1 1 (SnrnpU ICam i^rl^nnl IGibtaty Cornell University Library KF 570.P65 V.I A treatise on the law of real property. 3 1924 018 814 552 Cornell University Library The original of tiiis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924018814552 TREATISE ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY BY DARIUS H. MNGREY, LL. D., AUTHOR OF TREATISES ON CHATTEL MORTOAOES, REAL ESTATE MORTGAGES, AND CONTRIBUTING EDITOR OF THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW. IN TWO VOLUMES VOL. I. ALBANY H. B. PARSONS, LAW PUBLISHER, 1895. COPYHIOHT, 189B, By DARIUS H. PIXGREY. PREFACE. This work is an attempt to present the law of real prop- erty as it is to day, with its history and development. Hence, the author has not yielded to the temptation of in- dulging in abstract theories and intellectual vagaries upon conflicting and discordant views ; but the fundamental principles of the subject have been expounded and illus- trated by leading cases. The advancement of civilization in the United States has developed new estates and made it necessary to apply established principles in a new manner. New sources of wealth have been discovered, giving new industries and presenting questions diflficult to answer. Geologic and mineralogic developments have drawn upon the inventive genius of the people for mechanical devices to penetrate the earth, which have changed the uses and the values of land. To-day the owner of a farm may convey the coal to one man, the ore, or oil, or gas, or salt, to another, giving to each grantee a deed in fee-simple for his particular estate, while he retains the surface for settlement or culti- vation. Each estate becomes subject to taxation, to in- cumbrance, to levy, and to sale, precisely like the surface held by the grantor. Under proper restrictions each of the different owners has the right, without any express words of grant for that purpose to go upon the surface to open a way by drift, shaft, or well, to his underlying estate, and to occupy so much of the surface beyond the limits of his drift, shaft, or well, as may be necessary to operate his estate and to remove the products thus obtained. Under the modern conditions the surface of the land may be separated from the under strata, and these strata separated from each. other, so there may be as many fees- simple as there are strata. In the United States wooded lands may be cleared and put into cultivation, and un- IV PREFACE. opened mines developed by the life-tenant when the exi- gencies of the case demand it. On these modern lines the author has endeavored to produce a complete and practical treatise on real property expository of the law ; a treatise at once, serving the law- student and the practitioner, thus doing away with the necessity of having one book in the law-school and another in practice. In conclusion, it is proper to say that this work has been prepared by the author's personal labor. And it is hoped that the work will be received with the same kind indul- gence, hitherto extended to the author, for which he now takes opportunity to express his sincere thanks. Darius H. Pingrey. Bloomington, III., May 1st, 1895. CREATION OF ESTATES. 1. ESTATES AND TENURES. 2. FIXTURES AND OTHER AN- NEXATIONS. EBAL PROPERTY. II. CLASSIFICATION -i OF ESTATES. r 3. INCORPOREAL HE RED IT A- MENTS. RENTS. EASEMENTS. WATER RIGHTS AND EASE- MENTS. LATERAL AND SUBJACENT SUPPORT. LICENSE. ESTATES IN FEE. LIFE-ESTATES. ESTATES BY CURTESY. RIGHT OF DOWER. HOMESTEAD. ESTATES FOR YEARS. RENTING ON SHARES. ESTATES AT WILL AND TEN- ANCIES FROM TEAR TO YEAR. ESTATES AT SUFFERANCE. JOINT ESTATES. PARTITION. ESTATES UPON CONDITION. NATURE AND CLASSIFICA- TION OF MORTGAGES. RIGHTS OF PARTIES BEFORE DEFAULT. RIGHTS OF PARTIES AFTER DEFAULT. ESTATES OF REVERSION. ESTATES OF REMAINDER. EXECUTORY DEVISES. USES AND TRUSTS. POWERS. m. TRANSFER AND SUCCESSION OF ESTATES. 29. TITLE BY DESCENT. 30. TITLE BY ADVERSE POSSESS- ION. 31. TITLE BY ESTOPPEL. 33. TITLE BY GRANT. 33. TITLE BY DEED. 34. COVENANTS FOR TITLE. 35. TITLE BY WILL. TABLE OF CONTENTS. TABLE OF CONTENTS. VOLUME I. PART I.— CREATION OP ESTATES. CHAPTER I.— ESTATES AND TENURES. AKTICLE 1. — OWNKKSHIP OF EsTATBS AND TENURES. Sec. Page. 1. Definition of Estates 1 3. Underlying Strata — Separate Strata 3 3. Intervening Strata — Oil, Mineral, Gas, Coal and Iron 3 4. Mines 5 5. Different Stories and Rooms 7 6. Overhanging Buildings 9 7. Overhanging Trees 9 8. Lands Covered by Tide-Waters — United States Doctrine 10 9. Title of the States , 13 10. Lands Covered by Tide-Waters — English Rule 15 11. Accretions and Alluvion , 16 13. Accretion and Avulsion — Rights of Nations 19 13. History of the Rule 31 14. Filum Aquae 33 15. Erection of Wharves 33 16. Personal Property Distinguished 34 17. Incorporeal Hereditaments — Shares — Pews in Church 35 18. Houses, Trees and Crops 37 19. Acquisition by Occupancy 38 Akticle 3.— The Feudal System. 80. Origin of Feudal System 30 31. In the Early Ages 31 33. Views of Some Writers not in Accord with the Prevailing Doctrine. .. 31 33. Feudal Tenures in England 32 34. Tenures by Knight Service 34 35. Tenures by Socage 35 26. Kind of Socage Tenure 36 27. OtherTenurea 36 38, Tenures According to Quality of Service 38 B X TABLE OF CONTENTS, VOLUME L Article 3.— Foundation op Ownership of Land in the United States. Sbc. Page. 29. Origin of Ownership. . .' 38 30. Conquered Territory 39 Article 4. — Discovery and Colonization. 31. Rights of Discoverers , 40 32. Rights to Possess and Colonize 41 33. Recognition of Indian Titles by Europeans 42 34. Doctrine of the Colonies and the States 43 35. Doctrine of the United States Government 45 36. The Indian Territory 46 37. Title of the Indians to Oklahoma 48 38. The Outlet or Strip 49 Article 5. — Tenure in the United States. 39. Original Charters 60 40. English Possessions in America 51 41. Allodial lands 51 CHAPTER n.— FIXTURES AND OTHER ANNEXATIONS Article 1. — Accessions. 42. Growing Crops or Emblements 53 43. Trees— Crops 53 44. Manure 55 Article 2. — What Constitutes Fixtures. 45. Definition 56 46. General Statement 57 47. Statutory Provisions 59 4S. Intention May Control 59 49. Immovable Character of Fixtures 62 50. Physical Annexation 02 51. Houses and Other Structures may not Become Part of the Realty 63 52. Temporary Separation 64 53. Erecting Buildings upon Another's Land 64 54. Railroad Property 05 55. Rolling Stock of Railways — Constitutional and Statutory Provisions. . 66 50. Railroad Track — ^Doctrine of the Courts 66 57. Water Pipes — Poles and Wires 67 58. Fixtures in Manufactories and Mills 69 59. Machinery that Supplies the Motive Power 70 60. External Indications May Control 71 61. Illustrations 73 Article 3. — Mortgagor and Mortgagee. 62. Mortgagee's Right to Fixtures 74 63. Mutual Agreement— Express or Implied 75 TABLE OF CONTENTS. VOLUME I. Xl Sec. Page. €4. Annexation of Mortgaged Chattels 75 '63. Detachment Involving Great Damages to the Realty 77 66. Buildings Erected on Mortgaged Realty 77 ■67. Constructive Annexation 79 <8. Temporarily Annexed After Execution of Mortgage 80 69. Machinery Loaned or Sold to the Mortgagor oq Condition 81 Articlk 4. — ^Vendor and Vendee. 70. Houses — License to Erect 83 71. Hotels — Appendages 83 73. What Passes — Intention 84 73. Things Constructively Annexed 85 Article 5, — Landlord and Tenant — Lessor and Lessee. 74. In General— The Rule 86 75. Trade Fixtures 86 76. The Lessee's Right to Remove Fixtures 88 77. Things Useful and Ornamental 89 78. Time of Removal 91 79. Accepting a New Lease 94 Article 6. — Execution and Judgment Creditors. 50. Rights of an Execution or Judgment Creditor 96 Article 7. — Life Tenant and Remainderman — Executor and Heir — ■ Heir and Devisee. 51. Life Tenant and Remainderman • • • • 97 83. Executor and Heir 98 S3. Heir and Devisee 99 PAET II.— CLASSIFICATION OP ESTATES. CHAPTER III.— INCORPOREAL HEREDITAMENTS. Article 1. — Classification of Incorporeal Hereditaments. 64. English Classification iqi 85. American Classification 102 Article 2. — Common. 86. Definition jOg 87. Common of Pasture and Estover 103 88. Apportionment 104 89. Extinguishment IO5 Xll TABLE OF CONTENTS, VOLUME L Article 3.— Common op Piscary. &EC. Page. 90. Title and Dominion of the Sea 106 91. Fishery— Definition 107 92. Common of Fishery 108 93. Several Fishery 10& 94. The Right to Fish 110 95. Riparian Rights Ill 96. Tidal Waters 112 97. English Doctrine not Applicable 113 98. Oysters 114 99. Easement 115 100; Impeding the Passage of Pish 115 101. Rights of the State 116 102. Behring Sea Fishery 117 Article 4.— Offices. 103. In England 118 104. In the United States 118 Article 5. — Franchises. 105. Definition.... ,. ... 119 106. Implied Covenants of the Grantor and the Grantee. . . .' 120 107. Qualified Franchises 121 108. Franchises Subject to Eminent Domain 121 109. Impairment of Contract 123 Article 6. — Annuities. 110. Definition 124 1 11. Distinguished from Rent Charge , 124 112. Apportionment 125 113 Investment In the Public Funds 126 114. Statutory Provisions as to Apportionment 137 CHAPTER IV.— RENTS. Article 1. — Classification of Rents. 115. Definition 128 116. Rent Service 129 117. Rent Charge.... 131 118. Rent Seek 132- 119. Rack Rent 133 120. GroiindRent 133 131. Building Associations — Obtaining Title by Paying Rent 134 132. Apartment Houses 135 Article 3. — Apportionment. 133. General Rule of Apportionment 135 124. Apportionment of Rent as to Time 137 135. Modes of Apportioning Rent 138 TABLE OF CONTENTS, VOLUME L Xlll Article 3.— The Remedy. Sec. Page. 126. Distress 139 137. Action When Rent is Apportionable 140 128. Form of tlie Action 14t CHAPTER v.— EASEMENTS. Article 1. — Classification and Incidents. 129. Definition 142 ■130. Kinds and Qualities of Easements 143 131. Riglitsof the Owner 144 133. Gross and Appurtenant 14& 133. Profit a Prendre 147 134. Distinguished from a License 14!> 135. Distinguished from a Servitude 149 136. Duration of Right 150 137. Words of Inheritance 151 188. Secondary Easement 153 ' 139. Spurious Easements 153 140. Transfer of Right— Dominant Estate Divided 153 141. Equitable Easements 154 Article 3.— Creation by Grant. 142. By Express Grant 156 143. Extent of Right 158 144. Right of Way— Relative Rights Under the Grant 159 145. Easement in Gross Will not be Presumed 160 146. Enlargement of an Easement is not Allowed 161 147. Grant by Implication , 163 148. Implied Grant and Implied Reservation 163 149. Apparent and Continuous Easements 164 150. Reservation , 166 151. Reservation not Specifically Defining Easement 168 153. Notice of Reservation 168 153. Way of Necessity 168 154. A Reasonable Necessity Will Create a Right of Way 171 155. Air 173 156. Ancient Lights — Light and Air 17^ 157. Who May Grant 175 158. Disability of Grantor 176 159. Conveyance 176 Article 3. — Creation by Prescription. 160. Prescription I77 161. To Establish Prescription 178- 163. The User Must be Continuous, Exclusive, Adverse and Known to the Owner of the Fee 180 163. Acquiescence of the Owner Igj XIV TABLE OF CONTENTS, VOLUME L Sec, Page. 164. Evidence 183 165. Succession of Easements 183 Article 4. — Ckeation by Dedication. 166. Dedication of Land for Public Purposes 184 167. Highways and Alleys 186 168. Rights of Adjoining Land Owner 188 169. Abutting Owners 189 170. Estoppel 189 171. Acceptance — Evidence of 191' 172. Definite Location 193 173. Easement — Condition Precedent 193 174. Establishment by User 194 175. By Prescription 195 176. Evidence 196 177. Intention 196 178. Who May Dedicate 197 179. Dedication by Mistake 197 . 180. Qualified Dedication 198 181. Interruption of User 199 182. E.x;tent of Grant . 199 183. Rights of the Grantor 199 184. Irrevocable 200 185. Injunction by Owner , . 201 Article 5.— Abandonment and Extinguishment. 186. Merger 201 187. Separation and Reviver 202 188. Abandonment 203 189. Relea.se 304 190. Extinguishment 205 191. Non-User 206 192. Accepting a New Way 209 Article 6. — Obstkuctions. 198. Rights of the Servient Owner .. . 209 194. Manner of Use 210 195. Grantee of the Fee Subject to the Easement 211 196. Encroachment — Use of Gates 211 197. Question of Fact 212 Article 7.— Remedies by Abatement, at Law and in Equity. 198. Abatement 213 199. Reasonable Necessity 214 200. Actions at Law 215 201. Form of Action 215 208. By Whom Brought 217 303. Against Whom Brought 218 TABLE OF CONTENTS, VOLUME L XV Sec. Page. 204. Measure of Damages — Abutting Owners. . . , 21& 205. Actions in Equity 220 306. Relief by Injunction 232 CHAPTER VI.— "WATER RIGHTS AND EASEMENTS. Article 1. — Watbk Courses. 207. Water Course 224 208. Ownership 225 209. Lawful Use 226 210. Prior Appropriation 229 211. Prescription 230 212. Abandonment 231 213. Pollution 231 Article 2. — Surface Drainage. 214. Surface Water 232 215. Drainage of Surface Water 233 216. Drainage into Natural Channels 234 317. In Cultivating the Land 235 218. Obstruction of Flowage — Common Law Rule 236 219. Civil Law Rule 237 330. Arkansas Rule 239 331. English Doctrine 339 333. Prescription 240 333. Flowage From the Eaves of Houses 241 Article 3. — Subterranean and PERCOLATiNa Waters. 224. Subsurface Streams and Percolations 243 235. Percolations 243 336. Known and Defined Subsurface Streams 244 227. Rights of Lower Riparian Owner 244 238. Natural Gas and Petroleum 345 339. Modified Doctrine as to Subterranean Veins. 346 280. Malicious Interference with Percolating Waters 247 331. Present American and English Doctrine 348 233. Pollution of Percolating Waters 349 Article 4.— Ice. 333. Ownership— Rights of Mill Owners 351 334. Ice — Navigable and Unnavigable Waters 253 235. Great Ponds in Maine and Massachusetts 255 336. Right to Take Ice From Overflowed Land 256 CHAPTER VII.— LATERAL AND SUBJACENT SUPPORT. Article 1.— Lateral Support. 237. Right to Lateral Support 258 238. Excavations — Support of Buildings 259 XVI TABLE OF CONTENTS, VOLUME L Sec. Page. ^39. Notice of Excavation to Adjoining Owner 260 340. Reasonable Care 361 341. Municipal Corporations 363 243. Measure of Damages 363 343. Trees — Damage to Property in Common 364 Article 2. — Subjacent Support. 344. Support of Surface 265 345. Mining Rights 266 .346. Support— Custom 366 347. Mere Reservation of Minerals 367 348. Damages for Subsidence 367 .249. Support of Different Stories 267 Article 8.— Party Wallb. 250. Whatisa Party Wall ? 268 351. Regulation of Party Walls 370 353. Owned in Severalty 370 353. Increasing Height, Width and Depth of Wall 371 354. Tearing Down Party Walls 373 355. Termination of Easement 373 ^56. Implied Grant of Lateral Support 374 257. Expense of Building Party Walls 375 Article 4. — DrvisioN Pbkcbb. 258. Common Law Rule 276 259. Obligations of Adjoining Owners 277 260. Duties Imposed by Prescription 278 CHAPTER VIII.— LICENSE. Article 1. — ^Nature and Effect. 261. Definition 380 263. Entering upon Premises Without Invitation 383 263. How Created 283 264. Manner of the Licensee Exercising His Authority 385 365. Exclusive or Non- Exclusive 385 Article 3. — Revocable and Irrevocable. 266. Revocation of Parol Agreement 286 367. Revocation of Parol Agreement — Another View 389 268. Executory Agreement — Purchasing Standing Timber 390 269. On Land of Licensee 291 370. At Law and In Equity 293 271. Coupled with an Interest 294 373. Application of the Equitable Doctrine 295 TABLE OF CONTENTS, VOLUME L XVU Article 3.- -Extinguishment. Sko. Page. 273. Decay of the Works 397 374. By Expiration of Time 398 375. By Non-User or Abandonment 399 CHAPTER IX.— ESTATES IN FEE. Artici^e 1. — Nature and Distinction op Fees Simple. 876. Definition 300 277. Estates Distinguished 301 278. Alienation 301 379. Limitation to the Heirs in Deeds 303 380. Alienation Under Process of Law ! 306 281. Fee or Easement 307 Article 2. — Other Kind op Fees. 283. Determinable Pee — Definition 308 283. Base or Qualified Fee— Possibility of Reverter 309 284. Conditional Fee at Common Law 310 285. De Donis Conditionalibus 311 286. Fee Tail and Reversion 312 287. Words of Limitation 313 288. Division of Estates Tall 314 289. Estate Tail After Possibility of Issue Extinct 315 290. Abolition of Estates Tail 315 CHAPTER X.-LIFE ESTATES. Article 1. — Definition and Distinction. 891. Definition 319 «92. Estate Pur Autre Vie 330 Article 8.— Incidents op Tenancies for Life. 893. Alienation in Fee 32i 394. Adverse Possession of Life Tenant 323 295. Incumbered Life Estate — Apportionment 324 296. Taxes and Expenses 326 297. Rent — Apportionment 327 398. Claim for Improvements — Investments 327 299. Estovers 33I 300. Sale of Timber ] . . . 333 301. Timber as Such Belongs to the Inheritance 333 802. Rule of the Common Law 333 303. Timber Estates— Agricultural Custom in England 334 304. Modern System of Arboriculture 335 S05. Usufructuary of a Wood— Roman Law 336 C XVm TABLE OF CONTENTS, VOLUME I. Akticlb 3. — Emblements. Sec. Page- 306. Definition 338 307. Tenure of the Tenant 339 308. Incidental Riglits 340 309. To Whom Allowed 341 310. Lessees and Assignees 343 311. Emblements Under a Mortgage 343 312. Rights of a Tenant at Will and at Sufferance 343 313. Rights of Lessee of Mortgagor 344 Article 4. — Waste. 314. Definition 345 315. Tenants in Common ■• 347 316. Without Impeachment for Waste 347 317. Life Tenant— Question for the Jury 348 318. Waste by Life Tenant 349 319. Assignee of Life Estate 351 330. Landlord and Tenant. _ 351 331. Executors and Administrators SP3 3£3. Guardian and Trustee 354 Article 5. — Remedies. 333. Action of Waste 354 334. At Common Law — Liability of Tenant 355 335. In Equity— By Injunction 357 336. In Michigan 359 327. By Whom Brought 359 338. Against Whom Brought 360 339. Damages 363 330. Mortgagor and Mortgagee 363 331. English Rule for Issuing an Injunction 364 333. American Rule for Issuing an Injunction 364 333. Rendering the Security Insufficient. . , . ^ 365 334. Legal Title Remaining in the "Vendor 365 385. Rights of Third Parties 366 336. Action at Law by mortgagee 366 337. Trespass and Trover 367 338. License to Cut Timber 369 339. Damages to Mortgaged Property 369 CHAPTER XL— ESTATE BY CURTESY. Article 1. — Nature and Effect. 340. Definition 371 341. Origin of Curtesy 373 343. Seisin of the Wife 373 343. Birth of Child 375 344. In Equitable Estates 376 345. In Determinable Fees 378 TABLE OF CONTENTS, VOLUME L XIX Sec. Page. 346. Iq Reversion and Remainder 380 347. Alienation of His Estate of Curtesy — Divorce 381 348. Execution Sale of Curtesy 383 349. Sale of the Estate 383 Article 2. — Married Woman's Separate Estate. 350. At Common Law 384 3.51. Wife's Separate Estate 385 353. Alienation of Her Separate Property at Common Law 386 353. Alienation Under the Statute 386 354. Abolition of Curtesy — Retroactive Legislation 387 CHAPTER XII.— RIGHT OF DOWER. Article 1. — Nature and Effect. 355. Definition 389 356. Origin 393 357. Requisitles 393 353. Marriage Laws of Another State 394 359. Non-Resident Widows 394 360. Leasehold Estates 395 361. Base Fees 396 363. Seisin of Husband 396 363. Intermediate Freehold Estate 398 364. Incorporeal Hereditaments 399 365. Instantaneous Seisin 399 366. Vendor's Lien and Purchase Money Mortgage 4001 367. In the Equity of Redemption 401 368. Surplus 403 369. Obligation of the Executor or Administrator 40S 370. Use of Mines 404 371. Partnership 406 373. Equitable Estates 407 373. Conveyance by Husband 409 374. TrustEstate 410 375. Inseparable Property — Rents 410 Article 3. — Divested and Barred. 876. Conditional Limitation 411 377. Barred at Common Law 413 378. In the United States 414 379. Release and Estoppel 415 380. Conveyance by Widow Before Assignment 416 331. Conveyance of Land by Guardian of Husband 417 382. Conveyance Without Wife's Release 418 383. Adverse Possession and Laches 418 S84. Antenuptial Contracts 419 385. Fraudulent Antenuptial Conveyance By Husband or Wife 431 XX TABLE OF CONTENTS, VOLUME I. Sec. Page. 3S6. Dower Given in Lands of Whicli the Husband Died Seised— Inno- cent Puroliaser 434 387. Postnuptial Agreement to Bar Dower 435 388. Void Conveyance 437 889. Eminent Domain 438 390. Judicial Sales — Assignments 438 391. Partition 439 393. Adultery 431 398. Divorce 433 394. Alimony 434 395. Foreign Decree for Divorce 435 Article 3. — Jointdre and Devise in Lieu of Dower. 396. Jointure— Definition 437 397. Legal and Equitable 438 398. Testamentary Provisions 439 399. Construction of Will— Intention 440 400. No Express Declaration 441 401. Election by Widow 443 403. Valid Election 444 403. Mode of Making Election 444 404. Time to Elect 445 405. Insane Widow 446 406. Efeect of Acceptance 446 407. Invalid Devise 447 408. Lex Domicilii 448 ■ 409. Modifying or Abolishing the Right of Dower is Constitutional 448 410. Devise With Power of Sale 448 Article 4. — Assignment and Remedies. 411. Quarantine — Definition 449 413. According to Common Right — Against Common Right 450 413. Exceptions to the Rule as to Metes and Bounds 451 414. Parties 453 415. Recovery from Purchaser 454 416. Limitation 454 417. Effect by Death of Widow 456 418. Two Widows 457 419. Damages for Retention 458 430. Valuation of the Premises 459 431. Valid Assignment 460 433. Estoppel to Claim Dower 461 433. Present Value of Dower 401 434. Remedies to Recover 463 435. In Equity 468 436. Remedy by Distress — ^Ejectment 483 437. Confirmation of Report 464 438. Judgment 464 TABLE OF CONTENTS, VOLUME I. XXI CHAPTER XIII. -HOMESTEAD. Article 1. — Nature and Creation of the Estate. Sec. Page. 439. Definition 465 430. Actual Residence Required 467 431. Headof tlie Family 468 433. Dwelling and Business House Combined 469 433. Acquisition of New Homestead 471 434. Non-Resident Wife 471 435. Notice of Homestead 473 436. Time to Assert Claim 473 437. What Law Governs 473 438. Tenants in Common — Partners' Undivided Interests 473 439. Equitable Interests 476 440. Extent of Homestead 476 441. Purchase-Money Mortgage 477 443. Subrogation 478 443. Sale— Proceeds 478 444. Attachment and Judgment Creditors — Surplus 479 445. Mortgage of Homestead with Other Lands 480 446. Mortgage of Homestead with Other Lands — Marshalling Securities. . 480 447. Redemption 483 448. Judgment Liens . 483 Article 3. — Rights op Survivors and Heirs. 449. Minor Children 483 450. Effect of Deserting Husband 485 451. Divorce — Elopement 486 453. Widow's Rights 486 453. Remarriage 488 454. Husband Tenant at Will 488 455. Reversionary Interest 488 456. Right of Curtesy 489 457. Nature of the Estate 489 458. Rights of Parties 490 459. Testamentary Disposition of Homestead. 491 460. Mortgaged Homestead 491 461. Emblements 493 Article 3. — Abandonment and Extinguishment. 463. Abandonment 493 463. Temporary Absence 493 464. Sale 494 465. Mode of Alienation — Vested Rights 497 466. Conveyance to Wife by Husband 497 467. Fraud — Voluntary Conveyance Without Consideration 498 468. Joinder of Wife 499 468. Specific Performance to Convey Homestead 499 470. Removal from State 501 XXll TABLE OF CONTENTS, VOLUME I. Sec. Page, 471. Filing Notice — Temporary Absence 501 473. By Minor Cliildren 50a 473. Abandonment by Widow 503 474. Mortgages 502 475. Rights of Grantee 50a 476. Adverse Possession 504 477. Lease 505 CHAPTER XIV.— ESTATES FOR YEARS. Article 1. — Hibtoky and DEVBiiOPMENT. 478. History 506 479. Definition 506 480. Attendant Terms 507 481. Term— Definition 508 483. Interesse Termini ,. 508 Akticlb 3. — Creation op Leases. 483. Definition 509- 484. Controlled by the Statute of Frauds 510 485. Form of Lease 511 486. Distinction Between a Lease and an Agreement for a Lease 513 487. Execution , 513 488. Delivery and Acceptance 514 489. Property Covered 514 490. Construction 515 491. Covenants 516 493. Implied Covenants 517 493. Quiet Enjoyment 517 494. Leasing Furnished and Unfurnished Houses , 519 495. Cultivating Land 519 496. Repairs 530 497. To Pay Taxes and Assessments 521 498. Breach of Covenants in a Lease — Damages 538- Article 3. — Termination and Surrender. 499. What is a Surrender 524 500. Surrender by Operation of Law 526 501. To Whom Made 527 503. Notice of Surrender 538 503. Premises Untenantable 539 504. Destruction by Fire or Other Casualty 530 505. Covenant to Repair 533 506. Substitution of Lease 534 507. Ai^ceptance and Surrender — Damages 534 508. Waiver of Right to Surrender 536 509. Termination of Tenancy by Sale of the. Premises 536 510. Merger and Surrender 536. TABLE OP CONTENTS, VOLUME L XXIU Akticlb 4. — Extension and Renewals. Sec. Page. 511. Renewals 539 512. Stipulations for Renewals 540 513. Option to Renew 541 514. Construction 543 515. Specific Performance. ... 543 616. Parol Evidence 544 Article 5.— Forfeiture. 517. At Common Law 545 518. Rule in the United States 545 519. Non-Payment of Rent 546 520. Breaches of Conditions 547 521. Forfeiture in Equity 548 523. "Waiver by Lessor 549 523. In Case of Bankruptcy of Lessee 551 524. Improvements 551 525. Demand for Rent May be Waived 553 Article 6.— Oil Leases. 526. Oil and Gas Leases — Legal effect 553 537. The Title is Inchoate 554 528. Continuance of Lease 555 529. Option to Declare Forfeiture 555 530. Construction 556 531. Forfeiture 557 Article 7. — Assignments and Transfers. 533. What is an Assignment 559 533. Distinguished from a Sub-Letting 560 534. Sub-Lessee 562 535. Effect of Assignment 564 536. Liability of the Assignee 565 637. Liability to Pay Taxes 567 538. Assignee by Operation of Law 568 539. Covenants Not to Assign 569 540. Distinction Between a Covenant and a Condition 570 541. Failure to Deliver Possession to Lessee 570 542. Assignment of the Reversion 571 543. Attornment of Assignee 573 Article 8. — Rent. 544. Definition 576 545. Rent Implied ..... 576 646. Independent Covenants 577 547. Condemnation of Leased Premises 578 548. Condemnation of the Whole Premises 579 549. Condemnation Money — Apportionment 579 ,550. Extinguishment of Landlord's Title 580 XXIV Sec. Page, 551. Eviction 581 553. Eviction From a part of tlie Premises 582" 553. Actual Entry by the Landlord not Necessary. .... 58S 554. By Title Paramount 584 555. Set oflf 585 Article 9. — Eemedt. 556. Recovery of Possession 586- 557. Notice to Quit 587 558. Distress 588 559. Modern Statutes 589 560. Riglits to Distrain 591 561. Landlord's Lien 593 563. Eights of Purchaser of the Tenant's Crop 593 Article 10. — Relation. 563. Relation 595 564. Surrendering to a Stranger 595 565. Surrender by Lessor 595 Article 11. — Rights and Liabilities. 566. Lessee Cannot Deny the Landlord's Title £96 567. Exceptions to the Rule That the Tenant Cannot Deny His Lessor's Title.... 597 568. Disclaimer by the Tenant . . ." 598 569. Adverse Possession 599' 570. Rights of Tenant and Lessor's Grantee 601 571. Right to Emblements 601 572. Landlord's Liability 60S 573. Nuisances on the Demisied Premises 604 574. Removal of leased Building by Authority of City 60& 575. Tenant's Liability .605 576. Injurious Business 606 577. Wrongful Eviction 606 578. Measure of Damages 607 579. Illegal Business Carried on by the Tenant 608 Article 13.— Repairs. 580. Obligation of Landlord 608 581. Liability of Landlord for Breach of Covenant to Repair 609 583. Landlord is Not Liable Unless he Covenants to Repair 610 583. Liability of Tenant 611 584. Inevitable Accident 613 585. Entry of Landlord to Repair 612 586. Right to Repair by Tenant 613- 587. Liability of Landlord for Defects 61S 588. Negligent Use by Tenant - 614 589. Nuisances Created by Tenant 615- 590. Fire and Destruction of Premises by Negligence 616- TABLE OF GONTRNTS, VOLUME I. XXV Article 13.— Dangerous and Defective Premises. Sec. Page. 591. Liability of Landlord to Third Persons 617 593. Liability to Tenant 619 593. Liability to Tenant's Guest 631 594. Liability to Tenant's Servants 623 595. Liability of Tenant to Third Persons 623 596. Liability of Lessor's Grantee 623 Article 14. — Improvements. 597. Improvements 624 598. Allowances for Improvements 624 599. Right to Remove 625 600. Time to Remove 636 CHAPTER XV.— RENTING ON SHARES. Article 1. — Relation. 601. Relation of Landlord and Tenant or Tenants in Common of the Crops. 628 602. Intention 629 603. Construction of Contract 630 604. What Constitutes a Crop 631 605 Feeding the Products to Stock 633 606. Rights of the Landlord 633 607 Rights of Tenant 634 608. Title to Crops 635 609. Rights of Creditors 636 610. Rights Under the Lease 637 611. Rights of Purchaser 638 613. Abandonment of Premises 639 613 Removal of Crops 639 614. Time to Pay Rent 640 615 Manure 640 CHAPTER XVI.— ESTATES AT WILL AND TENANCIES FROM YEAR TO YEAR. Article 1. — Tenancy at Will. 616. Definition 643 617. Entering under a Verbal Lease — Void by the Statute of Frauds 643 618. Estates at Will Distinguished 644 619 Implied Tenancy at Will 645 620. Contract for a Lease 647 631. Entering Under a Verbal Contract to Purchase 647 633. Written Demise Witho\it Duration of Term or Reservation of Rent. . 048 633. Termination of the Estate 648 634. Termination of Notice 649 625. Denial of Landlord's Title 649 636. Notice by Action 650 637 Notice— Interval of Time , , 650 D XXVI TABLE OF CONTENTS, VOLUME I. Article 3.— Tenancies prom Year to Year. Sec. Page. 628. At Common Law 651 629. Nature of Tenancy for Years 653 630. Entry Under a Void Parol Lease 653 631. Holding Over .^ 653 682. Ground of the American Rule 656 Article 3. —Determination op Tenancy from Year to Year. 633. Notice to Quit , 657 634. Sufflciency of Notice 657 635. Taking a New Lease 658 636. Covenants , . .. 659 637. Waiver of Notice 659 Article 4.— A Valid Holding Over. 638. Improvements by Tenant to be Purchased by Landlord 659 639. Rebuttal of Implied Contract to Renew the Lease 660 640. To Avoid Liability for Rent the Surrender must be Complete 661 641. The Tenant Cannot Create a Different Tenancy 662 642. Extent of Liability. 662 643. Liability for Rent 663 644. Increased Rent 668 645. Parol Agreement to Reduce the Rent , . 664 646. Double Penalty 664 CHAPTER XVII.— ESTATES AT SUFFERANCE. Article 1.— Nature and Bppect. 647 Definition 666 648. Wrongful Holding Over 666 649. Other Tenants at Sufferance 667 650. Mortgagor's Holding Over After Foreclosure 668 031. Liability for Rent 669 653. Void Lease 669 653. Incidents of Tenancy at Sufferance 670 654. Adverse Possession 670 655. Recovering Possession. 671 656. The Weight of Authority 673 657. Defense — Plea of Liberum Tenementum 673 658. Entry of Landlord During Temporary Absence of the Tenant 674 659. What is a Forcible Entry and Detainer 675 CHAPTER XVIII.— JOINT ESTATES. Article 1. — Classipication. 660. Division and Definition 078 661. Division of Joint Elates , 078 TABLE OF CONTENTS, VOLUME L XXVU Article 2. — Joint Tenancies at Common Law. Sec. Paqe. 663. Definition G79 663. Construction of the Rule as to Duration and Quality of Interest 679 664. Construction of tlie Rule as to Time and Title 680 665. Joint Tenants are Seised Per My et Per Tout 6S1 666. Doctrine of Survivorship or Jus Accrescendi 681 667. Destruction of Joint Tenancy 683 668. Abolition of Joint Tenancy, 684 669. Actions .. 685 Article 3. — Tenancy in Copakcenart — At Common Law. 670. Definition 686 •671. Incidents of a Coparcenary 687 Article 4. — Tenancy in Common. 673. Definition 688 673. Relation of the Tenants 689 674. Purchasing an Outstanding Title by One of the Tenants 690 •675. Application of the Rule in Leasehold Estates 6!)1 676. Disseisin — Conveyance 693 ■677. Ouster 693 678. Adverse Possession 695 679. Payment of Taxes 696 680. Redemption From Tax Sale 699 681. Right of Trustee 699 683. Rights of Equitable Tenants in Common • 699 683. Presumption 700 ■684. Constructive Notice of Adverse Possession 701 685. Notice to Minors 703 *86. Sufficient Notice of Adverse Possession 703 «87. Title in the Name of One of the Co-tenants 704 €88. Necessary Expenses .. .704 689. Contribution 705 690. Improvements. 706 691. Waste 707 692. Rents and Profits 707 693. Occupant of Farms 709 ■694. Statutory Provisions — Use and Occupation 709 ■695. Lien 711 €96. Accounting 711 €97. Actions Between Co-tenants 713 698. Ejectment 714 •699. Right to Injunction 716 700. Commission for Sale of Lands 716 Article 5.— Estates in Entirety. *701. What is Tenancy by Entirety 716 703. Tenancy in Common 717 Xxviii TABLE OF CONTENTS, VOLUME L Sec. Pagb, 703. How Created... 718 704. Effect of the Married Woman's Acts 719 705. How Controlled 721 706. Effect of Absolute Divorce 733 Aeticlb 6.— Estates in Pabtnbbship. 707. Partnership Interest in Land 723 708. Bought with Partnership Funds 735 709. Reason for the Equitable Rule 736 710. Power of One Partner 738 711. Effect of Intention 738 713. Priority of Creditors 729 713. After Dissolution of Partnership 730 CHAPTER XIX.— PARTITION. Akticlb 1. — Nature and Effect. 714. Definition 733 715. Mode of Partition 734 716. WhenAllowed 785 717. Ownership in Severalty 787 718. Conveyance of One Co-Tenant of his Interest 738 719. Mutual Partition 788 730. Parol Partition — Adverse Possession 739 731. Partial Partition 741 733. Legal Title in Dispute 743 733. Partition by Disseised Co-Tenant 744 724. No Partition by Remainderman or Reversioner 746 Article 3. — Sale and Allotment. 735. Sale 748 736. When Sale Will be Decreed 750 727. Execution of Decree 750 738. Confirmation of Sale 751 739. Title Conveyed 753 730. Rights and Liabilities of the Purchaser 756 731. Default by Purchaser 756 733. Riglits of Mortgagee 757 733. Improvements 75T 734. Offset for Improvements 760 785. SaleSetAside 761 TABLE OF CONTENTS, VOLUME IL XXIX VOLUME II. CHAPTER XX.— ESTATES UPON CONDITION. Article 1.— Nature and Effect. Sec. Page.. 736. Definition 765 737. Condition Precedent and Subsequent 764 738. Creation of a Condition 76> 739. Condition Subsequent — Construction 767 740. Restriction as to Alienation 768 741. Right to Enjoy a Conditional Estate 769 742. Sale of Intoxicants — Other Undesirable Business 769 743. Performance of the Condition Becoming Impossible 771 744. Condition in Restraint of Marriage 773 745. Exemption from Grantee's Debis 773 746. Time of Performance 773 Article 2.— Forfbiturb and Re-entry. 747. Breach of Condition Subsequent 774 748. Re-entry 776 749. Grantor in Possession 778 750. The Condition Must be Legal 778 751. Conditional on Happening of Two Events 779 753. Waiver of Forfeiture 780 753. Continuing Conditions 781 754. Relief in Equity 783 755. Cancellation of Deed as Cloud Upon Title 782 756. Trust Instead of a Coudilion 783 Article 3. — Collateral Limitations and Conditional Limitations. 757. Definition of Collateral Limitation 784 758. Conditional Limitation Distinguished 784 CHAPTER XXI.— NATURE AND CLASSIFICATION OF MORTGAGES Article 1. — Definition and Development. 759. Definition 789 760. Origin of Mortgages 789 761. Vivum Vadium 790 762. Mortuum Vadium ; 791 763. "Welsh Mortgage 791 764. Protection to the Debtor in Courts of Equity 793 765. Equitable Rule 793 766. Redemption 794 Article 2. — The American Doctrine. 767. The Doctrine of the United States 795 768. States Giving a Mortgage a Dual Character 796 XXX TABLE OF CONTENTS, VOLUME II. Sec. Page. 769. States in which a Mortgage is Mere Security or Lien 797 770. States in which the Comimon Law and the Equity Rule are Blended. 799 771. State in which a Mortgage is a Species of a Pledge 800 Article 3.— Distinguishing a CoNDiTiONAii Sale, Assignments and an Absolute Sale. 772. Conditional Sale Distinguished 801 773. An Assignment and a Deed of Trust Distinguished 802 774. Deed of Trust and Mortgage Distinguished 803 775. Absolute Sale Distinguished 808 776. Character of the Defeasance 804 777. Deed Intended as a Security 805 778. Agreement to Reconvey 806 779. Rights of Purchasers 807 780. Assignments of Contract to Purchase Real Estate 807 781. Sufficient Evidence to Establish the Character of the Contract 808 Article 4.— Requisites and Validity. 783. Classification of Mortgages 809 783. Date and Delivery 811 784. Description of Parties 812 785. Description of Property 813 786. Condition 814 787. The Debt 815 Article 5.— Execution. 788. Sealing , 816 789. Signing 816 790. Attestation , 817 791. Acknowledgment 818 793. Delivery and Acceptance 819 Article 6. — Alterations and Additions to the Instrument. 793. English Doctrine 820 794. American Doctrine 831 795. Material Alterations 822 796. Correction of Mistakes 833 Article 7.— Equitable MoRTGAaES. 797. Definition 824 798. By Deposit of Title Deeds 825 799. American Doctrine 836 800. Informal Mortgages 837 801 . Collection of Rents and Profits , 828 803. Agreements to Make Convej'anceof Land When Intended as Security. 839 803. Assignment of Contract of Purchase 830 TABIiE OF CONTENTS, VOLUME IL XXXI' Article 8. — ^Vendob's Lien. Sec. Page, 804. Definition 831 805. When the Lien Attaches 834 806. Selling Real Estate and Personal Property Together at a Gross Price. 835 807. Parties Entitled to this Lien 836 808. Assignment of the Implied Lien 837 809. Waiving of the Implied Lien 837 810. Reservation of Vendor's Lien 830 811. Assignment of the Purchase-Money Notes 841 812. Waiver and Extinguishment of the Express Lien 841 813. Assumption of Payment of Lien 843 814. Priorities 843 815. Who Are Innocent Purchasers 844 816. Remedy to Enforce the Lien 841 817. Rights of the Vendee 845 818. Contribution 846 819. Parties.... 847 820. Commingling the Aggregate Price of Realty and Personalty 848 821. Tender of Deed 845 CHAPTER XXII.— RIGHTS OF PARTIES BEFORE DEFAULT. Article 1. — Registration of the Instrument. 822. Ancient Registration 850 823. Effect of Registration Under the Statute 851 824. The Lien— Creditors 852 825. Subsequent Deeds or Mortgages not Notice to a Prior Mortgagee. . . . 854 826. Unrecorded Mortgage and Subsequent Judgment 854 827. Lien of Purchase-Money Mortgage 856 828. When Possession is Notice 857 829. Mechanic's Lien 858 830. Waiver of Mechanic's Lien — Assignment of 85& 831. Commencement of the Mechanic's Lien. 861 832. Extent of Mechanic's Lien 862 833. After-acquired Title 863 834. TaxTitle 864 Article 2.— Suepicienct op the Record. 835. Delivery of the Instrument After Record 865 836. Sufficient Record 866 837. Place of Record— Special Book 866 838. Notice „ 868 Article 3. — Insurable Interests. 839. Insurable Interest of Mortgagor 869 840. Mortgagor May Insure for the Mortgagee's Benefit. 870 841. Invalidating Policy by Acts of the Mortgagor 871 842. Misrepresentation and Concealment by Mortgagor 872 XXXli TABLE OF CONTENTS, VOLUME IL Sec. Page. 843. Divisibility of the Contract 873 844 Tlie Mortgagee May Insure for His Own Benefit 874 845. Subrogation of tlie Insurer to the Rights of the Mortgagee 875 846. Stipulation against Alienation 876 847. Deed given as a Conveyance 877 848. Alteration of Ownership 877 Article 4. — Rights of thb Mortgagor. 849. Personal Liability . ; 878 850. Relative Rights^ to Mortgagee 879 851. Rents and Profits 880 852. Adverse Possession 881 853. Mortgagor's Remedies 881 854. Relative Rights as to Third Persons 883 855. Improvements 883 856. Remedies Against Mortgagor for Waste — In Equity 883 857. Remedy at Law 884 .858. Emblements 885 Article 5. — Rights of the Mortgagee. 859. Mortgagee's Interest Passes to His Administrator 886 860. Tenants in Common and Joint Tenants 887 861. The Mortgagee May Purchase the Equity of Redemption 887 663. Mortgagee in Possession 888 Article 6. — Assignment of Mortgage and Debt. €63. At Common Law Must be by Deed 889 864. What Constitutes an Assignment 890 865. Assignment of Notes — In Equity 891 Article 7. — Transfer of the Mortgaged Property. 866. Liability of Vendee 891 867. Grantee's Right of Assignment of Mortgage 893 868. Effect of Assuming Payment 893 869. Right of Mortgagee to Bring Action against Vendee 894 Article 8.— Merger. 870. Principles that Govern 895 871. Intent of Parties Govern in Equity 896 872. Mortgagee Taking the Equity of Redemption 897 873. Conveyance with Warranty 897 Article 9. — Subrogation. 874. Doctrine of Subrogation — Party Entitled to Redeem 898 875. Mortgagee must be Fully Paid 899 876. Subrogation of Surety 900 TABLE OF CONTENTS. VOLUME 11. XXXIU Article 10. — Payment op the Debt. Sbo. Paoe. 877. Actual Payment 900 «78. Change in Form of Debt 901 879. Reduced to Judgment 903 880. Application of Payment 903 881. Reissue and Revivor of Mortgage 903 Article 11. — Discharge and Release. 883. Release of Mortgage 904 883. Entering Satisfaction 905 884. Demand for Release 906 885. Cancellation of Release , 906 886. Penalty for Not Releasing 907 887. Parties 907 888. Subsequent Release 908 CHAPTER XXm.— RIGHTS OP PARTIES AFTER DEFAULT. Article 1.— Right to Foreclose. 889. After Condition Broken 909 890. Necessity of Demand for Payment 910 891. Stipulations that the Debt Shall Become Due , 911 893. Option of Mortgagee 913 893. Election of Remedies by Mortgagee 913 894. Actions at Lavf 913 895. Effect of the Statute of Limitations 914 896. Equitable Mortgages 915 897. When the Statute Begins to Run 916 898. Possession of Mortgagor 917 Article 3. — Foreclosure op Power-op-Salb Mortgages. 899. Validity 918 900. Trust Deeds ; 919 901. Who May Exercise the Povsrer of Sale 930 903. Trustees 933 903. Trustee's Right to Assign 933 904. Suspension of Power 933 905. Condition Precedent as to Sale 933 906. Mortgagee and Trustee Must not Purchase 934 a07. The Deed 934 908. To Whom Made 935 909. Setting Aside the Sale 936 910. Application of Proceeds 937 911. Recovery of Surplus 928 913. Redemption 829 Article 3. — Foreclosure by Taking Possession. 913. Foreclosure by Taking Possession 939 fll4. Sufficient Entry 93O E XXXIV TABLE OF CONTENTS, VOLUME II. Sec. Page, 915. When the Mortgagee May Enter 930 916. Executors and Administrators of the Mortgagee's Estate 931 917. Possession 931 Article 4. — Poeeclosdee by Writ op Entey. 918. Foreclosure by Writ of Entry 932 919. When the Right of Entry Accrues 933 920. Who May Poreclose 933 921. Nature of Defense 933 923. The Conditional Judgment 934 Aeticle 5. — Paeties to an Equitable Foeeclosuee. 933. General Rules as to Parties 935 924. Assignment of Note and Mortgage Separately , 936 925. Junior and Joint Mortgagees, Surety, Partners and Trustees 936 926. Personal Representatives of Mortgagee 937 927. Foreign Executor and Legatee , , . . 938 938. Against Whom Brought 939 Aeticle 6. — Foeeclosuee m Equity. 929. In Equity 940 930. Venue 941 931. Foreclosing Will Not Settle Paramount Title 941 933. Defense by Mortgagor 943 933. Failure of Title 944 934. A Recovery of Judgment on the Debt is no Defense 944 935. Fraud and Usury 945 936. Set-ofl 946 Article 7. — Appointment of a Receivee. 937. Equitable Jurisdiction 947 938. Under Legal and Equitable Mortgages 948 939. Legal Title Remaining in the Mortgagor , 949 940. Rents and Profits 949 Article 8.— Strict Foreclosure. 941. Strict Foreclosure 950 942. Modification of the Original Doctrine 950 943. When Used .' 951 Article 9.— The Decree in Equity. 944. Relief 953 945. Validity 953 946. Conclusive Against Whom , . 954 Article 10.— The Sale. 947. Nature of the Sale , 954 948. Subject-Matter 955 TABLE OF CONTENTS, VOLUME IL XXXV Sec. Page. 949. Notice, Place and Time of Sale 956 950. Terms of Sale 957 951. Marshalling and Method of Sale 958 952. Confirmation of Sale 960 953. Rights of Purchaser 961 954. Gaining Possession 963 955. To Whom Given 963 956. Title of Purchaser . . 963 957. Purchaser's Rights to the Crops 964 958. Right to Rents 965 959. Setting Aside the Sale 966 960. A Good Cause Must be Shown to Set Aside 967 Article 11. — Application op Proceeds. 961. Master's Report. 962. Dower and Homestead Rights 968 963. Marshalling Distribution of Proceeds 969 Article 13. — The Deficienct. 964. Personal Judgment for Deficiency 970 965. Decree for a Deficiency is Statutory 971 966. Enforcement of Personal Judgment 973 967. Purchaser Assuming Payment of Mortgage Debt 973 Article 13. — Accounting by Mortgagee. 968. Mortgagee in Possession 973 969. Final Accounting 974 970. Allowance for Improvements 974 971. Repairs 975 973. Compensation to Mortgagee 976 973. Periods of Rests 977 Article 14. — Redemption. 974. Redemption at Common Law 978 975. Strict Foreclosure 979 976. Right to Redeem 980 977. Subsequent Release of the Right to Redeem 980 978. Who May Redeem 981 979. Terms of Redemption 983 980. Must Pay the Whole Amount Due 984 981. Doctrine of Costs 984 Article 15. — Redemption Barred. 983. InEquity 985 983. Laches may be a Bar 986 984. Reasonable Dilligence and Good Faith 987 985. Exceptions to the General Rule 988 XXXVl TABLE OF CONTENTS, VOLUME IL Sec. Page. 986. Time to Redeem 988 987. Accrual of Action 989 988. Mortgagor iu Possession 990 CHAPTER XXIV.— ESTATES OF REVERSION. Article 1. — Nature and Incidents. 989. Definition 991 990. Particular Estate of Dower and Curtesy 993 991. Grant of Reversion 994 992. Rules of Descent 995 993. Remedy for Injury to the Estate 996 CHAPTER XXV.— ESTATES OF REMAINDER. Article 1. — Vested Remainder. 994. Definition and Distinction 998 995. Vested Remainder Distinguished 1000 996. Condition Precedent or Subsequent 1003 997. Power of Sale Added to a Life Estate 1003 998. Remainder Not Made Contingent by Uncertainty of the Amount. . 1004 999. Presumption of Law 1005 1000. To a Class of Persons 1007 1001. Cross Remainders ; 1007 1003. Devisee With Absolute Power of Alienation 1009 1003. Conveyance 1010 1004. Rights of Remainderman 1013 Article 3.— Contingent Remainders. 1005. Definition '. 1015 1006. Classes of Contingent Remainders— Passing of Title 1017 1007. Distinguished from an Executory Devise 1018 1008. Contingent Remainders With Double Aspect 1019 1009. Remoteness 1019 1010. Destruction of Contingent Remainders. . . . ^ 1030 Article 3. — Rule in Sheiley's Case. 1011. Nature of the Rule 1033 1013. Origin of the Rule 1034 1013. The Rule in Archer's Case 1036 1014. Application of the Rule in Shelley's Case 1038 1015. Construction Under the Rule in Shelley's Case 1038 1016. Requisites for Its Operation 1039 1017. Leasehold Estates 1030 1018. Power of Appointment 1030 1019. A Root of a New Succession 1031 TABLE OF CONTENTS, VOLUME IL XXXVU CHAPTER XXVI.— EXECUTORY DEVISE. AbTICLB 1. — HlSTOllY AND EPFKCT. SEa Page. 1020. Definition 1033 1021. Kinds of Executory Devises 1034 1022. Requirements of Executory Devises 1036 1033. Distinguished from Remainders 1037 Article 2. — Limitations to Executory Devises. 1024. Devise in Prsesenti 1038 1025. Qualification of the Disposition of the Estate 1039 1036. Defeating a Preceding Estate in Fee 1041 1027. Devise in Fee With a Devise Over Upon the Happening of a Cer- tain Event 1041 1028. Perpetuities 1042 1029. The Doctrine of Cy Pres 1045 1030. The Prohibition of Accumulations 1046 1031. Destruction of Executory Devises 1048 1032. Dying Without Issue as to Real Estate 1049 1033. Executory Devises of Chattel Interests 1053 1034. Lex Loci Rei Sitae 1054 CHAPTER XXVII.— USES AND TRUSTS. Article 1. — Uses. 1085. Definition 1056 1036. History and Origin 1057 1037. Uses and Estates at Law 1058 1038. Resulting Use 1059 1039. Incidents of Uses 1061 1040. The Statute of Uses 1062 1041. Use Upon Use 1063 1042. Kinds of Estate Necessary to Predicate a Use 1064 1043. Contingent Use 1064 1044. The Fiction of Scintilla Juris 1066 1045. Future Use 1068 1046. Shifting or Secondary Uses 1069 1047. Springing Uses 1071 Article 3.— Trusts. 1048. History and Origin 1073 1049. Kinds of Trusts 1074 1050. Active and Passive Trusts , 1076 1051. Executory and Executed Trusts 1077 1052. Express Trusts 1078 1053. Certainty in the Declaration of Trusts 1079 1054. Restraint on Alienation — Agreement to Hold Land in Trust 1080 1055. Words of Limitation 1 082 1056. Legal Representatives 1082 XXXVni TABLE OF CONTENTS, VOLUME IL Sec. Page, 1057. Revocation 108S 1058. Statute of Limitations 1084 1059. Statute of Frauds 1085 1060. Parol Evidence 108T 1061. Construction of Declarations of Trust 1088 1063. Implied Trusts 1090 1063. Implied Trusts as to Partners 1092 1064. Resulting Trusts 1094 1065. Wlien Resulting Trusts Arise 1096 1066. Payment of Purchase-Money 109S 1067. Parol Evidence to Establish a Resulting Trust 1103 1068. Parent and Child— Husband and Wife 1104 1069. Purchase of Land in Wife's Name 1105 1070. Fraud, Accident, or Mistake ' 1106 1071. Improvements Made by Funds Supplied by the Wife 1106 1073. Taking Title in Name of One of the Partners 1107 1073. Grantor Without Title Taking the Land as Trustee— When Es- toppel Arises 1108 1074. Enforcement of Resulting Trusts 1109 1075. Constructive Trusts 1110 1076. Fraud 1111 1077. Confidential Relations 1113 1078. Statute of Frauds , 1114 1079. Liability for the Cestui Que Trust's Debts 1115 1080. Spendthrift's Protection from the Claim of Creditors 1116 1081. Alienation of Trust Estates. 1118 1083. Future Estate in a Trust 1119 1083. Misappropriation of Trust Funds— Right of Cestui Que Trust to Follow Them 1120- 1084. Merger of the Equitable and the Legal Estates 1121 Article 3. — Trustees — Appointment and Duties. 1085. Trusts Without aTrustee 1122 1086. Acceptance of Trust 1123 1087. Death of Trustee 1123 1088. Sale of Trust Property 1124 1089. A Court of Equity May Order a Sale and a Reinvestment 1125 1090. Liability of Purchaser 1125 1091. Sale by Survivors 1126 1093. Liabilities of Trustees 1137 1093. Liability of Co-Trustees 1127 1094. Purchase of Trust Property by Trustee 1128 1095. Con veyance by Cestui Que Trust to Trustee 1129 1096. Compensation of Trustee. 1129 1097. Invalid Trust 1130 1098. Power to Destroy Trusts ... 1131 1099. In Case of Partition 1132 1100. Enforcement of Trust 1133 1101. Parties 1134 TABLE OF CONTENTS, VOLUME IL XXXIX CHAPTER XXVIII— POWERS. Auticlk 1. — Nature and Creation. Sec. Paob. 1103. Nature and Division 1135 1103. Creation of Powers 1136 1104. Division of Powers 1137 1105. Limitation of Powers of Disposal 1138 1106. Designation of Beneficiaries 1140 1107. Riglits of Donee's Creditors 1141 Article 3. — Exercise and Execution of the Power. 1108. Devise to Executor— Naked Power 1143 1109. Power of Sale by Implication 1144 1110. Power of Sale 1144 1111. Power of Sale to Pay Debts and Legacies 1146 1113. Doctrine of Election of Heirs 1147 1113. Who May Exercise the Power 1147 1114. Administrator with Will Annexed 1150 1115. Powers — Execution by Agent 1151 1116. latention to Exercise the Power 1153 1117. Prior Will Operating as an Execution of a Power Subsequently Created 1154 1118. Mode of Execution 1156 1119. Successive Executions 1157 1130. Excessive Execution 1158 1131. Defective Execution 1159 1183. Power Need Not be Referred to in the Execution 1161 1133. Perpetuities 1163 Article 3. — Extinguishment and Revocation of Power. 1134. Extinguishment of Power . . .' 1163 1135 Power of Revocation 1165 PART III.— TEANSFEE AND SUCCESSION OF ES- TATES. CHAPTER XXIX.— TITLE BY DESCENT. Article 1. — Nature and Classification. 1136. Title— Definition 1167 1137. Title by Descent and Purchase 1168 1128. Title by Descent 1168 1129. Who Are Heirs , 1170 1130. Disinheriting the Heirs 1171 1131. Vesting of Title in the Heirs 1 171 xl TABLE OF CONTENTS, VOLUME IL Sec. Pagb, 1133. Actual Seisin by Ancestor Required at Common Law 1172^ 1133. Law of Primogeniture 1173- 1184. Rule in the United States 1174 Article 3. — Right to Inherit. 1135. Kinds of Relationship 1175 1136. Computing the Degree of Consanguinity 1177 1137. Ancestral Estates 1179 1138. Exclusion of Half Blood 1179 1139. Exclusion of Collaterals to Half Blood Kindred ^ 1180 Article 3.— Who Mat be Heirs. 1140. Posthumous Children 1181 1141. Illegitimate Children 1181 1142. The Necessity of Legitimatizing the Bastard 118* 1143. Construction of such Statutes 1184 1144. Legitimatizing in Another State. . ., 1185 1145. Presumption of Legitimacy 1186 1146. Acknowledgment by Father 1187 1147. Yoid Subsequent Marriage 1188 1148. Inheritance from Illegitimate Child 1189 1149. Aliens 1189 1150. Capacity of an Alien to Hold Realty 1191 1151. Rules of Inheritance are Creatures of Municipal Law 1191 1153. Non-Resident Aliens may be Debarred From Inheriting...., 1192 1153. Effect of Treaty on Such Statutory Provisions 1193: Article 4. — Effect of Adtancbments. 1154. Advancement — Definition 1193 1155. What Constitutes an Advancement. 1194 1156. Value of the Advancement 1196 Article 5. — The Law That Governs. 1157. Lex Loci Rei Sitae 1196 CHAPTER XX2.— TITLE BY ADVERSE POSSESSION. Article 1. — Nature and Effect. 1158. Definition 1198 1159. Doctrine of Disseisin 1199 1160. Distinction Between Dispossession and Disseisin 1300' 1161. Constructive Possession 1201 1162. Two Parties Cannot be Seised at the Same Time of the Same Land Under Different Titles 1303 1163. Character of Possession 1203 1164. Improvements 1205 1165. Permission to Occupy 1205 TABLE OP CONTENTS, VOLUME IL xli Bec. Page. 1166. Presumption of Possession of the Legal Title. 1306 1167. Entering Under Executory Contract 1207 1168. Colorof Title 1207 1169. Necessity for Color of Title 1209 1170. Instruments That Will Give Color of Title 1210 1171. By Parol Gift 1211 1173. Parol Partition 1211 1173. Possession Through an Agent 1211 1174. Notice of Hostile Claim 1213 1175. Owner's Acquiescence 1213 1176. Mistalie , 1213 1177. Effect 1214 Article 3. — Parties. 1178. Tenants in Common 1314 1179. By Tenant 1216 1180. Between Trustees and Cestuis Que Trustent 1217 1181. By Vendor After Sale 1218 1183. By Vendee 1318 1183. By Mortgagor 1319 1184. By Husband and Wife 1320 1185. Remaindermen 1320 Article 3. — Against the State. 1186. Adverse Possession against the State 1223 1187. Land Under Navigable Rivers 1333 1188. Lands Entered as a Homestead 1334 1189. Lands Held by a Municipal Corporation 1334 1190. Public Highways and Streets — Substitution 1335 Article 4. — Statute of Limitations. 1191. Origin and Nature 1326 1193. Vesting of Title— Removal of Bar 1328 1 193. Tacking — Continuity of Possession 1229 1194. Interruption of the Statute 1331 1195. Entry that Will Interrupt 1333 1196. Against Whom the Statute Runs 1334 1197. Vesting of Title 1335 Article 5. — Abandonment. 1198. Advancement , 1236 1199. After Maturity of Title \ 1236 1300. Transfer of Land and Cancellation of Deed Before Record 1238 CHAPTER XXXI— TITLE BY ESTOPPEL. Article 1. — By Deed. 1201. Definition of Estoppel 1340 1203. By Deed , 1241 F xlii TABLE OF CONTENTS, VOLUME IL Sec. Page. 1203 Grantor 1842 1204. Estoppel Can Only be by What is Clear and Precise 1242 1205. EfEect of Covenant of Warranty 1243 1206. The Grantor Cannot Challenge the Validity of a Corporation as Grantee 1343 1207. Recitals of Purchase-Money 1344 1308. Alienation of Confiscated Real Estate by the Former Owner 1344 1309. Sale of the Entire Estate by Co-tenant 1345 1210. After-Acquired Title 1245 1211. Rights of Grantees 1248 1312. Sale of Expectancy — After- Acquired Estate 1248 1213. After- Acquired Title of Married Woman 1249 1314. Quit-Claim Deeds 1350 1315. Estoppel of Grantee 1251 1316. Partition by Consent , 1253 Article 3.— By Record. 1217. Definition , 1252 1218. Court Record 1253 1319. Pleadings 1354 Article 3.— In Pais. 1230. Definition 1254 1221. Representations and Intention 1356 1333. Judicial Sale 1258 1233. Against the United States Government 1258 1334. Estoppel to Deny Homestead 1260 1335. By Negligence and Fraud 1260 1226. By Acquiescence 1261 1227. Accepting Benefits 1262 1338. Estoppel by Conduct and Silence 1263 1339. Estoppel by Surrender 1263 CHAPTER XXXII.— TITLE BY GRANT. Article 1. — Public Grants. 1230. Grant— Definition- 1365 1231. Public Grant 1266 1232. Construction of the Grant 1267 1233. Power of the Government Over its Lands 1267 1334 Warranty by Government 1268 1235. Effect of a Patent and of a Certificate of Entry 1268 1336. Conclusion of the Acts of the Officers 1269 1237. Homestead Entry 1270 1338. Pre-emption 1270 1239. Receiver's Certificate Carries an Inchoate Title 1271 1240. Contract to Sell Homestead before Vesting of Title 1271 1241. Final Certificate is not a Conveyance 1271 1242. Tested Right to a Patent 1272 TABLE OF CONTENTS, VOLUME IL xliii Sec. Page. 1343. Courts' Supervision of the Land Department 1273 1244. Subsequent Purchaser 1374 1345. A Patent is a Title by Record 1376 1346. Legislative Grants 1277 1247. Grants by the Government of Tide Lands 1378 1248. Bights of the States 1379 1249. Forfeiture of Public Grant. 1281 1250. A Deed by an Officer for the State, 1383 1351. The Original States— Grant of Franchise to "Wharf out below High Water Mark 1283 1353. New States Admitted to the Union 1386 1353. The Territories 1388 Article 3.— Pkivatk Gkant. 1254. Definition 1289 1255. Classification of Conveyances 1290 1256. Feoffment 1291 1257. Grant 1293 1258. Release and Surrender 1294 1259. Conveyances Under the Statute of Uses 1393 1260. Covenant to Stand Seised to Uses '. 1395 1261. Lease and Release 1296 1263. Bargain and Sale 1393 1363. Modern Conveyances , 1293 Article 3. — Title by Involuntakt Alienation. 1364. Office Grant — Involuntary Alienation 1301 1365. Escheat 1303 1366. Forfeiture 1303 1367. Sales Under Esecution 1306 1368. Equitable Estates 1307 1369. Subject-Matter 1308 1370. Rights of Purchaser 1309 1371. Sale en Masse or in Parcels 1310 1373. Eminent Domain 1311 1373. By Statutory Provision Under the Supervision of the Court. • 1313 1374. Confirmation of Title 1313 1275. TaxTitles 1314 CHAPTER XXXni.— TITLE BY DEED. Article 1. — Nature and Requisites. 1376. Definition , 1316 1377. What Constitutes a Sufficient Writing 1317 1278. Alterations or Pilling Blanks 1318 1379. Presumption of Law as to the Time of Making Alterations 1330 1380. Parties to a Deed — Grantors 1330 1381. Insane Persons — Infants 1331 xliv Sec. Page, 1283. Ratification of Infant's Deed 1323 1283. Return of Consideration 1324 1384. Deed of Married Woman 1335 1385. Disseisee as Grantor 1326 1286. Grantees 1328 1387. Description of Grantee 1329 1388. Deed to Heir of Living Person 1330 1389. Subject-Matter 1330 1290. Growing Timber, 1331 1291. English Doctrine— Growing Trees 1333 1393. Other Things Which Are Realty 1338 1293. Consideration 1335 1394. Voluntary Conveyances. ; 1336 1395. Sufficiency of Consideration , 1337 1296. Love and Affection 1338 1297. Marriage , 1339 1398. Fraud and Duress 1339 1299. Valid Consideration , 1341 Article 3.— Execution. 1300. What is an Execution of a Deed 1343 1301. Execution by Agent 1343 1303. Power Coupled with an Interest 1344 1303. Power of Attorney Given by a Married Woman 1344 1304. Signing. 1345 1305. Signing by Mark 1346 1306. Sufficient Signing 1340 1307. Sealing— Origin 1347 1308. Sufficient Sealing 1348 1309. Mode of Sealing 1349 1310. Alteration 1350 1311. Acknowledgment 1351 1312. Officer Taking Acknowledgment 1352 1313. The Capacity of the Officer— Ministerial and Judicial 135S 1314. The True Doctrine 1354 1315. Amendment of Certificates 1356 1316. Equity Will Not Correct the Officer's Mistake 1357 1317. Reading Before Acknowledgment. . . . .' 1357 1 318. Delivery and Acceptance 1358 1319. Presumption of Delivery 1360 1330. Delivery to Stranger — Subsequent Acceptance by Grantee 1362 1321. Registration of Deed is Prima Fucie Evidence of Delivery 1363 1333. To Take Effect After the Grantor's Death 1364 1333. Re-delivery 1305 1334. Escrow— Definition 1365 1335. Grantee a.s Depositary 1 367 1336. Authority of Depositary 1367 1327. Death of Grantee Before Second Delivery 1368 1338. Rights of Grantee 1369 TABLE OF CONTENTS, VOLUME IL xlv Article 3. — Registration op the Instrument. Sko. Page. 1339. Registration 1371 1330. Who Are Bona Fide Purchasers— Quit-Claim Deeds 137a 1831. Sufficient Record. 1376 1333. Effect of Record 1378 1333. Curative Acts 1378 1331. Time of Record 1379 1335. Certificate of the Recorder Conclusive 1380 1336. Defective Record 1380 1337. Another Doctrine— Defective Record • 1381 1338. Index— Recording of Deed '. . 1381 1339. The Index is no Part of the Record 1383 1340. Liability of the Recorder for Errors in the Index 1383 1341. Descriptive Index — Statutory Provisions 1383 1343. Defectively Recorded Deed 1384 1343. Constructive Notice 1384 1341. General Recitals 1385 1345. Unrecorded Deed 1386 1346. Possession by One Not Shown to be the Ovrner by Record Title. . . 1387 1347. Mortgage by Absolute Deed — Defeasance Unrecorded 1388 1348. Actual Possession 1389 1349. Character of the Possession Required 1389 1350. Actual Notice 1390 1351. Exceptions to the Doctrine of Notice as Affecting Priority 1393 1353. Character of the Notice 1393 1353. Degree, Manner and Purpose of Actual Notice 1394 1354. Burden of Proof of Notice 1395 1355. Kind of Proof 1395 1356. Taking Effect of the Notice 1396 1357. A Purchaser Without Notice May Convey a Good Title to One Having Notice 1396 1358. Acquiring Title from One who has Notice of an Unrecorded Mort- gage .' 1397 1359. Judgment Creditors 1898 1360. Secret Lien or Trust 1399 1361. Implied Notice 1400 1863. Agent and Principal— English Rule 1400 1363. The Accepted Doctrine in England and in the United States.. .. 1401 1364. Agent's Knowledge 1403 1365. Kind of Knowledge Necessary 1403 1366. Agent of Two Principals in Two Separate Transactions 1403 1367. Fraud of Agent 1404 1368. Agents of Corporations 1405 1369. Officers Selling Incumbered Land to their Corporations 1406 Article 4. — Construction and Effect. 1370. Component Parts 1406 1371. Form of Deeds 1407 1372 Description 140» xlvi TABLE OF CONTENTS, VOLUME IL Sec. Paoe. 1373. Sufficient Description 1410 1374. Specific Description Will Control 1411 1375. Reference to Otlier Instruments 1413 1376. Reference to Maps and Plats 1418 1377. Rule of Interpretation 1413 1378. Ambiguity 1415 1379. Description in Joint Estates 1415 1380. Parol Evidence 1417 1381. Construction and EfiEect 1418 1383. Qualification of the Grant 1418 1383. Habendum .'. 1430 Article 5. — Boundaries. 1384. Boundary 1431 1385. Lands Bounding on Streams — Grants by the United States 1433 1386. Grant of Land Bounded on a Lake or Pond Non-Navigable 1424 1387. English Doctrine as to Title of Ponds and Lakes 1435 1388. Highways -. 1426 1389. Distance on the Meander Line or Along a Highway 1437 1390. Courses and Distances 1438 1391. Monuments 1438 1392. Plats and Surveys 1430 1393. Walls, Trees, Fences and Other Monuments 1431 1394. Quantity 1431 1395. Metes and Bounds — Reference to a Road 1433 1896. Division Lines Established by Parol Agreement 1433 1397. Such Parol Agreement not Within the Statute of Frauds 1433 1398. Acquiescence 1434 1399. Adverse Possession — Mistake 1435 1400. Admission of Parol Evidence 1436 Article 6. — Estate Conveyed. I-IOI. Appurtenances 1437 1403. Whatever is Appurtenant Passes 1439 1403. Easements 1439 1404. Exceptions and Reservations ' 1441 J405. Construction of Exceptions and Reservations 1443 1406. Reservation or Exception Repugnant to Grant 1443 1407. Access to Strata Underlying Coal 1444 1408. Reservation of Minerals , 1446 1409. Deed Taking Place of an Executory Contract 1447 1410. Revocation of Deed 1448 1411. Conveying Freehold Estate to Begin at Grantor's Death 1448 1413. Conditions 1449 1413. Fee Simple Conveyance 1453 1414. Proof of Ancient Deeds 1453 1415. Last Unregistered Deed 1454 TABLE OF OONTENTS, VOLUME 11. xlvii CHAPTER XXXIV.— COYENANTS TOR TITLE. Article 1. — Nature and Classification. SkC. Page, 1416. Definition 1455 1417. Covenants for Title 1456 1418. Feudal Warranty 1457 1419. Implied Covenants — Partition 14D7 1420. Restrictions 1460 1421. Married Woman's Covenants 1461 1422. Riglits of Grantee 1463 1423. The Riglit of Grantees to Enforce Covenants Inter Se 1463 1424. Equity Will Restrain the Violation of Covenants 1464 1425. Equitable Relief as to Subsequent Purchaser 1465 Article 2. — Covenant op Seisin and Right to Convey. 1426. When Broken 1468 1427. Public Easement 1470 1438. After- Acquired Title by Grantor 1470 1429. Lawful and Indefeasible Seisin 1471 Article 3. — Covenants Against Incumbrances. 1430. Nature of Covenant against Incumbrances 1473 1481. Breach of This Covenant 1474 1433. Question of Notice 1476 Article 4. — Covenant for Quiet Enjoyment. 1433. Definition 1477 1434. Breach— Eviction 1478 1435. Public Highway 1479 1436. What Constitutes a Breach 1480 Article 5. — Covenant for Further Assurance. 1487. Nature and Definition 1483 1438. Acts Required 1483 1489. Levying of a Fine — Removing Judgment and Other Liens 1483 Article 6. — Covenant of Warranty. 1440. Nature and Definition 1483 1441. Limited in its Operation 1484 1443. Rights of Assignee 1486 1448. Breach of this Covenant 1487 1444. Married Woman's Covenant of Warranty 1488 1445. The Estate Cannot be Enlarged 1490 1446. Rights and Liabilities of Heirs 1491 1447. Reference to Other Deeds 1491 xlviii TABLK OF CONTENTS, VOLUME II. AbTICLE 7. — COTENANTS THAT RUN WITH THE LaND. Sec. ■ ■ Paue. 1448. What Covenants Run with the Land 1493 1449. Parol Covenant 1494 1450. Party Walls 1494 1451. Fences 1495 1452. Covenants Affecting the Value of Land 1495 1453. Privity of Estate 1496 1454. Forfeiture for Breach 1497 Article 8.— Action por Breach of Covenants. 1455. Remedy at Law 1498 1456. Jurisdiction in Equity 1498 1457. When the Action Lies 1499 1458. When the Action Accrues 1500 1459. Who May Bring the Action 1501 Article 9. — Measure op Damages. 1460. Covenants of Seisin and Against Incumbrances — The Amount of Damages Recoverable. . ; 1503 1461. Covenants for Quiet Enjoyment and Warranty 1504 1463. Measure of Damages Against Remote Grantor 1505 1463. Recovery of Interest 1506 1464. Cost and Attorney's Fees ., 1506 1465. Nominal Damages. '. 1507 CHAPTER XXXV.— TITLE BY WILLS Article 1. — Histoet and Dbpinition. 1466. Historical Outline , 1509 1467. English Development 1510 1468. Definition 1511 1469. Kinds of Wills 1511 1470. Codicil 1512 1471. Devise and Bequest — Definition 1513 Article 3. — Testamentary Capacity. 1473. What Is 1513 1473. Persons Under Disability 1514 1474. Incapacity and Other Disabilities 1516 1475. Insanity ,... 1517 Article 3. — Requisites and Validity. 1476. What Constitutes 1518 1477. Sufficient Signing 1521 1478. What Signing will Answer the Requirements 1522 1479: Signing by Mark 1523 1480. Knowledge of Contents 1534 1481. Publication of Will 1524 TABLE OF CONTENTS, VOLUME II. Xlix Sbo. Page. 1482. Attestation by Witnesses 1525 1483. In Presence of the Testator— What Is 1537 1484. Competency of Witnesses 1529 1485. What Law Governs as to the Execution of Wills 1530 1486. Law that Governs as to Place 1533 1487. Attestation and Erasures 1533 1488. Mistakes 1534 1489. Equitable Doctrine of Conversion — Vested Interest Under a Will. . 1534 1490. Joint Wills 1535 1491. Validity of Holographs 1536 1493. Validity of Nuncupative Will 1536 1493. Essential of Statutory Requisites 1537 1494. Witnesses to Nuncupative Wills 1540 1495. Number of Witnesses Required by Different States 1540 Article 4. — Revocation and Revival of Will. 1496. Requisites of Express Revocation 1542 1497. Implied Revocation 1543 1498. By Subsequent Will 1544 1499. By Codicil 1544 1500. Marriage by Feme Sole After Making Her Will 1546 1501. Marriage and Birth of Issue 1547 1503. By Conveyance of the Property 1548 1503. By Alteration 1548 1504. Presumptions 1549 1505. Revival 1550 1508. Contingent Wills , 1550 Article 5. — Probate of Wills. 1507. What requisites will Entitle a Will to Probate 1551 1503. Effect of Probate — Living Persons' Estates 1553 1509. Construction of Will and Codicil 1554 Article 6. — Construction of Will. 1510. Construction — General Rule I555 1511. Intention . 1556 1513. From What Time Does the Will Operate I557 1513. Parol Evidence 1558 1514. Ambiguity and Conflicting Clauses I559 1515. Description of Devises 1560 1516. Next of Kin 15g0 1517. To Deprive an Heir of the Estate 1581 1518. Gift to Children as a Class 15gl 1519. Personal Representatives — Issue — Servants 13G3 1520. Forfeiture of Property by Crime 1562 1531. Trusts — Charitable Bequests. . .• 1504 1523. Perpetuities as to Charitable Gifts 1565 1523. After-acquired Property I565 G 1 TABLE OF COFTENTS, VOLUME IL Sec. Page, 1534. Power to Sell 1567 1535. Charge Upon Land 1567 1536. In Restraint of Marriage , 1567 1537. Restraint Upon Widow to Remarry 156!) 1538. Constraint in Restraint of Marriage Generally 1570- 1529. Widow's Contingent Right to Sell 1571 1530. Lapsed Devises and Legacies 1571 Article 7. — Contract to Make a Will. 1531. Contracts to Make Wills 1573 1532. Consideration 1573 1533. Specific Performance 1574 1534. Proof Required 1574 1535. Revocation of Testamentary Disposition of Property 1575 1536. Breach— Damages 1576 Article 8.— Actions to Construe the Will. 1537. Jurisdiction of Courts of Equity 1576 1588. The Court will not Pass on Future Contingencies 1577 1539. Parties 1578 1540. Who May Bring Suit 1579 1541. Costs 1580' TABLE OF CASES. TABLE OF CASES, [References are to sections: Vol. I, oontalng 19 1-735; Vol. 11, 88 736-1541.] A. Abbott V. Abbott, 1176, 1373, 1377. Abbott V. Allen, 1429. Abbott V. Berry, 731. Abbott V. Billups, 505. Abbott V. Essex Co., 1033. Abbott V. Godfroy. 800, 938. Abbott V. H61way, 1411. Abbott V. Ins. Co., 843. Abbott V. Jackson, 595. Abbott V. Middleton, 1510. Abbott V. Mills, 171, 183, 1443. Abbott V. Page, 1193. Abbott V. Powell, 446. Abbott V. Railroad Co., 216. Abbott V. Stewartstown, 153. Abbott V. Stratton, 801. Abbott V. Sweet, 489. Abeel v. Radcliff, 511. Abell V. Williams, 79, 506. Abendroth v. Railroad Co., 1388. Aberdeen R. R. Co. v Blalkie, 906. Abergaveng's Case, 667. Abenalte v". Edgar, 1398. Abernethy v. Church, 17. Ablard v. Fitzgerald, 1193. Abney v. Austin, 854. Abie's Case. 1013. Aborn v. Padeford, 1075. Abraliam v. Taigg, 1033. Abraham v. Wilkin, 1478 Achey v. Hull, 339. Achilles v. Achilles, 463. Achilles v. Willis, 440. Achron v. Jackson, 1404, Acken V. Osborne, 1000. Ackerman v. Horican Co., 205. Ackerman v. Gorton, 998. Ackerman v. Lyman, 469. Ackerman v. Vreeland, 1003, 1009. Ackertou v. Lyman, 563. Ackland v. Ackland, 379. Ackland v. Gravner, 938. Ackley v. Chamberlain, 433. Acquackanonk Water Co. v. Watson, 213. Ackroyd v. Smith, 145. Acton V. Bluudell, 321, 224, 225, 232. Adair v. Bogle, 498. Adair v. Cummin, 729. Adair v. Hare, 1156. Adame v. Ames Iron Co., 678, 724. Adams v. Adams, 655, 781, 1016, 1085, 1086, 1120, 1143, 1147, 1318. Adams v. Alkire, 1163, 1168. Adams v. Andrews, 143. Adams v. Barney, 198. Adams v. Barron, 437. Adams v. Beadle, 18, 43, 1393. Adams v. Buchanan, 814. Adams v. Bucklin, 117, 128.558. Adams v. Burns, 1067. Adams v. Chaplain, 284. Adams v. Cohoes, 643 Adams v. Corriston, 333, 337, 769, 857. Adams v. Corty, 777. Adams v. County, 1413. Adams v. Cowherd, 816. Adams v. Dannis, 1351. Adams v. Dees, 433. Adams v. Emerson, 193. Adams v. Field, 1306. Adams v. Fletcher, 591, Adams v. Goddard, 499, 534. Adams v. Guerard, 1016, 1067, Adams v. Hill, 363. Adams v. Hull, 1399. Adams v. Ins. Co. 846. Adams v. Iron Cliff Co., 60, 174. Adams v. Lee, 69. Adams v.' Linsell, 950. Adams v. Logan, 343, 346. Adams v. McKesson, 608. Adams v. Palmer, 378, 1273. Adams v. Parker, 863, 920. Adams v. Pease, 94, 96. Adams v. Pratt, 836, 1335. Adams v. Railroad Co., 155, 167, 169, 204, 223. Adams v. Robertson, 935. Adams v. Rockwell, 1398. Adams v. Ross, 279, 1019, 1443, 1445. Adams v. Savage, 1045. Adams v. Sayrc, 973. Adams v. Smith, 18. Adams v. State, 601. Adams v. Stevenson, 775, 786, 1374. Adams v. Van Alstyne, 260. Adams v. Walker, 333. Adams v. White, 430. lii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735; Vol. II, §8 736-1541.] Adams's Estate, 1110. Adcock V. Mooi'house, 533. Addison v. Hack, 369. Addy V. Grix, 1478. Adger v. Bostick, 446. Adkins v. Lewis, 971. Adkins v. Tomlinson, 1193. Adkins v. .Wlialen, 1385. Adier v. Mendelson, 640. Adsit V. Adsit, 398, 401. ^tna Ins. Co. v. Resh, 843, 843. jEtna L. Ins. Co. v. Bisliop, 1344. ^tna L. Ins. Co. v, Corn, 548, 871. JEtna L. Ins. Co. v. Ford, 1344. Afee V. Bettis, 449. Agan V, Shannon, 1311. Agate V. Loweubein, 314. Agerter v. Vaudergrift, 531. Agne V. Seitsinger, 153. Agnew V. Johnson, 697. Agnew V. Railroad Co., 871. Agnew V. Renwick, 88i. Agricultural Asso. v. Brewster, 1064. Agricultural Bank v. Rice, 784, 1380. Aliern v. Freeman, 133S, 1339. Aliern v. Odiorne. 804. Ahem v. Steele, 596. Ahem v. White, 837. Aiken v. Bridgeford, 912. Aiken v. Franklin, 1419. Aiken v. Gale, 818. Aiken v. Railroad Co., 951. Aiken v. Suttle, 394. Aiken v. Ela, 1168. Aikin v. Kellogg. 407. Aikin v. Smitli, 603, 1031, 1050. Aikin v. Weckerly, 1483. Ainsworth v. Barry, 659. Ainsworth v. Ritt, 504, 505. Airhart v. Massieu, 1150. Airey v. Buchanan, 433. Alabama v. Stanton, 818. Alabama Conference v. Price, 1515. Alabama State Land Co. v. Kyle, 1179, 1193, 1194. Alaniz v. Casenave, 1076, 1077. Albany Fire Co. v. Bay, 1118. Albany's Case, 1134. Albert v. State, 588. Albert v. Thomas, 143, 146, 1388. Albright v. Oyster, 1066. Alcock V. Sparhawk, 1535. Alcorn v. Sadler, 211, 215. Aldan v. Carlton, 690. Alden v. Pryal, 933. Alderman v. Neate, 486. Alderson v. Ames, 803. Alderson v. Bell, 960. Alderson v. Marshall, 569. Alderson v. Schulze, 860, Aldine Manuf. Co. v. Barnard, 48. Aldrich v. Griffith, 1168. Aldrlch V. Parsons, 18. Aldrich v. Reynolds, 311, 313, 858. Aldridge v. Aldrige, 401. Aldridge v. Dunn, 815. Aldridge v. Muirhead, 1083. Alexander v. Alexander, 340, 1053, 1106, 1130. Alexander v. Bishop, 498. Alexander v. Bridgford, 1439. Alexander v. Burnett. 1411. Alexander v. Carew, 633. Alexander v. Ellison, 688. Alexander v. Fisher, 318. Alexander v. Hodges, 535. Alexander v. Hooks, 806, 830. Alexander v. Jackson, 439. Alexander v. Kimbro, 708, 711. Alexander v. Meadville, 1177. Alexander v. Messervey, 960. Alexander v. Murry, 791. Alexander v. Pope, 1163. Alexander v. Savage, 1375. Alexander v. Sherman, 783. Alexander v. Shonyo, 769. Alexander v. Warrance, 344, 1070. Alexander v. Wheeler, 1169, 1176. Alger V. Kennedy, 504, 553. Algonquin Coal Co. v. Iron Co., 1162. Alien's Estate, 398. Alkire v. Kohle, 708. AUard v. Carleton, 725. AUard v. Lane, 883. AUday v. Whitaker, 730. Alleman v. Haw ley, 381, 441, 690, 733, 734 Allen V. Allen, 293, 910, 1163, 1426. Allen V. Atkinson, 1461. Allen V. Bank, 883. Allen V. Bartlett, 633, 817. Allen V. Carpenter, 310, 811, 313, 650. Allen V. Clark, 978. Allen V. Culver, 496, 1448. Allen V. DeGroodt, 294, 1004, 1185. Allen V. Devlin. 1229. Allen V. Elderkin, 858, 957. Allen V. Evans, 257. Allen V. Piske, 267. Allen V. Frost, 769, 851. Allen V. Gomme, 136, 140. Allen V. Griffin, 1475. Allen V. Hartwell, 402. Allen V, Henderson, 1032. Allen V. Holton, 668, 1177, 1445. Allen V. Howe, 577, 746. Allen V. Jackson, 744, 1537. Allen V. Jaquish, 506, 650. Allen V. Kellam, 767, 768. TABLE OF CASEa liii [References are to sections : Vol. I, oontalns S§ 1-735 ; Vol. II, 8§ 73ft-1641.1 Allen V. Kennedy, 46, 78, 1429. 1453. 1459. Allen V. Kincaid, 153. Allen V. Kirby, 556. Allen V. Koepsel. 487. Allen V. Lenoir, 791. Allen V. Little, 1417. Allen V. Logan, 1067. Allen V. Mansfield, 1170, 1175. Allen V. Mooney, 77. Allen V. Paul, 1179. Allen V. Poole, 679, 688, 953. Allen V. Pray, 406. Allen V. Read, 1415. Alien V. Sallinger, 698, 1378. Alien V. San Jose, 131. Allen V. Scott, 489. Allen V. Shackelton, 935. Allen V. Tobias, 059. Allen V. Trustees, 1037. Allen V. Van Houten, 1131. Allen V. "Watts, 1489. Allen V. Weber, 236. Allen V. Withrow, 1115. Allen V. Woodard, 1403. Allen V. Young, 101. AUender v. Sussan, 1033. Allgood V. Gibson, 96. Ailing V. Obatfield, 399. Allis V. Moore, 163, 1196. Allison V. Armstrong, 834. Allison V. Chaney, 1511. Allison V. Perry, 687. Allison V. Thomas, 1330. Allison V. Wilson, 1107. Allsmiller v. Preutchenicht. 420. Almand v. Scott, 603. Almony v. Hicks, 1336. Almy V. Church, 1190. Almy V. Daniels, 694, 696. Almy V. Greene, 535. Almy V. Hunt, 1431. Almy V. Jones, 1518. Also brook v. Eggleston, 678 Alstine v. Cundiff, 773. Alston V. Grant, 153, 573. Alsup V. Banks, 499. Altman v. Banholzer, 468. Alton V. 111. Trans. Co.. 183. Alvarado v. Wardholt, 685, 686, 1178. Aives V. Henderson, 181, 191. Alves V. Schlesinger, 1213. Alvis V. Morrison, 791, 1332. Alwood V. Ruckman, 601. Ambs V. Railroad Co.. 1375, 1378. Ament v. Wolf, 1168. American Bank Note Co. v. Railroad Co., 155, 161, 163. American Bible Soc. v. Price, llOl. American Fur Co. v. United States, 35. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1253. American Ins. Co. v. Rothohild, 846. American Mortg. Co. v. Hopper, 1238, 1241, 1243. Ameiican Mortc. Co. v. Hutchinson. 1330. American Mortg. Co. v. Wright, 1281. 1283. American Tract Soc. v. Atwater, 1515. American Trust Co. v. North Belle- ville Quarry Co., 333. American Tulu, etc. Co. v. Oil and Gas Co., 893. American Wire Co. v. Scholer, 960. Ames V. Ames, 714, 1103. 1109. Ames V. Kilton, 14U0. Ames V. Norman, 705, 706. Ames V. Phipps, 836, 1335. Ames V. Richardson, 839. Ames V. Shaw, 144, 196. Amesbury v. Brown, 386. Amey v. Cockey, 1383. Amick V. Brubaker, 632, 625. Amick V. Thorp, 198, 215. Amidon v. Harris, 133. Amis V. Stephens, 1170. Amondson v. Severson, 196. Amory v. KannofEsky, 500, 535. Amory v. Lawrence, 982, 984. Amory v. Meredith, 1116, 1133. Amory v. Reilly, 810. Amoskeag Manuf. Co. v. Goodale, 198. Amoskeag Manuf. Co. v. Head, 233. Amphlett v. Hibbard, 441, 827. Amsby v. Woodward, 539. Anderson v. Anderson, 980, 1318, 1499, 1537. Anderson v. Baxter, 933. Anderson v. Brown, 707, 713. Anderson v. Burnham, 1169. Anderson v. Carkins, 1340. Anderson v. Cary, 278. Anderson v. Dwyer, 112. Anderson v. Hapler, 575. Anderson v. Hubble, 1226. Anderson v. Hughes, 727, 738. Anderson v. Ins. Co. , 553. Anderson v. Kenshead, 938. Anderson v. Knox, 1426, 1430. Anderson v. Land Co. , 1 067. Anderson v. Northrop, 291, 1087, 1094. Anderson v. Odell, 444, 963. Anderson v. Pilgram, 893, 966. Anderson v. Prindle, 620, 637, 641. Anderson v. Railroad Co., 620. Anderson v. Richardson, 1391. Anderson v. Simpson. 361. Anderson v. Strauss, 178, 313, 850, 905, 957. Anderson v. Wells, 814. liv TABLE OF OASES. fEeferenoes are to sections : Vol. I, contains S§ 1-735 ; Vol. II, 8§ 736-1541.7 Anderson v. Wiston, 783. Anderson v. Toakum, 1314. Anderson's Appeal, 402. Anderson School Townp. v. Lodge, 5, 717. Andrae v. Haseltine, 353. Andreas v. Hubbard, 951. Andrews v. Andrews, 384, 397, 805. Andrews v. Avory, 1508. Andrews v. Bassett, 404. Andrews v. Brumfield, 1105. Andrews v. Coal Co., 1177. Andrews v. Day Butter Co., 78. Andrews v. Estes, 1301. Andrews v. Gillespie, 1458. Andrews v. Hailes, 165. Andrews v. Hobgood, 963. Andrews v. Lathrop, 1013. Andrews v. Murphy, 1373. 1373. Andrews v. O'Mahoney, 950. Andrews v. Rice, 1039. Andrews v. Scatton, 893, 947. Andrews v. Sparhawk, 1090. Andrews v. Wilkes, 956. Andru v. Watkins, 1391. Andrus v. Smelting and Refining Co., 1434. Andrus v. Vreeland, 873. Angell V. Rosenbury, 1055. Angevine v. Knox, 573. Angler v. Masterson, 763. Angus V. Dalton, 238. Anketel v. Converse, 809, 1365, 1367. Annable v. Patch, 1034. Ann Arbor Sav. Bank v. Webb, 871, 873. Annerly v. De Saussnre, 677. Annis v. Wilson, 1060. Anon,, 7, 89, 249, 344, 1113, 1125. Anson v. Anson, 960. Anson v. Railroad Co., 1085. Anstice v. Brown, 1074. Answorth v. Johnson, 505. Anthe v. Heide, 1348. Anthony v. Anthony, 399, 979, 999. Anthony v. Butler, 837. Anthony v. Herman, 868. Anthony v. Rogers, 638. Antomarchi v. Russell, 355. Antoni v. Belknap, 77, 616. Antroleus v. Smith, 1062. Anzar v. Miller, 1186. Apperson v. Farrell, 831. Apple V. Apple, 990. Applebee v. Percy, 573. Appleton V. Ames, 534, 539. Appleton V. Boyd, 668, 860. Appleton V. Parker, 878. Appleton V. Rowley, 344. Appleton's Appeal, 1123. Appling V. Odom, 602. Aqueduct Co. v. Chandler, 131, Archer v. Helm, 1397. Archer v. Ins. Co., 840. Archer v. Jones, 393, 1185. Archer v. Lavender, 344. Archer's Case, 1010, 1013, 1016, 1046. Ard V. Pratt, 1336. Arden v. Pullen, 592. Ardesco Oil Co. v. Mining Co., 1430. Argall V. Pitts, 851. Argent v. Durrant, 655. Arena v. Santa Barbara, 1190. Arendt v. Mace, 440. Arlin v. Brown, 804. Armas v. Mayo, 29. Arment v. Hensel, 325. Armentrout v. Gibbons, 810. Armijo v. Armijo, 1163. Armsby v. Pinkerton, 175. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 1478, Armstrong v. Berreman, 401. Armstrong v. Bicknell, 308. Armstrong v. Bryant', 688. Armstrong v. Dalton, 179, 1190. Armstrong v. Kent, 1002. Armstrong v. Lawson, 268, 1290. Armstrong v. Luco, 883. Armstrong v.. Morrill, 1086. Armstrong v. Ross, 809, 989. Armstrong v. Stovale, 1306. Arneson v. Spawn, 1391. Amet V. Bailey, 717. Arnold v. Arnold, 363. Arnold v. Barnett, 1360. Arnold v. Blaker, 175. Arnold v. Brown, 387. Arnold v. Coburn, 819. Arnold v. Crowder, 48, 67. Arnold v. Holbrook, 175, 180. Arnold v. Mundy, 8, 96. Arnold v. Ruggles, 17. Arnold v. Stevens. 191. Arnold v. Wainwright, 713. Arnold V. Waltz, 431. Arnold v. Woodward, 564, 1163, 1168. Arnot V. Alexander, 511, 515. Arnsby v. Woodward, 539. Arp V. Jacobs, 431, 451. Arrington v. Arrington, 1333. Arrington v. Cherry, 1081, 1088. Arrowsmlth v. Trust, 1499. Arthur v. Wiston, 784. Arundel v. McCulloch, 199. Arundell v. Phipps, 387. Asay V. Sparr, 559. Asburnham v. Bradshaw, 1485. Asbury v. Fair, 1161. Ashby V. Palmer, 405. Ashby V. White, 3' 0, 202. TABLE OF CASES. Iv [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains 8S 1-735; Vol. 11, §8 736-1541.1 Ashcroft V. Railroad Co., 133, 137, 160, 1403. Asher v. Mitcbell, 855. Ashern v. Steele, 591. Ashhurst v. Given, 1065. Ashley v. Warren, 758. Ashley v. Wolcott, 207, 214, 215. Ashiirst V. Field, 398. Ashmun v. Williams 18. Aspden v. Austin, 493. Aspden v. Seldon, 245, 347. Association v. Brinley, 411. Aston V. Aston, 816. Aston V. Ingle, 440. Astor V. Miller. 533, 543. Astor V. Turner, 958. Astor V. Wells, 1351, 1866. Atchison v. Pease, 1397. Atchison, etc. R. R. Co. v. Morgan, 54. Atkin V. Merrell, 373. Atkins V. Atkins, 359. Atkias V. Bordman, 151, 167, 186, 194. Atkins V. Chilson, 521. Atl^ins V. Kron, 1074. Atkins V. Paul, 785, 1347, 1373. Aikins V. Thompson, 143. Atkins V. Tutwiler, 863. Atkins V. Uton, 1439. Atkins V. Womeldorf, 601. Atkins V. Yeomans, 417. Atkinson v. Cole, 644. Atkinson v. Cummins, 1400. Atkinson v. Dowling, 1105. Atkinson v. Greaves, 1300. Atkinson v. Hewett, 335, 337, 339, 857. Atkinson v. Hutchinson, 1017. Atkinson v. Miller, 800. Atkinson v. Minot, 878. Atkinson v. Orr, 117. Atkinson v. Phillips, 1394. Atlantic Dock Co. v. Leavitt, 1309. Atlantic State Bank v. Savery, 1368. Atlee V. Packet Co., 1353. Atterbury v. Wallis, 1367. Attersoll v. Stevens, 334, 338. Attorney-Gen. v. Abbott, 1343. Attorney-Gen. v. Algonquin Club, 1434, 1435. Attorney-Gen. v. Andrevrs, 1485. Attorney-Gen. v. Bank, 109. Attorney-Gen. v. Bayley, 1033. Attorney Gen. v. Bradley, 1485. Attorney-Gen. v. Brooks, 514. Attorney-Gen. v. Chambers, 10, 14. Attorney-Gen. v. Day, 950. Attorney-Gen. v. Downing, 1485. Attorney-Gen. v. Emerson, 10. Attoniey-Geii. v. Gleg, 1091. Attorney-Gen. v. Hackney Board, 313. Attorney-Gen. v. Johnson, 10. Attorney-Gen. v. Lloyd, 1485. Attorney-Gen. v. Local Board, 1434. Attorney-Gen. v. Marr, 1303. Attorney-Gen. v. Merrimack Manuf. Co., 288, 758. Attorney-Gen. v. Meeting House, 279. Attorney-Gen. v. Parmeter 10, 15. Attorney-Gen. v. Proprietors, 1043. Attorney Gen. v. Richards, 15. Attorney Gen. v. Rev. Copper Co., 311. Attorney-Gen, v. Terry, 15, 95, 1434. Attorney-Gen. v. Williams, 1434. Atwater v. Bodflsh, 141, 186. Atwater v. Russell, 1053. Atwater v. Savings Bank, 1368. Atwood V. Atwood, 363, 418. Atwood V. Cable, 484. Atwood V. Canrike, 1193, 1391. Atwood V. Vincent, 804. Aubert v. Maze, 1299. Aubin V. Daly, 110, 364. Aubrey v. Fisher, 304. Aubrey v. Middleton. 1,535. Auburn v. Goodwin, 191, 1190. Augusta V. Bornm, 367. Augustine v. Doud, 949. Augustus V. Seaboldt, 1130. Aulick V. Wallace, 1511. Ault V. Blackburn, 933. Aultman v. Jenkins, 464. Aultman v. Richardson, 784. Aultman v. Timm, 1280. Aurora v. Reed, 215. Aurora Fire Ins. Co. v. Eddy, 846. Austeberry v. Oldham, 1424, 1448. Austin V. Amhurst, 96. Austin V. Barrett, 674, 683, 696. Austin V. Brown, 1185. Austin V. Chittenden, 935. Austin V. Davis, 1533. Austin V. Oakes, 1499. Austin V. Parish, 533, 747, 748. Austin V. Sprague Manuf. Co., 783. Austin V. Railroad Co., 1386. Austin V. Stanley, 430. Austin V. Stevens, 393, 1185. Austin V. Underwood, 441. Austin V. Wacks, 816. Austin V. Willis, 433, 437. Austin, etc. R. R. Co. v. Anderson, 219. Auwerter v. Mathiot, 1368. Auworth V. Johnson, 330, 505. Avegno v. Schmidt, 1308, 1366. Averill v. Taylor, 901, 978. Avery v. Maxwell, 358, 359. Avery v. Railroad Co., 1454. Axtel v. Chase, 1443. Ivi TABLE OF CASE& lEeferences are to sections: VoL I, contains 99 1-735: Vol. II, 99 736-161L1 Aycock V. Kimbrough, 719. Aydlett v. Pendleton, 734. Ayer v. Ayer, 1539. Ayer v. Brick, 1431. Ayer v. Emery, 1413, 1454. Ayer v. Philadelphia, etc. Co., 1310. Ayer v. Stewart, 895, 983. Ayers v. Dixon, 868. Ayers v. Hays, 883. Ayers v. Ins. Co., 846. Ayers v. Jack, 1348. Ayers v. Leggitt, 1348. Ayling v. Kramer, 141, 1403, 1413. Aynsley v. Glover, 160. Aynsley v. Reed, 395. Ayres v. Harness, 1379. Ayres v. Probasco, 794, 1115, 1378. Ayres v. Railroad Co., 180, 1388. Ayres v. Wait, 983. B. Babb V. Perley, 350. Babcock v. Canfield, 960. Babcock v. Scoville, 536. Babcock v. Utter, 1165. Baber v. Harris, 1419. Bachdell's Appeal, 935. Backenstoss v. Stabler, 18. Backhouse v. Bonomi, 337. Backus V. Lebanon, 108, 109. Bacon v. Bowdoin, 76, 489, Bacon v. Brown, 631. Bacon v. Cottrell, 970. Bacon v. Goodwin, 871. Bacon v. Ins. Co., 837. Bacon v. Lincoln, 1436. Bacon v. Schoonhover, 863, 883. Bacon v. Smith, 337. Baden v. McKenny, 430. Badger v. Badger, 983. Bada;er v. Lloyd, 1033. Badger v. Phinney, 1383. Badger Lum. Co. v. Marion Wat. Co., 57. Badgett v. Keating, 1084, Badgley v. Votrain, 1051. Bagley v. Morrill, 1390. Bagnell v. Broderick, 1331, 1333. 1335, 1350. Bagot V. Bagot, 301, 303, 304. Bagott V. Orr, 95. Bailey v. Appleyard, 161. Bailey v. Bailey, 777, 1085, 1483. Bailey v. Boyce, 398. Bailey v. Briggs, 1539. Bailey v. Campbell, 679. Bailey V. Carlton, 1163. Bailey v. Carter, 983, 983, 987. Bailey v. Cobb, 83. Bailey v. Culver, 187. Bailey v. Dalrymple, 781. Bailey v. Galpin, 1376. Bailey v. Gould, 864. Bailey v. Hobson, 315. Bailey v. Hopkin, 995, 1005, Bailey v. Lord, 1117. Bailey v. Merritt, 911. Bailey y. Miltenberger, 8, 1443. Bailey v. Myrick, 818. Bailey, Petitioner, 395. Bailey v. Railroad Co., 109, 1351. Bailey v. Sisson, 715. Bailey v. Stevens, 133, 194, 365, 433. Bailey v. Trammel, 678. Bailey V. Wells, 499, 501, 510, 737, 1413. Bailey v. West, 380. Bailey v. Winn, 1075. Bailey v. Wright, 560. Bailie v. McWhorter, 1080. Bailie v. Treharne, 703. Bailis V. Gale, 379. Bain v. Cline, 1474, Bainard v. Newton, 313. Baines v. Baker, 466. Baines v. Ottey, 1514. Bainton v. Ward, 1107. Bainway v. Cobb, 83. Baird v. Beininghaus, 781. Baird v. Jackson, 66, 855. Baird v. Williamson, 309, 331. Baird's Appeal, 668. Bakeman v. Talbot, 143, 144, 150, 194. Baker v. Anderson, 303. Baker v. Baker, 1066, 1068. Baker v. Bishop Hill Colony, 803. Baker v. Bliss, 1396. Baker v. Bridge, 379. Baker v. Brown, 1080. Baker v. Clark, 790. Baker v. Compton, 810. Baker v. Dayton, 463. Baker v. Denning, 1305, 1478. Baker v. Frick, 143, 150, 194. Baker v. Haskell, 1330. Baker v. Heiskell, 344. Baker v. Holtpzaflell, 503. Baker v. Humphrey, 1830. Baker v. Ins. Co., 988. Baker v. Jamison, 463. Baker v. Johnson. 488. Baker v. Jordan, 1401. Baker v. Leggett, 470. Baker v. Leibert, 436. Baker v. Licht, 1391. Baker V. Mclnturff, 571. Baker v. McLeod, 995, 999. Baker v. Nail, 567. Baker v. Pratt, 500. TABLE OF CASES. Ivii LRefereace3 are to sections: Vol. 1, contains S9 1-735; Vol. II, S5 T3ft-1541.1 Baker v. Prewitt, 720. Baker v. Richardson, 157. Baker v. Stewart, 70a, 703, 704. Baker V. St. Paul, 171, 184. Baker v. Swan, 684. Baker v. Vinning, 1066, 1067. Baker v. West, 1293. Bakes v. Reese, 1131. Balcli V. Jones, 691. Balch V. Smith, 1193. Balcom v. McQiiestero, 333 Baldock v. Atwood, 140. Baklozier v. Haynes, 403. Baldro v. Talmie, 895, 1193. Baldwin v. Aldrich, 261. Baldwin v. Buffalo, 191. Baldwin v. Brown, 1391, 1898. Baldwin v. Calkins, 164. Baldwin v. Campfield, 1074. Baldwin v. Casella, 573. Baldwin v. Hatchett, 859. Baldwin v. Howell, 956. Baldwin v. Humphrey. 717. Baldwin v, Ins. (Jo- 848. Baldwin v. Jenkins, 77;j, 778. Baldwin v. Marshall, 1315. Baldwin v. Salter, 831. Baldwin v. Shannon, 1380. Baldwin v Spriggs, 1501. Baldwin v. Tuttle, 1396. Baldwin v. Walker, 543. Baldwin's Case, 757. Bales V. Pidgeon, 175. Balfour v. Whitman, 1458. Ball V. Deas, 666. 668. Ball V. Harris, 1118. Ball V. Johnson, 294, 734. Ball V. Nye, 213, 383. Ball V. Palmer, 678, 693. Ball V. Wyelh, 1192. Ballard v. Butler, 303. Ballard v. Carter, 819. Ballard v. Child, 1445. Ballard v. Demmon, 160, 163, 163. Baliard v. Dyson, 194. Ballard v. Hansen, 1194. Ballard v. Struckman, 233. Ballentine v. Poyner, 300. Ballentine v. Wood, 1000. Ballinger v. Bourland, 910, 911. Ballinger v. Worley. 968. Ballou V. Taylor, 895. Balman v. Lahman, 874. Balston v. Bensted, 235. Balstone v. Salter, 1068. Baltimore v. McKim, 1351. Baltimore v. New Orleans, 716. Baltimore v. Williams, 1394. Baltimore, etc. R R. Co. v. Nesbit, 109 Baltimore, etc. R. R. Co. v. Railroad Co., 618. Bamberger v. Geisen, 863. Bamforth v. Bamforlh, 998. Banbury v. Sherin, 503. 513, 633. Bancroft v. Cosby, 809. Bancroft v. Curtis, 1060. Bandy v. Cartwright, 493. Bane v. Bane, 151. Bangher v. Wilkins, 493. Bangs V. Smith, 1116. Bank v. Arnold, 950. Bank v. Bacharach, 834. Bank v. Bank of Cape Fear, 109. Bank v. Barry, 1076. Bank v. Baumeister, 783. Bank V. Bradley, 8l0. Bank v. Crary, 43, 1293. Bank v. Davis, 1868. Bank v. Dugue, 840. Bank v. Eastman, 1200. Bank v. Emerson, 965. Bank v, Haggin, 1334. Bank v. Kent, 1413. Bank v. Knapp, 808. Bank V. McVeigh, 109. Bank v. Owens, 1299. Bank v. Rose, 979. Bank v. Smisson, 470. Bank v. Wise, 543. Bank's Appeal, 968. Banker v. Brakes, 514. Banker v. Housman, 1203. Bankhead v. Owen, 810. Banks v. Haskie, 513. Banks v. Lee, 1287. Banks v. McClellan, 935. Banks v. Ogden, 11. Banks v. Walker, 931. Bannester v. Bannester, 403. Banning v. Bradford, 938. Bannister v. Carter, 1033. Bannister v. Way, 953. Bannon v. Angicr, 173, 191. Bannon v. Comegys, 716. Banta v. Wood, 893. Banton v. Campbell, 703. Banton v. Shorey, 838, 1343. Baptist Church v. Witherell, 17. Barbee v. Barbee, 1307. Barber v. Harris, 703, 705. Barber v. Shaffer, 1161. Barbieri v. Ramelli, 893. Barbour v. Barbour, 389, 409. Barbour v. Bowen, 1094. Barbour v. Lyddy, 143. Barbour v. Nichols, 838, 1343. Barclay v. Goodloe, 1086. Barclay v. Pickets, 548, 549. Barclift v. Little, 1330. Iviii TABLE OF CASEa [References are to sections : Tol. I, contains §§ 1-735; Vol. 11, SS 736-1541.1 Bard v. Poole, 924. Barden v. Overmeyer, 701. Barford v. Street, 1107. Barger v. Hobbs, 1168. Barker v. Avery, 1313. Barker v. Barker, 343, 376, 464. Barker v. Bell, 826, 1220, 1859, 1493. Barker v. Blake, 414. Barker v. Board, 166. Barker v. Dayton, 430. Barker v. Deignan, 1163. Barker v. Jenkins, 453. Barker v. Jones, 679, 716, 723. Barker v. Richardson, 157. Barker v. Rollins, 446. Barkley v. Wilcox, 214, 215, 218. Barksdale v. Finney, 17. Barksdale v. Gamage, 284. Barksdale v. Garrett, 383, 416. Barksdale v. Parker, 730. Barley v. Roosa, 948. Barlow v. Barlow, 106S. Barlow v. McKinley, 1431, 1432. Barlow v. Rhodes, 149. Barlow v. Salter, 1032. Barlow v. Scott, 514. Barlow v. St. Nicholas Bank, 1431, 1460. Barlow v. Wainwright, 617. Barmick v. Thompson, 1197. Barnard v. Ashley, 1286. Barnard v. Barnard, 895. Barnard v. Duncan, 907. Barnard v. Eaton. 864. Barnard v. Edwards. 383, 416. Barnard v. Lloyd, 153. Barnard v. Onderdonk, 945. Barnard v. Sherley, 209. Barnard v. Stone, 1095. Barnard v. "Wilson, 956. Barnes v. Barnes, 268, 271, 1319, 1475. Barnes v. Boardman, 718, 721. Barnes v. Dow, 1080, 1082. Barnes v. Gay, 866. Barnes v. Irwin, 1500. Barnes v. Leeds, 725. Barnes v. Lloyd, 188. Barnes v. Lynch, 721. Barnes v. Mawson, 1. Barnes v. JDller, 1374, 1875. Barnes v. Munro, 1066. Barnes v. Sabron, 207, 210. Barnes v. White, 430. Bamesley v. Pomel, 981. Bamet v. Hughes, 1461. Barnett t. Johnson, 1, 155, 183. Bamett v. Knight, 448. Barnett v. Nelson, 971. Bamett's Appeal, 1050, 1081. Barney v. Arnold, 1020. Barney v. Frowner, 414, 420. Barney v. Hays. 1476, 1491. Barney v. Keokuk, 8, 9, 15, 1248^ 1385. Barney v. Leeds, 431. Barney v. Little, 1338. 1340 Barney v. McCarty, 1341. Barnham v. Butler, 738. Earnhardt v. Houghton, 267. Bamhart v. Campbell, 1379. Bamhart v. Greenshilds, 1353. Barnhart v. Lockwood, 527, 531. Barnum v. Barnum, 295, 1120. Barr v. Galoway. 843. Barr v. Gratz, 1414. Barr v. Hatch, 1121. Barr v. O'Donnell, 1067. Barr v. Shroeder. 1286. Barrague v. ilanuel, 923. Barret v. Cobum, 678. Barrett v. Bamber, 1075. Barrett v. Blackman, 851. Barrett v. Failing, 347. Barrett v. French. 698. Barrett v. Hincklev, 767, 768, 864. Barrett v. Prentiss, 1388. Barrett v. Stradt, 1185. Barrett v. Tewksbury, 1316. Barrington v. Tristram, 1.541. Barron v. Martin, 982. Barron v. Paulling, 973. Barron v. Richard. 141, 1453. Barrow v. Isaacs, 521. Barrows v. Barrows, 873, 464, 466, 469, 1318. Barrows v. McDermott. 235. Barrows v. Webster, 1388. Barry v. Clark, 874. Barry v. Colville, 696. Barry v. Guild, 933, 1461. Barry v. Hale, 431. Barry v. Ins. Co., 769. Barstow v. Rockport Ice Co., 235. Barteau v. Merriam, 674. BartU V. Lines, 384. Bartholomew v. Hamilton, 69. Bartholomew v. Muzzy, 1003. Bartlett v. Bangor, 170. Bartlett v. Bartlett, 1226. Bartlett v. Beardmorc, 176. Bartlett v. Borden, 767, 854. Bartlett v. Brown, 1378. Bartlett v. Downes, 499. Bartlett v. Drake. 789, 1306. Bartlett v. Drew, 1063. Bartlett v. Farrington, 551. Bartlett v. Gouge, 374. Bartlett V. Harlow, 676, 1209, 1379. Bartlett v. Haveland, 65. Bartlett v. King, 1515. TABLE OF CASES. lix IHeferences are to sections: Vol. I. contains §§ 1-735; Vol. II, 68 736-1541.1 Eartlett v. O'Connor, 208. Bartlett V. Pickesgill, 1066, 1067, Bartlett v. Prescott, 1153. Bartlett v. Secor, 1171. Bartling v. Brasuhn, 779. Barton v. May. 981. Barton v. Morris, 1333. Barton v. State, 598. Barton's Case, 501. Bascom v. Albertson, 1486. Basford v. Pearson, 1426. Basber v. Nordyke, 830. Baskin v. Baskin, 1481. Basnight v. Smith, 1170. Bass V. Bass, 1066. Bass V. Estill, 791, 1311. Bass V. Gregory, 162. Bass V. Navigation Co , 366. Basse v. Gallegger, 892. Bassett v. Bassett, 1278, 1299. Bassett v. Durfee, 405. Bassett v. Hughes, 869. Bassett v. Manuf. Co., 207, 215, 225, 227. Bassett v. Martin, 1311. Bassett v. Mining Co., 895. Bast V. Bank, 516. Bastard's Case, 418, 729, 990. Batchelder v. Bank, 147, 266. Batchelder v. Hubbard, 134. Batchelder v. Sturgis, 1460. Batchelder v. Whitaker, 279. Bateman v. Burr, 900. Batemanv. Hotchkiss, 301, 303. Bateman v. Pennington, 1503. Bateman v. Pool, 474. Baten's Case, 198, 199. Bates V. Bates, 363, 429, 990, 1473. Bates V. Childers, 804, 808, 816. Bates V. Clark, 35. Bates V. Conrow, 983. Bates V. Dist. of Columbia, 698. Bates V. Foster, 1375, 1419. Bates V. Gillett, 1005. Bates V. Norcross, 1103, 1332, 1343, 1455, 1456. Bates, Petitioner, 1514, 1519. Bates V. Ruddick, 951, 818. Bales V. Seely, 703. Bates V. Shroeder, 319, 327. Bateson v. Green, 89. Batesville Inst. v. Kauffman, 865. Bath V. Valdez, 684, 1178. Bathgate v. Haskins, 936. Batfenhausen v. Bullock, 1311. Batterman v. Albright, 43. Battey v. Hopkins, 758, 1046. Battle V. Petway, 1088. Battle Square Church v. Grant, 533, 994, 1054. Battncr v. Baker, 1399. Bancum v. George, 1380. Bangan v. Mann, 157, 178. Baugher v. Wilkins, 493. Baughman v. Portman, 607. Baughman v. Bced, 60l. Baum V. Grigsby, 809. Baum V. Tonkin, 849, 964. Baumgartner v. Guessfeld, 1066. Bausman v. Kelley, 901. Bawell's Case, 1045. Baxter v. Bradbury, 1428, 1131, 1465. Baxter v. Childs, 976 Bay V. Posner, 1373. Bay V. Williams, 869. Rayley v. Bailey, 976, 1476. Bayley v. Greenleaf, 805, 815. Bayley v. Lawrence, 554. Bailey v. Muehe, 928. Baylis v. Amherst, 87. Baylis V. Young, 1343, 1857. Bayliss v. Williams, 1298. Baylor v. Decker, 94. Baylor v. Hopf, 67:^, 692, 1067. Biiynham v. Guy's Hospital, 614 Beach v. Ban-ns, 1448. Beach v. Cooke, 886. Beach v. Cram. 505. Beach v. Dyer, 1075. Beach v. Gaylord, 223. Beacn v. Haynes, 279. Beach v. Miller, 1431. Beach v. Shaw, 950. Beach v. Trendgain. 198. Beadle v. Beadle, 1003. Beadle v. Seat, 1059. Beal V. Car Co., 499, 501, 534. Beal V. Warren, 1294, 1296. Beal V. Sanders, 338. Bealey v. Shaw, 160, 210, 211 Beall V. Clare, 171, 184. BeaH v. Elder. 1056. Beall V. Evans, 678, 1178. Beall V. White, 500, 663. Beals V. Stewart, 183. Beals V. Case, 200, 1423, 1425 Beam v. Bridges, 1068. Beaman v. Russell, 1279. Beaman v. Whitney, 784, 1286. Bean v. Bacheldcr, 1393. Bean v. Bean, 877. Bean v. Coleman, 143, 194. Bean v. French, 137, 150, 1404. Bean v. Mayo, 919, 1431. Bear v. Snyder, 418, 990. Bear v. Stahl, 359. Beard v. Basye, 1443 Beard v. Beard, 384. Beard v. Duralde, 53, Beard v. Hale, 416 Ix TABLE OF OASEa [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains §S 1-735; Vol. 11, 88 736-161].] Beard v. Lufriu, 1205. Beard v. Morris, 956. Beard v. Murphy, 238, 239. Beard v. Rowan, 1030. Beard v. Smith, 962. Beard v. Westcott, 1028. Beardman v. Wilson, 583. Beardsley v. Crane, 1391, 1397. 1398, 1400. Beardsley v. French, 7, 1190. Beardsley v. Knight, 729. Beai-ss v. Ford, 802, 976. Beasley v. Clarke, 163, 1160. Beatrice v. Black, 174, 175. Beatrice Gas Co. v. Thomas, 233 Beattie v. Copper Co. 535. Beattie v. Dickinson, 814. Beattie v. Wilkinson, 294. Beatty v. Gregory, 134. Beatty v. Kurtz, 1405. Beatty v. Mason, 1174. Beaty v. Bordwell, 688. Beaty v. Harkey, 754. Beaubien v. Kellogg, 1398. Beaudely v. Brook, 143. Beaumont v. Kein, 1505. Beavan v. Went, 1149. Beaven v. Lancaster, 363. Beaver v. Beaver, 1059. Beaver v. Slanker, 789. Beavers v. McKinley. 1063, 1068. Beavers v. Smith, 430. Bebb V, Crowe, 430, 432. Beck V. Graybill, 1068. Beck V Railroad Co., 266. Beck V. Rebow, 77 Becker v. Smith, 525. Becket v. Cordley, 1356. Beckert v Whitlock, 462. Beckfordv. Wade, 1197. Beckley v. Leffingwell, 1008. Beckwith v. Howlaud, 514. Beckwith v. Mining Co., 960. Beckwith v. Talbot, 484. Bedell v. Berkey, 363. Bedell v. Wilder, 573, Beddoe v. Wadsworth, 1443, 1453, 1459. Bedford v. Graves, 1066. Bedford v. Kelley, 566. Bedford v. Terhune, 500, 533, 1329. Bedgood v. McLaln. 1379. Beebe v. Coleman, 543. Beebe v. McKenzie, 1413. Beebe v. Swartwout, 933. 1436, 1434. Beecher v. Galvin, 1174. Beecher v. Marquett, etc. Co., 940. Beecher v. Parmele. 655. Beehler v. Daniels, 362. Beekman v. Frost. 1338 Beekman v. Railroad Co., 106. Beekman v. Sikes, 769, 957. Beem v. Kimberly, 403. Beer v. Beer, 134, Beers v. Narramore, 1110, 1123 Beers v. St. John, 46, 78. Begole V. Hazzard, 1060. Behm v. Molly, 1078. Bfchrens v. Behrens, 1504. Beitenman's Appeal, 1511. Beith V. Beith, 1295. Belate v. White, 1058. Belcher v. Belcher, 1109. Belcher v. Burnett, 1003. Belden v. Carter, 1324. Belding v. Manly, 963. Belknap v. Belknap, 692. Belknap v. Dennison, 871„ Bell V. Bank, 793. Bell V. Bell, 459. Bell v. Denson, 1194. Bell V. Fowler, 1515. Bell V. Gillespie, 1033. Bell V. Goodnature, 1330, 1239. Bell V. Langworthy, 1168, 1171. Bell V. Mayor, 363, 963. Bell V. McDuffle, 810. Bell V. Nealy, 393. Bell V. Pate. 938, 931. Bell V. Phyn, 713. Bell V. Railroad Co., 88, 89. Bell V. Sawyer, 1394. Bell V. Twilight, 904, 1357. Bell V. Wilkinson, 887. Bell V. Wilson, 347. Bell V. Woodward, 143. 1377. Bellamy's Case, 87, 88, 89. Bellis V. Anderson, 640. Bellis V, Bellis, 676. Bellov. Kavarro, 733. Belioe V. Rogers, 944. Bellows V. Letchfield, 1457, 14G0, 1461. Bellows V. Sacket, 233. Bellows V. AVeeks, 795. Bellows V. Wells, 43. Belton V. Summer, 1501. Beman v. Buckmastcr, 1484. Bemis v, Scofield, 1490. Bemis v. Wilder, 539. Benagh v, Turrentine. 298. Bender v. Crawford, 1193. Bender v Dugan, 1375. Bender v. George, 536. Bender v, Stewart, 674, 679, 683. Bending v, Bending, 401. Benedict v, Barling, 147, 153. Benedict v. Gilman, 970. Benedict v. Morse. 648, Benedict v. Mortimer, 943. Benefleld v Albert, 674. TABLE OF CASES. Ixi [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains 88 1-735; Vol. II, §8 736-1541.] Benesch v. Clark, 1103, 1105. Benet v. Costar, 93. Benfey v. Congdon, 557, 641. Benham v. Kowe, 638, 906. Benhard v. Carrow, 954. Benner v. Porter, 1253. Benneson v. Bill, 937. Bennet v. Bittle, 553. Bennett v. Austin, 1094. Bennett v. Bennett, 1473. Bennett v. Biddle, 162, 175. Bennett v. Brooks, 1511. Bennett v. Child, 701, 703, 704, 705, 714. Bennett v. Clemence, 1163. Bennett v. Davis, 344. Bennett v.Garlock, 1101. Bennett v. Harper, 1076. Bennett v. Hawes, 369, 389. Bennett v. Hibbert, 1152. Bennett v. Hulson, 1065. Bennett v. Jackson, 1493. Bennett v. Keelin, 1441. Bennett v. Railroad Co., 262. Bennett v. Turner, 312. Bennett v. Virginia, etc. Cattle Co., 693, 697. Bennett v. Waller, 1205. Bennett v. Williams, 1385 Bennett Fem. Seminary v. Wlii'.ney, 1067. Ben nock v. Whipple, 625. Benson v. Bank, 1408. Benson v. Green, 836, 1334. Benson v. Hall. 1318. Benson v. Heathorn, 1077. Benson v. Morrow, 8. Benson v. Railroad Co., 315, 318. Benson v. Stewart, 897. Benson v. Tilton, 877. Bent V. Hill, 1433. Bent V. Rogers, 1375. Bentbam v. Wiltshire, 1110. Bentley v. Sill, 553. Benton v. Baxley, 790. Benton v. Nicoll, 83'V, 1339. Benton v. Richardson. 651, Benton v. Shreeve, 960. Benton County v. Czarlinsky, 852, 895. Bentz V. Armstrong, 219. Bercaw v. Cockerill, 836, 1344, 1351. Berch v. SheriflE, 430. Berg V. Anderson, 1033. Bergen v. Bennett, 984, 1108 Berger v. Duflf, 1091, 1115. Burgess v. Wheate, 1035. Burgland v. Frawley, 491. Berhaus v. Hutcheson, 887. Berkeley v. Smith, 156. Berkowilz v. Brown, 1184. Berkshire Insurance Co. v. Sturgis, 792 1321 Berlack v. Halle, 769, 928. Bermondsey v. Brown, 172. Bernardi v. McElroy, 1181. Bernel v. Hovious, 601. Berney v. Sewell 938. Bernhart v. Lymburuer, 951. Bernier v. Bernier, 1238. Berns v. Taylor, 805. Bernstein v. Humes, 774, 838, 1169, 1285, 1346. Berrien v. Conover, 383. Berrigan v. Fleming, 703. Berrington v. Casey, 493. Berry v. Bogges, 814. Berry v. Carle. 96. Berry v. Dodson, 454. Berry v. Ewing, 448. Berry v. House, 1318. Berry v. Skinner, 904. Berry v. Webb, 722. Berry v. Whidden, 693. Berry v. Whitney, 866. Berry v. Williams, 1051, 1083. Berryhill v. Byiugton, 831. Berryhill v. Kircher, 1347. Berryman v. Schumaker, 747. Berthold v. Holman, 3:^8, 768. Betles V. Nunan, 349, 703, 704. Berton v. Anderson, 1360. Bertram v. Cook. 566. Bess V. Williams, 12^9. Best V. Best, 744. 1537. Best V. Jenks, 380. 452, 464, 1173 Best V. Sanders, 722. Best V. Smith, 533. Bethlehem v. Annis, 754. Betsey v. Torrance. 1285 Bottle V. Wilson, 387. Betts V. Harper, 1490. Betti V. Jackson. 1504. Betts V. Sims, 468. Betts V. Sykes, 806 Betz V. Maxwell, 636. Bevans v. Briscoe, 307, 308, 571. Beverly v. Beverly, 1066. Beverly v. Brooke, 938. Beverly v. Ellis, 837, 1336. Beverley's Case, 1474. Bibb V. Thomas, 1496. Bice V. Nixon, 734. Bickett V. Morris, 8, 14. Bickford v. Daniels, 916. Bickford v. Page, 1429. Bickford v. Parsons, 748 Bicknell v. Bicknell, 799. Bickwell v. Comstock, 1192. Biddel v. Brizzalara, 869. Ixii TABLE OF CASES. [Befereuces are to sections: YoL U contains §g 1-735; Vol. II, §§ 736-]641.] Biddle v. Hussman, 547. Uiddle's Appeal, 298. Biddlesford v. Onslow, 993. Bidwell v. Evans, 1179, n9i, 1346. jBieman v. Wagner, 1194. Bierce v. James, 734. Bierer's Appeal, 403. Blerne v. Bay, 1396. Biffle V. Pullman, 451. Bigden v. Vallier, 860. Bigelow V. Bemis, 895, 1198. Bigelow V. Cassldy, 867. Bigelow V. Collamore, 577. Bigelow V. Forrest, 1366. Bigelow V. Hoover. 11. Bigelow V. Hubbard, 355, 1431. Bigelow V. Jones, 684, 1360, 1461 Bigelow V. Littlefleld, 731. Bigelow V. Morong, 449. Bigelow V. Sliaw, 233. Bigelow V. Stilpheii, 795. Bigelow V. Btringfellow, 978. Bigelow V. Toplill, 836, 1331. BigerstafE v. Marslow, 864 JSigler v. Furmau, 567. Bigler v. Waller, 909. Biggs V. Bradley, 1443. Biggs v. Ins. Co., 843. Biggs V. McCurley, 577, 578. Biggs V. Peacock, 1099, 1100. Big Itapids v. Comstock, 1190. Bilderback v. Boyce, 1116. Biles v. Railroad Co., 1405. Bill v. Paj ne, 1530. Billan v. Herklebratli, 393. Billinghurst v. Walker, 813. Billings v. Stark, 783. Billings V. Taylor, 370, 412. Billington v. Welsh, 1349. Bills V. Mason, 437. Bingham v. Kirkland, 1343. Bingham v. Salene, 133. Bingham v. Thompson, 781. Bingham v. Weiderwax, 1438. Binnerman v. Weaver, 1537. Binney v. Proprietors, 260. Binzel V. Grogan, 439. Birch V. Wright, 989, 991. Bi Cher v. Parker,- 647, 693, 696. Bird V. Bird, 1375, 1474. Bird V. Decker, 854, 1306. Bird V. Johnson, 1534, 1535. Bird V. Keller, 918, 988. Bird V. Morrison, 1072. Birksall v. Cropsey, 807. Birmingham v. Kirwan, 401, 406. Birmingham Warehouse & Elec. Co. V. Land Co., 1076. Birnie v. Main, 825, 837, 898. Bin whistle v. Vardill, 1144. Bishee v. Hall, 1369. Biscoe V. Biscoe, 1033. Biscoe V. Perkins, lOlO. Bishop V. Bair, 350. Bishop V. Bishop, 43, 73, 1290, 1293, 1485. Bishop V. Doty, 601. Bishop V. Douglass, 869. Bishop V. Elliott, 7?. Bishop V. Howard, 617, 653. Bishop V. Howartli, 1513. Bishop V. Schneider, 837, 1337, 1340. Bishop's Case, 1328. Bislaud v. Bisland, 435, 428. Bissel V. Fletcher, 11. Bissell V. Taylor, 355. Bitely v. Bitely, 1060. Bivins v. Jarnigan, 1398. Bixler v. Saylor, 1419. Bizzell V. Nix, 818. Black V. Black, 712, 1073. Black V. Cobb, 795. Black V. Elkhorn Mining Co., 361, 363, 370. Black V. Gregg, 800, 803. 1313. Black V. Hills, 1383. Black V. Long, 826, 1359. Black V. Railroad Co., 1163. Black V. Reno, 460. Black V. Richards, 1490. Black V. Singley, 434. Black V. Williams, 1032. Blackburn v. Blackburn, 1061. B.ackburn v. Knight, 462. Blackmon v. Blackmou, 384. Blackman v. Riley, 1388. Blackmore v. Boardman, 514. Blackstone v. Butlemore, 1303. Blackstone Bank v. Davis, 740, 745. Blackwell v. Broughton, 431. Blackwell v. McLean, 725. Blackwell v. Ogdeu, 1121. Blades v. Higgs, 655, 657. Blagge v. Miles, 1116, 1123. Blain v. Harrison, 388, 435, 1444. Blaine v. Ray, 163. Blair v. Coxton, 553. Blair v. Hunter, 209. Blair v. Johnson, 1537. Blair v. Smith, 373, 467, 1396, 1397. Blaisdell v. Railroad Company, 261, 263. Blaisdell v. Stevens, 1350, 1355. Blake v. Blake, 1298. Blake v. Coots, 601. Blake v. Doherty, 1373. Blake v. Fash, 783, 1200. Blake v. Foster, 314. Blake v. Hawkins, 1116. Blake v. How, 679. TABLE OF CASES. Ixiii IReferences are to sections : Vol. I, contaias 8§ 1-735 ; Vol. II, §§ 736-1511.] Blake v. Rourke, 1475. Blake v. Sanderson, 536. Blake v. Taylor, 781. Blake v. Tucker, 1305, 1230. Blakely V. Calder, 724. Blakembre v. Stanley, 1420. Blakslee Manuf. Co. v. Blakslee, 1250. Rlalock V. Mlland, 1310. Blanchard v. Baker, 209. Blanchard v. Blanchard, 996, 998, 1496. Blanchard v. Brooks, 1445. Blanchard v. Ellis, 1310, 1428. Blanchard v. Morey, 788. Blanchard v. Railroad Co., 750. Blanchard v. Sheldon, 1061. Blancke v. Rogers, 61. Bland V. Lipscomb, 94. Blauey v. Beane, 337. Blaney v. Bearce, 768. Blaney v. Hanks 1200. Blank v. Kline, 1412. Blassingame v. Davis, 1158. Blauvelt v. Ackerman, 1096. Bleakley V. Ins. Co., 843. Bleckeley v. Branyan, 873. Bledsoe v. Mitcliell, 562. Bleecker v. Smith, 522. Bleidorn v. Coal Co., 1163. Bleidorn v. Pilot Mort. etc. Co,, 1385, 1391. Blethen v. Towle, 73. Blevins v. Rogers, 804. Blevins v. Smith, 390, 1465. Blight V. Blight, 112. Blight V. Robertson, 1210. Blight V. Rochester, 1194. Bliss V. Clark, 464, 1303. Bhss V. Collins, 135, 127. ]51iss V. Greely, 144. Bliss V. Kennedy, 147, 205. Bliss V. Whitney, 46, 67, 78. Blizzard v. Craigmlles, 802. Block V. Ishara, 250, 253, 253, 257. Block V. Pfafl, 1884. Blodgett V. Hildreth, 679, 1066, 1067. Blodgett V. Hobart, 790. Blodgett V. McMurtry, 1221. Blodgett V. Moore, 1500. Blodgett V. Rayalton, 171. Blondeau v. Snyder, 964. Blondeau v. Sheridan, 1460. Blood V. Blood, 363, 791, 1311. Bloodgood V. Ayers, 207. Bloom V. Noggle, 788, 799, 823, 826, 1351, 1359. Bloom V. Van Rensselaer, 899. Bloom V. Welsh, 43. Bloomfleld v. Johnston, 96. Bloomer v. Henderson, 1348. Bloomer v. Waldron, 1118. ' Blossom V. Brightman, 1379. Blossom V. Railroad Co., 947, 952. Blount V. Blount, 955. Blow V. Vaughan, 1372. Blue V. Blue, 439. Blue V. Leathers, 603. Blum V. Light, 439. Blum V. Mitchell, 981. Blum V. Rogers, 440. Blum V. Western, 153. Blumenberg v. Myers, 533, 535. Blundell v. Catterall, 15, 95. Blythe v. Ayres, 1146. Blythe v. Richards, 861. Board v. Babcock, 837, 1338, 1839, 1340. Board v. Martin, 1190. Board v. Patterson, 738, 1413. Board v. Trustees, 1454. Board v. Valentine, 591. Boardman v. Dean, 1293, 1299, 1321. Boardman v. Ford, 1400. Boardman v. Larrabee, 868, 967. Boardman v. Keed, 785, 1250, 1372. Boardeman's Appeal, 384. Boalwriglit v. Beekman, 100. Bobb V. Bobb, 1201. Bobo V. Richmond, 1176, 1397. Bodfish V. Bodlish, 144, 150. Bodwell V. Heaton, 796. Bodwell V. Nutter, 1066, 1071. Bodwell Granite Co. v. Lane, 625, 889, 1413. Boefer v. Sheridan, 318. Boehl V. Wadgymar, 803. Bogan V. Cleveland, 443, 467. Bogertv. Hertell, 1134. Bogert V. Perry, 1079. Boggess V. Meredith, 693, 733. Boggs V. Merced Co., 1331. Boggs V. Taylor, 1504. Boggs V. Varner, 1344. Bogie V. Bogie, 1454. Bogk V. Gassert, 777. Bogue V. Williams, 838, 1349. Bohall V. Dilla, 1243. Bohan v. Case, 1313. Bohanan v. Pope, 869. Bohannon v. Combs, 388. Bohn V. Davis, 906. Bohny v. Petty, 1399. Bohon V. Bohon, 1446. Boisclair v. Jones, 982. Boley V. Barutio, 693. Bolia V. Clark, 383. Bolles V. Chauncey, 878. Bolles V. Duff, 941, 943, 954. Bolles V. Smith, 1530. Bolles V. State Trust Co., 1084. Boiling V. Boiling, 398, 408. ixiv TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections : Vol. I, contains §S 1-735 ; Vol. II, §8 736-1641.] Boiling V. Hale, 719. Boiling V. Pace, 928. Boiling V. Teel, 719, 1216. Bollinger Co. v. McDowell, 1380. BoUo V. Navarro, 722. Bolman v. Overall, 1533. Bolster V. Cushman, 361. Bolton V. Bank, 1131. Bolton V. Bolton, 723. Bolton V. Landers, 518^624. Bolton V. McShane, 179. Bolton V. Oberne, 464. Boman v. Boman, 1130. Bomar v. Mullins, 703. Bompart v. Roderman, 719 Bonapart v. Carter, 1400. Bond V. Bunting, 1061. Bond V. Coke, 67, 68. Bond V. Fay, 1400. Bond V. Hopkins, 896. Bond V. Lockwell, 322. Bond V. Seawell, 1483. Bond V. Smith, 566. Bond V. Willis. 190. Bond V. Wood, 1251. Bond's Appeal, 1519. Bone V. Lansden, 1327. Bone V. Spear, 1476. Bone V. Tyrrel, 296, 1004. Bonelli V. Blakemore, 146. Bonetti v. Treat, 535. Boniel v. Block, 577, 579. Bonithan v. Hockmore, 973. Bonnell v. Holt, 808. Bonner v. Peterson, 389, 414 Bonner, Petitioner, 715. Bonny v. Redyard, 983. Bonomi v. Backhouse, 348. Bony V. Taylor, 1018. Boody v. Davis, 1320. Booker v. Tarwater, 1388. Boomer v. Gibbs, 1399. Boon V. McHenry, 1465. Boon V. Murphy, 809. Boon V. Orr, 73. Boone v. Boone, 404. Boone v. Chiles, 1344. Boone v. Clark, 738, 747, 748, 835. Boone v. Davis, 1055. Boone v. Hulsey, 1193. Boone v. Lewis, 1484. Booraem v. Railroad Co., 187. Booream v. Wood, 855. Boorman v. Sunnucks, 1385, 1386, Boorum v. Tucker, 379, 814. Boos V. Ewing, 809. Boos V. Morgan, 871. Booth V. Barnum, 1331. Booth V. Clark, 930. 754, Booth V. Goodwin, 473 Booth V. Ins. Co., 869. Booth V. Merriam, 593. Booth V. Oliver, 78. Booth V. Railroad Co , 238. Booth V. Starr, 1443. Booth V. Terrell, 994. Booth V. Wiley, 1326. Bootle V. Blundell, 1118. Bopp V. Pox, 371, 713. Borah v. Archers, 733. Boraston v. Green, 616. Boraston's Case, 1006. Boreel v. Lawton, 551, 553. Borden v. Clow, 986. Borden v. Downey, 1 002. Bordman v. Isborn, 558. Borer v. Lange, 1376, 1400. Borkenhague v. Vianden, 1391. Borland v. Dean, 1266. Borland v. Marshall, 343. Borland v. Nichols, 406. Borland v. Murphy, 426. Borman v. Sandgren. 490, 591. Borough V. Welsh, 389. Borst V. Corey, 896. Borst V. Empire, 137, 150. Borst V. Nalle, 1064. Borst V. Simpson, 746, 753, 755. Borrowes v. Ellison, 985. Borum v. King. 1296. Bosquett v. Hall, 431. Bosk V. Martin, 1097. Boskowitz v. Davis, 674, 1066, 1078. Bosley v. Schanner, 1398. Borstick v. Blades, 1,^27. Boston V. Binney, 563. 619. Boston v. Lecraw. 1251. Boston V. Richardson, 1251, 1393. Boston Bank v. Reed, 851. Boston Brock Co. v. Buffinglon, 583. Boston, etc. Corp. Co. v. Doherty, 189. Boston, etc. R. R. Co. v. Gilmore, 56. Boston, etc. R. R. Co. v. Railroad Co. 107. Boston, etc. R. R. Co. v. Ripley, 553, 553 Boston Safety Dep. Co. v. Coffin, 1510, 1511. Boston, etc. Trust Co. v. Mixter, 1055. Boston Water Power Co. v. Railroad Co., 108, 139. Bostwick V. Leach, 268, 1290. Bostwick V. Powers, 1341. Bostwick V. Williams, 1436. Boswell V. Buchanan, 1078. Boswell V. Cunningham, 1077. Bosworth V. Parenholz, 785. Bosworth V. Sturtevant, 1372, 1377. TABLE OF CASKS. Ixv [References are to sections : Vol. I, contains 88 1-735 ; Yol. II, §6 73S-1541.7 Botineau v. Ins. Co., 903. Bottomly v. Spencer. 387. Botsford V. Burr, 1064, 1066, 1067. Botsford V. Morehouse, ISOO. Bourne v. Bourne, 910. Bours V. Zacaariah, 1315. Boursot V. Savage, 1362. Boutelle v. Bank. 1012, 1113. Bovee v. Hinde, 1318. Boven v. Lewis, 1014. Bovey V. Smith, 1119. Bowden v. Bland, 1311, 1316. Bowden v. Parrish, 1312. Bowdish V. Dubuque, 567. Bowditch V. Anderson, 1098. Bowditch V. Chickering, 497. Bowe V. Hemking, 587, 591, 593, 593. Bowen v. Bassett, 1335. Bowen v. Beck, 869. Bowen v. Bowen, 747, 1130, 1540 Bowen v. Chase, 1051. Bowen v. Clark, 507. Bowen v. Collins, 373. Bowen v. Conner, 136, 187, 150. 1403. Bowen v. Guild, 1195. Bowen v. Haskell, 506. Bowen v. Lingle, 872. Bowen v. Manter, 881. Bowen v. Prout, 1373. Bower V. Hill. 140. Bowers v. Bowers, 368, 1390. Bowers v. Keesecker, 372. Bowers v. Smith, 1538. Bowers Sav. Bank v. Belt, 773. Bowie V. Berry, 173, 420. Bowlby V. Shively, 9, 1347, 1348, 1353. Bowler v. Curler, 1078. Bowles' Case, 301, 688. Bowles V. Hoard, 430. Bowles V. "Woodson, 793, 1338. Bowlin V. Burton, 147. Bowling V. Roark, 1285. Bowlsby V. Speer, 307, 215, 318. Bowman v. Foot, 533. Bowman v. Griffith, 1331, 1330. Bowman v. Ins. Co., 843. Bowman v. Long, 1056, 1057. Bowman v. Norton, 464. Bowman v. Robb, 1309. Bownan v. Robinson, 1346. Bowne v. Walcott, 1461. Bowser v. Maclean, 4. Bowyer v. Judge, 667. Boyce v. Adams, 1085. Boycc V. Stanton, 1075. Boyce v. Washburn, 368. Boyd V. Allen, 834, 1099. Boyd V. Carlton, 430. Boyd V. Conklin, 316, 319, Boyd V. Doty, 739 Boyd V. Ellis, 1348, 1372. Bovd V. FuUerton, 433, 443. Boyd V. Graves, 1397. Boyd V. Hamilton, 1131. Boyd V. Harrison, 355. Boyd V. Haseltiue, 1310. Boyd V. Martin, 366. Boyd V. McLean, 1064. Boyd V. Sachs, 1535. Boyd V. Satterwhite, 1116. Boyer v. Ament, 1440, 1461. Boyer v. Boyer, 943. Boyer v. Joffrion, 1339, 1344. Boyes v. Carritt, 1059. Boyes v. Cook, 1117. Boykin v. Ancrum, 1019. Boykin v. Pace, 1061. Boykin v. Rain, 347. Boykin v. Rosenfield, 1390. Boylan v. Meeker, 1473. Boyland v. Deinzer, 744. Boyle V. Tamlyn, 360. Boyle Ice Co. v. Gotild, 837. Boylston Ins. Co. v. Davis, 1379. Boynlon v. Champlin, 809. Boynton v. Longley, 309, 319. Boynton v. Pierce, 978. Boynton v. Railroad Co., 1131. Boynton v. Rees, 1357. Boynton v. Sawyer, 369. Bozeman v. Browning, 1196, 1383. Bozeman v. Ivev, 813. Bozarth v. Landers, 931, 946. Bozarth v. Largent, 840, 344, 950. Brace v. Marlborough, 834. Bracken v. Cooper, 674. Brackenburgh v. Gibbons, 1033. Brackett v. Goddard, 43, 381, 1290, 1393, 1401. Brackett v. Riddon, 1357. Bradford v. Brooks, 895, 1193. Bradford v. Cressey, 8, 1393. Bradford v. Kents, 403. Bradford v. Loan and Trust Co., 462i Bradford v. Marvin, 804. Bradford v. Patten, 613. Bradish v. Gihbs, 1133, 1500. Bradish v. Schenck, 601. Bradish v. Yocum, 1380. Bradley v. Bailey, 309, 310, 871. Bradley v. Bradley, 1130. Bradley v. Boom Co., 151. Bradley v. Curtis, 813, 816. Bradley v. Derosche, 450. Bradley v. Fuller, 767. Bradley v. Luce, 1326. Bradley v. Outram, 936. Bradley v. Parkhurst, 931. Bradley v. Railroad Co., 904, 941. Bradjey v. Rice, 1386. Ixvi TABLE OF CASES. IReferencea are to sections: Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735; Vol. II, §§ 736-1541,1 Bradley v. Eiches, 1363, Bradley v. Boat, 542. Bradley v. Snyder, 980. Bradley v. Walker, 1331, 1333, 1431. Bradley v. Washingtou Packet Co., 143. Bradner v. Faulkner, 571. Brady v. Ball, 259. Brady v. Banta, 453. Brady v. Cassidy, 1380. Brady v. Valentine, 593. Brady v. Waldron, 856. Brady v. "Walters, 1058. Bradshaw v. Callahan, 714. Bradshaw v. Crosby, 1460, 1465. Bradshaw v. Hurst, 452. Bradshaw v. Remick, 463. Bragg V. Conrad, 380. Bragg V, Lyon, 734. Brainard v, Hudson, 838, 1346. Braintree v. Battles, 674. Brakely v. Sharp, 133, 156, 186. Brakken v. Railroad Co., 171. Bramble v. Kingsbury, 1338. Bramhall v. Ferris, 1079. Bratnhall v. Flood, 787. Bramlett v. Roberts, 1214. Branch Bank v. Fry, 1131. Brand v. Frumveller, 513. Brande v. Grace, 573. Brandon v. Carter, 1085, 10S6 Brandon v. Laddy, 1374. Brandon v. Moore, 448. Brandon v. Robinson, 745, 1080. Brandt v. Foster, 1460, 1461, 1465. Branger v. Manciet, 493. Brann v. Elzey, 387. Branson v. Hill, 1519. Branson v. Studbaker, 381. Brant v. Yincent, 630. Brant v. Virginia Coal & Iron Co., 1103, 1105, 1331. Brant v. Wilson, 1470. Brantley V. Ins. Co., 1303. Brasher v. Cortlandt, 9.53. Brass Foundry v. Gallentine, 64. Brastow v. Barrett, 850. Bratt V. Watson, 513. Brattleboro v. Mead, 1033. Brauna v. Glesige, 367. Brawford v. Wolfe, 1314. Brawner v. Staup, 1067. Braxon v. Bressler, 8. Braxton v. Freeman, 398. Bray v. Adams, 1373, 1380. Bray v. Hussey, 1404, 1413. Braythwayte v. Hitchcock, 617, 019, 652. Breathitt v. Wbittaker, 1490, Brearley v. Cox, 73. Breckenridge v. Auld, 775. Breed v. Cunningham, 170. Breenden v. McLaurin, 678. Breeding v. Davis, 340. Brenner v. Bigelow, 566. Brem v. Lockhart, 824. Brendenburg v. Bardin, 1113. Brendrick v. Heygood, 1492. Brennan v. Durkln, 1066, 1067. Brennan v. Eggeman, 833, 1303. Brennan v. Whitaker, 49, 58, 64. Brennan v. Winkler, 1513. Brent's Case, 1040. Urereton v. Miller, 964. Bresce v. Stiles, 429. Bresnahan v. Bresnahan, 943, 1454. Brett V. Cumberland, 128. Bretz V. Matney, 402. Brew V. Vandeman, 1452. Brewer V. Blougher, 1148. Brewer v. Connell, 378, 386. Brewer v. Conover, 619. Brewer v. Dyer, 532. Brewer v. Hamer, 1143, 1146. Brewer v. Hjnkraan, 978. Brewer v. Marshall, 131, 140, 141, 1424, 1448, 1452. Brewer v. Nash, 874. Brewster v. Games, 863, Brewster v. Kitchin, 743. Brewster v. McCall, 1485. Brewster v. McNab, 563. Briar v. Robertson, 617. Brice v. Lane, 777. Brice v. Randall, 173. Brice v. Smith, 1033. Brice v. Stokes, 1093. Brick V. EUames, 798. Bricker v. Bricker, 1441. Brickett v. Morris, 8, 14. Brickett v. SpofEord, 1177, 1195. Bridge v. Abbot, 1514. Bridge Co. v. Kirke, 334. Bridgeford v. Barbour, 688. Bridgeport v. Blinn, 978. Bridgeport Bank v. Railroad Co., 794. Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken, 109. Bridger v. Pierson, 1404. Bridges v. Johnson, 476. Bridges V. Purcell, 261, 369, 270. Bridges v. Smyth, 559. Bridgewater v. Batton, 279. Brldwell v. Clark, 831. Brier v. Brinkman, 945. Briggs V. Greene, 1148. Briggs V. Hall, 553. Briggs V. Hannawald, 934. Briggs V. Oaks, 609, 610. Briggs V. Rice, 780. Briggs V. Bholes, 933. TABLE OF CASES. Ixvii rRef erences are to sections ; Vol. I, contains i% 1-735 ; Vol. 11, 8S 736-15il.l Briggs V. Upton, 1514. Brigham v. Brown, 1335. Bright V. Buckman, 782. 828, 1346. Bright V. Dunn, 162. Bright V. Knight, 1066. Bright V. Penny wit, 954. Bright V. Walker, 160, 163. Bright's Appeal, 1489. Brightman v. Brightman, 1033. Brightman v. Chapin, 146. Brighton v. Wilkinson, 109. Brill V. Brill, 139, 144, 150, 197. Brill V. Stiles, 1341, 1344. Brimmer v. Sohier, 1499. Brindley v. Grau, 298. BringhofE v. Munzenmaier, 63. Brinkerhoff v. Everett, 472. Brinkman v. Jones, 311, 776, 783, 1350. Brinkman v. Ruegge.sick, 1473. Brisbane v. Stoughton, 783. Brison v. Brison, 1067, 1076, 1078. Bristoe Sav. Bank v. Stiger, 866. Bristow V. Cormican, 96, 1386, 1387. Bristow V. Wood, 1424. Bfittain v. McKay, 43. Briltain v. Rositter, 783. Brittin v. Handy, 674. Brittinum v. Jones, 693, 695. Britton V. Hunt, 938. Britton v. January, 1351. Britton v. Twinging, 1033. Broach v. Powell, 474. Broadbentv. Ramsbotham, 231. Broadup v. Woodman, 1059, 1030. Broadway Nat. Bank v. Adams, 1080. Broadwell v. Merritt, 1306. Brobs V. Brock, 853, 960. Brock V. Brock, 1059, 1076. Brock V. Bruce, 830. Brock V. Eastman, 733. Brock V. Smith, 73. Brockleherst v. Jessop, 1183. Brockway v. Wells, 803. Broderick v. Broderick, 1483. Brokaw v. Brokaw, 399. Brokaw v. Hudson, 1519. Broliar v. Marquis, 1413. BroUey v. Lapham, 931. Bromfield v. Crowder, 996, Bromley v. Mitchell, 1277. Brouson v. Coffin, 260, 1430, 1431, 1448, 1451, 1460. , Bronson v. Kinzie, 986. BroDson v. Phelps, 1514, 1519. Bronson v. Thompson, 1196. Brooger v. Neece, 1160. Brookfleld v. Goodrich, 826. Brookfleld v. Williams, 733. Brookhaven v. Smith, 1401. BrookhaTen v. Strong, 9i, 94, 96. Brookings v. White, 849. Brooklyn v. Smith, 8, 233. Brooklyn Fire Ins. Co. v. Bledsoe, 753. Brook Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 845. Brooks V. Avery, 985. Brooks V. Black, 1461, 1463, 1463, 1464. Brooks V. Collins, 443. Brooks V. Curtis, 852, 253, 357, 1431. Brooks V. DuflBe, 1483. Brooks V. Everett, 346, 363, 374, 990. Brooks V. Galster, 43, 306. Brooks V. Jones, 379. Brooks V. Lester, 831. Brooks V. Marbury, 1050. Brooks V. McMeekin, 379, 385, 386. Brooks V. Moody, 1431. Brooks V. Pearson. 1080. Brooks V. Reynolds, 156, 200. Brooks V. Rice, 873. Brooks V. Rogers, 532, 569, 575, 1179. Brooks V. Shelton,-1066. Brooks V. Washington, 713. Brooks V. Woodson. 1482. Brooks V. Young, 808, 816. Brook's Appeal, 836, 1331. Brookville, etc. Hydraulic Co. v. But- ler, 336. Broom v. Broom, 707. Broome v. Davis, 433, 435. Brophy Min. Co. v. Mining Co., 838, 851, 1347. Brossart v. Carlet, 140. Brothers v. Porter, 1064. Brotherton v. Hatt, 1368. Brotzman's Estate, 744, 1537. Brovard v. Hoeg, 935. Brown v. Alabaster, 154. Brown v. Anderson, 1404. Brown v. Bank, 863, 973, 1478. Brown v. Banner Oil Co., 1330. Brown v. Bates, 668, 837. Brown v. Berry, 154. Brown v. Bigley, 1332. Brown v. Bocquin, 1161, 1168. Brown v. Bowen, 202, 233. Brown v. Bragg, 479. Brown v. Bridges, 1004. Brown v. Brown, 724, 783, 802, 805, 937, 1028, 1193, 1194, 1498, 1503, 1505, 1513. Brown v. Budd, 807. Brown v. Burkenmeyer, 154. Brown v. Butler, 534. Brown v. Caldwell, 738, 1412. Brown v. Cascaden, 849. Brown v. Chase, 939. Brown v. Cockerell, 1159, 1176, 1399 Brown v. Corielt, 936. Brown v. Cowan, 833. Brown v. Cozard, 445, 446. Ixviii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections : Vol. 1, contains §§ 1-735 ; Vol. II, §§ 736-1541.1 Brown v. Cranberry, 723. Brown v. Cunningham, 234. Brown v. Dean, 837. Brown v. DeGroff, 91. Brown v. Delaney, 901. Brown v. Dickerson, 1436. Brown v. Ditman, 956. Brown v. Doane, 1075. Brown v. Elect. Light Co., 51, 75, 78. Brown v. Frost, 959. Brown v. Gaffney, 828, 976, 979. Brown v. Graves, 1079. Brown v. Hallett, 1476. Brown v. Haman, 674. Brown v. Harper, 830. Brown v. Higgs, 1113, 1530. Brown v. Hogle, 678. Brown v. Huger, 1391, 1393. Brown v. Hummel, 109. Brown v. Illins, 330, 333. Brown v. Ins. Co. 809. Brown v. Jackson, 1203, 1445. Brown v. Jaquette, 601. Brown v. Keller, 518, 634. Brown v. Kirkman, 836. Brown v. Lawrence, 995. Brown v. Lillie, 53. Brown v. Lunt, 1313. Brown v. Lutheran Church, 717. Brown v. Magorty, 495, 610, 643. Brown v. Maury, 785, 1373. Brown v. McKay, 893. Brown v. McKee, 1433, 1450. Brown v. McMullen, 715. Brown v. Metz, 1443. Brown v. Mitchell, 1473. Brown v. Moore, 1313. Brown v. Morrill, 1391. Brown v. Parsons, 513. Brown v. Peck, 740. Brown v. Phillips, 1116. Brown v. Powell, 533, 560. Brown v. Railroad, 318, 830, 1194. Brown v. Rickard, 1406. Bjown V. Ricketts, 1539. Brown v. Riss'eu, 367. Brown v. Robins, 338, 348. Brown v. Rockhold, 895 Brown v. Sanborn, 43. Brown v. Sav. Bank, 1431. Brown v. Schley, 1101. Brown v. Sims, 559. Brown v. Smith, 830. Brown v. Stackhouse, 559. Brown v. Staples, 1457. Brown v. Sterrett, 1134. Brown v. Stewart, 768. Brown v. Thurston, 616. Brown v. Turner, 1071. Brown v. Vaulier, 815. Brown v. Vandergrift, 338, 630. Brown v. Waite, 1366. Brown v. Wellington, 693. Brown v. Williams, 390. Brown v. Wilson, 1459. Brown v. Winthrop, 1051. Brown's Petition, 398. Brown Oil Co. v. Caldwell, 139a Browne v. Amyot, 124. Browne v. Blice, 318. Browne v. Brockover, 340. Browne v. Browne, 722, 895. Browne v. Kennedy, 96. Browne v. Lamb, 1093. Brownell v. Brownell, 733. Brownell v. Welch, 039. Brownell v. Winnie, 795. Brownfield v. Wilson, 1498. Browning v. Harris, 363. Browning v. Ins. Co., 841. Browning v. Wright, 1419. Brownlee v. Allen, 711. Brownlee v. Arnold, 890. Brownson v. Chapman, 17. Brownson v. Hull, 703. Bruce v. Nicholson, 348, 350, 136&. Bruce v. Osgood, 730. Bruce v. Schuyler, 109. Bruce v. Slemp, 1155. Bruce v. Strickland, 465. Bruce v. Tilson, 821. Bruce v. Wood, 350. Brudenell v. Blwes, 1038, 1106, 1131, 1106. BrufEett v. Railroad Co., 109. Brumfield v. Reynolds, 659. Brundred v. Walker, 1305. Bruner v. Bateman, 464. Bruner v. Briggs, 1530. Brunson v. Morgan, 707. Brunswlck-Balke-Collender v. Her-^ rick, 770. Brunswick - Balke - CoUender Co. v. Rees, 588. Brush V. Brush, 1503. Brush V. Ware, 1350. Bryan v. Atwater, 686. Bryan v. Batchelder, 393, 393. Bryan v. Bradley, 1363. Bryan v. Erskine, 850. Bryan V. Ins. Co., 847. Bryan v. Lawrence, 61. Bryan v. Page, 633. Bryan v. Ramirez, 1338. Bryan v. Uland, 1445. Bryan v. Whistler, 143, 270. Bryan v. Wisner, 1373. Bryant v. Crosby, 43. Bryant v. Pennell, 1393. Bryant v. Pugh, 007, 608. TABLE OF CASES. Ixix IReferences are to sections : Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735; Vol. II, S§ 735-1641.] Bryant v. Richmond, 883. Bryden v. Campbell, 791, 1311, 1331. Bryson v. Holbrook, 1530. Bubb V. Yelverton, 339. Bubier v. Roberts, 381. Buccleuch v. Metropolitan Board, 15, 1251. Buchan v. Sumner, 707, 708, 713. Buchanan v. Balkum, 1344. Buchanan r. Bank, 823, 838, 1343. Buchanan v. Curtis, 166, 171, 174. Buchanan r. Ins. Co., 890, 893. Buchanan v. King, 665. 674 Buchanan v. Nash, 1133. Buck V. Adams, 1430. Buck V. Buck, 394. Buck V. Conlogue, 453. Buck V. Fisher, 936. Buck V. HoUoway, 838, 1350. Buck V. Ins. Co., 839, 814. Buck V. Lantz, 995, 1003. Buck V. Martin, 733. Buck V. Payne, 770. Buck V. Pickwell, 338, 1390. Buckelew v. Snedeker, 693. Buckeridge v. Ingram, 1477. Buckey v. Buckey, 1280. Buckhart v. Howard, 811. Buckholder v. Casad, 793, 1318. Buckingham v. Clark, 1075. Buckingham v. Morrison, 1096. Buckinghamshire v. Drury, 397. Buckland v. Buttorfleld, 77. Buckle V. Mitchell, 1394. Buckley v. Buckley, 83, 713. Buckley v. Daley, 770. Buckley v. Early, 1333. Buckley v. Sup. Court, 715 Bucklin v. Truell, 211, 233. Bucknall's Case, 1338. Buckout V. Swift, 66, 330, 856. Buckworth v. Thirkell, 340, 346, 376, 1046. Budd V. Brooke, 1392. Buie V. Buie, 1075. Buel V. Buel, 563. Buel V. Farwell, 938. Buffalo Co. Nat. Bank v. Hanson, 500. Buffalo Steam Eng. Works v. Ins. Co., 841. Buffingham v. Sears, 359. Bufflngton v. Bank, 406. Buffln^ton v. Maxson, 1065. Buffum V. Buffum, 707, 708. Buffum V. Harris, 318, 334, 335. Buglar V. Ross, 1472. Building Asso. v. Berger, 48. Building Asso. v. Clark, 833, 1339, 1351. Bukup V. Valentine, 559 Bulfer V. Willigrod, 1061. Bulkley v. Devine, 487, 489. Bulkley v. Dolbeare, 329. Bull V. Coe, 474. Bull V. Maloney, 933. Bull V. Pritchard, 1133. Bull V. Sykes, 803. Bull V. Walker, 1058. Bull's Petition, 190, 956, Bullard v. Bowels, 366. BuUard v. Briggs, 355. Bullard v. Dimlap, 533. Bullard v. Green, 960. Bullard v. Perry, 1138, 1157. BuUis V. Noble, 1228. Bulling V. Ellice, 1519. Bullock V. Bennett, 1512. Bullock V. Dommitt, 320, 505. Bullock V. Knox, 722, 1145. Bullock V. Stones, 1030. Bullock V. Whipp, 788. Bulwer v. Bulwer, 307, 571. Bulwer v. Jay, 1516. Bunch V. Grave, 877. Bunch V. Nicks, 1411. Bunckle v. Railroad Co., 1377. Bundy v. Bundy, 1086. Bundy v. Cunnmgham, 946. Bunker v.Barron, 778, 878. Bunker v. Gordon, 1364. Bunker v. Locke, 333, 430, 856. Bunn V. Frost, 839. Bunn V. Wells, 1372. Bunn V. Winthrop, 1063. Bunnell v. Taintor, 1073. Bunting V. Saltz, 468. Bunting v. Speck, 995, 999. Bunton v. Richardson, 545, 618, 651. Buras v. O'Brien, 11. Burbank v. Bethel, 591. Burbank v. Pillsbury, 138, 558, 1451. Burchard v. Hubbard, 1073. Burchard v. Roberts, 679. Burchell v. Osborne, 951. Burden v. Knight, 631. Burden v. Sheridan, 1061. Burden v. Taylor, 738. Burden v. Thayer, 543, 989, 991, 993. Burdgc V. Walling, 1024. Burdett v. May, 1067. Burdett v. Hopegood, 1515. Burdiok v. Briggs, 393. Burdick v. Cheadle, 593. Burger v. Boyd, 505. Burgess v. Bowles, 459. Burgess v. Fairbanks, 816. Burgess v. Hargrove, 449. Burgess v. Millican, 809. Burgess v. Muldoon, 347. Burgess v. Wbeate, 278, 1366. TABLK OF CASES. [References are to sections : Vol. I, contains §S 1-735 ; Vol. II, 98 736-1641,1 Burgett V. Williford, 676. Burhan v. Burhan, 724. Burghardt v. Van Deusen, 727, 723. Burgin v. Burgin, 1079. Burk V. Baxter, 61. Burk V. Hill, 1431. Burk V. Lewis, 502. Burke v. Andrews, 1066. Burke v. Beveridge, 1428, 1465. Burkett v. Burkett, 466. Burkett v. Wliittemore, 1117, 1485, 1508. Burkhalter v. Jones, 488. Burkitt V. Harper, 832. Burks V. Lee, 1510. Burleigh v. Clough, 997, 998, 1003, 1102, 1105, 1529. Builey V. Brooks, 938. Eurley v. Pike, 337. Burling v. Read, 655. Burlingamc v. Brewster, 795. Burlington University v. Barnett, 1535. Burne v. Van Loan, 1508. Buraell v. Caldwell, 618, 619, 624, 816. Burnell v. Nelson, 617. Burnes v. Lynde, 355. Burnes v. Tuch. 582. Burness v. Williams, 1426. Burnet V. Denniston, 901, 979. Burnett v. Jersey City, 830. Burnett v. Pratt, 668, 860. Burnett v. State, 263. Burnett v. Strong, 737. Burnett v. Wright, 796. Burnette v. McCluey, 1373. Burney v. Torry, 1472. Burnhans v. Burnhans, 743. Burnham v. Kempton, 205. Burnham v. Kevins, 167. Burnham v. Webster, 100. Burns v. Bryant, 633. Burns v. Byrne, 677, 679. Burns v. Collins, 840. Burns v. Cooper, 601. Burns v. Dreybus, 695. Burns v. Gallagher, 154. Burns v. Lynd, 1278, 1300. Burns v. Martin, 267. Burns v. Taylor, 804. Burnside v. Merrick, 709. Burnside v. Terry, 484, 769. Burnside v. Twitohell, 50, 58, 61, 66, 67. Burnside v. Watkins, 725. Burnside v. Wayman, 800. Burr V. Beers, 813. Burr V. Lancaster, 1431, 1432. Burr V. Mills, 148, 154. Burr V. Stenton, 1416, 1419. Burr V. Stitson, 493. Burrage v. Mining Co., 936. Burrall v. Clarke, 367, 406. Burrall v. Hurd, 367, 406. Burrellv. Burrell, 1158, 1176. Burrill v. Boardman, 1022, 1521. Burrill V. Sheild, 1091, Burris v. Page, 363. Burroughs v. De Couts, 1218. Burroughs v. Satterlee, 226, 229, Burrows v. Bangs, 886. Burrows v. Guest, 182. Burrows v. Molloy, 891. Burson v. Huntington, 1225. Burrus v. Meadors, 678. Burt V. Cook Sheep Co., 416. Burt V. Wilson, 805. Burton v. Barclay, 501, 510. Burton v. Perry, 871. Burton v. Reedf, 1428, 1461. Burton v. Scherpf, 267. Burton v. Wells, 1323. Burtners v. Keran, 1003. Burwell v. Fauber, 838, 1350. Burwell v. Hobson, 140, 205. Bury V. Pope, 234. Bury V. Young, 1322, 1324. Busch V. Huston, 678, 679, 684, 1178. Buse V. Page, 803. Buse V. Russell, 14. Busey v. Hardin, 952. Busey v. Reese, 1395. Bush V. Adams, 1167. Bush V. Bradley, 698. Bush V. Bush, 363, 1356. Bush V. Cooper, 1310. Bush V. Gamble, 697. Bush V. Lisle, 1473. Bush V. Macklin, 884, 955. Bush V. Marshall, 782. Bush V. Megee, 1475. Bush V. Sherman, 901. Bushell V. Bushell, 833, 1329. Bushey V. Glenn, 1169. Buss V. Dyer, 154. Busse's Estate, 452. Buszard v. Capel, 115, 544. Butcher v. Butcher, 556, 656. Buter V. Devoll, 634. Butler v. Baker, 1286. Butler V. Barnes, 1461, 1464 Butler V. Butler, 885. Butler V. Cushing, 592. Butler V. Gale, 1431. Butler V. Godley, 1084. Butler V. Howe, 985. Butler V. Huestls, 1119. Butler V. Manny, 497. Butler a. Miller, 879. Butler V. Page, 337. TABLE OF OASES. Ixx'i [HeferencBS are to sections : Vol. I, contains 8§ 1-735 : Vol. II, 8S 736-1541.1 Butler V. Peck, 215, 219. Butler V. Roys, 1379. Butler V. Taylor. 867. Butler V. Thornburg, 366, 367, 369. Butler V. Williams, 928. Butler's Case, 1410. Butler Bank v. Osborne, 708. Butrlck Y Tilton, 94, 1319. Butt V. Riffe, 1432. Butte Land, etc. Co. v. Vaughn, 810. Buttenuth v. St. Louis Bridge Co., 8, 11. Butterbausrli's Appeal, 296. ButterfielcT v. Butterfield, 1017. Butterfield v. Hamvant, 1511. Butterfield v. Reed, 188. Butterfield v. Wicks, 429. Butterfield v. Wilton Acad.. 740. Butteiworlh v. Crawford, 154. Buttlar V. Rosenblath, 703, 704. Button V. Schroyer, 807, 810. Button V. Tract Soc, 1515. Buttrick V. Wentworth, 910. Butts V. Broughton, 447, 978. Buzick V. Buzick, 355. Bazzell v. Gallagher, 719. Byan v. Luthy, 318. Byassee v. Reese, 268, 1290. Bybee v. Railroad Co., 1249. Byerly v. Humphrey, 874. Byers v. Byers, 769. Byers v. Hopple, 1491. Byers v. McClanahaii, 792, 1278, 1318. Byers v. Ins. Co., 842, 846. Byers v. Wachman, 1064. Byerss v. Wheeler, 785. Byington v. Fountain, 871. Byrd v. Byrd, 985. Byrd v. Forbes, 769. Byrd v. McDaniel, 982, 986. Byrne v. Taylor, 938. Byrns v. Woodward, 812. Byrom v. Chapin, 339. Cable V. Cable, 1050, 1311, 1405, Cadell V. Palmer, 1038. Cadmaa v. Peters, 781. Cadmus v. Fagan, 1431. Cadwalader v. App, 162. Cadwalader v. Bailey, 190. Cadwalader v. Tindall, 559. Cady V. Conger, 171. Cady V. AVaterCo., 208. Cesar v. Karatz, 573. Cagle V. Parker, 142. Cagger v. Lansing, 1328. Cagwin v. Buerkle, 1065. Cahill V. Layton, 145. Cahn V. Barnes, 1223. Gaboon v. Bayaud, 266, 274. Cain V. Furlow, 686. Cain V. Qimon, 985. Caiu V. McGuire, 268, 1290. Cains v. Jones, 1296. Cairnes v. Chabert, 296. Cairo, etc. R. R. Co. v. Packney, 830. Cairo, etc. R. R. Co. v. Stevens, 215, 217, 218. Cake V. Cake, 1371, 1378. Calder v. Chapman, 837. Calder v. Heegan, 1186. Caldscott V. Brown, 298. Caldwell v. Center, 1375, 1376. Caldwell v. Copeland, 2, 4. Caldwell v. Fulton, 2, 4, 1408. Caldwell v. Gale, 203. Caldwell v. Head, 1316. Caldwell v. Jacob, 1004. Caldwell v. Neely, 677, 678, 684. Caldwell v. Palmer, 707, 874. Caldwell v. PoUak, 463. Caldwell v. Seivers, 470. Caldwell v. Slade, 591. Caldwell v. Ward, 326. Calhoun v. Curtis, 693, 697. Calhoun v. Pierson, 1215, 1327. Calhoun v. Williams, 431. California Safe & Dep. Co. v. Elect- Light Co., 928. Call V. Barker, 723. Callahan v. Larson, 1348. Callahan v. Linthicum, 845. Callaham v. Robinson, 400, 401. Callamer v. Langdon, 859. Callanan v. Shaw, 937. Calloway v. Bank, 899. Calloway Co. v. Nally, 181, 191. Cally's Case, 1439. Calmady v. Calmady, 716. Calnmbet v. Paclieco, 1898. Calumet Iron & Steel Co. v. Lathrop, 67. Calumet, etc. Co. v. Russell, 1314. Calvert v. Aldrich, 690. Calvert v. Bradley, 538, 538. Calvert v. Rice, 300. Calvin v. Bowman, 1341. Calvin's Case, 1149. Calvo V. Davies, 868. Camden v. Anderson, 1074. Camden v. Vail, 809. Camden Bank v. Hall, 794. Camden, etc. Land Co. v. Lippencott, Cameron V. Gebhard, 430. Cameron v. Irwin, 908. Cameron v. Little, 027. Cameron v. Masoa, 804. Cameto v. Dupuy, 438. Ixxii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections : Vol. I, contains §S 1-733 ; Vol. II, §8 736-1541.1 Camoroa v. Tliermond, 733. Camp T. Scott, 554. Camp V. Wliitman, 153. Camp V. Wood, 580. Campau v. Baruard, 729. Campau v. Campau, 692, 1178. Campau v. Godfrey, 1271, 1379. Campbell v. Baldwin, 809, 817. Campbell v. Birch, 864. Campbell v. Braden, 1171. Campbell v. Campbell, 113, 367, 369, 371, 1472, 1488. Campbell v. Cavrutli, 1319, 1373. Campbell v. Carter, 543, 870. Campbell v. Clark, 1518. Campbell v. Dearborn, 772. Campbell v. Fetterman, 1179. Campbell v. Gas Co., 567. Campbell v. Hall, 1213. Campbell v. Holt, 895, 1192. Campbell v. Ins. Co., 844. Campbell v. Johnston, 785, 963, 935, 951 1372 Campbell v! Jones, 443, 1335. Campbell v. Karr, 177. Campbell v. Kuhlman, 131. Campbell v. Kuhn, 1282. Campbell v. Lacede, 720. Campbell v. Laramore, 1338. Campbell v. Leach, 1130, 1131. Campbell v. Lewis, 493. 536. Campbell v. Lowe, 714, 723. Campbell v. McComb, 950. Campbell v. Mesier, 250, 689. Campbell v. Morgan, 1322, 1375, 1413. Campbell v. Murphy, 369. Campbell v. Nichols, 1221. Campbell v. O'Neill, 48. Campbell v. Rankin, 816. Campbell v. Roach, 807. Campbell v. Roddy, 64, 65. Campbell v. Seaman, 161. Campbell v. Shields, 551. Campbell v. Smith, 161, 967. Campbell y. Stokes, 716. Campbell v. Watson, 1101. Campbell v. West, 160, 891. 930. Campbell v. Wilson, 160. Campbell's Appeal, 831. Canada's Appeal, 1483. Canal Co. v. People, 1386. Canal Co. ■». Railroad Co., 108. Canal Trustees v. Haven, 1385, Canatsey v. Canatsey, 1507. Canby v. Porter, 348. Candler v. Dinkle, 998. Candles v. Warner, 1059. Canfield v. Bostwick, 1518. Canfield v. Conkling, 886. Canfield v. Maguire, 1004. Canfield v. Sullivan, 1607. Cannock v. Jones, 1496. Cannon v. Boyd, 147. Cannon v. Hadley, 793, 1336, 1328, Cannon v. Hargadon, 318. Cannon v. McDanlel, 808. Cannon v. Stockman, 1197. Cannon v. White, 1333. Cannon v. Wilbur, 519, 578. Canterbury v. Atty.-Gen., 590. Cantine v. Brown, 1003. Cantrell v. Fowler, 581, 583, 585. Cantwell v. Moore, 566. Capek v. Kropik, 439, 438. Capel V. Girdle, 480. Capen v. Barrows, 1443. Capen v. Peckham, 48, 74, 75. Capens v. McKee, 131. Caperton v. Stege, 600. Capron v. Greenway, 186. Caravan v. Gray, 655. Carbray v. Willis, 149, 163. 187. 32a Carbury v. Cox, 1533. Card V. Bank, 831. Cardigan v. Armitage, 247. Care v. Keller, 383, 416. Carew v. Stubbs, 83. Carey v. Bertie, 743. Carey v. Bogle, 306. Carey v. Daniels, SiO, 1430. Carey v. Rawson, 803. Carithers v. Stuart, 874. Carithers v. Weaver, 567. Carleton v. Ridington, 269, 273. Carlin v. Chappel, 244. Carlin v. Ritter, 46, 51, 78, 79. Carlisle v. Carlisle, 1310, 1311. Carlisle v. Cooper, 163. Carlisle v. Graham, 94. Carlisle v. United States, 1366. Carlton v. Blake, 256. Carly v. Baughu, 1501. Carman v. Johnson, 1335. Carmichael v. Bodfish, 935. Carmichacl v. Carmichael, 383, 416, 1531. Carmody v. Mulrooney, 175. Carmody v. Railroad Co., 1176. Cam v. Haisley, 1168. Carnall v. Duval, 835. Carnegie Nat. Gas Co. v. Phila. Co., 488, 536. Carney v. Moshor, 562. Carolina Nat. Bank v. Senn, 453. Carpenter v. Bowen, 770. Carpenter v. BuUer, 1311. Carpenter v. Calvert, 1475. Carpenter v. Carpenter, 674, 768. 776. Carpenter v. Dexter, 791, 1311. Carpenter v. Gleason, 871, 872. TABLE OP OASES. Ixxiii [Befereac63 are to sections : Vol. I, contains S§ 1-735 ; Vol. II, §§ ra6-1541.] Carpenter v. Graber, 189. Carpenter v. Holcomb, 831. Carpenter v. Ins. Co., 839, 845. Carpenter v. Jones, 307, 571, 613. Carpenter v. Logan, 865. Carpenter v. Mitchell, 812. Carpenter v. Monks, 1163, 1176. Carpenter v. Muren, 1298. Carpenter v. United States. 563. Carpenter v. Walker, 58. Carpentier v. Webster, 677, 1178. Carr v. Benson, 865. Carr v. Eftiuger, 1468. Carr v. Ellison, 514. Carr v. Givins, 342. Carr v. Hobbs, 804, 805. Curr V. Rising, 776. ( arr v. Roberts, 1430. Carr v. Wallace, 86, 87, 89. Carrer y. Gough, 599. Carrico v. Fanners' Bank, 804. Carrig v. Dee, 156. Carrigan v. Drake, 1015, 1019, 1050 Carngan v. Evans, 723, 733. Carrigan v. Ins. Co., 842. Carrington v. Patten, 1309. Carrington v. Roots, 18, 43, 1393. Carroll v. Bonham, 1493. Carroll v. Bowles, 1039. Carroll v. Carroll, 1143, 1147. Carroll v. Norwood, 1373, 1379. Carroll v. Patrick, 1188. Carroll v. Richardson, 1540. Carroll v. SpofEord, 1339. Carrothers v. Jolliffe, 725. Carrow v. Headley, 871. Carruthers v. Sheddon, 784. Carson v. Blazer, 97. Carson v. Cemetery Co., 1446. Carson v. Dnndas, 1193. Cai-sou V. Fuhs, 344, 1011. Carson v. Godley, 577, 58S. Carson v. Murray, 379, 387. Carsons v. Winslow, 398. Carstairs v. Taylor, 496. Carter v. Bennett, 839, 840, 864. Carter v. Dale, 344. Carter v. Denman, 1430. Carter v. Flexner, 710. Carter v. Gibson, 1059. Carter v. Harlan, 270. Carter v. McDaniels, 363, 365. Carter v. Moulton, 1825. Carter v. Murcot, 93, 94. Carter V- Page, 146. Carter y. Stooky, 298. Carter v. Taylor, 733, 871. Carter v. Walker, 956. Carter's Appeal, 384. Caruth6r's v. Caruthers, 397. Caruther'sv. Humphrey, 769. Carver v. Bowles, 1039. Carver v. Fennimore, 690, 733. Carver v. Gough, 45, 48, 75. Carver v. Miller, 688. Carver v. McNulty, 1200. Carver v. Smith, 703, 704. Carwadine v. Carwadine, 1020,1046, Casamajorv. Strode, 953. Casburne v. Inglis, 447. Casborne v. Scarfe, 295, 344, 766. Case V. Green, 1210. Case V. McCabe, 803. Case V. Minot, 573. Case V. Peters, 781. Case V. Seger, 1072. Case V. Weber, 100. Case Co. v. Joyce, 438. Case Manuf. Co. v. Garven, 59, 64, Casey v. County, 175. Casey v. Iiiloes, 1251. CaSey v. King. 623. Cashman, v. Brownlee, 1163. easier v. Byers, 1374, 1378. easier v. Sliipman, 191, 960. Cassady v. Wallace, 902. Cass County Bank v. Weber, 433. Cassidy y. Caton, 891. Cassidy, v. Railroad Co., 217. Cassidy v. Say. Bank, 1374. Cassily v. Rhodes, 313, 957. Castle v. Elder, 1385. Castle V. Shipman, 191. Castner v. Riegel, 260. Cate v. Cate, 811. Gates V. Wadlington, 97. Cates V. Woodson, 1283. Cathcart v. Robinson, 1294. Catlin V. Decker, 1167. Catlin V. Ware, 378, 420. Catoe V. Cotoe, 1066, 1155. Caton V. Caton, 1477, 1531. Catterlin v. Armstrong, 855, 943. Catton V. Simpson, 795. Canflcld v. Clark, 1399. Caufman v. Sayre, 930, 986. Caughman v. Smith, 1364. Cauley v. Lawson, 384. Caulfield v. Maguire, 295. Caulfleld v. Sullivan, 407. Cavanaugh v. Clinch, 640. Cayanaugh v. Jackson, 1396. Cave V. Cave, 1367. Cave V. Craft, 147, 156, 1403, Cave y. Hastings, 484. Cavender v. Smith, 1235. Cavin v. Gleason, 1083. Cavley v. Porter, 348. Cawley's Estate, 1490. Cazas a v. Cazassa, 1154, 1155, 1318. XXIV TABLE OF OASES. [References are to sections : Vol. I, contain') §3 1-T35 ; Vol. II, 99 736-1541.] Cazenove v. Cutler, 973. Cazet V. Hubbell, 950, 958. Cecil V. Beaver, 1320. Cecil Bauk v. Snively, 1067. Center v. Bank, 1354. Central Bank v. Hume, 10C3. Central Bridge v. Lowell, 109. Central, etc. Co. v. Hotel Co., 57, 73. Central Transp. Co. v. Pullman's Car Co., 1333. Central Trust Co. v. Iron & Coal Co., 831. Central Trust Co. v. Railroad Co. , 854. Central Trust Co. v. United States Rolling Stock Co., 950. Cerf V. Pfleging, 166. Cerney v. Paulat, 895, Cesar v. Karntz, 591. Cessna v. Miller, 1534. Cliadbourn v. Henderson, 940. Chadeayne v. Robinson, 318. Chadock v. Cowley, 1001. Chadwick v. Island Beach Co., 866. Cliadwick v. Tatem, 399. Chafee v. Bank. 900. Chaffee v. Franklin, 868, 910. Clialker v. Chalker, 748, 752. Chalker v. Dickinson, 93, 97. Chalmers v. Smith, 495. Chalmers v. Storie, 398. Chamberlain v. Bell, 1315. Chamberlain v. Bracket, 1523. Chamberlain v. Brown, 431. Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 407, 1034. Chamberlain v. Dunlap, 503, 513. Chamberlain v. Hemmingway, 207. Chamberlain v. Gardiner, 817. Chamberlain v. Lyell, 931. Chamberlain v. Pybas, 569. Chamberlain v. Taylor, 1517. Chamberlain v. Thompson, 767, 858. Chamberlin v. Donalme, 619, 625. Chambers v. Alabama Iron Co., 300. Chambers v. Ilaney, 1331. Chambers v. Kingham, 510. Chambers v. Perry, 1093, 1118. Chambers v. Smilh, 1419. Chambers v. Wilson, 1031. Champenois v. Fort, 929. Champion v. Brown, 1337. Champion v, Munday, 141. Champliav. Champlin, 885, 1060, 1066. Champlin v. Foster, 938. Chan V. Brandt, 1391. Chance v. McWhorter, 1357. Chancellor v. Windham, 1411 Chandler v. Bailey, 1311. Chandler v. Barrett, 1475. Chandler V. Chandler, 770. Chandler v. Cheney, 701, 704. Chandler v. Dyer, 978. Chandler v. HoUingsworth, 885. Chandler v. Lazarus, 223. Chandler v. Simmons, 1382, 1283. Chandler v. Thurston, 309, 602, 612. Chandler v. White, 883. Channon v. Patch, 800. Chapel V. Hull, 825. Chapin v. Brown, 306. Chapin v. Crow, 1006. Chapin v. Hinkle, 975. Chapin v. Hunt, 1194. Chapin v. Mills, 406. Chapin v. Parker, 1499. Chapin v. School, 738. Chapin v. Sears, 723. Chaplin v. Chaplin, 286, 344. Chaplin v. Sawyer, 429. Chapman v. Beardsley, 804, 806. Chapman v. Bluck, 486. Chapman v. Chapman, 359, 809. Chapman v. Gray, 1269. Chapman v. Haskins, 94. Chapman v. Holmes, 1439. Chapman v. Lester, 446. Chapman v. l-'olack, 1876. ! Chapman v. Price, 340, 350, 351. i Chapman v. Quinn, 698. i Chapman v. Robertson, 986. : Chapman v. Schroeder, 388, 416. '. Chapman v. Sims, 1830. Chapman v. Thames Manuf. Co., 202, Chapman v. Towner, 630. Chapman v. Veach, 794, 057. Chapman v. Wright, 646. Chapman Valve Co. v. Oconto Water Works, 833. Chappell y. Railroad Co., 137, 1403. Charles v. Byrd, 518. Charles v. Charles, 384. Charles v. Dubose, 1094. Charles v. Froebel, 535. Charles v. Patch, 1372, 1380. Charles v. Rankin, 238, 243. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Riv. etc. Co., 107, 1233. Charleston, etc. R. R. Co. v. Leach, 733, 784. Charsley v. Jones, 494. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co. v. Gisborne, 804. Charticrs Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 3, 1407, 1408. Chase v. Alley, 384, 413, 413. Chase v. Bennett, 837, 1836. Chase v. Cartright, 1055. Chase v. Hall, 153. Chasd V. Hazelton, 337, 1004. Chase v. Kittridgo, 1483. TABLE OF CASES. Ixxv IReferenoes are to sections : Vol. I, contains g§ 1-735 ; Vol. II, SS 736-1541.1 Chase v. Marstoii, 914, 017. Chase v. Palmer, 784. Chase v. Peck, 799, 003, 804. Chasa v. Silverton, 221, 330, 331. Chase v. Stockett, 1059. Chase v. Sutton Mauuf. Co., 190. Chase v. "Williams, 867. Chase v. Wingate, 44, 1293. Chase's Case, 364. Chasemorev. Richards, 307, 331, 334, 337, 230, 238. Chastian v. Higdon, 716. Chatfleld v. Wilson, 308, 335, 337. 230, 332 Chatham v. Bradford, 837, 1339. Chauncey v. Aroold, 792, 1115, 1318. Chauncey v. Powell, 685. Chauteau v. Riddle, 1183. Chauvet v. Hill, 211. Chedel v. Millard, 867. Cheesebrough v. Green, 5, 249. Cheetham v. Hampson, 330, 505, 593. Chelton v. Green, 851. Cheney v. Straube, 1458. Cheney v. Teese, 1005. Cheney v. Woodruff, 839. Cheny t. Stone, 937. Chenowith v. Chenowith, 451. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 35. Cherokee Nation v. Railroad Co , 35 Cherry v. Arthur, 59. Cherry v. Bowen, 976. Cherry v. Greene, 1103. Cherry v. Matt, 1522. Cherry v. Stein, 156, 223. Chesebrough v. Pingree, 489. Chesley v. King, 230, 231. 336. Chesley v. Thompson. 691. Chesley v. Welch, 571. Chesuey v. White, 679. Chesnut v. Shane, 1374. Chesround v. Cunningham, 698. Chessman v. Whittemore, 1200. Chess's Appeal, 10 3. Chester v. Dickerson, 710, 1073. Chester v. Willan, 667. Chesterfield v. Bolton, 505. Chetham v. Williamson, 265. Chestnutt v. Gann, 1085. Chew V. Bank, 383. 416. Chew V. Barnet, 1314. Chew V. Chew, 1107. Chew V. Cook, 190. Chew V. Commissioners, 343, 344. Chew V. Farmers, 383. Chew V. Nicklin, 716. Chew's Appeal, 995. Chicago V. Drexel, 106. Chicago V. Gage, 1378. Chicago V. Garrity, 547. Chicago V. Iron Works, 1285. Chicago V. Middlebrook, 1170, 1189. Chicago V. O'Brennan, 582, 591. Chicago Attach. Co. v. Davis, 539. Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. v. Ft. Howart, 56. Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. v. Gait, 1163. Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. v. Groh, 1161. Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. v. Hoag, 162. Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. v. -Toilet, 1190. Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. v. Lewis, 1315. Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. v. People, 105, 106. Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. v. Quincy, 136. Chichester v. Cobb, 1478. Chick V. Sisson, 1318. Chick V. Willets, 769, 783. Chickering v. Failes, 1168. Child V. Baker, 1310. Child V. ChappcU, 171. Child V. Douglass, 1424. Child V. Starr, 1393. Childers v. Bumgardner, 343. Childers v. Childers, 1074. Childers v. Henderson, 453. Childers v. Lee, 030. Childress v. Monette, 912. Ch:ids V. Childs, 960, 979. Childs V. Dolan, 855. Childs V. Kurd, 78, 83S, 851, 1343. Childs V. McChesney, 1444. Childs V. Railroad Co., 315, 669, 691, 698. Chiles V. Gallagher, 1068. Chiles V. Jones. 1197. Chiles V. Stephens, 659. Chilton V. Braiden, 804. Chilton V. Brooks, 86'*, 901, 906. Chilton V. London, 89. Chipley v. Farris, 124.). Chipman v. Emeric, 324, 329. Chipman v. Hibbard, 339. Chipman v. Montgomery, 1539. Chipman v. Tucker, 792. Chippewa Lumb. Cc. v. Tremper, 743, Chirac V. Chirac, 1153, 1157. Chisolm V. Cliisolm, 429. Chism V. Williams, 1033. Chittenden v. Gossage, 894 Chittock V. Chiltock, 387. Chitty y. Parker, 1124. Choate v. Kimball, 48, 63. Choate v. Tigue, 804. Cholmey's Case, 1005. Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 983, 984. Chopin V. Runte, 439. Choteau v. Burlando, 898. Choteau v. .Tones, 679, 836. Choteau v. Thompson, 839. Ixxvi TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections: Tol. I, contains §§ 1-735; Vol. 11, §§ 736-1511.) 389. 553. , 408. Chouteau v. Railroad Co. Chretien v. Doney, 512. Christian v. Austin, 809. Christopher v. Austin, 553, Christopher v. Christopher, Christopher v. Sparke, 897. Christ's Church v. Lavezzolo, 156. Christy v. Dana, 803. Chris;y V. Spring Valley Water Works, 678, 670, 1178. Chubb V. Johnson, 1131. Chudleigh's Case, 1010, 1035, 1089, 104rl, 1046, 1263. Church V. Burghardt, 1199. Church V. Cliong, 650, 653. Church V Church, 373. Church V. Cole, 777. Church V. Gilman, 487, 1319. Church V. Grant, 1005, 1009. Church V. Kimble, 1039. Church V. Manuf. Co., 1538. Church V. McLaren, 403. Church V. Meelier, 93. Church V. Ruland, 1075. Church y. Smith, 804, 810. Church V. Sterling, 1077, 1094. Churchill v. Bauman, 315. Churchill v. Dibben, 1500. Churchill v. Evans, 359. Churchill v. Hulbert, 655. Chute V. Washburn, 737. Cihak V. Klekr, 154, 167. Cincinnati v. Church, 1190. Cincinnati v. Evans, 179. Cincinnaii v. White, 183. Cincinnati, etc. R. R. Co. v. Geise, 144. Cipperly v. Rhodes, 470. Cissna v. Haines, 879. Citizen's Bank v. Knapp, 58, 67. Citizen's Nat. Bank v. Dayton, 878, 936. Citizen's Sav., etc. Ass. v. Heiser, 1313. City Bank v. Smith, 754. City Fire Ins. Co. v. Mark, 846. Clader v. Thomas, 836, 1331. Claflin V. Case, 1440. Claflin V. Carpenter, 268, 1290. Claflin V. R. K. Co., 137, 150, 100. Clague V. Washburn, 1331. Claiborne v. Castle, 809. Claiborne v. Holland, 1090. Clancy v. Byrne, 589. Clancy v. Ries, 566. Clanghton v. CI mghton, 733. Clanton v. Estes, 999. Clanton v. Scruggs, 143. Clap V. Draper, 268. Clapp V. Boston, 366. Clapp V. Bromagham, 684. Clapp V. Engledow, 1415. Clapp V. Ingraham, 745, 1107. Clapp V. Maxwell, 965. Clapp V. Noble, 631. Clapp V. Spokane, 856. Clapp V. Stoughton, 747. Clark V. Adams, 1165. Clark V. Akers, 783. Clark V. Association, 1390. Clark V. Babcock, 598. Clark V. Banks, 307, 571. Clark V. Beers, 1093. Clark V. Burnside, 83. Clark V. Butler, 831. Clark V. Campau, 1161. Clark V. Clark. 344, 393, 704, 863, 1067. Clark V. Cogge, 153. Clark V. CollinG, 807. Clark V. Comfort, 1165. Clark V. Conroe, 1432. Clark V. Finlan, 773. Clark V. Ford, 546. Clark V. Fraley, 561. Clark V. Gilbert, 1163, 1171. Olark V. Glidden, 261, 267. Clark V. Harvey, 308, 571. Clark V. Henry 321. Clark V. Hershy, 695. 1075. Clark V. Holden, 300, 334. Clark V. Helton, 749. Clark V. Hunt, 814. Claik V. Ice Co. , 198, 84a Clark V. Iowa City, 113. Clark V. Jacob, 817. Clark V. Jackson, 877. Clark V. Keliher, 634. Clark V. Kraker, 950. Clark V. Lawrence, 313, 233. Clark V. Lindsey, 679. Clark V. Lineberger, 1434, 1436. Clark V. Manchester, 263. Clark V. Martin, 141, 750. Clark V. McNeal, 1357. Clark V. Merrill, 490. Clark V. Mlddlesworth, 296. Clark V. Milligan, 1287. Clark V. Munroe, 366, 827. Olark V. Parker, 157, 731. Clark V. Post, 1447. Clark V. Potter, 983, 984. Clark V. Providence, 1357. Clark V. Railroad Co., 363. Clark V. Raymond, 467. Clark V. Reyburn, 66, 386, 857, 974, 975. Clark V. Shannon, 464. Clark V. Simmons, 909. Clark V. Smith, 973, 1080. Clark V. Soule, 581. TABLE OF CASES. Ixxvii [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains 88 1-735: Vol. II, §8 736-1541.] Clark V. Stilson, 809. Clark V. Swift, 1457, 1465. Clark V. Tyler, 1532. Clark V. Vaughan, 683, 634. Clark V. Wheeler, 633. Clark V. Willson, 1155, 1311. Clark V. Zeigler, 339. Clarke's Appeal, 350. Clarke v. Cummings, 530, 533. Clarke v. Henckel, 143. Clarke v. Koenig, 469. Clarke v. McClure, 569. Clarke v. Royle, 805. Clarke v. Teriy, 849, 1033. Clarkson v. Clarkson, 298. Clarkson v. Pell, 995. Clarkson v. Read, 953. Clary v. Owen, 76. Clason V. Bailey, 1477. Clason V. Corley, 958. Clavering V. Clavering, 1051. Clay V. Freeman, 371. Clay V. Wliite, 343. Claycomb v. Hunger, 1443. Clayton v. Blakey, 616. Clayton v. Cagle, 1058. Clayton v. Corby, 96, 194. Clayton v. Liverman, 1490. Clayton v. McCoy, 693. Cleaver v. Burky, 935. Cleaver v. Matthews, 936. Clegg V. Hand, 1434, Clelland v. Cosgrove, 1338. Clemens v. Broomfield, 500, 635, 1329. Clemens v. Meyer, 1163, 1215. Clemens v. Murphy, 599. Clement v. Bank , 1429, 1453. Clement v. Bartlett, 1331. Clement v. Burns, 1251. Clement v. Burtis, 1453. Clement v. Durgin, 267, 270. Clement v. Youngman, 301. Clements v. Anderson, 179, 1190. Clements v. Cates, 674. Clements v. Kyles, 1391. Clementson v. Williams, 1193. Clecdaniel v. Hastings, 1378. Clepper v. Livergood, 344. Clerk's Case, 1416. Cleveland v. Booth, 891. Cleveland v. Choate, 1376, Cleveland v. Cohoes, 864. Cleveland v. Flas;g, 1397. Cleveland v. Hallett, 279, 1055, 1057. Cleveland v. Obenchain, 1158. Cleveland, etc. R. R. Co. v. Elliott, 359. Cleves V. Willoughby, 494. Click V. Click, 1332. Click V. County, 175. Clifford V, Catton, 596. Clifford V. Hoare, 193. Clifford V. Myers, 700. Clifford V. Watts, 554, Clift V. Clift, 363, 370, 375, 391, 413. Clifton Heights Land Co. v. Randall, 569, 1179. Climie v. Wood, 63, 74, 75. Clinch River Veneer Co. v, Kurth, 1377. Cline V. Jones, 1318, Clingan v, Mitcheltree, 1496. Clinton v. McKenzie, 361. Clinton v. Westbrook, 768. Clinton Wire Cloth Co. v. Gardner, 639. Clissold's Settlement, 1086. Cloos V. Cloos, 704. Clore V. Lambert, 62, 68, Clough V. Clough, 1031, 1306. Clough V, Hosford, 619. Clow V. Plummer, 697. Clowes V. Dickenson, 951. Clowes V. Hawley, 697. Clowes V. Vanderheyden, 1431. Clun's Case, 123, 124, 297. Clute V. Carr, 266, 272. Clute V. Fisher, 333, 334, 1385, 1386i Clute V. Railroad Co., 1381, 1394. Clute V. Robinson, 837. Clymer t. Dawkins, 684, 1178. Coal Creek Co. v. Heck, 1315. Coan V. Mole, 030. Coates V. Caldwell, 430. Coates V. Street, 719. Cobb V. Bennett, 94. Cobb V. Cook, 1060. Cobb V. Davenport, 91, 96, 1386. Cobb V. Dyer, 866, 874. Cobb V. Fant, 1096. Cobb V. Hall, 821. Cobb V. Lavelle, 8. Cobb V. Lucas, 1287, Cobb V, Stokes, 646. Coburn v. Harney, 126, 5p8, Cobiirn v. Harrington, 414. Cochran v. Cochran, 1032. Cochran v. Flint, 69. ' Cochran v. Polgar, 954. Cochran v. Guild, 1431. Cochran v, Harrow, 1338, Cochran v. Nebeker, 795. Cochran v, O'Hern, 344, 374. Cochran v. Shoenburger, 725. Cochran v, Stewart, 1309. Cochran v. Utt, 785, 1373. Cochran v. Van Surlay, 1089, 1373, Cochran v, Wimberly, 814. Cockell V. Bacon, 893. Ixxviii TABLE OF CASES. [Bef erenoes are to sections: Vol, I, contains §§ 1-735; Vol. II, §§ 736-1541.] Cocker v. Roberts, 468. Cocker v. Whitlock, 178, 333, 856. Cockey v. Cole, 929. Cockrell v. Armstrong, 1061. Cockrell v. Curtis, 450. Cockrill V. Bane, 833. Cooks V. Simmons, 679. Coder v. Huling, 713. Coddington v. Goddard, 1306. Codling V. Johnson, 140. Codman v. Evans, 185, 194. Cody V. Bunn, 1518. Cody V. Quarterman, 633, 629. Coe V. Manuf. Co., 160, 350. Coe V. Railroad Co., 56, 1344. Coe V. Ritter, 1372. Coe V. Smith, 457. Coe V. Turner, 1200. Coe's Trust, 1053. Cofer V. Scroggins, 449. Coffey V. Hendricks, 1373. Coffey V. Hunt, 851. Coffin V. Adams, 869. Coffin V. Argo, 1063. Coffin V. Loper, 335. Coffin V. Portland, 738, 748, 1413. Coffin V. Ray, 13i8. Coffin V. Rich, 109. Coflman v. Coffmau, 1468. Coffman v. Hillard, 887. Coffman v. Huck, 619. Cof ran v. Shepard, 651 . Cogan V. Cogan, 1010, 1046. Coggin's Appeal, 1518. Cogswell V. Tibbetls, 393. Cohea v. Jolmson, 1114. Cohen v. Duport, 553. Cohen v. Menard, 1271. Cohnv. Hoffman, 979. Cohn V. Norton, 498, Coke V. GutliBse, 593. Coke V. Hemmingway, 679. Coker v. Wliitlock, 178. Colburn v. Morrill, 553. Colby V. Duncan, 995. Colby V. Osgood, 1439, 1465. Colcord V. Savan, 1444. Coldcleuffli V. Johnson, 896. Cole V. Bradbury, 1403. Cole V. Drew, 200. Cole V. Gill, 619. Cole V. Hughes. 257, 1450, 1452. Cole V. Lake Co., 279, 623, 1373. Cole V. Mordaunt, 14G9. Cole V. Patterson, 542. Cole V. Raymond, 1205, 1440, 1455. Cole V. Roach, 75. Cole V. Sewell, 10C9. Cole V. Wade, 1C91, 1093, 1113, 1115. Cole V. White, 515. Cole Silver Mining Co. v. Gold Hil Water Co., 326. Colee V. Colee, 1300. Colegrove v. Dias Santos, 77, 78, 83. Coleman v. Chadwick, 244. Coleman v. Coleman, 679, 717, 739. Coleman V. Poster, 361, 363. Coleman v. Haiglit, 504, 585. Coleman v. Lane, 735. Coleman v. McCormick, 1237. Coleman v. Satterfleld, 350. Coleman v. Smith, 333, 1397. Coleman v. Sorrel, 1063. Coleman v. Stearns Manuf. Co. , 61. Coleman v. Van Rensselaer, 849. Coleman v, Witherspoon, 855. Coleman v. Wooley, 1081. Coleman's Appeal, 186. Coles V. Forrest, 938. Coles V. Sims, 131, 1433, 1434, 1435. Coles V. Trecothick, 950. Coles V. Withers, 810, 812, 878, 883, 895. Coles V. Wooding, 719. Coles V. York, 795, 959. Colgan V. Pellens, 340. Colgate V. Colgate, 399. Collagan v. Burns, 1504. Collar V. Collar, 1059, 1060. Collarmore v. Gillis, 74. College V. Cheney, 1465. Collared v. Huson, 963. Collier v. Blake, 1085. Collier v. Cowger, 1443, 1460, 1461, 1463. Collier v. Rutledge, 1536. Collingwood v Pace, 1149. Collins V. Benbury, 97, 1351. Collins V. Boyett, 464. Collins V. Carman, 404, 400. Collins V. Castle, 1435. Collins V. Chartiers Valley Gas Co., 339 333 Collins V. Collins, 674, 716, 996, 1319. Collins V. Dresser, 785. Collins V. Hall, 566. Collins V. Hasbrouck, 533. Collins V. Hopkins, 901, 904. Collins V. Johnson, 1171. Collins V. Lynch, 1184. Collins V. Prentice, 140, 153, 154. Collins V. Rigg, 980. Collins V. Stoking, 881. Collins V. 8t. Peters, 193, 200. Collins V. Torry, 367. Collins V. Townley, 1474, 1476. Collins V. Warren, 713. Collins Manuf. Co. v. Marcy, 742, 750, 1413. Collup V, Smith, 1502. TABLE OF CASES. Ixxix [References are to sections; Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735; Vol. II, §8 736-1541.] Collyer v. Collher, 563, 1504. Colman v. Packard, 768. Colrick V. Swinburne, 236. Colstone v. Gardner, 1135. Colt V. Eedfield. 150. Coltman v. Senliouse, 1033. Coltonv. Col ton, 1061. Colton V. Golbraith, 1315. Colton V. Smith, 721. Coltrane v. Lamb, 1312. Columbia College v. Thatcher, 1435. Columbia Falls Brick Co. v. Glidden, 1443. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 839. Columbian, etc. R. R. Co. v. Braillard, 566. Columbus V. Willard, 241. Colville V. Miles, 605. Colvia V. Baker, 1369. Colvin V. Woodward, 474. Colyer v. Hyden, 1820, 1333. Combination Land Co.v. Morgan,1348. Combs V. Goldworth, 1183. Combs V. Jolly, 1483. Combs V, Tarlton, 1463. Combs V. Young, 356, 390. Combs' Appeal, 1480. Comeford v. Dupuy, 359. Comer v. Bray, 925. Comer v. Comer, 678. Comer v. Chamberlain, 343. Comings v. Wellman, 783. Commercial Ins. Co. v. Sprankueble, 843. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Scam- mon, 846. Commissioners v. Glasse, 87. Commissioners v. Taylor, 183, 191. Commonwealth v. Alger, 1351, 1353. Commonwealth v. Andre, 1323. Commonwealth v. Bailey, 95. Commonwealth v. Chapin, 101. Commonwealth v Charlestown, 96. Commonwealth v. Coupe, 166. Commonwealth v. Cullen, 109. Commonwealth v. Duffield, 1107. Commonwealth v. Essex Co. 101. Commonwealth v. Fisk, 167. Commonwealth v. Gas Co. 57. Commonwealth v. Hackett, 995. Commonwealth v. Hall, 101. Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liq- uors, 1430. Commonwealth v. Manchester, 101. Commonwealth v. McCurdy, 100. Commonwealth v. Kewbury, 166. Commonwealth v. Railroad Co. 166. Commonwealth v. Roxbury, 40, 1333, 1346, 1351. Commonwealth v. Shattuck, 659. Commonwealth v. Vincent, 101, 1383. Comnock v. Wilson, 475. Comptou V. McMahon, 1114. Comptoa V. Milton, 1483. Compton V. White, 1322. Comstock V. Cavanaugh, 557. Comotock V. Comstock, 1426. Comstock V. Drahan, 007. Comstock V. Eastwood, 569; 678, 1178, 1179. Comstock V. Hadlyme, 1484. Comstock V. Misliail, 968. Comstock V. Railroad Co., 333. Comstock V. Smith, 1310, 1379. Comstock V. Son, 1443. Comtee v. Lyons, 1085. Couaut V. Palmer, 1514. Conant v. Roseborough, 777. Conard v. Atlantic Insurance Co., 759. Conboy v. Dickinson, 239. Conboy v. Railroad Co., 469. Concord Bank v. Bellis, 1286, 1320. Concord Co. v. Robertson, 233, 1351. Concord Mut. Ins. Co. v. Woodbury, 843. Condert v. Cohn, £33, 652. Condit V. Wilson, 1355. Cone V. Combs, 937. Cone V. Hartford, 167. Cone V. Ins. Co., 845. Cone V. Paute, 937. Coney v. Railroad Co., 56. Congdon v. Morgan, 1168, 1193. Conger v. Lance, 999. Conger v. Weaver, 498. Congregational Society v. Fleming, 48, 06. Congregational Society v. Stark, 379. Conklin v. Bauer, 833. Conklin v. Bowman, 948. Conklin V. Brown, 1139. Conklin v. Conklin, 733. Conklin v. Egerlon, 1114. Conkling v. Washington University, 1118. Conkling v. Tuttle, 516. Conlan v. Grace, 1310. Conley v. Print. Press & Manuf. Co., 790. Conley v. Schiller, 551. Connah v. Hale, 559. Conneham \ . Ford, 183. Connecticut v. Bradish, 1843. Connecticut Ins, Co. v, Butte, 679. Connecticut Mut. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 1077, Connell v. Connell, 1326, 1353, 1364, Connell v. Richmond, 601. Connell v. Wilhelm, 735. Ixxx TABLE OP CASES. LReferences are to sections: Vol. I, contains Sg 1-735; Vol. II, §8 736-1541.7 Conner v. Bradley, 519. Conner v. Chamberlain, 343. Conner v. Coffin, 78. Conner v. Elliott, 359. Conner v. Lewis, 1062. Conner v. Shepherd, 419. Conner v. Woodflll, 163, 223. Conners v. Halland, 904. Connery v. Brooke, 1377. Connor v. Bell, 1181. Connor v. Eddy, 14C7. Connor v. Gourand, 582. Connor v. Pushor, 1415. Conover v. Hobart, 935. Conover v. Ins. Co., 846. Conover v. Porter, 378. Conover v. Wbitmore, 859. Conoway v. Carpenter, 936. Conrad v. Efflnger, 1461, 1464. Conrad v. Long, 740. Conrad v. Mining Co., 75. Conrad v. Starr, 688. 831, 832. Consolidated, etc. Min. Co. v. Min. Co., 1210. Constable v. Stelbel, 1476. Constant v. University, 1364, 1366. Continental Bank v.* Bank, 1221. Contiss V. Hoyt, 53. Converse v. Lanashaw, 1400. Converse v. Koyes, 1067. Conway v. Alexander, 772. Conway v. Elgin, 468. Conway v. Stackweather, 631. Conwell V. Mann, 566. Conygrs v. Scott, 163. Cooch V. Gerry, 770. Coogan V. Burling Mills, 785, 1.373. Coogler V. Rogers, 1183, 1193. Cook V. Bartholomew, 889. Cook V. Basley, 910, 911. Cook V. Bisbee, 989. Cook V. Brown, 1333. Cook V. Burlington, 171, 185. Cook V. Clinton, 678, 684. Cook V. Cook, 399. Cook V. Creswell, 566. Cook V. Farrah, 569, 1103. Cook V. Eisk, 414. Cook V. Hammond, 418, 990, 998. Cook V. Hall, 1359. Cook V. Harris, 171. Cook V. Hull, 336. Cook V. Mayor, 191. Cook V. Oliver, 1193. Cook V. Patrick, 1066, 1320. Cook V. Prigdeu, 143. Cook V. Railroad Co., 272. Cook V. Rounds, 933. Cook V, Soule, 555. Cook V. Stearns, 261, 270. Cook V. Tombs, 123. Cook V. Trains, 828, 1343, 1349. Cook V. TuUis, 1083. Cook V. Walker, 1031. Cook V. Webb, 669, 714, 715, 723. Cook V. Whiting, 281, 1393. Cook V. Whellock, 566. Cook V. Winchester, 1488. Cooke V. Both, 514. Cooke V. Cooper, 863, 864. Cooke V. Crawford, 901. Cooke V. Meckan, 395. Cooke V. Onley, 950. Cool V. Lumber Co., 1290. Coole V. Barney, 722. Coole V. Young, 571. Cooler V. Church, 17. Cooley V. Golden, 11, 14. Coombs V. Beaumont, 75, 78. Coombes's Case, 1113, 1115. Coon V. Bean, 744. Coon V. Brickett, 752. Cocn V. Coon, 1527. Cooper V. Adams, 623. Cooper V. Arnett, 433. Cooper V. Austin, 1397. Cooper 7. Barber, 186. Cooper V. Church, 17. Cooper V. Coles 858. Cooper V. Cooper, 704, 1084. Cooper V. Corbin, 55. Cooper V. Davis, 66, 333, 856. Cooper V. Fox, 733. Cooper V. Holmes, 1004. Cooper V. Jackson, 834. Cooper V. Louanstein, 1300,1438. Cooper V. MacDonald, 344. Cooper V. Maupin, 153, 154. Cooper V. McGrew, 601. Cooper V. Ncwland, 924. Cooper V. Smith, 163. Coor V. Smith, 768. Coote V. Dearborn, 738. Cootes V. Yewell, 1006. Cope V. Cope, 787, 1143. Cope V. Romeyne, 58. Copeland v. McAdory, 1431, 1443, 1460. Copeland v. Barron, 1105. Copeland v. Copeland, 1230, 1328. Copeland v. Ins. Co., 843, 1301. Copeland v. Kehoe, 833. Copp V. Hersejr, 406. Coppage V. Heirs, 1536. Copper V. Dolvin, 223. Copper Mining Co. v. Beach, 512. Coppinger v. Bice, 1131. Corbet v. Corbet, 397. Corbet v. Laurens, 398. Corbet v. Waterman, 863. TABLE OF CASES. Ixxxi [References are to sections : Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735 ; Vol. .II, §§ 736-1541.] Corbett v. Hill, 6. Corbett v. Winn, 1460. Corbin v. Minchin, 475. Corbin v. Reed, 338. Corby v. Corby, 1061. Cord V. Hirsch, 947. Corder v. Morgan, 904. Cordova v. Hood, 809. Corev. Faupel, 1161, 1168, 1194. Corey v. Bishop, 615. Corey v. Moore, 1311. Corfleld v. Coryell, 98. Corker v. Corker, 1319, 1501. Corley v. Paxlon, 698. Corlies v. Hewland, 804. Corliss V. Drenning, 175. Corlis.s V. McLagin, 61. Cornellson v. Browning, 1486. Cornelius v. Ivins, 748, 1413. Cornelius v. Kessel, 1243. Cornelius v. Smith, 1059. Cornell v. Barney, 833. Cornell v. Dean, 563, 603. Cornell v. Hall, 781. Cornell v. Jackson, 1428. Cornell v. Lamb, 41, 560. Cornell University v. Mead, 1194. Cornellison v. Cornellison, 636. Cornet v. Bartelsman, 1369. Corning v. Gould, 190, 553. Corning v. Troy Factory, 805. Cornish v. Abington, 1331. Cornish v. Capron, 1426. Cornish v. Frees, 438, 833. Cornish v. Searell, 501, 567. Cornish v. Strutton, 314, 328. Cornog V. Cornog, 770. Cornog V. Fuller, 883. Cornwall v. Railroad Co., 1190. Cornwell Manuf. Co. v. Swift, 311. Corpman v. Baccastow, 776. Corrico v. Bank, 809. Corrigan v. Chicago, 534, 547, 549, 550. Corry v. Fleming, 1540. Corry v. Lamb, 401. Corson v. Mulvaney, 803. Cortleyeu v. Hathaway, 938. Corwithe v. Grifflng, 715. Coryell v. Dunton, 1122. Coryton v. Helgar, 1048. CosgrifiE V. Fobs, 598. Costello V. Edson, 1194. Coster o V. Long, 802. Costello V. Mead, 883. Coster V. Clarke, 713. Coster V. Lorillard. 662. Costigan v. Railrt^ad Co. 1448. Cotterell v. Button, 985. K 210, 548, Getting V. De Sartiges, 1116. Cottingham v. Springer, 929. Cotton V. Cotton, 1514. Cotton V. HoUiday, 1077. Cotton V. Manuf. Co., 146, 161, 164. Couch V. Gentry, 1473. Coudert v. Sayre, 131, 1420, 1423, 1424, 1425. Coughlin V. Coughlin, 477. Coughanour v. HofiEman, 431. Coulam v. Doull, 1130. Coulson V. "Waltam, 1414. Coulson V. King, 698. Coulter V. Herrod, 953. Counaughton v. Sands, 431. Council v. Ryan, 883. Counter v. McPherson, 496. Countryman v. Dick, 1454. County V. Bradshaw, 783. County V. Loviugston, 11. Courson v. Canfield, 933. Coursey v. Davis, 1000. Courtown v. Ward, 314. Covas V. Bertonlin, 730. Covel V. Hart, 153. Covell V. Weston, 1131. Covenant Mut. Bene. Asso. v. HofE- man, 666. Covenhoven v. Shuler, 349. Coverdale v. Aldrich, 1107. Covert V. Cranford, 315. Coney v. Railroad Co., 56. Covington v. Geyler, 340. Cowand v. Meyers, 1008. Cowdrey v. Hitchcock, 404. Cowdry v. Coit, 1436. Cowell V. Spring Co., 743, 750, 1215. 1413. Cowen v. Loomis, 828, 1346. Cowen V. Paddock, 832. Cowen V. Sunderland, 589,591,592. Cowie V. Goodwin, 552. Cowlam V. Slack, 87, 89. Cowles V. Cowles, 1000. Cowles V. Kidder, 210, 361, 273. Cowles V. Marble, 786, 979. Cowles V. Reavis, 1390. Cowley V. Knapp, 1491. Cowley V. Wellesley, 301, 303. Cowley V. Higginson, 196. Cowman v. Hall, 385. Cowper V. Andrews, 756. Cowper V. Mantell, 1117. Cowx V. Foster, 1117. Cox V. Bent, 617, 653. Cox V. Chamberlain. 1133. Cox V. Champneys, 938. Cox V. Cox, 295, 1534. Cox V. Clark, 1139. Cox V. Curwen, 1056. Ixxxii TABLE OF OASES. [References axe to sections: Vol. I, contains 85 1-735; Vol. II, §§ 738 1541.] Cox V. Donnelly, 1340. Cox V. Fenwick, 536. Cox V. Hart, 1373. Cox V. Holcomb, 1315. Cox V. James, 167, 170. Cox V. Kille, 892. Cox V. McMullen, 1379. Cox V. Robbins, 259. Cox V. liogers, 408. Cox V. Sims, 1105. Cox V. Ward, 733. Cox V. Wayne, 1357. Cox V. Wayt, 1311. Cox V. Wills, 1541. Coy V. Miller, 1398. Coyle V. Davis, 781. Coyle V. Franklin, 1179. Coyle V. Wilkins, 898, 982, 986. Coyler v. Finch, 799. Cozzens' Will, 1478. Crabtree v. Baker, 215. Craddock v. Edwards, 453, 470, 473. Craddock v. Biddlesborger, 18, 43. Craft V. Craft, 733, 978. Crafton v. Railroad Co., 259. Craig V. Beatty, 1508. Craig V. Church, 261. Craig V. Cocover, 401, 403. Craig V. County, 747. Craig V. Craig, 1109. Craig V. Leslie, 1473. Craig T. Southard. 1472. Craig V. Storage Co., 533. Craig V. Summers, 497, 533, 633, 537. Craig V. Walthall, 397. Craig V. Wells, 738, 741. Cragin v. Hadley, 1368. Cragin v. Powell, 1391. Cramer v. Hbose, 1067. Cramer v. Lepper, 935. Crance v. Callenbaugh, 1443. Crandall v. Allen, 11. Crane v. Aultman-Taylor Co., 871. Crane v. Bolles, 1109. Crane v. Brigham, 49, 68. Crane v. Caldwell, 807. Crane v. Dresser, 551, 553. Crane v. Fairchild, 414. Crane v. Fipps. 393. Crane v. Inhabitants, 738, 1413. Crane v. Patton, 261, 868, 570. Crane v. Reeder, 1150, 1151, 1285. Crane v. Waggoner, 431, 694. Oranson v. Cranson, 385. Cranston v. Crane, 903. Crapton v. Davies, 1511. Crary v. Goodman, 1399. Crassly v. Core, 1513. Crasson v. Swoveland, 838, 1347, 1350. Ciftvens V. Hoose, 1007. Cravens V. Rossiter, 1381. Crawford v. Bertholf, 1319. Crawford v. Binion, 715. Crawford v. Corev, 1387. Crawford v. Fuller, 959. Crawford v. Hazelrigg, 367, 369. Crawford v. Munford, 935. Crawford v. Richeson, 433, 443. Crawford v. Taylor, 895, 982. 987, Crawl v. Harrington, 363, 373. Crawley v. Price, 530. 540. Crawley v. Timberlake. 817. Crawshaw v. Sumner, 253. Creager v. Creager, 430. Creamer v. Holbrook, 1327. Crecelins v. Horst, 379. Creech v. Crockett, 649. Creecy v. Pearce, 369. Creekmur v. Creekmur, 1161, 1174. Creel v. Kirkham, 601, 603. Creesy v. Willis. 866. 869. Creighton v. Paine, 954. Crenshaw v. Seigfried, 950. Crerar v. Williams, 1033, 1515, 1521, 1522. Cresap v. Cresap, 997, 1105. Cresson t. Miller, 1885. Cresson, etc. Association v. Sowers, 1313. Cresson v. Stout, 60, 61. Crest V. Jack, 689. Creutz V. Heil, 1004. Crevelingv. Iron Co., 685. Crew T. Dixon, 1105. Crews V. Burclain, 1310, Crews V. Pendleton, 311, 858, 957. Cribben v. Cribben, 399, Cribben v. Deal, 1878. Crine V. Tifts, 43. Crippen v. Chappel, 874. Crippen v. Morrison, 48, 63. Crippen v. Morss, 157, 1379. Criscoe v. Hambrick, 788. Crisfleld v. Starr, 1458, 1461, 1463. Crispenv. Hannavan, 1168, 1193, 1194. Criswell v. Grumbling, 740, 1388. Critchett v. Cooper, 831. Critchfleld v. Remaley, 639. Croaker v. Benton, 208. Croan v. Phillips, 1148. Crocker v. Clements, 895, 983. Crocker v. Collins, 1190. Crocker v. Crocker, 713. Crocker v. Higgins, 983. Crocker v. Holmes, 895. Crocker v. Smith, 1476. Crocker v. TifEany, 676. Crocket v. Lee, 945. Crocket V. Maguire, 1343. Crockett v. Althouse, 566. TAULK OF CASKS. Ixxxiii. [References are to sections : Vol. I, contains S8 1-735 ; Vol. II, §8 736-1541.] Crockett v. Crockett, 302, 314. Crockett v. Thomas, 795. Croft V. Lumley, 530, 539. Croft V. Kaines, 608. Crofton V. Ilsley, 1485. CroUy V. Clark, 1157. Cromie v. Hoover, 74. Crommelin v. Tliiess, 533, 618, 683. Crompe v. Barrow, 1130. Crone v. O'Dell, 1121. Cronia v. Hazlotine, 915. Cronker v. Benton, 208. Cronkliite v. Cronkhite, 134, 266. Crook V. Gum, 896. Crook V. Ins. Co., 843. Crook V. Vandevoort, 676, 698. Cropley v. Cooper, 999. Crosbie v. Macdonal, 1470. Crosby v. Bank, 390, 951. Crosby v. Bessey, 161. Crosby v. Home, 563. Crosland v. Pottsville, 199. Crosly V. Loop, 127^, 542. Crosly v.Wadsworth, 18, 42, 1291,1393. Crosly V. Weld, 395. Crossdale v. Lanigan, 366, 372. Cross V. Bean, 1348. Cross V. Carson, 747. Cross V. De Valle, 1150. Cross V. Fro.st, 1420. Cross V. Harrington, 1253. Cross V. Kennlngton, 1525. Cross V. Kitts, 324, 236. Cross V. Marston, 77. Cross V. Mayor, 179, 1190. Cross V. Pike, 146. Cross V. Robinson, 853. Cross V. State Bank, 1278. Cross V. Weare, 1269. Crossland v. Rogers, 149, 153, 162. Crossley v. Lighton, 154. Crossley v. Lightowler, 91, 275. Crouch V. Fowle, 1419. Crouch V. Railroad Co., 753. Crouder v. Searcy, 1319. Crounch v. Puryear, 320, 370. Crouter v. Crouter, 780. Crow V. Beardsley, 713, 773. Crow V. Conant, 814. Crowell V. Woodbury, 735. Crowley v. Harader, 965. Crowley v. Mellon, 438. Croxall V. Sherrard, 995, 1016, 1041, 1082 1192 Crozier v. Bray, 997, 1025, 1105, 1499. Cruger v. MeLaury, 135, 747. Cruikshank v. Parker, 1109. Crum V. Cotting, 1457. Crum V. Sawyer, 355, 378, 387, 462, 1501. Crumbly v. Bordon, 886. Crump's Estate, 396. Crup V. Norton, 1061. Crutchfleld v. Coke, 939. Cruz V. Martinez, 1245. Cubbage v. Franklin, 1099. Cubbage v. Nesmith, 725. Cubitt V. Porter, 253, 254. Culbertson v. Tucker, 814. Culbrcth V. Smith, 1021. Culin's Appeal, 743. CuUen V. Sprigg, 738, 1373, 1418. Cullers V. James, 450. Cullers V. Piatt, 1890. CuUum V. Batre, 928. Cullwick V. Swindell, 62. Culpepper Soc. v. Diggs, 784. Culver V. Culver, 734. Culver v. McKeon, 955. Culver V. Phelps, 1270. Culver V. Rhodes. 678, 1178. Culver V. Sisson, 894. Culverhouse v. Worts, 611. Cumberland v. Codringtou, 877. Cummings v. Barrett, 233, 236. Cummings v. Black, 1374. Cummings v. Busby, 404. Cummings v. Bramhall, 1530. Cummings v. Cummings, 951. Cummins v. Cassidy, 1278. Cummins v. Fletcher. 979. Cummins v. Wire, 985. Cumstock V. Bartlett, 1116. Cundiflf V. Brokaw, 890. Cunningham v. Bell, 1066, 1068. Cunningham v. Curtis, 1891. Cunningham v. Fitzgerald, 193. Cunningham v. Hedrick, 819. Cunningham v. Horton, 619, 651. Cunningham v. Moody, 344, 349. Cunningham v. Pattee, 511, 1349. Cunningham v. Snow, 1196. Cunningham v. Ward, 708, 712. Curd v. Williams, 1078. Cureton v. Taylor, 1483. Currey v. Davis, 601. Currier v. Barker, 637. Currier v. Earl, 619. Currier v. Gale, 1169. Currier v. Sanvrin, 745. Currier v. Sutherland, 467. Currier v. Woodward, 430. Currin v. Spraull, 723. Curry v. Schmidt, 52. Curtis V. Board, 738, 756, 1413. Curtis V. Cash, 613. Curtis V. Curtis, 417, 425. Curtis V. Daniel, 1. Curtis V. Fleming, 787. Ixxxiv TABLE OP CASES. [References are to sectioas: Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735; Vol. II, §§ 735-1541.] Curtis V. Galvic, 623, 657. Curtis V. Gooding, 946. Curtis V. Hobart, 393, 414. Curtis V. Hoyt, 53, 171. Curtis V. Hutton, 1157. Curtis V. Kiley, 591. Curtis V. Lyman, 1336, 1338, 1340. Curtis V. Miller, 510. Curtis V. Mundy, 1350, 1853. Curtis V. Noonau, 269. Curtis V. Poland, 690. Curtis V. Eoot, 782. Curtis V. Water Co. 208. Curtiss V. Colby, 1314. Curtiss V. Livingston, 319. Curtiss V. Miller, 510. Cushing V. Adams, 201, 203, 264, 551. Cushing V. Blake, 344. Cusliman v. Bonfield, 1094. Cushraan v. Horton, 1388. Cussach V. Tweedy, 1331. Cuthbert v. Chauvet, 1098. Cuthbert v. Kulin, 548. Cuthbertson v. Ins. Co. 843. Cutler V. Dickinson, 776. Cutler V. Hamlin, 592. Cutler V. James. 1330. Cutler V. Pope, 368, 1390. Cutler V. Tufts, 1406. Cutler V. Tuttle, 1067, 1074. Cutter V. Cambridge, 1163. Cutter V. Waddingham, 1139, Cutter V. Doughty, 1106. Cutter V. Powell, 134. Cuyler v. Terrill, 723. D. Dacey V. Ins. Co., 846. Daebler's Appeal, 999. Daggett V. Kankin, 800, 803. Daggett V. Reas, 1426, 1461. Dabm v. Barlow, 523, 568. Dailey v. Kinsler, 1059. Dailey v. New Haven, 1085. Dailey v. State, 167, 168. Dakin v. Dakin, 387. Dalby v. Hirst, 303. Dale V. Hamilton, 1073. Dale V. Shively, 1417, 1439, 1460. Daley v. Savage, 591, 596. Dalmer v. Dash wood, 938. Dalston v. Reeve, 553. Dalton V. Bowker, 1461. Dalton V. Dalton, 1078. Dalton V. Rainey, 809. Dalton V. Smith, 934. Dalton V. Webb, 470. Daly V. Bernstein, 1086. Daly V. Greenburg, 1519. Daly V. Wise, 494, 573. Damainville v. Mann, 536. Dame v. Dame, 18, 53. Dameron v. Eskridge, 901. Dammann v. Dammann, 1503. Damon v. Damon, 1506. Damrell v. Hartt, 1105. Dana v. Dana, 1066. Dana v. Goodfellow, 1063. 1460, 1461. Dana v. Murray, 1001, 1123. Dana v. Railroad Co. , 880. Dandridge v. Curtis, 1539. Danforth v. Coleman, 966. Danforth v. Smith. 435. Dan V. Brown, 1496. Daniel v. Coker, 968. Daniel v. Hill, 1411. Daniel v. Leltch, 869. Daniel v. North, 157, 163, 203. Daniel v. Thompson, 1032. Daniel v. Wood, 17. Daniels v. Almy, 676. Daniels v. Bailey, 1290. Daniels v. Brown, 601. Daniels v. Davison, 838, 1348, 1350. Daniels v. Lowei-y. 464, 777. Daniels v. Moses, 812, 818. Daniels v. Pond, 44, 320, 615, 616, 1393. Daniels v. Ryan, 505. Daniels v. Straws, 513. Daniels v. Tearney, 1203. Dansey v. Griffiths, 1033. Danville Sem. v. Mott, 716. Danzier v. Boyd, 1285, 1391. Darby v. Darby, 707. 713. Darby v. Meyer, 1157. Darcas v. Crump, 1024. Darcy v. Askwith, 320, 328. Dark v. Johnson, 4, 129, 133. Darnaby v. Darnaby, 1860. Darnaby v. Watts, 1093. Darnell v. Barton, 998. Darrow v. ScuUin, 966. Darst V. Bates, 783, 935. Darst V. Murphy, 777. Dartington v. Dartington, 1510. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 107» 109. D'Arusement v. Jones, 1508. Dashiell v. Dashiell, 1033. Dashwood v. Maguire, 303. Date V. Ins. Co., 843. Daubeney v. Cockburn, 1130. Dauenhauer v. Devine, 350, 257. Daughaday v. Paine, 1344. Daugherty v. Daugherty, 298. Daugherty v. Deardorf, 338. Daugherty v. Rogers, 1513. Dausch V. Crane, 564, 565, 1175, 1198„ 1199. TABLE OF OASES. Ixxxv [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains 8§ 1-735; Vol. II, §8 T36-1541.] Dauzlger v. Silberthan, 324, 339. Davies v. Collins, 1194. Davenport v. Alston, 431. Davenport v. Ing. Co., 848. Davenport v. Lawson, 133, 146. Davenport v. Ledger, 845. Davenport v. McChesney, 911. Davenport v. Murray, 804. Davenport v. Shants, 58, 65. Davenport v. Sovill, 796. David V. New Orleans, 171. Davidge v. Chaney, 1083. Davidson v. Allen, 963. Davidson v. Arlecige, 1873. Davidson v. Bates, 1515. Davidson v. Coou, 1310. Davidson v. Cooper, 793, 1378. Davidson v. Davis, 459. Davidson v, Fisher, 593. Davidson v. Manuf. Co. 599. Davidson v. Pliillips, 659. Davies v. Davies, 1514, 1516, 1519. Davies v. Speed. 1033, 1045. Davies V. Williams, 198, 199, 936, 1133. Davis V. Andrews, 430. Davis V. Barnstaple,. 1540. Davis V. Bean, 921. Davis V. Bingham, 163. Davis V. Bilsland, 839, 830, 881. Davis V. Brocklebank 809. Davis V. Buffum, 46, 78. Davis V. Burrell, 556, 655, 657, 658. Davis V. Chapman, 694. Davis V. Christian, 701, 713, 713, 1090. Davis V. Clark, 337. Davis V. Cox, 948. Davis V. Dale, 940. Davis V. Davis, 799, 1066, 1161, 1171. Davis V. Demming, 781. Davis V. Denby, 972. Davis V. Duffle, 980. Davis V. Ellis, 1318. 1333. Davis V. Evans, 363. Davis V. Bgton, 307, 539, 671. Davis V. Fogle, 1501. Davis V. Fullers, 308, 310. Davis V. Garrett, 1331. Davis V. Getchell, 308, 309. Davis V. Givens, 674. Davis V. Gray, 743, 1412. Davis V. Hamilton, 810. Davis V. Handy, 1321. Davis V. Hemmingway. 925. Davis V. Hendricks, 1534. Davis V, Hess, 1373. Davis V. Hutton, 381, 692. Davis V. Ins. Co. ,9^6. Davis V. Jackson, 398. . . Davis V. Jenkins, 468. Davis V. Jewett, 993. . . - Davis a. Jones, 67, 78. Davis V. Judd, 1176, 1458. Davis V. Kiu^, 674, 679. Davis V, Lassiter, 968. Davis V. Logan, 363, 391. Davis V. Loudgreen, 315. Davis v. Marshall, 367. Davis v. Mason, 343. Davis V. McDonald, 378. Davis V. McFarlane, 43. Davis V. Milligan, 838, 1343. Davis V. Minor, 871, 1193. Davis V. Morris, 533, 536. Davis V. Moss, 46, 78, 79. Davis V. Ney, 1061, Davis V. O'Ferrall, 373. Davis V. Ownsby, 836, 1359, Davis V. Paul, 1530. Davis V. Perley, 1168. Davis V. Pierce, 871. Davis V. Rainsford, 1391, 1394. Davis V. Rogers, 914. Davis V. Sawyer, 690. Davis V. Smith, 504, 821, 1861. Davis V. Spaulding, 235. Davis V. Stond, 1168. ' Davis Sewing Mach. Co. v. Whitney, 463. Davis V. Thompson, 309, 616. Davis V. Townsend, 373, 374. Davis V. Wetherill, 355, 978. Davis V. Whitaker, 1338. Davis V. Williams, 1008, 1515. Davis V. Wilson, 562. Davison v. Ellmaker, 560. Davison v. Gent, 535. Davison v. Rake, 399. Davoue v. Fanning, 1110, 1524, 1539, Dawkins v. Dawkins, 1227. Dawkins v. Patterson, 906. Dawson v. Bank, 377. Dawson v. Drake, 968. Dawson v. Helmes, 1383. Dawson v. Ins. Co., 804, 1395, 1403. Dawson v. Linton, 497. Dawson v. Mayall, 1215. Dawson v. Merrille, 1240. Dawson v. Tremaine, 325. Day V. Adams, 1310. Day V, AUendcr, 162, 175. Day V. Case, 666. Day V. Caton, 357, Day V. Cochran, 342, 343, 348. Day V. Davis, 368, 678, 1178. Day V. Day, 1480. Day y, Floyd, 1508. Day V. Howard, 684. Day V. Ins. Co., 843. Day V. Mioou, 1266. Day V. Perkins,. 75, 78. - Ixxxvi TABLK OF CASES. [References are to sections: VoU I, contains SI 1-735; Vol. II, §S 736-1541.] Day V. Philbrook, 281. Day V. West, 393. Dayton v. Adkinson, 1144. Dayton v. Carson, 373, 383. Dayton v. Commissioners, 319. Dayton v. Craik, 500. Dayton v. Dayton, 926. Deaclrick v. Smith, 947. Deakin v. Underwood, 1113. Dean v. Allalley, 48. Dean v. Comstock, 618, 619, 624. Dean v. Dean, 1033, 1034, 1059, 1066. Dean v. Fuller, 1310. Dean v. Goddard, 1165, 1197. Dean v. McDowell, 710. Dean v. Mitchell, 374. Dean v. O'Meara, 690, 7S3. Dean v. Shelly, 1419. Dean y. Winton, 995. Deans v. Pate, 373. Dearborn V. Nelson, 877. Dearborn v. Valpey, 577. Dearie v. Martin, 350. Dcaring v. Thomas, 463. Dearman v. Dearman, 467. De Armas v. Mayor, 29. Deas V. Harry, 384. Deaver v. Jones, 1373. Deaver v. Rice, 603. Deaves's Appeal, 1504. Debolt V. Carter, 171. Debow V. Colfax, 307, 309, 310, 571. Decker v. Boice, 1358. Decker v. Patton, 943. Decouche v. Sayetier, 984. De Coursey v. Guarantee Trust and Safety Dep. Co., 12G. Dee V. Walker, 510. Deem v. Millikin, 1530. Deere v. Nelson, 1831. Deere v. Weir Sliugart Co., 257. Deering v. Beard, 463. 473. Deering v. Kerfoot, 371. Deering v. Tucker, 745. Deering v. Winchester, 689. Deery v. Cray, 1311. Deer Lace Company v. Land, etc. Co., 1405. Deeter v. Crossly, 888. Deflfeback v. Hswke, 1188, 1239. Deffeliz v. Pico, 464. De Forges v. Byland, 387. De Forest \r. Holum, 809. Defour v. Pereira, 1490. Defraunce v. Brooks, 279. De Gray v. Club House Co., 1432, 1423. 1425. De Grey v. Richardson, 342, 346. De Hart v. De Hart, 1539. De Haven v. Landell, 956. De Jarnette v. De Giverville, 904, De Jarnette v. McDaniel, 569, Dela V. Stanwood, 969. Delachaise v. Maginnis, 11. Delaficld v. Parish, 1470. Delaire v. Keenan, 803. Delamere v. Barnard, 1043. De Lancey v. Ganong, 518. DeLancey v. Piepgrass, 1346, 1348, 1249, 1250. Deland v. Williams, 298. Delaney v. Flanagan, 631. Delaney v. Root, 43, 268, 603, 603, 631, 1290. Delano v. Montague, 617, 631. Delano v. Smith, 890, 897. Delany v. Delany. 1053. Delaureal v. Kemper, 877. Dulashman v. Berry, 490, 513. Delashmutt v. Parrent, 679. De La Vega v. Butler, 1194. Delamere, etc. R. R. Co. v. Oxford Iron Co., 61. Delaware, etc. R. R-. Co. v. Sander- son, 3. Delhi V. Youmans, 227, 230. Delhur v. McCabe, 1416. Deller v. Hofferberth, 583. Deloney v. Hutcheson, 668. Deloney v. Walker, 72C. De Long v. De Long, 1298. Delogny v. Mercer, 1448. De Luze v. Bradbury, 156. De Manneville v. Crompton, 885. Demarest v. Willard, 543, 993. Demarest v. Wynkoop, 901, 982, 984, 985. De Mattos v. Gibson, 1424. Demby v. Parse, 81. Dement v. Williams, 719. Demesmey v. Graveline, 1328. Demi v. Bossley, 307, 571. Demill v. Reid, 1000, 1008, 1518. Deming v. Miles, 1331, 1334, 1836. De Morat v. Falkenhagen, 507. De Mass v. Robinson, 1531. Dempsey v. Kipp, 165, 307, 597. Den V. Allaire, 1032. Den V. Ashmore, 550. Den V. Barnard, 479. Den V. Branson, 703. Den T. Drake, 818. Den V. Fogg, 287. Den V. Hanks, 1293, 1399, Den V. Howell, 623. Den V. Jersey Co., 9, 95, 1248 Den V. Longstreet, 719. Den V. Mitton, 1483. Den V. Pont, 533, 540. Den V. Richmond, 1331. TABLE OF OASES. Ixxxvii [Beferonces are to sections: Vol. 1, contains 89 1 -736; Vol. U, 86 786-1S41.] Denby v. Mellgrew, 768. 854, 934. Denby v. Taylor, 533. Dendy v. Nicholl, 522. Denficld, Petitioner, 1513, 1528. Dengler v. Michilsson, 535, 541. Deuis V. Gayle, 448. Denis V. Velati, 1323. Denison v. Halliday, 265. Denlar v Hile, 1533. Denn v. Bagshaw, 1033. Denn v. Cartwright, 487. DenQOtt V. Atherton, 1419. Dennett v. Dennett- 347. 994. 1038, 1281. Dennis v. Bank, 437. Dennis v. Tomlinson, 861. Dennis v. Wilson, 145. Dennison v. Goehing, 1051. Dennison v. Grore, 555. Dennison v. Read, 491. Dennison v. Wertz, 509. Denny v. Colton, 11. Denny v. Steakley, 809. Denson v. Autry, 1130. Denson v. Mitchell, 1103, 1105. Dent V. Dent, 298. Denton v. Nanny, 368, 910. Denver v. Soloman, 592. Denver, etc. R. R. Co. v. School Dist., 741, 1412. DePeyster v. Clendenniag, 1485. Deputron v. Young, 1275. Derby v. Derby, 1498. Deronan v. Davidson, 1394. Denick v. Brown, 1330. Derrick v. Luddy, 566. Derry v. Derry, 1066. Des Jardins v. Boon Co., 1373. Deslespine v. Campbell, 963. Desloge v. Pearce, 4. Des Moines v. Hall, 167, 183. Despard v. Churchill, 1034. Despard v. Walbvidge, 644. De St. Romos v. Blane. 883. Desvergers v. Willis, 1431. Detwiler v. Detwiler, 1060. Deulin v. Commonwealth, 1508 Deupree v. Deupree, 1501. Deuster v. McCamus, 835. Devaynes v. Robinson, 1118. Devecmon v. Shaw, 401. Devereaux v. Cooper, 1398. Devereaux v. Fairbanks, 460. Derereaux v. McMahon, 1?04, 1305, 1306, 1309, 1317, 1319, 1331. Deville v. Widoe, 430. Devin v. Dougherty, 79. Devin v. Hindershot, 1459. Devoe v. Smeltzes, 1190. Devonshiro v. Eglin, 366, 367, 373. Devore v. Swoveland, 1439. DevoTse v. Snider, 1316. Devries v. Hiss, 695. Dew V. Barnes, 1511. Dewey v. Brown, 698. Dewey v. Dewey, 713. Dewey v. Lambier, 668, 669. Dewey v. McLain, 898. Dewey v. Williams, 747. Dewhurst, v. Wright, 1073, 1074. 1310. Dewitt v. Ackerman, 733. De Witt V. Eldred, 290. De Witt V. Harvey, 157. De Witt V. Ithaca, 170. De Witt V. PiersoD, 553, 577. De Witt V. San Francisco, 667. De Witt V. Village, 170. De Wolf V. Gardnier, 1134. De Wolf V. Johnson, 935. DeWolfv. Manufact. Co., 900, 931, 1373. Do Wolf V. Murphy, 368. 389, 910. Dexter v. Arnold, 969, 971, 982. Dexter v. Beard, 143. Dexter v. Lathrop, 673. Dexter v. Phillips, 113, 12.?, 134. Dexter v. Shepard, 908. De Yampert v. Brown, 1333. D'Eyncourt v. Gregory, 81. Dezell v. Odell, 1330. Dhein v. Benscher, 1193, 1194. Dial V. Reynolds, 938, 933. Dial V. Tappen, 927. Dias V. Glover, 703. Dick V. Ins. Co., 845. Dick V. Pitchford, 750, 1080. Dickason v. Williams, 866. Dicken v. Johnson, 1881. Dickerson v. Colgrove, 1192, 1338, 1330. Dickerson v. Evans, 1343. Dickerson v. McLean, 791. Dickerson v. Talbot, 1210. Dickey v. Permanent Land Co. , 880. Dickey v. Thompson, 951. Dickinson v. Davis, 1070. Dickinson v. Glenny, 800. Dickinson v. Grand Junct. Can. 336. Dickinson v. Hoomes, 1458. Dickinson v. Jackson, 769. Dickinson v. Jones, 318. Dickinson v. Mayor, 333. Dickinson v. McLane, 464. Dickinson v. Morgan,945. Dickinson v. Robinson, 398. Dickinson v. Uhl, 938. Dickinson v. Worcester, 317. Dickman v. Birkhauser, 450. Dickson v. Desire, 1419. Dickson v. Dickson, 570. Ixxxviii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains g§ 1-735; Vol. II, §§ T36-1541.] Dickson v. Satterfleld, 1019. Dicus V. Hall, 440. Diefendorf v. Dlefendorf , 1377. DlefEenbach v. Vogeler, 1338. Dlehl V. Ewing, 1415. Dietz V. Transfer Co., 1403, 1405, 1407, 1508. Diez V. Will, 1490. Digby V. Atkinson, 633. Digb'y V. Howard, 405. Digges's Case, 1119, 1134. Digley v. Jones, 779. Dikeman v. Parrisli, 1336. Dikeman v. Puckhafer, 1336. Dilger v. Palmer, 446. Dill V. Board, 155, 169, 191. Dillard v. Philson, 985. Diller v. Roberts, 632. Dillenger v. Kelley, 674. Dillman v. Hoffman, 154. Dillon V. Acme Oil Co., 233. Dillon V. Coppin, 1063. Dillon V. Praine, 1041. Dillon V. Grace, 150). Dilworth v. Guskey, 279. Dilworth v. Mayfleld, 371, 713. Dimes v. Petley, 198. Dimmick v. Dimmick, 1319. Dlngley v. Bank, 813. Dingley v. Dullum, 78. Dingley v. Dingley, 999. Dingeldeln v. Railroad Co., 877. Dinsmore v. Savage, 981. Dinwiddle v. Self, 1374. Dircks v. Lagsdon, 871. Dismukes v. Halpern, 1215. Dique v. Wright, 1337. Ditson V. Ditson, 473. Diver v. Diver, 704, 705. Divall V. Atwood, 923. Dix v. Ins. Co., 847. Dixon v. Ahern, 563. Dixon V. Ewart, 904. Dixon V. Homer, 973. Dixon V. Laville, 373. Dixon V. McCue, 406. Dixon V. Niccolls, 543, 601. Dixon V. Parker, 781. Dixon V. Stewart, 566. Doak V. Wiswell, 83. Doane v. Badger, 138. Doane v. Doane, 395. Dobbin v. Rex, 735. Dobbins v. Bank, 465. Dobbins v. Brown, 577, 1431. Dobbins v. Cardiner, 1310. ■ Dobbins v. Kuykendall, 430. Dobberstein v. Murphy, 380. Doblittle V. Eddy, 618. Dobson V. Kuhula, 689. Docrill V. Schenk, 502. Doctor V. Furch, 1460, 1461. Dodd V. Acklorn, 500. Dodd V. Parker, 1359. Dodd V. Watson, 315. Dodd V. Wlnship, 999, 1083. Doods V. Lanaux. 869. Dodge V. Berry, 333, 336. Dodge V. Briggs, 1344. Dodge V. Davis, 315, 691. Dodge V. Dodge, 398, 1300. Dodge V. Emerson, 878. Dodge V. Hay, 344, 349. Dodge V. Ins. Co., 983. Dodge V. Kennedy, 978. Dodge V. McClintock, 163. Dodge V. Potter, 836, 1335, 1338, 1340. Dodge V. Railroad Co., 187, 306. Dodge V. Stacy, 162, 303. Dodge V. Stevens, 1003. Dodge V. Williams, 1053, 1489. Dodson V. Ball, 1018, 1050. Dodson V. Dodson, 708. Dodsworth v. Addy, 1106. Doev. Allen, 532, 525. Doe V. Ashburner, 485, 486. Doe V. Baker, 624. Doe V. Bancks, 533. Doe V. Bartlirop, 1050,1108. Doe V. Bateman, 520, 533. Doe V. Bell, 630. Doe V. Sevan, 539, 737. Doe V. Birch, 522. Doe V. Bird, 697, 1500. Doe V. Blacker, 1300. Doe t. Brown, 619, 683. Doe V. Butcher, 534. Doe V. Carter, 539, 737. Doe V. Church, 557. Doe V. Clark, 1140. Doe V. Cochran, 654. Doe V. Cole, 989, 991. Doe V. Colyear, 1019. Doe V. Considine, 995, 999, 1000, 1131. Doe V. Cartwright, 487. Doe V. Cox, 557, 637. Doe V. Crags, 617, 653. Doe V. Creed, 518. Doe V. Crick, 557, 634. Doe V. David, 533, 539. Doe V. Dilmot, 1117. Doe V. Dowdall, 1443. Doe V. Diyjbar, 634. Doe V. East India Co., 11. Doe V. Edlin, 1530. Doe V. Ellis, 10H3. Doe V. Elvey, 1033. Doe V. Ewart, 1043. Doe V. Field, 1050. Doe V. Flinn, 518. TABLE OF CASKS. Ixxxix [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735; Vol. II, §8 736-1541.1 Doe V. Fonnereau, 1030, 1033 Doe V. Porwood, 506. Doe V. Gatacre, 1010. Doe V. Gladwin, 753. Doe V. Godwin, 540. Doe V. Goldsmith, 530. Doe V. Goodeu, 995. Doe V. Grafton, 638. Doe V. Greeubill, 1079. Doe V. Gwinnell, 414, 430. Doe V. Harris, 1496. Doe V. Harvey, 1015. Doe V. Hawks, 539, 798. Doe V. Hazell, 557, 633. Doev. Hughes, 1110, 1524. Doe V. Hull, 653, 654. Doe V. Humphreys, 637. Doe V. Hurd, 1293. Doe V. Ironmonger, 1016. Doe V. Jones, 165, 533, 535, 1112. Doe V. Killen, 348. Doev. Knight, 835. Doe V. Ladd, 1055. Doe V. Lancasshire, 1501. Doe V. Lanning, 1013. Doe V. Luxton, 293. Doe V. Lyde, 1033. Doev. Manning, 1394. Doe V. Marchetti, 530. Doe V. Marquis, 743. Doe V. Martin, 520. Doe V. M'Kaeg, 616, 623 Doe V. Meux, 522. Doe V. Milward, 506. Doe V. Moore, 996. Doe V. Morgan, 995. Doe V. Morpett, 634. Doe V. Nutt, 411. Doe V. Palmer, 637. Doe V. Parker, 518, Doe V. Passingham, 1041. Doe V. Perryn, 999, 1000, 1033. Doe V. Poole, 506. Doe V. Porter, 628, 629, 634. Doe V. Pott, 1084. Doe V. Powell, 486. Doe V. Prigg, 995. Doe V-. Proaser, 697. Doe V. Provoost, 999, 1020. Doe V. Pyke, 501, 534. Doe V. Quigley, 619. Doe V. Kaffan, 557, 633. Doe V. Rees, 522. Doe V. Rivers, 346, 1083. Doe V. Robbins, 292. Doe V. Robertson, 1473. Doe V. Robinson, 902. Doe V. Routledge, 1345. Doe V. Rusham, 1294. Doe V. Scarborough, 1020. Doe V. Scudamore, 346. Doe V. Smith, 684. Doe V. Spiller, 634. Doe V. Staples, 1500. Doe V. Steimett, 617, 633. Doe V. Thomas, 499. Doe V. Tidbury, 165. Doe V. Turner, 309. Doe V. Vincent, 1109, 1138. Doe V. Walker, 483. Doe V. Wandless, 525. Doe V. Watts, 534, 633. Doe V. Wells, 518. Doe V. Wightman, 634. Doe V. Wilkinson, 557. Doe V. Wood, 133, 265, 616, 1389. Doe V. Woodbridge, 533, 535, 753. Doe V. Woodmjin, 634. Dohm V. Haskins, 939. Doherty v. Matsell, 569. Doherty v. Stimmel, 1358. Dohoney v. Womack, 1075. Doidge V. Bowers, 618. Dolan V. Kelir, 881. Dole V. Bodman, 793, 1318. Dole V. Hughes, 357. Dole V. Thurber, 824. Doll V. Hallenbeck, 93.5. Dollard V. Roberts, 593. Dolman v. Cook, 936. Dominick v. Michael, 1114. Donaghy's Estate, 1318. Donahue's Estate, 1139. Donahue v. Bink, 503. Donahue v. Rich, 506. Donahue v. Thompson, 1176. Donald v. Nesbit, 1277. Donalds v. Beals, 838, 1361. Donalds v. Plumb, 1084. Donaldson v. Holmes, 832. Donegan v. Donegan, 706. Donell V. Stevens, 633. Donisthorpe v. Porter, 510. Donkersley v. Levy, 500. Donlin v. Bradloj-, 882, 1064. Donnell v. Penny, 1398. Donnell v. Thompson, 1434. Donnells v. Edwards, 668, 860. Donner v. Palmer, 1315. Donner v. Redenbaugh, 409. Donnewald v. Turner, 78. Don nor v. Quartermas, 679, 733. Dooley v. Bains, 1216. Dooley v. Pattee, 793. Dooley v. Stoninglon. 318. Dooley v. Walcott, 1350. Dooly V. Stringham, 457. Dooly Block v. Transit Co., 170 Doolittle V. Bailey, 1398. Doolittle V. Cook, 838, 1346. xc TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains S8 1-735; Vol. II, §§ 736-1B41.] Doolittle V. Lewis, 901. Dora V. Dunham, 732. Dorau v. Butler, 1314. Doran v. McConlogue, 1395. Dore V. Sellers, 839. Doremus v. Doremus, 1360. Dorman V. Bates Manuf. Co.. 146, 170. Dornoile v. Colville, 538. / Dorr V. Dudderar, 66, 333, 336, 856, 857. Dorr V. Gratz, 1178. Dorr V. Harkness, 590. Dorr V. Harratian, 750. Dorr V. Lovering, 1009. Dorr V. School Dist., 1378. Dorr V. Shaw, 951. Dorrlty v. Rapp, 348. Dorsey v. Bank, 1088. Dorsey v. Dashiell, 1430. Dorsey v. Dorsev, 943. Doi-sey v. Eagle" 307, 571. Dorsey v. Hall, 783. Dorsey v. Moore, 300, 317. Dorsey v. Sheppird, 1498. Dorsey v. Smith, 395. Dorsey v. Warfleld, 1484. Doss V. Ditman, 963. Doten V. Hair, 915. Dothard v. Denson, 1161, 1169. Doton V. Russell, 853. Doty V. Burdick, 568. 655. Doty V. Graham, 18, 80. Doty V. Teller, 387. Doughaday v. Crowell, 733. Dougherty v. Barnes, 404. Dougherty v. Dorvall, 1463. Dougherty v. McCalgan, 849. Doughty V. Owen, 50. Douglas V. CongrevR, 1016. Douglas V. Dakin, 1380. Douglas V. Dangerfleld, 670. Douglas V. McCoy, 388. Douglas V. Shumway, 368. Douglass V. Bank, 784. Douglass V. Cline, 56, 769, 940. Douglass V. Cruder, 1098. Douglass V. Dickson, 365. Douglass V. Durin, 859. Douglass V. Herms, 532. Douglass V. Ins. Co., 1412. Doniflass v. Moody, 773. Douglass V. Sliarp, 1105. Douglass V. Viele, 739. Douglass T. West. 1330. Douglass V. Whitaker, 631. Douglass T. Wiggins. 314. Douglass V. Yost, 1539. Doupe V. Genin, 496, 1436. Douse V. Earley, 505. Douthett V. Kettle, 1371. Douthitt V. Stlnson, 1306. Dovaston v. Payne, 167. Dover v. Rhea. 1060, 1066. Dow V. Dow, 1471. Dow V. Doyle, 1001, 1530. Dow V. Jewell, 719, 1379. Dow V. Whitney, 1375. Donnard v. Groff, 313, 313, 957. Dowd V. Tucker, 1070. Dowling V. Hennings, 355, 1438. Dowling V. Mill, 515. Dowliug V. Salliotte, 668. Downer v. Quartemas, 679, 733, 733. Downer v. Smith, 679, 1461, 1463. Downes v. Grazebrook, 906, 1084. Downes v. Timperon, 1500. Downing v. Marshall, 666, 1050, 1580. Downing v. Palmateer, 333, 856, 964. Downing v. Sullivan, 854. Downing v. Townsend, 1485. Downs V. Hopkins, 906. Downs V. Younge, 1310. Dowson V. Bell, 398. Doyle V. Mellon, 768, 853. Doyle V. Railroad Co., 593. Doyle V. Wade, 1815. Dozier v. Mitchell, 971. Draham v. Dietsch, 948. Drake v. Baker, 1461. Drake v. Brown, 1003. Drake v. Coal & Iron Co., 269. Drake v. Drake, 1106. Drake v. Glover, 1328. Drake V. Lanning, 1538, 1533, 1534, 1535. Drake v. Moore, 709. Drake v. Painter, 464. Drake v. Railroad Co., 319. Drake v. Ramsey, 1381. Drake v. Sherburne, 1076. Drake v. Wells, 78, 363, 367, 268. Drake v. Wilhelm, 639. Drand v. Roher Manuf. Co., 1369. Dray v. Dray, 674. Dreher v. Ins. Co., 847. Dresser v. Dresser, 693. Dresser v. Norwood, 1363. Dreutzer v. Bell, 467. Drew V. Cole, 21 1 . Drew V. Drew, 377. Drew V. Foster, 1436. Drew V. Hicks, 215. Drew V. Lockett, 876. Drew V. Peer, 363. Drew V. Streeter, 834. Drew V. Swift, 1390, 1891, 1400. Drew V. Towle, 1434. Drey v. Doyle, 637. Driver v. Hudspeth, 804. Driver v. Maxwell, 588. TABLE OF CASES. XCl [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains §S 1-735; Vol. 11, 88 736-lUl.] Drostv. Hall. 411, 414. Druid Park Heigbts Co. v. Ottenzer, 1113. Drury v. Drury, 387, 671. Drury v. Foster, 794, 1115, 1378. Drury v. Kent, 88. Dryden v. Newman, 678. Dubois V. Beaver, 7, 248. Dubois V. Campau, 674, 1178. Dubois V. Kelly, 78. Dubois V. Wilson, 831. Dubose V. Young, 837. 1334, 1336. Dubs V. Dubs, 343, 344, 373, 374. Dubuque v. Benson, 183. Dubuque v. Maloney, 170. Dubuque v. Railroad Go. 56. Dubuque & Pac. R. R. Co. v. Litch- field, 1233. Ducie V. Ford, 1064, 1066, 1067, 1078. Duckenfield v. Wliichcatt, 123. Ducker v. Burnham, 996, 997, 998, 1003, 1369. Ducker v. Dry Goods Co., 1369. Duckwall V. Kisner, 1213. Dudley v. Aqueduct Corp., 57. Dudley v. Bergen, 936. Dudley v. Caldwell, 768. Dudley v. Dudley, 363, 385. Dudley v. Easton, 390. Dudley v. Goddard, 807. Dudley v. Hurst, 65, 67. Dudley v. Littlefield, 713. Dudley v. Warde, 45, 46, 81. Duer V. Sandford, 137. Duff V. McDonough, 1346, 1348. Duff V. Wilson, 674, 679. Duffle V. Corriden, 1482. 1483. Duffleld V. Hue, 752, 1378. Duffey V. Railroad Co., 1451. Dufley V. Willis, 463. Dufford V. Smith, 1096. Duffy V. Calvert, 1090. Duffy V. McGinnis, 871, 881. Dugan V. Baltimore, 73i5. Dugan V. Follett, 1185. Dugon V. HoUis, 739. Dugan V. Lyman, 814. Dugger V. Dagger, 838, 1318, 1350. Duinneen v. Rich, 143, 366. Duke V. Balme, 804. Duke V. British Museum, 1485. Duke V. Clark, 836, 1359. Duke V. Compton, 543. Duke V. Bdgerton, 10^5. Duke V. Harper, 635. Dukes V. Turner, 803, 807, 817, 819. Dulaney v. Middleton, 995, 1039. Dumnv. Rothermel, 617. Dun V. Dietneh, 1433. Duncan v. Duncan, 403, 406, 710, 1499 Duncan v. Drury, 543. Duncan v. Forrer, 666, Duncan V. Millar, 836, 1R59. Duncan v. Moore, 464. Duncan v. Navassa Phosphate Co., 363. Duncan v. Pope, 1335. Duncan v. Railroad Co., 740, 743, 753, 754, 1413. Duncan v. Smith, 871. Duncan v. Stewart, 1508. Duncan v. Sylvester, 676. 731, 1379, Duucan v. Terre Haute, 389. Duncan v. Wicklifle, 1200. Duncan v. Williams, 678. Duncombc v. Felt, 300. Duncombe v. Powers, 174. Duncklee v. Webber, 487. Dundas v. Hitchcock, mil. Dungan v. HoUins 739. Dungan v. Scott. 839. Dunham v. Day. 1355. Dunham v. Hussmau, 1186. Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 4. Dunham v. Lamphere, 9. Dunham v. Loverock, 708. Dunham v. Osborne, 990. Dunham v. Williams, 167. Dunk V. Hunter, 561. Dunklee v. Crane, 839. Duaklee v. Railroad Co., 187. Dunklee V. Van Bnren, 964. Dunlap V. Avery 840. Dunlap V. BuUard 533. Dunlap V. Green, 708. Dunlap V. Shanklin, 813. Dunlap V. Stetson, 1393. Dunn V. Bagby, 599. Dunn V. Herbs, 953. Dunn V. Mellon, 574. Dunn V. Raley, 800. Dunn V. Robblns, 581. Dunn V. Sargent, 355. Dunne v. Ferguson, 43. Dunne v. Trustees, 630. Dunning v. Bank, 910. Dunning v. Finson, 659. Dunphy v. Gorman, 1296. Dunphy v. Ridde, 543. Dunscomb v. Dunscomb, 349. Dunseth v. Bank, 881. Dunston v. Railroad Co., 1405. Dunton v. Sharpe, 950. Dunton v. Outhouse, 814, 815. Duponv. Walden, 1185. Dupuy V. Leavenworth, 707. Duran v. Ritchie, 1040, 1871. Dnrando v. Durando, 363, 990. Durant v. Palmer, 590. Durden v. Whetstone, 889. xcu TABLE OF CASES. [Referenoea are to sections: Vol. I, contains 68 1-735; Vol. 11, 8g 736-1641J Durfee v. Garvoy, 131. Durfee v. Railroad Co., 1193. Durgin v. Lowell, 171. Durham v. Angier, 383, 416. Durham v. Rauroad Co., 48. Durham, etc, R. R. Co. t Walker, 150, 1403. Durkee v. Stringham, 783. Durkin v. Burr, 899. Durland v. Seller, 453. Durnherr v. Rau, 1459. Durreth v. Briggs, 809. Durst V. Dougherty, 1811, 1313. Duryea v. Duryea. 1501. Duryea v. Mayor, 150. Dussaume v. Barnett, 800. Dustin V. Cowdry, 556, 655. Dutch's Appeal, 737. Dutcher v. Culver, 136. Dutcher v. Hobley, 874. Dutton V. Gerrish, 494. Dutton V. Taylor, 149. Duval V. Marshall, 1066. Duval V. McLaskey, 854. Duvall V. Perkins, 1004. Dwelling House Ins. Co. v. Butterly, 841, 843. Dwen V. Blake, 803. Dwcnger v. Branigan, 366. Dwinel v. Barnard, 181. Dwinell v. Bliss, 1318. Dwight V. Eastman, 1000. Dwight V. Hayes, 366. Dwyer v. Garlough, 390. Dwyer v. Carroll, 585. Dycus V. Hart, 1300, 1330. Dye V. Cooke, 437. Dyer v. Clark, 708, 713. Dyer y. Eldridge, 705. Dyer r. Riley, 1093. Dyer v. Sanford, 187, 189, 1408. Dyer v. St. Paul, 338, 341. Dyer v. Wightman, 547. Dyett V. Pendleton, 653, 553. Dyke v. Randall, 384. " Dyne v. Nutley, 1375. Dyson v. Collick, 7. E. Eade v. Bade, 1053. Eadon v. Jeflcock, 347. Eads V. Rutherford, 689. Eager v. Furnival, 343. Eagle V. Swayze, 496, 583. Eagle Fire Ins. Co. v. Lent, 931. Eagleston v. Gutteridge, 793. Eardley v. Granville, 3, 4. Earl V. De Hurt, 205. Earl V. Fisk, 1345. Earl V. Hobart, 286, 235. Earl T. Snow, 877. Earl's Appeal, 298. Eailes V. Meaders, 676. Earll v. Earll, 450, 477. 590. Early v. Friend, 692, 694. Earnhart v. Earnhart, 1015. Earnshaw v. Myers, 1178. Earp's Will, 113. Eason v. Henderson, 696. Eason v. Munsell, 163. East V. Garrett, 1027. East V. Padden, 796. Easter v. Railroad Co., 140. 1451. Eastman v. Amoskeag Manuf. Co.. 303. Eastman v. Foster, 963. Eastman v. Vetter, 637. Easton v. Lyman, 1460. 1465. Eastwood v. Lewer, 141. East Haven v. Hemmingway, 1246. Easton and Amboy R. R. Co. v. Rail- road Co., 1246, 1348. East Texas Fire Ins. Co. v. Clark, 841. Eaton V. Chesebrough, 1440. Eaton V. Gas Co.. 531. Eaton v. Green. 776, 800. Eaton V. Simonds, 397, 978. Eaton V. Straw. 1033. Eaton V. Truesdail, 890. Eaton V. Whitaker, 1533. Eaton V. Whiting, 900. Eaves v. Estes. 64. Eaves v. Prentice, 657. Eberle v. Fisher. 390. Ebersole v. Rankin, 1830. Eberts v. Fisher, 734. Ebey v. Adams, 1313. Ebrand v. Dancer, 1068. Ecdestou V. Petty, 1483. Echols V. Hubbard, 1163. Eckerson v. Crippen, 361. Eckford v. Eckford, 1513. Eckinton v. Brick, 1481. Eckles V. Basco, 566, Eckman v. Eckman, 1293, 1405. Eckman v. Scott, 463. Eddy V. Davis, 821. Edelea v. Hardey, 1483. Edelen v. Middleton, 1033. Edenville v. Railroad Co., 176. Edgerton v. Huff, 333, 336. Edgerton v. Page, 551, 553. Edgerton v. Young, 871, 934. Edinger v. Heesen, 1066. Edmands v. Ins. Co., 841, 848. Edmison v. Lowry, 651, 573. Edmonds v. Crenshaw, 1093. Edrounson v. Meacham, 443. Edrington v. Harper, 773. Edsall V, Merrill, 698. TABLE OF CASES. XCIU [Reforences are to sections: Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735; Vol. II, §§ 736-1541.] Edson V. Colburn, 603, 608, 609, 610. Edson V. Munsell, 163, 727, 738. Edwards v. Bible, 3r6, 1083. Edwards V. Bishop, 688, 1178. Edwards v. Culbertson, 1076. Edwards v. Edwards, 1034, 1066. Edwards v. Pry, 433, 443. Edwards v. Gale, 143. Edwards v. Hale, 631, 685. Edwards v. Ins. Co., 853. Edwards v. Jagers, 109. Edwards v. Jones, 10B3. Edwards v. Kearzey, 465. Edwards v. McLean. 494. Edwards v. Noyes, 1415. Edwards v. Railroad Co., 318, 368, 580, 588, 591. Edwards v. Reed, 463. Edwards v. Tbom, 1311. Edwards v. Trumbull, 799. Edwards v. Van Patten, 524, 599. Edwards v. Varick, 1030. Edwardsville R. R. Co. v. Sawyer, 379. Ege V. Medlar, 844. Egerton v. Brownlow, 1040, 1051. Eggleston v. Eggleston, 450, 457. Eicbelberger v. Gitt, 810. Eiden v. Eiden, 1898. Einstein v. Holt, 1301. Eiseraan v. Gallager, 777. Eiseubach v. Hatfield, 9. Eisenburg v. Railroad Co., 263. Eiseuhart v. Ordean, 577. Eitelgeorge v. Build. Asso., 889. Ela V. Edwards, 1483. Elam V. Parkhill, 81. Elder v. Bales, 1146. Elder v. Derby, 833. Elder v. Rowe, 849. Elder v. Schumacher, 1381. Eldorado v. Davidson, 1190. Eldred v. Leahy, 493. Eldred v. Sherman, 513, 557. Eldred v. Warner, 1538. Eldredge v. Forrestal, 868, 990. Eldredge v. Greene, 1093. Eldridge v. Eldridge, 995, 996. Eldridge v. Pierce, 445, 457. Elgin Lum. Co. v. Longman, 831. Elias V. Verdugo, 438. Elkhart Car Works v. Ellis, 748. Elkins V. Edwards, 895. Ellen V. Ellen, 1193. EUenbogan v. Griffy, 906. EUicott V. Mosier, 384, 411, 414. Ellinger v. Crow], 1293, 1397. Ellington v. Bennett, 333. Elliott V. Aikin, 496, 553. Elliott V. Dycke, 1173. Elliott V. Hancock, 133. Elliott V. Johnson, 539. Elliott V. Lane, 1348. Elliott V. Merryman, 1090. Elliott V. Piersol, 1813. Elliott V. Railroad Co , 208. 310, 833, Elliott V. Rhett, 149, 153. Elliott V. Sallee, 140. Elliott V. Sanfley, 1443. Elliott V. Sleeper, 784, 878. Elliott V. Smith, 337, 567. Elliott V. Stone, 634, 637. Ellis V. Am. Academy, 167, 196, 201. Ellis V. Bassett, 147, 152. Ellis V. Carey, 1531. Ellis V. Darden, 1500. Ellis V. Davis, 431. Ellis V. Ditty, 343. Ellis V. Drake, 914, 917. Ellis V. Ellis, 414. Ellis V. Johnson, 868. Ellis V. Kyger, 748. Ellis V. Page, 616, 618, 633. Ellis V. Railroad Co., 142. Ellis V. Rascoe, 963. Ellis V. Welch, 547, 1483. Ellis V. Young, 1356. Ellison V. Brigham, 268. Ellison V. Daniels, 854. Ellison V. Ellison, 1051, 1053, 1131. Ellison V. Salem C. & M. Co., 63. Ellsworth V. Cook, 343. Ellsworth V. Extension Co. , 134. Ellsworth V, Lockwood, 867, 876, 909, Ellsworth V. Lord, 176, 183. Ellsworth V. Railway Co., 783. Elmendorf v. Carmichael, 1334. Elmendorf v. Taylor, 988, 1180. Elmer v. Loper, 973, 973, 1096. Elmore v. Mustin, 1411. Elrod V. Keller, 690. Elster V. Springfield, 162, 237. Elston V. Piggott, 674. Elston V. Schilling, 513. Elton V. Eason, 1017. Eltzrath v. Ryan, 1345. Elwes V. Maw, 18, 45, 46, 48, 51, 74, 78, 81. Elwin V. Elwin, 399. Elwood V. Klock, 418, 990. Ely V. Ely, 879. Ely V. McGuire, 768. Ely V. Stannard, 793, 1318. Ely V. Turpin, 968. Ely V. Wilcox, 828, 1348. Elyton Land Co. v. Denny, 416. Elyton Land Co. v. McElroth, 1193, 1510. Embree v. Ellis, 419. Embrey v. Owen, 208, 309, 210 XCIV TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735: Vol. II, §§ 736-1541.] Emeric v. Alvarado, 676, 679, 1202, 1209. Emerson v. Atkinson, 978. Emerson v. Fisk, 261. Emerson v Mooney, 1403, 1404. Emerson v. Proprietors, 1457. Eiiierson v. Simpson, 756. Emery v. Darling, 1533. Emery v. Fugina. 309. Emery v. Grocock, 480. Emery v. Ins. Co., 840. Emmal v. Webb, 1313. Emmerson v. Heelis, 43, 1291. Emmert v. Hays, 1157. Emmert v. Thompson, 874. Emmes v. Feeley, 55. Emmons v. Cairns, 1537. Emmons v, Hiuderer, 838. Emmons v. Murray, 828, 1283, 1346. JEmmons v. Scudder, 618, 631. Emmons v. Van Zie, 982. Emory v. Kieghan, 767. Empson v. Soden, 77, 306. Emry v. Railroad Co., 160. EnfleldFall Bridge Co. v. Railroad Co., 108. Engel V. Ayer, 1289. England v. Downs, 885. JIngland v. Vandemark, 1391. Engle V. Hall, 886. English V. Powell, 679. JInglish V. Waples, 1856. Ennor v. Thompson, 1315. Eno V. Del Vecchio, 253. Enoch V. Miller, 902, 1373. Enos V. Sutherland, 900. Ensign v. Colburn, 856. Eoff V. Irwine, 1330. Episcopal City Mission v. Appletoa, 789, 1412. •Epley V. Epley, 1100. Epps V. Randolph, 1297. Equitable Life Ins. Co., v, Gleason, 446. Equitable Life Ins. Co., v. Slye, 829. Equitable Mort. Co. v. Lowry, 1224. Equitable Trust Co. v. Christ, 50. Equitable Trust Co. v. Fisher, 909. Erckv. Church, 1358, 1193, 1399. Erickson v. Brandt, 1416. Erickson v. Michigan, 247. Erickson v. Smith, 809. Erickson v. Wallace, 488. Erlinger v. Bond, 951 Brskine v. Plummer, 268, 1280. Erskine v. Towusend, 759, 768. Erskine v. Wilson, 1440. Erwin v Brady, 889. Evitt V. Rotb, 1168. Erwin v. Acker, 880. Erwin v. Ferguson, 925. Erwin v. Olmstead, 656. Erwin v. Shuey, 788. Ecchhach v. Collins, 1503. Escher v. Simmons, 804, Eshelman v. Vinegar Co., 1319 Eshelman v. Martin, 211. Espin V. Pemberton. 1367. Espy V. Comer, 707. Essex v. Atkins, 1081. Essex V. Essex, 713, 1073. Essex Sav. Bank v. Ins. Co., 839, 843. Essexville v. Emery, ll&O. Essler v. Sloan, 935. Bstabrook v. Smith, 1431, 1441, 1458. Estate of Curry, 449. Estate of Wood, 1491. Esty T. Baksr, 633. 1374. Esty V. Currier, 1402. Estheridge v. Osborne, 551. Estheridge v. Vernoy, 926. Ettenheimer v. Heffernan, 1149. Eubank v. Pence, 101. Eubank v. Poston, 814. Eulrich v. Richter, 307. Eureka Co. v. Edwards, 1283. Eureka Lum. Co. v. Brown, 1277. Eustace v. Scawen, 667. Euyeart v. Kepler, 706. Evans v. Belmont Land Co., 1233, 1338. Evans v. Benyin, 394. Evans v. Berlocher, 1165. Evans v. Bidwell, 567. Evans v. Calmon, 430. Evans v. Dana, 163. Evans v. Enloe, 543. 807. Evans v. Evans, 340, 845, 376, 1018. Evans v. Foster, 1315. Evans v. Gale, 1298. Evans v. Gas Trust Co., 536, 539. Evans v. Gibson, 711. Evans v. Iglehart, 806. Evans v. Jones, 295. Evans v. Kimball, 871. Evans V. Lobdale, 848, 350. Evans v. McQlasson, 1359. Evans v. McKee, 1061, 1064. Evans V. McLucas, 928. Evans v. Person, 406. Evans v. Railroad Co., 477. Evans v. Roberts, 806. Evans v. Ross, 426. Evans v. Smith, 1490. Evans v. Walker, 1009. Evans v. Webb, 398. Evans v. Wells, 1801. Evansville Gas Light Co. y. State, 951. Evelyn v. Evelyn, 813. TABLE OF CASES. xcv [Eef erences are to aeotiona : Vol. I, contains §S 1-735 ; Vol. 11, IS 736-1541.] Everets v. Swift, 1225. Everett v. Edwards, 253, 256. Everett v. Remington, 1425. Everett v. Williamson, 507. Everetts v. Everetts, 792, 1318. Evers V. Challis, 1029. Eversole v. Early, 1443, 1458. Everson v. Webster, 1277. Everts v. Beach, 696. Evertsoa v. Bank, 874. Evertson v. Ogden, 882. Evertson v. Tappen, 369. Evill V. Conwell, 659. Ewart V. Graham, 1.S3. Ewell V.Salem, etc. Oo., 63. Ewer V. Hobbs. 716, 860. Ewing V. Arthur, 963. Ewing V. Buckner. 1057. Ewing V. Hurnet, 1163, 1372. Ewing V. Calquehoun, 8, 14, 213. Ewing V. Ewing, 404. Ewing V. Jones, 1057. Ewing V. Savage, 1285. Ewing V. Shannahan, 279, 1055, 1056, 1057. 1058, 1037. Ewing V. Shelton, 887. Ewing V. Warner, 1057. Ewing V. Winters, 999. Exall V. Partridge, 582. Excelsior Fire Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co., 844, 845. Exeter t. Odiorne, 1040, 1065. Exon v. Dancke, 1347. Ex parte Abbott, 280. Ex parte Allen, 961. Ex parte Astbury, 60. Ex parte Avery, 414. Ex parte Barclay, 45. Ex parte Belcher, 68. Ex parte Boyce, 785. Ex parte Caswell, 1123. Ex parte Colburn, 134. Ex parte Colton, 63. Ex parte Coming, 798. Ex parte Coomb, 798. Ex parte Day, 1490. Ex parte Edwards, 798. Ex parte Grace, 511. Ex parte Halthausen, 799. Ex parte Hanson, 986. Ex parte Hardy, 1354. Ex parte Houghton, 1074. Ex parte Jennings, 96. Ex parte Karish, 438. Ex parte Kerwin, 1378. Ex parte Langston, 798, 799. Ex parte Lindsay, 1506. Ex parte Lynch, 1464. Ex parte Manning, 955. Ex parte Miller, 514, 734. Ex parte Mills, 801. Ex parte Minor, 955. Ex parte Peake, 809. Ex parte Smyth, 134, 534. Ex parte Whitaker, 798. Ex parte Yallop, 1074. Ex parte Yates, 795. Exton V. Greaves, 970. Exton V. Scott, 835. Eyler v. Eyler, 1341, 1348. Eysaman v. Small, 317. Eyster v. Hathaway, 1315. r. Faben v. Paben, 1139. Fabri v. Bryan, 646. Fachet v. Drake, 61. Padness v. Braunborg, 1053. Fahnestock v. Pahnestock, 1134. Fain v. Smith, 793, 1318. Fair v. Brown, 834. Fair v. Stevenot, 828, 1348, 1350. Fairbanks v. Cudworth, 333, 334, 856. Fairbanks v. Metcalf , 1328. Fairchilds v. Chastelleux, 350. Fairchild v. Crane, 1032. Fairchild v. Fairchild, 708, 713. Fairchild v. Holley, 880. Fairchild v. Marshall, 406. Fairchild v. Phillips, 708. Fairfax v. Hunter, 11S3, 1157, 1473. Fairfield v. Morey, 177. Fairfield v. Williams, 167. Fairfield Sav. Bank v. Chase, 1369. Paivre v. iDaley, 464, 1381, 1382, 1383. Parlin v. Soak, 462. Palis V. Ins. Co., 843. Falkner v. O'Brien, 801. Pall V. County Sutter, 107, 108. Pall V. Moore, 630. Fallarss v. Pierce, 1343. Pall River v. Bristol, 57. Pall River Whaling Co. v. Borden, 707, 1073. Palls V. Wright, 431. Falls Manuf. Co. v. Brooks, 1168. Falmouth v. Thomas, 43. Faloon v. Simshauser, 1160, 1193, 1195, 1197, 1199. Pankboner v. Corder, 158, 163, 196. Panning v. Voelker, 543. Pant v. Gist, 431. Farabow v. Green, 338. Parges v. Ryland, 387. Farlee v. Farlee, 1319, 1476. Farley v. Craig, 117. Parley v. Thompson, 542, 543. Parmer v. Grose, 772. Parmer v. Hunter, 535. Farmers' Bank v. Corder, 703. XCVl TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains l§ 1-733; Vol. n, §§ 736-1541.1 Fanners' Bank v. Glenn, 1428. 1460. Farmers' Bank v. Woodford, 963. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Minne- apolis, etc. Works, 48, 50. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Teleg. Co., 930. Farmers' & Mech. Bank v. Kemmel, 985. Farmers', etc. Bank v. Haney, 1318. Farmers' Mer. Nat. Bank v. Wallace, 704. Farnam v. Farnam, 1009, 1056. Farnsworth v. Perry, 283, 1405. Farnsworth v. Railroad Co., 748. Farnsworth v. Taylor, 1376. Farnum v. Hefner, 539, 609, 610. Farnum v. Peterson, 1285. Farquliarson v. Eiclielberger, 1055, 1057. Farr v. Gilchrist, 1051. Farr v. Trustees, 666. Farrand v. Beshoar, 1078. Farrand v. Marshall, 238, 243. Farrant v. Lovel, 331. Farrant v. Thompson, 575. Farrar v. Chauffetete, 45, 58. Farrar v. Cooper, 191. Farrar v. Farrar. 1200. Farrar v. Heinrich, 564, 1162. Farrell v. Enright, 1181. Farrell v. Lloyd, 1068. Farrell v. Parlier, 943. Farrer v. College, 1499. Farrill v. Roberts, 1228. Farrington v. Baley, 561. Farrington v. Barr, 1038, 1052. Farrington v. Duval, 1066. Farrington v. Kimball, 535, 536. Farrington v. Stone, 1296. Farris v. Coleman, 379, 884. Farris v. Dudley, 219. Farrish v. Cook, 1517. Farrist Co. v. Bridgeport, 1251. Farrow v. Edmunson, 625. Farrow v. Farrow, 1000. Farwell v. Cotting, 978. Farwell v. Easton , 753. Fa! well V. Rogers, 1285. Farwell v. Warren, 8G0. Farwell Brick, etc. Co. v. McEenna, 450, 462. Fassett v. Mulock, 871. Fassettv. Smith, 1346. Faubion v. Rogers, 819. Faught V. Holway, 1163, 1176, 1398. Fauke v. St. Louis, 591. Faulk V. Thornton, 201. Faulkner v. Adams, 1319. Faulkner v. Brockenbrough, 768. Faulkner v. Davis, 1003. Faulkner v. Duff, 191. Faulkner v. Faulkner, 384. Faull v. Cook, 480. Favill V. Roberts, 1328. Favor v. McNulty, 140, Favrot v. Mettler, 585. Fawcetts v. Kimmey, 1300. Faxton v. Faxon, 1531. Fay V. Brewer, 334, 328. Fay V. Cheney, 916. Fay V. Fay, 1062, 1064. Fay V. HoUoran, 115. Fay V. Muzzey, 44, 82, 615, 1392. - Feamster v. Feamster, 1086, 1094. Fears v. Brooks, 344, 351. Feather v. Strohoecher, 729. Fechet v. Drake, 61. Fee V. Swingly, 769. Fee V. Taylor, 1475. Feilder v. Slater, 1424. Feimster v. Johnson, 61. Felch V. Harriman, 573. Felch V. Hooper, 1063. Felch V. Taylor, 536. Feldman v. Gamble, 880. Fell V. Brown, 928. Fellman v. Landis, 1476. Fellows V. Allen. 1500. Fellows V. Gilhuber, 593. Fellows V. Mitchell, 1093. Felton V. Smith, 816. Feuby v. Johnson, 1001. Fenn v. Holms, 1235. Fenn v. Smart, 748. Fennell v. Guffey, 536. Fennessey v. Fennessey, 385. Fenno v. Sayre, 808. Fentiman v. Smith, 370. Fenlon v. Miller, 673, 677, 1178, 1831. Fenton v. Steere, 733, 733. Fenwick v. Reed, 987. Ferguson v. Dent. 1416. Ferguson v. Glassford, 885. Ferguson v. Mason, 464. Ferguson v. Peden, 1161. Ferguson v. Speith, 438. Ferguson v. Tweedy, 343, 346. Ferguson v. Wright, 678. Ferguson v. Witsell, 149, 153. Ferguson's Appeal, 170, 305, 733, 1344. Ferrall v. Kent, 601. Ferrand v. Wilson, 303, 804. Ferrier v. Jay, 1117. Ferris r. Blackledge, 784. Ferris v. Ferris, 891. Ferriss v. Harshea, 1448. Ferris v. Land Co., 783. Ferris v. Quimby, 48, 58. Ferris v. Van Vechten, 1083. TABLE OF CASES. XCVU [References are to sections: Vol. I. contains §§ 1-735; Vol. II, 89 736-1541.] Ferris v. Wilcox, 803. Ferry V. Liable, 1118. Ferry v. Street, 1336. Ferry's Appeal, 1514. Fessler's Appeal, 603. Fessenden v. Taf t, 1066. F. sling V. Allen, 1034. Fetrow v. Merriwether, 890. Fetters v. Humphrey, 153, 156. Fichtner v. Ficlitner, 4-^8. Ficklin v. Rexey, 387. Fid tity, etc. Dep. Co. v. Dietz, 1004. Field V. Barling, 1, 155, 188, 1373. Field V. Holland, 880. Field V. Leiler, 353. Field V. Mills, 583. Field V. Providence, 1413. Field V. Stagg, 794, 1378. Fielil V. Watson, 1015. Field V. Wilson, 895. Fiel ler v. Varner, 796, 935. Fielding v. DuBose. 1328. Fields V. Squires, 1438, 1453. Fievel v. Zuber, 895. Fifield V. Sperry, 916. Fight V. Holt, 457. Fillebrowa v. Hoar, 553. Filliter v. Phippard, 590. Finch V. Finch, 1068. Finch V. Moore, 503. Finch V. Trent, 1171. Finch's Case, 657. Findley v. Armstrong, 810. Findley V. Findley, 381. Findley v. Smith, 818, 870. Finkelstein v. Herson, 557. Finlayson v. Crooks, 839. Finley v. Bank, 938. Finley v. McConiiell, 4J7. Finley v. Simpson, 138. Finley v. Saunders, 470. Fiulinson v. Porter. 150. FInlon V. Clark, 430. Finnegan v. Finnegan, 1316. Finney v. Harding, 562. Fint'in v. Birelston, 1464. Fiquel v. Allison, 601. Fire Ins. Co. v. Doll, 1301. Fireston v. Firestone, 361, 385, 1077. Firmetone v. Spaeter, 1388. First M. E. Church, v. Old Columbia, etc. Co., 738, 1412. First Nat. Bank v. Adam, 559, 801. i^'irst Nat. Bank v. Beegle, 957. First Nat. Bank v. Berlschy, 1060. First Nat. Bank v. 15riggs, 444. First Nat. Bank v. Bruce, 441. First Nat. Bank v. Day, 880. First Nat. Bank v. Gage, 937. First Nat. Bank v. Hollingsworth, 430. M First Nat. Bank v. Keig, 777. First Nat. Bank v. Mining Co., 899. First Nat. Bank v. Peck, 893. First Nat. Bank v. Roberts, 1813. First Nat. Bank v. Villegra, 339. First Universalist Soc. v. Boland, 383, 388, 989. Fischer v. Laack, 153. Fiscus V. Moore, 1155. Fish V. Dodge, 303. 588, 589. Fish V. Stewart, 803. Fish V. Water Proof Co., 61. Fisher v. Beard, 140, 174, 348. Fisher v. Beckwith, 1318. Fisher v. Bennehoff, 1158, 1391. Fisher v. Coles, 931. Fisher v. Cowles, 1311. Fisher v. Deering, 543. Fisher v. Dixon, 71, 82. Fisher v. Fair, 182. Fisher v. Fields, 379, 1055, 1059. Fisher v. Glover, 17. Fisher v. Hall, 793, 1318. Fisher v. Hamilton, 1300. Fisher v. Holden, 882. Fisher v. Janseu, 598. Fisher v Johnson, 808. Fisher v. Meister, 464. Fisher v. Melmine, 890. Fisher v. Moon, 269. Fisher v. Mossman, 895. Fisher v. Prosser, 677. Fisher v. Provin, 70 !, 704. Fisher v. Shropshire, 8U4, 809. Fisher v. Spencer, 1484. Fisher v. Smith, 1388. Fisher v. Thirkell, 598. Fisher V. Wegg, 668. Fisher V. Wister, 1031, 1050. Fisk V. Eastman, 346, 990. Fisk V. Kcene, 1027. Fisk V. Patton, 1066. Fisk V. Stevens, 869. Fisk V. Stubbs, 1316. Fitch V. Baldwin, 748, 1315, 1436. Fitch V. Conslantine Hydraulic Co.. 363. Fitch V. Rawlings 96. Fitchburg v. Melviu, 553. Fitchljurg R. R. Co. v. Frost, 163. Fitchburg R. R. Co. v. Gage, 106, 163 Fitchburg R. R. Co. v. Railroad Co., 108. Fitliian v. Corwin, 873 Fits v. Hall, 1383. Fitzgerald v. Anderson, 78. Fitzgerald v. Barbour. 140. Fitzgerald v. Barker, 869. Fitzgerald v. Church, 830. Fitzgerald v. Faunce, 1433. xcvni TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections : Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735; Vol. II, 88 736 -15a.] Fitzgerald v. Fernandez, 438. Fitzgerald v. Goff, 1225. Fitzgerald v. Milliken, 1315. Fitzbardine v. Pritchett, 304. Fitzherbert v. Shaw, 79. Fitzhugh V. Croghan. 1310, 1436. Fitzbugh V. Smitb, 803. Fitzbugh V. Townsend, 999. Fitzmaurice v. Bayley. 484. Fitzpatrick v. Fitzgerald, 1092. Fitzpatrick v. Railroad Co., 192. Filzwalter's Case, 10, 95. Five Cent Sav. Bank v. Asso. Co., 841. Flack V. Gosnell, 695. Fladang v. Rose, 702. Flagg V. Hean, 847. Fliigg V. Fames, 738, 1383. Flagg V. Giltmaker, 868. Flagg V. Mann, 674, 800, 1349. Flaherty v. McCormlck, 1161. Flanagan v. Cusbman, 441, 827. Flanders v. Clark, 1113. Flanders v. Greely, 783. Flanders v. Thomas, 911. Flanigan v. Sable, 870, 871. Flanniganv. Philadelphia, 384. Flaten v. Moorhead, 738. Fleet V. Dorland, 296. Fleek v. Zillhaver, 703. Fleet V. Hegeman, 98. Fleetwood v. Lord, 475. Fleiscbman v. Toplitz, 504. Fleming v. Burnham, 394. Fleming v. Graham, 474. Fleming v. Griswold, 1196. Fleming v. Kerr, 720. Fleming v. Parry, 883. Fleming Oil & Gas Co. v. Oil Co., 531. Fletcher v. Alcona, 1290. Fletcher v. Bank, 1431. Fletcher v. Grover, 689. Fletcher v. Herring, 44, 615, 1292. Fletcher v. Holmes, 769. Fletcher v. Kelly, 62, 839, 831. Fletcher v. Livingston, 368. Fletcher v. Northcross, 773. Fletcher v. Peck, 35, 109. Fletcher v. Phelps, 1386. Fletcher v. Smiton, 379. Flickinger v. Sliaw, 273. Flinnv. Davis, 1002, 1038. Flinn V. McKinley, 679. Flint V. Phipps, 793, 1318, 1319. Flint Plank Road v. Woodhall, 109. Flint V. Sweeney, 640. Flora V. Corbeau, 161. Florence v. Hopkins, 723. Florence Land Co. v. Warren, 978. Florenline V. Barton, 1274. Florernoy v. Harper, 938. Florernoy v. Warden, 1380. Flower v. Elwood, 8"8, 883. Flowers v. Flowers, 386. Flowery Mining Co. v. Min. Co., 1309 Floyd V. Floyd, 633. Floyd V. Harding, 712. Fluke V. Fluke, 1113. Flummerlelt v. Fluramerfelt, 1533. Flynn v. Delroit, 1190. Flynn v. Hatton, 505. Flynt V. Arnold, 1357, 1358. Flynt V. Hubbard, 838, 1068. Fock V. Wieshuhn, 878. Fogal v. Pirro, 979. Fogaty V. Brick Co., 576. Fogarly v. Finley, 1314. Fogarty v. K mmell, 170. Fogg V. Holcomb, 1830. Follansbee v. Johnson, 869. Follett v. Grant, 1439. Follett V. Pi'tman, 1499. Follman v. Mankato, 318. Foley V. McCarthy, 592, 1388. Foley V. Howard, 793, 1286, 1331. Foley V. Wyeth, 202, 337, 238, 243. Folger V. Mitchell, 719. Folsom V. Carli, 481, 440. Folsom V. Freeborn, 1251. Folsom v. Ins. Co., 816. Folsom V. Lewis, 591. Folsom V. Underbill, 171. Folt V. Huntley, 117, 547, 548. Fonda v. Jones, 809. Fonda v. Sage, 1318, 1319. Fond du Lac. Water Co. v. Fond du Lac, 17. Fontaine v. Lumber Co., 537. Foot V. Dickinson, 319. 334, 337. Foot V. New Hampshire, etc. Co., 366. Foote v. Bennett, 1430, 1465. Foote V. Burnet, 1460. Foote V. Cincinnati, 547, 548. Foote V. Gooch, 46, 68. Foote V. Ins. Co., 847. Foote V. Railroad Co., 159, 370. Foote's Case, 134. Forbes v. Darling, 1513. Forbes v. Hall, 1235. Forbes v. M( ffatt, 510, 870. Forbes v. Peacock, 1090. Forbes v. Railroad Co., 155, 169. Forbes v. Shattuck, 306, 571, 601. Forbes v. Smiley, 619. Ford V. Cobb, 64. Ford V. Flint, 1019. Ford V. Ford, 795, 1034, 1489. Ford V. Gray, 662. Ford V. Gregory, 783. Ford V. James, 13^2. Ford V. Johnson, 379. TABLE OP CASES. XCIX [References are to sections: Vol. 1, contains ii 1-735; Vol. TT, §9 736-1541.] Tord V. Knapp, 733. Ford V. Lewis, 1074. Ford V. Nortli Des Moines, 179. Ford V. Olden. 861. Ford V. Smith, 804. Ford V. Wliittock, 170. Ford V. Wilson, 1163. Fordyce v. Hiclis, 708. 709. Fore V. Fore. 452, 453. Forehand v. Jones, 610. Forest Oil C'o.'s Appeal, 875. Forman V. Forinan, 1000. Forrer v. Forrer, 673. Forrer v. Kloke, 938. Forse's Case, 15U0. Forster v. Hale, 1059. Forsyth v. Dungan, 166. Forsyth v. Forsyth, 751. Forsyth v. Smale, 1385. Forsvthe v. Price, 308. FortV. Allen, 1215, 1445. Fort V. Burch, 955, 1339, 1354, 1858. Fort V. OrndofE, 586. Fort Dearborn Lodge v. Klein, 556, 658, 659. Forth V. Chapman, 1033. Fortman v. Goepper, 59. F.irt Plain Bridge Co. v. Smith, 107. Fort Smith v. McKibbin, 1190. F.)rtune v. Walking, 465. Forward v. Deitz, 678. ForwooJ V. Forwood, 384. Fosdick V. Car Co. , 55. Fosdick V. Gooding, 414. Fosdick V. Schall, 55. Fosher v. Guilliams, 404. Foss V. Marr. 957. Fosselt V. Mulock, 951. Foster v. Boston, 905. Foster v. Brown, 134, 370. Foster v. Brownig, 266. Foster v. Foster, 1431. Foster v. Fowler, 105. Foster v. Gardner, 534. Foster v. Hackett, 698, 1003. Foster v. Johnson, 925, 933. Foster v. Kelsey, 659. Foster v. Mansfield, 1334. Foster v. Marshall, 393. Foster v. McGregor, 467. Foster v. Paine, 878. Foster v. Peyser, 593. Foster v. Potter, 910. Foster v. Robinson, 307, 571. Foster v. Roche, 735. Foster v. Smith, 1513. Foster v. Strong, 1344. Foster v. Thompson, 1461, 1463 Foster v. Van Reed, 844, 845. F'oster v. Wright, 11, 96. Foster's Appeal, 371, 713, 837, 1504. Foster's Case, 319. Fouch V. Wilson, 809. Fouclie V. Swain, 872. Foulke V. Bond, 11U3. Foushee v. Grigsby. 839. Foust V. Morman, 733. Fow V. Roberts, 591, 596. Fowle V. Wadsworth, 1066. Fowler v. Bailley, 707. It'owler V. Batt, 503, 577. Fowler v. Black, 1413. Fowler v. Fay, 543. Fowler v. Ludwig, 878. Fowler v. Poling, 1440. Fowler v. Raplcy, 563. Fowler v. Simpson, 564. Fox V. Corn, 679. Fox V. Davis, 337. Fox V. Frazer, 782. Fox V. Ins. C;o., 844. Fox V. School, 357. Fox V. Sugar Co. . 1376. Fox V. Wharton, 893, 939. Foxcroft V. Barnes, 738. Fraker v. Houck, 983. France v. Connor, 409. Francestown v. Deering, 1071. Francis v. Cockrell, 500. Francis v. Gerrard, 430. Francis v. Wells, 804, 805. 807, 809. Francisco v. Hendricks, 378. Franciscus v. Reieart, 1041. Frank v. BenesclCl98, Frank v. Branch. 708, 711. Frank v. Conradi, 580. Frank v. Davis, 964. Frank v. Heidenheimer, 1333. Frank v. Hicks. 797, 833. Frank v. Morgan, 535. Franke v. Shipley, 1480. Franke v. St. Louis, 591. Frankland v. Moulton, 66. Franklin v. Brown, 494. Franklin v. Coffee, 430. Franklin V. Dorland, 1193. Franklin v. Palmer, 550, 554, 567. Franklin v. Osgood, 1091, 1093, 1113. Franklin v. Pollard Mill Co., 153. Franklin v. Talmadge, 1287. Franklin V. Van Cott. 961. Fraaklin Canal, etc. Co. v. Card, 631, 638. Franklin Ins. Co. v. Findlay, 839. Franklin Land Co. v. Coal and Oil Co , 477. Franks v. Noble, 112. Fraser v. Bean, 938. Fraser v. Ott, 1388. Fratt V. Whittier, 57. TABLE OF CASES. [References ars t3 sections: Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735; Vol. 11, §§ 736-1541.] Frazer v. Jackson, 562. Frazer v. Robinson, 566. Frazer v. Western, 1397. Frazier v. Brown, 337, 330. Frazier v. Caruthers, 533. Frazier v. Church, 1085. Frazier v. Hanlon, 659. Frazier v. Hendern, 813. Frazier v. Myer, 196. Freary v. Cooke, 92. Frecket v. Drake, 67, Frederick v. Devol, 69. Frederick v. Dickey, 311. Frederick v. Frederick, 730. Frederick v. Gray, 686. Frederick v. Williams, 685. Frederick's Appeal, 1468. Free v. Beatley, 371. Free v. Stuart, 78. Freed v. Brown, 785, 1373. Freedom v. Norris, 147, 188. Freedman's Sav., etc. Co. v. Earle," 380. Freeland v. Burt, 5. Freeland v. Freeland, 384. Freeland v. Ritz, 484. Freeland v. Southworth, 77. Freeman v. Baldwin, 777. Freeman v. Barnes, 479. Freeman v. Coit, 1514. Freeman v. Foster, 1431. Freeman v. Freeman, 1499, 1532. Freeman v. Headley, 828, 619, 621. Fneman v. Kelly, 1066, 1067. Freeman v. Paul, 872. Freeman v. Peay, 793, 1318. Freeman v. Scofleld, 935. Freeman v. Wilson, 556. Freeman's Bank v. Vose, 786. Freemoult v. Dedire, 801. Freer v. Statenbur, 370. Freeson V. Bissell, 821. Freiberg v. Walzem, 438. Freison v. Bates College, 923. Freke v. Carbery, 1486. Fremont, etc. R. R. Co. v. Marley, 319. French v. Bankhead, 1351. French v. Baron, 973. French v. Brewer, 1408. French v. Crosby, 485. French v. Davis, 398. French v. Frazier, 1508. French v. French, 1371. French v. Lord, 389. French v. Marstin, 132, 146. French v. Mehan, 703. French v. New York, 599. French v. Old South Soc, 383, 989. French v. Pearce, 1399. French v. Pratt, 413, 413. French v. Rollings, 347, 1168. French v. Wade, 1308, 1366. French V. Williams, 151. Frentz v. Klotsch, 674, 679. Fresno Canal Co. v. Rowell, 1448, Frew V. Clarke, 1476. 1484. Frey v. Johnson, 1419. Frick V. Fisens, 1375. Frick V. Semon, 678. Friedenburg v. Jones, 496. Friedlander v. Ryder, 80, 509^ Friedley v. Hamilton, 776. Friend v. Friend, 1890. Frierson v. Blanton, 851, 855. Fries v. Null, 1845. Fiiezen v. Ins. Co., 816. Frink v. Adams, 779. Frink v. Pond, 1818. Frink v. Roe, 1104, 1370, 1303. Frisbie v, Bateman, 988. Frisbie v. Price, 621. Fritsche v, Fritsche, 143. Fritz V. Joiner, 985. Fritz V. Pusey, 1434, 1458, 1460. Frilz V, Turner, 1477. Fritzler v. Robinson, 796. Frost V. Beekman, 833, 1838. Frost V. Butler, 749. Frost V. Church, 1214. Frost V. Deering, 789, 1305. Frost V. Earnest. 547, 577. 1433. Frost V. Erath Cattle Co., 1118, 1118, 1875. Frost V. Koon, 946. Frost V. Raymond, 1419. Frost V. Wolf, 710. Frothingham v. McKusick, 339, 337. Front V. Hardin. 601. Froutin v. Small, 1419. Fry V. Payne, 677. Fry V. Scott, 876. Fryer v Rockefeller, 963. Fuchs V. Fuchs, 15:il, 1532. Fugate V. Pierce, 1194. Fuhr V. Dean, 143, 556, 655, 658. Fulleck V. Allison, 1476. Fuller V. Arms,- 141, 1403. Fuller V. Benett 1366. Fuller V. Cliamier, 1018. Fuller V. Cunningham. 836, 1835. Fuller V. Dauphin, 1385, 1386. Fuller V. Eastman, 931, 932. Fuller V. Eddy, 770. Fuller V. Fuller, 696. Fuller V. Hunt, 866. Fuller V. Langum, 910. Fuller V. Montague, 733. Fuller V. Musroon, 730. Fuller V. Ruby, 553, 573. TABLE OF CASES. CI [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains 68 1-735; Vol. II, e§ 736-1541.] Tuller V. Rust, 413. Fuller V. Saxton, 1414. Tuller V. Sweet, .564, 567. Puller V. Vau Geesen, 955, 956. Puller V. "Whitlock. 467. Puller V. Yates, 398, 400. Pulmer's Appeal, 694. Pulshear v. Randon, 1306. Fulthrope v. Foster, 763. Fulton V. Fulton, 393. Fulton V. Johnson, 902. Fulton T. Moore, 9.50 Fulton V. Norton, 73. Fulton V. Robert, 463. Pulton V. Stuart, 583. Fultou Bank v. Canal Co., 1367. Puuk V. Bigaldi, 57. Funkv. Crisswold, 1119. 1443. Punk V. Eggleston 1116, 1130. Punk V. Newcomer, 674. Funk V. Voueida, 1419, 1430, 1460. Furber v. Page, 1066, 1067, 1071. Purbush V. G lodwin, 853. Furguson v. Coward, 908. Furlong v. Cox, 845. Furlong v. Garrett 1168. Furlong v. Leary, 618, 633. Furnas v. Durgin, 1458. Furness v. Mickleson, 1153. Furnival v. Crew, 511. Furrh v. Winston, 676, 1379. Pussell V. Hennessy, 911. Pusselman v. Worthington, 568, 635. G. XJabhardt v. Reeves. 133. Gable v. Daub, 1435. Gadberry v. Sheppard, 743. Gadsend v. Desportes, 1011, 1016, Gadsend v. Whtiley, 1061. Gaffney v. Peeler, 1205. Gaflford v. Proskauer, 936. Gaffield v. Hapgood, 46, 78. -Gafford v. Strauss 853. Gage V. Barnes, 1404. -Gage V. Brewster, 879, 980. Gage V. Cheaebro, 773. Oage V. Downey 678. tick v. Sipe, 156 Haward v. Peavey, 995, 996, 1006, 1269, 1489. Hawes v. Hawes, 669. Hawes v. Humphrey, 1494. Hawes v. Nicholas, 1505. Hawes v. Wyatt, 1497. Hawke v. Ewart, 740, 1499. Hawkes v. Ins. Co. , 848. Hawkes v. Pike, ^9i, 1321. Hawkins v. Carbins, 193. Hawkins v. Chase, 1306. Hawkins v. Files, 605, 826, 1359, Hawkins v. Kemp, 1118. Hawkins v. McDougal, 724. Hawkins v. Skeggs, 807, 310, 571, Hawkins v. Thurman, 812. Hawks V. McCullough, 1419. Hawks V. Sailors, 999. Hawley v. Baltimore, 166. Hawley v. Bradford, 855, 367, 369, Hawley v. Clowes, 315, 325, 699. Hawley v. James, 872. Hawley v. Northampton, 1028. Hawley v. Zigerly, 1170. Hawralty v. Warren, 469. Haws V. Association. 1878. Hawthorn v. Calef, 109. Hawtry v. Butlin. 75, 78. Haxtun v. Corse, 1517. Haxtun v. McChinn, 1059. Hayden v. Bunkemper, 957. Hayden v. Dutcher, 156. Hayden v. Merrill, 694. Havden v. Robinson. 452. Hayden v. Stone, 171, 177. Hayden v. Stoughton, 4:i0, 738, 747, Hay v. Colioes Co., 287, 288. Hay v. Coventry, 1009. Hay V. Cumberland, 487. Hay v.Estell, 722. Hay V. Hill. 1335. Hay V. Palmer, 112, 124. Hay V. Watkins, 1120. Hayes v. Boylan, 1318, 1320. Hayes v. Davis, 740. Hayes v. Foorde, 1018. Hajes V. Frey, 901. Hayes v. Kershow, 1062. Hayes v. Livingston, 267. Hayes v. Pratt, 1091. Hayes v. N. Y. Min. Co., 75. Hayes v. Shattuck, 960. Hayes v. Tabor, 999. Hayes v. Waldon, 208, 209. Hayes's Appeal, 722, 723, 952. Hayne v. Cummings, 491. Hayne v. Gould, 688, 717. Hayne v. Hermann, 1075, 1078, Hayne v. Irvine, 1518. Hayner v. Smith, 551, 553. Haynes v. Aldrich, 640. Haynes v. Burlington, 131. Haynes v. Haynes, 1482. Haynes v. Jackson, 1391. Haynes v. Stevens, 1457. Haynes v. Union Imp. Co., 519. TABLE OF CASES. CXllI [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains 8§ 1-735; Vol. II, 88 736-1641.1 Ilaynes v. Wellington, 956. Haynes v. Young, 1391, 1431, 1460. Haynie v. Bickens, 406. Hays V. Cage, 985. Hays V. Doan, 77. Hays V. Ferguson, 1434. Hays V. Gloster, 1076. Hays V. Hall, 803. Hays V. Hinkleman, 319. Hiiyward v. Bank, 983. Hayward v. Hum, 287. Hayward v. Kenney, 737, 747. Hayward v. Ramage, 551. Haywood v. Brunswick Build. Soc, 1424. Haywood v. Fulmer, 861. Haywood v. Rogers, 608. Haywood v. Stillingfleet, 1035. Haywood v. Thomas, 1161, 1194. Hazird v. Albro, 096. Hazard v. Robinson, 186. Hazelrigg v. Boarman, 811. Hazeltine v. Edgmane, 233. Hazen v. Barnett, 720. Hazeton v. Putnam. 134, 361. Hazleton v. Reed, 1535. Hazlett V. Harwood, 1119. Hazlett V. Powell. 577. Head v. Baird, 770. Head v. Goodwin, 837, 1339. Heald v. Heald. 1003. Heald v. Ins. Co., 605. Headley v. Goundry, 883. Healey v. Alston, 1084. Healey v. Simpson, 1533. Healey V Seward, 1318. Healy v. O'Brien, 769. Healy v. Reed, 1539. Heap V. Barton, 79. Heard v. Horton, 1388. Heard v. Pilley, 1081. Hearle v. Greenbank, 344. Hearle v. Hicks, 1499. Heath v. Bishop, 1080. Heath v. Heath, 1387. Heath v. Hewitt, 143, 1388. Heath v. Randall, 368, 371. Heath v. White, 343. Heath v. Williams, 199, 310. Heatherly v. Waugh, 676. Heathman v. Holmes, 463. Heaton v. Fryberger, 1316. Heaton v. Sawyer, 451, 468. Heavilon v. Bank, 937, 957. Heckert v. Hile, 1143. Heckman v. Swett, 14. Hecock V. Van Dusen, 1163. Hedden v. Overton, 1309. Hedge v. Drew, 488. Hedrich v. Stahl, 1245. Heelman v. Me Williams, 1057. Heermance v. Vernoy, 61. Heermans v. Robertson, 1111. Heeney v. Church, 17. Heffelman v. Water Power Co,, 1376. Hefler v. Faulkner, 1508. Heflim v. Pliillips, 1432. Hefner v. Urton, 458, 938. Hegan v. Johnson, 617. Hegeman v. McArthur, 553. Hegeman v. Johnson, 950. Heifley v. Haynes, 563. Heilburg v. Schuman, 777. Heilman v, Heilman, 998. Heilman v. Kroh, 1313. Ileinlein v. Railroad Co., 363. Heinz v. Cramer, 1194, 1399. Heinz v. Shortt, 531. Heinsen v. Heinsen, 355, 379, 1330. Heiskill v. Powell, 1064. Heist V. Baker, 810. Heister v. Fortner, 834. Heizer v. Herzer, 113. Helberg v. Schurman, 777. Helbun v. Mofford, 505. Helck V. Reinheimer, 946. Hele V. Bond. 1135. Helfenstein's Estate, 786. HellaweU v. Eastwood, 75. Heller v. Ins. Co., 551. Helm V. Gilroy, 67. Helm V. Helm, 452. Helm V. Kleinschmidt, 1334. Helm V. Weaver, 810. Helm V. Wilson, 1396. Helm V. Yerger, 906. Helms V. May, 1285 Hemingway v. Scales, 704. Hemmenway v. Bassett, 336, 857. Hemmenway v. Towner, 1145. Hempfield R. R. Co. v. Thornburg, 804. Hemphill v. Boston, 175. Hemphill v. Fynn, 631. Hemphill v. Haas, 452, 458, 464. Hemphill v. McClimans, 1415. Hemphill v. Ross, 768. Hemphill v. Tevis, 623. Hempstead v. Johnston, 835. Henagan v. Horlee, 369. Hendershott v. Ping, 879. Henderson v. Carbondale Coal & Coke Co., 521. Henderson v. Chaires, 393, 428. Henderson v. Eason, 693, 694, 696. Henderson v. Grammar, 1075. Henderson v. Henderson, 1019. Henderson v. Hunter, 283, 758. Henderson v. Johns, 1336. Henderson v. Lowry, 960. CXIV TABLE OF CASES. LBeferenoes are to sections: Vol. I, contains §9 1-735; Vol. II, 8§ 736-1541.] Henderson v. Ovejrton, 1232. Henderson v. Pilgrim, 863. Henderson v. Smith, 1314. Hendrick v. Nunn, 1075. Hendricks v. Rosson, 792, 1318. Hendricks v. Smith, 608. Hendrickson v. Beeson, 500. Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 659. Hendrickson v. Woolley, 838, 1343. Hendrickson's Appeal, 824. Hendrix v. McBeth, 370. Hendrixson v. Cardwell, 307, 571. Hendry v. Squier, 581. Hendy v. Smith, 1345. Henkil v. Murr, 593. Henkle v. Dillon, 68. Henley v. Hotaling, 781. Hennessy v. Murdock, 190, 191, 1388. Hennes^ v. Walsh, 1064. Henning v. Burnet, 140. Henning v. Warner, 568. Henninger v. Heald, 954. Henninghausen v. Tischer, 936. Henrickson v. Hodgden, 792, 1318. Henry v. Bell, 849. Henry v. Carson, 1225. Henry v. Coats, 795. Henry v. Davis, 981. Henry v. Fisher. 831. Henry v. McClellan. 293, 1371. Henry v. Tupper, 521. Henry v. Whitaker, 1373. Hensal v. Wright, 323, 697. Henscliel v. Mamero, 885. Henshaw v. Bissell, 1196. Henshaw v. Foster, 1476. Henshaw v. Wells, 768. Hensley v. Brodie, 63. Henson v. Build. & Loan Asso., 474. Henson v. Moore. 437. Hepburn v. McDowell, 273. Hepburn v. Hepburn, 1093. Herber v. Christopheson 933. Herbert v. Herbert, 1006, 1110. Herbert v. Pue, 1405. Herbert v. Selby, 1008. Herbert v. Wren, 384. Herdman v. Cooper, 439. Herkimer v. Rice, 839. Herlakenden's Case, 77, 83, 300. Herman v. Deming, 1392. Herman v. Roberts, 139, 144, 205. Herndon v. Pratt, 1058. Herndon v. Reed, 1312. Heme v. Bembow, 338. Herques v. Marti, 1338. Herrell v. Sizeland, 618, 638. Herrick v. Marshall, 1215. Herrick v. Moore, 1431, 1432. Harrington v. Barrow, 1539. Herrington v. Coburn, 417. Herrington v. Wood, 536. Hersh v. Railroad Co., 106. Hershberger v. Blewett, 1331, 1238. Hershy v. Clark, 1490. Hershy v. Metzgar, 43. Herskell v. Bushnell, 601. Hervey v. Hervey, 397. Hervey v. Krost, 978. Hervey v. Rhode Island Locomotive Works, 55. Heselton v. Harmon, 170. Hess V. Final, 936. Hess V. Fox, 533. Hess V. Muir, 1187. Hess V. Meyer, 1392. Hess's Appeal, 1480. Hessel v. Johnson, 534, 660. Hessel v. Pott, 560. Hest V. Cocke, 423. Heuisler v. Nickum, 827. Heuser v. Harris, 1521. Hewes v. Wiswell, 1349. Hewitt V. Cox, 369, 414. Hewitt V. Dean, 890, 892. Hewitt V. Isham, 271. Hewitt V. Looseman, 1367. Hewitt V. Morris, 295. Hewitt V. Rankin, 371, 438, 709. Hewitt V. Templeten, 457. Hewlins v. Shippan, 370. Hext V. Gill, 245, 347. Hexter v. Knox, 586. Heyden's Case, 338. Heyer v. Alexander, 1364. Heyer v. Deaves, 947. Heysham v. Dettre, 57. Heyward v. Cuthbert, 433. Hey ward v. Farmers' Min. Co., 1803. Heyward v. Judd, 986. Hibbard v. Foster, 698. Hibbard v. Hurlbert, 1377. Hibbard v. Lamb, 1091. Hibbard v. Zenor, 837, 1337, 1341. Hibbert v. Cooke, 298. Hibblewhite v. M'Morine, 693. Hickenbotham v. Blackledge, 923. Hickey v. Hazard, 234. Hickey v. Railroad, 248, 1451. Hicklin v. McClear, 1194. Hickman v. Irvine, 370. Hickman v. Lynch, 1193. Hickman v. Perrin, 838, 1343. Hickman v. Sweet, 14. Hicock V. Scribner, 923. Hikok V. Railway Co., 188. Hikox V. Lowe, 787, 849. Hicks V. Bullock, 678. Hicks V. Coleman, 1389. Hicks V. Jennings, 935. TABLE OF CASES. CXV [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains 8§ 1-735; Vol. 11, 8§ 736-1541.] Hicks V. Silliman, 215. 217. Hicks V. Ward, 112,'). Hick's Appeal, 1514. Hide V. Tliornborough, 238. Hieatt v. Morris, 253. Hiestand v. Meyer, 1514. Higbee v. Rice, 684. Higbee v. Rodeman, 747, 1413. Higbie v. Farr, 816. Highstone v. Burdette, 684. Higinbotham v. Cornwell, 398. Higinbotham v. Stoddard, 1391, 1394. Higginbotham v. Sliort, 714, 716, 725. Higgins V. Carlton, 1478, 1494. Higgins V. Chamberlain, 337. Higgins V. Crosby, 1185. Higgins V. Ferguson, 832. Higgins V. Halligan, 644. Higgins V. Kusterer, 238, 236. Higgins V. Scott, 895. Hignite v. Hignite, 678. Hiborne v. Brown, 264, 271. Hilbourn v. Fogg, 618, 655. Hilchens v. Hilchens, 418, 990. Hildreth v. Eliot, 1057. Hildstand v. Meyer, 1514. Hiles V. Atlee, 1341. lliles V. Fisher. 703. Hiles V. Rule, 716. Hill V. Bacon, 995, 1431. Hill V. Barclay, 515, 521, 754. Hill V. Butler, 933. Hill V. Cook, 1124. Hill V. Crosby, 165. Hill V. Cutting, 261. Hill V. Den. 1061. Hill V. Eldred, 803. Hill V. Gomme. 1532. Hill V. Gwin, 338. Hill V. HardiQ, 1490. Hill V. Henry, 890. Hill V. Hill, 58, 268, 287, 404, 1027, 1032. Hill V. Johnston, 444. Hill V. Jones, 1099. Hill V. Jordan, 623. Hill V. Lord, 133. Hill V. McCarter, 825, 951. Hill V. McNichol, 1331, 1337, 1343, 1357, 1358. Hill V. McRea, 1080. Hill V. Meeker, 933. Hill V. Meyers, 488, 450, 1063. Hill V. Mitchell, 856. Hill V. Moore, 864. Hill V. Mundy, 71. Hill V. Nat. Bank, 48. Hill V. Pollard, 1066. Hill V. Reno, 714, 724. Hill V. Ressegieu, 355. Hill V. Robertson, 770. Hill V. Rockingham Bank, 999. Hill V. Sewald, 62, 69. Hill V. Shorey, 133. Hill V. Stocking, 559, 561. Hill V. Townley, 928. Hill V. Woodman, 592. Hillard v. Scoville, 734. Hillary v. Waller, 191. Hillen v. Iselin, 1123. Hilliard v. Gas Coal Co., 156, 504. Hiiliard v. Hilliard, 428. Hilliuger v. Eames, 1386. Hills V. Barnard, 999. Hills V. Ledwig, 1396, 1397. Hills V. Miller, 131, 134, 140, 159, 1250, 1422. Hills V. Simonds, 1003. Hillyer v. Vandewater, 1029. Hilsenbeck v. Guhring, 591. Hiltner v. Ege, 342, 346. Hilton V. Granville, 194, 347. Hilyard's Estate, 395. Hinchlifife v. Shea, 388. Hinchman v. Stiles, 367, 390. Hinchman v. Whitstone, 1197. Hinckley v. Beokwith, 586. Hindman v. Kizor, 208. Hindmarsh v. Carlton, 1483. Hinds V. Ballou, 837. Hine v. Dodd, 1355. Hine v. Robbing, 1300. Hiner v. Jeanpert, 175. Hines v. Allen, 1458. Hines v. Light, 1066. Hines v. Pott, 874. Hinkle v. Hinkle, 384. Hinkley v. Crouse, 1398. Hinkley v. Wheelwright, 861. Hinman v. Booth, 1334, 1328. Hinmau v. Ins. Co., 843. Hinsdale v. Humphrey, 128, 558, 1371. Hinson v. Bush, 392. Hinters v. Hinters, 674. Hinton v. Hinton, 374. Hiiiton V. Leigh, 823, 1329, 1344, 1351. Hinton v. Pritchard, 781. Hinton v. Tage, 1107. Hippesley v. Spencer, 331. Hirth V. Graham, 1290. Hiscock V. Norton, 804, 805. Hise V. Fincher, 1496. Hitchcock V. Bank, 943. Hitchcock V. Carpenter, 361. Hitchcock V. Portnier, 833. Hitchcock V. Shaw, 1484. Hi'chcock V. Simpkins, 994. Hitchens v. Morrison, 1176. Hitchman v. Walton, 72, 337. Hite V. Hite, 298. CXVl TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections : "Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735 ; "Vol. II, §§ 736-1641."} Hittinger v. Eames, 335. Hixon V. George, 463. Hoag V. Sayre, 826, 1359. Hobart v. Sanborn, 919. Hobbs V. Fuller, 914, 917. Hobbs V. Harvey, 881. Hobbs V. Lowell, 176. Hobbs r. Smith, 1080. Hoboken v. Railroad Co., 1247, 1248, 1351. Hobsden v. Lloyd, 1500. Hobson V. Cartwright, 1420. Hobson V. Edwards, 816. Hobson V. Hale, 1034. Hobson V. Philadelphia, 1888. Hoby V. Hoby, 375. Hockenhull v. diver, 1345. Hooker v. Gentry 1489. Hockley v. Mawbey, 1121, 1123. Hockman v. McClaiiahan, 1311. Hodder v. Ruffln, 953. Hodgdon v. Shannon, 787. Hodges V. Gill, 904. Hodges V. Ins. Co., 847. Hodges V. Korving, 1394. Hodges V. Thayer, 1460. Hodges V. Winston, 440, 1846, 1848. Hodges' Appeal, 963. Hodgkin v. McVeigh, 569. Hodkins v. Farrington, 263, 264, 366. Hodgkinson v. Ennor, 218. Hodgkinson, Petitioner, 734. Hodgson V. Jeffries. 272. Hodle V. Healey, 983. Hodson V. Ball, 1009. Hodson V. Dancer, 1117. Hodson V. Eddy, 1174. Hoes V. Boyer, 824. Hoeveler v. Fleming, 553. Hoffman v. Armstrong, 7, 243. Hoffman v. Beard, 733. Hoffman v. Burke, 949. Hoffman v. Buschman, 462, 1271. Hoffman v. Clark, 648, 650. Hoffman v. Harrington, 982. Hoffman v. Hill, 440. Hoffman v. Hoffman, 459. Hoffman v. Kulm, 355. Hoffman v. Mackall, 773, 900. Hoffman v. Savage, 191. Hoffman v. Stigers, 668, 704, 715. Hoffman v. White, 1158, 1398. Hoffstat v. Voight, 251, 254. Hofus V. Hofus, 1033. Hogan v. Barry, 200. Hogan V. Calvert, 1430. Hogan V. Campbell, 11. Hogan V. Jaques, 1065. Hogan V. Kurtz, 985. Hogan V. Stone, 972. Hogan V. Strayhorn, 1065. Hoge V. Hollister, 791. Hogenson v. Railroad Co., 815. Hogg V. Davis, 9, 1247. Hogg V. Odom, 784. Hogle V. Lowe, 711. Hogsett V. Ellis, 619, 651. Hoile V. Bailey, 783, 808, 900. Hoit V. Russell, 783, 1315. Hoitt V. Hoitt, 1499, 1500. Hoitt V. Webb, 440. Hokamp v. Hageman, 393. Holbrook v. Bowman, 1166. Holbrook v. Chamberlain, 75, 78. Holbrook v. Debo, 1400. Holbrook v. Insurance Company, 839, 847. Holcombe v. Coryell, 676, 1379. Holcombe v. Holcombe, 298, 1004. Holcombe v. Thompson, 866. Holdane v. Cold Springs, 170. Holden v. Bank, 1368. Holden v. Blaney, 1499. Holden v. Chandler, 1386. Holden v. Cox, 568. Holden v. Garrett, 836, 1859. Holden v. Joy, 84, 38. Holden v Shattuck, 359. Holder v. Coats, 7. Holder v. Lake Co., 810. Holdfast V. Marten, 379. Holdridge v. Sweet, 984. Holeman v. Abrams, 638. HoUaday v. Daily, 1308. Holland v. Alcock, 1053. Holland v. Bank, 867. Holland v. Fuller, 718. Holland v. Hodgson, 49, 336, 857. Holland v. Holland, 987. Holland v. Long, 165. Holland v. Withers, 431. HoUenbeck v. McDonald, 154, 939. Holley V. Glover, 31)1. 725. Holley V. Hawley, 684, 1178. Holley V. Hirscb, 1110. Holley V. Young, 490. Holliday v. Arthur, 777. Holliday v. Bank, 836, 1329, 1351. Holliday v. Lowry, 777. Hoilingsworth y. Atkins, 605. Hollingsworth v. Hill, 562. Hoilingsworth V. Koon, 981. Hoilingsworth t. Stennett, 639. Hoilingsworth v. Walker, 1193. Hollins V. Dcmarest, 195. Hollis V. Harris, 1385. Hollis V. Pool, 648. Hollis V. State, 448. Hollister v. Shaw, 1116. Hollman v. Tigges, 1113. TABLE OF CASES. CXVll [References are to sections: Vol. 1, contains S§ 1-735; Vol. II, e§ 736-1641,] HoUoway v. Brinkley, 603. Hollo way v. Holloway, 431. Holly V. Brown, 623. Holly River Coal Co. v. Howell, 1161. Holman v. Creaginiles, 1431. Holman v. Hopkins, 1486. Holman v. McCray, 1072. Holman v. Patterson, 805, 810. Holmberg v. Johnson, 325. Holmes v. Bank, 878. Holmes v. Bybee, 928. Holmes V. Coghill, 1107, 1121. Holmes v. Drew, 593, 843. Holmes v. French, 920, 923. Holmes v. Gilmac, 106S, 1083. Holmes v. Goring, 153. Holmes v. Grant, 773. Holmes v. Holloway, 659. Holmes v. Holmes, 725. Holmes v. Jersey City, 171. Holmes v. Jones, 153. Holmes v. McGee, 707, 1099. Holmes v. Meynel, 1032. Holmes v. Morse, 855. Holmes v. Railroad Co., 368. Holmes v. Seely, 153, 173. Holmes v. Sellers, 143. Holmes v. Tremper, 75. Holmes v. Trout, 1300. Holmes v. Turner Falls Co., 898, 901. Holmes V. Williams, 563. Holmes v. Wood, 637. Holridge v. Gillespie, 511, 977. Holsman v. Boiling Spring Co., 205, 209, 313, 232. Holsen v. Rockhouse, 1105. Holstein v. Adams, 1193. Holterhoff v. Mead. 687. Holton V. Meighen, 77S. Holton V. Whitney, 1176. Holyoke Co. v. Lyman, 101. Home Ins. Co. v. Field, 453. Home Ins. Co. v. Sherman, 554. Home Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 1814. Homer v. Riker, 174. Hornet V. B icon, 1033. Hone V. Van Schaick. 407. Honore v. Bakewell, 808. HoQore v. Ins. Co., 845. Honsee v. Hammond, 313. Honywood v. Hon\ wood, 303, 305. Hooberry v. Harding, 1080. Hood V. Brown, 776, 835. Hood V. Haden, 897, 1103, 1133. Hooker v. Cummings, 96, 101. Hoole V. Atty.-Gen., 175, 178. Hooper v. Apin, 331. Hooper v. Cummings, 738, 747, 1412. Hooper v. Farnsworth, 489. Hooper v. Ramsbottam, 1338. Hooper v. Wilkinson, 319. Hoopes V. Alderson, 143. Hoopes V. Bailey, 773. Hooton V. Holt, 652. Hoover v. Hoover, 1078. Hoover v. Wheeler, 831. Hoozier Stone Co. v. Malott, 133. Hope V. Barnett, 171. Hope V. Hope, 340, 1117. Hope V. Railroad Co., 394. Hope V. Stone, 1445. Hope V. Taylor, 1033. Hope Fire Ins. Co. v. Cambrelling, 1367. Hopewell Mills v. Bank, 48, 59, 60, 63, 64. Hopkins v. Crouch, 723. Hopkins v. Glunt, 1061. Hopkins v. Hopkins, 1048. Hopkins v. Lee, 1461. Hopkins v. Parkinson, 441. Hopkins v. Railroad Co., 107. Hopkins v. Ratliflfe, 563, 581, 585. Hopkins v. Stephenson, 970. Hopkins v. Young, 1455. Hopkins Academy v. Dickinson, 11, 14. Hopkins Manuf. Co v. Ins. Co., 846. Hopkinson v. Dumas, 1066, 1067, 1084. Hopp V. Byers, 1504. Hoppe V. Goldberg, 430, 486, 439, 448. Hopper V. Haines, 611. Hopper V. Hopper, 211. Hopper V. Parkinson, 827. Hoppock V. Johnson, 1365, 1367. Hoppock V. Ramsey, 873, 938. Hopson V. Fowlkes, 706. Hopson V. Ins Co. , 934. Horbprg v. May, 551. Horgan v. Bicker, 676. Horn V. Cole, 1331. Horn V. Miller, 311, 1453. Horn V. Nat. Bank, 66. Horn V. Smith, 73. Horn V. Tufts, 438. Horn V. Volcano Water Co. , 954. Hornbeck v. Westbrook, 1387, 1404. Hornberg v. Owen, 449. Home V. Lyeth, 1017, 1019, 1033. Horner v. Campbell, 951. Horner v. Pleasants, 1251. Horner v. Stillwell, 191. Hornldge v. Wilson, 538. Hornsey v. Hasey, 406. Horrigan v. Rice, 1426. Horsford v. Ins. Co., 843. Horsford v. Wright, 1461. Horstman v. Gerker, 863. Horton v. Brown, 1397. CXVIU TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735: Vol. 11, 8§ 736-1541. J Horton v. Cantwell, 1537. Horton v. Davidson, 569. Horton v. Howard, 298. Horton v. JKelly, 446. Horton v. Sledge, 723, 734. Horton v. Sullivan, 215. Hosford V. Ballard, 117. Hosford V. Johnson, 979, 980. Hosford V. Merwin, 733. Hoskins v. Litchfield, 439. Hoskins v. Paul, 559. Hoskins V. Rhodes, 601, Hoskins v. Woodward, 66, 73. Hospes V. Almsledt, 873. Hotchkiss V. Brainerd, 384. Hotchkiss V. Brooks, 464, 469. Houck V. Yaes, 8, 1385, 1386. Houehin v. Houchin, 1167. Houfes V. Schultz. 793. Hougan v. Railroad Co., 327, 329. Hough V. Bailey, 895. Hough V. Horsey, 935. Houghtaling v. Lewis, 1409. Houghton V. Hapgood, 344. Houghton V. Houghton, 707. Houlton V. Manteuffel, 1281. Houpes V. Alderson, 194. House V. Burr, 513. House V. Fowle, 379, 390, 1333 House V. Fuller, 674. House V. House, 396, 1067. House V. Jackson, 1016. House V. McCormick, 1203. House V. Metcalf, 588, 589. Houser v. Lament, 779. Houston V. Bybee, 333. Houston V. Blyth, 735. Houston V. Houston, 1485. Houston V. Laffee, 363. Houston V. Newsome, 433. Houston V. Nord, 890. Houston V. Railroad Co., 107. Houston V. Sueed, 1336. Houston V. Stringham, 935. Hout V. Hout, 1121. Hovenden v. Annesley, 895, 983. Hovey v. Blanchard, 838, 1361. Hovey v. Hobson, 1381. Hovey v. Nellis, 999, 1003. Hovey v. Walker, 570, 581, 585, 586. Howard v. Ames, 909. Howard v. Carusi, 378, 1117. Howard v. Carpenter, 1121. Howard v. Chase, 834, 860. Howard v. Pessenden, 18, 70. Howard v. Gresham. 883. Howard v. Handy, 917. Howard v. Harris, 766, 978. Howard v. Howard, 1064. Howard v. Huffman, 1300. Howard v. Merriam, 633. Howard v. Parish, 17. Howard v. Reedy, 1176. Howard v. Shaw, 6i9. Howard v. Smith, 1540, 1541. Howard v. Throckmorton, 696. Howard Ins. Co. v. Biuner, 846. Howe V. Adams, 463. Howe V. Alger, 170, 1395, 1403. Howe V. Andrews. 233. Howe V. Batchelder, 43, 361, 268, 309, 571, 1390. Howe V. Blanden, 714. Howe V. Clark, 562. Howe V. Kennett, 538. Howe V. Lewis, 853. Howe V. Thayer, 1341. Howe V. Wildro, 1300. Howe's Cave Asso. v. Houch, 599, Howel v: George, 1439. Howel V. Hanforth, 113. Howel V. Price, 763, 847. Howel V. Saule, 1374. Howell V. Estes, 153. Howell V. Foster, 609, 610. Howell V. Howell, 417, 1068. Howell V. Jones, 455. Howell V. Ray, 1305. Howell V. Richards, 1433, 1441. Howell V. Schenk, 307, 571, 957, Howell V. Taylor, 1474. Howell V. Tyler, 1104. Howey v. Goings, 733. Howland v. Blake, 781. Howland v. Coffin, 542. Howland v. Green, 1541. Howla'd V. Leach, 831. Howlin V. Sheppard, 395. Howton V. Frearson, 148. Howze V. Dew, 833, 1379. Hoxie V. Carr, 708, 711, 928, 1064. Hoy V, Bramhall, 951. Hoy T. Holt, 505. Hoyle V. Huson. 723. Hoyle V. Railroad Co., 55, 66, 582. Hoyt V. Pass, 774, 775. Hoyt V. Hoyt, 709. Hoyt V. Hudson, 207, 214. Hoyt V. Jaques, 1118. Hoyt V. Kimball. 739. Hoyt V. McLogan, 1324. Hoyt V. Swar, 378. Hoyt V. Tuers, 722. Hubbard v. Bagshaw, 68. Hubbard v. Buck, 809. Hubbard v. Clark, 807. Hubbard v. Congregation, 1118. Hubbard v. Goodwin, 1074. Hubbard v. Greeley, 1325. Hubbard v. Hubbard, 749, 752. TABLE OF CASES. CXIX [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains S§ 1-735; Vol. II, 8§ 736-1541.1 Hubbard v. Ins. Co. , 895. Hubbard v. Manwell, 11. Hubbard v. Nelson, 1460. Hubbard v. Norton, 1431, 1433. Hubbard v. Ross, 1326. Hubbard v. Russell, 203. Hubbard v. Shaw, 968. Hubbard v. Smith, 1350. Hubbard v. Town, 156. Hubbard v. Wood, 686. Hubbell V. Canady, 440. Hubbell V. Sibley, 987. Hubbell V. Warren, 141. Hubble V. Cole, 318. Huber v. Baum, 503. Huber V. Gazley, 184. Hubley's Estate, 298. Huck V. Flentye, 357. Huckabee v. Bettingsly. 903. Hudepohl v. Water & Min. Co., 1371. Hudgins V. Crow, 1194. Hudgins v. Marrow, 904, 960. Hudgins v. Wilkins, 995. Hudnal v. Wilder. 1394. Hudson V. Coe, 678. Hudson V. Hudson, 1533. Hudson V. Revett, 693. Hudson V. Wadswortli, 349, 1033. Hudson V. Wliite, 563, 1067, 1078. Hudson's C;ise. 1300. Huffv. FarwcU, 951. Huff V. McCauley, 133, 136, 367, 368, 1289. Huff V. McDonald, 696. Huffard v. Gattberg, 903. Huffman v. Cauble, 813, 816. Huffmaster v. Ogden, 390. Huffnagle v. Blackburn, 1067. Hufschmidt v. Gross, 449. Huggins V. Hall, 936. Hughes V. Allen, 371. Hughes V. Anderson. 215, 217, 219. Hughes V. Carne, 1300. Hughes V. Devlin; 1099. Hughes V. Edwards, 893, 897. Hughes V. Ford, 534, 599, 600. Hughes V. Graves, 1197. Hughes V. Hamilton, 735. Hughes V. Hodges, 474. Hughes V. Hughes, 723, 734. Hughes V. Israel, 1171. Hughes V. Kearney, 804. Hughes V. McDivitt, 1311. Hughes V. Morris, 783, 1311. Hughes V. Nichlas, 1011, 1015, 1017, 1033. Hughes V. Pickering, 1176, 1194. Hughes V. Railroad Co., 531. Hughes V. Robotham, 510. Hughes V. Tabb, 1090. Hughes V. Thistle-wood, 1326. Hughes V. Watson, 378. Hughes V. Walt, 566. Hughes V. Williams, 968. Hugley V. Gregg, 361. Hugunin v. Cochrane, 366, 814. Huhlein v. Huhlein, 400. Huidekoper v. Locomotive Works, 55. Huie V. McConnell, 1494. Hukill V. Myers, 511, 521, 533. Hulbert v. Clark, 895. Hulbert v. Emerson, 387. Hulbert v. McKay, 961. Hulett V. Inlow, 704. Hulick V. Scovil, 1319. Huling V. Abbott, 834. Hull V. Alexander, 5)67. Hull V. Chaffin, 1077. Hull V. Glover, 379, 380. Hull V. Halloway, 291. Hull V. Hull, 89!!, 988, 1445. Hull V. Noble, 838, 1350, 1358. Hull V. Vaughan, 619. Hull V. Young, 965. Hume V. Long, 684, 1178. Hume V. Randall, 1413. Humes v. Bernstein, 1168. Hummel v. Brown, 890. Hummell v. Terrace Co.. 340. Humphrey v. Buisson, 769. Humphrey v. Hurd, 769. Humphrey v. Phinnery, 430. Humphreys v. Harrison, 331, 856. Humphreys v. Merrill, 836, 1359. Humphreys v. Snyder, 803. Humphries v. Brogden, 337, 344, 345, 347, 349. Humphries v. Butler, 1076. Humphries v. Huffman, 116 , 1168. Humphries v. Humphries, 308. Hun V. Hunt, 1084. Hunger v. Dibble, 616. Hunkins v. Hunkins, 372, 384. Hunloke v. Gell, 1132. Hunnicut v. Peyton, 1162. Hunt V. Allison, 983. Hunt V. Amidon, 1443. Hunt V. Bailey, 644. Hunt V. Bay State Iron Co., 59, 64. Hunt V. Benson. 