m iiiii^ i&. '0M ■7 <„ Mm WM¥m Amiim&mm(mm^jm^^^m^mMims:f Cornell University Library D 16.9.B62 On the strength of nations. 3 1924 027 922 438 Cornell University Library The original of tliis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924027922438 ON THE STRENGTH OF NATIONS. BT ANDREW BISSET, OF TEINITT COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE, M.A., AND OF LINCOLN'S INN, BAKKISTEK-AT-LAW. LONDON: SMITH, ELDER AND CO., 65, COENHILL. M.DCCC.LIX. {The right of Translation is reserved.l PREFACE. The causes of the strength and weakness of a nation, so far as our own country is concerned, and in con- tradistinction to its wealth and commercial prosperity, have for some time occupied my thoughts; and I have employed much time in investigating minutely the records of one portion of the history of England, with a view of pointing out the evils in our systems of government and taxation, which appear to me to have sown the seeds of future disasters. But it is only lately that the critical aspect of affairs in Europe induced me to open up the subject of " The Strength of Nations," in order to recal to my contemporaries the lessons of the past as warnings, in the hope that they may be used to correct present evils, and avert possible and perhaps imminent dangers. The Strength of Nations is a subject equally vast in its extent and in its importance; involving as it iv PREFACE. does an elucidation of the causes of the decline and fall of the great empires of antiquity, and the dimi- nution or decay of some kingdoms and states of modem times ; and to do full justice to so compre- hensive a theme, would require more time and space than are available to a writer having in view the application to the present crisis of principles and examples deduced from the facts of universal history. This will account for, and I hope excuse, the limi- tation of the scope of this volume, and also the stress that is laid upon physical force and armaments as elements of national strength. It will, however, be seen that I have by no means omitted from the argu- ment those moral and intellectual forces, and that spirit of patriotism, which are to the material power of a nation what the soul is to the body. Nations, like individuals, have their growing youth, their energetic manhood, their maturity and decline ; and to what height of power and greatness they may rise, how early and rapid may be their descent from the culminating point of their strength and pro- sperity to decay and ruin, depends upon the sound- PEEFACE. V ness and vigour of their constitution, the amount of moral and spiritual forces they have exerted, and the extent to which these powers have been kept in healthy exercise by good government The examples I have selected are those nations whose history is best known to us, and whose fate affords the most instructive instances of the operation of causes analogous to those which tend to weaken the strength of Britain. If it be too late to retrace the steps which our rulers have at various times taken in deviation from the right course, there is yet time to remedy in part the consequences of such errors, and to make up for the shortcomings which have led this country to the verge of a precipice, while the nation has been lulled into a dream of false security. And when the people of England are thoroughly aroused from their apathy to a sense of impending danger and neglected duties, the resolute determination of Englishmen will be shown in energetic action combined with an expres- sion of the popular will, which no government will dare openly to disregard. VI PREFACE. At a ftiture time, I may be able to treat more fully, if not exhaustively, of " The Strength of Na- tions;" in the meantime, I trust that the present volume may be found serviceable in directing public attention to a subject which I believe has not before been discussed in a separate treatise ; and which is, at the present time, of paramount importance to the safety and welfare of the country. August 25M, 1859. CONTENTS. CHAP. PAGE I. Peimaey Element of the Stkenqth of Natiohs 1 n. The Spaetans . . ... 9 in. The Athenians . . . . .24 IV. The Romans ...... 51 V. The Spaniaeds and the Tckks . . .67 VI. Civilization and Conquest — Heko-wosship and Detil-'worbhip . . . . .94 VII. The Nobmans . . . . . .125 VIII. " The Cheap Defence oe Nations " — The Ancient Enqlish National Defences . . . 147 IX The Deae Defence of Nations — The Modben English National Defences . . .192 X. England and Fbance .... 210 XI. The Naval Powebs of Eubope . . . 257 ON THE STRENGTH OF E^ATIOINTS. CHAPTER I. THE PEmAEY ELEMENT OF THE STRENGTH OE NATIONS. " When a strong man armed keepetli his palace, his goods are in peace : but when a stronger than he shall come upon him, and overcome him, he taketh jfrom him all his armour wherein he trusted, and divideth his spoils." This is as true now as it was two thousand years ago, and it nearly concerns all independent nations to look well to their strength, and to take order that a stronger nation do not come upon them and over- come them, and take from them not only their armour, hut all things that render life of value to them. B 2 STEENGTH OF NATIONS. [cHAP. I. Since the publication, in 1776, of Adam Smith's immortal work on the "Wealth of Nations," the wealth of nations has, in this country at least, engaged so much attention, that but little has been left for another quality of nations — their Strength; without which their wealth, with all its advantages, may be of little use, since it may be destroyed at any time with fearfal rapidity. There appears to be a time in the history of all powerful nations at which, while their wealth goes on in- creasing, their strength begins to decline, till — to use the words of Bacon* — it comes to "that, that not the hundredth poll will be fit for a helmet ; and so there will be great population and little strength." And it is also well to bear in mind another remark of Bacon in the same Essay: "Neither is money the sinews of war (as it is trivially said) where the sinews of men's arms in base and effeminate people are failing; for Solon said well to Crcesus (when in ostentation he showed him his gold) : * Sir, if any other comes that hath better iron than you, he will be master of all this gold.' " As soon as this current has fairly set in, unless its course can be arrested — ^which is a difficult if not an im- possible operation — the decay of that nation has commenced, and will continue, till the time arrives when its strength is inadequate for its defence, and its wealth becomes the prey of an invader. ♦ Essay on the True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates. CHAP. 1.] PEIMARY ELEMENT. 3 Adam Smith appears to consider this question to be satisfactorily solved by " the irresistible supe- riority" which, he says, " a well-regulated standing army has over a militia." And he mentions, as the first great revolution in the affairs of mankind of which history has preserved any distinct account, the victory which the standing army of Philip of Macedon obtained over what he terms " the gallant and well-exercised militias of the principal republics of ancient Greece."* This statement contains several grave errors. It is true that Philip's army may be termed a standing army, and it is also true — though Adam Smith has omitted that essential element, and therein lies one principal fallacy of his argument — that it was a standing army formed of good materials; but it is not true that the troops of Greece which it de- feated were at that time " gallant and well-exeixised militiias." " Indeed," as Mr. Grote has well observed,! " the Spartan infantry, from their peculiar and systematic training, possessed, though not in the days of Philip of Macedon, the arrangements and aptitudes of a good standing army." And it is no small proof of the superiority of a well-regulated standing army formed of good materials, that every Greek who con- trasted his own brave and patriotic but unsystema- tized militia with the symmetrical structure of the * Wealth of Nations, bk. v. ch. i. f HistoTy of Greece, vol. ii. p. 606. B 2 4 STRENGTH OF NATIONS. [cHAP. I. Lacedsemonian armed force, and the preparation of every Spartan for his duty by a painful discipUne and laborious drilling, experienced a feeling of inferio- rity which made him willingly accept the headship of "these professional artists in the business of war," as they are often denominated by the Greek writers.* But Adam Smith's words, " gallant and well-exer- cised militias," would lead to the inference that the armed forces of the several States of Greece were in as sound a condition at the time of the battle of Ghse- ronea as at the times of the battles of Marathon, Ther- mopylae, and Platsea. The fact was, however, very different. We have the best authority for the con- clusion that, in the course of the century preceding the battle of Charonea, the military excellence of the Lacedsemonian armed force had greatly declined, if it had not almost disappeared, and that Athens no longer possessed a " gallant and well-exercised militia." I will endeavour to explain the causes of this change in these two States respectively. Mr. Grote, indeed, seems to think that the subdi- vision of Greece into numerous independent States — a subdivision in great part arising from the moun- tainous nature of the country — proved finally the cause of her ruin,t and that, had the Amphictyonic * Grote, Tol.ii. pp. 608, 609. Plutarch. Pelop. c. 23: Tld.vTuv '&Kpot TexvXrai Kal iro^ioTai tSp TroXefUKwv ovte£ oi STraprtorot. Xenoph. " Eep. Lao." c. 14. AaKtSmiiovlovg Si h6vovq ti} ovn TexviruQ tuiv TroXE/iiKiav. t History of Greece, vol. ii. p. 299. CHAP. I.] PRIMARY ELEMENT. 5 Council really been the " commune Grsecise con- cilium" which Cicero calls it, united Hellas might have maintained her independence not only against the Macedonian kings, but even against the con- quering legions of Rome.* But the fact that Greece did maintain her independence against the great Persian invasion proves that her subdivision into numerous independent States v^as not the cause of her ultimate ruin. That cause must, I think, be looked for elsewhere. And in regard to the two principal States of Greece, Sparta and Athens, there exist sufficient data whereon to found a tolerably accurate conclusion. No union could ever have imparted a durable and healthy vitality to a nation with such a government as either the Spartan oHgarchy or the Athenian de- mocracy. The question of standing armies and militias I shall hereafter consider more in detail. But Adam Smith, in the exaggerated importance he appears to me to have attached to standing armies generally, has, I think, taken an erroneous view of this ques- tion. At the same time the general opinion of the other States of Greece respecting the effect of the Spartan discipline seems to prove the advantage of superior discipline, whether the troops possess- ing that discipline are called a militia or a standing army. It is a remarkable fact that the militias of * History of Greece, vol. ii. p. 332. 