; and in the absence of contrary motives, if circumstances permitted, the government of the colony was a reflection of that of the metropolis. But it might be impossible or un- desirable to adhere to the social divisions or political organisation, that had been left behind. Many colonies were composed of citizens of mixed race ; and this would prevent them from establishing the social or tribal di- visions of the mother country : others again were founded by a class in revolt against the aristocracy ; and these would be unlikely to recognise the privilege of noble birth. Many of the colonies, therefore, adapted the constitution to the new conditions, and there were special cities of similar constitution, and worked at the same time to establish their own form of government among their allies. ° The towns of Italy and Sicily offer an instance of states politically independent of one another adopting similar institutions. Of. Swoboda op. cit. p. 30. This was in part due to the influence of lawgivers, on which see below § 20. 54 CAUSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE. [CH. II. forms of government, produced by these conditions, which lasted for a long time in the colonies*. § 18. The influence of Athens and Sparta. The establishment of democracy at Athens and her rise to power in the fifth century led to a rivalry and division of empire between that city and Sparta. Hence- forth there were two great powers in Greece, who sought by supremacy or federation to unite other states with themselves and thus to correct in some degree the permanent tendencies to separate autonomy, which pre- vailed generally in Greece. Many motives combined to effect such a cleavage, Athens and Sparta were opposed in every way, by race, by traditions, by character and by policy : but there was no stronger force at work than the opposition of principles of government. Sparta in cha- racter and constitution presented a form of aristocracy, almost unique in Greece, but in the general antithesis of democracy and oligarchy, minor differences were for- gotten, and the Peloponnesian confederacy included commercial states, like Corinth and Megara, which, in many ways, must have felt more in sympathy with the enterprise and energy of Athens, than with the barbarous military system of Sparta^. The two leading states 1 Of forms of government specially found in colonies we may note the ' oligarcliies of first settlers, of the kingly house, and of fixed number.' See Chapter iv. ' Corinth and Megara were doubtless thrown into alliance with Sparta by a feeling of commercial rivalry towards Athens (Megara in fact must have been democratic when she joined the confederacy) ; and they can have had little community of sentiment with Sparta. At the same time the oligarchs of Corinth, for example, would have been loath § 18] THE INFLUENCE OF ATHENS AND SPARTA. 55 appeared at once as the champions and standards of the political principles that they professed. Within their own confederacies it was only natural that they should foster the governments with which they were in sym- pathy ; and alliance with one or other of the great powers often determined for lesser states the fate of their consti- tution^. In the fifth century, when the empire of Greece was divided between Athens and Sparta, each state strove to introduce some uniformity of constitution into their own alliance, and in case of faction their support was assured to the party representing their own principles'. By the beginning of the Peloponnesian war the only mem- bers of the Delian confederacy that are known to have been oligarchic were Lesbos and Chios*. The rest were subject to Athens, and had either adopted a democratic constitution or had had institutions similar to those of Athens forced upon them°. In the Peloponnesian con- to enter into union with a state so active in the support of democracies as Athens. 2 The fate of Cos may be regarded as typical. We first hear of it as governed by a tyrant under Persian sway; it was probably democratic while in the Delian confederacy, oligarchic at the end of the war, demo- cratic and in the Athenian alliance after Cnidus, oligarchic after revolt from Athens in 357. (I have accepted the inferences drawn by Gilbert, Handbuch ii pp. 172—3.) 3 Ar. Pol. viii 7 1307 b 23 ol nh yap 'AOrivam iravraxov ras 6\iyapxias, oi Si AdKuves Tois S^puivs KariXvov. See § 26. ■• Mitylene was oligarchic (cf. Thuc. iii 27). Chios Gilbert {Handbuch ii p. 153) thinks was democratic. There is, I think, no evidence for this ; and the narrative in Thuc. iv 58, viii 24 and 38 seems to me to imply the existence of oligarchy. " The events of the first half of the fifth century, the delivery from Persia, the overthrow of the tyrants, the spread of trade etc., must have favoured democracy. In many states we can trace the deliberate introduction of Athenian institutions; and Miletus had even adopted 66 CAUSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE. [CH. II. federacy Sparta left autonomy to her allies^, but she took good care that they should be governed by oligarchies well disposed to herself, and it is clear that democracy was an ' inconvenient ' form of government, the correction of which was demanded by Spartan interests, wherever it was possible". At the beginning of the war Megara, Elis and Mantinea were her only democratic allies of importance. The Peloponnesian war was a conflict be- tween the opposing principles of the two governments', and as the fortunes of either side rose or fell, the cause of democracy or oligarchy was advanced. But even after Athens and Sparta had ceased to exercise supremacy over other states, they still remained the refuge, and support of democrats and oligarchs^" ; and while their help was always ready to further the cause that they the Athenian tribes and demes. (The evidence, which is epigraphic, is quoted by Gilbert, Handbuch ii p. 141 n. 1.) Interference with constitu- tions was especially forbidden in the second Athenian Confederacy: G. I. A. ii 17 (Hicks, Inscriptions 81). * Sparta always posed as the champion of autonomy. See § 49 n. 8. ' The principle is stated by Thuc. i 19. Cf. i 76 where the Athenians say v/j.eis yovVj tu AaKedaijibvioL, ras Iv ry JleXo7rovi^ri(r<^ irdXcts iirl t6 iijuv ili4\iiJL0v KaTacrT7j(rdfi.evoL e^ye!uTii,hoi, roir 58 CAUSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE. [CH. II. out^ and to recognise how little worthy she was of the extravagant praises bestowed upon her. But before the downfall of Sparta her government com- manded almost universal admiration. Aristotle speaks of earlier writers who left all other constitutions out of view while they praised that of Lacedaemoii ^. Plato spoke of ' the generally-praised Cretan and Lacedaemonian constitutions ' : and though he is by no means blind to the faults of Sparta his ideal state is built upon a similar frameworks Thucydides refers to the long continuance of a well-ordered constitution at Sparta", and Xenophon makes Critias (himself the author of the first treatise on the Spartan state) refer to the general opinion that the government of Sparta was the best'. But although admired it is doubtful whether the Spartan constitution was imitated. Pindar refers to the city of Aetna being founded ' in laws of the norm of Hyllus ' and remaining ' under the ordinances of Aegi- 1 Of. Ar. Pol. iv 14 1333 b 21 Kalroi. SiiXof us ^TreiS?; vvv ye oiiKh-i vtrdpxet- Tots Ad.KCi)aL rb &.pxeiv, oOk eOdaifjioves, ou5' 6 vofjiodh-7]s 6,yadbs. Sir Frederick Pollock, History of the Science of Politics p. 11 n. 1, expresses himself on the Spartans with a frankness that is refreshing. ' The Spartans have had their day of glorification from rhetoricians and second-hand scholars. To me they have always appeared the most odious impostors in the whole history of antiquity,... with aU their pre- tentious discipline they produced in the whole course of their wars only two officers, who are known to have been gentlemen, Brasidas and Callicratidas.' 2 Pol. vi 1 1288 b 41; iv 14 1333 b 12. The political theorists of the fourth century regarded Sparta as the ideal military state ; see Meyer, Geschichte des Alterthums ii p. 564. " Rep. viii 544 c. See Newman, Introduction pp. 400 — 1. " i 18; cf. iii 57. ' Xen. Hell, iii 3 4. Xenophon himself wrote a panegyric of the Lycurgean state {Resp. Lac.). § 20] LAWGIVERS. 59 mius": and he describes Aegina as governed under 'the norm of Hyllus and Aegimius'.' But these are probably merely conventional methods of praise ; a government founded on so rigid a system, as that of Sparta, was not for general application. There were colonies in which we can trace the existence of the so-called Dorian tribes, the division of classes, as in the Dorian states and other Dorian institutions^: but the essential features of a military aristocracy, based on a strict training, the separation of classes and occu- pations Sparta shared, so far as we know, only with Crete. § 20. Lawgivers. The method by which important changes of constitu- tion were effected in early times was most often the appointment of a single man, entrusted with full powers to revise the constitution and to draw up a code of laws. The practice was so fully in accord with Greek sentiment that the earliest constitutions were often connected with the name of some individual, although they may have arisen naturally and spontaneously from the circumstances of the community'. In the history of early societies a time comes when it is felt necessary to reduce the old un- written laws to order and to publish them, when revised, in a code". In Greece this work was usually effected in each state by a single man, and as the development of « Pyth. i 61. ' Fr. i (Bockh). * Cf. Heraclea in Pontus, Byzantium, Chalcedon. 1 Cf. the unsolved cLuestiou of Lyourgus and his work. " Maine, Ancient Law pp. 14 ff. 60 CAUSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE. [CH. II. society had made reform essential, such an one was usually given indefinite powers to readjust the constitution. Even in later times when further reforms were necessary the same process was sometimes employed. The absolute authority entrusted to the legislators induced Aristotle to regard men of this class as tyrants', although their appointment was intended to prevent tyranny by a reconciliation of factions. Either a citizen was chosen to reform the constitution of his own state, as Draco, Solon and Cleisthenes at Athens, Pittacus at Mitylene, Epimenes in Miletus, and Zaleucus in Locri ; or a stranger was called in, as one who would be free from party feeling and might introduce the institutions of some more wisely ordered state. Thus Charondas legislated for many of the states of Sicily and Italy*; Philolaus of Corinth for Thebes'^ and Demonax of Mantinea for Cyrene'. In the consideration of lawgivers we must not omit the founders of colonies: the oecist must often have been aesymnete, and nothing affords a better proof of the political talent of the Greeks than the institution of well-ordered and syste- matic government in so many colonies. In some cases we can trace the influence of philosophers on legislation. Pythagoras affords a notable instance of the philosopher in politics, but his action was directed more to influence the rulers than to alter the constitu- 3 Ar. Pol. iii 14 1285 a 30, (the office of alaviirfirqs is defined as alperfi rvpavvts) ; ib. ii ch. 12 gives a general account of the ancient legislators. Of. Plato JRep. x 599 n e. ^ See Plato cited in the last note. 5 Ar. Pol. ii 12 1274 a 22 and 31. ^ Hdt. iv 161, Demonax seems to have made some effort to adapt Spartan institutions to the needs of Gyrene. § 20] LAWGIVERS. 61 tion'. Strabo suggests that the good order of Elea was due to Parmenides and Zeno^ There were political theorists before Socrates; but the most prominent of them, the Sophists, were ' in the anti-social camp".' The masters of political philosophy came too late for their teaching to be realised in practice, if we except the attempt of Dion to found a philosophic state" and the possible influence of philosophic ideals on such men as Epaminondas", Archytas and Timoleon. One other factor of constitutional change must not be omitted ; the pretence of a return to an ' ancestral con- stitutional' It is easier to effect a revolution, if it be represented as a return to the past; and though the Greeks were not particularly moved by sentimental admiration for the archaic, the fiction of the restoration of ancient forms of government was put forward especially by oligarchs who wished to overthrow the later growths of a democracy". ' Newman, Introduction p. 377. Pythagoras breathed 'a new and more ethical spirit into the rule of the Few.' 8 Strabo vi 252. ' Newman, Introduction, p. 391. i» Plut. Dion 53. 11 Ar. Rhet. ii 23 1398 b 18 'Thebes never flourished till she was ruled by philosophers.' " Of. Ar. Pol. ii 8 1268 b 26 ff. on ol Trdrpioi v6fi.oi. 13 The oligarchies at Athens were established under a pretext of the restoration of the old democracy. Cf. Ar. Ath. Pol. 29 3; 34 3; Xen. Hell, ii 3 2; iii 4 2; Died, xiv 3. CHAPTER III. The Historical Development of Constitutions. § 21. The origin of Constitutions. I PRO(JEED to consider the process of constitutional de- velopment, tracing in a brief outline the general course of political change and dwelling only on such matters as illustrate the genesis or character of oligarchies. The Greek writers gave different accounts of the cycle of governments. With Plato' and Polybius'' the order is drawn up more in accordance with the relative merit of the different forms than in agreement with their succession in point of time. Aristotle's account is nearer to facts but it is too absolute''; as all states did not go through the same cycle in the same order: but there is still enough truth in it to make it applicable to the majority of those constitutions which did pass through the ordinary stages of development. ' Plato Rep. viii 544 o (criticised by Ar. Pol. viii 12 1316 b). 2 Polyb. vi 4 7 ; vi 9 10 ; aiirTj ttoKith&v dvaKiinXaats, aUrri (piaem olKovoiila. Maohiavelli, First Decade of T. Livius ch. 2, also describes ' the sphear and circle in which all Eepublios have, and do move ' and his order of succession is also a priori. 3 Ar. Pol. iii 15 1286 b. § 22] THE HEROIC MONARCHY. 63 Aristotle starts with the heroic age, and we also must assume it as ' a primary fact for the purpose of following out its subsequent changes' without speculating on 'its antecedent causes and determining conditionsV while we leave the difficult subject of the government of the tribal community out of view^. Aristotle was aware that other forms of union had preceded the state of the Homeric age, and his account of village settlements and their government at the beginning of the first book is not out of harmony with modern theories. It is important, however, to keep clearly before us that cities were gene- rally formed by the coalescence of several communities : that each, in fact, was a federation of smaller aggregates, which were in many cases tribal unions^ This is a fact of the utmost importance for the comprehension of early constitutions, in which the conflict of city and tribe was waged throughout the whole of the period of aristo- cracies. § 22. The Heroic Monarchy. The heroic monarchy, as depicted in the Homeric poems, contains both in the powers of government and in the social classes the germs of later forms of consti- ■• Grote ii p. 59 — 'To conceive absolute beginning or origin ia beyond the reach of our faculties: we can neither apprehend nor verify any- thing beyond progress or development or decay.' In pushing our investi- gations back we must ultimately come to facts which defy analysis or explanation. The origin of social classes is one of these facts. Cf. Freeman, Comparative Politics pp. 247 ff. » On this see W. W. Fowler, The City State ch. 2. 5 De Coulanges, La Cit4 Antique^" pp. 143 — 4. 64 DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONS. [CH. III. tution*. We find that the orders of society are divided almost as definitely as castes, and these must be accepted as established institutions, the origin of which, like the origin of classes in general, is beyond our power to explain. The king and the chiefs form together the first class of nobles. The king is supreme in power and honour, but he differs from the other chiefs only in degree, not in kindl King and nobles share the knowledge and practice of law and the science of things divine. The king is the chief leader in war, the nobles are the great warriors fighting from their chariots in front of the host of the commons, who hurl their weapons from a distance. But king and nobles are separated by a broad distinc- tion from the two other classes. Of these the general mass of freemen, practising different crafts' or cultivating their own lots of land, rank next in importance. Below them come the poor freemen, Thetes, working for hire, chiefly on the lands of other men*. They were paid in ' I assume that the picture of government and society presented by Homer corresponded in the main with the actual state of Greece in the so-called 'Achaean' period. There is an excellent sketch of Homeric Society in Grote Part i ch. 20. 2 The nobles like the king are called j3abpoi,, ijy^opes or niSovres. W. 5 66 DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONS. [CH. III. each other they stood on the same level of privilege'. Their acknowledgment of one chief as superior to the rest may be the justification of Aristotle's statement that the heroic king ruled over willing subjects and obtained his position by being the benefactor of his people in the arts of peace or war*. The government of the united state included three different powers, the monarch, the council of the nobles, the assembly of the commons ; but it is necessary to insist that there was nothing like a formal constitution at this period. ' There was,' as Grote says, ' no scheme or system, do idea of responsibility ; the obedience of the subject depends on personal feeling and reverence for the chiefs".' The king, who enjoyed a sort of 'divine right",' alone exercised individual authority, based on the ascend- ency of himself and his race, and though he required the consent and support of the other orders and usually ob- served the precedents and traditions of his ancestors, it is a mistake to say, as Thucydides and Aristotle do, that his powers were limited or defined". There was no division of political functions between different magistrates as there was in later times. War, justice and religion were the three spheres of government, and in all the king was supreme", though he might 8 One account that Aristotle gives of the origin of Aristocracy is o-w^- jSaive ylveirBai TroWois o/iotovs ivpbs aper^v (Pol. iii 15 128613 12). 3 Pol. iii 14 1285 b 6. i» ii p. 61. ^^ The dyoi §an\9jei give judgment (1. 39), apparently in the agora (1. 29). 5—2 68 DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONS. [CH. III. the privileged class and directed the government in their interest. In the democracy the people made known their will in the assembly : but the assembly was no longer the mute, submissive gathering of the legendary age, but a sovereign body, in which speech was the right of all, and speech the motor of government". § 23. Transition from Monarchy to Aristocracy. The transition from monarchy to aristocracy took place at an early period of history ; the accounts of it are largely legendary, and much room is left for speculation as to the occasion and cause. But one point is equally certain and important. If we put aside aristocracies founded on conquest, the change involved no break of continuity, no revolution of ideas : it was rarely violent, most often gradual, and sometimes almost imperceptible \ The explanation lies in the similar character of kingship and aristocracy in Greece. ' Aristocracy,' as Montesquieu described it, 'is a monarchy with several monarchs': no violence was done to men's ideas when the chieftains resolved on an equal division of power among themselves. The change was in the interests of the nobles, not of the commons. 