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The United States and Russia; 
 Their Historical Relations. 
 
 By 
 
 OSCAR S. STRAUS 
 
 Member of the Permanent Court 
 of Arbitration at The Hague 
 
 REPRINTED BY PERMISSION FROM 
 
 THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW 
 
 AUGUST, 190S 
 
 f 
 
GopyriRht 1905 by the 
 
 NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW 
 
 AH rigrhts reserved 
 

 .Ll-.,. 
 
 Cornell University Library 
 E183.8.R9 S91 
 
 The United States and Russia 
 
 olin 
 
 3 1924 032 749 248 
 
 THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA: 
 THEIR HISTORICAL RELATIONS. 
 
 BY OSOAB S. STEAUS, MEMBER OF THE PERMANENT COURT OF ARBI- 
 TRATION AT THE HAGUE. 
 
 Napoleon said : " History is a fiction agreed upoii." This 
 definition is more applicable to diplomatic history than to any 
 branch of the science, for the reason that diplomacy has so many 
 undercurrents whose sources are concealed from the public eye. 
 It is, doubtless, due to the Machiavellian spirit which guided the 
 diplomacy of nations for so many years that, even in the most 
 authoritative histories, we so often find the accounts of diplomatic 
 relations given, not as they were, but as the adroit schemers in- 
 tended they should appear. 
 
 The KishinefE massacres which took place in April, 1903, 
 caused a mighty storm of protest to arise in this country. These 
 protests, voiced by pulpit, press and mass meetings, were resented 
 by the Eussian Ambassador at Washington and by the official 
 classes in St. Petersburg, on the plea that the United States was 
 under repeated obligations of gratitude to Eussia because of her 
 " traditional friendship " for us, from the very beginning of our 
 national history until the present time. Many articles appeared 
 in the daily papers referring to this "traditional friendship," 
 and urging that the American public should at least refrain from 
 siding with the enemies of Eussia, however appalling might be 
 the rule of the Eussian bureaucracy. An article appeared in the 
 leading Eussian paper of St. Petersburg, the " Novoe Vremya," 
 headed " Eussia in America," as follows : 
 
 " The United States from time to time enters the arena of anti- 
 Russian propaganda which finds favorable soil in its politically unripe 
 population, without government traditions, and carried away by the 
 successes of its new imperialistic policy. The Siberian prisons, the 
 
THE yORTB AMEBIOAHf REVIEW. 
 
 Manchurian open door, the Kishineff disorders — all of these serve as 
 pretexts for the anti-Russian meetings so advantageous to Russia's ene- 
 mies, while Secretary Hay's stubborn Anglophilism lends governmental 
 importance to the claims of the various groups of American traders and 
 missionaries in the Far East . . . The Russian Foreign Office should 
 publish in English a sketch of the relations between the Russian and 
 American governments, beginning with the time of Catharine and end- 
 ing with the Spanish-American war." 
 
 When the Monarch was the State, and when the Monarch's 
 attachments, antagonisms or desire for revenge were the con- 
 trolling factors in international relations, the ruler's commands 
 were supreme, and the national conscience had to bend to his will. 
 But, even if the traditional Kussian claim upon the gratitude of 
 the United States were well founded, the enlightened spirit of 
 our age could not recognize that as a plea in bar against our con- 
 demnation of shocking wrongs, or against our withholding our 
 sympathies for the oppressed. 
 
 International relations among modem States are primarily 
 based, not upon sentiment or gratitude, but upon self-interests, 
 modified more or less by a sense of ]'ustice and right. However, 
 we are not here concerned with speculations, but with historical 
 facts. Let us see what these facts are. 
 
 CATHARINE II AOT) THE AMBEIOAN EEVOLUTION. 
 