6 STEENGTH OF NATIONS. [cHAP. I. Epaminondas, Cromwell, and Washington beat the professional soldiers opposed to them. The fundamental element of a nation's strength is the physical hardihood of its people, combined with that force and energy of character which are the consequences of such hardihood, and the patriotism, or love of and pride in country, which is the con- sequence of some degree of good government. Accordingly, all nations which have been at any time strong have encouraged the use of manly and athletic exercises ; the neglect of which has a most pernicious effect, not only on the bodily strength, but on the bodily and mental health and courage of the community. For a coward — a man incapable of defending himself — as a celebrated writer * has observed, wants one of the most essential parts of the character of a man, being as much mutilated and deformed in his mind as a man who is deprived of some of his limbs, or has lost the use of them, is in his body.' And to prevent that sort of mental mutilation, deformity, and wretchedness which cow- ardice necessarily involves in it, from spreading through the great body of the people, deserves the most serious attention of the government; in the same manner as it would deserve its most serious attention to prevent a deadly pestilential disease from spreading itself among them. The great writer above referred to, however, does * Adam'Smith: Wealth of Nations, bk. v. ch. i. part iii. art. ii. CHAP. I.] PRIMAEY ELEMENT. 7 not appear to estimate truly the danger of such a disease ; when comparing it to a leprosy, he adds, " or any other loathsome and offensive disease, though neither mortal nor dangerous:" for the disease of cowardice, when it has to any extent attacked a nation, is not only dangerous but mortal. Now, though it is true that the greatest courage and determination and force of character, as well as vigour of intellect, may co-exist with a feehle con- stitution and frame of hody, yet, besides courage, bodily strength, hardihood, activity, power of endur- ance, and some skill in the use of arms, are essential for defence against an enemy ; and these qualities can only be attained and preserved by some degree of bodily training and practice in the use of arms — a familiarity with which of itself imparts to men a certain amount of courage and self-reliance. Ac- cordingly, all healthy and powerful nations have cultivated bodily strength and hardihood, from the early Persians- to' the English yeomen, whose strong right arms sent their deadly shafts among their enemies' ranks with such unerring aim and irresis- tible force. Of the careful training of the English archers, I shall have occasion to speak hereafter. While the Persians were in their healthy and vigo- rous state, the three great lessons the youth were taught, from five to twenty years of age, were to ride, to shoot with the bow, and to speak truth.* But the » Herod, i. 136. 8 STRENGTH OF NATIONS. [CHAP. I. Persians fell from the same cause which has destroyed so many nations — by the trunk of the tree becoming too weak to bear the branches : a process which com- menced, in their case, from the time when Cyrus led the hardy mountaineers of Persia against the Medes. In fact, this question can be more satisfactorily elucidated fi'om the negative than the positive as- pect of it; that is, from endeavouring to learn and to state accurately the principal causes which have led to the decline of the strength, and ultimately to the ruin, of nations. There are many symptoms by which the disease of the political body manifests itself; and the world is now old enough to supply an induction of facts recorded with sufficient accuracy to furnish some conclusions that may be of use to the present generation. In the following pages I will endeavour to show by such an induction, neces- sarily more or less imperfect, to what causes some of the most remarkable nations of the history of the world have been indebted, first, for their strength and prosperity, and afterwards for their weakness and ruin. CHAPTER II. THE SPAETANS. The Greeks, in their early and healthy state, paid the greatest possible attention to the cultivation of bodily strength and activity, by instituting public contests in running, leaping, wrestling, boxing, and throwing the quoit. And it is not unworthy of note that the prize was made of small value, that the combatants might be animated by the love of distinction, not of sordid gain. Of the Romans I shall speak in a subsequent chapter. Among the Greeks, the Spartans, as I have said, were prominent for their cultivation of the physical and moral qualities (I mean those moral qualities that relate to courage, fortitude, and patriotism,) that go to the formation of a nation's strength. One grand peculiarity of Sparta consisted in having military divisions quite distinct from the civil divisions: a dis- tinction which enabled the Spartans to render their military organization much more perfect than it ever was in the other States of Greece.* The special * See the admirable account of the Spartan institutions, civil and military, in Grote's History of Greece, vol. ii. part ii. chapters tI. & viii. 10 STEENGTH OF NATIONS. [CHAP. II. ctaracteristic of the Spartan system, and the pivot upon which all its arrangements turned, was what was called the en6moty. This was a small company of men, varying from twenty-five to thirty-six, drilled and practised together in military evolutions, and bound to each other by a common oath. Each enomoty had a separate captain, or en6motarch, the strongest and ablest soldier of the company, who always occupied the front rank, and led the en&moty when it marched in single file. In whatever number of ranks the en6moty was drawn up, the enomotarch usually occupied the front post on the left ; in tech- nical language, stood on the left flank of the front rank : and care was taken that both the front rank man and the rear rank man of each file * should be soldiers of particular merit. These small companies were taught to march in concert, to change rapidly from line to file, to wheel right or left, in such man- ner that the enomotarch and the other front rank men should always be the persons immediately op- posed to the enemy. Their step was regulated by the fife, which played in martial measures peculiar to Sparta, and was employed in actual battle as well as in military practice. So perfect was their discipline, * To render this clear, it is proper to state that the number of ranks; and the consequent number of men in a file, was more than two. Moutecuculi gives the following clear definition of rank and file: — " Rang est uu nombre de soldats ranges en ligne droite a cote I'un de I'autre. File est un nombre de soldats ranges en ligne droite I'un derrifere I'autre." — Mimoirea de Montecuculi, p. 5. Paris, 1760. CHAP. n.J THE SPAETANS. 11 that if their order was deranged by any adverse accident, scattered soldiers could spontaneously form themselves into the same order, and each man knew perfectly the duties belonging to the place into which chance had thrown him. Above the en6moty there were larger divisions, somewhat corresponding to the modern battalion, or regiment, and brigade, each having its respective commander. Orders were transmitted from the king, as commander-in-chief, to these officers, each of whom was responsible for the proper execution of them by his division ; whereas in the Athenian armies the orders of the commander- in-chief were proclaimed to the army by a herald — a very rude and imperfect contrivance. One element of the Spartan patriotism appears to be assignable to the greater liberty and respect en- joyed by the women of Sparta than by those of the other States of Greece ; the patriotism of the men being elevated by the sympathy of the other sex, which manifested itself publicly, in such a manner as not only to confirm the self-devotion of the sol- diers, but materially to assist the State in bearing up against public reverses. The Spartan matrons' exhortation to their sons when departing on foreign service, " Return either with your shield, or upon it," was no unmeaning form of words ; and one of the most striking incidents in Grecian history- is the contrast between the bitter suffering of those mothers who, after the fatal day of Leuctra, 12 STRENGTH OF NATIONS. [cHAP. n. had to welcome home their surviving sons in dishonour and defeat, and the comparative cheer- fulness of those whose sons had perished. The same spirit which animated the three hundred Spartans at Thermopylae, and which dictated the inscription on their monument, " O stranger ! tell the Lace- daemonians that we lie here obedient to their laws,"* also dictated the letter of Brasidas to the Ephori, containing only the words, " I will execute your orders in this war, or die :"t as well as the answer of the mother of Brasidas to the ambassadors from the Grecians in Thrace, who said that Brasidas had not left his equal behind him : " You mistake. My son was a man of great merit, but there are many superior to him in Sparta." | Now if we examine the condition of Sparta about 200 years later, that is, in the time of Agis III. (about 250 B.C.), we find the old discipline and mili- tary training altogether gone, or degenerated into mere forms, and the dignity and ascendancy of the State among its neighbours completely ruined. To- gether with this result, we find its citizens few in number, the bulk of them miserably poor, all the land in a small number of hands, and a numerous body of strangers or non-citizens domiciled in the town, and forming a powerful moneyed interest. What were the causes of this fatal change ? * Fausan. iii. 226. Strab. ix. 429. + T)' .1 •• ■? t Plut. Lac. Apophthegm. * ' ^"- ^^- CHAP. II. j THE SPAETANS. 13 Lord Bacon seems to intimate an opinion {Essay on the True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates) that the aversion of the Spartans to the admission of strangers to the right of citizenship is sufficient of itself to account for the decline and fall of Sparta. It cer- tainly may in part account for Sparta's not becoming, like Eome, a great empire. But the fact that the feeling of the Romans on this point (of whom Bacon truly says that never any State was so open to receive strangers into their body as were the Romans) did not preserve them at last from the same fate which had befallen Sparta, seems to prove that we must look for other causes than this. Mr. Grote, who has examined and weighed all the evidence bearing on this subject with singular care and ability, has come to the conclusion that, though Greek theorists found a difficulty in determining under what class they should place the Spartan government, it was in substance a close, unscrupu- lous, and well-obeyed oligarchy ; including within it, as subordinate, those portions which had once been dominant — the kings and the senate, — and softening the odium, without abating the mischief, of the sys- tem, by its annual change of the ruhng ephors.* It followed, as one of the consequences of such an ohgarchy, that the number of qualified citizens went on continually diminishing; and of this diminished number, the proportion of those who were needy grew ' Grote: History of Greece, vol. ii. p. 476. 