'The revolution was not the work of the lower classes, who wished to overthrow the constitu- tion of society, but of the aristocracy who wished to maintain it".' " irappnjaLa was a universal principle of democracy. Of. the descrip- tion given by Dem. xix 184 (itt' iv 'Kdyois i] Tro^irela. ' In the light of the Aristotelian treatise on the Athenian constitu- tion, it vrould be difficult, for instance, to mark the date of the end of /SacriXeta at Athens. ^ De Coulanges, op. cit. p. 301. § 23] TRANSITION TO ARISTOCRACY. 69 The causes of the change can only be considered most generally. Aristotle talks of kings surrendering part of their powers of their own accord", of a general spread of ' virtue,' which induced men to found a common constitu- tion^ Both of these explanations point to the loss of prestige by the king, which brought the overlord to the same level as the chiefs. Elsewhere he mentions military changes which put power into the hands of ' the knights',' who must probably in this connexion be identified with the nobles. It was possible too that a weak, unwarlike man might become king, and inasmuch as the chief duty of the monarch was to command in war, his authority would be lost, if he proved unfitted for his duties'; or a time of peace might come when no general was required. Another cause that can be traced is connected with the union of smaller communities to form larger political organisations. Such a process, which the Greeks called avvoiKia^jiO'i, abolished the separate authority of a number of petty princes', who were compensated for their loss of independence by the grant of aristocratic privileges in the new state. Whether the chief power were still held by a king in the new state, mattered little: for the privileges of the nobles limited his au- 3 Pol. iii 14 1285 b 15. * Pol. iii 15 1286 b 8 quoted above § 22 n. 8. The passage continues oiiK^rt hir^^evop dXK i^riTovv KOLvbv tc Kal iroXireiav Kadiaraffav. = Pol. vi 13 1297 b 16. ^ The cause assigned for the appointment of the iroMnapxos at Athens by Ar. Ath. Pol. 3 2 is did, rb yeviadai T<.vd,s tCiv ^aaCKiuv tci. TToXefAtKa fjuiKaKois. ' Bekker Anecdota p. 257 EiiraTptdai, o!.../ieT^o>'Tes /SacriXi/coC yivovs preserves a faint trace of the origin of the Athenian nobility from the families, which had formerly held kingly rank. See also Plut. Thes. 32. 70 DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONS. [CH. III. thority, and the essential conditions of an aristocracy must have been fulfilled'. This process was the triumph of the city over the tribe, and it can be best illustrated in the history of Athens': but the history of the same State shows the repugnance of the nobles to the loss of their former local sovereignty, and the tendency to recur to the system of separate tribal settlements". A special form of aristocracy arose by the transfer of supreme power from the single monarch to the kingly family, who of their own numbers formed an aristocratic class. This subject I discuss more fully below". Distinct from all these causes is the conquest of a land by an invading race, who, through superiority of tactics or better equipment", overcame the former inhabitants of a district, and reduced them to serfdom or subjection, while the invaders formed a ruling class. Whether the form of the constitution was monarchic or not, we may regard it as possessing the essentials of an aristocracy in the superior privilege of the conquerors in relation to the conquered. The Dorian migration established throughout the Pelopon- nese a number of states of aristocratic constitution ; and 8 It seems clear that at Athens the Eupatrids formed a power in the state distinct from the king, exercising a check on the absolute authority of the monarch. This may be the explanation of the persistent legends that Theseus established a 'democratic constitution' and offered a 'government without a king.' ^ See Appendix A below. 1" See Appendix B below. " See chapter iv § 33. '2 The Dorians perhaps had both advantages. Thus they are credited with the introduction of the hoplite tactics, which overcame the system of chariots and light arms ; and there is some ground for supposing that the Dorians were 'men of iron' who overcame the 'men of bronze.' § 24] CHANGES OF GOVERNMENT. 71 the same origin must be attributed to the governments of Thessaly and Boeotia. § 24. Changes of Government incident on the establish- ment of Aristocracy. From the description just given of the transition to aristocracy it may be inferred that the constitutional changes required were neither many nor important. The essence of the change was the assertion of the authority of the class of nobles, as against the single monarch or the magistrates. Hence the Council assumed a greater im- portance under the aristocracy, while the assembly of the commons seems to have had even less weight than it possessed under the monarchy. The fate of the king differed in different states. As has been pointed out, the title ySacriXeii? in Greek is a term elastic in its applica- tion^; and the title was often retained after monarchy was really abolished. The ^aaiXeii^ might become a temporary or a responsible magistrate, or several /3ao-t- \^69 might take the place of one''. In some states new magistrates with special titles were instituted to receive some part of the king's power. Thus at Athens the polemarch and the archon shared the func- tions of government with the king, and in the course of time the king became the least important of the three. At Megara there was a legend of a similar division of duties between king and general'. Gradually the duties • Holm, Griechische Geschichte, i p. 318. " The division of the kingly power is illustrated by the double king- ship at Sparta (which diminished the importance of the ofBce). But the origin of this institution is prehistoric. See also chapter iv § 33. 3 Paus. i 39 6. 72 DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONS. [CH. III. of administration were distributed among a still greater number of magistrates, and Aristotle classifies the titular kings of later times either as life-generals or as ritual magistrates*. In point of tenure Athens shows the transition from the hereditary king for life to the elected and annual magistrate, and at Athens too we hear of the responsi- bility of the kings being asserted. Probably the council in many states gained the right to control the magis- trates. § 25. Transition from Aristocracy to Oligarchy. The transition to aristocracy from, monarchy, while it involved a formal change of constitution, was effected without doing violence to the general sentiment of the age ; but the institution of oligarchy, even if it required no change in the external form of government, was connected with the most momentous social movements and with an absolute revolution in the thoughts of men. In the aristocratic society classes were fixed with something of the rigidity of castes ; the rulers formed a close corporation, marrying only within their own order'^, maintaining a monopoly of the secrets of government, keeping within their own circle judicial, military and religious functions, and exercising an absolute rule over submissive subjects. Their authority was, in most states, •* Fol. iii 14 1285 b 14. 1 There is not very much evidence: but such a provision is usually characteristic of a close aristocracy. Hdt. v 92 asserts it of the Bacchiads at Corinth, and we may infer it of Megara from Theognis (see n. 19). Of. the prohibition of connubium at Bome. § 25] TRANSITION TO OLIGARCHY. 73 consecrated by the prescription of centuries ; in others sanctified as effectively by the right of conquest". Ke- spect for their rule was instinctive : they were ' the good ' and ' the best ' : their subjects the ' base ' and the ' craven.' To refuse them obedience was a sin', for they were descen- dants of the gods, who had given them both their power and their wealth*, and with whom they alone could mediate. To overthrow this government and set oligarchy in its place was to substitute wealth for ' virtue V to ignore the power of the gods and drive them from the earth', to give to might the place of right, to abolish privilege and let social forces have unchecked play. Changes so momentous and so destructive to their pretensions could not be accepted by the nobles without a bitter struggle ; and the echoes of this conflict are pre- served for us in the verses of the lyrical poets, all of them aristocrats, many of them spendthrift and ruined, who curse the power of wealth, and the rise of base men, and mourn the lost privileges of ' the good.' Nowhere do we 2 Bluntsohli, Theory of the State, p. 247 'Ancient peoples regarded war as a great international lawsuit, and victory as the judgment of God in favour of the victor.' ' Of. Xen. Besp. Lac. 8 5 oi ii.6:>ov S,voii.ov dXXa Koi avbdLov rh tvSoxp^- (TTOis v6fiois /i7? irddeffBat. * No evidence is required for the helief that power comes from the gods. It is inherent in the constitution of early society. Land, regarded as the true form of wealth, is said to be given by the gods and is therefore distinguished from other kinds of property. Cf . Solon fr. 13 9 — 13 ; Theogn. 197—202. ^ Cf. Plato Rep. viii 550 e and 551 A on the contrast of t\oDtos and d/jeri}, especially n/ia/iivov di; wXoiiTov iv vSKm /col tuv ifKovaltnv ari/wr^pa, dper'/i re Kal oi iya$oi. Theogn. 1135—50. 'The gods have left the earth.' 74 DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONS. [CH. III. get a more vivid representation of the revolution, or a better reflection of contemporary opinion, than in the pages of Solon and Theognis, the one a mediator between the past and the future, striving to unite the discord of factions and to restore peace and order to the state ; the other an irreconcilable enemy of the changes that were being effected, refusing to accept the inevitable, and still maintaining the cause of the old aristocracy. There is uncertainty about both the date of Theognis and the constitution of Megara : he lived in an age of revolutions, and his poems may refer to more than one form of con- stitution ; but his general attitude seems to be that of an aristocrat protesting against plutocracy, of a bitter op- ponent of the new-made rich who have risen to power and honour'. It is a circumstance peculiarly appropriate to the character of oligarchy that its origin can be traced to the invention of money more than to any one other fact; it ' We may assume that the Dorian aristocracy of birth at Megara was overthrown by Theagenes, and not restored after his expulsion. Probably an oligarchy of wealth followed (referred to by Plut. Q. G. 18), succeeded soon after by a violent democracy, after which oligarchy was probably restored (Welcker refers Ar. Pol. viii 5 1304 b 35 and vi 15 1300 a 17 to this period, but they seem to suit the events of 424 e.c. better). We do not know exactly at what stage Theognis was writing: his tone seems more natural in an oligarchy of wealth, than in a democracy. At any rate aristocracy was not far back in the past, and the poet shows the aristocratic loathing of the commons, rich and poor. F. Cauer, Parteien und Politiker in Megara und Athen, discusses the overthrow of aristocracy at Megara and its causes with much ability : but I cannot agree with his theory that we can assign different poems of Theognis to different dates, and thereby trace a definite change in his position. Herr Cauer assumes a transition from personal and political friendship with the lower classes to the violent championship of the aristocracy. This speculation seems to me far-fetched and unnecessary. § 25] TRANSITION TO OLIGARCHY. 75 was the redistribution of wealth, due to trade and industry, and only rendered possible by the introduction of coinage, which raised new social classes to power in the state. But these material causes required the contribution of moral causes. What had hitherto been considered the absolute right of the aristocracy came to be regarded as an odious privilege : and the revolution of ideas involved in this could not be effected without deep changes of sentiment in matters of government and religion, in fixed customs and social divisions. These changes probably did not take place until the rule of the nobles had proved oppressive to the excluded^. A close society, based upon hereditary succession and maintained by intermarriage, tends naturally to. become narrower, and as it becomes narrower to become also more despotic. When land is the only source of wealth, the landowners are apt to make an oppressive use of their monopoly, to enforce the laws of debt to their own pur- pose, to try and reduce the other classes to a still worse subjection'. Such an abuse of power raised a bitter feel- ing against the aristocracy ; and we may see in this degeneracy of government the basis of the ethical distinc- tions drawn by Plato and Aristotle between aristocracy and oligarchy. Oligarchy is the perverted form of a good 8 On this see W. W. Fowler, The City State, pp. 119 ff. 9 The laws of debt both at Athens and Borne were wrested so as to introduce a practical state of serfdom. I think the Eupatrid landowners at Athens were endeavouring before Solon's legislation to reduce the Thetes to the condition of the Lacedaemonian Helots. Cf. the descrip- tion in Ar. Ath. Pol. 2 § 2 (iSoiXevov ol Tvivqris toU irXovtrlois) ; § 3 (r6 SouXeiJeic). This explains the importance of his prohibition rb /i^ Savel^eiv iirl Tois a-dimaiv (9 § 1) which is described as the most democratic measure of all. 76 DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONS. [CH. III. government, and Aristotle explains that it came into being at a time when the rulers became ' worse,' and used their power to make money'". As long as land was the chief or only form of wealth, the other classes must have been in a state of dependence on the nobles, who owned most of the land". Some of the commons worked land be- longing to the nobles, others served for hire, and as they were paid in kind they could never accumulate wealth or attain independence. But the growth of trade and navigation, which suc- ceeded the spread of colonies, introduced new methods of producing wealth , deprived land of its exclusive import- ance, and exalted industry and commerce. One thing more was essential to dissolve the 'law of status '^^i the introduction of a proper medium of exchange. The tran- sition from barter to a money currency, which took place in Greece about the beginning of the seventh century, effected an economic revolution. Before this transition had taken place it must have been impossible to effect a proper division of employments or to give to industry its due reward^'. Trade in many Greek states was not essentially un- *" Pol. iii 15 1286 b 14 itrd Se x^^P^^s yevS^evoi ixpvf^<^Tt'^ovTO dirb twv KOLvwv, ivTevBiv irodev effKoyov yeviaOai, ras iXiyapxia^- Of. Plat. Rep. viii 550 E. 1' The possession of land is implied in Aristotle's definition of evyiveia (discussed in § 6) and in many cities was one of tlie conditions of political privilege. See ch. iv. § 30. '2 Bagehot, Physics and Politics p. 29. ' In early times the guiding rule was the law of status. Everybody was born to a place in the com- munity : in that place he had to stay : in that place he found certain duties which he had to fulfil, and which were all he needed to think of.' " Cf. At. Pol. i 9 1257 a 35. § 25] TRANSITION TO OLIGARCHY. 77 aristocratic. Many of the colonies governed by close aris- tocracies were most active in the pursuit of commerce. The chief epoch of colonisation, which was undertaken to a great extent to promote and protect commercial in- terests, is earlier than the period of oligarchic government; and there are many particular instances of aristocracies generally or of particular nobles engaging in trade". But trade and industry, unlike property in land, could not be limited to a class : other people besides the nobles might accumulate wealth. The introduction of money, a measure which has always proved to the advantage of industry, tended to emancipate the hired labourers from their thral- dom and rendered the exchange of property easy, so that, while it was possible for the commons to rise to wealth, it was equally possible for the nobles to lose their substance by rash speculation or to waste it in luxurious living. Lastly, the importation of corn from abroad had its in- evitable effects on agriculture". The general diffusion of wealth, involving the im- poverishment of some nobles and the enrichment of some of the commons", produced a state of political inequality which demanded redress. The same causes were not equally effective in all states. In some trade never attained to importance ; class distinctions were rigidly kept up and the old aristocracies survived". But in " The commercial activity of the aristocracies is obvious in the colonies. Cauer id. p. 21 argues that the nobles of Megara were especially interested in foreign trade. Of individual examples we may cite Solon (Plut. Sol. 2) and Sappho's brother (Strabo xvii 808). 1' See Cauer id. pp. 18 — 9 and Busolt StaatsaltertUmer^ pp. 33 — 4. '* This is the burden of the plaint of Theognis, cf. 315, -n-oAXoi rot irKovTovfft. KaKoif ayadol d^ Tr^vovrai. " The commercial oligarchy was never established in Sparta or Thessaly. 78 DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONS. [CH. III. most states the power of wealth could not be resisted": the economic revolution led first to social, then to politi- cal changes. Intermarriage between the classes became general", the commons were admitted to serve in the army'^, and in some states the balance of power had already shifted from birth to wealth before the people were conscious of change, and the only course possible was to recognise the accomplished fact and widen the basis of government^'. Such were the social and economic changes which rendered possible the transition from aristocracy to oli- garchy. But the transition was seldom effected immedi- ately. The nobles did not surrender their privileges without resistance, and the contest between birth and wealth generally led to a state of faction, the issue of which was almost invariably in the seventh and sixth centuries a tyranny ^^ The commons, strong in numbers 1* Of. Theognis passim, especially 700 irX-fiBei. S' avdpiinruiv Apirri /Ua yiveTM ijde \ irXovTeiv : and the sentiment XP^P-"-'^' "■"VPi which occurs in Alcaeus fr. 49 (Bergk) ; Pindar Isth. 2 11. The whole of lyrical poetry bears witness to it. ^' Theognis 183 ff. We may infer the same result for other states. ^° The introduction of hoplite tactics probably rendered it necessary to open the army to such of the commons as could furnish the equipment. In a time of perpetual war the state could not afford to maintain aristo- cratic distinctions. ^1 The constitution of Draco at Athens, as discussed in Ar. Ath. Pol. 4 2 {dircSidoTO i] iroKirela rois iiirXa TrapexofLii'oi.s), if we place any reliance on the account, may have been only the legal recognition of changes already accomplished. (This would explain the pluperfect iireSiSoro.) 2^ I do not know that there is any instance recorded besides that of Athens in which oligarchy succeeded aristocracy without the interme- diate stage of tyranny. But at Athens the constitution of Solon never got to work, and it needed the tyranny of Pisistratus to break the power of the nobles and clear the ground for a government on a fresh basis. § 25] TRANSITION TO OLIGARCHY. 79 and wealth but without leaders or organisation, could only overthrow the aristocracy by reviving monarchy. And the tyrants almost without exception used their position to break the power of the nobility and to deprive them of their privilege and prestige^l Tyranny had but a short reign in Greece, but it was rarely, if ever, possible to establish the old aristocratic constitution after it was once overthrown^: in most states of the mainland oligarchy was introduced^^, in some democracy succeeded directly to tyranny^. I have postponed until now the consideration of one factor which must have been of momentous consequence in the struggle between the old government and the new. The struggle between the tribe and the city, which has been said to characterise early periods of history, had here to be fought out to the death : for both the political privileges and the personal influence of the nobles de- pended on the tribal organisation of the state, and it proved vain to abolish the privileges of birth, without touching the sway of the great families. In almost all Greek states the ascending series of house, clan and tribe ^ E. Curtius in Hermes x p. 232 thinks Corinth was an exception. 