711. Hunt V. Blackburn, 703. Hunt V. Brown, 1388. Hunt V. Chapman, 936. Hunt V. Clark, 1356. Hunt V. Coe, 631. Hunt V. Cope, 553. Hunt V. Dulaney, 366. Hunt V. Evans, "1476. Hunt v. Gardner, 535. Hunt V. Gray, 795. cxx TABLE FF CASES. [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735; Vol. II, §§ 736-1541.1 Hunt V. Hall, 318, 337, 1005. Hunt V. Harbor, 814. Hunt V. Hazelton, 714, 715. Hunt V. Hunt, 796. Hunt V. Lewis, 964. Hunt V. Morton, 616, 618, 645. Hunt V. Mullanphy, 61, 67. Hunt V. Eousmanier, 801, 904, 1302. Hunt V. Stiles, 968. Hunt V. Thompson, 393. Hunt V. Wilkins, 395. Hunt V. Wright, 744, 1099. Hunter v. Anderson, 874, 1091. Hunter v. Frost, 637, 683, 638. Hunter v. Hays, 851. Hunter v. Hunter, 1834. Hunter v. LeConto, 560. Hunter v. Lodge, 831. Hunter v. Osterhoudt, 533. Hunter v. Potts, 1157. Hunter v. Relley, 553. Hunter v. Sandy Hill, 166, 183. Hunter v. Stoneburner, 1099. Hunter v. Windsor, 1338, 1340. Huntington v. Huntington, 1476. Huntington v. Lyman, 1383. Huntington, v. Mountjoy, 89. Huntington v. Parkhurst, 630. Huntington v. Whaley, 1174, 1176. Huntley v. Cline, 739. Huntley v. Russell, 314. Huntley's Case, 133. Huntsman v. Hendricks, 1460. - Hurd V. Coleman, 917. Hurd V. Curtis, 1459. Hurd V. Grant, 411. Hurd V. Hall, 885. Hurd V. Lacy, 358. Hurdman v. Railroad Co., 231. Hurlbert v. Clark. 1193. Hurley, v. Cox, 895. Hurley v. Hollyday, 813. Hurley v. Hurley, 680. Hurley v. Lamoreaux, 563. Hurley v. Mclver, 401. Hurst V. Dulaney, 369. Hurst V. Rodney, 1453. Hurst V. Wilson, 1011. Huson V. Young, 194. Huss V. Stephens, 1286, 1388, 1396. Hussey v. Dole, 923. Hnssey v. Peebles, 563. Husted's Appeal, 430. Huston V. Bybee, 191, 333. Huston V. Waldron, 805. Hutrhins v. Bacon, 698. Hutchins v. Byrnes, 1304. Hutrhins v. Heywood, 1040, 1064, 1065, 1079. Autchins v. King, 66, 343 268. Hutchins v. Masterson, 57. Hutchins v. Moody, 1430. Hutchins V. Pickwell, 368. Hutchins v. Prentice, 1464. Hutchins v. Rountree, 1461. Hutchinson v. Cummings, 593. Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 1345.' Hutchinson v. Kay, 60. Hutchinson v. Patrick, 813. Hutchinson v. Ulrich, 1430. Hutchinson's Appeal, 80, 1530. Huttemeier v. Albio, 1403. Hutting V. Hotel Co., 831. Hutto V. Tindall, 174. Button V. Hamboro, 193. Hutton V. Mayne, 944. Button V. Moore, 810. Hutton V. Smith, 1318. Hutton V. Warren, 598. Hutzler v. Phillips. 799. Huyck V. Andrews, 1431, 1433, 1435. Huyck V. Bailey, 1338. Huyser v. Chase, 634. Huzzey v. HefEernan, 833. Hyatt V. Taylor, 1530. Hyatt V. Wood, 525, 656. Hyde v. Baldwin, 1215. Hyde v. Chapman, 1060. flyde V. Jamica, 171. Hyde v. Warden, 510. Hyde v. Warren, 904. Hyden v. Hyden, 1064. Hyer v. Caro, 838, 1346. Hyman v. Chair Manufacturing Co., 1436. Hyman v. Devereaux, 783, 899. Hyman v. Kelly, 769, 940. Hymes v. Estey, 1481, 1435, 1460, 1463. Hyndman v. Byndman, 861, 906, 976. Hyne v. Osborne, 1174. laege v. Bossieux, 830. Ibbotson V. Elane, 113. Ibbs V. Richardson, 631. Idaho Land Co. v. Parsons, 1396. Iddings V. Nagle, 307, 571. Ide V. Ide, 1003, 1081, 1033. Idle V. Cooke, 387. Iggulden V. May, 514, 545. Iglehart v. Crane, 835. Her V. Griswold, 1076. Ilgenfritz v. Ilgenfritz, 1069. Illinois Cent. 1<. R. Co. v. Houghton, 1169. Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. Illinois, 8, 10, 95, 97, 334, 1353. Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. Miller, 315. Illinois Fire Ins. Co. v. Stanton, 839. TABLE OF CASES. CXXl [References are to sections : Vol. I, contains §9 1-735 ; Vol. II, §S T36-1M1.] Use V. Seinsheimer, 838, 1343. Imlay v. Huntington, 1081. Imler v. Baenish, 509. Indiana Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Coquil- lard, 846. lugall V. Pay, 338. Ingalls V. Cooke, 1431. Ingalls V. Hobbs, 494. Ingalls V. Plamondon, 153, 153, 250, 252 Ingalis V. Railroad Co., 70, 274. Ingalls V. St. Paul, etc. R. R. Co., 70. Ingels V. Ingels, 430. Ingersoll v. Sergeant. 116, 117, 127. IngersoU's Appeal, 1032. Ingle V. Culbertson, 909. Ingle V. Jones, 1091. Ingle V. Lea, 430. Inglis V. Inglis, 1181. Inglis V. Trustees, 1022, 1521. Ingoldsby v. Juan, 1306. Ingraham v. Dunnell, 202. Iiigraham v. Houg(j, 163. Ingraham v. Hutchiuson, 156. Ingram v. Little, 1278. lugwersen v. Rankin, 589. Inhabitants v. Wilmot, 179. Innerarity v. Bank, 1369. Inness v. Jackson, 1439. In re Alison, 764. In re Allen, 432. In re Andrew's Estate, 405. In re Armants' Will. 1491. In re Arrowsmlth's Trusts, 1499. In re Askins Estate, 1492. In re Barley, 1113. In re Baker's Estate, 1485. In re Batione's Estate, 995. In re Benson, 407. In re Berrien's Will, 1484. In re Bierbaum. 1114. In re Bignell. 1096. In re Blair, 1472. In re Booth's Will, 1477. In re Bruce, 337, 857. In re Camp, 849. In re Carey's Estate, 1500. In re Champion, 1090, 1538. In re Chawness' Will, 782. In re Citizens Pass. R. R. Co., 108. In re Clulow. 124. In re Codding, 371. In re Coghill, 445. In re Conney's Will, 1483. In re Corrie, 1106. In re Cottons' Estate. 1128. In re Cox's Will, 1483. In re Cremer's Estates, 1134. In re Crowey, 430. In re Dayger's Will, 1477. n re Davis, 950. n re De Visme. 1068. n re Diez, 1277. n re Downie's Will, 1483. n re Dugdale, 278, 1054. n re Eleventh Avenue, 170, 178. n re Elcock's Will, 1485. n re Emerson, 1478. n re Emery, 1 500. n re Engineering Co., 869. n re European Bank, 1367. n re Farmer, 708. n re Favp's Estate, 1474. n re Finn's Estate, 1488. n re Flintham, 1103. n re Gantert, 1111. n re Garreson, 414. n re Gatzran, 398. n re Gregier, 418. n re Griders' Estate, 678. n re Groomes' Estate, 1060, 1238. n re Guilford, 1479. n re Hallett's Estate, 1063, 1088. n re Hand, 175. n re Hatcli's Estate, 898, 459. n re Heaton, 1004. n re Hebden's Will, 1493. n re Helfenstein's Estate, 969. n re Hewitt, 1477. n re Higgins, 1477. n re Hodge's Estate, 1085. n re Hoffman's Estate, 1318. n re Holts' Will, 1484. n re Howe, 802. n re Huddeston, 1514. n re Hull, 11. n re Hunt, 1477. n re Johnston, 1505. n re Jordan's Estate. 1484. n re Kaufman's Will, 1501. n re Kerr, 108. n re Knapps' Will, 1505. n re Knight, 1277. n re Ladue, 153, 167. n re Latin, 296. n re Lawrence 390. n re Lechmere. 1033. n re Ledrich, 1095. n re Learned's Estate, 1485. n re Lewis, 703, 704, 705, 706. n re Levis Water Co. , 107. n re Longworth's Estate, 113. n re Lorrillard, 1533. n re Mackay, 1481. n re Mackeay, 1054. n re Macleay, 378. n re Male's Case, 1492, 1493. n re Markby, 124. n re Merriam's Will, 1508. n re McCabe, 1131. CXXll TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections : Vol. I, contains §9 1-735 ; Vol. II, §§ 736 1541.] In re McClellan, 293. In re McElwaine, 1482. In re Michell, 362. In re Moreley, 295. In re Murfleld's Will, 1484. In re Murray's Estate, 1285. la re Noble's Estate, 1484. In re Noyes' Will, 1503. In re Old's Estate, 10, 96. In re Oxnard's Estate, 831. In re Parry, 1014. In re Parson's Estate, 725. In re Phillips, 1477. In re Porter's Will, 1482. In re Powers, 1520. In re Presbyterian Church, 17. In re Price, 1128. In re Pulling's Estate, 372. In re RadclifEe, 1498. In re Railroad Co., 1032. In re Redding, 1478. In re Roberts, 1009. In re Roger's Trust, 113. In re Romero, 449. In re Rosher, 278, 1054. In re Sands, 840. In re Savory, 1478. In re Seager's Estate, 370. In re Shedel, 1518. In re Simerell's Estate, 1487 In re Smith, 955. In re Snelling's Will, 1474. Iq re Soher's Estate, 1491. In re Spencer, 1475. In re Stebbin'.s Estate, 1130. In re Steele, 1004. In re Steven's Appeal, 1130. In re Stewart, 401. In re Swenson's Estate, 1512. Id re Tallman's Will, 1474. In re Terrace, 1388. In re Teape's Trjsts, 1117. In re Tertelling, 432. In re Thompson, 367. In re Tinkler's Estate, 295. In re Tonge, 1498. In re Towanda Bridge Co., 108. In re Tucker's Will, 999. In re Tuller's Will, 1500. In re Twenty-Second St., 108. In re Urian, 349. In re Vardon's Trusts, 384. In re Vowers, 1511. In re Ward, 1506. In re Watkiiis, 425. In re Wells, 1513. In re White, 1504 In re Wilcox's Will, 1487. In re Williams' Estate. 544. In re Wilson's Will, 1484. In re Worcester's Estate, 460. In re Young's Estate, 1067. Insurance Co. v. Armstrong, 1056, 1520. Insurance Co. v. Gisborne, 366, 369. Insurance Co. v. Murphy, 871. Insurance Co. v. Nelson, 1313. Insurance Co. v. O'Connell, 563. Insurance Co. v. Sampson, 839, 846. Insurance Co. v. Stinson, 839. International Bank v. Bowen, 1228. Iowa Co. V. Railroad Co., 931. Iowa Land & Trust Co. v. Day, 930. Ireland v. Ireland, 384. Irey v. Marker, 1170. Irish V. Lundin, 814. Irish V. Railroad Co., 267. Iron City Bank v. Pittsburg, 109. Iron Co. V. McCann, 48. Irvin V. Clark, 1000. Irvine v. Irvine, 1205, 1266, 1281, 1282. Irvine v. Marshall, 1231, 1233. Irvine v. Muse, 803. Irvine v. Scott. 639. Irving V. Ford, 174. Irwin V. Bank, 120. Irwin V. Clark, 724. Irwin V. Covode, 318, 370. Irwin V. Dixion, 171. Irwin V. Dunwoody, 1032. Irwin V. Mattox, 481. Irwin V. Patchen, 1489. Irwin V. Woodmansee, 1163. Irwin's Appeal, 1486. Isaac V. Wall, 295. Isbam V. Delaware, 1057. Israel v. Israel, 684. Ittner v. Robinson, 497. Ives V. Ives, 656. Ives V. Van Auken, 150. Ivey V. Petty, 1193. Ivins V. Ackerson, 260. Izonv. Goiton, 505, 618. J. Jackeway v. Barrett, 1386. Jackman v. Arlington Mills, 216. Jackson v. Aldrich, 623. Jackson v. Allen, 525, 753. Jackson v. Alexander, 1293, 1299, 1381. Jackson v. Andrew, 320. Jackson v. Babcock, 261. Jackson v. Baker, 634. Jackson v. Beard, 901. Jackson v. Betts, 1496. Jackson v. Bitlinger, 1032. Jackson v. Blackwood, 1360. Jackson v. Borlle, 488. Jackson v. Bradt, 618, 624. TABLE OF CASES. CXXlll [References are to sections : Vol. I, contains 8§ 1-735 ; Vol. II, §§ 736-1541.] Jackson v. Jackson v. 320, 769. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. J ckson V. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson V. Jackson v. 1106. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Jackson v. Brown, 1009, 1028. Brownson, 302, 317, 318, Bryan, 618, 634. Bull, 1002. Cairnes, 654. Carpenter, 522. Gary, 1041, 1048. Caster, 314. Catlin, 1328. Chew 1032. Churchill, 406. Clark, 1377. Colden, 901, 908. Collins, 1460. Corey, 1317. Corliss, 520, 737. Curtis, 864. Craft, 752. Creighton, 474. Criuht .n, 437. Deese, 1099. De Laney, 1375. Deyo, 635. Dillon, 1293. Dubois, 826, 1359. Du Rose. 475. Dysling, 1396. Eddy, 553. Edwards, 355, 391. Evans, 1290. ■Farmer, 655, 657. Ferris, 1524. Florence, 1293. French, 625. Gardner, 499. Given, 1194. Green, 801, 803, 1150. Hallock, 808. Harder, 719. Harrison, 533. Hathaway, 201, 1403. Hendricks, 1133. Hilton, 1133. Hoffman, 1073. Holloway, 1503. Housel, 279. Hull, 893. Ingraham, 29. Ins. Co., 846. JacksoD, 340, 354, 1019, Janson, 1124, 1150. Johnson, 294, 342. Kingsley, 518. Kip, 361. Landers, 1067. Laroway, 1414. Lodge, 851. Lynch, 777, 968. Jackson v. Marsh, 1377. Jackson v. Mancius, 293. Jackson v.. McClellan, 738. Jackson v. Connell 706. Jackson v. McLeod, 647, 653, 654. Jackson v. Middleton, 1369. Jackson v. Mills, 1073. Jackson v. Moore, 1196, 1377. Jackson v. Morse, 1063. Jackson v. Murray, 1210. Jackson v. Myers, 1091. Jackson v. New Castle, 205. Jackson v. Ogden, 1396, 1397. Jackson v. ParkUurst, 647, 653. Jackson v. Pesked, 202, 993. Jackson v. Phillips, 793, 1028, 1029, 1310, 1318, 1319. Jackson v. Porter, 1246. Jackson v. Railroad Co., 270. Jackson V. Bobbins, 1002, 1103, 1196, Jackson v. Rowland, 567, 1328. Jackson v. Rowley, 1324. Jaekson v. Sackett, 462. Jackson v. Schauber, 1517. Jackson v. Schoonmaker, 294, 724. Jackson v. Sellick, 343. Jackson v. Shanlie, 1517. Jackson v. Shelton, 431, 455, 457, 474. Jackson v. Silvernail, 539, 1413. Jackson v. Smith, 561, 1194. Jackson v. Snyder, 960. Jackson v. Stevens, 702, 1067, 1456. Jackson v. Stevenson, 1425. Jackson v. Stiles, 654. Jackson v. Summeiville, 1398. Jackson v. Swart, 1262, 1416. Jackson v. Thorns n, 1537. Jackson v. Van Corleare, 1398. Jackson v. Van Valkenburg, 1358. Jackson v. Veeder, 1103. Jackson v. Vincent, 518. Jackson v. Warren, 954. Jackson v. Waters, 39. Jackson v. Wheeler, 618, 624. Jackson v. Whitlieck, 686. Jackson v. Williams, 864, 943. Jackson v. Wood, 897. Jacksonville v. Hasnott, 1333 Jacob V. Howard, 1003. Jacob V. Woolfolk, 1388. Jacoby v. Parkland Dist. Co. 443. Jacobs v. Allard, 209. Jacobs V. Gibson, 937. Jacobs v. Miller, 703, 704. Jacobs V. Railroad Co. 800. Jacobs V. Seward, 691. Jacobs V. Turpin, 950. Jaeger v. Hardy, 1346. Jaffe V. Harteau, 504, 593. Jagger v. Iron Co., 878. CXXIV TABLE OF OASES. [References are to sections : Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735 ; Vol. II, 8S 736-1541.] Jakeway v. Barrett, 1168, 1386. Jamaica v. Hart, 566. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct v. Chandler, 283. James v. Brown, 825. James v. Burbridge, b07, 816, 819. James v. Day, 868. James v. Dean, 623. James v. Drew, 1391, 1392. James v. James, 799. James v. Johnson, 871. James v. Landon, 567. James v. Morey, 837. James v. Patton, 789. James v. Peuney, 836. James v. Plant, 186, 510. James v. Pottson, 789. James v. Sammis, 174. James v. Smith, 1060, 1061. James v. Stanton, 674. James v. Worcester, 339. Jaminson v. Gjemenson, 1356, 1366. Jamison v. Bruce, 768. Jamison v. Miller, 1060. Jamison v. Perry, 853. . Jane v. Penny, 1334. Janes v. Jenkins, 156. Jane's Estate, 1145. Janney v. Sprigg, 343. Jarbre v. Calvin, 446. Jarechi v. Philharmonic Soc. 57, 77. Jarratt v. McCabe, 886, 887. Jarrettv. Stevens, 1163, 1193, 1194. JTarvis v. Aikins, 833. Jarvis v. Albro, 917. Jarvis v. Dean, 176. Jarvis v. Dutcher, 782, 799, 803. Jarvis v. Pond, 1519. Jasper v. Hazen, 1075. Jay V. Whelchel, 778. Jaynesville Hay Tool Co. v. Boyd, 1312. Jee V. Audley, 289, 1028, 1133. JefEeries v. Allen, 37iJ, 422. Jefferies v. Land Co., 11, 1385, 1392. Je£fers v. Jeffers, 1219. JefEers v. Lampson, 996. Jeffers v. Radcliff, 1379. Jefferson v. Coleman, 941, 943. Jefferson v. Edrigton, 862. Jefferson v. Jefferson, 993. J' fferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 109. Jeffery v. Hursh, 776, 851, 900, 1302. Jeffries v. Jeffries, 135, 140, 1435. Jeffries v. Williams, 347, 349. Jellett V. Rhode, 617. Jellison v. Halloran, 874. Jenckes v. Cook, 567, 1075. Jencks v. Alexander, 909, 1070. Jenkins v. Adams, 1832. Jenkins v. Bauer, 935. Jenkins v. Clyde Cal Co., 512. Jenkins v. Collard, 1205, 1208, 1266. Jenkins v. Corapton, 997. Jenkins v. Fahey, 1003. Jenkins v. Gaisford, 1478. Jenkins v. Gething, 71. Jenkins v. Harrison, 464, 469. Jenkins v. Hopkins, 1431. Jenkins v. Jackson, 573. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 465, 1015, 1380, 1298. Jenkins v. Pierce, 1342. Jenkins v. Pye, 1064. Jenkins v. Railroad Co., 219. Jenkins v. Rosenberg, 779, 1342. Jenkins v, Wilkinson, 865. Jenkins v. Wood, 691. Jenkins v. Young, 1042. Jenks v. Backhouse, 668. Jenks V. Horton, 396, 1004. Jenks V. Judge, 1318. Jenks V. Powlowski, 742. Jenks V. Quinn, 1442. Jenner v. Morgan, 124. Jennings v. Conboy, 1106. Jennings v. Gallimore, 1056. Jennings v. Reeves, 1415. Jennings v. Tisbury, 171. Jennings v. Webster, 936. Jenny v. Jenny, 378, 386. Jerauld v. Dodge, 1446. Jermain v. Pattison, 538. Jernigan v. Flowers, 1182, 1310. Jerome v. Hopkins, 796. Jerome v. McCarter, 928. Jersey City v. Dock & Imp. Co., 1246, 1248. Jersey City v. State, 179. Jesser v. Giflord, 993. Jessup V. Stone, 832. Jeter v. Davis, 682, 1180. Jeter v. Penn, 602. Jewell V. Gardiner, 198. Jewell V. Lee, 1422. Jewell V. Weed, 1520. Jewell V. West Orange, 925. Jewett V. Foster, 1379. Jewett V. Gage, 167. Jewett V. Hamlin, 879. Jewett V. Jewett, 191. Jewett V. Kcenholts, 808. Jewett V. Miller, 906. Jewett V. Morris, 959. Jewett V. Stockton, 676, 1379. Jewett V. Tomlinson, 871. Job V. Banister, 512. Jocelyn v. Nott, 1522. Jochumson v. Sav. Bank, 1508. Jodrell V. Jodrell, 301. TABLE OF CASES. CXXV [Iteferences are to sections : Vol. I, contains Se 1-735 ; Vol. II, 8S 736-1541.1 John V. Sabattis, 720. John Hancock, etc. Co. v. Patterson, 152. John Van Range Co. v. Allen, 69. Johnes v. Beers, lOUO. Johns V. Hardin, 1458. Johns V. Johns, 679. Johns V. Scott, 837, 1337. Johns Hopkins University v. Middle- ton, 1119. Johns Hopkins University v. Pinck- ney, 1499. Johnson v. Albertsoo, 617. Johoson V. Ames, 1056. Johnson v. Anderson, 881. Johnson v. Armstrong, 1475. Johnson v. Badger, etc. Co., 791. Johnson v. Bank, 1027, 1079. Johnson v. B ittelle, 998. Johnson v. Beauchamp, 619. Johnson v. Beazley, 1508. Johnson v. Brown, 860. Johnson v. Camp, Sll, 571. Johnson v. Candage, 963. Johnson v. Cantrill, 366 Johnson v. Carpenter. 863. Johnson v. Clarke, 865. Johnson v. Collins, 1465. Johnson V. Copeland, 1139. Johnson v. Crofoot, 605. Johnson v. Cashing 745, 1107, 1121. Johnson v. Davis, 789. Johnson v. Day, 1287. Johnson v. Deloney, 1059. Johnson v. Dixon, 496. Johnson v. Dodgson, 1306. Johnson v. Donaldson, 648, 650. Johnson v. Donnell, 975. Johnson v. Eaton, 1155. Johnson v. Farley, 835, 1318. Johnson v. Fritz, 374. Johnson v. Gay lord, 952. Johnson v. Glascock, 1492. Johnson v. Hambleton, 950. Johnson v. Harmon, 980. Johnson v. Hart, 702. Johnson v. Hoffman, 601. Johnson v. Hoover, 725. Johnson v. Hubbard, 1531. Johnson v. Johnson, 287, 315, 769, 899, 903, 904, 907, 1296, 1514, 1519. Johnson v. Jones, 800, 1310. Johnson v. Jordan, 141, 212. Johnson v. Kessler, 435. Jonnson v. Kinnicut, 151. Johnson v. Knapp, 573. Johnson v. Lewis, 162, 164. Johnson v. Lumber Co. , 594. Johnson v. Massy, 1371. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 31, 34, 40. Johnson v. Mehaffey, 73. Johnson v. Monell, 866. Johnson v. Morse, 411. Johnson v. Mosher, 62, 67. Johnson v. Muzzy, 128, 558. Johnson v. Nyce. 1434. Johnson v. Oppenheimer, 497, 504, 585, 640. Johnson v. Parnell, 1389. Johnson v. Prairie, 1285. Johnson v. Railroad Co. , 218. Johnson v. Reardon, 953. Johnson v. Richardson, 1333. Johnson v. Shellon, etc. Asso 146. Johnson v. Sherman, 586. Johnson v. Skillman, 266, 273. John«on v. Thomas, 417. Johnson v. Towsley. 1342. Johnson v. Valido Marble Co. , 839. Johnson v. Van Velsor. 789, 890, 892, Johnson v. Warren, 752. Johnson v. Waters, 729. Johnson v. Watson. 867, 908. Johnson v. White, 385. Johnson v. Williams, 951, 1330. Johnson v. Wing, 359. Johnson v. Wiseman, 57. Johnson's Will, 1504. Johnson Co. v. Wood, 1374. Johnston v. Antrobus, 1024. Johnston v. Canby, 824. Johnston v. Fitzgeorge, 1193, 1195, Johnston v. Huddleston, 1229. Johnston v. HyJe, 191. Johnston v. King, 509. Johnston v. Marble Co., 1432. Johnston v. Moore, 113. Johnston v. Morrow, 61. Johnston v. Shortridge, 1369. Johnston v. Smith, 679. Johnston v. Slater, 1313. Johnston v. Turner, 472. Johnston v. Van Dyke, 855, 420. Johnston v. Williams, 1330. Johnston v. Zane, 1080. Johnstown Iron Co. v. Iron Co., 364, 1408. Joliet v. Verley, 171. Joliffe V. East, 1541. JoUand v. Stainbridge, 1353. Jonas V. Flanniken, 679. Jones V. Bamford, 1364. Jones V. Barnes, 535. Jones V. Bigstaff, 1419. Jones V. Blake, 861. Jones V. Blumenstein, 463. Jones V. Brandon, 1197. Jones V. Brewer, 414. Jones V. Bridgman, 500. Jones V. Bull, 50. CXXVl TABLE OF CASES. LReferences axe to aeotions : Vol. I, contains §8 1-735 ; Vol. II, §8 736-1541.] Jones V. Burden, 955. Jones V. Robins, 1310. Jones V. Bush, 792, 1321. Jones V. Roe, 747, 782, 991. Jones V. Caldwell, 410, 1489. Jones V. Shay, 631. Jones V. Cbappell, 314. Jones V. Shears, 631. Jones V. Chamberlin, 611. Jones V. Sherrard, 725. Jones V. Conde, 965. Jones V. Shipley, 1380. Jones V. Crow, 160. Jones V. Soulard, 9, 11. Jones V. Davis. 567. Jones V. Smith, 708, 838. 853. Jones V. De Lassus, 1404. Jones V. Strong, 705, 1514. Jones V. Dexter, 1075, 1094. Jones V. Thomas, 311, 313, 957. Jones V. Dow, 446. Jones V. Timmons, 1290. Jones V. Duirer, 522, 563. Jones V. Tuck, 1483. Jones V. Flint, 18, ii, 43. Jones V. Type Found. Co., 1206. Jones V. Freed, 294, 1 185. Jones V. Wagner, 245, 246. Jones V. Gaddis, 1163, 1194. Jones V. Walker. 698. Jones V. Gas Co., 520, 529. Jones V. Webb, 1024. Jones V. Gates, 823. Jones V. Whitsett, 1429. Jones V. Gilbert, 367, 429. Jones V. Williams, 243. Jones V. Goflf, 469. Jones V. Wood, 1122. Jones V. Hagler, 1310. Jones V. Yoakani, 803. Jones V. Hart, 436. Jooss V. Fey, 704. Jones V. Hill, 328. Jordan v. Black, 385. Jones V. Hoard, 598. Jordan v. Bryau, 613, 614. Jones V. Hughes, 376. Jordan v. Clark, 384. Jones V. Janes, 804, 1192. Jordan v. Corey, 1315. Jones V. Jenkins, 141. Jordan v. Beaton, 1397. Jones V. Johnson, 690. Jordan v. Eve, 1432, 1436. Jones V. Johnston, 11. Jordan v. Jordan, 936. Jones V. Jones, 385, 413, 619, 1280, Jordan v. Lang, 1194. 1527. Jordan v. Mann, 884. Jones V. King, 1456. Jordan v. McClure. 379. Jones V. Knappen, 995. Jordan V. McNeil, 1225. • Jones V. Lapham, 803. Jordan v. Pollock, 838, 1359. Jones V. Lawrence, 891. Jordan v. Sayre, 769, 834, 852, 864. Jones V. Lemon, 1180. Jordan v. Soule, 690. Jones V. Lightfoot, 897. Jordan v. Staples, 602. Jones V. Loveless. 1225. Jordan v. Stevens, 1262. Jones V. Marsh, 387. Jordan v. Surghnor, 678, 1178. Jones V. Massey, 696. Jordan v. Van Bpps, 945. Jones V. Meredith, 344, 447, 978. Joseph Smith Co. v. McGuinness, 801, Jones V. Miller, 1032. 802. Jones V. Mills, 557, G33. Joslin V. Car Spring Co., 869. Jones V. Morris, 497. Joslin V. Rhoades, 997, 1105. Jones V. Parker, 366, 441, 827. Joslin V. Sones, 143. Jones V. Pasbby, 1375. Joslyn V. Parlin, 750. Jones V. Patterson, 350. Joy V. Bank, 357. Jones V. Pelham, 569. Joyce V. Martin, 588, 591. Jones V. Percival, 172. Joyce V. Williams, 1397. Jones V. Perry, 1273. Judd V. Deekin, 833. Jones V. Phelan, 951. Judd V. Ins. Co., 839. Jones V. Powell, 198, 384, 406, 559. Judd V. Skidmore, 816. Jones V. Quattlebaum, 1513. Judge V. Ins. Co., 846. Jones V. Railroad Co. , 748. Judge V. Reese, 777. Jones V. Read, 253. Judge V. Stone, 1282. Jones V. Reese, 1080. Judkins v. Woodman, 336, 838. Jones V. Richardson, 928. Judson V. Sierra, 1303. Jones V. Richmond, 1457. Juilliard v. May, 1364. Jones V. Rigby, 543. Julien V. Woodsmall, 233, 236. Jones V. Robbins, 470. Junction Railroad Co. v. Harris, 350. Jones V. Roberts, 1114, 1508. June V. Purcell, 8. TABLE OF OASES. CXXVll LReferences are to sections : Vol. I, contains §S 1-735; Vol. II, §8 736-1.541.1 Justis V. English, 351. K. Kable v. Mitchell, 735. Kaleding v. Joackimstahl, 463. Kaiser v. Lembeck, 366. Kaler v. Beaman, 131. Kalis V. Sliatteck, 593. Karnes v. Lloyd, 893. Kane v. Bloodgood, 984. Kline V. Elevated R. K, 155. 1251, 1388. Kane v O'Conners, 1100. Kane v. Sanger, 1458. Kankakee R. R. Co. v. Horan, 309. Kanne v. Otty, 1391. Kanouse v. Slockbower, 1386. Kansas City Laud Co. v. Hill, 1000. Kansas City, etc. R. R. Co. v. Cook, 230. Kansas City, etc. R. R. Co. v. Riley, 318. Karchner v. Hoy, 739, 1412. KarmuUer v. Krotz, 136, 137, 1377. Karr v. Washburn, 1060. Kash V. Huncheon, 599. Kate's Estate, 723. Kauffman v. Griesraer, 133, 215, 217, 319. Kauffman v. Peacock, 368. Kauffman v. Walker, 952. Kaufman v. Clark, 581, 585. Kay V. Railroad Co., 363. Keagle v. Pessell, 1296. Kean v. Connelly, 325, 696. Keane v. Brygger, 1336. Kearnes v. Hill, 684. Kearney v. Kearney, 1004. Kearney v. Post, 533. Kearney v. Vaughan, 1131. Kearsing v. Kilian, 1200. Keates v. Burton, 1053. Keates v. Cadogan, 593. Keates v. Hugo, 156, 338. Keates v. Lyon, 141, 145, 1434. Keating v. Springer, 156. Keating Imp. & Mach. Co. v. Elect. Light Co., 57. Keaton v. Terry, 726. Keay v. Goodwin, 697. Keckeley v. Moore, 438. Kedney v. Rohrbach, 534. Keech v. Enriquez, 1148, 1331. Keech v. Hall, 313. Keedle v. Flack, 869. Keegan v. Geraghty, 1157. Keele v. Cunningham, 679. Keeler v. Davis, 533, 753. Keeler v. Eastman, 314. Keeler v. Keeler, 58, 60, 1539. Keeler v. Woods, 1404. Keelet v. Tatnell, 378. Keeling v. Hoyt, 791, 1331, 1345, Keen v. Keen, 1504. Keener v. Moss, 726 Keeney v. Carillo, 336. Keeney, etc. Manuf. Co. v. Manuf. Co., 310. Keening v. Ayling, 750. Keerl v. Fulton, 343. Keese v. Sloan, 544. Keeter v. Glasgow, 1313. Keeton v. Keeton, 985. Keim's Appeal, 1019. Keiper v. Klein, 156. Keister v. Myers, 796, 923. Keith V. Horner, 808. Keith V. Wheeler, 871. Keith Coal Co. v. Bingham, 1343. Keiihly v. Stafford, 1473, 1484. Kekewich v. Manning, 1051. Kekewich v. Marker, 303, 856. Kellam v. Janson, 655, 657. Kellarv. Ins. Co., 844. Kellar v. Sinton, 895. Kellar v. Stanley, 394. Kellenberger v. Foresman, 496. Keller v. Ashford, 869, 1431, 1441, Keller v. Auble, 674, 679. Keller v. Harper, 1489. Keller v. Miller, 1484. Keller v. Nutz, 1343. Keller v. Ogslevey. 331. Keller v. Powell, 1165. Kelleran v. Brown, 776, 800. Kellett V. Shepard, 363. Kelley v. Harrison, 357. Kelley v. Hershaw, 891. Kelley v. Jenness, 1066, 1073. Kelley v. Johnson, 1066. Kelley v. Leachman, 775, 783. Kelley v. Meins, 378, 1105. Kelley v. Todd, 308, 571. Kelley v. Weston, 602. Kellogg V. Dickinson, 17, 898. Kellogg V. Howell, 960. Kellogg V. Malin, 1431, 1433, 1460. Kellogg V. Mix, 1511. Kellogg V. Piatt, 1434, 1443. Kellogg V. Rockwell, 638. Kellogg V. Robinson, 1431. Kellogg V. Smith, 1396, 1398. Kelly V. Austin, 18, 51, 66. Kelly V. Baker, 480, 432, 440. Kelly V. Bourne, 784. Kelly V, Church, 1417, 1434. Kelly V. Divver, 1415. Kelly V. Duff, 874. Kelly V. Dunning, 215. Kelly V. Greenfield, 179. CXXVlll TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections : Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735 ; Vol. II, §§ 736-1541.] Kelly V. Karsner, 1060. Kelly V. McGuire, 1139. Kelly V. Morgan, 1269. Kelly V. Nichols, 1227. Kelly V. Owen, 357. Kelly V. Partridge, 504. Kelly V. Taylor, 250. Kelly V. Waite, 623. Kelly's Case, 171. Kelsey v. Ward, 552, 555. Kelso V. Stigar, 1215. Kemp V. Bradford, 995. Kemp V. Cassart, 1155. Kemp V. Holland, 404. Kemp V. Kemp, 1053. Kemp V. Small, 777. Kemp V. Sober, 141. Kemp V. Westbrook, 294. Kemper v. Louisville, 219. Kempton v. Hallowell, 1080. Kenaday v. Edwards, 1085. Kendall v. Gleason, 1516. Kendall v. Hill, 507. Kendall v. Powers, 448. Kendell v. Lawrence, 1281. Kendrick v. Latham, 1168, 1193. Kendrick v. Niesz, 1282. Kenebel v. Scrafton, 1501. Kenege v. Elliott, 116. Kenna v. Nugent, 807, 371. Kennard v. Mabry, 837. Kennard v. Harvey, 562. Kenneday v. Price. 1067. Kennedy v. Badgett. 1099. Kennedy v. Boykin. 725, 1342. Kennedy v. Crawford, 528. Kennedy v. Gloster, 433. Kennedy v. Green, 1362, 1367. Kennedy v. Johnston. 405. Kennedy v. McCarrtel, 1310. Kennedy v. Mills, 404. 406. Kennedy v. Nedrow, 398, 400. Kennedy v. Northrup. 1345. Kennedy v, Nunan, 1079. Kennedy v. Owen, 1413. Kennedy v. Scovil, 137. Kennedy v. Siemers, 833. Kennedy v. Taylor, 1066. Kennemore v. Kennemore, 730. Kennerly v. Burgess, 338. Kennerly v. Swartz. 448. Kenney v. Wallace, 741. Kenny v. Barnes, 581. Kensington v. Bounerie, 395, 1004. Kenson v. Moore, 409. Kent V. Gerhart, 804, 809. Kent V. Kent, 364. Kent V. MafEey, 1496, 1530. Kent V. Morrison, 1105, 1118. Kent V. Waite, 165. Kent V. Welch, 1419. Kent County Ice Co. v. Burrows, 609, Kenworth v. Sawyer, 1444. Kenyon v. Kenyon, 363, 414. Kenyon v. See, 1008. Keppell v. Bailey, 131. Ker V. Eversled, 796. Kern v. Wyll, 578. Kernan v. Baliam, 785. Kernochen v. Ins. Co., 844. Kerns v. Deans, 816. Kerns v. Swope, 1353. Kerr v. Birnie, 1331. Kerr v. Clark, 617. Kerr v. Day, 803, 1346. Kerr v. Hill, 957. Kerr v. Kingsbury, 79. Kerr v. Lunsford, 1473. Kerr v. Merchant's Exch. Co., 504. Kerr v. Moon, 1486. Kerr v. Russell, 1813, 1814. Kershaw v. Thompson, 954. Kessingter v. Wilson, 449. Kessler v. McConachy, 552, 553. Kessler v. Letts, 359, 1331. Ketcham v. Everston, 816. Ketcham v. Patrick, 391, 739. Ketcham v. Duncan, 1320. Ketchiim v. Gulick, 877. Ketchum v. Newman, 339. Ketchum v. Spurlock, 1182. Ketchum v. St. Louis, 783, 802. Keteltas v. Penfold, 257. Kettel's Case, 1416. Kettle River R. R. Co. v. Railroad Co., 1434. Kettlewell v. Watson, 809. Keuren v. Railroad Co., 1347. Keve V. Paxton, 49. Key V. Ins. Co., 843. Key V. Snow, 1385. Keyes v. Dearborn, 490, 503. Keyes v. Sherwood, 950. Keyes v. Western, etc. Co., 586. Keys V. Carleton, 1057. Keyser v. Evans, 686. Keyser v. Hitz, 940. Keyser v. Mann, 162. Kevser's Appeal, 745. Kezar v. Clifford, 834. Kiddall v. Trimble, 417. Kidder v. Knox, 878. Kidgill v. Moore, 202. Kier v. Peterson, 370. Kilbreth v. Root, 437. Kiley v. Brewster, 905. Kilgore v. Kilgore, 995. Kilgour V. Ashcom, 140. Killev. Ege, 792, 1321. Killefor v. Briggs, 708. TABLE OF CASES. CXXIX [References are to sections : Vol. I, contains 9§ 1-735 ; Vol. 11, 8§ 736-1541.] Killmer v. WucUner, 733. KUlmore v. Howlett, 268. Killoran v. Murtagh, 566. Kilpatrick v. Henson, 834. Kieser v. Baldwin, 878. Kiester v. Miller, 499. Kimball v. Bible Soc, 1541. Kimball v. Bryant, 1439, 1465. Kimball v. Cross, 490. Kimball v. Cuddy, 1298. Kimball v. Darling, 66, 334. Kimball v. Fenner, 1293. Kimball v. Johnson, 1313. Kimball v. Kenosha, 187. Kimball v. Parish, 17. Kimball v. Powland, 637. Kimball v. Schofif, 1377. Kimball v. Semple, 1445. Kimball v. Steam Mill Co., 854. Kimball v. Story, 1530. Kimball v. Sullivan, 1118. Kimball v. Temple, 1443. Kimball v. Walker, 1299. Kimble v. Esworth, 837. Kimble v. White, 1514. Kimbrell v. Rogers, 1403. Kime v. Brooks, 1301. Kimmel v. Benna, 1314. Kincaid v. Brittain, 1460. Kincaid v. Howe, 1387. Kincaid's Appeal, 361, 373. Kinchman v. Stiles, 963. King V. Bales, 1315. King V. Bangs, 389. King V. Bank, 109. King V. Bath, 57. King V. Brigham, 1399. King V. Brown, 895. King V. Bushnell, 374, 1033. King V. Carmichael, 678. King V. Carpenter, 1326. King V. Cleveland, 1514. King V. Duntz, 981. King V. Fowler, 307, 571. King V. Frick, 999. King y. Gas Light and Coke Com- pany, 57. King V. Gilson, 1419, 1428, 1456, 1460, 1465. King V. Gotz, 444. King V. Grant, 493, 744, 1515. King V. Greve, 773. .Kingv. Haley, 1315. King V. Hyatt, 698. King V. Ins. Co., 187. King V. Isley, 1067. King V. Jones, 1439. King V. Kilbridge, 1431, 1441. King V. King, 787, 1489. King V. Lawson, 533. King V. Longnor, 1300. King V. McCarthy, 453. King V. McVickar, 835. King V. Melghen, 986. King V. Melling, 1013. King V. Miller, 300, 317. King V. Merritt, 416, 419. King V. Moore, 588. King V. Parker, 399. King V. Pedley, 588, 596. King V. Pillow, 1415. King V. Railroad Co., 1381, 1413. King V. Reed, 735. Kingv. Rhew, 1163. King V. Rowan, 674. King V. Rumbail, 1033. King V. Savage, 1106. King V. Scoggin, 1003. King v. Smith, 10, 331, 333, 856. King V. Tiffany, 308. King v. Wa'erworks, 57. King V. Welborn, 438. King V. Wells, 1404. King V. Wilcomb, 43, 74, 306, 1393. King V. Wright, 1450. King V. Yarborough, 11. King V. Young Men's Asso., 813. King's Estate, 1534. Kingdome v. Bridges, 1070. Kingdon v. Nottle, 1417, 1448. Kingman v. Harmon, 1005 Kingman v. O'Callaghan, 439. Kingsbury v. Burnside, 1059, 1330. Kingsbury v. Collins, 307, 571. Kings Fire Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 187. Kingsley v. Coal & Iron Co. , 1407. Kingsley v. Holbrook, 368, 371, 1310. Kingsley v. McFarland , 70. Kingsmill v. Willard, 165. Kinkaid v. Scott, 823. Kinna v. Smith, 86-5. Kinnaird v. Oil Co., 333. Kinnebrew v. Kinnebrew, 1393. Kinney v. Duluth Ore Co., 830. Kinney v. Ensminger, 805, 809. Kinney v. Hooker, 140, 143. Kinney v. Kinney, 1513. Kinney v. Slattery, 677. Kinsey v. Satterthwaite, 1397. Kinsey v. Woodward, 401. Kinsley v. Abbott, 668, 860. Kinsley v. Ames, 649, 650, 781. Kintner v. Jones, 1061. Kinzey v. Kinzey, 1069. Kip V. Bank, 1079. Kip V. Kip, 703, 704. Kip V. Norton, 1396, 1397, 1398. Kiplinger v. Green, 613. Kirby v. Giddings, 443. Kirby v. Potter, 113. cxxx TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections : Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735 ; Vol. 11, §§ 736-1541.] Kirhy v. Reese, 447. Kircher v. Scbalk, 336, 857. Kirchman v. Lapp, 73. Kirk V. Bartholomew, 310. Kirk V. King, 383. Kirk V. Kirk, 738. Kirk V. Sheets, 819. Kirk V. Williams, 813. Kirkham v. Boston, 809. Kirkham v. Sharp, 146. Kirkman v. Hunewill, 313. Kirkpatrick v. Ice Co., 1386. Kirkpatrick v. Kirkpatrick, 1476. Kirkpatrick v. Mathiat, 679. Kirkpatrick v. Peshioe, 181, 1453. Kirkwood v. Domnau, 431, 706. Kirkwood v. Thompson. 889. Kiser v. Houston, 836, 1334. Kister v. Reeser, 1403. Kitchell V. Burgwin, 431, 463, 464. Kitterlin v. Ins Co., 466. Kittery v. Bridge, 57. Kittredge v. Ins. Co., 457. Kittredge v. Proprietors, 683, 684. Kittredge, v. Woods, 43, 306, 1393. Kitts V. Willson, 373. Kitzmiller v. Van Rensselaer, 380. Kivett V. McKeitham, 266. Kleeb v. Board, 361. Klein v. Gehrung, 156. Klenk v. Walnut Lake, 166. Kleppner v. Laverty, 999, 1033. Kley V. Geiger, 1443. Klinck V. Keckley, 369. Kline v. Beebe, 343. Kline v. McLain, 583. Kline T. Ragland, 833, 1068. Kline v. Raymond, 795. Klinger v. Lemler, 795. Kloster v. Elliott, 606. Klyce V. Broyles, 831. Knagg V. Mastin, 794. Knapp V. Alvord, 801. Knapp V. Bailey, 838, 1350. Knarr v. Conoway, 335. Knatchbull v. Hallett, 1076. Kaauss v. Brua, 591, 596. Kneek v. Valtz, 159. Kneeland v. American Loan, etc. Co., 953. Kneeland v. Schmidt, 500. Kneenan V. Cavanaugh, 1391. Knell V. Build. Asso!, 834. Knepper v. Kurlz, 1443. Knight V. Bennett, 559, 617. Knight V. Brown, 315, 316. Knight V. Clements, 1379. Knight V. Coal & Iron Co., 1408. Knight V. Dyer, 143. Knight V. Elliott, 1393. Knight V. Heatou, 177, 179, 181, 191, 1190. Knight V. Ins. Co., 848. Knight V. Knight, 655, 1053. Knight V. Lawrence, 1168. Knight V. Mahoney, 744, 1536, 1537. Knight V. Majoribanks, 861. Knight V. McCord, 781. Knight V. Railroad Co., 1326, 1412. Knight V. Thayer, 1213, 1438, 1444. Knight V. U. S. Land Asso., 1253, 1253. Knolls V. Barnhart, 674, 679. Knott V. Carpenter, 350. Knotts V. Hydricks, 268. Knowles v. Brown, 686, 1344. Knowles v. Carpenter, 871. Knowles v. Harris, 696. Knowles v. Kennedy, 1428. Knowles v. Lawton, 870, 873. Knowles v. Rablin, 944. Knowles v. Toothaker, 1226, 1397. Knowlton v. Smith, 1176. Knorr v. Raymond, 1058. Knox V. Easton, 859. Knox V. Gye, 1063, 1063. Knox V. Haralson, 1290. Knox V. Jones, 1157. Knox V. Knox, 1498. Knox V. Yaw, 470, 1338. Knox's Estate, 1476, 1477, 1478, 1479. Knox Co. V. Nichols, 1120. Knudson v. Hannberg, 453. Knudson v. Litchfield, 1183. Knudson v. Omanson, 1345, 1385. Koch V. Briggs, 900. Kochemann v. Bickell, 1163. Koeler v. Phelps, 606. Koelle V. Kneclit, 133. Koenigheim v. Miles, 1406. Koenigs v. Jung, 164, 1398. Koester v. Burke, 902, 963. Kofka V. Rosicky, 1531. Kogar V. Kane, 1226. Kolasky v. Miehele, 512. Kouvalinke v. Geibel, 1034. Koiivalink v. Schlegel, 398. Koon V. Tramel, 1348. Koons V. Rittenhouse, 463. Koontz V. Ins. Co., 843. Koplitz V. Gustavus, 617, 630. Kopp V. Gunther, 1057. Kornegay v. Collier, 543. Korns v. Shaffer, 906. Kortright v. Cady, 883. Kreamer v. Earl, 1060. Krame v. Bank, 786. Kramer v. Carter, 1458. Kramer v. Cook, 490, 513, 577. Kramer v. Knauff, 145. TABLE OF CASES. CXXXl [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735; Vol II, §8 736-1541.] Krauert v. Simon, 1295. Kraut V. Crawford, 1385. KreUl V. Berrell, 1424. Kreitline v. Fraug, 728. . Kremer v. Railroad Co., 266. Krevet v. Meyer, 556, 655, 659. Krlbbs V. Alford, 63. Krlder v. MUner, 1397. Krlder v. Ramsey, 501. Krlpp V. Curtis, 150, 153. Krlse V. Neason, 1415. Kronk v. Ins. Co., 846. Krowell v. Keene, 777. Kruegel v. Berry. 520, 936. Kruger v. Ferraut, 496. Kruger v. Le Blanc, 174, 438. Krutsinger v. Brown, 928. Kuecker v. Voltz, 159. Kuhlman v. Heclit, 134, 153. Kuhn V. Rumpp, 779. Kull V. Kull, 1153. Kiinzle V. Wixom, 557. Kunze v. Evans, 1399. Kurtz V. Hlbner, 690. Kurtz V. McCune, 1431, 1443. Kurtz V. Saylor, 1485. Kuschke v. St. Paul, 188. Kutch V. Holly, 463. Kutter V. Smith, 70, 597, 598. Kyger v. Ryley, 769. Kyle V. Bellinger, 809. Kyle V. Kavanaugh, 1330. Kyle V. Keller, 604. Kyle V. McKenzie, 1406. Kyner v. Kyner, 875. L. Laberee v. Carleton, 738, 756, 1293, 1412. Labory v. Orphan Asylum, 1161, 1162. Lacey v. Clements, 450. Lackey v. Holbrook, 919. Lackland v. Nevins, 1003. Lacon v. Allen, 798. Lacy V. Arnett, 134, 267. Lacy V. Davis, 679. Lacy V. Rollins, 474. Ladd V. Boston, 200. Ladd V. Chase, 1116. Laid V. Harvey, 1033, 1471. Ladd V. Ladd, 1324. Ladd V. Noyes, 1459. Ladd V. Perley, 721. Ladd V. Putnam, 931, 932. Ladd V. Shattocks, 610. Ladd V. Wiggin, 935. Lade v. Baker, 118. Ladies' Seamen's Friends Soc. v. Hal- stead, 1251. Lafayette PI. R. Co. v. R. R. Co., 107. La Forge Fire Insurance Company v. Bell, 1368. Laflin v. Griffiths, 58, 61. Laflin v. Herrington, 1168. Lahr v. Railroad Co., 155, 169, 204. Lake v. Craddock, 668. Lake v. Doud, 790, 800. Lake v. Kennedy, 179. Lake v. Nolan, 367, 430, 791. Lake v. Page, 464. Lake v. Shumate, 835. Lake Erie, etc. R. R. Co. v. Kennedy, 267. Lake Erie, etc. R. R. Co. v. Michener, 267. Lake Erie, etc. R. R. Co. v. Priest, 1451. Lake Erie, etc. R. R. Co. v. Ziebarth, 281. Lake Shore, etc. R. R. Co. v. HofEert, 273. Lake Superior, etc. Iron Co. v. Mc- Cann, 78. Lakin v. Dally, 567. Lakin v. Lakin, 393. Lallance v. Fisher, 909. Lamar v. McNamee, 1339. Lamar v. Scott, 380. Lamb v. Cannon, 831. Lamb v. Crosland, 160. Lamb v. Danforth, 739, 1431, 1433, 1460, 1461. Lamb v. Foss, 850. Lamb v. Girtman, 1483. Lamb v. Mason, 460. Lamb v. Montague, 447, 867. Lamb v. Pierce, 838, 1347, 1350. Lamb v. Tucker, 869. Lamb v. Wakefield, 1445. Lamb v. Wogan, 450. Lambert v. Alcorn, 219. Lambert V. Estes, 1443, 1458, 1460, 1461. Lambert v. Stees, 1066. Lamden v. Sharp, 1309. Lamkin v. Knapp, 393. Lamm v. Railroad Co., 155, 169, 204, 359. Lament v. Le Fevre, 430. Lamont v. Stinson, 1353. Lamore v. Dixon, 620. Lampert v. Haydel, 1080. Lampert's Case, 377, 783, 1031. Lampher v. Glenn, 504. Lampleigh v. Lampleigh, 1064. Lampman v. Milks, 147, 1377. Lamprey v. Stat ■, 11, 1385, 1386, 1389. Lampson v. Clarkson, 549, 550. Lamson v. Drake, 295, 978. Lamson v. Lamson, 1060. CXXXll TABLE OF CASES. [Referonoes are to sections: Vol. I, contains §§ 1 -735; Vol. II, §§ 736 -1541. J Lancanshire v. Mason, 587. Lancaster v. Blaney, 1320. Lancaster v. DoJan, 1050, 1110, 1118. Lancaster v. Smith, 88H. Lancaster Co. Bank v. StaufEer, 343, 348. Lance's Appeal, 768, 1485. Land v. Smith, 170, 716. Land Asso. v. Vlera, 956. Land Co. v. Saunders, 1203. Landa v. Obert, 1193. Lander v. Hall, 318. Landon v. Burke, 943. Landon v. Townsend, 1194. Landsellv. Gower, 518 Landwehr's Estate, 1518. Lane v. Barron, 877. Lane v. Capsey, 198. Lane v. Collier, 441. Lane v. Conger, 950. Lane v. Debenham, 109. Lane v. Dighton, 1067, 1076. Lane v. Duchac, 865, 1331, 1336, 1338. Lane v. Kennedy, 1190. Lane v. King, 311, 313. Lane v. Lane, 378, 1054. Lane v. Richardson, 443, 1465. Lane v. Tyler, 713, 713. Lane v. Thompson, 339, 1377. Lane v. Utz, 1015. Lane v. Young, 567. Lang V. Caldwell, 868. Lang V. Smith, 1318, 1332. Lang V. Waring, 707. 709, 713, 713. Langdale v. Bnggs, 1499. Langdon v. Buchanan, 48. Langdon v. Mayor, 1347, 1404. Langdon v. Paul, 323, 337, 338, 857. Langdon v. Templeton, 1168. Langford v. Selmes, 533, 550. Langley v. Chapin, 750. Langley v. Hammond, 149. Langley v. Vaughn, 802. Landstaff v. Nicholson, 805. Langston v. Maxey, 463. Langstone v. Blackmore, 1121. Langworthy v. Chadwick, 349. Lankin v. Terwilliger, 153, 1388, 1395, 1403. Lannier v. Francis, 135. Lanow v. Fones, 707. Lanphere v. Lowe, 75. Lansdown v. Elderton, 953. Lansing v. Goelet, 942, 944. Lansing v. Wiswall, 140. Lansing v. Haynes, 1500. Lansing Iron &Eng. Works v. Walker, 69. Lantry v. Parker, 1170, 1173. Lapowski v. Smith, 1300. Laraway v. Larue, 677. Largis v. Case, 744. Larison v. Wilbur, 1244. Larkin v. Avery, 556. Larman v. Huey, 684. Larman v. Jordan, 755. Larman v. Knight, 1078. Larmour v. Rich, 1000. Larned v. Clark, 635. Larned v. Hudson, 618, 632, 624. Larson v. Butts, 469. Larson v. Clark, 1460. Larson v. Railroad Co., 239. LaRue v. Gilbert, 445, 446. Larzear v. Porter, 390. Lasala v. Holbrook, 238, 339. Lascells v. Onslow, 89. Lash V. Lash, 706. Lashbrooks v. Hathaway, 787. Lashley v. Souder, 777. Lasseld v. Reed, 44. 615. 1393. Lassells v. Cornwallis, 1107. Latham v. Blakeley, 336, 857. Latham v. McCann, 933. Latham v. McLain, 373. Latham v. Morgan, 1419. Latham v. Staples, 807. Latham's Appeal, 717. Lathrop v. Atwood, 1430. Lathrop v. Brown, 899, 904. Lathrop v. Doty, 1320. Lathrop v. Eisner, 137, 191. Lathrop v. Godfrey, 936. Lathropp v. Marsh. 615. Latta V. Kllbourn, 710. Latter Day Saints v. Church, 1064. Lattimer v. Livermore, 190. Laughlin v. Wright, 432, 463. Laugliran v. Smith, 617, 630. Laumier V. Francis, 135. Launder v. Brooks, 1467. Laurel County Court v. Seminary,. 1093. Lausman v. Drahas 951. Lautinshlager v. Lautinshlager, 1476.. Lavalle v. Strobbtre, 8. Lavigne v. Naramore, 810. Lavin v. Bank, 1508. Law T. Butler, 464. Law V. Streeter, 131. Law V. Thompson, 399. Lawe V. Hyde, 738, 1412. Lawley v. Hooper, 985. Lawrence v. Crane, 1516. Lawrence v. Du Bois, 779. Lawrence v. Farley, 793, 1321. Lawrence v. Fox, 813. Lawrence v. French, 553. Lawrence v. Gayette, 1076. Lawrence v. Hebbard, 1485. TABLE OF CASES. CXXXIU [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains 88 1-735: Vol. II, 88 736-1541.] Lawrence v. Investment Co., 1225. Lawrence v. Jenkins, 139, 260. Lawrence v. Kemp, 77. Lawrence v. Lawrence, 1174. Lawrence v. Palmer, 1400. Lawrence v. Railroad Co. , 698. Lawrence v. Robertson, 1462. Lawrence y. Senter, 1442. Lawrence v. Springer, 142, 266. Lawrence v. Straltou, 1200. Lawrence's Estate 1028, 1034. Lawson v Morton, 372. Lawton v. Lawton, 46, 48, 51, 76, 78, 81. Lawton v. Rivers, 164. Lawton v. Salmon, 46, 58, 81. Lawton v. Steele, 101. Lawyer v. Slinscerland, 464. Lawyer v. Smith, 1504. Laybourn v. Gridley, 6, 140. Laylin v. Knox, 978. Layson v. Grange, 440. Lazarus v. Ins. Co., 846. Lazarus v. Phelps, 631. Liizear v. Porter, 390. Lazell V. Lazell, 432. Leach v. Beatties, 684, 1178. Leach v. Hastings, 146, 190. Leach v. Thomas, 77. Leader v. Homewood, 78. League v. De Young, 1241. Leake v. Robinson, 1028, 1029, 1121, 1123, 1530. Leake v. Watson, 1019. Lear v. Leggett, 520, 539. Learned v. Tallmadge, 1185. Learoyd v. Godfrey, 262. Leary v. Shaffer, 367, 962. Leath v. Watson, 1100. Leathley v. French, 112. Leavenworth R. R. Co. v. United States, 1246. Leavitt v. Beirne, 1080. Leavitt v. Fletcher, 504, 580, 592. Leavitt v. Lamfrey, 418. Leavitt v. Reynolds, 963. Leavitt v. Towle, 1403. Leazre v. Hillegas, 158. Lebanon Sav. Bank v. Hollenbeck, 788. Le Barron v. Babcock, 693. Lechmere v. Lavie, 1053. Lechmere v. Loyd, 1000. Le Compte v. Lueders, 1397. Le Compte v. Wash, 392. Ledbetter v. Gash, 714. Ledyard v. Ten Eyck, 1386. Lee V. Bumgardner, 4, 1402, 1408. Lee V. Clark, 866. Lee V. Clary, 901. Lee V. Dean, 1460. Lee V. Fox, 674, 679. Leev. Ids. Co., 783, 843. Lee V. Johnson, 1243. Lee V. Lake, 178. Lee V. Lee, 1210. Lee V. Lindell, 362, 391. Lee V. McLeod, 266, 267, 272. Lee V. Meeker, 264. Led V. Moseley, 470. Lee V. Parker, 946. Lee V. Payne, 532. Lee V. Pearce, 861. Lee V. Pindle, 1499. Lee V. Risdon, 46, 77, 78. Lee V. Simpson, 1116, 1122. Lee V. Stepheson, 265. Lee V. Thompson, 1194. Lee V. Tower, 907. Lee V. Wagner, 885. Lee V. West, 570. Lee's Appeal, 1531, 1532. Lee's Case, 1475. Leech v. Schweder, 1448. Leeds v. Amherst, 316. Leeds v. Gifford, 851, 940. Leeds v. Wakefield, 1113, 1121. Leeper v. Baker, 1163. Lees v. Nuttall, 1077. Lees V. Whiteley, 839. LeFavor v. McNulty, 140. Lefavor v. Harmon, 686. LeFevre v. LeFever, 272. Lefflngwell v. Elliott, 1465. Leffingwell v. Warren, 1192, 1197. LeFrance v. Richmond, 1309. Legg V. Benion, 557, 634. Leggett V. DuBois, 1074. Leggett V. Firth, 998. Leggett V. Hunter, 1113. Legh V. Hewitt, 303, 493. Legro V. Lord, 467. Lehain v. Philpott, 126. Lehigh Coal, etc. Co. v. Early, 742, 752. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. v. McFarlan, 109. Lehigh Water Co.'s Appeal, 107. Lehman v. Comer, 945. Lehman v! Hawkes, 1360. Lehman v. Moore, 978. Lehman v. Stone, 562. Lekmann v. Rothbarth, 1075. Lehndorf v. Cope, 809. Leiby v. Wolf, 825, 1343. Leidlein v. Meyer, 211, 216, 219. Leigh V. Dickison, 688. Leigh V. Hewett, 495. Leigh V. Norbury, 1106, 1117, 1121. Leigh V. Winter, 1124. CXXXIV TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735; Vol. II, §§ 736-1541.] Leighton v. Orr, 1298. Leighton v. Theed, 616, 628. Leinen-Kugel v. Kelil, 1300. Leishmau v. White, 552. Leisman v. Lovely, 832. Leiter v. Day, 578. Leiter v. Pike, 489. Lelan v. Wilkinson, 1274. Leiand v. Gassett, 264. Leland v. Hayden, 2^8. Leiand v. Isenbecli, 1330. L'Elourneau v. Harmon, 1005. Lemann v. Boursall, 1493. Lembeck v. Nye, 1386. Lench v. Lench 1076. LeNeve v. LeNeve, 1366. Lenfers v. Henke, 370, 413. L Engle v. Reed, 1311. Lenlal v. Houles, 89. Lennox v. Brewer, 866. Lenoir v. Mining Co. , 678 Lenow v. Fones, 360, 371. Lenow v. Wilmarsh, 1296. Lenox v. Reed, 782. Lentz V. Carnegie, 209. Lenoz v. Prescott, 996. Leonard v. Aimstrong, 505, 551. Leonard v. Baton Rouge, 11. Leonard v. Binfield, 895. Leonard v. Burgess, 542. Leonard v. Burr, 282. Leonard v. Clough, 70. Leonard v. Diamond, 1050, 1081. Leonard v. Grant, 357. Leonard v. Leonard, 419. Leonard v. Storer, 593. Leonard v. White, 1402. Leroy v. Charleston, 995. Le Saulnier v. Krugcr, 379. Lesley v. Randolph, 629, 633. Leslie v. Hinson, 823, 836, 1331. Leslie v. Marshall, 995, 1021. Lessard v. Stram, 207, 214, 218. Lessly v. Bowie, 933. Lestrade v. Borth, 796. Letcher v. Letcher, 1066. Lethbridge v. Mytton, 1430. L'Etoureneau v. Henquenet, 1005. Lettice v. Honnable, 551. Levengood v. Hoople, 744, 1527. Levenson v. Standard 8oap Co., 51. Levering v. Heighe, 397. Level v. Lapegrollerie, 162. Levey v. Dyess, 505. Levin v. Sleator, 393. Levy V. Brush, 1050. Levy V. Cox, 1285. Levy V. Lane, 833. Levy V. Levy, 1053. Levy V. Martin, 874. Levy V. M'Cartee, 1149. Levy V. Mentz, 1351. Levjr V. Young, 1398. Lewis V. Baker, 1190. Lewis V. Barnhart, 1185. Lewis V. Boskins, 803. Lewis V. Bradford, 1350. Lewis V. Campbell, 1461. Lewis V. Carstairs, 140, 146. Lewis V. Conover, 879. Lewis V. DeForest, 963. Lewis V. Glass, 340. Lewis V. Hawkins, 807, 810, 817, 818, 896. Lewis V. Henderson, 1360. Lewis V. Hillman, 906. Lewis V. Hinman, 877, 1331. Lewis V. Hughes, 504. Lewis V. Jones, 44, 314, 495, 1292, 1427. Lewis V. Keeling, 94. Lewis V. Klotz, 310, 571, 836, 1331. Lewis V. Lewis, 404, 405, 1067, 1476, 1481, 1485. Lewis V. Lickty, 459. Lewis V. Lumber Co., 1158. Lewis V. McDowell, 818. Lewis V. Meserve, 361. Lewis V. Nangle, 923. Lewis V. Ocean Nav. & P. Co., 78. Lewis V. Pitman, 997. Lewis V. Pleasants, 1185. Lewis V. Robinson, 679. Lewis V. Small, 802. Lewis V. Smith, 931. Lewis V. Ward, 679. Lewis V. Wells, 901. Lewis V. White, 438. Lewis V. Whitten, 1271. Lewison v. Abrahams, 464. Leydecker v. Brintall, 583, 593. Leyman v. Abell, 88, 89. Libbey v. Talford, 592. Liddard v. Lapes, 133. Liddon v. Hodnett, 1174, 1398. Lide V. Hadley, 153, 172. Llebsnhutz v. Moore, 510. Llford's Case, 45, 77, 83, 153, 286. Ligare v. Semple, 359. Ligget v. Hlmle, 885. Liggins V. Inge, 189, 210, 269. Light V. Zeller, 1068. Lightner v. Mooney, 1343. Likes v. Kellogg, 1321. Lilienthal v. Champion, 935. Lillibrldge v. Coal Co., 3, 4, 1407, 1408. Lillibridge v. Ross, 1032. Lillie V. Dunbar, 1390. Llllie V. Hickman, 1385. Lillie V. Lillie, 1504. Lilly V. Dunn, 895. TABLE OF CASES. cxxxv [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735; Vol. II, 8§ 736-1541.] Lincoln v. Perry, 1129. Lincoln v. Purcell, 1196. Lincoln Bank v. Richardson, 109. Lincoln Build. & Loaa Asso. v. Hass, 1338. Linden v. Hepburn, 533. Lindenmeyer v. Gunst, 569, 1174. Lindley v. Davis, 438. Lindley v. GrofE, 294, 678. Lindley v. Martindale, 838, 1067, 1343. Lindley v. O'Reilly, 1109. Llndsey v. Austin, 438. Lindsey v. Bates, 808. Lindsay v. Brewer, 434, 438, 450. Lindsey v. Cooper, 1232, 1228. Lindsey V. Eastwood, 1431. Lindsey v. Freeman, 1210. Lindsey v. Hawes, 1236. Lindsey v. Jones. 142. Lindsey v. Springer, 1396, 1397. Lines V. Darden, 421, 1121. Lingan v. Henderson, 803, 807, 810. Lingan v. Lingan, 1144. Lingenfelter v. Ritcliey, 1064. Linker v. Smith, 385. Linn v. Ross, 503. Linn Co. Bank v. Hopkins, 440. Linnell v. Lyford, 974, 977. Linney v. Wood, 1391. Linscott V. Lamart, 872. Linscott V. Weeks, 337, 857. Linthicum v. Coan, 14. Linton v. Laycock, 999. Linville v. Savage, 809. Linzee v. Mixer, 750, 1423, 1435. Lipman v. Iron Works, 830. Lippincott v. Davis, 1014. Lippincott v. Stokes, 1121. Lisborne v. Davis, 165. List V. Hornbrook, 250. Listv. Rodney, 289. Litch V. Clinch, 895. Litchfield V. Cudworth, 348. Litchfield v. Scituate, 1251. Littell V. Jones, 348, 456. Little V. Brown, 809, 871. Little V. Downing, 1196. Little V. Dwinell, 398. Little V. Edwards, 1375. Little V. Giles, 744, 997, 1513, 1536, 1537. Little V. Macadovas, 592. Little V. Snedecor, 707. Little V. White, 1310. Littlefleld v. Coombs, 795. Littlejohn v. Barnes, 678, 1178. Little Rock, etc. R. R. Co. v. Chap- man, 230. Little-wort v. Davis, 777. Lively v. Rice, 1431, 1441. Livermore v. Aldrich,.1064, 1067. Liverpool Wharf v. Prescott, 1176. Livingston v. Greene, 995. Livingston v. Ketcham, 88, 89. Livingston v. Livingston, 936, 1070. Livingston v. Mayor, 170. Livingston v. McDonald, 215, 217, 219. Livingston v. Mott, 324. Livingston v. Murray, 349. Livingston v. Newkirk, 1111. Livingston v. Potts, 506, 1239. Livingston v. Reynolds, 335. Livingston v. Swan, 945. Livingston v. Tanner, 313, 650, 655. Livingston v. Ten Brock, 89. Livingston v. Tompkins, 521. Livins v. Sleator, 393. Lloyd V. Conover, 362. Lloyd V. Cozens, 533. Lloyd V. Crispe, 532. Lloyd V. Frank, 960. Lloyd V. Jones, 94. Lloyd V. Lloyd, 744. Lloyd V. Lynch, 674, 679. Lloyd V. Rosbee, 646. Lloyd V. Spillet, 1038, 1065, 1393. Lloyd V. Tomkies, 1436. Loader v. Clarke, 385. Lobdell V. Hayes, 372, 1131. Lobdell V. Simpson, 210. Lock V. Barbour, 1057, 1099. Lockhard v. Hendrickson, 863. Lockard v. Joines, 872. Locke V. Caldwell, 898, 982, 986. Locke V. Furze, 498. Locke V. Moulton, 777, 781. Locke V. Railroad Co., 259. Locke V. White, 1445. Lockett V. Hill, 899, 904, 906. Lockhart v. Forsyth, 1113, 1303. Lockhart v. Geir, 134, 266. Locking v. Parker, 764. Lockrow V. Horgan, 505. Lockwood V. Beckwith, 936. Lockwood V. Lockwood, 616, 618, 639. Lockwood V. Marsh, 874. Lockwood V. Sturdevant, 1436. Loddington v. Kime, 1033. Lodge V. Barnett, 1391. Lodge V. Patterson, 683. Lodge V. Wells, 1056. Lodge V, White, 535. Loeb V. McMahon, 429. Loebenthal v. Raleigh, 1118. Loeber v. Herring, 909. Loifus V. Maw, 1535. Lofsky V. Maujer, 560. Loftis V. Glass, 1489. Lofton V. Witboard, 1068. Logan V. Bell, 1500. CXXXVl TABLE OF OASES. [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains §8 1-735; Vol. 11, §§ 736-1541.] Logan V. Eva, 1068. Logan V. Gardner, 1415. Logan V. Greenlaw, 371. Logan V. Jelks, 1168. Logan V. Neill, 1330. Logan V. Phillips, 384, Logan V. Simmons, 385. Logan V. Stogsdale, 153. Logan V. Wabasli & 0. Co., 770. Logan V. Williams, 945. Logue V. Bateman, 1103. Loke V. Tyree, 1441. Lombard v. Culberlson, 837, 1341. Lombard v. Willis, 999. Lomerson v. Vroom, 1539. London, etc. R. R. Co. v. Gomm, 1054, 1424. Long V. Blackall, 1028. Long V. Campbell, 1287. Long V. Fewer, 140. Long V. Foust, 1493. Long V. Hartwell, 1409. Long V. Hewitt, 1121. Long V. Howard, 1442. Long V. Kansas City Stock Yard Co., 416. Long V. Long, 725. Long V. Mastyn, 464. Long V. McKay, 1068, 1069. Long V. Moler, 1432. Long V. Paul, 744, 1527. Long V. Stafford, 490. Long's Appeal, 719, 720. Longbottom v. Berry, 62. Longendyke v. Anderson, 154. Longhridge v. Bowland, 1359. Longhram v. Ross, 1443. LongstafE v. Meagoe, 77. Longuet v. Scawan, 763. Longwith v. Butler, 899. Longworth v. Hunt, 895, 983. Longworth v. Riggs, 1089. Lonedale v. Nelson, 243. Looney v. M'Lean, 496, 580, 587, 593. Loomis V. Bedel, 1436, 1443. Loomis V. Eaton, 935. Loomis V. Ins. Co., 841. Loomis V. Pingree, 783. Loomer v. Wheelwright, 510. Loraine v. Thomlinson, 123. Lord V. Atkins, 159,^170. Lord V. Brooks, 298. Lord V. Conklin Iron Manuf. Co., 218. Lord V. Conover, 391. Lord de la Warre's Case, 1266. Lord Advocate v. Hamilton, 10. Lord V. Lord, 398, 399. Lord Level's Case, 1266. Lord V. Wardle, 45 . Lorentz v. Lorentz, 1068. Lorick v. McCreery, 379. Lorimer v. Kiddoo, 464. Loring v. Bacon, 5, 349. Loring v. Blake, 1009, 1053. Loring v. Coolidge, 1001. Loring v. Eliot, 1005. Loring v. Loring, 1527, 1539. Loring v. Marsh, 1053. Loring v. Palmer, 1059. Loring v. Sleineman, 1508. Loring v. Sumner, 1484. Loring v. Thorndike, 1147. Lorman v. Benson, 126, 233, 234. Los Angeles Cemetery Asso. v. Los Angeles, 170. Losey v. Simpson, 1343, 1366. Lothrop V. Foster, 378. Lothrop V. Stedman, 109. Lotshaw's Appeal, 1099. Lott V. Thompson, 1516. Louard v. Deamond, 1050. Loubat v. Nourse, 371, 708, 713. Loud v. Brigham, 1194. Loud V. Lane, 871. Lough V. Michael, 804. Loughran v. Ross, 79. Louis V. Rutz, 1385. Louis Bridge Co. v. Curtis, 129. Louisiana, etc. Co. v. New Orleans, 1190. Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. v. Ballard, 359. Louisville v. Bank, 834. Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. v. Bonhayo, 338. Louisville R. R. Co. v. Covington, 190. Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. v. Etzler, 175. Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. v. Hays, 319. Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. v. Koelle, 145, 300. Louisville Asphalt Varnish Co. v. Lo- rick, 484. Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. v. Mossman, 319. Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. v. Philyaw, 1193. Louisville v. University, 109. Lounsbery v. Snyder, 551, 553. Lounsburg v. Norton, 777, 778, 976. Love V. Jones, 837. Love V. Sierra, etc. Min. Co., 800. Lovejoy v. Chapman, 780. Love joy v. Richardson, 1300. Lovelace v. Lovelace, 1318. Loveland v. Taylor, 1085. Lovell V. Knight, 1133. i Lovell V. Wall, 890, 1237. Lovell V. Williams, 878. TABLE OF CASES. CXXXVll [References are to sections: Vol. 1, contains 85 1-735; Vol. II, 88 736-1541.1 Lovtnan v. Taylor, 1085. Loverlng v. Humbold Safe Co., 871. liovering v. Lovering, 1003, 1416. liOvering v. Minot, 295. liow V. Allen, 895 Low V. Elwell, 525, 556, 655, 657, 658. iow V. Morgan, 925. Low V. Pew, 782. Low V. SchafEer, 1193. Low V. Staples, 1326. Lowe V. Davies, 1019. Lowev. JolifEe, 1484. Lowe V. Lowe, 371. Lowe V. Miller, 601, 697. Lowell V. Lowell, 150. Lowell V. Smith, 192. Lowensteia v. Plielon, 891, 892. Lowery v. Lowery, 414. Lowery v. Peterson, 810, 816. Lowmin v. Lowman, 881. Lowndes v. Chisholm, 950. Lowndes v. Dickerson, 98. Lowndes v. Norton, 801. Lowry v. Byers, 885. Lowry v. Mayo, 901, 1227. Lowry v. Mehally, 808. Lowry v. Smith, 837, 1341. Lows V. Telford, 556, 657. L )Wther v. Carlton, 1857. Loy V. Ins. Co., 846. iozon V. Pryse, 304. Lubback v. McMann, 430. Xucas V. Brooks, 567. Lucas V. Dorrieu, 798. Lucas V. Heudrix, 810. Lucas V. King. 7i2. Lucas V. Sawyer, 409. Lucas V. Turnpike Co., 162, 1449. Luce V. Carley, 1389. Luce V. Mortg. Co., 881. LucU's Appeal, 799, 837. Luce V. De Toro, 722. Lucy V. Railroad Co., 1163, 1193. Luddingtou v. Kime, 1008, 1023, 1026, 1028. Ludeling v. Stubbs, 215, 217. Ludford v. Barber, 514. Ludlow V. Cooper, 710, 713. Ludlow V. Railroad Co., 826, 1359. Lufkin V. Curtis, 378. Luflin V. Zane, 596. Luhrs V. Eriner, 1150. Lull V. Matthews, 338, 770. Lumbert v. Hill, li74. Lumpkin v. Adams, 1332. Lumpkin v. Muncey, 1331. Lund V. Lund, 787. Lundy v. Hanson, 1067. Lundy v. Lundy, 677. Lundy v. Pierson, 810. Lunt V. Hunter, 101. Luntz V. Greve, 294, 844. ' Luper V. Smith, 1482. Lupton V. Almy, 969. Lurman v. Hubner, 1170. Luther v. Wiamisimmet Co., 207. Lutwich V. Milton, 1261. Luzerne Water Co. v. Toby Creek Water Co., 107. Lybe's Appeal, 225, 226, 227. Lycan v. Miller, 1514. Lycoming Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 842, 908. Lyde v. Russell, 78. Lydrick v. Railroad Co., 1449. Lydston v. Powell, 782, 899. Lyford v. Railroad Co., 1448. Lyhe's Appeal, 225, 226, 227. Lykes v. Schwarz. 646. Lyle V. Buike, 1086. Lyle V. Shinnebargar, 1290. Lyles V. Digges, 1019. Lyman v. Arnold, 1372. Lyman v. Gedney, 872, 1391. Lyman v. Hale, 7, 243. Lyman y. Lyman, 951. Lyman v. Parsons, 1053. Lyman v. Railroad Co., 676. Lynch v. Baldwin, 551. Lynch v. Dalzill, 839. Lynch v. Doran, 466. Lynch v. Hancock, 951, 1356. Lynch v. Livingston, 1313, 1314. Lynch v. I^nch, 733. Lynch v. Mayor, 223. Lynch v. Ortlieb, 592. Lynde v. Hough, 533. Lynde v. Rowe, 62, 76. Lynde v. Williams, 1163, 1168. Lynn v. Lynn, 1051. Lynn v. Moore, 1415. Lynn's Appeal, 302. Lyon V. Fishmongers, 15. Lyon V. Home, 1475. Lyon V. Kain, 378. Lyon V. Lea, 192. Lyon V. Lyon, 802. Lyon V. McDonald, 146. Lyon V. Mcllvain, 871. Lyon V. Merrick, 259. Lyon V. Reid, 500. Lyons v. Osborn, 511. Lyons v. Van Riper, 1317. Lysle V. Williams, 502. • Lytle V. State, 1236. M. Maberry v. Dudley, 553. Mabie v. Hartinger, 882. Mabie v. Matteson, 129. CXXXVIU TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735; Vol. II, §§ 736-1541, Macdonald v. Morrill, 1400. Macdonald v. Walker, 901. MacEwon v. Beard, 834. Machell v. Clark, 282. Machemer's Estate, 410. Machette v. Wanless, 1295. Macliias Hotel Company v. Fisher, 518, 579. Machir v. Funk, 1118. Machir v. May, 1196. Mack V. Patchin, 493, 498, 541, 578, 1461. Mackall v. Mackall, 1472. Mackay v. Macreth, 534. Mackenzie v. Bankes, 1386, 1387. Mackenzie v. Cliilders, 1424, 1425. Mackey v. Collins, 1443. Mackey v. Harmon, 1432. Mackey v. Proctor, 342. Mackintosh v. Trotter, 78. Mackreth v. Symmons, 805. Macloon v. Smith, 928, 932. Macomber V. Ins. Co., 841. Macon, etc. R. R. Co. v. Baber, 259. Mactier v. Osborn, 521. Madden v. Barnes, 804. Madden v. Floyd, 784. Maddison v. Alderson, 782. Maddison v. Andrews, 1053. Maddox v. Arp, 823. Maddox v. Fenner. 1392. Maddox v. Maddox, 1472. Maddux v. Triplett, 1088. Madigan v. McCarthy, 53. Madison Fem. Inst. v. United States, 563. Magarity v. Shipman, 880. Magee v. Beatty, 836, 1331. Magee v. Catching, 772. Magee v. Magee, 387, 827, 1160. Magee v. Mellon, 422. Magee v. Young, 389, 409. Magner v. State, 101. Magnusnn v. Johnson, 776. Magoon v. Harris, 1373. Magruder v. Campbell, 810. Magrurter v. Eggleston, 891, 950. Magruder V. Petei', 1110. Maguire v. Park, 58, 77. Magwire v. Riggin, 355, 389. Maher v. Lanfrom, 935. Maher v. McConaga, 470. Mahigau v. Mead, 951. Mahone v. Williams, 960. Mahoney v. Hefner, 440. Mahoney v. Middleton, 1343. Mahoney v. Young, 420. Maier v. Joslin, 1375. Main v. Bosworth, 1060. Main v. Ryder, 1478. Main v. Schwarzwaelder, 77. Maine v. Cumston, 257, 1433. Mainwaring v. Beevor, 10^. Major V. Buckley, 1344. Major V. Holms, 1444. Major V. Watson, 1392. Maker V. Lazell, 1375. Malcolm v. Malcolm, 1032. Malcom v. Spoor, 264. Malcomson v. O'Dea, 10, 93. Mallard v Bank, 463. Mailory v. Hitchcock, 871. Mallory v. Railroad Co., 893. Mailory v. Stoddard, 1200. Malone v. Conn, 714. Malone v. Hobbs, 1496. Malone v. Kornrumpf, 463. Malone v. Majors, 404. Malone v. Marriott, 335. Malone v. McLaurin, 342, 346. Malone v. Whiting, 93. Maloney v. Hefer, 463. Malony v. Russell. 371. Manalt v. Starr, 796. Manchester v. Doddridge, 623. Manchester v. Durfee, 1012. Manchester v. Massachusetts, 1348, 1351. Mandel v. McClave, 367, 369, 373. Manderson v. Lukeus, 995. Mandeville v. Parker, 1483. Maudeville v. Soloman, 665, 674. Mandlebaum v. McDonell, 378, 740, 750, 1028. Manice v. Manice, 996, 1030. Mangold v. Barlow, 836, 1331. Mankato v. Willard, 170. Mankin v. Mankin, 1128. Manley v. Staples, 1475. Manly v. Lakin, 1476. Manly v. Pettee, 719, 720. Manly v. Slason, 804, 817. Manly V. Turnipseed, 1169. Mann v. Earle, 915. Mann v. Jackson, 1527, 1538. Mann v. Jennings, 959. Mann v.' Lovejoy, 617, 653. Mann v. Matthews, 1460, 1463. Mann v. State, 1373. Mann v. Stephens, 1423, 1434. Manners v. Johnson, 1424. Manners v. Manners, 723. Manning v. Brown, 556. Manning v. Frazier, 804. Manning v. Hayden, 1094. Manning v. Horr, 739. Manning v. Laboree, 414, 418, 420. Manning v. Pippen, 1076. Manning v. Smith, 149, 186. Manning's Case, 1031, 1043. TABLE OF CASES. CXXXIX IReferences are to sections: Vol. I, contains §8 1-735; Vol. II, §8 736 1541.] Mannlx v. Purcell, 1060. Mansur v. Blake, 1386. Mansfield v. Alwood, 1092. Mansfield v. Gordon, 1283. • Mansfield v. Mansfield, 1302. Mansfield v. Place, 160. Mansfield Coal & Coke Co. v. Mullen, 1407, 1408. Mansell v. Mansell, 1010, 1076. Mantell v. Beal, 1196. Mantz V. Buchanan, 369, 390. Manwaring v. Jenison, 48, 78. Maphis V. Pegram, 1812. Maple V. Kussart, 1210. Maple V. Stinson, 1174. Maples V. Millon, 18. 43, 75, 78. Marable v. Mayer, 800. Marble Co. v. Ripley, 1408. Marbury v. Cole, 703, 704. Marbury v. Brooks, 712. Marbury v. Thornton, 1457. Marcery v. Darling, 18. March v. Huyter, 1490. Marcilliat v. Marcilliat, 1067. Marcy v. Dunlap, 795. Markliam v. Brown, 263. Markham v. O'Connor, 1228. Markley's Estate, 1033. Markoe v. Andras, 812. Markoe v. Wakeman, 833, 1379. Marks v. Marks, 1025. Marks v. Ryan, 70. Marks v. SeVall, 676, 733. Marlowe v. Rogers, 608. Marrv. Gilliam, 677, 1178. Marr v. Ray, 617. Marratt v. Delhi, 179. Married Woman's Case, 1316. Marcellia v. Thalliimer, 843. Marsh v. Colby, 96. Marsh v. Current, 338. Marsh v. Daves, 708. Marsh V. Fish, 1431. Marsh v. Green, 928. Marsh v. Hubbard, 908. Marsh v. Lozenby, 431. Morsh V. Mitchell, 1392. Marsh v. Rice, 1073. Mar.ih v. Turner, 804. Marsh v, Whitmore. 983. Marshall v. Bacliedor, 78. Marshall v. Benysser, 1193. Marshall v. Cohn, 496. Marshall v. Crehore, 72.S. Marshall v. Dunham, 1354. Marshall v. Fisk, 1293. Marshal! v. Ferguson, 43. Marshall v. Green, 268, 1391. Marshall v. Hadley, 1510, 1511, 1515. Marshall v. McLean, 727, 738. Marshall v. Moseley, 124. Marshall v. Niles, 1373. Marshall v. Peters, 333, 236. Marshall v. Stewart, 803. 977. Marshall v. Thompson, 774. Marshall v. Turnbull, 153, 157, 732. Marshall v. Williams, 777. Marshall's Estate, 1119. Marston v. Fox, 1501. Marston v. Hobbs, 1429. Marston v. Marston, 956, 1396. Martin v. Alter, 768. Martin v. Aultman, 436. Martin v. Anderson, 502. Martin v. Baker, 1429. Martin v. Ballou, 743. . Martin v. Beatty, 855. Martin v. Black, 538. Marflin v. Blanchard, 632. Martin v. Cauble, 809. Martin v. Cook, 591. Martin v. Dwelly, 1421. Martin v. Dryden, 826, 1359. Martin v. Flaharty, 1320, 1834. Martin v. Flowers, 1301. Martin v. Fridley, 980. Martin v.' Gardner, 1503. Martin v. GUham, 328. Martin v. Goldborough, 883. Martin v. Hill, 586. Martin v. Houghton, 263. Martin v. Jackson, 898, 929. Martin v. Kennedy, 733. Martin v. Lachasse, 1001. Martin v. Martin, 379, 384, 394, 423 544, 553, 1454. Martin v. McNeely, 906. Martin v. McReynolds, 668, 935. Martin v. Mitchell, 1439. Martin v. Nixon, 788, 789, 800, 802. Martin v. O'Bannon, 807, 810, 816. Martin v. O'Conner, 533. Martin v. Pettitt, 593. Martin v. Pond, 930. Martin v. Railroad Co., 1163. Martin v. Richmond, 573, 592. Martin v. Riddle, 217, 219. Martin v. Rae, 78. Martin v. Seigler 1527. Martin v. Simpson, 233. Martin v. Smith, 666, 859. Martin v. Stearnes, 500. Martin v. Stoddard, 890. Martin v. Thayer, 1472. Martin v. Thomas, 795. Martin v, Thompson, 583. Martin v. Waddell, 8, 9, 40, 1332, 1248, 1353. Martin v. Walker, 437, 463, 782, 733. Martin v. Washburn, 583. cxl TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains g§ 1-735; Vol. II, §8 736-1541.] Martin Clothing Company v. Henly, 432. Martinz v. Lindsey, 901. Martling v. Martling, 1318. Marts V. Ins. Co., 846. Marvin v. Elliott, 1376. Marvin v. Ledwith, 995. Marvin v. Marvin, 393. Marvin v. Smith, 1050. Marwedel v. Cook, 591. Mary Lee Coal & R. R. Co. v. Winn, 1226. Marysville Turnpike Co. v. Howard, 109. Mason v. Dunman, 1493. Mason v. Germaine, 830. Mason v. Hill, 210. Mason V. Holman, 1831. Mason v. Holt, 268, 274, 657. Mason v. Lord, 935. Mason v. Mason, 1084. Mason v. Moody, 777. Mason v. Mullahy, 1846. Mason v. Nutt, 927. Mason v. Philbrook, 1328. Mason v. Powell, 659. Mason v. Sioux Falls, 175. Mason v. Smith, 586. Massachusetts v. Manchester, 101. Massie v. Sebastian, 1210. Massie v. Walts, 930, 1415. Massey v. Goodall, 495. Massey v. Gayder, 239. Massey v. Hunt'ngton, 1299. Massey v. Papin, 833. Massey v. Parker, 344. Masterman v. Moberly, 1476. Masters v. Pollie, 7. Masterson v. Cheek, 1320. Masterson v. Finnigan, 719. Masterson v. Puller, 807, 817. Masterson v. Townshend, 1511. Matesky v. Feldman, 838, 1350. Matheny v. Sandford, 1093. Matheny v. Stewart, 1461, 1464. Mather v. Church, 575. Mather v, Corliss, 793, 1318, 1443, 1460. Mather v. Fraser, 60, 63, 83. Mather v. Jorel, 1313. Mather v. Walsh, 1169, 1176, 1194. Mathews v. Bensel, 363. Mathews v. Burke, 562. Mathews v. Leaman, 1060. Mathewson v. Hoffman, 211. Mathewson v. Johnson, 723. Mathewson v. Sanders, 1325. Matlock V. James, 712. Matson v. Booth, 793. Mattair v. Payue, 723. Matteson v. Goddard, 1117. Matthewson v. Smith, 369. Mattex V. Weand, 809. Matthews v. Davis, 1164. Matthews v. Dixey, 353, 356. Matthews v. Duryee, 368, 963. Matthews v. Jeffrey, 1405. Matthews v. Light, 1094. Matthews v. Matthews, 391. Matthews v. Porter, 781. Matthews v. Ward, 41, 293, 1035. Matthis v. Hammond, 1032. Mattis V. Robinson, 566. Mattocks V. Moulton, 1092. Mattocks V. Stearns, 350. Matts V. Hawkins, 253. Matzon v. Griffin, 66. Maugham v. Sharpe, 784. Mauldin v. Cox, 476. Maule v. Ashmean, 493, 493. Maule V. Weaver, 1371. Maund's Case, 118. Maunsell v. Hart, 314. Maupin v. Emmons, 838, 1350, 1353. Maure v. Harrison, 869. Maurice v. Maurice, 1083. Maus V. Springfield, 176. Maxey v. O'Connor, 1235. Maxfield v. Patchen, 776. Maxwell v. Barringer, 1061, 1088. Maxwell v. Bridge Co., 1331. Maxwell v. Hartman, 898, 1188. Maxwell v. Hill, 1480, 1484, 1510. Maxwell v. Maxwell, 464, 1068, 1070, 1506. Maxwell v. McAtee, 143, 144, 196. Maxwell Land Grant Co. v. Dawson, 1197. May V. Bennett, 1196. May v. Blackburn, 153. May V. Boston, 1436. May V. Le Claire, 1380. May V. Nat. Bank, 1264. May V. Oil Co., 531. May V. Rumney, 416, 419. May's Appeal, 1001. Mayberry v. Standish, 171, 175. May bury v. Brien, 363, 373, 837. Mayer v. Hoover, 726. Mayer v. Wick, 947. Mayers v. Manning, 678. Mayhew v. Coombs, 809, 1351. Mayhew v. Hardesty, 586. Mayhew v. Norton, 201. Maynard v. Cleaves, 1080. Maynard v. Maynard, 488. 1318, 1321. Maynard v. Vinton. 1483. Mayo V. Fletcher, 76, 563. Mayo V. Foster, 818. Mayo V. NewhoH, 159. TABLE OF CASES. CXlI [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains 99 1-733: Vol. II, 83 736-1541.] Mayo V. Tomkiss, 928. Mayor \. Alford. 995. 1005. Mayor v. Horner, 160. Mayor V. Ins. Co., 598. Mayor v. Kiernan, 770. Mayor v. Mabie, 493. 493, 573. Mayor v. Maquam, 1190. Mayor v. Railroad Co., 1334. Mayor v. Snow, 1008. Maypole v. Forsyth, 354. Mays V. Mays, 1483. May wood v. Logan, 573. Maze V. Burke, 824. McAdow V. Black, 1380. McAfee v. Arline, 1375 1406. McAfee v. Bettis, 429, 449 McAlester v. Landers, 493, 555, 1434, 1464. M'AIister v. Jerman, 935. McAllister v. Milcliner, 1323. McAllister v. Pickup, 161, 175. McAllister v. United States 1353. McAlpine v. Powell, 463. McAlpine v. Reicheneker, 1393. McAlpine v. Woodroff, 1431. McAlpine v. Zilzer, 834. Mc Arthur v. Franklin, 978. McArthur v. Gordan, 805. Mc Arthur v. Henry, 1396. McArthur v. Martin, 445, 446. McArthur v. Scott, 995, 999, 1004, 1034, 1038. 1101, 1131. McBride v. Bank, 937. McBride v. Mclntyre, 1086. McBrier v. Marshall, 639. McBroom v. Thompson, 367. McBrown v. Dalton, 1099. McBryde v. Sayre, 306. MeCabe v. Bellows, 367. McCabe v. Gray, 1331. McCabe v. Muzzuchelli, 439. McOall V. Carpenter, 723. McCall V. Marsh. 906. McCall V. Lee, 1031. McCall V. Wells, 1174. McCall V. Wilson, 1334. McCalla v. Bane, 1143, 1147. McCalmont v. Whitaker, 210. McCamant v. Roberts, 1346. McCampbell v. Mason, 1025. McCandles's Appeal, 735. McCandlish v. Keene, 806. McCann v. Railroad Co., 1353. McCannes v. Taylor, 380. McCarron v. Cassidy, 970. McCarry v. King, 1185. McCartee v. Fuller, 384, 397. McCarthy v. Foster, 594. McCarthy v. McCarthy, 779. McCarthy v. Van Der Mey, 456, 1268. McCartney v. Osburn, 1005. McCarty v. Bank, 596. McCarty v. Ely, 585. McCarty v. Ins. Co., 1381, 1283, 1383. M'Carty v. Leggett, 1465. McCarty v. Nicrosi, 1281. McCarty v. Pruett, 804. McCaslin v. State, 804. McCaughey v. Smith, 795. McCauley v. Fulton, 713, 784, 1386. McCauley v. McKeig, 313. McCausland v. Fleming, 1376. McCaw V. Galbraith, 1074. McCay v. Cassidy, 1309. McCearly v. Lemennier, 175. McChesney v. White, 679. McClanahan v. McClanahan, 1155, 1476. McClanahan v. Porter, 430. McClain v. McClain, 794. McClary v. Bixby, 438. McClaskey v. Barr, 678, 1507, 1528. McClasky v. O'Biien, 873. McClea v. Ewing, 1476. McCleary v. Ellis, 745, 7r)0. McClellan v. Larchan, 1002. McClellan v. McClellan, 1059. McClintic v. Manns, 734. McClintic v. Wise, 816, 963. McClintock v. Graham, 63. McClintock v. Loisseau, 1067. McCliptock's Appeal, 368. McClure v. Andrews, 881. McClure v. Baniff, 474. McClure v. Englehart, 955. McClure v. Fairfield, 363. 388. McClure v. Harris, 365, 366. McClure v. Holbrook, 833. McClure v. Melendy, 1369. McClure v. Raben, 1212, 1446. McClurg V. Phillips, 800. McClurg V. Price, 553. McCollister v. Brand, 406. McCollough V. Land & Imp. Co., 1391, McComb V. Spangler, 928. McComb v; Wright, 950. McCombs V. Becker, 605. McConihe v. Fales, 933, 935. McConnell v. Beattie, 816. McConnell v. Blood, 58, 61, 75. McConnell v. Downs. 1458. McConnell v. Kibbie, 5, 717. McConnell v. McConnell, 923. McConnell v. Reed, 1330. McConville v. Lee, 444. McCoon V. Allen, 1473, McCord V. High, 198. McCord V. Oakland Min. Co., 800, 335, 696, 699. McCord V. Weil, 1194. cxlii TABLE OF C.iSES. [Beferences are to sections: Tol, I, contains §§ 1-735; Vol. II, §9 736-1541.] McCormack v. Crow, 142. McCormack v. Jones, 1334. McCormack v. Silsby, 476, 1176. McCormick v. Barnum, 1398. McCormirk v. Fitzmorris, 1379. McCormick v. Harvesting Mach. Co., 745. McCormick v. Horan, 216. SIcCormick v. Leonard, 1854. McCormick v. McCormick, 809, 571. McCormick v. Railroad Co., 216, 318. McCormick v. Su;ton, 1161. McCormick v. Wheeler, 136T. McCormick v. Young, 536. McCorry v. King, 842. McCotter v. Jay, 959, 960. McCracken v. Flanagan, 833. McCracken y. Hall, 77. McCracken v. McCracken, 366. McCracken v. Wright, 833. McCrady v. Brisbane, 543. McCraney v. McCraney, 393. McCrarey v. Remsen, 1331. McCrary v. Humes, 716. McCready v. Virginia, 8, 9, 98, 101, 1248. McCreary v. Bowburger, 1110, 1118. McCreary v. Burns, 294. McCreary v. Casey, 1064, 1066. McCreary v. Lewis, 379. McCreary v. Schafler, 446, 468. McCrillis v. Copp, 1340. McCroan v. Pope, 1081. McCrosby v. Walker, 440. McCue V. Water Co., 191. McCullouch V. C impbell, 1475. McCullough V. Holmes, 1055. McCullougU V. Irvine, 46, 303, 323. McCullough V. Railroad Co., 238. McCuUy V. Smith, 411. McCumber V. Gilman, 971. McCurdy v. Canning, 704, 705. McCusker v. McEvery, 1453. McDale v. McDale, 818. McDaniel v. Cummings, 219. McDaniel v. Grace, 343, 373. McDaniell v. Ragsdale, 470. McDearman v. Hodnutt, 1155. McDermott v. French, 702. McDermott v. Kernan, 463. McDermott v. Laurence, 711. McDermott v. Voorhees, 1380. McDevitt v. Frantz, 1068, 1076. McDonal, v. Hannah, 378. McDonald v. Bear River, etc. Co., 800. McDonald v. Belding, 1330. McDonald v. Black, 839, 845. McDonald v. Carr, 1004. McDonald v. Clark, 440. McDonald v. Crandall, 457. McDonald v. Criektons, 433. McDonald v. Hamblen, 698, 1113. McDonald v. Heylin, 296. McDonald v. Huff, 792, 1333, 1336. 1328. McDonald v. Kellogg, 774. McDonald v. Lindali, 153, 154. McDonald v. Vinson, 903. McDonnell v. Pope, 506. McDonnell v. White, 982. McDonough v. Gilman, 203, 596. McDonough v. Jefferson Co., 1168. McDonough v. Loughlin, 1484. McDonough v. Martin, 1416, 1419. McDonough v. Murdock, 278. McDowell V.' Simpson, 618. McDufl V. Beauchamp, 703, 704. McEachin v. Stewart, 1076. McElroy v. Hiner, 1076, 1296, 1318, 1320. McElroy v. Morley, 747, 1412. McEvoy V. Leonard, 726. McFaiiden v. Allen, 62. McFadden v. Crawford, 48. McPadden v. Fortier, 929. McFadden v. Worthington, 826, 1259. McFall V. McFall, 633. McFarlan v. Chase, 628. McFarlan v. Watson, 534. McFarlin v. Essex Co., 93, 96, 99. McGary v. Hastings, 1434, 1436, 1461. McGee v. Bank, 891. McGee v. Davie, 964. McGee v. Hall, 677, 685. 733, 1001. McGee v. Holmes, 679. McGee v. McGee, 384. McGettigan v. Potts, 343. McGill v. Demlng, 895. McGillivary v. Evans, 785. McGlauflin v. Holman, 509. McGlynn v. Moore, 523. McGonigan v. Plunimer, 809. McGoon V. Scales, 1050. McGorrisk v. Dwyer, 66. McGough V. Sweetzer, 978. McGovern v. Knox, 1066. McGowan v. Baldwin, 398, 456, 459, 460. McGowan v. McGoon, 1066. McGowen v. Myers, 1438. McGrath v. Boston, 487. McGrath v. Sinclair, 371. McGrath v. Walker, 591. McGreary v. Osborne, 73. McGregor v. Brown, 368, 314. McGregor V. Wait, 157, 158, 163. McGregor v. Gardner, 1808. McGrew v. Harmon, 1460. McGuckin v. Kline, 935. McGuffey v. Humes, 1461. TABLE OF CASES. cxliii [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735; Vol. II, 8§ 736-1541.] McGuffle V. Carter, 567. McGuire v. Devlin, 1063, 1101. McGuire v. Grant, 337, 338, 242. McGuire v. Stevens, 1372. McHany v. Schenk, 1843. McHenry v. Cooper, 978. McHugU V. Smiley, 769. Moll vain v. Assur. Co., 910. Mclndoe v. Merman, 831. Mclntire v. Funk, 1196. Mclntire v. Mclntire, 1487. Mcintosh V. Church, 515. Mcintosh V. Lown, 505. Mclver v. Cherry, 936, 928. McKeage v. Ins. Co., 57, 77. McKean v. Brown, S93. McKean v. Del. Canal Co., 9. McKean v. Yick, 982. McKee v. Augelrodt, 536. McKee v. Barley, 676. McKee v. Cattle, 342. McKee v. Griggs, 1075. M'Kee v. Pfout, 393. McKee v. Wilcox, 439. McKeegan v. O'Neill, 1531. M'Kellip V. M'llhinny, 373. McKelvain v. Allen, 810. McKelway v. Seymour, 748, 750. McKenna v. Boston, 166. McKenzie v. Cheetham, 598. JIcKenzie V. Elliott, 162, 194. McKenzie V. Lampley, 43. McKenzie v. Lexington, 499. McKenzie v. Murphy, 431. McKenzie's Appeal, 1003. McKeon v. Cutter, 573. McKibben v. Salinas, 725, 1167. McKie V. Anderson, 566, 1311. ' McKildoe v. Darracott, 531, 522. McKillip V. McKillip, 805. McKim V. Mason, 58, 63, 68. McKinney v. Peek, 645. M'Kinney v. Springer, 895, 1192. McKinnon v. McKinnon, 1476. McKissick v. Pickle, 738, 750. McKisson v. Davenport, 895. McKnight v. Bell, 719, 720. McKnight v. Gas Co., 529, 530. McKnight v. Kreutz, 739. McKnight v. Wimer, 903. M'Lain v. Gregg, 350. McLain v. Thompson, 809. McLane v. Palmer, 48. McLanahan v. Reeside, 837. McLaren v. Clark, 383. McLaren v. Ins. Co., 839. McLaughlin v. Collins, 1459. McLaughlin v. Green, 834. McLaughlin v. Hart, 445, 446. McLaughlin v. Ihmsen, 824. McLaughlin v. Johnson, 43, 73. McLaughlin v. Miller, 1431. McLaughlin v. Wheeler, 1334. M'Lean v. Bank, 910. McLean v. Bovee, 307, 571. McLean v. McKay, 141. McLean v. Paschal, 900. McLean v. Presley, 938. McLean v. Smith, 1176. McLean v. Warehouse Co., 593. McLean v. Webster, 1436. McLeery v. McLeery, 418. McLellan v. Jenness, 697. McLemore v. Durivage, 1192. McLemore v. Mabsou, 1457. McLennan v. Prentice, 1438, 1443, 1460, 1461, 1465. McLeran v. Benton, 685. McLeod V. Bullard, 861. McLeod V. Tarrant, 703. McLouth V. Hurt, 796. McMahan v. Morrison, 1395. McMahan v. McCleman, 672. McMahan v. Russell. 367, 769. McManus v. Carmichael, 8, 334. McMasters v. Feltyburger, 345, 376. McMasters v. Negley, 340, 345, 376. McMath V. Teel, 1194. McMechan v. Griffing, 828, 1349. McMichael v. Bankston, 795. McMicken v. Bank. 781. McMillan v. Gambill, 1168. McMillan v. McCormick, 825. McMillan v. Paper Co., 796. McMillan v. Richards, 956. McMillan v. Robbins, 326. McMillan v. Solomon, 504, 505. McMillan v. Williams, 438. McMillen v. Gerstle, 1344. McMillan v. Otis, 850. McMorris v. Webb, 415. McMurray v. McMurray, 959. McMurry v. Mobley, 1077. McMurtry v. Keifner, 733. McMurtry v. Masonic Temple, 956. McNab V. Young. 824. McNair v. Lot, 983. McNally v. Connolly, 74, 80. McNamara v. Culver, 773. McNamara v. Ins. Co. , 842. McNamara v. Seaton, 1397. McNeal v. Emerson, 268. McNeal, etc. Company v. Waltman, 708. McNear v. McComber, 1378, 1445. McNeer v. McNeer, 340, 354, 409. McNees v. Swaney, 776. McNeil V. Jordan, 1335. McNeil V. Kendall, 533. McNitt V. Turner, 836, 1359. cxliv TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections: Vol. 1, contains §§ 1-735; Vol. II, §§ 736-1541.] McNulty V. McNulty, 1318, 1319. McPhee v. O'Rourke, 443. McPheeters v. Wright, 674. McPhersou v. Cox, 1085. McPherson v. Cundiff, 1508. McPherson v. Hayward, 777, 987, 1183. McPherson v. Sanhorn, 950. McQueen v. Farquhar, 1358. McQueen v. Turner, 724. McQule V. Peay, 800, 802. McKaven v. Crisler, 795. McRea v. Cent. Nat. Bank, 48, 68. McRea v. McMinn, 828, 1846. McRee v. Means, 1031, 1082. McRimmon v. Martin, 1344. McRoberts v. Washburn, 107, 108, 109. McRae v. McRae, 872. McTaggert v. Smith, 444, 962. McTarnahanv. Pike, 1186. McTigue V. McTigue, 844. McVay v. Bloodgood, 963. McVey v. Durkin, 250. McWhinne v. Martin, 676, 1062. Mc Williams v. Boves, 442. Mc Williams v. Brookens, 821. Mc Williams v. Withington, 959. Meacham v. Herndon, 611. Meacham v. Meacham, 720. Mead v. Anderson, 153. Mead v. Larkin, 1453. Mead v. Railroad Co., 930. Mead v. York, 881. Meade v. Stairs, 1860. Meaden v. Sealey, 938. Meader v. Stone, 6.')6, 657. Meador v. Meador, 799. Meagher v. Drury, 1331. Meagher v. Hardenhrook, 212. Meagher v. Hays, 862. Meaher v. Pomeroy, 644. Mebane v. Mehane, 947, 952, 1080. Mebane v. Patrick, 163. Mecklem v. Blake, 1426. Medary v. Gathers, 505. Medley v. Elliott, 852, 898. Medley v. Medley, 846. Medlin v. Steele, 719. Medlock v. Suter, 1171, 1196. Medway v. Needham, 358. Mee V. Benedick, 67:1 Meech v. Meech, 398. Meehan v. Forrester, 777. Meeker v. Meeker, 1293. Meeker v. Wriglit, 704. Mehle v. Bensel, 318. Meigs V. Dimock, 806. Meigs V. McFarlan, 780. Meig's Appeal, 58, 58. Meir v. Kelly, 796. Meier v. Meier, 825, 890, 1163. Meister v. Moore, 358. Meixell v. Morgan, 317. Meley v. Collins, 883. Melia v. Simmons, 1508. Melizet's Appeal, 889. 409. Mellenv. Ins. Co., 840. Mellen v. Morrill. 598, 595. Mellicamp v. Mellicamp, 1000, 1263, 1286. Mellick V. Benedict, 126. Mellick V. Mellick, 1297. Mellison v. Allen, 1240. Mellon V. Millett, 598. Mellon V. Reed, 720. Mellor V. Spateman, 96. Mellor V. Watkins, 501, 543. Melius V. Snowman, 350. Melvin v. Proprietors, 350, 1286, 1874. Melvin v. Whiting, 92, 93, 99, 165. Memmert V. McKeen, 1431, 1435. Memphis Gas Light Co. v. State, 57. Memphis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Neigh- bors, 755. Menaugh v. Turrantine, 298. Mendell v. Delano, 137. Mendenhall v. Klinch, 261. Mendenhall v. Price, 1182. Meno V. Hoeffel, 631, 641. Meraman v. Caldwell, 347. Mercantile Back v. Ballard, 995. Mercantile Trust Company v.. Brown, 1000. Mercantile Trust Co. v. Railroad Co., 1460, 1464. Mercer v. Railroad Co., 183, 187. Mercer v. Selden, 342, 985. Mercer v. Watson, 1311. Mercer v. Woodgate, 180, 184. Merchant v. Woods, 908. Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Stanton, 53, Mercier v. Chace, 429, 432. Meridith v. Heneage, 1053. Merriam v. Brown. 68. Merriam v. Goss, 971. Merriam v. Hossam, 1058. Merriam v. Merriam, 923. Merriam v. Moore, 869. Merriam v. Walcott, 743. Merrick v. Wallace, 1331, 1384, 1836, Merrifleld v. Cohleigli, 1413. Merrifield v. Lombard, 232. Merrigan v. English. 831. Merrill v. Bullocks, 648, 651. Merrill v. Chase, 881. Merrill v. Emery, 404. 743, 1038. Merrill v. Frame, 1419. Merrill v. Ins. Co., 843, 846, 848. Merrill v. Ireland, 1344. Merrill v. Shattuck, 393. TABLE OF CASES. cxlv [References are to seotiona: Vol. I, contains §8 1-735; Vol. II, S8 736-1541.] Merrill v. Wyman, 1402. Merrills v. Swift, 787, 792, 835. Merriman v. Lacefield, 429. Men-iman v. Russell, 137. Merrin v. Lewis, 901. Merritt v. Bartholick, 924. Menitt v. BrinkerhoflE, 209. Merritt v. Clason, 1477. Merritt v. Daffln, 928. Merritt v. Disny, 279. Merritt v. Harris, 747. Merritt v. Home, 342. Merritt v. Hughes, 724. Merritt v. Judd, 79, 803, 804, 810, 817. Merritt v. Morse, 1458. Merritt v. Railroad Co., 828, 1349. Merritt v. Yates, 1315. Mersey Nav. Co. v. Douglas, 201. Mersmann v. Werges, 795. Merlins v. Joliflfe, 1358. Mertz V. Berry, 448. Mertz V. Vandergrift. 520, 531. Merwin v. Ins. Co., 841. Meserole v. Leary, 981. Messenger v. Railroad Co., 106. Messick v. Railroad Co. , 267. Metcalf V. Cook, 1081. Metcalf V. Hart, 261, 263, 267. Metcalf V. Parish, 1511. Metca'-f V. Sweeney, 1519. Metcalfe v. Miller, 724. Metcalfe v. Pulvertoft, 1345. Metropolitan Bank v. Godfrey, 787. Metropolitan Cem. Co. v. Eden, 140. Metropolitan Rubber Co. v. Rubber Co., 937. Metropolitan Society v. Brown, 63. Mette V. Dow, 1462. Mette V. Feltgen, 668, 704. Mettler v. Miller, 343, 1185. Metz V. Todd, 964. Metze V. Kavanaugh, 505. Meux V. Bell, 1353. Meux V. Cobley, 495. Mexia v. Oliver, 1303. Meyer v. Beal, 895. Meyer v. Cahen, 367. Meyer v. Construction Co., 831, Meyer v. Fogg, 1484. Meyer v. Grather, 787. Meyer v. Holle, 1097. Meyer v. Huneke, 795. ^ Meyer v. Johnston, 56. Meyer v. Lincoln, 1190. Meyer v. PfeiflEer, 945. Meyer v. Railroad Co. , 959. Meyer v. Rothschild, 534. Meyer v. Whitlaker, 233, 234, 236. Meyers v. Bentz, 740. Meyers v. Jackson, 669. 8 Michell V. Michell, 113. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Conant, 1350, 1353. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cronk, 51, 440. Michoud V. Girod, 906. Mickels v. Townsend, 873. Mickelwait v. Leland, 816. Mickle V. Matlock, 1483. Mickle V. Maxfield, 965. Mickle V. Miles, 115. Mickles v. Dillaye, 873, 970. Micou V. Ashurst, 776, 816. Middlebrook v. Corwin, 44, 615. Middlefield v. Knitting Co. , 1451. Middlemore v. Goodale, 1417, 1448. Middlesex Co. v. McCue, 317. Middlesex Co. v. Osgood, 495. Middleton v. Newport Hospital, 1424, 1453. Middleton v. Pritchard, 8, 1385. Middleton v. Sage, 1246. Middleton Sav. Bank v. Bachrach, 679. Middleton v. Steward, 348. Midgett V. Wharton, 1375. Midland R. R. Co. v. Fisher, 1451. Midland R. R. Co. v. Smith, 163. Midland R. R. Co. v. Wilcox, 830. Mifflin's Appeal, 1123. Milburn v. Milburn, 1501. Mildway's Case, 340, 350. Miles V. Banton, 1354. Miles V. Barrows, 1400. Miles V. Fisher, 668. Miles V. Jarvis, 1033. Miles V. Langley, 1349. Miles V. Lewis, 816. Miles V. Miles. 399. Miles V. Smith, 938. Miles V. Stehle, 943. Miles V. Strong, 1540. Milford V. Holbrook, 592. Milhan v. Sharp, 107. Mill River, etc. "Manuf. Co. v. Smith, 233, 336. Millard v. McMillin, 693. Millay v. Wiley, 1484. Milledge v. Lamar, 376. Millen v. Guerrard, 298. Miller v. Ashville, 1218. Miller v. Baker, 18, 43. Miller v. Benton, 504, 507. Miller v. Birdson, 1067. Miller v. Blase, 1064, 1067, 1100. Miller v. Board, 738, 1412. Miller v. Bradford, 1341. Miller v. Collyer, 953. Miller v. Cook, 951. Miller v. Crawford, 855. cxlvi TABLE OF CASKS. [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735; Vol. II, g§ 736-1541.1 Miller v. Curry, 863. Miller v. Dennet, 733. Miller v. Ellis, 1345. Miller v. Pinegan, 449, 459. Miller v. Finley, 795. Miller v. Foster, 1185, 1196. Miller v. Goodwin, 1399. Miller v. Henderson, 933. Miller v. Kolb, 948. Miller v. Land Co., 1375, 1393. Miller v. Lang, 567. Miller v. Lanahan, 950. Miller v. Lanbacli, 315, 316, 333. Miller v. Levi, 757, 758. Miller v. Little, 96. Miller V. Macomb, 1033. Miller v. Miller, 309, 691, 993, 1144. Miller v. Morris, 505. Miller v. Murfield, 1318, 1330. Miller v. Myers, 678. Miller v. Parsons, 1438. Miller v. Pearce, 1053, 1064. Miller v. Pence, 383, 390, 416. Miller v. Phillips, 1501, 1504. Miller v. Powell, 1315. Miller v. Potterfield, 997. Miller v. Railroad Co., 800, 1196, 1205, 1310. Miller V. Schnebly, 453. Miller v. Shackleford, 748. Miller v. Shaw, 983. Miller v. Shields, 398, 339. Miller v. Shumaker, 1493. Miller v. Springer, 1513. Miller v. State, 43, 109, 1186. Miller v. Stoddard, 839. Miller V. Teachout, 1053. Miller v. Thomas, 777. Miller v. Thompson, 967. Miller v. Tipton, 783. Miller t. Travers, 1378. Miller v. Waddington, 51, 330, 334. Miller v. Wilson, 65. Millford Sav. Bank v.. Ayers, 440. Millican v. Millican, l"476. Milligan's Appeal, 951. Milliken v. Bailey, 968. Millikiu V. Armstrong, 63. Millikin v. Kennedy, 1194. Millikin v. Welliver, 402. Millis V. Roof, 679. Mills V. Bank, 1118. Mills V. Catlin, 1436. Mills V. Colby, 70. Mills V. Dennis, 944. Mills V. Jennings, 979. Mills V. Land Co., 830. Mills V. Mills, 977, 1117. Mills V. Newberry, 1061. Mills V. Norris, 1034. MiLs V. Ralston, 953. Mills V. Redick, 53. Mills V. Seminary, 739. Mills V. Seward, 1018. Mills V. Traver, 1188. Mills V. Van Voorhles, 368, 910. Mills V. Williams, 1115. Milne's Appeal, 350. Milner v. Mllner, 697. Milton V. Colby, 70. Mims V. Mims, 836, 1334. Minard v. Burtls, 655. Miner v. Beekman, 987. Miner v. Lorman, 696. Miner v. Stevens, 657. Miner v. Wright, 319. Miners' Bank v. United States, 109. Miners' Trust Co. Bank v. Rosenberry, Mines' V. Gambrill, 1103, 1105, 1116. Minke v. McNamee, 698. Minkler v. Minkler, 1504. Minneapolis Co-operative Co. v. Will. iamson, 508, 643. Minneapolis Mill Co. v. Railroad Co., 366. Minor v. Rogers, 1061. Minor v. Sharon, 573, 587, 590, 593. Minor v. Wright, 219. Minot v. Amory, 395. Minot v. Brooks, 1168. Minot V. Paine, 298. Minot V. Sawyer, 932. Minot V. Tavlor, 1537, 1538. Minshall v. Lloyd, 45, 78, 80. Minter v. Durham, 679. Mlntir v. Mintir, 384. Minto V. Delaney, 11. Mintzer v. St. Paul Trust Co., 459. Mirick v. Hoppin, 551, 553. Mischke v. Bauglin, 1462. Mission v. Cronin, 1166. Mississippi Valley Co. v. Railroad Co., 836, 1359. Missouri Hist. Soc. v. Academy, 748. Missouri Val. Land Co. v. Barwick, 957. Mitchell V. Billingsley, 83. Mitchell V. Bartlett, 955. . Mitchell V. Berry, 985. Mitchell V. Blain, 1541. Mitchell V. Bogan, 337, 857, 899. Mitchell V. Burnham, 849. Mitchell V. Butt, 807. Mitchell V. Campbell, 1183. Mitchell V. Denson, 1131. Mitchell V. Farresh, 391, 415, 416. Mitchell V. Hazen, 676. Mitchell V. Knapp, 998. Mitchell V. Lloyd, 78. TABLE OF CASES. cxlvii [References are to sections: Vol. 1, contains §8 1-735; Vol. II, 88 736-1541.] Mitchell V. Mayor, 338. Mitchell V. McKinney, 950. Mitchell V. Mitchell, 1413, 1481. Mitchell V. Parks, 163. Mitchell V. Read, 1063. Mitchell V. Reed, 511. Mitchell V. Reynolds, 743. Mitchell V. Ryan, 1330. Mitchell V. Seipel, 153, 154, 156. Mitchell V. Sevier, 350. Mitchell V. Short, 1318. Slitchell V. Simpson, 1019. Mitchell V. Skinner, 1066. Mitchell V. Smale, 1385. Mitchell V. Tarbutt, 669. Mitchell V. Thome, 1404, 1405. Mitchell V. United States, 84. Mitchell V. "Warner, 1439, 1430, 1431, 1434, 1448. Mitchell V. Wellman, 773, 781. Mitchelson v. Smith, 446. Mittel v. Karl, 668, 673, 703. Mix V. Ins. Co. , 844. Mixer v. Reed 381. Mize V. Barnes, 807. Mizell V. Bennett, 743. Mobile, etc. Co. v. Huder, 951. Mobley v. Bruner, 698. Mobray v. Leckie, 891. Moderwell v. Mullison, 710. Moelle V. Sherwood, 1378, 1330. Moeller v. Moore, 977. Moellering v. Evans, 343. Moffat V. Smith, 496. Moffat V. Strong, 1033. Moflet V. Brewer, 198. Moffett V. Commissioners, 166. Mogg V. Mogg, 1034. Moisant v. McPhee, 777. Mold V. Wheatcroft, 273. Molins V. Werby, 103. Moll V. McCauly, 143. Molton V. Henderson, 1168. Molyneux v. Rowe, 1499. Monaghan v. Longfellow, 837, 1336. Monarque v. Monarque, 1587. Monk V. Noyes, 505. Money v. Ricketts, 1238. Monongahela Bridge Co. v. Kirk, 8. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 1373. Monroe v. Arledge, 791. Monroe Cattle Co. v. Becker, 1338, Monroe v. Fahl, 893. Monroe v. Hall, 740. Monson v. Tripp 1315. Montague v. Dawes, 901, 908. Montague v. Dent, 77. Montague County v. Land & Cattle Co., 1391. Montague v. Railroad Co., 968. Montague v. Selb, 674. Montanye v. Wallahan, 550. Montford v. Cadogan, 1086. Montgomery v. Brown, 938. Montgomery v. Chadwick, 971, 987. Montgomery v. Commissioners, 490. Moutgomery v. Gunther, 1165. Montgomery v. Hines, 1388. Montgomery Railroad v. Hurst, 795. Montgomery v. Keppel, 838, 1350. Montgomery v. McEwen, 336. Montgomery v. Merrill, 957. Montgomery v. Robinson, 474. Montgomery v. Vickery, 871. Montieth v. Finkbeiner, 593. Monypenny v. Daring, 1009. Moody V. Dryden, 1330. Moody V. Johnson, 698. Moody V. King, 345, 346, 376. Moody V. Moody, 703. Moody V. Tedder, 1116. Moody V. Walker, 1033. Moody V. Walters, 1010. Mooers v. Wait, 575. Mooers v. White, 1473. Moon v. Evans, 1130. Moon V. Giles, 1331. Moon V. Jennings, 680. Moon V. Johnson, 966. Mooney v. Moriarty, 437, 465. Moor V. Watson, 836. 1359. Moore v. Anders, 810. Moore v. Baker, 1285. Moore v. Bank, 543, 1346. Moore v. Beanes, 489. Moore v. Beason, 978. Moore v. Boyd, 657. Moore v. Bradford, 463. Moore v. Burrow, 1156. Moore v. Cable, 968, 970, 973. Moore V. Calvert, 343. Moore v. Carson, 191, 1373. Moore v. Childers, 1185. Moore v. Crawford, 1067, 1310. Moore v. Darbey, 340. Moore v. Davey, 836, 1359. Moore v. Demond, 1013. Moore v. Dick, 413. Moore v. Dunning, 463. Moore v. Eagles, 719. Moore v. Esty, 361, 990. Moore v. Elynn, 453, 463, 464, 467, 1396, 1330. Moore v. Frankenfleld, 1463. Moore v. Frost, 383, 416. Moore v. Hegeman, 358, 392, 451. Moore v. Johnston, 1427, 1430. Moore v. Jordan, 1067. Moore v. Kent, 430. cxlviii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections : Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735; Vol. IT, 8§ 736-1541.1 Moore v. Kerr, 720. Moore v. Kraemer, 1090. Moore v. Lackey, 810. Moore v. Levert, 260. Moore v. Littel, 1016. Moore v. Luce, 293,1185, 1197. Moore v. Lyons, 99.). Moore v. Mason, 657. Moore v. Mayor, 355. 409. Moore v. Merrill, 1429, 1442. Moore v. Moore, 676, 1059. Moore v. Morrow, 650. Moore v. New York, 389. Moore v. Parker, 1020. Moore v. Pitts, 539, 1454. Moore v. Railroad Co., 316. Moore v. Rake, 995, 1003, 1033. Moore v. Rawson, 156. Moore v. Reaves, 439. Moore v. Robbins, 1343. 1243. Moore v. Rollins, 370. Moore v. Sanders, 1031. Moore v. Shannon, 734. Moore v. Shultz, 1040. Moore v. Smith, 61, 78, 649, 1508. Moore v. Spruill, 601. Moore v. Starks, 938. Moore v. Stovall, 813. Moore v. Swert, 360. Moore v. Thomas, 824. Moore v. Thorp, 690. Moore v. Townsend, 338. Moore v. Vail, 1434. Moore v. Valentine, 46. Moore v. Waco, 171, 175. Moore v. Weaver, 1016, 1519. Moore v. Weber, 493, 554, 577. Moore v. Webster, 344 Moore v. Williamson, 690. Moors V. Albro, 802. Moorse v. Carson, 188. Moran v. Palmer, 707. Moran v. Mass, 1059. Moran v. Somes, 1374. Mordecai v. Schimer, 1114. More V. Calkins, 774. Moreau v. Saffaraus, 713. Morehead v. Morehead, 460. Morehouse v. Cotheal, 303, 318, 1027, 1033. Moreland v. Metz, 819. Moreland v. Myall, 43. Moreland V. Richardson, 838. Morenhout v. Higiiera, 732. Morey v. Hoyt, 65. Morey v. McGuire, 770. Moray v. Sobier, 1502. Morford v. Duflfenbacker, 1105. Morgan v. Bissell, 486. Morgan v. Blatchley, 414. Morgan v. Bowes, 240. Morgan v. Dodge, 1508. Morgan v. Elam, 13i'0. Morgan v. Fisher, 1075, 1083. Morgan v. Gilbert, 339. Morgan v. Hammett, 874. Morgan v. Hendren, 435. Morgan v. Joy, 949. Morgan v. Livingston, 13. Morgan v. Meuth, 188. Morgan v. Mining Company, 869. Morgan v. Morgan, 344, 350, 983, 1032. Morgan v. Moore, 201, 1057. Morgan v. Nagodish, 91. Morgan v. Railroad Co. . 170. Morgan v. Reading, 1385. Morgan v. Smith, 373. Morgan v. Walbridge, 970. Morgan v. Wilkins, 964. Morgeustern v. Klees, 891. Moriarty v. Ashworth, 333, 856. Moring v. Abies, 1167. Mormet Co. v. Archibald, 557. Mormon Church v. United States, 1253. Morrell v. Dickey, 1476, 1491. Morrell v. Frith, 1803. Morrill v. Kilner, 1296. Morrill v. Mackman, 630. Morrill v. Noyes, 5(5. Morrill v. Railroad Company, 738, 739, 1413. Morrill v. St. Anthony, etc. Co., 95. Morris v. Alston, 881. Morris v. Aperson, 566. Morris's Appeal, 58. 67, 68. Morris v. Bacon. 865. Morris v. Branchaud, 937. Morris v. Budlong, 968. Morris Canal v. Byerson, 1299. Morris v. Commander, 164. Morris v. Edgington, 552. Morris v. Giddens, 785. Morris v. Harris, 729, 1486. Morris v. Ins. Co., 949. Morris v. McCarthy, 668. Morris v. McClary, 1161, 1168. Morris v. McKnight, 901. Morris Canal & Banking Co. v. Mit- chell, 624. Morris v. Nixon, 772. Morris v. Roby, 1271. Morris v. Sickley, 1513. Morris v. Stephens, 1288. Morris v. Tillson, 551, 553, 577. Morris v. Ward. 458, 464. Morris v. Watson, 1118. Morrison v. Bausemer, 1364. Morrison v. Bowman, 401. TABLE OF CASES. cxiix [Referenoea are to sections: Vol. I, contains ii 1-735; Vol. II, §9 736-1541.] Morrison v. lirand, 778. Morrison v. Buckner, 893, 937. Morrison v. Campbell, 1486. Morrison v. Cbadwick, 553. Morrison v. Ilerrick, 509. Morrison v. Howe, 199. Morrison v. Marcli, 1846, 1350. Morrison v. Marquardt, 156. Morrison v. Martm, 895. Morrison v. McDaniel, 431. Morrison v. Morrison, 879, 1346. Morrison v. Robinson, 693. Morrison v. Stephenson, 1489. Morrison v. Underwood, 1438, 1465. Morrison v. "Wilson, 1314. Morrow v. Tiirney, 834. Morrow v. Williams, 1031. Morrow v. Williard, 1388. Morse v. Aldrich, 1448, 1452. Morse v. Bank 1111, 1113, 1133. Morse v. Bassett, 917. Morse v. Benson. 158. Morse v. Carpenter, 784. Morse v. Church, 750. Morse v. Copeland, 266, 367, 369. Morse v. Curtis, 1343. Morse v. Goddard, 498, 638. Morse v. Hayden, 743. Morse v. Lyman, 1537, 1538, 1539. Morse v. Morse, 1059, 1099. Morse v. Rogers, 1391. Morse v. Stockman, 1373. Morse v. Stocker, 171. Morse v. Thorsell, 873. Morse v. Whitcher, 768, 850, 851. Morton v. Barrett, 1043. Morton v. Covell, 889. Morton v. Leland, 1310. Morton Brewing Co. v. Morton, 369, 372. Morton v. Nelson, 1060. Morton v. Onion, 1500. Morton v. Robards, 826, 1359. Morton V. Tewait, 1059. Morton v. Volentine. 333. Morton v. Woods, 633. Moseley v. Hankinson, 1185, 1218. Moseley v. Marshall, 296. Mosely v. Allen, 638. Moser v. Lower, 604, 607, 673. Moses V. .Johnson, 333, 833, 384, 339, 856, 1063, 1093. Moses V. Loan A.sso.. 441. Moses V. Murgatroyd, 910. Moslier v. Mosher. 881. Mosher v. Yost, 293. Mosliier v. Norton, 862. Moshier v. Reding, 631. Mosier v. Caldwell, 224, 335. Mosier's Appeal, 874. Moss V. Gallimore, 543, 991, 993. Moss V. Harter, 1117. Moss V. Moss, 1068. Moss's Appeal, 298. Mosseller v. Deaver, 655. Mott V. Mott, 1398. Mott V. Oppenheimer, 1448, 1450. Mott V. Palmer, 1426. Molt V. Smith, 1308. Moule V. Garrett, 086. Moulton V. Libbey, 93, 94, 96. Moulton V. Robinson, 314, 601. Moulton V. Trafton, 383, 1405. Moultrie v. Hunt, 1157, 1486. Mounsey v. Ismay, 129. Mount V. Potts, 967. Mountford v. Scott, 1362. Mountjoy's Case, 265. Mowatt V. Carow, 1106. Mowry v. Shelden, 191. Mowry v. Wood, 782, 799, 803. Moyer v. Hinman, 1004. Moyer v. Mitchell, 505. Moyner v. Drummond, 431, 488. Mudgett V. Cay, 1328. Mueller v. Engeln, 1844. Mueford V. Richardson, 556, 656. Muhler v. Ins. Co., 839. Mulilker v. Ruppert, 1391. Muir V. Cross, 804. Muir V. Jones, 1260. Mulcahey v. Strauss, 892. Mulcahy v. Fen wick, 864. Muldoon V. Deline, 1878, 1380. Muldrow V. Jones, 655. Mulford V. Peterson, 865. Mull V. Bowles, 1067. MuUaney v. Duffy, 1400. Mullany v. MuUany, 340, 350. Mullen V. Banning, 1537. Mullen V. Cooper, 1168, 1170. Mullen V. Doyle, 1094. Mullen V. M'Kelvy, 1485. Mullen V. Rainer, 580. MuUer v. Sticker, 141, 156. Mulligan v. Jordan, 1422, 1423. Mulliken v. Graham, 1353. MuUins V. Cattrell, 1475. MuUins V. Conger, 1166. MuUins V. Wimberly, 828, 1346. Mullock y. 8ouder, 1485. Mulock V. Mulock, 1298. Mulry V. Norton, 11. Mulvey v. Gibbons, 907, 928. Muma V. Ins. Co., 848. Mumford v. Brown, 573, 585. Mumford v. Wardwell, 1252. Mumford v. Whitney, 134, 361, 368, 370. Munch V. Shabel, 1066. cl TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735; Vol. II, §§ 736-1541.] Mundy v. Jolliffe, 509. Mundy v. Mundy, 1481. Municipality r. Orleans Cotton Press, Munn V. Burges, 906, 907. Munoz V. Wilson, 792, 1319, 1320, 1321. Munro v. Collins, 997. Munro v. Meech, 281. Munro v. Munro, 1142. Munsion v. Reid, 187. Muuson V. Ensor, 1330. Murch V. Manuf. Co., 1004. Murchant v. Woods, 908. Murdock v. Clarke, 777, 863. Murdook v. Cox, 883. Murdock v. Gifford, 60. Murdock v. Gilchrist, 1299. Murdock v. Harris, 60. Murdock v. Railroad Co., 267. Murdock v. Ratcliflf, 360. Murdock's Case, 333. Murly V. McDermott, 256. Murphy v. Borland, 426. Murphy v. Colley, 847. Murphy v. Hunt, 462. Murphy v. Kelley, 218. Murphy v. Lee, 1404. Murpliy V. Lasch, 507. Murphy v. Lincoln, 153. Murphy v. Murphy, 884, 1075, 1484. Murphy v. Peabody, 1864. Murphy v. Price, 1434. Murphy v. Ramsey, 1253. Murphy v. Ryan, 8, 14, 94, 96. Murphy v. Welch, 178. Murr V. Glover, 560. Murray v. Ballou, 1343. Murray v. Blackledge, 1286. Murray v. Earl, 1338. Murray v. Graham, 795. Murray v. Hall, 665. Murray v. Hoyle, 1163. Murray v. Hudson, 1174. Murray v. Jayne, 1449. Murray v. Murphy, 1483. Murray v. Railroad Co., 259. Murray v. Walker, 777. Murrell v. Chase, 881. Murrell v. Jackson, 553. Murrell v. Smith, 945. Murry v. Murry, 1485. Murry v. Sell, 1064. Murry v. Sermon, 11. Murton v. Cladwin, 533. Musch V. Burkhart, 243. Musgrove v. Bonser, 791, 1311, 1350. Musham v. Musham, 1062. Muskett V, Hill, 133. Muskingum Turn. Co. v. Ward, 1287. Musser v. Hershey, 8. Mussett V. Busch, 96. Mussey v. Holt, 1200. Mussey v. Scott, 263, 525, 556, 655, 658, 1301. Mussey v. Union Wharf, 188. Musto V. Sutclifle, 1476. Mutton's Case, 1046, 1047. Mutual Build. Asso. v. Lowdermilk, 901. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Corey, 1203. Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Bank, 335. Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Bigler, 335. Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Dake, 837, 1331, 1336, 1339. Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Everett, 1121. Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Shipman, 1123. Muzzarelli v. Hulsliizer, 1448. Muzzy V. Knight, 787. Myatt V. Walker, 1472. Myar v. Snow, 1008. Myers v. Brodbeck, 1464. Myers v. Buchauan, 1333. Myers v. Croft, 1239. Myers v. Dodd, 358, 259. Myers v. Dunn, 137, 153. Myers v. Estell, 940. Myers v. Evans, 464, 1193. Myers v. Gemmel, 156. Myers v. Jackson, 698. Myers v. Kingston Land Co., 481. Myers v. McGavock, 1163, 1193. Myers v. Myers, 449. Myers v. Reed, 703. Myers v. Vanderbilt, 1476. Myers v. Weaver, 429. Mygatt V. Coe, 1453. Myrick v. Bill, 430, 468. Myrover v. French, 1319. N. Naederhouser v. State, 8. Nagle V. Macy, 960. Naill V. Maurer, 384. Nairn v. Majorbanks, 298. Nalle V. Paggi, 357. Naloy V. Minock, 1313. Nance v. Alexander, 563. Nance v. Hill, 430, 438. Napa V. Howland, 1310. Napier v. Bulwinkle, 156, 238, 256. Napier v. Howard, 1024. Napier v. Napier, 1118. Nash V. Astor, 1439. Nash V. Baker, 1320. Nash V. Fugate, 1318. Nash V. Simpson, 1526, 1529. Nash V. SpofEard, 1444. Nason v. Allen, 1269. Natches v. Vanderbilt, 1397. TABLE OF CASES. cli [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735; Vol. II, 88 T3B-1541.] Nathan v. Manning, 1476. National Banlj v. Grand Lodge, 869. National Bank v. Matthews, 1206. National Bank v. Merrill Co., 79. National Bank v. Mill Co., 807, 808. National Bank v. Nortli, 48, 57, 60. National Bank v. Scliween, 1387. National Bank v. Smith, 1090. National Bank v. Yankton Co., 1253. National Exch. Bank v. Cunningham, 153. National Build. Asso. v. Brewer, 500, 1200. National Fire Ins. Co. v. McKay, 933. National Foundry and Pipe Works v. Oconto Water Works, 832. National Manure Co. v. Donald, 190. National Stock Yards v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 266. Nau V. Brunette, 907, 1163. Navassa Guano Co. v. Richardson, 769. Nave V. Berry, 505. Nave V. Smith, 720. Naye v. Naegel, 583. Naylor v. Godman, 1033. Naylor v. Moflfatt, 927. Nazro v. Ware, 1319. Neal V. Hagtlirop, 970. Neal V. Brockhan, 449. Neal V. Coe, 433, 443. Neal V. Gregory, 1228. Neal V. Mackenzie, 515. Neal V. Parkerson, 1349. Neal V. Speigle, 809. Neale v. Bleckley, 1203. Neale v. Lee, 1193. Neale v. Ratcliffe. 496. Neale v. Seeley, 161. Neave v. Moss, 567. Nebraska v. Iowa, 11. Needham v. Smith, 1106. Neel v. Neel, 325, 370. Neel's Appeal, 694. Neeley v. Boyce, 1310. Neeley v. Buleys, 819. Neely v. Butler, 343. Neely v. Hoskins, 756. Neese v. Riley, 811. Neesom v. Clark' on, 734, 971. NefE's Appeal, 1499. Negus V. Becker, 253. Neil V. Neil, 148:1 Neil V, Ohio, 109. Neil V. Reid, 839. Neill V. Capelle, 777. Neill V. Shamburg, 708. Nellson v. Grignon, 1174. Neilson v. Harford, 1302. Nellson v. Lagow, 1055, 1057. Neilson v. Railroad Co., 831. Neligh V. Michenor, 783, 803. Nelson v. Brown, 403. Nelson v. Bush, 1385. NeUson v. Butler, 1386. Nelson v. Brewing Co., 588, 593. Nelson v. Carrington, 531. Nelson v. Ferris, 865. Nelson v. Kelly, 1221. Nelson v. Lark, 989. Nelson V. Nelson, 163. Nelson v. Pinegar, 856. Nelson v. Railroad Co., 108. Nelson v. Russell, 995. Nepean v. Doe. 653. Nesbit V. Godfrey, 503. Nessbitt v. Cavender 1067. Nesselrode v. Parish, 1391. Nestal V. Schmid, 1061. Nettleton v. Sikes, 363, 368, 371, 1390. Neuman v. Derfuret, 689. Neumiester v. Palmer, 631. Nevil's Case, 110, 384. Nevin v. Allen, 448. Nevins v. Peoria, 341. Nevitt V. Bacon, 852. New V. New, 1155. New V. Wheaton, 838, 838, 1347, 1350. New Albany, etc. R. R. Co. v. Peter- son, 237, 338. Newall V. Wright, 850, 919. New Bedford v. Fairhaven, 869. Newbold v. Newbold, 770. Newbold v. Smart, 678, 734. Newburg.i Turnp. Co. v. Miller, 107. Newbury v. Rutter, 849, 894. Newby v. Harrison, 365. Newby v. Vestal, 563. New Chester Water Co. v. Holly Manuf. Co.. 48. Newcomb v. Bonham 766. Newcomb v. Lewis, 1393. Newcomb v. Webster, 1595. Newcombe v. Leavitt, 1197. Newell V. Hill, 359. Newell V. Sass, 147. New England Ins. Co. v. Wetmore, 839. New England Mort. Co. v. Ober, 836, 1311, 1334. New England Mort. Co. v. Tarver, 777. Newhall v. Bank, 368. Newhall v. Wheeler, 379. NewhofE V. Mayo, 3, 139, 131, 157, 511. Newhouse v. Hill, 803. New Jersey Ins. Co. v. Meeker, 872. New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Franklinite Co., 345, 349. clii TABLE OF CASES. [Referenoea are to sections: Vol. I, contains §8 1-735; Vol. II, §§ 736-1541.] New Jersey Zinc & Iron Co. v. Canal & Banking Co., 741. Newkerk v. Newkerk, 379, 740. Newkirk v. Marshall, 1337. Newklrk v. Place, 1059. Newland v. Holland, 450. Newman v. Bank, 672. Newman v. Chapman, 933. Newman v. French, 583. Newman v. Ogden, 960. Newman v. Rutter, 533. Newman v. Samuels, 900. Newmarket Manuf . Co. v. Pendergast, 683. New Orleans v. Baltimore, 1099. New Orleans v. Gaines, 1315. New Orleans v. Moye. 263. New Orleans v. United States, 11. New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Louisi- ana, etc. Co., 108, 109. New Orleans Nat. Bank v. Raymond, 66. New Orleans, etc. R. R. Co. v. Harris, 109. New Orleans Sav. Bank v. McPortlan, 893. New Orleans Water Works v. Rivers, 109. Newpoint Lodge v. Newpoint, 1377. Newsom v. Hurtz, 1345. Newsom v. Snow, 1165. Newton v. Cook, 395. Newton v. Eddy, 8. Newton v. Griffiths, 1033. Newton v. Harland, 556, 655, 657. Newton v. Marsden, 744, 1527. Newton v. Marshall, 679. Newton v. Mayo, 1167. Newton v. McKay, 784, 853, 1387. Newton v. Newton, 1538. Newton v. Porter 1076, 1083. Newton v. Society, 1484. Newton v. Talcott, 1306. Newton v. Taylor, 1075, 1094. Newton v. Wilson, 115. New York v. Law, 1404. New York L. Ins. Co. v. Mayer, 367. New York L. Ins. Co. v. White, 1335. New York, etc. R. R. Co. v. Railroad Co., 108. New York, etc. R. R. Co. v. Provi- dence, 173. New York, etc. R. R. Co. v. Randall, 639. New York Real Estate, etc. Co. v. Motley, 503, 504. New Westminster v. Bighouse, 241. Ney V. Mumme, 698. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Seammon, 846. Nlcewander v. Nicewander, 1478. Nichol V. Alexander, 1438. Nichol V. Glover, 807, 808. Nichol v. Henry, 1339. Nicholas v. Chamberlin, 187. Nichols V. Allen, 1065. Nichols v. Baxter, 839, 840. Nichols v. Bertram, 109. Nichols V. Boswell, 1511. Nichols V. Briggs, 895. Nichols V. Counoil, 1188, 1340. Nichols V. Dennv, 668. Nichols V. Duluth, 237, 338. Nichols V. Eaton, 1080. Nichols V. Johnson, 795. Nichols V. Levy, 1080. Nichols V. Luce, 147, 153. Nichols V. Nichols, 463. Nichols V. Otto, 906. , Nichols V. Overacker, 441, 837. Nichols V. Reynolds. 836, 837, 1336. Nichols V. Smith, 676, 1309, 1379. Nichols V. Williams, 619. Nicholson v. Caress, 1445. Nicholson v. Combs, 1300. Nicholson v. Halsey, 1084. Nickells v. Atherstone, 535, 1339. Nickerson v. Buck, 1478, 1483. Nickerson v Swett, 795. Nicklas v. Morrison, 335. Nicklin v. Williams, 248. Nicoll V. Railroad Co., 741, 747. Nicolls V. Sheffield, 1047. Nicrossi v. Phillips, 343, 354. Niggeler v. Maurin, 803, 1295. Nightingale v. Burrell, 1021, 1026, 1028. Nightingale v. Hidden, 344, 1052, 1062, 1383. Nightingale v. Withington, 1281, 1283. Nigro V. Hatch, 70. Niles V. Davis, 1167, 1171. Niles V. Harmon, 933, 951. Nims V. Sherman, 960. Nix V. Moyer, 440. Nixon V. Hamilton, 1362, 1366. Nixon V. Lindsay, 729. Nobbs V. Hogg, 1092. Noble V. Bosworth, 70. Noble V. Burnett, 1484. Noble V. Noble, 373. Noble V. Sylvester, 73. Noblesville v. Railroad Co., 1170. Noe V. Kern, 1061. Noe V. Roll, 1066, 1075. Noe V. Splivalo, 401. Noel V. Ewing, 409. Noel V. Jevon, 374. Noel V. McCrary, 631. Noerenburg v. Johnson, 829. TABLE OF CASES. cliii IReferences are to sections : Vol. I, contains S8 1-735 ; Vol. II, 89 736-1541.1 Noffts V. Koss, 367. Nolan V. Gardner, 1492. Noll V. Swineford, 839. Nolle V. Meyer, 1097. Nolte's Appeal, 807. Noonau v. Albany, 216. Noonan v. Lee, 933, 1434, 1443. NorcToss V. Grifflths, 14. Norcross v. James, 1442, 1448. Norcross v. Norcross, 768. Norcross v. Widgery, 1349. Norcum v. D'Oench, 1121. Norfleet v. Cromwell, 141. Norfolk V. Cooke, 1251. Torfolk's Case, 479, 756, 1412. Norman v. Burnett, 1061. Norman v. Cunningham, 344. Norman v. Towne, 1344. Norman v. Wells, 840, 1448, 1453. 'N irman v. Winch, 1460. Normile v^. Gill, 250. Norrls v. Baker, 198. Norris v. Clark, 398, 399. Norris v. Hensley, 1003. N'orris v. Luther, 948. Norris v. Milner, 747. Norris v. Morrill, 637. Norris v. Moulton, 464. Norris v. Trustees, 109. Norris v. Wilkinson, 798. Norris v. Woods, 1068, 1110, 1118. North V. Henneberry, 1202. North V- Philbrook, 1055, 1057. North V. Shearn, 437. North Baltimore K. R. Co. v. Balti- more, 107. Northcut V. Whipp, 340, 345, 376, 990. North British Ins. Co. v. Hallett, 1352, 1353. Northern Pac. R. R. Co. v. Amacker, 1238. Northern R. R. Co. v. Elliott, 1420. Northern Cent. R. R. Co. v. Canton Co., 54. North Penn. Coal Co.'s Appeal, 707. North Penn. R. R. Co. v. Rehman, 259. Northport Real Est. Imp. Co v. Hen- drickson, 1161. North River Bank v. Rogers, 934. Northrop v. Marquam, 678, 685. Northrop t. Wright, 684, 1178. Northrup v. Phillips, 666. North Shore R. R. v. Pion, 15. Norton v Davis, 1311. Norton v. Joy, 928. Norton v. Ladd, 279. Norton v. Loan & Trust Co,, 953. Norton v. Norton, 475. Norton v. Palmer, 895. Norton v. Paxton. 1472, 1475. Norton v. Schofield, 232. Norton v. Schrauker, 1457. Norton v. Tliarp, 909. Norton v. Valentine, 223. Norton v. Whitehead, 1302. Norton v. Williams, 824. Norvell v. Boston Academy, 1430. Norwich Co. v. Norwich, 109. Norwich Ins. Co. v. lioomer, 842, 844, 845. Norwood V. Crawford, 1391. Norwood V. De Hart, 869. Norwood T. Norwood, 719, 928. Nott V. Shirley, 1117. Nottingham v. Jennings, 1028. Nottingham, etc. Co. v. Butler, 1433, 1425. Nourse v. Nourse, 1321. Nowlin V. Whipple, 273. Noy V. Ellis, 936. Noyes v. Hall, 838. Noyes v. Horr, 1341. Noyes v. Rich, 851. Noyes v. Sawyer, 935. Noyes v. Shepherd, 198. Noyes v. Southworth, 1500. Noyes v. Terry, 73. Nudd V. Hobbs, 133, 166, 1351. Nuernberger v. Von Der Heidt, 611. Nugent V. Powell, 722. Nugent T. Railroad Co., 591, 596. Null V. Howell, 363, 416. Nunn V. Givham, 350. Nussbaum v. Ins. Co., 839. Nute V. Nute, 1355. Nutter V. Nutter, 1003. Nye V. Hoyle, 1448. Nye V. Lowery, 1306. Nye V. Moody, 1376. Nye V. Taunton, 389. Nye's Appeal, 392. O. Oakland Cem. Co. v. Bancroft, 50. Oakes v. Munroe, 633. Oakley v. Hurlburt, 983. Oakley v. Oakley, 385. Oaks V. Heaton. 1240. Oastler v. Henderson, 500, 551. Gates V. Cooke, 379, 1514. Gates V. Jackson, 664. O'Bannan v. Roberts, 671. O' Brian v. Fry, 957. O'Brian v. Ball, 548, 550. O'Brian v. Capwell, 593. O'Brien v. Elliot, 402. O'Brien v. Fitzgerald, 113. O'Brien v. Flynn, 140. cliv TABLE OF CASES. IRefereuces are to sections : Vol. I, contains §8 1-735 ; Vol. 11, §§ 736-1541.] O'Brien v. Ins. Co., 842. O'Brien v. Kusterer, 75. O'Brien v. McGrane, 1393. O'Brien v. Pettis, 833. O'Brien v. St. Paul, 318. O'Brien y. Troxel, 631. O'Brien v. Wagner 748, 749. O'Brien v. Wetlierell, 743, 1413. O'Conner v. Andrews, 591. O'Conner v. O'Conner, 813. O'Conner v. Sliipman, 890. O'Connor v. Delaney, 693. O'Connor v. Fogle, 1196. O'Daniel v. O'Daniel, 163, 188. O'Donnell v. Burroughs, 63. O'Donnell v. Hitchcock, 53, 75, 80. O'Donnell v. Mclntyre, 564. O'Donnell v. Penny, 1396. O'Donnell v. Rodiger, 1473. O'Donnell v. White, 1066. O'Parrell v. Harney, 1392. O'Flynn v. Powers, 1111. O'Herrin v. Brooks, 1375, 1376. O'Keefer v. Kennedy, 1436. O'Kelly V. Williams, 465. O'Mahoney v. Burdett, 1034. O'Weara v. McDaniel, 1465. O'Mulcahy v. Holley, 864. O'Neal V. Pettus, 1333. O'Neal V. Sherman. 146. O'Neal V. Seixas, 801, 1330. O'Neall V. Parr, 1497. O'Neil V. Vanderburg, 1444. O'Neil V. Webster, 1313. O'Neill V. Douthitt, 887. O'Neill V. Smith, 1492. O'Riley v. McChesney, 313. O'Rorke v. Smith, 153, 154. O'Sullivan v. Norwood, 593. Ober V. Gallagher, 810, 816. Oberlies v. Willis, 608. Obert V. Obert, 723. 733. Oborn v. Searles, 1066. Ocean Beacli Asso. v. Yard, 1391. Ockington v. Richey, 368. Oconto Co. V. Jerrard, 1338. Odd Fellows', etc. Bank v. Harrigan, 953. Odd Fellows' Hall Asso. v. Hegelte, 255 Odell V. Montross, 776. Odenwelder v. Frankkenfleld, 1238. Odiorne v. Mason, 1313. Odlin V. Greenleaf, 897. Odneal v. Sherman, 146. Odom V. Beverly, 345. Odom V. Wethersbee, 684. Ofifut V. OfEut, 1493. OfEut V. Scott, 713. Ogburn v. Connor, 215, 319. Ogden V. Ball, 1436, 1439, 1433, 1434, 1436, 1441. Ogden V. Gibbons, 108. Ogden V. Grove, 153. Ogden V. Hatry, 530, 529, 531. Ogden V. Walters, 838, 1343. Ogilvie V. Copeland, 1391. Ogilvie V. Richardson, 953. Ogle V. Railroad Co., 174. Ogle V. Reynolds, 1109, 1110, 1515, 1524. Oglesby v. Hollister, 678, 686. Ohio Central R. R. Co. v. Central Trust Co., 891. 966. Ohio Ins. & Trust Co. v. Winn, 895. Ohnsburg v. Turner, 902. Okinson v. Patterson, 1363. Gland's Case, 307, 571. Olcott V. Bynum, 1066, 1067. Olcott V. Wing, 710. Oldham v. Pfleger, 853. Olds V. Congor, 640. Old South Soc. V. Wainswright, 676, 1194. Oldstein v. Build. Asso., 156, 238, 243, 250. Olean v. Steyner, 1190. Oliffe V. Wells, 1065. Oliphant v. Eckerley, 878. Oliva V. Bunaforza, 803. Oliver v. Daney, 839. Oliver v. Decatur, 938. Oliver v. Gary, 566. Oliver v. Holman, 1181. Oliver v. Hook, 153. Oliver v. Hunter, 484. Oliver v. Oliver, 1318, 1332, 1455. Oliver v. Palmer, 933. Oliver v. Piatt, 1880. Oliver v. Pitman, 154, 170. Oliver v. Stone, 1330. Oliver's Estate, 298. Olmstead v. Abbott, 272. Olmstead v. Niles, 18, 1290. Olney v. Balcb, 1514. OIney v. Sawyer, 674, 677, 679, 1178. Olson V. Merrill, 8. Olt V. Lahnas, 617. Omaha Refining, etc. Co. v. Taber, 366, 697. Omaha, etc. Co. v. Hanson, 1177. Omaha, etc. Trust Company v. Parker, 1173. Ombony v. Jones, 53, 78. Oneal v. Orr, 599. Oneto V. Restano, 333, 488. Oney v. Clendenin, 1163. Onslow's Case, 615. Onstott V. Murray, 171. Ontario State Bank v. Gerry, 441. TABLE OF CASES. clv [References are to sections : Vol. I, contains §8 1-735 ; Vol. II, 8S 736-1541.] Onward Build. Asso. v. Smithson, 1204. Opdyke v. Bartles, 978. Oppenheimer v. Fritter, 440. Oppenheimer v. Wright, 1313. Orcliard v. Hughes, 964. Orcutt V. Moore, 603, 605. Orde V. Hemlng, 987 Orena v. Santa Barbara, 1191. Orford v. Benton, 343, 346. Orford v. Churchill, 1121. Orford v. Richardson, 95. Orleans County Bank v. Moore, 963. Orleans Navi. Co. v. New Orleans, 135. Orman v. Day, 255. Ormond v. Martin, 690, 717, 733, 734. Ormsby v. Pinkerton, 175. OrndorfE v. Hummer, 1483, 1484. Orr V. Clark, 668, 1320. Orr V. Hadley, 1226, 1396. Orr V. Hodgson, 1150, 1153, 1157. Orr V. Jimmerman, 521. Orr V. Shraft, 432, 443. Orr's Estate, 453. Orrick v. Durham, 1344. Orth V. Jennings, 836, 1359. Orthwin v. Thomas, 394, 1004, 1145, 1184, 1185. Orvis V. Powell, 951. Osborn v. Nicholson, 1433. Osborn v. Osborn, 1038, 1293. Osborn v. Rabe, 83. Osborne v. Mull, 724. Osborne v. Schoonmaker, 463. Osborne v. Tunis, 926. 1414. Osgood V. Abbott, 748, 1412. Osgood V. Bliss, 1500. Osgood V. Eaton, 1066. Osgood V. Franklin, 1115. Osgood V. Stevenson, 795. Oshey v. Hicks, 783. Oskaloosa Water Co. v. Board, 57. Osten V. Jerome, 317. 219. Osterberg v. Union Trcist Co., 956. Osterman v. Baldwin, 1004. Ostrom V. San Antonio, 185. Oswald V. McCauley, 438. Oswald T. Mollet, 543. Otis V. Beckwith, 1051. Otis V. McLellan, 1003. Otis V. McMillan, 567. Otis V. Prince, 1528. Otley V. M'Alpime, 724. Ott V. Spiague, 464. Ottawa Gaslight, etc. Co. v. Graham, 213. 233. Ottumwa Lodge v. Lewis, 349. Ottumway Woolen Mill v. Hawley, 48. Ould V. Hospital, 1521. Ould V. Washington, 1053. Oury V. Saunders, 807. Ousley V. Jones, 1375. Ouslow's Case, 615. Outcalt V. Appleby, 296, 298, 1099, 1100. Outcalt V. Helme, 205, 306. Outcalt V. Ludlow, 1171. Outcalt V. Outcalt, 1518, 1530. Outerbridge v. Phelps, 154. Outtoun V. Duhn, 566. Overall v. Taylor, 1343. Overand v. Menczer, 1194, 1375, 1415, Overdeer v. Lewis, 657. Overdeer v. Updegraff, 147. Overfield v. Christie, 1169. Overman v. Jackson, 816. Overman v. Sasser, 81, 83. Overman v. Tate, 716. Overton v. Davisson, 1893. Overton v. Overton, 1484. Overton v. Sawyer, 219. Overton v. Williston, 80. Oves V. Ogelsby, 80. Owen V. Baker. 1312. Owen V. Campbell, 416. Owen V. Cooper, 1021. Owen V. Davies, 515. Owen V. Field, 132, 150, 191, 305,383,. 758, 989, 1403. Owen V. Hyde, 318, 320. Owen V. Peacock, 3 ■'8, 416. Owen V. Slatter, 423. Owen V. Yale, 393. 394. Owens V. Clark, 708. Owens V. Lewis, 268, 1290. Owene v. Northrup 832. Owens V. Owens, 392, 1062, 1520. Owings V. Beall, 930. Oxford V. Rodney, 813, 869. Oxley V. James, 534. Oyster v. KnuU, 379. Ozark Plateau Land Co. v. Hays, 1163. Pace V. Pace, 1080. Pacific Exp. Co. v. Haven 493. Pacific Railroad v. United States, 748, Packard v. Ames, 738, 756, 1413. Packard v. Ins. Co., 818. Packard v. Moss, 686. Packard v. Packard, 734. Packard v. Putnam, 1059. Packer v. Bird, 1385. Padbury v. Clark, 403. Paddock v. Somes, 215. Padelford v. Padelford, 299, 302. Padi V. Padi, 1163. Page V. Branch, 674, 678, 684, 1178. Pagev. Cooper, 1118. clvi TABLE OF CASES. LReferences are to sections: Vol. I, contains §S 1-T35; Vol. II, 89 736-1541.1 Page V. De Puy, 556, 655. Page V. Foster, 971. Page V. Horn, 384. Page V. Kress, 960. Page V. Lindsay, 1076. Page V. Murray, 1425. Page V. Ordway, 787. Page V. Palmer, 738, 750, 1413. Page V. Pierce, 830. Page V. Robinson, 338. Page V. Sherman, 1299. Page V. Trufant, 1460. Page V. Webster, 679. Page's Case, 1149. Paget V. Gee, 124, 397. Paget's Case, 1260. Paige V. Paige, 371, 708. Paine v. Benton, 787. Paine v. Cliandler, 231. Paine v. Church, 599. Paine v. Dwinell, 878. Paine v. Forsaith, 1523. Paine v. Steffln, 463. Paine v. Woods, 333, 286, 1386. Palne's Case, 343, 845, 876. Paine Lumber Co. v. United States, 9. Painter v. Water Co., 308, 1405. Palln V. Hills, 1514. Palk V. Clinton, 928. Palmer v. Carlisle, 925. Palmer v. Dodge, 334. Palmer v. Edwards, 533. Palmer v. Farrell, 1400. Palmer v. Fowley, 915. Palmer v. Harris, 816. Palmer v. Hawes, 433. Palmer v. Melson, 566. Palmer v. Palmer, 1330. Palmer v. Paul, 156. Palmer v. Ryan, 739, 1412. Palmer v. Snell, 883. Palmer v. Stevens 916, 1478. Paimer v. Waddell, 307.. Palmer v. Wetmore, 156. Palmer v. Wheeler, 1130. Palmerton v. Hoop, 1327. Palmetee v. Carey, 868, 967. Palmetto Lumber Co. v. Rlsley, 1066, 1075. Palms V. Palms, 1028. Pancake v. Cauffman 779, 781. Panton v. Holland, 238, 242. Paquette v. Clark, 823. Parberry v. Johnson, 830. Parham v. Thompson, 306. Paris V. Hulett, 943. Paris V. Norway Water Co., 57. Paris V. Vail, 609, 610. Parish V. Kashpare, 134, 367. Park V. Missionary Soc. , 997. Park V. Neeley, 1344. Park V. Pratt, 783, 1385. Park Commissioners v. Coleman, 677, 1178. Parke v. Mears, 1810. Parke v. Seattle. 341. Parker v. Banks, 1161. Parker v. Barnard, 262. Parker v. Bennett, 1403. Parker v. Cbambllss, 333, 828. Parker v. Constable, 618, 634, 628, 634. Parker v. Crittenden, 1228. Parker v. Cutler, 95. Parker v. Dacres, 975. Parker v. Doan, 464. Parker v. Pay, 1299, Parker v. Poote, 156, 160, 161, 191. Parker v. Gerard, 716. Parker v. Glover, 1000, 1489. Parker v. Hall, 1058. Parker v. Hart, 936. Parker v. Hayden, 400. Parker v. Hill, 793, 835, 1321. Parker v. Hollis, 617. Parker v. Hotchkiss, 309. Parker v. Jones, 833. Parker v. Kane, 13 0, 1355. Parker v. Logan, 1066. Parker v. Marks, 1837. Parker v. M'MlUan, 1065. Parker v. Meadows, 586. Parker v. Metzger, 1197. Parker V. Nightingale, 131, 140, 141, 1423, 1423, 1435. Parker v. Obear, 883, 416. Parker v. Osgood, 888, 1350. Parker v. Parker, 743, 1320, 1445. Parker v. People, 100, 101. Parker v. Publishing Co.. 263. Parker v. Shannon. 1346, 1348. Parker v. Snyder, 1064. Parker v. Somerby, 398. Parker v. Stanlland. 18, 43. Parker v. Storts, 957. Parker v. St. Paul, 191. Parker v. Taylor, 1347. Parker v. Wulstein, 534, 599. Parkersburg Gas Co. v. Parkersburg, 106. Parkes v. Parker, 886. Parkhurst v. Corey, 960. Parkhurst v. Hanrow, 1106. Parkhurst v. Smith, 1006. Parkinson v. Hanbury, 968. Parkinson v. Sherman, 869, 1443. Parkinson's Appeal, 1489. Parklst v. Alexander, 823. Parkman v. Bank, 1059. Parks V. Am. Miss. See, 1105. Prrks V. Bishop, 150. TABLE OF CASES. clvii [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains ii 1-135; Vol. II, SS 736-1541.] Parks V. Boston, 547, 548. Parks V. Hardey, 420. Parks V. Newberryport, 317. Parks V. Parks, 1155. Parmelee v. Simpson, 793, 1318. Parmenter v. Walker, 906. Parmenter v. Webber, 533. Parmer v. Parmer, 976, 979. Parr v. Newby, 430. Parrish V. Parrisli, 362, 371, 375, 413. Parrish v. Whitney, 1431, 1432. Parrott v. Hungelburger, 566. Parsell v. Stryker, 1533. Parshall v. Passmore, 739. Parsons v. Boyd, 66s. Parsons v. Brown, 556. Parsons v. Copeland, 49, 58, 73. Parsons v. Freeman, 869. Paraons v. Johnson, 141. Parsons v. Lanoe. 1506. Parsons v. Lent, 837. Parsons v. Lyman, 937. Parsoas v. Miller, 1493. Parsons v. Neville, 1539. Parsons v. Parsons, 111. Parsons v. Smith, 368, 1390. Partherwick v. Mason, 93. Partington's Case, 1413. Parton v. Allison, 380. 417. Partridge v. Bere, 893, 1183. Partridge v. Cavender, 1080. Partridge v. Chapman, 836, 1346. Partridge v. Church, 373. Partridge v. Gilbert, 188, 353, 355. Partridge v. Hatch, 1463. Partridge v. Lyon, 354. Pascault V. Cochran, 837. Paschall v. Passmore 1413. Pasco V. Gamble, 940. Patch V. Keeler, 1400. Patch V. Shore, 1117. Pate V. French, 1204. Patman v. Harland, 1424. Patrick v. Calerick, 371. Patrick V. McCormick, 1334. Patrick v. Sherwood, 396. Patten v. Deshon, 533, 535, 536, 639. Patten v. Iselin, 145. Patterson v. Blake, 707, 713. Patterson v. Boston, 547. Patterson v. Edwards, 805. Patterson v. Ellis, 1032, 1033. Patterson v. Graham, 551. Patterson v. Harlan, 1401, 1403. Patterson v. Hickey, 1504. Patterson v. Langster, 1331. Patterson v. Lanning, 729. Patterson v. Martin, 713, 719, 720. Patterson v. Munyan, 166. Patterson v. Snell, 793, 1331. Patterson v. Underwood, 1300. Patterson v. Wilson, 1122. Patterson v. Yeaton, 1200. Pattison's Appeal, 309, 571, 1290. Paltisson v. Gilford, 205 Patton V. Beechar, 1076. Patton V. Gouldsboiough, 1376. Patton V. State, 175. Patton V. Tallman, 1494. Patton V. Western, etc. Educational Co., 196. Patty V. Coolsby, 1105. Patureau v. Wilbert, 673, 691. Paul V. Carpenter, 1313. Paul V. Chickering, 497. Paul V. Frierson, 995. Paul V. Hazleton, 91, 96. Paul V. Hoeft, 831. Paul V. Railroad Co. , 747. Paulson V. Manske, 832. Pawling V. United States, 1318. Pawtucket v. Ballou, 1483. Paxson V. Brown, 1226. Paxton V. Kennedy, 541. Paxton V. Valley Land Co., 1163. Payne v. Avery, 805. Payne v. Cave, 644, 950. Payne v. Haine, 505. Payne v. Irvine, 592. Payne v. James, 583, 584. Payne v. Mathes, 1845. Payne v. Patterson, 776. Payne v. Payne, 1482. Payne v. Pavey, 1331. Payne v. Rogers, 583, 593. Payne v. Wilson, 800. Pay's Case, 1035. Payson v. Burnham, 1433, 1435. Pea v. Pea, 73. Peabody v. Fenton, 533. Peabody v. Hewitt, 784, 1177, 1194. Peabody v. Minot, 676, 715, 1379. Peabody v. Peabody, 934. Peaceable v. Read, 669, 686. Peagler v. Stabler, 781. Peak V. Brinson, 1303. Peaks V. Blethen, 747, 1330. Pearce v. Hall, 787. Pearce v. McClenaghan, 186. Pearce v. Moore, 1385. Pearce v. Morris, 978. Pearce v. Savage, 668, 1055. Pearce v. Wilson, 775, 786. Pearcy v. By bee, 11. Pearks v. Moseley, 1028, 1029. Pearl v. Hervey, 804. Pearly V. Smith, 112, 113. Pearne v. Coal, etc. Manuf. Co., 153, Pearsall v. Post, 157. Pearson v. Allen, 153. ■clviii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains §S 1-735; Vol. II, 9§ 736-1541.] Pearson v. Howey, 358. Pearson v. Pearson, 1541. Pearson v. Tinker, 830. Pease v. Allen, 1494. Pease v. Iron Co., 770. Pease v. Kelly, 804, 809. Pease v. Stone, 1137. Peaslee v. Peaslee, 387. Peck V. Batchelder, 73. Peck V. Cardwell, 1099. Peck V. Conway, 141, 145. Peck V. Goodberlett, 317. Peck V. Hapgood, 939. Peck V. Henderson, 1108. Peck V. Hensley, 1443. Peck V. Herrington, 315, 316, 317, 319. Peck V. Hiler, 551. Peck V. Jones, 547, 1443. Peck V. Lockwood, 95, 678. Peck V. Merrill, 773. Peck V. Sherwood, 396. Peck V. Smith, 1403. Peck V. Scoville, 584. Peck V. Vandework, 484. Peck's Appeal, 879. Peckham v. Had wen, 369. Peckham v. Lego, 391, 995, 997. Peden v. Cavins, 716, 734. Pedrick v. Pedrick, 1113. Peeble's Appeal, 1508. Peeble v. Watts, 1114. Peeler v. Peeler, 449. Peek V. Matthews, 1435. Peer v. Peer, 1070. Peil V. Rinehart, 591. Pelrce v. Burroughs, 396. Peirce v. Goddard, 53, 66. Peirce v. Hubbard, 1011, 1019. Pelham's Case, 393. Pell V. Ball, 735, 1099. PelLv. Cole, 3 jO. Pell V. McElroy, 1347, 1350. Pella V. Scholte, 179, 181, 191. Pellizzaro v. Reppert, 401, 404. Pells V. Brown, 1030, 1033. Pelton V. Draper, 610. Pelton V. Knapp, 881. Pemberton v. King, 46, 80. Pemberton v. Pemberton, 400. Pemberton v. Simmons, 801. Pence v. Arbuckle, 794. Pence v. Duvall, 1434, 1461. Pender v. Simmons, 801. Pendergast v. Young, 543. Penderick v. Searle, 1197. Pendill v. Agricultural Soc, 1310. Pendill v. Ells, 541. Pendill v. Mining Co., 519, 535. Pendleton v. Spear, 956. Pen Held v. Tower, 1124. Penfold V. Warner, 1303. Pengra v. Munz, 1333. Penhallow v. Dwight, 83, 306. 309 571. ' . . Penhallow v. Kimball, 405. Penley v. Watts, 534. Penn v. Cox, 668, 704. Penn v. Ott, 783. Penn v. Talleson, 947. Penn Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 309, 1407. Penn Gas Coal Co. v. Versailles Fuel Gas Co., 3. Pennant's Case, 753. Pennell v. DefEell, 1083. Penniman v. Hartshorn, 1306. Penniman's Appeal, 1503. Pennington v. Brinsop Coal Co. , 318. Pennington v. Flock, 1373. Pennington v. Pennington, 1038, 1038. Pennington v. Yell, 1369. Penninsalar, etc. Co. v. Crytal Falls, 175. Pennock v. Hoover, 831. Pennsylvania Co. v. Bauerle, 1113. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Preeport, 191. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Railroad Co., 1351. Pennybacker v. Leary, 1073, 1099. Pennybecker v. McDougal, 51. Penquite v. Lawrence, 176. Penrhyn v. Hughes, 395, 1004. Penrod v. Danner, 698. Penruddock's Case, 303. Penry v. Richards, 1393. Penton v, Robart, 18, 48, 51, 71, 75, 78, 306. Pentz V. Kuester, 567. Penzal v. Brookmire, 963. People V. Bank. 1075. People V. Bartels, 1314, 1315. People V. Boswick, 1318. People V. Bristol, 837, 1336. People V. Brown, 747. People V. Canal Appraisers, 8, 9. People V. Cassidy, 57. People V. Country, 1388. People V. Davidson, 171, 174, People v. Dudley, 538. People V. Gerke, 1157. People V. Hazen, 98. People V. Henderson, 1389. People V. Holladay, 1190. People V. Loomis, 334. People V. Lowndes, 98. People V. Manhattan Co., 109. People V. Mauran, 1350. People V. McClellan, 417. People V. Miller, 1314. People V. Moore, 183. TABLE OF CASES. clix [Eeferenoee are to sections: Vol. I, contains §8 1-735; Vol. II, §8 736-1541.] People V. Murray, 1306, 1477. People V. Nelson, 1314, 1315. People V. New York, etc. Co., 40, 1351, 1353. People V. O'Hara, 191. People V. O'Keefe, 171, 174. People V. O'Neil, 101. People V. Paulding, 641. People V. Pickert, 630. People V. Piatt, 96. People V. Railroad Co., 106. People V. Stitt, 963. People V. Storms, 785. People V. Tibbetts 334 People V. Vanderbilt, 1251, 1434. People V. Willis, 486. People's Bank v. Cage, 811. People's Gas Co. v. Tyner, 328. People's Ice Co. v. Davenport, 285. People's Ice Co. v. Steamer Excelsior, 233, 236. People's Sav. Bank v. Alexander, 535, 1435. People's Sav. Bank v. Denig, 1019, 1083. Peoria v. Johnston, 179, 191, 1190. Pepard v. Walbridge, 644. Pepper v. Pepper, 707, 713. Pepper v. Thomas, 430, 708. Pepper's Appeal, 1509. Peralta v. Castro, 1484. Peralta v. Givochio, 567. Percan v. Frederick, 791. Percival v. Percival, 398. Percy v. Millaudon, 689. Perdue v. Fraley, 441. Pere Marquette Boom Co. v. Adams, 1385. Pereles v. Magoon, 1391, 1892. Perean v. Frederick, 791. Perez v. Rabaud 591. Perkins v. Coleman, 1310. Perkins v. Dibble, 775. Perkins v. Gay, 1396, 1397. Perkins v. Gilbson, 807. Perkins v. Jones, 1491. Perkins v. Matteson, 863, 887. Perkins v. McDonald, 390. Perkins v. Perkins, 1475. Perkins v. Pitts, 719. Perkins v. Presnell, 1110. Perkins v. Simons, 1139. Perkins v. Sterne, 881. Perkins v. Strong, 836, 1331, 1834, 1336. Perkins v. Turnpike, 1236. Perkins v. Walker, 1119. Perkins v. West, 828, 1346. Perley v. Chandler, 167, 198. Perley v. Chase, 311, 858, 957. Perley v. Hilton, 222. Perley v. Langley, 133. Pernam v. Wead, 153, 1391. Perot V. Cooper, 781. Perrin v. Blake, 1012, 1015. Perrin v. Garfield, 132, 163. Perrin v. Granger, 17. Perrin's Estate, 1078. Perrine v. Newell, 995. Perry v. Aldrich, 377. Perry v. Burton, 1415. Perry v. Carr, 44, 615, 1393. Perry v. Charleston, 995. Perry v. Clark, 1426. Perry v. Davis, 522. Perry v. Dilrance, 470. Perry v. Fitzhowe, 198. Perry v. Grant, 804, 809. Perry v. Logan, 1033. Perry v. Price, 1393. Perry v. Railroad Co., 1402, 1405, 1508. Perry v. Scott, 1380. Perry v. Wall, 551. Persif ul v. Hind, 463. Person v. Chase, 1283. Personette v. Pryme 1072. Persons v. Alsip, 938. Persons v. Persons, 1069. Pestel V. Primm, 909. Peter v. Beverley, 1091, 1110, 1534. Peter v. Daniel, 138. Peter v. Lewis, 1133. Peter v. Stephens, 1169. Peter v. Woodhouse, 1830. Peters v. Bowman, 804, 928, 933. Peters v. Bridge Co., 864. Peters v. Canfield, 816. Peters v. Cartier, 1330. Peters v. Ham, 838, 1348. Peters v. Myers, 1431. Peters v. Tunell, 805, 806. Petersen v. Townsend, 1177. Peterson v. Arthurs, 1431, 1435. Peterson v. Clark, 337, 837, 778, 857. Peterson v. Fowler, 732. Peterson v. Hornblower, 441, 827. Peterson v. Kinkead, 566. Peterson v. Little, 448. Peterson v. McCullough, 1161. Petrain v. Keerman, 1060, 1064. Petre v. Ferrers, 575. Petre v. Heneage, 45. Petrie v. Foly, 1460. Petrie v. W right, 802. Pettee v. Hawes, 1403. Pettes V. Bingham, 1480. Pettibone v Griswolri, 787. Pettibone v. Smith, 213. Pettigrew v. Evansville, 315, 323. clx TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections : Vol. I, contains SS 1-735 ; Vol. II, §§ 736-1541.] Pettingill v. Mather, 884. Pettingill v. Porter, 149, 153. Pettijohn v. Beasley, 404. Pettman v. Bridger, 17. Pettus V. Dawson, 1148. Petty V. Petty, 355, 385. Pettyjohn v. Woodroof , 294. Petzold V. Petzold, 1066. Peugh V. Davis, 773, 781, 861, 968, 976, 977. Peyton v. Loudon, 239. Peyton v. Stith, 1179. PfafE V. Railroad Co., 144. Pfanner v. Sturmer, 308, 371. Pfeiffer v. Matthews, 257. PfeifEer v. McNott, 432. Phelps V. Chesson, 748. Phelps V. Green, 723. Phelps V. Jackson, 1075. Phelps V. Jepson, 668. Phelps V. Phelps, 994, 1533, 1539. Phelps V. Nowlen, 230, 231. Phelps V. Eacey, 101. Phelps V. Randolph, 553, 556, 655, 658. Phelps V. Rooney, 432. Phelps V. Taylor, 566. Phelps V. Townsley, 716. Phelan v. Fitzpatrick, 978. Phelan v. Kelley, 679. Phene v. Popplewell, 500. Philadelphia R. R. Co. v. Davis, 219. Philadelphia v. Girard, 1028. Philadelphia v. Railroad Co., 179, 1190. Philadelphia v. Scott, 1251. Philbrick v. Ewing, 77, 1402. Philbrick v. Spangler, 1476. Philbrook v. Delano, 804. Philips v. Brydges, 1084. Philleo V. Smalley, 432. Phillips V. Bank, 768. Phillips V. Beall, 1106. Phillips V. Bishop, 464, 1313. Phillips V. Bordman, 253. Phillips V. Brown, 1116. Phillips V. Covert, 616, 624. Phillips V. Crammond, 1064. Phillips V. Dressier, 144, 196. Phillips V. Ferguson, 744, 1527, 1528. Phillips V. Green, 1282. Phillips V. Hodges, 1345. Phillips V. Hulsizer, 981. Phillips V. Ins. Co., 843. Phillips V. Lansing, 219. Phillips V. O'Neal, 1396. Phillips V. Phillips, 679. Phillips V. Rogers, 1269. Phillips V. Skinner, 804. Phillips V. Smith, 303, 314. Phillips V. Stanch, 469. Phillips V. Stevens, 577. Phillips V. Taylor, 891. Phillips V. Thomas Lumber Co., 995, Phillips V. Thompson. 869. Phillips V. Treedy, 1420. Phillips V. Tudor, 1379. Phillips V. Vandergrift, 520, 529. Phillips V. Vose, 830. Phillips V. Winslow, 56. Phillips V. Wood, 997, 1105. Phillips Academy v. King, 1037. Phillipson v. Flynn, 1194. Philly V. Sanders, 833. Phinizy v. Clark, 769. Phinney v. Phinney, 986. Phipps V. Ackers, 996. Phipps V. Hope, 1476. Phipps V. Pitcher, 1484. Philpot V. Hoare, 539. Phoebe v. Boggess, 1493. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Fulton, 842. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 848. Phoenix Mut. Ins. v. Batchen, 830. Phoenixville v. Walters, 618, 633. Phyfe V. Warden, 511. Piatt V. Goodell, 1189. Piatt V. Smith, 984. Piatt V. Vattier, 895, 984, 1192. Plckard v. Kleis, 606. Pickard v. Pickard, 724. Pickard v. Sears, 1228. Pickering v. Langdon, 1031. Pickering v. Noyes, 133. Pickering v. Pickering, 690, 692. Pickett V. Bartlett, 639. Pickett V. Buckner, 368. Pickett V. Foster, 1062. Pickett V. Jones, 864, 901, 903. Pickett V. Lyles, 415. Pickett V. Nelson, 1397, 1400. Pickett V. Peay, 406. Pickins v. Webster, 43. Pickle V. McKissick, 738. Pico V. Gallardo, 779. Picot V. Page. 674. Pidcock V. Swift, 777. Pidgeley v. Rawling, 304. Piedmont Land Imp. Co. v. Machine Co., 1070. Pier V. Carr, 552. Pier V. Fond du Lac, 1326. Pierce v. Brew, 1299, 1431. Pierce v. Cemetery, 1405. Pierce v. Chace, 103, 705. Pierce v. Cleland, 147. Pierce v. Emery, 56. Pierce v. George, 49, 58, 61, 64. Pierce v. Grimley, 899. Pierce v. Hakes, 344, 1300, 1305. TABLE OF CASES. clxi [References are to sections : Vol. I, contains §8 1-735 ; Vol. II, §8 736-1541.] Pierce v. Joldersma, 505. Pierce v. Oliver, 737. Pierce v. Pierce, 384, 1064. Pierce v. Prescott, 1508. Pierce v. Rollins, 713. Pierce v. Shaw, 534, 963. Pierce v. Taylor, 1333. Pierce v. Trigg, 371, 713. Pierce v. "Wanett, 343. Pierce v. Williams, 412. Piercy v. Roberts, 1080. Pierre v. Fernald, 156, 157. Pierrepont v. Barnard, 263, 267, 368, 371. Piers V. Piers, 1145. Piersou v. Armstrong, 1393, 1396. Pierson v. Conley, 678. Piersoa v. David, 804. Pierson v. Glean, 203. Pierson v. Truax, 463. Pigg v. Corder, 945. Pig^ot V. Mason, 514. Piggott V. Stratton, 499, 501, 534, 1434. Pigot's Case, 1317. Pike V. Bacon, 1306. Pike V. Butler, 524. Pike V. Evans, 1168. Pike V. Galvin, 833. Pike V. Wassell, 1308. Pike's Case, 657. Pilcher v. Railroad Co., 477. Pilla V. Association, 1151. Pillow V. Sentell, 938. Pillsbury v. Brown, 175. Pillsbury v. Moore, 303. Pillsbury v. Morris, 353, 257. Pillsbury, etc. Co. v, Kistler, 1060. Pinchain v. Collard, 804. Pinckney v. Burrage, 985. Pindall v. Trevor, 1075, 1094. Pingree v. McDuffie, 153. Pingrey v. Watkins, 533, 536. Pinhorn v. Souster, 633. Pinkham v. Blair, 1033. Pinkston v. Huie, 1461. Pinkum v. Eau Claire, 131. Pinney v. Fellows, 1059, 1067. I'innington v. Galland, 158. Pins >n V. Ivey, 1037. Pintard v. Goodloe, 803. Pipe Line Co. v. Berry, 57. Pipkin V. Williams, 464, 467. Piqua Bank v. Knoop, 109. iPiscataqua Bridge v. New Hamsphire, 108. Pitkin V. Railroad Co., 135. Pitt V. Jackson, 344. Pitt V. Shew, 78. Pitts V. Cable, 778. Pitts V. Hendrix, 957. U Pitts V. Lancaster Mills, 208. Pitts V. Parker, 804, 810. Pitts V. Pitts, 392. Pitts V. Sheriff, 1319. Pittsman's Appeal, 445, 446. Pitzer V. Burns, 982. Pitzman v. Boyce, 263, 264, 266. Pixley V. Huggins, 826, 1359. Pizey V. Rogers, 585. Place V. Plagg, 67. Plain V. Roth, 951. PlaiTet Property & Fire Co. v. St. Louis, etc. Co., 1226. Plank-Road Co. v. Woodhull, 1520. Planter's Bank v. Davis, 343, 346. Planter's Bank V. Henderson, 467. Planter's Bank v. Sharp, 109. Plate's Estate, 1478 Plath V. Ins. Co., 843. Plato V. Roe, 773. Piatt V. Eggleston, 1433. Piatt V. Mickle, 1516. Piatt V. Spring, 1010. Piatt's Appeal, 369, 413. Platte Water Co. v. Irrigation Co., 212. Playfor v. Playfor, 978. Playter v. Cunningham, 493. Pleasants v. Blodgett, 838. Plimpton V. Converse, 153, 186. Plimpton V. Ins. Co., 889. Plowman v. Riddle, 805. Pluck V. Diggs, 535. Plumb V. Tubbs, 742, 744, 748, 750, 1412. Plume V. Howard Sav. Inst. 1508. Plnmer v. Plumer, 44, 615, 1292. Plumer v. Robertson, 1349. Plummer v. Dougherty, 936. Plummer v. Gould, 1875. Plunket V. Holmes, 346. Plymouth v. Carver, 1448, 1453. Plymouth v. Throgmorton, 113, 123. Plympton v. Boston Dispensary, 395, 996. Poignard v. Smith, 1163, 1183. Poitevent v. Hancock, 1413. Poitevant v. Supervisors, 188, 738. Polack v. Pioche, 505. Poland V. Railroad Co., 803. Pole V. Porker, 1176. Polhemus v. Empson, 1004. Polk V. Bathurst, 1107. Polk V. Cosgrove, 1334. Polk v. Reynolds, 871. Pollak V. Caldwell, 471. Pollard V. Hagan, 8, 9, 1247, 1353, 1253, 1385. Pollard V. Ins. Co., 846. Pollard V. Maddox, 1377. clxii TABLE OF CASES. IRef ereuoes are to sections: Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735 ; Vol. II, §§ 736-1541.] Pollen y. Brewer, 655. Pollit V. Kerr, 417. Pollock V. Glassell, 1476. Pollock V. Whipple, 500. Polly V. McCall, 163. Pomeroy v. Bailey, 1296. Pomeroy v. Lattia, 930, 925. Pomeroy v. Mills, 134, 361. Pompert v. Ricroft, 153. Pomroy v. Stevens, 1346. Pond V. Allen, 1518, 1580. Pond V. Eddy, 780. Ponder v. Rhea, 601. Pool V. Bentley, 486. Pool V. Blakie, 344. Pool V. BufEum, 1478. Pool V. Davis, 1319. Pool V. Nedham, 757. Poole V. Girrard, 464. Poole V. Kuskinson, 174, 177, 181. Poole V. Jackson, 1310. Poole V. Poole, 1019. Poole's Case, 43, 46, 77, 78, 80. Pooler V. Cristman, 1474. Poor V. Considine, 379. Poor V. McClure, 8. Poor V. Sears, 594. J'ope V. Devereux, 193. Pope V. Durant, 890. Pope V. Elliott, 1080. Pope v. O'Hara, 188, 191, 1403. Pope V. Shinkle, 63. Popham V. Bampfeild, 754. Popejoy V. Miller, 1374. Poplin v. Mundell, 836, 1331. Porch V. Fries, 350. Porcher v. Daniel, 1116. Port V. Campau, 1433. Port v. Jackson. 1430. Porter v. Bradley, 1431. Porter v. Dooley, 1331. Porter v. Durham, 319. Porter v. Ewing, 373. Porter v. Ford, 1505. Porter v. Fox, 1029. Porter v. Hill, 719. Porter v. Hubbard, 917. Porter v. Johnson, 1373. Porter v. Lazear, 390. Porter v. Merrill, 261. Porter v. Miller, 1161. Porter v. Muller, 782. Porter v. Perkins, 879. Porter v. Sevey, 838, 1350, 1858. Porter V. Steel Co., 48. Porter v. Trail, 937. Porter v. Turner, 1131. Porter's Appeal, 1493. Portland v. Terwillinger, 738, 1413. Portmore v. Bunn, 157. Portwood V. Newberry, 463. Postv. Bank, 1311. Post V. Bernheimer, 739, 1413. Post V. Hover, 1009. Post V. Kearney, 497, 536. Post V. Kreischer, 98. Post v. Pearsall, 133. Post V. Rivers, 1515. Post V. Weil, 739, 743, 1413, 1454. Poston V. Eubank, 951. Poston V. Gillespie, 385. Poston V. Miller, 978. Potomac Manuf. Co, v. Evans, 889, 890. Potomac Steamboat Co. v. Upper P. S. Co., 95. Pottery. Couch, 378, 1368. Potter V. Cromwell, 60, 68, 72. Potter V. Everett, 380. Potter V. Gardner, 1090. Potter y. Iselin, 145, 159. Potter V. Jones, 1472. Potter V. Langstrath, 777. ■ Potter V. Madre, 300. Potter V. McGowan, 484. Potter y. Potter, 1063. 1133, 1455. Potter V. Titcomb, 1486. Potter y. Tuttle, 1330. Potter y. Walker, 733. Potter V. Wheeler, 863. 391, 714. Potter y. Wliite, 355. Potts V. Coleman, 1171, 1174, 1415. Potts V. Gilbert, 1177. Potts v. Warehouse Co., 1388. Pottstown Gas Co. v. Murphy, 313, 233. Pouder v. Ritzlnger, 878. Pounds v. Dale, 1130. Poulson y. Simmons, 872. Poultry v. Holmes, 484. Powell V. Beckley, 505. Powell v. Conant, 793. Powell v. Demming, 1537. Powell y. Divett, 1278. Powell y. Gasson, 344. Powell v. Manuf. Co., 420. Powell v. Monson Co., 73, 881. Powell y. Powell, 380. Powell y. Railroad Co., 320. Powell v. Sims, 141, 156. Powels y. Innes, 839. Power v. Cassidy, 1065.- Power y. Sheil, 384. Powers v. Andrews, 899, 912. Powers y. BuUwinkle, 284. Powers v. Dennison, 51, 1426. Powers y. Dougherty, 1137. Powers y. Golden Lumber Co., 978, 980. Powers y. Hafley, 1532. TABLE OF CASES. clxiii [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains §§ l-735j Vol. II, 8§ 736-1541.1 Powers V. Ins. Co., 846. Powers V. McFerran, 1345. Powers V. Robinson, 707, 708, 713, 987. Powers V. Sample, 429. Poweshiek Co. v. Dennison, 956. Powley V. Walker, 314, 495. Poynter v. Chipman, 11. Poyntill V. Spencer, 1436. Prater v. Hoover, 342. Prater v. Prater, 434, 450, 451. Prather v. McClelland, 1473. Pratt V. Douglas, 296, 298, 1004, 1157. Pratt V. Farrar, 616, 628. Pratt V. Felton, 404. Pratt V. Leadbetter, 1012. Pratt V. Miller, 1065. Pratt V. Myers, 1296. Pratt V. Nixon, 1215. Pratt V. Northam, 895, 983. Pratt V. Ogden, 264. Pratt V. Pratt, 404, 463, 833. Pratt V. TefEt, 359. Pratt V. Van Wyck, 816. Pratt V. Whittier, 57. Pray v. Clark, 511. Pray v. Stebbins, 703, 705. Preble v. Brown, 91, 93, 96. Preble v. Railroad Co. 1399. Preble V. Reed, 148. Prefontaiae v. McMicken, 257. Prendergast v. Prendergast, 1053. Prentice v. Brimhall. 869. Prentice v. Dehon, 1192. Prentice v. Geiger, 144, 161, 210. Prentice v. Janssen, 1099. Prentice v. Railroad, Co. 1373. Preatis v. Bates, 1475. Prentiss v. Wood, 596. Prentiss's Case, 676, 1379. Preschbaker v. Feaman, 782. Prescott V. Hayes. 1293. Prescott V. Nevers, 315, 1160. Prescott V. Prescott, 430, 1001. Prescott V. Truemim, 1430, 1465. Prescott V. Walker, 374. Prescott V. Wells, 45. Prescott V. White, 199, 1431. Prescott V. Williams, 131, 188. Presley v. McLean, 965. Presstman v. Silljocks, 550. Preston v. Brant, 724. Preston v. Briggs, 46, 76, 78. Preston v. Hull, 222. Preston v. Preston, 1525. Preston v. Robinson, 1379. Preston v. Wright, 695. Preston Young, 853. Pretty v. Bickmore, 588, 589. Prettyman v. Wilkey, 1419. Prettyman v. Wolston, 1375. Prevost V. Gratz, 984. Prewittv. Ashford, 1310, 1314, 1337. Prewitt V. Ashland, 1336. Prewitt V. Graves, 1314. Price V. Baldouf, 153. Price V. Brayton, 43, 306, 1393. Price V. Brown, 1163. Price V. Church, 17. Price V. Courtney, 1118. Price V. Hobbs, 366, 420. Price V. Jackson, 1163, 1168. Price V. Jenks, 58. Price V. Kane, 1066, 1069. Price V. Kayton, 1436. Price V. Lanoe, 812. Price V. Lawsou, 213. Price V. Lawton, 933. Price V. McConnell, 253. Price V. McDonald, 800, 838, 1350. Price V. Pickett, 297. Price V. Pollock, 935. Price V. Price, 17, 357, 392. Price V. State Bank, 929. Price V. Sisson, 995. Price V. Thompson, 183, 185. Price V. Weehawken Ferry Company, 68. Price V. Williams, 486. Price V. Woodford, 404. Prickett v. Condon, 203. Prickett v. Parker, 1129. Prickett v. Ritter, 631, 645. Pride v. Viles, 831. Priest V. Nichols, 496. Priest V. Wheelock, 879. Prignow v. Daussat, 1297, 1321. Primm v. Walker, 14, 732, 838, 1379, 1386. Prince V. Case, 134, 264, 367, 271. Prince v. Hake, 443. Prince v. Hazleton, 1493, 1493. Princeville v. Anten, 185. Prindle v. Anderson, 637. Pringle V. Dunn, 1331. Pringle v. Sturgeon, 730. Pringle v. Written, 1436. Prior V. Scott, 1373. Prior V. Swartz, 9, 1251. Pritchard v. Atkinson, 1431, 1483. Pritchard v. Elton, 977. Pritchard v. Kalamazoo College, 863. Pritchard v. Thompson, 1531. Pritchett v. Mitchell, 935. Pritts V. Ritchey, 372. Probst v. Church, 1159. Proctor V. Adams, 263. Proctor V. Bigelow. 416. Proctor V. Clark, 1516. clxiv TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735: Vol, II, 8§ 736-1541.] Proctor y. Keith, 503. Proctor V. Robinson, 937. Proctor V. Toms, 833. Proctor V. Wells, 95. Proffltt V. Henderson, 314, 318. Promfret v. Ricroft, 187. Proprietors v. Ipswich, 1163. Prosser v. Hardesty, 1037. Prosser v. Railroad Co., 1358. Prosseus v. Mclntyre, 1074. Proud V. Bates, 4. Proud V. HoUis, 551. Proudfoot V. Hart, 496. . Prout V. Wiley, 1383. Prouty V. Clark, 809. Prouty V. Eaton, 897. Prouty V. Hoge, 933, 934. Prouty V. Price, 934. Providence Bank v. Billings, 109. Providence Co. Sav. Bank v. Hall, 681. Providence Gas Co. v. Thurber, 45, 57, 77. Provident Loan & Trust Co. v. Fiss, 1448. Provort V. Harris, 1318, 1323. Prow V. Prow, 1066. Pruden v. Pruden, 1533. Pruen v. Osborne, 1106. Pruitt V. Holly, 679, 1004. Prutsman v. Baker, 1319, 1330, 1333, 1338. Pryor v. Poster, 573. Puckett V. Benjamin, 1067. Pueblo R. R. Co. v. Beshoar, 337, 857. Pugh V. Currie, 710. Pugh V. Orton, 78. Pugh V. Pugh, 1518. Puget Mill Co. V. Brown, 1386. Pugsley V. Aikin, 538, 639. Pulaski V. State, 1303. Pulford V. Morton, 1060, 1066. Pullen V. Bell, 18. Pullen V. Pullen, 393. Pullen V. Railroad, 56, 937. Pulliam V. Owen, 936. Pulvertoft V. Pulvertoft, 1063. Pulteney v. Shelton, 615. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 1458. Pumpelly v. Phelps, 498. Pumphry v. Pumphry, 406. Purcell V. English, 595. Purcell V. Mather, 783. Purcell V. Wilson, 684, 1178. Purdy V. Bullard, 803, 817. Purdy V. Huntington, 863. Purdy V. Purdy, 668. Purefoy v. Rogers, 363, 1003, 1010, 1030. Purner v. Piercy, 43, 368. Pursell V. Stover, 373. Purvis V. Brown, 978. Pusey V. Clemson, 973. Putnam v. Putnam, 358. Putnam v. Story, 1003, 1083. Putney v. Day, 368, 1290. Putney v. Dresser, 668. Putzell V. Bank, 253, 354. Pyatt V. Lyons, 700. Pye V. Daubuz, 798. Pynchon v. Stearnes, 303, 830, 1383. Q- Quackenboss v. Clark, 538. Quackenbush v. O'Harra, 951. Quarrier v. Ins. Co., 843. Queen v. Clioiley, 375. Queen v. Earl, 4. Queen v. Lee, 75. Queen v. Lords, 113. Queen's College v. Hallett, 203, 993. Queen City Perpetual Asso. v. Price, 901. Quehl V. Peterson, 471. Quertermous v. Hatfield, 563. Quick V. Nitschelon. 1897. Quick V. Thomas, 1381. Quigley v. McEvony, 435, 468. Quimby v. Dill, 393. Quimby v. Manhattan C. & P. Co., 58, 61, 62, 73. Quinby v. Conlan, 1243. Quincy v. Cheesman, 939. Quincy v. Jones, 241, 242. Quincy v. Rogers, 1499. Quinn v. Kingon, 449. Quinn v. Shields, 1053. Quinn's Appeal, 444, 963. Quinnerly v. Quinnerly, 833. Quinnin v. Brown, 446. R. Rabb V. Griffin, 343. Raby v. Reeves, 1315, 1445, 1453. Rackley v. Chestnutt, 1374. Radclifle v. Buckley, 1121. Radford v. Edwards, 796. Radford v. Folsom, 779, 803. Raffety v. King, 978. Ragan v. McCay, 694. Ragan v. McElroy, 1306. Ragland v. Suntington, 1483. Ragsdale v. Estis, 533. Ragsdale v. Robinson, 794, 1378. Rahway Sav. Inst. v. Church, 77. Railroad Co. v. Allen, 144. Railroad Co. v. Bamhart, 363. Railroad Co. v. Beshoar, 769. Railroad Co. v. Cowdrey, 48. Railroad Co. v. Leech, 1295, 1379. TABLE OF CASES. clxv [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains §8 1-735; Vol. II, 88 736-1541.] Railroad Co. v. RadclifCe, 161. Railroad Co. v. Schumeir, 8, 234, 1385, Railroad Co. v. Soutter, 885. Railroad Co. v. Stigeler, 1391. Roadroad Co. v. Thomason, 17. Railroad Co. v. Telford, 139, 144. Railroad Co. v. Williams, 168. Railroad Co. v. Smith, 1346. Railsback v. Lovejoy, 997. Raines v. Corbin, 406. Raines v. Walker, 1008. Rainey v. Herbert, 170. Rakeslraw v. Hamilton, 808, 816. Raley v. County, 738, 748, 1413. Raley v. Williams, 1238. Ralls V. Hughes, 883. Ralph V. Carrick, 1106, 1519. Ralston v. Moore, 1315. Ralston v. Ralston, 864. Ramberg v. Wahlstrom. 674, 675. Rambei-ger v. Gieser, 863. Ramisez v. McCormick, 153. Ramsay v. Pe Uemer, 1066. Ramsay v. Joyce, 885. Ramsdell v. Ramsdell, 1003. Ramsey v. Ogden, 1399. Ramsey v. Ramsey, 1137. Ramthun v. Halfman, 166. Rand v. Cartwright. 1390. Rand v. Hubbell, 298. Randall v. Bradley, 983. Randall v. Cleaveland, 333, 993. Randall v. Coustans, 1060, 1395. Randall v. Doe, 999. Randall v. Edert, 1244. Randall v. Elwell, ^5 56, 167. Randall v. Ghent, 1396. Randall v. Josselyn, 1037. Randall v. Kreeger, 355, 409. Randall v. Latham, 137, 150, 1403. Randall v. Lower, 1457. Randall v. Mallett, 733. Randall v. Marble, 750. Randall v. Phillips, 668. Randall v. Randall, 387, 1061, 1403. Randall v. Rigby, 1453. Randall v. Silverthorn, 147. Rande v. Canal Co., 1416. Randol v. Tatum, 539. Randolph v. Middleton, 893. Randolph v. Randolph, 431. Rangeley v. Railroad Co., 139, 167. Ranger v. Bacon, 535. Rank v. Rank, 344. Rankert v. Clow, 763. Rankin v. Harper, 1070. Rankin v. Engwersen, 589. Rankin v. Kinsey, 811, 858, 957. Rankin v. Mortimere, 781, . Ranlet v. Cook 513. Rannels v. Rannels, 1 171. Rannells v. Washington University, 381. Ransom v. Hays, 935. Ranstead v. Ranstead, 696. Ranlenbusch v. Donaldson, 344. Rantin v. Robertson, 1434. Raritan, etc. R. R. Co. v. Delaware, etc. Canal Co., 107. Raritan Water Power Co. v. Veghte, 269, 273, 275. RashleigU V. Master, 113. Rapp V. Rechling, 1511. Ratcliffe v. Iron Works 564. Ratcliffe v. Mason, 371. Rathbone v. Hooney, 928, 931. Rathbone v. McConnell, 261. Rathke v. Gardner, 215, 218. Ranch v. Deck, 838. Raudebaugh v. Shelley, 1483. Ravald V.Russell 978. Rawlins v. Adams, 844. Rawlins v. Bush, 617. Rawlins v. Battel, 392. Rawlins v. Stewart, 971. Rawlins's Estate, 1511. Rawson v. Bell, 134, 170, 250. Rawson v. Corbett, 417. Rawson v. Inhabitants, 738, 1412, 1413, Rawson v. School District, 738. Rawstron v. Taylor, 231, 234. Ray V. Gas Co., 520, 531. Ray V. Pearce, S83. Ray V. Simmons, 1061. Ray V. Wilcoxen, 1345. Ray V. Yarnell, 467. Ray burn v. Davisson, 838. Rayburn v. Winant, 1389. Raymond v. Andrews, 651. Raymond v. Holden, 1444. Raymond v. Raymond, 1439, 1443. Raymond v. Squire, 801. Rayner v. Augent, 873. Rayner v. Lee, 419, 1194. Ray nor v. Drew, 769, 986. Ray nor v. Selmes, 980. Raynor v. Wilson, 499, 825, 1300, 1343. Razor v. McKay, 568. Rea V. Minkler, 1485. Rea V. Rea, 867, 898, 894, 419, 436. Read v. Allen, 698. Read v. Huff, 1068, 1070. Read v. Phillips, 1476. Read v. Patterson, 1099, 1100, 1539 Read v. Williams, 1053, 1106, 1134 1531. Reading v. Blackwell, 1489. Reading's Case, 677, 1178. Readman v. Conway, 496, 580, 593 Real V. Holllster, 1458. clxvi TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735; Vol. IT, §§ 73&-1511.1 Reams v. Spann, 723. Reardon v. Thompson, 362. Reast V. Donald, 1390. Reaume v. Chambers, 342. Reaves v. Garrett, 402. Reckhow v. Schanck, 653. Rector v. Gibbon, 566. Rector v. Higgins, 521, 537. Rector v. Mack, 956. Rector v. Waugh, 667, 676. Redd V. Murray, 1376, 1380. Redding v. Lamb, 1443. Reddy v. Aldrich, 773. Rede v. Farr, 539. Redfield v. Buck, 1296. Redfield v. Gleason, 696. Re;lfield v. Redfield, 1499. Redlon v. Barker, 71. Redemptorist v. Wenig, 1373. Redman v. Forman, 3i6, 330. Redmond v. Packenham, 908, 1326. Redshaw v. Bedford Level, 515. Redus V. Hayden, 343. Redwine v. Brown, 1458. Reece v. Miller, 96. Reed v. Association, 1390. Reed v. Birmingham, 170. Reed v. Campbell, 515. Reed v. Eastman, 935. Reed v. Farr, 1336. Reed v. Hazelton, 1535. Reedv. Kemp, 791, 1311. Reed v. McRill, 601. Reed v. Pierce, 1465. Reed v. Reed, 846, 870, 638, 777, 971, 1066, 1075, 1078. Reed v. Reynolds, 553. Reed v. Roberts, 1483. Reed v. Snell, 716. Reed v. Snowhill, 507. Reed v. St. John, 513, 515. Reed v. Taylor, 684. Reed v. Underbill, 1107. Reed v. Ward, 127. Reed v. Whitney, 872. Reed v. Woodward, 1476. Reeder v. Purdy, 556, 655. Reeder v. Sayre, 571, 617. Reeder v. State, 1388, 1340. Reeder v. Trullinger, 777. Reel V. Elder, 393. Rees V. Chicago, 174. Reesv. King, 518. Rees V. McDaniel, 11. Rees V. Perrot, 684. Reese v. Burts, 804, 810. Reese v. Coffee, 566. Reese v. Hawthorn, 1493. Reese v. Murnan, 1066. Reese v. Smith, 1438, 1465. Reeve v. Bird, 500. Reeves v. Brooks, 380, 437. Reeves v. Brayton, 1040, 1115, 1310. Reeves v. Bryner, 1131. Reeves v. Haynes, 465. Reeves v. Hayes, 863. Reeves v. Petty, 449. Reeves v. Tappan, 1115. Regan v. Boston, Gas Light Co., 170. Regents v. Williams, 109. Regina v. Railway Co., 61. 67. Rege v. Van Pelt, 1178, 1330. Relchenbach v. Ruddach, 1473. Reichenbasher v. Pahmeyer, 587. Reickhofl v. Brecht, 1075, 1094. Reid V. Abernethy, 1331. Reid V. Burns, 1298. Reid V. Colby, 1481. Reid V. Kirk, 53. Reid V. McCrum, 840. Reid V. McGowan, 474. Reid V. Mullens, 910. Reid V. Reid, 1086. Reid V. Rensselaer Glass Factory. 890. ' Reid V. Shergold. 1131. Reid V. Walbach, 1511. Reiflf V. Horst, 355, 380. Reiff V. Reiff, 306. Reifsnyder v. Hunter, 750. Reilly v. Booth, 143, 144. Reilly v. Brown, 777. Reilly v. Chouquetto, 1133. Reilly v. Phillips, 904. Reilly v. Small, 1057. Reilly v. Whipple, 1099. Reimer v. Stuber, 163, 303. Reimer's Appeal, 185, 1424. Reinboth v. Improvement Co., 679. Reinders v. Koppelmann, 734. Reinelil v. Shirk, 1027, 1033. Reinhart v. Bradshaw, 1237. Reinhard v. Virginia, etc. Co., 1306. Reinstein v. Daniels, 463. Reise v. Enos, 146. Reitenbaugh v. Ludwich, 638, 786, 968. Reithman v. Brandenburg, 633. Reltz V. Reitz, 1066. Relf V. Relf, 803, 810. Relyea v. Beaver, 7. Remington v. Higgins, 803. Reinington v. Sav. Bank, 1476. Remminglon v. Cady, 667. Remnant v. Bremridge, 538. Renals v. Cowlishaw, 1433. Rendall v. Ondreac, 538. Rendleman v. Rendleman, 398. Renfro v. Adams, 887. Rennyson's Appeal, 156. TABLE OF CASES. clxvii [References are to sections: Vol. I. contains 88 1-735; Vol. II, 88 736-1541.] Reno Water Co. v. Leete. 309. Reno Water Co. v. Lee, 209. Renond v. Daskani, 513. Renshaw v. Taylor, 928. Rentz V. Eubanks, 488. Repp V. Repp, 815. Requa v. Rea, 953. Rerick v. Kern, 367, 270, 373, 273. Respass v. Jones, 1067. Respini v. Posta, 507. Resser v. Carney, 1438, 1457, 1459. ReufE V. Coleman, 744, 1528. Revalk v. Kraemer, 458. Revel V. WatUinson, 295. Rex V. Commissioners, 221. Rex V. Horndon, 270. Rex V. Inhabitants, 789. Rex V. Newman, 1287. Rex V. Pedley, 588, 589. Rex V. St. Dunstan. 77. Rex V. Trafford, 216. Rex V. Yarborough, 11. Rexford v. Marquis, 146, 151. Reybold v. Reybold, 607. Reynel's Case, 103. Reynish v. Martin, 112. Reynolds v. Canal and Banking Co., 969. Reynolds v. Clark, 233. • Reynolds v. Deitz, 967. Reynolds v. (Jawthrop, 1296. Reynolds v. Hennessey. 911. Reynolds v. Hosmer, 210. Reynolds v. Moore, 816. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 392, 409, 418, 612, 716, 990. 1483. Reynolds v. Robinson, 1536. Reynolds v. Shuler, 46, 78, 80. Reynolds v. Tenant, 448. Reynolds v. Torin, 398. Reynolds v. Wilmuth, 696. Rhawn v. Pearce, 1264. Rhea v. Forsyth, 198. Rhea v. Rhea. 430. Rhinesmith v. State, 877. Rhoades v. Castner, 484. Rhoades v. Davis, 387. Rhoades v. Parker, 919. Rhoades v. Reed, 890. Rhodes v. McCormick, 5, 849. Rhodes v. Smethurst. 985. Rhodes v. Weldey, 1501. Rhodes v. Whitehead, 163. Rhyne v. Guevara, 440, 566. Rhyne v. Torrence, 1499. Ricard v. Sanderson, 967. Ricard v. Williams, 160. Rice V. Adams, 58. Rice V. Barnard, 713. Rice V. Brown, 487. Rice V. Dewey, 855. Rice V. Ege, 531. Rice V. Hartman, 1531. Rice V. Kelso, 833. Rice V. Nelson, 383. Rice V. Pennypacker, 1067. Rice V. Rice, 776, 787, 809. Rice V. Sanders, 868. Rich V. Baker, 338. Rich V. Basterfield, 589, 596. Rich V. Beaumont, 1500. Rich V. Bolton. 618, 639. Rich V. Bray, 733. Rich V. GilRey, 1497, 1503. R^ch V. Holmes, 606, 614. Richard v. Bent, 1439, 1480, 1460, 1465. Richard v. Harker, 1448. Richard v. Liford, 571. Richards v. Bellingham, 409. Richards v. Bergavenny, 1018. Richards V. Crawford, 851. Richards v. Fisher, 803, 807, 817. Richards v. Grinnell, 1073. Richards v. Knight, 957. Richards v. Leaming, 809. Richards v. McPherson, 804, 809. Richards v. Miller, 1486. Richards v. Railroad Co., 189. Richards v. Revitt, 1424, 1425. Richards v. Richards, 678. Richards v. Rose, 256. Richards v. Thompson, 1275. Richardson v. Baker, 816. Richardson v. Bigelow, 202. Richardson v. Blakemore, 562. Richardson v. Boston, 1251. Richardson v. Green, 805. Richardson v. Havelett, 802. Richardson v. Harrison, 1018. Richardson v. Hastings, 923. Richardson v. HoekenhuU, 872. Richardron v. Ins. Co. , 844. Richardson v. Jones, 953. Richardson v. Langridge, 616, 627. Richardson v. Levi, 1300. Richardson v. McKim, 963. Richardson v. McLavrin, 563. Richardson v. Millburn, 259, 360. Richardson v. Palmer, 131, 1377. Richardson v. Peterson, 563. Richardson v. Pond, 160. Richardson v. Powell, 1305. Richardson v. Railroad Co. , 337, 238. Richardson v. Richardson, 287, 398, 1027, 1484. Richardson v. Ridgeley, 809. Richardson v. Stillinger, 816. Richardson v. Tobey, 357. Richardson v. Wheatland, 1016. clxviii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735; Vol. II, §§ 736-1541.] Richart v. Scott, 238. Richie v. Dulse, 436. Richmond v. Ailsen, 895, 936. Richmond v. Connell, 606. Richmond v. Lattin, 884, 936. Richmond v. Morford, 1318. Richmond v. Poe, 179, 1190. Riclimond, etc. Co. v. Rogers, 1171. Richmond Manuf. Co. v. Atlantic De Laine Co., 213. Richmond R. R. Co. v. Railroad Co., 107, 108, 266. Richter v. Richter, 749. Ricker v. Butler, 1193. Ricketson v. Richardson, 787. Ricketts v. Railroad Co., 1410. Ricketts v. Turquand, 1380. Rico Reduction & Min. Co. v. Mus- grove, 690. Riddle V. Littlefleld, 1401, 1402. Riddle v. Mellon, 528. Riddle v. Weldon, 559. Riddle v. Whitehill, 1068. Rider v. Bagley, 937. Rider v. Kidder, 1068. Rider v. Maule, 719. Rider v. Smith, 138. Ridgeley v. Stillwell, 1080. Ridgway v. Budd, 713. Ridgway y. Ludlow, 1385, 1386. Ridgway v. McAlpine, 316, 383. Ridgway v. "Wharton, 484. Ridgway's Appeal, 711. Ridings v. Johnson, 834, 1329. Riedeburg v. Schmit, 711. Riehl V. Bingheimer, 466. Riehl V. Healing, 189. Rieman v. Wagner, 1193 Riesz's Appeal, 469. Rife V. Geyer, 1080. Rigden v. Vallier, 668. Riggs V. Fuller, 1168, 1193. Riggs V. Girard, 411, 1184. Riggs V. Owen, 949. Riggs V. Palmer, 1083, 1520. Riggs V. Pursell, 569. Riggs V. Riggs, 1158,1193, 1483. Riggs V. Tayloe, 1200. Right V. Beard, 618, 619, 634. Right V. Bucknell, 1304. Right V. Creber, 1033. Right V. Darby, 618. Right V. Proctor, 487. Right V. Thomas, 487. Rightsoll V. Hale, 147. Righter v. Forrester, 826, 1019, 1359. Rigley v. Souvey, 1476. Riley v. Gaines, 391. Riley V. Hale, 493. Riley v. Hoyt, 1355. Riley V. McCord, 879. Riley v. Rice, 1339. Riley v. Simpson, 593. Riley v. Stein, 140. Rindge v. Baker, 257. Ring V. Billings, 1401. Ringgold V. Ringgold, 972. Ringo V. Wing, 836, 1359. Ringo V. Woodruff, 1163. Rioux V. Cormier, 1394. Ripka V. Sergeant, 993. Ripley v. Seligman, 1066. Ripley v. Wightman, 504. Rippe V. Chicago, etc. R. R. Co., 95. Rippetoe v. Dwyer, 674, 951. Rippon V. Dawding, 1500. Risely v. Ryle, 617, 619. Risien v. Brown, 373. Rising V. Stannard, 618. Ritchie v. Griffiths, 837, 1334, 1840, 1341. Ritger v. Parker, 139, 186, 956. Ritter v. Stevenson, 830. Rittmaster v. Brisbane, 1319. Rivard v. Gisenhof, 1288. Rivard v. Walker, 1386, 1330. Rivas V. Summers, 722. Rivenett v. Bourquin, 1514, 1519. Riverdale Park Co. v. Westcott, 210. Rivers v. Adams, 89. Rivers v. Rivers, 1530. Rivers v. Thayer, 386. Rives V. Dudley, 170. Rivis V. Watson, 126. Roach V. Baker. 728. Roach V. Dion, 367. Roach V. Peterson, 504, 64Q. Roach V. Wadham, 1104, 1132. Roak V. Denn, 1122. Roan V. Holmes, 367, 390, 417. Roane v. Baker, 834, 1311, 1320. Roane v. HoUingsworth, 1500. Roanoke Imp. Co. v. Railroad, 191, 739, 1413. Roarty v. Mitchell, 905. Roath V. DriscoU, 310, 327, 333. Roath V. Smith, 926. Roband v. Jones, 1033. Robb V. Carnegie, 209. Robb V. Hannah, 186. Robbins v. Jones, 593. Robbins v. Kimball, 1066. Robbins v. Kinzie, 380. Robbins v. Magee, 136. Robbins v. Martin, 1443. Robbins v. Moore, 824, 1342. Robbins v. Robbins, 1481. Roberdeau v. Rous, 930. Roberts v. Bank, 68. Roberts v. Barker, 44, 1393. TABLE OF CASES. olxix [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735; Vol. II, §§ 736-1541.] Koberts v. Bowen, 1333. Roberts v. Build. Asso., 889. Roberts v. Cocke, 890, 1580. Roberts v. Coleman, 1155, 1476. Roberts v. Dixall, 844, 1118. Roberts v. Eldred. 708. Roberts v. Flatt, 938. Roberts v. Fleming, 970. Roberts v. Haines, 247. Roberts v. Hayward, 644. Roberts v. Lewis, 1536. Roberts v. Littlefield, 983. Roberts v. Lund, 1398. Roberts v. Morgan, 678. Roberts v. Richards, 1163. Roberts v. Roberts, 147, 1377, 1533. Roberts v. Rose, 199. Roberts v. Smith, 398. Roberts v. Stephens, 150, 1080. Roberts v. Sulherlin, 769. Roberts v. Thorn, 674. Roberts v. Walker, 387. Roberts v. "Whiting, 348, 1369. Roberts v. Wood, 931. Robertson v. Baker, 713. Robertson v. Biddell, 567. Robertson v. Blewett. 1385. Robertson v. Corset. 61, 69. Robertson v. Hay, 795. Robertson v. Norris, 350. Robertson v. Pickrell, 1215. Robertson v. Powell, 1499. Robertson v. Beed, 863. Robertson v. Stevens, 346. Robertson v. St. Johns, 511, 515. Robertson v. Wilson, 1003. Robeson, v. Pittinger, 156, 305. Robie V. Flanders, 380, 383, 416. Robinett v. Preston, 1309, 1379. Robins v. Barnes, 156. Robinson v. Adams, 1475. Robinson v. AUeson, 1166. Robinson v. Amateur Asso., 906. Robinson v. Appleton, 804, 819. Robinson v. Bland, 133. Robinson v. Brewster, 1476, 1481, 1482. Robinson v. Brown, 936. Robinson v. Chamberlayne, 1476. Robinson v. Craig, 1414. Robinson v. Cropsey, 773. Robinson v. Cross, 883. Robinson v. Deering, 554, 623. Robinson v. Douthit, 1205. Robinson v. Duvall, 666. Robinson v. Eagle, 703, 704. Robinson v. Ezzell, 18, 43. Robinson v. Fife, 984. Robinson v. Govers, 417. Robinson v. Grave, 147, 156. Robinson v. Green, 1514. Robinson v. Hardcastell, 1030, 1131. Robinson v. Hofman, 665. Robinson v. Holt, 566. Robinson v. Ivey, 813. Robinson v. Kilvert, 573. Robinson v. King, 1483. Robinson v. Kime, 1176. Robinson v. Lakeman, 344. Robinson v. Lehman, 806. Robinson v. Lewis, 679. Robinson v. McDonald, 733. Robinson v. Miller, 372, 418, 490. Robinson v, Noel, 1315. Robinson v. Ostendorff, 1050, 1114. Robinson v. Perry, 533, 533. Robinson v. Preswick, 333, 856. Robinson v. Railroad Co. , 738. Robinson v. Robinson, 1068, 1155, 1311. Robinson v. Russell, 330, 336. Robinson v. Ryan, 960. Robinson v. Schly, 1411. Robinson v. Shanks, 307. Robinson v.. Singh, 87. Robinson v. Swearinger, 436, 463. Robinson v. Sykes, 1106. Robinson v. Thrailkill, 147. Robinson v. Trans. Co., 136. Robinson v. Ware, 416. Robinson v. Wlieeler, 318. Robinson v. Williams, 786. Robinson V. Willoughby,778, 833, 1344, 1351. Robnett v. Ashlock, 1491. Robson V. Hough, 438, 463. Roby V. Colehour, 1178. Robcrdeau v. Rous, 930. Roche V. Farnsworth, 901. Roche V. Ullman, 1348. Rochereau v. Delacroix, 1351. Rochester Elect. L. Co. v. Power Co., 143. Rockford v. Hackman, 1080. Rockhey v. Rockhey, 459. Rockingham v. Penrice, 397. Rockland v. Water Co. , 57. Rockwell V. Adams, 1398. Rockwell V. Rockwell. 385. Rockwell V. Servant, 957. Rockwell V. Swift, 1001. Rodenfels v. Schuman, 1003. Roderigasv. Sav. Inst., 1508. Rodes V. Elevator Co., 1311. Rodney v. McLa\ighlin, 678. Rodrignez v. Haynes, 864, 1375. Rodwell V. Phillips, 18, 43, 1393. Roe V.Bedford 1015. Roev. Bundy, 1181. Roe V. Franmar, 1411. Roe V. Galliers, 539. Roe V. Pogson, 395. clxx TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections : Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735 ; Vol. II, 19 786-1541.) Roe V. Piideaux, 1120. Roe V. Rawlings, 1414. Roe V. Strong, 1246. Roe V. TranmaiT, 1141. Roe V. Vingut, 1029, 1030, 1118. Roe V. York, 499. Roebuck v. Dupuy, 1419. RofEey v. Henderson, 78, 268. Rogaa V. Walker, 982. Rogers v. Adams, 1310. Rogers v. Benton, 987. Rogers v. Blum. 814. Rogers v. Brent, 956. Rogers v. Brown, 629, 1196. Rogers v. Cook, 1117. Rogers v. Corey, 552, 553. Rogers v. Co.x, 267. Rogers v. Crow, 77. Rogers v. Davis, 777. Rogers v. Eagle Fire Co., 1411. Rogers v. Gilinger, 52. Rogers v. Grider, 704. Rogers v. Herron, 869, 873. Rogers v. Hillhouse, 1293. Rogers v. Hodgson, 891. Rogers v. Hoskins, 1353. Rogers v. Jones, 777. Rogers v. Ostrom, 552, 553. Rogers v. Place, 1317. Rogers v. Prattville Manuf. Co., 48, 58. Rogers v. Rogers, 1086, 1100, 1514. Rogers v. Ross, 1030. Rogers v. Sinsheimer, 252, 256. Rogers v. Taylor, 247. Rogers v. Trevathan, 401. Rogers v. Tucker, 814. Rogers v. Turley, 729. Rogers v. Tyley, 687, 1088. Rogerson v. Shepherd, 153, 205. Rolfe V. Harris, 754. Rohn V. Harris, 678, 716, 725, 1004, 1185. Roll V. Smalley, 948. Rolland v. Hart, 1363, 1367. Rollins V. Cross. 830. Rollins V. Mitchell, 1076. Rollins V. Mooers, 657. Romilly v. James, 1032. Rona V. Meier, 1003. Ronaldson v. Tabor, 566. Roper V. McCook. 810. Roper V. Roper, 377. Rook V. Cleveland, 991. Rook V. "Worth, 314. Rooney v. Gillespie, 623. Roonie v. Phillips, 996. Roosevelt v. Hopkins, 520. Roosevelt v. Thurman, 278. Root V. Cincinnati, 1392. Root V. King, 960. Root V. Shields, 1244. • Root V. Wadhouse, 154. Ropps V. Barker, 63. Roscarrick v. Barton, 766. Rose V. Blankenship, 438. Rose V. Busher, 603. Rose V, Hatch, 1050, 1061. Rose V. Hawley, 748. Rose V. Hayden. 1061, 1077. Rose V. Hill. 995. Rose V. Miles, 194. Rose V. Muncie, 829. Rose V. Page, 928. Rose V. Perkins, 816. Rose V. Porter, 1061. Rose V. Richmond, 1063. Rose V. Rose, 33, 337, 857. Rose V. Sanderson, 889. Rose V. Watson, 805, 817. Rose V. Worthington, 790. Roseboom v. Roseboom, 693, 1514, Roseel v. Jarvis, 568. Rosenberg v. Lostgarten, 643. Rosenberger v. Kepler, 1433. Rosenblat v. Perkins, 633. Rosenkrans v. Snover, 1432. Rosewell v. Pryor, 588. Rosholt v. Mehus, 451. Ross V. Armstrong, 729. Ross V. Bradford, 443. Ross V. Dysart, 547, 1434. Ross V. Garrison, 635. 701. Ross v. Goodwin, 1193. Ross V. Heintzeu, 808. Ross V. Hendrix, 1068. Ross V. Mitchell, 803. Ross V. Norvill, 983. Ross V. Parks, 1078. Ross V. Purse, 1348. Ross V. Railroad Co. , 201 Ross V. Ramsey, 735. Ross V. Ross, 358, 1106, 1144. Ross 7. Swaringen, 601, 603. Ross V. Sweeney, 431. Ross V. Thompson, 205. Ross V. Whitson, 804. Rosser v. Franklin, 1478. Rossiter v. Cossit, 369. Rossiter v. Rossiter, 1303. Rossiter v. Simmons, 1317. Rossman v. Adams, 8.6. Rossville, etc. Co. v. Iowa Mill Co., 50. Roth V. Insley, 431. Roth V. Gabbert, 1378. Rotlierham v. Green, 88, 161. Rothgerber v. Dupuy, 833. Rothrock v. Rothrock, 1474. Rothwell V. Deewes, 673, 674, 679. Rounds V. Little, 698. TABLE OF CASES. clxxi [References are to sections : Vol. I, contains §9 1-735 ; Vol. II, 8§ 738-1541.] Roundtree v. Roundtree, 999. Rountree v. Dennane, 431. RouDtree v. Denson, 674. Rountree v. Lane, 730, 1307. Roussaln V. Norton, 1311, 1343. Roussinet v. Rebout, 573. Routledge v. Donil, 1131, 1123. Routledge v. Grant, 644, 950. Routle V. Murray, 809. Rovelsky v. Brown, 710. Rowand v. Lyttle, 650. Kowan v. Portland, 170, 179. Rowbolham v. Wilson, 1, 139, 143, 170, 238, 244, S45, 247. Rowe V. Hamilton, 879. Rowe V. Johnson, 417. Rowe V. Railroad Co., 218. Rowell V. Doyle, 234, 335. Rowell V. Jewett, 803, 991. Rowell V. Klein, 571. Rowell V. Walley, 395. Rowland v. Bangs, 171. Rowland v. Miller, 1420. Rowland y. Prather, 391. Rowland v. Rowland, 744, 1001, 1363, 1537. Rowland v. Williams, 1158, 1159, 1164, 1193. Rowley v. Plannelly, 1409. Roy V. Clarke, 443. Roy V. Monroe, 1143. Royall V. Epps, 1033. Royall V. Lisle, 1163. Royall V. McKenzie, 1093. Royce v. Gugenheim, 553, 554. Royle V. Hamilton, 1131. Royston v. Royston, 735. Royton v. Royton. 350. Rubeck v. Gardner, 1473. Ruch V. Rock Island, 748, 1413. Ruckelschaus v. Oehme, 1221. Ruckman v. Cutwater, 44, 320, 1293. Ruckman v. Ruckman, 1819. Rudderow v. Dudley, 735. Ruddiman v. Taylor, 170. RudUill V. Rodes, 1505. Ruff V. Bull, 985. Ruff V. Doty, 959. Ruffier V. Womack, 773. Ruffin V. Overby, 569, 1168, 1193, 1194. Ruffin V. Ruffin, 1539. Ruffner v. Hill, 1390. Ruge V. Oyster, etc. Co., 183. Rugely V. Robinson, 1080. Rugg V. Ward, 1400. Ruggles V. Bank, 956. Ruggles V. Clare, 738. Ruggles V. Lawson, 1833, 1324. Ruggles V. Lesure, 361. Ruggles V. Walker, 830. Ruhl V. Ruhl, 810, 812. Ruhling V. Hackett, 796. Rumill V. Robbius, 153. Rumlit V. Otis, 1073. Rummell v. Lamb, 207. Rumph V. Hiatt, 1508. Rundell v. Lakey, 1431. Rung V. Schoneburger, 1164. Runnels v. Jackson, 1066. Runnells v. Webber, 389, 393, 1430, 1431. Runsey v. Railroad Co., 1251. Ruohs V. Hooke, 466. Rupert V. Penner, 1280, 1375. Rupley V. Welch, 210. Rupp V. Eberly, 1034. Rushton V. Lippincott, 833. Rush V. Perry, 1430. Russ V. Ins. Co., 843. Russ V. Mebius, 1065, 1068. Russ V. Perry, 355. Russ V. Steele, 1413, 1432. Russel V. Russel, 798. Russell V. Akeley, 895. Russell V. Bank, 325. Russell V. Beasley, 717. Russell V. Blake, 971. Russell V. Carr, 963. Russell V. Davis, 1174. Russell V. Duvon, 593. Russell V. Falls, 1483. Russell V. Folyan, 553, 554, 625, 647. Russell V. Hubbard, 134, 267. Russell V. Ins. Co , 842. Russell V. Jackson, 1053. Russell V. Maloney, 1326, 1397. Russell V. McCormick, 806. Russell V. Miller, 713. Russell V. Mixer, 885. Russell V. Napier, 153, 164, 305. Russell V. Pew, 760. Russell V. Reed, 795. Russell V. Richards, 268, 274. Russell v.'Rumsey, 389. Russell V. Russell, 706, 1070, 1519. Russell V. Southard, 787, 861. Russell V. Switzer, 1060. Russell V. Watts, 158, 154, 156. Rust V. Carpenter, 817. Rust V. Conrad, 531. Rust V. Low, 258, 260. Ruters v. Kingsland, 796. Rutgers v. Hunter, 512, 514. Ruth V. Ford, 1298. Rutherford v. Jamieson, 474. Rutherford v. Williams, 906. Rutland v. Brister, 808. Rutland V. Chesson, 994. Rutter V. Small, 684. clxxii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains §§ l-73o; Vol. II, §§ 736-1541.] Ryan v. Adamson, 839. Ryan v. Allen, 1011, 1515. Ryan v. Brown, 1293. Ryan v. Dox, 1061, 1063. Ryan v. Jones, 508, 507. Ryan v. United States, 484, 1210. Ryder v. Wilson, 895, 1193. Ryerss v. Wheeler, 1873. Rylands v. Fletcher, 496. Rymes v. Clarkson, 1476. Ryon's Appeal, 1530. Ryppon V. Bowles, 303. Sabledowsky v. Arbuckle, 141. Sackett v. Sackett, 136, 333, 324, 839 Sadler v. Lee, 336. Sadler v. Pratt, 1120. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Sutro, 1113. Safiford v. Safford, 418, 990. SafCord v. Stubbs, 1185. Sage V. McLaughlin, 776. Sager v. Galloway,' 1005. Saginaw Gas Light Co. v. Saginaw, 109. Sainsbury v. Matthews, 43. Saint V. Pillery, 78. Salap V. Crompton, 338. Sale V. More, 1053. Sales V. Lusk, 937. Salisbury v. Andrews, 573. Salisbury v. Clarke, 1061, 1078. Sallee v. Waters, 431. Salmon Fall Company v. Goddard, 1478. Salmon v. Huff, 1311. Salmon v. Smith, 553. Salmon v. Vallejo, 1417, 1439.. Sammers v. Payne, 376. Sammer's Case, 664. Sample v. Sample, 716. Sampson v. Bank, 1331. Sampson v. Henry, 364, 655. Sampson v. Hoddinott, 309. Sampson v. Schaeffer, 625. Sams V. Sams, 1143. Samson v. Rose, 571. San Antonio Brewing Co. Asso. v. Arctic Ice Manuf. Co., 69. San Antonio v. French. 633. Sanborn v. Clough, 1373. Sanborn v. Flaecler, 1478. Sanborn v. Robiason, 790, 1344. Sandbacher v. Dick, 551. Sandback v. Quigley, 417. Sandel v. Douglass, 310. Sanders v. Cassady, 803. Sanders v. Godding, 1394. Sanders v. Logue, 1193, 1194. Sanders v. Martin. 257. Sanders v. McAflfee, 809. Sanders v. McMillian, 413, 413, 430. Sanders v. Norwood, 819 Sanders v. Partridge, 536. Sanders v. Pope, 531. Sanders v. Reed, 336, 337, 857. Sanders v. Robertson, 733. Sanders v. Sharp, 535. Sanderson v. Mayor, 573. Sanderson v. Scranton City, 3. Sandford v. Travers, 933, 1419. Sandon v. Hooper, 971. Sandwich Mfg. Co. v. Zellmer, 1313 1441, 1444. Sands v. Hughes, 533. Sane v. Tyler, 713. Sanford v. Haines, 949. Sanford v. Harvey, 633. Sanford v. Jackson, 398. Sanford v. Kane, 978, 1444. Sanford v. Lackland, 1080. Sanford v. McLaren, 390. Sanford v. Railroad Co., 106. Sanford v. Sanford, 403, 1076. San Francisco v. Bradbury, 1190. San Francisco v. Calderwood, 184. San Francisco v. Canavan, 184. San Francisco v. Lawton, 946. San Francisco v. Le Roy, 1358. San Francisco v. Pixley, 1371. Sanger v. Merrilt, 720. Sanger v. Nightingale, 959. Sanger v. Rice, 1275. Sanscrainte v. Torongo, 569. Sansome v. Harrell, 473. Santer v. Dollman, 1323. Sargent v. Ballard, 160, 165. Sargent v. Courrier, 601. Sargent v. Parsons, 694, 696. Sargent v. Sargent, 113, 295. Sargent v. Smith, 651. Sarles v. McGee, 825. Sarles v. Sarles, 329. Sasser v. Sasser, 1068. Satterlee v. Matthewson, 109. Saucer v. Keller, 267. Sauer v. Bilton, 553. Sauer v. Steinbauer, 950. Sauers v. Giddings, 1174. Saulet V. Shepherd, 11. Saunders v. Blythe, 379, 380, 1318. Saunders v. Dehew, 1360. Saunders v. Evans, 1125. Saunders v. Gray, 953. Saunders v. Hackney, 1306. Saunders v. Harris, 885. Saunders v. Milsome, 894. Saunders v. Railroad Co., 11. TABLE OF CASES. clxxiii [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains S§ 1-735; Vol. II, S§ 728-1541.] Saunders v. Saunders, 1413, 1443. Saunders v. Schmaelzle, 1091. Saunders' Case, 318. Savage v. Burnham, 398. Savage v. Carter, 707. Savage v. Dooley, 853. Savage V. Masoo, 1448. Savage v. Savage, 724. Savanali v. State, 1351. Savil V. Savil, 395. Savings Asso. v. Printing Co., 1369. Savings Bank v. Taylor, 1333. Savrmut Nat. Bank v. Boston, 504. Sawtelle v. Ripley, 1539. Sawyer v. Baker, 1347. Sawyer v. Campbell, 1315. Sawyer V. Caton, 739, 1419. Sawyer v. Kendall, 1177. Sawyer v. McGillicudy, 593. Sawyer v. Peters, 1300. Sawyer v. Railroad Co., 363. Sawyer v. Sawyer, 1099. Sawyer v. Twiss, 73. Sawyer v. Wilson, 365. Saxby v. Railroad Co. , 139. Saxon v. Whitaker, 1475. Say v. Gas Co., 539. Saycrs v. CoUyer, 1435. Sayers v. Hoskinson, 306, 318, 370. Sayle v. Nat. Water Power Company, 69. Baylor v. Plaine, 1059. Sayre v. Ely ton Land Co., 965. Sayre v. Townsends, 1006. Scaife v. Emmons, 1493. Scaife v. Stovall, 563. Scaife v. Thomson, 688, 733. Scales V. Mande, 1061. Scales V. Paine, 833. Scammon v. Ins. Co., 846. Scanlan v. Scanlan, 379, 383, 1095. Scarborough v. Smith, 733. Scatterwood v. Edge, 1031. Schackleford v. Hall, 744. Schaeffer v. Berry, 1390. Schaeflfer v. Marthaler, 314, 315. SchaefEer v. Messersmith, 346. Schafler v. Fithian, 1300. Schaffer v. Kettell, 1530. Schaffner v. Grutzraacher, 1444. Schalk v. Kingsley, 770. Schaupp V. Hukill, 532. Schawig V. Purslow, 1168. Scheetz v. Pitzraler, 383. Scheifele v. Schmitz;. 61. Scheimer v. Price, 183. Schell V. Stein, 837, 1336, 1337. Schenck v. Conover, 954. Schenley v. Commonwealth, 158, 178. Scheppelmann v. Fuerth, 866. Schermerhoru v. Negus, 750, 754. Schiflerstein v. Allison, 895. Schile V. Brokhahns, 353. Schilling v. Holmes, 533, 535, 547, 553, 554, 634. Schilling v. Klein, 639. Schilling v. Linlner, 960. Schilling v. Rominger, 310. Schissel v. Dickson, 679, 693. Schlarb v. Helderbaum, 459. Schlessinger v. Mallard, 1065, 1085. Schlessinger v. Railroad Co., 748. Schlichter v. Mill Co., 933. Schmaltz v. Mead, 833. Schmidt v. Deegan, 793, 1336, 1328. Schmidt v. Quinn, 153. Schnebly v. Ragan, 811, 817. Schneider v. Botsch, 1167, 1199. Schneider v. Jacob, 1 388. Schneider v. Lord, 630. Schnisler v. Ames, 631. Scbnitz V. McManamy, 794, 1115. Schnitzius v. Bailey, 317, 318, 333. Schock V. Falls City, 1190. Schofield V. Homestead Co., 1439. School V. Sail, 893. School Committee v. Kesler, 137, 1317, School Dist V. Benson, 1197, 1199. School Dist. V. Hart, 367. School Dist. V. Lynch, 168. Schools V. Risley, 11. Schorl V. Stephens, 733, 734. Schradski v. Albright, 773. Schreiber v. Carey, 769, 939, 950. Schreyer v. Scott, 1060. Schriber v. Le Clair, 769, 900. Schroeder v. Gemeinder, 513. Schroeder, etc. Company v. Packer, 368. SchufiEert v. Grote, 1318. Schulenberg v. Harriman, 747, 1246, 1349. Schultz V. Arnot, 564. Schultz V. Bower, 337, 343. Schultz V. Byers, 339. Schultz V. Houfes, 1356. Schultz V. More, 800. Schultze V. Schultze, 1153, 1153, 1157. Schumaker v. Schmidt, 1490. Schuman v. International Trust Co., 493. Schumann v. Mark, 816. Schumitsch v. Ins. Co., 843. Schumpert v. Dillard, 1360. Schurmeier v. Railroad Co., 185. Schuster v. Ins. Co., 843. Schuyler v. Hanna, 457. Schuyler v. Leggett. 559, 561. Schuyler v. Smith, 618, 680, 631, 633, 647. clxxiv TABLE OF CASES. [References are to seotioua: Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735; Vol. II, S9 736-1S41.1 Schuyler v. Thoburn, 767. Schwartz v. Locket, 636. Schwartz v. Salter, 590. Schwartz v. Stein, 809. Schwartz's Appeal, 1030. Schweitzer v. Wagner, 367. Schwoerer v. Boylston Market Asso. 131. Scituate v. Hanover, 1059. Scoffln V. GrandstafiE, 1330, 1465. Scofield V. Hopkins, 436, 448. Scofield V. Olcott, 995, 998, 999.. Scoggins V. Smith. 1534. Scoles V. Wilson, 1341. Scott V. Ashlin, 421. Scott V. Beecher, 507, 631, 641. Scott V. Beutel, 153. Scott V. Brest, 972. Scott V. Clay & Brick Co., 583. Scott V. Fields, 894. 964. Scott V. Guernsey, 690, 723. Scott V. Hancock, 369. Scott V. Jones, 1111. Scott V. Kenan, 438. Scott V. Key, 1144. Scott V. Klrkendall, 1434. Scott V. Lunt, 117. Scott V. Mewhirter, 802. Scott V. McFarland, 859. Scott V. McNeal, 1508. Scott V. Pope, 204. Scott V. Raymond, 1456. Scott V. Scott, 1298, 1319. Scott V. Simons, 496, 587, 591, 596. Scott V. State, 177, 178, 183, 676. Scott V. Steller, 1448. Scott V. Twiss, 1429, Scott V. Umbarger, 1094. Scott V. Ware, 767, 893. Scott V. Webster, 338, 339. Scott V. West, 1024, 1030. Scott V. Wharton, 333, 334. Scott V. Wilson, 96. Scott's Appeal, 1476. Scovil V. Kennedy, 714. Scovill V. McMahon, 739, 743. Scranton v. Phillips, 2. Scratton v. Brown, 11, 14. Scripture v. Johnson, 979. Scriven v. Moote, 313, 957. Scriver v. Smith, 1434. Scrivner v. Dietz, 871. Scroggins v. Hoadley, 803, 807, 817. Scruggs V. Blair, 707, 713. Scruggs V. Railroad Co., 638, 862. Scrymser v. Phelps, 154. Scull V. Beatty, 459. Scull V. Pruden, 1378, Scull V. Reeves, 1061. Seagram v. Knight, 839. Seagrave v. Seagrave, 396. Seaman v. Hicks, 953, rieaman v, Lee, 213. Seaman v. Smith, 1386. Searcy v. Hunter, 1281. Searl v. Gardner. 233. Searl v. Sawyer, 337, 338, 339, 857. Searle v. Chapman, 446. Searles v. Searles, 314. Sears v. Choate, 1080. Sears v. Hanks, 464, Sears v. Martin, 936. Sears v. Putnam, 1054. Sears v. Russell, 1028, 1032, 1054. Sears v. Shafer, 1298. Sears v. Smith, 633, 804. Seaton v. Jamison, 411. Seaver v. Fitzgerald, 1009. Seavers v. Spink, 824. Seaward v. Willock, 1001. Seckler v. Delfs, 851. Second M. E. Church v. Humphrey, 1199. ' Secor V. Pestana, 629, 631. Secrest v, McKenna, 372. Seddon v. Senate, 1436. Sedgwick v. Hollenback, 1426, 1486. Sedgwick v. Laflin, 1121. Seeberger v. Weinberg, 955. Seebold v. Shilter, 1412. Seeger v. Hunting, 1089. Seeger v. Leakin, 1017, 1033, 1108. Seeger v. Mueller, 142. Seeger v. Pettit, 48, 75, 78. Seeley v. Bishop, 153. Seeley v. Brush, 233, 236. Seeley v. Jags, 405. Seeley v. Manning, 852. Seeley's Appeal, 398. Seellgson v. Singletary, 1277. Seely v, Alden, 223. Seemuller v. Thornton, 1168. Segar v. Babcock, 1400. Segrave v. Segrave, 393. Seibert v. Lewis, 109. Seibert v. Todd, 367. Seiberling v. Tipton, 1343. Seidensprager v. Speer, 369. Seiders v. Giles, -724. Seignious v. Pate, 940. Seller v. Mohn, 1064. Seltz V. Miles, 525. Seitz V. Railroad Co., 814. Sekemeler v. Galvin, 734. Selby V. Alston, 1084. Selby V. Robinson, 133. Selby V. Stanley, 809. Selden v. Canal Co., 264. Selleck v. French, 890. Sellers v. Botsford, 935. TABLE OF CASES. clxxv [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735; Vol. II, 89 736-1541.] Sellers v. Crassan, 1213. Sellers v. Railway Co., 148, 149. Sellers v. Sellers. 1305. Selllck V. Addums, 1397. Sellwood V. De Lashmutt, 769, 938. Sellwood V. Gray, 978. Semple v. Cook, 1161, 1163. Senior v. Armytage, 598. Sentill V. Armor, 438. Sentlll V. Robeson, 373. Sergeant v. Steinberger, 668, 704. Serrin v. Grefe, 1377. Serry v. Curry, 427. Servis v. Beatly, 810. Sessions v. Peay, 947, 949. Sessions v. Sherwood, 1321. Seton V. Slade, 515, 976. Severance v. Griffith, 849. Severson v. Moore, 934. Sewall V. Haymaker, 1314. Sewall V. Holland, 676. Se-wall V. Lee, 409. Sewall V. Robbins, 1498. Sewall V. Augerstein. 57. Sextoa V. Corley, 566. Sexton V. Storage Co., 532, 583, 535, 536, 539. Seymour v. Carli, 1161. Seymour v. Courtenay, 93, 94. Seymour v. Darrow, 878. Seymour v. Hubbard, 1183. Seymour v. Lewis, 140, 156, 186. Seymour v. McKinstry, 838, 1346. Seymour ,v. Ricketts, 723. Seymour's Case, 383. Shackelford v. Bailey, 1373, 1379. Shackelford v. Hall, 1537, 1538. Shackelton v. Sebree, 1411. Shacklands* Appeal, 1080. Shadden v. Hembree, 1036. Sbaefter v. Chambers, 863. Shafer v. Bear River, etc. Co., 849. Shaferv. Ins. Co., 843. Shafer v. Stull, 175. Shafer v. Wilson, 239. Shafer's Appeal, 711. Shaffer v. Hahn, 1396. Shaffer v. McClosky, 871. Shaffer v. Richardson, 392. Shailer v. Bumstead, 1504. Shaler v. Trowbridge, 1083. Shall V. Briscoe, 804. Shane v. McNeill, 387. Shane v. Railroad Co. , 216, 218. Shanks v. Lancaster, 1168. Shannon v. Puller. 1413. Shannon v. Hall, 1332. Shardlow v. Cotterell, 484. Share v. Anderson, 1315. Sharkey v. McDermott, 1532. Sharkey v. Sharkey, 778. Sharon v. Tucker, 1177. Sharon Iron Company v. Erie, 748, 753 Sharp V. Hall, 1411, 1476. Sharp V. Johnston, 430, 1194. Sharp V. McPike, 1313. Sharp V. Milligen, 79. Sharp V. Robertson, 1383. Sliarp V. Ropes, 141, 145, 1422. Sharp V. Shea, 1359. Sharp V. Thompson, 785, 1874. Sharp V. "Wallace, 1499. Sharpe v. Foy, 1367. Sharpe v. Kelley, 518, 635. Sharshaw v. Gibbs, 295, 1004. Shattuck V. Lamb, 1434, 1443. 1458. Shattuck V. Lovejoy, 520. Shaver v. McCarthy, 1473. Shaver v. "Williams, 445, 543. Shaw V. Beebe, 1211. Shaw V. Beers, 724. Shaw V. Beveridge, 17. Shaw V. Bisbee, 1447, 1458. Shaw V. Bowman, 571. Shaw V. Boyd, 397. Shaw V. Coffin, 540. Shaw V. Erskine, 776, 788. Shaw V. Farnsworth, 487. Shaw V. Fond, 378, 784. Shaw V. Hearsey. 702. Shaw V. Heisey, 943. Shaw V. Hill, 564. Shaw V. Hoadley, 910. Shaw V. Hoffman, 659. Shaw V. Lenke, 77. Shaw V. Maner, 607. Shaw V. Partridge, 350. Shaw V. Railroad Co., 929, 943. Shaw V. Read, 1068. Shaw V. Russ, 378. Shaw V. Schoonover, 1163. Shaw V. "Walbridge, 977. Shaw V. "Weigh, 379. Shea's Appeal, 384. Sheafe v. O'Neil, 435. Shear v. Robinson, 953. Shearer v. Middleton, 1194. Shearer v. Ranger, 355, 1431. Shearer v. Shearer, 371, 713. Shearman v. Morrison, 696. Sheckell v. Hopkins, 977. Shedd V. "Wilson, 880. Sheehy v. Mandeville, 890. Sheehy v. Miles, 487. Sheeks v. Erwin, 162. Sheen v. Rickie, 45. Sheets v. Seldon, 281, 493, 748, 1250. Sheets v. Sweeney, 1897. Sheelz's Appeal, 1514. clxxvi TABLE OF CASES. LUeferences are to sections: Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735; Vol. II, §§ 736-1541.1 Shelby v. Hearne, 542. Shelby v. Railroad Co., 1402, 1405. Shelby v. Shelby, 1130. Shelden v. Bennett, 935. Shelden v. Bliss, 384. Shelden v. Bradley, 389. Shelden v. Erskine, 1318. Shelden v. Ferris, 296. Shelden v. FickUn, 58. Shellabarger v. Binns, 880. Shellenberger v. Ransom, 1530. Shelley's Case, 1011, 1132. Shelly's Appeal, 445. Shelton v. Aultman, 468, 1312. Shelton v. Codman, 493, 1269. Shelton v. Carral, 425. Shelton v. Ficklin, 48. Shelton v. Jones, 806, 809, 819. Shelton v. Shelton, 394. Shepard v. Baker, 201. Shepard v. Cross, 438. Shepard v. Pettit, 691. Shepard v. Philbrick, 313. Shepard v. Richardson, 915, 943. Shepard v. Rinks, 719, 720, 1173. Shepard v. Ryers, 698. Shepard v. Spaulding, 46, 78, 79. Shepard v. Taylor, 1137. Shepard v. Adams, 951. Shephard v. Baker, 301. Shephard v. Clark, 1507. Shepherd v. Burkhalter, 789, 80O. Shepherd v. Cummings, 617. Shepherd v. Ins. Co., 846. Shepherd v. May, 866, 868, 877. Shepherd v. M'Evers, 1061. Shepherd v. Nave, 1391. Shepherd v. People, 199. Shepherd v. White, 1067. Sheppard v. Sheppard. 427. Sheppard v. Wilmott, 1376. Shepperd v. Hunt, 1423. Shepperd v. Jernigan, 676, 1379. Sheratz v. Nicodemus, 808. Sherburn v. Jones, 309. Sheridan v. Krupp, 591. Sherin v. Brackett, 1 193. Sherman v. Dodge, 1050, 1081. Sherman v. Fall River Iron Works Co., 213. Sherman v. International Trust Co., 493. Sherman v. McKeon, 1176, 1197, 1198. Sherman v. Sherman, 1075. Sherman v. Willett, 311, 957. Sherman v. Williams, 489, 493, 553. Sherrard v. Sherrard, 113. Sherred v. Cisco, 255. Sherrid v. SoutBwick, 450, 464. Sherrill v. Conner, 317, 334, 329. Sherrit v. Birch, 1539. Sherry v. Gilman, 784, 1286. Shershaw v. Gibbs, 295. Sherwood v. Baker, 416. Sherwood v. Ins. Co., 841. Sherwood v. Landon, 950. Sherwood v. Vandenburgh, 411. Sherwood v. Vliet, 161. Shields v. Arndt, 207. Shields v. Ohio, 109. Shields v. Lozear, 567, 770. Shields v. Roberts, 1176. Shields v. Russell, 777. Shields v. Schiff, 1208, 1366. Shields v. Stark, 691, 694. Shields v. State, 109. Shields v. Titus, 147. ShifEer v. Broadhead, 673. Shillaber v. Robinson, 802, 900. Shillito v. Shillito, 1525. Shimdelbeck v. Moon, 496, 583. Shine v. Wilcox, 317. Shinn v. Shinn, 701. Shinner v. Crawford, 1176. Shipman v. Furniss, 1298. Shipp V. Gibbs, 995. Shipp V. Snyder, 371. Shipp V. Suggett, 795. Shipen v. Clapp, 1110. Shipper v. Railroad Co. , 106. Shirack v. Shirack, 472. Shiras v. Caig, 787. Shirk V. Hoffman, 627. Shirlack v. Shirlack, 994. Shirley v. Ayer, 792, 1225, 1326, 1328. Shirley v. Burch, 784, 792, 1318. Shirley v. Crabb, 150, 367. Shively v. Bowlby, 8. 9, 15, 1252, 1253. Shlvely v. Hume. 226. Shively v. Hunt, 928. Shively v. Jones, 953. Shively v. Welch, 1353. Shoecraft v. Bloxham, 803. Shoemaker v. Railroad Co. , 143, 146. Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 154. Shoemaker v. Smith, 1066, 1364. Shoemaker v. United States, 1272. Shoemaker v. Walker, 990. Shoemaker's Appeal, 318. Sholl V. German Coal Company, 1170, 1407. Shontz V. Brown, 1395. Shoot V. Galbreath, 423. Shope V. Shaffner, 366, 367. Shorer v. Brokhage, 473. Shores v. Carley, 342, 346. Shores v. Scott River Co., 946. Short V. Currier, 1201. Short V. Devine, 144, 196. Short V. Piper, 328. TABLE OF CASES. clxxvii [References are to sections: Vol. 1, contains §9 1-735; "Vol. 11, %% 736-1541.] Short V. Wilson, 319. Shortall v. Hinckley, 1285. Shorter v. Frazer, 804, 809. Shorter v. Smith, 106. Shotwell V. Dodge, 215. Shotwell V. Matthews, 863. Shotwell V. Sedam, 406. Shoufe V. Giifflths, 1076, 1244. Shouffler v. Coover, 426. Shove V. Larson, 1341. Shrawder V. Snyder, 1311. Shrewsbury's Case, 328, 1277. Shreve v. Shreve, 1015. Shrieve v. Stokes, 238, 239. Shroder v. Brenneman, 133, 146. Shroeder v. Bauer, 4tl. Shrunk V. Schuylkill Nav. Co., 97. Shulbert v. Stanley, 776. Shumate v. Bailey, 1471. Shumway v. Collins, 552. Shurtz V. Thomas, 422. Shuttleworth v. Lowther, 981. Sibley v. Alba, 678, 718. Sibley v. Lefflngwell, 1350. SiceloflE V. Redman, 999. Sichler v. Look, 892. Siddon v. Cockrell, 995, 1527. Sidener v. Pavey, 874. Sides V. Scharff, 462. Sidney v. Sidney, 396. Sieber v. Blane, 592. Sikes V. Smith, 1476. Sill V. Blaney, 716. Sill V. Sill, 403. Sill V. White, 848. Silliman v. Gammage, 871, 881. Silloway v. Brown, 431. Sills V. Lawson, 1345. Silsbury v. McCoon, 1083. Silsby V. Allen, 619, 631. Silsby V. Bullock, 348. Silva V. Campbell, 522, 753. Silvarer v. Hansen, 1397. Silver v. Kendrick, 522. Silver Creek Cement Co. v. Cement Co.. 1899. Silverman v. Loomis, 1442. Silvers v. Potter, 1060. Silver Spang, etc. Co. v. Wanskuck, Co., 213. Silvey v. McCord, 1388. Simar v. Canaday, 355, 953. Simm V. Richards, 678. jSimmons v. Ballard, 987. Simmons v. Cornell, 179. Simmons v. Johnson, 1375. Simmons v. Leonard, 1481, 1482. Simmons v. Lyle, 375, 413. Simmons v. North, 796. Simmons v. Richard, 1163. W SimmoDs v. Simmons, 1319. Simmons v. Spratt, 720, 784, 1287. Simmons v. Wagner, 1239, 1242. Simmons v. Winters, 207, 1402. Simms v. Sirams, 722. Simons Creek Coal Company v. Doran, 1415. Simons v. Cloonan, 147. Simons v. McLaiu, 668. Simons v. Morehouse, 267. Simons v. Pierce, 53. Simonton v. Houston, 383. Simpkin v. Ashurst, 649. Simpson v. Applegate, 621. Simpson v. Bank, 836, 887. Simpson v. Clayton, 542. Simpson v. Del Hoyo, 1346. Simpson v. Leech, 371. Simpson v. McGlathery, 1828. Simpson v. Montgomery, 808. Simpson v. Moore, 298. Simpson v. Mundee, 791. Simpson v. Simpson, 301, 1478. Simpson v. Snedode, 1167. Simpson v. Walker, 1497. Simpson v. Wallace, 723, 724. Simpson's Appeal, 422. Sims V. Dame, 676, 677. Sims V. Dorsey, 602. Sims V. Hammond, 1343. Sims V. Quinlan, 1522. Sims V. Sims, 321. Sims's Estate, 1050. Sinclair v. Hone, 1506. Sinclair v. Jackson, 1073. Sinclair v. Slawson, 886, 1334, 1341. Sine v. Pox, 1440. Singer Manuf. Co. v. Lamb, 1281. Singer Manuf. Co. v. Rook, 1314. Singleton v. Huflf, 429. Singleton v. Singleton, 306. Sinnett v. Bowman, 1472. Sinnott v. Railroad Co., 1170. Sinton v. Boyd, 999, 1019. Sisk v. Smith, 390. Sisson v. Donnelly, 279. Sisson V. Hibbard, 64. Sitz V. Deihl, 814. Sizerv. Quinlan, 150. Skaggs V. Emerson, 552. Skaggs V. Nelson, 807. Sked V. Sedgley, 959. Skeen v. Lynch, 177. Skelton v. Ward, 966. Skepwith v. Martin, 747. Skinner v. Baker, 835. Skinner v. Beatty, 954. Skinner v. Chadwell, 443, Skinner v. Dayton, 754. Skinner v. Harris, 1518. clxxviii TABLE OF OASES. [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735; Vol. II, gS 736-1541.] Skinner v. Shannon, 432. Smith V. Arthur, 1207. Skinner v. Shepard, 747, 1413. Smith V. Atkins, 609, 610. Skinner v. Wilder, 7, 243. Smith V. Aude, 509. Skipper v. Stokes, 782. Smith V. Austin. 978. SkipwitU V. Cunningham, 1061. Smith V. Bank, 787, 1324. Skyme v. Occidental Mill, 830. Smith V. Bell, 1033, 1511. Slade V. Barlow, 738. Smith Y. Benson, 58, 264, 1379. Slade V. Rigg, 938. Smith V. Blanpied, 153. Slade V. Van Vechten, 906. Smith V. Blindbury, 298, 1004. Slater v. Back, 123. Smith V. Boone, 1398. Slater v. Dangerfield, 1019. Smith V. Borrie, 743, 1413. Slater v. Bawson, 1429. Smith V. Brannan, 747. Slatterly v. Wason, 1080. Smith V. Brinker, 536. Slattery v. Schnanmecke, 1364. Smith V. Brisson, 1001. Slaughter v. Swift, 713. Smith V. Brown, 731, 1381, Slauson v. Slauson, 404. Smith V. Bryan, 368, 1290. Sledge V. Obenchain 878. Smith V. Burnham, 1073. Slee V. Manhattan Co., 773, 981. Smith V. Buttner, 594. Slegel V. Lauer, 283, 388. Smith V. Camelford, 1130. Slett V. Collins, 809. Smith V. Cannell, 355, 1457. Sleverson v. Glover, 1031. Smith V. Carney, 1465. Slide & Spur Gold Min. Co. v. Sey- Smith V. Clark, 740. mour, 804, 809. Smith V. Clay, 983, 983, 984. Slingerland v. Sherer, 894, 895. Smith V. Clemson, 1500. Sloan V. Campbell, 808, 816. Smith V. Clyford, 293. Sloan V. Prothingham, 901. Smith V. Cremer, 780. Sloan V. Grider, 719. Smith V. Crosby, 781. Sloan V. Railroad Co., 106, 108. Smith V. Custer, 1243, 1244. Sloan V. Seymour, 368. Smith V. Dall, 1309. Sloan V. Williams, 378. Smith V. Darby, 345, 247. Sloat V. Rountree, 643. Smith V. Davis, 1086, 1460. Slocovich V. Ins. Co., 844. Smith V. Death, 1124. Slocum V. Seymour, 18, 368. Smith V. Deschaumes, 438. Slowey V. McMurray, 773. Smith V. Derr. 1144. Slutz V. Desenberg, 772. Smith V. Dixon, 1458. Small V. Clifford, 663. Smith V. Dyer, 916. Small V. Field, 1312. Smith V. Enob, 433. Small V. Hodgen, 955. Smith V. Ewing, 1241, 1344. Small V. Marburg, 403. Smith V. Faxon, 573. Small V. Proctor, 363. Smith V. Follansbee, 333, 328. Small V. Stagg, 808. Smith V. Foran, 874. Smalley v. Isaacson, 724. Smith V. Gage, 1327. Smallman v. Onions, 699. Smith V. Gale, 1161. Smart v. Baugh, 1192. Smith V. Greaves, 1373. Smart v. Morton, 245, 247, 249. Smith V. Gibson, 639, 838. Smiles v. Hastings, 170. Smith V. Griffin, 153, 190. Smiley v. Fries, 1373. Smith v. Goaow, 523. Smiley v. Gambill, 1504. Smith V. Guild, 927. Smiley v. Gas Co., 531. Smith V. Hague, 957. Smiley v. Van Winkle, 501, 532, 533, Smith V. Hamilton, 1397. 535. Smith V. Harriet, 1330. Smiley v. Wright, 372. Smith V. Harrington, 383, 989. Smilie v. Biffle, 1058. Smith V. Henrich, 135, 331. Smith V. Adams, 211, 225. Smith V. Hibbard, 805. Smith V. Allen, 712, 1298, 1297. Smith V. Higbee, 137. Smith V. AUis, 791. Smith V. Hill, 985. Smith V. Alt, 639. Smith V. Hitchcock, 1165. Smith V. Anders, 929. Smith V. Howell, 355, 388, 1060, 1306, Smith V. Angel, 991. 1430. Smith V. Arnold, 952. Smith V. Hughes 1443. TABLE OF CASES. clxxix lEefereuoes are to sections: Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735; Vol. II, 89 736 1541.] Smith V. Ins. Co., 843, 846, 847, 848. Smith V. Jackson', 708. Smith V. James, 1300. Smith V. Jenks, 18, 43. Smith T. Jewett, 298. Smith V. Kelly, 863, 1144, 1157. Smith V. Kemp, 92. Smith V. Kenrick, 135, 331. Smith V. Kerr, 504. Smith V. Kiniskern, 398. Smith V. Ladd, 137, 1315. Smith V. Land & Imp. Co., 1391. Smith V. Lee, 1165. Smith V. Levinus, 101, Smith V. Littlefield, 631, 650. Smith V. Loaf man, 1315. Smith V. Lock, 1895, 1408. Smith V. Lowry, 883, 1831. Smith V. Lumber Co., 563, 774. Smith V. Mase, 447. Smith V. Mapleback, 499, 534. Smith V. Marrble, 494. Smith V. Maryland, 9, 101, 1248. Smith V. Matthews, 1059. Smith V. McAllister, 1898. Smith V. McCorkle, 1186, 1397. Smith V. McGowan, 1200. Smith V. McKay, 1168, 1176. Smith V. McLean, 551. Smith V. Meldrem, 1371. Smith V. Montes, 1198. Smith V. Montgomery, 1226. Smith V. Moore, 337, 338, 803, 807, 817, 857. Smith V. Morman, 1395. Smith V. Nelson, 1873. Smith V. O'Hara, 210. Smith V. Olmstead, 1130. Smith V. Palmer, 1514. Smith V. Parsons, 1464. Smith V. Patterson, 294. Smith V. Patton, 801, 1066. Smith V. Phillips, 576. Smith V. Pierce, 1532, 1533. Smith V. Pollard, 1330. Smith V. Porter, 146. Smith V. Price, 73, 803, 1242. Smith V. Putnam, 164, 520, 539. Smith V. Railroad Co., 142, 448. Smith V. Raleigh, 551. Smith V. Randall, 1271. Smith V. Reeder, 658, 659. Smith V. Reid, 1846. Smith V. Rice, 601, 849, 1005. Smith V. Richards, 1459. Smith V. Roberts, 871, 1163, 1169. Smith V. Rochester, 1886. Smith V. Rome, 318, 1121. Smith V. Rowland, 804, 816. Smith V. Sacket, 1089. Smith v. Schultz, 563. Smith V. Shattuck, 1168. Smith V. Shaw, 1185. Smith V. Shepard, 1434, 1443. Smith V. Sheely, 1206. Smith V. Slocum, 201. Smith V. Sprague, 1431. Smith V. Smith (36 Ala. 728), 704. Smith V. Smith (80 Cal. 323), 767, 775. Smith V. Smith (2 Cromp. & Mees. 231), 1352, 1853. Smith V. Smith (1 Ed. N. Y. 189), 1541. Smith V. Smith (2 Halst. Ch. N. J.), 385. Smith V. Smith (144 111. 399), 1068, 1070. Smith V. Smith (110 Mass. 3021), 233. Smith V. Smith (18 Mich, 258), 910. Smith V. Smith (71 Mich. 683), 1388. Smith V. Smith (62 N. H. 429), 153. Smith V. Smith (48 N. J. Eq. 310), 1473. Smith V. Smith (52 N. J. L. 307), 358. Smith V. Smith (18 Ohio St. 583), 837. Smith V. Smith (10 Paige N. Y. 470), 714, 716. Smith V. Smith (81 Tex. 45), .'566. Smith V. Smith (2 Ves. 189), 397, 707. Smith V. Smith (20 Vt. 270), 404. Smith V. Smith (23 Wis. 176), 755, 758. Smith V. Smoult, 936. Smith V. Stair, 10, 1247. Smith V. Stewart, 619. Smith V. Stigleman, 553. Smith V. Story, 1874. Smith V. Straham, 1066, 1068, 1071. Smith V. Strong, 1439, 1460, 1461. Smith V. Swan, 881. Smith V. Sweringen, 729. Smith V. Thackerah, 338, 348. Smith V. Thayer, 310. Smith V. Thompson, 955. Smith V. Thurman, 1493. Smith V. Tindall, 606, 614. Smith V. Towers, 1080. Smith V. Townsend, 1383. Smith V. Trenton Delaware Falls Co., 860. Smith V. Tuit, 1535. Smith V. Turley, 1066. Smith V. United States, 795. Smith V. Van Ostrand, 849. Smith V. Von Hutton, 474. Smith V. "Westall, 1395, 1873. Smith V. Wiggin, 129, 301, 381. Smith V. Williams, 1305, 1310. Smith V. Worn, 143. Smith V. Young, 678. Smith V. Yule, 1350. clxxx TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections : Vol. I, contains Sg 1-735 ; Vol. II, e§ 736-1541.] Smith's Appeal, 299, 376, 401. Smith Paper Co. v. Servin, 58. Smither v. Smither, 405. Smithers v. Fitch, 176. Smithwick t. Ellison, 44, 1393. Smock V. Smock, 1504. Smoot V. Lecott. 344. Smyles v. Hastings, 158, 191. Snape v. Turton, 1119. Snapp V. Peirce, 1167. Snath V. Moberly, 1318. Snedeker v. Warring, 6,1, 77. Sneed v. Ewing, 1143. Sneed v. Osborn, 1896, 1397, 1898. Sneed v. Ward, 1309. \Snell V. Harrison, 674. Snell V. Levitt, 191. Snell V. Snell, 863, 474. Sneyd v. Sneyd, 365. Snider v. Martin, 475. Snively's Appeal, 735. Snook V. Snook, 399. Snow V. Flannery, 1344. Snow V. Lake, 1380. Snow V. Parsons, 208, 309. Snow Y. Pressey, 844. Snow V. Stevens, 367. Snow V. Warrick, 862. Snow V. Whitehead, 233. Snowden v. Dales, 1080. Snowden v. Tyler, 1330. Snowden v. Wilas, 261. Snower v. Cutler, 1020. Snowhill V. Snowhill, 1089, 1499. Snyder v. Hopkins, 325. Snyder v. Kunkleman, 560. Snyder v. Railroad Co., 1173. Snyder v. Snyder, 871, 1534. Snyder'? Appeal, 827. Society v. Fleming, 575. Society v. Varick, 784. Sohier v. Church, 738, 756, 1373, 1413. Sohier v. Coffin, 1385. Sohier v. Eldredge, 134, 398. Sohn V. Gautner, 1213. Solida V. McKenna, 166. Sellers V. Sollers, 1187. Sollory V. Leaver, 111. Soloman v. Agburow, 550. Solomon v. Vintners Co., 163, 238. Somerset v. Fogwell, 93, 1247. Somers v. Overhulser, 1067. Somers v. Pierson, 287. Somes v. Skinner, 838, 920, 1210. Sonday's Case, 1032. Sondley v. (!aldwell, 415. Sontag V. Bigelnw, 678, 1173. Sontag V. Schmisseur, 457. Soper V. Bro^n, 1519. Soper V. Guernsey, 850. Sorenson v. Davis, 678, 681, 1178. Sornberger v. Berggren, 816. Sossaman v. Ins. Co., 841. Soukup V. Investment Co., 1373. Soukup V. Topeka, 738. Souter V. Codman, 556. South V. Marcum, 1179. Southard v. Railroad Co., 747, 1412. South Berwick v. Huntress, 1378. Southbridge Sav. Bank v. Exeter Mach. Works, 59, 64, 69. Southbridge Sav. Bank v. Stevens Tool Co., 69. South Cong. Meeting House v. Lowell, 5. Souther v. Atwood, 717. Southerin v. Mendum, 768. Southern C. Oil Co. v. Henshaw, 698. Southworth v. Van Pelt, 337. Soutter V. Miller, 769, 783, 900. Soutter V. Porter, 733. Sowers v. Peterson, 698. Sowler V. Day, 1364. Sowles V. Rugg, 1336. Spalding v. Mumford, 496. Spangler v. Stanler, 363. Spangler's Estate, 296. Spargur v. Heard, 211. Sparhawk v. Bage, 1285. Sparhawk v. Cloon, 278, 1054. Sparhawk v. Sparhawk, 1085. Sparhawk v. Wills, 922, 971. Sparks v. Ball, 420. Sparks v. Hess, 804. 816. Sparks v. Pierce, 1188. Sparrow v. Kelso, 367. Sparrow v. Pond, 18. Spear v. Fuller, 540. Spear v. Haddock, 907. Spears v. Hartley, 895. Speck V. Riggin, 1850, 1353 Speer v. Evans, 1339. Speiden v. Parker, 68. Speir V. New Utrecht, 175. Speier v. Opfer, 701, 704, 705. Spencer v. Ayrault, 871. Spencer v. Barnett, 829. Spencer v. Carr, 1286, 1320. Spencer v. Fredenhall, 881. Spencer v. Greene, 995. Spencer v. Jennings, 1337. Spencer v. Lewis, 571. Spencer v. G'Neill, 569. Spencer V. Railroad Co., 176. Spencer v. Spencer, 385, 894, 1093. Spencer v. Webster, 883, 416. Spencer's Case, 115, 536, 840, 1434,. 1453. Spensley v. Valentine, 145. Sperb V. Railroad Co., 155. TABLE OF CASES. clxxxi [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains 8§ 1-735: Vol. II, §§ 736-1541.] Sperber v. Balster, 1535. Sperry v. Miller, 499. Sperry v. Pond, 750. Sperry v. Sperry, 748. Speyer v. Desjardins, 1073. Spicer v. Martin, 1423, 1434, 1435. Spicer v. Rowland, 681. Spiegel V. Spiegel, 468. Spies V. Price,1059. Spiess V. Neuberg, 833. Spiller V. Scribner, 1374. Spindle v. Schreve, 1080. Spinney v. Barbe, 77. Splalin V. Gillespie, 955. SpoflEord V. Weston, 1355. Spoon V. Van Fasseu, 406. Spooner v. Holmes, 113. Spotts V. Hanley, 1193. Spradlin v. Spradlin, 1171. Sprague v. Baker, 1443, 1458. Sprague v. Hazenwinkle, 880. Sprague v. Luther, 1478. Sprague v. Quinn, 633. Sprague v. Snow, 1406. Sprague v. Thurber, 1061. Spratt V. Spratt, 1473. Spread v. Morgan, 403. Spring V. Biles, 1117. Springer v. Berry, 1037, 1070. Springer v. Gas Co., 539, 536. Springer v. Springer, 1067. Springfield v. Harris, 208. Springfield, etc. R. R. Co. v. Stewart, 805. Spruck V. McRoberts, 833. Spurgen v. Collier, 976. Spurgin v. Adarason, 447, 871. Spurr V. Andrew, 1431. Squire v. Green. 1391. Squire v. Harder, 1068. Squire v. Harvey, 744, 1527. Squires v. Hoff, 618. St. Andrews's Church's Appeal, 141. St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. Minneapolis, 147, 1405. St. Charles v. Powell, 179. St. Clair v. Loviugston, 11. St. Croix L. & Lum. Co. v. Ritchie, 1336. 1338, 1341. St. Felix V. Rankin, 733. St. George v. Wake, 385. St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping, 155 305 St. John V. Palmer, 493, 1443. St. John V. Quitzow, 550. St. John V. Sweeney, 357. St. Johnsbury, etc. R. R. Co. v. Wil- lard, 931. St. Louis V. Railroad Co., 11, 1189, 1190, 1376. St. Louis V. Rutz, 8. St. Louis Bridge Co. v. Curtis, 129. St. Louis, etc. R. R. Co. v. McGee, 1349. St. Louis, etc. R. R. Co. v. Ramsey, 8. St. Louis, etc. R. R. Co. v. Wather, 698. St. Mary's Church v. Miles, 543. St. Paul V. Railroad Co., 1193. St. Paul's Church v. Ford, 17. St. Paul Lumber Co. v. Bolton, 831. St. Paul, etc. R. R. Co. v. Minneapo- lis, 166. St. Romes v. New Orleans, 550. Staab V. Raynolds, 516. Staats V. Ten Eyck, 1463. Stackpole v. Healy, 358. Stacy V. Bostwick, 566, 569. Stacy V. Metter, 177. Stafford v. Buckley, 110. StaflEord v. Coyney, 175, 177. Stafford v. Ingersoll, 258. Stafford v. Stafford, 1296. Stafford v. Van Rensselaer, 804, 834. Stafford v. Wentworth, 297. Stafford v. Williams, 955. Stafford v. Woods, 439. Staffordsville Gravel Co. v. Newell, 1348, 1413. Stagg V. Small, 838, 1346. Staines v. Dorman, 743, 754, Stahl v. Dehn, 777. Stahl V. Stahl, 418, 431. Slaley v. Housel, 1398. Stall V. Beecher, 1391. Stall V. Cincinnati, 1090. Stall V. Harrison, 1315. Stallard v. Cushing, 305. Stalling V. Ferrin, 313. Stambaugh v. Smith, 1460. Stamp V. Findley, 393. Stanard v. Eldridge, 1439. Stancell v. Roberts, 807. Stanclit v. Norton, 891. Standard Bank v. Stokes, 353, 354. Standish v. Babcock, 1083. Standish v. Lawrence, 357. Stang V. Redden, 953. Stangler v. Detiney, 464. Stanley v. Colt, 739, 756, 1065, 1418, 1454. Standard v. Mather. 936. Stanley v. Schwalby, 1173. Stanley v. Shoolbred, 1168. Stanley v. Twogood, 496. 505. Stanley v. Valentine, 1335. Stanhope v. Manners, 890. Staniford v. Fullerton, 1879. Stannard v. Sperry, 715, 735. clxxxii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains SS 1-735; Vol. II, §g 736-1641.] Stansbury v. Hubner, 287, 740. Stansbury v. Inglehart, 734. Stansell v. Jollard, 238. Stanton v. Hitchcock, 433, 434. Stanton v. Miller, 1838. Stanton v. MuUins, 1168. Stantons v. Thompson, 871, 881. Stanwood v. Dunning, 365. Staple V. Spring, 303. Staples V. Bradley, 719. Stark V. Barrett, 698, 1379. Stark V. Brown, 960. Stark V. Hopson, 362. Stark V. Huntor, 399. Stark V. Mercer, 964. Starkey v. Horton, 512. Starkin v. Richmond, 1435. Starling v. Porker, 17. Starnes v. Hill, 1013. 1015, 1019. Starr v. Bennett, 1317. Starr v. Child, 207, 1893. Starr v. Ellis, 510, 870, 873. Starr v. Leavitt, 1379. Starr v. People, 172, 174. State V. Atherton, 171, 178. State V. Atkins, 177. State V. Bachelder, 1236. State V. Birmingham, 174. State V. Boyce, 594. State V. Bradbury, 171. State V. Brewer, 1203. State V. Brown, 383, 741, 989. State V. Buck, 11. State V. Byrd, 1305. State V. Carson, 1224. State V. Commissioners, 1246. State V. Crutchfleld, 1334. State V. Elliott, 46, 78. State V. Franklin Palls Co., 100, 101. State V. Gas Co., 109. State V. Gilman, 1886. State V. Gramelspacher, 330. State V. Hamilton, 106, 109. State V. Hayward, 109. State V. Horn, 174, 175. State V. Howell, 566. State V. Ins. Co., 843. State V. Judy, 101. State V. Lewis, 101. State V. Liedtke, 1530. State V. Matthews, 794, 1278. State V. McCabe, 177. State V. Milk, 1223, 1386. State V. Narrow Island Club, 1251. State V. North. Cent. R. R. Co., 56. State V. Noyes, 107, 109. State V. Nudd, 175. State V. Pacific Guano Co., 1251. State V. Pepper, 1278. State V. Pinckney, 1351. State V. Pottmeyer, 233, 236. State V. Prosser, 1248. State V. Railroad Co., 56, 108, 1888. State V. Randolph, 101. State V. Banno, 177. State V. Rich, 179. State V. Richards, 624. State V. Riche, 795. State V. Roberts, 101. State V. Sargent, 1351, 1853. State V. Schwin, 1376. State V. Shawley, 363. State V. Sluder, 1298. State V. Steiger, 563. State V. Tombigbee Bank, 109. State V. Thackam, 560. State V. Thompson, 101. State V. Trask, 167, 184. State V. Uland, 405. State V. Votaw, 566. State V. Waterman, 179. State V. "Welpton, 179. State V. "White, 1508. State V. Williams, 589, 613. State V. Wincroft, 355. State V. Young, 1278. State Bank v. Hinton, 962. State Bank v. Wilson, 929. State Ins. Co. v. Schreck, 843. State Sav. Bank v. Harbin, 446. State Sav. Bank v. Kercheval, 51 States v. Appleton, 156. Staton V. Mullis, 1370. Staton V. Railroad Co., 215, 319. Stayton v. Blount, 1413. Stead V. Grosfield, 785, 1331, 1333. Steagall v. Stcagall, 1070. Steamboat Co. v. Munson, 1431. Steam Engine Co. v. Steam Ship Co., 170. Stearns v. Godfrey, 758. Stearns v. Hendersass, 1198. Stearns v. Ins. Co., 839. Stearns v. Mullen, 146. Stearns v. Nashua, 171. Stearns v. Palmer, 379. Stearns v. Richmond, 337, 341, 1319. Stearns v. Sampson, 655, 656, 657, 659. Stearns v. Swift, 381. Stears v. Hollenbeck, 834. Stebbins v. Duncan, 1380, 1311. Stebbins v. Stebbins, 1514. Stebbins v Watson, 1378. Stedman v. Gassett, 633. Stedman v. Smith, 252, 1163. Steel V. Prick, 602. Steel V. Johnson, 1171. Steel V. Portland, 170. Steel V. Refining Co., 1243. Steele v. Bank, 1330. TABLE OF CASES. clxxxiii [References are to sections : Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735 ; Vol. II, §§ 736-1541.] Steele v. Boley, 1188. Steele v. Fisher, 406. Steele v. Prierson, 1154, 1155, 1156. Steele v. Price, 1504. Steere v. Childs, 951. Steere v. Steere, 1059. StefEens v. Earl, 633. Steffln V. Steffln, 605. Steib V. Whitehead, 278, 1080. Stein V. Burden, 161, 164. Steine v. Dahm, 190. Steiner v. Coxe, 1250. Steinke v. Bentley, 142. Steinlein v. Halstead, 659. Steinruck's Appeal, 777. Stell V. Barham, 279. Stell V. Paschal, 69. Stelle V. Carroll, 372. Stellwagen v. Tucker, 1177. Stelz V. Shreek, 706. Stembel v. Martin, 1128. Stephen v. Beall, 906. Stephens v. Allea, 772. Stephens v. Benson, 134. Stephens v. Bridges, 510. Stephens v. Clay, 951. Stephens v. Gibbes, 404. Stephens v. Hume, 343. Stephens v. Ins. Co., 839, 893. Stephens v. McCormick, 1165. Stephens v. Motl, 1311. Stephens V. Rinehart, 1330, 1833. Stephens v. Stephens, 1028, 1030, 1063. Stephens' Appeal, 804. Stephenson v. Elliott, 868. Stephenson v. McClintock, 1066. Sterger v. Van Sicklen, 591. Sterling v. Baldwin, 268. Sterling v. Peet, 1434, 1436, 1461. Sterling v. Penlington, 342. Sterling v. Warden, 363, 264, 525, 556, 655, 657. Sterling Hydraulic Co. v. Williams, 1448. Sternberger v. Hanna, 951. Sterry v. Arden, 1294. Stetson V. Eastman, 1530. Stetson V. Freeman, 1400. Stettnische v. Lamb, ll94. Steubben v. Granger, 514. Stevens v. Anderson, 678. Stevens v. Brooks, 1168. Stevens v. Cooper, 781, 818, 1373. Stevens v. Castle, 1321. Stevens v. Dedham, 984, 987. Stevens v. Dennett, 1331. Stevens v. Ferry, 930. Stevens v. Flower, 997. Stevens v. Goodenough, 874. Stevens v. Hampton, 800. Stevens v. Hollingsworth, 440. Stevens v. Kelley, 333, 336. Stevens v. King, 1318. Stevens v. Lincoln, 833. Stevens v. McCormick, 716. Stevens v. Nashua, 175. Stevens v. Norfolk, 676. Stevens v. Orr, 153. Stevens v. Pantlind, 500, 575. Stevens v. Patterson, etc. R. R. Co., 1348, 1351. Stevens v. Pierce, 494, 592. Stevens v. Railroad Co., 9, 40, 56. Stevens v. Rainwater, 804. Stevens V. Rose, 48, 316. Stevens v. Stevens, 412, 1068, 1318. Stevens v. Thompson, 689. Stevens v. Vancleve, 1472. Stevens Point, etc. Co. v. Reilly, 95. Stevenson v. Anderson, 678. Stevenson v. Crapnell, 1060, 1335. Stevenson v. Edwards, 968. Stevenson v. Lumbard, 123, 536, 542, 552. Stevenson V. Maxwell, 821. Stevenson v. Stevenson, 1070. Stevenson v. Superior Court, 1508 Steward v. Welch, 1062. Stewart v. Brady, 744. Stewart v. Brand, 431. Stewart v. Brown, 1064. Stewart v. Chadwick, 1081. Stewart v. Clinton, 218. Stewart v. Doughty, 306, 307, 309, 571. Stewart v. Drake, 1443, 1458. Stewart v. Duflfy, 1194. Stewart v. Fellows, 780. Stewart v. Harriraan, 1484, 1494. Stewart v. Hartman, 153. Stewart v. Hutchins, 802. Stewart v. Mackey, 462. Stewart v. Matheny, 1004. Stewart v. McSweeney, 1285. Stewart v. Munholland, 1500, 1505. Stewart v. Neely, 994, 1003. Stewart V. Pettus, 1091. Stewart v. Preston, 830. Stewart v. Railroad Co., 583. Stewart v. Redditt, 792, 1818. Stewart v. Stevens, 143. Stewart v. Smith, 837. Stewart v. Sprague, 535, 551. Stewart v. Stewart, 386, 394, 399, 678, 1178, 1476. Stewart v. Stokes, 1131. Stewart v. West. 1457. Stewart v. Wood, 817. Stewart's Appeal, 1130. Stewart's Case, 803. clxxxiv TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735; Vol. 11, SS 736-1541.] Stickleboone v. Hatchman, 314, Stickney v. Stickney, 601. Stieger v. Hillen, 417. Stiff V. Ashton, 1331. Stiger V. Bent, 866. Stiles V. Japhet, 1333. Stiles V. Willis, 796. Still V. Buzzell, 981. Stillman v. Flenniken, 64. Stillman v. Weedon, 1117. Stilphea v. Houdlette, 393. Stilson V. Stilson, 393, 394. Stillwell V. Doughty, 134, 396. Stillwell V. Foster, 153. Stillwell V. Hamm, 987. Stillwell V. Railroad Co., 159. Stilwell V. Knapper, 744, 1537. SliQcMeld v. Millikin, 776. Stinson v. Richardson, 439. Stinson v. Ross, 854. Stinson v. Sumner, 388, 390. Stipe V. Stipe, 1443. Stipp V. Brown, 895, 1193. Stirling v. Stirling, 1481. Stockbridge v. Stockbridge, 1530. Stockett V. Howard, 1453. Stockton V. Weber, 737. Stockwell V. Campbell, 49, 77. Stockwell V. Couillard, 1404. Stockwell V. Hunter, 504, 505, 1383. Stockwell V. State, 1343. Stockton V. Railroad Co. , 8. Stoddard v. Cutcompt, 401, 403. Stoddard v. Emery, 543. Stoddard v. Gibbs, 343, 346. Stoddard v. Rotton, 873. Stoddard v. Waters, 545, 604. Stoever v. Stoever, 911. Stoker v. Middleton, 738. Stokes V. Appomattox Co., 162 Stokes V. Berry, 1197. Stokes V. McKibbin, 344. Stokes V. Payne, 1118. Stokes V. Stokes, 1118 Stokoe V. Singers, 191, 308, 369 275. Stoltz v. Doering, 1157. Stone T. Ashley, 1310. Stone V. Brooks. 171. Stone V. Duvall, 1323, 1337 Stone V. Ellis, 754, 979. Stone V. Godfrey, 447. Stone V. Hackett, 1051. Stone V. Hooper, 1434. Stone V. Houghton, 738, 1413 Stone v. Knapp, 364. Stone V. Launon, 886. Stone V. Lewis, 999. Stone V. Loan Co., 109. Stone V. Locke, 934. Stone V. Mississippi, 109. Stone V. Stone, 1373. Stone V. St. Louis Stamping Co., 513. Stone V. Vandemark, 401, 403, 404. Stone V. White, 795. Stone Land & Cattle Co. v. Boon, 816, 817. Stouebraker v. Zollickofler, 301, 1000. Stoner v. Rice, 1386. Stoner v. Shugart, 259. Stones V. Keeling, 1143. Stoney v. Shultz, 950. Stoolfoos V. Jenkins, 342. Stoppelbein v. Schultz, 855. Storch V. Harvey, 514. Storer v. Lane, 1076. Storm V. Manchang Co., 336. Story V. Hammond, 313. Story V. Johnson, 785. Story V. Livingston, 933 Story V. Palmer, 1086, 1099, 1100. Story V. Railroad Co., 155, 169, 170, 204. Story V. Saunders, 678. Stotesbury v. Vail. 500. Stott V. Rutherford, 493, 566, 567. Stoudenmire v. De Bardeleben, 339. Stoughton V. Baker, 93, 101. Stoughton V. Leigh, 346, 364, 370, 413, 414. Stoughton V. Pasco, 786. Stout V. Curry, 699. Stout V. Paul, 1193. Stout V. Keyes 957. Stout V. McNeill, 438. Stout V. Merrill, 567. Stout V. Stout, 1038, 1039. Stover V. Bounds, 803. Stover V. Tompkins, 967. Stover V. Wood, 885. Stow V. Russell, 504. Stow V. Tifflt, 366. Stowell V. Hastings, 1105. Straat v. Whig, 1065. Strahan v. Sutton, 398, 401. Straight v. Harris, 835. Strain v. Gardner, 563. Strait V. Brown, 336. Strange v. Beach, 796. Strathmore v. Bowes, 385. Stratton v. Best, 664. Stratton v. Staples, 591. Stratton v. Stratton, 394. Stratton v. Timber Co., 1066. Strauss v. Schmidt, 1506. Strauss's Appeal, 799, 804. Straw V. Trustees, 1541. Strawn v. Strawn, 363, 414, 1444. - Strayer v. Long. 5, 355, 387, 433. Street v. Griffiths, 174. Street v. Nelson, 575. TABLE OF CASES. clxxxv [References are to sections : Vol. I, contains 8§ 1-735 ; Vol. II, §3 736-1541.] Stribbling v. Coal Co., 883. Stribbling v. Hart, 959. Strickland v. Maxwell, 514. Strickland v. Parker, 56. Strickland v. Summerville, 812. Strickler v. Colorado Springs, 208. Striker v. Mott, 734. Stringfellow v. Ivie, 806, 830. Strode v. Magowan, 1145. Strohaner v. Voltz, 866. Strohmeyer v. Zeppenfleld, 497. Stroman v. Rottenbury, 784. Strong V. Blanchard, 971. Strong V. Clem, 409, 420. Strong V. Downing, 933. Strong V. Ins. Co., 839. Strong V. Lord, 707, 713. Strong V. Smith, 791, 1311. Strong V. Strong, 777, 781, 809. Strong V. Tomlinson, 939. Strong V. Waddell, 933. Strong V. Wilder, 1319. Stronghill v. Anstey, 1118. Strother v. Law, 904. Strond v. Lockhart, 1358. Stroyan v. Knowles, 238, 348. Struthers v. Pearce, 1075. Stuart V. Baker, 719. Stuart V. Henry, 869. Stuart V. Morrison, 809. Stuart V. Walker, 291, 1529. Stuart Y. Worden, 796. Stubbing!, v. Evanston, 547, 548. Stubendorf v. Hoffman, 443. Stuckey v. Keefe, 703. Studds V. Watson, 484. Studebaker v. McCargur, 963. Studholme v. Hodgson, 1541. Sluebben v. Granger, 514. Stultz V. Sale, 431. Stumpf V. Osterhage, 1168. Stunz V. Stunz, 399. Sturch V. Young, 938. Sturdivant v. Birchett, 1483. Sturges V. Bridgeman, 576. Sturgis V. Ewing, 1151. Sturgis V. Work, 1498. Sturr V. Beck, 308. Sturtevant v. Jaques, 865. Sturtevant v. Sturtevant, 1319. Stutz V. Dickey, 307, 571. Stuyvesant v. Davis, 533, 525. Stuyvesant v. Hall, 1343. Stuyvesant v. Mayor, 736. Stuyvesant v. Woodruff, 144, 150. Suber v. Chandler, 1183. Succession of Babb, 1498. Succession of Blakemore, 1504, 1538. Succession of Cassidy, 1458. Succession of Bhrenberg, 1491. Succession of Montgomery, 791. Succession of Morvant, 1476. Succession of Simon, 1351. Succession of Vidal, 1493. Suddarth v. Roberison, 566. Suddeth V. Knight, 8i6. Suessenbach v. Bank, 1067. Sueter v. Turner, 1316. Sufleld V. Brown, 142, 153, 154. SuUens v. Railroad Company, 216, 319. Sullivan v. Enders, 616, 637. Sullivan v. Flynn, 1381. Sullivan v. Graffort, 350, 357. Sullivan v. Latimer, 1085, 1087, 1088, 1090. Sullivan v. Lear, 1395. Sullivan v. O'Neal, 1370. Sullivan v. Rabb, 333, 856. Sullivan v. Sullivan, 723, 724. Sullivan v. Toole, 43, 67, 73. Sullivan v. Zeiner, 337. Sumerel v. Sumerel, 383, 398, 401. Summer v. Mitchell, 1311, 1313, 1338. Summer v. Partridge, 376. Summers v. Babb, 380, 430. Summers v. Darne, 837. Summers v. Smith, 1037. Summit v. Yount, 1527. Sumner v. Barnard, 1457. Sumner v. Conant, 1303. Sumner v. Crane, 1508. Sumner v. Darnell, 738, 1413. Sumner v. Palmer, 955. Sumner v. Peebles, 1190, 1336. Sunderland v. S".nder and, 1068. Supervisors v. Herrington, 550, 554. Supplee V. Timothy, 513. Surdanv. Cornell, 1000. Surget V. Arighi, 493. Surplice v. P.irnsworth, 491. Sussex V. Temple, 664. Sussex Co. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Woodruff, 844, 845. Sutherland v. Heathcote, 265. Sutherland v. Jackson, 1395, 1403. Sutlifl V. Atwood, 115, 538. Sutphen v. Ellis, 927. Sutphen v. Therkelson, 156. Sutton V. Askew, 355. Sutton V. Bailie, 1460. Sutton V. Chevault, 1485. Sutton V. Clarke, 201. Sutton V. Cole, 158. Sutton V. Groll, 167. Sutton V. Lodge, 481, 650, 653. Sutton V. Porter, 719. Sutton V. Temple, 494, 555, 592. Sutzteacher v. Dickie, 585. Swaine v. Ferine, 395, 385, 387. clxxxvi TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections : "Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735 ; Vol. II, §§ 736-1541. J Swaine v. Burton, 1129. Swaine v. Denby, 1099. Swan V. Hammond, 1500. Swan V. Railroad Co., 205. Swan V. Swan, 690, 733. Swan V. Yaples, 864. Swandale v. Swandale, 430, 443. Swann v. Thayer, 569, 1168, 1170, 1179. Swann v. Young, 566, 569, 1170. Swanner v. Swanner, 601. Swanson v. Calhoun, 724. Swarts V. Stees, 802. Swartz V. Leist, 868. Swartz V. Swartz, 270. Swasey v. Brooks, 1429. Swasey v. Jaques, 1540. Swearingen v. Morris, 1486. Swearingen v. Robertson, 1196. Sweatt V. Corcoran, 1235. Sweeney v. Warren, 1106, 1111, 1124. Sweeny v. Railroad Co., 591. Sweet V. Bean, 1298. Sweet V. Brown, 536, 1441, 1445. Sweet V. Jacocks, 1077. Sweet V. Mitchell, 977. Sweet V. Myers, 98. Sweet V. Southcote, 1357. Sweetapple v. Bindon, 344, 849. Sweetzer v. Sones, 66, 866. Swegle V. Belle, 781, 862. Sweigart v. Frey, 113. Swetser v. Lowell, 783. Swett V. Cutts, 207, 218, 225, 327. Swett V. Hooper, 890. Swett V. Patrick, 729. Swift V. Coker, 305. Swift V. Dean, 567. Swift V. Lumber Co., 545. Swift V. Mendell, 917. Swift V. Mulkey, 1168. Swift V. Roberts, 666. Swift V. Thompson, 75. Swigart v. Walker, 1244. Swinborne v. Swinborne, 674. Switzer v. Allen, 80. Switzer v. Knapp, 1309. Switzgable v. Worseldine, 1898. Sword V. Keith, 1531. Sword V. Low, 63. Swords V. Edgar, 589. Sydnor v. Palmer, 683, 686, 1178. Sydnor v. Sydnor, 1032. Syer v. Bundy, 1356. Sykes v. Betts, 830. Sylvester v. Sylvester, 1004. Sylvester v. Wilson, 1016. Syme v. Harvey, 71. Symonds v. Hall, 601, 605. Syms V. New York, 514. T Tabele v. Tabele, 363, 369. Tabler v. Wiseman, 716, 723, 734. Tabor v. Hamlin, 878. Taffe V. Warnick, 75. Taf t V. Boyd, 878. Taft V. Stetson, 69. Taft V. Stevens, 859. Taft V. Taft, 998, 1333, 1334, 1338, Taggart v. Murray, 999, 1499. Taggart v. Risley, 1210, 1363. Taggart v. Warner, 159. Tainter v. Clark, 1086, 1134. Tainter v. Cole, 676, 718. Tait v. Central Lunatic Asylum, 516. Taite v. Swinstead, 1119. Talamo v. Spitzmiller, 617, 653. Talbot v. Chamberlin, 1369. Talbot V. Whipple, 70. Talbott V. Braddell, 985. Talbott V. King, 174. Taliaferro v. Burwell, 340. Taliaferro v. Gay, 769, 851, 958. Tallmadge v. Bank, 141. Tallman v. Earle, 508. Tallman v. Murphy, 551. Tallman v. Wood, 1016. Tallman v. Smith, 881. Tallman v. Snow, 747. Taltarem's Case, 290. Tancred v. Christy, 619. Tanerman v. Lippincott, 589. Taney v. Fahnley, 1413. Tanner v. Hicks, 803. Tanner v. Hills, 602. Tanner v. Radford, 953. Tanner v. Skinner. 1061. Tanner v. Volentine, 131, 223, 367. Tanney v. Tanney, 679. Tantlinger v. Sullivan, 604. Taplin v. Jones, 161. TappcndorfE v. Downing, 11. Tapscott V. Williams, 1459. Tarbell V. Durant, 874. Tarbell v. West, 1343. Tarpenning v. Cannon, 1373. Tarrant v. Swain, 438. Tarver v. Tarver, 1506. Tasker v. Bartlett, 1309. Tassell v. Smith, 979. Tate V. Foshee, 719, 730. Tate V. Goff, 449. Tate V. Parish, 198. Tate V. Stooltzfoos, 1811. Tatro V. Tatro, 398, 394. Tattersall v. Howell, 738. Taul V. Campbell, 701. Tantlinger v. Sullivan, 519. Tauton v. Costor, 655. TABLE OF CASES. clxxxvii [References are to sections : Vol. I, contains S§ 1-735 ; Vol. II, 88 736-1541.] Tayloe v. Bond, 1538. Tayloe v. Gould, 343. Taylor v. Adams, 7ti8. Taylor v. Baldwin, 689, 815. Taylor y. Bradley, 602. Taylor v. Bray, 1185. Taylor v. Cole, 655. Taylor v. Collins, 334. Taylor y. Coots, 960. Taylor v. Cresswell, 1475. Taylor v. DeBus, 535. Taylor v. Eatman, 1109, 1133. Taylor v. Fickas, 316. Taylor v. Pried, 708. Taylor v. Galloway, 1118. Taylor v. Grange, 1099, 1100. Taylor v. Hampton, 190. Taylor v. Horde, 1197. Taylor v. Kurd, 290. Taylor v. Kearn, 956. Taylor v. King, 903, 1393. Taylor v. Ladd, 1326. Taylor v. Lawrence, 390. Taylor v. Maris, 825. Taylor v. Marlindale, 111. Taylor v. Mason, 740. Taylor v. McLain, 769. Taylor v. Meads, 344, 851. Taylor v. Miles, 1066. Taylor V. Millard, 141. Taylor v. Mitchell, 1485. Taylor v. Morton, 1804. Taylor V. Moseley, 828, 1846.. Taylor v. Needliam, 1202. Taylor v. Owen, 1453. Taylor v. Pugh. 385. Taylor v. Railroad Co., 750. Taylor v. Sample. 889 Taylor v. Slibbert, 838, 1346. Taylor v. Street, 1311. Taylor v. Sutton, 743. Taylor v. Taylor, 884, 894, 1008, 1026, 1134. Taylor v. Von Schroeder, 1067. Taylor v. "Waters, 361. Taylor v. Wa-kins, 68. Taylor v. Welch, 224, 336, 337. Taylor v. Jamira, 497. Tazewell v. Smilh, 1489. Teacle's Estate, 1498. TeafE v. Hewitt, 45, 48, 49. Teal V. Auty, 1391. Teal V. Hinchman, 879. Teal V. Walker, 764, 851. Teal V. Woodworth, 733. Teass v. St. Albans, 1391, 1396. Teflt V. Munson, 883. Telfair v. Slead, 1181. Telford v. Frost, 1239. Teller v. Boyle, 499. Temple v. Hammock, 1099. Temple v. Mead, 1476. Temple v. Scott, 1005, 1101. Tempest v. Rawling, 486. Templeman v. Biddle, 307. Templeton v. Voshloe, 317. Tenant v. Goldwin, 5, 149, 313. Ten Eyck v. Church, 497. Ten Eyck v. Craig, 861. Ten Eyck v. Witbeck, 1345. Tenny v. Agar, 1032. Tenn. & Coosa R. R. Co. v. Railroad Co., 746. Terhune v. Colton, 880. Terrell v. Allison, 954. Terrell v. Andrew, 1337. Terrell v. Frazier, 1290. Terrell v. Weymouth, 1383. Terry v. Allen, 322. Terry v. Briggs, 1033. Terry v. Chandler, 1397. Terry v. Drabenstadt, 1461. Terry v. Robins, 61. Terry v. Rosell, 767, 768. Terstegge v. German Benevolent Soc, 490. Tew V. Jones, 619. Tewksbury v. Bronson, 830. Tewksbury v. MagrafE, 567. Texas West. R. R. Co. v. Wilson, 163, Tharp v. Feltz, 638. Tharpv. Yarbrough, 1288. Tharpe v. Dunlap, 808, 816. Thaxter v. Turner, 170. Thayer v. Arnold, 358, 359, 360. Thayer v. Bacon. 1236. Thayer v. Brooks, 301. Thayer v. Cumence, 1417, 1480. Thayer V. Mann, 921. Thayer v. Payne, 158. Thayer v. Thayer, 886. Thayer v. Waples, 518. Thayer v. Wellington, 1484. The Armistad, 1241. Thebaud v. Hollister, 871. The Distilled Spirits, 1368. Their v. Barton, 543. Thellusson v. Woodford, 1030. Theurer v. Nantre, 67. The Rebeckah, 1232. Theriot v. Michel, 711. Thibodaux v. Anderson, 900. Thiebaud v. Bank, 512, 513. Thielman v. Carr, 48. Thigpen v, Maget, 563. Third Nat. Bank v. Gas Co., 1067. Thistle V. Buford, 1311. Thoburn v. Doscher, 859. Thomace v. Thomace, 1035. Thomas v. Black, 565, 643, 1130, 1185. clxxxviii TABLE OF CASES. LReferences are to sections : Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735 ; "Vol. II, §§ 736-1541.] Thomas v. Bowman, 1369. Thomas v. Church, 1431. Thomas v. Cochrane, 366. Thomas v. Coole, 1329. Thomas v. Cfont, 74, 78. Thomas v. Crofut, 74, 78, 338, 336, 867. Thomas v. Davis, 48. Thomas v. Frost, 513. Thomas v, Gammel, 378. Thomas v. Garvan, 716. Thomas v. Gregg, 398. Thomas v. Hughes 340. Thomas v. Huklll, 531. Thomas v, Jones, 1117. Thomas v. Kingsland, 586. Thomas v. Levering, 1499, 1540, 1541. Thomas v. Mansfield. 163, 784. Thomas v. Marshfield, 1387. Thomas v. Mitchell, 935. Thomas v. Morrisett, 769. Thomas v. Nelson, 500, 630, 653. Thomas v. Paclcer, 617, 653. Thomas v. People, 1508 Thomas v. Pickering, 684. Thomas v. Roberts, 1381. Thomas v. Simmons, 873. Thomas v. Sorrell, 133, 371. Thomas v. Standiford, 1064, 1068. Thomas v. Stickle, 1484, 1443. Thomas v. Thomas, 817, 1004. Thomas v. Von KapfE, 840, 1453. Thomas v. Wyatt. 784. Thomas' Appeal, 881. Thomason v. Dayton, 1303. Thomasson v. Wilson, 543, 556. Thompkins v. Mitchell, 817. Thompkins v. Wheeler, 793, 1318. Thompson v. Banks, 147. Thompson v. Barber, 1379. Thompson v. Bertram, 813. Thompson v. Bostick, 694. Thompson v. Bowman, 708, 709. Thompson v. Burhans, 1161, 1168. Thompson v. Burra, 398. Thompson v. Catlett, 1336. Thompson v, Cartwright, 1367. Thompson v. Chandler, 881. Thompson v. Christie, 531, 531. Thompson v. Cline, 1541. Thompson v, Cochran, 366. Thompson v. Conant, 1050. Thompson v. Craigmyle, 43. Thompson v. Crocker, 301. Thompson v. Cummings, 610. Thompson v. Kasley, 163. Thompson v. Egbert, 404. Thompson v. Flathers, 489. Thompson v, George, 881. Thompson v. Gibson, 303. Thompson v. Green, 1197. Thompson v. Harris, 1391. Thompson v. Hanfelt, 1166. Thompson v. Heffner, 817. Thompson v. Heywood, 334, 909. Thompson v. Hickey, 851. Thompson v. Holder, 716. Thompson v. Hoop, 1034, 1035. Thompson v. Ish, 1473. Thompson v. Jackson, 1319. Thompson v. Johnson, 1311, 1313. Thompson v. Jones, 893. Thompson v. King, 348, 439, 438, 456. Thompson v. Leach, 1010. Thompson v. Lee, 861. Thompson v. Lyman, 837. Thompson v. Lyon, 1113. Thompson v. McCorkle, 390. Thompson v. McElarney, 261, 372, 373. Thompson v. Morrow 430. Thompson v. Motor Road Company, 1377. Thompson v. Pioche, 1350. Thompson v. Railroad Co., 1004. Thompson v. Sanders, 1458. Thompson v. Sheppard, 468, 813. Thompson v. Simpson. 1338. Thompson v. Smith, 954. Thompson v. Strickland, 1281. Thompson v. Thompson, 306, 373, 813, 869, 1067, 1297. Thompson v. Tryon, 994. Thompson v. Vinton, 59, 64, 917. Thompson v. Waterlow, 149, 153. Thompson v. Young, 1514, 1519. Thompson's Estate, 298, 1 131. Thomson v. Adv. Gen. 1486. Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Land Imp. Co., 581. Thomson v. Peake, 1062, 1096. Thomson v. Smith, 821. Thorpe v. Goodall, 1107. Thorn v. Sutherland, 78, 535. Thorn v. Thorn, 438, 713, 733. Thorn v. Wilson, 1383. Tliornbury v. Thornbury, 393. Thornbury v. Wiggins, 662. Thome v. WooUcome, 535, 543. Thornell v. Brockton, 1380. Thornhill v. Hall, 1514. Thorniley v. Peters, 796. Thornton v. Bank, 678. Thornton v. Bradley, 631. Thornton v. Carver, 562. Thornton v. Grant, 95. Thornton v. Ins. Co., 845. Thornton v. Irwin, 878. Thornton v. Knox, 809. Thornton v. Kreppy, 340, 345. Thornton v. Payne, 487. TABLE OF OASES. clxxxix IReferences are to sections : Vol. I, contains 8§ 1-735 ; "Vol. II, 88 736-1B41.1 Thornton v. Pigg, 879, 893. Thornton v. Smith, 203. Thornton v. Thornton, 701. Thornton v. Trammell, 738, 1412. Thorp V. Durbon, 814. Thorp V. Merrill, 836, 1335. Thorpe v. Brumfitt, 145. Thrall v. Spear, 748. Thrapp v. Field. 521. Thrasher v. Ballard, 1118. 1121. Thrasher v. East Lon. Water Works, 79. Thrasher v. Pinkard, 355, 420, 425. Thredgill v. Pintard, 804. Thrift V. Delaney, 1237. Throckmorton v. Pence, 716. Throckmorton v. Price, 836, 837, 1331, 1334 1339 Thrust'on v. Hancock, 238, 242. Thruston v. Masterson, 674. Thunder v. Belcher, 313, 653. Thurber v. Dwyer, 617. Thurston v. Dickinson, 689. Thurston v. Maddocks, 438. Thurston v. Minke, 714, 715, 725. Thwing V. Davison, 1409. Tibballs v. Jacobs, 1318. Tibbetts v. Home, 64. Tibbetts v. Leeson, 1431. Tibbetts v. Penley, 201. Tibbetts v. Percy, 572. Tibbetts v. Tibbets, 206. Tice V. Derby, 679. Ticknor v. Dodd, 866. Ticknor v. McClelland, 43. Ticknor's Estate, 1515. Tienken v. Tienken, 995. Tier v. Pennell, 1106. Tiernan v. Burns, 384. Tiernan v. Thurraan, 1344. Tierney v. Brown, 1373. Tifft V. Horton, 64. Tilden v. Green, 1022, 1521, 1523. Tilden v. Tilden, 698, 1443. Tiley v. Hotel Co., 829. Tilford V. Fisher, 543. Tilford V. Torrey, 1066, 1068. Tilghman v. Little, 550. Tillar v. Bass, 430. Tilley v. King, 738. Tilllnghastv. Bradford, 1080. Tillinghast v. Champlin, 371, 713. Tillinghast v. Coggeshall, 344, 1011, 1012, 1016, 1018, 1082. Tillinghast v. Holbrook, 1382. Tillman v. DeLacy, 48, 58, 68. ■ Tillman v. People, 171. Tillman v. Spann, 1167. Tillnies v. Marsh, 301. TlUon V. Ins. Co., 846. Tillotson V. Prichard, 1453. Tillotson V. Webber. 1280. Tilton V. Emery, 1198. Tilton V. Hunter, 1343. Tilyou V. Reynolds, 566. Timlin v. Oil Co., 591. Timmons v. Rowlison, 557, 634. Tinckler v. Prentice, 497. Tingle v. Fisher, 816. Tinicum Pishing Co. v. Carter, 91, 97, 132, 102, 1251. Tink V. Walker, 372. Tinker V. Forbes, 141, 143, 143, 146, 156, 163, 1403, 1405. Tinkham v. Arnold, 160. Tinney v. Ashley, 821. Tinsley v. Craig, 361. Tinsley v. Ryan, 877. Tinsley v. Tinsley, 809. Tinsman v. Railroad Co., 303. Tipton V. Martin. 452, 462. Tisdale v. Risk, 389. Tisdale v. Tisdale, 674. Tisher v. Beckwitn, 1235. . Titchenell v. Jackson, 1059, 1061. Titley v. Wolstenholme, 901. Titman v. Moore, 462. Titsworth v. Stout, 674. Titus V. Ins. Co., 842. Titus V. Neilson, 367, 369, 963. Tobey v. McAllister, 809. Tobey v. Moore, 300, 283, 989, 1433, 1435. Tobey v. Railroad Co., 964. Tobey v. Secor, 1158, 1176. Tobin V. Young, 569. Toby V. Reed, 310, 858. Tod Y. Baylor, 419, 430. Todd V. Plight, 588. Toddv. Ins. Co., 843. Todd V. Jackson, 556, 655, 658. Todd V. Munson, 1076. Todd V. Outlaw, 791, 1311. Todd V. Oviatt, 346. Todd V. Railroad Co., 158, 178. Todd V. Sawyer, 1118. Todd V. Wortman, 1113. Todd's Will, 1506. Toledo Consolidated, etc. R. R. Co. v. Railroad Co., 108. Toleman v. Postbury, 583. Tolle V. Orth, 631. Toller V. Atwood, 1015. Tolles V. Winton, 48, 58, 65. ToUeson v. Blackstock, 1059. Tollman v. Mankato, 218. Tolman v. Emerson, 1195. Tolman v. Smith, 881, 931. Tome V. Loan Co., 938. Tome V. Merchants, etc. Co., 835. cxc TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections : "Vol. I, contains 8§ 1-735 ; Vol. II, §§ 73&-1541.] Tomle V. Hampton, 593. Toms V. Boyes, 833. Toms V. Owen, 1318. Tomlln V. Hilyard, 439, 1173. Tomlin v. Railroad Co., 8, 9, 97, 234. Tomlinson v. Dighton, 1118. Tomlinson V. Ins. Co., 847. Tomlinson v. Thompson, 337, 857. Tomlinson's Estate, 1496. Tompkins v. Merriam, 1513. Tompkins v. Miller, 714. Tompson v. Kenyon, 914. Tomson's Estate, 398. Tonawanda Railroad Co. v. Munger, 358. Toner v. Collins, 1034. Tong V. Eifort, 464. Tongue v. Nutwell, 1033. Tooke V. Hardeman, 403, 416. Tooker v. Annesley, 301. Toole V. Beckett, 49«, 593. Tooley v. Dibble, 1334. Tooley v. Kane, 947. Toomer v. Randolph, 968. •Toomes v. Conset, 977. Toomey v. McLean, 361. Toothe V. Eryce, 143. Tootle V. Clifton, 319. Topeka v. Cowee, 175, 177. Topping v. Brown, 833. Topping V. Sadler, 705. Tormey v. Gerhart, 965. Torrence v. Carbry, 361. Torrey v. Burnett, 78. Torrey v. Cook, 879, 893. Torrey v. Delavitt, 868. Torrey v. Forbes, 1170. Torrey v. Walles, 497, 639. Torriano v. Young, 338. Torry v. Black, 332. Totel V. Bonnefoy, 162, 319, 366. Toulmin v. Steere, 1366. Tousley v. Tousley, 836, 1336, 1359. Tourtellat v. Phelps, 1402. Towerson v. Jackson, 563. Town V. Ammigdon, 1093. Town V. Armstrong, 593. Town V. Needham, 733. Town V. Woodbury, 885. Towne v. Butterlield, 635. Towne v. Fiske, 57. Towne v. Rumsey, 453. Towns V. Bowers, 748. Townsend v. Brown, 1333. Townsend v. Coxe, 1364. Townsend v. Downer, 720. Townsend v. Hubbard, 1301. Townsend v. Payne, 957. Townsend v. Peterson, 781. Townsend v. Tickell, 1319. Townsend v. Windham, 1107, 1519. Townsend's Case, 684.. Townshend v. Frommer, 716, 1101. Townshend v. Thompson, 866. Townshend v. Long, 869. Tozer v. Jackson, 1492. Trabue v. Ingles, 954. Tracey v. Shumate, 735 Tracy v. Albany Exch. Co., 490, 513, 513, 514. Tracy v. Atherton, 160, 163, 163, 1196. Tracy v. Craig, 1094. Tracy v. Hereford, 395. Tracy v. Jenks, 836, 1335. Tracy v. Lincoln, 1231. Tracy v. Newton, 1176. Trader's Ins. Co. v. Race, 845. Trader's Nat. Bank v. Woodlawn Manuf. Co., 1339, 1351. Tradesmen's Build, etc. Asso. v. Thompson, 874. Traflord v. Boehm, 113. Trafton v. Hawes, 1362, 1363, 1396, 1399 Traip v. Traip, 1198. Trambley v. Luterman, 311. Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 338, 343. Traphagen v. Bunt, 1066. Traphagen v. Luny, 744, 1110. Trapier v. Waldo, 938. Trapnall v. Brown, 1065. Trappes v. Harter, 65. Trask v. Graham, 536, 537. Trask v. Patterson, 153, 350. Trask V. White, 897. Traute v. White, 350. Travis v. Milne, 1352. Trawick v. Davis, 1476. Trayser v. University, 889. Treadway v. Sharon, 48, 78. Treadwell v. Cordis, 1538. Treadwell v. McKeon, 1075. Treadwell v. Moon, 880. Treakle v. Gibson, 895. Treat v. Bates, 216. Trebble v. Frame, 655. Trecothick v. Austin, 937. Tredwell v. Inslee, 153, 164. Tremain v. Weatherby, 1168. Tremeere v. Morison, 538. Trenholm v. Wilson, 367, 978. Trenooth v. Gilbert, 684. Trentman v. Neff, 1373. Treon v. Emerick, 1379. Trevett v. Adams, 1377. Trexler v. Holler, 1037. Trezise v. Lacy, 828. Trickey v. Schlader, 166. Trimmier v. Winsmith, 437, 463, TABLE OF CASES. cxci [References are to sections : Vol. I, contains 88 1-T35 ; Vol. II, §8 736-1541.] Trinity Church v. Higgins, 497. Tripe v. Marcy, 838, 898, 1343. Triplett v. Sayre, 945. Tritch V. Norton, 831. Tritt V. Col well, 351. Troll V. Carter, 1075. Tromnas v. Mahlman, 430. Trope V. Kerns, 833. Trotter V. Dobbs, 436. Trotter v. Erwin, 804. Truup V. Haight, 936. Trout V. Eumble, 1210. Trowbridge v. Brookline, 337. Trowbridge v. Cross, 371, 438. Trowbridge v. Sypher, 369. True V. Nicholls, 387. Truebody v. Jacobson, 804. Trower v. Knight, 1119. Trull V. FuUer, 58, 61. Trull V. Granger, 498. Trull V. Skinner, 776, 861, 977. TruUinger v. Kofoed, 830. Trumbull V. Gibbons, 1033, 1475. Truman v. Lore, 1305, 1313, 1314, 1317. Trumpower v. Marcy, 1346. •Trusdall v. Lehman, 379. Truss V. Old, 575. Trust Co. V. Munson, 890. Trustees v. Connolly, 785, 913. Trustees v. Cowen, 170, 1453. Trustees v. Hoboken, 184, 185. Trustees v. Indiana, 109. Trustees v. Kirk, 1163. Trustees v. Lynch, 743, 1435. Trustees v. Manning. 1311. Trustees v. Mayor, 185. Trustees V. Otis, 171. Trastees v. Schrall, 8, 1386. Trustees v. Snell, 949. Trustees v. Spencer, 138. Trustees v. Streeter, 849. Trustees v. Strong, 1346. Trustees v. Wheeler, 1346, 1349. Trustees v. Wright, 804. Trutts V. Spats, 1403. Tryon r. Huntoon, 1067, 1373 Tryon v. Munson, 768. Tubbs V. Ins. Co., 843. Tubervil v. Stamp, 590. Tuckahoe Canal Co. v. Railroad Co. , 107. Tucker v. Andrews, 385. Tucker v. Byers, 563. Tucker v. Clark, 1438. Tucker v. Fenno, 915. Tucker v. Field, 784, 1373. Tucker v. Jackson, 959. Tucker v. Jones, 1403. Tucker v. Keeler, 853. Tucker V. Linger, 303. Tucker v. Morland, 1383. Tucker v. Newman, 333. Tucker v. Tilton, 1365. Tucker v. Wells, 474. Tuder v. Water Works, 335. Tuffnell V. Page, 1485. Tufts V. Adams, 1458, 1465. Tuit V. Smith, 1535. Tulane v. Clifton, 883. Tulk V. Maxay, 1434. Tumlinson v. Swinney, 430, 463, Tunstall v. Christian, 337. Tunison v. Chamblin, 1381. Turman v. Bell, 979, 1346. Turman v. White, 1013. Turner v. Argo, 439. Turner v. Baker, 1397, 1398, Turner v. Bachelder, 605. Turner v. Bennett, 457. Turner v. Bernheimer, 466 Turner v. Cameron, 56. Turner v. Gates, 1415. Turner v. Dartmouth, 167. Turner v. Doe, 633. Turner v. Donnelly, 1344. Turner v. Gqodrich, 1458. Turner v. Hebron, 93, 99. Turner v. Johnson, 899, 973, 980, 981. Turner v. Kennedy, 51. Turner v. McFee, 1395. Turner v. Meymott, 556, 655, 656, 658. Turner v. Morris, 435. Turnery. Railroad Co., 1376, 1393. Turner v. Risor, 693. Turner v. Scott, 1468, 1476, 1535. Turner v. Seabury, 309. Turner v. Selectman, 163. Turner v. Smith, 417. Turner v. Thompson, 156. Turner v. Timberlake, 1103. Turner v. Turner, 111. Turner v. Warren, 1278. Turner v. Watkins, 783. Turner v. Wilkinson, 779, 803. Turner v. Williams, 1163. Turnipseed v. Fitzpatrick, 734. Turpin v. Dennis, 1319. Turpin v. Saunders, 1163 Tuthill V. Tracy, 907. Tuttle V. Bean, 533. Tuttle V. Howe, 830. Tuttle V. Manuf. Co., 587, 593, 593. Tuttle V. Reynolds, 566, 635. Tuttle V. Turner, 1319. Tuttle V. Wilson, 383, 416. Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 983. Twining v. Neil, 960. Twitty V, Camp, 278. Tweddell y. Tweddell, 813. CXCll TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections : Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735 ; Vol. II, 8§ 736 1541.] Twogood V. Stephens, 446. Twort V. Twort, 691, 699. Twynam v. Pickard, 137. Tygart v. Peeples, 1508. Tyler v. Cooper, 151, 191, 196. Tyler v. Hammond, 186. Tyler v. Herring, 902, 1113. Tyler v. Jewett, 440. Tyler v. Lake, 344, 873. Tyler v. Mayre, 1087. Tyler v. Taylor, 860. Tyler v. Wilkinson, 160, 310. Tynan v. Paschal, 1504. Tyrell v. Baldwin, 437. Tyrell's Case, 1041. Tyrie v. Fletcher, 133. Tyringham's Case, 87, 88, 89. Tyrrell v. Ward, 874. Tyson v. Blake, 349. Tyson v. Latrobe, 1118. U. TJenger v. Bamberger, 639. Ufford V. Wells, 810. Uhler V. Hutchinson, 836, 1359. Ulbricht v. Eufaula Water Co., 350. Uline V. Railroad Co., 161. UUman v. Hezberg, 646. IJllman v. Jasper, 474. Ulrich V. Dakota, etc. Co., 339, 343. Umland v. Halcombe, 433. Umschield v. Scholy, 1405. Underbill v. Collins, 507. Underbill v. Corwin, 833. Underbill v. Railroad Co., 737. Underwood v. Carney, 140, 196. Underwood v. Bobbins, 1032. Unger v. Leiter, 963. Unger v. Mooney, 677, 684, 1163, 1174, 1178. Unglish V. Marvin, 630. Union v. Bell, 935. Union Bank v. Emerson, 61, 63, 67. Union Bank v. Stafford, 895. Union Central L. Ins. Co. v. Curtis, 890. Union Central L. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 890. Union Co. v. Peckham, 177, 184. Union Co. v. Spr.ague, 900. Union College v. Wheeler, 863. Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Haferd, 868. Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Kirdoff, 1307. Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Lovitt, 769. Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Slee, 803. Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. White, 978. Union Nat. Bank v. Choppin, 716. Union Nat. Bank v. Roberts, 795. Union Oil Co. v. Bliven, 361. Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Kindred, 1165, 1167. Union Trust Co. v. Trumbull, 1163. Union Water Co. v. Murphy, 855. United Land Co. v. Railroad Co., 136. United Security, L. & T. Co. v. Van- degrift, 938. United Society v. Brooks, 268. United States v. Appleton, 156, 1401. United States v. Arredonds, 1350. United States v. Braddock, 1336. United States v. California, etc. Co., 1310, 1344, 1363, 1330. United States v. Cook, 35. United States v. Crosby, 1486. United States v. Dalles Mil. Road Co., 1344, 1330. United States v. Duncan, 406. United States v. Fox, 357. United States v. Huckabee, 1298. United States v. Insley, 1323. United States v. Johnson, 1244. United States v. Kagama, 35. United States v. Kellar, 357. United States v. Nelson, 794. United States v. Pache Co., 1247. United States v. Peachy, 240. United States v. Railroad Co., 1223. United States v. Repentigny, 748, 1349. United States v. Rogers, 36, 97. United States v. Schuler, 18. United States v. Schurz, 1245. United States v. Soule, 38. United States v. Stevenson, 1238, 134L United States v. Stone, 1343. United States v. The J. G. Swan, 103. United States v. Turner, 1335, 1237, 1240. United States v. Wagon Road Co., 1233. United States Mort. Co. v. Gross., 1344. University v. Tucker, 318, 337. Upchurch v. Upchurch, 1478. Updike V. St. Louis, 501. Upham V. Varney, 1040, 1050. Upiohn V. Richland, 313, 333. Upton V. Archer, 794, 1115, 1378. Upton V. Bassett, 1345. Upton V. Townend, 551, 577. Urann v. Coates, 1061. Urey v. Urey, 1541. Uridias v. Morrell, 647. Urquart v. Brayton, 869. Usher v. Moss, 631, 641. Usher v. Richardson, 433. Usilton V. Usilton, 1033. Usina v. Wilder, 933. Utley v. Smith, 787. TABLE OF CASES. cxcin [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains §S 1-735; Vol. II, e§ 736-1541.] Utterbach v. Binns, 1318. Utterbach v. Phillips, 1446. Vail V. Drexel, 804. Vail V. Mix, 162. Vail V. Railroad Co., 741. Vail V. Vail, 1030. Vail V. Weaver, 48, 50, 75. Valentine v. Richard t, 1076. Valintine V. Jackson, 561. Valintine v. Wysor. 1118. Valladingham v. Johnson, 1S83. Valle V. Fleming, 874. Van Alen v. Bank, 1983. Van Arman v. Byingion, 845. Van Nest v. Hunter, 1474. Vanarsdale v. Vanarsdale, 398. Vanbeuren v. Dash, 15.30. Van Bibber v. Frazier, 677, 684, 1178. Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 1233. Van Brunt v. Gordon, 689. Van Buren v. Insurance Companv, 843. ^ Van Buren v. Olmstead, 968, 980. Vance v. Fare, 1373. Vance v. Johnson, 768. Vance v. Lincoln, 776. Vance v. Snyder, 791. Vance v. Vance, 384, 397. Vance v. Wood, 1193. Van Cleaf v. Burns, 395. Van Cloostere v. Logan, 833. Vandall v. Martin, 1176. Vandehaise v. Hughes, 972. Vanderburgh v. Ban Bergen, 361. Vanderbeck v. Hendry, 580. Vandergrift v. Railroad Co., 259. Vanderheyden v. {.'randall, 1010. Vanderkarr v. Vanderkarr, 1416, 1419. Vanderpoll v. Van Allen, 60. Vanderslice V. Knapp, 333, 336, 769, 856. Van Ooren v. Everitt, 308, 571. Van Doren v. Olden, 398. Van Doren v. Todd, 809. Van Dungeu v. Virginia, etc. Co., 688. Van Duyne v. Vreeland, 1533. Vin Duzen v. Van Duzen, 348. Vane v. Bainard, 316. Van Etta v. Evenson, 794, 1378. Van Every v. Ogg, 573. Vanhorn v. Darrance, 736. Van Horns v. Fonda, 674, 679. Van Keuren v. Railroad Co., 56. Vankirk v. Ins. Co. , 843. Van Meter v. McFadden, 799. Vannest v. Fleming, 317, 219. Van Ness v. Pacard, 70, 75, 271. Vannice v. Bergen, 885. Vannorsdall v. Van Deventer, 1288. Van Note v. Downey, 350. Van O'Llndav. Lathrop, 196. Van Orden v. Van Orden, 406. Van Osman v. McGregor, 1313. Van Pelt v. McGraw, 337, 857. Van Ratcliff v. Call, 430. Van Rensselaer v. Barringer, 117. Van Rensselaer v. Bonesteel, 536. Van Rensselaer v. Chadwick, 125. Van Rensselaer v. Gallup, 187. Van Rensselaer v. Hays, 117, 535. Van Rensselaer v. Jewell, 519. Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, 1310, 1366, 1330,1445. Van Rensselaer v. Penniman, 534, 1239. Van Rensselaer v. Radcliffe. 88, 89. Van Rensselaer v. Read, 116, 117. Vansant v. AUmon, 893, 934. Van Santwood v. Sandford, 1304. Van Steenwyckv. Washburn, 405,406. Van Syckel v. Emery, 339. Vansyckle v. Tryson, 257. Van Thorniley v. Peteis, 1359. Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 358, 1144. Van Wagener v. Hopper, 1854. Van Wyck v. Alligor, 333, 338. Van Wyck v. Knowls, 1249. Varn v. Varn, 668- Varney v. Stevens, 396, 1004. Varnum v. Meserve, 904, 910. Varick v. New York, 179. Varrick v. Briggs, 1357. Varrick v. Jackson, 654. Vartie v. Underwood, 368, 910, 1431. Vason V. Ball, 44, 77. Vass V. Hill, 631. Vassault v. Edwards, 1838. Vassen v. Dantek, 161. Vattier v. Hinde, 1356. Vaugban v. Dowden, 978. Vaughan v. Farmer, 1110. Vaughan v. Thompson, 467. Vaughen v. Haderman, .'i7. 77. Vaughen v. Dickes, 1033. Vaughn v. Hixon. 1220. Vaughn v. Powell, 905. Vaughn v. Schmalsle, 785, 836, 1359, 1372. Vaughn v. Stuzaker, 1437. Vaughn V. Tate, 1392. Vaughn v. Tracy, 1350. Vaughn V. Vaughn, 461. Vau.sse V. Russell, 80. Vaux's Case, 514. Vaux's Estate, 1117. Veal V. Fortson, 1383. Veal V. Robinson, 1168, 1301. Veazie v. Parker, 1333. CXCIV TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains §8 1-735; Vol. II, §§ 738 -1541.] Veeder v. Fonda, 949. Veghte V. Raritan, 134. Veghte V. Water Power Co., 191. Vehue v. Mosher, 337, 857. Venahle v Beauchamp, 674, 679, 729, 1419. Venable v. Mercantile Trust Company, 1114. Venable v. Railroad Co., 389. Vennum v. Babcock, 977. Ventress v. Cobb, 764. Ventress v. Creditors, 963. Venture Oil Co. v. Fretts, 537, 531. Verlander v. Harvey, 419, 420. Vermilye v. Express Co., 113. Vermont Sav. Bank v. Elliott, 414. Verner v. Betz, 66, 856. Vernon v. Bethell, 976, 977. Vernon v. Smith, 536, 840, 1448. Vernon v. St. James, 171, 185. Vernon v. Vernon, 407, 1523. Verona v. Railroad Co. , 166. Verry v. Robinson, 391. Very v. Russell, 899, 906. Very v. Watkins, 893. Vest V. Michie, 1350, 1354, 1369. Velter's Appeal, 115. Viall V. Carpenter, 153. Vick V. Gower, 1444. Vick V. Mcllhenny, 878. Vick V. Smith, 911. Vickery v. Roe, 1199. Vickesburg, etc. R. R. Co. v. Patton, 259 Vidal'v. Girard, 1037. Videau v. Griffin, 789, 1300. Viele V. Keeler. 1499. Villa V. Rodriguez, 861, 977, 1330. Villavaso v. Walker, 1351. Villers v. Handley, 991. Villiers v. Villiers, 379. Vincent v. Bevely, 133. Vincent v. Spooner, 384. Vincent v. Walker, 773. Vinson v. Gentry, 373, 383, 390. Vint V. Padget, 979. Vinton v. Beamer, 704. Vinton v. Green, 191, 205. Vinton v. Welsh, 101. Vinton's Appeal, 298. Virgin v. Brubaker, 831. Virgin v. Lamb, 1163 Virginia Coal Co. v. Robinson, 1811. Vintree v. Beasley, 560. Vleit V. Young, 802. Vogle V. Brown, 951. Vogel V. Lethritler, 1486. VoUmer's Appeal, 350, 357. Vomles V. Miller, 259. Von Glahn v. Brennan, 557, Von Tratha v. Bamberger, 1060, 1076, 1078. Voorhees v. Burchard, 147, 1403. Voorhees v. McGinnis, 49, 58, 63, 64. Voorhis v. Freeman, 60. Vorebeck v. Roe, 368. Voris V. Renshaw, 750. Voris V. Sloan, 1033. Voris V. Thomas, 679. Vornberg v. Owens, 449. Vosburgh v. Teator, 1397. Voss V. King, 564, 566, 569, 631, 698, 1179. Vossen v. Dautel, 153, 161. Vredenburgh v. Barnet, 834. Vreeland v. Vreeland, 733, 1319. Vrooman v. Powers, 1494. Vrooman v. Turner, 869, 1459. Vroon V. Ditmas, 831. W Wabash, etc. R. R. Co. v. Illinois, 106. Wabash, etc. R. R. Co. v. People, 106. Wacha v. Brown, 1398. Waco Bridge Co. v. Waco, 1215. Waddell v. Rattnew, 1008. Waddington v. Bristow, 1291. Waddington v. Buzby, 1474. Wade V. Comstock, 1461. Wade V. Dray, 737. Wade V. Greenwood, 804. Wade V. Halligan, 493. Wade V. Jones, 431. Wade V. Malloy, 295, 396. Wade V. Miller, 355, 770, 946. Wade V. Paget, 510, 1084. Wade's Case, 759. Wadkin v. Watson, 1318. Wadleigh v. Janvrin, 53. Wadley v. Williams, 603. Wadsworth v. Tillotson, 308. Wadsworth v. Wendell, 790. Waffle V. Railroad Co., 315, 316. Waggoner v. Jermaine, 203. Wagner v. Bissell, 359. Wagner v. Cleveland, etc. R. R. Co., 54. Wagner v. Hanna, 133, 145. Waguer v. McDonald, 1506. Wagner v. Swygert, 930. Wagner v. Wagner, 1540. Wagner v. White, 547, 654. Wahle v. Reinbach, 313. Wainman v. Hampton, 733. Wainwright v. McCullough, 1251. Wainwright v Sawyer, 1083. Wait v. Baldwin, 1390. Wait V. May, 14, 1888. Walt V. Maxwell, 1281. Wait V. Richardson, 697. TABLE OF CASES. CXCV [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735; Vol. II, §9 736-1541.] Wait V. Wait, 392, 393. Waite V. Frisbie, 1480. Wake V. Hall, 74. Walie V. Wake, 406. Wakefield v. Day, 1415. Wakefield v. Johnson, 831. Wakefield v. Newell, 218. Wakefield v. Boss, 1396. Wakeman v. Roache, 416. Walbridge v. Hammock, 777, 1310. Walcap V. McKinney, 770. Walcom V. Spoor, 364. Walden v. Bodley, 569. Waldeu v. Fitch, 591. Waldo V. Bodley. 1179. Waldo V. Rice, 987. Waldo V. Waldo, 801. Waldrom v. Jacharie, 804. Waldron v. Waldron, 1513. Waldrop v. Railroad Co., 330. Wales V. Bowdish, 1107. Wales V. Coffin, 703. Wales V. Melien, 850. Wales V. Stetson, 109. Walkenhorst v. Lewis, 807, 816, 817. Walker v. Armstrong, 1117. Walker v. Bank, 770, 861, 934. Walker v. Barron, 673. Walker v. Baxter, 871. Walker v. Carleton, 909. Walker r. Carroll, 809. Walker v. Cronin, 570. Walker v. Daly, 1076. Walker v. Denison, 1303. Walker v. Doan, 367. Walker v. Dohan, 538. Walker v. Fitts, 603, 603. Walker v. Furbush, 618, 630. Walker v. Hatton, 534. Walker v. Herron, 359. Walker v. Hobbs, 593. Walker v. Hughes, 1170. Walker v. Jeflreys, 831. Walker v. Kee, 816. Walker v. Kelly, 469. Walker v. Laflin, 733. Walker v. Lewis, 1009. Walker v. Locke, 1060. Walker v. Mackie, 1133. Walker v. M'Donald, 543. Walker v. Mining Co., 783. Walker v. Pritchard, 997, 998, 1003, 1033, 1105. Walker v. Rand, 791. Walker v. Reeves, 536. Walker v. Richardson, 499, 500. Walker v. Schreiber, 838, 1361. Walker v. Schum, 955, 960. Walker v. Seymour, 513. Walker v. Sharpe, 684. Walker v. Sherman, 43, 61, 73, 77. Walker v. Smallwood, 933. Walker v. Smith, 794. Walker v. Summers, 178. Walker v. Thayer, 913. Walker v. Tupper, 708. Walker v. Walker, 391, 515, 781, 1488. 1490. Walker v. Whitehead, 986. Walker v. Wilson, 1460. Walker's Case, 319, 337. Wall V. Arrington, 796. Wall V. Dickens, 401. Wall V. Hill, 430. Wall V. Hinds, 74, 77, 497. Wall V. Pittsburgh Harbor Co., 9, 1351. Wall V. Wall, 1410, 1411, 1476. Wall's Appeal, 1534. Wallace v. Bahlhorn, 509. Wallace v. Berry, 781. Wallace v. Bowens, 1069, 1070. Wallace v. Cherry, 311, 858. Wallace v. Church, 117, 1196. Wallace v. Costen, 1081. Wallace v. Fletcher, 138, 157, 163. Wallace v. Furber, '785. Wallace v. Harmstad, 39, 116, 143, Wallace v. Jewell, 795. Wallace v. Lent, 591, 596. Wallace v. Lewis, 1383. Wallace v. Maples, 816. Wallace v. Scroggins, 484. Wall.ice V. Silsby, 831. Wallace v. Smith, 784, 1080. Wallach v. Van Riswick, 1308, 1366. Walling V. Aiken, 979. Wallingford v. Hearl, 394. Wallis V. Harris, 1333. Wallis V. Harrison, 134. Walls V. Preston, 563. 601. Walmsley v. Milne, 60, 63, 73. Wain's Appeal, 1099. Walpole V. Orford, 1531. Walsh V. Boyle, 808. Walsh V. Dunn, 1464. Walsh V. Insurance Company, 839, 847. Walsh V. Kelly, 393. Walsh V. Lonsdale, 630. Walsh V. Martin, 516. Walsh V. McBride, 1066. Walsh V. Ries, 439. Walsh V. Ringer, 1378. Walsh V. Truesdell, 938. Walsh V. Whitcomb, 801. Walsh V. Young, 850, 1383. Waltermire v. Westover, 895, Walter v. Greenwood, 689. CXCVl TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains S§ 1-735; Vol. II, SS 736-1541.] Walter v. Makin, 151,4. Walter's Will, 1476. Walters v. Jordan, 393. Walters v. Meyer, 563. Walters v. People, 480. Walters v. Pfeil, 239. Walters v. Walters, 873. Walthall V. Goree, 704. Walton V. Ambler, 719. Walton V. Pill, 655. Walton V. Pollansbee, 1003, 1210. Walton V. Walton, 1502. Walton Plow Co. v. Campbell, 795. Walveridge v. Steward, 545. Walz V. Walz, 150. Wannall V. Kern, 1315. Wansbrou^h v. Maton, 51. Waples V. Hays, 1366. Warburton v. Sandy, 1091. Ward V. Amory, 10l6. Ward V. Armstrong, 1053. Ward V. Bull, 504. Ward V. Creswell, 95. Ward V. Davis, 178, Ward V. Day, 523. Ward V. Farmer, 678. Ward V. Fuller, 361. Ward V. Hague, 825. Ward V. Hearne, 1486. Ward V. Huggins, 1170. Ward V. Kelsey, 496, 505. Ward V. Kilpatrick, 77. Ward V. Krull, 535. Ward V. Lewis, 1061. Ward V. Lumley, 499. Ward V. Neal, 156. Ward V. Rapp, 368. Ward V. Robertson, 153. Ward V. Seymour, 874. Ward V. Sheppard, 300. Ward V. Waddington, 319. Ward V. Ward, 191, 275, 401, 1067. Ward V. Warren, 163. Ward's Case, 320. Warden v. Asburner, 113. Wardle v. Claxton, 344. Ware v. Cann, 740. Ware v. Chew, 190, 197, 206. Ware v. Egmont, 838. Ware v. Hylton, 1153, 1157. ■Ware v. McQuinn, 1392. Ware v. Owners, 430, 711. Ware v. Washington, 363. Ware v. Weatlinall, 1461. Ware v. Wisner, 1501, 1508. Warebime v. Build. Asso., 939, Warfield v. Henning, 141. Warfield v. Lindell, 577, 1178. Wargent v. HoUings, 1504. Waring v. King, 631. Waring v. Loder, 839. Waring v. Smith, 942. Waring v. Ward, 813. Waring v. Waring, 1081. Waring v. Williams, 1878. Wark V. Willard, 833. Warn v. Bickford, 1489. Warn v. Brown, 1383. Warn r v. Abbey, 563, 603. Warner v. Association Co., 848. Warner v. Beach, 1501. Warn?r v. Bennett, 748, 758. Warner v. Blakeman, 908. W-arner v. Bull, 1385. Warner v. Cammack, 437. Warner v. Howell, 1130. Warner v. Husington, 601. Warner v. Ins. Co., 1116. Warner v. Southworth, 1393. Warner v. Sprigg, 1017. Warner v. Van Alstyne, 366. Warner v. Warner, 1070. Warner v. Winslow, 885. Warnock v. Harlow, 1090, 1345. Warren v. Adams, 1064. Warren v. Blake, 141, 153, 186. Warren v. Bowdran, 1161, 1194. Warren v. Branch, 810, 812. Warren v. Brown, 166, 178. Warren v. Chambers, 1886. Warren v. Foreman, 960. Warren v. Fredericks, 1165, 1194, Warren V. Jacksonville, 166. Warren v. Kelly, 659. Warren v. Leland, 268. Warren v. Lovis, 776. Warren v. Lynch, 1377, 1308. Warren v. Lyons, 185. Warren v. Matthews, 95. Warren v. Peterson, 462. Warren v. Steere, 1067. Warren v. Sweet, 838, 1350. Warren v. Twilley, 362, 391. Warren v. Warren, 871. Warren v. Webb, 1539. Warren v. Williams, 363. Warriner v. Rogers, 1061. Warwick v. Bruce, 43. Warwick v. Warwick, 1362, 1477. Washburn v. Burns, 705. Washburn v. Hammond, 1221. Washburn v. Van Sleenwyck, 406. Washburn's Appeal, 723. Washington Bridge Co. v. State, 109. Washington Ice Co. v. Shorthall, 8, 333, 836, 1386. Washington, etc. R. R. Co. v. Caze- nove, 866. Washington, N. Gas Co. v. Johnson, 535. TABLE OF CASES. CXCVU [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains §§ 1-T35; Vol. II, gS 736-1541.] Wass V. Buckuam, 343. Wasson v. Connor, 1313. Waterbury v. Netherland, 404. Water Co. v. Lynn, 57. Waterfall v. Penistone, 63. Waterman v. Alden, 1093. Waterman v. Andrews, 785. Waterman v. Curtis, 973. Waterman v. Greene, 1109. Waterman v. Higgins, 995. Waterman v. Johnson, 796, 1386, 1400. Waterman v. Matteson, 336, 337, 857. Waterman v. Smith, 1335. Waterman v. Soper. 7. Waters v. Bailey, 511. Waters v. Bpssel, 938. Waters v. Crabtree, 779. Waters v. Hubbard, 8B8. Waters V. Lilly, 94, 133. Waters v. Randall, 776. Waters v. Stickney, 1508. Waters v. Tazewell, 344, 1537. Waters v. Waters, 883. Waters v. Young, 633. Watertown v. Cowen, 170. Watford v. Gates, 850. Wathen v. Glass, 851. Watherell v. Howells, 306, 325. Watkins v. Clifton, 817. Watkins v. Duvall, 544. Watkins v. Eaton, 679, 680. Watkins v. Goodall, 580, 592. Watkins v. Green, 1178. Watkins V. Holman, 930, 1131, 1373. Watkins v. Lynch, 1388. Watkins v. Nash, 1338. Watkins v. Peck, 138. 163. Watkins v. Thornton, 343, 346. Watkins v. Tucker, 1406. Watkins v. Vrooman, 800. Watkins v. Watkins, 893, 899. Watkins v. Young, 1155. Watriss v. Bank, 79. Watroses v. Allen, 743. Watrous v. Morrison, 1167, 1391, 1396, 1399. Watson V. Bartlett, 309. Watson V. Bondurant, 833, 1351. Watson V. Dodd, 1003. Watson V. Dundee, etc. Co., 871, 956. Watson V. Fletcher, 542. Watson V. Foxon, 1001. Watson V. Gray, 353. Watson V. Gregg, 1164. Watson V. Hillman, 792, 1318, 1321. Watson V. Jones, 1391. Watson V. Mercer, 1838. Watson V. Mort. & Invest. Co., 769. Watson V. Murray, 1066, 1346. Watson V. Neal, 951. Watson V. Pipes, 1483. Watson V. Pugh, 563. Watson V. Sherman, 906. Watson V. Smith, 1003, 1007, 1023. Watson V. Sutro, 723. Watson V. Watson, 343,348, 363, 1215, 1474, 1517. Waison's Appeal, 1050. Watson's Estate, 374. Watt V. Ganahl, 1176. Watterman v. Silberberg, 773. Watters v. Bredin 749, 1377, 1454. Watts V. Ball, 344, 350. Watts V. Brooks, 1399. Watts V. Coffin, 89, 553. Watts V. Gallagher, 458. Watts V. Howard, 398. Watts V. Kelson, 139. Watts V. Leggett, 449. Watts V. Parker, 1439. Watts V. Watts, 1183. Watts-Campbell Co. v. Yuengling, 48, 75. Waugh V. Montgomery, 877. Waugh V. Waugh, 1405. Way V. Myers, 551. Way V. Reed, 535. Way V. Way, 72. Wayne County Sav. Bank v. Stock- well, 175. Wayt V. Carmithen, 782, 802. Wead V. Gray, 1031. Wead V. Railroad Co., 1380, 1400. Weak V. Escott, 514. Weak V. Taylor, 490. Weare v. Van Meter, 679, 680, 688. Weart v. Crusen, 287. Weatherford v. King, 453. Weatherhead v. Stoddard, 999. Weathersbee y. Sleeper, 53, 78. Weaver v. Brown, 812. Weaver v. Gregg, 362, 889, 391, 409. Weaver v. Wible, 677, 1178. Webb V. Bird, 135. Webb V. Church, 345, 376. Webb V. Claverden, 1541. Webb V. Demopolis, 9, 170. Webb V. Haselton, 769. Webb V. Jones, 1500. Webb V. Paternoster, 264. Webb V. Portland Manuf. Co., 305. Webb V. Railroad Co., 590. Webb V. Rice, 781. Webb V. Richardson, 1160. Webb V. Robinson, 808. Webb V. Rorke, 861. Webb V. Russell, 501, 543. Webb V. Seekins, 543. Webb V. Thompson. 1385. Webb V. Webb, 1378. CXCVIU TABLE OF CASES. [Referenceg are to sections: Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735; Vol. 11, §8 736-1541.] Webb V. York, 977. Webb's Appeal, 1092. Webber v. Chapman, 1190. Webber v. Closson, 258, 259. Webber v. Curtis, 909. Webber v. Lee, 133. Webber v. Ramsey, 888. Webber v. Shearman, 559. Webber v. Vogel, 140. Weber v. Anderson, 1199. Weber v. Harbor Commissioners, 8, 15, 1247, 1348, 1253, 1253, 138). Webster v. Boddington, 1039. Webster v. Cooper, 379, 747, 1016, 1065, 1412. Webster v. Ellsworth, 346. Webster v. Nichols, 589, 645. Webster v. Singley, 911. Webster v. Stevens, 356. Webster v. Vandeventer, 668, 930, 925. Webster v. Van Steenbergh, 1345. Webster v. Webster, 302, 314, 316. Webster v. Welton, 1034. Weddell v. Hafner, 315. Wedekind v. Hallenberg, 999. Wedge V. Moore, 367. Weed V. Beebe, 938. Weed V. Crocker, 486. Weed V. Keenan, 333. Weed V. Lindsay, 630. Weed V. Mirlck, 900. Weed V. Weed, 1540. Weeks v. Eaton, 864. Weeks v. Maillardet, 693. Weeks v. McBeth, 1504. Weeks V. Railroad Co., 1336. Weeks v. White, 1240. Weeton v. Woodcock, 78. Wegg V. Villers, 1044, 1046. Weick V. Henne, 1493. Weide v. Gehl. 777, 779. Weigall V. Waters, 577. Weighman v. Jones, 1450. Weil V. Churchman, 894. Weil V. McWhorter, 563. Weil V. Uzzell, 928. Weiland v. Townsend, 1113. Weinsteine v. Harrison, 583. Weir V. Batdorf , 1324. Weir V. Humphries, 990. Weir V. Tate, 364. Weir's Appeal, 238. Weis V. Madison, 323. Weis V. Meyer, 190. Weiser v. Weiser, 714, 729. Weisinger v. Cock, 1322. Weisinger v. Muiphy, 684. Welborn v. Anderson, 1168. Welborne v. Downing, 463. Welch V. Agar, 716. Welch V. Allen. 279. Welch V. Ketchum, 1345. Welch V. Myers, 538. Welch V. Nash, 7. Welch V. Porter, 829. Welch V. Taylor, 190. Welch V. Welch, 351. Welch V. Wilcox, 131. Welch's Appeal, 732, 723. Welcome v. Hess, 507. Weld V. Brooks, 175, 181. Weld V. Hornby, 100, 161. Weld V. Traip, 1431. Welfare v. Welfare, 414. Weiland v. Williams, 690. Weiland Canal Co. v. Hathaway, 1330. Weller v. Arnold, 909. Weller v. Snover, 101. Weller v. Weller, 345, 376. Welles V. Castle, 504, 554, 593, 1050, 1080. Wellford v. Chancellor, 1077. Wellington v. Janvrin, 745. Wells V. Banister, 18, 371. Wells V. Beall, 416. Wells V. Caywood, 902. Wells V. Cowles, 17. Wells V. Francis, 819. Wells V. Garbutt, 153, 154. Wells V. Harter, 804. Wells V. Heath, 1055. Wells V. Hornby, 100. Wells V. Hornish, 561. Wells V. Howell, 358, 359. Wells V. Lincoln Co., 960. Wells V. Maples, 61. Wells V. Moore, 373. Wells V. Morrow, 808. Wells V. Neff. 1360. Wells V. Prissly, 487. Wells V. Prince, 293. Wells V. Rice, 953. Wells V. Ritter, 1030. Wells V. Sheerer, 566. Wells V. Somers, 933. Wells V. Thompson, 343. Wells V. Van Dyke, 853, 971, 981. Wells V. Wells, 901, 1503. Welp V. Gunter, 858. Welsh V. Bank, 1868. Welsh V. Brown, 1096. Welsh V. Foster, 1054. Welsh V. Phillips, 767, 768, 864. Welsh V. Schoen, 953. Welsh V. Taylor, 191. Welsh V. Woodbury, 391, 998, 1083, 1105. Wendell v. Van Rensselaer, 1328. Wendt V. Ross, 880. TABLE OP CASES. CXCIX [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains 88 1-735; Vol. II, 88 73&-1541.] Wentworth v. Miller, 608. Wentworth v. Railroad Co., 602. "Wentworth v. Tubbs, 831. West V. Bancroft, 167. West V. Chasten, 937. West V. Davis, 960. West V. Douglas, 1280. West V. Lassels, 123. West V. McMullen, 453. West V. Miller, 985. West V. Reed, 861, 1855. West V. Skip. 1063. West V. Stewart, 1164, 1426. West V. Walker 384. West V. Ward, 438. West V. West, 1260. West V. Weyer, 694. West's Appeal, 885. West Branch Bank, v. Chester, 890. West Covington v. Freking, 183. West Point Iron Co. v. Reymert, 325. West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 108. West Roxbury v. Stoddard, 235, 1386. West Shore Mill Co. v. Edwards, 544. Westbrook v. Gleason, 825, 1346, 1358. Westchester Ins. Co. v. Weaver, 842. Westcott v. Campbell, 420. Westcott V. Delano, 43, 268. Westcott V. Mining Co., 923. Westermeier v. Street, 585. Western v. McDermot, 181, 141, 1423, 1425. Western v. Skiles, 729. Western Granite Co. v. Knickerbocker, 156. Western Maryland College v. McKin- stry, 1476. Western Mass. Ins. Co. v. Riker, 847. Western Nat. Bank's Appeal, 250. Western Railroad Co. v. Railroad Co., 170. Western University v. Robinson, 86. Westervelt v. Voorhis, 824, 826, 1859. Westgate v. Wixon, 70. Westminster v. Brighouse, 241. Westmoreland v. Carson, 1380. Westmoreland v. Foster, 544. Westmoreland, etc. Gas Co. v. De Witt, 228, 545, 1404. Weston V. Arnold, 253. Weston V. Myers, 1478. Weston V. Sampson, 93. Weston V. Stoddard, 723. Weston V. Weston, 995. Westropp V. Elliott, 495. Wetherall v: Harris, 1130. Wetherbee v. Bennett, 1460. Wetherbee v. Ellison, 44, 615, Wetherell v. Brobst, 200. Wetherell v. Hough, 1128. Wethermer v. Hosmer, 584. Wetmore v. Zabriskie, 1099. Wetz V. Beard, 430, 468. Weyant v. Murphy, 980. Whalen v. Cadman, 431. Whalen v. Gloucester, 589. Whaley v. Jarrett, 196. Whall V. Converse, 999. Whalley v. Small, 1341. Whalley v. Thompson, 141. Whalley's Estate, 431. Wharton v. Moore, 855. Wharton v. Stevens, 219. Whatman v. Gibson, 1425. Wheatley v. Baugh, 224, 226, 230. Wheatley v. Calhoun, 708, 712, 827. Wheatley v. Chrisman, 208. Wheatley v. Thomas, 1266. Wheaton v. Gates, 17. Wheeldon v. Burrows, 158, 154. Wheeler v. Addison, 298. Wheeler v. Bedell, 48. Wheeler v. Bedford, 205, 206. Wheeler v. Bent, 1508. Wheeler v. Carpenter, 673. Wheeler v. Clark, 160. Wheeler v. Dascomb, 540. Wheeler v. Frankenthal. 