14 STRENGTH OF NATIONS. [CHAP. U. larger and larger, since tlie landed property tended constantly to concentrate itself in fewer hands. To these principal causes of decay were added sub- sidiary ones. I have said that the Spartan system of training cultivated, with the physical qualities of bodily strength, activity, and hardihood, or endurance, the moral qualities of fortitude and patriotism. But the system did not cultivate, in the least degree, the moral qualities of justice and humanity. On the contrary, in their aggressions on other States, and in their treatment of the races which they had subjected, they practised combinations of injustice, fraud, and atrocity, which, as Mr. Grote has observed, " even yet stand without parallel in the long list of pre- cautions for fortifying unjust dominion."* And this indicates another leading defect in the Spartan in- stitutions, which was the opposite extreme to the leading defect of the Athenian government. As the ruin of the Athenian government arose, as we shall see, from an excess of talk in the shape of long harangues, instead of dialectical discussion, one great evil ia the Spartan government arose from an absence of all public discussion whatever : for the Spartan character was of an eminently un- intellectual type ; destitute even of the rudiments of letters, rendered savage and fierce by exclusive and overdone bodily discipline, and, if possessing many of * Grote, vol. ii, p. 497. CHAP. II. J THE SPARTANS. 15 the qualities requisite to procure dominion, possess- ing none of those calculated to render dominion popular or salutary to the subject. This intellectual defect of the Spartan character becomes more strik- ing, when we find that it rendered all their excellent bodily training unavailing against inferior bodily training, where the inferiority was compensated by the leadership of a great and commanding mind. For the bodily training at Sparta combined strength and agility with universal aptitude and endurance, and steered clear of that mistake by which Thebes and other cities impaired the effect of their gymnas- tics — the attempt to create an athletic habit suited for the games, but suited for nothing else.* Yet Thebes, by the aid of one great mind leading her councils and commanding her armies, gave Sparta an overthrow from which she never recovered, — from which, indeed, the weak part of her system, particularly the accumulation of the land in very few hands, rendered it impossible for her to recover. In a society so eminently unintellectual as that of Sparta, it may be pronounced impossible for a first- rate general to be produced. It may be true that great generals are born, not made : but their genius requires an atmosphere somewhat intellectual for its * Cornelius Nepos, however, or the writer under that name ("Epam." 0. 2), distinctly states that Epaminoudas, in his own physical education, took especial care to avoid this error : " Non tam magnitudini virium servivit, quam velocitati; illam enim adathle- tarum usum, hanc ad belli existimabat utiMtatem pertinere." 16 STEENGTH OF NATIONS. [CHAP. II. development; and we hear nothing of great gene- rals (if such there are) born among savages. The Spartan training did, indeed, include the cunning as well as the hardihood and ferocity of the savage. But the stirategy of a great general must soar some- what beyond the cunning of an ordinary savage, or even of a Spartan. Indeed, two of the greatest generals the world has yet seen, the one in ancient, the other in modern times, were philo- sophers as well as generals and statesmen. The first gained the battle of Leuctra, the second the battle of Leuthen, both acting on the same strate- gical principle. The principle upon which Epaminondas acted at Leuctra and Mantinea, and Frederick at Rosbach and Leuthen, consisted in bringing a superiority of numbers to bear upon a particular point, and by defeating that part, and driving it in upon the rest, throwing into confusion and defeating the whole. The way in which Epaminondas explained this prin- ciple to the Thebans, who stood somewhat in awe of the acknowledged military superiority of the Spartans, was this : having taken an adder of the largest size, he showed it to them ; and then, in their presence having shattered the head of the animal, he said, " You see that the rest of the body is useless, the head being gone. So is it with the head of our enemies ; if we break to pieces the Spartan part, the rest of the body, consisting of their allies, will be CHAP. n.j THE SPAETANS. 17 useless."* Now as it appears that the Spartan com- manders always drew tip their line of battle so that the Spartans formed one wing of themselves,! the principle of Epaminondas was the same as that of Frederick. This was the principle on which Frederick acted always. Thus, Mitchell, the English ambassador,, speaking from his own personal observation and the king's own words, says of the battle of Kolin, which Frederick lost by the failure of his intention : " His intention was to have flanked their right;" and of the battle of Zomdorff : " The king's intention was to attack with his left the right of the enemy in flank, and to refuse his right." * Polysen. li. 3 : 'ETrajuvm/Sag TrporpeTTOiv QtiPaiovg TrpoGii/Mg dpfiijffai s-jri AaKe8aifioviovgf fuyuTTOv £Xiv (njWaf3(jjv, sSei^ev avToig, cat iravTtav ivavriov ttiv Ki^akqv tov Brijpiov ffvvTpiypag' " ^Oparsj" i^jj, '* Zri rb \onrdv (T&fia dxfytjffTOVj r^c Ke^aXrjg otxofi£vyg' oiJrw dij at Twv TToXefiiuv Ke(pa\cu' ijvrs rb XaKuivuchv TfyvTO trvvrpi^MfieVf to \uiir6v B&iia tS>v avfijidxi^v ajxprfcrov." f Thucyd. v. 71. On the other hand the Roman legions occupied the centre (mediam aciem tenebani), the allies and auxiliaries the wings (cornua). — ^Liv. xxxvii. 39. This arrangement, howeyer, was not always ohserved. At the battle of Marathon, the native Persians and Sakse, the best troops in the whole army, were placed in the centre, which they considered as the post of honour, and which was occupied by the Persian king himself when present at a battle. The right wing was so regarded by the Greeks. In the order of battle of the Turks, adopted and constantly followed ever since the victorious battle of Ikonium in 1386, the European troops occupy the left wing, the Asiatic troops the right wing, the Janissaries the centre. The Sultan, or the Grand Vizir, sur- roimded by the national cavalry, or Spahis, is in the central point of alL— Grote's History of Greece, vol. iv. p. 468. Von Hammer: Geschichte des Osmanniscken Beichs, bk. v. vol. i. p. 199. C 18 STRENGTH OF NATIONS. [OHAP. 11. It will be at once seen that the consequence of this movement is to bring a superiority of force to bear upon the enemy at a particular point : a prin- ciple which, though it may appear, as thus stated, extremely simple, is attended with so many diflS- culties in practice, that it has been found to require military genius of the very highest order for its successful execution. Frederick has himself related the careful precautions which he took to surmount those difficulties at the battle of Leuthen, and to prevent the failure of his plan, which had taken place at the battles of Prague and Kolin. His plan was, as he has himself explained it, to bring his whole army (which did not amount to half that of the enemy in numbers) to bear upon the left flank of the imperialists, to make the greatest possible efforts with his right, and to refiise his left with so much precaution as to render impossible blunders like those which had been committed at the battle of Prague, and had caused the loss of that of Kolin. The first line received orders to advance en echelon, the battalions at fifty paces distance behind one another, so that, the line being in motion, the extremity of the right would be a thousand paces in advance of the extremity of the left; and this disposition rendered it impossible for the troops to engage the enemy without orders.* Some notes, printed in the Quarterly Eeview, of a * Hist, de la Guerre de Sept Ans, tome i. p. 232, etseq. CHAP. II.] THE SPARTANS. 19 conversation with Sir Arthur Wellesley shortly before his departure for Spain, afford another illus- tration of the same principle. He is represented as sajring that he was not so much disheartened as others by the apparent invincibiHty of the French armies under Napoleon. The French charged in column, and were successful because the troops opposed to them would not stand the charge; but he had confidence, he said, in the steadiness of the British troops ; and if they stood firm, this would have the effect of giving them the advantage of superiority of numbers at that particular point, and also of a converging fire — a fire from the circum- ference to the centre ; while the enemy could return only a fire from the centre to the circumference, which is feeble in comparison. The measures adopted by Epaminondas after the battle of Leuctra proved him to be as great a statesman as he was a general. He founded the town of Messene, with a surrounding territory, as a refuge, in the form of an independent State, for the unfortunate Messenians, who had been so long exiles, or oppressed as the Helots of the Spartans, and thus effectually secured the former against the haughty and inhuman tyranny of the latter. This will appear but a just retribution. Yet, though Sparta's supremacy over the rest of Greece was thus destroyed, her independence would have con- tinued as long as her military excellence continued. c 2 20 STRENGTH OF NATIONS. [cHAP. II. But the same vices in her system, which had brought upon her the disastrous days of Leuctra and Mantinea, with all their fatal consequences, were sapping the strength of her government, and proved its ultimate destruction. With all their pretensions to religion, the Spartans neglected as much as the Romans (who in some points resembled them, though they were essentially different in others) the admonition of those suffering in Tartarus for injustice on earth : " Discite justitiam moniti, et non temnere Divos." The Athenians neglected the same admonition as much as either; while what strength existed at one time in the Athenian system of government was utterly destroyed by the weakness of a democracy, as the strength of the Spartan government was destroyed by the weakness of an oligarchy. It is not in the nature of human affairs that weak governments should stand, even if they should be altogether exempt from the vices of injustice and oppression ; but their destruction will be still more sure and speedy when, like the Spartan oligarchy and the Athenian democracy, they seek first to obtain and then to keep dominion over other States, by means which are utterly repugnant to the very first prin- ciples of justice and humanity. According to the careful investigation of Mr. Grote, landed property was always unequally divided at Sparta, nor were there any laws which tended to equalize it. Mr. Grote also shows that CHAP. n.J THE SPAETANS. 