'The Corinthian tyranny was distinguished from other tyrannies in having no democracy behind it : it maintained many of the conservative principles of the former oligarchy (of birth).' ^ Hdt. iii 50 mentions Prooles, a tyrant of Epidaurus; Epidaurus afterwards was governed by an aristocracy. Ar. Pol. viii 12 1316 a 34 mentions the tyranny of Charilaus at Sparta passing into aristocracy : but this was probably not a tyranny of the ordinary type. 25 Oligarchy succeeded tyranny at Megara, Sicyon and Corinth. ^' Democracy was instituted after the tyranny at Athens and in many of the towns of Ionia, where Greek tyrants had ruled in the interests of Persia. 80 DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONS. [CH. III. may be traced^. Originally, no doubt, these divisions were based on common descent'* and, at a time whea only the nobles were admitted to privilege, they were naturally adopted as political divisions and came to be recognised as essential parts of the constitution. But these divisions had a religious as well as a political function. Each tribe, each clan and each house had its own religious cult, and even if members of the other orders were admitted to the sacred rites, the nobles were alone qualified to mediate with the gods, just as they alone could represent the State in divine affairs. Lastly the so-called houses were as- sociated with certain districts of the country^', in which the nobles must have exercised sway over such members of the other orders as were settled there'", and it was as necessary to break down their local ascendency as it was to abolish their political privilege. The natural method of admitting the commons to the state was to open the vMi. See Gilbert, Handbuch ii pp. 302 ff. and Dicaearchus quoted there. "^ The names of the different Athenian yh>ri were all patronymic. 2' Many villages in Attica bore the names of noble 7^;'i;. The local factions of the sixth century each had noble leaders. 3" The nobles would not lightly surrender their absolute dominion within their own y4i>oi. They had the aristocratic feeling against centralisation and were constantly asserting the rights of the y^cos against those of the state. Of. De Coulanges, op. eit. p. 312 'The overthrow of royalty had resulted in the revival of the rule of the 7^cos: the families had resumed their life of isolation: each had begun again to form a petty state with a Eupatrid as chief and a crowd of clients and serfs as subjects.' He assumes that the Thetes had been reduced to serfdom long before Solon. I do not think there is any evidence for this. § 25] TRANSITION TO OLIGARCHY. 81 •yevri and the larger organisations in which they were grouped as parts of the constitution. This step can be traced at Athens, where the fiction of common worship took the place of kinship as a qualification for the membership of a 761/0?, at least as early as the constitu- tion of Solon, and the fevq were by this means thrown open to the two lower classes besides the Eupatrids. But this measure left both the power of the nobles within the r^evT] and their local influence undiminished. Citizen- ship was no longer limited to a class, but it was based on the membership of a religious corporation, in which Eupa- trid influence was dominant and of which a Eupatrid was the hereditary head. The people were still in vassalage; the extension of the franchise failed to emancipate them from the sway of their lords, and the instance only shows us how useless are democratic reforms in a society, which remains thoroughly aristocratic in spirit and organisation. The history of the sixth century is but the record of the factions of noble families, and it was not till Cleisthenes took decisive measures to abolish, root and branch, the tribal organisation as part of the constitution, to sub- stitute purely artificial divisions for the old system of house, clan and tribe, and to prevent by the most elaborate institutions any possibility of local factions, that the democratic constitution of Solon could be realised ^^ '' On the position of tlie yivri in the Athenian state see Appendix B, where also the character and importance of the reforms of Cleisthenes are discussed. The importance of such measures was clearly realised by Aristotle. Of. Pol. vii 4 1319 b 19 fri Se koX rk Toiaura /carair/ccuiiff^aTa Xpijiri/ia irpbs t^v StiiioKparlav rriv TOMirriv, ofs WKei,(r6h>t)S re 'A8'^vi] ixP^- aaro ^ov\6/iei'OS aii^crai tt]v StjfiOKpaTiav, Kal irepl Kvp^vrjv ol rbv 87jfwv Ka6iffTdvT€s. (jivKai re yiip ^repai TroLTjriai irXeiovs Kal tpparpiai, Kal ret rutv Idiiop iepuv (TvvaKTiov els 6\lya Kal Koii^d, Kal irdvTa ffotpurr^ov, Hirtas &v Sri w. 6 82 DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONS. [CH. III. The instance of Athens shows us how important it was to dissolve the old tribal associations and how hard it was to effect their dissolution. In most cases the tyranny performed this useful service : for the tyranny was called into being in the interests of the commons to break the power of the nobles, and this could only be done by depriving the old tribes of their dominant position. We cannot tell by what particular means this was accom- plished : in many cases the nobles were banished, in others, as at Sicyon, they were degraded'^ We have evidence of disputes between the privileged and the excluded in other states^, instances of the creation of artificial divisions in place of old tribal systems**; but even in default of positive evidence, we know that the change must have been accomplished before oligarchy was possible : and it is important to remember that the overthrow of these aristocratic privileges was as necessary a condition of oligarchy as of democracy. The measures I have been discussing involved religious changes. It was by a religious fiction that the commons were admitted to the 761/7; at Athens ; and the new poli- /tdXicrra dj'a/itx^ti)(7t Tr&vTes dXX^Xois, al d^ ffVv^deLai Sta^evxduo't.i' at Tpdrepai. Such measures were equally necessary before an oligarchy could succeed an aristocracy. 32 Hdt. V 68. 33 Such disputes were especially frequent in the colonies between the later immigrants and the original settlers. See Ch. iv § 31. 3* Busolt, Die Lakedaimonier p. 184, argues that ten local tribes took the place of nine birth tribes at Elis. The inference is drawn from Paus. V 9 6. A similar change in the tribal organisation at Gyrene is related by Hdt. iv 161, and the passage of Aristotle quoted in n. 31 probably refers to this (though Gilbert, Handbueh ii p. 230, assigns it to a later development of democracy mentioned by Heraclides, F. H. G. ii 212). § 26] THE FIFTH CENTURY. 83 tical organisations had their religious side ; new cults had to be instituted for the local tribes and demes. It was essential that the religious privilege of the nobles should be abolished not only in the tribe and its subdivisions but also in the state generally. Hence the overthrow of aris- tocratic government was marked by the introduction of new gods and new worships : and the efforts made by the tyrants to gain the support of great religious organisations show how keenly they realised the strength of religious elements in political affairs. § 26. Development of constitutions in the fifth century. The transition to oligarchy was usually accomplished after an interval of tyranny. Tyrannies were prevalent in Greece in the seventh and sixth centuries, and the latter century witnessed the birth of democracy, the great rival of oligarchy. It would involve a deviation from the subject of this essay to discuss the causes which produced democracy : democracy only concerns us as the alternative to oligarchy. I have already referred to the cleavage of Greek states in accordance with their form of government, and to the influence of Athens and Sparta as the respective champions of democracy and oligarchy, of 'liberty and equality ' on the one hand, of ' good order and good sense ' on the other\ Their influence may be illustrated from the events of the fifth century. Apart from the Delian and the Pelo- ponnesian confederacies, in which, as I have shown above, each power exerted a steady pressure in favour of its ' i\ev8fpta and Urovoftla opposed to eivo/da and aatppojivri. 6—2 84 DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONS. [CH. III. own principles, we may note the establishment of demo- cracy in Argos and Megara, which should probably be regarded as a consequence of their alliance with Athens', and it is usually assumed that democracies were established in Boeotia after the battle of Oenophyta'. During the Peloponnesian war Athens strove to forward the cause of democracy, by alliance with democratic states* or by forcible methods^ while the Spartans used their power to strengthen the hands of the oligarchs in many cities'. The Sicilian disaster was followed by the revolt of many Athenian allies, most of them establishing oligarchies im- mediately on revolt' ; and after the crushing defeat of Aegospotami Lysander imposed absolute and violent oligarchies on almost every state in Greece'. In some ^ The break-up of the general union of Greece, and the formation of separate alliances, which dates from 461, accentuated the constitutional differences. The existence of democracy at Megara in 427 is attested by Thuc. iv 66, and Argos, which had been aristocratic in 480 (Hdt. vii 149), was democratic in 421 (Thuc. v 31). Gilbert, Handbuch ii p. 70 and p. 77, is probably right in suggesting that the change of constitution was connected with their alliance with Athens. 2 The evidence is hardly strong enough for the conclusion. See Busolt, Geschichte ii^ p. 493 n. 5, p. 494 n. 1. * The coalition of Athens, Argos, Elis and Mantinea in 419 B.C. was a combination of democracies. 5 The plan of Demosthenes against Boeotia was concerted with democratic partisans: and it was doubtless intended to establish democracies. 8 Examples of Spartan influence are, the restoration of oligarchy at Megara (Thuc. iv 74) : the establishment of the shortlived oligarchy at Argos (Thuc. v 81) : the strengthening of the oUgarchy at Sicyon (Thuc. V 81) : the interference with the constitution in Achaea (v 82). ' Thuc. viii 64. 8 Plut. Lys. 14 KaT^Xve ri,! iroXirelas Kal KaBlari) SeKadapxlas. Cf. Xen. Hell, iii 5 12—13; Diod. xiv 10. § 27] THE FOURTH CENTURY. 85 cities his work was undone by the Spartan government', but in many oligarchies lingered on until Spartan power was shattered by the defeats of Cnidus and Leuctra. § 27. Development of constitutions in the fourth century. ■ The political state of Greece in the fourth century shows a marked change from its condition in the fifth cen- tury. Neither Sparta nor Athens had the ascendency which she had hitherto enjoyed ; other states rose to power and in general the lesser cities were left free to control their constitutions as they liked. One general tendency was the intensification of democracies and oligarchies : extreme forms of both these types were developed towards the end of the century ', and the philosophers, familiar with narrow oligarchies and tyrannical democracies, impressed with the rarity of moderate and legal governments^ came to regard all existing constitutions as perversions' and turned with relief to the study of the ideal. 9 Xen. Hell, iii 4 2. 1 Of. Newman, Introduction pp. 417 — 8. 'The Greek states were ruled either by harsh soldiers, pugnacious and keen for distinction like the Spartans, or by rapacious oligarchs, demagogues or tyrants.... We know from Aristotle that moderate forms of oligarchy and democracy did exist, but he dwells on the intolerance of compromise and the deter- mination not to share power with others.' ^ See Ar. Pol. vi 11 1296 a 1. He discusses the extreme forms S^/tos ^(Txaros, 6\iyapxto. &Kparos and rvpavvlSf he talks of the rarity of mode- rate forms, and sums up the matter (1. 40) ^5ij Si koI tois iv rah TrSKeffiv ^Oos Kad^ffTTjKe firid^ /SoiiXetr^at rb ttrov, dXX* tj apx^tv ^Tjreiv TJ Kparov/iivovs iiroiUveiv. 3 To Plato all ordinary constitutions are perversions : even to Aristotle ipiaTOKparla (which should mean the normal oligarchy) scarcely exists save as an ideal, while SiqiuiKpaTla had snch evil associations that TroXircfe had to be employed to denote the normal democracy. 86 DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONS. [CH. III. While one tendency of the age was to intensify the character of existing governments, the current set in favour of democracy rather than of oligarchy. The effective causes were various. The decline of Sparta, the hreak-up of her alliance, and the loss of her empire, set free a number of states, in which oligarchy had only been maintained by force. The most powerful and the most unscrupulous champion of this form of government was deprived of influence. Alterations in the relative strength of classes must have been caused by the Peloponnesian war, which in- volved the decrease in the number of the better classes and the loss of much of their property*. Connected with this was the introduction of mercenary forces, which diminished the importance of the citizen soldier. Economic causes tended to the same result. Trade became of increased importance, and trade is, in general, ultimately favourable to democracy. Hence came the growth of large trading cities, in which the people learnt to know their power and to divide the public funds by a system of state-socialism. It may have been this tendency which led Aristotle to the conclusion that ' in a large town it is difficult for any constitution save democracy to existl' The effect of the critical events of the fourth century may be briefly dismissed. The battle of Cnidus set free the islands and the Greek cities of Asia* and was un- * Ar. Pol. viii 3 1303 a 8 (of Athens). 5 Pol. iii 15 1286 b 20. Thueydides (vi 39 2) says practically the same thing, d i/jUci' ol Svviix,€voi (= oligarchs) rpoBv/ioOyTat iSiyara h neydXri 6 Xen. Hell, iv 8 1. § 27] THE FOURTH CENTURY. 87 doubtedly followed by the overthrow of many of the Lysandriau oligarchies'. The work was to a large extent undone by the peace of Antalcidas, which delivered over the Greeks of Asia to Persia,. Persian dominion was maintained in them by means of oligarchies or tyrannies, which were overthrown by Alexander s. The democratic revolution at Thebes in 379 was in every way important. The Boeotian towns adopted the constitution of their capital, and when once Thebes had gained supremacy in Greece, she used her power to es- tablish democracies'. The battle of Leuctra broke for ever the ascendency of Sparta : most of the Peloponnesian states renounced their allegiance and a series of revolu- tions led to the general triumph of democracy". In 356 the Social war set free the Athenian allies to mould their constitutions to their own liking, and many seem to have established oligarchies without delay". These events and ' There is little positive evidence: but many states attached them- selves to the Athenian alliance immediately after Cnidus : and we may assume that the democracies, which can be traced in many of them soon after, now took the place of the decarchies. The narrative of Diodorus xiv 84 implies this. 8 Pint. Alex. 34 mentions the overthrow of tyrannies: Arrian i 18 1 — 2 of oligarchies. ' Although Thebes did not interfere with the autonomy of other states, the new foundations of Messene and Megalopolis seem to have been democratic. 1° At Argos there was a massacre of oligarchs (Diod. xv 57) : at Sicyon a tyranny was established in the interests of democracy (Xen. Hell, viii 1 46) ; the democracy was probably restored at Mantinea {ib. vi 5 3) and at Tegea (vi 5 6). " In Chios, Mitylene, Rhodes and many other states oligarchies were established probably at this time. See Dem. xv 19 and cf. Ar. Pol. viii 3 1302 b 22 and 5 1304 b 25—30 on Rhodes and Cos. 88 DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONS. [CH. III. the termination of the brief Theban supremacy removed from Greek politics the influence of dominant powers and for a brief season there was a free competition of constitu- tions. But in the interval the power of Macedon had risen and Chaeronea put Greece beneath the heel of Philip. Greece was no longer independent, but her master was indifferent to the war of constitutions, by which she had for so long been distraught. To him oligarchy, democracy or tyranny were equal, so long as the government offered a sense of security and was ready to subserve his dominion^l The city state had reached the end of its development: the future was with mon- archies and federations ; and it is with mingled humour and pity that we read the poems of Isyllus, who, blind to all the real forces of the age, vaunts the power of the god in beating back Philip and looks for the salvation of Hellas in the return to a pious, mediaeval state of the Dorian type ; and seeks a counterpoise to Macedon in those nobles of the Dorian tribes, who are to grow their hair long and establish a new festival in honour of the patron saint of Epidaurus, the god of health and fortune — Asclepius". ^2 Macedon interfered, if she had reason to fear the conduct of an existing government. Thus at Thebes Philip established an oligarchy of exiles (Justin ix 4): and in 322 Antipater established a moderate timocraoy at Athens. '3 See Wilamowitz-MoUendorff, Isyllos von Epidauros, where the poems are quoted. APPENDIX A. The formation of the united Athenian state^. The history of Athens down to the seventh century is based almost entirely on legends, supported by inferences drawn from later institutions or survivals. The time has gone by when the stories of Erechtheus, Oecrops, Ion and Theseus would be accepted as genuine accounts of the reign of real kings. But it may be possible to derive some historical results from legendary evidence, and it would be as unwise altogether to reject as implicitly to accept the help of myths and tradition". Three stages in the unification of Attica are associated with the names of Cecrops, Ion and Theseus. The com- parative method in its application to the origin of civilised communities, the tendencies at work in later Athenian ' In this Appendix I have endeavoured to present a credible account of the development of the Athenian commonwealth. I have not dis- cussed all the theories that have been proposed, nor have I CLuoted all the evidence that makes for or against the theories I adopt. My object is to call attention to certain striking points, many of which escape notice in the ordinary textbooks. To deal exhaustively with the evidence and speculation on the subject would require a separate treatise of no inconsiderable length. * The instance of Eoman history shows what good results may be extracted from a rational treatment of the legends. 90 APPENDIX A. history^ and the survival of religious festivals^ show that the Athenian state was gradually developed by the combi- nation of small tribal communities into larger groups ; and it is entirely immaterial whether kings with the names of Cecrops, Ion and Theseus ever lived, if we can trace in the legends, however vaguely and indistinctly, some steps in the process. In the first political system of Attica there was a number of village communities, the settlements of noble families with their followers and dependents^ The tend- ency towards union made itself felt, and partly by force, partly by voluntary cohesion, the villages gradually formed themselves into larger political communities, and legend attributed to Cecrops the combination of the KWfiai into twelve TToXei?'. We may assume that at an early date the villages, feeling the need of common defence and common government, united in TroXet?, hill forts to which they could resort in time of danger', and which had each their king's house, council chamber and rulersl Probably the TToXet? were joined in a loose federal system, such as existed in Boeotia and Latium, and in time of danger they ' For the tendencies to separation in later Athenian history see Appendix B. * So Thuoydides ii 15 quotes the festival of the fui/okia as evidence . for the union of Attica and bases a further argument on the buildings of the Acropolis. Cf. Harpocration on the Panathenaea. 