TRANSLATED W 
 
 J E. GORDON- CUMMING 
 
Cornell University 
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Cornell University Library 
 VI 03 .C48 1887 
 
 Naval reform. 
 
 olin 
 
 3 1924 030 751 691 
 
NAVAL EEFOEM. 
 
 FEOM THE FEENCH OF THE LATE 
 M. GABEIEL CHAEMBS. 
 
 TRANSLATED BY 
 
 J. E. GORDON-GUMMING. 
 
 LONDON: 
 W. H. ALLEN & CO., 13 WATERLOO PLACE. S.W. 
 
 1887. 
 
 {AUxights reserved.) 
 
LONDON ; 
 PRINTED BY W. H. ALLEN AND CO., IS WATERLOO PLACE. 
 
THE PEEFACE 
 
 OF 
 
 M. GABRIEL CHARMBS. 
 
 The following is a summary of two years' discussion 
 sustained in the press upon what is, in my opinion, the all- 
 important question of the reform of the navy. I will 
 explain rapidly what is to be understood by this word 
 "reform." In the midst of the innumerable discussions 
 into which I have allowed myself to be drawn, I have 
 sometimes strayed amidst details, and lingered amongst 
 incidents. I have faced the naval problem in all its 
 aspects, so as to give rise to the least possible objections ; 
 I have made a point of examining and relating everything, 
 and from this may have resulted a certain amount of 
 confusion. Those who opposed the ideas which I de- 
 fended, accused me of attaching undue importance to the 
 torpedo, and asserted that, dazzled by the first success of 
 autonomous torpedo-boats, I had proposed that in the 
 future our fleets should be entirely composed of those 
 small boats. These would, however, lose all reason for 
 their existence where they had no larger vessels to con- 
 tend against. I was held up as the exclusive, violent, 
 and determiiied. partizan of a weapon, doubtless decisive. 
 
IV NAVAL EEFORM. 
 
 but in favour of which all others could not be imme- 
 diately sacrificed ; for they might still have their use and 
 value, as well as the new-comer. I may, perhaps, be 
 permitted to affirm that this way of judging the naval 
 campaign I have undertaken, is absolutely inexact. Even 
 if, as a few years back, the torpedo were still in a rudi- 
 mentary condition, even were the autonomous torpedoes 
 still untried, even had they not shown those naval and 
 military qualities which have surprised the whole world, 
 I should none the less demand the reform of naval war- 
 fare. Long before the late discoveries which have so 
 seriously modified the conditions of naval tactics, I held 
 that the present organisation of the maritime forces of the 
 great European nations was based upon a false and 
 dangerous principle, the principle of concentrating all 
 the fighting unities upon one ship. I have risen against 
 this principle ; I have attacked it, not merely, as may be 
 imagined, in favour of the torpedo, but in favour of an 
 opposite principle which triumphed long ago in the army, 
 and which will eventually triumph in the navy — the prin- 
 ciple of division of labour. The problem I have laid 
 down and endeavoured to solve is not merely to ascertain 
 whether the torpedo-boat will sink the ironclad, or 
 whether the ironclad will resist the torpedo-boat. How- 
 ever weighty this problem may be, whatever may result 
 from it, I consider another to be still more weighty, and 
 it may be put in the following way : Is it wise to continue 
 the construction of giant ships, more or less armour-plated 
 with their accumulated weapons of attack and defence 
 which can only be developed to the hurt of each other • 
 er-i» it not preferable to devote a special boat to each 
 
PREFACE. V 
 
 weapon, so as to bring the efficiency of each one to its 
 maximum. These giant ships must always labour under 
 the disadvantage of inferior speed; now, speed has 
 become the governing quality of the man-of-war. Would 
 it not, therefore, be advisable to replace the defensive 
 strength at present found in armour-plating by numerical 
 superiority, by speed, and relative invulnerability, to be 
 obtained by means of the smallest possible dimensions ? 
 
 The torpedo has been erroneously taken as the starting 
 point in that naval revolution I wish to see accomplished. 
 Certainly it furnishes a considerable argument for those 
 who are opposed to ironclads, but division of labour had 
 its staunch supporters in the navy long before the torpedo 
 made its startling apparition upon the seas. I have often 
 cited Admiral Aube as the eloquent precursor of an idea 
 which must, ere long, prove triumphant. At the height 
 of the rage for ironclads, he was not singular in foreseeing 
 the time when multiplied and simpler instruments of war- 
 fare should replace them. The construction of a floating 
 gun-carriage, the " Tromblon," may have been the 
 starting-point for the change I now advocate in naval 
 science. Not that the " Tromblon " was worth much, but 
 the trial made was a first attempt in favour of this pro- 
 gramme : to replace the ironclad, a vessel with several 
 aims and essentially complex, very expensive, and pos- 
 sessed of very moderate speed, by a great number of 
 special boats, gun-boats, rams, cruisers, &c., and to give 
 to these boats, each constructed for one sole and special 
 purpose, the greatest possible speed ; in one word, to 
 divide labour so as to improve it, and produce it cheaper. 
 Truly the realisation of so excellent a programme at that 
 
VI NAVAL REFORM. 
 
 time might well appear difficult. The great merit of the 
 torpedo lies, however, in having made it as simple as it is 
 necessary. Thanks to this new weapon, a complete coastal 
 defence can be organised with small, light boats, swift, 
 and moderate in cost. With these small boats, slightly 
 enlarged, even squadrons may be attacked in the open, 
 and forced to take refuge in the ports. Henceforward all 
 obstacles are removed. Number and speed will con- 
 stitute the offensive strength. Defensive strength will be 
 obtained by speed and small dimensions, and, thanks to 
 this, all that can be hoped for as to invulnerability in a 
 man-of-war will be obtained. Thus the torpedo was not 
 the origin, but the striking confirmation of ideas held by 
 many of the foremost naval men before I held them, as to 
 the organisation of the naval forces of a great nation, and 
 these ideas had even begun to be put into execution. 
 Their notion and mine was that speed should be the 
 principal factor to be considered in the construction of 
 any ship, and, after speed, small dimensions, which should 
 permit of a greater number. In a word, they held that 
 what chiefly ought to be considered in studying the 
 pattern of a boat, was the object it was to fulfil ; and 
 next, that the minimum boat capable of fulfilling this 
 purpose should be sought out. But from the moment 
 that the torpedo is sufficient for warfare between ships — 
 and the fine feats of arms at Fowchow and Shaipoo, 
 added to the experiments of every European navy, have 
 abundantly demonstrated this — one may be allowed to ask 
 of what further use are those monster guns with dimen- 
 sions keeping pace with the thickness of the armour- 
 plating? Will they be of any use in squadron warfare? 
 
PREFACE. Vll 
 
 No ; for the torpedo will decide the issue. Will they at 
 least be employed to bombard strongholds, to reduce 
 Malta or Gibraltar ? They might be ; but we sincerely 
 wonder in what direction the assailant would profit. To 
 begin with, the great ironclads would infallibly come to 
 grief in this operation if, whilst enveloped in the cloud of 
 smoke fatally inseparable from a bombardment, torpedo- 
 boats concealed by this cloud were to come and sink them, 
 together with their formidable artillery. And why attack 
 fortresses when naval warfare aims not so much at the 
 destruction of the military power of the enemy, as at the 
 annihilation of its financial and commercial power and 
 riches ? 
 
 Privateering warfare and coast warfare would lead 
 much more certainly to this result than the siege of 
 fortified places. Would not the ruin of Marseilles, or 
 the capture of the vessels belonging to our commercial 
 companies, be much more fatal to us than the destruction 
 of certain ports around Toulon, or the scattering of our 
 armour-clad squadron ? For privateering and coast- 
 warfare, for capturing ships or commercial towns, the 
 monster is useless ; a light gun, placed upon as rapid and 
 small a boat as possible, will suffice. I have adopted the 
 gun of 14 centimetres for my purpose in the ensuing work. 
 To be more precise, I have indicated under what con- 
 ditions a gun-boat, carrying two guns of this calibre, 
 should be constructed. I have certainly not pretended to 
 trespass on the domain of engineers, or to present indis- 
 putable figures to the public. I have, on the contrary, 
 owned my entire incompetence in matters of construc- 
 tion. I have limited myself to demanding speed as an 
 
Vlll NAVAL EEFOEM. 
 
 offensive weapon for gun-boats of 14 centimetres, as well as 
 for torpedo-boats ; and speed and limited dimensions for 
 them as a defensive weapon. 
 
 To this add nmnerical superiority ; for it is no less 
 essential than the rest. With numbers, every assault may 
 be attempted ; when numbers fail, refuge may be taken in 
 flight, and this can only be done by possessing superior 
 speed. The Chinese cruisers proved the truth of these 
 theories, for our squadron, although so brilliantly led, 
 could not come up to them at Ning-Poo ; although few in 
 number, they escaped us by their speed ; had they num- 
 bered strong enough, they could have passed through our 
 fleet, sunk our slow-going transports, jeered at our iron- 
 clads, severally surrounded, besieged, and destroyed our 
 slow and worthless ships. I cannot insist enough upon 
 these ideas, and they are, again, quite independent of the 
 torpedo. The torpedo is an admirable weapon, the most 
 destructive that we at present possess ; but we can fore- 
 see that it will be superseded, in a perhaps not far distant 
 future, by some still more decisive engine. Numerous 
 experiments in America seem to indicate that the day is 
 not far off when shells charged with nitro-glycerine will 
 be easily handled and discharged. From that moment 
 superior results, with very small guns, will be obtainable 
 over those with monster guns. It is said that a shell is in 
 process of invention in other quarters which, glancing 
 along the ship's side, will, at a given depth, burst in her 
 vital parts. All these inventions are no longer mere pro- 
 mises ; they are almost realities, and will render the 
 resisting power of ironclads still more illusory. But, sup- 
 posing it to be an error to believe in them, supposing even 
 
PREFACE. IX 
 
 that the torpedo is, as asserted by Admiral Peyron, less 
 efficacious than all experiments have hitherto gone to 
 prove, and that the ironclad ought to be preserved, there 
 is still no reason why the principle of division of labour 
 should be rejected, or why we should persist in the con- 
 centration of all our offensive and defensive weapons on 
 one ship. 
 
 We should, none the less, endeavour to reduce the size 
 of our ships, so as to have the greatest number possible, 
 and we should specialise their armament, that their means 
 of attack and defence should not interfere with each other, 
 and that their speed should not be sacrificed to a less im- 
 portant quality. If guns of 32 centimetres are insisted 
 iipon, a ship should be adopted of the ironclad type, with 
 the required armour, but manned with only one of these 
 guns. In this way we should obtain more ships for the 
 same price. It is true that they would carry fewer guns, 
 but artillery is not the most essential weapon. Before 
 artillery we emphatically place speed. Whatever number 
 of guns a ship may carry, it can make no use of them, 
 when in action, against an enemy possessing greater 
 speed. 
 
 To put many guns on a slow ship means to build an 
 enormous vessel, costing a great deal, easily attacked, 
 owing to its enoi'mous dimensions, but unable to use all 
 its armament. A simpler pattern is a hundred-fold pre- 
 ferable. It might risk being disabled by a lucky shot : 
 but, to annihilate a whole squadron composed of such ships, 
 as many lucky shots would be required as there were ships 
 in_ the squadron, and, whatever people may say, lucky 
 shots are not the rule. It is strange that it should be so 
 
X NAVAL BEPORM. 
 
 difficult, in the navy, to bow before the great law of divi- 
 sion of labour, which asserts itself everywhere else by the 
 light of evidence. Surely it ought to find a place here, 
 if anywhere. The weapons of warfare become more com- 
 plicated and delicate the further we advance. This is so 
 true that the need of creating more strict specialities for 
 men and officers is perpetually felt. In olden times the 
 same man worked at everything, now there are endless 
 categoi'ies : some are topmen, others signalmen, riflemen, 
 mechanics, gunnei's, or torpedo-men, and among the latter 
 there are even distinctions between the mechanics who 
 take charge of the submarine torpedo and the mechanics 
 serving the locomotive torpedoes. It seems as if each 
 could only properly fulfil the one function. 
 
 How is it, then, that, passing from the personnel to 
 the materiel, such an entire change takes place in the way 
 of viewing things ? All these specialities, so essentially 
 distinct, are collected on the same ship, with the perpetual 
 risk of interfering with each other ; they are all under the 
 same officer, who, with the best will in the world, cannot 
 possess universal knowledge. The result is, that nothing 
 acts as perfectly as it could act were it isolated. The 
 same manoeuvres do not suit both guns and torpedoes. 
 Therefore, one or other must be sacrificed in action. In 
 time of peace, according to the taste of the captain, one 
 drill or another is given the preference ; the rest are sub- 
 ordinate. It is difficult, moreover, to obviate some weak 
 point in the superintendence of the innumerable machines 
 placed side by side. Only when wanted for use is it dis- 
 covered that one or other has been neglected. In this 
 condition they often join the squadron, and, at the moment 
 
PREFACE. XI 
 
 when torpedoes are about to be discharged, their regula- 
 tion is found to be out of order, their compression pumps 
 will not work. Whatever precautions may be taken to 
 avoid such incidents, we shall never succeed in obviating 
 them on a ship where so much is attempted. Each weapon 
 can only be entirely efl&cacious on its own especial boat, 
 where it commands entire attention, and where undivided 
 care is given to making it produce all that it is capable of 
 producing. Nothing hinders it, everything favours it. 
 Moreover, if the ship is hit, only one weapon is lost; 
 whereas, when an ironclad is disabled, guns, torpedoes, 
 and rams disappear and sink together. It cannot suffi- 
 ciently be insisted upon that the idea of constituting the 
 naval strength of great nations by a small number of fight- 
 ing unities was most unfortunate. They are doubtless 
 formidable, but not sufficiently numerous to be found in 
 every spot where danger appears, and the destruction of 
 one in itself suffices to make a disastrous gap in this naval 
 strength. To have preferred a single ironclad to ten men- 
 of-war obtainable for the same price, and which could fight 
 or assail the enemy at ten different points, and could never 
 be all sunk at the same time, whereas a few lucky shots 
 suffice to destroy the machinery of the ironclad and 
 make it simply into a floating wreck^ — to have preferred 
 all this, even before the invention of locomotive torpedo- 
 boats and autonomous torpedo-boats, has been an enor- 
 mous military mistake, which would certainly have been 
 verified had any naval war broken out within the last 
 thirty years, or had this marine monster ever seen service ; 
 but, thank God ! it has never been forced to measure its 
 capacity in a great sea-fight. 
 
XU NAVAL EEFORM. 
 
 It is continually said that I am visionary and revolu- 
 tionary, the advocate of extreme conclusions, having no 
 respect for traditions, and striving suddenly to upset what 
 exists without exactly knowing what I should substitute. 
 Can it truly be said that ironclads have centuries of exis- 
 tence before them ? that they have been tried on thou- 
 sands of battle-fields ? that they have added to, or taken 
 from, the maritime supremacy of anyone ? that they have 
 rendered such service that it would be a crime to forget 
 them ? In point of fact, they have only been put to the 
 proof in the battle of Lissa, and everyone knows with what 
 results ! Without upsetting any tradition, without mis- 
 representing any lesson in history, or stating anything 
 treasonable, we may, therefore, hold that they are the out- 
 come of a false, radically false, conception, long ago aban- 
 doned both in trade and warfare, and that they ought to 
 disappear from our navy. In the navy, as everywhere 
 else, special arms are required and special instruments. 
 Now, the arms for the navy are guns, torpedoes, and 
 rams. I would therefore ask for gun-boats, torpedo-boats, 
 and rams. Having proved that these last can only be 
 constructed at great cost, and that they can only possess 
 very insufficient speed, I would replace them by spar 
 torpedo boats, which are, in fact, rams, and have proved 
 their capacities at Fowchow and Shaipoo. This would be 
 no contradiction to the rule I would lay down, but an in- 
 telligent application of it. As it is impossible to plate 
 all these special boats, I should seek protection for them in 
 reduced dimensions, which would then oflFer an insigni- 
 ficant target for the attacks of their enemies. 
 
 Speed would equally supply this protection, and would 
 
PREFACE. Xm 
 
 further permit them to come up with the enemy, and, if 
 they were stronger or quicker, to inflict serious injury. 
 Finally, boats of a smaller pattern would not only be less 
 easy to attack, more prompt to rush into battle, more 
 rapid in flight, but, as they would cost a great deal less 
 than our present ships, we might, for the same sum of 
 money, have a great many more of them. Everybody 
 agrees that numerical superiority is at once an offensive 
 and defensive weapon of no small importance. Instead 
 of, as at present, forming fleets of some few ironclads, 
 lost, notwithstanding their size, in the immensity of the 
 sea, I should cover the coasts and the commercial routes 
 with hundreds of boats that could not be destroyed in a 
 single fight, and that would, further, give naval warfare 
 all the breadth, extent, endurance and success it possessed 
 in the Past and will again possess in the Future. Is this 
 either revolutionary or visionary ? Is it not rather a 
 return to forgotten wisdom, an application of the prin- 
 ciples that obtain in land warfare, the recognition of a 
 universal law having universal results — division of labour, 
 which is opposed in naval constructions alone. If I have 
 succeeded in expressing myself clearly, I trust that I 
 shall no longer be considered an impetuous spirit, hasten- 
 ing to the conclusion that ironclads are useless, because 
 upholding the success of torpedoes, and maintaining a 
 naval revolution to be a necessity. It is not the success 
 of torpedoes that has convinced me of the futility of 
 ironclads and the necessity of naval reform. I was pre- 
 viously convinced thereof, and the proven success of 
 torpedoes has only confirmed me in my opinion. This 
 must not be understood as. a denial of all that I have 
 
XIV NAVAL REFORM. 
 
 written on the prospect opening out for torpedoes and 
 torpedo-boats. It seems to me that instead of exagge- 
 rating this prospect, I have, on the contrary, under-valued 
 it. Many criticisms have been pointed at me because of 
 my resolute defence of autonomous torpedo-boats, a thou- 
 sand and one defects have been found in our present 
 patterns ; it appears that they are not fit to be lived in, 
 that they are unfit for navigation, incapable of cruising 
 for any time in the open. But hitherto all these re- 
 proaches have been entirely gratuitous ; for a decisive 
 trial of these much-abused boats, in navigation and war- 
 fare, has been emphatically refused. All the voyages they 
 have been permitted to make, even in the worst weather 
 in the Mediterranean, have been most successful. There- 
 fore these trial trips have been suppressed as far as possible. 
 An excellent opportunity occurred for testing what 
 might be expected from torpedo-boats. Instead of 
 leaving the four samples of pattern 60 attached to the 
 evolutionary squadron, where they are held of no 
 account, it would have been much simpler to send them 
 to China, where they could have measured their streno-th 
 as much in military as in naval qualities. Escorted by a 
 transport, the voyage to China would have been quite 
 easy for them ; and once there, they would have accom- 
 panied the squadron in the Far East through all its 
 operations. Who knows but that by speed they might 
 have conquered, and might have renewed the exploits of 
 Shaipoo and Fowchow in the open sea, when the Chinese 
 cruisers took to flight pursued by the French ships at 
 Ning-po. Doubtless renown and success were dreaded 
 for them, so they were left at Toulon, 
 
PREPAOE. XV 
 
 Much as they favour ironclads, the Italians have shown 
 more sense. When starting for Massowah six torpedo- 
 boats accompanied them, and made the voyage without 
 hindrance with only the Cavour for escort. It is true 
 that other Italian torpedo-boats were not able to follow. 
 Finding their work too trying and too fatiguing, the crew 
 on board one of them nearly mutinied. This shows an 
 absolute want of disciphne. If the statement is correct, 
 it only proves that Italy may have magnificent ironclads, 
 but that she has not yet got true sailors. Now, to con- 
 stitute the power of a nation, the sailors are more 
 important than the ironclads. 
 
 I have never ceased to assert my opinion that torpedo- 
 boats are quite habitable. However, in consideration of 
 the complaints of a certain set in the navy, and its 
 effeminate disposition, I admit that it would be well to 
 adopt the type of 4 L inetres as pattern for the torpedo- 
 boat to be used on the open seas, and only to employ 
 pattern 60 for coast-guards ; although ^1-metres torpedo- 
 boats could venture anywhere. The contrary is asserted ; 
 but how can the fact be explained away that certain 
 torpedo-boats have travelled from England to Australia 
 and Montevideo, that others have crossed the Mediter- 
 ranean in every direction, and that others have resolutely 
 penetrated into the B.ed Sea ? 
 
 But it is much easier categorically to deny everything 
 than to discuss individual facts. It is obstinately 
 asserted that our torpedo-boats, pattern 60, carry only 
 three days' coal at 12 knots, and that it would be almost 
 impossible to re-coal at sea. Nothing is more incorrect ; 
 torpedo-boats of this type carry sufficient coal to navigate 
 
XVI NAVAL EEFOEM. 
 
 during six days at this speed, and during seven days at 
 10 knots. It appears, moreover, that certain German 
 torpedo-boats, only 33 metres long, go 19 knots and carry 
 coal for 8,000 knots at 10-knot speed. Why should we 
 not be able to allow our 4,1-metres torpedo-boats enough 
 coal for 2,000 knots at reduced speed ? Re-coaling would 
 always be easy, even at sea, as only a few sacks of coal 
 would be required. 
 
 It is at least singular that the re-coaling of torpedo- 
 boats is always being spoken of, but never that of the 
 ironclads. Could the latter, by any possibility, carry 
 enough coal for the whole of a long voyage ? Let us 
 examine this point. The Admiral Duperre, the master- 
 piece of our squadron, can only carry 700 tons of coal ; 
 at a speed of 12 knots, it consumes 100 tons a day. Its 
 bunkers, therefore, can only contain coal for seven days 
 at 12 knots. Might it not then be said of the Admiral 
 Duperre^ as it has been said of torpedo-boats, that it 
 cannot go any distance, that it is condemned to keep 
 close to the shores of France, and that it could not 
 possibly scour the seas where we have not a sufficient 
 number of coaling stations ? There would certainly be 
 no exaggeration in doing so. In reply, we shall be told 
 that the Admiral Duperre is a kind of enormous maritime 
 fortress, especially designed to protect our shores and 
 ensure their defence. This is how the Italians accounted 
 for their Duilio and Dandolo. These giant ships were 
 constructed much more for the protection of their terri- 
 tory than to obtain dominion on the sea. The much- 
 talked-of empire of the sea must be, therefore, renounced 
 for .ironclads ; a blockade against rapid ships could not 
 
PEEFACE, XVll 
 
 be maintained by tbem, nor could they give chase to a 
 mail-steamer going at full speed. But it suffices for my 
 purpose to show that ironclads cannot steam any longer 
 than torpedo-boats, and that it is much less easy to 
 re-coal. This simple fact will bring conviction as to the 
 truth of the theories I have laid down concerning the 
 division of labour in the navy. 
 
 Putting aside the torpedo-boat, and without referring 
 to the way in which warfare will be conducted in the 
 future, let us suppose the possession of the seas to be in 
 dispute, as in former days, and naval engagements to be 
 taking place, followed by a blockade of the whole coast 
 belonging to the vanquished. Could we gain possession 
 of that naval supremacy, the hope and ambition of every 
 great commercial nation in the days of sailing vessels, by 
 means of a small number of slow-going ironclads, with such 
 limited means of carrying coal as to prevent their going 
 far from the coaling stations, and unable either to escape 
 at fuU speed or to give chase to a cruiser or mail-steamer, 
 for fear that their bunkers would be empty in a few 
 hours ? Most certainly not ! Even were we to deny 
 the progress made in weapons of war, even were we to 
 limit ourselves to a belief in artillery and in rams, it 
 would still be better to possess a great number of rapid 
 vessels able to spread over all the commercial routes and 
 pervade the enemy's shores, than to possess a few monster 
 ships, useless for steaming purposes, useless in the pursuit 
 of an enemy, still more useless in blockading. 
 
 Nor is this all. Kot satisfied with condemning tor- 
 pedo-boats for their scanty means of carrying coal, their 
 detractors further assert that they would be unseaworthy 
 
XVIU NAVAL REFORM. 
 
 in rough weather. This is a question that experience 
 alone can solve, but all experiments are avoided. 
 
 Even were this the case, do our opponents imagine 
 that ironclads could escape all losses in the same weather, 
 with their enormous guns, and all the fragile machinery 
 necessary to working these guns ? 
 
 Experience has not yet decided on this point, and thus 
 we are again reduced to pure conjecture. 
 
 All the same, M. Garreau, a writer of unusual ability, 
 has said most judiciously : 
 
 " There does not exist a ship privileged to escape 
 disaster in the event of very rough weather. As eye- 
 witnesses, we know what the ironclads cruising about the 
 mouth of the Elbe suffered in the gales during the winter 
 of 1870. They would not all have been fit next day to 
 fight similar ships coming out of the enemy's port. 
 
 " Torpedo-boats of the size of the pilot-boats in the 
 Channel and the North Sea would not have suffered 
 so much, for, unlike the ironclads, they could have sought 
 the shelter of the first promontory within reach. 
 
 " At the beginning of last winter, the English Channel 
 Fleet, commanded by the Duke of Edinburgh, made an 
 expedition towards the Azores, and the naval journals 
 gave a quite sufficient account of it, we should imagine, 
 to dissuade new ironclads, carrying guns heavier than 40 
 tons, from attempting such a trial unless absolutely obliged 
 to do so. 
 
 " Coming out of the Bay of Biscay, and towards the Por- 
 tuguese ports, where their immense size prevented their 
 taking refuge, the English ironclads were overtaken by a 
 tempest which caused them to roll more than 25 degrees 
 
PBEFACE. XIX 
 
 each way, and, although their decks were high above 
 water, they were frequently swept by the sea, which, 
 moreover, got down below. 
 
 " This made existence intolerable, and occasioned serious 
 losses, which they were lucky to be able to repair at 
 Gibraltar. 
 
 " Torpedo-boats belonging to an enemy, issuing forth 
 from the neighbouring ports after the tempest, would 
 certainly have prevented this squadron from proceeding 
 on its way, and would have put an end to its campaign. 
 It would be interesting to know how torpedo-boats of 50 
 or 60 tons would have faced the same situation."* 
 
 Thus, we have proved that the action of ironclads is no 
 less circumscribed than that of torpedo-boats would be, 
 even granting — which, for my part, I decline to do — that 
 the latter cannot face a storm. The ironclads would also 
 be condemned to remain in European waters, whilst ships 
 of another pattern would scour the immensity of distant 
 seas. 
 
 But, in these European seas which assure naval supre- 
 macy, would not a great number of small boats, we again 
 repeat, be more powerful, more formidable, than a few 
 enormous ironclads, which could not possibly be every- 
 where at once ? 
 
 " Of what use to adventure the trade of the universe," 
 says Admiral de la Grravi^re, " if the riches brought from 
 such a distance are to be intercepted within sight of their 
 destination ? . . . The possession of the Baltic, the North 
 Sea, and the British Channel will not be disputed by 
 cruisers, but by flotillas. To be masters of these three 
 * Avenir des Colonies etde la Marine, du 25 Avril 1885. 
 
 b * 
 
XX NAVAL REFORM. 
 
 European basins is, in reality, to be masters of the whole 
 mercantile situation."* 
 
 Admiral Jurien de la Graviere overlooked the Mediter- 
 ranean ; but what he says of the Baltic, the North Sea, 
 and the British Channel is still truer of the Mediterranean. 
 To be masters of these four European basins is to be 
 masters of the whole commercial navigation of the world ; 
 and flotillas alone can give this mastery. 
 
 I will make the same answer as above to the final re- 
 proach levelled at torpedo-boats, that of being uninhabi- 
 table. Naturally, an ironclad is much more comfortable 
 to live on than a torpedo-boat ; but, if it is a question of 
 that, it is still more comfortable to live on dry land, and 
 the simplest plan would be to make a clean sweep of the 
 navy altogether. 
 
 The sufferings of the crews on torpedo-boats have been 
 greatly exaggerated. They will diminish as the boat 
 develops. The vibration which made it so specially 
 trying to be on the 64 and 65 patterns has already been 
 got rid of on other patterns. Further improvements are 
 being worked out. Torpedo-boats of 41 metres will afford 
 accommodation not to be found on the 33 metres boats. 
 The comfort on them will, of course, always be very in- 
 different. But are we to have a navy for use, or for 
 show ? If for show, we must own it frankly. If for use, 
 why think of comfort ? 
 
 Sailors of olden times navigated on crafts under con- 
 ditions a hundredfold more deplorable than those of 
 torpedo-boats, and made no complaints. 
 
 I refuse to believe that the sailors of the present day are 
 * Eevm des Dewv Mondes, du 15 Fevrier 1885. 
 
PREFACE. XXI 
 
 SO degenerate as to be unable to endure fatigues that their 
 forefathers would have bravely faced. It seems to me that 
 to persist in criticising the detail of present patterns is to 
 take the narrowest view of the ^torpedo-boat question. I 
 am the first to admit that the pattern is not perfect. 
 
 But, this granted, why not hasten to improve and 
 ameliorate it, so as to possess a special boat able to make 
 use of the torpedo in all weathers, and in aU seas, with as 
 little delay as possible. T insist on the words " a special 
 boat," because, for the torpedo-boat as well as for the 
 cruiser and the gun-boat, there is no chance if the law of 
 division of labour is not respected. 
 
 If every advantage of which it is capable is to be de- 
 rived from the torpedo-boat, we must hasten to order 
 a certain number of patterns of the boat, although not as 
 yet perfected, from aU our constructors. We must then 
 examine each pattern, try each carefully, and choose from 
 among them the pattern appearing to unite most of the 
 best qualities. After this pattern has been chosen and 
 adopted, we must not lose a moment, for we need five 
 hundred torpedo-boats to protect our coasts and keep 
 possession of the high seas. We should, therefore, organise 
 or cause the trade to organise, a complete manufactory, 
 even to the smallest tools, of the numerous weapons neces- 
 sary to us, and so arrange this trade that everything 
 should exactly fit, tubes, boilers, spare pieces, &c. 
 
 Thus, without delay, we could constitute a considerable 
 fleet, on which the damages would be of small importance, 
 as we should always be able to repair them at once. 
 
 Diversity of patterns would cause confusion, with disas- 
 trous results. At present there are as many patterns 
 
XXU NAVAL BfiFOEM. 
 
 as torpedo-boats, so that it is diflBcult to repair them 
 when damaged. The 'personnel is unacquainted with what 
 it has to use ; it has continually to begin its education all 
 over again, everything is in confusion, and our movable 
 defence, being in a state of anarchy, is understood by no 
 one. Only by proceeding as simply and rapidly as pos- 
 sible can we attain to any serious results. 
 
 1 am far from ignoring how contrary this is to the 
 habits of our Naval Administration. Convinced that divi- 
 sion of labour and the specialisation of instruments of war- 
 fare are things to be abhorred, it has begun by ordering 
 various boats, which are to fulfil several purposes, under the 
 name of despatch-torpedo-boats. They are to carry both 
 guns and torpedoes, and will, in their own limits, have 
 the same defects as ironclads. One of them, the Bomb, 
 is already finished and sent to Cherbourg. It is ten times 
 too big, and its armament is a great deal too complex ; it 
 carries two 10-pounders and some Hotchkiss, at the same 
 time as two torpedo-tubes of 4™ 40. 
 
 The result of such overloading is that, although possess- 
 ing bunkers of 120 cubic feet, it can only take 42 tons of 
 coal. Is this not a real climax, as was recently said ? 
 Moreover, it is now concluded that the Bomb must be 
 shorn of its tubes and torpedoes, and must replace its guns 
 by Hotchkiss's, so as to enable it to take in a sufficient 
 amount of coal for longer journeys. It will never be a 
 torpedo-boat. It might be made into a guard-ship on the 
 open sea or on the coast, a light-ship, or floating advanced 
 sentry. Those of the same pattern will share the like 
 fate. It is characteristic that the first move was to en- 
 large the torpedo-boat and surcharge it with artillery, so 
 
PREFACE. SXIU 
 
 that in time we should return to the ironclad, which is 
 unsuited to every branch of the service. 
 
 If we can place any faith in information furnished by 
 the Press, the order given to private yards for thirty-four 
 torpedo-boats suitable for the open sea, was scarcely more 
 felicitous. They were to be built with the double inten- 
 tion of turning them into both spar- torpedo and locomotive- 
 torpedo boats. How could they be expected to fulfil two 
 such opposite functions? 
 
 Why cannot people understand that it is one thing to 
 sight a vessel in the distance, and quite another to remove 
 obstacles barring the approach to it ? 
 
 The torpedo-boat for discharging torpedoes should have 
 no aim but to advance on the enemy and overtake it. 
 
 The enemy will escape it if it gives chase to the defen- 
 sive torpedo-boats surrounding it, or to the outposts 
 protecting it ; whilst it is losing its time fighting with 
 secondary enemies, the principal enemy wUl sink it or 
 escape. 
 
 For this special work a special boat is required, a sort 
 of ram to sweep the seas ; and meanwhile the torpedo- 
 boat for discharging torpedoes, devoted to one intention, 
 wUl take advantage of the first free passage to place its 
 deadly missUe with almost absolute certainty. 
 
 Have the consequences of what is about to be done 
 been reaUy well considered ? 
 
 An equipment of spar- torpedoes, weighing 1,200 kilo- 
 grammes, can only find room on a torpedo-boat for 
 discharging torpedoes at the expense of speed or coal. 
 
 It would, therefore, be well to consider two such im- 
 portant factors in the military strength of a war-ship. 
 
XXIV NAVAL EEFOEM. 
 
 The speed of 20 knots obtained on pattern 60, has already 
 been exceeded ; in England, torpedo-boats are being built 
 which, it is said, will give 25 knots — torpedo-boats of 
 moderate tonnage, and, therefore, of moderate size, of 
 about 60 or 70 tons displacement, and 35 or 37 mUres 
 long. In another place Mr. Thorneycroft turns out 
 35-metres torpedo-boats, having a speed of 20 knots, and 
 able to take in 20 tons of coal ; about twice and a half as 
 much as pattern 60 is able to take. This shows how 
 much other nations hold to speed and fuel. 
 
 A torpedo-boat without speed is, in point of fact, a 
 useless weapon ; it is still more so if, being possessed of 
 the requisite speed, it cannot sustain it during a sufl&- 
 cient length of time through lack of fuel. In truth, 
 ignorance is not the sole cause of these amazing mistakes ; 
 they arise still more from opposition. 
 
 Public opinion attaches such importance to torpedo- 
 boats, that some few must be constructed ; but they are 
 bungled, and are made to fail, so that afterwards it may 
 appear that the only plan is to give them up. Correct 
 notions are thus compromised by wrong application, and, 
 whilst ostensibly carried out, truth is discredited and 
 misrepresented. 
 
 Unfortunately the navy is given over, at present, to a 
 small number of men who use it freely to their own 
 profit and that of their families. They are much more 
 interested in keeping the monopoly of big and little 
 appointments, than in securing the naval eminence neces- 
 sary to the preservation of the military and commercial 
 position of our country, which so many rival nations will 
 dispute. It is strange, after so many revolutions in a 
 
Preface. xxv 
 
 society so upset and levelled as ours, that an institution 
 like the navy should be absolutely and entirely given over 
 to nepotism. This is nevertheless the case. 
 
 The small number of commands, always given by 
 official selection, always dictated by the same influential 
 admirals, assures rapid advancement to the most indiffe- 
 rent officer with good connection ; whereas the most 
 efficient may remain in obscurity for ever, unless he has 
 some chance of insisting on his merits, and proving 
 
 / The highest staff appointments shelter perfectly appa- 
 rent incapacity, and add to the accumulation of scandalous 
 abuse. In combating reform, certain heads of the navy 
 are fighting for existence ; not only for their own, but 
 that of their descendants, their sons, and sons-in-law. 
 They perfectly understand the drift of those changes 
 claimed ia the present state of things ; they perfectly 
 know that in the new order of things, when every indi- 
 vidual will have the chance and the right of attaining a 
 command, and when every command will be a serious 
 struggle against danger, exacting intelligence, self- 
 sacrifice, and courage, it will no longer be possible to 
 discreetly veil incapacity, and put it in the highest grades 
 to the detriment of those who have distuiguished them- 
 selves. The reign of Justice shall have succeeded that of 
 Favouritism, and EquaUty that of Patronage. 
 
 It is easy to understand that many do not desire this — 
 it was so easy to count on protection instead of personal 
 exertion — but, notwithstanding all opposition, truth must 
 come to light ; for it is a question of the well-being and 
 interest of France, against which coalition and private 
 
XXVI NAVAIi BBi'OEiyl. 
 
 interest cannot always prevail. The only argument of 
 serious importance that has been adduced against the 
 ideas I have undertaken to defend concerning the future 
 of the navy, is the example of other Powers ; for they, 
 too, persist in the error of big constructions. This, I 
 reply, is a mistake ; as in our own case, the illusion as to 
 ironclads is gradually disappearing in other nations. 
 
 I have often cited Germany, the nation now foremost 
 in Europe, and which, possessing dominion over the 
 Continent for the last few years, has now dreamt of ex- 
 tending its terrible dominion over the seas. 
 
 As we cannot refuse to admit the superior military 
 ability of Germany, let us now see by what means it 
 seeks to form its navy. Admiral Jurien de la Graviere 
 has pointed out the way. It is creating fleets of torpedo- 
 boats, to take possession of the Baltic, the North Sea, and 
 the Channel, and is suspending the construction of those 
 ironclads, now useless in European seas and everywhere 
 else. Under tlie direction of Lieutenant Tegethof, one of 
 the heroes of the battle of Lissa, and Admiral de Ster- 
 neck, Austro- Hungary is following in the footsteps of 
 Germany. There remain England, Eussia, and Italy. 
 Let us leave the latter aside, as it has not as yet had 
 any naval experience ; although we may just mention 
 that it takes good care to put no new ironclads in the 
 stocks. 
 
 England and Russia were near coming to blows only a 
 short time ago ; at the last moment England drew back, 
 and peace was not disturbed. Nevertheless, public 
 opinion had seldom been more bellicose in England, and 
 the British spirit never suffered more than when it had 
 
tREFAOE. XXVli 
 
 to renounce vengeance on the haughty enterprises of its 
 hereditary enemy. 
 
 But, after attentively considering the possibilities of its 
 fleet, its numerous ironclads drawn up in line of battle, 
 England was forced to confess and acknowledge, before all 
 Europe, that this naval force would prove powerless 
 against the fortifications of Cronstadt or the Russian 
 torpedo-boats in the Baltic. Suddenly overcome by this 
 fear which is, as we all know, the beginning of wisdom, 
 England, -gave up war, and hastily ordered the torpedo- 
 boats and cruisers she lacked. She felt that in the hour 
 of peril she could no longer risk her existence as a nation 
 by doing without them. 
 
 An Ulustrious prelate who is at the same time a great 
 patriot. Cardinal Manning, has placed himself at the head 
 of a league to defend the Empire, and this is how he 
 spoke on the defenceless state of his country at the very 
 first meeting : — 
 
 " There is no greater temptation to malefactors than 
 an undefended people. ... A country with undefended 
 shores is an invitation to all the thieves and robbers of 
 the world. . . . The Thames, the Mersey, the Humber, 
 and the Firth of Forth, all offer invitations to any Power 
 with whom we may be in hostile relation. If ordinary 
 defence is culpably neglected, it is the duty of every 
 patriotic Englishman to rouse the sense of the country 
 to our very great danger, to work for the attainment of 
 tranquil security, and to stir up the sluggish unwilling- 
 ness to spend money, public and private, in defending 
 our shores and rivers. When England is powerless all 
 the little ambitions of the world spring up ; but if Eng- 
 
XXVUl NAVAL REFORM. 
 
 land were powerfnl she might be the Peace-maker of the 
 world." 
 
 I quite agree with Cardinal Manning on the duty of 
 every enlightened patriot, and I think with him that it 
 consists in raising a cry of alarm to shake the people out 
 of its torpor when the national security is in danger; 
 therefore Cardinal Manning is right, a hundred times 
 over, in saying that a nation whose shores are unprotected 
 is the aim and object of all the depredators in the 
 world. But I have shown in this volume that our 
 shores ai'e quite as unprotected as those of England ; that 
 a few cruisers and gun-boats would be sufficient to burn 
 all our commercial ports, for they have nothing to defend 
 them. 
 
 I have also proved that after the war with China we 
 had no navy left. I might say that we had none before 
 that ; for is a navy, belonging to a nation like ours, 
 worthy of the name when it does not possess a single 
 cruiser capable'of overtaking a Chinese cruiser, and which, 
 although under a most distinguished chief, was obliged 
 to confine its operations to an ineffective bombardment 
 and an illusory blockade ? We spend 200 millions annu- 
 ally on our fleet, and yet we have not constructed a single 
 cruiser as rapid as the Chinese cruisers. 
 
 We have actually allowed the Chinese, whom we had 
 treated as a totally insignificant quantity, to get ahead of 
 us. It would be, perhaps, fair to blame individuals for 
 such a deplorable and humiliating situation ; but I have 
 preferred to blame the system. It is our naval system 
 that I have attacked ; I have exposed its vices and dis- 
 played the disastrous effects thereof. In reply, I am told 
 
PREFACE. XXIX 
 
 that the same system prevails in every other country. 
 But it does not prevail in every other country. It does 
 not prevail in Grermany or in Austria. It prevails in 
 England, and that is why England quails in the presence 
 of Eussia, and gives up the idea of fighting her. It 
 prevails, too, in Italy ; but this proves nothing, unless it 
 proves that Italy in her youth allows herself to be led 
 away by older nations. 
 
 But supposing it prevailed everywhere, would that be 
 a reason for suppressing the ideas of which I am the ex- 
 ponent, if they were true ideas and if the evidence of 
 truth were in their favour ? 
 
 Hitherto we have been in the habit of regarding France 
 as full of enterprise and daring, always at the head of 
 every forward movement. Henceforth, it would seem 
 that she will only be permitted to imitate others. All 
 innovations are forbidden. She must strike out no new 
 line of her own. She must fall into the beaten tracks. 
 
 It is diflBcult, I must confess, to be content with this 
 line for France. If, on the eve of Sadowa, it had been 
 said to Prussia : " Take care ! you place great faith in 
 your needle-guns ; it is great imprudence ; no one else 
 has them in Europe. Look around you, and do as others 
 do, in case you make a mistake ! " — if this language had 
 been used, and it had been listened to, Prussia would 
 have been destroyed, and Germany would never have 
 existed. 
 
 Isolation need not be feared ; we must rather seek it, 
 and seek it earnestly if we are in the right path. We did 
 not consult European opinion when we built the Glory 
 and inaugurated the reign of ironclads ', we may equally 
 
XXX NAVAL REFORM. 
 
 do without it to give up all those wonderful vessels which 
 are only strong outwardly, and reconstruct our naval 
 power on the great principle of division of labour, with its 
 three essential qualifications, classification of ships, 
 number, and speed. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTEE I. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 TOEPEDO-BOATS AND GuN-BoATS ... .1 
 
 CHAPTEE II. 
 
 Naval Warfare and the Organisation op Naval Forces 45 
 
 CHAPTEE III. 
 Coast Defence 97 
 
 CHAPTEE IV. 
 Naval Personnel 142 
 
 CHAPTEE V. 
 Service Afloat 196 
 
 Appendices 229 
 
NAVAL EEFOEM. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 TOEPBDO-BOATS AND GUN-BOATS. 
 
 1. 
 
 Are we on the eve of a great change in the navy which will re- 
 volutionise all the sea-going instruments of warfare, and all naval 
 administrative institutions ? Not only in France, but in Europe, 
 this question has, for the last few months, excited the utmost in- 
 terest, and given rise to eager discussion. 
 
 During the years following the great calamities of 1870-71 
 nations seemed to have but one thought and one pre-occupation — 
 strife on earth, Continental war — and they each consecrated all their 
 best energies and resources to the organisation of numerous and 
 powerful armies. 
 
 Little was thought about the navy. On the contrary (as in our 
 case in 1872), under pretext that it now filled a less important place, 
 and that its influence was weakened, the greatest sacrifices were 
 forced upon it, in order to benefit the armies thought to be urgently 
 required, against an enemy unable, it was asserted, to attack us 
 at sea. 
 
 This was like the Athenians described by Demosthenes, who 
 always put their hand over the wound just received, without 
 perceiving that another was soon to follow. The revival of 
 Colonial policy, and the taste for distant enterprise suddenly de- 
 veloped in France, was so opportune and natural that we have, little 
 ?/ 1 
 
ii NAVAL EEFOEM. 
 
 by little, seen all the European nations glide into the position we 
 were the first to occupy, and this has gone far to arrest the course 
 of ideas and bring back public attention to our long-neglected navy. 
 The essential instrument in Colonial policy is the navy. But it is 
 something else besides. The navy is one of the chief elements of 
 national safety for a nation like France, with a great extent of coast 
 to defend, its relations with Algiers, and its supremacy in the 
 Mediterranean sea to maintain ; and for a nation requiring to be 
 mistress of the sea if it is to secure arms and supplies from the 
 other side of the ocean. If, whilst protecting our frontiers on land, 
 we neglect our maritime frontiers, our want of foresight will risk 
 cruel retribution. 
 
 It is, therefore, natural that after this temporary neglect in favour 
 of the land forces, the navy should gradually become the object of 
 general attention. Aroused by the progress of her rivals, England 
 has begun to look with anxious eyes to what was once her powerful 
 fleet, now powerless to resist the coalition of two unfriendly naval 
 Powers. 
 
 Eorced to empty her ports that she may sustain her pretensions 
 in the Chinese seas, France has also perceived that her former supe- 
 riority is no longer assured. Nations, younger and more apt to 
 bend to progress, less encumbered by traditions and old-fashioned 
 materials — Italy, Germany, and Eussia — have entered the lists 
 agamst the two former mistresses of the sea. Unhindered by old 
 patterns and time-woru customSj they have profited by the latest 
 movements, both in their trade and in their navy. 
 
 Italy possesses superb ironclads, excellent cruisers, and fine 
 specimens of torpedo-boats. The German fleet is still insufficient, 
 but 150 torpedo-boats are in course of construction at the present 
 moment, and she will soon have a first-class personnel. Russia is 
 organising a squadron in the Black Sea. Austria is developing 
 more and more upon the Adriatic, in expectation of the day when 
 she will have attained dominion on the Egean Sea. On all sides 
 maritime supremacy is aimed at. Nations that formerly possessed 
 it seem now to be on the point of losing it, and what is so 
 
TOBPEDO-BOATS AND GUN-BOATS. 3 
 
 terrible for them is, that the weapon capable of destroying their 
 power is within reach of the poorest and the weakest. 
 
 We ask pardon if. at the outset of a study meant to be purely 
 technical, we quote the fancy of an imaginative man in whom, as a 
 heritage of his race, we know not what prophetic gift, what pro- 
 found insight into the future, was allied to the most brilliant 
 qualities of the novelist and the solid capacities of the statesman. 
 
 In the admirable and famous pamphlet which, in May 1871, 
 under the name of the Battle of Dorking, reminded heedless Eng- 
 land that the misfortunes which had overtaken France might one 
 day be hers, nothing is more curious, nothing more instructive, 
 than the sea-fight describing the Channel fleet sinking in the waves 
 and carrying with it all that was great of the English nation. 
 
 " It was about 10 o'clock that the first telegram came ; an hour 
 later the wire announced that the admiral had signalled to form 
 line of battle, and shortly afterwards that the order was given to 
 bear doWn on the enemy and engage. At 12 came the announce- 
 ment, ' Fleet opened fire about three miles to leeward of us.' That 
 is the ship with the cable. So far, all had been expectancy. Then 
 came the first token of calamity : ' An ironclad has been blown 
 up'; ' the enemy's torpedoes are doing great damage'; 'the flag- 
 ship is laid aboard the enemy ' ; ' the flag-ship appears to be sink- 
 ing ' ; ' the vice-admiral has signalled to ' — there the cable 
 became silent, and, as you know, we heard no more till two days 
 afterwards. The solitary ironclad which escaped the disaster 
 steamed into Portsmouth. Then the whole story came out — how 
 our sailors, gallant as ever, had tried to close with the enemy ; how 
 the latter evaded the conflict at close quarters, and, sheering off', 
 left behind them the fatal engines which sent our ships, one after 
 the other, to the bottom ; how all this happened almost in a few 
 minutes. The Government, it appears, had received warnings of 
 this invention ; but to the nation this stunning blow was utterly 
 unexpected." 
 
 Is this a romance of yesterday, this Battle of Borking, written 
 twelve years ago by a man that might well have been the last of 
 
 1 * 
 
4 NAVAL EEFOEM. 
 
 the great English statesmen ? Is it not, rather, a history of the 
 future ? Many signs point out that the reign of great ironclads 
 is over, as well as that of the nations that place their confidence 
 in them. We know how these squadrons are composed. Ever 
 since the origin of an ironclad navy, constructors and naval men 
 have constantly endeavoured to concentrate all their instruments 
 of naval warfare upon a single ship — gun, ram, and torpedo — so as 
 to have only one fighting unity armed with the most formidable 
 ofi"ensive and defensive strength attainable. To the immense fleets 
 of other days succeeded squadrons composed of few ships; but 
 they were naval monsters — real floating fortresses capable of direct- 
 ing any fire, and also of resisting any fire directed against them- 
 selves. Far-seeing minds alone protested against what appeared 
 to them a want of common-sense in a naval organization, that 
 neglected the great law of Division of Labour and the necessities 
 of modern progress. They pointed out how absurd it was, in days 
 when all the seas are easily and rapidly accessible by steam, to 
 constitute a navy of a few powerful but slow-going ships, both 
 heavy and costly, which never would be where they were most 
 wanted, and the loss of which would cause irreparable disaster. 
 
 For the price of one ordinary cruiser alone, ten war-ships could 
 be obtained, much more rapidly constructed, much more rapidly 
 worked, fit to get to any spot where their presence might be of 
 some use. But these criticisms availed not in the development of 
 ironclads. Only one thing threatened it — the parallel progress in 
 the size of guns. As fast as the engineers increased the force of 
 resistance for ironclads, in like measure the artillerists increased 
 the power of penetration by increasing the weight of the guns and 
 the initial velocity of the projectile. The monster gun was the 
 forced result of the monster ship. The latter grew even twice as 
 fast as the former, from the fact that it had not only to resist it, 
 but to carry it. 
 
 The result of all this was that the man-of-war inclined to 
 become more and more a gigantic mass of iron and steel all 
 but invulnerable, armed with gigantic artillery, possessing the 
 
TOBPEDO-BOATS AND GUN-BOATS. 5 
 
 greatest possible power of penetration, machines of enormous 
 weight, a complication of numberless mechanisms, a very miracle 
 of construction, but with the double disadvantage of costing at 
 least some fifteen millions (of francs), and being incapable of 
 storing a supply of coal adequate to the extension of its sphere of 
 action in all parts of the seas. 
 
 As often happens in human affairs, a grain of sand was the 
 means of arresting the naval giant and now threatens it with a 
 speedy death. The appearance of torpedoes on the scene is 
 no new thing ; it is of far earlier date that the Battle of Dorking; 
 One knows that the invention is contemporary with that of steam- 
 ships, and that it is due to the genius of the same man — the illus- 
 trious and unfortunate Fulton. Until the American War of Seces- 
 sion this terrible engine of destruction had only been tried in 
 isolated experiments. Some merely smiled at it, whilst others 
 opposed it with invincible scepticism ; and, further, the first 
 disaster produced by torpedoes caused inexpressible surprise and 
 pain. The Northern States had been the victims, and vented their 
 indignation against the Southerners by treating them as assassins, 
 unbelievers, wretches emanating from Hell. They spoke of tor- 
 pedoes with equal anger and indignation. Infernal machinations 
 of the enemy ; assassination in its worse form ; unchristian mode 
 of warfare; .... with similar expressions did they endeavour 
 to wither their adversaries' invention. But, after having withered 
 it, they did not hesitate to use it in their turn. Unchristian as it 
 might be, the torpedo was at once received as one of the weapons 
 of a Christian people. From that moment, and although ironclads 
 were only then in their infancy, it could be told that their reign 
 was over before it had begun. 
 
 " Up till now,^' wrote the Prince de Joinville, " there exists no 
 means of defence against this danger (the danger of the torpedo). 
 In the first war it will threaten both big and little ships in every 
 direction. A well-placed ton of powder, a petard carried in a dark 
 night by a resolute man, will suf&ce to send the whole naval force 
 to the bottom, with all the millions represented by ships like the 
 
b NAVAL REFORM. 
 
 Solferino or the Warrior, including the hundreds of human 
 beings who man them." This prediction would certainly have 
 been realised if, since the War of Secession, there had occurred 
 any great naval war. Wherever two navies have come into con- 
 tact, the torpedo has played an important, if not a decisive part. 
 In the war between Eussia and Turkey, hardy Eussian sailors blew 
 up Turkish monitors by placing explosive torpedoes along their 
 sides. In the war between Chili and Peru, a torpedo from the 
 Independencia blew up the Janequeo in a few minutes ; and if in 
 1870-71 France was unable to force the German ports and 
 approach their shores, it was greatly due to her fear of the tor- 
 pedoes sown in such profusion by the Germans that they them- 
 selves had the greatest difficulty in taking them up when peace 
 was made, and moreover lost a hundred and thirty men when they 
 tried to destroy them. 
 
 Eedoubtable as the torpedo may have been along the coasts and 
 in the rivers, it seemed until within the last few years as if squad- 
 rons in the open sea might not have much to fear from them. 
 In fact our ironclads had been armed with what were called diverg- 
 ing torpedoes, arranged so as to be methodically kept at a distance, 
 out of the wake of the ship. But these towing torpedoes required 
 singularly delicate and hazardous manipulation. The officers 
 affirmed that they caused great strain on the tow-ropes, and that 
 only ten knots speed could be achieved with them unless at the 
 risk of their being carried away. Moreover, the working of them 
 was always difficult, and often inefficient. A great deal more con- 
 fidence was placed in spar-torpedoes. 
 
 The history of these torpedoes is certainly most glorious. It 
 has been illustrated by American sailors and by Eussian. But the 
 most brilliant feat it has recorded is, without doubt, that of the 
 two small torpedo-boats of the 45 and 46 pattern at Fow-choow. 
 They fought in full daylight under the double fire of the Chinese 
 and of the French ships, the latter firing with' all their might on 
 the Chinese squadron. In the face of these difficulties and dan- 
 gers they blew up a transport and seriously injured a despatch 
 
TORPEDO-BOATS AND GUN-BOATS. 7 
 
 vessel. Sufficient justice has not been awarded to this act of 
 intrepidity, which certainly far outstrips the Canary exploits. 
 These took place during the night, as did those of the American 
 and Russian torpedo-boats on occasions when they attacked ships 
 in repose, whereas the torpedo-boats 45 and 46 were in full day- 
 light and between two fires. Simple sloops armed with torpedoes 
 renewed the same exploit at Shei-poo. 
 
 But, however admirable may be the heroism of our brave sailors, 
 it is evident that an arm that has itself to be placed against a ship 
 to destroy it could not possibly be taken into common use, or be 
 considered reliable, not to say decisive. The spar-torpedo, like the 
 diverging torpedo, was a formidable menace to the ironclad, not a 
 certain danger. It was possible to provide against it, and the assailant 
 braved such fearful perils that it inevitably must sometimes 
 come to grief. But as these perils lessened in proportion as the 
 speed increased, the dimensions of torpedo-boats were next re- 
 stricted, and attention turned to the construction of a diminutive 
 and very fast boat; a problem considered unsolved by most en- 
 gineers. Mr. Thorneycroft had, however, the merit of solving it. 
 The celebrated Miranda became the prototype of the first tor- 
 pedo-boats, appropriately known as " Thorney crofts.'' Thus 
 the torpedo-boat was invented; but it was, as yet, incompletely 
 armed. 
 
 It was only possible to use the spar-torpedo as a hand 
 weapon ; therefore the throwing weapon, the projectile-torpedo, 
 had to be created. Although various experiments were made 
 towards this end, Mr. Whitehead stands hitherto alone in having 
 achieved a practical result. His torpedo is a regular little sub- 
 marine boat, of cigar shape, varying in length and breadth. It 
 proceeds at a constant depth, and carries a charge of gun-cotton 
 in its head, which is exploded by percussion on contact. The 
 machinery sets two screws in motion ; the motive power being 
 compressed air, carried in a strong reservoir placed in the cen- 
 tral part of the torpedo. Two special appliances, one a hydro- 
 static piston and the other a pendulum, keep the torpedo 
 
8 NAVAli EEFORM. 
 
 horizontal, and at the required depth, generally about three 
 metres. When it deviates from its proper depth, the hydrostatic 
 piston hrings it back, by acting on a rudder placed at the stern ; 
 and the pendulum, acting on the same rudder, maintains the 
 horizontal position of the torpedo during its course. The speed 
 of the Whitehead torpedo is about twelve metres a second, during 
 the first 400 metres of its voyage. We shall see later on that it 
 has accomplished greater distances without deviating, but it is 
 prudent not to fire at the object at more than 400 metres. 
 
 It can be discharged above or under water. The latter method 
 is more generally employed. The torpedo is placed in a tube, 
 which is, in fact, a special sort of gun, having the torpedo as its 
 projectile. The torpedo-boat manoeuvres so as to point the axis 
 of the tube in the direction the torpedo is to take, and when 
 within range, the torpedo is discharged. A sort of key placed in 
 the middle of the tube opens the air chamber, the engine begins 
 to move, the torpedo assumes its proper depth, and continues its 
 course until it encounters the vessel against which it explodes. 
 Our ironclads have been supplied with locomotive torpedo-boats, 
 but this terrible weapon is naturally more efiBcacious on a 
 " Thomey croft," which has great speed and can get sufBciently 
 near the enemy to sink it with certainty. 
 
 Thanks to the tendency of modern artillery, ironclads are kept 
 at a great distance from each other. The " Thorneycroft " tor- 
 pedo-boat, trusting to its speed and small size to obviate all 
 danger, resolutely advances against the giant adversary it is going 
 to fight. A torpedo-boat carrying a locomotive torpedo may be 
 classed, as has been justly said, with a spar-torpedo-boat 300 
 metres long. If spar-torpedo-boats have already done so much 
 damage, what will be the effect of torpedo-boats furnished with 
 automatic torpedoes? Nevertheless, a great number of naval men 
 remain as yet unconvinced that this new fighting ship is to destroy 
 ironclads; they do not even believe it to be very dangerous. 
 They hold that the locomotive torpedo is an extremely delicate 
 weapon, disarranged by the least thing ; deteriorating with extra- 
 
TOEPEDO-BOATS AND GtJN-BOATS. » 
 
 ordinary facility ; risking the betrayal of all tlie hopes that have 
 been placed in it at the height of battle. As to the torpedo-boat 
 itself, its navigating qualities have long been doubted, and still 
 continue to be doubted. It is granted, perhaps, that it may be of 
 some use on the coast, or close to land ; but that this diminutive 
 boat, this " nutshell," as it is called by M, Gougeard, should ven- 
 ture on the open and stormy sea in the pursuit of a squadron, is 
 what many officers, perhaps ultra-faithful to old traditions if not 
 routine, refuse to admit. They treat the adherents of torpedoes 
 and torpedo-boats as visionary. They affirm, at least, that the 
 worth of the weapon and the boat destined to its use, has still to 
 be proved ; that decisive proof must be adduced, and that, in any 
 case, changes between the past and future system must come by 
 degrees. 
 
 We are going to examine into the justice of their assertions, 
 or, rather, by the example of our own manoeuvres and those of 
 'foreign fleets, we are going to refute the objections they advance 
 against those who, like Admiral Jurien de la Gravi^re, long before 
 the invention of torpedoes, predicted the advent of large fleets, 
 which should succeed the cumbrous and small squadrons of the 
 present day. 
 
 2. 
 
 To show how ill-founded are the criticisms levelled at the loco- 
 motive torpedo as a weapon of warfare, it is necessary briefly to 
 recapitulate the transformations it has gone through. The last of 
 these are so recent that it is not astonishing if they are scarcely 
 known even in the navy. It was towards the year 1872 that the 
 idea of a locomotive torpedo was first mooted ; to carry an ex- 
 plosive charge to a proper depth, under the bilge of a ship. Keel- 
 torpedoes were made; they were feebly charged and could only 
 go at a moderate speed. They went very badly and possessed 
 none of the qualities requisite in practical use; nevertheless the 
 problem was virtually solved. This first attempt was gradually 
 improved. 
 
10 NAVAL EBFOEM. 
 
 As far back ns 1876 Mr. Whitehead sold a locomotive torpedo 
 to the European Powers, and it went as well under water as above 
 it, and was equally endowed with suflBcient speed. Thus, from this 
 period only, did the locomotive torpedo earn the right to interest 
 the naval and political world. 
 
 At first an attempt was made to discharge the new weapon from 
 what were called shell-tubes, placed under water, and the results 
 were satisfactory ; but when it came to putting these shell-tubes 
 on board a vessel, and to discharging these torpedoes when under 
 weigh, almost insurmountable difiBculties were encountered, arising 
 from the speed itself; therefore the idea of firing the torpedoes on 
 the surface of the water came into vogue. 
 
 Not being constructed for this purpose, the Whitehead torpedo 
 gave very unsatisfactory results, and, as numerous accidents hap- 
 pened, a remedy had to be found. Mr. Whitehead thought at first 
 he should succeed by making smaller torpedoes, and gave them 
 4"' 40 in length, instead of 5"^ 80. 
 
 The model torpedo of 1877 was of this pattern. Thus modified, 
 the new torpedo was very little superior to that of 1876. But 
 other and more important modifications were to be foreseen, and, 
 as long ago as 1878, the French Government ordered a hundred 
 torpedoes of superior strength and dimensions to be turned out 
 with all haste at Indret. 
 
 The French torpedo of 1878 was a real advance. Justice was 
 never done to the engineer charged with its construction. At this 
 moment a slight modification of the stern is being introduced 
 at a trifling cost, and it is becoming an excellent weapon. 
 
 The improvements introduced in 1878 were unfortunately insuffi- 
 cient, so that when Mr. Whitehead ofiered us the 1880 pattern, 
 it appeared to be far superior, and all the world approved of it. 
 The manufactory at Indret was beaten out of the field and sup- 
 pressed, and we were reduced to buying our torpedoes in Austria. 
 In passing we may remark that this is a very serious matter, 
 for, in time of war, we shall be unable to procure the torpedoes 
 we require for our ships from other countries, and we shall risk 
 
TOBPEDO-BOATS AND GUN-BOATS. 11 
 
 finding ourselves without arms when we come to face some 
 enemy in possession of everything it requires. However this 
 may be, the pattern 1880 was the first really to give satisfac- 
 tion when discharged above water. As soon as it appeared, those 
 officers who knew the previous models, and had watched the 
 transformations of the torpedo with interest, begged that it should 
 be tried not on stationary ships against stationary marks, as had 
 been hitherto done, but on vessels in motion, fixing at objects 
 also in motion. These first attempts to fire at various angles 
 were not successful, the deviations of the torpedo being very irre- 
 gular. It would appear that in France people were at once 
 discouraged. After carefully studying the problem in 1881, the 
 Danes constructed a special tube, called a shovel tube, which 
 obtained a remarkable success. Ignorant of these Danish suc- 
 cesses, or else disgusted with their own experiments, the French 
 did nothing further for torpedoes : they contented themselves by 
 preserving them, more or less carefully, in the magazine ; and 
 the arrival of Admiral Du Petit Thenars, a most distinguished 
 oflBcer, was needed to bring a forgotten question once more into 
 notice at Toulon. 
 
 In the beginning of the year 1883 Admiral Du Petit Thonars 
 made the movable defence force do a great deal of firing at 
 Toulon, on stationary objects as well as others in motion. It- 
 was through his influence that the transport Le Japan was kept 
 armed, and has become, in a way, permanently commissioned for 
 experiments, whilst, at the same time, an excellent school of 
 engineers for the Whitehead torpedoes. From that moment fresh 
 attempts were made; a shovel-tube of the Danish pattern was 
 asked for ; in less than a year considerable progress was achieved. 
 Perhaps Admiral Peyron, who was at the head of the Admiralty 
 in the Ferry Cabinet, but was, at the time we speak of, Mari= 
 time Prefect at Toulon, and to whom, later on, all this progress 
 was a dead letter, might remember being taken on board Le 
 Japan by one of the torpedo-boats belonging to the movable 
 defence force, and being surprised at the firing whilst under 
 
12 NAVAL EEFOEM. 
 
 weigh off the Isles of Hyferes, had he not drunk of those waters 
 of forgetful ness which, according to Admiral Jurien de la Gra- 
 vi6re, flow round the foundations of the Palace in the Rue Royale. 
 And perhaps his faulty memory might have heen refreshed by the 
 documents in his of&ce, as to the amount of firing executed under 
 his eyes, both by the movable defence force and on board the 
 Japan, if official documents had ever served to refresh the faulty 
 memory of ministers. It was in the presence of Admiral Peyron 
 that torpedo-boats effected firing, whilst under weigh, with entire 
 success on moving objects, and that at 700 metres distance. 
 Since that date the placing of locomotive torpedoes has made great 
 progress, but of this the greater part of our navy is unfortunately 
 unaware. The superior and general officers remain satisfied with 
 the experiments tried with the first and still incomplete patterns, 
 those of 1876, 1877, and 1878 ; they do not believe in the results 
 obtained with the new 1880 pattern, and with the shovel-tube. 
 Their position is taken up, and their judgment passed. They 
 decline to come and see the firing of the present day ; they do not 
 even deign to lake any notice of it. If questioned in political 
 circles, they reply that the torpedo is still in its infancy, that it can- 
 not be reckoned upon, and should still less be taken into consi- 
 deration. They expend all their faith upon ironclads and enor- 
 mous guns, the progress of which they watched in the bygone 
 days of their youth or manhood. Every question having reference 
 to the torpedo is repulsed by them with irony or ennui. The 
 result is that we possess neither the personnel nor materiel neces- 
 sary towards the employment of the terrible weapon our neighbours 
 are studying and developing before we do. 
 
 The Japan is almost the only vessel upon which the locomotive 
 torpedo may be said to have become really practical. It makes 
 about 200 experiments every month, and never loses a torpedo. 
 If they are lost in other places it is, therefore, from want of practice 
 on the part of the officers and men. Even in the squadron, the 
 little firing attempted is without any definite aim or object. This 
 inaction produces inaptitude, and at every check the fault of the 
 
TORPEDO-BOATS AND GUN-BOATS. 13 
 
 operators is laid on the instrument. But the firing on the Japan 
 is done with entire success, whether at anchor or under weigh, in 
 fine or had weather, at a fixed mark, or the reverse. In its recent 
 firing, whilst under weigh, at a moving object, the deviations from 
 the mark were so slight that it may he asserted that 95 times per 
 cent, a vessel 70 metres long would have heen hit at distances 
 varying between 250 and 400 metres. People may therefore leave 
 ofi' telling us that the torpedo is not a weapon to be depended 
 upon. In the hands of a personnel trained and taught like that of 
 the Japan, it possesses admirable precision; and this may be 
 attained on any vessel going through similar training. But it is 
 asserted that, although the Whitehead torpedo may be precise, its 
 extreme delicacy will only permit its use when infinite care is 
 taken ; that the least thing would disarrange its marvellously com- 
 plicated mechanism ; and that this masterpiece of clock-making 
 could not withstand all the chances of war and distant travel. 
 
 Two facts which took place this very year prove the extent of 
 this fallacy. The only vessel in our Chinese Squadron possessing 
 Whitehead torpedoes is the ironclad La Triomphante. This vessel 
 left France two years ago. It possesses two discharging tubes and 
 eight locomotive torpedoes ; it has, as a special stafi', a torpedo 
 officer and two Whitehead mechanicians. From time to time it 
 discharges torpedoes for practice, and they are in as perfect con- 
 dition as when they started.* 
 
 The very day of the Langson surprise, Li-Hung-Chang went on 
 board this ironclad, just then anchored at Chefoo. After showing 
 him the artillery on board, and the rest of the military equipment, 
 the commander proposed that he should witness some firing with 
 Whitehead torpedoes. The discharging tube was pointed at 30 
 metres ahead of the Volta, distant 300 metres; the torpedo was 
 then discharged, and, to the great astonishment of the Petcheli 
 
 * When a torpedo is discharged, if the aim is faulty, a special mechanism makes 
 it sink to the hottom of the sea. The torpedo possesses another special mechanism, 
 which, instead of making it sink, brings it to the surface, where it can easily be 
 recovered ; so that the same torpedo may serve an indefinite period for practice — a 
 useful precaution, as they are very expensive, 
 
14 NAVAL REFORM. 
 
 Viceroy, it went perfectly straight to the spot designated. It is a 
 matter of great regret that the dimensions of the Triomphante pre- 
 vented her arriving in time for the battle of Foochoow ; she might 
 probably have sunk a Chinese vessel with one of her torpedoes, 
 discharged at 300 metres distance. 
 