21 the idea of LycurguSj as an equal partitioner of lands, was a dream of the century of Agis and Cleomenes. The mode in which Lycurgus suc- ceeded in giving to Sparta the strength which it long possessed in an eminent degree, was this : — He created in the Spartan citizens " unrivalled habits of obedience, hardihood, self-denial, and military aptitude; complete subjection on the part of each individual to the local public opinion, and prefer- ence of death to the abandonment of Spartan maxims ; intense ambition on the part of every one to distinguish himself within the prescribed sphere of duties, with little ambition for anything else."* What Lycurgus did, was to impose a vigorous public discipline, with simple clothing and fare, incumbent alike upon the rich and the poor. This was his special gift to Greece, according to Thucy- dides,t and his great point of contact with demo- cracy, according to Aristotle. | But he took no pains either to restrain the fiirther enrichment of the rich, or to prevent the further impoverishment of the poor ; and such neglect is one of the capital defects for which Aristotle censures him. § The philosopher also particularly notices the tendency of property at Sparta (from causes A\rhich it is * Grote: History of Greece, vol. ii. p. 519. t Thucyd. i. 6. X Aristot. Polit. iv. 7, 4, 5 ; viji. 1, 3. § Grote, vol. il p. 539. 22 STEENGTH OF NATIONS. [CHAP. ir. unnecessary to specify here, but which will be found enumerated in Mr. Grrote's History of Greece,) to concentrate itself in fewer hands, unop- posed by any legal hindrances. By whatever means the process was effected, we know that in the time of Agis III., about 250 years before Christ, when all the land of Sparta was in a very small number of hands, when the citizens were few in number, and the bulk of them miserably poor, the old disci- pline and the public mess (as far as the rich were concerned) had degenerated into mere forms.* The attempt of Agis to bring back the State to its ancient strength, by again admitting the disfran- chised poor citizens, re-dividing the lands, cancelling all debts, and restoring the public mess and military training in all their strictness, though it failed — partly from the want of ability in the sincere enthusiast who undertook it, and his misconception of what Lycurgus had really done, partly from its being made too late — at least proves the state of degra- dation and decrepitude to which Sparta had then fallen, and indicates some of the chief causes of that decrepitude and degradation. About two thousand years after Agis had paid with his own life, and the lives of his wife and mother,! for the noble and patriotic, but treacherous dream of a regenerated country, the dream of Agis actually oecame reality, in a nation which was fast * Grote, Tol. ii. p. 527. f lb. p. 534. CHAP. n.J THE SPARTANS. 23 perishing under the evils of a government which, like that of Sparta, favoured an exceedingly unequal distribution of property. The French Revolution, amid many crimes, may certainly be said to have regenerated the French nation as Agis proposed to regenerate the Spartan nation, and by means nearly similar to those proposed by him. It is remarkable, too, that the French king, Louis XVI., a man, like Agis, eminent for his virtues, met with the fate of Agis. As Agis, whose sincerity is attested by the fact that his own property and that of his female relatives, among the largest in the State, were cast in the first sacrifice into the common stock, became the dupe of unprincipled coadjutors, and perished in the vain attempt to realize his scheme by per- suasion ;* so Louis, with probably as sincere a desire to do what was best for the French nation, perished, like Agis, through the intrigues of the imprincipled people about him. But, though the fate of Louis was like that of Agis, the fate of France was very different from that of Sparta, * Grote, vol. ii p. 528. 24 STRENGTH OF NATIONS. [cHAP. m. CHAPTER III. THE ATHENIANS. We have the evidence of the most imexceptionable witnesses, — of Socrates, in so far as Plato can be considered as a trustworthy expounder of the opi- nions of Socrates, of Plato, of Thucydides, of De- mosthenes, — that, at the point of time whereof Adam Smith speaks, Athens no longer possessed, as he affirms,' a " gallant and well-exercised militia." The Athenian system of military training was never, at its best time, to be compared for excellence to the Spartan. Yet the result at Marathon, and on many other occasions, proved that in its earKer and better days, the Athenian armed force well de- served the description of a " gaUant and well-exercised militia." The fact, too, of such a citizen as Socrates serving repeatedly as a private soldier, proves that then the soldier-citizen system was effectually car- ried out. At the siege of Potidasa, Socrates won the prize of valour, but voluntarily yielded it to his pupil Alcibiades. Alcibiades himself confessed that he owed his life to Socrates ; and that in a certain CHAP. III.] THE ATHENIANS. 25 action, where he was severely wounded, Socrates alone prevented both his person and his arms from falling into the hands of the enemy. At the battle of DeHmn, during the Peloponnesian war, where the Athenians were defeated by the Boeotians, Socrates also behaved with the greatest bravery; and it is said that he saved the life of Xenophon, who had fallen from his horse : Strabo says he carried him several furlongs, till he was out of danger. After the battle, as Socrates was retiring with Laches and Alcibiades, he told them that he had just received an admonition not to follow the road that most of their men had taken. They who continued in that road were pursued by the enemy's cavalry, who, coming up with them, killed many on the spot, and took the others prisoners; while Socrates, who had taken another route, arrived safe at Athens with those who accompanied him. The division of labour had not then reached that point when philosophers and politicians could sit in whole skins at home, and with a " dastardly spurt of the pen," or as dastardly a wag of the tongue, send their brethren forth id battles, the dangers of which they did not share. But if the time for such division of labour had not then actually come, it was fast coming, and was very near at hand. The poison of the orators was rapidly doing its work upon the Athenian democracy ; and we have the testimony of Plato for the fatal effect 26 STRENGTH OF NATIONS. [CHAP. III. it produced during the course of one generation. Pericles first introduced the practice of paying the Athenians for attending at the public assemblies, and hearing him harangue. Plato, by the mouth of Socrates in his dialogue the " Gorgias," thus de- scribes the consequences of this measure : — " I hear it said," says Socrates, " that Pericles made the Athenians idlers, and cowards, and gossips, and co- vetous ; being the first who estabhshed the system of wages." * The Athenian sovereign multitude found it far pleasanter to be paid for listening to Pericles than to earn an honest subsistence by any sort of labour ; and they also found it very far pleasanter to hire foreign mercenaries to fight their battles than to fight those battles themselves ; in fact, without going farther than the evidence of those very orators, the public orations of Demosthenes afford abundant proof that, in his time, the Athe- nian government had fallen into a condition of hope- less imbecility. Never, perhaps, was the decline of a nation's strength * Plat. Gorg. p. 148. Bip: — Tavri ydp (yoiyc axoiia IltpucXia TrcTroLijKevai ASrivaiovQ dpyoig, xai dciKoig, Kai XoiKoVQ, Kai ^iXapyipovQ, £ie jwrBofpopdv TrpuiTOV KaTaaTrjaavTa. The answer to the argument of Demosthenes (" Contra Timokrat." c. 26) that if this payment were suspended the judicial as well as the administrative system of Athens would at once fall to pieces, is, that Athens was stronger before the estabUshment of it, and the vices and weakness of her government were so great under it, that the falling to pieces of such a system could not make things worse, and might have a chance of making them better. CHAP. m.J THE ATHENIANS. 27 coincident with the increase of its wealth (using "wealth" not in its primary sense of "weal" or "well- being," but in its now usual sense of " riches") more signally exemplified than in the case of Athens. As the power of Athens extended, and brought tribute from her subject States, the Athenians thus obtained the means of living without labour, and of amusing themselves with poets, painters, sculptors, and ora- tors. The same thing happens, indeed, more or less in the case of every State, as its revenue becomes great. Those who enjoy its revenues become rich, and can afFord to devote themselves wholly to amuse- ment. But the result, when those who, in the capa- city of sovereign, divide the revenue among them constitute the whole nation, as at Athens, has the effect of making the whole nation averse to labour, and, it would seem, also averse to danger. To use the illustration of Socrates, they are crammed with ports, and docks, and fortifications, and revenues, till they are in a state of bloated repletion, and are neither so healthy nor so strong as when they had no foreign revenues, and a small town so unfortified that they considered it indefensible against the host of the Persians. The result, according to the testi- mony of Plato, who had the best means of being well-informed on the matter, was to make the Athe- nians idlers and cowards. The opinion attributing this effect altogether to the mismanagement of Pe- ricles, probably awards to that orator rather more 28 STRENGTH OF NATIONS. [cHAP, HI. than in strict justice belongs to him. But we have good authority for the fact that Athens, after the time of Pericles, and indeed at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war (though even then such citizens as Socrates still persevered in performing their military duties), no longer possessed a gallant militia. The time of the sovereign people was divided between their business and their amusements. Their business consisted in listening to the adulation of their orators ; their amusements, in listening to the adulation of their poets : for Socrates proved, in the same Dialogue in which he showed so fully the de- structive influence of orators, that even of that grave and magnificent art. Tragic Poetry, the aim was simply to gratify the spectators ; since, while it does not avoid things which are pleasant but bad, it does avoid things disagreeable but useful. Poetry on the stage is then a kind of adulatory rhetoric addressed to a popular assembly composed of men, women, and children. It is related that Solon, after hearing Thespis in one of his own compositions, asked him if he was not ashamed to utter such falsehoods before so large an audience? And when Thespis replied that tlere was no harm in saying and doing such things merely for amusement, Solon indignantly exclaimed, striking the ground with his stick : " If once we come to praise and esteem such amusement as this, we shall quickly find the effects of it in our CHAP. III.] THE ATHENIANS. 29 daily transactions!"