 Under Catharine II, a scheme was formed in 1779, when we 
 were ia the most trying period of our Eevolution, for Eussia's 
 giving George III effective assistance against us, on condition that 
 the English should aid Eussia in renewed attacks upon the Turks. 
 A part of this programme was, that the Island of Minorca was 
 to be ceded by England to Eussia as a station for the Eussian 
 fleet in the Mediterranean, and as a rendezvous for the insurgent 
 Greeks. This project was drawn up by Catharine's chief adviser. 
 Count PotemMn, for presentation to the British Ambassador at 
 St. Petersburg; but, through the adroitness of Count Panin, 
 Catharine's Minister for Foreign Affairs, who favored the French 
 interest as against the English, the scheme fell through, thereby 
 causing the Empress to adopt the anti-British policy of armed 
 neutrality. The nature of Eussia's friendship for us at this 
 period, when we were most in need of the friendly offices of 
 foreign nations, is disclosed by Benjamin Franklin, who was then 
 in Paris as one of our Commissioners to negotiate peace with 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA. 
 
 Great Britain. He describes with what friendly satisfaction Kus- 
 sia had learned of the recognition of our independence by the 
 States General of Holland. I quote from his journal:* 
 
 "This day" (June 9, 1782), "I received a letter from Mr. Dana 
 dated at St. Petersburg, April 29th, in which is the following passage: 
 ' We yesterday received the news that the States General, on the 19th 
 of this month, acknowledged the independence of the United States. 
 This event gave a shock here, and is not well received, as they at least 
 professed to have flattered themselves that mediation would have pre- 
 vented it, and otherwise brought on a partial peace between Britain 
 and Holland.' " 
 
 Mr. Francis Dana, afterwards Chief Justice of Massachusetts, 
 was at this time our accredited Minister to Eussia. He remained 
 there about two years asking to be recognized ; but Eussia refused 
 to receive him or to recognize the independence of our country, 
 and this, too, although nine months before the preliminaries of 
 peace had been signed. At last Dana, in September, 1783, being 
 unsuccessful in his efEorts to secure recognition, or to have Eussia 
 recognize the independence of our country, obtained permission 
 from Congress to return home. 
 
 Some years ago, when Eugene Schuyler was Secretary of Lega- 
 tion at St. Petersburg, he made some investigation for George 
 Bancroft, the historian, and copied and translated some of the 
 diplomatic correspondence under the reign of Catharine II.-j- At 
 this time Coimt Osterman was Vice-Chancellor, and Prince 
 Demetri Galitzen was Eussian Ambassador at the Hague. In- 
 formation reached St. Petersburg from the Eussian Ambassador 
 that Mr. Adams had been received as TJnited States Minister. 
 The Vice-Chancellor writes to the Ambassador (May 6, 1783) : 
 
 "Now that their High Mightinesses have proceeded to the formal 
 recognition of Mr. Adams as Minister Plenipotentiary from the 
 United States, I must instruct you that Her Imperial Highness does 
 not wish any demonstration on your part that can lead to the pre- 
 sumption that she approves of this step. You must then abstain from 
 receiving or paying visits either to Mr. Adams, or to any other person 
 accredited from the Colonies which are separating from Great Britain." 
 
 As a further evidence of Catharine's feeling towards America, 
 I will cite the following: About this time a portrait of Wash- 
 
 * Franklin's Works, edited by Bigelow, vol. 8, p. 89. 
 t See Bancroft papers, America, Russia and England, vol. 2, Lenox 
 Library. 
 
THE NORTH AMEBWAN REVIEW. 
 
 ington was sent from the Hague in the Eussian despatch-bag to 
 Francis Dana, who was then at St. Petersburg, doubtless as a 
 courtesy to Mr. Adams. On the receipt of the bag at the Eussian 
 Foreign Office, Count Osterman. returned the portrait to Prince 
 Oalitzen, the Ambassador at The Hague, with a sharp letter in 
 which he says : " With your despatch came a portrait of Washing- 
 ton to be delivered to one Dana, an American gentleman here, 
 but as this man is not known to Her Imperial Majesty or Her 
 ministry, you are commanded by Her Majesty to return it to the 
 source from which it reached the courier, together with documents 
 accompanying it." 
 