 The second fact, not less striking than the first, occurred during 
 the Eussian manoeuvres. The cruiser Afrika was anchored ahead 
 of a buoy, and her broadside brought to bear on the widest side of 
 the Biorkosund Channel, so as to be in position for its guns to 
 repulse an eventual attack by torpedo-boats, when a fishing-smack 
 from among the dozens assembled came up to her from ahead, and 
 exploded a torpedo under her bows. The cruiser was immediately 
 considered to be disabled. It was then found that the opposing 
 force had hired this boat and manned it with disguised officers and 
 sailors, who had discharged the torpedo. So that this implement 
 of warfare, considered to be so fragile and delicate, was put on a 
 little fishing-boat by the Russians and kept there several days. 
 Its discharge was aided by chance, and its success was none the 
 less decisive, 
 
 The worth of locomotive torpedoes as weapons of warfare has 
 therefore been proved. But, as we have already said, so long as 
 they had to be placed on ironclads, compelled to keep out of the 
 range of their own artillery in battle, their use or even their 
 efficiency might well be doubted ; and it might be advanced that 
 their use should be restricted, or secondary. Placed on Thorney- 
 crofts, they would be terrible at the mouths of harbours and on the 
 coasts. On the open sea they were not so dangerous, and their 
 effect might still be doubtful. 
 
 This illusion, or rather this hope, could be cherished up to the 
 month of April 1884, at which period autonomous torpedo-boats, 
 capable of facing the roughest seas and making long voyages on 
 them, made their appearance in our squadron. 
 
 These torpedo-boats were not the first to come out victorious 
 from a similar trial. Those constructed by English firms, either 
 for Greece or the South American States, had gone alone to their 
 
TOBPEDO-BOATS AND GUN-BOATS. 15 
 
 destination without escort and without accident, although not 
 without encountering storms. 
 
 The two torpedo-boats possessed by our squadron, patterns 63 
 and 64, the work of M. Normand, our cleverest constructor, came 
 alone, under similar conditions and with equal success, from Brest 
 to Toulon. But experiments that were unpublished could not 
 influence opinion. 
 
 The brilliant exploit of the torpedo-boats 63 and 64, on the 14th 
 April 1884, had quite a different effect. The squadron had started 
 in the morning in a violent easterly gale. As soon as it had left 
 the shelter of the coast the breeze freshened, and at the entry of 
 the Hyeres harbour the wind rose with great force. The sea 
 became so rough that the two plated coast-guard ships Le Vengeur 
 and Le Tonnerre were quite unable to follow the ironclads ; the 
 first was obliged to seek shelter under the Bregangon Fort, and the 
 second had to proceed on her own course. 
 
 Far from imitating this example, the two torpedo-boats showed 
 extraordinary steadiness in their course ; they not only followed 
 the squadron at a speed of ten knots, but when it slackened to 
 eight knots were obliged to pass it, as their engines could not be 
 restricted to that speed. 
 
 A considerable sensation was created by this behaviour of two 
 vessels of 33 metres and 45 tons ; we may say that the fame of it 
 resounded throughout all Europe, and that it gave the initiative 
 to further experiments instituted without delay by all the other 
 maritime nations. From that date it was no longer doubtful that 
 the problem of fast navigation on relatively minute boats was 
 solved. 
 
 These essays in navigation were pursued, and the torpedo-boats 
 68 and 64 remained with the squadron. They accompanied it to 
 Corsica^ Algiers, Tunis, Morocco, and Corfu, and went across the 
 whole western basin of the Mediterranean with it. Although they 
 were so small, and so little above water, they enjoyed complete 
 security, and never suffered any serious loss, even in bad weather or 
 bad seas. 
 
16 NAVAL REFORM. 
 
 Of course, in protracted gales (the longest never last more than 
 four or five days), some precautions were necessary, and they had 
 to he handled with care ; but this must be done with every ship, 
 and big ironclads are alone exempt from this. Their machines 
 proved to he excellent, and only met with one difiBoulty — that of 
 conforming to the normal speed of a squadron. Their slowest pace 
 is eight to nine knots. But this is only another advantage, for in 
 attacking squadrons, torpedo-boats ought to possess the greater 
 speed. Speed and agility are precisely the conditions for their 
 success. 
 
 The sea-going properties of torpedo-boats have, therefore, been 
 completely proved. Their worth, from a military point of view, 
 still remains to be seen. But many naval men assert that, small 
 though they be, torpedo-boats would never escape the vigilance of 
 ironclads, as they could be distinguished at a great distance, and 
 would certainly be sunk before reaching them. 
 
 Ironclads are armed with special guns ; Hotohkiss, Nordenfeldt, 
 &c. They are very light, and are placed in the tops and all along 
 the ship's sides, whence they can open fire on all assailants. But 
 this means of protection is much less certain than is imagined, and 
 it could only be used if the torpedo-boats were seen when far 
 enough off to be kept for some minutes under fire by the iron- 
 clads. 
 
 Thanks to their speed, the torpedo-boats can advance with 
 lightning rapidity, and if only perceived at a distance of a few 
 hundred metres, nothing could stand any chance against them. 
 The danger is less imminent in daylight, when, unless there is a fog 
 or the smoke of battle envelopes the ship, the eye can sweep the 
 whole circle of the horizon without intermission. 
 
 The ironclad is provided with two electric lamps, and they cast 
 their rays far over the sea. But these rays only light up one spot 
 at a time ; all the rest is plunged in shadow, made all the deeper 
 by the contrast. If the ironclad is attacked by several torpedo- 
 boats, it may be able to sink one or two that it has sighted by 
 means of this electric light ; but whilst conducting operations it 
 
TOEPEDO-BOATS AND GUN-BOATS. 17 
 
 would probably be blown up itself by the others. Moreover, 
 everyone knows how a constant and active watch exhausts a naval 
 personnel, especially when its cause of anxiety is the gravest peril. 
 An ironclad pursued by torpedo-boats is condemned to an inces- 
 sant watch, enough to demoralise the most veteran crew. The 
 machines themselves suffer from this perpetual strain ; the electric 
 lamps have always to be kept alight, always to be in motion, and 
 become worn out in this forced service. At first, both men and 
 instruments are perfectly ready and in good condition, and are, 
 therefore, proof against any surprises. But in the long run, fatigue, 
 uncertainty, and sustained effort produce unavoidable consequences. 
 A few seconds of lassitude and forgetfulness, on the part of the 
 sailors or oflBcers of the watch, suffice. Some mechanism may go 
 out of order, a luminous ray may go out or deviate, and horrible 
 disasters result. 
 
 These are not purely theoretical arguments and inductions 
 devoid of truth. At night the result is certain. Big vessels of 
 moderate speed have been attacked by torpedo-boats in our own 
 experiments as well as in those of certain foreign squadrons. 
 Everywhere the result has been the same. Everywhere the 
 dwarf has killed the giant. Everywhere the big ship has been 
 reached by the destroyer, and been unable to resist it. The 
 movable defence force at Toulon was the first to attempt these 
 experiments in warfare. Watchful as the ships might be, and fore* 
 warned as they were of the intended attack by the torpedo-boats, 
 and supplied with powerful electric lights, the torpedo-boats had 
 invariably the advantage over them. One or more of the assailants 
 was always able to get near enough to the vessels they were 
 attacking, and to discharge the torpedoes with unerring aim before 
 there was time to signal their presence. 
 
 We will not recount the details of these experiments worked 
 under the enlightened direction of Admiral Du Petit-Thonars. We 
 limit ourselves to recalling what was accomplished later on by our 
 evolutionary squadron, wherein Admirals Jaures and Aube took the 
 initiative. Quite as great an impression was made by the attack 
 
 2 
 
18 NAVAL BEFORM. 
 
 upon this squadron, off the coast of Algiers with the two torpedo- 
 hoats 68 and 64, as by that undertaken with the same boats in the 
 heavy gales off the islands of Hyeres. 
 
 It may not, however, have been noticed how essentially 
 favourable to the ironclads all the conditions were of this attack. 
 
 It is generally admitted that at least three torpedo-boats (thirty- 
 nine men and 600,000 francs) are required to combat one ironclad 
 with any chance of success (700 men and twenty million francs). 
 
 Now, in the experiments to which we have alluded, two torpedo- 
 boats had to fight against six ironclads, warned as to the time of 
 attack, and favoured by specially brilliant moonlight for the 
 look-out. 
 
 It is quite certain that in time of war the moment of attack can 
 never be known, and that the assailants will almost always choose 
 a dark and sombre night, so as to be less easily discovered by the 
 electric light, the rays of which are to a great extent absorbed by 
 the vapour of the damp atmosphere. 
 
 Therefore the squadron had altogether exceptional advantages, 
 which ought to have insured its success. 
 
 Nevertheless, although the torpedo-boats had to face every 
 obstacle, although twelve electric rays were employed to discover 
 them, it was only at a distance of 1,200 rnelres, that is to say 
 about seventy seconds before the right moment for discharging their 
 torpedoes, that they were perceived by the flagship Richelieu. 
 
 The alarm had scarcely been given before the torpedo-boats were 
 upon the squadron, and it is surely not too much to assert that in 
 a serious attack one at least of these vessels would have been 
 disabled. 
 
 Whatever effect may have been produced by such decisive experi- 
 ments, they failed to disarm the opponents of torpedoes and 
 torpedo-boats in France. Care was taken not to renew them in the 
 squadron, for fear that the result might again be in favour of the 
 engine and boat against which there is such inveterate prejudice.* 
 
 * A new experiment was, however, tried last spring. Three torpedo-boats 
 attacked the squadron with complete success. But silence was maintained as to 
 this fresh proof, even more decisive than the first. 
 
TOBPEDO-BOATS AND GUN-BOATS. 19 
 
 Germany, Austria, and Bussia are eager in the use of the tor- 
 pedo. England and France, on the contrary, do everything they 
 can to hinder its progress. It is as if the two great maritime 
 nations of Europe knew hy instinct that this great naval revolution 
 is preparing danger for them. 
 
 " Pitt is the greatest idiot in the world," said Admiral St. 
 Vincent when the first torpedoes invented by Fulton were favour- 
 ably considered by the English statesman. " Pitt is the greatest 
 idiot in the world if he encourages a system of warfare that would 
 be useless to those who are masters of the sea, and which, if it 
 succeeds, will deprive them of that supremacy." 
 
 This argument might hold good in 1805, it was even prudent ; 
 but, now that the discovery is in universal use, it would be no less 
 a folly to ignore it than it would formerly have been to encourage 
 it when as yet unknown and of no weight. 
 
 England and France are on thc^rong tack. Instead of accepting 
 the inevitable, instead of recognising that the past is gone, and 
 that the conditions of naval supremacy are altered ; instead of sub- 
 mitting their war-ships to the necessary alterations, they prefer 
 to shut their eyes and deny evidence. Heaven grant they may 
 not be cruelly punished for this. Faithful to worn-out traditions, 
 these are the sole nations that keep a squadron armed all the year 
 round, fondly imagining that this will insure their superiority over 
 their rivals. 
 
 The Austrians, Germans, and Italians go to work quite diffe- 
 rently. Persuaded that squadrons armed throughout the winter 
 cost a great deal, do little service and execute very few manoeuvres, 
 they prefer to arm their ironclads only during a limited period of 
 the summer. To make up for this, they are not satisfied with 
 putting three or four ships on the water, but, concentrating all 
 their available force on the sea, they execute endless manoeuvres, 
 and thus train a considerable body of men to maritime life. 
 
 During the summer of 1884 the Italians mobilised almost all 
 their torpedo-boats; and the Austrians, with a budget of only thirty 
 millions, whereas ours reaches nearly two hundred millions {francs), 
 
 2 * 
 
20 NAVAL HEFORM. 
 
 armed six ironclads, six torpedo-boats, and three despatch-boats, 
 and executed manoeuvres with them we should not have dared to 
 undertake with our squadron. They separated their fifteen boats 
 into two divisions, each comprising three ironclads, a despatch- 
 boat, and three torpedo-boats; the admiral's ship remaining 
 neutral. These two divisions, after exercising together, simulated 
 a squadron fight. They advanced towards each other, each iron- 
 clad having a torpedo-boat on either beam. When at a suitable 
 distance, the artillery opened fire, the vessels disappeared in the 
 smoke, and the torpedo-boats then seized the opportunity to dash 
 into the fight. No sooner were they perceived than they were met 
 by the fire of guns and musketry from the tops ; but very often 
 they were only perceived after the torpedoes were already placed. 
 
 These manoeuvres comprised 300 shots discharged as much 
 from the ironclads as from the torpedo-boats ; the latter further 
 effected a dozen night-attacks under entirely various conditions. 
 Sometimes the squadron was anchored, and defended itself; at 
 other times it was in motion, taking to flight before the torpedo- 
 boats, and endeavouring to annihilate them with its fire. 
 
 The results furnished by this campaign were very remarkable ; 
 nine times out of ten the torpedo-boats succeeded in their attacks, 
 and probably they have thence derived rules of naval strategy of 
 which we may be entirely ignorant — for the military representative 
 despatched from Vienna to assist at these experiments was a lieu- 
 tenant-colonel in the cavalry. 
 
 The Kussian manoeuvres were even better than the Austrian. 
 Last year they mobilised all their vessels on the Baltic and 
 divided them into two squadrons. The vice-admiral in charge 
 of the torpedo-boats took the command of one, and the other was 
 under the admiral in command of the artillery. These two squad- 
 rons were disposed on a given day, at a distance of sixty miles 
 from each other, and thence began a perfect little war: a war of 
 reconnaissances ; a war of torpedoes ; attacks by day, attacks by 
 night, an attack on the ports and fortifications by one of the fleets; 
 everything was tried. 
 
*OBPBDO.-BOATS AND GUN-BOATS. 21 
 
 The arbitrators appointed to judge the firing had been chosen by 
 the Ministry, and were distributed over the various ships. Unfor- 
 tunately we possess very scanty information as to these important 
 manoeuvres, in which guns were so favourably tested against tor- 
 pedoes. We only know that from the very beginning of the 
 operations the iron-clad frigate Wladimir-Mo?iomach was suddenly 
 confronted by the enemy, and attacked with such vigour by its 
 torpedo-boats that she hardly had time to open fire before they 
 were upon her. 
 
 Later on a general attack by the opposing torpedo-boats and 
 the spar-torpedo-boats on the Tschichatschef division anchored in 
 the Transmund roads, was again entirely successful. The torpedo- 
 boats were recognised, and the whole force of the artillery was 
 directed against them. 
 
 Meanwhile, the spar-torpedo-boats came down unnoticed upon 
 the ships of the division. Protected by the fog and the clouds of 
 smoke, they approached first one and then another of the ships, 
 placed their torpedoes, and then fled in an opposite direction. To- 
 wards the end it was no longer a battle, but a massacre of ships. 
 Being quite unable to reach the spar-torpedo-boats, the torpedo- 
 boats under Admiral Tschichatschef endeavoured in vain to repulse 
 them. In the opinion of every onlooker, three-quarters of the 
 squadron would have been destroyed ; its situation would have been 
 most dangerous, as it was constantly enveloped in fog and smoke. 
 
 In another manoeuvre, the frigate Swietlana, the strongest in 
 the squadron, and protected, moreover, by defensive outrigger 
 torpedoes, was destroyed by three torpedo-boats. The ironclads 
 Kreml and Perwenec were equally sunk. Finally, the monitor 
 Carodejka, and the despatch-boat Zemcug, came upon the torpedo- 
 boats as they passed the batteries at Cronstadt with the squadron, 
 ^nd were considered as destroyed. 
 
 And, lastly, two torpedo-boats were sent against an old gun- 
 boat, the Ossetr, and discharged Whitehead torpedoes at it. The 
 first torpedo struck the Ossetr aft, and, bursting, sent up a column 
 of water and wrecked wood. A second hit the still floating hulk, 
 
22 KAVAL EEPOBM. 
 
 and entirely destroyed it. Thus, it is evident that we may draw 
 the same conclusions from the Kussian manoeuvres as from the 
 Austrian.* 
 
 Eussia has entire confidence in torpedo-boats and in torpedoes. 
 She already possesses more than a hundred torpedo-boats of the 
 first class, and indefatigably continues to construct others. 
 
 But we must specially give our attention to the German experi- 
 ments. For several years Germany seems to have conceived the 
 idea of placing her naval strength on a par with her military force. 
 At first she took the usual method, and constructed more or less 
 indifi'erent ironclads, which more or less disappointed her. But 
 she soon changed her tactics. In view of the indecision now sub- 
 sisting as to the future instruments of naval warfare, she speedily 
 comprehended that it was of the first importance to get together 
 an exoellent j)ersonnel, and to procure the greatest possible number 
 of these inexpensive torpedo-boats, destined, whatever happens, to 
 play a foremost part in the future. Giving up expensive construc- 
 tions, she set to work under General Caprivi, the Naval Minister, 
 who appears to be a very able man, and employed the same means 
 in the organisation of her naval force as those whereby she formed 
 her incomparable force on land. She increased the number of 
 her crews, and gave them a complete course of instruction. In 
 1884 she mobilised her whole available materiel, and went through 
 very important manoeuvres at three different spots on the Baltic 
 and the North Sea. " In a few years," an English journal, the 
 Army and Navy Gazette, just]y observes, "Germany will be able 
 to take the lead in a naval coalition in any part of the world what- 
 soever. She continues to increase the number of her torpedo- 
 boats and to improve their quality. She is evidently ambitious of 
 naval power. The tenacity she shows towards the attainment of it 
 is a certain pledge of her success. Extreme care is given to in- 
 struction and to the equipment of her ships. The remarkable 
 
 * Since these lines were written, a complete acootint of the Russian manojuvres 
 has been given by The Yacht, in its June numbers. They were even more decisive 
 than we have stated above. 
 
TOEPEDO-BOATS AND GUN-BOATS. 23 
 
 manceuvres executed by her fleet are a lesson and a warning to 
 England." 
 
 This lesson is not only for England ; we cannot sufficiently 
 take it to heart ourselves. Germany has, perhaps, studied the 
 offensive and defensive rdle of torpedoes and torpedo-boats more 
 than any other Power. Her manoeuvres have proved that the use 
 of these engines and boats would make it almost impossible for a 
 squadron to effect a bombardment. 
 
 One of our admirals, Admiral Aube, had already asserted this 
 fact, but it was placed beyond dispute by a feigned attack on 
 Dantzig, undertaken by the German squadron. The squadron was 
 rapidly enveloped by the smoke ; the volume and density of this 
 smoke naturally increased in proportion to the quantity of powder 
 used by the huge artillery on the ironclads and the coast batteries, 
 which proves that, the more formidable the artillery, so much the 
 more favourable to the torpedo are the conditions of attack. At 
 times the ships were so completely concealed by the smoke that 
 the gunners of the batteries had only the flashes of the enemy's 
 fire to assist them in taking aim. 
 
 One can understand how easy it is for a torpedo-boat to profit 
 by this darkness, and to approach and blow up an ironclad. This 
 is only one, but one very instructive instance of the German 
 manoeuvres. The Gazette de Voss sums up the general lessons 
 which have flowed from them : — 
 
 " Not only were the ironclads provided with the apparatus for 
 explosive torpedoes ; but a special division of torpedo-boats was 
 attached to the squadron at the end of July, and later on another 
 set of experiments were added that the new torpedo-boats might 
 be tried. The result of these trials has confirmed the value of 
 this submarine engine for the defence of the German shores. The 
 idea of placing one or two torpedo-boats alongside of each iron- 
 clad seems to be finally given up. It is found preferable to 
 build torpedo-boats of larger dimensions, so as to render them 
 thoroughly sea-going and to link them to the squadron ironclad 
 as a sort of floating appendix. 
 
24 NAVAL BEFOBM. 
 
 " This year's experiments here proved that enormous ironclads 
 can he sunk by the simple explosion of a torpedo. Even in the 
 brightest moonlight, and notwithstanding the utmost vigilance, 
 no ship is safe from attacks that may be directed against her, 
 especially if at anchor and exposed on a coast abundantly supplied 
 with torpedo-boats. Even if moving, the blockading ships w^ould 
 not be in safety, seeing that the torpedo-boats can follow them and 
 recognise their prey by the lights, which the enemy has great difiS- 
 culty in covering if moving along with the squadron. If the ship 
 is hit in her water-tight compartments, she may be considered as 
 disabled, by the single fact that she thereby loses the power of 
 evolution. 
 
 " The increase of strength for the ironclad, carried out by the 
 recommendations of the English admiral Symonds, would not 
 obviate that result. As far as we can at present judge, there are 
 no means of protecting even the most perfect and powerful fighting 
 ships against the destructive eifects of torpedo-boats. An attempt 
 has been made to keep watch over the squadron ironclads, by means 
 of guardships placed at a distance of 500 metres from them ; but 
 experience has proved that even in the brightest moonlight, and 
 supposing the crew to be as wide awake as in the daytime, it is 
 impossible to ensure the security of the threatened vessel. 
 
 " The idea was started to surround ships at anchor with a sort of 
 submarine girdle of metallic network, but this gave only very 
 unpractical results ; seeing that if the boat thus protected were to 
 be attacked, it would be unable to move, and would therefore lose 
 all means of defence. As to the torpedo-boats, they are difficult 
 to hit, and have the advantage over large vessels that when the 
 torpedo is exploded they can be easily steered so as to avoid the 
 concussion. 
 
 " Nevertheless, it is only advisable to employ them if they can 
 surprise the enemy either when favoured by the darkness of night, 
 a fog, the smoke from the firing, or if they can suddenly appear 
 from ambush. In what especially relates to the torpedoes them- 
 selves, it has been found, in the experiments made of different 
 
tOBPBDO-BOATS AND GUN-BOAtS. 2 5 
 
 systems, that the German Navy alone possesses the most mur- 
 derous engines of this nature. It employs a torpedo invented by 
 an Austrian naval officer ; the secret of the invention was hought 
 by the Admiralty at the price of 225,000 francs, and the German 
 Navy itself undertakes its development. This torpedo has at the 
 present moment attained such a degree of perfection that it consti- 
 tutes one of the marvels of modern times." 
 
 This shows us the extent of German enthusiasm for the tor- 
 pedo ; their chief end is, moreover, to possess the greatest possible 
 number of torpedo-boats. Last year seventy were constructed and 
 this year the number came up to 150. Austria imitates the 
 German example ; the Naval Minister asked and obtained a credit 
 of 1,778,000 florins from the delegates, as a first instalment for the 
 construction of a fleet of sixty-four torpedo-boats of the three dif- 
 ferent kinds — torpedo-boats for direct attack, scout torpedo-boats, 
 and those for the open sea destined to bear the brunt of the 
 battle. 
 
 Germany has only one ironclad in the stocks ; Austria is giving 
 up their construction entirely, and contents herself with getting 
 other despatch-vessels ready. It will be seen that the lessons 
 derived from these manoeuvres are not lost upon the Allied Em- 
 pires. It is said that they are inspired by the one spirit, or, 
 rather, that it was through German instigation that Austria under- 
 took her successful experiments in 1884. In case of a common 
 war the two navies are to be organised on one system. England 
 and France are, therefore, alone in their opposition to the general 
 movement. England has, however, ceased to hold out more than 
 a feeble opposition. The manoeuvres of the Channel Fleet 
 silenced the most determined opponents of the torpedo. A clever 
 officer, escaping observation, led a fleet of torpedo-boats to within 
 less than 400 metres of the vessel to be attacked, although it 
 defended itself as best it could by its electric lights. 
 
 In another experiment the confusion was such that the watch 
 fired on ordinary boats filled with excursionists, thus showing 
 how difficult it would be for an ironclad in the confusion of battle 
 
26 NAVAL BEFORM. 
 
 to distinguish friendly torpedo-boats from those of the enemy, and 
 only to hit the latter. 
 
 The new English constructions include a number of torpedo- 
 boats ; and Lord Norlhbrook declared, in a recent discussion, that 
 if England continued to build ironclads, it must be that she was 
 rich enough to incur military expenditure which probably would 
 be useless. 
 
 France is, therefore, alone in altogether denying evidence. She 
 is so proud of the ironclads that are not afloat, but are still in 
 the stocks, that she has only ordered seven more torpedo-boats 
 this year of the same pattern from the clever constructor of 
 patterns 63 and 64.* 
 
 3. 
 
 The discussion may be endlessly prolonged as to whether squad- 
 rons of ironclads would resist the attack of a fleet of torpedo- 
 boats. We ourselves consider that it is decided by the result 
 shown at the manoeuvres of every European Power. It is no 
 longer a question of pure theory, but of facts proved by experi- 
 ments. Nations who, like Germany and Austria, renounce the 
 construction of ironclads and order numerous torpedo-boats, 
 therefore take a clear and prophetic view of the future, and this 
 will ensure for them a naval force superior to those of their 
 rivals. 
 
 It is long since Admiral Aube wrote : " A squadron, being more 
 or less a collection of ironclads, is no longer the guarantee of 
 naval power." And quite recently M. Gougeard, the former 
 Jifaval Administrator in the Gambetta Cabinet, said in a pamphlet 
 
 * The Temps announces, in its number of the 22nd June 1885, that the French 
 have ordered thirty-four first-class torpedo-boats from the trade. This news 
 appears true ; but we must, nevertheless, show that the description of our future 
 torpedo-boats is not correct as given by Le Temps. They will not be overloaded 
 by an equipment of spar-torpedoes, to the detriment of speed or coaling, and they 
 will not discharge torpedoes of 4™ 40, as upon the torpedo-boat of pattern 68, 
 on which the tubes are not high enough above water. These torpedoes are 
 entirely inferior to the 5* 95 torpedo, and the gun-cotton used with them is quite 
 insufficient. 
 
TOBPEDO-BOATS AND GUN-BOATS. 27 
 
 which gave rise to much discussion: ''It is, and always will be, 
 quite ridiculous to risk 12 to 15 millions, or even more, against 
 200,000 or 300,000 francs, and six hundred men against twelve." 
 
 Thus, on this point, doubts are gradually disappearing, and 
 the defenders of ironclads are reduced, as a last resource, to 
 speak of the enormous sums spent on the actual materiel, from 
 which it would be, in their opinion, disastrous to draw no profit. 
 
 But it is not enough to recognise the necessity of building more 
 torpedo-boats as fast as may be. The discussion again re-opens 
 whenever the question arises as to what pattern shall be employed 
 for the next fighting-vessel. The question would seem to be de- 
 cided for us, as the torpedo-boats 63 and 64 have given evidence 
 of remarkable naval and military qualities. This is not the case, 
 however. The torpedo-boats had no sooner returned from scour- 
 ing the Mediterranean in every direction and in all weathers, than 
 M. Gougeard, in the pamphlet we have just quoted, accuses them 
 of being "nutshells" incapable of really facing tempests and 
 holding their own on the sea, and he proposes to substitute for 
 them what might be called a giant torpedo-boat with an armoured 
 deck 95 metres long, a mean draught of 4 m. 50 and a displace- 
 ment of 1,780 tons. And this disposition to augment the dimen- 
 sions of torpedo-boats has not only shown itself in controversy, 
 but also in practice, and has exercised an important influence in 
 our constructions. 
 
 At present we have torpedo-boats of 350 tons ; we shall soon 
 have them with a displacement of 1,200 tons. England has out- 
 stripped us in this path ; she has gone with a bound from the 
 small torpedo-boats to the Polyphemus of 2,640 tons displacement, 
 and 73 metres in length. If this movement towards increased 
 size continues, if from scout torpedo-boats we come to despatch- 
 torpedo-boats, then to torpedo-boats with armoured decks, we 
 shall at last, by perfectly logical sequence, arrive at the monster 
 ships of the present day. If this is to happen, it would be better 
 to keep on with the existing state of matters, and to continue 
 wasting the millions of our Budget until the next war. 
 
^8 NAVAL BEfOEM. 
 
 The reason given for thus increasing the size of torpedo- 
 boats is, that they are judged incapable in their restricted dimen- 
 sions of risking the pursuit of ironclads, and that ihey are at the 
 same time quite unprotected against the fire of these ironclads. 
 It is desired to make them more thoroughly sea-going; more 
 commodious for the crew, and less vulnerable to the enemy's bullets. 
 The hopeless chimera of invulnerability so long pursued in giant 
 vessels since ironclads were invented, is now being attempted for 
 these very boats which are destined to destroy all chance of it in 
 the former. Nothing shows such a want of common-sense. It is 
 not that the little torpedo-boats are not blessed with a sort of 
 invulnerability; but we should take the conditions well into account 
 that cause them to be invulnerable. To escape being captured by 
 the enemy they have three essential qualities ; speed, number, and 
 small dimensions. Their speed gives them the choice of the 
 moment of attack, enables them to strike suddenly upon the enemy, 
 and fall upon him so swiftly as to prevent his hitting them or 
 fleeing before them when he feels unable to offer resistance. 
 
 By the confession of every sailor, speed is now the best weapon. 
 Thanks toMts speed, the Huascar accomplished exploits in the 
 war between Chili and Peru which made the name of the unfortu- 
 nate Admiral Gran famous ; but when Fortune betrayed it, when, 
 taken between two fires, this heroic ship, deprived of its officers, 
 covered with blood and ruin, was obliged to give itself up to the 
 Chilians, notwithstanding its armour and large but useless artillery, 
 the wooden frigate Union, its companion cruiser, found means, by 
 its still greater speed, to escape from the scene of battle to con- 
 tinue its adventures, its brave fights and glorious enterprises. 
 
 Number is a still more important guarantee of invulnerability. 
 In truth, what does it matter in a fleet of torpedo-boats if several 
 come to grief when others, reaching the goal, annihilate the enemy? 
 The destruction of two or three torpedo-boats cannot in material 
 loss equal the destruction of a first-class ironclad. The loss in 
 men is not greater than what would be produced on the same iron- 
 clad by a lucky shot sweeping its decks, or destroying the officers 
 
TOBPEDO-BOATS AND GUN-BOATS. 29 
 
 and quartermasters in the conning-tower, as happened on board 
 the Httascar. 
 
 Then, for the price of an ironclad we should have at least sixty 
 torpedo-boats. The squadron does not exist that would be capable 
 of withstanding the attack of such a flotilla even in broad day- 
 light and without being taken unawares. What occurred on the 
 river Min is decisive on this point. 
 
 Notwithstanding its excellent locomotive torpedoes, the ironclad 
 La Triomphante sank no boat belonging to the enemy, because, 
 retarded by its size, it could not reach the fight in time, and, 
 moreover, it was impossible for it to move cleverly in the midst 
 of a light fleet, on a river much too narrow and shallow for it. 
 
 On the other hand, the 45 and 46 torpedo-boats, although 
 only armed with spar-torpedoes, resolutely threw themselves upon 
 the Chinese squadron and inflicted serious losses upon it. One 
 of them was struck by a bullet from a Chinese vessel to which it 
 presented its broadside. 
 
 If, instead of having to do with untrained artillerists, the tor- 
 pedo-boats 45 and 46 had been face to face with European 
 artillerists, probably both would have perished at the first attack ; 
 but if other torpedo-boats had immediately followed them, these 
 last would have hit the enemy before it had time to reload and fire 
 another round at them. 
 
 Now the torpedo-boats 45 and 46 are obliged to get close to the 
 sides of a vessel before they can blow it up. The greatest speed 
 of the torpedo-boats 63 and 64 is, on the contrary, two knots in 
 excess of that of patterns 45 and 46, and they can discharge their 
 torpedoes at 200 and 400 metres distance. 
 
 In a squadron fight the first line of torpedo-boats would risk 
 being destroyed in broad day-light; but, whilst they disappeared, 
 the second line would certainly annihilate the iron-clad squadron. 
 Number and speed are, therefore, special conditions of invulner- 
 ability, as they do not merely apply to each separate instrument 
 of warfare, but to the united strength of these instruments. 
 
 Small size is of the same importance as a means of safety. A 
 
30 NAVAL REFORM. 
 
 miniature torpedo-boat need only present its bow to the enemy, 
 which means such a small target that it would be very difficult to 
 hit it. The smaller the torpedo-boat, the fewer risks it runs, and 
 the less it is exposed to perish. 
 
 It is therefore clear that the first condition to be observed in 
 building a torpedo-boat is to keep it within the smallest dimen- 
 sions. It is utter folly to exact more from it than that it should 
 be capable of going anywhere or in any weather, and that its 
 military equipment should be conveniently arranged for managing 
 the vessel. But navigation on the small boats is supposed to be 
 a chimera. This is to forget the [history of all the ancient flotillas 
 as related by Admiral Jurien de la Gravi^re; it is, further, to 
 forget that Christopher Columbus crossed the ocean and discovered 
 the new world in simple caravels. 
 
 Whatever may be advanced, the torpedo-boat of 33 metres and 
 45 tons is a thorough sea-going vessel, and fit for any voyage. 
 We must acknowledge that they are not at all comfortable quarters, 
 and that the torpedoes are so cramped for room that it is very diffi- 
 cult to work them. It would have sufficed to give the boats 
 36 or 37 metres to remedy this disadvantage. The first were of 
 41 metres and 71 tons. There would be nothing to complain of if 
 this last pattern were adhered to, and were the limit, instead of the 
 beginning of increase of size. 
 
 The torpedo-boat of 41 metres would still be very small, but 
 no one would venture to say that it could not face the ocean. Let 
 us, therefore, accept it as our definite type in the future. 
 
 We would only ask that equal speed should be bestowed on it, as 
 on those of patterns 63 and 64 ; say a maximum of 21 knots. But 
 we mean real speed, not merely that obtained by experiments. In 
 the trials made, fully-laden vessels are not referred to, with their 
 crews, fittings, and materiel. The result is that the true speed is 
 always a little short of the official speed. 
 
 For instance, a torpedo-boat having made 21 knots in the trial 
 trips, only makes 19 or even 18 when fully equipped. Now, as speed 
 is the first condition for the success of a man-of-war, any mistake 
 
TOEPEDO-BOATS AND GUN-BOATS. 81 
 
 as to speed is of incontestable importance. It is to be hoped that 
 our torpedo-boats will not stop at 21 knots. Torpedo-boats have 
 already been spoken of as making 25 knots. Boilers are further 
 talked of which will ensure this increased speed, and these are 
 known as the Belleville boilers. They are lighter than the others, 
 and can stand a pressure of 12 to 15 atmospheres, whilst the 
 present boilers cannot exceed 9 atmospheres ; lastly, they can be 
 heated by sea-water without risk, and cannot explode. They ought 
 to be tried on one or more of the torpedo-boats about to be con- 
 structed. The real motto of the modern navy should be " Speed, 
 more speed, and yet more speed." 
 
 4. 
 
 In dealing a mortal blow to the ironclad, the advent of autono- 
 mous torpedo-boats, armed with locomotive torpedoes, at once puts 
 an end to the race which has for some years gone on between the 
 ironclad and its guns. 
 
 As soon as the armour has disappeared, shattered by the torpedo, 
 the big gun will no longer have any function to fulfil. It might, 
 indeed, be employed against protected batteries at the ports or on 
 the coasts ; but this would be to condemn itself to certain failure. 
 For, although there may be limits to the endurance of armour on 
 the sea, and if in consequence the moment is sure to come when the 
 shot will perforate the armour, it is by no means the same thing on 
 land. Defensive works can be protected for ever. Walls of sand 
 can be utilised to raise works with terraces, into which big bullets 
 may sink without doing the least harm ; as happened in the case 
 of the English at Alexandria. 
 
 We shall probably witness a revolution in the art of defending 
 ports as well as in the art of fighting on the open sea. Hence- 
 forward this defence will be chiefly carried out with torpedo-boats 
 coming suddenly out from the indentations of the coast, and roam- 
 ing about to arrest the course of the assailing squadrons. What 
 will be the use henceforth of monster guns at such a high price, 
 and still more expensive fortifications to contain them ? 
 
32 NAVAL EEFOBM. 
 
 If we persist in the present system of defence, it is plain that 
 coastal warfare will chiefly consist in burning the open ports and 
 unprotected towns, as it will have become impossible to attack 
 strongholds. 
 
 It was proved at the bombardment of Alexandria that, the for- 
 midable artillery on the Inflexible and the other ironclads produced 
 but little effect upon the big guns mounted behind the epaulements 
 without embrasures, or on the disappearing gun-carriages on the 
 Moncrieff system. 
 
 Those most competent to have an opinion, judged that given a 
 'personnel equal in number and skill on both sides, a fleet com- 
 posed of the best ironclads afloat could not obtain a victory that 
 would compensate for the dangers to which she would be exposed 
 in a duel with fortifications. 
 
 " If the Alexandrian forts," says the United Service Gazette, 
 " had been armed with better guns, like those to be met with on 
 the German and French coasts, and if the guns had been served by 
 German or French artillerists, the results of the war would have 
 been very different. Probably a third of our fleet would have been, ■ 
 if not actually sunk, at least disabled and practically lost/' 
 
 Should the risk of such losses be incurred, when the only naval 
 strength of a great nation consists of a small number of ironclads, 
 which take years to rebuild and repair ? 
 
 The bombardment of Alexandria has further demonstrated tliat 
 if the big guns of an ironclad risked being quickly disabled by the 
 resistance of the forts, the only method of doing them serious 
 harm was to use the small artillery carried on swift vessels. 
 
 Observing that the fire of Fort Marabout was annoying the inner 
 division, the commander of the gun-vessel Condor took advantage 
 of her light draught of water, advanced so as to get within range of 
 the fort, and opened fire, taking care to present the smallest possible 
 surfiice to the enemy. The latter concentrated fire on the gun- 
 vessel, but could never succeed in seriously damaging it. The 
 commander of the Condor had placed a Nordenfeldt machine-gun, 
 which he had borrowed from the Inflexible, on his foretop, and the 
 
XOBPEDO-BOATS AND GUN-BOATS. 33 
 
 gun belonging to his own boat in the main-top, whilst a rocket- 
 tube was fitted on the bowsprit. With these various weapons he 
 opened fire on the embrasures of the forts. The firing of the 
 Nordenfeldt, chiefly, caused such losses amidst the men serving the 
 guns that they began to desert ; three other gun-boats shortly 
 joined the Condor, and, following the same tactics, soon succeeded 
 in reducing the artillery of Fort Marabout -to silence. Struck by 
 their success. Admiral Seymour hastened to call for the co-opera- 
 tion of the four gun-boats in bombarding Mex, a fort provided 
 with earthworks, which made it a less easy conquest for the big 
 guns of the ironclads than stonework would have been. 
 
 Is not this a valuable lesson, and does it not prove that only 
 gun-vessels of small size, considerable speed, and armed with light 
 guns, can for the future measure themselves against forts ; not to 
 destroy them, but to silence them by means of lucky shots in their 
 embrasures ? Their light draught and their agility enables them to 
 change their position as often as they think fit ; to escape from the 
 fire of their adversary ; and to take the best position for rendering 
 their own efficacious. 
 
 At Sfax the water on the shores was so shallow, that our iron- 
 clads were obliged to keep such a space between them that they 
 could only use their turret-guns. 
 
 Gun-boats would have got near enough to the shore to fire at 
 short range, not only on the works but on the town. 
 
 Henceforward, as fortifications are invulnerable, or, at least, as 
 they can only be attacked through the embrasures, arsenals and 
 towns are what must be aimed at. Small guns will suffice for this 
 purpose. 
 
 It has been calculated that the price of the Duperre would give 
 us 25 torpedo-boats besides 10 gun-boats, the combined broadside 
 of which would weigh 1,200 kilogrammes, nearly as much as the 
 Duperri with a broadside of 1,400 kilogrammes. There would, 
 however, be this great difierence, that the firing on the gun-boats 
 being much more rapid than that of the Duperre, their 1,200 kilo- 
 grammes of shot, passing over the fortifications to fall in showers 
 
 3 
 
34 NAVAL REFORM. 
 
 over the town, -would produce the greatest disasters, whereas the 
 huge cannon-balls of the ironclad would probably have as little 
 eflPect on the protected forts, or on earthworks, as the firing of 
 the Inflexible had on the fortifications of Alexandria. 
 
 The Duperre would be forced by its size to remain out in deep 
 water, and would be exposed to the assaults of torpedo-boats ; the 
 10 gun-boats, reckoning on their number and speed to escape 
 danger, would rush forward ; some would endeavour to disable the 
 heavy guns and those serving them by the embrasures ; others 
 would fire on the town, would force the channels, and get 
 into the harbour. Several would sink, but, so long as some 
 succeeded, what would that matter ? War cannot take place 
 without men and boats being lost, and surely it is better to lose 
 one or two gun-boats and their small crews than the third of a 
 squadron of ironclads. 
 
 If ironclads are driven out of the field by torpedoes, we shall no 
 longer require armour-piercing guns for naval engagements. What 
 we want are guns powerful enough to stop a mail steamer or an 
 unarmoured cruiser, or at most to demolish the present super- 
 structure of ironclads and to destroy the service of the guns. 
 
 Far-seeing naval men have long predicted that the most terrible 
 danger threatening the ironclads in any future naval warfare, will 
 be when they are assaulted on several sides at once by a series of 
 agile gun-boats difficult to hit. 
 
 An ordinary bullet reaching one of their turrets would suffice to 
 destroy one of the tubes of the hydraulic system in connection with 
 their guns, and would disable it entirely. 
 
 The Germans, who seem to bring the same admirable foresight 
 to bear on naval problems as that whereby they have secured the 
 most powerful military organisation in Europe, are convinced that 
 small guns would be in a position to fight successfully against big 
 ironclads, even if unaided by the torpedo. They go further than we 
 do. They do not ask for several gun-boats — they only ask for one. 
 
 The following is quoted from the Marine verordnungs blatt, 
 15th November 1883 :— 
 
TOEPED0-B0AT3 AND GUN-BOATa. 35 
 
 "The strength of the big gun is certainly formidable. But 
 would not a less formidable projectile suffice to disable the adver- 
 sary ? The chance of taking correct aim at sea is very remote, 
 as the ship and the object aimed at are both in motion. It is 
 much easier to work a gun of small dimensions, and much easier 
 to hit with it. If a shot misses, the loss is not so great as if it 
 were a projectile of 10, 15, or 20 owts., from guns of 50, 75, or 
 100 tons. Besides, each gun is equally exposed to the enemy's 
 fire. One shot in the muzzle is sufficient to disable a gun, and 
 several small guns directed against a big gun in an armour-plated 
 tower, would soon silence it. 
 
 " It would be easy for a small vessel armed with three or four 
 small guns, and with its vital parts well protected, to attack a vessel 
 like the Inflexible or the Italia from astern, and, taking advantage 
 of the rapid firing, further to reckon on a shot hitting the muzzle 
 of its only gun, or else smashing and destroying the unarmoured 
 parts. We do not want monster guns on our beautiful and powerful 
 ships. We ought to adopt guns easier worked and easier served. 
 Let us leave monster guns to giants ; they offer too large a target 
 to the enemy's fire, and are too easily hit.' ' 
 
 . Convinced by these facts, we must first find out the gun we can 
 best utilize for our navy in the system of war we think is to be 
 that of the future. We shall next see on what vessels we must 
 place them. The French navy boasts of eight guns of diflFerent 
 sizes, and each gun of the same size represents diiferent models 
 (the 1875 model, the 1880, &c.) 
 
 This causes such complications that both officers and men have 
 to go through the most intricate studies and drill. The 16-cm. 
 gun is rather too heavy to fulfil the part now assigned to artillery. 
 It would not suit small vessels. The 14-cm. is not perfect. 
 The 15-cm. gun used by the Italians and Germans would be 
 preferable. But we have not got this pattern, and we must of 
 course, use what we have got. 
 
 The destructive effects of the 14-cm. gun are, however, very 
 ample ; it is light, and can easily be carried on small vessels ; 
 
 3 * 
 
36 NAVAL EEFOEM. 
 
 it is easily worked and easily understood. Its projectile, which 
 weighs 30 kilogrammes, will do more damage in a quarter of 
 an hour than the halls from the great guns ; for the effect of one 
 monster hall will he supplemented hy the numher of bullets of 
 a smaller size, and rapidity of fire will compensate for everything 
 else. 
 
 It only remains to find an appropriate vessel for the 14-cm. 
 gun. Our opinion is that the vessel should he built on the same 
 principle as a torpedo-boat. It should be endowed with con- 
 siderable speed, and cost little ; so that the pattern may be multi- 
 plied. Lastly, it should be made as small as possible, so as to 
 escape the enemy's fire. We want a boat to be very low in the 
 water, and not to draw more than two metres except at the extreme 
 end of the stern, where we might go as far as 3 m. 50 in order to 
 be able to carry screws of sufiBcient size. 
 
 The offensive weapon of this vessel being the gun, its defensive 
 weapons would be its speed and its small size. By its speed, 
 both in proceeding and in evolutions (it would have two screws), 
 it would be free to accept or to reject fighting an enemy less swift 
 than itself; thanks to this speed, it would have nothing to fear 
 from a spar-torpedo, and would, moreover, be in too constant 
 motion for a Whitehead torpedo to hit it, even if we admit that the 
 Whitehead-torpedo, which at present is regulated for an immersion 
 of three mitres, and which in this case would pass under its keel 
 without touching it, could be regulated to a smaller immersion 
 without losing precision in firing. 
 
 The maximum length of this gunboat would he 60 mUres ; 
 the width would be a tenth of its length. The light draught 
 would enable it to go through almost any channel, which is what 
 our present men-of-war cannot do. Its armament would consist 
 of two 14-cm. guns, one in the bows, the other midships or a little 
 abaft, besides as many Hotchkiss as could be given her without 
 adding to the estimated draught. We might, perhaps, be tempted 
 to content ourselves with one gun, which would simplify the pro- 
 blem ; but we must be in a position to fire in every direction, and 
 
TOBPEDO-BOATS AND GUN-BOATS. 37 
 
 not construct vessels which would be too dear in comparison to 
 their reduced armament. The speed of this gun-boat should be 
 equal to that, of the torpedo-boats, that is to say, from 20 to 21 
 knots, later on 25, and, like them, she should take in suflBcient 
 coal to enable her to keep up 10 knots for six or eight days. She 
 would not require any masts, except, perhaps, a jury mast, so that 
 she could get away before the wind in case of injury. Under these 
 conditions the most she need cost would be a million and a half 
 {francs). The despatch torpedo-boats ordered from the Maison 
 Claparede and the Forges et Chantiers, which are as nearly as 
 possible of the same size, and are burdened with much more 
 complicated armaments, do not exceed 827,000 francs in price. 
 But the speed of these despatch torpedo-boats is not more than 
 20 knots, whilst we still keep to the same armament. There 
 would be, in consequence, an increase in the cost of the hull and 
 machinery. 
 
 Not being engineers, we cannot pretend to draw out the precise 
 plan of what we will name the 14-cm. gun-boat. We must limit 
 ourselves to a broad outline of the programme. It is not the 
 first time we attempt it, and we have, moreover, been preceded in 
 this path by Admiral Aube, a naval authority of high standing. 
 Being an earnest advocate of division of labour, M. Aube thinks 
 that this great principle should be applied in the navy as in all 
 other human afikirs. 
 
 In his opinion, the enormous ironclad intended to resist 
 spur, torpedo, and artillery, all at the same time, is not capable 
 of simultaneously using so many different weapons. Therefore 
 he asks that the fighting unities should be separate, that military 
 instruments should be classified and gun-boats constructed side 
 and side with torpedo-boats.* 
 
 Important and serious objections have been made to his sugges- 
 tions as well as to ours. 
 
 * See the article on the " Future of the French Navy " in the Revue des deux 
 Mondes of the 1st July 1874, and that of the 15th March 1882 on " Naval Defence 
 and the Ports of France." 
 
38 KAVAii eEfoeM. 
 
 If torpedoes are to have the great speed wherein lies their 
 strength, if they have proved that they can fight against a heavy sea, 
 it is because they are so extremely light. In proportion as they 
 are overloaded their quality of speed and their seaworthiness is lost. 
 
 The captains of these little vessels are so convinced of this that 
 they have been heard to complain very energetically of an addi- 
 tion of even 50 or 100 kilogrammes weight. It cannot be 
 sufficiently insisted upon, that if the constructors were able to 
 invent minute torpedo-boats possessing great speed, it was because 
 the armament of these boats was very light. It weighs, in fact, 
 only two tons ; whereas a gun of 14 cm., with its equipment, 
 weighs nearly five times as much. This diflPerence in weight is 
 easily explained. The discharging- tube is really a cannon ; but its 
 function is only to send the torpedoes a few metres, so that the 
 discharging force is always very small, and it is not necessary that 
 the tube should be able to bear to any great extent. The torpedo 
 itself contains the power required for its propulsion, in the form 
 of compressed air. It is quite another thing with the projec- 
 tile. It is only an inert mass, receiving its impulse from the enor- 
 mous pressure due to the explosion of a charge of gunpowder. To 
 enable the gun to resist this great strain it requires to be very 
 thick, and consequently heavy. 
 
 On another hand, if the torpedo weighs more than a moderate- 
 sized projectile, we must not forget that two torpedoes suffice to 
 make a boat a dangerous enemy, whereas a gun would be of no 
 use unless furnished with a considerable number of rounds. The 
 result would be that the supply for a gun of moderate dimensions 
 would weigh a great deal more than the supply necessary to a 
 discharging-tube for torpedoes. The author of a remarkable 
 article, " A Criticism on Naval Tactics from the Torpedo point of 
 View," writes: — 
 
 "Hence we can understand how different is the solution of the 
 torpedo problem to that of the gun-boat. 
 
 "When a vessel is being built her displacement is known, and the 
 different weights of which she is composed are divided in relation 
 
TOEPEDO-BOATS AND GUN-BOATS. 39 
 
 to fixed proportions, from which it is impossible to deviate. Thus, 
 on a swift boat, about 35 per cent, of the gross weight must be 
 reckoned for the hull, 45 per cent, of the total weight for the motive 
 power and condensers, 10 per cent, for the coal. 
 
 "Thus, only 10 per cent, remains for the weight of the armament, 
 the crew, spare stores, victuals, &c. 
 
 "This fraction is sufficient for the torpedo-boat, by reason of the 
 limited number of its crew and the relatively light weight of this 
 engine of war. 
 
 "But, if a gun-boat of equal speed were in question, we should 
 first bear in mind that the hull must weigh at least 40 per cent, 
 of the total, for this strength would be necessary to resist the con- 
 cussion of its armament. We should thus have only 5 per cent, left 
 to our disposal for the armament, victuals, spare stores, and crew. 
 
 "Now, the weight of a 14-cm. gun, with its whole equipment, is 
 about 10 tons. A crew of at least twenty-five men would be re- 
 quired to majiage the motive power and the armament. We may 
 calculate the weight of these twenty-five men, with their bags, 
 victuals, spare stores, and other impedimenta on board, at about 
 8 tons. This gives us a total of 18 tons, representing 5 per cent, 
 of the total weight, which brings us to the fact that a gun-boat 
 capable of great speed, and only carrying a simple little 14-cm. 
 gun, cannot he realised under 360 tons. This is a long way behind 
 our torpedo-boats of pattern 60, weighing only 50 tons ! " 
 
 There is doubtless much truth in the observations we have just 
 quoted, and we are far from stating that a gun-boat could be as 
 small and light as a torpedo-boat. We may add that she would be 
 useless if she were. The torpedo-boat must be specially swift and 
 specially small, because it comes close up to the enemy, and imme- 
 diately under its fire, to attack. But to burn ports or open har- 
 bours, to blow up powder-magazines, or even to attempt lucky 
 shots into the embrasures of batteries, the gun-boats may be at dis- 
 tances of more than 400 metres, where they will be far less exposed 
 than torpedo-boats. 
 
 All the same, we cannot agree to the figures we have just quoted, 
 
40 NAVAL REFORM. 
 
 and we still maintain that it is possible to construct rapid ships 
 that can carry reasonable guns without giving them too great 
 dimensions. 
 
 Indeed, we think we can prove that it is easy to have a swift 
 vessel which shall carry weight equal to ^Jgth of its displacement. 
 To prove this we will take three cases, which seem convincing. In 
 his pamphlet, M. Gougeard suggests the plan of a vessel which 
 would be, at the same time, a gun-boat and a torpedo-boat. This 
 vessel will have a steel deck, and will be capable of steaming 20 to 
 21 knots. We are sure that it will fulfil the expectations of M. 
 Gougeard, if approved of by M. de Bussy, the Director of our Naval 
 Constructions. Its displacement will be 1*780 tons. This is 
 evidently far too much for us. But let us see what it is to carry. 
 
 According to the author of the suggestion, it is to have : six 
 guns of 10 cm,, with equipment weighing 5 tons ; eight machine- 
 guns, with equipment, weight, say 5 tons ; five discharging tubes 
 for torpedoes, with their carriages, say 5 tons if small torpedoes 
 are used, and 7 tons if big torpedoes are used ; ten torpedoes, 
 which will weigh 2*5 tons if they are of the small pattern, and 4 
 tons if they are of the big pattern ; finally, air-pumps and 
 accumulators weighing 4 tons. Thus, the total armament amounts 
 to 46*5 tons or 50*5 tons. 
 
 Now, if we remember that this vessel of M. Gougeard's has an 
 armoured deck, seven metres long in the region over the machi- 
 nery, and four mitres forward and aft, and that a deck of this kind 
 weighs more than 200 tons, it will easily be seen that, by diminish- 
 ing its thickness by one-third, the boat would still be fully pro- 
 tected. But we altogether disapprove of this protection, being 
 persuaded that we should not aspire to making our gun-boats in- 
 vulnerable by means of armour-plating any more than our torpedo- 
 boats, even in a modified degree. 
 
 However this may be, we should have a surplus weight of 70 
 tons to dispose of. This amount, added to the 50 tons we spoke 
 of, would give 120 tons for the artillery, rather more than one- 
 fifteenth of the total displacement of the ship. 
 
Torpedo-boats and gun-boats. 41 
 
 We shall take the despatch torpedo-boats Bombe Couleverine, 
 Dague, Dragonne, Flecfie, and Lance for our second case in point, 
 They were constructed by the Maison Claparede and by the Soci6t6 
 des Forges et Chantiers, at the price we have already quoted. In 
 the bargain signed between the officials and Maison Claparede, a 
 bargain arranged, controlled, and approved of by our engineers, we 
 remark that the weight of the hull is to be 40 per cent, of the total 
 weight, the weight of the motive power 26 per cent, of the total, 
 the weight of the coal-supply 13 per cent, of the total. 
 
 We may now remark, in our turn, like the author of the pamphlet 
 we have just quoted, that, according to this calculation, we are a 
 long way from the figures which gave the weight of the motive 
 power as 45 per cent. of''the total weight. And, in making the 
 same calculations as our opponent, based on the above figures, 
 which are exact and indisputable, as we quote them from an official 
 document, we find that a fraction of 22 per cent, is left for arma- 
 ment, victuals, spare stores, and crew, instead of the 5 per cent, 
 fraction which we were allowed. 
 
 With this fraction of 22 per cent, we could easily aiford the 7 
 per cent., that is, nearly one-fifteenth, for the armament. It is 
 about the fraction set aside in the design for the despatch torpedo- 
 boats of which we speak, for the various equipments of these boats, 
 seeing that the weight of these equipments is as much as 19 tons 
 5 cwt. 
 
 We might take a very little from the masts, which we should 
 limit to a jury-mast, and from the anchors and chains, to which a 
 weight of 7 tons is, we think needlessly, sacrificed. The men's pro- 
 visions might be laid in for a month, instead of forty days, seeing 
 that the vessel only carries coal for ten days, and we should then 
 easily spare 22 tons for our armament, that is, 7 per cent, of the 
 total weight. 
 
 Shall we cite another example ? 
 
 We may choose that of the torpedo-boats, pattern 60, with dis=> 
 placement of about 45 tons. Their armament includes the follow- 
 ing weights : two discharging tubes, with accumulators, weighing 
 
42 na^al reform. 
 
 1,200 kilogrammes; one air-pump, weighing 400 kilogrammes; 
 and four torpedoes, weighing 1,600 kilogrammes. The whole 
 about 3 tons 2 cwt. ; and this represents 7 per cent, of the total 
 weight.* 
 
 We must be forgiven these dry details; they are, of course, 
 rather technical, hut indispensable if we are to escape the accusa- 
 tion of theorising. 
 
 We have chosen three complete contrasts from boats of different 
 dimensions, so as the better to prove that a fraction of 7 per cent, 
 may always be calculated on for the armament of a swift vessel. If 
 this armament is entirely composed of guns, the conclusion we 
 come to is that a vessel of 150 tons is amply sufficient to carry a 
 14-cm. gun. We need no longer be told that a vessel of at 
 least 360 tons is necessary for this purpose. On a swift vessel of 
 these dimensions we could easily place two 14-cm. guns and several 
 Nordenfeldts. To be sure, we should not coal for three months. 
 M. Gougeard will be content if his vessel can make 1,800 miles at 
 a reduced speed of 10 knots. We are not more exacting. We 
 only aspire to the same speed with vessels of 300 or 350 tons, at 
 most 400 tons, which would not cost more than a million and a 
 half {francs) each, and which, aided by torpedo-boats, would be 
 the best instruments of war in the future. 
 
 We must be excused if we make another calculation. M. 
 Gougeard has set down, in his pamphlet, that a sum of 180 million 
 (francs) are required to complete the fourteen ironclads we now 
 have in the stocks. 
 
 Take 14 millions {francs) off this sum for cruisers, repairs, 
 outlays, and 116 millions {francs) would remain, with which we 
 might construct the best fleet of light vessels in the world. It 
 would comprise forty-five gun-boats with the 14-cm. patterUj 
 costing a million and a half {francs) each, and 200 torpedo-boats 
 at 250, OQO francs. With such a fleet we should be irresistible on 
 the Mediterranean and invincible on the ocean ! But the authori- 
 ties prefer to swallow up millions in the construction of ironclads 
 • All these figures and comparisons have been verified. 
 
I'OBPEDO-BOA'TS AND GUN-BOATS. 43 
 
 which never were any good, and never will be ! To justify this 
 blindness, it is asserted that we have already seventy torpedo- 
 boats, and that they suffice to defend our shores. This is alto- 
 gether inexact. Most of our torpedo-boats are old patterns, with 
 a speed of only eleven or twelve knots,and which, besides, are in 
 such a state that if war were to break out to-morrow, we could not 
 make use of them. They are attached to the movable defence of 
 our ports, and they are sometimes used for excursions to see if 
 their machinery is in good order. But their armament has never 
 yet been tried, or, rather, they have never yet had any armament. 
 No one knows what kind of torpedo should be used on them, still 
 less is it known what officers could lead them to battle. The 
 •personnel is as deficient as the materiel. None has been got 
 together anywhere except on the Japan, on which vessel alone 
 locomotive torpedoes are used. The torpedo-boats of pattern 63 
 and 64 have gone through excellent practice in navigation and 
 tactics, but have had hardly any in firing. 
 
 Every competent person asserts that in case of sudden war we 
 could not put twenty torpedo-boats in line out of the seventy 
 figuring in the official lists ; and yet the first shots directed by the 
 small vessels would be the most formidable, and would decide the 
 victory. It is high time to take warning. Two ministerial 
 despatches have been devoted to the study of a project for the 
 organization of the personnel of the locomotive torpedoes, and for 
 stoking the torpedo-boats. But it is to be feared that, being sent 
 to separate commissions, this project, like so many others, will 
 be buried in the ministerial records. It rests with public opinion 
 to put pressure on the Government, and to force it to show more 
 decision. However admirable the locomotive torpedo may be, it is 
 a weapon that can only be of service to nations that have studied 
 it and practised its use. 
 
 We repeat that we in France have so little knowledge of it, that 
 three-quarters of our navy unhesitatingly deny its efficiency. Even 
 if our seventy torpedo-boats were armed and excellent in all 
 respects, they would not be sufficient for a nation bounded on three 
 
44 NAVAL EEFOEM. 
 
 sides by the ocean. We should therefore hasten to have a great 
 many more put in hand. As the 41 metres, 71 tons pattern is 
 approved of, torpedo-boats of this class might be reserved for the 
 ocean and for cruisers. Those we already possess, and which are 
 all of an inferior pattern, might be grouped in the Mediterranean, 
 where they might at once be set to work to instruct the personnel. 
 There are, perhaps, forty of real use. Would not this be the best 
 use to make of them ? As to swift gun-boats — we have none. 
 
 Even our cruisers are not swift enough, and the fleet of small 
 vessels we now possess chiefly represents old patterns which reflect 
 but little credit on those who constructed them. They possess no 
 speed, are useless as cruisers, can make no head against bad 
 weather, and are at the mercy of any ironclad or other boat better 
 armed than they are, as their total lack of speed would always pre- 
 vent their seeking safety in flight. The new patterns have no 
 speed, and are an easy mark to hit. They draw too much water ; 
 their only advantage over the older patterns is that they possess 
 better sea-going qualities. 
 
 We ask that speed should be the first factor in the place of 
 every vessel to be constructed, and, after speed, small dimensions 
 which will permit us to have a greater number. 
 
 But, once again, it is imperative that this fleet should be com- 
 posed of offensive vessels, of gun-boats and torpedo-boats ; both of 
 which we so entirely lack. Speed is no less essential in admini- 
 stration than in war. If we are to be ready at the decisive moment, 
 we must expedite the construction of all the component parts of 
 the future weapons of naval warfare. Let us remember that admini- 
 stration means foresight, and that in the navy, especially in our 
 navy, nothing can be got without preparation. We are already 
 distanced by some of our rivals. It is only time that we should 
 note this and take warning. 
 
45 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 NAVAL WABPARE AND THE ORGANISATION OF NAVAL FORCES. 
 
 1. 
 
 We have shown in the preceding chapter that the ironclad, the 
 Leviathan of the sea, may he vanquished by the merest atoms, and 
 can no longer resist the assault of torpedo and gun-boats. It still 
 remains for us to explain what we understand by the maritime 
 warfare of the future, and the organisation of the naval force of a 
 great country like ours, in connection with this subject. This 
 second task is no less important than the first; it is perhaps more 
 so, for the ironclad must not only be abolished but replaced. 
 
 We have spoken of gun-boats and torpedo-boats ; we have seen 
 how useful they would be either in attacking a squadron or in coast 
 operations. But this is not all. We have now to prove whether 
 these new engines of war will suffice in maritime encounters, and 
 whether it will not be necessary to supplement them by vessels of a 
 different type. This done, further inquiry must be made as to the 
 method to be adopted in organising the light flotillas for which we 
 propose to abolish our existing heavy fleets. 
 
 The problem is vast and complex ; all the more difficult to solve 
 from the fact that we are not helped by past experience. We need 
 only glance at any modern navy to convince ourselves that in 
 nothing does it resemble those of the past. 
 
 Now that they are composed of such varied and heterogeneous 
 
46 NAVAL REFORM. 
 
 fighting units, what have our present squadrons in common with 
 the uniform construction of the vessels of former days? 
 
 A variety of patterns changing from year to year, from nation to 
 nation, and modified with such rapidity that they are old-fashioned 
 almost as fast as invented, have replaced the old liner, which was 
 the same, always and everywhere. 
 
 Progress is so rapid, inventions are so multifarious, that vessels 
 of the most dissimilar patterns are brought together in the same 
 fleet, without any decision being reached as to which type would 
 be the most efficient for naval warfare, and as to what tactics would 
 hest unite them in some common action, on which the issue of a 
 great battle, or the destinies of those nations engaged in it, might 
 depend . 
 
 To explain the real cause of this naval anarchy, a primary ques- 
 tion must be put. What is to be the naval warfare of the future, 
 what are to he its conditions and consequences ? 
 
 It is, in fact, impossible to know what instruments should be 
 employed when the object to be pursued and the method for 
 attaining it are as yet unknown. Now it is this uncertainty that 
 hovers over the navy. For centuries nations aspiring to naval 
 supremacy had a perfectly clear object in view : the annihila- 
 tion of rival fleets in one or more of those squadron fights, success 
 in which secured what was called the empire of the sea, to a 
 victorious Power, for a more or less extended period. 
 
 Although high-sounding, this magnificent expression faithfully 
 corresponded to the reality. 
 
 From the moment that a nation had by a single blow, or by 
 several decisive battles, destroyed all the naval strength that could 
 hold her in check, she was in real truth the mistress of the ocean ; 
 she was its sovereign and reigned unrivalled ; she did not suffer 
 any other to enter the lists with her. 
 
 She had only to blockade the enemy's coasts, to watch the 
 ports, to stop the merchant ships in their passage, to prevent their 
 cruisers getting to sea, and, finally, to keep the enemy in incessant 
 dread of the sudden landing of an army on her shores — a powerful 
 
NAVAL WARFARE AND ORGANISATION OF NAVAL FOEOBS. 47 
 
 diversion on which the issue of a war frequently depended. This 
 immense and all-important advantage might he secured by one 
 single hattle. As there was then only one pattern of vessel, the 
 line-of-battle ship, and, in consequence, only one fighting unit — 
 this same liner armed with powerful guns — ^it follows that the 
 squadrons were all of a similar pattern ; and when one of them had 
 perished in a maritime disaster, it took a number of years to 
 replace, during which the conqueror reigned unquestioned. The 
 latter roamed over the world in full liberty, easily taking possession 
 of a certain number of points for revictualling, and of well- 
 placed fortresses commanding the military and commercial high- 
 ways. On these it depended, by means of its cruisers, to deny to 
 any other squadron the possession of maritime dominion. 
 
 Sheltered by the forts of Malta and Gibraltar, the English fleets 
 commanded all the Mediterranean thoroughfares, making the 
 attempt to force these obstacles impossible without risk of 
 annihilation. 
 
 Squadron-fighting was really the chief instrument in naval 
 warfare, as the empire of the sea was attained by means of it. The 
 siege of strongholds was equally of capital importance, as these 
 strongholds dominated, and could close, the great routes for 
 commerce and war. 
 
 But usually a Power that had succeeded in banishing rival fleets 
 from the seas, lost no time in blockading isolated forts, and 
 reducing them by starvation. As in the case of Malta after 
 Aboukir, these eventually surrendered when they ceased to receive 
 that help from outside which it was no longer possible to give them. 
 
 Thus, once again, the supreme object in the disposition of naval 
 forces was squadron-fighting. And nothing was more simple or 
 uniform than this mode of battle, on which the fate of the world 
 depended. . 
 
 Victory was obtained by means of tactics more or less skilful, 
 more or less fortunate, and known to all ; proved by centuries of 
 experience, based on perfectly fixed rules, on definitely laid down 
 principles, over which the genius of a SufFren or a Nelson might 
 
48 NAVAL EEFOBM. 
 
 preside in a moment of sublime inspiration, but which nevertheless 
 were implicitly followed by all the fleets advancing to battle as the 
 assured means towards success. 
 
 There was but one pattern of vessel, with the gun for its only 
 weapon, and in like manner the wind was the only motive power, 
 permitting but a slight variety of combinations, to be repeated in 
 each successive battle. 
 
 If we consult the past, collect accounts of naval encounters, 
 study them critically, as they have often been studied already, we 
 shall see that amidst diversity of incidents, uniformity of weapons 
 has always produced uniform effects. Before falling upon each 
 other, either squadron struggles for several hours, perhaps for 
 several days, to obtain the weather-gage. This attained, the 
 fortunate squadron has the exclusive advantage of speed and 
 superior tactical position. 
 
 It is enabled to surround part of the enemy's force, whilst the 
 remainder, rendered powerless by its position, is prevented from 
 giving any assistance in sufficient time to equalise the fortunes of 
 action. 
 
 This first manoeuvre will almost always decide the fate of the 
 battle, and if the assailant comes out victorious he will doubtless 
 remain master of the situation, for he has only to fall back again 
 on his adversaries and annihilate them ; unless these, panic-stricken, 
 and acknowledging themselves conquered by anticipation, shall 
 have preferred flight to defeat as at Aboukir and Trafalgar. 
 
 " The two fleets meet," says Admiral Aube, " advancing in line 
 of battle ; they first fire at each other from a distance, then at 
 close quarters; the ships are riddled by repeated broadsides, 
 blood streams down the scuppers, the masts fall and encumber the 
 hull fore and aft. The shattered helm no longer directs the power- 
 less ship, boarding has become possible, and has, in some cases, 
 decided the action. 
 
 "Amidst the wreck of their fleet the admirals search out the 
 vessels that can still manceuvre. The conqueror will be the one 
 who can count up the greater number. He can achieve the 
 
NAVAL WARFARE AND ORGANISATION OF NAVAL FORGES. 49 
 
 destruction of his adversary if the latter persists in heroic resist- 
 ance. But the wind changes ; night closes in, or some other inci- 
 dent takes it out of his grasp ; the fight is not over, it will soon 
 be renewed on another field of battle. Or else darkness has set in, 
 the wind has not changed, nothing has modified the respective 
 chances of the combatants. Or perhaps the tempest has completed 
 the work of destruction so well commenced. Then the victory is 
 decisive ; call it Trafalgar if you like, and for ten years England 
 will reign the undisputed mistress of the sea. Her squadrons will 
 blockade all the enemy's coasts, were they even those of Napoleon's 
 Empire, or, in other words, those of Europe ; her convoys will 
 fearlessly roam the great commercial highways of the world, and 
 the merchants of Liverpool and London will rule the markets and 
 monopolize commerce."* 
 
 This picture is no less true than striking. It is no less correct 
 in the case of decisive victories than in that of fights less dis- 
 astrous to the vanquished squadron, as inferiority in numbers had 
 been made up for, by ability and a fortunate application of tactics. 
 