5 See above § 25 nn. 27—30. ^ Strabo ix 397 quotes Philochorus. There were many reasons why the number twelve should be adopted and no stress need be laid upon it. ' The fortification was usually the first step in the foundation of a city. ' Thuc. ii 15 ^Tri yap KiKpowos Kal twv irpiiriav /SoiriWuv i] 'Attikt) is Qriaia. del Kark t&Khs yifeiro irpvTavu& re ixoi(Tas Kal S.pxovTai. The irpxiTaveia I take to be the residence of the chiefs. The next stage in the progress towards unity was associated with the name of Ion, the eponymous hero of the lonians, represented as the leader of a body of immi- grants who settled in Attica", and gave their name to the people of the land". In this way the legend suggests the spread of a feeling of unity, and Aristotle regards Ion as the first founder of the Attic commonwealth '". In other ways Ion's coming was important : he was said to have been made polemarch of Athens" by a division of the kingly power, which reminds us of the union of Ramnes and Titles and the consequent division of authority between Romulus and Tatius ; he was said also to have founded the four Ionian tribes, each with a <^vKo^acriXevvXo^av\o^acriXet<;. On this assumption Athens (then called Cecropia) was only the capital of one of the (^vKaC, but its leading position is shown by the title irpea^eia given to it by Sophocles and by its being the lot of Aegeus, presumably the eldest son of Pandion ; while the assumption that Pandion was '5 I omit the evidence for this conclusion. It is natural to assume that the ^i/Xo/Soo-eXeis originally possessed real kingly power, and it is difficult to conceive that any system of common government could at so early a date be applied to tribes that were not local. Gilbert, Handbuch i' p. 116 n. 1, quotes Ar. Ath. Fol. 21 3 to show that the rptTries (which were subdivisions of the paTpiai and vKaL The origin of the <^v\ai I have already discussed ; if the assumption that they formed local divisions of Attica be correct, we may assume that they included all classes of the people, but it is generally agreed that the ^parpiai 1 The followiBg appendix, like the last, is intended to call attention to certain important questions without discussing the theories of others or quoting the evidence in full. The subject is exceedingly intricate and aU conclusions must be more or less tentative. I have prolonged the Appendix in order to suggest an emendation in Ar. Ath. Pol. 22 4 which seems to me to involve some points of importance. ^ For the early aristocratic Constitution of Athens cf . especially Ar. Ath. Pol. 2 and 3. 96 APPENDIX B. and the yei/??, subdivisions based on birth, were originally closed to all but Eupatrids. Thus they formed the outworks of the aristocracy, if, as we may fairly conclude, member- ship of a 76i'09 was a necessary condition of citizenship. Solon's legislation broke down the exclusive privilege of birth and substituted other qualifications for citizenship, but it did not abolish the tribal organisation of the state or deprive it of its political importance. We have now to see how the admission of non- Eupatrids to citizenship was reconciled with the mainten- ance of the old birth organisations. We have no direct evidence to guide us and the greatest uncertainty still prevails ^ There are several passages in the grammarians, all in substantial accord and probably ultimately derived from Aristotle, which describe the tribal organisation of Attica*. Two of these, both citing Aristotle ^ say that the whole 3 Of recent textbooks Gilbert, Handluch i? pp. 117 — 9, says ' Originally none but Eupatrids were counted as members of Phratries and yivr) after the time of Draco at any rate, if not before, the burgess body, and therefore the phratries also, contained non-Eupatrid members'; Busolt, Staatsaltertumer^ p. 126 n. 1, says 'In Solon's time at least the lower orders were admitted to the tribes' but he implies that they were not members of the yif-n ; Thumser (Hermann, Lehrhuch" p. 312) seems to think that the 7^i'9) did include non-Bupatrids, though he is uncertain whether there were special 7^;'5; for them or whether they were admitted to the old y^Ti; Meyer, Geschichte des Alterthims n p. 311, thinks that at a comparatively early period the whole population was divided into yiin\. ^ The chief passages are Lexicon Dem. Patm. p. 152 Sakkelion (quoted by Dr Sandys in his edition of Aristotle's Gonstitutimi of Athens p. 252) : Scholiast to Plato Axiochus 371 J> ; PoUux viii 111 ; Harpocratiou s.v. yevv^raL. 5 Lexicon Dem. Patm. and Scholiast to Plato I.e. They are un- doubtedly based on a lost passage in Aristotle's Ath. Pol. THE ATHENIAN rfivr). 97 population of Athens was divided into three classes ; these were divided into four tribes, each tribe into three ^parplai, each (ftparpia into 30 yivrj, each yevopaTpiat, and yivrj. Moreover the authorities show that Aristotle assumed a multitude of over 10,000 yevvqrai, and though the numbers are obviously fanciful and arti- ficial, it seems clear that Aristotle could not have imagined that the Eupatridae alone included anything like that number. The only indication as to the date at which this elaborate system was drawn up is a statement that ' of old before Cleisthenes introduced his tribal organisation ' the population was so divided^ The system described in the passages cited, which assume, I think, the admission of non-Eupatrids, need not be put earlier than the reforms of Draco and Solon (which lasted until Cleisthenes), although the division of the Eupatrids into house, clan and tribe was probably a natural institution dating from the earliest times. This is the chief direct evidence and it might be supported by many inferences : but taking it alone the statements are explicit, and it does not seem reasonable to attach to them any other meaning than that the whole of the citizen population, whether Eupatrid or not, was admitted to yevoes: ■ Harpocration s.v. yevK^Tai: Bekker Anecdota p. 227 9 — 15. The dis- tinction is drawn most explicitly in Piiilochorus quoted by Suidas toi>s 5^ ^pirepas iirivayKes Six^aBai Kal tovs 6pyeuva! Kal tovs &iJ.oyd\aKTas (possibly from an old law). The admission of non-Eupatrids to the phratries at least by the time of Draco is established by the law of Draco quoted in Dem. xliii 57 where 6,puTTivSr]v can scarcely bear any other meaning than 'from the nobles.' 8 Thumser (Hermann, LehrTmcW 319 — 20) assumes ;that the dpyeQves were new members of the yivq admitted after the incorporation of Eleusis. 7—2 100 APPENDIX B. of the 761/0? and therefore including strictly all members of the 761/0?^°) were, in a special sense, the non-Eupatrid members admitted to the yevoyd\aKTes. ^^ In Bekker I.e. the yivos is defined as a ffiarfiiia, iK Tpi&KovTa &vbpwv t7vveaT(bt: Harpocration explains yevi'TJTaL as o^x oi (rvyyeveis aTrXws* dXX ol i^ dpxv^ ^Is TO. KoKo^i^cva y^yrj KarapefiTid^vTes. 1^ Ar. Ath. Pol. 13. The compromise effected after the expulsion of Damasias seems to point to some feeling between the orders, but the incident is too obscure to help us very much. THE ATHENIAN <^kvr\. 101 intended to introduce new principles into the constitution, to increase the power of the people or even to extend the franchise to any great extent. Their object and effect was to alter the social organisation, to break the personal influence of the Eupatrids, to divorce the conduct of the government from any connexion with the r^km]. It would be beyond the province of this essay to discuss the reforms of Cleisthenes ; but I wish to consider the accounts of his work, in so far as they throw light on the aristocratic organisation of the Solonian constitution. The clearest account of his work is given in Aristotle's Constitution of Athens ch. 21. The introduction of ten new tribes needs no commentary. It was intended to 'mix (the population) in order that more might take part in politics ' (§ 2). oOev ikexdv '^o' to fir) v\.oKpi,veiv, tt/jos TOW e^erd^etv to, yevr) ^ovXa/ievovi. The meaning of this passage is not obvious, but the last clause is most important. 'The saying arose "don't distinguish tribes" addressed to those who wanted to find out the jivoi: of anybody.' Under the new constitution the yevT) were not connected with the local tribes, and membership of a yevo'; was no longer necessary to citizenship. New citizens had been created, who had not belonged to the old yivr] : for their sake reference to the Yevi; was to be avoided, but the passage would be devoid of meaning if we supposed that only the Eupatrids had hitherto been admitted to the yevT], We need not discuss the local organization introduced by Cleisthenes (§§ 3 and 4) : but at the end of § 4 there is a passage which needs explanation and also, I venture to think, emendation. The passage is as follows : Kal Br] flora'} iiroLrfaev aKKrjXmv tov? olKovvTa d4 4>rini irpura lihi S9)ii.ov ^i/iirav ) to include all political functions, as he explains in the same passage that participation in the assembly or law courts is as adpurros dpxn- Aristotle uses apx^ and dpxal in two senses (1) generally of citizenship : (2) specially of magisterial powers. But in the definition of the different forms of oligarchy (discussed in the next section) there is no doubt that he uses the word in its general sense. The passage quoted in the next note contains an instance of the special use. * Ax. Pol. viii 6 1305 b 30 iv 6...airi Ti/iifpidTuv &v5pes dpiaTOKpaTtKciJs &pxovTes (where Awb TLfj.ijfjuirtav corresponds to irXovrivdiji' : dpiffTOKpaTLKUJS to &pL(rTLvd7iv). § 30] ARISTOCEACY OF BIRTH AND LAND. 113 of families' was established''. This was not a frequent solution, and, as Aristotle saw, the whole question of popu- lation was involved'. Adoption offered a partial solution of the difficulty*, but there might still be too many sons for the property to maintain, and it is possible that in- fanticide and exposure were practised more frequently in aristocracies than elsewhere in order to meet the diflS- culty". There was also the opposite danger to be con- sidered: if the transfer of property were allowed, many of the nobles might become impoverished (while a few got most of the land into their hands), and in this way the number of the citizens would decline. The remedy devised to meet this was the division of the land into 2 See below § 34. ' Ar. Pol. ii 6 1265 a and b passim, especially ib. a 38 dTowof Si Kal rd 7-ds KT^iTEis Iffd^ovra t4 irepl to TrXijOos tuv TroXirdv pJr) KOTaffKeudffw. The difficulty in the Spartan state was met at first by her continued conquests. Afterwards the opposite danger befell the Spartans. Their rigid system tended to the decline of population and the consequent inequality of property. * This was the legal fiction employed to prevent the extinction of a yivoi. Plato lays stress on adoption in the Laws v 740 o. ^ There is very little evidence. Ar. Pol. ii 6 1265 b 12 says that Phidon of Corinth tous o^kous ilirous (^li^ij Seiv Sia/Uneii' xal t6 ttX^Sos twc jroXiTuv, but he does not say how this was secured. At Thebes {ib. ii 12 1274 b 3) Fhilolaus legislated Trepi rijs iraiSoiroUas, oOs KaXoOffiv iKeTvoi vSfiovs BcTiKois. Aelian V. H. ii 7 says the law at Thebes prohibited exposure, but allowed a father to sell his children into slavery. Cf. Plato i?ep. v 459 D where the exposure of the unfit is suggested, and Laws v 740 d where the highest magistracy is to deal with 'the redundant or deficient,' and various means are specified. Ar. Pol. ii 10 1272 a 21 (speaking of Crete) alludes to another method: vphi Si tV iXiyojirlav is ii(pi\iii.op iroWii ire ixbvTi di ry AaKeSaifiovlav irSXei <:i7> /ier' dXiyttJv 6 ffofiod^Trjs iin/j.^eiap SoKei Te-jrotTJaBaL rpotftys re Kal iiTLTtjSevfidTtay. There may have been other states which practised this training originally. 1^ Xen. Resp. Lac. 10 5 ^ SjrdprTj fiovij drjfiocrig. i-jnTtjSeOovffa t^v koKo- K&yadlav. Cf. Ar. Eth. quoted in n. 10 ; Thuc. i 84 (oans h toIs (ii'07- KaLOTtiTois TratSeiJeTat). Thucydides also harps on dperi^i trbvos and jueXeriJ (see i 123 ; ii 39 ; V 69 ; vi 11). In Thuc. i 68 the Corinthians talk of the ^Klvryra vbiuiM of the Spartans : cf. i 77 ; iii 37 (vb/j-oi 6.Klvryroi) ; v 105 120 VARIETIES OF OLIGARCHY. [CH. IV. § 33. Aristocracy of the Kingly Family. I proceed to discuss some other special forms of aris- tocracy. Of these one of the most frequent is the aristo- cracy of the royal house. In tracing the extinction of kingship I called attention to one method by which the aristocratic government might be established. Power might be exercised not by a single king but by the whole of the royal race. This is due to the inherent similarity between aristocracy and the old monarchy. The ruling family might cease to give the supreme authority to a single man and resume the sovereignty themselves. In a large number of the Ionian colonies of Asia Minor and the islands, the ruling class traced their descent from the kings who were traditionally regarded as the leaders of the first colonists^. At Miletus the Neleids formed the ruling dynasty" : at Ephesus, Erythrae and Chios we find mention of Basilidae, who probably claimed descent from kingly families'. At Mitylene the aristocracy of the (Aa/ce5at/A6i'iot yap Tpbs <7(pas aurovs Kal Tb, 4tlx^P'-^ vdfitfjia TrXeiara apery Xpwi'Tai). Of. Xen. Resp. Lac. 10 7 tois fiev yap ra v6fji.L/ia iKTiKomiv o/wlas dVao-i TTjv trbXiv oWdav iirolTja-e. For their 'blind observance of law' of. Thuo. i 84 {eS^ov\oi dfi,a8iiTTepov tS>v v6/iuv ttjs {nrepoxpias irai.devdfi.evoi.) ; ii 40 ; iii 37 and Xen. Resp. Lac. 8 1 Sri jjiiv ep 'STrdprri /id'Ki.ffTa TrdBovrai. raXs dpxcus re Kal rots vdfioa tcfiev aTravres ; cf. Hdt. vii 104. 1 Hdt. i 147. Most of the colonies were said to have been governed by Proclidae or Glauoidae. 2 Nicol. Dam. P. H. G. iii 388: other authorities are cited in Gilbert, Handbuch ii p. 139 n. 1. ' Strabo xiv 633 mentions /ScwiXeis at Ephesus, who even in his time had the insignia of kings. Suidas s.v. HvSayipas mentions Bao-iXISai. Ar. Pol. viii 6 1305 b 18 mentions AXiyapxia ^ao-t\id&p at Erythrae. Hdt. viii 132 and an inscription {Bull. Corr. Hell, iii 244 cited by Gilbert) mention pav iroWol ircpl ttji' 'Afflav. At Chalcis the rulers were called 'l7nroj36rai (Strabo x 447 ; Plut. Per. 23 ; Hdt. V 77). 3 Cf. Heracl. F. H. G. ii 216 ^eldtav . , .■n-'Kiloai. /j^t^Soikc tyjs TroXirelas, v6fj.Qv 6ds, ^Kaarov iirdvayKes Tp^(pet.v Xirirov. § 37] OLIGARCHY OF KNIGHTS AND HOPLITES. 133 The 'constitution of the hoplites' is more important. Aristotle implies that many early constitutions assumed this form*: the hoplite qualification is the basis of the polity as it is most frequently described by him, and he refers so often to this form of government that it probably had a larger application than we have evidence to prove". I have already discussed certain characteristics of this form of government: it would probably only admit a minority to power, and it seems practically to have been based on a property valuation, as hoplite service was usually obligatory on all who attained a certain census. Actual instances of such a constitution are few. The Draconian constitution gave power 'to all who provided themselves with a suit of arms*': the oligarchy established at Athens in 411 was intended to give power to five thousand, selected from those who were 'best able to serve the state in person and property'': the government which succeeded it was that of a fictitious body of five thousand, really composed of all who 'provided themselves with a suit of arms'.' The Malians seem to have had a similar quali- fication for citizenship'. < Pol. vi 13 1297 b 22. ^ See oh. i § 5 where the information bearing on the polity is collected. 6 Ar. Aih. Pol. 4 2. ' Thuc. viii 65 3 ; Ar. Ath. Pol. 29 5. It was, I think, an oligarchy of limited number, based on a hoplite census. See Appendix 0. * Thuo. viii 97 1 tois ireyTa,Ki.axMoi,s i\j/7]^li>. The number was a fiction. Thucydides praises this constitution and it was the ideal of Thera- menes (Xen. Sell, ii 3 48) tA iitivToi aiv tois SwafUvois xal lieS' lirvuv xal p.eT d^irlStav tbtpeXeXv dtd, ToiTWv ttjv troXtTeiav irpbadiv &piffTov ijyo'^fiTjv eli/air. 9 Cf. Aristotle quoted in § 41 n. 25. 134 VARIETIES OF OLIGARCHY. [CH. IV. § 38. Aristocracies and Oligarchies of Fixed Number. In some states participation in the active duties of citizenship was not made to depend directly on the attainment of a certain qualification, but was limited to a body of men, fixed in number, who themselves coopted others to vacancies on the roll. This is the second form of oligarchy described by Aristotle^ There were necessary conditions for the membership of these bodies: and any of the usual oligarchic qualifications might be required. Aristotle in the passage referred to, doubtless having certain instances in his mind, assumes that privilege will depend on a high assessment, but he corrects this by saying that if the choice be made from all the principle is aristocratic; if from any definite class, it is oligarchic^. The earliest form of such a government was that of the Opuntian Locrians, where a body of one thousand held supreme powers I have already suggested that The Thousand should be connected with the hundred hou^s, and we may conclude that The Thousand represented the ^ Pol. vi 4 1292 b 1 brav airb rifiTif/ATiov fiaKpwv ujatv at dpxat Kal alpuvrai airol Tois iWetirovras ; of. ib. 14 1298 a 39. 2 At. I.e. av ixkv ovv iK Tavruv Toirav (this word seems superfluous) TOVTO TTOiiSffi, Soke? tout' efroi fxaXKov 6,pi(TT0KpaTLKbv, iav Si ^k twCiv ci€p6vTWV koX Kptvov irepl twv dtKalav (of. ib. 1328 a 28 and iii 1 1275 b 18). Thuo. vi 39 opposes /SouXeOo-ai and KpTvai. 2 Theory of the State (Engl. Trans.), pp. 484—8. 140 ORGANISATION OF OLIGARCHIC GOVERNMENT. [CH. V. states of modern Europe, but Aristotle expressly includes legislation as one of the functions of the deliberative element'. The correction of Aristotle seems to be a mistake arising from a difference in the point of view : for Aristotle, with the concrete method of thought natural to a Greek, looks to the holders of political power and not to the duties performed by them, and in the following description of oligarchic government I shall follow his classification. It is characteristic of an oligarchy that ' some men should deliberate about all*,' and from the definition of the deliberative element this principle involves the corollary that some, i.e. a few men, should have supreme power. For ' the deliberative element has authority to decide war and peace, to make and dissolve alliance, to pass laws, to inflict death, exile and confiscation, to elect magistrates and to call them to account^' A body of men possessing such authority must have been the sovereign power in the state, and I proceed to consider to what element in the oligarchic government sovereignty was most often entrusted. In the aristocracy the chief authority might conceivably be vested in the whole body of the nobles, who would form in this way a small assembly of the privileged, but it was generally wielded by a council of nobles, who might be supposed to repre- sent their order. So in the oligarchy proper 'the delibe- rative power,' though it might be exercised by a small ^ ri pov\€v6iievov is both legislative and administrative. Laws and law-making are mentioned three times in Pol. vi 14 1298 a. 4 Ar. Pol. vi 14 1298 a 34. 