 Prom the same source we learn that, on May 15th, 1780, Sir 
 James Harris, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, writing to 
 Viscount Stormont, the British Secretary of State, after referring 
 to an interview he had with Prince Potemkin, stated that the 
 Prince suggested that the Secretary of State should ask the 
 Empress to mediate between Great Britain and her enemies, and 
 to acquaint her "with the terms on which you wish for an ac- 
 commodation for America . . . and you may depend not only on 
 her not betraying you, but be almost certain that she will begin 
 by being your mediator, and, if she does not succeed, end by being 
 your ally."* This throws a direct light upon the motives under- 
 lying Catharine's desire to become a mediator which has been 
 made much of even by some American historians. John Piske, 
 in his " American Eevolution," says : 
 
 " At the beginning of 1778, Sir James Harris, afterwards Earl of 
 Malmesbury, was sent as Ambassador to St. Petersburg, with instructions 
 to leave no stone unturned to secure an offensive and defensive alliance 
 between Russia and Great Britain, in order to offset and neutralize the 
 alliance between France and the United States. Negotiations to this 
 end were kept up as long as the War lasted, but they proved fruitless. 
 While Catharine coquetted and temporized, the Prussian Ambassador 
 had her ear. . . . The weight of France was, of course, thrown into the 
 same scale, and for four years the Eussian Court was the scene of 
 brisk and multifarious intrigues. , . . From Prince Potemkin, one of 
 Catharine's lovers, whose favor Harris courted, he learned that nothing 
 short of the cession of Minorca would induce the Empress to enter into 
 this desired alliance. Russia was already taking advantage of the sit- 
 uation to overrun and annex the Crimea; and the maritime outlook, thus 
 acquired, made her eager to secure some naval station on the Mediterra- 
 nean. Minorca was England's to give. ... It was not, however, until 
 
 • Bancroft papers, vol. 2. 
 
THE UTflTBD 8TATEB AND RUSSIA. 
 
 1781 that the oflFer of Minorca was made, and then Catharine had so far 
 acceded to the general combination against England that she could not 
 but refuse it."* 
 
 Before this time, in I'l'^G, as there were very close relations 
 existing between Great Britain and Eussia, it was very much 
 feared that Great Britain would be able to draw troops from Eus- 
 sia to serve against the Colonies. That there was ground for 
 this fear is evidenced by a resolution, passed by the Continental 
 Congress (December 30th, 1776), instructing our commissioners 
 ia Europe to guard against this contingency. The resolution is 
 as follows: 
 
 " That the commissioners be respectively directed to use every means 
 in their power . . . for preventing German, Russian and other foreign 
 troops from being sent to America for hostile purposes."t 
 
 General Sir William Howe wrote from New York (November 
 30th, 1776) to Lord George Germain that a reinforcement of 
 15,000 troops was needed, " which I hope may be had from Eussia, 
 or from Hanover, or from other German States.";}: 
 
 Theodore Lyman, the best of our early writers on our diplom- 
 acy, says in reference to Dana's mission at St. Petersburg, and 
 the refusal of the Empress to recognize him, that the conditions 
 upon which she undertook to receive Dana were more severe than 
 England herself exacted : 
 
 "They amounted to this: ' Strike off seven years of your independence; 
 confess that you owe your independence to the English acknowledgment; 
 annul all acts of sovereignty prior to that time — all Commissioners and 
 Ministers — treaties with France and Holland; and then you will be in 
 a condition to present yourself at the Court of St. Petersburg.' "§ 
 
 The Continental Congress, in sending Dana to St. Petersburg, 
 hoped to enter into the armed neutrality which Eussia was 
 organizing; but, as Dana was absolutely ignored. Congress, in 
 May, 1783, adopted a resolution to the effect that, though it ap- 
 
 * John Fiske, " The American Revolution," New York, 1897, vol. 2^ 
 p. 143. W. Eton, in "A Survey of the Turkish Empire" (London. 
 1798), says: "The Empress, and particularly Potemkin, were very 
 anxious to obtain from His Majesty a cession of the Island of Minorca, 
 which was intended as a station for her fleet, and a rendezvous for th« 
 Greeks," p. 423. 
 
 See also Diaries and Correspondence of Sir James Harris, First Ear 
 of Malmesbury, vol. 1, pp. 345, 359, 363, etc. 
 
 t American Archives, fourth series, vol. 3, p. 1617. 
 
 t Id., p. 926. 
 