 Tourville, when forced, at the Hague, to fight with about 40 
 vessels, 3,114 guns, and rather less than 20,000 men, against 
 100 vessels, 4,000 English guns, 2,614 Dutch guns, and 
 42,000 men, was able to keep his enemies in check during a 
 whole day, and retired without disaster, thanks to the ability 
 with which he kept the weather-gage, and thanks also to the 
 clumsiness of the English, who, instead of taking the French 
 between two fires, as everything pointed to their doing, broke 
 through their line to rejoin the Dutch, from whom they had been 
 separated. 
 
 This is the history of the past ; the history of a sailing navy ; 
 the history of yesterday, if we take it by date, but already ancient 
 history by the conditions that made it possible. Since then two 
 grand revolutions have taken place : first, that caused by steam, 
 whereby the principles of former tactics have evaporated in smoke ; 
 
 * See the Revue des deux Mondes, loth March 1882. 
 
50 NAVAL BEFOBM. 
 
 and secondly, that caused by the torpedo, -which is still more im- 
 portant and of much more radical effect. 
 
 Let us examine the first, and, in order to give its full weight 
 to the examination, let us ask tacticians, strategists, and maritime 
 critics -what change it has produced in those rules and those 
 methods of warfare just proved to have been absolute, universal, 
 and rigorously scientific. What strikes us above all on this point 
 is the variety of judgment and opinion, the contradiction of doc- 
 trines, and what Montaigne would have called a really extraordinary 
 " clashing of brains." 
 
 Even the results of the few battles fought in these last years 
 have in no way modified the general indecision. The only squadron 
 fight that could teach us anything, the Battle of Lissa, brought 
 forward no incontestable truth to convince the whole world. It 
 seemed, however, to confirm the prediction of Admiral de Jon- 
 quieres, uttered many years before, when a mere lieutenant, as to 
 the consequences of the invention of steam : " Thanks to steam, 
 vessels can move in every direction, with such rapidity that the 
 effects of the ram can, and, what is more, must, replace projectiles 
 and annul calculations on the cleverest system of tactics." 
 
 The futility, or rather impossiblity, of clever tactics, and the 
 value of ramming, were certainly the results gleaned by tacticians 
 from the battle of Lissa. But we must not imagine, in conse- 
 quence, that they have been able to deduce any new rules from it. 
 
 Admiral Bourgeois has commented upon the battle of Lissa in 
 one of his moat learned memoirs, and expresses himself in the 
 following manner : " We add nothing to what has been said as to 
 the mistake made by the Italian squadron when it took up its 
 fighting formation, or as to the merit of the organisation of the 
 Austrians; but we emphatically assert that neither of these, or 
 even the signal bravery of charging the enemy and sinking him, 
 exercised any decisive influence on the result of the day. Had 
 not this squadron passed through the Italian lines without doing 
 the slightest damage ? And was not every vestige destroyed 
 of the former order of things when the great event of the day 
 
NAVAL WAEFABE AND ORGANISATION OP NAVAL FORCES. 61 
 
 happened, the grand experiment in ramming, the success of which 
 almost constituted the whole victory of Lissa and immortalised 
 the name of Tegethof ? As in the case of Nelson at Trafalgar, 
 the bravery and energy of the captain were of far more service 
 than the learned combinations of the tactician. No one would 
 venture in future fights to reckon on the happy chance that 
 delivered over the Re d' Italia, perhaps without speed or guidance, 
 to the decisive blow of the Max, but we have endeavoured to 
 show in this memoir* that cleverness and an accurate grasp of 
 the situation on the part of the captain, aided by a precise know- 
 ledge of the capacity of his own vessel and the defects of its 
 adversary, can, by suiting the circumstances of the case to his 
 situation, procure for him as brilliant a success." 
 
 Thus we see that the battle of Lissa, whilst proving the value of 
 ramming, leaves us in complete uncertainty as to the manner of 
 conducting an attack of this nature. Need we, then, be surprised 
 that, notwithstanding the prophecy of Admiral de Jonquieres, pro- 
 jectiles have continued in use, and that the very day after the 
 triumph of Tegethof guns should have been as much employed as 
 ever against ironclads ? 
 
 Or need we even be surprised that M. Gougeard,t in his last 
 pamphlet, should have applied the axiom " When in doubt, refrain," 
 and gone as far as proposing to give up ramming, and to suppress 
 the ram, so as to secure increased speed ? We should therefore 
 conclude, with Admiral Bourgeois, that between two vessels of equal 
 merit the issue of battle will henceforward exclusively depend on 
 the coolness and ability of their captains ; and this puts an end to 
 naval tactics. 
 
 As we cannot gauge human ability, it is evident that it cannot 
 be made a basis of science. 
 
 " In view of a naval action," says M. de Penfentenyo,J " it would 
 be difficult to lay down any absolute rule as to the plan to be 
 
 * Admiral Bourgeois. Memoirs sur la giration des navires. 
 f M. Gougeard. La marine de guerre, son pass^et son avenir. 
 X De Penfentenyo. Introduction a la tactique navale. 
 
 4 * 
 
52 NAVAL REFORM. 
 
 observed on giving or receiving the blow. An admiral should 
 always grasp the exigencies of the moment, and subordinate the 
 formation of his vessels to the nature of the plan adopted by those 
 he has to fight against." 
 
 " Thus," says Admiral Aube,* in his turn, " an absence of fixed 
 rules, and energetic audacity in the captain secures success, far more 
 than the wisest combinations of the tactician, and, after the first 
 shock, every vestige of former plans disappears in the melee. A 
 happy chance becoming the decisive event of the day, audacity, 
 coolness, the captain's grasp of the situation, that is to say his 
 moral qualities, all that is uncertain, elastic, least appreciable, in 
 fact the unforeseen, these are the last words of the naval tactics of 
 the present day — of that science which ere now had its set prin- 
 ciples, and, therefore, its definite rules." 
 
 This apparently trenchant and paradoxical conclusion of Admiral 
 Aube's is not merely the outcome of the diversity of opinion shown 
 by strategists and tacticians, but the actual consequence of facts 
 seriously studied. 
 
 From the moment that the wind ceased to be an important 
 factor in executing the most difiBcult manoeuvres, and in instan- 
 taneously changing all the positions in action, no one has been 
 able to say which is the best line of battle or which is the best 
 mode of meeting the enemy. 
 
 The weather-gage has ceased to exist; the only advantage lies 
 in number and speed. 
 
 The manner of striking matters but little, for, after a first pas- 
 sage at arms, a first assault in which it is supposed, without, how- 
 ever, the slightest reason, that the vessels will only graze each 
 other, the melie will be complete, the confusion absolute, and each 
 will have to look out for itself. 
 
 Probably there are no two works on naval tactics which agree as 
 to the formation for battle to be observed by two squadrons. Some 
 prefer the line ahead, others the line abreast, others the quarter- 
 
 * Admiral Aube. " L'ATenir de la marine Fran9ai8e." See the Revue des deux 
 Mondes, July Ist, 1874. 
 
NAVAL WARFARE AND ORGANISATION OP NAVAL FORCES. 53 
 
 line, whilst the more sincere confess their entire ignorance. The 
 latter alone are right. Whatever tactical combinations may have 
 been planned beforehand, all naval actions will soon degenerate 
 into a series of single combats, in which each vessel will attack 
 another belonging to the enemy and endeavour to sink it. 
 
 It is probable that the cannonade will only, as at Lissa, be the 
 prelude to action. 
 
 Although the gun has always proved itself stronger than armour- 
 platiug ; although the best plates in the experiments against fixed 
 targets have never withstood, the firing of the most powerful pro- 
 jectiles, the effect of artillery directed against moving ironclads 
 would never be decisive in one of these general fights, where the 
 density of the smoke makes it impossible to hit an adversary in the 
 most vulnerable points or cause irreparable damage. 
 
 We have seen the Huascar come out of its fight with the Eng- 
 lish Shah and the Amethyst without much damage done to it. 
 
 " The state of the Huascar after the battle,'' says a military 
 correspondent, "proves how more or less useless artillery becomes 
 on the day of action at sea. There is a wide difference between 
 this and the results to be obtained at fixed targets. . . . The 
 monitor was struck by seventy or eighty projectiles. No pro- 
 jectile of 23 centimetres pierced its armour."* And this was a case 
 of one ship fighting against two. Between more evenly-matched 
 squadrons the results would be still less important. 
 
 The boarding of other days has been succeeded by the attempt 
 to ram one ironclad against another. It is impossible to calculate 
 what would be the result of each of these separate duels, the sum 
 total of which would form a battle, just as the wars of Homer were 
 composed of a multitude of single-handed fights without any appa- 
 rent connecting link. The merits of the captains, far more than 
 superiority of arms, would decide the matter. 
 
 Just as sometimes occurs in collisions between merchant- 
 steamers, so two ironclads, bringing their heavy bulk into collision, 
 will sink at the same instant, and through the same blow be 
 * Revue Maritime, 1881, " Des operations de guerre maritime re'cente." 
 
54 NAVAL EEFOEM. 
 
 swallowed up by the waves. Occasionally only one may be de- 
 stroyed, but it is almost certain that, driving her ram into the hull 
 of her adversary at full speed, the one that does not succumb will 
 be very seriously damaged, as sometimes happens when merchant- 
 steamers come into collision, and the vessel which strikes the other 
 nearly always loses its forepart. 
 
 A still more striking example is the case of the collision between 
 the Kron Prinz and Friedrich-der-Grosse. On this occasion, the 
 ramming vessel owed its safety entirely to the immediate neighbour- 
 hood of an English naval dockyard, which gave it shelter and the 
 means of repairing its serious damage. 
 
 The conqueror will remain disabled, incapable of steering, de- 
 prived of speed, at the mercy of the weakest adversary ready to fall 
 upon it. 
 
 The largest squadron will, therefore, be sure of ultimate success. 
 If it has taken the precaution to hold a few ironclads in reserve, 
 whilst the others have tried their strength against the enemy, eyen 
 if it has been worsted in the first encounter, it will only require to 
 bring forward this reserve in order to annihilate the shattered 
 remains of the conqueror. Thus, number will decide the whole 
 issue. 
 
 " Be numerous," will be the only lesson in naval tactics, which 
 one cannot call a science, as in former days; "for," writes a 
 tactician, " in future their character must always be speculative, 
 and can never again resemble those branches of human knowledge 
 founded on precise dogma and fixed rules." 
 
 But if the author we have just quoted spoke, in those days, of 
 the future, would he not now be speaking of what actually exists ? 
 
 Is it not evident that in conditions similar to those we have 
 described, no squadron, even if commanded by the most intrepid 
 chief, would have the audacity, or rather the folly, to attack a 
 squadron more numerous than itself ? 
 
 The not-far-distant past answers for what is in the future. 
 
 Since the invention of steam, we have only witnessed one 
 squadron fight, the battle of Lissa. Its issue would naturally 
 
NAVAL WABFABB AND OBGANISATION OP NAVAL FOBCES. 55 
 
 inspire confidence in navies numerically weak, as it seemed to 
 prove that courage on the part of the personnel, added to the genius 
 of the commander, made up for quantity and quality in the instru- 
 ments of warfare. 
 
 But what did we witness when France and Germany, and, later 
 on, Russia and Turkey, came to blows ? In these two wars, 
 wherein, for a time, it was thought that the navy would play an 
 important part, the nation possessing the fewest ironclads with- 
 drew from fighting, sheltered her fleets behind the walls of her 
 forts and the torpedo lines in her harbours, and, without a struggle, 
 relinquished to the enemy that " empire of the sea," which in the 
 beginning of the century England had only attained by means 
 of the brilliant victories of Trafalgar and Aboukir. 
 
 Is this flight, this confession of weakness, to be accepted by the 
 vanquished as a sort of moral defeat from which she would have 
 to sufi'er as much as from an actual defeat ? By no means ; for, 
 only to cite the war between Turkey and Russia, far from resigning 
 herself to naval inaction because she had given up squadron fight- 
 ing, the latter Power, after inflicting most serious injuries on the 
 Turkish monitors by means of torpedoes carried in boats, did not 
 hesitate for a moment to threaten England herself, and to prepare 
 to attack her vigorously. 
 
 When our neighbours from over the Channel sent their fleet to 
 Besika, once again to save the Ottoman Empire, which of us does 
 not recall the sensation produced by the news that Russia had 
 purchased a fleet of cruisers, with the intention of attacking and 
 destroying British commerce on every sea. A legitimate sensation, 
 for if war had broken out it would not have been limited to the 
 Eastern basin of the Mediterranean where the British ironclads 
 so proudly bore the national flag. Whilst they advanced towards 
 the Dardanelles, a Russian fleet, made up of seven cruisers and 
 transports, suddenly left that port of Vladivostock which has 
 arisen in the extreme East like an advanced work threatening the 
 foundation of England's strength, and made its appearance before 
 San Francisco. The English naval forces in those parts consisted 
 
56 NAVAL EEFOEM. 
 
 at that time of only two ships at anchor, one at Honolulu, and the 
 other at Vancouver. 
 
 From the very commencement of hostilities, Esquimault, the 
 only coaling depot, and the only port in the whole Pacific where 
 English vessels can go for repairs and revictualling, would have 
 fallen into the power of the Kussians, who, once masters of the 
 ocean in that part of the world, would in their turn have expelled 
 the commerce of their rivals ; a much more serious disaster than 
 the loss of a battle. According to the Pall Mall Gazette the 
 English commerce on the east and west coasts of Africa may be 
 reckoned at £160,000,000 sterling. 
 
 This would have been the first stake in the war. Of what use 
 then, is it to possess the most powerful squadron in Europe, if it 
 can only go about slowly in the Mediterranean, and on the Euro- 
 pean coasts (where it will never overtake an enemy determined to 
 escape by flight from almost certain defeat), and if it is unable to 
 blockade the enemy's ports in every quarter of the globe, so as 
 to arrest cruisers sallying forth to roam over every sea, and commit 
 their terrible depredations ? Not only has squadron warfare ceased 
 to have any rules, principles, or scientific methods, but, what is 
 still more decisive, it is no longer of any importance ; the fruits 
 of a victory do not even compensate for the efforts made to 
 achieve it. 
 
 Since the invention of steamers, and the advance made in speed, 
 the " empire of the sea " has become an empty phrase, and a 
 meaningless expression. The greatest triumphs no longer secure 
 the sovereignty of the ocean. After Aboukir and Trafalgar 
 England was able to close our ports from Cadiz to Antwerp, from 
 Gibraltar to Naples ; unceasingly to menace our landing-places, 
 such as Walcheren and Quiberon ; to surprise our cruisers ; destroy 
 our privateers ; separate our colonies from the mother country ; and 
 take possession of them one by one ; to monopolise the trade of 
 the world by hunting ours down without mercy. We had no more 
 fleets, and hers were more powerful than ever. 
 
 It is true that we attempted to send light frigates in pursuit of 
 
NAVAL WAEPABE AND OEGANISATION OF NAVAL FORCES. 57 
 
 her trading vessels, and that, sometimes, by at first escaping obser- 
 vation, they were able to inflict some little damage ; but as they 
 could not achieve any greater speed than the English sc[uadrons, 
 having equally to depend on the wind as their motive power, not- 
 withstanding all their efforts, and the heroism of their brave 
 captains, they were always surrounded, overcome and captured in 
 the end. Their more or less glorious tale had always the same 
 finish. Times are changed ! Now-a-days it would neither be possi- 
 ble for the English navy, or the united naval force of all Europe, 
 to effect a strict, effective, and thorough blockade of such an 
 extensive littoral as, for instance, that of France. 
 
 To maintain a blockade the besieging squadron must always 
 be at highest tension, steam for full speed ready ; otherwise rapid 
 cruisers may succeed in running the blockade at night, and gaining 
 the open sea, there to roam about the commercial highways, and 
 accomplish more ruin and disaster in a few weeks than could be 
 done to any country whatsoever by years of blockade. 
 
 The War of Secession started a special type — the blockade- 
 runners. They will be improved each time a fresh war arises. 
 And everyone must be aware that no ironclads could incessantly 
 keep all their fires alight without exhausting their coal, and, more- 
 over, that their engines would be incapable of resisting such a 
 strain without deteriorating. 
 
 " The maximum of speed," says Admiral Aube, " depends on the 
 tension of steam, and this tension cannot always be maintained 
 except when in motion. This implies a consumption of coal which, 
 as the supply must be kept up, must eventually paralyze vessels, 
 and it further implies the still more fatal wear and tear of machinery, 
 which, for the sake of speed, must necessarily be very fragile." 
 
 Moreover, big ironclads can only boast of a normal speed of 8 to 
 10 knots, never making beyond 13 to 15 knots ; cruisers and big 
 merchant steamers, which are always convertible into cruisers in 
 time of war, make 17 knots, and some have even reached 18 knots. 
 But there is no doubt that greater speed will be obtained. From 
 that moment it will be easy to force any blockade ; we do not mean 
 
58 NAVAli REFORM. 
 
 at night, which is always an easy task, but in full daylight, in the 
 face of an opposing squadron. 
 
 It is thus evident that squadron-fighting has no further reason 
 for existence, as the command of the sea would never through its 
 means be secured to the nation to whom it gave the victory. 
 
 If a squadron-fight took place so lately as 1866 between the 
 Austrians and Italians, it was owing to the fact that an ironclad 
 navy was then only feeling its way ; it was going through a period 
 of uncertainty, and, therefore, of mistakes. In confirmation of 
 this, we may state that, alongside of the Italian ironclad division 
 was Admiral Albini's whole sailing squadron, which did not dare to 
 come into action, and subsequently abandoned the Admiral in 
 command. Admiral Albini deserved condemnation, as much as 
 Admiral Persano. 
 
 But Tegethof's late flag-captain, who manages the naval afi'airs 
 of Austro-Hungary with so much skill at the present date, has just 
 informed the delegates that, as the reign of ironclads is at an end, 
 the programme and tactics of his former chief must be abandoned. 
 In the course of all the other great maritime wars we have witnessed 
 during the last few years — in North America during the War of 
 the Secession, in South America during the war between Chili and 
 Peru, we have had the most convincing and practical proof of the 
 inutility, the impossibility of the blockade, which used to be the 
 sole advantage in squadron-fighting. Were the sixty ships sent in 
 pursuit of the Alabama and the other Southern privateers able to 
 prevent their enterprises, so disastrous to their enemies on the 
 ocean ? Did the active watchfulness of the Chilians on the coast 
 of Peru stop the Huascar and the Union in their audacious cam- 
 paigns ? And during the dark months of 1870 and 1871 were not 
 most of our captures effected by isolated cruisers, although a false 
 generosity had absurdly restricted their number ; whereas our block- 
 ading fleets could only inflict insignificant losses upon Germany. 
 
 A war of pursuit will, therefore, necessarily, fatally, definitely, 
 replace squadron warfare in future conflicts between maritime 
 nations. 
 
NAVAL WAEPAEE AND ORGANISATION OP NAVAL FORCES. 59 
 
 Vainly do philanthropy or international rights attempt to 
 oppose the natural course of events ; by one of those contradic- 
 tions by no means uncommon in history, chasing was solemnly 
 condemned at the Congress in Paris at the very moment it was to 
 become such a necessity that, without it, we cannot possibly 
 imagine how naval battles could be anything more than passages- 
 at-arms as fruitless as they would be sanguinary, or fictitious 
 tournaments in which the extent of disaster would only be equalled 
 by the insignificant results obtained at such a cost. 
 
 We do not merely allude to the appearance on the scene of an 
 ironclad navy, which bids fair to transform the fleets of the Powers 
 into squadrons made up of a small number of useless vessels, 
 incapable of guarding the seas after victory. 
 
 But it was at the Congress of Paris that the principle of nation- 
 alities destined to transform Europe received its first sanction, and 
 in some sense its official baptism, by implicitly recognising that 
 the aspirations of Piedmont were legitimate. By degrees, Italy 
 was created, then Germany, and all over Europe national unities 
 sprang up ready to indicate their right to exist, that is, to extend 
 their frontiers. 
 
 We have seen their struggles for existence j the consecration of 
 their utmost resources to conquer military power by armed force, 
 failing which there can be no political power. But no sooner did 
 they consider their frontiers secure, than, they directed their atten- 
 tion to the seas,- whence riches and prosperity are exclusively, 
 derived. No sooner were they free than they set to work to form 
 an industry and start their trade. 
 
 Now, commerce can only be developed by securing outlets in 
 every part of the world, and thus securing raw material as the 
 necessary aliment of the national workshops. Hence that universal 
 movement of nations towards unoccupied territory, towards distant 
 shores, towards uncivilised regions, which, under the name of 
 colonial policy, seems to have become the principal and almost the 
 only European ambition. It would doubtless be rash to state that 
 great nations will soon cease to dispute political supremacy on the 
 
60 NAVAL EEFOEM. 
 
 Continent. But we may say, without fear of contradiction, that 
 they will in future fight for the commercial supremacy of the sea. 
 
 Economical rivalry will be hotter than military competition. A 
 realistic, practical policy will seek for material advantages before 
 and above all others, as they are the source and origin of all others. 
 And as public wealth only results from private wealth, it is evident 
 that if, in future wars, we are to divert some great commercial re- 
 source from a country, or to deprive it of some monopoly, we must 
 unflinchingly attack private property, and aim at destroying its 
 general prosperity by a series of individual disasters. 
 
 In proportion as the number of united, strong, and ambitious 
 nations has increased, so has the number increased of those who 
 are anxious to turn the globe to their own advantage, and the 
 greater are the chances of those naval conflicts, which can only be 
 settled by pursuit ; for, as the weapon employed must always be 
 suited to the object in view, it is quite certain that, despite the 
 eloquent remonstrance of philosophersj and platonio declarations 
 in congress, none will give up the chief aim of war, the chance of 
 destroying an enemy's mercantile navy, to amuse themselves ex- 
 perimenting with its fleet on naval tactics, gaining no other advan- 
 tage than to prove the superiority of numbers, and the infallible 
 power of great squadrons. 
 
 I must be forgiven if I again quote that admirable pamphlet 
 the Battle of Dorking, teeming as it does with the prophetic in- 
 stinct of a far-seeing mind : — 
 
 " Fools that we were ! We thought that all this wealth and 
 prosperity were sent us by Providence, and could not stop coming. 
 In our blindness we did not see that we were merely a big work- 
 shop, making up the things which came from all parts of the 
 world, and that if other nations stopped sending us raw goods to 
 work up, we could not produce them ourselves. True, we had in 
 those days an advantage in our cheap coal and iron, and had we 
 taken care not to waste the fuel, it might have lasted us longer. 
 But even then there were signs that coal and iron would soon 
 become cheaper in foreign parts, while, as to food and other things, 
 
NAVAL WAEFAEE AND OEGANISATION OF NAVAL FOECES. 61 
 
 England was not better off than it is now. We were so rich 
 simply because other nations from all parts of the world were in 
 the habit of sending their goods to us to be sold or manufactured, 
 and we thought that this would last for ever. And so, perhaps, 
 it might have lasted, if we had only taken proper means to keep it ; 
 but in our folly we were too careless even to insure our prosperity ; 
 and after the course of trade was turned away it would not come 
 back again. . . . But our people could not be got to see how 
 artificial our prosperity was ; that it all rested on foreign trade and 
 financial credit; that the course of trade once turned away from 
 us, even for a time, it might never return, and that our credit 
 once shaken might never be restored. To hear men talk in these 
 days, you would have thought that Providence had ordained that 
 our Government should always borrow at 3 per cent., and that 
 trade came to us because we lived in a foggy little island set in a 
 boisterous sea." 
 
 Hence it would appear that the chief aim of war against the 
 greatest maritime Power will be to divert its commerce. Now 
 what is essential towards doing this ? Let us glance at what 
 occurred in America during the War of Secession : — 
 
 The operations of the Confederate cruiaers [says M. DislfereJ had not only ob- 
 tained a material result : the capture and destruction of a large number of 
 American vessels. Up till the month of May 186i, 239 yessels, making a total of 
 104,000 tons, and worth more than fifteen million dollars, had been destroyed. 
 
 The moral effect had been still more considerable. Most of the Federal mer- 
 cantile vessels had become the property of English owners. In the year 1863 alone, 
 the transfer of 348 vessels was registered, making a total of 252,000 tons. The in- 
 surance tax had reached a figure ruinous to the commerce of the North. The war 
 was eventually protracted not only by the resources furnished by the blockade- 
 runners, but still more by the confidence inspired by the repeated exploits of the 
 Semmes and WaddeUs, and their imitators, in the minds of those defending the 
 rights of the States.* 
 
 Do not these facts shed a perfectly new light on maritime war- 
 fare ? Let us take, for example (and merely as an example, we 
 sincerely trust), the hypothesis of a conflict between France and 
 England. To please the partisans of squadron warfare, let us 
 even imagine our fleet destroyed or blockaded by the English 
 
 * Dislfere — Les Croiseurs et la Gtierre de Course. 
 
62 NAVAL EEFOEM. 
 
 squadrons ; would the mercantile navy, on which our neighbours 
 depend for sustenance and trade, be even then secured ? Cruisers 
 would escape at every moment from the shores of our three seas, 
 and reach the great commercial highways of the ocean. These 
 highways, on which the riches of the world circulate, which, in 
 some sort, are the arteries supplying the life of this immense 
 British Empire, are by no means numerous. There are five or six, 
 perhaps ten at most, which we could continually scour. Doubtless 
 there are strongholds like Aden, Malta, Gibraltar, to defend them. 
 But of what avail will these be ? It is not beneath the fire of 
 these fortresses that our cruisers will endeavour to accomplish their 
 exploits. On the contrary they will avoid all known or possible 
 dangers. 
 
 A war of chase has its own rules, and we must have the courage 
 openly to own them. These are, to fall without pity on the weak ; 
 and without false shame, and with all possible speed, to fly from 
 the strong. The moment they sight an enemy's fortress or squad- 
 ron, or even a man-of-war, not even necessarily superior to their 
 own — in fact, the moment they anticipate any resistance which 
 might interfere with their mission of destruction — cruisers should 
 fly at full speed, and carefully decline unequal combat. 
 
 But the immensity of the ocean would remain to them, and they 
 would roam up and down to sink merchant ships, and cut off the 
 adversary's communications with its colonies and the rest of the 
 world. 
 
 The author oi the Batde of DorMn^ h&s just told us what the 
 consequences of a war carried out on these lines would be to Eng- 
 land. Let us go into further detail. 
 
 Last year (1885) England imported 75 million hectolitres of 
 wheat, required for home consumption, the freightage of 1,000 
 vessels ; she imports cattle in immense numbers, chiefly from 
 Canada and the United States ; and, besides these staples of food, 
 cotton, wool, alpha, minerals, &c., all of which are necessary to her 
 trade. How many squadrons would she need to escort those im- 
 mense convoys and protect them from the attacks of cruisers ? 
 
NAVAL WARPAEE AND OEGAN.ISATION OP NAVAL FOBOES. 63 
 
 Were she even possessed of three times, or five times, as nume- 
 rous a defending force, it would still be insufficient for the protec- 
 tion of the cloud of vessels annually bringing 15 million tons to 
 the ports of the metropolis alone, and distributing 17 million tons 
 of English produce over the world. 
 
 Hostilities would no sooner commence than what happened in 
 the American War of Secession would again take place ; the premium 
 on insurance against losses at sea would become so high that navi- 
 gation would be impossible. Even at the time of the insignificant 
 expedition of Tel-el-Kebir the insurances for ships going through 
 the Suez Canal became so enormous that prudent shipowners pre- 
 ferred to lay up their vessels. What would happen, then, in a real 
 war ? All the rivals of England, all the young ambitious nations 
 already possessing a commerce and aspiring to a mercantile navy, 
 would eagerly do by Great Britain as she did by America in the 
 Secession. Each would emulate his neighbour in striving for a 
 portion of the great prize. • 
 
 Were the struggle to last for any length of time, the ruined ship- 
 owners would be obliged to sell their vessels to foreign Powers. 
 New steam companies would, by degrees, replace the dispossessed 
 English companies, and, this change effected, and the stream of 
 trade diverted into new channels, why should it return, on the re- 
 storation of peace, to that " foggy little island set in a boisterous 
 sea '' which, during so many long years, has monopolised the riches 
 of the universe by the marvellous genius of its people and their 
 still more marvellous luck ? 
 
 Let not shortsighted philosophers tax us with barbarism. Heaven 
 forbid that we should wish evil to happen to England, or rejoice 
 beforehand in what might bring her fall. But the example we have 
 selected substantially proves the overwhelming results of a war of 
 chase and, if we may be forgiven a seeming profanity, it further 
 proves its civilising tendencies. 
 
 Although the means towards attaining this new strength for the 
 weak may be terrible and barbarous, the results will certainly not 
 be opposed to the cause of humanity, for, in time, entire freedom 
 
64 NAVAL REFORM. 
 
 will be secured on the oceaD, its empire will be snatched from those 
 few nations hitherto more fortunate than the rest, and its sceptre 
 shattered in their impotent hands, to be apportioned in fragments 
 to the whole universe. 
 
 It may be necessary to pass through cruel revolutions before 
 reaching this new phase, which may really be considered the 
 triumph of equality. It is one of the conditions of our imperfect 
 nature that even what is good cannot be produced in our midst 
 without many shocks and convulsions. 
 
 Who knows whether the extreme danger that cruising lends to 
 maritime warfare may not induce the forts to give in without a 
 struggle to the inevitable consequences of commercial and political 
 rivalry, and to consent to the loss of those privileges they are 
 unable any longer to maintain. Economical law everywhere tends 
 to equalise riches and to level all markets, to lower those that are 
 high and raise those that are low : Deposuit potentes de sede et 
 exaltavit hmnilis. 
 
 Is it not remarkable that the laws of warfare tend to the same 
 result, and that the strength of nations and their interests are be- 
 coming more and more equalised ? We shall doubtless be told 
 that, although the case of England conclusively proves how useless 
 squadron warfare is, and how essential it is to replace it by a war 
 of chase when fighting an entirely maritime nation, it is quite a 
 different matter when a continental nation, where the navy is not 
 paramount, is to be attacked. 
 
 It may be said that squadron fighting may be very useful against 
 such a nation. Having once annihilated its naval forces, and being 
 sure of no further resistance in that quarter, we should be free to 
 land an army on the enemy's territory, and much bloodshed would 
 be the result. 
 
 This will be in truth, as we have already stated, one of the con- 
 sequences of squadron victories. But here, again, times are 
 changed. Armies are not what they were in former days. 
 
 The number of troops we could land on the adversary's shores 
 would not, certainly, decide the issue of a war. And the operation 
 
NAVAL WABi-AEE AND OBGANISATION OF NAVAL POROBS. 65 
 
 would be very hazardous. "An expeditionary force," Admiral 
 Aube says, " can only cross the ocean by special vessels called 
 transports, and under the following conditions : a thousand men 
 in each ship, an average of 500 horses, which for an army of 
 30,000 men and 3,000 horses means 36 vessels. These vessels 
 must have at least the space of one cable between them for navi- 
 gation, and at most two lines, which gives a length of 3,600 
 metres to this double line, each vessel, including the bowsprit, 
 averaging 100 metres. To ensure uniformity, the speed, regulated 
 by the slowest vessel, could not exceed 8 miles ; every time the 
 Channel was crossed to hostile shores at least 48 hours would be 
 required. Admitting this, what Admiral would undertake to pre- 
 vent a vessel with a ram, and going at least 13 knots, from making 
 a gap in the squadron of transports ? Without thinking it any 
 special act of ability or superior bravery, which of our captains 
 would not willingly undertake this task, especially at night, and 
 undertake to sink a considerable number of the enemy's trans- 
 ports before his own vessel could be reached? We know how 
 rapidly the Congress, an American frigate with 60 guns, sank 
 and disappeared in the waves when attacked by the Merrimac, 
 although the latter was only a coarse and imperfect imitation of 
 our present rams. In this scene of carnage, during the American 
 War, more than 200 men met their death, although the Congress 
 was anchored near the shore. From this we may form some 
 opinion of the risks to which an expeditionary army would he 
 exposed in one of these nights, compelled to keep the sea, and far 
 from all assistance."* 
 
 The preliminary danger avoided, and supposing a landing to 
 be effected, what would become of a body of 80,000 men, in the 
 presence of one of the armies of the present day, if it could only 
 be revictualled from the squadron that had brought it, and were 
 consequently forced to keep the sea as its base of operations ? 
 As soon as it landed, would it not be surrounded and overwhelmed 
 by the superior masses, annihilated by the greater number, and 
 
 * Admiral Aube, L&s Reformes de notre marine militaire. 
 
66 NAVAL REPOEM. 
 
 forced with all haste to return to the point of disembarkation from 
 which it had ventured ? 
 
 When people speak of the combinations of former days they 
 forget that the conditions of continental warfare are no less modi- 
 fied than the conditions of maritime warfare ; and that the forces 
 that we must put into action, if we are to strike a decisive blow, 
 are so numerous that they must be founded on something more 
 solid than the waves of the sea, or the vessels composing a fleet of 
 transports. 
 
 In a Continental war, pursuit will still inflict the most damage 
 on the enemy. Would not our situation in 1870 and 1871 have 
 been still more aggravated, would not our resistance have been 
 shortened by several months, if German cruisers had arrested the 
 numerous vessels bringing us arms and provisions, to replace those 
 we had ceded to Germany at Sedan and RIetz ? Our arsenals were 
 empty, our trade was very slow ; but the markets of the world were 
 open to us, and we drew plentifully from them. Even in the midst 
 of those terrible disasters, our mercantile relations with other 
 nations were maintained, our exterior riches remained intact, our 
 national industry did not receive its deathblow. Hence came it 
 that our prosperity was so soon restored. Things would have been 
 very diff'erent had all our merchant-ships been destroyed or cap- 
 tured, had our relations with Algiers been cut off, had our losses 
 equalled our misfortunes. Ruin would have followed defeat, and 
 cruelly aggravated its consequences. Could any occurrence on our 
 coasts have produced greater calamities ? 
 
 Hitherto we have intentionally left out any mention of torpedoes, 
 wishing to prove that steam alone sufficed to bring about a mari- 
 time revolution, and that those who opposed squadrons and 
 advocated a war of chase, demanding that ironclads should be 
 given up and cruisers constructed, had not only a prophetic insight 
 into the future, but a very accurate, just, and ample appreciation of 
 the present. 
 
NAVAL WARFARE AND OEGANISATION OF NAVAL FOEOES. 67 
 
 It must, however, be recognised that their opinions have received 
 such striking confirmatioQ from the introduction of the torpedo, 
 the improvements that have rendered it automatic, and the inven- 
 tion of autonomous torpedo-boats, that they are, to a certaiu 
 degree, renewed and revived. 
 
 Admitting it to be impossible to find definite rules of tactics 
 in squadron -fighting, they maintained that it was necessary to 
 apply the principle of doubling on the enemy and of flank move- 
 ments to naval attack (the employment of -which had brought 
 such success to the armies knowing how to employ and put it in prac- 
 tice on land) ; that the employment of numbers and masses directed 
 against the same adversary, harassing it simultaneously from 
 diiferent points, and attacking it at different angles, should replace 
 that fatal consequence of squadron-fighting, single combat between 
 ironclads, in which the pattern possessing the greatest perfection 
 was always sure to win ; that the most perfect of the giant ships 
 armed at once with guns, rams, and torpedoes could not resist a 
 cloud of small gun-boats, mere floating gun-carriages, and torpedo- 
 boats mancEuvring at a higher speed than herself, pressing her on 
 every side, attacking her repeatedly, and able, by their speed, to 
 escape her reprisals ; that, in one word, at sea as on land, progress 
 in the means employed should lead to their separation, their 
 classification, and the triumph of extended over compact order. 
 
 These arguments were answered by the assertion that the minute 
 and agile engines on which they founded their hopes were im- 
 possible of construction ; that a vessel of heavy tonnage was essen- 
 tial towards carrying the guns ; that the torpedo was a weapon not 
 to be depended on ; that we had by no means mastered it, and that 
 a vessel suitable to it had not, and probably never would be found. 
 
 The startling invention of autonomous torpedo-boats shattered 
 all these objections at a single blow. From the moment that these 
 small vessels, hitherto considered unseaworthy, began to show 
 navigating qualities of the highest order, from the moment that 
 their terrifying power of destruction was fully brought to light, 
 it was no longer possible to deny that fleets could be constructed 
 
 5 * 
 
68 NAVAL EEPOBM. 
 
 in a very short time, and at relatively moderate cost, able to sur- 
 round and destroy great squadrons. 
 
 The problem of gun-vessels, hitherto declared unsolved, is not 
 more so than that of torpedo-boats ; it can, and ought to receive 
 the same solution. 
 
 We purposely left rams out of the question, because, in our 
 opinion, the shock of two vessels would destroy both ; and for a 
 ram to he efficacious against a big ironclad it would need to be 
 almost as large as its opponent. The ram can he, and ought to 
 be, replaced by the spar-torpedo, the effect of which is quite as 
 terrible as that of the ram. From that moment what would remain 
 of squadron tactics, of the tactics of former days ? If attacked at 
 night, and in the open sea, could any combination, the adoption 
 of any line or order of battle, any strategical means, help any ten 
 ironclads, however admirable, to resist the sudden and impetuous 
 attack of some hundred light and easily managed boats manoeuvring 
 with lightning speed, falling on them from every point of the 
 compass, and surrounding them with their double or triple meshes 
 of destruction ? 
 
 The torpedo-boat, backed by the gun-vessel, will be the means 
 of the final disappearance of ancient tactics, just as a single gust 
 of wind dissipates slight mists on the horizon. The most deter- 
 mined defenders of ironclads feel this so strongly, they are so 
 thoroughly convinced of it, that they are already confident that, 
 in future, a squadron will never again venture on the open sea 
 unless protected by lines of torpedo-boats, despatch and defensive 
 gun-boats fitted to encounter the attack they themselves are power- 
 less to resist. 
 
 The squadron-fighting of former days will be succeeded by flotilla 
 conflicts; by a war of atoms; by charges of marine cavalry, if we 
 may use the term, in which the most insignificant might decide the 
 fate of the most powerful. 
 
 If this is so, of what utility are the latter ? What purpose can 
 they fulfil, or of what good are they ? Let us admit, although 
 nothing would be less likely, and although experience points to 
 
Naval warfare and organisation of naval forces. 69 
 
 the contrary, that they would be protected by their advanced 
 guard of small vessels. This supposition is, of course, purely gratui- 
 tous, for it is quite clear that if defensive torpedo-boats and gun- 
 boats have to fight against adversaries as small and rapid as they 
 are themselves, which a single wave may obliterate from their 
 sight, and which at night give no mark for their guidance, they 
 will have far less chance of success than offensive torpedo and 
 gun-boats ; for those, without stopping to fight their equals, will 
 directly attack the enormous and continually visible mass presented 
 by the ironclads. 
 
 But, once again, we will suppose the ironclads to have escaped. 
 What will be the result ? Will the empire of the sea belong on 
 this account to the nation who owns them ? Will the miraculously 
 preserved vessels be any more capable of efficiently blockading the 
 coasts of the vanquished nation ? Most certainly not. If they 
 attempt this enterprise they will find themselves in the presence 
 of a fresh diflBculty, which we have not as yet pointed out, but 
 which is calculated more than ever to increase the difBculties of 
 blockading in the future. 
 
 We limited ourselves to showing that a fleet watching a port, 
 a harbour, or a bay, could not have steam up the whole time 
 without speedily expending its coal, and wearing out its machinery ; 
 and that in consequence it would not be able to stop cruisers and 
 blockade-runners. But torpedo-boats will now sally forth from 
 the blockaded coasts as well as cruisers. The besieging squadron 
 will be obliged to remain on the open sea, to avoid surprise by 
 a submarine torpedo. For this reason we never dared approaeh 
 the German shores during the war of 1870-1871. We were at 
 least safe in the open. Now-a-days it would be quite different. 
 The incessant attacks of torpedo-boats would be a hundred times 
 more dangerous for a blockading squadron than for a squadron in 
 motion. 
 
 Think what an existence it would lead, opposite a coast ready at 
 every hour of the day, at every instant of the night, to disgorge 
 invisible enemies upon it, ready to attack it unawares, in fog, in dark- 
 
70 Naval eEfobm. 
 
 ness, and in silence. If it protected itself witli netting it would be 
 unable to move, and would remain at the mercy of outrigger 
 torpedoes and guns, which could easily aim at a stationary 
 mark. If it contented itself with electric lights, its boilers and 
 machinery from always being in use, and its watch from, being for 
 ever on the alert, would be exhausted in a few days ; and when 
 men and things had lost all energy, the inevitable danger would 
 suddenly burst upon them. Human endurance, however great, 
 could not hold out against such a strain. 
 
 Either in the papers or in letters from China, who has not read 
 the piteous accounts of the moral sufferings undergone by our 
 brave sailors during the long months they passed before Foo Chow 
 doing nothing, and yet exposed to destruction at any moment ? 
 
 Their straitened circumstances, and their unbearable condition of 
 exasperation, had reached a pitch that would have brought about 
 grave complications had it lasted only a few weeks longer. And 
 yet the danger was not serious at Foo Chow; there was small 
 chance of a surprise, the torpedoes and torpedo-boats were in no 
 way to be feared. 
 
 There is nothing more • demoralising for the stoutest hearts, 
 for the bravest spirits, than doubt and indecision, and those 
 intangible dangers they cannot come face to face with, and which 
 glide on in the night season like phantoms, to be transformed 
 into horrible realities at the very moment when, worn out by the 
 incessant strain, attention relaxes and energy falls back on itself 
 conquered and shattered, not by fear, but by lassitude. 
 
 If squadron-fighting has become impossible since locomotive tor- 
 pedoes and autonomous torpedo-boats were invented, it follows that 
 the only advantage to be derived from squadron successes, namely 
 the empire of the sea and its accompaniments, has become still 
 more impossible. 
 
 On the other hand, a war of chase — the weapon of the weak 
 against the strong — acquires new facilities and marvellous efficiency 
 through their agency. By putting an end to blockading, torpedo- 
 boats enable cruisers to make any part of the shores of a great 
 
NAVAL WARFABB AND OEGANlSATlON OP NAVAL POBOES. 71 
 
 country their point for departure and revictualling. They can 
 come and go to re-coal or deposit their prizes, if they have any, 
 without the risk of being shut in by an enemy's squadron. They 
 are masters of the ocean, and from afar can harass the slow and 
 heavy ironclads at will, or escape on their approach by their 
 superior speed They can even go through their lines to force a 
 blockade, like the famous blockade-runners in the War of 
 Secession. 
 
 But this is not all ; for another system — a war of pursuit — will 
 certainly make its appearance on the scene in the next maritime 
 war. The minute torpedo and gun-boats, destined to be so efficient 
 in squadron attacks, will not be less so when attacking merchant- 
 ships. Provided they are escorted by a transport, capable by its 
 speed of escaping the threatened attacks of the ironclads, they will 
 be able to keep the sea for a long time without being seen or 
 noticed, and will always be ready to fall upon a disabled or 
 insufficiently- armed opponent. And what nation so poor but it 
 will possess sufffcient resources to provide itself with weapons of 
 war, so moderate in cost ? 
 
 One of the most splendid and at the same time the most terrible 
 consequences of the immense progress of modern invention, is that 
 the richest and most powerful people with the biggest manufac- 
 tories, may now be at the mercy of an adversary it might formerly 
 have destroyed in a few hours ; that the admirable mechanism of 
 its material prosperity may be taken to pieces by a hand that 
 formerly would have been crushed by merely touching it. In view 
 of the insufficiency of her naval strength, England is at this 
 moment going through a phase of doubt and fear which becomes 
 more prominent every day. Her statesmen tremble for the future, 
 and endeavour to meet the situation by increasing their fleets. 
 
 The attempt is vain, for the problem is not to be solved. They 
 may double the number of their men-of-war ; their maritime 
 frontiers may bristle with fortifications, they may make them 
 impregnable by protecting them with armour, big guns of immense 
 •weight, and even torpedoes of every sort, but they will never hinder 
 
72 Naval eepoem. 
 
 even a third-class maritime power from inflicting irreparable losses 
 on their country. A few kilograms of explosible material, or 
 several swift vessels, would suffice to destroy their biggest mail 
 steamers in the course of a few moments. 
 
 And what took place on the open sea would equally take place 
 on the coasts ; for the special law of this war of chase is to attack 
 open ports, undefended towns, and unfortified mercantile ware- 
 houses. From the moment it became lawful and even obligatory 
 to attack private property on the sea — because if it were not 
 attacked no war would be possible, and the strong would always be 
 at liberty to crush the weak without mercy, to arrogate the right to 
 make his own use of the world, to regulate every market, to 
 monopolise the riches of the world — from that moment similar 
 property on land must come under similar conditions. No city 
 whatsoever should be spared, still less a prosperous one, any more 
 than a mercantile fleet. It comes to the same thing, whether the 
 produce of a country is set on fire on board its ships, or when 
 stored in its docks and warehouses ; or, rather, the latter opera- 
 tion has the material and moral advantage of being more decisive. 
 It is certain that an adversary will be brought to terms quite as 
 quickly by depriving him of one of his commercial ports as by 
 depriving him of a military port, just as dispersing his merchant 
 shipping will attain the same result a great deal quicker than 
 destroying his men-of-war. 
 
 Would the loss of Marseilles be less serious than that of Toulon ? 
 Now, a few 14-centimetres gun-boats suddenly appearing on the 
 scene in the middle of the night, would suffice to bombard a com- 
 mercial or industrial town and to annihilate its riches. And what 
 nation is there, however humble, that has not the means of pro- 
 viding itself with a few 14:-centimhtreg gun-boats? On this point 
 the chances of maritime warfare are again on the eve of being 
 equalised to the advantage of the weaker powers. The day of 
 powerful vessels engaging heavy forts is over ; that of small 
 murderous engines attacking the sources whence nations derive 
 their wealth, is about to commence. The invention of autonomous 
 
NAVAL WAEfARE AND OBGANJSATION OP NAVAL FOECES. 73 
 
 torpedo-boats will for ever do away with the possibility of landing 
 troops on an enemy's territory, which formed so important an 
 element in the wars of other days. 
 
 Admiral Aube has already told us how easy it would be, with an 
 ordinary cruiser having a ram, to make a gap in a fleet of trans- 
 ports composed of two lines of ships extending over 3,600 metres. 
 
 But a cruiser with a ram is a very inferior engine of war ; after 
 one or two collisions it would be demolished. The invention of 
 torpedo-boats has made the destruction of a fleet of transports a 
 matter of certainty. Imagine what ruin, what disasters, what 
 losses a fleet of torpedo-boats would inflict, compared with any a 
 cruiser provided with a ram could accomplish, descending at night 
 into the midst of this floating army. Let us go further and imagine 
 the danger avoided, by some providential chance or some unex- 
 plained good fortune. The army has disembarked and commenced 
 operations. During this period what becomes of its base, which 
 can only be the fleet it came in ? It remains exposed day and 
 night to the attacks of the torpedo-boats ; sooner or later i-t must 
 be destroyed by them. 
 
 Then the invading army is placed in the same situation as the 
 Egyptian army after Aboukir. It must live on the country and 
 maintain itself by constant victories. But there is only one 
 apparent resemblance between this situation and that of the troops 
 led by Buonaparte and Kleber after the squadron commanded by 
 Brueys was destroyed ; for those troops had not much to fear from 
 the Mamelukes, and the army that was to fight them could only 
 come by sea. 
 
 What happened in 1870-1871 was totally different. What 
 would have been the fate of General Trochu's expeditionary force, 
 if the original intention had been carried out, of taking it to the 
 shores of the Baltic, 300 miles away from the actual theatre of 
 action, and at such a distance to attempt a campaign which would 
 have had so little influence on the general struggle ? Up till the 
 time when the verdict was pronounced at Sedan and Metz, the 
 German army that was especially to oppose General Trochu''s, 
 
?4 naVal reform. 
 
 remained ready under the orders of General Falkenstein, superior 
 both in numbers and in possession of all the railways and resources 
 of the country. General Trochu's army would have been sur- 
 rounded and beaten in the very outset ; but if in his flight the sea 
 had not afforded it protection, if the fleet of transports had been 
 destroyed or dispersed, there would have been nothing but capitu- 
 lation left to him. 
 
 Henceforward it is quite evident that the importance of maritime 
 supremacy in a continental war has disappeared. In former days 
 it was a reality, but now it has become an illusion as many other 
 things have done. Fleet actions, blockades^ and descents upon the 
 continent will only be recollections of the past. There are now 
 only two methods of warfare ; that of pursuit on the open sea, and 
 a coast warfare against undefended towns. The latter is the con- 
 sequence and natural outcome of the former ; and after showing 
 how useless all the others are, we shall be able to demonstrate 
 how these should be conducted, and what means should be 
 employed to secure the greatest advantage they are capable of 
 producing. 
 
 From the preceding pages it will be seen that in future the great 
 law for the navy as well as for political economy will be division 
 of labour. Various vessels and arms, each with their own appointed 
 task to fulfil, will succeed the uniformity of the fighting unit, a 
 uniformity equal to that of the mode of fighting. Each weapon 
 should have its own boat, for it is impossible to do two things 
 well at a time ; and if any single vessel is to be a kind of complete 
 arsenal, it will probably end in being unfit for any one of the 
 various operations it might have to undertake. On land the same 
 troops are not expected to execute cavalry charges and to know 
 the work of infantry and artillery men. O^ly savage nations have 
 retained such primitive methods of warfare. 
 
 Progress has been still slower at sea. Since the invention of 
 ironclads it seemed for a long time to be at a standstill. But the 
 
NAVAL WARFARE AND ORGANISATION OP NAVAL FORCES. 75 
 
 locomotive torpedo and the autonomous torpedo-boat appeared on 
 the scene, and accomphshed, or will very soon accomplish, a naval 
 revolution similar to that vrhereby the land forces have been 
 transformed. Improved arms, the employment of weapons of 
 singular precision and power, will produce, as they have done 
 on land, the triumph of extended order in naval engagements. 
 It will not then he sufficient to specialize the means; they must 
 be greatly multiplied so as to produce the greatest effect against 
 the enemy, at the same time giving it the smallest and therefore 
 the most difficult target to hit. Protection will no longer be 
 sought in size and invulnerability, but in speed, and, if we may 
 thus express it, in the fact of never being caught. Armour- 
 plating will disappear and be replaced by number and by small 
 dimensions. 
 
 Three methods of destruction exist in the present day, three 
 weapons for the ships — the torpedo, gun, and ram. It would 
 only be logical to construct torpedo-boats,- gun-boats, and rams. 
 Unfortunately the latter have to be abandoned because, to work 
 them against large ironclads, the rams would need to be of equal 
 size. These would doubtless have a certain amount of speed, 
 but they would not have the advantage ensured by small dimen- 
 sions, and, as we have said, these rams, whilst crushing their 
 adversaries, would risk being demolished themselves. We should 
 replace them by torpedo-boats armed with outrigger torpedoes. 
 These would be rams of a new kind, acting by the shock of 
 their torpedo against the vessel attacked, although themselves 
 uninjured by the shock, for the explosion of the torpedo would 
 not reach them. With floating gun-carriages, 14 centimetres gun- 
 boats (us we named them in a preceding chapter) and torpedo- 
 boats further supplied with a ram, which (at a given moment 
 and only in a very extreme case, as this ram as a weapon is 
 very secondary) will enable them to get rid of an enemy of their 
 own pattern, we shall completely realise the division of labour 
 we advocate. 
 
 Let us, then, take the ^l-nietres 71-tons torpedo-boat, or the 
 
76 NAVAL EEFOEM. 
 
 14-cm. gun-boat, with a speed of 20 to 21 knots, to be increased, 
 later on, to 25, and see how they can be disposed for naval war- 
 fare. We have supplied the 14-cm. gun-boat with two guns as 
 their naaximum, and with as many Hotchkiss besides as it can 
 take. As for the torpedo-boat, it must have two discharging tubes 
 and two torpedoes for each tube. These torpedoes will be 5™ 75 
 in size, and loaded with 40 kilograms of gun-cotton. The pro- 
 jecting stern will protect the discharging tubes in case of collision. 
 At the present date the extremities of these tubes are flush with 
 the stern, which is a very bad arrangement, for they might be in- 
 jured if their bow struck against a vessel at sea, or a buoy in 
 harbour, a pontoon, or an obstacle of any sort. Beyond these 
 discharging tubes the torpedo-boat should have no other arm on 
 board, neither machine nor machine-guns, nor even rifles. It is an 
 attaching torpedo-boat, for the sole purpose of engaging large 
 ships. If armed with a Hotchkiss, as already suggested, the cap- 
 tain would be tempted to fight torpedo-boats belonging to the 
 enemy, and thus neglect the only object he should pursue. We 
 shall be met with the inquiry whether it will be easy for a torpedo- 
 boat belonging to the enemy to stop it ? It would, or rather, it 
 might be, if it were sent out alone to do battle. But, side by side 
 with the attacking torpedo-boat we should place another, that we 
 might call a defensive torpedo-boat, and its mission should be to 
 engage the enemy's torpedo-boats so as to clear the course for its 
 brother-in-arms. 
 
 The defensive torpedo-boat would have no discharging tube, 
 that is to say, no Whitehead torpedo. The armament would 
 consist of three or four Hotchkiss as powerful as they can be 
 got, and an outrigger torpedo at the end of a spar. This torpedo 
 will be fit to shatter a boom, break through a protecting net, or, if 
 the necessity should arise, it could even blow up a ship. Its 
 Hotchkiss will riddle the enemy's torpedo-boats ; its torpedo-ram 
 will strike and sink them. It will be the best kind of ram, as we 
 have already demonstrated. It will replace the ram that would 
 have satisfied many distinguished men in former days, and which 
 
NAVAL WARFABB AND OEGANISATION OP NAVAL FORCES. 77 
 
 would now be very inferior to a torpedo-boat armed with an out- 
 rigger torpedo. For such a reduced and light armament we 
 should probably not require a 4:l-metres torpedo-boat ; about 
 36 metres and 50 tons would probably suffice. As in the case 
 of the attacking torpedo-boat, this one should be able to make 
 1,400 to 1,800 miles at 10 knots with its ordinary su^pply of coal. 
 
 It would further be advisable that its maximum speed should, if 
 possible, exceed the speed of its linked companiou, the attacking 
 torpedo-boat, even should its supply of coal be unable to hold out 
 longer than six days. Its object being the pursuit of the enemy's 
 torpedo-boats, it can never go too fast for that purpose. 
 
 Thus, we have two vessels of very nearly similar construction, 
 but of a different armament, one destined to attack by means of the 
 torpedo, the other set apart for defence against torpedo-boats. 
 These two boats will always accompany each other. The number 
 on each attacking torpedo-boat will correspond to the number on 
 the defensive torpedo-boat. They will be, as it were, linked together, 
 two and two, and will never leave each other, the one protecting 
 the other. Each of these couples will form a torpedo fighting unit. 
 
 The gun-fighting unit will be the 14-cm. gun-boat. We have 
 already described it at sufficient length, and need not go over the 
 same -ground again. But both these torpedo-boats and gun-boats 
 in which everything has been sacrificed to speed, must re-coal after 
 seven or eight days at sea.* They will require depots for coals, 
 
 * The necessity that torpedo-boats and gun-boats should reviotual after a few 
 days' naTigation has been the object of innumerable criticisms. One would imagine 
 that ironclads were not liable to the same thing. Now, our last ironclad, the 
 Admiral Duperr^, can only take 700 tons of coal on board. At a speed of 12 knots 
 this splendid ship consumes 100 tons of coal a day ; she therefore carries coal in 
 her bunkers for only seven days at 12 knots. Then why talk, in the face of this, 
 about the re-coaling necessary for torpedo-boats, re-coaling that can be done in a 
 few hours. The Duperriis less autonomous than a torpedo-boat. How can it scour 
 the seas ? Of what use can it be, unless ae a coastguard remaining constantly 
 within reach of a coaling depot. It would not be easy to convey coals to it, for it 
 is not so easy to ship 700 tons of coal as the few bags necessary to a torpedo-boat ; 
 and this is the vessel that is supposed to secure the " empire of the seas." Fully 
 aware of its superior speed, and secure in the knowledge that, if the ironclad were 
 foolish enough to give chase its bunkers would soon be empty, any ordinary steamer 
 might amuse itself by hoisting hostile colours in its sight, on the open sea, and could 
 
78 NAVAL REFORM. 
 
 stores, and reserve men. In our basin of the Mediterranean, be- 
 tween France and Algiers, nothing would be easier ; there would 
 be no lack of ports. There may be now in far-off seas, but they 
 must be made. They are a necessity for all flying squadrons. 
 
 Although M. Gougeard approves of vessels of considerable 
 tonnage, he claims a fleet of transports to come to their assist- 
 ance. Our small boats must submit to the same law. They too, 
 in long cruises, must be escorted by transports. For the latter 
 purpose we should choose the type of steamer employed by the 
 great English and French companies. These already attain con- 
 siderable speed, but at the outset we should bring it up to at least 
 sixteen or seventeen knots. They must be constructed with a 
 great number of water-tight compartments, to diminish the chance 
 of being sunk. They would only take advantage of their speed to 
 keep up with the gun-boats when they gave chase to merchant- 
 ships, and to fly with all speed from the enemy, under the protection 
 of these same gun-boats, if they are attacked. It will therefore 
 be sufficient to arm them with a certain number of 14-cm. guns 
 and Hotchkiss, permitting them to fight only if there be any 
 absolute necessity. But as a general rule they will not defend 
 themselves, they will merely be the base for supplies, the convoy 
 for the small boats, and remain as much as possible away from 
 the fighting. They might even, if so arranged, remain at given 
 points, where it would be easy to rejoin them at a certain distance 
 from the mercantile routes scoured by the gun-boats and torpedo- 
 boats. These transports would carry stores and ammunition. 
 They should be the parent ships, and able to furnish food for two 
 or three months, and coal for at least thirty days. They should, 
 further, most decidedly have a workshop on board, as well organ- 
 ized as possible, for locomotive torpedoes, with spare gear. 
 
 They must naturally be able to provide for their own require- 
 moreover, run a blockade with much greater chance of success than the ironclad. 
 If the i)M/)err^ starts at 14 knots, its maximum speed, it could not maintain the 
 pace for many hours, and its consumption of coal would be increased by halt as 
 much again. These are the ironclads that are to be cruisers — perfect tortoises, xm- 
 protected by their shells, and obhged to steam at G knots to saye their coal ! 
 
NAVAL WAEFARE AND ORGANISATION OF NAVAL FORCES. 79 
 
 meats, whether for two or for three months. Each of these trans- 
 ports, according to its tonnage, could provide for a greater or less 
 number of torpedo-boats and gun-boats. We will take for model 
 a transport of the same pattern as the Mytho ; a transport of 
 this kind could supply the needs of 4 gun-boats, 8 attacking 
 torpedo-boats, and 8 defensive torpedo-boats. Each gun-boat would 
 have a crew of 45 to 50 men, each attacking torpedo-boat a crew 
 of 14 men, each defensive torpedo-boat 18 men ; this, for the 20 
 boats, would form a maximum of 460 men. As many would be 
 on the transports, and would from time to time exchange with the 
 crews of the small vessels ; for although the latter are far less 
 uncomfortable than is sometimes asserted, it is not easy to con- 
 tinue on them for entire months without a rest. In the course 
 of a long cruise, officers and men could alternate in this service. 
 By this means the discomforts would be lessened, and no one 
 would have any serious cause of complaint. 
 
 It only remains for us to demonstrate that a fleet thus con- 
 stituted would fulfil all the needs of a naval war present or future. 
 As far as pursuit is concerned, the thing is evident. Our trans- 
 ports, escorted by their satellites, extending their action to a large 
 circle, will be admirable instruments for a war of chase. Each 
 little vessel will be a sort of feeler spreading itself out on the sea 
 in pursuit of merchant-ships. We have furthermore the steamers 
 belonging to our mercantile companies, which would be freighted 
 for the use of our gunboats and torpedo-boats, which could, accord- 
 ing to need, be sent alone in pursuit of the enemy. A great 
 number of them are already commanded by lieutenants perfectly 
 acquainted with and accustomed to handling them, and who could 
 any day take the command in a campaign. 
 
 As a war of chase is the most important item in maritime war- 
 fare, as it is the means whereby the enemy may be most effectually 
 reached, and as this must, above all other things, be held well in 
 view in preparing for future wars, we think it necessary further 
 to devote a special and independent instrument to its service, 
 devoted entirely to bringing out all its points, We therefore pro- 
 
80 NAVAL EBPORM. 
 
 pose the construction of cruisers capable of acting alone and with- 
 out other help or protection than their speed. 
 
 The transports, gun-boats, and torpedo-boats will be the vultures 
 circling in flights in pursuit of their prey. The rapid cruisers will 
 roam in solitude like the hawk in search of quarry. The pattern 
 to be adopted for these cruisers has been much discussed in every 
 country. England appears to be about to draw the line at ships 
 with limited protection, of the Esmeralda pattern, and France at 
 patterns similar to the 8fax, or M. Gougeard's vessel. 
 
 In our opinion all armour-plating, whether for our cruisers or 
 other vessels, should be firmly suppressed. The purpose is not to 
 construct figtiting units for war, but simple sea-rovers, only to 
 attack the weak and those unable to defend themselves. It is 
 useless to give them heavy guns. We should be satisfied with 
 two 14-cm. guns, as on our gun-boats, one forward, the other 
 either aft or nearly amidships, with as many Hotchkiss as possible ; 
 and, finally, as supreme protection, two tubes with locomotive 
 torpedoes, likewise placed one forward and the other aft. 
 
 These cruisers, on the high seas, should sacrifice everything to 
 speed ; which is alike indispensable in escaping from a formidable 
 adversary and in sudden descents upon a disarmed foe. They must 
 steam at least 20 knots when fully laden. In many respects they 
 will resemble the pattern proposed by M. Gougeard, with the 
 essential difference that, being rovers on the maritime highways, 
 and not men-of-war, the armoured deck of the latter will be 
 replaced by an equivalent weight of coal in the former. In this 
 way their sphere of action and of destruction will be extended. 
 They will hardly require to go into port for repairs. They must 
 revictual from the vessels they have captured, and relentlessly 
 sink the merchant-vessels the moment they have taken their stores 
 and coal, so as not to encumber themselves. They must land the 
 crews of the captured vessels on the nearest friendly shore. They 
 must beware of running willingly into any danger. If torpedo- 
 boats and gun-boats attack them, they must seek safety in flight ; 
 and never, on any account, must they attempt to approach shore 
 
NAVAL WAEPAEE AND ORGANISATION OF NAVAL FOfiOES. 81 
 
 batteries, for these might inflict the most serious damage on them. 
 They must limit themselves to pursuit on the open sea and to 
 forcing blockades. 
 
 These vessels will be our blockade runners and our Alahamas, 
 but Alahamas that will, on no account, repeat the folly of their 
 celebrated model by accepting battle. They will probably cost 
 more than two million francs each. The great ocean lines are, as 
 we have already observed, not more than ten in number, and our 
 cruisers must limit themselves to these. 
 
 The existing squadrons must still be fought, as they will pro- 
 bably continue a few years longer in existence. We are about to 
 prove that our transports, gun- boats, and torpedo-boats will suffice 
 for this purpose. 
 
 In order to give more precision to our ideas, we will classify our 
 vessels in groups, ■which we shall n.&me Jighting groups, each to be 
 composed of two gun-boats, four attacking torpedo-boats, and four 
 defensive torpedo-boats. It seems to us that a group thus con- 
 stituted would combine sufiBcient strength to overcome any ironclad 
 or big vessel. Let us suppose a hostile squadron, made up of 
 ironclads, torpedo-boats, and look-out ships. The moment it is 
 seen, our torpedo-boats and gun-boats, profiting by their speed, 
 will surround it on every side.* The gun-boats and defensive 
 torpedo-boats will lead the way, attacking the look-out ships and 
 hostile torpedo-boats, and clearing the way for the attacking 
 torpedo-boats, which will be close behind them ; they will do the 
 utmost possible harm, and they •will make as much smoke as pos- 
 
 * It has been argued that au ironclad could not be thus surrounded by torpedo- 
 boats giving chase ; and the reason given is, that the moment they were observed, the 
 ironclad would go off at full speed to avoid their attack. Allowing that an ironclad 
 having sighted torpedo-boats six miles off, should take to flight and start off at 
 a speed of fourteen miles with the enemy in full pursuit ; in five hours she will 
 have made seventy miles ; in the same amount of time the torpedo-boats, going six- 
 teen knots, would make eighty miles ; but as the ironclad had a start of six miles, 
 they could only head it by four miles (80—6=74). The ironclad would, therefore, 
 be outstripped in five hours ; also we have supposed the ironclad to start at a 
 speed of fourteen knots, whereas she would need at least half an hour to do so, if 
 her fires were not all alight. The torpedo-boat increases its speed in five minutes. 
 The operation is always slow for the ironclad, 
 
 6 
 
82 NAVAL EETORM. 
 
 sible so as to conceal their companioDS in the fight. If they succeed 
 in making the gap through the light vessels of the advanced guard 
 which is more than likely, the attacking torpedoes will not pro- 
 ceed at their maximum of speed till the ironclads, firing their big 
 guns, are surrounded by that cloud of smoke which invariably 
 masks their view after the first round ; then nothing will stop 
 them ; if they can only muster in force, success is certain. 
 
 In every fighting group the torpedo-boats will act in accord and 
 simultaneously attack the ironclad they may have picked out ; 
 and of four torpedo-boats attacking her from ahead, from astern, and 
 from either beam, at least one must succeed, even in full daylight, 
 as they will have the help of her own dense smoke. The only 
 difficulty is to break through the lines of the advanced guard. The 
 issue of battle will depend on this first attack. To succeed, the 
 fighting groups will have to take various formations, according to 
 circumstances. There is, doubtless, a system of tactics needed in 
 this. It is being studied in foreign navies. France has hitherto 
 neglected it. She is said to be going to consider it. But it is 
 quite time to begin ! 
 
 We may, however, at once set forth the principles on which this 
 system must be based. There are three of them : 1st, speed ; 
 2nd, number ; and 3rd, invulnerability ; to be obtained for the 
 instruments of warfare by small size and rapidity in evolution. 
 
 Large torpedo-boats, large gun-boats, and still larger vessels 
 carrying both guns and torpedoes have been already suggested. 
 An attempt has been made to armour-plate them for the protec- 
 tion of their machinery. All these errors prove that we have not 
 taken into account the real nature of the new instrument of mari- 
 time warfare. 
 
 The merit of these fighting groups we have just formed is to 
 obtain the advantage that men, extended as skirmishers, possess 
 over a body in close column. They fight in long lines sufficiently 
 apart from each other for projectiles to pass between them, gene- 
 rally without hitting them ; they are sufficiently mobile and 
 sufficiently numerous to surround the enemy. In an attack such 
 
NAVAL WARFARE AND ORGANISATION OP NAVAL FORCES. 83 
 
 as we have imagined their first line may be partially or entirely 
 destroyed, but it will no sooner be reached than the second will 
 advance, without giving time to the squadron attacked to reload 
 its guns and continue firing. Moreover, a sort of general melee 
 will succeed to the assault on the ships of the advanced guard, 
 the protectors of the squadron. Such of these as are not injured 
 will turn round on seeing themselves left behind, and will go in 
 pursuit of the assailant. In the midst of all these combined little 
 vessels, confused and mixed up together, how should the ironclads 
 distinguish their own so as only to fire on those belonging to 
 the enemy ? And hitherto we have only spoken of action by day, 
 which ought to be and can be carefully avoided so as to economise 
 resources. But at night the chances of the assailant will be still 
 greater. The defending torpedo-boats will disperse their adver- 
 saries, whilst the gun-boats fire on the electric lights of the 
 squadron, and thus take away all means of resistance. Then the 
 attacking torpedo-boats will do their work without difiBculty. They 
 will not even run any very great danger. The only protection 
 that must be afforded to them will be in their small dimensions and 
 their speed. This is generally suflScient to save them, and econo- 
 mical as well. 
 
 That small boats are less expensive than big ones is a truth laid 
 down by M. de la Palisse. Now, the cheaper a boat is, so much the 
 easier is it to multiply patterns of it, and, furthermore, the greater 
 the number the greater the chance of success will be where number 
 is all-important. We will not insist on actions against squadrons, 
 for, if any doubt remains on the issue of these encounters in full 
 daylight, none remains as to their issue by night. 
 
 We may lay down as a principle, as Admiral Aube has done, that 
 any squadron attacked at night by a flotilla of linked torpedo-boats 
 and gun-boats is virtually a " flotilla destroyed." 
 
 Those who are most convinced of this truth still have reserva- 
 tions as to operations on the coast. Small boats, they say, can 
 never besiege a stronghold, or bombard Gibraltar and Malta. 
 Heaven forbid that we should deny this. But we assert that those 
 
 6 * 
 
84 NAVAL EBFOBM. 
 
 who think they can he homharded hy ironclads, or coast defence 
 ironclads, are the victims of an entire delusion, and are quite wrong 
 in attempting to retain such heavy vessels for this purpose when 
 they have already repudiated them for naval engagements. 
 