5 lb. 1298 a 4. § 39] GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 141 assembly of citizens', was generally entrusted to the council, the special organ of oligarchic government. The executive power in the early aristocracies was usually entrusted to a single magistrate, whose powers were as unlimited in scope as those of the king had been. The division of power among a number of special magis- trates was only gradually introduced with the growing complexity of political life'. The powers both of council and of magistrates were in the early constitutions undefined and unrestricted. In this respect they recalled the king and the senate of the Heroic age ; and we have now to trace the develop- ment of the third element in the Heroic state, the assembly of the commons. We saw that the commons, though they had no definite authority, were called to- gether in the agora to listen to the king or the nobles, and expressed their approval or dissent in a primitive fashion by shouting. The rise of aristocracy tended further to reduce the slight importance which they had hitherto possessed. The king was by his position raised above the nobles and was thus better able to do justice to all ; but the people could expect but small consideration from rulers, whose claim to political sovereignty was based upon social superiority. Hence in many aristocratic states the assembly of the commons had to submit to a still further restriction of its powers, to be maintained on suffer- ance or to be entirely removed from the constitution^ " This would be the case in some of the ' ohgarchies of fixed number,' for which see § 38. For the special case of the Oligarchy of the Five Thousand at Athens see below, Appendix C. 7 See Gilbert, Handbuch ii p. 323. 8 For the reduction of the power of the assembly, we may compare 142 ORGANISATION OF OLIGARCHIC GOVERNMENT. [CH. V. Oligarchies were unlikely to give a share in the constitution to any one outside the circle of the privileged few. It is probable that in most oligarchies there was an assembly of the qualified citizens, and in some, the poorer classes, who were in other respects debarred from exer- cising powers of government, were admitted to the assembly"; but, however constituted, the powers of the assembly were inconsiderable beside those of the council, and the oligarchs carried into effect their theory of special- isation of authority, of efficiency, secrecy and dispatch by delegating the duties of government to small councils or to the magistrates. § 40. Powers of Magistrates etc. in Oligarchies. 'A ruler,' Sir James Stephen has said, 'may be regarded as the superior of the subject, as being by the nature of his position presumably wise and good; or he may be regarded as the agent and servant, and the subject as the wise and good master, who is obliged to delegate his power to the so-called ruler, because, being a multitude, he cannot use it himself Herein we have the antithesis of oligarchic and democratic sentiment, which may be abundantly confirmed from Greek litera- ture. the addition to the pip-pa at Sparta, by means of whioli the ordinary citizens lost the Kvpla xal Kpdros, which they had had before (Plut. Lye. 6). In the aristocratic state at Athens there is no mention of the assembly : all power seems vested in the magistrates or council, and we know that the Eupatrids used it oppressively. It is obvious that the commons would have no voice in close governments like the Swaareiai. " See below, § 47. § 40] POWERS OF MAGISTRATES. 143 Thus Plato draws almost the same distinction, when he says that the people in a democracy call their rulers 'magistrates' (dpxovres), while in other states they are called 'masters' (hecnroTaiy. Demosthenes, whose evidence as that of a democratic advocate must be discounted, says that the subjects in an oligarchy are ' cravens and slaves^,' all must be done sharply at the word of command*, and it is a crime to speak evil of the magistrates, however bad they be*. It was characteristic of the oligarchic rulers to allow no criticism, brook no opposition and demand an instant obedience. This is the ground, no doubt, on which oligarchies claimed the character of being well governed and well ordered^ : I have already called at- tention to the strict observance of the law that prevailed at Sparta', and, though there may not have been so ready a compliance in most oligarchies, the magistrates were doubtless swift to punish any insubordination or contempt for authority. This idea of the competence and rights of government 1 Plato, Bep. T 463 b. Ar. Pol. iii 4 1279 a 33 and b 8 contrasts apxh BecTTOTtK'^ with dpxv iroKtriK'^, " xxiv 75. Cf. [Dem. ] Ix 25, fear is a potent motive. ' xix 185 ii> ixilvais rah TroKirdais tt&vt' i^ ^iriTdyfmTos d(iias ylyverai. This is contrasted with democracy in which Itrr' ev \liyois t] irdkiTaa. * xxii 82 h> yap tois dXiyapxiais oid' lt,v iSjiv It' 'AndpoHuiiids nxej atax^oj^ j3e/3tw/c6Tes, oiix iarL \^eLV KaKus Tois apxovras, ' eivofila and eira^la. were commonly claimed by the oligarchs. It is doubtful whether the philosophers would give them credit for anything else than intense and despotic rule. So Ar. Pol. vi 3 1290 a 27 calls oligarchic governments nvvTovwripas koL ScaTroTiKwripas. In iv 4 1326 a 26 he argues that eii>ofiia and eirra^la can scarcely be found in an over- populous city, although eira^la is the salvation of an oligarchy (vii 7 1321 a 3). « See § 32 n. 10. 144 ORGANISATION OF OLIGAECHIC GOVERNMENT. [CH. V. dominated in the oligarchic constitution, and we can best realise it by contrasting it with the democratic theory. In the fully developed democracy the people wanted to exercise their powers directly, they were jealous of all institutions in the state other than the assembly, and both council and magistrates were rendered in every way subordinate agents of the popular power. The duties of government were divided amongst a great number of magistrates whose authority was restricted as far as possible : the lot secured that ordinary men would be chosen (so that it was impossible to leave much to their discretion) : their tenure was short, reelection was usually forbidden, offices were intended to rotate and all who exercised the smallest authority did so with a full re- sponsibility to the governing body'. In the oligarchies almost every one of these conditions is reversed. The functions of government were not so thoroughly divided, the magistrates had larger indepen- dent powers, they were appointed by and from a small privileged body, the same men might be reelected and they were most often irresponsible. These points must be discussed in detail. § 41. Appointment and Qualification of Magistrates. It was characteristic of oligarchy to limit both office and the right of electing to office to privileged classes ^ ' On this characteristic of democracy, especially in so far as it is connected with the use of the lot, cf. Mr J. W. Headlam'a Election by Lot. 1 In the exceedingly corrupt passage in Ar. Fol. vi 16 1300 b it is clear that ri rivas {KadiffTdpai) ^k tlvuv is oligarchic. § 41] APPOINTMENT OF MAGISTRATES. 145 The electing body might be the same as the class eligible for office^ or the candidates might possess a higher qua- lification than the electors'. On the other hand in oligarchies in which no assembly existed, or in those in which the powers of the assembly were altogether small and inconsiderable, election was entrusted to the councils Election by vote was the usual method of appoint- ment^. Lot was possible in an oligarchy*; it may have been sometimes adopted to check the powers of great families or cliques, but its use was probably rare: for the oligarch did not believe, as the democrat tended to believe, that all men were equally qualified far. political duties. The lot was supposed to result in the appoint- ^ At Sparta the Ephors ylvovrai iK toO SrntokriraiiTb^ (Ar. Pol. ii 9 1270 b 8), the yipoi/res from the KaXol Kiyadol. The KbaiioL at Crete were appointed iK tivuv yevwv (ii 10 1272 a 34). ' Cf. Ar. PoL viii 6 1305 b 30 ii^ oVais dXiyapxI-cu^ oOx oSroi alpovvrat rhs dpxci'S i^ ^v ol dpxovris eltnv, dW al fj,h dpxal iK TtfnjfidTWp /xeydXtav clalv rj iraipLuVj aipovvraL 5' ol otXIthl ^ 6 fi^yxos, i.e. the power of election was entrusted to an assembly of hoplites, or presumably of the classes otherwise excluded from the government. Cf. also the passages in n. 2 and vi 15 1300 a 15 quoted in n. 14 below, and 1300 b 4. * The Council of the Areopagus, according to Ar. Ath. Pol. 8 2, originally had power of election, and in the revolutionary governments at Athens the Council of the Pour Hundred was to have power to appoint magistrates {ib. 30 2; 31 2), and the Thirty did so (35 1). 5 Ar. Pol. vi 9 1294 b 8 Soke? SriiJ.oKpaTi.Kbv fjtiv elvai, KXripards elcot rets dpxds, tA 5' aiperds dXiyapx^Kdv. ^ Ib. vi 15 1300 b ad in. Cf. also Anaximenes Rhetor quoted by Gilbert, Handbtich ii p. 319 n. 1, irepl di tos 6\iyapxtai rds ii.iv dpxl^s Sei Tovs vbjiovs dTovifietv i^ iffov waai rots ttjs TroXiTdas fierixovfrL, toOtuv di etvai rets fiiv TrXefcrras KkqptaTds^ rh^ 5e fjieyi(rTas KpvirTQ ^7i(p(p p.G6' opKwv Kal irKda-Tris dKpt^elas Sia\l/T}ipi.a-Tds. This is rather an ideal scheme than a generalisation of experience. W. 10 146 ORGANISATION OF OLIGARCHIC GOVERNMENT. [CH. V. ment of the ' average ' man', and the oligarch did not, any more than the philosopher', believe in the political capacity of the ' average ' man. The method of appoint- ment by acclamation which prevailed at Sparta and possibly at Crete was a ' puerile ' method" in the opinion of Aristotle and little better than the lot". In some cases there was a double process of election", or a com- bination of lot and election'", and more rarely perhaps cooptation". ' Ar. AtK Pol. 27 5 Kk'qpovixiviav iirt^eKQs del fji,5XKov rCjv TVxitvTfjiv TJ t£>v iineiKuv cuiBpilnruv : Xen. Mem. iii 9 10 election by ol rvxivres or the lot are classed together. ^ Besides the passages in the preceding note, of. Ar. Pol. ii 8 1269 a 5 (primitive man was like ol Tux^KTes and oi dxiijToi); viii 8 1308 a 34 (6 Tu^wv opposed to 6 iroXiTiKlis avfip) : viii 8 1309 a 9. ' Plut. Lye. 26 describes the election of yipoyres at Sparta ^oy ykp ihs TokXa Kal Toi)s d/aiXXw^^xous iKpivov. This is justly described as ircuda- pi.' ain-Qv aiper&s ehai.. The process by which the Four Hundred were chosen described in Thuc. viii 67 3 is a sort of cooptation. " See Ar. quoted in n. 3 and cf. Pol. vi 15 1300 a 15 KadurTouriv . . .iK Tivuv i Kvpiwripiav. Cf. Plato Laws V 744 c. 18 Cf. Ar. Pol. ii 6 1266 a 9 t4 5^ rots /iiv ei-ropaTipoK iirivayKes iKK\q- (n&^eai eXvai, koX ipei.v ApxavTas ij n iroiSv &\\o Twv ttoXitikuv, toi>s 6' d^eiffSoi, TOVTO S' SKvyapx'^Kbv . 10—2 148 ORGANISATION OF OLIGAECHIC GOVERNMENT. [CH. V. attending the assembly or for not acting as judges^'. Instances in which this principle is enforced are to be found in the constitution attributed to Draco by Aristotle and in the projected oligarchy at Athens^". Pay for public services on the other hand was a democratic insti- tution^^ and was rarely found in oligarchies^^ On the contrary it was oligarchic for the highest offices to involve such a burden of expense that the poor might be unwill- ing to hold them^. It was usual in all states, whether oligarchic or demo- cratic, to set a higher limit of age for the exercise of official power than for the ordinary duties of citizen- ship ; but the principle was carried further in oligarchies than in democracies. ' In an early stage of society age implies rule and rule implies age^'; and in the councils of the oligarchies (which were usually survivals from the aristocratic constitutions) old age was very often a neces- sary qualification, while in many the senators held office for life^^ so that there was bound to be a preponderance of old men. Specific instances of advanced age as a condition of office are not frequent''^ The magistrates appointed at 19 Ar. Pol. ¥i 13 1297 a 16; ef. Plato Laws vi 764 a. 2» Ar. Ath. Pol. 4 3; 30 6. 21 Ar. Pol. Ti 13 1297 a 36. ^ The constitution of the Four Hundred maintained pay for the arohons and irpvTavus (Ar. Ath. Pol. 29 5) but the government was an oligarchy disguised as a democracy. 23 Ar. Pol. vii 7 1321 a 31. 2* Freeman, Comparative Politics p. 72. 25 See below, § 44, and of. the title yepovala applied to many of the old councils. 28 Except for the constitutions considered in § 34 no certain instance § 42] TENURE OF MAGISTRATES. 149 Athens after the Sicilian expedition to be a check upon the democracy were a board of old men", and at Chalcis an age of at least fifty was required for the magistrates'^. § 42. Tenure and Responsibility of Magistrates. From the general conception of government formed by the oligarchs we should naturally expect them to grant a longer tenure of power to their magistrates than was usual in democracies^ and to allow them to hold their office more than once. As specific instances we may cite those constitutions in which hereditary kings survived, for these formed ' life magistracies^ ' : and the gradual transition can be quoted in which a mature age was a necessary condition of citizen- ship. In Ar. Pol. vi 13 1297 b 14 hi MaXieOo-i Sk ij fi.^v TroXireia rjv ix ToijTdjif (tw;' oJTrXtTeu/cirwz'), tcls S' dpxas ripovvTO iK tQv ffTparevofi^vwv it is doubtful whether oi (lnr\iTevK6Tes denotes those who are ahready released from service or is meant to include also ol oTrXtreiJoxTes. In Plato's Republic (vii 740 a) the guardians were not to be admitted to rule until their fiftieth year, and in Aristotle's ideal state the younger men were to be excluded from deliberative (i.e. political) power {Pol. iv 9 1329 a 13 ; 14 1332 b 35), and it is probable that some states actually had similar provisions. The constitution of Draco (Ar. Ath. Pol. 4) indirectly made a mature age a qualification for the crparrp/la. ^ Thuc. viii 1. 28 Heraclides F. H. G. ii 222 vbiws di fiv XaXnSeOa-i /it) apfai in)5i irpeff^evffai veihrepov irdv TevTTjKovTa. (I do not know whether Trpea^evffaL could mean be a senator, but its ordinary sense does not seem suitable here.) It is difficult to believe that aU magistrates (e.g. military officers) had to be over 50. 1 Ar. Pol. ii 11 1273 a 15 a long tenure of office is defined as oligarchic. Of. also viii 8 1308 a 24. " Ar. Pol. iii 15 1287 a 5 describes kingship as arparTiyia AlSios. It is possible that the chief magistrates of Opus and of Epidamnus (mentioned in this place) held office for life, but the passage is capable of another interpretation. 150 ORGANISATION OF OLIGARCHIC GOVERNMENT. [CH. V. from a life tenure to ten years and then to one year can be traced in the case of the supreme magistrates at Athens: but after the completion of constitutional de- velopment, even in oligarchies, we know no instances of office conferred for more than a year, except in the case of the council, the members of which often sat for life. The idea of the responsibility of the magistrates which is characteristic of democracy was never enforced to the same degree in oligarchies. The oligarchic conception of official power required that the magistrate should not be liable to be called to account by the ordinary citizens : the authority of government would have been impaired had the magistrates been brought into collision with any board of revision and audit. At the same time the success of an oligarchy depended so absolutely on the intimate cooperation of magistrates and council, that a magistrate would be extremely unlikely to act against the authority of the council : and the council, composed as it usually was of past magistrates, would, from the age and ex- perience of its members, be able to make its advice equivalent to command and its censure to condemnation. Hence the indefinite powers entrusted to the aristocratic and oligarchic councils often included, no doubt, the power to control the magistrates, to see that they did not transgress the laws and to call them to account in case they offended^. Sparta, whose constitution differed in most respects from that of other states, left the supervision of all other 3 It is recorded of the council of the Areopagus that they had to keep the magistrates within the written laws (Ar. Ath. Pol. 4 4: in § 2 of this chapter, which contains so many difficulties, eWvvai. are mentioned without a hint as to how they were conducted). Solon gave the power § 42] RESPONSIBILITY OF MAGISTRATES. 151 magistrates to the Ephors^ In states in which stress was laid on the strict observance of the law the nomophylaces may have had the duty of seeiag that the magistrates did not transgress the law and so have formed a board of control over them^ But in most states the magistrate was left a large amount of freedom. They acted on their own discretion and were not bound by written rules': while oligarchies would be more inclined than democracies to entrust single magistrates or small boards of magis- trates with absolute and omnipotent authority'. The powers of the Ephors and the Cosmi are well known, and another significant instance is afiforded by the oligarchic constitution at Athens in 411. Under the provisional government the ten generals were to have absolute power and only to consult with the council at their discretion^ of calling the magistrates to account to the people, but the Areopagus remained the guardian of the laws (Ar. Ath. Pol. 8 4 it was MaKoiros TTJs iroXiTeias entrusted with rb vo/iixpuXaKelv) and so must have had some control over the magistrates. The council of the Four Hundred at Athens was to have power irepl tuv eiBvvSv (Ar. Ath. Pol. 31 1). Cf. Plut. Q.G. 2 on the 'nocturnal council' at Crete. The councils them- selves were usually irresponsible. ^ Pol. ii 9 1271 a 6. From Ar. Bhet. iii 18 1419 b 31 and Plut. Agis 12, Gilbert, Handbuch i^ p. 59 n. 1, concludes that the Ephors were responsible and had to render an account to their successors. = See below, § 43. ^ Ar. Pol. ii 9 1270 b 29 says that the Ephors at Sparta decided aOToyvtji)fj.oves and not Kara 7pd/tjuara Kal Toifs vdfutvs. Cf . ib. 10 1272 a 38. ' Cf. Theophr. Gharact. 8 ; the oligarchic man is wont to say, when the appointment of magistrates is discussed, ibs 5« aiTOKpdropas TO&rovs eTvai. 8 Ar. Ath. Pol. 31 2. 152 ORGANISATION OF OLIGARCHIC GOVERNMENT. [CH. V. § 43. Single Magistrates and Boards of Magistrates. The oldest type of aristocratic govermnent is that represented by the rule of the Bacchiadae at Corinth, in which the clan of that name formed a council of govern- ment, jointly controlling the state and appointing every year one of their number with the position and powers of the former king^ We need not suppose that he was the only magistrate^ but in dignity he was the chief and he doubtless held the chief administrative power. Gradually in most states political functions were divided; military command was separated from civil administration, which was shared by a number of magistrates ; but many oli- garchies still kept one man at the head of the constitu- tion^ and entrusted him with the chief control of the administration, while democracies tended to divide power, to suspect the holders of it and therefore to create several boards of magistrates. Single magistrates, who are de- scribed as supreme in the administration, were appointed at Opus and at Epidamnus*, in the different Elean com- ^ Diod. vii fr. ol 8K..'BaKxi-5ai....KaT4(Txov tt}v apxh^ Kal Koivy fxkv TrpoeuTT-fiKeaav ttjs iriKews aTracres, i^ airCiv Si ha Kar' hiavriv -gpoviiTO TrpiravLVj 6s tt}v tov ^atrtX^ws e?Xf t6.^iv. ^ Nicol. Dam. F. H. G. iii 392 implies that there was a TroKip.apxos : if so the TrpvTavi.s was not commander in chief. 3 Ar. Pol. viii 1 1301 b 25 SKiyapxi-Kiv de Kal & dpxiav d ets (of Epidamnus). ^ Ar. Pol. iii 16 1287 a 6 ttoWoI iroLoCinv '4va KipLov ttjs Sioi/cijtrews • TOtaini yap apxh ns ^(Tti Kal irepl ''ETrtda/xvov Kal irepl 'Offowra. In Locris we may perhaps identify this magistrate with the dpxis mentioned in I.G.A. 821 41 (Roberts Epigraphy 231, Hicks Manual 63). From the passage of Aristotle quoted in n. 3 we might conclude that the magis- trate at Epidamnus was called apxav. Gilbert, Handbueh ii p. 237 n., suggests that he was called diotKrjrds. § 43] SINGLE MAGISTRATES. 153 jnunities" and at Locri in Italy«. In most Greek states there was one magistrate, who was formally at the head of affairs', but apart from these merely titular chiefs we may distinguish the irpvravi^ as a magistrate found with especial frequency in oligarchies^ Single magistrates of this sort were entrusted with large powers ; but a small board of magistrates, if acting in concord, must have possessed still more authority. The best examples of such boards are furnished by the Ephors at Sparta and the Cosmi at Crete. The Ephors enjoyed a high prestige', and the Gosmi (who are often compared to the Ephors) had also the command in war". Ephors were also to be found in the Dorian colonies of Tarentum, Heraclea in Italy, Thera and Gyrene". In Western Locris the damiorgi were the chief magis- 5 Cauer Delectus^ 112, Eoberts Epigraphy 292 op fiiyccrrov tAos ?x" is used to describe the different magistrates in the different towns (wlio probably had different titles). ^ Kov /ieylarwv airois iffrlv. He calls it X/ok /xeydXri Kal Ifforipavvos. Cf. Plut. Ages. 4. 