 § " Diplomacy of the United States," by Theodore Lyman, Jr., vol. 1 
 
TEE NORTH AMEBIOAN REVIEW. 
 
 proved the principles of armed neutrality founded on the liberal 
 basis of a maintenance of the rights of neutral nations and of the 
 privileges of commerce, yet they are unwilling at this juncture to 
 become a party to a Confederacy which may hereafter too far 
 complicate the interests of the United States with the politics of 
 Europe. This resolution is in reality the foundation of the policy 
 which has controlled the foreign relations of the United States, 
 and it was subsequently formulated by Washington in the lan- 
 guage so familiar to American ears, " Friendly relations with all, 
 entangling alliances with none." As Lyman says, this is the only 
 instance in the history of the country in which the United States 
 volunteered, themselves, to become a party to a league of 
 sovereigns in Europe. While the principles adopted by the 
 Northern Confederacy were exceedingly grateful to the American 
 government, and a proposal to join it was considered an effectual 
 mode of hastening the acknowledgment of independence, in 
 reality it was fortunate that Dana did not succeed in his mission. 
 Francis Wharton, the editor of the "Diplomatic Eevolutionary 
 Correspondence," concludes : " That Catharine was resolutely 
 averse to the American cause until after the definitive peace, 
 there is now no question."* 
 
 THE WAR OF 1812. 
 
 Reference is frequently made to the Russian offer of mediation 
 in 1813 to procure a peace between the United States and Great 
 Britain, and this incident is cited as a proof of Russia's friendly 
 interest in the welfare of our country. It must be remembered, 
 however, that at that time she was closely leagued with England 
 in the sixth celebrated coalition against France. The trade of the 
 Baltic was greatly embarrassed, and the Russian Emperor looked 
 upon this war with great regret as opposing the commercial pros- 
 perity of the Russian nation. 
 
 M. de Daschkofl, the Russian Minister, said: 
 
 " The peace of Russia with England seemed to present this immense 
 advantage to the commerce of nearly all seafaring people, that it freed 
 their relations from that constraint, from that continual vexation to 
 which it had been subjected for many years without interruption."t 
 
 * See " Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States,"' 
 edited, under the direction of Congress, by Francis Wharton (Govern- 
 ment Printing-office), vol. 6, pp. 213, 425; vol. 1, p. 265, etc. 
 
 t Lyman's Diplomacy, vol. 1, p. 436. 
 
THE UNITBD 8TATEB AND BUBBIA. 
 
 The mediation was declined by Great Britain. Eussia was at 
 that time in alliance with England, her interests were to do all 
 in her power to bring about peace for the benefit of her com- 
 merce. In view of these facts, it can hardly be claimed that she 
 was actuated by the spirit of friendship for the United States in 
 hei^ desire to become mediatM. On- the contrary, tne real explana- 
 tion of her friendly interest lies in the fact that, Alexander being 
 at that time in alliance with England to counteract the power 
 of Napoleon and fearing an attack from him, Eussia naturally 
 desired that her ally, England, should be freed as speedily as 
 possible from the American war, so that she might give her aid 
 to Eussia in repelling Napoleon. This view of Eussia's interest 
 was confirmed by Eobert Goodloe Harper, United States Senator 
 fAm Maryland, in his speech in Philadelphia in 1813. He said : 
 
 "England and Russia therefore stood alone. England could spare 
 nothing for the direct assistance of Russia except the cooperation of a 
 fleet in the Baltic. Such was the situation of Europe about the moment 
 of attack; and the war which, at the same moment, was declared by the 
 United States against England was so timed, whatever might have been 
 the intention of the authors, as to have the effect of direct and not in- 
 considerable cooperation with France. . . . This was a great loss to 
 Russia."* 
 
 EUSSIA AND THE CIVIL WAB. 
 
 Frequent reference is made to Eussia's friendly attitude to us 
 during the Civil War, and to her sending several war-ships to the 
 Atlantic and to the Pacific with " Sealed Instructions." Much 
 has been made of this, but, even if such instructions existed, is 
 there any basis for the conclusion that they were for any other 
 purpose than to offset England — in other words, that her actions 
 towards us, even during the Civil War, were but moves made by 
 her upon the chessboard of European diplomacy ? 
 