 In a former chapter we have cited the case of Alexandria. Now, 
 Alexandria is neither Malta, nor Gibraltar, nor Aden. Its forti- 
 fications are almost worthless ; their only protection lies in their 
 formidable guns, but these were served, in the struggle against 
 the English, by most inefficient gunners. Even the English 
 naval critics admit that, if these gunners had been German or 
 Erench, a third of the besieging squadron would have been sunk 
 or disabled. 
 
 Now, if we calculate what the third of an ironclad squadron costs, 
 and what it represents in military value, we may then ask ourselves 
 what nation would be sufficiently mad or foolish to risk such a loss 
 at the beginning of a war, with no other advantage to be gained 
 than to take possession of the fortifications, or, rather, to reduce 
 those fortifications, which could be so easily got round, to silence ? 
 We have surely proved that naval strongholds have ceased to he of 
 the importance attributed to them in former days. Malta and Gib- 
 raltar are always excellent harbours for re-coaling, but now-a-days 
 no sailor would venture to maintain that they are still the " keys 
 of the Mediterranean." 
 
 There are no " keys of the Mediterranean " now, all its ports are 
 open. Our small boats, our gun-boats, our rapid cruisers, our 
 transports, would none of them hesitate to go through the Straits 
 of Gibraltar at full speed, in the night, without fear of the English 
 guns. Could anyone seriously believe that the guns of Malta 
 would interfere with the freedom of the Suez Canal ? For a 
 squadron to attack either Malta or Gibraltar would, therefore, be 
 almost as useless as it would be foolhardy. But what would be 
 still more foolhardy, and even absurd, would be to attack them by 
 means of ironclads. 
 
 " The growing idea of constructing a vessel suitable for every 
 purpose," says Mr. Gougeard, " shows itself in many ways. The 
 
NAVAL WARFAEE AND OEGANISATION OF NAVAL FOKOES. 85 
 
 constructors have further aimed at enahling it to attack fortifica- 
 tions. The turret guns have an elevation allowing them to engage 
 forts situated at an altitude of 400 metres. Is it not madness 
 to employ a vessel that cost twenty millions (francs) to bombard 
 a fort ? Its principal merit, that of speed, would find no scope ; 
 and the fire of some big gun cleverly placed might do it incal- 
 culable mischief."* 
 
 This is sufficient testimony. We have only to recall the mischief 
 done to the English vessels by those poor Egyptian gunners, or 
 to the Galisonniere by the Chinese fire, and we shall have no 
 difficulty in realising the certain disaster that would befall a 
 squadron of ironclads lightly measuring its strength against the 
 great English or German naval strongholds. The armour-plated 
 coast-guard ships, a kind of floating siege-train, such as the 
 Vengeur and the Tonnerre, would not fare any better. Armour- 
 plated coast-guardships, and ironclads, would both have to reckon 
 with the torpedo, and would have to run far greater danger by its 
 means than by any firing from forts. 
 
 They could not approach the shore without coming against a 
 mine-torpedo ; just as this year (1885) the Eussian vessels in the 
 great manoeuvres frustrated the siege of Oronstadt. But even at 
 a distance they would not be safe. We have explained, at some 
 length, how, from the very first, both parties would be enveloped 
 in smoke. The torpedo-boats would then advance against the 
 ironclads, hidden, like the ancient gods, in a cloud, invisible, as 
 they were, until they suddenly descended amidst thunder and 
 lightning. 
 
 The English understood this perfectly ; all their newspapers 
 agreed, after the siege of Alexandria, that the blinding smoke 
 made it very difficult for the ironclads to continue firing, and that 
 if the Egyptians had possessed torpedo-boats the peril would have 
 been very great. In future it will be so great that we can only 
 wonder what admiral will be endowed with sufficient audacity, or 
 
 * M. Gougeard, La Marine de Guerre, son Pasii4 et son Avenir. 
 
86 NAVAL EEFOBM. 
 
 rather temerity, to venture on bombarding a well-fortified port with 
 these, monster vessels. 
 
 Obliged to keep at a certain distance to give his defen- 
 sive torpedo-boats and his look-out ships space to extend their 
 protecting lines, the firing from his ironclads would be greatly 
 weakened. Each of these ironclads would be in dread of an 
 explosion, which might reach them at any moment by the 
 sudden advent of a torpedo. The gunners would think a great 
 deal more about defending themselves from this minute enemy, 
 which they would incessantly image to be close upon them, than 
 about the distant forts now enveloped in smoke; and their firing 
 would consequently be very unsteady. 
 
 The attacking squadron, being itself attacked, and having to 
 conduct two such dissimilar operations, would probably fail in 
 both. Even if this were not so, and it succeeded in efiectually 
 bombarding the fortified place, nothing could protect it, at night- 
 fall, from the assaults of its enemies. It would be forced to seek 
 the open sea for safety, and it would reach it exhausted by a day 
 spent in superhuman efi'orts, and would no sooner get there than 
 torpedo-boats and gun-boats, turning up from every point of the 
 compass, would oblige it to begin all over again, and to defend 
 itself after it had attempted an attack — and what advantage would 
 be gained by all this ? Once again, what advantage is to be 
 derived from bombarding, or even burning Malta, Gibraltar, or any 
 other of those old and once formidable fortresses to the ground ? 
 Would the place submit any the more ? Did Belfast capitulate 
 after trials of this sort? In order to obtain possession of forti- 
 fied places they must be invested for a long time, and this is 
 impossible at sea. It is barely worth while to set an arsenal on 
 fire. What did we gain by the destruction of that of Foo-Chow ? 
 To attack Toulon, when Nice, Marseilles, Cette, for instance, could 
 be laid in ruins without incurring the slightest danger, would be 
 one of those martial follies, one of those military absurdities against 
 which M. von der Goltz has protested so strongly in his book The 
 Nation in Arms. Attacking or defending the fortified places on the 
 
NAVAL WARFARE AND ORGANISATION OF NAVAL FORCES. 87 
 
 seaboard is no longer, and never will bej anything but a remini- 
 scence of the past. Every nation will in future protect its shores 
 by means of torpedo-boats ; and it is with this intention that 
 Germany is, at the present moment, constructing a hundred and fifty 
 for her own use, and Austria seventy-five. We ourselves possess a 
 certain number of 21-metres torpedo-boats, which would be very 
 suitable for the purpose if they were armed and commanded by 
 good officers. But we ought to have ten times more, twenty times 
 more, when we consider the extent of our seaboard. 
 
 Whatever happens, this new danger is what we shall have to 
 contend against, when we attempt to land on hostile shores in any 
 future war. Now to avoid, just as to fight, these indefatigable 
 rovers, encountering and sinking our ironclads, do we not still 
 require small vessels of great speed and of light draught? Our 
 14:-cms. gun-boats possess these two qualities. We should only 
 require them to bombard open towns, commercial cities, and un- 
 fortified places, where they would appear suddenly and accomplish 
 their work of destruction, although ready to fly if the defence were 
 too well organized. It may, however, be necessary provisionally 
 to blockade the fortified ports, and to force their channels, so as 
 to cripple or destroy a fleet of hostile ironclads. This might 
 be accomplished by audacity and determination. 
 
 We have shown that it was impracticable to blockade cruisers 
 and fast gun-boats ; it is a much easier matter to shut slow-going 
 ironclads into a port by cruising round that port. A few shots 
 might reach the torpedo-boats and gun-boats, but, considering 
 their dimensions, there would be every chance of the projectiles 
 missing the mark. If a fairly open channel had to be forced, 
 which ironclads could never do, torpedo-boats of the necessary 
 speed and size should be sent out, and would glide unharmed 
 beneath the fire of the forts, whilst the gun-boats endeavoured 
 to reduce these forts to silence by lucky shots into their embrasures. 
 They would throw the town into dismay and terror, by bombarding 
 the arsenal, the shops, and private houses from afar, as the Prus- 
 sians, convinced that the weak point should always be attacked 
 
88 NAVAL EEPORM. 
 
 sent their shells over the fortifications of Paris and Strasburg. 
 The objection will, perhaps, be raised, that these fleets and this 
 system of war will be unsuitable for Colonial enterprise. Nothing 
 is less true. 
 
 Either from insufiScient materiel, or, more likely, owing to the 
 absolute inexperience of the sailors and soldiers, the armament of 
 the coasts is still in its infancy in the countries which are the 
 centres of these enterprises. Take Tunis, Tonquin^ China, for in- 
 stance. We have already explained why small gun-boats would 
 have been greatly preferable at Sfax for approaching the land. 
 The large ironclads, thanks to their heavy draught, were unable to 
 use most of their guns. We may ask of what good our ironclads 
 were to us at Tonquin ? They certainly bombarded the forts on 
 the river at Hu6 ; but two gun-boats managed the greater part of 
 the affair, as their light draught enabled them to cross the bar. 
 After this exploit, the ironclads remained stationary in the bay 
 at Along, and their men were only employed in landing-expe- 
 ditions. 
 
 Gun-boats and defensive torpedo-boats would have been far more 
 useful. They could have reduced the forts, as well as the iron- 
 clads; the transports would have landed as many men; and, finally, 
 with their rapid mobilisation, they would long ago have cleared 
 the Gulf of Tonquin of those pirates that infest it, to the discredit 
 of civilisation and our domination. 
 
 We think the fact is indisputable that, after the exploits of the 
 45 and 46 torpedo-boats at Foo-Chow, and those of the Bayard 
 at Shei-Poo, a fleet of torpedo-boats could easily have vanquished 
 the Chinese fleet. 
 
 A flotilla of gun-boats could have equally silenced the forts on 
 the river Min. It might not have been able to destroy the works 
 at Foo-Chow, for they were raised by a Frenchmen on the prin- 
 ciples of modern fortification. This destruction of the Foo-Chow 
 works was not, and could not, be completed with the means at the 
 disposal of our gallant Admiral Courbet, and we again ask what 
 weight it had in the Chinese deliberations? 
 
NAVAL WAEFAEE AND ORGANISATION OP NAVAL FOBCES. 89 
 
 Foo-Chow is one of the most glorious names in our annals of 
 war ; its destruction is one of the most splendid feats our navy can 
 boast of This is a great deal; it is everything; but the results 
 would have been far greater if obeying the necessities, and, there- 
 fore, the principles of modern warfare, our squadron had left Foo- 
 Chow and its arsenal on one side, and then thrown itself into the 
 Yangtse-Kiang to bombard its undefended towns, sink its junks, 
 obstruct its canals, stop trade, and incite revolution in the districts 
 still disaffected from the Tai-ping insurrection, and still smarting 
 from the cruelties perpetrated during its repression. We con- 
 demned our troops to sufferings and sacrifices that seemed endless 
 that we might fight China according to the ancient system, as if it 
 were a European nation, to whom the loss of a fort would be a 
 disaster, because a humiliation. 
 
 On leaving the river Min, our squadron tried to take Kelung and 
 Tamsui. At the former place it was successful. It failed at 
 Tamsui, and had to rest satisfied with blockading the coasts of 
 Formosa. 
 
 This blockade was exceedingly difficult at that particular season, 
 and would have been more effectually accomplished by small gun- 
 boats cruising rapidly in the open, and able, in the event of bad 
 weather, to take refuge in the nearest bay, an impossibility for iron- 
 clads. But who knows whether Tamsui would not have been taken 
 at once, if our naval forces had been organised in the way we have 
 pointed out. 
 
 May we not believe that, from the very first, gun-boats endowed 
 with the valuable qualities we have pointed out, and, in any case, 
 defensive torpedo-boats, would have crossed the bar which stopped 
 the ironclads and cruisers ? Steaming up the river again without 
 striking a single blow, they would have occupied a town the name 
 of which now merely recalls a reverse to our sailors, who, 
 nevertheless, showed the same bravery as at Son-Tay and at 
 Foo-Chow. 
 
 We think we have now answered all the objections that have been 
 made, or can be made, to the new engines of war which we suggest 
 
90 NAVAL EEFOBM. 
 
 for naval use. It still remains for us to demonstrate how much 
 cheaper and less costly they are than our present fleet. 
 
 This, however, would take us too far. We will only cite one in- 
 stance. Our evolutionary squadron, prepared for great battles at 
 sea, the centre and essential component of our naval force, is gene- 
 rally composed of six ironclads. Take an average of 15 millions 
 {francs) for each ; this gives a total of 90 millions {francs). Put 
 their crews at 650 men, and we have a total of 9,300 men. 
 
 Thus, according to our previous calculations, one of our fighting 
 groups in a naval action would have greater offensive properties 
 than one of the ironclads, and, in other situations in maritime war- 
 fare, these united groups would furnish much more useful and much 
 more rapidly-obtained results than these same ironclads. Now, six 
 fighting groups, which we shall take as the equivalent of an evolu- 
 tionary squadron, represent twelve gun-boats, at 8 millions 
 {francs), and carrying 600 men ; twenty-four attacking torpedo- 
 boats, at 6 millions {francs), and carrying 336 men; twenty-four 
 defensive torpedo-boats, at 6 millions {francs), and carrying 432 
 men. Finally, three transports, meaning one transport for two 
 groups, at 12 millions {francs), and carrying 1,380 men. We thus 
 reach a general total of 42 millions {francs) and 2,748 men. 
 
 We have only to compare the two and draw our own oonolusions. 
 We restrict ourselves to speaking of the squadron. We set aside 
 the ironclads in dock or in harbour, our armour-plated cruisers, &c. 
 We do not take into account the enormous accessory expenses 
 necessary to the construction of large vessels, ruinous workshops, 
 enormous cranes, vast docks, the immense personnel, &o. 
 
 On the squadron alone we save 48 millions and 1,152 men. We 
 shall, as a matter of fact, have more oflBcers in our fighting groups 
 than in this squadron. 
 
 This is by no means a cause of regret, for our officers of the 
 present day do not have enough opportunities of handling a ship*; 
 they hardly ever have a command, and lose all their qualities of 
 energy and decision, either on land or on board the ironclads ; the 
 captain, who has all the responsibility, leaves the initiative to no one. 
 
NAVAL WAEFABE AND OEGANlSATION OP NAVAL FOECES. 91 
 
 Our superior officers, weakened by this debilitating system, will 
 find a sort of regeneration, we migbt even say a resurrection, in the 
 new regime. 
 
 But this navy does not, as yet, exist, and, although our light 
 fleet may easily be organised in a few years, it cannot be got ready 
 all at once. There is a period of transition to be thought of. What 
 would happen if — as Heaven forefend — we had to undertake a naval 
 war within a few months ? 
 
 Let us glance at our fleet and see what meets our gaze. Does 
 it possess the elements necessary to that War of the Future we 
 have endeavoured to portray ? Could it face this war without 
 exposing itself to disaster ? 
 
 We have said that the war of the future will be a war of chase; 
 an offensive and defensive war on our coasts and on the enemy's 
 coasts, on those of our colonies and the colonies belonging to the 
 enemy. For this, swift cruisers are necessary, and we have none ! 
 The last constructed by our engineers are less swift than those 
 that preceded them ; progress with us has been inverted ; we have 
 walked backwards. We further require gun-boats, linked torpedo- 
 boats, and transports : we have absolutely none! To second the 
 cruisers and organise the offensive and defensive system on the 
 three seas bordering our land, in the western basin of the Medi- 
 terranean, in the radius of our colonies and those of our opponents, 
 we require small squadrons of torpedo-boats, besides fully-rigged 
 cruisers for the open sea ; but we are totally without any. 
 
 We have asserted, without contradiction, that France can hardly 
 put forty torpedo-boats in line, and among those torpedo-boats 
 there are only eight of pattern 60. All the rest are of the 
 27 metres pattern, and incapable of leaving the coast. 
 
 We need only mention the Russians as our superiors. They 
 possess 200 torpedo-boats, 160 in the Baltic and 50 in the Black 
 Sea. In our navy we do not find a single swift gun-boat provided 
 with a light and powerful armament. Finally, even if our trans- 
 ports are not without their value, and could be of use in supplying 
 our torpedo-boats and gun-boats with stores, when they come into 
 
92 NAVAL EEFORM. 
 
 existence, they are far too slow, and they barely secure a sufficient 
 supply for the victualling of a squadron or a colony ! This was 
 evident at Tonquin, as we were obliged to charter merchant ships 
 at enormous sums, for this service. 
 
 It takes time to construct cruisers and gun-boats. Torpedo- 
 boats could be had much faster. Everybody will agree that we 
 need only apply to French and foreign trade to have a hundred 
 vessels within a year. This would cost 25 millions {francs), the 
 true price (very different from the official estimate) of an ironclad 
 of the last pattern ; and it would be a far more useful outlay than 
 the completion of the six ironclads which are still building, and 
 which can only be ready, at the earliest, in five or six years, by 
 which time large squadrons will probably have been utterly con- 
 demned. 
 
 Supposing this wise course were adopted, and cruisers set in 
 hand with all speed, how could they be employed ? how could they 
 be provided with parent vessels, or added to our squadron, which 
 as things are now, would be unable to provide for their wants. 
 Among the large ironclads composing the squadron, or which 
 might compose it, we have seven vessels with a central citadel and 
 a displacement varying between 7,000 and 8,000 tons. These are 
 of the Richelieu, Suffroi, and Colbert pattern. In the central 
 citadel of these ironclads there are 27 cms. guns. The rest of 
 their big guns and the light guns are on deck. Now everyone is 
 aware that the guns in a central citadel have a very limited angle 
 of training. Each time they are fired the citadel is so filled with 
 smoke that it is impossible for the adjacent guns to be fired till it 
 clears away. We may, therefore, conclude without unfairness and 
 without raising the anger of the gunners, that if these citadel guns 
 were done away with, the offensive strength of the ironclad would 
 not, so far as the guns were concerned, be diminished by one 
 half. 
 
 Having laid this down, let us resign ourselves to the sacrifice. 
 Each 27 cms. gun, with its regular supply and its spare stores, 
 weighs 70 tons ; therefore, we should obtain the following reduc- 
 
NAVAL WAEPAEB AND ORGANISATION OP NAVAL POBOBS. 93 
 
 tions in weight for the ironclads : — The Colbert, having six citadel 
 guns, would get rid of 420 tons ; this would apply in like manner 
 to the Trident, the Richelieu, and the Friedland, while the Suffren, 
 the Marengo, and the Ocean, which have four citadel guns, would 
 get rid of 280 tons. Getting rid of the guns means diminishing 
 the crew as well. We could also proportionately reduce the rig- 
 ging, stores, provisions, spare gear, &c. It would he advisable to 
 remove the armour from the citadel, as it could he of no further 
 use ; but, taking the discreet pace at which work is done in our 
 arsenals into consideration, this operation would extend over 
 several years. We must, therefore, give up the idea, for the time 
 being, at all events ; for it is more important to organise a fleet 
 for immediate use when we are absolutely without one. We might, 
 at any rate, begin partially or entirely to remove the armour from 
 the citadel of one or two of those ironclads laid up in the ports, 
 and not likely to be required immediately to join the squadron. 
 Merely by the plan we have pointed out, we should gain 700 tons 
 on the four first, and 580 on the three others. 
 
 Our conclusion may at once be guessed at. We wish an equi- 
 valent weight of coal to replace the guns and other weights we 
 have unshipped. The central citadel being cleared out, would be- 
 come a workshop for torpedoes, and our ironclads, although they 
 would still retain their upper deck armament, would be enabled to 
 provide for the wants of a certain number of torpedo-boats. The 
 Colbert, the Trident, the Richelieu, and the Friedland could each 
 take charge of 16 torpedo-boats, 64 in all. The Suffren, the 
 Marengo, and the Ocean could each provide for the wants of a 
 dozen, in all 36 torpedo-boats. We should thus obtain a total of 
 100 torpedo-boats — fifty fighting couples. If the trade managed 
 to turn out more than 100 torpedo-boats, we could still easily 
 provide for their needs. 
 
 Applying the system of suppressing the citadel guns to our 
 ironclad frigates — to those, at least, that are still available, and to 
 our coast-defence ironclads, we should form new floating depots to 
 supply the torpedo-boats with coal and various stores. Our 
 
94 NAVAL EEFOBM. 
 
 cruisers could further take charge of several small boats. The 
 number of the latter should be increased, for they are the chief 
 destructive power of the present squadrons. Give us as many 
 as possible, and even with our present naval resources we shall 
 succeed in supplying them with everything necessary to their 
 maintenance. 
 
 We did not reckon our three big ironclads in our calculations, 
 the Redoubtable, the Admiral Duperre, and the Devastation, 
 because these vessels, being far more powerful than the rest, are so 
 encumbered and overloaded, and have so many auxiliary machines 
 on board, such complicated armaments, such intricate mechanisms, 
 that it would require endless time and labour to remove even a part 
 of all this, to simplify them and adapt them to the use of torpedo- 
 boats. These are the fine results of the construction of ironclads ! 
 Would that they were to be the last ! A fleet thus composed is 
 certainly not that of the future, or one such as we have described 
 funher back. Ironclads of inferior speed, of great draught, and 
 an enormous surface would be too easily destroyed by torpedoes; 
 and the torpedo-boats for which they would provide supplies, would 
 be too often employed in defending them against the hostile torpedo- 
 boats. They must have strong protection to adventure a meUe, 
 but we are short of everything, and we must supply our need with 
 as little delay as possible. Now what we ought to procure without 
 delay, not in the future but at once, are torpedo-boats. We must 
 take whatever comes to hand to enable these to keep the sea, until 
 such time as our views triumph and the weapons of future warfare 
 are constituted. 
 
 If anyone were found to regret that we should remove those guns 
 from the ironclads which are at times so useless, we would ask 
 whether seven vessels escorted by a hundred torpedo-boats would 
 not be far more formidable, would not constitute a very much more 
 powerful force than either their former central citadel guns, or the 
 new ironclad, however strong ? The latter might strengthen them, 
 but only when five or six years had elapsed, at the same cost as 
 would supply a hundred torpedo-boats. There can be no doubt 
 
NAYAL WAEFAEE AND ORGANISATION OF NAVAL POROBS. 95 
 
 as to the answer. Add some of our cruisers to this fleet, and some 
 of our transports which could re-victual at any moment, and, not- 
 withstanding our present weakness, by dint of a little forethought, 
 holdness, and ability, we shall soon be able to make a very good 
 appearance on the seas. Of course, care must be taken to avoid 
 accepting as permanent, the provisional arrangement we propose 
 as a makeshift ; it is a mere expedient to employ the existing iron- 
 clads, which are entirely condemned by us. Our ironclads once 
 relieved of the guns in their central citadel, will take in an extra 
 supply of fuel ; the whole weight of the guns, stores and crew will 
 be replaced by coal. They will, nevertheless, we repeat, be very 
 heavy ; they will waste a great deal, do very little work, and real 
 transports should at once replace them. 
 
 Meanwhile, it is urgent that stations should be organised, both 
 for our future swift full-rigged cruisers and our small squadrons 
 of torpedo-boats and gun-boats. Toulon and the north of the 
 Mediterranean, Ajacnio and Porto Vecchio towards the centre, 
 Algiers and Biserta to the south ; Dakar and the Gaboon on the 
 Atlantic; Mayotte and Nossi-B6 on the Indian Ocean; Port Royal 
 in Martinique, and the Pointe-a-Pitre in Guadaloupe on the coast 
 of America ; Obock at the entrance of the Red Sea; Saigon in the 
 Chinese seas; Tahiti, with the seaport Phaeton nearTaraveo, in the 
 Pacific, would be these stations. We should not need to surround 
 them with fortifications ; our altered ironclads, our flotillas of small 
 boats, alternately offensive and defensive, would be a better safe- 
 guard than costly fortresses, of which there are none, and which 
 we must construct, if we are to guard the coaling depots we 
 ought to multiply all over the world. These would be first 
 steps, the prologue as it were, to our naval re-organisation. But 
 after these are taken, the re-organisation should not be delayed a 
 single instant. Whatever modifications may be carried out, our 
 ironclads cannot last much longer. 
 
 In future we must employ light flotillas, supported by rapid 
 transports and independent cruisers, the forlorn hopes of naval 
 warfare, roaming at will over the commercial highways, whilst 
 
96 NAVAL REFORM. 
 
 the gun-boats and torpedo-boats alternately accomplish their work 
 of protection and devastation. It is time to bestir ourselves. 
 We are very much behind other nations. Germany, Kussia, 
 Austria, Italy and England are about to outstrip us, and when 
 they have succeeded in doing so, our future may be at stake. 
 Thirteen years ago we marched blindly to a military disaster. 
 Enlightened naval men, whose disciple and exponent I have the 
 honour to be, men of distinguished reputation and ability, tell us 
 they are convinced that if we do not take care, that if we persist 
 in believing in our imaginary naval superiority, we shall expe- 
 rience an equally terrible, and perhaps more irreparable catastrophe. 
 The voice of these men, who only witness in favour of truth and 
 their country, deserves to triumph over political clamour, and to 
 be heard by France ; for its salvation, its existence even, as a great 
 nation, is at stake, and a few months of callousness, or of weak- 
 ness, may effect irreparable mischief. 
 
97 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 COAST DEFENCE. 
 
 1. 
 
 In studying the future conditions of naval warfare, we have hitherto 
 given our exclusive attention to the offensive side of the question. 
 We have considered the best means of reducing the enemy's 
 squadrons, ruining its commerce, ravaging its shores. 
 
 But if to attack is essential, it is furthermore necessary to be in 
 a position to defend ourselves. The offensive-defensive system is 
 the best, according to M. de Moltke ; it would, however, be power- 
 less to save a great nation from the dangers that might overtake 
 it. Whilst meting out desolation and death to its adversary, it 
 might expose itself to injuries that would be fatal to its prosperity, 
 had no precautions been taken to ward them off. Even victory 
 would scarcely make up for the burning of its seaports, and the 
 destruction of its commercial towns, accomplished, as we have seen, 
 by a few torpedo-boats and gun-boats^ meeting no obstacles. 
 
 France is vulnerable on three seas, but it is easy to break through 
 this girdle of waves which, according to the magnificent expression 
 of Berryer, beats against her shores to challenge her genius and 
 awaken her to a taste for distant enterprise. It is no longer a 
 frontier defending her, and we should show great carelessness if, 
 after protecting our eastern provinces with an almost continuous 
 chain of fortresses, we left the shores of the British Channel, the 
 Mediterranean, and the Atlantic unprotected. 
 
 7 
 
98 NAVAL BEFORM. 
 
 This is not to say that we should multiply fortresses as they have 
 been multiplied in the Vosges and in the Alps. We do not lack 
 fortresses ; it will easily be understood, after all we have said 
 about the useless results of bombardment, that we look upon walls 
 as valueless. We are not advocates of fortified works. On land, as 
 at sea, we repudiate those enormous constructions, as expensive 
 as they are impotent. 
 
 The torpedo is a defensive as well as an offensive weapon ; the 
 task should be assigned to it not only of defending our arsenals 
 and big military depots, but that also of defending our commercial 
 seaports, and the rich cities of our littoral, which at present are 
 without protection, and are always liable to surprise, bombard- 
 ment, or destruction by fire ; it would fulfil the task far better 
 than heavy structures, those masses of stone and iron impossible 
 to maintain in every direction. 
 
 The first question we must determine is to whom the coast 
 defence should be confided. At present it is shared by the army 
 and navy. The defence of the arsenals is assigned to the prefets 
 maritimes, who have the title of commanders-in-chief, and each of 
 these commands all the troops, of whatever description, included 
 in the limits of his arsenal. These limits are clearly defined. At 
 Toulon, for instance, they extend on the east as far as Hyeres ; 
 on the west to Ollioules ; on the north as far as the second ridge 
 of those hills known by the name of " La Cote Noire," which form 
 a background crowned by forts overlooking the sea and the railway 
 valley from Marseilles to Nice. The prefet maritime has full 
 authority in the whole district of each fortress, and the naval guns 
 placed under his orders occupy a certain number of the forts and 
 batteries set apart for the protection of the arsenal. But these 
 forts and naval batteries, however numerous and important, only 
 constitute part of the defence of Toulon. Forts and land batteries 
 complete this defence, and turn our great Mediterranean seaport 
 into a vast entrenched camp. 
 
 Thus, to be more explicit, the batteries at Cape Sepet, and at 
 the Point of Grosse-Tour are manned by marine artillery ; whereas 
 
COAST DEFENCE. 99 
 
 the forts of Faron, Six-Fours, &c. are manned by the military. 
 But this co-operation between the War Office and the Admiralty 
 does not exist in the case of our commercial seaports, where the 
 defences, if there be any, are entirely in the hands of the military. 
 It is the duty of the generals in command of whatever district these 
 ports may happen to be in, to defend them against all attacks ; 
 even against a naval attack. 
 
 Doubtless, a clever general is fit for the task confided to him. 
 Massena defended Genoa, blockaded on land and by sea, better than, 
 or at least as well as, the most heroic admiral could have done. 
 But are times not changed ? A great many people think they are 
 not. They are of opinion that sailors should be left at sea ; that 
 no advantage can accrue from stationing them in fortresses ; that 
 whilst their fleet manceuvres might, perhaps, be useful to repulse 
 any attempt to bombard, on the other hand, as every bombardment 
 is followed by landing, soldiers are more fitted than sailors to 
 frustrate this second operation ; that consequently the simplest 
 plan would be to entrust the service of torpedoes to the navy, 
 whilst leaving the guns to the army, by linking the marine artillery 
 to the ordinary artillery. They would see no objection to placing 
 officers in the seaports to take charge of the torpedoes and torpedo- 
 boats, under the command of the general of the district. The 
 naval force would be always on its natural element, the sea, where 
 alone it has an indisputable right. 
 
 We know that the Germans do not share these views. After 
 careful consideration they have decided to assign the coast defence 
 to the navy, and their reasons for so doing are formed from what 
 is, in our opinion, their correct appreciation of the warfare of the 
 future. Convinced that the torpedo will, in future, be the prin- 
 ciple weapon, both offensive and defensive, they have come to the 
 conclusion that they must subordinate everything else to it ; that 
 harmony and unity may give them every advantage. Until within 
 the last few years, with them, as with us, the torpedo played a 
 secondary part, and for a long time their management was shared 
 between the army and the navy. A corps of engineers was detailed 
 
 7 * 
 
100 NAVAL EEFOEM. 
 
 to bar the entry to their ports, as securely and quickly as possible, 
 with ground mines. 
 
 This work, differing entirely from the ordinary sappers' work, 
 had, moreover, the disadvantage, in time of war, of diverting a great 
 number of these men from their usual duties. It could, moreover, 
 seriously hamper the navy, which would always prefer to keep 
 ports open as long as possible, so as to secure refuge in time of 
 need. 
 
 The navy alone can combine the defence of a port against the 
 enemy and reserve the option of entering it. A more extended 
 use of torpedo-boats and of torpedo-batteries will reconcile all 
 interests. The introduction of torpedo-batteries amongst the 
 weapons employed by the artillery and engineers would have had 
 the same disadvantages as those of ground mines. Thus it is 
 evident that no commander of a naval station could dispense with 
 a naval personnel. To fix the torpedoes, to maintain the torpedo- 
 boats, to profit by their success, to keep the enemy at a distance, 
 sailors must be employed. They are equally required for seaward 
 forts ; in the commercial ports ; and to help the vessels and the 
 seamen hired from the merchant service. 
 
 Henceforward the naval personnel and materiel are of foremost 
 importance, and take the first rank in arming seaports. Then why 
 not organise these places, so as to ensure this naval supremacy ? It 
 takes a sailor to recognise hostile ships, to judge of their strength, 
 to understand their manoeuvres, and discover the means to outwit 
 them ; therefore, why not leave to the sailor what no one else can 
 do as well ? In this, a general, however clever and distinguished, 
 will never equal an admiral. 
 
 A fleet appears in the open; it executes manoeuvres on the 
 coasts ; what operation is it preparing for ? Towards which point 
 and in what way will it direct its efforts ? This is an important 
 question, and not only requires great judgment, but the sailor's 
 grasp of the situation added to his knowledge and experience of 
 naval matters. And when it is a question of opposing the landing 
 of the enemy, or some other enterprise, even with the guns 
 
COAST DErENOE. 101 
 
 belonging to the fortresses and the batteries, would not the naval 
 gunner, practised in firing at moving targets and taking aim at 
 ships in motion, be much more fitted than the artilleryman for 
 this difficult task ? 
 
 Therefore, to repulse the attack, as well as to provide the 
 defence, the sailor should be employed. These reasons, which led 
 Germany to confide the defence of her coasts to the navy, agree so 
 thoroughly with the ideas we have set forth as to attacking these 
 coasts, that we do not hesitate to adopt them. 
 
 It may be recollected that we have endeavoured to show that 
 to besiege fortifications, bombard earthworks, shower bullets upon 
 fortified walls or terraced works, will be perfectly useless in the 
 future. Our arsenals will not be threatened ; it is always possi- 
 ble, if not easy, to shelter those from the onslaughts of the 
 enemy; but our mercantile ports, the towns on our shores, the 
 railways that unite them, are and will always remain exposed to 
 surprise. How could the army protect or save them ? We have 
 further explained that when the hostile fleets come to ravage our 
 shores, they will be composed of small light vessels eager for the 
 darkness of night to aid their desperate adventures. It would be 
 of little use if guns, however formidable, were to attempt to fire 
 at them from the forts. By the very fact of modern advance, 
 artillery must take the second rank in naval warfare, and become, 
 as it were, auxiliary to the torpedo. The latter, easily carried on 
 vessels not larger than the vessels of attack, continuously cruising 
 in flotillas before the threatened points, alone can attempt to 
 obviate the perils that beset them. 
 
 They can, further, when stationed in the channels, bar the 
 way to the assailants. We therefore repeat that the gun has a 
 subordinate part to play. It should support the torpedo, and not 
 obstruct its action. To insure this end, the sphere of action of 
 each should previously be most minutely laid down. At night, 
 guns could only fire if the horizon were carefully lighted up and 
 the enemy were discovered by means of search-lights, the enemy 
 meanwhile doing all in his power to avoid observation. But it 
 
102 NAVAL EEFOEM. 
 
 ■would be vexatious in the extreme if the assistance given to the 
 gun hindered the manoeuvres of the torpedo, either by illuminating 
 those regions where the ground-mines were placed (which the 
 hostile vessels would then easily avoid) or by indicating the pre- 
 sence of defensive torpedo-boats endeavouring to surprise and sink 
 these vessels. 
 
 Will not this be the result, if we assign our guns to the mili- 
 tary whilst the torpedo is assigned to the navy ? Complete 
 unanimity of action can only be secured by complete unanimity 
 in the command ; thus it would seem only natural that the corps 
 employing the principal weapon, and on which definitely devolves 
 all decisive operations, should also govern the accessory operations 
 surrounding these. If the navy is the essential element in coast 
 defence, in defending seaports and harbours ; if it is impossible to 
 do without it, if everything must be organised so that it should be 
 well upheld and never thwarted, the Germans are right in giving 
 it full and entire authority. 
 
 The navy alone can methodically and systematically organise 
 defence, and, as the Germans hold, the navy alone can foresee the 
 enemy's intention, guess the aim of his manoeuvres, by means of 
 its scouts appreciate his strength and his projects, and dispose or 
 modify the plan of attack or resistance, aided by these observations. 
 
 Hitherto, France does not seem to have realised the paramount 
 necessity of the navy in coast defence. This has given rise to 
 deplorable mistakes, resulting, amongst other disadvantages, in the 
 expenditure of immense sums with small profit, and in oversights 
 which might be fatal in a critical moment. In constructing the 
 coast batteries, the services they might have to render have not 
 been taken into proper consideration. Splendid forts have been 
 erected, but they are often so ill-placed, and at such an elevation, 
 that it is easy to avoid their fire by keeping close in shore. 
 
 Up to the present date they are inefficiently armed, either 
 because their guns have not been mounted or because they are not 
 sufficiently powerful. No definite plan has been elaborated for the 
 co-operation of the artillery when called upon to defend an attack 
 
COAST DEFENCE. 103 
 
 on the sea-board. By night it is impossible to take aim, by day it 
 is still more impossible to allow the forts to fire in every direction, 
 for then, again, the operations of the torpedo-boats would be 
 paralysed. 
 
 If the task of defending our coasts had been assigned to the 
 navy, the use of the works which protect — or, rather, which were 
 intended to protect — our ports might, perhaps, have been more 
 seriously taken into consideration before they were constructed. 
 And, if the matter had been attentively considered, half of those 
 useless and expensive works would never have been begun at all. 
 
 A torpedo-boat, at a cost of 200,000 francs, protects a harbour 
 better than a fort costing several millions. The saving would have 
 been considerable. Our mercantile ports would certainly have been 
 placed in a state of defence. Butj as they were not, and could not, 
 be included in any plan of warlike operations on the Continent, 
 thoy were entirely left out of the question by the military, which 
 merely gave them a garrison ; and by the navy, which only thought 
 of its own centres. Marseilles, Bordeaux, Saint Nazaire, Havre, 
 Dunkirk, &c., are at the mercy of the feeblest assailant; nothing 
 has been done to protect them from such a contingency. 
 
 In the war of 1870-71 a Prussian corvette captured a merchant- 
 vessel at the mouth of the Gironde, and this grave insult has been 
 so entirely forgotten that, although fourteen years have elapsed, we 
 are still in as unsatisfactory a position as at the time it happened. 
 If fresh hostilities broke out to-morrow the same would certainly 
 occur, and with greater ease than in 1870-71, when our fleets were 
 absolutely in possession of the sea. Now, any of the Powers with 
 which we might be engaged have the means of disputing, and pos- 
 sibly wresting it from us altogether. But the navy could not be 
 held responsible for this ; with slow-moving squadrons it could not 
 overtake cruisers and gun-boats on the open sea ; and its autho- 
 rity expires at the estuaries of the mercantile ports, precisely where 
 an enterprising enemy would direct his attack. 
 
 It is objected that coast defence does not solely consist in de- 
 fending an arsenal from bombardment, an unfortified town from 
 
104 NAVAL EBFOKM. 
 
 being burnt, a harbour from the bold descent of any adventurer 
 upon the vessels that may have taken refuge in it. It is no less 
 necessary to prevent a force from landing on our shores. Without 
 doubt, this task should be assigned to the army ; but how fulfil 
 it, if all the ports whence it could v^atch the enemy are removed 
 from its control ? 
 
 At this point we may remind our readers of what we have said 
 on the futility, consequently the improbability, of invasion in 
 future warfare. 
 
 Landing a considerable body of troops on the enemy's territory 
 will become more and more unusual. Even should it occasionally 
 be attempted, it ought to be frustrated, not on land, but at sea, 
 by sending small squadrons of torpedo- and gun-boats to scatter 
 destruction amidst the fleets of transports conveying the hostile 
 army. 
 
 Semaphores and telegraph-wires would secure the rapid con- 
 centration of these small squadrons, and our swift cruisers and 
 scouts of every description would always maintain communication 
 between our shores and any point whence a hostile fleet might 
 engage. This would be immediately signalled, and the small 
 squadrons sent in pursuit. If by chance, or by misadventure, 
 they did not meet it on the open sea, they would still render 
 most efficient service at the moment of disembarkation. 
 
 One can imagine the disorder and the confusion of the vessels 
 assailed by the torpedo-boats, and the disarray the transports 
 would be thrown into by being attacked at the very moment of 
 disembarkation. Supposing that the enemy had chosen a point 
 for landing protected by our artillery, the effect of the fire from 
 the forts would be far less formidable ; and there, again, if they 
 interfered with the action of the torpedo-boats, they would do a 
 great deal more harm than good. The two operations should be 
 so combined that the one should never be a serious hindrance to 
 the other ; and this can only be attained by subordinating the less 
 to the more important. As everything is possible, suppose we 
 admit that the navy fails to prevent the disembarkation of the 
 
COAST DEFENCE. 105 
 
 enemy. Then commences the task of the military. All the lines 
 of rail, all the roads, all the fortresses dominating them, have 
 remained in their hands; they are, therefore, masters of the situa- 
 tion against an enemy with no other base than the sea, where 
 its transports are incessantly liable to attack by cruisers or sur- 
 prise by torpedoes. As we have shown, the military will easily 
 get the better of the enemy, and the navy will second it by re- 
 assembling more small squadrons again to attack the fleet of 
 transports. 
 
 When the army and navy thus harmonise in a wise division of 
 labour, each following its natural functions, by mutually support- 
 ing the other without trespassing on each other's province, the 
 coast defence will be more assured, the army will be relieved of a 
 task which it is by no means certain of being able to fulfil, and 
 the interests of the navy will be much better attended to than 
 they have hitherto been. 
 
 So we are among those who think it would be well to follow 
 the example of Germany. It is, in fact, followed by the nations 
 unhindered by the traditions of an old-fashioned navy — by Eussia 
 and by Austria. In Eussia, the littoral is divided into districts of 
 defence, placed under the command of the senior commandant of 
 fortresses, who is named by Imperial decree. These commands are 
 habitually given to naval officers, unless the fortress, although 
 situated on the coast, is only of strategic value with reference to 
 an attack from land. 
 
 Before the last war the shores of the Baltic had been divided 
 into these districts, under the command of a rear-admiral. This 
 organisation is developing more and more. Two companies of 
 torpedo-men (which, for want of sailors, are supplemented by 
 engineers), have been formed; one has St. Petersburg for its 
 centre, and the other Odessa, and they are re-distributed over 
 various parts of the coast in small detachments, having orders, in 
 time of peace, to study the part of the country where they will 
 have to operate in time of war. Meanwhile, flotillas of torpedo- 
 boats go through manoeuvres among the rocks, on the shore, so as to 
 
106 NAVAL REFORM. 
 
 familiarise officers and men with this sort of navigation. We shall 
 mention, further on, how the officers of the Customs are called 
 upon to help in defending the shores. Austria faithfully imitates 
 Germany, and has completely adopted the course in which the 
 latter has so boldly preceded her. 
 
 Speaking to the delegates during their last session, Vice-Admiral 
 Baron de Sterneck unfolded the plans he hoped to adopt for put- 
 ting the Austro-Hungarian navy on a footing that would enable it 
 to fulfil all the requirements of the future, and explained his 
 reasons for rejecting the programme of his illustrious predecessor, 
 Tegethof. 
 
 This programme had been drawn up at a time when ironclads 
 were the preponderating naval force, thereby making the possession 
 of numerous squadrons essential. Now this is all changed. 
 Austria fully realises that the ironclad is outstripped by the 
 torpedo-boat, therefore the Naval Minister has determined to 
 divide the shores of the Empire into several districts, and specially 
 to appoint a flotilla of torpedo-boats for each district. 
 
 Four flotillas of this description will suffice for the whole 
 Empire. They will not leave the coasts. There will be sea-going 
 torpedo-boats to escort the fleets, and these will chiefly consist of 
 swift despatch-vessels ; it is hoped that private yards will be able 
 to assure a speed of twenty miles an hour to these despatch-vessels, 
 and, of course, the torpedo-boats for the open sea will not be less 
 swift. 
 
 But it will be the task of the coast torpedo-boats to secure pro- 
 tection for the ports and roadsteads. After Baron de Sterneck had 
 explained his views. Count Hohenwart recalled the fact that in 
 1859 two French frigates before Fiume had sufficed to force the 
 garrison of that town to quit it and to leave the shores undefended. 
 For the future, hostile frigates will be prevented approaching 
 Fiume by the torpedo-boats, on which Austro-Hungary places the 
 utmost reliance to preserve her from all danger. 
 
 The navy seems, in her opinion, as in that of Eussia and 
 Germany, to be the best and only guarantee for the safety of her 
 
COAST DEFENOB. 107 
 
 coasts against those powers overlooking the seas on any part of her 
 territory. And France, which is washed hy three seas, which may 
 be attacked on three sides at a time, still believes herself safe 
 from harm because her ports are surrounded by fortresses, where 
 the guns are placed at such elevations that they would be unable to 
 bear on a vessel passing close in shore, and because these each 
 have a few badly-armed or unarmed torpedo-boats. It never seems 
 to occur to her that if war breaks out she will be attacked on the 
 whole extent of her shores now covered with flourishing cities, 
 industrial establishments, populous villages, and rich villas. 
 
 She has never yet thought of dividing them into districts ; of 
 placing these districts under regular command ; of studying each 
 detail so as to fix the point of refuge or of action for the torpedo- 
 boats ; and of deciding how it will be possible to defend these 
 chance ports against the enemy's descents. There is a great deal 
 to be done in this direction, and only the navy can do it. 
 
 Like Russia, we should have companies of torpedo-men always 
 engaged in scouring the coasts, in noting all its indentations, and 
 making acquaintance with its creeks, bays, or any ambuscades 
 where carefully-hidden torpedo-boats might lie in wait for the 
 enemy, like ants behind a grain of sand watching their prey. 
 
 When this first work is done, and all the places suitable to tor- 
 pedo-boats have been explored, we shall next have to think of the 
 means whereby they may be connected, either with the nearest 
 semaphores or with the ports, so as to be instantaneously warned 
 of any smoke appearing on the sea, or of approaching fleets. 
 
 The Austrian, whose rugged shores seem specially to require 
 defence by torpedo-boats, did all this long ago ; and every year 
 vessels are sent to stations which are expected to supply them 
 with water, food, and coal. I repeat that with us this has not 
 even had a beginning. Outside our naval stations we have not a 
 single depot with provisions or ammunition for our torpedo-boats. 
 This state of things will continue until coast defence is specially 
 made over to the navy, and becomes one of its principal objects. 
 Preparation for war should be made with method, sequence, and 
 
108 NAVAL REFOEM. 
 
 precision, and it exacts technical knowledge and unremitting 
 care. 
 
 In France it almost looks as if the general plan for organising 
 our coast defence had been laid down by nature. As we are sur- 
 rounded by three seas, why should we not appoint a vice-admiral 
 with the supreme command of the naval force on each of them ? 
 He would be aided in his office, according to the extent of coast, by 
 one or two rear-admirals carrying out the supreme command under 
 his orders. We might at once find out which ports would be most 
 suitable for their head-quarters ; but as this subject touches on the 
 more important subject of suppressing some of our naval stations, 
 we prefer reserving it for another opportunity. It is sufficient if 
 we add that under the vice-admiral and the rear-admirals each 
 station for torpedo-boats would be commanded, according to cir- 
 cumstances, by captains or commanders. 
 
 We hold that all coasts thus surrounded by a continuous cordon 
 of torpedo-boats could easily be made invulnerable. It is essential 
 that this cordon should be continuous ; that each flotilla should be 
 linked to those adjoining it, that they may be in a position to 
 unite in force, and without loss of time, at any spot where dangers 
 may be feared. This could not be obtained by leaving them 
 severally under the command of the military head of the district 
 they might be in ; a military official who might be totally unable 
 to judge of the time, place, and circumstances most favourable to 
 their action. For this reason we hold that the coast and its 
 fortifications should be handed over to our navy, as these are 
 henceforth destined to be almost the sole support of the attacking 
 torpedo, the defence for the depots containing their victuals and 
 supplies, and for the stationary and locomotive torpedoes by 
 which they are protected. 
 
 Thoroughly to understand the aim and extent of this reform, we 
 must enter into some precise details, and explain the present 
 organisation, with its mistakes, its merits, which might be im- 
 proved by development, and its disadvantages. We shall endeavour 
 to do this as clearly as possible. 
 
COAST DEFENCE. 109 
 
 2. 
 
 At the present moment the defence of our naval ports is the 
 only defence entrusted to our sailors. Each is under the vice- 
 admiral prifet maritime, holding the supreme command, and 
 depends for its submarine engines upon the rear-admiral who is 
 dockyard superintendent. This ofBcer presides over the local 
 commission, a sort of committee which studies all questions relating 
 to submarine defence. This commission is composed of the dock- 
 yard superintendent, president ; the chief of the stationary defence 
 force ; the chief of the movable defence force ; the second in com- 
 mand of the stationary defence force ; one of the lieutenants of 
 the movable defence force ; an oflBcer of marine artillery, a naval 
 engineer officer ; an engineer belonging to the hydraulic works ; 
 and a lieutenant from a torpedo-boat as secretary. 
 
 Thus composed, the local commission takes the initiative in 
 what relates to the submarine engines belonging to the defence. 
 The prefet maritime adds any remarks he may have to make, and 
 duly sends on the reports drawn up on these questions, to the 
 Naval Minister, who then approves or disapproves of the measure 
 submitted to his consideration. 
 
 This system has the serious disadvantage of creating an unad- 
 visable antagonism between the prefet, who has the executive 
 power, and the local commission, whose president is nevertheless 
 his subordinate. Hence arise rivalries, more or less important ; 
 but very definite and very prejudicial to the service. The fulfil- 
 ment of the measures advocated by the local commission, and 
 sanctioned by the Minister, is under the control of three adminis- 
 trations apparently much more distinct than they are in reality : 
 firstly, the stationary defence force ; secondly, the movable defence 
 force ; and thirdly, the torpedo commission. 
 
 The defence of ports by ground mines comes under the head of 
 stationary defence. The captain or commander, who is harbour- 
 master, is also at the head of this stationary defence force ; his 
 staff includes a commander who is second in command ; several 
 
110 NAVAL REPOEM. 
 
 torpedo-boat lieutenants, with junior and petty officers besides 
 seamen, of the corps of veteran seamen. This corps is organised 
 on a military scale with a complement of first and second class 
 petty officers, as in the navy. The men composing it are former 
 seamen, who, having completed their service, are accepted according 
 to their certificates and recommendations. The seamen belonging 
 to a port or to its neighbourhood, generally try, after they have 
 served their time, to get into the corps of veteran seamen. They 
 find it an easy berth, good pay and little work; they either 
 marry or live the life sailors generally do as unmarried men ; they 
 get promotion and appointments that satisfy them, and as good 
 retiring pay as if they had remained in active service. Only some 
 of them are trained for the stationary defence force ; for the captain 
 or commander, who, in addition to this command, has the control 
 of the harbour, also directs the berthing of the vessels both in 
 the harbour and roads, and the other details connected with the 
 general domestic economy of the dockyard. 
 
 The veteran seamen are worth very little. They live their 
 regular or irregular family life on land, and only go to the arsenal 
 during the day and during the dockyard hours. They are them- 
 selves more labourers than seamen ; they have the disposition, the 
 way of looking at things, the habits of dockyard labourers, and 
 all the vices fostered by a generally idle life ; for they have even 
 less to do than the dockyard men, which is saying a good deal. 
 In fact the best of them seem, under the style of cockswain, to be 
 the head servants of the high officials abounding in our naval 
 ports. 
 
 The ships do not shift berth every day, nor does the stationary 
 defence force go through daily drill. Nevertheless the system is 
 good in itself, and, as it is of recent date, it might easily be remo- 
 delled. 
 
 If it is finally decided to do away with maritime inscription, 
 which has no further reason for existing in our modern navy (as 
 service is obligatory, and as the system is only a source of adminis- 
 trative abuses), a principle must be laid down that every Frenchman 
 
OOAST DEPBNOB. Ill 
 
 having served his time in the navy must join the reserve, and be 
 called upon to defend our shores in time of war. 
 
 The corps of veteran seamen might form a nucleus for the 
 reserve. Under more energetic rule it might be kept up to the 
 mark by preparing, in the naval stations, not only for the defence 
 of these ports, but for that of our commercial ports, and by going 
 through mobilising experiments as often as possible. The veteran 
 seamen, better organised and better disciplined, would be the 
 nucleus of the stationary defence force in what relates at least to 
 \h.& personnel, which is quite as difficult to get together and keep 
 up as the materiel. To prevent an enemy entering a port, to keep 
 him even at a certain distance, the stationary defence force uses 
 ground mines, submarine mines, and spar torpedo-boats. The 
 ground mines, or sleeping torpedoes, are placed at the bottom of 
 the sea, and they are exploded from a shore-station as the vessel 
 passes over them. But if they are immersed at a greater depth 
 than 20 to 25 metres the result of the explosion is insufficient, 
 unless the charge is enormous and, in consequence, unmanageable. 
 
 A torpedo, charged with 700 kilograms of gun-cotton, at a 
 depth of 30 metres, is only effective for a distance of 8 or 9 metres 
 above where it is placed ; consequently, a vessel passing 9 or 
 10 metres above this torpedo at the time of the explosion would 
 receive little damage, and would certainly not sink. 
 
 Whether at the bottom, or moored at a certain depth, torpedoes 
 have only a very restricted area of effect, which is illustrated by the 
 fact that spar torpedoes may be fired at the end of a 7 or 8 metres 
 pole without the slightest damage to the boat upon which they are 
 carried. But this limited power of action makes it very difficult to 
 work these ground mines. They should explode at the precise 
 moment when the vessel passes above them. To attain this two 
 observers are employed ; the one, placed at the continuation of the 
 line of torpedoes, indicates the very moment the enemy crosses the 
 line ; the other, placed in line with the centre torpedo, sees 
 exactly which torpedo the enemy is passing over, and presses the 
 firing key. 
 
112 NAVAL EEFORM. 
 
 If the enemy appears by day, the observers may, to a certain 
 extent, be sure of success, always supposing that the smoke from 
 the guns does not obscure their line of sight ; but when the attack 
 takes place at night, the electric light, if used to discover the 
 assailants, may only serve to point out to them where the tor- 
 pedoes are placed, and it seems very difficult to calculate on any 
 success. 
 
 Night attacks are, however, what we must provide against, as 
 they are more probable and more dangerous than any. Ground 
 mines are no longer adapted to naval warfare. They require too 
 delicate handling, and are, moreover, very heavy ; it takes a long 
 time to place them ; their component parts are too expensive and 
 elaborate, and they are anything but certain in their results. Their 
 day is past, and they should be set aside. 
 
 Submarine mines are of two kinds; some are sunk about 
 10 metres, and being disposed like ground mines explode in the 
 same way, by means of an electric current controlled from a shore 
 station. They have the same disadvantages, although in a less 
 degree, as the ground mines, and, therefore, should be equally 
 rejected. 
 
 The other moored torpedoes, called contact torpedoes, are the 
 best of all. They alone are worth retaining, and are just like 
 submarine captive balloons. They are pear-shaped, and explode 
 when a ship's bottom strikes them. 
 
 They float at a depth of four or five metres, which admits of 
 their being lightly charged with dynamite or gun-cotton ; the 
 handling is very easy ; they are kept in their place by a mush- 
 room sinker at the bottom of the sea, to which they are attached 
 by a small chain; a water-tight chamber secures sufficient buoyancy 
 in them to compensate for the weight of this chain, and to keep 
 them vertical. They are moored either in a straight line or in 
 diamonds. 
 
 The search-light would point out their position, which is cer- 
 tainly a disadvantage, as it points out the danger to the assailant. 
 The electric light should only be employed to sweep the horizon, 
 
COAST DEFENCE. 113 
 
 and perhaps to expose any doubtful ship to the defensive torpedo- 
 boats or to the guns of the batteries. 
 
 But, with this exception, the contact-torpedoes, which are very 
 light, very easily handled, and not heavily loaded, which do not, 
 moreover, require two observers, and which other nations succeed 
 in keeping charged and in placing rapidly, are certainly the right 
 engine for the stationary defences. Unfortunately in France we 
 are still casting about both for a definite model and for a method of 
 mooring it quickly and well. 
 
 We need not again describe spar-torpedoes, we have already 
 sufficiently explained them. It will be enough if we add that the 
 vessels appointed to their use belonging to the stationary defence 
 force are neither numerous enough nor swift enough. But this is 
 a point to which we must return. 
 
 The movable defence force, reserved to prevent an enemy from 
 approaching a port or reaching the channels where the stationary 
 defence is in operation, is under commanders. The staff of 
 officers in each port consists of two or three lieutenants, each com- 
 manding a vessel, a supernumerary lieutenant, and an engineer 
 officer. 
 
 The subordinate liersonnel is similar to that of the navy. 
 The offensive power consists of torpedo-boats, and some are fur- 
 nished, or ought to be furnished, with spar-torpedoes, and the rest 
 with locomotive torpedoes. Whitehead torpedoes, adjusted and 
 kept in good condition in time of peace, are the best for these 
 vessels, as they can be served out quickly to them in time of war. 
 This is the department of the torpedo commission. 
 
 There is a torpedo commission in all our five ports, where it 
 forms an off-shoot of the local commission. It is composed of the 
 commander at the head of the movable defence force, a lieutenant 
 from the stationary defence force, and an officer of naval engineers, 
 member of the local commission. 
 
 The torpedo commission decides all points having reference to 
 the Whitehead torpedoes, their preparation in the workshops, their 
 suitable preservation, repair, and modification, according to 
 
 8 
 
114 NAVAL REFOEM. 
 
 demand, the impulse for their discharge, &c. We must at once 
 state that the dual functions imposed on the commander of the 
 movable defence force and on the lieutenant of the stationary 
 defence force are much to be deprecated. They encourage the 
 indecision and want of activity which hitherto have hindered pro- 
 gress in our ports. 
 
 Moreover, it often happens that neither the commander who pre- 
 sides over the torpedo commission, nor the lieutenant who is 
 attached to it, have any knowledge of the locomotive torpedo at 
 the time they assume their functions. It is only after lengthened 
 practice that they master this engine, and thus all the practical 
 working of the commission rests with the engineer and the petty 
 oflScers of the workshops. The engineer is himself frequently 
 changed, and has, moreover, too many and varied occupations to 
 be able to devote much attention to the torpedo. Can we, there- 
 fore, be surprised if, in two, or indeed four of our ports, the 
 Whitehead torpedoes can neither be prepared, adjusted or kept 
 in order? 
 
 This state of things, insisted on by some, and denied by others, 
 produced an incident quite recently which is very characteristic of 
 the deplorable state of our maritime organisation. Anxious to 
 avoid the reproach of inaction, Cherbourg hastily organised a 
 series of torpedo manoeuvres for autonomous torpedo-boats on the 
 Lafisse system. This system increases the extra loading of the 
 torpedo-boat by at least 1,750 kilograms, and gives 1,600 kilo- 
 grams more than that hitherto adopted by the authorities at 
 Toulon. These made objections to its adoption, but the Cher- 
 bourg authorities would not yield to them. Toulon again in- 
 effectually appealed to the Minister, and orders were issued to 
 organise the Lafisse system on the torpedo-boat 62. On the 
 arrival of this torpedo-boat in the squadron, the board of inquiry 
 condemned the change, and, delaying the issue of the torpedo-boat 
 by at least two months, the former system had to be replaced at a 
 very considerable cost. One may well ask if the final decision on 
 similar matters should not rest with the Minister, and whether 
 
COAST DBFENOB. 115 
 
 common sense and duty are satisfied in trying to please both 
 Toulon and Cherbourg. 
 
 In France we have a materiel for torpedoes, which must neces- 
 sarily increase, notwithstanding the dislike showed by the naval 
 administration for a weapon that has the serious disadvantage of 
 upsetting all tradition and all official habits. Although still in an 
 elementary stage, it represents property worth at least forty 
 millions {francs), given up without discrimination to a variety of 
 commissions, and to a fluctuating personnel devoid of responsi- 
 bility, whose impotent efforts can only result in tne most entire 
 confusion. 
 
 Out of the 600 locomotive torpedoes we possess, 300 require 
 reconstruction to be of any use ; they are of obsolete pattern, and 
 would be easily altered if our factories for repairs at Indret were 
 not so inefficient. More than a year ago this alteration was 
 allowed to be necessary, but barely four torpedoes have been tested 
 there. The other 296 wander about between our arsenals and 
 vessels, and are badly adjusted, badly cared for, and their results 
 are in consequence doubtful. If doubt is thrown on what we have 
 just stated, we need only recall certain experiments made in the 
 squadron, and the lamentable state in which the torpedoes on a 
 certain ironclad were found when they were returned into store. 
 This is a most serious fact. 
 
 The more we study the problem of the torpedo-boat, the more 
 convinced we remain that if its perilous task is to have successful 
 results, the weapon it carries must be accurately determined ; it is 
 most difficult for a torpedo-boat having missed its aim to escape j 
 the captain should not think of such a thing ; he should only antici- 
 pate success ; he should be convinced that when once his torpedoes 
 are discharged he will only have to deal with a sinking ironclad. 
 
 Now this cannot be the case when we possess only one pattern 
 of locomotive torpedo (the Whitehead), constructed abroad by a 
 foreigner, known to all the world as well as to us, and so much 
 neglected by us, that perhaps we may be allowed to say that we do 
 not even know how to take care of it. We are at the present 
 
 8 * 
 
116 NAVAL EEFOEM. 
 
 moment the only power without a special factory for the torpedo, 
 where every effort should he made to improve it, and keep our im- 
 provements carefully to ourselves. 
 
 It appears that Germany has the right to boast that she possesses 
 a pattern for torpedoes which is superior to that of any other 
 nation. 
 
 England prides herself in the same belief; her new torpedoes 
 have attained a speed of 24 knots an hour, and they are admitted 
 to be effective at a distance of 540 metres. Even Turkey boasts 
 of a torpedo exclusively her own, and unknown to other nations. 
 In the midst of this general emulation, France gives over the care 
 of making inventions for her to Mr. Whitehead. None of our 
 engineers have given their entire attention to the locomotive tor- 
 pedo ; even the theory of it is not as yet grasped by us, and nothing 
 is more curious than the discussions to which it gives rise amongst 
 those who have made it their special study ; a great many people 
 think they know all about it, although they have not mastered even 
 the elements of it. It would be, perhaps, difficult completely to 
 instruct all the officers that may become captains of torpedo-boats, 
 during a sudden and always possible war, in the science of the 
 torpedo ; we could further wish that the new engine might be 
 assimilated to the ordinary projectile. The day when it becomes 
 nothing more than a shot, which may be kept without detriment 
 in a locker, the freedom of the sea will be secured for every nation 
 choosing to construct torpedoes. We are not near this as yet 
 in France ; not only do we neglect to construct torpedoes, but we 
 do not even understand how to keep those of Mr. Whitehead in 
 order. 
 
 The number of our torpedoes actually serviceable is insufficient 
 to arm our vessels ; and, if they were sufficient, the arrangements 
 on board the ship for their discharge is in such an inefficient 
 condition that it would negative their effect. Our impulse 
 tubes are not gauged, the doors of these tubes are not water-tight 
 on board the torpedo-boats ; for the last two years we have been 
 wanting to reconstruct the breach. 
 
COAST DEPENOB. 117 
 
 In 1884 a ministerial despatch gave orders to try a binged 
 breach on some of the torpedo-boats, similar to those which are 
 so successful on other vessels; but this has only just been started, 
 and it will be a long time before the arrangement will be com- 
 pleted. When it is completed, more trials will be necessary ; 
 when a report will be sent from one office to another, and bring no 
 decision for, at least, a year after it is sent to head^quarters ; and 
 this'^(as is only too likely), if it does not go straight off to repose in 
 a mouldy official report, whence it will never again emerge. 
 
 Almost every detail of the military armament of our torpedo- 
 boats is absolutely neglected ; even its formation is in its infancy. 
 We have no impulse tubes, no accessory spare tubes; so that 
 the smallest damage disables the equipment for an indefinite 
 period. If anything is damaged by any accident, the loss is very 
 great: even if we had the necessary material it takes a considerable 
 time to replace it. If we had spare gear any accident would be 
 unimportant, as it could be repaired at once. 
 
 But our arsenals work for urgent, well-known, and well-defined 
 needs; not for things that may be needed. We have already 
 proved, but we cannot often enough repeat, that a large number of 
 torpedo-boats may be seen in our ports which have been waiting 
 for years for a discharging apparatus, which has never yet been 
 taken into consideration ; in case of war no one could tell what 
 style of equipment would best suit them. 
 
 Thus, both as to manufacturing and as to perfecting torpedoes, 
 we are notably and strikingly inferior to other nations, who have 
 got their special workshops for the construction and readjustment 
 of the engine of war, by a process that remains secret. This does 
 not prevent their occasionally buying a pattern, that seems an im- 
 provement on the rest, from Mr. Whitehead ; but they work chiefly 
 for themselves, and, if we may be allowed to say so, they work 
 steadily. 
 
 Following the precepts of the fable, English, Kussians, and 
 Germans trust no one but themselves. We trust entirely to Mr. 
 Whitehead, and pour our millions into his cash-box ; they are, 
 
118 NAVAL E J! POEM. 
 
 doubtless, well spent, but would it not be better to expend them 
 in a national factory ? And we ought to take into account that 
 some war might occur obliging Mr. Whitehead to refuse to 
 supply us. 
 
 Would this supposition, even, be absurd? And yet no one 
 seems to have thought of it. If it came to be realised, we should 
 not have a single torpedo to put on board our vessels, unless, by 
 hastily organising (and, therefore, under very disadvantageous 
 conditions) this national factory, which we had done nothing to 
 start in time of peace. 
 
 Finally, however perfect our torpedo-boats may be from the sea- 
 going point of view, their equipment is still most incomplete, and 
 in this direction, if hostilities broke out, we should find ourselves 
 terribly disappointed. 
 
 We must, therefore, search out the weak points of our present 
 organisation, and the remedy that should be at once applied to 
 them. 
 
 What is the reason of the state of things we have just described? 
 We do not hesitate to say that it is owing to our having neither 
 the working gear nor the necessary personnel for torpedoes ; to the 
 fact that there is no one in high places thoroughly convinced that 
 the torpedo is a weapon destined to play at least as important a 
 part as the gun. The speech made by Admiral Peyron, in the dis- 
 cussion over the budget, conclusively proves this. What has been 
 done for guns, and what has been done for torpedoes ? 
 
 In comparing the organisation of the service of artillery and that 
 of torpedoes, we clearly see the estimation in which the new weapon 
 is held. The marine artillery has a special foundry at Euelle, a 
 special workshop in every dockyard, a responsible workshop, where 
 guns are repaired and kept in order, and, lastly, a firing range at 
 Gavres, or even on the Sovereign, where the guns coming from the 
 State workshops, or bought by contract, are tried. As personnel 
 in charge of the construction, repairs, and preservation of the guns 
 
COAST DEFENCE. 119 
 
 and projectiles appropriated for the service of the fleet, it has an 
 inspector-general residing in Paris. This inspector, who is general 
 of a division of artillery, is assisted by a brigadier-general, with 
 the rank of adjutant to the inspector-general. Under the orders 
 of these two general officers, besides two majors or captains, as 
 aides-de-camp, there are two officers of high rank in the artillery, 
 one captain, two draughtsmen, two overseers, with authority over 
 the works, and an accountant. 
 
 Besides the special and unexpected inspections which the Minis- 
 ter may confide to the permanent inspector, and to the deputy 
 adjutant-general, the latter has more particularly to proceed on 
 periodical rounds of inspection. The permanent inspector-general 
 of artillery and the adjutant take part in the deliberations of the 
 Naval Board of Construction. The inspector-general has to consider 
 all projects, designs, and instructions having reference, firstly, to the 
 establishment, the construction, the amelioration and maintenance 
 of the materiel for the artillery both in France and in the Colonies ; 
 secondly, to the application and execution of experiments ; thirdly, 
 to the general inspection of materiel, and the use to which it can 
 subsequently be put ; fourthly, to the inspection of the manufactory 
 of ordnance, weapons, projectiles, and materiel ; and fifthly, to the 
 practice at the ranges. He gives his opinion on all inventions in 
 connection with the artillery, by order of the Minister, transmitted 
 through the Naval Board, all the building and other matters in 
 connection with marine artillery are overlooked by his staff, he 
 does not correspond himself with the authorities in the dockyards 
 or establishments outside the ports ; the communications he may 
 have to exchange with them are made in the name of the Minister 
 by the Board of Control ; finally he sends an annual report to the 
 Minister on the general state of the department. 
 
 This powerful centralisation in Paris gives unity and remarkable 
 activity to the service. A director with a deputy has charge of the 
 foundry at Kuelle ; and a large personnel of a lower grade, both 
 civil and military, is employed in the factory. 
 
 In each port the command of the artillery is given to a colonel, 
 
120 NAVAL EEFOEM. 
 
 who equally has a numerous civil and military personnel at his 
 disposal; it has charge, firstly, of all works relating to the artillery; 
 secondly, of the workshops connected with the service ; thirdly, of 
 the trials of ordnance and powder ; fourthly, of the arrangement and 
 preservation of the ordnance and ammunition reserved for the 
 armament of State establishments and marine batteries ; fifthly, it 
 has to store, issue, and keep account of all the articles in con- 
 nection with the commission. 
 
 As we have just shown, this organisation is complete ; and if 
 it may be criticised on some heads, it certainly assures all the 
 advantages for the artillery to be derived from order, method, and 
 a clear view of the means towards attaining the object in view. 
 Does anything similar exist for torpedoes ? We shall see. As to 
 personnel, this is what we find. In Paris, two lieutenants, under 
 the immediate orders of the controller of the army ; the latter is 
 far too engrossed by the gigantic constructions which are unfortu- 
 nately the order of the day, to think about torpedoes, and he only 
 listens with half an ear to the observations of the two lieutenants; 
 for he is not the least bound to pay any attention to them. 
 