10 Ar. Pol. ii 10 1272 a 9. " Inscriptions prove the existence of ephors at a comparatively late period in Thera and Heraclea; but as all these colonies had direct or indirect connexion with Sparta we may assume that the ephorate was an early institution. For Thera cf. Cauer Delectus^ 148 1: Cyrene Heraclides F. H. G. ii 212; Heraclea Cauer 40 1 (of about 400 b.o.), and as Heraclea was a colony of Tarentum we may assume that this magis- tracy existed also in the metropolis. 154 ORGANISATION OF OLIGARCHIC GOVERNMENT. [CH. V. trates^^ : magistrates with this title held the chief execu- tive power in many states". At Athens, in the early constitution the gradual division of the king's powers can be traced, while in the oligarchy of the Four Hundred the chief authority was entrusted to a board of ten, and in 404 B.C. the Thirty seem to have directed the administra- tion themselves. Massalia shows us an artificial constitution, with a gradual devolution of power. From the assembly of Six Hundred, fifteen men were chosen to administer current affairs ; from the fifteen three presidents were elected and : from the three one man to have supreme power in the state". This system of ensuring that the magistrates should be members of the assembly produced a well- ordered government, which lasted for centuries. A similar attempt to introduce unity into the administration was made by the Four Hundred at Athens ; for in the pro- jected constitution all the magistrates were to be chosen out of the council ^^ There were certain magistracies connected with special constitutions. One class of these was entrusted with censorial duties, with the supervision of women and children and the control of the gymnasia: such magis- trates Aristotle describes as aristocratic and not oligar- chic'". In a luxurious oligarchy, he says, a magistracy 1= Roberts Epigraphy 232 and 233 (I. G. A. 322 and 328). ^ For instances see Gilbert Handbuch ii p. 327. " Strabo iv 179. 15 Ar. Ath. Pol. 30 2. See Appendix C. 1" In vii 8 1322 b 37 tSiai Se rait (rxo^a-ffTiKUTipais Kal /iS^^ol' eirmepai- cats irdXecrLVi ^tl de <^povTL^oiuais edKOCffiias, yuvcLiKovofiict, vofioi\aKes at Athens: see n. 24. In some instances these magistrates may have been able to veto proposals made in the assembly, and thus to exercise a function usually reserved to the council. 156 OEGANISATION OF OLIGARCHIC GOVERNMENT. [CH. V. ■with them should be made and to guard the state archives, in order that proper records might be kept^\ Such magistrates were appointed in Abdera, Chalce- don, Mylasa, and Corcyra, and with slightly different titles in Andania, Elis and Thespiae^^. To the thesmothetae . at Athens at the date of their institution Aristotle assigns duties very similar to those ascribed to the nomophylaces^', and in the reform of the Athenian democracy at the end of the fourth century seven nomophylaces were instituted as a check upon the democracy^. Other magistrates who performed some of the duties usually ascribed to the nomophylaces were the registrars, who had the custody of private contracts and of public documents, but these do not seem to have been a specially oligarchic institution^. 21 The best general description of their duties is in Xen. Oec. 9 14 eSidaaKov 5^ avT^v otl Kai iv tols e^ofxovfxhaiz TrbXeaiv oOk dpKeXv Sokgl rots TToKlraLs 7Jv vb^ovs /caXoi)s ypdipuvrat, dXXa Kal vofj.o(pv\aKas 7rpo(raipoO*'Tai, otrives iiTLcrKoirovvTes rbv /x^v Troiovvra rd vofjiLfw, iiraivoOaiv, 7]v d^ rts iraph Toirs voixovs iroLTJ ^rjfxiovai. Cf. Plato Laws vi 754 1> (of the vofio^i!/\aK€S in his constitution) irpCorov f^v 0i)Xa/cej '4{nti)(yav twv v6^it}v, ^iretra t(ov ypafifidruv wv dV ^/cacros cLiroypdipT} rots dpxovffi rd irXridos t^s avrwv ovalas^ (Their duties in other respects seem more extensive than those of this magistracy in general.) Cf. Cic. de Leg. iii 20 46. See also the descrip- tion of these magistrates at Athens in n. 24. 22 For these see Gilbert Handbuch ii p. 338 n. 1. 23 Ar. Ath. Pol. 3 4. 2^ Their duties are stated in Lex. Rhetor. Cantab. 674 tAs S^ ipxas ■qv&yKa^ov ToJs vofioii XPV"'^'"- ""'^ ^'' '^V ^kkXt/itiV k"' ^o Ty ^ovXrj /ierd, tUv irpo^8pojv iKo.O'qvro KiaXvovres to. dffufj.tpopa t^ 7r6Xet TrpdrreLv' itrrd 5^ TJffav Kal KaT^(TT7](rav, ois ^Lhdxopos ore 'E^tdXr?;? pLOi^a KaT^Xitre rrj i^ *Apeiov irdyov iSouXij rd irepl toS aii/iaros. It has been thought that the last statement is mistaken, as there is no trace of the existence of this magistracy before the reforms of Demetrius. 25 Ar. Pol. Tii 8 1321 b 34. 44] CONSTITUTION OF THE COUNCIL. 157 § 44. Constitution of the Council. Generally speaking the council formed the most im- portant element in the oligarchical constitution. In the times of the Heroic Monarchy and of the Aristocracy it acted as the representative of the nobles, and in the constitution of the later oligarchies it continued to re- present the privileged body. It was the sovereign power in the state as the assembly was in the democracy, and where the one institution was powerful, the other was bound to be subordinated But the oligarchic council differed from the democratic council not only in power and importance, but in size and constitution. The demo- . cratic assembly was obliged to delegate some of its powers to a council, but in order to minimise the power of the individual members a large number of citizens was ad- mitted to it, usually appointed by lot, and the large council was regarded as essentially democratic^. The oligarchic council, on the other hand, was composed I of a small number of members, which even in the most i populous states rarely exceeded one hundred. At Sparta, I there were thirty, at Cnidus sixty, at Corinth^ eighty, in Elis ninety; and in the Areopagus, which was made up of ex-archons sitting for life, it has been calculated that ' Ar. Pol. vi 15 1299 b 38 (caraXiierai Si Kal ttjs /SouX^s ri S6va/iis h rats TOLa^Tats Srj^ioKpaTiais iv als aiirfis tructwj' 6 dij^os xP'7y"tir£f'et irepl wdyruv. The converse is true of oligarchy. Cf. J. W. Headlam Election by Lot, p. 42 'It would be equally correct if we substituted for the Greek words 'Eule of the Many,' 'Eule of the Few' the expressions 'Eule by the Assembly,' 'Rule by the Council.' 2 Ar. Pol. vii 8 1323 a 6. 3 For Corinth see § 46 n. 2. 158 ORGANISATION OF OLIGARCHIC GOVERNMENT. [CH. V. there would be not more than ninety members at a time^ In the few instances in which larger councils occur in oligarchies, we may assume that they practically took the place of the assembly, and that no more numerous body was entrusted with real power. Thus in the oligarchic revolution at Athens in 411, the Five Thousand were practically excluded from the government, while in the projected constitution, the acting council was apparently intended to be formed of one fourth part of the whole body of the citizens ^ In the later oligarchy the Thirty nominated a council of Five Hundred, but this was the most numerous body in the constitution, and the Thirty themselves probably acted as a councils In the oligarchies of fixed number, in which the Assembly was not so large as to preclude discussion, the council would not be so indispensable, and this may explain why we do not find it so much in evidence in these constitutions'. I proceed to discuss the method of appointing mem- bers of the council. In primitive times when govern- ment was of the patriarchal type the chiefs were probably convoked by the king to advise him'. When sovereignty ^ Hermann Lehrbuch der Staatsaltertumer^, p. 388 n. 6, where Titt- mann is quoted. ^ In the provisional constitution the Four Hundred acted as the supreme authority. For the projected constitution see Ar. Ath. Pol. 30 3 and Appendix C below. ^ Ar. Ath. Pol. 35 1. The 'Three Thousand' seem never to have had any power. ' Dioaearch. F. H.G. ii 244 mentions ri ruv yepbvrwv opxe'"" at Croton : at Locri we find the x'X'oi performing functions that usually belonged to an oligarchic council. At Massaha 15 irpoecrTuTes were chosen from the avviSptov, who probably formed a sort of council, Strabo v 179. 8 There is not, so far as I know, any evidence as to the method by which the council was selected in the heroic constitution. § 44] CONSTITUTION OF THE COUNCIL. 159 passed from the king to the chiefs, the council either included all the nobles of a certain age or it was formed from the heads of the clans whose union made the stated In later times some principle of selection had to be applied. At Sparta", in Elis" and at Cnidus'^ the senators were elected from certain privileged classes or families; in Epidaurus sixty of the hundred and eighty citizens were constituted a council^^ In Athens" and Crete^' the chief magistrates were admitted to the council after their term of office. We have not sufficient information as to the constitution of the councils in ordinary oligarchies, but we may infer that the highest qualifications required for the magistracies were also exacted in the case of the senators and that the most careful process of election was usually enforced '^ But the senators differed from the " The title of the senators at Epidamnus ^iXapxoi may point to a system in which the v\al and their subdivisions were represented : it is possible that the Spartan yepotnrla may have been originally representa- tive of the thirty obes. In many states the numbers of the senators suggest a connexion with the ^vXai, and originally the smaller divisions may have been represented. i» Ar. Pol. a 9 1270 b 24. " Ar. Pol. viii 6 1306 a 18 says the aipeats was dwaffTeunKr/ (I take this to mean from certain families), and he compares it to the Spartan method. '2 Plut. Q.G. i TrpiKpiToi i| ipiaruv. It is doubtful whether the xaXoi K&yaSol of Sparta and the ftpioroi of Cnidus refer to certain privileged families or merely to the claims of wealth and education. For Sparta see § 32 n. 7. 13 Plut. Q.G. 1. " Ar. Ath. Pol. 3 6; Plut. Sol. 19. 1^ Ar. Pol. ii 10 1272 a 34 {alpovi'Tai...Tovs y^povras iK ruv KeKoa-fiTjKd- Tuv) and Strabo x 484 both imply some principle of selection applied to the ex-oosmi. 16 From the few instances of which we have definite information it is 160 ORGANISATION OF OLIGARCHIC GOVERNMENT. [CH. V. magistrates inasmuch as a higher limit of age was usually necessar}'^' and in many cases they were appointed for life '8. The commonest title used to describe the senate in an oligarchy was yepovata, though ^ovK-q was also found ; and in constitutions in which the old oligarchic senate was preserved side by side with a democratic council, they were sometimes distinguished by the titles of yepovcrla and /3oi/Xj;''. The senators were often called yepovTe<;, but many other titles were used. to describe them in different states, and we hear of the ^a/jLioopjol in Elis^", the rifiov'xoL at Teos^', the dprvvoi at Epidaurus"^, the ap.v^/j.ove'i at Cnidus^', the (pvXapxoi at Epidamnus^. The oligarchic council was then, as a general rule, composed of a comparatively small number of men, who fulfilled the highest conditions in respect to birth and clear that the conditions for election to the council were more stringent than for the election of magistrates. 1' At Sparta an age of at least sixty years was required (Plut. Lye. 26), and the frequent application of the title of ydpovres to the senators, of yepovala to the senate, points to a high limit of age being necessary else- where. ^8 Examples of life senates are the councils at Sparta, in Crete, Elis, Cnidus (Plut. Q. G. 4) and the council of the Areopagus at Athens. ^ Ephesus, Strabo xiv 640, Dittenberger Sylloge 134. At Crete the senators were called ■yipovres (they are so described by Aristotle), the senate ^uXd (Cauer Delectus^ 121"). 2° Gilbert, Handbueh ii p. 101, thinks the tl'a/j.i.upyol were the senators of the separate states, and that they united to form the ^a/j.i.apyla of the united state (mentioned in Cauer Delectus^ 257). 21 Dittenberger Sylloge 234 18. 22 Plut. Q. G. 1. 23 Plut. Q. G. 4. 24 Ar. Fol. viii 1 1301 b 22. § 45] POWERS OF THE COUNCIL. 161 wealth, who had usually held the most important magis- tracies, and who, in many cases, were appointed for life. § 45. Powers of the Council. The members of the oligarchic council thus enjoyed the highest political privilege in their states, and the council could not fail to be imbued with an exclusive and aristocratic spirit. Its authority was great. The indi- vidual magistrate, holding a temporary office, usually without experience of its duties, was expected to seek and to follow advice from a council, composed of ex-magis- 1 trates, irresponsible and deciding on their own discretion, \ which often formed the only permanent organ of the con- stitution. Such an institution, whatever the theoretical division of political power may have been, was inevitably obliged to rule the policy of the state : the magistrates acted under its direction and thus became in a sense its responsible ministers. Its powers could not be defined, for the very reason that they were unlimited': there was probably no branch of the administration in which it had not sovereign authority, and even where the assembly possessed any importance, the council decided what business was to be brought before it and so exercised a veto on its proceed- ings". 1 This point ia brought out by Mr J. W. Headlam in an article on The Council at Athens (Classical Review, vi p. 296). ' The natural con- clusion is that the Council (of the Areopagus in early times) never had any definite and limited duties. The arohons were executive; the council superintended, directed and if necessary punished them.' " Even in democracies the council was 'probouleutio': and this part W. 11 162 ORGANISATION OF OLIGARCHIC GOVERNMENT. [CH. V. Hence we find the vaguest descriptions of the compe- tence of the senate in oligarchies. The Council of the Areopagus ' administered most of the greatest things'' and was 'the guardian of the stated' At Cnidus the senators were ' guardians and counsellors in the greatest matters^'; at Crete the elders were 'irresponsible and absolute"' and 'advisers in the greatest matters',' while at Sparta, although the Ephors attained a power that was almost tyrannical, they only held oflfice for a year and the senate was said to ' rule over all things ' and to be ' sovereign in affairs of stated' These instances are sufficient to show that the com- petence of the oligarchic council eludes definition. It was the sovereign body, the chief ' deliberative ' element', just as the assembly was in the democracy : and the other elements in the state, whether assembly or magistrates, exercised their powers in subordination to the council. Its judicial duties will be discussed below. of its duties must have been of more real importance in oligarchies. See below § 46. 2 At. Ath. Pol. 3 6; 44. 4 lb. 8 4. ^ ^'jria'KoiroL...Kal 7rp6^ov\oi twv fieyiffrcov Plut. Q. G, 4. « Ar. Pol. ii 10 1272 a 36. ' Strabo xiv 480. ^ Isocr. xii 154; Polyb. vi 45 5 Si' wy xal /leff' iav tt&vto. x^i-p^t^Tcu to, Kari, TTjv TToKa-dav; Dionys. Hal. ii 14 ^ yepovcrla irav elxe twv koivSv rb KpdTos. Plut. Ages. 4 represents rb Kparos as shared between the senate and the ephors: and in the fourth century the ephors undoubtedly gained authority at the expense of the senate. ^ Of. the definition of the deliberative element in Ar. Pol. vi 14 1298 a 4. Some of the powers mentioned there were formally exercised by the assembly in some oHgarchies. § 46] SUBDIVISIONS OF THE COUNCIL. 163 § 46. Subdivisions of the Council. In discussing the constitution of the oligarchic council I have laid stress on the small number of members which it usually included. But there was usually, also, a much smaller committee, chosen generally from the council, on which considerable power was conferred. This committee was entrusted with the duty of the preliminary considera- ution of measures before they came before the council or the assembly, the duty of preparing motions and drawing I up proposals : and hence they sometimes bore the name of irpo^ovKoi^, a magistracy which Aristotle describes as I especially oligarchic. In democracies these duties were generally performed by the council, but even in democracies, the council was often divided into committees in order to transact current business and to control meetings of the council or the assembly. But while in a democracy each committee was appointed for a very brief period and given ^ It is usually assumed that the irpb^ov\oi denote a small board of magistrates, often a subdivision of the /SouX^ itself. I think the term was applied vaguely to the small oligarchic councils as well. Thus Ar. Pol. vi 14 1298 b 26 describes irpipcvKoi. as an 6,pxSov in oligarchies entrusted with probouleutic duties, arranging all questions to be sub- mitted to the people (there is no mention of any other kind of jSouXiJ) : of. ih. 15 1299 b 33 all constitutions must have a probouleutic magistracy: if this is small, it is oligarchic, and called Tp6pov\oi ; if large, democratic and called /SouX^ : 6 /liv yap /3ouXeu7-i)s SijiumKbv, b Si irpb^ovXas iXiyapxt- Kbv. (There seems here a contrast of the large consultative body of the democracy with the small one of the oligarchy.) So in vii 8 1322 a 12 the irpb^ovKoi and the /3oi/Xi) are described as similar institutions in dif- ferent constitutions. The term is used to describe the council at Cnidus (Plut. Q. G. i). At the same time in the instances in which we know of the TT/aAjSouXoi (as at Corinth and Athens) the term describes either a committee of the /SouX^ or a magistracy independent of it. 11—2 164 ORGANISATION OF OLIGARCHIC GOVERNMENT. [CH. V. as little real power as possible, we may assume that the corresponding oligarchic committees were appointed for a considerable period and possessed considerable power, securing the oligarchic ends of secrecy, efficiency and despatch. At Corinth there was a council of eighty (in all proba- bility) and a committee of eight^ : at Chios' and Massalia* there were bodies of fifteen chosen from the larger councils. At Corcyra^ and Eretria" magistrates called irpo^ovKoi are mentioned in inscriptions, though we know nothing of the duties they performed ; and committees of the council, with special titles, can be traced in Delphi', Megara, and Chalcedon*. ^ Nicol. Dam. F. H. G. iii 394 (6 S^yitos) irapaxp^/xo KareirT^o-aTo ttoXi- Telav TOidvde' /xtav ^kv (i/crdSa irpo^odXojv iTotTjaej^j 4k d^ twv \oiiriov ^ovKt)v KariXf^ev avSpuv 8'. This is of course impossible. Busolt Die Lakedai- monier reads o' for 8'. He thinks that one 0uXi5 appointed eight irpbfiov- \oi, and from the other seven 0u\ai 70 senators were appointed. This seems extremely unlikely; is it not more probable that the source of the corruption lies in dvSpdp 7 I suggest dKTddav (perhaps avSpuv should pre- cede Trpo^oiXoiv above, cf. Ar. Ach. 755 Avdpes irpb^ovKoi): then we get a council of (9 X 8) + 8 = 80, i.e. 10 councillors chosen from each of eight tribes, and one from each made a Trp6^ov\os. ' Cauer Delectus^ 496 a ol irevTeKald^Ka seem to have formed a com- mittee of the povkif. * At Massalia fifteen were chosen from rb avviSpiov of 600 (really an assembly, not a council) Treire/fafSe/ca 5' elai tov cwedptov irpoeaTwreSy Toi- Tots d^ ra irpdx^tpo. dt-oLKeTv S^Sorat Strabo iv 179. ^ C. I. G. 1845 113. Both -rpb^ovKoi and irpiSiKoi. ^aXas are men- tioned. ^ See Gilbert Handbuch ii p. 67 u. 2. ' In Delphi two povXevral and a secretary are frequently mentioned in inscriptions. See Gilbert Handbuch ii p. 38. 8 In Megara aUnp-varai. (Dittenberger Sylloge 218) and in Chalcedon (a Megarian colony) alavp-vUvTsi (C. I. G. 3794) occur. In the latter instance it is supposed that they act in the same capacity as the Athe- § 47] THE ASSEMBLY. 