 A recent writer, referring to this, says that Prince Gortcha- 
 koff, the Chancellor of the Empire, had demanded from the 
 Signatory Powers of the Treaty of Paris (1856) the abrogation 
 of the clause of the Treaty which prohibited Eussia from main- 
 taining an armed navy in the Black Sea. England and France 
 strongly opposed this. The Chancellor, in reply, sent what came 
 very near to being an ultimatum, and, fearing that this act 
 
 • Harper's Speech. Pamphlet — Commemoration of Russian Victories 
 (Philadelphia, 1813). 
 
THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW. 
 
 would be followed by hostilities, despatched a portion, of his fleet 
 into neutral waters, so that it would not be bottled up for de- 
 struction, as had once been the case when Eussia's fleet was in the 
 harbor of Sebastopol. This same writer states that Russia at that 
 time was without an ally in Europe, that Nihilism was rampant, 
 that the nobility was secretly plotting against the life and throne 
 of the Tsar, and that the fleet was sent to the American waters 
 for its own. protection, and uot for the benefit of the United 
 States.* Be that as it may, why was the knowledge of the exist- 
 ence of such instructions kept from our Government, and why 
 do not the records disclose, as would be natural under such cir- 
 cumstances, what those mysterious " Sealed Instructions " were, 
 and what purpose the ships were to serve ? That Eussia was our 
 friend during the Civil War, in the same way as almost all other 
 European Powers were our friends, is entirely true. Turkey was 
 among the first of the Powers to show positive friendship for us 
 during the Civil War. She interdicted pirates in the service of 
 the Confederacy from making depredations upon the commerce 
 of our country in the ports of the Turkish Empire. This was 
 recognized by Secretary Seward in his despatch to E. Joy Morris, 
 then our Minister to Turkey; on June 3nd, 1863, he wrote: 
 
 " The President received with profound satisfaction the decree of His 
 Majesty the Sultan interdicting the entrance of pirates engaged in 
 depredating upon our commerce in the ports of Turkey. . . . Nor is the 
 proceeding any the less entitled to our grateful acknowledgments be- 
 cause the piratical operations of the insurgents, such as they have been, 
 have already been brought to an end. It will, on the contrary, be to the 
 honor of the Sultan that he took the lead in conceding to the United 
 States rights which it is now expected will soon be conceded by all the 
 other maritime Powers . . . The Turkish Government has been singu- 
 larly just and liberal towards us in this emergency." 
 
 That the Eussian squadron came here in 1863 on a mission 
 to aid the United States is both an afterthought and a myth. If 
 the squadron had come here upon any such mission, would not 
 our Government have placed on record its acknowledgment for 
 this great act of friendship ? On the contrary, Russia "was very 
 profuse in the expression of her thanks to us for the hospitable 
 reception given to the fleet and its officers. 
 
 Cassius M. Clay, our Minister to St. Petersburg, in his despatch 
 
 * Pamphlet — " A Brief Review of Eussia's Relations with America," 
 by a Russian- American Diplomat (Washington, 1903). 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA. 
 
 to Secretary Seward of November 8th, 1863, said that His 
 Majesty the Emperor was " now absent, but no doubt he would 
 on his return make suitable acknowledgments to our Govern- 
 ment of the amicable reception of his subjects at New York": 
 that the Eussian officers had " always been gratified to meet those 
 of the American Navy, and they should be most happy, should 
 any ships of war visit Cronstadt, to reciprocate the late courtesies 
 extended to their countrymen." 
 
 When the Russian fleet arrived, Gideon Welles, the Secretary of 
 the Navy, wrote to Mr. Stoeckl, the Eussian Minister at Washing- 
 ton, a letter which shows that the visit was one of courtesy only : 
 
 Navy Department, September 23rd, 1863. 
 
 " The Department is much gratified to learn that a squadron of Rus- 
 sian war-vessels is at present o£f the harbor of New York, with the inten- 
 tion, it is supposed, of visiting that city. The presence in our waters of 
 a squadron belonging to His Imperial Majesty's navy cannot but be a 
 source of pleasure and happiness to our countrymen [sic]. I beg that 
 you will make known to the Admiral in command that the facilities of 
 the Brooklyn Navy-yard are at his disposal for any repairs that the 
 vessels of his squadron may need, and that any other required assistance 
 will be gladly extended. 
 