 In the ports we find one engineer in charge of the torpedoes, 
 and having, besides this, special duties in the arsenal; his time is 
 more taken up in superintending vessels in process of repair than 
 in looking after the small workshop apportioned to the torpedoes, 
 where the personnel is merged in that of other workshops. 
 Besides this engineer, or rather including him, there is a torpedo 
 commission, presided over by a commander, who is at the same 
 time at the head of the movable defence force. As this commission 
 is made up of purely temporary members, it can neither have tradi- 
 tions nor sequence of ideas. 
 
 The commander of the movable defence remains two years ; he 
 comes knowing nothing, and takes a long time to learn, for he is 
 unfortunately very often dull and timid. He does not venture to 
 try experiments for fear of losses ; be gives out that he is always 
 ready, and when, thanks to the force of circumstances, he has got 
 to knovr a little about his duties, he is sent oflf, or given the com- 
 
OOAST DBFENOB. 121 
 
 mand of some transport, on which he quickly forgets all he has 
 learnt. The engineer, on his part, is only too willing to give up 
 the study of a weapon which can be of no use to him. 
 
 As to materiel, the supply of torpedoes is lamentably deficient. 
 First, we repeat, there is no workshop for them answering to 
 that at Euelle for artillery. As for the storing and repairs, 
 they are done in the workshops in the dockyards, by a limited 
 •personnel, where there are no plans or works having reference to 
 the future, and where urgent necessities are alone attended to, or 
 losses repaired that may occur at the moment. The workmen are 
 as unsatisfactory as the assistant-engineers placed over them. 
 Mechanics are borrowed from various trades to work at torpedoes. 
 There would be nothing to complain of, if these would remain 
 constant to their new task. But they do nothing but move from 
 one workshop to another — from that of the torpedoes to that 
 having to do with the machinery for the ships, &c. &c. The petty 
 officers are no less unstable. 
 
 In none of our five ports, if the need arose, should we find the 
 plans necessary to the construction of the spare gear of a tube for 
 discharging torpedoes. 
 
 After each loss the necessary measurements have to be taken on 
 the disabled vessel. 
 
 For stores and spare gear no provision is made in our ports. 
 
 Finally, the torpedo commission has the merest pretence of a 
 workshop, with a foreman and a few mechanics. This workshop 
 is, however, the best at Toulon, for, by a happy chance, the per- 
 sonnel has not been altered for some time ; but it is very insuffi- 
 cient, and will become still more so. 
 
 Thus, there is no torpedo service, or none to speak of. Vainly 
 have young officers taken up the subject with enthusiasm, vainly 
 have some of our engineers endeavoured to follow in their foot- 
 steps, vainly is everything tried on the Japon and in the movable 
 defence force. 
 
 All these isolated efforts and unsupported attempts fail through 
 want of encouragement and direction. Every project, work, and 
 
122 NAVAL EEFOEM. 
 
 plan is sent to Paris ; often they are very contradictory, and to 
 pronounce among them all, to solve the problem, or, rather, to 
 show the Controller of the Navy (who is profoundly indifferent) the 
 way to solve it, there are only two lieutenants at the ofiBce ; and 
 these would be much the better for a fresh course on the Japon, or 
 with the movable defence force, where progress is the order of the 
 day. 
 
 To keep up with what is being done, and to foresee what ought 
 to be done, it is necessary to have a continuous acquaintance with 
 the torpedo and its accessories, as it is in a continual state of tran- 
 sition and improvement. It has been much simplified, and will 
 be yet more so ; the successive patterns we obtain from Mr. White- 
 head, and which our admirals unfortunately ignore, bear witness to 
 this. 
 
 And how should two lieutenants, permanently established in 
 the Eue Koyale, be acquainted with the service they direct — if such 
 an expression can be used under similar circumstances. They 
 ought to go about to all the ports, and, above all, to Toulon ; 
 but why should they put themselves out ? Zeal seems especially 
 unseasonable in the navy. Hence constant hesitation, reforms 
 always in abeyance, a complete absence of authority and of all 
 initiative, no concentration, no direction, no centralisation, no 
 encouragement from head-quarters. 
 
 In the first instance, conflicting interests of all sorts interfere 
 with each other in the ofBce, and hinder everything. As the two 
 lieutenants have no authority, and the controller of the navy is 
 indifierent, the Minister's Chief of the Staff, aspires to have a voice 
 in the new and unorganised service. Sometimes the Board of 
 Construction is called in as well. 
 
 How can a way be found out of all this confusion and all this 
 conflicting opinion, most of which is worth so very little? This 
 want of order will exist so long as there is no special and 
 responsible personnel set apart for the torpedo, as for the artillery, 
 and when once this is organised, all the reforms, remodellings, and 
 improvements will follow as a matter of course. 
 
OOAST DEFENCE. 123 
 
 Just as there exists for the fleet artillery, for the men-of-war, 
 a personnel to construct, repair, and prepare the armaments on 
 land, and a navigating j»«-so/2w«'/ making use of it on the ships, so, 
 in like manner, there must he the two classes of personnel for the 
 torpedoes. To constitute the first there must he a head depart- 
 ment in Paris for inspecting the torpedoes, directed hy a responsible 
 vice-admiral, who will receive the official reports, projects, studies, 
 &c. ; will examine them carefully, direct and put into execution 
 such as may appear advisable to him. He must be assisted in 
 this work by officers frequently changed, constantly making a round 
 of the forts, and going over the torpedo training-ships, and who, 
 hy regular attendance at experiments, will be fully informed as to 
 the requirements developed by practice. 
 
 These officers will, of course, remain attached to their own pro- 
 fession ; they will represent the naval fighting element, in the same 
 way as the vice-admiral, and will have the principal voice in the 
 preparation of new instruments, as may be required. 
 
 But we repeat that these officers must often be transferred, and 
 not continue with settled ideas, which might be good when they 
 first came to Paris, although of little use a few months later. 
 Besides these movable officers, there will be room for one or two 
 torpedo-engineers, living on land and forming part of the directing 
 ■personnel in the ports, to which we must shortly give our attention. 
 
 The general inspection of torpedoes will be placed on the 
 same footing as the artillery at the Admiralty, and the vice- 
 admiral at the head of it will be a member of the Board of Construc- 
 tion. This is very important, otherwise the torpedo would continue 
 in a subordinate position. To execute these plans, projects, 
 reforms, &c., required by the General Board of Inspection, there 
 must be a resident personnel to keep up traditions and maintain 
 continuity of purpose. We may call it the corps of torpedo- 
 engineers. There will be, as we have already said, two torpedo- 
 engineers attached to the General Board of Inspection in Paris, 
 and in the ports, according to their importance, one or two of 
 the same class of engineers. 
 
124 NAVAL EEFORM. 
 
 The latter will unite the present so-called torpedo-workshops 
 and those for regulating the torpedoes under their absolute con- 
 trol. The nucleus of a central establishment for the organisation 
 of torpedoes will thus be formed such as our ports can no longer 
 do without, for repairing the weapon and its discharging tubes. 
 We do not mean locomotive torpedoes only, the spar-torpedoes and 
 ground-mines of the stationary defence-force, and also the appa- 
 ratus for electric lights, as much on land as on sea, all need super- 
 intendence. All this materiel for torpedoes of different patterns, 
 and their auxiliaries, would belong to the torpedo commission. It 
 is only a question of building a workshop for repairs, and for 
 keeping the reserves in good order. It is hardly necessary to men- 
 tion that when there is a question of using the torpedo materiel 
 on board ship, naval ofiBcers and torpedo-men must undertake it ; 
 and on land the stationary defence-force is most fitted for the 
 purpose. The torpedo engineers will also regulate the locomotive 
 torpedoes ; they will ascertain that they are in good working order ; 
 that their depth and deflection are correct, and will serve them out 
 to the vessels along with the discharging tubes ; just as the artil- 
 lery in the ports serves out guns, shot, and fire-arms of all sorts. 
 
 Thus we should have a torpedo commission on the same plan 
 as the artillery, with the same functions and the same responsi- 
 bilities. 
 
 We have already shown how these departmental workshops 
 should be constituted, by a fusion of the torpedo workshops 
 with those of the committee already existing. Their per- 
 sonnel should be augmented according to the requirements of 
 the service, by drawing workmen from the various workshops 
 in the dockyards where they at present swarm. In this no ex- 
 pense need be incurred — a matter of considerable importance 
 now-a-days. It only remains to organise and set this factory for 
 making torpedoes in good working order. Of this we fully recog- 
 nise the necessity. It will only require two or three torpedo- 
 engineers; just as only two superintendents are required by the 
 artillerists at Euelle. As a nucleus of workers we might take the 
 
COAST DEFENCE. 125 
 
 men at Indret, who repair our locomotive torpedoes, and who even 
 made some of them a few years ago. 
 
 We have already said that it was a great mistake to give up 
 making them at Indret. The first torpedoes turned out hy this 
 estahlishment were by no means so had as they were made out to 
 be, and cost a great deal less (notwithstanding the difficulties that 
 had to be surmounted in turning them out) than those of Mr. 
 Whitehead. 
 
 We had only to persevere in the path we had entered, and 
 progress would soon have resulted. But, in characteristic French 
 fashion, everything was destroyed ; and now we must make up 
 for this stupid waste of material. For reasons we have already 
 given, it would he impossible to rest content with Mr. Whitehead's 
 torpedoes ; and it would be of little use if we attempted to obtain 
 others by private contract, as secrecy is the first condition to be 
 observed in perfecting torpedoes. On the other hand, Indret was 
 ill-selected ; as the centre for a similar estahlishment should be so 
 situated as to allow of incessant experiments. In our opinion the 
 piece of water at Berre, in Provence, is naturally suitable for a 
 tqrpedo-factory. Although within reach of a main-line of rail, it 
 is too far ofi' for the curious, whose visits are sometimes so difficult 
 to prevent; it is further placed in a climate which facilitates work- 
 ing out-of-doors, and sheltered from the possibility of surprise or 
 bombardment by sea. Lastly, its vast extent of shallow water is 
 wonderfully adapted to the tests necessary to ensure accuracy in 
 the torpedo. Therefore at Berre a factory should be established 
 without delay, where our officers might succeed, after the pro- 
 gramme we have traced, in making the torpedo as easy to manage, 
 and as sure in its results, as are those of the firing of guns. 
 
 As we wish to leave nothing to imagination in this work, and 
 to avoid any appearance of the flights of fancy attributed to us by 
 Admiral Peyron, from the Tribune in the Chamber of Deputies, we 
 must be allowed to make a few calculations. What would be the 
 cost of the organisation that we propose? We shall soon see. Let 
 us think first of the materiel. We estimate the expense of esta- 
 
126 NAVAL EEFORM. 
 
 blishing this factory for torpedoes at about a million {francs). 
 We have unfortunately five ports requiring departmental workshops, 
 ■which will multiply expense ; but until one or two of them are 
 done away with, they must all benefit by the reform. 
 
 We have already said that in organising the two manufactories 
 of the torpedoes now in use we should for the present have a suffi- 
 cient establishment. When important works had to be undertaken 
 the torpedo commission would apply to the big establishments for 
 naval construction. The present workshops only require to be 
 established in some special locality, and this would not be hard to 
 find in our ports, where we have plenty of ships lying idle, a 
 partial refit costing on an average about 100,000 francs for each 
 port, making a total of 5Q0,QQ(i francs. We take an average, for 
 Toulon would, of course, require more than 100,000 francs, but 
 this might be saved in other ports. 
 
 Furnished government offices might be appropriated to the 
 general committee ; allow this to cost ZOfiOO francs, and add up 
 the whole sum : 1,000,000 //-aswes for the factory, 500,000 francs 
 for the departmental workshops, ^Q,OQO francs for the committee : 
 total 1,530,000 _/ra«c«. \jQi ns now go on to the personnel. This 
 must be increased in proportion to the requirements of the service, 
 but at the expense of the Naval Construction Department, which 
 will then be freed from the difficulties it incurs through the torpedo 
 service, at present under its control. By taking workmen from the 
 Indret factory, and from the departmental workshops in the dock- 
 yards, all expense will be avoided. It is hardly necessary to 
 mention that these workmen are on the same footing as those in 
 the dockyards ; draw the same wages ; are under the same rules ; 
 have the same prospect of advancement, &c. 
 
 The Inspector-General being one of our vice-admirals, we have 
 only to provide the funds for his rounds of inspection ; also those 
 for the naval officers attached thereto. The expenses of the 
 personnel are therefore reduced to forming a new corps of torpedo 
 engineers. Now we shall only require two engineers at the manu- 
 factory, and two others at each of the departments in Toulon, 
 
COAST DEFENCE. 127 
 
 Brest, and Kochefort ; Lorient and Cherbourg might he given one 
 each ; we may allow three for the General Inspection, and at the 
 Government offices, and this would bring them up to thirteen. 
 The total expense for such a limited j)ersonnel would not certainly 
 come up to lW,000/rancs. In round numbers, the sum total for 
 reorganising materiel and personnel may be estimated at 2,000,000 
 francs. 
 
 It may he asked how the corps of torpedo engineers is to be 
 recruited ? Evidently by promotion and good pay. One of these 
 engineers must have the rank of a flag officer, with the same 
 pay and allowances. The others will all rank as superior officers ; 
 six will have the same rank as captains, and six that of com- 
 manders, with the same pay and allowances. By placing this 
 privileged corps on this footing there will be no difficulty about 
 recruiting. The foremost naval engineers will easily be induced to 
 enrol themselves in it. Two or three of our officers would make 
 excellent torpedo engineers. Kecruits must chiefly be sought for 
 among the engineers, and a few mechanics might be selected. It 
 may be objected that our reform does not go very deep, as it only 
 aspires to organise a system already in existence. But we are told 
 that the chief need is to have an autonomous, self-governing corps, 
 and separate workshops. By this means responsibility would be 
 secured which, at present, is non-existent. 
 
 According to existing arrangements the Controller of the Navy 
 is the head of the torpedo department. Has he the leisure to study 
 their materiel, which is so detailed and minute compared to the 
 gigantic materiel of Naval Construction ? Even had he the leisure, 
 would he not always view the new weapon with instinctive distrust, 
 as it threatens to annihilate all his pet schemes for the construction 
 of his marvellous ironclads ? 
 
 Finally, what we ask for the torpedo is that it should have the 
 same chance as the gun. The latter will soon be of no more 
 importance than the torpedo, and as there are men specially 
 detailed for directing the artillery, would it not be quite natural to 
 appoint some to direct the torpedo department ? It can hardly be 
 
128 NAVAL BEFOBM. 
 
 believed how fatal the present organisation, or rather disorgani- 
 sation, is to all progress. Thus, an engineer of inferior grade has 
 the superintendence of the torpedo workshops. This official gives 
 an account of his actions to the head of his department, who again 
 reports it to the Director of Naval Construction in Paris. He 
 receives his orders from the same source. Now the Director of 
 Naval Construction has many other things to do besides occupying 
 himself with the trifling details of the navy. 
 
 What are torpedo-boats in comparison with the Foudroyant and 
 the Caiman at Toulon ? — these immense machines that take up so 
 much attention, and require so much genius and so many mil- 
 lions ? The occasional ministerial despatches relating to torpedoes 
 and torpedo-boats are put into execution several years after they 
 are received, torpedo-boats are seen hauled up for whole months 
 waiting for repairs that might have been finished in a few 
 days. The torpedo officers wear themselves out in fruitless efforts 
 to have them repaired, and in the end receive incomplete and 
 imperfect work — never a finished job. They struggle against the 
 prevailing inertia, made more absolute by the absence of responsi- 
 bility. It is useless to complain of the delays or failure in execu- 
 ting the work given to any but the Director of Naval Construction. 
 And his chief in Paris, the Controller of the Navy, will always 
 excuse his having failed to pay any attention to details beneath 
 his notice. The great fact will be to create responsibility. Let 
 us have self-governing workshops, special engineers, a general 
 inspection, all responsible for what concerns them, and soon we 
 need have no cause to envy foreign powers, who are at present so 
 far in advance of us. 
 
 4. 
 When once the torpedo department is organised, and the boats 
 have been manned by sailors who have learnt their business, there 
 will remain no fear of our materiel being insufficient, or of the 
 greater part of it proving worthless. But to make and improve the 
 weapon is not everything; the men must be trained as well. Some- 
 
COAST DBFBNOB. 129 
 
 times we look forward with dread to what would become of us 
 should a naval war break out. Where could officers be found to 
 command the seventy torpedo-boats that are reckoned fit for 
 service? Could officers be employed who had never served in these 
 vessels, and who have none of the knowledge indispensable to such 
 duties and responsibilities ? And by what title could these superior 
 officers be appointed to command light fleets of torpedo-boats ? 
 Has the Minister only to stamp on the ground in order to produce 
 men capable of directing operations to which they have never given 
 a thought ? How is the personnel of engineers to be procured, 
 necessary to the management of all these machines at high pres- 
 sure ? Could this personnel be formed in a few days ? Could the 
 few men be found again who have previously served on torpedo- 
 boats ? Have any precautions been taken in view of this ? 
 
 A torpedo-class has been formed, and there are now naval 
 torpedo-men, as there are gunners, signalmen, &c. Sailors pass 
 through this special course in the schools for submarine mining, 
 and leave, after examination, with a certificate that they understand 
 ground-mines and spar-torpedoes, as well as the search-lights 
 used both on land and at sea. 
 
 But to undertake the locomotive torpedoes, which are of a very 
 complicated mechanism, we need special engineers, who have 
 served their apprenticeship on board the Japan, the training- vessel 
 for locomotive torpedoes. 
 
 The Naval Minister invited the authorities at the naval ports 
 to suggest a project for organizing this special corps, which is to 
 be a corps of torpedo-engineers, and is to constitute one more 
 branch of the service. Unfortunately there is a long way between 
 projecting and organising a corps — for there is many a slip 
 between the cup and the lip. The training of officers is of far 
 greater importance; and what is being done on their behalf? 
 Nothing — or almost nothing. We have spoken of the movable 
 defence force ; but is it not extremely discouraging when we realise 
 that this defence, which should be a great training-school, has 
 only two torpedo-boats fit for duty in each port ! 
 
 9 
 
130 NAVAL REFORM. 
 
 We can only bestow the name of torpedo-boats on those capable 
 of discharging torpedoes ; not on those Thorneycrofts making mere 
 excursions on the sea, and bare of all military armament. A few 
 steam trials, but no discharge of torpedoes ; a few ridiculous tac- 
 tical manoeuvres, but no attack on warlike lines ; a few sorties by 
 night, but no reconnoitring of the coasts ; indeed, nothing that 
 our movable defence force would be likely to be called upon to 
 do when hostilities broke out — such is our sum-total. 
 
 We have not got six officers in our navy who have fired and 
 exploded torpedoes at moving targets. This is the exact state of 
 matters, although it may be denied at the Eue Royale. Every year 
 two torpedoes, properly primed and carried on torpedo-boats, are 
 experimented with by other nations, at either a fixed or a movable 
 target. We have never dared try these experiments ; it is true that 
 we actually ventured to discharge two loaded locomotive torpedoes 
 by means of the dropping gear — that is, a stationary tube placed 
 in the water — but this was only done after the personnel concerned 
 in the manoeuvre had been sent off to an absurd distance. And 
 this is all that has taken place ! We have never yet discharged a 
 torpedo from a torpedo-boat under weigh. What confidence 
 can this give to the personnel ? It is tantamount to allowing that 
 the discharge is attended with danger, and that the torpedo may 
 possibly remain in the tube, or sink to the bottom to blow up the 
 torpedo-boat, &c. &c. 
 
 Who knows that such notions may not have some influence, 
 at the moment of action, on the daring or determination 
 of the assailants? Not only is it absolutely essential that we 
 should understand how to discharge a torpedo, but it is also essen- 
 tial that we should have entire confidence in the engine entrusted 
 to us. We should be perfectly certain that it will not burst in 
 the impulse-tube, and that if it does go to the bottom it will 
 do no harm to the torpedo-boat above it. This result can only 
 be attained by regular and frequent practice, in all weathers and 
 in any kind of sea. These experiments will demonstrate to the 
 captain that torpedoes may be discharged even when submerged by 
 
COAST DEFENCE. 131 
 
 a sea, and will convince him that the weapon placed in his hands 
 is all-powerful and certain. 
 
 Like Kussia, we should have at least 200 torpedoes, and 
 keep a great number of them ready in all respects. This would 
 be the best school for captain and crew. Our movable defence 
 force would then be equal to its task. The instructors for our 
 'personnel should remain several years in this corps, to keep up its 
 reputation. Now we have mentioned that at the present time they 
 are commanded by a commander who gives up his post just when 
 he begins to be capable of filling it. The commanding officers only 
 remain a year in their ships, and when they leave the movable 
 defence force, many of them know nothing about the armament of 
 the ship, because they have only given their attention to her navi' 
 gation. They often leave for distant stations, whence it would be 
 impossible to recall them in a sudden emergency. Of course it 
 would be impossible to keep all officers in France who had served on 
 board torpedo-boats; but if we are to be sure of having some in time 
 of danger, we must train a good many in time of peace. Twelve 
 pass yearly into the movable defence force. This number should 
 henceforward be at least trebled. Neither is the instruction of the 
 engineers arranged to the greatest advantage ; the -personnel is 
 changed every six months; neither instructors, that is petty officers, 
 nor students stay long enough on board these little vessels. If 
 six months suffice for the students, it is impossible that the same 
 period of time can be sufficient for the petty officers who are to 
 be over them. These should be very numerous, and should be at 
 least two years in the movable defence force. 
 
 We should have the same remark to make about the stationary 
 defence force if we had not already demonstrated how useless this 
 organisation is. Are the conditions under which our naval forts could 
 be defended by ground-mines known to any ? Do we possess the 
 matiriel to render the lines of these torpedoes efficient ? Do the 
 mooring lighters exist for this service ? If they exist, are they 
 fitted for it ? Have the functions of the shore-batteries been con- 
 sidered, so as to allow of complete harmony in organising the 
 
 9 * 
 
132 NAVAL BBPORM. 
 
 general defence? Is the arc of the fire from these batteries arranged 
 so as not to interfere with the arc of the attack by torpedoes ? 
 Are the search-lights for the defence in their place, and are they 
 properly worked ? Has it ever been decided how torpedoes should 
 be moored ? Have we impulse-tubes fit to put on the defend- 
 ing steamers ? Do these steamers exist except on paper ? Would 
 they be available in time of war ? Are the veteran seamen fit for 
 the duties confided to them ? Are they regularly drilled ? Could 
 they, immediately on an outbreak of hostilities, be enrolled and 
 form a solid and certain defensive force ? 
 
 All these questions may be answered absolutely in the negative. 
 In this direction nothing has been done. We must, therefore, give 
 a new impetus to our stationary force, and prepare it for service 
 in time of war, not only for the protection of military stations, 
 but also for that of the commercial ports which at present are 
 exposed to such terrible risks. 
 
 Thus we return to oxxx starting point : coast defence. After all 
 we have said, and whilst things are in their present condition, the 
 navy could not possibly undertake this, for it lacks both materiel 
 and personnel. It could barely defend our arsenals. As to our 
 commercial ports, a single rapid cruiser, a single gun-boat of the 
 kind we have suggested, could bombard them in the night without 
 fear of resistance. 
 
 This danger has become so thoroughly realised that the Naval 
 Minister at one time contemplated an appeal to the ports to 
 persuade them to procure defensive torpedo-boats for themselves. 
 A despatch of the 2l8t November 1882, received by the Ch-amber 
 of Commerce at Dunkirk, communicated a report of the meeting 
 of the sub-committee of defence for the naval ports, in which 
 Vice-Admiral Garnault invited the War Minister and the Minis- 
 ter of Marine to inquire whether each Chamber of Commerce 
 would not be disposed, in the first instance^ to purchase the 
 torpedo-boats necessary to local defence. The "naval depart- 
 ment," said the despatch, " would undertake to supply the per- 
 sonnel and the war materiel for these torpedo-boats, which would 
 
COAST DEFENCE. 13S 
 
 naturally be placed under the command of the military governor 
 of the town, on condition that under no pretext should they be 
 applied to any other purpose than to their especial mission. The 
 price of each torpedo-boat should not exceed %iO, 000 francs." 
 
 After citing the terms set down by the Minister, the President 
 of the Chamber of Commerce at the time of these deliberations 
 added : " This is a summary of the question put by the Naval 
 Minister, and I invite this assemblage to formulate an opinion 
 of what may be an opportunity for adopting the propositions 
 made to us, or to give any reasons which might tend towards 
 their rejection." The Dunkirk Chamber of Commerce decided, 
 after some discussion, on acquiring two torpedo-boats, allowing 
 the two following considerations to influence it : 1st. That it 
 is of the highest importance that mercantile sea-ports should 
 afford protection to the vessels frequenting them, and that they 
 should possess formidable means of defence for their benefit; 
 and 2nd. That, as similar armaments are the order of the day 
 in foreign ports, notably in Germany, it is quite clear that 
 France owes it to herself to take the same precautions, unless 
 she is satisfied at any given moment to see herself reduced to 
 a state of inferiority, the consequences of which might be disas- 
 trous to the country. 
 
 But how were the 400,000 francs to be procured, necessary 
 to this acquisition ? After examination, discussion, and rejection 
 of the various combinations proposed, the Chamber decided : 1st, 
 that the Minister of Marine should be informed, in writing, that 
 the acquisition of two torpedo-boats for the defence of the port 
 of Dunkirk and its shores was admitted in principle ; 2ndly, 
 that the Minister of Commerce and Public Works should be 
 requested to find out how the financial question could best be 
 met. In a despatch dated 24th April 1883 the Minister of Com- 
 merce replied to the inquiry profiered by the Chamber, as to the 
 resources whence the 4:00,000 francs necessary to the first purchase 
 of defensive torpedo-boats could be drawn, that he could suggest no 
 financial combination which would facilitate the acquisition. 
 
134 NAVAL REFORM. 
 
 We must at least hope that this final discouragement was in- 
 spired by considerations superior to the purely financial reasons 
 given by the Minister of Commerce. 
 
 The kind of maritime decentralisation proposed was not alto- 
 gether a happy inspiration. To us it would seem a mistake to 
 organise a private defence side by side with the national defence, 
 as the former could not come up to the requirements of modern 
 warfare. The coast defence should be organised on a uniform 
 system thoroughly mastered in the time of peace, that it may 
 work smoothly in time of war. 
 
 We have already stated that we consider this can only be 
 accomplished by the navy, assisted by its freshly constituted 
 stationary and movable defence forces. Not only should the men 
 and arms necessary to the protection of each port he supplied 
 by the navy, but also the actual vessels on board which they 
 are to be placed. Our frontier towns have not as yet been 
 requested to construct their own fortifications. Neither is it 
 advisable to invite the mercantile ports to buy torpedo-boats at 
 their own expense. This arrangement, this infinitesimal sub- 
 division of the forces, would certainly have great drawbacks; for 
 nothing is more dangerous in warfare than a want of unity. 
 
 We are so persuaded of the necessity of a complete unity of 
 action, that we do not hesitate, in opposition to the weightiest 
 opinions, to believe that the batteries and fortresses on the coast 
 should be given into the hands of the navy rather than into those 
 of the army ; and that a power of opposition, perhaps indispen- 
 sable to saving our coasts from the devastation that threatens them, 
 may result from thus concentrating all the defensive elements in 
 one corps. This by no means proves that the personnel and mate- 
 riel of our mercantile ports would be useless in time of war. On 
 the contrary they would ofier great opportunities, in our opinion, 
 which it would he exceedingly foolish to neglect. 
 
 Just as the army employs the maUriel of the agriculturist, just 
 as it keeps account of the horses in each district that they may be 
 requisitioned in time of need ; so, in the same way, we should wish 
 
COAST DEFENCE. 135 
 
 to see the naval force profit by the opportunities presented by the 
 merchant service. The State subsidises the companies, and should 
 impose a certain standard of construction which, moreover, would 
 cost very little, 
 
 Each of our seaports has immense interest in more and more 
 developing our coast defence. It is a question of life and death for 
 them all, and the example of the Chamber of Commerce at Dunkirk 
 shows that all the Chambers of Commerce would incline to second 
 such an imperative reform, if the price were not too high. 
 
 Now the modifications requisite on board our merchant ships 
 would be very simple if the Whitehead torpedo were employed. 
 Our navy employs this engine principally on board the torpedo- 
 boats; but recent experiences have proved that it could be carried 
 on board any kind of vessel. In this case, why should we not 
 give impulse-tubes to a portion of our merchant ships ? Thus 
 armed, these ships would be of great service at the entrance to the 
 harbours ; in the daytime their speed, which is generally inferior to 
 that of rapid cruisers, would not allow of their going further ; but 
 at night they could go their rounds, and, without running any great 
 risk, they could prevent the approach of an assailant. 
 
 What will happen if the torpedo-boats are obliged to fall back 
 on the coast for defence, when surprised by enemies better armed 
 and stronger in number than themselves ? In the neighbourhood 
 of the fortified stations they will be succoured by the coast artillery 
 and the vessels attached to the movable defence force, provided 
 either with Whitehead torpedoes, Hotchkiss guns, or search-lights ; 
 but at the present moment in the vicinity of our mercantile ports 
 there is nothing in the shape of batteries or fixed defence. It would 
 be quite easy to create an efficient system of protection ; we need 
 only invite the constructors to strengthen their steamers forward, 
 and to make the necessary structural alterations either for Hotch- 
 kiss guns, for impulse-tubes, or for search-lights. 
 
 In time of war, the State would at once requisition these vessels, 
 as it requisitions the farm-horses. Everything would be classified 
 and numbered before-hand, that there should be no delay in mobil- 
 
136 KAVAii eefoem. 
 
 ising. Every year a conimissioii, including a naval officer from 
 the neighbouring station, the harbour-master, and a naval com- 
 missioner, would inquire into the condition of the vessels in each 
 commercial port. At the naval stations the jjersonnel and maUriel 
 would be got ready, which would arm them at the outbreak of 
 hostilities ; their own personnel of stokers and engineers might be 
 retained. The support necessary to torpedo-boats would thus 
 be assured almost everywhere on our coasts, or at least at all the 
 most important points. 
 
 Hitherto none of these steps have been taken ; indeed they 
 have not even been thought of. In consequence of such inconceiv- 
 able negligence, the Minister of Marine can only advance that as 
 there is an insufficiency of the materiel necessary to the menof-war, 
 it would be folly, on his part, to attempt to provide it for the 
 merchant-ships. In the present state of matters, a vessel no sooner 
 gets into port than her artillery is at once transferred to another 
 ship. Only the other day the ammunition and supplies for the 
 machine-guns had to be disembarked from all the vessels in the 
 port at Toulon, so as to send ihem to Tonkin. Our naval Budget 
 reaches about two hundred millions {francs) and our country 
 thinks that these appropriations should be sufficient to keep the 
 danger in check which always threatens a great nation ; whilst 
 her rivals, being better informed than she is, know her real weak- 
 ness and her scarcely disguised impotence. The Eussians and 
 English have long since begun to classify their merchant-ships. 
 Ever since 1877 M. Normand has built what are in truth steel 
 cruisers, with a speed of eighteen knots, for the Russians. They 
 call them mail steamers ; but their speed, and the naval officers 
 commanding them in time of peace, would guarantee their scouring 
 the seas to a very formidable extent. The Russian and English 
 steamers allow for the possibility of being called into action. 
 England has specially given her attention, during the last few 
 years, to adapting her fast merchant-steamers as chasers. 
 
 With us it has barely been touched upon in discussing the sub- 
 sidies to be given to the mercantile companies. As speed is the 
 
COAST DEFENCE. 137 
 
 principal element in naval engagements, we should wish to see the 
 authorities in France, as well as in England, encourage the con- 
 struction of swift steamers by means of premiums. They would, it 
 is true, cost rather more than the present steamers ; hut it might 
 be possible to combine the service of Peace in ordinary trafiSc, and 
 the service of War in their capabilities for speed. We must be 
 allowed to submit a few ideas on this subject to the attention of 
 our engineers. When a ship is constructed, her load-line is 
 designed for a certain draught ; and when this line is ascertained, 
 trials of speed should he undertaken. If the ship is overloaded, 
 she sinks down and goes much slower ; if, on the other hand, she 
 is less heavily laden than was originally designed, better results 
 for speed will be obtained if care is taken of the trim, and the 
 screw is kept sufficiently immersed. We should therefore ask that 
 the horse-power of the engines on board our steamers should be 
 increased. This is the first step necessary towards greater speed ; 
 next we should require that the steamers be so constructed that 
 their water-line should become finer, the screw being at the same 
 time thoroughly immersed. These light vessels would perhaps 
 make eighteen knots, and they would be employed not only in 
 chasing singly, but in escorting torpedo-boats, in forcing block- 
 ades, in fighting either with small-arms or Whitehead torpedoes, 
 as we have explained in a former work. 
 
 As we do not pretend to be engineers. Heaven forbid that we 
 should presume to give the right dimensions for the ship we should 
 wish taken into consideration by our great companies. She should 
 be of steel, and this would greatly diminish the weight of the 
 hull ; she should have two screws, which would give a lighter 
 draught; her beam above water forward should be comparatively 
 great; her engines should be compound; her hold should be so 
 divided as to be of use for carrying varied cargoes, and to make 
 her, if necessary, unsinkable in time of war. Is this vessel a mere 
 day-dream ? We do not think she need be ; we think she might be 
 constructed, and might be perfectly appropriate to the two purposes 
 we have in view for her. In time of peace she would be very use- 
 
138 NAVAL EEFOEM. 
 
 ful for trading purposes ; in time of war she could be of immense 
 service if kept light. 
 
 However this may be, it is high time to begin to think about 
 utilising the materiel furnished by the merchant service, so as to 
 fill up the gaps in the navy in time of war. The Kussians have 
 outstripped us in this, as we have already remarked. They have 
 gone further; and with remarkable foresight they have endeavoured 
 to utilize their administrative institutions in the defensive service. 
 Thus they have organised a custom-house flotilla attached to the 
 navy, and deserving special mention. This flotilla was started in 
 1873, under the command of a rear-admiral ; and its mission is 
 to prevent smuggling, to practice the naval personnel in coast 
 navigation amidst the rocks of the Baltic ; to instruct a certain 
 number of the subordinate personnel of the navy, yearly, so as to 
 form good ofiicers for the fleet ; to superintend the local service, 
 to aid vessels in danger, and in time of war it is supplied with 
 torpedoes and co-operates in the coast-defence. At present it 
 includes three vessels, and seven steamers, able to manoeuvre under 
 canvas. Each of these ships has to guard about a hundred miles 
 of coast, and each is armed with four guns. The men are given 
 a carbine, a revolver, and a sword. They serve two years after having 
 served a year in the squadron, and return once more to service with 
 the fleet. Each vessel is commanded by a lieutenant, assisted by a 
 sub-lieutenant and a coast-guard officer. The men have to take 
 their turn at everything : steering, handling the ship, drill, &c, 
 and they must further learn to read and write. 
 
 Although attached to the navy, the custom-house flotilla is 
 placed, in time of peace, under the control of the Finance Minister. 
 The condition of officers and men is reported every year to the 
 Admiralty by the Naval Minister, who exercises constant watch- 
 fulness over the personnel, and keeps himself informed as to the 
 service of the customs. 
 
 It is intended to have a similar flotilla in the Black Sea and on 
 the coasts of Silesia. 
 
 A coast-guard has, further, been organised at various points on 
 
COAST DEFENCE. 139 
 
 the littoral, under the orders of the Head of the Customs, and its 
 mission is no less naval than fiscal. 
 
 Eussia is every day becoming a more important naval power; 
 and if ever the war incessantly threatened by their long-standing 
 antagonism breaks out between her and England, it will no longer 
 (to quote the words of JVI. Bismarck) be a fight between the elephant 
 and the whale. The elephant has learnt to swim — or, rather, it 
 is now surrounded by aquatic defenders protecting it on every side. 
 
 The Russian coast is excellently guarded, and the Russian 
 cruisers are more and more accustomed to venturing into distant 
 seas, where they will shower so many blows on the whale that it 
 will, perhaps, eventually sink under such a formidable assault. 
 It is melancholy to realise that in the midst of the general efforts 
 of all European nations to prepare for the naval warfare of the 
 future, France alone is at a standstill. She, alone, has done 
 nothing to defend her coasts and her commercial ports, and just 
 in the same way she has failed to understand the part torpedoes 
 are going to fill on the open sea. 
 
 If we minutely examine the state of our navy, it is dreadful to 
 contemplate the work that lies before us ; not, indeed, that of trans- 
 forming it, but that, alas ! of being able to use it at all, in its 
 present condition. No problem is solved, no steps are taken. 
 The work will be immense ; there is not any single point in our 
 naval organisation that does not call for reform. 
 
 It is easy to understand the lack of activity and the hesitation 
 of those who, not having the courage to give themselves up, heart 
 and soul, to this vast and complicated task, take refuge in denying 
 the truth that they may not be obliged to shake off the torpor 
 induced by the magnitude of the task. Apr^s nous le deluge 
 doubtless expresses their tone of thought; for this thoroughly 
 French saying did not, unfortunately, die out with the expiring 
 monarchy; it has since then been heard too frequently on lips 
 which should only have cried Laboremus. Yes, it should be work 
 and work without rest or respite ; for time waits for no man, and 
 the peril is great. 
 
140 NAVaL EEB*OItM. 
 
 We care little, though we may be called alarmists when we 
 point out how our country is deceived in her fancied security. We 
 care little though we be accused of showing up our weakness to 
 our rivals, and encouraging them to profit by it. We know too 
 well whose are the lips uttering these reproaches, and what are the 
 sentiments that inspire them. Nothing is to be gained by blinding 
 ourselves as to our real capabilities ; and others are not in the 
 least taken in ; we teach them nothing by exposing our weak 
 points. 
 
 After showing that the day for ironclads is past and gone, that 
 our cruisers possess no speed, that our arsenals are bare of the 
 most necessary arms, we have thought it our duty once again to 
 show up the situation of our beautiful and prosperous shores, upon 
 which any chance wave may land an enemy that could ravage them 
 in a few hours without encountering the slightest opposition. 
 
 Our commercial ports are open ; our populous cities in the 
 north are exposed to every descent, and one of the chief sources 
 of our public Eevenue, where one winter city succeeds another, 
 where the gayest resorts spread themselves out beneath the blue 
 sky in a delicious climate, and amidst exquisite scenery, the beau- 
 tiful coast of Provence, may be easily devastated, and covered with 
 the remains of this glorious prosperity and enviable wealth by a 
 few cruisers and gun-boats, passing by at night, and overwhelming 
 Mentone, Nice, Cannes or Saint Raphael with their ruinous pro- 
 jectiles. How could isolated forts prevent such a misfortune? 
 They dominate the routes to Italy ; but their fire would have no 
 effect on the sea, and would be lost in the darkness. Coast defence 
 is, or rather ought to be, a naval defence. The attack will proceed 
 from the open sea, and it is there that protection should be found ; 
 flotillas of torpedo-boats, sustained by vessels ranging the horizon 
 with their search-lights, must chase the assailant and force his 
 retreat. The coast batteries would merely be their auxiliaries 
 in this work of salvation. 
 
 We must again repeat that we possess neither flotillas of torpedo- 
 boats, vessels ready for war, or torpedoes. All our resources are 
 
COAST DEFENCE. 141 
 
 dedicated to useless ironclads, which would, above all, be useless 
 to preserve our coasts from the disasters likely to overtake them in 
 consequence of our want of forethought. We know too well that 
 no one believes in these catastrophes, that they are declared impos- 
 sible, opposed to modern progress, and unworthy of civilised 
 nations. 
 
 No one believed until 1870 that the day would come when we 
 should see Paris bombarded, and Verdun set on fire. People 
 believed that war had ceased to be barbarous, that humanity would 
 never again witness those scenes of carnage and desolation which 
 make the history of a horrible tragedy. It was a terrible mistake, 
 and the awakening was, indeed, tremendous. It is no less a mistake 
 to try and deceive ourselves into the belief that an enemy, fighting 
 for existence against us, would stop at devastating our coasts ; an 
 enterprise easy to him and disastrous to us. It is high time that 
 we should anticipate the devastation that is, perhaps, not far off, 
 and that those who govern us should take thought. 
 
142 NAVAL BEFORM. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 NAVAL PEESONNBL. 
 
 1. 
 
 As yet, we have given our attention exclusively to naval matSriel, 
 and to studying the weapon to be used in the wars of the future. 
 But the new order of things we have sought to analyse, should 
 have a new personnel, or at least a personnel adapted to its 
 requirements, appropriate to its exigencies, and fulfilling its neces- 
 sities. Has this personnel any existence at the present time ? 
 If it does not exist, how can it be organised, with as little delay 
 as possible ? 
 
 To answer these questions we must attentively examine the 
 present state of matters, and carefully avoid all prejudice and illu- 
 sion. It is often repeated that our navy is evidently superior to 
 all others by reason of our maritime inscription, which secures a 
 numerous and well-drilled personnel, ready, in case of war, to 
 embark and proceed at once to the scene of action. Maritime 
 inscription is one of those institutions that no one ventures to 
 assail, that no one dares to question in a nation at once so wedded 
 to routine, and at the same time more revolutionary than any 
 other in Europe. 
 
 A moment's reflection will suffice to show us that it is no 
 longer in harmony with the navy of the present time. It pro- 
 vides topmen, and that is all ! Now topmen are hardly employed 
 at all in this modern system, consisting of a series of mechanisms 
 
NAVAL PEESONNBL. 143 
 
 becoming more and more complicated, more and more delicate, 
 and depending upon engines which ordinary sailors can handle no 
 better than any outsider. But this simple fact never strikes the 
 numerous admirers of maritime inscription. They have stuck at 
 the brilliant epoch when Colbert was at the head of affairs. 
 Dazzled by the genius of the great Minister to whom France owed 
 its navy, able, during two centuries, to cope with the English 
 navy, at no great disadvantage, they are totally unable to realise 
 that everything is changed in our times. Maritime inscription 
 seems, in their eyes, at once a master-piece of political foresight 
 and of philanthropy. They still confidently reiterate the words 
 repeated in 1846 by M. Thiers, and which even then were 
 not in conformity with the fact. In the words of Colbert, " The 
 man who toils on the sea and gives himself up to a seafaring life, 
 needs protection more than any other. You need protection ; you 
 shall be protected ; but I require you always to be ready to hand ; 
 if you claim more protection from me, you, on your part, must 
 serve more." This was Colbert's excellent idea ; an idea sometimes 
 misunderstood, but which in course of time prevailed. Colbert 
 said : "If I take your life, I am your foster father, and give com- 
 pensation for it ; I institute pensions for the infirm such as no 
 other country grants. When you are old, and have lost your 
 strength in the service, I will provide for your needs ; if you have 
 a wife and children lacking food in your absence, the Gaisse des 
 Invalides will supply it.'" 
 
 This paternal institution — or maternal, to be more correct — 
 compensated for maritime inscription. The maternal relation of 
 the State towards a personnel always at its command, and keeping 
 it constantly supplied with everything required for the equipment 
 of a squadron, is a most seductive idea. Let us see if the reality 
 bears it out. 
 
 Whilst speaking enthusiastically of maritime inscription, two 
 things pass unheeded. Istly, the entire revolution caused by 
 steam replacing sail-power at sea, and 2ndly, the no less funda- 
 meutal revolution introduced both in our laws and military habits 
 
144 NAVAL liEFOEM. 
 
 by obligatory service. It was certainly just and admirable of Col- 
 bert to make the merchant service (at that time monopolised by 
 our riverine population) the nursery of our navy. In the days of 
 sail-power, that is up to a quite recent date, when our mercantile 
 flag was to he seen in every distant land, it was quite natural 
 that the maritime inscription should supply us with saeVors in the old 
 acceptation of the term ; that is with top-men accustomed to hand- 
 ling sails, to long cruises, to the maritime life of the epoch, so 
 different to that of the present day. In it alone were men to be 
 found, broken in to the incessant fatigue of sea-faring life, to all 
 the chances peculiar to long voyages, and requiring an exceptional 
 expenditure of physical and moral energy. It was a good educa- 
 tion to have seen the storm beating furiously against their native 
 shores from earliest youth, if in after life they had to brave the 
 storm on a light bark, or even on one of the three-deckers of olden 
 times. 
 
 As long as things remained unchanged, it could truthfully be 
 said that the population on our coasts, under the rule of maritime 
 inscription, was trained in our coastal and merchant service, and that 
 when it came to join the navy it would be found perfectly drilled, 
 requiring no preparation, and in good fighting order. This is no 
 longer the case. Sail-power is no longer paramount at sea, but is 
 replaced by steam. Even if born on a sailing-ship, a native of the 
 coast would not any the more be fitted for handling the engines 
 than any ordinary conscript. The complicated engines on board 
 a modem vessel would puzzle him quite as much ; he would be 
 just as awkward and just as difficult to teach. To have breathed 
 the sea-air from his earliest youth would avail him nothing. Long 
 cruises, interminable voyages which could only be endured by 
 those accustomed from youth upwards to live between sea and 
 sky, have given place to a new style of navigation, exacting more 
 intelligence than strength or perseverance. In this way the best 
 seamen are as often secured by conscription as by maritime in- 
 scription ; or rather a great many more are secured by the former 
 than the latter. The townsman makes a better gunner than the 
 
NAVAL PERSONNEL. 145 
 
 fisherman does ; aud is still better if he happens to be a workman 
 or mechanic. Whatever their origin, the men only arrive in the 
 rough at head-quarters. But conscription certainly supplies more, 
 both in quantity and quality. 
 
 I'or instance, on board a vessel of the evolutionary squadron (to 
 name it would be useless) the crew includes 350 men on the inscrip- 
 tion, and 404 obtained by conscription ; all the petty officers natu- 
 rally have had themselves placed upon the inscription, but in most 
 oases they began as volunteers ;* amongst the sailors only seven 
 topmen were conscripts, whereas twenty-eight were on the maritime 
 inscription. On the other hand, 21 gunners were conscripts, 
 whereas 28 were on the maritime inscription; 5 torpedo-men 
 against 4 ; 22 helmsmen against 7 ; 62 riflemen against 29 ; 32 
 working engineers against 4 ; 4 carpenters against 3 ; 2 sail-makers 
 against 2 ; 1 caulker against 3, &c. ; ordinary deck-hands, who 
 have no speciality, are alone taken in greater numbers from the 
 maritime inscription. These number 149 against. 24. 
 
 It is clear that conscription does not produce gunners, riflemen, 
 or torpedo-men ready-made. Conscripts must be trained; but 
 the men on the inscription are no better, as their education must 
 begin from the very commencement. Only engineers, in a pro- 
 portion of 90 or 95 from conscription against a few on the 
 inscription, enter the service, if not skilled, at least grounded. All 
 the rest is an inert mass, waiting to be moulded before it can be 
 converted into crews suitable to the modern navy. 
 
 In the days of saihng the working of the guns was very simple, 
 and was done very much on the same system on board merchant 
 ships and men-of-war. But now-a-days, in all the complications 
 of a great ironclad, the machinery, the service of the heavy guns, 
 the machine-guns, and torpedoes, is it to be supposed that mer- 
 chant seamen can suddenly develop into engineers or gunners ? 
 
 * Every naval ofBcer, of which there are about 4,000, may be said to have their 
 names placed on the roll of maritime inscription, when, having first been balloted, 
 or having voluntarily enlisted, they have accomplished a preliminary term of service. 
 They have then made up their minds to make the navy their profession, and it is 
 very advantageous to them to be inscribed. 
 
 10 
 
146 NAVAL REFORM. 
 
 Or when innumerable torpedo-boats and gun-boats have begun to 
 cover the seas, is it likely that men from a fishing-boat, or even a 
 steamer, will be found ready suddenly to serve on board one of 
 those delicate and terrible machines ? Sails will become of scarcely 
 any importance, and the duties of topmen will be reduced to 
 insignificance. 
 
 If Colbert's plan is to be taken up and adapted to modern re- 
 quirements ; if a monopoly is to be created, and provision made 
 for that part of the population most fitted by its vocations and 
 mode of life for naval warfare, maritime inscription should no 
 longer be exclusively applied to the inhabitants of our coasts. It 
 ought equally to be applied to the men in our factories, to the 
 engineers on our railways and in trade, to all the modern personnel 
 instructed in the workshops where machinery is constructed and 
 supervised. These would be of far greater service than men only 
 fit to handle sails or climb rigging. We cannot, of course, 
 treat trade on the same system as Colbert treated the merchant 
 service. Modern ideas would be entirely opposed to it. Trade 
 must be free When engineers and stokers have served their time 
 in the navy they cannot be prevented going on the railway or into 
 the factories. This would have to be done, however, if we were 
 really to remain faithful to Colbert's traditions. The wind being 
 the only motive power in the navy of his day, he embodied the 
 topmen in the merchant service into a brigade ; steam having 
 replaced it in the present time, we should, in the same way, em- 
 body every engineer and stoker in the trade into a similar brigade. 
 No one would dare to propose this ; therefore maritime inscrip- 
 tion, even if modified and adapted to the present state of the navy, 
 is condemned, and hopelessly condemned, whatever efforts may be 
 made to uphold it. 
 
 We have practically shown that in reality it no longer plays a 
 chief part, and that conscription produces the greater number of 
 men, and of men fitted to take special duty in our fleets. We have 
 admitted that inscription produces one class almost exclusively, 
 that of topmen. But it by no means supplies them all, and those it 
 
NAVAL PERSONNEL. 147 
 
 does supply are far from well-drilled. This is due to the steady 
 falling off in our merchant service. To cite merely one example : 
 twenty years ago as many as seventy sail of French ships might 
 be seen lying in Valparaiso harbour ; at this moment there are not 
 ten. It is the same in every other part of the world. The mari- 
 time commerce is carried on almost exclusively by English and 
 German vessels. Our shipowners find that their ships cost too 
 much, and they are perfectly right. The salaries both of German 
 officers and of the men are just half those of the French. Our 
 shipowners labour under a still greater disadvantage from the fact 
 that, thanks to maritime inscription, all the officers and three parts 
 of the crew on board a French ship must be of French origin — a 
 rule that prevents our shipowners changing their crews, and taking 
 one here and another there, according to the need of the hour ; 
 they cannot imitate the English and Germans by employing Arabs, 
 Malays, Chinese, people of every nation, who take work at almost 
 nominal wages. It is, therefore, impossible for us to compete 
 with other nations ; our sailing vessels must of necessity dis- 
 appear, notwithstanding any premium granted to them. Steamers 
 must take their place ; but our personnel is too restricted, too 
 limited in number, to supply the demand. The disappearance of 
 seamen is the result of this growing diminution in the number of 
 sailing vessels ; there are hardly any left. An enormous majority 
 of the men on the inscription are fishermen coasting about the 
 shores ; even ordinary boatmen, perfectly incapable of serving on 
 our ships. This is so true, the contingent raised is so useless in 
 seafaring matters, that a special training ship has been organised, 
 called the school for topmen, to supply the navy with men knowing 
 how to handle the rigging. 
 
 In former days it was not found necessary to train seamen. 
 Here, again, the merchant service furnished any amount of them. 
 Thus maritime inscription does not, at the present date, supply 
 the speciality for which it was purposely set on foot. The topmen 
 it supplies to the navy are generally as untrained as ordinary re- 
 cruits ; and as service is now obligatory for all, it is difficult to 
 
 10 * 
 
148 NAVAL REFORM. 
 
 understand why a difference should be made between the two, or 
 why there should be two categories of men called to serve on the 
 same men-of-war. If the men on the inscription submitted to con- 
 scription, if they became soldiers instead of remaining sailors, the 
 navy would lose very little now, and would lose less as time went 
 on ; handling the sails would become more and more simple and, 
 at the same time, more and more unimportant. Thus maritime 
 inscription has been useless to the navy for more than fifty years ; 
 and during the last twenty years it has done great harm to the 
 merchant service, by depriving it of liberty under the cloak of 
 Protection. 
 
 The Chambers of Commerce in our sea-port towns protest 
 incessantly, and with good reason, against the law forcing ship- 
 owners to employ a crew three-parts French. This heavy obli- 
 gation prevents competition with foreign rivals, who, according to 
 circumstances, can take any number of of sailors they may require, 
 without regard to their nationality. This is one of the principal 
 causes why our sailing vessels have ceased to exist. 
 
 On the other hand, maritime inscription helps trade to a certain 
 extent when steamers are in question ; but it is at the expense of 
 the State. 
 
 As we have just said, the engineers in our fleets have all been 
 obtained by conscription; they are trained on our ships, and no 
 one is unaware of the trouble and care this entails. It is with the 
 utmost diEBculty that a sufficient staff is maintained to work the 
 engines in our navy; and this is not always successfully done. 
 As soon as the engineers have picked up sufficient experience in 
 the schools and on board the men-of-war, their time of service has 
 expired, and they leave in all haste. If any of them have acquired 
 a liking for the sea they have no inducement to remain with our 
 fleets, as they find much more lucrative and honourable situations 
 in the mercantile companies. They have only to put their names 
 on the inscription (they are aware that the steamer upon which 
 they may have taken service is sure to be requisitioned in time of 
 war, but this is only an extra inducement in its favour), and, at the 
 
NAVAL PEBSONNEL. 149 
 
 end of twenty-five years at sea, they are often in possession of 
 quite as large a pension paid by the State as if they had served 
 in the navy. For instance, a chief engine-room artificer, on leaving 
 the navy, puts his name on the inscription roll, and goes into 
 the service of a company ; he will get on by degrees, and if he rises 
 to the responsible situation of working engines of a certain power 
 on board a steamer, the pension he receives from the State would 
 be equal to that of a chief engineer, say, 1,200 francs or 1,500 
 francs. This means that the navy gives a premium to those who 
 rise in the merchant service ; so that an engineer of any standing 
 would be very foolish to waste his opportunities in the former, if 
 by serving the private companies he can get a higher salary, and, 
 at the same time, can secure a pension. It is true that if he 
 reached the rank of fleet engineer in the navy, he would have a 
 better retiring pension, of nearly 3,000 yra«cs ; but as long as he 
 remained in the service he could not save a halfpenny, whereas 
 he would always be able to save a good deal in the companies' 
 service, as the salaries are very good. 
 
 The engineers who are enrolled on the maritime inscription 
 before joining the navy are few in number and quite uneducated; 
 they join too young to have any experience; the navy, therefore, 
 trains them, and the companies reap the advantage. This is an 
 incontrovertible fact ; the Messageries Maritimes organised a school 
 in former days to train engineers for their ships, but it was soon 
 given up, as the Messageries became aware that they had no need to 
 educate engineers, when the State undertook it for them ; they actu- 
 ally draw their engineers from the navy, and these accept situations 
 from them after their five years' service. Thus it may be seen 
 that this intimate connection between the merchant service and the 
 navy, which is considered, and, indeed, was, such an excellent 
 arrangement in the days of Colbert, now cheats the State by de- 
 priving the navy of its engineers, who are so all-important to it. 
 Far from being supplied with engineers by the merchant service, as 
 it used to be with topmen in the days of sailing, the navy now sup- 
 plies the merchant service. It is now a school to train engineers 
 
150 NAVAL EEFOEM. 
 
 for trading vessels ; whereas, in olden days, traders formed seamen 
 for the navy. Colbert's idea no longer obtains. The aims he 
 pursued are entirely reversed. 
 
 The loss to the State is by no means entirely gain to the trading 
 companies, for the restrictions imposed upon the merchant service 
 by maritime inscription negative any advantage they might other- 
 wise derive. Our shipowners, as we have already said, are forced 
 to employ a crew of which the whole of the officers, and three-parts 
 of the total number of men, must be of French origin ; in their 
 special line they cannot profit as other trades might do, by the low 
 price of foreign labour ; they are, moreover, forbidden to discharge 
 sailors in foreign lands, and if, for any reason, men have been left 
 in a distant country, the law ordains that they must be sent home 
 at the expense of the shipowner. 
 
 Although French sailors are thus protected against the ship- 
 owners, they in their turn are forbidden to sojourn or take employ- 
 ment on foreign vessels without special permission. Their liberty 
 of action is no less hampered than that of the ship-owners. They 
 transact all bargains with the latter through the agents for the navy. 
 
 The merchant service cannot make way under these rules ; mari- 
 time inscription is a close network hampering any possibility of 
 development. Under pretext of keeping constant control over the 
 interests of the men, of guarding them with paternal or, as M. 
 Theirs expressed it, with maternal care, the naval administration 
 undertakes every detail of their affairs, and manages them with an 
 administrative routine, an ignorance of economy, and a mismanage- 
 ment that is utterly deplorable. 
 
 The fishing on the coasts and the coastal trade, which is their 
 prerogative, gives rise to any number of abuses. The naval agents 
 are like little sovereigns in their own district, and their despotism is 
 often unjust and unreasonable. 
 
 ■ The history of the naval Gaisse des Invalides is most lament- 
 able; it has been told so frequently that we need not recapitulate 
 it. We need only say that it is one of those institutions which are 
 of no further use. Every individual is now under the obligation to 
 
INAVAL PERSONNEL. 151 
 
 serve, and therefore sailors have no more right than soldiers to be 
 helped or given retiring pensions. If they want a retiring fund, 
 let them administer it themselves, as they have begged permission 
 to do ever since 1861. They should be put on a par with every- 
 one else. They do not require an agent to negotiate their engage- 
 ment on board a merchant vessel : any minor official would 
 undertake it. As the State exacts no more from them than from 
 the rest of the nation, it should cease its pretended paternal or 
 maternal protection. The only result of the noble mission it is 
 supposed to fulfil is to encourage an immense, useless, and expensive 
 administration. 
 
 If we open the Almanack du Marin, we find 230 agents em- 
 ployed in ports other than our five naval stations ; that is in 
 districts where maritime inscription exists ; besides 92 agents of 
 various ranks, and 253 officials or syndics of various ranks. These 
 added together make a total of 575 persons employed to work the 
 maritime inscription. To these must be added the clerks who 
 collect around the agents, and of whom the Almanack du Marin 
 and the Amiuaire de la Marine make no mention, as they do not 
 rank as officers. We do not think we should exaggerate if we 
 asserted that there are two clerks to every agent, but we have no 
 statistics on this point. It is true that the agents for maritime 
 inscription have other things to do besides enticing men to enlist; 
 they make bargains for the navy, and fulfil the same mission in 
 their special seaport as each commissariat officer fulfils in his own 
 district. But if they were quit of the maritime inscription, which 
 engrosses almost their whole attention, there might be fewer of 
 them, and they might be better placed, and render more important 
 services. 
 
 Maritime inscription formerly bore the blame of placing those 
 inscribed under much severer laws than those which govern other 
 citizens, military service being in their case obligatory, whereas it 
 did not reach the whole nation. As this service lasted fifty years, 
 it was only fair to bestow great privileges on them as compensa- 
 tion for the exceptional burden laid upon them. 
 
162 NAVAL EEFOEM. 
 
 But here, again, a radical change has taken place. The military 
 law of the 27th July 1872, made personal service ohligatory for 
 every Frenchman up to the age of forty ; those in our central pro- 
 vinces must serve as well as those on the coast. 
 
 It is difficult to see why a difference should be made between 
 those serving at sea and those on land, or why the former should 
 enjoy advantages that are not granted to the latter. Universal 
 service has considerably changed the hard life and unfortunate 
 condition to which those on the inscription were reduced, as com- 
 pared with that of the contingent raised for the army or for the 
 navy itself. 
 
 There is a crying disparity between the position of men on the 
 inscription and that of conscripts serving on the same ships, who 
 go through the same hardships and lead exactly the same existence. 
 The sailor enrolled on the inscription enters the service with the 
 rank of seaman of the 3rd class and fourpence a day (the cost 
 deducted of keeping up his clothing) ; whereas the naval conscript 
 during a space of seventeen or eighteen months only obtains the 
 grade of naval apprentice and twopence a day, and the military 
 conscript the advance of a halfpenny a day with the grade of a 
 soldier of the 2nd class. If he has already been at sea, a member 
 of the inscription can enter the service with a grade corresponding 
 to his position in the hierarchy of the merchant service, but this 
 favour is not granted to the conscript. The pay of an inscribed 
 seaman, already better than that of soldiers, is further increased 
 by the institution of a large number of supplementary allowances ; 
 allowances for extra work ; allowances for special certificated apti- 
 tude ; high pay for continuous service ; allowance for being recalled 
 at the end of five years ; allowances for each legitimate or legiti- 
 mised child under ten years of age, &o. &c. &c. 
 
 The first of these allowances can indeed be obtained by men 
 raised by conscription and incorporated into the crews ; but this 
 occurs after a much longer period, as their advancement is much 
 less rapid, and in any case far more laborious. A man on the 
 inscription is at liberty to marry without permission, but the con- 
 
NAVAL PEESONNEL. 153 
 
 script cannot. He has the right to enter the merchant-service, 
 but a conscript may not do so. He is privileged to attend the 
 classes in the hydrographic schools which prepare him as certificated 
 captain, but the conscript is not admitted to them. He can only 
 be called upon to serve during a period of seven years, after which 
 a special decree from the head of the executive would he neces- 
 sary for further calls ; the conscript is only freed from active ser- 
 vice at the end of nine years. The seven years over which the 
 service of a member of the inscription extends, includes a normal 
 period of three years' active service : if kept over this term, or 
 recalled after dismissal, he draws the high pay of four sous daily. 
 When he is not on active service he is on renewable leave, which 
 allows him to take employment in certain lines of trade, and gives 
 him various privileges belonging to active service ; or else he has 
 merely ordinary leave. If he is recalled after five years' active 
 service, or from leave which allowed him to take employment in 
 certain lines of trade, he receives an allowance of fourpence or 
 fivepenoe besides the daily help of two sous for each child under ten 
 years old. The time he spends on renewable leave counts as regular 
 service during the seven years, if the member of the inscription 
 spends his time coasting, and within certain boundarieSj &c. 
 
 Finally, he secures both for himself, his widow, his children, 
 and sometimes his descendants, pensions or grants from the funds 
 of the Institution for Disabled Seamen, which amount to more 
 than six million _/ra«c* a year. 
 
 After his five years' service, the conscript falls back into the 
 territorial army, where he receives no indemnity whatever ; he re- 
 ceives neither pension nor half-pay ; nothing is done either for him 
 or for his widow or children. 
 
 But, as he has left 3 per cent, of his pay in the hands of the 
 State, he may be said to pay or to contribute towards the privi- 
 leges enjoyed at his expense, by those enrolled on the inscription. 
 We repeat that this is a glaring injustice. If we added up all the 
 allowances, half-pay, and pensions we have just mentioned, it would 
 soon be seen how heavy the charge of the maritime inscription is 
 
154 NAVAL REFORM. 
 
 on the Treasury, and how useless, seeing that, since the develop- 
 ment of steam navigation, the lists on our men-of-war, or on our 
 merchant-ships, show a totally insignificant numher of seamen, whoj 
 in any case, are always easily procured. The Maritime Inscription 
 supplies fewer men with important specialities than conscription, 
 such as working engineers, gunners, torpedo-men, riflemen, &c. 
 No one would venture to say that the ten years' service exacted 
 hy the State beyond the age of forty compensate for the favours 
 lavished on those on the roll of maritime inscription. 
 
 Sailors over forty years of age are certainly not fit to encounter 
 the hardships in the navy of the present day, nor would they be 
 likely to possess the moral and physical dexterity that it exacts. 
 Maritime inscription might very well be suppressed and conscrip- 
 tion alone resorted to, in the navy as in the army, without losing any- 
 thing by the abolition of those ten years' extra service expected 
 from its members, and which never could really be utilised. 
 
 It can only be advantageous to give everyone equal rights ; and 
 it is to be hoped that, notwithstanding prejudice and routine, this 
 may yet be decided upon. From every point of view, it would be 
 a good plan to continue to equalise the chances for everyone, and, 
 when once the inscription is suppressed, to add a certain number 
 of conscripts to the navy, either from the seaboard or from the 
 interior, which thus would have but one origin and a homogeneity 
 unknown at the present time. 
 
 There would be but one system of raising men, and, after draw- 
 ing lots, some would be appointed to the army and others to the 
 navy. Naturally, exchanges between the two services would be 
 authorised, and even favourably entertained. The working engi- 
 neers balloted for the army would have every inducement to join 
 one of our fleets, where they could ply their trade and gain expe- 
 rience in it. But, although their active service, in either force, 
 might be over, they would continue to be attached to it until the 
 age of forty. 
 
 The conscripts who have served five years on board our ships, and 
 who are then attached to the territorial army, probably make very 
 
NAVAL PERSONNEL. 155 
 
 indifferent soldiers, and, when war breaks out, the special acquire- 
 ments they have gained in the navy are entirely lost. 
 
 When the reserves are called out, engineers and firemen, who have 
 been trained at great expense by the State, and who would be 
 specially useful on board torpedo-boats and gun-boats, go to swell 
 the reserves of the army, to which they are quite unaccustomed. 
 A large and valuable personnel is thus foolishly frittered away. 
 
 We only mention engineers and firemen because they are of the 
 most importance. But the gunners, the torpedo-men, the signal- 
 men, and the riflemen trained in the navy should not be lost to 
 that service. 
 
 It is, furthermore, perfectly simple to have a naval reserve on 
 the same lines as the territorial reserve. Every man who has served 
 in the navy should enter this reserve. In case of war, he should 
 be obliged to rejoin the naval division of which he was a member, 
 as he at present is obliged to rejoin the brigade to which he is 
 attached. The distances are sufficiently short, the means of com- 
 munication sufficiently rapid, to prevent any serious difficulty in 
 carrying out this operation. 
 
 The only objection advanced has its origin in the old prejudice 
 we have already considered, that the population on the sea-coast 
 is alone fit for a sea-faring life, and that, to be a good sailor, it is 
 necessary to spend one's whole existence gazing at the sea. This 
 is far from the fact. After five years' service a labourer or a towns- 
 man is quite equal to the fisherman or the coaster. He goes back 
 to his village or town without losing the practical experience he 
 has acquired at sea. Even after years have elapsed, he will prove 
 himself a true sailor the moment he rejoins the vessel he is accus- 
 tomed to, if he has formerly mastered the handling of the engines 
 and been properly drilled. He might, perhaps, suffer a few days 
 from sea-sickness, but this is the only point in which he would be 
 inferior to the population on the coasts; and is it worth retaining 
 such an unjust and expensive institution as maritime inscription 
 merely because it supplies us with sailors who are exempt from a 
 few days' sea-sickness ? 
 
156 NAVAL EEFORM. 
 
 2. 
 
 We are persuaded that Maritime Inscription, so contrary to the 
 principles of equality, and rendered so useless by the progress 
 that has taken place in the navy, should, and must, disappear 
 as soon as possible ; but we think, on the other hand, that the 
 proposal to reduce the term of service from five to three years, 
 which is brought forward by a certain party, and already voted by 
 the Chamber of Deputies, will be the ruin of the navy, if it is 
 accepted by the Senate. 
 
 We have just accused the Inscription of failing to produce 
 specialists, when the modern navy cannot get on without them. 
 We have, therefore, to depend on Conscription for that which the 
 Inscription is now unable to supply. Even if strenuous exertions 
 will transform a conscript into a skilled workman, it is perfectly 
 evident that it could not be accomplished in less than three years 
 and that to dismiss men, just as they begin to be fitted for work, 
 will certainly make the navy a school, but will never secure any 
 trained seamen for it. 
 
 It has been endlessly discussed whether the three years' service 
 will supply us with non-commissioned officers for the army ; our 
 highest authorities think it will not ; they consider that this 
 measure, so unluckily reducing the time spent with the colours, 
 will be the ruin of the army. 
 
 In the navy there can be no doubt on the subject ; it is abso- 
 lutely certain that the three years' service would be its death-blow. 
 To dispel any hesitation that may exist as to this point, it will 
 suffice to go over the different departments, and to examine the 
 way in which they are formed. Every crew includes two elements : 
 (1) the certificated seamen who have passed through various 
 schools, and (2) the ordinary deck hands. The first carry on 
 the service ; the second are, more or less, their auxiliaries. 
 
 Setting aside the engineers, to whom we must revert more fully 
 later on, the certificated seamen comprise topmen, gunners, signal- 
 men, riflemen, and torpedo-men. 
 
NAVAL PEESONNBL. 157 
 
 We have already laid down that as the sails are now of scarcely 
 any importance, we need have no anxiety about getting men who 
 can handle them. These men have their use, however, during 
 long voyages, when the wind gives a chance of economising coal. 
 Hitherto, they have been supplied by the Maritime Inscription ; 
 but there is a training ship to improve them. 
 
 It is absolutely necessary that the signalmen, gunners, torpedo- 
 men, and riflemen should spend some time in a special training 
 school before they can be employed ; the gunners on the Sovereign ; 
 the signalmen on the Isis ; the riflemen at the barracks at Lorient ; 
 the torpedo-men at Boyardville, and on the Japan. 
 
 The men are not sent to the schools till they have been kneaded 
 somewhat into shape in the naval barracks called " Quarters." 
 They are there about six months, and then go through a process 
 of selection : those whom it is not thought possible to make much 
 of, become deck hands, boatmen, stokers, servants, &c. ; they are 
 sent on board some vessel or another, and are drilled either in the 
 squadron or during a cruise at sea. The others are sent to the 
 schools to go through a thorough course of training, and after a 
 period of nine or ten months' instruction, as a rule, each passes 
 a sufficiently good examination to attain the grade and the high 
 pay of a certificated seaman, certificated gunner, certificated 
 signalman, &c. 
 