617. Wheeler v. Hatch, 1426. Wheeler v. Howard, 8a2. Wheeler v. Ins. Co., 840. AVheeler v. Kirtland, 389, 1066. Wheeler v. McBain, 1445. Wheeler v. Ruthven, 399. Wheeler v. Schad, 1452. Wheeler v. Smith, 1200. Wheeler v. Sohier, 1458. Wheeler v. Spinola, 1194, 1386. Wheeler v. Walden, 1229. Wheeler v. Wayne Co. , 1440. Wheeler v. Wheeler, 1501. Wheeling v. Campbell, 179, 1190. Wheelwright v. Wheelwright, 1822, 1324. Whetsel v. Roberts, 804. Whetstine v. Wilson, 1531, 1536. Whetstone v. Bowser, 226. Whipple V. Cumberland Manuf . Co , 210. VVhisenant v. Gordon, 1822. Whitaker v. Brown, 1404. Whitbeck v. Cook, 493, 1427, 1431. 1485. Whitbeck v. Skinner, 572. Whitby V. Duffy, 744. White V. Barlow, 1402. White V. Beckwith, 683. White V. Blakemore, 810, 817, 818. White V. Bradley, 150. White V. Brocaw, 1448, 1445. CO TABLE OF CASES. [.References are to seotioas: Vol. I, contams §§ 1-735; Vol. II, §§ 736-1541.] White V. Carpenter, 1066, 1344. White V. Chapin, 133, 198. White V. Connelly, 1313. White V. Crawford, 188, 191. White V. Denman, 826, 1337, 1359 White V. Ditson, 1053. White V. Downs, 788, 810. Wliite V. Elwell, 263. White V. Farley, lOGO. White V. Fitzgerald, 713. White V. Foster, 368, 1344, 1350, 1402. White V. Fox, 795. White V. Foxborough, 175. White V. Fulghum, 444, 445, 446, 457, 474. White V. Hapeman, 1176. White V. Hampton, 980, 1341. White V. Hicks, 1116, 1133. White V. Holland, 617. White V. Howard, 1034, 1486. White V. Hunt, 538. White V. Johns, 795. White V. Kavanaugh, 1079. White V. King, 1390. White V. Land Co., 773. AVhite V. Levy, 633. White V. Luning, 1391. White V. Magarahan, 1331. White V. Mann, 831. White V. Maynard, 261. White V. McPheeters, 1003. White V. Montgomery, 583. White V. Nicholson, 505. White V. Patterson, 1346. White V. Patton, 833, 1314, 1456. White V. Polleys, 445, 446. White V. Pollock, 1330. White V. Pressly, 1461. White V. Railroad Co., 137, 148, 150, 261, 1215. White V. Rittenmeyer, 769. White V. Sawyer, 1527. White V. Sayre, 667, 676, 1379. White V. Secor, 937. White V. Stanfield, 1516. White V. St. Barbe, 1121. White V. Stephens, 904. White V. Story, 413. White V. Stover, 808. White V. Stuart, 692. White V. Tide Water Oil Co., 140. White V. Wagner, 334, 338. White V. Ward, 1161, 1399. White V. White, 295, 457, 1080. White V. Whitney, 1443, 1458. White V. Wiley, 174. White V. Williams, 808. White V. Wilson, 789, 796. White's Appeal, 53, 271. White's Bank v. Nichols, 1395, 1403 White River Tump. Co. v. Railroad Co., 108. White Star Line Steam. Co, v. Morgan, 1338. White Stone Quarry Co. v. Stone Co., 524. White Water Canal Co. v. Vallette, 803. Whitehead v. Bennett, 74, 75. Whitehead v. Clifford, 500, 1339. Whitehead v. Cummins, 369. Whitehead v. Curry, 679. Whitehead v. Hellen, 861. Whitehead v. Middleton, 368. Whitehead v. Morrill, 963. Whitehead v. Ragan, 1376, 1391. Whitehead v. Vineyard, 803. Whitehead v. Wooten, 940. Whitehouse v. Cummings, 153. Whitely v. Fox, 1076. Whitely V. King, 1504. Whiteridge v. Parkhurst, 403. Whiteside v. Singleton, 1168. Whitfield V. Pindar, 124. Whithurst v. Yandall, 812. Whiting V. Bank, 945. Whiting V. Denney, 1460. Whiting V. Whiting, 1031. Whitlock V. Johnson, 1165, 1343. Whitmarsh v. Cutting, 307, 309, 571. Whitmarsh v. Walker, 18, 268. Whitmore v. Learned, 1064. Whitmore v. Shiverich, 769. Whitney v. Allair, 572. Whitney v. Buckman, 782, 787, 1375. Whitney v. Colton, 311. Whitney v. Cotton Mills, 311. Whitney v. Dennison, 1430, 1458. Whitney v. French, 775, 778. Whitney v. Lee, 140. Whitney v. Monroe, 33L Whitney v. Parker, 725. Whitney v. Railroad Co., 131, 819, 1420, 1422, 1423, 1435. Whitney v. Richardson, 134. Whitney v. Slater, 1004. Whitney v. Smith, 1409. Whitney v. Whitney, 1511, 1540. Whitsell v. Mills, 393, 451. Whittaker v. Barker, 600. Whittaker v. Belt, 390. Whittaker v. Hawley, 504, 505. Whittaker v. Perry, 655. Whiltelsey v. Hughes, 903. Whittemore v. Russell, 1033, 1105. Whitten v. Saunders, 818. Whitten v. Whitten, 7i3, 724, 733, 1379. Whittier v. Winkley, 147. Whittington v. Flint, 768, 852. TABLE OF CASES. CCl [Referencfis are to sections : Vol. I, contains §9 1-735 ; Vol. II, §9 736-1541.] Vhittington v. Wright, 1332. Whittle V. Artis, 698. Whittlesey v. Fuller, 668, 704. Whittlesey v. Hoppenyan, 1193. Whittlesey v. Kellogg, 1391. Whitwell V. Warner, 1094. Whitworth v. Berry, 170. Whltworth V. Gangain, 801. Whitzman v. Hirsh, 1462. WhoJey v. Cavanaugh, 1210. Whorton v. Webster, 339. Wlckersham v. Chicago, 1369. Wickersham v. Comerford, 450. Wickes V. Clarke, 348, 387. Wickham v. Halker, 1403. Wickham v. Hawker, 94, 133, 361, 265. Wicks V. Scriven, 295. Wicks V. Westcott, 909. Wier V. Simmons 738, 756, 1413. Wier's Appeal, 338. Wies V. Meyer, 142. Wiggin V. Chance, 470. Wiggin V. Perkins, 995. Wiggin V. Swett, 112. Wiggins V. Lusk, 792. Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Railroad Co., 54, 282. Wight V. Dickson, 514. Wight V. Gray, 51, 58, 68, 69. Wight V. Hicks, 1130. Wightman v. Reynolds, 1305. Wightman v. Sehleifer, 379. Wikoff's Appeal, 1499. Wilber v. Peirce, 886. Wilber v. Sisson, 602. Wilbur V. Moulton, 337, 339. Wilbur V. Nichols, 520. Wilbur V. Tobey, 1153. Wilbur V. Wilbur, 321, 1475. Wilburn v. Shell, 1504. Wilcher v. Thompson, 467. Wilcox V. Allen, 963. Wilcox V. Foster, 885. Wilcox V. Jackson, 1231, 1233. Wilcox V. Montour, etc., Co., 502. Wilcox V. Wheeler, 379. Wilcox V. Wilcox, 693, 713, 891. Wild's Case, 87, 89. Wildbore v. Gregory, 1117. Wilde V. Coutillion, 648, 656. Wilde V. Minsterly, 337. Wilde V. Waters, 78. Wilder v. Davenport, 1441. Wilder v. Haughey, 943. Wilder v. St. Paul, 166, 171, 174, 184. Wilder v. Wheeler, 379. Wildey v. Bonney, 719, 1397. Wildgoose v. Wayland, 1353. Wildmaa v. Wildman, 113. Wilds V. Layton, 314. Wiley V. Bridgman, 1269. Wiley V. Pinson, 935. Wilhelm v. Caylor, 895, 983. Wilhoit V. Tubbs, 1196. Wilkerson v. Allen, 1183. Wilkerson v. Thompson, 1179. Wilker v. Bodington, 480. Wilkes V. Harper, 331. Wilkes V. Smith, 818. Wilkes-Barre v. Wyoming Hist. See, 738. Wilkin V. Johns, 732. Wilkin V. Wilkin, 723. Wilkins v. Fry, 492. Wilkins v. Jewett, 257. Wilkinson v. Allen, 898. Wilkinson v. Brandon, 380. Wilkinson v. Flowers, 853, 893, 897. Wilkinson v. Getty, 1121, 1301. Wilkinson v. Green, 931. Wilkinson v. Joberus, 714, 715. Wilkinson v. Kughler, 598. Wilkinson v. Leland, 1273. Wilkinson v. May, 808. Wilkinson v. Merrill, 431. Wilkinson v. Paddock, 791. Wilkinson v. Power, 806. Wilkinson v. Roper, 1373. Wilkinson v. South, 1028. Wilkinson v. Stuart, 724, 733. Wilkinson v. Thomas, 1155. Wilks V. Back, 1301. Will of Ward, 1500. Willan V. Willan, 514. Willard v. Reas, 804. Willard v. Tillman, 543. Willard v. Ware, 1116, 1117. Willard v. Willard, 714, 715, 716, 720. Willard v. Worsham, 868. Willet V. Burgess, 976. Willet V. Sandford, 1048. Willet's Appeal, 1157. Willey V. Comer, 571. Willey V. Haley. 1027. Willey V. Laraway, 324. Willey V. People, 166. Willey V. Railroad Co., 191. Williams v. Ackerman, 631. Williams v. Angell, 746, 754, 1010, 1012. Williams v. Atkins, 569. Williams v. Beekman, 1461, 1462. Williams v. Blackwell, 101, 1419. Williams v. Burrell, 498. Williams v. Case, 944. Williams v. Cheathan, 781. Williams v. Cleaver, 601. Williams v. Crutcher. 1378. Williams v, Davis, 1296. Williams v. Deriar, 618, 629. ecu TABLE OF CASES. LReferences are to sections : Vol. I, contains §S 1-735 ; Vol. II, 89 736-1611.] Williams v. Earle, 539. Williams v. Evans, 515, 1409, 1499. Williams v. Flood, 268. Williams v. Graves, 1033. Williams v. Hale, 393. Williams v. Hasseil, 734. Williams v. Haywood, 552. Williams v. Hilton, 860. Williams v. Hyde, 1290. Williams v. Ins. &)., 839, 844. Williams v. James, 160. Williams v. Jolinson, 1478. Williams v. Laden, 381. Williams v. Latham, 1320. Williams v. Lucas, 801. Williams v. Mass, 1309. Williams v. McKinney, 1515. Williams v. Moreland, 210. Williams v. Nelson, 165. Williams v. New York, 1251. Williams v. Nolen, 601. Williams v. Otey, 1058. Williams- V. Price, 968. Williams v. Railroad Co., 144, 150. Williams v. Rice, 807. Williams v. Roberts, 804. Williams v. Robinson, 938. Williams v. Robson, 378. Williams v. Safiford, 131. Williams v. Samuels, 814. Williams v. Shelden, 708. Williams v. Smith, 557. Williams v. Spencer, 560. Williams v. Starr, 878, 927. Williams v. Sutton, 698. Williams V. Swetland, 462. Williams v. Talbert, 1411. Williams v. Teachey, 465. Williams v. Turner, 1033, 1033. Williams v. University, 754. Williams v. Vanderbilt, 500, 532. Williams v. Veach, 1485. Williams v. Vreeland, 1075, 1078. Williams v. Wager, 1066, 1067. Williams v. Wait, 566. Williams v. Wallace, 1194. Williams v. Warren, 659. Williams v. Washington, 904. Williams v. Whitaker, 457, 458. Williams v. Williams, 383, 413, 1070. Williams v. Willis, 440. Williams v. Witherel, 438. Williams v. Woodard, 1118. Williams v. Woten, 805. Williams's Appeal, 73, 117, 1093. Williams & Mary College v. Powen,'387. Williamson v. Beckhman, 1081. Williamson v. Berry, 947. Williamson v. Brown, 838, 1350, 1353, 1361. Williamson v. Carskadden, 1313, 1314. Williamson v. Champlin, 934. Williamson v. Daniel, 1032. Williamson v. Hall, 1460. Williamson v. Jones, 318, 1333. Williamson v. Oleson, 308. Williamson v. Railroad Co., 48, 56. Willing V. Peters, 874. Willingham v. Joyce, 515. Willion v. Berkley, 385. Willis v. Albertson. 1395. Willis v. Astor, 513. Willis v. Freeman, 707. Willis V. Gas Co., 520, 539, 531. Willis V. Gattman, 1316. Willis V. Hillis, 1064. Willis V. Hodson, 1373, 1374. Willis V. Lewis, 1806. Willis V. Lucas, 1:79. Willis V. Milk, 431. Willis V. Smith, 1113. Willis V. Watson, 1131. Willison V. Watkins, 568, 1179. Willoughby v. Lawrence, 539. Willoughby v. Matley, 1146. Willoughby v. Willoughby, 480. Wills V. Cooper, 1084. Wills v. Goff, 634. Wills v. Leverich, 1400. Wills V.Summers, 537. Willson V. Treadwell, 593. Willson V. Betts, 1414. Willson V. Watkins, 635. Wilmore v. Stetler, 716, 1337. Wilson V. Anthony, 983. Wilson V. Atkinson, 683. •Wilson V. Beddard, 1478. Wilson V. Bennett, 901. Wilson V. Boyce, 803, 1375. Wilson V. Bnrgett, 805. Wilson V. Chalfant, 367. Wilson V. Christopherson, 464. Wilson V. Cochran, 1417, 1439, 1431, 1435. Wilson V. Cockrill, 1411. Wilson V. Delaplaine, 544. Wilson V. Edmonds, 317. Wilson V. Eigenbrodt, 963. Wilson V. Faircbild, 1395. Wilson V. Finch Hatton, 494. Wilson V. Fine. 1341, 1344. Wilson V. Fleming, 668, 704. Wilson V. Forbes, 1351, 1465. Wilson V. Fredenberg, 459. Wilson V. Gerhardt, 535. Wilson V. Goldstein, 520. Wilson V. Gunning, 1398. Wilson V. Harmon. 113. Wilson V. Hayward, 963. Wilson V. Henry, 1163. TABLE OF CASES. CClll LReferences are to aeotions : Vol. I, contains 89 1-735 ; Vol. II, 88 736-1541.1 "Wilson V. Hill, 839, 840, 1200. Wilson V. Hooper, 770. Wilson V. Hull, 176. Wilson V. Hunt, 1434. Wilson V. Inloes, 99. Wilson V. Ins. Co., 843. Wilson V. Kimmel, 1311, 1813. Wilson V. Mackreth, 365. Wilson V. Maltby, 337, 338, 857. Wilson V. McCullough, 1353. Wilson V. McEwan, 1161. Wilson V. McLenagUan, 383. Wilson V. M'Neal, 1409. Wilson V. Miller, 1350, 1352, 1355. Wilson V. Mills, 464 Wilson V. Mineral Point, 335. Wilson V. Moore, 403. Wilson V. Murpliy, 871. Wilson V. Oatman, 430. Wilson V. Ott, 1501. Wilson V. Parlier, 398, 823, 1004. Wilson V. Parshall, 777, 781. Wilson V. Peelle, 674. Wilson V. Quigley, 1311. Wilson V. Ring, 853. Wilson V. Rodeman, 633. Wilson V. Ross, 782. Wilson V. Smith, 552, 553. Wilson V. Taylor, 467. Wilson V. Traer, 1313. Wilson V. Troup, 7«3. 859, 901. Wilson V. Vanstone, 977. Wilson V. Waddell. 331. Wilson V. White, 999, 1025, 1280, 1287. Wilson V. Widham, 1439. Wilson V. Willes, 96. Wilson V. WUson, 747, 750, 782, 972, 1163. Wiltbanks's Appeal, 298. Wilton V. Tazell, 688. Wilts V. Water Works, 233, 335. Wiltshear v. Cottrell, 60, Wiltshire v. Sidford, 253. Wilworth V. Wilworth, 1514. Wimberly v. Mayberry, 839, 832. Wimer v. Wimor, 715. Winans v. Peebles, 1393. Winant v. Hines, 507. Winchell v. Clark, 1403. Winchester v. Railroad Co., 1367. Wind V. Jekyl. 1. Winder v. Diflfenderffer, 973. Windsor v. Simpkins, 733. Winebrinner v. Weisieger, 467. Wineman v. Hughson, 543. Wineman v. Phillips, 535, 882. Winfield v. Henning, 140, 141, 1434. Wing V. Gray, 43, 75, 615, 1392. Wing V. Hall, 1163. Wing V. Hayden, 464. Wingard v. Tift, 267, 273. Wingerter v. Wingerter, 1075. Wingfleld v. Virgin, 1058. Wingo V. Caldwell, 1165. Winham v. McQuire, 191. Winktield v. Briukman, 1075. Winkleman v. Winkleman, 464. Winn V. Abeles, 239, 1176, Winn V. Cabot, 1374. Winn V. State, 524. Winnetka v. Prouty, 191. Winningham v. Pennock, 1430, Miunipisiogee Paper Co, v. Land Co., 1161. Winship v. Pitts, 320. Winslow V. Cooper, 267. Wiu.slow V. McCall, 1463. Winslow V. Mer. Ins. Co,, 49, 58, 68, 75. Winsmore v. Greenbank, 303. Winsor v. Mills, 278, 1054. Winstandley v. Stipp, 1285, Winstead Sav. Bank v. Spencer, 790, 1310. Winston v. Hodges, 1351. Winston v. Johnson, 150, Winter v, Anson, 809, 1368, Winter v. Brockwell, 369. Winter v. Peterson, 138d, Winter v, Stevens, 556, Winter v. White, 1374, Winterborn v. Chambers, 683. Winterfield v. Strauss, 543, Wintermute v, Heinly, 1540. Wintermute v. Light, 18, 43, 73, 1393. Winters v. Bank, 963, Winters v, De Turk, 416, Winters v. Earl, 777, 981. Winters v. Fair, 8U5, Winthrop v, Fairbanks, 136, 137, 1315, 1403. Winton V. Carmesh, 489, 504, 505. Wire Cloth Co, v, Gardner, 631, 632. Wirt V. May, 14. Wirth V. Sanson, 1242, Wisconsin, etc. R. R. Co. v. Land Co., 769, 774. Wisdom V. Newberry, 582. Wise V. Hyatt, 679. Wise V. Wise, 1352. Wiseley v. Findlay, 722, 724. Wiseman v. Lucksinger, 134, 367. Wiseman's Case, 1260. Wisewall v. Baxter, 893. Witbeck v. Witbeck, 1316. Witham v. Broom, 1050, Withers v. Buckley, 1252, Withers v. Jenkins, 340, 344, 345. Withers v. Larrabee, 618. CCIV TABLE OF CASES. [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735; Vol. II, §§ 73ft-15il.] Withers v. Morrell, 933. Withers v. Patterson, 1508. Withers v. Richardson, 897. Withers v. Sims, 999. Withers V. Yeaden, 110.5. Withington v. Herring, 1303. Withington v. Warren, 1317. Withy V. Mumford, 1458. Witman v. Watry, 1229. Witt V. Carroll, 1065. Witt V. Jefferson, 132. Witt V. Mayor, 681. Witt V. Kailroad Co., 1375. Witte V. Quinn, 748. Witter V. Danitz, 171. Witter V. Dudley, 1346. Witthaus V. Schack, 388. Wittingham v. Lighthipe, 1063. Witts V. Homey, 1066. Woerz V. Kademacher, 1066. Wofford V. McKinna, 785, 1373, 1379. Woloott V. Hamilton, 651.' Wolf V. Bellinger, 1503. Wolf V. Dozer, 617. Wolf V. Driggs, 1318. Wolf V. Fleisbacker, 438. Wolf V. Holton, 557. Wolf V. Hunter, 1336. Wolf V. Wolf, 719. Wolfe V. Dowell, 883. Wolfe V. Frost, 134, 141, 361. Wolfe V. Johnson, 567. Wolfe V. Sullivan, 170, 1190. Wolffe V. Wolff, 618, 631, 632. Wolford V. Baxter, 48, 50, 61. Wolford V. Farnham, 1059. Wolford V. Herrington, 1077. Wolfskin V. County, 166. Wolloston V. Hakewill, 533, 534. Wolverton v. Collins, 1319. Woman's Union Miss. Soc. v. Mead, 1523, 1541. Womersley v. Church, 232. Wood V. Beach, 1299. Wood V. Beasley, 744, 1537. Wood V. Bogle, 497. Wood V. Boyd, 137, 150. Wood V. Cochrane, 1315, 1316. Wood V. Colvin, 908. Wood V. Fleet, 719, 720, 733. Wood V. Fornerook, 1436. Wood V. Fowler, 8, 233, 334. Wood V. Goodridge, 1118, 1302. Wood V. Gordon, 641. Wood V. Griffin, 318, 329, 719, 993, 1001, 1004, 1038. Wood V. Hammond, 395, 1537. Wood V. Kurd, 171, 590. Wood V. Kelley, 1886. Wood V. Keyes, 1124. Wood V. Leadbitter, 134, 268, 270. Wood V. Little, 725. Wood V. Lord, 430, 463. Wood V. Manley, 363, 371 Wood V. Mann, 953. Wood V. Medley, 1476. Wood V. Montgomery, 713. Wood V. Moorehouse, 938. Wood V. Morgan, 430. Wood V. Nicholson, 1375. Wood V. Noack, 607. Wood V. Rabe, 1078. Wood V. Riiilroad Co., 267. Wood V. Rayburn, 838, 1349. Wood V. Robertson, 279. Wood V. Seaver, 1530. Wood Y. Seely, 1338. Wood V. Simmons, 393. Wood V. Sutchcliffe, 206. Wood V. Trask, 311. Wood V. Veal, 157. Wood V. Waud, 213, 223. Wood V. Wheeler, 431. Wood V. Whelen, 66, 68, 968. Wood V. Williams, 925, 926. Wood V. Wood, 394, 883, 1505. Wood's Appeal, 886, 1334, 1346. Woodburn's Estate, 402. Woodbury v. Berry, 1520. Woodbury v. Fisher, 1318. Woodbury v. Luddy, 462. Woodbury v. Parshley, 134, 261, 870. Woodbury v. Swan, 834, 866. Woodbury v. Woodbury, 619 Wooden v. Haviland, 796. Woodfolk V. Blount, 1330. Woodgate v. Unwin, 664. Woodhan v. Bank, 63. WoodhuU V. Northbridge, 738. WoodhuU V. Rosenthal, 532, 533. Woodman v. Pitman, 234, 235. Woodman v. Smith, 1401, 1403. Woodroff V. Greenwood, 1433. Woodroff V. Morristown Inst., 936. Woodruff V. Bowen, 362. Woodruff V. Depue, 924. Woodruff V. Mutschler, 926. Woodruff V. Railroad Co., 1096. Woodruff V. Robb. 773. Woodruff V. Trapnall, 1333. Woodruff V. Woodruff, 739, 1300. Woods V. Bank, 1168. Woods V. Bailey, 811. Woods V. Bonner, 1310. Woods V. Huntingford, 813. Woods V. Naumkeag Steam Cotton Co., 496. Woods V. Perkins, 431. Woods V. Ridley, 1493. Woods V. Savin, 785, 1372. TABLE OF CASES. CCV [References are to sections: Vol. I, contains §9 1-735; Vol. 11, 88 736-1541.] Woods V. "Wallace, 800. Woods V. Woods, 853. Woodslde v. Adams, 770. Woodstock Iron Co. v. Fullenwider, 294. Woodward v. Allen, 1436, 1443. Woodward v. Blue, 1145. Woodward v. Boro, 836. 1331. Woodward v. Brooks, 1364. Woodward v. Brown, 635. Woodward v. Camp, 792. Woodward v. Conder, 608. Woodward v. Dowse, 393. Woodward v. Gates, 318. Woodward v. Ins. Co., 843. Woodward v. Pickett, 338, 858. Woodward v. Seely, 266. Woodward v. Sibert, 1067. Woodward v. Till, 470. Woodworth v. Blair, 938. Woodworth v. Huntoon, 945. Woodworth v. Payne, 750. Wool cot V. Lerdell, 468. Wooldridge v. Bank, 1058. Woolever v. Knapp, 693, 694, 696. Woolery v. Woolery, 1503. Wooley V. Paxton, 1518, 1530. Woolf ord V. Herrington, 1064. Woolley V. Holt, 62, 769. 851. WooUey v. Wickard, 810. Woolsey v. Jones, 788. Woonsocket Inst. v. Am. Worsted Co., 908. Wooten V. Bellinger, 851. Worcester v. Georgia, 35. Worcester Nat. Bank v. Cheeney, 886, 1335. Worfield v. Lindell, 683. Work V. Harper, 833, 1337. Workman v. Greening. 777. Workman v. Mifflin, 547. Worley v. Daniel, 1377. Worley y. Dryden, 778. Worley v. Taylor, 1130. Worrall v. Munn, 1324, 1335, 1338. Worrell v. Forsyth, 387. Worssam v. Vandenbrande, 1195. Worth V. Johnson, 907. Worthington v. Cooke, 127. Worthinglon v. Gimson, 149. Worthington v. Hiss, 733. Worthington v. Hylyer, 785, 1373. Worthington v. Lee, 936, 938. Worthington v. Staunton, 676, 733. Worthington v. Wade, 166, 174. Worthy V. Caddell, 1345. Worthy v. Warner, 932. Wortman v. Skinner, 1113. Woy V. Hooton, 1066. Wragg V. Compt. Gen., 804. Wren v. Bradley, 740. Wren v. Parker, 1170, 1194. Wright V. Barlow, 1118. Wright V. De Grofl, 432. Wright V. Douglass, 1059. Wright V. Endelield, 1500. Wright V. Freeman, 191, 193. Wright V. Harris, 1278. Wright V. Hays, 469. Wright V. Herron, 845. Wright V. Howard, 160, 208, 310. Wright V. Jennings, 295, 438. Wright V. Lake, 338. Wright V. Lassiter, 1375. Wright V. Lattin, 543, 553, 599, 600. Wright V. Manifold, 1483. Wright V. Moore, 164, 199, 816. Wright V. Morley, 869. Wright V. Rose, 368, 904, 910. Wright V. Sadler, 701. Wright V. Sperry, 679. Wright V. Tichenor, 1168. Wright V. Trevezant, 486. Wright V. Troutman, 816. Wright V. Wakefield, 1118. Wright V. West 405. Wright V. Westheimer, 433. Wright V Whitlick, 468. Wright V. Wilkins, 756. Wright V. Wright 387, 1030, 1104, 1394. Wrights' Estate, 1531. Wronkow v. Oakley, 379. Wunderlev. Wuuderle, 1149, 1150, 1151, 1153, 1153, 1157. Wurcherer v. Hewitt, 931. Wurtz V. Page, 1489. Wyatt V. Smith, 354. Wyatt V. Tisdale, 1186. Wych V. Bast India Co., 896. Wyche v. Clapp, 1490. Wyckoff V. Scofield, 940. WyckofiE V. Wyckoff, 1535. Wyllie V. Pollen, 1365. Wyman v. Bahcock, 976. Wyman v. Brown, 1041, 1411. Wyman v. Russell, 983. Wyman v. Symmes, 1484. Wyndham v. Way, 18, 306. Wynkoop v. Burger, 173. Wynkoop v. Cowing, 977. Wynn v. Garland, 134. Wynn v. Williams, 480. Wythe V. Thurlston, 1106. Wythers v. Lee, 805. Wyvell V. Jones, 831. Y. Yale V. Dederer, 1080. Yancey v. Mauck, 804, 810. CCVl TABLE OF CASES. [References ^re to sections : Vol. I, contains §§ 1-735 ; Vol. II, §9 736-1541.] Yancey v. Radford, 719, 1S04, 1316. Yarborough v. Monday, 1309. Yard v. Ocean Beach Association, 1190. Yarmoutli v. North Yarmouth, 109. Yarnall's Will, 1493, 1493. Yarnish v. Tarbox, 1391. Yaryan v. Schriner, 809. Yates V. Bachley, 599. Yates V. ComptoQ, 1108. Yates V. Hawbly, 889. Yates V. Law, S87. Yates V. Paddock, 436. Yates V. West Grafton, 174. Yeakle v. Jacob, 368, 1289, 1390. Yeaton v. Roberts, 1025. Yellow River Improvm't Co. v. Wood, 105. Yelverton v. Steele. 1163. Yerex v. Bineder, 317, 219. Yerger v. Barz, 838, 863, 1335, 1861, 1364. Yerks v. Hadley, 1213. Yester v. Commissioners, 1353. Yetter v. Fitts, 814. Yoakum v. Yoakum, 1298. Yocum V. Lovell, 468. Yocum V. Zahner, 1004. Yolo Co. V. Barney, 1190 Yorkly v. Stinson, 402. Yosemite Valley Case, 1336, 1243. Yost V. Devault, 469. Youndt V. Youndt, 1504. Young V. Bankier Dist. Co., 209. Young V. Boardman, 405. Young V. Brand, 956. Young V. Burhans, 546, 581. Young V. Clement, 741. Young V. Coleman, 803. Young V. Collett, 494. Young V. Cosgrove, 1376. Young V. Edwards, 676, 734. Young V. Gay, 612. 614, 758. Young V. Graff, 901. Young V. Harris, 805. Young V. Harrison, 109, 1251. Young V. Mahoning, 879. Young V. Miller, 930. Young V, Morehead, 863. Young V. PauU, 469. Young, Petitioner, 1404. Young V. Ringo, 1393, 1295. Young V. Roberts, 901. Young V. Tarbell, 366, 414, 837. Young V. Thrasher, 871, 707. Young V. Weed, 1083, 1088. Young V. Wolcott, 430. Young V. Wood, 809. Young V. Young, 372, 421, 1003, 1061, 1396, 1532. Youngblood v. Vastin, 1845. Younge v. Guibeau, 1319. Younghusband v. Gisborne, 1080. Youngman v. Railroad Co., 56, 850. Youngs V. Carter, 385. Youngs V. Duvall, 1818. Youngs V. Trustees, 869. Yount V. Morrison, 901. Youse V. Foreman, 1509. Z. Zabriskie v. Railroad Co., 109, 938. Zachry v. Lockhart, 368. Zaegel v. Kuster, 928. Zane v. Fink, 779. Zane v. Kennedy, 1110, 1118. Zapp V. Miller, 692, 693. Zapp V. Strohmeyer, 431. Zeibold v. Foster, 1891. Zeismeiss v. King, 1515. Zell V. Ream, 655. Zell V. Society, 140, 147. Zeller v. Eckert, 898. Zerega v. Percival, 1491. Ziegler v. Grim, 724. Zigler V. McClellan, 590. Zimmer v. Sennott, 1515. Zimmerman v. Anders, 1085. Zimmerman v. Lebo, 408. Zimmerman v. Robinson, 1813. Zippar V. Reppy, 633. Zollman v. Moore, 956. Zorntlein v. Bram, 703, 704. Zouch V. Parsons, 1281. Zug V. Commonwealth, 1351. Zuver V. Lyons, 1061. LAW OF REAL PROPERTY. PART I. CREATION OF ESTATES. CHAPTEE I. estates and tenures. Article 1. Ownership of Estates and Tenures. § 1. Definition of Estates. § 10. Lauds Covered by Tide-Waters § 2. Underlying Strata — Separate —English Rule. Strata. § 11. Accretions and Alluvion. § 3. Intervening Strata — Oil, Min- § 12. Accretion and Avulsion — Rights eral, Qas, Coal and Iron. of Nations. § 4. Mines. § 13. History of the Rule. § 5. Different Stories and Rooms. § 14. Filum Aquae. § 6. Overhanging Buildings. § 15. Erection of Wharves. § 7. Overhanging Trees. § 16. Personal Property Distinguished. § 8. Lands Covered by Tide- Waters § 17. Incorporeal Hereditaments — — United States Doctrine. Shares — Pews in Church. § 9. Title of the States. § 18. Houses, Trees and Crops. § 19. Acquisition by Occupancy. § 1. Definition op Estate. — The proper and technical meaning of estate is the degree, quantity, nature and ex- tent of interest which one has in land, tenements, and hereditaments, or in real property.' Real estate means an estate in fee or for life in land, and does not comprehend terms for years or any interest short of a freehold.' Though the word real as applied to property, in distinc- tion from personal, is now so familiar it is one of somewhat recent introduction. Under the feudal law the term used was expressed by "lands, tenements and hereditaments," and this term became known as real from the nature of the • 2 Bl. Com. 16 ; 3 Kent's Com. 401. »Co. Litt. 19, 20. 1 2 CREATION OF ESTATES. [§ L remedy for the recovery of them as distinguished from that provided in case of injuries, contracts broken, and the like. In the one case, the claimant recovered the real thing sued for, the land itself ; while, ordinarily, in the other, he could only i-ecover damages as compensation.' Mr. Williams' says the term, real property, did not come into general use until after the feudal system had lost its hold, nor till even as late as the beginning of the seven- teenth century. One of the earliest cases in which the courts applied the distinctive terms of real and personal to estates, without any words of explanation, is said to be that of Wind v. Jekyl.' In general terms, real property includes land and what- ever is erected or growing upon the same, with whatever is beneath or above the surface. * This includes houses standing and trees growing upon the land, but will not embrace chattels like stock upon a farm, or furniture in a house. But not only may houses or growing trees acquire the character of personal, but various chattels, originally personal, may acquire that of real property." Prima facie, the owner of land is entitled to the surface itself and all below it, ex jure natures, and those seeking to derogate from that right, must do so by some grant or conveyance ; ' the owner has not only whatever is beneath the surface, but what is above it; "usque ad orcum," as well as " usque ad caelum. " '' So if an aerolite falls upon the surface and sinks into the ground it is a part of the real estate.' And the people own the column of light and air above a highway, whether of land or water, because it is as much a part of the highway as the land or water. The light and air above become vested, and the legislature 'Bouvier's L. Diet. = Williams' Beal Property, 6, 7. 3 IP. Wm. 575. ■•Coke's Litt. 4a. 'Boiivier's L. Diet. «Rowbotham v. Wilson, 3 El. & El. 753; Barnes v. Mawson, 1 MauleA Selw. 84 ; Curtis t. Daniel, 10 East, 373. ' Coke's Litt. 4 a. »Goddard v. Winchell, 86Iowa, 71. §§ 2-3] ESTATES AND TENURES. 3 has no right to deprive the abutting owners of it without compensation.' § 2. Underlying Strata — Separate Strata. — How- ever, this general law may be modified. The discovery of new sources of wealth, and the springing up of new indus- tries, present questions not easily solved. But it is the crowning merit of the common law, that it is not composed of arbitrary rules, and may be modified to a reasonable extent to meet new exigencies of civilization. The expan- sive property of the common law will cover the new con- ditions. Anciently a man who owned the earth's surface, had title to the center of the earth. Under the modern conditions, the surface of the land may be separated from the different strata underneath it, and there may be as many different owners as there are strata." The surface of the land and the minerals beneath it may be dissevered in title and become separate tenements. In case of such severance the mineral becomes a separate cor- poreal hereditament; and its ownership is attended with all the attributes and incidents peculiar to the ownership of the land. ' Separate estates may exist in the upper and lower portions of the same building, and in the surface of the soil and underground strata.* A conveyance of coal underlying land is not only a fee simple grant of the coal, but also such grant of the space left after the removal of the coal. * So if a freeholder grants lands excepting mines he severs his estate in parallel layers or strata.' §3. Intervening Strata.— Oil, Mineral, Gas, Coal and Iron.— The development of the sciences of geology and 'Barnett B.Johnson, 15 N. J. Eq. 481 ; Field v. Barling, 149111. 556. 'Lillibridge v. Lackawanna Coal Co., 143 Pa. St. 393. 'Delaware, etc.. Railroad Co. ®. Sanderson, 109 Pa. St. 583; Sanderson ■». Scranton City, 105 Pa. St. 469 ; Scranton v. Phillips, 94 Pa. St. 15 ; Caldwell V. Copeland, 37 Pa. St. 427 ; Caldwell v. Pulton, 31 Pa. St. 475. «NewhofE v. Mayo, 47 N. J. Eq. 31. ' Lillibridge v. Lackawanna, Coal Co , 148 Pa. St. 293. 'Eardley v. Granville, L. R. 3 Ch. Div. 826. 4 CREATION OF ESTATES. [§ 3 mineralogy, and the multiplying of mechanical devices for penetrating the earth's surface, have greatly changed the uses and the values of land. So now the owner of a fai'm may sell the land to one man, the iron, or oil, or gas to another, giving to each purchaser a deed in fee simple for his particular deposit or stratum, while he retains the surface for settlement and cultivation. Each stratum becomes a subject of taxation, of incumbrance, levy and sale, pre- cisely like the surface. Under proper restrictions each of the different owners has the right, without any express words of grant for that purpose, to go upon the surface to open a way by shaft, or drift, or well, to his underlying estate, and to occupy so much of the surface, beyond the limits of his shaft, drift or well, as may be necessary to operate his estate and to remove the product thus obtained. Thus, where the owner of land conveys the coal under the surface he retains the title to everything beneath the coal stratum, and has the right of access to it, though the deed does not expressly reserve it. And the grantor of the coal stratum, who owns the surface, is entitled to bore through the coal to reach gas and oil found to exist beneath the coal stratum.' lu this case Chief Justice Paxon says that the owner of the coal must so enjoy his own right as not to interfere with the lawful exercise of the rights of others who may own the estate, either above or below him. The right of the surface owner to reach his estate below the coal stratum exists at all times. The exercise of it may be more diffi- cult at sometimes than at others and attended with both trouble and expense. No one will deny the title of the sur- face owner to all that lies beneath the strata which he has sold. It is as much a part of his estate as the surface. If he is denied the means of access to it, he is literally de- prived of an estate which he has never parted with. He gave no title to any of the strata underlying the stratum sold, and it cannot be supposed that the grantor parted with, or intended to part with, his right of access to the underlying stratum, and, hence, he has the right to access to take out coal, oil. gas and iron under the stratum sold. 1 Chartiers Block Coal Co. ■». Mellon, 152 Pa. St. 286. § 4] ESTATES AND TENURES. 5 Justice Williams, in this case, says that one who buys a single sti'atum is bound to know where it is, and how it is situated with reference to the strata above and below it, and he must be conclusively presumed to have taken title subject to the servitudes imposed by nature upon it as the necessaxy consequence of its position among the rocks that underlie the surface. He knows that his stratum lies upon and is supported by the rocks below it, and that other rocks lie upon and are supported by his stratum. The lower stratum can only be reached through the upper ; the upper can only be supported by the lower. This servitude for support has long been recognized, and courts have en- forced the right to support as one existing independently of, and requiring no aid from, statutes or contracts, and as resting on the order of creative work and the laws of nature. The necessity for access results from the work of nature, just as truly as the necessity for support. Both must be had in nature's way, or not at all. These servi- tudes are reciprocal, and are due from and due to every stratum in succession, from the surface to the centre, because of the relation these layers hold to each other in the order of their creation. However, this right of servitude may be waived by the owner of the surface.' § 4. Mines. — Coal and minerals in place are land, and the surface right can be in one man, and the mineral right in another, and both are holders of corporeal hereditaments." Mines are land, and subject to the same laws of posses- sion, and there is no more reason why mines in another's land, whether opened or unopened, may not be held by deed duly acknowledged and recorded, than any other land.' There is no substantial difference between a title by ex- ception out of a grant, and a title by direct grant of the same subject. Under an exception from a conveyance of land of all the coal therein, the dominion of the grantor 'Penn Gas Coal Co. v. Versailles Fuel Gas Co., 131 Pa. St. 522. 'Caldwell v. Fulton. 31 Pa. St. 475; Lee «. Bumgardner, 86 Va. 315. Caldwell V. Copeland, 37 Pa. St. 427; Lee «. Bumgardner, 86 Va. 315. 6 CREATION OF ESTATES [§ 4 over the coal is no greater, and his ownership is no more absolute, than if his title was acquired by purchase from one owning both coal and surface." If a freeholder grants lands excepting mines, he severs his estate vertically ; that is, he grants out his estate in parallel horizontal layers, and the grantee only gets the parallel layer granted to him, and does not get any under- lying mineral layer or stratum. That underlying stratum remains in the grantor." The word "mines" means subsoil containing the min- erals, and not merely the minerals themselves.' The owner of the mines has absolute right to do as he pleases with them, and he has a right to carry coal through them. Whether the word ' ' mine " be used as it often is, in the sense of minerals, the thing dug out of the mine, or that which contains the minerals, that which contains can- not be less than the thing contained ; and, hence, the con- taining chamber which has the minerals is the mine, and the owner is entitled to use the mine for any purpose what- ever and at any period.* There is a distinction between a copyhold tenement, with minerals under it, and freehold leased land, with a reservation of the minerals, or freehold land where the sur- face belongs to one owner and the subsoil containing min- erals belongs to another, as separate tenements divided from each other vertically instead of laterally." The owner in fee-simple of lands containing mines or quarries, has an absolute right to use them, and the cham- ber which encloses them, and the space or shell which the working of the minerals creates, and the subsoil generally, in any manner which he thinks proper.' The severance of mines is usually effected by exceptions in deeds, which transfer the freehold in the surface and reserve the mines.' ■Lillibridge v. Lackawanna Coal Co., 143 Pa. St. 293, 307. 'Eardley ii. Granville, L. R. 3 Ch. Div. 826. 'Hamilton v. Graham. L. R. 2 Scott & Div. App. Cas. 166. *Proud V. Bates. 84 L. J. Cli. 406. 'Bowser v. Maclean, 2 DeGex, F. & J. 415; Queen v. Earl, 1 Plow. 310. •McSwinney on Mines, 67. 'Bainbridge on Mines and Min. 84. § 5] ESTATES AND TENURES. 7 The ownership of the earth in which the minerals exist is as much a corporeal hereditament as the ownership of the surface.' But a grant of all the oil in land is incorporeal although it be exclusive." A grant of land "excepting all minerals," does not pre- vent the grantee from taking the petroleum.' In England the right to mines of gold and silver was con- sidered one of the jura regalia. Bur. in the United States there is no jura regalia, and whoever owns the land owns everything contained in it, including mines, unless they are expressly reserved, and the same law is applicable to a transfer by the Federal Government. Under the common law of England the right to the gold and silver mines was not regarded as an incident of sovereignty, but was regarded as a personal prerogative of the King, which could be ahenated at his pleasure.' When livery of seisin was necessary to convey lands, an undeveloped mine was considered an incorporeal heredita- ment, as livery of seisin could not be made of an unopened mine. But when livery of seisin is no longer required to convey land, an unopened mine is a corporeal hereditament, and is conveyed as other lands ai'e. § 5. Different Stories and Eooms in the Same House AND Separate Floors. — Several distinct tenements may exist under the same roof; and tenements are essentially distinct when one is under the other, or one is beside the other. " So a building may be so divided with the upper portion to be used as a church, and the lower rooms as stores." So one party may own the foundation and second story of a building, and another party the third story and roof of the building.' 'Lee V. Bumgardner, 86 Va. 315; Desloge v. Pearce, 38 Mo. 588. 'Dark v. Johnston, 55 Pa. St. 164. ■ 'Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. St. 86. 'Queen v. Earl, 1 Plow. 310. 'Strayer v. Long, 86 Va. 557; Loring v. Bacon, 4 Mass. 575. 'South Cong. Meeting House v. Lowell. 1 Met. (Mass.) 538. 'Cheesebrough v. Green, 10 Conn. 318; 36 Am. Dec. 396. See also, Co. 8 CREATION OF ESTATES. [§ 5 Separate seisin in a building, as distinct from the laud on which it stands, and even of different floors or portions of the same building has been recognized.' So two parties, in conjunction with a third party, may buy land and erect a building thereon, under an agreement that the first story shall be owned and used by one of the parties, the second story by the third party and the third story by the other party. Each party will then own his part of the property in severalty, and partition cannot be had because there will be no community of interest." And one of two parties can own the ground and the first story of two connecting brick buildings, and the other the second stoiy. And in case of the destruction of the said building, the owner of the second story may have, by con- tract, the right to make and continue up the wall upon walls, which may be made for any new building to any height consistent with the safety of the building. Each will own for himself distinct parts of the premises in severalty. ' It is a common thing for one person to own the soil and the first floor of a building, and another party the second, and even other higher stories of the same building. One may own the soil, and other parties each own a different floor. Or the owner of the soil may convey to another the right to build the first story and to occupy the same, and by agreement the owner of the soil may acquire the right to build on the walls other stories to be owned and occu- pied by himself.* In large cities, at the present time, in the construction of large apartment houses on the co-operative plan, a corpora- tion is organized which takes title to the land in its name, and after erecting the building, makes leases for a long term of years of the different apartments to the subscrib- ers of the stock respectively, reserving general functions Litt. 56 b; Tenant v. Goldwin, 1 Salk. 31, 360; 2Ld. Raym. 1089; 2 Inst. 403; Freeland v. Burt, 1 Term Rep. 701. Compare Tenant v. Goldwin, 6 Modern, 314. ■ N. Y. Law Journal. March 3, 1893, "Separate OwnersUip of Floors in Same Buildings," and cases cited. ' Anderson Scliool Twp. v. Masonic Lodge, 130 Ind. 108. 'McConnell v. Kibbe, 43 111. 13. < Rhodes v. McCormick, 4 Iowa, 368, 375. §§ 6-7] ESTATES AND TENURES. 9 for the commou welfare to be performed by the corporation, and expressly defining the privileges of the tenants who are the subscribers. § 6. OvEEHANGiNG BtTiLDiNGS. — The Ordinary rule of law is that whoever owns the site, owns everything up to the sky and down to the center of the earth. But the ordi- nary presumption of law is no doubt frequently rebutted, particularly with regard to property in cities, by the fact that adjoining tenements, either from their having been once jointly owned or from other circumstances, protrude themselves over the site upon which they are built. In such cases the part protruding remains the property of the owner of the house, but it does not carry with it anything above or below the part protruding. The adjoining pro- prietor owns everything else including the vertical column of air over the protruding part, and also the space beneath it.' Hence the ownership of a building partly overhanging other premises does not give the owner a right to raise the overhanging part of his building, because he does not own the space above the overhanging part." § 7. Overhanging Trees.— A tree standing upon the boundary line between two adjacent properties, so that part of the trunk is on one side and part on the other side at the base, the tree and its fruit is common property of the two adjacent owners, and neither can remove or injure the tree without the consent of the other.' But if the tree at its base is wholly upon the property of the owner, it is a portion of his realty,* and he is entitled to its fruit,' ' Corbett v. Hill, L. R. 9 Eq. 671. « Laybourn ». Gridley (1892), 2 Ch. 53. 2 Griffin v. Bixby, 13 N. H, 4.54; Skinner v. Wilder, 38 Vt. 115; "Waterman D. Soper, 1 Ld. Raym. 737; Dubois v. Beaver, 35 N. Y. 133. Anon. 3 Rolle, 355; Relyea v. Beaver, 34 Barb. (N. Y.) 547. < Dubois V. Beaver, 25 N. Y. 133; Hofifman®. Armstrong, 48 N. Y. 303; Ly- man V. Hale, 11 Conn. 177; Holder v. Coats, 1 Moo. & M. 113; 23 Eng. C. L. 264; Masters v. Pollie, 3 Rolle, 141. Compare Waterman v. Soper, 1 Ld. Raym. 757. ' Skinner «. Wilder, 33 Vt. 115; Hoffman v. Armstrong, 48 N. Y. 201 ; Mas- ters V. Pollie, 2 Rolle, 141. 2 10 CREATION' OF ESTATES. [§ g though the branches overhang the premises of the adjacent owner and some of the roots penetrate his soil.' But when the ripen fruit falls upon the land of the ad- jacent owner from the overhanging branches, it becomes his property; he may cut off the penetrating roots and the overhanging branches,' but he has no right to convert the branches or the fruit thereon to his own use. ° § 8. Lands Covered by Tide-Waters— United States Doctrine. — It is the settled law of this country that the ownership and dominion of sovereignty over lands covered by tide- waters within the limits of the several States be- long to the respective States, with the consequent right to use or dispose of the same where it can be done without impairment of the interests to the public in the waters, and subject always to the paramount right of Congress to control their navigation so far as necessary for the regula- tion of commerce with foreign nations and among the several States. The same doctrine is applicable to lands covered by fresh water over which a great commerce is conducted. The fact that it is not tide- water makes no difference in the applica- tion of this principle. The great lakes are inland avenues of commerce, and are governed, in this respect, by the same principles as control in respect of tide-waters. " When the revolution took place the people of each State became themselves sovereign, and in their character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters and the soil un- der them for their own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the Constitution to the general government.' The bed or soil of navigable waters is held by the people ' Lyman v. Hale, 11 Conn. 177; Dubois v. Beaver, 25 N. Y. 132; Skinner v. Wilder, 38 Vt. 115. Compare Waterman v. Soper, 1 Ld. Raym. 737; Qriffln V. Bixby, 12 N. H. 454. ' Lyman «. Hale, 11 Conn. 173; Grandona v. Lovdal, 70 Cal. 161. 'Beardslee®. French, 7 Conn. 125; Dyson v. CoUick, 5 Barn. Ad. 600; 7 Eng. C. L. 328; Welch v. Nash, 8 East, 394. * Illinois Central R. R. Co. u Illinois, 146 U. S. 387; Shively c. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1. 5 Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. (V. S ) 36ff, 410. See. also, Arnold v. Mundy 1 Halst. (N. J.) 1; Stockton v. Railroad Co. 32 Fed. Rep. 9. § 8] ESTATES AND TENURES. 11 of the State in their character as sovereign in trust for public use for which it is adapted.' The same doctrine is held in this country in respect of lands covered by fresh water in the great lakes, over which is conducted an extended commerce with different States and foreign nations. These lakes possess all the general characteristics of open seas, except in the freshness of their waters and in the absence of the ebb and flow of the tide. In other respects they are inland seas, and there is no reason or principle for the assertion of dominion and sovereignty over the owner- ship by the State of lands covered by tide waters that is not equally applicable to its ownership of the dominion and sovereignty over lands covered by fresh water of these lakes. The Enghsh doctrine that the ebb and flow of the tide constitute the legal test of the navigability of waters, is repudiated in the United States as wholly inapplicable to our condition." The soil of one-half of the river that is unnavigable, to the middle of the stream, is presumed to belong to the owner of the adjoining land.' If the stream be navigable, the rights of the owners are subject to the public use of it as a highway. The better rule in this country is, that the title to the land under all waters, navigable in fact, whether tidal or not, is in the State." However other States have established that the fee of the riparian owner of lands extends to the middle line of 'Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. (U. S.) 367, 410; Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. (U. 8.) 312, 330; McCready v. Virgioia, 94 U. 8. 891, 394; Weber v. Harbor Com- missioners, 18 Wall. (U. 8.) 57. 2 Illinois Central R. R. Co. i). Illinois, 146 U. 8. 387. ' Willard on Real Estate, 320. ^Barneys. Keokuk, 91 IT. S. 834; Musser ®. Hersbey, 42 Iowa, 356; Wood V. Fowler, 36 Kans. 683; Benson v. Mon-ow, 61 Mo. 845; Poor v. McClure, 77 Pa. 8t. 314; Monongahela Bridge Co. v. Kirk, 46 Pa. 8t. 112; Bailey v. Miltenberger, 31 Pa. St. 37; People v. Canal Appraisers, 33 N. T. 461 ; 8t. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. ■». Ramsey, 53 Ark. 314; Naederhouser ». State, 28 Ind. 257; McManus v. Carmicbael, 3 Iowa, 1; Haight ■». Keokuk, 4 Iowa, 199. 12 CREATION OF ESTATES. [§ 9 the main channel of the great rivers.' And the law of the State will control titles within its jurisdiction." The better and more generally accepted rule in this coun- try is to apply the term "navigable" to all streams which are in fact navigable, and to limit the title of the riparian owner to the bank of the stream. Especially is this true in the States where the lands have been surveyed and patented under the federal law.' The decisions of the United States Supreme Court re- garding navigable waters, must be considered with refer- ence to the facts upon which they were made, keeping in mind the local laws of the different States, as well as the provisions of the acts of Congress relating to such waters. By the laws of England, Scotland and Ireland, the own- ers of the banks prima facie own the beds of all fresh water rivers above the ebb and flow of the tide, even if actually navigable, to the thread of the stream, usque ad filum aquce.' The. rule of the common law on this point has been adopted in all the original States, except Pennsylvania, North Carolina and Virginia, and except as to great rivers, such as the Hudson, the Mohawk and St. Lawrence, in New York ; and this rule has been adopted in Illinois, Michigan, Ohio and Wisconsin. But it has been wholly rejected, as to rivers navigable, in fact, in Pennsylvania, Virginia and North Carolina, and in most of the new States.' § 9. Title op the States. — In the distribution of powers between the genei'al government and State government, the right to the fisheiies and the power to regulate the fiph- ' Middleton*. Pritchard, 3 Scam. (111.) 510; Braxon v. Bressl r, 64 III. 4S8; HouckB. Yates, 83 111. 179; Cobb v. Lavalle, 89 111. 331; Lavalle ». Strobel, 69 111. 370; Washiagton Ice Co ». Shorthall, 101 111. 46; Brooklyu v. Smiih, 104 111. 439, 438; Trustees v. SchroU, 120 111. 509, 518, 519; Butternuth v. St. Louis Bridge Co. 133111. 53), 550; June v. Purcell, 36 Ohio St. 396; Olson u. Merrill, 43 Wis. 203; Newton v. Eddy, 23 Vt. 319; Bradford v. Cressey 45 Me. 9. 2 St. Louis V. Rutz, 138 U. S. 326. ' Wood V. Fowler, 26 Kans. 683, 689; Railroad Co. ■». Schurmeir, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 373; Tomlint). Railroad Co. 33 Iowa, 106. *Hargrave's Law Tracts, 5; Bickett v. Morris, L. R. 1 H. L. Sc. 47; Murphy v. Ryan, W. R. 3 C. L. 113; Ewing o. Colquehoun, 2App. Cas. 839. 'Gould on Waters {2nd ed.), 56-78. § 9] ESTATES AND TENURES. 13 eries on the coasts and in the tide waters of the State, were left, by the Constitution of tlie United States, with the State, subject only to such powers as Congress may justly exercise in the regulation of commerce, foreign and do- mestic' Each State owns the beds of all tidal waters within its jurisdiction,unless they have been granted away. In like manner the States own the tide- waters themselves and the fish in them, so far as they are capable of owner- ship while running. This title is, however, subject to the paramount right of navigation, the regulation of which, in respect to foreign and interstate commerce, has been granted to the United States. There has been no such grant of power over fisheries. These remain under the exclusive control of the State, which has consequently the right, in its discretion, to appropriate its tide-watex's and their beds to be used by its people as a common for taking and cul- tivating fish, so far as it may be done without obstructing navigation.' Whatever soil below low-water mai'k is the subject of ex- clusive property and ownership, belongs to the State on whose maritime border and within whose territory it lies, subject to any lawful grants of that soil by the State, or the sovereign power which governed its territory, before the declaration of independence." If the States choose to resign to the riparian proprietors rights which properly be- long to them in their sovereign capacity, it is not for others to raise objections.* It is the right of the State to dispose of its tide-land free from any easement of the upland owner.' In the absence ' Dunhams. Lamphere, 3 Gray (Mass.), 268; Jones «. Soulard, 34 How. (U. S.) 41. ' McCready B. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391. See, also, Manchester e. Massachusetts 139 U. S. 240. 'Shively ». Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1; Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. (U. S.) 71, 74; Den v. Jersey Co., 15 How. (U. S.) 426; Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. (U. S.) 367; Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. (U. S.) 212. * Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324. 'Eisenbach v. Hatfield. 2 Wash. St. 353; Bowlby d. Shively, 22 Orpff. 410; Hogg v. Davis, 22 Oreg. 428; Stevens ». Railroad Co., 34 N. J. L. 533; Gould V. Railroad Co.. 6 N. Y. 533; McKeen «. Del. Canal Co., 49 Pa. St. 434; Wall v. Pittsburgh Harbor Co., 153 Pa. St. 427; Tomlin «. Railroad Co., 33 Iowa, 106; People v. Appraisers, 33 N. Y. 461. 14 CKEATION OF ESTATES. [§ 9 of legislation or usage in the several States, the common law rule will govern the rights of the riparian proprietors, and by that law the title to the tide-lands is in the States.' In Alabama the title of an owner of lands bordering on a navigable stream extends to low- water mark.' A riparian owner in Connecticut may extend his wharves beyond low- water mark, since he has the right to connect his land by such means with navigable waters, provided he does not interfere with navigation." He can make a pier for his own use and the use of the public. * But it must be i-emembered that the test of navigability of a stream in many States is not whether the stream is subject to the ebb and flow of the tides, but whether it is navigable for seagoing vessels. Upon the acquisition of a Territory, by the United States, whether of cession from one of the States, or by treaty with a foreign country, or by discovery and settlement, the same title and dominion passed to the United States, for the benefit of the whole people, and in trust for the several States to be ultimately created out of the Territory. The title to the shore and lands under tide-waters is regarded as incidental to the sovereignty of the State, such title being in the State, the lands are subject to State regulation, under the condition of not interfering with the regulations which may be made by Congress with regard to public navigation and commerce. The State may even dispose of the usufruct of such lands, as is frequently done by leasing oyster beds in them, and granting fisheries in particular localities; also, by the reclamation of submerged flats, and the erection of wharves and piers and other adventitious aids of commerce. Sometimes large areas so reclaimed are occupied by cities, and are put to other public or private uses, State control and ownership therein being supreme, subject only to the paramount authority of Congress in making regulations of commerce and in subjecting the lands to the necessities and uses of commerce. This right ' Hardin «. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371. » Webb V. Demopolis, 95 Ala. 116. •Prior V. Swartz, 62 Conn. 132. * Paine Lumber Co. v. United States, 55 Fed. Rep. 854. § 10] ESTATES AND TENURES. 15 of the State to regulate and control the shores of tide- waters and the land under them is the same as that which is exercised by the Crown of England. But it depends on the State to what waters and to what extent this preroga- tive of the State over the lands under water shall be ex- ercised.' § 10. Lands Covered by Tide-Waters— English Doc- trine. — In England the ebb and flow of the tide constitute the legal test of the navigability of waters. In that country no waters are navigable in fact, at least to any extent, which are not subject to the tide. In England tide- water and navigable water are synonymous terms, and tide- waters, with a few small and unimportant exceptions, mean nothing more than public rivers as contradistinguished from private, and writers on the subject of admiralty juris- diction took the ebb and flow of the tide as the test, be- cause it was a convenient one and more easily determined the character of the river. Hence, the established doctrine in England is that the admiralty jurisdiction is confined to the ebb and flow of the tide. In other words, it is confined to public navigable waters." But the common doctrine of the dominion over and ownership by the crown of lands within the realm under tide- waters is not founded upon the existence of the tide over the lands, but upon the fact that the waters are navigable tide-waters, navigable waters being used as synonymous with tide- waters.' The soil of navigable tidal rivers, so far as the tide flows and reflows, is prima facie in the crown.* In England, from the time of Lord Hale, it has been the settled law that the title in the soil of the sea, or of arms of the sea, below ordinary high water mark, is in the King, except so far as an individual or a corporation has acquired rights in it by express grant, or by prescription or usage.' ' Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, 381, 883; Shively v. Bowlby, 153 U. S. 1,46. 5 Genesee Chief, 13 How. (U. S.) 443, 455. 'Illinios Central R. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387. ^Malcomson «. O'Dea, 10 H. L. 593. 'Fitzwalter's Case, 3 Keb. 343; 1 Mod. 105; 3 Shep. Ab. 97; King v. Smith, 3 Dong. 441 ; Attorney Gen. ■». Parmeter, 10 Price, 378, 400, 401, 413, 16 CREATION OF ESTATES. [§11 This title, jus privatum, whether in the King or in a subject, is held subject to the public light, jus publicum, of navigation and fisheries.' And this is the law of Scotland." The common law very naturally divided waters into navigable and unuavigable, and made the ebb and flow of the tide the test of navigability. In the United States, while still retaining the common law classification of navi- gable and unuavigable, many States have rejected, in view of the changed condition, its test of navigabilitj'', and adopted in its place that of navigability in fact ; and, while still adhering to navigability as the criterion whether waters are public or private, yet these States have extended the meaning of that term so as to declare all waters public highways which afford a channel for any useful commerce, including small streams merely floatable for logs at certain seasons of the year. It is generally held that the water must be capable of some commerce of pecuniary value, as distinguished from boating for mere pleasure. But it would be a better definition for public waters to hold that they are such when used for public uses of any kind as navigation, boating or sailing for pleasure, and the like. § 11. Accretions and Alluvion. — Alluvion is an additiou to riparian land, gradually and imperceptively made by the water to which the land is contiguous. It is different from reliction, and is opposite of avulsion. The test of what is gradual and imperceptible is that, though the witnesses may see from time to time that progress has been made, they cannot perceive it while the process is going on. Whether it is the effect of natural or artificial causes makes no dif- ference. The result to the ownership in either case is the same. The riparian right to future alluvion is a vested right. It is an inherent and essential attribute of the orig- 464 ; Attorney Gen. ». Chambers, 4 DeOt. M. & G. 206 ; 4 DeG. & J. 55 ;. Attorney Gen. ■». Emerson (1891), 1 App. Cas. 649 ; Malcomson v. O'Deii, lU H L. Cas. 591, 618, 623. 'Attorney Gen. v. Parmeter, 10 Price, 378, 400, 401, 411, 412, 464 ; Attorney Gen. V. Johnson, 2 Wilson Ch. 87, 101, 102, 103; Gann ®. Free Fishers, 11 H. L. Cas. 192. ' Smith V. Stair, 6 Bell App. Cas. 487 ; Lord Advocate v. Hamilton, 1 Macq. 48, 49. § 11] ESTATES AND TENURES. 17 inal property. The title to this increment vests in the law of nations. The right is a natural, not a civil one. The maxim '■' qui sentit onus, sentire debet et commodum " — he who derives a benefit from a thing ought to bear the dis- advantage attending it — lies at the foundation. The owner takes the chances of injury and of benefit arising from the situation of the property. If there be a gradual loss, he must bear it, if a gradual gain, it is his. This principle applies alike to streams that do, and those that do not over- flow their banks, and where dykes and other defenses are, aiid where they are not, necessary to keep the water within its proper limits.' In England this rule applies to both fresh and salt water, such as the rivers and the shores of the sea." An accretion may be defined as an addition to land con- terminous with the water, which is formed so slowly that its progress cannot be perceived, and does not admit of the view, that, in order to be accretion, the formation must be one not discernible by comparison at two distinct periods of time, ' and this law of accretion applies to the Mississippi river notwithstanding that, owing to the swiftness of its current and the softness of its banks, the changes are more rapid and extensive than in most other rivers." Alluvion deposited against an island in a lake and a neighboring lot, so as to connect them, must be equally divided between the owners of both.' 'Lamprey v. State, 52 Minn. 181; Crandall «. Allen, 118 Mo. 403; Munici- pality i>. Orleans Cotton Press, 18 La. 122; Delachaise v. Maginnis, 44 La. Ann. 1043; County v. Lovingston, 23 Wall. (U, S.) 46, 69. ' King, The d. Yarborough, 8 Dow & Clark's App. Cas. 178. 'Jeilries «. East Omaha Land Co., 134 U. S. 178; Eex «. Yarborough, 3 Barn. & Cress. 91; 2 Bligh, IT. S. 147; 1 Dow & Clark, 178; 5 Bing. 163; In re Hull, 5 Mees. & Wels. 327; Scratton v. Brown, 4 Barn. & Cress. 485; Jones v. Johnston, 18 How. (U. S.) 150; Jones i>. Soulard, 34 How. (U. S.) 41; Schools V. Risley, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 91; Halsey v. McCormick, 18 N. Y. 147; Mulry ». Norton, 100 N. Y. 434; Hopkins Academy d. Dickinson, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 544; Camden & At. Land Co. v. Lippincott, 45 N. J. L. 405. ■•Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U. S. 359; 145 U. S. 519. 5 Bigelow V. Hoover, 85 Iowa, 161. See, also, Pearcy v. Bybee, 30 Greg. 385; Bissel V. Fletcher, 27 Nebr. 583; Tappendorfl v, Downing, 76 Cal. 169; Hub- bard V. Manwell, 60 Vt. 235; Leonard v. Baton Rouge, 39 La. Ann. 275; Buras v. O'Brien, 43 La. Ann. 527. 3 18 ^ CEEATION OF ESTATES. [§ 11 At common law, the person whose land is bounded by a stream of water which changes its course gradually by alluvial formations, shall still hold by the same boundary, including the accumulated soil. Every proprietor whose land is thus bounded is subject to loss by the same means which may add to his territory; and, as he is without remedy for his loss in this way, he cannot be held account- able for his gain.' And when a stream, which is a bound- ary, from any cause suddenly abandons its old and seeks a new bed, such change of channel works no change of boundary; the boundary remains as it was, in the center of the old channel, although no water may be flowing therein. This sudden and rapid change of channel is termed in the law avulsion. If the change is violent and visible, and arises from a known cause, such ag a freshet, or a cut through which a new channel is formed, the original thread of the stream continues to mark the limits of the two estates." This general law of accretions is applicable to land on the Mississippi river and to land on the Missouri river. Not- withstanding the rapidity of the change in the course of the channel, and the washing from the one side and on to the other, the law of accretions controls the Missouri river, as elsewhere, not only in respect to the rights of individual land- owners, but also in respect to the boundary lines between States. The boundary, therefore, between Iowa and Ne- braska is a varying line, so far as aif ected by those changes of diminution and accretion in the mere washing of the waters .of the stream. ■ Jones V. Soulard, 24 How. (U. S.) 41; Jeffries v. East Omaha Land Co., 134 U. S. 178; New Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet. (U. S.) 663, 717; Banks «. Ogden, 3 Wall. (U. 8.) 57; Saulet v. Shepherd, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 503; County v. Lovingston, 23 Wall. (U. S.)46. ' Gould on Waters, sect. 159, Angell on Water Courses, sect. 60; Gill «, Ly- diqk 40 Neb. 508; Saunders v. Railroad Co., 30 Abb. N. C. (N.Y.) 88; Denny V. Colton (Tex.), 23 8. W. Rep. 133; Poynter ®. Chipman 8 Utah, 443; 3 Bl. Com. 262; Hopkins' Academy ®. Dickinson, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 544; Buttenuth ®. St. Louis Bridge Co., 123 111. 535; Rees «. McDaniel, 115 Mo. 145; Hagan V. Campbell, 8 Port. (Ala.) 9; Murry v. Sermon, 1 Hawks (N. Car.), 56; Cooley V. Golden, 117 Mo. 33; Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U. 8. 359; 145 U. S. 519. § 12] ESTATES AND TENURES. 19 In lSt7 the Missouri river above Omaha, which had pur- sued a course in the nature of an ox-bow, suddenly cut through the neck of the bow and made a new channel. This was an avulsion so the boundary was not changed, and it remained as it was prior to the avulsion, the center hne of the old channel.' In some of the States where a city lot is separated from the river by a road or street owned in fee by the public, the accretions belong to the street for public use and not to the owner of the lot;" but this rule is different in some other States." A tract of land which has been submerged on the sea shore is reclaimable, if by the gradual operation of the water, the land is brought above the sea surface again, and the original owner's title is again in force, if the boundaries can be established.' The rule is everywhere admitted, that where the land encroaches upon the water by gradual and imperceptible degrees, the accretion or alluvion belongs to the owner of the land, and this rule is equally applicable to lands bound- ing on tide-waters or on fresh waters, and to the king or the State as to private persons; and it is independent of the law governing the title in the soil covered by water." § 12. Accretion AND Avulsion — Eights of Nations. — This general rule is universally recognized as correct be- tween the boundaries of private property touching on streams, and between States or nations regulated by pre- scription or by treaty. Accretion, no matter to which side it adds ground, leaves the boundary still the center of the > Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U. S. 359. 'St. Louis V. Railroad Co., 114 Mo. 13. ' Municipality «. Orleans Cotton Press, 18 La. 123; Delachaise v. Maginnis, 44 La. Ann. 1048. * Mulry V. Norton, 100 N. T. 424. 'Hargrave's Law Tracts, 5, 14, 38; Rex v. Yarborough, 3 Barn. & C. 91;" 4 Dowl. & R. 790; 1 Dow. & Clark, 178; 2 Bligh N. R. 147; 5 Bing. 163; Doe 1). East India Co., 10 Moore, P. C. 140; Foster v. "Wright, C. P. D. 438; Handly D.Anthony, 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 374, 380; Jeffries v. East Omaha Co., 184 U. S. 178, 189-198; Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U. S. 359; Minto v. Delaney, 7 Oreg. 337; County «. Lovingston, 23 Wall. (U. S.) 46; 64 111. 56; Jones v. Soulard, 24 How. (U. S.) 41; St te «. Buck (La.), 15 South Rep. 531. 20 CREATION OF ESTATES. [§ 12 channel. Avulsion has no effect on the boundary, but leaves it in the center of the old channel. Whatever changes happen to either bank of the river by accretion on the one or degradation on the other, that is, by the gradual and insensible accession or abstraction of mere particles, the river as it runs continues to be the boundary. But if the river deserts its bed and forces another channel in another direction, then the nation, through whose territory the river thus breaks its way, would suffer injury by loss of territory greater than the benefit of retaining the natural river boundary, and hence that boundary remains in the middle of the deserted river bed.' When the change is not total, but progressive only, that. is, when the river does not abandon either State, but only gradually shifts its course by accretions, then it continues still to be the boundary, and the augmentation of territory, which one country gains at the expense of the other, is to hold as a new acquisition of property. But when a river changes its course, directing its course through the territory of one of two conterminous States, the bed which it leaver dry remains the property of the State to which the river belonged, that being retained as the limit between the twa nations." The rights which either State has in the river, do not undergo any change by reason of alluvion. The lands insensibly by the water are lost by one of the riparian States, and those which the water abandons on the opposite bank increase the domain of the other State. But if by natural accident, the water, which separated the two States, enters of a sudden into the territory of the other, it will thenceforth belong to the State whose soil it occupies, and the land, including the abandoned river channel or bed, will incur no change of ownership.' When the river changes its course, forcing itself into one '8 Atty. Gen. Opinion, 175, 177; Eayneval, Droit de la Nature, 1 torn. p. 307; Merlin, Eepertoire, Feodalite; Vattel, Droit des Gens., Liv. I. Ch. 23, s. 268, 270; Gundling, Ju3 Nat. p. 248; "Wolff. Jus Gentium, s. 106- 109. ' Riquelme, Derecho International, 1 torn. p. 83. •Pando, Derecho International, p. 99; Bello, Derecho International, p, 38. § 13] ESTATES AND TENURES. 21 of two conterminous States, it then becomes the property of the State through whose territory it flows.' § 13. History op the Eule. — It was early held that alluvial soil added by a river to land became part of such land and belonged to the owner by the law of nations." The Roman agri limitati consisted of districts or territories acquired by conquest and assigned and set apart for the bene- fit of veteran soldiers when retired from active service in the army. The method of surveying such a territory was to draw lines towards the four quarters of the heavens, parallel and crosswise, in order to effect a uniform division of the lots and to fix immutable boundaries between them. These boundaries, called limites, were marked by a slip of land left for the purpose, untouched by cultivation, as walks or highways. The squares of land contained either thirty-three or a hundred and thirty-three acres ; that is they were either ten or twenty actus square. And as these lands were bordered on streams or other waters they were not entitled, as other riparian lauds were, to any accretion or alluvion or to island in the stream, but were strictly con- fined to the lines by which they were actually or theoreti- cally limited.' And in the Code Napoleon' it is laid down as the law that alluvion is for the benefit of the owner of the land, whether in respect of a river, a navigable stream, or one admitting floats or not ; on the condition, in the first place, of leaving a landing place or towing path conform- ably to regulations. But this was the French law and was copied into the Code.' Such is also the law of Spain.' Blackstone says the reason of this is de minimis non 'Almeda, Derecbo Publico, 1 torn, p. 199; See, also, Febrero Mexicano, 1 torn. p. 161; Sala Mexicano (1845 ed.;, 2 torn, p, 62; Eseriche, Die. s. "Vol. Accession Natural, Alluvion, Avulsion; Alvarez, Jus. Lib. II. tit. I. s. 6; 3 Partida, tit. 28, 1. 31; Braton de Legg. Angeliae, Lib. 2, Cap. 2,fol. 81. ' Justinian's Insti. Lib. II. tit. 1 , sect. 20. ' Dig. Lib. 41, tit. 1, 1. 7, 16; Dig. Lib. 43, tit. 12, 1. 1, sects. 6, 7; 3 Niebuhr's Hist, of Rome, App. 1; Sander's Inst. 177. * Book II., sect. 556. ' 4 Nouveau Dictionairie de Brillon, 278; Morgan ». Livingston, 6 Mart. (La.) 19, 243. « 8 Partidas, tit. 38, 1. 26. 22 CREATION OF ESTATES. [§ 14r curat lex — the law does not notice trifles ; and besides, the owner being often a loser by the breaking in of the sea, or at a charge to keep it out, this possible gain is, therefore, a reciprocal consideration for such possible charge or loss. But if the alluvion be sudden or considerable, in this case it belongs to the king.' The learned commentator took this definition from Bracton." And Hale shows the great antiquity of this rule.' The reason for this rule, de minimis lex non curat, is not sufficient ; neither is the principle of the maxim qui sentit onus, sentire debet et commodum — he who derives a benefit from a thing ought to bear the disadvantages attending it. The reason rests upon a much broader foundation, and has a much more important purpose in view, and that is to preserve the fundamental riparian right, in which all others depend, and which often constitutes the principal value of the land, of access to the water. If the riparian owner was liable to be cut off from access to the water by the process of ac- cretion, and another owner obtain the intervening alluvion, the damage might be incalculable and even destroy the value of his property. § 14. FiLUM Aqtj^ — Filum is used almost universally in connection with aquce to denote the middle hne of a stream. Medium filum is sometimes used with no additional mean- ing. Altum filum denotes high water mark. When the stream is not navigable, the boundary line is the center of the current of the stream, called the filum aquce, and the owners of the shore have a right of property in the bed of the stream to this filum aquce. But if the stream is navigable the boundary line is the low or high water mark, according to tlie law of the State, on the adjoining shore, and the soil or bed of the stream is the property of the State. Hence, an island rising in non-navigable streams, under the doctrine of accretion, will belong to the owner on whose soil it is formed, and if it be in the middle of such stream the opposite proprietors on the adjoining banks > 2 Bl. Com. 263, ' Bracton, Lib. II. c. 2. • De Jure Maris, 1st pt. c. 6. § 15] ESTATES AND TENURES. 23 would own that portion lying on their side of the filum aquce, in severalty.' If the stream is navigable the State owns the bed and an island forming in the current of the stream will belong to the State; but the owners of the shores are entitled to that alluvion which may attach to their sides of the land which they own •," and the same rule applies where one party owns the bed of the stream and the other the shore.' And if a non-navigable stream disappears on account of gradual ac- cretions, the boundary line of contact will be the line at which the stream finally disappears.* If, however, by some sudden change the bed of a navigable stream is un- covered, it still belongs to the State. ' As between riparian owners, riparian rights may, by the acts of the parties, be separated from the ownership of the shore. ° By the law of England, Scotland and Ireland, the own- ers of the banks prima facie own the beds of all fresh water rivers above the ebb and flow of the tide, even if actually navigable, to the thread of the sti'eam, usque ad fllum aquce. ' This rule has been followed by all the orig- inal States, except Pennsylvania, Virginia and North Caro- lina, and it is the rule also in Ohio, Illinois, Michigan and Wisconsin, though the rule has been rejected in most of the new States. § 15. Erection op Wharves.— By the law of England every building or wharf erected, without license, below high water mark, where the soil is the King's, is a purpres- ture, and may, at the suit of the King, either be de- ' 3 Kent's Com. 428; Primm v. Walker, 88 Mo. 99; Hopkins Academy v. Dickinson, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 544. 'Scratton v. Brown, 4 Barn. & Cr. 495; Cooley ». Golden, 117 Mo. 33; At torney-Gen. v. Chambers, 4 Dig. G M. & G. 306, 218j Hickman i>. Sweet, 99 Cal. 303. ^Linthicum v. Coan, 64 Md. 439. ■"Buse v. Russell, 86 Mo. 209. » Halsey v. McCormick, 18 N. Y. 147. «Hanf'ird v. Railroad Co. 43 Minn. 104; Gilbert ». Eldridge 47 Minn. 210; Wirt v. May, 48 Minn. 453. See, also, Norcross v. Griffiths, 65 "Wis. 599. 'Hargrave's Law Tracts, 5; Swing v. Colquhoun, 2 App. Gas. 839; Bickett V. Morris, L. R. 1 H. L. Sc. 47; Murphy v. Ryan, 12 Ir. R. 3 C. L. 143. 24 CREATION OF ESTATES. [§16 molished, or be seized and rented for his benefit, if it is not a nuisance to navigation.' In England the owner of land fronting on a navigable river in which the tide ebbs and flov^s has a right of access from his land to the river; and may recover compensation for the cutting off of that access by the construction of public works authorized by an act of parliament. The right thus recognized, however, is not a title in the soil be- low high water mark, nor a right to build thereon, but a right of access only, analogous to that of an abutter upon a highway.' And this decision, Lord Selborne says, must be applicable to every country in which the general law of riparian rights prevails, unless excluded by some positive rule or binding authority of the lex loci. ' The common law of England upon this subject, at the time of the emigration of our ancestors, is the law of this country, except so far as it has been modified by the chart- ers, constitutions, statutes or usages and laws of the United States. § 16. Personal Property DiSTmamsHED. — Personal property is a term usually employed to designate all things temporary and movable, and such as are comprehended under the general word chattel. All property not of a free- hold nature, and descendible to the heirs at law, is so de- nominated.* Eeal property consists of things substantial and immovable, and of the rights and profits annexed to, or issuing out of, them. Personal property consists of money, goods, and movables, and such rights and profits as relate to movables ' Personal property is to be distinguished from things per- sonal. There may be a personal estate in realty, as chattels > Hargrave's Law Tracts, 8j; Blundell v. Cotterall, 5 Barn. & Aid. 268, 298, 305; Attorney Gen. ■». Richards, 2 Anst. 603, 616; Attorney Gen. ». Parmeter, 10 Price, 378, 411, 464; Attorney Gen. ■». Terry, L. B. 9 Ch. 425, 429, note; Weber v. Commissioners, 18 Wall. (U. S.) 57, 65; Barney v. Keokuk, 94 TJ. S. 824, 837; Shively v. Bowlby, 153 U. S. 1. 'Buccleuch v. Metropolitan Board, L. R. 5 H. L. 418; Lyon v. Fishmongers Co., 1 App. Cas. 662. 'North Shore Railways. Pion, 14 App. Cas. 613, 620; 14 Can. Sup. Ct. 677. * 2 Kent's Com. 310; 2 Bl. Com. 884. ' 2 Bl. Com. 15. § 17] ESTATES AND TENURES 25 real; but the only property which a man can have in things personal must be personal property.' Lands, houses, and immovable property, things capable of being held under the feudal system, were called tene- ments or things held.' They were also denominated hered- itaments, because on the death of the owner, they de- scended by law to his heir.' A tenement comprises everything which can be holden, so as to create a tenancy, in the feudal sense of the word, and things incorporeal, though they do not lie in tenure.* Corporeal hereditaments comprise substantial, permanent objects which may be inherited. The term land will include all such.' Incorporeal hereditaments comprise anything, the subject of property, which is inheritable and not tangible or visible; or rights issuing out of a thing corporate, whether real or personal, or concerning or annexed to or exercisable within the same.* § lY. Incorporeal Hereditaments — Shares—Pews in Church. — The existence of incoi'poreal hereditaments is merely an idea and abstract contemplation, though their efifects and profits may be frequently the objects of the bodily senses.' According to Blackstone, there are ten kinds of incorporeal hereditaments: advowsons, tithes, commons, ways, oflBices, dignities, franchises, corodies, annuities, and rents." In the United States there are no advowsons, tithes, dignities, nor corodies, commons are rare, offices rare or unknown, and annuities have no necessary connection with land." But there are other incorporeal hereditaments not named in the list, as remainders and reversions, dependent ' Bouvier's L. Diet. ^Glanville, Lib. IX, Cap. 1, 2, 3; Co. Litt. 1 b.; Shep. Touch. 91. »Co. Litt. 6 a; Sliep. Touch. 91. ••3 Kent's Com. 401, and authorities cited. '2B1. Com. 17. '2 Bl. Com. 20; Leake's Prop, in Land, 9. ' Co. Litt. 9 a: Pothier's Traite des Choses, sect. 2. 8 2B1. Com. 20. »3 Kent's Com. 402, 404, 454. 4 26 CREATION OF ESTATES. [§ 17 on a particular estate of freehold, easements of light, air and the like, and equities of redemption.' Incoporeal hereditaments are said to he in grant; corporeal in livery; since a simple deed or grant would pass the former, of which livery was impossible while livery was necessary to a transfer of the latter. But this distinction is now done away with, even in England." Shares in canals and railways are generally personal propei-ty. " Eeal estate held by a corporation is realty, but a share of stock in what is called a joint-stock corporation is personalty without regard to the nature of the property in which such capital stock is invested." A freehold right in a pew in a church is classed by some courts among incorporeal rights. " In Maine, Massachusetts and Connecticut, pews are real estate.' In New York a pewholder has no interest in the soil. However, if the corporation of the church owns the fee of the ground, and the trustees have granted a durable lease or fee of ground for a vault, it cannot be sold if the owner of the vault objects.' The owner of the pew cannot erect anything over it, or dig a vault under it, without the consent of the trustees of the church.' The trustees of the church have a right to take down, rebuild or remove the church, for the purpose of more convenient worship, without making any compen- sation to the pewholder for the temporary interruption, un- less the church was taken down as a matter of expediency and not of necessity. While the house remains, the use of the pew by the holder is absolute. ° ■ Bouvier's L. Diet. «8«fe9 Vict. C. 106, sect. 3. ^Barksdale v. Finney, 14 Gratt. (Va.) 356; Brownson v. Chapman, 63 N. Y. 635; Railroad Co. v. Tliomason, 40 6a. 408; Starling i>. Parker, 9 Beav. 450. Compare Welles v. Cowles, 3 Conn. 567; Price «. Price, 6 Dana (Ky.), 107. *2 Kent's Cora. 340n; Arnold ii. Ruggles, 1 R. J. 165. ' 3 Addams Eccl. 419. « 15 Cent. L. Journ. 101. 'In re Presbyterian Clmrcli, 3 Edw. 155; Shaw ». Beveridge, 3 Hill, 86. 8 Daniel v. Wood, 1 Pick. (Hass.) 103. 'Kellogg V. Dickinson, 18 Vt. 366; Gorton v. Hadsell, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 508: Gay V. Baker, 17 Mass. 435; Howard v. Parish, 7 Pick (Mass.) 188; Kimball V. Parish, 34 Pick (Mass.) 347. See, also, Price v. Church, 4 Ohio, 515; Fisher § 18] ESTATES AND TENURES. 27 A franchise of corporatious is a grant in gross to them of an incorporeal hereditament, and is not appurtenant to any particular land or property.' § 18. Houses, Trees and Crops.— Of course the build- ings are generally a part of the real estate. But there are exceptions to this rule. Thus, a house erected on another's land, may, by contract, belong to the builder as personal property." Growing grass, fruit and trees are natural products of the earth, and are parcels of the land. They are within the statute of frauds, and can only be sold by an agreement in writing.' But grain and vegetables, which are annual products of the earth, are chattels, and may be seized on execution as personalty and may be conveyed by parol.* If the growing grass is owned by one not the owner of the freehold, then it is not considered a parcel of the land. ' Chattels can become incorporated with the realty and then lose their character as personalty." If trees are planted and cultivated by a nurseryman in the course of his busi- ness, they become personal property.' Many things in their V. Glover, 4 N. H. 180; Baptist Church ». Witherell, 3 Paige (N. Y.), 303; St. Paul's Church ». Ford, 34 Barb. (M. Y.) 16; Cooper v. Church, 33 Barb. (N. Y.) 3J3;"VVheaton ». Gates, 18 N. Y. 395; Perrin v. Granger, 33 Vt. lOU Abernethy B. Chuich, 3 Daly (N.Y.). 1; Heeney v. Church, SEdw. (N.Y.) 608; Shaw D. Beveridge, 3 Hill (N. Y), 36; under the ecclesiastical law, Pettman ». Bridger, 1 Phill. Eccl. 316. ' Fond du Lac Water Co. v. Fond du Lac, 83 Wis. 333. 5 Pingrey's Chat. Mort. sect. 189; Doty v. Gorham, 5 Pick. (Mass.)487j Dame ». Dame, 3S N. H. 439; Marcey v. Darling, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 383; Pullea V. Bell. 40 Me. 314; Howard v. Pessenden, 14 Allen (Mass.), 124, 138; Kelly v. Austin, 46 111. 156. See, also, Pingrey's Real Estate Mort. sect. 401 et seq ; Aldrich v. Parsons, 6 N. H. 555; Wells i>. Banister, 4 Mass. 514; Ashmun d. Williams, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 403. 'Green v. Armstrong, 1 Denio(N. Y.), 550; Wintermute «. Light, 46 Barb. (N. Y.) 278; Rod well v. Phillips, 9 Mees. & Wels. 501; Carrington «. Roots, 2 Mees. & Wels. 348; Crosby v. Wadsworth, 6 East, 602. ^ Robinson «. Ezzell, 72 N. Car. 231; Jones ». Flint, 10 Ad. & El. 753; Parker- v. Staniland, 11 Bast, 362; Backenstoss «. Stabler, 33 Pa. St. 351; Craddock ®. Riddlesbarger, 3 Dana (Ky.), 306. » Smith V. Jenfcs, 1 Denio (N. Y.), 580: 1 N. Y. 90; Green ». Armstrong, 1 Denio (N. Y.), -550. « Adams v. Beadle, 47 Iowa, 439; Maples d Millon. 31 Conn. 598. ' Miller v. Baker, 1 Met. (Mass.) 37; Whitmarsh u. Walker, 1 Met. (Mass.) 313; Wyndham ». Way, 4 Taunt. 316; Penton v. Robart, 2 East, 88. 28 CREATION OF ESTATES. [§ 19 nature personal may become realty, by incorporation with it.' The natural products of the soil, without man's interven- tion, such as trees before being felled and converted into timber," and fruit before it is gathered,' are, at common law, realty.* § 19. Acquisition by Occupancy.— The acquisition of property undoubtedly began by occupancy; estates and land were separated for private use from the vast expanse of territory. And in the beginning, before civilization had dawned upon the barbarian, occupancy was the creation of title. This idea of title was seized by Coke, who insists that title is the means whereby the owner of land has a just cause for the possession of land. At first each nomad seized for the time being to his own use such places as he found most agreeable to his own convenience, provided no prior individual had taken possession. Such interest or estate in the land remained in the first, taken by the princi- ples of universal law, till such time as he abandoned it to seek other places.' And so men chose different occupations and manners of living, according to the diversities in their places of resi- dence or environment. Men congregated because it proved more advantageous than living apart; by thus uniting they could repel the onslaughts of inhospital tribes and develop their social nature. This compelled the abandon- ment of predatory and the assumption of agricultural babits by all except the shepherds and the hunters. The inhabitants of steppes and deserts, interspersed only here and there with fruitful pasture grounds, chose the life of shepherds, and roved as wandering tribes from place to place, with their tents and herds. Those who settled upon favorable situated parts of the seacoast soon discovered, with increasing population and development, the advantage of their position, and laid out towns and built houses. ' Elwes V. Maw, 2 Smith's Leading Cases, 319, Hare's note. » United States «. Schuler, 6 McLean, C. C. 37. ' Sparrow v. Pond, 49 Minn. 412. •Adams v. Smitli, Breese (111.), 221; Rodwell rs. Phillips, 9 Mees. & Wels. 501; Slocum t>. Seymour, 36 N. J. L. 138; Olmstead v. Niles, 7 N. H. 523. ^ 2 Bl. Com. 9. § 19] ESTATES AND TENURES. 29 Those who lived on plains devoted themselves to agricul- ture, while the rude and hardy mouutaiueer gave himself up to the chase.' Occupancy gave the right to the temporary use of the soil, and the right to the permanent property in the sub- stance of the earth itself, which excludes every one else but the owner from the use of it. Upon whatever ground the right of property is founded, the power of giving and transferring follow as a natural consequence. And as to the matter of succession to the property, Judge Blackstone,' with other writers upon gen- eral law, incorrectly holds that children have no better right by nature than strangers; that the preference given to the children to succeed to the property of their deceased parents originated solely in political establishment. This doctrine is not sound. No one, even in the most savage state, has ever conceded, by action or by word, that a stranger has as good a right as a child to the property of a deceased parent. The learned commentator is opposed by the very authority which he has so frequently cited as to other points of his argument, and that authority is the Bible.' And Isaac, after ninety years, reclaimed his father's property,* and after much contention with the Phil- istines, gained possession and held it " In the civil law, Justinian says, that it is principally to prevent any vacancy of possession, that father and son are considered as one person. Hence, upon the death of either the inheritance does not properly descend, as it continues in the hands of the survivor." This law of occupancy, whether it be applied to the con- duct of nations or of individuals, is but a part of the great law of nature. It is based upon the nature of man and the environment in which he is placed. Though there is a measure of uncertainty concerning the precepts ' Weber's Outl. of Univer. Hist. sect. '3B1. Com. 10, 11. ' Gen. ch. xv; 3, 4. ^Gen. ch. xxi; 30. ' Gen. ch. xxvi; 15, 18, et seq. 'Pandects, Lib. 38, tit. 3, law 11. 30 CREATION OF ESTATES. [§ 20 of the law of nature, an uncertainty in a greater or less degree found in all the moral sciences, yet the actual prac- tice and usages of men, while not the only evidence, is the best evidence of what it is agreed upon as the law. Under the English conception, title to real estate is founded upon possession, which originated with Coke, who says that title to real estate is the means whereby the owner of land has a just possession of his property.' But under the American conception, ownership is title; because title is the chain of transfer from or under sovereignty, and so when one has a chain of transfer from sovereignty he has the title, whether in possession or not, if his possession has not been barred by the statute of hmitations. Article 2. JTie Feudal System. % 20. Origin of Feudal System. § 34. Tenures by Knight Service, § 31. In the Early Ages. § 85. Tenures by Socage. ■§ 33. Views of Some Writers not in § 36. Kind of Socage Tenure. Accord with the Prevailing § 37. Other Tenures. Doctrine. § 28. Tenures According to Quality of § 23. Feudal Tenures in England. Service. § 20. Origin of Feudal System. — The prevailing opinion is that the feudal system originated with the northern Gothic conquerors of the Roman Empire." By the Norman conquest England was made the home of many Norman soldiers. The conquered Saxons received no favors of the King, and those who had opposed the Conqueror had their lands confiscated.' And at the com- pletion of the Doomsday book, 1086, two decades from the battle of Hastings, the King held all the lands, not pos- sessed by the Church, in demesne, or of him directly, as feuds, by comparatively few individuals.* It was a base confiscation and appropriation by the king. ' Co. Litt. 345, b; Titulus estjusta causa pogsidendi id quod nostrum est. " 3 Kent's Com. 491. However, see Voet's Disgressio de Peudis, sect. 1; Lib. 2, note 1, by Mr. Hargrave to Co. Litt. «2 Bl. Com. 48; Wright's Tenures, 61, 62. * 1 Spence's Eq.Jur. 93. §§ 21-22] ESTATES AND TENURES. 31 111 these grants the Norman King and his vassals fol- lowed the custom of their own country which is called the feudal system.' The King was considered as in some sense the proprietor, and was called the lord paramount/ a feu- dal fiction invented by William the Conqueror, who held that the king or queen is the fountain of honor, justice and property. This feudal fiction has been greatly modified in America and every man and woman is presumed to be the fountain of honor and justice, and sovereignty the fountain of property. § 21. In the Early Ages. — In the beginning when the right to property was recognized, every man occupied as much land as his necessities required, and which he found unoccupied. When the existence of an organized society became desirable, then followed the establishment of gov- ernments, and a new relation arose between each govern- ment and its citizens, that of protection on the one hand and dependence on the other. This involved the idea of service to the State as a condition to the use and enjoyment of land within the jurisdiction of the government. This relation was modified according to the environment of par- ticular States. In Europe it early took the form of the feudal system.' § 22. Views of Some Writers not in Accord With the Prevailing Doctrine. — Some writers assert that the sources of the feudal system was not found in the northern Gothic nations who overran the western empire of the Romans, and that an image of feudal policy has been discovered in almost every age and quarter of the globe.* But, if so, its traces are very indistinct, and it would seem that there is no reliable history of this subject until that of the Gothic conquerors of the Roman Empire. However, Gibbon dis- covered in the governments of the ancient Parthians and Persian empires the essence of the feudal system in grants hj the king to the nobles of lands and houses, on condition ' Wright's Tenures, 63. ' Co. Litt. 65a. 'Bouvier's L. Diet. tit. "Tenure," 3. ■^Voet's Digressio de Feudis, sect. 1. 82 CREATION OF ESTATES. [§ 23 of service in war.' Audit is said that the feudal policy existed in its most rigid form among the ancient Mexicans and among the Mahrattas and the Rajpoots in Hindostan, and in the Island of Ceylon/ and that the feudal system was preserved among the states of the Etruscans prior to the dominion of the Romans.' § 23. Feudal Tenures in England. — Lands are held by some feudal tenures. There were traces of feudal grants and of the relation of lord and vassal in the time of the Anglo-Saxons, but the formal and regular establishment of feudal tenures in their genuine character, and with all their fruits and services, was in the reign of William the Conqueror." However, it appears from the laws of the Saxons that a considerable portion of land was held under their lords by persons of a greater or less degree of bondage who owed services of either a civil, military or agricultural character. A large quantity of the lands which were entered in the Conqueror's celebrated Doomsday book were then held by the same tenure and subjected to the same services as they had been in the time of Edward the Con- fessor. But the Normans introduced some new provisions, and attempted to re-establish more which had become obsolete causing contests between the Normans and the English with respect to their restoration. And it appears tliat the general system of their laws remained much the same under the new dynasty of the Normans as it was under that of the Saxons. ° It has been said that there can be no doubt that the most essential part of what has been called the feudal system actually prevailed among the Anglo-Saxons.' It is concluded by some historians that the main difference between Anglo-Saxon feudality and the Norman feudal 1 1 Gibbons Hist. 329, 343. «3 Kent's Com. 490, n. 3 1 Niebuhr'3 Hist, of Rome, 99, 101. ^Wright's Tenures, 65-76; 3 Bl. Com. 50; Craig's Jus Feudale, Lib. 1, Dieg. 7. * Hale's Hist. Const. Law, 130 ; Stevens' Const. Eng. 33. « 3 Turner's Hist, of tlie Anglo-Saxons, 541, 542 ; 1 Reeve's Hist. Eng. L. 9 ; 8 Hallam's Middle Ages, ch. 8 pt. 1. See Bryce's Holy Roman Empire, 123, 346; Freeman's Norman Conquest, 47. § 23] ESTATES AND TENURES. 33 system consisted in the establishment in the later era of a more certain canon of descent and inheritance. The claim of the heir became an absolute right, and the lord lost any discretionary power of denying the renewal grant." By the law of William, all free men were required to swear that they would be faithful to him as their lord. The terras of this law are said to be absolutely feudal, and were apt and proper to establish that policy with all its con- seqaences.' But as an oath of fidelity was required, as well from the great landowners themselves as from their tenants, this system broke in upon the feudal compact in its most essential attribute, the exclusive dependence of the vassal upon his lord.' It may now be considered that the complete feudal system did not exist in England at the Anglo-Saxon period, and was substantially introduced by the Normans.* Norman customs, and their upholders and interpreters, Norman lawyers, were the real introducers of the feudal system of tenures into the law of England.' Hallam says that when the convulsions of the Conquest began to sub- side, the Saxons felt the effects of the Norman laws and cried out for the restoration of their own ; but they were the weaker party and had to submit, as the industry of the lawyers had woven a net from which there was no escape.' And Mr. Williams truthfully says that in what manner tenures crept in was a question, perhaps, never asked in those days, and if asked it could not probably, even then, have been minutely answered.' Sir Matthew Hale will not allow that the English took their laws from the Normans, and he insists that the laws of Normandy were, in a greater part thereof, borrowed from the English. ° ■ 1 Palgrave's Rise and Progress of the Eng. Com. ch. 19, 576-587. ' Wright's Tenures, 64, 65. 23 Hallam's Middle Ages, 430; 1 Stubb's Const. Hist. 273, 274. * 19 Contem. Rev. 748. 'Williams' Real Prop. (6 ed.) 4, citing 1 Stubbs' Const. Hist, of Eng., ch. ix. ' 3 Hallam's Middle ages, 468. 'Williams' Real Prop. (6 ed.) 4, 5. ' Hale's Hist. Com. L. ch. 6. 5 34 CREATION OF ESTATES. [§ 24 § 24. Tenures by Knight's Service.— The tenures which were authoritatively estabUshed ia England were tenures by Knight's service, and tenures by socage. Knight's service was essentially military in its character, and required the possession of a certain quantity of land, called a knight's fee. Tenure by knight's service, in addi- tion to the obligation of fealty and the military service of forty days in a year, was subject to certain hard condi- tions. The tenant was bound to afford aid to his lord, by the payment of money, when his lord stood in need of it, on certain emergent calls, as when he married his daughter, when he made his son a knight, or when he was taken prisoner.' Many arbitrary and tyrannical incidents or lordly privileges were attached to this tenure. When the tenant died, his heir at law was obliged to pay relief to the lord, being in the nature of a compensation for being permitted to succeed to the inheritance. The lord was entitled to wardship of the minor heir, and took the profits of the land during the minority. The lord could also dispose of his infant ward in marriage, and if the ward refused, he or she forfeited as much as was arbitrarily assessed for the value of the marriage. If the tenant ahened his land, he was liable to pay to the lord a fine for the privilege of selling. If the tenant died, without leav- ing an heir competent to perform the feudal service, or was convicted of treason or felony, the land escheated or re- verted to the feudal lord. This tenure became so oppressive that the whole system was destroyed at a blow. Tenures by knight's service, and the fruits and consequences of tenures in capite' were abolished; and all tenures ©f es- tates of inheritance in the hands of private persons, except copyhold tenures, were turned into free and common socage; and the same was discharged from homage, wardship, values and forfeitures of marriage, and other charges in- cident to tenures by knight's service, and from all aids for marrying the lord's daughter and for making his son a knight.' This statute, says Blackstone, was a greater ac- > 3 Kent's Com. 504. " Co. Litt. 108 a. n 5. »Stat. 13 Car. II., c. 24; LHt. s. 117, 118. § 25] ESTATES AKD TENURES. 35 quisitiou to the civil property of England than even Magna Charta itself; since that only pruned the luxuriances which had grown out of military tenures, and thereby preserved them in vigor, but the statute of King Charles extirpated the whole, and demolished both root and branches.' Few statutes ever secured such national independence and so abridged the royal prerogative." The greatest part of the lands in England were held by the tenure of knight's service. The statute of 12 Charles II. essentially put an end to the feudal system in England, although some fictions founded on the ancient feudal re- lation and dependence, are still retained in socage tenures.' § 25. TEmjBES BY Socage. — The services by socage were defined and certain, and generally of a pacific nature.' The redeeming quality of this service was its certainty; and in this sense it is often placed in opposition to the tenure by knight's service, where the tenure was alto- gether precarious and uncertain. The tenant held his tene- ment by any certain service, in lieu of aU other services, so that they were not services of chivalry or knight's service. ' According to the earlier common law writers, socage signified a service rendered by a tenant to his lord by the soke or ploughshare.* Others derive the word from the Saxon soc, which signi- fies liberty or privilege, denoting thereby a free or privi- leged tenure. The French word soc signifies a plough- share. In favor of the French definition is urged the na- ture of the employment, as well as the most usual condi- tion of tenure of the lands of sockmen, who were princi- pally engaged in agriculture. In favor of the Saxon sig- nification is urged the beneficial nature of the tenure, and also_^the circumstances that socagers were bound to attend > 3 Bl. Com. 87, 88. ' 1 Stephen's Engl. Const. 431. » 3 Kent's Com. 509; Williams' Seisin of Freehold, 13. * Wright's Tenures, 139-143. »Litt. 117; 3B1. Com. 79. ^Bouvier'sL. Diet. tit. "Socage." 36 CREATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 26-27 the court bai'Gn o£ the lord, to whose soc or right of justice they belonged.' § 26. Kind op Socage Tenures.— The term socage was afterward extended to all services which were hot of a military character, provided they were fixed. There wez-e three kinds of these socage tenures: 1. Frank tenure, which is called free and common socage to distinguish it from the other two; 2. Ancient tenure, which is now called ancient demesne; 3. Base tenure, which is now copyhold tenure. But as the term socage has long since become ob- solete as to the two latter, socage and free and common socage now mean the same thing." There is now only one kind of tenure by which an estate in fee simple can beheld, and that is the tenure of free and common socage.' The owners of fee simple estates, held by this tenure, were not villeins or slaves, but free men.' By statute" the ancient tenure of knight's service was abolished, and all lands, with the exception of copyholds and of ecclesiastical lands, which continued to be held in free alms, or frank almoigne, were turned into free and common socage, and the great mass of real property in England is now held under this tenure. § 27. Other Tenures. — Other tenures have grown out of knight's service and socage. Of these is tenure by grand serjeanty, which consisted in some service immediately re- specting the person or dignity of the sovereign ; as, to carry the king's standard, or to be his constable or marshal, his butler or chamberlain, or to perform some similar service, or to carry his sword before him at his coronation.' Tenure by petit serjeanty required some inferior service,, not strictly military or personal to the king ; as, the annual sender of a bow or sword, or a dagger, or a knife, or a lance, or a pair of gloves of mail, or a pair of guilt spurs, > See 3 Hallam's Middle Ages, 481; Co. Litt. 86 a, n. 1; Wright's Tenures, 143; 1 Ellis's Intro. Doomesday, 69; 3 Chitty's Bl. Com. Mr. Christian's note, 80, « Co. Litt. 17, 86. ' 3 Bl. Com. 101. «2B1. Com. 60, 61; 3 Hallam's Middle Ages, 481. ' 13 Car. II. c. 24. «Litt. 9. 153; 3B1. Com. 66. § 27] ESTATES AND TENURES. 87 or an arrow. Thus, the Duke of WelUngton annually pre- sented his sovereign with a banner, in acknowledgment of his tenure. Such tenant did no personal service except to render and pay annually certain things to the king, and hence, this service was only socage in effect.* Tenure by copyhold was a tenure by copy of court roll, and any species of holding by particular custom of the manor. Such estate was originally at the will of the lord, agreeably to certain customs evidenced by entries on the roll of the court's baron.' Tenure in frankalmoigne is a species of ancient tenure whereby religious corporation, aggregate or sole, holds its lands of the donor, in consideration of the religious services performed. The tenant is not bound to take an oath of fealty to a superior lord. Since the Eeforma- tion the services have been regulated by the liturgy, or book of common prayer of the church of England.* Burgage was a species of tenure in socage, where the king or other person was lord of an ancient borough, in which the tenements were held by a rent certain.' The free alienation of land commenced with burgage tenures, and was dictated by the genius of commerce.' Gavelkind was a tenure by which almost all the lands in England were held prior to the Conquest, and which is still preserved in the county of Kent. It has been styled socage tenure.' In the county of Kent all estates of inheritance in land, including estates tail,' are presumed to be holders by this tenure until the contrary is shown.' Lord Coke derives gavelkind from "gave all kinde"; for this custom gave to all the sons alike." Every son is as great a gentleman as the eldest son is." All the sons of ■ Litt. s. 159 ; 3 Coke's Inst. 233. ' Litt. s. 160: 2B1. Com 81. « Co. Litt. .58a ; 2 Shars. Bl. Com. 95. ■• 2 Coke's Inst. 502 ; 2 Bl. Cora. 101 ; Co. Litt. 67b; Litt. s. 135 » 2 Bl. Com. 82 ; Litt. s. 162. * Dalrymple's Essay on Feudal Property, c. 8, sect. 1. ' Bouvier's L. Diet. tit. " Gavelkind.'' 8 Litt. s. 265; Robinson's Gavelkind (3rd ed.), 64, 119. " Robinson's Gavelkind (3rd ed.), 54. " Co. Litt. 140a. 1' Litt. s. 210. 88 CREATION OF KSTATES. [§§ 28-29 a tenant of gavelkind lands take equally, or their heirs, male and female, by representation. § 28. Tenubes According to Quality of Service— The old common-law writers distinguished according to the quality of the service, into /ree or hase. Free tenure was such as was not unbecoming a soldier or a freeman to per- form ; as to serve the lord in the wars. Base tenure was only considered fit for a peasant ; as to plow the land and the like. They were further distinguished with reference to the person from whom the land was held ; as a tenure in capite, where the holding was of the person of the king. The king's tenants in capite were subject to many burdens and restraints, from which the tenants of other lords were exempt. Tenure in gross was where the holding was of a subject.' Feud was land held of a superior on condition of render- ing him service.' Article 3. Foundation of Ownership of Land in the United States. § 29. Origin of Ownership. § 30. Conquered Territory. § 29. Origin of Ownership. — Under the feudal tenures in England, William the Conqueror invented the feudal fiction that the king or queen is the original proprietor, or lord paramount of all the land in the kingdom, and the true and only source of title.' In the United States sovereignty is the true source of title." In the purchase of territory the United States government has never disturbed the owner- ship of the acquired land, as is witnessed in the acquisition of Florida, Louisiana, Gadsden purchase and Alaska. The same custom was adopted in gaining territory by annexa- tion, as in the case of Texas. All valid individual ownership of land in the United States is derived from a grant of the local government, ' Bouvier's L. Bict. tit. "Tenures." » 2 Bl. Com. 106. '2B1. Com. 51, 53, 59,86. « 8 Kent's Com. 378. § 30] ESTATES AND TENURES. 39 from that of the United States, or from the crown, or royal chartered governments established in this country prior to the Revolution. And in the Colonial period, ownership to land passed to individual from the crown, through the colonial corporations, and the colonial or proprietary au- thorities. ' In ancient Greece and Italy, all property in land was de- rived from the government by allotment to individuals in absolute right.'' The United States' territory was acquired as foUows : Ceded from England, 1783, 866,391 square miles; Louisiana purchase in 1803, from France, 862,922 square miles; Florida purchase, in 1821, from Spain, 68,680 square, miles; admis- sion of Texas, in 1845, 365,573 square miles; Oregon, settled hj treaty, in 1846, 298,804 square miles; California terri- tory, conquered from Mexico in 1847, 515,764 square miles; Arizona, acquired from Mexico in 1854, by treaty, 57,466 square miles; Alaska, acquired from Eussia, in 1867, 577,390 square miles, making a total of 3,602,990 square miles. The doctrine that sovereignty is the source of property is taken from the feudal laws and is in accord with the American institutions. But no other principle of feudal tenure is applicable to the American Union, in the transfer of real estate. The principles which underlie the fabric of the State and the Federal government are unqualifiedly antagonistic to the feudal tenures. It may be said that the Thirteen Colonies took feudal tenures as a rightful inherit- ance. Be that as it may, no other portion of the great American Union has any grounds for the adoption of such incompatible heresies as feudal tenures, especially those States coming into the Union from Spanish jurisdic- tions. § 30. Conquered Territory. — The United States govern- ment is not now, nor never has been, engaged in acquiring territory by conquest, unless subduing Indian tribes can be ' Jackson b. Ingraham, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 163. See, also, Jackson v. Waters, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 365; De Armas v. Mayor, 5 La. 133. 'Arnold's Hist. Rome, 367. 40 CREATION OF ESTATES. [§31 called conquest. The rights of the United States to Indian lands will be treated in due course and in its place. It was a general principle in the ancient states of Greece and Italy, that conquered territory belonged to the State, and not to the individuals. The great mass of the territory was left as the demesne of the State, and the occupiers of it held by a pi-'ecarious tenure.' Article 4. Discovery and Colonization. % 31. Rights of Discoverers. § 35. Doctrine of the United States § 33. Rights to Possess and Colonize. Government. § 33. Recognition of Indian Titles by § 36. The Indian Territory. Europeans. § 37. Title of the Indians to Okla- § 34. Doctrine of the Colonies and the homa. States. § 38. The Outlet or Strip. § 31. Eights of Discoverers. — On the discovery of America, the great nations of Europe appropriated to them- selves whatever they could without infringing upon the rights of other nations. And all the nations believed that they made ample compensation to the natives by bestow- ing on them civilization and Christianity, in exchange for unlimited independence. In order to establish harmony, it was settled that discovery gave title to the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against all other European governments, which title might be con- summated by possession. This policy gave to the nation making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the nations, and estab- lishing settlement upon it. It was a right with which no European nation could interfere. It was a right which all asserted for themselves, and to the assertion of which all assented. This rule considerably impaired the rights of the natives. The discoverers respected the right of the natives, as occupants, but asserted the ultimate dominion to be in themselves, and exercised a power to grant the soil, while yet in the possession of the natives. • Arnold's Hist. Rome, 267. § 32] ESTATES AND TENURES. 41 The grantees held the land subject only to the Indian right of occupancy.' Mere transient discovery is not sufficient to vest title in the discoverers. Discovery must be followed in a reason- able time by occupation and settlement, more or less per- manent, under the sanction of the State. Discovery is an imperfect title unless followed by occupation, and unless the intention of the sovereign to take possession be declared or made known to the world." § 32. Right to Possess and Colonize. — The original immigrants to this country believed that they had the right to possess, subdue, and cultivate the soil according to the law of nature and the gift of Providence. The great patent of New England, which was the foundation of the subse- quent titles and subordinate charters in that section, tended to confirm that opinion. The practice of the Euro- pean nations constituted a law of nations which seemed to disregard the possession of the natives, because they had not been admitted into the society of nations.' It was insisted that the English had an undoubted right to enter and appropriate for agricultural purposes all the residue of the unimproved lands in the country as being open and common to the first hona fide occupants. That, in a state of nature, the only title to property was the labor by which the same was appropriated and cultivated, and that the Indians were stiU in that imperfect state of civil policy which borders upon a state of nature, and the exten- sive tracts of territory which the natives claim as national property were not subject to any regulation nor defined as property, and lay neglected in that common state wherein nature had left it, and hence the discoverers had a right to occupy it and receive title by the government.* And it was considered as an instance of the most imaginable 'JohQson«. M'lntosh, 8 Wheat. (U. S.), 543, 573. ' Vattel, Lib. 1, c. 18, sects. 207, 208; Kluber's Droit des Gens Modernes de Europe, sect. 126; Marten's Precis. 37; Greenborn's Hist, of Oregon and Cali- fornia (4 ed.), 304. ' Chalmer's Political Annuals, 676 ; 1 Mather's Magnalia, 65 (ed. 1820) ; Hutchison's State Papers (Boston, 1769), 37. * 4 Massachusetts Hist. Collections, 159. 6 42 CREATION OF ESTATES. [§ 3g civility that the English purchased several tracts of land of the natives, notwithstanding the patent which the grantees had for the country.' When the Puritans of New England settled at Plymouth they made treaties with the Indians, which treaties bore the language of dependence and submission, and the English accepted the acknowledgments of the chiefs that they were dependent and allies and loyal subjects of the king." The great patent of New England' recited that the king's subjects had taken actual possession of the continent in the name and to the use of the king, as sovereign lord thereof. The whole territory was granted to the corpora- tion, to be held of the crown in free and common socage, and with absolute power of legislation and government over the whole country, and with a complete monopoly of trade. § 33. Recognition of Indian Titles by Europeans. — The English, the French, and the Spaniards recognized the title of the land as belonging to the natives, and never interfered with their national affairs. The English pur- chased the alliance and dependence of the Indian tribes and bought their lands at a price set by the natives themselves. By the laws of Spain, when the Indians gave up their lands to the whites others should be assigned to them, and they held them in complete ownership, as if they were held under a complete grant. But as the Indians were considered in a state of pupilage, the authority of the public officers, who were constituted their guardians, was necessary to a valid alienation of their property.* Vattel believed that it was the proper method to pur- chase the lands from the natives ; that the natives had no right to usurp more territory than they could subdue and cultivate.' Spain allotted to the Indians particular portions of the ' 1 Mather's Magnalia, 72. ' Morton's New England Memorial, 64, 67. ' Granted by King James, in 1630, and including the territory between the degrees of forty and forty-eight of north latitude. ^Recopilacion de las Indias, Lib. 4, tit. 13, 1. 13, 8 ; 3 White's Recopila- cion de Leyes de las Indias, 34, 41, 59, 95. 'Vattel's Droit des Gens, c. 1, sect. 81, 309. § 34] ESTATES AND TENURES. 43 soil which she had wrested from them, and took steps to prevent the intrusion of white settlers. Spain enacted that when the Indians gave up their lands to the whites others should be assigned them." And if a sale by the Indians was followed by payment of the price, and delivery of the property, no one could take advantage of an informality in the mode of making it, but the Indians." § 34. DOCTEINE OF THE COLONIES AND THE STATES. — Lands in possession of friendly Indians were always, under the colonial governments, considered as being owned by the tribe or nation, as their common property, by a per- petual right of possession. Subject to the right of posses- sion, the ultimate fee was in the crown and its grantees, which could be granted by the crown or colonial legislature while the lands remained in possession of the Indians, though possession could not be taken without their consent. An individual could not purchase Indian lands without permission or license from the crown, colonial governors, or according to the rules prescribed by the colonial laws ; but such purchases were valid with such license, or in con- formity with the local laws ; and by this union of the per- petual right of occupancy with the ultimate fee, which passed from the crown by the license, the title of the purchaser became complete.' Indian possession or occupation was considered with reference to their habits and modes of life ; their hunting grounds were as much in their actual possession as the cleared fields in the possession of the white ; and their rights to its conclusive enjoyment in their own way and for their own purpose were as much respected, until they aban- doned them, made a cession to the government, or an au- thorized sale to individuals.' ' Recopilacion de las Indias, Liv. 6, tit. 3, 1. 14 ; " Y porque a los Indios se TiaMan de senalar y dar tierrai, y aquas, y monies, si se quitaren a Espanoles, se las dinjusta reeompensa en otra parte." ' Nouveau Repertoire de juris Verbo Nullite, sec. 8, 3 ; 7 Proullier's Droit Civil Francais, No. 553, art. 561, 564. 'Mitchel ?i. United States, 9 Pet. (U. S.) 711, 746. ■•See 3 Johnson's Di?. 15, tit. Iiidian=i; Wharton's Dig. tit. Lands, 488; John- son e. M'Intosh, 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 571, 604. 44 CEEATION OF ESTATEa [§ 34 It was the universal rule tha,t purchases made at Indian treaties, in the presence and with the approbation of the officer under whose direction they were held by the au- thority of the crown, gave a valid title to the lands ; it pre- vailed under the laws of the States after the Eevolution, and yet continues in those where the right to the ultimate fee is owned by the States or their grantees. It has been adopted by the United States, and the purchases made at treaties held by their authority, have been always held good by the ratification of the treaty, without any patent to the purchases from the United States. This rule, in the colonies, was founded on a settled rule of the law of Eng- land, that, by his prerogative, the king was the universal occupant of all vacant land in his dominion, and had the right to grant it at his pleasure, or by his authorized officers.' The colony of Massachusetts, in 1633, forbid the pur- chase of lands from the Indians, without license from the government ; and a similar law was enacted by the colony of Plymouth in 1643." The colony of New York ordained that no purchase of lands from the Indians should be valid without the governor's license, and the execution of the purchase in his presence.' New Jersey ordained that all purchases from the Indians without the consent of the government should be void. In 1758 the Indians released, for a valuable consideration, all claims to lands in New Jersey.* William Penn, the founder of Pennsylvania, made a treaty with the Indians in 1682, whereby they sold a large tract of their land." Vattel extolled the moderation of William Penn, and the first settlers in New England, who fairly purchased from the Indians their lands.' Governor Calvert, in 1633, purchased land from the Indians, and 'Co. Litt. 1, 416; 4 Bac. Abr. Prerog. 153; 7 Day's Com. Dig. 76; Holdea V. Joy, 17 Wall. (U. 8.) 211, 214. 'See 1 Holmes's Am. Annuals, 383; 2 Hazard's Collection of State Papers, 5B1-.584; 1 Holmes's Annuals, 217, 218. • 1 Smith's Hist. N. York, 39. • Annual Register for 1759, 191. » 1 Proud's Hist. Penn. 212. • Vattel's Droit des Gens, c. 1, sects. 18, 309. § 35] ESTATES AND TENURES. 45 founded Maryland; and in 1644, all Indian purchases, without the consent of the proprietary of the province, were declared void and illegal.' Virginia was principally purchased from the Indians." Georgia made purchases from the Indians. In 1733 and 1738 Savannah, with a large tract of land, was purchased from the Indians. § 35. Doctrine of the United States Government. — The United* States Supreme Court declared that the right given by European discovery was the exclusive right to purchase, but this right was not founded on the denial of the right of the Indian possessor to sell. The right of the soil was in the natives, and the rights of the whites was the exclusive right of purchasing such lands as the Indians were willing to sell.' But this doctrine does not seem to accord with another decision, which holds that the title of the Indian to lands lying within the territorial limits of a State, though entitled to respect by the courts until it be lawfully extinguished, was not such as to be absolutely re- pugnant to a seisin in fee on the part of the government within whose jurisdiction the land was situated." But Justice Johnson rendered a dissenting opinion, claiming that the Indians were absolute owners of the soil, and that prac- tically, and in cases unaffected by particular treaties, the restrictions upon the right of the soil in the Indians amounted only to an exclusion of all competitions from the market, and a preemptive right to acquire a fee simple by purchase when the owners should be pleased to sell. The right of the Indians to their occupancy is as sacred as that of the United States to the fee, but it is only a right to occupancy. ' And when the possession is abandoned by the Indians, it attaches itself to the fee without further grant;" and the lands cease to be Indian country without any fur- ther act of Congress, unless by a treaty by which the Indians ' Chalmers's Annuals, 216. 'Jefferson's Notes on Virginia, 1.53. 'Worcester », Georgia, 6 Pet. (U. S.; 515. ■•Fletcher ». Peck, 6 Cranch (U. S.), 87. » Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. (U. S.) 1, 48; United States v. Cook, 19 Wall. (U. 8.) 591. « Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. (U. 8.) 1, 17. 46 CREATION OF ESTATES. [§36 parted with their title, or by some act of Congress, a differ- ent rule was applicable to the case.' While the Indian tribes own the soil of their country, they are under the political control of the United States; they cannot, therefore, have the right of eminent domain as an inherent right." The Indian tribes are the wards of the national government, and are dependent on the United States for their political rights. ° But while this is the rela- tion between the Indian tribes and the Federal government, yet there is another phase to this relationship. The tribes in the Indian Territory have treaties with the United States in which they are recognized as independent nations, and no stranger can take up his residence among them without their consent. Many of the Indians now hold land in severalty and are becoming civilized and voters, and, of course. United States » Brittain v. McKay, 1 Ired. L. (N. Car.) 265; Thompson « Craigmyle, 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 391. § 4i] FIXTURES AND OTHER ANNEXATIONS. 55' they may be sold and separated from the soil,' after ma- turity." § ii. Manure. — Manure is a part of the land where it is made. It becomes a part of the realty.' And it is now generally held that it is part of the real estate, even if it be laid up in heaps in the farm yard. * Manure taken from the barnyard of a homestead, and piled upon the land, though not broken up, nor rotten, nor in a fit state for in- corporation with the soil, is a part of the land. ' When a mortgagor is evicted from the premises, he has no right to sell or to remove the manure, because it is a part of the freehold, and the title is vested in the mort- gagee.' But stock of cattle, or the increase thereof, or plantation tools, unless expressly stipulated to the con- trary, do not go with the farm, as they are not real prop- erty.' Manure upon lands in a village or city, where they are not used for agricultural purposes, is not a fixture, and is personalty and not a part of the land." As a general rule, in this country, manure made upon the farm cannot be re- moved by the tenant, but in England, and in some of the ' Craddock v. Biddlesliorger, 3 Dana (Ky.), 206; Jones v. Flint, 10 Ad. & E. 753. 'Thknor v. McClelland, 84 111. 471; Davis v. McParlane, 37 0al. 634; Mar- shall V. Ferguson, 23 Cal. 65; Miller v. State, 39 Ind. 267; Moreland v. Myall, 14 Basil (Ky.), 474; Bryant v. Crosby, 40 Me. 9; Purverc. Piercy, 40 .Vld. 312; Delauey v. Root, 99 Mass. 546; Brown ». Sanborn, 31 Minn. 403; Howe v. Batchelder, 49 N. H. 204; Bloom v. Welsh, 27 N. J. L. 177; Harris©. Frink, 49 N. Y. 24; Brittain v. McKay, 1 Ired. L. (N. Car.) 265; Hershey w. Metzgar, 90 Pa. St. 317; Bellows v. Weils, 36 Vt. 599; Jones v. Flint, 10 Ad. & E. 753; Sainsbury v. Matthews, 4 Mees. & Wels. 343. » Middlebrook B. Corwin, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 169. ^ Lassell ». Reed, 6 Me. 333; Daniels v. Pond, 31 Pick. (Mass.) 367; Galla. gheri). Shipley, 34 Md. 418. ' Fay V. Muzzey, 13 Gray (Mass.), 53, 55; Lewis v. Jones, 17 Pa. St. 363. « Chases. Wingate, 68 Me. 204, See, also, Wetlierbee v. Ellison, 19 Vt. 379; Lewis v. Jones, 17 Pa, St. 263; Perry «. Carr, 44 N. H. 118; Plumer v. Plumer, 30 N. H. 558. ' Vason V. Ball, 56 Ga. 268. In some of the States it has been held that slaves were so far regarded as real property as to descend to heirs, instead of passing to personal representatives. 2 Dana (Ky.), 43. «8ee Fletcher v. Herring, 112 Mass. 383; Plumer v. Plumer, 30 N. H. 558. 56 CEEATION OF ESTATE& [§45 United States, the rule is otherwise, and the outgoing ten- ant may remove the manure. ' Article 2, What constitutes Fixtures. §45. §46. §47. §48. §49. §50. §51. §S2. §53. §54. Definition. General Statement. Statutory Provisions. Intention May Control. Immovable Character of Fix- tures. Physical Annexation. Houses and Other Structures may not become Part of the Realty. Temporary Separation. Erecting Buildings upon An- other's Land. Railroad Property. § 55. Rolling Stock of Railvrays — Constitutional and Statutory Provisions. § 56. Railroad Track — ^Doctrine of the Courts. § 57. Water Pipes — Poles and Wires. § 58. Fixtures in Manufactories and Mills. § 59. Machinery that Supplies the Motive Power. § 60. External Indications May Con- trol. § 61. Illustrations. § 45. Definition. — Technically speaking, a fixture is any- thing of an accessory character annexed to houses and lands so as to constitute a part of them. The term is also used to denote personal chattels annexed to the freehold, but removable by the person annexing them.' The term is of modern origin, and is not found in the more ancient books of the law.' In its broadest significa- tion, fixture means anything which is by artificial means attached permanently or substantially to the soil or free- hold. ' Under the ancient rule, whatever became necessary to the freehold, and partook of all its legal incidents and properties, was realty, and could not be severed without the consent of the owner of the land. ' But the modern ' Roberts v. Barker, 1 Cromp. & Mees. 809; Smithwick v. Ellison, 3 Ired. (N. Car.) 336; Ruckman v. Outwater, 4 Dutch. (N. J.) 581. ' 1 Wait's Law & Pr. 602. See 33 Cent. L. Journ. 303. 'See Sheen v. Rickie, 5 Mees. & Wels. 175. *TeafE o. Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 511; Farrar v. Chaufletete, 5 Denio (N.Y.), 537; Providence Gas Co. ■». Thurber. 2 R. I. 33. ' Co. Litt. 53a, 4. Elwes v. Maw, 3 East, 38; Dudley ®. Warde, Amb. 113. Minshall v. Llnvd, 2 Mees. & Wels. 450. § 46] FIXTCKES AND OTHER ANNEXATIONS. 57 rule is greatly relaxed and intention and circumstances have a great modifying effect in this regard.' Some things, though moveable in their nature, are in re- spect to their legal qualities, of the nature of things real, such as heir-looms and things in the nature of heir-looms, which, by special custom, pass with the inheritance; also, animals, ferce, naturce, not domesticated, so confined to the realty as to become appurtenant to it; among these may be named deer in a park, pigeons in a pigeon house, conies in a warren, fish in a pond and the like. Other articles are classed as fixtures on the principle of constructive attach- ment, as deeds and other papers which constitute the muni- ments of title to the land, the keys of a house, and the like, which belong to the real estate and pass with it be- cause these things are incident to the realty, and of no value in any other relation.' § 46. General Statement. — Lord EUenborough' held that the doctrine of fixtures depends largely in its applica- tion upon the relations of the parties whom he divides into three classes : 1. Executor and heir. As between them, the common- law rule, that whatever is affixed to the freehold becomes a part of it and passes with it, quicquid plantatur solo, solo cedit, is observed in full vigor. — In this class f aU also mortgagor and mortgagee, vendor and vendee, as to whom the strict rule of the common law is still in force.' 2. Between executor of tenant for life, or in tail, and the remainderman, the right to fixtures is considered more favor- able for the executor. 3. Between landlord and tenant, in which case, in favor of trade, and to encourage industry, the greatest latitude is allowed, so that all fixtures set up for better enjoyment of trade are retained by the tenant, though this does not include fixtures used for agricultural purposes. Where, 'Ex parte Barclay, 5 DeG. M. & G. 403; Prescott v. Wells, 3 Nov. 82; Carver v. Gough, 153 Pa. St. 225. See, also, 8 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 41. ' Liford's Case, 11 Co. 50; Lord v. Wardle, 8 Bing. N. C. 680; Petre v. Heneage, 12 Modern, 520. 'Elwes V. Maw. 8 East, 83; McCullough v. Irvine, 13 Pa. St. 438. *Foote i>. Gooch, 96 N. Car. 365. 8 58 CREATION OF ESTATES. [§ 46 however, they are used for mixed purposes of trade and agriculture, they are held to jbelong to the tenant.' Chief Justice Pearson ably says that the reason of this distinction is, that when additions are made to the land by the owner, whether vendor, mortgagor, or ancestor, the purpose is to enhance the value of the realty, and to be permanent. With the tenant the annexations are made for a temporary purpose, and not with a view of making them part of the land; hence, for the encouragement of trade, manufacturing and the like, the tenant is allowed to re- move what had apparently become affixed to the soil, if annexed for the purpose of trade, and not merely for better enjoyment of the premises." But the tenant must remove the fixtures before the term expires, or at least before he gives up possession.' AH fixtures for the time being are part of the freehold, and if any right to remove them exists in the person erect- ing them, this must be exercised during the term of the tenant, and if not so removed, the right to remove is lost, and they become a parcel of the soil.* The weight of authority, both English and American, ancient and modern, is that where a tenant' quits possession or surrenders the premises unqualifiedly to his landlord without removing or reserving the fixtures, he is under- stood to make a dereliction of them to his landlord; and the few cases in which the right of property in fixtures has been held to remain unchanged after the termination of the tenancy and the surrender of possession of the premises by the tenant, rest upon the particular attendant circum- ' "Williams on Per. Prop. 16, note. ^ Moore v. Vallentine, 77 N. Car. 188. See, also, Pemberton v. King, 2 Dev. (N. Car.) 376; Tyler on Pixt. (ed. 1877) 490, 491 ; Lawton ». Salmon, 1 H. Bl. 260; Dudley v. Warde, Amb. 113; Lawton v. Lawton, 3 Atk. 13. '2 Taylor's Land & Tenant (8th ed.), sect 551; Tyler on Fixt. chs. 30 and 81; Ewell's Fixt. 137, et seq.; Amos and Ferard's Fixt. 94: Gibbon's Fixt. 39; Grady's Fixt. 181; Poole's Case, 1 Salk. 368; Lee v. Risdon, 7 Taunt. 191; 2 Smith's Lead. Cases, 202. ■■Davis B. BufEum, 53 Me. 160; Gaffield «. Hapgood, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 192; Carlin D. Ritter, 68 Md. 478; Allen v. Kennedy, 40 Ind. 142; Davis v. Moss, 38 Pa. St. 346; Beers v. St. Jolm, 16 Conn. 332; Bliss v. Whitney, 9 Allen (Mass.), 114; Preston ». Briggs, 16 Vt. 134; Shepard v. Spaulding, 4 Met. (Mass.) 416; State V. Elliott, 11 N. H. 540; Reynolds v. Shuler, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 333. §§ 47-48] FIXTURES AND OTHER ANNEXATIONS. 59" stances, and may be regarded as exceptional, and they do not invalidate the general rule." § 47. Statutory Provisions. — In some of the States cei'tain classes of fixtures have been regulated by statute. In Ehode Island it is provided that the water-wheels, steam engines, boilers, main belts, which give motion to the shaft- ing, all shafting, whether upright or horizontal, and hang- ers for the same, except such as are used to drive a special machine, all drums, pulleys, wheels, gearing, steam pipes, gas pipes and gas fixtures, water pipes and fixtures, kettles and vats set and used in any mechanical or manu- facturing establishment, shall be declared to be real estate, whenever the same belong to the owner of real estate to which they were attached. All other machinery, tools, and apparatus of every description, used and employed in any manufacturing establishment are declared to be per- sonal estate, and as such shall be considered, in assign- ments of dower, in attachments, and in all cases whatso- ever, except in assessment and payment of taxes.' In Vermont, machinery attached to or used in any shop, mill, printing office or factory, may be mortgaged, the deed to be executed, acknowledged and recorded as deeds of real ejtate, and such mortgages may be assigned, dis- charged or foreclosed like mortgages of real estate.' In Connecticut, fixtures of a manufacturing or me- chanical establishment, or of a printing or publishing house, the furniture of a dwelling house, and the hay in the barn, may be mortgaged with the realty, when these articles are specifically named as included in the mortgage; or separate from the realty if particularly described, and the mortgage be executed, acknowledged and recorded in all respects as a mortgage of land.* § 48. Intention May Control.— When no contract ex- ists between the parties, a machine placed in a building is generally found to be real estate or personal property ' Carlin v. Ritter, 68 Md. 478, 487; Tyler's Pixt. 453. »Pub. Stat. 1882, ch. 171, sects. 19. ' Rev. Stat. 1880, sect. 19S0. *Gen. Stat. 1888, sect. 3016. 60 CREATION OF ESTATES. [§ 48 from the external indications which show whether or not it belongs to the building as an article designed to become a part of it, and to be used with it to promote the object for which it was erected, or to which it has been adapted and devoted. The tendency of the modern decisions is to make this a question of what was the intention with which the machine was put in place. ' Thus, railroad spikes and machinery, placed on a mill lot with the bona fide in- tention of attaching them to the mill, and which are neces- sary to be used, will be regarded as real estate.' So when machinery is wrongfully placed in a mill, it does not there- by become realty.' The intention is gathered from the man- ner of annexation and the character of the improvement, and whether it is essential to the proper use of the realty.* Intent alone will not convert a chattel into realty. ' It is necessary to keep in view the distinction between chattels whose completeness and identity, as separate and distinct articles may be preserved, notwithstanding their annexa- tion, and those which necessarily become incorporated in the realty.' Intention can be inferred fz'om the nature of the article affixed, the relation and situation of the party making the annexation, the structure and mode of annexation, and the purpose for which the annexation was made. ' ■ Hill V. Nat. Bank, 97 U. S. 450; Choate «. Kimball, 56 Ark. 55; Carver ji. Gough, 153 Pa. St. 225 ; Ottumway Woolen Mill d. Hawley, 44 Iowa, 57 ; McRae ®. Cent. Nat. Bank, 66 N. Y. 489. 'McFadden v. Crawford, 36 W. Va. 671. ' Gill V. De Armant, 90 Mich. 425. See, also, Langdon v. Buchanan, 62 N. H. 657. * Tillman v. De Lacy, 80 Ala. 103 ; Rogers v. Prattville Manuf. Co., 81 Ala. 483 ; Green v. Phillips, 26Gratt. (Va.) 753 ; Slielton«. Ficklin, 33 Gratt. (Va.) 727. See, also, Aldine Manuf. Co. v. Barnard, 84 Mich. 683 ; Stevens v. Kose, 69 .Mich. 359 ; Manawanng v. Jenison, 61 Mich. 117; Wheeler" i). Bedell, 40 Mich. 693; Ferris v Quimby, 41 Mich. 203; Crippen v. Morrison, 13 Mich. 23; New Chester Water Co. v. Holly Manuf. Co., 53 Fed. Rep. 19 ; 3 C. C. App. 399 ; 3 U. S. App. 264. s Thielman v. Carr, 75 111. 385 ; Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Minneapolis etc. Works, 35 Minn. 543 ; Arnold v. Crowder, 81 111. 56 ; Wolford «. Baxter, 33 Minn. 12 ; Treadway v. Sharon, 7 Nev. 37. 6 Porter v. Steel Co., 123 U. S. 269 ; Dunham v. Railway Co., 1 Wall. (U. S.) 254 ; Railway Co. v. Cowdrey, U Wall. (U. S.) 459. 'TeifE V. riewett, 1 Ohio St. 511, 530 ; Congregational Society v. Fleming, § 48 J FIXTURES AND OTHER ANNESATIONS. 61 There is no universal test whereby the character of what is claimed to be a fixture can be determined in the abstract; for the mode of annexation and thp manner of use are not in all cases conclusive; the express or implied understand- ing of the parties may control.' It must be remembered that the intention to be sought is not the undisclosed purpose of the actor, but the intention implied and manifested by his act. It is an intention which settles, not merely his own rights, but the rights of others who have, or may acquire, interests in the property. They cannot know his secret purpose, and their rights de- pend, not upon that, but upon the inferences to be drawn from what is' external and visible. The intention is that which was either expressly declared by the parties compe- tent to make it the governing rule, or which flows, patent to all, from the nature and character of the act, the clear purpose to be served, the manifest relation which the arti- cles bear to the realty, and the visible consequences of their severance upon the proper and obvious use of it." The question of realty or not realty depends wholly upon what the facts found show concerning the nature, object, purpose and relation of the improvement in and to the property regarded as a building for purposes for which it is used. No doubt this question is primarily and usually one of mixed law and fact,' and therefore for the jury.' But the principles when stated are often such as will permit no other presumption than one of law.' 11 Iowa, 533 ; Thomas v. Davis, 70 Mo. 73 ; 43 Am. Eep. 756 ; McRae v. Bank, 66 N. y. 489, 496 ; Williamson v. Railroad Co., 29 N. J. Eq. 311, 829 ; Till- man V. De Lacy, 80 Ala. 103 ; Capen i). Peckhxin, 35 Conn, 88 ; Rogers i). Prattville Manuf. Co., 81 Ala. 483 ; Hairisburg Ele. Co. ». Goodman, 129 Pa. St. 206 ; Carver v. Gougli, 153 Pa. St. 225. ' Wheeler v. Bedell, 40 Mich. 693 ; Iron Co. ■». McCann, 86 Mich. 106 ; Vail a. Weaver, 133 Pa. St. 363 ; Watts Campbell Co. ii. Yuengling, 135 N. Y. 1 ; Seeger«. Pettit, 77 Pa. St. 437. See, also, Lawton v. Lawton, 3 Atk. 13 ; Penton V. Robart, 3 East. 88 ; Elwes v. Maw, 3 East. 38 ; Dean ». Allalley, 3 Bsp. 11. 2 National Bank v. Norlh, 160 Pa St 303; Hopewell Mills ■». Bank, 150 Mass. 519 ; Tolles v. Winton, 63 Conn. 440. = Campbell «, O'Neill, 64 Pa. St. 390 ; Hopewell Mills «, Bank, 150 Mass. 519. *Seeger v. Pettitl, 77 Pa St. 437 ; Building Assn. «. Berger, 99 Pa. St. 830; McLane v. Palmer, 3 Kulp. (Pa.) 349. « Hopewell Mills ». Bank, 150 Mass, 519. 62 CKEATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 49-50 § 49. Irremovable Character of Fixtures. — The doc- trine now recognized to determine the irremovable charac- ter of fixtures is : 1. Actual annexation to the realty or something appurtenant thereto. 2. Application to the use or purpose to which that part of the realty, with which it is connected is appropriated. 3. The intention of the parties making the annexation to make a permanent accession to the freehold.' The rule is also stated : 1. Actual annexation, which must be of a permanent character, except in case of those articles which are not themselves annexed, but are deemed to be of the freehold, from their use and character. 2. Adapt- ability to the use of the freehold. 3. The intention of the parties at the time of making the annexation. In the case of machinery, the circumstance that it mayor may not be removed from the freehold without great injury to the building containing it or to itself, is not now deemed to be controlling. But when a building is constructed for milling or manufacturing purposes, and is so employed, all the machinery and appliances used in connection with the business, whether attached in any way to the realty or not, become a part of the realty." § 50. Physical Annexation. — Mere physical annexation is no longer the only test.' But whatever is aflSxed to the soil becomes, in contemplation of law, a part of it, and is, consequently, subjected to the same rights of property as the soil itself.' But it must be borne in mind that many exceptions have become engrafted upon this rule. But to make machinery a part of the freehold, it should be annexed ' Tyler on Fixt., 114 ; TeafE v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 311 ; Keve v. Paxton, 26 JSr. J. Eq., 107 ; Brennan v. WMtaker, 15 Ohio St. 446 ; Crane v. Brigham, 11 N. J. Eq. 29. " Voorhees ii. McGinnis, 48 N. T. 278 ; Pierce v. George, 108 Mass. 78 ; Par- sons V. Copeland, 38 Me. 537 ; Winslow v. Men Ins. Co., 4 Met. (Mass.) 806; Stockwell V. Campbell, 39 Conn. 362 ; Holland v. Hodgson, 7 L. R., C. P. 328. 3 Vail D. Weaver, 132 Pa. St. 363; Doughty v. Owen (N. J.), 19 Atl. Eep. 540. * Oakland G emetery Co. v. Bancroft, 161 Pa. St. 197; Broom's Maxims, 268. § 51] FIXTURES AND OTHER ANNEXATIONS. 63 to the soil.' To make loose machinery or utensils where such property is the main agent or principal thing in pros- ecuting the business, a fixture, it must be attached to the realty in some way, or at least it must be mechanically fitted, so as in ordinary understanding to constitute it a part of the structure itself, and must be essential to the business. It must be permanently attached to, or the com- ponent part of, some erection, structure or machine which is attached to the freehold, and without which the erection, structure or machine would be imperfect or incomplete." § 51. Houses and Other Structures May not Become Part of the Realty. — Houses and other buildings may not be a part of the realty if erected so that they may be removed. But a house permanently resting upon the ground is a part of the realty ;' but the mere erection of a building does not make it a fixture/ and in order to de- termine whether it be a fixture depends upon various cir- cumstances and relations connected with its being placed upon the land. ' If not permanently fastened to the ground it is not a fixture.' If a building is erected for temporary use, either by agreement, or the manner of attachment to the real estate indicates this, it does not become a part of the realty ; ' otherwise if erected for a permanent use.' Wooden structures or buildings, resting by their own weight on flat stones laid upon the surface of the ground, without any other foundation, are not fixtures.' ' Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Minneapolis, etc., Works, 35 Minn. 543; Burnside v. Twitchell, 43 N. H. 390. ' Wolford V. Baxter, 33 Minn. 12. See, also. Equitable Trust Co. v. Christ, 47 Fed. Rep. 756; Jones v. Bull, 85 Tex. 136; Rossville Alta Min. Co. v. Iowa Min. Co. 15 Colo. 29. 3 Miller v. Waddington, 91 Cal. 377; Lawton v. Lawton, 3 Atk. 13. " Pennybecker -o. McDougal, 48 Cal. 160; Penton ». Robart, 3 Bast, 88. 5 Levenson v. Standard Soap Co. 80 Cal. 250; 13 Am. St. Rep. 147; Elwes v. Maw, 3 East, 38. « Carlin v. Ritter, 68 Md. 478. ' Kelly V. Austin, 46 111. 156; Brown v. Elec. Light Co. 55 Fed. Rep. 239. « Wight v. Gray, 73 Me. 297; State Sav. Bank v. Kercheval, 65 Mo. 683; Powers V. Dennison, 30 Vt. 753. » Carlin v. Ritter, 68 Md. 478. 64 CREATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 52-5S Questions as to fixtures generally arise between the prima facie right of the landlord on the one hand, and ex- ceptions in favor of trade or of tenants on the other ; but if the building is not united to the freehold, it is not a fix- ture,' and may be removed ;' but a building wrongfully removed on to land does not become real estate.' And a house left on the land by a tenant becomes a part of the real estate, if not removed before the tenant is ejected by the landlord.' § 52. Temporary Separation. — A temporary separation of a fixture from the realty does not change its character'. Thus, a fixture temporarily separated to make repairs, stiE remains a part of the realty." So if a building is torn down in order to remodel it by the use of the same materials and others, the material still retains its character as a part of the land;' and the debris of a building blown down remains realty." But it was held at a trustee's sale of real estate that the fixtures removed when the building was burned down, did not pass with the land.' § 53. Erecting Buildings Upon Another's Land. — When buildings are erected upon another's land without permit they become a part of the realty and cannot be re- moved.' But when a building is erected under an under- standing or agreement that it maybe removed at anytime, it is then no part of the realty.'" Incorporating a house ' Wansbrough v. Maton, 4 Adol. & El. 884. ' Gregg V. Railroad Co. 48 Mo. App. 494. ' Michigan Mut. L. Ins. Co. ■». Cronk, 93 Mich. 49 ; Compare Harris «. Bannon, 78 Ky. 5G8. * Turner ». Kennedy (Minn.), 58 N. "W. Rep. 833. « Wadleigh «. Janvrin, 41 N. H. 503. « Beard v. Duralde, 23 La. Ann. 284. ' Rogers v. Gilinger, 30 Pa. St. 185. 8 Curry ». Schmidt, 54 Mo. 515. «Reid ®. Kirk, 12 Rich. (S. Car.) 54; Madigan v. McCarthy, 108 Mass. 876 j 11 Am. Rep. 371. '"Gregg V. Railroad Co., 48 Mo. App. 494; Smith t. Benson, 1 Hill (N. T.), 176. See, also, Simons v. Pierce, 16 Ohio St. 215; Merchants' Nat. Bank f>. Stanton (Minn), 56 N. W. Rep. 821. § 54 FIXTURES AND OTHER ANNEXATIONS. 65 with the realty of another lot, by removing it thereon, makes it a parcel of such lot.' If a party has the permission to erect a house upon an- other's land with the understanding that he may remove it, it then remains personalty.' A small house built in sections so it can be removed, will be held to be personalty.' A saw mill temporarily placed on land with the intention of being removed, is personalty.' A ball room on stone piers is not realty.' A building erected upon a public com- mon by the United States government for temporary use, is no part of the land. ° §54. Eailroad Property. — A railroad company occupy- ing land under an agreement with the owner, for a tem- porary easement therein, may, on termination of such agreement, remove the rails which it has laid down, because the rails are not then real estate.' And when the railroad company puts fixtures on the wrong land by mistake it may remove them.' So, where a railroad company acquires the right of way and builds upon the land stone piers and abutments for a bridge, and then abandons the land, such erection does not become a part of the realty." Kails fastened to the roadbed of a railroad, as well as depots and other buildings, may, under certain circumstances, be treated as trade fixtures and removed by the company, if the sur- rounding circumstances show that it was not intended at the time the rails were laid upon the land, that they should be incorporated into the freehold.'" ' Harris v. BannoD, 78 Ky. 508. See, also, Peirce «. Goddard, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 559. » Mills 1). Redick, 1 Nebr. 437; Weathersbee ii. Sleeper, 42 Miss. 732; White's Appeal, 10 Pa. St. 252; Dame «. Dame, 38 N. H., 429; Curtiss v. Hoyt, 19 Conn. 154. 'O'Donnell v. Hitchcock, 118 Mass. 401. ■* Brown v. Lillie, 6 Nev. 244 'Ombony v. Jones, 19 N. Y. 234. « Meigs's Appeal, 62 Pa. St. 28; 1 Am. Rep. 372. ' Wiggins Perry Co. v. Railroad Co., 142 U. S. 396. 8 Atchison, T. & S. P. R. R. Co. d. Morgan, 42 Kans. 23. 'Wagner 11. Cleveland, etc. Railroad Co., 23 Ohio St. 563; 10 Am. Rep. 770. '» Northern Cent. R. R. Co. v. Canton Co., 30 Md. 347. 9 66 CEEATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 55-56 § 55. EoLLiNQ Stock op Eailways— Constitutional and Statutory Provisions. — Several of the States have declared rolling stock of railroads to be personalty. This has been done in Arkansas, Illinois,. Missouri, Nebraska, Texas and West Virginia.' In Wisconsin it is a fixture;' the same has been enacted in Florida,' Iowa* and Montana.' In New York, rolling stock, such as cars, locomotives, tenders, and the like constitute personal property, and are not part of the realty. ° By statute in New York, this ques- tion has been settled, excepting from the operation of a chattel mortgage act, mortgages by railroad companies on real and personal property which have been recorded as mortgages of real estate. ' And it may generally be stated that the recording acts do not embrace mortgages of personal property of railway corporations, used with their realty for railroad purposes.' § 56. Eailroad Track— Doctrine of the Courts.— The decisions of the courts, when not controlled by statute, are not uniform as to the question whether rolling stock is a parcel of the land. It is held, however, that the materials used in the construction of a railway become annexed to the soil in the process of construction, and a railroad track is, thei'efore, deemed a fixture.' Thus, a marine railway, consisting of iron and wooden rails and sleepers, endless chain, gear, wheelers and ship -cradle, and constructed in the usual manner, is a fixture." So a railroad track laid ' Wood on Railr ads, 1625. 'Laws of 1873, cU. 119, sect. 39, 40. » Acts of 1874. ch. 1987. * Code of 1873, sects. 1284, 1285. 5 Laws of 1873, p. 103. 6Hoyle V Plattsburgh, etc., R. R. Co., 54 N. Y. 314; 18 Am. Rep. 595; Randall v. Elwell, 52 N. Y. 531; 11 Am. Rep. 747. ' Stat. 1868, ch. 779; Rev. Stat. 1875, p. 555, sect; 115; act of 1876, p. 307, sect. 4. 'Hammock ». Loan and Trust Co., 105 U. S. 77; Cooper v. Corbin, 105 111. 224; 24 Am. L. Rev. 428. See, also, Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U. S. 235; Fosdick V. Car Co., 99 U. S. 256; Huldekoper «. Locomotive Works, 99 U. S. 258. Compare Hervey ». Rhode Island Locomotive Works, 93 U. S. 664. 'Strickland v. Parker, 54 Me. 268; Turners. Cameron, L. R. 5Q. B. 306. '» Strickland v. Parker, 54 Me. 268. § 57] FIXTURES AND OTHER ANNEXATIONS. 67 down upon the land, with a view to its permanent improve- ment or beneficial enjoyment, is a fixture." When the rolling stock is not in use, in New Hampshire, it is per- sonalty." When the question is not controlled by the constitution or statute, where the question has been directly presented, roUing stock has generally been decided to be personalty. ' However, this rule is not general and other courts hold roll- ing stock to be realty.* § 57. Water Pipes^Poles and Wires. — In England water mains and underground conduits have been consid- ered as fixed to, included in, and a part of the real estate. ' Gas mains and pipes are somtimes distinguished from wa- ter mains, as apparatus for the delivery of the manufact- ured article, and are considered machines or chattels ; ° but water pipes are not machinery.' Water pipes and mains are not to be considered as appurtenances to the place of supply but are real estate.' ' Van Keuren v. Central R. R. Co., 38 N. J. L. 165. 'Boston, etc., R. R. Co. ■». Gilmore, 37 N. H. 410. See, also, Williamson*. N. J. S. R. R. Co., 29 N. J. Eq. 311; State ®. Somerville, etc., R. R. Co., 4 Dutch. (N. J.) 21. 3 Stevens v. Buflfalo, etc., R. R. Co., 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 590; Randall i). Elwell, 52 N. Y. 521; Hoyle ». Plattsburgh, etc., R. R. Co., 54 N. Y. 314; Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. V. Ft. Howard, 21 Wis. 44; Coe v. Columbus, etc., R. R. Co., 10 Ohio St. 372; Dubuque ®. Railroad Co., 39 Iowa, 56. * Meyer «. Johnston, 53 Ala. 237, 332; Youngman v. Elmira, etc., R. R. Co., 65 Pa. St. 278; Coney v. Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co. 3 Phila. (Pa.) 173; Mor- rill a. Noyes, 56 Me. 458; State v. Korth Cent. R. R. Co., 18 Md. 193; Phillijjs V. Winslow, 18 B. Men. (Ky.) 431; Douglass «. Cline, 12 Bush (Ky.), 608,630; Pierce v. Emery. 32 N. H. 484. See, also, PuUen v. Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co., 4 Bis. C. C. 35; Galveston R. R. Co. v. Cowdrey, 11 Wall. (U. S.) 459. » 43 Eliz. ch. 2; King v. Bath, 14 East. 610; King v. Waterworks, 1 Maule & S. 634; King v. Gas Light & Coke Co., 5 Barn. & C. 466. See, also. Gas Co. V. Thurber, 2 R. I. 15; Pipe Line Co. v. Berry, 52 N. J. L. 308. « Commonwealth v. Gas Light Co. 12 Allen (Mass.), 75; Memphis Gas Light Co. V. State, 6 Coldw. (Tenn.) 310. ' Dudley v. Aqueduct Corp. 100 Mass. 183. See, also Water Co.u. Lynn, 147 Mass. 31; Fall River v. Bristol, 125 Mass. 567; People «. Cassidy 46 N Y. 46. 8 King V. Bath, 14 East. 610; King «. Gas Light & Coke Co., 5 Barn. & C. 466; Compare Oskaloosa Water Co. v. Board 84 Iowa, 407. 68 CREATION OF ESTATES. [§ 57 But, in Kansas, the poles, wires and lamps of an electric light plant, beginning at the power house and extending throughout the city, are appurtenances to the power house, within the mechanics' lien law of that State.' But the poles and wires of electric light companies and the pipes of water companies, and the tracks of cable road companies, while their physical connection with the power house or pumping house is necessary for the operation of the entire plant, are still not parts or adjuncts of the building itself, but independent real estate interests, and independent por- tions of such plant." Gas fixtures are uniformly held to be severable from the realty whether the question of their annexation arises be- tween landlord and tenant, vendor and vendee or purchaser of the personalty and mortgagee of the real estate. ' Of course, express stipulation may make them pass with the real estate ; * or an intent to do so may be so clear, from the attending circumstances and expressions, as to have the same effect." There is a distinction between gas fittings and gas fix- tures. Gas fittings include all the piping down to the points of opening where chandeliers, brackets and the like, used for lighting are attached, the gas fixtures covering only those attachments. ° Under the same doctrine, radia- tors and valves connecting with steam heating apparatus are not fixtures attached to the real estate.' They are ex- ' Badger Lum. Co. «. Marion Water Sup. Co., 48 Kans. 187. 2 Paris V. Korway Water Co., 85 Me. 330; Hall v. Benton, 69 Me. 846r Kittery v. Bridge, 78 Me. 93; Rockland «. Water Co., 82 Me. 188. Com- pare Hutcliins V. Masterson, 46 Tex. 551 ; Keating Improvement & Mac. Co. «. Elect. Light Co., 74 Tex. 605; Oskaloosa Water Co. «. Board, 84 lowa,. 407. 3 Vaughen v. Haldeman, 83 Pa. St. 533; Heysliam v. Dettre, 89 Pa. St. 506; McKeage v. Ins. Co.,- 81 N. T. 38; Guthrie v. Jones, 108 Mass. 191; Towne v. Fiske, 137 Mass. 135. Compare Johnson v. Wiseman, 4 Met. (Ky.) 357. * Jarecbi v. Philharmonic Soc, 79 Pa. St. 403; Fratt «. Whiltier, 58 Cal. 120; Sewell V. Angerstein, 18 Law T. N.^S. 300; Heysham v. Dettre, 89 Pii. St. 506. = Funk V. Brigaldi, 4 Daly (N. T.), 359; Central, etc., Co. v. Hotel Co. (Ohio, Cin. Sup. Ct.) 26 Ohio L. J. 149. « Vaughen v. Haldeman, 33 Pa. St. 533; Jarcchi v. Philharmonic Soc. 7ft Pa. St. 408. ' National Bank v. North, 160 Pa. St. 303. § 58] FIXTURES AND OTHER ANNEXATIONS. 69 actly analogous to gas fixtures, and are severable from the realty. § 58. Fixtures in Manufactories and Mills. — In cases Under this head, to require substantial or even nominal an- nexation, would exclude things absolutely essential to the enjoyment or use of the freehold, and include others which are conclusively unimportant; therefore, whatever is essen tial to the purpose for which the building is used may be ■considered as a fixture, although the annexation between them is such that it may be severed without physical injury to either.' Where the machinery is permanent in its char- acter, and essential to the purpose for which the building is occupied, it must be regarded as realty and pass with the building ; and whatever is essential to the purpose for which the building is used will be considered as a fixture, although the annexation between them be such that it may be severed without physical or lasting injury to either." The permanent and habitual annexation controls, and not the manner of fastening.' When a building is erected as a mill or manufactory, and the water- works or the steam - works relied upon to move it are erected at the same time, and the machinery to be driven by them are essential parts of it, adapted to be used with it and in it, they are parts of it, and belong to the realty.* The tendency of modern decisions is in favor of viewing every thing as a fixture which has been held or employed, however slight or temporary the connection between the realty and it. This doctrine is required by the growth and 1 Lawton v. Salmon, 1 H. Bl. 359. ' Green v. Phillips, 36 Gratt (Va.) 753; 31 Am. Rep. 333; Smith Paper Co. V. Servin, 130 Mass. 511; Ferris «. Quinby, 41 Mich. 303; Keeler v. Keeler, 31 N. J. Eq. 181; McConnell v. Blood, 133 Mass. 47; Morris's Appeal, 88 Pa. St. 368; Sheldoa v. Ficklin, 33 Gratt. (Va.), 737; Price v. Jenks, 14 Phil. (Pa.) 228; Farrar v. Chaufletete, 5 Denio (N. Y.), 537. 'Brennan v. Whitaker, 15 Ohio St., 446; Parson v. Copeland. 38 Me. 537; Pierce t. George, 108 Mass. 83; Laflin v. Giifflths, 35 Barb. (N. Y.) 58. ■•Rices. Adams, 4 Harr. (Del.) 333; Cope v. Romeyne, 4 McLean, C. C, 384; Trull v. Fuller, 38 Me. 545; Burnside v. Twitchell, 43 N. H. 390; M'Kim a. Mason, 3 Md. Ch. 186 ; Davenport v. Shants, 43 Vt. 546; Citizen's Bank v. Knapp. 33 La. Ann. 117; Hill v. Hill, 43 Pa. St. 521; Voorhees v. McGinnis, 48 N. Y. 378; Winslow v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 4 Met. (Mass.) 306. 70 ' CREATION OF ESTATES. [§ 59 extension of manufacturing industries; that the requisites of physical annexation to the soil be relaxed to the extent that the question of fixtures vel non shall depend on the nature and character of the act by which the structure is put into place. Therefore, the permanency of the attach- ment does not depend on the strength, or force, or manner of the annexation to the freehold so much as upon its con- stancy, and upon the use to which the attached chattel is adapted, the purposes for which designed, and the intention of the party annexing it.' § 59. Machinery that Supplies the Motive Power. — The distinction between the motive power of a factory and the machines driven by it is somewhat arbitrary, still it is one based upon a physical difference easily perceived, if not dictated by any well-defined principle, and is no more il- logical than many distinctions to be found in other branches of law. The machinery of a manufactory that supplies motive power, as the engine, boiler, and their attachments, as contradistinguished from that propelled by it, where permanently annexed to foundations resting upon the free- hold, is generally held to be a fixture, though susceptible of being removed without any material injury to the freehold or to the machinery.' The machinery furnishing the motive power is generally more closely annexed to the soil, and of a more permanent nature as the power furnished by it may be adapted to the propulsion of the machinery of a variety of mills without any substantial change in the motive power itself, or in the building, other than by substituting one kind of machinery for another; whilst the machinery that is pro- pelled has more of the general character of personalty, is not as a rule so closely annexed to the freehold, and may be removed, and frequently is, from one mill to another, as any other article of personalty; and is more properly ac- • Tillman ». DeLacy, 80 Ala. 103; Carpenter v. Walker, 140 Mass. 416; Eogers v. Prattville, Manuf. Co., 81 Ala. 483; Maguire ». Park, 140 Mass. 31; Wight V. Gray, 73 Me. 297; Meigs's Appeal, 62 Pa. St. 28; Quinby v. Man- hattan C. & P. Co., 24 N. J. Eq. 260; Tolles B. Winton, 63 Conn. 440. 'Case Manuf. Co. «. Garven, 45 Ohio St. 289. § 60] FIXTURES AND OTHER ANNEXATIONS. 71 cessory to the business carried on upon the realty than the realty itself.' Under this rule, carding machines of a woolen factory, attached to the building by cleats to confine them to their proper places, and subject to removal whenever convenient or business requires it, are not fixtures, but chattels; whilst the steam engine and boiler, used to supply the motive power, permanently fixed upon a foundation laid in the ground, are realty." There is a conflict of authority in regard to the question whether machines placed in a building become fixtures which pass with a conveyance of the real estate. The character of the property, as real or personal, may be fixed by contract with the owner of the realty when the article is put in position; but such contract cannot affect the rights of an innocent puchaser without notice. ' § 60. External Indications May Control. — When no contract exists between the parties, a machine placed in a building is generally found to be real estate or personal property from the external indications which show whether or not it belongs to the building as an article designed to become a part of it, and to be used with it to promote the object for which it was erected, or to which it has been adapted and devoted. Thus, where the facts showed that the machines, most of which were large and heavy, and were all procured for use in manufacturing cotton cloth ; where there were changes in the kinds of goods manu- factured, and the machines were not intended to be moved from place to place, but were intended to be put in posi- tion and then used with the building until they should be worn out, or until, from unforeseen cause, the real estate should be put to a different use; where the most of them were fastened to the floor for the purpose, among others of steadying when in use; where, apparently, they had ' Fortman v. Goepper, 14 OMo St. 567 ; Cherry v. Arthur, 5 Wash. St. 787. 'Case Manuf. Co. v. Garven, 45 Ohio St. 289, 301. ' Hopewell Mills v. Taunton Sav. Bank, 1.50 Mass. 519. See, also, Hunt v. Bay State Iron Co., 97 Mass. 279; Thompson ». Vinton, 131 Mass. 139- Southbridge Sav. Bank v. Exeter Mach. Works, 127 Mass. 542, 545 . Case Manuf. Co. v. Garven, 45 Ohio St. 289. 72 CREATION OF ESTATES. [§ 61 been attached to the building and connected with the motive power with a view of permanence, and where cer- tain loom beams, which were laid upon the looms when in use, although not fastened thereto, were essential parts of the looms — all the machines including the loom beams are realty.' In New York, the looms in a woolen factory are not realty when merely fastened to the floor by screws to keep them in their places." And so in New Jersey, spinning- frames, twisting-frames, and like machinery are not realty, though fastened to the floor by nails or screws or held in position by cleats.' And so in England, cotton looms are not part of the realty.' The rolls in an iron rolling mill are realty, whether in place, or fixed for use, or temporarily detached.' § 61. Illustrations. — A molding machine and a planing machine, placed in a sash and blind factory, one of which was bolted to the floor for greater firmness, and the other left standing without fastenings, are personalty.' So machines used in a shoe shop attached to the building by nails and bolts are not real estate.' And where the prop- erty was certain pieces of machinery known as "jibs," placed in the building with other machinery, and which cannot be displaced without injury to themselves, may, by their mode of connection, be personalty.' ' Hopewell Mills v. Taunton Sav. Bank, 150 Mass. 519 ; Nat. Bank v. North, 160 Pa. St. 303. Compare Vanderpoel v. Van Allen, 10 Barb. (N. Y.) 157 ; Potter v. Cromwell, 40 N. T. 287 ; Cresson v. Stout, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 116. » Murdock v. GiflEord, 18 N. Y. 28. Compare Murdock v. Harris, SO Barb. (N. Y.) 407. 'Keeler «. Keeler, 31 N. J. Eq. 181. 'Hutchinson v. Kay, 23 Beav. 413. 'VoorhisB. Freeman, 2 Watts & 8. (Pa.) 116. See, also. Ex parte Ast- bury, L. R. 4 Ch. App. 630 ; Haley v. Hammersley, 3 DeG, F. & J. 587 ; Mather v. Frazer, 2 Kav & J. 586 ; "Walmsley v. Milne, 7 C. B. (N. S.) 115 ; Wiltshear «. Cottrell, 1 El. & B. 674. «Blancke v. Rogers, 26 N. J. Eq. 563. See, also. Wells v. Maples, 15 Hun (N. Y.), 90. 'McConnell v. Blood, 123 Mass. 47. * Davis ». Jones, 2 Barn. & Al. IfiS, 167. § 61] FIXTURES AND OTHER ANNEXATIONS. 73 The wires of an electric light company are realty.' The entire machinery of a fruit canning factory is realty, though some of the articles, such as crates, capping machines and work tables, are not actually annexed to the soil. " A shingle machine in a mill is part of the realty.' However, a shingle machine not fastened to the floor, except so far as necessary to keep it in place, was held to be personalty.* Mill saws in a saw mill are a part of the realty." Machin- ery in a brewery is a parcel of the realty. ° So is heavy machinery for making paper, fastened to the building,' and machinery in a nail factory is part of the realty.* Machines for making kegs belong to the factory and are fixtures.' But stills set up in a furnace, in the usual manner, for making whiskey, are personalty;'" so is machinery for spinning flax and tow personalty. " A stone for grinding bark, affixed to a bark mill is personalty." And it has been held that a kettle or boiler put up in a tannery with brick and mortar was personalty. " Leather fastened to a bench by screws, grindstones resting upon frames standing upon the floor, anvils, vises and a portable forge are personalty." ' Fecliet v. Drake (Ariz.), 12 Pac. Rep. 694. See, also, Regina v. Railway Co., 3 El. &E1. 393. ' Dudley v. Hurst, 67 Md. 44. 3 Corliss ». McLagin, 39 Me. 115. See, also. Trull v. Fuller, 38 Me. 545. « •Wells V. Maples, 15 Hun (N. Y.), 90. 'Burnside v. Twitchell, 43 N. H. 390. See, also, Coleman v. Stearns Mannf. Co., 38 Mich. 30; Robertson v. Corsett, 39 Mich. 777; Johnston v. Morrow, 60 Mo. 339. « Scheifele v. Schmitz, 43 N. J. Eq. 700. Compare Wolford «. Baxter, 33 Minn. 13 ; 53 Am. Rep. 1. 'Quinby B. Manhattan C. & P. Co., 34 N. J. Eq. 300. See, also. Fish v. Water-Proof Co., 39 N. J. Eq. 16. « Delaware, etc., R. R. Co. v. Oxford Iron Co., 36 N. J. Eq. 453. » Laflin v. Griffiths, 35 Barb. (N. Y .) 58. See, also, Snedeker v. Warring, 13 N. Y. 170, 174 ; Walker v. Sherman, 30 Wend. (N. Y.) 636, 639. '» Moore v. Smith, 34 111. 513 ; Burk v. Baxter, 3 Mo. 307 ; Terry c. Robins, 13 Miss. 291. Compare Bryan v. Lawrence, 5 Jones L. (N. Car.) 387 ; Feimster v. Johnson, 64 N. Car. 359. "Cresson v. Stout, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 116. " Heermance r. Vernoy, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 5. "Huat V. Mullanphy, 1 Mo. 508. Compare Union Bank v. Emerson, 16 Mass. 159. "Pierce v. George, 108 Mass. 78 ; 11 Am. Rep. 310. 10 74 CREATION OF ESTATES. [§ 62 Article 3. Mortgagor and Mortgagee. § 63. Mortgagee's Right to Fixtures._ § 66. Buildings Erected on Mortgaged § 63. Mutual Agreement— Express or' Realty. Implied. § 67. Constructive Annexation. § 64. Annexation of Mortgaged Chat- § 68. Temporarily Annexed After Ex- tols, ecution of Mortgage. § 65. Detachment Involving Great § 69. Machinery Loaned or Sold to the Damages to the Realty. Mortgagor on Condition. § 62. Mortgagee's Eight to Fixtures. —A mortgagee has no better right to the fixtures than a vendee, and at common law stands upon the same footing as an ordinary- purchaser, and the mortgage covers everything actually or constructively annexed to the soil." Any fixtures annexed to the land at the time of the ex- cution and delivery of the mortgage, or any fixture there- after annexed is covered by the mortgage." And this rule holds good vsrhen it is a trade fixture,' or whether annexa- tion was made before or after the mortgage.* However, the language of the mortgage may give the mortgagor the right to remove the fixtures.'' The rule is the same between the vendor and vendee, and mortgagor and mortgagee, in those States where a mortgage passes the legal title and in reference to articles attached to the realty at the time of the execution of the deed or mortgage; but it does not follow that the rights of the ' M'Kim ». Mason, 3 Md. Ch. 186; Millikin i). Armstrong, 17 Ind. 456; Voor- hees ». McGinnis, 48 N. Y. 378; McFadden v. Allen, 134 N. Y. 489; Quinhy 11. Manhattan C. & P. Co., 24 N. J. Eq. 260; Walmsley «. Milne, 7 C. B. (N. S.) 115. 'Climie v. Wood, L. R. 3 Exch. 256; 4 Exch. 328; Fletcher «. Kelly (Iowa), 55 N. W. Rep. 474. Compare Hill v. Sewald, 53 Pa. St. 371. ' Ex parte Colton, 2 Mont. D. & De G. 735; Johnson v. Mosher, 82 Iowa, 29; Choate B. Kimball, 56 Ark. 55. ■•Cullwick®. Swindell, L. R. 3 Eq. 249; Woodham i>. Bank, 48 Minn. 67; Metropolitan Society v. Brown, 28 Beav. 454; Lynde». Rowe, 12 Allen (Mass.), 100. See also, Longbottom v. Berry, L. R. 5 Q. B. 133; Mather v. Eraser, 2 Kay & J. 536. ' Waterfall v. Penistone, 6 El. & Bl. 876. See, also. Haley ». Hammersley, 3 DeG., F. & J. 587; 9 W. R. 563; Crippen «. Morrison, 13 Mich. 33. Pingrey's Mort. sect. 305 et seg. §§ 63-64] FIXTUKES AND OTHEK ANNEXATIONS. 75' mortgagee are, in reference to subsequent accessions mad& by the mortgagor, the same in those States where the legal title does not pass and the mortgage is a simple security for the debt.' §63. Mutual Agreement — Express or Implied. — A mutual agreement is entirely efficacious in preserving the personal character of annexed chattels as between the par- ties to the mortgage." The agreement made by the parties will control them, unless the articles are of such a character that their detachment would involve a destruction or great injury to the realty, as such annexation may well be re- garded as an abandonment of the lien by him who impliedly assents to the annexation; otherwise the agreement will control. ' Thus, an engine and boiler were purchased by the chat- tel mortgagor, who executed a chattel mortgage on them for the price, payable at a certain date. He failed to pay at the time specified, and gave a new chattel mortgage in lieu, payable at a time named, but before this date of pay- ment he gave a real estate mortgage on the property on which the engine and boiler were situated. It was decided that the real estate mortgage could not cover them to the exclusion of the chattel mortgage lien." The mortgage of fixtures as personal property may operate as a constructive severance as between the parties thereto, " yet an innocent purchaser without notice holds them a& part of the realty. " § 64. Annexation of Mortgaged Chattels. — Any prop- erty belonging to the mortgagor, which he chooses to an- ' Clore V. Lambert, 78 Ky. 224, 228; Woolley ». Holt, 14 Bush (Ky.), 788. See, also, Union Bank v. Emerson, 15 Mass. 159; Hamilton v. Huntley, 78 Ind. 521; 41 Am. Rep. 593. ' Pingrey's Mort. 397; Pope «. Skinkle, 45 N. J. L. 39; Harlan v. Harlan, 20 Pa. St. 303; O'Donnell «. Burroughs (Minn.), 56 N. W. Rep. 579. Ewellon- Fixt. 66; Ellison v. Salem C. & M. Co., 48 111. App. 120. 3 Pingrey's Chat. Mort. 197. *Sword V. Low, 122 111. 487. Compare Kribbs v. Alford, 120 N. Y. 519. 'Hensley v. Brodie, 16 Ark. 511; McClentoc «. Graham, 3 McCord (8. Car.), 553; Ropp's v. Barker, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 238 «Biingholff V. Munzenmaier, 30 Iowa, 513; Hopewell Mills «. Taunton Sav. Bank, 150 Mass. 519. 76 CREATION OF ESTATES. [§ 64 nex to the mortgaged premises, becomes realty. But it is difficult to perceive any equitable ground upon which the property of another, which the mortgagor annexes to the mortgaged premises, should inure to the benefit of a prior mortgagee of the realty. There is no inequity toward the prior real estate mortgagee, but equity towards the mortga- gee of the chattels, in protecting the lien of the latter to its full extent so far as it will not diminish the original security of the former. The real estate mortgagee is entitled to any annexations made by his mortgagor of his own property, but is not entitled to the property of others." But an existing mortgage of realty may have priority of a chattel mortgage of machinery subsequently annexed, as a permanent accession, although the chattel mortgage be made at the time the articles were attached.' How far the hen of a chattel mortgage is preserved after the chattel is annexed to the realty is not settled in New York.' The current of authority is that the character of prop- erty, as real or personal, may be fixed by contract with the owner of the real estate when the article is annexed ; but such contract cannot affect the rights of a mortgagee of the realty, or of an innocent purchaser, without notice.' When the chattels are so annexed to the realty that they cannot be removed without destroying or injuring the land, they will go with the realty. " It has been held that if machinery or other chattels are not annexed to the realty in a permanent manner, it is suf- ficient evidence of the intention of the parties that they are to remain personal property." 'Campbell v. Roddy, 44 N. J. Eq. 244, 251. ' Brass Foundry ». Gallentlne, 99 Ind. 525. 3 Voorhees v. McGinnis, 48 N. Y. 278 ; TifEt v. Horton, 53 N. Y. 377 ; Sisson «. Hibbard, 75 N. Y. 542. * Hopewell Mills v. Taunton Sav. Bank, 150 Mass. 519 ; Case Mamif. Co. v. Garven, 45 Ohio St. 289 ; Southbridge Sav. Bank v. Ex. Mach. Co., 127 Mass. 542. 545 ; Brennan v. Whitaker, 15 Ohio St. 446; Slillman v. Plenniken. 58 Iowa. 450 ; Hunt v. Bay State Iron Co., 97 IVIass. 279 ; Thompson v. Vinton, 121 Mass. 139. Compare Ford v. Cobb, 20 N. Y. 344 ; Tibbitts v. Home, 65 N. H. 242. ' Pierce d. Gteorge, 108 Mass. 78. ' Sisson V. Hibbard, 75 N. Y. 542 ; Eavei v. Estes, 10 Kans. 314 ; Ford «. Cobb, 20 N. Y. 344. §§ 65-66j fixtures and other annexations. 77 § 65. Detachment Involving Great Damages to the Realty. — Where the articles are of such character that their detachment would involve the dismantling of an im ■ portant feature of the realty, their annexation may well be regarded as an abandonment of any prior lien by him who imphedly assented to the incorporation. Shingles, lumber or brick to be used in a building, railroad iron or ties to be used in the construction of a railroad, are appar- ent examples of such a class of chattels. If the detach- ment of the articles so named will occasion no damage to the realty, then the lien upon them may be enforced in the same degree as if they had remained chattels. If the de- tachment will result in the diminution in the value of the freehold, as it would have stood had the attachment not been made, then the better rule seems to be that the depre- ciation must first be made good to the real estate mortga- gee before the right of the chattel mortgagee can be recog- nized.' If the mortgage enumerates some fixtures and not others, which afterwards come into dispute as to right of the two mortgagees, it is to be supposed that those omitted do not pass by the mortgage deed, if they can be removed without dismantling the realty." Thus, where machinery for a saw mill was sold, on condition that it should remain the property of the vendor until paid for, and part is incorporated into the realty, which is mortgaged, the part incorporated belongs to the realty, but that lying in the yard does not. ' § 66. Buildings Erected on Mortgaged Eealty. — Un- less there is a contract to the contrary all buildings erected by the mortgagor are parts of the realty. And when the building is a chattel by agreement, fixtures include every- thing which would come under the definition had the building been real estate." ' Campbell v. Roddy, 44 N. J. Eq. 353. See, also, Morey«. Hoyt, 62 Conn. 643; Bartlett v. Haviland, 93 Mich. 553. « Trappes v. Harter, 3 Comp. & M. 153, 177. ' Davenport v. Shants, 43 Vt. 546. See, also. Miller ». Wilson, 71 Iowa, 610; Tolles V. Winton, 63 Conn. 440. «Dorr V. Dudderar, 88 111. Iu7; Baird v. Jackson, 98 111. 78; Wood », Whelen, 93 111. 153; Matzon ». Griffin, 78111. 477; Sweetzer c. Jones, 85 Vt, '78 CREATION OF ESTATES. [§ 66 If a building is erected for temporary use, either by agreement, or the manner of attachment to the real estate indicates this, it does not become realty.' When buildings are incorporated with other realty they become a part of it, and the former lien is lost,' unless there is collusion with the owner of the realty to defeat the lien.' When the materials of a dwelling-house on mortgaged land are used in the construction of a house upon another Jot of land, the right of the property rests in the grantee of that land.* So where mill- stones were severed from a mill and sold by the mortgagor, they pass to the purchaser. ' If a mortgagor in possession removes a building to an- other lot of land, and sells the lot to a bona fide purchaser, the lien is lost and the remedy of the mortgagee is at law, for the removal of the building. ° There is no diflficulty in applying this rule while fixtures remain attached to the realty, and so long as the mort- gagor continues in possession; or when the property sev- ered passes into the possession of a person in collusion with him to defeat the lien and security of the mortgagee, whether upon or off the mortgaged premises, because the right of the mortgagee would be unaffected by fraud.' But when the property is severed and sold by a mortgagor in possession, having the legal title, to an innocent pur- chaser, the lien in equity is gone, and the remedy of the mortgagee is by action at law against the mortgagor, and those who act with him to impair or defeat the security of the mortgage. But where the mortgage is regarded as a 317; Horn i). Nat. Bank, 135 Ind. 381; Frankland v. Moultoa, 5 Wis. 1; New Orleans Nat. Bank «. Eaymoad, 29 La. Ann. 355; Guernsey ■». Wilson, 134 Mass. 483; Burnside v. TwitcUell, 43 N. H. 390; McQorrisk v. Dwyer, 78 Iowa, 279; Congregational Society v. Fleming, 11 Iowa, 533. I Kelly V. Austin, 46 111. 156. ' Harris v. Bannon, 78 Ky. 568. * See Hamlin v. Parsons, 12 Minn. 108. * Peirce «. Goddard, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 559. ' Cooper V. Davis, 15 Conn. 556. See, also, Buckout v. Swift, 27 Cal. 433. » Verner v. Betz, 46 N. J. Eq. 256. See, also. Clark ®. Reyburn, 1 Kans. 281; Kimball v. Darling, 32 Wis. 684; Hutcbins v. King, 1 Wall. (U. 8.) 53; Gore II. Jenness, 19 Me. 53; Gooding v. Shea, 103 Mass. 360; Wilson v. Maltby, 59 N. T. 126. Compare Hoskin v. Woodward, 45 Pa. St. 42. ' Hamlin v. Parsons, 12 Minn. 108. § 67] FIXTURES AND OTHER ANNEXATIONS. 79 conveyance of the legal title to the property, giving the mortgagee the right of possession, then his legal ownership and actual constructive possession give him the right to follow and recover the property if severed from the realty, so long as it remains a chattel. The principle applied is, that the property severed from the realty so as to become a chattel belongs to the legal owner of the laud, or mort- gagee. But when the mortgage is regarded merely as a lien for security and the mortgagor has the right of posses- sion until ejectment, or foreclosure, then the mortgagee has merely the right to restrain the removal of the prop- erty by injunction, to protect the lien; or, after the re- moval, a right to recover damages for the wrongful dimi- nution of his security. § 67. Constructive Annexation. — Fixtures may be con- structively annexed. Thus, machinery iu a canning busi- ness, part of which is attached to the soil, and other parts are necessary to the use of the part attached, is a fixture. If the principal part becomes fixed by actual annexation to the soil, such part of it as may not be so physically an - nexed, but which, if removed, would leave the principal thing unfit for use, and would not of itself and standing alone be well adapted for general uses, is constructively an- nexed.' And as a general rule a mortgage of land passes all the fixtures upon the land mortgaged without special mention of them, as they are considered part of the realty.' Platform scales fastened to sills laid upon a brick wall set in the ground are fixtures.' So the stones, tackling, and implements of a mill are fixtures." So the wires of an elec- tric light company form an integral part of the machinery and are fixtures." So hop-poles belong to the land.' A ' Dudley v. Hurat, 67 Md. 44. 'Burnside v. Twitchell, 43 N. H. 390; Morris's Appeal, 8S Pa. St. 368. 3 Arnold v. Crowder, 81 111. 56; 25 Am, Rep. 260; Bliss v. Whitney 9 Allen . Orr, 4 Greene (Iowa), 304. See, also, McLaughlin v. Johnson, 46 111. 163; Glidden v. Bennett, 48 N. H. 306; Sawyer v. Twiss, 26 N. H. 348. ' Wintermute v. Light, 46 Barb. fN. Y.) 378. See, also. Smith «. Price, 39 111. 38. » Noble V. Sylvester, 42 Vt. 146; Peck v. Batchelder, 40 Vt. 333; Brock v. Smith, 14 Ark. 431; Pulton v. Norton, 64 Me. 410; Drake «. "Wells, 11 Allen (Mass.), 141. See, also, Johnson v. MehafEey, 43 Pa. St. 308. 86 creation of estates.. [§§ 74-75 Article 5, Landlord and Tenant — Lessor and Lessee. § 74. In General— The Rule. § 77. Things Useful and Ornamental, § 75. Trade Fixtures. § 78. Time of Removal. § 76. The Lessee's Right to Remove § 79. Accepting a New Lease. Fixtures. § 74. In General — The Rule. — The claim to have articles considered as personal property is received with the greatest latitude and indulgence." Public policy in this country re- quires that the tenant should be permitted so to use the premises he occupies, as to derive from them the greatest amount of profit and comfort, consistent with the rights of the landlord." The fixtures that the tenant has added may generally be removed during his term ; ° but the fixtures cannot be removed if such detachment will work great in- jury to the realty.* In some of the States, statutory pro- visions prevail, describing what kind of attachment makes fixtures. ' § 75. Trade Fixtures. — The rule applicable to trade fix- tures is very liberal to the tenant, and he may remove what- ever he places upon, or temporarily annexes to, the freehold." The tenant may remove them at the expiration of his term, whenever the removal is not contrary to any settled custom, and the removal will not materially injure the realty.' And it is the general rule that articles put in merely as furniture, are removable, though more or less substantially fastened to the building. So machines not essential to the enjoyment and use of a building, occupied as a manufac- 1 WallB. Hinds, 4 Gray (Mass.), 356; Thomas®. Grout, 5 Bush (Ky.), 37; Elwes v. Maw, 3 East, 38; 2 Smith's Lead. Gas. 238. ' Climie -o. Wood, L. R. 3 Exch. 257; Gapen v. Peckham, 35 Gonn. 88. 'King c. Wilcomb, 7 Barb. (N. T.) 363; Gromien. Hoover, 40 Ind. 57. ^CoUamore ». Gillis, 149 Mass. 578; Whitehead ». Bennett, 37 L. J. Gh. 474; Wake V. Hall, 7 Q. B. 295, 301. 5 McNally ■o. Connolly, 70 Gal. 3. « Climie v. Wood, L. R. 8 Exch. 257; Capen o. Peckham, 35 Conn. 88. ' Coombs V. Beaumont, 5 Barn. & Ad. 72; Holbrook «. Ghamberlin, 116 Mass. 155; Hawtiy v. Butlin, L. R. 8 Q. B. 290; 21 W. R. 633; Day v. Per- kins, 3 Sand. Ch. (N. Y.) 339; Maples v. Millon, 31 Conn. 598 § 75] FIXTURES AND OTHER ANNEXATIONS. 87 tory, nor especially adapted to be used in it, are removable, though fastened to the building, when it is clear that the purpose of fastening them is to steady them for use, and not to make them a permanent part or adjunct to the building.' Although a building may be raised on a brick founlatiou and have a brick chimney, yet if the erection on such foundation is of wood and the building is used for the sole purpose of trade, the tenant may remove it at the end of the term." But if the building is of brick, with brick founda- tion, let into the soil, although erected for the sole purpose of trade, it cannot be removed by the tenant, while ma- chinery, engines, vats and utensils, with their accessories, may be removed.' So furnaces, cider mills, buildings rest- ing on blocks, salt pans, platform scales, factory machines, and other things of like nature, used in trade, are remov- able by the outgoing tenant.* A glass case, a stand of drawers, and a large mirror bought by the tenant of a restaurant, to use in his business, and screwed or nailed to the ceiling, also gas fixtures screwed upon gas pipes fas- tened to the ceiling, are not fixtures.' But a bar, bar fix- tures, cupboard, bowling alleyways and racks, attached by a tenant to a building occupied by him as a saloon under a lease, so annexed to freehold as to belong to it, are fixtures, and cannot be removed by the tenant." A gin stand, not attached to the realty, though used for the purpose of the farm, when it is not permanently affixed, is not a fixture; nor is a bell, though only usod for farm purposes, when it is only set upon posts, and not perma- nently affixed. ' Posts and boards on a farm will be regarded as personalty, if there is nothing to show that they are kept ' Winslo w V. Mer. Ins. Co. , 4 Met. (Mass ) 306 ; Hellawell v. Eastwood , 3 Eng. L. & Eq. 563; Queen v. Lee, L R. 1 Q. B. 341 ; McConnell v. Blood, 123 Mass. 47. ' Penton v. Robert, 4 Esp. 83; O'Donnell v. Hitchcock, 118 Mass. 401. 3 Whitehead ». Bennett, 37 L. J. Ch. 474. ■■Holmes v. Tremper, 30 Johns. (N. Y.) 39; Swift v. Thompson, 9 Conn 63, TafEe v. Warnlck, 3 Blackf. (Ind.) Ill; Watts-Campbell Co. v. Tuengling, 135 N. Y. 1; Brown «. Elect. Light Co., 55 Fed. Rep. 229; Hayes v. N. Y. Min. Co., 3 Colo. 373; Hanralian v. O'Reilly, 103 Mass. 201; Graves v. Pierce, 53 Mo. 433; Lanphere v. Lowe, 3 Nebr. 131. ' Guthrie v. Jones, 108 Mass. 191. « O'Brien u. Kusterer, 37 Mich. 289. ' Cole v. Roach, 37 Tex. 413. 88 CREATION OF ESTATES. [§ 76 for the purpose of fencing, so as to convert them into realty. ' The modern rule is that a tenant, whether for life, for years or at will, may carry away all such fixtures of a chattel nature as he has himself erected upon the demised premises for the purpose of ornament, domestic convenience or to carry on trade, provided the removal can be effected without material injury to the freehold." This is the rule ill England and America, and the true criterion is the inten- tion on the part of the tenant to remove the fixtures during his terra, at the time he placed them upon the premises. The manner of their annexation is no longer the test. ' This is an exception to the common law rule, which was very strict in preventing a tenant from severing from the freehold anything which has been affixed to it. § 16. The Lessee's Eight to Remove Fixtures. — The exercise of the right to remove trade fixtures is, however, restricted by the rule that the principal thing shall not be destroyed by the accessory.' And if the tenant, at will of the mortgagor, add fixtures after a mortgage is executed on the realty, his right to remove them after an entry by the mortgagee for the purpose of foreclosure, must be de- termined by the rule which prevails as between mortgagor and mortgagee, and not by that which prevails as between landlord and tenant. " The mortgagee may, at common law, disavow the tenancy and enter and evict the tenant who will not even be entitled to emblements.' It is not within the power of the mortgagor, by an agree- ment made with a third person, after the execution of the mortgage, to give to such person the right to hold anything to be attached to the freehold, which as between mortgagor and mortgagee, would become a part of the realty. The ' WiDgv. Gray, 36 Vt. 261. 2 Watts-Campbell Co. v. Yuengling, 125 N. T. 1; Vail v. Weaver, 132 Pa. St, 363; Van Ness v. Pacard, 2 Pet. (U. S.) 137; Seeger «. Pettit, 77 Pa. St. 437; Conrad v. Mining Co., 54 Mich. 249; Brown v. Elect. Light Co., 55 Fed. Rep. 229. 3 Hall v. Sewall, 53 Pa. St. 374; Seeger v. Pettit, 77 Pa. St. 440; Carver v. Gough, 153 Pa. St. 225. * Lawton «. Lawton, 3 Atk. 13. 'Lynde n. Rowe, 12 Allen (Mass.), 100. «Mayo V. Fletcher, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 525. § 77] FIXTURES AND OTHER ANNEXATIONS. 89 entry of the mortgagee would entitle him to the full enjoy- ment of the premises with all the additions and improve- ments made by the mortgagor, or by his authority ;' but a tenant under a lease may redeem to protect his interest." § 77. Things Useful and Ornamental. —The right of the tenant to remove things useful and ornamental is well settled, and many ornamental and useful fixtures can be removed by the tenant, such as a hanging and looking-glass, when not made into the wall.' When mirrors are not set into the walls, and put up after the house was built, and are capable of detachment without interfering with or in- juring the walls, they are as much furniture as pictures hung in the usual way, and do not become subject to a real estate mortgage of the premises.' But if the mirror frames are actually annexed to the realty they become subject to such mortgage. Thus, the mirror-fi-ames were so annexed during process of building, and as part of that process, and formed part of the structure. Those in the hall filled up and occupied a gap left in the wainscoting, and all such mirrors were an essential part of the inner surface. Those in the parlor fitted into a gap purposely left in the base- board. AU were fastened to the walls with hooks and screws. Their removal would have left unfinished walls and would have required work upon thp house to supply and repair their absence. Such mirrors were realty. ' Tapestry," wainscot,' ornamental chimney pieces,' stoves and grates annexed to the chimney with brick work, and cupboards supported by hold fasts,' cooking-coppers, wash-tubs, blinds, and the like," may be removed by the ' Clary t). Owen, 15 Gray (Mass.), 532. 'Bacon v. Bowdoin, 33 Pick. (Mass.) 401 ; Preston ®. Briggs, 16 Vt. 134. ' Beck -0. Rebow, 1 P. Wm. 94. Compare Poole's Case, 1 Salk. 368 ; Her- lakenden's Case, 4 Co. 64. ^McKeage -o. Hanover Pire Ins. Co., 81 N. T. 38. 5 Ward V. Kilpatrick, 85 N. Y. 413, 419. See, also, Spinney v. Barbe, 43 111. App. 585. « Hiirvey v. Harvey, 3 Strange, 1141 ; Lee v. Risdon, 7 Taunt. 188. ■"Lawton v. Lawton, 3 Atk. 13. ' Leach v. Thomas, 7 Car. & P. 338. 'Rex V. St. Dunstan, 4 Barn. & Ores. 686. "Colegrave v. Dias Santos, 3 Barn. & Ores. 76. 12 90 CREATION OF ESTATES. [§ 77 outgoing tenant. But presses, cupboards, glazed doors, movable partitions, grates, ranges and other like fixtures, windows and blinds, door keys," sun dial erected on a per- manent foundation," a furnace placed in a house so that it cannot be removed without disturbing the brick work of the house adjoining the furnace, and probably without causing a portion of the ceiling to fall,* are all portions of the realty. But a portable iron furnace standing in the cellar, and capable of being removed without injury, is not a fixture.' If set in brick, then it is a question of fact whether it is a part of the realty. ° Lamps, chandeliers, candlesticks, can- delabra, sconces, and the vaiious contrivances for lighting a house by means of candles, oil or other fluid, have never been considered as irremovable fixtures and as forming part of the freehold. Nor does it appear that the ordinary apparatus for lighting has ever been classed as fixtures.' Gas fixtures, although fastened to the building, are not fixtures, and may be removed f and so of a gasometer and apparatus for generating gas.' Gas stoves connected with gas pipes are not fixtures." Water and gas pipes laid in the ground are generally con- sidered fixtures and belong to the realty." But articles of furniture movable in their nature are not fixtures, although attached by screws, nails or brackets; such things as hangings, pier-glasses, chimney glasses, bookcases, carpets, blinds and curtains." ' Longstaff e. Mtagoe, 2 Adol. & El. 60. « Liford's Case, 11 Co. 50. 3 Snedeker v. Warring, 13 N. Y. 170. "Main v. Scliwarzwaelder, 4 E. D. Smith (N. Y.), 273 ; Stock-well v. Campbell, 39 Conn. 362. sRaliway Sav. Inst. v. Church, 36 N. J. Eq. 61. 6 Allen V. Mooney, 130 Mass. 155 ; Maguire v. Park, 140 Mass. 21. ' Vaughen v. Haldeman, 33 Pa. St. 522. 8 Lawrence «. Kemp, 1 Duer (N, Y.), 363 ; Shaw v. Lenke, 1 Daly (N. Y.), 487 ; Wall ®. Hinds, 4 Gray (Mass.), 256 ; Montague v. Dent, 10 Rich. (S. Car.) 135; Jarechi u. Philharmonic Society, 79 Pa. St. 403; Rogers v. Crow, 40 Mo. 91. 9 Hays V. Doane, 11 N. J. Eq. 84. '"Vaughen v. Haldeman, 33 Pa St. 522. " Providence Gas Co. v. Thurber, 2 R. I. 15 ; Philbrick v. Ewing, 97 Mass. 133. " Walker v. Sherman, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 645. § 78] FIXTURES AND OTHER ANNEXATIONS. 91 The removal of gas fixtures is analogous to the removal of a stove temporarily annexed to the floor and the chimney by means of the pipe, and which would not pass by conveyance as part of the realty. ' A show case with drawers and sash, fastened down by nails, is not a part of the realty." A mortgage of a plantation will not cover the wagons and implements used upon it, or the stock and cattle, unless such property is expressly included." A pump erected by a tenant, which can be removed without injury to the freehold, may be removed at the expiration of his term.* A tenant, who is not a gardener by vocation, can- not remove a border of box planted by himself,' and so a conservatory erected on a brick foundation, affixed to and communicating with rooms in a dwelling by windows and doors, cannot be removed by a tenant for years.' A wooden icehouse of 2,000 tons capacity, erected on wooden blocks may be removed by the tenant.' Under the head of articles put up by the tenant for domestic use and convenience, and allowed to be removed during the term, are grates, stoves, iron backs to chimneys, fixed tables, furnaces, coppers, coffee mills, malt mills, jacks, cupboards, iron stoves and the like." The right of removal will depend upon the mode of annexation of the article, and the effect which the removal will have upon the premises.' § 78. Time of Eemoval. — The tenant may remove them at the expiration of his term, whenever the removal is not contrary to any settled custom, and the removal will not materially injure the realty." These fixtures, after the term, if not removed before or at the expiration of it, > Freeland v. Southworth, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 191. ' Cross ». Marston, 17 Vt. 533. »Vason». Ball, 56 Ga. 368. ■■McCracken v. Hall, 7 Ind. 30 ; Grymes v. Boweren, 6 Bing. 437. 'Bmpson v. Soden, 4 Barn. & Adol. 655. «Bucklnnd ®. Butterfield, 2 Brod. & Bing. 54 ; 4 Moore, 440. 'Antoni v. Belknap, 102 Mass. 193. 'Amos & Ferard's Fixt, ch. 3 sect. 4. 'Biickland v. Butterfield, 3 Brod & Bing. 54. '"Free V. Stuart, 39 N 'br. 320; Coombs ». Beaumont, 5 Barn. & Adol, 38; Holbrook v. Chamberlin, 116 Mass. 155; Hawtry v. Butlin, L. R. 92 CREATION OF ESTATES. [§ 78 become a gift in law to him, the landlord, in reversion, and are not removable.' The rule to be accepted by these English decisions is tliat the tenant's right to remove fixtures continues during his original term and during such further period of possession by him as he holds the premises under a right to still con- sider himself as tenant. While the modern decisions have, in the interest of trade, greatly enlarged the number of movable or trade fixtures, yet they agree with the eailier authorities in limiting the time within which the removal must take place.' So where a tenant quits possession and surrenders the premises to the landlord without removing or reserving his fixtures, he is understood to make a dere- liction of them to to the landlord, and cannot thereafter remove them." The few cases in which the right of prop- erty in fixtures has been held to remain unchanged after the termination of the tenancy and the surrender of posses- sion of the premises by the tenant, rest upon the particular attendant circumstances, and may be regarded as excep- tional, and they do not invalidate the general rule.' When 8 Q. B. 290; 21 W. R. 633: Day v. Perkins, 2 Sand Ch. (N. Y.) 359; Maples V. Millon, 31 Conn. 598: Mackintosh v. Trotter, 2 Mees. & Wels, 185; 2 Taylor's Land. &Ten. (8thed.)sect. 551; Tyler'sFixt. cbs. 30 and 31; Grady's Fixt. 181; Amos & FerarJ's Fixt. 94; Gibbon's Fixt. 39; E well's Fixt. 137; Poole's Case, 1 Salk. 368; Lee v. Risdon, 7 Taunt. 191; Sweet v. Myers (S. Dak.), 53 N. W. Rep. 187. ' Poole's Case, 1 Salk. 368; Minshall v. Lloyd, 2 Mees. & Wels. 450; Weeton V. Woodcock, 7 Mees. & Wels. 14; Davis v. Jones, 2 Barn. & Aid. 165; Lyde ■». Russell, 1 Barn. & Add. 394; Colegrave v. Dias Santos, 2 Barn. & Cress. 76; Brown v. Elect. Light Co., 55 Fed. Rep. 229; Roffey ». Henderson, 16 Jur 84; Hallen v. Riinder, 1 Comp. Mees. & Roscoe, 266; Wilde ©.Waters, 16 Q. B. 637; Pitt v. Shew, 4 Barn. & Aid. 206; Pugh i>. Arton, L. R. 8 Eq. 626; Leader v. Homewood, 5 C. B. N. S. 546; Elwes v. Maw, 3 East, 38. « Weeton v. Woodcock, 7 Mees. & Wels. 14; Penton v. Robart, 2 East, Sf. ' Pizgerald v. Anderson, 81 Wis. 341; Preston v. Briggs, 16 Vt. 124; Sliepanl «. Spaulding, 4 Met. (Mass.) 416; Reynolds v. Shuler, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 338; Weathersby v. Sleeper, 42 Miss. 782; Thomas ». Crout, 5 Bush (Ky.), 37; Seeger v. Pettit, 77 Pa. St. 437; State B.Elliott, 11 N. H. 540; Bliss s. Whitney, 9 Allen (Mass.), 114; Childs ». Hurd, 32 W. Va. 66, 102; Dingley v. Buffum, 57 Me. 381; Beers v. St. John, 16 Conn. 322; Davis v. Moss, 38 Pa. St. 346; Allen u. Kennedy, 40 Ind. 143; Gaffleld v. Hapgood, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 193; Davis V. BufEura, 51 Me. 160; Haflick v. Stober, 11 Ohio St. 482. *Carlin v. Ritter, 68 Md. 478, 487; Tyler's Fixt. 453. See, also, Treadway D. Sharon, 7 Nev. 37. § 78] FIXTURES AND OTHER ANNEXATIONS. 93 he quits the premises, leaving his fixtures behind him, it may well be presumed that he intended to abandon them.' But this presumption can never arise while the tenant remains in possession." In the case of tenants for life and at will, whose terms, from the nature of the tenancy, are of uncertain duration, this general rule is relaxed and they, or their representa- tives, have been allowed to remove the fixtures after the expiration of the term.' But this subject may be controlled by agreement as between landlord and tenant.* Abandonment of the premises holds as to a person who claims under the tenant, and he cannot enter and take away fixtures.' The lessee may repair machinery which the lessor has agreed to keep in good condition, but has broken his con- tract, and then at the end of his term remove it if it can be detached without injury to the realty.' And if a tenant holds over he may, while in possession, remove his fix- tures. ' Where a landlord agrees to sell a trade fixture for the benefit of the tenant, but fails to do so, then the tenant has a reasonable time to remove such fixture, although the term has expired and the possession surrendered.' A tenant who remains in possession as tenant at will after the expiration of his lease may remove the fixtures as if his lease were still running. ' 'DuBois V. Kelly, 10 Barb. (N. Y.) 496; Conner v. Coffin, 22 N. H. 541; Moore ». Smith, 24 111. 513. » Conner v. Coffin, 22 N. H. 541. 'Haflick V. Stober, 11 Ohio St. 482; Martin v. Roe, 7 El. & Bl. 237; Lawton «. Lawton, 3 Atk. 13; Ombony v. Jones, 19 N. Y. 234; Weeton v. Woodcock, 7 Mees. & Wels. 14 * Lewis V. Ocean Nav. & Pier Co., 125 N. Y. 341; Saint v. PiUey, L. R. 10 Exch. 137; 12 Eng. R. 577; Brearley v. Cox, 24 N. J. L. 287; Marshall v. Bacheldor, 47 Knns. 442; Lake Superior, etc.. Iron Co. v. McCann, 86 Mich. 106; Booth v. Oliver, 67 Mich. 664; Manwaring v. Jenison, 61 Mich. 117. 6 Donnewald v. Turner, 44 Mo. App. 350. « Andrews v. Day Button Co., 132 N. Y. 348. ^ Lewis V. Ocean Kav. & Pier Co., 125 N. Y. 341. 8 Thorn ». Sutherland, 123 N. Y. 236; Torrey v. Burnett, 38 N. J. L. 457; 20 Am. Rep. 421. ' Brown v. Elect. Light Co., 55 Fed. Rep. 229; Lewis v. Pier Co., 135 N. Y. 341. 94: ckeation of estates. [§ 79 § 19. Accepting a New Lease from His Landlord. — If a tenant having the right to remove fixtures erected by him on the demised premises accepts a new lease of such premises without reservation or mention of any claim to such fixtures, and enters upon a new term thereunder, the right of removal is lost, notwithstanding his actual posses- sion has been continuous. This is because the fixtures set upon the premises at the time of the lease are part of the thing demised, and the tenant by accepting the lease of the land without reservation of the fixtures acknowledges the right of his landlord to them, which he is afterwards estopped from denying. ' Thus, where a tenant from year to year, erects on the premises certain buildings, structures and fixtures and subsequently during the tenancy, and after receiving notice to quit at the end of the current year, ac- cepts from his landlord a written lease of the premises, ' ' together with all the rights, appurtenances and privileges belonging," for a term of five years, without a reservation of the right to remove the fixtures then on the premises, the right of removal is lost." In this case Judge Miller says: " It is a lease for a term of years to take effect upon the expiration of the prior yearly tenancy, containing terms, conditions and stipulations which did not pertain to the prior tenancy by the year, and which contained no reservation of the right to remove the fixtures then on the premises / and it was under this lease that the tenant continued in posses- sion. The question then immediately before us is, what effect had the acceptance of this lease and continuing in possession under it, upon the tenant's right to remove these trade fixtures. And here again, in answer to this question, all the elementary writers concur in laying down the propo- sition, that if a tenant having the right to remove fixtures erected by him on the demised premises, accepts a new lease of such premises without reservation or mention of 12 Smiths's Lead. Cas. (8th ed.) 214; 2 Taylor's Landl. & Ten. sect. 552; Amos & Ferard's Fixt. 117; Gibbon's Fixt. 43; Ewell's Fixt. 174, 175; Grady's Fixt. 98; Tyler's Fixt. 437, 438, 439; Merritt v. Judd, 14 Cal. 59; Loughranii. R'ss, 45 N. y. 792; Watriss v. Nat. Bank, 124 Mass. 571; Abell v. Williams, 3 Daly (N. Y.), 17; Devin v. Dougherty, 27 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 461; Shepard «. Spaulding, 4 Met. (Mass.) 416; Davis v. Moss, 38 Pa. St. 346. ' Carlin v. Ritter, 68 Md. 478. § 79] FIXTURES AND OTHER ANNEXATIONS. 95 any claim to such fixtures, and enters upon a new term thereunder, the right of removal is lost, notwithstanding his actual possession has been continuous.'" And Judge Allen says that acceptance of a lease of the premises in- cluding the buildings, without any reservation of right, or mention of any claim to the buildings and fixtures, and occupation under the new letting, are equivalent to a sur- render of the possession to the landlord at the expiration of the first term. The tenant is under a new tenancy, and not under the old; and the rights which existed under the former tenancy, and which were not claimed or exercised, are abandoned as effectually as if the tenant had actually removed from the premises, and after an interval of time, shorter or longer, had taken another lease and returned to the premises. "A lease of land and premises carries with it the buildings and fixtures on the premises, and the ten- ant, accepting a lease of the premises without excepting the buildings, takes a lease of the lands with the buildings and fixtures, and acknowledges the title of the landlord to both, and is estopped from controverting it.'" Opposed to the weight of authority both in this country and in England, the cases of Kerr v. Kingsbury, ° and Sec- ond National Bank v. Merrill Co.* stand out prominently. Why the right should be lost when the tenant takes a renewal of the lease, is not apparent, and these two cases have the best of the argument. The reason which saved the tenant his right to the fixtures, in the first place, is equally influential to save to him on renewal what was un- questionably his before. The second lease ought not to include the fixtures as part of the realty unless from the lease itself, an understanding to that effect is plainly inferable.'' The general rule should be that one who, while occupy- ing the premises for trade purposes as a tenant from year ' Carlin v. Ritter, 68 Md. 478, 488. ' Loughran v. Ross, 45 N. Y. 793. See, also, Fitzlierliert v. Shaw, 1 H. Bl 258; Sharp v. Milligan, 33 Beav. 419; Heap v. Barton, 74 Eng. C. L. 273; Thresher v. East Lon. Water Works, 2 Barn. & Cress. 608. '89 Mich. 150, opinion by Cooley, J. * 69 Wis. 501. > Kerr v. Kingsbury, 39 Mich. 150. 96 CKEATION^ OF ESTATES. [| 80 to year, takes a new lease thereof, with an agreement either expressed or implied on the part of the landlord that he shall still retain the right to his trade fixtures, does not thereby lose his right to remove them. To divest him of that right there must be clear evidence, in the express terms of the lease or otherwise, shovv^ing that to be the intention of the parties.' And this rule should apply to all other leases be- tween landlord and tenant whether the fixtures are trade fixtures or other fixtures on a farm. But the law is over- whelmingly the other way. Article 6. Execution and Judgment Creditors. % 80. Rights of an Execution or Judgment Creditor. § 80. Eights of an Execution or Judgment Creditor. — A creditor who levies upon a tenant's fixtures acquires no greater rights therein, or to remove them than the tenant has." So where a tenant erects a building on the demised premises under an agreement with the lessor that at the expiration of the lease the building shall belong to the lessor on payment of the costs thereof, the building be- comes a part of the realty, and is not subject to the debts of the tenant." And though the lessee has authority from the lessor to remove the fixtures, until removed, an attach- ing creditor of the lessee cannot take them.' But whenever fixtures may be seized and severed by virtue of an execution against the tenant, without the con- sent of the landlord, they are subject to the tenant's debts, ^ and the same rule holds as to an attachment." If the ten- ant is entitled to remove the fixtures without the consent ' Nat. Bank v. Meriill Co., 69 Wis. 501. « Friedlander v. Ryder, 30 Nebr. 783. ^Switzert'. Allen, 11 Mont. 160. ■• jrcNally V. Connolly, 70 Cal. 3. ^Minshall v. Lloyd, 3 Mees. & Wels. 450; 8 Smith's Lead. Gas. 317; Poole's Case, 1 Salk. 368. ^O'Donnell v. Hitchcock, 118 Mass. 401. § 81] FIXTURES AND OTHER ANNEXATIONS. 97 of the landlord, an assignee or execution creditor may re- move them.' Generally fixtures are not considered personalty so as to be sold on execution, as they savor of the realty." Article Y. Life-Tenant and Remainderman — Executor and Heir — Heir and Devisee. §81. Life-Tenant and Eemainderman. §83. Heir and Devisee. § 82. Executor and Heir. § 81. Life-Tenant and Eemainderman. — The right to fixtures as between the executor of the life-tenant and the remainderman, rests much upon the same ground as that between landlord and tenant. The life-tenant should have the same right, which any tenant has, to hold anything of a personal nature, temporarily affixed to the soil, which was not intended as a permanent appendage, and which can be removed without material injury to the realty. But if the thing be incorporated with the realty it cannot be re- moved. Thus, the tenant for life can not remove from the freehold a dwelling-house affixed thereto, during his ten- ancy.' But an engine, cotton-gin and condenser attached to a mill by the life-tenant after his term commenced, not solely for the enjoyment of the land, but for the mixed purpose of trade and agriculture, belong to the executor of the life-tenant as against the remainderman.* In this case Judge Clark says that between landlord and tenant, the tenant cannot go on the premises to remove the fixtures after the termination of his lease without being a tres- passer, except in those cases where the duration of the term is not fixed, but uncertain, or where there is an agree- ' Overton v. Williston, 31 Pa. St. 155; Doty v. G nbam, 5 Pick. (Ma^s.) 487. ^ Oves V. Ogelsby, 7 Watts (Pa.), 106. See, also, Pemberton ». King, 2 Dev. (N. Car.) 376; Vausse v. Russell, 2 McCord (8. Car ), 329; Reynolds v. Shuler, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 323; Goddard v. Chase, 7 Mass. 432; Hutchman's Appeal, 27 Pa. St. 209. "Deraby v. Parse, 53 Ark. 526. See, also, Elam v. Parkhill, 60 Tex. 581. * Overman ii. Sasser, 107 N. Car. 432. 13 98 CREATION OF ESTATES. [§ 82 ment that he may remove after the expiration of the lease. But as between the executor of the life tenant and the re- mainderman, the executor can remove such fixtures within a reasonable time after the death of the life-tenant. So a steam or fire engine erected in a colliery will go to the executor of a hfe-tenant." Where articles as tapestry, marbles, statues, pictures with their frames, and glass and similar things, belong to one tenant for life, remain on the premises detached at his death, the next tenant for life cannot, by attaching them to the freehold, prejudice or affect the rights of his succes- sors." The right of removing fixtures is more in favor of the executor than of the remainderman.' § 82. Executor and Heir.-— As between the executor and the heir, the rule has been applied in favor of the in- heritance. Nothing which has been erected for permanent use and advantage of the freehold, and which at the time of erection, was intended to remain permanently upon, or attached to the realty, can be removed by the executor. So between the executor and heir, whatever is affixed to the freehold becomes a part of it and passes with it.* So where the owner of the land in fee, for the purpose of better en- joyment of the land, erects and affixes to the freehold cer- tain machinery, such as is used in working coal or iron mines, the purpose for which this was erected, it will pass to the heir as parcel of the realty.' And if the corpus of the machinery belongs to the heir, all that belongs to that machinery, although more or less capable of being detached from it, and of being used in such detached state, to greater or less extent, must, nevertheless, be considered as belong- ing to the heir.° Even in regard to manufactories, all arti- cles fixed to the freehold, whether by screws, solder, or by •Elwes V. Maw, 3 East, 38, 54; 2 Smith's Lead. Cas. 228; Lawton v. Salmoa. 1 H. Bl. 260n. See, also, Lawton v. Lawton, 3 Atk. 13; Dudley v. Warde, Amb. 113; Tyler's Tlxt. 490, 491, 496. = D'Eyncourt v. Gregory, L. R. 3 Eq. 382. » Overman v. Sasser, 107 N. Car. 432. * Overman v. Sasser, 107 N. Car. 432. 5 Fisher v. Dixon, 12 CI. " Colgrave v. Dias Santos, 3 Barn. & Cress. 80. 100 CREATION OF ESTATES. [§ 88 tenant for life devises fixtures, his devise is void, as he can- not dispose of the realty.' The testator may devise such things as are severable from the freehold and which would go to his executor, provided the estate itself is devisable. If the estate is not devisable the fixtures will not pass by devise. But whatever is at- tached to the land as a permanent addition goes to the heir. In such case the executor has no interest in the fixtures, unless they are attached to an estate for term of years belonging to the deceased, and which will pass to the ex- ecutor." A tenant for life has no power to devise the realty, and of course cannot devise the fixtures which are a part of the realty;' whatever would pass to his executor he can be- queath. In England fish in a pond, or deer in a park, or rabbits in a warren become a quasi-attachment to the realty and go to the heir, and the executor has no interest in the animals, unless they are attached to an estate for a term of years belonging to the deceased.* ' Herlakenden's Case, 4 Co. 62. » Litord's Case, 11 Coke, 46b, 50b. See, also, 1 Scliul. Per. Property, 151. 3 Shep. Touch. 469, 470. ■• Liford's Case, 11 Co. 46b, 50b, where the general subject of what appertains to an inheritance is discussed. PART II. CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. CHAPTEE III. incokpoeeal hereditaments. Article 1. Classification of Incorporeal Hereditaments. % 84. English Classification. § 85. American Classification. § 84. English Classification.— Blackstone says that in- corporeal hereditaments are principally of ten sorts; ad- vowson, tithes, commons, ways, offices, dignities, fran- chises, corodies or pensions, annuities and rents. He gives the definition of an incorporeal hereditament as a right issuing out of a thing corporeal, whether real or personal, or concerning or annexed to, or exercisable withiu the same.' It is not the thing corporeal itself, which may consist in lands, houses, jewels or the like; but something collateral thereto, as a rent issuing out of those lands or houses, or an office relating to those jewels. Corporeal hereditaments are the substance, which affects the senses, and may be seen and handled by the body, and are in fact, the same as land. Incorporeal hereditaments are such subjects as do not affect the senses, but exist in the mind only, as rents, commons, ways and the like." Incorporeal hereditaments were said to be in grant; cor poreal, in livery. The reason of this was because a simple deed or grant would pass the former, of which livery was impossible, while livery was necessary to a transfer of the ' 2 Bl. Com. 20, citing Co. Litt. 19, 20. " 2 Bl. Com. 20; 3 Kent's Com. 401, 402; Willard's Real Estate, 47. (101) 102 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 85-86 latter. But this distinction is now abolished, even in Eng- land.' § 85. Amekican Classification. — In the United States there are no advowsons, tithes, dignities nor corodies, com- mons are rare; offices, in the EngUsh sense, are unknown, and annuities have no necessary connection with land. There are other incorporeal hereditaments not included in Blackstone's list, such as vested and contingent remain- ders, and reversions dependent upon a particular estate of freehold, easements of light, air, and the like, and equities of redemption. Kent considers only the following incorporeal rights : 1. Commons ; 2. Ways, easements and aquatic rights ; 3. Offices ; 4. Franchises ; 5. Annuities ; 6. Eents." Commons, offices, franchises, and annuities will be consid- ered in this chapter. Rents, easements, vested and contin- gent remainders, reversions, and equity of redemption, will be treated in their appropriate place in separate chapters, or combined, as the natural development of the subjects makes necessary. Article 2. Common. § 86. Definition. § 88. Apportionment. § 87. Common of Pasture and Estover. § 89. Extinguishment. § 86. Definition. — Common is an incorporeal heredita- ment, which consists in a profit which one man has in con- nection with one or more others in the land of another. The object is for a man to pasture his cattle, or to provide necessary fuel for his family, or to repair his implements of husbandry. ' Bouvier's L. Diet. tit. " Incorporeal Hereditaments," 3. • 3 Kent's Com. 403. For an explanation of the incorporeal hereditaments in Blackstone's list, ■which have no application in the United States, consult any law dictionary. The definitions and discussion of them have no place in a practical American law treatise. § 87] INCOBPOREAL HEREDITAMENTS. 103 Tlie rights of common are little known in the United State^ and do not exist in any of the northern or western parts of the United States which have been settled since the Revolution. The policy of the old law in favor of common of pasture and of estovers, as being conducive to improvement ' in agriculture, has entirely changed or become obsolete ; and this incorporeal right is now found to be an incumbrance rather than an advantage." In the United States there are very few instances of the rights of common. ' § 87. Common of Pasture and Estover. — Common of pasture is divided into common of pasture appurtenant and common of pasture appendant. There is a distinction be- tween common appendant and common appurtenant in this iniportant particular, that, if he who has common appur- tenant purchases a parcel of land subject to the easement, aU his rights of common are extinct; or, if he takes a lease of part of the land, all the common is suspended; because it is the foUy of the commoner to intermeddle with the land; his common appurtenant was against common right, and he cannot have common in his own lands, which he has purchased.* Common appurtenant cannot be extinct iit part and be in esse for part, by the act of the parties. ' Common appendant is founded on prescription, and is regularly annexed to arable land. It authorizes the owner or occupier of arable land to put commonable beasts upon the waste grounds of the manor, from the necessity of the case, and to encourage agriculture. The tenant is limited to such beasts as are levant and couchant on his estate, be- cause such cattle only are wanting to plow and manure his land. It was deemed an incident to a grant of land as of common right, and to enable the tenant to use his plow land.° ' 2 Inst. 86 ; 4 Co. 37a. ' 3 Kent's Com. 403. 3 "Western University v. Robinson, 12 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 29, 33. See, also, Carr ». Wallace, 7 Watts (Pa.), 394. ^Bellamy's Case, 1 Leonard, 43; Tyringham's Case, 4 Co. 38; Wild's Case, 8 Co. 79. 'Tyringham's Case, 4 Co. 38. See, also, Carr B.Wallace, 7Watts(Pa.), 894,397. «2 Bl. Com. 33; 3 Kent's Com. 404. 104 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 88 Common appurtenant may be annexed to any kind of land, and may be created by grant as well as by prescrip- tion.' The owner could put in other beasts than such as plow or manure the land; and not being founded on neces- sity, like the other right, as to commonable beasts, was not favored in the law." A fold-course is not a several right to the herbage, but a right of common appurtenant of pasture for sheep.' § 88. Apportionment. — The common of estovers cannot be apportioned. It is an entirety and cannot be divided, for that may work oppression and injustice, by surcharg- ing the land. If, therefore, a farm entitled to estovers be divided by the act of the party among several tenants, none of them can take estovers, and the right is extinguished.* There are rights of common which are at law divisible, and in all such cases may be apportioned to the several parts of the dominant estate upon its severance by different conveyances. A right of pasture for cattle sans nombre is of this kind. In such case, though the right is not limited in terms, yet it is intended for the use of the estate and limited to such cattle as may be kept upon the dominant estate or upon any portion of it, and equally upon any portion, so that upon a division of the dominant estate and upon apportionment of the service to the several parts, the servient estate is not charged to any greater extent than before or with more cattle. And the rule is that wherever the common is admeasurable the common is apportion- able. ' But the right being measured by the uses of the es- tate cannot be severed from the estate and granted over." If the effect of the conveyance is to surcharge the com- mon and burthen to a greater extent the servient estate, it ' Cowlam V. Slack, 15 East, 108. '3 Kent's Com. 404. See, also, 2 Bl. Com. 33; 3 Cruise's Dig. tit. "Com- mon " ; Commissioners «. Glasse, 19 L. R. Eq. 134; Baylls ®. Amhurst, 6 Ch. Div. 500. » Robinson ®. Singh, 11 Ch. Div. 798. *Co. Litt. 164b; Leyman t. Abeel, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 30; Van Rensselaer ». Radcliff, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 639; Livingston v. Ketcham, 1 Barb. (N. Y ) 592. ' Tyringham's Case, 4 Co,, 35. * Drury v. Kent, Cro. Jac. 14. § 89] INCOEPOKEAL HEKEDITAMENTS. 105 shall extinguish; if otherwise, the reshall be an apportion- ment and such portion will pass as appurtenant.' The right to take herbage by the mouth of his cattle gives the commoner no incidental right to keep the com- mon open as an ornament to his dwelling, or as contribu- ting to his own personal pleasure or convenience.' § 89. Extinguishment. — If he who has common appur- tenant purchases a parcel of the land subject to the ease- ment, all his rights of common is extinct; or, if he takes a lease of part of the land, all the common is suspended. His common appurtenant was against common right, and he cannot common in his own land which he has purchased.' Common of estovers cannot be apportioned. It is an en- tirety, and cannot be divided, for that might cause oppression and injustice, by surcharging the land. If, therefore, a farm entitled to estovers be divided by the act of the party among several tenants, none of them can take estovers, and the right is extinguished.* Custom may control the right of common in England. The right of common may be held subservient to a distinct right in the lord of the manor, founded upon immemorial usage to dig in the soil, without having sufficient herbage for the commoners.' In regard to rights of common which by law are indivis- ible, a conveyance of any portion of the dominant estate will extinguish the whole, as in the case of common of estovers." ' Rotherham «. Green, Cro. Eliz 593; Bellamy's Case, 1 Leonard, 43; Tyring- ham's Case, 4 Co., 35; Bell v. Ra Iroad Co., 25 Pa. St. 161; Hall v. Lawrence, 2 R. I. 318. 'Bell V. Railroad Co., 35 Pa. St. 161, 181. 'Btll V. Railroad Co., 35 Pa. St. 161, 181; Bellamy's Case, 1 Leonard, 43; Wild's Case, 8 Co., 79; Tyringham's Case, 4 Co., 38; Carr v. Wallace. 7 Watts. (Pa.), 394. 397. See, also, Anon Hobart, 335; Lenial v. Hanles, 3 Keb. 66, pi. 4: Cowlam v. Slack, 15 East, 108; Livingston ». Ten Broeck, 16 Johns (N Y.) 14. «Co. Litt. 164b; Van Rensselaer v. Radclifl, 10 Wend. (N. T.)639; Leyman ■». Abeel, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 30; Livingston v. Ketcham, 1 Barb. (N. Y.) 5!)2; Co. Litt. 165a; Huntington v. Mountjoy, Godbolt, 17; Co. Litt. 164b; Watts ■V. Coffin, 11 Johns. (N. Y.) 495. " Bateson v. Green, 5 Term Rep. 411; Lascelles v. Onslow, 2 Q. B. Div. 433. See, also, Hall v. Byron, 4 Ch. Div. 667. «Hall 0. Lawrence, 2 R. I. 318, Ss36. 14 106 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§9(V Profit a prendre is a Norman French term, and designates a right of common to take something from the land.' Article 3. Common of Piscary. § 90. Title and Dominion of the Sea. § 97. Engligh Doctrine not Appli- § 91. Fishery — Deflnitlon. cable. § 92. Common of Fishery. § 98. Oysters. § 93. Several Fishery. § 99. Easement. § 94. The Right to Fish. § 100. Impeding the Passage of Fish, § 95. Riparian Rights. § 101. Rights of the State. g 96. Tidal Waters. § 102. Behring Sea Fishery. § 90. Title and Dominion of the Sea —By the com- mon law, both the title and the dominion of the sea, and of rivers and arms of the sea, where the tide ebbs and flows, and of all lands below high- water mark, within the jurisdic- tion of the Crown, are in the King. Such waters, and the lands which they cover, either at all times or at least when the tide is in, are incapable of ordinary and private occu- pation, cultivation and improvement; and their natural and primary uses are public in their nature for highways of navigation and commerce, domestic and foreign, and for the pupose of fishing by all the King's subjects. There- fore, the title, jus privatum, in such lands as of waste and unoccupied lands, belongs to the King as the sovereign, and the dominion thereof, jus publicum, is vested in him as the representative of the nation and for the public btmefit. The right of fishing in the sea and the creeks and arms thereof, was originally lodged in the Crown, as the right of depasturing was originally lodged in the owner of the waste whereof he was lord, or as the right of fishing belongs to him that is the owner of a private or inland river. And though the King was the owner of this great waste, and as a consequent of his propriety had the primary right of fishing in the sea and the creeks and arms ' See Rivers 0. Adams, 3 Ex. Div. 361; Chilton v. Loudon, 7 Ch. Div. 735. Pi'ofits a prendre are those taken and enjoyed by the mere act of the proprietor himself. § 91] INCORPOREAL HEREDITAMENTS. 107 thereof, yet the common people of England had regularly a liberty of fishing in the sea or creeks or arms thereof as a public common of fishery, and may not without injury to their rights be restrained from it, unless in such places, creeks or navigable rivers, where either the King or some particular subject had gained exclusive of the common liberty.' Lord Coke, when enumerating the different things that are comprehended under the term "land" as a subject of ownership, mentions land covered with water. He says : "Also the watei-s that yield fish for food and sustenance of man are not by that name demandable in a prcecipe ; but the land whereupon the water fiows or stands is demand- able; as for example, viginti acras terrcB aqua coopertas — twenty acres of land covered with water."" After show- ing that the right of fishery may be granted by the owner distinct from the right of soil, he says : "If a man grant aquam suam, the soil shall not pass, but the fishery with the water passes therewith." And where a collection of water has acquired a specific name he says that the land maybe included under that name; " stagnam, or poole, does consist of water and land, and therefore by the name ot stagnam or poole, the water and land shall pass also." So of a goose or gulf, for which a prcecipe will lie with the esplees in taking fish therefrom.' This shows that still waters, as weU as rivers and streams, were thfe subject of private ownership by the old English law. § 91. Fishery— Definition. —A fishery is a right or lib- erty of taking fish in the waters of another person, or in a river running through another man's land.* Or it is an incorporeal easement on the land of the riparian owner, like a way or common.' It is a right common to all the citizens of the State to fish in the tide- waters of the State, ' Hargrave's Law Tracts, 11, 12. « Co. Litt. 4a. •Co. Litt. 5b. <2B1. Com. 34, 39; 3 Kent's Com. 409; Cruise's Dig. tit. "Common," sect. 39. 'Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Carter, 61 Pa. St. 21. Compare Cobb. v. Daven- port, 33 N. J. L. 223. 108 CliASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 92-93 and may be enjoyed at will except so far as it is restrained by positive law, or by grants from the State to individuals.' § 92. Common of Fishery.— Kent says a common of fishery is not an exclusive right, but one enjoyed in com- mon with certain other persons.' It resembles the case of other common.' But a common of fishery is not correctly described by alleging it to be a common fishery.* It is claimed by some that there is no difference between a com- mon of fishery and a free fishery. ' The distinction between common of fishery, free fishery and several fishery, seems not to be settled.' A common of fishery is the right to fish in the waters of another, and when an action of trespass is brought, a successful defense may be made by a plea of common of fishery. The cases are innumerable in which actions of trespass have been sus- tained for fishing in a common of fishery. § 93. Several Fishery.— The only substantial distinction between free and several fishery is between an exclusive right of fishery, usually called "several", sometimes "free" (used as in free warren), and a right in common with others, usually called "common of fishery", sometimes "free" (used as in free port).' A " several" fishery is an exclusive right to fish in a given place, either with or with- out the property in the soil. " In England the soil of navigable tidal rivers, so far as the tide flows and reflows, is prima facie in the Crown, and the right of fishery therein is prima facie in the public. But the right to exclude the public therefrom, and to create a ' Brown v. De Grofl, 50 N. J. L. 409 ; Morgan v. Nagodlsh, 40 La Ann. 246. See, also, Preble v. Brown, 47 Me. 284 ; Paul v. Hazleton, 37 N. J. L. 106 ; Brookhaven v. Strang, 60 N. Y. 56. 5 3 Kent's Com. 409. "Smith V. Kemp, 3 Salk. 637. 4Benett «. Costar, 8 Taunt. 183; 3 Moore, 83. 5 Smith V. Kemp, 3 Salk. 637 ; Carter v. Murcot, 4 Burr. 3162. ^Freary v. Cooke, 14 Mass. 488 ; 3 Bl. Com. 39, 40 ; Seymour v. Courtenay, 5 Burr. 2814 ; Melvin v. Whiting, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 79 ; Co. Litt. Lib. 3, No. 181. ' Halford v. Baily, 13 Q. B. 436. sMalcomson v. O'Dea, 10 H. L. 593, 619. § 93] INCORPOREAL HEREDITAMENTS. 109 several fishery, existed in the Crown, and might lawfully have been exercised by the Crown before Magna Charta, and the several fishery could lawfully be afterwards made the subject of grant by the Ci'own to a private individual.' In ordinary cases the owner of a several fishery is to be pre- sumed to be owner of the soil," however, he is oiilj prima facie owner of the soil ; ' and a several fishery may exist without the property in the soil." By the common law of England, all the subjects of the king have a common and general right of fishing in the sea, which fishery is held to extend to all places where the tide ebbs and fiows.' While the right of fishing is prima facie exclusive in the owner of the soil, as part of the inherit- ance, yet it is not inseparable from the soil, but may be ac- quired, distinct from the ownership of the soil, by grant or prescription ; and such grant may confer upon the grantee a right of fishing, exclusive of the owner of the soil, where- by a several fishery is granted, or may be a license for him to fish in common with the owner and others, whereby a common of fishery is created.' A several or exclusive right of fishing in the estate of another may be also acquired by an adverse uninterrupted and exclusive use and enjoyment of it for a period required by the statute of limitations. In such case the one so using it acquires title to the right of fishing against all the world.' A several fishery is the exclusive right to fish in one's own waters, or is derived therefrom by grant ; and an ac- tion of trespass may be brought against one for illegally fishing in a several fishery. ' Malcomson v. O'Dea, 10 H. L. 593. 'Somerset «. Fogwell, 5 Barn. & Cress. 875. ' Partberiche v. Mason, 2 Chitty 658. 'Angell's Water Courses, 6-10 and cases cited; Woolr. on Waters, 111 et seq. * Weston V Sampson, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 347; Moulton v. Libbey, 37 Me. 472; Preble v. Brown, 47 Me. 284; Stougbton v. Baker, 4 Mass. 522. ^Woolrich on Waters, 110-114; Angell on Water Course, 71-74; Washb. on Ease, 410, 411-421; Co. Litt. 122a, and note 7; Melone v. Whiting, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 184; McFarlin v. Essex Co. , 10 Cush. (Mass.) 311. 'Chalker B.Dickinson, IConn. 302; Turners. Hebron, 61 Conn. 175; Church ■». Meeker, 34 Conn. 421. 110 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 94 § 94. The Eight to Fish.— The right to fish is a right or profit in lands.' The right to fish in fresh water rivers in which the soil belongs to the riparian owners is exclusive in them. The right of fishing in the sea, its arms and estuaries, and in the tidal water wherever it ebbs and fiows, is, at com- mon law, publici juris, and so belongs to all the subjects of the crown, the soil of the sea, and its arms and estuaries, and tidal waters, being vested in the sovereign as a trustee for the public. The exclusive right of fishing in the one case, and the public right of fishing in the other, depend upon the existence of the proprietorship in the soil of the private river by the private owner, and by the sovereign in a public river." But the right to ^sh upon one's own land, or in a several fishery, is subordinate to the public use of the stream for navigable purposes.' The right of fishery incident to the ownership of the soil of a river or other stream may be granted to another by the owner thereof, while retaining the soil and freehold of the real estate, either to be enjoyed in common with him- self, or to be exclusively enjoyed by such grantee as a sep- arate incorporeal hereditament.' Separate articles of agreement, each granting one-half of certain fishing privilege, which includes the shore of the river, such privilege to be exercised in a specific manner, with the right to pass and repass do not show a right to such an exclusive use as will iniply an intent to grant the fee in the soil, especially when the fishing season is con- fined to a small part of the year. ' 'Wickham v. Hawker, 7 Mees. & Wels. 63; Lloyd v. Jones, 6 C. B. 81; Bland V. Lipscomb, 4 El. & B. 714, note; Waters v. LlUey, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 145. 'Murphy «. Ryan, 2 Ir. L. R. C. M. 143; Carlisle v. Graham, L. R. 4 Exch. 361, 366. '^ Moulton ». Libby, 37 Me. 473; Adams ®. Pease, 3 Conn. 481; Lewis «. Keeling, 1 Jones L. (N. Car.) 299; Cobb v. Bennett, 75 Pa. St. 336; 15 Am. Rep. 753; Wilson i>. Inloss, 6 Gill (Md.). 134; Brookhaven v. Strong, 60 N. Y. 56; Chapman v. Hoskins, 3 Md. Ch. 485. ■•Washb. Eas. & Serv. 411; Carter v. Murcot, 4 Burr. 2162; Hargr. L. Tracts, 5; Co. Litt. 4b, 132a; Hale's De Jure Maris, c. 5; Seymour v. Courtenay, 5 Burr. 2814. *Butrick v. Tilton, 155 Mass. 461. f 95] INCORPOREAL HEREDITAMENTS. ill The owner of land adjoining a pond which belongs to another, has no right to fish therein.' In England the right of public fishery is never mentioned except in connection with tide-waters, where the title to the land is in the crown. It is never said that this right exists in lakes or ponds, or in any other fresh waters. § 95. EiPARiAN Eights.— The private right of fishery is confined to fresh water rivers, unless a special grant or presci'iption be shown. The right to fish in the sea, and in the bays and arms of the sea, and in navigable tide- waters, at common law, is a right public and common to every person/ and if any person has an exclusive privilege in navigable waters and arms of the sea, he must show it strictly, by grant or prescription." This public right of fishing includes shell fish as well as floating or swimming fish.' The owner on a navigable stream, where the title is in himself, may use the water in any way consistent with the full enjoyment by the public of the right of navigation, and which does not interfere with the rights of other riparian owners. With these limitations the riparian owner may erect wharves, booms and the like extending into the water.' But the construction of a pier or the ex- tension of any land into navigable waters for a railroad or other purpose, by one not the owner of the land, does not give the builder of such pier any riparian rights.' Eiparian rights are incident to the ownership of the land on the margin of navigable waters. ° ' Decker v. Baylor, 133 Pa. St. 168. 'H lie's De Jure Maris, c. 4; Pitzwalter's Case, 1 Mod. 105; Parker v. Cut- ler M. Co. 20 Me. 353; Oxford v. Richardson, 4 Term R. 437; Ward v. Cres- well, Wllles, 365; Warren ». Matthews, 1 Salk. 357; 6 Mod. 73; Blundells. Catterall, 5 Barn. & Al. 268. 'BagotteOrr, 2 Bos. & Pul. 472; Proctor v. Wells, 103 Mass. 216; Com- monwealth V. Bailey, 13 Allen (Mass.), 542; Peck ». Lockwood, 5 Day (Conn). 22; Dean v. Jersey Co., 15 How. (TJ. 8.) 432. ^Thornton v. Grant, 10 R. I. 477: Morrill©. St. Anthony, etc., Co. 26 Minn. 223; Rippe v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. 33 Minn. 18: Stevens Point, etc., Co. -0. Reilly, 46 Wis. 237; Attorney Gen. v. Terry, 9 L. R Ch. 423. » Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387. ' Potomac Steamboat Co. v. Upper P. S. Co., 109 U. 8. 672. 112 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 96 § 96. Tidal Waters.— The right in England extends as far as the tide ordinarily ebbs and flows.' It is an indis- puted doctrine of the common law, in rivers where the tide ebbs and flows, the right of fishing is public or common, unless an express monopoly is granted to individuals, or is acquired by prescription.' Where the course of the river gradually changes, the right of riparian owners to fish changes so as to follow the thread of the stream. ° The right of the public to fish does not extend to a large inland navigable, but not tidal, lake, at common law. * The ownership of the sovereign does not extend beyond the ebb and flow of the tide, although the river is navi- gable beyond that point, and this is so because a custom that the public should have profit a prendre in private soil cannot legally exist.' And the public cannot acquire by immemorial usage any right of flshing in a navigable river above the ebb and flow of the tide.' A right of fishing in private waters cannot be acquired by the public dedication.' Nor can the right extend to private rivers made navigable under acts of Parliament. ' The English doctrine as to navigable rivers, and the common right as to the use thereof, and as to the right of fishing as well as to the right to the soil, in rivers not navigable, in the common law sense of the term, have been declared to be the law in many of the States.' ' Reese ®. Miller, 8 Q. B. Div. 625. « Paul V. Hazleton, 37 N. J. L. 106 ; Preble v. Brown, 47 Me. 284 ; Brook- haven V. Strong, 60 N. Y. 56. ' Miller v. Little, 4 L. R. Ir. 302 ; Poster v. Wright, 4 C. P. Div. 438. «Bloomfield v. Johnston, 8 Ir. R. C. L. 68. See, also, Marsh v. Colby, 39 Mich. 626; Bristow v. Cormican, 3 App. Cas. 641. ' Murphy ®. Ryan, 2 Ir. R. C. L. 143, 149 ; Austin «. Amhurst, 7 Ch. Div 689 ; Allgood v. Gibson, 34 L. T. 883. •Austin V. Amhurst, 7 Ch. Div. 689. See, also, Mellor v. Spateman, 1 Saund. 343 ; Wilson «. Willes, 7 East. 121 ; Clayton v. Corby, 5 Q. B. 415 Fitch V. Rawlings, 2 H. Bl. 398. ' Cobb v. Davenport, 34 N. J. L. 223. 8 Hargreaves ». Diddams, 10 L. R. Q. B. 582. Mussett v. Burch, 35 L. T. 436. 'Adams v. Pease, 2 Conn. 481 : Commonwealth «. Charlestown, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 180', Scott v. Wilson, 3 N. H. 321 ; People i>. Piatt, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 195 ; Hooker «. Cummings, 20 Johns. (IST. Y.) 00 ; Ex pa>te Jennings, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 518 ; Berryt). Carle, 3 Me. 269 ; Arnold v. Mundy, 1 Halst. (N. J.) 1 ; § 97] INCORPOREAL HEREDITAMENTS. 113 Kent says that in rivers and streams not navigable as tide- waters, the owners of the soil over which they flow have, at common law, the exclusive right of fishing on his own side, unless some other person can show a grant or prescription for a common piscary, in derogation of the right naturally attached to the ownership of the soil.' § 97. English Doctrine not Applicable.— In some of the States the English doctrine of tidal waters has been set aside as not applicable. Thus, in Pennsylvania the Enghsh doctrine that no rivers are deemed navigable, so as to give the common right of fishing, except those where the tide ebbs and flows, is not applicable to the great rivers in that State; and the owners of the land on the banks of such rivers as the Susquehanna and the Delaware, so far up as they have a capacity for public use as commercial highways, have no exclusive right of fishing in the rivers opposite their respec- tive lands. The right to fisheries in such rivers is vested in the State, and open to all the world." And this doctrine has been adopted in South Carolina.' No general or exclu- sive right of fishery exists in the navigable waters of the State, and a navigable stream exists when the waters are sufiicient in fact to afford a common passage for people in sea vessels. * And this rule is applicable to the great rivers of the western States. " In this connection it will be necessary to note what the United. States Supreme Court has declared as to the owner- ship of the land covered by fresh water. Some of our rivers are navigable for great distances above the flow of the tide, even for hundreds of miles, by the largest vessels used in commerce. Hence, there can be nothing in the ebb and flow of the tide that makes the waters peculiarly Browne v. Kennedy, 5 Har. & J. (Md.) 195 ; McFarlin v. Essex Co. 10 Gush (Mass.) 309 ; Moulton v. Libbey, 37 Me. 472. ' 3 Kent's Com. 418. 'Carson «. Blazer, 3 Binney (Pa.), 475 ; Shnenk v. Schuylkill Nav. Co., 14 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 71 ; Tinioum Fishing Co. u. Carter, 61 Pa. St. 21. ' Gates V. Wadlington, 1 McCord, (8. Car.), 580. * Collins 1). Benbury, 3 Ired. (N. Gar.), 377. See, also, Chalker ii. Dickinson 1 Conn. 883. 5 Houck on Rivers, 235. See, also, Tomlin v. Railroad Co. 32 Iowa, 106. 15 114 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 98 suitable for admiralty jurisdiction, nor anything in the absence of a tide that renders it unfit. The great lakes also in the United States possess all the general character- istics of open seas, except in the freshness of their waters and in the absence of the e bb and flow of the tide. And there is no reason for the assertion of dominion and sovereignty over the ownership by the State of lands covered by tide-waters that is not equally applicable to its ownership of the dominion and sovereignty over lands covered by the fz'esh waters of these lakes.' In England " tide- waters " and " navigable waters " are synonymous," but not so in this country. If a river is in fact navigable it is classed as navigable, irrespective of the tide. This doctrine is founded upon the necessity of preserving to the public the use of navigable waters from private interrup- tion and infringement and is as applicable to navigable fresh waters as to waters moved by the tide.' § 98. Oysters. — A party may be the owner of oysters in the tide- waters of a bay or arm of the sea, which may be a common fishery to all the inhabitants of the State or town, if they have been planted by him or by those from whom he derives the right to take them, in a bed clearly marked out and defined, where there were no oysters growing spon- taneously at the time." A State may prohibit non-resident or citizens of ^ other States from taking oysters within its territorial hmits.' And so a statute" making it a misdemeanor for a non resident to plant oysters in the waters of the State, without consent of the owners of the same, or on the shore to gather oysters from their beds, in any such waters, either for his own benefit or for that of his employer is valid and not inviola- ' Illinois Central R. R. Co. ■». Illinois, 146 U. S. 387. = Gc'nese Cliief, 13 How. (TJ. S.) 433, 455. 'Illinois Central Railroad Co. «. Illinois, 146 U. S. 887, and these great lakes and their connections are "high seas." United States v. Rodgers, 150 IT. S. 249. "People V. Hazen, 131 N. Y. 313; Fleet v. Hegeman, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 43; Lowndes v. Dickerson, 34 Barb. (N. Y.) 586; Post v. Kreischer, 108 N.Y. 110. 'Corfleld v. Coryell, 4 Wash. 0. C. 371. « N. Y. Pen. Code, sect. 441. §§ 99-100] INCORPOREAL HEREDITAMENTS. 115 tion of the constitution of the United States.' Such act is a lawful exercise of legislative power over the common property of the citizens of the State.' This act does not contravene the provisions of the Federal Constitution that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges of citizens in the several States. ° § 99. Easement. — An unorganized public cannot acquire a right of fishery in a natural pond by prescription.'' It is only of fisheries which may be the subject of private property that easements can be predicated. If one is to take fish within another's freehold, it is an easement, and may be acquired by grant from the owner thereof or by prescription.' If by prescription it must be shown to have been an actual and exclusive possession of the fishery, ad- verse to the right of the riparian owner, uninterrupted and continued for a time provided." § 100. Impeding the Passage of Fish. — The common law made the owner's right to adjacent lands and water of rivers subordinate to the public convenience; and all erec- tions and impediments made by the owners, to the obstruc- tion of the free use of the river as a highway for naviga- tion are nuisances. The right of fishery in rivers not navigable must be so used as not to injure the private rights of others, and does not extend to impede the passage of fish up the river by means of dams or other obstruc- tions.' The owner who has by legislative permission maintained for more than twenty years a dam across a navigable stream, does not thereby acquire any prescriptive right to maintain the dam as it is, as against a subsequent act of the legisla- ' People V. Lowndes, 130 N. T. 455. ' McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. 8. 391. 'Haney «. Compton, 36 N. J. L. 507; McCready «. "Virginia, 94 "U. S. 391. * Turner «. Hebron, 61 Conn. 175. ' Washb. Ease. & Serv. 420. • McParlin v. Essex Co., 10 Cush. (Mass.) 304; Melvin «. Whiting, 13 Pick (Mass.) 184. ' Weld V. Hornby, 7 East, 195; Boatwright v. Beelsman, 1 Rice, (8. Car.) L. 446; Case v. Weber, 2 Cart. (Ind.) 109. 116 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 101 tive provision that all owners of dams shall provide suitable fishways thereiu.' Every State has laws regulating the taking of fish, and all such laws are for public benefit, to preserve the fish, and such laws are public, of which the courts must ex officio take notice." 101. Rights of the States.— In the United States the power to regulate and control the rights of fishing in the public waters resides in the several States, within their re- spective jurisdiction.' It is TAithin the power of the State to preserve from extinction fisheries in waters within its jurisdiction by prohibiting exhaustive methods of fishing, or the use of such destructive instruments as are likely to result in the extermination of the young as well as the mature fish." But while the legislature has power to reg- ulate and limit the manner of taking fish in waters which are public breeding places or passageways for fish, it does not assume to interfere with the privilege of the owners of private ponds having no communication through which fish are accustomed to pass to their ponds. Such ponds, whether natural or artificial, are regarded as private prop- erty,and the owners may take fish therefrom whenever they choose, without restraint from and legislative enactment, 'Parkers. People, 111 111. 581. See, also, State v. Franklin Falls Co., 4& N, H. 240; 6 Am. Rep. 513. * Burnham d. Webster, 5 Mass. 266; Commonwealth v. M'Curdy, 5 Mass. 324. 2 Smith D. Maryland, 18 How. (U. S.) 71; Hooker v. Cummings, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 100; Smith v. Levinus, 8 N. Y, 472; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133; 119 N. Y. 226; State v. Roberts, 59 N. H. 256; Stoughton v. Baker, 4 Mass. 532; Commonwealth v. Vincent, 108 Mass. 441; Lunt v. Hunter, 16 Me. 9;. State V. Franklin Falls Co., 49 N. H. 240; Phelps v. Racey, 60 N. Y. 10; Mas- sachusetts V. Manchester, 139 U. S. 240; Commonwealth v. Manchester, 152 Mass. 230; State i). Thompson, 85 Me. 189; HolyokeCo. v. Lyman, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 500; Gentile ». State, 29 Ind. 409; State ®. Lewis, 134 lad. 250; State s. Randolph, 1 JVIo. App. 15; Magner ». State, 97 111. 320; Weller v. Snovcr, 42 N. J. L. 341 ; McCready ». Virginia, 94 U. S. 391; 'Vinton v. Welsh, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 87, 93; Commonwealth v. Essex Co., 13 Gray (Mass.), 239, 248; Com- monwealth V. Chapin, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 199. See, also. State v. Judy, 7 Mo. App. 524; People v. O'Neil, 71 Mich, 325; Commonwealth v. Hall, 128 Mass. 410; Allen 1). Young, 76 Me. 80, Williams v. Blackwall, 2 Hurl. & C. 33. ^Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133; Parker v. People, 111 111. 581; Eubank ®. Pence, 5 Lift. (Ky.) 338; 8 Am. & Eng. Ency. of L. 34, 35. § 102] INCOEPOKEAL HEliEDITAMENTS. 117 since the exercise of this right in no way interferes with the rights of others.' § 102. Behring Sea Fishery.— In the United States the President and Congress are vested with all the responsi- bility and powers of the government for determining ques- tions as to the maintenance and extension of our national dominion. The great Behring Sea controversy between the United States and England was settled by a tribunal of arbitration whose decision was announced August 15, 1893, at Paris, Trance. It was held that the Pribyloff Islands belonged to the United States, whose jurisdiction is bounded by the three-mile limit from the shore of such islands; but outside of the three-mile limit the United States Government has no jurisdiction. But the arbitrators, as they had a right to, established a protected zone of sixty miles around the Pribyloff Islands, in which it is forbidden at any time to catch or pursue the seals. This rule will break up pelagic sealing. Outside the three-mile limit the seals are held in the same manner as wild animals that go from place to place, being the property of him who first takes them, ex- cept as to the protected zone, established by the arbitrators. The close season extends from May 1st to July 31st, when no seals shall be taken. As to national jurisdiction this decision is contrary to the teachings of late law writers on international law, who sug- gest that a State has the right to extend its territorial waters from time to time, at its will, with the now increased range of its guns from the three-mile limit to fifteen miles, though they add it would undoubtedly be more satisfactory that the nations should settle this question by mutual con- sent.' The Paris decision is also opposed to the doctrine held by some of our own courts, that the United States had jurisdiction beyond the three-mile limit.' • State v. Roberts. 