 " I avail myself of this occasion to extend through you to the officers 
 of His Majesty's squadron a cordial invitation to visit the Navy-yard. 
 I do not hesitate to say that it will give Rear-Admiral Paulding very 
 great pleasure to show them the vessels and other objects of interest at 
 the Naval station imder his command."* 
 
 After our Minister met the Emperor, he again reported to Mr. 
 Seward, on August 32nd, 1864, as follows: 
 
 " His Majesty told me that he had allowed his officers lately in the 
 United States to call upon me en masse, and express their gratitude for 
 the courtesies extended to them in America, all of which was evidently 
 as a national compliment." 
 
 Prance endeavored to bring about a joint mediation, and in- 
 vited Eussia and England to unite with her in the attempt, and 
 Eussia refused; but that refusal was given after, and not before, 
 England had refused. Bayard Taylor, who was acting as Charg6 
 at St. Petersburg, in a despatch, dated November 15th, 1863, to 
 Secretary Seward, confirms this. He wrote : 
 
 " While I infer from the above that Russia would, to a certain extent, 
 be inclined to take part in a movement which she foresaw to be inevitable 
 
 * This letter from the files of the Navy Department was published in 
 the New York " Evening Post," April 18th, 1904. 
 
THE NORTH AUEBIOAIH REVIEW. 
 
 on the part of England and France, rather than permit a coalition be- 
 tween these two Powers from which she should be wholly excluded, the 
 probable refusal of the English Government, announced to-day by tele- 
 graph, relieves me from all apprehension of complications that might 
 arise from the proposition. I stated to Prince GortehakoflF, at our recent 
 interview, my belief that England would not accede, and am very glad 
 to find it so soon confirmed." 
 
 Further corroboration of this view is contaiaed in a later des- 
 patch from Mr. Taylor to Secretary Seward, under date of Decem- 
 ber 17th, 1862, in which he said: 
 
 " Mr. Adams having communicated, io answer to my confidential letter, 
 aa encouraging statement of the present attitude of England, I took 
 occasion, in an interview which I had with Prince Gortchakoff last week, 
 to read him some portions of it. This led to a renewed conversation upon 
 American affairs, and it was very soon evident to me that the anxiety 
 which His Excellency had manifested on previous occasions was begin- 
 ning to subside. He still inquired whether some arrangement with the 
 insurgents which would put an end to the war was not possible." 
 
 Henry Clews, in an article in this Eeview in 1904, published 
 a letter to him from Mr. Gladstone touching upon the attitude 
 of the English Cabinet during our Civil War, which completely 
 refutes the claim that England would have intervened in favor 
 of the Confederacy but for the friendship of Kussia towards us. 
 The letter bears date May 30th, 1889, and is as follows : 
 
 " As a member of it [the English Cabinet], and now nearly its sole 
 surviving member, I can state it never at any time dealt with the sub- 
 ject of recognizing the Southern States in your great Civil War, except 
 when it learned the proposition of the Emperor Napoleon III, and de- 
 clined to entertain that proposition without qualification, hesitation, 
 delay, or dissent. In the debate which took place on Mr. Roebuck's pro- 
 posal for that negotiation. Lord Russell took no part, and could take 
 none, as he was a member of the House of Lords. I spoke for the 
 Cabinet. You will, I am sure, be glad to learn that there is no founda- 
 tion for a charge which, had it been true, might have aided in keeping 
 alive angry sentiments happily gone by." 
 
 THE FRIENDSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES FOR RUSSIA DURING THE 
 POLISH INSURRECTION. 
 
 But there is another side to this story, which, to use a common 
 phrase, puts the boot on the other leg. 
 
 In the beginning of 1863, affairs in Eussia were in a very pre- 
 carious state. An insurrection in Poland had broken out to such 
 a degree that considerable agitation was felt in all Europe. The 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA. 
 
 French Minister of Foreign Affairs invited Great Britain, and 
 subsequently the United States, to join with France in bringing 
 about the cessation of hostilities. 
 