 Armed with this certificate, they are put on board some commis- 
 sioned vessel, and are almost able to fill the post allotted to them. 
 
 By that time they already count twenty months' service, and 
 have cost the State a considerable sum without any return. They 
 must be on board ship for some time before they become acquainted 
 with all they have to do, for they have to get accustomed to the 
 life on board, and although they may be useful in their own line, 
 it is quite another matter when they have to help in other things, 
 not included in what they have acquired at the schools. 
 
 Thus, the certificated rifleman arriving from Lorient is well up 
 in military drill, and can cut a very good figure in a landing party. 
 But on board ship he must b& able to help the gunners to work 
 
158 NATAL EBFORM. 
 
 the guns, the topmen to handle the sails ; he must learn to row 
 in a boat, &c., and he has no notion of any of these things when 
 he first joins. 
 
 Even if a year were suflSoient to train him, and this is not always 
 the case, he will then have had thirty months in the service ; and 
 the moment he is fitted to do the work that it has cost so much to 
 teach him to execute, he is sent about his business. 
 
 The same occurs in the case of topmen and signalmen ; they have 
 to learn to handle the guns, and, above all, the use of the rifle. 
 Most of them join the landing parties, as there are never enougti 
 riflemen. Besides, it is indispensable that every man on board 
 should know how to handle a rifle. It was proved at Fow Choow 
 that the firing from the tops was often more efficient than that 
 of the big guns. The Kropakcheks made fearful havoc in the 
 ranks of the Chinese navy. We find, therefore, that these certifi- 
 cated seamen, in common with the riflemen, have quite a new field 
 of knowledge to master. It is the same in the case of the torpedo- 
 men and gunners. The latter are, however, put through a course 
 on board their training ships, which fits them to be of use in any 
 direction over and above their own speciality when they join their 
 ships. But this is the exception. The gunners were specially 
 selected when they first joined the service, and similar results could 
 not be expected from sailors taken hap-hazard from the barracks. 
 
 Thus, after effecting a selection amongst those who have lately 
 joined the the service, the navy has succeeded, by dint of money and 
 exertion, in creating a better class, which are called certificated 
 seamen. It takes ten months to train them in their profession, 
 and at least a year to complete their education as sailors; in all 
 twenty-two months. If these men have passed four or six months 
 in the barracks before going to a school which only opens at a 
 certain date — and this is always the case, as it is a very good thing 
 to give them a little general instruction as a means of finding out 
 what they are most fitted for — it takes thirty months to turn out 
 a good sailor. And here, again, we only allude to the carefully- 
 chosen few. 
 
NAVAL PBESONNBL. 159 
 
 The others, the deck hands, have to learn to handle rifle, guns, 
 rigging, and hoats. They are not supposed to equal the certifi- 
 cated seamen, but they must be able to help them, and, if necessary, 
 to supply their places. 
 
 Thus, the third of the armament of a gun is composed of certifi- 
 cated gunners ; the two other parts are supplied by deck hands 
 and riflemen. We find the same proportion of certificated seamen 
 in the landing parties and in other branches of the service. 
 
 Now if it takes thirty months to obtain a certificate, can we 
 wonder that a great deal longer is required to train a deck hand ? 
 Five years barely suffice, and even then a man must stop a long 
 time on the same vessel, and not be bandied about from one to 
 another, as too often is the case, since we have organised a fleet 
 of transports that must be disarmed after every voyage. What, 
 then, would become of our navy under the system of three years' 
 service ? If the blind partisans of this movement were to go on 
 board a newly commissioned ship, they would see the confusion 
 and disorder that reigns during the first months, and the difficulty 
 that a crew, composed of young sailors, finds in settling down. 
 What would it be if there were none but inexperienced sailors 
 among them ? 
 
 On joining a regiment the conscripts find everything in full 
 working order. But when a ship is first commissioned, this is by 
 no means the case. The order to commission is received. The 
 complement for each ship is settled beforehand and a personnel 
 from the barracks is appointed — so many certificated seamen, 
 so many deck-hands — and the best must be made of the 
 bargain ! 
 
 It would take a long time to establish a certain amount of 
 discipline and be ready for sea, if a crew of this nature were 
 entirely made up of sailors who had never been afloat or had any 
 experience. The five years' service is only too short, but it at least 
 gives us sailors in part inured ; and a man-of-war starting for a 
 long cruise generally attains a certain cohesion after a period of 
 six months. The three-years system would supply nothing but 
 
160 NAVAL REPOEM. 
 
 novices, and many months must elapse before the first gun were 
 fired. 
 
 We speak of the navy as it is organised at the present time. 
 But the navy we dream of, the navy of the future, will exact a 
 personnel no less solid and well drilled. If, on vessels of smaller 
 dimensions, the crews can be more easily and rapidly disciplined 
 than the immense herds that are at present let loose on our large 
 ironclads and cruisers, on the other hand, they must have a still 
 more careful and special education if they are to fulfil the singu- 
 larly difficult and delicate mission entrusted to them. 
 
 Less varied knowledge is required for handling a torpedo-boat 
 or a gun-boat, but it must be far more precise than the kuow- 
 ledge necessary on board the ships of our squadrons. Courage, 
 decision, and professional insight are required, such as can only be 
 attained after several years^ service. 
 
 It is constantly asserted, and rightly so, that the three years' 
 service may be enough to initiate soldiers in their ordinary drill, 
 but that it is not enough to get them thoroughly under discipline, 
 or fit them to march unflinchingly to battle. 
 
 How much more does this apply to the navy ! 
 
 The torpedo is singularly difficult to handle, and requires such 
 a special course of instruction that, after creating a special post 
 for the men employed on ground mines, it is talked of making 
 another for locomotive torpedoes. It is not the course of instruc- 
 tion that is the most difficult part of the business. It is still 
 harder to find courage to start without a moment^s hesitation in 
 pursuit of a gigantic enemy, merely on a fragile boat that a single 
 shot will destroy. 
 
 It is nothing to discharge a torpedo, but to embark on a 
 torpedo-boat and give chase to an ironclad is what exacts special 
 moral conditions, and a valorous and martial spirit. 
 
 And what shall we say of the exceptional fatigue, the long cruises, 
 the incessant watching of blockades, or the breaking of blockades ; 
 the agitation of a life of perpetual endurance, such as our brave 
 sailors have just gone through in China ! 
 
NAVAL PERSONNEL. 161 
 
 An army has always its moments oi' respite, a fleet never has. 
 It is unceasingly threatened, and never has an instant of repose 
 during the whole war. 
 
 Anchorage is never secure, the open sea is almost always rough ; 
 and, thanks to the autonomous torpedo, it will meet with incessant 
 snares. 
 
 Only a deep sense of honour and duty can withstand so many 
 trials. 
 
 It really is treason to the nation to allow that three years 
 should be the limit of our longest term of service. It is to strike 
 a blow at the very existence of our country, and to expose it once 
 again to the chance of its colonies being taken from it, its coasts 
 being left defenceless and at the mercy of the enemy. 
 
 3. 
 
 Hitherto we have omitted all mention of the engineers. The 
 late improvements in the navy have given them so much respon- 
 sibility that we must devote a separate chapter to them. As 
 we have already said, if the principle of maritime inscription were 
 not so opposed to our habits, and modern ideas, if it were possible 
 to modify Colbert's theory so as to appropriate it to the necessities 
 of our own times, seeing that ships now depend on steam, and 
 not on the wind, we ought to search in the mines, in trade, on 
 the railways for engineers capable of handling them. 
 
 We shall be more and more in want of them, not only for the 
 engines of our ships, but for those of our torpedo-boats ; and we 
 shall have further need of them to take our locomotive-torpedoes 
 to piecesj and to keep them in order and repair them. At the 
 present time the dearth of engineers is so absolute that on many 
 of our armed vessels there is no regular staff to handle the engines. 
 In vain may the alarm be sounded, or hasty nominations be made, 
 so as to fill up the posts vacated by the petty engineer ofiBcers 
 leaving the service ; no steps taken in this direction have produced 
 the slightest effect, and on this point the state of the navy is really 
 deplorable. We must explain the reason of it. Our corps of 
 
 11 
 
162 NAVAL EEPORM. 
 
 engineers is made up either by conscription or of the pupils from 
 the schools oi Arts et Metiers. 
 
 The pupils of the Arts et Metiers, after going through a good 
 final examination at their school, join the navy with the rank of 
 ywpil engineers. This is an intermediate grade between the engine- 
 room artificer and chief engine-room artificer ; it is held equivalent 
 to the rank of chief engine-room artificer. 
 
 The men obtained by conscription, and knowing some trade 
 (fitters, blacksmiths, boiler-makers, or such like) go through a slight 
 examination after a few months' service, and, if they pass, they 
 are appointed working artificers. 
 
 Much is left out in the instruction of these men, but to facilitate 
 their mental development, and to put them in the way of reaching 
 those grades that can only be attained by passing an examination, 
 schools have been started at Brest and at Toulon. 
 
 Promising pupils are sent to these schools, and they go through 
 courses likely to be very useful to stokers fitting themselves to be 
 engine-room artificers, to engine-room artificers fitting themselves to 
 be chief engine-room artificers ; and to chief engine-room artificers 
 wishing to become engineers. The organisation of these schools 
 is excellent, and they supplied excellent engineers when the 
 amount of machinery was limited and it was possible to choose 
 among the candidates. But since the machinery has increased, 
 more and more engineers are required; the scarcity of candidates 
 is very great, and the standard has been lowered. Artificers find 
 great facilities for improving themselves in the navy, and those 
 who work conscientiously are sure to reach honourable posts, as 
 no rank, including that of engineer, can be obtained except by 
 competition. 
 
 A good stoker, with a certain amount of intelligence, having 
 passed through the elementary school, can obtain the rank of chief 
 engine-room artificer before his five years' service is completed. 
 At the end of this period the students from the Arts et Metiers 
 have generally reached that of engineer. But as soon as these 
 artificers have finished iheir term of obligatory service, they almost 
 
NAVAL PERSONNEL. 163 
 
 all disappear, the lists are reduced, they must be filled up by men 
 knowing less, theoretically and practically ; the general efficiency 
 is diminished, and re-engagements become more and more rare. 
 
 From what we have just said on the organisation of the body 
 of artificers it will be seen that the Conscription will, only supply 
 a very limited contingent of petty officers. These men are, as a 
 rule, insufficiently educated, and notwithstanding the course of 
 study they have to attend, which the exigencies of the service 
 prevent many from doing, the rank of chief engine-room artificer 
 is only obtainable by a select few. Still less likely are they to 
 obtain the rank of engineer. 
 
 The school of Arts et Metiers should, therefore, be the nursery 
 for naval petty officers, and this was the case when the lists were 
 not so full ; but now that we employ steam so much more, and have 
 need of so many more hands, and our machinery increases daily, 
 we can safely assert that the students from these schools join the 
 navy less and less, and, what is more, as we have before remarked, 
 those who do join it leave it again as soon as their term of service 
 has expired. We must, therefore, endeavour in the first instance 
 to attract, and in the second instance to retain, those usually 
 industrious pupils by a very ample theoretical and practical educa- 
 tion, to be more and more developed in the navy, and to admit of 
 their becoming excellent officers of the watch in the engine-rooms. 
 
 To further this, a fantastic project has been conceived at head- 
 quarters, more fitted for a comic opera than to be brought forward 
 as a serious proposition, such as I wish to advance. Every two 
 or three years, at various intervals, an engmeer officer, an old pupil 
 of the schools, is sent round on a tour of inspection, in full 
 uniform, covered with crosses and medals, and as much gold lace 
 as possible. A naval officer, either a rear-admiral or a captain 
 accompanies him, also in full uniform. Both of these go and beat 
 up Chalons, Aix, Angers, &c. ; both of them set forth the merits 
 of the profession ; both try to enlist men who almost always fail 
 them. The students have read La Fontaine, and the engineer 
 officer reminds them of the fox with his tail cut off". 
 
 11 * 
 
164 NAVAL REFORM, 
 
 Old comrades have warned them what the navy has in store for 
 them ; they still more distrust the enlisting attempted hy these 
 bedizened officers, and they go off to serve their time, if they are 
 obliged to do so ; which is not invariably the case, as voluntary 
 service for oue year, and the chance of drawing a lucky number, 
 gives many of these only a year under the colours, in an artillery 
 regiment. Are they right in this ? In some ways they are, and 
 in some ways they are not. Not, certainly, from a pecuniary point 
 of view ; but they are right if they are ambitious, for, if money is 
 a powerful persuasive, ambition is also a considerable incentive. 
 
 Take a pupil of the Arts et Metiers when he first joins the 
 artillery ; at his own request he is incorporated among the men 
 employed by the State, his education soon allows him to outstrip 
 all competitors, and in two years at most he is a non-commissioned 
 officer. A few years later he will be a sub-lieutenant, and, as he 
 was young when he attained the rank of officer, he may rise to 
 high rank. 
 
 This hope of becoming an officer, and the example of certain 
 former pupils of the schools who may have had a brilliant military 
 career, often has for result that many men, who enter the service 
 intending to leave it on the first opportunity, end by remaining 
 with the regiment, and by preferring what is almost a certainty 
 to what might await them in trade. It would, of' course, be more 
 lucrative, but it would also be more uncertain. 
 
 A great many commissioned or non-commissioned officers, both 
 in the Artillery or in the marines, begin in this way. They gene- 
 rally become captains before they are five-and-thirty years old. 
 At this age they all have money, a good position, and a prospect 
 of better things. If, on the contrary, the pupil from the Arts et 
 Metiers joina the navy, he will enter as pupil engineer, that is, he 
 joins with the hope of becoming a petty officer. For two years 
 he will enjoy both pecuniary and honorary advantages above his 
 comrade who has entered the army. The pecuniary advantage 
 will last even longer, for the pay of petty engineer officers is far 
 better than that of non-commissioned officers in the army. Thus, 
 
NAVAL PERSONNEL. 166 
 
 to cite an example, a chief engine-room artificer draws 100 or 200 
 francs a month, according to what his duties may he, which is far 
 in excess of a sergeant's pay. But in the long run he is placed at 
 a disadvantage. Supposing he happens to be industrious and 
 clever, and that good luck falls to his share, he will he appointed 
 engineer, that is to say assistant, after five years' service; he will 
 remain ten or fifteen years in that position, and consequently 
 will not become staflf-engineer for a very long time ; this corre- 
 sponds to the rank of lieutenant. Moreover, the future of the 
 principal engineers is very restricted, for the highest rank, that 
 of instructor of machinery, is only equal to that of colonel, and 
 only six can hold it. 
 
 Any engineer of standing in the navy is able to give the names 
 of such of his school companions who, having joined the artillery, 
 became ofBcers long before he did, and reached a much higher 
 rank than his. What is the result of this ? The pupil from the 
 Arts et Metiers, who finds he has been mistaken as to the navy, 
 almost invariably leaves his corps when he has accomplished his 
 term of service ; and trade benefits by the experience he has 
 acquired at the expense of the State. I have already shown that 
 the merchant service receives him with open arms ; he not only 
 draws higher pay, but is treated as an equal by the oflicers of the 
 steamer he is appointed to. 
 
 It is a curious fact that it was a Minister of Marine who decreed 
 in 1864, on the suggestion of the Minister of Commerce, M. B6bic, 
 that the engineer of&cers, officers of the watch in the engine-rooms 
 of the large steamers, should be officers of the same rank as 
 certificated captains, officers of the watch on deck. Anybody is 
 welcome to explain away this contradiction. The same Minister 
 left the Naval Engineers in the inferior position against which 
 they so justly protest. If the pupil from the Arts et Metiers is 
 tired of the sea he can go into a factory, either as artificer or 
 designer, and he will be able to secure the same pay anywhere, 
 and certainly much more distinction than in our navy. Therefore, 
 if we want engineers, and Heaven knows how much we require 
 
166 NAVAL REFORM. 
 
 them, let us give thera the distinction they claim, and esteem 
 ourselves fortunate that they do not ask for increased pay as they 
 have in England. 
 
 We will examine into the means for compassing this end, and 
 compare our navy, in this respect, with that of other nations. We 
 not only require engineers, but we still more urgently require a 
 lower class of working artificers and engine-room artificers. It 
 must be formed by degrees either in the schools or at sea ; this 
 takes time, a great deal of time, more and more every day, as the 
 engines become more and more elaborate. The same "personnel 
 is, moreover, expected to work the locomotive torpedoes which 
 require such extremely delicate handling that special artificers are 
 talked of for their exclusive study. 
 
 It is certainly impossible that three years should suffice to train 
 them. It could only be achieved by the greatest efforts, and of 
 what use would it be, if their service were only to last three years ? 
 The artificers would leave as soon as they had learnt their work, 
 and in this way all the labours that should of right belong to the 
 navy would only go to supply trade and the merchant service. 
 These would reap the benefit of its stokers and engine-room arti- 
 ficers, as well as that of the chief engine-room artificers and 
 engineers. We need not pursue this self-evident fact; we will only 
 add that the reduction of the period of service to three years will 
 more than ever encourage an exodus on the part of the naval 
 artificers after they have completed their appointed time. 
 
 As they could not become engineers or assistants before their 
 time is up, they would have still less inducement than they have 
 at present to re-engage themselves. The inferior position assigned 
 to our engineers is not a thing of yesterday. The very small com- 
 plement of officers existing at the present time is the result of 
 twenty years' struggle. And even the creation of this number 
 would have been adjourned sine die had not the English and 
 French fleets met at Cherbourg in 1860. 
 
 When the English engineer officers were presented to the 
 Emperor be requested that the French engineer officers should be 
 
NAVAL PERSONNEL. 167 
 
 presented to him. It had to be acknowledged that this was im- 
 possible, as there were none ! The astonished Emperor gave 
 orders that a gap in our organisation so much to be deprecated 
 should be filled up. The work was taken in hand, but with 
 evident reluctance. The corps of engineer officers was organised — 
 but in what way ! One or two chief engineers were created, and 
 enjoyed the privileges of officers in some respects, although not 
 in others. The staff and fleet engineers had a post, but not a rank. 
 They had been given special stripes on their sleeves, particularly 
 to distinguish them as subalterns. Their duties are ill-defined, 
 and everything in this organisation pointed to the intention that 
 it should break up of itself. However, the services done, pointed 
 out as they were by enlightened commanders, proved stronger than 
 other influences, and instead of a break-up there was incessant 
 progress. But this progress was only achieved in the face of over- 
 whelming opposition, and at the price of superhuman effort. 
 The following are the words of Admiral Krantz : 
 
 Up to the present date, the improvement in the prospects of our engineers has 
 been forosd, as it were, out of the Commission deputed to study the organisation 
 of this personnel ; and I must reluctantly testify to the fact that what has sometimes 
 been granted and decided in theory has often been put into practice with scanty 
 good-will. 
 
 Thus in all that concerns our engineers we are in as inferior a 
 position, compared with other nations, as we were in 1860. Our 
 complement of engineer officers reaches 105 persons : 6 inspectors 
 of machinery, 35 fleet engineers, and 64 staff engineers. The first 
 six rank with corvette captains, a rank no longer existing in the 
 navy, and which, coming somewhere between a lieutenant and a 
 commander, equals that of a major in the army. 
 
 Thus our engineers can never attain the rank of a commander. 
 The fleet engineers correspond in rank to the naval lieutenants, and 
 the staff engineers to sub-lieutenants. 
 
 The English have 823 engineer officers, the Americans 254, 
 Chili has 41, almost as many engineers as it has officers ; and this 
 personnel may have had something to say, in the last war, as to the 
 superiority of the Chilians over the Peruvians, who had no organised 
 
168 NAVAL REFORM. 
 
 corps of engineers. Turkey has 480, Holland 43, Portugal 42, 
 Brazil 133, and Kussia 548. 
 
 This last-named Power, which certainly has not a democratic 
 reputation, boasts of 2 engineers with the rank of general officers, 
 8 with that of colonels, 11 with that of lieutenant-colonels. 
 
 England has engineers who rank with captains and commanders. 
 We alone stop at the rank of corvette captain. An incident simi- 
 lar to that which occurred at Cherbourg in 1860 happened at 
 Dulcigno in 1880, when the demonstration of the collective Euro- 
 pean naval forces occurred in the Adriatic : our engineers took 
 a very insignificant position amidst those of other nations. We 
 know that the French rear-admiral did not fail to remark it ; but 
 his remarks, along with many others, produced no result and bore 
 no fruit. 
 
 Twenty years have elapsed since the Vice-Admiral Bouet-Willau- 
 metz, commanding the evolutionary squadron, wrote as follows : — 
 
 When it happens that I have to go down at night to the engine-rooms, and I 
 see these powerful machines at work, on which depends the safety of the ship, 
 when I see that numerous personnel occupied in such difficult work, it is quite 
 alarming to reflect that so much responsibility rests with an ordinary petty officer. 
 
 " Now that we have succeeded in turning out good engines," 
 wrote Vice-Admiral Jurien de la Graviere, "it would be quite 
 unpardonable if we left them in doubtful and unskilful hands." 
 
 " The engineers fill a most important place in the present days," 
 wrote the Vice-Admiral Paris. " Both the issue of a battle and 
 the honour of the colours may depend upon the skilful management 
 of the engines of a ship." 
 
 We will only add the opinion of Admiral Krantz, one of the 
 last admirals commanding the evolutionary squadron. He was 
 even more explicit than his brother oflScers, but what he wrote has 
 hitherto remained a dead letter : — 
 
 The pupils from the professional schools, which supply the navy with staff engi- 
 neers and chief engineers, and give them a training equal to that in any foreign navy, 
 have ceased to join the navy ; or else those who enter it leave it as soon as they 
 have fulfilled the time exacted by the law of 1872 — that is, so soon as they have 
 become really useful. 
 
 In the hope of introducing better discipline among the personnel of the engines, its 
 
NAVAL PEESONNEL, 169 
 
 OTVn hierarchy was taken away from'it, and its own special uniform, that it might be 
 entirely assimilated with the rest of the crew. This reform was most unpopular. 
 The standard of admission to the rarious ranks was raised at the same time ; and if 
 the bad effects of it were not felt all at once, it was owing to the fact that the 
 period of serTice lasted seven years at that time, and that the numerous additions 
 to the usual complement made promotion fairly rapid among the engineers. 
 
 The creation of fleet and staff engineers gave the young men an incentive. Each 
 one hoped for a speedy reorganisation of his own corps ; and, moreover, at that 
 period the engines were comparatively simple, and a less well-educated and less 
 numerous staff was required than the present naval materiel exacts. 
 
 A great block in promotion has resulted from the war in 1870 ; the period of 
 service has at the same time been reduced to five years, and the dismissal of the 
 classes is always anticipated. 
 
 The steam-ship companies have become more and more numerous ; trade has 
 developed ; the network of railways has considerably increased ; a knowledge of 
 machinery is in great demand, engineers are in request everywhere. I have always 
 thought, and I still continue to think, that since 1860, or at least since 1872, we 
 should seriously have ameliorated the situation of our petty engineer ofScers as 
 regards their comfort, their quarters, and their food, and as regards their position 
 on board and their assimilation. A man expected to possess a solid knowledge 
 of mathematics, physics, and machinery, ought not and cannot be considered on a 
 par with a sail-maker or caulker, petty officer though he may be. 
 
 The conditions of every-day life which may suit the latter cannot satisfy engineers 
 whose education and intelligence have been more developed, and who have gone 
 through a school that suppUes controllers of works and factories ; a school that has 
 Bupphed distinguished general artillery oflBcers both to the army and the marines, 
 and the pupils of which are more and more sought after by the railway and the 
 steamship companies. 
 
 The engineers may at times be somewhat um'easonable in their demands, but it 
 must be acknowledged that they have some grounds for complaint. Meanwhile 
 discontent makes steady progress ; the engineers always leave us, and young men 
 take their departure who would guarantee the efficiency of this important branch 
 of the service. 
 
 Not only are we unable to choose the best pupils from the schools of Arts et 
 Mgtiers, but we are forced to be thankful for any that come to us, even when they 
 quite intend leaving us as soon as they have accomplished the term of service 
 i mposed by law. 
 
 This situation is all the more alarming in that, far from getting any better, 
 it becomes daily more defined. I consider nothing is more indispensable on board 
 a man-of-war than good engineers ; it is more dangerous to have an unskilful 
 engineer chief of the watch in the engine-room, than an unskilled officer of the 
 watch on the bridge ; for the officer in command can superintend the latter, whereas 
 the mistakes of the engineers are generally discovered when it is too late to remedy 
 them. 
 
 In connection with the report we have so largely quoted. Admiral 
 Krantz drew up a statement on the organisation of the engineer 
 personnel, which begins with these words: " I lay down the prin- 
 ciple that every engineer should have begun as petty officer, and 
 should have worked with his own hands before attaining the rank 
 
170 NAVAL BEPORM. 
 
 of officer." This principle is not admitted by everyone, and many 
 think that it would raise the standard of our corps, of engineers 
 if a special school were founded which would turn out engineer 
 officers. The example of England is quoted as she attaches great 
 importance to that branch of her naval organisation, and grudges 
 no sacrifice to procure the best men to handle her engines. In 
 England the engineer officers are recruited from young men having 
 passed certain examinations as student engineers at the schools 
 established in the dockyards at Portsmouth and Devonport, and 
 about fifty are supplied to each of these ports. 
 
 The preliminary education necessitates remaining six years in 
 the dockyards ; at the end of this period the young men considered 
 eligible enter on a course of study at the Royal Naval College at 
 Greenwich, with the rank of assistant engineer. They then follow 
 an advanced course of study, and after a stay of nine months 
 they leave it to begin serving in the navy. We need not imitate 
 England, for the engineers turned out by the schools of Arls et 
 Metiers are excellent. Our difficulty is not to train them, but to 
 retain them in the service. 
 
 We have long insisted on the necessity of having a much greater 
 number of engineer officers ; but, if we have been properly under- 
 stood, it is not that we think that officers only are indispensable. 
 We require good engine-drivers, and nothing more or less ; we ask 
 that these engine-drivers should be given the title and rank of 
 officers, because human nature (and this is one of its best sides) 
 thinks more of honours than of money. But we lay down the 
 principle, in common with the Vice-Admiral Krantz, that the 
 existing and future officers should not be engineers, but artificers 
 who have done the work with their own hands, and are always 
 ready to give a hand again. 
 
 We have plenty of excellent engineers. These construct and im- 
 prove on the engines ; on board ship the one thing to be thought 
 of is the driving of them. If the engineer officers were only as 
 good drivers as the best among the senior petty officers of former 
 days, they would be quite worthy of the gold braid awarded to 
 
NAVAL PEESONNHL. 171 
 
 them, and no really intelligent naval officer would wonder at having 
 them for comrades and equals. 
 
 If a special school were founded as a nursery for engineer officers, 
 this school would produce inferior engineers to those turned out 
 hy the Polytechnic schools. They would consider themselves 
 ahove manual labour, they would be more taken up by theory than 
 practice, they would experiment on the engines confided to their 
 charge, and try to improve them, instead of merely confining them- 
 selves to handling them. They would no longer be engine-drivers, 
 and, as the iniexior j)ersonnel of the engines would depend entirely 
 on the conscript stokers, it would be less efficient than ever. 
 
 Although the engines may become simpler, the difficulty of 
 getting suitable men will be greater, as the former increase in 
 number and as ironclads disappear with their complicated mecha- 
 nisms, leaving us only with small, easily-handled vessels, above 
 all requiring a (tonsiderable number of engineers. On torpedo- 
 boats and gun-boats, taking their slight dimensions into account, 
 there would be no room for two officers, an engineer -officer and 
 an ordinary officer ; their engines can perfectly be worked by an 
 engine-room artificer. Thus, in order to obtain as many petty 
 officers as possible, we would endeavour to increase the number 
 of commands. 
 
 A special school which gave us ready-made officers, and left us 
 with nothing but the workmen obtained by conscription to fill 
 the posts of petty officers, would only aggravate the abuse of which 
 we complain. If this were absolutely unavoidable, it would be 
 better merely to apply to the Naval School; the students might 
 choose, on leaving it, between the rank of midshipman in the navy 
 and candidate for the engineers. But it is easy, at this point, to 
 see what antagonism there would be between two sections of officers, 
 the one responsible for the engines, and the other for handling the 
 ship. Inevitable difficulties and annoyances would be the result. 
 Now it is essential at sea that the supreme command should be in 
 the hands of one man only, if the safety of everyone is to be con- 
 sidered. The ship cannot be divided in two slices, with different 
 
172 NAVAL EEFOKM. 
 
 rules and under separate authority. The engineers must be given 
 the rank of officers to ameliorate their condition and satisfy their 
 justifiable ambition ; but the absolute command of the engines, 
 in common with every other part of the vessel, must be left in the 
 hands of the ship's officers. When once these principles are estab- 
 lished, our corps of engineers requires no further schools than those 
 already existing. The working artificers obtained by conscription 
 become engine-room artificers, engineers, and fleet-engineers by 
 competition. 
 
 We should claim a six months' residence in one of our schools 
 at Brest or Toulon for the students from the schools of Arts et 
 Metiers, or for those from the technical schools at Marseilles, 
 Lyons, &c., after which we would have them compete annually, or 
 in terms, at the same time as the engine-room artificers who are 
 already in the Brest and Toulon schools, or on board other vessels, 
 for the rank of chief engine-room artificer. This would certainly 
 be a great advantage for these students, as it would allow them to 
 become chief engine-room artificers, equal to sergeants in the army, 
 a year after they left the schools. If these young men, who are 
 compelled to join the service, were to join the artillery, or any 
 other branch of the service, they would begin as common soldiers, 
 and would certainly not be sergeants at the end of a year. We 
 cannot sufificlently insist upon this point, that all our future 
 engineer officers should begin by being artificers, and as highly 
 educated artificers as possible ; this would certainly not thin their 
 ranks, for, with the democratic spirit now so universal, aristocratic 
 instincts should disappear from the navy, and a good artificer 
 endowed with intelligence and education should be as much 
 esteemed as any officer trained on the benches of the Naval School. 
 
 If any of the old-fashioned prejudice remains, it will soon be 
 wiped out. Living together on board these little vessels, the 
 constant necessity of mutually helping each other, the perils gone 
 through side by side, in a space so limited that it would be impos- 
 sible not to become intimate, will engender a familiarity that it is 
 always possible to avoid on board a large ship. 
 
NAVAL PT5RS0NNEL. 173 
 
 What our engineers want is a lucrative and honourable position. 
 It can be given them without changing the system of conscription, 
 and without bringing them and the officers of the ship into contact 
 with each other on board the vessel. They would never get on 
 together, and most unseemly quarrels might arise. Thus, in our 
 opinion, nothing need be altered in the system of conscription, 
 or the system of advancement for artificers, as it at present exists. 
 The remedy for the unfortunate state of things we have described, 
 in common with many others, must be found in increasing the list 
 of the fleet engineers. Let three posts of Inspector of Machinery 
 with the rank of captain, and a similar post in Paris be instituted 
 for the three ports of Brest, Lorient and Toulon. Let the com- 
 plement of inspectors of machinery be kept up as it is now, 
 under the denomination of second-class inspectors of machinery, 
 and let this complement be increased to twelve instead of six. 
 
 Let a fleet engineer, with two or three staff engineers under his 
 orders, be appointed on board vessels with engines of more than 
 2,000 indicated horse-power, although under 3,000 ; a staff 
 engineer on board vessels of more than 1,000 indicated horse- 
 power, and under 2,000 ; and a chief engineer on other vessels 
 having engines under 1,000 indicated horse-power, but not under 
 300. 
 
 For engines under 300 indicated horse-power an engineer or an 
 engine-room artificer would be sufficient. This simple reform 
 would admit of increasing the complement of fleet engineers and 
 make it easy to find employment for them. These lists, which 
 now include only 35 fleet engineers and 64 staff engineers might 
 be increased to 50 fleet engineers and 120 staff engineers. The 
 increase would at once be felt. We should not gain in quality 
 as yet, but only in quantity. We should, however, hope that 
 in future, seeing a better chance of advancement opened out to 
 them, the engineers will hesitate to leave the navy in favour of 
 trade, which would then only attract the residue from the navy, 
 whereas it now attracts all her best men. 
 
174 NAVAL REFORM. 
 
 We have not exhausted all the specialities in the navy; our 
 officers, who are the first and most important of all, have still to 
 he touched upon. They, too, have a good deal to try them. 
 
 At the present moment there exists so much dissatisfaction 
 amidst naval officers that if these could find an outlet of any 
 sort, in trade, as the engineers have done, certainly more than 
 half the complement of our naval lieutenants would leave the 
 service. 
 
 We are not asserting anything without proof; it is only neces- 
 sary to refer to the list of applications made to the "Transatlantic" 
 and "Messageries Ma;ritime " companies, to realise that the names 
 of more than a hundred naval lieutenants are inscrihed on each 
 of them as candidates for the command of a steamer. The mer- 
 chant service should supply both men and officers to our navy ; 
 but just the contrary takes place. Two hundred naval lieutenants 
 apply for a post in our principal companies ; and these are dis- 
 tinguished ofiicers specified in the " Annuaire '' as decoris (this 
 being essential towards being accepted by the companies, whose 
 only difficulty lies in the number of applicants to select from) and 
 able to show seniority of ordinary service ; for our lieutenants 
 patiently await the more or less distant day of their nomination 
 as commanders, without a thought of leaving the navy. 
 
 This universal apathy engenders a profound indifference to every- 
 thing in connection with the profession, and is entirely due to 
 the system of service adopted in the navy, a system that puts an 
 end to all high aspirations and all energy, whilst it suppresses all 
 initiative, and so alters even the best disposition that nothing but 
 personal bravery is left to our officers — the courage applicable to 
 the circumstances of every-day life has entirely disappeared. 
 
 The fact of always filling a subaltern's post has brought about 
 a horror of responsibility, a kind of cowardice, when any resolution 
 has to be formed, which makes our admirals into men incapable 
 of relying on their own judgment in the smallest matter. 
 
NAVAIi PERSONNEL. 175 
 
 We have a striking instance of this in the fact that Admiral 
 Pierre and Admiral Oourhet were the only two admirals thought 
 fit to command the two expeditions to China and Madagascarj and 
 considered to possess the vigour necessary to conduct a naval 
 expedition. The former died at the outset, and his successors 
 were unahle to carry out his work ; the latter was more fortunate, and 
 did not die until he had brought the campaign to a successful 
 issue. 
 
 But we need scarcely recall what went on in China hefore the 
 arrival of Admiral Courbet, and how our fleet disgraced itself in the 
 eyes of other nations when it remained a passive and indifferent 
 spectator of all that took place at Tonquin. Need we recall the 
 lasting blow to our prestige in the Eastern Mediterranean, dealt 
 by the weakness of an admiral who, without so much as firing a 
 shot, allowed our citizens at Alexandria to be massacred, although 
 our flag was hoisted and our naval division, commissioned to the 
 Levant, was anchored in the port. 
 
 There lie unmistakable signs of serious and dangerous mischief 
 in all this. We must search out the cause if we are to find the 
 remedy for it. 
 
 As we are speaking of the naval " service," which might better 
 be called " servitude " — the more dignified term should be sup- 
 pressed — it may be well to run through its component parts. It 
 may be divided into several periods. The naval school term, and 
 the grade of midshipman, are the period of apprenticeship. 
 Towards twenty-one years of age the midshipman becomes a sub- 
 lieutenant, and under this title he is taken as an officer of the 
 watch either on board a transport or a small man-of-war. Some 
 lieutenants are even mate of the watch to the first lieutenant ; but 
 this only happens in the squadron, and only on board some of the 
 big ships in the squadron. 
 
 When the sub-lieutenant becomes lieutenant, his duty remains 
 the same ; he is always called to serve as officer of the watch on 
 larger men-of-war. Now, this duty of the mate of the watch con- 
 sists in walking the deck during four hours, both at sea and in 
 
176 NAVAL BEPORM. 
 
 the harbour; to repeat the orders written by the captain, these 
 being called down a tube. As soon as any manoeuvre of the 
 slightest importance has to be executed, the commander comes on 
 deck, and the officer of the watch is merely a mouth-piece. Nothing 
 is more humiliating or sadder than the position of lieutenants who 
 know their own worth, and very often are alive to the deficiencies 
 of their chief, but who nevertheless are condemned to this subordi- 
 nate part. How is it possible that the judgment or nautical experi- 
 ence of an ofiScer can be formed under similar conditions ? And 
 this business lasts until he becomes commander, that is until the 
 age of forty-three years, after twenty-seven years' service, of which 
 twenty-two are spent as officers of the watch — 'twenty-two years 
 spent in these monotonous, wearisome, and, not to mince terms, 
 degrading duties, which are only brought to an end by an appoint- 
 ment to some gunboat in an unhealthy river. 
 
 Doubtless exceptions are made for what are called in the navy 
 " les fils d'Archevique," and in ordinary parlance the sons and 
 sons-in-law of admirals, or people more or less remotely connected 
 with admirals. 
 
 In no profession is equality such an empty word as in the navy. 
 The lucky ones are given successive and suitable commands ; but 
 we need not discuss those privileged individuals — our business 
 is with those who have to submit to the ordinary regulations. 
 Thus a lieutenant, according to the existing regulations, becomes 
 a commander at the age of forty-three. Of course we do not 
 allude to those who get on because they have some connection with 
 an admiral. In a few years the age for becoming commanders 
 will have to be extended to forty-seven, as the vacancies in the 
 higher posts are so limited. Not even then will a command of 
 some sort be given to the commander, worn out by this time by 
 constant subordination, stupified by blind obedience. He must 
 first undertake the duties of second officer on a vessel commanded 
 by a captain, and then the unfortunate being loses the small 
 amount of intelligence, energy, or initiative remaining to him, and 
 becomes the submissive and docile slave of a chief imposed upon 
 
NAVAL PEESONNEL. 177 
 
 him by discipline, but who generally fails to impose by his own 
 merits. And how should it be otherwise ? A naval officer can only 
 show his work or his qualities towards the age of forty ; and it 
 is hard if he has been able to retain any after thirty years of an 
 odious position, in which he has always been obliged to give way 
 to the caprices and fancies of those above him, who have never 
 allowed him to manifest the smallest individuality. When, at 
 length, he obtains a command, even if endowed with the best dis- 
 position in the world, he will feel the same unconscious desire to 
 domineer that often converts those who have been oppressed into 
 the worst of tyrants. He retaliates on others for what he has gone 
 through himself. He takes his revenge on others for the suffering 
 he has endured. The second officer on board a ship is called 
 " the dog on board," and this contemptuous expression is only a 
 type of the reality. This last trial is the most degrading of all. 
 We need not be astounded at the physical and intellectual weakness 
 which shows itself in almost all the heads of the navy. They 
 have been accustomed to obey during most of their lives, and now 
 they are quite unable to command. 
 
 The responsibility crushes and oppresses them. They can never 
 throw off the feeling that they are still officers of the watch or 
 second officers, they always appear as if waiting for orders from head- 
 quarters; to act on their own account would seem impossible. 
 When distant missions are confided to them they hold on to the 
 telegraph wire, that they may get perpetual directions from Paris. 
 In Paris they understand nothing of modern advance, and hold 
 firmly to routine ; they are incapable of the most simple effort of 
 will or intelligence. The life they have led has unfitted them, 
 unnerved and transformed them, and it is quite usual for an officer 
 to lose all heart in his prime, after having been brilliant and 
 full of promise in his youth. The long campaigns and fatigues 
 at sea increase this premature decrepitude. 
 
 We may further unhesitatingly assert that the greater number 
 of naval officers who, having passed the age of fifty, may still 
 be found endued with some energy and spirit, will prove to have 
 
 12 
 
178 NAVAL EEFORM. 
 
 spent most of their time on shore, and thus to have escaped the 
 demoralising life on board ship. A strange career, if all the 
 drudgery must be avoided in order to be fit to render service 
 at the age which is the prime of life in a man who has lived on 
 shore. 
 
 We have said that a naval officer is tied to the grade of officer 
 of the watch during the space of twenty-five years. To this 
 lack of variety in subordinate service there is added another 
 vexatious item ; I mean the life in the ward-room. Everybody 
 knows that the ward-room is the cabin in which all the officers 
 meet. There was a time when all the officers of the watch on 
 board a vessel were of the same rank, lieutenants or sub-lieute- 
 nants. Notwithstanding the difference of age which may exist 
 between naval lieutenants (it may be a difference of seventeen 
 years, and will be extended to twenty in a few years) it was 
 perfectly natural that officers of the same rank should live to- 
 gether, and, thanks to mutual give and take, a commission was 
 generally gone through without much unpleasantness. But now- 
 a-days it is the custom to suppress any information as to the 
 embarkation of officers ; entirely according to the goodwill and 
 pleasure of the minister, vessels of the same pattern may have 
 entirely dissimilar staffs. One may have none but lieutenants 
 as officers of the watch, another may boast of three lieutenants 
 and two sub-lieutenants to fulfil the same duty, or even four 
 lieutenants, and one midshipman, &c. 
 
 A number of subalterns, no matter of what rank, are thrown 
 hap-hazard on board a vessel. They are forced to mess together 
 and lieutenants of forty years of age and over may have to asso- 
 ciate with sub-lieutenants, or even midshipmen fresh from the 
 schools. Not only does this arrangement subvert all notions of 
 discipline, but it condemns men to daily intercourse whose ages 
 are too dissimilar for them to have anything in common, so 
 that it is not surprising to hear that the lieutenants are apt to 
 envy the doctors and engineers, who can go and live with their 
 chosen associates elsewhere than on board sliip. As to the 
 
NAVAL PEBSONNEL. 179 
 
 officer who, notwithstanding all these disadvantages, still cares 
 enough for his profession to wish to be on active service, and 
 who reckons on his own personal merit and services to succeed 
 otherwise than by seniority, let us examine how his efforts are 
 rewarded. If he has been able to win the approval of an admi- 
 ral, if his worth is really marked, he may be placed on the 
 promotion list. This list is looked over yearly by the board of 
 Admiralty, and includes the names of certain ofi&cers submitted 
 to the Minister for selection. Everyone is aware of how it is 
 made up. If an officer hopes to find a place upon it, he must 
 call upon all the members of the Board of Admiralty, make his 
 " academical " visits, as they are called in the navy, and asks 
 as a favour what should only be given as a right. It is clear 
 that his efforts are not appreciated unless he has secured consi- 
 derable interest. Every member of the Admiralty Board has his 
 candidates, relations, or friends, whom he introduces to his col- 
 leagues, and these are accepted on condition that their friends 
 are accepted in return. 
 
 The army promotion list is made out under the superintendence 
 of the inspector- generals who have personally seen and known the 
 officers, and examined into their merits. There is nothing of the 
 sort in the navy. Living in Paris, the Council of the Admiralty 
 knows nothing of what takes place at sea or in the ports. Besides 
 which the promotion list is only a decoy, seeing that the Minister 
 has the double right of promoting where he pleases, and of choos- 
 ing from the list, at a venture, what officers shall receive promo- 
 tion. And, in exact contrast to what takes place in the War 
 Department, the naval promotion list comprises the names of so 
 many officers that they can never be exhausted in a year, and, as 
 others are added every year, it follows that a candidate may remain 
 inscribed for five or six years before receiving promotion. He 
 may, even, have attained his seniority before he has been selected 
 for promotion. 
 
 Therefore, what is the result of this ? It is that a naval 
 lieutenant never is selected as commander without powerful 
 
 12 * 
 
180 NAVAL REFOEM. 
 
 interest, unless his name has been at least three years on the 
 promotion list ; thus it happens that any lieutenant who hopes to 
 be provided for in three years by seniority, does his utmost to avoid 
 being sent to sea, to do no more service, and to lead a perfectly 
 indolent life, being quite aware that there would be no reward for 
 his exertions, as he would gain absolutely nothing, even if his 
 name were on the promotion list. 
 
 This is the experience of the first sixty lieutenants inscribed 
 in the Annuaire ; all those among them who have not been for 
 some time on the list, absolutely refuse to do anything, and seek 
 a quiet post on land to escape going to sea, which they hate. 
 
 In the War Department it is quite otherwise ; the promotion list 
 is re-cast every year, and all the officers inscribed on the list, with 
 two or three exceptions, pass on within the year ; so that, whatever 
 the seniority of rank, an army officer always tries to merit inscrip- 
 tion on the list, which is sure to give him a few months' advantage 
 beyond his seniority. Moreover, the Minister of War has not the 
 right to follow his own inclination in the choice of the officers 
 inscribed on the promotion list, or to name them to a higher rank. 
 He is bound to follow the rotation of the list. 
 
 The army list is therefore a reality ; that of the navy is a make- 
 believe, a mirage, an ingenious method of disguising the least- 
 merited favours under a colour of justice. The life of an officer 
 embraces three periods, three distinct phases : the first, from 
 twenty to thirty years old, a period of enthusiasm, of work, of 
 devotion, and of a desire to do well ; the second, from thirty to 
 forty years old, a period of latent revolt against the narrow 
 discipline and the despondency brought about by the situation of 
 an officer of the watch ; feeling himself bound to it for many long 
 years, disgust and weariness comes on, the zeal disappears, less and 
 less work is done; the third, from the age of forty, absolute lassi- 
 tude, indifference, and weariness. There is no further struggle ; 
 things may take their chance. From that moment no more study ; 
 he plays at patience, or games of trictrac, and, aided by increasing 
 physical weakness, soon attains that happy state of intellectual 
 
NAVAL PERSONNEL. 181 
 
 torpor to be found in most of the heads of the navy, that love of 
 repose, that worship of routine, that horror and want of compre- 
 hension of progress, which ends in their having but one aspira- 
 tion, that of being allowed to live out their tranquil existence, and 
 to blindly enjoy the present, oblivious of the past and careless of 
 the future. 
 
 We cannot assert sufficiently often that the principal and over- 
 whelming reason of this gradual decomposition in the navy is 
 the outcome of the monotonous duty to which a naval officer 
 is condemned during twenty-two years, that of officer of the watch. 
 
 It is certainly inconceivable that from the age of thirty-seven years 
 it should be obligatory, during another ten years, to be on deck for a 
 watch of four hours, in all weathers and in every kind of climate. The 
 physical fatigue increases more and more ; rest after the watch 
 becomes more and more necessary. When an officer past forty 
 has concluded his wearisome duty, going up and down like a wild 
 beast in his cage, and repeating the orders of his chief, his only 
 inclination is to do nothing ; and he cares very little about the 
 education of the men he ought to superintend and direct. He 
 throws himself at full length in his cabin, and leaves this care and 
 superintendence to his subalterns. 
 
 We may add that the less there is to do during a watch, the 
 more wearisome it is; and usually it is quite uneventful. The 
 moment anything the least unusual occurs, the commander appears 
 on the scene and takes all initiative out of the hands of the officer. 
 Therefore the latter has only a long and trying task, less interesting 
 than that of a sentinel at the outposts. 
 
 In the present condition of the navy, with its large and costly 
 vessels, no captain would allow one of his lieutenants even a single 
 chance of sharing the peril and honour of directing a difficult 
 manoeuvre. He feels the responsibility; could he trust anyone 
 but himself? The commands have become fewer. The fleets only 
 comprise a few powerful unities ; consequently those who are 
 selected to command them are, in like manner, fewer in number 
 than ever. 
 
182 NAVAL EEFOEM. 
 
 It is a strange fact that these splendid ironclads, these perfect 
 engines, which certainly are marvellous productions of human 
 genius, have had a deteriorating effect upon the navy, by condemn- 
 ing a still greater number of subalterns waiting for promotion to 
 fulfil the duties of ordinary officers of the watch. 
 
 An unusual amount of intellectual capacity is needed to com- 
 mand these large vessels ; but the captain alone need possess it, 
 the rest of the officers are merely his submissive instruments. 
 Unfortunately the captain seldom comes up to the importance of 
 the almost superhuman task confided to him ; and whilst his 
 officers are all being weakened by the surrounding inaction, he 
 himself is paralysed by the immense responsibility weighing him 
 down. Squadron fighting is, thank God ! a thing of the past, 
 but, if it still existed, we should soon see what fatal catastrophes 
 would bring about the destruction of these vessels. 
 
 Can we alter the state of matters we have just described? 
 Most assuredly — and without other expenditure than what would 
 be necessitated by increasing the list of officers, the notorious 
 insufficiency of which was rendered notable by the ill-starred 
 expeditions to China and Madagascar. The other alterations 
 needful to protect the naval officer from premature decrepitude 
 need cost the State nothing. 
 
 It is almost forced upon us that our complements should be 
 increased. Unfortunately, in 1871, they were reduced by 380 
 officers under pretext of economy; but the fact was forgotten 
 that economies at the expense of our national security are fatal, 
 and may bring about irreparable misfortunes. No doubt in time 
 of peace the present strength was sufficient; but as soon as 
 mobilisation became needful, the necessary effective force would 
 no longer be forthcoming. This became evident in the first naval 
 effort we were called upon to make since 1870, that is during the 
 last few months. There were no officers ; and they could only be 
 obtained by disturbing various appointments on land, and by con- 
 fiding part of the service on board our ships to a personnel insuffi- 
 cient both in number and in standing. Such a situation seems 
 
NAVAL PEESONNBl. 183 
 
 incredible ; it is so strange that we can hardly believe it. We 
 must, nevertheless, yield to evidence. It is only too true that, in 
 order to make any way against the nation we had treated as a 
 " negligeable quantity," we had to sound the alarm, take whatever 
 we could get, and " scrape the bottom of the bunkers " as the 
 sailors say. We had no other way of officering the vessels we 
 sent to the Chinese seas. And how were they officered ? Sub- 
 lieutenants were taken as second officers on transports of the third 
 class ; midshipmen were officers of the watch on transports of the 
 first and second class ; and, finally, sailing-masters were sent on 
 board ships with a sub-lieutenant, where the ordinary staff would 
 have comprised three lieutenants and two sub-lieutenants. 
 
 There are simple beings who believe that our armament on a 
 peace footing is a more or less limited effective, at times requiring 
 to be filled up ; in no case to be reduced in time of war. These 
 people have a certain common-sense of their own. How is it 
 possible that the requirements of peace should be more than those 
 of war, or that the personnel needful in the former should be 
 limited in the latter ? How explain that fewer officers, or officers 
 of subordinate rank, are required for service under fire than for 
 ordinary work ? 
 
 The service in time of war is arduous in a much greater degree, 
 and exacts very different qualities. But the Minister of Marine 
 has been obliged to ignore this elementary truth. Our vessels set 
 out with insufficient resources, with a diminished personnel which 
 was over-wrought by this most arduous mission ; for the chances 
 of war were added to all the ordinary anxieties at sea. No doubt 
 each most thoroughly did his duty within the limits of his strength ; 
 but these limits must not be overstepped ; it does not do to rely 
 entirely on the courage of men ; it must be remembered that their 
 courage may be crushed by circumstances. 
 
 The exigencies of modern warfare are a hundred-fold more terri- 
 ble than those of the warfare of former days. In olden times, in 
 the days of sailing vessels, a surprise was rarely to be dreaded. 
 Only in certain winds could there be any danger, and, so long as 
 
184 KAVAL EEFOEM. 
 
 the wind did not change its quarter, safety could be insured by 
 taking up a certain position. Vessels could take stock of each 
 other, and take each other's measure before coming into close 
 quarters ; they could, in some sort, make acquaintance before 
 beginning to fight. Therefore the watches were not so arduous ; 
 they were shorter and less charged witli anxiety. There was no 
 torpedo to fear, and shots could be avoided from a distance. Now- 
 a-days all this is changed. A blockading squadron, or a squadron 
 of cruisers has not an instant's rest. She is threatened unceasingly ; 
 if she is not perpetually on the alert, she runs the risk of being 
 attacked and beaten. Day and night, in all weathers, in all winds, 
 at anchor or in the open sea, she is in danger of being annihilated 
 by an almost invisible enemy. Instead of diminishing the number 
 of officers of the watch, they ought rather to be increased. More- 
 over, as we have endeavoured to explain, the duty of defending 
 our shores should be given over to the navy, and to the torpedo- 
 boats. 
 
 Now the war in China obliged us to diminish our movable 
 defence force, already so insufficient. Great alarm was taken 
 at the danger of dismantling our frontiers on land ; but no one 
 seemed to perceive that our shores were equally exposed, and that 
 with the exception of a few slow and heavy ironclads, and a few 
 worthless coasting vessels, which could not be everywhere at the 
 same moment, everything we possessed in the way of naval strength 
 had been despatched to China, and that a few swift vessels could 
 have ravaged our shores without encountering the slightest resis- 
 tance. Nevertheless it was seen fit to aggravate a situation so 
 replete with peril. Was it feared that the mobilised force would 
 be compromised if some fifteen thousand men were borrowed from an 
 army reckoning hundreds of thousands on a peace footing, although 
 that which constituted the very key-note of the defence of our 
 nation along the whole maritime frontier might be disorganised with 
 impunity ? 
 
 It might be exhaustively repeated that torpedo-boats should 
 iiloue defend our shores; in vain might it be set forth that they 
 
NAVAL PERSONNEL. 185 
 
 alone were fitted to protect our naval and commercial ports, in vain 
 might the movable defence force be upheld as the school best 
 suited to form the officers and the engineers destined, later on, to 
 serve on board these vessels ; in vain might attention be attracted 
 to the ever-increasing number of those splendid torpedo-boats of 
 which other nations become possessed ; in vain might it be most 
 clearly established that we could not consider ourselves properly 
 defended unless in possession of two hundred armed torpedo-boats ; 
 no sooner had we to do with that " negligeable quantity " called 
 China, than we had to give up the only ten armed torpedo-boats 
 we possessed. And all the sacrifices we were obliged to make 
 did not succeed in satisfying Admiral Courbet. We were totally 
 deficient in officers, even after the means employed for spreading 
 them out ; even when the number absolutely necessary for the 
 requirements of the service in France was diminished, in order 
 to send the greatest possible number to China. This is the con- 
 dition to which we were reduced by an ordinary quarrel with the 
 Celestial Empire. What would become of us if we had to sustain 
 a naval war with any European nation whatsoever? Impossible to 
 officer all the vessels we possess ; our naval and commercial ports 
 undefended ; the whole extent of our shores on fhe three seas 
 bordering them offered to the insults of the enemy ! This sums 
 up, in a few words, what our condition is ; this is the direction 
 towards which our mournful situation tends. 
 
 Who is to be held responsible for this state of affairs ? The 
 origin of it dates from some time back — from the period directly 
 succeeding our disasters, when every thought was centred in 
 economy, with a view to the re-organisation of the army. The 
 disastrous idea of reducing the number of naval officers by 382, 
 at one single stroke, came into contemplation, although it should 
 rather have been increased by retrenchment in the arsenals and 
 constructions. 
 
 It might have been tolerably easy to foresee that the suc- 
 cessive transformations in the navy would necessitate a more 
 numerous and a superior staff. 
 
186 NAVAL BEPOBM. 
 
 Without going back to the radical difference made by the intro- 
 duction of steam as the motive power for ships, one lieutenant 
 suflBced, in former days, efficiently to direct and superintend the 
 whole battery of a frigate ; all the guns were under his eye and 
 under his hand. Now-a-days the guns are less numerous, but they 
 are spread about among the redoubts and in turrets, making it 
 much more difficult to superintend them. The apparatus for 
 handling them is delicate and most complicated. New engines 
 have been added to the old; torpedoes, electric lighting, &c. The 
 introduction of torpedo-boats has resulted, and will still further 
 result, in increasing the number of commands. 
 
 Thus a Minister of Marine endowed with ordinary common 
 sense would have largely developed the complement of officers, 
 instead of reducing it. Not one understood this, or rather none 
 had the courage to say it, or to accept office on condition of being 
 permitted to accomplish a reform which was so urgent and dis- 
 tinct a necessity. We cannot tell whether any will be found in 
 the future capable of doing what no one can be found to do in the 
 present; but we assert that if there is to be a navy there must 
 be officers possessing great experience, and that, as long as there 
 is not a sufficient number of these officers, our navy will be in a 
 sorry condition. 
 
 If the outlay is thought excessive which must inevitably result 
 from increasing the complement of officers, it will be easy to reduce 
 it by establishing a system of half pay for officers, as in the case 
 of petty officers. According to the strength required, more or less 
 excellent servants return to their families with their pay cut down, 
 and liable to be recalled when the need arises. The same regula- 
 tion might quite as reasonably be applied to surplus officers in 
 time of peace ; they would be placed on two-thirds pay, and, when 
 it came to their turn to serve in the ports or to go to sea, they 
 would be placed on full pay. 
 
 The strain being incomparably more severe in the navy than in 
 any other branch of the public service, it will be recognised that 
 there should be sufficient officers to enable some to take a holiday 
 
NAVAL PERSONNEL. 187 
 
 between two commissions. Even if we resumed the complement 
 of 1870, this would not be obtainable; we should barely have 
 enough officers for the ordinary work. And even with this comple- 
 ment we should be obliged, in a European naval war, to have 
 recourse to the certificated captains, who could be sent on board 
 as supernumerary sub-lieutenants, to fill the vacancies in a per- 
 sonnel which is always too small. 
 
 Although so necessary, this increased strength would only be a 
 feeble palliative to the moral condition of the corps of naval 
 officers. They would reach a higher grade a year or two sooner, 
 hut the lieutenants would equally have to fulfil the demoralising 
 duties of officer of the watch until the age of about forty or forty- 
 three years. 
 
 Now we have shown that this watch, although acceptable in 
 youth, when instruction is needed and sought after, becomes tire- 
 some and unbearable to the officer of a certain age desiring personal 
 action. One of our ministers realised this so thoroughly that he 
 instituted pecuniary compensation — an allowance of 500 francs 
 a year to be given to lieutenants counting twelve years' service in 
 their rank. 
 
 One hundred out of seven hundred are now in receipt of this 
 allowance, and the recipients are named Senateurs ; although this 
 additional pay does not assuredly compensate for the additional 
 exercise of patience and endurance that falls to their share. 
 
 On consulting the Annuaire it will be seen that a lieutenant 
 with twelve years' service in his rank counts twenty years' service 
 as watch-keeping officer, and twenty-five years' total service, provided 
 he has come from the Naval School. He has then a right to 
 retire ; and it is to be regretted that the only premium that can 
 be ofi'ered him should be that of 500 francs a year, with the 
 prospect of going on with the same service for five or six years 
 longer. This is the time at which our officers enter into the third 
 phase of their existence : depression, resignation, indiflference. 
 
 This is all wrong ; and if such a deplorable state of things is to 
 be put an end to, the former rank of corvette captain must again 
 
188 NAVAL REFORM. 
 
 be instituted. This corresponds to the rank of colonel in the army, 
 but was done away with long ago in the navy ; we suppose with 
 a view to enabling the sons and sons-in-law of admirals to become 
 commanders in a shorter space of time. These individuals are 
 always sure to be unhindered in their career, and to rise to the 
 top of the tree. The recent examples of this are numerous and 
 scandalous. It is high time that they should become rarer. The 
 rank of corvette captain might be restored without any expense to 
 the State, with advantage to the service, and to the improvement 
 of the condition of the officers; seeing that it was abolished through 
 caprice, or interest, or some fancy. 
 
 Let us suppose the strength made up to that of 1870, com- 
 prising 270 commanders, 800 lieutenants, and a total of 1,070 
 ofiBcers. By restoring the rank of corvette captain, there need 
 only be 200 commanders, 200 corvette captains, and 670 lieu- 
 tenants, giving a total equal to the former of 1,070 ofiBcers. 
 There would, therefore, be no expense on this head ; for out of the 
 pay of 70 commanders and 130 lieutenants, a hundred of which 
 already draw an allowance of 500 francs a year, from having more 
 that twelve years' service in their rank, it would be possible to 
 make up the pay of 200 corvette captains. To restore this rank 
 would greatly improve the condition of subaltern officers ; it would 
 certainly diminish the period of service as lieutenant by four years, 
 and any officer from the Naval School would at least have the 
 prospect of becoming corvette captain as soon as he had a right 
 to his retirement. Humble but consoling prospect, compared 
 with the present state of matters ! The post of corvette captain is 
 clearly defined in the navy ; we have seen how unadvisable it is 
 that a commander should be put back again to the duties of second 
 officer ; and we have said that in fulfilling them he parts with 
 the small amount of pride and intellectual energy remaining to 
 him. 
 
 The corvette captains would act as second officers on vessels 
 oummanded by captains, and the commanders would have no other 
 duty than their own, which would raise this rather depreciated rank. 
 
NAVAL PERSONNEL. 189 
 
 Beyond the duties of second ofiBoer, the corvette captains would 
 further be given the command of despatch-vessels, despatch-trans- 
 ports, and other vessels which are at one time commanded by 
 commanders, and at another by lieutenants, according to the good 
 will and pleasure of the Minister. 
 
 A presidential decree should establish the list of vessels to be 
 commanded by corvette captains. The lieutenants should be 
 nominated partly by selection and partly by seniority. Above this 
 rank promotion should be by selection. The corvette captains 
 ■would be recruited every three years, and entirely from lieutenants; 
 one half by selection and one half by seniority ; the lieutenants 
 appointed by selection would be nominated in turns, according to 
 their seniority on the promotion list. 
 
 The complement of commanders could be reduced to 200 by 
 not filling up the vacancies ; that of lieutenants could be filled up 
 as rapidly as possible by sub-lieutenants, who in their turn could 
 be easily replaced by increasing the admission to the Naval School 
 in proportion to the vacancies, and by the titular nomination of 
 some auxiliary sub-lieutenants. 
 
 At present there are first and second class lieutenants, and the 
 Senateurs as well ; but this is not a special class, it is only an 
 ironical title proceeding from the fact that seniority of rank gives 
 a right to the allowance of 500 francs to which we have alluded. 
 Whatev-er class they may belong to, all lieutenants work under the 
 same designation, and do the same duty. There is no distinction 
 between a lieutenant counting seventeen years' service in the rank, 
 and one who has just been promoted. The one has quite as good 
 a chance as the other of a command at sea : they can and do fulfil 
 the same duties, sometimes as second officer, but chiefly as officers 
 of the watch. Is not this equality too much of a good thing ? 
 Although founded on equality in rank, it makes no difierence for 
 service rendered, or for seniority in rank. In our opinion, this 
 should be changed, and, after showing how distasteful and weari- 
 some the service of the watch through long years might become, 
 no one need be surprised if we ask that lieutenants of the first 
 
190 NAVAL REFORM. 
 
 class should cease to go to sea as officers of the watch. They 
 should only be obliged to be second officer under a commander, 
 or under captains of despatch-vessels in the flotilla, gun-boats, 
 and other small ships classified by a presidential decree. We need 
 hardly say that we look upon them as the natural heads of the 
 groups of torpedo-boats. 
 
 The lieutenants of the second class should be officers of the 
 watch on board ships commanded by captains, second in command 
 to corvette captains, or commanders of vessels inferior to such as 
 should be commanded by lieutenants of the first class. This 
 would be the nursery for recruiting commanders for torpedo-boats. 
 When torpedo-boats have come into common use, when we possess 
 hundreds of them, the command of them must certainly be given 
 to young men in full possession of physical strength and intelli- 
 gence. As they become easier to handle, these will discharge the 
 task to perfection, and all the more so from the fact of their being 
 more active, younger, and less worn out in the service. Mere 
 sub-lieutenants will be capable of commanding torpedo-boats of a 
 small pattern. In youth we dread no danger ; discoirifort and 
 privation are of little moment to us. 
 
 Home appointments, according to their importance, should be 
 equally divided between first and second class lieutanants. The 
 number of both classes of lieutenants should be fixed according to 
 the requirements of the service; therefore it is evident that lieu- 
 tenants of the first class should be less numerous than those of 
 the second class. We reckon that 200 lieutenants of the first class 
 would suffice. Lieutenants could only be placed on the promotion 
 list for the rank of corvette captain after spending two years at 
 sea in the first class of their rank. This condition appears most 
 important to us ; for, to a certain extent, it would guarantee the 
 rights of seniority, whilst allowing a sufficient scope for selection ; 
 and the scandal would be less than such as at present exists, when 
 lieutenants can become commanders, and anticipate their promotion 
 from the Naval School by seven or eight years, with no other recom- 
 mendation than family interest. If our suggestion is adopted, no 
 
NA.VAL PKESONNBL. 191 
 
 one would be a lieutenant for more than five or six years ; thus, 
 no one could gain more than three or four years by promotion 
 through selection, and this would be amply sufiBcient. 
 
 We have elsewhere indicated how promotion by seniority should be 
 regulated. It is disgraceful and scandalous that when once the list 
 is made out, a Minister should have it in his power to choose as he 
 pleases, and to add whomever he likes to the list. There should 
 be no middle course; either the list must be done away with, and 
 everything left to the more or less judicious decision of the 
 Minister ; or else the list must be as just and fair as possible. We 
 should, perhaps, prefer the first alternative, for the decision of a 
 Minister is worth a great deal more than that of the Board of 
 Admiralty. The Minister has only one naval family, whereas each 
 member of the Board has his own; and as these members have no 
 direct knowledge of the officers, similar to that possessed by the 
 inspectors-general of the army, who have personally examined 
 them in their regiments, they prefer candidates connected with 
 their own family, or with their own friends, to candidates who may 
 possess every meritj but whom they have no means of discovering. 
 A sort of compact is entered into by them all, a sort of compromise 
 for their respective ■proUg&s. 
 
 But the term of office our Ministers enjoy is too short and 
 unstable to allow such an extent of power to be given up to them. 
 On accepting office, each would have countless friends expecting 
 places. Politics would come in, and recommendations from sena- 
 tors and deputies would ruin the system. We are, therefore, 
 obliged to leave things to the Board of Admiralty, in which it can 
 do less harm than might be done by others. 
 
 But if this is to be the way of things, the list must be made 
 infallible, and the Minister must conform to the precedence on the 
 list in selecting for promotion. The officer longest inscribed is, 
 or ought to be, the most deserving, and, therefore, should be pre- 
 ferred above others. If it is thus in the army, why should it be 
 otherwise in the navy ? We may add that the present promotion 
 list is so full that three years might be allowed to elapse without 
 
192 NAYAL REFORM. 
 
 adding new names to it, and without coming to an end of those 
 already inscribed. 
 
 We have already pointed out the advantages of a published list, 
 remodelled every year, and as far as possible limited to the number 
 of officers that may be selected during the current year. We 
 repeat that in the existing state of things there are lieutenants who 
 have been four years on the list, and who still await their turn. 
 These officers should be struck ofi" or else given their promotion. 
 It is quite absurd that they should be inscribed for any length of 
 time; each promotion brings fresh disappointment and discourage- 
 ment to those who are passed over. We have, moreover, explained 
 that from the moment it is more or less admitted that a lieutenant 
 placed on the list cannot be promoted unless he has been inscribed 
 for two or three years, none of the lieutenants whose turn of 
 seniority ought to come up during the same period either wish 
 to be placed on the list, or have any interest in being put on it ; 
 and, therefore, they try to show as little activity as possible. We 
 should, therefore, follow the system adopted in the army, and, by 
 remodelling the list every year, give it that reputation for fair 
 dealing which it lacks at the present time. 
 
 According to the description we have given of the duties of a 
 naval officer " keeping the watch," it may be seen that it is within 
 reach of the meanest capacity, and requires no extra training. 
 Nevertheless, by a strange anomaly, the corps of naval officers is 
 only recruited from young men leaving the naval school. A few 
 certificated captains, promoted in consequence of some campaign, 
 complete the strength. The officers risen from the ranks, are so 
 few in number that it is needless to speak of them. And yet, what 
 could be more democratic or more natural than the attempt to 
 facilitate the attainment of officers' rank by our petty officers ? 
 
 The navy is a sort of aristocracy, and it is almost impossible 
 to penetrate through its doors ; no crack regiment is more exclu- 
 sive, nor is there any symptom in the army of that from which the 
 navy chiefly suffers — obstruction of the inferior ranks by men all 
 showing the same origin, an apparently equal reputation, and the 
 
NAVAL PEESONNBL. 193 
 
 same right to promotion. A great many officers, on rising from 
 the rank of suhalterns, and reaching that of captain, consider that 
 they have had a most successful career, and, when they are ohliged 
 to retire, leave the army quite satisfied. All naval lieutenants 
 aspire to hecome commanders, and think they have not got their 
 deserts unless they do. And, further, if they are obliged to retire 
 with this rank, they feel that they have failed in their career. 
 
 In the army, the officers of Saint Oyr and the Polytechnic School, 
 form a picked set to whom the higher steps seem to belong of right. 
 
 In the navy, all who have been through the Naval School, and 
 all others as well, aspire to the superior ranks, so that they all 
 hinder each other, and only those succeed who possess interest. 
 This condition of things is the more to be regretted in that it is 
 manifestly contrary to the law. 
 