165 § 47. The Assembly. In the heroic kingship, although no definite power or privilege was assigned to the assembly of the commons, it was still customary to convoke them to hear the decision of their chiefs, that they might express in primitive fashion their approval or dissent*. In this function lies the germ of those powers of the people, which were after- wards developed in the sovereign assemblies of the Greek democracy : but in the later aristocracies and in the oligarchies the commons lost for the most part even the small part which they had hitherto enjoyed in the con- stitution. The supreme council of government was the political creation of the aristocracy, and the powers wielded by it left small place for the assembly. In some oligarchies the commons still retained their right of meeting, and an assembly existed open to those who were otherwise politi- cally disqualified'': but the powers of such an assembly were neither independent nor important ; and in most oligarchies and aristocracies the commons had no place or lot whatever; for these constitutions involved the creation of a privileged class to which alone political rights were given, and the distinction of 'those within' and 'those nian Trpm-ivai. It is therefore assumed that in both states they origin- ally acted as irpS^ovXoi. 1 Cf. Freeman Comparative Politics, p. 206. ' There is no formal reckoning of votes (in the Homeric assembly) ; but I suspect that any formal reckoning of votes is a refinement belonging to a much later stage of political life. To shout or to clash the arms is the primitive way of declaring assent.' " For the admission of the S^/iot (or a class otherwise unprivileged) to the assembly in oligarchies see Aristotle quoted in n. 3 § 41 and n. 5 below). 166 ORGANISATION OF OLIGARCHIC GOVERNMENT. [CH. V. without the constitution ' arose. ' Those within the con- stitution ' formed some sort of assembly, which met when summoned and decided questions submitted to it, but differed as widely as possible from the assembly of a democracy. In the aristocracies of conquest, the members of the ruling race were alone qualified to take part in the assembly ; the subjects were altogether excluded. In the oligarchies of limited number, ' the Six Hundred ' or ' the Thousand' were the only privileged citizens. Their number was not too large to preclude discussion, and the assembly performed, therefore, some of the functions usually entrusted to the council : and in this form of constitution the institution was more important than in any other kind of oligarchy. In the dynasty there was probably nothing of the nature of an assembly'. Leaving these special forms of government out of view, we may assume that the ordinary oligarchical con- stitution did include some sort of assembly*. But it was characteristic of the oligarchy to make the council the responsible and efficient element in the constitution and to give but a minimum of power to the assembly. Its action was restricted to such questions as were brought before it by the magistrates or counciP; the magistrates ' A dwaffrela dXlyoiv avSpQv probably held all power in their own hands. Of. the account of the rule of the Bacchiadae Diod. vii fr. * Ar. Pol. iii 1 refers to some states in which there was no regular assembly 1275 h 7 iv ivtais yap ovk Iffrt, Sfjfios, oi5' ^KKXiialav void^ovaw dXXa avyKk-fiTom. For the aiyKKifros we may cite Acragas and Melite. See Swoboda, Griechische Volksbeschlusse, p. 307. ^ Ar. Pol. vi 14 1298 b 29 it is a good plan in an oligarchy to sub- mit to the people what the irpd^ovXai have decided upon and to limit the issue to the question submitted, oihoi yhp /leff^fei 6 5^/xos toC povXeieirdai § 47] THE ASSEMBLY. 167 were alone qualified to speak, there was practically no discussion and the assembly had only the power to express approval or dissent; and legally, perhaps, their dissent might be disregarded. The meetings served to make the citizens acquainted with the will and purpose of the ! rulers ; they secured, as far as possible, that the action of 1 the government should not be in conflict with the feelings of the people ; the assembly served also the purposes of publicity and registration' ; it was an ofiice of record for many formal acts which needed witnesses, such as the adoption of sons or the emancipation of slaves'. Lastly the assent of the assembly was especially called for in cases in which the state contracted responsibilities to other states. The decision of war and peace and treaties often took place in the assembly. It was doubtless felt that the honour of the state was more solemnly pledged by the united action of council and assembly. Even in the states I in which the power of the assembly was very small, it was \ generally called upon to participate in the decision of the community ^ The most important power that the assembly Kal \ieiv oiSh dw^fferai Twv irepi t^k voKtrelav ...aTo^ritpi^iJsvov f-iv yap xipiov Set TToieiv rb t\^6os, KaTa'ij/i)i^bixevov Sk /jtij Kipiov. This is in a description of a moderate oligarchy in which the lower classes were admitted to the assembly ; the ordinary oligarchy probably gave even less power. ' This was its function in the heroic age, Grote ii p. 69 ' The Agora was a special medium of publicity not including any idea of responsi- hmty.' ' For adoption see the Gortyn inscription x 33; for the emancipa- tion of Helots at Sparta, Thuo. v 34. ' Hence even in oligarchies the regular form of decree would be ISo|c Tj /SouXj Kal T(p SijiMf (or some equivalent phrase). See Swoboda Grie- cMsche Volksbeschlusse, p. 24, who quotes the usual forms. 168 ORGANISATION OF OLIGAECHIC GOVERNMENT. [CH. V. exercised was the election of magistrates': but in some cases they do not seem to have exercised even this power freely^", and the example of Rome shows us how it was possible for an oligarchic council to interfere with the right of the citizens to appoint their magistrates. In some rare instances the council directly elected the officers of state". In all other respects the assembly acted only in sub- ordination to the council, without power of initiative or independence of action. In the rare event of disagree- ment between different magistrates or between magistrates and senate the assembly might be called upon to decide^^, but usually the policy of the state was already resolved on, when the assembly was invited to assent". It thus served generally to secure a general knowledge and pub- licity of policy and to register the divers acts of the state. In proportion as the power of the council rose, the importance of the assembly declined". ' This Ar. Pol. ii 12 1274 a 15 calls tV dvayKaioTdrriv Siva/juv that can be given to the drjiju>s. ^^ The method of 'double election,' which is described as oligarchic, prevented the people from exercising an absolute choice. It involved the interference of council or magistrates with the choice of the assembly. " Of. Ar. Ath. Pol. 8 2. ^2 Cf. Thuc. i 87 where the assembly of Sparta decides between the king and the ephors. '^ Cf. the gradual decline of the power of the assembly at Venice {Encycl. Brit, xxiv p. 142). 'It remained none the less true that the people had been left nothing more than the illusory right of approving by acclamation each new doge after his election.' 1* There are many passages laying stress on the small powers of the assembly in the oligarchy. Cf. Ar. Pol. ii 10 1272 a 10 (of Crete) iKK\-q- (xlas di lierixowri. irdiTes, Kvpla d' oidevds 4(tti.v aW rj i AaKeSalfiovi. This points to the institution of special legal magistrates. 1° Thus the Archons at Athens (to judge by their competence in later times) were concerned with private law: the Council of the Areopagus, like the senate at Sparta, and the Council at Thebes, had public jurisdiction. § 48] JUDICIAL AFFAIRS. 175 was a natural consequence both of oligarchic sentiment and of the system of small courts, that in oligarchies the speakers in trials should be kept to their subject and should not be allowed to work on the emotions of the judges". One of the earliest acts in both oligarchic revolutions at Athens was the suspension of the popular jury courts '^ In some oligarchies, however, we find traces of large courts and even of the appointment of jurors from the classes excluded in other respects from all political pri- vilege. Thus at Chios we have evidence of a court of three hundred at a time when the island was probably under a close oligarchy", while in other states, of which Heraclea on the Pontus serves as the example, the juries were composed of men who were not on the citizen roll, and this gave the orators an opportunity to make dema- ^^ Ar. Jlhet, i 1 1354 a 17 to, roLavra ird.dyi r^s ^vxv^ °^ ^^P' "^^^ irpdyfiaTos iffTLV dXXct ivpbs rbv SiKaffT-^v. wtrr' ei irepi irdffas r/v rds Kpi- cets KaBAwep hi hlats ye vvv iarl riav ToXewv Kal fid^iffra 4v rats eivofiov- fxhais oi8h av etxov otl \iyov(nv...ol 5^ koX Kfa\6ovaiv ^^w tov irpAyfiaros \4yeiv KaB&irep Kal iv 'Apeiifi ir&yif. Cf. Plut. de virt. mart. 7 toi>s pi)Topai iv TOLs ApiffTOKpaHats oi)K iuifft Tadaiveffdat. 12 In 411 the first step was to give the generals summary jurisdiction with power of life and death (Ar. Ath. Pol. 29 5). We are not told to whom judicial power was to be entrusted under the oligarchy. It was perhaps included (with eOBvvai) in the general administrative powers of the pov\ri {ib. 31 1). The Thirty t6 Kvpos 8 ^v iv toIs diKatrrdis Kari- \vcrav (ib. 35 2). Trials were conducted in the /SouXi; of five hundred with open voting and in the presence of the Thirty, but they put many to death under their own order without trial (Lys. xiii 85). 1* Eoberts, Epigraphy 149 22. The inscription is referred to the fifth century. The explanation of so large a court under an oligarchy may lie in the alliance with Athens, as SIkm dir4 i^^i,v el/iec. Pindar, 01. ix 15, praises Opus for eivo/da and Bi/us, and the praise was perhaps not merely conventional. § 49] TEIBAL DIVISIONS. 177 ent communities and prescribe the conditions for them". Herein we have the distinction between local jurisdiction'' and what we should call to-day ' international ' courts. In the latter courts there are different kinds of judges", and the presiding magistrates choose jurymen to decide on oath. These instances, coming not from the highly civilised commercial states of central Greece and the Aegean, but from the backward tribes in the north and from Crete, show us that the oligarchies did not neglect the proper organisation of judicial institutions, and we may reasonably conclude that the great commercial cities such as Aegina and Megara and Corinth developed their legal system to as high a pitch of perfection as the great trading demo- cracies such as Athens^". § 49. Tribal Divisions. Having concluded the discussion of the powers of government I proceed to consider the question of tribal and class divisions in oligarchies. I have discussed in a previous chapter the gradual break-up of the tribal organisation and the substitution of local, political di- " SlKai &irb (TviipHKuv, of. Roberts, Epigraphy 232 1. 35 Swdj^uvTai. KCLT Tcis avv^okas. ^^ 1. 7 iinSa^ia Slictj. 1' 1. 10 Tol ^evodUai. (=recuperatores) and kvajj-orai, act in one event; and dafiiopyol and ItpKiafwrai in another. 20 There must have been courts for the settlement of disputes be- tween citizens of these cities and those of other states. This may account for the praise lavished by Pindar on the respect which states like Aegina and Corinth had for law and justice. Cf. 01. xiii 6 ; Pyth. viii 1 ; 01. viii 21. W. 12 178 OEGANISATION OF OLIGARCHIC GOVERNMENT. [CH. V. visions for the old tribes based on birth and religion, and I have pointed out that it was only where this was brought to pass that any government other than aristo- cracy was possible. But where aristocracy survived, where birth and privilege remained united, it was necessary to maintain the old divisions of tribe and phratry and house uncorrupted and unassailed. It is strange that there is scarcely any direct evidence for the existence of the Dorian tribes at Sparta', but we can scarcely doubt that they existed there, and we hear also of twenty-seven phra tries ^ The Dorian tribes formed divisions of the population in many other states : in some they lost their exclusive privileges and other tribes of equal right were instituted : in others, perhaps, they lost all political importance, but some few probably still retained the old Dorian tra- ditions ^ Tribal divisions always point to the smaller groups out of which cities are formed, and are usually associated with the territorial influence of certain noble families. The ideal of the noble was that he and his clan should be absolute rulers in however small a domain. Hence some 1 The moat important evidence is in Pind. Pyth. i 62 Ila/xipiXm Kal /iav 'B.pa.K\ei.Sdv ^Kyovoi (as a description of the Spartans). It seema most likely that the Dorian tribes arose before the Dorian migration and, as they were found in many Dorian colonies, it is a natural inference that they existed in Sparta. 2 Demetrius of Skepsis in Ath. iv 141 e, r. ^ There is a reference to the ! tois GeTraXois 5ovkei€i,v Kad^ OfwXoyiaSt ^0* y oUre i^dyovcnv adroiis €k ttjs x^P^^ ^^^ diroKTevoOinv' aiyroi 6^ ttjv xtipap airroTs ipya^d^evoi rdj avvrd^eLS dirodib- aiuwTai, and Aristotle (in Pol. ii ch. 10) uses it three times of the Cretan serfs. (I should have pointed out in n. 6 that there are traces of many different terms being applied to the Cretan serfs, d^a/uioTai, /iv(^Tai, /tXapSrot, foiKies (at Gortyn) and ircploLKOi. It seems probable that different titles were used to describe them in different towns of Crete.) Their position in the state made inr-qKooi appropriate as a general description of the class. Thuoydides constantly applies the term to the subjects of the Thessalians (ii 101; iv 78; cf. Xen. Hell, vi 1 9). Gilbert, Handbuch ii p. 16 n. 1, assumes on insufficient evidence that the subject class in Thessaly bore the title of (ri/i/mxot. ' Isocr. xii 177 — 8. It is not clear whether Isocrates regards the Perioeci as the conq^uered population : but I assume that he does, as he talks of the 'rightful owners of the land' (before the Dorian invasion). 184 OEGANISATION OF OLIGAKCHIC GOVERNMENT. [CH. V. originally belonged to the race conquered by the Dorian invaders. It is hard to explain the difference in the position of the two classes. Some writers assume a difference of race to account for the original difference of condition, but the balance of probability is on the whole against this assumption, although in the course of time no doubt both Helots and Perioeci included people of more than one race". The theory that the Helots were the serfs of the ' Achaeans ' who occupied the Peloponnese before the Dorian invasion and that the Perioeci were the conquered 'Achaeans' lacks evidence. Others assume that while the original Helots were the peoples subdued by the Dorians, the Perioeci were themselves originally Dorian: that in the Dorian invasion the invaders were divided into nobles (who afterwards became Spartiates) and commons who were made Perioeci". Many of the ancient writers considered the Perioeci to be Dorian ; they were included with the Spartiates in the term ' Lacedaemonians,' and no diversity of religion can be established ^2. But it is more probable that they were Achaeans ; in favour of this assumption is the fact that there were noble families within the ranks both of the Spartiates and the i" Many Dorians must have been reduced to the condition of Helots after the conquest of Messenia. " Grote ii p. 371 (who says : ' The Perioekio townships were probably composed either of Dorians entirely or of Dorians incorporated in greater or less proportion with the preexisting inhabitants') refers to Hdt. viii 73 and i 145. 1^ It is not possible to draw any conclusion from religion. Of. S. Wide Lakonische Kulte p. 387 — 8 ' Dorian and pre-Dorian cults cannot be distinguished. The Dorians probably took over most of their cults from the older inhabitants.' § 50] CLASS DIVISIONS. 185 Perioeci'' ; and above all the way in which the Spartan constitution was regarded. As I have already pointed out, the perioeci were entirely omitted from consideration, the Spartiates were regarded as forming the whole civic community, organised on an equal and democratic basis". Such an idea would not have been so persistent had not the Perioeci been regarded as subjects of another race. If we assume that the Spartiates included all the original invaders, we can only suppose that the Perioeci got more favourable terms than the Helots when they submitted^^ Similarly in Thessaly the Penestae were the inhabitants of the districts occupied by the Thessalian conquerors, while the Perrhaebi, Magnetes and Achaei, who occupied the more distant parts of Thessaly, had been granted better terms and were in a less galling subjection than the Perioeci of Lacedaemon, as they retained their tribe name and still remained members of the Delphian Amphi- ctyony^^. The existence of separate classes based upon birth usually involves a diversity of occupation and so effects a division of labour. Thus in Lacedaemon agriculture was ^' The inference is doubtful: on the Spartiates see § 32 n. 7; Xen. Hell. V 3 9 talks of the KaXol Kiya8oi tuv vepiolKui', " See above § 3 n. 15 and ef. especially Isocr. xii 178 who talks of the laovoida and STi/ioKparla of the Spartiates. Isocrates (xii 255) regards the original Spartan invaders as not being more than two thousand in number. '^ Mr J. W. Headlam ingeniously suggests that the difference of status arose from the difference of occupation, the Perioeci living in the towns the Helots in the country. The distinction is so early, how- ever, that we have no data to decide whether the difference of status was cause or effect. " See Grote ii p. 279. 186 ORGANISATION OF OLIGARCHIC GOVERNMENT. [CH. V. given over to the Helots, while commerce and industry were left to the Perioeci. The ruling class practised the arts of war and government. But the aristocracy usually went further than this : they not only felt a contempt for commerce and industry, but they made the practice of either pursuit an absolute disqualification for citizenship". To consider particular instances, at Sparta the banausic arts were entirely forbidden to a citizen'' ; at Thebes, Aristotle says, a man must have 'held aloof from the market-place for ten years,' before he was eligible for citizenship '^ At Thespiae even agriculture was con- sidered dishonourable ''''. In Thessaly there was a ' freemen's agora ' from which the farmer and the tradesman were excluded^S while at Epidamnus, a colony which must have had a most im- portant trade with the barbarians of Western Greece, industry was carried on by state slaves'''', the citizens were precluded from actually taking part in commerce, and a public magistrate superintended sales to foreigners^. Naturally oligarchies in which privilege was based on wealth and the wealth was mainly derived from commerce could not inflict disabilities on the trader. In this respect " I have discussed the general aspects of this question above in § 12. See n. 3 there. 1^ Aelian V. H. vi 6 pdvavcrov S' ctShai rix"'')'' ^vSpa AaKtSat/MdviOV oix i^TJv. Plut. Lye. 4. We may compare, as characteristic of the same intolerant spirit, the exclusion of foreigners (|eio;Xacr£oi) which prevailed in Sparta and Crete. ^ Pol. iii 5 1278 a 26: cf. vii 7 1321 a 28. 2» Heracl. Pont. F. H. G. 21 Ar. Pol. iv 12 1331 a 32. "2 Ar. Pol. ii 7 1267 b 17. 23 Plut. Q. G. 29. § 51] SUMMARY. 