 In accordance with our policy of strict neutrality and of not 
 mixing with the affairs of European States, Mr. Seward gave a 
 courteous declination to this invitation. This declination pro- 
 duced such satisfaction in Kussia that Prince Gortchakoff pub- 
 lished his reply to our Minister in the Eussian press. I will quote 
 a few passages therefrom : 
 
 " May 22nd, 1863 — I lost no time in laying before the Emperor, my 
 august master, the despatch which you have communicated to me by order 
 of your Government, and which contains the answer of Mr. Seward to 
 Mr. Dayton, relative to the recent application of the French Government 
 upon the subject of events in the Kingdom of Poland. His Majesty the 
 Emperor has been sensibly moved by the sentiments of confidence which 
 the Government of the United States places in his views and designs in 
 regard to the general well-being of his Empire. Such manifestations 
 must strengthen the bonds of mutual sympathy which unite the two 
 countries, and constitute a consummation which too much accords with 
 the aspirations of the Emperor His Majesty not to look upon it with 
 pleasure." 
 
 The insurrection in Poland at that time was occupying much 
 more of the attention of the Cabinets of Europe, including Eus- 
 sia, than our Civil War. Our Minister in Paris, Mr. Dayton, in 
 his despatch to Mr. Seward of February 23rd, 1863, reports: 
 
 "The insurrection of Poland has driven American affairs out of view 
 for the moment. A disturbance on the Continent, especially in Central 
 Europe, is so near at hand, and touches the interests of so many of the 
 crowned heads of these countries, that distant events fall out of sight 
 until these more immediate troubles are settled." 
 
 Minister Clay, in his despatch of November 8th, 1863, says: 
 " The Eussian reception in American waters is the subject of conversa- 
 tion in all circles; and the gentry and the common people seem alike to 
 understand and feel the friendly demonstration made at this time, when 
 France, England and Austria are attempting, under the pretence of 
 national justice, to put them under the ban of Christendom for defending 
 the integrity of their Empire."* 
 
 THE AlASKAN PURCHASE. 
 
 It has frequently been claimed by Eussia that her sale to us of 
 Alaska was made out of friendship for this country. That is 
 another myth. 
 
 * Foreign Relations, 1863, MS. Archives, Department of State. 
 
TEE NORTH AMEKIOAN REVIEW. 
 
 Charles Sumner, who was chairman of the Committee on 
 Foreign Affairs in the Senate when the Alaska treaty came up 
 for ratification, in his great speech ia support of the treaty, under 
 the heading " Eeasons for Cession by Kussia," said : 
 
 " Turning from the question of title which time and testimony have 
 already settled, I meet the inquiry, Why does Bussia part with posses- 
 sions associated with the reign of her greatest ruler and filling an im- 
 portant chapter of geographical history? Here I am without information 
 not open to others. 
 
 " But I do not forget that the First Napoleon, in parting with Louisi- 
 ana, was controlled by three several considerations. First, he needed the 
 purchase-money for his treasury. Secondly, he was unwilling to leave 
 this distant unguarded territory a prey to Great Britain, in the event of 
 hostilities, which seemed at hand. And, thirdly, he was glad, according to 
 his own remarkable language, ' to establish forever the power of the 
 United States, and give to England a maritime rival that would sooner or 
 later humble her pride.' 
 
 " Such is the record of history. Perhaps a similar record may be made 
 hereafter with regard to the present cession. There is reason to imagine 
 that Russia, with all her great empire, is financially poor, so that these 
 few millions may not be unimportant to her. ... It will be for her ad- 
 vantage not to hold outlying possessions from which thus far she has 
 obtained no income commensurate with the possible expense for her 
 protection." 
 
 Sumner, the statesman and the author of " Prophetic Voices 
 Concerning America," was certainly correct and almost prophetic 
 in this instance, for, with the acquisition of Alaska, the United 
 States did undoubtedly purchase serious and threatening boun- 
 dary and fishery complications with Great Britain, which were 
 only recently happily settled by arbitration. 
 
 RUSSIA AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 It will be remembered that Eussia was the dominant Power in 
 the so-called " Holy Alliance," whose purpose was to suppress all 
 forms of popular uprisings, to crush the spirit of liberty in the 
 Central and South American Eepublics, and ultimately, as a 
 logical consequence, to dominate a large part, if not the whole, 
 of the American Continent. 
 