59 N. H. 256. » 1 Whart. Int. L. Dig. 114; Hall Int. L. 137. ' United States v. Tlie James G. Swan, 50 Fed. Rep. 108. See, also, U. 8 Bev. St. sects. 1954, 1956. 118 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 103-104 Article i. Offices. % 103. In England. § 104. In the United States. § 103. In England. — In England offlces are iucorporeal hereditaments, and consist in a right, and correspondent duty, to execute a public or private trust, and to take the emoluments belonging to it." These offices may be granted to a man in fee, or for life, as well as for years, and at will;' save only that offices of public trust cannot be granted for a term of years, especially if they concern the administra- tion of justice, for then they might perhaps vest in execu- tors or administrators. Neither can a judicial office be granted in reversion." Offices are public or private; the former affect the people generally; the latter are such as concern peculiar districts beloging to private individuals. The general rule is, that judicial offices must be exercised in person, and that the judge cannot delegate his authority to another; in England there are exceptions to this rule.* § 104. In the United States. — In the United States, no public office can properly be termed an hereditament, or a thing capable of being inherited. The tenure of office never extends beyond good behavior. According to the English definition all offices are public; but in another sense em- ployments of a private nature are also called offices, such as the office of president of a bank, the office of director of a corporation and the like. Kent says that private ministerial offices only can be classed as hereditaments in the United States, and that he does not know of any such subsisting in this country. That it would not be consistent with the manners and usages of this country to grant a private trust or employment to one, and his heirs, in fee; "though I do not know of any posi- tive objection to such a contract in point of law." ' ' 3 Kent's Com. 454; 2 Bl. Com. 36. '2 Bl. Com. 36. ' Reynel's Case, 9 Co. 95. * Mollns V. Werby, 1 Lev. 76; 4 Inst. 391. ' 3 Kent's Com. 454. § 105] incorporeal hereditaments. 119 Article 5. Franchises. § 105. Definition. § 108. Franchises Subject to Eminent § 106. Implied Covenants of the Gran- Domain. tor and the Grantee. § 109. Impairment of Contract. § 107. Qualified Franchises. § 105. Definition. — A franchise is a special privilege con- ferred by government on individuals, and which does not belong to the citizens of the country by common right.' It is an incorporeal hereditament, being a certain privilege conferred by grant from the government, and vested in in- dividuals.' Blackstone says franchises are ro^'al privileges, or branch of the king's prerogative, subsisting in the hands of a subject. Being therefore derived from the crown, they must arise from the king's grant.' But now, in England, they are granted by the legislature, instead of by the crown.' The principal franchises are bridges, ferries, railroads and turnpike roads. In a popular sense, franchise seems to be synonymous with right or privilege. In the United States franchises are usually held by cor- porations created for the purpose, and can be held only under legislative grant. They are held subject to the exer- cise of the right of eminent domain, and are liable for the debts of the owner. A franchise owes its existence to a grant, or, as at com- mon law, to prescription, which presupposes a grant, and is vested in an individual or body politic' Franchises cannot be sold by the corporation unless authorized by statute.' ' Ang. & Am. Corp. sect. 4. « 3 Kent's Com. 458. 2 2 Bl. Com. 37. ■• 1 Coal. Bl. Com. 274, n. ' Chicago City R. R. Co. v. People, 73 Dl. 541. « Yellow River Imp. Co. «. Wood Co., 81 Wis. 554; Foster v. Fowler, 60 Pa, St. 27. 120 classification of estates. [§ 106 § 106. Implied Covenants of the Grantor and the Grantee. — On the part of the goTernment, franchises con- tain an implied covenant not to invade the rights vested, and on the part of the grantee to execute the conditions and duties prescribed in the grant. Some of these fran- chises are presumed to be founded on a valuable consider- ation, and to involve public duties, and to be made for the public accommodation, and to be affected with a, jus publi- cum, and are necessarily exclusive in their nature. ' If the State, in granting a franchise, imposes a limitation or condition that a certain thing shall be completed within a given time, no other power can waive the forfeiture aris- ing from the non-performance of the condition.' The State cannot arbitrarily destroy or impair the franchise or any right or power essential to its beneficial exercise.' In the grant of a franchise of building and using a pub- lic railway, there is an implied condition that it is held as a quasi-puhWc trust for the benefit of the public and the owner possessed of the grant must exercise a perfect im- partiality toward all who seek the benefit of the trust.* The privilege of making a road, or establishing a ferry, and taking tolls for the use of the same, is a franchise, and the public have an interest in the same, and it is not a common right to every one who may wish to exercise this privilege. " Grants by the public are to be strictly construed, and an intention to grant an exclusive privilege or monopoly is not to be imphed. So where exclusive privileges are not expressly given by the charter, they should not be held to be conferred.' Discrimination in rates by common carriers is now con- trolled by State statutes and the interstate commerce act.' 1 3 Kent's Com. 458. ' Chicago City R. R. Co. ■». People, 73 111. 541. •Sloan v. Railroad Co. 61 Mo. 24; 21 Am. Rep. 397. * Messenger ». Railroad Co. 37 N. J. L. 531 ; 17 Am. Rep. 754; Sandford v. Railroad Co. 24 Pa. St. 378; People v. Railroad Co. 23 Hun (N. Y ), 533; Shipper v. Railroad Co., 47 Pa. St. 338. ' Beekman v. Railroad Co. 3 Paige (N. T.), 45. « Parkersburg Gas Co. v. Parkersburg, 30 W. Va. 435; Shorter a. Smith, 9 Ga. 517; Morawetz on Priv. Cor. sect. 1057; State v. Hamilton, 47 Ohio St. 62. 'Hersho. Railroad Co. 74 Pa. St. 181; Wabash, etc.. Railroad Co. ■». Peo- ple, 105 HI. 236; Wabash, elc, R. R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557. At com- |§ 107-108] INCORPOREAL HEREDITAMENTS. 121 § lot. Qualified Franchises. — Where a franchise grant- ed is not exclusive in terms, the legislature may grant other franchises similar in terms, essentially interfering with the utility and profit of the former.' So a ferry right is not infringed by the building of a bridge which diverted part of the traffic." But if the franchise be exclusive, and the government obligates itself not to grant a similar franchise to be exer- cised at the same place, a subsequent franchise would be void as it would impair the obligations of a contract." The grant of a new franchise may sometimes render valueless franchises of an existing corporation; but unless the State contract has precluded the State from such new grant, the incidental injury can constitute no objection to the granting of the new privilege.* § 108. Fkanchises Subject to Eminent Domain. — Fran- chises are subject to the exercise of eminent domain like other property. Thus, the legislature has power to pass an act authorizing parties to whom the right to construct a railroad is given, to run upon, intersect or use any portion of other railroad tracks,upon making due compensation.' mon law a carrier could not charge more than was reasonable. However, he could charge to favored persons an unreasonable low rate. — Great Western R. R. Co. ®. Sutton, L. R. 4 fl. L. 226, 237; Pitchburg Railroad v. Gage, 12 Gray (Mass.), 393. 'Lehigh Water Co. 's Appeal, 102 Pa. St. 528; State o. Noyes, 47 Me. 189; Raritan, etc., R. R. Co. ■». Delaware, etc. Canal Co., 18 N. J. Eq. 546; La- fayette Plank Road Co. ■». Railroad Co., 13 Ind. 90. 'Hopkins «. Railroad Co., 2Q. B. Div. 224. See, also, Fort Plain Bridge Co. ■». Smith, SON. Y. 61; Fall d. County Sutter, 21 Cal. 252; McRoberts v. Washburne, 10 Minn. 28; Tuckahoe Canal Co. ■». Railroad Co. 11 Leigh (Va.), 42; Charles River Bridge «. Warren River Bridge Co., 11 Pet. (U. S.) 420; Richmond R. R. Co. v. Railroad Co., 13 How. (U. S.) 71. 'Newburgh Turnpike Co. v. Miller, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.)101; Mllhau «. Sharp, 27 N. Y. 620; Boston, etc., R. R. Co. v. Railroad Co., 2 Gray (Mass.), 1; Dartmouth College i). Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 518. ^Luzerne Water Co. v. Toby Creek Water Co., 148 Pa. St. 568; Lehigh Water Co.'s Appeal, 102 Pa. St. 528; Houston v. Railroad Co., 83 Tex. 548; North Baltimore Railroad Co. v. Baltimore, 75 Md. 247; In re Levis Water Co., 11 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 178. ' Canal & R. R. Co. v. Railroad Co., 44 La. Ann. 485; Toledo Con- sol. St. R. R. Co. V. Railroad Co., 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 363; In re Kerr, 42 Barb. (N. Y.) 119; McRoberts v. Washburne, 10 Minn. 27; White River Turnpike Co. 16 122 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 10& And the legislature may, by general laws, impose upon corporations new and additional burdens not contained in their charters, and which are conducive to the general security, quiet and good order. ' But it cannot, under color of such laws, destroy or impair the franchise or any right or power essential to its beneficial exercise." A franchise is property and may be taken under the power of eminent domain w-hen adequate compensation is provided and the obligation of the contract is not impaired but recognized. ° § 109. Impairment op Contract. — The intent of the State to make a permanent grant must be clearly expressed. There must be a sufficient consideration. Mutual assent is the essence of the contract. The contract on the part of the State not to exercise its powers of legislation can never be implied, and the reservation of the right to repeal, alter or amend, negatives any intention to confer irrevocable franchises. The franchise is to be regarded as some legal power, not as a right secured by contract with the State.* No one has a vested right to be protected against conse- quential injuries arising from the proper exercise of rights by others.' ■». Railroad Co., 21 Vt., 590; Boston Water Power Co. v. Railroad Co., 33 Pick. (Mass.) 360; New York, etc. R. R. Co. ■». Railroad Co., 36 Conn. 196; West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. (U. S.) 507. 'Nelsons. Railroad Co , 26 Vt. 717. See, also. State «. Railroad Co., 43 Conn. 851; Fitchburg Railroad Co. v. Railroad Co., 4 Allen (Mass.), 198. 'Sloan V. Railroad Co., 61 Mo. 24; 21 Am. Rep. 397. See, also, Ogden v. Gibbons, 4 Johns. Cli. (N. Y.) 150; Fall v. County Sutter, 21 Cal. 252. 3 West River Bridge v. Dix, 6 How. (U. S.) 507; In re Twenty-Second Street, 103 Pa. St. 108; In 're Towanda Bridge Co., 91 Pa. St. 316; Boston Water Power Co. v. Railroad Co., 23 Pick. (Mass.) 360; In re Citizens Pass. R. R. Co., 3 Pittsburg (Pa.), 10; Richmond R. R. Co. v Railroad Co., 13 How. (U. S.) 71; New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Louisiana Light and Heat Co., 115 U. S. 650; Piscataqua Bridge v. New Hampshire, 7 N. H. 35; Enfleld Toll Bridge Co. v. Railroad Co., 17 Conn. 40; Backus v. Lebanon, 11 N. H. 19. ■•Dillon's Mun. Cor. sect. 97 ; 3 Morawetz Priv. Cor. sects. 1861-1064; Nor- wich Co. V. Norwich, 25 Conn. 19 ; State v. Gas Co., 37 Ohio St. 45 ; Gas Co. «. Avondale, 43 Ohio St. 257; Stone. d. Loan Co., 116 U. S. 307; Shields v. State, 26 Ohio St. 86; Shields ». Ohio, 9.5 U. 8. 319; Saginaw Gas Light Co. «. Saginaw, 28 Fed. Rep. 529. 'Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. (V. S.) 380. § 109] INCORPOREAL HEREDITAMENTS. 12S The doctrine that the creation of a private corporation by charter is such a grant as includes an obligation of the. nature of a contract which no State legislature can pass laws to impair,' has been, in a large degree, obviated by the practice of reserving to the State the right to alter, revoke or repeal charters, general incorporation laws, and special privileges and immunities/ However, if the State does pass a law impairing the obligations of a contract, the law is unconstitutional and void.' 'Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 518. » State 1). Hamilton, 47 Ohio St. 53. ^Dartmouth College «. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (IT. S.) 518 ; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch (U. S.), 133; Green «. Biddle, 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 1 ; Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. (U. S.) 514 ; Planters Bank v. Sharp. 6 How. (U. S.) 301 ; Trustees v. Indiana, 14 How. (U. S.) 268 ; Piqua Bank i>. Knoop, 16 liuw. (U. S.) 369 ; Neil v. Ohio, 3 How. (U. S.) 720 ; Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black (r. S.), 436 ; Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken, 1 Wall. (U. S.) 116 ; Hawthorne v. Calef, 2 Wall. (U. S.) 10; Miller v. State, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 473 ; New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light aud Heat Co., 115 U. S. 650 ; New Orleans Water Works v. Rivers. 115 U. S. 674 ; Stone «. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814 ; Flint Plank Road v. Woodhall, 35 Mich. 99 ; McRoberts v. Wash- burne, 10 Minn. 23: Gorman e. Railroad Co., 36 Mo. 441; Bruffett v. Railroad Co., 25 111. 310; Miner's Bank ». United States, 1 Greene (Iowa), 553; Bruce V. Schuyler, 4 Gilm. (111.) 221 ; Lincoln Bank v. Richardson, 1 Me. 79 ; Yar- mouth V North Yarraoutli, 34 Me. 411 ; Coffin v. Rich, 45 Me. 507 ; State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189, 205 ; Edwards d. Jagers, 19 Ind. 407 ; Louisville v. Uni- versity, 15 B. Mon. (Ky.) 642; Maysville Turnpike Co. v. Howe, 14 B. Mon. (Ky.)426; New Orleans, etc., R. R. Co. v. Harris, 27 Miss. 517; State V. Tombeckbee Bank, 2 Stew. (Ala.) 30; State v. Hayward, 3 Rich. (S. Car.) 880; Young v. Harrison, 6 Ga. 130; Attorney General v. Bank, 4 Jones Eq. (N. Car.) 2S7; Bank of State v. Bank of Cape Fear, 13 Ired. (N. Car.) 75; Bank of Dominion v. McVeigh, 20 Gratt. (Va.) 457; Regents v. Williams, 9 Gill & J. (Md.) 365; NorrisD. Trustees, 7 Gill & J. (Md.) 7; Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. V. McFarlan, 31 N. J. Eq. 706; Zabriskie v. Railroad Co., 18 N. J. Eq. 178; Iron City Bank v. Pittsburg, 37 Pa. St. 340; Commonwealth u. Cullen, 13 Pa. St. 133; Brown n. Hummel, 6 Pa. St. 86; People ». Manhattan Co., 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 331; Lothrop v. Stedman, 42 Conn. 583; Washington Bridge Co. «. State, 18 Conn. 53; Brighton «. Wilkinson, 3 Allen (Mass.), 27; Central Bridge V. Lowell, 15 Gray, 106; Nichols v. Bertram, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 343; King v. Bank, 15 Mass. 447; Wales v. Stetson, 3 Mass. 146; Grammar School d. Burt, U Vt. 633; Backus v. Lebanon, 11 N. H. 19 ; Seibert v. Lewis, 133 U. S. 384 ; Greenwood «. Freight Co., 105 U. S. 13. 124 classification of estates. [§§ 110-111 Article 6. Annuities. § 110. Definition. § 113. Investment in the Public §111. Distinguished from Rent Funds. Charge. § 114. Stamtory Provisions as to § 113. Apportionment. Apportionment. § 110. Definition. — An annuity is a yearly sum stipu- lated to be paid to anothei*, in fee, or for life, or years, and chargeable only on the person of the grantor. If it is to be paid to the annuitant and his heirs, it is a personal fee, and transmissible by descent like an estate in fee, and forfeitable for treason as an hereditament ; ' the husband is not entitled to curtesy nor the wife to dower in an annuity." It cannot be conveyed by way of use, is not within the statute of frauds, and may be bequeathed and assigned as personal estate.' An annuity in fee is personal estate sub modo. It has none of the incidents and charac- teristics of real estates, except that of descending to the heir, and not forming assets in the hands of the executor. § 111. Distinguished prom Rent Charge. — An annuity is different from a rent charge, with which it is sometimes confounded ; the annuity being chargeable on the person merely, and so far personalty ; while a rent charge is some- thing reserved out of realty, or fixed as a burden upon the estate in land.' If the annuity is made chargeable upon land, it will then become a rent charge, and descend to the heirs as realty." An annuity charged on real and personal property of the testator which was expressly left to a certain party "forever," without mention of heirs, was held to pass to the personal representative of the said party.' ' Co. Litt. 2 a ; NevU's Case, 7 Co. 34 b ; 2 Bl. Com. 40 ; Co.. Lltt. 144. « Co. Litt. 32 a. » Stafford ». Buckley, 2 Ves. 170 ; Aubin ». Daly, 4 Barn. & Aid. 59. <2B1. Com. 40. s Sollory ». Leaver, L. R. 9 Eq. 22. « Taylor v. Martindale, 13 Sim. 158. See, also, Parsons v. Parsons, L. R. 8 Eq. 260. § 112] INCORPOREAL HKREDITAMENTS. 125 An annuity either proceeds from the lands or the coffers of another. Where it is charged upon the land, it may be real or personal, at the election of the holder. If it is out of the coffers, it is personal only as to the remedy, but the property itself is real as to its descent to the heir. And this seems to be the only sense in which an annuity, for which the security is merely personal, can be called real estate.' Whei'e an annuity is charged on real and personal estate, and is left to the testator's children, "or their heirs," the next of kin of a deceased child takes.' § 112. Apportionment. — Annuities were not in general apportionable at common law.' Though annuities are not subject to apportionment, like rent, under the English statute,* yet if the annuitant dies within the quarter or year, as the case may be, and the annuity was given for maintenance in infancy, or for the separate maintenance of a, feme covert, equity will apportion the annuity up to the day of the annuitant's death, on the principle that the allowance was necessary.' But is not the rule at law." But a later statute' has amended this statute' as to ap- portionment, and now all rents service, rents charge, and other rents, annuities, dividends, and all other payments of every description, made payable at fixed periods, may be apportionedi and the recovery of the apportioned parts from the last period of payment. To enforce the payment of an annuity, an action of an- nuity lay at common law, but when brought for arrears must be before the annuity determines." ' Turner ». Turner, Ambl. 783. « Parsons v. Parsons, L. E. 8 Eq. 260. ' Plymouth v. Throgmorton, 1 Salk. 65; Dexter v. Phillips, 121 Mass. 178. *2 George, IF., ch. 19, sect. 15. « Pearly v. Smith, 3 Atk. 260; Hay v. Palmer, 3 P. Wm, 501; Howel », Hanforth, 2 Wm. Bl. 843. See, also, Heizer v. Heizer, 71 Ind. 536; Blight v. Blight, 51 Pa. St. 430. « Queen n. Lords, 16 Q. B. 357, 363. ' 4 Williams, IV. c. 23. * 3 George, II. c. 19, sect. 15. » Co. Litt. 385. 126 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 113 Annuities, except where clearly intended for the daily- support of the beneficiary, as in the case of a child or of the separate maintenance of a wife, are not apportionable.' § 113. Investment in the Public Funds. — The general rule, followed in chancery, that sums of money, payable periodically at fixed times, are not apportionable during the intervening period, applies to investment of public funds. So Lord Hardwicke held in the South Sea Annui- ties, where the debt, by the terms of the settlement, had originally been secured upon a mortgage, the interest upon which would have been apportionable, and had been trans- ferred to government securities by order of court; or where the money was directed to be laid out in land, and in the mean time to be invested in government securities, the in- terest and dividends to go in the same way that the rents and profits would ; and the rents, if the money had act- ually been invested in land, would have been apportionable under the statute". The three per cent, bank annuities or consols come under the same rule. ° In these English cases the interest of the holder was a perpetual annuity, at a fixed rate of interest, subject to redemption by the govern- ment by payment of the principal sum upon which the in- terest was computed.* The rule applies to coupons for interest on bonds of the United States." The bonds of the United States are evidence of money borrowed by the government in no other sense than the ' Wiggin V. Swett, 6 Met. (Mass.) 194; Reynish v. Martin, 3 Atk. 330, 336; Howel V. Hanforth, 3 W. Bl. 843; Anderson v. Dwyer, 1 8ch. & Lef. 301; Franks v. Noble, 13 Ves. 484; Leathley v. French, 8 Ir. Ch. 401. m George II. c. 19, sect. 15; Pearly v. Smith, 3 Atk. 360; Wilsons. Har- man, 2 Ves. Sr. 672; Ambler, 379; Sherrard v. Sherrard, 3 Atk. 503. 3 O'Brien v. Fitzgerald, 1 Ir. Ch. 290; Rashleigh v. Master, 3 Bro. C. C. 99; In re Longworth's Estate, 1 Kay & Johns. 1; Campbell v. Campbell, 7 Beav. 483; Michell D. Michell, 4 Beav. 549. " 6 George, II. c. 38; Wildman v. Wildman, 9 Ves. 174; Kirby v. Potter, 4 Ves. 748; TrafEord v. Boehm, 3 Atk, 440; Warden v. Ashburner, 2 De G. & Sm. 366. = Sargent v. Sargent, 103 Mass. 297. Compare Sweigart v. Frey, 8 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 299; In re Rogers's Trust., 1 Dr. & Sm. 338; Johnston v. Moore, 37 L. J. Ch. 453; Ibbotson v. Elane, L. R. I. Bq. 188. § Hi] INCORPOREAL HEREDITAMENTS. 127 English annuities. The coupons are severable and nego- tiable separately. They fall within the general rule of law which does not allow the apportionment of such payments, and not within the rule which governs interest on ordinary debts between individuals.' So interest on the debt of the United States, and also interest on the funded debt of a canal corporation, are not apportionable." § 114. Statutory Provisions as to Apportionment. — Apportionment may be controlled by statute. Thus in Massa- chusetts it is provided for an apportionment of an annuity, or the use, rent income or interest of any property, real or personal, or the income of any fund, as between those tak- ing successive interests under a will. But it does not pro- vide for securing the carrying out of the testator' s inten- tion, the accuracy of the inventory and appraisal of his property, or the just rights of his legatee, by providing for the apportionment of sums growing due at the time of the testator's death, between the capital and the income of his estate.' In England it is enacted that all rents, annuities, divi- dends, or other periodical payments in the nature of in- come, shall, like interest on money lent, be considered as accruing from day to day, and shall be apportionable in respect of time accordingly." From a time anterior to the American Eevolution, it has been clearly settled in England that in the case of invest- ments in the public funds, on which interest was payable at stated periods, and the principal of which might be paid at any time at the option of the government, the general rule applied, and no apportionment could be allowed, ex- cept when provided by statute. ' Spooner v. Holmes, 103 Mass. 503; Vermilye v. Express Co. 31 Wall. (U S.) 138. See, also, Clark v. Iowa City, 30 Wall. (TJ. S.) 583. 'Earp's Will, 1 Parson's Cas. (Pa.) 453, 467. ' Gen. Stat. ch. 97, sects. 38, 34. •'33&34Vict. c. 35, CHAPTEE IV. RENTS. Article 1. Classification of Rents. § 115. Definition. § 119. Rack Rent. § 116. Rent Service. § 120. Ground Rent. § 117. Rent Charge. § 121. Building Associations— Obtain- § 118. Rent Seels. ing Title by Paying Rent. § 122. Apartment Houses. § 115. Depinitiok. — In the feudal economy, rent had a two-fold qnaUty : 1. Something issuing out of the land and tenements corporeal, as a compensation for the pos- session ; 2. An acknowledgment by the tenant to the lord, of his fealty or tenure. Eent cannot issue out of a mere privilege or easement.' Or rent is a compensation to the lord for the right of occupancy of his laud by the tenant.' The modern definition is that it is a return or compensa- tion for the possession of some corporeal inheritance, and is a certain profit in money, provisions, or labor, issuing out of the lands and tenements in return for their use." Some of the common law properties are that it must be a profit to the proprietor, certain in its character, or capable of being reduced to a certainty, issuing yearly, that is, periodically, out of the thing granted, and not be a part of the land or thing itself." As rent issues out of the land, it is said to be incident to the reversion, and the right to demand it necessarily at- taches itself to the ownership, and follows a transfer of the premises, and the several parts thereof, without the con- sent of the occupant. 12 Bl Com. 41; Co. Litt. 142, a; Buszard v. Capel, 8 Barn. & Cress. 141. ' Bingham on Real Estate, 554. See, also, Spenser's Case, 5 Rep. 16. 'Bouvier's L. Diet., tit. Rent. ■* Co. Litt. 47; 2 Bl. Com. 41 ; 3 Kent's Com. 460. (128) § 116] RENTS. 129 At common law the destruction of the reversion, de- stroyed the rent incident thereto. This has been prevented by statute' in England and in most of the United States. At common law there were three species of rent : rent- service, rent-charge and rent-seek." It has been lield in Pennsylvania that rent may issue out of lands and their furniture, such as live-stock, and the Ukejanflthat a right of distress may be incident to a rent purporting to issue out of both ; ' and in Virginia such rent can be apportioned.* These distinctions of the common law, for all practical purposes, have become obsolete, in consequence of the vari- ous statutes of England aud in the United States, allowing every kind of rent to be distrained for without distinction. §116. Rent Service. — Rent service had some corporeal service attached to the tenure of the land, to which the right of distress was necessarily incident. Its payment was a condition subsequent implied in law, and essential to be observed, in order to insure the continuance of the grant. The tenant held his land by fealty, or other cor- poreal service and a certain rent. It is so named because there was some corporeal service incident to the tenancy, as fealty, homage, or other service. A right of distress was inseparably incident to this rent.' After the enact- ment of the statute quia emptores" no such condition would be implied in a grant in fee, between individuals. Every freeman might then sell his lands at pleasure ; the system of sub-infeudation was destroyed, and feudal re- straint upon aUenation abolished. This statute abolished all tenures between grantor and grantee of the fee, thus preventing a rent service from being reserved out of the fee.' Hence, what would have been a rent service, because '8 & 9 Vict., c. 106. See, also, U. C. St., c. 90, sect. 7; Hurd's 111. St. (1891), c. 31, sect. 40. 'Utt. sect. 313. » Vetter's Appeal, 99 Pa. St. 52 ; Mickle v. Miles, 81 Pa. St. 20. Compare Sutliff V. Atwood, 15 Ohio St. 186 ; Fay v. Holloran, 35 Barb. (N. Y.) 295. ^Newton v. Wilson, 3 Hen. & Mun. (Va.) 470. 'Litt. sect. 215; Co. Litt. 143a; Kenege v. Elliott, 9 Watts (Pa.) 258. 6 18 Edward, I., c. 1(1390). 'Van Rensselaer v. Read, 26 N. Y. 563. 17 130 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§116 of the implied obligation to render it, would, in subsequent grants become a rent charge or a rent seek, and a failure to pay would not of itself work a forfeiture of the estate. But the king was not bound, unless the statute is made by express terms to include him; the tenure created by royal grants was not affected by this change in the law; and every conveyance, emanating from the Crown, reserving rent, still created a rent service and involved the possibility of forfeiture. For a breach of the condition, the king might by inquisition have the estate of the tenant declared at an end, resume possession, and his original seisin would be restored unaffected by the previous demise. As to private parties a rent service may be reserved in a lease between a reversioner or remainderman, and a tenant of a term of years, as this tenure does not exist between such parties.' It is held in Pennsylvania and South Carolina that the statute quia emptores' was never in force in those states, and that a rent reserved to a grantor and his heirs, in the grant of lands in fee, is a rent-service and not a rent- charge. So the release of part of the ground from the rent does not, therefore, extinguish the whole, and the re- mainder of the land remains subject to a due proportion of the rent.° In Pennsylvania ground-rents are rents-service, of which distress is a necessary incident ; but a grantor who has not reserved his rent by a valid deed cannot enforce it, because the statute of quia emptores, which would have converted the rent-service into a rent-charge, is not in force, and it cannot exist independently of the deed, because Pennsyl- vania titles are allodial and not feudal." Rent-service was the only kind of rent originally known to the common law ; a right of distress was inseparably in- cident to it so long as it was payable to the lord who was entitled to the fealty. It was called a rent -service because it was given as a compensation for the military or other ' Williams on Real Prop. 247. = 18 Edward, I., c. 1. 8 Iiigersoll V. Sergeant, 1 Wharton (Pa.), 337. " Wallace v. Harmstad, 44 Pa. St. 493. § 117] BENTS. 131 service for which the land was originally liable. When a rent was granted out of lands by deed, the grantor had no power to distrain for it, because there was no fealty an- nexed to such grant. A quit-rent was so called because the tenant thereby went quit and free of all other services. § 117. Rent-Charge. — A rent-charge, or fee-farm rent, arises on a grant by one person to another of an annual sum of money, payable out of certain lands, in which the grantor has an estate. It can be created or transferred by deed only, unless it be given by will.' As there was no fealty annexed to such a grant of the whole estate, the rent-charge was not favored at common law. When the rent was granted out of lands by deed, the grantor had no power to distrain for it, because there was no fealty an- nexed to such grant. To remedy this inconvenience an ex- press power of distress was inserted in grants of this kind, and it was thence called a rent-charge, because the lands were charged with a distress." In New York rent issuing out of the lands, reserved in a deed, to the grantor, his heirs, and assigns forever, with a covenant on the part of the grantee for its payment, to- gether with a right of distress and re-entry in case of non- payment, although not a rent-service, for want of rever- sion in the grantor, is a fee-farm rent, or, if not strictly such, it is a rent charge in fee, and equivalent to such rent- charge granted by the owner of lands in fee." A rent reserved in fee upon a conveyance of lands is a rent-charge, and not a rent service. The right of re-entry may be created by deed, and is valid in favor of the grantor of the land, his heirs, devisees and assigns, against the grantee, his heirs and assigns." Fee farm rents may either be reserved by the owner of the land in the deed conveying the land, or granted by him to a stranger while he retains the land, or they may be ac- ' Willard on Real Estate, 204. "Litt. sect. 317; Co. Lltt. 143 b. sVaa Rensselaer v. Read, 26 N. Y. 558, 564. * Hosford V. Ballard, 39 N. Y. 147 ; Van Rensselaer v. Barringer, 39 N. Y. fl; Van Rensselaer i). Hays, 19 N. Y. 68. Compare IngersoU v. Sergeant, 1 Whar. (Pa.) 337. 132 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 118 quired by prescription.' These kinds of rents are of no special importance in the United States, though they are sometimes resorted to in order to provide for certain heirs in the inheritance without partitioning the land, or for raising jointure for married women. They are valid limita- tions and have received recognition in this country to a very limited extent." § 118. Rent-Seck. — Rent-seek, siccus, or barren rent, was rent reserved by deed, without any clause of distress, and in a case in which the owner of the rent had no future interest or reversion in the land. The owner accordingly had only the remedy by a writ of annuity, or a writ of as- size.' Rent-seek is in effect nothing more than a rent for the recovery of which no power of distress is given, either by rules of the common law or the agreement of the parties.* These distinctions of rent, however, for all practical pur- poses, have become obsolete, in consequence of various statutes both in England and in this country, allowing every kind of rent to be distrained for without distinction. Rent-charge and rent-seek could be granted in fee, in tail, for life, or for years, and one grantee might take the rent for a particular estate and another grantee the re- mainder;' but the grantor could not grant a rent for a longer time than his estate extended." Such rents are hereditaments and descend, in the absence of other disposition, to the heirs of the party to whom they were reserved, and are devisable and assignable in all re- spects like other incorporeal hereditaments.' The right to distrain, and the right to maintain actions of annuity, and assize of novel disseisin, at common law, fol- ' Wallace v. Church, 111 Pa. St. 164. ' Williams's appeal, 47 Pa. St. 290; Atkinson v. Orr, 83 Ga. 34; Scott v. Lunt, 7 Pet. (U. S.) 596; Farley i>. Craig, 11 N. J. L. 263; Adams v. Buck- lin, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 121; Foltz v. Huntley, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 210. 8 Litt. Sect. 313, 217, 218; Co. Litt. 150b, 160a. * Co. Litt. 443; 2 Bl. Com. 42. <■ Williams on IJeal Prop. 334. « 3 Cruise's Dig. 285, 292. 'Shep. Touchs. 238; Lade v. Baker, 3 Vent. 149, 260-266; Maund's Case, 7 Co. 28b. §§ 119-120] KENTS. 133 lowed the ownership of the rent, when it passed from the person to whom it was reserved, whether it passed by de- scent or assignment.' § 119. Eack Eent. — In English law rack rent is the full extended value of land let by lease, payable by a tenant for life or years. It is an annual rent raised to the utmost, or to the full annual value of the premises, or near it. Hence, it is the highest rent that can be obtained by the competition of those who desire to become tenants. It is not strictly a legal terra, though sometimes used in acts of Parliament ; in legal documents it is represented by the best rent that can be obtained without a fine. The tenants in Ireland pay what is called rack rent to their landlords. And if they reclaim unproductive lands, even by great work, they are allowed nothing, but, on the other hand, are compelled to pay rack rent on the land thus reclaimed. There is an insensible act providing that " this law shall not extend to leases at rack rent," etc. This act was introduced into Pennsylvania in 1715, in Ohio in 1795, into Indiana, 1807, and into Illinois, 1819, and is found in sec- tion eight of the conveyancing act of Illinois. At a certain time this provision had an application to certain titles in the county of York, England. It never had any application in the United States and never can. § 120. Ground Rent.— Ground rent is rent paid for the privilege of building on another's land. It is distinguished from rent paid to the lessee by his tenant of the premises where the buildings are erected, and from the ordinary rent paid by the tenant to his landlord upon a demise of lands and tenements. It is a rent reserved to himself and his heirs by the grantor of lands in fee simple out of the lands conveyed. In Pennsylvania it is real estate and goes to the heir. The interest of the owner of ground rent is an estate altogether distinct and of a very different nature from that which the oyvner of the land has in the land itself. Each ' Maund's Case, 7 Co. 28b; Co. Litt. 144b. 134 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 121 is the owner of a fee simple estate. The one has an estate of inheritance in the rent, and the other has an estate of inheritance in the land out of which the rent issues. The one is an incorporeal inheritance in fee, and the other is a corporeal inheritance in fee." So the owner of the rent is not liable for any part of the taxes assessed upon the owner of the land out of which the rent issues. Being real estate, it is bound by a judgment and may be mortgaged like other real estate. It is a rent service. Such rent is distrainable by the common law." It may be apportioned, and this may take place by opera- tion of law as when the owner of the rent purchases part of the land ; in which case the rent is apportioned and extinguished pro tanto.' At law these two estates can only exist when held by two different persons. But if one is legal and the other equitable one person may hold both. Ground rent deeds are usually drawn so that the owner of the rent has three remedies for the recovery of the arrearage : 1. By action ; 2. Distress ; 3. The right to re-enter and hold the land as of the grantor's former estase. Such convey- ances are used in Maryland and Pennsylvania, but not very much in the other States. In the early history of Philadelphia a system of ground rents facilitated the sale of lands to parties with a small capital. Formerly the owner of the ground could not redeem and discharge the rent which was perpetual. Since 1850, in Pennsylvania, after a fixed number of years the owner of the land can redeem the ground rent at his option after the term expires.* In Maryland, since 1888, ground rents are redeemable after ten years. § 121. BunjDiNG Associations— Obtaining Title BY Pay- ing Eent. — Corporations have been organized both in Eng- land and in America which loan money on realty, taking security on the land, and payments are made in rents at stated and fixed intervals, generally monthly. A party who subscribes for stock and who has a small capital may ' Irwin V. Bank, 1 Pa. St. 349. « Co. Litt. 143 a. » Litt. sect. 333. * See Cadwalder's Ground-Rents. §§ 122-128] RENTS. 135 invest it in a lot, and the loan association will then take a mortgage back and loan him money sufficient to erect a house, the money being paid out under the direct super- vision of the corporation. The vendee or mortgagor makes montlily payments, and will receive a clear title, and dis- charge the mortgage in about eighty-four months. The vendee at this rate pays about twelve per centum on the money loaned, instead of rent, and when the loan matures he has the property in fee simple clear from all incum- brances. Or the vendee who subscribes for stock may buy a house and make a small payment, when the loan association will come to his rescue. This system has some similarity to ground rents, as practiced in Pennsylvania since 1850; of course ground rents are real estate, and the mortgage taken back by the loan association is a chattel. § 123. Apartment Houses. — Another plan is adopted in large cities in the erection of apartment houses on the CO operative plan. A corporation is organized which takes title to the land in its name, and after erecting the build- ings, makes leases for a long term of years of the different apartments to the subscribers of the stock respectively, re- serving general functions for the common welfare to be performed by the corporation, and expressly defining the privileges of the tenants who are the subscribers of the stock. Article 2. Apportionment. § 123. General Rule of Apportion- § 124. Apportionment of Rent as to ment. Time. § 125. Modes of Apportioning Rent. § 123. General Rule of Apportionment. —At common law, rent could not be apportioned; so in the interval between two periods, at each of which a portion of rent becomes due from the lessee, no rent can be recovered for the occupation since the first of those periods, because an entire contract cannot be apportioned, and that under a 136 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 123 lease, with a periodical reservation of rent, the contract for the payment of each portion is distinct and entire. This is a general principle established from the earliest history.' In the case of real contracts, the general principle has received quahfication, on the division of the subject matter, to which the contract refers ;" hence, under certain circum- stances, at common law, rent was apportioned,' on sever- ance of the land from which it issued, or of the reversion to which it was incident.* Courts of equity assumed jurisdiction to extend the com- mon-law doctrine of apportionment of rent, in respect of eviction of the land, to cases, though not within the defini- tion of legal eviction, which involved a substantial diminu- tion of the benefit for the enjoyment of which the lease contracted; or to substitute apportionment, where good faith required it, for extinguishment." The objection to the doctrine of the apportionment of rent was, that it exposed the tenant to several suits or pro- cesses of distress, for a thing which was originally entire, and he ought not to be obliged to pay his rent in different parcels, and to several landlords, when he contracted to pay, in one entire sum, to one person. When there is no agreement or statute to control, no ap- portionment can be made between the days of payment in rents of real estate. And the same rule applies in the in- terest on bonds of the United States, with or without cou- pons, and whether the principal is payable at a time fixed or at the option of the government, the option not having been exercised. Chief Justice Gray says the bonds of a State must, of course, be governed by the same rule, and that no valid distinction can be made with regard to the 1 Dexter v. Phillips, 131 Mass. 178; Tyrie v. Fletcher, Cowp. 666; Robinsoa ■c. Bland, 2 Burr. 1079; Plymouth v. Throgmorton, 1 Salk. 65; Loraine v. Thomlinson, Doug. 585. Cook r. Tombs, 3 Anst. 420; Liddard «. Lopes, 10 East 536; Cluu's Case, 10 Co. 137. ' West v. Lassels, Cro. EI'z. 851. Stevenson v. Lambard, 2 East, 575. 5 2 Inst. 504. * Clun's Case, 10 Co. 127; Co. Litt. 150a, 293b; Huntley's Case, Dyer, 336. ' Slater v. Buck, Mos. 256: Elliot ». Hancock, 2 Vera. 143; 3 Rep. in Cha. 7; 1 Cas. in Cha. 31. Compare Duckenfield v. Whichcatt, 3 Cas. in Cha. 304; Vincent v. Bevely, Noy 83. § 124] BENTS. 137 bonds or certificates of counties, cities or towns, or of rail- road corporations, not issued separately for the payment of specific debts, but usually bought and held by way of in- vestment ; that the same rule applies to the interest on a note of the receivers of a raihoad, and to the interest on the certificate of a voluntary association, as a social club, if such note or certificate creates no personal or corporate liability, but is to be satisfied, at a future day, only out of a fund held upon a special trust, when the terms of the trust do not take it out of the general rule.' § 124. Apportionment op Eent as to Time. — At com- mon law and in equity no apportionment was allowed as to time. These courts never qualified, but distinctly recog- nized, the rule, that rent connot be apportioned in respect of time." So, if a tenant for life gave a lease for years, rendering a yearly rent, and died in the course of the year, the rent could not be apportioned, and the lessee would go free of rent for the first part of the year. That is, on the determination of a lease, by the death of the lessor, in the interval between two days of payment, no rent was paid by the lessee for the occupation of the estate, during the fractional part of the year. ' To remedy this and prevent the loss of rent a statute* was enacted providing that where any lessor having only an estate for life in the lands demised, shall happen to die before or on the day on which any rent was reserved or made payable upon any demise, which determined on the death of such tenant for life, his executor may recover from the under-tenant, if such tenant for life die on the day on which the same was made payable, the whole, or if before such day, then a proportion of such rent, according to the time such tenant for life lived, of the last year or ' Dexter v. Phillips, 121 Mass. 178. ' Ex parte Symth, 1 Swanst. 337, 340 n ; Hay v. Palmer, 2 P Wm. 502 ; Jenner v. Morgan, 1 P. Wm. 392 ; Cutter v. Powell, 6 Term Rep. 320. 'Clun's Case, 10 Co. 127; Jenner v. Morgan, 1 P. Wm. .392; Hay «. Palmer, 2 P. Wm. 502 ; Stillwell v. Doughty, 3 Bradt. (N. Y.) 359 ; Mar- shall V. Mosely, 21 N. Y. 280 ; Cutter v. Powell, 6 Term Rep. 320 ; Dexter v. Phillips, 121 Mass. 178. ni George II., c. 19, s. 15. 18 138 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 125 quarter of a year, or other time, in which rent was grow- ing due, making all just allowances. This section has been adopted in the United States. So a representative of a tenant in tail, who has demised the entailed estate by a lease void against the remainder- man, is entitled to apportionment, thus making a tenant in tail a lessor, having only an estate for life.' The law does not apportion rent in point of time, nor does equity." However, there are some cases of a peculiar kind, where on the death of a tenant for life before the day of paying rent for the current quarter or other period, the rent has been divided between his representative and the remainder- man ; but these are all cases in which the lease terminated on the decease of the life tenant ; either because he had no power to lease so as to affect the remainderman, or because if such power was given to him it had been defectively executed, and the lessee, holding the premises until the rent day, voluntarily paid the whole to the person who succeeded to the estate. In all these cases of this kind the lessee was not, at common law, bound to pay at all for so much of the time since the last rent day, as had elapsed before the death of the tenant for life, but having con- scientiously paid for the whole time the person who took the estate in remainder was held by the courts of equity to have received for the use of the executor, of his life tenant, so much of the rent as accrued beyond his decease. ° Except when otherwise provided by statute, a contract for the payment of rent at the end of each quarter or month is not apportionable in respect of time." §125. Modes of Apportioning Eent. — Kent could be apportioned by granting the reversion of part of the land out of which the rent issues, or by granting part of the rent to one person, and part to another.' ' Whitfield «. Pindar, cited in 2 Bro. c. c. 662. ' Ex parte Symth, 1 Swanst. 387, note. 3 Ex parte Symth, 1 Swanst. 337 ; Paget v. Gee, 1 Ambler 199, . Railroad Co., 16 Pick. (Mass.) 522 ; Bingham on Real Estate, 17; Toml. L. Die, tit. "Easement;" Bouvier's L. Die., tit, " Easement." = Mabie v. Matteson, 17 Wis. 1; Mounsey v. Ismay, 3 Hurl. & Colt. 497 ; St. Xouis Bridge Co. v. Curtis, 103 111. 410. 3 Rowbotham «. Wilson, 8 El. & Bl. 123. "Rangeley v. Railroad Co., 1 L. R. Ch. App. 306, 310. (142) § 130] EASEMENTS. 143 need neither a person to hold them, nor can they be as- signed or inherited. The land whose occupier enjoys the right is the domin- ant estate, and that against which the right is exercised is the servient tenement.' It is a new quality imposed on both heritages." A chattel real, such as a building, not belonging to the owner of the realty, may have attached to it, a right of passage therein, analogous to an easement which the courts will protect.' § 130. Kinds and Qualities of Easements.— Easements are as various as the exigencies of domestic convenience or the purpose to which real estate may be applied. Some easemepts are positive or affirmative, which authorize the commission of acts on the realty of another actually in- jurious to it; others are negative, such as prohibit the owner from building to the obstruction of light to the dominant tenement, and othei's which are onlj'- consequen- tial injurious.* Some attach to the land as incident or appurtenant, such as the right of pasture on other land ; of fishing in other waters ; of taking game on other land ; of way over other land ; of taking wood, minerals, or other produce of the soil from other land ; of receiving air, light, or heat from or over other land ; of receiving or discharging water over other land, or having support to buildings from other land; of going on other land to clear a mill-stream, or repair its banks, or draw water from a spring there, or to do some other act not involving ownership ; of carrying on an •offensive trade ; of burying in a church, or particular vault." The most common are right of way, water, light, air, and heat, support and party walls. Some of these ease- ments will be treated in separate chapters. "Dark v. Johnston. 55 Pa. St. 164; Ritger «. Parker, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 147; Smith V. Wiggin, 48 N. H. 109 : Harbacks. Boston, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 397 « Wa'ts V. Kelson, L. R. 6 Ch. App. 186. ' Newhoff V. Mayo, 48 N. J. Eq. 619. ■•Tudor'sLead. Cas. 107. 'Bouvier's L. Diet. tit. "Easements," 3, and cases cited. 144: CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 13 L Easements are acquired by grant, express or implied, by prescription, and by public dedication. The doctrine of prescription at common law has been superseded by the statute of limitations. At common law prescription re- quired actual and uninterrupted enjoyment immemorially, or for upwards of twenty years, to the extent of the ease- ment claimed, from which a grant is implied. A negative easement does not admit of possession ; and, by the civil law, it cannot be acquired by prescription, and can only be proved by grant. Use, therefore, is not essen- tial to its existence. ' § 131. Rights of the Owner.— The dominion which the law gives the landowner over his land, where he owns it in fee, invests him with power, when he conveys a part, to impose such limitations upon its use as will prevent his grantee, and those claiming under him, from making use of the part conveyed which may impair the value of the part retained, provided such limitations are reasonable, and not opposed to public policy. Vice Chancellor Van Fleet forcibly says that when by the construction of a grant it ap- pears that it was the intention of the parties to create or reserve a right, in the nature of a servitude, in the land granted, for the benefit of other land owned by the grantor, no matter in what form such intention may be expressed, such right, if not against public policy, will be held appur- tenant to the land of the grantor, and binding on that con- veyed to the grantee, and the right and burden thus created and imposed will pass, with the lands, to all subsequent grantees." Any grantee of the land to which such right is appurte- nant, acquires, by his grant, a right to have the servitude or easement, or right of annuity, as it is sometimes called, protected in equity, notwithstanding that his right may not rest on a covenant which, as a matter of law, runs with the title to his land, and he may not be able to main- tain an action at law for the vindication of his right.' > Gale's Easem. 23, 81, 138. «Coudert v. Say re, 46 N. J. Eq. 386. See, also, Whitney?). Railroad Co., 11 Gray (Mass), 359, 363 ; Tanner «. Valentine, 75 111. 634. ' Western v. MacDermott, L. R. 1 Eq. Cas. 499 ; L. R. 3 Ch. App. 73 ; Hill* § 131] EASEMENTS. 145 A chattel real may be subject to an easement. Thus, a building belonging to the lessee, which was to remain on the land until the expiration of the lease, at which time the lessor had an option of buying it, cannot be severed from the land until the time specified ; the lessee's interest in both land and building is a chattel real, and he can grant an easement in the building.' By a gfant of a right of way not exclusive in terms or by necessary implication, and where the easement granted is not inconsistent with the right of passage in the grantor, such right of passage remains in him and in his subsequent grantees of the fee." The grant of a right of way over laud does not convey the soil or any corporeal interest in it. An owner whose land is burdened with a right of way has all the rights and benefits of the soil consistent with the reasonable use of the way." So a conveyance by each of two adjoining land- owners to the other of the open space between their build- ings, to be used as a common way for the mutual benefit and for no other purpose, divests each grantor of the title to the land so conveyed, leaving in him nothing but a right of way, and he cannot complain of its reasonable use by a third party so long as such use does not impede the exer- cise of the right of passage.' When a condition is imposed, the grantee of the same land, may have the advantage of that condition and re- cover damages for its non -performance.' The owner can- not create a new species of incorporeal hereditaments so as to enable the party entitled to it to sue third persons in his own name for interfering with it, or, it seems, to bind the V. Miller, 3 Paige (N. Y.), 354 ; Coles v. Sims, 5 DeG., M. & G. 1 ; Scliwoerer V. Boylstou Market Asso., 99 Mass. 285 ; Parker v. Nightingale, 6 Allen (Mass), 341; Whitney «. Railroad Co., 11 Gray (Mass.), 359: Gawtry v. Leland, 31 N. J. Eq. 385 ; Kirkpatrick v. Peshine, 34 ^. J. Eq. 306; Brewer «. Marshall, 19 N. J. Eq. 537 ; Coudert o. Sayre, 46 N. J. Eq., 386. ' NewhoflE V. Mayo, 48 N. J. Eq. 619. 9 Campbell v. Kuhlman, 39 Mo. App. 628. 'Aqueduct Co. ■». Chandler. 9 Allen (Mass.), 159, 163; Richardson v. Palmar, 38 N. H. 213, 330 ; Welch v. Wilcox, 101 Mass. 163, 164 ; 100 Am. Dec. 113, note ; Goddard's Easements, 4. ^Law V. Slreeter (IST. H.), 30 At. Rep. 347. 'Pinkum v. Eau Claire, 81 Wis. 301. 19 146 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 132 laud in the hands of an assignee." The owner of the domi- nant estate cannot create a new servitude. Thus, laying pipes in a ditch to convey away water, is a new servitude, and can be enjoined." He cannot call upon the owner of the servient estate to make repairs." And when he makes the repairs he must not injure the. premises,* upon which he has a right to go to make them.' § 132. Gross and Appurtenant.— Easements in gross are those attached to the person and not to an estate, are the same in nature as those attached to an estate, but are not assignable or inheritable." It is not necessary that the dominant and servient estates be in contiguity with each other. Thus, where a person lived on certain land, sold other land, with the reservation that a one-half interest in the well thereto should be exempt, and, that he should have the privilege of the right of way to and from said well, if he sells the land on which he lives, conveying his interest also in the well and right of way, such interest is an easement appurtmant to the land.' But if one grants the use of a private alley way entirely upon his land to an adjoining property owner, his heirs and assigns, and pro- vides that the grantee shall have the right to convey the privilege granted to certain persons named, the grant is one in gross, and does not become appurtenant to the land of the grantee, and he cannot convey the easement thereby obtained to persons other than those named in the grant, and he cannot invest others with the powers conferred upon him by the deed.' And drawing water from a spring by means of an aqueduct may be reserved in gross." ' Keppell V. Bailey, 3 Mylne & K. 517, 535. •Allen V. Saa Jose L. & Water Co., 92 Cal. 138. 'Gillis V. Nelson, 16 La. Ann. 279; Williams v. SafEord, 7 Barb. (N. Y.) 309 ; Prescott ». Williams, 5 Met. (Mass.) 429. ^iHaynes v. Burlington, 38 Vt. 360; Capers v. McKee, 1 Strobh. (S. Car.) 164 ; Kaler v. Beaman, 49 Me. 207. = Durfee «. Garvey, 78 Cal. 546 ; Prescott ». Williams, 5 Met. (Mass.) 435. « Garrison ». Rudd, 19 111. 558; Wagner v. Hanna, 38 Cal. 117; Koelle v. Knecht, 99 111. 396. " ' Witt V. Jefferson tKy), 18 S. W. Rep. 229; Perrin «. Garfield, 37 Vt. 312. * Fisher v. Fair, 34 S. Car. 203. 9 Goodrich v. Burbank, 12 Allen (Mass.), 459. See, also, Ashcroft v. Rail- road Co., 136 Mass. 196; Owen v. Field, 102 Mass. 102. § 133] EASEMENTS. 147 If a way is in gross not attached to the land, it is not a strict easement but a personal right, and if it does not partake 'of the nature of a profit a prendre, is neither assignable nor inheritable.' Where the easement is appurtenant to the land granted, the grantee has no right to permit other persons to use it for the benefit of other lands. ' A conveyance of the dominant tenement carries with it all easements appurtenant to it, whether expressly named or not. ' § 133. Profit a Prendre. — A class of rights, not techni- cally easements, is of the same nature and called profit a prendre. These are rights to take the products of the land.* If the right be personal and partakes of the nature of a profit a prendre, it is assignable and inheritable. Thus, a right of profit a prendre, such as taking" soil, gravel, mineral and similar things from another's land, is so far an estate in the land itself, that if granted to one in gross it will descend by inheritance or it may be assigned." Aright to take water so far partakes of the nature of a profit a prendre, that if held in gross it may be assigned." And a right may be assigned to hunt in another's park and carry away game that is captured ; ' and so a right to search on another's land for minerals which may be taken away by the finder.' Eights exercised by one man in the soil of another, accompanied with participation in the profits of the soil ' Wagner v. Hanna, 38 Cal. Ill; Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Carter, 61 Pa. St. 38. * Hoozier Stone Co. ■». Malott, 130 Ind. 31. See, also, French v. Marstin, 34 N. H. 440; Shroder v. Brnneman, 33 Pa. St. 348; Davenport v. Lamson, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 72. ' ^Brakely ». Sharp, 3 Stockt. (N. J.) 306; Gebhardt «. Reeves, 75 111. 301. < Bingham v. Salene, 15 Oreg. 308; Hill u. Lord, 4S Me. 99; Doe v. Wood. 3 Barn. & Aid. 724; Huff ». McCauley, 53 Pa. St. 309; Nudd «. Hobbs, 17 N. H. 537; Selby v. Robinson, 3 Term Rep. 7.58; Waters v. Lilley, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 145; Perley«. Langley, 7 N. H. 333; Wickhamc. Hawker, 7Mees. & Wels. 63. ' Post v. Pearsall. 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 425. «Hillt). Lord, 48 Me. 100; White v. Chapin, 13 Allen (Mass.), 516; Amidoa V. Harris, 113 Mass. 59. See, also, Hill v. Shorey, 43 Vt. 614; Dark v. John- ston, 55 Pa. St. 169. 'Thomas v. Sorrell, Vaughan, 351; Bailey v. Stephens, 13 C. B., N. 8. 108. 8 Muskett V. Hill, 5 Bing. N. C. 694. 148 CLASSIFICATIOlir 'OF ESTATES. {§ IgB thereof, as .ri^ts of pasture or digging of sand, are profits a prmdre. They ddffier from easemiente, in that the f onner are rights of p-roflts, and the latter are were rights of con- venience without profits. A right to take something out of the soil of another is a profit a prendre, as the right of common, and also a right to take drifted sand, or a liberty to fish, fowl, hunt, and hawk." The propei-ty in animals ferce naturce, while they are on the soil, belong to the owner of the soil, and he may grant a right to others to come and take them, by a grant of hunting, shooting, fowling and the like. The right may be granted by the owner of the fee simple, and such a grant is a profit a prendre.' A distinction between an interest in the soil, or a right to profit in it, and an easement, is not always clear. The line fit separation is sometimes obscure, in some points unsettled, with no established principles to determine it.* The right to enter upon the lands of another to cut grass, for pasturage, for the purpose of hunting, or for fishing, is an interest in the land, or a right to take a profit. in the soil.* So a grant to a party, his heirs and assigns forever, of a sole and exclusive right and privilege to shoot, take and kill any and all wild fowl upon and in any lakes, sloughs, or waters situated upon certain lands, and the right of ingress and egress to and from said lakes, sloughs, and waters for the purpose of shooting and taking wild fowl is a profit a prendre and not a mere license revokable at pleasure.' Chief Justice Lord says in this case that the right to take something out of the soil, or from the land of another, which includes shooting, hunting and fishing, is a profit a prendre ; and is so far of the character of an estate or interest in the land itself, if granted to one in gross, it is treated as an estate, and may be for life or for inherit- ' 1 Crabb's Real Prop. 135. 2 Ewart V. Graham, 7 H. L. Gas. 331. 'Hills. Lord, 48 Me. 99. * Pickering ». Noyes, 4 Barn. & Cress 639; Wickham v. Hawker, 7 Maes. & Wels. 6i; Waters v. Lilley, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 145. See, also, Webber v. Lee, L. R. 9 Q. B. 315; Washb. on Easem. 8-11; Gould on Waters, sects. 24, 25, 184, 185. 5 Bingham v. Salene, 15 Oreg. 208, 213. §§ 134r-135] EASEMENTS. 149 ance.' It is manifest, tUerefore, that the contention that the deed only created a license, revokable at pleasure of the grantor, cannot be sustained. § 134. Distinguished from a License. — The modern cases distinguish between an easement and a license. An ease- ment is a liberty, privilege, or advantage in land without profit, existing distinct from the ownership of the soil.* A claim for an easement must be founded upon a grant by deed or writing, or upon prescription, which supposes one. A license is an authority to do a particular act, or series of acts, upon another's land, without possessing any estate therein, and is terminable at the wiU of him who gives it and cannot be transferred to any other person.' But some af the courts hold that an executed license is irrevocable;' in which case they become easements. ' This is put on the ground of estoppel. A mere license to pass over the land of the licensor is re- vocable at his pleasure." § 135. Distinguished prom a Servitude. — Servitude at the present time is often used as a correlative term with easement. A servitude consists in patiendo. Servitudes are rights, jura in re, existing in the property of another. A servitude never imposes an active duty, but only a duty to suffer or abstain from doing something.' What the ' Washb. on Easem. 9. » Pomeroy v. Mills, 3 Vt. 379. ' Prince «. Case, 10 Conn. 375; Woodbury ®. Parshley, 7 N. H. 337; Mum- ford V. Wliitney, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 380; Ex parte Coburn, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 568; Hazleton i>. Putnam, 3 Cliand. (Wis.) 117; Wolfe v. Frost, 4 Sandf, Ch. (N. y.) 7.J, 90; Foster v. Brown, 4 R. I. 47; Wallis v. Harrison, 4 Mees. v& Wels. 538; Wood ». Leailbitler, 13 Mees. & Wels. 838; Veghte v. Raritan Co., 19 N. J. Eq. 153; Hills «. Miller, 3. Paige (N. Y.), 357. < Russell V. Hubbard, 59 111. 335; Lacy v. Arnett, 33 Pa. St. 169; Beatty v. Gregory, 17 Iowa, 114; Rawson v. Bell, 46 Ga. 19;. Wynn v. Garland, 19 Ark. 33; Stephens v. Benson, 19 lud. 367. " Wood V. Lead bitter. 13 Mees. & Wels. 845. « Parish v. Kaspare, 109 Ind. 586; Cionkhite v. Cronkhite, 94 N. Y. 333; Wisemans. Lucksinger, 84 N. Y. 31; 38 Am. Rep. 479; Ellsworths. South- ern Ry. Extension Co., 31 Minn. 543;, Batchelder v. Hibbard, 58 N. H. 369; Lockhart ». Geir. 54 Wis. 183; Kuhlman v. Hecht, 77 111. 570; Whitney v. Richardson, 59 Hun (N. Y.), 601. ' Dig. Lib, 8, tit. 1, law 15, sect. 1. See, also, 2 Austin's Juris. (3rd ed ) 840-843. 150 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 136 common law terms easements are, in the civil law, servi- tudes. Like incorporeal hereditaments, they may pass without a grant.' A burden affecting lands by which the owner is restrain- ed from the full use of his property, or is obliged to suffer others to do acts upon it, is a servitude." Servitudes are di- vided into positive and negative. Where the owner of the servient estate is not obliged to perform any act for the benefit of the dominant estate, it is called a positive ser- vitude;' but when the servitude requires the owner to permit something to be done upon his property by another or to refrain from some enjoyment of his property which would otherwise be legal for him, it is a negative servitude.* § 136. Duration of Eight. — Easements and profits a prendre may be held for years, for life, or in fee.' And a grant which provides that the grantor "does hereby grant unto the party of the second part the right of way for log- ging purposes over and through " a certain tract of swamp and overflowed land, is not limited in time. ' When an easement is created with reference to a partic- ular use of the dominant tenement, its use and duration are limited by that purpose, and it ceases when the estate is essentially changed in its mode of occupation. ' And a deed to a railroad company granting it the privilege of building and using a track in a certain street for a specified time, does not confer any right after that time.' Whether the interest reserved is perpetual or only a personal one, depends upon the question whether it is ap- purtenant to the land retained for its benefit, or an ease- ment in gross for the owner.' ' Orleans Navigation Co. v. New Orleans, 2 Mart. (La.) 369. "Laumier v. Francis, 23 Mo. 181; Erskine's Inst. 354. 2 Smith V. Kenrick, 7 C. B. 515; Webb «. Bird, 10 C. B., N. 8. 269. "Pitkin «. Railroad Co., 2 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 221; JeflEries v. Jeffries, 117 Mass, 184. ' Huff V. McCauley, 53 Pa. St. 310. 8 Robinson «. Crescent City Mill & Trans. Co., 93 Cal. 816. ' United Land Co. v. Railroad Co., L. R. 17 Eq. 158; 10 Cli. App. 586; Allan ■B Gomme, 11 Ad. & El. 759. 8 Chicago, etc. Railroad Co. v. Quincy, 189 111. 355. 'Winthrop «. Fairbanks, 41 Me. 312;Karmuller v. Krotz, 18 Iowa, 359; Bowen ». Conner, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 133. § 137] EASEMENTS. 151 § 137. WoKDS OF Inheritance. — rWords of inheritance are not necessary when the easement is to continue per- manently or so long as the grantee performs a certain work. Thus, where the grantee agrees to do a certain thing, he and his heirs take, in equity, an easement, determinal when they cease to comply with the agreement, though the agree- ment contains no words of inheritance.' So where land already appropriated by a raih'oad company is conveyed to it, " reserving the passageway at grade over said railroad where now made," the reservation need not include the word "heirs" to make it a perpetuity." The common law rule requiring the word "heirs" in the creation of an estate of inheritance by deed is inapplicable in creating a permanent easement.' Where an easement is for the benefit of the principal estate, it is a permanent right, appurtenant to the principal estate in the hands of successors and assigns, without words of limitation.* Of course it is a well settled rule of the common law that, to create an estate of inheritance in land by deed to an individual, it is absolutely necessary, with few aiid well settled exceptions, to use the word "heirs" and tliat no cir- cumlocution or other words will supply the place of that word;^ but this rule is inapplicable in creating permanent easements, appurtenant to the land. So under this rule an owner of land fronting on a river conveyed a strip across the same to a railroad company, reserving the right to cross such strip at any place. The deed provided that the railroad company should lay its tracks so that the top of the rails should be on the level of the ground, and that it should secure water pipes crossing the strip. Such reser- vation created a permanent easement in favor of the uncon- veyed portion, not limited to the life of the original owner, 'Hall V. Turner, 110 N. Car. 393; following Merriman v. Russell, 3 Jones, Eq. 470, and distinguishing School Com. v. Easier, 67 N. Car. 443. 2 White V. Railroad Co., 156 Mass. 181. ^Chappell V. Railroad Co., 63 Conn. 195. ' Washb. on Easm. (4th ed.) ch. 1, sect. 5. See, also. Kennedy v. Scovll, 13 Conn. 336; Randall v. Latham, 36 Conn. 48; Myers v. Dunn, 49 Conn. 71; Borst V. Empie, 5 N. Y. 33; Mendell ». Delano, 7 Met. (Mass.) 176; Smith v. Higbee, 13 Vt. 113; Dyer v. Sanford, 9 Met. (Mass.) 395; KarmuUer*. Krotz, 18 Iowa, 353. 'Challis on Real Prop. 170; 1 Swift's Dig. 77. 152 CLASSIFIOATIOK OF ESTATES. [§ 138 but passed with a conveyance of the premises.' An ease- ment may be created by way of exception or reservation." If created byway of reservation the word, "heirs" is necessaiy to create an easement in fee. ' If created by way of exception the word "heirs" is not necessary to create an easement in fee, if the grantor owns the fee at the time of the conveyance.' The common law rule requiring the word "heirs" in the creation of an estate of inheritance by deed is inapplicable in creating a permanent easement appurtenant to the land.* § 138. Secondary Easement. — It is generally held that the estate to which easements are appurtenant must be cor- poreal. But an easement may have another right annexed to it, which may be called a secondary easement. Thus, a right of pasturage, of drawing water, of hunting or fish- ing, carries with it the right to enter the estate where it is to be enjoyed.' This right, however, is an essential part of the principal easement.' Such right is a part of the servi- tude to perform such work as is necessary for preserving and making use of the servitude, and the owner of the dominant tenement can enter to make necessary repairs." In the absence of express agreement, the grantee of the easement must keep it in repair. But the obligation to re- pair may be by covenant imposed upon the owner of the servient estate.' ' Chappell V. Railroad Co., 63 Conn. 195. ' Bowen v. Conner, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 132. » Ashcroft «. Railroad Co., 136 Mass. 196; Bean ». French, 140 Mass. 239; Claflin V. Railroad Co. 157 Mass. 489. * Wood ». Boyd, 145 Mass. 176; White v. Railroad Co., 156 Mass. 181; Myers D. Dunn, 49 Conn. 71; Borst «. Empie, 5 N. T. 33; Mendell v. Delano, 7 Met. (Mass.) 176; Smith «. Higbee, 12 Vt. 113; Dyer v. Sanford, 9 Met. (Mass.) 395; Karmuller i>. Krotz, 18 Iowa, 353; Winthrop v. Fairbanks, 41 Me. 307; Smith v. Ladd, 41 Me. 314. 'Chappell !). Railroad Co.. 62 Conn. 195; Lathrop v. Eisner, 93 Mich. 599. ' Washb. on Easem. sect. 25. ' Wallace «. Fletcher, 30 N. H. 434. » Kauffman v. Griesemer, 26 Pa. St. 407; Peter v. Daniel, 5 C. B. 568; Pres- cott ■0. Williams, 5 Met. (Mass.) 429; Watkins v. Peck, 13 N. H. 377. •Doane v. Badger, 12 Mass. 65; Hamilton v. White, 5 N. Y. 9; Rider d. Smith, 3 Term Rep. 766. §§ 139-140] EASEMENTS. 153 § 139. Spurious Easements. — Where the owner is obliged to keep his fence in repair, this obligation has been called a spurious easement. The servient owner's failure to re- pair the fences renders him liable for any injury which the adjoining owner's cattle might sustain in consequence.' It is not generally supposed that the owner of the servi- ent estate is obliged to do positive acts for the benefit of the other, in the absence of contract." The duty of the servient owner is the same as that of a third person, in point of law, and he must not interfere with the right in rem.' That an obligation to maintain partition fences may arise by prescription, which could be enforced by the writ de curia claudenda at common law, does not admit of a doubt. This right of enforcement of such duty is a spuri- ous kind of easement.' § 140. Transfer op Eight — Dominant Estate Divi- ded. — As a general rule where the dominant estate is par- titioned, if the easement is a general one for the benefit of the whole estate, it will attach itself to each parcel. ° No division of the dominant estate can increase the burden on the servient estate. ° The right of way becomes appurten- ant to every lot into which the granted estate may be di- vided.' ' Gale on Easera. (4th Ed.) 460. 'Brill B. Brill, 108 N. Y. 511 ; 3 Kent's Com. 419, note. See 7 Am. L. Rev. 49. 'Saxby». Railroad Co., L. R. 4 C. P. 198. Compare Lawrence «. Jenkins, L. R. 8 Q. B. 274 ; Railroad Co. v. Telford, 89 Tenn. 293 ; Herman v. Roberts, 119 N. Y. 87 ; Cooley on Const. Lim. 558 ; Harvey v. Crane, 85 Mich. 316. ■•Gale and Whateley on Easm. 201, 202. s Seymours. Lewis, 13 N. J. Eq. 439; Elliott «. Sallee, 14 Ohio St. 10; Good- all V. Godfrey, 53 Vt. 219; Collins v. Prentice, 15 Conn. 39. Burwell «. Hob- son, 12 Gratt. ^Va.) 322; Kilgouer v. Ashcom, 5 Harr. & J. (Md.) 83; Baldock V. Atwood, 21 Oreg. 73. Lewis v. Carstairs, 6 Whart. (Pa.) 193; Metropolitan Cem. Co. V. Eden, 16 C. B. 42; Fisher v. Beard, 32 Iowa, 352; Easter v. Rail- ro .d Co., 14 Ohio St. 48; Underwood v. Carney, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 2Sb; Lansing c. Wiswall, 5 Denio (N. Y.), 213. • Parker «. Nightingale, 6 Allen (Mass.), 341; Hills ®. Miller, 3 Paige (N. Y.), 257. 'Codling V. Johnson, 9 Barn. & Cress. 933; Whitney®. Lee, 1 Allen (Mass.), 198; O'Brien v. Plynn, 158 Mass. 198; Brossart v. Carlett, 27 Iowa, 297. 20 154 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ Hi However, when the easement is only attache^, to a part of the estate, on a division no other part will be entitled to the benefit of it.' When the easement is appurtenant to the land the owner has a right to use it."" And so where a continuous and apparent easement or servitude is imposed by the owner of real estate on a part of his land for the benefit of another part, and the respective portions are sub- sequently sold to different persons, the purchaser of the servient property, in the absence of an express reservation or agreement on the subject, takes it subject to the ease- ment or servitude thus imposed.' But where a deed con- veys all the coal lying and being within a certain boundary, with the free and uninterrupted right of way for the pur- pose of digging, mining and carrying away coal, the gran- tee in the deed or his successor in title has no right to take through the pit or over the surface of the tract, coal from other and adjoining tracts owned by him, as this rule of benefit for another part of the estate does not apply.* § 141. Equitable Easements. — Some easements are called equitable because they are only protected in a court of equity. Unity of possession and title of the dominant and the servient estate by the owner of the servient estate, extinguishes the easement, if the two estates are co-ex- tensive and co-equal.' A covenant, though gross in law, may be in equity bind- ing even to the extent of fastening a servitude on real property. It must appear, however, either by express stip- ulation or necessary implication, that the parties intended to impose a permanent restraint on the mode of occupation See, also, Brewer v. Marshall, 19 N. J. Eq. 543; Greene v. Creigliton, 7 R. I. 1; Winfleld v. Henning, 31 N. J. Eq. 190; Jeffries v. Jeffries, 117 Mass. 184. 1 Allan V Gomme, 11 Ad. & El. 759; Metropolitan Gem. Co. ®. Eden, 16 C. B. 43. Bower v. Hill, 3 Bing. N. C. 339; Henning ». Burnet, 8 Exch. 187. « Riley D. Stein, 50 Kans. 591. Laybourn v. Gridley (1892), 3 Ch. 53; Long D. Fewer 53 Minn. 156; Le Favor v. McNulty, 158 Mass. 413; Fitzgerald*, Barbour, 55 Fed. Rep. 440; Kinney ». Hooker, 65 Vt. 333; White v. Tide Water Oil Co., 50 N. J. Eq. 1. 8Zell V. Society, 119 Pa. St. 390; Webber v. Vogel, 159 Pa. St. 335. * Webber «. Vogel, 159 Pa. St. 235. «Atwater«. Bodfish, 11 Gray (Mass.), 151; Warren v. Blake, 54 Me. 376; Whalley c. Thompson, 1 Bos. & Pul. 873. § 141] EASEMENTS. 155 of the respective estates.' And representations and cir- cumstances under which a transfer is made, will bind the vendor and his grantees, with notice, to all the conditions and terms." This intention of the parties must be clear in order to create the equitable easement.' If the owner of two parcels so uses them as to make one servient to the other, in equity an easement will be imposed upon one lot in favor of the other, which, upon the change of ownership by sale, becomes a legal easement.' The re- striction imposed should be in pursuance of a general plan of the grantor, not for his personal benefit, but for the mu- tual advantage of all the lots in the hands of the grantees. '' Where several owners grant to a city a street, with a covenant that buildings shall be set back, it is a grant in fee to each grantor of a negative easement in the lands of all.' The following restrictions have been declai-ed equitable easements: That a canal should continue to run through the respective estates;' that no offensive trade should be carried on;' that land should remain open for common benefit and not be sold;' that no tavern should be main- tained on any of the lots;'" that no trade or business should be entered into on the lots;" that the residences should be set back at a certain distance on the street,'" and be of a ' Hubbell ». Warren, 8 Allen (Mass.), 173; Brewer ». Marshall, 19 N. J. Bq. 537; Winfield v. Henning, 21 N. J. Eq. 190. ' Tallmadge u. Bank, 26 N. Y. 105; Peck d. Conway, 119 Mass. 546. See, also, Parker v. Nightingale, 6 Allen (Mass.), 341; St. Andrews' Church Ap- peal, 67 Pa. St. 512; Western v. MacDermott, L. R. 1 Eq. 499. 8 Wolfe t). Frost, 4 Sand. Ch. (N. T.) 73; Gilbert v. Peteler, 38 Barb. (N. T.) 488; 38 N. Y. 165. Clanton v. Scruggs, 95 Ala. 279; Tinker v. Forbes, 136 111. 231; Adams v. Andrews, 15 Q. B. 284; Duinneen «. Rich, 22 Wis. 550; Cook ®. Prigden, 45 Ga. 331; Stewart r. Stevens, 10 Colo. 440. > Tink-r v. Forbes, 1 36 111. 321 ; Fuhr v. Dean, 36 Mo. 116; Taylor v. Millard, 118 N. Y. 344; Knight v. Dyer, 57 Me 174; Bryan v. Whistler, 8 Barn. & Cress. 28S; La^vrence v. Springer, 49 N. J. Eq. 289; Cagle «. Parker, 97 N. Car. 271; Beaudely ». Brook, Cro. Jac. 189; Brown on Stat, of Frauds, sect. 232. . «Moll V. McCauly, 83 Iowa, 677; Gerrard v. Cook, 2 Bos. & Pul. N. R. 109; Holmes i'. Sellers, 1 Lev. 305. ^Rowbotham v. Wilson, 8 H. L. Cas. 362. See, also. White «. Railroad Co., l.'ie Mass. 181. 5 Atkins V. Tliompson, 155 Mass. 336. • Smith V. Railroad Co , 83 Wis. 371. ' Wies V. Meyer, 55 Aik. 18; Barbour v. Lyddy, 49 Fed. Rep. 896. ' Seeger ®. Mueller, 133 III. 86; Lindsay v. Jones, 31 Nev. 72, 9 Fritsche v. Fritsche, 77 Wis. 266. '"McCormack v. Crow (Ky.), 15 S. W. Rep. 181. " Ellis «. Railroad Co., 40 Mo. App. 165. 158 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 143 The court will look to the surrounding circumstances existing when the deed was made, the situation of the parties and the subject matter of the conveyance.' Where the easement is granted or reserved in express terms by deed, the only question concerns the proper construction of the language." Deeds are to be construed most strongly against the grantor and it will therefore take stronger words to create an easement by reservation than by direct grant.' Where the words are ambiguous, parol evidence will be admitted to explain their meaning.* A way appurtenant to land may be located by parol agree- ment;' and an executed parol agreement for the construc- tion of a ditch across one man's land to drain the land of another, creates an easement appurtenant to the latter tract ^f land." § 143. Extent op Eight. — The extent of the right and duties of the respective owners toward each other, is to be determined by the language of the grant and by the cir- cumstances existing at the time the grant was made. What is necessary for the reasonable and proper enjoyment of the easement granted, and the limitations thereby imposed on the use of the land by the owner, depend upon the terms of the grant and the purposes for which it was made, the nature and situation of the property subject to the ease- ment, and the manner in which it has been used and oc- cupied. ' The fact that an easement may be shown which renders a lot servient to another joining it on the east, has no ten- 'Bell V. Woodward, 46 N. H. 332; Bradley v. Washington Packet Co., 13 Pet. (U. S.) 89; Glave v. Harding, 3 Hurl. & N. 944; Wallace v. Harmstad, 44 Pa. 8t. 496. '•'Shep. Touch 88. 'Suffleld ». Brown, 4 DeG. J. & S 185. "Gardner v. Webster, 64 N. H. 520. = Kinney v. Hooker, 65 Vt. 333. « Steinke b. Bentley, 6 Ind. App. 663. See, also, Clarke v. Henckel (Md.), 26 At. Rep. 1039. 'Toothe V. Bryce, 50 N. J. Eq. 589; Dexter v. Beard, 130 N. T. 549; Rochester Elect. L. Co. v. Power Co., 60 Hun (N. Y.), 581; Heath v. Hewitt, 137 N. Y. 166; Hoopes ». Alderson, 23 Iowa, 162; Garland v. Furber, 47 N. H. 803; Bakman «. Talbot, 31 N. Y. 868; Maxwell v. McAtee, 9 B. Moa. (Ky.) 20; Bean v. Coleman, 44 N. H. 541; Baker v. Fiick, 45 Md. 340. § 144] EASEMENTS. 159 dency to establish a similar easement in such lot appurten- ant to another lot on the west." A right of way appurtenant to a lot cannot be used for the purpose and benefit of another lot, to which no such right is attached, even though such other lot be adjoining and within the same enclosure with that to which the ease- ment belongs.' But the grantee can use the easement for all lawful purposes,' granted at the time of the transfer." The acceptance of the deed is an acceptance of the ease- ment. Thus, under a deed expressly granting a right of way and designating the exact piece of land over which the easement is to extend, no act is required of the grantee to show an acceptance by him of the easement.' § 144. Eight op Way — Relative Rights Under the Grant. — The grantee of the easement may use it for all lawful purposes." The owner of the soil is under no obli- gations to repair the way, as that duty belongs to the party for whose benefit it is constructed.' The grantee is entitled to do any act which may be necessary to promote its beneficial use, to the extent of inclosing the way.° The conveyance of a right of way gives to the grantee not only a right of way to an unobstructed passage at all times over the grantor's land, but also such rights as are incident or necessary to the enjoyment of such right of passage." The owner of the way, where its limits are defined, has not only the right of a free passage over the traveled part, but also to a free passage on such portions of the way as he thinks proper or necessary." And the owner of the fee subject to the easement may rightfully use the land for ' Tinker v. Forbes, 136 IH. 221. 'Albert v. Thomas, 73 Md. 181. See, also, Shoemaker v. Railroad Co., 45 Minn. 366. sReilly v. Booth, 44 Ch. Div. 12. * Joslin «. Sones, 80 Iowa, 534. ' Smith v. Worn, 93 Cal. 206. "Reilly t>. Booth, 44 Ch. Div. 12; Harvey v. Crane, 85 Mich. 316. ' Herman d. Roberts, 119 N. Y. 87. 8 Harvey ». Crane, 85 Mich. 316. 'Bliss V. Greeley, 45 N. Y. 671; Herman «. Roberts, 119 K T. 37; Maxwell ■s. McAtee, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 21. '» Herman v. Roberts, 119 N. Y. 37. 160 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 145 any purpose not inconsistent with the rights of the owner of the easement." The rights of the owner of the ease- ment are paramount, to the extent of the grant, to those of the owner of the soil." Justice McGrath says what may be considered a proper and reasonable use by the owner of the fee, as distinguished from an unreasonable and improper use, as weU as what may be necessary to the beneficial use and enjoyment of the easement by the owner, are questions of fact to be determined by the trial court or jury.' The owner of the servient estate is not obligated to do any positive act, as to erect or maintain a fence for the benefit of the owner of the dominant estate. The owner of the fee is no more bound to define by fences the course to be taken than he is to prepare the surface of the way for the grantee's safe travel." And the idea of a joint use of the land by both parties, in the sense that a use by the grantee should at any time give way to a use by the grantor, unless so covenanted, is contrary to a reasonable construction of a grant.' The grantee may use the right of way in any reasonable manner ° and the fee remains in the grantor.' § 145. Easement in Gross Will not be Presumed. — Where an easement can fairly be construed to be appur- tenant to some other estate, it will not be presumed to be personal or an easement in gross." A building restriction 'Railroad Co. v. Telford, 89 Tenn. 293; Cooley's Const. Lim. 558. 'Railroad Co. b. Allen, 33 Kans. 385; Railroad Co. ii. Telford, 89 Tenn. 393; Herman «. Roberts, 119 N. Y. 37. 'Harvey v. Crane, 85 Mich. 816, 335. See, also, Bakeman v. Talbot, 31 N. Y. 366; Prentice v. Gciger, 74 N. Y. 841; Herman v. Roberts, 119 N. Y. 37; Railroad Co. «. Allen, 33 Kans. 285. ^ Brill ». Brill, 108 N. Y. 511. 'Herman i). Roberts. 119 N. Y. 37, 48. - « Short ti. Devine, 146 Mass. 119; Phillips v. Dressier, 132 Ind. 414; Ames V. Shaw, 82 Me. 379. ' Cincinnati, etc. . Railroad Co. «. Geisel, 119 Ind. 77; Pfaff «. Railroad Co. 108 Ind. 144; Williams v. Railroad Co., 50 Wis. 71; Bodfish «. Bodfish, 105 Mass. 317; Stuyvesant v. Woodruff, 31 N. J. L. 133; Short v. Devine 146, Mass. 119. 'Washb. Easem. 39, 161; Louisville, etc.. Railroad Co. r. Koelle, 104 III. 455; Dennis t>. Wilson, 107 Mass. 591; Ackroyd «. Smith, 10 C. B, 164; Gar- § 146] EASEMENTS. 161 which does not appear to any part of a general plan for the benefit of all the land is not appurtenant.' But a reserva- tion that no building shall be erected on the granted premises by the grantee, his heirs or assigns, is presumed to be for the benefit of the land retained and not a personal right, and is, therefore appurtenant to the remaining land." § 146. Enlargement of an Easement is not Allowed. — A party having a right of way over another's land to a particu- lar close, cannot extend it to other closes.' Thus, where the owner of land conveys in one deed a part thereof and aright of way over the other part, useful and necessary to the enjoy- ment of the land granted, the grantee takes such right of way as appurtenant to the land granted only, and cannot by reservation in a subsequent conveyance of such land enlarge such right of way or extend it to other lands owned by him.* The grantee has no right to use it as appur- tenant to other lands afterwards acquired," nor extend it to another lot to which no such right is attached, even though such other lot be adjoining and within the same inclosure with that to which the easement belongs.' And the fact that an easement may be shown which renders a lot servient to another joining it on the east, has no tendency rison v. Rudd, 19 111. 558; Wagner v. Hanna, 38 Cal. 117; Thorpe v. Brumfitt, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 650; Spensley v. Valentine, 34 Wis. 154; Cahill v Lay- ton, 57 Wis. 600, 610; Kramer «. KnaufE, 12 111. App. 115; Potter v. Iselin, 31 Han (N. Y.), 134. ' Sharp V. Ropes, 110 Mass. 381. See, also, Keates v. Lyon, L. R. 4 Ch. 318. ' Peck V. Conway, 119 Mass. 546. See, also, Dennis v. Wilson, 107 Mass. 591. ' Smith V. Porter, 10 Gray (Mass.), 66; Kirkham v. Sharp, 1 Whart. (Pa.) 323; 29 Am. Dec. 57; Lewis v. Carstairs, 6 Whart. (Pa.) 193; Shroder v. Brenneman, 23 Pa. St. 348; Rexford v. Marquis, 7 Lans. (N. Y.) 249; Carter 1). Page, 8 Ired. L. (N. Car.) 190; Leach «. Hastings, 147 Mass. 515; French v. Marstin, 24 N. H. 440; 57 Am. Dec. 294. See, also. Garrison v. Rudd, 19 111. 558; Gunson «. Healy, 100 Pa. St. 43. ■• Reise v. Bnos, 76 Wis. 634. 'Stearns v. Mullen, 4 Gray (Mass.), 151; Davenport v. Lamson, 31 Pick. (Mass.) 73; Cotton v. Pocasset Mfg. Co. 13 Met. (Mass.) 433; Smith «. Porter, 10 Gray (Mass.), 66; French v. Marstin, 34 N. H. 440; Shroder v. Brenneman, 23 Pa. St. 348; Giinson ». Healy, 100 Pa. St. 43, 'Albert v. Thomas, 73 Md. 181. See, also. Shoemaker v. Railroad Co., 45 Minn. 366. 21 162 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 147 to establish a similar easement in such lot appurtenant to another lot on the west.' § 147. Grant by Implication. — It is well settled that on the conveyance of several parcels of land, there is an im- plied grant or a reservation, as the case may be, of all ap- parent and continuous easements, or incidents of property which have been created or used by the vendor during the unity of possession, though they could not then from their general ownership have a legal existence." Where a con- tinuous and apparent easement or servitude is imposed by the owner of real estate on a part thereof for the benefit of another part, the purchaser at private or judicial sale, in the absence of an express reservation or agreement, takes the property subject to the easement or servitude." Where the owner of an estate imposes upon one part an apparent and obvious servitude in favor of another, and at the time of the severance of the ownership such servitude is in use, and is reasonably necessary for the fair enjoyment of the other, then, whether the severance is by voluntary aliena- tion or by judicial proceedings, the use is continued by the operation of law. * A right of private way in an alley is established by showing ownership of the easement as an incident to the ownership of the lot." The easement may be limited and then abolished." An easement will pass by implication to ' Tinker ®. Forbes, 136 111. 221. See, also. Leach v. Hastings, 147 Mass. 515: Johnson «. Shelter Island Grove, etc. Asso., 47 Hun (N. Y.) 374; Bonelli v. Blakeraore, 66 Miss. 136; Brightman v. Chapin, 15 R. I. 166; Dormant. Bates Manuf. Co., 83 Me. 438; O'Neal ». Sherman, 77 Texas, 183; Cross v. Pike, 59 Vt. 324; Lyon d. McDonald, 78 Tex. 71. ' Washb. on Basem. 73; Goddard on Easem. 119; Thompson v. Banks, 43 N. H. 540; Nichols i>. Luce, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 102; Voorhees i>. Burchard, 55 N. Y. 98; Bliss v. Kennedy, 48 111. 71. 2 Cannon®. Boyd, 73 Pa. St. 179; Pierce i\ Cleland, 133 Pa. St. 189; Zell v. Uuiversalist Soc. 119 Pa. St. 390; Overdeer v. Updegraff, 69 Pa. St. 110; Geible v. Smith, 146 Pa. St. 376; 29 W. N. C. 465; Benedict v. Barling, 79 Wis. 551. "Ellis V. Bassett, 128 Ind. 118; Pierce v. Cleland, 133 Pa. St. 189. "Newell V. Sass, 143 III. 104. See, also, Halloway v. Delano, 18 N. Y. Supp. 704, 707; 28 Abb. N. C. 190; Rightsell v. Hale, 90 Tenn. 556; Ellis v- Bassett, 128 Ind. 118. «Batchelder». Bank (N. H.), 33 At. Rep. 593. § 148] EASEMENTS. 163 the grantee of a tenement not only when it is an easement of necessity, but whenever its use has been open and con- tinuous, so that it is entitled fairly to be regarded as an in- cident of the estate granted.' The parties are presumed to contract with reference to the condition of the property at the time of the sale." But a way of necessity may be used for all lawful purposes in connection with the land to which it gives access, and is not limited to the purpose for which the land was used at the time the way was created.' An easement over land on a river front will attach to alluvion additions." § 148. Implied Grant and Implied Eeservation. — A dis- tinction is generally made between an implied grant and an implied reservation. It is the settled law in England that where the owner of two adjoining lots sells one he does not reserve impliedly for the benefit of the other any easement except those of a strict necessity ; but he does impliedly grant to the vendee all continuous and apparent easements which are necessary for the reasonable use of the property granted and which have been or are at the time of the grant used by the owner of the entirety for the benefit of the part granted. ' The reason for denying the reservation by implication is that to permit it would be to allow the grantor to derogate from the grant. Many of the American courts adhere to the English doctrine as to implied reservation, though there are others which lay down the rule more favorable to the grantor. To illustrate : It has been decided that when the owner of land flowed by a mill-dam sells the mill and dam and retains the land, the right to flow the land to the ex- tent it was then flowed, without payment of damages, 'Kobinson v. Grave, 39 L. T. 7; Cave v. Craft, 53 Cal. 235; Robinson®. Thrailkill, 110 Ind. 117; Randall v. Silverthorn, 4 Pa. St. 173; Zell v. Uni- versalist Soc. 119 Pa. St. 390; Cannon v. Boyd, 73 Pa. St. 179, ^Lampman v. Milks, 31 N. Y. 505; Roberts v. Roberts, 55 N. Y. 375; Simmons n. Cloonan, 47 N. Y. 3. »Whittiers. Winkley, 63 N. H. 338. See, also, Shields v. Titus, 46 Ohio St. 538; St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. ■». Minneapolis, 41 Minn. 270; Bowling V. Burton, 101 N. Car. 176. * Freedom v. Norris, 138 Ind. 377. 5 Washb. on Easem. (4th ed.) p. 105. 164: CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 149 passed by the grant ; but when the owner sells the land flowed and retained the mill and dam without reserving the right to flow, he is not protected from the payment of damages for an ovei'flow.' So the conveyance of a building by a railway company with special covenants of title does not retain an implied reservation of the right to flood the lot in case of freshets, notwithstanding the embankment causing the overflow was in existence prior to such convey- ance ; and the purchaser might reasonably presume that the company had availed itself of competent engineering skill, and had so constructed its works as not to impede the natural flow of the water." The doctrine of implied grant of easement in the land of the grantor once rested very much on the principle that the grantor should not be heard to derogate from his grant. ' § 149. Apparent and Continuous Easements. — An ap- parent easement is one that is obvious. And those courts which hold that a reservation may be implied beyond strict necessity restrict the rule to such easements as are "appar- ent and continuous."' When the part conveyed is the dominant estate, later authorities generally go beyond easements of necessity; many holding that grantees take implied easements of whatever uses had been apparently and continuously made of the servient estate, for the convenient and beneficial en- joyment of the dominant estate. But this rule is not always recognized in its broad sense.' j When the part conveyed is the servient estate, there has been a great conflict of authority since Pyer v. Carter." Some cases holding implied reservations as extensive as the implied grants upon conveyance of the dominant estate ; ' Preble v. Reed, 17 Me. 169; Burr v. Mills, 21 Wend. (N. T.) 289; Goddard on Easem. 124; Washb. on Easem. (4th ed.) 54; Gould on Waters, sect. 354. ^ Sellers v. Railway Co., 81 Tex. 458. ^ Howton V. Frearson, 8 Term Rep. 50. ^Sellers v. Railway Co., 81 Tex. 458. ^ Thompsons. Waterlow, L. R. 6 Eq. 36; Langley v. Hammond, L. R. 3 Exch. 161; Worthington «. Gimson, 3 El. & El. 618; Barlow ». Rhodes, 1 Crompt. & M. 439; Manning v. Smith, 6 Conn. 289; Grant v. Chase, 17 Mass- 448; Gayetty v. Bethune, 14 Mass. 49. « 1 Hurl. & k. 916. § 149] EASEMENTS. 165 other adhering to the earlier rule, that grantors can claim nothing in derogation of their grants, beyond easements of necessity.' This whole doctrine was originally restricted to ways of necessity, because it is pro bono publico that the land shall not be unoccupied." And it might have been better to have always restricted both implied grants and implied reserva- tions to easements of necessity; not perhaps of absolute physical necessity, but of reasonable necessity as distin- guished from mere convenience.' There is a want of uni- formity in the American and English cases as to the facts necessary to imply an easement reserved;* the better doc- trine seems to be, that in order to establish an easement by an implied reservation, where there has been a unity of possession and a subsequent sale of a portion of the land over which the easement is claimed, that said easement must have been apparent, continuous and necessary at the time of sale, the term "necessary" meaning that there could be no other reasonable mode of enjoying the dominant estate without this easement. It is less difficult for the grantee of the parcel sold to establish the easement than the grantor, for the reason that the grantor ought not to be allowed to derogate from his absolute deed by claiming rights and burdens over the land sold, in the face of his covenants of warranty, even though said burden might have been apparent and continuous at the time. There should be an element of absolute necessity in the case. " Thus, a right to discharge water by a ditch on a servient tenement may be claimed by express or implied reservation in the deed of the land over which the right is claimed; but to raise an implied reservation of such an easement in favor of the grantor of the alleged servient tenement, the necessity of it to the dominent estate retained by the grantor, must be imperious, and an element of absolute necessity in the case.' ' Tenant v. Goldwln, 2 Ld. Ray. 1089. » Dutton V. Taylor, 3 Lutwyche, 1487. ' Carbrey ». Willis, 7 Allen (Mass.), 364; Pettingill v. Porter, 8 Allen (Mass.), 1. " Washb. on Easem. sect. HI. ' Ferguson «.Witsel1, 5 Rich. (S.Car.)284; Elliotts. Rhett, 5 Rich. (S.Car.)413. « Crossland «. Rogers, 33 S. Car. 130, 138. 166 CLASSIFICATION- OF ESTATES. ]§ 150 § 150. Eeservation. — When the intention of the parties as shown by the deed, is to annex the use of a passage way, it will be so determined, and a passage way will be had over the land.' And a reasonable right of way does not en- title the owner of the dominant estate to inclose a right of way with fences.' He is entitled only to a reasonable and usual enjoyment and use of the easement.' A right of way will be inferred from evidence that the way has been used in every manner necessary for the full enjoyment of the dominant estate.* Technically, it is said an easement cannot be created by reservation or exception, since it is neither a parcel of the thing granted nor does it issue out of the thing granted.' If created by reservation it must be to the grantor himself.' When the conveyance is in fee, it vests in the grantee and his assigns all the rights of absolute ownership, except as restricted by the reservation, which, being in favor of the grantor, is to be construed most strongly against him.' So when the reservation is "the right of way through and over the carriage or alley way " to the stables, and is to con- tinue as long as the stables are "occupied as private stables," the grantor does not reserve the alley way itself, but the right of way over it, which means simply the right to pass over it.' When the exigencies of the enjoyment of the easement require a way across the estate, it may be changed from time to time; thus, in working a stone quarry." When a right of way is not definitely defined, the owner ' White ». Railroad Co., 156 Mass. 181. « Sizer v. Quinlan, 83 Wis. 390. »Bakeman«. Tolbut, 31 N. Y. 366; Baker v. Frick, 45 Md. 387; Brill v. Brill, 108 N. Y. 511. ■• Parks V. B-shop, 130 Mass. 340; 31 Am. Rep. 519. = Durham, etc. R. R. Co. v. Walker, 3 Q. B. 940, 967; Randall v. Latham, 36 Conn. 53; Owen ». Field, 103 Mass. 107. « Borst V. Empie, 5 N. Y. 83, 89. ' Duryea v. Mayor, 63 N. Y. 593, 597; Borst v. Empie, 5 N. Y. 33, 39; Ives t). Van Auken, 34 Barb. (N. Y.) 566. « Grafton v. Moir, 130 N. Y. 465. See, also, Bodfish «. Bodfish, 105 Mass. 319; Kripp v. Curtis. 71 Cal. 63; Stuyvesant v. Woodruff, 31 N. J. L. 136; Williams v. Railroad Co., 50 Wis. 76. 9 Colt B. Redfleld, 59 Conn. 437. See, also, Lowell Inst. v. Lowell, 153 M"ss. 530. § 150] EASEMENTS. 167 having acquiesced iu the use of a certain way, the easement will be sustained as enjoyed." The part reserved is vested in the grantee subject to the easement.'' And an easement may be acquired by the grantor of a deed poll by a clause of reservation, and the technical distinction between a reservation and an excep- tion will be disregarded, and the language used so con- strued as to effectuate the intention of the parties.' According to the English law a right of way cannot strictly be made subject to an exception or a reservation, because it is an entire parcel of a thing granted, nor is it issued out of the thing granted, the former being essential to an exception, and the latter to a reservation." If, there- fore, an easement is excepted or reserved in a deed, it operates by way of grant from the grantee to the grantor." In such a state of the law, the word "heirs" must be used to create an easement in fee. But in the United States, an easement may be created by way of exception or reservation;' if created by way of reservation, the word "heirs" is necessary to create an easement in fee' But if created by way of exception the word "heirs" is not necessary to create an easement in fee if the grantor owns the fee at the time of the conveyance, ° as an exception may be created by words of reservation.' And a reservation of an easement by the grantor is ap- purtenant to the land retained by him, the benefit of which will pass to a subsequent purchaser.'" If the easement be appurtenant only to a building, the destruotion of the build- ing destroys the easement." ' Roberts v. Stephens, 40 III. App. 138. !> Winston «. Johnson, 43 Minn. 398. 3 Haggerty v. Lee, 50 N". J. Eq. 461. ^ Durham, etc. R. R. Co. «. Walker, 3 Q. B. 940, 967. 'Goold V. Deep Coal Co., 3 DeO. J. & S. 600; Finlinsoni). Porter, L. R. 10 Q. B. 188. * Bowen v. Conner, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 133. ' Ashcroft V. Railroad Co. , 136 Mass. 196; Bean ii. French, 140 Mass. 339. 8 Wood 11. Boyd, 145 Mass. 176. "Wood v. Boyd, 145 Mass. 176; (ilaflin v. Railroad Co., 157 Mass. 489; Hamlin v. Railroad Co. , 160 Mass. 459. ■» Walz V. Walz (Mich.), 59 N. W. Rep. 431. " Shirley v. Crab (Ind.), 37 N. E. Rep. 130. 168 classification of estates. [§§ 151-153 § 151. Eesekvation Not Specifically Defining Ease- ment. — When there is a reservation but the easement is not specifically defined, the rule in such case is that the en- joyment and user need be only such as is reasonably neces- sary and convenient for the purpose for which it was created.' So when a right -of way is not bounded in the grant, the law bounds it by the line of reasonable enjoy- ment. The owner of the servient estate has the right to use it in any way that he sees fit, provided he does not un- reasonably interfere with the rights of the owner of the easement.' The grantee can use the right in any lawful manner.' § 152. Notice of Eeservation. — The use and acceptance of an easement by the grantee is sufficient notice to third parties of the easement, even though the conditions on which the grant was made were in parol.' Where the facts show that the way was a way of passage, that it was open and visible and had been used continuously for many years, this constitutes sufficient notice to the purchaser of the existence of the easement.' If the easement is not re- served, a purchaser of the land takes it free from any ease- ment, unless it be open and visible. ' But a purchaser with actual notice is bound by the right of the easement.' § 153. Way of Necessity. — When one part of an estate is dependent of necessity for the enjoyment of some use, in the nature of an easement, in another part, and the owner conveys either part, without express provisions on the subject, the part so dependent called the dominant es- tate, carries with it an easement of such necessary use in 1 Atkins D. Bordman, 3 Met. (Mass.) 457; Tyler «. Cooper, 124 N. Y. 626; Goddard on Easem. 333; Washb. on Easem. 244; Rexford v. Marquis, 7 Lan. (N. Y.) 249. 'Johnson v. Kinnicut, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 153; Goddard on Easem. 332; Grafton V. Moir, 130 N. Y. 465. 3 Bradley d. Boom Co. 82 Mich. 9; French i>. Williams, 83 Va. 462; Bane V. Bane, 63 Mich. 653. •■ Ague V. Seitsinger, 85 Iowa, 350. 5 Ellis «. Bassett, 128 Ind. 118; John Hancock, etc., Ins. Co. ». Patterson, 108 Ind. 582; Ingals v. Plamondon, 75 111. 118. » Wells «. Garbutt, 132 N. Y. 430; Treadwell v. Inslee, 120 N. Y. 458. 'Franklin v. Pollard Mill Co., 88 Ala. 318. § 153] EASEMENTS. 169 the other part called the servient estate.' This rule has long been applied to implied reservations as well as to im- plied grants." Or the rule may be stated that when property in land has been severed by voluntary conveyance, one portion of which is inaccessible except by passing over the other or by trespassing on the lands of a stranger, a grant of way by necessity is presumed between the parties. This species of right of way, therefore, in the absence of anything to the contrary contained in the deed, becomes an incident to the grant indicative of the intention of the parties. ' But such a right of way cannot be presumed over a stran- ger's land, as such easement is founded on a presumed grant.* When, therefore, property in land has been severed by voluntary or statutory conveyance, one portion of which is inaccessible except by passing over the other, or by tres- passing on the land of a stranger, a grant of a right of way of necessity is presumed between the parties." But the strict rule must be applied, and the way must be from the circumstances one of strict necessity and not one of mere convenience;' and a way of necessity ceases when the necessity from which it results ceases.' ' Pinnington «. Gallaod, 9 Exch. 1; Liford's Case, 11 Coke, 46 b; May®. Blackburn (Ky.), 35 S. W. Rep. 112. ^ Clark V. Cogge, Cro. Jac. 170. ' Trask v. Patterson, 29 Me. 499; Whitehouse v. Cummings, 83 Me. 91; Camp V. Whitman, 51 N. J. Eq. 457; Pomfert v. Ricroft, 1 Wm. Saund. 333, n. 6; Warren v. Blake, 54 Me. 276, 2S6. See, also, Kuhlman v. Hecht, 77 111. 570. ■•Mead v. Anderson, 40 Kans. 203; Cooper v. Mallpin, 6 Mo. 624; Pingree -B. McDuffle, 56 N. H. 306; Olivers. Hook, 47 Md. 301; Schmidt «. Quiiin, 136 Mass. 575; Pettingill «. Porter, 8 Allen (Mass.), 1; Nichols v. Luce, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 103; Pernam v. Wead, 2 Mass. 302; Allen v. Kincaid, 11 Me. 155; Collins v. Prentice, 15 Conn. 39; Seeley v. Bishop, 19 Conn. 128; Myers -v. Dunn, 49 Conn. 71; Holmes v. Seely, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 507; Stewart ■». Hart- man, 46 Ind. 331, 311; Smyles v. Hastings, 32 N. Y. 317. See, also. Cross- land V. Rogers, 33 S. Car. 130. ' Whitehouse?). Cummings, 83 Me. 91, overruling Trask v. Patterson, 39 Me. 499, so far as it militates against this rule. 'Still well V. Foster, 80 Me. 333; Stevens v. Orr, 69 Me. 333; Suffleld ». Brown, 4 De G., J. & S. 185; McDonald v. Lindall, 3 Rawle (Pa.), 492; Mar- shall V. Trumbull, 28 Conn. 183; Ferguson «. Witsell, 5 Rich. (S. Car.) 284; Elliot V. Rhett, 5 Rich. (S. Car.) 418; Vossen i>. Dautel, 116 Mo. 379. 'Whitehouse?). Cummings, 83 Me. 91; Holmes ». Goring, 2 Bing. 76; Ru- mill V. Robbins, 77 Me. 193; Seeley v. Bishop, 19 Conn. 138; Abbott v Stew- 22 170 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES [§ 15S The better doctrine is that an easement will be held to have been reserved by the grantor, in the absence of ex- press words of reservation, only when the easement claimed is mutual, or is continuous and strictly an ease- ment of necessity.' The necessity which will raise an implied easement varies with the nature of the property and of the easement." An easement may pass by implication from the manner in which the grantor has used the land in connection with his other land." In the case of a way when implied, it must be of necessity.' Where a certain way is not necessary for access at the time of the conveyance of the land, but is only a conveni- ence, there being other ways over the intervening lands, the grantee cannot, by subdividing and selling separate por- tions thereof give a necessity for such way.' The grantee must take the way as granted, though not as convenient as another way not granted or appurtenant." But the grantee can have a way of necessity, even if the State is his grantor.' And when the way of necessity artstown, 47 N. H. 230; Viall v. Carpenter, 14 Gray (Mass.), 136; Lide v. Hiidley, 36 Ala. 627. * ' Scott )'. Beutel, 23 Gratt. (Va.) 1; Mitchell v. Seipel, 53 Md. 251; Wheel- don ». Borrows, 13 Ch. D. 31: Russell v. Watts, 25 Oh. D. 559, Plimpton ». Converse, 43 Vt. 713; O'Rorke v. Smith, 11 R. I. 259; 38 Am. Rep. 440; Bart- lett ». Prescott, 41 N. H. 493; Ogden v. Grove, 38 Pd. St. 487; Ramirez «. Mc- Cormick, 4 Cal. 245; Washb. Easem. (4th Ed.) 258; Goddard Easem. 369; Lo- gan ii. Stogsdale, 133 Ind. 373. « Covel p. Hart, 56 Me. 530; Geraughty v. McCann, 6 N. R. C. L. 411. 8 Thayer «. Payne,3 Cush. (Mass.) 337; Fetters «. Humphrey, 19 N. J. Eq. 471; Alston v. Grant, 8 El. & Bl. 138; Thompsons. Waterlow, L. R. 6 Eq. 36, 40; Insals v. Plamondon, 75 111. 118. See, also, Morse v. Benson, 151 Mass. 440; Barnard ». Lloyd, 85 Cal. 131; Chases. Hall, 41 Mo. App. 15; Pearson®. Allen, 151 Mass. 79; Price ». Baldauf, 82 Iowa, 669; Benedict ii. Barling, 79 Wis. 551; Rogerson v. Shepherd, 83 W. Va. 307; Krippi). Curtis, 71 Cal. 63; In re Ladue, 118 N. Y. 213; Nat. Exch. Banks. Cunningham, 46 Oliio St. 575; Smith ®. Blampied, 63 N. H. 653; Smith®. Smith, 63 N. H. 439; Howell «. Estes, 71 Tex. 690; Russell v. Napier, 83 Ga. 770; Mead v . Anderson, 40 Kans. 303. *Ward®. Robertson, 77 Iowa, 159, Fischer «. Laack, 76 Wis. 313; Smith «. Griffin, 14 Colo. 429. See, also. Holmes ®. Jones, 80 Ga. 659. ' Lankin v. Terwilliger, 23 Oreg. 97. See, also. Murphy v. Lincoln, 63 Vt. 278. « Pearne v. Coal Creek Min. & Manuf . Co. 90 Tenn. 619. ' Pearne ®. Coal Creek Min. & Manuf. Co. 90 Tenn. 619. § 154] EASEMENTS. 17L once existed, it will be presumed to exist until some fact is shown establishing non-existence.' § 154. A Reasonable Necessity Will Create a Eight OF Way. — The general rule is that an absolute physical necessity need not always be shown, as in the case of land- locked premises, or the support of a wall, but there must be a reasonable necessity for the right of way, as distin- guished from a mere convenience.'' Hence, where an owner conveys one of two parcels of lands by an absolute and unqualified deed, an easement will be implied in favor of the land retained by the grantor, and against the land conveyed to his grantee, only in case the burden is ap- parent, continuous, and strictly necessary for the enjoy- ment of the former." Thus, the owner of a tract of land on which was a mill-dam, mortgaged forty-one acres of it without reserving the right to overflow such land. About two acres of this tract were flooded by the dam, though it was not shown that the two acres were actually under water when the mortgage was executed and delivered, or that it was necessary to flood them in order to run the mill successfully. Under these circumstances a purchaser of the forty-one acres at a foreclosure sale took title free from the easement.* When it is claimed that an easement exists by necessity, evidence of the necessity must be given." The doctrine of implied reservation rests upon the presumed intention of ' Blum V. Weston. 102 (.'al. 363. "Hollenbeck v. McDonald, 113 Mass. 347; Brown v. Berry, 6 Coldw. (Tena.) 98; Root »). Wadhams, 107 N. Y. 384. 'Brown v. Burkenmeyer, 9 Dana (Ky.), 159; M'Donald v. Lindall, 3 Rawle (Pa.), 493; Dillinan v. HofEman, 38 Wis. 575; O'Rorke v. Smilli, 11 R. I. 264; Collins V. Prentice, 15 Co.in. 39; Wheeldon v. Burrows, 13 Ch. Div. 31; -Cross ley 1). Lightowler, L. R. 3 Ch. App. Cas. 478; Russell v. Watts, 35 Cli. Div. 573; Bro.vn®. Alabaster, 37 Ch. Div. 504; Suffleld v. Brown, 4 DeG. J. & S. 185; Cooper v. Maupin, 6 Mo. 634; 35 Am. Dec. 464; Burns ». Gallagher, 63 Md. 463; Mitchell v. Seipel, 5 J Md. 351; Buss v. Dyer, 135 Mass. 387; Longen- dyke v. Anderson, 101 N. Y. 635, 630; Butterworth v. Crawford, 46 N. Y. 349; Burr «. Mills, 31 Wend. (N. Y.) 390, 392; Scrymser v. Phelps, 33 Hun (N. Y.), 4'!'4; Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 11 Abb. N. 0. (N. Y.) 80; Outerbridge ■B. Phelps, 13 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 117. * Wells V. Garbutt, 133 N. Y. 430. ' Gayetty v. Bethune, 14 Mass. 49, 55; Oliver v. Pitman, 98 Mass. 50. 172 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 155 the parties as. it is gathered from the conveyance, inter- preted in the hght of the circumstances surrounding them when it was executed, and with reference to which, as ex- isting facts, they are supposed to have contracted. It is not necessary, when a party owns a idght of passage, that such easement claimed by the grantee must be really necessary for the enjoyment of the estate granted. It is sufficient if it is highly convenient, and beneficial therefor. ' § 155. Air. — The right to the enjoyment of free and pure air, as incident to the estate, is conceded. An action lies for noxious vapors which visibly diminish the value of the property.' So where elevated railroads stand wholly upon lands owned by a municipality, they are liable to abut- ting owners only for such consequential damages as result from the invasion of property rights ; that is, the taking of their easements in the streets ; such as the easement of air, which is impaired by smoke and gases, ashes, and cinders ; the easement of light, impaired by the structure itself, and the passage of cars thereon ; the easement of access, af- fected by the drippings of oil and water and by the fre- quent columns ;' and the railroad companies are liable for the noise of their trains, upon the ground that they are trespassers." Light, air and access, which constitute property cannot he taken from the owner of the fee for public use with- out compensation.' The operation of an elevated railroad is an element of damage, as impairing and lessening the land-owners easement, and it is incidental to the main- tenance and use of the structure." And a dedication of a strip of land for a public street embraces not only the surface of the ground, but the light and air, and an in- ' Cihak ». Klekr, 117 111. 643. 2 St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping, 11 H. L. Cas. 642; 4 Best & S. 608, 616. ^ Am. Bank Note Co. ®. Eailroai Co. 129 N. T. 352. * Kane v. Railroad Co. 125 N. Y. 164. 'Dill V. Board, 47 N. J. Eq. 421; Lamm v. Railroad Co. 45 Minn. 71; Adams v. Railroad Co. 39 Minn. 286; Story v. Railroad Co. 90 N. Y. 132; Lahr r>. Railroad Co. 104 N. Y. 368. Compare Fobes v. Railroad Co. 121 N. Y. 505, as to surface roads and not as to elevated railways. « Sperb «. Railroad Co., 137 N. Y. 155. § 156] EASEMENTS. 17ii dividual has no more right to obstruct the hght and air above the street than he has to obstruct the surface of the soil.' § 156. Ancient Lights — Light and Air.^As to ease- ments in general it is held that an easement will pass by implication to the grantee of a tenement whenever its use has been open and continuous, so that it is entitled to be regarded as an incident of the estate granted." In the United States, as a general rule, this principle has no application in the case of light and air. Light and air are the common property of all. The owner of the lot can- not be presumed to have assented to an encroachment thereon if he has permitted the light and air to pass over it into the windows of his neighbor's house situated upon an adjoining lot. The general rule in the United States is that an easement in the unobstructed passage of light over an adjoining close cannot be acquired by prescription.' The law of implied grants and implied reservations, based upon necessity or use alone, should not be applied to easements for hght and air over the premises of another.' No right of an easement in light or air can be acquired by implication or by prescription." However, New Jersey" and Virginia' hold a different view, with no American authority to sustain it. Chan- ' Field V. Barling, 149 III. 556; Barnelt v. Johnson, 15 N. J. Bq. 481. ' Eobinson v. Grave, 29 L. T. 7; Cave v. Crafts, 53 Cal. 35. 'Keats V. Hugo, 115 Mass. 204; Christ Church v. Lavezzolo, 156 Mass. 89; Muller v. Strieker. 19 Ohio St. 135; Guest v. Reynolds, 68 111. 478; Tinker «. Forbes, 136 111. 237; Keating v. Springer, 14j III. 481; Reiinyson's Appeal, 94 Pa. St. 147; Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend. (N. T.) 309; Carrig v. Dee, 14 Gray (Mass.), 583; Pierre v. Fernald, 26 Me. 436; lugraham «. Hutchinson, 2 Conn. 584; Napier ®. Bulwinkle, 5 Rich. (N. Car.) 311; Haver- stick V. Sipe, 33 Pa. St. 868; Ward v. Neal, 37 Ala. 501; Klein v. Gehrung, 25 Tex. 232; Powell v. Sims, 5 W. Va. 1; Cherry v. Stein, 11 Md. 1; Myers v. Gemmel, 10 Barb. (N. Y.) 537; Palmer v. Wetmore, 2 Sand. (N. Y.) 316; Keiper v. Klein, 51 Ind. 316; Morrison*. Marquardt, 24 Iowa, 35. ■"Muller V. Strieker, 19 Ohio St. 135; Haverstick v. Sipe, 33 Pa. St. 368; Keiper v. Klein, 51 Ind. 816. ' Oldstein v. Firemen's Building Asso. 44 La. Ann. 492; Hubbard v. Town, 33 Vt. 295; Cherry v. Stein, 11 Md. 1; Turner v. Thompson, 58 Ga. 268. «Sutphen v. Therkelson, 38 N. J. Eq. 318. ■" Berkeley v. Smith, 27 Gratt. (Va.) 892. 174 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 156 cellor Eunyon gives the reason of the rule in New Jersey and says, that by the first constitution of this State, which was adopted in 1776, it was provided that the common law of England, except such parts as were repug- nant to the rights and privileges contained in that charter, should still remain in force until altered by law of the legislature of that State, and he accepts the English view;' this reason is not tenable and is un-American in tone. The Virginia court appears to follow the doctrine of the New Jersey court," in opposition to every other court in the United States. In England a right under certain circumstances has been recognized to enjoy, by the owner of one tenement, the hght and air which naturally reach it from and across the land of an adjacent owner. The extent of the easement, therefore, depends upon the amount of enjoyment derived from it during the period of prescription." A few cases of American courts were in accord with the English doctrine, but they have been overruled by later decisions except in New Jersey and in Virginia. Of course all the authorities agree that the right to have the light and the air enter windows of a building over adjacent lots may exist by express grant, or by virtue of an express covenant or agreement." The French rule is congruous with the American. " ■Sutphen v. Therkelson, 38 N. J. Bq. 318, 323. See, also, Brakely ». Sharp, 1 Stockt. (N. J.) 9; 3 Stockt. (N. J.) 206; Seymour v. Lewis, 2 Beas. (N. J.) 439; Fetters v. Humphreys, 18 N. J Eq. 360; De Luze v. Bradbury, 25 N. J. Eq. 70; Haggerty ». Lee, 54 N. J. L. 580; Hayden «. Dutcher, 81 N. J. Eq. 217; Robesou v. Pittenger, 2 N. J. Eq. 57. ' Berkeley v. Smith, 37 Graf. (Va.) 892. 'Moore v. Rawson, 3 Barn. & Cress. 333; Robins n. Barnes, Hob. 131; Olave V. Harding, 27 L. J. Exch. 386; Palmer «. Paul, 2 L. J. Ch. 154; Robinson v. Grave, 27 L. T., N. S. 648; Russell v. Watts, 47 L. T., N. S. 245. ■• Oldstein ■». Firemen's Building Asso. 44 La. Ann. 492; Keating «. rSpringe, 146 111. 481; Hillard v. Gas Coal Co., 41 Ohio St. 662; Brooks v. Reynolds, 106 Mass. 31; Keats «. Hugo, 115 Mass. 204. See, also. White v. Bradley, 66 Me. 263; Janes v. Jenkins, 34 Md. 1; United States v. Appleton, 1 flumn. 0. C. 493; Mitchell v. Seipel, 53 Md. 365; Morrison s. Marquardt, 24 Iowa, 35 ; "Western Granite Co. v. Knickerbocker, 103 Cal. 111. ' 1 Mourlon, 861; 8 Laurent, 54. § 157] EASEMENTS. 175 In some of the States the easement will be recognized provided it be absolutely necessary and indispensable to the grantee.' Mr. Washburne says' that the weight of authority is, both in England and America, that if one sells a house, and the light necessary for the reasonable enjoyment thereof is derived from and across adjoining land tlien belonging to the same owner, the easement of light and air over such vacant lot would pass as incident to the dwelling-house, because necessary to the enjoyment thereof, but that the law would not carry the doctrine to the securing of such easement as a mere convenience to the granted premises. The first part of this statement is undoubtedly correct so far as relates to English law, but is incorrect as to the general rule in America, as the cases already cited in this section abundantly prove. The law of implied grants and implied reservations, based upon necessity or use alone, should not be applied to ease- ments for light and air over the premises of another ;° and it follows that a landlord will not be liable for obstructing his tenant's window by building on the adjoining close in the absence of any covenant or agreement in the lease for- bidding him from so doing.* § 157. Who may Grant. — The owner of the estate may grant the easement. ' And the owner of an estate less than a fee may charge his estate with an easement.' So an owner of an estate for years may, by appropriate acts, cre- ate a right of way over the land during his term, in favor of other estates, even for years. Where the servient and the dominant estate are both for years, such right will have the qualities of easements, but will cease at the expiration of ' Turner «. Thompson, 58 Ga. 368; Powell v. Sims, 5 W. "Va. 1. ' Washb. on Easem. 504. 2 Mullen «. Strieker, 19 Ohio St. 135; Haverstick v. Sipe, 33 Pa. St. 368; Keiper v. Klein, 51 Ind. 316. * Myers v. Gemmel, 10 Barb. (N. T.) 537; Palmer v. Wetmore, 3 Sandf. Dempsey v. Kipp, 61 N. Y. 463. » Andrews v. Hailes, 3 El. & Bl. 349; Doe v. Jones, 15 Mees. & Wels^ 580, ^ Lisborne v. Davies, 1 C. P. 360; KingsmiU «. Millard, 11 Exch. 313; Doe v. Tidbury, 14 C. B. 304. a Holland*. Long, 7 Gray (Mass.), 487. ^ 3 Kent's Com. 450; Commonwealth v. Newbury, 3 Pick. (MaBS.) 51; Nudd V. Hobbs, 17 N. H. 525; Hunter v. Sandy Hill, 6 HiU (N. Y.), 407. § 166J EASEMENTS. 185 capable of taking a dedication for public uses.* But a pri- vate passage cannot be created by dedication." What is dedicated must be suited to the wants of the community. Highways are estabhshed by dedication by the owners of the land, or by appropriation of the State under the right of eminent domain. In the case of dedication no formal acts are necessary to the creation of the way. If the inten- tion to dedicate is clearly shown this is suflBcient. ' But the fact that all but one of the streets were open and used, does not show a dedication of the one. Neither is the convey- ance of land in such street by deed describing it as part of the street a dedication.* And the mere acquiescence of a land owner in the use of a road on his land by persons who for convenience, went that way to reach the public road is not sufficient evidence of a dedication.' But the actions of the owner may be sufficient evidence of a dedication." An intent to dedicate is absolutely essential; but intent is not essential in the case of prescription or in that of estoppel. Thus, it is held that a statute regulating the dedication of ways does not apply to ways gained by prescription. ' Acceptance must be made in a reasonable time.' Ac- ceptance must be made before the dedication is complete," and after acceptance it is too late to withdraw the offer of dedication of the street as a public highway." The mere acquiescence by the owner of the land in its occasional and ' Warreu v. Jacksonville, 15 111. 236. 'Hall V. McLeod, 2 Met. (Ky.) 98; Wilder ». St. Paul, 13 Minn. 208. ' Trickey s. Schlader, 53 111. 78; Hawleyii. Baltimore, 33 Md. 270; Buchanan -B. Curtis, 25 Wis. 99. . Harris, 61 N. Y 448. » Guthrie v. New Haven, 31 Conn. 321 ; Child v. Chappell, 9 N. Y. 346. •Irwin V. Dixion, 9 How. (U. S.) 31. * Curtiss B. Hoyt, 19 Conn. 154 ; Holmes e. Jersey City, 1 Beas. (N. J.) 299 ; Trustees v. Otis, 37 Barb. (N. Y.) 50 ; Beall«. Clore, 6 Bush (Ky.), 680 ; Ab- bott V. Mills, 3 Vt. 531 ; Stearns v. Nashua, 46 N. H. 199 ; Hayden v. Stone, 113 Mass. 350. •Brakkenw. Railroad Co., 39 Minn. 41 ; Buchanan v. Curtis, 25 Wis. 99; David ■». New Orleans, 16 La. Ann. 404 ; Stone v. Brooks, 85 Cal. 489; Green «. Canaan, 39 Conn. 157; Witter «. Damitz, SlWis. 385; Moore v. Waco, 85 Tex. 306. «Jolieti). Verley, 35 111. 58. ' Blodgett V. Royalton, 14 Vt. 394. * Cook V. Burlington, 80 Iowa, 106 ; Wilder v. St. Paul, 12 Minn. 203. 'Vernon v. St. James, 16 Ch. Div. 449. '"Cady V. Conger, 19 N. Y. 356 ; Onstott v. Murrray, 33 Iowa. 457; Wood V. Hurd, 34 N. J. L. 87 ; Jennings v. Tisbury. 5 Gniy (Mass.), 73; Debolt «. Carter, 31 Ind. 355 ; Gentleman v. Soule, 32 111. 271 ; State v. Atherton, 16 N, §§ 172-178] EASEMENTS. 193 cated highway is neccessary ; it is enough that the public travel it.' § 172. Definite Location. — The location must be definite. Laying of a street through private lands must be certain and definite, in order that a dedication may be imphed. A gen- eral privilege or license by the owner to cross his lands with- out reference to any specified route is not sufficient." The street must be actually laid out, and the intent clearly infera- ble from the facts of the case. ' The persons who may use the dedicated land cannot be limited, for the dedication must be for the benefit of the public, and not for any particular part of it.* A right of way indefinite in its location cannot be sus- tained as a prescriptive right." But the way, if expressly granted, may be fixed by the acts of the parties.' A court of equity may decide the track to be used.' § 173. Easement — Condition Precedent. — A city may gi'ant an easement with condition. Thus where a city has the right to grant to a certain railroad company the right and privilege of establishing a depot on lands covered with waters, and to build the necessary embankments, a per- mission granted by the city to a railroad company under its chartei-, and not under the statute, to locate and construct a railroad in the city on condition that it would fill in a certain area of cove lands within a certain time, and to build railroad buildings on the land so filled, is not a grant of the lands for the railroad purposes, but only an ease- ment or permission to occupy the land if it should be filled within the time limited. H. 303, 310 ; Dourgin v. Lowell, 3 Allen (Mass.), 398. Compare Kelly's Case, 8 Gratt. (Va.) 632 ; Mayberry v. Standisb, 56 Me. 342. 'People V. Davidson, 79 Cal. 166; People v. O'Keefe, 79 Cal. 171. See, also, Hope «. Barnett, 78 Cal. 9. 2 Starr v. People, 17 Colo. 458. ^Iq re Eleventh Avenue, 49 How, (N. Y.) 308. '' Bermondsey v. Brown, L. R. 1 Eq. 215, » Holmes ». Seelev, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 507; Brice v. Randall, 7 Gill. & J. (Md.) 349; Jones v. Percival. 5 Pick. (Mass.) 485. 'Bannon v. Angler, 3 Allen (Mass.), 138; Wynkoop v. Burger, 12 Johns. (K. Y.) 233. 'Lide«>. Hadley, 36 Ala. 637. 2.5 194 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 174 Judge Stiness says the filling of the laud by the railroad company was a condition precedent to its rights to occupy it, and its poverty will not excuse its failure to perform the condition within the time limited. If the city fills in the land and takes possession equity will not relieve the com- pany on the ground that the city may be compensated for its expenditures.' § 1T4. Establishment by User. — A way may be estab- lished by user. Whenever a way has been used the time required to become a public highway this is a sufficient dedication." Long acquiescence by the owner in the use of the land for public purposes is evidence of dedication.' Time, though often a material ingredient in the evidence, is not an indispensable ingredient in the act of dedication. If the act of dedication be unequivocal it may take place immediately.'' Where the owner allows lands to be used as a public highway for the prescribed time declared in the statute of limitations to bar his title, this is a sufficient dedication. ° But if the use is a mere license, the grantor can revoke it at any time." But where the grantor has allowed the public to use the way for a long time, making no objec- tions and having full kno\yledge of such user, the ease- ment will be established.' The statute sometimes controls this question.' ' New York, etc. Railroad Co. v. Providence, 16 R. I. 746. ' James v. Sammis 132 N. Y. 339. See, also, Beatrice v. Black, 38 Nebr. 268; Starr v. People, 17 Colo. 458; Worthington ». Wade, 83 Tex. 26; Grand- Yille 1). Jenison, 84 Mich. 54; 86 Mich. 567. 'Buchanan ®. Curtis, 35 Wis. 99; Poole v. Huskinson, 11 Mees. & Wels. 830. "Ogle V. Railroad Co., 3 Houst. (Del.) 267, 373; Angell on High. sect. 143; Rees V. Chicago, 38 111 822; Hutto ». Tindall. 6 Rich. L. (S. Car.) 403; Wilder V. St. Paul. 12 Minn. 200; Fisher v. Beard, 32 Iowa, 346. 5 White V. Wiley, 13 N. Y. Supp. 16; 59 Hun (N. Y.), 618. •Homer v. Riker, 79 Mich. 551; Irving v. Ford, 65 Mich. 241; Kruger v. Le Blanc, 70 Mich. 76; Adams v. Iron Cliff Co., 78 Mich. 271. 'Yates V. West Grafton, 83 W. Va. 507; State v. Horn, 35 Kans. 717; People V. Davidson, 79 Cal. 166; People v. O'Keefe, 79 Cal. 171; State «. Birmingham, 74 Iowa, 407; Street v. Griffiths, 50 N. J. L. 656; Duncombe ». Powers, 75 Iowa, 185. » See Talbott v. King, 32 W. Va. 6. § 175] EASEMENTS. 195 § 175. By Prescription.— a public way may be estab- lished by prescription. Where land has been used by the public as a street with the knowledge of, and without objection by, the owner of the fee for a number of years, an actual dedication of the street may be presumed, though the use has not been sufficient to give the public a right by prescription.' But a mere user by the public with the knowledge of the owner is not sufficient to dedicate a way." Ordinarily, however, a use of land by a city as a public street is a sufficient adverse possession of the city for the purpose of the statute of limitations.' And a law may be "within the statute of limitations.' One test is whether the thing dedicated has been used by the public for such a length of time that the public accom- modation and the enjoyment of private rights would be materially affected by the interruption of such user. ' If the only evidence of dedication is the user, such user, in order to constitute sufficient evidence of such dedication, must have continued at least the time required for adverse possession by the statute of limitations." A way opened by individuals as a private way may, by adverse use by the public, become a public way by prescrip- tion.' The user must be with the knowledge of the owner, and for a continued length of time necessary to bar an action to recover the title of the land. ° " Mason «. Sioux Falls (S. Dak.), 51 N. W. Rep. 770, 774. « Topeka v. Cowee, 48 Kans. 345. ' Moore v. Waco, 85 Tex. 306. See, also, Bales «. Pldgeon (Ind.), 29 N. E. Eep. 34; Beatrice «. Black, 38 Neb. 363. * Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. v. Btzler (Ind.), 30 N. E. Rep. 33; McAllister v. Pickup, 84 Iowa, 65. See, also, Stafford v. Coyney, 7 Barn. & Cress. 357; Arnold v. Holbrook, L. R. 8 Q. B. 96; Hemphill v. Boston, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 195; Arnold*. Blaker, L. R. 6Q. B. 433; Stevens «. Nashua, 46 N. H. 195. 5 Hiner v. Jeanport, 65 111. 438; State i>. Nudd, 33 N. H. 337; Mayberry v. Standish, 56 Me. 343. •Day V. AUender, 33 Md. 536; Hoole ». Atty. Gen. 32 Ala. 190. 'Weld V. Brooks, 153 Mass. 297; Click c. County, 79 Tex. 131. ' Graham v. Hartnett, 10 Nebr. 517; Shafer v. StuU, 33 Nebr. 94; Wayne County Sav. Bank v. Stockwell, 84 Mich. 586; Speir v. New Utrecht, 131 N. Y. 430; White v. Poxborough, 151 Mass. 38; Peninsular Iron & L. Co .v. Crystal Falls, 60 Mich. 510. See, also, In re Hand Street, 53 Hun (N. Y.), 206; Casey . County, 75 Iowa, 655; Patton ®. State, 50 Ark. 53; McCearly v. Lemennier, 40 La. Ann. 353; State . Horn, 35 Kans. 717; Pillsbury ®. Brown, 196 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 176-177 § 176. EvTDENOE. — Evidence of the general understand- ing in the community, that a street is a higliway is admis- sible, as is also evidence that the land had not been taxed on the ground that it was a highway.' In those cases when there is other evidence than user of a dedication, the whole matter will be left to a jury," to determine the fact.' In most cases, either the dedication or the acceptance, or both must be proved by evidence of acts of permission and en- joyment. And length of enjoyment is always an important ingredient when the evidence of dedication depends on acts of this nature. When the evidence shows that a road has not become a highway, dedication is not established.' On the question whether land has been dedicated for a public highway, evidence is admissible to show that it was for the interest of the owner to have a highway at the locus in quo, and that he had petitioned for it, and had signed a remonstrance against the change in its location." § 177. Intention. — In general to make a highway by dedication, the owner's intention to dedicate must appear, and the acceptance of such dedication by the use of the way by the public must also appear. With the concurrence of these two things the dedication is complete." The use of the way by the public, without objection by the owner, is evidence of intention on his part to dedicate 83 Me. 450. See, also, Carmody v. Mulrooney, 87 Wis. 552; Corliss i>. Drennin^ (Wash.), 35 Pac. Rep. 1074; Ormsby ». Pinkerton, 159 Pa. St. 458; Bennett s. Biddle, 140 Pa. St. 396; 150 Pa. St. 420; Geible v. Smith, 146 Pa. St. 376; Grace Church v. Dobbins, 153 Pa. St. 297; Hansford i). Berry (Ky.), 33 S, W. Rep. 665. 1 Grandville ». Jenison, 86 Mich. 567. See, also, Wilson ». Hull, 7 Utah, 90; Maus V. Springfield, 101 Mo. 613. '' Jarvis ». Dean, 8 Bing. 447; HobbsD. Lowell, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 405; Penquite e. Lawrence, 11 Ohio St. 374. ' Hartford v. Railroad Co., 59 Conn. 350; Bartlett v. Beardmore, 77 Wis. 356. See, also, Spencer «. Railroad Co., 63 Conn. 343. * Smithers v. Fitch, 83 Cal. 153. 'Ellsworth v. Lord, 40 Minn. 387. See, also, Edenville v. Railroad Co., 77 Iowa, 69. « Union Company ». Peckman, 16 R I. 64; Fairfield «. Morey, 44 Vt. 339, 343; Godfrey «. Alton, 13 111. 39; State ». Ranno, 83 Vt. 606; Scott ». State, 1 Sneed (Tenn.), 639. §§ 178-179] EASEMENTS. 197 it." A mere permissive use of a way by a certain portion of the community is not a dedication;' and a user of a way without the owner's knowledge is not a dedication.' There must be an intention shown to dedicate a way before it will be established.* § 178. Who May Dedicate.— Nobody but the grantor can make a dedication. He must be the owner of the land when the dedication is made." Of course, this has no reference to the exercise of the right of eminent domain. Under the common law a married woman cannot alone make a dedication;' nor a mortgagor;' no trespasser can dedi- cate;' nor can a tenant in common dedicate the common land," a,=i such an attempted dedication would be invalid against the grantor and all of his cotenants, as he can give no exclusive right. § 179. Dedication by Mistake. — Where the owner dedi- cates land for a highway under a mistaken belief that it is a legal highway, and it is accepted as such and expenses are incurred by others upon the faith of the dedication, it is binding upon the grantor and must continue." Thus, where the owner of land, under the belief that a certain road, used by the public, was a legally established highway, proposed that, if the route of the highway was so changed as to run 'Pooler. Huskinson, 11 Mees. & Wels. 827; Stacey «. Metier, 14 Mo. 478; Skeen b. Lynch, 1 Rob. (Va.) 186; Hayden v. Stone, 112 Mass. 349; Knight v. Heaton, 22 Vt. 483. ' Stafford v. Coyney, 7 Barn. & Cress. 259. ' Topeka ®. Cowee, 48 Kans. 345. " State V. Adkins, 42 Kans. 203; Campbell ®. Karr, 26 111. App. 805; State v. McCabe, 74 Wis. 481. ' Warren v. Brown, 31 Nebr. 8; Lee ii. Lake, 14 Mich. 12; Baugan i). Mann, 59 111. 492; Ward v. Davis, 3 Sandf. (N. Y.) 502; Scheney «. Commonwealth, 36 Pa. St. 29. « Todd v. Railroad Co., 19 Ohio St. 514. ' Hoole v. Atty. Gen. 22 Ala. 190; Murphy «. "Welch, 128 Mass. 489; Walker -». Summers, 9 W. Va. 533. See, also, Anderson v. Strauss, 98 111. 485; Coker ■». Whitlock, 54 Ala. 180. « State V. Atherton, 16 N. H. 208; Gentleman v. Soule, 33 111. 279. 9 Scott V. State, 1 Sneed (Tenn.), 639. " Marratt v. Deihl. 37 Iowa, 250; State v. "Waterman, 79 Iowa, 360. See, also, Ford V. North Des Moines, 80 Iowa, 626. 198 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 180 along a line of his land, he would give the right of way, and it is so changed, neither he nor his grantees can resume possession of the dedicated route and fence it up, upon its being ascertained that the old road was not a legal high- way.' No length of use by the public of a highway, which is supposed to be upon a certain line, but which, by mistake, is not, can give any claim to the high way under the statute of limitations, except as to the true line." On the other hand, it is held that a city may be barred by the statute of limitations from ejecting a party who has encroached upon its streets; that a city may be estopped in equity. The weight of authority is in such case, that its rights have been lost by equitable estoppel.' But other courts hold that the statute of hmitations does not run against a city, because it is a trustee for the pubUc, and therefore cannot be barred from asserting its rights over a portion of a street which has been encroached upon by an individual; that equitable estoppel does not apply.* § 180. Qualified DEDicA-ftow. — A dedication of land for public use as a highway may be made subject to a right to devote a part thereof to other purposes, and when such portion has been thus devoted, the use as a way will be suspended so long as that part is used for such designated purpose.' So there may be a dedication to the public of a right of way subject to the right of the owner of the soil to plow it up in due course of husbandry." ' Marratt v. Deihl, 37 Iowa, 350. ' Bolton V. McShane, 79 Iowa, 26. Compare State «. Welpton, 34 Iowa, 144. 3 Wheeling v. Campbell, 12 W. Va. 36; Kelly «. Greenfield, 2Har. & M. (Md.) 138; Knight v. Heaton, 22 Vt. 481; Varick i>. New York, 4 Johns. Ch. (N.T.) 53; Inhabitants v. Wilmot, 2 Root (Conn.), 288; Armstrong v. Dalton, 4 Dev. (N. Car.)368; States. Rich, 7 Rich. (S. Car.) 390; Rowan®. Portland, 8B. Mon. (Ky.) 333; Clements v. Anderson, 46 Miss. 581; St. Charles ». Powell, 23 Mo. 535; Cincinnati r. Evans, 5 Oliio St. 594; Lake «. Kennedy, 13 Ohio St. 42; Peoria?). Johnston, 56 III. 45; Richmond w. Poe, 34 Gratt. (Va.) 149; Pilla V. Scholte, 24 Iowa, 383. * Cross ®. Mayor, 18 N. J. Eq. 311; Jersey City ». State, 80N.J. L. 521; Simmons v. Cordell, 1 R. I. 519; Philadelphia v. Railroad Co., 58 Pa. St. 263. 5 Ayres «. Railroad Co., 53 N. J. L. 405. - Arnold?'. Holbrook, L. R., 8 Q. B. 96; Mercers. "Woodgate, L. R., 5Q. B. 26. §§ 181-183J EASEMENTS. 199 § 181. Interruption of the Usfr. — A substantial inter- ruption of the travel over the highway is an interruption of the use and the easement fails'. Putting up a fence or barrier across the way does not necessarily, as a matter of law, constitute an interruption of the use of the way in the absence of evidence of the occasion or circum- stances or effect of that act." A single act of interruption by the owner is of more weight than many acts of enjoy- ment by the public' The public may lose its right by non- user, or by adverse possession, as by fencing in the land by the owner.* § 182. Extent op Grant. ^The extent of the grant is marked out by the dedication. And a highway by user in- cludes only so much land as is used for that purpose, and cannot be extended upon adjacent lands against the con- sent of the owner, except under proper condemnation pro- ceedings instituted for that purpose. " So a dedication of a public park on the water, carries the park into the bay only to the extent of the accretions. The submerged lands of the bay not disposed of by the State, are the State's proper- ty, and are not subject to disposition of the owner of the land adjacent to the bay. ° § 183. Rights op the Grantor.— The dedication of land for a public highway confers a mere easement for public use as a highway, and the land owner retains the right to use the land for any lawful purpose compatible with the full enjoyment of the public easement.' But he cannot do anything which will substantially interfere with such right of passage.' He can make all uses of the land which do not ' Weld V. Brooks, 132 Mass. 297. = Weld V. Brooks, 102 Mass. 297. 'Poole V. Huskiasoa, 11 Mees. & Wels. 827; Dwinel v. Barnard, 38 Me. 554. < Knight ». Heaton, 32 Vt, 480; Pella v. Scholte, 34 Iowa, 288; Callaway Co. V. Nolley, 31 Mo. 393; Alves v. Henderson, 16 B. Men. (Ky.) 131. ' Scheimer v. Price, 65 Mich. 638. See, also. Burrows v. Guest, 5 Utah, 91. *Ruge V. Oyster Canning & Fishing Co. 25 Fla. 656. 'Ellsworth?). Lord, 40 Minn. 387; People v. Moore, 50 Hun (N. Y.), 356; Des Moines v. Hall, 24 Iowa, 234; West Covington v. Preking, 8 Bush (Ky.), 138. * Mercer v. Railroad Co. 36 Pa. St. 99; Dubuque v. Benson, 33 Iowa, 248. 200 CLASSIFICATION" OF ESTATES. [§ 184 couflict with the purposes to which it is dedicated.' He may dig under the soil for minerals." In some of the States, however, a formal dedication passes the soil and freehold in the land.' And when a street is dedicated to the public, the ease- ment embraces not only the ground of the street, but also the light and air above the street; neither the grantor nor any individual has any more right to obstruct the hght and air above the street than he has to obstruct the surface of the soil.* § 184. Irrevocable. — A dedication when complete can- not be revoked as long as the public use continues or private rights, be affected by an interruption of the use. ' The dedication must be irrevocable, with no reservation to destroy or resume it.° But before the dedication has been accepted by anybody it may be revoked.' But it is held in New Jersey that the owner cannot with- draw the dedication of streets when once unequivocally manifested. That the public may accept the dedication whenever their convenience may require, or not accept it at all." The principal on which the dedication is held irrevocable is that to allow it to be recalled to the injury of one who purchased adjoining land on the faith of it, would operate as a fraud.' ' Seals V. Stewart, 6 Lans. (N. Y.) 408; Commissioners v. Taylor, 3 Bay (S. Car.), 383; Abbott v. Mills, 3 Vt. 531; Hunter v. Sandy Hill, 6 Hill (N. Y.), 407; Cincinnati v. White, 6 Pet. (U. S.) 413; Connehan v. Ford, 9 Wis. 340; Scott V. State, 1 Sneed (Tenn.), 633. ' Dubuque B. Benson, 38 Iowa, 348; West Covington v. Freking, 8 Bush (Ky.). 138. 3 Price V. Thompson, 48 Mo. 361; Alton t. Illinois Trans. Co. 13 111. 38. •> Field V. Barling, 149 III. 556; Barnett«. Johnson, 15 N. J. Eq. 481. ' Union Co. «. Peckham, 16 R. I. 64; Wilder v. St. Paul, 13 Minn. 200; Beall V. Clore, 6 Bush (Ky.), 680; State v. Trask, 6 "Vt. 355; Huber v. Gazley, 18 Ohio 18. » Mercer v. Woodgate, L. R. 5 Q. B. 26; San Francisco v. Canavan, 42 Cal. 541. ' Baker v. St. Paul, 8 Minn. 494. See, also, San Francisco v. Calderwood, 31 Cal. 589. » Trustees v. Hoboken, 33 N. J. L. 13. 'Herman on Estop., sect. 531. §§ 185-186] EASEMENTS. 201 § 185. Injunction by the Owner. — The right to restrain by the owner of land may be exercised, when the land is used for other purposes than those to which it was dedi- cated, because the fee is not conveyed but only an ease- ment.' And when a way has been abandoned by the public , and the owner has fenced in the way, he may restrain the reopening of it." And the owner of the soil may have an injunction in his own name against a rail- road company who undertakes to lay down its rails along a dedicated street. ' And where the fee is not conveyed, but only an easement, use of the land for other purposes than those to which it was dedicated, may be restrained at suit of the owner of the fee.* And the owner of the freehold, by reason of his general property, may maintain an action for the erection of a bay window over the highway.* Article 6. Abandonment and Extinguishment. § 186. Merger. § 190. Extinguishment. § 187. Separation and Reviver. § 191. Non-User. § 188. Abandonment. § 192. Accepting a New Way. § 189. Release. § 186. Merger. — Where the same person becomes the owner of the easement and of the land upon which it is a servitude, the easement is extinguished." The same person having become the owner of the dominant and the servient estate, and there being no one else entitled to use them, there ' is a merger and the mere easement is extin- guished.' The owner naust possess both estates abso- 'Princeville v. Auten, .77 111. 325; Trustees ». Hoboken, 33 N. J. L. 13; Vernon v. St. James, 16 Oh. Div. 449. » Ostrom v. San Antonio, 77 Tex. 346. 'Scliurmeier v. Railroad Co., 10 Minn. 82. * Warren v. Lyons, 22 Iowa, 351. See, also. Cook v. Burlington, 30 Iowa, 94, 101 ; Price ». Thompson, 48 Mo. 361. 'Codman v. Evans, 5 Allen (Mass.), 308; Eeimer's Appeal, 100 Pa. St. 182. «Robb V. Hannah (Ky.), 14 S. W. Rep. 360. See, also, Morgan v. Meuth, 60 Mich. 238. 'Capron «. Greenway, 74 Md. 289; Plimpton v. Converse, 42 Vt. 712; Colesman's Appeal, 62 Pa. St. 274. 26 202 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 187 lutely/ The owner's title must not be conditional or deter- minable, and the estates must be inseparable, except by his own acts.' The two estates being co-equal and co-extensive, the easement is extinguished, so no man can have an ease- ment in his own laud. ' If the title of one of the estates is defective, the easement is suspended only while the two estates are held by the one owner. ' If the adverse enjoyment of an easement be extinguished within the period of prescription, by the unity of title, and the land which possesses the easement be shortly there- after transferred from the land charged with the easement, by a reconveyance, the right to be acquired by user must commence de novo from the last period." § 187. Separation and Eeviver.— If the dominant es- tate is less in point of duration than the servient, and the dominant is the one conveyed, the easement will only be merged during the union of the two estates, and will re- vive upon a separation of the estates." And upon the sepa- ration of two estates where the easement has been merged, all easements which are incident of the property, such as the flow of water, of air, or support of land, will revive;' and so all easements necessary to the enjoyment of any part separated. ° But easements may be destroyed and ex- tinguished, and of course cannot then be revived, as when the owner cuts off an aqueduct." All the easements will revive which are necessary, appurtenant and incident to the parcels when separated, unless the grantor, by his own acts, 'Brakely v. Sharp, 9 N. J. Eq. 9; Warren v. Blake, 54 Me. 276; Penrce i\ McClenagban, 5 Rich. (S. Car.) 178; Ritger «. Parker, 8 Cush, (Mass.) 145; Manning v. Smith, 6 Conn. 289. « James v. Plant, 4 Ad. & El. 749; Hazard v. Robinson, 3 Mason, C. C. 273. "Atkins «. Bordman, 2 Met. (Mass.) 457; Cooper v. Barber, 3 Taunt. 99; Atwater ». Bodflsh, 11 Gray, 150; Seymour v. Lewis, 11 N. J. 4S0. « Tylers. Hai^mond, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 193. 'Manning v. Smith, 6 Conn. 289. « Grant v. Chase, 17 Mass. 443 ; Carbrey -o. Willis, 7 Allen (Mass.), 864. ' Dunklee v. Railroad Co. 24 N. H. 497. 'Promfret v. Ricroft, 1 Wm. Sand, 323, n. 6. 'Nicholas «, Chamberlain, Cro. Jac. 121. § 188] EASEMENTS. 203 transfers the land or parcel without the easement, which he has destroyed before granting.' Where lands are conveyed as abutting on a proposed street, and the street extends over other lands of the grantor than those conveyed, a right to the use of the proposed street, as a means of passage to and from the lands con- veyed, will arise by implication in favor of the grantee on delivery of the deed, and will continue iu force until the proposed street becomes a public highway." But there is some controversy whether the private right of way in grantees, holding by such conveyance, is merged in the public right when the dedication is consummated by public acceptance, or whether it is merely suspended thereby and will revive if the public right is afterwards abandoned.' Several courts hold that when the public right attaches, the preceding right is thereby extinguished, and that if the public right is subsequently surrendered, the adjacent owner takes the land to the middle of the street, discharged of all right of way.' • The contrary doctrine is sustained by the majority of cases.' § 188. Abandonment. — The maxim once a highway al- ways a highway, does not apply except where it involves the rights of abutters or those occupying a similar position. But where no such rights are involved, the public may either abandon or vacate a highway; and where such rights do exist they may also be abandoned by those entitled to bar them. So a highway may cease to exist either by abandonment or vacation according to law. Sothenon- user of an easement for the purpose intended for a period of thirty years, due totheabandonment of commerce upon the stream, vnll be taken as an abandonment of the ease- ment.' The mere non-user of an easement for twenty years, wiU afford a presumption of a release or extinguish- 1 Munsion v. Eeid, 46 Hun (N. Y.), 399. » Dodge V. Railroad Co. 43 N. J. Eq. 351. ^Booraem v. Railroad Co., 40 N. J. Eq. 657. * Mercer v. Railroad Co., 36 Pa. St. 99; Kings Co. Fire Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 101 N. Y. 411; Kimball v. Kenosha, 4 Wis. 321; Bailey v. Culver, 84 Mo. 531. "Dodge T). Ra Iroad Co., 43 N. .J. Eq. 351. « Freedom v. Norris. 128 Iiid. 377. 204 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 189 ment, but not a very strong one, if not aided by circura- stances; however, if in the meantime, some act has been done by the owner of the land charged with the easement, inconsistent with, or adverse to, the existence of the right, a release or extinguishment of the right will be pre- served.' To work a forfeiture, there must be a non-user or aban- donment of the use such as to indicate an intention ndt to continue its use." The easement wiU. cease when there is no longer any use for it. Thus where there is a right of way to outhouses, and the outhouses are removed and the land taken for a pubhc way, the right of way wQl cease.' Although an easement for a slope for street grade may be abandoned by a city, an intention to abandon will not be estabhshed by the mere fact that the city built a re- taining wall along the street hne.* An abandonment may be consented to by both parties, when it will be eflfectuaL' A municipal authority has no more right, even with the authority of the legislature, to lessen or diminish the width of a street, than to convey it absolutely." An easement acquired by actual grant is not lost by non- user. ' § 189. Release. — A right of way can be released to the owner of the servient estate by the owner of the dominant estate.' And where an easement is encroached upon, the party injured must not sleep on his rights. Thus, where a party erects a building, which encroached upon an easement ' 3 Kent's Com. 448. « Poitevent v. Supervisors, 58 Miss. 810. See, also, Hickox v. Railroad Co., 78 Mich, 615. ' Hancock v. "Wentworth, 5 Met. (Mass.) 446. See, also, Mussey v. Union Wharf, 41 Me. 34. " Kusclike V. St. Paul, 45 Minn. 225. See, also, O'Daniel v. O'Daniel, 88 Ky. 185. 'Pop3 V. O'Hara, 48 K. T. 446; Partridge v. Gilbert, 15 N. Y. 601. ' Moose c. Carson, 104 N. Car 431. ' Butterfield «. Reed, 160 Mass. 361; White v. Crawford, 10 Mass. 183: Barnes v. Lloyd, 113 Mass. 234. 'Richards ». Railroad Co., 153 Mass. 120. § 190] EASEMENTS. 205 without serious objections at the time, and which was ac- quiesced in by the party injured for nine years, the court of equity will not order a removal of the building.' A mere parol agreement to release an easement will not destroy it.' But where the owner abandons the right of way and takes in exchange another way, an oral agreement is sufficient if the owner stands by and makes no objections while the work is completed.' If the grantor conveys his land on condition for an easement, if the condition is not performed, the easement will be destroyed.* § 190. Extinguishment. — An easement may be extin- guished in many ways. If an easement for a particular purpose is granted, there is an end of the easement when the purpose no longer exists.' And where a private lane between lots was abandoned by the owner, and a line fence built in the center thereof, a subsequent purchaser of the owner of the lots cannot revive the use of such lane. ° An easement may be destroyed by no act of the parties. Thus, when the owner has granted a lot at a certain dis- tance from the river front, the privilege of using the river front passes as appurtenant to the lot; if the river encroaches upon the lot and washes it away, the easement is gone and the grantee cannot use other portions of the grantor's premises for such purpose.' On conveyance of the dominant estate, when by covenant an easement is ap- purtenant to the land, it is severed and extinguished when the grantee of the land with the easement conveys the land and reserves the easement to himself, his heirs and assigns.' And where a city does not accept an easement or way, and it is fenced up, the easement is extinguished.' ' Green v. Richmond, 155 Mass. 188. 'Riehle v. Heulings, 38 N. J. Eq. 20; Dyer v. Sanford, 9 Met. (Mass.) 395; Liggins V. Inge, 7 Bing. 683. 'Boston, etc., Corp. v. Doherty, 154 Mass. 314. ■■ Carpenter v. Graber, 66 Tex. 405. 'Halin «. Baker Lodge, 21 Oreg. 30; Chase «. Sutton Mauuf. Co., 4 Cush. (Mass.) 152; National Manure Co. i>. Donald, 4 Hurl. & N. 8. •Hennesy «. Murdock, 17 N. T. Supp. 276; 63 Hun (N. T.), 625. See, also. Comings. Gould, 16 Wend, (N. Y.) 538. ' Weis «. Meyer, 55 Ark. 18. 8 Cadwalader «, Bailey, 17 R. I. 495. 'Smith V. Griffln, 14 Colo. 429. 206 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 191 Whei'e a railroad company took up the rails of its road and sold the roadbed, the easement was abandoned.' If an easement is not reserved in a deed, but is necessary, it will continue.' And if a lessee gives notice that his rights must be respected to a purchaser of the land, the latter can be estopped from encroachment upon the former's ease- ment.' A mortgagor who has reserved the right to release an easement on a strip of land, in a power of sale mortgage, loses the right after sale of the land under the power of sale." An easement may be extinguished by the act of God. ° And an easement may be destroyed by the act of. the law;' it can be destroyed without any conveyance or grant,' and by the agreement of the parties.' But the mere knowledge of a life tenant of the erection of a building across an alley and his failure to object does not create an estoppel against the remainderman, and thereby extinguish the easement.' § 191. Non-User.— The presumption of extinguishment by non-user, of a right of way for twenty years must be fortified by other evidence in order to forfeit the easement." The court protected an easement so far against the pre- sumption of abandonment, as to hold that the mere neglect of the grantee for forty years to exercise the right to dig ore in the land of another, would not extinguish the right, when there was no act of adverse enjoyment on the part of the owner of the land." There must be an adverse user or the easement will not be lost. " Thus, the mere non-user by 1 Louisville Railroad Co. v. Covington, 3 Bush (Ky.), 536. 'Bond V. Willis, 84 Va. 796; Leach v. Hastings, 147 Mass. 515. » Ware v. Chew, 43 N. J. Eq. 493. "Bull's Petition, 15 R. I. 534. 5 Taylor v. Hampton, 4 McCord (S. Car.), 96. CompaFe Chew «. Cook, 39 N. J. Eq. 396. « Taylor ». Hampton, 4 McC rd (S. Car.), 96; 30 Cent. L. Jour. 430. 'Lattimer v. Livermore, 73 N. Y. 174, 183. 8 Stein V. Dahm, 96 Ala. 481. » Welsh V. Taylor, 134 N. Y. 450. '"Wright V. Freeman, 5 Havr. & J. (Md.) 477. "Arnold v. Stevens, 34 Pick. (Mass.) 106. " Gibson v. Port r (Ky.), 15 S. W. Rep, 871; Pennsylvania Railroad Co. «. Freeport, 138 Pa. St. 91. § 191] EASEMENTS. 207 a railroad company of the entire width of its right of way, does not cause such non used part to revert to the public, even though the pubhc is allowed by the company to use it as a thoroughfare.' And where a city has acquired an easement in land for a public street, mere non-user for any length of time will not operate as an abandonment ; at least until the time arrives when the street is required for actual pubhc use, and when the municipal authorities may be called upon to open and use it. Neither will the misuser by the city authorities constitute an abandon- ment." So mere non-user of a right of way granted to a railroad company will not extinguish the right in the ab- sence of adverse possession by the servient owner, or of such acts on the part of the railroad company as evince a clear intention to abandon the right of way. ' There is no sound distinction between easements created by deed and those acquired by prescription on this point.* But it is said that when the right has been acquired by deed, mere disuse for any length of time will not defeat the right. Only such acts by the owner of the servient tenement, as vsdll be adverse to the owner of the easement, continued for the time of prescription, will have that effect.' Eights gained by dedication may be lost by adverse user by private individuals, ' or by non-user. ' But the evidence ' Parker v. St. Paul, 47 Minn. 317; Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Preeport. 138 Pa. St. 91. ^ Parker v. St. Paul, 47 Minn. 317. 'Roanoke Imp. Co. ■». Railroad Co., 108 Mo. 50. See, also, Dill v. Board, 47 N. J. Eq. 431; Horner v. Stillwell, 85 N. J. L. 807; Johnston v. Hyde, 33 N. J. Eq. 633; Arnolds. Stevens, 34 Pick. (Mass.) 106; Owen v. Field, 102 Mass. 112; Hall «. McCaughey, 51 Pa. St. 43; Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Preeport, 138 Pa. St. 91; Smyles v. Hastings, 32 N. Y. 317; Caster ». Shipman, 35 N. Y. 533. ^ VegUte B. Water Power Co., 19 N. J. Eq. 143; Stokoe v. Singers, 8 El. & Bl. 81; Pope V. O'Hara, 48 N. Y. 446; Winham v. McGuire, 51 Ga. 578. Compare Welsh v. Taylor, 50 Hun (N. Y.), 187. •Farrar®. Cooper, 34 Me. 400; Bannon v. Angler, 2 Allan (Mass.), 128; Tyler v. Cooper, 47 Hun (N. Y.), 94. 6 Alves V. Henderson, 16 B. Mon. (Ky.) 172; Callaway Co. v. NoUey, 81 Mo. 398; Pella i). Scholte, 34 Iowa, 286; Knight 1>. Heaton, 22 Vt. 480. 'Commissioners v. Taylor, 2 Bay (S. Car.), 292; Baldwin ». Buffalo, 39 Barb . Alderson, 33 Iowa, 161; Bakeman v. Talbot, 31 N. Y. 866; "Huson o. Young, 4 Lans. (N. Y.) 63; Baker v. Frick, 45 Md. 337. §§ 195-196] EASEMENTS. 211 It is not necessary that the party claiming an easement or right of way shall be the only one who can or may enjoy that or a similar right over the same land, but his right should not depend for its enjoyment upon a similar right in others. He must exercise it under some claim existing in his favor independently of all others.' A way for carriage does not include a drive way for cattle, nor does a way for pigs include one for oxen." A claim to extend a bay window on the street is un- reasonable, and will not be allowed.' Nor a prescriptive right to carry away clay without hmit;* nor a right to cut all the wood on a lot of land; " nor to excavate coal to the injury of the buildings on the land. ° § 195. Gkantee op the Fee Subject to the Ease- ment.— The grantee of the fee subject to the easement has the same rights as his grantor to the use of the way. The grantee may build over the way when not forbidden by his deed. Thus, where the owner of a block of land in a city laid it out into lots and sold a corner lot subject to a right of way fifteen feet in width across the rear thereof from a side street ' ' for horses, carriages and carts for the private convenience of the owners " of all lots, the way to be kept open for the use and purposes aforesaid and nb other, and the grantee is successor in title, he will not be restricted from building over the way so long as he leaves the way open the specified width, and to a height sufficient so as not to interfere with the easement granted; he is not required to keep the way open for the purpose of furnish- ing light and air to buildings on the other lots. ' § 196. Encroachments— Use of G-ates. — In the absence of a contract forbidding it, the owner of the servient estate wiU have a right to swing gates across the way. ° 1 McKenzie v. Elliott, 134 111. 156. = Eallard v. Dyson, 1 Taunt. 388. ' Codman v. Evans, 5 Allen (Mass.), 310. * Clayton v. Corby, 5 Q. B. 415. » Bailey v. Stevens, 12 C. B. N. 8. 108. 'Hilton V. Granville, 5 Q. B. 701. ' Hollins V. Demorest, 129 N. Y. 676. 'Phillips V. Dressier, 122 Ind. 414; Whaley v. Jarrett, 69 Wis: 613; Green v. QoS, 44 111. App. 589; Ames v. Shaw, 82 Me. 379. 212 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 197 So where the gates at the ends of the right of way have been in use forty years such use must be deemed to have been the intention of the parties, and the gates cannot be disturbed and taken down.* Where the right of way is granted and no stipulation to the contrary, the owner of the servient estate may erect gates at the ends of the way." He may also svring shutters across the way; ° or use it to pile building materials on, so long as he does not interfere with the dominant owner's rights.* But a reservation in a deed of " thirty- three feet for a street," to be "kept open" gives the owner of the ease- ment an unobstructed thirty-three feet for a street, and the owner of the servient estate cannot place a fence across the street vsdth a gate ten feet wide through which the owner of the easement may pass. The terms of the grant must control, and the thirty-three feet must not be impeded. " When by the several grants to the parties their proper- ties are bounded by a private aUey in controversy, and the same use of the alley is made appurtenant, neither party has the right to alter the character of the alley without the consent of the other. ° § 197. Question of Fact. — It is a question of fact whether the land owner's maintenance of gates across the right of way is an unnecessary, interference with its use.' In New Jersey the court will take judicial notice that a brick waU three feet and eight inches from certain win- dows, and at least fifteen inches above them, is a detri- mental obstruction to Kght and air. " ' Frazier ». Myers, 132 Ind. 71. See, also, Fankboner v. Corder, 137 Indn 164. ' Short B. Devine, 146 Mass. 119; Maxwells. McAtee, 9 B. Men. (Ky.) 20r Garland ■». Furber, 47 N. H. 301; Amondsoa «. Severson, 37 Iowa, 602; Tyler ». Cooper, 47 Hun (N. Y.), 94; Cowling v. Higginson, 4 Mees. & Wels, 345. ''Underwood «. Carney, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 285, 292. * Van O'Linda v. Lothrop, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 292. "Patton ». Western Car. Educational Co., 101 N. Car. 408. « Ellis V. Academy, 120 Pa. St. 608. ' Brill «. Brill, 108 N. Y. 511. « Ware v. Chew, 43 N. J. Eq. 493. § 198] easements. 213 Article 7. Remedies by Abatement, at Law and in Equity. % 198. Abatement. § 203. Against Whom Brought. § 199. Reasonable Necessity. § 304. Measure of Damages— Abut- § 200. Actions at Law. ting Owners. § £01. Form of Action. § 205. Actions in Equity. § 202. By Whom Brought. § 206. Relief by Injunction. § 198. Abatement. — The remedies for the disturbance in the rightful enjoyment of an easement are : 1. By act of the party ; for the injured party may enter upon an- other's land and abate the nuisance. 2. By action at law. 3. By suit in equity. ' A party may bring his action to recover the damage or may take the remedy in his own hands and abate the nui- sance." The party must in the selections of means of pro- tection within his power, use care to prevent unnecessary injury to the property of others.' The owner of the ease- ment, after notice and request to remove the obstruction, may puU it down, although it be a house actually inhab- ited." But before notice is given to abate a nuisance, the owner of the easement has not right to puU down an in- habited house.' A pubhc nuisance cannot lawfully be abated by a private person unless he has siiffered special damages not common to others. And a person obstructed in his use of a high- way, and having occasion to use it, cannot interfere with any erection unless in case of necessity, and then only to the extent of that necessity." And it is held where a party can maintain an action for a nuisance, he may enter and abate it, though at the time 1 3 Kent's Com. 448 n. 2 Great Falls Co. v. Worster, 15 N. H. 413; Jewell «. Gardiner, 13 Mass. 311; Rhea«. Forsyth, 37 Pa. St. 503; Adams®. Barney, 25 Vt. 225; Perry®. Filzhowe, 8 Q. B. 757. 2 Noyes v. Shepherd, 30 Me. 173; Beach v. Trudgain, 2 Gratt. (Va.) 319. See, also, Amick v. Tharp, 13 Gratt. (Va.) 564; McCord v. High, 24 Iowa, 348. ■■ Lane ®. Capsey (1891), 3 Ch. 411; Davies v. Williams, 16 Q. B. 546. See, also, Baten's Case, 9 Co. 53 b. ' Per-y D. Fitzhowe, 8 Q. B. 757. « Clark V. Ice Co., 24 Mich. 508; Dimes v. Petley, 15 Q. B. 276. 214 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 199 it caused but nominal damages.' Before he abates the nuisance, he must have been injured," unless in the nature of things the injury is sure to come. If a neighbor's eaves project over his land, he need not wait until the rain has actually fallen and been thrown upon his premises. So if a dam has been erected, which, when filled, will overflow his land, he need not wait for the closing of the gates; ' and he should abate the nuisance within a reasonable time.* And after he has abated the nuisance, he can re- cover all damages which he may have suffered up to the time of his abatement.' However, this method of suppressing a nuisance cannot be apphed in but few cases. § 199. Reasonable Necessity. — Before the owner of the easement can proceed to abate the nuisance, he must be justified, and a jury wiU pass upon this question.' And he can only reduce the nuisance so as to abate his injury.'' He must, in his selection of means of protection within his power, use care to prevent unnecessary injury to the prop- erty of others.' In abating a nuisance, no act which is unnecessary is al- lowed." And where any excess of a right may be abated without interference with the right, such interference can- not be justified." Where one, in exercising a right, trans- forms it so as to make it include a right not granted, in such a manner that the wrongful part cannot be abated without abating the rightful part, the whole may be = Amoskeag Manuf. Co. v. Goodale, 46 N. H. 53; Baten's Case, 9 Co. 53 b; Great Falls Co. «. Worster, 15 N. H. 438. ^Norris v. Baker, 1 Rolle, 393; Jones ». Powell, Palm. 536. 3 Amoskeag Manuf. Co. v. Goodall, 46 N. H. 53, 56. * Moffet ». Brewer, 1 Greene (Iowa), 348. 'Tate V. Parrish, 7 Mon. (Ky.) 336; White v. Chapin, 102 Mass. 188. See 33 Cent. L. J. 445. 'Morrison v. Howe, 130 Mass. 571. 'Davies v. Williams, 16 Q. B. 546; Wright v. Moore, 38 Ala. 599; Heath v. Williams, 35 Me. 309; Gates«. Blincoe, 3 Dana (Ey.), 158; Prescott v. White, 31 Pick. (Mass.) 341. « Great Falls Co. v. Worster, 15 N. H. 413. •Roberts v. Rose, 3 Hurl. & C. 163; Baten's Case, 9 Co. 53 b.; Arundel v. M'Culloch, 10 Mass. 70; Gray v. Ayres, 7 Dana (Ky.), 375. "Greensdale v. Halliday, 6 Bing. 379; Shepard v. People, 40 Mich. 487. §§ 200-201] EASEMENTS. 215 abated. Thus, where one has a right to flow clean water over the land of another, and flows dirty water, the entire flow of water may be stopped ' § 200. Actions at Law. — When the owner of the ease- ment wants to collect damages, he may proceed at law by bringing a suitable action. The right to have land not built upon for the benefit of Ught and air of the adjoining land, may be made an easement within reasonable limits by deed." And such easement may be created by words of covenant, as well as by words of grant.' And in order to attach the easement to the dominant estate, it is not neces- sary that it should be created at the moment when either the dominant or the servient estate is conveyed, if the pur- port of the deed is to create an easement for the benefit of the dominant estate* And by the same deed numerous parties may grant similar or reciprocal easements over or in favor of many parcels of land." So, when the owners of lots bounded by a public square mutually covenant, among other things, that portions of some of the lots shall not be built upon, or not built upon above a certain height, and afterwards the city takes such lots for a site for a new court house, the city is liable for damages for the extin- guishment of light and air created by the covenants." If the servient owner obstructs the right of way, the dominant party may maintain an action therefor, even though he may not be able to prove any injury and actual damages to have been occasioned thereby, because a repe- tition of such acts might in time ripen into an adverse pos.- session.' § 201. Form of Action. — When the action is to recover consequential damages for interfering with the right of an ' Crosland b. Pottsville, 136 Pa. St. 511. 'Biooks V. Reynolds, 106 Mass. 31. 'Hogan V. Barry, 143 Mass. 588. * Louisville, etc. E, R. Co. v. Koelle. 104 III. 455; Wetherell v. Brobst. 23 Iowa, 586. ' Tobey v. Moore, 130 Mass. 448; Beals ». Case, 138 Mass. 138. "Ladd V. Boston, 151 Mass. 585. 'Cole V. Drew, 44 Vt. 49; Asliby ». White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938; Harropu. Hirst, L. R., 4 Exch. 43; Collins v St. Peters, 65 Vt. 618. 216 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 201 easement, the form of action, at common law, is case and not trespass.' And when the statute provides for a pen- alty for the encroachment on an easement, it has been de- cided that the injured party must proceed according to statute. Thus, the owner of a private way cannot main- tain an action of trespass for damages against a railroad company that obstructs it, but must bring an action for the penalty as prescribed by the statute.' For any act of the owner of the easement in excess of his rights, trespass is the remedy,' which is local.* The owner of the fee may estabhsh his title against the owner of the easement, who claims more, by a writ of entry." The action may be brought in the county where the damages are done, as where the dam in one county flows land in another, the action may be brought in the latter.' Although the right to the passage is an incorpo- real right, yet, when the party is in possession of it, he can maintain a suit for an obstruction of it by a wrong-doer.' If the act is done in one State and the injury follows in another, an action will lie;' but ejectment will not lie against one who claims an easement to try his title to it,' nor a writ of entry.'" The more approved remedy for the disturbance or inter- ruption of the rights of the owner of the way is an action of trespass on the case." But a writ of entry cannot be maintained by a party who possesses no higher interest in the soil than a mere easement or right of way." The right to a fee and the right to an easement in the same estate are rights independent of each other, and may I Tibbetts v. Penley, 83 Me 118; Smith v. Wiggin, 48 N. H. 100. 5 Ross V. Railroad Co. 33 8. Car. 477. 'Ganley v. Looney, 14 Allen (Mass.), 40; Faulk ». Thornton, 108 N. Car. 314. '' Mersey Nav. Co. v Douglas, 3 East, 497. ' Morgan v. Moore, 3 Gray (Mass.) 319; Tillmes v. Marsh, 67 Pa. St.507. « Thompson v. Crocker, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 59; Sutton®. Clarke, 6 Taunt. 29. 'Hamilton v. Dunnison, 56 Coun. 359. 8 Thayer «. Brooks, 17 Ohio, 493. 9 Clement v. Youngman, 40 Pa. St. 341. '» Smith V. Wiggin, 48 N. H. 109. " Mayhew v. Norton, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 357; Gushing v. Adams, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 114. " Smith V. Wiggin, 48 N. H. 105 § 202 J EASEMENTS. 217 well subsist together when vested in different persons. Each can maintain an action to support his right; the for- mer to protect and enforce his seisin of the fee; the latter to prevent a disturbance of his easement." The general rule is that an action of ejectment will not he for an easement which is not a title to or an interest in law." A party is en- titled to damages for a continuance of the disturbance of his easement, after a former recovery therefor, although it does not materially interfere with his use of the easement. ' § 202. By Whom Brought.— Whenever there is an inva- sion of rights, the law infers damages, although it be merely nominal it is not regarded as damnum absque in- juria, because it is founded on an inf ringment of the legal title of the injured party. The familiar maxim ubijus, ibi remedium, rests on this principle.'' When the property is leased and the tenant in possession, for an injury to the possession, the tenant only has his remedy; for an injury to the reversion, the right of action is in the owner. And when a party does things which injure the reversion, the owner may have his action for the injury to the reversion." A tenant at will of land may sustain an action for an interruption of a passage way appurtenant to the land oc- cupied by him." No neglect of the tenant for life or years to resist en- croachment wiU create a prescription against the owner of the fee.' Where simultaneous conveyances are made to two mills ' Morgan v. Moore, 3 Gray (Mass.), 319; Hancock v. Wentworth, 5 Met. (Mass.) 450; Jackson ». Hathaway, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 453; Shepard«. Baker, 24 N. H. 208. ■' Smith V. Slocomb, 11 Gray (Mass.), 280. " 3 Ellis 1). Academy, 130 Pa. St. 608. ' Ashby V. White, 1 Salk. 19; 2 Ld. Ray. 955; Chapman v. Thames Manuf. Co. 18 Conn. 369. 'Jackson v. Pesked, 1 Maule & 8. 334; Ingrahara ». Bunnell, 5 Met. (Mass.) 118; Baker v. Sanderson, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 348; Gushing d. Adams, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 110; Hastings®. Livermore, 7 Gray (Mass.), 194; Kidgill ■». Moor, 9 C. B. 364; Brown v. Bowen, 30 N. Y. 519; Tinsman v. Railroad Co., 1 Dutch (N. J.) 355; Queens. Hallett, 14 East, 489; Richardson v. Bigelow, 15 Gray (Mass.), 154. •Foley V. Wyeth, 3 Allen (Mass.), 185. ' Reimer v. Stuber, 20 Pa. St. 458; Daniel v. North, 11 East, 373. 28 218 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 203 which refer to the same plan upon which is marked a way- leading to one of the mills, which is not then laid out and a canal across that way to the other miU, the rights of both owners are equal.' An action lies against one who erects a nuisance without any request made to abate it, but not against the feofee, unless he does not reform the nuisance after request made." So a tenant for years is not liable for keeping a nuisance as it used to be before the commencement of his tenancy, if he has not been requested to remove it, or done any new act which of itself is a nuisance." § 203. Against Whom Brought. — Any person who in- terferes with the easement is liable for the damages. And no notice or request to abate a nuisance is necessary before bringing suit against the original wrong doer in such case for the damage done; but the grantee of a nuisance is not liable to the party injured only upon request made, he re- fusing to remove the nuisance." The injury is, in its na- ture, a private nuisance. " If the grantee of land continues the nuisance, he will not be liable until requested to abate it, and refuses to do it.' If a notice has been given, a con- veyance of the land does not render it necessary to give another notice. ' When an easement is destroyed the purchaser of the servient estate is not responsible, ' though he would be Ua- ble if he resisted the restoration of the easement if it is of ' Richardson v. Bigelow, 15 Gray (Mass ) 154. ' Penruddock's Case, 5 Co. 100 b; Winsmore v. Greenbank, Willes, 583; Pierson v. Glean, 3 Green (N. J.), 37. ^McD(Jnough ». Gilman, 3 Allen (Mass.), 364; Byppon v. Bowles, Cro. Jac. 37.S. ■•Eastman ». Amoskeag Manuf. Co. 44 N. H. 143, 158; Waggoners. Jer- maine, 3 Denio (N. Y.), 308; Hubbard «. Russell, 34 Barb. (N. Y.) 407; Thorn- ton 'B. Smith, 11 Minn. 15; Caldwell ». Gale, 11 Mich. 77; Fish v. Dodge, 4 Denio (N. Y.), 811. ' Staple «, Spring, 10 Mass. 73. « Pillsbury i\ Moore, 44 Me. 154; Dodge v. Stacy, 39 Vt. 577; Grigsby v. Clear Lake Co., 40 Cal. 407. ' Caldwell v. Gale, 11 Mich. 77; Eastman v. Amoskeag Manuf. Co., 44 N. H. 143, 157. Compare Pickett v. Condon, 18 Md. 413, 417. 8 Ballard «. Butler, 30 Me. 94. § 204] EASEMENTS. 219 such a nature as can be replaced. ' After due notice the owner of the easement may hold responsible the party who created the obstruction or the person who continues it.' §204. Measure. OF Damages — Abutting Owners.— In estimating damages to a lot caused by the construction and maintenance of a railway in a street in front of the premises, but beyond the centre hne thereof, only such injuries to the property should be considered as proxi- mately result from interference with the appurtenant easement for purposes of access, hght and air which the owner has in that part of the street.' In New York the abutting owners are only entitled to damages for the con- struction and operation of the elevated railway "in front " of the abutters' premises, resulting from taking and obstructing their street easement of light, air and access.' In Minnesota the court adopts the hmitation as to place " in front of the premises." ' Judge Mitchell says a recovery can only be had for damages resulting from destruction of or interference with the easement of access, light and air. The very ground work upon which the right of recovery is based is that the abutting owner has in the opposite one-half of the street not the fee but an easement for access, hght and air for the benefit of his premises. These are rights in the nature of private property which the owner has in that part of the street, and consequently they are only property j-ights which the railroad company has trespassed upon; and if so it would seem logically to follow that this is ah for which it is hable to respond to him in damages.* Chief Justice Euger says that an elevated railway in a street of a city, supported by columns placed along the outer hne of the sidewalks, and operated by steam power, is a perversion of the use of the street from the purposes ' Ballard v. Butler, 30 Me, 94. 'Eistman v. Amoskeag Manuf. Co., 44 N. H. 143, 158. See, also, Thomp- son V. Gibson, 7 Mees. & W. 456. ^Lamm v. Railroad Co., 45 Minn. 71; Adams ». Railroad Co., 39 Minn. 386. « Story V. Railroad Co., 90 K Y. 133. 5 Adams ». Railioad Co., 39 Minn. 386. •Lamm v. Railroad Co., 45 Minn. 71. 220 CLASSIFICATION OP ESTATES. [§ 205 originally designed, and in a use which neither the city authorities nor the legislature can legalize or sanction "without providing compensation for the injury inflicted upon property of abutting owners. The abutters acquire an easement in the bed of the street for egress and ingress to and from their premises, and, also, for the free and uninterrupted passage and circulation of light and air. And the erection and operation of such elevated railway in the street, the use of which is intended to be perman- ent, constitute a taking and appropriation of the ease- ment by the railway corporation, rendering it liable to the abutters for the damages thereby occasioned.' The loss of hght, which is an element of damage, includes the loss of light reflected from the street as well as the loss of direct rays." § 205. Actions in Equity.— Equity follows the law. It will not enlarge the boundaries of its jurisdiction. So where a court of law has determined the legal rights of two adjoining land owners under a reservation in the deed from the one to the other of the right to construct a build- ing upon the common line between them, the court of equity will not interfere. Vice Chancellor Bird says that, notwithstanding the chancellor supposed that the grantor has secured a substantial right by his reservation, which could not be interfered with at the will of his grantee — the extent of that right to be determined, however, by a legal tribunal — the chief justice has concluded that he liad no substantial right whatever except at the pleasure of his grantee or his privies; and this at once becomes the guide for the action of the court, of equity." When the party has an adequate remedy at law, a court of equity will not take jurisdiction. And an adequate remedy at law means a complete remedy to which the complainant may resort at wiU, and which he can control." If a title is in controversy, the court wiU first require the plaintiff to settle the question at law, unless imme- > Lahr v. Railroad Co., 104 N. Y. 268. ' Scott ». Pape, 31 Ch. Div. 554. ' Hagerty v. Lee, 48 N. J. Eq. 98, 101. * Wheeler v. Bedford, 54 Conn. 244. § 205] EASEMENTS. 221 diate interference is necessary to prevent permanent injury.' It may be stated as a general rule that where an ease- ment or servitude is annexed or pertains to a private estate, either by grant, covenant or prescription, any encroachment upon its quiet enjoyment and exercise will be prevented by injunction." Where the injury is trifling no injunction will be granted.' Where land is so situated with reference to a public highway, that such highway is necessary to ingress and egress, and over such land the owner has a private ease nient in the public highway, he may maintain an action for its obstruction, and this action may be bv injunction to enjoin the obstruction of such public highway." He may recover damages merely nominal, not being bound to wait until the injury is fully consummated and actual damages have accrued.' Every injury imports damages, and if damages are not established the party injured is entitled to a verdict for nominal damages." And where one has a right of way by prescription he can enjoin its obstruction.' And the owner of the private right of way can enjoin the owner of the fee from making such use of the land as will render the road impassable or otherwise interferes with its use by the grantee for the purpose granted.' And though one tenant in common has a right to use the whole property if he does not exclude the other, he may not obstruct an alley held by them in common. And if the other tenant is not using the aUey at the time of such obstruction, and is not damaged by it, this makes no difference.' Although the closing of the right of way may be a ' Burnham v. Kempton, 44 N. H. 79; Robeson «. Pittenger, 1 Green (N. J.), Ch. 57; Outcalt v. Helme, 42 N. J. Eq. 665. ' High on Inj. sect. 545. «St. Helen's Smelting Co. ■». Tipping, 11 H. L. Cas. 643; Owen «. Field, 13 Allen (Mass.), 457. *Ross V. Thompson, 78 Ind. 90; Harding v. Cowgar, 127 Ind. 245. » Ross V. Thompson, 78 Ind. 90; 3 Story's Eq. Jur. sect. 934. « Webb V. Portland Manuf. Co. , 3 Sumner, C. C. 189; Washb. on Easem. 295. 'Rogerson v. Shepherd, 33 W. Va. 307. 8 Herman v. Roberts, 119 N. Y. 37. » Swift V. Coker, 83 Ga. 789. 222 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 206 nuisance for which an action of law may be maintained, yet being a continuing nuisance it will authorize a court of equity to interpose by injunction/ The jurisdiction of chancery has been so extended as to grant relief to prevent the deprivation of rights connected with real estate as the right of easement and the like, without showing that the injury threatened will be irre- parable." But where the injury is contingent and doubtful no injunction will be granted." And in some cases a mandatory injunction will be granted requiring the defendant to remove the obstruction." In actions respecting real estate, if there be no equitable ground of relief involved, the rights of the parties must be determined at law. When thus determined, or when in proceedings by biU. in equity, the rights of the plaintiff are admitted in the pleadings, or are undisputed, or otherwise clearly appear, and equity, based upon those rights, may be asserted, and a decree for equitable rehef be made.' § 206. Relief BY In JUNCTION. — In granting or withholding rehef by injunction, the court weighs the conveniences and inconveniences in the first instance, and when no very great injury will result to an unoffending party, the court often leaves parties to their remedy at law." And where an injunction is sought in aid of an easement, if it appears that the uses of the easement have been perverted by the plaintiff to the great detriment of the defendant's property, by increased inconvenience and annoyance to his tenants, and the consequent diminished rental value, the 1 Russell V. Napier, 80 Ga. 77; Stallard v. Cusliing, 76 Gal. 472; Wood on Nuis. sects. 783, 783. ' Swan V. Railroad Co., 73 Iowa, 650. Compare Jackson v. New Castle, 33 L. J. (N. S.) Eq. 698. 3 Bliss V. Kennedy, 43 111. 74; Pattisson v. Gilford, L. R. 18 Eq. 259; 9 Eng. R. 786. "Earle v. DeHart, 1 Beas. (N. J.) 380; Ackerman v. Horicon Co., 16 Wis. 154; Holsman v. Boiling Spring Co., 1 McCart. (N. J.) 342; Corning v. Troy Factory, 40 N. Y. 192; Burwell v. Hobson, 12 Gratt. (Va.) 322. ' Ferguson's Appeal, 117 Pa. St. 427. See, also, "Vinton v. Greene; 158 Mass. 426. • Chambers v. Alabama Iron Co., 67 Ala. 353 ; 3 Pom. Eq. sect. 1338 ; Wood «. SutclifEe, 2 Sim. N. S. 163. § 206] EASEMENTS. 223 court will not interfere, but will leave the party to his rem- edy at law. ' Where the privileges of a public nature are also benefi- cial to private property, as in the case of land upon a pub- lic square, the enjoyment of them will be protected against encroachments by injunction." And parol evidence is in- admissible to change a written grant. Thus, parol evi- dence is inadmissible to show that a grantor orally agreed that no hotel should ever be erected on a lot retained by him.' When a party is shown to be entitled to relief it will be granted according to the circumstances of the case." And to entitle himself to an injunction to protect a right he claims in land, must show that, on the undisputed facts of his case, and according to the established law of the State, he possesses the right which he claims. ' When the gravamen of the complainant's case is that the defendant has been guilty of unconscientious conduct in depriving him of the enjoyment of his legal rights, to his irreparable injury, it is a condition precedent to the com- plainant's right to bring his adversary into a court of con- science, that his adversary's unconscientious conduct shall be either admitted, or shall have been established against him by a judgment at law. ° Nothing short of the threat- ened destruction of property of great value by acts of wan- ton lawlessness, inflicting injuries which must result in irreparable damage, wiU justify the granting of an injunc- tion staying an important public work. ' ' McBryde v. Sayre, 86 Ala. 458. ' Wheeler v. Bedford, 54 Conn. 244. 3 Tibbitts V. Tibbltts (N. H.), 20 At. Rep. 979 ; Ware v. Chew, 43 N. J. Eq. 493. «Chapin v. Brown, 15 R, I. 579. ' Dodge V. Railroad Co., 43 N. J. Eq. 351. « Outcalt V. Helme, 42 N. J. Eq. 665. ■> Dodges. Railroad Co., 43 N. J. Eq. 351, CHAPTER VI. water rights and easements. Article 1. Water Courses. § 207. Water Course. § 211. Prescription. § 208. Ownership. § 212. Abandonment. § 209. Lawfui Use. § 213. Pollution. § 210. Prior Appropriation. § 207. Water Course. — A water course must be a stream flowing in a particular direction, though it need not flow continually. It must flow in a definite channel having a bed, banks, and usually discharge itself into some stream or body of water. It must be something more than a mere surface drainage over the entire tract of land, occasioned by freshets or other extraordinary cause. ' The size of the stream is not important. It may be very small, and the flow of the water need not be constant." But where rain water flows down a natural depression without forming for itself a bed or channel, there is no water course, although at recurring seasons a large stream of water should flow.' The stream must be something more than a mere surface drainage over the entire face of a tract of land, occasioned by unusual freshets. Water flowing through a hollow or ravine, only in times of rain or melting of snow, is not, in contemplation of law, a water course.* It must be a living ' Chamberlain «. Hemingway, 63 Conn. 1; Robinson v. Shanks, 118 Ind. 125; Simmons ». Winters, 21 Oreg. 35; Luther?;. Winnisimmet Co., 9 Cush. (Mass.) 171; Starr v. Child, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 149; Gavit v. Chambers, 3 Ohio, 495; Sweet v. Cutts, 50 N. H. 439; Rummell ». Lamb (Mich.), 59 N. W. Rep. 167; 9 Am. Rep. 276; Lessard v. Stram, 62 Wis. 112; 51 Am. Rep. 715; Palmer «. Waddell, 22 Kans. 352; Gibbs v. Williams, 25 Kans. 314; 37 Am. Rep. 241; Bloodgood V. Ayers, 108 N. Y. 400; 2 Am. St. Rep. 443; Barnes v. Sabron, 10 Nev. 217; Shields v. Arndt, 3 Greene Ch. (N. J ) 234. 'Gillette. Johnson, 80 Conn. 180; Basset ®. Salisbury Manuf. Co.,43N. H. 569. 'HoytB. Hudson, 27 Wis. 656; Bowlsby v. Speer, 31 N. J. L. 351, Ashley n. Wolcott, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 193. "Chasemore v. Richards, 7 H. L. Cas. 349; Euhich v. Richter, 41 Wis. 318. (224) § 208] WATER RIGHTS AND EASEMENTS. 225 stream with definite banks, not necessarily running all the time, but it must be fed from more permanent sources than mere surface water.' § 208. Ownership.— The law of water courses is founded to a great extent, if not wholly, upon the common law maxim aqua currit et debet currere ut currere solebat. So the owner of the land has no property in the water itself, but a simple usufruct while it passes along His right to the continued flow of the water in its natural channel, is not an easement but a natural right." While he may use the water as it runs over his land as an incident to his land, he cannot unreasonably detain it, or give it another direction. Without the consent of the adjoining proprietors, he cannot divert or diminish the quantity of water which would otherwise descend to the proprietors below, nor throw the water back upon the pro- prietors above, without a grant, or an uninterrupted enjoy- ment of twenty years, which is evidence of it. ' But the diminution of a stream to be unlawful, must be substantial, and sufficient to cause actual damage. * The riparian owner of land bordering upon a running stream, has at common law a right to the flow of its waters as a natural incident to his estate, and they cannot lawfully be diverted without his consent. " But the American doctrine seems to be that the riparian owner has a right to the reasonable use of the water.' ' Chamberlain v. Hemingway, 63 Conn. 1. ' Williamson v. Oleson (Iowa), 59 N. W. Rep. 367; Wadsworth v. Tillotson, 15 Conn. 366; Stokoe ». Singers, 8 El. & BI. 36; Bartlett v. O'Connor (Cal.), 36 Pac. Rep. 513. ' Wright V. Howard, 1 Sim. & Stu. 190; King v. TifEany, 9 Conn. 163; Davis 1). Fuller, 13 Vt. 178. " Wheatley v. Chrisman, 31 Pa. St. 398; Elliot d. Railroad Co. 10 Cusli. (Mass.) 191; G-illett v. Johnson, 30 Conn. 180; Qerrish ». Mew Market Manuf. Co. 30 N. H. 478; Chatfleld v. Wilson, 31 Vt. 358; Embrey v. Owen, 6 Exch. 853. 'Sturrv. Beck, 133 U. S. 541; Strickler d. Colorado Springs, 16 Colo. 61; Curtis V, La Grande Water Co., 30 Oreg. 34; Hindman v. Rizor, 21 Oreg. 113; Painter v. Pasadena L. & Water Co. 91 Cal. 74; Croaker ». Benton, 93 Cal. 365. *Snow». Parsons, 28 Vt. 459; Springfield v. Harris, 4 Allen (Mass.) 494; Hayes v. Waldron, 44 N. H. 580; Davis d. Getchell, 50 Me. 602; Pitts v. Lan- caster Mills, 13 Met. (Mass.) 156. 29 226 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES [§ 209 What is a reasonable detention, depends upon the size of the stream and upon the uses to "which it is subservient, as the detention must necessarily be sufficient to accumulate the head of water requisite for practical use. § 209. Lawful Use. — In the use of streams for domestic, agricultural, and manufacturing purposes, to which every riparian owner is entitled, there may be some diminution, retardation, or acceleration of the natural current, that is perfectly consistent with the common right, and which is necessarily implied in the right to use it at aU. ' But the use must be reasonable, and so as not to cause material in- jury or annoyance to the adjoining owner." And what is a reasonable use is generally a question for the jury." It is held in England that the riparian owner has a right to have the natural water of the stream transmitted to him, without sensible alteration in its character or quality. The right of the upper heritor to send down, and the cor- responding obligation of the lower heritor to receive, nat- ural water, whether flowing in a natural channel or not, and whether upon or below the surface, are incidents of prop- erty arising from the relative limits of their respective lands and the strata below them. The lower heritor can- not object so long as the flow above or below ground, is due to gravitation, unless it has been unduly and unrea- sonably increased by artificial means. So the law in England and Scotland is that the lower riparian owner is entitled to have the natural water of the stream trans- mitted to him not only in a pure state for drinking and other ordinary purposes, but without sensible alteration in its character or quality.* ' Cady «. Springfield "Water "Works Co., 134 N. Y. 118. "^ Emboy v. Owen, 6 Exch. 353; Davis v. aetcliell, 50 Me. 602; Parker v. Hotchkiss, 25 Conn. 321; Gould v. Boston Duck Co., 13 Gray (Mass.), 442; Hayes v. Waldron, 44 N. H. 580; Merritt ®. Brinkerhofl, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 306. 'Miller v. Miller, 9 Pa. St. 74; Hayes «, "Waldron, 44 N. H. 580; Sno-w v. Parsons, 28 Vt. 459. * Young V. Bankier Dist. Co., 1 App. Cas. (1893), 691; Baird «. "Williamson, 15 C. B., N. S. 392; Blair v. Hunter, 9 Court Sess. Cas., 3d Series (Macpher- son), 207. § 209] WATER RIGHTS AND EASEMENTS. 227 The water must be used in a lawful manner and in a reasonable amount,' and must not be so used as -to pro- duce perceptible damages to the other proprietor." The right of a riparian owner to the flow of a stream of water OTer his land may be severed from the land by grant.' The conveyance of mill privileges carries with it the right of flowage without express words to that effect.* A mere hcense to use water is revokable at the will of the grantor, and passes no interest for a permanent use of the water. ' And when the right is permanent the grantee cannot increase the quality of the flow by taking water from another source on the grantor's land." In Indiana, persons using the water of an artesian well to bathe patients at a sanitarium, the well and sanitarium being on their own land, are not liable to an adjoining owner for allowing the water so polluted to flow into a stream, which is the natural water course of the basin in vrhich the weU. is situated, if there is no neghgence or mahce, and all due care is used to avoid injury. ' But the rule laid down by the Indiana court is contrary to the EngUsh and Scotch' doctrine and the weight of authority in this country. The late decisions of the American courts fully accord with the Enghsh and Scotch. Thus, in Ala- bama it is correctly decided that the upper heritor has no right to wash the ore taken from his land, and then allow the water thus used to run into a stream and pollute it so as to render it unfit for use for stock, and to cover the land of the lower heritor with mud and refuse.' And in late cases in Pennsylvania" it is held that a manufacturer ' Sampson v. Hoddinott, 1 C. B., N. S. 590. 'Blanchard v. Baker, 8 Me. 253; Jacobs ». Allard, 43 Vt. 303; Holsman ®. Boiling Spring Co., 14 N. J. Eq. 335. > Gould ». Stafford, 91 Cal. 146. * Watson V. Bartlett, 63 N. H. 447. . 'Reno Water Co. ■». Leete, 17 Nev. 203; Reno Water Co. v. Lee, 17Nev. 208. ' Furner ®. Seabury, 135 N. Y. 50. ' Barnard v. Sherley, 185 Ind. 547. See, also, Penn. Coftl Co. ». Sanderson, 113 Pa. St. 126. 'Young V. BankierDist. Co., 1 App. Cas. (1893) 691; Baird «. Williamson, 15 C. B., N. S. 392. 'Drake ®. Coal and Iron Co. (Ala.), 14 S. Rep. 749. See, also, Boynton v. Longley, 19 Nev. 69. w Lentz v. Carnegie, 145 Pa. St. 612; Robb ®. Carnegie, 145 Pa. St. 824. 228 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 209 of coke from coal not mined on his own land is liable in damages to the lower heritor for the pollution of a stream as a necessary incident to his business, and also for actual damages done to crops and soil. An earlier case' is not overruled but is commented on, and the distinction drawn that in the early case the coal was being mined by the owner of the soil, and in the latter cases the coke was not made on the land where the coal was mined. In the earlier Pennsylvania case it was said that such pollution is the natural and necessary result of the development by the owner of the resources of his own land. Now, it seems that if, in the case where the coal was mined on the land of the owner, he was exempt from damages, upon the ground that the individual interest must yield to the greater and paramount interest of the public, it will make but httle difference where the coke was made. The manu- facturing of the coke from the coal was that which con- tributed to the paramount and public interest. On the other hand, if the owner is to be exempted from liability because the coal was mined on his own land, and not because of public benefit, then the doctrine of sic utere tuo ut alienum nonlcedas will be abolished, and the rights of the lower heritor would be destroyed ; and hence, the reason- ing of the Pennsylvania cases is iUogical and untenable. Because the lower proprietor purchases under the protec- tion of the rule aqua currit et debut currere ut currere solebat, water runs and ought to run as it used to run, at least to the extent that the servitude of his land shall not be added to by artificial means or the industry of man. While the lower proprietor must submit to the flow of water coming down upon his lands by the natural force of gravitation, he is not bound to receive water brought up ■ from a depth by artificial means, such as pumping. The owner is entitled in mining to excavate and remove strata of minerals in the lands to any depth practical to which he may choose to go. If, in doing so, in the ordinary course of working, he should happen to tap springs or a water waste from which the water, by gravitation, rose to the surface and flowed down to the lower proprietor's land, ' Penn. Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. St. 126. § 210] WATER RIGHTS AND EASEMENTS. 229 this must be submitted to; but the mine owner is not enti- tled, by pumping, to increase this servitude or burden on one unwilling to submit to it, by pumping up water which might never rise to the surface, or which might only do so more gradually and slowly and in much smaller volume. § 210. Pkiok Appropriation. — It has been said, contrary to the weight of authority, that the right to run a mill and to dam up the water for that purpose, depend upon the priority of estabhshment; that he who first creates a miU upon the banks of a stream obtains a prior right to the use of the stream for that purpose, and if the quantity of water is not sufficiently large to permit the running of more than one mill, no other miU can be erected. So, if a second mill is erected by a proprietor above, and the detention of the water for the purpose of the mill is so great as to dimin- ish materially the supply of water to the first miU, the owner of the latter can enjoin such detention or diversion of the water.' So it has been held that a miU owner is en- titled to a reasonable user of the stream for his miU, even if it causes damage to a lower mill owner, and stopping water entirely during the night has been held to be a reas- onable user under the circumstances of the case; but it seems that the general rule is that the riparian owner is entitled to a reasonable user." In some of the western States it has been held that the first appropriator of a natu- ral stream for purposes of irrigation gets an exclusive right to the extent of such appropriation.' The riglit to land in California rested for years upon no other title than that of prior occupation and appropriation, and so the right to the use of running water was also ac- quired in the same way. So, in this State, as between per- ' Liggina v. Inge, 7Bing. 683 ; Boaley v. Shaw, 6 East. 309 ; Mason v. Hill, 5 Barn. & Ad. 1 ; Carey v. Danie's, 8 Met. (Mass.) 466 ; Williams v. Morland, 3 Barn. & Cress 913 ; Elliot v. Railroad Co., 10 Cush. (Mass.) 191, 193 ; Smith V. O'Hara, 48 Cal. 871. ' Prentice v. Geiger, 74 N. Y. 841 ; Keeney, etc. Manuf. Co. v. Union Manuf. Co , 39 Conn. 576 ; Holden «. Lake Co., 53 N. H. 553. ' Schilling t). Rominger 4 Colo. 100; Bar.ies ». Sabron, 10 Nev. 217; Lob- dell V. Simpson, 3 Nev. 374. 230 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 211 sons claiming water merely by the appropriation of the water itself, he has the best right who is first in time.' The better doctrine is that mere priority of appropriation of the water of a stream confers no exclusive right to the use of it. The right to have a stream flow on in its accus- tomed course can only be interfered with by an easement acquired by grant, or by an adverse enjoyment, for the period of time limited by statute of limitations for entry upon land. Mere priority of occupation of running water, without such consent or grant, confers no exclusive right.' The right of the first appropriator is this: Neither the owner of the land below can pen back the water, nor the owner of the land above diveit it to his prejudice. And the owner of the land who applies the stream that runs through it, to the use of a mill newly erected, or other pur- poses, if the stream is diverted or obstructed, may recover for the damages thus sustained." When a party buys a mill and water privileges, so long as he does not increase the quantity or the volume of water, it cannot be said that he imposes an additional burden upon the servient estate. He can make a new dam higher than the old one, when the bed of the stream having been changed and deepened by recurring freshets, in order to get the same surface level of water to supply the race, unless such additional height affects injuriously the rights of others.* § 211. Prescription. — A party acquires a right to the use of the water in a particular manner, by an uninterrupted ' Butte Canal, etc. Co. v. Vaughn, 11 Cal. 143 ; Smith v. O'Hara, 43 Cal. 371. See, also, Rupley v. Welch, 38 Cal. 452; Reynolds v. Hosmer, 51 Cal. 205; Kirk V. Bartholomew (Idaho ), 29 Pac. Rep. 40. ' Roath V. DriscoU, 20 Conn. 533 ; Heath 71. Williams, 25 Me. 309 ; Mason v. Hill, 5 Barn. & Ad. 1 ; Wright «. Howard, 1 Sim. & Stu. 190; Embrey «. Owen, 6 Exch. 353. sCowlesD. Kidder, 24 N. H. 364; Whipple®. Cumberland Manuf.Co. 2 Story, C. C. 661 ; Tyler «. Wilkinson, 4 Mason, C. C. 397; Davis v. Fullers, 13 Vt. 178. * Mason ■o. Hill, 5 Barn. & Ad. 1 ; Williams «. Morland, 3 Barn. & Cress. 910; Bealey«. Shaw, 6 East. 309; M'Calmonts. Wliitaker, 3 Rawle (Pa.), 84; Carey «. Daniels, 8 Met. (Mass.) 466 ; Riverdale Park Co. ■». Westcott, 74 Md. 311. See, also. Smith v. Thayer, 155 Mass. 48 ; Cornwell Manuf. Co. v. Swift, 89 Mich. 503. §§ 212-213] WATER EIGHTS AND EASEMENTS. 231 adverse enjoyment of such use for the statutory period.' If the stream be diminished in quantity or even corrupted in quahty, as by means of the exercise of certain trades, yet if the occupation of the party so taking or using it has ex- isted for twenty years or the time required by statute, there is a presumption of grant and the party whose land is below must take the stream subject to such adverse right." § 212. Abandonment. — When a party has a right to a particular use of water, he may abandon that use by not using it for more than twenty years, or the period of hmita- tion required by the statute. ' And a tenant in common may recapture and use his proportion of the water for any law- ful purpose.' The right to use water in a water- course through the land of the owner, is inseparably annexed to the soil and passes with it, not as an easement, nor as an appurtenance, but as a parcel. Use does not create it ; and disuse cannot destroy it. Unity of possession and title in such land with the lands above and below it does not extinguish or suspend it.' But a party who has a particu- lar use of the water may lose such right by abandonment for twenty years. " § 213. Pollution. — A riparian owner has the right to use the water which flows through his land in any man- ner which does not substantially injure other riparian owners, or in any manner which cannot injure them in ' Alcorn ». Sadler, 71 Miss. 634; Chauvet v. Hill, 93 Cal. 407. See, also, Trambley«. Luterman (N. Mex.), 27Pac. Rep. 313; Hopper v. Hopper, 146 Pa. St. 365 ; Spargur «. Heard, 90 Cal. 321 ; Horn v. Miller, 142 Pa. St. 557; Cornwell Manuf. Co. v. Swift, 89 Mich. 503 ; Frederick «. Dickey, 91 Cal. 358 ; Attorney General v. Revere Copper Company, 153 Mass. 444 ; Whitney v. Cotton Mills, 151 Mass. 396 ; Mathewson v. Hoffman, 77 Mich. 430. 'Smith V. Adams, 6 Paige (N. Y.), 485 ; Bucklin v. Truell, 54 N. H. 133 ; Bealey v. Shaw, 6 East. 208 ; Eshleman v. Martic, 153 Pa. St. 68 ; Leidlein v. Meyer, 95 Mich. 586; Drew «. Cole (Cal.), 32 Pac. Rep. 229. 'Kirman v. Hunnewill, 93 Cal. 519 ; Stalling v. Ferrin, 7 Utah, 477. * Meagher v. Hardenbrook, 11 Mont. 385. 'Johnson v. Jordan, 2 Met. (Mass.) 239. 'Kirman v. Hunnewill, 93 Cal. 519. See, also, Platte Water Co. v. Irriga- tion Co. 12 Colo. 525 ; McCauley v. McKeig, 8 Mont. 389. 232 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 214 any use to which they may put the water lawfully.' He cannot damage other riparian owners by polluting the wa- ters.' Any filth brought upon the land must be kept so as not to injure others." A riparian owner has no right to use the water in such a manner as to corrupt the atmos- phere.' And a proprietor who allows noxious substances to escape from his premises and pollute an adjacent own- er's well, is liable for the damages.' But the pollution of the water by the usual impurities from the streets in a city is not a cause of action.' Article 2. Surface Drainage. § 314. Surface Water. § 319. Civil Law Rule, I 315. Drainage of Surface Water. § 330. Arkansas Rule. § 316. Drainage Into Natural Chan- § 331. English Doctrine. nels. § 333. Prescription. § 317. In Cultivating the Land. § 333. Flowage From the Eaves of § 318. Obstruction of Flowage— Com- Houses. mon Law Rule. § 214. Surface Waters — Definition. — Surface waters are those which ooze through the soil, or diffuse or spread themselves over the ground's surface, forming bogs, •Pettibone v. Smith, 37 Mich. 579; Ewing v. Colquhoun, 3 App. Cas. 889; Pennington ■». Brinsop Hall Coal Co., 5 Ch. D. 769. ii Silver Springs, etc. Co. ®. Wanskuck Co., 13 R. I. 611; Gladfelter v. Walker, 40 Md. 1; Price «. Lawson, 74 Md. 499; Richmond Manuf. Co. ■». Atlantic De Laine Co., 10 R. I. 106; Acquackanonk Water Co. v. Watson, 39 N. J. Eq. 366; Wood •». Waud, 3 Exch. 748; Seaman e. Lee, 10 Hun (N. Y.), 607; Holsman «. Boiling Springs Bleaching Co., 14 N. J. Eq. 335. 'Tenant v. Goldwin, 3 Ld. Ray. 1089; Hodgkinson v. Ennor,4Best& S. 339; Pottstown Gas Co. v. Murphy, 39 Pa. St. 357; Clark v. Lawrence, 6 Jones Eq. (N. Car.) 83; Upjohn ». Richland, 46 Mich. 543; Honsee v. Ham- mond, 39 Barb. (N. Y.) 89; O'Riley v. McChesney, 3 Lans. (N. Y.) 378; 49 N. Y. 673. . Williams, 25 Kans. 214; Gillett ■V. Johnson, 30 Conn. 180; Ashley v. Wolcott, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 193. "Ashly ». Wolcott, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 193; Bowlsby «. Speer, 81 N. J. L. 351; Gould ». Booth, 66 N.Y. 62. Compare Bassett «. Salisbury Mf. Co , 43 N. H. 569. 'Butler V. Peck, 16 Ohio St. 334; Ogburn ». Connor, 46 Cal. 346; KaufE- man v. Griesemer, 26 Pa. St. 407. « Kelly V. Dunning, 39 N. J. Eq. 483; Weddell ». Hapner, 134 Ind. 315; Barkley «. Wilcox, 86 N. Y. 140; Cairo, etc. E. E. Co. ■». Stevens, 73 Ind. 278; Eathke v. Gardner, 134 Mass. 14; Benson v. Eailroad Co., 78 Mo. 504; Petligrew b. Evansville, 25 Wis. 233; Paddock i>. Somes, 103 Mo. 326. 'Crabtree v. Baker, 75 Ala. 91; Goldsmith v. Elsas, 53 Ga. 186; Peck v. Henington, 109 111. 611; Hicks v. Silliman, 93 111. 355; Auroras. Eeed, 57 111. 39; Butler v. Peck, 16 Ohio St. 334; Miller ». Laubach, 47 Pa. St. 154; Livingston v. McDonald, 21 lovra, 160; Ludeling v. Stubbs, 34 La. Ann. 935; Knight V. Brown, 35 W. Va. 808. See, also, Amick v. Tharp, 13 Gratt. (Va.) 664; Davis ». Londgreen, 8 Nebr. 43. 8 Waffle ». Railroad Co., 58 Barb. (N. Y.) 413; 53 N. Y. 11; Horton v. Sulli- van, 97 Mich. 383. 30 234 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 216 collect the waters and discharge them upon lands where they would not otherwise go.' So the owner of the lower field has the right, in the improvement thereof, to fill up the surface, and if by so doing the surface Wa,ter of the higher field is prevented from flowing thereon, the owner of the latter is without remedy." A party who has upon his premises a marshy basin of water without a natural outlet has no right to dig a drain and discharge this water upon the land of another.' A lake or pond having no outlet is governed by. the same rules as are water courses. When surface waters reach and become part of a natural watercourse they lose their character as surface waters and come under the rules governing water courses.* Of course, it is different in case of a bog or marsh. § 216. Draining Into Natural Channels. — The upper owner may in the exercise of his right to a reasonable en- joyment of his lands, drain surface water into a stream into which it would nalturally flow, although he thereby increases materially the volume of water flowing through the lands of the lower riparian owner, " but the stream must be the natural outlet,' and not filled beyond its natural capacity so as to overfiow and materially injur© the adjoining owner, under the common-law doctrine.' It appears that waters overflowing the banks of a stream, in consequence, of the insufiiciency of the natural ' Amick V. Tharp, 13 Gratt. (Va.) 564; Hughes v. Anderson, 68 Ala. 280; Hogenson v. Railroad Co , 31 Minn. 334; Staton v. Railroad Co., 109 N. Car. 337I Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. Miller, 68 Miss. 760; Shotwell v. Dodge, 8 Wash. St. 337; Covert v. Cranford, 141 N. Y. 531; Churchill 1). Baumann (Cal.), 36 Pac. Rep. 93; Brew v. Hicks (Cal.), 35 Pac. Rep. 563. ^Goodale v. Tuttle, 39 N. Y. 467. 'Butler V. Peck, 16 Ohio St. 334. ^Schaefer v. Marthaler, 34 Minn. 487; Alcorn v. Sadler, 66 Miss. 331. » Gillisou V. Charleston, 16 W. Va. 383; Knight ®. Brown, 35 W. Va. 808; Peek*. Herrington, 109 111. 611; Miller v. Laubaeh, 47 Pa. St. 154; McCor- mick V. Horan, 81 N. Y. 86; Treat v. Bates, 37 Mich. 390; Jackman v. Arling- ton Mills, 137 Mass. 377. « Waffle ». Railroad Co., 53 N. Y. 11; Leidlein v. Meyer, 95 Mich. 586; Boyd V. Conklin, 54 Mich. 583. ' Noonan v. Albany, 79 N. Y. 470; Jackman v. Arlington Mills, 187 Maas. 277. § 217] WATER EIGHTS AND EASEMENTS. 235 channel to hold and carry off the same, are surface waters within the meaning of that term.' But as soon as the overflowed water regains the water-course, it is then no longer surface water." § 21 Y. In Cultivating the Land. — In those States where the civil law servitude has been adopted, the owner of the upper estate may make drainage which is necessary to the proper cultivation and development of his estate. He may cut ditches and lay drains by which the flow of the sur- face waters upon his estate may be increased beyond the slow process by which they would ultimately reach the same point.' So the owner of land may collect the surface water by means of underground drains, and discharge the same on the lower land at one point, if the point of dis- charge is the natural water shed of both estates, though the flow of the water is greater by the use of such drains than by the use of surface drains.* But this system of drainage cannot be used in reclaim- ing swamps and marshes; it must be confined to the natu- ral development of agriculture.' But the owner of the land may draw off the water from the swamp, or divert the percolation, so as to collect the water in a well upon his own land, notwithstanding it results in serious detri- ment to the adjacent proprietor. And where the common law controls, it has been held the owner of the higher lands may make such drains as are necessary by good husbandry, and not be liable to any action for damages to the lower proprietor. ' But in a later case in the same State this rule was modified, and the court held that the upper proprietor must keep the surface waters within his boundaries, or •Taylor®. Fickas, 64 Ind. 167; Shane «. Railroad Co., 71 Mo. 837; Abbott s. Railroad Co., 83 Mo. 271; McCormick v. Railroad Co., 57 Mo. 433; 70 Mo. 359. See, also, Rex v. Trafford, 1 Barn. & Ad. 874. ' SuUens b. Railroad Co., 74 Iowa, 659; Moore ii. Railroad Co., 75 Iowa, 363. 5 Hicks ». Silliman, 93111. 355; Hughes v. Anderson, 68 Ala. 280; Peck ?;. Herrington, 109 111. 611; Martin i>. Riddle, 36 Pa. St. 415; Kauffman v. Griese- mer, 26 Pa. St. 407; Ludeling ■». Stubbs, 34 La. Ann. 933; Livingston v. Mc- Donald, 21 Iowa, 160. ^Meixell ». Morgan, 149 Pa. St. 415. 'Ludeling v. Stubbs, 34 La. Ann. 935. «Templeton v. Vosliloe, 73 Ind. 134. 236 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 218 permit them to flow off without artificial interference, un- less within the limits of his lands he can turn them into a natural water-course.' But where the common-law rule prevails, the owner of the higher field wh^re his land is flowed, may leave a dead furrow at the bottom of the de- pression for the purpose of permitting the surface water more readily to pass off, though the flow is thereby ac- celerated, and the lower proprietor has no remedy." So the owner of land upon the slope of a hill running down to a mill pond may cultivate and fertilize it in the ordi- nary way for garden purposes without becoming liable to the owner of the pond, which is encroached upon so as to diminish the water power by the large amount of solid matter thereby constantly carried into the pond by surface drainage.' A man has a right to cultivate his land in the usual and reasonable way, as well upon a hill as in the plain, and such damage the lower proprietor must protect himself against as best he may, and he may build a wall on his own land to protect it against the overflow.* § 218. Obstruction OF Flo wage— Common LawEule. — The common law rule as to the obstruction of tbe flow of surface waters by the lower proprietor, does not agree with the civil law rule. The common law holds with the maxim, cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum, et ad inferos. So under this rule the party owning real estate has the free and unfettered control of his own land above, upon and beneath the surface, and this right cannot be in- terfered with, or restrained by any consideration of injury to others which may be occasioned by the flow of mere surface waters is consequence of the lawful appropriation of land by its owner to a particular use or mode of en- joyment. In the application of this principle, it matters ' Cairo, etc. R. R. Co. ®. Stevens, 73 Ind. 278. ^ Peck V. Goodberlett, 109 N. Y. 180. See, also, Bchnilzius v. Bailey, 48 N. J. Eq. 409. 3 Middlesex Co. v. McCue, 149 Mass. 103. ■•Cassidy «. Railroad Co. 141 Mass. 174; Pai-ks v. Newburyport, 10 Gray (Mass.), 28; Dickinson v. Worcester, 7 Allen (Mass.), 19. See, also, MeixcU b. Morgan, 149 Pa. St. 415; Yerex ». Eineder, 86 Mich. 24; Hughes «. Anderson, 68 Ala. 280; Vannest v. Fleming, 79 Iowa, 638; Osten ». Jerome, 93 Mich. 196. § 219] WATER BIGHTS AND EASEMENTS. 237 not, whether a party obstructs or changes the direc- tion and flow of surface water by preventing it from coming within the limits of his lands, or by erecting bar- riers or changing the level of the soil, so as to turn the water off in a new course after it has come within his boundaries. Hence the obstruction of surface water or an alteration in the flow of it, affords no cause of action in behalf of a person who may suffer loss or detriment there- from against one who does no act inconsistently with the due exercise of dominion over his own soil. So under this rule the lower proprietor has an absolute right to dam back surface waters flowing from higher lands," and this rule is in operation in Connecticut," Indiana,' Kansas,' Maine, ° Massachusetts,' Minnesota,' Missouri," New Hamp- shire,' New Jersey," New York," Ehode Island," Vermont,"' Wisconsin," and South Carohna."" § 219. Civil Law Eule. — The States which have adopted the civil law rule are in accord with the maxim sic utere tuo, ut alienum non Icedas. The civil law doctrine is that the lands of the lower or sei-vient owner are subject to a natural servitude under which he is obliged to receive, from the lands of the upper or dominant estate, the surface waters which naturally flow therefrom. The general principles ' Gannon v. Hargadon, 10 Allen (Mass.), 106. ' Chadeayne v. Robinson, 55 Conn. 345. 'Cairo, etc. R. R. Co. v. Stevens, 73 Ind. 278. * Kansas City, etc. R. R. Co. v. Riley, 83 Kans. 374. "Murphy v. Kelley, 68 Me. 531. ' Rathke v. Gardner, 134 Mass. 14. 'O'Briens. St. Paul, 35 Minn. 331; Rowe v. Railroad Co., 41 Minn. 384; Follman v. Mankato, 45 Minn. 457; Brown «. Railroad Co., 53 Minn. 359. 'Benson B. Railroad Co., 78 Mo. 504; Stewart v. Clinton, 79 Mo. 603. Com- pare Shane v. Railroad Co., 71 Mo. 237; McCormick v. Railroad Co., 70 Mo. 359. » Swett V. Cutts, 50 N. H. 439. '» Bowlsby V. Speer, 31 N. J. Eq. 351; Schnitzius v. Bailey, 48 N. J. Eq. 409. Compare Lord v. Conklin Iron Manuf. Co., 43 N. J. Eq. 157. "Barkley v. Wilcox, 86 N. Y. 140. "Wakefield v. Newell, 12 R. I. 75; BufEum v. Harris, 5 R. I. 343. "Harwood v. Benton, 33 Vt. 734.- "^Lessard v. Stram, 63 Wis. 118; Johnson «. Railroad Co., 80 Wis. 641. "Edwards v. Railroad Co., 39 S. Car. 473. 238 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 219 of the law in the matter of rainwater and drainage, and of the respective rights and duties of adjoining proprietors in relation thereto, are in general the same as in the case of running water. Almost the whole law of water courses is formed on the maxim of the civil law, aqua currit ei debet currere. Because water is descendible by nature the owner of the upper field has an easement in the lower field for the discharge of all waters which by nature rise in or fall upon the dominant or superior estate. Under this rule the owner of the servient or inferior tenement has no lawful right to obstruct the natural flow of the water to the ma- terial injury of the dominant or superior proprietor. This rule is now the law in Alabama, Cahfornia, "Georgia, ' Illinois,' Iowa,' Louisiana," Maryland,' Michigan, ° Neb- raska," Nevada,'" North Carolina," Ohio,'' Pennsylvania," Tennessee," Texas," and West Virginia." > Parris v. Dudley, 78 Ala. 134; Hughes v. Anderson, 68 Ala. 380. 5 Ogburn v. Connor, 46 Cal. 346; McDaniel v. Cummlngs, 83 Cal. 515; Gray V. Mc Williams, 98 Cal. 157. 3 Goldsmith v. Elsas, 53 Ga. 186. * Totel«. Bonnefoy, 133111. 653; Dayton v. Commissioners, 138 111. 371; Peck V. Herrington, 109 111. 611; Gormley ®. Sanford, 53 111. 158; Gillham v. Bail- road Co., 49 111. 484; Lambert v. Alcorn, 144 111. 313. 'Livingston v. McDonald, 31 Iowa, 160; SuUens*. Railroad Co., 74 Iowa, 659. See, also, Vannest v. Fleming, 79 Iowa, 638; Wharton v. Stevens, 84 Iowa, 107. Compare Drake v. Railroad Co., 70 Iowa, 59; Phillips v. Lan- sing, 69 Iowa, 199. •Minors. Wright, 16 La. Ann. 151; Hooper ». Wilkinson, 15 La. Ann. 497. ■> Philadelphia, etc. R. R. Co «. Davis, 68 Md. 381. 8 Boyd V. Conklin, 54 Mich. 583; Yerejc d. Eineder, 83 Mich. 24; Osten*. Jerome, 93 Mich. 196; Leidlein v. Meyer, 95 Mich. 586. •See Fremont, etc. R. R. Co. «. Marley, 35 Neb. 138. '" Boynton v. Longley, 19 Nev. 69. " Porter?). Durham, 74 N. Car. 767; Jenkins v. Railroad Co., HON. Car. 438; Overton v. Sawyer, 1 Jones L. 308; Staton v. Railroad Co., Ill N. Car. 378. " Tootle V. Clifton, 33 Ohio St. 347; Butler v. Peck, 16 Ohio St. 834. "Hays v. Hinkleman, 68 Pa. St. 334; Glass v. Fritz, 148 Pa. St. 324; Mar- tin V. Riddle, 36 Pa. St. 415; Kauffman v. Griesemer, 36 Pa. St. 407. See Bentz «. Armstrong, 8 W. (& S. 40. "Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. v. Hays, 11 Lea. 383; Louisville, etc. R. R. Co D. Mossman, 90 Tenn. 157. " See Gulf, etc. Railroad Co. i). Helsley, 63 Tex. 593; Austin, etc. B. R. Co. V. Anderson, 85 Tex. 88. " See Gillison v. Charleston, 16 W. Va. 383. See, also, Whitney v. Railroad Co., 33 Oreg. 188; Kemper v. Louisville, 14 Bush (Ky.), 87. §§ 220-221] WATER RIGHTS AND EASEMENTS. 239 §220. Arkansas Rule.— The court says in this State, so far as the decisions which proceed upon the civil law doc- trine follow the civil law rule as the more reasonable one, "we are precluded by our statute from accepting them as authority." ' In Arkansas the court applies the law to the circumstances of each case. Hence, a railroad company is liable to an action at the instance of the proprietor whose lands are materially damaged by the obstruction of the sur- face water by an embankment which has been constructed without culverts to provide for the continued flow of the suiface water." At one time South Carolina seemed to be inclined to the doctrine of the Arkansas court as the most reasonable, as the obstructing owner may have a reasonable use of his property, with the restriction that he use his property so as not to injure another — sic utere tuo ut alienum non Icedas.' §221. English Doctrine. — The question whether the servient or inferior proprietor has a right to obstruct the fl )w of surface water coming from the dominant or supe- rior estate, does not seem to have been decided. Many cases cited by the American courts do not apply to surface w^ater at aU.* In case of working mines, it is held that there can be no doubt, on the one hand, that the owner of a mine is enti- tled to work out the minerals without regard to the inter- est of his neighbor, so long as he confines his operations to his own grounds and resorts to no extraordinary means of -working; and if the effect of working out these minerals be to throw water down upon his neighbor, who lies upon a lower level than himself, that is just the natural servi- tude which the lower heritor below ground must submit to, as the lower heritor above ground does; and, on the other hand, the lower heritor, if he desires to protect him- ' Little Rock, etc. R. R. Co. ■». Chapman, 39 Ark. 463. ' Little Rock, etc. R. R. Co. v. Chapman, 39 Ark. 463; Kansas City, etc. Co. -». Cook, 57 Ark. 387. *See "Waldrop ». Railroad Co., 38 8. Car. 157, Compare Edwards i>. Rail- road Co., 39 S. Car. 473. ^See Rex v. Commissioners, 8 Barn «. Cress. 355; Chasemore «. Richards, 7 H. L. Cas. 349; Broadbent v. Ramsbotham, 11 Exch 603; Rawstron v. Tay- lor, 11 Exch. 369; Acton v. Blundell, 13 Mees. & Wels. 352. 240 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 222 self against the invasion of water from above, must secure that protection by leaving a sufficient barrier of his own minerals upon his premises to prevent the water finding its way to him.' The rights of the upper and the lower owners are not treated by the common law authorities as peculiar to either common or civil law, but as natural incidents to the land, which are and must be analogous as governed by universal jurisprudence, except where specially modified. The Eng- lish courts cite the civil law on such questions, and they have decided cases arising out of England without attempt- ing to inquire into any local law as the basis of decision. The Enghsh cases show that the owner of arable lands, when he is the dominant proprietor, may drain his lands in the usual course of husbandry, without exposing him- self to an action by the servient owner, and the servient owner may not interfere with such drainage, except where necessary to the reasonable use of his property. § 222. Prescription — The right to the flowage of surface water may be gained by prescription. Thus, where water coming from a spring or rains or melting snow, has flowed over lands in a well defined channel for a period of time so long that the memory of man runneth not to the contrary, it cannot be diverted or obstructed.' And in such case it can make no difference whether such channel be natural or artificial ; and if the party in order to improve his lands for agriculture or trade purposes, alters such channel upon his own land or increases the volume or velocity of the water the adjoining proprietor has no cause of complaint, unless he can show material damages.' And the right to overflow the lands above a dam may be gained by prescrip- tion or given by statute." The extent of the right will be 1 WilsoA V. Waddell, L. R, 2 App. Caa. 95. See, also, Bairde. Williamson, 15 C. B., N. S. 376; Smith «. Kenrick, 7 0. B. 515; Hurdmaa v. Railroad Co., L. R., 3 C. P. DiT. 168. 2 Schnitzius*. Bailey, 48 TST. J. Eq. 409. ' Schnitzius v. Bailey, 48 N. J. Eq. 409. See, also, Houston ». Bybee, 17 Oreg. 140; Oneto ». Restano, 78 Cal. 374; Preston v. Hull, 77 Iowa, 309; Bal- lard e. Struckman, 133 111. 636; Weed ». Keenaa, 60 Vt. 74. ' Amoskeag Manuf . Co. ». Head, 56 N. H. 386; Perley «. Hilton, 55 N. H. 444; Bucklin v. Truell, 54 N. H. 123. § 223] WATER RIGHTS AND EASEMENTS. 241 determined by the extent of the overflow which the dam in fact has caused.' § 223. Flo WAGE from the Eaves of Houses. —Where a party builds a house on the line of his lot, with eaves pro- jecting over the adjoining lot, so as to throw the water from the roof upon such lot, it is an encroachment upon such lot to the extent of the projection. So a party has no right to erect a building in such a place that the water falling thereon, after passing through spouts to the ground, flows off his ground on to that of another to the latter's damage." And any party is a trespasser whenever he sheds the water from his building so as to throw it upon the land of another. ' And where such flowage is continued for twenty years merely by the sufferance of such owner without any assertion of right on the part of the owner of the building, no easement is acquired.' But it is said that the ac- quiescence for twenty years by the owner of the adja- cent lot in this encroachment is sufficient to lay the foundation for presuming a grant of the right so to use his land.' The owner of a building whose walls are injured by the failure of the adjoining proprietor to put proper eaves- troughs or gutters upon his building, may recover damages to the extent of the inj ury so caused, though the wall was also injured by a leak in the building." And a party whose premises are being injured by water escaping from a de- fective pipe upon adjoining premises may, upon refusal of the owner to repair the pipe, build a wall to protect his ' Ellington ». Bennett, 59 Ga. 286; Griffin v. Bartlett, 55 N. H. 119. 'Conner v. WoodflU, 126 Ind. 85; Armstrong v. Luco, 102 Cal. 272. 'Bellows ». Sackett, 15 Barb. (N. Y.) 96; Weis v. Madison, 75 Ind. 241; Lynch v. Mayor, 76 TST. Y. 60; Miller «. Laubach, 47 Pa. St. 154; Pettigrew v. Evansville 25 Wis. 323; Seely v. Alden, 61 Pa. St. 302; Adams t\ Railroad Co. 18 Minn. 260. ■•Conner v. WoodflU, 126 Ind. 85. See, also, Wood v. Waud, 3 Exch 748 788. ' Cherry v. Stein, 11 Md. 1. See, also, Norton v. Volentine, 14 Vt. 239, 246; Smith V. Smith, 110 Mass. 302; Carbrey v. Willis, 7 Allen (Mass ), 864; Tucker u. Newman, 11 Ad. & El. 40; 8 Kent's Com. 436. ' Chandler v. Lazarus, 55 Ark. 312, 31 242 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 224 premises from further injury, and recover the expense of constructing the wall. ' There may be a prescriptive right acquired for the pur- pose of receiving such water." But an easement of eaves- drip does not justify the erection of spouts to collect the water and to discharge it in a body upon the adjoining land.' Such a right of drip is an interest in land and can- not, therefore, be acquired by parol hcense.* Article 3. Subterranean and Percolating Waters. § 324. Subsurface Streams and Per- § 329. Modifled Doctrine as to Sub- eolations, terranean Veins. § 325. Percolations. § 230. Malicious Interference with g 336. Known and Defined Subsur- Percolating Waters. face Streams. § 331. Present American and English § 337. Rights of Lower Biparian Doctrine. Owner. §332. Pollution of Percolating § 328. Natural Gas and Petroleum. Waters. § 224. Subsurface Streams and Percolations. — The rule applicable to subsurface streams having a known and defined course is the same as to water courses upon the surface. Percolations spreading in every direction through the soil are deemed to be upon the same basis as surface waters.' If the under-ground stream flows in a known and defined channel it is treated the same as water fiowing in a defined channel upon the surface." But unknown and 'Comstock V. Railroad Co., 48 Hun (N. Y.), 335. See, also, Adams «. Walker, 34 Conn. 466; Copper «. Dolvin, 68 Iowa, 757; Beach ». Gaylord, 43 Mim. 476; Tannery Valentine, 75 111. 634; Martin ». Simpson, 6 Allen (Mass.), 103; Hazeltine v. Edgmand, 35 Kans. 303; Gould v. McEeuna, 86 Pa. St. 3C3 2 Morton p. Volentine, 14 Vt. 346; Cherry v. Stein, 11 Md. 1; Carbrey v. Willis, 7 Allen (Mass.), 864. 5 Beynolds «. Clarke, 3 Ld. Eaym. 1899. " Tanner ». Volentine, 75 111. 634. = Greenleaf v. Francis, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 121; Wheatley v. Baugh, 35 Pa. St. 528; Chasemore «. Richards, 7 H. L. Cas. 348; Acton v. Blundell, 13 Mees. & Wels. 334; Bury v. Pope, 1 Cro. Eliz. 118; Buffam v. Harris, 5 R. I. 248; Rawstron v. Taylor, 11 Exch. 369. « Taylor «. Welch, 6 Oreg. 198; Angell on Water Courses, sect. 112 b; Pom. Rip. Rights, sect. 63. § 225] WATER EIGHTS AND EASEMENTS. 243 undefined subterranean streams, though of considerable volume, are treated as percolating waters.' Subterranean waters are generally divided into percola- tions and underground rivers which differ from surface streams in scarcely anything besides the fact that their course cannot be readily discovered from the surface indi- cations. As a rule the owner of land may dig a well, make a reservoir, open a mine, drain his land by ditches, or other- wise change its natural condition, and if he thereby dis- turbs the underground water of his neighbor, he is not liable in damages.' § 235. Percolations. — Percolations spread in every di- rection through the earth. Water which sinks into the top son and passes through it, following no defined channel, belongs to the owner of the land where it is found, for the purpose of enabling him to cultivate his land by controlling it. It is not water in a water-course in the sense of being obedient to the law regulating the use of water flowing in defined natural channels.' Percolating water is part of the soil, or cannot be dis- tinguished from it. Hidden or vuiknown veins of water belong to the soil and constitute a part of it, and may be used, controlled and removed by the owner in the same manner that he can the soil through which the water per- colates. • Against the weight of authority it has been held that where the course of the subterranean stream is unknown or not well defined, it may be controlled by the law appUca ble to water course upon the surface, and that the owner of the dominant estate has no right to divert the water which passes through his land, to the injury of those who "Hosier v. Caldwell, 7 Nev. 363; Haldeman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. St. 518. •Cross®. Kitts, 69 Cal. 217; Chase v. Silverstone, 63 Me. 175; Hosier v. Caldwell, 7 Nev. 363; Taylor.^). Welch, 6 Oreg. 198. 'BufEum V. Harris, 5 R. I. 243; Hosier v. Caldwell, 7 Nev. 363; Chatfield V. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49. Compare Bassett v. Salisbury Manuf. Co., 43 N. H. 569; Swett V. Cutts, 50 N. E. 439. 244 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 226-22T were accustomed to receive it upon their lands below;' but this is not the law.' § 226. Known and Defined Subsurface Streams. — Where a subterranean water-course is known and well de- fined, the law with regard to it is the same as that appli- cable to surface streams and the maxim aqua currit, et debet currere, ut solebat currere, applies. ° But whenevier the stream is so hidden in the earth that its course is not discoverable from the surface, there can be no such thing as a prescription in favor of an adjacent proprietor to have an uninterrupted flow of such stream through the land of his neighbor.* Known and defined subterranean streams are governed by law applicable to surface water course. This is recognized by aU the courts, when the subsurface stream is sufficiently defined to come within the rule.' One court has held that mere percolating water is a well defined and known underground stream, when it percolates through a space of ground of unknown and indefinite width, but stiU confined, as it naturally would be in all cases, by some natural barriers." § 227. Eights of Lower Riparian Owner. — In the ab- sence of mahce or negligent cutting off unknown and un- defined streams, or percolating waters, the lower riparian owner has no right to require such water to come down to him where it has been diverted before it became a recog- nized part of a water-course, in operations carried on by 1 Smith V. Adams, 6 Paige (N. Y.), 435; Balston «. Bensted, 1 Camp. 463. 'Haldeman v. Bruckhard, 45 Pa. St. 514; Lybe's Appeal. 106 Pa. St. 636; Acton v. Blundell, 13 Mees. & Wels. 334: Davis v. Spaulding, 157 Mass. 431. 'Dickinson v. Grand June. Can Co., 7 Exch. 300. * Lybe's Appeal, 106 Pa. St. 636; Haldeman v. Bruckliard, 45 Pa. St. 514. 5 Wheatley ». Baugli, 2'} Pa. St. 538; Whetstone ». Bowser, 29 Pa. St. 59; « Cole Silver Min. Co. v. Gold Hill Water Co., 1 Saw. C. C. 470; Hanson «. McCue, 42 Cal. 303; Colrick v. Swinburne, 105 N. Y. 503; Redman v. For man, 83 Ky. 214; Cross v. Kitts, 69 Cal. 217; Taylor v. Welch, 6 Greg. 198; Shively v. Hume, 10 Oreg. 76; Strait ». Brown, 16 Nev. 317; Burroughs v. Saterlee, 67 Iowa, 396; Saddler v. Lee, 66 Ga. 45, governed bystatute, Ga. Code, sec. 3019. ' Keeney v Carillo, 2 New Mex. 480. § 228] WATER RIGHTS AND EASEMENTS. 245 the owner of the land through which it percolates.' No right as to prescription can exist as to percolating water, nor is one prevented from making any lawful and legiti- mate use of his own land, by digging or otherwise, even though the effect is to drain a spring on the land of an adjacent proprietor. Injury to the spring, therefore by draining it, or cutting off water supply to it by percola- tion, wiU not be, per se, actionable." But when a condemnation statute provides that compen- sation shaU be made for damages sustained by any person, whether by taking his property or injuring it in any man- ner, then a city which condemns land and constructs a sewer, whereby a well upon the land not taken was made dry, the well being fed by water percolating through the soil, is liable to the owner of the weU.' § 228. Natural Gas and Petroleum — A land owner has the legal right to sink a well on his own land, and draw therefrom all the gas that may naturally flow to it, although by so doing he may diminish the supply of an adjoining land owner; and he may use explosive compounds, such as nitro-glycerine, in shooting a well on the ground that it will increase the flow of gas to the injury of an ad- joining land owner.' But if the well is sunk in the center of a thickly popu- lated city where the necessary quantity of nitro-glycerine to shoot it, when exploded,, would endanger the property and lives of those who have no connection with such shoot- ing, the owner of the well must be content with such flow of gas as can be obtained without such shooting. ' ' Bishop's Non-Cont. Law, sect. 877; Prazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 894- Delhi V. Youmans, 45 N. Y. 369; Taylor v. Welch, 6 Oreg. 198; Chatfleld v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49; Elster v. Springfield, 49 Ohio St. 82; Chasemore v. Richards, L. R. 7 H. L. 349; Hanson ». McCue, 43 Cal. 303; Roath v. Driscoll, 20 Conn! 533; Lybe's Appeal, 106 Pa. St. 626. Compare Bassett v. Salisbury Manuf. Co , 43 N. H. 569; Swett «. Cutts, 50 N. H. 439. ' Elster t). Springfield, 49 Ohio St. 83; Frazier«. Brown, 13 Ohio St. 394, and cases cited. 'Trowbridge v. Brookline, 144 Mass. 139. Compare New Albany, etc. R. R. Co. V. Peterson, 14 Ind. 113; Hougan «. Railroad Co., 85 Iowa, 558. ^ People's Gas Co. v. Tyner, 131 Ind. 377. ' People's Gas Co. ■». Tyner, 131 Ind. 377. 246 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 22& Petroleum oil, like subterranean water, is included in the comprehensive idea which the law attaches to the word land, and is a part of the soil in which it is found. Like water, it is not the subject of property except while in actual occupancy, and a grant of either water or oil is not a grant of the soil or of anything for which ejectment will lie. ' The discovery of petroleum led to new forms of leasing land. Its fugitive and wandering existence within the limits of a particular tract was uncertain, and assumed certainty only by actual development founded upon ex- periment." "Water and oil, and still more strongly gas, may be classed by themselves, if the analogy be not too fanciful, as minerals /eroB naturcB." Possession of the land is not necessarily possession of the gas. If an adjoining, or even a distant, owner, drills his own land, and taps the gas of his neighbor, so that it comes into his well and under his control, it no longer be- longs to the neighbor but becomes his.' Under proper qualifications what is subterranean whether it be solid rock, mines or porous soil, or salt springs, or part land and part water, the person who owns the surface may dig therein and apply it and all that is there found to his own purposes ad libitum.' § 229. Modified Doctrine as to Subterranean Veins. — It has been held that in making the distinction between percolating water and a subterranean water course, it is necessary that the latter should be known or defined to entitle it to recognition of the law. Thus, where the party has bored a well and tapped an artesian well and has utilized the flow, an adjacent land owner cannot lawfully bore another well and tap the same vein, and thereby take away the water from the first well by extravagant usage, when by proper management the water would have been sufficient for both proprietors, because such a vein is such ' Gould on Waters (3nd ed.), 291. ' Brown «. Vandergrift, 80 Pa. St. 142. ' Westmoreland, etc. Gas Co. ■». DeWitt, 130 Pa. St. 335. ■• Angell on Water Courses, 109; New Albany,'etc. E. R. Co. v. Peterson, 14 Ind. 112. § 230] WATER RIGHTS AND EASEMENTS. 247 a water course as entitles it to be treated as a regular and defined surface stream.' So if a party sinking a gas well, cuts through intervening layers of rock and clay, which permit a stratum of salt water to come up and mingle with a stream of fresh water which supplies a well, thereby spoihng it, the owner of the gas well will be liable for the damages, provided that the evidence showed that he had knowledge, or might have obtained it, that damage was likely to occur, and could have prevented it at a small expense. The court holds that the underlying principle upon which the law of non-liability for injuries to percolating water is based, is either that the injury is unavoidable in the lawful enjoyment of the estate, or it is not ascertain- able beforehand; and, in this case, as it was both ascer- tainable and avoidable, the owner of the gas well was liable for damages." This rule is a departure from the general rule. If a party knew, or might have known, that the injury was likely to occur, and could have avoided it with reasonable care and expense, then he is liable for the damages for cutting off percolating water. § 230. Malicious Interference With Percolating Waters. — ^A land owner may not, under the civil law, negligently and maliciously divert, even an unknown sub- terranean stream, to the damage of an adjoining pro- prietor,' but he may drain, mine or quarry, though in so doing he interferes with the flow of water in hidden, unknown, underground channels." There are several dicta which recognize the rule as exist- ing at common law, that a land OAvner is liable for mali- ciously cutting off percolations from his neighbor." But ' Burroughs v. Saterlee, 67 Iowa, 396. See, also, Hougan ». Railroad Co , 35 Iowa, 558. •Collins V. Chartiers Valley Gas Co., 131 Pa. St. Rep. 148. 'Haldeman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. St. 514; Dig. Lib. 39, tit. 3, sect. 12. * Chase®. Silverston", 62 Me. 175; Browu v. Illius, 27 Conn. 84; Delhi ». Toumans, 50 Barb. HST. Y.) 316; 45 N. Y. 363. ' Greenleaf «. Francis, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 117: Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. St. 528; Haldeman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. St. 514; Chesley «. King, 74 Me. 164; 248 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 231 this exception has been denied, because if a man has a legal right to do a certain thing, courts will not inquire into the motive by which he is actuated in enforcing the same. A different rule would lead to the encouragement of htigation and prevent, in many instances, a complete and full enjoyment of the right of property which inheres to the owner of the soil.' The civU law deemed an act, otherwise lawful, illegal if done animo vicino nocendi, which is the law of Scotland, but this principle has not been adopted in the common law,' and those authors who cite this as a common law rule make a mistake. § 231. Present American and English Doctrine. — The present English and American law on this subject is that if a man dig a well in his own field, and thereby drains his neighbor's well, he may do so unless he does so maliciously, and this rule comes from the civil and not the common law.' So if a party digs a well on his own land in good faith to obtain water for his own use, he is not liable for any damages which incidentally result to a neighbor by reason of thereby diverting the water which has been accustomed to percolate or flow, in an unknown subterranean current, into the neighbor's spring.* But if the party digs the well on his own land for the sole purpose of inflicting damages upon his neighbor who has a right to a spring he will be liable. = In order to have protection to a subterranean stream, the owner must show that it is well defined and not a mere percolation. ° Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 394; Redman o. Forman, 83 Ky. 214; Brown v. Illius, 37 Conn. 84. ■Phelps V. Nowlen, 73 N. Y. 39; Ohatfleld v. Wilson, 38 Vt. 49. = Chasemore v. Richards, 7 H. L. Gas. 849, 887. 'Dig. Lib. 39, tit. 8, sect. 13; Oum eo qui suo fodiens meini foniem, avertit, nihil posse agi; nee de dolo. Et sane actionem non debet habere; si non animo viciTU} nocendi, sed suum agrum nuliorem faeiendi id fecit, * Chase », Silverstone, 65 Me. 175. ' Chesley v. King, 73 Me. 164. Compare Glendon Iron Co. v. Uhler, 75 Pa. St. 467; Phelps v. Nowlen, 72 N. Y. 39. See Washb. on Basem. 488-492; Paine v. Chandler, 134 N. Y. 385. » Williams v. Ladew, 161 Pa. St. 283. § 232] WATER RIGHTS AND EASEMENTS. 249 § 232. Pollution of Percolating Waters.— The ques- tion of liability for polluting percolating waters is not answered alike by all the courts. The weight of authority sustains the position that the rule as to surface waters does not apply to percolating waters; that every proprietor may use his own soil as is most convenient to his own purpose without thereby becoming liable in damages for diverting waters of percolation or of unknown subter- i-anean currents from his neighbor's well or spring or stream. Thus, the owner of land through which water flows in a subterranean course, has no right or interest in it which wiU enable him to maintain an action against a land owner, who in carrying on mining operations on his own land in the usual manner, and drains away the water from the land of the first mentioned owner." It is generally held a party can use his land in any reasonable manner, and if he thereby corrupts the water of the adjoining premises, he cannot be held liable." So a foul- ing of a spring through the discharge into it of subter- ranean streams and percolations corrupted by passage through a cemetery is damnum absque injuria.' But a party was held liable for injury done by the long continued percolation of foul water from his premises to a neighbor's well,* but upon the ground that a proper use of the defend- ant's premises would have excluded the foul matter. But in the absence of negligence, where oil percolates through the earth from the defendant's refinery until it strikes the water by which it is conveyed to the plaintiff's weU no action will lie. ' But no one has a right to main- tain a nuisance nor the right to cast upon the premises of another a noxious material. ' ' Acton V. Blundell, 13 Mees. & Wels. 334. See, also, Greenleaf v. Francis, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 117; Roath v. Driscoll, 30 Conn. 533; Chatfleld v. Wilson, 38 Vt. 49. ^ Upjohn V. Richland, 46 Mich. 549. See, also. Brown v. Ulius, 37 Conn. 84. 2 Greencastle v. Hazelett, 33 Ind. 186. Compare Clark v. Lawrence, 6 Jones Eq. (N. Car.) 83. *Ball V. Nye, 99 Mass. 583. See, also, Womersley v. Church, 17 L. T. R. N S. 190; Norton v. Scholefleld, 9 Mees. & Wels. 665. 'Dillon V. Acme Oil Co., 49 Hun (N. Y.), 565. « Pottstown Gas Co. ». Murphy, 39 Pa. St. 257; Ottawa Gas Light Co. v. Graham, 38 111. 73. 32 250 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 232 But the rule is being modified, and the defendant is held liable for negligence, the want of reasonable care, under the circumstances, for the rights of others. The Pennsyl- vania court holds in regard to subterranean streams, that what was held to be necessarily unknown and merely speculative as to the flow of water under ground, has been, by experience in such cases as sinking wells for gas and oil, reduced almost to a certainty. Justice Mitchell says: ' ' If this is the state of knowledge at the present day, if the existence of a stratum of clear water and its flow into wells and springs of the vicinity, and the existence of a separate and deeper stratum of salt water, which is likely to rise and mingle with the fresh when penetrated in boring for oil or gas, are known, and the means of preventing the mixture are available at reasonable expense, then, clearly, it would be a violation of the living spirit of the law not to recognize the change and apply the settled and immutable principles of right to the altered conditions of facts."' And the Kentucky court says that the owner of a spring of water is entitled to recover damages for its pollution by oil stored in large quantities on the land of his neighbor, which, leaking from the casks containing it, saturates the ground, and penetrates to the hidden or unknown veins of water feeding the spring.' The trend of the later deci- sions is based upon reason. Of course the decisions have held that injury to springs and wells, supplied by mere percolations, was not actionable, and the reason has always been the same, that the damage could not be fore- seen or avoided. But the boundaries of knowledge have been so enlarged as to make an end of the reason; cessante ratione, cessat ipsa lex.' The lower proprietor has the right to receive the percolations without any pollution thereof, unless such fouling is inevitable. In these cases the ground of the defendant's liability is negligence, the want of reasonable care, under the circumstances, for the right of others." ' Collins v. Chartier Valley Gas Co., 131 Pa. St. 143. 'Kinnalrd «. Standard Oil Co., 89 Ky. 468. ' Collins ». Chartier Valley Gas Co., 131 Pa. St. 143. < Collins «. Chartier Valley Gas Co., 139 Pa. St. 111. See, also, Snow «. § 233] WATER RIGHTS AND EASEMENTS. 251 The rule is that actual damage is not necessary to sus- tain the action for the pollution of waters.' Where the grievance is continuous, an injunction wiU lie if it will restore the plaintiff to his former position, even though the nusiance has produced no actual damage." Article i. Ice. § 233. Ownership — Rights of Mill § 235. Great Ponds in Maine and Mass- Owners, achusetts. §234. Ice — Navigable and Unnavi- §286. Right to Take Ice From Over- gable Waters. flowed Land. § 233. Ownership — Eights of Mill Owner. — The owner of the fee is entitled to take ice, if the taking of it does not interfere with navigation. The owner of land through which a stream of water runs has a right to a just and reasonable use of it. So long as the w^ater is not wholly obstructed or diverted, and no appropriation is made than a just and reasonable use, the proprietor who is lower down cannot complain. ' While the proprietor of the soil rightfully overflowed by a mill owner, cannot draw the water off by drains or canals, so as to injure the use of the same by the mill owners, he can use it to water his cattle, to irrigate his land, for do- mestic purposes, and for any reasonable profit or advantage which does not, in a perceptible and substantial degree im- pair the operation of the mill. And the unbroken line of authority is that he may take and carry away the water, Whitehead, L. R. 27 Ch. Div. 588; Beatrice Gas Co. v. Thomas (Nebr.), 59 N. W. Rep. 923; Gas Co. v. Pebley, 25 Pla. 381; Hauck v. Pipe Line Co.. 153 Pa. St. 366. 'Merrifleldft Lombard, 13 Allen (Mass.), 16; Holsman v. Boiling Springs Co., 14 N. J. Eq. 335. ^Goodson V. Richardson, L. R. 9 Ch. App. 221; Wilts v. Swindon Water Works, L. R. 9 Ch. App. 451. 3 Scarlet. Gardner (Pa.), 13. At. Rep. 835; Elliot v. Railroad Co., 10 Cush, (Mass.) 191; Brown ». Bowen, 30 N. Y. 519. 252 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 233 when formed into ice, provided he does not thereby dimin- ish the head of water at the dam of the mill owner." Justice Morse says that the owner of land covered by water is ordinarily the sole owner of ice formed upon such water; and the ownership is not confined to ponds entirely on his land, but his riparian ownership of the bed of a stream will carry with it the ice formed upon the surface of such stream, as far as such riparian rights extend." And it is the general rule that such land owner has the exclusive right to the ice, and to gather and sell it for his own benefit, provided he does not thereby impair, to a per- ceptible and substantial extent, the flow of water for mill purposes and that the mill owner has no right to such ice. This right results from and grows out of the title to the bed of the stream, and such use of the waters as results therefrom." It is held, in one case that if the removal of the ice will lessen the supply of water it must remain where it is.