 Although the law of 1832, regulating naval promotion, and very 
 slightly modified since that date, confirmed the aristocratic tradi- 
 tions so heavily weighing down the navy at that time, and at the 
 present — it reserved a third of the posts, belonging to the lower 
 rank of officers, for first-class petty officers and auxiliary sub- 
 lieutenants possessing certain qualifications. But it was practi- 
 cally held of little account, and it was allowed to become a dead 
 letter. Certificated captains may be employed any time that the 
 complement of half-pay officers is insufficient for the required 
 strength instead of supernumerary sub-lieutenants, and as super- 
 numerary sub-lieutenants when they have deserved their distinc- 
 tion by brilliant service or special acts of bravery. They may even 
 be at once appointed lieutenants. But, in reality, those on half- 
 pay have hitherto been so few in number, that those selected to 
 be put on the lists of the regular service have always been very 
 few. 
 
 To reach the rank of officer, the petty officers are obliged to go 
 through an examination which is all the more difficult as it is 
 scarcely possible to prepare for it at sea. Those who hope to pass 
 it must have the luck of spending some time on land, and they 
 must likewise have saved sufficient money to pay for instruction 
 
 13 
 
194 NAVAL BBFOEM. 
 
 in the required technical knowledge. We thus see that the promises 
 held out by the law are a mere snare and delusion. Good faith 
 and justice equally require that an end should be put to this abuse. 
 The War Department has instituted schools for non-commissioned 
 officers; the Navy should do the same. The hydrographic schools 
 in the ports, which turn out certificated captains, are insufficient, 
 because the petty officers cannot make use of them, and because 
 they are not thought to be qualified to prepare for the rank of 
 officer. 
 
 Special schools are needed on board ships, and in the divisions 
 of the fleet. There would be no lack of subjects, and doubtless 
 men would be found among the best of the petty officers who would 
 be quite equal to taking their turn at -watch-keeping, even supposing 
 that they were only promoted at thirty or thirty-five years old. 
 Some of them might even rise higher. It would be a question of 
 activity and intelligence. The navy would thus cease to be an 
 exclusive body, jealous, narrow, anti-democratic. It would be 
 recruited from two forces, the Naval School, and the School for 
 Petty Officers. 
 
 On the other hand, it is difficult to comprehend why the students 
 from the polytechnic schools should obtain admission. They have 
 no sort of right ^- '■■ ' j which they arrogate to themselves 
 
 and which i. _ ^.^uied to them — the right to enter every 
 
 civil and military profession, as if they were fit for everything, and 
 nothing came amiss to them. To crown these reforms in the 
 personnel, and to make them practicable, to constitute a navy 
 physically and morally worthy of its mission, we ought still more 
 emphatically to lower the standard of age for retirement. 
 
 The limit of age for a vice-admiral is at present sixty-five years ; 
 for a rear-admiral sixty-two ; for a captain sixty years; for a com- 
 mander fifty-eight ; and for a lieutenant fifty-three years. It is 
 far too prolonged in all ranks, taking into consideration the wear 
 and tear of mind and body engendered by a life spent at sea. To 
 establish this fact will be the hardest task of all. We should doubt 
 the existence of a single admiral owning enough energy to admit 
 
NAVAL PERSONNEL. 195 
 
 that he has ceased to possess any. In reforming the limit for 
 age, it will be necessary to interfere with personal interests, and 
 these are, of all others, the most difScult to reconcile. 
 
 It would, however, he a great mistake to hesitate. In theory 
 no oflBcer should be on active service in the navy after sixty years 
 of age. What can be expected of a lieutenant at fifty-three years 
 of age, and of what use can he possibly be ? With all indulgence, 
 it would be impossible to refrain from admitting that the limits 
 of age should be reduced by three years in all ranks. This would, 
 again, be an excellent means of hindering officers stagnating as 
 subalterns. If we think of the energy req^uired by a naval officer 
 in the fulfilment of his mission ; if, above all, we think of the 
 energy he will require to possess in the future, when naval art will 
 have been revolutionised by the terrible weapons which are only 
 now beginning to make their appearance, we are forced to admit 
 that no career can exact greater or more varied qualifications. 
 Body and mind must be exceptionally fitted for such a responsi- 
 bility. In the navy, where it is necessary to be strong as well as 
 worthy, youth and health are advantages, the lack of which nothing 
 can replace. 
 
196 NAVAL REFORM. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 SEEVICE AFLOAT. 
 
 In the preceding chapter we have drawn a faithful picture of the 
 hardsliips and obligations of a naval oflBicer, but we did not touch 
 upon the entire change we consider to be impending in regard both 
 to our personnel and materiel. We have endeavoured faithfully 
 to depict the existing state of things, so that we may more clearly 
 realise what is in store for us. One of the happiest and most 
 fertile results of the abolition of the great fighting unities of the 
 few but giant ironclads of the present day, will be to multiply 
 commands almost ad infinitum, and to give our ofiBcers an early 
 chance of developing those qualities of originality, intelligence, and 
 courage which characterise, or rather which ought to characterise, 
 the navy. 
 
 Admiral Aube has described the navy as " the science of accepted 
 and fulfilled responsihilities." Now we have seen that it is very 
 far from fulfilling this description. The navy seems at present to 
 be the science of irresponsibility. Each tries to avoid any task 
 likely to compromise ; each keeps in the background the moment 
 anything important has to be decided, or personal judgment used 
 requiring boldness of conception, followed by rapidity of execu- 
 tion, such as formerly might have been considered the leading 
 characteristic of our sailors. To the generation formed by sailing 
 vessels, by its long cruises, its incessant fatigues, its perpetual 
 struggle against the elements let loose by nature, by its constant 
 
SEBVIOB AFLOAT. 197 
 
 perils, a newteeneration has succeeded ; and being accustomed to 
 steam navigkion, with its almost mathematical regularity, on fine, 
 commodious, and solid ships, it has lost all the remarkable and 
 admirable qualities of its predecessor. 
 
 We have described the wearisome and deteriorating work it is 
 obliged to fulfil until it reaches the age when physical and moral 
 force fail, and the hour of inevitable decrepitude strikes. We 
 predict, and firmly believe that a revolution will take place in 
 the navy of the future. Watch-keeping will become less and less 
 important, as vessels of heavy tonnage, requiring a considerable 
 staff, will themseves become fewer and fewer. 
 
 Lieutenants and sub-lieutenants will, on the other hand, revive 
 the traditions of a former generation of sailors ; and not only will 
 the handling of our torpedo-boats and gan-boats fall to their share 
 at an early age, and give their powers of common-sense full exer- 
 cise, but they will also have to give proof of energy and decision 
 at an age when, at present, they have only passively to submit to 
 discipline. They will revive the traditions of the good old times, 
 made familiar by legends, telling of those sailors whose brilliant 
 campaigns have made some of the most splendid pages of our 
 history. 
 
 Neither can another axiom advanced by Admiral Aube, that " a 
 sailor is formed at sea, and only at sea," be any longer applied 
 to the existing state of things. As going to sea is monotonous, 
 each one avoids it as much as he can, and if he goes he learns 
 next to nothing. 
 
 We may, for instance, assert that the evolutionary squadron, 
 the object of which ought to be to form lieutenants, does not in 
 any way develop the courage or intelligence of its ofiicers. It is 
 impossible that anyone should learn anything whatsoever from 
 going in and out of a few easy harbours, a few exercises in tactics 
 consisting in forming line ahead, or line abreast, or line of bearing; 
 or from gun practice where each ship fires in succession at the same 
 target, and where the last ship finds herself blinded by the smoke, 
 and, being unable to distinguish anything, fires at haphazard. 
 
198 NAVAL EEFOEM. 
 
 Farther on we shall see that distant stations are no better 
 schools for seamanship or for the art of war. There is, moreover, 
 manifest favouritism in the selection of oflBcers for sea-service. It 
 must not he imagined that every officer has an equal chance 
 of a good appointment, or that they all have the same oppor- 
 tunities of acquiring the scientific and professional value needed 
 for promotion. The system of appointments for sea-service is 
 most arbitrary. The officers are distributed among the five ports, 
 which each have their own roster for sea-service. The result is 
 that those belonging to the ports that have more frequent and ad- 
 vantageous appointments in their gift, have at once a better start. 
 
 For instance, an officer attached to the Toulon division most 
 hkely would he sent to the Levant or to the Far East; another, 
 attached to Rochefort, might be perpetually condemned to the most 
 unhealthy stations in Africa, the Senegal, or the Gaboon. 
 
 The want of a general roster for sea-service has long been felt; 
 and it is scandalous that such a legitimate measure has not hitherto 
 been passed. Not only should there be a general roster, but it 
 should, further, be hona fide. Now at the present moment it is 
 nothing of the sort. Officers for sea-service are chosen by selec- 
 tion, and not by rotation ; this means that the more favoured are 
 the sons, relatives, and friends of admirals, and are selected for the 
 best appointments, whilst ordinary mortals must put up with the 
 worst. 
 
 The right to sea-service has been rendered unequal by creating 
 specialities for the officers, just as there are specialities for the 
 sailors, torpedo-boat officers, gunners, riflemen, &o. Nothing could 
 be better if everybody had the same facilities given them for acquir- 
 ing one or more of these specialities. But the Minister of Marine 
 has the right to select the officers who shall attend the schools, 
 and many can never get into them at all. When the staff of a 
 vessel is being organised, the captain chooses his second officer 
 according to his own liking ; then comes a selected officer. As 
 there must naturally be an officer for each speciality, those who 
 are certificated, of course, obtain the preference. There remains but 
 
SBBVICB AFLOAT. 199 
 
 one post for the ordinary oflScer; it is that of "officer of the 
 broom," as it is called on board ship, so as to indicate how 
 humble is his position and how common are his duties. 
 
 It need hardly be added that the admirals choose their flag- 
 captains and the whole of their staff. This is a deplorable system. 
 All these selections only exist in order that officers may do each 
 other mutual favours, and thus obtain patronage. A captain 
 takes the relation of an admiral as second officer or as selected 
 officer, so as to secure the good graces of the former. Favouritism 
 always comes before the interests of the service. 
 
 Does a colonel in the army select his lieutenant-colonel, or a 
 major his captains ? There is no sort of reason why the same 
 system should not be followed in the navy as in the army. The 
 officers should go to sea in regular succession ; not according to 
 the caprice of the authorities. Those to whom a disagreeable 
 appointment falls must make the best of it. It very often hap- 
 pens that those who have to face this disagreeable prospect find 
 some means or other of remaining at home, and very shortly after 
 they are selected for some first-rate appointment. Now this is a 
 regular scandal. Any officer refusing an appointment in his proper 
 turn should be placed at the foot of the list, and should even be 
 deprived of his rights by such conduct. 
 
 The same occurs when a command is in question. The Minister 
 bestows it arbitrarily, and is responsible to no one for his decision. 
 We have only to turn over the naval Annuaire to prove that the 
 greater part of the commands devolve on members of leading naval 
 families. 
 
 Democracy has not invaded the navy. On the contrary, privi- 
 leges are jealously transmitted from father to son, as in a most 
 exclusive caste. 
 
 It has been justly observed that it would be easy unerringly 
 to point out those on the list of the students admitted to the naval 
 school, who without any personal merit would reach the rank 
 of admiral, and those who would not, unless under exceptional 
 circumstances, even were they excellent officers. The brilliant 
 
200 NAVAL BEFOEM. 
 
 appointments, the showy commands, are all for the former ; con- 
 scious worth is the share of the others — and this, according to La 
 Rochefoucauld, is of no use unless Fortune brings it into notice. 
 
 The creation of specialities, as we have already observed, has 
 had a bad effect on the general situation of an officer. Formerly 
 the very fact of being one meant that he was fit for every duty 
 in the service. There was one list only for all the four ports, and, 
 with the exception of a single officer selected by the captain, the 
 staff of every ship commissioned for sea-service was taken from this 
 list. 
 
 According to the regulations, the senior watch-keeping officer 
 had charge of the guns, the lower deck battery, and even that of 
 the upper deck. The captain then selected the navigating officer; 
 the officer in command of the landing party ; in a word, the officer 
 for each separate duty and branch of the service. If any proved 
 incapable of any particular duty, a note was made against him, 
 and this note followed him everywhere, often exercising a decisive 
 influence on his career. 
 
 This is no longer the case. Seeing the diversity and intricacy 
 of maritime engines, a certain number of technical schools have 
 been instituted for each branch of naval science, and a certain 
 number of officers, selected every year by the Minister, are sent to 
 them. These are the gunnery school, established in the harbour 
 of the Hyeres islands, the Souverain and its tenders, the torpedo- 
 school at Boyardville in the lie d'016ron, the school of musketry 
 at Lorient, the astronomical school at the Montsouris observatory, 
 and, lastly, the gymnastic school at Joinville-le-Pont. After pass- 
 ing the usual examinations, the officers receive a certificate of 
 special capacity, which gives them special advantages. They 
 embark as officers superintending torpedoes, gunnery, musketry, &c., 
 and take the direction of these various branches of the service. 
 
 The speciality of officers in charge of the engines already consti- 
 tuted by the creation of various ranks for the chief engineers, and 
 likely to be developed more and more by increasing our strength, 
 completes the series of special officers in the navy. We are far 
 
 \ \ 
 
SKBVIOE AFLOAT. 201 
 
 from finding fault with this organisation ; in itself it is excellent. 
 The schools supply a real want, and are of incontestable utility. 
 Nevertheless, the development of specialities breaks up the unity 
 of the naval corps, and manifestly violates justice. An officer can, 
 and ought to possess, as in olden times, a thorough knowledge 
 of the scientific branches of his profession. Without this he can 
 never be fit to command. They almost all have the same starting 
 point, and go on board the Borda ; therefore, the equality existing 
 at the outset of their career should be maintained in the sequel. 
 As no competition is required for admission to the schools, there 
 is no reason that one should be admitted in preference to another. 
 Everyone ought, at least, to have the option given him. Should 
 this system prove impracticable, selection might then find some 
 justification, but at present it clearly weakens the whole corps. 
 
 But it is not impracticable. Various plans have been suggested 
 for placing each speciality within reach of every officer. It was 
 proposed to unite all the special schools in one principal naval 
 college, just as we have one principal military college. Perhaps 
 this would be a good plan. Whether it were or not, there are even 
 now officers who are acquainted with several specialities ; we may, 
 therefore, consider the plan feasible, and it would be easy to 
 adopt it. 
 
 It would only be necessary to arrange the turns for going to sea 
 and for returning to shore in such a way that each officer should 
 be able to go through the courses at one or more of the schools, 
 and that at the end of a certain number of years he should have 
 followed those of all the schools. These courses of instruction 
 could very easily be condensed into a few months. 
 
 As fast as the torpedo improvements take place, so much the 
 simpler does it become, and easier to understand. The same 
 obtains with reference to our guns ; it would be much easier to 
 become conversant with them if, as we could wish, the navy were 
 content only to use the 14-cms. gun. In a very short time, those 
 who had qualified would gain the two certificates which, now-a- 
 days, are particularly indispensable, that of gunner and torpedo- 
 
202 NATAL REFORM. 
 
 officer. The others could be gained with still greater ease, and 
 when each had acquired all the different specialities, the latter 
 would virtually cease to be specialities, as they would be common 
 to everyone. The navy of the present would then resemble the 
 navy of the past. The corps of officers would he increased in 
 value. General progress would set in, and those differences in 
 education would cease to exist which at present give rise to 
 serious jealousies, and serve as a pretext for the most flagrant 
 favouritism. 
 
 We have quoted Admiral Aube's opinion that a sailor can only 
 be trained at sea. The sea is the great school for naval officers. 
 We must now examine the working of the measures intended to 
 secure their instruction in the present state of our naval organi- 
 sation. Our active fleet, in which our officers spend their time 
 at sea, and receive the instruction necessary and indispensable to 
 their complete develop7nent, may be divided into three easily-defined 
 categories : these are the vessels at naval stations in far-off lands ; 
 transport ships; and, lastly, the evolutionary squadron: three 
 services filling, or supposed to fill, three chief necessities. These 
 three essentially different services constitute our professional 
 schools. 
 
 Let us examine their value from this particular aspect; and, to 
 start with, we shall set aside the transport ships, because we con- 
 sider that far the best thing the navy could do would be to get rid 
 of them. We, of course, mean the transports reserved to carry 
 troops to our colonies, and the provisions required for them ; we 
 have already said that we should retain transports to accompany 
 and escort our torpedo-boats and onr gun-boats. But our present 
 immense fleet of transports costs an immense sum, absorbs a 
 considerable portion of our personnel, and is of no more use in 
 educating our officers or seamen, than ordinary steamers are. 
 
 It has often been proposed, with great justice, that the navy 
 should be set free from a charge so unsuitably and so uselessly 
 
SERVICE AFLOAT. 203 
 
 absorbing its energy and its resources. Would it not be un- 
 doubtedly more simple, and far more economical, to make this over 
 to the merchant service ? It would do the work thoroughly, and 
 it would, moreover, give it a legitimate profit. 
 
 Wo have indicated our lamentable lack of officers during the 
 Chinese War. Our transport fleet was chiefly to blame for this. 
 At that time it included (of course, we do not speak of armed 
 vessels) eight transports of the Annamite type, each having one 
 commander and four lieutenants (the regulation number would be 
 five) ; three transports of the Tarn type, whose staff' included one 
 commander, one lieutenant, and three sub-lieutenants (instead of 
 four) ; five transports of the Finisierre type, with the same staff" 
 as the transports similar to the Tarn ; one transport of a particular 
 pattern, the European, having the same number of officers. Thus 
 the 17 great transports absorbed 17 commanders, 32 lieutenants, 
 and 27 sub-lieutenants, and these might have armed 17 cruisers 
 or look-out ships for the fleet if we had had them. 
 
 We must add seven more provision transports to those we have 
 enumerated (the Caravane, Bievre, Arriege, &c.), each having a 
 lieutenant in command, and another second in command. These 
 fourteen officers could, in like manner, have been better employed. 
 We should add despatch-transports fairly well armed, but possessed 
 of such inferior speed that they can hardly be reckoned as men-of- 
 war. 
 
 The vessels which were formerly called station transports, some 
 commanded by a lieutenant, and others by a commander, had a 
 lieutenant second in command, and three sub-lieutenants as officers 
 of the watch. So we again have 50 officers that might have been 
 better employed. If we add them all up, we obtain a total of 159 
 naval officers condemned to subordinate duty. A chartered steamer 
 would do as well as a transport, and were the former to be sunk 
 by a hostile torpedo-boat or gun-boat it might be a misfortune ; 
 whereas, were the same to happen to the transport — as would be 
 very likelyj considering her undefended condition, her moderate 
 speed, and her insufficient armament — it would be a humiliation 
 
204 NAVAL EEFOBM. 
 
 as well as a misfortune. We should out and out have lost a vessel 
 distinctly carrying the pennant of a man-of-war. 
 
 We have not alluded to the old ships employed in transporting 
 convicts to New Caledonia. These (there are two constantly 
 armed) are commanded by a captain, with a commander as his 
 second officer, five lieutenants, and five sub-lieutenants. They are, 
 in fact, considered a training school. Surely it would be better, 
 even if gradually, to replace all these transports by merchant 
 vessels, which could, if required, and according to the nature of 
 their mission, have a naval lieutenant, or a doctor or agent, 
 attached to them as Government agent. Those detailed for carry- 
 ing the convicts might, further, be provided with a crew of trained 
 men. 
 
 We should thus restore the fighting element to our ofiBcers, and 
 this is their real work. It would set them free from enervating 
 and insignificant duties. These may be very instructive in time 
 of peace, but they are almost humiliating in time of war. Accord- 
 ing to a saying in use at the time of the Crimean War, they 
 condemn their victims to be nothing but the maritime following 
 of the army. 
 
 The necessity for reform in this direction is no new thing. As 
 long ago as 1865 the Prince de Joinville wrote : — 
 
 Once for all, the navy should clisoontinue transport service. It will ruin it, and 
 we have come to this conclusion after giving it the fullest consideration, it will ruin 
 it if this continues to be imposed upon it. The extent and continuity of this 
 service during the Crimean, Italian, and Mexican wars are, perhaps, answerable for 
 the distaste and general falling-off to be noticed in our naval officers. 
 
 No order or discipline are possible on board a transport. After struggling to 
 maintain them for a few days, it is given up in despair. The crew lives in a sort of 
 hopeless confusion and helter-skelter ; even the officer becomes infected, and forgets 
 the severe and salutary lessons that he learnt on board a man-of-war. Later on he 
 takes the iiTegular habits acquired on board the transport back to the man-of-war. 
 As the former fills such an important place in the life at sea, habits acquired upon 
 it necessarily obtain the mastery, and the officer, having lost all taste for discipline, 
 no longer sets the example in it. 
 
 Let us say frankly what is the ease : the soldiers and their leaders consider the 
 transport as a sort of inn. The naval officer is the innkeeper, paid to look after 
 them. Thus he is often placed in the moat unpleasant and humiliating situation in 
 relation to his comrades in arms. Is it surprising that the general relations between 
 the ai-my and navy should be somewhat affected by this ? Prom whatever side of 
 
SBEVIOE AFLOAT. 205 
 
 the question it may be viewed, nothing but disagreeables can result when a nation 
 burdens the navy with transport service. 
 
 The English gave up doing this many years ago. They had preceded us in the 
 practice, and had gained great experience on the subject in the Peninsular War, as 
 ■well as in India and America. At the present date they have, perhaps, one or two 
 troopships like the Himalaya. They use them because they happen to have them, 
 and, moreover, they are as a drop in the ocean to their immense iieet. Their ac- 
 knowledged rule is never to employ a man-of-war on any duty that mil demoralise 
 the crew, humiliate the officer, injure the discipline, and consequently the intrinsic 
 value as well as the reputation of the navy. 
 
 The Americans make the same rule. The Turks alone cram their soldiers on 
 board their men-of-war in the same way as we do. I doubt whether we should 
 take them as our models. 
 
 Taking our vast armies into consideration, and the limited resources of our mer- 
 chant service, it might be permissible, at a time of great pressure and difficulty, if 
 the sea were clear, and if the temporary encumbrance were of no inconvenience, to 
 employ the navy to transport a considerable body of troops ; but, as a general rule, 
 this duty, and the subsequent coming and going, should devolve on the merchant 
 service, or on a special transport service to which its officers and crew would 
 permanently belong.* 
 
 Personally I should prefer applying to the merchant services, and to the steam- 
 ship companies already in existence. They should have a certain number of supple- 
 mentary vessels, which the Government could charter by paying well for them. 
 When unoccupied, or on a return, these vessels might give themselves up to com- 
 mercial operations. This would be a powerful means of furthering the develop- 
 ment of the service of merchant-steamers destined to replace the " old merchant 
 craft, "t and this cannot be sufficiently encouraged. 
 
 - For unforeseen emergencies, the State would do well to keep a reserve of the big 
 transports it possesses at present, and which it would lend to the companies when 
 it were a case of caiTying horses or artillery ; but this pait taken by the State in this 
 important branch of our militaiy service would be quite exceptional. As a rule, it 
 would depend entirely on the merchant service for moving the troops and 
 matgriel. 
 
 If it were decided to make this alteration in our naval organisation, we be- 
 lieve that it would remedy one of the causes of moral deterioration that have 
 affected our officers. J 
 
 No one will be surprised, after reading the opinions we have 
 already advocated as to the impossibility of convoying an army by 
 sea, in the present day, to the theatre of a European war, if we 
 
 * The Prince de Joinville spoke from the experience gained in the Crimean, 
 Italian, and Mexican wars, with reference to the transport of an army to a hostile 
 country. We have already shown that this will in futm-e be impossible. Hence- 
 forward it will only be a question of carrying troops to a distance, to the colonies, or 
 to a country like China, where the principles of naval warfare are unknown. Only 
 the " coming and going " spoken of by the Prince de Joinville will have to be con- 
 sidered. His argument is still more to the point in the existing state of things, 
 and for this reason we have quoted it. 
 
 t Written m 1865. 
 
 I Etudes sur la marine et Rgcits de guerre, by M. le Prince de Joinville. 
 
206 NAVAL EEFORM. 
 
 entirely agree with the opinion of the Prince de Joinville. To 
 carry the more or less numerous body of troops necessary to 
 colonial expeditions, the merchant service is sufficient : it was em- 
 ployed in Tunis, Tonquin, China ; it ought to he employed every- 
 where, and still more exclusively. 
 
 By suppressing our naval transports we effect considerahle 
 economy in our constructions, and get the proper use of a 'per- 
 sonnel, diverted to a service for which it was never intended.* 
 
 We are thus left with only two schools in which our sailors can 
 complete their education in seamanship, even as regards the 
 modern sea-going engines, by getting accustomed to the sea, by 
 studying the eventualities of the weather, of the shipwrecks and 
 the tempests they continuously meet with in their chequered 
 career, by acquainting themselves with the geography of the coasts, 
 the resources of the harbours, ports, and diflferent countries, in a 
 word, with everything necessary to that war of chase we have 
 suggested to be the futui-e system of warfare. 
 
 The prolonged fatigue of the voyages with their varied expe- 
 riences are as necessary to the sailor as a knowledge of ths 
 weapons of war. They alone can give him the calm determination 
 and accurate judgment, without which he would feel powerless and 
 unnerved in the great day of battle. 
 
 Now, do the distant stations and the evolutionary squadron fulfil 
 this requirement, as they certainly did in the bygone days of 
 sailing vessels ? This has often been questioned, and, we think, 
 with reason. Let us set aside the evolutionary squadron for the 
 moment ; and confine ourselves to the distant stations, and let 
 us see whether they add to the education of our officers and our 
 crews, or whether, on the contrary, they do not greatly hinder it. 
 
 At the beginning of the century, French colonial enterprise 
 seemed to have for ever died out ; there were, at that time, no 
 
 • Considerable saTing would be effected in the transport of maUriel or personnel 
 by the merchant seryice. To cite an example : a transport of the Moselle type, 
 carrying maUriel for Madagascar, costs such a sum in coal and armament, that from 
 Toulon to that colony the carriage of every ton amounts to the price of 130 francs. 
 Any private company would undertake it at half the cost. 
 
SERVICE AFLOAT. 207 
 
 younger sons obliged to fly the mother country and seek their 
 fortunes in new countries ; three millions of men had fallen on the 
 European battle-fields, mowed down as much by victory as by 
 defeat ; our colonies had been the ransom of our disasters ; we had 
 handed them over to the conqueror ; and although entire with- 
 drawal was not as yet spoken of, we were, for the moment, content 
 to keep within our frontiers without any other prospect than that 
 of living distrustfully amidst our enemies, and perpetually obliged 
 to restrain our ambition. 
 
 Nevertheless, absolute retirement is so difficult to a great and 
 rich nation like France, that in the very first years of the Restora- 
 tion a certafn set of our compatriots, established in far-off coun- 
 tries, resumed the traditions of exterior expansion, with more or 
 less success, for our commerce and trade. Certainly no comparison 
 could be made between this small band of prudent and courageous 
 men, and the immense stream of English emigration covering the 
 world with its successive invasions. Nevertheless, small though 
 it was, this chosen band of Frenchmen, perpetuating their here- 
 ditary genius for colonisation, was worthy of being protected 
 from governments successively plunged in savagery or complete 
 anarchy. 
 
 We have heard of the long and bloody revolutions which fol- 
 lowed the proclamation of national independence throughout 
 Spanish America. To preserve the life and fortunes of our country- 
 men from this reaction, our diplomatic agents in these unquiet 
 regions had always to be armed, and ready with observations, 
 advice, and threatened action. They were, in truth, something 
 more than ordinary diplomatic servants ; they were what our con- 
 suls in the East had been for centuries in the Mussulman country ; 
 they were the representatives of the Government of their own 
 country, and their authority had to be supported and sanctioned 
 by a naval force. This force consisted of the fleet on the neigh- 
 bouring naval station, and was generally sufficient. They had the 
 right to call upon its services, with this reservation, that, when the 
 commander-in-chief responded to their requisition, he should share 
 
208 NAVAL EEPOEM. 
 
 the responsibility as a guarantee that the national flag was justi- 
 fiably employed. 
 
 The first ten years of the "July" monarchy, terminating in 
 the deposition of the Dictator Eosas, included the history of our 
 prolonged struggles in La Plata, and concentrated the general 
 action of naval Powers beyond the confines of Europe. It explained 
 and justified the division of responsibility, which, although it had 
 great advantages, had also great drawbacks ; especially when the 
 combined action of its two representatives plunged a European 
 nation into a war without being able exactly to trace its origin (as 
 it too often proceeded from individual interests), or to foresee the 
 consequences, as these depended on the chances of war and of 
 politics. 
 
 However, this situation was likely to occur in the days of 
 sailing fleets. Communications with the countries of which we 
 speak was both difficult and uncertain. Seeing that to reach the 
 nearest of them, the region beyond Cape Horn, a vessel took five 
 or six months to make the double journey, what Government could, 
 at such distances, direct the action of its agents ? A general 
 programme was traced out for the ministers and the admirals, a 
 general aim was suggested to them ; but everything else had neces- 
 sarily to be left to their judgment and patriotism. Therefore 
 everything depended on the choice of men. 
 
 The names of Admiral Eoussin, of Admiral de Mackan, of 
 Admiral Trehouart, and of others less well-known, attest that this 
 station at La Plata was a valuable training-school for the diplo- 
 matic and military profession, and a no less valuable naval school 
 for all our sailors. The type of vessel being always the same, 
 as sailing was our only means of locomotion, and the gun our 
 only instrument of warfare, all the elements of a complete naval 
 education might be found in any part of the world. All the other 
 naval stations were the same as that of La Plata ; they all fulfilled 
 the same requirements ; they offered unquestionable advantages to 
 our sailors, and the knowledge was easy to acquire, as it was easy 
 to retain. 
 
SEBVIOK AFLOAT. 209 
 
 This organisation of the naval stations has been religiously 
 adhered to, nothwithstanding the changes which have quite altered 
 their characteristics. Now-a-days there is no reason that they 
 should exist ; they are no use politically, and do a great deal of 
 harm to the navy. In fact, since the introduction of steam in 
 naval matters, the invention of electric telegraphs, tlie incessant 
 progress, which shortens all the routes on the globe, and does 
 away with distance — Valparaiso, Shanghai, Sydney, San Francisco, 
 &c. are only a few hours from Paris — a complete revolution has set 
 set in, whereby our representatives in distant countries are relieved 
 of all responsibility. Our admirals have ceased to be diplomatic 
 as well as naval ; even our diplomatic servants have become the 
 mere mouthpiece of the home officials. Without doubt the most 
 detailed written information, the best drawn up report, does not 
 compensate for an intimate knowledge of men and things acquired 
 on the spot, by constant and familiar intercourse with them. 
 
 Our Government made this serious mistake with regard to China 
 when our diplomatic agents failed to convince it of the alteration 
 made during the last twenty years in the Celestial army. It was 
 then seen that no minister in Paris would entrust national politics, 
 even in the remotest lands, or during the greatest emergencies, to 
 the care of their agents. Above all, none of the latter will ever 
 be able, in future, to take the initiative for France without direct 
 instructions from head-quarters. The telegraph is always at hand 
 to settle any difficulty, to answer the most awkward questions. 
 Any personal decision come to on an important subject by our 
 agents would at once be disowned. Furthermore their threats 
 would not be backed up under the circumstances. Our military 
 and naval strength is so insignificant in the countries where we 
 still maintain naval stations^ that they would easily be held in 
 check by the army and navy of the country. 
 
 If proof were needed of this we should cite the episode of the 
 Huascar, fighting unaided against the Shah and the Amethyst, 
 and coming undefeated out of the contest. But this is an old 
 story. Since the appearance of torpedoes and torpedo-boats on 
 
 14 
 
210 NAVAL REFORM. 
 
 the scene, who would risk the bad ships at our stations in anything 
 so foolish as a collision with nations which are no longer in a state 
 of anarchy and barbarism, which are now organised and have 
 acquired unity, and which would no longer be daunted by the 
 prospect of an impossible bombardment, or a still more impossible 
 naval invasion ? Our naval stations have lost all diplomatic and 
 military value. Everyone knows that they have long ceased to be 
 of the same use as training-schools as they were in the days of 
 sailing. 
 As far back as 1870 Admiral Aube writes : — 
 
 Our naval stations generally consist of a frigate with an admiral and his nume- 
 rous staff on board, and of two or three despatoh-Tessels. The station is decided 
 among them. The frigate remains in the harbour of the capital, and leaves it 
 very seldom for an annual visit to the less important ports, in which the despatch- 
 vessels take their turns by more or less arbitrary rules. Three years are passed 
 in this way, almost always at anchor, or making some unimportant cruise. . . . 
 If these are schools, they are schools of far niente, of carelessness and laxity under 
 entirely false appearances. For nothing is smarter in appearance, better kept up, 
 more dashing, than any one of our frigates anchored for eight months at Valparaiso 
 or Rio de Janeiro. It would, of course, be unjust to let the blame for this state of 
 things fall upon the commander of the station. This inaction is very distasteful 
 to a great many of them, and quite contrary to their inclination!!. But representa- 
 tions and demands from our plenipotentiaries and our consuls intervene. For 
 many long years they have relied on the presence of men-of-war ; they cannot 
 comprehend the use of, what seem to them, these purposeless excursions, seeing 
 that they are only for the instruction of the officers and the crew. They demand 
 and implore the constant presence of the admiral, and even do not hesitate to com- 
 plain of him when, by leaving head-quarters, he completely reveals the futility of 
 these stations, as well as that of their own highly-salaried posts, from a political 
 point of view 
 
 These observations are quite correct ; we must add, even should 
 Admiral Aube blame us for calumniating his brother officers, that 
 this forced inaction seldom comes amiss to our admirals. 
 
 Kepose,_/ar niente, and absence of care are by no means dis- 
 tasteful to them in the moral and physical condition they have 
 attained by the time they are old enough for a command. On the 
 contrary, this state of things just suits them. In proof of this, 
 they are not even specially anxious to remain at the head-quarters 
 of the diplomatic agent. Some, from various motives, prefer 
 other anchorage ; where they and their ships can equally slumber 
 ill peace. 
 
SBBVIOB AFLOAT. 211 
 
 Nothing is more natural. If naval stations are kept up it is 
 not to satisfy their zeal, which has long heen quenched, hut their 
 justifiahle amhition. Each of them, in turns, spends two years (it 
 used to he three) in one or other of these stations, and oomhines 
 the advantages of a good pecuniary herth with that of " fulfilling 
 their conditions " for being named Vice-Admiral. 
 
 " Fulfilling their conditions" — is not this a charming expres- 
 sion coined by the navy ? It has of late been modified, to satisfy 
 the natural progress of modern jargon, and has been replaced 
 by the word "qualifying." In order to be promoted from one rank 
 to another, a certain number of years must have been spent at sea, 
 and sometimes a certain number of years in a command. These 
 are the conditions. 
 
 The favourites " qualify " at their ease, that is, they go to sea 
 as little as possible ; they go on board to qualify, and as soon as 
 their task is finished, they have only to expect their just reward. 
 The profane and vulgar go further in their efforts to qualify, but 
 it avails them nothing. To use another nautical expression, those 
 who succeed do so with the " Navy List under their arm," that is 
 by seniority. Our rear-admirals are among the lucky ones in the 
 navy ; they go to sea with a view to qualifying ; they are sufficiently 
 numerous to avoid going to sea more than twice during their 
 probation, and at the same time they are not too numerous to 
 prevent any from qualifying. 
 
 However notable the incapacity of an admiral may be, no Minis- 
 ter would venture to deprive him of this right. We had some 
 recent examples of this which led to most unhappy results, at the 
 outset of the Chinese affair. The admiral who has to qualify sets 
 out, therefore, to hoist his flag at some particular station ; accord- 
 ing to his tastes and habits, or the number of daughters he has to 
 marry, he will select certain parts of the station which he will 
 leave as seldom as possible. One will live the frugal and econo- 
 mical life of a prudent man in some isolated spot, another will 
 do just the contrary ; but they all hope, with few exceptions, for 
 what is well described in an expression which, without being 
 
 14 * 
 
212 NAVAL EEFOEM. 
 
 absolutely nautical, is in common use in the navy, namely, " to be 
 left in peace." They are obliged to spend two years abroad, but 
 what an annoyance it would be for them to get into any bother, 
 either military or naval ! It may be remembered how bitterly one 
 of them, who happened to be in China at the time of the River 
 expedition, regretted that he had refused to stir from his own port, 
 where he was in safety, in order to superintend what was taking 
 place at Tonquin ; he was determined not to move, ne quid in turha, 
 as Cicero says. Everything was in a blaze around him ; he would 
 see nothing and bear nothing. He was not obliged to occupy 
 himself either with naval or political matters. He was qualifying, 
 and that was all. 
 
 In small as in great things, the same spirit animates the com- 
 mander-in-chief of stations. To keep out of hot water, they keep 
 to parts that are thoroughly well known, and navigate with the 
 utmost prudence. They follow the beaten track, and, so to speak, 
 they only choose the buoyed passages, or visit the great commer- 
 cial centres. On the voyage to India, China, or the Pacific Ocean, 
 they always stop at the same halting-places. They might get into 
 trouble if they explored the coast, or investigated countries that 
 are little known, and so they do not meddle with this. The naval 
 ships seem in as great a hurry to get to the end of their voyage 
 as if they belonged to the merchant service. There is no more 
 surveying, thanks to the hydrographic engineers, who have dis- 
 possessed the navy of this branch of the service. They perpetually 
 repeat that of Corsica and Algiers, but they would certainly take 
 good care not to go to a distance to pursue their occupation in 
 dangerous and inaccessible countries. No more study of the 
 colonies ! no more discoveries ! nothing to open the minds of the 
 sailors. An admiral who is qualifying cares for none of these 
 things. He does as his predecessor has done before him, and what 
 his successor will do after him, and so on, until the absurdity of 
 such a system becomes so evident thai a man will be found suffi- 
 ciently intelligent to demand its suppression in Parliament, a man 
 with suflBcient courage to ensure its accomplishment by the naval 
 
SERVICE AFLOAT. 213 
 
 ministry. At the present time no admiral in command of a station 
 could strike out a line for himself. 
 
 Every rear-admiral who has more or less efficiently commanded 
 a naval station takes all the official and officious correspondence 
 with him ; so that if his successor, animated hy a nohle zeal, were 
 inclined to throw himself into the path of innovations, it would 
 need considerable research to make himself acquainted with his 
 station, and know what to make of it. The fact of an admiral 
 carrying oflf the official correspondence may, perhaps, be surprising; 
 but it has long been admitted that the navy was organised for 
 individuals, not individuals for the navy. Therefore each tries to 
 take all he can get, and works for himself alone ; no one helps 
 another in order to benefit the public service. Besides, we repeat 
 that no matter how the naval statistics were organised, or what 
 disposition the admirals showed in their command, they would 
 none the less be wretched schools for the navy, as they " localise " 
 men and ships, and prevent their making acquaintance with new 
 parts of the world. We have met admirals who have reached their 
 rank without having seen the Levant, or being thoroughly 
 acquainted with the Mediterranean, the battle-field of all our 
 naval fights. 
 
 The more lands he has visited, the better is a seaman's training ; 
 and a good officer should be able to act as pilot into the different 
 ports all over the world. Professional knowledge is developed by 
 searching out all the twistings and turnings of the coast ; the timid 
 gain in courage, and the adventurous gain in audacity. 
 
 Now-a-days a practical as well as a theoretical knowledge of all 
 the regions of the maritime world is necessary ; it will become 
 indispensable to captains in time of war, as war will consist of 
 long cruises in distant parts of the world. An hour wasted may 
 decide a success or a defeat. Even at night, even in a fog, nothing 
 could excuse any hesitation in entering a port to escape from an 
 enemy superior in strength ; nothing could excuse a mistake in 
 tactics resulting from an absence of acquaintance with the place, 
 or the resources and perils it may offer. It is not sufficient to 
 
214 NAVAIi EBPOEM, 
 
 have studied these ports or localities on the charts to escape this 
 disastrous hesitation. The sailors know what assurance is to he 
 gained hy personal ohservation, even were it the imperfect obser- 
 vation to he acquired in a single voyage. 
 
 Thus it is evidently necessary to modify the old system at our 
 naval stations, as it lessons the intellectual superiority of our 
 officers, and prevents the greater number of them attaining a com- 
 plete acquaintance with the seas, upon which they may some day 
 have to take command, and upon which any lack of experience 
 may prove so cruelly fatal to them. 
 
 It is to this system that we owe the strange fact that our navy 
 alone stands aloof from the great progress in explorations and 
 discoveries that have taken place all over Europe. We have some 
 first-class explorers who, like M. de Brazza, came out of the 
 navy; but it was not as sailors that they accomplished their labours 
 — our navy is satisfied with going a round of the stations. 
 
 Even in Europe our officers, at least those who count twenty- 
 five or thirty years' service, have little beyond a knowledge of the 
 Adriatic, the Baltic, or the coasts of Norway ; but when we cast 
 our eyes on a map of the world, when we read the exploits of navi- 
 gators during the two last centuries, we can only wonder why 
 steam has not furthered the enterprise commenced with sailing- 
 vessels, and without the aid of modern progress, by those coura- 
 geous navigators who discovered so many unknown lands for us, 
 about which we know nothing more in the present day than what 
 was transmitted to us by them. 
 
 Another disadvantage of naval stations, hardly less serious 
 than that of injuring the profession, is that our admirals and 
 officers who are at them are left in complete ignorance of the 
 new weapons of war. Of the seven admirals at the present 
 moment on active service, only the admiral who is second in com- 
 mand of the evolutionary squadron is able to keep up with the 
 march of improvements. The rest, scattered about the four 
 quarters of the globe, placed at the head of naval divisious com- 
 posed of two or three ships of inferior type, and the vessel that 
 
SERVICE AELOAT. 215 
 
 carries their flag, generally some wooden frigate armed with guns 
 of small calibre, remain during the whole of their command quite 
 out of reach of all the recent improvements in arms. From the 
 moment they gave up the command of an ironclad, when they 
 ceased to he captain, until the moment when they may be called 
 -as vice-admirals to command a squadron, that is to say, during a 
 period of ten or twelve years, our flag-officers never have anything 
 to do with any experiments relating to the weapons of war. Their 
 information is derived either from books or from committees, if they 
 ever require any. This explains the reason why many of them 
 entirely decline to believe in the changes accomplished in the navy, 
 and smile when they are told about torpedo-boats. 
 
 It is not at Valparaiso or any other port in the New World that 
 they would be likely to become familiar with the latest discoveries, 
 or ponder over the altered tactics rendered necessary by their 
 introduction into the navy. This will not stand in their way, 
 however, in the case of war, and the supreme direction of instru- 
 ments of war will be confided to them although they are as ignorant 
 of their uses as the greater part of the general public, and some 
 people will perhaps be astonished wheu in presence of the unfore- 
 seen they give proof of complete incapacity. 
 
 From whatever point of view we look at the system of naval 
 stations, with their monotonous cruises, their insignificant excur- 
 sions and their missions, admitting of no variety and permitting 
 very narrow possibilities for study and observation, with their 
 inveterate habits of routine and enforced ignorance, we must reach 
 the same conclusion which not only Admiral Aube, but Admiral 
 Jurien de la Graviere came to as far back as 1871, that is, the 
 necessity of doing away with these stations. He says : " The 
 naval stations are not only useless but they are cruel. They take 
 up three or four years of an officer's life, sometimes in the prime 
 of his youth, to be spent in some unhealthy climate in a distant 
 land . . ." And he adds : " It has been proposed to replace the 
 stations by flying squadrons. It is the general desire in the navy, 
 and I adhere to it unconditionally." - Although our opinion may 
 
216 .NAVAL REPOEM. 
 
 be of little value, we must be permitted to remark that we entirely 
 agree with Admiral Jurien de la Gravi^re, and join in the hope that 
 naval stations will be replaced by flying squadrons. It may be 
 objected that the small vessels we advocate are unfit to go to sea. 
 Nothing is less the case. 
 
 As certain il-metres torpedo-boats now building are called sea- 
 going torpedo-boats, evidently they are expected to justify their 
 designation, and be able to go to every part of the globe. We 
 have endeavoured to show that these are fighting vessels, and that 
 they are to serve not only for coast defence or in forcing an entry 
 into ports containing hostile vessels, but also on the open sea, in 
 fighting a squadron, in a war of chase, in stopping a transport, or 
 sinking a steamer. We have admitted, however, that these 
 torpedo-boats would not be able to keep the sea for long unattended, 
 and that they must always be followed by a parent ship, by a 
 transport, rightly described as a swift collier by a naval author who 
 holds the same theories as we do. Others have held that torpedo- 
 boats should be escorted by cruisers. We are unable to share this 
 opinion. Cruisers have a very diiferent mission to fulfil from that 
 of the flotillas of small boats convoyed by transports. The cruiser 
 should stand apart ; it cannot be large enough to supply the wants 
 of other vessels as well as its own ; it requires great speed, coal, 
 armament, provisions, and spare stores. Properly speaking, it is 
 not a fighting ship, we should never wish it to measure its strength 
 against a scjuadron, or even against a vessel better armed than 
 itself. It is a naval rover, and should equally be ready to fly 
 before the superior strength of an enemy, or to fall without mercy 
 on defenceless merchant shipping. Its crew would necessarily be 
 somewhat numerous ; for it will be requisite to disperse it over the 
 vessels it has captured, whenever it is able to retain them without 
 risk, and without diminishing its own strength. It must therefore 
 scour the seas, active and solitary ; we must not encumber it with 
 torpedo-boats and gun-boats which might impede its action and 
 hinder it in its adventures, or force it to be too slow, too circumspect, 
 and too prudent. We only require a transport carrying provisions. 
 
SERVICE AFLOAT. 217 
 
 coal, and men for our torpedo-boats'and gun-boats. They must, 
 moreover, be endued with great speed to fly from all danger and to 
 keep out of the way of it. 
 
 We have sufficiently explained the conditions to be fulfilled by 
 this floating warehouse ; it is useless to recapitulate. It will fulfil 
 the same purpose towards our men-of-war as the railway trains fulfil 
 for our armies during a campaign. Accompanied by it, the torpedo- 
 boats and gun-boats will go fearlessly to sea and will act in groups. 
 Id long voyages the revictualling of small vessels both in coals and 
 food will take place on the open sea. It remains to be seen 
 whether this will always be possible. In the Mediterranean, on the 
 Channel, and along the coast where shelter is always to be had ; in 
 seas where the trade winds blow, that is between the latitudes of 
 23° north and south, in the Atlantic and Pacific, revictualling 
 would not only be possible but easy. In the northern parts of the 
 Atlantic, on the route to New York, the gales are frequent; but the 
 ports are not too far from each other, the sea is not entirely without 
 shelter, and there, again, torpedo-boats or gun-boats should be allowed 
 to cruise. The same in the Chinese seas, where shelter is easily 
 obtained. In the Northern Pacific the crossing from Japan to San 
 Francisco can be easily accomplished, seeing the general state of the 
 sea. There is no revictualling necessary at sea — for it is very 
 difficult and sometimes impossible to accomplish — except on the 
 voyage from the Cape of Good Hope to Cape Horn, and vice versa, 
 that is, on the voyage round the world by the South Pacific and by 
 the Atlantic below the 23° of latitude. But we should not seek 
 for merchant vessels or for men-of-war in that region, nor would 
 battles take place in it. 
 
 Round the Cape Guardafui to India, part of the route to China, 
 during the south-west monsoons in the months of April and 
 September, is very dangerous, and without a great deal of fuel gun- 
 boats and torpedo-boats could not risk it. During these periods 
 there are almost unceasing gales in that region. It is a line for mail 
 steamers that we could intercept at Obock, a place we have taken 
 possession of, and which might be very useful to us if we showed a 
 
218 NAVAX EEFORM. 
 
 little more foresight and cleverness than we have hitherto done in 
 our colonial and naval enterprises. 
 
 Let there be no mistake as to our meaning ! The short disqui- 
 sition we have just indulged in concerns our torpedo-boats and 
 gun-boats cruising about the sea, that is to say, in search of an 
 enemy making long halts on a beaten track, sometimes delayed, 
 sometimes towed. We speak of a state of war. But going to sea 
 in time of peace is subject to a different set of rules. Every kind 
 of voyage from one place to another is possible if the present routes 
 are modified so as to admit of the necessary revictualling. Thus it 
 is easy to go to the Cape of Good Hope by coasting along Africa, 
 to Cape Horn by keeping along the coasts of America; from 
 Guardafui to India during the south-west monsoons, by looking out 
 for intervals of calm, or by coasting along Asia, &c. &c. This 
 kind of navigation, which would be as frequently as possible along 
 the coasts, would be excellent for the oflBcers ; it would teach them 
 to know the creeks and bays which in the hour of danger would 
 offer them refuge, or in time of battle they would serve as posts of 
 observation, whence they could observe the enemy and prepare 
 their attacks; it would familiarise them with geographical facts of 
 which they are almost ignorant at present. It would accustom 
 them not to avoid the shores, an inclination more and more notice- 
 able as they reach the higher ranks. This was the method in 
 ancient times, and modern progress ought to bring us back to it. 
 It is easy to understand what an admirable school of navigation 
 and naval science these -long voyages would be for our sailors. 
 They could take soundings in every part of the world, and could 
 scour the seas with those perfected instruments they make so little 
 use of at present. 
 
 When they have gone round the world many times in eighty days 
 several times repeated in these "nutshells," in these little vessels 
 that would be able to go everywhere, to which nothing is inacces' 
 sible, what pluck, what valour, what strength to resist all perils 
 they will have acquired ! Instead of being condemned as they are 
 at present to the stultifying duty of watch-keeping during a voyage, 
 
SEE VICE AFLOAT. 219 
 
 they would themselves he in command, they would learn to he re- 
 sponsible, and responsihility would not alarm them. 
 
 Always on the outlook, always kept on the alert by the magni- 
 tude of their duty, always active, they would early acquire the 
 strong characteristics possessed by our sailors in former days, and 
 which at present they so entirely lack. They would have the 
 science that only experience can give, and they would give them- 
 selves heart and soul to their profession. Formerly the long and 
 trying voyages in sailing vessels gave them valuable leisure to take 
 refuge in solitude and study, they were obliged through long 
 months to find resources within themselves ; nothing came to 
 distract them from the monotonous spectacle of the sea and sky, 
 and this concentration went to form chosen spirits and indomitable 
 courage. The incessant struggle with the difficulties of navigation, 
 always so trying and so replete with the unforeseen, would sharpen 
 their wits and none the less strengthen their disposition. 
 
 A new generation will arise without any of the distaste, the lassi- 
 tude, the ignorance, or the faint-heartedness of this generation 
 so cruelly deteriorated by the life at a station or in a squadron. 
 Our fleet being constituted in groups, as we have already explained, 
 a certain amount of circulation must be established among these 
 groups. They must each leave our ports in turns, and only return 
 to them after having made some voyage fixed upon beforehand, 
 either round the world or the coasts of a whole continent. As the 
 fatigues would be very great, the voyages must not last longer than 
 eighteen months or two years at the most. If any complication 
 happened to arise in any particular country, and if it were judged 
 necessary to make a naval demonstration there, the groups dissemi- 
 nated over the seas immediately would concentrate. 
 
 The ordinary navigating personnel would be composed of captains 
 commanding the groups, on board transports — commanders on 
 isolated cruisers, experienced lieutenants on the gun-boats ; and the 
 young ones, and when needful the sub-lieutenants, on the torpedo- 
 boats. In weighty matters the admiral would be referred to ; for 
 instance, when several groups happened to concentrate at any par- 
 
220 NAVAL REFOKM. 
 
 ticular spot and were able to go through important manoeuvres with 
 each other. These expeditions in groups must soon become a 
 source of enjoyment to the officers ; interesting voyages, plenty of 
 leave, shortened absence from France, with months of rest at the 
 end of it, all these must please the officers ; the greater number of 
 them would have a command, for both the staff and the crew of 
 these small vessels must be frequently changed. Each would 
 acquire an opportunity of showing what he is worth and finding 
 his level in the opinion of others. The trial would be public. 
 Injustice, favouritism, unfair promotion would thus become, if not 
 impossible — that they never will be — at least more difficult. 
 
 The monotony of life in harbour at our stations will in this way 
 be avoided. As it is necessary to make the round in two years, the 
 vessels at a station are always obliged to employ their days going 
 somewhere or other, generally returning several times to the same 
 spot, and it wearies them almost as much as if they remained 
 stationary at sea. The sailors would thus have the life of action 
 suitable to them and necessary to their instruction. It would 
 increase their private as well as their professional worth. At the 
 stations they waste their life in idleness ; their disposition becomes 
 embittered. They count the months, hours, moments, till it is time 
 for them to go back to France ; they feel how useless everything is 
 that they do, as it is only done to simulate activity. If some 
 favoured and well-organised stations may satisfy one officer, how 
 many others are condemned to spend two years on the coasts, on 
 the West African coast for instance, and are weary and disgusted 
 with a profession that teaches them nothing, but, on the contrary, 
 obliterates their thinking powers and their knowledge. Unhealthy 
 stations of this kind, and a too prolonged residence at them, cause 
 moral decrepitude to supervene, and those who may have been 
 brilliant officers as subalterns, become more than indifferent ad- 
 mirals from remaining too long in a country where bodily and 
 mental existence alike are an effort. 
 
 We cannot repeat sufficiently often that beyond everything sailors 
 should have an interest in their profession, and that this profession 
 
SEEVIOE AFLOAT. 221 
 
 should qualify them as pilots all over the world. Let them go all 
 over it as often as possible, as near the continents as may be, so as 
 to become acquainted with them, reserving times of peace for 
 special studies and those purely technical and scientific. We should 
 equally wish isolated cruisers to be always at sea, and thoroughly 
 to get to know the commercial routes so as to scour them in time 
 of war. Their routes must be settled for them, whilst leaving them 
 the fullest possible liberty as to pace. On their return their com- 
 mander ought to give a precise and detailed account of the voyage; 
 an account which should be submitted to a committee whose busi- 
 ness it is to test the results obtained with regard to the education 
 of the officers and men, and with reference to the geographical 
 information required. 
 
 Does the evolutionary squadron fulfil its object any better than the 
 fleets on naval stations ? Is it really what it was formerly ; what 
 it is still supposed to be — we mean the safeguard of our naval 
 frontiers in Europe, and the chief school for the higher applications 
 of naval science ? This still remains to bo discussed before we 
 complete this long, although incomplete study of our naval organi- 
 sation. 
 
 The evolutionary squadron in the Mediterranean [writes Admiral Aube] was 
 organised by one of the most vigorous and sensible minds that has ornamented our 
 navy, and dates from 1840, whence we may reckon the revival of all the faculties of 
 France, when the energy which had remained in abeyance during the years of the 
 Restoration was revived in her by the breath of real liberty inaugurated during the 
 revolution in 1830. Emerging victoriously from the first trials of hberty, French 
 society had, at that time, faith in its destiny, and at one time thought it was suffi- 
 ciently strong, if not to defy, at least to have no fear of all Europe. A faith which 
 proved fatal to us. Amongst many other elements tending to confirm this confident 
 security, the navy was not backward. It owed this as much to what was its rea 
 importance throughout history, as to the progress it had just accomplished. The 
 navy of that date consisted chiefly of the squadron of twenty-one vessels just 
 bequeathed to us by Adnairal Lalande, in which his strong will and martial ardour 
 were reproduced ; his admirable creation, in which discipline and reciprocal trust 
 guaranteed not only victory but continuous progress in the future. In common with 
 all true and just undertakings, the idea paramount in this organisation took irre- 
 sistible, and it may be said universal, effect. Every nation envied us this great 
 
222 NAVAL EEFOEM. 
 
 school whioli had become a permanent institution, and hastened to imitate it. Under 
 this strong influence our sailing navy reached the apogee of its power and strength, 
 but it was only for a brief space. * 
 
 This has long been a thing of the past. After all we have 
 already said about future naval warfare ; about the disappearance 
 of naval battles; the uselessness of plans for battle prepared before- 
 hand; of fighting orders ; of previously arranged manoeuvres; and, 
 in fact, of all evolutionary tactics ; it is easy to understand that a 
 squadron can no longer be either the instrument or the chief school 
 for the art of war. In this also, first steam, and then the torpedo, 
 has effected a revolution which must utterly change all our insti- 
 tutions, if we do not desire that a bigoted worship of the past 
 should condemn us to an impotence still more dangerous to the 
 future of our nation. 
 
 The squadron then was, or was intended to be, the chief naval 
 school for discipline — the school of tactics and evolution; and, at 
 the same time, it was the arm at once ready to protect France on its 
 maritime borders. This is no longer the case. To ensure discipline, 
 order, method, regularity, continuity of tradition, there must be 
 uniformity. This existed when a certain number of line-of-battle 
 ships went to compose the squadron. But, now-a-days, it is composed 
 of vessels of different patterns, with nothing in common, and 
 unable to unite in obedience to the same laws. Each vessel is a 
 separate unit, living its own life, without anything to connect it 
 with the others. There is no common rule among their ranks. 
 What may be possible on board the Trident, is not possible on 
 board the Admiral Duperre, or on board the Redoubtable, and still 
 less on board the Tonnerre. Henceforth, the squadron is a mere 
 aggregate, in which ironclads, torpedo-boats, and coast-defence 
 ships are brought aimlessly together. In no way is it a fighting 
 unit. But this is not all. In olden days, a man-of-war was, in 
 itself, a perfectly organised fighting unit, and its elements harmo- 
 nised with irresistible force. 
 
 Officers, petty officers, and sailors, met to spend long years 
 
 * Admiral Aube, Les r^formes de noire marine militaire. 
 
SERVICE AFLOAT. 223 
 
 together, became identified with their ship and with their commander, 
 who was the highest embodiment of it. They almost all knew each 
 other intimately, and fulfilled the same duties. Turn about, they 
 were sailors in the rigging, gunners in the batteries, marines in the 
 landing parties and in the boats manned for fighting. 
 
 In the squadron, the personnel now-a-days is changed every six 
 months. The men are told off to their special duties. Machinery 
 replaces mind and personal initiative in every direction. Thus 
 it happens that a ship is quite as little to be described as a unit as 
 a squadron is. It is again an aggregate of distinct personalities, 
 incapable of fusion, incapable of identifying themselves with their 
 temporary home. Emulation, which has already been destroyed 
 between the vessels of the squadron, is also destroyed amidst 
 the varied crew of these vessels. Torpedo-men, gunners, engineer 
 artificers, and sailors alike ignore each other; the officers and 
 captain no longer have them in hand. 
 
 To all this, incessant changes in organisation may be added, 
 changes that are necessary, as they are induced by the continuous 
 progress in the navy, but which, nevertheless, are fated to put an 
 end to the squadrons of former days. These used to be excellent 
 training schools for order and discipline. Do they even teach 
 tactics at the present time ? To do this, there must be tactics to 
 teach ; someone must be able to settle a definite plan for the battles 
 of the future, and the steps to take in closing with and conquering 
 the enemy. Now, no one can do this. The manoeuvres are thus 
 invariably and aimlessly the same. The most that can be said — and 
 we are far from saying it — is that the squadron helps the captains 
 to learn how to handle their ships in relation to each other. But 
 the contrary is in reality the case. 
 
 When a captain has received a command, he feels he is not only 
 under the eyes of his brother officers, but of his rivals; by the 
 least mistake he may lose the rank of rear-admiral, to which he 
 thinks he is certain to be promoted ; he trembles before the respon- 
 sibility that surrounds him ; he has received the command of a ship 
 that has cost vast sums, and which represents an essential element 
 
224 NAVAL REFORM. 
 
 of national greatness : God forbid that he should risk its loss in one 
 of those daring manoeuvres which are the triumph of real seamen. 
 
 The squadron is only a school of cowardice for those in command. 
 In the case of the officers, it is quite evident that it can in no way 
 develop their experience and nautical knowledge ; for what com- 
 mander would leave the direction of the smallest evolution to one 
 of his lieutenants, when the smallest evolution may bring about 
 the gravest disasters for which he must be personally responsible ? 
 
 Thus the evolutionary squadron is perfectly sterile and useless as 
 a training school, it is even the most dangerous that can be 
 imagined. It keeps steadily to routine, and is incapable of the 
 smallest progress. England and France alone persist in retaining 
 an institution no longer answering to modern requirements. 
 
 As we have already said, nations more modern, less encumbered 
 with traditions — Italy, Germany, Eussia, Austria-Hungary — have 
 no permanent squadrons ; they content themselves with mobilising 
 all their fighting units during a few months of the summer — iron- 
 clads, torpedo-boats, &c. — for important manoeuvres at sea, for 
 coast attack and defence, &c. 
 
 This system is excellent as well as economical. 
 
 How many of the twelve months during which they are equipped, 
 do our squadrons really employ in manoeuvres ? According to the 
 tastes, temperament, and good pleasure of the admirals in command, 
 they remain at anchor during the winter; sometimes at Toulon, or 
 at the Salins d'Hy^res ; in the gulf of Jouan, or at Villafranca. 
 Sometimes they go to sea for a day or two for manoeuvres, and then 
 return to rest and do nothing. 
 
 The admiral in command is so absorbed by the details of the 
 complicated administration on board his great ships, and by that of 
 his enormous persotmel, that he has no time for anything else. 
 How could he organise experiments with the new instruments of 
 warfare ; how can he study the effect of new movements to be 
 executed; how should he try new systems of coast attack and 
 defence, of bombarding and landing ? He is worn out in giving 
 the orders necessary to the working of the squadron. This heavy 
 
SEEVIOE AFLOAT. 225 
 
 duty leaves him no leisure. As to the rear-admiral, second in 
 command, he must remain ahsolutely passive. 
 
 If he is of a critical turn of mind, he may indulge in sad reflec- 
 tions as to how perfectly useless are his own, and the functions of 
 all those surrounding him. If he appreciates routine, he can go to 
 sleep on board, and scarcely he disturbed by the noise of the blocks 
 grating on deck, or the pacing of the officers and sailors above his 
 head. And yet, as we have observed, he alone of all the rear- 
 admirals has the chance of seeing the new weapons and the new 
 vessels ; for his brother officers, growing rusty on distant stations 
 or in the dockyards, have not the consolation of being able to 
 observe the progress made in the navy, for themselves, or of forming 
 an opinion as to what could be made of them under a different 
 organisation, allowing them to study them and use them. 
 
 If all we have just said is true, we must add that the evolutionary 
 squadron deceives the country, and inspires it with a false sense of 
 security by letting it imagine that in the hour of peril it would 
 save its maritime frontiers from the attack threatening it. This 
 illusion should at once be dispelled. Reform is both necessary and 
 urgent, and to be efficacious it ought to be complete. We would 
 view it in this light. A recent circular from the naval ministry, 
 which, however, has remained a dead letter, has given orders that 
 all our men-of-war in the reserves shall be armed. We may divide 
 them into two categories : first, those in course of construction or 
 those in process of repair; secondly, those completed and afloat. 
 We should like to see the latter, in conformity to the ministerial 
 decision, classed in the reserves according to their condition, so 
 that those completed should be able to go to sea in three days at 
 most, and those afloat in a fortnight. 
 
 As soon as the sailors came into port they would be propor- 
 tionately subdivided, according to their qualifications, and sent on 
 board the classified vessels. The general drill for each particular 
 line would be gone through on board, either in the reserve or at 
 sea, when each vessel might effect a short cruise. But the sailors 
 would always live on board even if they could not always be at sea. 
 
 15 
 
226 NAVAL EEFOBM. 
 
 The vessels classed in the reserve according to their armament 
 might be commanded by a rear-admiral in every naval port. 
 Lastly, the stationary and movable defence force would acquire all 
 the extension we have asked for them. 
 
 When the latter are strongly organised, when the depots and the 
 ports of refuge have been decided upon for our torpedo-boats all 
 over our coasts, when it is decided how many of them shall belong 
 to each district requiring defence, we should leave as many armed as 
 we possibly can for the instruction of the men and the ofBcers, and 
 the others would equally be classed in the reserve at the chief naval 
 centre in that part of the country, so as to be ready to go to sea in 
 a few days. This system would have the merit of accustoming a 
 certain number of rear-admirals to the study and constant hand- 
 ling of all the instruments of war. Every year during a settled 
 period a vice-admiral should be sent to the Mediterranean, and 
 another to the Atlantic and the Channel to take the command of 
 manoeuvres resembling those of our army, in which fighting 
 tactics would be gone through by every class of ship. This would 
 indeed be a good training in the tactics for war. 
 
 Those vice-admirals who generally live in Paris, being free for 
 months from any other employment, will have had heaps of time to 
 prepare themselves by study and reflection, by theoretical acquaint- 
 ance with naval progress, and by the example of other nations^ for 
 the experiments and movements they have to execute. They will 
 be able to reduce to practice the problems they have thought out in 
 the silence of their study. 
 
 As in the army, there will be divers matters to develop in these 
 great naval manoeuvres. Sometimes the torpedo-boats will attempt 
 an assault on the squadron, or else an attempt may be made to 
 bombard unfortified towns. At other times the coasts will be 
 reconnoitred, or attacks by day or by night will be attempted ; in 
 a word, everything will be done to imitate warfare in these thorough 
 trials, which will at length give us men fit to command our navy, 
 and officers worthy to second them. 
 
 Here we will pause, for space forbids our entering into the details 
 
SERVICE AFLOAT. 227 
 
 of the new system we advocate. We have not aspired to be 
 exhaustive ; this would have been impossible, but we have at least 
 run through all the heads of a subject which is of first-rate 
 importance, and worthy of the attention of our statesmen no less 
 than of that of our sailors. In such a vast area, we have doubtless 
 made various mistakes, but we think that the doctrines we advocate 
 will on the whole rise superior to the objections advanced against 
 them, and likely to be advanced against them in the future. Our 
 navy is certainly passing through a very critical phase ! We must 
 be forgiven for saying it is in a state of decadence. The old- 
 fashioned materiel is now worthless ; the wearied and worn-out 
 personnel deteriorates more and more. 
 
 One of those great efforts, so usual in our country, and causing 
 a transition from the lowest degree of weakness to the apogee of 
 strength and progress, is necessary towards the restoration of our 
 maritime superiority and towards our national security. We have 
 frequently been reproached for desiring changes, and we have often 
 been told that nothing is more dangerous than sudden changes, that 
 we should beware of them, and not imagine that the future can be 
 arranged all in a moment, without taking the weight of the past 
 into consideration. We certainly do not deny the theoretical 
 justice of these reflections ; but there are moments in the history 
 of organisations, as in those of nations, when, as the result of a 
 series of blunders, a shock is necessary if we are to pass from 
 entire stagnation to a regular and progressive advance. The navy 
 has reached this stage. The traditions of a sailing navy were ex- 
 cellent when the wind was the only motive power, but they should 
 not be retained where steam has come into general use and where 
 they are now quite unsuitable. 
 
 There is as much difference between sailing and steam navigation 
 as there is between coaching and railway travelling. What would 
 have been thought of any wiseacre suggesting, out of respect for 
 tradition and from fear of innovations, that the railways should be 
 made on the same plan as the coaching roads ? This is, however, 
 the sort of wisdom that is being preached for the navy. What is 
 
 15 * 
 
228 NAVAL EEFORM. 
 
 more, the construction of large ironclads, the absolutely false idea 
 that division of labour should not be applied to the organisation of 
 the means of naval science, and that all the weapons of war should 
 be accumulated on the same ship at the risk of hindering each 
 other and condemning each other to powerlessness, has had most 
 disastrous consequences. We have come to a standstill. We have 
 a materiel, enormous in the amount of energy it wastes and the 
 resources it absorbs, which a torpedo can destroy in a few seconds ; 
 we have added to this materiel a personnel possessing no con- 
 fidence in the engines it has to make use of, and incapable of 
 employing others which it is unacquainted with. 
 
 How are we to free ourselves from this situation? We persist in 
 thinking that it can only be done by a manly determination, helping 
 us to cut all the cables that bind us to the past and to turn our 
 attention resolutely to the future. 
 
229 
 
 APPENDIX I. 
 
 THE 14-OENTIM^TBES aUN-BOAT. 
 
 Several naval newspapers and especially L'avenir des Colonies et de la 
 Marine, and Le Yacht have seriously criticised the type of the 
 \.A.-centimetres gun-boat advocated by me in the Revue des Deux Mondes. 
 They have argued against the estimates I brought forward in support 
 of my opinion, which was, that the displacement of these gun-boats 
 would not greatly exceed that of the despatch-vessels at present in 
 course of construction, say 300 to 350 horse-power. 
 
 This figui'e would be quite admissible [vn-ites the Yacht] if the conditions of 
 speed were the same ; but the author has not taken a fact into account which is 
 of capital importance ; namely, that he requires his gun-boat to hare a speed of 
 21 knots, whereas the torpedo despatch-boats are only built for a speed of 
 17 knots. 
 
 Xow, supposing everything to be otherwise in proportion, the motive power 
 
 should increase in proportion to the cube of speed. Therefore, if 1,250 indicated 
 
 horse-power is sufficient to give a speed of 17 knots to the torpedo-boats in question, 
 
 it would be necessary to supply them with engines capable of developing about 
 
 1'23 
 1,256 = 2,250 horse-power to attain a speed of 21 knots. The weight of the 
 
 motive power which is equal to 25 per cent, of the displacement, say 80 tons, will 
 rise by the same process to 145 tons, say 40 per cent, of the displacement. Thus 
 it is not so easy, as it might seem at first sight, to put engines on board a vessel 
 capable of securing the desired speed for it. 
 