 Eussia's relations to the Monroe Doctrine were not confined 
 to her primacy in the " Holy Alliance." In the autumn of 1818, 
 J. B. Provost, the American Commissioner who had been sent out 
 by the President to receive the formal delivery of Astoria, stopped 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA. 
 
 on his return at the port of Monterey, in California, and while 
 there prepared the report of his mission. In this report he in- 
 f onhed the President of an incident he regarded as most serious — 
 which was that, until 1816, the Eussians had no settlement south 
 of the fifty-fifth degree. But in that year, very probably because 
 of Humboldf s glowing description of that region, she. had estab- 
 lished two colonies, one at Atooi in the Sandwich Islands, and 
 the other on the coast of California, a few leagues from San 
 Francisco. ^ 
 
 In February, 1^33, the Eusjian Minister at Washington, 
 Chevalier Pierre de Politica, placed in the hands of tte Secre- 
 tary of State an edict of the Emperor Alexander to the effect 
 that all rights of commerce, industry and fishing on th^North- 
 west coast of America, from Behring Straits to the fifty-first 
 degree, were exclusively granted to Eussian subjects.. Foreign 
 vessels were, therefore, not only not to land on the coast and 
 islands, but not even to come within one hundred Italia:u^iles. 
 The subject was renewed by Politica's successor. Baron d^.'Juyl; 
 and, one day in July, 1823, when he called at the State, Depart- 
 ment, Adams announced to him "that we should contest the 
 right of Eussia to any territorial establishment on this continent, 
 and that we should assume distinctly the principle that the Amer- 
 ican continents are no longer subjects for any European colonial 
 establishments." 
 
 According to McMaster, from whose excellent chapter on the 
 Monroe Doctrine I have drawn largely in this statement, when 
 the time came for Monroe to write his annual message to Con- 
 gress, there were three distinct matters that required the Presi- 
 dent's serious attention : "the attempt of Eussia to colonize ia 
 California and her selection of the fifty-first degree of north 
 latitude as the southern boundary of Alaska; the threatened in- 
 tervention of the Holy Alliance in the affairs of South-American 
 Eepublics; and the proposition of Canning for a joint declara- 
 tion against them."* The Cabinet held meeting after meeting 
 to discuss these matters; they had before them the opinions of 
 the two living ex-Presidents, Jefferson and Madison. What was 
 done Adams himself best describes: 
 
 " I remarked that the communications recently received from the 
 Russian Minister,. Baron de Tuyl, afforded, I thought, a very suitable 
 * " With the Fathers," by John Bach McMaster, pp. 1-54. 
 
TEE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW. 
 
 and convenient opportunity for ub to take our stand against the Holy 
 Alliance, and at the same time to decline the overture of Great Britain. 
 It would be more candid, as well as more dignified, to avow our prin- 
 ciples explicitly to Russia and France, than to come in as a cockboat in 
 the wake of the British man-of-war. This idea was acquiesced in on all 
 sides." 
 
 It follows as a conclusion that such reasons for gratitude as we 
 may have to Eussia are not for her friendly, but for her hostile, 
 attitude towards us, in that these important incidents were mainly 
 the cause of our formulating and announcing to the world our far- 
 seeing continental policy. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 I have endeavored to present briefly the results of a careful 
 examination of all accessible authentic and reliable data bearing 
 upon the relations of the two countries, from the reign of Em- 
 press Catharine II to the present time. The inferences and con- 
 clusions from these facts are clear, that, with the exception of 
 Eussia's hostile or unfriendly attitude during the earlier years of 
 our history, when the United States was struggling for recogni- 
 tion as an independent nation, and the " Holy Alliance " incident, 
 the relations between Eussia and the United States have been 
 uniformly normal and friendly; each nation, as against the other, 
 on all occasions and during periods of war, has strictly observed 
 its neutral obligations, as was incumbent upon it under the laws 
 of nations between friendly Powers. To infer that the United 
 States is imder obligations of gratitude to Eussia for any special 
 acts of friendship shown, other than such as the laws of neu- 
 trality have imposed, is to substitute a myth and the fulsome 
 language of ceremonial functions for historical facts. 
 
 OsoAE S. Straus.