* This applies still more strongly to the subsequent comic writers. The event seemed to confirm the truth of the great Athenian legislator's opinion. On a certain' day in the year 424 before Christ, the comedy called "The Clouds," which Aristo- phanes had written against Socrates, was performed at Athens. If a stranger at Athens on that day, after visiting the fortifications, the arsenal, the port, and the docks of the Athenians, and hearing the enumeration of their present revenues and of the projects for their future increase by the conquest of Sicily and other countries, had then gone to the theatre and listened to the witty but false and scurrilous representation given by the satirist of the philosopher — in which the only man of that time who had the courage and the wisdom to tell the Athe- nians the truth as to their political condition, is held up to public ridicule and obloquy, as the representa- tive of those Sophists whom he lived only to refute — the stranger would hardly have thought that the fabric which was so fair to look upon, combining so much material splendour and so much intellectual activity, was already sapped to its foundations, and in a single century from that time would be nothing but a ruin. With all that outside splendour, with all that in- * Plutarch. Solon, 29. Diogen. Laert. i. 59. Mr. Grote remarks : " It is curious to contrast Solon's reverence for the old epic with the unqualified repugnance which he manifested towards Thespis and the icama,."— History of Greece, vol. iii. p. 194. 30 STRENGTH OF STATIONS. [cHAP. in. tellectual activity, with all those triumphs of what are called the fine arts, which have excited the admiration of all succeeding generations of civilized men, the Athenian people were then but a nation of Sybarites and cowards; who, amid many crimes, into which injustice and inhumanity entered largely as ingredients — for cowardice and cruelty are pro- verbially found together — ^branded themselves with eternal disgrace by the judicial murder of their wisest and most virtuous fellow-citizen — Socrates: though to compare the virtue of Socrates with the general Athenian standard of his age would be doings him but scanty justice. In regard to the mass of the Athenians it may perhaps be said, with some degree of truth, that with their military virtue had gone all other virtue. Mili- tary virtue is sure to be destroyed in time by a bad government, whether that bad government be the government of the few as at Sparta, of the many as at Athens, or of one as at many other places. But it is instructive to note the way in which the corrupting influence of wealth, introducing luxury, and idleness, and aversion to military service, does its work. In a democracy, like Athens, it corrupts directly the whole mass, by giving to each citizen the means of idle- ness and the dream of power without labour and without danger. In an oligarchy, like Sparta, it corrupts the few who are rich, and destroys the miUtary spirit and patriotism of the rest. In a CHAP. III. J THE ATHENIANS. 31 despotism of one, it acts somewhat in the same way as in an oligarchy. Aristophanes has introduced ^schylus in the " Frogs," contending that dramatic works should be so written as to afford instruction ; that, as school- masters are the teachers of children, poets are the teachers of men.* The result, however, would seem to show that all the teaching of the grave tragic poets, and aU the wit and satire of the scurri- lous comic poets, are altogether unavailing to open the eyes of men corrupted by power which they know not how to use wisely. But if, according to Socrates and Plato, the poets were as ineffectual guides of the Athenian people as the orators, this at least may be said for some of the comic poets, that if they failed to save their countrymen from the impending ruin, it was not for want of telling them of their personal vices — vices of a kind and degree sufficient to account for the ruin of any State, with- out reference to the form of government, whether it was an Athenian democracy, a Spartan or Vene- tian oligarchy, or a Turkish monarchy. We may read what is commonly called History for a lifetime without learning so much about the brutality of Athenian manners and the depravity of Athenian morals, as we may learn from a few lines of the "Achamians," the "Knights," the "Clouds," the • ToXe flip ydp TraiSapioiaiv ian SiSdoKaXos oane ^(idliu, roXinvS' rifiiaai iroifirai. — Aristoph. Ban. 1053. 32 STRENGTH OF NATION'S. [cHAP. UI. "Plutus," the "Frogs," and the "Lysistrata" of Aristophanes. The private morals of the Athenians were on a level with their public morals ; which, as will be shown, were summed up in the principle of universal tyranny and plunder. It would seem as if Adam Smith, having deter- mined to prove the superiority of standing armies over militias, and to find facts in support of his con- clusion, was so intent upon this object as to shut his eyes to the facts that were against him, and even to forget, when he asserted that Philip's standing army vanquished "the gallant and well-exercised militias of the principal republics of ancient Greece," that he had himself, only about ten pages before, used the following words : " After the second Per- sian war the armies of Athens seem to have been generally composed of mercenary troops, consist- ing, indeed, partly of citizens, but partly, too, of foreigners." Even at the beginning of the Pelopon- nesian war, the Athenians depended chiefly on mer- cenary forces J* and when, near a century later, Demosthenes was urging them to serve in person, he seemed to regard it as a considerable point gained if he could succeed in getting even a fourth of the force to be raised to consist of Athenian citizens.f * Thucydides (i. 121) represents the Corinthian ambassadors saying: — iivrirfi ydp AQrjvaiuv )j iivafug /uiXXov ij ouaia, ^ Si r/fierspa rdlg (rw/iatrt roirXkov laxoovaa rj ToTg ;^pi3/ia(Ti. f Phitipp. i. C. 8 : Xkyti) Srj Toiig iravraQ aTpaniirag SiaxiXiove' Toiruiv 6k, ABrivaiovQ ftjfii Siiv (ivai TnvTaicoaiovQ, CHAP, in.] THE ATHENIANS. 33 Demosthenes also charges them not only with de- pending almost entirely on mercenaries, but also with paying their mercenaries very irregularly, and even suffering great losses and disasters from not paying them at all.* The generals being often foreigners, as well as those mercenary troops, have no check whatever upon their proceedings, and not only serve ill, but deceive and defraud their employers, the sovereign multitude, engaged at Athens in amusing themselves with their orators and poets, f It is impossible to conceive any amount of incapa- city, feebleness, and disorder beyond that exhibited by the Athenian democracy in the last half-century of its existence — that is, in the half-century before the battle of Chaeronea. Their government, as Demosthenes told them, was all talk and no do. J And when they did anything, it was always too late.§ They locked the stable door when the horse was stolen. Having shown that the Athenians were what Socrates describes them as being in his time, I will now endeavour to show the influence of the orators in producing that result. * Philipp. i. c. 9. t Fhilipp. i. c. 15. J Olynth. i. c. 5 : iiQ airag fikv Xoyog, av airy rci irpdy/mTa, liArawv Ti faivtTcu xal Ktvbv, iidKurra Sk 6 irapd rije ri^urkpaQ TtoKtlilQ, § Philipp. i. c. 14 ; also Orat. de Pace ; and Philipp. iv. : oXXoi navTiQ avdpoiToi irpA tZv vpayimriav tiuiOaai )(p^a9ac T(p l3ovKaiea9af vfitie Sk /UTd to, irpay/jora. 34 STRENGTH OF NATIONS. [CHAP. IIL If it be true, as Mr. Grote contends,* that not only the oratory of Demosthenes and Pericles, and the colloc[uial magic of Socrates, but also the philo- sophical speculations of Plato and the systematic politics, rhetoric, and logic of Aristotle, are traceable to the practice of public speaking in the shape of long harangues and dialectic discussion, it is admitted by the same historian f that the power of speech in the direction of public affairs became more and more obvious, developed, and irresistible towards the cul- minating period of Grecian history — the century preceding the battle of Ghseronea ; till at last it reached its highest point and Greece its destruction at the same time. But whether or not it be true- that the powers of thought of Socrates and Plato are in any degree attributable to this practice, it appears to me of the first moment to endeavour to show what were the opinions of Plato and his master Socrates respecting the effects of oratory on the well- being of a nation, and how far those opinions were borne out by the result which followed a very few years after Plato's death. The world was too young then to have furnished data for a political philosophy, but it is wonderful how truly the inspiration of Plato had diviued what the experience of the succeeding two thousand years was to confirm: namely, that orators are the ruin of every State in which they obtain predominance. * History of Greece, Tol. ii. p. 106. f Ibid. p. 105. CHAP. III. J THE ATHENIANS. 35 The pestilential influence of orators formed, ac- cording to the evidence of Plato's Dialogues, the constant topic of Socrates' advice and warnings to his countrymen. The Gorgias in particular, one of the most celebrated of Plato's works, is almost entirely devoted to that subject. When one reads the Gorgias of Plato, and sees how Socrates esta- blishes his conclusions by arguments, to use his own words, strong as iron and adamant,* and reflects how little effect for good those arguments produced upon his countrymen, and that with that foolish democracy the sophistry and adulation of demagogues bore down the wisdom enforced by the "colloquial magic" of Socrates, one may well be tempted to despair for mankind, and to feel that, as those arguments were, when uttered, ineffectual to save a State rushing to its destruction, so to attempt to reproduce any of them now will be but a labour in vain. Nevertheless, I win state shortly some of his conclusions. He points out the constant habit of orators and sophists (for Socrates classes them together : a sophist and an orator, he says, are the same thing, or very nearly so,t) of answering a short question by a long harangue beside the point. Thus in the Protagoras, Protagoras having made a very long speech, instead of giving a short answer to a short question, Socrates * Plat. Gorg. p. 134, Bip,: mStipole Kal ddajiavrivoig \6yoig. f Plat. Gorg. p. 157, Bip. ; Tavrbv tan aofiarrji xal priTbip, fi iyyig n sal irapairKliaiov, D 2 36 STEENGTH OF NATIONS. [CHAP. UI. said : — " If a man were to apply to Pericles, or any- other of the famous orators, he might hear from them as fine a speech as that which Protagoras has made : but if he were to put a question to them, they could no more answer, or ask again, than an inani- mate book ; but like brass, which if struck gives out a loud sound, and makes a long reverberation, unless some one lays hold of it and stops it, so the orators make answer to a short question by an inordinately long harangue."