* However, in Kansas, the general rule is not accepted. The doctrine in this State is that upon navigable streams the title of the riparian owner of the soil was limited to the bank of the stream, and that therefore, the ice form- ing upon such streams belonged to the general public ; but the court recognized the doctrine that, upon a stream not navigable, the ice would be the property of the riparian owner of the bed of the stream.' And the unexecuted 1 Cummings v. Barrett, 10 Gush. (Mass.) 186; Stevens i>. Kelly, 78 Me. 445; Paine v. Woods, 108 Mass. 160; Ham v. Salem, 100 Mass. 350; State v. Pott- meyer, 33 Ind. 402; Edgerton v. Huflf, 26 Ind. 35, 46; Julien «. Woodsmall, 83 Ind. 568; Bigelow*. Shaw, 65 Mich. 341. ^BigelowB. Shaw, 65 Mich. 341, explaning Higgins v. Kusterer. 41 Mich. 318. See, also, Clute v. Fisher, 65 Mich. 48; Lorman ». Benson, 8 Mich. 18; People's Ice Co. v. Steamer Excelsior, 44 Mich. 299; Washington Ice Co. v. Shortall, 101 111. 46; Brooklyn p. Smith, 104 111. 429. 3 Stevens v. Kelly, 78 Me. 445; Gould on Waters, sect. 191; Marshall v. Pe- ters, 13 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 218; Dodge v. Berry, 26 Hun (N. Y.), 246; Paine v. Woods, 108 Mass. 160; Washington Ice Co. v. Shortall. 101 111. 46. * Mill Eiver, etc. Manuf. Co. v. Smith, 34 Conn. 463. Compare Seeley v. Brush, 35 Conn. 419. ' Wood V. Fowl r, 26 Kans. 682. The case of Meyer v. Whittaker, 5 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 173, holds that the ice is the property of the owner of the easement to flow; but this is disproved in Dodge v. Berry, 26 Hun (N. Y.), 346. § 234] WATER RIGHTS AND EASEMENTS. 253 license to take ice from a pond or stream passes no title to the ice.' The owner of a pondage right is not the abso- lute owner of the ice forming on the pond but he has a right to have it remain when such continuance is useful in the legitimate exercise of the right to use the water as a motive power for his mill ; and the landlord cannot cut, for sale, ice from the pond on his land where its removal works actual injury to one for pondage right therein.' And the grant of land on a stream which flows from a pond, the title to the bed of which is in the State, vests in the grantee a right to the undiminished flow of the water, except by a reasonable use of the water in the pond by the public. ° § 234. Ice — Navigable and Unnavigable Waters. — The different views, as to what are and what are not navi- gable streams, expressed by the courts have weight in decid- ing who is the owner of the ice. Thus in Michigan pri- vate ownership of lands bounded on navigable fresh water is not restricted to the meander Hne.' And this doctrine must also apply to the small inland lakes of this State by analogy, whether they can strictly be termed navigable or not.' In England streams are considered navigable only so far as they partake of the sea, and to the extent that their waters are affected by the ebb and flow of the tide, and only so far is the title of the riparian owner hmited to the bank; above such point, even although the stream is large enough to be used, and in fact is used, for purposes of navigation, the riparian owner owns the soil ad medium filum aquce. So that really three distinct characters of streams are recognized: 1. Those small streams, which cannot be used for any purpose of navigation, in which the title to the soil is in the riparian owner, and along which the pubhc has no rights of highway or otherwise. 2. An ' Balcom v. McQuesten, 65 N. H. 81. ' Howe 11. Andrews, 62 Conn. 398. ' Concord Manuf . Co. v. Bobertson (N. H.), 35 At. Rep. 718. *Lorman». Benson, 8 Mich. 18; Palmer v. Dodd, 64 Mich. 474; Clute », Fisher, 65 Mich. 48. ' Clute V. Fisher, 65 Mich. 48. ■254: CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 234 intermediate class, in which the riparian owner owns to the middle of the channel, but along whose stream the public has all the rights of a highway. 3. That which is called technically the navigable streams, where the title to the bed of the stream is in the sovereign, and all rights are in the public. The same doctrine of riparian owner- ship to the center of the stream in aU rivers unaffected by the ebb and flow of the tide, is recognized in some States of the Union. But the better rule is that the term ' 'navigable" applies to all the streams which are in fact navigable; and in such ^jase to hmit the title of the riparian owner to the bank of the stream. Especially is this true in the States where the lands have been surveyed and patented under the Fed- eral law. ' This doctrine is applicable to lands covered by fresh water over which a great commerce is conducted. The fact that it is not tide water can make no difference in the application of this doctrine. The great lakes in the United States are inland avenues of commerce, and are governed, in this respect, by the same principles as ob- tain in respect to tide-waters." The title of the soil being in the State, and the stream being, a public highway, obviously the ownership of the ice will rest in the general pubHc, or in the State as the representative of that public. The riparian proprietor will have no more title to the ice than he will to the fish. The fact that his land joins the land of the State, gives him no title to that land, or to anything formed or grown upon it, any more than it does to anything formed or grown or found upon the land of any individual neighbor. So, in the absence of legislation, the one that first appro- priates the ice which is formed is entitled to it, and on the same principle that he who catches a fish in one of these waters owns it.' Neither the right of travehng upon ice ' Flannagan v. Philadelphia, 42 Pa. St. 219; Bridge Co. v. Kirke, 46 Pa. St. 113; Railroad Co. «. Schurmeir, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 373; McManus «. Carmlchael, 3 Iowa, 1; Haight «. Keokuk, 4 Iowa, 199; Tomlin i>. Railroad Co., 33 Iowa, 106; People v. Tibbetts, 19 N. Y. 523; People v. Loomis, 33 N. Y. 461; TVood V. Fowler, 26 Kans. 683. * Illinois Cent. Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387. 'Wood V. Fowler, 36 Kans. 683; Hlckey «. Hazard, 8 Mo. App. 480; Gage § 235] -WATEIi RIGHTS AND EASEMENTS. 255 of tidal rivers, nor the right of taking ice therefrom is an absolute property right in any one. Both are naturally the common right belonging to the people in general.' And any citizen who may lawfully go upon the river may gather ice from it according to law. He is entitled to the ice prepared by his labor to be removed, and another can- not take it from him." § 235. Great Ponds in Maine and in Massachusetts. — It is well settled in Massachusetts that the property in great ponds is in the State; that the public have the right to use them for fishing, fowling, boating, skating, cutting ice for use or sale, and other lawful purposes; and that the owners of the shores have no exclusive rights in them ex- cept by a grant of the legislature.' The great ponds which were not appropriated before the years 1641-1647 to private persons, were by the colonial ordinance of that year made public, to lie in common for public use, and that fishing, fowling, boating, skating or riding upon the ice, taking water for domestic or agricultural purposes, or for use in the arts, and the cutting and taking of ice, are lawful and free upon these ponds to all persons who own land adjoining them, or can obtain access to them without trespass, so far as they do not interfere with the reason- able use of the ponds by others, or with the public right, unless in cases where the legislature has otherwise di- rected.* But no party can by his own acts appropriate a part of the pond by scraping it, or setting up stakes, exclude the pubUc from it. The ice until it is cut remains a part of the realty, and no one has any exclusive title to it. There is no statute or other law which enables an owner of the shore, or any other person, thus to exclude the public. " -». Steinkrauss, 131 Mass. 233; Rowell «. Doyle, 131 Mass. 474; 35 Alb. L. J. ,33; Meyer d. Whitaker, 55 IJow. Pr. (N. Y.) 376. ' Woodman v. Pitman, 79 Me. 456. ' Brown v. Cunningham, 83 Iowa, 512; Wood v. Fowler, 35 Kans. 683. 'Hittinger v. Eames, 131 Mass. 539; Gage v. Steinkrauss, 131 Mass. 323. * West Roxbury, v. Stoddard, 7 Allen (Mass.), 158. See, also, Barstow v. Bockport Ice Co., 77 Me. 100; Tudor v. Water Works, 1 Allen (Mass.), 164. •People's Ice Co. «. Davenport, 149 Mass. 332; Rowell v. Doyle, 131 Mass. 474. 256 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 236 In Maine ponds containing more than ten acres are pub- lic; and the right to cut ice upon them is a public right free to all. In this particular the right of the riparian owner is no greater than that of other citizens.' The ice fields, after they have beeii staked, fenced and scraped, have so far become the property of the appro- priator that an action will lie against one who disturbs his possession." But if he does not scrape the snow from the ice, and only erects stakes with his name thereon around nearly one half of the great pond, he does not thereby ac- quire such a right to the ice thus enclosed as will enable him to maintain trover against one who, previous to the formation of the ice, removes the lily-pads, scraped off the snow, bored holes in the ice to let off the surface water and proceeded to harvest the ice against the written pro- testation of the first party." In these States the great ponds are held by the State for the public. The right to take fish or ice therefrom is com- mon and free to all, unless abridged by the legislature.* Neither the shore proprietor, nor any corporation with au- thority to cut ice therefrom, has any greater or different right in respect to that, than every other inhabitant who can gain legal access to the pond.' § 236. Right to Take Ice From Overflowed Land. — The owner of the easement to overflow another's land is not entitled to the ice which forms on the water covering such land ; such ice belongs to the owner of the fee.' This right is qualified only that the owner of the soil shall do no injury to the easement, and that the quantity of the ' Barstow v. Rockport Ice Co., 77 Me. 100. ' Woodman v. Pitman, 79 Me. 465. 'Barrett v. Rockport Ice Co., 84 Me. 155, See, also. People's Ice Co. «. Davenport, 149 Mass. 332. * Barrows «. McBermott, 73 Me. 441; West Roxbury v. Stoddard, 7 Allen (Mass.), 158. * Barstow v. Rockport Ice Co., 77 Me. 100; Hittinger v. Eames, 131 Mass. 839;. Gage V. Steinkrauss, 181 Mass. 223; Rowell v. Doyle, 131 Mass. 474. 8 State B. Pottmeyer, 33 Ind. 403; Edgerton ». Huff, 26 Ind. 35; Jullen v. Woodsman, 82 Ind. 568; Marshall ». Peters, 12 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 318; Meyers. Whitaker, 55 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 376; Higgins v. Kusterer, 41 Mich. 318; Peo- ple's Ice Co. V. Steamer Excelsior, 44 Mich. 239; Washington Ins. Co. ■». Shortall, 101 111. 46. § 236] WATER RIGHTS AND EASEMENTS. 257 water shall not be materially lessened.' Of course the owner of the land thereby flowed must not draw off by canal, aqueducts or ditches, the water which has been raised by the dam." The owner of the fee may use the water to water his cattle, to irrigate his crops and gardens, and for any other reasonable purpose which does not prac- tically and in a perceptible and substantial degree impair the right to run the mill ; or he may take and carry away the water when formed into ice, for use or sale, provided he does not thereby appreciably diminish the head of water at the dam of the mill-owner.' And his land may be of peculiar value by reason of its situation affording oppor- tunities to do this." When the owner of the easement maliciously and unnecessarily draws the water from the pond and thus destroys the ice field, he is liable in damages to the riparian owner who owns the land under the pond.' The owner of a bed of a mill pond raised by a dam across an unnavigable stream, has an incident to such ownership the right to cut ice therefrom whenever the exercise of such right does not appreciably diminish the head of water to the detriment of the mill owner.' iBrookville, etc. Hydraulic Co. v. Butler, 91 Ind. 134. 'Cook V. Hull, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 269; Storm «. Mauchaug Co., 13 Allen (Mass.), 10. ' Cummings t). Barrett, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 186. * Ham V. Salem, 100 Mass. 350. Compare Meyer v. Whitaker, 5 Abb. N. C. (N. y.) 172; Mill River, etc. Co. v. Smith, 34 Conn. 462. But Meyer ». Whitaker is condemned in Dodge v. Berry, 26 Hun (N. Y.), 246; and Mill River, etc. Co. V. Smith, cannot be reconciled with Seeley ». Brush, 85 Conn. 419. ' Stevens v. Kelley, 78 Me. 445. See, also, Chesley ». King, 74 Me. 164. « Stevens v. Kelley, 78 Me. 445; Paine v. Woods, 108 Mass. 160, 178; Higgins e. Kusterer, 41 Mich. 318. 33 CHAPTER VII. lateral and subjacent support. Article 1. Lateral Support. § 837. Right to Lateral Support. § 340. Reasonable Care. §338. Excavations — Support of Build- §341. Municipal Corporations. ings. § 343. Measure of Damages. § 239. Notice of Excavation to Adjoin- § 343. Trees — Damage to Property in ing Owner. Common. § 237. Right to Lateral Support. — It is an ancient principle of the common law that every land owner has a right to lateral support for his soil as against the adjoining soil of his neighbor; and such right exists as well against the public as against an individual; and as against either, he is entitled to damages for an injury caused as the direct result of the removal of such lateral support.' The right of an owner of land to the support of the land adjoining is jure natures, like the right in a flowing stream. Every owner of land is entitled, as against his neighbor, to have the earth stand and the water to flow in its natural con- dition. In the case of land, which is fixed in its place, each owner has the absolute right to have his land remain in its natural condition, unaffected by any act of his neighbor; and, if the neighbor digs upon or improves his own land so as to injure this right, the injured owner may maintain an action against him, without proof of negligence.' 1 Stearns ®. Richmond, 88 Va. 993; Schultz v. Bower (Minn.), 59 N.W. Rep. 681; TuQstall v. Christian, 80 Va. 1; Gilmore v. Driscoll, 133 Mass. 199; Sulli- van v. Zeiner, 98 Cal. 346. ' Gilmore ». Driscoll, 133 Mass. 199; Foley v. Wyeth, 3 Allen (Mass.;, 131, 133; Hay i>. Cohoes Co., 3 N. Y. 159, 162; Richardson b. Railroad Co., 25 Vt. 465, 471; Humphries ». Brogden, 13 Q. B. 739; Backhouse v. Bonomi, 9 H. L. Cas. 503; Wilde v. Minsterley, 3 Rolle's Abr. 564; Schultz v. Bower (Minn.), 59' N. W. Rep. 631; Nichols «. Duluth, 40 Minn. 389; McGuire v. Grant, 35 N. J. L. 363. (258) § 238] LATERAL AND SUBJACENT SUPPORT. 259 § 238. Excavations— Support of Buildings. — The prin- ciple of lateral support of land is well established.' As to land in its natural condition there is a right to such support from the adjoining land; as to buildings on or near the boundary line, injured by excavating on the adjoining land, there is no right of action, in the absence of improper motive, or of carelessness in the execution of the work. This is the weight of authority." It has generally been considered that for an excavation causing an injury to the soil in its natural state an action will lie; but that without proof of a right by grant or pre- scription in the plaintiff, or of actual negligence on the part of the defendant, no action will lie for an injury to buildings by excavating adjoining land not previously built upon.' It cannot be supposed that the owner of a house can ac- quire by prescription a right to have it supported by the adjoining land, inasmuch as he does nothing upon, and has no use of, that land, which can be seen or interrupted or known or sued for by the owner thereof, and therefore no assent of the latter can be presumed to the acquirement of right in his land by the former. The English cases rest on an analogy to the doctrine of ancient lights, which is not in force in this country* except in New Jersey and Virginia. If land is dug away to such an extent that the adjoining land would have fallen whether there were buildings on it ' Nichols V. Duluth, 40 Minn. 389; McCullough v. Eailroad Co., 53 Minn. 13; McGuire ». Grant, 1 Dutch. (N. J.) 356; Farrand v. Marshall, 19 Barb. (N. Y.) 380; 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 409; Charless «. Rankin, 33 Mo. 566; Kichardson ». Railroad Co., 35 Vt. 465; Rowbotham v. Wilson, 8 El. & Bl. 133; Dyer v. St. Paul, 87 Miun. 457. ' Gilmore ». Driscoll, 133 Mass. 199; Angus v. Dalton, 6 Ch. App. Cas. 740; L. R. 3 Q. B. Div. 85; Smith ». Thackerah, L. R. 1 C. P. 564. 'Panton ». Holland, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 93; Lasala «. Holbrook, 4 Paige (N. Y.), 169; Hay v. Cohoes Co., 3 N. Y. 159, 163; Richart s. Scott, 7 Watts (Pa.)i 460; Beard v Murphy, 37 Vt. 99, 103; Shrieve v. Stokes, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 453; Booth V. Railroad Co., 140 N. Y. 367. ^Oldstein v. Firemen's Build. Assn. 44 La. Ann. 493; Mitchell v. Mayor, 49 Ga. 19; 15 Am. Rep. 469; Hide e. Thornborough, 3 Car. & K. 350, 355, and Stansell v. Jollard, cited therein; Solomon v. Vintner's Co., 4 Hurl. & Nor. 585, 599, 603; Chasemore v. Richards, 7 H. L. Cas. 349; Greenleaf ®. Francis, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 117; Napier e. Bulwlnkle, 5 Rich. (N. Car.) 811; Richart «! Scott, 7 "Watts (Pa.), 460; Keats v. Hugo, 115 Mass. 204, 215. 260 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 239 or not, an action will lie, and the buUdings may be allowed for in damages.' § 239. Notice op Excavation to Adjoining Owner. — Although the law seems to give the owner of a building put upon his own land in a manner most advantageous, and sometimes necessary, to make it available for his use, especially in a closely built city, but little protection against the choice or caprice of another who may own the adjoining lands, yet it wUl be observed he is not entirely without protection. Thus, excavation by an owner on his land, adjoining another' s building, causing damages, with- out his knowledge or previous notice to him, is evidence of want of care in doing the work." Howevei', the question whether such omission to give notice, under the circum- stances, is evidence of carelessness in the execution of the work is an important one, and it cannot be said to be defi- nitely settled. But from the English decisions it appears that the party who is about to endanger the building of his neighbor by a reasonable improvement on his own land, is bound to give the owner of the adjacent lot proper notice of the intended improvement, and to use ordinary skill in conducting the same.' It is the weight of authority, and the better rule, that notice to one's neighbor of an intention to make a contem- plated improvement of property would seem to be a reason- able precaution in a populous city, where buildings are necessarily required to be contiguous to each other; because improvements made by one proprietor, however skillfully conducted, may be attended with disastrous results to his neighbors, who ought to have the opportuity to protect themselves and property.* ' Brown v. Eobins, 4 Hurl. & Nor. 186; Strogan d. Knowles, 6 Hurl. & Nor. 454; Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. 8. 235; Weir's Appeal, 81 Pa. St. 203. Compare Thurston v. Hancock, 12 Mass. 220; Foley v. Wyeth, 2 Allen (Mass.), 131; Louisville, etc. Railroad Co. v. Bonhayo (Ky.), 21 S. W. Rep. 526. « Schultz i>. Byers, m K J. L. 443; Lasala v. Holbrook, 4 Paige (N. Y.), 169, 173. ^Peyton «. London, 9 Barn. & C. 725; 4 Man. «& R. 635; Walters «. Pfeil, 1 Mood. & M. 362; Massey «. Goyder, 4 Car. & P. 161. ^Shafer v. Wilson, 44 Md. 268; Beard r. Murphy, 37 Vt. 101; Winn d. § 2J:0] LATERAL AND SUBJACENT SUPPORT. 261 Justice Scudder ably and correctly says that a mere notice, which can cause but little trouble to one who is honestly exercising his right of excavating his land next to his neighbor's house, may enable the receiver of notice to shore or prop his walls to prevent their falling, or it may lead to some arrangement by which neither will be injured. It is more than a mere neighborly courtesy to give such notice, because it involves the right of one man to assert his right, regardless of the injury he may cause to his neighbor without such warning. The manner of giving notice may be only such as is reasonable under the circumstances, either to the owner of the property, or, if there be difficulty in finding or serving it on him, then it may be given to the tenant or occupant who is interested in protecting the property. When it can be shown that such owner had knowledge of the improvement that was about to be made, it would not be necessary to prove a formal notice given him.' § 240. Reasonable Care. — The owner in excavating for a building has a right to go below an adjacent owner's founda- tion wall, even though it is reasonably certain that such foun- dation wall will be endangered thereby. After giving due notice to such adjacent owner, the person excavating is chargeable only with reasonable care; it being the duty of the -adjacent owner to use the necessary appliances to pro- tect his building." And if he underpins the adjacent foundation wall he must use reasonable care in so doing.' A party in the exercise of a right upon his own land which involves danger to the property of his neighbor is bound to pVovide against such by all reasonable diligence and care. So where a party undertakes to construct a retaining waU on his own land, which materially increases Abeles, 35 Kahs. 85; Shrieve v. Stokes, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 453; Schultz v. Byers, 53 JST. J. L. 443. ' Schultz «. Byers, 53 N. J. L. 442, 447. See, also, Larson v. Railroad Co., 110 Mo. 334; Conboy v. Dickinson, 93 Cal. 600; First Nat. Bank v. Villegra, fl3 Cal. 96; Ulrick ». Dakota, etc. Co., 3 S. Dak. 285. See, also, Ketchum «. Newman, 116 N. Y. 433. ' Covington v. Geylor, 93 Ky. 375. 'Covington v. Geylor, 93 Ky. 275. 262 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 241 the risk of the adjoining property to landslides, he is bound to exercise his right in a way not to expose the property of his neighbor to any risk which may be pro- vided against by the exercise of ordinary diligence, which would require that he,v in its construction, should take into account or anticipate such storms or rainfalls as might reasonably be expected to occur. And no weakness or defect of such wall, caused by his neglect, and which the exercise of ordinary care and skill would have avoided in its construction, although combined with the act of God, will excuse liabiUty for damages to the adjoining property.' He is bound to use due care and diligence." He will be liable for damages caused by blasting of rocks with explosives so powerful as to break windows, loosen the walls and injure the furniture of an adjoining owner.' § 241. Municipal Corporations. — It has been denied that the right of lateral support exists as against the public; that is, in the soil of a street. The law, however, is that the right of an adjoining owner to lateral support may be as- serted against a municipal corporation making excavations in changing the grade of streets, as against a private indi- vidual.' The natural right of lateral support is confined to the soil merely, and the right to support for buildings in the United States cannot be acquired by prescription, as against a mu- nicipal corporation. ' A city having authority to grade its streets has no more power over them than a private indi- vidual has over his land, and that it cannot, under the spe- cious plea of public convenience, be permitted to exercise that dominion to the injury of another's property, in a mode that would render a private individual responsible in damages, without being responsible itself. The rights and liabiUties of a city, with respect to the adjoining owner, are to be governed by the law of adjoining proprietors.' An 'Hummell«. Terrace Co., 20 Oreg. 401. ' United States v. Peachy, 36 Fed. Rep. 160. ' Morgan «. Bowes, 17 N. Y. Supp. 22; 62 Hun (N. T.), 623. " Stearns «. Richmond, 88 Va. 992; Parke v. Seattle, 5 Wash. St. 1. 5 Quincy v. Jones, 76 111. 231. « Nevlns v. Peoria, 41 111. 507 ; K. Westminster «. Brighouse, 20 Can. S. Ct. 520. § 242] LATERAL ^ND SUBJACENT SUPPORT. 263 abutting owner is entitled to the lateral support of the ad- joining land in a public street, and the city is liable for damages to such owner's land occasioned by removing such lateral support in grading the street.' Thus, where a city, in changing the grade of a street ex- cavated to the depth of sixty feet, causing the land of the adjoining owner to cave in to such an extent as to destroy the walls of brick buildings thereon twenty feet from the street line, it is liable in damages for the injury." § 212. Measure of Damages. — ^There is, as incident to land, in its natural condition, a right to support from the adjoining land, and if land not subject to artificial pressure sinks or falls away, in consequence of the removal of such support, the owner may have an action for damages against the party thus removing such support." The right of action is not based upon negligence and want of skill, but upon the violation of the right of property which has been thus invaded and disturbed.' And the damages recovered in an action for the withdrawal of such support are limited to the injury to the land itself.' How- ever, the law requires of every man that he shall so use his own property as not unnecessarily to injure that of his neighbor. So, if, in making the excavation which he has a right to make, he does it in a wrongful, negligent or reckless manner, he will be liable for the full consequence of his acts, not only for injury to the soil itself, but to the improvements or structures thereon." When the injury is caused by negligence, the rule of damages is the diminution of value of the property as the 'Dyer v. St. Paul, 27 Minn. 457; Lewis on Em. Dom. 100, 151; Stearns r. Riclimond, 88 Va. 992; Columbus v. Willard, 7 Ohio Cir. Ct. 113. « Stearns v. Richmond, 88 Va. 092. 'Moellering d. Evans, 121 Ind. 195; Schultz v. Bower (Minn.), 59 K. W. Rep. 631; McGuire v. Grant, 25 N. J. L. 356; Transp Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. S. 635. *Ulrick u. Dakota L. & T. Co., 2 S. Dak. 275; Foley ». Wyeth, 3 Allen (Mass.), 131; Panton«. Holland, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 92. 5 Schultz V. Bower (Minn.), 59 N. W. Rep. 631; Farrand ■». Marshall, 19 Barb. (N Y.) 380; Gilmore v. Driscoll, 123 Mass. 199; Thurston «. Hancock, 12 Mass. 331. « Dorrity v. Rapp, 73 N. Y. 307; Charless i). Rankin, 22 Mo. 666; Foley v. Wyeth, 3 Allen (Mass.), 131; Quincy v. Jones, 76111. 241. 264 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES [§ 243 direct and legitimate result of such negligence and want of care. But where the excavation is made carefully and with proper regard for the rights of the adjoining owner, and injury ensues, the measure of damages is the diminu- tion of the value of the land in consequence of such excava- tion, and not the cost of restoring the lot to its former con- dition.' And where, in consequence of the added element of neg- ligence in making the excavation, the damages recoverable extend to buildings as well as to the soil, and the rule of damages is the diminished value of the property injured, and not the cost of repairing it." The measure of damages for depriving land of lateral support is the actual damage to the land by the loss of, and injury to, the soil alone; and is not the cost of restoring the land to its former condition including the diminished market value of the buildings.' The action is based on the damages sustained to the land.* In this country there can be no damages for obstructing ancient Ughts, ' except in New Jersey and Virginia. § 243. Trees — Damage to Property in Common.— Where trees stand upon and draw sustenance from two tracts of land each owned by a separate party, in the ab- sence of a showing to the contrary, it will be presumed that the property or trees are owned by the parties as ten- ants in common." And when one tenant in common de- stroys such trees upon the boundary line of the two estates, he is liable to his co-tenant for the damages thereby sus- tained.' So where a row of trees grown upon the boundary line between two adjoining tracts of land is used as a fence by stretching barbed wire along the trunks of the 'McGuire ». Grant, 35 N. J.'L. 356; Gilmore v. DriscoU, 122 Mass. 199. 'Ulrick «. Dakota L. & T. Co., 2 S. Dak. 375. 8McGettigan«. Potts, 149 Pa. St. 155; 30 W. N. C. 137. ^Moellering b. Evans, 121 Ind. 195; McGuire i>. Grant, 35 N. J. L. 856. 'Oldstein v. Firemen's Build. Asso., 44 La. Ann. 493. Tlie French rule Is the same. 1 Mourlon, p. 861 ; 8 Laurent, p. 54. 'Dubois V. Beaver, 35 N. Y. 134; Griffln v. Bixby, 13 N. H. 456. ■" Dubois V. Beaver, 35 N. Y. 134. § 244] LATERAL AND SUBJACENT SUPPORT. 265 trees, the owners of the adjoining tracts are tenants in com- mon as to said trees and neither can destroy them without becoming liable to the other in damages.' But if the trunk of the tree is wholly within the bound- ary of one man's land, the entire tree belongs to him. But the adjoining owner may, without notice to the other party, cut ofiE all projecting roots and limbs that come upon, over or into his premises, but he cannot appropriate the overhang- ing fruit.' Article 2. Subjacent Support. § 344. Support of Surface, § 347. Mere Reservation of Minerals. § 345. Mining Rights. § 348. Damages for Subsidence. § 346. Support— Custom. § 349. Support of Different Stories. § 244. Support of Surface. — It is a general rule of of law that the owner of the surface is entitled to absolute support, and not as an easement or right depending on a supposed grant but as a proprietary right at common law." And where there is an absolute right of support, it is not material that the surface owner is ignorant or cognizant of the state of the mines, or the mode of working, or that the mine owner has shown the utmost skiU and prudence in working the mine.* And the only reasonable support which can be, is that which will protect the surface from subsidence. ' Hence, the surface owner is entitled to actual support for his land at the hands of the owner of mines beneath it." But this actual support cannot be superior to the con- ' Musch V. Burkhart, 83 Iowa, 301. ' Lyman v. Hale, 11 Conn. 177. See, also, Hoffman v. Armstrong, 48 N. Y. 301; Skinner v. Wilder, 38 Vt. 115; Hutchings v. King, 1 Wall. (U. S.) 59; Musch 1). Burkhart, 83 Iowa, 301. See, also, Hickey v. Railroad Co., 96 Mich. 498; Jones «. Williams, 11 Mees. & Wels. 181; Cooley on Torts, 667; Wood on Nuis., sect. 113; Grandona v. Lovdal, 70 Cal. 161. Compare Lonsdale v. Nelson, 3 Barn. & C. 303. ' Bainbridge on Mines & Min. 433. *Bainbridge on Mines & Min. 434; Harris i). Ryding, 5 Mees. & Wels. 60. « Humphries v. Brogden, 13 Ad. & El. N. S. 739, 745. « Carlin v. Chappel, 101 Pa. St. 348. 34 266 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 245-246 sequences of convulsions of nature such as earthquakes, and such violent disturbances as may be classified as being the act of God. Prima facie the owner of the land is entitled to the surface itself and aU below it ex jure naturae.' He is enti- tled to support from the strata below." § 245. Mining Eights.— When the surface is severed from the underlying minerals, and the parts are allotted to different parties without any limitation as to the removal of the coal or minerals, the owner of the underlying stratum cannot remove it without leaving suflficient sup- port for the surface. ' The upper and underground estates being severed, they are governed by the same maxim which limits the use of property otherwise situated, sic utere tuo et alienum non Icedas. In the absence of express agreement, the owner of mines cannot work them so as to injure the surface.' Yet the owner of both the surface and the mines, may so grant the right as to give the owner of the mines a right to excavate the same, though, by so doing, he may injure the surface.' Hence, where the owner of land on which a /sotton mill was to be built, conveyed the land, reserving to himself all mines and minerals, and power to take them at pleasure, he may work the mines though to the injury of the build- ings.' In the absence of contract, the mine owner is liable for subsidence, even though he worked his mine carefully and according to the custom of the country.' § 246. Support — Custom. — Mining property is servient to the surface to the extent of suflficient support to sustain it. To control the rule of the common law, a usage to mine without observing this duty, must be so ancient and ' Rowbotham v. Wilson, 8 H. L. Cas. 348. •> Coleman «. Chadwick, 80 Pa. St. 81. 'Jones «. Wagner, 66 Pa. St. 429. *Hext V. Gill, L. E. 7 Ch. App. 699; 3 Eng. Rep. 574. 6 Rowbotham u. Wilson, 6 El. & Bl. 593; 8 H. L. Cas. 348. * Aspden ». Seddon, L. R. 10 Ch. App. 394. See, also, Smith v. Darby, L. R. 7 Q. B. 716. ' Humphries «. Brogden, 13 Q. B. 739; Smart v. Morton, 5 El. & Bl. 30; New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Franklinite Co., 3 Beas. (N. J.) 343. §§ 247-249] LATERAL AND SUBJACENT SUPPORT. 267 uniform in the particular region as to amount to a custom j and such custom must be so ancient, that the memory of man runneth not to the contrary. Such a custom can hardly be pretended in the United States.' § 247. Mere Eeservation of Minerals. — It is the general doctrine that a mere reservation of minerals, or such a reservation with the right of mining, must always respect surface rights of support, and will not, standing alone, permit the surface to be destroyed, without some additional statutory or contract authority, and that" such statute or contract authority will be construed to prevent the destruction of surface rights." But easements to do such acts as are reasonably necessary to get out the minei-als and remove them from the mine may be granted or reserved so as to attach to the mining estate." § 248. Damages for Subsidence. — If a house be injured by the subsidence of the soil on which it stands, caused by mining, the owner may recover for the damages." And when the support has been wrongfully withdrawn the sur- face owner may have damages, and is not obliged to wait until the subsidence takes place. Having violated a right by such withdrawal, an action can be brought and full compensation received," provided there has been some actual damage.' § 249. Support of Different Stories. — The owner of the lower story of a dwelling cannot deprive the upper > Jones 1). Wagner, 66 Pa. St. 429, 434. 'Erickson v. Michigan L. & Iron Co., 50 Mich. 604; Hext d. Gill, 7 Ch. App. 699; Bell v. Wilson, 1 Cli. App. 303; Smith ®. Darby, L. R. 7 Q. B. 710; Hilton v. Granville, 5 Q. B. 701; Roberts v. Haines, 6 El. & Bl. 643; Smart i: Morton, 5 El. & Bl. 46; Harris v. Ryding, 5 Mees. & Wels. 60; Jeffries v Williams, 5 Exch. 793; Humphries ». Brogden, 13 Q. B. 739 'Eadon v. Jeffcock, L. R. 7 Exch. 379; Robotham v. Wilson, 8 H. L. Cas. 348; Smith v. Darby, L. R. 7 Q. B. 716; Aspden v. Seddon, 10 Ch. App. 394; Cardigan v. Armitage, 2 Barn. & C. 198; Harris «. Ryding, 5 Mees. & Wels. 60; Rogers v. Taylor, 38 E. L. & Eq. 574. ■• Stroyan v. Knowles, 6 Hurl. & Norm. 465; Brown d. Robins, 4 Hurl. & Norm. 186. 'Nicklin®. Williams, 10 Exch. 259; Bonomi v. Backhouse, El. Bl. & El. 633; 9 H. L. Cas. 503. « Smith V. Thackerah, L. R. 1 C. P. 564; Fisher v. Beard, 33 Iowa, 346. 268 CLASSIFIOATIOHr OF ESTATES. [§ 250 stories, which are owned by others, of their support.' The proprietor of the ground floor is bound by the nature and condition of his property, without any servitude, not only to bear the weight of the upper story, but to repair his own property, so that it may be able to bear such weight. The owner of the ground story is obliged to uphold it for the support of the upper story." And the owner of the upper story cannot hold the others in contri- bution for repairing the roof.' And if one owner neglects to repair his part to the damage of the others, equity will give relief to the injured owners.' Neither owner can do anything within his story that will impair the safety or enjoyment of the other owners of their respective parts.' The owner of the upper story has a right, without any express grant, to the support of the lower story/ Article 3. Party Walls. § 350. What is a Party Wall? § 255. Termination of Easement. § 361. Begulation of Party Walls. § 356. Implied Grant of Lateral Siip- § 253. Owned in Severalty. port. i 353. Increasing Height, Width and § 357. Expense of Building Party Depth of Wall. Walls. § 354. Tearing Down Party Walls. § 250. What is a Party "Wall?— A party wall is a wall between two estates, used for the common benefit of both in the construction of buildings on such estates. But the mere building a wall by one of two adjacent owners and placing the same in equal proportion on each estate, ' Harris v. Ryding, 5 Mees. & Wels. 60; Humphries ». Brogden, 13 Q. B. 739; Jeffries «. Williams, 5 Bxch. 793; Smart v. Norton, 5 El. & Bl. 30; New Jersey Zinc Co. «. Franklinite Co., 3 Beas. (N. J.) 333, 343; Rhodes*. Mc- Cormick, 4 Iowa, 876. 'Graves v. Berdan, 36 N. Y. 501; Anon. 11 Mod. 7. 'Lorir>g «. Bacon, 4 Mass. 575; Ottumwa Lodge v. Lewis, 34 Iowa, 67. ■■ Cheesebrough v. Green, 10 Conn. 318. See, also. Anon. 11 Mod. 7. ' Harris «. Ryding, 5 Mees. & Wels. 76; Rhodes v. McCormick, 4 Iowa, 376. « Humphries ». Brogden, 13 Q. B. 747. § 250] LATERAL AND SUBJACENT SUPPORT. 269 do not make the wall a party wall in the absence of agreement to that effect.' But a brick wall which is used in common as a wall of two adjacent properties in a city, is a party wall if erected partly on the soil of each estate and so used for many years by both owners without ques- tion or complaint by either." Every wall of separation between two buildings is presumed to be a party wall, unless the contrary is shown." A party wall can only become such by statute, by agree- ment, or by prescription. A parol agreement by the owner of the adjoining land to pay for the part of the wall set upon his land, does not run with the land nor bind his grantee.' But it appears if the parol agreement is executed it is Talid. ' In most cif the States party walls are regulated by statute. In New York the term party wall does not necessarily imply an absolutely solid structure, and there is no rule re- quiring the waU to be such a structure in order to be a party wall.' But in some other States the wall must be solid;' the statutes must be consulted as to regulations. Under the principles of the common law, a party wall must ordinarily be considered to mean a solid wall, with- out windows or openings. Because such openings tend to weaken the strength of the structure, and impair its value for lateral support of the ad joining building. They prevent the utilization of the wall for the erection of an additional story for the building. They also increase the hazard of fire. If allowed to continue for a period of twenty years, the privilege of the adjoining owner would mature into a perfect legal right, under the doctrine of prescription. ° The doctrine of ancient lights has no bearing on this point. Where a wall has been used for more than twenty-one ' Oldstein v. Firemen's Build. Asso., 44 La. Ann. 493. 'Kelly D. Taylor, 43 La. Ann. 1157. •Campbell v. Mesier, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 334. *List«. Hornbrook, 3W. Va. 340. 'Rawson v. Bell, 46 Ga. 19. •Haraman v. Jordan, 129 N. Y. 61. 'Traute v. White, 46 N. J. Eq. 437; Vollmer's Appeal, 61 Pa. St. 118; Graves v. Smith, 87 Ala. 450. 8 Graves B. Smith 87 Ala. 450; Ulbricht v. Eufaula Water Co., 86 Ala. 587. 270 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 251-252 years by both owners, it becomes a party wall whether equally on the lot of each or not.' In most of the States the owner of land, in building a party wall, partly on his own land and partly on that of an adjoining owner, has no right, against objections of the adjoining owner, to leave openings for windows therein, to be used until such time as the adjoining owner shall build.' § 251. Eegulation of Party Walls.— The regulation of party walls is a very ancient form of exercising the police power, and was transmitted to the United States from the customs of London. It is an interference with the rights and enjoyment of property, sustainable only on the police power of the State, and must be governed by the strict rules of the statutory grant,' which must be consulted in many cases for the law bearing upon this subject. § 252. Owned in Severalty. —Party walls erected by the owners of two adjoining lots are not held by the owners as tenants in common, but each owns one-half of the wall in severalty, with an easement in the other half. The title to each is qualified by a cross-easement in favor of the other, which entitles him to support his building by means of the half of the wall belonging to his neighbor.* There is nothing in the English cases' where the owners of a party wall are called tenants in common, and which decide that tenancy in a party wall has some of the qualities of tenancy in common, which suggest that one 'McVey v. Durkin, 136 Pa. St. 418; Western Nat. Bank's Appeal, 103 Pa. St. 171. 'Normile «. Gill, 159 Mass. 427; Ingals v. Plamondon, 75 111. 118; Gibson «. Holden, 115 111. 199; Bloch v. Isham, 38 Ind. 37; Sullivan v. Graflfort, 35 Iowa, 531; Graves v. Smith, 87 Ala. 450; Danenhauer v. Devine, 51 Tex. 480; Vollmer's Appeal, 61 Pa. St. 118; Milne's Appeal, 81 Pa. St. 54; Tiaute ». White, 46 N. J. Eq 437. 3 Hoffstot V. Voight, 146 Pa. St. 633. « Graves «. Smith, 87 Ala. 450; Bloch «. Isham, 28 Ind. 87; Ingals ». Plamon don, 75 111. 118; Rogers v. Sinsheimer, 50 K. Y. 646; Brooks «. Curtis, 50 N. Y. 639; Pillsbury*. Morris, 54 Minn. 493. ^Cubilt V. Porter, 8 Barn. & C. 357; Wiltshire v. Sidford, 1 Man. & Ry. 404; Stedman v. Smith, 8 El. & Bl. 1; Watson ®. Gray, 14 Ch. D. 193. § 253] LATERAL AND SUBJACENT SUPPORT. 271 owner of a party wall for the lateral support of buildings can have partition of the wall, or cannot carry it up higher than it may originally be built for the purpose of using it as the wall of his building. The adjoining owners of a party wall and the land cov- ered by it have each an easement in that portion thereof owned by the other by virtue of a party wall contract which runs with the land. It is competent for each party to provide how, when and to whom the costs of his portion shall be paid, and to make a covenant to pay therefor the mere personal covenant of the covenantee, and severable from his ownership of the land.' Statutory provisions con- trol in some States; thus, one who erects a wall in a city or town in the District of Columbia, Iowa, Mississippi, South Carolina and Louisiana may place half of the parti- tion wall on the adjoining land. § 253. Increasing Height, Width and Depth of Wall. — The limitation upon the right of each owner to use the wall as the lateral wall of sunh house as he may desire to erect is that he shall not impair the value of the waU to the other owner. If one owner carries up the wall, the addition becomes part of the party wall, and the own- ers have equal rights in it, and the value of the waU to either owner cannot be thereby impaired; but neither owner has a right to use the waU so as to weaken it." Either owner has a right to build the wall higher." Each may increase the height, at least, of his half, if not of the entire wall, when it can be done without damage to the other proprietor." And the weight of authority is that each proprietor has the lawful right to increase the height of the entire party wall, when it can be done without injury to the adjoining building, and without impairing the value of the cross-easement, to which the adjacent owner is entitled.' ' Pillsbury ®. Moms, 54 Minn. 493. 2 Phillips «. Bordman, 4 Allen (Mass.), 147; Everett «. Edwards, 149 Mass. 588. » Brooks «. Curtis, 50 N. Y. 639. * Graves*. Smith, 87 Ala. 450; Aodrae v. Haseltine, 58 Wis. 395; 46 Am. Rep. 635. 'Brooks V. Curtis, 50 N. Y. 639; 10 Am. Rep. 545; Blooh ®. Isham, 38 Ind. 37; 93 Am. Dec. 387; Negus v. Becker, 68 Hun (N. Y.), 393, following Brooks 272 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 255 So, one owner may underpin and deepen the foundation, and raise the wall higher on his own land.' And where the statute does not control, one owner of a party wall has a right to lower the foundation so as to give him a sub-base- ment." A wall was built by a party, one-half on adjoining land. A vendee bought the adjoining land, and an agreement was made between the parties by which the vendee might use the wall as a party wall for his store, ten stories high, with the right to add to the height of it, the vendee agreeing to strengthen the wall and foundation by necessary addition thereto on 'his own side. It was held that the vendee bad a right to make necessary additions to the foundation on the other side.." And one owner has a right to take down, and rebuild a ruinous wall, even if he raised the height." Under the English Building Act,' it was decided that one owner of a party wall can lawfully take down an addi- tion built upon it by the other owner,' but this decisioa is controlled by the statute. One English case seems to support the view that a wall may be a party wall to such height as it belongs in common to two adjoining buildings, and ceases by implication to be such for the rest of its height ;' but this decision is opposed to the weight of authority and cannot be approved. Each owner of a party wall which is in a state of de- cay may pull it down and rebuild it. But pulling down without an intention to rebuild the wall as it originally stood is a conversion for which an action by the other owner will lie.* V. Curtis, 50 N. Y. 639; Everett «. Edwards, 149 Mass. 588; Matthews v. Dixey, 149 Mass. 595. ' Eno V. Del Vecchio, 4 Duer (N. Y.), 53. ^ Standard Bank v. Stokes, 9 Oh. D. 68. See, also, Field v. Leiter, 117 IlL 341. 'Field V. Leiter, 117 111. 341. * Partridge v. Gilbert, 15 N. Y. 601; Putzell v. Bank (Md.), 28 At. Eep. 276, « 14 Geo. IIL.c. 78. ' Matts 11. Hawkins, 5 Taunt. 20. ' Weston V. Arnold, L. R. 8 Ch. App. Cas. 1090. See, also Price ». Me- Connell, 27 111. 255. 8 Schile V. Brokhahns, SON. Y. 614; Jones v. Read, 10 Jr. C. L. 315; Stand- ard Bank v. Stokes, 9 Ch. D. 68; Crawshaw ®. Sumner, 56 Mo. 517. §§ 254-255] LATERAL AND SUBJACENT SUPPORT. 273 Either party may underpin the foundation, sink it deeper, and increase its thickness, if he can do it without injury to the other building.' Where a joint owner in- creases the height of the wall, and hires an independent contractor to do the work in a lawful manner, so that the work itself does not become dangerous or extraordi- nary, the owner is not liable for damages incident to the falling of the wall through some accident." § 254. Tearing Down Party Walls. — One of the owners of a party wall has no right to tear it down without the con- sent of the other, when the wall is in good repair.' And where the right to take down a party wall exists because it is un. safe, the party taking it down must exercise reasonable care so as not to injure his neighbor, and the support which the latter needs for his building the former must provide.' And when the party wall is torn down and replaced solely because it is unsuited for a new building to be erected by one of the adjoining owners, the other cannot be compelled to contribute to the cost of the new wall, so long as he ]jiakes no use of it different from his use of the old one.' A joint owner in a division wall may remove it and erect a new one if the work is done in a reasonable time and the co-owner is reimbursed for necessary expense in protecting his property during the change." If the portions of the division wall belong to the parties in severalty or as ten- ants in common under the English doctrine, the rights are not particularly different. ' § 255. TERMrNATiON OF EASEMENT. — An easement in a party wall is terminated by decay." And where a party 'Eno«. Del Vecchio, 4 Duer (N. Y.), 53; 6Duer(]Sr. T.), 17; Hieatt v. Morris, 10 Ohio St. 533; Phillips v. Bordman, 4 Allen (Mass.), 147. 'ISTegus V. Becker, 143 N. Y. 303. ' Partridge «. Lyon, 67 HunflSr. Y.), 39. ! * Maypole v. Forsyth, 44 111. App. 494. » Hoffstot V. Voight, 146 Pa. St. 633. «PutzelI». Bank (Md.), 38 At. Rep. 376. 'Bank v. Stokes, 9 Ch. Div. 73; Cubit v. Porter, 8 Barn. & Cr. 357. « Bowling «. Hennlngs, 20 Md. 179; Odd Fellows' Hall Asso. d. Hegele, 24 Greg. 16. 85 274 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 256 wall is destroyed by fire, the joint owners are remitted to their original title to the division line. If one rebuilds on the old foundation so that part of the wall stands on land of the other, the latter may use that part without paying for it.' Where one owner's house has gone to decay, but the other owner's house is good, and the wall is sufficient for it, the first cannot puU it down in order to build a new and larger house." § 266. Implied Grant of Lateral Support.— When the owner of adjoining lots of land builds two houses upon them, having one wall between them, one-half on each lot, and then sells one lot without reference to the walJ, the division line being run by courses and distances through the center thereof, there is an implied grant of a party wall, whether the building is conveyed under the descrip- tion of the lot or by designation as a building.' It is the actual existence of the wall as a part of both houses, and not the reference to it as a monument, from which the grant and reservation are implied.* Under such conditions no express grant, or agreement, or statute, de- fines or limits the rights of the parties, and they are such as the law implies to have been the intention of the parties from the grant, expressed or implied from user of the wall as a party wall, and it is immaterial whether the grant is by the single owner of both estates, or is the mutual grant of several owners.' If the owner of the houses sells one of them, an ease- ment for support arises in favor of the owner of each house.' ' Antomarchi v Russell, 63 Ala. 356; Hoffman®. Kuhn, 57 Miss. 746; Dow- ling t). Hennings, 20 Md. 179; Partridge®. Gilbert, 15 N. Y. 601; Sherred ». Cisco, 4 Sandf. (N. Y.) 480; Orman v. Day, 5 Fla. 385. ' Potter D. Wiiite, 6 Bosw. (N. Y.) 644, 647. 3 Carlton v. Blake, 153 Mass. 170. * Carlton ii. Blake, 152 Mass. 176; Everett v. Edwards, 149 Mass. 588; Rich- ards «. Rose, 9 Exch. 218; Rogers v. Sinsheimer, 50 N. Y. 646. 'Everetts®. Edwards, 149 Mass. 588; Webster «. Stevens, 5DuerfN. Y.), 553; Richards v. Rose, 9 Exch. 218. See, also, Matthews v. Dixey, 149 Mass. 595. 'Napier v. Bulwlnkle, 5 Rich. (N. Car.) 311; Webster v. Stevens, 5 Duer (N. Y.), 553; Murly v. M'Dermott, 8 Ad. &E1. 138. § 257] LATERAL AND SUBJACENT SUPPORT. 275 § 257. Expense of Building Party Wall. — At the pres- ent time statutory provisions generally control and regu- late party waUs, which are generally erected by express agreement between the parties, each contributing his share of the expense. The mere erection by one of the owners of a party wall between them will not subject the other to liability for one-half the cost of building." Agreements to pay one-half the expense of building a party wall wiU be readily implied." And it appears that where one uses ad- ditions to a party wall after they are made ho must pay one- half their cost." Where one covenants that he would pay one-half the expense of a party wall, it creates an ease- ment which runs with the land in some of the States.* And in such case there is no right of action against the party covenanting, after he has parted with the title, when his grantee uses the wall." But where a party wall is built on two lots, and the owner of one orally agrees to pay his half when he shall use the wall, and then sells and con- veys the lot, he then becomes liable for payment, as he has put it out of his power to use it. ° A court of equity will interfere by injunction, at a suit of one of the part owners of a party wall, to prevent the other from impairing or injuring the wall. ' A party wall is used when a building is permanently at- tached to it, whether by joist or timbers let into it, or any other mode." Where a party agreed to pay for half of the party wall when used, mortgages the lot and then erects a building using the wall, this does not make the mortgagee 1 Cole 1). Hughes, 54 N. Y. 444; Richardson ». Tobey, 131 Mass. 457. •Day V. Caton, 119 Mass. 513; Huck«. Flentye, 80111. 258; Rlndgeu. Baker, 57 N. Y. 209; Standish «. Lawrence, 111 Mass. 111. 8 Sanders ». Martin, 2 Lea (Tenn.), 213. ^Keteltas v. Penfold, 4 E. D. Smith (N. Y.), 122; Greenwald v. Kappes, 31 Ind. 316; Maine v. Cumston, 98 Mass. 317. Compare Pillsbury v. Morris, 54 Minn. 492. * Standish v. Lawrence, 111 Mass. 111. « Nalle V. Paggl, 81 Tex. 201. ' Graves ». Smith, 87 Ala. 450; Dauenhauer v. Devine, 51 Tex. 480; Sullivan V. Graffort, 35 Iowa, 531; Bloch ». Isham, 28 Ind. 37; St. John ». Sweeney, 59 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 175; VoUmer's Appeal, 61 Pa. St. 118; Vansyckle ■». Trys'on, 6 Phila. (Pa.) 401. « Deere v. Weir-Shugart Co. (Iowa), 59 N. W. Rep. 255. 276 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 258 liable for the use of the wall, though he has foreclosed his mortgage and taken the land.' And where there is no agreement express or implied in any form that a party will pay for one-half of the wall when built, the owner who has not agreed to pay for the half on his land, may build the wall higher without making payment to the adjoining owner." But if he has agreed to pay when used, then, upon using the wall he becomes liable to the other co- owner.' Article 4. Division Fences. § 258. Common Law Rule. § 260. Duties Imposed by Prescrip- I 259. Obligations of Adjoining Own- tion. §258. Common Law Rule. — Division fences are now regulated almost entirely by statutory provisions which must be consulted for the law bearing upon any particular feature of mutual rights. By the common law every man is bound at his peril to keep his cattle on his own land.' But th^ common law rule that the owner of domestic animals must keep them in his own enclosure, and cannot without becoming a trespasser, suffer them to run at large on the enclosed land of others, is completely reversed in some States." While a party at common law was not bound to fence his land, he was nevertheless bound, at his peril, to keep his domestic animals on his own grounds, and prevent them from escaping.' ' Pfeiffer v. Matthews, 161 Mass. 487. « Wilkins v. Jewett, 139 Mass. 29 ; Joy «. Bank, 115 Mass. 60; Brooks «. Curtis, 50 N. Y. 639; Allen v. Evans, 161 Mass. 487; Fox «. School, 120 Mo. 349. 2 Maine «. Cumston, 98 Mass. 317; Standish v. Lawrence, 111 Mass. Ill; Richardson v. Tobey, 121 Mass. 457; Prefontaine v. McMicken, 8 "Wash. St. 694. *Tonawanda Railroad Co. ■». Munger, 5 Denio (N. Y.), 259; Webber ». Clos- son, 35 Me. 26; Myers v. Dodd, 9 Ind. 290. ' Hurd V. Lacy, 93 Ala. 427. 'Stackpole v. Healy 16 Mass. 33; Rust «. Low, 6 Mass. 90; Thayer «. Arnold, § 259] LATERAL AND SUBJACENT SUPPORT. 277 § 259. Obligations of Adjoining Owners. —The obliga- tion of owners of adjoining lands to make and maintain partition fences, where no prescription exists, and no agreement has been made, rests entirely on positive provisions by statute. Trespass wiU lie against the owner of cattle entering on the ground of another, though there be no fence to obstruct them, unless he can protect himself by statute, or prescription, or agreement.' The more reasonable rule is that partition fences and ditches are to be placed on the land of both parties equally." When neither owner of the partition fence repairs it, the common law rule applies.' The common law rule has been recognized in Maine,* Massachusetts,' New Hampshire," Vermont,' New York,' New Jersey," Delaware," Mary- land," Kentucky," Minnesota," Indiana,'* Michigan." But the common law rule has never been in force in Ohio," California," North Carolina," South Carolina," Georgia," Texas," Missouri," and Mississippi." 4 Met. (Mass.) 589; StafEord v. Ingersol, 8 Hill (N. Y.), 38; Avery «. Maxwell, 4 N. H. 36; Wells ®. Howell, 19 Johns. (N. Y.) 385. 1 3 Kent's Com. 438; Churchill v. Evans, 1 Taunt. 539; Thayer v. Arnold, 4 Met. (Mass.) 589; Lyons v. Merrick, 105 Mass. 71; Richardson v. Milburn, 11 Md. 340. » Newell V. Hill, 2 Met. (Mass.), 180. Compare Vomles v. Miller, 3 Taunt. 188. 3 Webber v. Closson, 85 Me. 26; Myers ». Dodd, 9 Ind. 290. ^Harlow v. Stinson, 60 Me. 347. ' Lyons v. JVIerrick, 105 Mass. 71. « Avery v. Maxwell, 4 N. H. 86. ' Holden v. Shattuck, 34 Vt. 336. swells V. Howell, 19 Johns. (N. Y.) 385. « Coxe «. Bobbins, 4 Halst. (N. J.) 384. '» Vandegrift v. Railroad Co., 2 Houst. (Del.) 287. "Richardson v. Milburn, 11 Md. 340. "Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. «. Ballard, 3 Mete. (Ky.) 177. ''Locke V. Railroad Co., 15 Minn. 350. '* Brady v. Ball, 14 Ind. 317. 1' Johnson v. Wing, 3 Mich. 163. 16 Cleveland, etc. R. R. Co. «. Elliott, 4 Ohio St. 474. "Comerford v. Dupuy, 17 Cal. 308. ■8 Lams V. Railroad Co. 7 Jones (N. Car.), 468. "Murray v. Railroad Co., 10 Rich. (S. Car.) 237. ^» Macon, etc. Railroad Co. v. Baber, 43 Ga. 305. " Walker «. Herron, 33 Tex. 55. •'Crafton v. Railroad Co., 55 Mo. 580. *'Vicksburg, etc. Railroad Co.«. Patton, 31 Miss. 156. 278 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 260 In Pennsylvania/ Iowa," and Illinois' the owner is not bound to fence in or fence out animals. In Ohio an adjoining owner cannot build a high fence which excludes the light and air from his neighbor.* § 260. Duties Imposed by Prescription. — A right in the nature of an easement may be created in favor of the own- ers of one of two adjoining tracts, and a correlative duty may be imposed on the owners of the other tract to have the latter perpetually maintain the whole or a part of a division fence." That an obligation to maintain partition fences may arise by prescription, which could be enforced by writ de curia claudenda at common law, does not ad- mit of a doubt. This right is called a spurious easement." This easement seems to be founded upon the duty which at common law required the owner of a close, at his peril, to keep his cattle thereon, and to prevent them from trespas- sing on adjoining close ; and when the owner of the latter erected a fence for his protection, and maintained it for the prescriptive period, he was deemed to have discharged his neighbor from his original duty, and to have become bound to protect his own close by some grant or agreement the evidence of which was lost by lapse of time. ' There is no doubt that an obligation to maintain a partition fence may exist by prescription.' In Massachusetts it is held that since, at the original set- tlement of the country, no prescription to fence could exist, the common law authorizing the writ of curia claudenda, being inapplicable to the state of the colony, was never in- troduced into this State. But under the statute adjoining owners are bound to make and maintain an equal part of the division fence, and can agree upon the parts to be made ' North Pennsylvania R. R. Co. ®. Rehman, 49 Pa. St. 101. « Wagner ». Bissell, 3 Iowa, 396. 3 Stoner v. Shugart, 45 111. 76. *Kessler v. Letts, 7 Ohio Cir. Ct. 108. ' Castner ». Riegel, 54 N. J. L. 498. « Gale & What, on Easem. 201, 302. 'Ivins«. Ackerson, 38 N. J. L. 320; Lawrence v. Jenkins, L. R. 8 Q. B, 274; Washb. on Easem. 634. *Boyle V. Tamlyn, 6 Barn. & C. 329; Moore v. Levert, 24 Ala. 310; Bronsoa 4). Coffin, 108 Mass. 185; Richardson v. Milburn, 11 Md., 340. § 260] LATERAL AND SUBJACENT SUPPORT. 279 and maintained by each respectively; or, in default of an agreement, can procure an assignment of the part each shall make and maintain, and since the country had then been settled long enough to allow the time necessary to prove a prescription, and ancient assignment or agreement may have existed and been lost, a right by prescription may be set up and proved by ancient usage/ The continuous maintenance of the whole of a division fence for the full prescriptive period by the owner of one tract as of duty will raise a presumption of grant or agree- ment for its perpetual maintenance." But the continuous maintenance for any length of time of a part only of a di- vision fence must be deemed to be referable in the absence of proof of an express agreement, to an agreement or an assignment made under the statute, and no presumption will arise of a perpetual obligation to maintain that portion of the fence.' And an agreement of adjoining owners respecting division of the fence between them may be by parol." ' Rust «. Low, 6 Mass. 90. See, also, Binney i>. Proprietors, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 503; Thayer v. Arnold, 4 Met. (Mass.) 589; Harlow i>. Stinson, 60 Me. 347. 2 Castner i). Riegel, 53 N. J. L. 498. "Adams v. Van Alstyne, 25 N. Y. 233. « Ivins V. Ackerson, 38 N. J. L. 333. CHAPTER Vin. LICENSE. Article 1. Nature and Effect. § 361. Definition. § 264. Manner of the licensee Exercis- § 363. Entering upon Premises With- ing His Authority. Invitation. § 265. Exclusive or Non-Exclusive. § 263. How Created. § 261. Definition. — A Kcense is an authority given to do some act, or a series of acts, on the land of another without possessing an estate therein.' An easement is a liberty, privilege, or advantage in land without profit, existing distinct from the ownership of the soil." A license is a personal interest or right which is terminated by the death of either the licensor or licensee, and which cannot be assigned without the consent of the licensor.' An unsuccessful attempt to create an easement is often called a license.* A contract to furnish three specific rooms for a definite time with light and heat and board is not a lease." But a contract, in form a lease, for a definite time at a fixed rate, of specified rooms separate from other rooms so as to form a tenement in themselves, is a lease." A party with the oral consent of the owner may cross the land, and will therefore have a license to cross. The ' Cook V. Stearns, 11 Mass. 533; Metcalf v. Hart, 3 Wyo. 514; Taylor v. Waters, 7 Taunt. 374; Blaisdell «. Railroad Co., 51 N. H. 485; Wolfe v. Frost, 4 Sand. Ch. (N. Y.) 72; Mumford ». Whitney, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 380; Bridges V. Purcell, 1 Dev. & B. (N. Car.) 493. 2 Clark D. Glidden, 60 Vt. 702; Pomeroy v. Mills, 3 Vt. 279. 8 Wolfe V. Frost, 4 Sand. Ch. (N. Y.) 72; Woodbury «. Parshley, 7 N. H. 237; Rathbone v. McConnell, 20 Barb. (N. Y.) 311; Snowden ». Wilas, 19 Ind. 13; Emerson «. Pisk, 6 Me. 200; Cowles v. Kidder, 34 N. H. 364; Howe v. Batchel- der, 49 N. H. 304; Ruggles «. Lesure, 34 Pick. (Mass.) 187. •* Coleman v. Foster, 1 Hurl. & Norm. 37. ' White «. Maynard, 111 Mass. 250. 'Porter v. Merrill, 124 Mass. 534. (280) § 261] LICENSE. 281 same permission given in a deed, would create an ease- ment. Oral permission to enter land and dig minerals is a license,' or to throw waste matter into a stream," or to enter land and cut and remove wood.' But if this same privilege was properly granted in a deed it would then be an ease- ment. A license transfers no estate to the licensee.' And an instrument executed with all the formalities of a deed may be only a license, when such is the legal construction.* Licenses are personal and terminate with the death of either party." A mere license is personal to the licensee and is not assignable, ' unless made so by the contract. ' A conti-act in writing for the use and possession of a tract of land, and the right to cut, remove and appropriate timber growing thereon is a lease and not a license." This right passes the right of possession and, therefore, creates a lease and not a license.'" A right to sepulture in a burying ground of a church is not an absolute right in the soil but a mere license or privilege." And a grant to a party of the exclu- sive right or privilege of boring for oil upon a farm is a mere incorporeal hereditament." A person who breaks into a building to protect property from fire h a mere licensee to whom the owner owes no duty to keep the premises in safe repair. " 'Anderson v. Simpson, 31 Iowa, 399; Kleeb v. Bard, 7 Wash. St. 41. « Thompson v. McElarney, 83 Pa. St. 174. 3 Greeley v. Stilson, 27 Mich. 153. * Clinton v. McKenzie, 5 Strob. (S. Car.) 36. * Jackson v. Babcock, 4 Johns. (H. Y.) 418; Wickham v. Hawker, 7 Mees. & Wels. 76; Baldwin v. Aldrich, 34 Vt. 526; Vandenburgh v. Van Bergen, 13 Johns. (N. T.) 313. * Ruggles V. Lesure, 34 Pick. (Mass.) 187. See, also, Vandenburgh v. Van Bergen, 13 Johns. (N. T.) 213. 'Mendenhall v. Klinck, 51 N. T. 346. 8 Hill «. Cutting, 107 Mass. 596. 'Crane «. Patton, 57 Ark. 340. '"Tinsley v. Craige, 54 Ark. 346; Haywood i>. Fulmer (Ind.), 33 N. E. Rep 574. " Craig V. Church, 88 Pa. St. 43; Kincaid's Appeal, 66 Pa. St. 411; Hancock V. McAvoy, 151 Pa. St. 460. "Union Oil Co. v. Bliven Oil Co., 72 Pa. St. 173. "Gibson v. Leonard, 143 111. 182. 36 282 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 262 A license may be created by parol, but an easement on the laud of another is not created by a license, even when in writing and made upon a good consideration; it must be by deed, or upon prescription which supposes a deed to have been given.' § 262. Enteeino upon Premises without Invitation. — The general rule is that a licensee goes upon land at his own risk, and must take the premises as he finds them. An open hole, which is not concealed otherwise than by darkness of the night, is a danger which a licensee must avoid at his peril." So where a person is a mere licensee, he has no cause of action on account of danger existing in the place he is permitted to enter. ' There is a clear distinction between a license and an in- vitation to enter premises, and an equally clear distinction as to the duty of an owner in the two cases. An owner owes to a licensee no duty as to the condition of premises, unless imposed by statute, save that he should not knowingly let him run upon a hidden peril, or willfully cause him harm ; while to one invited he is under obligation for reasonable security for the purpose of the invitation. In the absence of invitation or of statute provision, the owner is not liable to a fireman, who has entered in the course of his duty, and who has been injured by the inse- curity of the premises." Because the owner of a building in a populous city does not owe it as a duty, at common law, to keep such building safe for firemen or other officers who in a contingency may enter the same under license conferred by law.' The owner or occupant of land or a building is not liable, 1 Mumford ». Whitney, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 381; Eckerson «. Crippen, 110 N. y. 585; White «. Railroad Co., 139 N. Y. 19; Hazleton «. Putnam, 3 Chaud. (Wis.) 117. 2 Reardon i). Thompson, 149 Mass. 367. See, also, Mathews «. Bensel, 51 N. J. L. 30. 3 Holmes v. Railway Co., L. R. 4 Exch. 354; Parker «. Publishing Co., 69 Me. 173; Bedell «. Berkey, 76 Mich. 435; Railroad Co. v. Barnhart, 115 Ind. 399; Gibson v. Leonard, 37 111. App. 344. "Gibson v. Leonard, 143 111. 183; Beehler v. Daniels (R. I.), 29 At Rep. 6. "Woodruff V. Bowen(Ind.), 34 N. E. Rep. 1113. § 263J LICENSE. 283 at common law, for obstructions, pitfalls, and other dangers there existing as, in the absence of any inducement or in- vitation to others to enter, he may use his property as he pleases. But he holds his property subject to such reasonable control and regulation as the legislature, under the police power vested in the State by the constitution, may impose for the prevention of injuries to the rights of others and the security of the pubUc health. Hence, a statute may be en- acted compelling the owners or occupants to provide against injuries to uninvited licensees." An implied invitation is sufficient to make the owner liable to injuries of the licensee who is not negligent. Thus, a police officer who falls down an uncovered well in or near a passageway to a house where he has been called to quell a disturbance of the peace, may recover damages for his injuries, as he was using the pass- ageway by the owner's invitation, who calledhim." Accord- ingly where a letter carrier falls down an elevator-well in a hallway where he is accustomed to leave letters in boxes put there for that purpose, he may recover for his damages from the owner of the building as there is an implied in- vitation to the carriers to enter the premises.' §263. How Created. — Licenses maybe created by ex- press agreement or by parol, ' or they may be implied by the inducement and representation of the land owner.' And the necessity of the case may give one party a license to enter the land of another. Thus, one, whose cattle has escaped upon the land of another, may follow them and drive them back without being a trespasser, unless the es- cape itself was a trespass." ' Parker v. Barnard, 135 Mass. 116. 2 Learoyd v. Godfrey, 138 Mass. 315. ' Gordon v. Cummings, 152 Mass. 513. See, also, Bennett ■». Railroad Co. , 103 U. S. 577. ^Blaisdell v. Railroad Co., 51 N. H. 485; Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 Mees. &• Wels. 838. ' Sterling v. Warden, 51 N. H. 231; Greenwood L. & P. J. R. R. Co. v. R. R. Co., 134 N. Y. 435; Kay v. Railroad Co., 65 Pa. St. 373; Martin «. Houghton, 45 Barb. (N. Y.) 258; Nettleton v. Sikes, 8 Met. (Mass.) 34; White «. Elwell, 48 Me. 360; Wood v. Manley, 11 Ad. & El. 34; Mussey v. Scott, 33 Vt, 83, 84. » Sawyer v. Railroad Co., 105 Mass. 196. 284 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 263 Railroad tickets are contracts which import a license to enter upon the premises of a railroad. And a written or printed ticket to a theater or concert is a license to enter the place where held." But a ticket to a theater has been thought to give something more than a license to enter the premises." Persons have a license to enter public places of entertain- ment,' a post-office,' though in a private building, an hotel;' and persons, in case of a wreck, may go upon the beach for the purpose of saving life and property;' and a party may enter upon the land of another, to do a certain thing under a parol license until revoked.' A Hcense to take stone implies a right to draw it carefully over the licenser's land.' A license to gather fruit from certain premises will not justify the person remaining on the premises who is not there for that purpose, after he has been ordered to leave.' The owner of property owes no duty to mere licensees, or those who go upon his premises by license merely or for their own convenience, to keep his premises in such con- dition, so that they shall not be injured.'" An acquiescence on the part of the owner of the land which has been entered will create a license;" and it may be created anew after the death of the ancestor, by acqui- escence of the heirs." ' Coleman v. Foster, 1 Hurl. & Norm. 37; Drake v. Wells, 11 Allen (Mass.), 144. ' Drew V. Peer, 93 Pa. iSt. 334. See, also, Fitcli v. Constantine Hydraulic Co., 44 Mich. 74. » Gilbert ®. Nagle, 118 Mass. 378; Markliam v. Brown, 8 N. H. 533. ■•Sterling v. Warden, 51 N. H. 338, 331; Burnett i>. State, 30 Ala. 19. » Markliam v. Brown, 8 N. H. 538. 'Proctor V. Adams, 113 Mass. 376. ' New Orleans Co. v. Moye, 39 Miss. 374; Houston «. LafiEee, 46 N. H. 507; Pierrepont v. Barnard., 6 N. Y. 379. 8 Clark V. Railroad Co., 38 Vt. 103. » State V. Shawley, 43 Mo. App. 584. '" Galligan*®. Metacomet Manuf . Co. 143 Mass. 537; Eisenburg®. Railroad Co., 33 Mo. App. 85; Heinlein ». Railroad Co., 147 Mass. 136; Clark v. Manches- ter, 63 N. H. 577. " Pitzman v. Boyce, 111 Mo. 387; Metcalf ». Hart, 3 Wyo. 514. "Hodgkins v. Farrington, 150 Mass. 19. §§ 264^265] LICENSE. 285 § 264. Manner of the Licensee Exercising His Au- thority. — The licensee must exercise his authority in a reasonable and prudent manner, and then will not be re- sponsible for the natural consequence of the exercise of his authority.' So long as the license remains unrevoked, the licensee may adopt the same course as if he possessed an interest in the land instead of a naked authority. Thus a house or other building, erected on land by the license of the owner, does not become the property of the land owner as annexed to the soil, but remains the personal property of the licensee ; " and upon revocation the licensee may enter with such employes as are reasonably necessary to remove it.' The licensee must enter by the usual mode of access provided by the owner, as by the gate or bars,* and the licensee does not become a trespasser ab initio by leaving the bars down. ' But where the license is given by law to an officer, any abuse of his authority will make him a tres- passer ab initio.' A licensee must not unnecessarily and unreasonably obstruct the way in exercising his authority ; if he does he is liable to an action on the case. ' § 265. Exclusive or Non-Exclusive. — There can be an exclusive license to the licensee, and the intention to ex- clude the grantor need not appear by express words. Al- though there is a prima facie presumption against such license being exclusive, yet the common intention to ex- clude the grantor need not appear by express words." Such 'Prince ». Case, 10 Conn. 375; Webb v. Paternoster, Palmer, 71; Selden b Canal Co., 29 N. Y. 640; Kent v. Kent, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 569; Pratt v. Ogden, 34 N. Y. 20. = Hilborne «. Brown, 12 Me. 162; Smith ®. Benson, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 176. Compare Leland d. Gassett, 17 Vt. 403. 'Hodgkins v. Parrington, 150 Mass. 19; Lee v. Meeker, 2 Wis. 487; Pitz- man v. Boyce, 111 Mo. 387. * Gardner v. Rowland, 2 Ired. (N. Car.) 247. ' Stone 1). Knapp, 39 Vt. 501. See, also, Johnstown Iron Co. v. Cambria Iron Co., 32 Pa. St. 241; Sterling v. Warden, 51 K H. 317. ^Malcom «. Spoor, 13 Met. (Mass.) 279. 'Cashing ■». Adams, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 110; Sampson ■». Henry, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 36. * Sutherland «. Heathcote (1891), 3 Ch. 504, rejecting the doctrine of Chet- ham v. Williamson, 4 East. 469. •286 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 266 a, right of property may have a legal existence as an ease- ment in gross to the exclusion of the grantor/ When the licensee has authority to do acts, and has all the rights of the licenser, he may then hold responsible any party interfering with his rights." An exclusive right to all the profits of a particular kind can, no doubt, be granted; but such a right cannot be in- ferred from language which is not clear and explicit.' Where there is nothing to show that the grantee's right is exclusive, the landowner may work the mines, provided he does not disturb the grantee in any workings which the grantee is carrying on." A license is never exclusive unless it is expressed to be so. It only makes lawful that which otherwise would be a trespass." If a man grants to another a license to cut timber or dig minerals on his land, the grantee may take all that he can, but the owner has also a right to cut and dig as he pleases." Article 2. Revocable and Irrevocable. § 266. Revocation of Parol Agree- § 369. On Land of Licensee. ment. § 270. At Law and In Equity. § 267. Revocation of Parol Agree- § 271. Coupled with an Interest. ment — Another View. § 273. Application of the Equitable § 268. Executory Agreement — Pur- Doctrine. chasing Standing Timber. § 266. Eevocation of Parol Agreement. — The adjudi- cations upon this subject of the right to revoke a parol li- cense are not uniform, and they cannot, therefore, be classi- fied or arranged into harmonious groups, and a searcher of 1 Lee ». Stephenson, E. B. & E. 513. See, also, Wilson ». Mackreth, 3 Burr. 1834; Bailey b. Stephens, 12 C. B., K. 8. 91. » Sawyer v. Wilson, 61 Me. 529. 'Mountjoy's Case, 1 And. 307; 4 Leon. 147; Doe «. Wood, 2 Barn. & Aid. 724; Carr -p. Benson, L. R, 8 Ch. 524. * Sutherland v. Heathcote (1892), 1 Ch. 475. ' Wickham v. Hawker, 7 Mees. & Wels. 63. *Mountjoy's Case, t And. 807; 4 Leon. 147; Newby «. Harrison, 1 J. & H. 393: Dennison v. Holliday, 1 Hurl. & N. 631. f 266] LICENSE. 287 the law must not confuse the different rules. One class of cases uphold with great steadiness the general rule that a parol license to do an act on the land of the licenser, while it justifies anything done by the licensee before revocation, is, nevertheless, revocable at the option of the licenser, and this, although the intention was to confer a continuing right and money had been expended by the licensee upon the faith of the license. Such a license, therefore, may not be changed into an equitable right on the ground of equitable estoppel.' This plainly is within the rule of the statute of frauds, and the rule required by public policy. It gives security and certainty to titles, prevents the burdening of lands with re- strictions founded upon oral agreements which are easily misunderstood. Under this rule a parol license is revocable.' And so, where a railroad company lays a side track upon its own prop- erty for the benefit of another under a parol agreement, the expense to be met by the other party, it may revoke the same at any time; whether the bill for expense was pre- sented or the work paid for or not, cannot control in such case.' So a parol grant of the right to drain land by carrying water off through sluices on adjoining land creates no ease- ment, but is merely a license, and equity will not enjoin its revocation on the ground that money has been expended and embankments built to reclaim the land from the river in reliance upon the same, where it appears that the work "was almost finished when the license was obtained. It ap- pears that in New Jersey an easement cannot be imposed on land by the force of parol evidence, and a license exe- cuted at • the expense of the licensee will not have that effect;' and this is the better rule. ' Crosdale v. Lanigan, 129 N. Y. 604. See, also, Cronkhite v. Cronkhite, 94 N. Y. 333. 'Nat. Stock Yards v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 112 HI. 384; D wight v. Hayes, 150 111. 273; 49 111. App. 530. 3 Lake Shore, etc. R. R. Co. v. HofiEert, 40 111. App. 631. See, also, Wood- ward c. Seely, 11 111. 157; Clute v. Carr, 20 Wis. 531; Foster v. Browning, 4 R. I. 47. * Lawrences. Springer, 49 N. J. Eq. 289. See, also, Johnson v. Skillman, 288 CLASSIFICATION OF ESrATKS. [§ 266 A verbal agreement to build a mill-dam may be revoked after the dam is built/ as the permanent right to flow- land by the erection of a mill-dam cannot be created by parol under this doctrine." A party who has received a license to enter the premises of the licensor for certain purposes must act within a reasonable time/ and when this license is by parol agree- ment, it may be revoked at the option of the licensor though money has been expended.' An entry made on public mineral lands is at most but an entry under license of the government, and a subsequent sale to another person by the government and an issue of the receiver's certificate for the price thereof, so divest the government of the title that the license is eo instanti revoked. ' So the right to revoke a license under which a railroad company has built its road on land to recover the land is not lost by delay." A corporation having the right to clear out and enlarge a canal can revoke any license given by its predecessor or its agents to erect a bridge, such as inter- feres with the enjoyment of its franchise.' It is but right that when such a license is revoked that the licensee shall have notice of the revocation, either by notorious acts of the licenser or by notice, oral or written.' 29 Minn. 95; Pitzman v. Boyce, 111 Mo. 387; Lockbart «. Geir, 54 Wis. 133; Batchelder v. Hibbard, 58 N. H. 269; Duinneen v. Rich, 22 Wis. 550; Foot B. ISTew Hampshire, etc. Co., 23 Conn. 214; Morse «. Copeland, 2 Gray (Mass.), 302. ' Kivett i\ McKeithan, 90 N. Car. 106. See, also, McCrackea v. McOracken, 88 N. Car. 272. 'Clute V. Carr, 20 Wis. 531. Compare Lee ». McLeod, 12 Nev. 280. 'Cahoon ». Bayaud, 123 N. Y. 298. < Total V. Bonnefoy, 133 111. 653; Cahoon®. Bayaud, 123 N. Y. 298; Hodg- kins v. Farrington, 150 Mass. 19; Clapp ®. Boston, 133 Mass. 367. ' Omaha, etc. Eefining Co. v. Tabor, 13 Colo. 41. *Kremer«. Railroad Co., 51 Minn. 15. 'BassiJ. Navigation Co., Ill N. Car. 439; Richmond & Dan. Railroad Co., V. Railroad Co., 104 N. Car. 669. See, also, Minneapolis Mill Co. v. Railroad Co., 51 Minn. 304. Compare Devonshire «. Ela;in, 14 Beav. 530. 8 Kivett V. McKeithan, 90 N. Car. 106; Beck v. Railroad Co., 65 Miss. 172. § 267] LICENSE. 289 § 26 T. Revocation of a Parol Agreement — Another View. — Of course where a mere naked license is involved, it can be revoked at the pleasure of the licensor.' But it is the settled law of some States that where a license, involv- ing the expenditure of money, has been so far executed that its withdrawal would operate as a fraud upon the per- son who expended money in rehance upon it, no revocation can take place without making compensation to the party injured by the withdrawal." It is held an executed hcense, the execution of which involved the expenditure of money or labor, is regarded in equity as an executed agreement for a valuable consideration, and that it is, therefore, irre- vocable, although given merely by parol and relating to the use and occupation of real estate. ° So an executed hcense to lay pipes to conduct water from one farm to another, for the benefit of the owner of the latter, is irrevocable, and the licensor may be enjoined, upon terms, from interfering with the water pipes laid in pursuance of the license.* It is held that in equity such executed license is not re- vocable.* But of course the license is revocable if the licensee does not perform his part of the agreement.' These cases hold that equity may control the statute of frauds in order to prevent it from being used as a cover for the commission of the frauds which it was meant to sup- press, but the power to do this belongs solely to equity, "and cannot be exercised by a common law tribunal, with- ' Wood r. Railroad Co., 90 Mich. 334; Parish «. Kaspore, 109 Ind. 586; Lake Erie, etc. R. R. Co. v. Kennedy, 132 Ind. 274; Lake Erie, etc. R. R. Co. b Michener, 117 lad. 465. ' Simons «. Morehouse, 88 Ind. 391; Clement F. Durgin, 5 Me. 9; McBroom t. Thompson, 25 Oreg. 559. sRerick v. Kern, 14 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 367; 16 Am. Dec. 497; Augusta v. Burum (Ga.), 19 S. E. Rep. 820. ••Clark v. Glidden, 60 Yt. 703. See, also, Brauns v. Glesige, 130 Ind. 167; Metcalf *-. Hart, 3Wyo. 513; IStessick r. Railroad Co., 128 Ind. 81; Saucer 1!. Keller, 129 Ind. 475 ; Harlan v. Logansport X. Gas Co., 133 Ind. 333. *Lee ». McLeod, 13 Nev. 380; Devonshire v. Eglin, 14 Beav. 530; Barnhardt D. Houghton, 27 Beav. 435; Davies B. Marshall, IOC. B., N. S. 703; Lacy ». Arnett, 33 Pa. St. 169; Huff v. McCauley, 53 Pa. St, 306; Wilson ». Chalfant, 15 Ohio, 348. • School District v. Hart, 3 Wyo. 563. 37 290 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 268 out confounding jurisdictions which have hitherto been kept separate." ' But all the jurisdictions hold that a naked parol license may be revoked." § 268, ExECUTOEY Agreement^Puechasing Standing TiMBEE. — A purchaser of standing wood and timber, after seveiance of the trees, from the land, has an irrevocable license to enter and remove them, but before they are cut his license may at any time be revoked by the licenser, leaving him no remedy but an action to recover damages for the breach of the contract.' Purchasing standing tim- ber is not a sale or a contract for a sale of an interest in land, but an executory agreement for the sale of chattels to take effect when the wood and timber are severed from the land, with a license to enter and cut the trees and re- move them. Such a contract, if oral, is not within the statute of frauds, and its construction is the same as if it was in writ- ing." So if the purchaser has not severed the trees from the land within the time limited therefor, he cannot, upon a subsequent sale and conveyance of the laud by the owner, enter and cut the trees. ' But a contract in writing for the use and possession of a tract of land, and the right to cut, remove and appropriate timber growing thereon is a lease and not a license. ° ' Prince v. Case, 3 Am. Lead. Cas. 557. See, also, Hayes ii. Livingston, 34 Mich. 381, 387; Burns v. Martin, 45 Midi. 23. «Winslow«. Cooper, 104111. 235; Murdock v Bailroad Co., 73 N. Y. 579- Irish V. Railway Co., 44 Iowa, 380. Wood i). Railroad Co., 90 Mich. 334; Wiugard «. Tift, 24 Ga. 179; Hatfield -b. Bailroad Co., 39 N. J. L. 571; Allen v. FLske, 42 Vt. 462; Shirley v. Crabb (Ind.), 37 N. E. Rep. 130; Tanner i>. Vol- entine, 75 III. 634; Burton v. Scherpf, 1 Allen (Mass.), 133; Wiseman ». Luck- singer, 84 N. Y. 31, 41; Dempsey «. Kipp, 61 N. Y. 463; Pierrepont v. Bar- nard, 6 N. Y. 279; Risien «. Brown, 73 Tex. 135; Rogers -o. Cox, 96 Ind. 157; Russell «. Hubbard, 59 111. 335; Morse v. Copeland, 3 Gray (Mass.), 303; Drake ■». Wells, 11 Allen (Mass.), 141. 2 Giles ». Simonds, 15 Gray (Mass.), 441 ; Fletcher v. Livingston, 153 Mass. 388. "Claflin^. Carpenter, 4 Met. (Mass.) 580; Drake «. Wells, 11 Allen (Mass.), 141; United Society v. Brooks, 145 Mass. 410; Hill v. Hill, 113 Mass. 103, 105. ' Fletcher d. Livingston, 153 Mass. 388. See, also, Glynn «. George, 20 N H. 114; Mason e. Plolt, 1 Allen (Mass.), 45; Wescott v. Delano, 20 Wis. 514; Roffey V. Henderson, 17 Q. B. 586; Williams v. Flood, 63 Mich. 487; Schrae- der, etc. Co. v. Packer, 129 U. S. 688; Ward v. Rapp, 79 Mich. 469. 8 Crane v. Patton, 57 Ark. 340. § 269] LICENSE. 291 The sale of growing trees, with a right at a future time to enter upon the land and cut and remove them conveys an interest in the land;' but when the intention is to con- vey the trees only after being felled and separated from the soil, this agreement is only an executory contract for the sale of personal property," and vests the title of the trees in the vendee.' A grant of all the timber standing and growing on land to the grantee, his heirs and assigns forever, with permis- sion freely to enter, cut and carry them away at pleasure, conveys an estate of inheritance in the trees, with the right in the soil necessary for their support and growth, while the fee in the soil itself remains in the grantor." § 269. On Land of Licensee. — It is held that an exe- cuted license to do acts of a permanent nature on the land of the licensee, or of a third person, which necessarily ' Slocum V. Seymour, 36 N. J. L. 138: Hutchins «. King, 1 Wall (U. S.), 58; Buck «. Pickwell, 27 Vt. 157; Yeakle «. Jacob, 33 Pa. St. 876; Huff v. Mc- Cauley, 53 Pa. St. 206; Bowers v. Bowers, 95 Pa. St. 477; Harrell v. Miller, 35 Miss. 700; Mumford v. Whitney, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 380; Boyce v. Wash- burn, 4 Hun CN". Y.), 792; Green v. Armstrong, 1 Denio (N". Y.), 550; Warren 1). Leland, 2 Barb. (N. Y.) 614; Vorebeck d. Roe, 50 Barb. (N. Y.) 302; Mc- Gregor ». Brown, 10 N. Y. 114; Putney v. Day, 6 N. H. 430; Ockington v. Richey, 41 N. H. 375; Kingsley v. Holbrook, 45 N. H. 313; Howe v. Batchel- der, 49 N. H. 204. 2 Harrell B. Miller, 35 Miss. 700; Killmore v. Howlett, 48 N. Y. 569; Mc- Clintock's Appeal, 71 Pa. St. 365; Marshall v. Green, L. R. 1 C. P. Div. 35; Sterling v. Baldwin, 42 Vt. 306; Ellison ». Brigham, 38 Vt. 64; Bostwick v. Leach, 3 Day (Conn.), 476, 484; Whitemarsh v. Walker, 1 Met. (Mass.) 313; Claflin 9. Carpenter, 4 Met. (Mass.) 580; Douglas «. Shumway, 13 Gray (Mass.), 498; Giles v. Simouds, 15 Gray (Mass.), 441; Parsons 4). Smith, 5 Allen (Mass.), 578; Drake 9. Wells, 11 Allen (Mass.), 141; Delaney v. Root, 99 Mass. 546- White V. Poster. 103 Mass. 375; Smith v. Bryan, 5 Md. 141; Purner v Piercy, 40 Md. 313; Armstrongs. Lawson, 73 Ind. 498; Owens v. Lewis, 46 Ind. 488- Byassee v. Reese, 4 Met. (Ky.) 372: Cain ■». MoGuire, 13 B. Mon. (Ky ) 340- Edwards «. Railroad Co., 54 Me. 105; Cutler v. Pope, 13 Me. 877; Ersklne v. PiUmmer, 7 Me. 447. 8 Barn&s v. Barnes, 6 Vt. 388; Owens ». Lewis, 46 Ind. 488; Mumford ■» "Whitney, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 380; Pierrepont v. Barnard, 6 N. Y. 279; Nettle- ton ®. Sikes, 8 Met. (Mass.) 34; Heath ®. Randall, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 195; Mc- Neal V. Emerson, 15 Gray (Mass.), 384; Giles ». Simonds, 15 Gray (Mass.)! 441- Drake v. Wells, 11 Allen (Mass.), 141, 143: Russell ». Richards, 11 Me. 371. *Knotts V. Hydricks, 13 Rich. (8. Car.) L. 314; White v. Foster, 102 Mass. S75; Delaney «. Root, 99 Mass. 546; Clap v. Draper, 4 Mass. 266. 292 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 269 obstructs the enjoyment of an easement of the Ucenser over such land, either wholly or in part, is irrevocable.' But one class of decisions hold that where the act is done on the land of the licenser he can revoke the license at any time, and cannot be estopped inequity." Easements which are negative, and are executed on the land of the licensee, are controlled by a different rule; as where a man has an easement of light and air upon and over the adjacent lot, he may abandon the same and license the erection by his neighbor of a building which shall extinguish such right, and the license becomes irrevocable.' When the license passes no estate or interest in the licenser's land, but is simply a relinquishment of a right or easement on his part affecting the land of another, and the extinguishment being consummated by the erection of a permitted structure on the licensee's land, the licenser's previous easement necessarily becomes extinct, and cannot be restored by any revocation of the license, but only by the removal of the structure so as to restore matters to their original condition ; but this a licensee in such case cannot be compelled to do since the structure is one erected upon his own land with the licenser's consent.' But where the effect of the structure erected upon the licensee's land is not merely to destroy some incorporeal right of the licenser, but the effect is to create a continuing easement on the land of the licenser, as if the structure, instead of diverting a flow of water from the licenser's land backs it up, the weight of authority holds that inasmuch as the effect is not to extinguish, but to create, an easement a parol license is revocable even to the extent of compeUing the removal of the obnoxious structure, though erected upon the licensee's land." ' Curtis V. Noonan, 10 Allen (Mass.), 406; Earitan, etc. Co. v. Veghte, 21 N. J. Eq. 463, 475; Morse v. Copeland, 2 Gray (Mass.), 302; Stokoe ». Singers,. 8 El. & Bl. 31. Compare Morton Brewing Co. ». Morton, 47 N. J. Eq. 158. 'Curtis 13. Noonan, 10 Allen (Mass.), 406; Morse v. Copeland, 2 Gray (Mass.),. 302; Fishery. Moon, 11 L. T. N. S. 623, 625. ^ Morse ». Copeland, 2 Gray (Mass.), 302; Goddard on Easm. 472. * Winter v. Brockwell, 8 East, 308; Liggins v. Inge, 7 Bing. 682; Addison ». Hack, 2 Gill (Md.), 221. ' Seidensparger v. Speer, 17 Me. 123; Bridges v. Purcell, 1 Dev. & Bat.- (N. Car.) 492; Carloton v. Ridmgton, 21 N. H. 291. § 270] LICENSE. 293 But another class of cases hold that no distinction in equity arises out of the place where the works are erected under license, whether upon the lands of the licensee or licenser.' § 270. At Law and in Equity. — Those courts that hold that an executed parol license cannot be revoked when money has been expended, apply, in most cases, the rule of equity holding that no revocation can be made at law. So it is held a mere license affecting lands is, at law, always revocable though granted for a valuable considera- tion, and though the hcensee may have expended money on the faith of it." But this rule is modified in equity by the principle of equitable estoppel; but equitable estoppel always proceeds on the basis of pi eventing fraud. Its effect is to restrain the exercise of a legal right, and this even a court of equity cannot do unless there has been such conduct as will render the assertion of a legal right a fraud. It is said that the grant of a privilege which is necessary to a permanent business is presumed to be commensurate in duration with the business, and although at first but a license, and as such revocable, yet that when acted upon in the expenditure of money it becomes a contract for a valu- able consideration to be executed by a court of equity as a contract part performed.' The erection of a side track connecting with a railroad, at the expense of a company, and the expenditures of large sums of money by it in the erection of car works, from which cars were delivered by means of the side track, do not estop the railroad from revoking the license to connect the side track with the company's track.* Chancellor Bates says, in this case, the disappointment of the com- pany certainly involved them in no little hardship. But hardship is not the ground for equitable relief, except in favor of one who, without any negligence in securing his rights by the appropriate legal modes, has been misled to ' Morton Brewing Co. v. Morton, 47 N. J. Eq. 158. 'Jackson v. Railroad Co., 4 Del. Ch. 180. ' Rerick v. Kern, 14 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 267; Swartz v. Swartz, 4 Pa. St. 353. < Jackson v. Railroad Co., 4 Del. Ch. 180. 294 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 271 his prejudice through some fraud or laches of the party against whom the relief is sought, or by such conduct of the latter as renders it an act of bad faith to take advan- tage of the mistake. The principle of equitable estoppel proceeds upon the ground of preventing fraud. Its effect is to restrain a party from exercising his legal right, and even this a court of equity cannot do, unless there has been, on his part, some conduct, declaration or improper concealment, mis- leading an innocent person to his prejudice and rendering the assertion of the legal right as against such person an act of bad faith, amounting to constructive fraud. And to warrant the interference of the court with the legal right or title of a party, the case relied on to work the estoppel must be clear, beyond doubt, upon the facts. And the more stringently do these rules apply in a case where the effect of the estoppel, if allowed, will be to con- vert what was originally a bare privilege, temporary and revocable, into an easement in the licenser's land, perpetu- ally binding it and transmissible from the licensee. But at law a license is insufficient to create or transfer an interest in land." Many cases have been decided on the principle that a license so far as it has been executed is not revocable so as to charge the licensee with damages for acts done under it. This rests upon the clear and familiar principle, volenti non fit injuria.'' § 271. Coupled With an Interest.— A large class of cases are those of a license coupled with an interest, such as a license to enter, or do some act, upon land of the licenser, the continuance of which is necessary to the enjoyment of a right or interest which the licenser had created; thus, a license given to hunt on one's land and have deer kiUed. The gift of the deer when killed, which I Cook B. Stearns, 11 Mass. 533; Mumford «. Whitney, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 384; FootB. Railroad Co., 23 Conn. 214; Fosters. Browning, 4R. I. 47; Carter V. Harlan, 6 Md. 20; Bridges «. Purcell, 1 Dev. & Bat. (N. Car.), 492; Fentl- man s. Smith, 4 East, 107; Rex v. Horndon, 4 Maule & S. 565; Hewlins fl. Shippan, 5 Barn. & Cress. 221; 11 E. C. L. 207; Bryan v. Whistler, 8 Barn. & Cress. 288; Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 Mees. & W. 888. 'Clement v. Durgin, 5 Me. 9; Woodbury v. Parshley, 7 N. H. 237. § 272] LICENSE. 295 may be by parol, carries the privilege of entering to take it away, which privilege cannot be revoked. So this pi'inci- ple applies where one has a license to enter generally on the land of another for the purpose of removing one's chat- tels placed there by the licenser's consent ; this license is irrevocable until after a reasonable time for its exercise.' So the owner of the laild may be restrained from prevent- ing the removal of fixtures by the revocation of the license granting their erection.' § 272. Application of the Equitable Doctrine. — While many courts hold that the doctrine of equity cannot apply, and there can be no equitable estoppel,' yet many cases hold that where a license has been so far executed that its revocation would work a fraud, actual or construct- ive, upon the licensee, equity will restrain such revocation, although its continuation results in an easement upon the lands of the licenser in favor of the lands of the licensee.' The principle upon which courts of equity interfere is to prevent one party from taking advantage of the lack of a formal writing to work a fraud upon the other.' So, where a drain is dug from the land of the licensee, across the land of the licenser, by oral consent, for farm drainage pur- poses, the licensee will be protected in its continued use by equitable estoppel of the licenser.' And so the licensee will be protected on digging a ditch, by permission, on the licenser's land, so as to change the channel of a natural stream.' So a parol license will be held irrevocable which 'Thomas v. Sorrell, Vaughn, 330; 1 Levins, 217; Pierrepont i\ Barnard, 5 Barb. (N. Y.) 364; 6 N. Y. 279; Heath v. Randall, 4 Gush. (Mass.) 5; Nettle- ton V. Sikes, 8 Met. (Mass.) 34; Wood v. Manley, 11 Ad. & El. 34; Patrick v. Colerick, 3 Mees. & Wels. 483; Hewitt v. Isham, 7 Exch. 77. 'Helborn v. Brown, 12 Me. 162; Prince D. Case, 10 Conn. 375; Barnes ». Barnes, 6 Vt. 388; White's Appeal, 36 Pa. St. 134; Wells v. Bannister, 4 Mass. 514; Vanness v. Pacard, 2 Pet. (TJ. S.) 137. 'Crosdale v. Lanigan, 129 iST. Y. 604; Lake Shore, etc. R. R. Co. ®. HofEert, 40 111. Ap. 631. * Morton Brewing Co. «. Morton, 47 N. J. Eq. 158. 5Rerick«. Kern, 14 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 267; M'Kellip v. M'llhenny, 4 Watts (Pa.), 317; 3 Am. Lead. Cas. (4th ed.) 761; Pomeroy on Spec. Perf. 132; Waterman on Spec. Perf. 283. • Hodgson v. Jeffries, 52 Ind. 334. 'Cook V. Railroad Co., 40 Iowa, 451. 296 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 272 gives the licensee the right to maintain a water con- duit across the Ucenser's land to supply a village with water.' When the owner of a brewery constructs, at considerable expense, a drain from the cellar of the brewery, along the line of a neighbor's lot by his consent, and connects it with a public sewer in a street upon which the brewery lot did not face, and maintained it for thirty years, and no par- ticular time was fixed for the continuance of the drain, and its continuance is of great consequence to the brewery, and worked little or no injury to the neighbor's lot, the pre- sumption, from these circumstances, is, that it is to con- tinue as long as the necessity of the brewery required it, and the license cannot be revoked.' And so, the permis- sion to use water for a mill, or anything else that is viewed by the parties as a permanent erection, will be of unlim- ited duration, and survive the erection itself, if it shall be destroyed or fall into a state of dilapidation.' An executed license may become an agreement for a valuable consideration, and where the revocation of the license will operate as a fraud upon the licensee, w^ho has expended money and made improvements upon the faith of it, equity will hold the owner of the land as a trustee ex maleficio to prevent such revocation. Where there has been such a part performance of an oral agreement for an easement upon land, that would be sanctioning fraud to refuse its specific performance, the statute of frauds does not prevent an enforcement of the agreement.* But a corporation having ground for a cemetery, when it considers it no longer necessary to continue it as such may revoke the license of burial and bar the right of future 1 Devonshire v. Elgin, 30 L. J. Ch. , N. S. 495. See, also, Le Fevre «. Le Fevre, 4 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 341; Mold ». Wheatcroft, 27 Beav. 510; 6 Jur. N. S. 2; 29 L. J. Ch., N. S. 11; Nowlin ®. Whipple, 120 Ind. 596; Olmstead «. Ahbott, 61 Vt. 381. 'Morton Brewing Co. ». Morton, 47 N. J. Eq. 158. ^Rerick v. Kern, 14 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 267. See, also, Thompson v. Mc- Elarney, 83 Pa. St. 174; Raritan Water Power Co. v. Veghte, 31 N. J. Eq. 463; Pursell v. Stover, 110 Pa. St. 43; Risien i>. Brown, 73 Tex. 135; Grlm- shaw «. Belcher, 88 Cal. 217. 13 Edw. I. c. 18. 2 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 104. » McCance t). Taylor, 10 Gratt. (Va.) 580. See, also, Freedman's Sav. & Trust Co. V. Earle, 110 U. S. 710. * Ex parte Abbott, 15 Ch. Div. 447; Hatton v. Haywood, L. R. 9 Oh. 339. » Harback v. Boston, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 295; Smith v. Wiggin, 48 N. H. 105. « Munro ». Meech, 94 Mich. 596. ■" Branson .v. Studabaker, 133 Ind. 147. See, also, Sheets v. Selden, 1 Wall. (U. 8.) 177; Mixers. Reed, 35 Vt. 354; Cook«. Whiting, 16 El. 481; Braokett ■». Goddard, 54 Me. 313. 8 Lake Erie & W. R. R. Co. v. Ziebarth (Ind.), 33 N. E. Elep. 366. 308 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 282 Where a farm was divided into two parts by a town road which ran through it, a deed to the farm "reserving the town road" does not reserve the fee of the road but only its use.' Article 2. Other Kind of Fees. § 282. Determinable Fee— Definition. § 286. Fee Tail and Reversion. § 283. Base or Qualified Fee— Possi- § 287. Words of Limitation. bility of Reverter. § 288. Division of Estates Tail. § 284. Conditional Fee at Common § 289. Estate Tail After Possibility of Law. Issue Extinct. § 285. De Donis Conditionalibug. § 290. Abolition of Estates Tail. § 282. Determinable Fee — Definition. — A determinable fee, also called a qualified or base fee, has a qualification subjoined to it, and which must be determined whenever the qualification annexed to it is at an end." Kent uses the qualified, base, or determinable fee promiscuously, and says a limitation to a man and his heirs, so long as A. shall have heirs of his body ; or to a man and his heirs, tenants of the manor of Dale ; or till the marriage of B. ; or so long as St. Paul's church shall stand, or a tree shall stand, are a few of the many instances given in the books, in which the es- tate will descend to the heirs but will continue no longer than the period mentioned in the respective limitations, or where the qualification annexed to it is at an end.' Base fee is sometimes applied only to a fee conditional at common law, but this distinction is not followed in prac- tice. A base fee has a qualification annexed to it, which determines whenever the annexed qualification requires.' A tenant in tail, may, by bargain and sale, lease and re- lease, or covenant to stand seized, create a base fee, and ■ Day ». Philbrook, 85 Me. 90. »Co. Litt. 27a, 220; 1 Preston on Est. 449; 2 Bl. Com. 109; Cruise's Dig. tit. 1, sect. 83; Leonard «. Burr, 18 N. Y. 96; Challis on Real Prop. 224. ' 4 Kent's Com. 9. *B1. Com. 109. See, also, Seymour's Case, 10 Rep. 97b. § 283] ESTATES IN FEE. 309 the estate will continue until it is avoided by the issue in tail by entry.' All fees liable to be defeated by an executory devise are determinable fees, and continue descendible inheritances until they are dischargpd from the determinable quality annexed to them, either by release or the happening of the event." The existence of such an estate as a qualified or determinable fee is recognized in this country.' § 283. Base or Qualified Fee— Possibility op Re- verter. — A determinable, base or qualified fee, as has been said, is a fee of which the duration depends upon the concurrence of collateral circumstances which qualify and debase the privity of the grant. The qualification must be found in the instrument itself, but no special or technical words are required to establish it.* Where an estate is conveyed in fee for a specified pur- pose, and no other, the fee is a base fee determinable upon the cessation of the use of the property for that purpose. Upon the determination of a base fee, the property re- verts to the grantor,' without any claim or act on his part when it is determined by limitation.' In the mean time, the estate is out of him, and that remains to him is the mere possibility of reverter.' This possibility is capable of transmission to his grantees, and will pass to them under a conveyance of the reversion.' Where a parcel of land is conveyed reserving a building with the privilege of remain- ing as long as the building stands, this estate is a base or qualified fee in so much of the land as is necessary for the ' Watkins ou Conv. 117; Machell v. Clarke, 3 Ld. Raym. 778. ' Goodright v. Searle, 2 Wilson, 29. 'Jamaica Pond Aqueduct v. Chandler, 9 Allen (Mass.), 160; Leonard r. Burr, 18 N. Y. 96; Gillespie v. Broas, 23 Barb. (N. Y.) 370; State v. Brown 27 N. J. L. 13; Henderson v. Hunter, 59 Pa. St. 335; Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Rail- road Co., 94 111. 83, 93; First Universalist Society «. Boland, 155 Mass. 171; Slegel -». Lauer, 148 Pa. St. 336. Compare Gray's Perp. 19; 3 Law. Quart. 394. ■• Slegel V. Lauer, 148 Pa. St. 236. » Kirk «. King, 3 Pa. St. 486; Scheetz ». Fitzwater, 5 Pa. St. 126. «3B1. Com. 109, 110. ■" Slegel V. Lauer, 148 Pa. St. 236, 245. s Slegel V. Lauer, 148 Pa. St. 336; 4 Kent's Com. 10. « Scheetz v. Fitzwater, 5 Pa. St. 136. 310 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 284 reasonable use of the building, determinable when the building ceases to remain upon the premises.' The possibility of reverter is not conveyed by the deed, and is the possibility that the land may revert to the grantor or his heirs when the granted estate determines.' And this possibility does not become invalid for remote- ness. Such possibility of reverter upon breach of a condi^ tion subsequent is not within the rule against perpetuities.* § 284. Conditional Fee at Common Law. — A condi- tional fee at common law, is a fee restrained to some partic- ular heirs, exclusive of others, as to the heirs of a man's body, by which only his lineal descendants are admitted, in exclusion of collateral heirs; or, to the heirs male of his body, in exclusion of both collaterals, and lineal females also. It was called a conditional fee, by reason of the condition expressed or implied in the donation of it, that if the donee died without such particular heirs, the land should revert to the donor. For this was a condition annexed by law to all grants whatsoever, that, on failure of the heirs specified in the grant, the grant should be at an end and the land re- turn to its ancient proprietor. Such a gift, then, was held to be a gift upon condition that it should revert to the donor, if the donee had no heirs of his body, but, if he had, it should then remain to the donee. It was therefore called a fee-simple, on condition that the donee had issue. Hence, so soon as the donee had the required heirs born to him, his estate was no longer conditional, but became absolute by the performance of the condition, at least so far abso- lute as to enable him to charge or to alienate the land, or to forfeit for treason. It was therefore construed at common law to be, and called, a fee-simple on condition that the donee had the heirs prescribed.* ' Farnsworth v. Perry, 83 Me. 447; Moulton v. Trafton, 64 Me. 318. 'Smiths. Harrington, 4 Allen (Mass.), 566, 567; Attorney Gen. «. Merri- mack Manuf. Co. 14 Gray (Mass.), 586, 613; Owen «. Field, 103 Mass. 90, 105, 106; Gillespie i). Brons, 23 Barb. (N. T.) 370. 'Tobey t). Moore, 130 Mass. 448; French v. Old South Society, 106 Mass. 479; First TJniversalist Society «. Boland, 155 Mass. 171. * 2 Bl. Com. 110. § 285] ESTATES IN FEE. 311 Where the person to whom a conditional fee was limited had issue, then he could debar such issue by selUug the estate. But if he could not ahene it, the donor would still have been entitled to his right of reverter upon the donee's death, for the estate would have continued subject to the limitations contained in the original donation.' An alienation by the tenant of a fee conditional bars the right of issue then or thereafter born, who without such alienation would have taken per formam doni; the birth of issue to the tenant in fee conditional performs the con- dition and confirms in the purchaser a good title in fee." Where a fee conditional is granted, the whole estate is in the tenant in fee; there is no estate left the grantor. The possibility of reverter on the determination of the fee by the death of the tenant without heirs of his body is not an estate; it is neither the subject of inheritance nor of demise. ' § 285. De Donis Conditionalibus. — The donee of a con- ditional fee had the power to convey, oraliene in fee, as soon as the condition was performed, and thereby debar his own issue, and also the possibility of a reversion to the donor. This right of alienation by the donee was repugnant to the nobility, who were anxious to perpetuate their possession, and they alleged that it was a breach of the condition of the grant or gift. They therefore enacted a statute' called de donis conditionalibus, for the express purpose of prevent- ing the donee of a conditional fee from aliening the land as soon as issue was born ; and for the further purpose of securing the reversion to the grantor. This statute provided that the lands or tenements given to the donee, and the heir, or heirs, of his body, should in every event go to such issue, if there were any; or if none, should revert to the donor.' This is frequently said to have been the origin of estates ' Nevil's Case, 7 Rep. 124; Challis on Real Prop. 240. ''Powers V. Bullwinkle, 33 S. Car. 293; Barksdale v. Gamage, 3 Rich. Eq. (S. Car.) 374. 'Adams ®. Chaplain, 1 Hill Ch. (8. Car.) 276; Deas v. Horry, 2 Hill Ch. (S. Car.) 244. * 13 Edw. I. c. 1. »2 Bl. Com. 112-116; 2 Preston on Est. 878, 380; 2 Inst. 332, 338. 312 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 286 tail, though the statute rather gave perpetuity than origin- ally creating that ancient kind of feudal estate.' This statute only severed the limitation from the con- dition of the gift, according to the manifest intent of it, and restored the effect of the limitation to the issue and the reversion, as the proper effect of the condition to the donor. It did not create any new fee, aut re aut nomine.' A fee simple conditional, at common law, has been declared to be the same as an estate tail under the statute de donis conditionalihus. ° § 286. Fee-Tail and Eeversion.— The origin of fee-tail and reversion is from the construction given by the judges to the statute de donis conditionalihus, they deciding that the donee had no longer a conditional fee-simple which be- came absolute, and at his own disposal the instant any issue was born; but they divided the estate into two parts, leaving in the donee a new kind of particular estate, which they denominated a fee-tail ; and vested in the donor the ultimate fee-simple of the land, expectant on the failure of issue, which expectant estate is now called reversion. A fee-tail, then, in its origin, was a conditional fee, shorn of the right of alienation after condition performed, and vest- ing in the donor an indefeasible reversion.* A donor is one who gives land to another in tail, and a fee-tail is so called because it is entailed, that is, limited, as to how long it shall continue. A-tenant in-tail cannot charge the inheritance with his debts after his death,' but his hfe estate may be sold for the satisfaction of his debts." He may commit waste, and is under no obligation to keep down the interest on an in- cumbrance or pay it off,' though a receiver may be ap- pointed to collect the rents and profits of such an estate to ' 4 Kent's Com. 12. 'Wright on Ten. 189. » Willion «. Berkley, Plowd. 235, 339. ♦Crabb on Real Prop. sect. 971; Wright on Ten. 187. 'Liford's case, 11 Rep. 50; Williams on Real Prop. 57, 58. • Williams on Real Prop. 58, 59. 'Bl. Com. 115. § 287] ESTATES IN FEE. 313 keep down the interest on any incumbrance.' Dower and courtesy are incidents of estates-tail.' If he discharges incumbrances or the interest, he is pre- sumed to do it in favor of the inheritance." § 287. Words of Limitation.— At common law the word "heirs" is as necessary in the creation of an estate-tail as a fee-simple.* The "body "or some other words of pro- creation, are necessary to make a fee-tail, in order to ascer- tain to what particular heirs the fee is limited or restrained. So, if a grant be made to a man and the issue of his body, to a man and his seed, to a man and his children or off- spring, it will convey only an estate for life, because the words "his heirs " are necessary to make a fee-tail.* But, in case of a demise, if the intention is shown to create an estate-tail, though the proper words of limitation are not used, it will be so construed ' An expression in a will denoting an intention to give to the devisee an estate of inheritance descendible to his, or some of his, lineal, but not collateral, heirs, has always been regarded as sufficient to devise a fee-tail. ' A devise of land to one "and the heirs of his body so long as they hold and till the same," carries an estate in fee tail, the condition being inoperative and void, as an attempt to restrain alienation. ' The words "heirs of the body," or "heirs lawfully be- gotten of the body, "are appropriate to create an estate-tail, and it is well-settled that their use or an equivalent expres- sion are words of limitation to be construed as creating ' Story's Eq. Jur. sect. 835. « Co. Litt. 224, a. ' Chaplia v. Chaplin, 3 P. Wm. 245; Amesbury e. Brown, 1 Ves. Sr. 477; Earl «. Hobart, 3 Swanst. 186. . Burnham, 100 N. Y. 1; Jackson v. Johnson, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 74; Jones v. Freed, 42 Ark. 357; Smith v. Patterson, 95 Mo. 525; Wallingford «. Heart, 15 Mass. 471; Anderson v. JSTorthrop, 30 Fla. 612; Lindley*. Grofl, 37 Minn. 338; Allen®. DeGroodt, 98 324 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 295 tate remains iu.ppssession of the executrix of such estate, who, by the will creating the reversion, is also given a life tenancy in such estate, the statute of limitations will not run against the remainderman in favor of an adverse title acquired by her to the property held in trust or as life ten- ant, until after her decease, unless, at least, there be clear proof of prior actual knowledge brought directly home to him of the repudiation by her of her trust, and of the abandonment by her of her claims as life tenant, and of the acquisition and open assertion by her of such adverse title.' Eemaindermen who have a vested remainder in fee, have a right, pending the continuance of the life estate, to resort to the courts by bill to remove clouds from, and otherwise to protect and preserve, their reversion." § 295. Incumbered Life Estate — Apportionment. — Under the old rule, the life estate had to bear one-third part of the entire debt, and the remainder of the estate the other two-thirds.' But this rule was declared most absurd, and that the interest alone arising during the life estate was the tenant's fair proportion." But in South Carolina it is held that the tenant must pay one third of the incum- brance and the reversioner the residue.' The general rule, however, is that the tenant for life is bound, in equity, to pay the interest on the incumbrance out of the rents and profits, but is not chargeable with the incumbrance itself and is not in duty bound to extinguish it. The tenant for life is only to contribute during the time he enjoys the estate, and the value of his estate is Mo. 159; Pettyjohn®. Woodroof, 77 Va. 507; Hope v. Railroad Co., 79 Ya. 283; Orthwein v. Thomas, 127 111. 554; Evans ». Benyon, 37 Ch. Div. 329: Beattie v. Wilkinson, 36 Fed. Rep. 646; Kemp ». Westbrook, 1 Ves. Sr. 279; McCreary v. Burns, 17 S. Car. 45; Kellar v. Stanley, 86 Ky. 240; Luntz v Greve, 102 Ind. 173; Jackson v. Schoonmaker, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 390. ' Anderson v. Northrop, 80 Fla. 612. Compare Woodstock Iron Co. ». Ful- lenwider, 87 Ala. 584. » Aiken v. Suttle, 4 Lea (Tenn.), 103; 1 Story's £q. Jur. sect. 704. 3Rowell V. Walley, 1 Rep. in Ch. 219. "White V. White, 4 Ves. 24; Story on Eq. Jur. 487. • Wright V. Jennings, 1 Bailey (8. Car.), 277. See, also. Garland ;;. Crow, 2 Bailey (S. Car.), 24. § 295] LIFE ESTATES. 325 generally calculated according to the Wigglewbrth's and the Carlisle tables, the latter being the more accurate.' Against the incumbrancer the life tenant is not entitled to postpone payment of the principal of the mortgage debt until expiration of the life tenancy; nor to hold the premises by paying the interest only.' If the life tenant pays off the incumbrance, he is, prima facie, entitled to that charge to his own benefit, with the qualification of paying no interest during his life," and the payment is apportioned between the hfe tenant and rever- sioner. The tenant for life is to keep down the annual interest, even if it exhausts the rents and profits, in order to save the estate from forfeiture.* And if the rents and profits are insuflScient to pay the interest on the incumbrance, and the life tenant pays them without notifying the remainderman of his intention of charging the excess on the inheritance, it wiU be presumed that he intended to exonerate the inheritance which will bind his personal representatives,' when the life estate is also benefited.' If the incumbrancer neglects to collect his interest from the tenant for life, he may collect the arrears from the remainderman.' The remainderman has a right to recoup sums paid for interest accruing during the life tenancy. ° But the obli- ' Casborne v. Scarfe, 1 Atk. 606; Sarile v. Savile, 2 Atk. 458; Revel v. Wat- kinson, 1 Ves. Sr. 93; Barnum v. Barnum, 43 Md. 351; Hunt v. -Watkins, 1 Humph. (Tenn.) 498; Swaine ®. Ferine, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 483; Wade v. Malloy, 16 Hun (N. Y.), 336; Newton ». Cook, 4 Gray (Mass.), 46; Dorsey v. Smith, 7 Harr. & J. (Md.) 367; Tracy v. Hereford, 3 Bro. C. C. 128. ' Larason v. Drake, 105 Mass. 564; Wicks v. Scriven, 1 John. & H. 215; Aynsby v. Reed, 1 Dick. 249; E^ans v. Jones, Kay, 29. * Earl v. Hobart, 8 Swanst. 199. * In re Morley, L. R. , 8 Eq. 594; Doane v. Doane, 46 Vt. 485, 496; Plympton v. Boston Dispensary, 106 Mass. 544; Caulfield v. Maguire, 8 Jones & La. T. 141; Shershaw v. Gibbs, Kay, 383, 339. Compare Penrhyn «. Hughes, 5 Ves. 99. ' Kensington v. Bouverie, 7 H. L. Cas. 557. » Isaac 7). Wall, 6 Ch. D. 706. ' Roe V. Pogson, 2 Mad. 581. « Howlin ■B. 8heppard, 6 Ir. R. Eq. 497. 326 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 296 gation of the tenant to pay the interest exists only between him and the remainderman.' "When the estate is not sufficient to pay all the legacies in full as between the life tenant and remainderman, the legacies must be apportioned. Until the legacies are set apart the life tenants take their proportional share of the net income of the estate; that is, of the income less the taxes and interest of any debts of the estate remaining un- paid.' § 296. Taxes and Expenses.— As between tenant for life and remainderman, ordinary taxes are to be paid by the tenant for life.' And the ordinary expenses of care and management of the principal are chargeable upon the life estate to be paid out of the income.* The tenant is bound to pay the interest and taxes accruing during the continu- ance of his estate, ' provided the income is sufficient there- for." The expenses must be taken out of the income.' And the ordinary taxes assessed upon bank stock during the life estate are chargeable upon the life estate.' While taxes and expenses of improved lands must be paid out of the income, assessments for permanent im- provements may be equitably apportioned between the life ' In re Morley, L. R., 8 Eq. 594. "Wood V. Hammond, 16 R. I. 98; Bailey, Petitioner, 13 R. I. 543, 561; Croly V. Weld, 8 De G. M. & G. 993; In re Tinkler's Estate, L. R., 30 Eq. 456; Cox V. Cox, L. R., 8 Eq. 343; Winot v. Amory, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 377, 388; Levering «. Minot, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 151; Sargent v. Sargent, 103 Mass. 297; Hewitt V. Morris, 1 Turn. & R. 341; Cooke ii. Meeker, 36 N. Y. 15; Hilyard's Estate, 5 Watts & S. (Pa.) 30. ' Jenks ®. Horton, 96 Mich. 13; Bone v. Tyrrell, 113 Mo. 175; Fountaine v. Pellet, 1 Ves. Jr. 337; Varney «. Stevens, 33 Me. 331; Cairns «. Chabert, 3 Ed. Ch. (N. T.) 313; Bailey, Petitioner, 13 R. I. 543; Hagan v. Varney, 147 111. 381. ^Peirce «. Burroughs, 58 N. H. 303. «Moseley v. Marshall, 33 N. Y. 303; House v. House, 10 Paige (N. Y.), 158; Stilwell V. Doughty, 3 Bradf. (N. Y.) 311; Sheldon v. Ferris, 45 Barb. (N. Y.) 134; Wade ». Malloy, 16 Hun (N. Y.), 236. « Clark V. Middlesworth, 82 Ind. 340. ' Butterbaugh's Appeal, 98 Pa. St. 351; Spangler's Estate, 31 Pa. St. 335. 'Plympton ». Boston Dispensary, 106 Mass. 544, 547; Patrick v. Sherwood, 4 Blatch. C. C. 113; Fleet v. Dorlaad, 11 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 489; McDonald ». Heylin, 4 Phila. (Pa.) 73. §§ 297-298] LIFE ESTATES. 327 tenant and remainderman,' and on the death of a life tenant the taxes of the current year will be apportioned between his estate and the remainderman." An agreement by the reversioner to pay the taxes assessed upon the land, is not of itself a release of the life tenant from the duty of making such payment," and the purchaser of the reversion, either by mortgage or absolute sale, is subrogated to all the rights of the original rever- sioner as against the life tenant.* As has already been stated, a tenant for life is obliged to pay ordinary annual taxes; but assessments laid upon the property by municipal authorities for permanent improve- ments are to be apportioned equitably between the life tenant and the interests in remainder.' § 297. Rent^Apportionment. — At common law rent payable on a specified day could not be apportioned as to a part of the time.' So if a tenant for Kfe, or any one who has a determinable estate, dies but a day before the rent reserved on a lease of his becomes due, the rent is lost for no one is entitled to recover it.' But if the lease is given under a power so that it does not terminate with the death of the life tenant, then the entire rent goes to the reversioner.' The rule of the common law has been changed so the rent can now be apportioned.' § 298. Claim for Improvements— Investments. — A ten- ant of a life estate who has made permanent and valuable improvements, has no claim for reimbursement on the re- 'Outcalt V. Appleby, 36 N. J. Eq. 73; In re Laytin, 20 N. Y. Supp. 73; 2 Connoly's Sur. (N. Y.) 106. » Crump's Estate, 13 Pa. Co. Cl. 286. s Jenks V. Horton, 96 Mich. 13. < Jenks V. Horton, 96 Mich. 13. 'Pratt v. Douglass, 38 N. J. Eq. 516; Plympton ». Boston Dispensary, 106 Mass. 544; Stilwell ®. Doughty, 2 Bradf. (N. Y.) 311; Peck v. Sherwood, 56 N. Y. 615. « Perry v. Aldrich, 13 N. H. 343. See, also, Clun's Cas. 10 Co. 127; Cro. Jac. 310 ' Paget «. Gee, Amb. 198; 3 Bl. Com. 124. 'Stafford v. Wentworth, 1 P. Wm. 180; Rockingham v. Penrice, 1 P. Wm. 178. 'Price V. Pickett, 21 Ala. 741. 828 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 298 maindexnian. Such improvements must.be deemed to have been made by the life tenant for his own benefit and enjoy- ment during the pendency of his own estate, and upon the termination of the hfe tenancy, they being a part of the realty pass as such to the owner in whom the remainder is vested, and he takes them without any liability to recom- pense the life tenant for his expenditure. ' The general rule undoubtedly is, that a tenant for life cannot make repairs or permanent improvements upon the estate, at the expense of the inheritance. This rule has ex- ceptions. Thus, it has been held that a life tenant was justified in completing, at the expense of the estate, a mansion house which had been begun by the testator." So the expense of putting a building into a tenantable condi- tion may be charged upon the fund, while the expense of keeping it in repair afterwards should be payable from the income. ° If the improvement is reasonable and judicious in itself, and constitutes a proper investment of the fund, the expense may be incurred, and the work done and charged to the general fund.' So can additions and permanent im- provements be made and properly charged to the general fund.' But in most respects improvements which a tenant for life may wish to make must be paid for by the tenant. Stock dividends in Georgia are annual profits," and so in Pennsylvania when not declared out of the corpus.'' The cost of extensive repairs of buildings, made in order to secure a better class of tenants and increased rents, must be paid out of the income. ' The appreciation in value > Wilson V. Parker (Miss.), 14 Soutli. Eep. 264: Hagan«. Varney, 147 111. 281. ' Pratt 11. Douglass, 38 N. J. Eq. 516; Hibbert v. Cooke, 1 Sim. & Stu. 552; Dent ». Dent, 30 Beav. 368; Caldecott v. Brown, 2 Hare, 145, 146. » Smith v. Blindbury, 66 Mich. 319; Parsons v. Winslow, 16 Mass. 361; Cal- decott V. Brown, 2 Hare, 145, 146; Corbett v. Laurens, 5 Rich. Eq. (S. Car.) 301. * Sohier «. Eldredge, 103 Mass. 345. 5 Watts V. Howard, 7 Met. (Mass.) 478. « Millen v. Guerrard, 67 Ga. 384, according to the Code, following Massachu- setts rule. ' ' Vinton's Appeal, 99 Pa. St. 434. 8 Outcalt V. Appleby, 36 N. J. Eq. 73. fee, also. Carter v. Stookey, 89 111. 279; Gravest. Cochran, 68 Mo. 74; Wheeler «. Addison, 54 Md. 41; Miller ®. § 298] LIFE ESTATES. 329 of an unproductive property while awaiting a satisfactory sale by the executor, is a part of the corpus of the estate and not of the income.' Where an investment is made by a corporate or unin- corporate association, organized to deal in land as a com- modity, and profits which result from the business are divided among the shareholders with no impairment of the principal, such profits are personalty representing income, and the life tenant under the will of a person making such investment is entitled to them." The capital belongs to the remainderman, and the income cannot be distinguished from that derived from investments in ground rents, or interest bearing bonds." But increase in the value of the trust investment goes to the remainderman.* If the tenant for life and the remaindermen sell the land and take a mortgage back to secure the purchase money pay- able to them jointly, the life tenant has a right to the interest during his lifetime," and a purchaser from the remaindermen has only their rights." The decisions are not uniform upon the respective rights of tenants for life and remaindermen in regard to what are commonly called stock dividends. In Massachusetts ' cash dividends, however large, are regarded as income, and stock dividends, however made, as capital. This rule has not been altogether acceptable, and has been somewhat qualified or modified by subsequent cases in that State, although the general principle as first asserted is still sus- tained." And it is held that the court may, in deciding whether such distribution is an apportionment of addi- Shields, 55 Ind. 71; Garland v. Garland, 73 Me. 97; Benagh «. Turrentine, 60 Ala. 557; Holcombe v. Holcombe, 29 N. J. Eq. 597; Hill on Trust. 606; Nairn «. Marjoribanks, 3 Russ. 582. ' Outcalt V. Appleby, 36 N. J. Eq. 73. 'Tomson's Estate, 153 Pa. St. 332; Oliver's Estate, ISO Pa. St. 43. 3 Vinton's Appeal, 99 Pa. St. 434. ^Hubley's Estate, 41 Leg. Int. (Pa.) 66; Thomson's Estate, 153 Pa. St. 332. ' Horton v. Howard, 95 Mich. 135. « Horton v. Howard, 95 Mich. 135. ■"Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101. 'Daland ®. Williams, 101 Mass. 571; Leland v. Hayden, 103 Mass. 543. 42 330 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 298 tional stock, or a division of profits, look to the substance and intent of the action of the corporation as shown by its votes.' The United States Supreme Court has practically- adopted the Massachusetts rule with a few qualifications, and holds that ordinarily a dividend declared in stock is to be deemed capital, and a dividend in money is to be deemed income of each share." In Connecticut and Rhode Island, dividends of new shares, representing accumulated earnings, are held to be capital and not income.' The Maine court holds that dividends of stock go to the capital under all ordinary circumstances, and that this is the weight of authoiity.' In Maryland, where the net earnings have been applied to improvements of the prop- erty, and a dividend declared for the time of such applica- tion of net earnings, such dividend goes to the life tenant." In Pennsylvania, where a corporation has made profits and proceeds to distribute them among the stockholders, the tenant for life will be entitled to receive them, and this without regard to the form of the transaction. Equity, which disregards form grasps the substance, and will award the thing distributed, whether stock or moneys, to whomso- ever is entitled to the profits.' So surplus earnings which accumulated before the testator's death is principal, and the accumulations after death income of the principal, and be- long to the life tenant.' In Kentucky where a dividend, although declared in stock, is based upon earnings of the company, it is, in re ality, whether called by one name or another, the income of the capital invested in it. It is but a mode of distribut- 'Dalandv. Williams, 101 Mass. 571. See, also, Rand v. Hubbell, 115 Mass. 461; Davis v. Jackson, 152 Mass. 58. 2 Gibbons*. Mahon, 186 U. S. 549. 'Brinley v. Grou, 50 Conn. 66; Brown's Petition, 14 R. I. 371. ^ Richardson ». Richardson, 72 Me. 403. ' Thomas «. Gregg. 76 Md. 169. * Moss's Appeal, 83 Pa. St. 264. See. also. Smith's Appeal, 140 Pa. St. 544; Wiltbank's Appeal, 64 Pa. St. 256; Biddle's Appeal, 99 Pa. St. 378; Vinton's Appeal, 99 Pa. St. 434; Van Doren v. Olden, 19 N. J. Eq. 176; Ashhurst «. Field, 26 N. J. Eq. 1; Lord ». Brooks, 63 N. H. 73. ' Earp's Appeal, 38 Pa. St. 368. § 299] LIFE ESTATES. 331. ing the profits.' The earlier New York cases are in accord with the Pennsylvania rule." Some late authors have adopted the Pennsylvania rule as the correct one, and speak of it as the American rule; also stating that it prevails in every State of the Union except Massachusetts and Georgia; but such is not correct, for an examination of the authorities will show that the rule dif- fers materially as to the proper rule to be established on the main question as well as on minor matters. § 299. Estovers. — Estovers is the right or privilege which a tenant has to furnish himself with so much wood from the demised premises as may be sufficient or necessary for his fuel, fences and other agricultural purposes.' They are divided into esfoveria, cedificandi, ardendi, arandi, et claudendi." The life tenant may take from the land a reasonable amount of fuel for the supply of himself and family upon the farm including the persons employed to cultivate it upon shares or otherwise." But the life ten- ant of two estates cannot take firewood from one of them, for use of both." At common law estovers were divided into housebote, ploughbote, and haybote. The first included the necessary wood for fuel and repairs; the second included such as were necessary for the making and repairing implements of hus- bandry; the third included what was used in the erection and maintenance of fences and hedges. Where several tenants are granted the right of estovers from the same estate, it becomes a common of estovers, but no one of such tenants can, by underletting his land to two or more persons, apportion his right among them; for in this way he might surcharge the land, and the rights of his co-tenants as well as those of the landlord, would be thereby ■ Hite V. Hite, 93 Ky. 257. = Claikson v. Clarkson, 18 Barb (N. Y.) 646; Simpson v. Moore, 30 Barb, (N. Y.) 637; Goldsmith «. Swift, 35 Huq (N. Y.), 201. 3 2 Bl. Com. 85. ^ Co. Litt. 41b. 'Smiths. Jewett, 40 N. H 530; Miles «. Miles, 83 N. H. 147; Padelford v, Padelford, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 152. «CookD. Cook, 11 Gray (Mass.), 128. 332 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 300-301 invaded. In case, therefore, of the division of a farm among several tenants, neither of the undertenants can have estovers and the rights, consequently, become extinct.' § 300. Sale op Timber.— The law intends that the life tenant shall enjoy his estate in such a reasonable way, that the land shall pass to the reversioner as practicably impaired as to its natural capacity and the improvements upon it;' so it is waste to cut timber merely for sale.' But cutting timber on a claim for a mine, to be used in the operation of the mine is not waste.* So a tenant for life may cut timber to repair fences, even though the timber is very scarce, for it is his duty to keep the fences in repair. ' He may take timber for his own use in a reasonable manner, but he will not be permitted to strip the land en- tirely of its timber and convert it into lumber and sell it away from the inheritance.' The tenant for life may use and dispose of fallen and dead trees for firewood ;' he is en- titled to the old trees which cannot be used as timber, and to the tops and branches of trees which have been felled for timber, and also the regular thinnings and trimmings of the trees in the woods; and these may be converted into firewood, or to any other use he can make of them.' Cutting trees, not for clearing but for sale, is waste.' But it is not waste for the life tenant to cut and fell dead and de- caying timber which would otherwise become worthless be- fore the hf e estate fell in. '° § 301. TiMBEE, AS Such, Belongs to the Inheritance. — Timber, as such, belongs to the inheritance. A tenant 1 4 Coke, 36. 'Ballentine v. Poyner, 2 Hay. (N. Car.) 268; Ward «. Sheppard, 2 Hay. (N. Car.) 461; Potter ». Mardre, 74 N. Car. 36. 'Dorsey «. Moore, 100 N. Car. 41. ^McCord V. Oakland Quick. Min. Co., 64 Cal. 134. ' Calvert «. Rice, 91 Ky. 533. •DuDCombe v. Felt, 81 Midi. 332. ' King ». Miller, 99 N. Car. 583. ' Herlakenden's Case, 4 Co. 62; Channon v. Patch, 5 Barn. & Cress. 897. 'Ward V. Sheppard, 2 Hay. (N. Car.) 283; Clark v. Holden, 7 Gray (Mass.), 8. '»8ayers«. Hoskinson, 110 Pa. St. 473. § 302] LIFE ESTATES. 333 for life, unless he holds without impeachment of waste, has no right to fell timber, except for necessary and proper repairs of the buildings and erections on the prem- ises, and for firewood. And where timber has been blown down by wind, or severed by accidental cause, or has been cut down by a wrong doer, it belongs to the party who has, at the time of severance, the first estate of inheritance.' And where timber has been severed, the fund arising from the sale of it, the court will order to be invested for the benefit of the estate, that is, the inheritance; but, accord- ing to the later cases, though otherwise in some of the earlier cases, the tenant for life, though he may be subject to impeachment of waste, if free from fault in respect to the particular timber severed, will be allowed to receive the interest of the fund for life. This is the settled rule in cases where the timber is cut by the order of court for the benefit of the estate ; and reason and justice of this rule equally apply to the case where the timber has been severed by tempest, accident or trespass, if the tenant for life be innocent." So the life tenant is entitled to the extent of the amount of the net proceeds of sale realized for fire- wood, but as to the amount realized for the timber, he is entitled only to the interest during his life.' § 302. EuLE OF THE CoMMON Law. — The common law rule of England was very strict in regard to waste. Its rigor has been much relaxed in the United States in the matter of using timber. This must be expected in a new country where land is worth moi'e without timber than with it. There is a material difference between the local circumstances of States abounding in woods and Great Britain.' So if the life tenant clears part of a wooded farm, but does not exceed the relative proportion of cleared land, considered as to the whole tract, he does not commit waste. ' ' Bowie's Case, 11 Co. 79. i^Tooker v. Annesley, 5 Sim. 335; Bagot i). Bagot, 33 Beav. 509; Bateman v. Hotohkln, 31 Beav. 486; Waldo v. Waldo, 7 Sim. 261. »Stonebraker«. Zollickoflfer, 53 Md. 154; Lowndes «. Norton, 6 Ch. D. 139; Simpson v. Simpson, 3 L. R., Ir. 308; Jodrell ». Jodrell, L. R., 7 Eq. 461. Compare Cowley ». Wellesley, L. R. 1 Eq. 656. * Hastings v. Criinckleton, 3 Yeates (Pa.), 361. * Lynn's Appeal, 31 Pa. St. 44. 334 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 803 The circumstances in the United States determine the question of each case.' So, as to whether cutting timber upon the premises by the tenant for life be waste, will de- pend upon the custom of farmers, the situation of the country, and the value of the timber." § 303. Timber Estates— Agricultural Custom in Eng- land. — In point of law, an agricultural custom, or custom of husbandry, whether relating to the cultivating of the land or regulating the rights and liabilities of landlord and tenant, in the absence of agreement, need not be an imme- morial custom." Once arriving at the fact of what is tim- ber, the tenant for life, impeachable for waste, cannot cut it down; this is modified by the exception which has been established by modern authorities in favor of the owners of timber estates, which are cultivated merely for the produce of saleable timber, and where the timber is cut periodically, but if the estate is not a timber estate, the tenant for life cannot cut timber at all.* The course of dealing with the land adopted by the set- tler appears to afford the governing rule as to the tenant for life. A timber estate is bought with reference to an .annual return, and the profits are placed on the same foot- ing as ordinary rents and profits, and the question of waste is not relevant.' The tenant for life is entitled to all fair .and proper thinnings, and also to all coppices cut periodi- cally in the nature of crops, in a timber estate, whether osier, hazel or oak.' Proper and regular thinning of a wood, for the purpose of improving the rest of the trees, within certain limits, does not amount to waste.' ' Webster «. Webster, 33 N. H. 26; Padelford v. Padelford, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 153; Crockett v. Crockett, 3 Ohio St. 180; Moreliousea. Cotheal, 23 N. J. L. 480, 531; Jackson v. Brownson, 7 Johns. (2Sr. Y.) 237. 'McCullough V. Irvine, 13 Pa. St. 438. See, also, Pynchon®. Stearns, 11 Met. (Mass.) 304. 'Dalby ®. Hirst, 1 Bred. & B. 334; Tucker «. Linger, 8 App. Cas. 508; Legh V. Hewit, 4 East, 368. * Honywood v. Honywood, L. R. , 18 Eq. 309. 5 Ferrand v. Wilson. 4 Hare, 344, 373. ' Bateman i>. Hotchkin, 31 Beav. 486. ■"Bagot V. Bagot, 33 Beav. 509; Cowley v. Wellesley, 85 Beav. 685; L. R., 1 Eq. 656; Phillips v. Smith, 14 Mees. & Wels. 594 § 301] LIFE ESTATES. 335 When a life tenant enters upon an estate where there are extensive woods, consisting principally of beech trees, be- sides other timber, such as oak, ash and elm, he may, dur- ing his lifetime, cut and sell large quantities of timber, re- ceive the proceeds and apply them to his own use, where such is the local custom.' If trees standing separately by themselves are felled by a tenant for life, that would be waste; but where trees are standing in a wood, and they are felled in due course of management for the benefit and preservation of the estate, the trees so felled become part of the rents and profits, and so belong to the tenant for hfe." § 304. Modern System of Arboriculture. — The Year Books and older legal works do not furnish illustrations in which legal principles are applied to a comparative modern system of arboriculture. Occasion to invoke the principle for the benefit of the life tenant of " timber estates " arises only in a time when woods are cultivated on the plan of annual croppings, and when to treat them otherwise would be to destroy the revenue of a property and to paralyze its management. The expression "timber estate " was first used in 1845.' The remarks of Lord Eomilly' relate only to cutting poles in an oak coppice, and not to cutting timber; and the case" was only a case of coppice, and not timber. When it is once established that, by a custom of a dis- trict, certain trees are timber, they are to be treated as timber to all intents and purposes, and subject to the rules of law as to timber, and the custom cannot be modified so as to introduce a dififerent rule as to felling trees of that description." A timber estate is an estate the whole or part of which is 'Dashwood v. Magniac (1891), 3 Cb. 306. '■'Bateman v. Hotchkia, 31 Beav. 4'j6; Kekewich®. Marker, 8 Mac. & G. 311; Bagot V. Bagot, 33 Beav. 509, 517; Cowley v. Wellesley, 35 Beav. 685; Hony- •wood V. Honywood, L. R., 18 Eq. 310. ^Perrand v. Wilson, 4 Hare, 344. < Bagot B. Bagot, 32 Beav. 509. 517. ' Pidgeley «. Rawling, 3 Coll. 375. "Aubrey v. Fisher, 10 Bast, 446. 336 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 305 cultivated in such a way that whatever is taken out of it is taken, not so much for the sale of the immediate value of what is taken, as with a view to the preservation of the estate by allowing a succession of ' timber in due course to grow up. It includes more than coppice in which trees are so cut down periodically as to admit of tlieir growing again on the same stools. It is an estate the possession of which confers the right of cutting down large timber trees once for all, so that they may not grow again. The very essence of the idea of a timber estate is that the trees in a wood on it are cut down, not for the sake of their immediate value, but under a settled course of forestry or management with the view to the preservation of the wood as an entire thing. The main object of taking away the trees is to secure a succession by making room for other trees to grow. So where the object is preservation, and not destruction, the cutting of timber is not waste." It is an estate on which cultivation goes on for the purpose of dealing with the trees as crops, which forms an excep- tion to the general rule with regard to waste. Timber may be rateable to the poor as "saleable underwood."* It was also formerly subject to tithe as silva coedua,' but a statute was passed prohibiting its being taken for a tithe.* § 305. Usufructuary of a Wood — Roman Law. — The Roman law forbids in general language the cutting of tim- ber trees: "Si grandes arbores essent, non posse eas ccedere." " There is a distinction between silva ccedua and silva non ccedua. Silva ccedua, as a rule, is equivalent to coppice '■' quce succisa rursus ex stirpibus aut radicibus renascitur.'" ° This meaning was transmitted through the ecclesiastical law into the English law of tithes and the statutes dealing with tithes. Roman forests were the subject of revenue, both to the State, which farmed them continually, and to citizens, ' Co. Litt. 53b. H3 Eliz. c, 3, s. 19; Fitzhardinge ». Pritcliett, L. R. 3 Q. B. 135. ^Lozou V. Pryse, 4 My. & Cr. 604. Ho Edw. III. c. 3. 5 Dig. Lib. VII. tit. 1, sects. 9, 11. «Dig. Lib. I. tit. 16, sect. 80. § 305] LIFE ESTATES. 837 Periodically croppings of big trees were a necessary part of their management and enjoyment. The definition of "silva ccBdua" makes it equivalent with coppice. " Silva ccedua est, id quidam putant, quce in hoc habetur, ut ccederetur ." ' This definition corresponds to the description of "timber estates.'" Modern commentators have here a basis for the authority in the usufructuary to cut such plantations as are expressly cultivated for periodical felling and sale. And in a study of the Eoman law of usufruct one is convinced that periodical cropping of big trees was a necessary part of their management and enjoyment.^ Such a practice of felling timber at regular periods was considered to be well justified, when in conformity with the usage of the locality and the practice of the farmers.* French law at first followed the Roman law as to cutting great trees." But France made a distinction in regard to felling of cultivated woods at stated periods." And it is now settled that the usufructuary riiay cut timber on plantations that are arranged for cutting at periodical times, although the usufructuary is in duty bound to fol- low the custom of former proprietors as to quantity and times.' Tithes were payable in England in respect of silva ccedim, and what wood came under that description was from the earliest times the subject of contest with the ecclesiastical lawyers. So an act was passed authorizing a prohibition against the proceeding in the spiritual court to recover tithes of gros bois.' ' Dig. Lib. I. tit. 16, sect. 30. ' Honywood v. Honywood, L. R. 18 Eq. 306. ' XIX Laspeyre's Archiv f ur die Civilistische Praxis, pp. 71-113; Sintenis, Civilrecht, p. 59; Valgerow, Pandekten, p. 785; Roby's Justinian, p. 77. . Bovee, 24 Wis. 295. ' Davis V. Eyton, 7 Bing. 154; Bulwer i>. Bulwer, 3 Barn. & Aid. 470; Debow ■B. Colfax, 5 Halst. (.N. J.) 128; Carpenter » Jones, 63 111. 517. ' Bevan v. BriscDe, 4 Har. & J. (Md.) 139. . Walker, 5 Term R. 373; Wilds v. Layton, 1 Del. Ch. 226; Searles V. Searles, 3 Sand. CIi. (N. T.) 601; Lewis «. Jones, 17 Pa. St. 262; Covertown V. Ward, 1 Seh. & Lef. 9; Moulton v. Robinson, 27 N. H. 550. 2 Co. Litt. 53b. « Crockett b. Crockett, 3 Ohio St, 180; Webster «. Webster, 33 N. H. 25; Phillips v. Smith, 14 Mees. & "Wels. 594; Keeler v. Eastman, 11 Vt. 393. » Greene v. Cole, 2 Saund. 252; Jackson v. Cator, 5 Ves. 688; Douglass v. Wiggins, 1 Johns, Ch. (N. Y.) 435; Agate v. Lowenbein, 57 N. T. 604; Maun- sell B. Hart, 11 Ir. Eq. 478. «3Rolle, Abr. 814,815. ' 2 Rolle. Abr. 815. §§ 315-316] LIFE ESTATES. 347 § 315. Tenants in Common. — Waste as to tenants in common is generally controlled by statute. A tenant in common may be guilty of waste. Thus, a tenant in com- mon who quarries and removes stone from the common property is guilty of waste. ' And he may commit waste by cleai'ing wood land." But taking fixtures from a ruinous mill by a tenant in common and using them in his own is not waste.' Where a tenant in common is in sole possession of the land, claiming the whole of it adversely to his co-tenant, the latter may maintain an action against him for waste for cutting timber and for the use of the land.* An injunction against waste will be granted where a case of partition is pending;' but after partition is decreed an in- junction will not he against the tenant for farming contrary to the custom of the country, between landlord and tenant. ° The tenancy must be admitted to make one tenant liable to another, under a statute giving damages for waste.' § 316. Without Impeachment foe Waste. — The inten- tion of the phrase "without impeachment for waste," is to enable the tenant to do many things, such as cutting wood, opening new mines, and the like, which would otherwise at common law amount to waste. But this phrase does not operate as a license to the tenant to destroy the estate, or to commit malicious waste, such as cutting down fruit trees, or trees which serve for shade or ornament.' If he be a tenant "without impeachment for waste," he has the same right to cut timber, work mines, and the like, for his own use, as the owner of the inheritance; but this phrase does not justify him in demolishing the buildings, or doing that which operates as destructive or malicious waste.' 'Childs -D. Railroad Co., 117 Mo. 414. 'Johnson v. Johnson, 2 Hill Ch. (S. Car.) 277. 'Dodd V. Watson, 4 Jones Eq. (N. Car.) 48. * Dodge V. Davis, 85 Iowa, 77. ' Hawley ». Clowes, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 123. « Bailey n. Hobson, L. R. 5 Ch. App. 180. 'Prescott V. Nevens, 4 Mason, C. C. 326. » Stevens ». Rose, 69 Mich. 259. ' Leeds v. Amherst, 14 Sim. 357; Vaue v. Barnard, ,2 Vern. 738; Aston ». Aston, 1 Ves. Sr. 265. 348 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 817 It seems that no particular form of words is nece^ary to make an estate for life without impeachment for waste,' and the words in a lease "to have and to hold, to use and control as he thinks proper, for his benefit during his natural life," import a leasing without impeachment for waste." The life tenant, under a lease without impeachment for waste, owes a duty to the reversioner or remaindraan to preserve in a reasonable manner the buildings and all the fruit and ornamental trees on the estate. He has no right to commit any malicious waste, or to destroy such build- ings or trees. He has a right to cut and take timber for his own use, the same as the owner of the inheritance, and this is the extent of his right. § 317. Life Tenant — Question for the Jury.— It is held, and with reason, that the acts done or permitted that con- stitute waste differ according to the condition of the coun- try. The clearing of land by a life tenant is waste in Eng- land, but in the United States it is left for the jury to say whether the life tenant has dealt with his land in a hus- bandmanlike manner and has observed the proportions of cleared and woodland as a prudent owner in fee would in the management of his own land.' While in its essential elements, waste is the same in this country and in England, yet in respect to ax^ts which con- stitute waste, the rule that governs in a new and unopened land, covered largely with primeval growth, must be very different.' And it is for the jury to determine whether, in clearing additional lands, the tenant for life acted as a pru- dent owner in fee would have done, had he been cultivat- ing the land for a support or for a profit. ' And the court will take notice of a change in the condi- tion of carrying on a great plantation by slaves before the 1 Webster v. Webster, 33 N. H. 21. 2 Stevens v. Rose, 69 Mich. 359. 2 Sherrill «. Conner, 107 N. Car. 630; SUtae v. Wilcox, 1 Dev. & Bat. (N. Car.) Eq. 631. ^King V. Miller, 99 N. Car. 583. 5 Hastings ». Crunkleton, 3 Yeates (Pa.), 261; Wilson v. Edmonds, 24 N. H. 517; Harvey «. Harvey, 41 Vt. 378; Dorsey v. Moore, 100 N. Car. 44; Craw- ley V. Tiraberlake, 3 Ired. Eq. (N. Car.) 460. § 318] LIFE ESTATES. 349 war and after it, when tenement houses erected all over the farm are substituted for the negro cabins located near the dwelling, and will leave the jury to determine whether a prudent owner of the fee would, under the circumstances, have incurred the expense of keeping in repair a barn used originally for the protection of stock needed for the whole farm.' It is a question of fact as to what actions constitute waste, and a finding on such question will not be disturbed on conflicting evidence.' § 318. Waste by Life Tenant. — Waste on the part of a life tenant and tenant for years consists in such actions as tend to the permanent loss of the owner of the fee such as the destruction or lessening the value of the inheritance. ' This estate may be created by law, as in estates of dower, and by the curtesy, or by deed. A life tenant who tears down the building on the land, even for the purpose of erecting a better one is guilty of waste.* Where timber is in the way of cultivation or prevents the growth of vegetation by its shade, or good husbandry re- quires its removal, the life tenant has a right to remove it, and is not liable to the reversioner. ' Mines and quarries opened at the commencement of the life estate may be worked by the life tenant, even to exhaus- tion without making him liable for waste. ° But he must not at common law open land to search for mines, or to open new mines.' It is waste to take rock from land for the purpose ' Sherrill v. Conner, 107 N. Car. 630. « Jackson v. Brownson, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 232; Eysaman v. Small, 15 N. T. Supp. 268. »Proffitt ®. Henderson, 29 Mo. 325. * Dooley v. Stringham, 4 Utah, 107. ' Sayers v. Hoskinson, 110 Pa. St. 473. See, also, Jackson «. Brownson, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 227; Harder v. Harder, 26 Barb. (N. Y.) 414; Moorehouse u. Cotheal, 22 N. J. L. 521; Woodward v. Gates, 38 Ga. 205; Hastings®. Crunk- leton, 8 Yeates (Pa.), 261; Findlay v. Smith, 6 Munf. (Va.) 134; Alexander v. Fisher, 7 Ala. 514; Owen®. Hyde, 6 Yerg. (Tenn.) 334. •Sayers ■». Hoskinson, 110 Pa. St. 473; Shoemaker's Appeal, 106 Pa. St. 892. 'Saunder's Case, 5 Rep. 12; Irwin v. Covode, 24 Pa. St. 162; wings v. Emery, 6 Gill (Md.), 260. 550 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 318 of paving the streets of a city.' So is taking clay from the soil by a life tenant and manufacturing the same into brick and selling the same/ A life tenant cannot cut turf on bog lands for sale ; " nor dig for gravel, lime, clay, stone, or the like, except for re- pairs of the building or for manure of the land." He is liable for all the expenses for the preservation of the prop- erty and the payment of the taxes. ^ Where there is no limitation upon the tenant he may cul- tivate the farm in most husbandlike manner ; ° and re- gardless of the duration of his term he is liable for volun- tary or omissive waste.' If he rents a house from year to year and leaves before the time expires, he is liable for voluntary or omissive waste, where a thief enters the bouse, cuts out and carries away the plumbing work. * A party who has only a contingent remainder or exe- cutory devise cannot maintain waste ; ° and one having a remainder for life only cannot sue for waste." Unless there is a privity of estate between the parties, the injury is merely a trespass, and an action cannot be maintained." Tenants in common for life are liable to the reversioner for an injury to the inheritance by a stranger, or by a part of the tenants in common ; " and a reversioner may re- cover after he has parted with his estate, for waste com- mitted before such sale." An action against a tenant for life by devise does not survive after his death." A tenant pur autre vie in possession can commit waste as against a remainderman or owner of the inheritance, ' Smith «. Rome, 19 Ga. 89. » University v. Tucker, 31 W. Va. 631. 3 Co. Litt. 54 b. * Dickinson «. Jones, 36 Ga. 97. 'Mehle v. Bensel, 39 La. Ann. 680. « Hubble V. Cole, 85 Va. 87. ■> Boefer ». Sheridan, 43 Mo. App. 336. 8 Ryan v. Suthy, 11 N. Y. Supp. 709. 9Hunt». Hall, 37 Me. 363. "> Mayo V. Feaster, 3 McCord Ch. (S. Car.) 137. " Lander v. Hall, 69 Wis. 336. >2 Wood V. Griffin, 46 N. H. 330. i» Robinson v. Wheeler, 35 N. Y. 353. »* Browne v. Blick, 3 Murph. (N. Car.) 511. §g 319-320] LIFE ESTATES. 351 and is liable for such injury.' And an unlawful removal of petroleum by the life tenant constitutes waste." § 319. Assignee of Life Estate. — An action for waste may be maintained by the reversioner against the assignee of a life estate." An assignee of an estate for life is a tenant for life. In England, under the common law, as enlarged by the statutes of Gloucester and of Marlbridge, the action will lie.* And it may be an action on the case in the nature of waste. ' Chief Justice Gilfillan says, that the assignee is as much within the reason for the rule as the lessee before assigning. Succeeding to the entire interest of the lessee and standing in his estate, he owes the same duty, so far as privity of estate is concerned, to preserve the reversion. He is entitled to the immediate possession; and as to part of the relief to which the reversioner may be entitled, to wit, forfeiture of the estate for life or years and eviction, he is the only one who can be- affected by it. His assignor is not interested in it. It is different from a case of underletting." There appears to be no decision to the contrary to this doctrine. It has been held that neither an action of waste nor an action on the case in the nature of waste can be brought unless there is a privity of estate, and these actions have not been sustained between the assignee of the reversion and the assignee of a doweress.' But the heir of the reversioner could bring waste against the doweress after her assignment. And so might the assignee of the heir of the reversioner against the assignee of a life estate created by contract. ° § 320. Landlord and Tenant. — Some of the ancient cases restrict the tenant within very narrow limits as to ' McDole V. McDole, 39 111. App. 274. « Williamson v. Jones (W. Va.), 19 S. Rep. 436. « Curtiss «. Livingston, 36 Minn. 380. *1 Inst. 54 a; Greene v. Cole, 3 Saund. 353, and note; Foster's Case, Gould's 63; Ward v. Waddington, Clayton, 136; Sanders v. Norwood, Cro. Eliz. 683. 'Short ». Wilson, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 33. 8 Curtiss V. Livingston, 36 Minn. 380, 382. 'Foot V. Dickinson, 3 Met. (Mass.) 61L « Bates V. Shraeder, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 260; Walker's Case, 3 Kep. 33. 352 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 320 his rights to alter or improve the premises held by him without subjecting him to an action of waste, or to a for- feiture of the estate. And it was questionable whether a tenant or copyholder could erect a new building upon the premises, without subjecting himself to a loss of the property.' But upon the principles of the modern cases, it is not waste to make new erections upon the demised premises, which may be removed at the end of the term without much inconvenience, leaving the property in the same condition as it was at the commencement of the tenancy. But the tenant has no right to pull down valu- able buildings, or to make improvements or alterations which will materially and permanently change the nature of the property, so as to render it impossible for him to restore the same premises at the expiration of the term." No act of the tenant amounts to waste, unless it is or may be prejudicial to the inheritance, or to those who are entitled to the reversion or remainder. Thus, a tenant may open a way over meadow lands for his convenience, and dig drains by the side thereof, and carry on earth for the purpose of making the way passable; or he may erect houses on such land where there were none before, and dig cellars for them, and raise the ground about them; or he may carry quantities of earth upon the low and wet parts of such lands; provided, that the occa- sional breaking up of such land will be a judicious and suitable mode of cultivating it, and the cost of leveling^ be small; and if, after deducting such cost, the land over which the way was made, and on which the houses were built, would, in case of their removal, be equally or more valuable for agricultural purposes, including plowing and seeding down to grass, as if it had not thus been changed and built upon.* The tenant is entitled to estovers,' for firewood and tO' ■Ward's Case, 4 Leon. 241; Darcy v. Askwith, Hob. 234; Gray ®. Ulysses, Z Dyer, 211 b, note; 2 Roller, Abr. 815; Co. Litt. 53 a. 2 Winship v. Pitts, 3 Paige (N. Y.), 259. See, also, Owen v. Hyde, 6 Yerg, (Tenn.) 334; Jackson v. Andrew, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 431; Crouch v. Puryear, 1 Rand. (Va.) 258; Jackson ». Brownson, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 237. 'Pynchon v. Stearns, 11 Met. (Mass.) 304. « Harder v. Harder, 26 Barb. (N. Y.) 409. § 321] LIFE ESTATES. 853 keep the place in repairs.' A tenant from year to year must keep the premises wind and water tight," but is not bound to rebuild buildings which have become ruinous dur- ing his occupation, unless he has covenanted to rebuild. ' If a tenant at will commits waste, it is a termination of the estate, and he is Uable for trespass.' A purchaser is not liable for waste, unless he commit- ted it or it was done with his knowledge." A tenant in possession under a lease giving him an option to pur- chase the premises, if he fails to exercise the right within the specified time, is liable for waste committed on the premisesduring his possession." § 321. Executors and Administrators. — The action of waste and the action in the nature of waste cannot be brought against an executor or administrator for the waste- ful management of the property of the deceased.' Legatees whose legacies fail of payment by reason of the executor wasting the personal estate have no claim upon the real estate devised to the executor.' The probate court may prevent waste by control of the executor." And a court of equity has jurisdiction of a bill charging an executor with waste in not accounting for properly which has come into his hands, although a final settlement has been made with the probate court.'" But when the executor is able to respond in his executorial capacity a court of equity will not inter- fere, as he may be held to a strict accountability for his administration." Where an administrator is entitled to possession of an in- solvent estate, he is then, in possession, liable for waste. " ' Cheetham v. Hampson, 4 Term R. 318. « Auworlh V. Johnson, 5 Car. & P. 239. 3 Bullock v. Dommitt, 6 Term R. 650. < Daniels B. Pond, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 867; Ruckman v. Outwater, 38 N. J. L. 581. * State V. Gramelspacher, 126 Tod. 398. 'Powell V. Railroad Co., 16 Oreg. 83. 'Wilburs. Wilbur, 7 Met. (Mass.) 249 8'Wilkes V. Harper, 1 N. Y. 586, Sims v. Sims, 3 Stockt. (N. J.) 158. 9 Whitney c. Monro, 4 Edw. Ch. (N. T.) 5. 1" Clark V. Henry, 9 Mo. 339. " Keller v. Ogsbury, 121 N. T, 363. " Gregg D. Currier, 36 N. H. 200. 45 354 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 822-323 § 322. Guardian and Trustee.— Where a trustee holds an estate and commits waste, the heir or his guardian cannot bring an action of waste against him, as the trustee is not a tenant in such a manner as to permit an action to be brought against him.' The remainderman cannot interfere even if the trust funds are being wasted." If a guardian accounts for the waste he has committed, which is of small consequence, he will not be charged with waste.' But the guardian, in whom the estate becomes vested has no right to commit waste by cutting and remov- ing timber from the land, except for necessary repairs of the buildings and fences, and his assent to such cutting and removal to another is no defense in an action of trespass brought against him therefor.* Article 5. Remedies. % 333. Action of Waste. § 333. American Rule for Issuing an § 334. At Common Law— Liability of Injunction. Tenant. § 333. Rendering the Security Insuffi. § 335. In Equity— By Injunction. cient. § 326. In Michigan. § 334. Legal Title Remaining In the § 327. By Whom Brought. Vendor. § 338. Against Whom Brought. § 335. Rights of Third Parties. § 339. Damages. § 336. Action at Law By Mortgagee. § 330. Mortgagor and Mortgagee. § 337. Trespass and Trover. g 331. English Rule for Issuing an § 338 License to Cut Timber. Injuncion. § 339. Damages to MortgagedProperty § 323. Action of Waste.— The action of waste under the old Enghsh practice, was a remedy given for injury to lands, houses, woods, and the like, by a tenant thereof for life or years, to the injury or prejudice of the heir, or of him, in the reversion or remainder. It was either volun- tary or permissive, the one by actual design; the other ' Kincaird v. Scott, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 368. « Terry v. Allen, 60 Conn. 530. 5 Bond ®. Lockwood, 33 111. 313. ■•Torry v. Black, 58 N. T. 185. § 324] LIFE ESTATES. 355 arising from mere negligence and want of sufficient care. The action was partly founded upon the common law, and partly founded upon the statute of Gloucester, and was a mixed action ; real, so far as it recovered the realty in- jured, and personal so far as it covered the damages for the injury. Originally, and under the old practice, the action was brought for both of these specific purposes, and, if waste was proved on the trial, the plaintiff recovered, not only the premises injured, but also the damages he had sustained by reason of the injury. The action for this double purpose, having fallen into disuse, was finally abolished in England by statute. ' In this country, although adopted in some of the States, it has been but little used; having been, in practice, virtu- ally superseded by the action on the case in the nature of waste for the recovery of damages merely, or by bill in equity. Tenants for life, not made unimpeachable for waste by the person granting the estate, are liable for both commissive and permissive waste. The ancient remedies for waste by writ of estrepement, and writ of waste at common law have become obsolete in most of the States. The modern practice in this country and in England, is to bring injunction to stop the commis- sion of waste, when the injury would be irreparable; or by special action on the case in the nature of waste, to recover damages." In Pennsylvania and Delaware, the ancient writ of es- trepement, to prevent the commission of waste, is in use, though improved by statutory enactment. ° § 324. At Common Law — Liability of Tenant. — After the tenant has committed waste, he is liable at law for the damages, and under the statutes of Marlbridge* and Glou- cester,' the judgment was given for treble the actual dam- >3& 4 William IV, c. 37. 'Dickinson n. Mayor, 48 Md. 583. 'See MeCullough v. Irvine, 13 Pa. St. 438; Randall v. Cleveland, 6 Conn. 328; Smith®. Follansbee, 13 Me. 373; Parkers. Chambliss, 13 Qa 335; Sack- ett V. Sackett, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 309; Hensal a. Wight, 10 Pa. Co. Ct. 416. < 53 Henry, III. ch. 23. ' 6 Edvrard, I. ch. 5. 356 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 32i age, and the land wasted was forfeited to the reversioner.' In most of the States the amount of damages is controlled by statutory provisions. At common law a writ of prohi- bition was had where waste had been threatened, and a writ of waste where damage had actually been done.' The tenants by the curtesy, and in dower, and for life or years, are answerable for waste committed by a stranger, and they have their remedy over against him.' The land- lord cannot protect the property against strangers ; the tenant can, and is presumed to be able to protect it.* A stranger who does injury to the premises is liable either to the tenant or the reversioner; but one who acts by the authority or permission of the tenant in possession is not a stranger, and for his acts the tenant is liable as for commissive waste." At common law, tenants by the curtesy and in dower were answerable for waste com- mitted by strangers, and this liability was extended to tenants for life and for years.' It is the general princi- ple that the tenant, without some special agreement to the contrary, is responsible to the reversioner for all injuries amounting to waste, done to the premises during his term, by whomsoever committed, with the exception of the act of God and pubhc enemies, and of the reversioner himself. This principle is founded on public policy.' As the tenant in dower and the reversioner are privies in estate, a judgment by the doweress against a trespasser is a bar to another action by the reversioner for the same cause. ° In Vermont the doweress is made liable for waste committed or suffered by her.' Under this statute she is 1 Sackett v. Sackett, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 313; Shemlle. Conaor, 107 N. Car. 543; Chipman o. Emeric, 3 Cal. 283; Harder v. Harder, 36 Barb. (N. Y.) 409; Dan- zinger v. Silberthan, 18 N. T. Supp. 350. 2 2 Inst. 300. »Co. Litt. 54, a; 3 Inst; 145, 303; Willey v. Laraway, 64 Vt. 559. * White -D. Wagner, 4 Harr. & J. (Md.) 373. ' Livingston v. Mott, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 605. « 53 Henry III. c. 33; 6 Edw. I c. 5. 'Fay®. Brewer, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 303; Sackett v. Sackett, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 191; Clark V. Holden, 7 Gray (Mass.), 8; AttersoU v. Stevens, 1 Taunt. 198; 1 Inst. 54. 57; 3 Roll. Abr. 831. «Foot V. Dickinson, 3 Met. (Mass.) 611; Willey v. Laraway, 64 Vt. 559. ' Rev. L. sect. 2227. § 325] LIFK ESTATES. 357 not liable for acts amounting to waste committed by third persons without her permission." Although the reversioner at common law may bring his action against the actual trespasser when the injuries affect the inheritance, yet the tenant in dower is answerable for such injuries to the estate ; and, being thus liable, it fol- lows, as a legal consequence, that she has her action over against the trespasser. The fact that the reversioner may omit to take action against the real trespasser, relying on the liability of the tenant to answer to him for such tres- passes, is, of itself, a strong reason for holding that it is the right of the tenant to maintain an action aguinst the wrongdoer before judgment against herself in favor of the reversioner. § 325. In Eqihty — By Injunction. — It is an established principle of equity jurisprudence, that courts of equity will not take cognizance of cases, where their jurisdiction is concurrent, if there is a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law.' But injunction will lie at the instance of the owner of the land to restrain the cutting of timber, quar- rying of rock, mineral or any other act which is in the na- ture of waste.' But where works for the manufacture of brick have already been constructed, and clay beds opened and worked upon the common property by joint owners, as between the subsequent grantee or mortgagee of an in- dividual share or interest in the land and co-tenants in possession, it is not waste for the latter to continue the business in the customary way, so as to entitle the grantee or mortgagee to an injunction restraining such use of the premises and suspending the business." However, when there is nothing in the situation of the premises or other special circumstances to take the case out of the general rule, the unauthorized digging of clay by the tenant is waste. ' ' Willey V. Laraway, 64 Vt. 559. » Chapel «. Hull, 60 Mich. 167. ^ Snyder v. Hopkins, 31 Kans. 557; Holmberg v. Johnson, 45 Eans. 197; Wilson V. Mineral Point, 39 Wis. 160; West Point Iron Co. v. Reymert, 45 N. T. 703; Beach on Inj. 1167. * Russell V. Bank, 47 Minn. 386. 'Livingston v. Reynolds, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 157. 358 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 325 So in special cases an injunction will issue to restrain in- juries to the freehold in the nature of waste between ten- ants in common." But where works have been established for carrying on the business of making brick, and the business lawfully- undertaken by the owner of the land, as between the sub- sequent grantee of an undivided interest in the land and co-tenants in possession, it is not waste for the latter to con- tinue the business in the customary way. And such gran- tee is not entitled to an injunction against them, restrain- ing such use of the premises and breaking up or suspend- ing the business." But such grantee, if excluded from his share, would be entitled to an accounting." Where the lessee is insolvent and there is an implied covenant on the part of the lessee to use the farm in a hus- bandmanlike manner, and not exhaust the soil by improper tillage, an injunction will lie against an outgoing tenant to prevent him from plowing up all the meadow upon the farm.* Because a due proportion of meadow land upon a farm is consistent with good husbandry; so it would be waste for the outgoing tenant to plow up all the meadow land upon the farm, as much as it would be for an outgoing tenant of a garden to plow]up a strawberry bed.' Timber cut on land, not needed for use, the land being sold for taxes, will become the property of the purchaser at the tax sale, after the time for redemption has expired.' And when there are two claimants, one of them may have an injunction against the other for waste when the damages cannot be satisfied in money;' And the remedy for waste committed by the owner of the life estate in land charged with the payment of a legacy on the termination of the life estate, is in equity where further waste can be enjoined, and damages awarded for the waste committed, which will 1 Hawley v. Clowes, 3 John. Ch. (K. Y.) 123; Atkinson «. Hewitt, 51 Wis, 375; Coffin v. Loper, 35 N. J. Eq. 443. 'Neel V. Neel, 19 Pa. St. 323; McCord v. Oakland Mining Co. 64 Cal. 134. 'Kean v. Connelly, 35 Minn. 232. ^ Chapel a. Hull, 60 Mich. 167. ' Watherell ®. Howells, 1 Camp. 227 • Nicklase v. Morrison, 56 Ark. 553. ' Arment v. Hensel, 5 Wash. St. 153. §§ 326-327J LIFE ESTATES. 359 be held so far as necessary for the benefit of the legatee whose claim must be paid before the remaindermen take.' § 326. In Michigan.— In Michigan, under the statute' providing when any person shall neglect or refuse to pay any taxes on the land of such person within the time speci- fied by law, the township treasurer shall be entitled to an injunction to restrain waste on any such lands upon which the taxes shall remain unpaid, when it shall appear that such lands are chiefiy valuable for the timber, being, stand- ing or gi-owing thereon, it is not a condition to grant an injunction that it be shown that the land, if stripped of the timber, would not be worth the amount of the taxes. ' And it is no defense that the taxes can be collected by another process, and that the owner does not intend to commit waste, and if waste should be committed the land would be of sufficient value to pay the taxes.* § 327. By Whom Brought. — At common law, the per- son having the next immediate estate of inheritance in re- version or remainder could maintain an action of waste, in which he could recover treble damages and the premises damaged, there being privity of estate or of action between the parties.' If there was no privity, then an action upon the case in the nature of waste was the remedy, by which the actual damages could be recovered by any one having a reversionary interest against any one who did the waste, whether lessee or stranger. ° By the common law a person having an expectant interest in land less than an inherit- ance cannot maintain the action of waste ' Nor can a per- son having a contingent remainder or entitled upon a con- tingency to an executory devise have this action. ° ' Dawson v. Tremaine, 93 Mich. 330. ■^3 How. Stat. sect. 1170 n 1. 'Caldwell d. Ward, 83 Mich. 13, explained ia 88 Mich. 878. ^Rossman v. Adams, 91 Mich. 69. As to the law in Ohio, see McMillan v. Robbins, 5 Ohio, 30. 5 Foot V. Dickinson, 2 Met. (Mass.) 611; Bates v. Shraeder, 13 Johns. (N.Y.) 260; Walker's Case, 3 Rep. 33. « Chase v. Hazelton, 7 N. H. 175; Elliot v. Smith, 2 N. H. 430. 'Peterson v. Clark, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 305. 8 Hunt V. Hall, 37 Me. 363; Bacon v. Smith, 1 Q. B. 345. 360 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 328 In Pennsylvania one having a contingent interest in real estate may commence an action to recover damages for waste ; ' and so in West Virginia." The plaintiff cannot by fiUng an amended petition avail himself of a cause of action accruing after the filing of bis original petition; and therefore, in an action for waste, an anaended petition alleging commission of waste since the filing of the original petition is bad." The plaintiff must have the legal title.* § 328. Against Whom Brought.— The action on the case in the nature of waste has almost entirely superseded the common law action of waste, as well for permissive as for voluntary waste. At conmion law, waste lay against a tenant in dower, tenant by the curtesy and guardian in chivalry, but not against lessees for life or years.' This doctrine was found extremely inconvenient as ten- ants took advantage of the ignorance of their landlords, and committed acts of waste with impunity. To remedy this inconvenience the statute of Marlbridge ' was enacted. But as the recompense given by this statute was frequently inadequate to the loss sustained, the statute of Gloucester ' was passed, which increased the punishmefit by enacting that the place wasted should be recovered together with treble damages." The statute of Marlbridge provided for full damages and punishment by amercement.' The word firmarii in this statute included all such as held by lease for life or Kves, or for years, by deed or without deed, '° and also devisees for life or years. " By the statute of Glou- cester, it was provided, also, that a man, from henceforth, shall have a writ of waste, in chancery, against him that ' Laws of 1891. No. 179, p. 208. « University «. Tucker, 31 W. Va. 631. 2 Davis V. Clark, 40 Mo. App. 515. "Gillett V. Treganza, 13 Wis. 473. ' 3 Inst. 299. ' « 53 Henry III. cli. 33. ■"CEdw. I. ch. 5. 8 1 Cruise's Dig. 119, sects. 35, 36. '2 Inst. 145. ">2Inst. 145, note 1. "Rolle's Abr. 826, 1 35. § 328J LIFE ESTATES. 361 holds by the law of England or otherwise for term of life, or for term of years, or woman in dower. And he who shall be attainted of waste shall lose the thing that he has wasted, and, moreover, shall recompense thrice so much as the waste shall be taxed.' At common law, a tenant at will was punishable for voluntary waste but not for permissive waste.' Tenants in dower, by the curtesy, for hfe or lives, and for years, were included in the statute of Gloucester. Tenants at will were always considered as omitted from the statute of Marlbridge as well as from the statute of Gloucester, and, therefore, continue to be not punishable for mere permissive waste, and punishable for voluntary waste by action of trespass as at common law. The settled construction of these English statutes until a comparatively recent period, was that they included per- missive waste as well as voluntary waste." So under the prohibition to do waste, the tenant is held to be liable for the waste of a stranger, though he assented not to the doing of waste." Every lessee of land, whether for life or years, is liable in an action of waste to his lessor for all waste done on the land in lease by whomsoever it may be committed, ' with the exceptions of the acts of God, public enemies, and the acts of the lessor himself. ' The instances in the earlier reports in which lessees for life or years, were held liable for permissive waste, which consisted in injuries resulting from acts of negligence or omission, are frequent, and their liability is grounded on the statute which subjected them to the action of waste.' This construction of the English statutes continued to be received without dissent until some later decisions.* But > 2 Inst. 299. ' Salip V. Crompton, Cro. Eliz. 777, 784; Shrewsbury's Case, 5 Rep. 14; Harnett v. Maitland, 16 Mees & Wela. 258. » 2 Inst. 145; 7 Bac. Abr. 250. " 2 Inst. 303; Fay v. Brewer, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 203. » AttersoU v. Stevens, 1 Taunt. 198. «Wliite V. Wagner, 4 Harr. & J. (Md.) 373; Heydon's Case, 13 Co. 69. 'Griffith's Case, Moore 69; Darcy ». Askwith, Hob. 234; Glover v. Pipe, Owen, 92; 2 Bl. Com. 283. « Gibson v. vyells, 4 Bos. & P. 290; Heme v. Bembow, 4 Taunt. 764; Tor- riano V. Young, 6 Car. & P. 8. 46 362 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 329 these later cases cannot be regarded as settling the law against the older cases and the opinions of Coke and Black- stone, and are unsound in principle." ^he true construction of the statute of Grioucester makes tenants for life or years liable for permissive as well as voluntary waste. And so, an action on the case in the nature of waste will lie against a tenant for years for per- missive waste.' A tenant in dower is ordinarily held liable for the com- mission of waste." A purchaser in possession of lands under a contract to purchase, whether written or verbal, is a tenant at will, for the purpose of sustaining an action on the case in the nature of waste for destruction, committed while in such possession.' An execution debtor is liable for waste after sale and be- fore possession by the vendee." And a purchaser of land is liable for the negligent burning of a building upon a re- cission of the contract." Where there is an exchange of land, before the deeds and possession are given, an action of waste will lie.' Devisees having a life interest in land, with a possibility of a share in the fee, may be enjoined from committing waste. ' § 329. Damages. — The amount of damages to be recovered is generally regulated by statute ; in some of the States the ' 4 Kent's Com. 76, 79; Broom on Parties, 257; Roscoe on Real Actions, 385; Ferrard on Fixt. 3';8, 281. 2 Moore ii. Townsend, 83 N. J. L. 284. In Jones v. Hill, 7 Taunt. 393, Gibbs, C. J., expressly guards himself against the implication that he concurs in the position that an action will not lie against a lessee for years for permis- sive waste. lu Martin e. Gilham, 7 Adol. & El. 540, and in Beale v. Sanders, 3 Bing. N. S. 850, this question is not decided. In Harnett v. Maitland, 16 Mees. & Wels. 256, 261, the cases of Gibson d. Wells, 4 Bos. & P. 290; H< rne V. Bembow, 4 Taunt. 764, and Torriano v Young, 6 Car. & P. 8, are cited, but Parke, B., intimates an opinion against these cases as necessarily involv- ing the result that a tenant for life is also dispunishable for permissive waste. 3 Parkers. Chambliss, 12 Ga. 235; Harney «. Harney. 41 Vt. 373; Short®. Pip r, 4 Harr. (Del ) 181. Compare Smith v. PoUansbee, 13 Me. 373. ■• Freeman ®. Headley, 33 N. J. L. 533. ' Rich ». Baker, 3 Denio (N. T.) 79; Thomas v. Crofut, 14 N. Y. 474. • Cornish ». Strutton, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 586. ' Marsh ii. Current, 6 B. Mon. (Ky.) 493. *Farabow«. Green, 108 N. Car. 339. § 330] LIFE ESTATES. 363 reversioner can still recover treble damages.' Generally the actual damages are the diminution of value by the waste ; that is, the difference between the market value before and after the waste was committed." Where tim- ber is cut the reversioner in fee may recover damages or possession of the timber, and may maintain trover, re- plevin, or trespass de bonis.' And the tenant cannot re- coup for improvements made by him on the premises at another time ; ' but he may be allowed, in equity, in miti- gation for firewood and timber furnished by him from other premises.' The plaintiff can only recover for the injury to the par- ticular estate which he holds." If cutting ornamental trees is no injury to the reversion, there can be no claim for damages.' Where the waste is committed by a stranger, he is not liable for full damages in an action by the tenant, unless the tenant has already been held responsible to the remainderman. ° § 330. Mortgagor and Mortgagee. — It is well settled in equity that a mortgagee cannot maintain an action to re- strain waste by the mortgagor without showing that thereby his security will be impaired." And so the vendor who holds the legal title as security for the fulfillment of the contract of purchase by the vendee in possession should show that he will sustain some injury, or that his security ' Sackett v. Sackett, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 313; Slierrill «. Conner, 107 N. Car. 543; Danziger v. Silberthall, 18 N. Y. Supp. 350; Harder v. Harder, 26 Barb. (N. Y.) 409; Chipmau ». Emeric, 3 Cal. 383. 'Chipman v. Hibberd, 6 Cal. 163; Achey v. Hall, 7 Micli. 483; Clark d. Zeigler, 79 Ala. 346; Stundenmire v. DeBardelaben, 85 Ala. 83; Harder v. Harder, 26 Barb. (N. Y.) 409. 3 Lanes. Thompson, 43 K. H. 334; Frothingliam s. McKuslck, 24 Me. 403; Seagram ». Knight, L. R. 3 Ch. App. 631; Bulkley ». Dolbeare, 7 Conn. 333; Langdon d. Paul, 33 Vt. 205. ^Morehouse v. Cotheal. 22 N. J. L. 531; Miller v. Shields, 55 Ind. 71; Van Syckel ». Emery, 18 N. J. Eq. 387. ' Sarles v. Sarles, 3 Sand. Ch. (N. Y.) 601. 'Hamden v. Rice, 24 Conn. 350. 'Bubb V. Yelverton, L. R, 10 Eq. 465. 'Wood V. Griffln, 46 N. H. 230; Beach on Inj. 1173. 'Robinson t). Russell, 21 Cal. 467; Buckout v. Swift, 37 Cal. 483. 364 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 331-332 will be impaired, before he can maintain an action to re- strain waste.' Courts of equity will interfere to ])revent the commission of waste by the mortgagor in possession. This interven- tion is based upon' two grounds : 1. The right of the mort- gagee to the protection of the entire security unimpaired during the life of the mortgage. 2. As between the mort- gagor and the mortgagee the latter is deemed at common law the owner of the fee and as such entitled to protection. And where the mortgage is considered but a lien, the mort- gagee is^ entitled to protection of equity against commission of waste. The mortgagor in possession may exercise all acts of ownership, if he does not impair the security ; he must not depreciate the value of the premises and render the security insufficient. Courts of equity will take jurisdiction especially where the mortgagor has been declared a bankrupt, and his prop- erty vested in an assignee. The mortgagee's lien will be protected in equity.' § 331. English Rule for Issuing an Injunction.— In England if the security of the mortgage is insufficient, and the court is satisfied of that fact, the mortgagor will not be allowed to do that which will directly impair the security — cut timber upon the mortgaged premises. If the security is sufficient, the court will not grant an injunction merely because the mortgagor cuts timber, or threatens to cut tim- ber. There must be a special case made out before the court of equity will intervene. The property must be worth at least one-third more than the amount loaned on the premises. ' § 332. American Eule for Issuing an Injunction. — The margin required in England is not sufficient in the United States. But in England land values are, to a certain ex- tent, stationary. In the United States they are fluctuat- iMiUeru. Waddingham, 91 Cal. 377. ' Pin^ey on Mort. 863. 8 King V. Smith, 3 Hare, 239, 244: Humphreys o. Harrison, 1 Jac. & W. 581; Hippesley v. Spencer, 5 Madd. 256; Harper v. Apin, 54 Law T., U. 8. 383; Farrant v. Lovel, 3 Atk. 728. §§ 333-334] LIFE ESTATES. 365 ing. Therefore, to be a sufficient security in this country, there should be a much broader margin between the amount of the debt and the estimated value of the property mortgaged for its security than is considered sufficient in England;" so in the United States the margin varies from one-half to two-thirds. § 333. EeND BRING THE SECURITY INSUFFICIENT. — While some authority holds that the mortgagee is entitled to an injunction, restraining any acts of vrastebythe mortgagor in possession which may diminish the value of the mort- gaged property, yet the great weight of authority is to the effect that equity will not interfere in such cases unless the acts complained of are such as may render the security in- sufficient for the satisfaction of the debt, or of doubtful security." In other cases, the courts in stating the ground upon which equity will interfere, seem to regard it as a necessary condition that the sufficiency of the security be threatened.' When the mortgagor is committing waste which impairs the security, or renders it insufficient, equity, at the suit of the mortgagee, wiU restrain him by injunction.* § 334. Legal Title Remaining in the Vendor.— When the vendor of land retains the legal title as security for the purchase money, executing only a bond for title, the rela- tion between him and the purchaser, in substance, is the same as between mortgagee and mortgagor; the same rights and remedies, legal and equitable, and the same limitations ' Moses V. Johnson, 88 Ala. 517. 'Moriartyt). Ashworth, 43 Minn. 1; Moses v. Johnson, 88 Ala. 517; Coker v. Whitlock, 54 Ala. 180; Scott v. Wharton, 2 Hen. & M. (Va.) 25; Vanderslice v. Knapp, 20 Kans 647; Harris v. Bannon, 78 Ky. 568; Van Wyck 11. Alliger, 6 Barb. CN. T.) 507, 511; King«. Smith, 2 Hare, 239; Adams V. Corriston, 7 Minn. 456; Dorr ». Dudderar, 88 111. 107; Bunker ®. Locke, 15 Wis. 635; Am. Trust Co. v. North Belleville Quarry Cj., 31 IST. J. Eq. 89. * Cooper v. Davis, 15 Conn. 556; Fairbanks v. Cudworth, 33 Wis. 358; Hast- ings 9. Perry, 20 Vt. 272; Gray v. Baldwin, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 164. * Moses B. Johnson, 88 Ala. 517. See, also, Harris v. Bannon, 78 Ky. 588 Downing v. Palmateer, 1 Mon. (Ky.) 64; Murdock's Case, 2 Bland (Md.), 461 Robinson b. Preswick, 3 Edw. Ch. (N. T.) 246; Sullivan «. Rabb, 88 Ala. 433 Hammond v. Winchester, 82 Ala. 470; Coleman v. Smith, 55 Ala. 368. 366 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 335-336 to the right of recovery exist in each case.' So, when the vendee commits waste, the court of equity will treat the case precisely as if the parties were mortgagor and mortgagee," and an injunction will issue." But the vendor must show that he will sustain injury, or that his security will be impaired, before he can maintain an action to re- strain waste. So long as the sufficiency of the security is unimpaired, he has no right to disturb the vendee in any use or enjoyment which the latter may make of the land. Such use and enjoyment by the vendee is a use of his own property, and unless he thereby impairs the security or di- minishes the estate which he received from the vendor, or the value of the land as he received it, he should not be re- strained." § 335. Rights of Third Parties.— Interested third par- ties may have the mortgagor restrained from committing waste. Thus, a purchaser may have an injunction at a foreclosure sale, pending confirmation, restraining the mortgagor in possession from impairing the property.' So, upon application of a party who stands in the relation of a surety of the mortgage debt, either personally for its pay- ment, or by reason of his property being covered by the mortgage. He has a right to protect the principal fund, thereby saving himself from loss." § 336. Actions at Law by Mortgagee. — If adequate damages can be recovered at law for the injury committed, and it is not alleged that the mortgagor is insolvent, relief in equity will be refused.' Where property is severed from the realty so as to become a chattel, it belongs to the owner of the land, who, under the common law, is the mortgagee; the mortgagee having ' Moses V. Jolmson, 88 Ala. 517. ^ Scott V. Wharton, 2 Hen. & M. (Va) 35; Fairbank v. Cud worth, 33 Wis. 358. 3 Taylor v. Collins, 51 Wis. 123; Kimball v. Darling, 32 Wis. 675; Thomp- son «. Haywood, 129 Mass. 401. « MiUer v. Waddingham, 91 Cal. 377. 'Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Bigler, 79 N. Y. 568; Malone v. Marriott, 64 Ala. 486; Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Bank, 18 Hun (N. Y.), 871. « Knarr ». Conaway, 43 Ind. 360, 365; Johnsons. White, 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 194. 'Robinson v. Russell, 24 Cal. 467; Montgomery v. McEwen, 9 Minn. 103. § 337] LIFE ESTATES. 367 such interest in the land, and the actual or constructive possession of the land may maintain an action for the value of the articles, or an action for the specific chattels.' But a mortgagor of a farm, while in possession, may cut a reasonable quantity of wood for his own use as fuel, and may, on leaving the farm, remove the wood for use else- where.' No rule of law or equity will enable the mortgagee to pursue the property when sold by the mortgagor, and subject to his lien after it has become annexed to, and forms a part of, the real estate of his vendee. ' However, in some of the States replevin cannot be brought for such severed articles under any condition. In New Jersey the mortgagee cannot maintain replevin for severed articles which have been removed, but he may maintain an action at law, in the nature of an action on the case, against the wrong doer." In Kansas the mortgagor has the right of posses:ion of the premises, and may sever and remove timber, wood, sand, earth, coal, stone, or anything else therefrom, and sell the same, unless it unreasonably impairs the mortgage security. When it unreasonably impairs the mortgage security the remedy of the mortgagee is not at law, but in equity, not replevin to recover the property severed from the realty, but generally injunction to restrain the com- mission of waste. ' In many of the States, the mortgagee can maintain replevin for timber cut or fixtures removed from the estate. At common law a second mortgagee might maintain trespass after discharging the first mort- gage.' §337. Trespass and Trover. — At common law, after condition broken, the right of possession immediately ac- ' Waterman v Matteson, 4 R. I. 539, Holland v. Hodgson, L. R. 7 C. P. 338; Dorr V. Dudderar, 88 111. 107; Hemenway «. Bassett, 13 Gray (Mass.), 878; Latham v. Blakely, 70 N. Car. 368; Gofl v. O'Conner, 16 111. 421; Thomas v. Crofut, 14 N. Y. 474. ' Judkins «. Woodman, 81 Me. 351. 3 Harris v. Bannon, 78 Ky. 568. ■•Klrcher v. Schalk, 39 N. J, L. 335. ' Vanderslice v. Knapp, 30 Kans. 647. See, also, Clark v. Reyburn, 1 Kans. 281. • Sanders ». Reed, 12 N. H. 558. S68 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 337 crues to the mortgagee.' So as an incident to the right of possession follows the right to bring trespass for an injury to the freehold." In those States where a mortgage is a mere lien, the in- terest of the mortgagee is contingent and may be defeated by payment, and is not such an interest as will sustain trespass for waste;' though it appears that trespass may be brought under some circumstances. Thus, a building was removed from the premises pending foreclosure proceedings and the mortgagee brought trespass against the mortgagor. It was held that the action could be maintained when the mortgagee, under such circumstances, shows that there is a deficiency upon a regular foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged property,' or that the purchaser acted fraudu leutly to injure the mortgagee. ' At common law if the mortgagor cuts timber after con- dition broken and removes it, he is liable in trespass, trover, or in an action on the case in the nature of waste." In those States where a mortgage is a mere lien, a pur- chaser taking such property without notice is not liable to the mortgagee.' It is held in New York that the purchaser is liable if he has an intent to injure the mortgagee," but in other States the mortgagee is not entitled to the timber cut from the mortgaged property until foreclosure. ° Such prop- ' Hapgood 0. Blood, 11 Gray (.Mass.), 400. = Linscott V. Weeks, 73 Me. 506; Vehue v. Mosher, 76 Me. 469; Atkinson v. Hewit, 63 Wis. 396; Sanders «. Eeed, 13 N. H. 558; Southworth «. Van Pelt, 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 347; Harris v. Haynes, 34 Vt. 320; Butler ?i. Page, 7 Met. (Mass.) 40; Mitchell v. Began, 11 Rich. (8. Car.) 686; Hampton v. Bodges, 8 Ves. 105. 'Peterson v. Clark, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 305; Pueblo, etc. Railroad Co. ■!). Beshoar, 8 Colo. 33; Adams ii. C{)rriston, 7 Minn, 456. * Eose v. Rose, 53 Mich. 585. ' Toml'nson «. Thompson, 37 Kans. 70. See, also, Burley «. Pike, 63 N. H, 495. = Langdon v. Paul, 33 Vt. 305; Hagar v. Brainerd, 44 Vt. 394. See. also, Hitchman v. Walton, 4 Mees. & Wels. 409; Blaney v. Bearce, 2 Me. 132; Frothingham ». McKusick, 24 Me. 403; Waterman v. Matteson, 4 R. I. 539 Smith i\ Moore, 11 N. H. 55; Searle e. Sawyer, 127 Mass. 491; Wilbur v. Moulton, 137 Mass. 509; In re Bruce, 9 Ben. D. C. 236. ' Wilson V. Maltby, 59 N. Y. 136. « Van Pelt v. McGraw, 4 N. Y. 110. ' Adams ®. Corriston, 9 Minn. 456. §§ 338-339] LIFE ESTATES. 869 erty may be sold under foreclosure sale, though it be not on the premises." § 338. License to Cut Timber. — The mortgagor maybe licensed to cut timber, and this agreement may be inserted in the mortgage or impUed by the terms and conditions. Thus, where the note is to be paid in wood cut from the premises.' But he must not cut timber in excess of the amount stipulated.' But after the payment of the mort- gage, the mortgagee can claim nothing further, though the timber was cut before payment and without license;* he has no right for damages for a previous trespass. ' Where the cutting of timber is under license, express or implied, from the mortgagee, it belongs to the mortgagor, otherwise to the mortgagee.' In case of wild lands, a cus- tom to cut down and carry away timber might be equiva- lent to a license.' A mortgagor of a farm, while in posses- sion, may cut a reasonable amount of wood for his own use as fuel, and may, on leaving the farm, remove the wood for the use elsewhere. ° He may cut timber for re- pairing fences and for other purposes, according to the well- known and existing usages of ordinary husbandry;' and he may take the annual crops." § 339. Damages to Mortgaged Property. — The mort- gagor is liable to the mortgagee, at common law, for in- ' Higgins V. Chamberlin, 33 N. J. Eq. 566. ''Ingell v. Fay, 112 Mass. 451. 'Scott V. Webster, 50 Wis. 53; Searle®. Sawyer, 137 Mass. 491; Page «. Robinson, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 99; Smitli p. Moore, 11 N. H. 55; Enamons «. Hin- derer, 24 N. J. Eq. 39; Van Wyck v. Alliger, 6 Barb. (N. Y.) 507, 511; Hill V. Gwin, 51 Cal. 47; Goggill «. Millburn Land Co., 35 N. J. Eq. 87; Wilson v. Maltby, 59 N. Y. 126. ■•Bertbold v. Holman, 12 Minn. 385; Corbin v. Reed, 43 Iowa, 459. ' Kennerly v. Burgess, 38 Mo. 440. "Smith V. Moore, 11 N. H. 55; Gore v. Jenness, 19 Me. 53; Lull». Matthews, 19 Vt. 332. 'Langdon v. Paul, 22 Vt. 205. 8 Judliins B. Woodman, 81 Me. 351; Wright v. Lalie, 30 Vt. 206. 'Hapgood ». Blood, 11 Gray (Mass.), 400; Smith ». Moore, 11 N. H. 55, 63; Page B. Robinson, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 99, 103. '» Woodward v. Pickett, .8 Gray (Mass.), 617; Searle v. Sawyer, 137 Mass. 491, 494. 47 370 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 339 jury done to the premises.' The mortgagee may recover for a permanent injury to the land which injures his se- curity.' In those States where a mortgage is a mere lien, the damages a mortgagee may recover against a third person in trespass on the case are the amount of injury to the mortgage as a security, however great the injury to the land may be,' and he must show that the mortgagor is in- solvent." In Connecticut, this matter of damages is regu- lated by statute. ' One holding land both as mortgagee and grantee of the mortgagor or grantor, is liable for waste to the junior mortgagee.' If the senior moi'tgagee settles for the dam- ages to the premises in good faith, the second mortgagee has no remedy unless he shows that such settlement was inadequate to compensate for the injury.' So, a junior mortgagee is entitled to damages between the date of the judgment of foreclosure and the date of the sale there- under.* When the mortgagee is in possession and dis- charges a trespasser, all the remedy the mortgagor then has is against the mortgagee, as for profits received." In bringing injunction against the mortgagor, the bur- den of proof is upon the mortgagee; but when the defense is affirmative, then the burden changes to the mortgagor.'" 'King D. Bangs, 120 Mass. 514; Byrom v. Chapin, 113 Mass. 308. » Atkinson «. Hewett, 63 Wis. 396; Searle v. Sawyer, 127 Mass. 491. Wilbur «. Moulton, 127 Mass. 509; James «. Worcester, 141 Mass. 361. 2 Morgan v. Gilbert, 2 Flip. C. C. 645. ^ Gardner -o. Heartt, 3 Denio (N. Y.), 232. " Acts of 1879, p. 392. « Scott V. Webster, 50 Wis. 58. 'Byrom «. Chapin, 113 Mass. 308. 8 Whorton -o. Webster, 56 Wis. 356. 'Guthrie v. Kahle, 46 Pa. St. 331. "Moses V. Johnson, 88 Ala. 517. See, also, Harrill v. Stapleton, 55 Ark. 1. CHAPTER XI. ESTATE BY CXJRTESt Article 1. Nature and Effect. % 340. Definition. § 346. In Reversion and Remainder. § 341. Origin of Curtesy. § 347. Alienation of His Estate of § 842. Seisin of tlie Wife. Curtesy — Divokce. § 343. Birtli of Child. § 348. Execution Sale of Curtesy. § 344. In Equitable Estates. § 349. Sale of the Estate. § 345. In Determinable Fees. 340. Definition. — Curtesy is an estate by common law which a man is entitled to, on the death of his wife, in the lands or tenements of which she was seised in possession in fee simple or in tailduring their coverture, provided they have had lawful issue born alive which might have been capable of inheriting the estate. It is a freehold estate for the term of his natural life, created by the act of the law. ' In the common law the word is used in the phrases, tenant by curtesy, or estate by curtesy, but seldom alone. In Scotland the word itself denotes the estate. An estate of tenancy by the curtesy arose: 1. Lawful marriage; 2, seisin of the wife; 3, birth of issue capable of inheriting; 4, the estate became consummate on the death of the wife, the tenant surviving.' It does not exist as at common law in Arizona Territory, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kan- sas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma Territory, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Washington and Wyoming. In Oregon and Pennsylvania the husband has curtesy whether there be issue of marriage or not. "McMasters «. Negley, 153 Pa. St. 303; Mild way's Case, 6 Rep. 41; Co Litt. 30a; 3 Bl. Com. 136. « Bozarth v. Largent, 128 111. 102. (371) 372 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 340 In Illinois and Ohio the husband has a dower interest, but no curtesy. After the birth of a child the husband's title to curtesy becomes possible, and the curtesy is then initiate. After the death of the wife the title becomes complete, and the curtesy is then consummate. In England curtesy has become practically infrequent by reason of the prevalence of marriage settlements exclud- ing such right. And in the United States it has no exist- ence now in over half of the States and Territories. Under the married woman acts, when the wife has the absolute control of her separate property, the husband has now only a modified tenancy in those States where tenancy is not abolished, dependent upon a contingency, and no estate vests in the husband during the life of the wife. It is an interest which may possibly ripen into something tangible in the uncertain future. The rationale of this is that the statute having in express terms given the wife the absolute control of her separate estate, as if she was sole, such an estate in the wife is wholly incompatible with the common law right of curtesy in the husband; therefore, the curtesy of the husband preserved by the statute in terms must be a modified curtesy, a curtesy which does not come into existence until the death of the wife, and which may be destroyed entirely by the act of his wife during her life, and the lien of the husband's creditors cannot attach to it until her death.' At common law, in a grant of an estate of inheritance ta a married woman, the husband's curtesy could not be excluded, and the same rule applies as to equitable estates.' In England the married woman's act of 1882 has not affected the right of a husband to an estate by the curtesy in the undisposed of real estate of his wife.' The right of tenancy by the curtesy can exist only in real estate, yet when money is treated in equity as real ' Colgan V. Pellens, 48 N. J. L. 27; Moore v. Darby (Del.), 18 At. Rep. 768; Jackson v. Jackson, 144 111. 274; Breeding v. Davis, 77 Va. 639; Alexanders. Alexander, 85 Va. 353; Browne v. Bockover, 84 Va. 424; McNeer v. Mc- Neer, 142 111. 388. ' Chapman v. Price, 83 Va. 392; MuUany v. MuUany, 3 Green Ch. (N. J.) 16, ' Hope V. Hope (1892), 2 Ch. 336. §§ 341-342] ESTATE BY CURTESY. 373 estate, the husband may have in the interest thereof a curtesy. ' Since the married women's acts in the United States, which provide that the married women's lands and all the rents and profits shall remain their separate property under their sole control, and shall not be subject to the control of their husbands, or be Uable for their husbands' debts, the estate of tenancy by the curtesy initiate has become a mere expectancy, instead of a vested estate as at common law." There is no curtesy in leasehold estates; ' and curtesy may be lost by laches on the part of the husband.* § 841. Origin op Curtesy. — While there is a contro- versy as to the derivation both of the custom and its name, it is thought that the term is derived from curtis, a court, and that the custom, in England at least, is of Enghsh ori- gin, though a similar custom existed in Normandy and still exists ill Scotland. ' But it is held that curtesy was not of feudal origin; that it was granted to save the husband from falling into pov- erty, and comes from one of the rescripts of the Emperor Oonstantine." In the French law tenancy by curtesy is called droit de viduite. ' § 342. Seisin of the Wipe. — According to the English law the wife must have been seised in fact and in deed, and not merely of a seisin in law of an estate of inhei-itance. ' And in case of the descent of lands upon the wife, an en- try by the husband during coverture was necessary to ' Withers ». Jenkins, 14 S. Car. 597; Thornton v. Krepps, 37 Pa. St. 391; Hatfield -o. Sneden, 54 N. Y. 284; Northcut v. Whipp, 12 B. Mon. (Ky.) 65, 71; Evans v. Evans, 9 Pa. St. 190; Taliaferro ». Burwell, 4 Call (Va.), 321; Buck- •worth ». Thirkell, 3 Bos. & P. 652n. ' McNeer v. McNeer, 142 111. 388. 'Lewis V. Glass, 92 Term. 147. * Thomas tj. Hughes, 94 Ky. 620. •Wright on Ten. 192; Co. Litt. 80, a; 2 Bl. Com. 126; Litt. sect. 35. « Wright on Ten. 194; Craig's Jus Feudale, Law. 2, Dleg. 22, sect. 40; 2 Bl. Com. 126. ' 4 (Euvrea de D'Aguesseau, 660. 8 Co. Litt. 29, a; Mercer ». Selden, 1 How. (U. 8.) 37; Ellis ■». Dlttey (Ky ) 23 S. W. Rep. 366. 374 CLASSIFICATION- OF ESTATES. [§ 342 support his right to curtesy. The husband cannot be a ten- ant by the curtesy of the wife's estate in reversion or re- mainder, while there is an outstanding hf e estate not ter- minated; the interest must fall into possession before he acquires an inchoate right of curtesy. ' In the United States seisin in law, without actual entry is sufficient to give curtesy.' And an entry is unnecessary where the wife dies so soon after the vesting of the estate as to render it im- possible.' If the wife is the owner of waste, uncultivated lands not held adversely, she is deemed seised in fact, so as to entitle the husband to the right of curtesy.' In some of the States an actual entry is not required in case of adverse possession.' The severity of the common law on the right to curtesy is much relaxed, and a constructive seisin of the wife is sufficient to sustain the husband's right to his curtesy, where it is not rebutted by an actual disseisin." ' Co. Litt. 29, a; De Grey «. Richardson, 3 Atk. 469; Watklns v. Thornton, 11 Ohio St. 367; Malone v. McLaurin, 40 Miss. 161: Prater d. Hoover, 1 Cold. (Tenn.) 544; Shores i). Carley, 8 Allen (Mass.), 435; Planters' Banks. Davis, 31 Ala. 636; Gentry v. Wagstaff, 3 Dev. (K Car.) 370; Tayloe v. Gould, 10 Barb. (N. Y.) 388; Hitner v. Ege, 33 Pa. St. 305; Stoddard v. Gibbs, 1 Sumner, C. 0. 263; Keerl «. Fulton, 1 Md. Ch. 533; Mackey v. Proctor, 13 B. Mon. (Ky.) 433; Orford v. Benton, 36 N. H. 395; Ferguson v. Tweedy, 43 N. Y. 543; Gibbins V. Eyden, L. R. 7 Eq. 371; Moore «. Calvert, 6 Bush (Ky.), 356. 'Wass V. Bucknam, 38 Me. 356; Watkins ®. Thornton, 11 Ohio St. 367; Rabb V. Griffln, 36 Miss. 579; Stephens ». Hume, 35 Mo. 349; Childerso. Bumgardner, 8 Jones (N. Car.), 297, 298; Day «. Cochran, 24 Miss. 361, 376; Harvey v. Wickham, 33 Mo. 113, 115; Carru. Givens, 9 Bush (Ky.), 679; Jack- sou ». Johnson, 5 Cow. (N.Y.) 74; Chews. Commissioners, 5 Rawle (Pa.), 160; Mettler ». Miller, 129 111. 630. 5 Eager s. Furnivall, 17 Ch. D. 115. See, also, McKee «. Cottle, 6 Mo. App. 416; Withens v. Jenkins, 14 S. Car. 597. « Davis*. Mason, 1 Pet. (U. S.) 503; Jackson v. Sellick, 8 Jolins. (N. Y.) 263; Green ®. Liter, 8 Cranch (U. S.) 249; Clay «. White, 1 Mun. 162; Pierce v. Wanett, 10 Ired. L. (N. Car.) 446, (Va.) 163; Barr ®. Galloway, 1 McLean C. C. 476; McDaniel v. Grace, 15 Ark. 465; M'Oorry ». King, 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 267. Compare Neely ». Butler. 10 B. Mon. (Ky.) 48. ' Kline v. Beebe, 6 Conn. 494; Redus v. Hayden, 43 Miss, 624; Merritt v. Horne 5 Ohio St. 307; Borland ®. Marshall, 3 Ohio St. 308; Stoolfoos v. Jen- kins, 8 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 175. 'De Greys. Richardson, 3 Atk. 469; Sterling e. Penlington, 7 Viner, 149, pi. Ill; Ellsworth ». Cook, 8 Paige (N. Y.), 643; Mettler s. Miller, 139 111. 638; Adams «. Logan, 6 Mon. (Ky.) 175; Wells s. Thompson, 13 Ala. 793; Pierce ». Wanett, 10 Ired. (N. Car.) 446; Reaume v. Chambers, S3 Mo. 36. § 343] ESTATE BY CURTESY. 375 The marriage must be a lawful one; if void curtesy does not attach; if voidable, the husband will have curtesy, un- less it be actually void during the hfe of the wife. In some of the States a dissolution of the marriage takes away the right of curtesy. This is the law in Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachu- setts, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ehode Island and Vermont. Before curtesy was abolished, this was the law in Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri and Ohio. § 343. Birth of Child. — The husband becomes initiate upon the birth of a child, whether it was born before or after the acquisition of the estate; provided it was born alive, its death would not affect the right of curtesy. It is immaterial whether the issue be living at the time of the seisin, or at the death of the wife, or whether it was born before or after seisin.' But if the issue take as purchasers, the husband is not entitled to take by the curtesy. Thus, where there was a devise to the wife and her heirs, but if she died leaving issue, then to such issue and their heirs, the husband in such case would not be entitled to curtesy." The husband's right to curtesy takes precedenoe to any claim by descent of a son of the wife by a prior marriage." But in Michigan by statutory provisions this was changed.* The issue must be born alive and be able to take the in- heritance as her heir. So in case of a tail male, a female child would not satisfy the condition and the husband would not take curtesy. ' The child must have been born during the lifetime of the mother, as well as alive and capable of inheriting the estate. Hence, a child born after the death of its mother, by means of the Caesarian operation, is not a compliance '2 Bl. Com. 128; Guion v. Anderson, 8 Humph. (Tenn.') 307; Watson v. Watson, 13 Conn. 8!; Comers. Chamberlain, 6 Allen (Mass.), 166; Co. Litt. 29b; Paine's Case, 8 Co. 34. 'Barker v. Barker, 2 Sim. 249; Janney v. Sprigg, 7 Gill (Md.), 197. ' Heath v. White, 5 Conn. 236. *Hathon v. Lyon, 2 Mich. 93. 'Co. Litt. 29b; Day v. Cockran, 24 Miss. 261; Heath u. White, 5 Conn. 228. 376 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 344 with the common law rule, and the husband in such case, would not be entitled to curtesy.' In Oregon and Penn- sylvania the birth of a child is not necessary to give the husband curtesy." The issue must be born alive; ' and a child is born alive which, after being deHvered of its mother, makes a distinct effort to breathe while the umbilical cord is yet uncut, though no effort is made thereafter." § 344. In Equitable Estates.— At common law a hus- band could not have curtesy of a use. ' But in equity he may be a tenant by the curtesy of an equity of redemption, and of lands of which the wife has only a seisin in equity as a cestui que trust.' A tenant by curtesy has a right to redeem;' but where the mortgage contains covenants of both the husband and wife, of good right to convey seisin in fee, and of gen- eral warranty, and is sufficient to pass not only the estate of the wife but also the estate, right, and interest of the husband in the property which he has or may subsequently acquire, upon her death he takes an estate for life in the land as tenant by the curtesy, which under the covenants of the mortgage, inure to the benefit of the mortgagee and passed under a sale under a decree of foreclosure of the mortgage." If the mortgagee enters in the lifetime of the tenant for life, the tenant by the curtesy will be barred of his right to redeem after twenty years from such entry." If money be agreed to be invested in land for the wife, the money is considered in equity as land, and the husband > Marsellis «. Thalhimer, 2 Paige (N. T.), 42. « Dubs ». Dubs, 31 Pa. St. 154; Lancaster County Bank «. StaufEer, 10 Pa. St. 398. ' Nicrosi v. Phillipi, 91 Ala. 299. *GofE«!. Anderson, 91 Ky. 303. See, also, Ewell's Med. Jur., 111. Com- pare Doe ». Killen, 5 Houst. (Del.) 14. » Sugden's Gilbert on Uses, 48, 440. * Alexander v. Warrance, 17 Mo. 238; Rawlings v. Adams, 7 Md 26; Nor- man «. Cunningham, 5 Gratt. (Va.) 63; Balser v. Heiskell, 1 Coldw. (Tenn.) 641; Pierce®. Hakes, 23 Pa. St. 231; Watts e. Ball, 1 P. Wm. 108. 'Robinson ». Lakeman, 28 Mo. App. 135; Jones v. Meredith, 1 Bunb. 347. ^Bozarth v. Largent, 128 111. 108; Gochenour v. Mowry, 33 111. 331. « Anon. 2 Atk. 333. Compare Blake v. Foster, 2 Ball & Bea. 387, 575. § 344] ESTATE BY CURTESY. 377 will be allowed curtesy.' And if the wife's land be sold in partition after her death, the husband as tenant by curtesy will be entitled to the use of the proceeds for life, upon giving security for repayment at h'is death." The husband is tenant by curtesy if the wife has an equitable estate of inheritance, notwithstanding the rents and profits are to be paid to her separate use during the coverture. The receipts of the rents and profits is a sufficient seisin in the wife.' A gift of a fee simple estate, or a gift of a capital sum of money, to the separate use of a married woman, gives her the same power of alienation over it as if she were a single woman. This separate use is a creature of equity, and equity says the estate may be so limited to a married wo- man as that she can get rid of every possible interest of the husband. But if the married woman fails to dispose of it by deed or will, her husband will be entitled to curtesy therein; but where the married woman disposes of it, as she has a right to do, the husband's right to curtesy is lost." In Alabama, Kentucky, Maryland and Virginia, curtesy attaches to equitable estates as provided by statute, and this was the law in Mississippi before the abolition of cur- tesy. If lands be devised to the wife, or conveyed to trustees for her separate and exclusive use, and with clear and dis- tinct expression that the husband is not to have curtesy, but the same is to be for the wife and her heirs, he wiU be ' Casborne v. Scarfe, 1 Atk. 603; Sweetapple v. Bindon, 2 Vern. 536; Cun- ningham ». Moody, 1 Ves. 174; Dodson v. Hay, 3 Bro. C. C. 405; Chaplin v. Chaplin, 3 P. Wm. 229. ' Clepper ■». Livergood, 5 Watts (Pa.), 113. 8 Roberts «. Dixwell, 1 Atk. 607; Powell v. Gossom, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 179; Pitt V. Jackson, 2 Bro. C. C. 51; Morgan v. Morgan, 5 Madd. 248; Houghton «. Hapgood, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 154; Withers v. Jenkins, 14 8. Car. 597; Raw- lings V. Adams, 7 Md. 54. < Cooper V. MacDonald, 7 Ch. Div. 288, 300; Taylor v. Meads, 4 De G. J. & 8. 605; Ege v. Medlar, 82 Pa. 8t. 86; Gushing v. Blake, 30 N. J. Eq. 689; Archer v. Lavender, 9 Ir. R. Bq. 220; Tillinghast v. Coggeshall, 7 R. I. 383; Carter v. Dale, 3 Lea (Tenn.), 710; Nightingale v. Hidden, 7 R. I. 115. Compare Moore v. Webster, L. R., 3 Eq. 267; Appleton v. Rowley, L. R., 8 Eq. 139. 48 378 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 345 barred of his cuitesy." The rights coming from a mort- gagee are subject to the claims of the equity of redemption so long as the same remain in force. The husband of a mortgagee in fee is not entitled to his curtesy, though the estate becomes absolute at law, unless there has been a foreclosure, or unless the mortgage has subsisted so long a time as to create a bar to the redemption." If there is nothing abridging the rights of a husband in a conveyance of land to a wife, he will be entitled to cur- tesy." But if there be clear and distinct expressions that the husband is not to have a life estate, but the same is for the wife, as trustee in possession, a court of chancery will consider the husband as a trustee for the wife and heirs and bar him of curtesy.* And, in general, a wife having an equitable estate in fee, her husband will be entitled to his life estate at her death.' § 345. In Determinable Fees. — As a general rule, cur- tesy can only be commensurate with the estate of the gran- tee, and must cease with the determination of that estate. The derivative estate cannot continue longer than the primi- tive estate, cessante statu primitivo cessat derivativus. But if lands are given to a woman and the heirs of her body, and she marries and has issue which die, and then she dies without issue, whereby the estate of the wife is deter- mined, and the inheritance of the land reverts to the donor, yet the husband is entitled to hold the estate tail for life as 'Pool V. Blakie, 53 111. 495; Waters v. Tazwell, 9 Md. 291; Bennet ». Davis, 2 P. Wm. 316; Rtokes ®. McKibbin, 13 Pa. St. 267; Cochran «. O'Hern, 4 Watts & S. (Pa.) 95; Carter v. Dale, 3 Lea (Tenn.), 710; Clark ». Clark, 24 Barb. (N. Y.) 582; Hearle v. Greenbaak, 3 Atk. 695. Compare Dubs ii. Dubs, 31 Pa. St. 149; Nightingale «. Hidden, 7 R. I. 115; McTigue v. McTigue, 116 Mo.138. ' Chaplin v. Chaplin, 7 Viner, 156, pi. 33. 3 Luntz V. Greve, 102 Ind. 173. * Tyler n. Lake, 3 Russ. & Myl. 183; Massey ». Parker, 2 Myl. & K. 174; Wordle v. Claxton, 9 Sim. 524; Cushing ». Blake, 30 N. J. Eq. 689; Fears ». Brooks, 13 Ga. 195. See, also, Rautenbusch v. Donaldson (Ky.), 18 S. W. Rep. 536; Nicrosi v. Phillipi, 91 Ala. 299. Compare Smoot v. Lecatt, 1 Stew. (Ala.) 590; Chew v. Commissioner, 5 Rawle (Pa.), 160. 5 Dubs v. Dubs, 31 Pa. St. 149; Rank v. Rank, 120 Pa. St. 191; Carson ®. Fuhs, 181 Pa. St. 256. § 345] ESTATE BY CURTESY. 37& tenant by the curtesy, for that is implied in the gift.' And where an estate is devised to a woman in fee, with a devise over, in case she dies under the age of twenty-one, without issue, and she marries, has issue which dies, and then she dies, by which the devise over takes effect, the husband is entitled to curtesy.' There is a distinction between a condition and a limita- tion. If the wife's seisin be determined by a condition in deed expressly annexed to the estate, and the donor or his heirs enter for breach of the condition, the curtesy is de- feated, for the donor resumes his prior paramount title, and all intermediate rights are divested or destroyed. But a limitation merely shifts the estate from one person to an- other and leaves the prior seisin undisturbed. The limita- tion over takes effect, and the estate next in expectancy vests without entry, and the curtesy is preserved. But if it be a conditional limitation, the curtesy will be defeated, for the conditional limitation cuts off or produces a deter- mination of the estate upon which it operates. But the cases of an estate tail determining by failure of issue, and of a fee determining by executory devise or springing use, are exceptions to the general rule, denying curtesy or dower after the determination of the piincipal estate.' It is diffi- cult to see why the equity of a tenant by curtesy, of the grantee of a limitation over in a conditional limitation, should be superior to the equity against the heir of the grantor, who takes the property upon the determination of an estate upon limitation or estate upon condition. Mr„ Butler says, in speaking of limited fees, which by grant are to contiime only to a certain period, that curtesy and dower wiU continue after the expiration of the period to whicli the 'Nortbcut V. Whipp, 13 B. Mon. (Ky.) 65; Webbs. Cburcb, 90 Ky. 117; Paine's Case, 8 Co. 34. 'Buckworth v. Thirkell, 3 Bos. & P. 658, note. See, also, Evans d. Evans, 9 Pa. St. 190; Tbornton ». Krepps, 37 Pa. St. 391; Moody v. King, 3 Bing, 447; Hatfield v. Druden, 54 N. Y. 385; Grant v. Townsend, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 554 Wright V. Herron, 6 Rich. Eq. (S. Car.) 406; 5 Rich. Eq. (S. Car.) 441. Com- pare Weller v. Weller, 38 Barb. (N. Y.) 588; Withers d. Jenkins, 14 S. Car. 597, 611. « McMasters v. Negley, 152 Pa St, 303: Buckworth v. Thirkell, 3 Bos. & P. 653, note; Butter's Note. 170, lo Co. Litt. 341a; Roper ou Hmb. iiiid Wife, c. 1, sect. 5; 3 Preston on Abstr. of Title, 384; Park on Dower, pp. 173, 186. 380 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 346 fee was to continue. But where the fee was originally cre- ated by words importing an absolute fee, and by subsequent words was made determinable upon some peculiar event, then the curtesy and dower cease with the estate to which the event is annexed. Lord Mansfield, to evade this doctrine decided in Buckworth v. Thirkell, that the case was one of contingent, and not of a conditional limitation. Such technical subtleties are not sufficiently intelligible for practicable use, and the distinction is not clear and pre- cise or based upon any sound principle. In South Carolina, where fees conditional are recog- nized and have never been changed by the statute de donis conditionalibus, a husband was entitled to hold curtesy in fees conditional.' The effect of limitation over to defeat curtesy is ably stated by Chief Justice Paxson. He says that if the estate of the wife be an estate of inheritance, determined by lim- itation which operates to defeat her estate at common law, the right of curtesy is gone. But if the limitation over be by way of springing use or executory devise which takes effect at her decease, thereby defeating or determin- ing her original estate before its natural expiration, and substituting a new one in its place, which could not be done at common law, the seisin and estate which she had of the fee simple or fee tail will give the husband curtesy.' If the wife has no descendible estate in the land, upon her death the heirs of her grantor will be in by operation of law for condition broken, and the husband wiU not be entitled to curtesy.* § 346. In Eeversion and Remainder. — A husband has no curtesy in lands in which his wife had only a remainder, expectant on a prior estate which did not determine during the coverture. ' If there be an outstanding estate for life the husband cannot be the tenant by the curtesy of the ' 3 Bo3. & P. 652. ^ Odom V. Beverly, 32 S. Car. 107. ' McMasters v. Negley. 153 Pa. St. 303; McMasters v. Feltyberger, 152 Pa. St. 313. 'McMasters c. Negley, 152 Pa. St. 30a » Todd v. Oviatt, 58 Conn. 174. § 347] ESTATE BY CUETESY. 381 wife's estate in reversion or remainder unless the particular estate be ended during coverture.' The particular estate must determine during coverture, or be merged in the reversion by coming into the same hands.' The abolition of the common law maxim, non jus sed seisina facit stipitem, — it is not the right but seisin that makes the stock — in modern times does not logically deter- mine the right of the husband to curtesy in a remainder which could not by possibility have vested in possession during coverture. Either actual or legal seisin is an in- dispensable requisite to title by the curtesy; so the husband cannot have curtesy in lands in which the wife had onlj* a remainder expectant on a prior estate which did not deter- mine during the coverture. The particular estate must determine during coverture.' A man is not entitled to tenancy by the curtesy, nor a woman to dower out of a reversion or a remainder expect- ant upon an estate of freehold,* but upon a reversion expect- ant upon an estate for years both of these rights accrue; for the possession of the tenant for years constitutes a legal seisin of the freehold in reversion. ' § 347. Alienation of His Estate op Curtesy — Di- VOECE. — At common law the husband may forfeit his curtesy by a wrongful alienation, or by making a feoff- ment, or levying a fine importing a grant in fee, suffering a common recovery, joining the mise in a writ of right, or by any other act tending to the disherison of the re- versioner or remainderman." But an alienation for the 'Reed t. Reed, 3 Head (Tenn.), 491; Malone v. McLaurin, 40 Miss. 161; Planters' Bank v. Davis, 31 Ala. 626; Adams d. Ligan, 6 Mon. (Ky.) 175; Medley v. Medley, 27 Gratt. (Ya.) 568; Stoddard «. Glbbs, 1 Sumner, C. C. 263; Watkins s. Thornton, 11 Ohio St. 367; Moody o. King, 2 Bing. 447; Ferguson d. Tweedy, 43 N. T. 548; Shores v. Carley, 8 Allen (Mass.), 425; Brooks v. Everett, 13 Allen (Mass.), 457; Fisk v. Eastman, 5 N. H. 240: Orford v. Benton, 36 N. H. 395; Hitner v. Ege, 23 Pa. St. 305; Does. Rivers, 7 Term R. 272; Robertson v. Stevens, 1 Ired. Eq. (N. Car.) 247. »Doe D. Scudamore, 2 Bos. & P. 294; Plunket v. Holmes, 1 Lev. 11. ' Schaeffer v. Messersmith, 10 Pa. Co. Ct. 366. * Shores v. Carley, 8 Allen (Mass.), 425; Webster v. Ellsworth, 147 Mass. 602. 'Stoughton B. Leigh, 1 Taunt. 410; De Grey v. Richardson, 3 Atk. 470;. Goodtitle v. Newman, 3 Wils. 521. ' Co. Litt. 251, a, b; 2 Inst. 309; Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. I. c. 7. S82 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [8 SJ-g life of- the tenant himself did not work any wrong' and passed only his interest." Divorce by the husband for the wife's fault, puts an end to the marital relations by absolutely dissolving the bonds of matrimony, and thus renders it impossible for the hus- band's right as tenant by the curtesy to ever become con- summate.' In other words the divorce cuts off and des- troys the husband's right as tenant by the curtesy, unless the right is preserved to him by statute." § 348. Execution Sale of Curtesy.— A husband's es- tate of curtesy can generally be sold on execution to pay his debts. Thus, notwithstanding the homestead right of children the curtesy of the husband can be sold to satisfy his debts ; but in Arkansas the right of enjoyment of the purchaser being postponed until the termination of the children's minority.' When the estate of curtesy is once vested, it becomes liable to his debts, and cannot be divested by his disclaimer,' and can be sold on execution at law.' In North Carolina curtesy initiate cannot be sold to satisfy a judgment against him;' and this is the general rule; and it is held that a judgment against a husband is not a lien on lands devised to a wife, for such title cannot be taken in execution.' A voluntary settlement of that curtesy upon the wife by the husband is void as to his creditgrs ; '" and she cannot ' 3 Inst. 309. ' Flagg «. Bean, S5 N. H. 63; Dennett v. Dennett, 40 N. H. 505; Boykin ». Rain, 38 Ala. 333; French v. Rollins, 31 Me. 373; Meraman v. Caldwell, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 33. ' Gould V. Crow, 57 Mo. 304; Burgess ». Muldoon (R. I.). 39 At. Rep. 398. * Barrett «. Failing, 111 U. S. 534; Burgess v. Muldoon (R. I.), 39 At. Rep 298. 'Littell«. Jones (Ky.), 19 S. W. Rep. 497; Thompson v. King, 54 Ark. 9. « Watson ®. Watson, 13 Conn. 83. ' Canby s. Porter, 13 Ohio, 79; Litchfield ®. Cudworth, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 33; Days. Cochran, 24 Miss. 261; Roberts v. Whiting, 16 Mass. 186; Lancaster County Bank «. StaufEer, 10 Pa. St. 398. « Bruce v. Nicholson, 109 N. Car. 302. « Evans v. Lobdale, 6 Houst. (Del.) 313. ■» Van Duzer v. Van Duzer, 6 Paige (N. T.), 366; Wickes v. Clarke, 8 Paige (N. Y.), 161. § 3i9] ESTATE BY CURTESY. 383 devise it by his consent in writing.' In Massachusetts she can devise it as provided by statute.' Where the husband has curtesy and the wife has devised her entire estate to him for life, it will be presumed that he too holds as tenant by curtesy, and during the life of the children the land cannot be sold on judgment for his debts.' § 319. Sale op the Estate. — Where land in which one has an interest as tenant by the curtesy is sold, the fund represents the land, and the tenant by the curtesy is en- titled to interest thereon during his life." Because, if the estate had not been sold, he, as tenant by curtesy, would have been entitled to its possession and to the receipts of the rents and profits.' When sale is had by order of court, the court of equity under its general power may make an order providing for the payment of the fund to the husband, with or without his giving security for its safe keeping during his life, or provide for its investment and the payment of the interest thereon to him for the terra of his hfe." But generally, before making an order for such security, there must be some fact alleged and proved tending to show the property would be unsafe and insecure in the hands of the tenant for life.' The rights of heirs to such fund arising from a sale of lands by the father as tenant in curtesy attach immediately on his death with interest from that time, and his estate cannot be discharged until payment in full.' 'Middleton v. Steward, 47 N. J. Eq. 293. «SiIsby V. Bullock, 10 Allen (Mass.), 94. » Sill V. White, 62 Conn. 430. *Sweetapple ». Bindon, 3 Vern. 536; CunnlngliuniD. Moody, 1 Ves. Sr. 174, 177; Dodson v. May, 3 Bro. C. C. 405; Dunscomb v. Dunscomb, 1 Johns. Ch. {N. Y.) 508; In re Camp, 126 N. Y. 377. 'Halfield v. Sneden, 54 N. Y. 280; Bertles v. Nunan, 92 N. Y. 152, 160. « In re Camp, 136 N. Y. 377; Covenhoven v. Shuler, 2 Paige (N. Y.), 133, 133; Tyson v. Blake, 23 N. Y. 558; Smith v. Van Ostrand, 64 N. Y. 378, 381; Livingston v. Murray, 68 N. Y. 485. 'Hudson V. Wadsworth, 8 Conn, 348; Langworthy v Chadwick, 13 Conn. 42; Clarke ». Terry, 34 Conn. 176. «In re Urian, 11 Pa. Co. Ct. 495. 384 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 350 Article 2. Married WomarCs Separate Estate. § 350. At Common Law. § 353. Alienation Under the Statute. § 351. Wife's Separate Estate. § 354. Abolition of Curtesy— Retro- § 852. Alienation of Her Separate active Legislation. Property at Common Law. § 350. At Common Law. — At common law in a grant of an estate of inheritance to a married woman, the hus- band's right to curtesy could not be excluded. ' And so with respect to the ordinary equitable estates of married women, as where lands have been given to trustees in fee upon trust for a married woman and her heirs, or for a single woman in fee, who afterwards marries, they fall within the reason and are governed by the same rule as legal estates, and, therefore, in any case where the husband would be tenant by the curtesy at law he will be so in equity.' At common law upon marriage the husband becomes entitled to a freehold in his own right in the real estate of his wife; it is a subject upon which a devise of the wife cannot operate." Nor is this right affected by the fact that in consequence of his cruelty, the wife has been com- pelled to separate from him.* The husband is entitled to the possession and manage- ment of his wife's real estate and to receive the rents and profits thereof ;' and this is the rule, though the lands are held by her in joint tenancy.' If the rents are due and uncollected at his death, the husband's personal representatives are entitled to them in ' Mildway's Case, 6 Rep. 41; Clancy on Rights of Women, 191; Mullany v. MuUany, 3 Green Ch. (N. J.) 16. 'Morgan v. Morgan, 5 Madd. 410; Watts v. Ball, 1 P. Wm. 109; 1 Mionor's Inst. (3d Ed.) 352; Chapman «. Price, 83 Va. 393. 'Clarke's Appeal, 79 Pa. St. 376; 1 Bl. Com. 442. ^ Van Note «. Downey, 4 Dutch. (N. J.) 219. 'Nunn V. Givhan, 45 Ala. 370; Shaw v. Partridge, 17 Vt. 626; Jones v. Pat- terson, 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 572. « Bishop V. Blair, 36 Ala. 80; Royston v. Royston, 31 Ga. 161. § 351] ESTATE Br CURTESY. 385 preference to the widow.' While living, he alone is author- ized to sue for the accruing rents.' The husband may convey this estate by his own deed to another;' but on the termination of the coverture the wife will be remitted to her right by action to recover the pos- session.* He has no right to commit waste on lands held by cur- tesy;' nor can he incumber his wife's property without her consent." In all actions where his freehold and the inheritance are affected, the actions must be brought in their joint names ' § 351. Wife's Separate Estate.^ — But as to a married woman's separate estate, the same may be so limited as to give her the inheritance and to exclude the husband from the curtesy. ° The power of alienation by deed inter vivos, or by will, is an incident to the separate estate, and, if not expressly or impliedly restricted, always exists in a married woman just as if she were sole; and if exercised, effectually excludes her husband's rights by curtesy or otherwise,' if not controlled by statute. No particular phraseology is necessary to create a separate use. The words, "to have and to hold in her own ^ight, free from any claims or demands from her hus- ' Shaw V. Partridge, 17 Vt. 636. 'Mattocks V. Stearns, 9 Vt. 326; Babb c. Perley, 1 Me. 6; Fairchild v. Chastelleux, 1 Pa. St. 176. 'Trask ». Patterson, 29 Me. 499; Co. Litt. 326a; Robertson ». Norris, 11 Q. B. 916; M'Lain «. Gregg, 2 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 454; Mitchell v. Sevier, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 146. Compare Walsh ». Young, 110 Mass. 396; Evans v. Lobdale, 6 Houst. (Del.) 212; Bruce v. Nicholson, 109 N. Car. 202. 'Coleman v. Satterfield, 2 Head (Tenn.), 259; Junction Railroad Co. a. Harris, 9 Ind. 184; Melius v. Snowman, 21 Me. 201; Bruce v. Wood, 1 Met. (Mass.) 542. 'Porch V. Fries, 18 N. J. Eq. 204. « Dearie v. Martin, 78 Pa. St. 55; Knott «. Carpenter, 8 Head (Tenn.), 542- Pell tJ. Cole, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 252. 'Babb V. Perley, 1 Me. 6; Hall v. Sayre, 10 B. Mon. (Ky.) 46; Melvin n. Proprietors, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 165; Co. Litt. 67a; Coe v. Manuf Co 35 Conn 175. • Chapman v. Pj-ice, 83 Va. 393. » Taylor v. Meads, 4 DeG. J. & S. 605; Justis v. English, 30 Gratt (Va ) 571 49 386 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 352-353 band or any person or persons claiming under, through or against him in any way, now or at any time hereafter," are sufficient.' These words, "to her sole and separate use," are generally used." § 352. Alienation of Her Separate Property at Com- mon Law. — At common law the court of chancery in Eng- land allowed the wife to join with her trustee and aliene her separate property, and thus prevent her estate going to the husband for life. She could thus in her lifetime aliene her separate estate before her death, and thus defeat the tenancy by the curtesy of the husband. So he really had no curtesy initiate in her separate property. But if she died before selling her property, he took his curtesy as it then became consummate. And under the com- mon law rule this doctrine was upheld in Alabama, Connecticut, Greorgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, and Vermont. But in these States where the common law curtesy pre- vailed there could be restrictions placed upon her power of alienation, or to anticipate the income thereof, in order to render null the undue influence of her husband in persuad- ing her to sell so that he could obtain the proceeds. In Mississippi, Pennsylvania, Ehode Island, South Caro- lina, Tennessee, and Virginia no alienation of the wife's separate estate could be made by her or her trustee, unless she had a special power to aliene granted to her, thus defeating any undue influence of the husband over the wife in the disposing of her property. But statutory provisions now regulate the wife's separate property in every State, and the strict common law right of curtesy exists in but few States. § 353. Alienation Under the Statute.— In the follow- ing States the wife cannot alienate her real property or interest therein without her husband joining in the con- veyance, and it is not subject to the liabilities of her hus- band: Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, ' Chapman v. Price, 83 Va. 392. 'TrittB. Colwell, 31 Pa. St. 328; Fears v. Brooks, 12 Ga. 195; Welch v. Welch, 14 Ala. 76. § 354r] ESTATE BY CURTESY. 387 Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mary- land, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hamp- shire, New Jersey, New Mexico Territory, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Ehode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and West Virginia. In the following States a married woman may sell and convey her separate real estate the same as if she was a feme sole, and it is not subject to the debts of her hus- band: Arizona Territory, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Michigan, Mis- sissippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma Territory, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming. § 354. Abolition of Curtesy — Ketroactive Legisla- tion. — At common law the husband has a right as tenant by the curtesy initiate in the wife's estate of inheritance the moment a child was born of the marriage who might by possibility become their heir to such estate. This right is property, subject to conveyance and to be taken for debts, and must be regarded as a vested right, no more subject to egislative interference than other expectant interests which have ceased to be a mere contingency and become fixed. But while it remains initiate the legislature may have full power to modify or even abolish it. ' This right initiate, it has been held, can be cut off by legisla- tion at any time before it becomes consummate by the death of the wife, but this is not the weight of authority. The better rule is at common law, and the one generally followed, that by the birth of a child the estate by the marital right is extended in duration to become an estate, not for the mere joint lives of the husband and wife, but for his own life, and in this enlarged estate it is not a mere possibility which is termed tenancy by the curtesy initiate, but is vested in the husband and cannot be cut off.' The weight of authority is that the estate of tenancy by the curtesy initiate, as it existed under the common law and ' Wyatt V. Smith, 35 W. Va. 810. 'Bishop V. Married Worn., sect. 43. 388 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES, [§ 354r before it was qualified by the modern statutes enlarging the rights of married women, was a vested estate and could not be destroyed by legislation which took effect after it came into existence. The authorities that hold differently fail to distinguish between the estate as it existed before the passage of the Married Women's Acts, and after the enactment of these laws. Under the Married Women's Acts, which provide that married women's lands shall remain their separate prop- erty under their sole control, and not to be subject to the control of their husbands, or be liable for their husbands'^ debts, the estate of tenancy by the curtesy initiate becomes a mere expectancy, instead of being, as at common law, a vested estate. Hence, an act which abolishes the estate by curtesy is constitutional as applied to those who, at the time of its passage, have only an estate by the curtesy initiate under the " Married Woman's Acts," since a mere expectancy may be taken away by the legislature.' 'McNeer «. McNeer, 143 lU. 388; Jackson v. Jackson, 144 111 274. CHAPTER XII. BIGHT OF DOWEK. Article 1. Nature and Effect. % 355. Definition. § 366. § 356. Origin. § 357. Requisites. § 367. g 358. Marriage Laws of Another § 368. State. § 369 § 359. Non-Resident Widows. I 360. Leasehold Estates. § 370. §361. Base Fees. §371. § 362. Seisin of Husband. § 373. § 363. Intermediate Freehold Estate. § 373. § 364. Incorporeal Hereditaments. § 374. § 365. Instantaneous Seisin. § 375. Vendor's Lien and Purchase- Money Mortgage. In the Equity of Redemption. Surplus. Obligation of the Executor or Administrator. Use of Mines. Partnership. Equitable Estates. Conveyance by Husband. Trust Estate. Inseparable Property — Rents. § 355. Definition. — Dower exists where a man is seised of an estate of inheritance and dies in the lifetime of his wife. In that case she is at common law entitled to be en- dowed for her natural life, of a third part of all the lands whereof her husband was seised, either in deed or in law, at any time during coTerture, and of which any issue which she might have had, might by possibility have been heir.' Before entry the widow has only a right which must be conveyed by release, and that to a person having the free- hold in possession of the lands, for to him only can a re- lease of her right be made. After entry she is seised of an ■estate of freehold, which she may convey to the person im- mediately in reversion, by a deed of surrender, or to a stranger by any mode of conveyance by which a freehold may be transferred." In the United States common law dower has been abol- ished in many States. It exists in the following States : "Litt. sect. 36. ' Watkins on Convey. 87. (389) 390 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 355 Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana^ Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. In Illinois and Ohio the husband is allowed dower in the wife's property the same as she is in her husband's property. And in Texas, where it is said dower never existed, the statute provides that the surviving husband or wife shall be entitled to an estate for life, in one-third of the land of the intestate, with remainder to the child or children of the intestate. Dower never existed, has been abohshed, or greatly modi- fied in the following States : Arizona Territory, CaUfornia, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Min- nesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma Territory, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. In New Mexico an act of Congress' may give the right of dower, but the statute has never been interpreted ; but there is no law of the Territory giving dower. In Wyom- ing several decisions of the Supreme Court decide that there is no right to dower in that State, but an act of Con- gress, when Wyoming was a Territory gave a dower right. In California, Louisiana, and Texas, upon the death of either husband or wife, one-half of the community property goes to the survivor, and the remainder to the children of the deceased. That is, a marriage is a kind of partnership, and at its dissolution the husband and wife each take back what they put into the business; and the profits, without any reference to the amount of the capital contributed by either, are equally divided. This doctrine is in accord with the French and Spanish civil law. It is held that the inchoate right of dower during the life time of the husband is not an estate in land, it is not even a vested right, but a mere intangible, inchoate, contingent expectancy. The law regards it as in the nature of an in- ' 34 U. S. Stat 638. § 355] RIGHT OF DOWER. 391 cumbrance on the husband's title." It has been held by some courts as a vested right," and a right arising by contract.' Again this right has been called an expectancy or possibility,* a contingent interest in real estate,' not an estate," but a mere contingent right.' Many cases hold that inchoate dower is a valuable right,' having many of the incidents of property; ' that its present value can be computed,'" though other cases hold a contraiy doctrine." It has been held a valuable consideration for a conveyance to the wife." And a wife may maintain an action for its protection ; '" she can redeem a mortgage covering it ; " and such a claim is an incumbrance within the covenant against incumbrances.'" The decisions cannot be reconciled. But it is generally held that, until dower has been assigned the widow has nothing in the land of which an estate can be predicated, and that her right is a mere chose in action." ' Smith V. Howtll, 53 Ark. 279; Hill v. Ressegieu, 17 Barb. (N. T.) 162; Hawley v. Bradford, 9 Paige (N. T ), 200 ; Shearer v. Banger, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 447; Heinsen v. Heinsen, 145 111. 658. » Dunn V. Sargeant, 101 Mass. 336; Sutton v. Askew, 66 N. Car. 172. ' Johnston v. Van Dyke, 6 McLean, C. C. 422. Compare Boyd v. Harrison, 36 Ala. 588. * Randall v. Kieiger, 23 Wall. (U. S.) 137. » Simar «. Canaday, 53 N. Y. 298. "State V. Wincroft, 76 N. Car. 38. ' Johnston v. Van Dyke, 6 McLean, C. C. 422. e Miller v. Crawford, 32 Gratt. (Va.) 287; Simar v. Canaday, 53 N. Y. 293; B«llard v. Briggs, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 533. ' Buzick V. Buzick, 44 Iowa, 259. '"Jackson v. Edwards, 7 Paige, (N.Y.), 386; Gore v. Townsend, 105 N. Car. 228; Strayer v. Long, 86 Va. 557; Buzick v. Buzick, 44 Iowa, 259; Stoppel-. bein «. Schultz, 1 Hill (S. Car.), 130. " Moore v. Mayor, 8 N. Y. 110; ReifiE v. Horst, 55 Md. 42. " BuUard v. Briggs. 7 Pick. (Mass.) 538. "Petty V. Petty, 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 215; Burns v. Lynde, 6 Allen (Mass.), 305; Simar v. Canaday, 53 N. Y. 298; Bissell v. Taylor, 41 Mich. 702. '* Davis V. Wetherell, 13 Allen (Mass.), 60. "Bigelow ». Hubbard, 97 Mass. 195; Smith v. Cannell, 33 Me. 123; Russ v. Perry, 49 N. H. 547; Thrasher v. Pinckard, 23 Ala. 616. Compare Magwire V. Riggin, 44 Mo. 513. '« Wade V. Miller, 32 N. J. L. 296, 306; Heissen v. Heissen, 145 111. 658, overruling Crum v. Sawyer, 132 111. 443, on this point. 392 CLASSIFICATION OF BSTATES. [§ 356 1 356» ORiaiif. — This provision of the common law was intended for the sure and competent support of the widow, and the better nurture and education of the children.' The custom of the ancient Germans is probably the ori- gin of the right of dower, which was carried by the north- ern barbarians into their extensive conquests; and when permanent interests are acquired in land, the dower of the widow was extended and applied to real estate, from prin- ciple and affection. In the customs of the ancient Germans dotem non uxor marito, sed uxori maritus offert.* The same custom existed among the Goths, and was incorporated into the laws of the Visigoths and Burgund- ians. Among the Anglo-Saxons there were no traces of dower until the Norman conquest.' Bouvier says dower comes from doner, to endow.* And Spelman deduces dos from the French douaire. The law of dower, in the mode of endowing ad ostium ecclesice was limited to the third part of the freehold lands which the husband held at the time of the marriage.' In its modei'n sense it applies to aU lands of which the husband is seised during coverture. This application and mode have con- tinued in the English law, but in the United States it has been modified in some of the States, abolished in others, and never adopted at all in other States. The origin of dower is of great antiquity and its his- tory has not been traced.' While there are several kinds of dower, the common law dower is the only one that is known in the United States,' with this exception : the English decisions define dower as a provision which the law makes for a widow out of the lands or tenements of her husband for her support and the nurture of her chil- ■ Co. Litt. 30 b; Fleta, Lib. 5, c. 23, sect, 2. ' Tacitus, de Mor. Germ. c. 18. '2 Bl. Com. 120; Wright on Ten, 192. * Bouvier's L. Diet. •Glanville, Lib. 6, c. 1; Bracton, Lib. 2, c. 39, sect. 2; Fleta, Lib. 5, c, 24, Beet, 7. « Hill V. Mitchell, 5 Ark. 608; Comb.9 v. Young, 4 Yerg. (Tenn.) 218; 1 Scribner on Dow. sect, 1. 'Litt. sect. 51; Stewart's H. & W. sect. 245; 1 Scribner n Dower, sects. 5-11. § 357] BIGHT OF DOWEK. . 393 dren.' But in thft United States this rule must be modi- fied, where estates are small, and the policy of our laws is to distribute them with each generation, where dower is one of the positive institutions of the State, founded in policy, and the provision for the widow is a part of the law of distribution, and the aim of the statute is not subsistance alone, but provision commensurate with her husband's estate ; thus, woodlands may be cleared and cultivated and unopened mines opened and developed." § 35Y. — Requisites. — 1. Marriage; 2. seisin of the hus- band; 3. death of the husband. Dower will attach if the marriage is not absolutely void, and existing at the death of the husband; it belongs to a wife de facto, whose marriage is voidable by decree, as well as to a wife dejure. It belongs to a marriage within the age of consent, though the husband dies within that age.' But at common law a feme covert being an a lien could not be endowed.' But in England, any alien woman marrying a British subject becomes naturalized and can have her dower. ' And Congress' has provided that any alien woman marrying a citizen becomes a citizen, and therefore can have dower. And in those States where an alien can hold land the same as a citizen his widow will be endowed as other widows. But in some States aliens are not allowed to hold real estate, and, of course, there can be no dower interest. Because the power of the State to regu- late the tenure of real property within its limits, and the modes of acquiring and transferring real estate, and the rules of its descent, and the extent to which a testamen- tary disposition of it may be exercised by its owners, is undoubted. It is an established principle of law every- where recognized, arising from the necessity of the case, that the disposition of immovable property, whether by 1 Co. Litt. 30b; 2 Bl. Com. 130. » See sect. 370. ^Co. Litt. 33a; 2 Bl. Com. 130. *Co, Litt. 31b; Kelly v.. Harrison, 2 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 29. '7 and 8 Vict. c. 66. 6 U. S. Rev. Stat. sect. 1991 See, also, Kelly ». Owen, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 496; Leonard v. Grant, 6 Saw. C. C. 608; U. S. v. Kellar, 11 Biss. C. C. 314 50 894 . CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 358-359' deed, descent, or any other mode, is exclusively subject to the government within whose jurisdiction the property is situated." Where a void marriage has been annulled by judicial decree, the wife is not entitled to dower in real estate owned by the husband at the date of the decree." § 358. Marriage Laws of Another State. — The mar- riage must be vaHd, and is presumed to be until shown otherwise. The doctrine generally adopted and supported by reason and public policy is, that a marriage celebrated according to rites and ceremonies recognized by the laws of the country where the marriage takes place is valid everywhere.' The law of marriage is a part of the jus gentium, governed by the lex loci contractus, and recognized everywhere by civilized nations, with some exceptions, in- volving polygamy, incest and probably some other equally heinous crimes against the general recognized law of marri- age, and express prohibitory and invalidating words in a statute. It is a law of comity among the different States of this country.' This is the case where the parties being resi- dents of one State, for the sake of evading the law, go into another State, where such marriage is valid, are there married and immediately return and continue their place of residence: the marriage is valid there, and after the hus- band's death his widow is entitled to dower in his estate.' § 859. Non-Eesident Widows. — Some of the States have provided by statute that the widow shall not be entitled to an interest in lands conveyed by the husband when the wife, at the time of the conveyance, is a non-resident of the State. This law is valid, for it is competent for the legislature of any State to declare the mode and manner by which real ' United States v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315. « Price V. Price, 134 N. Y. 589. sHarral v. Harral, 39 N. J. Eq. 279, 387. * Smith V. Smith, 53 N. J. L. 307. * Van Voorhis ». Brintnall, 86 N. Y. 18; Moore®. Hegeman, 93N. Y. 521; Putnam v. Putnam, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 433; Medway v. Needham, 16 Mass. 157; Meister v. Moore, 96 U. S. 76; Ross v. Ross, 139 Mass. 243; Pearson®. Howey, 6 Halst. (N. J.) 18, 31; Smith v. Smith, 52 N. J. L. 207; Story Conf. L. sect. 123. § 360] EIGHT OF DOWER. 