187 they differed radically from the aristocracies, but they inherited from them the contempt for the classes ex- cluded from the government, and Corinth was dis- tinguished for despising handicrafts less than any other state ^. § 51. Summary. I have brought to a close my study of the political organisation of aristocracies and oligarchies. In both constitutions we may notice the action of the same prin- ciples : both believed in the unwisdom of the multitude, in the justice and necessity of limiting privilege to a few, and in letting these rule the rest of the population, as subjects excluded from citizen rights. Both had the same scheme of government, in which the mean was struck between the single dominion of a tyrant and the sove- reignty of a large assembly, by the creation of a council, in which a few able men, acting in concert, were to direct the policy of the state. In both the magistrates had considerable independent authority ; the theory of special- isation of functions was realised and the rulers were left free of control and generally irresponsible. Throughout the constitution the theory of ' some men ' being qualified and 'most men' unqualified was carried out; and law- courts and assemblies were both filled by members of the privileged minority. But the points of difference between the aristocracies of birth and the oligarchies of wealth were almost as great ^ Hdt. ii 167 (after discussing the general attitude of the Greeks) riKiara Si KoplvBiot ivovTai, roiis x^'/""'^X''<"' 188 OKGANISATION OF OLIGARCHIC GOVERNMENT. [CH. V. as the points of similarity. The end of the aristocrat was success in war : the end of the oligarch wealth : the former (at least in Crete and Sparta) passed his life in military training and martial exercises, the latter in commerce and industry, pursuits which were either forbidden or put under a grave social stigma in aristocracies. The common system of Sparta and Crete led to a uniformity of life, and demanded an ascetic abstinence ; the rich oligarchies were noted for their luxury and extravagance. The aris- tocracies rested on the maintenance of fixed ordinances and customs : they were conservative, slow to move and cautious. The oligarchies were keen and enterprising, anxious never to be displaced in the struggle for wealth and honour. The aristocracies of birth were found in states in a backward stage of civilisation. Setting aside Crete and Sparta, aristocratic constitutions survived mainly in the semi-barbarous states of northern Greece. Had they been affected by the general advance of civilisation, their constitutions must have submitted to the inevitable progress, which elsewhere produced oligarchy or demo- cracy. Even Sparta cannot be regarded as an altogether civilised state : in many respects the Spartiates resemble rather a host of savage warriors than the citizens of a Greek city. The Spartan system is an instance of the truth, that social uniformity, especially when combined with a narrow military ideal, must be purchased at a ruinous cost. It requires a good deal of imagination to conceive what the ordinary Spartiate was like, but Plu- tarch's statement that ' he wore one shirt all the year round, was filthy of body and for the most part abstained § 51] SUMMARY. 189 from washing,' is a strong corrective to the unmeasured panegyrics pronounced upon the race. From his earliest years the individual at Sparta was sacrificed entirely to the state. An education, which stunted all his faculties, prepared him for the practice of war ; and as a consequence Sparta produced scarce ten men who were eminent in aught else than the art of war. 'The whole scheme of their laws,' says Aristotle, 'is directed only to a part of virtue, to martial valour. So while they warred they were saved, but were ruined when they ruled, for they knew not how to be at leisure and had never practised any art more sovereign than the art of war.' No part of Aristotle's indictment is truer or more damning than that 'they knew not how to be at leisure.' All that constitutes the glory of the Greeks is entirely lacking in the Spartan: there is not a trace of Spartan literature and to have practised the fine arts would have disfranchised a citizen. Lastly, they failed even in following their own ideal. Empire was the end of their national life : empire they attained by false professions of bringing liberty to the oppressed, and by a sacrifice of Greek interests to the barbarian. Empire they maintained by means of a crush- ing tyranny and a violation of justice ; and empire they lost, as soon as another race rose to military preeminence. Lastly the very system on which the Spartan fortunes rested became itself corrupt and effete : it was intended to abolish private wealth and to make the citizens superior to money: it succeeded eventually in impoverishing the state, making the citizens greedy of lucre and finally in disfranchising all but a hundred, in whose hands wealth was concentrated. 190 ORGANISATION OF OLIGARCHIC GOVERNMENT. [CH. V. At their best the Spartans were harsh soldiers ; ruling so oppressively over their subjects, that they were always fiercely hated: in their private life not touched by the influences of Hellenic culture, living in a barrack with the ideals of a barrack : politically well disciplined and obedient, cautious, stupid and conservative. The oligarchy of wealth differed from the aristocracy of the Spartan type alike in its virtues and its vices. Its character was more normal : it was Hellenic and not bar- barous : its interests were diverse : literature and art were practised and formed no disqualification for citizenship. In itself the oligarchic ideal of government was good : the intimate combination of a small council with the magistrates, acting in harmony themselves and command- ing the willing allegiance of their subjects, forms one of the strongest and most efficient constitutions that can be imagined. Such was the cause of Rome's greatness, such the foundation of the glory of Venice. But the govern- ment of an oligarchy, to be successful, must rest on the contented obedience of the excluded classes; and the narrower the basis of the government, the more important this condition becomes. The Greek oligarchies, to judge by the sentiment of Greek literature about them, rarely came near this ideal. Moderate oligarchies tended to become extreme, and in the fourth century, at least, every piece of evidence points to the ordinary oligarchies being narrow and oppressive. They were class governments and class governments of a particularly odious type. Governments of birth, though they may often prove vicious and tyrannical, are as often controlled by a sense of honour and by traditions of virtue. But a class government founded on wealth, in which § 51] SUMMARY, 191 ■wealth is the aim of the citizen and the standard of privi- lege, tends to become a government of brute force, treating its subjects with harsh injustice, exploiting the many at the expense of the few, making every possible abuse of absolute power. Democracy at its worst is an evil tyranny : but keenly as the Greek writers (most of whom wrote in Athens with all the faults of the degenerate Athenian demos before their eyes) realised the evil character of democracy they have worse terms of condemnation for oligarchy. ' Men,' says Aristotle, ' who have excess of power and wealth and friends neither wish nor know how to be ruled.' ' A few men rule and base men in place of the best, for democracy is least base of governments.' Coixuption, treachery and aggrandisement are the three characteristic vices of the oligarch : and in the awful war of factions, in which Greek states were at all times engaged, the historians have no hesitation in putting the blame on the oligarchs. An oligarchy is a city of slaves and tyrants, says Aristotle : oligarchy makes one city into two cities, always at war with one another, says Plato : and the oligarchic oath, ' I will be ill-minded to the demos and contrive what ill I can,' was a declaration of relentless war, waged by every means, in which peace and armistice were impossible. Srafft? was the bane of the city state of Greece, it was the overthrow of the social contract ; and there is no doubt that if we strive to apportion the blame, the greater share must be assigned to the selfish greed for power and the sacrifice of state interests to private aggrandisement which characterised the oligarch. APPENDIX C. The oligarchic revolution at Athens: the provisional and the projected constitution^. For the study of the theory and practice of oli- garchic government we have no material more interesting or important than the accounts of the brief rule of the Four Hundred at Athens and of the permanent con- stitution which they projected. Our knowledge of the revolution and of the revolutionary government is based almost entirely on Thucydides and Aristotle'': these authors are not always in agreement, and while Thucydides, as a contemporary, is more likely to have had a better know- ledge of the inner workings of the conspiracy and of such matters as depended on hearsay, Aristotle, who used later historians in addition to Thucydides, probably availed 1 The length of the foUowing appendix is due in part to the importance of the subject and in part to its uncertainty. The new information given us by Aristotle is not yet incorporated in the text-books, and I have therefore made a careful study of the account given by him and compared it throughout with Thucydides. I have derived much help from Professor von Wilamowitz-MoUendorff's Aristoteles und Athen ii eh. 4, especially from his discussion of the projected constitution. 2 The light thrown by Lysias xx is discussed in the course of the Appendix. Citations of Thucydides are from Book viii and those of Aristotle from the Constitution of the Athenians. THE FOUR HUNDBED AT ATHENS. 193 himself of documentary evidence, and is more precise in quoting the terms of laws and decrees". In some cases the two authorities supplement one another, but it must be admitted that their differences cannot always be reconciled. This is the less to be wondered at, if we consider the cir- cumstances of the revolution, the brief duration of the government and the partial fulfilment of the proposals made. These facts will serve to explain also the uncer- tainty concerning the body of the Five Thousand, which played so large a part in the professions of the oligarchs and yet was never constituted. Aristotle, moreover, gives us, what is entirely passed over by Thucydides, a sketch of the projected constitution which did not come into existence. As an illustration of oligarchic theory this scheme is of more importance than the provisional govern- ment of the Four Hundred, which, after all, was little better tha.n an organised reign of terror. It would be beside my purpose to study the motives which induced the Athenians to accept the change of constitution. In one aspect, however, the professions of the oligarchs are important. The revolution was carried out in form of law ; it established a close oligarchy under the disguise of a moderate democracy*, it was professedly based on the hoplite census (the ideal of many political thinkers^), and it assumed the pretence of a return to the 'ancestral' constitution °. In the distress of their 3 On Aristotle's materials see Gilbert, Bandbuch i^ p. xxxi. ^ See the discussion eonoeming the Five Thousand below and of. Ar. 29 3. 5 See above, § 37 n. 8. ^ See above, § 20 nn. 12, 18. It is worth noting that the democrats at Samos claimed that they were really maintaining the irdrptoi v6/m>i w. 13 194 APPENDIX C. fortunes and the disappointment of their hopes the Athe- nians might look back with sentimental longing to the days of Solon and Cleisthenes, and envy the old balanced constitutions which existed in their time or before them'. The pretence, hollow as it was, was aided by the profession that the constitution was to be only a temporary ex- pedient until the end of the war^, when presumably the old democracy was to be restored. The machinery by which the change of government was effected may be briefly considered. Down to the end of the sixth century the work of reform was usually entrusted to a single lawgiver: in the fourth century the normal process of legislation required the assent of the assembly, the council and a large court of Nomothetae; there is no evidence that this practice prevailed in the fifth century^, and so far as we can trace, in the period of the Peloponnesian war, at least, important reforms were carried out by legislative commissions'". In 411 (Thuo. 76 6) against the oligarchs. The same pretence was made on the institution of the Thirty Tyrants. (Xen. Hell, ii 3 2 ; Ar. 34 3.) ' For Solon and Cleisthenes see Ar. 29 3. The limitation of the franchise went further than Solon, and in this as in other respects the oligarchic constitution has many resemblances to that ascribed to Draco in ch. 4 of Aristotle. ^ Ar. 29 5 ?Ms av 6 iriXe/ios y. The same idea is vaguely suggested by Thuc. 58 3 'Athens has her life at stake, the constitution can be changed afterwards. ' * See Gilbert, Handbuch i^ p. 336 n. It is a possible inference from Lysias xxx 28 (o! fdv Tpbyovoi vofwOiras -gpovvTO 'Zb\oiva Kal QefuaTOK\ia Kol JlepLKKia) that the procedure of the sixth century was employed also in the fifth, and that individuals like Themistocles an^ Pericles were entrusted with powers of revision. 1° The procedure in 411 b.o. is discussed in the text. On the over- throw of the Four Hundred vonoffirat were appointed (Thuc. 97 1). There is no reason for identifying them with the heliastio commission THE FOUR HUNDRED AT ATHENS. 195 the formal initiative for the revolution was entrusted to a committee of thirty"; and after the preliminary measures proposed by them had been carried a hundred men were chosen to revise the constitution". The first proposal of the Thirty Commissioners ensured immunity to any one proposing any change in the constitution". This required probably the suspension not merely of the jpa^^ irapa- v6/j,a)v, the great safeguard against revolution, but of all the special laws and processes designed to protect the democracy". Thucydides, whose account is somewhat vague, implies that their proposals went no further", but we may accept Aristotle's account that they formally pub- lished the two great principles, which had already been of the fourth century, and from Lysias we should conclude that they formed a special legislative commission. (Lys. xxx 2 Nioomachus was chosen as tuv vSfiwv ivay pacis and held office for six years. He is referred to as voiMoBh-Tii. Cf. also And. i 96 where {,vviypa\l/ev is used, probably of a member of such a commission. ) The Thirty Tyrants were appointed as a legislative committee (Xen. Hell, ii 3 2 Tpi&KovTa &pdpas iXicrSai, ot tous Trarplovs vd/wvs ^vyypd\j/oi(n) . After the overthrow of the oligarchy in 403 And. i 82 refers to the appointment of five hundred voiioBirai. These, however, seem to have been special commissioners, for Lysias xxx 4, 5 shows that the revision of the different laws was divided between them, and he charges Nicomachus with spending four years over his share of the work. ^* Ar. 29 2 corrects Thucydides 67 1, who mentions only ten ^vyypa- oweis of election entrosted to them, which I have already discussed, the Five Thonsand took no part in the Constitatioii. in the fiist proposal th^ were lepresented as a sovereign power (Ar. 29 5 ■Hit S' SKKtiv ToXirebv irirpi^nu tasar k.t.X. ; cf. Lys. zx 13) ; bnt Thucy- dides implies that they were subordinate to the ^vX^ (67 3 robs -rem-a- Kurx/Movs ^vXXSyew awirtta adrot: Sox^. In the projected constitution they were entrusted with all powers of government. THE FOUR HUNDRED AT ATHENS. 203 sovereignty of the council*^ and an executive magistracy with absolute power*^ The council was not qualified to change the laws", but in other respects its powers were unlimited. It had the whole of the state business in its control *^ It was to appoint the magistrates and to call them to account. The generals had important powers but they were chosen by the council", doubtless from its own members'", the other magistrates were not to hold ofiice more than once, though no such restriction was *^ Thuc. 67 3 &pxeiv oTTj; Sv Apiffra yiyviitrKtiKnv aiTOKpdropas; Ar. 31 1. ^ Ar. 31 2, tlie generals were to be aiTOKp&ropes and to consult with the jSouX-f) at discretion. ^ The laws made irepl tGiv irdKmKaii were to be observed without change (Ar. 31 1);; i.e. the laws of the constitution, which had been drawn up by the legislative commission, were to be observed by the provisional government, i.e. it was to rule iierk vS/wv, ^ A few details are given in Ar. 31 1. Dr Sandys in his n. to Ar. 33 1 calls attention to C.I. A. iv 3 179 d in which the fiovX^ authorizes certain expenditure. Nothing is said about the law-courts : the popular juries had of course gone with the abolition of pay ; probably judicial powers were divided between the executive and the council. ^ The account of the election of generals in Ar. 81 2 is confused. Apparently three occasions are referred to and a different process prescribed for each : (1) for the immediate present ten generals are to be chosen from all the Five Thousand (i.e. as the revolution took place in a state of war, it was necessary to appoint without delay before the provi- sional constitution came into force generals superseding the former board, most of whom were at Samos) : (2) as soon as the /SouXi? is appointed it is to choose ten men with full powers after a review of the troops under arms (these must be the generals ; the method of election would exclude those with the fleet at Samos) : these were to hold office for a year, and (3) for the future (ri Xolttov i.e. in the projected constitu- tion) the election is to take place in accordance with the conditions pre- scribed. ^ The inference, which is probable, is confirmed by the fact that Theramenes (Thuc. 92 9), Aristarchus (98 1) and Alexicles (94 4), described as arpaT'riyhs av ix rijs 6\iyapxi-^s, were all generals. 204 APPENDIX C. placed on the generals or the members of the council**. We do not learn any other details of the constitution. It is possible that the five proedri mentioned by Thucy- dides acted as presidents of the council*^ Thucydides also mentions the appointment of prytaneis™ whom we may take to be a standing committee. The provisional government, thus constituted, entrusted absolute and un- limited power to the Council of Four Hundred, who soon established a reign of terror", which led to dissensions within their own ranks and finally to their overthrow. And so the government, which was intended as a temporary expedient to prepare the way for a definite and elaborate constitution, was swept away, and the pro- jected scheme, a sketch of which is preserved by Aristotle ^^ was never realised. The scheme is of great interest, as an instance of oligarchic invention, but it throws little light on actual oligarchies, for it is unlike any known constitution and its character is fantastic and unpractical. ^ At. 31 3. ^ The title of these officers and the analogy of the five presidents in the projected constitution (Ar. 30 4) makes this probable. If the proedri were the leading spirits of the revolution, as the part ascribed to them by Thucydides 67 8 implies, I should be inclined to identify them with Pisander, Antiphon, Phrynichus, Therameues and possibly Aristarchus. It is characteristic of Thucydides not directly to mention the names of the proedri, but in ch. 68, immediately after relating their appoint- ment, he proceeds, as if by a natural association of ideas, to describe the chief agents of the revolution (Pisander, Antiphon, Phrynichus and Theramenes). In 90 1 Aristarchus is associated with Phrynichus, Anti- phon and Pisander as one of the leaders of the oligarchs. '» 70 1. ^^ Thuc. 70 1 ^vefiov Kara Kpdros t'i)v tt^Klv. *2 0. 30. The projected is distinguished from the provisional govern- ment by phrases such as els tot 'Konhv xpi^rac (30 3, cf. 31 2), eU rbv fiiXKovra xp^vov (31 1), eh rbv &Wov xpl>vop (31 3) . THE FOUR HUNDRED AT ATHENS. 205 Its most important principle is the rotation of political duties'". The Five Thousand qualified for citizenship were to be divided into four ' lots" ' and those over thirty years of age in each lot were to serve as a council*^ for the year while the rest were excluded from almost all the duties of government^'. From the council thus consti- tuted, which would contain about a thousand members*', all the more important magistrates (about a hundred 5' This we Bee clearly in the aoeoimt of Aristotle; there are indi- cations in Thucydides also that the principle was put forward by the oligarchs. The envoys at Samos assert (86 3) tGiv irevTaKurxiMt-'i' on Tr&vm iv Tti<">v, KoX Toiriav rb "Kax"" f^^pos ^ovKeieiv, vet/juu Si Kal tovs AWovs Trpbs T^v X^^tp iKdcTTjv. roi/s S' ixarbv dvSpas Staveifiai (r0as re aOrovs Kal rovs dWovs T^TTapa pt^prj ujs IcraiTara Kal SiaKKTjpiaaai, Kal els ^viavrbp ^ovXeieiv, In this passage the hundred men are to divide aU the Five Thousand (tows &\Xovs as opposed to (r