 I might at once accept these conclusions, and restrict myself to 
 remarking that the speed of the despatch torpedo-boats is not 
 17 knots, but, in accordance with exact stipulation, it is " 18 knots 
 at least." 
 
 We should thus, from this very moment, have a gun-boat of 
 350 tons, making 18 knots, and able to carry two U-centimetre guns. 
 But everybody knows that the incessant progress in manufacture 
 tends to insure considerable saving in the weight of the machinery, 
 and that the new Belleville'hoiier has brought about precious results in 
 this direction. When the Belleville boiler has been adopted we shall, 
 perhaps, attain a speed of 20 knots for vessels with a displacement of 
 only 350 tons, and able to carry two li-centimetre guns. Every day 
 
230 NAVAL RflPORM. 
 
 the machinery and hull become lighter ; we may therefore venture to 
 suppose (the author of the paper we now reply to is the first to 
 acknowledge it) that the solution of the problem we have raised is 
 not far off. 
 
 I have not aspired to solve the problem myself ; I have always 
 taken the utmost care to avoid any appearance of setting myself up 
 as an engineer or a sailor. I have limited myself, in some sort, to 
 establishing the principle of as swift a gun-boat as compatible with 
 the smallest possible dimensions ; and I have left the application of 
 the principle to those in the profession. 
 
 I have never dreamt of planning a gun-boat. But the very objec- 
 tions advanced prove to me that the programme I have outlined is 
 by no means impossible to realise. In fact, taking the calculations 
 of my opponent, and considering the despatch torpedo-boat which is 
 to make, not 17 but 18 knots, as I have just said, if the speed is to 
 be increased to 20 knots, it will be necessary that the machinery 
 which at present is of 1,250 horse-power should develop a strength of 
 l,250ff = 1,700 horse-power. Thus we have an increase of 450 indi- 
 cated horse-power for this machinery, say an increase of 28 tons in 
 the weight, and not, as has been asserted, an increase of 1,000 horse- 
 power, which would give an increase of 65 tons. 
 
 It would certainly be impossible for our despatch torpedo-boats — if 
 the rest of the weight is to remain the same — to stand the extra 
 28 tons necessary to increase the strength of their machinery, which 
 cannot at present insure a speed of 20 knots ; but I may be allowed 
 to remark that these despatch torpedo-boats which I have only 
 quoted as an approximate type of the gun-boat I ask for, might be 
 sufficiently modified in their shape, and their motive power, so that 
 by augmenting their displacement by a certain number of tons their 
 speed would be sensibly increased. I never meant anything else ; 
 speaking comparatively, I have tried to show that a swift vessel with 
 a speed of 20 knots, and of a relatively small displacement, might be 
 constructed and might be seaworthy, whilst reserving a weight nearly 
 equal to 7 per cent, of its total weight for its armament. 
 
 This result has been obtained for the torpedo-boats ; certainly the 
 problem is more difficult in reference to the gun-boats, as their hull 
 must be sufficiently powerful to resist the weight of the guns and 
 their recoil. 
 
 But the construction of a gun-boat, satisfying the conditions I have 
 indicated, appears quite feasible ; and if we must at present give a 
 displacement a little in excess of 350 tons, this displacement will be 
 sufficient in future. 
 
 I will not, therefore, discuss figm-es or formulas, which, whilst all 
 more or less empiric, are modified at every instant by the construc- 
 tor's art. To show what different results may be obtained in the 
 construction of ships, I need only cite the German torpedo-boats very 
 succinctly described in the Yacht of the 12th of January. These 
 toi-pedo-boats are 36 metres long ; they have two discharging tubes 
 
APPENDIX 1. 231 
 
 and rigging, and they carry 22 tons of coal, enabling them to cover 
 a distance of 3,000 miles at a speed of 11 miles the hour. 
 
 If the calculations are exact, the constructor of these torpedo-boats 
 has, by diminishing the weight of the huU and of the engines, con- 
 siderably outstripped our present torpedo-boats, which are very far 
 from being able to steam for 3,000 miles at a rate of 11 knots without 
 recoaUng, although the Yacht is mistaken in saying that the latter 
 have only coal for three days at 12 knots, whereas they carry enough 
 coal for five days at 12 knots, or six days at 10 knots. The lines of 
 the boat must also be taken into account, according as they are more 
 or less happy. The speed (with an equal displacement and equal 
 weight for the hull and the engines) is another matter. No calcula- 
 tions can equal practical experience, and I persist in asking that trial 
 should be made of a swift gun-boat, that its sea-going qualities may 
 be tested, in the same way that torpedo-boats were tested, being 
 convinced as I am that the result of these experiments would be to 
 the fuU as satisfactory as those in the former instance. To achieve 
 this, our constructors who have lost the art of building light vessels, 
 who are quite spoilt by the ironclads, who give such a sadly-reduced 
 rate of speed to our cruisers, must entirely change their ways. 
 One of them attempted to construct a torpedo-boat, and his boat 
 could only make 12 knots. Evidently he is unable to solve the great 
 problem whereby small dimensions and great speed can be united ; 
 others will doubtless have better success. To them I appeal. I 
 reiterate that I do not pretend to be a constructor, that I have esta- 
 blished neither plan nor estimate, for this would have been unsuitable 
 on my part. I have limited myself to judging by comparisons, the 
 better to convey my meaning and to indicate in what direction the 
 studies should be prosecuted. 
 
 It may be seen from these comparisons that, with 360 tons dis- 
 placement and the present boilers, we have a gun-boat carrying two 
 I'i-cmitimetre gwas and making 18 knots. I may, therefore, reasonably 
 contest that with the Belleville boilers and the lighter machinery 
 the future has in store for us, a displacement of 400 tons would give 
 us gun-boats making 20 knots, and able to carry an equal armament. 
 The engineer who constructs the first will have rendered signal service 
 to the country and the navy. 
 
232 NAVAL REFORM. 
 
 APPENDIX II. 
 
 The two following letters are addi-essed by the Chamber of Commerce 
 at Bordeaux to the Ministers of Marine and Commerce, and point out, 
 in a singularly able manner, how greatly the protection supposed to 
 be afforded by the Maritime Inscription militates against our mer- 
 chant service. 
 
 I. 
 
 Bordeaux, 31st May 1876. 
 Sm, 
 
 In a letter, dated 12th November 1873, that we had the 
 honour to address to one of your esteemed predecessors, treating of 
 the scarcity of sailors in our commercial ports, we petitioned that 
 after their regular service these sailors should be registered in the 
 ordinary way, and should no longer constitute a separate class 
 among their countrymen ; our wishes on this subject may be thus 
 summed up : — 
 
 1st. — Inscription at the age of twenty for those who decide on the 
 navy. 
 
 2nd. — Sailors not to be called upon to serve after the age of forty ; 
 this law being already established, on the 25th July 1872, for the 
 army. 
 
 3rd. — Application of civil law to sailors, when not serving in the 
 navy. 
 
 The statement of our wishes ended as follows : — 
 
 "If no special privileges are granted to sailors in consideration of 
 the hardships of a life at sea, that they should at least be treated on 
 an equality with Frenchmen in other professions. Therefore, no 
 young saUor should be inscribed until the age of twenty, when he 
 has decided in favour of the navy, and none should be obliged to 
 serve after the age of forty. 
 
 "Lastly. — The sailor, when not serving in our navy, should be 
 registered according to civil law ; when he goes on board a merchant 
 vessel he should merely be required to state where he is going, and 
 to make his residence Imown when he returns to France ; and except 
 for these ordinary obligations, all sailors should, in time of peace, 
 
APPENDIX II. 233 
 
 have the option of embarking on board foreign merchant vessels if 
 they desire to do so." 
 
 These are the simple modifications we should wish to see introduced 
 into Maritime Inscription. 
 
 Our letter of November 12th was forwarded, in the form of a 
 pamphlet, to the Merchant Service Commission, instituted by a 
 decree from the President of the EepubUc, dated 15th October 1873. 
 
 Permit us to transcribe an extract from the verbal deliberations of 
 the sitting of the Merchant Service Commission, 22nd December 1873, 
 having reference to our request that French sailors should be left free 
 to take foreign service. 
 
 With reference to the subject of affording facilities to our sailors for embarking 
 on board merchant ships belonging to other nations in time of peace, the Sub- 
 committee passed the follovring resolution, in which it decided that it need not 
 concern itself Tvith the subject in question, as eTOry facility is already afforded: — 
 
 " The Bordeaux Chamber of Commerce has desu-ed that this should be done. . . . 
 NoWj since 1863, all those who are on the Inscription have enjoyed this privilege from 
 the age of twenty-seven. They are provided with a certificate granting them 
 absolute liberty to serve on board foreign merchant ships, and even to settle in 
 foreign lands. This permission is not sufficiently known, and the Sub-committee 
 lays stress upon it, as it is advisable to make it more generally known." 
 
 M. Dupuy de Lome, the esteemed chairman of the Committee, also 
 expressed himseK in similar terms. 
 
 This, Sir, is what we read in the report of the last inquiry with 
 regard to the merchant service ; if we are correctly informed, 
 however, facts do not in practice correspond with the intentions of 
 the legislature of 1868 ; sailors are not quite so much at liberty to 
 embark on foreign merchant ships as the Merchant Service Com- 
 mission believed, and it would, in reality, be transformed into a sort 
 of discretionary power in the hands of the Commissioners of the 
 Maritime Inscription. 
 
 Sir, we consider the question to be of such great importance, that 
 we must ask you explicitly whether the right exists to the extent 
 represented in this extract from the report of the Naval Committee, 
 allowing French saUors to embark on board foreign ships. 
 
 If the answer is in the affirmative, our wishes will be completely 
 satisfied, and henceforward, when French vessels are starting for 
 countries like the United States, where desertion is so frequently 
 induced by the high rate of pay, it will be permissible that the ship- 
 owners shall only engage the sailors for the outward voyage. Every 
 requirement will be met in this way ; the sailors will be enabled to 
 earn much higher wages as long as they consider it to be to then- 
 advantage to remain abroad, and they will not be treated as deserters, 
 which often obliges them to change their nationality, as their fear of 
 the law often prevents their returning to their own country ; finally, 
 the ship-builders will benefit by the saving in the personnel and 
 victualling they will realise in port during the operations of unlading 
 and taking in cargo, and this would compensate for the high rate of 
 pay the new crew would receive for the return voyage. 
 
234 NAVAL EBFOEM. 
 
 We should limit to-day's letter to what we have just written , if it 
 were not incumbent upon us briefly to notice the following passage 
 occm-ring in the Eeport of the Sub-Committee (page 235 in the volume 
 of the 1873 Eeport j. 
 
 " In the facihty afforded to the ship-owner to take a foreign crew, 
 the Bordeaux Chamber of Commerce sees a prospect of increasing the 
 number of French sailors." 
 
 These words seem to contain a double meaning, and to contradict 
 themselves ; but such could not be the result of the united investiga- 
 tion undertaken by the Merchant Service Commission, "Whilst 
 investigating the reason why sailors were so scarce in our ports, the 
 Chamber of Commerce at Bordeaux put all local interests aside, and 
 took a lofty stand on the side of justice, for it recognised that this 
 alone could secure real prosperity. 
 
 After taking up the cause of the sailors, it could not overlook the 
 legitimate interests of the ship-owners. With this intention it asked 
 that, in compensation for the common rights that are to be restored 
 to the sailors, facilities should be, if necessary, afforded for engaging 
 foreign crews ; this is perfectly logical, and does not imply any 
 contradiction. 
 
 II. 
 
 Bordeaux, 20th July 1876. 
 
 SlH, 
 
 We have the honour to acknowledge your despatch of the 28rd 
 of June, in which you were so good as to make known to us that 
 although the French sailor when provided with his certificate of 
 service is free to serve on board foreign vessels, and to reside beyond 
 French territory, this permission ceases the moment he goes on 
 board a merchant vessel belonging to his own country ; and that 
 according to the terms of the 270th Article in the Mercantile Code, 
 in which the conditions remain unaltered, the captains are obliged to 
 bring back their crews to their own country without coming to any 
 understanding with them, before starting, concerning the simple 
 voyage of a vessel from a French to a foreign port. 
 
 From motives we hope to be able to explain to you, we do not 
 consider that it is possible to entirely uphold the 270th Clause with 
 regard to the actual necessities of the merchant service, nor even in 
 the interest of the State. 
 
 We would, first of all, hasten to admit that, taking the moderate 
 rate of our sailors' pay into account, it is to the interest of our ship- 
 owners to retain their crews for the return voyage ; but we must 
 allow, on the other hand, that, if the number of oui- sailors is to be 
 increased, it is our duty to allow the latter to enjoy all the advan- 
 tages of civil life ; therefore, what can be fairer than to allow our 
 sailors complete freedom in their engagements, whether at home or 
 abroad, after they have fulfilled the legal requirements of their own 
 country ? 
 
AjfPllNDlX it. 23$ 
 
 It is certain that captain and crew have every inducement to hold 
 together during the whole voyage, if it lies in regions where wages 
 are moderate ; this will always be the case when Asia and Africa are 
 the destination, or even most of the European ports ; but it is another 
 matter when the ships are bound for certain American and Austra- 
 lian ports, and notably for the great ports of the United States, where 
 the sailors can sometimes obtain higher pay than that of the officers 
 in our merchant service ; of course, these high salaries will always 
 tempt our sailors. Nine times out of ten, enticed by enterprising 
 agents, and notwithstanding the watchfulness of the captains and the 
 authority of the consuls, the French crews will desert their ships. 
 
 This occurs incessantly, and the French captains are then obliged 
 to combine those discordant elements in a crew which you have 
 described as fraught with danger and disadvantages of all sorts. This 
 would not be the case if our sailors were better treated by the laws 
 of their own country, and were permitted to profit by the high wages 
 to be obtained in the United States, and in any other ports, in quite 
 another way than by such an unlawful method as desertion ; for, 
 after laying by a certain amount, many of them would be glad to 
 return to their own country and to their families, and they would 
 thus constitute the chief element of our crews, whereas, at present, 
 they dare not return to France on account of the severity of the law, 
 and they end by being lost to the country. 
 
 Therefore, we conclude that it would be infinitely preferable to pre- 
 vent these deplorable results of desertion, by leaving the possibility to 
 the captains and crew of coming to an understanding before starting, 
 when they may judge it advisable to limit their mutual engagements 
 to a fixed portion of the voyage. 
 
 We hope that you will be good enough to take the motives into 
 favourable consideration, that have induced us to lay greater stress 
 upon the request we forwarded to you on the 81st of last May. 
 
286 
 
 NAVAL BEFORM. 
 
 APPENDIX III. 
 
 To show the extent to which Maritime Inscription interferes with 
 the principle of equahty, which ought to be the basis of all our naval 
 and military institutions ; we will compare the duties and the present 
 rights of A, who is on the Inscription, with those of B, who has 
 joined by Conscription. One glance will show to what degree the 
 latter is sacrified to the former. 
 
 Maritime Insokiption. 
 
 A. joined the service in response to the 
 
 first call, April 14, 1880. 
 Admitted as seaman of the 3rd Class ; 
 
 pay, 80c. 
 
 Certificated giinner of the 1st Class, 
 December 14, 1880 ; 2nd Class seaman, 
 December 14, 1880; pay. If. 10c. 
 
 Has a right from October 14, 1881, to 
 the continuous service allowance, 20c. 
 per diem, and to two months' leave on 
 full pay, or four months' leave on half 
 
 pay- 
 Has a right from April 14, 1883, to the 
 
 continuous service allowance of 30c. 
 
 per diem, and to two months' leave on 
 
 fall pay, or four months' leave on half 
 
 pay. 
 Can marry without leave. 
 Can be promoted 2ud Class working 
 
 petty officer after he has obtained his 
 
 certificate. 
 Terminates the two years' of renewable 
 
 leave, and is free from active service 
 
 May 14, 1887. 
 
 Keed not come out for the drill that B. 
 is obliged to attend. 
 
 OONSCBIPTION. 
 
 B. joined the service as voluntarily bound 
 for five years from April 14, 1880. 
 
 Admitted as naval apprentice ; pay, 60c. 
 (can only pass as seaman of the 8rd 
 Class after a year's service). 
 
 Certificated gunner of the 1st Class, 
 December 14, 1880 (cannot advance 
 in grade as ho has not been a 3rd 
 Class seaman for six months.) 
 
 Has no right to this allowance during 
 his engagement. 
 
 Has no right to this allowance nor to the 
 temporary leave. 
 
 Cannot marry without leave 
 
 Can only become 2nd Class petty officer 
 after he has been at sea for six months 
 as 3rd Class seaman. 
 
 Is free from active service April 14, 
 1889 (two years after A. , who is on the 
 Maritime Inscription). During the last 
 four years (as in the Army Reserve) 
 the State exacts two periods of drill, 
 each lasting twenty-eight days ; B. may 
 not absent himself from these. 
 
 Is obliged to attend for thirteen days' 
 drill as part of the ten-itorial army. 
 
APPENDIX III. 
 
 237 
 
 CONSCEIPIION. 
 
 Cannot join the merchant service, 
 
 Maritime Inscbiption. 
 Has a. right to engage in the merchant 
 
 service (in sea-going ships, coasters, or 
 
 fishing vessels). 
 May gratuitously attend the course at 
 
 the Hydrographic Schools. 
 Is liable to be called upon to serve up to 
 
 the age of fifty. 
 Can earn the retiring allowance (at the 
 
 age of fifty, and after twenty-five 
 
 years' total service). 
 Can only be recalled by an especial law. 
 
 The time spent in renewable leave during 
 
 the obligatory period of service counts 
 
 as serving the State, even if A. follows 
 
 the coasting and fishing trade, as re- 
 gards the retiring pension. 
 After five years' active service, below 
 
 the grade of 1st Class petty officer, 
 
 has a right to lOo. a day for every 
 
 child under ten years old. 
 Is called upon to serve at the age of 
 
 twenty. 
 Can easily become coastguardsman or 
 
 syndic under the Commissioner for 
 
 the Maritime Inscription. 
 
 We will now give the no less instructive Tarifif of the Pensions 
 given to those placed on the Maritime Inscription — a tariff regulated 
 by the full pay. 
 
 Cannot attend the Hydrographic Schools 
 
 free of charge. 
 Cannot receive a retiring allowance. 
 
 Is liable to be recalled for service up to 
 the age of forty. 
 
 Can only be recalled to service by an 
 
 especial law. 
 Does not enjoy this privilege. 
 
 Does not enjoy this privilege. 
 
 Is called upon to serve at the age of 
 
 twenty-one years. 
 Does not enjoy this privilege. 
 
 MOHTHIT SaLABIES. 
 
 Annual Salaries. 
 
 1 
 
 Supplement. 
 
 3 
 
 i 
 
 3 
 
 Supplement. 
 
 II 
 
 I'ft 
 so 
 
 1'^ 
 
 
 Pay Comprised 
 
 in 
 each Category. 
 
 3 
 1 
 
 For Ave years' sevvine on 
 board the vessels of the 
 fleet, or in the barracks 
 on shore. 
 
 For invalids, or after the 
 a^e of 60, or for infirmity 
 contracted in the ser- 
 vice of the State. 
 
 For five years' service on 
 board the vessels of tbe 
 fleet, or in the barracks 
 on shore. 
 
 For invalids, or after the 
 age of 60, or for infirmity 
 contracted in the ser- 
 vice of the State. 
 
 Maximum. 
 
 s 
 
 1! 
 
 '25f. andimder 
 
 25-01 to 40f. . 
 
 Pay •( 4001 to 55f. . 
 
 5501 to 70f. 
 
 and over . 
 
 frs. 
 17 
 21 
 27 
 
 32 
 
 frs. 
 6 
 6 
 7 
 
 7 
 
 9 
 9 
 
 9 
 
 frs. 
 32 
 36 
 43 
 
 48 
 
 frs. 
 204 
 252 
 324 
 
 384 
 
 1 
 frs. frs. frs. frs. 
 72 108 384 192 
 72 108 , 432 ! 216 
 84 108 516 ' 258 
 
 84 1 108 1 576 288 
 
 frs. 
 24 
 24 
 24 
 
 24 
 
238 NAVAL BEPOBM. 
 
 APPENDIX IV. 
 
 The cruiser La Clocheterie having had an accident at Cherbourg by 
 which she was nearly lost, Lc Petit Marseillais, of the 28th March 
 1885, published an article on the subject, in which the objections we 
 had advanced against Maritime Inscription are remarkably summed 
 up. Le Petit Marseillais has, moreover, reproduced word for word 
 the terms of a paper we had just published in the Bevue Scientifique. 
 This is the article : — 
 
 If we are to believe certain private information, the accident which occurred 
 lately on board the Clocheterie was entirely due to a mistake made by the engine- 
 room /jccsonne/. A valve left open instead of being shut, or vice versa — it needs 
 little else seriously to endanger the safety of a ship. 
 
 Now, this mistake in the handling seems inexplicable at iirst sight, especially on 
 board a man-of-war ; but it is not so surprising if, on the one hand, we recollect the 
 complicated machinery of modern men-of-war, and, on the other, the inevitable in- 
 experience of the engine-room personnel, who sometimes, in urgent cases, come on 
 board only a few hours before the start. 
 
 Thus all the world knows how difficult the naval administration finds it to man 
 the vessels required for the expedition to China ; there is not only a dearth of 
 officers, according to the daily information supplied from the naval ports, but there 
 is also the gi'oatest difficulty in obtaining the ordinary crows, and, amongst these, 
 the men belonging to the special branches are more difficult than any others to 
 secure. 
 
 The accident on board the Clocheterie may chiefly be ascribed to this difficulty in 
 obtaining specialists, and the necessity we are imder of transfeiTing men from on 
 board one vessel to another of a totally different type. Fortunately the accident 
 had no serious results, but it might easily have been a real disaster for our navy. 
 This leads us once more to assert that the navy and the public are mistaken in 
 receiving as an indisputable tact that our fleet is ready to meet all eventualities 
 because it has the support of that admirable institution called Maritime Inscription. 
 
 As long as our navy had only the wind to depend on for its motive power. Maritime 
 Inscription did, in truth, satisfy every requirement ; in case of war, we had merely 
 to raise a certain number of sailors to man the necessary vessels. Between these 
 and the merchant ships there was so little difference in the handling, that the 
 personnel on board the foi-mer need not feel at a loss on board the latter ; only 
 topmen and gunners were required to man the vessels of former days. Now, the 
 topmen were all formed by their experience on merchant vessels ; the apprenticeship 
 of the gunners was of very short duration 
 
 The weapon of warfare was so primitive and so simple, and such definite rules 
 had to be observed in the handling of it, that a few weeks sufficed to leani all the 
 
APPENDIX IV. 239 
 
 iu8 and outs of it. Now-a-daya, this is no longer the case, and modern fleets no 
 longer bear any resemblance to the fleets of Colbert's date. 
 
 What is needed on hoard onr ironclads, onr cruisers, and our torpedo-boats, is no 
 longer seamen knowing how to handle the sails, but men specially trained in a 
 knowledge of the complicated machinery, in one place acting on the propeller, in 
 another working the enormous guns, in another steering the vessel — or elsewhere, 
 aiming and firing the torpedoes. 
 
 Maritime Inscription is unable to sxipply these specially trained men ; it can supply 
 plenty of good, courageous sailors, ready for any fate or any heroic deed ; but these 
 qualities are not sufficient in modern warfare, can'ied on mathematically and 
 scientifically. 
 
 It takes more than a day to initiate a fisherman in the practical science, teaching 
 him the handling of all the delicate machinery on board our u-onclads, cruisers, and 
 torpedo-boats, even if he had been born on the sea and made twenty long voyages. 
 He would require a long apprenticeship in time of peace, and if he had not gone 
 through this, not only would he be of no use on board the vessel he was appointed 
 to, but, fui'ther, he might gravely endanger its safety, even were he only in a sub- 
 ordinate position. The strong and simple organisation of our JIaritime Inscription, 
 which during two centuries has enabled us to struggle with varying fortmies against 
 England, now no longer gives us any superiority over oni- powerful rival. It is true 
 that the Maritime Inscription could at any moment furnish us with 100,000 seamen ; 
 but these seamen would be of as little use in our navy as 100,000 recruits who had 
 never held a gun would be to the ai-my, if they had suddenly to be sent on active 
 service. 
 
 We require men specially trained for oui' navy, and we shall never get these unless 
 we reform otu- organisation, and completely break through routine, to take all the 
 progress into account that has been made in the vessels, the guns, and the naval 
 machinery, without which we shall frequently be exposed to accidents as inexpli- 
 cable as that on board the Clocheterie. 
 
240 NAVAL EBFOEM. 
 
 APPENDIX V. 
 
 My readers must forgive my reproducing a general sketch of the 
 state of our navy, which I outlined in the Revue Scientifique of March 
 
 21st, 1885, in reply to an article signed X , which credited us with 
 
 a startling superiority over England. Although it contains a great 
 deal of the information already given, it seems to be not without its 
 use as a rapid summary of the alarming situation we are in. 
 
 The Tkub State op oue Naval Force. 
 
 The article written byM. K , on " The English and French 
 
 Navy," appears to me to be of a nature that will give a very incorrect 
 idea of the true condition of our naval force. It has long been said 
 that " comparisons are not facts " ; therefore the parallel drawn by 
 
 M. X between England and France, even were it beyond criticism, 
 
 would not suffice to prove that our navy is in a brilliant condition. 
 But, in my opinion, he starts from totally false premises, and, 
 although they may be singularly ingenious, they will not stand 
 careful examination. I must be allowed to attempt this analysis ; 
 and at least it will present the problem which everyone endeavours 
 to solve under a new aspect, as it is so closely related to our national 
 security. The article to which I wish to reply as briefly as possible, 
 without x)retending to have closely studied all the details of the 
 French and English fleets, compares the principal points in their 
 organisation and the iimtmel they have at their disposal. Therefore, 
 in a rapid but complete sketch he includes all the elements composing 
 the naval forces of the two countries. These elements are three in 
 number. The personnel, the instruments of war, and the coast 
 defence with that of the ports. Are we inferior or superior to the 
 English in each of these elements ? 
 
 We know the stir and excitement that was raised on the other side 
 of the Channel a few months ago by this question. Several English 
 writers, desLrous of promoting reform in their navy by all the means 
 at their disposal, did not hesitate to sound the alarm by maintaining, 
 in spite of the general opinion to the contrary, in spite of all past 
 
APPENDIX V. 241 
 
 experience, and, I will add, all possibility, and against evidence 
 itself, that France carried the day over England as regarded her 
 personnel, her instruments of warfare, and her naval defences. We 
 were supposed to have the advantage in all these things. Such was 
 the theory of Admiral Symonds, who every year has made it his 
 particular business to put the alarming progress made in the French 
 navy before our neighbours' eyes. Unlikely though it be, this theory 
 has crossed to our side of the Channel, and has been upheld with 
 
 unusual cleverness in the article by M. X . Let us see if it is as 
 
 correct, as it is reassuring and flattering to our vanity. 
 
 1. 
 
 The author glances rapidly at the subject of the jyersonnel. He 
 says it would be too difficult to attempt exact comparison between 
 two things which so utterly refuse to be appraised, as the worth of 
 men and officers. In this I agree with him. But it seems to me 
 impossible to fall in with his way of thinking when he adds that the 
 institution of certificated gunners, and that of the Maritime Inscrip- 
 tion, gives us a startling superiority over the English. Perhaps we 
 may be superior to them as to the gunners, and no doubt the institu- 
 tion of certificated gunners deserves the greatest praise. But how 
 admit that Maritime Inscription will in case of war, supply us with 
 perfectly experienced seamen, and with a number more than suffi- 
 cient to man our reserve ships ? 
 
 I do not wish to discuss the maintenance or the suppression of 
 Maritime Inscription in this place ; it is a subject that would require 
 to be exhaustively treated. I will merely state that it is certainly not 
 able to supply us with men " thoroughly experienced " in the duties 
 of our modern navy. When Colbert organised it — when this talented 
 minister, to whom France owed a navy capable of struggling, with 
 varying success, against England during two hundred years, made the 
 fisheries andmerchant service into a monopolyforthe sailors overwhom 
 the State could exercise her full power in time of war — the only motive 
 power for ships was the wind. Thus it might be truly said that the popu- 
 lation on our shores, whilst under the control of Maritime Inscription, 
 was being trained by coasting and trading, and that it could any day 
 be amalgamated with our navy and be found quite prepared for 
 fighting. This is no longer the case. Steam has replaced the wind 
 as the motive power. Even if he were born on board a sailing vessel, 
 a native of the coast is no more fit than any conscript to handle our 
 machinery. To this the fact may be attributed that quite as many 
 men are trained for the navy, that have been levied by conscription, 
 as are embodied from the Maritime Inscription. A townsman makes 
 a better gunner or engine-room artificer than a fisherman, and is 
 worth still more when he is a workman or mechanic. 
 
 If we were to take up Colbert's idea and adapt it to modern 
 exigencies, the Maritime Inscription should no longer be applied to 
 the population on our shores, but to the workmen in our factories, to 
 
 16 
 
242 NAVAL REFORM. 
 
 the engineers on the railways, and in trade, and to all this new 
 personnel which would be much more useful on board our ships than men 
 accustomed to handle sails that are no longer in use. But it is quite 
 evident that it would be impossible to legislate for the men who 
 populate our factories, in the same way aS' Colbert legislated for those 
 on our shores; modern ideas would be opposed to it. There is, 
 therefore, but one way to provide sailors thoroughly drilled in the 
 present naval system, namely, to constitute a special corps of engine- 
 room artificers and stokers as numerous and as weU-educated as 
 possible. 
 
 Now, England has considerably outstripped us in this direction. 
 She has excellent schools for engine-room artificers, and she gives 
 promotions and material rewards to induce those who have been 
 through them to remain in the navy. On our side, nothing is done 
 for the engine-room artificers. After endless opposition, a few of the 
 advantages they would enjoy with our neighbours are unwillingly 
 granted to them. We have, moreover, a ridiculously insufficient 
 number of them. The moment their term of service has expired 
 they hasten to leave the navy. Maritime Inscription enables them 
 to leave it comfortably provided for, since, although in the merchant 
 service, they still retain their right to the retiring pension if they are 
 on the Inscription. In this we find a singularly dangerous attribute 
 of our naval organisation. 
 
 Beyond her own engine-room artificers, in time of war England 
 could get as many as she required from her immense merchant 
 service. But could we even man our ships now in commission ? 
 And if it were a case, as many think it will be, of putting shoals of 
 small vessels in line, whence should we draw the neoesa&vy personnel 
 
 to lead them to battle ? I do not desire, any more than M. X , 
 
 to insist upon this question of the personnel, to which I shall, more- 
 over, be obliged to return further on. 
 
 I have nevertheless sought to prove how wrong it would be to 
 accept the usual opinion and to go to sleep in fancied security. It is 
 held that the Maritime Inscription is an admirable institution, and 
 satisfies every need. Everyone thinks so, repeats it, and believes it. 
 In reality this was true two centuries ago. But what changes have 
 
 taken place in the navy since the days of Colbert ! M. X truly 
 
 remarks : — 
 
 In the time of a sailing navy, the service of the guns was very simple, and was 
 almost the same on board merchant vessels as on board men-of-war. . . . But 
 now, with machinery as complex as the great ironclads themselves, on board which 
 everything is complex — the motive power, the service of the guns, the machine guns 
 and the torpedoes — is it possible to believe that merchant seamen can suddenly 
 become experienced engine-room artificers or gunners ? This may be required at 
 any moment ; for modern wars break out so suddenly, and last so short a time, that 
 very likely there would not be a fortnight given to prepare for it. 
 
 This is all perfectly true ; but the conclusion to be drawn fi-om 
 these observations is that Maritime Inscription cannot provide the 
 personnel we can no longer do without for our machinery, and that 
 
APPENDIX V. 243 
 
 the English, with their thoroughly organised corps of engine-room 
 artificers and stokers, are in this matter greatly our superiors. To 
 say that in time of war we should at once have a " drilled and 
 efficient " personnel is entirely to misconstrue the truth. By levying 
 a general levy of all the members on the roll of the Maritime 
 Inscription, we might secure whole herds of sailors without training 
 or any value, if not without courage or good-will. But we should 
 lack men for every special branch, and at the outset we should lack 
 officers. These are so reduced in number that merely to carry out 
 an ordinary war with China we do not know where to turn to fill the 
 vacancies in our crews. It is notorious that the list of our officers 
 is so restricted that we are obliged to seek the most distressing expe- 
 dients to remedy the unprecedented scarcity indicated on every hand. 
 
 The dockyard and shore appointments remain unprovided for ; the 
 officers can no longer obtain permission to settle down, or long leave; 
 they no sooner return from a voyage than they are sent off again ; 
 and as these measures do not suffice, young midshipmen are requisi- 
 tioned, and are associated sometimes with lieutenants and sometimes 
 with sub-lieutenants ; and when they have scarcely left school, duties 
 are entrusted to them which it is most dangerous that they should 
 attempt to fulfil. 
 
 In this the English are also far in advance of us. 
 
 The personnel of their officers is far more numerous and far more 
 elastic than ours. By hastening the age at which they have to retu-e, 
 by increasing the retiring pension, they make advancement much 
 easier, they secure a far larger complement, much simpler and better 
 adapted to the different exigencies of peace and war. We are at om- 
 wits' end, in an ordinary war with China ; what would happen if we 
 had to fight one of the great European Naval Powers ? 
 
 Failing a superior persofinel to that possessed by the English, we 
 may, perhaps, outstrip them in the quantity and value of our materkl. 
 
 This is affirmed, at least, by M. X , and he endeavours to prove 
 
 it by means as contestable as they are ingenious. 
 
 He begins by blaming the system followed either by Admiral 
 Symonds, Lord Northbrook, or Sir Thomas Brassey, in the com- 
 parisons they draw between the English and French fleets. We know 
 that the two latter, in balancing the respective merits of the two 
 navies, contented themselves with adding up their respective tonnage; 
 the navy boasting of the biggest dimensions, seemed, in their eyes, 
 the most formidable. 
 
 M. X — ; — easily shows the worthlessness of this comparison. The 
 size of ships in nowise testifies to their qualities. Their merits lie 
 entirely in the construction of the hull, propellers, and the armament, 
 and in the distribution of the armour-plating over the parts that 
 alone are vital, so as to originate new types, far superior to those of 
 foi-mer days, but with equal tonnage. 
 
 16 * 
 
244 NAVAL EEFOBM. 
 
 The system upheld by M. X is quite as open to criticism as 
 
 that of Lord Northbrook and Sir Thomas Brassey . Instead of judging 
 the worth of the Fleets by their tonnage, he judges them by classing 
 the vessels belonging to them according to the degree of thickness in 
 their armour-plating. 
 
 Is this plan any better than the other ? 
 
 M. X tells us that, at least, it is based on one of the principal 
 
 elements of the strength of ironclads, namely, " the resisting force." 
 For this to be the case, it would be necessary first to prove that 
 the thickness of the plating alone constituted the resisting force in 
 ironclads. 
 
 Now, in order to justly appreciate this, we must take many other 
 things into account. With equal thiclaiess, the experiments at 
 Spezzia showed that one plate might be very inferior to another of a 
 different pattern. 
 
 This is not all, for the defensive qualities of a vessel also depend 
 upon her shape, the way she is constructed (water-tight compartments, 
 &c.), her speed, her facility of turning, the state of her machinery; 
 on a thousand other causes, with which the tliickncss of her plating 
 would have nothing whatever to do. 
 
 In the method adopted by M. X , he takes no account of all 
 
 this ; he necessarily reckons wooden vessels in the same category as 
 iron or steel-plated ships; swift vessels with "tubs"; successful ships 
 with the unsuccessful ; everything is confounded together in a way 
 that the bad and good are alike valuable ; no matter if a vessel be 
 more or less armour-plated ; if it be out of order ; if its artillery be 
 defective ; if it be of an old-fashioned type ; if it fail to answer to the 
 exigencies of modern warfare. 
 
 M. X is obliged by his system, logically, to include a whole 
 
 series of old vessels as part of our fighting strength. Some, like the 
 Couronne, have been stripped of their plating ; others, like la, Flandre, 
 la Gauloise, la Provence, ka. &c., are absolutely worth nothing, and 
 no one would be foolish enough to lead them to battle. It is quite 
 enough if they have, or if they once had, a few inches of plating ; it 
 is so much gained over England. 
 
 All the first category of vessels reckoned by M. X should be 
 
 suppressed. He, himself, owns that several of the ironclads he 
 mentions have been struck off the navy list ; the others only figure in 
 it as a memory. 
 
 In the three last categories cited by M. X , certain ships may 
 
 be found, in virtue only of a process of valuation generally received, 
 but which I consider to be utterly false and misleading. 
 
 A vessel is no sooner on the stocks, than it is officially added to the 
 list of our Fleet ; it may take six or seven years to complete ; several 
 wars may meanwhile break out ; the ship itself is liable to numerous 
 accidents, and may not in any way realise the hopes of her con- 
 structors. None of this is taken into account. No one hesitates to 
 reckon up these prospective ships; these possible, but not actual 
 
APPENDIX V. 245 
 
 ships, if I may thus express myself; their plating is measured, the 
 strength of their guns is taken into account, and we congratulate 
 ourselves that our country is so well protected against foreign aggres- 
 sion by these remarkable instruments of warfare. 
 
 In this way le Duguesclin, le Tirire, V Acheron, la Flamme, la Fusee, 
 which are still in course of construction, we find chronicled in 
 
 M. X 's second category ; in his third category, le Foudroyant ; 
 
 in his fourth, V Admiral Baudm, le Caiman, le Furieux, I'Indomptable, 
 le Teirible, le Tonnant, and these are hkewise unfinished. The moral 
 of the fables, " la Peau de I'Ours," and " Perrette et son pot au lait," 
 is entirely unknown in the navy. 
 
 Certain disappointments ought, however, to have taught us only to 
 reckon vessels capable of going to sea in a few days among our 
 effective force. How many of this kind may be found in the four 
 categories put together by M. X ? 
 
 Most of those upon which he reposes om* naval superiority, can 
 only be commissioned in two, three, or four years hence ; and who 
 knows whether the conditions of modern naval warfare may not be 
 totally and entirely modified by that time. The thickness of their 
 future plating, and the projected diameter of their guns, matters, 
 therefore, but little to us. We shall see all that when they are 
 embodied in our squadrons, if squadrons still continue to exist at 
 that date. Until that date, is it not a mockery to consider them as 
 an actual element in our naval strength ? Even if no change has 
 taken place at the time they really are ready for use, who is to 
 guarantee that some cardinal defect will not do away with their value 
 to the service during a longer or shorter period of time ? 
 
 Look at the case of the Devastation. Everyone said she was an 
 admirably-planned vessel, so we were bound to believe it. She would 
 have been a wonderful instrument of warfare, if her machinery had 
 not been an entire failure. The cylinders were so constructed that 
 they continually threatened to burst. 
 
 The Devastation, begun in 1873, and afloat since 1879, has only just 
 taken her place in the squadron. Trials of speed could not be 
 attempted, because the result was perfectly foreseen. She sailed 
 quite slowly from Brest to Toulon : at every halting-place telegrams 
 were at once sent to official head-quarters, reporting that the expected 
 accident had not occm-red. She has at last joined our evolutionary 
 squadron, but every care is taken not to employ her in difficult 
 manoeuvres, as well as to diminish the speed of the other ships, so 
 that she may be enabled to keep up with them. She will never be 
 able to go at full speed. 
 
 This does not prevent her being honourably placed in the parallel 
 
 drawn by M. X , who cares nothing for speed, or, in consequence, 
 
 for the machinery ; is not her plating 38 cent, thick, and is she not 
 armed with four guns of 34 cm. ? 
 
 To show how foolish it is to reckon our real naval strength by the 
 armoftr of the vessels we have on the stocks, I need only cite one 
 
246 NAVAL EBFOEM. 
 
 example. According to the Ministerial promises made by M. L'Aniy 
 in his famous report, all the ironclads in course of construction in 
 1878 were to be finished in 1883 at latest; now only one, the Admiral 
 Dwperre, built by private contract, is at this moment fit for active 
 service, considering the Devastation will not be in fighting condition 
 until her machinery has been altered. The Foudroyant, of the same 
 type, begun only two years later, was to be finished in 1881 ; the 
 report of M. Menard Dorian on the Naval Budget for the manoeuvres 
 in 1885, informs us that it can only be finished this year at the 
 earliest. 
 
 None of the ships begun in 1877, and which ought to have been 
 finished in 1882, will be ready in 1886, for several of them are not 
 even launched. 
 
 The Marceau alone, which is built by private contract, will be 
 ready, we are assured by M. Menard-Dorian, at the end of her fifth 
 year, and will form part of the active fleet in 1886. 
 
 I am at a loss to know why M. X leaves her out of his calcu- 
 lations, considering he includes the Admiral Baudin, which equally 
 will be unable to join the active fleet before 1886, and which may 
 not join it even then. 
 
 Therefore, if we are to draw an aiithentic and really practical 
 comparison Isetween om- fleet and the English fleet, it would be both 
 wise and prudent, instead of reckoning with the future, to keep to the 
 present, and to face it frankly. 
 
 Unfortunately, the conclusions thus arrived at are very different 
 to those advanced by M. X . At the present moment every sea- 
 going ironclad, cruiser, despatch- vessel, gun-boat, transport, &c. &c., 
 that we possess is in the Chinese seas, engaged in a war which, 
 without being in itself destructive, causes more losses in naval 
 material than the most murderous wars. The necessity of always 
 being on the alert, always ready for action, obliges our ships to be 
 always under steam, to keep all their boilers lit, and this is the cause 
 of dreadful wear and tear. 
 
 As a rule, when a vessel has been six or seven years in commission, 
 her boilers are worn out and require replacing. But, in two months, 
 the vessels in our Chinese squadron consume as much fuel as they 
 do usually in a year. Thus their engines will have gone through as 
 much wear and tear in one year as they would otherwise have done 
 in six years. When they return to France they will all need to be 
 dismantled, in order to change their boilers. But the resources of 
 om- arsenals, and, above all, the way the work is set about, quite 
 unfit them for this duty. If we are to be ready for it, spare boilers 
 should at once be ordered ; but no one thinks of this, and the vast 
 sums absorbed by the armament forbids the subject. 
 
 Thus om- whole fleet will be under repair at the same moment. 
 
 It is only too evident that this operation will be impossible. It 
 wiU be of no use to apply to private enterprise, as the materiel, the 
 plant, &c., are not forthcoming. 
 
APPENDIX V. 247 
 
 The repair of our worn-out vessels will, in any case, take at least 
 some years. 
 
 During this time we shaU be without a navy ; far from struggling 
 with England, we shall be incapable of resisting the most insig- 
 nificant naval Power. And I only speak of repairing the boilers, 
 although om- vessels will be worn-out at all points. At the present 
 moment there are no more arms to give out in our arsenals. The 
 training-ship for gunners, the Souveram, recently asked for 14-cm. 
 guns to replace her old ones, which, having fired then- regulation 
 3,000 rounds, are no longer safe. It was necessary to refuse, as there 
 were none. It is now in contemplation to take the guns from on 
 board the Richelieu ; after much hesitation this is sure to be done, for 
 guns are certainly essential to the instruction of gunners. 
 
 When our fleet returns, the boilers and part of the armament will 
 have to be renewed. It is worth considering whether it would not be 
 preferable to give it up, and to concentrate all our energies upon 
 torpedo-boats and light gun-boats, better adapted to modern warfare. 
 
 It is reported that one of our naval officers, who is better known 
 as a diplomatist than a sailor, recently remarked that the principal 
 advantage of the Chinese war would be in ridding us of old-fashioned 
 matiriel, with which we should otherwise have remained encumbered 
 for many years. It will, in truth, rid us of the greater part of our 
 sea-going ironclads and cruisers, or else it will oblige us to spend 
 much time and money in repairing them. 
 
 No one seems to pay any heed to this consequence of the Chinese 
 war. It is, however, incontestable that it will leave us, during a more 
 or less extended period of time, without a navy, whether we attempt 
 to retain our present materiel by repairing it, or whether we prefer at 
 once to organise another, which would assuredly be the wiser course 
 to pursue. 
 
 I shall be told that I attach no importance to the first-class iron- 
 clads forming our evolutionary squadron. Do they, in truth, con- 
 stitute a formidable naval force likely to give umbrage to England ? 
 At the present time the squadron boasts of four vessels of a recent 
 type, and built according to the latest system. 
 
 These are the Admiral Duperre, the Devastation, the Tonnerre, and 
 the Vengeur.* 
 
 The Tonnerre and the Vengeiir are two coast-defence ships, which 
 may serve as a floating siege-train to go and besiege a port, but 
 which never can sail with a squadron. Experience has demonstrated 
 that they could not withstand gales that did the torpedo-boats no 
 harm. 
 
 This is the condition of the Devastation. 
 
 The Admiral Duperre has one serious defect, although she is really 
 a beautiful ship ; her sea-cocks are too low, so that if she ventured 
 into shallow water, or got too near the coasts, the sand and the 
 detritus would get into her engines. 
 
 * The Tonnerre and the Vengeur have just been taken out of the squadron. 
 
248 NAVAL EEFOfi.M. 
 
 These are, however, all we possess, as the Redoubtable, of the type 
 of the Devastation, is changing her boilers. I do not count the 
 wooden ironclads, the Richelieu and the Marenyo, which are likewise 
 changing their boilers ; the Colbert, the Suffren, the Trident, who 
 ought to change them ; the Ocean, which is rotten ; since, whatever 
 the thickness of their armour, their power of resistance would be 
 very inferior in a real war. 
 
 Some of them are more or less seaworthy, others are laid up ; their 
 engines are all worn out, and they are all of little use as instruments 
 of warfare. If what precedes is correct, of what use would it be to 
 measure the plating of these worn-out vessels whose worthlessness 
 has been proved, or to assert, by means of more or less contestable 
 calculations, that their thickness exceeds that of the English vessels ? 
 
 The worth of a vessel depends on many other elements besides its 
 armour. However well armour-clad it may be, the Devastation, for 
 instance, will never be worth anything until she can increase her 
 speed. 
 
 To stop at the plating without paying any heed to the engines, is 
 to admire a beautiful corpse, and to imagine, as it is perfectly con- 
 stituted, that it is superior to the weakest man alive. A child would 
 be able to cope with the body of Hercules. 
 
 The Devastation could not withstand the attacks of a few rapid 
 vessels. This consideration will, of itself, demolish the whole edifice 
 
 of comparisons built up by M. X , who takes the plating as his 
 
 only standard for comparing the respective strength of the English 
 and French navies. 
 
 M. X considers, however, that we may boast superiority in two 
 
 other directions — our guns and the speed of our cruisers. He is 
 right about the guns, but this superiority is about to desert us, as the 
 new English breech-loaders (of 233m. and 343m.) possess an initial 
 speed superior to our 84cm. guns, the 39cm., or even the 42cm. guns. 
 
 According to a recent report by Colonel Maitland, the Director of 
 Woolwich Arsenal, the initial velocity of the English 233-millimetres 
 gun, weighing only 19 tons, is 768 metres ; and that of the 343- 
 Hrt'rtMnefres English gun, weighing only 63 tons, is 625-2 metres superior 
 by 10 metres to that of the 119-tons Krupp gun. 
 
 Our 42- centimetres gun has no greater velocity, and will have to be 
 given up on this account. 
 
 The English factory at Elswick manufactures a i32,-miUim6tres gun 
 weighing 110 tons ; its projectile, weighing 847 Jdlogrammes, has an 
 initial velocity of 616 metres. 
 
 As to the speed of om- cruisers, it is absolutely inferior to that of 
 
 the English cruisers. M. X exaggerates it in the most self-evident 
 
 way. Doubtless, the Diiquesne and the Tourville make, as he says, 
 16 knots and some tenths ; but the Tourville has had to be sent back 
 from China by reason of a breakdown in her engines, which will have 
 to be thoroughly overhauled. The more recent types, the For/ait, 
 the Roland, &c., do not make 15 knots, but only 14 at the outside. 
 
APPENDIX V. 249 
 
 Therefore, the asserted inferiority of the English in the matter of 
 speed is a mere delusion. And we will not include their merchant 
 steamers, much swifter than ours, and which they could arm in time 
 of war. We limit ourselves to the cruisers in our navy. We have 
 none that are even equal, still less superior to the best types in foreign 
 navies. 
 
 All oui- rapid cruisers are wooden, excepting three, which, con- 
 sidering their age, cannot be compared to the last English, Italian, 
 or American cruisers, whose principal machinery and valves are pro- 
 tected by internal plating, and which, being constructed on the longi- 
 tudinal cellular principal, are almost unsinkable. A few months ago 
 the Naval Review, an official journal, itself stated, in referring to the 
 Esmeralda, a Chilian vessel which at the present moment is the most 
 successful type of cruiser afloat : — 
 
 It is evident that these vessels are greatly superior, seeing that their vital parts 
 are well protected against shot. Their style of armament further adds to their 
 superiority, as it includes heavy guns, machine guns, and quick-firing guns. In 
 fntui'e engagements, the action of the guns thus mounted Tvill be the more impor- 
 tant, not only from its destructive action on the sailors and officers on deck, but also 
 from the destruction they ivill cause in the structure of the ship attacked. The 
 Inconstant (English), and the TourviUe (French), might, before they had seriously 
 damaged their adversary, be destroyed or sunk by a cruiser such as we describe, 
 possessing greater speed although much less powerful. 
 
 We have only two ships in the fleet, and as yet they are incomplete, 
 who unite these conditions to a certain extent, and these are the 
 Sfax and the Milan. The latter is of 3,800 horse-power, with 1,546 
 tons displacement, but the former, which has only 5,000 horse-power 
 to 4,500 tons displacement, cannot fail to be inferior to the Esmeralda, 
 which has the same power for 3,000 tons ; or to the Italian types 
 which with this same strength have even 500 tons less displacement 
 than the Chilian cruiser ; or the English Leander and the Mersey, 
 which, with 3,750, or 3,550 tons have, or ought to have respectively, 
 5,000 and 6,000 horse-power. 
 
 We have no similar vessels in com'se of construction. The Italians 
 have one in commission and two on the stocks ; the English have 
 four finished vessels of the Leander type, three in construction of the 
 Mersey type ; and in compliance with the projects recently sanctioned 
 in Parliament, four more are to be built of this last type, but 
 improved both in armament and in construction. 
 
 I do not enlarge upon these details, as I give them entirely with 
 the view of proving that om* cruisers do not make up for the inferiority 
 of our ironclads. If it is supposed that naval warfare is to remain 
 what it was in the past, that is to say, a war of squadrons, there can 
 be only one method, at the present time, of seriously comparing the 
 naval strength of the two countries. It is not by comparing the 
 relative thickness of the platmg of their ships, for this thickness is 
 only one of the elements of then- offensive and defensive power. 
 
 Only one element can be rightly and justly taken into considera- 
 tion, and that is number. And as, when all is told, one ironclad will 
 
250 NAVAL BEPOEM. 
 
 be as good as another in a squadron fight in which superiority in 
 manceuvring is mucli more important than the size of the vessel, the 
 victory will most likely belong to the side which has been able to put 
 the greater number in line. 
 
 Now, M. X acknowledges that England is the one to do this ; at 
 
 this moment she possesses twelve large ironclads at least, in use, and 
 with more than 30 centimetres of plating, and guns of more than 
 27 centimetres ; she will have twenty before we have eight fit for 
 service. This is our true situation, and no calculations can disprove 
 
 it. It is true that M. X justly remarks, that England, being 
 
 entirely a maritime and commercial Power, may be ruined by a single 
 war, if the enemy goes in for destroying her merchant service. That 
 part of his work is certainly irrefutable. 
 
 Admiral Aube long ago remarked : " Ten cruisers, even with no 
 armour-plating, but led by worthy imitators of Captain Semmes, 
 would suffice to ruin the riches and consequently the power of Eng- 
 land." But do we possess these ten cruisers ? They would require 
 to be endowed with speed superior to that of the English merchant 
 steamers. 
 
 Now, what our present cruisers lack is speed, and those constructed 
 of late are less swift than those preceding them. Progress on this 
 head has gone by contraries. Most of the thirty cruisers that 
 
 M. X reckons in his list do not make more than 14 knots, and, 
 
 moreover, they will return from China quite worn out. The best we 
 possess were not able to catch up the Chinese cruisers at Shaipoo, as 
 these were much swifter.* Therefore, we have the whole of our fleet 
 to create, destined to pursue the enemy ; and as long as we are with- 
 out it we shall never be able to conduct the only war against England 
 which would avail anything, which would strike her to the core, 
 destroy her commerce, and put an end to her amazing prosperity. 
 
 3. 
 What has most astonished me in the article written by M. X- 
 
 Li'n Marines militaires de la France et de I'Angleterre is that part of his 
 article which refers to torpedo-boats. From it I learn, with surprise, 
 that is excusable in a man who for the last year has struggled, with 
 the aid of the press, to persuade his country that torpedo-boats are 
 really fighting vessels, and who has been opposed with singular 
 unanimity by the whole naval official world from the Minister down- 
 wards (who was heard to declare in the Chamber of Deputies, the day 
 after Foochow and on the eve of Shaipoo, that the torpedo could not 
 be relied on as a weapon) to the last officer on command of an iron- 
 clad ; I learn that from the moment the toi-pedo was invented, France 
 had hailed the renovation of the navy by. torpedo-boats, and that 
 
 * We have not paid sufficient heed to the fact that China, the country we consider 
 so uncivilised, had two cruisers more rapid and better armed than our best. Yet 
 people are found to admire the way in which our navy has been managed during the 
 last fifteen years. 
 
APPENDIX V. 251 
 
 nothing had been neglected during the last four years that could 
 conduce to keeping our fleet up to the level of modern progress. 
 
 Would to Heaven that this were indeed the case ! But when 
 
 M. X adds that we have no less than forty -five torpedo-boats of the 
 
 second class, making at least 18 knots the hoiu- ; eighteen first-class 
 torpedo-boats with a speed of 20 knots, and able to get over 1,200 
 mUes at a moderate pace ; eight large despatch torpedo-boats of 300 
 tons each, the whole admirably constructed and manned by crews of 
 tried ability and courage, he gives way to the most fatal illusion, and 
 runs the risk of spreading the most dangerous mistake amongst the 
 public. 
 
 This question of the torpedo-boats is of first-rate importance ; ii; 
 outstrips all others at the present, time, not only because the torpedo 
 is the weapon that will one day destroy the ironclad, but chiefly 
 because it is that which henceforward must be employed in coast and 
 harbour defence. 
 
 M. X draws a harrowing picture of the condition of the 
 
 harbours and the guns which are supposed to protect the great 
 English naval stations ; if he is to be believed, these forts are useless 
 and their old-fashioned guns are worthless. So be it. We will not 
 
 waste time in arguing the point. But M. X does not mention 
 
 that these English, who, according to his account, understand 
 nothing about torpedoes and torpedo-boats, are, at this very moment, 
 energetically giving their attention to providing torpedo-boats, which 
 will efficiently replace the fortifications and guns at their naval 
 stations, the absence of which he laments. 
 
 The English Naval Journals announce that vessels of this sort 
 leave every day for those very points indicated, according to the Pall 
 
 Mall Gazette, by M. X as being so defenceless ; as soon as they 
 
 arrive, England will be able to take heart, and will fearlessly witness 
 the collapse of the old walls in which she formerly trusted, but which 
 no longer satisfy the conditions of modern warfare. When it is 
 stated that the English have paid no heed to torpedoes or torpedo- 
 boats, this fact seems left out of the calculation ; which, however, 
 conclusively proves, in my opinion, that they have perfectly grasped 
 the revolution that is to be brought about in the navy by these new 
 instruments of warfare. 
 
 Doubtless they continue to build ironclads, because being rich, 
 excessively rich, they can give themselves the luxury of keeping up 
 two navies, one in the style of former days, and another on the 
 futm-e model, so as not to find themselves at a loss, if the hopes 
 placed in the latter should happen to be disappointed. 
 
 Just in the same way, in the past, they set about constructing iron- 
 clads with the utmost caution. 
 
 If they are not, as yet, entirely satisfied that the torpedo has from 
 henceforth conquered the ironclad, they at least know that it is so 
 fatal to her, that no ironclad vessel would venture to approach a coast 
 or harbour if she were threatened by torpedo-boats at those points. 
 
262 NAVAL EEFOBM. 
 
 And all the time the English are being credited with blindness, 
 they are sending torpedo-boats to their naval stations, to protect 
 their coaling and victualling depots against any hostile enterprise. 
 
 I cannot imagine what document M. X can have consulted for 
 
 the figures and details he gives with reference to the English torpedo- 
 boats. 
 
 Doubtless he is right as to the indifferent worth of the Poli/phemus ; 
 although it is a matter of surprise that the English should put two 
 vessels of a similar pattern on the stocks, if his criticisms are really 
 deserved ; but when he tells us that England only possesses nine 
 torpedo-boats of the second class, and about sixty gun-boats, is he 
 really correct in his statement ? 
 
 According to Le Carnet de Vofficier de Marine, the English have 
 twenty-one torpedo-boats of the first class, and sixty-three of the 
 second class. What is more, the new programme at the Admiralty 
 includes ten torpedoc-ruisers, endowed with a speed of 16 knots, and 
 thirty first-class torpedo. boats, with a speed of between 18 and 20 
 knots. 
 
 Finally, we must add that certain English Colonies — Australia, for 
 instance, and New Zealand — constructed defensive torpedo-boats at 
 their own expense quite a year ago. 
 
 Considering the vast extent of the British Empire, I admit that 
 this is very little. But, thanks to her admirable industrial resources, 
 England will be supplied, at any moment, with a considerable fleet of 
 torpedo-boats ; whereas it would take us a long time, unless we 
 applied to her constructors, to attain the same result. 
 
 The figures given by M. X as to our own torpedo-boats are 
 
 simple iniriKic. In reality, we have not, at the present time, ten 
 torpedo-boats armed and ready to go to sea. Most of those appearing 
 on the list are worth nothing. And whilst we persist in finishing 
 ironclads, we do not command seven torpedo-boats. Seven torpedo- 
 boats ! and we require at least 200 to protect our shores on the three 
 seas, not to mention Algiers and the Colonies. If we adopted the 
 same proportion as the Germans, a torpedo-boat for every ten miles of 
 coast (less than 19 kilometres), what total should we reach ? 
 
 The expense of this defensive organisation would not, however, be 
 very great. With the money that is spent so uselessly in constructing 
 forts and batteries around our naval and commercial ports, we might 
 have hundreds of torpedo-boats, which would preserve them from all 
 danger. But this is never thought of, and any sudden attack might 
 cause the most serious disasters. 
 
 At the present time our fortifications and our dock-yards are only 
 protected in the most trifling way, by what is called the movable 
 defence force ; that is, by some few unarmed torpedo-boats, from 
 which the oSicers have never discharged a torpedo. Our commercial 
 ports and the towns on om' shores are absolutely unprotected. If, 
 for instance, war were to break out, the whole Mediterranean coast 
 might be ravaged in a few hours by rapid cruisers, without any 
 
APPENDIX V. 253 
 
 chance of preventing it. Cette, Marseilles, Nice, could be burnt to 
 the ground with extraordinary facility. Even Toulon could easily be 
 bombarded. We are no further on with the defence of our coasts 
 than we were in 1870. Now we know that in 1870 a German cruiser 
 was able to take possession of a French vessel at the mouth of the 
 Gironde. A still sadder, though less humiliating, occurrence showed 
 at that time to what catastrophes we should have been exposed if 
 Germany had been what she soon will be — a maritime nation. 
 
 To save Toulon from a sudden descent, no better method was found 
 than to bar the port with a boom. But lo and behold ! to the general 
 surprise, an old wooden frigate, the Sibylle, made its way into the 
 harbour, commanded by that Captain Pierre who died Admiral in 
 Madagascar. She had sailed over the boom without even suspecting 
 its existence ; and no one had witnessed the performance of this easy 
 exploit. 
 
 At the present moment, the fortifications of our naval ports are as 
 worthless as this barricade, and every one of them could easily be 
 bombarded and destroyed, above all at night, by a few swift vessels 
 cruising in the open, and escaping easily, aided either by the darkness 
 or their speed, from the fire of the forts. 
 
 M. X is sadly mistaken when he imagines that we possess a 
 
 well-trained personnel for our torpedo-boats. In truth, we ask how 
 and where this persomul is to be trained, considering we have only 
 about ten armed torpedo-boats ? 1 assert that every man with the 
 least knowledge of the state of om' navy anxiously asks himself the 
 following questions : — If a war of any description were to occur at 
 the present moment, where would the Minister of Marine find officers 
 to commission even the small number of unarmed vessels in our 
 ports ? Where would he procure officers to command the seventy 
 torpedo-boats that are reckoned available ? Would he take officers 
 that have never commanded this sort of vessel ? Would he entrust 
 them to those officers who have none of the knowledge required for 
 their handling ? What superior officers would he select for the chief 
 command of these flotillas of small vessels ? Will he only require to 
 stamp on the ground, and produce out of space officers capable of 
 directing movements to which they have never turned their attention, 
 which have never been studied, tried, or put into practice ? How will 
 he obtain the engineers necessary to the handling of all these engines 
 at full steam ? 
 
 Can this personnel, which has no existence, be trained in a few days ? 
 WiU it be easy to find the few men who have previously served in 
 torpedo-boats ? What means have been adopted towards this end ? 
 
 Doubtless a project has been thought of whereby a secondary per- 
 sonnel for the torpedo-boats will be secured ; but will this project 
 succeed ? Will it not end in a bastard organisation, fit only for a 
 time of peace, but quite inadequate to the requirements of war. Even 
 supposing the project to be a good one, will it include the officers 
 who are to command the torpedo-boats ? Will it endeavour to secure 
 
254 NAVAL EEFOfiM. 
 
 for them the knowledge indispensable to the faithful fulfilment of the 
 important task confided to them ? 
 
 All these questions must, as yet, be answered in the negative. 
 Nothing serious has been done towards the practical training of the 
 personnel — which, moreover, is infinitesimal in number — to be found in 
 the movable defence force. A few experiments in steaming, but no 
 discharge of torpedoes ; a few aimless manoeuvres, but no attack in 
 conformity with the rules of war ; a few nocturnal raids, but no 
 survey of the coasts ; and this is absolutely all that has been done. 
 
 Foreign torpedo-boats fire their two torpedoes every year, really 
 loaded and primed, against either a fixed or a movable target ; we 
 have never dared to try this. We actually have had the temerity to 
 execute two explosions of torpedoes discharged by means of dropping 
 gear, that is to say, stationary ; but not till the precaution was taken 
 of sending the operators to a ridiculous distance. We have never 
 yet discharged a torpedo from a torpedo-boat in motion. 
 
 What courage can this give our men ? 
 
 Certain persons even go the length of saying that they are dan- 
 gerous to discharge ; that the torpedo might fail to leave the impulse 
 tube ; or that, in leaving it, it might sink to the bottom to explode 
 beneath the torpedo-boat. 
 
 Such fears must, of course, exercise a disastrous effect on the men 
 and officers at the moment of conducting the assault. It is, there- 
 fore, urgently necessary that these should know the direction in 
 which to discharge the torpedoes, and that they should have abso- 
 lute confidence in the instrument intrusted to them ; they ought to 
 feel certain beforehand that this engine will not burst in the tube, 
 and that, if it does go to the bottom, it will cause no injury to the 
 torpedo-boat, which will pass over it. 
 
 This result can only be obtained by regular training and frequent 
 experiments, in all sorts of weather and every kind of sea, as these 
 will teach the captains whether it is possible to discharge the tor- 
 pedoes even when the tubes are under water, and what line of con- 
 duct they should pursue under the various circumstances that present 
 themselves. To talk of a " clever and well- trained personnel" when 
 not a single experiment has been tried, when not a single officer has 
 even been deputed to study all the results obtained by a torpedo, is to 
 allow ourselves to be deceived by the most inconceivable mirage. And 
 I assert, moreover, that anyone at aU acquainted with the state of 
 om- navy in the matter of materiel, will anxiously seek light on the 
 following questions : — If a war of any sort were to take place, how 
 many torpedo-boats could the Minister of Marine put in commission ? 
 How many would he find with their machinery in good working 
 order ? Have we a sufficiency of locomotive torpedoes to supply all 
 the vessels fit to carry impulse. tubes ? Have our old-fashioned loco- 
 motive torpedoes been altered ? Are they not accounted available, 
 when it is perfectly well known that they could not be used ? Are 
 our Whitehead torpedoes properly regulated ? Does the equipment 
 
APPENDIX V. 255 
 
 for our torpedo-boats exist, and, if so, in what state is it ? Are there 
 any locomotive torpedoes at all on the torpedo-boats at Brest, Cher- 
 bourg, Lorient, Eochefort ? Have they ever been discharged ? Is 
 there any spare gear for the torpedo-boats ? Every other nation has 
 a factory for torpedoes ; have we any ? Has the mobilisation of the 
 torpedo-boats ever been thought of ? Will such ever be attempted ? 
 Under what conditions will our naval ports be able to defend them- 
 selves ? Will the guns on our coasts be of any use at night ? Are 
 the defence search-lights in position, and are they used in their 
 proper places ? Have we the necessary materiel to be used for the 
 line of torpedoes ? Is this materiel well taken care of ? Do the sub- 
 marine mines resist the explosion of neighbouring torpedoes ? Have 
 we any pattern of a contact torpedo ? Is it known how to moor a 
 torpedo ? Have we any impulse-tubes adapted to the defending 
 steamships ? Do these ships indeed exist, except on paper ? Would 
 they be available in time of war ? 
 
 To all these questions concerning the materiel, as well as those 
 relating to the personnel, we must answer absolutely in the nega- 
 tive. None of the problems relating to coast defence by torpedoes 
 and torpedo-boats have been either solved or even taken into con- 
 sideration. 
 
 No decisive experiments have been attempted, and on this point, 
 again, our superiority is a mere fallacy, which does not stand the 
 most cursory examination. I must be forgiven for thus brutally dis- 
 sipating the seductive illusions of M. X ; but it is most important 
 
 that the country should know the truth as to om* naval situation. 
 Now, this truth may be summed up in a few words. Neither in the 
 matter of personnel nor in that of materiel are we ready for war. 
 
 In the matter of personnel, notwithstanding the Maritime Inscrip- 
 tion, a worn-out institution which no longer satisfies the require- 
 ments of steam, every branch is deficient. We above all lack 
 engineers, and we should need hundreds for the extensive machinery 
 of our present and future navy. The list of our ofiicers, so unfortu- 
 nately reduced in 1872, was insufficient even for the Chinese war. 
 
 We have neither quantity nor quality ; not that our officers are 
 deficient in courage and ability, they proved the contrary in China, 
 but they have no knowledge of the locomotive torpedo, which will 
 henceforth take such an important part in naval warfare. Our 
 admirals go to the length of denying its merits ; and as om- captains 
 and lieutenants have never had a chance of gaining any knowledge of 
 it, they do not know whether they should share the opinion of their 
 chiefs, or give themselves up to the progress that fascinates without 
 convincing them. 
 
 Our situation with regard to materiel is still more serious. Our 
 first-class ironclads are worthless ; the other ironclads, cruisers, 
 despatch-vessels, gun-boats, &c., are worn out by the Chinese war, 
 and will come back in a state that will prevent their being of any use 
 for several years to come. This war has made havoc among the 
 
256 NAVAL EEFORM. 
 
 resources of our dock-yards ; not only have all our cruisers disappeared, 
 but we are short of both arms and ammunition. 
 
 A vessel no sooner returns from a voyage than it, is impatiently 
 expected in port, that the guns it carries may be removed on board 
 another vessel. As to our seventy torpedo-boats, ten may be counted, 
 perhaps, as equipped, but in a very indifferent fashion. In time of 
 war we could not put twenty in line, for want of equipment, officers, 
 and engineers. Nothing has been attempted since 1871 for the 
 defence of our mercantile ports and our coasts. Useless fortifications 
 have been constructed round our naval ports ; but the rest, that is 
 the whole wealth of our country, remains unprotected ; an adventurous 
 enemy might destroy our large commercial towns without encounter- 
 ing the least resistance, and without running the least danger 
 himself. 
 
 I only speak of Prance ; I set aside our defenceless colonies, our 
 naval stations, which are either non-existent or in embryo. I do 
 not wish to darken what is already a depressing picture. Some 
 people may still persist in denying its authenticity. I wish they 
 were in the right. Optimism is the fashion, and those who point 
 out the perils that beset us are treated as rebellious spirits and 
 revolutionists. Nevertheless, the longer I study the condition of our 
 navy, the more I am persuaded that I have given an exact description 
 of it ; and he who denies it remains wilfully blind, and shuts his eyes 
 to irreparable disaster. 
 
 LONDON ; FEINTED BY W. H. ALIEN AND CO., 18 WATEBLOO PLACE. 8.W, 
 
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