395 estate situate within the State may be transferred by the husband or by the husband and wife. Thus, although the right of dower has been abohshed in Kansas, the contin- gent interest of the wife in the real property of the hus- band is similar to dower in its inchoate state. Such a law is valid in Kansas, and is not repugnant to the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.' So, a woman residing out of the State at the time of her hus- band's death is not entitled to lands lying within the State, owned by him, but which he had conveyed without her joining in the deed.' Such a provision in the State statute is not in conflict with the Federal Constitution by discrim- inating against a non-resident. ° But when the sale of land is a scheme to perpetrate a fraud upon such non resident wife for the purpose of depriving her of her dower rights, this rule does not apply, and the wife will take dower in such lands.* But if the sale was to defraud his creditors, this does not entitle her to dower. ' § 360. Leasehold Estates. — At common law a lease of whatever duration is but a chattel.' Although a lease was denominated a chattel real to distinguish it from mere movables, it was not considered as real estate; it was not an estate of inheritance, but like other chattels went to the executor or administrator and not to the heir, and could not be the subject of dower.' Many of the States have given dower in personal prop- erty. The leasehold interests have the character and in- cidents of personal property as at common law, and stat- utes which govern the right to distribution and of dower in other personal property are applicable to them. ' ' Buffington v. Sears, 46 Kans. 730. 'Pratt V. TefEt, 14 Mich. 191; Ligare v. Semple, 33 Mich. 438; Atkins*. Atkins, 18 Nebr. 474; Thornburn v. Doscher, 33 Fed. Rep. 810. 'Bennett «. Harms, 51 Wis. 351; Buffington ». Sears, 46 Kans. 780; Connor «. Elliott, 18 How. (U. S) 591. . Hill, 29 N. H. 202; Tabele V. Tabele, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. T.) 45; Gibson v. Crehore, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 146. ^Durando v. Durando, 23 N. T. 331; Brooks v. Everett, 13 Allen (Mass.), 458; Blood v. Blood, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 80 ; Gardner v. Greene, 5 B. I. 104; Arnold v. Arnold, 8 B. Men. (Ky.) 203. 'Bates s. Bates, 1 Ld. Raym. 326. sBurris v. Page, 13 Mo. 358; Gillis v. Brown, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 388; Ware v. Washington, 6 Smed. & M. (Miss.) 737; Spangler ®. Stanler, 1 Md. Ch. 36. Compare Goodwin ». Goodwin, 33 Conn. 314. ■■ Purefoy v. Rogers, 3 Saund. 380. * Dudleys. Dudley, 76 Wis. 567; Browning v. Harris, 99111. 456; Young o. jyiorehead, 94 Ky. 608; Carter v. McDaniel, 94 Ky. 564 §§ 364-365] RIGHT OF DOWER. 399 wife is not entitled to dower in a contingent or executory- estate of inheritance where a possession or right of pos- session never vested in the husband during his hfetime.' So she can have no dower in a vested remainder' or rever- sion/ but this rule is different under the Alabama statute.* § 864:. iNCORPOEEAii Hereditaments. — Dower may be claimed out of incorporeal hereditaments, except annui- ties, not issuing out of land,' when they are estates of inheritance." She has dower in rents,' and in crops planted by her husband and growing at his death.' Dower attaches to all real hereditaments, such as rents, commons in gross or appendant, and piscary, provided the husband was seised of an estate of inheritance in the same.' But in these cases the wife is dowable only by reason of her right to be endowed of the estate to which they are appendant. § 365. Instantaneous Seisin. — A transitory seisin for an instant, when the same act that gives the estate to him conveys it out of him is not sufficient to give the wife dower.'" The land must be vested in the husband benefi- cially for his own use, and then instantaneous seisin is sufficient to give dower. " No length of time is required for the seisin to be in the husband, provided it be for his beneficial use. The vesting 1 Bush V. Bush, 5 Del. Ch. 145. 'Eldredge v Forrestal, 7 Mass. 253; Brooks v. Everett, 13 Allen (Mass.), 457; Watson v. Watson, 150 Mass. 84. 'Kellett «. Shepard, 139 111. 433; Strawn v. Strawn, 50 111. 33. See, also, Beaven v. Lancaster (Ky.), 31 S. W. Rep. 243; Crawl v. Harrington, 33 Nebr. 107. *Zachry v. Lockard, 98 Ala. 371. 'Co. Lltt. 32 a; 2 BI. Com. 133; Chase's Case, 1 Bland. Ch. (Md.) 337. «WeirD. Tate, 4 Ired. Eq. (N. Car.) 264; Chase's Case, 1 Bland. Ch. (Md.) 327; Stoughton v. Leigh, 1 Taunt. 410. ' Aubin V. Daly, 4 Barn. & Aid. 59. 'Ralston «. Ralston, 3 Greene (Iowa), 533. 'Co. Litt. 33 a; Park on Dower, 113. '« Co. Litt. 31b ; Gully ». Ray, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 107; Sneyd v. Sneyd, 1 Atk. 442. " Stanwood v. Dunning, 14 Me. 290. 400 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 366 for an instant is sufficient to give dower to his widow." But possession by a son of a portion of his father's land at the time of its allotment to his mother as dower is not such a seisin as will entitle his widow to dower if he dies before his mother.' § 366. Vendor's Lien and Purchase-Money Mort- gage. — A vendor's lien takes preference to a widow's dower' in those States where a vendor's lien is recognized.* In like manner, when land is conveyed and a purchase- money mortgage given back, the wife has no interest su- perior to that of the vendor or mortgagee, though she did not release her dower interest; she is endowable of the equity of redemption only; but against all besides she has an endowable right in the land.' So, where the land is conveyed to a husband, and at the same time mortgaged to a third person, who furnishes the purchase-money, the widow of the grantee will have no right of dower as against the mortgagee.' Where an unmarried man mortgages his real estate and then marries, his wife has a dower interest in the same as to all persons except the mortgagee. So a sec- ond wife, who survives her husband, is entitled to dower in lands mortgaged by him and his first wife.' If the equity of redemption has expired before the death of the husband she has no dower interest." ' 3 Bl. Com. 133; Gage v. "Ward, 35 Me. 101; McClure v. Harris, 12 B. Mon. (Ky.) 261; Douglass v. Dickson, 11 Rich. L. (S. Car.) 417. ' Carter v. McDaniel, 94 Ky. 564. s Johnson v. Cantrell, 92 Ky. 59. < Thompson ■». Coohran, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 73: Hugnnin d. Cochrane, 51 III. 303; McClure «. Harris, 13 B. Mon. (Ky.) 261; Warner «. Van Alstyne, 3 Paige (N. Y.), 513; Barnes v. Gay, 7 Iowa, 36; Price v. Hobbs, 47 Md. 359; Boyd V. Martin, 9 Heisli. (Tenn.) 383. » Hurst «. Dulaney, S7 Va. 444; Young v. Tarbell, 37 Me. 509; Jones «, Parker, 51 "Wis. 318; ClaAt). Munroe, 14 Mass. 351; George -v. Cooper, 15 W. Va. 666; Bullard v. Bowers, 10 N. H. 500; Stow v. Tiffl, 15 Johns. (X. Y.) 459; Insurance Co. v. Gisborne, 5 Utah, 319; Butler v. Thornburg, 131 Ind. 237; Dwenger v. Branigan, 95 Ind. 221; Carey «. Boyle, 53 Wis. 574; Bar- rett V. Lewis, 106 Ind. 130. * Clark ■». Munroe, 14 Mass. 351. See, also, Kaiser®. Lewbeck, 55 Iowa, 344 ' Shope V. SchafEner, 140 111. 470. 8 Shope V. Schaflner, 140 111. 470. § 367] RIGHT OF DOWER. 401 § 367. In the Eqxhty of Redemption. — lu England dower is a legal estate, so there is no dower interest in an equity of redemption.' In America the widow has dower in the equity of redemption, although she has re- leased her right of dower." But to redeem the land as against the mortgagee, she must pay the whole amount due on the mortgage.' And she can bid in the mortgaged land on the same conditions that her husband can.* She is en- titled to dower in any surplus that may be realized on fore- closure. " A widow can have dower in laud sold subject to a mort- gage, only by paying her ratable share of the sum neces- sary to discharge the mortgage, which will be an amount bearing the same proportion to the whole debt that the computed present value of her dower bears to the whole value of the land.' Foreclosure effectually divests her dower right, if she has joined in the mortgagee, and there is no surplus. "^ But if the time for redemption has not expired, she may redeem and take her dower.' A widow is not endowable of an equity of redemption in the District of Columbia.' The statutes of Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Nebraska, New York, ' Story's Eq. Jur. sect. 529. ' Snow V. Stevens, 15 Mass. 278; Leary v. Shaffer, 79Ind. 567; Titus v. Neil- son, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 452. ' McMahon v. Kussell, 17 Fla. 698, 705; Campbell v. Campbell, 30 N. J. Eq. 415; McCabe v. Bellows, 7 Gray (Mass.), 148; Graves ». Braden, 62 Ind. 93. ■« Walker v. Doane, 131 111. 27. •Berrall v. Hurd, 61 Mich. 608; Berrall v. Clark, 61 Mich. 624; Mandel v. McClave, 46 Ohio St. 407; Seibert v. Todd, 31 S. Car. 206; Hinchman«. Stiles, 9 K J. Eq. 454. 'Noffts V. Koss, 29 111. App. 301; Jones v. Gilbert, 135 III. 27. 'Roach V. Dion, 39 Minn. 449; Crawford v. Hazelrigg, 117 Ind. 63; Meyer ■D. Cahen, 111 N. Y. 270; Roan ». Holmes, 32 Pla. 295; Schweitzer v. Wagner, 94 Ky. 458; Butler v. Thornberg, 131 Ind. 237; Shope v. Schaffner, 140 111. 470; Johnson v. Watson, 87 111. 535. « ^Xrenholm v. Wilson, 13 S. Car. 174; Eaton v. Simonds, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 98; Hawley v. Bradford, 9 Paige (N.Y.), 300; Collins s. Torry, 7 Johns. (N.Y.) 378; Sparrow «. Kelso, 93 Ind. 514; Elder v. Robbins, 133 Ind. 303; New York Life Ins. Co. V. Mayer, 14 Daly, 318; 19 Abb. N. C. 73. See, also, Rea v. Rea, 63 Mich. 257; Lake v. Nolan, 81 Mich. 113; Wedge ». Moore, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 8. •In re Thompson, 6 Mackey (Dist. Col.), 536. 51 402 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 368 North Carolina, Oregon, West Virginia and Wisconsin provide that if lands are purchased by the husband during marriage, who gives a mortgage to secure the purchase- money, the widow has dower only in the equity of redemp- tion, if she did not join in the mortgage. And she will be entitled to dower in lands mortgaged by her husband before marriage, as against every one except the mortgagee or those claiming under the mortgage. She will be entitled to dower as against the purchaser of the mortgaged prem- ises at the administrator's sale, as he occupies the same po- sition as a purchaser from the husband. However, if the mortgage had been foreclosed, the mortgaged premises sold, and a title acquired under the mortgage sale, that will bar all dower rights.' § 368. Surplus.— The claim of the widow to dower in the surplus is well settled. If she would have been entitled to dower in the real estate she will be entitled to it in the sur- plus.' But before death of the mortgagor the wife of the owner of an estate, subject to a mortgage, has no claim to any part of the surplus, as against her husband or his as- signee in bankruptcy. ' In some States the inchoate dower right of the wife will be protected in the surplus, either by investing one-third of the proceeds of a mortgage sale to await the perfection or cessa- tion of such right, or by calculating the present value of her chance of surviving her husband and paying her at once such collateral sum.* But if a wife releases her dower right in a junior mort- gage, her dower right in the surplus arising from a sale under the first mortgage, passes to and vests in the junior mortgagee. ^ • Shope V. Schafifner, 140 111. 470. ' Chaifee ®. Franklin, 11 R. I. 578. See, also, "Wright s. Eose, 3 Sim. & Stu. 333. 3 Kauffman v. Peacock. 115 111. 214; Newhall «. Bank, 101 Mass. 428. 4DeWolf », Murphy, 11 R. I. 630; Denton ». Nanny, 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 618; Mills ». Van Voorhies. 23 Barb. (N. Y.) 125, 136; 30 N. Y. 413; 10 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 153; Vartie v. Underwood, 18 Barb. (N. Y.) 561, 564; Matthews v. Duryee, 4 Keyes (N. Y.), 525. ' De Wolf V. Murphy, 11 R. I. 630. g 869] EIGHT OF DOWER. 403 The surplus being the value and representation of the equity of redemption, the widow is entitled to be endowed of that,' provided her husband is dead." § 369. Obligation of the Executor or Administrator TO Redeem. — As has already been stated, in England, at common law, the widow is not entitled to dower in the lands of her husband, which she has joined in mortgaging in fee, unless the legal estate in the laud becomes again vested in the husband before death. This is because the right of redemption is a mere equitable title, and dower is claimed to be a strictly legal right, attaching only to a legal seisin. The American doctrine generally is not in accord with the English rule. In the United States the widow is entitled to dower in mortgaged lands against every one except the mortgagee and his assigns. ' But a question has arisen as to her right to require the executor or administrator to re- deem the land, set apart as dower from incumbrances there- on, which were created by mortgages executed by herself and husband, she only having released her right to dower in the land in legal form. It is held by one class of deci- sions that the personal estate of the husband is primarily liable for his debts, and that the widow can require his personal representative to apply the personal property to relieve the dower land from the incumbrances.* So it has been held that the wife's inchoate dower is property of sub- stantial value, and that, when land has been sold under a decree foreclosing a mortgage in the execution of which she has joined her husband and released her right of dower, she may have the value of her contingent right of dower in the ' Pickett «. Buckner, 45 Miss. 336; Matthews v. Duryee, 45 Barb. (N. Y.) 69; "Whitehead «. Middleton, 3 How. (Miss.) 696. 5 KaufEman v. Peacock, 115 111. 314. 'Hursts. Dulaney, 87 Va. 444; Insurance Co. v. Gisborne, 5 Utah, 319; Butler D. Thornburg, 131 Ind. 237. * Boynton v. Sawyer, 35 Ala. 497; Campbell v. Murphy, 3 Jones Bq. (N. Car.) 357; Creecy t». Pearce, 69 N. Car. 67; Mathewson v. Smith, 1 R. I. 33; Peckham «. Hadwen, 8 R. I. 160; Mandel v. McClave, 46 Ohio St. 407; Camp- bell V. Campbell, 30 N. J. Eq. 415; Harrow v. Johnson, 3 Met. (Ky.) 578; Mantz «. Buchanan, 1 Md. Ch. 303; Klinck v. Keokley, 2 Hill Ch. (S. Car.) 250; Henagan ». Harllee, 10 Rich. Eq. (S, Car.) 385, 404 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 370 entire proceeds of the sale ascertained, and the husband's interest therein exhausted to pay the debt secured by the mortgage before any part of her interest can be taken.' But the general rule is, where the statute does not control, that the widow is only entitled to dower in the surplus; it treats her dower interest, to the extent of the incumbrance, as extinguished by her joining her husband in the mortgage and releasing her dower right, and holds that she takes the land subject to the incumbrance, and is not entitled to have any part of the residue of her husband's estate appropriated to the payment of the mortgage debt in exoneration of her dower." And it may be stated as the general rule that a widow is not entitled to dower in the lands subject to the mortgage, where she has released her dower interest." § 370. Use op Mines.— The doctrine that a widow is not dowable of mining lands, unless, at the time of the hus- band's death, the mines had been opened comes from Eng- land. But the rule laid down in the early case* undoubt- edly had its origin in cases where the relation of landlord and tenant existed. A tenant who rents a farm cannot cut and sell the timber therefrom, convert the farm into a brickyard, open a stone quarry or sand pit, bore for oil, or mine for ore thereon, unless authority so to do is expressly given or arises by implication from the situation; but one who rents a piece of ground upon which there is an open quarry or sand pit or brick yard, or open mine, may quarry, take out sand, make brick, or operate the mine, unless there is either an express reservation, or some condition or circumstance which would operate as an implied restriction. ' Mandel v. McClave, 46 Ohio St. 407. See, also, Crawford o. Hazelrigg,, 117 Ind. 63. ' 1 Scribner on Dower (2nd Ed.) sects. 37-45; Piatt's Appeal, 56 Conn. 572; Hawley v. Bradford, 9 Paige (N. Y.), 200; Rossiter v. Cossit, 15 N. H. 38; Hastings v. Stevens, 29 N. H. 564; Hewitt v. Cox, 55 Ark. 225; Tabele v. Tabele, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. T.) 45; Titus v. Neilson, 5 Johns. Ch.. (N. Y.) 453; Evertson b. Tappen, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 497; Gibson v. Crehore, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 475; 5 Pick. (Mass.) 146; Trowbridge v. Sypher, 55 Iowa, 852; Daniel «. Leitch, 13 Gratt. (Va.) 195; Whitehead v. Cummins, 2 Ind. 58; Scott v. Hancock, 13 Mass. 162. 3 Hewitt V. Cox, 55 Ark. 225. < Stoughton »; Leigh, 1 Taunt. 402. § 370J BIGHT OF DOWER. 405 The question in that class of cases is one of interpreta- tion of the contract, of what was the use granted.' The widow is dowable of mines which had been opened at the death of the husband; and it is generally held that she cannot open new mines, even upon the land set apart to her as dower; that is to say, a widow is not dowable of mineral deposits where there is no opened mine." But this rule must be modified in this country, where estates are small, and the policy of our laws is to distribute them with each generation, where dower is one of the posi- tive institutions of the State, founded in policy, and the provision for the widow is a part of the law of distribu- tion, and the aim of the statute is not subsistence alone, but provision commensurate with the estate. Thus, a hus- band died possessed of land, which was not improved, and was wholly valueless for agricultural purposes or lumber- ing. Its principal value, and practically its sole value, was in deposits of iron ore contained in it. And it was held that the widow was entitled to dower rights in the royalties realized from the lease by the guardian of minor heirs of the mineral lands which were undeveloped at the time of her husband's death, and solely valuable for the minerals afterwards discovered therein. ° This is the correct doctrine in this country. And so when a case shall occur in which the lands assigned for dower cannot be made available for the reasonable support of the widow without converting a portion of the woodland to the purposes of cultivation, and in which upon an attempt being made thus to render it available, the reversioner shall insist upon a forfeiture, it must be decided upon consideration of the object of the law in establishing the right to dower, upon a comparison ' Kier v. Peterson, 41 Pa. St. 361. ^Leafer'sB. Henke, 73 111. 405; Hendrix v. McBeth, 61 Ind. 473; Freer ®. Stotenbur, 36 Barb. (N. Y.) 641; Gaines ». Mining Co., 33 N. J. Eq. 603; Crouch «. Puryear, 1 Rand. (Va.) 358; Clift «. Clift, 87 Tenn. 17; Findlay ■». Smith, 6 Munf. (Va.) 134; Sayers v. Hoskinson, 110 Pa. St. 473; Irwin ■». Covode, 34 Pa. St. 163; Neel -o. Neel, 19 Pa. St. 323; Moore v. Rollins, 45 Me. 493; Reed v. Reed, 16 N. J. Eq. 348; Billings «. Taylor, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 460; 1 Bish. Mar. Worn. sect. 364; 1 Scrib. on Dower (3nd Ed.), 300-206, Clift ». Clift, 87 Tenn. 17. ■" In re Seager Estate, 93 Mich. 186. 406 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 371 of its regard for the present comfortable sustenance of the widow with its care for the preservation of the inheritance, and upon a view of the actual condition of the estate and of the surrounding country with regard to improvements and population, whether the change of timbered into arable land is in the particular case such an act of waste as would be just cause of forfeiture.' The English authorities should not be followed. They define dower as a provision which the law makes for a widow out of the lands or tenements of her husband and for her support and the nurture of her children." The rules appli- cable to England where landed estates are large and diver- sified, where the laws of inheritance are exclusive, where the theory of dower is subsistence merely, and where there is a strong disposition to free estates from even that charge, should not obtain in the United States. So a widow should not be excluded from her dower in- terest in mineral lands which, at the death of her husband, are unimproved and unproductive, and are chiefly and solely valuable for the minerals contained in them. This doctrine is in accord with the interpretation of the statutes of the States providing for dower, though it is opposed to the English rule. But the mere possessory right given by the United States statute to the location of a mining claim is not such an estate that dower can be predicated thereon by State legislation as against the United States and its grantees.' § 371. Partneeship. — According to the American cases the mere circumstances that land is bought with joint, funds for partnership use is not regarded as sufficient to convert real estate into personalty after the partnership is closed and its affairs settled. Generally as between the personal representatives and heirs at law of a deceased partner, his share of the surplus of the real estate of the copartnership, which remains after paying the debts of the firm and adjusting all the equitable claims of the ' Hickman v. Irvine, 3 Dana (Ky.), 131. See, also, Gaines v. Mining Co., 33 N. J. Eq. 603. •Co. Liu. 30b; 3 BI. Com. 130. •Black V. Elkhorn Mining Co., 53 Fed. 859. § 372] EIGHT OF DOWER. 407 different members of the firm as between themselves is considered and treated as real estate.' And where there is an agreement between the partners for a conversion and sale of the lands after the dissolution of the firm, and for a distribution of the proceeds, equity regards the land as personal property, not only for partnership purposes, but for distribution as well, upon the principle that what the parties have directed to be done shall be taken as actually done.' But a widow will take her dower in the surplus of the real estate of the partnership in which her husband was a member, which remains after paying the partnership debts, for life as in real estate, and not absolutely, as in personal property under a statute giving dower in person- alty, unless there was an agreement between the partners for a conversion and sale of the lands after the partner- ship affairs should be settled and a distribution of the proceeds.' And where land is not held as partnership property, the widow has dower. * But no dower attaches when the partnership is insolvent. ' However, in Virginia the doctrine is that land bought with partnership funds for partnership purposes is so far considered as personalty that the widow of a deceased partner is not entitled to dower therein.' § 372. Equitable Estates. — A court of equity should apply the rules and incidents of legal estates to trust prop- ' Loubat V. Nourse, 5 Fla. 363; Lowe v. Lowe, 13 Bush (Ky.), 688; Shearer v. Shearer, 98 Mass. 107; Dilworth v. Mayfleld, 36 Miss. 52; Clay v. Freeman, 118 U. S. 97; Tillinghast v. Champlin, 4 R. I. 173; Campbell v. Campbell, 30 N J. Eq. 415; Hewitt ii. Rankia, 41 Iowa, 39; Bopp v. Fox, 63 111. 540; Simpsons. Leech, 86111. 386; Galbraith v. Gedge, 16 B. Mon. (Ky.) 631; In re Codding, 9 Fed. Rep. 849; Logan v. Greenlaw, 35 Fed. Rep. 299; McGrath V. Sinclair, 55 Miss. 89; Mallory v. Russell, 71 Iowa, 63; Trowbridge v. Cross, 117111. 111. 'Foster's Appeal, 74 Pa. St. 391; Lowe v. Lowe, 13 Bush (Ky.), 688. 'Lenow v. Fones, 48 Ark. 557; Mallory ■». Russell, 71 Iowa, 318; Young v. Thrasher, 115 Mo. 232; Free v. Beatley, 95 Mich. 426; Bopp v. Fox, 63 111. 540; Loubat v. Norris, 5 Fla. 350. *Ratcliflfe«. Mason, 93 Ky. 190; Shipp «. Snyder, 131 Mo. 155; Hughes v. Allen, 66 Vt. 95. ' Paige V. Paige, 71 Iowa, 318. 'Parrish v. Parrish, 88 Va. 539- Pierce «. Trigg, 10 Leigh (Va.), 406; Deer- ing V. Kerfoot, 89 Va. 491. 408 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 372 erty, and give the wife her dower in her husband's equit- able estates. But at common law the wife was not dow- able of a use, and trusts are now what uses were at the common law.' But in England, by a statute," dower was made to attach to equitable estates of inheritance in possession, other than estates in joint tenancy, and upon lands in which the hus- band, though he had no seisin, was entitled to a right of entry at his death. On the other hand, the wife was not entitled to dower in lands sold by the husband in his life time, or devised by will, or declared by will to be exempt from her dower. In the United States generally the widow is entitled to dower in both equitable and legal estates of her husband.' It has been held that there is no dower in a preemption right under the law," and also no curtesy in a preemption right. ' At common law, possession under an executory contract for the purchase of land does not give dower.' But in sev- eral of the States the widow has dower in lands which her husband has contracted to purchase, but died before the deed was delivered.' But an equitable seisin would be necessary, and if the trustee or legal owner denied and ' Dixon «. Saville, 1 Bro. C. C. 326; Maybury v. Brien, 15 Pet. (U. 8.) 38; Hamlin v. Hamlin, 19 Me. 141; Stelle v. Carroll, 13 Pet. (U. S.) 301. « 8 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 105. 5 Atkin V. Merrell, 39 111. 62; In re Pulling's Estate, 97 Mich. 875; Lawson •B. Morton, 6 Dana (Ky.), 471; Dubs v. Dubs, 31 Pa. St. 151; Hawley v. James, 5 Paige (N. T.), 318; Gully v. Ray, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 107; Smiley v. Wright, 2 Ohio, 512; Bowen v. Lingle, 119 Ind. 560. Compare Hamlin v. Hamlin, 19 Me. 141; Stelle ». Carroll, 12 Pet. (U. S.)201; Young v. Young, 45 N. J. Eq. 27. ■i Wells V. Moore, 16 Mo. 478; Bowers v. Keesecker, 14 Iowa, 301. Compare Davis V. O'Ferrall, 4 Greene (Iowa), 358. ' McDaniel v. Grace, 15 Ark. 465. « Morses. Thorsell, 78 111. 600; Latham v. McLain, 64 Ga. 330; Secrest v. McKenna, 6 Rich. Bq. (S. Car.) 73; Pritts v. Ritchey, 29 Pa. St. 71; Bowen v. Collins, 15 Ga. 100. 'Lobdell v. Hayes, 4 Allen (Mass.), 187; Reed v. Whitney, 7 Gray (Mass.), 533; Church v. Church, 3 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 434; Robinson i). Miller, 1 B. Mon. (Ky.) 93; Smiley v. Wright, 2 Ohio, 512; Hart v. Logan, 49 Mo. 47; Thompson v. Thompson, 1 Jones L. (N. Car ) 430. § 373] EIGHT OF DOWEE. 409 held adversely to the trust during the hfe of the cestui que trust, the latter's widow- would not have dower.' It is generally held that where there is a contract to pur- chase, and the purchaser has not paid the entire purchase - money in his life time and so has not become invested with the equitable fee, no right to dower attaches at his death." And so no right of dower exists in land which, at the time of marriage, the husband was under an equitable obliga- tion to convey.' In Maryland a contract by the husband to sell his equit- able estate wiU, in equity bar the claim of the wife for dower." Where the wife is allowed dower in the equitable estate of her husband, he must be in a position at the time of his death to enforce a conveyance of the legal title, or the contract of purchase must be such that the title can be completed after his death. ° § 373. Conveyance by Husband. — A conveyance by the husband of land when the wife's signing is necessary, does not convey her dower right. ° If the wife joins with her husband in the conveyance of his land to defraud his creditors, a court of equity will not aid in restoring to her an interest in the property which she actively aided her husband fraudulently to withhold from his creditors.' But she can question such conveyance and have her rights restored, although she joined in the deed, if she had no tnowledge of the intended fraud." A foreclosure sale will not estop her from claiming her dower when she did not join in the mortgage.' But if she ' Thompson «. Thompson, 1 Jones L. (N. Car.) 430; Sentiil v. Robeson, 2 Jones Eq. (N. Car.) 510. 'Greenbaum v. Austrian, 70 111. 591; Walters ®. Walters, 133 111. 467; Mor- gan V. Smith, 25 S. Car. 387; Crawl v. Harrington, 33 Nebr. 107. 'Hunkins v. Hunkins, 65 N. H. 95; Greene v. Greene, 1 Ohio, 535. "MoRaes. McRae(Md.), 37 At. Rep. 1038. Compare Bowie v. Berry 3 Md. Ch. 363. » Tink V. Walker, 148 111. 334; Porter v. Ewing, 24 El. 617. •Dayton v. Corson, 51 Minn. 406; Vinson «. Gentry (Ky), 31 S. W. Rep. 878; Goodrum v. Goodrum, 56 Ark. 583. ' Barrow «. Barrow, 108 Ind. 345; Noble v. Noble, 26 Ark. 317; Blair ■» Smith, 114 Ind. 114. « Kitts V. Willson, 130 Ind. 493. » Davis B. Townsend, 33 S. Car. 113. 52 410 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 374-375 acquiesces in the sale of the land as that of her husband she is estopped from claiming it as her own; but what is not sold she can claim a dower interest in as property of her husband. ' It is held that a wife has such an interest in land con- veyed by her husband during coverture, in which she did not join, as will make a release by her a valuable considera- tion." After the husband's sale the grantee can take possession though the wife has not released her dower." § 374. Trust Estate.— A wife of a trustee is not entitled to dower in the trust estate, any further than the hus- band has a beneficial interest therein.* And a widow is not entitled to an interest in a fund bequeathed to a trustee, the income to be paid to her husband during his lifetime, and at his death the principal to be paid over to other persons designated.' Whei'e land of a husband is sold by the sheriff during coverture, and the purchaser conveys it to a trustee in fee in trust for the wife of the judgment debtor, there is no such merger of legal estate as wiU destroy the wife's inchoate right of dower, but her right remains unaffected." Where a party has real estates in trust to sell and convert into money, the wife has no inchoate right of dower in the proceeds or in the real estate before sale.' § 375. Inseparable Property — Rents. — Dower is assignable to the widow in mines, quarries and the like, and she may enjoy the same either by an allotment by ' Jefleries ». Allen, 34 S. Car. 189. ^Hamlett «. Dilts (Ind.), 30 N. E. Rep. 313; Mandel v. McClave, 46 Ohio St. 407. ^ Deans v. Pate, 114 N. Car. 194. ^Hinton v. Hinton, 2 Ves. 631; Noel v. Jevon, 2 Freeman, 43; Brooks v. Everett, 13 Allen (Mass.), 458; King v. Bushnell, 131 111. 658; Dean v. Mitchell, 4 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 457; Prescott v. Walker, 16 N. H. 343; Bartlett v. Gouge, 5 B. Men. (Ky.) 153. ^ Watson's Estate, 139 Pa. St. 461, distinguishing Cochran v. O'Hern, 4 Watts & 8. (Pa.) 95; Dubs v. Dubs, 31 Pa. St. 149; Johnson v. Fritz, 44 Pa. St. 449. « Davis V. Townsend, 34 S. Car. 113. ' Hunter v. Anderson, 152 Pa. St. 386; Willing v. Peters, 7 Barr (Pa.), 287. § 376J EIGHT OF DOWEB. 411 metes and bounds, or by a share of the rents and royalties where mines are open, whether the same had been operated by her husband or by lessees paying rents or royalties on the mines. ' So if a husband died seised of a mill she may enjoy either a third toll dish, or one-third of the profits, or the entire mill every third month. So if a property be a ferry, one- third of the profits or a use of the ferry for a third part of the time in alternate periods should be set apart to the widow.' And where the thing is entire, as a house, the widow may be endowed of so many rooms, in which case passages and stairways may be enjoyed jointly with others.' Article 2. Divested and Barred. § 376. Conditional Limitation. § 386. Dower Given in Lands of § 377. Barred at Common Law. Which the Husband Died § 378. In the United States. Seised — Innocent Purchaser. § 379. Release and Estoppel. § 387. Postnuptial Agreement to Bar § 380. Conveyance by Widow Before Dower. Assignment. § 388. Void Conveyance. § 381. Conveyance of Land by Guar- § 389. Eminent Domain. dian of Husband. § 390. Judicial Sales — Assignments. § 383. Conveyance Without Wife's § 391. Partition. Release. § 392. Adultery. §383. Adverse Possession and Laches. §393. Divorce. § 384. Antenuptial Contracts. § 394. Alimony. § 385. Fraudulent Antenuptial Con- § 395. Foreign Decree for Divorce. veyance By Husband or Wife. § 376. Conditional Limitation. — It is well settled in the English common law, that, in case of an estate tail, dower and curtesy continue after the estate is determined ; as where land is given to a man or woman, and the heirs of his or her body, and the donee marries and dies, leaving no heirs of the body, the surviving wife is entitled to dower, ■ Clift V. Clif t, 87 Tenn. 17. '3 Scribner on Dower, ch. IV., sect. 17; Hoby v. Hoby, 1 Vern. 318. 'Parrish v. Parrish, 88 Va. 539; 1 Rop. Hus. & Wife, 396; Simmons v, Lyles, 27 Gratt. (Va.) 933. 412 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 376 or the husband, if there had been issue born alive, to cur- tesy, though the estate of tail is determined, according to its own limitation, and the interest of the donor or remain- derman becomes immediate. The argument that the deriv- ative estate must cease w^ith the primitive, is answered by the court by saying, in effect, that the right to curtesy is tacitly imphed in the gift, and that it is not derived merely out of the estate of the wife, but is given to the husband by the privilege and benefit of the law, for, as soon as he had issue, his title became initiate, and cannot afterward be defeated by death of the issue, which, being the act of God, ought not to turn to his prejudice.' This reason applies to the wife's dower. Her title to dower is also initiate during the coverture, by the mere fact of marriage and of the husband's being seised of an estate of inheritance which any issue of the marriage might inherit. So, the widow of a donee in tail is entitled to dower, although by the death of the husband without issue the estate tail is determined. The estate tail must, how- ever, have been of such a character as that at any time any issue which she might have had by the marriage might by possibility have inherited it as heir to her husband; and, so in case of curtesy, the issue actually born must have been such as according to the terms of the entail might inherit the estate as heir to the wife.' In either case, whether dower or curtesy is demanded, the right depends exclusively whether the issue of the marriage will take as heirs of the deceased wife or husband. If the children of the deceased wife take as purchasers, then curtesy will be denied.' ' Paine's Case, 8 Coke, 34. * Littleton's Ten. sect. 52; Northcut v. Whipp, 13 B. Mon. 65, 72; Fry ®. Scott (Ky.), 11 S. W. Rep. 426; Webb «. Church, 90 Ky. 117; Mill"dge v. Lamar, 4 De Saus. (S. Car.) 637; Evans v. Evans, 9 Pa. St. 190; Hatfield v. Sneden, 54 N. T. 285; Sammes v. Payne, 1 Leon. 167; Moody v. King, 3 Birg. 447; Buckworth v. Thirkell, 3 Bos. & Pul. 652, note; Smith's Appeal, 23 Pa. St. 9. See, also, Jones v. Hughes, 27 Grp.tt. (Va.) 560. Compare Co. Litt. 241 a, Butler's note, 170; Sugden on Powers, 333; 3 Preston on Abstr. of Title, 373; Park on Dower, 168, 186; Weller v. Weller, 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 588; Edwards c. Bibb, 54 Ala. 475. ' Summer v. Partridge, 2 Alk. 46; Barker d. Barker, 3 Sim. 249; Moody v. King, 2 Bing. 446. § 377J RIGHT OF DOWER 415 So, if the tenant in fee dies without heirs, by which the land escheats, or if the tenant in tail dies without heirs, whereby the inheritance reverts to the donor, or if the grantee of a rent in fee dies without heirs, in all these cases the widow's dow^er is preserved.' So, dower will not be defeated by a conditional limitation, created by way of shifting use or executory devise. The cases of an estate tail determining by failure of issue, and of a fee determin- ing by executory devise or springing use, are exceptions to the general rule, denying curtesy or dower after the deter- mination of the principal estate." But dower will be de- feated by the operation of collateral limitations, as in the case of an estate to a man and his heirs so long as a tree shall stand; or in case of a grant of land or rent to a party and his heirs till the building of St. Paul's church is fin- ished, and the contingency happens.' § BIT. Barred at Common Law. — According to the com- mon law, dower could be extinguished in various ways, though the husband could not defeat it by an act in the nature ot ahenation or charge without the assent of the wife, given and proved according to law. If the husband and wife levy a fine, or suffer a common recovery, this bars dower.* In England, by statute," power is given the husband to bar his wife's right to dower, as by convey- ance in his lifetime, by devise, or by his declaration by wiU that his lands shall be exempt from her dower.' A sure way to bar dower was by the introduction of a trustee into the conveyance, and limiting the lands to such per- sons as the purchaser should appoint, and in default of, and until such appointment, to the purchaser for life, and in case his wife should survive him, then to another and ' Paine's Case, 8 Coke, 34; Smith's Appeal, 33 Pa. St. 9. ' Buckworth «. Thirkell, 3 Bos. & P. 653, note; Roper on Husb. & W. c. 1, sect. 5; Park on Dower, pp. 173, 186; McMasters d. Negley, 152 Pa. St. 303. '3 Preston on Abstr. of Title, 373; Co. Litt. 341a, Butler's note, 170. See, also, McMasters v. Peltyberger, 152 Pa. St. 313; Northcut e. Whipp, 13 B. Mon. (Ky.) 65; Webb v. Church, 90 Ky. 117. ■•Lampet's Case, 10 Coke, 49 b; Earl v. Snow, Ploud. 504; Dawson v. Bank, 6 Ch. D. 218. *3and4 Wm. IV. c. 105. « Report). Roper, 3 Ch. D. 714. 414 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 378 his heirs during the life of his wife, in trust for the pur- chaser's heirs and assigns, with remainder to the heirs of the purchaser in fee.' And whether the trustee must be a party to the conveyance from the purchaser, it is said, strictly speaking, a purchaser is entitled to the concurrence of the trustee, in every case in which the trustee is sui juris, and can convey without the expense of a fine or an order in chancery." § 378. In The United States.— Some of the States have laws declaring that the widow shaU be dowable only in the lands of which her husband died siesed. Under these stat- utes a husband may seU lands during coverture and defeat his wife's dower.' But in most States dower is barred by the voluntary act of the wife, by her joining in a deed of conveyance of the land, containing apt words of grant or release on her part, acknowledging in the mode prescribed by the statute; there must be apt words of grant, showing an intention on her part to relinquish her dower,* or an acknowledgment of release and waiver as provided by statute,' and the wife must be of age.° And the renuncia- tion should be in the same deed in which her husband con- veys the land.' And after the husband's death and before it is set off to her, a grantee by quitclaim takes no title or right of possession. ° The wife cannot be deprived of her dower right other- wise than by her voluntary conveyance thereof in the manner prescribed by the statute." In Illinois the husband has a dower in the wife's land, and he is not controlled by the statute, and may release his inchoate dower right in ' Co. Liu. Lib. 3, Butler'a note, 330. 'Park on Dower, 93, 99. 'Brewer v. Connell, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 500; Jenny v. Jenny, 24 Vt. 324. "C^tlin v. "Ware, 9 Mass. 218; Lufkin v. Curtis, 13 Mass. 223. 'Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 488; Lyon ». Kain, 36 111 370; Hughes v. Wat- son, 10 Ohio, 127. 'Thomas b. Gammel, 6 Leigh (Va), 9; Hoyt v. Swar, 53 111. 139. 'Williams v. Robson, 6 Ohio St. 514; Shaw v. Rusb, 14 Me 432. 8 McDonal t. Hannah, 51 Fed. Rep. 73. •Francisco v. Hendricks, 28 111. 64; Sloan v. Williams, 133 111. 43; Cram v. Sawyer, 132 111. 448. § 379] EIGHT OF DOWER. 415 any mode to which the ordinary rules of law would give effect.' At common law any agreement between husband and wife was void, so the wife had no power of contract to re- lease dower. She must comply strictly with the statute relating to release/ or by acting under full capacity to con- tract, accorded her in some of the States.' § 379. Eelease and Estoppel. — A wife can release her dower right by joining with her husband in the convey- ance. So, if a wife joins in a deed, by her husband, of the equity of redemption on sale of his interest, and also in the receipt for the price, she will thereby be barred of her right of dower as against the purchaser." The statute must be followed. A compromise agreement between the widow and heirs of a decedent respecting his property, which un- dertakes to confirm existing land titles, but makes no new grants, will not operate as a release of the widow's right of dower in land conveyed by the decedent to one of the heirs, in which conveyance the wife did not join. " Unless author- ized by statute, a married woman cannot bar her right of dower by any release made to her husband during cover- ture.' A release of dower by a wife direct to her husband will not enable him by his sole deed to convev the land free of her dower right; since, if the release has had the effect to release to him, he becomes vested with the fee simple and the dower right reattaches by operation of law.' But where she has power to release her dower by an attorney in fact, she may constitute her husband an attorney for such purpose. ' As a general rule no acts of the husband 1 Crum o. Sawyer, 133 111. 448. 'Grove v. Todd, 41 Md. 633, 2 Conover s. Porter, 14 Ohio St. 450; Keeler v. Tatnell, 33 N. J. L. 62; Davis B. McDonald, 42 Ga. 205; Lothrop v. Foster, 51 Me. 367. •■Scanlan®. Scanlan, 134 III. 630. See, also, Grant v. Jackson, 5 Del. Ch. 404. ' Farris v. Coleman, 103 Mo. 352. *Rowe V. Hamilton, 8 Me. 63; Martin v. Martin, 32 Ala. 86; Le Saulnier v. Krueger, 85 Wis. 214; Carson v. Murray, 3 Paige (N. Y.), 488; House v. Fowle, 30 Oreg. 163; 23 Oreg. 308. ' Wightman v. Schleifer, i8 N. Y. Supp. 551; 63 Hun (N. Y.), 683. « Wroiikow V. Oakly, 133 N. Y. 505; Hull v. Glover, 126 111. 122. 416 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [8 380 during coverture, without the concurrence of the wife, can defeat dower.' If the wife goes to live with a fraudulent grantee of her husband's estate, who is her father-in-law, this does not con- firm the conveyance and she still has a dower interest." If the wife does not sign her husband's mortgage, but after its execution joins with her husband in a deed for a sale of it, she is estopped to claim dower as against the grantee at a foreclosure sale.' If she accepts part of the purchase- money as her personal dower, this does not bar her right to dower in the realty.* But if she takes from the heirs a lease of part of the land, she cannot claim dower in the leased premises during the continuance of the lease, since she is estopped to deny her landlord's title.' In Missouri a seal imports a sufficient consideration to support a release by a widow of her dower right in an ac- tion at law.' § 380. Conveyance by WrDow Before Assignment. — A proper release of the inchoate right of dower should be made in the deed executed by the husband and wife. But the widow in equity may be estopped from avoiding her sale before allotment of dower ; at law such sale is void, except when made to the terre-tenant, in whose favor it operates as a release or relinquishment. A conveyance it is held, to a person other than the terre-tenant, before it is assigned, has a different operation at law and in equity. Until assigned, her right to dower is an equity, of which a court of law does not take cognizance ; but, upon the principle, that an assignment of a right in action, though not assignable at law, wiU be protected in equity, a court of equity will uphold the widow's alienation of her dower in- terest to a stranger, and protect the rights of the grantee, there being a valuable consideration paid, and the absence of fraud, imposition or undue advantage ; and the fact ' Crecelius v. Horst, 11 Mo. App. 301; Gerry v. Stimson, 60 Me. 186. » Brooks V. McMeekin, 37 S. Car. 285. 'Boorum v. Tucker, 51 N. J. Eq. 135. * McCreary «. Lewis, 114 Mo. 583. 'Heinsen v. Heinsen, 145 111. 658. 'Saunders r>. Blythe, 113 Mo. 1. § 381] RIGHT OF DOWER. 417 that the entire purchase-money has not been paid, does not defeat the defense.' A quit claim deed by the widow to the heirs will release her dower right, if it does not convey it." And if it be granted without reservation it wUl convey her dower right.' Of course the inchoate right of dower conveyed without joining her husband would be void in equity' and in law.' It is commonly held that if a widow sells her right of dower before it is assigned to her according to law, such sale is an equitable assignment of her right to be enforced in a court of equity. ' § 381. Conveyance of Land by Guardian of Husband. — Where the husband becomes insane the court will appoint a guardian or conservator to protect his property, who must proceed under the statute, and the wife's dower right is not affected. The payment of the balance of the pur- chase price by a guardian of a husband is the same, in legal effect, as if it had been paid by the husband when sane, and the widow's riglit of dower is not affected thereby, and she is entitled to dower therein.' But she is not entitled to any interest in the increased value of the land occasioned by lasting and valuable improvements made between the sale by the guardian and death of her husband." ' Wilkinson v. Brandon, 92 Ala. 530. See, also, Reeves v. Brooks, 80 Ala. 36; Saunders v. Blythe, 113 Mo. 1. ' Dobberstein ». Murphy, 44 Minn. 526. » Bray v. Conrad, 101 Mo. 331. * Wilkinson v. Brandon, 93 Ala. 530; Robie». Flanders, 33N.H. 524; Powell e. Powell, 10 Ala. 900; Potter v. Everett, 7 Ired. Eq. (N. Car.) 153; Lamar v. Scott, 4 Rich Eq. (S. Car.) 516. »Harto. Burch, 130111. 436; Relff «. Horst, 55 Md. 43; Kitzmiller v. Van Rensselaer, 10 Ohio St. 63; Summers v. Babb, 13 111. 483; Bailey v. West, 41 111. 390; Robbins ». Kinzle, 45 111. 354; Best v. Jenks, 123 111. 453; Hull v. Grover, 126 111. 133. «Parton v. Allison, 109 N. Car. 674; 111 N. Car. 439. 1 Davis V. Hutton, 127 Ind. 481. *6ore B. Brazier, 3 Mass. 544; Alleman v. Hawley, 117 Ind. 533; Davis ». Hutton, 127 Ind. 481; Powell ®. Monson, etc. Manuf. Co., 3 Mason, C. C. 347; RannelsB. Washington University, 96 Mo. 226; Stearns «. Swift, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 532; Dunseth «. Bank, 6 Ohio, 77; Hobbs v. Harvey, 16 Me. 80; Mosher v. Mosher, 15 Me. 371. 53 418 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 882-383 § 382. Conveyance Without Wife's Eelease. — The wife's dower will not be relinquished without complying with the law. So a conveyance of land by the testator just before death, to his step children, the daughter of his widow taking in part upon a valuable consideration, can- not affect the widow's dower who takes under the will of the testator.' But if she joins in the deed, this bars her dower." It is the general rule, except in case land is taken under the right of eminent domain, that a sale by the husband without the wife's joining wiU not bar her dower.' § 383. Adverse Possession and Laches.— Adverse pos- session for the statutory period under contract of sale made by the husband alone, does not bar the wife's inchoate right of dower.* After the husband's death the right becomes consummate, and long adverse possession is proper evidence for the jury to estabhsh a release of dower right.' A per- fect bar of the statute against the husband so as to bar his title will not affect his wife's inchoate right of dower." During the lifetime of the husband, the wife's inchoate right to dower cannot be asserted against the adverse pos- session. So the statute does not begin to run against the right of dower until the right of action therefor accrues to her which cannot be until she becomes discovert.' In equity laches or lapse of time may be a bar to a claim of dower.' In some States the statute of Umitations wiU bar her dower." 1 Sumerel v. Sumerel, 34 S. Car. 85. = Scanlon «. Scanlon, 134 111. 630. . „^ o w u 1 Dayton v. Corson, 51 Minn. 406; Vinson «. Gentry (Ky.), 21 S. W. Kep. 578; Goodrum v. Goodrum, 56 Ark. 533. .„ „ . n/r ^Bolin? V. Clark, 88 Iowa, 481; Durham v. Angier, 30 Me. 243; Hart v. Mc- Collum, 28 Ga. 478; Moore v. Frost, 3 N. H. 126; Williams «. Williams, 89 ^Barnard «. Edwards, 4 N. H. 107; Guthrie v. Owen, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 839; Parker v. Obear, 7 Met. (Mass.) 24. 6 Miller ». Pence, 133 111. 149. ' Simonton v. Houston, 78 N. Car. 408; Miller v. Pence, 183 111. 149. 8 Barksdale v. Garrett. 64 Ala. 277; McLaren v. Clark, 63 Ga. 106; Tuttle v. Wilson, 10 Ohio, 24; Chew v. Farmers, 9 Gill (Md.), 861. « Care ». Keller, 77 Pa. St. 487; Berrien v. Conover, 16 N. J. L. 107; Rice ®. Nelson, 37 Iowa, 148; Durham v. Angier, 20 Me. 343; Tuttle v. Wilson, 10 Ohio 34. § 384] BIGHT OF POWER. 419 Many of the States have enacted statutes in respect to barring dower by lapse of time, which control this ques- tion.' § 384. Antenuptial Contracts. — Antenuptial contracts according to statute, barring dower, are upheld, but such contracts must be fair, equitable, and a reasonable provi- sion made for the wife.' When an antenuptial contract is one-sided against the woman, the burden of proving its execution with full knowledge of its contents without imposition and with entire fairness is on the husband, and that proof must be more than the mere production of the agreement.' The contract must be fair, reasonable and just as between the parties in view of all the circumstances of the case at the time the contract was made.* If the covenants are mutual and reciprocal the contract is valid, ' and the intended marriage a sufficient considera- tion.' Thus, a woman can surrender the right of dower in consideration of her support during life and a sufficient money consideration in addition.' But if the contract does not bar her dower, she may, and must, elect to take under it or her right of dower; she can elect to take under one or the other.' The provisions under the agreement being designated as a satisfaction of her claim for dower, ■Chapman v. Schroeder, 10 Ga. 331; Ralls v. Hughes, 1 Dana (Ky.), 407; Carmlchael v. Carmichael, 5 Humph. (Tenn.) 96; Robie «. Flanders, 33 N. H. 524; Durham v. Angier, 20 Me. 242; Chew d. Bank, 2 Md. Ch. 231; Ridgway ■» McAlplne, 31 Ala. 464; Owen v. Peacock, 38 111. 33; Tiittle v. Wilson, 10 Ohio, 24, Spencer » Weston, 1 Dev. & B. (N. Car.) 213. Wilson v. Mc- Lenaghan, 1 McMull Eq (S. Car.) 35. s Shea's Appeal, 121 Pa. St. 302; Hinkle v. Hinkle, 34 W. Va. 142; Tiernan D. Binns, 9i Pa. St. 248. 3 Page » Home 11 Beav. 227; Barth v. Lines, 118 111. 377; Pierce v. Pierce, 71 N. Y, 154, Taylor v. Taylor, 144 111. 436. ^Grogan». Garrison, 27 Ohio St 59; Hastings v. Dickinson, 7 Mass. 155; Vance v. Vance, 21 Me 364, Faulkner v Faulkner, 3 Leigh (Va.), 255; Farris -» Coleman, 103 Mo. 352, Beard v Beard, 23 W. Va. 130. ' Findley v. Findloy, 11 Gratt. (Va ) 434. • Forwood v. Forwood, 86 Ky. 114, Naill v. Maurer, 25 Md. 538; Hinkle ». Hinkle, 34 W. Va. 142, Ireland a. Ireland, 43 N. J. Eq. 311. ' West V. Walker, 77 Wis 557. 8 Carter's Appeal, 59 Conn. 576. 420 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ S84 she cannQt accept the agreement without renouncing the right to dower.' Mere consideration of marriage is not a sufficient consid- eration to support an antenuptial agreement to bar dower. Judge Lucas says, in eloquent and forcible language: "The spirit of our law, therefore, is to ignore any fancible theories of identity and absolute reciprocity of powers, rights and duties between the sexes, and to adhere to the natural and Christian of human experience and divine government. Influenced by this genius of our legislature, I shall conclude, therefore, that because the man may accept the marriage as a consideration sufficient to sustain his agreement to renounce and waive all right in his wife's property during coverture and of survivorship, should he outlive her, nevertheless it by no means follows that the weaker vessel, who has been induced to betroth herself in mar- riage, can, without any other consideration whatever, and in the absence of all reciprocal engagernents on the part of the man and without any provision whatever for jointure bind herself by an antenuptial agreement not to claim any of the rights of survivorship in his property, should she survive him. I "think such a contract would be adverse to the spirit, if not in direct contravention, of our statute. And such an opinion, were it necessary to decide the point, would be abundantly sustained by the highest authori- ties."" The true rule is that^, in order to bar dower by an ante- nuptial agreement, some provision should be made in lieu thereof, and such provision should be fair and reasonable. If the covenants are mutual and reciprocal the contract is valid. Thus, it is a valid agreement to support the ante- nuptial agreement that the woman was to retain her right to all the property that she then owned, or might there- after acquire, the benefit of her own labor, the right of contracting, and to be otherwise independent of her hus- band, when all the rights were not given by the statute/ 'In re Vardon's Trusts, L R. 38 Ch. Div. 134; Herbert v. Wren, 7 Cranch (U S), 370; Hotchkiss v. Brainerd Quarry Co., 58 Conn. 133. ' Hinkle v. Hinkle, 34 W. Va. 143, 148 'Forwood «. Forwood, 86 Ky. 114, Findley v. Findley, 11 Gratt. (Va.) 434. § 385] RIGHT OF DOWER. 421 At common law antenuptial agreements are void/ but they will be upheld in equity.' But a conveyance to a married woman, under the statute, will not be deemed a joi-nture unless such intention is expressed in the deed or appears by necessary implication from its contents.' As has already been said, the legal or equitable provi- sions must be a fair equivalent to the dower estate to make the agreement binding." But it has been held against the weight of authority, that, if a woman, being of age, accepts a particular some- thing in satisfaction of dower, she must take it with aU its faults, and must look" to the contract alone, and cannot, in case of eviction, come against anyone in possession of the lands on which otherwise her dower right might have attached. ' By the common law no provision or settlement made by a man before his marriage in favor of his future wife could bar dower. ° The reason of this rule of the common law was that dower being a freehold estate by a maxim of the common law, could not be barred by a collateral satisfac- tion.' § 385. Fraudulent Antenuptial Conveyance by Hus- band OR Wife. — A wife will have dower in lands con- ' Murphy v. Murphy, 12 Ohio St. 407; Martin v. Martin, 22 Ala. 86; An- drews V. Andrews, 8 Conn. 79; Gelzer v. Gelzer, 1 Bail. Eq. (S. Car.) 387. ^McGee v. McGee, 91 111. 548, Jordan v. Clark, 81 111. 465; Hastings ®. Dick- inson, 7 Mass. 153; Mintier «. Mintier, 38 Ohio St. 307; Logan ». Phillips, 18 Mo. 22; Boardman's Appeal, 40 Conn. 169; Hathaway v. Hathaway, 46 Vt. 234. Freeland ». Freeland, 128 Mass. 509. 3 Chase ». Alley, 83 Me. 334; Bubier v. Roberts, 49 Me. 460, 466. •■McCartee v. Teller, 2 Paige (N. Y.), 511; Sheldon ®. Bliss, 8 N. Y 31; Pindley ». Pindley, 11 Gratt. (Va.) 434; Blackmon v. Blackmon, 16 Ala. 633; EUicott «. Mosier, 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 574; Vincent v. Spooner, 2 Cu-h. (Mass ) 467; Shea's Appeal, 121 Pa. St. 302; Hinkle v. Hinkle, 34 W. Va. 142; Power «. Shell, 1 Molloy, 296. 'Charles ». Charles, 8 Gratt. (Va.)486; Kaillo. Maurer, 25 Md. 532; Cauley «. Lawson, 5 Jones Eq. (N. Car.) 132; Dyke v. Rendall, 2 De G. M. & G. 209; 31 L. J., N. S. ch. 905; Hunkins v. Hunkins, 65 N. H. 95. « Vincent «. Spooner, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 467. ■" Hastings v. Dickinson, 7 Mass. 153; Logan i). Phillips, 18 Mo. 22; Jones «. Powell, 6 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 196; Murphy v. Murphy, 13 Ohio St. 407. 422 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 385 veyed to defraud her in contemplation of marriage,' and the wife's right of dower will be protected against a voluntary conveyance of the husband made pending a marriage engagement under the same circumstances in which the husband is relieved against an antenuptial con- tract by the wife.' This rule has generally been enforced as to settlements by the wife, but applies either way.' But an antenuptial deed is not necessarily fraudulent be- cause not disclosed to the intended wife.' If the deed be fraudulent, it can only be set aside as to the intended wife's right of dower/ unless controlled by statute. In passing on this question of constructive fraud, the court will take into consideration the meritorious object of such convey- ance and the situation of the intended husband or wife in point of pecuniary means.' But the right of dower is gen- erally subject to all legal or equitable incumbrances which existed before it attached. So, if the real estate is con- veyed just before marriage, but the sale is bona fide ac- cording to a previous arrangement, dower will not attach to the land, as no fraud tainted the transaction.' But if the conveyance is made to defeat the wife's dower, it will not be held valid as to her rights." And so, where a hus- band makes a voluntary conveyance of land with the de- sign to exclude his wife, unknown to her, the deed is in- valid as to the wife's dower, because it is made for the purpose of cutting off the wife's dower." A court of equity will protect a wife against a voluntary conveyance by her i Rockwell ». Rockwell, 81 Mich. 493; Brooks v. McMeekin, 37 S. Car. 285. 5 Chandler v. HoUingsworth, 3 Del. Ch. 99. aStrathmore ■». Bowes, 1 Ves. Jr. 33; England v. Downs, 3Beav. 528; God- dard ». Snow, 1 Russ. 485; Taylor v. Pugh, 1 Hare, 608. * Dudley ■». Dudley, 76 Wis. 567; England v. Downs, 3 Beav. 533. 5 Youngs V. Carter, 10 Hun (N. Y.), 194; Chandler «. HoUingsworth, 3 Del. Ch 99 » St. George v. Wake, 1 Mylne & K. 610; Gregory v. Winston, 33 Gratt. (Va.) 103; Firestone v. Firestone, 3 Ohio St. 415; Hamilton v. Smith, 57 Iowa, 15; Cowman v. Hall, 3 Gill. & J. (Md.) 398; Butler v. Butler, 31 Kans. 526. 'Champlin®. ChSmplin, 16 R. I. 314. 8 Swaine ■». Ferine, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 483; Petty v. Petty, 4 B. Mon. (K.y.> 315 •Cranson «. Cranson, 4 Mich. 230; Smith ». Smith, 2 Halst. Ch. (N. J.) 515. § 385] RIGHT OF DOWER. 423 intended husband, of all his estate, to the exclusion of the wife, made pending an engagement of marriage, without her knowledge, even in the absence of express misrepre- sentation or deceit, and whether the wife knew of the existence of the property or not;' but it must be under- stood that the wife takes dower subject to all legal or equitable incumbrances which existed before it attached," so an antenuptial deed is not necessarily fraudulent because not disclosed to the intended wife/ But of course, if the voluntary conveyance is made in contemplation of marriage, the deed is void against the party affected,* though no ac- tual misrepresentations or deceit enter into the convey- ance.' Some of the cases state the matter in language that cannot be accepted without qualifications. In North Carolina it is decided that, in order to sustain a settle- ment by a wife, the husband must have general knowl- edge of her intention to make one, or that she has done so, and she must have his consent to the very act or in- strument by which the settlement is made." But the rule should be that concealment of what it is the right of the wife to know, and what it is the duty of the hus- band to disclose, is itself fraud in law. And a court of equity will protect a wife against a voluntary conveyance or settlement by the husband of all of his estate, to the ex- clusion of his wife, made pending an engagement of mar- riage, without her knowledge, prior. to the marriage, even in the absence of express misrepresentation or deceit, and whether the wife knew of the existence of the property or not.' The reasonable doctrine seems now to be well settled that an antenuptial deed is not necessarily fraudulent if not dis- ' Chandler v. Hollingsworth, 3 Del. Ch. 99. « Champlin v. Champlin, 16 R. I. 314. ' Dudley v. Dudley, 76 Wis. 567; Oakley v. Oakley, 69 Hun (K. Y.), 121. * Strathmore v. Bowes, 1 Ves. Jr. 23; England v. Downs, 2 Beav. 528. 5 Linker v. Smith, 4 Wa.sh. C. C. 224; Tucker v. Andrews, 13 Me. 134; Logan «. Simmons, 8 Ired. Bq. (N. Car.) 487; Spencer «. Spencer, 3 Jones. Eq. (N. Car.) 404, 409; Poston v. Gillespie, 5 Jones. Eq. (N. Car.) 258; Ramsay v. Joyce, 1 McMull. (S. Car.) 236. 'Spencer v. Spencer, 3 Jones Eq. (N. Car.) 409; Poston v. Gillespie, 5 Jones Eq. (N. Car.) 262. ' Chandler v. Hollingsworth, 3 Del. Ch. 99. 42-i CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 386 closed to the intended wife, and that the facts and circum- stances may be taken into consideration as to whether a fraud was actually intended,' unless all of the estate was conveyed in contemplation of marriage." § 386. DowEE Given in Lands op Which the Husband Died Seised — Innocent Purchaser. — A marriage is a valuable consideration paid by the wife for the rights and estates accorded her as a wife, including the right of dower in lands of which the husband may be seised during cover- ture.' So, a secret conveyance, made just before marriage, with the intention of defeating the vesting in the wife of the right of dower, the grantor being permitted to remain in possession, is a fraud against the wife, and void, so that notwithstanding it, for the purposes of dower, the husband may be treated as dying seised of the property.* In those States where the wife has dower only in those lands of which the husband died seised and possessed an- other view is presented. In Georgia the wife is entitled to dower in lands of which the husband was seised and pos- sessed at the time of his death, or to which the husband obtained title in right of the wife. ' So an actual sale by the husband though made for the purpose of defeating dower, will be upheld in favor of the purchaser against the widow's claim of dower after her husband's death. But a mere colorable sale, not intended by the parties to be real and operative except as a means of dividing the lands among the children of the husband after his death, he in the mean time to be the real owner while the grantee is to be the nominal and formal owner, will leave the husband 'Jones V. Jones, 64 Wis. 307; Dudleys. Dudley, 76 Wis. 567; Fennessey ». Pennessey, 84 Ky. 519; Hamilton o. Smith, 57 Iowa, 15; Champlinu. Champlin, 16 R. I. 314; Saunders v. Harris, 1 Head (Tenn.), 185; Jordan v. Black, Meigs (Tenn.), 143; Logan «. Simmons, 3 Ired. Bq. (N. Car.) 487; Loader ». Clark, 2 Mac. & G. 383. Oe ManneviUe d. Crompton, 1 Ves. & B. 354. « Chandler v. Holiingsworth, 8 Del. Ch. 99. » Rivers v. Thayer, 7 Rich. Eq. (S. Car.) 144. * Brooks V. McMeekin, 37 S. Car. 385; Flowers v. Flowers, 89 Ga. 632; Thayer v. Thayer, 14 Vt. 107; Jenny v. Jenny, 24 Vt. 324; Brewer ®. Connell, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 500. » Code, sect. 1763. § 387] RIGHT OF DOWER. 425 seised so far as the dower right is concerned; and his widow, after his death, may claim dower, and have it as- signed, notwithstanding such colorable and pretended sale made by the husband. ' The law in Connecticut is the same. So where a husband executes a valid deed conveying all his real estate to his children, and places it in the hands of a third person to be delivered at his death, on the happen- ing of the event and the delivery of the deed by the de- positary in> accordance with his instructions, the sale is valid and the widow has no dower in such lands." But in England and most of the States the right to dower is created on the marriage, and the wife has her right to dower in all the lands held by the husband in fee during coverture. And under this last law of dower, the widow, being entitled to dower against a fraudulent grantee, can claim rents and profits for such time as is not barred by liaiitation. As against purchasers for value without notice taking from the fraudulent grantee after the death of the grantor, and while the widow, though aware of her husband's deed, neglects to bring action to avoid it, she cannot claim dower. ' In those jurisdictions where the deed in fraud of the wife is vitiated by reason of the fraud, the grantee has no estate whereon to predicate a deed of trust on the lands, hut the fee will descend to the grantor's heirs unincum- bered.* § 387. PosT-NuPTiAL Agreement to Bar Dower. — At common law, both legal and equitable jointure in order to be a complete bar to dower, must be made before marriage. If settled upon the wife after marriage, the widow would have the right to elect which she would take, but she was not entitled to both. ' But under the statutory provisions of many States a post-nuptial agreement will be upheld. Thus, in Michigan there is no legal objection to an arrangement ■ Flowers ». Flowers, 89 Ga. 533. See, also. Stew, on Hus. & Wife, sect. 268; 1 Scrib. on Dower, ch. 39, sect. 18. ' Stewart v. Stewart, 5 Conn. 317. ' Brooks «. McMeekin, 37 S. Car. 385. * Brooks «. McMeekin, 37 S. Car. 385. *Drury v. Drury, 2 Eden, 64; Swaine v. Ferine, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 488. 54 426 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 387 between husband and wife for a fair consideration to ex- tinguish her right of dower.' And such agreement, like an antenuptial contract, must be a fair and voluntary one. If the wife is defrauded or improperly persuaded into such an arrangement by any fraud or device of her liusband, she is entitled to full and adequate redress." In Illinois the hus- band has dower in his wife's land and he may release it in her lifetime in any mode to which the ordinary rules of law will give that effect. The statute has in ho way restricted his power to release his inchoate right.' A postnuptial settlement in favor of a wife, made in pursuance of a fair contract for a valuable consideration, will be held good. Judge Lacy says, although it may have been under such circumstances that it must be pronounced fraudulent and void as to the creditors of the husband, yet if the wife has relinquished her interest in the property upon the faith of such settlement, it will be held good, to the extent of a just compensation for the interest she may have parted with. The dower interest of the wife may constitute a valuable consideration, that wiU support a postnuptial settlement, and that such settlement, made in consideration of the surrender of such dower interest, may be supported against the claims of creditors with notice." And the fraud of the husband will not affect this, because it will be a sufficient answer to the charge of fraud, on the part of the husband and wife, in executing the deed of settlement to say that if there were fraud, and she participated in it, still it will not be imputed to her. ' Where the husband has no control over the wife's sepa- rate chattels, she may agree to let him manage them dur- ing his life. But the reception of such property by the wife after his death, cannot constitute a part performance or a fuU consideration for an alleged parol contract in the nature of jointure.' ' Randall v. Randall, 37 Mich. 563; Rhoades v. Davis, 51 Mich. 306. ' Wright V. Wright, 79 Mich. 537; Dakin v. Dakin. 97 Mich. 384; Chittock V. Chittock (Mich.), 59 N. W. Rep. 655. ' Crum V. Sawyer, 133 111. 448. ■"Strayer v. Long, 86 Va. 557. See, also, Worrell ». Forsyth, 141 111. 32. ' William and Mary College v. Powell, 12 Gratt. (Va.) 387. "Roberts v. Walker, 101 Mo. 597. § 388] SIGHT OF DOWER. 427 Outside of the power given by statute, no postnuptial agreement or settlement at law between husband and wife is valid to convey, bar or release dower. But postnuptial agreements for separation and for the separate maintenance of the wife, through the intervention of a trustee are valid and wiU bar dower;' otherwise a postnuptial agreement is void at law if not made valid by statute.' The right of dower is inferior to all liens on the land which attached prior to the marriage, but superior to those which attached after the marriage without the wife's con- sent including judgments. So a postnuptial settlement in favor of the wife upon a valuable consideration is good in equity, though void at common law, and the relinquish- ment of the wife's dower is a good consideration for such, settlement as against creditors of the husband to the ex- tent of the value of the dower.' § 388. Void Conveyance.— The wife's relinquishment of dower is inoperative where the husband's deed is ineffect- ual to convey title.* For the relinquishment can be in- voked for no purpose but to aid the title passing by the deed of the husband which contains it. Therefore, when that title fails the relinquishment becomes inoperative." And if the deed is set aside because it was given to defraud the husband's creditors, her dower will not be released though she signed the deed according to the statute. ' If the husband's title fails her dower is thereby defeated.' 1 Fox V. Davis, 113 Mass. 255; Magee i>. Magee, 67 Barb. (N. Y.) 487; Settle V. Wilson, 14 Oliio, 257; Carson v. Murray, 3 Paige (N. Y.), 483; Randall v. Randall, 37 Mich. 568. ^Peaslee v. Peaslee, 147 Mass. 171; Shane®. McNeill, 76 Iowa, 459; Bottomly V. Spencer, 36 Fed. Rep. 782. sFicklin v. Rixey, 89 Va. 833; Yates v. Law, 86 Va. 117; De Farges v. Ryland, 87 Va. 404; Wickes v. Clarke, 8 Paige (N. Y.), 161; Arundell v. Phipps, 10 Ves. 139; Jones ». Marsh, Cas. Temp. Talbott 63. * Smith V. Howell, 58 Ark. 279. 'Hinchlifle». Shea, 103 N. Y. 153; Witthaus v. Schack, 105 N. Y. 333; Stinson v. Sumner, 9 Mass. 143; Douglas v. McCoy, 5 Ohio, 532; Blaiu v. Har- rison, 11 111. 384. ' Bohannon t>. Combs, 97 Mo. 446. ' McClure v. Fairfield, 153 Pa. St. 411. 428 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 389-390 § 389. Eminent Domain— The right of dower may be barred by the exercise of eminent domain on the part of the government.' And after the dower is set off, an exercise of eminent domain over that portion of the estate is a valid exercise of that power. After her dower has been set off to her, then she can have compensation for taking the land in eminent domain proceedings." The inchoate right of dower before the husband's death is wholly divested when the land is taken for public use and the owner paid, and no compensation need be paid to her.' Though some courts hold that equity will secure the value of her dower to the wife.* Inchoate dower is subject to legislative control as by a change in the laws affecting it, which may constitutionally be made applicable where there was a previous marriage a,nd seisin, if the husband was still alive.' Taking land under eminent domain will bar dower, and this is the gen- eral rule.' § 390. Judicial Sale— Assignments.— A wife's right of dower is not affected by an execution sale of her husband's land,' unless the lien is prior to dower." The general rule is that dower cannot be barred by a sale for debts of the 'Ervin ». Brady, 48 Miss. 560; Tisdale v. Risk, 7 Bush (Ky.), 139; Runnels -». Webber, 59 Me. 488; Sheldon «, Bradley. 37 Conn. 324; Bonner v. Peterson, 44 111. 253; Weaver v. Gregg, 6 Ohio St. 547; Nye v. Taunton, 113 Mass. 277; French v. Lord, 69 Me. 537; Duncan v. Terre Haute, 85 Ind. 104. 2 Borough V. Welsh, 117 Pa. St. 174. 'Moore v. New York, 8 N. Y. 110; Erwin v. Brady, 48 Miss. 560. Compare 'Weaver v. Gregg. 6 Oiiio St. 547, 550; Maguire v. Riggin, 44 Mo. 512, 515. -i Wheeler v. Kirtland, 27 N. J. Eq. 534; De Wolf «. Murphy, 11 R. I. 630; In re Hall's Estate, 9 L. R. Eq. 179. Compare French v. Lord, 69 Me. 537. 'Taylor v. Sample, 51 Ind. 423; Bennett «. Harms. 51 Wis. 251; Magee v. Young, 40 Miss. 164; Barbour v. Barbour, 46 Me. 9; Melizet's Appeal, 17 Pa. St. 449; Weaver «. Gregg, 6 Ohio St. 547. Compare Rose v. Sanderson, SS 111. 247; Russell v. Rumsey, 35 111. 362. "Chouteau v. Railroad Co. (Mo.), 22 S. W. Rep. 458; Venahle v. Railroad, 112 Mo. 103; Gwynne v. Cincinnati, 3 Ohio, 24; Duncan v. Terre Haute, 85 Ind. 104. 'House V. Powle, 22 Oreg. 303; Whiteaker v. Belt, 25 Oreg. 490: Vinson v. Gentry (Ky.), 21 S. W. Rep. 578. 8Mantz ». Buchanan, 1 Md. Ch. 202; Brown v. Williams, 31 Me. 403; Sanford v. McLaren, 3 Paige (N. Y.), 117. § S91J EIGHT OF DOWER. 43,9 husband.' In some States the dower right is subject to the claims of creditors, and a judicial sale will bar the wife's dower." Where a voluntary assignment of the husband will de- feat dower his bankruptcy will defeat it;' but generally the assignee in bankruptcy holds the bankrupt's land subject to the wife's dower.' The wife having only an inchoate right of dower in the land during her husband's life, she is not required to paj the taxes on the same or any part thereof to protect that right.' So, a sale under a judgment of the land for delin- quent taxes does not bar dower where the wife was not made a party to the tax suit, and this is true although such right of dower is only inchoate." But a judicial sale of the husband's land does not give a wife the right of allotment in the husband's lifetime,' unless made so by statute,' and not then if the husband's grantees redeem from the sale.' As a general rule, a transfer of a husband's estate, or that of his grantee, by operation of the statute of limita- tions, will have no greater effect upon his wife's right of dower than a conveyance by her husband in which she has not joined.'" § 391. Partition. — The right of dower of a wife sub- sists by 'virtue of the seisin of the husband, and this right is always subject to any infirmity, incumbrance or incident which the law attaches to that seisin, either at the time of the marriage or at the time the husband became seised. ' Stimon «. Sumner, 9 Mass. 149; Crosby ii. Bank, 107 Mo. 436; Hinclimaa V. Stiles, 9 N. J. Eq. 361; Sisk v. Smith, 6 111. 503; Combs «. Young, 4 Yerg. (Tenn.) 218; Roan v. Holmes, 32 Pla. 295. 'Lazear v. Porter, 87 Pa. St. 513. 'Perkios v. McDonald, 10 Lea (Tenn.), 732. * Porter v. Lazear, 109 TJ. S. 84; Dudley v. Easton, 104 U. 8. 99; In re Lawrence, 44 Conn. 411 ; Dwiger ». Gtarlough, 31 Ohio St. 158; Eberle v. Fisher, 13 Pa. St. 533; Lazear v. Porter, 87 Pa. St. 513; Thompson ». Mo- Corkle gnd.), 34 N. E. Rep. 813. 'Miller v. Pence, 132 111. 149. "Blevins v. Smith, 104 Mo. 583. 'Gatewood v. Tomlinson, 113 K Car. 312. ^Huffmaster v. Ogden (Ind.), 35 N. E. Rep. 513. 'Huffmaster v. Ogden (Ind.), 35 N. E. Rep. 512. >» Taylor®. Lawrence, 148 111. 388. 430 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 391 Xiiability to be divested by a sale in partition is an incident which the law affixes to the seisin of all joint estates, and the inchoate right of the wife is subject to this incident." The right which the law gives to every tenant in common to have partition of lands held in common, or a sale and distribution of the proceeds if it appears they cannot be divided in kind without loss or injury to the parties inter- ested, is a right paramount to that of inchoate dower of the wife of any one of such tenants, and the purchaser acquires a title free from any such claim." There can be no doubt that a sale for the purpose of par- tition under a statute will bar the inchoate right of dower of the wife of one of the co-tenants in common, and that the purchaser wiU take a clear title to the land,° and the -wife need not be made a party to the proceedings.* The right of the other co-tenants to demand partition is paramount to the inchoate right of dower in the wife of any of the co-tenants; whenever this paramount right is exercised the subordinate right of dower can- not properly be allowed to interfere with or abridge the fuU enjoyment of the paramount right. The inchoate right of dower springs out of, and is necessarily dependent upon, the concurrence of marriage and seisin of the husband during coverture, so it is dependent upon and quaUaed by the nature of such seisin. Therefore, if the nature of the husband's seisin is such as will not support the claim of dower, it must fail, as in case the husband be seised as trustee, or his seisin is subject to the lien of a pur- chase-money mortgage, or he is a co-tenant, or the land is subject to the lien of a judgment rendered before mar- riage. ' This principle is illustrated in the well settled rule that while a judgment against one of the co-tenants is made a ' HoUey v. Glover, 36 8. Car. 404; Weaver v. Gregg, 6 Ohio St. 547; Davis V. Logan, 9 Dana (Ky.), 186 See, also, Parrish v. Parrish, 88 Va. 629. 'Mitchell «. Parrish, 69 Md. 335; Clift o. Clift, 87 Tenn. 17. 'Rowland v. Prather, 53 Md. 232; Walker v. Walker, 6 Coldw. (Tenn.) 571; Warren ». Twilley, 10 Md. 39; Potter v. Wheeler, 13 Mass. 504. * Weaver v. Gregg, 6 Ohio St. 547; HoUey ». Glover, 36 8. Car. 404; Lee «. Lindell, 23 Mo. 202; Lloyd v. Conover, 25 N. J. L 48. 'HoUey v. Glover, 36 S. Car. 404. § 392] EIGHT OF DO WEB. 431 lien upon the undivided interest of such tenant in com- mon, under which such undivided interest may be levied upon and sold, yet such incumbrance is subordinate to the paramount right of the other tenants in common to de- mand partition; and after sale, the purchaser takes his title freed and discharged from such subordinate incum- brance on the share of the j udgment debtor, and the cred- itor is remitted to his debtor's share of the proceeds of the sale, even though the judgment creditor is not a party to the proceedings for partition.' Chief Justice Mclver ably says, that as the inchoate right of dower arises out of and is dependent upon the nature of the husband's seisin, such inchoate right must necessarily be affected with any in- firmities of such seisin, and be qualified by any paramount right subject to which it has been acquired; and when the husband's seisiu is qualified by, and subject to, the para- mount right of the other co-tenants to demand partition, the wife's inchoate right of dower, growing out of, and de- pendent upon such seisin, is subject to the same qualifica- tion. When, thei'efore, the husband is divested by the ex- ercise of the paramount right of the other co-tenants to demand partition, the inchoate right of dower is likewise destroyed, so far, at least, as the land is concerned, and the wife is no more a necessary party for that purpose than is a judgment creditor of one of the several co-tenants in common, in case of a sale of the common property for partition." This reasoning is sound and strongly supports the conclusion to which the learned judge arrived. The statutes of the States generally provide for the sale of lands held in common, where it becomes necessary when the estate cannot be equitably divided. But in case there he no statute on this subject, equity may order the sale of land for partition between tenants in common. § 392. Adultery.— The statute of Westminster 2,' made adultery in the wife, accompanied with elopement, a for- 'Ketchin v. Patrick, 33 S. Car. 443; Riley v. Gaines, 14 S. Car. 454. 'Holley«. Glover (S. Car.), 15 S. E. Rep. 605. Compare Jackson v. Ed- wards, 7 Paige (N. Y.), 386; Mattliewa v. Matthews, 1 Edw. Ch. (N. T.) 565: 1 Scrib. on Dower, pp. 338-341; Verry v. Robinson, 25 Ind. 19. » 13 Edw. I. c. 34. 432 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 392 feiture of dower by way of penalty; but reconciliatioa with the husband would reinstate the wife in her right. This statute has been re-enacted in most of the States, and so the wife may defeat her dower by elopement followed by adultery, or by adultery alone, or by abandonment.' And it is held that a woman forfeits her dower under the statute by remaining in adultery without being reconciled to her husband, although he drove her away by his cruelty in the first place." But it is held that it would be other- wise where the husband deserted his wife.' However, in Kentucky if a wife admits any man or men to her periodi • cally, or whenever it is convenient or opportunity is offered during the abandonment of her husband, such constitutes adultery within the meaning of the statute.' And in Florida it is held to sustain the plea in bar of dower based 6n the English statute, it is necessary to prove both that the wife left her husband willingly, and that she was guilty of adultery during the desertion." In some States elopement and adultery without divorce is no bar.' If the husband condones the offense,' but does not take the wife back, her dower interest revives.' Adultery while hving with her husband will not bar dower,' nor is dower barred by the wife's desertion only in Pennsylvania," but otherwise in Alabama." In North Car- ohna, under the statute, a wife is not barred of dower, > Thornburg v. Tliornburg, 18 W. Va. 532; Walters i>. Jordan, 13 Ired. (N. Car.) 361: Lecompte «.Wash, 9 Mo. 551; Bell v. ISTealy, 1 Bailey (8. Oar.), 313. Compare Lakin v. Lakin, 3 Allen (Mass.), 45. ' Woodward v. Dowse, 10 C. B. N. S. 733; Bell ». Nealy. 1 Bailey (S. Car.), 313, ' Graham v. Law, 6 Upp. Can. C. P. 310; Walters «. Jordan, 13 Ired. (N. Car.) 361; Reel v. Elder, 63 Pa. St. 308; Shaffer v. Richardson, 37 Ind. 138; Hender- son D. Chaires, 35 Fla. 36. * Goss v. Froman, 89 Ky. 318. ' Henderson v. Chaires, 35 Fla. 36. 6 Bryan D. Batcheller, 6 R. I. 543; Rawlins v. Buttel, 1 Houst. (Del.) 324^ Pitts ». Pitts, 53 N. Y. 593. ' Co. Litt. 33a, note 8. « Govier v. Hancock, 6 Term R. 603. 9 Cogswell ». Tibbetts, 3 N. H. 41; Reel v. Elder, 63 Pa. St. 308. ■» Nye's Appeal, 136 Pa. St. 341. " Hinson v. Bush, 84 Ala. 368, overruling Williams «. Hale, 71 Ala. 83. § 393] RIGHT OF DOWER. 433 though she be in prison as an accomplice in her husband's murder." In New York it was held that a judgment dissolving a valid marriage for the adultery of the husband did not cut off the wife's inchoate right to dower in lands of which he was, at the date of the judgment or theretofore, seised; and she having survived him dower was assigned, the court resting its decision on the ground that the section denying the wife's right to dower when divorced for her adultery by fair implication, saved it when a divorce was granted for the adultery of the husband. This dissolution and release in New York is not absolute. The wife, when the husband is guilty, is stiU entitled to her support; and the obligations of the marriage stiU rest upon the hus- band so far as to render it unlawful for him again to marry." But this decision seems to be in conflict with other New York cases.' But the decision of Wait v. Wait has been confirmed by statute in New York." It must be remembered that in New York a decree of divorce for adultery may not be absolute, and when the husband is the guilty party, he is stiU bound to support his wife. This law is similar to that in other States for separate maintenance of the wife. § 393. Divorce. — A divorce a vinculo matrimonii, bars the claim of dower; for to entitle a woman to dower, she must have been the wife of the husband at his death." At common law a divorce a mensa et thoro. did not bar dower, because the relations of husband and wife were not dissolved, and was simply a legal separation. ° ' Owens V. Owens, 100 N. Car. 240. » Wait V. Wait, 4 N. Y. 95. «Day V. West, 2 Ed. Cli. 592; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 24 Wend. 193. See, also, Moore v. Hegeman, 27 Hun. 68; 92 N. Y. 531. ^Oode Civ. Proc. s;ct. 1754; Price v. Price, 124 N. Y. 589. sPullen V. Pullen (N. J.), 28 At. Rep. 719; 2B1. Com. 130; Ourtiss. Hobart, 41 Me. 230; Wait v. Wait, 4 Barb. (N. Y.) 192; Whitsell v. Mills, 6 lud. 229'; Levins ®. Sleator, 2 Greene (Iowa), 604; Burdick v. Briggs, 11 Wis. 126; Billan D. Herklebrath, 23 Ind. 71; McCraney v. McCraney, 5 Iowa, 232; Rendleman «. Rendleman, 118 111. 260. « Watkins d. Watkins, 7 Yerg. (Tenn.) 28-3; Bryan v. Batcheller, 6 R. I 546; Hokarap V. Hagaman, 36 Md. 511; Walsh v. Kelly, 34 Pa. St. 84; Seagrave v. 55 434 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 394 Where divorce has been obtained and the wife is an inno- cent party, many of the States have provided that, in such case, the wife shall have dower' in the same manner as if her husband was dead." In some of the States the right of dower accrues in such case at once when the decree is given, the same as if the husband had died/ A divorced wife can claim no dower in lands conveyed before the divorce." But a wife who has obtained a divorce from her husband for his fault, is not barred of dower though she afterwards commits adultery.' It is held by some courts that the parties may agree upon the amount of ahmony and that the court can decree such an amount as the parties agreed upon, and thus bar dower.' But this doctrine is not accepted by all the courts.' § 394. Alimony. — At common law alimony was only for the life of the husband. The court may decree the amount of the ahmony the husband is to pay and the length of time for the payment.' Upon divorce being granted, a de- cree in favor of the wife of permanent alimony will bar her right to dower in some States." But if it appears that the divorce is one a mensa et thoro dower will not be barred though alimony is decreed." Postnuptial agreements are not upheld unless they are Seagrave, 13 Yes. 443; Wait v. Wait, 4 Barb. (N. Y.) 193; Clark «. Clark, 6 Watts & S. (Pa.) 85. 1 Crane v. Pipps, 39 Kans. 585; Stilson v. Stilson, 46 Conn. 15; Wood v. Simmons, 30 Mo. 363; Runnells «. Webber, 59 Me. 488: Lamkin v. Knapp, 20 Ohio St. 454; Marvin v. Marvin, 59 Iowa, 699. 'Gleason v. Emerson, 51 N.H. 405; Merrill v. Shattuck, 55 Me. 370; Percival V. Percival, 56 Mich. 297; Hunt v TlumpsoD, 61 Mo. 148; Stilphen v. Houd- lette, 60 Me. 447. ' Tatro ». Tatro, 18 Kebr. 395; Harding v. Alden, 9 Me. 140; Rea v. Kea, 63 Mich. 257. "McKean v. Brovcn, 83 Ky. 209. = Gordons. Dickinson, 131 111. 141. «Owpn V. Yale, 75 Mich. 256; Storey v. Storey, 125 III. 608. ' Seeley's Appeal, 56 Conn. 202. See, also, Stilson «. Stilson, 46 Conn. 15. 6 Storey v. Storey, 125 111. 608; Stratton v. Stratton, 77 Me. 377; Buck v. Buck, 60 111. 343. » Stewart v. Stewart, 43 Ga. 294; Tatro v. Tatro, 18 Nebr. 395; Wood «. Wood, 59 Ark. 441. '" Taylor v. Taylor, 93 N. Car. 418. § 395] EIGHT OF DOWEB. 435 controlled by statute,' and an agreement to accept alimony in lieu of dower wiU not be sustained in some courts,' but it will be in other jurisdictions.' In some States ali- mony may not interfere with the right of dower." § 395. Foreign Decree for Divorce. — Full faith and credit are given to the judgment of another State when the same effect upon rights of property within the jurisdiction of that State is given to such a judgment as is given to it by the law of the State where rendered." So the effect which a decree of divorce, granted in one State, has upon lands of the husband in another State is to be determined, not by the laws of the former, but by the laws of the lat- ter State. Therefore, where a husband obtained a decree of divorce in Illinois on the ground of his wife's abandon- ment of him, the wife is not thereby deprived of her then existing dower rights in the lands of her husband in New York, although the effect of the decree under the statute of Ilhnois was to deprive her of dower in that State. ' The ' 'misconduct" which under the laws of New York' deprives a wife, divorced because thereof, of her right of dower, is only that kind of misconduct which under the laws of New York is a ground for divorce, that is, adultery. ' While it is a principle of general recognition that real estate should be adjudged by the law of the place where the property is situated, as not within the reach of extra- territorial law, yet it is not inconsistent with this principle to accord to a foreign divorce the same effect upon real property located beyond the forum of the decree, that is given to divorces of the same class decreed within the jurisdiction where such property is situated; the same effect should in general be attributed to such divorce as would ordinarily belong to a divorce of the same sort by » Martin v. Martin, 33 Ala. 86. « Shelton v. Shelton, 20 8. Car. 560; Stilson v. Stilson, 46 Conn. 15. » Owen V. Yale, 75 Mich. 356; Storey v. Storey, 125 111. 608. « Rea V. Rea, 53 Mich. 40: 63 Mich. 257. » Green e. Van Buskirk, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 307. •Van Cleaf v. Bums, 133 N. Y. 540, reversing 62 Hun, 350. ' 1 Rev. Stat. 741, sect. 8. •Van Cleaf v. Burns, 133 N. T. 540. 436 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 395 the lex loci rei sitce. If a dissolution of the marriage would there be consequent upon such a divorce, and would there extinguish the right of dower according to the local law, then the hke effects would be attributed to the foreign divorce which worked a like dissolution of the marriage.' Hence, if a right of dower, according to such local law, would accrue upon the granting of a divorce by the local tribunal, the like effect would follow a foreign divorce of the same sort decreed by a competent tribunal. Judge Dickman ably says: "The foreign divorce would not be recognized as exerting an extra-territorial force, propria vigore, but would owe its effects rather to its con- formity to the law of the place where the real property might be situated. '" Thus, a divorce granted to the wife by reason of the aggression of her husband by a competent court in California, both being residents of that State, would, in a claim of dower in Ohio lands, have a like effect with a divorce for an aggression of the same sort decreed by a court of the latter State.' This doctrine is illustrated by the following : A husband deserted his wife in the State of Maine and went into North Carolina and she removed into Rhode Island. Afterward the husband committed adultery in North Carohna, for which cause he was di- vorced from the bonds of matrimony by a competent court of Rhode Island, he having been personally cited to appear, refused to do so.. This divorce was valid, and the wife was entitled to dower in the lands held by the husband in Maine, during the coverture in the same manner as if they had both continued to reside in Maine, and the divorce had been there decreed.' ' Story on Confl. Laws, sect. 230e. » MoGiU V. Deming, 44 Ohio St. 645. ' McGill V. Deming, 44 Ohio St. 645. * Harding v. Alden, 9 Me. 140. § 396] RIGHf OF DOWER. 437 Article 3. Jointure and Devise in Lieu of Dower. % 396. Jointure— Definition. § 404. Time to Elect. § 397. Legal and Equitable. § 405. Insane Widow. § 398. Testamentary Provisions. § 406. Effect of Acceptance. § 399. Construction of Will— Inten- § 407. Invalid Devise, tion. § 408. Lex Domicilii. § 400. No Express Declaration. § 409. Modifying or Abolishing the § 401. Election by Widow. Right of Dower is Constitu- § 402. Valid Election. tional. § 403. Mode of Making Election. § 410. Devise With Power of Sale. § 396. Jointure— Definition. — Jointure is a joint estate limited to both husband and wife. A competent hveh- hood of freehold for the wife, of lands and tenements, to take effect in profit or possession, presently after the death of the husband, for the life of the wife at least. The following are necessary to make a valid jointure: 1. It must take effect, in possession or profit, immediately from the death of the husband. 2. It must be for the wife's life, or for some greater estate. 3. It must be limited to the wife herself, and not to any other person in trust for her. 4. It must be. made in satisfaction for the wife's whole dower, and not of a part of it only. 5. The estate limited to the wife must be expressed or averred to he in satisfaction of her whole dower. 6. It must be made before marriage. Such jointure is binding on the widow, and is a complete bar to the claim of dower. There are other modes of limiting an estate to a wife which are good jointures within the statute, provided the wife accepts them after the death of her husband. She may reject them and claim her dower." In its more enlarged sense, a jointure signifies a joint estate limited to both husband and wife." Jointures are regulated by the statute of uses." Jointure must be for the wife's life, and be made and declared to be in satisfaction of her whole dower.* If jointure is made before marriage, ' Cruise's Dig. tit. 7; 2 Bl. Com. 187. 5 2 Bl. Com. 137. '27Hen. VIL c. 10. -• Co Litt. 36b; Vernon's Case, 4 Co. 1. 438 CLASSIFICATIOK OF ESTATES. [§ 397 it bars dower; if made after marriage, the wife, on the death of her husband, has her election to accept the jointure or to renounce it and apply for her dower at common law. Under the EngUsh law, adultery is no forfeiture of the jointure, or of the agreement to settle jointure, though it be a bar to dower. This distinction depends upon the statute in the one case and not in the other.' But in many of the States jointure is forfeited in the same cases in which dower is. § 397. Legal and Equitable.— At common law jointure is divided into legal and equitable. At common law legal jointure did not require the assent of the wife or her guar- dian in order to make it binding upon her, provided it was not fraudulent. Her assent operated to conclude her from setting up the charge of fraud." A conveyance to trustees, for the use of the wife after her husband's death, is, at law, no jointure; but such settlement, if in other respects good, win be enforced in chancery as an equitable bar of dower. ' Equitable jointure is an executory contract for such a pro- vision, of which a court of equity wiU decree specific per- formance. And a jointure on an infant before marriage bars her dower, on the ground of its being a provision by the husband for the wife's support. It was a bar, a pro- visione veri, and not ex contractu ; and the assent of the wife was held not to be an operative circumstance, though the antenuptial contract was, in that case, executed by the infant in the presence of her guardian; and it might issue out of either real or personal property or both.' An equitable jointure in lieu of dower, if assented to by the guardian of the infant before marriage, will consti- tute an equitable bar. ' ' Sidney v. Sidney, 3 P. Wm. 369; Seagrave v. Seagrave, 13 Ves. 443. ^ Co. Litt. 36b. 'Hervey v. Hervey, 1 A.tk. 563. ■•Buckinghamshire v. Druiy, 3 Bro. P. C. 493; 3 Eden, 39; Caruthers«. Ca- ruthers, 4 Bro. C. C. 506; McCartee v. Teller, 3 Paige (N. Y.), 511; 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 367; Levering v. Heighp, 3 Md. Ch. 81; Corbet v. Corbet, 1 Sim. & Stu. 613; Shaw V. Boyd, 5 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 309; Craig v. "Walthall, 14 Gratt. (Va.) 518; Andrews v. Andrews, 8 Conn. 79; Smith v. Smith, 5 "Ves. 189. » Corbet v. Corbet, 1 Sim. & Stu. 613; McCartee v. Teller, 3 Paige (N. Y.), 511; 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 367. § 398j BIGHT OF DOWER. 439 Legal jointure was made by way of use — an equitable estate for life or in fee; an estate for years was not suffi- cient. It must be provided out of real property." § 398. Testamentary Provisions. — At common law un- less controlled by statute or the contrary appears from the will, the presumption is that the legacy or devise is in- tended as a bounty and not as a purchase or in lieu of dower.' The widow is entitled to both under the common law, unless the contrary appears on the face of the will. This intention may appear by express words, or it may be implied from the frame of the will or particular clause of donation." A devise by the husband does not extinguish the widow's right to dower, unless it clearly appears that such was the intention.* The provision must declare in express terms, to be given in lieu of dower, or that intention must be deduced by clear and manifest implication from the wiU, founded on the fact that the claim of dower would be inconsistent wtih the wiU, or so repugnant to its dispositions as to disturb and defeat them.' But there is another line of decisions that maintain a different rule, and they hold that an intention manifested by the testator in his will, to make an equal division of his ' 2 Bl. Com. 137; Vance v. Vance, 21 Me. 364; Hastings ■». Dickinson, 7 Mass. 158. 'McGowan v. Baldwin, 46 Minn, 477; In re Gotzian, 34 Minn. 159. 3 In re Gotzian, 34 Minn. 159; Konvalinka v. Schlegel, 104 N. T. 123; Boil- ing V. Boiling, 88 Va. 524; Sumerel o. Sumerel, 34 S. Car. 85. Sill V. Sill, 31 Kans. 248; Sanford v. Saiiford, 58 N. T. 69; Reaves v. Gar- rett, 34 Ala. 558; Bretz v. Matney, 60 Mo. 444; O'Brien v. Elliot, 15 Me. 135; Tooke V. Hardeman, 7 Ga. 20; Duncan v. Duncan, 3 Yates (Pa.), 303; Wilson 1). Moore, 86 Ind. 344; Millikin i). Welliver, 37 Ohio St. 460; Bt-em ®. Kimberly, 73 Wis. 343; Cox e. Rogers, 77 Pa. St. 160; Spread v. Morgan, 11 H. L. Cas. 588; Padbury v. Clark, 3 Mac. & G. 307; Wliitridge «. Parkhurst, 30 Md. 62; Bradfords v. Kents, 43 Pa. St. 474: Yorkly «. Stinson, 97 N. Car. 336. ^Woodburn's Estate, 138 Pa. St. 606; Anderson's Appeal, 36 Pa. St. 493; Bierer's Appeal, 93 Pa. St. 266; Cox «. Rogers, 77 Pa. St. 167. 3 Allen V. Hartnett, 116 Mo. 278. * Church B. McLaren, 85 Wis. 123. "Baldozier v. Haynes, 57 Iowa, 683; Stoddard «. Cutcompt, 41 Iowa, 339; Craig V. Conover, 80 Iowa, 355. * Craig ». Conover, 80 Iowa, 355. ' Bannister v. Bannister, 37 S. Car. 539 See, also, Nelson v. Brown, 66 Hun (N. T.), 311; Stone v. Vandermark, 146 111. 313; Goodrum v. Goodrum, 56 Ark. 533. > Zimmerman «. Lebo, 151 Pa. St. 345. § 404] RIGHT OP DOWER. 445 If she has taken the residence for life according to the will, a conveyance to her of such property by all the heirs and legatees, gives her a good fee-simple title to it.' She cannot take her homestead in other land not the home- stead of her husband in order to increase her dower right." § 404. Time to Elect. — The time to elect is regulated by statute; and election should be exercised in substantial compliance with it.' In all cases where there is a wiU, the widow is conclusively bound by it, unless she renounces its provisions and elects in the manner pointed out in the statute.' And if she dies without having made an election as presciibed by statute, she will be deemed to have taken imder the will notwithstanding the fact that she was ignor- ant of the statutory requirements, and had in fact deter- mined to take under the law. ' However it has been held that if a widow dies during the time prescribed for making the election, she will be presumed to have elected that provision which was most favorable to her.' She can make her election before letters have been issued, but she cannot be compelled to do it.' In Georgia the widow may, before the will is admitted to record and the executor has qualified, repudiate the election previously made." ' Small V. Marburg, 77 Md. 11. ^ Christopher v. Christopher, 92 Tenn. 408. ^ Price ». Woodford, 43 Mo. 247; Ewing v. Ewing, 44 Mo. 33; Dougherty V. Barnes, 64 Mo. 159. ^Stephens v. Glbbes, 14 Fla. 831; Waterbury v. Netherland, 6 Heisk. (Tenn.) 512; Cowdrey v. Hitchcock, 103 111. 263. 5 Fosher v. Guilliams, 120 Ind. 172. See, also, Hillard v. Binf ord, 10 Ala. 987; Kemp v. Holland, 10 Mo. 255; Malone v. Majors, 8 Humph. (Tenn.) 577; Hastings v. Clifford, 33 Me. 133; Smith v. Smith, 20 Vt. 270; Lewis v. Lewis, 7 Ired. Eq. (N. Car.) 72; Collins i>. Carmen, 5 Md. 504; Thompson v. Egbert, 17 X. J. L. 459; Pratt i). Felton, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 174; Boone v. Boone, 3 Har. & McH. (Md.) 95; Pettijohn «. Beasley, 1 Dev. & B. (N. C.) 254; Kennedy «. Mills, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 556. * Merrill v. Emery, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 507. ' Stone V. Vandermark, 146 111. 312. 8 Hill ». Hill, 88 Ga. 612. See, also, Pellizzarro v. Reppert, 83 Iowa, 497; Andrews v. Bassett, 93 Mich. 449; Slausoa v. Slauson, 83 Iowa, 366. 446 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 405-406 § 405. Insane Widow. — Any court having the power of a court of equity will act for an insane widow where she has a right of election. Such court has the power, and it is its duty, to protect those who have no other lawful pro- tector. In making such election, the court is guided by consideration for the benefit of the insane widow without regard to what advantage may be to the husband's heirs." An incompetent is incapable of consenting, and there can be no implication of assent or presumption of acquiescence from the failure of an incompetent to act.' So the failure of an incompetent widow to file her election according to statute, will not be deemed an assent on her part to take under the will.' In such case the legal representative of the insane widow may make the election.* §406. Effect of Acceptance. — An acceptance made by the will wiU bar the widow's right to any legal claim in land aliened by her husband during coverture and by warranty deed.' This rule applies to a widow insane, and when an election is made by the authorized agent she is bound,' and such an election takes effect in another State.' Where a husband during the lifetime of his first wife made a will disposing of all his property, and after her death remarried and then died without making any change in such will, or in any way providing for the second wife, she ' Young 41. Boardman, 97 Mo. 181, 188; Van Steenwyck v. Washburn, 59 Wis. 502; Wright 1). West, 3 Lea (Tenn.l, 78, Smither ® Smither, 9 Bush (Ky ), 330, State v Upland, 80 Minn, 377; Penhallow v. Kimhall, 61 N. H 596; Lewis v. Lewis, 7 Ired, Eq 72. « Digby «. Howard, 4 Sim. 588, 3 Clarke & F. 634; Ashby v. Palmer, 1 Mer. 396; Seeley «. Jago, 1 P Wm, 389. 5 In re Andrew's Estate, 93 Mich. 449 "Bassett v. Durfee, 87 Mich. 167, In re Andrew's Estate, 93 Mich. 449. Compare Kennedy ® Johnston, 61 Pa. St. 451 'Chapln ». Mills, 1 R I, 446, Kennedy v Mill, 13 Wend. (N. Y,)553, Steele -B. Fisher, 1 Edw Ch (N Y ) 435, Aliens Pray, 13 Me 138; Hornseyc. Casey, 21 Mo. 545, Bufflngton v Bank 113 Mass 246; Raines v Corbin, 34 Ga 185; Evana v Pierson, 9 Rich (S, Car.) 9. Haynie v. Dickens, 68 111, 267; Fairchild «. Marshall, 42 Minn. 14 Compare Borland v. Nichols, 13 Pa. St. 38. 'Van Steenwyck v. Washburn. 59 Wis. 483. 'Washburn ». Van Steenwyk, 33 Minn. 336. SeC; also, Purophry v Pum- phry, 52 Ark. 193. § 407] RIGHT OF DOWER. 44:7 takes a dower right ia his estate, the same as if he had died intestate.' The court of equity will allow her this election, after acceptance, and enjoyment for some time of the devise if it appears that she acted without full knowledge and understanding of her true situation and rights, and of the consequence of her acceptance." If the wife has made her election of the devise with full knowledge of her rights she will be bound." If the husband exchange for other lands, the wife must elect in which she will take dower.' §407. Invalid Devise. — If the widow accepts the testa- mentary provision and it or the wiU shall fail for illegality, she is not bound and equity will relieve, provided the right of creditors or purchasers are not concerned, and wiU per mit her to claim dower. ' The widow by her election to take the provision made for her in the will, consents to all the terms and conditions announced for her in the will, and yields any right inconsistent therewith, and, therefore, is not entitled to dower, at least in the absence of any offer to surrender the benefit she had received under the will, and to take what the law would allow her. ° If a testator, having contrary to his intention, died intestate as to a por- tion of his property, the statute declares who are interested in it. And if the widow elects to take under the will she relieves this real estate from the burden of dower; ' and she is at once on the death of her husband charged with the duty of informing herself so as to make her election. ' 'Burrall v. Hurd, 61 Mich. 608; Burrall v. Clark, 61 Mich. 634. 'Wakes. Wake, 3 Bro. C. 0. 25.5; Jones v Powell, 6 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 194; Shotwell v. Sedam, 3 Ohio 1; Chapin v. Hill, 1 R. I. 446; Dixon v. McCue, 14 Gratt. (Va.) 540; McCalister v. Brand, 11 B. Mon. (Ky. ) 870; Collins v. Carman, 5 Md. 508; Copp -v. Hersey, 31 N. H. 317; United States ®. Duncan, 4 McLean, C. C. 99; Duncan v. Duncan, 3 Yeates (Pa.), 303. 'Birmingham v. Kirwan, 3 Sch. & Lef. 451; Van Orden v. Van Orden, 10 Johns. (N. T.) 80; Pickett ». Peary, 3 Const. Rep. (S. Car.) 746; Jackson ». Churchill 7 Cow. (N. Y.), 387. ■• Co. Litt. 31b. 'Hone V. Van Schalck, 7 Paige (N. Y.), 321, 338. •Lee V. Tower, 124 N. Y. 370. 'Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 43 N. Y. 434; In re Benson, 96 N. Y. 499; Vernon v. Vernon, 53 N. Y. 363; Caulfleld v. Sullivan, 85 N. Y. 153. 8 Akin V. Kellogg, 119 N. Y. 441. 448 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 408-410 § 408. Lex Domicilii. — Wills of personal property must be construed by the lex domicilii. Thus, where one dom- iciled in New York bequeathed personal property to his wife, but made no disposition of real estate in another State, and there was nothing incompatible with her claim for dower, the testator's intention must be measured by the common law rule of the lex domicilii.' § 409. Modifying oe Abolishing the Eight of Dower IS Constitutional. — In most jurisdictions the wife's con- tingent right of dower in her husband's lands, should she survive him, is a valuable interest, but it is not a vested one. It is a contingency of which the husband at com- mon law cannot bar her by his own act. Yet, being a contingency and not a vested thing, a statute may consti- tutionally take it away from her.' During the life of the husband the right of dower is a mere expectancy or possibility.' In that condition of things the lawmaking power may deal with it as may be deemed proper. It is not a natural right. It is wholly given by law, and the power that gave it may increase, diminish or otherwise alter it, or wholly take it away. But upon the death of the husband, the right of the widow becomes fixed and vested.' § 410. Devise With Power of Sale.— If the devise is to the widow with a power of sale of real estate, the directions to seU must be absolute, in order to create an equitable conversion ; if the directions to seU are condi- tional they are not sufficient to authorize an equitable conversion. ' ' Boiling V. Boiling, 88 Va. 534. 'Richards v Bellingham Bay Land Co., 54 Fed. Rep. 209; Weaver «. Gregg, 6 Ohio St. 547; Strong v. Clem, 13 Ind. 37; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 24 Wend. (N T ) 193- Sewall v. Lee, 9 Mass. 363; Noel «. Ewing, 9 Ind. 37; Lucas v. Sawyer, n'lowa, 517; Barbour ^>. Barbour, 46 Me. 9; Magee ii^ Young 40 Miss 164- Moore li. Mayor, 8 N. T. 110; Melizet's Appeal, 17 Pa. St. 449; Henson v. Moore, 104 111, 403; 2 Bish. on Mar. Worn. sect. 42. See, also, Goodwin v King, 31 Fla. 525; France v. Connor, 3 Wyo. 445. 3 6oodkind«. Bartlett, 136 111. 18; Randall v. Kreiger, 33 Wall. (U. S.) 148. 4 Randall v. Kreiger, 28 Wall. (U. S.) 148. See, also, McNeer v. McNeer. 143 111. 388. 5 Machemer's Estate, 140 Pa. St. 544. § 411] EIGHT OF DOWER. 449 To establish a conversion, the will must direct it abso- lutely free of all conditions." Article 4. Assignment and Remedies, § 411 Quarantine— Definition. § 420. Valuation of the Premises. §412. According to Common Riglit — §421. Valid Assignment. Against Common Right. § 422. Estoppel to Claim Dower. §413. Exceptions to the rule as to §423. Present Value of Dower. Metes and Bounds § 424. Remedies to Recover. § 414 Parties. § 425. In Equity. § 415 Recovery from Purchaser. § 426. Remedy by Distress — Eject- § 416. Limitation. ment. § 417. Effect By Death of Widow. § 427. Confirmation of Report. §418. Two Widows. §428 Judgment. § 419. Damages for Retention. § 411. Quarantine — Definition. — At common law the space of forty days was allowed the widow to remain in her husband's principal mansion immediately after his death. This was called her quarantine. In all the States of the United States provision has been made by statute securing to the widow this right for a greater or lesser space of time. It is generally held that she has no estate in the land until assignment; and after the expiration of her quaran- tine the heir at common law might put her out of posses- sion, and drive her to her suit for her dower. She had no right to stay in her husband's mansion beyond the forty days; and it is not until her dower has been duly assigned that the widow acquires a vested estate for life, which will enable her to sustain ejectment." Quarantine is a personal right, forfeited by implication of law or by a second marriage.' If dower is not set off to her within the time prescribed, she may take action for the 'Jones v. Caldwell, 97 Pa. St. 42; Hammond ». Putnam, 110 Mass. 235. ^Lilt. sect. 43; Co. Litt. 32b, 37a; Johnson v. Morse, 2 N. H. 49; McCully V. Smith, 2 Bailey (S. Car.), 103; Doe v. Nutt, 2 Carr. & P. 430. 2 Co. Litt. 32, 32b, 34b; 2 Bl. Com. 139. 57 450 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 412 recovery of dower and its assignment, or her possession may continue her natural life.' ' No one can make assignment of dower but the tenant of the freehold. ' And the writ of dower will not lie against a person holding a mere chattel interest in the land, or hav- ing an estate of less duration than the life of the dower- ess.' Because an assignment of dower being an act in- volving the interest of the person entitled to the inherit- ance, no one is competent to assign dower but the tenant of the freehold As no tenant of an inferior nature is ca- pable of binding the rights of the freeholder in real ac- tion, and CQnsequently as a judgment obtained on writ of dower brought against a person having merely a chattel interest, would be voidable by the freeholder, as the consist- ency of the law requires that such person should not bind the freeholder by assigning dower without action.' If her right of dower is denied on legal ground, equity wiU defer the final determination of her claim until her legal right has been established by a judgment at law.' § 412. AccoRmNG TO Common Eight— Against Common Eight. — At common law a widow is entitled in the assign- ment of dower to one-third of each tract of land. And an assignment by the law is called * ' according to common right. " Where dower is assigned the widow by the heir, he may assign the whole of one or more of the several tracts in lieu of a third of each one, which will be a good assignment if accepted by the widow. This assignment by agreement is "against common right." ° If dower is assigned according to common right and the widow be evicted by paramount title of the one-third as- signed to her in one parcel, she, is entitled to be endowed ^Eiggs V. Girard, 133 111. 625. ^ Drost ®. Hall (N. J.), 28 At. Rep. 81; Ellicott v. Hosier, 7 N. Y. 201, 205. ^Dorst V. Hall (N. J.), 28 At. Rep. 81; Hurd «. Grant, 3 Wend. (K. Y.) 340; Galbraith i). Green, 18 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 85, 94; Seaton ». Jamison, 7 Watts (Pa.), 533, 537. *Parkon Dow. 256; See, also, Ellicott v. Mosier, 7 N. Y. 201; Sherwood ■B. Vandenburgh, 2 Hill (K Y.), 303, 807. « Association ». Brinley, 84 N. J. Eq. 438, 489. « Sanders ». McMillian, 98 Ala. 144; French v. Pratt, 27 Me. 381. § 413] BIGHT OF DOWER. 451 anew in the remainder of that parcel. But if the widow- be endowed against common right and be evicted of a part of the land assigned her, she can have no new assignment of dower by reason thereof. ' Dower of common right must, as a general rule, be set out by metes and bounds." However, if the dower arises out of rents, or other incorporeal hereditaments, of which the husband was seised in fee, the third part of the profits is appropriated to the widow." If the property be not divisible, as a miU, she is dowable in a special manner and has either one third of the toll, or the entire mill for every third month." And where one died seised of a ferry, the widow was endowed of one-third of the profits, or to have the use of it one-third of the time. ' The assignment of dower in mines may be by a propor- tion of the profits.' An assignment of dower against common right in all the lands of which the husband of the doweress died seised and duly accepted and enjoyed by her is conclusive that dower was set off in aU his real estate. ' The conveyance of land to a widow, executed after the death of her husband, but in accordance with his express directions prior to his death, is not to be deemed an assign- ment of dower against common right in the absence of any evidence of such intention.' § 413. Exceptions to the Eule as to Metes and Bounds. — The general rule at common law is that the assignment of dower must be by metes and bounds, but to this rule there are exceptions, one of which is that when the thing is entire, as a house, the assignment may be of so many rooms, and not a third part of it. In such case ' French v. Pratt, 27 Me. 381. « Co. Litt. 34b; Pierce v. Williams, 3 Pen. (N. J.) 521; Sanders v. McMillian, «8 Ala. 144. ' Co. Litt. 144b. *Co. Litt. 33a. ' Stevens v. Stevens, 3 Dana (Ky.), 373. "Stoughton V. Leigh, 1 Taunt. 403; Billings?). Taylor, lO Pick. (Mass.) 460; Lenfers n. Henke, 73 111. 405. 'Fuller V. Rust, 153 Mass. 46. » Chase v. Alley, 82 Me. 334. 452 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 413 it is essential to the beneficial enjoyment of the part that passages and stairways be assigned to be used by the widow jointly with others.' Another exception to the rule is that when from the nature of the husband's interest in the property there can be no assignment in severalty, an assignment by metes and bounds will of necessity be dispensed with, as where lands are held in common, in which case dower interest is assigned to be held in common with other tenants." And the same is now true with respect to lands held by the husband as a joint tenant, where the jus accrescendi, the right of survivorship, has been abolished, except as to estates held jointly by executors or trustees, or where otherwise provided in the instrument creating the estate.' Where there is no dwelUng house on the premises in which dower is sought to be assigned, the widow's wishes need not be consulted, but there must be a fair division according to the quality and quantity.* Where there are several parcels of land the commissioners or other officers may set dower entirely in one of the parcels ° if any one is of sufficient value." And where there are several pieces and a part is incumbered by mortgage, dower may be set wholly in the unincumbered parcels.' At common law if the property did not admit of an assignment of dower in severalty, either from the nature of the husband's interest in it or from the quality of the thing itself, the assignment by metes and bounds was of necessity dispensed with, and an assignment of compensa- tion in lieu of dower was made, or an assignment against common right; and this assignment was so made as to yield the widow one-third of the rents and profits received from the entire estate. ° ' Simmons v. Lyles, 37 Gratt. (Va.) 923. « Co. Litt. 33b; Litt. sect. 44; Parrish v. Parrish, 88 Va. 529. 'Parrish v. Parrish, 88 Va. 529. ■" Moore v. Dick, 134 111. 43. See, also, White v. Story, 3 Hill (S. Car.), 543; Jones V. Jones, Busbee (N. Car.), 177. 'Piatt's Appeal, 56 Conn 572; Clift ». Clift, 87 Tenn. 17. « Williams v. Williams, 78 Me. 84; French v. Pratt, 27 Me. 885. ■I Piatt's Appeal, 56 Conn. 572. * Sanders «. McMillian, 98 Ala. 144. § 414] EIGHT OF DOWER 453 § 414. Parties.— If the land is held separately by sev- eral grantees of the husband, dower must be granted in each parcel;' and if suit is brought, separate action must be brought against each owner." And when the widow is entitled to dower in a tract of land which has been divided among different owners, she may bring a separate suit for dower against each owner without joining the other owners as co-defendants. ' An administrator of an intestate has no interest in the lands, and is not entitled by his petition to be made a party to the suit by the intestate's widow for assignment of her dower.' But a creditor of a person who died seised of lands, and who has a lien on the realty, may be made a party to a proceeding for dower and contest the claim of the widow;' because he has such an interest as entitles him to be made a party defendant to the end that he may justly prevent the allotment of excessive dower.' And the same rule holds as to personalty when the creditor has a hen on the property.' The tenant of the freehold is the proper party to allot dower. But a disseisor may do it, and if made strictly of common right, it will bind the rightful owner.' If a guar- dian of a minor tenant makes the assignment, it will con- trol the tenant upon arriving at age; otherwise not.° But in Illinois it has been held that a minor tenant of the free- hold may revise the assignment upon becoming of age, though the assignment was set off by his guardian.'" Either 'Droste v. Hall (N. J.), 39 At. Rep. 437; Co. Lltt. 25 a; Cook v. Fisk, Walk. (Mich.) 423; Doe o. Gwinnell, 1 Q. B. 433; In re Garrison, 15 N. J. Eq. 93. i'Droste a. Hall (N. J.), 39 At. Rep. 437; Barney®. Frowner, 9 Ala. 901; Fos- dick t). Gooding, 1 Me. 30; Hartshorne v. Hartshorne, 3 N. J. Eq. 349. » Coburn ». Herrington, 114 111. 104; Droste ®. Hall (N. J.), 39 At. Rep. 487. ^Kenyonc. Kenyon, 17 R. I. 539. ' Welfare v. Welfare, 108 N. Car. 272. «Ex parte Moore, 64 N. Car. 90; Lowery «. Lowery, 64 N. Car. 110; Ex parte Avery, 64 N. Car. 113. ' Hewitt ». Cox, 55 Ark. 225. 'Co. Litt. 85 a; Stoughton ®. Leigh, 1 Taunt. 402, '3 Bl. Com. 136; Jones v. Brewer, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 814; Young u. Tarbell, 87 Me. 509; Curtis v. Hobart, 41 Me. 230. "Bonner v. Peterson, 44 III. 260; Strawn v. Strawn, 50 111. 256. 454 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATEa [§§ 415-416 of two or more tenants of the freehold, who hold jointly may set off the dower.' The action is brought against the tenant of the freehold, even if he be a disseisor.' Where land, at the time a suit is brought, is owned by different parties, such parties should be made defendants.' But where there are several parcels sold by the husband to different grantees, to join the grantees of the several parcels aliened renders the bill multifarious by uniting definite and independent demands against different defend- ants in one bill.* §415. Eecovery from Purchaser. — The inchoate right of dower cannot be defeated by subsequent omissions of the husband. So where he has neglected to record his deed, and then gives a mortgage upon the land to others, his widow is entitled to dower out of the land in the hands of the purchaser at a sale made for the foreclosure of the mortgage. ' A plea of purchase for a valuable considera- tion without notice is equitable in its character, and has no proper application to a claim purely legal hke that of dower;" it cannot be a defense against a legal claim of dower.'' § 416. Limitation. — In the English law the wife's remedy by action for her dower is not within the ordinary stat- utes of limitation for the widow had no seisin; but a fine levied by the husband, or his alienee or heir, will bar her by force of the statute of non-claims, unless she brings her action within five years after her title accrues, and her dis- abilities, if any, be removed. ' In English law there is no 1 Co. Litt. 35 a. i* Ellis u. Ellis, 4 R. I. 110; Maiming v. Laboree, 33 Me. 343; Barker i), Blake, 36 Me. 438; Ellicott «. Mosier, 7 N. Y. 301. 'Morgan v. Blatchley, 33 W. Va. 155. *Droste c. Hall (N. J.), 39 At. Rep. 437; Crane v. Fairchild, 14 N. J. Eq. 76 'Sondley v. Caldwell, 28 S. Car. 580; Pickett v. Lyles, 5 S. Car. 375. « Story's Eq. sect. 630; McMorris ». Webb, 17 8. Gar. 563; Sondley «. Cald- well, 28 S. Car. 580. •> Mitchell V. Farrish, 69 Md. 335. •4 Kent's Com. 70. § 416] RIGHT OF DOWER. 455 bar. And it has been held by many States that the writ of dower is not within the statute of Umitations.' But many States have enacted laws providing that lapse of time shaU bar dower." In Missouri it is held that, an action for the assignment of dower being an action for the recovery of real estate, is not barred unless the land has been in the adverse possession for the specified time given the statute.' In Montana there is no statute barring the right of the widow to prosecute her action for the assign- ment of dower.* In Illinois the statute of hmitations as to real estate applies, and it may be interposed after the death of the husband. ' In those cases where the statute of limitations may be interposed to bar dower, it must be after the death of the husband and not before.' A vendee of land in possession under an executory con- tract of sale does not hold adversely to the vendor so long as the purchase money remains unpaid; and during that time the statute of hmitations will not run in the vendee's favor. But such possession of the vendee is adverse to the claim of dower in the land made by the widow of the ven- dor. Her right of action for an assignment arises immedi- ately upon the death of her husband, and may be against 'Barnard v. Edwards, 4 N. H. 107; Parker v. Obear, 7 Met. (Mass.) 24; Burt c. Cook Sheep Co., 10 Mont. 571; Wakeman v. Roache, Dudley (6a.), 123; Wells®. Beall, 2 (Jill. & J. (Md.) 468; Mitchell v. Farrish, 69 Md. 235; Tooke V. Hardeman, 7 Ga. 20; Robie v. Flanders, 33 N. H. 521; Spencer v. Weston, 1 Dev. & B. (N. Car.) 213; Guthrie v. Owen, 10 Yerg. (Tenn. 339; May ». Rumney, 1 Mich. 1. 'Tuttle V. Wilson, 10 Ohio. 24; Chapman v. Schroeder, 10 Ga. 321; Car- michael v. Carmichael, 5 Humph. (Tenn.) 96; Robie v. Flanders, 33 N. H. 524; Chew V. Bank, 2 Md. Ch. 231; Spencer v. Weston, 1 Dev. & B. (X. Car.), 213; Chase v. Alley, 82 Me. ^34; Proctor v. Bigelow, 38 Mich. 282; King v. Merritt, 67 Mich. 194; Durham v. Angler, 20 Me. 242; Ridgway v. McAlpine, 31 Ala. 464. ' Beard v. Hale, 95 Mo 16; Robinson v. Ware, 94 Mo. 678; Sherwood v. Baker, 105 Mo. 478; Null v. Howell, 111 Mo. 273. See, also, Barksdale v. Garrett, 64 Ala. 277; Elyton Land Co. v. Denny. 96 Ala. 836; Owen v. Campbell, 32 Ala. 521. «Burt v. Cook Sheep Co., 10 Mont. 571. 5 Miller d. Pence, 133 111. 156; Owen v. Peacock, 38 111. 33. « Miller v. Pence, 132 111. 156; Durham v. Angier, 30 Me. 342; Moore v. Frost, 3 N. H. 127; Winters v. De Turk, 133 Pa. St. 359. 456 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 417 the heir himself or any one who deforces her of it.' This is the rule when dower comes within the statute of limita- tions. There is no analogy between the effect of possession by a disseisor of the husband and that of possession by a vendee entering under him ; the former, if continued long enough, destroys the husband's title, causing the right of dower to fall with it ; whereas the latter is held under the title of the husband and not adversely to it. Wherefore, although the delay of the statutory period after the husband's death in bringing the action for_dower will bar it, no length of possession prior to the husband's death by one claiming under a deed from him will have that effect." In Illinois the right to sue for dower is not barred by the seven years statute of limitations where it appears that, during one of the seven years' occupation of the land of the defendant, the land was sold for taxes, since it is essential to the bar of the statute that the defendant should have paid all the taxes." And when the widow claims dower and occupies the land, the statute does not run against her." § 417. Effect by Death of Widow. — The right of al- lotment of dower is a legal right personal to the widow and cannot be transferred by assignment.' And where the widow dies before dower is assigned, and not having brought an action to recover dower, her right at law for damages for its detention died with her." At law if she, in an action of dower, dies before judgment of seisin is executed, her right to an estate in dower is deter- mined; if before the damages are assessed, her right to damages are gone.' ' Long V. Kansas City Stock Yard Co., 107 Mo. 298. 2 Winters v. De Turk, 133 Pa. St. 359, distinguishing Care v. Keller, 77 Pa. St. 489. = Hart «. Randolph, 143 111. 521. * Hastings v. Mace, 157 Mass. 499. » Parton v. Allison, 109 N. Car. 674. 'Parks V. McClellan, 44 N. J. L. 553, 553; Story's Eq. Jur. sect. 625; Park on Dower, 309; Howell «. Howell, 59 Hun (N. Y.), 538. •" Point V. Kerr, 49 N. J. Eq. 65; Rowe i). Johnson, 19 Me. 146; Rawson®. § 418] BIGHT OF DOWEE. 457 Damages can only be given for the detention of the pos- session, and in writs of right, where the right itself is dis- disputed, no damages are given, because no wrong is done until the right is determined. This is the rule at law. In equity a different rule prevails, and the court will de- cree an account of rents and profits against the persons ■who have been in possession since the death of the hus- band, provided that, at the time when the bill is filed, the legal right to damages was not gone.' When a widow who files a biU in chancery for dower, dies pending the suit, her personal representative may revive the suit and obtain mesne profits," unless he and the widow were guilty of great laches.' In equity, if a widow dies pending a bill for dower, her death does not deprive her personal representative of the arrears of dower, but he may revive the suit and recover mesne profits. But if no suit be pending in equity when the widow dies, her right to damages dies with her, and, in that case, her personal representative cannot recover mesne profits. And if the report of the master iu chancery has been confirmed, the action does not abate, but will be continued by the executor of the widow after her death." § 418. Tw^o Widows. — Cases may occur in which there may be two or more widows to be endowed out of the same realty. ° Thus if a party who is married be seised of land and sells to another who has a wife, and then both vendor and vendee die, the widow of the vendee will have dower in only two-thirds of the land, and one-third of the remaining one-third on the death of the vendor's widow who having the elder title in dower, is to be first satisfied Corbett, 43 111. App. 127; Turney d. Smith, 14 111. 343; Atkins v. Yeomans, 6 Met. (Mass.) 438; Sandback v. Quigley, 8 Watts (Pa.), 460; Roane. Holmes, S2 Fla. 395. ' Park on Dower, 880. 'Curtis «. Curtis. 3 Bro. C. C. 630; Story Eq. Jur. sect. 635. See, also, Stieger v. Hillen, 5 Gill & J. (Md.) 131; Kiddall v. Trimble, 1 Md. Cli. I43] 147; Johnson «. Thomas, 3 Paige (N. Y.), 377, 383. ^Stieger d. Hillen, 5 Gill & J. (Md.) 131, 139; Herrington v. Ooburn, 108 111. 613. * Robinson «. Govers, 138 N. Y. 435. 'Co. Litt. 31a; Gear «. Hamblin, 1 Me. 54; Reeve's Dom. Rel. 58. 58 458 CLASSIFICATION OP ESTATES. [§ 41& of her dower out of the whole tract. So if lands descend to a son charged with the right of dower of his mother, and it is set off to her, and then the son dies in her life- time, his widow is only entitled to dower in two-thirds of the premises, because he died seised of no greater part.' Had the son survived his mother, his widow would have taken dower in the whole estate.' But of course, if the marriage of the vendee did not take place until after the assignment of the elder doweress, then the dower in the one-third would not revive to the vendee's widow. ' Since by the assignment of dower, the son or vendee loses the seisin to that part of the land, the widow of the son or vendee would only have dower out of the remaining two- thirds, in conformity to the maxim, dos de dote peti non debet, dower should not be sought of dower; but if the vendee or son survived the vendor's or ancestor's widow, he would regain the actual seisin of the one-third and his wife's right would attach.' So where a husband is di- vorced for his fault and then remarries and' dies, leaving the divorced and the second wife surviving, the former takes dower in one-third of the whole unincumbered and the latter takes dower in the whole subject to the incum- brance of the first wife's prior right of dower. ° § 419. Damages FOR Eetention. — At common law, where the husband was once seised during coverture in such manner, that the wife's inchoate or contingent right of dower attached, it was not in the power of the husband to defeat it by any act in the nature of an aUenation or charge. The wife upon the death of the husband was en- titled to claim dower from the ahenee, if she survived her 'Stable. Stahl, 114 111. 878; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 5 Paige (N. Y.). 161; Safeord v. Safford, 7 Paige (N. Y.), 259. «In re Cregier, 1 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 599; Elwood «. Klock, 13 Barb. (N. Y.) 50; Atwood i>. Atwood, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 883. Compare Leavitt v. Lamprey, 13 Pick. (Mtiss.) 382. ^Manning v. Laboree, 33 Me. 343; Bastard's Case, 4 Rep. 122; Reynolds «. Reynolds, 5 Paige (N. Y.), 161. Compare Bear v. Snyder, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 592, * McLeery v. McLeery, 65 Me. 172; Cook v. Hammond, 4 Mason, C. C. 485; Robinson v. Miller, 2 B. Mon. (Ky.) 288; Hilchins v. Hilchins, 2 Vern. 405. ^ Stalil 0. Stahl, 114 111. 378. § 420] RIGHT OF DOWER. 45& husband, and the dower was to be assigned to her in kind in the same manner as she would have recovered against the heir of the husband, had the latter died seised, except as to damages. She was not entitled to any damages, un- less the husband died seised.' The statute of Merton" gave damages when the husband, died seised, equal to the value of the dower, from the time of the husband's death; but the construction is, that the damages are computed only from the time of making the demand of the heir;' and damages in the case of detention of dower rest on similar grounds in most of the United States. She can recover damages for the retention of her dower, to an amount equahng one-third part of the annual value of the mesne profits of the land." A right of dower is not an undivided third of the entirety, but of one-third in severalty;' nor is it one-third of the entire income of the whole.' Statutory provisions now control the recovery of damages. §420. Valuation of the Premises. — ^At common law if the land was held by the heir or devisee, the widow was entitled to have the value of the land estimated at the time dower was assigned, thus giving her the benefit of improvements made by the heir or devisee, and also that she should bear a proportion of the loss which may have incurred by an unavoidable diminution in the value of the lands during the time which intervenes between the death of her husband and the assignment of dower. If such deterioration was caused by the willful waste of the heir, she was entitled to an action for damages against him, but it did not affect or alter the manner of assignment.' The American doctrine excludes the widow ' Scrib. on Dower, ch. 29, sects. 1, 6; Co. Litt. 32 b; Verlander v. Harvey, 36 W. Va. 374. Compare Tod. v. Baylor, 4 Leigh (Va ), 498. = 20 Hen. 111. 'Co. Litt. 33b; Embree v. Ellis, 3 Johns. (N. Y.) 119. ^Kea V. Rea, 53 Mich. 40; 63 Mich. 257. 'May B. Rumney, 1 Mich. 1, 9; Rayner v. Lee, 20 Mich. 384. * Leonard®. Leonard, 4 Mass. 533; Conner ■». Shepherd, 15 Mass. 167; King V. Merritt. 67 Mich. 194. 'Sanders v. McMillian, 98 Ala, 144; Pepper v. Thomas, 85 Ky. 539; Catlin v. Ware, 9 Mass. 218; Mahoney v. Young, 3 Dana (Ky.), 588; 460 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 421 from taking advantage of an. alienee in the husband's lifetime and excludes the widow from taking advantage of his improvements upon the estate; she must take ac- cording to the value at the time of the alienation in case the husband sold in his lifetime, and according to the value at the time of the assignment if the land descended to the heir.' She is generally allowed, though not in all the States, to have the benefit of any rise in value result- ing from other causes, the policy of the rule being not to discourage purchasers from making improvements.' The wife will not be allowed for her own improvements.' § 421. Valid Assignment. — The assignment must be legal in order to make it valid. An assignment of dower in lands not included in the petition is void." And where property was conveyed to the husband at his instance for the purpose of defrauding his wife, and the consideration of the conveyance was her land, this shows a resulting trust in favor of the wife ; and a second wife after his death cannot have dower in such lands. ° When a widow accepts a portion of the land for her Wall V. Hill, 7 Dana (Ky.), 175; Powell «. M. & B. Manuf. Co. 3 Mason, C. C. 347; Humphrey B. Pliinney, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 484; Thompsons. Morrow, 5 Serg. & R. (Pa) 389; Wilson v. Oatman, 2 Blackf . (Ind.) 233; Verlander d. Harvey 36 W. Va. 374; Tod «. Baylor, 4 Leigh (Va.), 498; Hale v. James, 6 Johns'. Ch. (N. Y.) 258; Parks ». Hardey, 4 Bradf. (N. Y.) 15; Summers v. Babb 13 111. 483; AUsmiller «. Freutchenicht, 86 Ky. 198; Thrasher ii. Pink- ard, 33 Ala. 616. Compare Doe v. Gwinnell, 1 Q. B. 683, 695; Strong «. Clem, 13 Ind. 37: Harrow v. Myers, 29 Ind. 469. 1 Manning v. Laboree, 33 Me. 343; Moore v. Kent, 37 Iowa, 20; Co. Litt. 33 a; Husted's Appeal, 34 Conn. 488; Young v. Wolcott, 1 Iowa, 174 Pepper V Thomas 85 Ky. 539; .AUsmiller u. Freutchenicht, 86 Ky. 198; McClanahan -». Porter, 10 Mo. 746; Catlin v. Ware, 9 Mass. 318; Baden v. McKenny, 7 Mackey (D. Col.) 368. ,,^ ^ ,^ ^ Boyd V. Carlton, 69 Me. 300; Price v. Hobbs. 47 Md. 359; Westcott 1>. Campbell, 11 R. I. 378. Bowie v. Berry, 1 Md. Ch. 452; Johnston «. Van- Dyke, 6 McLean. C. C. 433; Wood v. Morgan, 56 Ala. 397; Ware v. Owens, 43 Ala. 313; Springle v. Shields, 17 Ala. 395; Francis ». Garrard, 18 Ala. 794; Sanders v. McMillian, 98 Ala. 144; Barney v. Frowner, 9 Ala. 901; Beavers -». Smith, 11 Ala. 20. 3 Sparks v. Ball, 91 Ky. 503. "Falls V. Wright, 55 Ark. 562. 'Randolph «. Randolph, 107 N. Car. 506. See, also, Sheppard v. Sheppard, 87 Ala. 560. §§ 422-423] RIGHT OF DOWER. 46i dower interest at a suit of the husband's creditors, which proved to be far less than one-third of the land, she will be entitled to a re-assignment.' But a re- sale and re-estimate will not be decreed on the ground that the allowance was excessive, especially when the creditors do not complain.' § 422. Estoppel to Claim Dower. — The widow may bar her right to dower by her acts, without a formal release. Thus, if she consents that her dower interest in lands, though not included in the order of sale may be sold by the administrator, and accepts her part of the purchase-money, she is estopped, in equity, from asserting her legal title against the purchaser ; but the estoppel is not available at law." In order that her acts during coverture shall act as an estoppel they must be equivalent in legal effect to one of the formal modes provided by law for the release of dower.* If by her acts she misleads and works a fraud upon the purchaser she is estopped. ' But mere silence on her part is not sufficient to estop her from claiming dower. ° Participation in a judicial sale in a suit to which she is made a party will work an estoppel ; ' otherwise not. ' Her dower is not estopped by a conveyance by her as her husband's administratrix, unless she covenants to warrant title.' § 423 Present Value of Dower. — The rule for com puting the present value of the wife's contingent dower is to ascertain the wife's expectation of life and that of the joint hves of the husband and wife, and from the present value of an annuity, payable during the wife's life, deduct the present value of an annuity payable during their joint ' Young V. Young, 7 Mackey, 243. ' Scott V. Ashlin, 86 Va. 581. 'Austin V. Willis, 90 Ala. 431; Hall «. Caperton, 87 Ala. 285. " Martin v. Martin, 22 Ala. 104. ' Jeflferies «. Allen, 34 S. Car. 189. 5 Owen V. Slatter, 26 Ala. 547; Heth v. Cocke, 1 Rand. (Va.) 344. 'Simpson's Appeal, 8 Pa. St. 199; 'Wriglit v. DeGroff, 14 Micli. 167. ' Grady v. McCorkle, 57 Mo. 172. See, also, Magee v. Mellon, 23 Miss. 585; Usher v. Richardson, 29 Me. 415. "Shoots. Galbreath, 128111. 214; Magee ». Mellon, 33 Miss. 585; Usher v. Richardson, 29 Me. 415; Shurtz v. Thomas, 8 Pa. St. 359. 462 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 424 lives. To ascertain the present value of a contingent right of dower, a calculation must be made by the rules for the ascertainment of the expectation of life of a person; not only the expectation of life of the wife, but the proba- bilities of her joint hfe with the husband. If this is term- inated by the death of the wife, she gets nothing; if by the death of the husband, her annuity then commences. From the probability of the life of the wife, deduct the proba- bility not of the life of the husband, but the probability of the life of both, and the result is the probability that the wife wiU be hving and the husband dead. And if from the probabihty that the wife wiU be living at the end of each year, deduct the probability that both will be Hving, the result is the fraction representing the probability that the husband wiU be dead and the wife living. And so, as Judge Lacy says, if, from the present value of an annuity, payable while the wife lives, the present value of an an- nuity payable while both are hving be deducted, the re- mainder will be the present value of an annuity while the wife survives the husband.' In estimating the value of the wife's inchoate right, the amount of a mortgage on the land, in which she has united with her husband, should be deducted from the value of the land." § 424. Eemedies to Eecoveb. — The assignment of dower may de made in pais by parol, by the owner of the free- hold. But if dower 'be not assigned after the expiration of the quarantine, then the widow had her action at law by writ of dower unde nihil habet, or by writ of right of dower against the tenant of the freehold. The former gave the widow damages for non-assignment of her dower, but the latter did not." The writ of right of dower is seldom used in this country. On recovery at law, the sheriff, under the writ of seisin, delivered to the widow possession ' Strayer v. Long, 86 Va. 557. See, also, 2 Minor's Inst. 156. As to tlie rule in South Carolina, see. Hay ward «. Gutbert, 1 McCord, 386; Wrights. Jennings, 1 Bailey, 280. ' Fichtner v. Fichtner, 88 Ky. 355. 3 Co. Litt. 32 b; 3 Inst. 263. §§ 425-426] EIGHT OF DOWER. 463 of her dower by metes and bounds, if the property was properly divisible, and the lands could be held in severalty.' Probate courts now generally settle the right of dower between the widow and the heir or devisee, and each State has statutory provisions controlling this subject, § 425 In Equity. — Dower may be recovered by bill in equity, as well as by action at law. Its jurisdiction is concurrent with that of law, unless changed by statute, and the rules governing assignments of dower are the same. When the legal title to dower is in controversy it must be settled at law. But if that be settled, full and effectual relief can be granted to the widow in equity, both as to the assignment of dower and the damages to be awarded for retention." The common law remedy for the recovery of dower has been superseded by the probate courts. Gen- erally the probate courts do not have jurisdiction in the recovery of .dower against the husband's alienee," unless given by statute;* and then if equitable rights are to be de- termined, a court of equity has jurisdiction. ' §426. Eemedy by Distress — Ejectment. — Unless the remedy is denied by statute, as a general rule where the dower of the widow is lawfully assigned or secured to her, whether by the court or by the agreement of the parties in interest, the dower of annual interest due the widow may be recovered by distress." This remedy is allowed where rent is granted to the widow out of the lands of which she is dowable in heu of dower; the law considers the rent or owelty in such cases a charge of common right, because a valuable consideration, that is a right that the party had in the lands charged has been given for it, and, ' Litt. sect. 36. 'Curtis V. Curtis, 2 Bro. C. C. 630; Shelton «. Carrol, 16 Ala. 148; Blain v. Harrison, 1 1 111. 384; Turner v. Morris, 87 Miss. 733. s^Tlirasher v. Pinckard, 33 Ala. 616; Bisland v. Bisland, 11 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 164; In re Watkins, 9 Johns. (N. T.) 346; French v. Crosby, 33 Me. 376; Sheafe v. O'Neil, 9 Mass. 9. * Danforth v. Smith, 23 Vt. 247. » Morgan v. Hendren (Ala.), 14 South. Rep. 540; Hall v. Pierson, 63 Conn 332. •Baker v. Leibert, 125 Pa. St. 106; Borland v. Murphy, 4 Week. Notes, 472- Murphy v. Borland, 92 Pa. St. 89; Evans v. Ross, 107 Pa. St. 281. 464 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 427-428 therefore, the law gives a remedy by distress for the re- covery of the debt.' In some States the widow may bring ejectment for her dower." But ejectment does not neces- sarily determine the right of possession in the sense ordi- narily applicable to ejectment suits, but determines the widow's right to dower in the whole premises without judgment of ouster in her favor as in other cases; after such general judgment the court must proceed to admeas- ure and assign her dower the same in all respects as in probate proceedings.' § 427. Confirmation op Report.— In many of the States commissioners are appointed by the court of probate or in equity to allot dower to the widow and report to the court. But the allotment to the widow conveys no right in the dower until the commissioner's report of allotment has been made to and confirmed by the court." When the widow is the defendant in the suit and has not elected to take the value of her dower in money ac- cording to statute, her dower should be assigned before ah absolute sale of the real estatd*is decreed.' § 428. Judgment. — The judgment provides for the as- signment of dower" and the recovery of damages in those States where damages are allowed, for the retention of her dower. The manner of assigning dower after judgment is controlled by statute. Though the judgment of dower is erroneous, it cannot be questioned collaterally, and not having been reversed or set aside, is conclusive on the widow's right to such dower.'' The judgment is conclusive to all parties to the proceedings for assignment." ■Shouffleri). Coover, 1 "Watts & S. (Pa.) 400; Litt. sects. 213, 214, 216; 1 Imt. 47a, 142a, 169b. » Rea V. Rea, 63 Mich. 257. 5 Galbreath v. Fleming, 60 Mich. 408; Yates v. Paddock, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 529. * Austin ». Willis, 90 Ala. 421; Adams v. Barron, 13 Ala. 305; Reeves v. Brooks. 80 Ala. 26. See, also, Serry ». Curry, 26 Nebr. 353. 5 Kilbreth v. Root, 33 W. V-a. 600. »2 Bl. Com. 136; Co. Litt. 82b. '' Crowley v. Mellon, 52 Ark. 1. 8 Henderson v. Chaires, 25 Pla. 26; Bisland v. Bisland, 11 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 164; Hilliard ». HlUiard, 50 Ark. 34. CHAPTEE XIII. homestead. Article 1. Nature and Creation of the Estate. § 429. Definition. § 440. Extent of Homestead. §430. Actual Residence Required. §441. Purchase-money Mortgage. § 431. Head of the Family. § 442. Subrogation. § 433. Dwelling and Business House § 443. Sale— Proceeds. Combined. § 444. Attachment and Judgment § 433. Acquisition of New Home- Creditors— Surplus. stead. § 445. Mortgage of Homestead with § 434. Non-Resident Wife. Other Lands. § 435. Notice of Homestead. § 446. Mortgage of Homestead with § 436. Time to Assert Claim. Other Lands — Marshalling § 437. What Law Governs. Securities. I 488. Tenants in Common— Partners' § 447. Redemption. Undivided Interests. § 448. Judgment Liens. § 439. Equitable Interests. § 429. Definition. — A homestead is a life estate created by statute, and is peculiar to our American States. It is of recent origin and exists for protection against creditors. The purpose of the law is to provide a home and shelter for the surviving wife and minor children. To accomplish this the homestead is continued, for the joint and several benefit of the survivor and of the children, after the death of the head of the family in whom the principal estate was vested.' Homesteads are occupied by the head of the family, and are exempt from sale on execution or attachment. In, some of the States, to secure the exemptions the convey- ance must be drawn to the head of the family so as to show that the property is designed to be held as a home- stead; or, if already purchased, or if the conveyance does not show such design, a notice that the same is designed to be so held must be executed and acknowledged by the • Capek s. Kropik, 129 111. 519. 59 (465) 466 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 429 person owning the proprety, which shall contain a full description thereof, and must be recorded with the officer where deeds are recorded. The exemptions do not extend to sales for non-payment of taxes or assessments, or for a debt contracted for the purchase of the property, or prior to the recording of the deed or notice, or for any debt contracted before the homestead law was passed. In other States no notice or declaration in writing is necessary to identify the homestead. The exemption is- a mere privilege, which the statute secures to the debtor, and to his widow and children after his decease, and does not run with the land and cannot be transferred to another with the land. The estate of homestead in the widow is a conditional life estate, subject to the joint right of occupancy of the minor children of the deceased husband, during the minority of the youngest of them. The condition is that it shall not be voluntarily surrendered or abandoned.' The homestead is a statutory exemption of a certain amount of real estate, purchased and occupied for a home, by a man having a family, from the claim of his creditors. It is generally defined by the amount of its value, so that if necessary when it is not capable of being set off by metes and bounds, the widow may be paid in money. In Tennessee the husband and wife may assert their joint or several interest of homestead in the wife's land against a decree for their joint debt." In Illinois the hus- band can have a homestead in his wife's property to the same extent as if the title to the property was in himself ; he can have but one homestead. If it attaches to property owned by the wife, he cannot have another in property the title to which is in himself' Any resident of the State of either sex who is married, or the head of a family, is entitled to the exemption of the homestead.* The husband's right of curtesy in the homestead of his -wife during minority of the children, yields to their right to ' Jones V. Gilbert, 135 111. 33. * Turner u. Argo, 89 Tenn. 443. » Herdman v. Cooper, 39 111. App. 330. ^ Thompson v. King, 54 Ark. 9. § 430] HOMESTEAD. 467 occupy the homestead." But the widow is generally granted her homestead in addition to her dower right' except in a few States. ' In Mississippi land owned jointly by husband and wife may be claimed as a homestead.* Buying a lot and placing building materials thereon is a sufficient notice of a homestead, where no notice is required to be recorded.' § 430. Actual Residence Required. — The ownerin sev- eralty of real estate, in order to claim a homestead, in most States must actually reside on the premises,' and the same rules govern as to what is a homestead that control the determination of one's domicil. ' So, whei-e a party makes preparations upon land and has evinced his intention to make it his home, coupled with his intention to reside upon it as soon as fully improved, the homestead becomes com- plete.' But after completed, it is indispensable that the place be occupied as a residence,' though a temporary ab- sence, animo revertendi, from an established home for the purpose of health, business or pleasure, does not vitiate the homestead.'" ' Hoskins v. Litchfield, 31 111. 143; Thompson v. King, 54 Ark. 9; Loeb v. McMahon, 89 111. 487. 'Walsh ». Reis, 50 111. 477; Jones v. Gilbert, 135 111. 34; Chaplin «. Sawyer, 35 Vt. 290; Bresee «. Stiles, 33 Wis. 120; Mercier ». Chace, 11 Allen (Mass.), 194; Bates v. Bates, 97 Mass. 392; Merriraan v Lacefield, 4 Heisk. (Tenn.) 223; Chisolm v. Chisolm, 41 Ala. 327. ^Butterfield v. Wicks, 44 Iowa, 310; Singleton «. Huff, 49 Ga. 584; McAfee V. Bettis, 72 N. Car. 29. * Powers ». Sample, 69 Miss. 67. 'Myers «. Weaver (Mich.), 59 N. W. Rep. 810; Kingman v. O'Callaghan {S. Dak.), 57 N. W. Rep. 912. •Prescott v. Prescott, 45 Cal. 58; Ingels v. Ingels, 50 Kans. 7.55; Lubbock V. McMann, 82 Cal. 228; Tromans v. Mahlman, 92 Cal. 1; Finlon v. Clark, 118 lU. 32; Tillar v. Bass, 57 Ark. 179. 'Bunker v. Locke, 15 Wis. 638; Austin t. Stanley, 46 N. H. 51; Davis®. Andrews, 30 Vt. 678; Kelly v. Baker, 10 Minn. 156. •Franklin v. C.iffee, 18 Tex. 413; Dobkins s. Kuykendall, 81 Tex. 180; Barnes t>. White, 53 Tex. 638. • Hayden v. Slaughter, 43 La. Ann. 385. "Burch «. Sheriff, 37 La. Ann. 735; Tomlinson v. Swinney, 22 Ark. 400; "Wood V. Lord, 51 N. H. 454; Barker®. Dayton, 28 Wis. 367; Walters ®. Peo- ple, 18 m. 194; Wetz V. Beard, 12 Ohio St. 431; Hoppe v. Goldberg, 82 Wis. 660. 468 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 431 The character of the property cannot be changed to a homestead by saying that the owner intends at some future time to occupy it as a home;' actual residence with inten- tion to make it a homestead are essential requisites;" the mere fact that it was acquired by descent, and not by pur- chase, is not sufficient to entitle a party to a homestead.' In South Carolina a debtor is entitled to a homestead, whether he lives on it or not,* and such is the law of Ten- nessee.' Moving onto t}ie premises with the intention of making it a homestead and erecting a building for a residence, are sufficient to make it exempt.' If the husband, with his family, reside on a placer mining claim, he can claim his homestead under the State law.' § 431. Head of the Family.— The head of the family may claim the homestead exemption, but it is not always certain who is this party. The husband with the minor children continuing to live on the homestead after a divorce has been granted and the property divided, is still the head of the family, and may claim a homestead exemp- tion though the custody of the children was awarded to the wife " And if a brother lives with his sister and helps support her he is the head of the family.' So where a ' Brans o. Caiman, m Mich. 427; Sharp v. Johnston (Tex.), 19 S. W. Rep. 259. 5 Carrier t. Woodwaid, 62 X. H. 68; Lake v. Nolan, 81 Mich. 112; Gamier •B. Joffrion, 39 La. Ann. 884; Meigs v. Dibble, 73 Mich. 101; First Nat. Bank V. HoUingsworth. 78 Iowa, 575; Bowles r. Hoard, 71 M ch. 150; In re Crowey, 71 Cal, 300; Parr v. Newby, 73 Tex. 468; Adams t. White, 28 Fla. 352; My- rick V. Bill, 5 Dak. 167; Ingle v. Lea, 70 Tex. 609; Coates ». Caldwell, 71 Tex. 19; Van Ratclifl r. Call, 72 Tex. 491; Deville v. Widoe, 64 Mich. 593; Bebb V. Crowe, 39 Kans. 343. ' Creager v. Creager, 87 Ky. 449. * Swandale«. Swandale, 25 S. Car. 889; Nance v. Hill, 26 S. Car. 227. » Rhea v. Rhea, 15 Lea (Tenn.), 527. "Lament v. La Fevre, 96 Mich. 175; Cameron v. Gebhard, 85 Te- 610. ' Gaylord v. Place, 98 Cal. 472. 8 Hall v. Fields, 81 Tex. 553. 'Moyer«. Drummond, 32 S. Car. 165. See, also, Graham «. Crockett. 18 Ind. 119; Whaley ». Cadman, 11 Iowa, 226; Marsh «. Lazenby, 41 6a. 154; Homestead Cases, 31 Tex. 678; Barry v. Hale (Tex.), 21 S. W. Rep. 783; Sallee § 432] HOMESTEAD. 469 single woman supports an invalid sister and resides with her she is the head of the family." So if the debtor's family have married or have died, leaving him alone, he can stiU hold his homestead." Where the family hves with the wife on her land, and she and the children separate from the husband, and she obtains a divorce from him, he loses his homestead as the head of the family. ' And if the homestead has been decreed to the wife who obtained a divorce from the husband ihen he loses it." After the death of the husband, though there be no children, the wife can stiU claim a homestead. ° The husband, or the head of the family, must be under some obligation, natural or moral, to support the family dependent upon him for support. If the children are strangers to him in blood, and he is under no obhgation to support them, he is not entitled to homestead.' § 432. Dwelling and Business House Combined. — The authorities are not uniform as to what will or will not be considered a homestead when the building claimed as a homestead is in part adapted and devoted to business and another part used as a dwelling; but the general rule is that where the trade, adaptation and use of the building are incidental or secondary only to its habitation as a dwelling; V. Waters, 17 Ala. 486; Blackwell v. Broughton, 50 Ga. 390; Wade «. Jones, 20 Mo. 75; Connauuhton v. Sands, 32 Wis. 387; Arnold v. Waltz, 53 Iowa, 706; Rountree v. Deunaul, 59 Ga. 637. ' Chamberlain v. Brown, 33 S. Car. 597. i'Stults V. Sale, 9.5 Ky. 5; Wilkinson v. Merrill, 87 Va. 513, overrul- ing Calhoun d. Williams, 33 Grait. (Va.) 18; Wood v. Wheeler, 7 Tex. 13; Fant v. Gist, 36 S. Car. 577; Stewart v. Brand, 23 Iowa, 477; Barney v. Leeds, 51 N. H. 2.53; Silloway v. Brown, 13 Allen (Mass.), 34: Halloway «. Halloway. 86 Ga. 576; Ross ». Sweeny (Ky.), 15 S. W. Rep. 357; Woods v. Perkins, 43 La. Ann. 347; Roth v. Insley, 86 Cal. 184. ■= Arp V. Jacobs, 3 Wyo. 489. '' Jackson v. Shelton, 89 Tenn. 82; Kirkwood v. Domnau, 80 Tex. 645. ' Whalley's Estate, 11 Nev. 360; Morrison v. MoDaniel, 30 Miss. 317; Kitchell ». Burgwin, 31 111. 40; McKenzie v. Murphy, 24 Ark. 155; Daven- port V. Alston, 14 Ga. 371; Folsom v. Carli, 5 Minn. 337; Crane v. Waggoner, 33Ind. 83; Stalil ®. Stahl, 114 111. 378; Coughanour v. Hoffman (Idaho), 13 Pac, Rep. 231; Willis ». Mike, 76 Tex. 82; Holland v. Withers, 76 Ga. 667; 2app B. Strohmeyer, 75 Tex. 638. "Bosquett v. Hall, 90 Ky. 566. See, also, Ellis v. Davis, 90 Ky 183- In re Romero, 75 Cal. 379. 470 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [8 432 where the chief use of the structure is that of a home for the owner, and some part only, not essential to this end, is fit to be used as a shop or office or salesroom, it is a home- stead. But when this state of facts is reversed and the residence feature is only auxiliary to the business use where only a relative small part of the building is devoted to the uses of a habitat, and the chief adaptation and use are those of business, the building is not a homestead, even though the occupant has no other home and uses this for all the purposes of living. So a building used princi- pally as a store building, though the owner sleeps in a small back room, taking his meals elsewhere, is not a homestead. ' Of course a professional man would not lose the exemp- tion by reason of devoting some part of his dwelling to the use of his profession; but if, for instance, a physician- should make a public infirmary of his residence and con- tinue to live there merely as an incident to the conduct of the hospital, the homestead would be lost.' A homestead must be the place where the claimant re- sides; the place where he lives; the place where he usually sleeps and eats; where he surrounds himself with the or- dinary insignia of home. If the facts of the case do not show this, it is no home- stead." Of course parts of a building may be used for business purposes, where such use is not the principal one but is a secondary adaptation;* otherwise it is not a home- stead. " The business part must be of secondary importance and not the principal object of the building in order to have the homestead sustained.' A building used as a hotel can- • Garrett v. Jones, 95 Ala. 96; Kennedy v. Gloster, 98 Cal. 143. = Ackley v. Chamberlain, 16 Cal. 181; Lazell ®. Lazell, 8 Allen (Mass.), 575; Harriman v. Insurance Co. , 49 Wis. 71; Goldman v. Clark, 1 Nev. 607, Mer- cier ». Chace, 11 Allen (Mass.), 194; Laughlin v. Wright, 63 Cal. 113. ^Philleoti. Smallcy, 33 Tex. 49=!; Martin Clothing Co. v. Henly, 83 Tex. 593; Pfeiffer v. McNatt, 74 Tex. 640. ' Phelps V. Roouey, 9 Wis. 71; Palmer v. Hawes, 80 Wis. 474. ' Houston ». Newsome, 83 Tex. 75. •Orr V. Shraft, 33 Mich. 360; In re Allen, 78 Cal. 393; Skinners. Shannon, 44 Mich. 87; Stanton v. Hitchcock, 64 Mich. 316; Cass County Bank v. §§ 433-434] HOMESTEAD. 471 not be used as a homestead, though the husband and wife live in it.' § 433. Acquisition op New Homestead. — A party can sell his homestead and buy another, and his homestead right vests simultaneously with the acquisition of the new property." But where the declaration of homestead must be filed before the land becomes a homestead, this rule must be strictly followed before the exemption can be claimed." The general rule allows the owner to sell his homestead and reinvest the proceeds in another homestead, provided he does it in the time required by the statute.' So, the owner of the homestead may convey it to another in consideration for a conveyance to his wife of real estate not exempt, but which becomes a homestead after convey- ance. ' So, one can exchange his homestead for another if he occupies it as a homestead, although the deed for the second was not filed for record.' § 434. Non-Eesident Wife. —To claim a homestead the party must be a resident of the State where claimed. So, a non-resident wife cannot claim a homestead in her hus- band's land on which he lives, and he can sell it without her release of the homestead right. ' There is nothing in the statutecreating a homestead which contemplates that a wife, who has never lived on the premises, or claimed to live there, shall have a homestead after her husband's death. She cannot claim such an interest by relation as Weber, 83 Iowa, 63; Bebb v. Crowe, 39 Kans. 342; In re Tertelling, 3 Dill. C. C. 339; Umland «. Holcorabe, 36 Minn. 286; Kelly v. Baker, 10 Minn. 154. ' McDowell V. Creditors, 103 Cal. 364. ' Cooper V. Arnett (Ky.), 26 8. W. Rep. 811; Freiberg v. Walzem, 85 Tex. 264; Boyd ». Fullerton, 125 111. 438; Broome v. Davis, 87 Ga. 584; Rose v. Blankenship (Tex.), 18 8. W. Rep. 101. ' Wright ». Westheimer, 2 Id.iho, 963. < Boyd V. Fullerton, 135 111. 487 ; Crawford v. Richeson, 101 111. 351 ; Neal V. Coe, 35 Iowa, 410; Edwards v. Fry, 9 Kans. 417; Bailey v. Steve, 70 Wis. 316. ' Airey v. Buchanan, 64 Miss. 181, distinguishing Adams v. Dees, 63 Miss. 854. 'Smith «. Enos, 91 Mo. 579. 'Black V. Singley, 91 Mich. 50; Stanton v. Hitchcock, 64 Mich. 316. 472 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 435-436 will avoid his dealings with property which he never meant should be the home of the absentee, however much he may have wronged her by deserting and leaving her in the other State." But, if the wife be a resident, though she has de- serted her husband with his consent and is living separate from him at the time of his decease, she has a homestead in the premises." If she has deserted her husband and is living with an- other man in adultery, in another State, she can claim no homestead at the death of her husband.' § 435. Notice of Homestead. — Possession by the hus- band with the wife, he being the head of the family, is presumptively his possession ; and if the premises occupied be homestead property, the creditor of the wife is charge- able with constructive notice of its homestead character, though the formal paper title be in the wife.* And where the husband is the head of the family, and both he and his wife have an interest in the same tract of land, each inter- est exceeding in value the homestead exemption and the husband is the debtor, the homestead exemption will be allowed him out of his interest ; ' and it must be entirely taken out of the husband's interest." Where notice is required to be served on the sheriff, if the husband is absent, then the vdfe can serve such notice of the homestead.' § 436. Time to Assert Claim.— A homestead right may be effectually asserted any time before sale of the land. And a judgment ordering the property sold does not debar the debtor from asserting his right of homestead in the property at any time before sale.' In most of the States a party can assert his right to a homestead exemption when- ever an action has been commenced against him to collect ' Staoton ». Hitchcock, 64 Mich. 316. ' Lindsey ». Brewer, 60 Vt. 627. « Prater v. Prater, 87 Tenn. 78. * Broome v. Davis, 87 Ga. 584. « Hart V. Leete, 104 Mo. 315. ' Johnson v. Kessler, 87 Ky. 458. •■ Quigley s. MoBvony (Nebr.), 59 N. "W. Rep. 767. 'Robinson v. Swearingen, 55 Ark. 55; Martin v. Aultman, 80 Wis. 150. §§ 437-438] HOMESTEAD. 473 a debt ; if a levy is made on his homestead he can then as- sert this right." But after the homestead has been legally assigned, the owner cannot sell that and claim another in other land subject to the lien." § 437. What Law Governs. — The homestead law in force when the debt is contracted applies when it is sought to enforce such debt against the homestead.' A probated homestead is to be set apart in pursuance of the statute in force at the time the order setting it apart is made, and the interest therein which the wife and the surviving chil- dren take is to be determined by the same statute.' And a debtor who acquires the right of homestead by reason of his marriage, can assert that right against antecedent debts, in lands owned by him at the time such debts were con- tracted, if his creditors had fixed no lien upon the lands at the date of the marriage;" but a different rule would apply if his creditors had acquired a lien before his marriage. " The law in force at the timerof the death of the husband governs the homestead.' § 438. Tenants in Common — Partners' Undivided In- terests. — It is the general rule that one may have a home- stead right in land held in common with another." It has iScofleld V. Hopkins, 61 Wis. 370; Hoppe i). Goldberg, 82 Wis. 660. ' Richie v. Duke, 70 Miss. 66, distinguishing Trotter v. Dobbs, 38 Miss. 198, and Jones ». Hart, 63 Miss. 13. 3 Trimmer v. Winsmith (S. Car.), 19 S. E. Rep. 283; Jackson «. Creighton, 39 Nebr. 310; Bills v. Mason, 42 Iowa, 329; Warner «. Cammack, 37 Iowa, 642; Dennis v. Bank, 19 Nebr. 675; Martin v. Walker, 43 La. Ann. 1019; Mooaey v. Moriarty, 36 111. App. 178; Henson v. Moore, 104 111. 403. "Sheehy v. Miles, 93 Cal. 388; Tyrrell «. Baldwin, 78 Cal. 470. 'Dye «. Cooke, 88 Tenn. 275; North ». Shearn, 15 Tex. 174. ' Pender v. Lancaster, 14 S. Car. 25. 'Gruwell ». Seybolt, 82 Cal. 7. « Oswald «. McCauley, Dak. 289; Hill v. Myers, 46 Ohio St. 183; Thomp- son®. King. 54 Ark. 9; Robson«. Hough, 56 Ark. 631; Greenwood v. Maddox, 37 Ark. 648; Sentell i>. Armor, 35 Ark. 49; Thorn v. Thorn, 14 Iowa, 49; Mc- Clary v Bixby, 36 Vt. 354; Hewitt v. Rankin, 41 Iowa, 35; Williams «. With- -ered, 37 Tex. 130; Smith v. Deschaumes, 37 Tex. 439; Giles v. Miller, 36 Nebr. 346; Tarrant ». Swain, 15 Kans. 146; Horn v. Tufts, 39 N. H. 478; King v. Welborn, 83 Mich. 195; Shepard v. Cross, 33 Mich. 98; Kruger v. Le Blanc, 75 Mich. 434; Lewis v. White, 69 Miss. 353. 60 474 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 438 also been held that homestead may lawfully be assigned out of partnership property where all the partners give their con- sent." But this is not the general rule; homestead is only allowed out of such partnership property as the partners have an undivided interest in, and that is what remains after the partnership debts are paid, and a distribution made among the partners.' In California it was held that a homestead could not be claimed by a tenant in common because there was no pro- vision made in that State for partition.' And the courts of Tennessee hold that homestead does not attach to undivided interests in land, and, hence, the husband may convey such interest without his wife's joining in the defed to waive homestead.' In cases of homesteads before they are set out, the par ties owning the premises including the homestead, are not, strictly speaking, tenants in common of the premises, al- though they are often termed such. The interest of the widow does not extend only to the homestead, and the owner of the residue has no interest in the homestead it- self. The estates are distinct from each other, but the boundaries are not known when set off according to valu- ation. Not being tenants in common the statute control- ling partition is not applicable, but when partition must be made courts of equity have jurisdiction." If partition can- not be made without prejudice to the rights and interests of some of the parties, the court may decree compensation to be made by one party to the other for equality of parti- tion." The court of chancery wiE. take jurisdiction in partition cases involving the homestead, when its severance would ' McMillan v. Parker, 109 N. Car. 252; Ferguson v. Speith, 13 Mont. 487; Scott V. Kenan, 94 N. Car. 296; Stout v. McNeill, 98 N. Car. 1; Trowbridge ». Cross, 117 111. 111. ' Ex parte Karish, 33 S. Car. 437; Moyer v. Druramond, 32 S. Car. 165. 3 Wolf V. Fleishacker, 5 Cal. 344; Giblin v. Jordan, 6 Cal. 417. ■• Case Co. v. Joyce, 89 Tenn. 337. See, also, Cornish c. Frees, 74 Wis. 490; West i<. Ward, 26 Wis. 579; Thurston v. Maddocks, 6 Allen (Mass.), 427; Elia8 V. Verdugo, 27 Cal. 418. ' Lindsey v. Austin, 60 Vt. 627. ' 1 Spence's Eq. Jur. 654; Bispham's Equity, sects. 487-493. § 438] HOMESTEAD. 475 greatly depreciate the value of the residue of the premises, although proceedings are pending in the probate court to set out homestead. To prevent inequality of partition the court will determine in its discretion the manner of grant- ing relief by ordering the payment of money by one owner to the other owner.' Tenants in common in Montana may have a homestead in the land." This subject is now regulated by statute in California,' and a tenant in common or joint tenant may have a homestead if he lives upon the land as a home- stead, and must have the exclusive possession. If he does not live upon the land and have exclusive possession he can- not under the statute have a homestead.* In South Carolina a joint tenant may have homestead after parti- tion and may restrain a sale of his interest before it is set out to him.' In Illinois where a homestead estate exists predicated upon an estate held by the householder as a tenant in common with another, there is no provision of law authoriziug allotment of homestead in a moiety of the land. Where a wife dies seised of an undivided one-half of a lot as a tenant in common with her husband, the premises being their homestead, and leaving minor children by a former husband, then living in the family, the husband will, as before the death of the wife, be entitled to homestead in one-half of the lot in his own right as owner of the fee; and the homestead interest in the moiety of which the wife died seised, will by the statute be continued for his benefit and for the benefit of the minor children, each moiety of the fee contributing to the homestead estate. In sucli case the right of occupancy is not divisible, and although the minor step-children can only have homestead in tlie moiety of which their mother died seised, yet the right to occupancy so long as the homestead continues must neces- sarily continue for their benefit in the whole of the land " Lindsey v. Brewer, 60 Vt. 627. ' Lindley v. Davis, 7 Mont. 206. 3 Statutes of 1868, p. 116. 'Fitzgerald v. Fernandez, 71 Cal. 504. See, also, Cameto v. Dupuy, 47 Cal. 79. 'Nance v. Hill, 26 S. Car 227; Keckeley v. Moore, 2 Strob. Eq. (S. Car.) 23. 476 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 439-i40 constituting the homestead including the land of the hus- band.' In most of the States it is necessary for the tenant claim- ing homestead to live on the premises." § 439. Equitable Interests. — An equitable title to land acquired under a contract of sale is an estate in land sub- ject to be impressed with the lien of homestead as fully as an estate in fee, though it is subordinate to the rights or claims of the vendor; but upon the ripening of the equit- able estate into a fee by a conveyance to the purchaser, the homestead right attaches absolutely.' The holder of an equitable title to land under a contract of purchase is the owner thereof within the meaning of the homestead law.' And he may claim homestead in lands exchanged for his homestead.' § 440. Extent of Homestead. —It makes no difference if part of the homestead has been used for some other pur- pose, not inconsistent with the owner's homestead interest, where the part claimed as not being a part of the home- stead, has not been totally abandoned by the debtor." But a house situated on the land of the homestead, rented to another party is not part of the homestead.' In Alabama, land cultivated in connection with the residence portion, is part of the homestead, though not contiguous thereto,' but this is not the general rule. " Irrigating ditches runnmg ' Capek i>. Kropik, 129 111. 509. » Giles V. Miller, 36 Nebr. 346; Lewis ». White, 69 Miss. 352; Fitzgerald ». Fernandez, 71 Cal. 504. 3 Alexander v. Jackson, 92 Cal. 514; Stafford «. A¥oods, 144 111. 203. 4 Blue ■o Blue, 38 111. 9; Tomlin ». Hilyard,43 111. 300; Moore v. Reaves, lo Kans. 150'; Stinson «. Richardson, 44 Iowa, 373; McKee .. Wilcox, 11 Mich. 359- McCabe v. Mazzuchelli, 13 Wis. 478; Chopin v. R^^e, 7.. Wis. 361. ^Binzel .. Grogan. 67 Wis. 147; Hoppe .. Goldberg, 82 Wis 660. See, also, Blum v. Light, 81 Tex. 414; Gotewood «. Scurlock (Tex.), 21 S. W. ^'^Ho^Lan .. Hill, 47 Kans. 611; Layson .. Grange, 48 Kans, 440; Millford Savins Bank «. Avers, 48 Kans. 602. ,. - ,t- ' McDonald .. Clark (Tex.), 19 S. W. Rep. 1023; Folsom . Carh, 5 Minn 337; Ashton v. Ingle. 30 Kans. 670; Kelly «. Baker, 10 Minn. 154. 6 Hodges V. Winston, 95 Ala. 514. _, „ ._ . . »Linn County Bank v. Hopkins, 47 Kans. 580; McCrosky .. Walker, 55 Ark. § 441] HOMESTEAD. 477 through the homestead, for its successful cultivation belong to it and are a part of it.' But if the land is not used as a homestead it cannot be claimed as such; " though a garden used in connection with the dwelling and contiguous is part of the homestead.' It has been held that a parcel of land used as part of the homestead, though not contiguous, will be considered as a portion of the homestead provided the value does not exceed that prescribed by statute.* But the use of a spring on land not contiguous with the homestead, will not make the land part of the homestead.' A house removed from the premises where it belongs, cannot be claimed as a homestead." A party who has a homestead of a single house may allow his son to live in a portion of it.' § 441. Purchase-Money Mortgage. — In cases of pur- chase-money mortgages, the husband acquires no home- stead right when he made the mortgage against the debt thus contracted. The property undoubtedly may become impressed with the character of a homestead in respect to other debts ; under the homestead exemption laws, claims must be held subordinate to the mortgage, for no home- stead claim can be made until after the purchase is fully effected by the payment of the purchase -money.' In those States where a declaration of homestead must be filed, a mortgage executed by the husband and not re- corded before a valid declaration of homestead by the wife is filed for record, cannot be enforced against the wife's 303; Williams v. Willis, 84 Tex. 398; Achilles v. Willis, 81 Tex. 169; Oppen- heimer v. Fritter, 79 Tex. 99; Blum v. Rogers, 78 Tex. 530. ' FauU «. Cooke, 19 Greg. 455. " Rhyne v. Guevara, 67 Miss. 139; Maloney v. Hefer, 75 Cal. 433. ' Arendt o. Mace, 76 Cal. 315. 'Dicus «. Hall, 83 Ala. 159; Tyler v. Jewett, 83 Ala. 93. See, also, Greely V. Scott, 3 Woods, C. C. 657; Hubbell «. Canady, 58 111. 435; Stevens v. Holl- ingsworth, 74 111. 303; Gregg «. Bostwick, 33 Cal. 330; Hoitt v. Webb, 36 N. H. 158. 'Nix «. Mayer (Tex.), 3 S. W. Rep. 819. ' Michigan Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Cronk, 93 Mich. 49. ' Pratt V. Pratt, 161 Mass. 376. 'Moses v. Loan Asso. (Ala.) 14 South. Rep. 413; Hopper v. Parkinson, 5 Nev. 333, 338; Peterson v. Hornblower, 33 Cal. 375; Hand v. Railroad Co., 13 S. Car. 314. 478 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 442-443 claim of homestead.' But if the homestead has been waived, the mortgage then will take precedence." And if the vendor's lien has been waived the mortgage will be superior to it.' The States of Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, Nevada, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia, have a provision in their constitution, that the homestead exemption shall not prevail as against any obhgation or debt contracted for the purchase of the premises. The States of Louisiana and Texas will not allow mortgages upon the homestead ex- cept for the purchase thereof or improvements thereon. ^ The vendee of land who has not paid the purchase price is not entitled as against the vendor to set up the land as a homestead.* % 442. Subrogation.— The homestead right may be sub- rogated. The husband has power to convey the land to satisfy the purchase-money therefor, if done in good faith and without fraudulent purposes to defraud the wife in her homestead right, or to a purchaser ignorant of such intention.' So where money was borrowed and used to pay off the balance due for the purchase price of land se- cured by mortgage, and another mortgage on the same land containing waiver of homestead, the lender of the money stood in the place of the mortgagees and so entitled to be paid in preference to the homestead for the debtor." § 443. Sale — Proceeds. — It is a general rule that where a homestead is sold the proceeds are exempt the same as the homestead, until invested in property whereby the homestead right is waived. So where land is sold in parti- ' Ontario State Bank v. Gerry, 91 Cal. 94; First National Bank s. Bruce, 94 Cal. 77. ^Shroeder*. Bauer, 140 III. 135. ' Nichols i\ Overacker, 16 Kaus. 54; Flanagan v. Cushman, 48 Tex. 241; Lane B. Collier, 46 Ga. 580; Allen «. Hawley, 66 111. 164, 168; Jones v. Parker, 51 Wis. 218; Amphlett i>. Hibbard, 29 Mich. 298; Austin «. Underwood, 37 111. 438. * Perdue », Fraley (Ga.), 19 S. E. Rep. 40. ' Roy V. Clarke, 75 Tex. 28. « McWilliams v. Bones, 84 Ga. 203. ■§ 444] HOMESTEAD. 479 tion in which a person is entitled to a homestead, he is en- titled to a homestead out of his share of the proceeds of the sale.' In North Carolina when the homestead is sold, the proceeds lose the quality of homestead exemption and become subject to the personal property exemptions." In Kentucky the proceeds are exempt unless converted into property not exempt. " In Texas the sale of a homestead for the purpose of reinvestment in another homestead is a voluntary conversion of the exempt property into money which becomes subject to garnishment.' The general rule allows the owner of the homestead to sell it and to reinvest the proceeds in a new homestead provided he does it in the time prescribed bylaw.' And^ under such rule, if the sale is made with a bad motive it deprives creditors of no right, and is therefore not fraudu- lent as to them. ' And so the owner of the homestead does not forfeit his exemptions by using it as a bawdy house and sell liquor thereon without a license, so long as he lives there in the house.' If he works no injury to his creditors they cannot complain.' If the homestead is sold contrary to law, the party claiming the right of homestead cannot claim a homestead in the proceeds of such iUegal sale.° The debtor may declare the land a homestead in order to prevent his creditors from seizing it, and they have no remedy. '° § 444. Attachment and Judgment Creditors — Surplus. — As against subsequent attachment or judgment credit- ' Swandale «. Swandale, 25 S. Car. 389. « Lane d. Richardson, 104 N. Car. 642. 'Skinner s. Chadwell (Ky.) 1 S. W. Rep. 437; Brooks ®. Collins, 11 Bush Beeves v. Petty, 44 Tex. 249. 3 Miller v. Finegan, 26 Fla. 29. « Watts V. Leggett, 66 N. Car. 197; Graves v. Hines, 108 K. Car. 262; Mc- Afee V. Bettis, 72 N. Oar. 28; Gregory «. Ellis, 86 N. Car. 579. ' Myers v. Myers, 89 Ky. 442. « Hall V. Fields, 81 Tex. 553. 'TateB. GofE, 89 Ga. 184. 8 Vornberg v. Owens. 88 Ga. 237; Kessinger v. Wilson, 58 Ark. 400; Neal «, Brockhan, 87 Ga. 130; Quinn v. Kinyon, 100 Mo. 551. § 450] HOMESTEAD. 485 though they were at the time of his death dependent mem- bers of his family. ' But at the civil law grandchildren were included with children." A homestead cannot be set off from the estate of the decedent to minor children who are not the children of the decedent in fact or by adoption.' But children natural or adopted can claim homestead though deserted by their father' or mother, ° the other spouse being dead. § 450. Effect of Deserting Husband. — After the death of the husband the wife can abandon the homestead. So during the life of the husband if she voluntarily and with- out any just and reasonable cause abandons and separates herself from her husband and continues in wanton disre- gard of her duties as a wife to live apart and separate from him until his death, she is then estopped and precluded from claiming a homestead in his lands." But when a wife is driven from home by the tyranny and intolerable meanness of the husband, then, at his death, she can claim her homestead in his property.' And if she separates from him with his consent she can claim dower.' The wife can claim homestead though the house is on leased land.° And an abandoned wife may claim a dwell- ing house, even if built on leased ground, and is a mere chattel as an exempt homestead.'" In case of separation by mutual consent and a fair di- "vision of the property, the homestead becomes extinct." ' Peeler v. Peeler, 68 Miss. 141; Bigelow v. Morong, 103 Mass. 287; Burgess -». Hargrove, 64 Tex. 110; Estate of Curry, 39 Cal. 529. ' 2 Domat's Civil L. Art. 2793. 3 In re Romero, 75 Cal. 379. < Cofer V. Scroggius, 98 Ala. 343. 5 Hiifsehmidt v. Gross, 112 Mo. 649. « Farwell Brick, etc. Co. v. McKenna, 86 Mich. 283; Newland ». Holland, 45. Tex. 589; Cockrell «. Curtis, 83 Tex. 105; Eggleston v. Eggleston, 72 111. 24; Dickman v. Birkhauser, 16 Nebr. 686; Prater v. Prater, 87 Tenn. 78. 'Lamb ». Wogan, 27 Nebr. 236; Sherrld «. Southveick, 43 Mich. 515. 'Bradley v. Deroche, 70 Tex. 465; Lacey v. Clements, 36 Tex. 661; Earl v. Earl, 9 Tex. 643; Lindsey v. Brewer, 60 Vt. 627. » Hill V. Myers, 46 Ohio St. 183. " Cullers -B. James, 66 Tex. 494. " Wickersham v. Comerford, 96 Cal. 433. 486 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 451-452 § 451. Divorce— Elopement. — A divorced wife is not the wife of her former husband.' So a married woman loses her inchoate right to the homestead in the premises of her husband when she is divorced from him." So, if she has deserted her husband and eloped with another man, and taken a permanent residence in another State, and there continues to hve in adultery with him, after her husband's death she has no homestead right in his property. ' If the wife owns the land and has obtained a divorce from her husband, then he loses his homestead right;' but if he owns the land and is responsible for the support of the children, though she has the custody of them, then he can claim his homestead exemptions. ' Where the decree is silent on the subject, the homestead will remain in the spouse holding the legal title thereof, discharged of claims of the other party." And if the husband deserts his wife, the home- stead vests in her.' § 452. Widow's Eights. — The widow is entitled to occupy the homestead, even against the heirs or devisees, as long as she maintains her home thereon.' She can in Mis- souri sell her homestead or release it to the owner of the fee after the children become of age." In this respect it sustains a strict analogy to the right of dower. She may release it to the alienee of the fee so as to merge the home- stead therein, but she cannot aUen to a stranger to the fee.'" If she abandons it, then, so far as she is concerned, the exemption is gone." An assignment for the benefit of 1 Whitsell V. Mills, 6 Ind. 239, Ohenowith v. Chenowlth, 14 Ind. 3; Moore v. Hegeman, 37 Hun (S. Y.), 68. 2 Heaton v. Sawyer, 60 Vt. 495. 3 Prater v. Prater, 87 Tenn. 78. * Arp «. Jacobs, 3 Wyo. 389. 5 Biffle V. Pullman, 114 Mo. 50. sRosholt V. Mehus (N. Dak.), 57 N. W. Rep. 783. ' Hagerty v. Hagerty, 149 111. 655. 8 Fores. Fore, 3 N. Dak. 360; Towne «. Rumsey (Wyo.), 35 Pac. Rep. 1035. ' Weatherf ord «. King 119 Mo. 51, overruling Miller v. Schnebly, 103 Mo. 368. •» Best n. Jenks, 133 111. 447. " Gowan v. Fountain, 50 Minn. 364. § 452] HOMESTEAD. 487 creditors, executed by the debtor alone, does not divest eithei- him or his wife of the homestead exemption.' In some States the widow and children will hold the homestead even if they do not reside on it.' And in the case of homestead, it is universally held that homestead laws, being remedial in their nature, should receive a liberal construction; at least the language used by the legislature should not be restricted by judicial interpre- tation. ' The creditors of the husband cannot disturb her right of homestead,' but she cannot claini but one homestead." If she waives her dower interest, this does not waive her homestead.' In Virginia the widow can only assert a claim of home- stead against the creditors of her husband.' Hence, a widow whose husband owed no debts at his decease can- not claim a continuance of the homestead which, in his lifetime, he had set apart as such. If the householder dies intestate, and there are no debts as against which a homestead can be held exempt, the exemption ceases alto- gether, and the land, therefore, set apart as a homestead goes, if the intestate dies seised of an estate of inheritance, according to the statute of descent, to the heirs at-law, subject to the wife's right of dower, if the intestate leaves a wife." In Minnesota the widow has only the homestead claimed by the husband." In Utah, if the homestead exceeds the exemption of the statute, the heirs take the land subject to the homestead right of the widow. '° ' Hemphill v. Haas, 88 Ky. 493. ^Durland i\ Seller, 37 Nebr. 33. 'Tipton ti. Martin, 71 Cal. 335; Johnsoa ». Gaylord, 41 Iowa, 363; Brad- shaw ». Hurst; 57 Iowa, 745; Orr's Estate, 39 Cal. 101; Busse's Estate, 35 Cal. 310; Graham v. Stewart, 68 Cal. 374; Durland i>. Seller, 37 Nebr. 38. " Childers «. Henderson, 76 Tex. 664. 'Carolina Nat. Bank ii. Senn, 35 S. Car. 573. «Hayden v. Robinson, 83 Ky. 615. ' Helm V. Helm, 30 Gratt. (Va.) 404. « Barker «. Jenkins, 84 Va. 895. 'King V. McCarthy, 54 Minn. 190. '» Knudsen v. Hanaberg, 8 Utah, 303. 488 ■ CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 453-455 § 453. REMAREiAaE. —When there is no statutory provi- sion to the contrary, if the wife marries again, but, with her children, continues to hve on such real estate as a homestead, the marriage does not destroy the homestead character of the realty so as to subject it to the payment of the debts of the decedent husband.' Such right of home- stead is not affected so long as she occupies the homestead as a home for herself and children, though she remarries." In some of the States remarriage extinguishes homestead in the wife. If the widow remarries and accepts anofher home she loses her right,' and cannot hold it by leasing the land to a tenant;' but this is not the law in Missouri, where she can hold her homestead though she remarries and goes to her husband's residence to reside.' § 454. Husband Tenant at Will. — A mere occupancy of land under a deed which confers no title because the grantor had none, will not support a claim for homestead exemption. Nor can a wife derive any homestead right from her husband who, with her, occupied the land at his death as tenant at will, which he had conveyed to others. The homestead right is founded on ownership of some as- signable interest in the land, and a tenant at will has no such interest and there can be no homestead right descend at his death." § 455. Reversionary Interest. — The right of homestead does not exist in a reversionary interest.' So a wife is not entitled to homestead in property of her deceased husband whose interest therein was in remainder on the death of his mother in possession as the widow of his father. The claimant of homestead must have the right of present oc- ' Brady 11. Banta, 46 Kans. 131; Moore v. Flynn, 135 111. 74. ' Fore ». Fore, 3 K. Dak. 260. 'Buck V. Conlogue, 49 111. 391; Oraddockti. Edwards, 31 Tex. 609. *Home Ins. Co. v. Field, 43 III. App. 893. 'Wests. McMullen, 113 Mo. 405. 'Berry «. Dobson, 68 Miss. 483. ' Jackson v. Shelton, 89 Tenn. 83, 88, 89. §§ 456-457] HOMESTEAD. 489 cupancy. Unless the husband had the right of homestead in lands at his death, his widow can have none.' § 456. Right of Curtesy.— The general rule is that the husband's right of curtesy in the homestead of his wife during the minority of her children, yields to their right to occupy the homestead. The husband is not entitled to take possession of or hold it as a tenant by the curtesy, until the children's homestead right expires." Notwithstanding the homestead right of the children of a deceased married woman, the curtesy of the husband can be sold at once to satisfy his debts, but the right of enjoyment of the pur- chaser must be postponed until the termination of the chil- dren's minority.' Where there are no children the value of the life estate may be estimated by well defined rules, and when there is no good reason that the sale shall be post- poned until the expiration of the estate, the value of the remainder in fee may be ascertained with sufficient cer- tainty to warrant the court to dispose thereof in due course as in other cases.* § 457. Nature of the Estate. — The adult heirs of a person whose property has been selected for a homestead take a vested remainder therein subject to the life estate of the surviving husband or wife. ' The wife takes the same estate as the husband had when he died, and the estate is subject to all debts to which it could have been held liable for during his lifetime." The allotment of homestead does not confer or divest any title.' In Utah the widow takes a life estate in the homestead with remainder to decedent's children. " The homestead is an estate under most statutory provis- ions, but in some States, as in Elinois, it has. been held, ' Howell 1). Jones, 91 Tenn. 403. ' Thompson v. King, 54 Ark. 9. »Littell ». Jones, 56 Ark. 139. * McCarthy ». Van Der Mey, 43 Minn. 189; McGowan v. Baldwin, 46 Minn. 477. " Schuyler v. Hanna, 31 Nebr. 307. 'White®. White, 63 Vt. 577. 'Williams v. Whitaker, 110 K Car. 393. « Dooly V. Stringham, 4 Utah, 107. 62 490 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 458 under a former statute, a mere right or exemption and not an estate,' and that the exemption did not affect the rights of heirs or devisee;' and such a privilege ceased with the occupancy.' But the Ilhnois act of 1873 clearly invests the house- holder with an estate of homestead." In Tennessee the right of homestead attaches to real es- tate owned by husband and wife jointly as tenants by en- tireties. ° § 458. Rights of Parties. — All parties interested must have notice of the allotment of homestead. The allotment does not confer or divest any title and is not strictly, but a quasi-proceedings in rem ; and only those persons having actual or constructive notice are bound thereby. And the . allotment of a homestead to one having no right thereof is void. If the children have no notice of the allotment of homestead to the widow they are not bound." And where the husband refuses to unite with the wife in asserting the homestead right, she may act alone.' When the wife has a vahd right to homestead, she must be made a party to an action to forceclose a mortgage thereon given by the husband.' And in California the fiUng of the declaration of homestead gives to the wife an interest in the premises of which she cannot be divested by any act of the husband alone or by any action taken against him alone." So a sale under an action to foreclose a mortgage on a homestead is void as against the wife of the mortgagor when she is not made a party to such ac- tion; and in such case she is entitled to the possession of the premises without paying such mortgage debt." 'McDonald®. Crandall, 43 111. 231; Coe v. Smith, 47 111. 225; Hewitt v. Templeton, 48 111. 367; Hartwell v. McDonald, 69 111. 293. 2 Turner v. Bennett, 70 111. 268; Eggleston v. Eggleston, 72 111. 24; Fight «. Holt, 80 111. 84; Sontag v. Schmi.sseur, 76 111. 541. 3 Finley ». McConnell, 60 111 259. *Bldridge v. Pierce, 90 111. 474; Kitterlin v. Ins. Co., 134 111. 652. 5 Jackson v. Shelton, 89 Tenn. 82; White «. Fulghum, 87 Tenn. 281. « Williams ». Whitaker, 110 K. Car. 393. ■" Hemphill v. Haas, 88 Ky. 493. 8 Morris v. Ward. 5 Kans. 239. 'Hefner i). Urton, 71 Cal. 479; Revalk ». Kraemer, 8 Cal. 73. "Watts V. Gallagher (Cal.), 31 Pac. Rep. 636. §§ 459-460] HOMESTEAD. 491 § 459. Testamentary Disposition of Homestead. — The homestead will descend to non-resident heirs.' The word "heirs" does not mean resident heirs or minor heirs." In Florida a homestead is not subject to testamentary dispo- sition, and, although the owner of the homestead may leave a wUl as to his homestead, he dies intestate as to that;" yet in some States the widow may elect to take under the will or the homestead.* She may take the homestead or her distributive share of the estate.' And when she does waive her homestead and takes another part of the estate, she cannot so divide the estate as to injure the other parties interested in the estate. ° In Missouri if she accepts the terms of the will which gives her an amount larger than that allowed by law, she cannot insist on her homestead if repugnant to the terms of the will;' but she can take what the law gives her irrespective of the will.' § 460. Mortgaged Homestead. — ^Where the homestead is mortgaged, the life estate of the survivor is subject to and must bear its proportion of the incumbrance, if a valid hen, in case of a deficiency of personal property; and it is error to charge the remainder in fee with the entire incum- brance of the subsisting mortgage for which the entire estate is liable." The mortgaged homestead must bear its proportion of the mortgage debt.'" A mortgage given before a homestead right accrues will be the prior lien." ' Scull ■». Beatty, 37 Fla. 426. 2 Miller « Finegan, 26 Fla. 29. 'McGowan v. Bald.vin, 46 Minn. 477; Wilson v. Fridenberg, 19 Fla. 461; 21 Fla. 386; Lewis v. Lichty, 3 Wash. St. 213. * Lewis V. Lichty, 3 Wash. St. 213. 'lure Hatch's Estate, 62 Vt. 300; Schlarb v. Holderbaum, 80 Iowa, 394; Hoffman v. Hoffman, 79 Tex. 189. "Mintzer ». St. Paul Trust Co., 45 Minn. 323. 'Davidson v. Davis, 86 Mo. 440; Burgess v. Bowles, 99 Mo. 543. sRockhey v. Rockhey, 97 Mo. 76; Bell v. Bell, 84 Ala. 64. ' McGowan v. Baldwin, 46 Minn. 477. "Lamb v. Mason, 50 "Vt. 345; Devereaux v. Fairbanks, 50 Vt. 700; In re Wor- cester's Estate, 60 Vt. 420. " Black V. Reno, 59 Fed. Rep. 917; Morehead v. Morehead (Ky.), 25 S. W. Rep. 7.')0. 492 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 461-462 § 461. Emblements — Where homestead or dower is as- signed the widow while the crops growing at her husband's death still remain upon the land, takes the crops as against the decedent's creditors and next of kin. The similarity in the nature and the object of dower and homestead rights is so great that the established rule, with respect to emble- ments, in the one case, resting upon sound reason as it does, should be adopted in the other case. The assignment of dower carries the growing crops with the land, and, for the same reason they follow and go with the homestead.' Article 3. Abandonment and Extinguishment. § 462. Abandonment. § 470. Removal from State. § 463. Temporary Absence. § 471. Filing Notice— Temporary Ab- § 464. Sale. sence. § 465. Mode of Alienation — Vested § 472. By Minor Children. Rights. § 473. Abandonment by Widow. § 466. Conveyance to Wife by Hus- § 474. Mortgages. band. § 475. Rights of Grantee. § 467. Fraud— Voluntary Conveyance § 476. Adverse Possession. Without Consideration. | 477. Lease. § 468. Joinder of Wife. § 469. Specific Performance to Con- vey Homestead. § 462. Abandonment.— A homestead may be abandoned and the right divested. Whether the homestead has been abandoned is often a question of intention. In many States, in order to hold the homestead there must be an actual residence on the land. In sucli cases a removal from the homestead, with no intention of returning, is an abandonment." And a wife may abandon the homestead ' Vaughn v. Vaughn, 83 Tenn, 742. ^Farlin v. Sook. 26 Kans. 397; Koons v. Rittenhause, 28 Kans. 359; Brad- ford T. Loan & Trust Co., 47 Kans. 587; Hart «. Randolph, 142 111. 521; Mar- tin D. Walker, 43 La. Ann. 1019; Blackburn v. Knight, 81 Tex. 326; Hoffman V. Buschman, 95 Mich. 538; Warren v. Peterson, 32 Nebr. 727; Port wood ». Newberry, 79 Tex. 337. § 463] HOMESTEAD. 493 by deserting her husband without cause and remaining away from him.' And where the statute makes provision that a temporary absence from the homestead shall not be an abandonment, if a declaration is filed it must be followed.' Any abandonment of the homestead, such as a perma- nent removal from it, where actual residence is required to support the right, or the acquisition of a new homestead, is an extinguishment of the homestead. ° And the home- stead estate cannot be barred by an antenuptial contract,* nor by a post nuptial contract, in relation to the homestead, entered into before the right has accrued.' When the statute makes it necessary to file a declaration of abandonment, an abandonment will not be complete until the filing of such declaration.' When all the circum- stances show an abandonment the homestead will be lost.' § 463. Temporary Absence. — ^A temporary absence from the homestead is no abandonment,' if there is no intention to abandon." And though the owner temporarily re- moves and offers the land for sale, and then moves back ' Farwell Brick, etc. Co. v. McKenna, 86 Mich. 283. 'Murphy ». Hunt, 75 Ala. 438; Beclsert v. Whitloclt, 83 Ala. 123; Sides v. Scharfl, 93 Ala. 106. 'Woodbury v. Luddy, 14 Allen (Mass.), 1; Howe v. Adams, 28 Vt. 544; Stewart v. Mackey, 16 Tex. 58: Dearing«. Thomas, 25 Ga. 224; Williams®. Swetland, 10 Iowa, 51; Titman v. Moore, 43 111. 169; Moore e. Dunning, 29 111. 138; Kitchell v. Burgwin, 21 111. 40; Gouhenant v. Cockrell, 20 Tex. 96. * Achilles v. Achilles, 137 111. 600. ' Crum V. Sawyer, 182 111. 466. 6 Tipton V. Martin, 71 Cal. 825. ' Kutch V. Holly, 77 Tex. 220; McAlpine v. Powell, 44 Kans. 411; Langston 1). Maxey, 74 Tex. 155; Graves ». Campbell, 74 Tex. 576; Welborne «. Down- ing, 73 Tex. 527; Baker v. Jamison, 73 Iowa, 698; Heaton v. Sawyer, 60 Vt. 495; Trimmier ®. Winsmith (S. Car.), 19 S. E. Rep. 283; Mallard v. Bank (Neb.), 59 N. W. Eep. 511; Bradshaw v. Remick (Iowa), 57 N. "W. Rep. S97; Jackson -o. Sackett, 146 111. 646. sTumlinson v. Swinney, 22 Ark. 400; Robsont). Hough, 56 Ark. 621; Wetz «. Beard, 12 Ohio St. 431; Barker b. Dayton, 28 Wis. 367; Painter ». StefEen, 87 Iowa, 171; Eckman v. Scott, 84 Nebr. 817; Persifull v. Hind, 88 Ky. 296; Osborne v. Schoonmaker, 47 Kans. 667; Wood v. Lord, 51 N. H. 454; Pierson v. Truax, 15 Colo. 223. 'Robinson v. Swearingen, 55 Ark. 55; Malone v. Kornrumpf, 84 Tex. 454-, Moore v. Flynn, 135 111. 74; Moore ». Bradford, 70 Miss. 70. 494 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 464 to the homestead, there is no abandonment." When the domicil is once acquired, it is presumed to continue until a change, facto et animo, is shown, and it is presumed to continue until another is acquired by actual residence with the intention of abandoning the former one." The wife's temporary absence from the homestead does not divest her of the right to the same, and subject the property to the payment of the deceased husband's debts.' So, this right is not divested if the owner is temporarily absent for the purpose of trade." And a part of the home- stead may be used for business purposes if the premises are not abandoned as a homestead. ' And the owner may go to other neighborhoods to work and still claim his home- stead;" the wife may live in town and the husband still work the farm and hold his homestead;' or both may live in an adjoining house and work the farm.' A temporary absence will not work a forfeiture of homestead." § 464. Sale. — In the sale of the homestead the statute must be complied with. A surrender of possession pursu- ant to a conveyance of the property is not an abandon- ment of the estate of homestead, but is, by virtue of the statute an appropriate mode of transferring the estate." A quitclaim deed of the homestead to the grantee of the property subject to the homestead right, is a sufficient grant to transfer the homestead. " A conveyance of land occupied as a homestead, not ' Gregory ®. Gates, 93 Ky. 533. « Caldwell v. PoUak, 91 Ala. 353. ' Desring ■». Beard, 48 Kans. 16. *Hixon V. George, 18 Kans. 253; Robinson v. Swearingen. 55 Ark. 55. 'Heathmanc. Holmes, 94 Cal. 391, distinguishing Laughlin v. Wright, 63 Cal. 113, and Maloney v. Hefer, 75 Cal. 433; Harle v. Richards, 78 Tex. 80. « Duflfey u. Willis, 99 Mo. 133. ' Reinstein v. Daniels, 75 Tex. 640. 8 Nichols s. Nichols, 63 N. H. 621. 'Davis Sewing Mach. Co. v. Whitney, 61 Mich. 518; Jones v. Blumenstein, 77 Iowa, 361; McDermott v. Kernan, 72 Wis. 268; Quigley «. McEvony (Nebr.), 59 N. W. Rep. 767; Pratt v. Pratt, 161 Mass. 276; Fulton v. Robert, 113 N. Car. 431; Raiding v. Joachimstahl, 98 Mich. 78; Edwards v. Reid, 39 Nebr. 645. i» Moore v. Flynn, 135 111. 74. " Paivre v. Daley, 93 Cal. 664. § 464] HOMESTEAD. 495 executed as required by the statute, when there is no abandonment or delivery of possession, can have no effect upon the estate of homestead." The wife is generally required to join in the conveyance of the homestead in order to give a complete title;' such conveyance for a valuable consideration will give the grantee the premises free from any liens of the husband's creditors.' The homestead estate cannot be sold to a third person who does not own the fee, until such homestead has been set off, so as to vest such third person with the right to have the homestead set off. ' If the husband sell the homestead without consent of wife, and gives possession, they may recover possession again. ° The rule is general that the statute must be complied with in order to make a valid sale of the homestead," where the acts of the parties do not estop them from claiming. And if the wife signs the mortgage, but not in conformity with the statute, she can still claim her life estate in the premises set off to her as a homestead as against a sale or mortgage.' A verbal agreement for the transfer of the homestead, assented to by both husband and wife, followed by the change of the possession and performance of the agreement operates to transfer the equitable title; " but if the wife does not consent and no other homestead is furnished, the homestead is not lost and the sale is void.' ' Barraws v. Barrows, 138 111. 649; Ganson v. Baldwin, 93 Mich. 217. ^ Norria v. Moulton, 34 N. H. 394; Clark v. Shannon, 1 Nev. 568; Poole v. Crerrard, 6 Cal. 71; Burnside v. Terry, 45 Ga. 629; Lawyer v. Slingerland, 11 Minn. 457; Sears v. Hanks, 14 Ohio St. 298; Kitchell v. Burgwin, 21 111. 44; Slaughter v. Detiney, 15 Ind. 49; Fisher v. Meister, 24 Mich. 452. ' Parker v. Dean, 45 Miss. 409; Bowman «. Norton, 16 Cal. 314; Bliss v. Clark, 39 111. 590; Deffeliz v. Pico, 46 Cal. 289. ■• Best V. Jenks, 123 HI. 453. 'Myers v. Evans, 81 Tex. 317. • Wilson V. Mills (N. H.), 22 At. Rep. 455. 'Dickinson v. McLane, 57 N. H. 31; Lake v. Page, 68 N. H. 318; Phillips n. Bishop, 31 Nebr. 853; Aultman v. Jenkins, 19Nebr. 211; Daniels v. Lowery, S2 Ala. 519; Law v. Butler, 44 Minn. 482; Duncan v. Moore, 67 Miss. 136; Bolton V. Oberne, 79 Iowa, 278; Hemphill v. Haas, 88 Ky. 492; Barker v. Barker, 27 Nebr. 135. 'Drake -o. Painter, 77 Iowa, 731; Winkleman v. Winkleman, 79 Iowa, 319. ' Collins V. Boyett, 87 Tenn. 334, overruling Levison v. Abrahams, 14 Lea, (Tenn.), 336. 496 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 464 In many States it is provided by statute that no convey- ance affecting the homestead shall be of any validity unless the wife joins in the execution of such instrument and acknowledges the same. So no conveyance will be held valid under such a statute, in which the only mention of the wife as grantor is in a clause whereby she expressly releases her dower and nothing more.' If the deed does not answer the requirement of such statute, the weight of authority holds that such deed is void absolutely and not relatively; that it is a mere nullity, and leaves the property as if it had not been executed and delivered.' But after the execution of such void deed the husband and wife may abandon the homestead, and then it becomes subject to the debts of the husband." But in those States having no such statute, and the homestead is limited to a certain amount, all over that amount is controlled by the laws of conveyance in the same manner and to a like extent as if no exemption had been provided by law.* So where the husband has sold the premises without his wife joining, the grantee can have a court of equity set off the home- stead, but if that cannot be done, have the amount of the exemption awarded the wife in lieu of homestead right, and thus acquire the possession of the granted premises.' Or if the wife dies after the husband's conveyance, then he can give possession, and the grantee will take the whole title free from homestead." In Illinois the homestead is an estate capable of being conveyed by the owner separately from the fee.' > Wing V. Hayden, 10 Bush. (Ky.), 276; Long v. Mastyn, 65 A^a. 543; "Wil. Boni}. Christopherson, 53 Iowa, 481; Qreenough ®. Turner, 11 Gray (Mass.), 333. 5 Morris v. Ward, 5 Kans. 289; Ott v. Sprague, 27 Kans. 630; Lear v. Tot- ten, 14 Bush. (Ky.), 103; TongB. Eifort, 80 Ky. 153; Jenkins v. Harrison, 65 Ala. 345; Long v. Mastyn, 65 Ala. 543 Goodrich v. Brown, 63 Iowa, 247; Bruner v. Bateman, 66 Iowa, 488; Cummingss. Busby, 62 Miss. 195; Ferguson V. Mason, 60 Wis. 389; Sherrid v. Southwick, 43 Mich. 515. 3 Pipkin V. Williams, 57 Ark. 243. * Hotohkiss V. Brooks, 93 111. 386. 5 Hotchkiss V. Brooks, 93 III. 386. 6 Maxwell v. Maxwell, 145 111. 156. 'LorimerB. Kiddoo, 44 111. App. 645. §§ 465-466J HOMESTEAD. 497 § 465. Mode of Alienation — Vested Rights. — The owner of a homestead has no vested rights in statutes pre- scribing the mode of aUenation. And a statute making it unlawful for a married man to sell or otherwise dispose of his homestead without the consent of his wife, and declar- ing conveyances, made of the homestead invalid, unless the wife shall join in such conveyance, vests no estate in the wife, and divests no estate out of the husband. It may enlarge the operation of former homestead exemption laws, and change the mode of alienating homesteads, them- selves. But as Judge Woods ably says, the jus disponendi of the husband is not destroyed or taken away. The method only of conveying the homestead is changed. The vested rights in his estate are not taken from the husband, and he has no vested right in any former statute of the State. A former statute under which he could sell the homestead, may be repealed at the pleasure of the legisla- ture, and a new method of alienation prescribed, such as requires the wife's consent thereto, which is no invasion of any vested rights of the husband. No vested right is taken away from the husband; no estate whatever is vested in the wife.' This is the law when the homestead is not con- sidered a vested right. But in some States a homestead is held to be a vested estate or right and then this law will not apply and the legislature cannot change the mode of alienation.'' § 466. Conveyance to Wife by Husband. — In many States the husband can convey his real estate direct to his wife without the intervention of a trustee. But he cannot convey the homestead to her unless the statute is complied with and she releases or waives her right. And when he attempts to convey the homestead to her without the sig- nature or acknowledgment of the wife the conveyance is void. Nothing passes by the deed unless the homestead is ' Massey v. "Womble, 69 Miss. 347; Mooney e. Moriarty, 36 111. App. 174; Dobbins v. Bank, 112 111. 566. 'Rives V. Haynes, 88 N. Car. 310; Edwards i). Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595; For- tune V. "Watkins, 94 N. Car. 304; Gilmore v. Bright, 101 N. Car. 383; Jenkins ». Jenkins, 83 N. Car. 208; Williams v. Teachey, 85 K Car. 403; O'Kelly v. Williams, 84 N. Car. 281; Bruce v. Strickland, 81 N. Car. 267. 63 498 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [8 467 released in due form." But if the property is greater in value than the homestead, the deed passes the excess over the amount of the homestead when the homestead is ad- measured by valuation/ Such conveyance passes the legal title subject to the pre-existing rights of homestead, 'and is not an alienation of the homestead, but is valid for the purpose of passing the legal title of the land into the wife subject to all pre-existing rights without the voluntary sig- nature and assent of the wife.* In Michigan the husband may convey his interest in the homestead to his wife. ' § 467. Fraud— Voluntary Conveyance Without Con- sideration.— A voluntary conveyance of the homestead for a valuable consideration will pass the title to the grantee free from all debts of the grantors. But when there is no valuable consideration for such a conveyance to a third person, it is held by some courts that it is a fraud upon the grantor's creditors-and the creditors may seize the property in the hands of the grantee." But it is generally held that even fraudulent acts of the person entitled to a homestead are not allowed to divest that right,' and a judgment cred- itor cannot have a conveyance of his debtor's homestead estate set aside as fraudulent.* The debtor holds the ex- emption absolutely and entirely free from the claims of the creditor;' such creditors being entitled to no lien thereon, 1 Barrows v. Barrows, 138 III. 649. ^Kitterlin v. Ins. Co., 134 111. 647; Gages. Wheeler, 129 111. 197; Hartmau V. Schultz, 101 111. 437. 'Turner v. Bernlieimer, 95 Ala. 241. ^ Harsh v. Griffin, 72 Iowa, 608; Burkett v. Burkett, 78 Cal. 310; Baines b. Baker, 60 Tex. 140; Ruohs ». Hooke, 3 Lea (Tenn.), 302; Spoon ». Van Fossen, 53 Iowa, 494. ^ Lynch v. Doran, 95 Mich. 395. * Currier v. Sutherland, 54 N. H. 475. Compare Garrison v. Monaghan, 33 Pa. St. 232; Dreutzer «. Bell, 11 "Wis. 114; Winebrinner v. "Weisiger, 3 Mon. (Ky.) 33; Foster v. McGregor, 11 Vt. 595; Vaughan ®. Thompson, 17 111. 78; Dearman «. Dearman, 4 Ala. 521; Legro v. Lord, 10 Me. 161; Planter's Bank v. Henderson, 4 Humph. (Tenn.) 75. 'Gruhn v. Richardson, 128 111. 186. 8 Moore v. Flynn, 135 111. 79. »Ray 1). Yarnell, 118 Ind. 112; Blair ®. Smith, 114 Ind. 126. §§ 468^69] HOMESTEAD. 499 and their rights being in no manner affected by the trans- fer, it is immaterial how the parties dispose of it.' § 468. Joinder of Wife. — In transferring the home- stead the wife must join in the execution of the deed, the statutory provisions being followed in detail. This is the general rule. But it may not be necessary to have the wife's name appear in the body of the deed, though her execution and signing of the deed must be in conformity with the statute.' To convey complete title and have a legal execution it requires the joint action of the wife and the husband,' for a conveyance by the husband alone does not transfer the homestead ; * though in some States he may convey if he owns the homestead in fee.' § 469. Specific Performance to Convey Homestead. — It is the general rule that a conveyance of a homestead is only effected by complying with the statute. So there can be no conveyance of the homestead by the wife unless with due formality and in substantial compliance with the stat- ute. And she is not authorized under an executory agree- ment to sell her homestead occupied by herself and hus- band, and a court will refuse to enforce a specific perform- ance of such executory contract. ° If the conveyance is not executed in compliance with the statute, when there is no abandonment or delivery of possession, it can have no ef- fect upon the estate of homestead.' The contract has no 'Pipkin ». Williams, 57 Ark. 243; Bogan v. Cleveland, 53 Ark. 101; Clark ». Raymond, 84 Iowa, 251; Wilcher v. Thompson (Miss.), 12 South. Rep. 828; Wilson V. Taylor, 49 Kans. 774; Fuller v. Whitlock, 99 Ala. 411. 2 Shelton ». Aultman, 82 Ala. 815; Yocam v. Lowell, 111 111. 213; Davis «. Jenkins, 93 Ky. 353. 3 Hall n. Loomis, 63 Mich. 709. < Bunting v. Saltz, 84 Cal. 168; Woolcot v. Lerdell, 78 Iowa, 669; McCreery V. SchafEer, 36 Nebr. 173; Betts v. Sims, 25 Nebr. 166; Thompson «. Sheppard, 85 Ala. 611; Alt «. Banholzer, 39 Minn. 511; Spiegel ». Spiegel, 64 Mich. 345; Myrick v. Bill, 5 Dak. 167; Coker ». Roberts, 71 Tex. 597; Gilmore ». Bright, 101 N. Car. 382; Conway ». Elgin, 38 Minn. 469. 'Wright ». Whittick, 18 Colo. 54. 5Jenkins«. Harrison, 66 Ala. 345; Jones v. GofE, 63 Tex. 348; Clarke v. Koenig, 36 Nebr. 572. ' Barrows v. Barrows, 138 111. 649. 500 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ iQ9 validity," and will not be enforced by specific perform- ance." And specific performance of an agreement to sell real estate will not be decreed against a vendor, a married man, whose wife refuses to join in the conveyance, unless the vendee is willing to pay the full purchase-money and ac- cept a deed without the wife's execution ; if not he must resort to his action at law for damages. No abatement which can be made in the price on the ground of the wife's right, will be just to both parties, without making a new contract for them which the court will not do.' But in those States where the homestead is limited to a certain amount, if the premises so occupied exceed this value the householder, under the statute, is entitled to a homestead therein of the specified value and no more, and the value above that amount is controlled by the laws' of conveyance in the same manner and to a like extent as if no exemption had been provided by law.' So where the husband has sold the real estate the grantee may apply to a court of equity and have the homestead set off, or in case it cannot be done, have the amount of exemption awarded the wife in lieu of her homestead right and thus acquire the possession of the granted premises.' But when the homestead is the home, an established house and piece of land, without hmitation or value, and incapable of division,, specific performance of the contract will not be decreed, when the homestead is sold by the husband without the joint action of the wife according to statute. And in Kansas it appears that if the location and extent of the homestead can be ascertained the court will deter- mine the ultimate rights of parties.' But generally if the premises continue to be the home- stead, the grantee of the husband is not entitled to specific > Donner v. Redenbaugh, 61 Iowa, 271; Larson v. Butts, 23 Nebr. 370. 'Phillips V. Staucli, 30 Mich. 369, 383; Larson v. Butts, 22 Nebr. 370; Yost V. Devault, 9 Iowa, 60; Wright v. Hays, 34 Tex. 253. 'Riesz's Appeal, 78 Pa. St. 485; Young v. Paul, 3 Stockt. (N. J.) 401; Hawralty v. Warren, 18 N. J. Eq. 124. *Hotchkiss V. Brooks, 93 111. 386. ^Hotchkiss V. Brooks, 98 111. 386. ' Conboy v. Railroad Co. 42 Kans. 658. §§ 470-471] HOMESTEAD. 501 performance.' However, if the husband and wife, in pur suance of the husband's contract to sell, remove from the premises and establish their homestead elsewhere, and the grantee is put into possession, then specific performance of this contract is enforceable because of the subsequent part performance." § 470. Removal From State.— A permanent removal from the estate is an abandonment of the homestead. The homestead interest in land terminates by removal from the State with the intention of never returning." But when a party moves into another State, and there obtains no other homestead, his right to his homestead will remain so long as the animus revertendi remains, if it be a reasonable time and not contrary to statute.* So a leaving of the State in search of health, and an absence of several years, is no abandonment.' But a permanent removal from the State and investing in another homestead is an abandon- ment in some States ; and if the last homestead is sold by the owner and a return made to the former State where the first homestead was located, and he buys real estate it will not create a new homestead, and the land will be liable for the debts created when he owned the first homestead." In Texas a man may move to another State, leaving his wife and children on his homestead, with intention of moving his family, and still retain his homestead if he re- turns. ' But under the North Carolina statute he would lose his homestead.' § 471. Filing Notice — Temporary Absence. — In those States where filing of notice is essential to hold a ' Phillips V. Stanch, 20 Mich. 369. « Walker v. Kelly, 91 Mich. 212. 3 Knox V. Yow, 91 Oa. 367; Perry v. Dillrance, 86 Iowa, 424; Bank «. Smis- son, 73 Ga. 422; Maher v. McConaga, 47 111. 393; Baker v. Leggett, 98 N. Car. 304; Craddock v. Edwards, 81 Tex. 609. ^Cipperly v. Rhodes, 53 111. 346; Wiggins v. Chance, 54 111. 175; Wood- ward V. Till, 1 Mich. N. P. 210. * Jones V. Robbins, 74 Tex. 615. « Dalton ». Webb, 83 Iowa, 478; Caldwell v. Scivers, 85 Ky. 38. ■< McDaniell v. Ragsdale (Tex.), 8 S. W. Rep. 625. ^Finley v. Saunders, 98 N. C. 463. See, also, Lee v. Moseley, 101 N. Car. 311. 502 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 472-474 homestead, if the owner removes from it and fails to occupy it continuously, the notice must be filed or owner loses his right." If the notice is not filed, an inten- tion to return is immaterial and the right is divested.' Filing of notice is the law of but few States, § 472. By Minor Children. — Minor children are incapa- ble, either by acts or declarations, to waive or abandon the homestead, and actual occupancy by them is not necessary.* So, if a minor does not occupy the homestead continuously, but farms the land and lives with his mother on other premises, his right is not lost.' And when both parents are dead, the guardian of the minor children may take them to their kin where they are given a home, and rent the homestead and use the income for their support, and the homestead is still theirs as if they lived on it.' § 473. Abandonment by Widow. — A widow may aban- don her homestead. Accordingly, after the homestead has been set out, if the widow remarries and leaves the State with no intention of returning, she loses her right of home- stead." She can also extinguish her right by accepting a lease from the decedent's heirs and afterwards selling the same to them, cancelling the lease, and accepting other pro- visions for her support.' And where she claims to be sole owner of the land and of the homestead, and conveys it in fee simple in disregard of the rights of the husband's minor heirs, she will be held to have abandoned the home- stead," notwithstanding she subsequently obtains a recon- veyance of the land to herself.' § 474. Mortgages. — Where the husband and wife exe- cute a mortgage on the homestead according to the statute, ' Quehl V. Peterson, 47 Minn. 13. = Pollak 1). Caldwell, 94 Ala. 149. 'Shirack v. Shirack, 44 Kans. 653; Bootli ». Goodwin, 39 Ark. 633. * Deering », Beard, 48 Kans. 16. * BrinkerhofE v. Everett, 38 111. 363. See, also, Rhorer v. Brockhage, 86 Mo. 544; Johnston d. Turner, 29 Ark. 280. « Craddock v. Edwards, 81 Tex. 609. ■"Ditson V. Ditson, 85 Ark. 276. 8 Garibaldi v. Jones, 48 Ark. 330. ' Sansom v. Harrell, 55 Ark. 573. § 475] HOMESTEAD. 503 waiving this right, it will be vahd. In Texas a mortgage on the homestead is invalid, executed by husband and wife. But a mortgage to pay a vendor's lien is valid. And so is a trust deed given by the husband after the wife's death.' A mortgage given by the husband and wife made to secure the husband's debts does not defeat the right to homestead as against other debts ; a homestead should be assigned out of the surplus proceeds where the land is sold under such mortgage." And a waiver may be made so as to let in a judgment lien.' In Texas a deed of trust executed by the head of the family, consisting of himself and his minor children, his wife being dead, is not void upon his homestead." In Missouri, until the wife has filed her claim of homestead, the husband may mortgage the homestead without the wife joining.' And in Arizona, the wife must sign the mortgage or it will be invalid to place a hen on the home- stead," and this is the general rule. In North Carolina, when there is a judgment lien hav- ing priority to a mortgage of the same land, upon which execution may issue, it makes it necessary to have allot- ment of homestead. Such mortgage cannot be made by the husband without the assent of the wife, and if executed without the wife's assent it is void.' In order to convey the homestead or give a lien upon it the wife must join with the husband in waiving the homestead right.' § 475. Eights op Grantee. — A grantee may purchase the premises subject to a homestead, and if there be a prior 'Hensel v. Build. & L. Asso., 85 Tex. 2X5. 2 Jackson v. Shelton, 89 Tenn. 83; White ». Fulghum, 87 Tenn. 281. 'Jackson v. Creighton, 29 Nebr. 310. ■■Bateman ». Pool, 84 Tex. 403; Lacy v. Rollins, 74 Tex. 566; Smith v. Von Hutton, 75Tex. 635. 'Tucker v. Wells, 111 Mo. 399. * Hancock v. Herrick (Ariz.) 39 Pac, Rep. 13. ' Hughes «. Hodges, 103 N. Car. 236, 347; Flemings. Graham, 110 N. Car. 374. «Reid V. McGowan, 28 S. Car. 74; Snell v. Snell, 123 III. 403; Rutherford v. Jamieson, 65 Miss. 219; Broach v. Powell, 79 Ga. 79; McClure v. Braniff, 75 Iowa, 38; Ullman ii. Jasper, 70 Tex. 446; Colvin e. Woodward, 40 La. Ann. 627; Bull®. Coe, 77 Cal. 54; Montgomery®. Robinson, 76 Cal. 239; Gleaaons. Spray, 81 Cal. 317 504 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 476 lien to the homestead of a judgment he cannot enjoin the enforcement of such hen. ' And if the wife is deserted by the husband and sells the homestead and gives possession to the grantee, and the husband quitclaims his rights to the grantee, the grantee will hold the premises as against a second grantee who buys with notice of all the circum- stances.' When the homestead is sold under execution the grantee takes a defeasible title, which may be made com- plete by waiver of the homestead privilege.' But if the homestead is claimed then the grantee may, under the Georgia statute, take the premises after the expiration of the estate of homestead." And in this State the sale of the homestead may be made by order of court. Undec such sale the purchaser acquires not only the title of the benefi- ciaries, but that of the estate so as to bar the rights of the adult heirs and all persons claiming under them, their rights being transferred to the property in which the proceeds of the sale were invested." In Alabama if the widow sells her entire interest in the land to one of the heirs, dower not having been allotted to her, and then abandons the homestead, her alienee is enti- tled in equity to recover the rents and mesne profits to which she would have been entitled if she had abandoned the homestead without having her dower interest; and also her share of the proceeds of the sale of the land.' § 476. Adverse Possession. — During coverture, and while the husband remains the head of the family, neither the wife nor the husband can hold the homestead adversely to the other.' But adverse possession for the requisite time and accord- ing to law will extinguish a homestead.' However, a ten- ant under a lease of the homestead executed by the hus- band without the concurrence of the wife, is estopped during the existence of the term from asserting adverse ' Comnock v. Wilson, 33 Nebr. 615. ^ Corbin «. Minchen, 81 Iowa, 683. 3 Snider®. Martin, 55 Ark. 139. * Grace v. Kezar, 86 Ga. 697; Jackson v. DuBose, 87 Ga. 761. ' Fleetwood v. Lord, 87 Ga. 592. * Norton v. Norton, 94 Ala. 481. ■< Mauldin v. Cox, 67 Gal. 387. 'McCormack v. Silsby, 83 Cal. 73; Mauldin «. Cox, 67 Cal. 387. § 477] HOMESTEAD. 505 possession against either the husband or the wife. One who has been in adverse possession for the statutory pe • riod, occupying the land as a homestead, acquires such a title that a valid transfer can only be made in the manner prescribed by the statute for the conveyance of the home- stead.' § 477. Lease. — Where it is provided that the homestead shall not be alienated without the joint act of the husband and the wife, a lease of the homestead should be executed by the wife in connection with her husband. In Kansas the constitution" provides that a homestead shall not be alienated without the joint consent of the husband and the wife when that relation exists. Under this clause a lease of the homestead under which the lessee takes possession of the premises, in such a way as to interfere with the pos- session and enjoyment of the wife of the homestead, is such an alienation of the homestead as, under the constitu- tion and statute, requires the joint consent of the husband and wife.' So, a lease of a homestead for a period of twenty-five years, with privilege of prospecting and dig- ging for coal, gas and minerals upon any or all portions of the homestead, at the pleasure of the lessee, and to erect derricks, engines, houses and buildings for storage purposes if needed, may interfere with the use and occu- pancy of the homestead by the wife, and, therefore, requires joint consent of husband and wife to give it validity.* But a temporary lease of the homestead during the ab- sence of the wife is valid;' otherwise, the wife must join.' ' Bridges ». Johnson, 69 Tex. 714. s Art. 15, sect. 9. ^Coughlin V. Coughlin, 36Kans. 116; Pilcher v. Railroad Co., 38 Kaas. 516. ■•Pranklm Land Co. v. Coal & Oil Co., 43 Kans. 518. 'Earll V. Earll, 60 Mich. 30. 'Evans®. Railroad Co., 68 Mich. 603. 64 CHAPTER XIV. estates for years. Article 1, History and Development. §478. History. §481. Term— Definition. § 479. Definition. § 482. Interesse Termini. § 480. Attendant Terms. § 4:T8. History.— Estates less than a freehold are: 1. Es- tates for years. 2. Estates at will, and tenancies from year to year. 3. Estate at sufferance. The first will be treated in this chapter, and the others in succeeding chapters. In the earlier times of the English history leases for years were held by a precarious tenure. The possession of the lessee was held to be the possession of the owner of the freehold, and the term might have been defeated by this owner, by his suffering a common recovery. The lessee acquired no estate or vested interest in the land, and he could not protect his interest.' In the reign of Henry VI. it appears that the law gave the lessee, who was unduly evicted, the right to recover, not only damages for the loss of the possession, but for the possession itself." A statute was enacted which enabled the lessee for years to falsify a recovery suffered to his prejudice.' But all these interests are generally considered as chattel interests in lands, and the lessee is never said to be seised of land. But many statutes have been enacted which give to estates for years of a certain duration, all the characteristics of a freehold estate. § 4Y9. Definition. — An estate for years is an interest in lands by virtue of a contract for the possession of them for ' Co. Litt. 46a. ' 4 Kent's Com. 85. 5 31 Hen. VIII. o. 15. (506) § 480] ESTATES FOR YEARS. 507 a definite or limited period of time;' and it is deemed an estate for years, though the number of years should exceed the ordinary limit of human life.' But an estate for life is a higher and greater estate than a lease for years. If the lease be made for a less time than a year, the lessee is still a tenant for years,' for the length of time for which the estate is to endure is of no importance in ascertaining its character, unless otherwise declared by statute.* The term of the lease became a certain and permanent interest, and long terms became common in England, and were created by way of trust to secure jointures, and raise portions, or money, on mortgage for family purposes, and made attendant upon the inheritance. ' § 480. Attendant Terms. — Attendant terms were created by long leases or mortgages so arranged as to protect the title of the owner. To raise a portion for younger children, a mortgage was made to a trustee, who had power to take possession of the property, or to sell a part of the term if the portions were not duly paid. If the deed did not be- come absolutely void upon payment of the portion, a release was made by the trustee and the mortgage discharged. These attendant terms furnished security to purchasers and mortgagees. If a bona fide purchaser or mortgagee took a defective conveyance or mortgage, and thereby acquired only an equitable title, he then took an assignment of an outstanding term to a trustee for himself, and cured the defect, by securing to himself the legal estate during the term, in preference to any creditor, of whose incumbrance he had no notice, at or before the time of completing his contract for the purchase or mortgage." ' a Bl. Com. 140. 'Co. Liu. 46 a. 'Litt. sect. 67. < Brown t). Bragg, 33 Ind. 133; Goulds. School District, 8 Minn. 431; Lilt, sect. 67. 'Freeman v. Barns, 1 Vent. 55; Norfolk's Case, 3 Cli. Cas. 34; Denn v. Bar- nard, Cowp. 597. ' Willoughby v. Willougliby, 1 Term R. 763. See, also, Wilker v. Boding- ton, 3 Vern. 599; Wynn «. Williams, 5 Ves. 130; Capel v. Girdler, 9 Ves. 509; Emery i>. Grocock, 6 Mad. 54; 3 Coventry's Powell on Mort. 477-513; Co. Litt. 290, Buter's note. 608 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 481-482 A term of years attendant upon the inheritance was the creation of a court of equity, and invented to protect prop- erty, and a distinction was made between attendant terms and terms in gross, though in law they were the same. §481. Term — Definition.— Estates for years are fre- quently called terms. It is the limitation of the estate, as a term of years for hfe, and the like. The word term does not merely signify the time specified in the lease, but the estate also, and interest that passes by the lease; hence, the term may expire during the continuance of the time, as by surrender, forfeiture, and the like.' The legal difference be- tween the term and the time of a lease for years is, that the word term does not merely signify the time specified in the lease, but the estate also, and interest that passes by the lease. A lease for the space of twenty years' time during the lessees' lives, is for twenty years only provided the lessees live that long, and expires on their death during the twenty years." And a lease for a term certain, and thereafter to continue at the will of the lessee is valid.' And where there is a conflict of testimony as to the length of the term under a verbal lease its duration is a question for the jury.* § 482. Interesse Termini. — When a lease is made, the lessee does not become complete tenant by lease to the les- sor, until he has entered on the land let; before entry he has no estate, but only a right to have the lands for the term by force of the lease; and this right is called inlaw an interesse termini.'' It is an interest in the term. The de- raise of a term in land does not vest any estate in the les- see, but gives him a mere right of entry on the land, which right is called his interest in the term, ov interesse termini." It is a right or interest only, and not an estate. It may be extinguished by a release to the lessor; and it may be'as- ' 3 Bl. Com. 145; Co. Litt. 45. 2 Sutton V. Lodge, 83 Ga. 770. 3 Myers v. Kingston Coal Co. 136 Pa. St. 582. " Irwin B. Mattox, 138 Pa. St. 466. ' Williams on Real Prop. 339; Watkins on Convey. 15. • Co. Litt. 46; 2 Bl. Com. 144. * § 488J ESTATES FOR YEARS. 509 signed or granted away, but it cannot, technically consid- ered, be surrendered; for there is no reversion before entry, in which the interest may merge. Nor will a release from the lessor operate by way of enlargement, for the lessee has not estate before entry." The interest may be released, but it cannot be enlarged by release; it may be assigned, but it cannot be surrendered; though it is no impediment to a surrender or merger of a prior interest, in a more remote interest.' But when the words and consideration inserted in the lease were deemed sufficient to raise a use, the statute of uses operated upon the lease, and annexed the possession to the use without actual entry. It is so far vested as to be capable of descent to the personal representatives, or of bequest hke other chattel interests. Article 2. Creation of Leases. § 483. Definition. § 491. Covenants. § 484. Controlled by the Statute of § 492. Implied Covenants. Frauds. § 493. Quiet Enjoyment. § 435. Form of Lease. § 494. Leasing Furnished and Unfur- §486. Distinction Between a Lease and nished Houses. an Agreement for a Lease. § 495. Cultivating Land. § 487. Execution. § 496. Eepairs. § 488. Delivery and Acceptance. § 497. To Pay Taxes and Assessments. § 489. Property Covered. § 498. Breach of Covenants in a Lease § 490. Construction. — Damages. §483. Definition. — A lease is properly a conveyance of lands or tenements, usually in consideration of rent or other annual recompense, made for life, for years, or at will, but always for a less time than the lessor has in the premises; for if it be for the whole interest it is more properly an assignment of a lease.' Leases for years were made to commence in fnturo; for, being a chattel interest, thej ' 3 Preston on Convey. 311-217; Doe v. Walker, 5 Barn. & Cress. 111. 2 2 Preston on Convey. 316. 3 Williams on Real Prop. 423. 510 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 484 never were required to be created by feoffment and livery of seisin. The lessee was never technically seised. He could not defend himself in a real action. He held in the name of his lord, and was rather his servant than owner in his own right.' The distinction between terms for years and freehold estates is thus very great. These leases were made to commence in the future, pro- vided they did not contravene the doctrine of perpetuities, lay vesting in possession at a time beyond a life or lives in being, and twenty-one years thereafter.' § 484. Controlled by the Statute of Frauds.— Now the statute of frauds' controls this subject and leases must be in writing. The statute declares that all leases, estates, or terms of years, or any uncertain interests in lands, created by livery only, or by parol, and not put in writing and signed by the party, should have the force and effect of leases, or estates at wiU only, except leases not exceeding the term of three j'^ears, whereupon the rent reserved dur- ing the term shall amount to two-third parts of the full improved value of the thing demised. And that no lease or estate, either of freehold or term of years, should be a,ssigned, granted, or surrendered, unless in writing. A statute of frauds has been adopted by all the States similar to the English, though the length of time varies in some of the States. In some of the States the writing must be sealed, but in this regard the rule is not uniform.* The statute of frauds extends to agreements for the assignment of leases.' It is also required in England" that a lease required by law to be in writing of any tenements or hereditaments shall be void at law, unless made by deed. It is no objection to a written contract that some of its terms are to be fixed by something to be done in the ' 1 Preston on Estates, 204-306; Digby on Keal Prop. 145. ' Williams on Real Prop. 388. '39 Car. II. c. 3, sects. 1, 3, 3. ^Taylor's Land & Ten. sect. 34. 5 Poultney «. Holmes, 1 Strange, 405; Potter v. McGowan, 15 R. I. 350; "Wallace v. Scoggins, 18 Greg. 503. 6 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, sect. 3. § 485] ESTATES Fi)R YEARS. 511 future, if that something is doue before the action is brought thereon, and if it is then in writing the provisions of the statute of frauds are compKed with.' While the memorandum must express all essential elements of the contract with reasonable certainty, these may be gathered either from the terms of the memorandum itself, or from some other paper or papers referred to. If one of the series of papers which appears to have relation to the same contract, is signed by the party to be charged, this is enough, as all the papers are to be considered together as forming one contract or memorandum. And parol evi- dence is admissible to identify any paper referred to." Thus, a written agreement for the subleasing of rooms in a building in process of erection, which recites an agreement by the owner to lease the building to the proposed sub- lessor, and provides that such sublease is to be made as soon as the building is ready for occupancy and the lease is to be deUvered and to be subject in all respects to such owner's agreement, is sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds in the lease of the building, though the lease is not at the time in existence, but is executed and delivered before action is brought for a breach of the agreement for the sub- lease." §485. Form of Lease. -^The various parts of a lease are : 1. The premises, including the date, the names of the lessor and the lessee, the parcels, which ought to be accu- rately described, and the exceptions, if any. 2. The ha- bendum and tenendum by which the estate or interest of the lessee is limited. 3. The reddendum, or clause where- by rent is reserved. 4. The covenants and conditions." The usual covenants are on the part of the lessee, to pay ' Freeland v. Ritz, 154 Mass. 257. 2 Ryan b. UniteJ States, 136 TJ. S. 68; Peck v. Vandemark, 99 N. Y. 39; Louisville Asphalt Varnish Co. v. Lorick, 39 S. Car. 533; Ridgway v. Whar- ton, 6 H. L. Cas. 338; Atwood v. Cobb, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 227; Rhoades ». Castner, 13 Allen (Mass.), 130; Beckwith «. Talbot, 95 TJ. S. 389; Grafton v. Cummings, 99 U. S. 100; Fitzmaarice v. Bayley, 9 H. L. Cas. 78; Cave t Hastings, 7 Q. B. 125; Olivers. Hunting, 44 Ch. D. 205; Studds v. "Watson, 28 Ch. D. 305; Shardlow v. Cotterell, 18 Ch. D. 280; 30 Ch. D. 90. » Freeland v. Ritz, 154 Mass. 357. * Crabbe's Prec. Convey. 1034-1026. 512 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [8 4Sg rent, to pay taxes, to keep the demised property in good repair, and to leave it in good repair at the expiration of the term; and he also frequently covenants not to cut down timber, to insure, and not to assign or sublet without the permission of the lessor. The lessor covenants for quiet enjoyment by the lessee under the demise; to the lessor is reserved the power of en- tering to view the state of repairs; also a power of re-entry on non-payment of rent or non-performance of covenants by the lessee. The appropriate words for creating a lease are "demise, lease, and to farm let," but any words show- ing the intention of the parties are sufficient; as "shall hold and enjoy" are sufficient." The form or phraseology of a lease is not material to its validity or effect, provided it clearly shows the intention of the one party to put the other in possession of the premises, and of the latter to as- sume such possession for some determinate period. § 486. Distinction Between a Lease and an Agree- ment FOR a Lease. — If the instrument purports to convey to the tenant a present right of possession, without con- templating the execution of any further writing for the pur pose, it is a lease. A lease, upon its execution, confers on the tenant an interest in the land, and the term becomes vested in him instanter upon his entry. An agreement for a lease confers no legal interest in the premises, yet it will operate as a license to enter thereon, and then if the in- tended lessor refuses to execute the lease the proposed ten- ant can enforce specific performance." But words of pres- ent demise will not make it a lease, if the contrary inten- tion can be clearly inferred from the rest of the instrument; nor is the word "agreement" decisive of its nature.' The intention of the parties is to be sought from the whole in- strument, and that must govern its construction." And when it admits of two constructions, parol evidence may ' Doe V. Ashburner, 5, Term R. 168. ' Price V. Williams, 1 Mees. & Wels. 6. 3 Tempest v. Bawling, 13 East, 18; Weed ». Crocker, 13 Gray (Mass.), 219. * People V. Gillis, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 201; Poole v. Bentley, 12 East, 168; Doe V. Powell, 8 Scott, N. R. 687; Morgan v. Bissell, 3 Taunt. 65. § 487] ESTATES FOR YEABS. 513 be introduced to show the intention of the parties.' Cer- tainty as to time of commencement, duration and amount of rent, is usually necessary to constitute a present de- mise." § 48T. Execution. — The lease must be properly executed; and a deed executed by a town or city, regular on its face, under the corporate seal for a part of its common, is prima facie evidence that all the prerequisites of law au- thorizing this act have been observed." The date of the lease is not a matter of substance. And the date is not conclusive as to the deUvery, for either party may show that delivery took place on a different day.* No particular form of words is necessary to constitute a lease; but whatever terms express the intention of the one party to divest himself temporarily of the possession of his property, and of the other to receive and hold it, are sufficient.' The terms usually employed are "demise," "grant," "lease," and "to farm let;" but a covenant to stand seized to the use of the covenantee, or a license tO' enter and enjoy, will operate as a lease. ° And a present lease may be made by two writings, one signed by the lessor and the other signed by the lessee.' So will an agreement between vendor and vendee be a lease, by separate instru- ments, that a person named shall be a tenant to the latter." And a writing to the effect that a person signing it has taken possession of certain lands which he is to hold for a third person, free of rent, until such time as the third party may sign it, is a lease." Parol authority to insert in a ' Alderman v. Neate, 4 Mees. & Wels. 704 ; Doe v. Asliburner, 5 Term R. 16i; Chapman v. Bluck, 4 Bing. N. C. 187. « Wright V. Trevezant, 3 Car. & P. 441. 3 Wells ®. Pressy, 105 Mo. 164. * Church ». Gilraan, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 656. * Thornton v. Payne, 5 Johns (N. Y.) 74; Hallett v. "Wylie, 3 Johns (N Y.) 47. 'Right ». Thomas, 3 Burr. 1446; Right v. Proctor; 4 Burr. 2209. 'Duncklee v. Webber, 151 Mass. 408; Shaw v. Farnsworth, 108 Mass. 357; McGrath v. Boston, 103 Mass. 369. ' Denn ®. Cartwright, 4 East, 29. 'Allen ». Koep.sel, 77 Tex. 505. 65 514 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 488-489 lease the number of the house intended to be demised is sufficient for that purpose.' And where the lessee seals the lease, where a seal is required, and the lessor signs it, each party becomes bound thereby.' §488. Delivery and Acceptance. —In order to have the deed take effect it must be delivered and accepted. Where the lease operates entirely for the benefit of the lessee his acceptance may be presumed; or acceptance may be inferred from acts, such as entry into possession, as well as established by words of formal acceptance.' There is no acceptance where executory proceedings on each side are involved in the proposal, and the party professing to ac- cept introduces variance and formulates his adoption on the offer with conditions and qualifications, which assent alters some of the constituents or materially varies the effect.* The mere fact that the lease has always been in the possession of the lessor is not conclusive evidence that it has not been delivered so as to become operative; and where it is retained by either party with consent of the other, it must be considered as dehvered, for both under- stand that it has been executed and is in operation.' If the lessee, who has not signed the lease, accepts it when prop- erly executed by the lessor, the lease binds the lessee the same as if he had executed it. ° § 489. Property Covered. — "Where the exclusive posses- sion of land occupied by a leased building is necessary to the enjoyment of the demise, the land passes as incident.' When one takes land under a lease and goes into possession 1 Bulkley v. Devine, 137 111. 406. «Rice D. Brown, 81 Me. 56. 3 Jackson «. Bodle, 30 Johns. (N. Y.) 184; Maynard v. Maynard, 10 Mass 456; Hedge v. Drew, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 141. ^ Burkhalter v. Jones, 33 Kans, 5; Baker v. Johnson, 37 Iowa, 188; Bentz «. Eubanks, 41 Kans. 38; Erickson v. Wallace, 45 Kans. 430. ' Oneto V. Restano, 89 Cal. 63. « Carnegie Nat. Gas. Co. ■». Phlla. Co., 158 Pa. St. 817. ' Chesebrough v. Pingree, 73 Mich. 488; Allen v. Scott, 31 Pick. (Mass.) 35; Bacon «. Bowdoin, 33 Pick. (Mass.) 401; Winton v. Cornish, 5 Ohio, 477; Hooper ». Farnsworth, 138 Mass. 487. § 490] ESTATES FOR YEARS. 515 and pays rent under it, he cannot repudiate the lease on the ground of uncertainty of the property leased. ' If part of the demised land is taken under the right of eminent domain, a corresponding rebate must be made in the amount of rent paid." But when a tenant leases land for a certain purpose, such as the quarrying of soapstone, re- serving yearly rent according to the amount quarried, and with a fixed minimum rent payable at all events, he will be bound, though the purpose for which he leased the land fails.' And if he takes a lease of land on which there is a registered mortgage, he does so with full knowledge of the mortgage and will be bound accordingly." A lease of a house carries with it the land under the eavet and projections and its garden; of a house and barn, the land necessary to their complete enjoyment; of a farm, all the buildings upon it; and of an interior parcel of land, a right of way to it over the grantor's other land.' § 490. Construction. — A lease is to be construed accord- ing to the intentions of the parties, which is to be ascer- tained, if possible, from the terms of the instrument itself; or, if there be several instruments from their terms con- strued together.' The intent must control when clearly as- certained, though it be in opposition to the strict letter of the contract. ' As to boundaries and description of premises, the same rules apply as in cases of deeds and other seal in- struments.' The holding over by the tenant who has the option for an additional term, is notice to his landlord of his election to exercise his privilege. ° ' Bulkley v. Devine, 127 111. 406. «Leiter s. Pike, 127 111. 287. 3 Abbot V. Smith, 19 Dist. Col. 600. * Thompson v. Flathers, 45 La. Ann. 120. ' Hay V. Cumberland, 25 Barb. (N. Y.) 594, Sherman v. Williams, 113 Mass. 481. « Weak V. Taylor, 9 Price, 595. ' Hathaway v. Power, 6 Hill (N. T.), 453; Tracy v. Albany Exch. Co., 7 N. T. 473. 8 See "Deeds." » Kramer v. Cook, 7 Gray (Mass.), 650; Kimball ». Cross, 136 Mass. 300; Montgomery v. Commissioners, 76 Ind. 362; Delashman v. Berry, 20 Mich. 516 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 49L Ordinarily a lease will begin on the day of its date if no other time is fixed; but if it has no date or. an impossible one it wiU commence from delivery. ' At common law a lease limited by months was construed as meaning lunar months." But in the United States a month is a calendar month. Where a person enters into possession of premises under a verbal lease for one month and continues in possession thereafter paying monthly in contemplation of the letting, a new letting commences with each monthly term.' So a lease for one year, and so on for two or three years, as the parties shall agree, does not become a lease for two or three years without a subsequent agreement, but after it has commenced running on the second year it is not determinal until that year has ended.* § 491. Covenants. — ^In technical language a covenant is any agreement which is executed under a seal; but in treat- ing of leases the word wOl be used to denote agreements whether under seal or not.' Words in the forna of a con- dition may be construed to be a covenant and wiU be so con- strued where there is doubt; but words importing a cove- nant, if intended to operate as a condition, are always expressed to that point.' The terms "upon condition," or "provided that," are usually employed to express a con- dition. The word "proviso" in a lease usually implies a condition, but if a penalty is annexed it becomes a cove- nant. But no condition is created by the words "yielding and rendering," unless to construe them otherwise would leave the lessor without remedy in case of the non-payment of rent; nor do words in restraint of the grant, or words of an uncertain character, have that effect.' 292; Clarke T'. Merrill, 51 K. H. 415; HoUey v. Young, 66 Me. 520; Long v. Stafford, 103 X. T. 274; Terstegge fl. German Benevolent Soc., 92 Ind. 82; Harding v. Seeley, 148 Pa. St. 20. ' Keyes t. Dearborn, 12 N. H. 52. «2 Bl. Com. 141. 'Borman «. Sandgren, 37 HI. App. 160. * Harris «. Evans. 1 Wilson, 262. ' Hayne v. Cummlngs, 16 C. B. N. S. 426. « Surplice i>. Farnsworth, 7 Mac. & G. 576. 'Comyn'sDig. Condition. §§ 492-493] ESTATES FOE YEARS. 517 A stipulation in a lease that the lessee shall surrender the leased premises to the lessor whenever the latter desires to proceed with contemplated improvements thereon, does not give the lessor a right to terminate the lease by re-entry; it is merely a covenant for the breach of which the lessor may recover damages, unless there is a right of re-entiy there- for reserved in the lease. ' § 492. Implied Covenants. — The parties may control their liabilities and obligations by express covenants. But there are implied covenants which arise by the construc- tion of law from the employment of certain words and forms of expression, such as "grant," "lease," "demise," and the like. "Usual covenants," within the meaning of a stipula- tion to insert them in a lease, are such as are incident to the nature of the contract, and which may be exacted independent of positive stipulation." Generally "lease" and "demise" are the only words which will raise implied covenants.' The trend of the decisions seem to be against implied covenants, which might have been expressed, and especially so where the deed seems to con- tain all the stipulations and conditions which the parties intended.* Liability under an implied covenant arises from the privity of estate created between the parties by the possession of the lessee under the lease. § 493. Quiet Enjoyment.— A covenant of quiet enjoy- ment by the tenant is implied, and is in every lease expressed or imphed. ' And this implied covenant applies in the grant of an incorporeal as well as of a corporeal hereditament.' Under this covenant the lessor is bound ' Bergland v. Frawley, 73 Wis. 559. See, also, Dennison v. Read, 3 Dana {Ky.), 586. ' Wilkins ». Pry, 1 Merv. 363. 'Maule V. Ashmead, 30 Pa. St. 483; Hamilton v. Wright, 38 Mo. 199; Mayor v. Mabie, 18 N. T. 160. * Sheets v. Selden, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 433; Aspdin v. Austin, 5 Ad. & El. N. 8. 684. 'Mack V. Patchin, 43 N. T. 167; Eldred ». Leahy, 31 Wis. 546; Berrington ■V. Casey, 78 HI. 317; Bandy v. Cartwrlght, 8 Exch. 913; Maule d Ashmead 20 Pa. St. 482. 'Mayor v. Mabie, 13 N. Y. 157. 518 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 493 only to protect the lessee's enjoyment against his own acts and those of strangers asserting a paramount title.' It implies no warranty against a mere trespasser." It ex- tends to possession only by an entry and expulsion or by an actual disturbance of possession.' So an eviction by a breach of this covenant must be by title paramount, but need not be by suit; if the tenant surrenders without con- test, he assumes the burden of proving that the claimant had a paramount title.* The. breach cannot occur unless the lessee has taken possession, actual or constructive, and before suit brought.' In making a lease it is implied that a lessor had a legal right to lease the premises, and it is broken if the lessee is prevented from entering by a paramount title.' An express covenant of quiet enjoyment runs with the land and inures to the benefit of the assignees of the respective parties,' and when expressed none other of the kind will be implied.' Entry for the purpose of recovery of possession for breach of covenant does not constitute an eviction or breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment. ' Where a lessee is excluded from possession, and is compelled to pay rent during part of the exclusion, the measure of damages for such breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment is the differ- ence between the agreed rental and the actual rental value increased by the amount paid by the lessee.'" If the enjoyment is disturbed by causes for which the lessor is ' Wade 11. Halligan, 16 III. 507; Morse v. Goddard, 13 Met, (Mass.) 177; Moore v. Weber, 71 Pa. St. 429; Sherman v. Williams, 113 Mass. 481; Branger «. Manciet, 30 Cal. 626; Pacific Exp. Co. ■». Haven, 41 La. Ann. 811. ^Baugher v. Wilkins, 16 Md. 35; Playter v. Cunningham, 21 Cal. 239; Surget 1). Arighi, 11 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 87. 3 Whitbeck v. Cook, 15 Johns. (N. T.) 483. « Hamilton v. Cutts, 4 Mass. 349; (Jreenvault v. Davis, 4 Hill (N. Y.), 648. ^St. John V. Palmer, 5 Hill (N. Y.), 599. 'StottD. Rutherford, 92 U. 8. 107; Grannis v. Clark, 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 36. Compare Gano v. Vanderveer, 34 N. J. L. 293. ' Campbell «. Lewis, 3 Barn. & Aid. 392; Shelton v. Codman, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 318. 