* Farther on in the same Dialogue, where Socrates is pressing Protagoras hard on the point under discussion, Protagoras again flies off into a long speech, filled with illustrations, on a topic very distantly connected with that which they were dis- cussing. At the conclusion of this by-the-mark ora- tion, he was loudly applauded. Whereupon Socrates observed that he had a short memory (as many of us have, at least, for long speeches), and that if a man made a long speech to him he always forgot what it was about. As therefore, if he were deaf, Protagoras would think it necessary to speak to him in a louder than his ordinary voice, so, as he was forgetful, he hoped that Protagoras would shorten his answers, and accommodate their length to his capacity. Upon this, Protagoras lost his temper, as sophists and ora- tors are apt to do when their sovereign infallibility is questioned. In the Gorgias, Socrates being asked by Polus * Plat. Prot, p. 124, Bip. CHAP, ni.] THE ATHENIANS. 37 to tell him what art he considers rhetoric to be, answers, "No art at all: though a kind of skill." Being further questioned, he says that he also con- siders cookery to be no art, but a kind of skill, like rhetoric ; and that cookery and rhetoric are branches of the same pursuit. Being asked what pursuit, he rephes that he fears it would be ill-bred to say the truth ; that he does not like to say it, lest he should appear to be satirizing Gorgias' profession. Gorgias desiring him to speak freely, Socrates said that he considered rhetoric to be a pursuit not go- verned by art, but belonging to a mind adroit, and bold, and eminently fitted by nature for intercourse with men : that he called it, in short, adulation. The word used by Plato, which I have here trans- lated " bold," is av^^uaq, which properly means " manly, masculine, courageous." Hobbes uses a different word to express his notion of the leading quality of the rhetorical mind : " Impudence in demo- cratical assemblies does almost all that's done ; 'tis the goddess of rhetoric, and carries proof with it. For what ordinary man will not from so great bold- ness of affirmation conclude there is great probability in the thing affirmed?"* It may be of importance to call attention here to the great disadvantage in the modem systems of education, arising from the works of Cicero being so much more studied and put into the hands of the » Hobbes' Behemoth, p. 113 : ed. London, 1682. 38 STRENGTH OF NATIONS. [CHAP. III.^ young than those of Plato. Cicero was as inferior to Socrates in real courage as in true philosophy. His idea of the highest type of human nature is what he calls a perfect orator, that is, a man who carries this pursuit, which Plato in the Gorgias proves to be so base and pernicious an employment of the intel- lectual faculties, to its utmost height. In doing this, instead of enforcing by example and precept, sim- plicity, compactness, and perspicuity in language by the use of the fewest and most apt and simple words, arranged in their most natural order, he has introduced into language verbosity, complication, confusion, and what is falsely called " fine " writing. And the tendency of modern education being to make pedants, not practical men of business, or great statesmen and great warriors, he is admired and imitated, while the true view of the question, as developed by Socrates and Plato, is unknown or kept out of sight. It is a remarkable proof of this, that in his Dialogue De Oratore, in which he imitates the form of Plato's Dialogues, which was all he was capable of imitating — for Plato's dialec- tical powers and dramatic talent were equally beyond his reach — ^he introduces one of the speakers enun- ciating this opinion, which Plato had put into the mouth of Socrates in the Gorgias — that eloquence is not an art, because it depends not on knowledge, and that the great object of an orator is to recommend himself to his clients and to prepossess the judges in CHAP. ni.J THE ATHENIANS. 39 his favour — only for the purpose of refuting him. No one who is competent to give an opinion on the subject would hesitate for a moment as to the com- parative value of the arguments of Cicero and Plato. Dr. Franklin, who in some points of his character bore a considerable resemblance to Socrates, has in his Autobiography pointed out the importance of teaching young men to discuss rather than to harangue — of practising them in dialectics rather than in rhetoric. But, unfortunately, the works of the *' fine-writing " pedants are the books in repute with those who have the control of modem education both in England and America.* Socrates having shown what sort of a thing oratory is, then proceeds to show to what ends orators use the power they attain in a State, and to. prove by one of the most remarkable displays of his wonderful dialec- tical powers, by a demonstration as close and as clear as any in Euclid, that to injure is a greater evil than to be injured ; that injustice is the greatest of evils, punishment the cure of it, impunity the permanence of it ; to be unjust and to be punished, the greatest of aU evils except one ; to be unjust with impunity the greatest of aU. He thence concludes that rhe- toric is of no use to us for defending our own injus- tice, or that of our friends or our country. In the * The notes and commentaries in the editions of Select Orations of Cicero, recently published both in England and America, for the use of schools and colleges, may be cited as examples of this. 40 STRENGTH OF NATIONS. [cHAP. in, coiirse of the discussion, he says to Polus : " Do yoti think it a good thing for a person to accomplish what he thinks fit, if he is without good sense ? And is this what you call being powerful ? " " No," replies Polus. " Then," continues Socrates, "if you would refute me, you must show that orators have good sense, and that rhetoric is an art, and not an adulation. But though you shoijld leave me unre- futed, orators and despots, who do whatever they think fit in a State, will be never the better for it. Power, you say, is a good thing. But to effect what we think fit, being without good sense, you yourself dlow to be a bad thing." He thence concludes that if any one, being an orator or a despot, unjustly kills any one, or banishes him, or takes from him his property, thinking it to be a good thing for him to do so, when in reality it is a bad thing, such power is an evil for the orator or the despot himself as well as for others; and they who possess it are unen- viable and miserable. Socrates having then shown that when the government is either a monarchical despotism or a democracy (like that of Athens), if any man wishes to become very powerful in the State, his best plan for attaining that end is to accustom himself from his youth upwards to resemble the despot or the democracy as much as possible, in order to acquire influence by adroit adulation ; that by this means he will have obtained the power of doing with impunity CHAP. UI.] THE ATHENIANS. 41 the greatest possible quantity of injustice, and will then be afflicted with the greatest of evils, being evil in mind, and being corrupted by power, and by the imitation of his master ; Callicles asks him if he does not know that this imitator will, if he pleases, be able to destroy the non-imitator, and take his pro- perty ? Socrates replies, " Surely I do, if I am not deaf, having heard it so often from you and Eolus, and from nearly every other person in Athens." This question of Calhcles and this answer of Socrates sufficiently set forth the Athenian main principle of public morality at that time — a principle of universal tyranny and plunder. The ambassador from the Athenians to Camarina, during the Peloponnesian war, sums it up in a few words : " To a tyrant " (that is, a sovereign prince), " or a sovereign city or state, nothing is unreasonable which is profitable." * This is precisely the same as the Roman sole principle of public morals, namely, the extension of the empire. If Pericles had been the good statesman his ad- mirers called him, he must of necessity have made the Athenians better men than they were when he first began to govern them. But Socrates contends that the result proved that he failed in this first requisite of a good statesman, inasmuch as he left them more unjust and more ferocious than he * Thucyd. vi. 85 : 'AvSpi Si Tvpaw(fi, ri ttoXei igx^iv ixo^^Vi ovSkv SXoyov, 8, n ^vjujiopov. 42 STRENGTH OF NATIONS, [CHAP. III. received them. " A superintendent of asses," says Socrates, " or of horses or oxen, would be thought a very bad one, if the animals did not kick, and start, and bite when they were intrusted to him, but did all this when they quitted his charge." * And he says such politicians bear the same relation to good statesmen as authors of cookery-books and tavern-keepers to good gymnasts or superintendents of the body. As cooks and tavern-keepers cram the body and bring on repletion and disease, and are nevertheless eulogized by the ignorant, in like man- ner, says Socrates, are eulogized " the men who, having feasted the Athenians and crammed them with what they desire, are said to have made them a great nation : because it is not perceived that the common- wealth is swollen and hollow, through those men of antiquity ; for, without making us just or temperate, they have crammed us with ports, and docks, and fortifications, and revenues, and such trumpery." f This precisely agrees with the opinion of Bacon, * Plat. Gorg. p. 149, Bip. Socrates afterwards compares a statesman complaining of injustice from the State which he has ruled to a sophist professing to teach virtue complaining of his pupils not paying his fee. This, he says, is absurd, since it is evident that if the sophist had taught them what he professed to teach, virtue and justice, they could not have committed the injustice of defrauding him of his hire. The statesman and the sophist, therefore, who have been treated thus, have no right to complain, since their being so treated proves that they have not performed what they undertook, namely, the one to make his fellow-citizens or subjects, the other his pupils, just and virtuous. t Plat. Gorg. p. 155, Bip. CHAP, m.] THE ATHENIANS. 43 formed from a much larger historical experience than that of Socrates and Plato. " WaUed towns," he says, in his Essay on the True Greatness of King- doms and Estates, " stored arsenals and armories, goodly races of horses, chariots of war, elephants, ordnance, artillery, and the like, — all this is but a sheep in a lion's skin, except the breed and disposi- tion of the people be stout and warlike." Socrates, being reminded by Callicles that under the sort of liberty then existing at Athens, he could be brought into danger of his life, perhaps by a worth- less man, answers : " I must be very foolish if I did not know that in this State any one whatever may be so treated."* He thus predicts his own fate and the resignation and fortitude with which he wiU meet it : " I shall be judged," he says, " as a physician would, if tried before children on the accusation of a cook, who would say, ' See what evils this man has inflicted upon you, cutting, and burning, and emaciating you, giving you bitter draughts, and forcing you to fast ! not like me, who have feasted you with everything that is dehghtfol.' What could the physician say to all this ? If he said the truth, ' I did all these things for your health,' would not such judges hoot him down ? I well know that I myself should be treated in a similar manner, if I were brought before a court of justice. For I shall not be able to remind the judges of any pleasures that I have procured for * Plat. Gorg. p. 160, Bip. 44 STRENGTH OF NATIONS. [cHAP. lU. them, which are what they understand by benefits. And if any one should say that I corrupt the youth by unsettling their minds, or libel the older men by bitter speeches, either in private or in public, I shall neither be able to say the truth, namely, ' I say and do all these things justly, and therefore for your good ;' nor shall I have any other defence ; so that I must be content to undergo my fate." C " Does a man, then, who is thus situated — so unable to protect himself — appear to you to be as he should be?" S. " If that be in him, of which we have so often spoken : if he have protected himself by never having said or done anything unjust, either towards men or gods. For this is, as we have frequently admitted, the best sort of self-protection. If, therefore, any one should convict me of being incapable of affording this protection to myself or others, I should be ashamed, whether I were convicted in the presence of many, or of one only ; and if I were to perish from this kind of ihcapabiHty, I should be grieved ; but if I should die for want of Adulatory Rhetoric, I should bear my death very easily. Death itself no one fears, who is not altogether irrational and unmanly ; but to com- mit injustice is an object of rational fear, for to arrive in the other world with the soul loaded with crimes, is the greatest of evils."* * Plat. Gorg. p. 163, Bip. I have, in the translations from Plato in this chapter, availed myself of some valuable " Notes on CHAP, ra.] THE ATHENIANS. 45 To sum up in a few words what is said in this Dialogue of Plato respecting the nature of rhetoric : — To learn or know, and to beheve — in other words, knowledge and belief — are different things.* But they who have learnt and they who only believe are both persuaded. There are, then, two kinds of persuasion — ^the one affording belief without know- ledge, the other affording knowledge. When an assembly is called together for the choice of gene- rals or the operations of warfare, if the assembly be governed by orators, the orators wUl advise, and not the men versed in mihtary affairs. If the ques- tion relate to the building of walls, or the construc- tion of harbours or docks, the advisers again will be the rhetoricians, not the engineers. Gorgias, in this Dialogue, says to Socrates that he could make any person who received his instructions, an orator capa- ble of persuading a multitude ; not producing know- ledge in their minds, but belief; that, for instance, on the subject of health and disease, an orator would be more capable of persuading than a physician, in some of the Dialogues of Plato," published in the Monthly Repository in 1834 ; departing from that translation in some places where the Greek did not seem to be fuUy or exactly rendered. * 2Q. ndrepov oiv ravrbv SokcX aoi elvai iie/iaOtiKhai xai irima- TivKwai, Kai iia^riaiQ Kai v'ujtiq, ri a\Xo n ; TOP. Qiojiai jiiv lyuyt, S> 2iiKpar£f, dXKo. SQ. KoXwg yap oUi, yviiay Sk ivQkvSv ei yap TVS ok ipoiTO, dp' ioTi, a Fopyia, wiong ^euSi/Q Kai aSiiBriQ, (pairiQ cLv, lie iySifiai. POP. Nm. SQ. Ti ^6 ; kmarriiiti hn ij/ivSije Kai aXri&rig ; POP. Ov SrJTa. 2Q. Aq \iyvyap oiiv '6n oil ravrov ianv. POP. 'AKriSiri \kyug, n. <. ?* — ^Plat. Gorg. p. 20, Bip. 46 STRENGTH OB" NATIONS. [CHAP. HI. a multitude, or among those who are ignorant. In other words, one who does not know, provided he be a rhetorician, will be more persuasive among those who do not know, than one who does know. But this, it is to be observed, will only take place to the full extent in an assembly like that of the Athenian democracy, where one orator followed an- other, and one long harangue followed another long harangue, and where there was no opportunity for questioning each speaker, and sifting the accuracy of his assertions, or testing the soundness of his views, which he put forth with that boldness of affirmation that carries proof with it to the minds of ordinary men. An orator, moreover, of great tact and ability will mould his adulation of the multitude whom he addresses into such a form as to make it assume the appearance of the reverse of adulation. This is par- ticularly observable in the orations of the greatest of Athenian orators. The public orations of Demo- sthenes are full of instances which make it appear as if he gave the Athenians, not adulation, but bitter truths. But these apparently harsh things are tem- pered with occasional compliments, that render his mode of appealing to the Athenian people very different from that, of Socrates. However, when Demosthenes addressed them, the Athenians felt that their affairs were in so unprosperous a condition, that he could say things to them for which they would have hooted down, and perhaps condemned to death. CHAP. III. J THE ATHENIANS. 47 any orator fifty years before. But a multitude of five or six thousand men is much too large for deli- berative discussion : and the principle of representa- tion was then unknown. Some measure limiting the duration of all speeches to a quarter of an hour (time enough for a speech as long as a leader in The Times), with some exceptions in favour of ministers making official statements, would make the English Parliament nearly perfect as a deliberative assembly. It always contains a very great number of men of good sense and practical knowledge. But under the present system these men are borne down by some half-dozen rhetoricians, who catch the Speaker's eye when men of sense fail to catch it, and who not only waste the public time with their orations, but, according to the present system» obtain most of the great ofiices of the government, and by that means have the opportunity of displaying their want of all practical knowledge and abihty in the misgovernment of the coimtry. The practical wisdom of the nation, of which the English Parliament is the representative, has in the course of many ages laid down a set of rules for the management of delibera- tive discussion in Parliament. These rules com- pletely get rid of the difficulties which in almost all other assemblies of men, public or private, have beset discussion, and rendered it inefiective for the object of a full, exact, and temperate investigation of the question. 48 STRENGTH OF NATIONS. [CHAP. HI. " I think, Gorgias," says Socrates, " that you have had experience of many discussions, and must have perceived this : that men seldom know how jointly to examine and mark out the things about which they attempt to discuss ; and having learnt and instructed themselves, so to break off the conversation. But if they dispute on any matter, and one of them charges the other with not speaking rightly, or not clearly, they are angry, and think that it is said in envy, and for the sake of victory, and not in the pursuit of the proposed object of discourse; and they sometimes end by shamefully reproaching one another, and ban- dying such words as make the bystanders ashamed of themselves for having desired to listen to such men."* Consequently, to obtain such a discussion as Socrates and Franklin might have approved of in the English ParHament, the only thing required is to muzzle the men who make inordinately long harangues, by limiting their speeches to a quarter of an hour. It may be shown from innumerable passages in * Plat. Gorg. p. 26, Bip. Gl/icu, w Topyia, /cat ri efiTTCipov, dvai TToXXtuv \6yiiiv Kai KaQEwpaKsvai sv avToig rb ToiovSe, 'on oij padiuig SvvavTm 01 av9p(i>irot, ircpl Hv S,v ivixitprjauat Sui\iyea9at, Stopura- lievot irpbs (i\X^Xo«£ Kai fiadovreg Kai SiSa^avrts eavTOve, oiirw SioKvsaSai rdg awovaioi' &XK' i&v rrcpi row aiifrnPtintaiaai Kai /o] ipy 6 irepoc rbv 'irepov dpQ&e Xeytiv ij p,^ aa^Sg, xoKiiraivovai re Kai kutA ipQovov oiovrai rbv iavrSiv Xkytiv, fCKovtucovvTat, SSX ob ZflTovvTO^ rb irpoKiifiivov Iv Tif \6ytf Kai hiioi ye rtKfvrSvres atoxwra i.'rraKKaTOvrat XoiSoptiSivres ra Kai elvovrce Kai aKoiictavTcg wepi aipCiv aiirStv TOiavra, oTa Kai roiig napovrag axStffBai iiirip a^Zv avT&v, on TotovTdiv AvOpuiruiv ■nliioaav ixpoarai yevsaSai. CHAP, m.] THE ATHENIANS. 49 tlie -writings of Plato that, in the opinion of the -wisest man Athens ever produced, it was the orators who, in their adulation of the people for their own purposes, destroyed the Athenian commonwealth. And if the passages cited in this chapter from Demosthenes be considered as showing that his oratory was certainly not all adulation, since he told them many bitter truths, the orators who preceded him had already done so much mischief that a much greater man than Demosthenes — a man like Epami- nondas, a first-rate general as well as a first-rate statesman — would probably have been quite as unable as Demosthenes to save Athens. Even in a government like that of England, the power of orators has been great for the last 200 years. How much greater it would become if that government were assimilated much more than it is at present to the Athenian democracy, may be in- ferred from the known power of the orators in the latter days of Athenian independence. Socrates, in Plato's Dialogues, uses the word Orator as equiva- lent sometimes to Sophist, and sometimes to Despot. He represents orators as men having, without being either wise or just men, the absolute power of life and death, confiscation and ruin, over their feUow- citizens. If the field for the exercise of rhetoric and sophistry in the deliberative national assembly of England were effectually checked, the extension of 50 STRENGTH OF NATIONS. [cHAP. m. the sufirage might be a safe and a beneficial mea- sure. But if such a measure is carried out to any considerable extent before the other measure of pre- venting the rhetorical sophists from working their mischief, we shall only exchange one set of bad and dangerous rulers for another set of rulers still worse and still more dangerous. 51 CHAPTER IV. THE EOMA]!IS. The Romans were not less attentive than the Greeks to athletic exercises. Plutarch relates what pains Cato the Censor took in training his son in throw- ing the javelin, in riding, in swimming rapid rivers, in enduring heat and cold; how Marius, throwing off his old age and his infirmities, went daily to the Campus Martins, where he took his exercises with the young men; and how Julius CsBsar did not make his feeble health an excuse for indulgence, hut by imwearied exercise and frugal diet, by constantly keeping in the open air and enduring fatigue, strug- gled with his malady, and kept his body proof against its attacks. The effect of the Roman system of athletic exercises in strengthening and hardening their bodies, appears from the fact that a Roman soldier usually carried a load of sixty pounds weight, besides his arms ; that under this load the soldier com- monly marched twenty miles a day, sometimes more, usually completing the day's march in five hours, that is, marching twenty miles in five hours, some- £ 2 52 STRENGTH OF NATIONS. [CHAP. IT. times twenty-four miles in that time. But the Roman system of training, while, like the Spartan, it cultivated the physical quaHties of bodily strength, activity, and endurance, with the moral qualities of fortitude and patriotism, did not crdtivate in the least degree, Uke the Spartan also, the moral qualities of justice and humanity. Their leading principle, to which all others gave way, was the extension of the empire ; in other words, universal dominion and uni- versal plunder. Nevertheless, the Roman constitution, or system of government, possessed elements of duration which did not belong either to the Spartan or Athenian system. The Spartan government was, as we have seen, an almost pure oligarchy, the Athenian an almost pure democracy ; each of which worked out rapidly its own destruction, without check or coun- terpoise. On the other hand, the Roman system of government had in it the two elements of oligarchy and democracy, which acted as checks on one another ; for a time at least. It is true that they mostly acted in such a way that now the one predominated, and now the other. At last, however, after great strug- gles, the government of Rome was brought to a just equilibrium, under which there was no insurmount- able obstruction to merit. The republic was thus managed for several ages without internal discord. But as wealth and luxury increased, especially after the destruction of Carthage, the more wealthy pie- CHAP. IT.j THE ROMANS. 