8 Burr V. Stenton, 43 N. Y. 462. 'Schuman «. International Trust Co., 158 Mass. 287. '"Riley v. Hale, 158 Mass. 240. §§ 494-495] ESTATES for yeaks. 519 not responsible it is no breach.' But if the work to be done on a building is a reconstruction of a part of it rendered necessary by an original defect, the lessor's implied warranty has failed, and the lessee has a right to demand dissolution of the lease.' If a portion of the premises is leased to another at the time of making a lease his covenant is immediately broken.' § 494. Leasing Furnished and Unfurnished Houses. — The rule governing covenants is different in its application to furnished and unfurnished houses. One who leases an unfurnished building to be occupied as a dwelling house does not impliedly agree that it is fit for habitation.* This distinction between furnished and unfurnished houses in reference to the construction of contracts for letting them when there are no express agreements about their condition has long been recognized in England, where it is held that there is an implied contract that a furnished house let for a short time is in proper condition for immediate occupation as a dwelling ; ' and this is the rule in the United States." But when it is covenanted that the premises shall be fit for a specified purpose, the tenant may notify the landlord of their unfitness and then abandon them if they are not put into suitable condition.' § 495. Cultivating Land. — Express covenants must be performed in accordance with custom. Thus, where a lessee covenants to cultivate the land according to the best rules of husbandry practiced in the neighborhood, the lessee may cultivate according to the practice of his neigh- ' Harrison v. Muncaster (1891), 2 Q. B. 680. » King V. Grant, 43 La. Ann. 817. 'McAlester v. Landers, 70 Cal. 79. *Dutton». Gerrish, 9 Cusli. (Mass.) 89; Stevens v. Pierce, 151 Mass. 207; Sutton V. Temple, 13 Mees. & Wels. 52; Hart v. Windsor, 13 Mees. & Wels. 68. » Smith V. Marrable, 11 Mees. & Wels. 5; Wilson ®. Finch Hatton, 3 Exch. 336; Charsley v. Jones, 53 J. P. Q. B. 380. « Ingalls V. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348; Daly v. Wise, 138 N. Y. 306. See, also, Edwards v. McLean, 133 N. T. 303; Cleves v. Wllloughby, 7 Hill (N. Y.), 83; Franklin v. Brown, 118 N. Y. 110. ' Young V. Collett, 63 Mich. 331. 520 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 496 bors, which will answer the covenant.' And where laud is leased on an agreement that the manure made on the farm shall be used on the land, the lessor may maintain an ac- tion ex contractu for a breach of the agreement, or he may- sue in tort for the conversion of the manure. The action of tort would lie, but this does not exclude the mainten- ance of an action of contract upon an express agreement, and such actions have been maintained." Of course when the question of the statute of frauds arises in such actions, it must be pleaded.' §496. Repairs.— At common law the landlord is not bound to repair, unless he expressly covenants to do so; but he may bind himself and the reversioner to make repairs by express covenant.* And his covenant to make "all necessary repairs" binds him to restore the premises to their original condition as to the fitness for the business for which they are rented. ' On the other hand where the tenant expressly covenants to keep the house in good and tenantable repair and so to leave the same at the expiration of the term, the tenant's obligation is to put and keep the premises in such repair as, having a regard to the age, character and locality of the house, would make it reasonably fit for the occupation of a tenant of the class who would be hkely to take it.° There is no complemental duty on the landlord to make such repairs as the tenant is not to make.' In order to make a landlord hable, it niust appear that he has the control and management of that part of the premises in which the defects are found, in which case, aside from the doctrine of con- ' Meux «. Cobley (1893), 3 Ch. 353. 5 Legh t. Hewitt, 4 East, 154; Powley v. Walker, 5 Term R. 373; Massey «. Goodall, 17 Q. B. 310; Westropp v. Elliott, L. R. 9 App. Cas. 815; Batthy- any ». Walford, 36 Ch. Div. 869; Lewis c. Jones, 17 Pa. St. 363; Brown v. Magorty, 156 Mass. 209. See, also, Chalmers v. Smith, 153 Mass. 561. ^ Middlesex Co. ■». Osgood, 4 Gray (Mass.), 447. 'Allen ®. Culver, 8 Denio (N. Y.), 384. ' Ward «. Kelspy, 38 N. Y. 80. «Proudfoot B. Hart, 35 Q. B. 42. ' Kellenberger «. Poresman, 13 Ind. 475; Elliott ®. Aiken, 45 N. H. 80; Mof- fatt «. Smith, 4]Sr. Y. 126. Compare Johnson ii. Dixon, 1 Daly (N. Y.), 178; Eagle V. Swayze, 3 Daly fN". Y.), 140. § 497] ESTATES FOR YEARS. 521 tributory negligence, his responsibility is the same to ten- ants of other parts of the premises as to third persons.' The landlord is not bound to protect the tenant of a lower story from the weather when the roof has been in- jured by fire;" and he is under no obhgations to repair a common roof.' But he is liable for defective construction of the premises.* And when the landlord occupies the upper part of the house he is not liable to a tenant of the ground floor for damages from extraordinary causes such as a rat's gnawing a hole in a box used in draining the roof." The liability of a tenant to repair is not usually left to implication, but the fact and the extent of such liability are fixed by express covenant; and where there is an ex- press covenant, none will be implied. This express cove- nant may be conditional. Where it follows such words as "the same being first put in repair by the lessor," those words constitute a condition precedent.' A general cove- nant to repair only binds the lessee to see that the tene- ment does not suffer more injury than the usual operations of nature will cause to a building of its age and condition.' When it is covenanted that the rent shall cease if the premises a-re destroyed by fire, it is meant that the premises shall be permanently unfit for occupancy. " § 497. To Pay Taxes and Assessments. — The duty of paying all taxes and assessments falls upon the landlord, and he can shift the burden upon the tenant only by ex- press covenant. The tenant may pay them and deduct the ' Toole V. Beckett, 67 Me. 544; Priest v. Nichols, 116 Mass. 401; Friedenburg «. Jones, 63 Ga. 613; Readman v. Conway, 126 Mass. 374; Looney ». McLean, 139 Ma s. 33. Compare Woods «. Naumkeag Steam Cotton Co., 134 Mass. 357. s Doupe «. Genin, 45 N. Y. 119. 'Kmeger v. Ferrant, 29 Minn. 385. * Scott ®. Simons, 54 N. H. 436. See, also, Marshall v. Cohen, 44 Ga. 489; Shindelbeck v. Moon, 32 Ohio St. 264. ' Carstairs ». Taylor. L. R., 6 Ex. 217, distinguishing Rylands «. Fletcher, L. R., 3 H. L. 330. •Neale v. Ratcliflfe, 15 Q. B. 916; Cannock ». Jones, 3 Exch. 233; Counter •0. McPherson, 5 Moore, P. C. C. 83. 'Gutteridge v. Munyard, 7 Car. & P. 129; Stanley s. Twogood, 3 Bing. N C. 4. ' Spalding v. Munford, 37 Mo. App. 281. 66 522 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 49T amount from the rent, or collect them from the landlord.' A covenant by the lessee to pay all taxes and assessments during the term of the lease is an agreement to pay them as part of the rent." A covenant in a lease that the lessee shall pay taxes, and that the lessor shall permit the removal of the lessee's improvements are independent of each other, and the lessee may enforce the lessor's covenant in equity without showing paynjent of the taxes. ° And if the lessee covenants to pay all assessments, he must do it, though the pavement which caused the assessment be different and more costly from that generally used in his part of the city.* And when he has covenanted to pay all taxes, he is liable for all taxes which have been levied during his term, though they are collected after its expiration.' But a covenant to pay the taxes only does not include a special assessment for the construction of a sewer." The tenant, unless he cove- nants to pay taxes, is not bound to pay the taxes and as- sessments; but, as a general rule, he may pay them and deduct them from the rent, or collect them back from the lessor.' He may bind himself to pay the taxes and other assessments,' and he must pay his proportionate share when he occupies a part of the premises.' The termination of his lease, by the destruction of the building after he has paid the taxes, does not entitle him to a return of the taxes paid. '" Such covenant to pay taxes runs with the land and will bind the lessee's assignee." ' Jones B. Morris, 3 Exch. 748; Dawson v. Linton, 5 Barn. & Aid. 521. ' Gedge v. Shoenberger, 83 Ky. 91. 'Strohmeyer ®. Zeppenfield, 28 Mo. App. 268; Butler «. Manny, 52 Mo. 497. . Hannah, 6 Duer (N. Y.), 26J; Taylor v. Zamlra, 6 Taunt. 534; Tinckler «. Prentice, 4 Taunt. 549. 8 Trinity Church ®. Higgins, 48 N. Y. 533. s Wall V. Hinds, 4 Gray (Mass.), 256. "Wood 1}. Bogle, 115 Mass. 30. See, also, Paul ». Chickering, 117 Mass. 265; Johnson v. Oppenheim, 55 N. Y. 280. "Posti). Kearney, 3 N. Y. 394. See, also, Torrey «. Wallis, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 443. § 498] estates for teabs. 523- § 498. Breach of Covenants in a Lease— Damages. — The question of damages often comes up where the lessor fails to give possession to the lessee, thereby breaking a covenant of the lease, the lessee having paid, in some cases, a part of the rent in advance. The true rule is, though not followed in all the States, that the lessee is entitled to re- cover the rent paid in advance, the difference between the rent agreed to be paid and the value of the term, and such special damages as he might show that he was entitled to according to the circumstances of the case.' It is held by some courts that the rule of actions on covenants in leases, express or implied, is that where the lessee has paid no rent or other expenses only nominal damages can be recovered. This rule once prevailed, and was adapted in analogy to actions on covenants in deeds of real estate, and it now prevails to a limited extent in New York." This rule has been repudiated in England,' and in nearly every State of the Union. The true rule is: 1. Damages should be recovered that arise naturally and generally from such breach of contract. 2. If the special circumstances under which the contract was made were stated at the time and known to both par- ties, then the amount of injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach of the contract under those special circumstances should be recovered. Justice Carpenter says that there may be cases in which, from the nature of the transaction or the character of the business in which the party is engaged, a promise may be implied to use the utmost diligence in the performance of the duty undertaken. In such case the law will not re- quire that the party be specially informed, but will deem him to have contemplated the importance of the business and hold him responsible accordingly. And profits that are lost by a breach of contract are in some -cases recover- ■Hallt). Horton, 79 Iowa, 352 ; Alexander ®. Bishop, 59 Iowa, 573; Adair i). Bogle, 20 Iowa, 244; Trull v. Granger, 8 N. Y. 115; Cohn v. Norton, 57 Conn. 480. 'Conger v. Weaver, 20 N. Y. 140; Mack ». Patchin, 42 N. Y. 167; Pum, pelly V. Phelps, 40 N. Y. 59. 5 Williams v. Burrell, 1 Man. Gran. & Scott, 402; Locke v. Furze, 19 C. B., N. S. 96. 524 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 499 able where they are definite and certain, but otherwise where they are not.' Thus a landlord leased to the lessee a store, then occupied by another tenant under an unexpired lease covering a part of the time for which the place was leased to the second tenant, and the occupant refused to give up possession. It was held in a suit for damages against the lessor for dam- ages, by the second tenant, that the second tenant was not bound at his own expense to take measures to gain posses- sion, and that the lessor was liable for more than nominal damages. But such expenses as the second tenant had in- curred in preparing to occupy the premises, after he had been informed that the tenant in possession refused to sur- render them, were incurred in bad faith, and could not be recovered; and that they could not be recovered in any case if they were unreasonable." Article 3. Termination and Surrender. % 499. What is a Surrender. § 505. Covenant to Repair. § 500. Surrender by Operation of § 506. Substitution of Lease. Law. § 507. Acceptance and Surrender — § 501. To Whom Made. Damages. i; 503. Notice of Surrender. | 508. Waiver of Right to Surrender. § 503. Premises Untenantable. § 509. Termination of Tenancy by § 504. Destruction by Fire or Other Sale of the Premises. Casualty. §510. Merger and Surrender. § 499. What is a Surrender.— Technically, there can be no surrender of a fee simple estate at common law. The owner of the estate might reconvey to his grantor, or the latter's legal successor, and take a new title. The Saxons, however, had to surrender their estates to William the Conqueror and then take them back under the conditions of feudal tenure imposed by him, but this does not change the rule. But at common law a lessee for life or years can surrender his estate and take a new estate ' Cohn V. Norton, 57 Conn. 480. ' Cohn V. Norton, 57 Conn. 480. I 499] ESTATES FOR YEAES. 525 from the reversioner. Not only can that be done by the tenant, but the acceptance of a new estate by the grantee is itself a surrender of the old one, and that, upon the principle that the two cannot stand together, the acceptance of the later one necessarily involves the surrender of the first. Hence, if a lessee for years takes a lease for his own life or that of another man, the acceptance of the latter wiU necessarily be a surrender of the first; or if a lessee for forty years accepts an estate for twenty years, or if a lessee for life accepts a lease for years, the acceptance of the one involves the surrender of the other. By statute in England, a surrender must be in writing, under seal, unless the tenancy is one which could be created without writing. Many of the States in the United States have enacted laws prohibiting the surrender of a term of years, or other interest in land, except by deed or note in writing, or by operation of law, though in some States a surrender may be made by parol. Where a writing is required, a mere erasure, cancellation or de- struction of a lease is not of itself a sufficient surrender.* The words "surrender and yield up," are not necessary, but any form of words which clearly indicate the inten- tion of the parties is sufficient." The lessee's surrender will not operate to affect the rights of third parties, such as sublessees; but after the surrender they must perform their covenants to the surrenderee.' A surrender may be presumed when the term appears to have done the duty for which it was created.* The finding of the lease in the possession of the lessor with the seals torn off, and a lease granted to another, raise the presumption of a surrender. ' 'Raynor v. Wilson, 6 Hill (N Y.), 469; Roe v. York, 6 East, 89; Doe v. Thomas. 9 Baro. & Cress. 388; Ward « Lumley, 5 Hurlst. & N. 88; Kiester v. Miller, 35 Pa. St. 481 ; Jackson v. Gardner, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 404; Bailey v. Wells, 8 Wis. 141. 'Smith V. Mapleback, 1 Term Rep. 441. ' Piggott 1). Stratton, 1 DeG.,P. & J. 33; Adams v. Goddard, 49 Me. 213; Beal v. Car Co., 125 Mass. 157; McKenzie v. Lexington, 4 Dana (Ky.), 139. *Bartlett v. Downes, 3 Barn. & Cress. 616. •Walker v. Richardson, 3 Mees. & Wels. 883. 526 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 500 The surrender terminates the relations of landlord and tenant, but the tenant must pay all rent then due.' It is no termination of the lease by the death of the lessee as an action will lie against his administrator." After the termination of a lease the lessor can enter and the lessee has no right to oppose him.' The premises must be used for the purposes as set forth in -the lease. And it is no cause for surrender because a place rented for a saloon can- not be occupied as such, the lessee being refused a license by the proper authorities.* Surrender is the yielding up of an estate for life or for years, to him who has the next immediate estate in reversion or remainder wherebythe lesser estate is merged by mutual agreement.' To remedy the defect which sometimes re- sulted from a surrender, in discharging the underlessee from the payment of rent, and the conditions and depend- ent covenants annexed to the lease, a statute' was enacted, providing that if a lease be surrendered to be renewed, and a new lease given, the privity and relation of landlord and tenant, between the original lessee and his underlessee, should be reserved ; and this statute places the chief land- lord and his lessee, and the underlessee, in reference to rents, rights, and remedies, exactly in the same situation as if no surrender has been made. § 500. Surrender by Operation of Law. — A surrender by operation of law is effected in many ways by the acts of the parties, and the surrender is implied, and they are es- topped from denying the surrender.' But a mere agree- ment to surrender the lease is inoperative unless accom- panied by the act of surrender;' but accompanied by the act, it will be a valid surrender." Though one of two ' Sperry v. Miller, 8 N. T. 336. ' Alsop V. Banks, 68 Miss. 664. ' Gillespie •b. Beecher, 85 Mich. 347. ' Teller v. Boyle, 183 Pa. St. 56. 'Co. Liu. 337b. •4 Geo. II. c. 28, sect. 6. 'Bedford v. Terhune, 30 N. Y. 453; Lyon ■». Reed, 13 Mees. & Wels. 285. * National B. Asso. v. Brewer, 41 111. App. 233 ' Buffalo County N. Bauk v. Hanson, 34 Nebr. 455; Clemens v. Broomfleld, 19 Mo. 118; Kneeland i). Schmidt, 78 Wis. 345; Whitehead v.- CliflEord, 5 § 501] ESTATES FOR YEAE3. 527 or more lessees is willing to give up the lease, this does not make it a voluntary surrender. ' If a lessee agrees to deliver up possession of a mill after he has completed his work, the tenancy does not terminate until he has removed his prop- erty and left the mill in the condition set forth in the lease." A refusal and failure to pay the rent by the tenant when due according to the terms of the lease, in the absence of stipulation to the contrary terminate the lease.' When the surrender is by mutual agreement, either may be estopped from denying a surrender by having done acts inconsistent with the continuance of the lease. Hence, no writing is required.' § 501. To Whom Made. — The surrender must be by the party in possession to one who has a higher estate. There- fore, it must be to the lessor himself or his authorized agent. An undertenant cannot surrender to the original lessor, nor a tenant for life to one entitled only to a remainder for years; nor can one joint tenant surrender to another. A lessee for years may surrender to one who is entitled to the reversion for years or for a less time.' If the tenant gives up his term to the immediate rever- sioner, he surrenders his estate, which becomes merged in the revei'sion; and all liability on the covenants of the lease is extinguished, ° but there will be no surrender if there be an intervening estate.' One who yields up possession of an unexpired lease- to Taunt. 518; Pbene v. Popplewell, 13 C. B., N. S. 334; Hall v. Burgess, 5 Barn. & Cress. 333; Reeve v. Bird, 1 Cromp. M. & R. 31; Dodd v. Acklom, 6 Mann. & G. 673; Walker-ti. Ricliardson, 3 Mees. & Wels. 891; Baker v. Pratt, 15 111. 568; Stotesbury v. Vail, 18 N. J. Eq. 390. ' Williams «. Vanderbilt, 143 111. 338. « Stevens v. Pantlind, 95 Mich. 145. 'Pollock ®. Whipple, 33 Nebr. 753; TTendrickson v. Beeson, 31 Nebr. 61. * Thomas v. Nelson, 69 N. Y. 118; Amory v. Kannoffsky, 117 Mass. 351; Hanham v. Sherman, 114 Mass. 19; Donkersley v. Levy, 38 Mich. 54; Martin v. Stearns, 53 Iowa, 345; Nelson v. Thompson, 33 Minn. 508; Oastler v. Hender- son, 3 Q. B. 575; Jones «. Bridgman, 30 L. T 500; Beall v. White, 94 U. S. 383; Dayton v. Craik, 36 Minn. 133. ' Cornish «. Searell, 1 Man. & R. 703; 8 Barn. & Cress. 471. « Smiley v. Van Winkle, 6 Cal. 605; Bailey v. Wells, 8 Wis. 158; Greider'a Appeal, 5 Pa. St. 433. ■■ Burton V. Barclay, 7 Bing. 745. 528 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 502 another who is not entitled to the immediate reversion, but who assumes the burden of paying the accrued rent, although he does not make a technical surrender, he, and those claiming under him, are estopped from claiming any further interest in the lease.' A voluntary surrender by a lessee to his lessor does not affect the rights of the sublessee; " and the landlord may reserve the right to sue the undertenant. ° Many of the States have incorporated the English statute * into their law and the privity of estate between the original lessee and lessor is reserved so that the lessor can sue the underlessee for the rent. In those States in which this statute has not been adopted the question may arise, how far the underlessee, whose derivative estate still con- tinues, is discharged from all the rents and covenants annexed to his tenancy. ° A surrender does not destroy outstanding rights of third persons, but as to them operates only as a grant subject to their rights.' § 502. Notice of Suekendee. — Generally a lease will commence on the day of its date, if no other time is fixed; if it has no date, or an impossible one, it will commence from delivery.' And when a tenant has a right to ter- minate the lease at his pleasure so it be at the end of a specified time as at the end of a year, and a present interest is to commence from the date of the lease, the day of the date is included, and notice at the beginning of the second year will hold the tenant for the second year's rent as he had entered upon the second year's duration." And a lease from month to month requires a month's notice to ter- ■ Updike V. St. Louis, 94 Mo. 234. 'Eten «. Luyster, 60 N. Y. 253; Krider v. Ramsay, 79 N. Car. 354; Great Western Railroad Co. v. Smith, 3 Ch. Div. 235; Mellor v. Watkins, L. R. 9 Q. B. 400. sBeal v. Boston Car Spring Co., 125 Mass. 157. ''4 Geo. II. c. 28, sect. 6. 5 See Barton's Case, Moore, 94; Webb v. Russel, 3 Term R. 401. « Doe V. Pyke, 5 Maule & S. 146; Piggott v. Stratton, 1 De G. F. & J. 33. 'Keyes v. Dearborn, 13 N. H. 52. sNesbit v. Godfrey, 155 Pa. St. 351; Lysle v. Williams, 15 Serg. & R. (Pa.> 136; Marys v. Anderson, 24 Pa. St. 273. § 503 J ESTATES FOR YEARS. 529 minate the term, which must be givea before beginning upon the succeeding month, at which time the lease is to terminate.' Whenever the required notice is legally given the lease is surrendered.' But a second notice by the land- lord to give up the possession is a waiver of a prior notice to quit.' When the tenant does not give the notice re- quired at the legal time, he will be held to have elected to continue the tenancy;* and the notice must be unequivocal in its terms so that the landlord may have definite knowl- edge of the lessee's intention. ' § 503. Premises Untenantable. — The landlord is not re- quired to make repairs to demised premises unless he cove- nants so to do. And if a tenant covenants to make all necessary repairs and improvements, and before the expi- ration of the term the premises fall into such a dilapidated condition that they cannot be used for the business to which the lease restricts their use, the tenant cannot, by vacating the premises relieve himself from liability for rent.' In New York the statute provides' that the lessee of a building which shall become, without his fault, unten- antable may quit the premises and be discharged from pay- ing further rent. If the landlord does not fully comply with this requisite and keep the premises in a tenantable condition, the tenant can surrender at such time; but if the premises thereafter become tenantable the tenant cannot surrender and defeat the payment of rent.' In the absence of statute the un- tenantable condition of the premises, or their total destruc- tion by unavoidable accident of fire, flood, or tempest will ■ Banbury v. Sherin (S. Dak.), 55 N. W. Rep. 723. ' Wilcox «. Montour I. & S. Co., 147 Pa. St. 540; Chamberlain v. Dunlop, 126 N. T. 45. » Dockrill v. Schenk, 37 111. App. 44. * Burk ?!. Lewis, 46 Mo. App. 227; Donohue u. Bank N. Co., 37 111. App. 552; Finch v. Moore, 50 Minn. 116. • ' Gardner «. Ingram, 61 L. Times, 729. • Huber v. Baum, 152 Pa. St. 626, 630. 'Laws of 1860, ch. 345. See, also, Tallman v. Earle, 23 N. Y. Supp. 17; 3 Misc. Rep. 76; New York Real Estate & B. Imp. Co. ■». Motley, 20 N. Y. Supp. 947; 1 Misc. Rep. 23t. «Ryan «. Jones, 20 N. Y. Supp. 842; 2 Misc. Rep. 65. 87 530 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 504 not, as a general rule, relieve the tenant from paying rent for the whole term.' § 504. Destruction by Fire or Other Casualty.— In New York the statute 'provides that if the building becomes destroyed by the elements the relation of landlord and tenant is dissolved, unless the tenant elects that it shall continue. So, if a building is destroyed by fire, or injured so as to be untenantable, the tenant need not continue in possession and may surrender the premises;' notice to the landlord from the tenant of his intention to surrender is not neces- ' sary; he is simply required to surrender as soon as is rea- sonable under the circumstances.' But the tenant has the right to keep the premises long enough to remove his own property, and such occupation will not be under the lease so as to entitle the landlord for rent for such time.' And if the tenant keeps his goods on the premises by an inde- pendent contract with the landlord for a short time, in order to dispose of them, this does not make the occupation come under the lease.' The destruction of the building must be without fault of the tenant, in order that he may surrender his lease and not be liable for further rent.' And when he surrenders he must make his election in a reasonable time, and once made he cannot repudiate it.' At common law a covenant in a lease was not terminated by destruction of the building by fire unless so provided in the lease.' But where there is a lease of apartments in a building, and they are destroyed by fire or other casualty, the interest of the lessee ceases, and the relation of land- 1 Baker ■». Hotpzaffell, 4 Taunt. 45; Hallett «. Wylie, 3 Johns. (N. T.) 44; Proctor V. Keith, 12 B. Mon. (Ky.) 252; Gibson v. Perry, 29 Mo. 245; Linn V. Ross, 10 Ohio, 412; Fowler v. Bott, 6 Mass. 63; Hart 'o. Windsor, 12 Mees. & Wels. 79, 85. » Laws of 1860, ch. 345. 3 Fleischman v. Toplitz, 134 N. T. 349; Smith v. Kerr, 108 N. Y. 31 ; John- son V. Oppenheim, 55 N. Y. 280. 4 Fleischman v. Toplitz, 134 N. Y. 349. s Fleischman v. Toplitz, 134 N. Y. 349. « Kelly V. Partridge, 23 N. Y. Supp. 1027; 4 Misc. Rep. 205. ■■ New York Real Estate & B. Imp. Co. v. Motley, 22 N. Y. Supp. 705; 3 Misc. Rep, 232. 8 Roach V. Peterson, 47 Minn. 462. ^Lanpher v. Glenn, 37 Minn. 4. § 504] ESTATES FOR YEARS. 531 lord and tenant is, upon the happening of such an event, dissolved." In Connecticut the statute' provides that the tenant shall not be liable to pay rent after the tenement becomes unfit for occupancy, without his fault or neglect, unless it is otherwise stipulated. After repairs the tenant then be- comes liable, provided the lessor makes the necessary re- pairs with reasonable diligence ; and this statute appUes to mere rooms in a building, leased by themselves, as well as to the entire building.' The lessee cannot aban- don the premises and surrender the lease when the lessor repairs in a reasonable time, unless the landlord joins with him and accepts the surrender. If he does abandon the premises he is liable only for rent, to be sued for as such, when it becomes due; and no action for breach of contract will lie against him.' A lease providing for repairs by the lessor for damages caused by fire or the elements, has reference to some sudden, unusual or unexpected action of the elements, as floods, tornadoes, and the like, and not to natural or ordi- nary results of an efficient cause existing at the time of the demise, such as the inflow of water into the cellar or base- ment of a business house, making such part untenantable. ' And damages by smoke and water rendering the occu- pancy unpleasant, do not exempt the lessee from rent.' If the tenant chooses to vacate the premises under the statute, he must do so before he is made liable for future rent.' The surrender of the leased premises is a condition annexed to the release of the obligation 'Harrington v. Watson, 11 Oreg. 143; McMillan v. Solomon, 42 Ala. 356; Kerr v. Merchants' Exch. Co., 3 Edw. Ch. fN. T.) 315; Ainsworth v. Eitt, 38 Cal. 89; Womack v. McQuarry, 28 Ind. 103; Graves v. Berdan, 26 N. T. 498; Shawmut Nat. Bank v. Boston, 118 Mass. 125 ; Stockwell v. Hunter, 11 Met. (Mass.) 448; Winton v. Cornish, 5 Ohio, 477. ' Gen. Stat. p. 354, sect. 17. ' Miller n. Benton, 55 Conn. 529. < Miller v. Benton, 55 Conn. 529. ' Harris v. Corlies, 40 Minn. 106. •Lewis V. Hughes, 12 Colo. 208. ' Roach V. Peterson, 47 Minn. 291. 532 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 505 to pay rent, and is necessary to give the lessee the benefit of the relief provided by the statute.' Destruction by fire or inevitable accident is no ground of defense at common law, unless exceptions to that effect are inserted in the lease, or the State statute changes this rule.' But the rule of the common law has been modified in most of the States, and the tenant is absolved from paying rent where the buildings are destroyed or become ruinous." § 505. Covenant TO Repair. —Inevitable accident will ex- cuse a party from penalty, but will not relieve him from his covenant to perform. Although the tenant may be bound to make tenantable repairs, yet he is not bound to rebuild when the buildings have accidentally become ruinous or are destroyed, unless by express agreement.* An agree- ment by the tenant to repair will not be implied. But when he absolutely covenants to repair, he is bound by the agree- ment, though the building is destroyed by fire;' and if he does not repair he is liable in damages.' A general covenant to repair only binds the lessee to use reasonable care in protecting the buildings;' and it runs with the land. And a covenant to make all necessary re- pairs binds the lessee to make them from whatever cause.' Where the landlord fails to keep the buildings in suitable repair according to covenant, and the tenant is in conse- • Gay V. Davey, 47 Ohio St. 396; Johnson v. Oppenheim, 55 K. Y. 380; Hil- llard ». Gas Coal Co., 41 Ohio St. 662. 'Ward V. Bull, 1 Fk. 371; Davis d. Smith, 15 Mo. 467; Jaffe «. Harteau, 56 N. Y. 398; Welles v. Castles, 3 Gray (Mass.), 335. 3 Whittaker v. Hawley, 35 Kans. 674; Alger v. Kennedy, 49 Vt. 109; Graves «. Berdan, 36 N. Y. 503; Coleman v. Haight, 14 La. Ann. 564; Leavitt v. Fletcher, 10 Allen (Mass.), 121; Stow i). Russell, 36 111. 35; Ripley «. Wight- man, 4 McCord (S. Car.), 447. •Auworth ■». Johnson, 5 Car. & P. 339; Cheetham v. Hampson, 4 Term Rep. 318. ' Chesterfield v. Bolton, Comyns, 637; David v. Ryan, 47 Iowa, 643; Hoy v. Holt, 91 Pa. St. 88; Moyer v. Mitchell, 53 Md. 171. Compare Levey v. Dyesa, 51 Miss. 501; Millers Morris, 55 Tex. 413. ^Metze «. Kavanaugh, 11 Ir. 0. L. 431. ' Stanley v. Towgood, 3 Bing. N. C. 4; Gutteridge ■». Munyard, 7 Car. &■ P. 139; Douse v. Earle, 3 Lev. 364. « Lockrow 11. Horgan, 58 N. Y. 635; Monk v. Noyes, 1 Car. & P. 365; Beacli ■v. Crain, 3 N. Y. 86. § 505] ESTATES FOR YEARS. 633 quence obliged to surrender possession, the landlord cannot then collect any rent.' If the tenant agrees to surrender the buildings in repair at the end of the terra, those de- stroyed he must i-ebuild." The tenant is not bound to rebuild when the buildings have become accidentally ruinous or destroyed, unless by express covenant." An exception in a covenant to repair damages by the elements or the acts of Providence, does not include damages to which human agency in any way contributed.* *■ A lessor's covenant to make all necessary repairs binds him to restore the premises to their original condition as to fitness for the business for which they were leased;' and his covenant to keep them in repair does not make him liable for accidental injuries to the lessee or others arising from their being out of repair." The liability of the tenant for repairs on his covenant has been modified in many of the States. According to the doctrine of the later American cases, where not controlled by statute, when the premises are destroyed, the liability terminates, although there be an express covenant; as where a single room is leased and afterwards destroyed by fire. But as to land the rent con- tinues though the house is destroyed.' A tenant cannot recover for repairs unless the lessor agreed to make them.' ' Pierce v. Joldersma, 91 Mich. 463 ; Leonard «. Armstrong, 73 Mich. 577. 'Mcintosh V. Lown, 49 Barb. (N. Y.) 550; Abby ». Billups, 35 Miss. 618; Payne v. Haine, 16 Mees. & Wels. 541. 'Bulloclis. D.)mmitt, 6 Term Rep. 650; White v. .Kicholson, 4 Mann & Grang. 95; Auworth v. Johnson, 5 Car. & P. 239: Nave v. Berry, 23 Ala. 383. "PolackB. Pioche, 35 Cal. 416. ' Ward V. Kelsey, 38 N. Y. 80. «Flynn v. Hatton, 4 Daly (N. Y.), 553. 'Buerger v. Boyd, 25 Ark. 441; McMillan ®. Solomon, 43 Ala. 356; Graves 11. Berdan, 26 N. Y. 498; Winton v. Cornish, 5 Ohio, 477; AinswortU v. Ritt, 38 Cal. 89; Womack v. McQuarry, 28 Ind. 103; Stockwell v. Hunter, 11 Met. . Milward, 3 Mees. & Wels. 328. 5 Co. Litt. 218b. ; Allen v. Jaquish, 31 Wend. (N. Y.) 638. 6 Donahue «. Rich, 2 Ind. App. 540. 'Ryan v. Jones, 20 N. Y. Supp. 843; 3 Misc. Rep. 65. BDe Morat «. Falkenhagen, 148 Pa. St. 393. "Murphy v. Losch, 148 Pa. St. 171. § 507] ESTATES FOR YEARS. 535 there is no acceptance and surrender of the premises." The landlord may enter the premises after a wrongful abandon- ment by the tenant, for the purpose of caring for the same without waiving his rights under the lease ; and he is not bound to find a new tenant for the property ; ' but if he does rent the same to a new tenant, his measure of dam- ages for a breach of the old lease is the difference between the rent under the old lease and the less amount he receives under the new one.' The renting was for the tenant's benefit and on his account, and the lessor is entitled to re- cover the rent stipulated less the amount received from the new tenant.* But if the landlord accepts such surrender and takes possession and relets the premises to another, this is a full acceptance, unless there are facts rebutting such inference ; ' and whenever there is a complete accept- ance of the surrender, the rent ceases.' If the lessor of a hotel supports an option lavv which passes, which causes the bar of the hotel to close, the lessee has no right to surrender the lease, but is, nevertheless, bound by the covenants.' If he unconditionally accepts a surrender, he has no claim against the lessee for damages by reason of the diminished rent received by the new tenant ; ' and if he accepts the surrender for a considera- tion, before the termination of the term and takes posses- sion, the surrender is complete and no action can be main- tained against the lessee under the covenants ; ' but the acceptance must be by the lessor.'" After abandonment by the tenant, and the refusal to re- scind by the lessor, the latter may take possession for the purpose of caring for the property and of leasing it to others. The rescinding the contract is wholly a matter of ' Scott V. Beecher, 91 Mich. 590. 'Respini v. Porta, 89 Cal. 464. ' Bowen v. Clarke, 33 Oreg. 566; Winant v. Hines, 14 Daly (N. Y.), 187. 'Underbill v. Collins, 132 N. Y. 369; Scott v. Beecher, 91 Mich. 590. 'Underhill v. Collins, 133 N. Y. 269. « Welcome v. Hess, 90 Cal. 507. ' Baugham v. Portman (Ky.), 14 S. W. Rep. 343. « Everett «. Williamson, 107 N. Car. 204. »Reed v. Snowhill 51 N. J. L. 163. "Kendall v. Kill, 64 N H. 553. 536 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 508-510 intent on the lessor's part, and that intent will not be in- ferred from his merely taking possession, especially when it is found that he did so with no intent to relinquish his rights under the lease, even though he might conceive his right to be only to damages.' § 508. Waiver of Right to Surrender.— The tenant may waive his right to surrender when he can legally do so. If the landlord fails to furnish steam heat and eleva- tor service as agreed in the lease, some forbearance on the tenant's part in delaying to surrender possession, does not necessarily constitute a waiver of his right to abandon, the question being one for the jury.' § 509. Termination of Tenancy by Sale of the Prem- ises. — In the absence of contract the tenant's possession is not divested by sale of the premises. But if a tenant agrees to surrender possession of the lease on sale of the property, which provision is inserted in the lease, he will be bound by this agreement if the premises are sold." If the tenant is in possession at the time of the sale by the landlord, the purchaser is chargeable with notice of his possession.* An agreement by a tenant, to purchase the premises from the grantee of his landlord, and until conveyance to pay rent, operates as a surrender of the lease. ' A sale under execution will not avoid a lease if the judg- ment lien only operated on the land after the tenant took rightful possession." § 510. Merger and Surrender.— Surrender is the act of the party, and merger is the act of law. Merger consoli- dates two estates, the lesser becoming merged in the greater, ' Miller v. Bentoa, 55 Conn. 529. » Minneapolis Co-Operative Co. ■». Williamson, 51 Minn. 53. 2 Johnston v. King, 83 "Wis. 8. *Friedlander v. Ryder, 30 Nebr. 783; Wallace v. BaUhorn, 68 Mich. 87; Imler v. Baenisb, 74 Wis. 567. 'Denison «. Wertz, 7 Serg. & R. (.Pa.) 372; McGlauflln «. Holman, 1 Wash. St. 289; Morrison «. Herrick, 130 111. 631; Mundy v. JoUifEe, 5 Mylne & Cr. 167. 'Smith u. Aude, 46 Mo. App. 631. § 510] ESTATES FOR YEARS. 537 A term for years may be defeated by way of merger, when it meets another term immediately expectant thereon. A merger also takes place when there is a union of the freehold or fee and the term, in one person, in the same right, and at the same time. The less term becomes merged and is extinguished. This is so because there would be an absolute incompatibility in a person filling, at the same time, the characters of tenant and reversioner in one and the same estate.' But a grant of the lessor's estate from the termi- nation of the lease does not merge the two estates." An estate for years may merge in an estate in fee, or for life ; and an estate pur autre vie may merge in an estate for one's own life; and an estate for years may merge in another estate or term of years, in remainder or reversion. Merger applies when there is a unity of seisin of the land, and of a right of way over it, in the same person.' There is no merger when two estates are successive and not concurrent. Hence, a lease may be granted to a tenant pur autre vie, to commence when his life estate ceases, and he will never, in that case, stand in the character, which the law of merger is intended to prevent, of the reversioner to himself.* The tenant may surrender to the immediate reversioner, the effect of which is to extinguish all liability on the cove- nants of the lease. ' But an intervening estate will prevent merger and surrender.' To a surrender, it is necessary that the tenant of the particular estate should relinquish his estate in favor of the tenant of the next vested estate, in remainder or reversion. Merger is confined to the cases in which the tenant of the estate in reversion or remainder grants that estate to the tenant of the particular estate, or where the particular tenant grants his estate to the tenant in reversion or remainder. The several estates must generally be held in the same legal right. But this rule is subject to qualifications, and 'Liebschutz v. Moore, 70 Ind. 142; 3 Bl. Com. 177. 5 Hyde v. Warden, 3 Exch. 73. ' James s. Plant, 4 Ad. & El. 749. *Doe V. Walker, 5 Barn. & Cress. 111. 'Curtiss®. Miller, 17 Barb. (N. T.) 477; Bailey v. Wells, 8 Wis. 158; Co. Litt. 338a. « Burton v. Barclay, 7 Bing. 745. 68 538 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 510 merger may take place where the two estates are held hj the same person in different rights, as where he holds the freehold in his own right, and the term en autre droit. If they are held in different legal rights, there will be no merger, provided one of the estates be an accession to an- other merely by the act of law, as by marriage, by descent, by executorship, or intestacy. This is so because merger is the extinguishment of one estate in another by the conclu- sion of law, and the law will not allow it to take place to the prejudice of creditors, infants, legatees, husbands, or wives. ^ When two estates come together in one person, the first will merge in -the second, even though the first is for a longer period, unless the second is created by way of re- mainder, when no merger results. The person becoming possessed of both will have the benefit of both in succession." An estate for one thousand years is less than, and becomes merged in, a life estate, where the two come together in one person. Merger is not favored in equity, and is never allowed, unless for special reasons, and to promote the intention of the party. Intention does not govern at law as in equity. ' A court of equity will support the interest of the cestui que trust, and not suffer the trust to merge in the legal estate, if the justice of the case requires it. But at law the doctrine of merger will operate, even though one of the estates be held in trust, and the other beneficially, by the same person. However, in equity, if the legal and the equitable interests descend through different channels, and unite in the same person, and are equal and coextensive, the equitable estate merges in the legal.* Equity regards intention in applying the rule of merger. ' ' Chambers o. Kingham, 10 Ch. D. 743; Donisthorpe v. Porter, 2 Eden 162. 'Hughes V. Robotham, Cro. Eliz. 303; Co. Litt. 273b, Stephens «. Bridges, 6 Madd. 48. 3 Co. Litt. 54b; Loomer v. Wheelwright, 3 Sandf. Ch. (N. T.) 135. * Wade 4). Paget, 1 Bro. C. C. 863; Goodright v. Wells, Doug. 771. ' Starr v. Ellis, 6 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 393; Forbes v. Moffatt, 18 Ves. 384; Gibson v. Crehore, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 475. § 511] ESTATES FOR YEARa 63& Article 4. Extensions and Renewals. § 511. Renewals. § 514. Construction. § 512. Stipulations for Renewals. § 515. Specific Performance. § 513. Option to Renew. § 516. Parol Evidence. § 511. Renewals. — A grant of a right in demised premises by one with a terminable lease with a right of renewal will not cease to have effect, on the termination of a lease, if there is in fact a renewal thereof.- The renewal lease is deemed at least in equity to be a mere continuance of the original term for the preservation and protection of rights acquired therein.' The tenancy once established may be continued by mutual consent of the parties, by the execution of a new, or what is equivalent thereto, a renewal of the old lease, at the expiration of each term for a further year or other time. Imperfect rights of renewals, founded upon local custom, have sometimes been recognized and enforced in equity, but these are exceptions to the general rule.' But if there has been a breach of the agreement sufficient to cause forfeiture, and the party entitled thereto, either expressly, by his conduct, waives it or acquiesces in it, he wiQ be precluded from enforcing the forfeiture and equity will aid the defaulting party by relieving him against it if necessary.' However, this breach is often waived at law and there is then no need of an appeal to equity. The landlord is not bound to renew, without a covenant for the purpose.' But where a covenant is inserted it runs with the land and binds the grantee of the reversion.' 'Ex parte Grace, 1 Bos. & P. 376; Waters v. Bailey, 2 Younge & C. 219; Holdridge v. Gillespie, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 30; Phyfe «. Wardell, 5 Paige (N.Y.), 268; Mitchell v. Reed, 61 N. Y. 123; Gibbes v. Jenkins, 3 Sandf, Ch. (N. Y.) 130; NewhoflE D. Mayo, 48 N. J. Eq. 619. See, also, Lyons v. Osborn, 45 Kans. 650. 'Phyfe V. Wardell, 5 Paige (N. Y.), 268. '1 Pom. Eq. Jur. sect. 451; Hukill d. Myers, 36 W. Va. 689. * Robertson ■». St. Johns. 2 Bro. C. C. 140. '4 Kent's Com. 109. 540 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. -[§512 The covenant for renewal must be reasonably definite and certain, both as to term and amount of rent.' § 512. Stipulations for Bene wals.— Leases are gen- erally drawn with a stipulation for renewal by the lessee if so desired. And a provision for notice to continue the lease as per agreement is solely for the benefit of the lessor who can waive it; and election to hold for an additional term at an increased rent may be enforced against the lessee from his continuing to occupy the premises and paying the rent at the increased rate without proof of formal election at the expiration of the first term.' If the tenant desire to quit he should give the stipulated notice.' And a notice given to the landlord to surrender "as provided for in the lease" is sufficient.' If the lessor is dead at the time of the re- newal, then the lessee is entitled to have the lease renewed by every one who has or claims to have an interest in the property as a representative of the lessor. ' An agent can enter into a lease for his principal with a covenant for re- newal which will bind the lessor." The lessee cannot add to the term of renewal unless agreed to by the lessor,' but his legal representatives at his death may give the required notice and have a renewal.' After giving the notice to the tenant to quit, the lessor may waive the notice and allow the tenant to continue for another term.' And where the lessor has a right to sell the premises, the purchaser is bound to notify the lessee before he has exercised his right of option under the lease. Such a sale should be open and notorious which shall be ' Cunningham v. Pattee, 99 Mass. 348; Pray v. Clark, 113 Mass. 283; Abeel V. RadcliflE. 13 Johns. (N. Y.), 297; Arnot v. Alexander 44 Mo. 35. ''Stone V. St. Louis Stamping Co., 155 Mass. 367; Kramer ®. Cook, 7 Gray fMass.), 550; Bradford ». Patten, 108 Mass. 153; Delashman v. Berry, 20 Mich. 292. Compare Thiebaud v. Bank, 42 Ind. 213. 3 House V. Burr, 24 Barb. (N. Y.) 535; Chretien ®. Doney, 1 N. Y. 419. ■i Jenkins v. Clyde Coal Co., 83 Iowa, 618, See, also, Eldred v. Sherman, 81 Wis. 183. = Bratt B. Woolston, 74 Md. 609. « Daniels v. Straw, 58 Fed. Rep. 827. ' Chamberlain v. Dunlop, 126 N. Y. 45. 8Kolasky v. Michel, 120 N. Y. 635. «Supplee?). Timothy, 124 Pa. St. 375. § 513] ESTATES FOR YEAKS. 541 brought home to the tenant. Until he has such notice he is entitled to deal with his lessor, the apparent ownpr of the title, the same as if he were the actual owner whose grantee is bound by his acts and declarations until such notice is given.' The covenant may be conditional or unconditional upon the performance of certain covenants, or the payment of some fine or bonus,' and such performance or payment is a condition precedent to the right of renewal.' But when the covenant is independent non payment of rent is no ex- cuse for not renewing.' The word " renew " imports the giving of a new lease on the same terms as the old one, unless the contrary other- wise appears.' It does not imply that it shall contain all the covenants of the former, at least not those which are accidental and non-essential, such as covenants to build, to pay for buildings, to renew, and the like.' § 513. Option to Renew. — Many leases provide that the tenancy may continue without any formal notice to the landlord. Such continuance in possession with payment of rent will operate to ci-eate a new term.' If notice is re- quired and given to the landlord according to stipulation, and the landlord accepts such notice and arranges to re-enter, then the lessee cannot repudiate the notice and continue another term.' If the tenant remains after notice to quit, the lessor does not renew the term by demanding rent under the license of the notice which refuses to continue the lease." . After the tenant has served the agreed notice and re- moved from the premises, he cannot renew the lease with- out re-entry and exclusive possession." Equity will some- 'Starkey v. Horton, 65 Mich. 96; ' Copper Min. Co. v. Beach, 13 Beav. 478. 'Job V. Banister, 39 Eng. L. & Eq. 599. ^ Tracy ». Albany Exch. Co., 7 N. Y. 472. ''Brown v. Parsons, 22 Mich. 24. « Willis «. Astor, 4 Edw. Ch. (N. T.) 595; Rutgers v. Hunter, 6 Johns. Ch. (N. y.) 215. ^ Schroeder v. Gemeinder, 10 Nev. 355. 'Grenier v. Cota, 92 Mich. 23. 'Banbury v. Sherin (S. Dak.), 55 N. W. Rep. 723. '» Thomas v. Frost, 29 Mich. 336. 542 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 514 times step in and grant a renewal where the tenant has not slept on his rights and is not back in the payment of rent; but he must act within a reasonable time.' But a renewal will not waive damages under the former term." Arbitrators who are provided for in the lease may renew and fix the rental.' And it is held that comphance on the part of the lessee with other conditions besides payment of rent, on which the renewal was to be granted, will operate as a renewal.* A covenant that the lessee shall, at the expiration of his lease, have a refusal for three years longer, binds the lessor to renew at the same rent; and the acceptance by the lessee of a new lease at an increased rent is not a waiver of his right.' And where the lessee has an option to renew he must make his election before the expiration of the cur- rent term. ' The lessor can also insert a condition to renew unless he sells the premises.' § 514. Construction. — A parol agreement, though dif- ferent than the written lease, is merged in the written instrument, which controls ; in other words, the parol agreement is, therefore, extinguished." And covenants in a lease for renewals will not be so construed as to create perpetuities.' If the possession of the tenant is that created by a new lease, it will not be construed as a holding under the prior lease by renewal. " A lease for a fixed term, subject to be defeated by the happening of a particular event, is determined by the hap- pening of that event;" and an estate for life terminates at ' Banks «. Haskie, 45 Md. 207. « "Walker v. Seymour, 13 Mo. 592. 3 Brand v. Frumveller, 32 Mich. 215. Van Eensselaer v. Jewett, 3 N. Y. 144. 8 Co Litt 203a: Conner «. Bradley, 1 How. (U. S.) 211. § 520] ESTATES FOR YEARS. 647 In order to work a forfeiture of a lease for non-payment of rent there must be a demand on the tenant for the rent, though such demand may be in the form of a notice to quit,' unless the demand is waived by the lessee.* And the owner of the land, to prevent a multiplicity of suits, may have an injunction to prevent repeated trespasses thereon by the ousted tenant, without alleging irreparable injury or the insolvency of the tenant.' § 520. Breaches op Conditions. — Leases generally pro- vide for re-entry of landlord upon breach of conditions. The landlord is the only party who can enter for condition broken and use his option to do so or not as he prefers.* When the language of the covenant is that upon certain contingencies the lease shall be null and void, a slight vari- ation of the words following makes no difference in their real meaning. If the lease is null and void, it is not made any more so by provisions that it shall be of no effect be- tween the parties. The legal effect of a covenant is that the forfeiture is for the benefit of the lessor and at his op- tion, and such effect can only be changed by an express stipulation that the lease shall be void at the option of either party or of the lessee.' In order to make a forfeiture, the re-entry clause must clearly apply to the particular covenant broken, and the breach must be such ao was intended by the parties to be provided against;' and this provision for re-entry only applies to affirmative covenants that are to be performed by the tenant.' But the provision may be made so it wiU apply to both affirmative and negative acts.' When the lessor declares a forfeiture, he cannot after- wards recover damages stipulated in the lease and accruing 'Hayness. Union Invest. Co., 85 Nebr. 766; Cannon «. Wilbur, 30 Nebr. 777. 'Pendill v. Mining Co., 64 Mich. 172. ' Tantlinger v. Sullivan, 80 Iowa, 218. * Shattuck V. Lovejoy, 8 Gray (Mass.), 204. 'Jones v: Gas Co., 146 Pa. St. 205; Ogden v. Hatry, 145 Pa. St. 640; Phillips V. Vandergrift, 146 Pa. St. 357. 'Crawley v. Price, 10 Q. B. 302. 'Doe V. Marchetti, 1 Barn. & Ad. 715. 'Croft s. Lumley, 6 H. L. Cas. 672. 548 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 521 between the date of the assertion of forfeiture and the insti- tution of the suit. Having elected to forfeit the lease he cannot recover.' The forfeiture extends to the whole of the demised premises." A forfeiture for the breach of a covenant against assign- ment of the lease can take place only upon a voluntary as- signment of the lessee's entire estate.' A forfeiture is a strict legal right, and can never be enforced except by the holder of the legal title.* The lessor has the right to declare a forfeiture, even though he has no reversion,' though a cestui que trust has no such right.' The lessor can waive the forfeiture and affirm a continu- ance of the contract and recover the several sums agreed to be paid.' The lessee is liable for the rent though the premises are sold to him at the expiration of the term.' And if he pays the consideration the lessor is bound to convey according to the agreement." § 521. Forfeiture in Equity.— Relief is given in equity where the breach is not willful, and when compensation in damages can be calculated with certainty.'" And so where the lessor's conduct has misled the lessee into supposing the covenant was not to be insisted on, equity will relieve." Judge Brannon forcibly says that courts of equity were originally founded, among other purposes, to relieve against ' Wilson ». Goldstein, 152 Pa. St. 524. » Clarke v. Cummings, 5 Barb. (N. Y.) 339. 'Roosevelt v. Hopkins, 33 N. Y. 81; Smitli v. Putnam, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 221; Jackson v. Corliss, 7 Jolins. (N. Y.) 531; Lear ii. Leggett, 1 Russ. & M. 690. ^Grummett v. Gingrass, 77 Micli. 369. 'Doe ®. Bateman, 2 Barn. & Aid. 168. ' Doe «. Goldsmith, 2 Cromp. & J. 674; 3 Tyr. 710. 'Willis V. Gas. Co., 130 Pa. St. 222; Ray «. Gas Co., 138 Pa. St. 576; Mertz V. Vandergrift, 138 Pa. St. 576. 'Wilbur ®. Nichols, 61 Vt. 433. ' Kruegel v. Berry, 75 Tex. 230. '" Hill ®. Barclay, 16 Ves. 403; Nelson lo. Carrington, 4 Munf. (Va.) 332; Giles «. Austin, 63 N. Y. 486; Rector v. Higgins, 48 N. Y. 533. " Story's Eq. Jur. sect. 1319; Hughes v. Railroad Co., C. P. Div. 120n 1; Pom. Eq. Jur. sect. 451; Orr v. Zimmermin, 63 Mo. 73; Thropp v. Field, 3ft N. J. Eq. 82; McKildoe v. Darracott, 13 Gratt. (Va.) 378. § 522] ^ ESTATES FOR YEARS. 649 hardness of coui'ts of common law, and notably to relieve against forfeiture, even where it clearly exists; and veiy safely it can be said that equity looks with disfavor upon forfeitures, and will not be quick, or alert to see or declare or enforce them." So if a -lessor by his conduct clearly in- dicates that payment of rent will not be demanded when due, and thus lulls the lessee into a feeling of security and throws him off his guard, and thereby does not make the payments as stipulated, the landlord cannot suddenly with- out demand or notice declare a forfeiture; and if there be a technical forfeiture at law equity will relieve against it." But equity leans against the lessors seeking to enforce a forfeiture of a lease, and only decrees in their favor when there is a full, clear, and strict proof of a legal right there- to.' A covenant not to underlease will be upheld, espe- cially when the lessee is negligent.' Equity will relieve against a forfeiture incurred by the breach of a covenant to insure in a lease of real estate, caused by accident or mistake, if no actual damages have been sustained by the lessor, 'and for the non-payment of rent on the day it is due.' In genei-al, where there has been a breach of a covenant to perform some collateral duty such as to repair or to insure, which has been caused by ac- cident or mistake, equity will relieve if the lessor can be compensated or otherwise be placed in the same condition as if the bi'each had not occurred.' § 522. AVafver by Lessor.— a breach of the covenants of a lease may be waived by the lessor unless such breach makes the lease void.' And the lessor must have knowl- ' Hukill V. Myers, 36 W. Va. 639, 645. » Hukill V. Myers, 36 W. Va. 639. 'Henderson c. Carbondale Coal & Coke Co., 140 TJ. S. 25; Grummett » Gingrass, 77 Micli. 369; Rust d. Conrad, 47 Mich. 449; Thompson v. Christie, 138 Pa. St 230. ' Barrow v. Isaacs (1891), 1 Q. B. 417. ' Mactier v. Osborn, 146 Mass. 399. • Atkins V. Chilson, 11 Met. (Mass.) 112. 'Sanders v. Pope, 12"Ves. 282n; Livingston v. Tompkins, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. T.) 415; Heury v. Tupper, 29 Vt. 3.58; Mactier v. Osborn, 146 Mass. 399. «Doe c. Bancks, 4 Barn. & Aid. 401. 550 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 522 edge of the breach in order to waive the forfeiture.' A mere delay in declaring a lease forfeited for non-payment of rent does not constitute a waiver of the right of forfeit- ure." But a receipt and acceptance of rent which has ac- crued subsequent to the forfeiture, without any declaration of such forfeiture, is a waiver of the breach of the cove- nant. ' Though the landlord has waived some conditions of the lease by accepting rent, this does not preclude the right of the lessor to maintain an action for subsequent breaches of covenants of the lease which are continuing in their nature." And an acceptance of rent after his right of possession is fixed, that had accrued is no waiver of his right to enter. ' But acceptance of rent accruing after the breach of condi- tion, with full knowledge of the breach and all the circum- stances is a waiver of the right to declare a forfeiture of the lease and re-entry on the premises.* But if he receives rent only for the time prior to the breach of the condition, or if the rent is received without notice or knowledge of the breach, payment under such circumstances will not constitute a waiver of his right to elect to declare the estate of the lessee forfeited and of the right to re-enter.' The landlord does not waive his right to declare a forfeit- ure for non-payment of rent, if he forbears to collect the rent when due, thus allowing the tenant to be continually in default, or by paying taxes upon the premises which should have been paid by the lessee.' ' Clarke v. Cummings, 5 Barb. (N. Y.) 340; Doe v. Birch, 1 Mees. & Wels. 403. » Williams v. Vanderbilt, 145 111. 338. 5 Doe V. Rees, 4 Bing. N. C. 384; Bowman v. Foot, 39 Conn. 331; TuUle «. Bean, 13 Met. (Mass.) 375; Hunter «. Osterhoudt, 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 33; Keeler B. Davis, 5 Duer (N. Y.), 507. "Jones V. Durrer, 96 Cal. 95; McGlynn v. Moore, 25 Cal. 384; Lloyd v. Crispe, 5 Taunt. 249. 'Frazier v. Caruthers, 44 111. App. 61. / "Brooks®. Rogers, 99 Ala. 433; Silva«. Campbell, 84 Cal. 420. ' Dahm v. Barlow, 93 Ala. 120; Dendy ®. Nicholl, 4 C. B. N. S. 376, 387; Jackson v. Carpenter, 3 Cow. (N. Y.) 33; Murton v. Cladwin, 6 Adol. & E. N. S. 353; Stuyvesant v. Davis, 9 Paige (N. Y.) 437; Gomber «. Hackelt, 6 Wis. 334; Doe v. Allen, 3 Taunt. 78; Bleecker v. Smith, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 530. ' Douglas V. Hemes, 52 Minn. 304. §§ 523-524] ESTATES FOR YEARS. 551 Forfeiture of a lease for breach of condition by sub- letting is waived by accepting rent accruing after forfeit- ure, or suing out a distress warrant with knowledge of the fact rehed upon as a forfeiture.' In case of a continu- ing breach, the landlord does not waive the forfeiture by accepting rent after the first breach.' But allowing the tenant to spend money in improvements after the forfeit- ure is a waiver," and the time to declare a forfeiture may be suspended by the lessor,* or the lessor may delay to declare a forfeiture without waiving his right.' When a lease is void, giving a second lease is a sufficient declara- tion of the forfeiture.' But a second lease can be given subject to the first, and is then not such a declaration.' § 523. In Case of Bankruptcy of Lessee.— If the lease provides that if the lessee shall forfeit his term in case of his committing any act of bankruptcy, a breach of this pro- vision wiU support a re-entry by the landlord. ' Leases are often made with this proviso, that if the Jessee becomes bankrupt the lessor may re-enter and the lease becomes void. But when the lessee assigns the lease with the lessor's consent, and then becomes bankrupt, no forfeiture is incurred by the stipulation.' § 524. Improvements. — Stipulations are often inserted in a lease as to improvements made by the tenant. And a stipulation that the lessee shall make certain improve- ments by a specified time, and in case of failure to com- ply with any of the stipulations, he agrees to forfeit the lease, this is a condition upon breach of which the lessor may • McKildoe v. Darracott, 13 Graft. (Va ) 278. See, also, Frazier i\ Caruth- ers, 44 111. App. 61; Hukill v. Myers, 36 W. Va. 689; Silver ®. Kendrick, 3 N. H. 160; Newman v. Rutter, 8 Watts (Pa.). 55. 'Doe V. Jones, 5 Exch. 498; Doe v. Woodbridge, 9 Barn. & Cress. 376. 'Ward V. Day, 5 Best. & Smith, 359; 33 L. J. Q. B. 254. *Doe V. Meux, 4 Barn. & Cress. 606. 'Perry v. Davis, 3 C. B. N. S. 769. « Gufly v. Hukill, 34 W. Va. 49. 'Schaupp 0. Hukill, 34 W. Va. 375. 'Doe V. David, 1 Cromp. M. & R. 405; Domoile v. Colville, 7 Ir. C. L. 68; Toleman v. Portbury, 7 Q. B 344. 'Smith V. Gronow (1891), 2 Q. B. 394. 652 CLASSIFICATIOX OF ESTATES. [§ 525 re-enter.' If the lessor is to take the improvements at the expiration of the lease, the lessee is not required to make a formal offer of them to the lessor." Improve- ments agreed to be left cannot be taken away as fix- tures.' Nor can he claim rent for the improvements left on the place, he having the right to remove them.' In the absence of express agreements the landlord is not bound to pay for improvements made by the tenant dur- ing his term. But when it is agreed that the tenant shall be paid for his improvements when he shall surrender the premises, he is entitled to retain the possession until they are paid for even though his term has expired.' But he can claim pay for only such as fill the contract." And where the lease for a term of years provides that the build- ings and other improvements made by the tenant shall not be removed, but shall be delivered to the lessor at the ex- piration of the term in good repair and condition, usual wear and. inevitable accident alone excepted, the right of the lessee in such buildings wiU not extend beyond the use of the same during the term, and the lessor takes a present estate in such buildings, subject to the user by the tenant during the term.' § 525. Demand for Eent May be Waived. — The parties to a lease may waive demand for rent. At common law a demand for rent is necessary before the lessor can law- fully re-enter,' and this is the general rule as controlled by statute." This demand can be waived by the parties. When the mode agreed upon is pursued by the lessor in gaining possession, if not contrary to law, the lessee has no cause of complaint. And if the lease provides that the lessor need make no demand for rent when due, but may enter 1 Winn V. State, 55 Ark. 360. ' White Stone Quarry Co. v. Stone Co. (Ky.) 17 S. W. Kep. 163. s Edwards v. Van Patten, 46 Kans. 509. See, also, Parker v. Wulstein, 4S N. J. Eq. 94. * Hughes V. Ford, 15 Colo. 330. ' Van Rensselaer ®. Pennimah, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 569. ' Pike v. Butler, 4 N. Y. 360. ' Corrlgan v. Chicago, 144 111. 537. 8 Doe V. Wandlass, 7 Term R. 117. sPendill v. Mining Co., 64 Mich. 173. § 526] ESTATES FOE YEAR& 563 -without notice to the lessee, he has a complete right so to do.' The party entitled to the possession of property has a right to take it in any manner that does not involve a breach of the peace, and such rule applies to the landlord in taking possession after condition broken in the lease." The forfeiture for non-payment of rent may be waived by the landloi'd and by him only;' and the mere receiving of rent due after the lease has been forfeited may not be a -waiver of the forfeiture.* And the mere payment of rent or royalty, unless f uUy paid, will not waive the forfeiture, as it will be a continuing cause of forfeiture.' Article 6. Oil Leases. % 526. Oil and Gas Leases— Legal Ef- § 539. Option to Declare Forfeiture. feet. § 530. Construction. §527. The Title is Inclioate. §531. Forfeiture. § 528. Continuance of Lease. § 526. Oil and Gas Leases. — Oil and gas leases cover an important province by themselves and wiU be classed together. Such leases demise the oil and gas under the grantor's land with the right to go upon and operate the land for oil and gas purposes. These leases have a clause inserted that they shall become nuU and void and aU rights thereunder cease and determine, unless a well shall be completed on the premises within a ' Pending. Mining Co., 64 Mich. 172. « Hyatt B. Wood, 4 Johns. (N. Y.)150; Low v. Elwell, 121 Mass. 315; Mus- sey V. Scott, 33 Vt. 83; Sterling v. Worden, 51 N. H. 217; Stearns s. Samp- son, 59 Me. 568; Seitz v. Miles, 16 Mich. 456; Farmer v. Hunter, 45 Mich. 337. 'Cveveling b. Iron Co.. 51 N. J. L. 84. «Bleecker v. Smith, 13 Wend, (N. T.) 533; StuyvesautB. Davis, 9 Paige (N. T.) 427; Jackson v. Allen, 3 Cow. (N. T.) 220. ' Alexander v. Hodges, 41 Mich. 691 ; Doe v. Woodbridge, 9 Barn. & Cress. 376; Doe o. Allen, 3 Taunt. 78; Does. Jones, 5 Exch. 498, Gluck u. Elkan, 36 Minn. 80. 70 554 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 527 specified time, or unless the lessee shall pay a certain, amount monthly for every additional month. The legal effect of such a lease is to confer on the grantee the right to explore for oil or gas on the tract described. If he does not exercise this right within the time specified, it is lost to him, unless he chooses to pay the stipulated amount for each month for the opportunity to explore. If he does exercise it and finds nothing, he is under no obliga- tion to continue his explorations. If he explores and finds oil or gas, the relation of landlord and tenant or vendor and vendee is established, and the tenant is under an im- plied obligation to operate for the common good of both parties, and pay the rent or royalty reserved.' Such lease covering the premises for a term of years and so long as the gas or oil is produced in paying quantities, is a contract coupled with a conditional grant dependent upon the production of gas or oil in paying quantities." Under a lease providing that the lessee shall drill and complete a gas well on the demised premises within ninety days, or, in case of failure so to do, shall pay a yearly rental value from the expiration of the ninety days until such well shall be completed, the annual rental is due at the end of one year after default. ° § 527. The Title is Inchoate. — An oil lease is not a grant of property in the oil, but merely a grant of posses- sion for the purpose of searching for and procuring oil.* A vested title cannot ordinarily be lost by abandonment in a less time than that fixed by the statute of limitations, unless there is satisfactory proof of an intention to aban- don. An oil or mining lease stands on different ground. The title is inchoate and for purposes for exploration only until oil is found. If it is not found no estate vests in the lessee ; and the title ends when the unsuccessful search is abandoned. If oil is found, then the right to produce becomes a vested right, and the lessee will be protected ' Glasgow V. Oil Co., 153 Pa. St. 48. " Herrington v. Wood, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. 325. 'Evans v. Gas Trust Co. (Ind.), 39 N. E. Rep. 398. * Barnhart «. Lockwood, 153 Pa. St. 83. §§ 528-529] ESTATES FOR YEARS. 555 in exercising it in accordance with the terras and condi- tions of his lease.' § 528. Continuance op Lease. — After the time has ex- pired for exploration the lessee has forfeited his right, un- less the lessor encourages him to proceed and allows expen- ditures of money and labor in operation of the lease on a basis of its continuance; in such case the lessor is estopped to declare a forfeiture." And when he begins to explore for oil or gas, the drilling cannot be regarded as prosecuted to success so long as no actual product of oil or gas is ob- tained. The lessee, after drilling into the oil-bearing rock, and finding oil, for the production of which it is necessary to pump the well, is bound by his covenants to exercise due diligence in ascertaining whether oil can be produced in paying quantities, and, if it can be, in effecting such pro- duction.' § 529. Option to Declare Forfeiture.— A stipulation in a lease that the failure of the lessee to perform shall ren- der the lease void, is inserted wholly for the benefit and protection of the lessor, and it is optional with him to avail himself of it.' The right of the lessee is gone, but his acts do not forfeit the right of the lessor. The lessee's liabihties growing out of the non-performance are to be distinguished from his rights under the lease. The latter he can forfeit, but the former belong to the lessor, and can be lost only by his acts.' So an agreement in an oil lease, providing that a failure to sink a well within a certain time or to make certain pay- ments shall render the lease void, is enforceable at the option of the lessor.' When the lease provides that all wells shall be located by the lessor, it is his duty so to do, and if he does not he cannot recover against the lessee for 'Venture Oil Co. ■». Fretts, 153 Pa. St. 451. ' Riddle v. Mellon, 147 Pa. St. 30. ' Kennedy v. Crawford, 138 Pa. St. 561. * Springer v. Ga.s Co. 145 Pa. St. 430, 304; Ray v. Gas Co. 138 Pa. St. 576 ; Wills V. Gas. Co., 130 Pa. St. 233. ' Galey d. Kellerman, 133 Pa. St. 491 . •Evans v. Gas Trust Co. and.), 39 N. E. Rep. 398. 556 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 530 not drilling additional wells.' Where the covenant is for the benefit of the lessor, the lessee by his own act and de- fault cannot reUeve himself from a liability already in- curred for rental.' § 530. Construction. — An oil lease must be construed with a due regard to the known characteristics of the busi ness.' Oil and gas leases are generally combined in the same instrument and are classed together. But there is an important difference between oil and gas, which makes it necessary to distinguish for some purposes between an oil and a gas lease. After the lessee has ascertained the existence of oil, it is his duty to sink as many wells as may be reasonably neces- sary, in view of operations on adjoining lands, to secure so much of the oil from the land demised as may be obtained with profit. But the duties of a lessee operating for gas caunot be measured by the same rule applied in the same manner as in the case of a leasehold operated for oil. Every barrel of oil brought to the surface may be utilized. Whether the well that produces it is a strong one, yielding many barrels per day, or a weak one, yielding but few, is a matter that in no way affects the ability of the producer to market his oil, or the price to be obtained for it. In a gas territory, the lessee may sink many wells, and find gas in them all, but he can utilize only such of them as have a volume and pressure sufficient to enable him to transport the gas through his line and deliver it to the purchaser. If no one of them has the requisite pressure, then no one of them can be utilized; the gas roust be wasted, the cost of the wells will be lost, and the lessor entitled to no royalty. The lessee may have a good well, from which he can util- ize the gas with profit. He may put down another on the same farm, and thereby so reduce the pressure in the first as whoUy to destroy its value, without getting a sufficient pressure at the second to enable him to utilize that. The > McKnight v. Gas. Co., 146 Pa. St. 185. « Phillips D. Vandergrift, 146 Pa. St. 357. See, also, Jones «. Gas Co., 146 Pa. St. 304; Ogden v. Hatry, 145 Pa. St. 640. 3 Brown v. Vandergrift, 80 Pa. St. 142. § 531] ESTATES FOR YEARS. 557 gas, if coming from one well, would be of great value. Di- vided in such manner that the volume and pressure at each is below the necessary standard, the whole is lost. Thus, the apphcation of the rule as to oil wells, to gas wells might destroy the whole business. So, if the lessee has drilled one paying gas well upon the premises, he is not bound to seek others, as in the case of oil territory, and his failure to drill others is no breach of an implied covenant." § 531. FoEFEiriTRE. — The covenant in a lease for forfeit- ure, provided the lessee does not comply with the terms, is for the benefit of the lessor, and the lessee, by his own act and default, cannot relieve himself from a liability already incurred." And a condition that the lease shall be " null and void " if the covenant is not performed by the lessee, all words following "null and void " as a qualification of the condition are mere verbiage.^ And when the lessor affirms the continuance of the con- tract, the lessee cannot set up a forfeiture as a defense to an action in affirmance of the lease. ' If the lessee begins preparation within the time specified it is sufficient, though the work is not at the proposed site. Thus, where the lessee is to begin operations for a test well within one year from the date thereof, at some point in the district in which the premises are located, and complete said well in eighteen months after its commencement; if before the expiration of a year from the date of said lease said test well is located by surveying and level- ing, the timbers for the derrick are cut down and hewn, a contract made -for drilling the well, and the ma- chinery is ordered to be hauled to said location, but neither said timber nor machinery is hauled to said location within the year, by reason of the impassable conditions of the roads, 'McKnight v. Manuf. Nat. Gas. Co., 146 Pa. St. 185. 'Wills B.Gas Co., 130 Pa. St. 322; Ray v. Gas Co., 138 Pa. St. 576; Ogdea V. Hatry, 145 Pa. St. 640. ' Ogden V. Hatry, 145 Pa. St. 640. *Galey v. Kellerman, 123 Pa. St. 193; "Wills v. Gas Co., 130 Pa. St. 223; Ray v. Gas Co., 138 Pa. St. 576; Smiley a. Gas Co., 138 Pa. St. 592; Agerter v. Vandergrift, 138 Pa. St. 593; Mertz v. Vandergrift, 138 Pa. St. 594. 558 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 531 the condition is fulfilled, provided the well is completed in less than eighteen months after the date of said lease.' Upon covenant that the lessee shall drill a well within a specified time, and on failure so to do shaU pay the lessor a certain amount per annuin until such well is commenced, the lessor cannot recover in ejectment for failure to drill the well, the lease containing no clause providing for a for- feiture of the lessee's rights upon such failure.' When it is demonstrated that oil cannot be obtained, or when the lessees abandon their search, their right to pos- session of the demised premises will be at an end, and thereafter they will have no more right to occupy them than a stranger.' And if the lessee does not comply with the condition the landlord can declare a forfeiture." Or if the first well is completed as per agreement, and then the premises are abandoned for several years, the lessor can declare a forfeiture.' Where the lease contains no cove- nant on the part of the lessee to pay rent or develop the land, the only penalty upon him for failure to operate the land or to pay an amount agreed upon for delay, is a for- feiture of his rights under the lease.' Where the lessee has made a test of the territory and finds no oil his Ma- bility is at an end and he may remove his rnachinery, in accordance with the lease, and the lessor cannot, several years after abandonment, recover rents.' And so, on the other hand, the lessee cannot return and take possession after his 'abandonment because the leasehold has appre- ciated in value.' Where a lease is given with the intention of having the premises tested for oil by sinking wells, the tenant does not fulfill his covenants by sinking wells on other land." ' Fleming Oil & Gas Co. v. Oil Co., 37 W. Va. 645. = Thompson •». Christie, 138 Pa. St. 330. 3 Eaton o. Gas Co., 133 N. Y. 416; Rice v. Ege, 43 Fed. Rep. 661. ^Thomas v. Hukill, 34 W. Va. 385. »Heintz v. Shortt, 149 Pa. St. 387. 'Glasgow -B. Oil Co., 153 Pa. St. 48. 'May «. Oil Co., 153 Pa. St. 518. See, also. Venture Oil Co. v. Pretts, 153 Pa. St. 451. sBarnhartB. Lockwood, 153 Pa. St. 82. » Gibson s. Oliver, 158 Pa. St. 277. S 532] ESTATES FOR YEABS. 569 Article Y. Assignments and Transfers. % 532. What is an Assignment. § 539. Covenants Not to Assign. ^533. Distinguished from a Sub-let- §540. Distinction between a Covenant tmg. and a Condition. 6 534. Sub lessee. § 541- Failure to Deliver Possession to § 535. EfEect of Assignment. Lessee. § 536. LiabHity of the Assignee. § 542. Assignment of the Reversion. § 537. Liability to Pay Taxes. § 543. Attornment of Assignee. § 538. Assignee by Operation of Law. § 532. What is an Assignment. — An assignment, in the broadest sense in which the term is used in conveyanc- ing, may be any transfer of property; in respect to lands it is generally employed to designate a transfer of some par- tial or qualified interest. As between parties, it is necessary to the validity of an assignment, that the assignor should express his intent to transfer the title to the property ; and, in the cases in which a writing is required by the statute of frauds, that intention should be expressed in writing. A consideration for the assignment is only neces- sary in order to sustain it against creditors and other third parties. The technical words of an assignment are "grant, assign, transfer, and set over." But any language which expresses the intent to transfer the property is sufficient. The assignment must be an unconditional and absolute de- livery to the assignee;' and where a lease itself is required to be in writing by the statute of frauds, the assignment of it must also be in writing.' Every estate and interest in lands and tenements may be assigned, as also every present and certain estate or interest in incorporeal hereditaments, even though the interest be future, including a term of years to commence at a subse- quent period; for the interest is vested in prcBsenti, though only to take effect infuturo;' and the possibility of a term or a power coupled with an interest, is assignable in equity." 'Peabody v. Fenton, 3 Barb. Cb. (N. Y.) 451. 'Hess V. Pox, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 437: Brewer v. Dyer, 7 Cusb. (Mass.) 337. 'Co. Litt. 46b. -•King V. Lawson, 98 Mass. 809; Robinson v. Perry, 21 Ga. 183. 560 CLASSIFICATION- OF ESTATES. [§ 533 If a lessee parts with his whole interest in the whole or a part of the premises, it is an assignment so far that there will be no tenure between the parties, and no reversion in the lessee, although the lessee uses words of devise and re- serves rent and a right of re-entry. ' § 533. Distinguished from a Sub-Letting.-— A lessee for years may assign or grant over his whole interest, unless restrained by covenant not to assign without leave of the lessor. ° If the deed passes all the estate, or time of the term or, it is an assignment ; but if it be for a loss portion of time than the whole term, it is an underlease and leaves a reversion in the lessee. The tenant's right to create an under-tenancy by the grant of a less estate than his own, is one of the first principles of the feudal system, and a part of the common law. An under-letting differs from an assignment in the essential fact that some rever- sionary interest, no matter how inconsiderable, is retained by the original tenant.' A restriction against sub-leasing does not prevent an as- signment of the lease, and a restriction against an assign- ment does not prohibit a sub-letting.' ■ And any sub-tenant unless limited by his lease, except one at will, may under- let for so long as his interest continues.' A grant by the tenant of a portion of the premises for his entire term is an assignment, and not an under-letting of that portion.' 'Sexton V. Storage Co., 139 111. 318; WoodhuU v. Rosenthal, 61 N. Y. 382; Allcock i>. Moorhouse, 9 Q. B. 366; Langford «. Selmes, 3 Kay & J. 330; Lee «. Payne, 4 Mich. 106; Ragsdale v. Estis, 8 Rich. 439; Smiley v. Van Winkle, 6 Cal. 605; Craig ii. Summers, 47 Minn. 189; Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe R.R. Co. «. Settegast, 79 Tex. 256. 2 Robinson?). Perry, 21 Ga. 183; Den ». Post, 25 N. J. L. 285; Brown «, Powell, 25 Pa. St. 839; Croramelin ». Thiess, 31 Ala. 421. 3 Bedford «. Terhune. 30 N. Y. 453; Smiley «. Van Winkle, 6 Cal. 605; Sex- ton 1). Storage Co., 129 111. 318. •■ Lynde v. Hough, 27 Barb. (N. Y.) 415; Greenway v. Adams, 12 Ves. 400; Beardmau v. Wilson, L. R. 4 C. P. 57; Field v. Mills, 33 N. J. L. 354; Har- grave v. King, 5 Ired. Eq. (N. Car.) 430. ' Jackson ». Harrison, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 66. « Sands «. Hughes, 58 N. Y. 293; Patten v. Deshon, 1 Gray (Mass.), 325; Palmer v. Edwards, 1 Doug. 187u. Compare McNeil v. Kendall, 128 Mass. 245; Fulton V. Stuart, 2 Ohio, 215. 8 533] ESTATES FOR YEARS. 561 If the whole term is not assigned and there be a reversion, it is a sub-letting and not an assignment." Intent of the parties will control. If the intent is to transfer the whole interest in the whole or a part of the premises, it is an assignment ; but in Massachusetts if the intent appears to leave any right of reversion or re-entry in the grantor, it is only a sub-lease." The better opinion is that a right reserved of re-entry will not change an assignment of the whole term into a sub-letting,' though other courts hold that a reservation of a right of entry upon failure to pay rent makes a transfer of the whole term a sub-letting.* The rule which prevails and is founded upon sound prin- ciples is, that where a lessee grants or transfers the whole term for which the premises were leased to him, leaving no reversionary interest in himself, the transaction amounts to an assignment, and not to a sub-lease. This results by the operation of law without regard to the form of the in- strument. So a mere reservation of rent, or of a right of re-entry for a breach of the condition of the lease, will not change the legal relations of the parties, and the introduc- tion of covenants into the instrument, whatever may be their effect between the immediate parties, does not change the legal effect of giving up the reversion. ° The same instrument may in law create an assignment of the term, as between the original lessor and the assignee, and also the relation of landlord and tenant between the parties to the second demise." But this is the result of contract only, and not conclusive on the original lessor, who comes into privity of estate by reason of the grant or "Parmenter v. Webber, 8 Taunt. 593; Derby v. Taylor, 1 East. 503; Pingrey V. Watkins, 15 Vt. 479; Collins ». Hasbrouck, 56 N. Y. 157; Patten v. Deshou, 1 Gray (Mass.), 325; Aston d. Miller, 3 Paige (N. Y.), 68; Craig o. Storage Co., 139 111. 318. ' Dunlap V. BuUard, 131 Mass. 161. 'Sexton ®. Storage Co., 129 111. 318; Palmer®. Edwards, Doug. 187n; Davis u. Morris, ,% N. Y. 5T5; Lloyd v. Cozens, 3 Aslim. (Pa.) 138; Doe v. Bateman, 2 Barn. & Aid. 108; Smiley v. Van Winkle, 6 Cal. 605. ■•Linden v. Hepburn, 3 Sand. (N. Y.) 070; Keaney ». Post, 1 Sand. (N. Y.) 105; Martin v. O'Conner, 43 Barb. (N. Y.) 533, ' Craig «. Summers, 47 Minn. 189; "Woodhull v. Rosenthal, 61 N. Y. 383. •Stewart v. Railroad Co., 103 N. Y. 601. 71 562 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 534 assignment of the whole term.' This distinction is disre- garded in some of the cases, and in others it is held that the introduction of a surrender clause determines the char- acter of the instrument and implies a reservation. But no such effect can be given to a covenant which only becomes operative after the expiration of the term." The right of re-entry is not an estate or interest in land, nor does it im- ply a reservation of a reversion. It is a mere chose in action, and when enforced, the grantor is in through the breach of the condition and not by reverter.' All the modern authorities now hold that where all of the lessee's estate is transferred, the instrument will oper- ate as an assignment, notwithstanding the reservation of a rent to the grantor, and a right of re-entry on the non- payment of rent or the non-performance of the other cov- enants in the lease.* In Massachusetts the demise of the entire term of the lessee is a sub-lease and not an assignment, when the right reserved in the lease for the lessor to re-enter and resume possession for a breach of the covenant, ' because in this State the right to re-enter and forfeit the lease is a contin- gent reversionary estate in the property; and where an es- tate is conveyed to be held by the grantee upon a condition subsequent, there is left in the grantor a contingent rever- sionary interest, which is an estate capable of demise.' This rule is probably predicated upon a local statute and is plainly contrary to the principles of the common law. § 534. Sub-lessee. — A sub-lessee for years under a tenant from year to year holds so long as the original tenancy con- ' Sexton V. Storage Co., 129 111. 318. « Stewart v. Railroad Co., 103 N. Y. 601; Blumenberg «. Myres, 33 Cal. 93; Schilling v. Holmes, 23 Cal. 337. 2 Sexton V. Storage Co. 139 111. 318; Craig u. Summers, 47 Minn. 189. * 1 Piatt on Leases, pp. 1-9, 102; Wood on Land & Ten., p. 131; Woodfall on Land & Ten. (7th Ed.) 211; Taylor on Land. & Ten. (8th Ed.) 16n; 5 Ba. con's Abr. Tit. "Leases," sect. 8; 2 Preston on Cov. 13t, 135; Bordman v. Wilson, L. R. 4 0. P. 57; Doe «. Bateman, 2 Barn. & Aid. 163; WoUoston v. Hakewell, 3 Scott, N. C. 616. sBullard v. Dunlap, 131 Mass. 161; McNeil d. Kendall, 138 Mass. 245. * Austin V. Parish, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 215; Brattle Square Church v. Grant, 3 Gray (Mass.), 143. See, also, Collins v. Hasbrouck, 56 N. Y. 157; Ganson v. TifEt, 71 N. Y. 48. § 534] ESTATES FOE YEARS. 563 tinues, and even beyond the term, if the original tenant is allowed to hold over." And he will possess all the rights of his lessor as tenant by curtesy or in dower, or other hfe tenant, subject to be defeated by the termination of the life estate; " and then he can continue provided the reversioner or heir does acts suflBcient to amount to a new demise to him.' He is not in privity with the original lessor, and he is not liable to an action of covenant for rent reserved in original lease.' But if the original lease is surrendered to the lessor, without prejudice to the sub-lessee, the lessor may recover subsequently accruing rents from the sub- lessee. ' If the rent in the second lease be larger than that reserved in the first, the parties may agree that the sub- lessee shall pay the difference to the original lessor. ' The sub-lessee is subject to distress for rent in arrear, or to eviction under the original lease. He may protect himself against loss by reason of the failure of the original lessee to pay the chief rent by covenants in his lease.' The lessor may restrict the sub-letting and still not waive his right to forfeiture if the lessee sublets to others. ' The sub-lessee is chargeable with notice of the term of his lessor's lease,' and his rights are not prejudiced by a surrender and acceptance of the lease by the original lessor." But if the sub-lessee knows that the lessee has surrendered and then pays rent to him as the agent of the lessor, and then tries to obtain a lease from the original lessor, he acquiesces in 'Pelrse v. Sharr, 3 Mann. & R. 418; Mackay v. Mackreth, 4 Doug. 313; Oxley V. James, 13 Mees. & Wels. 309. ' Doe V. Butcher, 1 Doug. 50; Ex parte Smyth, 1 Swanst. 337. 'Doe V. Watts, 7 Term R. 79. ^Holford V. Hatch, Doug. 183; Harvey v. McGrew, 44 Tex. 413; Grundin ■5. Carter, 99 Mass. 16; McFarlan v. Watson, 3 N. T. 386. 'Beal V. Car Co., 135 Mass. 157. ' Smith V. Mapleback, 1 Term R. 441 ; WoUaston ». Hakewill, 3 Mann. & Gr. 333. 'Penley v. Watts, 7 Mees. & Wels. 601; Walker v. Hatton, 10 Mees. & "Wels. 349. *Wetheimer v. Hosmer, 83 Mich. 56. ' Foster v. Gardner, 78 Iowa, 305. '» Hessel v. Johnson, 139 Pa. St. 173. See, also, Kedney «. Rohrback, 14 Daly (N. T.), 54; Giddings v. Felker, 70 Tex. 176. 564 CLASSIFICATIOJSr OF ESTATES. [§ 535 the lessor's possession and becomes his tenant at will and his rights under the sub-lease are terminated." It is a reasonable rule of the law, and well settled, that a tenant for a certain term, or for life, who has underlet has no right to surrender his lease to the prejudice of the sub-tenant." The sub-tenant cannot be disturbed by any act which was not in his power to prevent.' A tenant for a term certain, who has sub-let the premises or a portion of them, cannot by a surrender of them to his lessor prejudice the rights of the sub-tenant, who will be held to have attorned to the original landlord on the terms of the sub-lease to him. And after such sub-letting and surrender, if the sub-tenant remains in possession of the premises sublet to him, his goods thereon are not liable to distraint for rent due from a new tenant, to whom the landlord has demised the premises after the surrender.* Where the lease prohibits sub-letting, no valid sub-lease can be made without the lessor's consent.' § 535. Effect of Assignment. — ^The original lessee, by the assignment of his lease, is not released from the pay- ment of the rent covenanted by him to be paid, but still remains liable therefor; and his assignee becomes liable on the same covenant because of his privity of estate, and be- cause the covenant to pay rent runs with the land, and the original landlord may sue either the original lessee or the assignee upon such covenant.' The substitution of one tenant in the place of another does not operate as a matter of law to discharge the latter from future performance of his express covenants.' The tenant is bound by his express covenants to pay rent even after he has assigned the term ' Appleton D. Ames, 150 Mass. 34. '1 8hep. Touch. 401; Adams v. Giddard. 48 Me. 213; Eten «. Luyster, 60 N. Y. 253; Brown v. Butler, 4 Phila. (Pa.) 71. 'Doe V. Pyke, 5 Maule & S. 146; Piggott v. Stratton, 1 De G. F. & J.. 33, 46. < Hessel v. Johnson, 129 Pa. St. 173; 143 Pa. St. 8. 5 Meyer v. Rotlischild (La.), 15 South. Rep. 383. 6 Sexton ». Storage Co., 139 III. 318; Van Rensselaer v. Hays, 19 N. Y. 68; Pluck 1). Diggs, 5 Bligh, N. S. 3t; Thome v. Woollcome, 8 Barn. & Aid. 586; Smiley v. Van Winkle, 6 Cal. 605; Blumenberg v. Myers, 33 Oal. 93; Schil- ling V. Holmes, 23 Cal. 280. 'Ranger v. Bacon, 33 N. Y. Supp. 551; 3 Misc. Rep. 95. § 536] ESTATES FOR YEAHS. 565 with his landlord's assent, and though the landlord has accepted the assignee as his tenant and received rent from him.' The privity of contract with his lessor makes him lia- ble upon his covenants after his assignment of the lease.' In general, where, on the assignment of a lease with the consent of the lessor, no new leasing is made, nor under- standing had, that the lessee shall be released, nor acts done from which the intention to release can be inferred, the assignment will not operate to discharge the lessee.' His privity of contract continues until the lease is termin- ated.' If the lessee gives up his possession to another to whom a lease is granted, that is a surrender by operation of law, and the original lessee is no longer liable.' An assignment of a lease as security does not give the assignee the right to the property." The assignee of the leasehold estate may re-assign to the original lessee if he accepts the lease, and thereby discharge himself from lia- bility to the lessor for subsequent rent;' but otherwise, if the lessee does not accept. ' § 536. Liability of the Assignee. — The law is well set- tled that the assignee of the lease is liable for the payment of the rent and royalty which accrues while he holds the as- signment of the lease." Where the original lessee has divested "Frank v. Maguire, 43 Pa. St. 82; Sanders v. Sharp, 153 Pa. St. 555; Way v. Reed, 6 Allen (Mass.), 364. Compare Patton v. Deshou, 1 Gray (Mass.), « Washington N. Gas Co. «. Johnson, 133 Pa. St. 576; Charles v. Froebel, 47 Mo. App. 45. 'Stewart v. Sprague, 71 Mich. 50; Wineman v. Phillips, 93 Mich. 823; Ward D. Krull, 49 Mo. App. 447; Lodge i). White, 31 Ohio St. 569; Wilson v. Ger- hardt, 9 Colo. 585 Taylor u. De Bus, 30 Ohio St. 468; Hunt v. Gardner, 39 N. J. L. 530; Almy v. Greene, 13 R. I. 3'iO; Farrington v. Kimball, 130 Mass. 313. ^Bonetti v. Treat, 91 Cal. 233; Jones v. Barnes, 45 Mo. App. 590. 'Nickells v. Atherstone, 10 Ad. & El. 944; Amory v. Kannoffsky, 117 Mass. 351; Davison v. Gent, 1 Hurlst. & N. 744; People's S. Bank v. Alexander, 140 Pa, St. 33. « Thorn v. Sutherland, 138 N. Y. 236. 'Denglers. Michelssen, 76 Cal. 125. ' Beattie v. Copper Co., 7 Mont. 330. "'Fennell®. GufEey, 155 Pa. St. 38; Fennell v. GufEey, 189 Pa. St. 841; Springer v. Gas Co., 145 Pa. St. 480. 566 CLASSIFICATION OP ESTATES. [§ 536 himself of his entire estate, and thus ceased to be in privity of estate with the original landlord, his assignee must nec- essarily be in privity of estate with the original landlord, and hence is liable as assignee of the term;' but the land- lord may sue the assignor or assignee upon a covenant to pay rent. But the assignee is not liable for an oral understanding between his assignor and the original landlord, which he did not know at the time of the assignment." The assignee by the acceptance of possession under an assignment, in the absence of stipulations to the contrary, assumes the liability for obligations maturing by virtue of such covenants while he holds the estate. Thus, where the rent becomes due at the end of each quarter, one taking an assignment during the quarter is liable for the whole quarter's rent; and the same rule applies to taxes, where the breach of the cove- nant accrues after the assignment." The assignee, being solely liable in privity of estate, is liable only for obligations maturing or breaches occurring while he holds the estate as assignee, and not for those which occurred before he became assignee or after he ceased to be such.* The assignee takes the place of the lessee in respect to liabiKty upon covenants not yet matured.' So a covenant of warranty in an assignment and transfer of a lease, which is limited to the right, title, and interest of the assignor in the premises, does not include a liability for ac- cruing rent and taxes.' The assignee is entitled to the benefits of all the covenants real, annexed to the estate, such as covenants for quiet en- joyment for further assurance, for renewal, for repairs and the like.' An assignee is liable to the original lessor for 1 Sexton «. Storage Co., 129 111. 318. 'Springer*. Gas. Oo., 145 Pa. St. 430. 3 Trask ». Graham, 47 Minn. 571. See, also, Spencer's Case, 5 Bep. 16; Blake «. Sa:iderson, 1 Gray (Mass."), 383; Van Rensselaer v. Bonesteel, 24 Barb. (N. Y.) 365; Post V. Kearney, 2 N. Y. 394; Graves v. Porter, 11 Barb. (N. Y.,. 593. < Patten v. Deshon, 1 Gray (Mass.), 335. 'Mason v. Smith, 131 Mass. 510. « Trask v. Graham, 47 Minn. 571. See, also, Sweet v. Brown, 13 Met.. (Mass.) 175. ' Vernon v. Smith, 5 Barn. & Aid. 11 ; Campbell v. Lewis, 3 Barn & Aid. 392. § 537] ESTATES FOR YEARS. 567 rent accruing due after the assignment.' The liability of the assignee continues during the privity of estate with the landlord, but does not extend to breaches occurring before the assignment to him or after his alienation of the term." In some States actual entry by the assignee is necessary to make him liable on the covenant for rent.' In Illinois entry is not necessary to make the assignee liable.' And in Massachusetts if the assignment is made by deed, entry is not necessary to place his liability; ' but entry is necessary in New York. ° If the assignment is made by way of mort- gage, then the assignee must always enter in order to be held liable for rent on the covenant/ except in a few States.' As between the lessee and the assignee the latter should perform the covenants while he has the estate, as there is an implied promise on the part of the assignee to indemnify the original lessee against liability for breach while he holds the estate.' And one taking a lease by assignment which on its face contains notice of liability to forfeiture is bound to ascertain whether it has been forfeited.'" § 537. Liability to Pay Taxes. — Where by the terms of the lease the lessee assumes to pay all the taxes and levies, or assessments on the premises during the continu- ance of the lease, he is liable for taxes and assessments which have been duly levied upon the leased property during "Trask d. Graham, 47 Minn. 571; Cox v. Fenwick, 4 Bibb(Ky.), 538; Jrc- Cormick v. Young, 3 Dana (Ky.). 394; Gravest. Porter, 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 593; Babcock v. Scoville, 56 111. 461; Walker ». Reeves, 3 Doug. 461n. 'Grundiu v. Carter, 99 Mass. 16; Sanders v. Partridge, 108 Mass. 556; Davis V. Morris, 36 N. Y. 576; Stevenson ». Lambard, 3 East. 575. 'Felch V. Taylor, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 139; Smith v. Brinker, 17 Mo. 148. ^Babcock v. Scoville, 56 III. 466. ' Sanders v. Partridge, 108 Mass. 556. «Damainville v. Mann, 33 N. Y. 197. 'Pingrey v. Watkins, 15 Vt. 488; Graham ». Way, 88 Vt. 34; McKee v. Angelrodt, 16 Mo. 383 ' Mayhew v. Hardesty, 8 Md. 479. See, also, Johnson d. Sherman, 15 Cal. 287; Calvert v. Bradley, 16 How. (U. S.) 593. 'Moules. Garrett, L. R. 5 Exch. 1.S3; L. R. 7 Exch. 101; Farrington v. Kimball, 136 Mass. 313; Bender d. George, 93 Pa. St. 36. ■» Carnegie Nat. Gas Co. v. Phila. Co., 158 Pa. St. 317. 668 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 538 the term, although they may be payable thereafter.' And an assignee, by accepting possession under the assignment, no stipulations to the contrary, assumes the liability for ob- ligations maturing by virtue of such covenants while he holds the estate." And if the lessee does not pay such as- sessments and taxes, the lessor may recover the fuU amount of them, though he has paid no part of them. Because the covenant is not one simply of indemnity, but a positive agreement to pay the assessments, and is broken when the lessee neglects to pay the taxes.' And the proper measure of damages is the amount of the taxes unpaid with inter- est thereon.' § 538. Assignee by Operation of Law. — The rules applicable to an assignee's liability apply to one who be- comes so by operation of law if he takes possession. ' The receiver of a lessee may waive the term if the income is not sufficient to pay rent, and will not then be liable as assignee.' An executor of a lease, it is held, is liable as an assignee of the lease, though he does not enter, but an administrator is liable as assignee only when he enters. If either enters and receives rents and profits, then he is held liable, both in his representative capacity, but not beyond the actual value of the use of the premises.' But if not named in the covenant of a lease, their liability only extends to covenants running with the land, and they can discharge themselves by assigning, but not by under- letting." Assignees by operation of law become liable on the covenants if they accept the assignment and take pos- session." ' Craig v. Summers, 47 Minn. 189; Wills ®. Summers, 45 Minn. 90. ' Trask v. Graham, 47 Minn. 571. 3 Rector v. Higgins, 48 N. Y. 532. ■* Fontaine v. Lumber Co. 109 Mo. 55. ' SutliflE V. Atwood, 15 Ohio St. 186; Calvert v. Bradley, 16 How. (U. 8.) 580; People v. Dudley, 58 N. Y. 333; Welch v. Myers, 4 Camp. 368; How v. Kennett, 3 Ad. & El. 659. s Martin v. Black, 9 Pai.a;e (N. Y.), 641. ■I Jermain v. Pattison, 46 Barb. {IS. Y.) 13; Pugsley i>. Aikin, 11 N. Y. 494; Remnant «. Bremridge, 8 Taunt. 191. ' Hornidge «. Wilson, 11 Ad. & E. 645; Tremeere v. Morison, 1 Bing. N. C. 89. 'White V. Hunt, 6 Exch. 33; Quackenboss v. Clarke, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 555. § 589] ESTATES FOR YEARS. 569 The better opinion is that an executor of a lessee cannot be made hable as an assignee of a term without entry and an actual taking possession by him of the demised premises; ' if he takes possession he is liable for rent to the value that the premises may yield. In Louisiana the sale of an unexpired term of a lease in- volves the sale of the obligation as well as the rights. But nothing prevents the severance of the right of occupancy from the obhgation to pay the rent and the sale of the former alone. The purchaser in such case would, of oourse, assume the risk of his right being defeated by failure of the principal lessee to pay his rent, but he would not become personally bound for the rent. The sale being of the right of occupancy alone, and not of the lease.' § 539. Covenants Not to Assign. — A covenant in a lease not to assign is for the benefit of the lessor alone, and he may waive it, and if he does not choose to avail himself of it no one can complain.' And such a covenant does not apply to an involuntary assignment by sale under execu- tion, and such sale is not a violation of the covenant and does not work a forfeiture;' and the same principle holds good as to a sale under bankruptcy proceedings and the like.' If the landlord desires to avoid such involuntary transfer of the leasehold interest, he must provide expressly in his lease that such transfer of the property shall work a forfeiture and the same will be effectual.' ' Randall d. Andrae, 61 L. J. Q. B. 630. Compare Remnant «. Bremridge, 8 Taunt. 191; Pugsley v. Aikin, 11 N. Y. 494. ' Walker v. Dohan, 39 La. Ann. 743. Chief Justice Bermudez and Justice "Watkins dissented from this opinion, holding that whoever acquires the right of occupancy under the lease acquires the lease, and whoever buys the lease buys tlie right of occupancy under it. This is undoubtedly tlie correct doctrine. 'Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe R. R. Co. v. Sellegast, 79 Tex. 356; Croft v. Lumley, 5 El. & B1.-648; Tanerman v. Lippincott, 39 Mo. App. 478: Sexton •«. Storage Co., 139 111. 318; Webster v. Nichols, 104 111. 160; Willoughby V. Lawrence, 116 111. 11; Arnsby v. Woodward, 6 Barn. & Cress. 519; Chicago Attach. Co. ■». Davis S. M. Co., 143 111. 171; Rede «. Farr, 6 Maule & S. 131; Kandol v. Tatum, 98 Cal. 390. ■■Farnum v. Hefner, 93 Cal. 543. *Farnum«. Hefner, 79 Cal. 575; Riggs 4). Pursell, 66 N. Y. 198; Bemis v. Wilder, 100 Mass. 446; Jackson v. Silvernail, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 377. " Appleton V. Ames, 150 Mass. 34; Davis v. Eyton, 7 Bing. 154; Doe v. David, 72 570 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 540-541 If the lease is assigned against a covenant which forbids assignment, and the landlord accepts rent from the as- signee, he waives his right to avoid the lease and cannot declai-e the assignment void.' Nothing short of an actual and voluntary transfer of the lease will be a breach of a condition or covenant against assignment;' and such covenant does not of itself render an assignment void in the absence of a condition to that effect.' § 540. Distinction Between a Covenant and a Condi- tion. — There is a distinction between a condition and a covenant. Thus, a clause in a lease that the lease is not to be sold, assigned, or transferred without the consent of the lessor, is a covenant and not a condition, and the lease will pass by an assignment without the lessor's consent, so that the assignee can maintain ejectment under it.* So where a lease contains a similar provision against as- signing, and also provides for forfeiture on breach of other covenants, there is no right of entry for breach of the pro- vision against assigning, for that does not create a condi- tion but a covenant only;' a breach of the other covenants cannot be applied to such a covenant. ° No words of agree- ment merely will create a condition; to produce a condition apt terms must always be employed. ' § 541. Failure to Deliver Possession to the Lessee. — In order to hold the lessee liable to pay rent, the lessor must 5 Tyrw. 135; Roe «. Galliers, 2 Term R. 133. See, also, Doe «. Hawks, 3 East. 481. I Randol v. Tatum, 98 Cal. 390. '^Lcar V. Leggett, 1 Russ. & M. 690; Hargrave v. King, 5 Ired. Eq. (N. Car.) 430; Doe v. Bevan, 3 Maule & S. 353; Smitli v. Putnam, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 331; Moore ». Pitts, 53 N. Y. 85; Doe «. Carter, 8 Term R. 300; Philpot ii. Hoare, 2 Atk. 319. ' Williams v. Earle, 10 Best & Sm. 740, 753. See, also. Sexton «. Storage Co., 139 111. 318. Compare Elliott v. Johnson, 8 Best & Sm. 38; Bemis v. Wilder, 100 Mass. 446. < Hague ». Ahrens, 53 Fed. Rep. 58; 8 C. C. App. 436; 3 U. S. App. 231. « Doe V. Godwin, 4 Maule & S. 365. 'Crawley ». Price, L. R., 10 Q. B. 302. 'Shaw V. Coffin, 14 C. B. N. S. 372; Den v. Post, 35 N. J. L. 385; Wheeler V. Dascomb, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 285. See, also, Spear v. Fuller, 8 N. H. 174. § 542] ESTATES FOB YEARS. 57L put him in possession. If the landlord fails to deliver pos- session of the leased premises, the lessee may abandon the premises and he is discharged from paying rent.' And so, if the mortgagees of the leasehold interest have been evicted from the premises by the lessor, it relieves them from any liabihty for the payment of rent." But in the absence of fault in the lessor, the lessee can recover only such rent a& he has advanced and such mesne profits as he is liable to- pay over.' § 542. Assignment of the Eeversion. — Under the com- mon law, the assignee of the reversion cannot sue or be sued upon the covenants of the lease. But this rule has been generally modified by the statutes of the several States, so that the assignee stands in the same position as to the tenant as did his assignor.* The assignee of the re- version may sue for all breaches of covenants by the lessee in his own time.* And no action will lie in the name of the lessor for the use of his vendee for a breach of cove- nants by the lessee, where no breach had occurred before the sale of the reversion." He may enforce all forfeitures not waived by his vendor. ' The covenant to pay rent may be assigned separately.* But a covenant to repair does not pass to the assignee and can only be enforced by the lessor at the expiration of the term;' the grant includes all rents falling due and accrued subsequent to the assignment, but not the rents previously 'Deugler v. Michelssen, 76 Cal. 125. 'PendillD. Eells, 67 Mich. 657. ' Mack V. Patchin, 42 N. Y. 167. < Evans D. Enloe, 70 Wis. 345; St. Mary's Church v. Miles, 1 Whar. (Pa.) 229; Howland v. Coffin, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 135; McCrady v. Brisbane, 1 Kott& MeCord (S. Car.). 104; Willard v. Tillman, 2 Hill (IST. T.), 274. ' Shelby v. Hearne, 6 Yerg. (T_enn.) 513. See, also, Stoddard v. Emery, 128 Pa. St. 436. 'Stoddard v. Emery, 128 Pa. St. 436. 'Watson 1). Fletcher, 49 III. 498; Page v. Esty, 54 Me. 319; Fanning c.Voel- ker, 40 Mo. 129. 'Winoman v. Hughson, 44 111. App. 23; Bradley v. Roat, 5 Paige (N. Y.), 683; Dixon v. NlccoUs, 39 111. 373. 'Demarest v. Willard, 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 206. 572 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 543 due;' and it includes notes taken by the lessor for rent or' their vahie in money." Under the modern statutes the assignee of the reversion stands in the same position and has the same remedies by entry, action, or otherwise, for the non-performance of any agreement contained in the lease so assigned, or for the re- covery of any rent, or for the doing of any waste, or other cause of forfeiture, as the assignor has, or may have had, if such reversion had not been assigned;' no attornment is necessary as at common law.' Under the statutes this rule of attornment extends as well to grants or leases in fee re- serving rents, as to leases for life or for years." Where the leased premises are sold at foreclosure sale, the lessor being made a party, he is entitled to all rents up to the time of the surrender of the premises. ° The tenant or his assignee is liable in severalty to the heirs of the rever- sion.' An assignee of a part of the reversion may sue and be sued upon the covenants running with the land, if they be divisible in their nature.' § 543. Attornment of Assignee. — At common law, a lease was not assignable so as to invest the assignee with the legal title to the rent. The tenant neither owed fealty or rent to the assignee until he had assented to the assign- ment by attorning to the assignee." No one could defeat the estate by entry but the' lessor or his heirs. There was privity of estate between the grantee of the lease and the tenant but no privity of contract. At common law the lessor's assignee, in order to sue on the covenants in the ' Wright V. Lattin, 38 111. 293; Kornegay v. Collier, 65 N. Car. 69; Farley ». Thompson, 15 Mass. 18; Gale v. Edwards, 52 Me. 363; Bank v. "Wise, 3 Watts (Pa.), 394; Leonard ». Burgess, 16 Wis. 41. » Beebe v. Coleman. 8 Paige (N. Y.), 393. 3 Webb «. Seekins, 63 Wis. 39; Evans v. Enloe, 70 Wis. 345. ■> Winterfleld v. Stauss, 24 Wis. 403. 'Webb V. Seekins, 63 Wis. 29; Wis. Kev. Stat, sects. 3194, 3195. e Giles v. Comstock, 4 N. Y. 270. ' Cole «. Patterson, 35 Wend. (N. Y.) 456; Crosby n. Loop, 13 111. 635. "Aster ■». Miller, 3 Paige (N. Y.), 08; Simpson v. Clayton, 4 Bing. N. 0. 758; Stevenson v. Lambard, 3 East, 575; Crosby d. Loop, 13 111. 625 9 Webb D. Russell, 3 Term R. 393. § 543] ESTATES FOR YEARS. 573 lease, musb have the same estate as the lessor had when he made the lease. If a tenant for years sublet, and then assigned his rever- sion, and his assignee then bought in the reversion in fee, the reversion of the term merged in the reversion in fee. Hence, all covenants and duties annexed to the sub-lease, and owing to the holder of the reversion of the term, were merged, and thus the assignee could neither compel pay- ment of rent nor re-enter. A statute' was enacted providing ' ' that the king should have, hold, possess and enjoy to him and his heirs and suc- cessors forever, such late abbotries, monasteries in as ample a manner as the late abbots, priors, " etc. But this act failed to confer upon the king's grantees the enumerated rights, interests and titles. So it was enacted' "that all persons and bodies politic, their heirs, successors and assigns, having any gift or grant of the king, of any landsorotherhereditamentSjOrof any reversions in the same shall have like advantages against the lessees, their executors, administrators and assigns, by entry, for the non-payment of the rent, or for doing waste, or for other forfeitures, as said lessors and grantors, their heirs or successors might have had. " In the second section is enacted "that all lessees and grantees of land or other heredita- ments, their executors, administrators or assigns shall have like action and remedy against all persons and bodies politic, their heirs, successors and assigns, for any con- dition or covenant expressed in the indenture of their leases as the same lessees might have had against the said lessors and grantors and their successors." But this act did not give the right of the assignee of the lease to recover of the tenant, until the tenant had attorned to the assignee. But another act' dispensed with attornment in order to give the assignee a remedy against the tenant. Under the English statutes leases not under seal did not come under the provisions. To bring the grantee within provision of the English acts, he must take the same rever- '31 Henry Vm. c. 13. » 33 Henry VIII. c. 34, sect. 1. H&5 Ann, c. 16, sect. 9, 10. .574 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 543 sion which subsisted between the lessor and the lessee. That is to say, if there be a sub-letting to an under lessee, and then the lessor paramount purchases the reversion of his tenant, or if his tenant purchases the immediate reversion, in neither case can the purchaser maintain an action for rent against the sub-tenant. The first tenant can buy the reversion of his landlord, and then has a title in fee. His leasehold title merges in his fee simple title, and in this case, under the statute' he had no remedy against the sub- tenant. To remedy this another statute' was passed. But this act did not protect the subtenant in his rights. So another act' was passed, providing " that where the rever- sion expectant on a lease, made either before or after the passage of this act, of any tenements or hereditaments of any tenure shall be surrendered or merged, the es- tate, which shall, for the time being, confer, as against the tenant under the same lease, the next vested right to the same tenements or hereditaments shall, to the extent and for the purpose of preserving such incidents to, and obliga- tions on, the same reversion as, but for the surrender or merger thereof, would have subsisted, be deemed the rever- sion expectant on the same lease." In Illinois, the English statute of 4 and 5 Anne was never adopted,* but an Illinois statute supplies its place, ' though there are decisions that imply that this statute does not apply, and that attornment is still necessary.' Attorn- ment is necessary in Missouri.' Prior to an English statute" it was the law that, although a tenant who has made an underlease could not, by a sur- ' 32 Henry VIII. c. 34, sect. 1. 5 7 & 8 Vict. c. 76, sect. 12. 3 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, sect. 19. See, also, U. C. Con. St. c. 90, sect. 7; Hurd's Stat, of 111. p. 356, sect. 40. ■* Fisher v. Deering, 60 111. 114. 'Kurd's Stat, (1891), p. 901, sects. 14, 15. See Webb v. Russell, 3 Term R. 393; Thorn «. Woollcombe, 3 Barn. & Ad. 586; Taylor's Land & Ten. (7th Ed.), sects 294, 446; Woodfall's Landlord & Ten. (11th Ed.), p. 283; Wood's Land. & Ten., p. 856, sect. 505. See, also, Thomasson v. Wilsou, 146 111. 384. ' Oswald v. MoUet, 29 111. App. 449; Walker v. McDonald, 38 111. App. 644. ' Duke ». Compton, 49 Mo. App. 304. » 4 George II. c. 28. § 543] ESTATES FOB YEARS. 575 render, prejudice his tenant's interest, yet he would lose the right to distrain for rent reserved upon the under-lease; for, since the rent is incident to the reversion, the surren- derer cannot collect it in this form, because he has parted ■with his reversion to the original lessor; nor can the sur- renderee have this remedy, because the reversion to which it was incident at the time of the surrender, merged in the greater reversion, of which he was already possessed." By the English statute' it was provided that if a lease be surrendered, in order to be renewed, and a new lease given, the relation of landlord and tenant between the original lessee and his under lessee should be preserved ; and it placed the chief landlord and his lessee and the underlessee, in reference to rents, rights and remedies, exactly in the same situation as if no surrender had been made. But, irrespective of statute, the doctrine of merger will not ordinarily bo held to apply, against the intention of the parties and against the interest of the original lessor. ' This rule of attornment was founded upon the policy of the feudal law imposing upon the tenant obligations of service and fealty, but was abolished in England;' and this doctrine of attornment has been regarded by some authori- ties as unsuited to the American States, and as having never been a part of the law of this country; that the abol- ishment of this doctrine in England descended to the Amer- ican colonies, and hence the ancient rule of attornment was never in force in this country.' But this is not the general mle, and it is held that the English statute was never adopted in this country." 'Their v. Barton, Moore, 94; Webb v. Russell, 3 Term R. 401; Mellor v. Watkins, L. R. 9 Q. B. 400. ' 4 George II. c. 38. 8 Moore B. Bank, 8 Watts (Pa.), 138; Duncan v. Drury, 9 Barr (Pa.), 333; Campbell v. Carter, 14 111. 288; Aetna L. Ins. Co. ■». Corn, 89 111. 170; Dunphy •». Riddle, 86 111. 32; Shaver®. Williams, 87 111. 469; Fowler ®. Fay, 63 111. 375. *4 Anne, c. 16, sects. 9, 10; Moss v. Qallimore, 1 Doug. 279. 'Farley v. Thompson, 15 Mass. 18; Burden v. Thayer, 3 Met. (Mass.) 76; Baldwin «. Walker, 21 Conn. 178; Jones ». Rigby, 41 Minn. 530; Pendergast «. Young, 21 N. H. 234; Tilford v. Fleming, 64 Pa. St. 300. "Fisher v. Deering, 60 111. 114. See, also, U. C. Con. St. c. 90, sect..?; Hurd's Rev. St. of 111. (1891), p. 356, sect. 40. 576 classification of estates. [§§ 644-545 Artioj^ 8. Bent. §544. Definition. §550. Extinguishment of Landlord's § 545. Rent Implied. Title. § 546. Independent Covenants. § 551. Eviction. §547. Condemnation of Leased § 553. Eviction from a Part of the Premises. Premises. § 548. Condemnation of the Whole § 553. Actual Entry by the Landlord Premises. not Necessary. § 549. Condemnation Money— Appor- § 554. By Title Paramount. tionment. § 555. Set-off. § 544. Definition.— Rent is a certain profit issuing yearly- out of lands and tenements corporeal. ' Or it is the compen- sation to the landlord for the right to occupy his land and enjoy its annual profits;" it cannot issue out of mere privilege or easement.' And past indebtedness cannot be placed with future rent and collected as such." The rent must be reserved to him from whom the land proceeded, or to his legal representatives, and it cannot be reserved to a stranger. ' A covenant to support the lessor is a suffi- cient consideration, and the lessee will hold the entire term though the lessor dies before the expiration of the lease.' Where the lessor and owner of the premises conveys them without reservation, he cannot recover rent of the tenant therefor accruing unless the rent has been assigned to him by the grantee.' And such conveyance carries th& note given for rent as an incident, and the grantee becomes the landlord. ° § 545. Eent Implied. — When there is no covenant ex- pressed in a lease to pay rent, it is implied that the lessee ( 1 3 Bl. Com. 41. J 2 3 Kent's Com 460; Bingham on Real Est. ."554. r ^Co. Litt, 143a; Buszard ®. Capel, 8 Barn. & Cress. 141. For a history of rents see chapter IV. *Paxton c. Kennedy, 70 Miss. 865. = Litt. sect. 34(?; Co. Litt. 143b. ' In re Williams' Estate, 22 N. Y. Supp. 906; 1 Misc. Rep. 35. ' West Shore Mills Co. v. Edwards, 24 Oreg. 475. * Watking ®. Duvall, 69 Miss. 364; Martin b. Martin, 7 Md. 368; Westmore- land V. Foster, 60 Ala. 448; Wilson «. Delaplaine, 8 Harr. (Del.) 499; Keesee V Sloan, 69 Miss. 369. § 546] ESTATES FOB YEAKS. 577 shall pay the reasonable worth of the use of the premises so long as he holds them, unless the landlord expressly waives or releases it. As the lessee may at any time dis- charge himself from further payment of rent under this implied covenant by assigning his lease to anybody, a cove- nant is generally inserted in addition to words of reserva- tion, thus binding the lessee, his executors and assigns, to pay rent until the expiration of the lease. The covenant need not be in direct words. "Yielding and paying rent," is a sufficient covenant. "Subject to the payment of the rent reserved," in the assignment of a lease, is not suffi- cient." And a tenant holding over after notice to quit is liable to pay a reasonable compensation." An action for rent or for use and occupation can only be maintained upon a promise express or implied to pay for such occupation.' Forfeitures are to be construed strictly; and where a lease provides that it shall become forfeited if any of the pay- ments provided for is not paid, the whole payment is meant, not a balance on running account; therefore, if a part of a payment be accepted before it is due, no forfeit- ure is incurred by a failure to pay the remainder in the specified time.' § 546. Independent Covenants. — If the covenant to pay rent is independent of the other covenants, the land lord may recover the rent, and it is not necessary for him to show that he has performed his covenants. ° And where the lessor's covenant to repair is independent, a failure to re- pair does not relieve the tenant from paying rent.' And when the tenant is bound to notify his landlord to repair the buildings, he will not be absolved to pay rent by aban- doning the premises before giving the stipulated notice.' Independent covenants can be enforced irrespective of the other covenants. ■ Walenridge v. Steward, 3 Moore & S. 561; Igguldon v. May, 7 East, 237. ' Stoddard v. Waters, 30 Ark. 156. See, also, Bunton v. Richardson, 10 Allen (Mass.), 260. 'Swift V. Lumber Co., 64 K H. 5J. * Westmoreland, etc. Gas Co v. De Witt, 130 Pa. St. 285. 'Clark V. Ford, 41 111. App. 199. 'Young V. Burhans, 80 Wis. 438. ' Green «. Reddiag, 93 Cal. 548. 73 578 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 547 § 547. Condemnation of Leased Premises. — A tenant, as the owner of the estate for years, is guaranteed just compensation before his title can be divested under the power of eminent domain. The lessee takes the term as every other interest in land is taken, subject to the exer- cise of that power, whenever the public necessity and con- venience demand it. He holds and enjoys the estate granted, subject to the exercise of the sovereign power to appropriate his land to a pubhc use, upon making to him a just compensation; and if he suffers loss, or is deprived of his estate, he is provided with the same remedy that is given to all other owners, and holds his title subject to this right, as his landlord holds his title. So taking under the right of eminent domain is not a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment, and does not technically amount to an eviction.' So the taking of the property by eminent do- main is not a breach of the covenants of the lease, and does not release the tenant from the payment of rent." As the tenant' s liability for the payment of rent continues after a part of his term has been taken by the exercise of the right of eminent domain, and appropriated to the public use, he will be entitled to recover such damages as he sustains by the taking of his leased property by the public/ If the landlord's remedy to collect his rents will be im- paired or defeated on account of the insolvency of the ten- ant, or otherwise, a court of equity may interfere to pre- vent the payment of the damages recovered in a proceeding for condemnation under the eminent domain, into the hands of the tenant, and appropriate so much of the fund as may be necessary to the payment of the rents due or to become due, to the landlord." 'EossB. Dysart, 33 Pa. St. 453; Frost v. Earnest, 4 Wliar. (Pa.) flO; Dyer ■0. Wightmaa. 66 Pa. St. 435; Folts v. Huntley, 7 "Wend. (N. Y.) 311; Parks ». Boston, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 198; Foote «. Cincinnati, 11 Oliio, 408; Patterson v. Boston, 30 Pick. (Mass.) 1-59; Stubbings v. Evanston, 136 111. 37. ^ Chicago V. Garrity, 7 111. App. 474; Ellis v. Welch, 6 Mass. 346; Workman s. Mifflin, 30 Pa. St. 363; Peck «. Jones, 70 Pa. St. 85; Wagner «. White, 4 Hnr. & J. (Md.) 564; Schilling ». Holmes, 33 Cal. 230; Corrigan ». Chicago, 144 111. 537. 3 Stubbings v. Evanston, 136 111. 37; Corrigan v. Chicago, 144 111. 537. Com- pare Biddle v. Hussman, 33 Mo. 597. ■" Stubbings ». Evanston, 136 111. 37. §§ 548-549] ESTATES FOR YEARS. 579 § 548. Condemnation of the Whole Premises. — As has been said, the taking of a portion of leased premises for public use and a part remains which is susceptible of occu- pation under the lease, the covenants of the lease are not abrogated, and the tenant will be bound to pay according to the terms of the covenants in the lease. The les- see will not be entitled to apportionment or abatement of the rent for the part of the land taken, but is bound to pay rent for the whole of the premises demised, he having received due compensation for the part taken. ' But while condemnation proceedings may not amount to a technical eviction, yet when the entire tract of land is taken, its ef- fect is to abrogate the relation of landlord and tenant. Whatever title the tenant, as well as the landlord, has in the land passes to the State or corporation in whose behalf the right of eminent domain is exercised. The effect is an absolute extinguishment of the right and title of both in or control over the subject of the demise. It is in effect evic- tion by paramount right, coupled with a conveyance by the owners of their respective interests. Hence, the liability of the tenant to pay rent also ceases, and in any action brought by the landlord for the rent accrued after the ter- mination of his estate, the tenant may plead such termina- tion in defense.' § 549. Condemnation Money — Apportionment. — Where the leased premises are condemned and all taken, a com- pensation is paid which must be apportioned between the lessor and the lessee. The lessor's interest is the reversion with the rents added. The lessee's interest in the premises is the value of the term, subject to the rents, and each must receive compensation. The money stands in lieu of the land taken, to be appor- tioned upon the several interests in the premises. The les- see's compensation is the value of the leasehold estate, sub- ject to the rent covenanted to be paid. ' Parks D. Boston, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 198; Folts r. Huntley, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 211; Footer. Cincinnati, 11 Ohio, 408; Stubbings v. Evanston, 136 111. 37. 'Corrigan v. Chicago, 144 111. 537; Barclays. Pickels, 38 Mo, 143; Cuth- bert V. Kuhn, 8 Whart. (Pa.) 357. See, also, O'Brien v. Ball, 119 Mass. 28. 580 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 550 If the value exceeds the rental, he will be entitled to the excess. If it does not exceed the rent, he will receive no compensation. If the covenant to pay rent is not affected by the con- demnation, the lessor will be entitled, as compensation, only to the present value of his reversion which he holds subject to the term created by his lease; and the lessee continues personally liable, but losing his estate and right to its enjoy- ment, he will be entitled to receive not merely the value of. the term, but also a sum of money equivalent to the present value of the sum of the rents in futuro; or he should re- ceive the value of his term subject to the rents, and such further sum as will be considered a present equivalent for the rent thereafter to be paid.' So if the whole land be taken for public use, which has been leased, the rent there- after ceases," because the landlord's title is absolutely ex- tinguished in the leased estate, and he cannot, therefore, enforce the contract for the payment of rent after its ex- tinguishment.' § 550. Extinguishment op Landlord's Title. — ^A lessee by indenture is technically estopped from denying his lessor's title after taking possession under him; whether the action be assumpsit, debt, covenant, or ejectment. But the lessee may plead that, although the lessor had an interest in the premises at the time of making the lease, his interest termi- nated before the alleged cause of action arose.' Although the lessee cannot show that his lessor had no title to the premises when the tenancy began, he may show that he had a limited estate, which was determined by its own lim- itation before the cause of action accrued, as where he held the estate for the life of another, or the like, which expired during the term;^ or that the landlord had conveyed, or has been evicted by title paramount, or that his title has been ' Corrigan v. Chicago, 144 111. 587. 2 Barclay v. Pickels, 38 Mo. 143. ' Lampson •». Clarkson, 113 Mass. 348. *Den «. Ashmorc, 33 N. J. L. 361; Presstman v. flilljacks, 53 Md. 647; Hardin v. Forsythe, 99 III. 312; Langford v. Selmes, 8 Kay & J. 330; Solo- man B. Agburow, 3 Bulst. 373, 375; Lampson v. Clarkson, 113 Mass. 348. '^ Lampson B. Clarkson, 113 Mass. 848; St. Jolin «. Quitzow, 73111. 334. § 551] ESTATES FOB YEARS. 581 sold under execution and conveyed.' And so where the estate of the landlord, in the whole of the demised premises, as well as that of the tenant, is extinguished by condemna- tion proceedings, the liability of the tenant to pay rent ceases upon the termination of such estates.' § 551. Eviction. — If the landlord deprives the tenant of the use of the premises, such action on his part is an evic- tion; though a mere trespass by the landlord without any intention to deprive the tenant of the premises will not con- stitute eviction.' The eviction must be more than a mere trespass or an act interfering with the beneficial enjoy- ment of the premises. It is some act indicating his inten- tion to evict the tenant." If the tenant iinds another lessee in possession with whom he settles as to the joint possession, he cannot then refuse to pay rent to his landlord. ° The landlord may enter to rebuild with the tenant' s con- sent, and such action works no eviction of the tenant." But where a tenant yields up possession to a purchaser of the property at a foreclosure sale of the landlord's interest, it constitutes an eviction.' A mere interruption is not an eviction." And if the land- lord enters upon the premises to rebuild, with the knowl- ' Tilghman v. Liitle, 13 III. 239; Franklia v. Palmer, 50 111. 203; Supervisors «. Herrington, 50 111. 232. * Corrigan v. Chicago, 144111. 537. See, also, Montanye v. Wallahan, 84 111. 355; Emmes v. Feeley, 133 Mass. 346; O'BrieQ v. Ball, 119 Mass. 28; Harrison ■B. Myer, 93 U. S. Ill; St. Romes v. New Orleans, 34 La. Ann. 1201. ^Hayward «. Ramge, 33 Nebr. 836; Lounsbery ■». Snyder, 31 N. T. 514; Edminson v. Lowry (S. D.), 53 N. W. Rep. 583; Edgerton b. Page, 20 N. Y, 281; Hayner v. Smith, 63 111. 430; Morris v. Tillson, 81 111. 607; Bartlett «. Far- rington, 120 Mass. 284; dishing v. Adams, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 110; Mirick v. Hoppin, 118 Mass. 582; Paltersod ». Graham, 140 111. 531; Lynch v. Baldwin, 69 111. 210; Cram v. Dresser, 3 Sandf. (N. Y.) 130; Gray v. Graff, 8 Mo. App. 339; Boreel v. Lawton, 90 N. Y. 293. . Ostrom, 35 Barb. (N. Y.) 538. » Pillebrown v. Hoar, 134 Mass. 580; Stevenson v. Lambard, 3 East, 576. "Morrison v. Chadwick, 7 C. B. 283; Blair v. Claxton, 18 N.Y. 539; Martin V. Martin, 7 Md. 375; Hegeman v. McArthur, 1 B. D. Smith (N.Y.), 147; Dyett V. Pendleton, 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 737; Lawrence v. French, 35 Wend. (N. Y.) 443. § 553] ESTATES FOR YEARS. 583 tenant may then leave the premises with no liability for the rent;' but the Uability to pay revives if the tenant resumes possession," and the rent already due when evicted can be collected. ' Acts not amounting to an eviction may affect the amount to be recovered for use and occupation,* and may be set up by way of recoupment in an action for rent where recoupment is recognized. ' If the eviction is only partial, and the tenant after leav- ing the premises resumes possession, he need not pay the intermediate rent.' § 553. Actual Entry by Landlord not Necessary. — An actual entry or physical exclusion of the tenant is not necessary to constitute eviction ; any obstruction or inter- ruption of the landlord of the tenant's beneficial enjoyment of the thing demised, and on which rent is reserved, is suf- ficient. So the erection of a nuisance near the premises; the use of parts of the same building for a house of prosti- tution; or even petty annoyances, injui-ious to the tenant's business and destructive to the comfort of his family, may be sufficient,' provided he leaves the premises.' An actual wrongful eviction of the tenant, or withholding of pos- session from him, by the landlord, relieves him from the 'ReedB. Reynolds, 37 Conn. 469; Colburg v. Morrill, 117 Mass. 263; Smith V. Stigleman, 58 111. 141; Shumway v. Collins, 6 Gray (Mass.), 237; Wilson v. Smith, 5 Terg. (Tenn.) 379; Schilling «. Holmes, 23 Cal. 230; Pier v. Carr, 69 Pa. St. 326. ' Corning B. Gould, 16 Wend. (N. T.) 538; Morrison®. Chadwick, 7 C. B. 283; Fitchburg v. Melvin, 15 Mass. 268; Bordman v. Isborn, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 295; Russell v. Fabyan, 27 N. H. 539; Martin «. Marlin, 7 Md. 378; Smith v. Stigleman, 58 111. 141. ' GUes D. Comstock, 4 N. Y. 270; Kessler v. McConachy, 1 Rawle (Pa.), 435. "Cowies. Goodwin, 9 Car. & P. 378; Gilhooley v. Washington, 4 N. Y. 217; Boston, etc. R. R. Co. ■». Ripley, 13 Allen (Mass.), 421. 'Kelsey v. Ward, 38 N. Y. 83. "Fuller®. Ruby, 10 Gray (Mass.), 285; Anderson v. Ins. Co. 21 111. 601; Christopher v. Austin, 11 N. Y. 216. ' Watts®. Coffin, 11 Johns. (N. Y.) 495; Dyett ®. Pendleton, 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 727; Cohen®. Dupont, 1 Saudf. (N. Y.) 360. Compare Dewitt v. Pierson, 113 Mass. 8. 'Jackson ®. Eddy, 13 Mo. 209; Rogers ®. Ostrom, 35 Barb. (N. Y.) 523; Cohen v. Dupont, 1 Sandf. (N. Y.) 260; Edgerton ®. Page, 20 N. Y. 381; Greton ®. Smith, 33 N. Y. 245; Alger ®. Kennedy, 49 Vt. 109. 684 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 554 payment of rent while out of possession; and a constructive eviction will have the same effect, if the tenant leaves the premises in consequence of it." When the tenant does not abandon the premises constructive eviction does not bar the collection of rent. Thus, cutting holes through the floors and ceiling for belts for machinery;' allowing waste pipes to leak into the premises;' piling firewood on the premises;* the erection of a fence so that the tenant could reach the premises only over the land of another is not evic- tion.' And entry to make necessary repairs is no eviction.' Erections by the lessor, or with his consent, so near the demised premises as to seriously diminish the enjoyment will constitute an eviction; ' or any acts done by the lessor which render the premises useless is an eviction.' In Illinois the landlord has no right to enter the leased premises without the tenant's consent, even though the lease has expired.' § 554. By Title Paramount. — To constitute an eviction by title paramount, there must be a paramount title, in- cluding a present right of entry, and an actual entry, with- out collusion on the part of the tenant." If the tenant be evicted from the premises by title paramount before the rent falls due, he will be discharged from the payment of the rent, for the obligation to pay ceases when the consid- ' Briggs ». Hall, 4 Leigh (Va ), 484; Hunt v. Cope, Cowp. 242; Jackson v. Eddy, 12 Mo. 209; Mirick v. Happin, 118 Mass. 582; Christopher v. Austin, 11 N. Y. 216; Kessler v. McOonachy, 1 Rawle (Pa.), 435; Edgerton «. Page, 30 N. Y. 381. ii Elliott v. Aikin, 45 N. H. 30. 3 Edgerton v. Page, 20 N. Y. 381. ^Loundsbery v. Snyder, 31 N. Y. 514. See, also, Boreel v. Lawton, 90 N. Y. 393; Morris v. TiUson, 81 111. 607; Gray «. Gaff, 8 Mo. App. 339; Cram v. Dresser, 3 Sandf. (N. Y.) 130. 5 Boston, etc. R. R. Co. v. Ripley, 18 Allen (Mass.), 431. sMurrell v. Jackson, 33 La. Ann. 1341; Maberry «. Dudley, 2 Pennypacker, 387. Compare Hoeveler v. Fleming, 91 Pa. St. 322; Sauer v. Bilton, 7 Ch. Div. 815. ' Wright ■». Lattin, 38 111. 393; Sherman ». Williams, 113 Mass. 481; Royce V. Guggenheim, 106 Mass. 201. SHayner v. Smith, 63 111. 430; Bentley v. Sill, 35 111. 414; Edgerton v. Page, 20 N. Y. 381; Wilson v. Smith, 5 Yerg. (Tenn.) 399. « Phelps D. Randolph, 147 111. 335; 45 111. App. 493. '» Camp V. Scott, 47 Conn. 366. § 555] ESTATES FOR YEARS. 585 eration for it ceases, which is the enjoyment of the land.' A disturbance of the possession by a stranger, without claim of paramount title, will not be an eviction;" but if evicted by the stranger by title paramount, his liability to pay rent ceases.' But dispossession by the public enemy wiU not abate the rent.' § 555. Set-off. — At common law, in the consideration of an agreement under seal, a set-off could not be set up as a defense in a suit for the money agreed upon to be paid. But there is no doubt if fraudulent representations or conceal- ment of a material fact are made by either of the parties to a lease, it may be made the ground for rescission and avoid- ance of the lease, and the lessee injured by the deceit may abandon the premises, and, on such fraud successfully defend against a claim for rent or have a right of set-off. And when damages have been sustained by the lessee by breach of the lessor's covenant, if an action for rent is brought, the lessee may recoup his damages from the rent or, at his election, he may bring a separate action for the recovery of damages;' and the fact that the lessee has paid the rent for the greater part of the term will not deprive him of the right to counterclaim his damages for the entire term." The lessee, after accepting the lease and entering into possession of the premises, upon discovery of the fraudu- lent representation by the lessor of a material fact, is not compelled to give up the premises and rescind the lease, but in an action against him for rent may set up his dam- ages from such fraudulent representation.' But the land- lord may let premises in any condition in which they ' Franklin v. Palmer, 50 111. 203; Supervisors v. Herrington, 50 111. 333. «Royce «. Suggenheim, 103 Mass. 305; Hazlett o. Powell, 30 Pa. St. 393; "Welles D. Castles, 3 Gray (Mass.) 333; Moore v. Weber, 71 Pa. St. 439. ' Robinson v. Deering, 56 Me. 358; Russell v. Fabyan, 37 N. H. 543; Home Xife Ins. Co. v. Sherman, 46 N. Y. 373. * Wagner v. White, 4 Harr. & J. (Md.) 564; Schilling v. Holmes, 33 Cal. 230; Clifford «. "Watts, L. R. 5 C. P. 577. Compare Bagley v. Lawrence, 1 Bay (S. Car.), 499. ' Kelsey «. Ward, 38 F. T. 83; McAlester v. Landers, 70 Cal. 79. ' Cook v. Soule, 56 K Y. 430; McAlester v. Landers, 70 Cal. 79. '' Dennlson v. Grove, 53 N. J. L. 144. 74 536 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 55g happen to be, in the absence of fraud, and the tenant must seek protection through the express terms of the contract.' Article 9. Remedy. § 556. Recovery of Possession. § 560. Rights to Distrain. g 557. Notice to Quit. § 561. Landlord's Lien. § 558. Distress. § 563. Rights of Purchaser of the Ten § 559. Modern Statutes. ant's Crop. § 556. Eecovery of Possession. —An owner of land may enter on it and expel with reasonably necessary force a wrongful occupant without being liable in trespass quare clausum f regit or for assault and battery, or for injury to the occupant's goods, even if the force used would subject the owner to an indictment at common law for breach of the peace, or under the statute for forcible entry." A tenant after the expiration of his term becomes a tres- passer though his holding is in good faith under a color and reasonable claim of right; and the landlord, without legal process, may forcibly enter therefore and eject the tenant.' S(^ if the landlord, who having peaceably entered after the termination of the tenancy, proceeds against the tenant's opposition, to take out the windows of the house, or to forcibly eject the tenant, he is not liable to an action for an assault, if he uses no more force than is necessary for the purposes." This rule is supported by the main current ' Sutton ». Temple, 13 Mees. & Wels. 53. 2 Low V. Elwell, 121 Mass. 309; Todd -o. Jackson, 36 N. J. L. 535; Fulir v. Dean, 26 Mo. 116; Freeman b. Wilson, 16 R. I. 534; Allen v. Keily, 17 R. I. 731; Souter «. Codman, 14 R. I. 119. ^ Allen®. Keily, 17 R. I. 731; Turners. Meymott, 1 Bing. 158; Butchers. Butcher, 7 Barn. & Cress. 399; Krevet v. Meyer, 24 Mo. 107; Sterling v. Warden, 51 N. H. 217; Manning v. Brown, 47 Md. 506; Harvey v. Brydges, 14 Mees. & Wels. 437; Davis ®. Burrell, 10 C. B. 831, 825; Lows v. Telford, L. R. 1 App. Gas. 414. Compare Dustin n. Cowdry, 23 Vt. 631; Parsons v. Brown, 15 Barb. (N. T.) 690; Newton v. Harland, 1 Mann. & Gr. 644; Page ®. De Puy, 40 111. 506, 510; Reeder ». Purdy, 41 111. 279; Larkin ». Avery, 23 Conn. 304. ■• Mugford ». Richardson, 6 Allen (Mass.), 76; Winter «. Stevens, 9 Allen. (Mass.), 526. § 557] ESTATES FOK YEARS. 58T of modern decisions both in England and in America, though there are decisions both English and American which are in conflict with it. If the landlord can gain legal possession in his tenant's absence, a re-entry by the latter will be a trespass,' and the landlord may defend his possession by force." In Illinois, under the law,^ the lessor's grantee has the same right of entry by action or otherwise as is given to the lessor, and it is not necessary in the action for forci- ble detainer by the grantee of the lessor to prove that the lessee attorned to the grantee.' But in Illinois, under the statute, the landlord has no right to enter the leased premises without the tenant's con- sent, even though the lease has expired." The landlord has no right to enter and remove the ten- ant's property, in the absence of the tenant, since the statute applies as well in the case of constructive as of act- ual possession;" the landlord's only remedy is by action of forcible detainer or ejectment.' § 557. Notice to Quit. — As a general rule, the notice to quit should be in writing, and in many of the States it is so provided by statute. At common law a parol notice was sufficient, unless a written one was required by the express agreement of the parties;' and it may be by parol where the lease is by parol." The notice to quit must be positive and explicit, and so certain in respect to the premises and the time when the tenant must leave, that there will be no danger of mistake on his part.'" 'Massey v. Scott, 32 Vt. 82; Todd ». Jackson, 3 Dutch. (N. J.) 535. « Davis ». Burrell, 10 C. B. 821. Compare Page v. De Puy, 40 111. 506; Reeder «. Purdy, 41 111. 379; Dustin v. Cowdry, 23 Vt. 631. '111. Rev. Stat. Ch. 80, sect. 14. ^Thomasson v. Wilson, 146 III. 384. * Phelps «. Randolph, 147111. 335. 'Phelps «. Randolph, 147 111. 335, distinguishing Fort Dearborn Lodge v. Klein, 115 111. 190. 'Phelps V. Randolph, 147 111. 335. ' Legg V. Benion, Willes, 43. 'Timmins v. Rowlinson, 1 "W. Bl. 533; Doe v. Crick, 5 Esp. 196. '"Does. Cox, 4 Esp. 185; Doe v. Church, 3 Camp. 71; Doe ®. Wilkinson, IZ Ad. & El. 743; Williams v. Smith, 5 Ad. & El. 350. 688 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 558 Where the statute does not provide otherwise, the length of time for which the notice is to be given must in all cases have reference to the term of the letting. Where that is by the month, one month's notice is sufficient, given on the rent day;' and where it is from week to week, one week's notice is sufficient." The day named in the notice must be the day of or corresponding to the day of the conclusion of the ten- ancy.' Where a tenant is in possession under a lease for a term, and assents to the termination of his lease and then con- tinues to hold from day to day under the new arrangement, he is not entitled to a month's notice to quit." A lessee may not be entitled to a notice to quit. Thus, where a lease provides that it shall terminate whenever the lessee ceases to work for the lessor, and the lessee ceases to work for the lessor, and before action for unlawful detainer is commenced, the lessee is not entitled to notice to quit.' And where the lessee sets up as a defense and adverse pos- session for a period that will bar the landlord's right of ac- tion, the lessor need not prove service of notice to quit be- fore bringing the suit." § 558. Distress. — The non-payment of rent, or non-per- formance of any other stipulated service, was originally, by the feudal law, a forfeiture of the feud, and the lord was at liberty to enter and take possession. But this was changed into a right of distress which was borrowed from the civil law. But the power of distress, in its ancient ap- phcation, was as grievous and oppressive as the feudal for- feitui'e. The power for distraining for rent, and other feu- dal services, became very oppressive and burdensome. A ' Doe 4). Hazell, 1 Esp. 9i. ' Jones i>. Mills 10 C. B. N. S. 788. ^Finkelstein v. Herson, 55 N. J. L. 217. ^Benfey «. Congdon, 40 Mich. 383; Lane v. Kuhl, 94 Mich. 474. 'Marmet Co. v. Archibald, 37 W. Va. 778; Hackett ». Marmet Co., 52 Fed. Bep. 268; 3 C. C. App. 76. « Wolf D. Helton, 92 Mich. 136; Kunzie v. Wixom, 39 Mich. 384. See, also, Eldred «. Sherman, 81 Wis. 182; Comstock v. Cavanaugh, 17 R. I. 333; Von Glahn v. Brennan, 81 Cal. 361. 1 559] ESTATES FOR YEARS. 589 statute was enacted ' which qualified the manner of dis- training. In the following year the statute of Marlebridge " was en- acted, which remedied some of the abuses against distress. By these provisions the power of distress was confined to the original intention of the law, which was to seize the tenant's goods by way of pledge, in order to compel hira to perform his feudal engagements. This remedy is of great antiquity and is said to have pre- vailed among the Gothic nations of Europe from the break ing up of the Eoman Empire. The English statutes, since the time of Magna Charta, have, from time to time, ex- tended and modified its features to meet the demands of the times. At common law, the right to distress was inseparably an incident to a rent service, but had to be reserved in the case of a rent charge. In most of the States of this country, where it has been adopted, it has been modified, or rather follows the English statute,' which extends it to rents seek and rent charge, thereby abolishing all distinction between them.* At common law, if the deed is an indenture, cov- enant will lie; if a deed poll, assumpsit is the proper action to bring for the collection of rent; and debt will lie in most cases, whether the deed is an indenture or a deed poll. ° § 559. Modern Statutes. — At the present time, the policy of the law respecting distress has been changed. Now distress is a summary mode of seizing and selling the tenants property to satisfy the rent which he owes. When rent is due and unpaid, the landlord, upon demand, may enter immediately by himself or his agent upon the de- mised premises and distrain any goods and chattels that are to be found there belonging to the tenant and others.* ' 51 Hen. III., De Districtione Saccorii. = 52 Hen. III. '4 Geo. II. c. 28. ^Coburn v. Harvey, 18 Wis. 147; Grant v. Whitwell, 9 Iowa, 154. "Burbank «. Pillsbury, 48 N. H. 476; Johnson v. Muzzy, 45 Vt. 419; Good- win B. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510; Hinsdale v. Humphrey, 15 Conn. 433; Adams v. Bucklin, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 131. ' 8 Anne ch. 14. .590 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 559 By statute ' distress could be had for six months after the end of the term, if the lessor's title and the tenant's posses- sion still continued. But now articles placed upon the demised premises by way of trade, and belonging to third persons," are exempt, and also all articles temporarily j)laced on the premises and belonging to third persons. And the exception is general in those cases in which the course of business necessarily puts the tenant in temporary possession of the property of his customer. ' The statutes of the various States are different and must be consulted in regard to distraining for rent. In New England the law of attachment on mesne process has generally superseded the law of distress, and in other States it has been abolished. At common law the distrainer must have possessed a reversionary interest in the premises out of which the dis- tress issued, unless he had expressly reserved the power to distrain when he parted with the reversion, except in case of rent charge.'' But a statute' substantially abolished all distinction between rents, and gave the remedy in all cases where rent is reseryed upon the lease. The effect of this statute was to separate the right of distress from the reversion to which it had before been incident, and to place all kinds of rents upon the same footing as if the power of distress had been expressly reserved in each case. This statute has been adopted in many of the States. At common law a distress could not be made after the expiration of the lease, but this has been remedied by States where this mode of distraining for rent is adopted, and the process may issue after the tenancy has terminated, ' Hare ■». Stegall, 60 111. 380; First Nat. Bank v. Adam, 138 111. 483; Asay 11. Sparr, 36111. 115; Gorton v. Falkner, 4 Term Rep. 565; Jones u. Powell, 5 Barn. & Cress. 647; Harms v. Solem, 79 III. 460. 2 Brown ». Stackhouse, 155 Pa. St. 583; Hoskins v. Paul, 4 Hal. (N. J.) 110. 'Brown v. Sims, 17 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 188; Connah «. Hale, 38 Wend. (N.Y.) 472, 477; Riddle v. Weldon, 5 Whar. (Pa.) 9; Cadwalader v. Tindall, SO Pa. St. 433. " Schuyler?). Leggett, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 660; Hill «. Stocking, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 377; Co. Litt. 143b. = 4 Geo. II. c. 38. .§ 560] ESTATES FOB TEAKS. 591 provided the lessor still holds the title; ' but he cannot dis- train after he has treated the tenant as a trespasser.' § 560. Right to Distrain.— The right to distrain is not extinguished by taking a note, bond or other S3curity for the rent, unless it is expressly taken as payment; nor by an unsatisfied judgment for the amount.' It can be re- sorted to in case the lease reserves the right to re-enter, or a part of the premises has been surrendered; but a sur- render of the whole of the premises extinguishes this right. A tender of the rent v\'ith costs when suit has been commenced, extinguishes the right to distrain,* pro- vided it be made to the landlord or to his authorized agent.' There can be no distress unless the relation of landlord and tenant exists." A distress may be made, either upon or off the land. It generally follows the rent, and is, consequently, confined to the land out of which it issues. If two pieces of land are let by two separate demises, although both be contained in one lease, a joint distress cannot be made for them ; for this would be to make the rent of one issue out of the other. However, if lands lie in different counties, are demised together by one lease at one entire rent, and it does not appear that the lands are separate from each other, one distress may be made for the whole rent. For the purpose of making the seizure, the landlord, or his agent or officer, may enter the house or building through the door or window which is open, but he cannot lawfully break inclosures or fastenings. Once having en- tered an open door, he may break an inner door.' At JBukup V. Valentine, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 554; Webber b. Shearman, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 547; Knight v. Bennett, 3 Bing. 861. ' Bridges B. Smyth, 5 Bing. 410. » Snyder •». Kunlileman, 3 Pen. & W. (Pa.) 487; Bailey v. Wright, SMcCord (S. Car.), 484, Cornell v. Lamb, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 407; Lofsky v ' Mauler 3 Sand. Ch. (N. Y.) 69. • J . ■"Hunter v. Le Conte, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 738; Virtue v. Beaslev 1 Mood & R. 21. J . « ' Browne v. Powell, 4 Bing. 230. 'Hessel ». Pott, 3 Barr (Pa.), 179; Murr v. Glover, 34 111. App. 381. 'Williams v. Spencer, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 352; State v. Thackam 1 Bav r. Iron Works, 87 Ky. 559. ' Fowler «. Simpson, 79 Tex. 611; Fuller?). Sweet, 30 Mich. 241. ^Dausch®. Crane, 109 Mo. 323; Schultz v. Arnot, 33 Mo., 173; Farrar «. Helnrich, 86 Mo. 532. See, also, Arnold v. Woodward, 14 Colo. 164; Voss v. King, 33 W. Va. 336; O'Donnell ». Mclntyre, 118 N. Y. 156. ' Dausch V. Crane, 109 Mo. 323. •Thomas v. Black (Del.), 18 At. Kep. 771. 596 classification of estates. [§ 566 Article 11. Rights and Liahlities. § 566. Lessee Cannot Deny the Land- § 573. Nuisances on the Demised lord's Title. Premises. § 567. Exceptions to the Rule That the § 574. Removal of Leased Building by Tenant Cannot Deny his Les- Authority of City. sor's Title. § 575. Tenant's Liability. § 568. Disclaimer by the Tenant. § 576. Injurious Business. § 569. Adverse Possession. § 577. Wrongful Eviction. § 570. Rights of Tenant and Lessor's § 578. Measure of Damages. Grantee. § 579. Illegal Business Carried on by § 571. Right to Emblements. the Tenant. § 572. Landlord's Liability. § 566. Lessee Cannot Deny the Landlord's Title. — At common law, almost any act of the tenant, inconsistent with his fealty to the landlord, worked a forfeiture of the term. This rule has its origin in the military nature of the feudal tenure. But forfeitures are very much reduced in this country, by the abolition of fines and feoffments, and by the statute provisions that no conveyance by a tenant for life or years, of a greater estate than he can lawfully convey, shall work a forfeiture, or be construed to pass any greater interest. While the relation of landlord and tenant is preserved in its integrity, the common law rules have been greatly modified by statutes, and some of the methods by which a tenant forfeited his term under these rules are inapplicable under our institutions, and are not now nor never have been adopted in this country. The general rule is that by disclaiming and denying the landlord's title, or asserting an adverse claim to title in himself, openly and notoriously, brought to the knowledge of the lessor, the tenant commits a forfeiture.' And this rule applies to the assignee of the lessee as well as to the ' "Wells «. Sheerer, 78 Ala. 143; Hackett ». Marmet Co. 52 Fed. Rep. 268; a C. C. App. 76; 8 U. S. App. 149; Reese v. Coffee, 133 Ind. 14; Cantwell v. Moore, 44 111. App. 656; Bertram i>. Cook, 32 Mich. 518; Hughes ». Watt, 28 Ark. 153; Ronaldson v. Tabor, 43 Ga. 230; Bedford «. Kelly, 61 Pa. St. 491; Phelps v. Taylor, 33 La. Ann. 585; Hardy ». Akerly, 57 Barb. (N. Y.) 148; Cook ». Creswell, 44 Md. 581; Brenner v. Bigelow, 8 Kans. 497;. Mattis V. Robinson, 1 Nebr. 3; Frazer v. Robinson, 43 Miss. 131. § 567] ESTATES FOR YEARS. 597 lessee himself; and the assignee is bound by his assignor's acknowledgment of his tenancy of the premises.' And if the lessor is in possession and leases land and places the tenant in possession, in the absence of fraud, it is no defense that the land is tide land, and the title to which is in the United States when the lease was made." And in general, the tenant having entered under the lessor's title cannot deny it, in the sense of putting him to the proof of title.' But where one is induced by fraud or mistake to accept a lease, he may contest the landlord's title.' § 567. Exceptions to the Rule That the Tenant Can- not Deny His Lessor's Title. — The general rule is as stated that the tenant and his privies in blood or estate are estopped from denying the title of the lessee's lessor. But to this rule there are exceptions. The tenant may show that the landlord's title has expired or that the payment of rent or other act by which he acknowledged it was induced by fraud or a mutual misapprehension of the landlord's title.' However the tenant cannot dispute his landlord's 'Derrick v. Luddy, 64 Vt. 463; Tuttle v. Reynolds, 1 Vt. 80; Stacy d. Bost- ■wick, 48 Vt. 192; Jamaican. Hart, 53 Vt. 549; Stott ®. Rutherford, 93 U. S. 107. = Halli!. Wilbur, 4 Wash. St. 644; Clancy v. Reis, 5 Wash. St. 371, 492; Collins V. Hall, 5 Wash. St. 366; Columbian, etc. R. R. Co. v. Braillard, 5 Wash. St. 493; Clancy v. Williams, 5 Wash. St. 493. 'Swann v. Young, 36 W. Va. 57; Rector v. Gibbon, 111 U. S. 276; Goode v. Gaines, 145 U. S. 141; Petersons. Kinkead, 93 Cal. 372; Smith v. Smith, 81 Tex. 45; State ». Howell, 107 N. Car. 835; McKie v. Anderson, 78 Tex. 307; Cook V. Whelock, 24 Q, B. 658; Williams v. Wait, 3 S. Dak. 310; Rhyne v. Guevara, 67 Miss. 139; Parrott v. Hungelburger, 9 Mont. 536; Outtoun «. Dulin, 73 Md. 536; Robinson v. Holt, 90 Ala. 115; Morris v. Ap- person (Ky.), 13 S. W. Rep, 441; Bonds v. Smith, 106 N. Car. 553; Oliver i\ Gary, 42 Kans. 623; Davison «. Ellmaker, 84 Cal. 21; Killoren «. Murtaugh, 64 N. H. 51; Palmer®. Melson, 76 Ga. 803; Hammons «. McClure, 85 Tenn. 65; Crockett v. Althouse, 35 Mo. App. 404; Eckles v. Booco, 11 Colo. 523; Tilyou V. Reynolds, 108 N. Y. 558; Con well «. Mann, 100 N. Car. 334; State -». Votaw 13 Mont. 403; Dixon v. Stewart. 113 N. Car. 410; Sexton v. Carley, 147 111. 269; Hamilton v. Pittock, 158 Pa. St. 457; Voss b. King 38 W. Va. 607. " Suddarth v. Robertson, 118 Mo. 386. « Swift «. Dean, 11 Vt. 333; Lakin «. Dolly, 53 Fed. Rep. 333; Grammar School V. Parker, 25 Vt. 696; Lane v. Young, 31 N. Y. Supp. 838; 66 Hun 598 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATE& [§ 568 title so long as it remains as it was at the time the tenancy was commenced; but he may show that the title under which he entered has expired or been extinguished.' In the absence of a written lease this estoppel arises from the possession and consequent benefit to the tenant." And after receiving the f uU benefits of a lease granted by the lessor in his own name, the tenant cannot dispute his landlord's title although he was in fact a mere agent to the landlord.' And so one who takes a lease by indenture of his own land is estopped to deny the landlord's title until his term ex- pires/ unless he be in possession at the time of taking the lease, in which case he can set up his paramount title." But one having a mere naked possession and who accepts a lease, cannot set up a title inconsistent with that of the lessor,' though one may deny the title of a third party to whom he had attorned.' If the tenant is bound to pay taxes he cannot acquire a tax title by a sale of the premises for taxes. ° And a tenant of trust property cannot dispute the title of the trustee, nor claim under the title of his wife." § 568. Disclaimer by the Tenant. — What acts amount to a disclaimer, is often a question of nicety, and diffi- cult of determination, as to which the authorities are not (N. T.), 563; Bigler «. Furman, 58 Barb. (N. Y.) 545; Weave v. Moss, 1 Bing. 360; Pentz v. Kuester, 41 Mo. 447. 1 JsJfckson V. Rowlapd, 6 V7end. (N. Y.) 667; Lancanshire ». Mason, 75 N. Car. 455; McGaffie ®. Carter, 43 Mich. 497; Elliott- u. Smith, 23 Pa. St. 181; Tewksbury «. MagrafE, 85 Cal. 237; Frauklin v. Palmer, 50 111. 203; Wolf v. Johnson, 30 Miss. 518; Otis®. Millan, 70- Ala. 46; Stout v. Merrill, 85 Iowa, 47; Shields v. Lozear, 34 N. J. L. 496; Robertson p. Biddell, 32 Fla. 304; Gal- lagher B. Bennett, 38 Tex. 291; Jenckes v. Cook, 9 R. I. 520; Evans v. Bid- well, 76 Pa. St. 497. « Puller®. Sweet, 30 Mich. 237. ' Stott V. Rutherford, 92 U. S. 107. '' James «. Landon, Cro. Eliz. 36. ' Peralta n. Ginochio, 47 Cal. 459. «Bowdish ®. Dubuque, 38 Iowa. 341: Lucas v. Brooks, 18 "Wall. (U. S.) 436. ' Cornish v. Searell, 8 Barn. & Cress. 471. 8 Jones V. Davis, 24 Wis. 229; Carithers r. Weaver, 7Kans. 110. See, also. Stout®. Merrill, 35 Iowa, 47. » Baker ». Nail, 59 Mo. 265. '» Miller v. Lang, 99 Mass. 13. § 569] ESTATES FOR YEARS. 599 ia accord. Grenerally attronment, or delivery of posses- sion, to a stranger or adverse claimant, or any act disavow- ing the title of the landlord, and claiming a superior hostile title or ownership, amounting to the repudiation of the tenancy, will constitute a ground of forfeiture.' The most certain test of the sufficiency of a disclaimer to create a forfeiture is, whether the tenant's holding is thereby rendered so adverse as to put the statute of limitations in operation in his favor, whereby his adverse possession will ripen into a fee by the lapse of time, which is a direct repudiation of the relation of landlord and tenant and its obligations." It is the general rule that a purchase by a tenant of an adverse title, and claiming under it, is a forfeiture of the term.' Where a party has obtained possession of the premises through collusion with the landlord's tenant, he cannot, until he has surrendered possession to the landlord, set up as against the lessor a right to possession otherwise acquired.* § 569. Adverse Possession.— An adverse possession is an actual possession by a party holding under some color or claim of title which is adverse to the title of another claimant. Where possession is commenced rightfully, and with the consent of the owner, as in the case of a tenancy, nothing is presumed to make it adverse. Mere holding over does not have that effect. ' And when a tenant claims a right to possession under the lease, such possession is not adverse to the landlord." Before a tenant can begin to acquire any prescriptive right, he must repudiate his tenancy and give his landlord notice thereof.' ' Dahm v. Barlow, 93 Ala. 130. * Dahm v. Barlow, 93 Ala. 120. « Willison V. Watkins, 3 Pet. (U. 8.) 43. Compare Eosseel v. Jarvis, 15 Wis. 571. Razors. U'-Kay, 44 111. App. 79; Doty v. Burdick, 83 111. 473; Fussel- man v. Worthington, 14 111. 135 Henning v. Warner, 109 N. Car. 406. ' Gwynn v. Jones, 2 Gill. & J. (Md.) 173. 'Brooks ®. Rogers 99 Ala., 438. ' Stacy V. Bostwick, 48 Vt. 193. 600 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 569 A non-resident may acquire title to land by the adverse possession of those claiming under him as tenants. ' But title by adverse possession cannot originate between adjoin- ing owners of land in possession of the same tenant with- out notice of the adverse claim brought home to the other proprietor." In order to create the bar of the statute of limitations it is necessary to show that the possession was adverse; ° if it was not adverse in its inception, then it can- not be converted into one of hostility by a mere mental in- tention. Some notice or act indicating an intention to dis- seise is necessary." A landlord may claim the benefit of the statute of limitations under the possession of his tenant.' Adverse possession of land up to a marked boundary for the prescriptive time establishes the right of the occupant to the premises so occupied, although his original entry may not have been under title or claim of title." A lessee who receives possession of the premises from his lessor, and who afterwards purchases his lessor's title, is not estopped to assert adverse ownership against another claimant, although in the meantime he has attorned to the latter.' And a party residing with the tenant and helping to pay rent, thereby admits the landlord's title and can acquire no right to the premises by adverse possession against the landlord. ° In general, a tenant's possession will not be adverse until and unless notice of his disclaimer has been distinctly and unequivocally brought home to the landlord; and having entered under his landlord's title, he cannot dispute it in the sense of putting him to the proof of title.' ' Lindenmeyer ■o. Gunst, 70 Miss. 693. 'i Harper ». Morse, 114 Mo. 317. 3 Comstock B. Eastwood, 108 Mo. 41. "Spencer «. O'Neill, 100 Mo. 49; Campbell «. Gas Co., 84 Mo. 353. 'Clifton Heights Land Co. v. Randell, 82 Iowa, 89; Chamberlain v. Pybas, 81 Tex. 511; Lindenmeyer v. Gunst, 70 Miss. 693. ^ Sanscrainte v. Torongo, 87 Mich. 69. See, also, Ruffln ». Overby, 105 N. Car. 78; Dogherty «. Matsell, 119 N. Y. 646. ' Cook «. Farrah, 105 Mo. 493. See, also, De Jarnette v. McDaniel, 93 Ala. 215. » Hodgkin v. McVeigh, 86 Va. 751. See, also, Tobin b. Young, 134 Ind. 607; Horton v. Davidson, 135 Pa. St. 186. 9 Swann v. Young, 86 W. Va. 57. See, also, Swann v. Thayer, 36 W. Va. §§ 570-571] ESTATES FOR YEARS. 601 § 570. Eights of Tenant and Lessor's Grantee.— The rights of the lessee in possession aro vested, and not deter- minal at the will of the lessor; and a sale during the term of the lands to one having notice of it cannot extinguish it. And if the grantee, by his wrongful acts, deprive the ten- ant of the enjoyment of his j-ights, the grantee is liable to the extent of the injury. And it is not necessary that such injury shall have occurred by force or violence to make the grantee liable; and if the grantee prevents the enjoyment of the premises by the lessee, by making threats of prose- cution that induce the lessee's servants to leave his employ, and dissuades others from entering his service, the grantee is also liable for damages." And where the lessee is to pay debts owing by the lessor, and have the payments applied as rent, the grantee of the lessor receives the deed, subject to such agreement entered into between the lessor and les- see, whether aware of its existence or not; and the pay- ments made, after the conveyance by the lessee, are prop- erly chargeable against the rent account.' § 571. Right to Emblements. — In case of a tenancy from year to year, the tenant is not entitled to emblements be- yond the end of the year. ' Crops which are not of annual growth, and those which do not ordinarily require the labor of the tenant, but are permanent and natural products of the earth, such as trees, fruits, natural grasses and the like, are not emblements; nor are such as do not ordinarily mature in the same year in which labor is expended upon them. Of this class is a second crop of clover.' 46; Voss V. King, 33 W. Va. 236; Genin ». Ingersoll, 3 W. Va. 558; Walden v. Bodley, 14 Pet. (U. S.) 156; Peyton v. Stith, 5 Pet. (U. S.)485; Willison v. Wat- kins, 3 Pet. (U. S.) 44; Clarke v. McClure, 10 Gratt. (Va.) 305; Alderson v. Marshall, 7 Mont. 388; Jones v. Pelham, 84 Ala. 208. ■Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555; Dickson v. Dickson, 33 La. Ann. 1261; Lee V. West, 47 Ga. 311 ; Crane v. Patton, 57 Ark. 340. » Hovey v. Walker, 90 Mich. 537. ' Lewis «. Klotz, 39 La. Ann. 259; Gassett ». Drysdale, 48 Mo. App. 430; Hendrixson v. Cardwell, 9 Baxt. (Tenn.) 93; Re-der v. Sayre, 70 N. T. 180; Litt. sect. 68. * Graves v. Weld, 5 Barn. & Ad. 105; Fobes d. Shattuck, 32 Barb. (N. Y.) 568. 76 602 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 571 When the landlord enters for the non payment of rent, the tenant's right to the growing crops are lost,' and if the tenant wrongfully retains possession, crops planted by him, so long as they remain unsevered belong to the landlord.* And the tenant does not take the emblements when he had notice to quit in time to avoid putting in the crop, nor where the tenancy is terminated by his own fault.' The right to emblements is conceded to those whose ten- ure is uncertain and dependent upon a contingency such as tenants for life or at will; or is unexpectedly determined before harvest by the act of God or of law, and without fault on the part of the tenant, as by death, or by notice to quit.* In several States the tenant for years is entitled to the waygoing crop, which is confined to grain sown in the au- tumn before the expiration of the lease, and cut in sum- mer after it is determined." But this custom will only prevail where the contract is silent or uncertain, and there are no express covenants.' The executors of the tenants in fee are entitled to the crops if they are ripe for harvest, in preference to the heirs,' but the crops will pass with the land under a devise.' la Mississippi the crops pass to the heir upon the death of the tenant in fee.* If the leasehold estate is terminated 1 Gregg V. Boyd, 23 N. Y. Supp. 918; 69 Hun (N. Y.) 588. « Bakers). McInturflE, 49 Mo. App. 505. sRee'ier v. Sayre, 70 K. Y. 180; Samson v. Rose, 61 N. Y. 411. "Bradley v. Bailey, 56 Conn. 374; Gland's Case, 5 Coke, 116b; Kingsbury ». Collins, 4 Bing. 207; King v. Fowler. 14 Pick. (Mass.) 238; Stewarts. Doughty, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 108; Whitemarsh v. Cutting, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 361; Chesley V. Welch, 37 Me. 106; Harris v. Carson, 7 Leigh (Va.), 633; Spencer «. Lewis, 1 Houst. (Del.) 233;' Haslett v. Glenn, 7 Har. & J. (Md.) 17; Harris v. Frink, 49 N. Y. 24. 5 Demi v. Bossier, 1 Pa. 234; Shaw v. Bowman. 91 Pa. St. 414; Howell 1). Schenck, 24 N. J. L. 89; Clark v. Banks, 6 Housl. (Del.) 584; Dorsey v. Eagle, 7 Gill & J. (Md.) 331; Foster v. Robinson, 6 Ohio St. 95; Van Doren v. Everitt, 5 N. J. L. 460; Corle v. Young, 47 N. J. Eq. 73. s Stultz ■». Dickey, 5 Binn. (Pa.) 285; Iddings v. Nagle, 2 Watts & S. (Pa.) 22; Demi v. Bossier, 1 Pa. 234. 'Pattison's Appeal, 61 Pa. St. 394; Howe v. Batchelder, 49 N. H. 204; Pen- hallow V. Dwight, 7 Mass. 84; Kingsley v. Holbrook, 45 N. H. 319; Bradley «. Bailey, 56 Conn. 374. 8Bradner». Faulkner, 34 N. Y. 349. 'McCormick v. McCormick, 40 Miss. 763. § 572] ESTATES FOR YEARS. 60S through the fault or act of the tenant, he is not entitled to emblements.' So if a widow terminates her tenancy by- marriage she loses the emblements.' But that will not affect the rights of the sub-lessee who did not participate in the act.' And it has been held that a tenant who is evicted may hold as emblements crops growing on the premises which were put in by his servants.* Of course the tenant is entitled to all crops grown and harvested during his term." A tenant may sow wheat in the fall and harvest it ac- cording to stipulation in the lease, though his tenancy ter- minates in the spring." It is the general rule that the executor of a tenant for life is entitled to the crops sown during the lifetime of the tenant but maturing after his death. This rule applies to a case where a lessee of a tenant for life sows land even while he had reason to suppose that his lessor was near death with a fatal disease.' § 5Y2. Landlord's Liability. — The lessor may become liable in damages to the tenant for breach of contract. Thus, the lessor leased the premises with a water power. Upon taking possession the lessee found that the water power belonged to another party to whom he was obliged to pay rent. The rent thus paid was collected from the lessor by the lessee." The tenant may either maintain an action on the covenant for such breach, or may recoup his damages in an action for the rent; ' he can also recoup for 'Richard v. Liford, U Rep. 51; McLeaa v. Bovee, 24 Wis. 395; Rowell v. Klein, 44 Ind. 290; Chesley «. Welch, 37 Me. 106. 'Hawkins d. Skegg, 10 Humph. (Tenn.) 31; Debow ». Colfax, 10 N. J. L. 128. See, also. Carpenter®. Jones, 63 111. 517; Bulwer «. Bulwer, 2 Barn. & Aid. 470; Davis u. Eyton, 7 Ring. 154. 'Bevans ». Briscoe, 4 Har. & J. (Md.) 139. ^Kenna v. Nugent, 7 Ir. C. L. 464. 'Willcy 1). Conner, 44 Vt. 68; Clark v. Harvey, 54 Pa. St. 142; Johnson v Camp, 51 111. 230. «Kelley «. Todd, 1 W. Va. 197; Van Doren v. Everitt, 3 South. (N. J.) 460; Planner «. Sturnur, 40 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 401. 'Bradley B. Bailey, 56 Conn. 374. See, also, Co. Litt. 55b, n. 1; 2 Bl. Com. 133. « Bedell v. Wilder, 65 Vt. 406. •Tibbits «). Percy, 24 Barb. (N. Y.) 39; Mayor v. Mabie, 13 N. Y. 151; "Whitbeck v. Skinner, 7 Hill (N. Y.), 53. 604 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§573 fraud on the part of the landlord.' The tenant has all the rights and easements incident to the ownership of the land leased unless reserved in the lease and can sustain an action against his lessor if such incidents are taken away.' The tenant may bring trover for conversion of the tenant's produce; ' or he may recover damages for injury to his prop- erty by the landlord." § 573. Nuisances on the Demised Premises. — If the landlord erects or continues a nuisance near the premises he is liable to the tenant.' So if the landlord leases a house which he knows to be infected with a contagious disease, without disclosing the fact to the tenant, he is liable to damages that may arise therefrom." But if there be a con- cealed defect in the sanitary condition of the premises un- known to the lessor, he is not liable.' But where there is an implied grant by the landlord by which a tenant of part of the premises is to enjoy light and air, the landlord is liable if he leases the rest of the premises to a tenant who obstructs the light and air impliedly granted to the first tenant.' This is because the implied grant contains wliat- ever is necessary to the beneficial enjoyment of the prem- ises." Hence, when there is a substantial interruption of the lessee's quiet enjoyment by the acts of the landlord, the landlord is liable in damages." There is no implied warranty that a tenement is fit for human occupation as to render the lessor hable to the ten- ant for injury to his health resulting from a defective sewer where the lessor had no knowledge of the defect. " But if ■ Whitney v. Allaire, 1 N. Y 305. « Edmison v. Lowry (S. Dak.), 53 N. W. Rep. 583. ^Felch i>. Harriman, 64 N. H. 472. * Roussient v. Rebout, 76 Cal. 454. 'May wood «. Logan, 78 Mich. 185; Alston v. Grant, 3 El. & Bl. 128. 6 Minors. Sharon, 113 Mass. 477; Cesar v. Karutz, 60 N. Y. 229. See, also, Smith «. Faxon, 156 Mass. 589. ■■ Kern v. Myll, 94 Mich. 477. * Case V. Minot, 158 Mass. 577. « Salisbury «. Andrews 19 Pick. (Mass.) 350; Johnson i). Knapp, 146 Mass. 70; 150 Mass. 267; Brande v. Grace, 154 Mass. 310. '» Fuller B. Ruby, 10 Gray (Mass.), 285; Robinsnn v. Kilvert, 41 Ch. Div. 88, 97; Sanderson i>. Mayor, 13 Q. B. 547; Jenkins v. Jackson, 40 Ch. Div. 71. " Angevine v. Knox-Goodrich (Cal), 31 Pac. Rep. 539. See, also, Green §§ 574-575] ESTATES FOR YEABS. 605 there is a source of danger on the demised premises known to the lessor, and he does not disclose ib to the tenant, and it is not discovered by the tenant, the landlord is Hable for the damages." Nor can the landlord escape liability by em- ploying a servant to abate the nuisance who negligently performs the work in an imperfect manner. The knowledge of the condition of the nuisance which the servant had must be imputed to the landlord." § 574. Eemoval of Leased Building by Authority of THE City. — Municipal corporations have power to lay out streets and to order the removal of buildings for that pur- pose. So when a landlord cuts away a portion of a leased building in obedience to the order of the proper authorities, he does not render himself liable in damages to his tenant for interference with the latter's possession of the premises, although the statute under which the city acted was after- wards adjudged unconstitutional.' § 575. Tenant's Liability. — The tenant is liable to the landlord for gross carelessness whereby the buildings are destroyed by fire.' And the landlord may bring trover against the tenant during the term of the tenancy for the value of wood into which trees were converted which were wrongfully severed from the premises by the tenant. ' And the lessor may maintain an action of detinue or trover to recover aU specific articles wrongfully removed, with privity of the lessee, from the demised property during the tenancy.' V. Redding, 92 Cal. 548; Van Every v. Ogg, 59 Cal. 565; Mumford v. Brown, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 475; Kern v. Myll, 94 Mich. 477; McKeon v. Cutter, 156 Mass. 296. See, also, Daly v. Wise, 132 N. T. 306; Pryor v. Foster, 130 N. Y. 171. ' Martin v. Richards, 155 Mass. 381. 'Baldwin v. Casella, L. R. 7 Exch. 325; Gladman v. Johnson, 36 Law J. C. P. 148; Applebee ». Percy, 43 Law J. C. P. 365; Martin d. Richards, 155 Mass. 381. ' Dunn. V. Mellon, 147 Pa. St. 11. * Stevens v. Pantline, 95 Mich. 145. 'Brooks V. Rogers, 99 Ala. 433; Street v. Nelson, 80 Ala. 230; Mather v. Church, 3 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 509; Harlan s. Harlan, 15 Pa. St. 507; Anderson B. Hapler, 34 111. 436; Truss v. Old, 6 Rand. (Va.) 556; Mooers v. Wait, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 104: Farrant v. Thompson, 5 Barn. & Aid. 836; Society'©. Fleming, 11 Iowa, 533. « Petre v. Ferrers, 61 L. J. Ch. 426; 65 L. T. N. S. 568. ■606 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 576-577 § 576. Injurious Business.— The landlord in leasing his premises has a right to presume that the process used in carrying on a business will be a reasonable and lawful one. Thus, a landlord who leases land to a company for the manufacture of press brick, and the company uses a pro- cess in burning the bricks that generates noxious gases that injure and destroy his growing crops, is not estopped from claiming damages for the injury occasioned by the nuisance; though he leased the land for that purpose, yet he had a right to presume that the process would be reason- able and lawful.' § 577. Wrongful Eviction— For a wrongful eviction the tenant may recover his damages against the landlord. But if the eviction is not the work of the lessor and he is not responsible for it, the tenant has no cause of action against him. Thus, when the tenant has covenanted to keep the premises in good repair during the lease at his own expense he is bound to make repairs, and the land- lord is not responsible for the acts of an adjoining lot owner on his own premises against which the lessor had not covenanted.' Under such circumstances there can be no abatement or suspension of rent because of such injury to the leased premises.' Where the lessee expressly covenants to keep the premises in repair he is bound to make good any injury from any cause not resulting from the acts or neglect of the landlord.' In order to work a legal eviction the act complained of must proceed from the landlord, or someone acting under his authority or by or through him.' So the removal of a party waU by an adjoining owner whereby the building is 'Fogarty «. Brick Co., 50 Kans. 478. See, also, Sturges v. Bridgman, 11 Ch. Div. 853; Smith v. Phillips, 8 Phila. (Pa.) 10. » Eisenhart «. Ordean, 3 Colo. App. 163. See, also, Dearborn v. Valpey, 153 Mass. 30. 8 Kramer v. Cook, 7 Gray (Mass.), 550; Fowler v. Bott, 6 Mass. 68; Bigelow «. CoUamore, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 236. < Phillips V. Stevens, 16 Mass. 238; Allen v. Howe, 105 Mass. 341; Hallett v. Wylie, 3 Johns. (N. Y.) 44; Weigall b. Waters, 6 Term Rep. 488; Green v. Bales, 2 Q. B. 325. 'DeWitt V. Pierson, 113 Mass. 8; Gilhooley «. Washington, 4 N. Y. 317. ^ 578] ESTATES FOR YEARS. 607 made untenantable does not operate as an eviction which discharges the tenant from payment of rent,* nor does it violate a covenant for quiet enjoyment.' Intention is oftentimes material. Acts of the landlord in interference with the tenant's possession to constitute an eviction, must clearly indicate the intention on the part of the lessor that the tenant shall no longer continue to hold the premises.' The failure of the lessor to paint the house and repair the fences according to agreement, do not constitute such an eviction as to render the lessor liable for expenses incurred by the lessee in obtaining another house and removing thereto." When the landlord has a legal right to evict the tenant he must proceed according to law. If he takes upon himself without authority to evict a tenant he is liable in damages, though the eviction was effected without violence and in the absence of the tenant.' § 578. Measure of Damages. — In an action by a lessee for a breach of a covenant in a lease to repair the premises, the tenant's measure of damages is the difference between the rent he agreed to pay and the rental value of the prem- ises without the repairs having been made.' Ordinarily where a tenant is wrongfully evicted by his landlord, the measure of damages is the rental value of the property for the unexpired term less the amount of rent reserved by his lease,' and damages actually incurred; and the landlord is not liable for greater damages for a wrongful eviction than actually occurred when he acted in good faith without malice, and with reasonable prudence in the exercise of which he believed to be a legal right.' ' Carson v. Codley, 26 Pa. St. 117; Hazlett v. Powell, 30 Pa. St. 393. « Frost V. Earnest, 4 What. (Pa.) 86; Dobbins v. Brown, 13 Pa. St. 75; Moore ■B. Weber, 71 Pa. St. 439. ' Morris «. Tillson, 81 III. 607; Upton v. Townend, 17 C. B. 30. ■•Biggs V. McCurley, 76 Md. 409. 'Boniel v. Blocls, 44 La. Ann. 514. « Biggs V. McCurley, 76 Md. 409. 'Cannon v. Wilbur, 30 Nebr. 777; Mack v. Patchin, 43 N. T. 167. «Leiter v. Day, 85 111. App. 248. 608 classification of estates. [§§ 579-580 § 579. Illegal Business Carried on by the Tenant. — The tenant is bound to pursue the business agreed upon in a lawful manner. If the tenant is conducting an illegal business and is in default in the payment of rent, the lessor must proceed legally to evict him, and has no right to take the law into his own hands and seek private redress. The law provides a remedy which must be followed." An illegal use of the premises works a forfeiture.' Article 12. Repairs. § 580. Obligation of Landlord. § 585. Entry of Landlord to Repair. §581. Liability of Landlord for Breach §586. Right to Repair by Tenant. of Covenant to Repair. §587. Liability of Landlord for Defects § 582. Landlord is Not Liable Unless § 588. Negligent Use by Tenant. he Covenants to Repair. § 589. Nuisances Created by Tenant. § 583. Liability of Tenant. § 590. Fire and Destruction of Premi- § 584. Inevitable Accident. * ses by Negligence. § 680. Obligation of Landlord.— If the landlord does not agree to repair the demised premises, he is not respon- sible for their condition." When it is the understanding that the landlord shall retain control of the stairways and halls of the tenement for the common use of the occupants and those having lawful occasion to be there, he is bound to see that reasonable care and skUl are exercised to render the halls and stairways reasonably fit for the use which he thus invites others to make of them, and he is responsi- ble for any injury which others, lawfully using them with due care, sustain through his failure to discharge his duty;* but he is not answerable for defects which do not render the halls and stairways reasonably unfit for use, or which reasonable care and skill would not prevent." The obliga- tion resting upon the landlord, under such circumstances, ' Boniel ». Block, 44 La. Ann. 514. 'Machias Hotel Co. v. Fisher, 56 Me. 321. ' Mullen B. Rainear, 45 N. J. L. 520. * Looney n. McLean, 129 Mass. 83. ' Gillvon ». Reilly, 50 N. J. L. 26. § 581] ESTATES FOR YEABS. 609 is that reasonable care and skill have been exercised to render the premises reasonably fit for the use which he has invited others to make of them.' A landlord who contracts with his tenant to attend to all the repairs of the demised premises is only required to exercise reasonable diligence in ascertaining what repairs are necessary, and in making such repairs as due inspec- tion would show proper. He does not, by his contract, guaranty that the premises will never, in fact, be out of repair. ' § 581. Liability op Landlord for Breach of Cove- nant TO Eepair. — The landlord will be held by his con- tract, and if the tenant remains on the premises after hav- ing been wrongfully evicted, by the promise of the land- lord to pay him damages due to the carelessness of the other tenants, such promise is a valid consideration and may be enforced.' And when the landlord stipulates to repair, but fails to fulfill his promise, the tenant may then, repair and take the expense out of the rent, provided he shows that such repairs were necessary.* The landlord is entitled to a reasonable time to repair, and this question of reasonable time is a question for the jury to determine.' The tenant should not stand quietly by and voluntarily allow his property to remain exposed to injury. He should make the repairs himself and charge the same to the land- lord unless prohibited from doing so by the landlord.' But the landlord is not bound to put the premises in a better condition than when he demised them unless he agrees to do so.' If he refuses to make repairs the tenant can make them according to the agreement, and take the expense out = Camp V. Wood, 76 N. T. 93; Edwards v. Railroad Co., 98 N. Y. 345; Van- derbecko. Hendry, 34 N. J. L. 467, 471; Francis -d. Cockrcll, L. R. oQ. B. 184, 501; Readmau v. Conway, 136 Mass. 374; Looney ». McLean, 139 Mass. 33; Watkins v. Goodall, 138 Mass. 533. 'Frank v. Conradi, 50 N. J. L. 33. See, also, Leavitt v. Fletcher, 10 Allen (Mass.), 119; Green v. Bales, 3 Q. B. 335. 'Dunn V. Robbins, 30 N. Y. Supp. 341; 65 Hun (N. Y.), 635. *Hovey v. Walker, 90 Mich. 537. ' Young s. Burhans, 80 Wis. 438. 'Cantrell c. Fowler, 33 S. Car. 589. ' Kaufman v. Clark, 7 Dist. Col. 1. 77 610 CLASSIFICATION" OF ESTATES. [§ 582 of the rent;' and if he does not make them he cannot re- cover damages on that account/ for the measure of the tenant's damages is the difference between the rental value of the premises as they are and as the landlord agreed to put fchem/ If the injury to the premises is not referable to the negligence of the landlord he is not liable." § 582. Landlord is Not Liable Unless He Covenants TO Eepair. — The rule is that the landlord is not liable to the tenant for not repairing the premises unless he cove- nants to do so.° And a covenant by him to rebuild, in case of the destruction of the premises by flire, or if he does not do so, to remit the rent, cannot be implied, nor can it be demanded as a usual covenant. A tenant who leases a farm must keep the fences in repair." And if the landlord agrees to repair fences and fails to do so, the tenant may repair them and deduct the expense from the rent, but the landlord will not be liable to the tenant for damages done by cattle breaking down the unrepaired fences and destroy- ing crops. ' And when he covenants to repair, he can only be held upon the written contract and not upon a contem- poraneous verbal agreement.' And his covenant to repair is independent of the lessee's to pay rent. Performance of the lessor is not a condition precedent to any hability on the part of the lessee for rent." The tenant is generally liable both to his landlord and to third parties for damages arising from his neglect to repair division fences and party walls, or from the unsafe condi- tion of the premises, unless such condition is the result of causes beyond the control of the tenant." He is not liable ' Hopkins v. Ratliff, 115 Ind. 213. 'Hendry v. Squier, 126 Ind. 19. 3 Clark V. Soule, 56 N. Y. 420. See, also, Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Land Imp. Co., 23 N. Y. Supp. 900; 4 Misc. Rep. 207. ^ Kenny®. Barns, 67 Mich. 336. «Burnes v. Fuchs, 28 Mo. App. 279; Cantrell v. Fowler, 32 S. Car. 589; Weinsteine «. Harrison, 66 Tex. 546; O'Connor v. Gourand, 14 Daly (N.Y.), 64. « Hoylemao ». Railroad Co., 33 "W. Va. 489. •I "Wisdoms. Newberry, 30 Mo. App. 241. 8 Kline v. McLain, 33 W. Va. 32. 'Newman r>. French, 45 Hun (N. Y.), 65. '"Chicago V. O'Brennan, 65 111. 160; Exall «. Partridge, 8 Term Rep. 308; Payne ». Rogers, 2 H. Bl. 350. Compare Driver v. Maxwell, 56 Ga. 11. § 583] ESTATES FOR YEARS. 611 for not rebuilding a ruinous chimney,' or for a nuisance in the place when demised.' A tenant is Uable to his co-tenant for negligently using a water-closet whereby the latter's goods are injured, provided the landlord has made all neces- sary repairs;' otherwise, if there are inherent defects in the premises.* § 583. Liability of Tenant. — The tenant wiU be held to perform his covenants or become liable to the lessor. And a covenant by a lessee generally to improve the property, refers to the treatment of the lands in their use for agri- cultural purposes, where the demised premises are farming lands. The mode of cultivation, the proper and sufficient use of manures in enriching the land, and matters of this sort, are within the terms and meaning of this stipulation. ' To hold it to relate to improvements of any other character would leave the obligations of the tenant under it un- bounded. And if a tenant covenants to leave the place in good re- pair he is bound by his contract." But when the tenant covenants to keep the landlord harmless from any claim of damages arising from his neglect in not removing the snow and ice from the roof of the building leased, or from the sidewalk in front of the premises, this does not give the lessee the sole occupancy of the sidewalk nor bind him to keep the same in repair. ' In the absence of an agree- ment to keep the premises in repair the landlord is not liable for injuries arising from a defective condition of the premises, nor for a defect arising during the continuance of the lease, although it is admitted that if a nuisance ex- isted at the time of the demise or in the nature of things becomes so by the legitimate use of the premises he wiU be liable.' If the tenant has expressly agreed to repair, his 'Eagle V. Swayze, 2 Daly (N. T.), 140. » Gridley v. Bloomington, 68 111. 47. ' White V. Montgomery, 58 Ga. 204. * Martin v. Washburn, 33 La. Ann. 437. •Naye «. Noezel, 50 N. J. L. 533. « Scott V. Clay and Brick Co. 135 N. Y. 141. 'Leydecker v. Brintnall, 158 Mass. 392. * Shindelbeck v. Moon, 33 Ohio St. 364; Deller v. Hofferberth, 127 Ind. 415. 612 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 584-585 neglect to do so makes him liable to the landlord;' but he can make the repairs at any time before expiration of the lease." If the tenant continues to hold the premises after a breach by the lessor, equal to an eviction, he is still liable for the rent.' § 584. Inevitable Accident. — It is often inserted in a lease that the tenant shall not be liable for damages caused by the act of God or for damages resulting from inevitable accident. To determine what damages are caused by inevitable ac- cident is not always an easy question to answer. Over- flows are inevitable accidents and relieve the tenant from repairs of damage caused directly by them.* But a window broken by a stone accidentally kicked by a passing team is not broken by an inevitable accident.' § 685. Entry of Landlord to Eepair. — The landlord has a right to make such repairs as are needed, but not so as to disturb the tenant's enjoyment of the premises further than is absolutely necessary to put and keep them in the same condition they were in when the lease was given, and to remedy defects amounting to a nuisance. If he goes beyond this he becomes a trespasser. " He has no right to enter to make extensive alterations.' If the landlord refuses to make the repairs as agreed, then the tenant may make them and deduct the amount of the expense from the rent.' • Martinez v. Thompson, 80 Tex. 568. 'Payne v. James, 42 La. Ann. 230. 3 Boston Block Co. v. Bufflngton, 39 Minn. 385. * Payne v. James, 45 La. Ann. 381. «Peck «. Scoville Manuf. Co., 43 III. App. 360. 'Kaufmans. Clark, 7 Dist. Col. 1; Glickauf v. Maurer, 75 111. 389; Sutz- bacher v. Dickie, 51 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 500. 'Dwyer «. Carroll, 86 Cal. 298. 8Favrot v. Mettler, 21 La. Ann. 220; Westermeier v. Street, 21 La. Ann. 714; McCarty ®. Ely, 4 E. D. Smith (N. Y.), 375; Mumford «. Brown, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 475; Gott «. Gandy, 2 El. & B. 845; Pizey v. Rogers, 1 Ry. & Moo. 357; Hovey v. Walker, 90 Mich. 537; Cantrell«. Powler, 33 S. Car. 589; Hopkins v. Ratliff, 115 Ind. 213; Johnson v. Oppenheim, 55 N. Y. 280; Coleman v. Haight, 14 La. Ann. 564. §§ 586-587] ESTATES FOR YEARS. 613 § 586. Eight to Eepair by Tenant.— Of course the gen- eral rule is, if the landlord refuses to fulfill his covenant to repair after being requested so to do by the tenant, the lat- ter can make them and recover, and that this duty devolves upon the tenant in order to protect his own property, pro- vided the expense is not relatively great." But if the bur- den of repairing is unreasonable the law will not cast the responsibility upon the tenant of repairs which the land- lord had bound himself to make.' And if the landlord pre- vents the tenant from making the repairs by repeated promises to make them, and the tenant acts in good faith. the tenant may have damages he has suffered from the continuance of the want of repairs, even under the general rule that he may make them and collect the expense from the landlord.' And when the tenant does make them after refusal of the landlord to comply with his contract, the tenant must show that the repairs were necessary.* § 587. Liability op Landlord for Defects. — It is the general rule that there is no warranty implied in the letting of premises that are reasonably fit for use. The lessee takes an estate in the premises hired, and he takes the risk of the quality of the premises, in the absence of an express or implied warranty by the lessor, or of deceit." There is an exception to this rule, arising from the duty which the lessor owes the lessee. This duty arises from the rela- tion of the parties and is imposed, by law, and does not spring from contract. When there are concealed defects, attended with danger to an occupant, and which a careful examination would not discover, known to the lessor, the latter is bound to reveal them, in order that the lessee may guard against them. And when this failure to reveal such facts may not be actual fraud or misrepresentation, it is such negligence as may lay the foundation of an action 'Parker v Meadows, 86 Tonn. 181; Fort v. Orndoff, 7 Heisk. (Tenu.) 167. 'Hexters Knox, 63 N. Y 561, Martin v. Hill, 42 Ala. 275; Hinckley «. Beckwith. 13 Wis 31, Parkers. Meadows, 86 Tenn. 181. "Kejesv. Western, etc. Co., 34 Vt. 81. * Thomas v. Kingsland, 108 N. Y, 616; Hovey «. Walker, 90 Mich. 537 *Tuttle». Manuf. Co., 145 Mass. 169. 614 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 588 against the lessor, if injury occurs.' So where one leases premises infected with the smaU-pox, and injury results thereby, the landlord is liable if he knew the danger and did not inform the tenant." Such active agencies of mis- chief which no tenant can be presumed to know, if known to the landlord, are a ground for damages if injury results to the tenant.' If the lessee sustains personal injuries from the defective condition of the building, he cannot maintain an action of tort against the lessor, founded upon a breach by the lessor of an agreement to repair the building within a reasonable time. Because the cause of action arises merely from a breach of promise and the action is in con- tract. As a general rule there must be some active negli- gence or misfeasance to support tort. There must be some breach of duty distinct from breach of contract.' The landlord can only be held for neglect and not for misfeasance which furnishes the ground for an action of tort.' § 588. Negligent Use by Tenant. — If the landlord be guilty of negligence or other delictum which leads directly to the accident and wrong complained of by the lessee, he is liable; if not so guilty, no liability attaches to him. If he lets a building or warehouse knowing that it is so weak and imperfectly constructed that the floors will break down from the weight necessarily to be placed upon them, his negligence imposes liability upon him for the injury to the person or property of any one who may lawfully be upon the premises using them for the purpose for which they are demised.' Or if a wharf is leased, and, at the time of the demise, the wharf is unsafe for the use the lessor knew it was to be used for, and the owner knew, or by the exercise of reasonable dihgence could have known, of its condition, ' Cowes V. SunderlaTid, 145 Mass. 363. 'Minor ». Sharon, 112 Mass. 477. 'Bowe v. Hunking, 135 Mass. 380; Eeichenbacher v. Pahmeyer, 8 HI. App. 217. See, also, Scott v. Simons, 54 N. H. 426; Godley v. Hagerty, 30 Pa. St. 387. ^Tuttle i>. Manuf. Co., 145 Mass. 169. ^Looney v. McLean, 129 Mass. 33; Bows v. Hunking, 135 Mass. 380. 'Edwards v. Railroad Co., 98 N. Y. 245, 249. I 589] ESTATES FOR YEARS. 615 he then becomes liable for injury to one lawfuUy using it.' So, a landlord who leases the upper stories of his build- ing for a business involving the storage of articles of great weight, representing the floors to be sufficiently strong for that use, but knowing that they are not, is liable, under the general rules of law, for injuries to ten- ants to whom he subsequently lets the lower stories, for injuries received by them in consequence of the overload- ing of such upper stories by the tenant thereof in reliance upon his representations. And the tenant below may recover from the tenant above for an injury caused by his negligence in overloading the floors, notwithstanding he has also a remedy against the landlord therefor.' In general, where the injury is the result of the misfeasance or nonfeasance of the lessor, the party suffering damages may sue him for damages.' It is the general rule in England and in America that, where property is demised, and at the time of the demise there is no nuisance, but becomes so by act of the tenant while in possession, and an injury happens during such possession to a party, the owner is not liable. But, where the owner leases prem- ises which are a nuisance, or must, in the nature of things, become so by their use, and receives rent, then, whether in or out of possession, he is liable for injuries resulting from such nuisance.* § 589. Nuisance Created by Tenant. — A landlord whose tenant during the term has created a nuisance on the demised premises will not be liable therefor so long as he has no right of entry or power to abate; but when the term expires, or when the landlord may enter and abate ' Albert v. State. 66 Md. 335. See, also, Joyce v. Martin, 15 R. I. 558; Hex V. Pedly, 1 Ad. & El. 823; Godley v. Hagerty, 30 Pa. St. 387; Carson v. Godley, 36 Pa. St. Ill; House v. Metcalf, 37 Conn. 631, 640; Fish v. Dodge, 4 Denio (N. ¥.), 311. 'Brunswick-Balke-CoUender Co. v. Rees, 69 Wis. 443. 2 Todd V. Flight, 9 C B., N. S. 377. 'Joyces. Martin, 15 R. I. 558; Rosewell v. Pryor, 1 Salk. 460; Kingf. Pedly, 1 Ad. & El. 833; King v. Moore, 8 Barn. & Ad. 184; Todd v. Flight, 9 C. B., N. S. 377; Nelsons. Brewing Co., L. R. 3 C. P. 311; Pretty v. Bickmore, L. R. 8 C. P. 401. 616 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 590 the nuisance, he will become liable for its continuance, and that liability cannot be evaded by a renewal of the lease, though with covenants to repair, and without the land- lord's having taken actual possession.' The landlord's liability is restricted to that which is a nuisance in its very essence and nature at the time of the demise, and not some- thing merely capable of being rendered a nuisance by the tenant.' But it is held by some courts that the lessor is liable for a nuisance which was a necessary, contemplated or probable result of the use of the premises for the pur- pose for which they were demised.' It is held by some decisions that the landlord's liability in such case will be discharged by reason of his having re- quired the tenant to stipulate to keep the demised premises in repair.* But this is not the law, for the tenant cannot be interposed between the person injured by the nuisance and the landlord liable therefor." It has been held that knowledge on the part of the lessor, of the existence of the nuisance at the time of the demise is essential to place the liability upon him." If the nuisance arises during the term and the landlord cannot enter to abate it he is not liable therefor. But when the term expires, he has a right to re-enter and abate the nuisance. If he has the power and fails to exercise it, he is then liable for the injury worked by the nuisance.' § 590. Fire and Destruction of Premises by Negli- gence. — At common law, he in whose house or room a fire originated, whether by neghgence or accident, was respon- sible for the loss resulting from the fire invading other 1 Ingwersen «. Rankin, 47 N. J. L. 18; Rankin v. Ingwersen, 49 N. J. L. 481. 2 Gandy v. Jubber, 5* Best & S. 87. ^House V. Metcalf, 37 Conn. 631; Rex v. Pedley, 1 Ad. & El. 823; Fish v. Dodge, 4 Denio (N. Y.), 311. 4 Pretty v. Bickmore, L. R. 10 0. P. 401; Gwennell v. Earner, L. R. 10 C. P. 658. 5 Swords V. Edgar, 59 N. Y. 38; Ingwersen v. Rankin, 47 N. J. L. 18. «Gwinnell «. Earner, L. R. 8 C. P. 658; State v. Williams, 30 K. J. L. 103. Compare Gandy v. Jubber, 5 Smith & B. 87. ■"Clancey «. Byrne, 56 N. Y. 139; Rich v. Basterfield, 4 C. B. 782; "Whalen V. Gloucester, 4 Hun (N. Y.), 24; Rex v. Pedley, 1 Ad. & El. 833; Ingwersen V. Rankin, 47 N. J. L. 18; sec. 596. § 591] ESTATES FOB YEARS. 617 premises; ' and this rule extended to a fire kindled in an owner's close." But this rule was modified by statute and any person was exonerated from such liability in whose house or chamber any fire accidentally began;' and an- other statute exonerated any person on whose estate any fire accidentally began." At common law the tenant was liable for demised buildings burned either by negligence or mischance." Under the alterations of these English statutes, a fire produced by negligence is not accidentally begun within their meaning, and the exoneration from liability did not extend to fire occasioned by negligence. ' So the lessee is not liable for loss that is caused by fire without his fault or neghgence. ' But if the ruinous state of the premises is caused by the neglect of the tenant he cannot recover from the landlord for want of repair." And whether negligence exists is a mixed question of law and fact." And such questions are to be determined by a jury, under the direc- tions of the court, on consideration of all the circumstances found." Article 13. Dangerous and Defective Premises. % 591 Liability of Landlord to Third § 594. Liability to Tenant's Servants. Persons. § 595. Liability of Tenant to Tlxird § 593 Liability to Tenant. Persons. § 593. Liability to Tenant's Quest. § 596. Liability of Lessor's Grantee. § 591. Liability of Landlord to Third Persons. — Though the general rule of law is that the occupant and not the owner of the premises is responsible for injuries ' Canterbury ®. Atty. Gen 1 Phil 306. ' Tubervil v. Stamp, 1 Salk 13 » 6 Anne ch. 31 n4 George III, c 78 ' Co. Litt. 536. 'Filliter o Phippard, 11 Ad. & E., N. 8. 346; Webb v. Railroad Co., 49 N. Y 430; Dorr v. Harkness, 49 N. J L. 571. ■" Schwartz v. Salter, 40 La. Ann. 264. 'Zigler V. McClellan, 15 Oreg. 499. •Durant i>. Palmer, 29 N. J L. 544. '"Wood V. Hurd, 34 N. J L. 87; Earle v. Earle, Spen. (N. J.) 347. 78 618 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 591 caused by a failure to keep in repair, yet where the prem- ises were let with a nuisance on them by means of which the injury complained of was received, such owner is lia- ble.' But it is the duty of the owner of a building under his own control in his own occupation to keep it in such safe condition that travelers on the highway shall not suf- fer injury.' If the landlord has no notice of the defect and had exercised due diligence he is not liable for injury.* The owner of land or a building who has it under con- trol is bound to be careful and diligent in keeping it safe for those who go there by his invitation express or im- pUed, but he owes no such duty to those who go there for their own convenience or as mere licensees.' And a party working for the lessee, injured by his own careless- ness cannot recover from the landlord. ' The general rule that a landlord is not liable to a ten- ant unless he warrants the premises to be in a fit condi- tion for occupancy, has exceptions arising from a duty which the law, under certain circumstances, imposes upon the lessor because of the relation subsisting between him and his lessee. So if at the time of the demise, there is some latent or concealed defect in the premises, consisting of original structural weakness, decay or infectious disease, which the lessor knows, or should know, renders their oc- cupation dangerous and is not known to the lessee or dis- coverable by his careful inspection, the law makes it the duty of the lessor to disclose it; and a failure to do so is ac- tionable negligence if injury results." 'Denver®. Soloman, 3 Colo. App. 534; Gridley «). Bloomington, 68 111. 47; Chicago «. O'Brennan, 65 111. 160 'Fankec. St. Louis, 110 Mo. 516. See, also, Adams v. Fletcher, 17 R. I, 137; McGrath i). Walker, 18 N. Y Supp 915; 64 Hun (N. Y.), 179. ^Borman ». Sandgren, 37 111. App. 160; Perez v Rabaud, 76 Tex. 191. * Sweeny » Railroad Co , 10 Allen (Mass.), 368; Gordon «. Cummings, 153 Mass. 513; Hart v Cole, 156 Mass 475; Hilsenbeck v. Guhring, 131 N. Y. 674; Stergero Van Sicklen, 133 N. Y. 499, Curtis «. Kiley, 153 Mass. 123; Timlin D. Oil Co , 126 N, Y 514; O'Connor e. Andrews, 81 Tex. 38. Board v. Valentine, 60 Hun (N. Y.), 579; Marwedel «. Cook, 154 Mass. 335; Folsom v. Lewis, 85 Ga. 146. 5 Caldwell «. Slade, 156 Mass. 84. See, also, Sheridan v. Krupp, 141 Pa. St. 564; Peil v. Reinhart, 137 N. Y. 381. «Bowe ». Hunking, 135 Mass. 380; Cowen «. Sunderland, 145 Mass. 363; § 592] ESTATES FOR YEARS. 619" If the landlord demises the premises which are in a con- dition dangerous to the public, or with a nuisance upon them, he may be liable to third parties for injuries result- ing therefrom; because by the letting in that condition and receiving rent therefor he is considered as authorizing the continuance of the nuisance.' § 592. Liability to Tenant. — The general rule is that there is no warranty, express or imphed, that the premises are safe or reasonably fit for occupancy. But this applies only to the portion leased by the tenant. Because the lease of a portion of a building leaves the responsibility for what is not demised upon the landlord, and he is responsi- ble to a tenant of the other portion of the demised prem- ises for an injury to him for his neglect in keeping his por- tion in proper repair." Under the general rule a railroad company which leases a house situated upon a mountain side, where snowslides sometimes occur, is not bound to notify the lessee of the danger therefrom, although the company has knowledge thereof, and the lessee has not, and has never before hved in a region where snowslides occur; in the absence of any deceit or misrepresentation, the company is not liable for personal injuries to the lessee, or for death of members of the family occasioned by the destruction of the house by a snowslide. ' But the landlord is responsible for any portion of the premises which he controls. Thus, where a portion of a building is let, and the tenant has rights of pas- sageway over staircases, and entries in common with the landlord and of other tenants, there is no such leasing as will exonerate the landlord from all responsibility for the safe condition of that portion of which he still retains Scott V. Simons, 54 N. H. 426, 431; Wallace «. Lent, 1 Daly (N. Y.), 481; Minor v. Sharon, 113 Mass. 477; Walden v. Fitch, 70 Pa. St. 460; Edwards u. Railroad Co., 98 N. Y. 345; Cesar v. Karutz, 60 N. Y. 239. ■Pow V. Roberts, 108 Pa. St. 489; Nugent v. Railroad Co., 80 Me. 62, 78; Stratton v. Staples, 59 Me. 94; Godley v. Hagerty, 30 Pa. St. 387; Burbaiik v. Bethel, S. M. Co., 75 Me. 373; Knauss v. Brua, 107 Pa. St 85; Dalay «. Savage, 145 Mas.s. 38; Joyce v. Martin, 15 R. I. 558; Aliern v. Steele, 115 N. Y. 303. 'Payne®. Irvin, 44111. App. 105; 144 111. 483; Dollard v. Roberts, 130 N. Y. 369. 'Doyle V. Railroad Co., U7 U. S.413. 620 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 592 control, and which he is bound to keep in repair; as to such portion, he still retains the responsibility of a general owner to all persons, including the tenants of his building.' And ignorance of the defect is no defense of an action for in- jury." The landlord owes to his tenants and those em- ployed by such tenants the duty not to expose them to a dangerous condition of the place, which he controls, which reasonable care on his part would have prevented." But if the premises are in the entire control of the tenant, and the landlord has not covenanted to repair them, a tenant can- not recover for injury received for want of repairs.* It is the duty of the tenant to make an examination which is necessary to determine whether the premises he leases are safe and adapted to the purpose for which they are hired.' Hence, a tenant cannot recover for injuries re- ceived by reason of the want of repair of the premises hired." Of course, if there is a concealed defect which ren- ders the premises dangerous, which the tenant cannot dis- cover by the exercise of reasonable diligence, of which the landlord has or ought to have knowledge, it is the land- lord's duty to disclose it, and he is liable for an injury which I'esults from his concealment of it.' But if there is no fraud or concealment by the lessor, then the lessee is subject to the maxim caveat emptor and he takes the land as he finds it.' The landlord, unless so agreed, does not warrant that the premises shall be in any ' Leavitt «. Fletcher, 10 Allen (Mass.), 119; Foster v. Peyser, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 242; Readman v. Conway, 126 Mass. 374; Milford v. Holbvook, 9 Allen (Mass.), 17; Sawyer v. McGillicuddy, 81 Me. 318; Looney i). McLean, 129 Mass. 33; Watkins v. Goodall, 138 Mass. 533; Leydeckeru. Brintall, 158 Mass. 292; Toole v. Beckett, 67 Me. 544. 'Leydecker «. Brintall, 158 Mass. 292; Foley v. McCarthy, 157 Mass. 474. 3 Holmes D. Drew, 151 Mass. 578. * McLean d. Warehouse Co. , 158 Mass. 472. ^Cowen V. Sunderland, 145 Mass. 368; Stevens v. Pierce, 151 Mass. 207; Booth V, Merriam, 155 Mass. 521. 'Booths. Merriam, 155 Mass. 521. ' Cowen «. Sunderland, 145 Mass. 363; Minor «. Sharon, 112 Mass. 477; Bowe ■». Hunking, 135 Mass. 380; Martin «. Richards, 155 Mass. 381. See, also, Butler v. Gushing. 48 Hun (N. Y.). 617; Coke d. Gutkese 80 Ky. 598. 8 Hill «. Woodman, 14 Me. 38, 42; Gregor v. Cady, 82 Me. 131; Keates v. Cadogan, 10 0. B. 591. § 593] ESTATES FOR YEARS. 621 particular condition or state or repair, or that they are suitable for the purpose for which they were demised.' This is the general rule in the United States, but has been modified in England." This general rule does not apply to premises over which the lessor retains control as a common passageway by which several tenements are reached.' It applies where he has no control over the premises demised.' But if he has control of some parts of the premises, a tenant who is injured by his own fault on the landlord's portion has no remedy." § 593. Liability to Tenant's Guest. — The same rule as to the landlord's liability applies to the tenant's guest. - Hence, where the owner of the tenant's house, the halls and stairs of which are in his control, knowingly allows the stairs and banisters to become badly out of repair, is liable to a visitor of the tenant for an injury caused from his neglect to repair." But the lessor of a hotel is not liable for an injury to a guest caused by a falling of an awning known to be unsafe, unless he was bound by the lease to keep the awning in re- pair;' the lessee took the building without warranty and knew of the defect. 'Tuttle V. Manuf. Co., 145 Mass. 169, 176; JafEe v. Harteau, 56 N. Y. 398, 401; Bowe V. Hunking, 135 Mass. 883; Ardenu. Pullen, 10 Mees. & Wels. 831; Sutton V. Temple, 13 Mees. & "Wels. 52; Hart v. "Wiudsor, 12 Jlees. & Wels. 68, 85; Llbbey v. Talford, 48 Me. 316; Foster v. Peyser, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 242; Gregor v. Cady, 83 Me. 181; Welles v. Castle, 3 Gray (Mass.), 333. «48 & 49 Vict. c. 73; Walker v. Hobbs. L. R. 33 Q. B. 45S. 2 Toole s. Beckett, 67 Me. 544; Sawyer v. McGillicuddy, 81 Me. 818. * Little V. Macadaras, 29 Mo. App. 332. 'Town V. Armstrong, 75 Mich. 580; Willson v. Treadwell, 81 Cal. 58. See, also, Sieber v. Blanc, 76 Cal. 173; Lynch «. Ortlieb, 70 Tex. 727; Cutter v. Hamlin, 147 Mass. 471; Davidson v. Fischer, 11 Colo. 588. « 0' Sullivan v. Norwood, 14 Daly (N. Y.), 286; Riley v. Simpson, 83 Cal. 217; Tomle ®. Hampton, 129 111. 379; Martin v. Pettit, 117 N. Y. 118; Brady e. Valentine, 31 N. Y. Supp. 776; 8 Misc. Rep. 30; Henkel ». Murr, 31 Hun (N. Y.), 28; Fisher v. Jansen, 138 111. 549; Montieth v. Finkbeiner, 31 N. Y. Supp. 388; 66 Hun (N. Y.J, 633. ' Fellows V. Gilhuher, 83 Wis. 639. See, also, Payne v. Rogers, 2 H. Bl. 350; Russell v. Devon, 2 Term Rep. 667; Cheetham v. Hampson, 4 Term R. 318; Robbinsi). Jones, 15 C. B. N. 8. 221; Mellen v. Morrill, 1?6 Mass. 545; Leonard v. Storer, 115 Mass. 86; Burdick v. Cheadle, 36 Ohio St. 393; Fisher V. Thirkell, 31 Mich. 1; Harris v. Cohen, 50 Mich. 334; Clark v. Babcock, 23 Mich. 164. 622 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 594 One who visits a tenant cannot be deemed as present on the premises on the implied invitation of the landlord,' When a lessee enters the demised premises he has full con- trol and it is practically his own private property for the term of the lease. No one, not even the lessor himself, can lawfully enter without the lessee's permission or invi- tation express or implied." The tenant can say who shall be his guests. And when a guest does enter the premises and while there is injured, without his own fault, by some defect of the premises, he must seek his damages from him whose invitation impliedly assured him he could enter safely and who alone is responsible for the defect which caused the injury. In such a case the guest can have no greater claim against the lessor than the lessee himself and the members of his family have." § 694. Liability to Tenant's Servants. — The liability of the landlord to the tenant's servants is no different than ttiat to the tenant. So when a servant is negligent and places himself knowingly in a place of danger, a place which had been forbidden him, and is thereby injured, he cannot recover from the landlord.* And when the landlord, for a consideration, remodels the tenements and employs one of the tenant's servants to help him, the landlord is not liable for the servant's own carelessness.' However, if the servant of the lessee is injured without fault on his part because the premises are defective and dangerous, the landlord is responsible, unless it appears that such owner did not know or by reasonable care and diligence could not have known of the unsafe condition of the premises when he leased them." > McKenzie i). Cheetham, 83 Me. 543. » Mellen v. Morrill, 136 Mass. 545. ' Robbing v. Jones, 15 C. B. N. 8. 331; Burdick ». Cheadle, 30 Ohio St. 393; Bowe«. Hunking, 135 Mass. 381, 383; O'Brien v. Capwell, 59 Barb. (N. Y.) 497; Nelson ?). Brewing Co., L, R. 3 0. P. 311. See, also, Tuttle v. Manuf. Co., 145 Mass. 169; Hutchinson «. Cummings, 156 Mass. 329; Kalis v. Shat- tuck, 69 Cal. 593. * McCarthy v. Foster, 156 Mass. 511. ' Poor V. Sears, 154 Mass. 539. See, also, Smith «. Buttner, 90 Cal. 95. « State o. Boyce, 73 Md. 469. See, also, Johnson v. Lumber Co., 3 Wash. St. 733. §§ 595-596] ESTATES FOR YEARS. 623 § 595. Liability of Tenant to Third Persons.— When the landlord has not agreed to repair, then the tenant must repair and keep the premises, over which he has entire control, in a safe condition. Thus, the occupier of a build- ing who negligently permits the building, or the access to it, to be in an unsafe condition, is liable for an injury- caused thereby to a person whom he, by invitation, express or implied, induces to enter upon it." The duty of the tenant to keep in a safe condition the demised pi'emises of which he has entire control, extends to all appurtenances connected therewith, and this includes the steps, stairs and other approaches." So, it is as clearly the duty of the owner of a shed, and lessee of the land on which it stood, to keep the driveway in repair as it is to keep the shed in repair. And it is no more the duty of the lessor to watch the ap- proach to the shed and see that it is kept safe for use, than it is to watch the shed itself and see that that is kept in a safe condition.' § 596. Liability of Lessor's Grantee. — It is well settled that any person injured by a continuing nuisance can maintain an action against the land owner who created it, or against a grantee who continues it, provided, if the grantee suffers it to remain, he has the power to abate it." And a lessee is a grantee within the meaning of this rule." This is the rule, as accepted by nearly all the courts, though it has been differently expressed. But it has. been said, if a nuisance be created, and a man purchases the premises with a nuisance upon them, though there be a demise for a term at the time of the purchase, so that the purchaser has no opportunity of removing the nuisance, yet, by purchasing the reversion, he makes himself liable for the nuisance." However, this is not the law. The gen- eral rule is that if the nuisance is created by a tenant or ' Mellon V. Morrill, 126 Mass. 545. > Purcell V. English, 86 Ind. 34. » Abbott V. Jackson, 84 Me. 449. * Prentiss v. Wood, 133 Mass. 486; Lufkinu. Zane, 157 Mass. 115. 'McDonough v. Gilman, 3 Allen (Mass.), 364. « King V. Pedly, 1 Adol. & E. 833. Compare Gandy v. Jubber, 5 Best & 8. 87; Eich v. Basterfield, 4 0. B. 784. 624 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 597-598 by a former owner, who has let the premises to a tenant, a grantee subject to the tenancy, in consequence of the pur- chase and the subsequent receipt of rent, is not made liable to third persons for the use which the tenant continues to make of the premises, even if it constitutes a nuisance.' Article 14. Improvements. § 597. Improvements. | 599. Right to Remove. § 598. Allowances for Improvements. § 600. Time to Remove. § 597. Improvements. — When used in leases the word "improvements" is more comprehensive than "fixtures." It embraces all additions, alterations, erections and annexa- tions made by the lessee during the term of his lease. Every such improvement inures to the benefit of the land- lord at the expiration of the lease, and the tenant cannot recover compensation therefor, unless by custom or by express agreements." As between the rightful owner of lands and an occupant who in good faith has put on improvements, the land with its improvements belongs to the owner of the land, without compensation for the increased value, at common law, though the rule may be otherwise in equity and by the statutes of some of the States. A permanent right of way appurtenant to the demised premises, which has been acquired by the tenant, apper- tains to the landlord. ' § 598. Allowance for Improvements. — The tenant has no implied authority to make improvements and receive ' Dalay v. Savage, 145 Mass, 38. See, also, Clifford «. Cotton Mills, 146 Mass. 47; McCarthy v. Bank, 74 Me. 315; Ahern ». Steele, 115 N. Y. 280; Fow V. Roberts, 108 Pa. St. 489; Knauss v. Brua, 107 Pa. St. 85; Nugent v. Railroad Co., 80 Me. 63; Scott v. Simons, 54 N. H. 436; Wallaces. Lent, 1 Daly (N. T.), 481. 2 Kutter V. Smith, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 491. « Dempsey v. Kipp, 61 N. Y. 463. § 599] ESTATES FOE YEARS. 625 compensation for them from the landlord. If he places improvements upon the demised premises he cannot recover for them.' But if the lessor authorizes the ten- ant to make improvements with an agreement that they shall be paid for, then the tenant can recover for them.' In some jurisdictions the right to compensation for im- provements is regulated by custom entering into the con- tract of the leasing." If a lessee has a right to compensation for his improve- ments, if they are partially destroyed he can restore them and still receive compensation, if done before the deter- mination of his possession. Thus, where a lessee under an invalid lease is entitled to recover for a house erected by him upon the leased land, and the house is partially des- troyed by fire pending a suit to cancel the lease, he may restore it to its former condition in order to preserve what the fire left and recover fuU value of the house as repaired.' § 599. Eight to Remove. — The tenant has no right to remove permanent improvements added to the premises by himself, unless the lease so stipulates. Thus, a covenant that at the expiration of his term of years the tenant will vacate the premises without notice and leave the same in as good condition as when demised or may be made by im- provements, prevents the lessee from removing buildings placed on the premises by himself.' And when the lease provides that when the tenant has performed all the terms he may remove the improvements, such a compliance is a condition precedent to their removal." If a lease contains a clause that at its termination the lessor is to renew the same or pay to the lessee the full value of any buildings the lessee might erect thereon, a renewal of it does not work a conveyance to the lessor of the buildings and im- ' Jones V. Hoard, 59 Ark. 42; Cossgrill v. Foss, 65 Hun (N. T.), 184; Gocio ». Day, 51 Ark. 46; Kutter v. Smith, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 491. ' Wilkinson v. Kugler, 153 Pa. St. 238; Mayors. Ins. Co., 3 Abb. App. Dec. (N. Y.)261; 34 How. (N. Y.) 103. 'Senior t. Armitage, Holt, 197; Hutton v. Warren, 1 Mees. & Wels. 466. *Baxter«. State, 56 Ark. 312. 'Carver c. Gough, 158 Pa. St. 225. ' Clemens v. Murphy, 40 Mo. 122. 79 626 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 600 provements for trade, and the lessee can remove them.' But if the tenant covenants that all improvements on the buildings shall belong to the landlord at the expiration of the lease, shelves not fastened to the floor affixed by the tenant, and also furnaces with hot air flues for the purpose of heating the storeroom in which the tenant keeps his goods, and a large awning, are all improvements embraced within the covenant and cannot be removed by the tenant." If the tenant has the right to remove the improvements, but fails to pay the rent, the lessor can evict him;' but he can remove the buildings already erected." If the tenant pays rent by making repairs and improve- ments, if he is evicted he can recover for such improve- ments.' But a refusal to give a written lease to an occu- pant, according to promise, is not such an eviction as enti- tles the occupant to compensation for improvements.' Be- cause the mere fact that a landlord permits permanent im- provements to be made without objection or warning that he will not pay for them, raises no presumption that he in- tended to do so.' But where the lease authorizes the ten- ant to remove his improvements at the end of his term, he is entitled to egress and ingress for a reasonable time after the expiration of the lease to remove his improvements.' § 600. Time to Eemove. — A tenant who has a right to remove the improvements, has a reasonable time after the expiration of the lease to remove the improvements; but he is confined during that time to the right of ingress and egress for that purpose and cannot retain possession.' This rule applies equally to small and large bodies of land." If ' Howe's Cave Asso. v. Houck, 66 Him (N. Y.) 205. See, also, Hughes v. Ford, 15 Colo. 330; Edwards v. Van Patten, 46 Kans. 509; Kash«. Huncheon, 1 Ind. App. 361. « Parker v. Wulstein, 48 N. J. Eq. 94. See, also, French v. New York, 16 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 230. ' Paine v. Church, 7 Hun (N. Y.), 89. ■• Wright V. Lattin, 38 111. 298. ' Oneal v. On, 5 Bush (Ky.), 649. • Yates V. Bachley, 38 "Wis. 185. 'Gocio V. Day, 51 Ark. 46; Dunn v. Bagby, 88 N. Car. 91. 8 Davidson v. Manuf. Co., 99 Mich. 501. 'Caperton v. Stege, 91 Ky. 351. "Capertoni!. Stege, 91 Ky. 351. § 600] ESTATES FOR YEARS. 627 the tenant wrongfully allows them to remain on the prem- ises after the expiration of the lease, he cannot recover rent for such improvements.' If he voluntarily leaves the premises before the expiration of the term, even with the consent of the landlord, he loses his right to be paid for the improvements according to con- tract, unless he reserves the right by a new agreement." But this rule will not apply where the tenant is evicted.' ' Hughes «. Ford, 15 Colo. 330. ' Whittaker v. Barker, 1 Cro. & M. 113. ' Wright V. Lattin, 38 HI. 293. CHAPTEE XV. renting on shares. Article 1. Relation. § 601. Relation of Landlord and Ten- § 608. Title to Crops. ant or Tenants in Common of § 609. Rights of Creditors. the Crops. § 610. Rights Under the Lease. § 602. Intention. § 611. Rights of Purchaser. § 603. Construction of Contract. § 612. Abandonment of Premises. § 604. What Constitutes a Crop. § 613. Removal of Crops. § 605. Feeding the Products to Stock. § 614. Time to Pay Rent. § 606. Rights of the Landlord. § 615. Manure. § 607. Rights of Tenant. § 601. Relation of Landlord and Tenant or Tenants in Common of the Crops. ^ — The renting on shares creates either the relation of landlord and tenant, or that of tenants in com- mon of the crops, according to the terms of the contract and the intention of the parties. If this intention is that the land- lord shall lease the land to the tenant, and that a share of the crop shall be received as rent, the relation of land- lord and tenant exists. Then the landlord's right to the crop attaches only upon a division and delivery of the same." But on the other hand many decisions hold that a letting of lands on shares for a single year or for a series of years is no lease, and does not give the tenant any interest in the land; but he and the landowner are merely tenants in com- mon.' The word tenant will be used in this connection 'Sticliney i>. Stickney, 77 Iowa, 699; Alwood v. Ruckman, 21 111. 200; Creel D. Kirkham, 47111. 344, 347; Walls s. Preston. 25 Cal. 59; Hatchell o. Kim- bough, 4 Jones (N. Car.), 163; Blake v. Coats, 3 Greene (Iowa), 548, Symonds V. Hall, 37 Me. 354; Dixon v. Niccolls, 39 111. 384; Hoskins ». Rhodes, 1 Gill. & J. (Md.) 266; Herskell v. Bushnell, 87 Conn, 43; Burns v. Cooper, 31 Pa. St. 426; Ross «. Swaringer, 9 Ired. (N. Car.) 481; Atkins v. Womeldorf, 53 Iowa, 150; Brown v. Jaquette, 94 Pa. St. 113; Sargent v. Courrier, 66 111. 245; Front B. Hardin, 56 Ind. 165. Compare Warner v. Hoisington, 42 Vt. 94. 2 Connelly. Richmond, 55 Conn. 401; Adams v. State, 87 Ala. 89; Baugh- man v. Reed, 75 Cal. 319; Guest b. Opdyke, 31 N. J. L. 554; Bernal v. Hovious, (628) § 602] RENTING ON SHARES. 629 whether the relation of landlord and tenant exists or not, in order to distinguish the owner of the land from the party- working it. In North Carohna, by statute," all crops raised on the de- mised lands for agricultural purposes vest in the landlord. § 602. Intention. — It is not always clear what the con- struction of the contract is. The intention may be that the title to an undivided portion of the crop shall vest in the owner of the land as grown, thus creating a tenancy in common ; or that the title is to be in the tenant, the amount of rent being fixed by a share of the crop. If the intention be that one shall go upon the farm to work it and the crop to be divided between him and the landlord, and there is no leasing of the lands, the tenant has no estate in the land beyond a license to go upon it to work. The landowner is then in possession of the land and must maintain aU suits to protect his property from injury by third persons. The parties are tenants in common of the crops to the amount of their respective shares from the time of the planting, until raised and divided.' Even call- ing the landlord's share of the crop rent, or using technical terms of a lease, wiU not change this intention.'. Nor does an agreement by the landowner to pay the farmer for one-half the grain produced have that effect.' Where the landlord has no interest in the crop until divi- 17 Cal. 546; BradisU v. ScUenck, 8 Johns. (X. T.), 151; Williams v. Nolen, 34 Ala. 167; Lowe v. Miller, 3 Gratt. (Va.) 205; Fiquet v. Allison, 12 Mich. 330; Currey ■v. Davis, 1 Houst. (Del.) 598; Williams v. Cleaver, 4 Houst. (Del.) 453; Ferrall v. Kent, 4 Gill (Md.), 209; Bishop v. Doty, 1 Vt. 37; Warner ». Hois- ington, 42 Vt. 94; Cooper c. McGrew, 8 Orog. 327; Smith v. Rice, 56 Ala. 417; Ponders. Rhea, 32 Ark. 435; Johnson r. Hoffman, 53 ilo. 504; Swanner r. Swanner, 50 Ala. 66; Moore v. Spruill, 12 Ired. (>r. Car.) 55; Fobes c. Shattuck, 23 Barb. (N. T.) 568; Daniels v. Brown, 34 X. H. 454; Reed r>. McRill, 41 Xebr. 206; Moulton v. Robinson, 27 X. H. 550. ' Code, sect. 1754. ' Creel r. Kirkham, 47 111. 344; Tanner v. Hills, 48 N. T. 662; Chandler v. Thurston, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 205; Jordan v. Staples, 57 Me. 455; Steel v. Frick, 56 Pa. St. 172; Walker e. Fitts, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 191; Delaney v. Root, 99 Mass. 550; Esdon v. Colbum, 28 Tt. 631. ' Taylor v. Bradley, 39 N.T. 129; Chandler v. Thurston, 10 Pick. (Mass. ) 205. * Wilber v. Sison, 53 Barb. (N. T.) 258; 54 N. Y. 131. Compare Tanner v. Hills, 48 X. T. 663. 630 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 603 sion and delivery of the same, until division the crops may be attached by creditors of the lessee." Where the parties are held as tenants in common, the tenant may assign his interest in the crop." The title to the whole may be intended to vest in the ovrner of the land, a share of the crop being given as com- pensation to the cultivator.' The rule seems to be that where the landlord furnishes the land and supplies, and other things of that sort, and keeps a general supervision over the farm, and agrees to pay a certain portion of the crop to the laborer for his work, the laborer is then a cropper and he has no title to any portion of the crops until the division; but where there is a renting, and the relation of landlord and tenant exists, the tenant has a title to his share." And a verbal contract with the tenant that the crop shall belong to the lessor until his debt for supplies is paid, wiU not protect the landlord against the tenant's creditors,' but a mere crop- per has no title to the crops raised on shares until division." § 603. Construction OF Contract. — The conclusion of the authorities is, that each case must depend on its own facts and circumstances, and must be governed by the inten- tion of the parties manifest in their contract. Generally, where the contract is oral and not capable of being exactly proved, it must be left to the jury to determine what the contract is. Whether the lessor has any potential interest depends on the conti'act, which, when uncertain, must be ascertained by the jury. If the contract is that the specific products are to belong to the parties jointly, and are to be divided, he has such potential interest; if the contract is that the lessee is to pay, as rent, a share of the crops or its equivalent, he would have no interest in any specific prop- 'RossB. Swaringer, 9 Ired. (N. Car.) 481; Kelley v. Weston, 20 Me. 232; Deaver v. Rice, 4 Dev. & Bat. (isT. Car.) 431. •' Aikin v. Smith, 21 Vt. 182. Compare Kelley v. Weston, 30 Me. 232. 'Jeter v. Penn, 28 La. Ann. 230. See, also, Wentworth v. Railroad Co., 55 N. H. 540. ■i Almaud v. Scott, 80 Ga. 95. ' Wadley v. Williams, 75 Ga. 373. « Appling «. Odom, 46 Ga. 583; Sims v. Dorsey, 61 Ga. 488. § 604J RENTING ON SHARES. 631 erty so that he could sell, though he has a claim for rent payable at the stipulated time. ' Where it is agreed by oral contract by the parties to farm a lot of land on shares, it being agreed that each was to furnish one-half of the seed and manure, that one should do the hand labor and the other the team work, and that the former should harvest the crops and divide them equally between them, the parties were tenants in common." But where the tenant leased a farm from year to year on shares, giving the owners a share, and having exclusive control of the farm, he is not a tenant in common with the owners.' Each case must depend upon the special terms of the contract, and the subject matter and the surrounding circumstances, in the light of which it is to be interpreted, the question being, as in the case of other contracts, what was the intention of the parties." When the parties are to occupy the premises jointly, and the lease shows their inten- tion that the specific products were to be divided between them, and that they should be jointly owners of the crops, they are tenants in common.' The parties will not be tenants in common when the provisions of the lease show a contract contrary to that construction. ' The fact that parties agree to farm on shares, and one agrees to expend a certain sura of money in the farming operations does not make the parties partners nor consti- tute a partnership.' § 604. What Constitutes a Crop. — When the tenant has a right to the crop, the question comes up whether he has a right to the stalks of a cornfield after he has gath- ered the corn. Thus, where it is agreed that the tenant shall raise a crop of corn on the landlord's land, the tenant ' Orcutt v. Moore, 134 Mass. 48. «Delaney«. Root, 99 Mass. 546. 'Cornell v. Dean, 105 Mass. 435. •Warner v. Abbey, 112 Mass. 355. 'Walker v. Fitts, 34 Pick. (Mass.) 191. 'Connells. Richnnnd, 55 Conn. 401. 'Rose V. Busher (Md.), 27 CM. L. News, 149; 30 At. Rep. 687. See, also. Blue V. Leathers, 15 111. 81; Hallo way ». Brlnkley, 43 Ga. 226. 632 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 605 to divide the crop, the stalks being a substantial use as feed, are to be considered as a part of the crop.' If the tenant has a right to gather the crop after the expiration of the term, he is entitled to free egress and ingress so far as is necessary to gather and remove the crop, but he can- not hold over and exclude the landlord after the time at which he was to surrender.' A mere field cropper for a share of the crop has no right to turn cattle upon the land until the crop is harvested and removed.' And in Iowa he cannot pasture the corn stalks.* The rule is different in Missouri. " § 605. Feeding the Products to Stock. — Frequently the title to the products of leased lands for agricultural purposes is reserved by the lessor. And frequently the products are to be fed to stock, oftentimes jointly owned by the lessor and lessee. In such case the question arises as to the title of the products thus raised to be fed to cattle. Thus, where by the terms of a lease of a farm for dairy purposes, the tenant agreed to take charge of the stock, in which he and his landlord had a joint interest, to raise enough on the place to feed it, and if enough was not raised to buy what was necessary, the tenant owns the products and not the landlord," though the landlord had agreed to buy feed if the tenant did not raise sufficient. So where a tenant is to feed the hay and straw in a careful and farmer-like manner, and if enough is not raised the land- lord is to supply the deficiency, the tenant has the title to the products.' Accordingly where it is stipulated that the tenant shall take good care of the stock, and in case the hay raised is insufficient to feed it, then the landlord will make up the deficiency, and in case there be a surplus the landlord will buy it from the tenant, the title to the ' Moser v. Lower, 48 Mo. App. 85. 'Stoddard «. Waters, 30 Ark. 156. sTantlinger «. Sullivan, 80 Iowa, 218; Kyte v. Keller, 76 Iowa, 34. ^Kyte «. Keller, 76 Iowa, 34. * Moser t. Lower, 48 Mo. App. 85. 8 Colville v. Miles 137 N. T. 159, reversing 45 Hun, 336, and disapproving Heald v. Ins. Co., Ill Mass. 38. 'Johnson v. Crofoot, 53 Barb. (N. Y.) 574; 37 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 59. § 606] RENTING ON SHRAES. 633 produce is in the tenant." In like manner where the lessee is to feed the fodder on the leased farm to the landlord's stock which he also leased, and to winter the stock through to grass in the spring, the hay belongs to the lessee and may be sold under execution in the fall so as to prevent him from keeping the cattle through the winter.' Under the same rule where a farm, with tools, cows and other stock was leased for a term of years, the landlord to have a share of the grain and potatoes, and half of the calves and half of the lambs and half of the wool, the hay belongs to the tenant although the lessor agreed to furnish stock to eat all the hay that should grow.' And where by the terms of the agreement one-half of the hay cut on the leased farm is to be eaten by the stock kept on the farm and the other half of the hay to be divided equally be- tween the lessor and the lessee, the title to the hay belongs to the occupier until division and delivery." However, in Massachusetts it has been decided in a simi- lar case that the clause in the lease amounted to a reserva- tion of the title to the owner of the land." § 606. Rights of the Landlord. — Unless otherwise pro- Tided by agreement or custom, a crop should be divided from time to time as considerable parts thereof shall be gathered, especially where the gathering of the whole is delayed for a considerable length of time. There is no reason ordinarily why it should not be done, and reason of convenience, economy and safety of the parts of the crops gathered, and the security of the rights of the parties in- terested strongly suggest that such division takes place.' In North CaroUna, by statute, ' all crops raised on the demised land for agricultural purposes are vested in posses- sion of the landlord; so the denial by the lessee in an ' McCombs V. Becker, 3 Hun (N. Y.), 343; 5 Thomp. & Cooke, 550. • Hawkins «. Giles, 45 Hun (N. T,), 318. See, also, Steffln v. Steffln, 4 Civ. Pr. Rep. 179. ' Turner ». Batchelder, 17 Me. 357. ^Symonds v. Hall, 37 Me. 854. See, also, Orcutt v. Moore, 134 Mass. 48. 'Heald v. Ins. Co., Ill Mass. 38. Compare Orcutt v. Moore, 134 Mass. 48; Colville V. Miles, 137 N. Y. 159. « Smith V. Tindall 107 N. Car. 88; Rich v. Hobson, 113 N. Car. 79. 'Code, sect. 1754. 80 634 CLASSIFICATIOK OF ESTATES. [§ 607 action by the lessor for the possession, of certain crops, that possession was vested in the lessor, excuses the les- sor's failure to make demand before action brought.' When there is no right of re-entry reserved upon failure to perform the covenants or conditions of the agreement, nor any stipulation therein that a failure to perform shall operate as a forfeiture or termination of the lease, the landlord cannot enter." So under a lease of land, in which is stricken out the usual printed clause giving the lessor a right of re-entry in case the covenants are broken, and which stipulates that the land shall be farmed in a husband- man-hke manner, and that if the tenant fails to do so, the lessor shaU have the right to cause it to be done and de- duct the expense from the lessee's share of the products, the landlord cannot re-enter upon the tenant's failure to comply with his covenants."' The lease may give only the right of re-entry and pos- session of the stock and farming tools and utensils rented with the farm in case the lessee fails to work the farm in a good and workman-like manner, and not to autliorize the seizure of the crops for such breach.* Where the ten- ant agrees to deliver to the landlord portions of all crops grown on the farm, "including the present growing crop of clover seed," the lessor is entitled to the whole crop of clover. ° And the lessee must deliver to the landlord his share and not the net proceeds of his portion. " § 607. Eights of Tenant. — Though the tenant may be only a cropper, yet he has rights. So, where it is agreed that the tenant shall plow the landlord's land in the fall and raise a crop of corn thereon the next year, the tenant to have a share of the crop and the lessor the remainder, and nothing is said as to the duration of the contract, the tenant becomes a mere cropper and not a tenant, but has a right to his portion of the stalks.' Nor would a tenant 1 Rich V. Hobson, 113 N. Car. 79. spickard v. Kleis, 56 Mich. 604, 609. ' Hanaw v. Bailey, 83 Mich. 34. *Koeleg « Phelps, 80 Mich. 466. 'Kloster v. Elliott, 123 Ind. 176. 'Richmond v. Connell, 55 Conn. 403. ' Moser v. Lower, 48 Mo. App. 85. § 608] EENTING ON SHAKES. 636 lose his right to his share of the straw because it was not divided before the expiration of the term before he left the farm. The straw is not an emblement, because an emble- ment is a crop left growing on the farm by the outgoing tenant; hence, the tenant has a right to his share of the straw when it is divided, though he has left the premises." Where a tenant leases land to plow and put in wheat in a farm-like manner, whether such contract is considered a lease or a cropping contract, the person sowing the crop has no right in any land except that which he sows in wheat, and is not entitled to any of the volunteer crop growing upon adjoining land not sown by himself." And when a tenant is to give the landlord a net portion of a dairy on the farm, the tenant is not entitled to an allow- ance for the expense of making and preparing the dairy product, but will be allowed his necessary expense in trans- porting it to market and disposing of it there. ° An agreement by which a party is to pay a certain amount and take and work a crop put in by a former tenant, and give the landowner a share, his own share to be bound for the amount, constitutes such party a tenant, and the title to the crop raised is in him.' § 608. Title to Crops. — A worker on a farm may be only a servant, though he receives a portion of the crop for his labor. Thus, where a tenant retains the control of the farm, and croppers work it under his directions, and are to receive a part of the crop as wages for their labor, the relation between them and the tenant is not that of landlord and tenant, but of master and servant; and a sale by them to the tenant's lessor of a part of the crop before the master is fully paid for his portion of the crop and ad- vances he had made to them, passes no title to the landlord.* And where a cropper under an agreement by which the landowner is to furnish teams, utensils and supplies to ' Wood V. Noack, 84 Wis. 398. ' Shaw V. Mayer, 95 Cal. 301 'Reybold v. Reybold, 6 Houst. (Del.) 430. * Bryant ». Pugh, 86 Ga. 535. » Bryant v. Pugh, 86 Ga. 535. See, also, Oberlies v. Willis, 30 Nebr. 705. 636 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 609 make a crop which is to remain the landowner's, the crop- per to have w^hat remains after deducting his share for the use of the land and enough to pay for the supphes fur- nished, has no tille to any part of the crop until his share is set apart to him.' The authorities are somewhat conflicting as to what words will constitute a contract one of lease and what will constitute one of hire. The general rule is that the charac- ter of the contract to work land on shares is to be determined by ascertaining the intention of the parlies as expressed in the language that they have used. If the language used imports a present demise of any character by which any interest in the land passes to the occupier, or by which he obtains the right of exclusive possession, the contract be- comes one of lease, and the relation of landlord and tenant is created. If, on the other hand, there be no language in the contract importing a conveyance of any interest in the land, but by the express terms of the contract the general possession of the land is reserved by the owner, the occu- pier becomes a mere cropper and the relation of master and servant exists between him and the owner." In case of renting on shares, if the landlord takes posses- sion of all the crop when gathered, without any legal pro- ceeding or permission from the tenant, he is guilty of con- version as to the tenant's share of the crop.' § 609. Eights of Creditors.— In Delaware the rental value of a crop of wheat sown by an outgoing tenant in the fall, before his tenancy expires, on a sale of the de- mised premises upon a judgment against the landlord in the meanwhile, and a purchase of them by another, may be apportioned in proceedings against the landlord in which the tenant is garnished.' The landlord and tenant may by agreement provide that all the crops raised upon the ' Hammock d. Creekmore, 48 Ark. 364; Hendricks ». Smith (Ark.), 13 S. W. Rep. 781. See, also, Woodward «. Conder, 33 Mo. App. 147. 2 Haywood «. Rogers, 73 N. Car. 330; Adams v. McKesson, 53 Pa. St. 81; Esdon ■». Colburn, 38 Vt. 631; Wentwortli v. Miller, 53 Cal. 9; Grays. Robin- son (Ariz.), 33 Pac. Rep. 713. 2 Marlowe ». Rogers (Ala.), 14 South. Rep. 790. ■» Kent County Ins. Co. v. Burrows, 6 Houst. (Del.) 355. § 610] RENTING ON SHAKES. 637 land may be delivered to and remain the property of the landlord in order to protect his interest.' § 610. Rights Under the Lease —The tenant has no rights paramount to those given in the lease. Authority given by a landlord to his tenant to clear land for cul- tivation, or to use the land and take care of it, does not confer upon the tenant power to sell the growing timber on such parts of the land as he does not clear." Culti- vating land on which there is a young orchard, and thereby injuring the trees, make the tenant liable to the landlord for damages to the orchard.' And where land is leased on the agreement that the manure made on the farm shall be used on the land, the lessor may maintain an action ex contractu for a breach of the agreement, or he may sue in tort for the conversion of the manure.* If the cropper agrees to take the crops to market, biit fails to do so and stores them on the farm, this does not make him guilty of conversion.' Where the performance of the conditions in the lease is a condition precedent to the tenant's acquiring the title to the crop, he must per- form the condition before obtaining lawful possession of it. Thus, where the husband has entire control of the farm, jointly owned by himself and wife, and leases it, reserving a lien on the increase of the stock to secure the performance of the condition of the lease, such increase is not liable for the debts of the tenant until dehvered to him after performance of the conditions. ° The landlord and tenant may, by agreement, provide that all the crops raised upon the land may be delivered to and remain the property of the landlord, and be disposed of by him, and such agreements vdll protect the title of the landlord in the property against attaching creditors of the ' Farnum v. Hefner, 79 Cal. 575; Howell v. Foster, 65 Cal. 169; Bdson v. Colburn, 28 Vt. 631; Briggs ®. Oaks, 36 Vt. 138; Paris v. Vail, 18 Vt. 277; Smith V. Atkins, 18 Vt. 461. 'Ladd V. Shattock, 90 Ala. 134. ' Thompson ». Cummings, 39 Mo. App. 537. * Brown v. Magorty, 156 Mass. 209. ' Forehand ». Jones, 84 Ga. 508. ' Pelton V. Draper, 61 Vt. 364. 638 . CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 611 tenant, when such agreement is made for the pfotection of the landlord in case of advancement by him, or for some other valuable consideration.' But such a rule cannot apply where the property, or part of it, delivered to the landlord, is to be immediately redelivered to and become the property of the tenant." § 611. Rights of Purchaser. — As between the lessor and his lessee on shares, growing crops are personal prop- erty, and they may be sold by parol as against a subse- quent grantee, especially where the latter has notice of such sale.' In Maryland the landlord has a lien on the whole crop for his rent. However, if the purchaser buys the tenant's share and the tenant delivers the grain to the designated warehouse, and there makes a division to the landlord and the purchaser, the landlord cannot carry away both shares, and if he does he is guilty of conversion of the purchaser's share.* If the premises are mortgaged, the tenant may purchase the premises when sold under foreclosure and thereby ex- tinguish the tenancy, if there be no redemption. So when a tenant agrees to pay a share of the crop in the fall after harvested, and the land is sold under the mortgage and bought by the lessee, this extinguishes the tenancy, and the crops growing on the premises at the time of sale fol- low the reversion and the lessee becomes the owner of it as an incident to his purchase,' there being no redemption. When a purchaser buys the tenant's share before division, if such share is salable, he takes no more than the tenant has. He cannot rely on a want of notice of the contract between the landlord and tenant. The purchaser cannot assume what the tenant's share is. No question of innocent pur- chaser can arise. The purchaser knows the tenant's inter- est is derived through the contract with the landlord, and that he will only take the tenant's interest whatever that 'Howell®. Foster, 65 Cal. 169; Smith v. Atkins, 18 Vt. 461; Paris®. Vail, 18 Vt. 277; Briggs «. Oaks, 26 Vt. 138; Edson v. Oolburn, 28 Vt. 631. « Farnum v. Hefner, 79 Cal. 575. ' Nuernberger ». Von Der Heidt, 39 111. App. 404. "Hopper e. Haines, 71 Md. 64. ' Culverhouse v. Worts, 33 Mo. App. 419. §§ 612-613] RENTING ON SHARES. 639 may be. The purchaser can readily go to the lessor and ascertain what the tenant's share is. If he does not do so, he can only take the tenant's share, and cannot defeat their contract by a subsequent purcha,se upon any pretense of innocent purchaser.' And so where there is a parol modification of a written lease, and the purchaser depends upon the written lease, without actual notice of this sub- sequent parol agreement, his rights cannot exceed those of the tenant himself under the parol agreement." § 612. Abandonment op Premises. — The tenant may lose his crop by abandonment of the premises without cause. Thus, if a tenant leases a farm for a term of years on shares but rescinds the agreement and abandons the land, he loses all rights to the growing crops. The lease not be- ing terminated by the lessor, but by the lessee's violation of" the agreement under which he holds, the doctrine of emblements does not apply." When he abandons the premises he surrenders the contract, and the crops become a part of the land and goes with it.* But if the lessor should compel the tenant to abandon the premises before termination of the lease, by acts in violation of the agree- ment, and gathers and markets the crops, he is hable to the lessee for the latter's portion. ' § 613. Removal of Crops. — In some States a removal of the crops without the landlord's consent is made a misde- meanor. Where such rule prevails, if the tenant re- moves the crops without the consent of, or required notice to, the landlord, he violates the law, though the removal of the crops be for the purpose of finding storage, there being no place on the premises to place them. ° But after the crops have been divided and the landlord receives his ' Meacham v. Herndon, 86 Tenn. 366. ' Meacham v. Herndon, 86 Tenn. 366, distinguishing Jones v. Chamberlin, 5 Heisk. (Tenn.) 310. ' Kiplinger v. Green, 61 Mich. 340. * Chandler®. Thurston 10 Pick. (Mass.) 305; Carpenter s. Jones, 63 111. 517. ' Young V. Gay, 41 La. Ann. 758; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 48 Hun (N. Y.), 143. • State V. Williams, 106 N. Car. 646. 640 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 614-615 share, then the tenant may, remove his part,' because what- ever relation exists between them has ceased." § 614. Time to Pay Rent.— As a rule, when not other- wise provided, the crop should be divided from time to time as considerable parts thereof shall be harvested.' And when laud is cultivated for a year on shares, the lessor agreeing to furnish the teams and the agricultural implements and supplies, the lessee to furnish the labor, the right of the lessor to demand his rent and pay for advances is when the crop is gathered and ready for divi- sion." And after the crops have been made, it is too late to raise objections to the manner of cultivation." Of course, a reasonable time during the term will be allowed, a reasonable time to make the division.' And the tenant has a reasonable time after the maturity of the crops to gather them, and if any loss in the amount made and gathered on the place occurs by reason of the fact that the crops were not gathered in time, the tenant may show that such loss did not occur by reason of any fault or neglect on his part but by reason of providential inter- ference. ' § 615. Manure.— A tenant under a farming lease or contract has no right to remove from the premises he oc- cupies without an express stipulation to that effect, any manure made in whole or in part from the land.' The manure is not regarded as a product of the land to which the tenant is exclusively entitled, but is compost resulting from the consumption or decay of this product, and re- ' Jordan c. Bryan, 103 N. Car. 59. « Curtis V. Cash, 84 N. Car. 41. ' Smith V. Tindall, 107 N. Car. 88; Rich v. Hobson, 113 N. Car. 79. * Jordan ». Bryan, 103 N. Car. 59. ' Young e. Gay, 41 La. Ann. 758. "Harrison v. Clifton, 75 Iowa, 737. ' Rawlins «. Bush, 80 Ga. 588. sPulteney v. Shelton, 5 Ves. 147, note 3; Onslow's Case, 16 Yes. 173; Fay V. Muzzey, 13 Gray (Mass.), 53, 55; Lassell v. Reed, 6 Me. 333; Goodrich v. Jones, 3 HIU (N. Y.), 143; Middlebrook v. Corwin, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 169; Wetherbee v. Ellison, 19 Vt. 379; Plumer v. Plumer, 30 K. H. 558; Lathropp V. Marsh, 5 Ves. 359, 260n; Daniels v. Pond, 31 Pick. (Mass.) 867. § 615] RENTING ON SHARES. 641 quired by the land to repair the waste to which it has been subject in producing the crops consumed. And it is for that reason that the law holds manure in such a case to be an acGi'etion of the land, which the tenant cannot remove.' It is equally well settled that this rule does not apply to manure made in a hvery stable or in a manner not con- nected with agriculture or in a course of husbandry, and if in such case the tenant of the livery stable or the person thus making the manure upon the land of an- other, owns the manure entirely distinct from the real estate, he has the right to remove it or dispose of it as he pleases." So a tenant at will, who feeds cattle on the premises from his own hay, bought for that purpose, may remove the manure it makes from the premises.^ And he may re- move it after the expiration of his lease/ ' Gallagher v. Shipley, 34 Md. 418. 'JfiumerB. Plumer, 30 N. H. 558; Daniels ». Pond, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 367; Terry ». Carr, 44 N. H. 118; Godard v. Gould, 14 Barb. (N. Y.) 662; Wing v. Gray, 36 Vt. 261; Corey v. Bishop, 48 N. H. 146. 'Corey «. Bishop, 48 N. H. 146. < Fletcher ». Herring, 112 Mass. 382. 81 OHAPTEE XVI. estates at will ai?d tenancies prom year to year. Article 1. Tenancy at Will. % 616. Deflnitlon. § 622. "Written Demise Without Du- § 617. Entering Under a Verbal Lease ration of Term or Reserva- — Void by the Statute of tion of Rent. Frauds. § 623. Termination of the Estate. I 618. Estates at Will Distinguished. § 624. Termination of Notice. § 619. Implied Tenancy at Will. § 635. Denial of Landlord's Title. § 620. Contract for a Lease. ^ 636. Notice by Action. § 631. Entering Under a Verbal Con- § 627. Notice— Interval of Time. tract to Purchase. § 616. Definition. — An estate at will is where the land- lord lets land to the tenant, to hold at the will of the lessor,' and it may be determined instanter bv a demand of possession, though the tenant may enter afterwards for the purpose of removing his goods, without being a trespasser." Estates at will, in the strict sense, have become almost extinguished, under the operation of judicial decisions. Now a tenancy at will is defined as a grant or contract, and that general tenancies are constructively taken to be tenancies from year to year. ° A tenancy at will is now scarcely distinguishable from a mere permissive occupa- tion. If a tenancy be created by express words clearly showing it to be the agreement of the parties that it shall continue only so long as both parties please, it is an estate at will, although rent be reserved payable by the year or part of a year.* A simple permission to occupy creates a tenancy at will, unless there are circumstances to show an intention to create a tenancy from year to year." ' Litt. sect. 68. s Doe «. M'Kaeg, 10 Barn. & C. 731. See, also, Pratt v. Parrar, 10 Allen (Mass), 519; Antoni«. Belknap, 102 Mass. 193. 3 Clayton «. Blakey, 8 Term Rep. 3. * Richardson B. Langridge, 4 Taunt. 138; Harrison v. Middleton, 11 Gratt. (Va.) 527; Sullivan v. Enders, 3 Dana (Ky.), 66. ' Doe V. Wood, 14 Mees. & Wels. 683; Lockwood ■». Lockwood, 33 Conn. (642) § 617] ESTATES AT WILL AND TENANCIES. 6i3 It was settled upon principle of justice and poUcy, that estates at wiU were equally at wiU of both parties, and neither of them was permitted to exercise his pleasure in a wanton manner, and contrary to equity or good faith. The tenant had the right of ingress and egress to gather his crops,' and in fact had the possession of the land until the crop was harvested.' Nor could the tenant before the time arrived to pay rent, determine the estate, so as to cut off the landlord from his rent. ' He had the right to estovers and a reasonable time to remove his family.* He was not responsible for permissive waste nor bound to make repairs; but was hable for commissive waste.' § 617. ENTERiNa Under a Yerbal Lease— Void by the Statute of Frauds.- -Where one enters and occupies land under a verbal lease for a term of years, void by the statute of frauds, and pays no rent reserved, he becomes and re- mains a tenant at will and is not liable beyond the period of his occupation." Such lease is ineffectual to vest any term whatever in the lessee, and when he goes into posses- sion under it, with the consent of the lessor, in the absence of any other agreement, he becomes a tenant at will merely, subject to liability to pay, at the rate of the stipulated rent for the use and occupation. ' It now seems settled that an entry under a void lease for years, or under a void lease for one or more years, to com- 425; Hunt v. Morton, 18 111. 75; Hall v. Wadsworth, 38 Vt. 410; Huger «. Dibble, 8 Rich. (S. Car.) 332. 'Litt. sec. 68; Co. Litt. 55a. ' Boraston v. Green, 16 East. 71. 3 Leighton b. Theed, 3 Salk. 413. *Ellis V. Paige, 1 Fick. (Mass.) 43; Co. Litt. 55b, 56a; Litt. sec. 69; Davis v. Thompson, 13 Me. 309; Brown v. Thurston, 56 Me. 126. »Co. Litt. 57a; Phillips v. Covert, 7 Johns. fS. Y.) 1; Daniels b. Pond, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 369. ' Talamo v. Spitzmiller, 120 N.Y. 37; Barlow v. Wainwright, 23 Vt. 88; Doe «. Stennett, 3 Esp. 717; Hegan v. Johnson, 3 Taunt. 148; Knight v. Benett, 3 Bing. 361; Riseley v. Ryle, 11 Mees. & Wels. 16; Thurber v. Dwyer, 10 R. I. 355; Kerr v. Clark, 19 Mo. 133; Eidgley v. Stillwell, 38 Mo. 400; Shepherd v. Cummings, 1 Cold. (Tenn.) 354; Dumn v. Rothermel, 113 Pa. St. 373; Kop- litz V. Gustavus, 48 Wis. 48; Eeeder d. Sayre, 70 N.Y. 184; Laughran v. Smith, 75 N. Y. 209. ' Talamo v. Spitzmiller, 120 N. Y. 37; Jellett v. Rhode, 43 Mimi. 166. 644 CLASSIFICATIO]Sr OF ESTATES. [§ 618 mence infuturo, followed by payment of rent, may create a yearly tenancy, if the tenant holds over upon the expira- tion of the first year. The mere fact of entry does not have that effect, and the creation of a tenancy from year to year depends upon something more than occupation for part of a year. "While it is not required that a new contract shall be made in express terms, there must be something from which it may be inferred, something which tends to show that it is within the intentions of the parties. The pay- ment and receipt of an installment or aliquot part of the rent is evidence of such understanding, and goes in support of a yearly tenancy, and without explanation to the con- trary it is controlling evidence for that purpose.' At no time can a parol demise, void under the statute of frauds, be resorted to for the purpose of ascertaining the duration of the term; ' but it may be valid so far as it reg- ulates the amount of rent to be paid." § 618. Estates at Will Distinguished.— Tenancies at will, where no rent is reserved, can be terminated instan- ter upon notice.* The reservation of annual rent is the leading circumstance that turns leases from uncertain terms into leases from year to year. ° Where a tenant for a term of years holds over at the expiration of the term, he becomes a tenant from year to year, and is entitled to ' Cox «. Bent, 5 Bing. 185; Bishop ®. Howard, 3 Barn. & C. 100; Braythwayte V. Hitchcock, 10 Mees. &Wels. 494; Mann«. Lovejoy, Ryan& M. 355; Tliomas V. Packer, 1 Hurl. & N. 672; Doe v. Crago, 6 C. B. 90; Reeder v. Sayre 70 N. T. 184; Laugliran ». Smith, 75 N. Y. 209; Talamo v. Spitzmiller, 130 K Y. 37; Wolf V. Dozer, 32 Kans. 436; Atwood v. Norton, 81 Ga. 507; Delano v. Monta- gue, 4 GTush. (Mass.) 42; Olt e. Lohnas, 19 III. 576; Wheeler v. Frankenthal, 78 111. 134; Briar v. Robertson, 19 Mo. App. 66; Parker v. Hollis, 50 Ala. 411; White ■». Holland, 17 Oreg. 3; Johnson v. Albertson, 51 Minn. 333. 'Haines v. Beach, 90 Mich. 563; Wheeler v. Frankenthal, 78 111. 134. sMarr v. Ray, 151 111. 340; 50 111. App. 415. < Izon V. Gorton, 5 Bing. N. 0. 501. "Herrell v. Sizeland, 81 111. 457; Lockwood «. Lockwood, 32 Conn. 425j Right V. Darby, 1 Term Rep. 159; Hunt i>. Morton, 18 111. 75- Squires v. Huff, 3 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.)17; McDowell v. Simpson, 3 Watts (Pa.), 139; Godard V. Railroad Co., 2 Rich. (S. Car.) 346; Crommelin it. Thiess, 31 Ala. 419; Den ■0. Drake, 14 N. J. L. 523. § 619] ESTATES AT WILL AND TENANCIES. 645 hold till the end of the current year, and cannot be re- quired to quit at an intermediate day.' And if he has an election to renew the lease, he cannot elect to take prem- ises different from those named in the writing, and by hold- ing over several years becomes a tenant from year to year.' If rent is reserved, and notice to quit is required, it is a tenancy from year to year; and if the length is an indeter- minate period of tenancy it is governed by the time of paying the rent." In Maine and Massachusetts the doctrine of tenancies from year to year has not been adopted.' In Maine, a verbal lease at an annual rent, for any period, creates a tenancy at will." And in Massachusetts, parties continu- ing upon the premises upon an agreement for a new lease are tenants at will. " In New York, a landlord has an option to treat a tenant from year to year holding over as a tres- passer or as a tenant for another year. ' A strict tenant at will, as formerly held, is not entitled to notice to quit;' but the i-ule now seems to be that ten- ants at will are regarded as holding from year to year, so far as to be entitled to notice to quit, before they can be evicted by process of law." But there are decisions which do not coincide with this doctrine in full. '° § 019. Implied Tenancy at Will. — An implied tenancy at will in the modern sense is when the tenant is in posses- ' Phoenixville u. Walters, 147 Pa. St. 501. = Baltimore, Ohio & Chicago R. R. Co. v. Railroad Co., 137 111. 9. 'Doidge V. Bowers, 3 Mees. & Wels. 365; Hunt v. Morton, 18 111. 75; Rich ■B. Bolton, 46 Vt. 84; Williams d. Deriar, 31 Mo. 1. ^Witters ®. Larrabee, 48 Me. 570; Moore v. Boyd, 34 Me. 243; Hilbourn «. Pogg, 99 Mass. 11; Buuton e. Richardson, 10 Allen (Mass.), 260; Furlong v. Leary, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 409; Walker v. Furbush, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 366; Rising «. Stannard, 17 Mass. 282. ' Withers v. Larrabee, 48 Me. 570 ' Emmons v. Scudder, 115 Mass. 867. ' Schuyler v. Smith, 51 N. T. 309. See, also, Wolffe v. Wolff, 69 Ala. 549. * Jackson -o. Bradt, 2 Caines (K Y.), 169. 'Lamed v. Hudson, 60 N. Y. 102; Parker v. Constable, 3 Wils. 25; Right ■e. Beard, 13 East, 211; Jackson t>. Bryan, 1 Johns. (N. Y.) 322; Jackson v. Wheeler, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 272; Ellis v. Paige, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 43. '» Dean v. Comstock, 32 111. 173; Dolittle v. Eddy, 7 Barb. (N. Y.) 74; Bur- nett V. Caldwell, 9 Wall. (U. S.) 290. 646 CLASSIFICATION' OF ESTATES. [§619 sion of premises with the privity and consent of the land- lord, but no express tenancy or term certain has been cre- ated, nor anything been done by the owner to expressly recognize him as a tenant.' Such tenancy will be the case where one is permitted to enter into possession under a contract for the purchase of the land, or for a future lease of the same;' or if he enters under an agreement for a lease, in which case that tenancy will continue until he pays rent for a year or some portion of a year having reference to a year/ The tenant wiU not be liable for rent unless there is an express agreement to that effect.' If the contract for purchase or lease fails by the fault of the occupier, he will be held liable for the rent.' His fail- ure to perform makes him a trespasser ah initio ; or the rent may be asked for as damages suffered from his breach of contract." A grantor who remains in possession after the delivery of his deed to the purchaser and a judgment debtor who continues after the sale of the land under execution, to hold by consent of the purchaser, are also tenants at will.' If such holding is without consent of grantee, he will be liable in trespass. " 'Doe v. Quigley, 3 Camp. 505; Right ». Beard, 13 Bast, 211, "Gould V. Thompson, 4 Met. (Mass.) 234; Dean «. Corastock, 33 111. 180; Hamerton ». Stead, 3 Barn. & Cress. 478; Riseley «. Ryle, 11 Mees. & Wels. 16; Goodtitle v. Herbert, 4 Term Rep. 680; Doe v. Browne, 8 East, 165; Silsby V, Allen, 43 Vt. 177; Harris ®. Frink, 49 N. Y. 32; Freeman i). Headley, 33 N. J. L. 523; Glascock «.. Robards, 14 Mo. 350; Cole v. Gill, 14 Iowa, 529; Jones ®. Jones, 3 Rich. (S. Car.) 543. ^ Braythwayte v. Hitchcock, 10 Mees. & Wels. 494. ■• CofEman v. Huck, 24 Mo. 496; Cunningham v. Holton, 55 Me. 33; Wood- bury v. Woodbury, 47 N. H. 11; Harle v. McCoy, 7 J. J. Marsh (Ky.), 319. ^Tancred «. Christy, 12 Mees._ & Wels. 316; Hall ». Transportation Co., 34 N. T. 391; Hogsett v. Ellis, 17 Mich. 367; Howard v. Shaw, 8 Mees. & Wels. 118. * Johnson v. Beauchamp, 9 Dana (Ky.), 134; Chamberlin «. Donahue, 44 Vt. 59; Burnett «. Caldwell, 9 Wall. (U. 8.) 293; Brewer «. Conover, 18 N. J. L. 215; Smith «. Stewart, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 46; Clough u Hosford, 6 N. H. 231. Compare Hull ». Vaughan, 6 Price, 157; Boston b. Binney, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 9; Forbes v. Smiley, 56 Me. 174; Gould v. Thompson, 4 Met. (Mass.) 228. 'Currier v. Earl, 13 Me. 216; Nichols v. Williams, 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 13. 8 Tew ». Jones, 13 Mees. & Wels. 12 §§620-621] ESTATES AT WILL AND TENANCIES. 647 § 620. Contract for a Lease. — If a party enters under a contract for a lease, and no rent is paid and the lease is never executed, he is a tenant at wiU. Thus, a tenant had a contract for a lease for a term of years and entered under it. The landlord tendered the lease but the tenant refused to accept it because the landlord had not completed build- ings on the premises according to agreement. This refusal of the tenant to accept made him a tenant at wiU.' No rent having, at any time, been paid and accepted, he was only a tenant at will." Payment of rent would have raised the tenancy to one from year to year.' And if he had under protest paid rent according to tlie contract, he might have done so without surrendering substantial rights legal or equitable.* If the tenant has received the required notice to quit, but holds over pending negotiations for a new lease, which are never consummated, such a holding is an estate at wlH." Or if the tenant enters with a promise of receiving a lease which is never executed and tendered to him, he is a ten- ant at will, never having paid rent." § 621. Entering Under a Verbal Contract to Pur- chase. — A verbal contract to purchase is void under the statute of frauds. So the entry under such verbal contract makes the person in possession a tenant at will. ' He is a tenant at will of the owner, having occupied by permission without a lease or rent or valid contract to purchase. ° A part performance of an oral lease within the statute of frauds in Iowa, is not sufficient to take it out of the statute." ' Weed V. Lindsay, 88 Ga. 686. 'Chapman v. Towner, 6 Mees. & Wels. 100; Anderson v. Railroad Co., 3 El. & El. 614; Anderson v. Prlndle, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 616; Dunne v. Trustees, 39 111. 578. 3 Walsh V. Lonsdale, L. R. 31 Oh. D. 9. ^Lamare v. Dixon, 6 Eng. & Ir. App. 414. 'Fall V. Moore, 45 Minn. 515. "Childers «. Lee (N. Mex.), 25 Pac. Rep. 781. 'Hall V. Wallace, 88 Cal. 434; Hamerton v. Stead, 3 Barn. & Ores. 478; Silsby V. Allen, 43 Vt. 177; Freeman v. Headley, 33 N. J. L. 533. » Jones V. Shay, 50 Cal. 508; Frisbie v. Price, 37 Cal. 253; Simpson v. Apple- gate, 75 Cal. 345. 'Thorp V. Bradley, 75 Iowa, 50; Hunt v. Coe, 15 Iowa, 197; Burden v. Knight, 83 Iowa, 584. 648 classificatioit of estatks. [§§ 622-623 § 622. Wbitten Demise Without Duration of Teem or Reservation of Eent. — It is essential that rent be reserved to make a tenant from year to year. So a written demise without reservation of rent or any duration of the term creates a strict tenancy at will.' Where there is no reser- vation of rent and no duration or limit of the term, the lease cannot be regarded as having created any greater estate than a strict tenancy at will." § 623. Termination of the Estate. — An estate at wiU at common law may be terminated by either party by direct notice or by acts which are inconsistent with the continu- ance of the relation of landlord and tenant.' It will term- inate on the death of the lessor,* and if the lessee dies his personal representatives have no right to possession under the tenancy:' though the tenancy will continue if a co lessee sm-vives.' The estate will be terminated if the landlord conveys his estate. ' And this is so though the sale is merely colorable and made to terminate the tenancy.' And so a written lease will have the same effect." So wiU an assignment by the tenant at will if the lessor has notice; otherwise not. '° ' Amick «. Brubaker, 101 Mo. 473. « Lamed v. Iludsoa, 60 N. Y. 103. 3 Doe V. M'Kaeg, 10 Barn. & Oress. 721; Esty ®. Baker, 50 Me. 335; Den v. Howell, 7 Ired. (N. Car.) 496; Holly ». Brown, 14 Conn. 255; Clark «.Wheelock, 99 Mass. 15; Turner v. Doe, 9 Mees. & Wels. 643; Jackson v. Aldrich, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 106. * Manchester v. Doddridge, 3 Ind. 360. 5 Cody D. Quarterman, 13 Ga. 386; Reed v. Reed, 48 Me. 388; Howard v. Merriam, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 563; James v. Dean, 11 Ves. 391; Morton v. Woods, L. R. 4 Q. B. 393. 8 Co. Litt. 55b. ■■ McFarlan v. Chase, 7 Gray (Mass.), 462; Robinson ». Deering, 56 Me. 357; Rooney v. Gillespie, 6 Allen (iVTass.), 74; Stedman «. Gassett, 18 Vt. 346; Hemp- hill ». Tevis, 4 Watts & S. (Pa.) 535; Hill ». Jordan, 30 Me. 367; Morse «. Goddard, 13 Met. (Mass.) 177; Howard «. Merriam, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 563. * Curtis ®. Galvin, 1 Allen (Mass.), 315. 'Alexander v. Carew, 13 Allen (Mass.), 70; Pratt v. Farrar, 10 Allen (Mass.), 519; Casey v. King, 98 Mass. 503; Furlong «. Leary, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 409. "Pratt V. Farrar, 10 Allen (Mass.), 519; Pinhorn v. Souster, 8 Bxch. 763; Co. Litt. 57a; Kelly v. Waite, 13 Met. (Mass ) 300; Cole v. Lake Co., 54 N. H. 277; Sprague b. Quin, 108 Mass. 554; Cooper s. Adams, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 87. . §§ 624-625] ESTATES AT WILL AND TENANCIES. 649 § 624. Tekmination by Notice.— A strict tenant at will, in the original signification of that tenancy, is not entitled to notice to quit.' If the party goes into possession with the consent of the owner, and for an indefinite period, he is entitled to notice to quit, as held by many decisions," though the authorities conflict. But this matter of notice is now generally regulated by statute. So if a tenant enters for an indefinite time, rent payable monthly, this creates a tenancy at will, and the tenant must have the necessary statutory notice in order to terminate the tenancy.' Where a tenancy is terminable upon notice and demand of possession, and such demand and notice have been given terminating such tenancy, it is not necessary that a new notice shall be given after the expiration of the tenancy. * Where the tenancy at will is an estate upon condition or limitation, and the condition is broken, or the limitation expires, no notice is required to determine the tenancy.' § 625. Denial op Landlord's Title. — If the tenant de- nies the title of his lessor, he is not entitled to any notice to quit before suit against him for possession.' A tenant at will or sufferance who repudiates the relation of land- lord and tenant, asserts an adverse ownership of his lessor and, thereafter may be treated as a tenant at will, and no notice is necessary to terminate his tenancy.' And no no- tice is required where the tenancy is determined by the tortious acts of the tenant.' ' Jackson ». Bradt, 2 Caines, 169; Doe v. Baker, 4 Dev. (N. Car.) 220; Brown «. Keller, 33 111. 153; Hall v. Burgess, 5 Barn. Cress. 332; Elliot v. Stone, 1 Gray (Mass.), 571; Dean v. Comstnck, 32 111. 173; Burnett v. Caldwell, 9 Wall. {U. S.) 290. 'Rights. Beard, 13 East, 311; Parker v. Constable, 3 Wils. 25; Jackson®. Wheeler, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 272; Phillips v. Covert, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 1, 4; Jackson v. Bryan, 1 Johns. (N. Y.) 323; Larned v. Hudson, 60 N. Y. 102. * Haines ®. Beach, 90 Mich. 563. ■•Morris Canal and Banking Co. v. Mitchell, 31 N. J. L. 99; State ii. Rich- ards (N. J.), 34 At. Rep. 576. 'Bolton V. Landers, 37 Cal. 105; Elliott «. Stone, 1 Gray (Mass.), 575. 'Bodwell Granite Co.i). Lane, 83 Me. 168. 'Jackson v. French, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 337; Chamberlin v. Donahue, 45 Vt. 50; Willson v. Watkins, 8 Pa. (U. S.) 43; Amick v. Brubaker, 101 Mo. 473. * Jackson v. Deyo, 3 Johns. (N. Y.) 433; Clemens v. BroDmfield, 19 Mo. 118; 82 650 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 626-627 Where the tenant at will buys the undivided interest in the land of one of the heirs of his lessor, and then denies the interest of the grantee of another heir, this is equiva- lent to an ouster of his co-tenant, which amounts to a claim of adverse ownership, and the tenancy may then be treated as at an end and no notice to quit is required.' A disclaimer by the tenant of holding under his lessor determines the estate at will.' § 626. Notice by Action. — Notice may be valid if not served personally by the lessor. So where notice is neces- sary to a tenant in possession before an action can be properly commenced against him for a recovery of the premises, an action commenced without such notice and dismissed before trial, answers for all purposes for giving notice to the tenant." § 627. Notice — Interval of Time.— If the rent is re- served, and notice is required, the notice must be equal to the interval between the times of payments. Thus, if the rent is payable monthly, the tenancy can only be deter- mined by a monthly notice, and the notice must regularly terminate with some month counting from the beginning of the tenancy." The notice must terminate with the month, quarter, or year, according to the nature of the tenancy." The tenancy can only be terminated at the end of the period equal to that in which the rent is made payable." Lamed v. Clark, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 39; Ross v. Garrison, 1 Dana (Ky.), 35; Tuttle v. Reynolds, 1 Vt. 80. 1 Amick V. Brubaker, 101 Mo. 473. "Towne v. Butterfield, 97 Mass. 105; Duke ». Harper, 6 Yerg. (Tenn.) 280; Farrow v. Edmundson, 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 605; Harrison v. Middleton, 11 Gratt. (Va.) 527; Sampson v. Schaeffer, 3 Cal. 196; Fusselman v. Worthington, 14 111. 135; Bennock«. Whipple, 12 Me. 346; 'Woodward v. Brown, 13 Pet. (U. S.) 1; Russell v. Fabyan, 34 N. H. 223; Boston v. Biuney, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 1; Chamberiin v. Donatiue, 45 Vt. 55; Sharpe v. Kelley, 5 Deuio (N. Y.), 431. 'Cornellison v. Cornellison, 1 Bush (Ky.), 149; Betz v. Maxwell, 48 Kans. 142. ■» Grace v. Michaud, 50 Minn. 139. 5 Hunter «. Frost, 47 Minn. 1; Anderson «. Prindle, 33 Wend. (N. Y.) 616; Currier v. Barker, 2 Gray (Mass.), 227. « Holmes v. Wood, 88 Mich. 435; Eastman e. Vetter (Minn.), 58 K. W. Rep. 989. § 628] ESTATES AT WILL AND TENANCIES. 651 If the tenancy is determined by the lessor between the interval of the payment of rent, the lessor can only re- cover rent accruing up to the last pay day.' A tenancy from month to month requires a month's no- tice to vacate, given on or before pay day." And where a month's notice is required, a noticB given that the tenant surrenders possession on the day on which the notice is given, will not terminate the tenancy on the expiration of one month from that date. Because a notice given to the effect that the tenancy is terminated on the very day it was given, is clearly insufficient. It did not terminate the tenancy on the day named and could not, by mere lapse of time become effectual to terminate it on some other and later date.' Article 2. Tenancies from Year to Year. § 628. At Common Law. § 631. Holding Over. § 629. Nature of Tenancy for Years. § 632. Ground of the American Rule. §630. Entry Under a Void Parol Lease. § 628. At Common Law. — A tenancy at will arises from grant or contract, and general tenancies are constructively taken to be tenancies from year to year. The ancient rule of the common law required, in the case of all tenancies from year to year, six months' notice on either side, and ending at the expiration of the year, to determine the tenancy; and there must be a special agree- ment, or some particular custom, to prevent the applica- tion of the rule. This tenancy from year to year could not be determined by either party except at the end of the 'Harrison v. Middleton, 11 Gratt. (Va.) 527; Sullivan v. Enders, 3 Dana (Ky.), 66; Doe v. Cox, 11 Q. B. 122 ; Richardson v. Langridge, 4 Taunt. 128; Cameron -o. Little, 62 Me. 550; Elliott ». Stone, 1 Gray (Mass.), 571. 'Shirk V. Hoffman (Minn.), 58 N. "W. Rep. 990. 'Eastman v. Vetter (Minn.), 58 N. W. Rep. 989. 652 CLASSIFI0ATIO.N OF ESTATES. [§§ 629-630 year.' There is no fixed rule on this subject in the United States. The rule varies in the different States. The reservation of an annual rent is the leading circum- stance that turns leases for uncertain terms into leases from year to year." § 629. Nature of Tenancy for Years. — A tenancy for years is a demise for a term certain, whether it be for one or more years. A tenancy for half a year, a quarter of a year, a month or a week, is governed substan- tially by the same rule. This tenancy is created by the act of the parties, and not by the acts of the law. This estate cannot be determined, nor can the tenant relieve himself from liability for rent, except by giving notice, having the requisites both as to length and the time of giving it, of his intention to determine the tenancy. This estate goes to the personal representatives of the lessee upon his death; and it can be assigned,' and the assignees are bound by all the covenants in the original lease.* The term is controlled by the character and the covenants of the contract for rent; if it be a yearly rental, then the estate is for a year, and if the rental be monthly, then it is for a month, together with an implied obligation to continue the relation of landlord and tenant, until it is determined by the proper notice from either of the parties.' § 630. Entry Under a Void Parol Lease. — Although a parol lease may be void, yet, when the tenant enters and occupies, the agreement regulates the terms on which the tenancy subsists in all respects except as to the duration of the term. It is a reasonable inference in such case, from ■ Leighton ii. Theed, 1 Ld. Raym. 707; Parker v. Constable, 3 Wils. 25; Doe «. Porter, 3 Term Rep. 13; Doe v. Grafton, 18 Q. B. 495. ^Herrell v. Sizeland, 81 111. 457. 'Pugsleyc. Aikin, 11 N. Y. 494; Cody v. Quarterman, 12 Ga. 386; Doe b. Porter, 3 Term R. 13; Grigsby v. Tel. Co. (8. Dak.), 59 N. W. Rep. 734. ■• Patten v. Deshon, 1 Gray (Mass.), 327; Torrey v. Wallis, 3 Gush. (Mass.) 443. 'Secor V. Pestana, 37 111. 528; Williams v. Deriar, 31 Mo. 1; Lockwood v. Loekwood, 22 Conn. 425; Rich v. Bolton, 46 Vt. 84; Lesley ®. Randolph, 4 Kawle (Pa.), 123; Grigsby v. Tel. Co. (8. Dak.), 59 N. W. Rep. 734; Rogers ®. Brown (Minn.), 58 N. W. Rep. 931. § 631] ESTATES AT WILL AND TENANCIES. 653 the circumstances, that the parties intended a tenancy on the terms of the original agreement, and the law implies a new contract between the parties corresponding there- with so far as it is not in conflict with the statute of frauds.' While a parol lease for more than the prescribed period creates, in the first place, only an estate at will, yet such estate, when once created, may, like any other estate at will, be converted into a tenancy from year to year by payment of rent or other circumstances which indicate an intention to create such yearly tenancy." But a tenancy from year to year cannot be created by an occupancy for two years under a verbal agreement to work land on shares for a term of five years. The rela- tion of landlord and tenant will not be created either by the agreement or in consequence of any occupancy under it.' The rule that an annual reservation of rent is necessary to turn a lease for an uncertain term into a lease from year to year does not apply to a parol tenancy for years, void under the statute of frauds, where the entire rent has been paid in advance; such tenancy is from year to year.* § 631. Holding Over. — It is weU settled that when a ten- ant enters under a parol lease for a year, and holds over, and when a tenant under a valid lease for years holds over, the law implies on his part to renew the tenancy on the same terms for another year; but the landlord may treat him as a trespasser, or as a tenant holding upon the terms of the original lease.' And the tenant cannot, after hold- 'Laughran v. Smith, 75 N. Y. 305; Doe v. Bell, 5 Term Rep. 471; People v. Rickert, 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 336; Greton v. Smith, 33 N. Y. 345; Clayton v. Blakey, 8 Term Rep. 8. » Koplitz V. Gustavus, 48 Wis, 48; Brant v. Vincent (Mich.), 59 N. W. Rep. 169; Morrill v. Mackman, 34 Mich. 379; Coan v. Mole, 39 Mich. 454; Schneider V. Lord, 63 Mich. 141; Huntington v. Parkhurst, 87 Mich. 38. See, also, Walker v. Furbush, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 366; Thomas v. Nelson, 69 N. Y. 118; Schuyler v. Smith, 51 N. Y. 809. 3 Unglish V. Marvin, 138 N. Y. 380. < Brants. Vincent (Mich.), 59 N. W. Rep. 169. 5 Goldsborough v. Gable, 140 111. 369; Harvey v. Gunzberg, 148 Pa. St 394; Voss V. King, 38 W.Va. 607; Usher v. Moss, 50 Miss. 308; Conway n. Stark- weather, 1 Denio (N. Y.), 113; Schuyler v. Smith, 51 N. Y. 809; Smith v. Lit- 654 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 631 ing over, in the course of the payment of rent, create a different tenancy by accompanying such payment with conditions.' If a tenant from year to year holds over after his tenancy has been terminated by notice to quit, it is optional with the landlord either to follow up the notice by ejectment, or to waive the notice and hold the tenant for another year, whether the tenant actually agrees to it or not." The great weight of American authority is that,- if a ten- ant holds over without any new contract, it is optional with the landlord to treat him either as a trespasser or as a ten- ant from year to year, in case the prior term was for a year or longer; and if the prior term was shorter than a year, then from term to term, according to such shorter term; an election to treat him as a tenant, however, being in- ferable from any unreasonable delay to proceed against him as a trespasser, as well as from acts or words directly recognizing him as tenant.' If the tenant remains in possession for some particular time or purpose, by permission of the landlord, he will only be liable, unless he exceeds the permission, for the period of occupation. And if the landlord accepts a surrender of the premises from the tenant holding over, the tenant will be liable for rent, or use and occupation, up to the time of such acceptance." The English decisions and some of the States hold that if the tenant holds over he becomes simply a tenant at suf- ferance, and cannot be held for another year or term with- tlefield, 51 N.Y. 539; Wire Cloth Co. v. Gardner, 99 III. 151; Clapp v. Noble, 84 111. 62; Secor ». Pestana, 37 111. 535; Prickett v. Ritter, 16 111. 96. 'Scott V. Beecher, 91 Mich. 590; Voss v. King, 88 W. Va. 607. 2Tolle». Orth, 75 Ind. 398; Wire Cloth Co. v. Gardner, 99 111. 151; Hemp- hill «. Flynn, 2 Pa. St. 144; Bacon ». Brown, 9 Conn. 334; Conway v. Stark- weather, 1 Denio (N.Y.), 113; Schuyler ». Smith, 51 N.Y. 309; Witt v. Mayor, 5 Rob. (N. Y.) 348; 6 Rob. (N. Y.) 441; Noel v. McCrory, 7 Cold. (Tenn.) 623; Schuisler v. Ames, 16 Ala. 73; Wolffe b.WoM, 69 Ala. 549; Providence County Savings Bank «. Hall, 16 R. I. 154. 'Douglass V. Whitaker, 33 Kans. 381; Moshier v. Reding, 12 Me. 478; Con- way ■». Starkweather, 1 Denio (N. Y.). 113; Delaney v. Flanagan, 41 Mo. App. 651; Garrett v. Clark, 5 Oreg. 464; Williams v. Ackerraan, 8 Oreg. 405. . Shears, 4 Adol. & El. 832 Waring a. King, 8 Me^s. & W. 571: Delano ». Montague, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 43 Edwards ». Hale, 9 Allen (Mass.), 463; Emmons «. Scudder, 115 Mass. 367 lieumeister ». Palmer, 8 Mo. App. 491. » O'Brien v. Troxel, 76 Iowa, 760. 'Rev. Stat. ch. 73, sect. 10; Franklin Canal, Mill and Water Co. v. Card, 84 Me. 538. < Schuyler v. Smith, 51 N. Y. 809. ' Lazarus v. Phelps, 153 U. S. 81. See a contrary view in Keener's Quasi Con. p. 191, et seq,; 1 Am. & Eng. Ency. of L, p. 883, aad cases cited. This point is now controlled by statute in many States. 656 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 632 § 632. Ground op the American Exile. — A tenant wha holds over after the end of his terai may be deemed to be in possession upon the terms of his prior lease upon the ground that the parties are presumed to have tacitly re- newed the former agreement." When the tenant holds over he presumably holds over for another year, if the prior holding was for one or more years; or, if the time was shorter, for another term in case the landlord assents; and he cannot be permitted to overthrow this presumption by setting up that he intended to hold over as a wrongdoer and not as a tenant. The tenant being in possession has the landlord at disadvantage, and can greatly embarrass or defeat his arrangements for a new letting by holding over, and therefore should not do so without the risk of being held himself.' Tlie tenant will not be held if he leaves the premises at the expiration of his lease; and this is so though he has made a verbal lease to continue," which is void under the statute of frauds.' The holding over rests, not upon the former lease, but upon a new contract which the law implies to be for the same time and upon the same terms as the lease under which the term was held the preceding year.' And if there is an increase of the rent, with no other alteration, which is paid, he becomes a tenant for another year.° This rule does not apply where the tenant is a municipal corporation,' because a contract will not be implied on the part of a municipal corporation." ' Hall V. Myers, 43 Md. 446; Allen v. Bartlett, 20 W. Va. 46; Gardner «. Commissioners, 31 Minn. 33; San Antonio v. French, 80 Tex. 575; Donell v. Stevens, 4 McCord (S. Car.), 59; Diller ti. Roberts, 13 Serg. & R. 63; Ellis d.. Paige, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 43; Schuyler v. Smith, 51 N. Y. 309. 'Wire Cloth Co. ®. Gardner, 99 111. 151; Schuyler v. Smith, 51 N. Y. 309 ' White V. Levy, 93 Ala. 484. * Crommelin «. Thiess, 31 Ala. 412; Martin v. Blanchett, 77 Ala. 288. See,, also. Hunter v. Frost, 47 Minn. 1. Banbury v. Sherin (S. Dak.), 55 N. W. Rep. 723. ^ Sears d. Smith, 3 Colo. 288; Reithman «. Brandenburg, 7 Colo. 323, 480; WoMe s. Wolff, 69 Ala. 549. * Zippar v. Reppy, 1 5 Colo. 269; Digby v. Atkinson, 4 Camp. 275. ' San Antonio ». French, 80 Tex. 575. 8 Bryan v. Page, 51 Tex. 534. §§ 633-634] estates at will and tenancies. 657 Article 3. Determination of Tenancy from Year to Year. § 633. Notice to Quit. § 636. Covenants. ^ 634. Sufficiency of Notice. § 637. Waiver of Notice. § 635. Talsing a New Lease. § 633. Notice to Quit. — A tenant from year to year is entitled to notice to quit before action, unless he has for- feited his right by his own act.' The length of time re- quired to be observed in giving notice is regulated by stat- ute. If the rental be for a period less than a year, as by the quarter, the month, or other definite time, as a general rule, the notice must be for as long a time as the periods of payment." The notice inust be given for a certain length of time before the estate is to terminate, and the estate can only be determined at the expiration of the time during which the tenant lawfully held, at the end of each rental period.' If it is payable yearly the tenant can only termi- nate his tenancy at the end of the current year.' In South Carolina a tenancy from year to year looks to the end of the calendar year for its termination, without regard to the time when the tenancy commenced; and this applies to leases of city houses as well as to agricultural leases. ' The fact that the lessor has become insane since the de- mise does not terminate the tenancy.' § 634. Sufficiency of Notice. — The notice must be suffi- ciently dear that it can be understood as to the time of ' Doe V. Stennett, 2 Esp. 717; Doe v. Watts, 7 Term Rep. 79; Doe v. Browne, 8 East. 166. ' Sanford v. Harvey, 11 Cusli. (Mass.) 93; Cunningham v. Horton, 57 Me. 422; Doe o. Hazell, 1 Esp. 94; Jones v. Mills, 10 0. B., N. S. 7S8; Doe v. Rap- pan, 6 Esp. 4. 'Steflfens ». Earl, 40 N. J. L. 133; Waters «. Young, 11 R. I. 1; Oakes v. Munroe, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 285; Burns «. Bryant, 31 N. Y. 453. * Hunter v. Frost, 47 Minn. 1; Courlort v. Colin, 118 N. Y. 309; Lesley ». Randolph, 4 Rawle (Pa.), 123; Rosenblat v. Perkins, 18 Oreg. 156; Phcenix- ville V. Walters, 147 Pa. St. 501. ' Floyd ». Floyd, 4 Rich. (S. Car.) 33; Wilson v. Rodeman, 30 S. Car. 210. « McFall ». McFall, 35 8. Car. 559. 83 658 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 635 the termination of the tenancy.' The notice should always be given to the immediate tenant of the party giving it." Where a corporation is the tenant the notice should be addressed to the corporation and not to the officers, but served on the latter.' A notice to one of two tenants in common holding over is sufficient;* and a notice to several joint tenants is sufficient if served on one." The personal representatives of a tenant from year to year must be served with notice." The service should be personal, but where it cannot be made upon the tenant from year to year, service upon his wife will be sufficient in the absence of statutory regulations. ' As a general rule the notice should be in writing, and is, in many States, so provided by statute. At common law, parol notice was sufficient," unless a written one was re- quired by the express agreement of the parties." The question as to the sufficiency of the notice must be raised on the trial and not on appeal.'" § 635. Taking a New Lease. — If a tenant for life or for years takes a new lease of the reversioner of the same premises included in the former tenancy it is a surrender in law of the first lease. A surrender in law of a lease in possession is implied in the acceptance of a new lease from the reversioner, for if the lessee accepts a new lease from his lessor he admits and affirms his lessor's ability to make such new lease, which could not be done by him if 'Granger e. Brown, 11 Cash. (Mass.) 191; Hauchet «. Whitney, 1 Vt. 311; Huyser v. Chase, 13 Mich. 102; Mills v. GofE, 14 Mees. & Wels. 73; Doe v. Morphett, 7 Q. B. 577; Doe v. Wilkinson, 13 Add. & El. 743; Doe v. Smith, 5 Adol. & El. 350. ' Jaclison V. Baker, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 270. 3 Doe V. Woodman, 8 East, 238. " Doe V. Crick, 5 Esp. 196. = Doe D. Watkins, 7 East, 551. «Doe ». Porter, 3 Term Rep. 13; Parker «. Constable, 8 Wils. 35. '' Buter V. Devall, 40 Mo. App. 351. See, also. Doe «. Wrightman, 4 Esp. 5; Doe V. Spiller, 6 Esp. 70 ; Clark «. Keliher, 107 Mass. 406 ; Schilling v. Holmes, 23 Cal. 231;. Doe «. Dunbar, 1 Mood. & M. 10; Walker «. Sharpe, 108 Mass. 154; Kees v. Perrot, 4 Car. & P. 230. 8 Timmins v. Rowlison, 1 W. Bl. 533; Doe v. Crick, 5 Esp. 196. 'Legg V. Benoin, Willes, 48. "Gansons. Ballwin, 98 Mich. 317. §§ 636-638] ESTATES AT WILL AND TENANCIES. 659 the old lease stood in the way." If the second lease is made with stipulations inconsistent with the former lease the latter must prevail, the presumption being that a sur- render of the old one was intended. § 636. Covenants. — In a tenancy from year to year, there is no implied covenant for quiet enjoyment against eviction by title paramount on the determination of the landlord's interest; if on such determination a tenant is evicted by a superior landlord, he has in the absence of an express agreement, no claim against his own landlord for damages for such eviction." § 637. Waivee of N'otice. — The landlord may waive the notice. Thus, the acceptance of rent waives the notice and the tenancy continues.' And the tenant may waive the formal insufficiency of the notice of an intention to terminate a tenancy from month to month by refusal to quit on the ground that he is a tenant from year to year. * But this matter of waiving notice by accepting rent depends generally upon the intention of the parties, the tenant knowing that the notice was not waived.' Article 4. A Valid Holding Over. % 638. Improvements by Tenant to be § 642. Extent of Liability. Purchased by Landlord. § 643. Liability for Rent. § 689. Rebuttal of Implied Contract § 644. Increased Rent. to Renew the Lease. § 645. Parol Agreement to Reduce § 640 To Avoid Liability for Rent the the Rent. Surrender must be Complete. § 646. Double Penalty. § 641. The Tenant Cannot Create a Different Tenancy. § 638. Improvements by Tenant to be Purchased by Landlord. — It is often provided by the lease that the ' Edwards v. Hale, 37 W. Va. 193. ' Schwartz v. Locket, 61 Law Times, 719. » Kimball t). Rowla'id, 6 Gray (Mass.), 334; Norris v. Morrill, 43 N. H. 318; Prindle ii. Anderson, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 391; Doe «. Palmer, 16 East, 53. «Drey «. Doyle, 28 Mo. App. 349. 'Kimball «. Rowland, 6 Gray (Mass.), SS^; Prindle v. Anderson, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 391; Doe v. Humphreys, 2 East. 337. 660 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 639 tenant shall make improvements, such as erecting build ■ ings for his business, and that at the expiration of the term the landlord will purchase them. A tenant in pos- session at the expiration of the lease who has made authorized improvements that the landlord has engaged to purchase at the termination of the lease, may retain his possession until such purchase shall be performed, but not without, meantime, being chargeable with rent.' So a tenant in possession of land at the expiration of the lease, who has erected a mill on it which the landlord had agreed to purchase at the expiration of the term, may retain his possession until such purchase shall be performed, but not without, meantime, being chargeable with rent." Such pos- session by the tenant makes him accountable for the rents. ' § 639. EEBUTTAii OP Implied Contract to Renew the Lease.— While it is true that where a tenant holds over, the landlord may treat him as a trespasser or elect to hold him for another term at the same rent,* yet this implica- tion of a renewal of the lease may be rebutted. If acts are shown which will suffice to rebut the impUcation of a renewal, then the tenant will not be in possession upon the former terms. But a tenant remaining in possession by the consent of the landlord pending treaty for a lease, cannot be treated as a trespasser.' Because the fact of the negotiations rebuts the implication that the landlord elects to hold him as tenant upon the former terms.' In Kentucky, if the tenant holds over ninety days, then ' Hohman v. Abrams, 2 Duer (N. Y.), 485. « Franklin Canal, Mill and Water Co. v. Card, 84 Me. 538. See, also, Scruggs V. Railroad Co., 108 U. S. 368; Moselj v. Allen, 138 Mass, 81. 3 Benham v. Howe, 3 Cal. 887; Kellogg v. Rockwell, 19 Conn. 446; Harri- son V. Wyse, 24 Conn. 1; Reitenbangh v. Ludwick, 31 Pa. St. 131; Tharp v. Feltz, 6 B. Mo.n. (Ky.) 6; Anthony v. Rogers, 30 Mo. 381. * New York, etc. R. R. Co. «. Randall, 103 Ind. 453; McBrier v. Marshall, 136 Pa. St. 390; Harvey v. Gunzberg, 148 Pa. St. 394; Critchfield v. Remaley, 21 Nebr. 178; Goldsborough®. Gable, 140 HI. 369; Drake ii. Wilhelm, 109 N. Car. 97. ' Schilling o. Klein, 41 111, App, 309; Hollingsworth v. Stennett, 2 Esp. 717; Drake ®. Wilhelm, 109 N. Car. 97. » Smith V. Alt, 7 Daly (N. Y.), 493. See, also, Clinton Wire Cloth Co. •». Gardner, 99 III. 151; Brownell «. Welch, 91 111. 533; Drake v. Wilhelm, 109 N. Car. 97. § 640] ESTATES AT WILL AND TENANCIES. ' 661 he becoines liable for another term." But the parties may agree that the tenant shall be liable for another term if he begins on another year." In general, the lease may expressly provide that a hold- ing over after the expiration of the term shall make the tenant liable only for the time he occupies, and it will be a Talid agreement. ' And so the lease may expressly provide that the tenant shall have an option to purchase the prem- ises, and an oral acceptance of such option is sufficient, as the lease is signed by the party by vrhom the sale is to be made.* § 640. To Avoid Liability for Rent the Surrender Must be Complete. — The tenant, in order to exonerate himself from liability for holding over, must completely surrender the possession at the expiration of the term. The surrender must be complete unless he remains tem- porarily by consent of the landlord. If he partially sur- renders the premises, M^hich is not accepted by the landlord, and still remains on some portion of the land, the landlord can elect to hold him for another term. To be a valid sur- render it must be complete, entire and unequivocal.' In order to relieve himself from the payment of rent and holding over he must make a complete surrender.' If he continues to hold over the landlord may elect to hold him for another term.' And if the tenant wants to hold the landlord he must pay the fuU amount of the rent due according to the original lease; if the landlord takes part of the payment, but refuses to extend the tenancy until the full amount is paid, the tenant cannot continue the tenancy if he fails to pay the full amount.' So the tenant will be held, although he has given notice to the landlord that he will vacate the premises at the ' Gen. Stat. art. 4, ch. 66; Irvine v. Scott, 85 Ky. 360; Uenger v. Bamber- ger, 85 Ky. 11. ' Uenger v. Bamberger, 85 Ky. 11. 'Pickett ». Bartlett, 107 N. Y. 277. * Smith V. Gibson, 25 Ncbr. 511. 5 Cavanaugh v. Clinch, 88 Ga. 610. 'Johnson v. Oppenheim, 55 N. Y. 280; Roach©. Peterson, 47 Minn. 391. 'Flint ». Sweeney, 49 Minn. 509. ' Olds V. Congor, 1 Ok. Ter. 333. 662 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 641-642 expiration of the lease, if he does not give possession at that time, at least where the holding over is not unavoida- ble." But if he makes all preparations to leave and tenders the keys to the landlord's agent at the expiration of the lease, who refuses to receive them and orders the tenant to wait until the landlord arrives home, at which time he tenders the landlord the keys and vacates the premises, he will not be held for another term." § 641. The Tenant Cannot Create a Different Ten- ancy. — The new tenancy will be the same as the one under the lease. If the tenant holds over by express consent of the landlord, or under circumstances from which such consent may be implied, as for a considerable length of time without objection and without demand for rent, he is then entitled to notice to quit.' But if the landlord has elected to treat him as a tenant rather than a trespasser by demanding rent, the tenant cannot thereafter, in the course of the payment of his rent, create a different ten- ancy by accompanying such payment with conditions." § 642. Extent of Liability. — As has been stated where a tenant holds over at the expiration of the term, no new- arrangement having been made, his holding becomes a tenancy for another year upon the same terms and con- ditions as upon the former holding. But a false and ma- terial representation made to the lessor by the lessee as an inducement to the making of the lease, will avoid the'lease at the option of the lessor. ' In Missouri, in the absence of an express contract, where the tenant holds over after the expiration of the lease, 'the law implies that he holds subject to the terms of the lease so far as they are applicable to a monthly letting." 'Haynes v. Aldrich, 133 N. Y. 287. ^ Adler v. Mendelson, 74 Wis. 464. ^Benfey v. Congdon, 40 Mich. 388; Anderson «. Prindle, 23 Wend. (N Y.) 616; People v. Paulding, 33 Hun (N. Y.), 91; Usher v. Moss, 50 Miss. 308; Meno V. Hoeffel, 46 Wis. 383. * Scott V. Beeclier, 91 Mich. 590. 'Harvey v. Gunzberg, 148 Pa. St 394. ' Hausler v. Holman Paper Print. Co., 49 Mo. App. 63. §§ 643-644] ESTATES AT WILL AND TENANCIES. 663 The general rule is that by holding over the tenant be- comes liable for the rent of the premises for a further term of the same length of time as in the original lease." But the landlord has no right to enter upon the demised prem- ises for the purpose of occupying until the term granted is terminated by legal notice, and without this notice the tenant may hold over." § 643. Liability foe Rent. — After there has been a complete surrender of the premises at the expiration of the term, and the landlord has accepted the same, no rent accrues against the tenant thereafter. ° And when the landlord consents to his occupation he is only liable for the time he remains in possession,* and must have notice to quit. ° Remaining with the consent of the landlord only makes him liable for the time in possession and is not a holding over for another term." § 644. Increased Rent. — To increase the rent the land- lord must give the tenant notice and the tenant must im- pliedly or expressly assent to the increase, or he will not be bound.' So notice to the tenant that, if he continues to keep the premises beyond the present term, he must pay an increased rent, naming the amount, vsrill not bind the tenant, if he refuses to pay it at the time of the notice, though he holds over. ' But if the tenant keeps silent after receiving notice of the increased rent, his silence will be construed as an assent on his part to keep the premises at the increase of rent.' ' Wood V. Gordon, 18 N. Y. Supp. 109. 2 Thomas ». Black (Del.), 18 At. Rep. 771. 'Minneapolis Co-operative Co. v. Williamson, 51 Minn. 53; Adams ». Cohoes, 53 Hun (N. Y.), 260. 'Brown v. Magorty, 156 Mass. 209; Sloat i). Rountree, 87 Ga. 470. 5 Sloat v. Rountree, 87 Ga. 470. * Rosenbergs. Lostgarten, 16 N. Y. Supp. 523. 'Atkinson v. Cole, 16 Colo. 83. 8 Galloways. Kerby, 9 111. App. 501. 'Roberts b. Hayward, 3 Car. & P. 432; Despard ®. Walbridge, 15 N. T. 374; Higgins «. Halligan, 46111. 173; Hunt i). Bailey, 39 Mo. 357, See, also, Payne s. Cave, 3 Term Rep. 148; Routlodge v. Grant, 4 Bing. 653; Meaher b. Pome- roy, 49 Ala. 146; Gallagher®. Himelberger, 57 Ind. 63. 664 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 646-646 § 645. Parol Agreement to Eeduoe the Eent. — A pa- rol agreement to reduce the rent, without consideration, is void. Of course the landlord can hold the tenant after holding over as a trespasser or elect to continue his ten- ancy.' Where the landlord, at the request of the tenant, agrees to reduce the rent reserved in the contract of leas- ing, and there is no evidence tending to show that the ten- ant had surrendered the term, or that he offered to do so, and refuses to execute the terms of the lease, or that there was any reason why he could then have surrendered the premises and refuse to execute the terms of the lease, such parol agreement to reduce the rent will be void for want of consideration, and the landlord may collect the rent pro- vided in the original lease." Where the tenant is not shown to have changed his position in consequence of such agreement, and there is nothing to show any injury or loss to the tenant, or gain or benefit to the landlord in conse quence of such agreement, the latter will not be estopped from demanding and collecting rent originally agreed to be paid; such agreement to accept a reduced rent will not have the effect of an executed gift as to the original rent and that afterwards agreed to be taken, when no receipt or release is given for the rent. Such an agreement under the circumstances is founded upon no consideration and is void," § 646. Double Penalty.— By the English statutes* it is enacted that if a tenant holds over after demand made, and notice in writing to deliver the premises, or if he holds over after having given neUlbe of his intention to quit, he should be liable to pay double rent, so long as he continues to hold over. These provisions, with some modifications, are adopted by several of the States. The notice must be in writing. ' The English statutes iPrickett. v. Ritter, 16 111. 96; Hunt «. Morton, 18 111. 75; McKlnney «. Peck, 28 111. 174; Webster v. Nichols, 104 111. 160. 2 Qoldsbornugh v. Gable, 140 111. 269. sGoldsborough v. Gable, 140 111. 269. <4 Geo. II. c. 28; 11 Geo. II. c. 19. "Belles V. Anderson, 38 III. App. 128; Chapman v. Wright, 20 111. 120; Ull- man v. Herzberg, 91 Ala. 458. § 646] ESTATES AT WILL AND TENANCIES. 665 provide that the tenant shall be liable only for the time of his holding over," and this rule is followed by some of the States." But in other States the law is different. Thus, in Ala- bama, the damages given by the statute are not double the agreed rent for the time the landlord is kept out of possession, but double the amount of the annual rent agreed to be paid, that is, double the rent for the entire year, although the tenant willf uUy held over only for a few weeks, or oven days ' 'Cobb V. Stokes, 8 East, 358; Lloyd v. Rosbee, 2 Camp. 453. 'Fabri v. Bryan, 80 111. 182; Griffin v. Knisely, 75 111. 411. *Ullman t. Herzberg, 91 Ala. 458; Lykes v. Schwarz, 91 Ala. 461. 84 CHAPTEE XVII. estates at subtekance. Aeticle 1. Nature and Effect. § 647. Deflnition. § 655. Recovering Possession. § 648. Wrongful Holding Over. § 656. Tlie Weight of Authority. § 649. Other Tenants at Sufferance. § 657. Defense — Plea of Liberum § 650. Mortgagor's Holding Over Tenementum. After PorecloBure. § 658. Entry of Landlord During §651. Liability for Rent. Temporary Absence of the § 652. Void Lease. Tenant. § 653. Incidents of Tenancy at Suffer- § 659. What is a Forcible Entry and ance. Detainer. § 654. Adverse Possession. § 647. Definition. — At common law, a tenant who holds over after the expiration of his term becomes a tenant at sufferance. He has only a naked possession, and no estate which he can transfer or transmit. He stands in no privity to his landlord, is not hable to pay rent and is not entitled to any notice to quit. He holds by the laches of the landlord, who can enter and put an end to the tenancy when he pleases. At common law, when, by the terms of the lease, the tenancy terminated at a day certain, the landlord can always commence his action of ejectment to recover possession of his land, after the expiration of the lease, vsdthout any notice to quit ; and this he could do, although the tenant became a tenant at sufferance by holding over the term without his permis- sion. It is only in a tenancy from year to year, the ter- mination of which is uncertain, that the tenant was entitled to notice to quit.' § 648. Wrongful Holding Over. — A tenant at suffer- ance goes into possession in a lawful manner, but his hold- 'Co. Litt. 57b; Co. Litt. 270b; Jackson «. Parkhust, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 113; Jackson «. McLeod, 12 Johns. (^. Y.) 182; 2 Bl. Com. 150; Russell b Fabyan, 34 N. H. 318; Uridias v. Movrell, 25 Cal. 35; Bircher «. Parker, 40 Mo. 148; Schuyler v. Smith, 51 N. Y. 309. (666) § 649J ESTATES AT SUFFERANCE. 667 ing over is wrong.' A material distinction exists between a person going into possession of an estate by act of the parties, and afterwards holding over, and by act of the law and then holding over. In the first case he is a tenant at sufferance; and in the other he is "a trespasser." As a general rule a tenant wrongfully holding over, or a vendor so holding after the expiration of the date that he was to deliver possession, or a lessee of the vendor who had agreed to deliver possession but refuses to do so, is a tenant at sufferance.' If a party enters by the act of law, as, for example, a guai-dian, and holds over, he is then a trespasser.* In Michigan where a vendor fails to remove from the dweUing house at the time set after the sale and holds over without any special agreement with the vendee, an agree- ment may be implied and the vendor becomes a tenant at will of Ms vendee. ' § 649. Otheb Tenants at Sufferance. — Tenants pur autre vie, holding over after the death of the cestui que vie, are the tenants at sufferance.' So are sub-tenants after the expiration of the original lease, who hold over, tenants at sufferance.' So tenants at wUl whose estate has been determined by alienation, by the death of the lessor, or by the happening of some event on which their estate was contingent, and mortgagors after the estate has been sold under foreclosure and there is no redemption, are tenants at sufferance. ' So when a person having a contract to pur- chase, takes a lease of the same property for a month and enters under it, his possession after the expiration of his ' Co. Litt. 57b. * Co. Litt. 57b; 2 Inst. 134. 'Benedict v. Morse, 10 Met. (Mass.) 233; Hauxhurst v. Lobree, 38 Cal. 563; Hollis v. Pool, 3 Met. (Mass.) 350; Wilde v. Cantillon, 1 Johns. Cas. (IST. Y.) 123. ^Merrill ». Bullock, 105 Mass. 491; Co. Litt. 57b. ' Hoffman v. Clark, 63 Mich. 175. Compare Johnson v. Donaldson, 17 R. L 107. « Co. Litt. 57b; 3 Inst. 134. '2 Bl. Com. 150; Creech ». Crockett, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 133. ' Simpkin v. Ashurst, 4 Tyrwhitt, 781 ; Kinsley v. Ames, 3 Met. (Mass.) 29. CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 650 term, in the absence of any other agreement, is that of a tenant at sufferance. ' § 650. Mortgagor's Holding Over After Foreclos- ure. — In most of the States the mortgagor has a time al- lowed him to redeem after foreclosure and may then right- fully hold the possession and if he redeems the title still remains in him. But when his right of possession ter- minates at the foreclosure sale, and he still remains in possession he is a tenant at sufferance." And so the mort- gagor's grantee of the equity of redemption in possession is likewise a tenant at sufferance, if as such grantee he en- ters before the mortgagee's sale, and especially where he enters under a deed from the mortgagor himself.' Under a statute which provides that a tenant by suffer- ance shall quit upon notice in writing by the owner, such tenant is entitled to such notice from the mortgagor when he purchases the mortgaged land at the foreclosure sale." But in New York the decisions refuse to give to the words "tenant at sufferance" their strict technical mean- ing, and hold that a person having come in by right and holds over after the expiration of his estate, is not a tenant at sufferance so as to entitle him to notice to quit. To en- title him to notice, the holding over must be continued for such a length of time after the expiration of the term, and under such circumstances as to authorize the impUcation of assent on the part of the landlord to such continuance. In such case the tenancy existing by the implied assent of the landlord ought to terminate before the tenant can be removed, and in such case the tenant is a tenant by suffer- ance within the meaning of the statute and cannot be re- moved by summary proceedings or action of ejectment without the previous notice.' This doctrine ignores the difference between a tenancy by sufferance and a tenancy ■ Moore v. Smith (N. J.), 39 At. Rep. 159. ' Kinsley v. Ames, 3 Met. (Mass.) 39. 2 Johnsons. Donaldson, 17 R. I. 107. * Johnsons. Donaldson, 17 R. I. 107. 'Smith V. Littlefleld, 51 N. Y. 539; Rowan v. Lyttle, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 617; Allen e. Jaquish, 31 Wend. (N. Y. 631; Garner v. Hannah, 6 Duer (N. Y.), 370; Livingston v. Tanner, 12 Barb. (N. Y.) 484. See, also, Hoffman v. Clark, 63 Mich. 175. §§ 651-652] ESTATES AT SUFFERANCE. 669 at will, since a person who so occupies with the owner's assent is technically a tenant at will." But the general rule is that a lessee on holding over after the expiration of his lease becomes a tenant at sufferance," and is not enti- tled to notice to quit' unless the statute makes it necessary. § 651. Liability for Rent.— At common law the ten- ant at sufferance was not liable for reftt.' But he was liable to the lessor for tort damages.' And where the statute makes a tenant at sufferance liable for rent, he must pay it to the party having lawful possession of the estate. Thus, when the tenancy at will is terminated by the execution of a lease of the premises to a third person, and converted into a tenancy at sufferance, the statutory liability of the tenant at sufferance for rent is to the lessee alone." The crops raised by a tenant at sufferance, as a grantor left in possession by the laches of the grantee, during the existence of his tenancy, are his as against the grantee.' The landlord may recover in an action of tort damages for his exclusion from the premises, from the expiration of the lease to the removal of the tenant.' § 652. Void Lease. — The mere fact that a person goes into possession under a parol lease which is void, does not create a yearly tenancy. The lease is ineffectual to pass any term whatever in the lessee, and when he goes into possession under it with the consent of the landlord, in the absence of any other agreement, he becomes a tenant at will, merely subject to liability to pay rent at the rate of the stipulated rent for use and occupation." But the terms of ' Moore ». Morrow, 28 Cal. 551; Allen v. Carpenter, 15 Mich. 25. ' Sutton V. Lodge, 83 Ga. 770. 'Chuck V. Chong, 91 Cal. 593. * Cruise's Dig. tit. 9, c. 2, sect. 6. 'Sargent v. Smith, 12 Gray (Mass.), 426; Cunningham ®. Holton, 55 M:e. 33; Hogsett V. Ellis, 17 Mich. 368; Merrill v. Bullock, 105 Mass. 490. « Cofran ». Shepard, 148 Mass. 582; Bunton v. Richardson, 10 Allen (Mass.), 260. ' Wolcott 11. Hamilton, 61 Vt. 79. * Sargent ». Smith, 12 Gray (Mass.), 426. See, also, Raymond v. Andrews, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 265. 'Talamo v. Spitzmiller, 120 N. Y. 37; Thomas ®. Nelson, 69 N. Y. 118. 670 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 653-654 the lease, void as to duration of the term, will control in respect to rent.' A payment and receipt of an installment or aliquot part of the annual rent is evidence of such understanding and goes in support of a yearly tenancy, and without explana- tion to the contrary, it is controlling evidence for that pur- pose." And a verbal agreement by the owner of land that the tenant may remain in possession without payment of rent constitutes a tenancy at will, and the tenant's posses- sion is terminated by the execution of a written lease of the land by the owner to a third person.' § 653. Incidents of Tenancy at Sufferance. — The ten- ant has only a naked possession, and no estate which he can transfer or transmit, or which is capable of enlarge- ment by release, for he stands in no privity to his land- lord, nor is he entitled to any notice to quit.* In the absence of statute he is not liable to pay rent.' He holds by the laches of the landlord, who may enter and put an end to the tenancy when he pleases. A tenant at sufferance cannot, in an action by the land- lord to recover possession, deny his landlord's title nor set up another title which he has acquired by purchase." Nor can the tenant set up an adverse possession for the prescrip- tive time, that can bar the landlord's title.' The tenant by sufferance has no assignable interest, and his assignee is a trespasser upon entry, and has no rights of a tenant by sufferance in any particular. ° § 654. Adverse Possession. — It is well settled that where a party goes into possession of land under a lawful • Coudert v. Cohn, 118 N. Y. 309. ' Cox V. Bent, 5 Bing. 185; Bishop v. Howard, 2 Barn. & C. 100; Doe v. Crago, 6 C. B. 90; Braythwayte v. Hitchcock, 10 Mees. & W. 494; Mann v. Lovejoy, Eyan & M. 355; Thomas v. Paclier, 1 Hurl. & N. 673. ^Hooton V. Holt, 139 Mass. 54. *Co. Litt. 270b; Jackson «. Parkhurst, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 128. See, also, Chuck V. Chong, 91 Cal. 593; Sutton v. Lodge, 83 Ga. 770. 5 Cruise's Dig. tit. 9, c. 2, sec. 6. 'Grifflnr. Sheffield, 38 Miss. 359, 390; Jackson «. M'Leod,12 Johns.(N.Y.)182. ■"Doe ®. Hull, 3 Dowl. & R. 69; Gwynn v. Jones, 2 Gill. & J. (Md.) 173. 'ReckhowB. Schanck, 43 N. Y. 448; Thunder v. Belcher, 3 East, 449; Nepean v. Doe, 3 Mees. & W. 911. § 655] ESTATES AT SUFFERANCE. 671 title, and after his right has expired holds over, his posses- sion thus continued will not be regarded as adverse to his landlord.' This estate of sufferance may be destroyed whenever the true owner shall make an actual entry on the land and oust the tenant; before entry he cannot main- tain an action of trespass against the tenant by sufferance as he may against a stranger, because the tenant is in by a lawful title; nor can the tenant dispute the landlord's title nor set up another title until he has surrendered his pos- session." After entry the tenant cannot question the title of his landlord or set up that of a third party. ' Nor can he set up adverse possession under the statute of limitation.* § 655. Eecovering Possession. — The landlord may re- cover possession by an action of ejectment. In the absence of statutory provisions the landlord may re-enter, upon the tenant holding over, and remove him and his goods, with such gentle force as may be requisite for the purpose; and the tenant will not be entitled to resist or sue him. Inas- much as the tenant has no rightful possession as against the landlord, he cannot bring trespass quare clausumf regit against the landlord for his entry.' The landlord in the absence of statute is not liable to a tenant at sufferance for an assault committed in the act of forcibly entering and expelling the tenant, though he may be liable criminally for breach of the peace." 'Days. Cochran, 24 Miss. 361; Varrick ». Jackson, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 166; Jackson ®. Cairns, 30 Jolins. (N. Y.) 301; Doe v. Hull, 3 Dow. & By. 38; Griffin V. Slieffleld, 38 Miss. 359, 390. 'Jackson v. Cairns, 30 Johns. (N. Y.) 301. 'Jackson v. M'Leod, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 183; Jackson «. Stiles, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 575. * Doe V. Hull, 2 Dow. & Ry. 698. 'Davison v. Wilson, 11 Q. B. 890; Taylor v. Cole, 3 Term Rep. 293 Taunton v. Costar, 7 Term Rep. 427; Pollon v. Brewer, 7 C. B. N. S. 371 Argent v. Durrant, 8 Term Rep 403; Turner «. Meymott, 1 Bing. 158 Jackson v. Farmer, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 201; Sampson «. Henry, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 36; Zell c. Ream, 31 Pa. St. 304; Kellam v. Janson, 17 Pa. St. 467; Muldrow V. Jones, 1 Rice (S. Car.), 64. See, also, Canavan v. Gray, 64 Cal. 5. 8 Low*. Elwell, 131 Mass. 309; Davis®. Burrell, 10 C. B. 821; Burling r. Head, 11 Q. B. 904; Stearns v. Sampson, 59 Me. 568; Adams » Adams, 7 Phila. (Pa.) 160; Todd v. Jackson, 26 N. J. L. 535; Fuhr v. Dean, 36 Mo. 116; Sterling v. Warden, 51 N. H. 239; Hilbourn v. Fogg, 99 Mass. 11; Churchill 672 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 656 However there are decisions against the weight of au- thority, which hold in such case, the landlord is liable to the tenant in trespass quareclausum f regit, and for assault and battery.' When the landlord begins an action to recover posses- sion, a complaint showing that the tenancy had be6n of sufferance, and that such tenancy had terminated, and that the tenant still wrongfully occupies the premises and refuses to give the landlord possession is sufficient though by mistake, it alleges that the landlord was in possession instead of that he was entitled to the possession." Now, in Illinois, under the statute the landlord can gain possession when a tenant holds over, only by forcible de- tainer or by ejectment; he has no right to enter against the tenant's consent." § 656. The Weight op Authority. — The weight of authority is as shown in the preceding section. So, when a tenancy has been legally terminated by the landlord, he may peaceably enter the premises, whether he discloses or conceals his intentions of entering to be for the purpose of removing the tenant. After such entry he may remove the tenant, using such force as will sustain a plea of mol- liter manus. And if the tenant, after a reasonable op- portunity therefor, neglects to remove his goods, the land- lord may remove and deposit them, with due care, in some near and convenient place.' It is not material whether he entered with an intention to remove the tenant and his goods, or foi-med such intention after his entry, if his entry was peaceable and without force. ' V. Hulbert, 110 Mass. 42; Livingston «. Tanner, 14 N. Y. 64; Trebble v. Frame, 1 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) ao.5; Krevet ». Meyer, 24 Mo. 107; Walton v. File, 1 Dev. & B. (N. Car.) 567; Harvey v. Brydges, 14 Mees. & W. 437^ Blades v. Higgs, 10 C. B. N. S. 713. Compare Nevpton v. Harland, 1 Mann. & Gr. 644. 'Dustin*. Cowdry, 23 Vt. 631; Mosseller d. Deaver, 106 N. Car. 494; Page V. Depuy, 40 111. 506; Reader v. Purdy, 41 111. 279; Doty ». Burdick, 83 111. 473; Knight B. Knight, 3 111. App. 208; Wliiltaker*. Perry, 38 Vt. 107. Compare Beecher v. Parmele, 9 Vt. 352; Mussey «. Scott, 32 Vt. 82; 4 Am. L. Rev. 439. « Minard v. Burtis, 83 Wis. 267. 3 Phelps -0. Randolph, 147 III. 335; 45 111. App. 492. ^Stearns v. Sampson, 59 Me. 568. 'Butcher v. Butcher, 7 Barn. & 0. 399. § 657] ESTATES AT SUFFERANCE. 673 The tenant cannot maintain trespass s^MarecZaMSMTO/reg^zY for his entry, nor for his acts after such entry.' The land- lord may enter upon the premises and take out the windows of the dwelling-house, and if the tenant undertakes to pre- vent him from taking out the windows, the landlord has the right to use as much force as is necessary in order to overcome his resistance." And so, where the tenant refuses to leave, the landlord may go upon the premises and tear down a portion of the building and place it in an uninhabitable condition, and the landlord will not be a trespasser ab initio because the ten- ant has no right to be on the premises against his lessor's will.' The tenant whose terra has expired cannot bring tres- pass against his landlord for forcibly breaking and entering the house in his absence. * § 657. Defense — Plea of Liberum Tenementum. — The plea of liberum tenementum is a good justification, in an action of trespass, by the landlord, for the entry and ex- pulsion.' And hence, the owner of land who forcibly enters- thereon and ejects without unnecessary force a ten- ant at sufferance, who has reasonable notice to quit, is not hable to an action for an assault." An English case' held that the landlord under such cir- cumstances was hable to an action for assault and battery. But a later English case' questioned, Newton v. Harland, and held that where a breach of the peace is committed by a freeholder, who, in order to get possession of his land, ' Meader d. Stone, 7 Met. (Mass.) 147. 'Mugford V. Richardson, 6 Allen (Mass.), 76. 'Harris v. Gillingham, 6 N. H. 11. See, also, Erwin ». Olmsted, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 229; Wilde v. Coutillon, 1 Johns. Cases (N. Y.), 123; Hyatt v. Wood, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 150; Ives v. Ives, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 235. * Turner v. Meymott, 7 Moore, 574; 1 Bing. 158. 'Meader v. Stone, 7 Met. (Mass.) 147; Miner v. Stevens, 1 Cush. (Mass.)483, 485; Mason v. Holt, 1 Allen (Mass.), 45; Curtis v. Galvin, 1 Allen (Mass.), 215; Moore v. Mason. 1 Allen (Mass.), 406. "Low v. Elwell, 121 Mass 809. 'Newton v. Harland, 1 Man. & Gr. 644; 1 Scott, N. R. 474. ' Harvey i>. Brydges, 14 Mees. & "W. 4S7. See, also, Davis v. Burrell, 10 C. B. 821, 825. 85 674 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 658 assaults a person wrongfully holding possession of it against his will, although the freeholder may be responsi- ble to the public in the shape of an indictment for a forci- ble entry, he is not Uable to the tenant. The case of Newton v. Harland is said to be overruled' and the true doctrine stated that the landlord is not liable to an action of trespass for assault and battery. There is no reason why the landlord should not treat such tenant as a wrongdoer. ' Of course the tenant will have a reasonable time in which to remove his goods, after which the landlord may enter and remove them, storing them near by, providing it was done in a careful manner;' the tenant has no other rights, however, than those of ingress, egress and regress, for a reasonable time to take care of and remove hi^ prop- erty.' § 658. Entry of Landlord During Temporary Absence OF THE Tenant. — When the tenant refuses to give up pos- session, or after the lease has expired, and the landlord dur- ing the temporary absence of the tenant, leaving no one in possession, enters in a peaceable and orderly manner, and having so entered, forces open in a peaceable manner an outer door of a dwelling house on the premises which was fastened by the tenant, and in a careful manner removes the tenant's goods and stores them in an out-building, and takes possession, the landlord is not liable to the tenant.' And a re-entry by the tenant except to get his goods, when they are on the place, in a peaceable manner, will be a trespass.' Once in possession, the landlord may protect that possession, as well against the individual who, in vio- lation of his contract, has attempted to wrong him, as ' Blades v. Higgs, 10 C. B., N. S. 713. See, also, Lows v. Telford, 1 App. Cas. 414, 426; Jackson v. Farmer, 9 Wend, 201; Oberdeer «. Lewis, 1 Watts & S. (Pa.) 90; Kellam v. Janson, 17 Pa. St. 467; Stearns v. Sampson, 59 Me. 568; Sterling v. Warden, 51 N. H. 217; Eames v. Prentice, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 337; Curtis 11. Galvin, 1 Allen (Mass.), 215. 'Co. Lilt. 576; Pike's Case, 3 Leon. 233; Finclie's Case, 2 Leon. 143. 'Rollins V. Mooers, 25 Me. 192. ^ Moore v. Boyd, 24 Me. 242. 'Smith V. Reeder, 21 Oreg. 541. "Todd V. Jackson, 2 Dutch. (N. J.) 525; Mussey v. Scott, 32 Vt. 83. •§ 659] ESTATES AT SUFFERANCE. 675 against a stranger who intrudes upon his possession/ and he may defend his possession by force." Having obtained possession by an act of which the ten- ant has no right to complain, he cannot be hable to an action for the incidental act of expulsion to which he was obliged to resort in order to make his entry effectual, be- cause of the tenant's unlawful resistance.' If the land- lord enters in a peaceable and orderly manner, even while another is in possession, he commits no wrong at all, as he has a lawful right to do so, and his entry in contemplation of law restores him to complete possession.* By statutory provision in Illinois, the landlord cannot enter, even in the tenant's absence; he must gain possession by action of forcible detainer or by ejectment." § 659. What is a. Forcible Entry and Detainer.— The words manuforti import something criminal in its nature; something more than is meant by the words vi et armis. So if the landlord enters with a strong hand, manu forti, to dispossess the tenant by force, he may be indicted for a forcible entry. A forcible entry is such an entry as is made with a strong hand, with unusual weapons, an unusual number of servants or attendants, or with menace of life and limb. An entry which only amounts in law to a tres- pass is not within the statute. There must be something of personal violence, or a tendency to, or threats of, per- sonal violence, unless the entry or detainer is riotous." And the statutes of forcible entry and detainer are not in- tended to apply to mere acts of trespass which are not ac- companied with violence and do not tend to a breach of the peace. A forcible entry must be accompanied either w^ith actual violence or with circumstances tending to ex- ' Todd a. Jackson, 2 Dutch. (N. J.) 535. 2 Davis B. Burrell, 10 C. B. 831, 835. 2 Low V. El well, 121 Mass. 313; Fuhr v. Dean, 26 Mo. 116; Turner v. Mey- mott, 7 Moore, 574; 1 Bing. 158; 8 Bog. C. L. 450. *CooIey on Torts, 323. * Phelps V. Randolph, 147 111. 335, distinguishing Fort Dearborn Lodge v. Klein, 115 HI. 190. 'Williams v. Warren, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 257. 676 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 659 cite terror and to intimidate the owner or his servants from maintaining his rights.' The word force when used in the statute means actual force as contradistinguished from implied force, and so it was held under the English statute.' As a general rule it may be stated that to render an en- try forcible under the statute of forcible entry and de- tainer, it must be accompanied with circumstances tending to excite terror in the owner and to prevent him from maintaining his rights. There must be at least violence, or some unusual weapons, or the parties attended with an unusual number of people; some menaces, or other acts giving reasonable cause to fear that the party making the forcible entry will do some bodily hurt to those in posses- sion if they do not give up the same.° So it may be stated as a general rule to make an entry forcible, there must be such acts of violence used, or threatened, as give reason to apprehend personal danger in standing in defense of the possession. If there is no more force used than is implied in every trespass, with nothing to excite fear of personal violence, the case is not within the statute; therefore, the forcing open the outer door of a dwelling house, in a peace- able manner, or quietly and peaceably taking possession of the premises after the lease has expired, is not of itself sufficient to constitute a forcible entry within the meaning of the statute." One having a right to enter may do so, provided he does so without force and in a peaceable manner. The word force as here used means actual force, as contradistin- guished from implied force. A peaceable entry by the owner in such case as completely defeats the possession and seisin of the occupant as if put in possession by a suit at law. In either case, the possession of the occupant is determined; and if he does not at once vacate the prem- ' Foster d. Kelsey, 36 Vt. 201. 5 5 Rich. II. ch. 8. ' Commonwealth n. Shattuck, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 145. See, also, Evill v. Con- well, 2 Blaokf. (Ind.) 133; Dunning v. Finson, 46 Me. 550. *Frazier». Hanlon, 5 Cal. 156; Stearns v. Sampson, 59 Me. 568; Shaw «, Hoflfman, 25 Mich. 163; Ft. Dearborn Lodge ®. Klein, 115 111. 177; Hendrick son e. Hendrickson, Vi N. J. L. 302; Gray «. Finch, 33 Conn. 495. § 659] ESTATES AT SUFFEEANCE. 677 ises, the owner being in possession, may himself maintain an action of trespass against the tortious occupant, but the owner is not authorized to assault him or forcibly eject him.' However, there are cases which hold that the jury may find the entry to be forcible, when made with strong hand, or with multitude of people, or in a riotous manner, even in the absence of the occupant, and with no personal vio- lence or intimidation toward him." Another class of cases, controlled by statute, forbid peaceable entries, if against the will of the occupant, and under which restitution will be granted, even to a wrongful occupant, as against an owner entitled to possession, though he use no actual force in gaining possession." ' Ft. Dearborn v. Klein, 115 111. 191, 192. See, also, Smith v. Reeder, 31 Oreg. 541. » Ainsworth v. Barry, 35 Wis. 136; Steinlein v. Halstead, 42 Wis. 422; War- ren V. Kelly, 17 Tex. 544; Holmes®. Holloway, 31 Tex. 658. ' Chiles V. Stephens, 3 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 310; Brumfleld v. Reynolds, 4 Bibb (Ky.), 388. See, also, Davidson v. Phillips, 9 Terg. (Tenn.) 93; Krevet V. Meyer, 34 Mo. 107; Greeley v. Spratt, 19 Fla. 644; Mason v. Powell, 38 N. J. L. 576; Allen v. Tobias, 77111. 169. Compare Ft. Dearborn Lodge v. Klein, 115 ni. 191. CHAPTER XVIII. joint estates. Article 1. Classification. § 660. Division and Definition. § 661 Division of Joint Estates. § 660. Division and Definition. — Estates are divided as to their qualities in respect to the number of owners, into estate in severalty and joint estates. An estate in severalty is held by one person in his own right only, without any other person being joined or con- nected with him in point of interest during his estate. It is an estate which is held and enjoyed by one to the exclu- sion of all the world.' Joint estates are those whose title is vested in two or more persons. A joint interest may be had either in the title or possession of land.' § 661. Classification of Joint Estates. — The joint es- tates are divided into joint tenancy, estates in coparceny, tenancy in common, estates in entirety, and estates in partnership. Blackstone and Kent classify the joint estates as joint tenancy, estates in coparceny, and tenancy in com- mon;' but it wiU be better to treat of estates in entirety, and partnership estates separately under their appropriate heads. > 2 Bl. Com. 179. » 4 Kent's Com. 357. » 4 Kent's Com. 357; 2 Bl. Com. 179. (678) §§' 662-663] JOINT ESTATES. 679 Article 2. Joint Tenancies at Common Law. § 663. Definition. § 665. Joint Tenants are Seised Per § 663. Construction of the Rule as to My et Per Tout. Duration and Quality of In- § 666. Doctrine of Survivorship or terest. Jus Accrescendi. § 664. Construction of the Rule as to § 667. Destruction of Joint Tenancy. Time and Title. § 668. Abolition of Joint Tenancy. § 669. Actions. § 662. Definition. — A joint tenancy is an estate in land held by two or more persons by the same title, not be- ing a title by descent, at the same period, and without any words importing that they are to take in distinct shares. A four-fold unity is necessary to the existence of a joint tenancy : 1. Unity of interest ; 2, unity of title; 3, unity of time; 4, unity of possession. So joint tenants must have one and the same interest, accruing by one and the same conveyance, commencing at one and the same time, and held by one and the same undivided possession.' Upon the death of one, his share vests in the survivor or survivors, and when the estate becomes one in severalty in the last joint tenant, it descends to his heirs upon his death." As a general proposition the estate held in joint ten- ancy must be of the same duration or nature, and quan- tity of interest, whether the estates of the several joint tenants be in fee, in tail, for life, or for years, or even in remainder. An entry or re entry made by one joint tenant is deemed to be the entry of all;' and the occupation by one is prima facie an occupation of all.' § 663. Construction op the Rule as to Duration AND Quantity of Interest. — The proposition that the '2 Bl. Com. 180; Litt. sect. 304; Thornburg «. Wiggins, 135 Ind. 178. «Litt. sects. 280, 381, 286; Co. Litt. 180 b; Coster ®. Lorillard, 14 Wend (N. Y.) 365, 336; Thornburg v. Wiggins, 185 Ind. 178. » Co. Litt. 319, 364. *Ford V. Grey, 1 Salk. 285; Small v. Clifford. 38 Me. 213. 680 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 664: estate held in joint tenancy must be of the same duration or nature, and quantity of interest needs ex- planation, because where the fee is limited, by one and the same conveyance, to two persons, and to the heirs of one of them, it is a good joint tenancy.' And so, two persons naay have a joint estate for life, with remainder to one of them in fee, and if he who has the fee first dies, the survivor takes the whole estate for his life." And joint tenants may have an estate for their lives with several inheritances.' Lord Coke says there may be two joint tenants, the one for life, and the other in fee, but he denies that an estate of freehold and an estate for years can stand in joint tenancy." § 664. Construction of the Eule as to Time and Title. — It is the general rule that estates of joint tenancy must be created at one and the same time and by one and the same title. " But to this there are exceptions in the case of uses and executory devises. Thus, if there be a devise or limitation to the title of the children of a person, the estate may vest in joint tenancy in one, and afterwards in other children, as they are successively born." So, if a person makes a conveyance in fee to the use of himself for life, and of such wife as he should afterwards marry, for their joint lives, he, and the wife whom he should after- wards marry, are joint tenants, though they come to their estates at several times. The estate of the wife is held in abeyance until the marriage, and then it has relation back and takes effect from the original time of creation. ' Uses may be raised by common law conveyances, as fine and feoffment, and the limitation may be declared by de- vise, though it be not by way of use.' And it has been ' Wiscot's Case, 3 Co. 60; Litt. sect. S85. ^Litt. sect. 285. «Litt. Sect. 283. •• Co. Litt. 188a. ' Woodgate v. Unwin, 4 Sim. 129. « 2 Preston on Abstr. 67. 'Co. Litt. 188a; 1 Co. 101; 2 BL Com. 181. « Sammes's Case, 13 Co. 54. See, also, Gates v. Jackson, Strange 1173; Sussex V. Temple, 1 Ld. Raym. 310. §§ 665-666] JOINT ESTATES. 681 held that whether the settlement is to be considered as the conveyance of a legal estate, or a deed to uses, makes no difference, and the estate will be in joint tenancy, though vested at different times.' § 665. Joint Tenants are Seised Per My et Per Tout. — Per my et per tout means that each tenant has the entire possession, as well of every parcel as a whole; he is seised by the moiety or half, and by all. Joint tenants have the whole for the purpose of tenure and survivorship, while each has only a particular part for the purpose of aUena- tion." Joint tenants are regarded as having one entire and con- nected right; and they must join and be joined in all ac- tions respecting the estate. ° They have an undivided moiety of the whole.* A joint tenant, in respect to his companion, is seised of the whole; for the purposes of alienation and to forfeit, and to lose by default, he is seised only of his un- divided part or proportion." A joint tenant is not permitted to purchase in an out- standing adverse title to the common property for his own benefit to the exclusion of the other joint tenants, provided they make their election to claim the benefit wilhin a rea- sonable time, and contribute to the expenses incurred in the purchase of such title." One joint tenant may distrain for rent, and appoint a bailiff for that purpose, unless the others expressly dissent.' § 666. Doctrine op Survivorship or Jus Accrescendi. — At common law, where one of several joint tenants died, the entire tenancy or estate went to the survivors, and so on to the last survivor, who took an estate of inheritance. The whole estate or interest held in joint tenancy, whether ' Stratton ■». Best, 3 Bro. C. C. 233. « 1 Preston on Est. 186; Co. Litt. 186a; 3 Bl. Com. 182. See Murray®. Hall, 62 Eng. C. L. 455n. »Litt. sec. 811. Co Lltt. 273 b; 1 Preston on Est. 138; Gilpin v. HoUingsworth, 3 Md. 190. « 1 Prest. on Est. 138. »3B1. Com. 188. < 2 Prest. Absts. 72. 'Co. Litt. tit. Parceners, 163-175. «Drury «. Drury, 1 Rep. in Clian. 49; O'Bannon v. Roberts, 3 Dana (Ky.), 54. 688 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 672 Article 4. Tenancy in Common. § 672. Definition. § 686. 8ufl5cient Notice of Adverse § 673. Relation of the Tenants. Possession. § 674. Purcliaslng an Outstanding § 687. Title in the Name of One of Title by One of the Tenants. the Co-tenants. § 675. Application of the Rule in § 688. Necessary Expenses. Leasehold Estates. § 689. Contribution. § 676. Disseisin— Conveyance. § 690. Improvements. § 677. Ouster. § 691. Waste. § 678. Adverse Possession. § 693. Rents and Profits. § 679. Payment of Taxes. § 693. Occupant of Farms. § 680. Redemption from Tax Sale.. § 694. Statutory Provisions— Use and I 681. Right of Trustee. Occupation. § 683. Rights of Equitable Tenants in § 695. Lien. Common. § 696. 'Accounting. § 683. Presumption. § 697. Actions Between Co-tenants. § 684. Constructive Notice of Adverse § eg**. Ejectment. Possession. g 699. Right to Injunction. § 685. Notice to Minors. § 700. Commission for Sale of Lands. § 672. Definition. — A tenancy in common, at common law, is where two or more persons hold the same land with interests accruing under different titles; or accruing under the same title, other than descent, but at different periods; or, conferred by words of limitation imparting that the grantees are to take distinct shares. The only unity requi- site to create a tenancy in common being a unity of posses- sion. The American law in this respect differs from the Eng- lish common law. This tenancy, at common law, is created by deed or will, or by change of title from joint tenancy, or coparcenary, by construction of law in many cases.' Ill the United States tenancy in common may be created by descent as well as by deed or will. And whether the estate is created by act of the party or by descent, in either case tenants in common are deemed to have several and distinct freeholds; for that circumstance is a leading char- acteristic of tenancy in common. Each tenant is consid- ered to be solely or severally seised of his share." They are '2 Bl. Com. 193; 2 Preston on Abstr. 75, 76; Litt. sects. 393, 394, 298, 302. i'Mittel ». Karl. 133 111. 69; 4 Kent's Com. 367, 368. § 673] JOINT ESTATES. 689 seised per my but not per tout. Whatever may be derived by one tenant in common in regard to the joint estate in- ures to the benefit of all.' § 673. Eelation op the Tenants. — Tenants in common must hold by unity of possession; and they may hold by several and distinct titles at the same time, by the same deed or descent, in the United States. At common law, this estate is created by deed or will, or by change of title from joint tenancy or coparcenary, or it arises in many cases by construction of law. In the United States it may be created by descent, as well as by deed or will. So where one dies intestate and the joint owners of his property are his children, they are tenants in common." And where a party agrees to plow the land of the landlord and raise a crop on shares, he and the landlord are tenants in common, the crop to be divided between them.' If one tenant cuts and removes timber without com- mitting waste, he is not liable to an action of tort or tres- pass as against the co-tenant. The measure of daniages is the value of the trees when from the stump." Where several grantees buy different amounts in the land, and pay accordingly, such contribution fixes the pro- portion of the owner.' Selling standing timber on desig- nated land to be cut and removed at a specified rate, vests the exclusive title to the timber in the purchaser, and leaves the exclusive title to the land in the vendor, and, hence, does not make the vendee and the vendor. tenants in com- mon either in the land or in timber, as each is a sole tenant of his own estate, the one of the land, the other in the timber.' And if one co-tenant sells his interest in the tim- ber, and the others refuse to allow the purchaser to enter "Gilchrist V. Beswick, 33 W. Va. 168. See, also, McMahon t). McClernan, 10 W. Va. 419; Forrer b. Forrer, 29 Gratt. (Va.) 134; Rothwell v. Dewees, 3 Black (U. S.), 613; Newman «. Bank, 80 Cal. 368. "Fenton v. Miller, 94 Mich. 204. 'Moser ». Lower, 48 Mo. App. 85. * Patureau v. Wilbert, 44 La. Ann. 355. » Walker v. Barrow, 43 La. Ann. 863; Baylor v. Hopf, 81 Tex. 637. •Dexter v. Lathrop, 136 Pa. St. 565, distinguishing Wheeler v. Carpenter, 107 Pa St. 271, and Shififer v. Broadhead, 126 Pa. St. 260. 87 690 CLASSIFICATIOSr OF ESTATES. [§ 674 and cut the timber, he can compel his grantor to seek par- tition in order to obtain his property in the timber." § 674. Purchasing an Outstanding Title by One of the Tenajsjts. — Tenants in common stand in such confidential relations as to one another's interest that one of them is not permitted to acquire an interest in the property hostile to that of the others. Therefore, a purchase by one of an in- cumbrance on the joint estate, or an outstanding title to it, is held at the election of the other tenants within a reason- able time to inure to the benefit of all upon contributing a pro rata amount of the consideration actually paid." But a deed given as a mortgage of an undivided interest in land does not make the grantee a tenant in common with the other owner of the land, and the grantee may, there- fore, buy in an outstanding title on the whole land and en- force it. ' But the tenant in common who permits the land to be sold and then buys the title from the purchaser, holds such title in trust for himself and his co-tenants.* While one tenant in common cannot buy in an adverse paramount title so as to oust his co-tenant, yet the rule is not apphcable where a tenant buys in the independent in- terest of any tenant in common similarly situated as him- self.' Their relations are such that one co-tenant will not be permitted to purchase an outstanding title and set it up against the title of the other; and such title will inure to the benefit of all the tenants.' ■ Mee V. Benedict, 98 Mich. 260. 'Carpenter v. Carpenter, 131 N. Y. 101; Dubois*. Campau, 24 Micb. 361; Collins V. Collins, 181 N. Y. 648; 13 N. Y. Supp. 28; Ramberg v. Wahlstrom, 140 111. 182; Bracken s. Cooper, 80 III. 231; Dray «. Dray, 31 Oreg. 59. 3 Barteau v. Merriam, 53 Minn. 333. ^Hinters v. Hinters, 114 Mo. 26; Davis v. King, 87 Ponn. St. 361; Boskowitz v. Davis, 12 Nev. 446; Austin «. Barrett, 44 Iowa, 488; Davis v. Givens, 71 Mo. 94. «Snell v. Harrison, 104 Mo. 158. « McPheeters «. Wrigbt, 134 Ind. 560; Brittin «. Handy, 30 Ark. 381; Vena. ble». Beauchamp, 3 Dana (Ky.), 331; Dillinger«. Kelley,84 Mo. 561; Houses. Fuller, 18 Vt. 165; Mandeville v. Solomon, 39 Cal. 125; Brown v. Homan, 1 Neb. 448; Tisdale®. Tisdale, 3 Sneed (Tenn,), 596; King v. Rowan, 10 Heisk. (Tenn.) 675; Lee v. Fox, 6 Dana (Ky.), 171; Rothwell ». Dewees, 3 Black (U. S.), 619; Bracken «. Cooper, 80 111. 221; Montague «. Selb, 106 111. 49; § 675] JOINT ESTATES. 691 This rule applies to joint tenants, tenants in common or coparceners, and if one buys an outstanding title, it wiU in- ure to the joint benefit of all co-tenants, upon their con- tributing to the expense of it in proportion to their respect- ive interests;' and this is so whether the several interests of the different tenants accrue under the same instrument, under different instruments, or by acts of law; and it is held by some authorities that this rule applies, however, the tenancy may have been formed, whatever the relation of the tenants with each other may be, and from whatever source the outstanding title may be acquired." However, it has been held by a few courts, contrary to the general rule, and upon no sound basis, that tenants in common are subject to this mutual obhgation only when their interests accrue under the same instrument, or act of the parties or of the law, or where they have entered into some engage- ment or understanding with each other; because persons acquiring unconnected interests in the same subject by dis- tinct purchases, though it may be under the same title, are not bound to any greater protection of each other's inter- ests than will be required between strangers.' § 675. Application of the Rule in Leasehold Es- tates. — The privity of tenants in common as to buying outstanding titles is limited to the acquisition of hostile interest. So a tenant in common in a leasehold estate Titsworth v. Stout, 49 111. 78; Buchanan ■o. King, 22 Gratt. (Va.) 414; Jones v. Stanton, 11 Mo. 433; Knolls v. Barnhart, 71 N. Y. 474; Lloyd v. Lynch, 28 Pa. St. 419; Keller v. Auble, 58 Pa. St. 410; Van Home «. Fonda, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 409; Benefield s. Albert. 132 111. 670. 'FlaggB. Mann, 2 Sumner, C. C. 486; Swinburne v. Swinburne, 28 N. Y. 56S; Picot v. Page, 26 Mo. 398; Funk v. Newcomer, 10 Md. 301; Thruston v. Masterson, 9 Dana (Ky.), 238; Gossom v. Donaldson, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 280; Duff s. Wilson, 72 Pa. St. 443; Davis v. King, 87 Pa. St. 361. 'Page V. Branch, 97 N. Car. 97; Rountree ®. Denson, 59 Wis. 533; Brain- tree V. Battles, 6 Vt. 395; Grimm «. Wicker, 80 N. Car. 343; Boskowitz v. Davis, 13 Nev. 446; Olney b. Sawyer, 54 Cal. 379; Clements ». Cates. 49 Ark. 243; DufE». Wilson, 73 Pa. St. 443; Thruston ». Masterson, 9 Dana(Ky.), 328; Wilson v. Peelle, 78 Ind. 384; Bender s. Stewart, 75 Ind. 88; Elston «. Pig- gott, 94 Ind. 14. ^Rippetoe «. Dwyer, 49 Tex. 498; Roberts®. Thorn, 35 Tex. 728; Brittin v. Handy. 30 Ark. 381; King v. Rowan, 10 Heisk. (Tenn.)675; Frentz v. Klotsch, 88 Wis. 313; Buchanan v. King, 33 Gratt. (Va.) 414. 692 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 676 may, before the expiration of their estate, purchase of the landlord the fee for his own exclusive benefit, but he will thereby acquire no right greater than his grantor had. Their privity of estate does not extend to the estate re- maining in their landlord and he can sell it to any one of them.' The reason for the general rule not existing in such cases, is that it can have no application." § 6Y6. Disseisin — Conveyance.— It is the general rule of law that the possession of one tenant in common though exclusive, being consistent with the rights of his co-tenant, does not amount to a disseisin of the co-tenant, and that an ouster or some act which the law deems equivalent to an ouster is necessary to constitute a disseisin of a co- tenant by a tenant in common.' The conveyance of the undivided share of an estate in common is made in like manner as if the tenant in com- mon was seised of the entirety.'' It is held that tenants in common, like joint tenants, cannot convey a distinct por- tion of the estate by metes and' bounds, so as to prejudice their co-tenants or their assignees, even though it may bind the grantors by estoppel, and as against the co-ten- ants, such conveyance is abortive and void." But the bet- ter law will aUow the co-tenant to convey his own interest with, and perhaps without the assent of his co-tenants, and a deed by metes a,nd bounds will operate to convey the gr-an tor's interest in the part conveyed." But of course 1 Ramberg v. Wahlstrom, 140 111. 183. ^ Freeman on Co. Ten. sect. 1.55. ^Bellis «. Bellis, 133 Mass. il^; Old South Soc. v. "Wainwright, 156 Mass, 115. * Green b. Arnold, 11 R. I. 364. 'Great Water Falls Co. «. Worster, 15 N. H. 413, 449; Scott v. State, 1 Head (Tenn.), 433; Duncan v. Sylvester, 34 Me. 483; Peatiody v. Minot, 34 Pick. (Mass.) 339; Bartlett v. Harlow, 13 Mass. 348; Mitchell «. Hazen, 4 Coun. 495; Griswold v. Johnson, 5 Conn. 363; Jewett v. Stockton, 3 Yerg. (Tenn.) 492. Compare "White v. Sayre, 2 Ohio, 110; Prentiss's Case, 7 Ohio, 470. «Emerie v. Alvarado, 90 Oal. 444; Crooks. Vandevoort, 13Nebr. 505; Hart- ford, etc. Ore Co. v. Miller, 41 Conn. 112; Lyman v. Railroad Co., 58 N. H. 884; Worthington ®. Staunton, 16 W. Va. 308; Goodwin v. Keney, 49 Conn. 563; Young v. Edwards, 33 S. Car. 404; Furrh v. Winston, 66 Tex. 521;: Shepherd v. Jernigan, 51 Ark. 275. § 677] JOINT ESTATES. 693 such a conveyance has no effect upon the rights of the grantor's co-tenants.' They are seised per my and not per tout. They may convey to each other, the same as to a stranger." The ancient common law made this distinction: 1. Ten- ants in common rnay deliver seisin to each other, but they cannot convey to each other by release. 2. A joint tenant cannot convey to his co-tenant, because they are both act- ually seised, but for that reason they may release to each other; whereas tenants in common may convey to each other, but they cannot release to each other, because they are not jointly seised.' The general rule is that where a common estate can be partitioned only by sale, one of the tenants in common may convey his interest to a stranger without the consent of his co-tenant; since, as the partition is not of the land but of the proceeds of sale, the conveyance cannot affect the rights of the co-tenant who will in any event receive his full share.* And it is the better law that a tenant in common can convey his share when such conveyance does not affect the rights of his co-tenants;' and if he conveys the whole estate it may be made legal by i-atification of his co-tenants.' And so all the co-tenants must join in making a dedication.' On the same principle one tenant cannot as against his co-tenants give a license to a third person to enter on the land held in common. ' § 677. Ouster. — The relation of tenants in common is such that they have a united possession. And when one takes possession of the property with the consent of his co- tenants this is no ouster, unless he gives them notice that ' Sewall V. Holland, 61 6a. 608; Marks v. Sewall, 130 Mass. 174: Talnter •c. Cole, 120 Mass. 163. See, also, Stevens v. Norfolk, 46 Conn. 237; Earles v. Meaders, 1 Baxt. (Tenii.) 248. « Heatberly v. Weston, 2 Wils. 232. 'Rectors. Waugh, 17 Mo. 13, 28; Co. Litt, 193a, Butter's note, 80. * Crocker v. Tiffany, 9 R. I. 505, 506; Horgan ». Bickerton, 17 R. I. 483. ^Emeric s. Alvarado, 90 Cal. 444; McKee b. Barley, 11 Gratt. (Va.) 340; Holcombe v. Coryell, 10 N. J. Eq. 392; Nichols ®. Smith, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 319. «McWhinne v. Martin, 77 Wis. 182. See, also, Sims v. Dame, 113 Ind. 127. ■I Daniels v. Almy (R. I.), 27 At. Rep. 330. « Moore v. Moore (Col.), 34 Pac. Rep. 90. 694 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 677 he no longer recognizes their rights, or uses words and does acts which indicate his intention to oust them. Pos- session given to one by mutual consent is not an ouster of those not in possession." And stale demands will not be- gin to run against a co-tenant until there is an unequivocal act of repudiation or ouster by the one in possession." A person remaining in possessiou, after entering under a claim of title of which he is co-tenant with another, can- not deny the common source of title, nor defend himself by proving that the paramount title is in a third person.' And his possession will inure to the benefit of his co-tenant out of possession, so as to ripen their right into a title, if it is in another; and it is immaterial whether the deed un- der which he enters does in fact pass any interest.' If he acquires title from a third person, such tenant in possession cannot use this title to keep the other out, but the latter is entitled to be let into possession, and then the former may make his title available by appropriate action.' An actual ouster is necessary in order to start the statute of limitations in motion against a co-tenant.' There may be adverse possession by a tenant in common without an ouster, and likewise there may be an ouster without an adverse possession. Both must exist to start the statute.' Assuming to convey the entire estate has been held a disseisin of the co-tenants.' An ouster may be presumed from the mere fact of a very long exclusive possession, taking rents and never account- ing to the other co-tenants,' provided such possession is ' Fenton v. Miller, 94 Mich. 204. ' Golson V. Fielder (Tei. Cir. App.) 21 S. W. Rep. 173; Lundy v. Lundy, 131 111. 140. 3 Weaver 1). Wible, 25 Pa. St. 270. ^Park Commissioners®. Coleman, 108 111. 591. « Olney v. Sawyer, 54 Cal. 379. ' Carpenter «; Webster, 27 Cal. 524; Reading's Case, 1 Salk. 392; Van Bib- ber V. Prazier, 17 Md. 436; Marr «. Gillian, 1 Cold. (Tenn.) 488. ' Warfield «. Lindell, 30 Mo. 272; Unger v. Mooney, 63 Cal. 586. 'Kinney t\ Slattery, 51 Iowa, 353. Compare Caldwell v. Neely, 81 N. Car. 114; Sims v. Dame, 113 Ind. 127. •Fisharc. Prosser, Cowp. 217; Warfield v. Lindell, 38 Mo. 581; Gray v. § '678J JOINT ESTATES. 695 with the knowledge and implied acquiescence of the other tenants in common.' § 678. Adverse Possession. — Adverse possession by a tenant in common will only run from the time when the knowledge thereof is brought home to his co-tenant.' While a suit is pending in partition the statute of limita- tions cannot run against or in favor of any co-tenant.' If one be in possession and pays the taxes, but makes no claim of adverse possession, his co-tenants are not de- prived of any rights.* And when he makes the claim of adverse possession, the possession must be visible, dis- tinct, notorious, continuous and hostile, and inconsistent with the rights of his co-tenants. ° Until the tenant, out of possession, has notice that the possession of his co-tenant has become hostile, it will be deemed, in law, to have been amicable, notwithstanding the tenant in possession may, in fact, have been holding adversely. ' The rule of law is, that a tenant in common cannot acquire title by adverse possession, unless there has been an ouster of his co-tenants as to entitle them to bring ejectment against him;' mere possession is not adverse to that of a co-tenant, unless there is an actual ouster or refusal to let the co-tenant occupy.' The possession of one co-tenant in common, though ex- Givens, 2 Hill Ch. (S. Car.) 513; McGee v. Hall, 26 S. Car. 179; Laraway o. Larue, 63 Iowa, 407. ' Annely v. De Saussure, 26 S. Car. 497; Fry «. Payne, 82 Va. 759; Burns V. Byrne, 45 Iowa, 287. See, also. Gale v. Hines, 17 Fla. 774. « Stewart v. Stewart, 83 Wis. 364. 'Christy v. Spring Valley Waterworks, 97 Cal. 21. ^Pierson v. Conley, 95 Mich. 619. ' Beall V. Evans, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 443. See, also, Dryden v. Newman, 116 III. 190; Littlejohn d. Barnes, 138 111. 478; Jordan v. Surghnor, 107 Mo. 520; Sorensoa v. Davis. 83 Iowa, 405; Comstock v. Eastwood. 108 Mo. 41. « Miller v. Myers, 46 Cal. 535; Rohn v. Harris, 130 111. 531. ' Day v. Davis, 64 Miss. 258. « Burrus v. Meadors, 90 Ala. 140 ; Newbold v. Smart, 67 Ala. 326; Steven- son v. Anderson, 87 Ala. 228: Sibley v. Alba, 95 Ala. 191; Brown «. Hogle, 30 111. 119; Sontag v. Bigelow, 143 111. 143; Gage v. Downey, 94 Cal. 341; Mc- Claskey v. Barr, 47 Fed. Rep. 154; Comestock v. Eastwood, 108 Mo. 41; Littlejohn v. Barnes, 138 111. 478. 696 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 679 elusive, being consistent with the right of his co-tenant, does not amount to a disseisin of the co-tenant ; and an oustei", or some act which the law deems equivalent to an ouster, is necessary to constitute a disseisin of his co- tenant by a tenant in common.' § 679. Payment of Taxes. — The payment of taxes by one tenant in common cannot give strength to title by ad- verse possession against the others." He cannot acquire a tax title thereto and hold it adversely to his co-tenants. The acquisition of such title merely operates as against them as a payment of the taxes.' He cannot acquire a tax title adverse to his co-tenant's title, nor invoke the statute of limitations to defeat such title.* While a tenant in common cannot, as against his co-ten- ant, acquire a title to the latter's interest by purchase at a 'Duncan u. Williams, 89 Ala. 341; Buscli v. Huston, 75 111. 344; Ball v. Palmer, 81 111. 370; Comer v. Comer, 119 111. 170; Peck v. Lockridge, 97 Mo. 549; Mayes «. Manning, 78 Tex. 43; In re Grider's Estate, 81 Cal. 571; For- ward «. Deetz, 33 Pa. 8t. 72; Barret v. Coburn, 3 Met. (Ky.) 513; Bailey v. Trammell, 37 Tex. 328; Adam «. Ames Iron Co., 24 Conn. 235; Culver ». Khodes, 87 N. Y. 348; Story v. Saunders, 8 Humph. (Tenn.) 663; Simon v. Eicliard, 42 La. Ann. 842; Hamilton v. Redden, 44 Kans. 193; Stevenson v. Anderson, 87 Ala. 338; Greenliill v. Biggs, 85 Ky. 155; Cook v. Clinton, 64 Mich. 309; Rodney v. McLaughlin, 97 Mo. 426; Hignite v. Hignite, 65 Miss. 447; Frick v. Simon, 75 Cal. 337; Oglesby «. Hollister, 76 Cal. 186; Richards V. Richards, 75 Mich. 408; Caldwell i>. Neely, 81 N. Car. 114; Northop v. Marquam, 16 Oreg. 173; Ward v. Farmer, 92 N. Car. 93; Hicks v. Bullock, 96 N. Car. 164; Page i>. Branch, 97 N. Car. 97; Breden v. McLaurin, 98 N. Car. 307; Hampton «. Wheeler, 99 N. Car. 223; Lindley ». Groff, 37 Minn. 338; Hudson V. Coe, 79 Me. 83; Thornton ®. Bank, 45 Me. 158; Roberts i>. Morgan, 30 Vt. 325; Smith v. Young (Iowa), 56 N. W. Rep. 506; Lenoir®. Min. Co., 113 X. Car. 513; Alsobrook v. Eggleston, 69 Miss. 833; King v. Carmichael (Ind.), 35 N. B. Rep. 509; Ferguson v. Wright, 113 N. Car. 537; Gregory v. Gregory, 103 Cal. 50. 'Delashmutt ®. Parrent, 39 Kans. 548; Wise v. Hyatt, 68 Miss. 714; English V. Powell, 119 Ind. 93; Christy v. Spring Valley Waterworks, 97 Cal. 21; Pox V. Coon, 64 Miss. 465. ^Hannig v. Mueller, 83 Wis. 335; Burchard «. Roberts, 70 Wis. 118; Newton V. Maribhall, 62 Wis. 13; McChesney «. White, 140 111. 330; Lewis v. Ward, 99 111. 535. 2 Jonas B. Flanniken, 69 MLss. 577; Tanney ®. Tanney, 159 Pa. St. 377; McGee D. Holmes, 63 Miss. 50; Cohea «. Hemingway, 71 Miss. 33. § 679] ' JOINT ESTATES. 697 tax sale of the whole, yet such title acquired is good against a stranger." Each tenant in common is Uable for his share of the taxes to his co-tenant who has paid them, but the tenant paying cannot acquire an adverse tax title." But a tenant in common of land which has been sold for taxes, may, after his interest has been conveyed and he has ceased to be connected with the title as tenant in common, purchase a tax title and set it up against those who were his co-ten- ants.' Under the general rule a spouse of a co-tenant is equally disqualified to set up a tax title.* A co-tenant taking a tax title will be treated as a trustee of the title for the equal benefit of the co-tenants. ' And an assignee of such co-tenant who has a tax title, or the cer- tificate of sale, takes no greater or higher rights than his assignor had.' A tax title obtained by one co-tenant in- ures to the benefit of all when they contribute their share of the expense.' There are some cases which hold, and others suggest, that where a tenant in common buys from a purchaser at a tax sale, after the time for redemption has expired, and there are no equitable circumstances making the purchaser ' Cocks v. Simmons, 55 Ark. 104; Burgett v. Williford, 56 Ark.. 187. 'Schisseli;. Dickson, 129 Ind. 139; Hannig s. Mueller, 83 Wis. 235; Cocks «. Simmons, 55 Ark. 104; Barker v. Jones, 62 N. H. 497; McChesney b. White, 140 111. 330; Emeries. Alvarado, 90 Cal. 444; Minter v. Durham, 13 Oreg. 470. ' Jonas V. Flanniken, 69 Miss. 577. *Lee V. Fox, 6 Dana (Ky.), 172; Burns v. Byrne, 45 Iowa, 285; Rothwell v. Dewees, 2 Black. (U. S.) 613; Busch«. Huston, 75 111. 343; Robinson v. Lewis, 68 Miss. 69. 'Freeman on Coten. sect. 158; Cooley on Tax. (2d ed.) 500; Burroughs on Tax. sect. 123; Weare v. Van Meter, 42 Iowa, 128; Bailey «. Campbell, 82 Ala. 342; Johns v. Johns, 93 Ala. 239; Flinn v. McKinley, 44 Iowa, 68; Tice ». Derby, 59 Iowa, 312; Pruitt «. Holly, 73 Ala. 369; Donnor d. Quartermas, 90 Ala. 164. « Ph'pps V. Phipps, 47 Kans. 328. '' Clark v. Lindsey, 47 Ohio St. 437; Page ». Webster, 8 Mich. 263; "Vena- ble V. Beauchamp, 3 Dana (Ky.), 321; Choteau v. Jones, 11 111. 300; Allen v. Poole, 54 Miss. 323; Davis o. King, 87 Pa. St. 261; Middleton Sav. Bank v. Bacharach, 46 Conn. 513; Blake v. Howe, 1 Aik. (Vt.) 306; Johnston «. Smith, 70 Ala. 118; Douglas 4). Dangerfield, 10 Ohio, 152, 158; Whiteheads. Curry, 67 Miss. 637. 88 698 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 67& a trustee for his co-tenant, or where the taxes for which the land was sold accrued before the ownership of the tenant commenced, he holds for himself a valid tax title." And some cases restrict the mutual obligations of co-tenants to those titles accruing under the same instru- ment or act of the parties or of the law ; under such title none can deny the validity of the instrument or act, and each is bound to preserve the estate in good faith for the equal benefit of all." There is some uncertainty as to the extent and grounds of the principle that a purchase of a tax title by one tenant in common inures for the benefit of all' Some hold that there must be a fiduciary relation in order that the title shall inure to all.' While others hold that a tenant in common cannot take advantage of a title created by his own default, as against his co-tenant. ° And so it is held that a tenant in common may purchase a tax title from a stranger, after the period of redemption has expired and hold it for his own benefit.' And that he may take an assignment of a paramount mortgage, and rely upon it to defeat a petition for partition.' And on the other hand, it has been held that a purchase of a tax certificate before the period of redemption has 'Lewis 1). Robinson, 10 Watts (Pa.), 354; Kirkpatrick ». Mathiot, 4 "Watts & S. (Pa.) 251; Reinboth v. Improvement Co., 29 Pa. St. 139; Frentz v. Klotsch, 28 Wis. 312; Page v. Webster, 8 Mich. 263; Wright v. Sperry, 21 Wis. 336. 'Bender v. Stewart, 75 Ind. 88; Hadley ». Musselman, 104 Ind. 459; Phelan V. Kelley, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 389; Olney v. Sawyer, 54 Cal. 379; Knolls v. Barn- hart, 71 N. Y. 474; Keller v. Auble, 58 Pa. St. 410; Frentz v. Klotsch, 28 Wis. 312; Millis ®. Roof, 121 Ind. 360. 'Frentz d. Klotsch, 28 Wis. 312, 318; Connecticut Ins. Co. v. Bulte, 45 Mich. 113, 120; Rothwell v. Dewees, 2 Black (U. S.), 618. ^ Lloyd V. Lynch, 38 Pa. St. 419, 434; Van Home v. Fonda, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 388; Flinn v. McKinley, 44 Iowa, 68; Weare v. Van Meter, 42 Iowa, 128; Venable v. Beauchamp, 3 Dana (Ky.), 331, 324. 'Choteau «. Jones, 11 111. 300; Voris v. Thomas, 13 111. 442; Dubois v. Campau, 24 Mich. 360; Lacey v. Davis, 4 Mich. 140; Downer s. Smith, 38 Vt. 464. « Reinboth v. Improvement Co., 29 Pa. St. 139; Keele ». Cunningham, 2 Heisk. (Tenn.) 288; Watkins v. Eaton, 30 Me. 529; Jonas v. Flanniken, 69 Miss. 575; Coleman v. Coleman, 3 Dana (Ky.), 398. 'Blodgett V. Hildreth, 8 Allen (.Vlass.), 186. §§ 680-682] JOINT ESTATES. 699 expired, by one who is not a tenant in common at the time, will inure to the benefit of the other tenants in common, if he becomes such before he gets the tax deed.' § 680. Eedemption From Tax Sale. — When one tenant in common pays the taxes and takes a tax title the lien of the tax is discharged, in such a sense that it cannot ripen into a legal title as against his co-tenants, except upon their refusal or neglect to pay their share;" but he is entitled to possession, and to have the lien of the tax sale kept alive, until his co-tenants pay him their shares of the redemption money.' Until the other co-tenants pay their share of the redemption money they have no right to the possession of any part of the land, in equity or at law. * § 681. Eight of Trustee. — The trustee has no right to buy the land of the cestui que trust at a tax sale and thereby obtain the title. So one who holds the legal title to real estate as trustee for one of several tenants in common, cannot either by himself or in conjunction with a stranger to the title acquire a tax title thereto adverse to the co-tenant of his cestui que trust; nor can such person acquire title to such real estate as against such co-ten- ant by purchase from one to whom a tax deed is issued.'* § 682. Rights of Equitable Tenants in Common. — The possession of an equitable tenant in common is the posses- sion of the trustee, who holds the legal title, and there can be no adverse claim or possession during the continuance of the relation, ' for the cestui que trust in actual possession is the tenant at will of the trustee, and the statute of limi- tations does not apply.' Holding as he does under the trustee he cannot destroy that relation by setting up an 'Flinn v. McKinley, 44 Iowa, 68; Tice v. Derby, 59 Iowa, 313. 'WatkinsB. Eaton, 30 Me. 539; Weare v. Van Meter, 43 Iowa, 138; Moon V. Jennings, 119 Ind. 130. ' Hurley v. Hurley, 148 Mass. 444. * Watkins v. Eaton, 30 Me. 539, 535. ' Sorenson v. Davis, 83 Iowa, 405. See, also, Spicer v. Rowland, 39 Kans. 740. « 3 Perry on Trusts, 863. 'Wood on Lira. 303; Lewin on Trusts, 881; 3 Perry on Trusts, 863. 700 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 683 adverse possession under a subsequent deed from the same grantor; and even if he did so, his disclaiming conduct must be of the same character as would create an adverse possession against a co-tenant in common.' § 683. Presumption. — If one tenant in common enters upon the common laud and holds the actual, open and ex- clusive possession of it, claiming it as his own, the entry and possession are necessarily adverse to the other tenants. So where one tenant in common enters and occupies openly and exclusively under a deed purporting to convey the whole estate with warranty, his entry and possession will be referred to the title under which he entered and occu- pied. The legal presumption in such cases will be that he entered and held in conformity to his deed as sole and ex- clusive owner." And though the grantor and the grantee under a deed purporting to convey the entire estate in land paid taxes thereon for many years, there is no presumption that they hold the same adverse to another party who is owner of an interest therein as tenant in common by record title, where the land was unoccupied and no use thereof made by either party.' But a tenant will be deemed to have notice, of the adverse holding by his co- tenant where the hostile character of the possession is so openly manifested that a . man of reasonable diligence would discover it.' In order to relieve the adverse claimant from the general rule or presumption of law, it is necessary for the court to find notice to the other joint owner, and this will never be done in the absence of actual notice, where there is bad faith shown. ' It is generally necessary that actual notice be shown to have reached the co-tenant out of possession in order to charge hira with effect of the ouster; but the ' Buswell on Adverse Poss. sect. 342; Jeter v. Davis, 109 N. Oar. 458. * Clark «. Vaughan, 3 Oonn. 191; Nevemarket Manuf. Co. v. Pendergast, 34 N. H. 54, 59; Kittredge ». Proprietors, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 247. 3 White V. Beckwith, 63 Oonn. 79. "Van Dungenc. Virginia Coal & I. Co., 53 Fed. Rep. 838; 3 0. 0. App. 294; 8 U. S. App. 229. 'Bender*. Stewart, 75 Ind. 88; Austin v. Barrett, 44 Iowa, 488; Wilson v. Atkinson, 77 Cal. 485; Sydnor v. Palmer, 29 Wis. 249. § 684] JOINT ESTATES. 701 hostile intent may be manifest by acts or declarations so open and notorious, or of such a nature that it may be readily presumed that the co-tenant out of possession is informed thereby of the hostile intent.' But this hostile intent is not manifest by the mere fact of possession as in case of dispossession by a stranger, but must be estabhshed by actual or presumptive notice of the hostile intent with which the possession is held, directly or indirectly com- municated to the co-tenant out of possession." § 684. Constructive Notice of Adverse Possession. — The entry under a deed for the whole property from a ten- ant in common to a stranger, where the grantor claims to be sole owner, is notice to the co-tenants out of possession of the adverse claim, and constitutes an ouster." But a deed from a tenant in common, purporting to convey only the interest of the grantor, is not sufficient to put the co-ten- ants upon inquiry as to the claim of the grantee entering under such a conveyance.* The record of a deed is constructive notice only to subse- quent purchasers and incumbrancers from the grantor; and when a recorded deed for the whole is taken by a ten- ant in common in possession, it is not notice to his co-ten- ants of an adverse claim.' Possession by the grantee of a tenant in common, under a deed purporting to convey the whole estate with general warranty, the possession being peaceable, continuous, open, notorious and exclusive, is adverse to the co-tenants." This general rule is not accepted in North Carolina, and such ' Winterburn v. Chambers, 91 Cal. 170; Warfield v. Lindell, 30 Mo. 283; Lodge V. Patterson, 3 Watts (Pa.), 77; Dikeman v. Parrish, 6 Pa. St. 227. " Winterbura «. Chambers, 91 Cal. 170. 'Highstone v. Burdette, 61 Mich. 54; Odom v. Wethersbee, 26 S. Car. 244; Weisinger v. Murphy, 3 Head (Tenn.), 674; Higbeo v. Rice, 5 Mass. 344; Unger v. Mooney, 63 Cal. 586; Bath ®. Valdez, 70 Cal. 350. * Edwards u. 'Bishop, 4 N. Y. 61; Busdm. Huston, 75 III. 348; Purcell a Wilson, 4 Gratt, (Va.) 16; Van Bibber v. Prazier, 17 Md. 436; Hume ii Long, 53 Iowa, 299; Holley «. Hawley. 39 Vt. 525; Northrop v. Wright, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 221; Batht). Valdez, 70 Cal. 850; Trenouth v. Gilbert, 63 Cal. 404. * Holley V. Hawley, 39 Vt. 535; Leach ®. Beatties, 33 Vt. 195; Paget). Branch, 97 N. Car. 97. 'Kearnes v. Hill, 21 Fla. 185; Greenhlll v. Biggs, 85 Ky. 155. 702 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 685 grantee is a tenant in common;' but the taking of a deed from a stranger by a tenant in common, in possession of the common property does not operate as an ouster of his co-tenant." When a person whose possession of the whole property is adverse to the title of the co-tenants, accepts a deed for an undivided share, this acknowledges the co-ten- ancy and will deprive his possession of its exclusive char- acter. ' Although the general rule is that, where several persons have a right and one of them enters generally, it shall be an entry for all, for the reason that the entry shaU always be taken according to right; yet any overt act or con- veyance, by which the party entering or conveying asserts a title to entirety will amount to a disseisin of the other parties, whether joint tenants or tenants in common.* So, Tvhere one tenant in common conveys to a' stranger who enters and holds exclusive possession, his entry and pos session are adverse to the title and possession of the co- tenants, and amount to a disseisin, and such possession, if continued for the prescriptive time, will bar the title of such co-tenants. ' § 685. Notice to Minors.— The rule is that an infant is not chargeable with notice of the adverse claim of his co- tenant, and the period of his infancy is not counted in determining whether the adverse possession has continued a sufficient length of time to justify the presumption of ouster." But when the statute commences to run, it will continue, regardless of any intervening disability.' So, ' Day V. Howard, 73 N. Car. 6; Caldwell v. Neely, 81 N. Car. H4. 2 Page V. Branch, 97 K. Car. 97. ' Cook V. Clinton, 64 Mich. 309. ^Reedi). Taylor, 5 Barn. & Adol. 575; Clymer v. Dawkins, 3 How. (U. 8.) 674; Kittredge v. Proprietors, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 247; Clark ». Vaughan, 3 Conn. 19; Clapp «. Bromagham, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 530; Thomas ». Pickering, 13 Me. 337. See, also, Townsend's Case, 4 Leon. 53. 5 Rutter V. Small, 68 Md. 133. See, also. Baker v. Swan, 32 Md. 355; Israel v. Israel, 30 Md. 126; Larman v. Huey, 13 B. Mon. (Ky.) 443; Bigelow ». Jones, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 164. « Northrop v. Marquam, 16 Greg. 493. See, also, McGee v. Hall, 26 S. Car. 179. ' Wood on on Limitations, sect. 6; Buswell on Limitations, sect. 372. § 686] JOINT ESTATES. 703 where a person, in whose favor a cause of action for the recovery of real estate exists, and who is under no disabil- ity, dies, the statute of limitations does not cease running against those to whom the property is devised or descends, notwithstanding their disability at that time. The disabil- ity must exist at the time the right of action first accrues." So, the running of the statute of limitations is not sus- pended during the minority of one who claims property under the decedent.' For it is a general principle of lim- itations that, after the cause of action has once accrued, subsequent accruing disabilities do not stop the running of the statute.' Where one of the tenants in common is barred, all are barred, notwithstanding individual instances of disa- bility.' Where one co-tenant is a minor, the statute not having begun to run against his ancestor, his minority will pro- tect all his co-tenants out of possession, and the statute wiU not begin to run against any of them until after his disa- bility has ceased.' § 686. Sufficient Notice of Adverse Possession. — As a general rule, the entry of one tenant in common will inure to the benefit of all, yet he may so enter and hold as to render his entry and possession adverse, and an ouster of co-ten- ants; and where a vendee of one tenant in common sets up a claim in his own right to the whole tract of land, and enters and holds possession openly and continuously for more than the statutory period, his possession is adverse, and a recovery by the other tenants in common is barred, although they had no actual notice of the adverse character of the possession,' provided it may reasonably be presumed that the co-tenant has knowledge of the adverse possession.' ' McLeran v. Benton, 73 Cal. 329, 344. ' Alvarado ■». Nordholt, 95 Cal. 116. » Grether v. Clark, 75 Iowa, 383; Chancey v. Powell, 103 N. Car. 159; Fred- erick D. Williams, 103 N. Car. 189. * Freeman on Cotenancy, sect. 378; Buswell on Lim. sect. 136. ' McGee v. Hall, 26 8. Car. 179. " Greenhill v. Biggs, 85 Ky. 155. ' BJiowles ». Brown, 69 Iowa, 11. 704 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 687-688 Thus, where a co-tenant has been in possession and openly claims title to the property, either personally or through his successors, and he and his heirs have received all the rents of the property in controversy from the date of an administrator's deed to the time of trial, and have paid all taxes, it is sufficient notice of the adverse possession to his co-tenants out of possession.' So where one enters and takes the profits exclusively and continuously for a long period, under circumstances which indicate a denial of the right in another to receive them, an ouster may be presumed.' § 687. Title in the Name of One of the Co-tenants. — By agreement the title may stand in the name of one of the co-tenants and his co-tenants still be entitled to their interests. Thus, where one tenant in common holds land, each tenant having paid his proportionate share for an un- divided interest, with the agreement that he shall convey to them whenever so requested, or if sold the proceeds shall be divided, the interests of the tenants in common are in the land and not in the proceeds. ' So where it is agreed that one tenant shall redeem the land sold under a mort- gage, the transaction will be treated in equity as a redemp- tion, and not as divesting the co-tenant of his estate.* § 688. Necessary Expenses. — A tenant in common can compel the others to unite in the expense of necessary repairs to a house or mill belonging to them, though this rule is limited to those parts of common property, and does not apply to the case of fences enclosing wood or arable lands. The writ of de reparatione facienda lay, at common law, in such cases, to compel a tenant to aid in the neces- ' Bryan ». Atwater, 5 Day (Conn.), 188; Packard i). Moss, 68 Cal. 123; Le- favour V. Homan, 3 Allen (Mass.), 354; Harmon v. James, 7 Sm. & M. (Miss.) Ill; Oglesby v. HoUister, 76 Cal. 141; Keyser v. Evans, 30 Pa. St. 509; Hub- bard ?'. Wood, 1 Saeed (Tenn.), 286; Frederick i>. Gray, 10 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 182; Jackson v. Whitbeck, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 633; Alvarado v. Nordholt, 95 Cal. 116. « Sydnor ii. Palmer, 29 Wis. 226; Cain v. Purlow, 47 Ga. 675; Peaceable v. Read, 1 East, 568. 3 Rogers «. Tyley, 144 111. 652; Allison v. Perry, 180 111. 16. * HolterhoS v. Mead, 36 Minn. 42. § 689] JOINT ESTATES. 705 sary repairs.' But the repairs could only be made when they were necessaiy to prevent the premises from going into decay." An agreement by two tenants in common to share the expense of fencing includes the expense of the survey necessary to determine the boundary of the land." And a CO tenant who pays taxes or removes incumbrances is entitled to be reimbursed.* § 689. Contribution. — The doctrine of contribution for necessary repairs rests on the principle that where parties stand in aquali jure, equality of burden becomes equity.' In Louisiana, joint owners must contribute ratably to useful expenses incurred on the property by a joint owner having the management of it when no opposition on their part has been made to such expenses." But as a general rule a tenant in common cannot, in the absence of agreement or understanding with his co-tenant to that effect, make improvements upon the common prop- erty at the expense in any part of his co-tenant, so as to enable him to recover any portion of the costs or value of the improvements, either in an action brought by him for that purpose, or by way of set-off in an action brought against him by such co tenant. ' Of course this rule is not apphcable to necessary repairs nor in the matter of parti- tion. Where one of several who are jointly, or jointly and severally, liable on a contract for the same debt, pays more ■ Co. Litt. 54b; Bowles' Case, 11 Co. 83b; Carvers. Miller, 4 Mass. 559. ''Alexander ». Ellison, 79 Ky. 148; Beaty v. Bordwell, 91 Pa. St. 438; Leigh V. Dickeson, 13 Q. B. 194. 'Hayne v. Gould, 54 Fed. Rep. 951; Armstrong v. Bryant (Ky.), 16 8. W. Rep. 463. * Weare «. Van Meter, 43 Iowa, 128; Wilton «. Tazwell, 86 111. 39; Allen v. Poole, 54 Miss. 323. See, also, Conrad «. Starr, 50 Iowa, 470, 47X; Scaife v. Thomson, 15 S. Car. 337; Bridgford v. Barbour, 80 Ey. 539. * Herbert's Case, 3 Co. lib; Deering v. Winchelsea, 2 Bos. & Piil. 370; 1 Cox, 318; Campbell ». Mesier, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 334; Fletcher v. Grover, ' 11 N. H. 369; Eads v. Rutherford, 114 lud. 373. « Percy v. Millaudon, 5 Martin, N. S.(La.), 68. ' Walter v. Greenwood, 29 Minn. 87; Crest v. Jack, 3 Watts (Pa.), 338; Stevens®. Thompson, 17 N. H. 103; Thurston ». Dickinson, 3 Rich. Eq. (S. Car.) 317; Neuman v. Drelfurst, 9 Colo. 3^8; Taylors. Baldwin, 10 Barb. (N. y.) 583. 706 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 690 than his share he is entitled to contribution from the others to reimburse him for excess thus paid. Accordingly if two lessees agree to pay the taxes on the land demised, both are liable for them, and if one pays them he can have con- tribution. And the fact that they are tenants in common of the property for which this general liability was con- tracted has nothing to do with the case.' One tenant in common cannot, without authority, bind another by a pur- chase of goods for use in the building owned by them." § 690. Improvements.— It is well settled that one tenant in common is not responsible to his co tenant for the cost of improvements voluntarily put upon the property, unless he so agreed, or afterwards ratified the act of making them." In the absence of express or implied agreement between the co-tenants that the improvements made by one of them upon the common property is to be paid for, it is clear that neither can maintain an action against the other to recover any portion of such expense;* but circum- stances may exist which amount to a ratification of such expenditure, which will make the co-tenant liable for his portion of the expense. ° His only remedy is to go into equity and have partition of the estate, when complete equity wiU be done to all parties." It is generally held that a part owner, who has enhanced the value of the common property at his own cost, is entitled to such equitable com- pensation as will leave only the value of the estate without the improvements to be divided among the tenants in com- mon in partition, he holding the improvements, or their value, in excess of the portion given to the other tenants in common;' ■Van Brunt v. Gordon, 53 Minn. 337. 2 Dobson V. Kuhula, 30 N. Y. Supp. 771; 66 Hun (IST. Y.), 637. ^ Rico Keduction & Min. Co. o. Musgrave, 14 Colo. 79; Carver ». Fenni- more, 116 Ind. 336, 343; Welland v. Williams, 31 Nev. 380; Alden v. Carleton, 81 Me. 358; Elrods. Keller, 89 Ind. 382. * Calvert «. Aldrich, 99 Mass. 74; AUeman «. Hawley, 117 Ind. 532; Davis V. Sawyer (N. H.). 20 At. Rep. 100. 'Pickering v. Pickering, 63 N. H. 468, and cases cited; Jordan ». Soule, 79 Me. 590; Alden v. Carleton, 81 Me. 358. « AUeman v. Hawley. 117 Ind. 533. ■"Hall V. Piddock, 31 N. J. Eq. 311; Kurtz ■». Hibner, 55 111. 514; Moore v. §§ 691-692] JOINT ESTATES. 707 § 691. Waste. — The action of waste was given as between joint tenants and tenants in common by statute," which is the law adopted by the States." Tenants in common are liable to each other for waste and a court of equity will re- strain a tenant from destructive or malicious waste.' While one tenant in common is not liable for permissive waste, except in the special cases of contribution for repairs, yet if one tenant in common suffers the property to be destroyed by his neghgence, he is liable to his co-tenants for their loss.* So, if one tenant sells trees growing on the land, and receives payment for the same, he may be sued in assump- sit by his co-tenant, ' but he is not hable in tort or trespass. ' And where he is in sole possession of the land claiming the whole of it adversely to his co-tenants, the latter may main- tain an action against him for waste in cutting timber and for the use of the land.' But if he believes that he owns it in severalty, he will not be liable for waste. ' § 692. Eents AND Profits. — Tenants in common in posses- sion, at common law, arp not liable to those out of possession for a due share of the profits of the estate in common, in the absence of statute or agreement; but where one tenant rents the share of another for a specified term and remains in ex- clusive possession, his holding over will be construed the same as a tenant under a landlord, who holds over." But to make one tenant in common liable to another, without a special Williamson, 10 Rich. Eq. (S. Car.) 323; Dean v. 0'Meara,47 111. 120; Green v. Putnam, 1 Barb. (N. Y.) 500; Swan v. Swan, 8 Price, 518; Moore v. Thorp, 16 R. I. 655. Compare Ormond v. Martin, 37 Ala. 606; Tones ». Johnson, 28 Ark. 211; Scott V. Guernsey, 48 N. Y. 106; Elrod «. Keller, 89 Ind. 382; Curtis®. Poland, 66 Tex. 511. ' Westminster II. c. 23. "Childs V. Railroad Co., 117 Mo. 414; Shiels v. Stark, 14 Ga. 429. »Twort V. Twort, 16 Ves. 128. *8hepardB. Pettit, 30 Minn. 119; Jacobs o. Seward, 1 L. R. 5 H. L. 464. Chesley v. Thompson, 3 N. H. 9; Balch v. Jones, 61 Cal. 284. » Miller v. Miller, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 133. ' Patureau v. Wilbert, 44 La. Ann. 355. ' Dodge V. Davis, 85 Iowa, 77. * Jenkins v. Wood, 145 Mass. 494. »Zapp V. Miller, 109 N. Y. 51; Boley v. Barutio, i^O 111. 192; Berry v. Whidden, 63 N. H. 473; O'Connor v. Delaney, 53 Minn. 247; Belknap v. Belknap, 77 Iowa, 71; Harry v. Harry, 127 Ind. 91. 708 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 692 agreement, for rent, it must be shown that the latter has been refused occupancy by the former.' Open and unequivo- cal acts of exclusive ownership are necessary to constitute such disseisin.' A tenant in common may maintain an action against the heirs of his co-tenant for an accounting of rents collected by them after the co-tenant's death but not of the rents col- lected by such co-tenant/ because they are not liable for rents collected by their ancestor." In Virginia the tenant in possession is liable to his co- tenant for the reasonable rental value of the latter's share; ° and this rule applies in other States; ° so under this rule each joint tenant is entitled to recover his share of the rents and profits,' when out of possession of the one having exclusive possession." So heirs occupying the land during the contest of the will, the,will being set aside, must account for the rents and profits from the time the will is canceled to the date of taking possession by their co-tenants.' Unless some peculiar circumstances are shown, the owner of an undivided interest in land who occupies the whole estate in good faith under claim and color of title to the whole, and has made permanent and valuable improve- ments under a mistaken belief that he is the owner of the whole estate, is accountable only for the fair rental value of the property in the condition in which it was when he took possession.'" 'Davis 11. Button, 127 Ind. 481; Bennett n. Virginia Ranch, L. & Cattle Co., 1 Tex. Civ. App. 331; Tliompson v. Jones, 77 Tex. 626. -Gale». Hines, 17 Fla. 773; Boggess v. Meredith, 16 W. Va. 1; Ball v. Palmer, 81 111. 870; Millard «. McMullin, 68 N. Y. 345; Campau ®. Campau, 44 Mich. 31. 'Brittinum b. Jones, 56 Ark. 624. * Turner v. Riser, 54 Ark. 38. » White «. Stuart, 76 Va. 546. sEdsall «. Merrill, 37 N. J. Eq. 114; Buckelew c. Snedeker, 27 N. J. Eq. 82. 'Schissel t. Dickson, 129 Ind. 139. 8 Baylor v. Hopf , 81 Tex. 637. 'Clayton v. McCay, 148 Pa. St. 335. i» Early v. Friend, 16 Gratt. (Va.) 21; White v. Stuart, 76 Va. 546; Pickering V. Pickering, 68 N. H. 468; Morrison v. Robinson, 81 Pa. St. 456; Hannah v. Carver, 121 Ind. 278. §§ 693-694] JOINT ESTATES. 709 § 693. Occupant op Farms. — The general rule applies to farm property. So where one of several tenants in com- mon of a farm occupies it and has taken, in the usual course of husbandry, the annual product thereof without having any contract in respect to its use and without hav- ing ousted or denied the rights of any of his co-tenants, he is not liable to account to them, or to any one of them, for its use, or for the products so taken, because he becomes the sole owner of such property.' So a tenant in common having in due course of hus- bandry grown and sowed annual or other crops while in legal and peaceable possession with the assent of his co- tenants, becomes the sole owner of them, and if any other co-tenant takes them away against his assent, he thereby renders himself Uable for their value." § 694. Statutory Provisions — Use and Occupation. — At common law there was no remedy for an oul^teuant to collect his share of the rent from the tenant in possession, for the mere use and occupation,' which is the law now where no statute has been enacted to the contrary. The fact that no such remedy was available at common law, led to the enactment of a statute,' which provides that ac- tions of account shall and may be brought and maintained by one joint tenant and tenant in common against the other, as bailiff for receiving more than comes to his just share or proportion. In the construction of the English statute the leading English case' holds that the statute does not mention lands or tenements, or any particular subject. "Every case in which a tenant in common receives more than his share is within the statute; and account will lie when he does re- 'Le Barron v. Babcock, 123 N. Y. 153; Woolever v. Knapp. 18 Barb. (N. Y.) 265; Wilcox v. Wilcox, 48 Barb. (N. Y.) 327; Henderson v. Eason, 17 Ad. & El. 701; Dresser v. Dresser, 40 Barb. (N. Y.) 300; Roseboom v. Roseboom, 15 Hun (N. Y.), 809; 81 N. Y. 856; Zapp v. Miller, 109 N. Y. 51, 57. "Calhoun v. Curtis, 4 Met. (Mass.) 418; Bird v. Bird, 15 Fla. 424; Brown v. Wellington, 106 Mass. 318; Henderson v. Eason, 17 Ad. & El. 701; Le Barron v. Babcock, 122 N. Y. 153. 'Hender-son v. Eason, 17 Ad. & El., N. S. 701, 718. <4 Anne, ch. 16, sect. 27. Henderson v. Easen, 17 Ad. & El. K S. 701. 710 CLASSIFICATIOK OF ESTATES. [§ 694 ceive, but not otherwise. It is to be observed also, that the receipt of issues and profits is not mentioned, but simply the receipt of more than comes to his just share; and, fur- ther, he is to account when he receives, not takes, more than comes to his just share." Hence, use and occupation merely do not reader the pos- sessory tenant ia common liable to his co-tenant." But this construction is not accepted by all the American courts, vfhich hold that where occupancy of one tenant in common is beneficial, and at a profit to such occupant, and is entire and exclusive, he is bound to account to his co-tenants for what he has received by such occupancy more than his just proportion." But many of the Amei'ican States have enacted a statute making the occupant liable for the rents and profits above his just share. ' The relation of tenants in common of land is not in any sense a relation of partnership. In the case of mines the tenant in possession may lawfully remain in possession and may take minerals or other valuable products for his own advantage. His ownership is such that he cannot take his own share, without also at the same time and by the same act taking the share of his co-tenant. And the tenant in possession must compensate the out-tenant for his propor- tion of the mineral taken by the former whether the ap- propriation be profitable or otherwise to the taker. In Pennsylvania, in case of a slate quarry the compensa- tion is to be measured by the fair market value of the slate in place, which is the royalty or slate-leave to be obtained for the privilege of removing and manufacturing the slate, in view of all the special circumstances. " While the tenant in common cannot recover of another for mere occupation, unless a statute rules to the contrary, yet such occupation may be considered and made an equit- ' Henderson v. Easen, 17 Ad. & El. N. 8. 701; Sargent®. Parsons, 13 Mass. 149; Woolever v. Knapp, 18 Barb. (N. Y.) 365; Crane v. Waggoner, 27 Ind. 53; Ragan». McCoy, 39 Mo. 367. 2 Hayden ». Merrill, 44 Vt. 336; Shlels b. Stark, 14 Ga. 439; Early®. Friend, 16 Gratt. (Va.) 47; Thompson v. Bostick, 1 McMuUan Eq. (S. Car.) 75. 'West ®. Weyer, 46 Ohio St. 66; Almy ®. Daniels, 15 R. I. 312. ^ Fulmer's Appeal, 138 Pa. St. 34; Neel's Appeal, 3 Penny. (Pa.) 66. §§'695-696] JOINT ESTATES. 711 able set-off against the occupying tenant's claim for re- pairs, which in the absence' of an agreement is likewise not subject of an action between co-tenants.' § 695. Lien. —Unless made so by statute, a tenant in common has no lien for his share of the rents collected." Neither has a tenant in common any lien against the co- tenant's undivided interest in land in the hands of an as- signee, for rents in excess of his share collected and re- tained by the assignor.' And the right of one co-tenant in common of land upon partition to charge the interest of h;s co-tenant with the payment of what may be due on an accounting as to receipts and disbursements concerning the common estate, does not entitle him to priority of a bona fide purchaser or incumbrancer of the interest of such co- tenant. On the partition of land held in common a court will, in the division of the property or of its proceeds, if undivisible and therefore sold for partition, do full justice between the co-tenants by directing an accounting to be taken of receipts and disbursements by them, and will so apportion the funds as to do complete equity. But the court will never allow this right to a co-tenant to entitle him to priority over the rights of a bona fide purchaser or incumbrancer of the interest of one co-tenant in the com- mon estate.' § 696. Accounting. — The mere occupation of a tenant in common or a joint tenant would not of itself, at common law, make him liable to his co-tenant for an accounting. To be held liable he must have stood in the place of a baihff or receiver of rents and profits." But this rule has been changed by statute,' which makes joint tenants and tenants in common liable in account as bailiffs for receiving ' Davis V. Chapman, 36 Fed. Rep. 42. 2 Clark V. Hershy, 53 Ark. 473, 492; Brittinum «. Jones, 56 Ark. 624; Pres- ton V. Wright, 81 Me. 306. 'Devries v. Hiss, 72 Md. 560; Flack v. Gosnell, 76 Md. 88. ^Burns v. Dreyfus, 69 Miss. 211. 'Co. Litt. 200b; HufE v. McDonald, 23 Ga. 181, 169; Woolever ®. Knapp, 18 Barb. (N. Y.) 265. See, also, Sargent v. Parsons, 12 Mass. 149. «4 & 5 Anne, c. 16. 712 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 696 more than their just share.' And this is the law now in the United States/ wherever the doctrine of joint tenancy- exists. But this statute does not allow a tenant to collect from his occupying co-tenant for use and occupation beyond the amount received as rent or profit from third persons/ unless the former has been disseised by the latter, when the disseised co-tenant will be liable to his co-tenant for the rental value of the premises irrespective of actual profits, and he is not then entitled to any compensation for improvements." If he uses the estate only to an extent less than his shave with the assent of his co-tenants, and not to the extent of an ouster or denial of right of his co-tenant, he is not liable to account.' But the tenant in possession will be allowed the expense of the necessary repairs and for perfecting the title." But he is not entitled to compensation for his services rendered in the care and management of the common property, except there has been a specific agree- ment or a mutual understanding to that effect.' And where there is an understanding that one owner shall have compensation for the management of the property, if no specified amount is named for such services, he is entitled to a reasonable amount for the services performed. " One tenant in common of land has the right as against a lessee, holding under a lease executed by all the tenants jointly, to receive and receipt for the entire rent, which he may apply to a mortgage on the premises given by all the 'Henderson v. Bason, 17 Ad. & El. N. S. 701, 708; Eason v. Henderson, 12 Ad. & El. N. 8. 986, 993; Sturton i>. Eichardson, 13 Mees. & Wels. 17. - Gage ». Gage (N. H.), 29 At. Rep. 543; Knowles ®. Harris, 5 R. I. 403; Hazard v. Albro, 17 R. I. 181. ^Bird V. Bird, 15 Fla. 424; Jones v. Massey, 14 S. Car. 392; Everts v. Beach, .SI Mich. 136; Reynolds v. Wilmeth, 45 Iowa, 693; Howard®. Throck- morton, 59 Cal. 79; Kean v. Connelly, 25 Minn. 222. * Austin V. Barrett, 44 Iowa, 488. 5 Almy V. Daniels, 15 R. I. 313; 17 R. I. 543. «McCord V. Oakland, 64 Cal. 134. See, also, Barry v. ColvlUe, 129 N. Y. 303; Shearman v. Morrison, 149 Pa. St. 386. 'Hamilton ». Conine, 28 Md. 635; Fuller v. Fuller, 33 Fla. 336; Redfield v. Gleason, 61 Vt. 230. *Ranstead v. Ranstead, 74 Md. 378. § 697] JOINT ESTATES. 713 tenants; but such tenant in common cannot apply his co- tenant's share of such rent in payment of a debt due from the co-tenant to the lessee without express authority. *■ §697. Actions Between Co-tenants.— The taking of all the profits does not amount to an ouster of a co-tenant. But if one actually ousts the other, the one that is ousted Tvill be driven to his action of ejectment." So, one tenant in common cannot bring an action of trespass against his co-tenant for entry upon and enjoyment of the common property. If, however, one occupies a particular part of the estate by contract, and his co-tenant disturbs him in his occupation, he becomes a trespasser." While the general rule is that a tenant in common can recover from a stranger the whole property, he can recover from a co-tenant in possession only such interest as he really owns.* So, a growing crop put in by one tenant in common, who took exclusive possession without contract, on partition made while the crop is growing, goes in sever- alty, as the property of each. ' A tenant in common out of possession may demand a settlement of the one in possession for timber cut and con- verted, and on refusal to settle the demandant may main- tain trover for the conversion of his interest in the timber. And the fact that the timber was liable to destruction by fire, would not authorize the tenant in possession to cut, take away and manufacture the timber. " An action on the case sounding in tort may be main- tained by one tenant in common against a co-tenant for a misuse of the common property, though not amounting to a total destruction of it.' And when a licensee of one tenant ' Miner v. Lorman, 70 Mich. 173. 'Co. Litt. 199b; Doe v. Prosser, Cowp. 217; Doe v. Bird, 11 East, 49. 'Wait V. Richardson, 33 Vt. 190; Clowes v. Hawley, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 484; Keay v. Goodwin, 16 Mass. 1. ^Bennett v. Virginia Ranch, L. & Cattle Co., 1 Tex. Civ. App. 321. 'Calhoun v. Curtis, 4 Met. (Mass.) 413. « Clow v. Plummer, 85 Mich. 550. See, also, Hensal v. Wright, 10 Pa. Co. Ct. 416. 'McLellan v. Jenness, 43 Vt. 183; Agnew v. Johnson, 17 Pa. St. 373; Lowe a. Miller, 3 Gratt. (Va.) 205. See, also. Bush v. Gamble, 127 Pa. St. 43. 90 714 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 698 takes ore from a mine, he has a right only to his licenser's share. If the licensee sells ore belonging "to his co-tenant the purchaser is guilty of conversion, though ignorant of the vendor's want of title.' Where a house is owned in common, one of the co-ten- ants may, without joining the others, sue a trespasser in his room where the injury was to his occupancy simply and not to the room." § 698. Ejectment. — The general rule is that a tenant in common, as against every person but his co-tenant, is enti- tled to possession of every part of the property, and may, therefore, recover possession of all such lands in an action of ejectment brought against a stranger to the common title. Each tenant can pursue his remedies independent of the others, and may maintain ejectment or trespass to try title alone, and may recover the entire premises from a trespasser, stranger, wrongdoer and all persons other than his co-tenants and those claiming under them." This rule is recognized in California, Colorado, Kansas, Oregon, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina and Texas, but repudiated in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Missouri. Where one tenant in common brings an action of disseisin, and grounds his claim to recover on the common title, he recovers for the benefit of the whole.* And in an action of trespass quare clausum fregit, the tenancy being one in com- mon, the plaintiff may recover the whole damages.' As against a mere disseisor, one tenant in common of undivid- ed realty, may recover the possession of the premises, as ' Omaha v. Grant, etc., Co. v. Taber, 13 Colo. 41. 'Milner v. Milner (Ala.), 14 South. Rep. 373. 'Hardy v. Johnson, 1 Wall. (U. S.) 371; Williams v. Sutton, 43 Cal. 71; Chapman ». Quinn, 56 Cal. 366; Freeman on Co-Tenancy, sect. 343; Croft v. Eains, 10 Tex. 523; Sowers v. Peterson, 59 Tex. 316; Read v. Allen, 56 Tex. 176; Hutchins v. Bacon, 46 Tex. 414; Ney v. Mumme, 66 Tex. 368; Crook v. Vandevoort, 18 Nebr. 505; Stark d. Barrett, 15 Cal. 363; McDonald v. Ham- blen, 78 Tex. 638; Chesround «. Cunningham, 3 Blackf. (Ind.) 83; St. Louis, etc. Railroad Co. v. Prather, 75 Tex. 53; Coulsone. Wing, 43 Kans. 507; Cor- ley s. Parton, 75 Tex. 98. See^ also, Barrett v. French, 1 Conn. 364; Hibbard V. Foster, 34 Vt. 543; Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Henshaw, 89 Ala. 448. ^Barrett v. French, 1 Conn. 364. 'Hibbard v. Foster, 24 Vt. 542. § 698] JOINT ESTATES. 715 such possession will inure to the benefit of all co-ten- ants. ' The general rule is not supported by some courts. In Massachusetts it is held that a tenant in common will have entire justice done him if he is allowed his undivided share alone." And in Pennsylvania a tenant must recover on the strength of his own title, and he cannot maintain eject- ment for the interest of another co-tenant. ° At common law, tenants in common could not recover on a joint de- mise, and as the right of possession, which depends on title, is severed, a recovery by one will restore him only a moiety of the possession against a disseisor, who will hold the other moiety with him in common. But the weight of authority in the United States is that one tenant in common may recover the whole estate as against a trespasser or a stranger.* But a tenant in common cannot maintain an action for specific performance of a contract for the conveyance of the entire estate unless all persons interested in the con- tract are parties to the action.' Nor can one tenant, act- ing solely for himself, recover the whole tract where he has no community of interest with the other tenants who do not recognize each other's titles.' Two or more tenants in common may sue in ejectment or any one may sue alone for his share ; ' and one may bring an action to remove a cloud upon the title without joining his co-tenant.* 'Crook V. Vandevoort, 13 ISTebr. 505; Voss ». King, 33 W. Va. 336; Bounds «. Little, 75 Tex. 316. 2 Dewey -o. Brown, 2 Pick. (Mass.), 387. 'Mobley u. Bruner, 59 Pa. St. 481, 433. See, also, Minke v. McNamee, 30 Md. 294; Jones «. Walker, 47 Ala. 175; Gray v. Givens, 26 Mo. 303. * Allen V. Salinger, 103 N. Car. 14, 18; Gilchrist t). Middleton, 107 N. Car. 668; Poster ». Hackett, 112 N. Car. 546; Moody v. Johnson, 112 N. Car. 798, 804:Harelson c. Sarvis, 39 8. Car. 14. ' Lawrence u. Railroad Co., 4 Wash. St. 664. ' King ®. Hyatt, 51 Kans. 504, 516. 'Tildens. Tilden, 13 Gray (Mass.), 108; Bush v. Bradley, 4 Day (Conn.), 308; Penrod v. Danne, 19 Ohio. 218; Shepard v. Ryers, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 501; Whittle V. Artis, 55 Fed. Rep. 919. See, also, Myers v. Jackson, 135 Ind. 136; Childs V. Railroad, 117 Mo. 414. ' Bates V. District of Columbia, 7 Mackey, 76 716 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 699-701 § 699. Right to Injunction. — The right to an injunc- tion to restrain the acts of the co-tenant is seldom recog- nized by the courts. And in the absence of willful or malicious injury or destruction caused by neglect or unskillfulness, a tenant in common will not, at the instance of his co-tenant, be enjoined from prosecuting the business of working on their common property, of which he has possession.' But where parties are only equitable tenants in common, the legal title being in a trustee, an injunction will be granted against injury to the premises, because the party in possession has no legal title, and is a trespasser upon the trustee;" but not so if he had legal title," unless he be insolvent and is destroying the estate." § 700. Commission for Sale op the Lands. — One ten- ant cannot bind his co-tenant by contract pertaining to the realty. So, if a tenant in common employs a broker to sell the joint property, the broker cannot hold the other co-ten- ants responsible for commission, unless they ratify the sale.' But where one of two tenants in common places the laud for sale in the other's hands, who sells it through a broker, the two tenants are jointly liable for the broker's commis- sion.' Article 6. Estates in Entirety. § 701. What is Tenancy by Entirety. § 704. Effect of the Married Woman's § 703. Tenancy in Common. Acts. § 703. How Created. § 705. How Controlled. § 706. Effect of Absolute Divorce. § 701. What is Tenancy by Entirety. — At common law husband and wife were regarded as one person, and a ' McCord V. Oakland Quicksilver Min. Co., 64 Cal. 134. "Smallman «. Onions, 3 Bro. C. C. 631. ^ Goodwin n. Spray, 2 Dick. 667. ^Hawley i>. Clowes, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 132; Twort ®. Twort, 16 Ves. 138; Stout V. Curry, 110 Ind. 514. ' Pyatt «. Lyons, 51 N. J. Bq. 308. « Clifford V. Meyer, 6 lad. App. 633. § 702] JOINT ESTATES. 717 conveyance to them by name was a conveyance in law to but one person. They took the whole of the estate between them, and each was seised of the whole and not of any un- divided portion. They were thus seised of the whole, be- cause they were legally but one person. Death separated them, and the survivor still held the whole because he or she had always been seised of the whole, and the person who died had no estate which was descendible or divisible; and during their joint lives neither can aliene so as to bind the other." They are seised per tout, but not per my; and the estate so held is not subject to partition." This estate resembles a joint tenancy, in that it has the quality of survivorship, and the heirs of the survivor take the estate. In joint tenancy the right of survivorship can be destroyed by the action of either party; not so in estates by entirety. Tenancy by entirety arises from the unity of the husband and wife, and it applies to an estate in fee for life or for years. This estate of tenancy by the entirety has but one fea- ture in common with that of joint tenancy, and that is in the right of survivorship. In all other essential respects they differ. The estate which vests by virtue of a grant jointly to husband and wife is peculiarly the result or pro- duct of the marriage relation, and depends for its continu- ance upon the unity of man and wife. §702. Tenancy in Common. — The same words of convey- ance which will make two persons joint tenants, will make husband and wife tenants of the entirety.' If the estate be conveyed to husband and wife and to a third party, the latter takes a moiety, and the husband and wife as one person, the other moiety." And the death of the husband ' Speier n. Opfer, 73 Mich. 38, 39; 2 Bl. Com. 183; Wright v. Saddler, 30 N. Y. 330; Taul v. Campbell, 7 Yerg. (Tenn.) 319; Ross v. Garrison, 1 Dana(Ky.) 37. 'Thornton v. Thornton, 3 Rand. (Va.) 179; Bennett v. Child, 19 Wis. 364; Chandler r>. Cheney, 37 Ind. 396; Barden v. Overmeyer, 134 Ind. 660; Shinn v. Shinn, 43 Kans. 1. 'Barber v. Harris, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 615; Litt. sect. 291; Co. Litt. 187b. . Scott, 38 S. Car.34; McLeod «. Tarrant, 39 S. Car. 371. « Georgia, etc. Railroad Co. v. Scott 38 S. Car. 185. ^Hiles V. Fisher, 32 N. Y. Supp. 795; 67 Hun (N. T.), 239. * Carver v. Smith, 90 Ind. 223; Bennett ®. Child, 19 Wis. 363; Fisher s. Pro- Vln, 25 Mich. 347; Jacobs v. Miller, 50 Mich. 119; McDufl v. Beauchamp, 50 Miss. 531; Berrigan v. Fleming, 2 Lea (Tenn.), 271; Banton v. Campbell, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 587, 594; Den v. Branson, 5 Ired. (N. Car ) 426 ; Hannan v. Tow- ers, 3 Harr & J. (Md.) 147; Marburg v. Cole, 49 Md. 403; Fleek v. Zillhaver, 117 Pa. St. 213; French v. Mehan, 56 Pa. St. 286; Kip v. Kip, 33 K J. Eq. 213; Butllar •b. Rosenblath, 43 N. J. Eq. 651; Zorntlein v. Bram, 100 N. Y. 13; Bertles v. Nuuan, 92 N. Y. 153; Pray v. Stebbins, 141 Mass. 319; Pierce v. Chace, 108 Mass. 254; Brownson v. Hull, 16 Vt. 809; Garner v. Jones, 53 Mo. 68; Hall v. Stephens, 65 Mo. 670; Robinson «. Eagle, 39 Ark. 302; Harding v. Springer, 14 Me. 407; Myers -c. Reed, 17 Fed. Rep. 401; Wales ». Coffin, 13 Allen (Mass.), 313; Bates v. Seely, 46 Pa. St. 348; Baker v. Stewart, 40 Kans. 442; Mittel «. Karl, 133 111. 68; In re Lewis, 85 Mich. 340; Farmer's Bank v. Corder, 33 W. Va. 333. «Buttlar D. Rosenblath, 43 N. J. Eq. 651; Jacobs v. Miller, 60 Mich. 134; Diver s. Diver, 56 Pa. St. 106; Baker v. Stewart, 40 Kans. 442; Marburg v. Cole, 49 Md. 402; Zorntlein «. Bram, 100 N. Y. 13; Berlles v. Nunan, 92 N. Y. 153; Robinson v. Eagle, 39 Ark. 202; Fishery. Provin, 25 Mich. 347; Mc- Duff«. Beauchamp, 50 Miss. 531; McCurdy ®. Canning, 64 Pa. St. 39; Speier «. Opfer, 73 Mich. 38; Kip v. Kip, 33 N. J. Eq. 313; Chandler v. Cheney, 37 720 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 704 On the other hand able courts do not coincide with this doctrine, and hold that, under the married woman acts, a conveyance to husband and wife makes them tenants in common, and the estate by the entirety has ceased.' These decisions are based upon sound reasoning and are in touch with the best interests of society. Now the ex- istence of a married woman under these acts is no longer merged in that of her husband, and she has become eman- cipated and is a separate entity, endowed, so far as her sep- arate estate is concerned, with the powers and subject to the liabilities of femes sole." In Ohio and Virginia' such estates are treated as tenancy in common, and in Connecticut* as a joint tenancy. And in Kentucky' and Iowa" a conveyance to husband and wife makes a tenancy in common, unless the estate is expressly declared to be a tenancy in entirety. The Ohio court holds with great soundness of argument that the right of survivorship is not founded in principles of natural justice, nor in any reason of policy applicable to our society and institutions; that the English doctrine is adverse to the understandings, habits and feelings of the people. ' In New York a married woman may take and hold real property as a joint tenant with her husband, and where by a deed to herself and her husband it appears plainly that the intent was to convey to her not merely as a wife, but separately, by virtue of her individual right, as joint ten- ant with him, she has the right to dispose of her interest Ind. 391, 412; Carver v. Smith, 90 Ind. 222; Bennett v. Child, 19 Wis. 363; Vinton v. Beamer, 55 Mich. 561; Garner s. Jones, 52 Mo. 68; Hulett v. Inlow, 57 Ind. 412; Hemingway v. Scales, 42 Miss. 1; In re Lewis, 85 Mich. 340. ' Cooper «. Cooper, 76 111. 57. 2 Clark «. Clark, 56 N. H. 105; Walthall v. Goree, 36 Ala. 728; Smith ». Smith, 80 Ala. 643; Hoffman v. Stigers, 28 Iowa, 302; Meeker v. Wright, 76 N. Y. 262, overruled by Bertles ». Nunan, 92 N. Y. 153. ' Farmers' & Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Wallace, 45 Ohio St. 152; Penn v. Cox, 16 Ohio, 30; Wilson v. Fleming, 13 Ohio, 68; Sergeant «. Steinberger, 3 Ohio, 305. •" Whittlesey v. Fuller, 11 Conn. 337. 'Roarers ®. Grider, 1 Dana (Ky.), 342. « Hoffman ». Stigers, 28 Iowa, 303. ' Sergeant v. Steinberger, 3 Ohio, 305. § 705] JOINT ESTATES. 721 independent of her husband." In Illinois a deed of land to a man and his wife "not as tenants in common but as joint tenants " creates in the grantees an estate in joint tenancy with the right of survivorship." § 705. How Controlled. — The husband and wife are seised of the entirety; but, being one person, there can be no moiety or separate estate between them, and the hus- band, therefore, cannot forfeit or ahene the estate, because the whole of it belongs to the wife as well as to him. Dur- ing the hfe of the husband, he has the absolute control of the estate of the wife, and can convey or mortgage it for that period." When an estate in land is vested in husband and wife as an entirety under the common law, the husband is entitled to the use and possession of the property during his life. During this period the wife has no interest in or control over the property.' During the lives of both, neither has an absolute inherit- able interest; neither holds an undivided half; they take by entireties. K^ either has such a separate interest that he or she can seU, incumber or devise, or which his or her heir can inherit. It is an entirety, in which both take the same and inseparable interest. Neither can affect the other's rights by a separate transfer.' If the husband sells the estate and the wife dies first, the sale wiU then be valid;" if the husband dies first, the wife can then recover possession.' And the statute of limitations does not run against her during coverture. ° ' Jooss V. Fey, 129 N. Y. 17, distinguishing Bertles v. Nunan, 93 N. T. 153; Cloos v. Cloos, 55 Hun (N. Y.), 450; 24 Abb. N. C. 319. 'Mette V. Feltgen, 148 111. 357. ' Barber «. Harris, 15 Wend. (N.Y.) 616; Bennett v. Child, 19 Wis. 364; Ames V. Norman, 4 Sneed(TenD.), 683; Dyer f. Eldridge (Ind.), 36 N. E. Rep. 533. * Washburn v. Burns, 34 N. J. L. 18; Jones 1!. Strong, 6 Ired. (N. Oar.), 367; Topping t. Sadler, 5 Jones (N. Car.), 357; Pray ». Stebbins, 141 Mass. 319). _ Compare Diver «. Diver, 56 Pa. St. 106, ■ 'Speier^. Opfer, 73Mich. 38, 39. See. also, In re Lewis, 85 Mich. 340. •Ames V. Norman, 4 Snced (Tenn.), e83; Barbtr r. Harris, 15 Wend. (N.Y. 615. 'Pierce v. Chace, 108 Mass. 258; McCurdy v. Canning, 64 Pa. St. 39; 1 Bish. Mar. Wom. sect. 631. «Co. Litt. 836a. 91 722 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 706 § 706. Effect of Absolute Divorce. — The estate of en- tirety is founded upon the unity of husband and wife, and could not exist in the first place but for such unity. Hence, anything that terminates the legal fiction of the unity of two separate persons ought to have an effect upon the es- tate whose creation depended upon such unity. The con- tinued existence of this estate depends upon the continued legal unity of the two persons to whom the conveyance was actually made. The survivor takes the whole in case of death, because that event has terminated the marriage and the consequent unity of person. An absolute divorce terminates the mar- riage and unity of person just as completely as does death itself, only, instead of one, as in the case of death, there are in the case of divorce two survivors of the marriage, and there are from the time of such divorce two living per- sons in whom the title still remams. And hence, the ten- ancy by the entirety is severed, and a severance having taken place, each takes his or her proportionate share of the property as a tenant in common without survivorship. There can be no joint tenancy, because seisin by the en- tirety does not create a joint tenancy either in substance or form," and as a tenancy by the entirety depends wholly upon the marital relationship, there can be no seisin in joint tenancy by virtue of the very fact which terminated the unity of persons upon which the right of survivorship is itself founded, and to which it owed its continued exist- ence; so, when the unity is broken by divorce, the tenancy by the entirety is severed and each takes a proportionate share of the property as a tenant in common." There is no implied condition that each of the grantees shall remain faithful to the obligations of the married state, and shall not, by his or her conduct, cause a dissolu- tion of the marriage relation upon which the estate de- pends; so, a decree of absolute divorce does not vest the whole title in the innocent party.' ■ Jackson a. McConnell. 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 175. « Stelz V. Shreok, 138 N. Y. 263. See, also, Harrer ». Wallner, 80 111. 197; Lash v. Lash, 58 Ind. 536; Ames s. Norman, 4 Sneed (Tenn.), 683; Bonegan V. Donegan (Ala.), 15 South. Rep. 823. 'Stelz c. Shreok, 123 N. T. 268. § 707] JOINT ESTATE& 723 But this doctrine is not accepted in Michigan, where it is held an estate by the entirety is not affected by a decree of divorce of the parties. Justice Grant says that he sees no reason in holding that a husband or wife can, by a vio- lation of the marital relations and obligations, obtain an interest in land which she or he does not possess while ful- filling such obligations; that the common law does not per- mit a person thus to profit by his own gross wrong and a violation of the most sacred obUgation. ' But such a reason seems to be more sentimental than real. Such doctrine will aid in perpetuating a fiction of the common law that has no place in our society, and is repugnant to our insti- tutions. Therefore, as a legal unity of husband and wife was the only basis of the estate of entirety, the destruc- tion of that unity by divorce necessarily makes the tenants by the entirety tenants in common; that the barrier of unity thus being destroyed, partition can be had between such tenants in common as between other tenants in com- mon,' and this upon the principle of the maxim cessante ratione legis cessat, et ipsa lex — when the reason of the law ceases, so does the law itself. Article 6. Estates in Partnership. % 707. Partnership Interest in Land. § 710. Power of One Partner. § 708. Bought with Partnership § 711. Effect of Intention. Funds. § 713. Priority of Creditors. § 709. Reason for the Equitable § 713. After Dissolution of Partner- Rule, ship. § 707. Partnership Interest in' Laxd.— When real es- tate is purchased with partnership funds, for partnership use, it is an estate in partnership, and is treated in equity as personal property.' In the United States it is generally • In re Lewis, 85 Mich. 340. » Kirkwood v. Domnau, 80 Tex. 646; Enyeart v. Kepler, 118 Ind. 36; Harrer «. Wallner, 80 111. 197; Hopson v. Fowlkes, 93 Tenn. 697; Russell r. Russell, 122 Mo. 235; Freem. Coten. sect. 444; 3 Bish. Mar. Div. and Sep. sects. 1650, 1651. 'Powers V. Robinson, 90 Ala. 225; Dupuy v. Leavenworth, 17 Cal. 262; 724 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 707 held that where there is a conveyance of land to a part- nership, in its common or firm name, no legal title vests in the partnership as such. The legal title vests in the several persons composing the partnership as tenants in common, with all the attributes and incidents of a ten- ancy in common, so far as mere legal remedies can be en- forced. Such title is chargeable with an equity, when- ever the land is wanted to meet partnership debts or to secure equalization in division among the partners. Until equitable interposition is invoked, the. status of the title is not changed. If, after satisfying partnership wants, there remains a surplus of land, or of money for which land was sold, such surplus, whether of land or its proceeds, re- tains all the attributes of land, in every particular in which realty is distinguished from personalty.' Such realty has no title which can be converted into a legal land title, in the partnership as a separate entity; be- cause the legal title, being in the tenants in common as individuals, cannot be forced out of them to meet partner- ship debts, or other partnership wants, except by a pro- ceeding in equity which pro tanto destroys its character- istics as land, and converts it into personalty. This is in no sense the conversion of an equitable title to land into a legal land title. It is the conversion, through chancery powers, of a legal land title of tenants in common, into partnership, personal assets, for the payment or partner- ship debts and other partnership wants.' Buffum «. BufEum, 49 Me. 108; Moraa v. Palmer 13 Mich. 367; Little v. Sned- ecor, 52 Ala. 167; Houghton v. Houghton, 11 Sim. 491; Broom v. Broom, 3 Myl. & K. 443; Smith v. Smith, 5 Ves. 189; Darby v. Darby, 3 Drew. 495; North Penn. Coal Go's Appeal, 45 Pa. St. 181; Patterson v. Blake, 12 Ind. 436; Fowler «. Bailley, 14 Wis. 135; Willis v. Freeman, 35 Vt. 44; Davis v. Chris- tian, 15 Graft. (Va.) 11; Lang v. Waring, .35 Ala. 6>5; Fall River Whaling Co. V. Borden, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 458; Savage v. Carter, 9 Dana (Ky.), 408; Bu- chan V. Sumner, 2 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 165;Lang v. Waring, 25 Ala. 635; Youug V. Thrasher (Ark.), 21 8. W. Rep. 1104; Holmes v. McGee, 27 Mo. 598; Lano>v «. Fones, 48 Ark. 557. ' Pepper v. Pepper, 24 111. App. 316; Strong «. Lord, 107 111. 35; Lang v. Waring, 35 Ala. 625; Scruggs d. Blair, 44 Miss. 406; Caldwell v. Parmer, 56 Ala. 405; Espy v. Comer, 76 Ala. 501; Brunsenj), Morgan, 76 Ala. 593. ''Buchan v. Sumner, 2 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 165; Lang v. Waring, 35 Ala. 635;^ Andrews v. Brown, 21 Ala. 437; 3 Pom. Eq. sect. 1166, n. 6. § 708] JOINT ESTATES. 725 § 708. Bought with Partnership Funds. — To make land partnership property it must be purchased with part- nership funds for partnership purposes, or there must be one of such elements present." If partnership funds have been used in the acquisition of real estate, whether the title be taken in the name of one partner, or in the name of all so as to make them, in law, tenants in common, such property will for certain purposes be treated in courts of equity as personalty;' it matters not that the legal title is in one of the partners, or in a third person, for equity will regard it as held in trust for the partnership, and the trust can be enforced by the interested parties, whether partners or creditors.' So where one partner buys land with the partnership funds, the land is partnership property, though he takes title in his own name ; ' all lands bought with partnership funds for partnership purposes are assets of the firm.' So land may belong to a partner- ship although standing in the name of one of the firm.' And so partners may put in land as capital for the conduct of the business.' So long as it is dealt with as partnership property by the firm, though standing in the name of one partner, the latter cannot set up the statute of limitations to bar the rights of creditors. ' No presumption of partnership between co-owners will arise from the fact that they jointly engaged in the same business, as mining for oil." ' Dodson V. Dodson (Oreg.), 37 Pac. Rep. 542; Hoxie v. Carr, 1 Sumner, C. C. 183; Buchan v. Sumner, 2 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 165; Wheatley v. Cal- houn, 12 Leigh (Va.), 364; Alexander v. Kimbro, 49 Miss. 529; Frank v. Branch, 16 Conn. 261; Alkire v. Kahle, 123 III. 499. 'Powers V. Robinson, 90 Ala. 225; Cunningham v. Ward, 30 West Va. 572. » Thompson v. Bowman, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 316; Dyer v. Clark, 5 Met. (Mass.) 562; Owens v. Collins, 23 Ala. 837; Fairchlld v. Fairchild, 64 N. Y. 471. See, also, Buffum v. BuflEum, 49 Me. 108; Loubat v. Nourse, 5 Fla. 350; Smith V. Jackson, 2 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 28. ■•Fairfield v. Phillips, 83 Iowa, 571. »Fordyce v. Hicks, 80 Iowa, 273; Roberts v. Eldred, 78 Cal. 394; Paige v. Paige, 71 Iowa, 318; Pepper v. Thomas, 85 Ky. 540. • Williams v. Shelden, 61 Mich. 311. ■" Killefer v. Briggs, 70 Mich. 508. « Jones V. Smith, 81 S. Car. 527. 'Neill V. Shamburg, 158 Pa. St. 263; Walker v. Tupper, 152 Pa. St. 1; 726 CLASSIFICATION OP ESTATES. [§ 709 A deed made to a partnership in the firm name, without naming as grantees the individual partners, vests in the members of the firm the power to convey." And a trust deed under seal, executed in the name of the firm by one of the partners, is binding on the firm as a contract, though not as a deed." When land is purchased with partnership funds and for partnership purposes, there is an implication of law that the land is held for the partnership. But where it is purchased with the separate funds of the partners it cannot, by a verbal agreement between themselves, be converted into partnership property, because no trust in lands can be created, unless by writing, except such as arises or results by implication of law; and parol evidence is not admissible to prove any declaration of trust, or agreement of the parties for a trust, although it is received to establish a fact from which the law will raise or imply a trust." However, some cases hold that where parties have been let into a partnership by parol under an agreement that they should become partners in realty held as an incident to the business, after long and continued existence of the partnership, and payment of the consideration, either in part or whole, that they acquired an interest in the realty by virtue of such partnership agreement. These cases are sustained upon the principle of part performance, and that it would be inequitable to allow the other partners to retain the benefits, and at the same time appropriate the entire realty.* § 709. Eeason for the Equitable Rule. — In an ordi- nary trading or commercial partnership, the usual dealings of the concern in the course of its business are with money or other personal property. Real estate does not appear in Butler Bank v. Osborne, 159 Pa. St. 10; Dunham v. Loverocb, 158 Pa. St. 197; Taylors. Pried, 161 Pa. St. 53. ' Dunlap V. Green, 60 Fed. Rep. 242. 'McNeal. etc. Co. v. Waltman, 114 N. Car. 178. 3 Whuatley v. Calhoun, 12 Leigh (Va.), 269, 277; Alexander v. Kimbro, 4» Miss. 529. * In re Farmer, 10 Chi. L. News, 395^ Marsh v. Davis, 33 Kans. 326, and cases cited. § 709] JOINT ESTATES. 727 the regular dealings of such a partnership, but it often happens that real estate is acquired in legitintiate channels, though it does not become the subject-matter of the regu- lar business dealings of the firm. It must be disposed of in order to secure the money paid out from the funds. The property and the resources contributed by the several partners constitute a fund specially appropriated for use in carrying on the partnership business, for the satisfaction of partnership obligations, and for a ratable division of what may be left aniong the partners. None of these special purposes could be effectually carried out as to real estate, if the incidents of the legal ownership of that kind of property are recognized in partnership dealings. The powers of the general several partners in the acquisition, management, control and disposition of the partnership property in the course of business, would be impossible of adequate exercise if hampered by the restrictions which at law embarrass the ownership and alienation of such real estate. The incidents of dower, heirship and the like, practically preclude, so far as real estate is concerned, a recognition at law of that species of title which the part- nership, and the several members thereof, have in the firm property; for each has the power of absolute disposition within the scope of the business, and in the case of death of a member, the survivor or survivors are vested with an exclusive title and right of disposition for partnership pur- poses. Hence, it would be impracticable to recognize the incidents of its legal ownership.' Each member of a partnership for dealing in real estate has full authority to contract for the sale or other disposi- tion of its entire property, though, for technical reasons, the legal title vested in all the partners can only be trans- ferred by their joint act." Such real estate is assets of the firm so far as the rights of creditors of the firm are concerned, and, -hence, a home- stead interest cannot be acquired or held therein.' ' Lang 11. Waring, 17 Ala. 145. 'Thompson n. Bowman, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 316. 'Hewitt V. Eankin, 41 Iowa, 35; Drake v. Moore, 66 Iowa, 58; Hoyt v. Hoyt, 69 Iowa, 174; Burnside v. Merrick, 4 Met. (Mass.) 537; Dyer v. Clark, 5 Met. (Mass.) 563; Fordyce v. Hicks, 80 Iowa, 273. 728 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 710-711 § 710. Power of One Partner.— In real estate partner- ships one partner may bind the firm. So, in equity and for partnership purposes, such real estate is treated as per- sonalty; and one member of the partnership, engaged in buying and seUing real estate, can bind the firm by contract in the firm name for the sale of the partnership land, and such contract can be specially enforced against all the part- ners;' and if one partner sell such real estate and is charge- able with deceit, the firm is responsible for the damages;' and one partner may lease the realty,' or bind the firm for its disposition.* If one partner deals in real estate speculation contrary to agreement with his other co-partners, this does not give the latter a right to share in his profits. " § 711. Effect of Intention. — Intention plays an im- portant part as to the real estate. An agreement to use real estate for partnership purposes or as partnership prop-, erty, is not sufficient to convert it into partnership stock, in the absence of evidence of such intention." It does not necessarily follow that real estate purchased with partner- ship funds, and in the name of one or of aU the partners, or third person, is partnership property. This will depend, as between the partners at least, upon their intention to be derived from their agreements and acts.' It does not follow that real estate used for partnership purposes is partnership property. A contrary presumption prevails when the title is not in the firm, and to rebut this presumption it must appear that the property was paid for ' Rovelsky v. Brown, 92 Ala. 532. * Chester v. Dickerson, 54 N. Y. 1. 2 Moderwell ». Mullison, 21 Pa. St. 257. « Frost V. Wolf, 77 Tex. 455; Pugh v. Carrie, 5 Ala. 446; Olcott v. Wing, 4 McLean C. C. 15; Ludlow v. Cooper, 4 Ohio St. 1. Compare Carter v. Flex- ner, 92 Ky. 400; Duncan v. Duncan, 93 Ky. 37. 'Latta V. Kilbourn, 150 U. 8. 524. See, al.o. Dean v. McDowell, 8 Ch. D. 345. «Ware«>. Owens, 43 Ala. 313; Frank v. Branch, 16 Conn. 261; Theriot v. Michel, 38 La. Ann. 107; Alexander v. Kimbro, 49 Miss. 529. ' Hoxle V. Carr, 1 Sumner C. C. 183; McDermot v. Laurence, 7 Serg & R. (Pa.) 438; Ridgway's Appeal, 15 Pa. St. 177; Hunt v. Benson, 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 459; Brownleet). Allen, 21 Mo; 133; Evans v. Gibson, 29 Mo. 223. § 712] JOINT ESTATES. 729 with firm money and used for partnership purposes, or that it was by proper agreement actually brought into the firm, and this latter must be determined by the intention derived from the agreement and the acts and conduct of the part- ners.' § 712. Priority of CREofTORS. — If real estate is pur- chased with partnership funds for partnership purposes, and used as partnership property, and the deed conveys the real estate to the individual partners, though such deed conveys the legal title of the lauds to them individually as tenants in common or as joint tenants, yet if upon the face of the deed it appears that they were partners and the land was purchased for partnership purposes, they will hold such lands as trustees for the partnership, as against all creditors of one of the individual partners, whether claiming by judgment liens against him, by a mortgage or deed of trust executed to secure his individual debts, or in any other manner. And in a court of equity, such real property, so held by the individual partners in trust for the partnership as partnership property, will be first subjected to the payment of all the debts of the partnership, includ- ing any debt or debts due from the partnership or any member of the partnership, unless the debts can be other- wise paid out of other assets of the partnership, before any part of this land can be applied to the satisfaction of any debtors of any one of the ind vidual members of such partner- ship, no matter what may be the character of their claim, whether they claim liens on the land by judgment, by deeds of trust executed by the individual partners, or by attachments, or in any other mode." A conveyance subsequently by one partner of an undi- vided moiety of such real estate to a trustee, to secure his individual creditors, passes the legal title to one undivided moiety of such real estate, but subject to the prior implied trust in favor of partnership creditors, or the balance due 'Hogles. Lowe, 13 Nev. 286; Shafer's Appeal, 106 Pa. St. 49; Riedeburg -». Schmitt, 71 Wis. 644; Bates on Part. sect. 280. "Langi). Waring, 35 Ala. 625; Coder v. Huling, 27 Pa. St. 84; Black ». Black, 15 Ga. 445: Arnold v. Wainright, 6 Minn. 370; Galbraith v. Gedge, 16 B. Mon. (Kj.) 631; Lane v. Tyler, 49 Me. 252. 92 730 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 713 another partn^ upon a settlement of the partnership ac- counts; and after their payment the interest of the partner making such deed of trust or mortgage on such real estate is bound by the express tiiist to pay his individual debts secured by such deed of trust or mortgage." When the trustee knows th^ the real estate is partner- ship property when the deed of trust was executed by the individual partner for his debt, though the creditor secured did not, such real estate will have to be applied first to the payment of all partnership debts and liabilities, as any other partnership property, before any of it can be applied to the individual creditor secured by such deed of trust, upon the principle that when a trustee accepts such a deed of trust, with notice of certain facts invahdating it, or affecting it with a prior trust in favor of others, the creditor secured by it is presumed to assent to the deed for his benefit; Avhich presumption involves the further presumption that he had notice of such facts as the trustee had notice of when the latter accepted the deed of trust for him, which invalidate or subject the land to some prior equitable trust." If, however, the property stands in the name of one of the partners and he transfers to an innocent purchaser without notice for a valuable consideration, the purchaser will hold it to the exclusion of the partnership debts." § 713. After Dissolution of the Partnership. — In most of the American States the rule is substantially the same, and where a conveyance of land to a partnership, in its common or firm name, is made, no legal title vests in the partnership as such. The legal title vests in the several persons composing the partnership as tenants in common, with all the attributes and incidents of a tenancy in com- > Cunningham v. Ward, 30 W. Va. 573. 'Crow r. Beardsley, 68 Mo. 435, 439; Green v. Banks, 34 Tex. 508; Marbury v. Brooks, 7 Wheat. (U. S.) 556; 11 Wheat. (U. S.) 78; David v. Christian, 15 Gratt. (Va.) 11; Brooke v. Washington, 8 Gratt. (Va.) 348; Robertson v. Baker, 11 Fla. 193; Wheatley v. Calhoun, 13 Leigh (Va.), 364, 373; Floyd r. Harding, 38 Gratt. (Va.)401; Crooker v. Crooker, 46 Me. 350, 364; Matlack r. James. 13 N. J. Eq. 138; Ridgway r. Budd, 15 Pa. St. 177. 'Smith c. Allen, 5 Allen (Mass.), 456; Moreau v. Saffarans, 3 Sneed (Term.), 595. § 713] JOINT ESTATES. 731 mon, so far as mere legal remedies can be enforced. Such title is chargeablfe with an equity, whenever the land is wanted to meet partnership debts or to secure equahzation in division among the partners. Till equitable interpo- sition is invoked, the status of the title is not changed. It remains a legal title in all the partners as tenants in com- mon.' After the satisfaction of all partnership debts, on dissolution of the firm, any residuum of land, or of money for whicli laud was sold, retains all the attributes of land, in every particular in which realty is distinguished from personalt> ,' and is treated as realty in the settlement of the partner's estates.' So when the firm be dissolved or when it is evident that it can no longer continue its business, the I'eal estate constitutes a part of its assets and may be divided by partition if it be shown that such realty will not be required to satisfy any liability of the partnership ; * and then it will go to the partners in severalty or to the wives and heirs of the deceased members of the dissolved firm." The English doctrine is not in accord with the majority rule in the United States. In England real estate pur- chased with partnership funds and for partnership pur- poses is capital, and has for every purpose the quality of personal estate ; and the surplus, after the settlement of the partnership debts, goes to the personal representatives of a deceased partner, instead of his heirs.' So in England 'Powers V. Robinson, 90 Ala. 325; Pepper v. Pepper, 24 III. App. 316. 'Lang V. Waring, 35 Ala. 631; Lane v. Tyler, 49 Me. 2§3; Loubat v. Nourse, 5Pla. 363; Patterson v. Blake, 13 Ind. 436; Goodwin v. Richardson, 11 Mass. 460; Tillinghast r. Champlin, 4 R. I. 173; Hatchetti). Blanton, 73 Ala. 423; Slaugliteri). Swift. 67 A'.i. 491. 'Wilcox V. Wilcox, 13 Allen (Mass.), 253; Shearer v. Shearer, 98 Mass. 107; Harris v. Harris, 153 Mass. 439. *Pepper v. Pepper, 34 III. App. 318; Strong v. Lord, 107 1\\. 35; Lang o. Waring, 25 Ala. 635; Scruggs v. Blair, 44 Miss. 406; Buchan v. Sumner, 2 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 165. ° Foster's Appeal, 74 Pa. St. 398; Offut v. Scott, 47 Ala. 105; Rice ». Barnard, 20 Vt. 479; Collins v. Warren, 29 Mo. 336; Buckley v. Buckley, 11 Barb. (N. Y.)43; Holland v. Fuller, 13 Ind. 195. Compare Thorn v. Thorn, 11 Iciwa, 148; White v. Fitzgerald, 19 Wis. 480; Dewey v. Dewey, 35 Vt. 655; Gulbraith 0. Gedge, 16 B. Mo:i. (Ky.) 631; Fairchild v. Fairchild, 64 N. Y. 47t; Ludiow «. Cooper, 4 Ohio St. 1; Pierce ». Trigg, 10 Leigh (Va.), 406. •Bell V. Phyn, 7 Ves. 453; Darby v. Darby, 3 Drew. 495; Essex ». Essex, 20 Beav. 443. 732 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 713 a claim of dower in the residuum of the real estate could not be sustained as it can in the United States. And it has been held by some States, that the widow and heirs should be made parties to any suit for a sale of the realty to pay the debts of the firm, or it will be subject to their rights in the hands of the vendee.' And other courts hold that the in- terest of a partner in such realty, on his decease, is in his heirs, subject only to the right of dower, and to a trust in favor of the partnership for the adjustment of the partner- ship affairs after the other property of the partnership has been exhausted." ' Collins ®. Warren, 29 Mo. 236; Lang «. Waring, 25 Ala. 625. See, also, McCauley v. Fultou, 44 Cal. 355. ' Dilworthi). Mayfleld, 36 Miss. 40; Coster v. Clarke, 3 Ed. Cli. (N. Y.) 405; Dudley «. LittlefielJ, 21 Me. 418; Andrews ».. Brown, 21 Ala. 437; Dyer ». Clark, 5 Met. (Mass.) 562; Davis «. Christian, 15 Gratt. (Va.) 11; Lang «. War- ing, 25 Ala. 625. See, also, Russell s. Miller, 28 Mich. 1; Bopp ®. Pox, 63 111. 540; Darby «. Darby, 3 Drew. 495. CHAPTER XIX. partition. Article 1. Nature and Effect. §714. Definition. §730. Parol Partition — Adverse Pos- § 715. Mode of Partition. session. § 716. When Allowed. § 721. Partial Partition. § 717. Ownership in Severalty. § 723. Legal Title in Dispute. § 718. Conveyance of One Co-tenant § 733. Partition by Disseised Co-ten- of his Interest. ant. § 719. Mutual Partition. § 734. No Partition by Remainderman or Reversioner. § 714. Definition. — ^When two or more persons own real estate jointly or in common, the allotment to each of his share in severalty is called partition. This cannot be done in estate of entirety.' The term is technically applied to the division of real estate made between coparceners, tenants in common or joint tenants. It is divided into compulsory and voluntary. Voluntary partition is effected by mutual conveyances or releases, to each person of the share which he is to hold in severalty, executed by the other owners. Compulsory partition is made by virtue of special laws pro- viding that remedy. The English statute of 31 Henry VIII. c. 1, gave tenants of a freehold estate of inheritance the right to compel par- tition. By the statute of 31 Henry VIII. c. 32, this right was extended to tenants for hf e and for years, but such partition would not affect the right of the reversioners. Adult tenants in common have an absolute right to a partition of the land held in common, notwithstanding in- conveniences may thereby result to the other tenants; or, if partition cannot be had to a sale and a division of the pro- ceeds." And in equity, as at law, a pending lease for " Weiser v. Weiser, 5 Watts (Pa.), 279; Bennett s. Child, 19 Wis. 364; Howe V. Blonden, 31 Vt. 315. 'Amesi) Ames, 148111. 321; Campbell v. Lowe, 9 Md. 500; Higginbottom (733) 734 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 715 years is no obstacle to partition between the owners of the fee.' While adult tenants in common have an absolute right to partition, the rule is different as to infants. So where a court of equity is called upon to partition lands in behalf of minors, it is the duty of the court to inquire whether the partition, if granted will result beneficially to the minors or to their detriment; and if, upon investigation, it appears that partition is not for their benefit, then partition should be denied." § 715. Mode of Partition. — At common law partition ■was made by writ of partition; and in equity by bill since the reign of Elizabeth. The writ of partition in England has been abolished' and equity now has sole jurisdiction. In some of the States the writ of partition, regulated or modified by statute is used either solely or concurrently with other modes of partition. In other States a biU is filed in the proper court, or by apphcation to commission- ers specially authorized. If the remedy at law is insuffi- cient then relief may be had in equity, which will have jurisdiction over partition of incorporeal as well as cor- poreal hereditaments, and partition of incorporeal hered- itaments is pecuharly a subject of equitable jurisdic- tion.* At common law the judgment of the court vested the titles in severalty in each party, without any mutual con- veyance. But a decree in equity has the same effect as a judgment at law. ° v. Short, 35 Miss. 160; Potter ». Wheeler, 13 Mass. 504; Scovil «. Kennedy, 14 Conn. 349; Ledbetter«. Gash, 8 Ired. (N. Car.) 463; Smith v. Smith, 10 Paige (N. T.), 470; Bradshaw v. Callaghan, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 558; Hill v. Reno, 113 111. 154. 'Co. Litt. 46a; 167a; Cook ». Webb, 19 Minn. 167; Thruston v. Minke, 83 Md. 571; Hunt v. Hazelton, 5 N. H. 316; Willard v. Willard, 145 U. S. 116; Wilkinson v. Joberns, L. R. 16 Eq. 14. 'Ames V. Ames, 148 111. 331. See, also, Tompkins i). Miller (N. J.), 37 At. Rep. 484; Malone«. Conn (Ky.), 33 S. W. Rep. 677. 3 3 and 4 Will IV. ch. 27. "Bailey v. Sisson, 1 R. I. 338; Buckley v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. 6. = Hoffman v. Stigers, 28 Iowa, 303; Hassett i>. Ridgley, 49 111. 301. § 716] PAETITION. 735 Proceedings for partition are local and must be brought in the county where the land is situated.' In equity as at law, a pending lease for years is not an obstacle to partition between the owners of the fee/ nor is a perpetual mining lease.' It is not necessary that a portion of each of several par- cels shall be set off in severalty to each. Any parcel may be set off entii-e to any one of the owners. The fundamental rule is only that the owners in common shaU become owners in severalty in exact proportions in value to their respective interests in the common property.* And where one of the co-tenants has expressly agreed that a certain portion of the lands shall be assigned to him, he cannot afterwards complain of such assignment.' § 716. When Allowed.— Partition may be had between co-tenants of any joint estate, except estates in entirety, when they have the seisin and immediate right of posses- sion.' And a common possession, without which there cannot be partition, will be presumed from a common title.' Partition between tenants in common of real estate is a matter of right by modern law, when either of them will not consent to hold and use the property in common." And ordinary partition involves only property held incom- ' Wimer v. Wimer, 83 Va. 890; Bonner, Petitioner, 4 Mass. 133; Brown v. McMulIen, 1 Nott & McCord (8. Car.), 258; Peabody c. Minot, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 333; Corwithe v. Grifflng, 21 Barb. (N. Y.) 9; Crawford v. Binion (La.), 15 South. Rep. 693. ^ Co. Litt. 46a; 167a; "Wilkinson v. Joberns, L. R. 16 Eq. 14; Hunt v. Hazel- ton, 5 N. H. 216; Thruston v. Minke, 32 Md. 571; Cook v. Webb, 19 Minn. 167; "Willard v. Willard, 145 U. S. 116. 'Hauessler v. Missouri Iron Co., 110 Mo. 188. ^ Stannard v. Sperry, 56 Conn. 541. ' Haines v. Hewitt, 139 111. 347. « Willard v. Willard, 145 U. S. 116; Parker v. Gerard, Amb. 236; Co. Litt. 167; Barker v. Jones, 63 N. H. 497; Sample v. Sample, 34 Kans. 73; Baltimore ■V. New Orleans, 45 La. Ann. 536; Rohu v. Harris, 130 111. 535; Land ■B. Smith, 44 La. Ann. 931; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 43 La. Ann. 1118; Welch s. Agar, 84 Ga. 583; Chastain v. Higdon, 84 Ga. Ill; Tabler «. Wiseman, 3 Ohio St. 207; Calmady v. Calmady, 3 Ves. Jr. 568; Danville Sem. v. Mott, 136 III. 291. ' Thomas v. Garvan, 4 Dev. (S. Car.) 223, «WlUard v. Willard, 145 U. S. 116; Smith v. Smith, 10 Paige (N. Y.), 470. 736 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 716 mon and can only arise between co-tenants of such prop- erty.' Adult parties may demand a partition at any time and are not compelled to wait for a future speculative rise in the price." If the nature of the property is such that it cannot be enjoyed in severalty, the court will order it sold a,nd the proceeds divided." A mortgagee of an undivided share, even at common law, cannot compel partition.* But when the mortgagee has foreclosed on one part of the land, then he may have partition with the owner of the other part.' Land not held in pai'tnership, though owned by the partners, can be par- titioned. ° The statute of limitations is not applicable to an action in partition.' The right of partition exists from the date of the tenancy. All the tenants have an equal right to possession. The mere fact that one tenant fails to assert his right to partition during the prescriptive time does not bar his right to partition, and to have his portion of the land set aside to him, ° unless the tenant in possession has held adversely to him with his knowledge;' he must show clear title to have partition." If he has parted with his interest, he cannot effectually unite with the co-tenants in a deed of partition; because such deed, for want of mutual interests and consideration, will not bar a representative of a co-tenant from making a partition." Every person having an interest in the premises, whether in actual possession or not, must be made a party to the suit for partition. " And in New York when grandchildren arein esse, ' Baltimore v. New Orleans, 45 La. Ann. 526. i^Land v. Smith, 44 La. Ann. Oil. 'Higginbotton «. Sljort, 35 Miss. 160. *Bannon ». Comegys, 69 Md. 411; Ewer v. Hobbs, 5 Met. (Mass.) 1. 'Plielps V. Townsley, 10 Allen (Mass.), 554. « Thompson «. Holden, 117 Mo. 118; Reed v. Snell, 36 Nebr. 815. 'McCray v. Humes, 116 Ind. 103. ' Peden v. Cavins, 134 Ind. 494. »Wilmore». Stetler (Ind.), 84 N. B. 357; Collins «. Collins, 131 N. Y. 648. '» Pierce «. Rollins, 83 Me. 173. " Patterson ». Martin, 33 W. Va. 494. "Hiles ». Rule, 131 Mo. 348; Overman v. Tate, 114 N. Car. 571; § 717] PARTITION. 737 and have a vested remainder, they must be made parties. ' If one of the tenants has sold his interest, his rights are extinguished, and he and those claiming under him need not be made parties to a suit for partition;' partition does not affect third persons, and so, when creditors are made parties to the suit, it will be dismissed as to them,' un- less they have a lien on the land. When land is devised and, in accordance with the will, an equitable conversion follows by sale of the land, there can be no partition. But where there is no absolute di- rection to sell the land, there is no equitable conversion. And if there is an equitable conversion, those concerned are only the devisees, and not a stranger, and so a tenant in common with the testator cannot raise this question to bar the right to partition.* § 717. Ownership in Severalty. — In order to have par- tition the land must be held jointly or in common. So where each party owns his part of the realty in severalty there can be no partition, for it is legally impossible that partition can be had where there is no community of interest. The parties must have undivided interest in the land jointly or in common with each other, because title in severalty to a distinct portion will not give the right of partition." And so when land is purchased for a particular use, which use entered into the consideration of the con- tract by which it was created, one of the tenants in common cannot defeat the joint purpose by a partition without the consent of the co-tenants." Thus, where several congregations composing a ministerial charge pur- chase real estate for a parsonage for their joint benefit, one Throckmorton v. Pence, 121 Mo. 50; Union Nat. Bank v. Choppin (La.), 15 South. Rep. 304. ' Campbell v. Stokes, 143 N. Y. 23. Compare Townshend v. Frommer, 125 N. Y. 446. * Stevens s. McCormick (Va.), 19 8. E. Rep. 743. « Stevens v. McCormick (Va.), 19 S. E. Rep. 743 . Phillips, 83 Ga. 293; Campbell v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 84 Mo. 352; Tate i>. Foshee, 117 Ind. 322. « Manly v. Pettee, 38 111. 138. See, also. Wood v. Fieet, 36 N. Y. 501. 'Pringle v. Sturgeon, 6 Litt. (Ky.) 112; Wood «. Fleet, 36 N. Y. 501; Town- send V. Downer, 32 Vt. 183. "Fleming v. Kerr, 10 Watts (Pa.), 444. ' Meacham v. Meacham, 91 Tenn. 533; AUday «. Whitaker, 66 Tex. 669; McKnight v. Bell, 135 Pa. St. 359. « Rountree v. Lane, 32 S. Car. 160. ■" Frederick v. Frederick, 31 W. Va. 566; Kennemore v. Kennemore, 36 S. Car. 3S1; Moore v. Kerr, 46 Ind. 468; Bruce v. Osgood, 113 Ind. 360; Shepard ®. Rinks, 78 111. 188; Baker v. Prewitt, 64 Ala. 551; John «. Sabattis, 69 Me. 473; Kave «. Smith, 93 Mo. 596; Hazen b. Barnett, 50 Mo. 506; Simmons «, Spratt, 26 Fla. 449. « Sanger v. Merritt, 131 N. Y. 614; Patterson i>. Martin, 33 W. Va. 494. § 72 i] PARTITION. 741 The general rule is, according to the late decisions, that parol partition, when fair and equal and followed by due execution and possession in severalty, will bind even infants and a feme covert; and a judgment or a mortgage or a lien of a legacy against one of the tenants in common will, after the partition ipso facto cease to bind the whole estate and attach to the tenant's purport.' A partition which merely severs the relation existing be- tween tenants in common in the undivided whole, and vests title to a correspondent part in severalty, is not such a sale or transfer of title as will be affected by the statute of frauds.' This is because the partition is not an acquisition or purchase of land, nor is it in any proper sense a trans- fer of title to land; it is a mere setting apart in severalty of the same interest held in common, not in other, but in the same land.' This is the correct doctrine and is the trend of the courts, and is based upon sound reasoning. The result of a parol partition does not confer a merely equitable right, but a right recognized, and which will be enforced at law. Ejectment will not lie to compel payment of a sum stipulated in the nature of owelty; nor, in the absence of a contract to that effect, would a bill lie to en- force a conveyance." § 721. Partial Partition. — The owner of an undivided interest is not entitled to a partition of a part of the land held in common, but the whole must be divided if any.' How- ever one or more of the tenants in common may have their shares set off, leaving the residue undivided when this can be done with equity to all parties;" but if an equitable equahzation cannot be done in this manner, the entire estate must be partitioned.' 'Willard v. Willard, 50 Pa. St. 119; Long's Appeal, 77 Pa. St. 151; Mc- Knight V. Bell, 135 Pa. St. 358. 5 Mellon V. Reed, 114 Pa. St. 649; Meacham v. Meacham, 91 Tenn. 533. = McKnight v. Bell, 135 Pa. St. 358. * McKuight V. Bell, 135 Pa. St. 358. 'Duncan v. Sylvester, 16 Me. 388; Blgelow v. Littlefleld, 53 Me. 34. «Ladd«. Perley, 18 N. H. 396; Abbott v. Berry, 46 N. H. 369; Smith v. Brown, 66 Tex. 543; CTark «. Parker, 106 Mass. 554; Colton v. Smith, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 311. ' Barnes v. Lynch, 151 Mass. 510. 742 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 722 But tenants in common will not be denied partition of a remaining portion of the estate on the ground that they had previously obtained partition of a part thei'eof, on a partition that makes no reference to such remainder, where it appears they acted in good faith in obtaining the former division.' § 722. Legal Title in Dispute.— The established rule is that upon a bill for partition of lands, if the legal title of the parties are brought into dispute, a court of equity will not proceed to settle the disputed title but will either dis- miss the bill, or retain it to allow the legal title to be settled in an action at law, but if on such a bill the title of one party is disputed on equitable grounds, the legal title not being contested, a court of equity will pass upon and settle such dispute in that suit." But in many States it has been enacted that the chancery court shall have jurisdiction to settle legal titles among tenants in partition.' The practice generally being to refer the decision of a disputed legal title to a jury, but where an equitable title is involved the whole question is for the decision of the court.' However these statutes generally authorize the court of chancery to settle all the conflicting claims of such parties as are properly joined as co-tenants, but it is not allowable to bring into a suit between co-tenants one who is a stranger to the suit. ' The partition between true owners and a contest between them on the one hand and a stranger on the other hand 'Barnes «. Boardman, 157 Mass. 479. 'Pom. Eq. Jur. 1388; Bish. Eq. 499; Rivas -d. Summers, 33 Fla. 539; Manners «. Manners, 3 N. J. Eq. 384; Hoyt v. Tuers, 35 N. J. Eq. 360; Vreeland v. Vreeland, 49 N. J. Eq. 332; Peterson v. Fowler, 73 Tex. 534; Fenton v. Steere, 76 Mich. 405; Welch's Appeal, 136 Pa. St. 397; Carrigan v. Evans, 31 S. Oar. 363; Fullers. Montague, 59 Fed. Rep. 313; Rich ». Bray, 37 Fed. Rep. 273; Mathewson v. Johnson, 1 Hoff. Ch. (N. Y.) 560; Criscoe ». Hambrick, 47 Ark. 335. 3 Gore V. Dickinson, 98 Ala. 363; Olaughton i>. Claughton, 70 Miss. 384; Hay's Appeal, 133 Pa. St. 110; Simms ». Simms, 88 Ky. 643; Best v. Sanders, 31 S. Car. 603. "Donnor v. Quartermas, 90 Ala. 164; Berry v. Webb 77 Ala. 507. 'Nugent V. Powell, 63 Miss. 997; Cooper ®. Fox, 67 Miss. 337; Claughton v. Clanghton, 70 Miss. 384. § 722] PARTITION. 743 who sets up an unfounded claim to an interest in the prop- erty are distinct matters which have no connection with each other, and such adjustments must be in a court of law, notwithstanding the statute.' Equitable titles will be tried in equity in an action for partition;' but equitable estates cannot be divided by a writ of partition at law.' A court of equity may decree partition between the devisees of land, though the titles are legal.' If the title be equitable, or if there are equities to settle, application may be made to the court for that purpose, and equity having once jurisdiction, it will decree a parti- tion if a proper case be made out.' But when a question is raised as to title during the proceedings in equity for partition, in the absence of a controlling statute, the court will order a stay of proceedings until the title can be de- termined in an action at law; ° but the court will not, of its own motion, retain the bill to give the complainant an op- portunity to establish title at law but he must apply for leave.' In Great Britain disputed question of title used to be set- tled in a court of law. But such practice should not be expected in those States where the powel-s of the courts of law and equity are exercised by the same person. And so the equity court takes jurisdiction whenever the com- plainant shows himself seised of the requisite title, whether the lands sought to be partitioned are held adversely to him or not; and now many statutes authorize the litigation ' Bullock V. Knox, 96 Ala. 195. ^ Griffin v. Griffin, 33 Ga. 107; Morenhout v. Higuera, 33 Cal. 289; Bollo v. Navarro, 33 Cal. 459; Godfreys. Godfrey, 17 Ind. 6; Ormond v. Martin, 37 Ala. 598. 'Coale V. Barney, 1 Gill. & John. (Md.) 334. ■■Haggin d. Haggin, 3 B. Mon. (Ky.) 317; Wiseley v. Findlay, 3 Rand. (Va.) 361. s Lucas V. King, 10 IT. J. Eq. 277; Campbell v. Lowe, 9 Md. 500; Carter v. Taylor, 3 Head (Tenu.), 30. 'McCallsc. Carpenter, 18 How. (U. S.) 297; Boone v. Boone, 3 Md. Ch. 497; Garrett B. White, Sired. Eq. (N. Car.) 131; Horton v. Sledge, 29 Ala. 478; Wilkin B. Wilkin, IJohns. Ch, (N. Y.) Ill; Walker v. Laflin, 26 111. 473; Dewilt v. Ackerman, 17 N. J. Eq. 215; Hay v. Estell, 18 N. J. Eq. 251; Obert«. Obert, ION. J. Eq. 98; Foust «. Moorman, 2 Ind. 17; Manners v. Manners, 2 N. J. Eq. 384. ' Hassam v. Day, 39 Miss. 393. 744 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 723 in an action of partition of all questions of title, legal or equitable, which arise upon the pleadings between the co-tenants and their privies, who may be parties to the action.' § 723. Partition by Disseised Co-tenant. — The writ of partition was a common law process, and was an available remedy, at least between coparceners, for over three hun- dred years before courts of chancery assumed jurisdiction of the subject matter. The writ was returnable before judges or commissioners especially appointed to hear the cause; and if, upon the return of the writ, it was shown that the plaintiff's title was contested, or that the lands were held adversely, the proceedings were dismissed or sus- pended until the question of title had been otherwise de- termined. This proceeding was necessary, because a trial by jury of an issue involving the title to real property was matter of common right, of which a citizen could not be deprived by the institution of a proceeding in which that form of trial was not permissible. And, hence, where the court of chancery extends its jurisdiction to partition suits it followed the established rules of practice in courts of law in this respect, and requires the plaintiff to show an actual holding and possession in common with his co-tenants be- fore he can obtain a hearing in a court of equity. So, where not changed by statute, where the complainant's legal title is in dispute, courts of equity decline to take jur- isdiction to try this question, but in a proper case will retain the petition for a reasonable time until the question of title can be determined at law.' In many of the States it is now ' Gates V. Salmon, 35 Cal. 593; Martin v. Walker, 58 Cal. 590; Watson v. Sutro, 86 Cal. 527; Luco t>. De Tore, 91 Cal. 405. 'Slade «. Barlow, L. E. 7 Eq. 396; Gifford v. Williams, L. R. 5 Ch. 546; Bolton V. Bolton, L. R. 7 Eq. 398n; Barker v. Jones, 63 N. H. 497; Potter v. Waller, 3 DeGex & Sm. 410; Currin v. SprauU, 10 Gratt. (Va.) 145; Wilkin «. Wilkin, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) Ill, 118; Hoffman v. Beard, 33 Mich. 59; Hardy ». Mills, 85 Wis. 141; Mattair v. Payne, 15 Pla. 683; Simpson «. Wallace, 83 N. Car. 477; Phelps v. Green, 3 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 303; Sey- mour ■B. Bicketts, 31 Nebr. 240; McMurtry «. Keifner, 36 Nebr. 533; Brock V. Eastman, 38 Vt. 658; Tabler v. Wiseman, 3 Ohio St. 307; Windsor ■». Simpkins, 19 Oreg. 117; Griscoe v. Hambrick, 47 Ark. 335; Welch's Appeal, 136 Pa. St. 397; Fenton v. Steere, 76 Mich. 405; Carrigan v. Evans, 81 S. Car. § 723] PARTITION. 745 necessary, as it was at common law, that the petitioner, at the beginning of the partition, has an actual or construct- ive possession, in common with the defendants, of the land. Both title and possession, or right of possession, must be vested in the petitioner.' But constructive posses- sion follows the legal title and is sufficient to support the action of pai'tition." In many States it has always been held that a disseised co-tenant might maintain compulsory partition.' And under the codes of those States which have abolished courts of equity, and where now the same person exercises legal and equitable powers in the same court,the rule should be abro- gated which prevents a recovery by a disseised co-tenant in partition; and now a trial and determination in a partition action should settle all issues involving the title and right of possession of any of the parties.' In many States, as at common law, it is the well settled rule of practice in actions for partition to withhold relief in equity if it appears that the title or the right of possession of the plaintiff is disputed, or that he has been actually ousted by his co-tenants. It is not always clear what conduct will be considered in law sufficient to effect an ouster, but the current of authority in States not under a code is uniform and unbroken that when a disseisin has been established, although for a period less than that required to extinguish his title, a tenant in common of real property must wait until he has regained possession in an action or proceeding 262; Reams ». Spann, 38 S. Car. 530; Brown «. Cranberry, etc. Co., 40 Fed. Rep. 849; Wa-shburn's Appeal, 105 Pa. St. 480; Ferguson's Appeal, 117 Pa. St. 43e; Kates' Estate, 148 Pa. St. 471; Fenton v. Steere, 76 Mich. 405. ' Whitten v. Whitten, 36 N. H. 333; Brownell «. Brownell, 19 Wend. (N.T.) 367; Hoyle v. Huson, 1 Dev. (N. Car.) 348; Scbori v. Stephens, 62 Ind. 441; Florence d. Hopkins, 46 N. Y. 183; Hughes ®. Hughes, 63 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 408; Sullivan ». Sullivan, 66 N. Y. 37; Chapin v. Sears, 18 Fed. Rep. 814; Haskell v. Queene, 31 N. Y. Supp. 357; 66 Hun (N. Y.), 634. 2 Wainman v. Hampton, 110 N. Y. 429; Weston v. Stoddard. 137 N. Y. 119. 'Call V. Barker, 13 Me. 335; Marshall ';. Crehore, 13 Met. (Mass.) 464; Howey n. Goings, 13 111. 108; Scarborough v. Smith, 18 Kaus. 399; Martin «. Walker, 58 Cal. 590; Cuyler v. Ferrill, 1 Abb. (U. S.) 183; Miller t). Dennet, 6 N. H. 109; Tabler v. Wiseman. 3 Ohio St. 307; Godfrey v. Godfrey, 17 Ind. 9; Cook V. Webb, 19 Minn. 167. 4 See 3 Rum. Pr. 31, 41; Fiero Spec. Act., 91, 93. 94 746 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 724 at law before he can insist upon a division of the property between himself and his co-tenants. The two remedies cannot be enforced in the same action. There is but one exception to this rule, and that is, where the original juris diction of the action is purely equitable, and it has once rightly attached, it may be effectual for complete relief, even if it does require the determination of questions of title to real property and of conflicting claims to its possession.' Under the code practice there is no ground for this rule as thus established centuries ago, and though abrogated the courts will not break away from this precedent but follow it in plain contradiction of their codes. § 724. No Partition by Remainderman or Rever- sioner. — A remainderman or reversioner cannot, especially as against tenants in possession, whether of a term for years, for life, or in fee, be entitled to partition. Because any partition which may be made at the instance of such a party, though equal when made, might be unequal when the estate shall vest in possession." If partition was allowed in such a case it would not always be made according to quality and value but often according to quantity, which would subvert the fundamental principles of an equitable division. The value may be different at the close of the particular estate from what it would be when the partition is made." The remainderman could not get immediate possession though partition was allowed. If the remainderman be a tenant by curtesy and owns an undivided interest in fee, he is then entitled to partition on account of his interest in fee.' A partition cannot be sustained where the plaintiff has only a reversionary interest, and not a vested estate in ' Hosford V. Merwin, 5 Barb. (N. Y.) 63; Scott v. Guernsey, 60 Barb. (N.Y.) 178; Hayes's Appeal, 123 Pa. St. 110; Hopkins ®. Crouch, 86 Ky. 281. ' Stansbury v. Ingleliart, 20 D. C. 134; Tabler v. Wiseman, 2 Ohio St. 208; SeldersB. Giles, 141 Pa. St. 93; Sullivan v. Sullivan, 66 N. Y. 37; Hughes v. Hughes, 68 How. Pr. (N. Y.)408; Schori v. Stephens, 62 Ind. 441; Merritt v. Hughes, 36 W. Va. 856; Wilkinson «. Stuart, 74 Ala. 198. 2 Merritt ». Hughes, 36 W. Va. 356. See, also. Striker v. Mott, 2 Paige (N. Y.), 387. " Otley V. M' Alpine, 2 Gratt. (Va.) 340; McQueen v. Turner, 91 Ala. 273. § 724] PARTITION. 747 possession.' When there is no life estate in the way par- tition may be had;' but tenants in reversion or remainder cannot have partition until the particular estate ceases.' But some of the courts hold, contrary to the general rule, that there may be partition of a vested remainder." Partition cannot be had of contingent remainders or other uncertain future interests, and they cannot be sold for partition.' But partition may be had in such cases pro- vided all the parties vpho may be, by any possibility inter- ested, unite in asking for such a decree of partition.' The possession of a tenant for life is not adverse to the remainderman or reversioner, and therefore the statute of limitations does not begin to run against them until the termination of the life estate.' Eemaindermen and reversioners cannot have possession where the life tenant has the entire and exclusive posses- sion, ° unless the life tenant consents to partition.' But, by statutory provisions, a life tenant may maintain a bill in equity for the partition of the lands,'" which will bind the remainderman if made a party to the suit. And ' Metcalfe d. Miller, 96 Mich. 459; Packard «. Packard, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 191; Ziegler^. Grine, 6 Watts (Pa.), 106; Brown v. Brown, 8 N. H. 63; Culver v. Culver, 3 Root (Conn.), 378. 2 Wisely ». Pindlay, 3 Rand. (Va.) 361; McClintic o. Manns, 4 Munf. (Va.) 338. 'Swanson v. Calhoun, 81 Ga. 777; Moore d. Shannon, 6 Mackay (Dist. Col.), 157; Osborne ». Mull, 91 N. Car. 203; Bragg v. Lyon, 93 N. Car. 151; Eberts D. Fisher, 54 Mich. 294; Adams v. Ames Iron Co., 24 Conn. 330; Hodgkinson, Petitioner, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 374. * Blakeley v. Calder, 15 N. Y 617; Hill v. Reno, 112 111. 154; Hilliaid v. Sco- ville, 53 111. 449. See, also, Preston®. Brant, 96 Mo. 552; Smalley v. Isaacson. 40 Minn. 450. ' Simpson v. Wallace, 83 N. Car. 477; Williams d. Hassell, 74 IT. Car. 437; Ex parte Miller, 90 N. Car 625; Irvin v. Clark, 98 N. Car. 445. »Aydlett«. Pendleton, 111 N. Car 28. ■■ Jackson v. Schoonmaker, 4 Johns. (K Y.) 390; Co. Litt. 240b; Ball v. Johnson, 8 Gratt (Va ) 285 "Savage v Savage. 19 Oreg. 112; Rickard o. Rickard, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 251; Smalley v Isaacson, 40 Minn. 450; Burhans v. Burhans, 3 Barb. Ch (N. Y.) 398, Whitten v Whitten, 36 N. H. 336; Tabler v. Wiseman, 3 Ohio St. 303; 3 Pom. Eq Jur. sect. 1388, n 1, » Bice V Nixon, 34 W. Va. 107. '"Bierce v. James, 87 Tenn. 538, Gayle v. Johnston, 80 Ala. 395; Preston v. Brant. 96 Mo. 553, 748 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 725 as among themselves tenants in common of a life estate in land may maintain a suit for partition.' Many statutes have a controlling effect upon partition which should be consulted. Article 2. Sale and Allotment. § 725. Sale. § 731. Default by Purchaser. § 726. When Sale Will be Decreed. § 733. Rights of Mortgagee. § 737. Execution of Decree. § 733. Improvemeuts. § 738. Confirmation of Sale. § 734. Offset for Improvements. § 729. Title Conveyed. § 735. Sale Set Aside. § 730. Rights and Liabilities of the Purchaser. § 725. Sale. — In case the land cannot be partitioned a sale may be ordered and the proceeds divided. Commis- sioners are generally appointed to view the land and then determine whether it is susceptible of partition. This order for the sale of land does not depend upon statute, and equity may order the sale of land for partition between the tenants in common; such jurisdiction has been exercised and universally recognized by courts of equity.' In case one tenant in common has given a mortgage on his share, supposing he owned it in severalty, and partition is impracticable, equity will order the parcel sold separately provided it can be done without prejudice to the other co- tenants.' The commissioners to make partition must act strictly within the statute, or their proceedings will be void." Whatever is capable of being divided may be subject of 1 Hawkins ■d. McDougal, 125 Ind. 597; Shaw v. Beers, 84 Ind. 538. See, also, Sikemeier v. Galvin (Mo.), 27 S. W. Rep. 551; Reinders v. Koppelmann, «8 Mo. 482. «Holley». Glover, 86 S. Car. 404; Gray «. Cornwall (Ky.), 26 S. W. Rep. 1018; Johnson v. Hoover, 75 Md. 486. 3 Kennedy v. Boykin, 35 S. Car. 61. *in re Parson's Estate, 64 Vt. 193; Blackwell «. MacLean (Wash.), 37 Pac. Rep. 317. § 726] PARTITION. 7i9 partition in equity; and the inconvenience or difficulty of making partition is no objection. And for the sake of con- venience in equity a recompense may be made by a sum of money to one of the parties so as to prevent injustice or unavoidable inequality; or the court may order the sale of the property and division among the several owners accord- ing to their respective titles, as its powers are adequate to a full compensatory adjustment." And things appurtenant may be sold with the land, such as a spring and an aque- duct.' So, if a ferry franchise, or right to cross a river and receive tolls is so connected with the land used, if it is to be regarded as part of the land, it may be partitioned.' So a mill property which is not susceptible of partition may be sold and the proceeds divided.* If the property can be divided, in order to equalize the portions, it may be done by owelty of partition or payment of money," provided the co-owners agree to such a division.' And when a bond is given for the payment of owelty upon land, it is a lien upon the entire estate in the land thus taken, including the interest therein, which passes to the recognizor by descent.' And where it is determined that one tenant shall pay in money the value of the share of the other, the title does not vest in the former until the money is paid. ' And a lien upon land for equality of par- 'Pell V. Ball, 1 Rich. Eq. (S. Car.) 361; Holmes v. Holmes, 2 Jones Eq. (N. Car.) 334; Gregory ». Gregory, 69 N. Car. 523; McGilllvray i). Evans, 27 Cal. 92; Royston ». Royston, 13 Ga. 435; Coleman v. Lane, 26 Ga. 515; Graham v. Graham, 8 Bush (Ky.), 834; Thruston c. Minke, 33 Md. 571; Ross v. Ramsey, 3 Head (Tenn.), 15. ' Allard v. Carleton, 64 N. H. 24. 'Rohil T. Harris, 130 HI. 535. *Carrothers v. Jolliffe, 32 W. Va. 563. See, also. Poster v. Roche, 117 N. Y. 462; King v. Reed, 11 Gray (Mass.), 490; "Wood v. Little, 35 Me. 107; Crowell V. Woodbury, 52 N. H. 613; Higginbottom v. Short, 25 Miss. 160. 'Green D. Arnold, 11 R. I. 864; Houston r, Blythe, 71 Tex. 719; Hagar t). Wiswall, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 152; Dobbin v. Rex, 106 N. Car. 444; Stanna-d v. Sperry, 56 Conn. 541. "Whitney ». Parker, 63 N. H. 416; Barnes «. Leeds, 54 N. H. 128, 145; Car- rothers v. Jolliffe, 33 W. Va. 562. 'McCandless' Appeal, 98 Pa. St. 489; Snivel/s Appeal, 129 Pa. St. 250, 368; Long V. Long, 1 Watts (Pa.), 365; Cubbage v. Nesmith, 3 Watts (Pa.). 314, See, also, Burnside v. Watkins, 30 S. Car. 459. ^McKibben v. Salinas, 36 S. Car. 379. 750 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 726-727 tition is not discharged by the execution of a note for the same. The land remains the primary debtor.' In equity such part of the land as may be more advan- tageous to one of the parties on account of its proximity to his other land, or for any other reason, will be allotted to him if it can be done without injury to the others." § 726. When Sale Will Be Decreed.— If the land can be partitioned in an equitable manner a sale will not be or- dered. A sale of lands for distribution is not a matter of unconditional right." It will be sold only in case a fair and just division cannot be made.* So a sale of land for dis- tribution or division will not be decreed against the objec- tions of one or more of the co-tenants without an averment and proof that a fair and equitable partition cannot be made." And in some of the States by statute provision a case seldom arises where a court of chancery through the principle of owelty or some other proper order, cannot make an equitable partition." It is well settled that a court of equity has jurisdiction in cases of partition whenever the remedy at law is insuffi- cient or the peculiar circumstances of the case render the proceeding in equity the more suitable and just.' § 727. Execution of Decree. — A decree is nofice to pur- chasers of land embraced in the shares,' and is equivalent to an ordinary conveyance.* A judgment of partition is conclusive as to the title of the land portioned, and that the parties and their privies were tenants in common of • Dobbin D. Rex, 106 N. Car. 444; Jones v. Sherrard, 3 Dev. & Bat.-Eq. (N. Car.) 179. ' Cochran v. Shoenberger, 33 Fed. Rep. 397; Story ». Johnson, 1 Tounge & Col. 538; Hall v. Piddock, 21 N. J. Eq. 311; Gaithers v. Brown, 7 B. Men. (Ky.) 90; Graham d. Graham, 8 Bush (Ky.), 334. 'Deloney v. Walker, 9 Port. (Ala.) 500. • Keener ». Mass. 66 Tex. 181; Keaton«. Terry, 93 Ala. 85, 'Keaton ». Terry, 93 Ala. 85. ' McEvoy v. Leonard, 89 Ala. 455, 457. 'Mayer v. Hover, 81 Ga. 308; Greer v. Henderson, 37 Ga. 1. ' Marshall v. McLean, 3 Greene (Iowa), 363. • Anderson 1). Hughes, 5 Strobh. (S. Car.) 74. % 728] PARTITION. 751 the part awarded to the plaintiff.' The action is conclusive only of the right to the land allotted, and not to an ad- vancement and distribution of the valuation money to those entitled.' And judgment of partition does not affect the' right of property; it only determines the right of posses- sion without vesting in any of the parties any new or ad- ditional title in the part set off to each party.' § 728. Confirmation op Sale. — The final order of con- firmation of sale in a partition suit has the force and effect of a judgment which binds the parties where there is com- plete jurisdiction, whatever errors or irregularities may have preceded it.* A decree of partition is equivalent to an ordinary conveyance, ' and is notice to purchasers of land embraced in the estate to be partitioned." Eegularity of the proceedings before judgment is suffi- ciently proved by decree confirming sale in partition.' Judgment of partition is conclusive as to the title to the land partitioned, and that the parties and their privies were tenants in common of the part awarded to the plaintiff." Where land is sold under an interlocutory judgment in partition authorizing a referee or master to execute a deed on confirmation of his report of sale, on compliance by the purchaser with the terms of sale, the purchaser may be compelled to take the title until confirmation, or before final judgment is entered. ' The order decreeing partition is not a final decree in the full and true sense of the term, for it remains open for the purpose of controlling the mode and basis of partition;'" but as to the right to partition the order is final." A 1 Edson v. Munsell, 13 Allen (Mass.), 600; Burghardt v. Van Deusen, 4 Allen (Mass.), 374. ' Dutch's Appeal, 57 Pa. St. 461. 'Pierce v. Oliver, 13 Mass. 211; Wade v. Deray, 50 Cal. 876. * Woodhull V. Northridge, 102 N. Y. 165. "Anderson v. Hughes, 5 Strob. (S. Car.) 74. 'Marshall v. McLean, 3 Greeve (Iowa), 363. 'Stokes V. Middleton, 28 N. J. L. 32; Foxcroft i>. Barnes, 29 Me. 138. 8 Edson V. Munsell, 12 Allen (Mass.), 600; Burghardt v. Van Dusen, 4 Allen (Mass.), 374. «KirkB. Kirk, 137 N. Y. 510. >» Roach®. Baker, 130 Ind. 362. " Kreitline «. Franz, 106 Ind. 359. 752 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 729 sheriff's deed made before approval of sale by the court is void.' § 729. Title Conveyed. — After partition, if the property can be divided, each tenant takes his share in severalty. And where partition has been made at law, none of the par- titioners is a warrantor to the alienee of one of them." And it is held where each tenant in common makes parti- tion by quit claim deeds, there is no warranty of title.' And when one of the parties is evicted by a prior title, he is enti- tled to another partition ; * though this does not hold as to a purchaser from the tenant.' The better authority holds that although deeds inter- changeably be executed between the parties for their sev- eral shares in effecting the partition made by law, are quit claim deeds, yet in partition between tenants, there is an implied warranty between them that each will make good to the others any loss sustained by an eviction under a su- perior title ; ' because in the partition of land a warranty is implied on account of the privity of estate.' But on the other hand it is held if there be no fraud in the execution of the quit claim deeds, no warranty is implied. ° It is held in Michigan that a tenant whose interest be- comes severed by partition, is a purchaser of the interest of his co-tenants in the lands set apart to him.' After partition none of the former co-tenants can acquire by purchase a paramount title to the joint estate which he may enforce against them, for they can assert their right to contribution as before partition." But this principle does not apply, after the tenants in common have been ' Burden v. Taylor (Mo.), 37 S. W. Rep. 349. « Ketchin ». Patrick, .33 S. Car. 443. ^Beardsley v. Knight, 10 Vt. 185; Weiser v. "Weiser, 5 Watts (Pa.), 379. ■•Feather «. Strohoecker, 3 Pen. & W. (Pa.) 505; Co. Litt. 173b. 5 Ketchin v. Patrick, 33 S. Car.-443. « Huntley v. Cline, 93 N. Car. 458. 'Nixon V. Lindsay, 3 Jones Eq. (N. Car.) 330. See, also, Rogers ». Turley, 4 Bibb (Ky.), 356; Morris v. Harris,^ Gill (Md.), 36. *Beardsley v. Knight, 10 Vt. 185; Weiser v. Weiser, 5 Watts (Pa.), 379. ' Campau v. Barnard, 35 Mich. 381. "> Co. Litt. 174a. Venable v. Beauchamp, 3 Dana (Ky.), 326. § 729] PARTITION. 753 evicted under an adverse title, and each of them is then at liberty to buy the lost land for his own exclusive benefit." In the case of partition there is an imphed warranty be- tween the parties thereto, by which they have the mutual right in case of eviction by paramount title, to have com- pensation against each other for the loss sustained ; and the right exists against an alienee of one of the owners but not in his favor. The remedy is in a court of equity, either by setting aside the partition when improperly made, if it can be done without injustice to others, or by contribu- tion." At common law, on failure of title after partition, and eviction from the purport allotted to the heir or coparcener, he had the right to re-enter and defeat the partition, or to obtain recompense from the coparceners for the part lost." By statute,* this right of contribution was extended to tenants in common and joint tenants; but the right was limited to warranty and recompense without the right of re entry and to defeat the partition." The effects of statutes in most of the States have abol- ished, to a great extent, the right of survivorship and co- parceny, which existed at common law, and for all practical purposes have reduced the different estates to an estate in common, with the rights and remedies that appertained to tenants in coparcenary at common law. The practical effect of giving joint-tenants and tenants in common the right of compulsory partition, and preserving their rights upon any previous warranty, as if they had been copar- ceners, confers upon them the rights and remedies of co- parceners at common law; the most important of which, in case of partition, are the implied condition and vvar- ranty, whereby a coparcener, evicted by paramount title, could defeat the partition in the whole, or recover recom- pense for that part lost. ■ Coleman v. Coleman, 3 Dana (Ky.), 403. 2 Sawyers «. Cator, 8 Humph. (Tenn.) 356; Morris v. Harris, 9 Gill (Md.), 19; Dugan V. HoUins, 4 Md. Ch. 189. » Co. Litt. 174a. <31Hen. Vni. c. 1. ' Ross v. Armstrong, 35 Tex. 354, 373; Western «. Sklles, 35 Fed. Rep. €74. 95 754 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 729 It has been held in Pennsylvania' that where the parti- tion was by deed, which contained a clause of special warranty, that no warranty was implied, and that the rights of the tenants in common depended solely upon the covenants in the deed. However, in the same court" it was held that in a partition of lands between tenants in common, who derived their estate by descent, there is an implied warranty of title; and this was the case of parti- tion by deed. In the former case, the decision seems to be influenced by the consideration that the deed of partition contained an express covenant of special warranty, de- clared on as a general warranty; the court holding that an express covenant qualifies and restrains the generalty of an implied covenant. Other considerations were adverted to, which must have an influence. And finally, the statute abolishing the distinction between joint estates was not as strong as those of to-day. It can be reasonably stated and laid down as a general rule that, in partition between tenants in common, there is an implied warranty between them, by which they have the mutual right, in case of eviction by paramount title, to have compensation from each other for loss sustained, and that the remedy is by bill in equity, either by setting aside the partition, when improperly made and can be done with- out injustice to others, or by contribution, when it is most proper.' In Maine, by statute, tenants in common under the same deed as grantees have several freeholds, and may join in an action against their grantor for a breach of the covenant of warranty or proceed alone,* as at common law. At common law, in every exchange of land, there is im- plied both a condition of re-entry and a warranty; and, if ' Weiser ». Weiser, 5 Watts (Pa.), 279. See, also, Beardsley v. Kniglit, 10 Vt. 185. ^ Patterson v. Lanning, 10 Watts (Pa.), 135. 'Sawyers ®. Gator, 8 Humph. (Tenn.) 256; Ross v. Armstrong, 35 Tex. 354, 373; Western v. Skiles, 85 Fed. Rep. 674. See, also, Nixon «. Lindsay. 3 Jones Eq. (N. Car.) 333; Boyd v. Doty, 8 Ind. 370; Manning ». Horr, 18 Iowa, 118; Adair v. Cummin, 48 Mich. 380; Johnson v. Wateis, 111 U. S. 640, 667; Guedici v. Boots, 43 Cal. 453; Dugan v. Hollis, 4 Md. Ch. 139, 147; Douglass V. Viele, 3 Sand. Ch. (N. Y.) 439; Smith ». Sweringen, 36 Mo. 551. "Lamb ». Danforth, 59 Me. 333; Svvett v. Patrick, 11 Me. 179. § 729] PARTITION. 755 one party is evicted from the land conveyed to him, he may either re-enter upon his own land or recover upon the war- ranty ; but, in the latter case, the recompense should be con- fined to the land given in exchange; and that the same condition and warranty were implied in the case of a parti- tion.' So, where a coparcener took advantage of the con- dition, she defeated the partition as to the whole; but when she vouched by force of the warranty, the partition was not defeated in the whole, but she recovered recompense for the part that was lost. This implied w^arranty and condition were, by the com- mon law, confined to a partition made between coparceners and for the reason undoubtedly that the right of compul- sory partition was given by the common law only to copar- ceners, and not to joint tenants or tenants in common, to whom the right was first given by statute in England, and followed by the States in this country. At common law, if suit had been commenced upon a parmount title, all the coparceners must have been impleaded, and in case of re- covery, all must have sustained their due proportion of the loss. Therefore, that coparceners should not be placed in a worse condition by a compulsory partition, the common law annexed to the partition, the implied warranty, as a condition for their protection. At common law, joint ten- ants and tenants in common could only make partition by agreement, so no reason existed why the law should imply a warranty in case of partition by them, because, by the terms of their agreement, they could provide against future losses by paramount titles. And hence, the law implied no warranty or condition, because they were not compellable to make partition, as coparceners were, and might protect themselves by express stipulations or covenants in their deeds of partition. But when the law was changed so that partition could be compelled by tenants in common, then the law applicable to coparceners should control, and the law v,'i;l annex to the partition the implied warranty, as a con- dition for their protection. Therefore, a tenant in common evicted by a paramount title could defeat the partition in the whole, or recover recompense for the part that was lost. ' Bastard's Case, 4 Co. 131. 756 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§§ 730-731 In speaking of these rights, the court of Tennessee holds that the right of entry did not exist in that Statfe, as it was not given by statute, and had never been in use in that State; that the imphed covenant could not be vouched upon, because that mode of proceeding had never been in use there, and is now obsolete in England, and no action of covenant upon such implied warranty could be found; there- fore, where there has been a partition between tenants in common, and there is a failure of title, such relief must be given by bill in a court of chancery, either by setting aside the partition, when improperly made and it can be done without injustice to others, or by contribution, when it is most proper.' § 730. Eights and Liability of the Purchaser. — The decree of partition protects the purchaser." And where all the parties to the action for partition join in seeking by rule to compel the purchaser at a sale under an order in the cause to comply with his bid, and the purchaser resists the same, the principle of equity will be applied that governs the court in actions of specific performance. ' A purchaser cannot be compelled to take title of land where the proceedings of partition are voidable.* If the decree directs that the mineral rights in the whole land re- main undivided, a purchaser of one of the tracts acquires no interest in the mineral rights. ° § 731. Default by the Purchaser. — When a purchaser buys the land at the sale of the master he is then responsi- ble for the purchase money. If he then fails to complete the sale by paying the amount bid, he is liable for any de- ficiency caused by his default whereby a resale was ordered. So if he be a part owner of the land and purchases a part of the property at the sale and makes default in complet- ing the purchase, and, upon a resale a deficiency occurs, the court may pass upon and determine in a summary ' Sawyers v. Gator, 8 Humph. (Tenn.) 256. •Covas®. Bertoulin, 44 La. Ann. 683. » FuUer v. Missroon, 35 S. Car. 314. «Crouter v. Crouter, 183 IT. Y. 55. •Barksdale r>. Parker. 87 Va. 141. §§ 732-733] PARTITION. 757 manner his liability to make it good, and charge such de- ficiency against his share in the fund; and if he has made a deposit this may be applied on the deficiency.' § 732. Eights op Mortgagee. — A mortgagee of a parcel of the common land must abide the result of partition. So where in partition a parcel of the estate which is covered by a mortgage executed by one of the co-tenants, or by at- tachment hen, falls to a tenant other than the mortgagor or judgment debtor, the hens are wholly lost, and cannot be shifted to a parcel allotted to the debtor; ' and this rule apphes when such hens have been acquired pendente lite.' Accordingly where there is a suit for partition of the common estate consisting of several parcels, upon some of which liens exist by mortgage, the court cannot extend any mortgage or other lien to property not included or described by the mortgage.' However, if a party to the suit for partition, be a purchaser or mortgagee of a particular parcel he may ask the court to assign it to his vendor or mortgagor in the event the latter refuses to protect him,' which the court will do provided it works no injustice to the other co-tenants in assigning them their portions in severalty. § 733. Improvements. — A tenant in common, who has made improvements on the land held in common, is en- titled to an equitable partition. And the only good faith required in such improvements is that they should be made honestly, for the purpose of improving the property, and not of embarrassing his co-tenants, or encumbering their estate, or hindering partition. The fact that the tenant making such improvements knows that an undivided share in the land is held by an- other, is no bar to equitable partition. Nor is it any bar to ' Bailey v. Dalrymple, 47 N. J. Eq. 81 ; Vass v. Hill (N. Y.), 31 At. Rep. 585. ' Green ». Arnold, 11 R. I. 364; Soutter v. Porter, 37 Me. 417; Marks v. Sewall, 130 Mass. 174; Marshall v. TurnbuU, 28 Conn. 183, 185; Dora v. Dun- ham, 34 Tex. 377; Primm v. Walker, 88 Mo. 98. •Martin v. Kennedy, 83 Ky. 835. * Green v. Arnold, 11 R. I. 364. 'Randell ». Mallett, 14 Me. 51. - - i 758 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATES. [§ 733 allowance for improvements in equalizing the partition, that the improvements were made by tenants in common in reversion, during the previous Ufe estate.' Equity will endeavor to equalize the partition and give each co-tenant his equitable share, and such part of the land as may be more advantageous to any party on ac- count of its proximity to his other land, or for any other reason, will be directed to be set off to him if it can be done without injury to the others; and when the lands are in several parcels each joint owner is not entitled to a share of each parcel, but only to his equal share in the whole ; where a partition exactly equal cannot be made without injury, a gross sum or yearly rent may be directed to be paid for owelty or equality of partition, by one whose share is too large, to others whose shares are too small; and where one joint owner has put improvements on the property, he shall receive compensation for his im- provements, either by having the part upon which the im- provements are assigned to him at the value of the land without the improvements, or by compensation directed to be made for them. This is the equitable mode of partition as sustained by the highest authority and reason.' And this rule applies if the improvements are made by tenants in common in reversion during the previous life estate.' And the parties seeking compensation for improve- ments may be the plaintiffs in the case, and the allowance wiU be made to them not on the principle that a party asking relief, in equity must first do what is equitable himself.' When a sale is ordered, a proper allowance must be made for the improvements. The part of the proceeds to be ' Charleston, etc. R. R. Co. v. Leech, 39 S. Car. 446; Hall v. Piddock, 31 N. J. Eq. 311; Scalfe «. Thompson, 15 S. Car. 337. ' Swan V. Swan, 8 Price, 518; Town v. Needham, 3 Paige (K. T.), 553; St. Felix V. Rankin, 3 Edw. Ch. (N T.) 333; Conklin v. Conklin, 3 Sandf. Ch. (N. T.) 65; Green v. Putnam, 1 Barb. QH. T.) 500; Brookfleld v. Williams, 3 N. J. Eq. 341; Obert v. Obert, 1 Halst. Ch. CN. J.) 397; Doughaday v. Crowell, 3 Stockt. (N. J.) 301. 3 Green «. Putnam, 1 Barb. (N. T.) 500; Brookfleld v. "Williams, 3 N. J. Eq. 341. *St. Felix V. Rankin, 3 Edw. Ch. (N. T.) 333; Conklin v. Conklin, 3 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 65; Doughaday «. Crowell, 3 Stockt. (N. J.) 301; Town v. Need- ham, 3 Paige (N. T.), 553; Brookfleld v. Williams, 3 N. J. Eq. 841. § 733J PARTITION. 759 allowed for the improvements must be such proportion as the value of the improvements bears to the value of the whole premises.' For a court of equity will not grant a partition without first directing an account and suitable compensation, or else in the partition it will assign to such tenant in common that part of the premises on which the improvements have been made if such can be done without injuring the other co-tenants." And so if a part is sold by one co-tenant and it can be assigned to the purchaser as a part or whole of the share of his grantor without prejudice to the grantor's co-tenant in the original tract, it will be so assigned.' The claim of such grantee constitutes an equity which is involved in a partition of the original tract, and may be recognized and brought to the attention of the court in an original bill filed by others interested in the partition of the common property, or the grantee may propound it in a cross-bill.* Such grantee is a proper party to a suit of partition, because of his interest in having partition so directed as to protect him, so far as that may be done with- out prejudice to the rights of the other co-tenants. ' A court of equity will not allow one man to deprive another of the fruits of his labor and expenditures, if such an unconscionable result may be avoided consistently with the security to each of them of the full measure of all that he is entitled to claim. And if a tenant in common makes improvements in good faith, he may get the benefit of them in partition even when the estate is sold and a distribution is made of the proceeds.' 'Hall «. Piddock, 21 N. J. Eq. 311. 'Conklin v. Conklin, 3 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 65; Green d. Putnam. 1 Barb. (N. T.) 500; Hall v. Piddock, 21 N. J. Eq. 311; Ferris «. Montgomery Land & Imp. Co., 94 Ala. 557; Donnor v. Quartermas, 90 Ala. 164; Wilkinson v. Stu- art, 74 Ala. 198; Sanders v. Kobertson, 57 Ala. 465. •Gittingss. Worthington, 67 Md. 146; Boggess v. Meredith, 16 W. Va. 28, 29: Worthington v. Staunton, 16 W. Va. 208; Teal v. Woodworth, 3 Paige (N. Y.), 472; Camoron v. Thurmond, 56 Tex. 22; St. Felix ». Rankin, 3 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 323. * Ferris v. Montgomery Land & Imp. Co., 94 Ala. 557. 'Gates v. Salmon, 35 Cal. 576; Harlan v. Laugham, 69 Pa. St. 235; Whittou «. Whitton, 38 N. H. 127. "Hall V. Piddock, 21 N. J. Eq. 311; Lynch v. Lynch, 18 Nebr. 586; Buck 760 • CLASSIFICATION OP ESTATES. [§ 734 § Y34:. Offset for Improvements. — But the tenants out of possession may offset the rents against the improve- ments which the tenant in possession has made.' The right to have compensation for improvements is not a legal right, but is a right enforceable in a court of equity, and the facts that the improvements were made after notice of the co-tenant's title will not defeat recovery." One tenant in common cannot be deprived of the right to use and enjoy the common property because his co- tenants are wilhng to let the property lie idle, or fail or refuse to set up any claim to it ; and while he is thus left in sole possession, he may manage the common prop- erty in any way he pleases, provided he does not injure his co-tenants.' He may cultivate or improve the prop- erty, and the plain dictates of justice are that he is per- mitted to enjoy the fruits of his own labors, unless that result involves some infringement upon the rights of his co-tenants who are out of possession by their own will and desire. The out-tenant may at any time assert his right to share in the possession, or he may have the property partitioned and assigned in severalty, according to the interest of each. He cannot complain of the mere • possession of a co-tenant so long as he refrains from set- ting up any claim to share in that possession. And if, in the partition, the part of the property which he re- ceives is as much as he would have been entitled to if his co-tenant had not been in possession at all, then it cannot be said that his share in the property has been diminished by the fact that his co-tenant has improved V. Martin, 31 S. Car. 590; Borah v. Archers, 7 Dana (Ky.), 177; Robinson v. McDonald, 11 Tex. 385; Dean i>. O'Meara, 47 111. 131; Wood v. Fleet, 36 N. Y. 501; Thorn v. Thorn, 14 Iowa, 55; AUeman v. Hawley, 117 Ind. 532; Crafts «. Crafts, 13 Gray (Mass.), 360. Compare Gourley v. Woodbury, 43 Vt. 89; Car- ver V. Fennimore, 116 Ind. 236; Ford v. Knapp, 103 N. Y. 135; Cooler v. Dearborn, 115 111. 509; Killmer v. Wuchner, 79 Iowa, 723; Cox v. Ward, 107 N. Car. 507; Dugan v. Baltimore, 70 Md. 1; Worthlngton v. Hiss, 70 Md. 172;. McGee v. Hall, 28 S. Car. 563; Charleston, etc. R. R. Co. v. Leech, 39 S. Car. 446. ' Peden v. Cavins, 134 Ind. 494. = AUeman v. Hawley, 117 Ind. 533; Neesom «. Clarkson, 4 Hare, 97 ^ Wilkinson v. Stuart, 74 Ala. 198; Hall «. Piddock, 31 N. J. Eq. 311. 'Newbold v. Smart, 67 Ala. 326; Gayle v. Johnston, 80 Ala. 395. § 735] PAETITION. 761 the part which ia allotted to him in the division. The court will not be unmindful of the equitable claim of a tenant in common who has, in good faith, expended his labor and capital in the improvement of property of which he has had sole possession while his co-tenants have abandoned or neglected it; but this equitable claim must not be allowed to impair the right of the co-tenant out of possession, or to hinder or burden him in the parti- tion of the property. In some cases the amount of compensation allowed is not permitted to go beyond the amount of the rents charged against the improving tenant.' While there is a conflict of authority upon the question of allowing a co- tenant, on partition, to recover compensation for improve- ments made by him without the assent of his co-tenants, yet the great weight of authority holds that he can have such compensation for improvements made in good faith ; and the rents will be taken into consideration in the allot- ment; and if the improvements exceed the rents, then the improving tenant shall be reimbursed for the deficiency. If one tenant in common has placed a burden upon the premises, partition should be so made, if practicable, as to allot to such tenant in common the parcel upon which the burden has been placed;' this is in accordance with the principles of equity. §735. Sale Set Aside. — Sales may be set aside for fraud and a purchaser who has bought the property and paid a deposit in good faith has an inchoate right which entitles him to a hearing upon the question whether the sale shall be set aside; ° and parol evidence to show a sale at an inadequate price, must be clear especially where .there has been a great lapse of time between the sale and the confirm- ation thereof during which time no adverse bid has been made to the court.' 'Horton v. Sledge, 39 Ala. 498; Ormond b. Martin, 37 Ala. 598; Turnip- seed V. Fitzpatrick, 75 Ala. 304. 2 Young V. Edwards, 33 S. Car. 404; Charleston, etc. R R. Co. ■». Leech, 39 S. Car. 446. 'Hughes «. Hamilton, 19 W. Va. 868; Connell v. Wilhelm, 36 W. Va. 598. * Tracey v. Shumate, 33 W. Va. 474; Kable v. Mitchell, 9 W. Va. 493. 762 CLASSIFICATION OF ESTATE& [§ 735 A sale of land under partition may be set aside where the statute has not been substantially complied with. Thus, if no advertisement has been posted as required by statute, the sale may be set aside, and a purchaser at such sale must be repaid the amount of his purchase-money, with legal interest.' ' Rudderow v. Dudley, 41 N. J. Eq. 611. [end of volume one. J