53 beians united with the patricians, and the two parties of rich men, the old and the new, engrossed between them all the honours and emoluments of the State. The body of the people were impoverished and op- pressed, and at the same time brutalized by the gladiatorial shows, while they were also thoroughly corrupted by idleness and by dependence for food upon those public men who intended to use them for their own purposes. We thus see that while, for a time, the govern- ment of Rome enjoyed the advantages of a combina- tion of the oligarchical government of Sparta and the democratical government of Athens, it afterwards suffered at once from the evils of both kinds of government. In this state of things the Roman plebeians became the ready instruments, first, in the hands of Marius, and afterwards in those of Julius Cjesar, for the complete destruction of the Roman constitution. Then came to pass in Rome what, as we have seen, had before come to pass in Sparta and Athens — the total destruction of the military spirit of the people, and of their ability to defend them- selves from foreign aggression ; and those who had conquered and oppressed nearly all the world were conquered and oppressed in their turn. The cause of the disease, in this as in all similar cases, was bad government. But it may be instruc- tive to note some of the symptoms of this disease. In the earlier period of Roman history, when the 64 STRENGTH OF NATIONS. [CHAP. IV. political constitution of Rome was strong and healthy, individuals were restricted by law to a small portion of land, men cultivated their own farms with their own hands, and the republic could always command the service of an abundance of hardy and brave soldiers when there was need of them. But when landed property was engrossed by a few, whose im- mense estates were, in a great measure, cultivated by slaves, Rome was forced to depend on the provinces, both for supplies of provisions, and of men to recruit her armies.* Hence Pliny may be considered as having correctly pointed out at least one of the prin- cipal symptoms of the great disease which destroyed the Roman empire, when he ascribes the ruin, first of Italy, and then of the provinces, to too extensive landed possessions, "f The evil had become very great in the time of Horace, who contrasts the Roman youth of his day, bom and brought up amid licentious luxury, with the hardy sons of rustic soldiers who resisted Pyrrhus and Hannibal, and had been used to till the earth, and to cut and carry home wood at the command of their austere mothers. J * Juvenal, ix. 55; Liv. vi. 12; Senec. Ep. 114. Whether the produce of the land under the cultivation of slaves was less or not, Rome's dependence on the provinces for provisions might be partly owing to her immensely increased population. t xviii. 3, 6: Latifundia (sc. nimis ampla) perdidere ItaUam; jam vero et provincias. X Hor. Carm. iii. 6. The picture Horace here gives of the Roman vices of his time hardly falls short of those given by Juvenal. CHAP. IT.] THE ROMANS. 55 This opinion is supported by that of Lord Bacon, who ascribes the fact that " England, though far less in territory and population, had been nevertheless an overmatch for France," to the great abundance in England of substantial yeomen and small freeholders. " And herein,"" Bacon adds, ia the Essay before re- ferred to, "the device of King Henry the Seventh (whereof I have spoken largely in the history of his life) was profound and admirable, in making farms and houses of husbandry of a standard ; that is, maintained with such a proportion of land unto them as may breed a subject to live in convenient plenty, and no servile condition; and to keep the plough in the hands of the owners, and not mere hirelings." In accordance with the notion, which appears to have been generally entertained in the ancient world, that every citizen of a country should be a land- holder, and also with the principle that the State should be the chief landlord, the practice at Rome was that the territory of the State, so far as it was not left unenclosed or reserved for public purposes, should be divided in equal portions among the citi- zens. At first, no citizen had more land than he could cultivate himself. Romulus allotted to each only two acres : a regulation corresponding with the law of Queen Elizabeth, that no cottage should be built with less than four acres of land attached to it.* * Stat. 31 EUz. c. 7. 56 STRENGTH OP NATIONS. [CHAP. IT. After the expulsion of the kings, seven acres were granted to each citizen, which continued for a long time, and indeed as long as the republic retained its pristine health and strength, to be the usual portion assigned them in the division^ of conquered lands.* Quinctius Cincinnatus, Curius Dentatus, Fabricius, and Regulus had no more.f Cincinnatus had only four acres, according to Columella. This corresponds, in a remarkable degree, with the very large number of small landholders in -England two or three centuries ago ; there having been between forty and fifty freeholders in every hamlet, in the fifteenth century, according to the testimony of Fortescue. The part of the Roman territory left unenclosed was mostly kept as pasture, and a revenue was raised from it, both from citizens and strangers, who turned out sheep or cattle upon it. When a new territory was gained in war — the richer parts of it already in cultivation being too valuable to be given up to pasture, and the division, if they were divided, being necessarily siibject to the general rule which allotted an equal portion to every citizen — it was the practice at Rome to allow individuals to occupy such lands, and to enjoy all the benefits of them, on condition of paying to the State the tithe of the produce, both as a rent and an acknowledgment that the State was the proprietor of the land. On this principle most of the kings of Rome are said to have carried an * Liv. T. 30 J Val. Max. iv. 3, 5. f "Val. Max. iv. 4, 6, 7. CHAP. IT.j THE ROMANS. 57 agrarian law ; that is, to have^ divided a portion of the public land among those whom they admitted to the rights of citizenship. But these new citizens, the Roman commons, though they received their portion of land as freehold whenever the public land was divided, had still no right to occupy it (as they were not a part of the populus) while it lay in the mass unallotted; while the old burghers, the patricians, who enjoyed exclusively the right of occupation with regard to the undivided public land, had no share in it when divided, because they already enjoyed from ancient allotment a freehold property of their own. Hence the public land was wholly unprofitable to the commons while it was undivided, and became wholly lost to the patricians when it was divided; and hence the violent hostility of the patricians to agrarian laws.* The success of the patricians in their struggle with the commons on this point, which enabled individuals to engross such large masses of landed property, proved in the end their own destruction and that of their country, f Another symptom of the decay of a nation's strength, closely connected with the symptom last mentioned, is the immense accumulation of wealth in a few hands, and the use made of that wealth for corruption and luxury. Crassus is said to have * The above passage contains the substance of Niebuhr's researches as to this point. — ^Arnold's Hist, of Borne, vol. i. p. 156. t Plin. xviii. 3, 6. 58 STRENGTH 01" NATIONS. [cHAP. IT. possessed in lands upwards of 1,600,000?., besides money, slaves, and household fiirniture, which may be estimated at as much more.* Seneca is recorded to have possessed 2,421,875Z. ;f Pallas, the freedman of Claudius, an equal sum;t Lentulus, the augur, 3,229,166Z.§ But the effect of the immense accumu- lation of wealth in a few hands, with the power of corruption which this wealth possessed, either in the hands of its owners or of those who found means to borrow it, is most strikingly exemplified in the career of Caesar, the dictator. Csesar, before he enjoyed any office, owed 1,300 talents, or 251,875Z.|| When, after his prjetorship, he set out for Spain, he is reported to have said, that he was "bis millies et quingenties," more than two million pounds sterling, worse than nothing.lT He is said to have purchased the friend- ship of Curio at the beginning of the civil war by a bribe of "sexcenties sestertiiim" (484,373t); and that of the Consul L. Paulus for 1,500 talents, about 279,500Z.** Lucan says of Curio: «Hic vendidit urbem ;" and Virgil is thought to refer to him when he says, " Vendidit hie auro patriam." No man ever understood better than Csesar the art of corrupting by money. When he was about to lead his army, with which he had conquered Gaul, into Spain to fight » Plin. xxxiii. 10, 47. f Tacit. Ann. xiii. 42. t Tacit. Ann. xii. 53. § Senec. de Bene/, ii. 27. II Plutarch. ^ Appian. de Bell. Civ. ii. 432. »* Dio, xl. 60 ; Plut. in Caes. et Pomp. ; Suet. Cces. 29. CHAP. IT.] THE ROMANS. 59 against Roman legions led by Roman generals, he wished to take every precaution to secure the ad- herence to himself of his officers and soldiers. The plan he hit upon was to borrow money from his officers, and distribute it to his soldiers. By which means, to use his own words, he accomplished two things ; he secured the adherence of the officers by the debt, that of the soldiers by the gratuity.* Another mode in which this unwholesome accumu- lation of wealth in a few hands showed itself, was in luxurious living, personal ornaments, and houses. Apicius wasted on luxurious living about half a mil- lion sterling. Caligula laid out on a supper upwards of 80,000Z. ; and Heliogabalus, upwards of 24,000i The ordinary expense of Lucullus for a supper in the Hall of Apollo, was 50,000 drachmas (1,614Z. lis. 8d.). Pliny says, that in his time Lollia Paulina wore, in full dress, jewels to the value of " quadragies sester- tiiim" (32,201i 13s. 4c?.); or, as others read the pas- sage, "quadringenties sestertitim"t (322,916Z. 13s. 4