He: CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY FROM Date Due "c- *^ '^Ef^ ^ S^ i ^ 1 j r CORNELL UNI VEHSITY LIBRARY 3 1924 092 566 136 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR Cornell University Library The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924092566136 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR Organisation, Efforts, Difficulties and Achievements BY EDWIN A. PRATT Auttor of "The Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest, 1833- 191 4," "A History of Inland Transport and Communication," "Railways and their Rates," "American Railways," etc. Vol. II LONDON SELWYN AND BLOUNT, LTD. 21 YORK BUILDINGS, ADELPHI, W.C.2 1921 ^•^''^^'^'ttL ^u|j;-v „ W* ' l^lld^O'J CHAPTER XXXVI. CLAPHAM JUNCTION OF THE NORTHERN SEAS. While the story told in the last Chapter may have been regarded as an interesting one, it is, after all, only half a story. It takes naval men from all parts of Great Britain to Thurso and' leaves them there. But Thurso counted only as the end of a stagg — the land section of a through Journey to be continued on the ocean ; and the finish of the story must needs be given before the reader can realise the full value and extent of the advantages which the running of the Euston-Thurso Special, under the conditions detailed, conferred alike on the Navy and on the national cause. When, just before the declaration of war, the Grand Fleet arrived at Scapa Flow, it landed a staff of clerks from the Glasgow Post Office who were to undertake, partly on Scapa Pier and partly at Kirkwall, capital of the Orkneys, the postal duties for the Grand Fleet north of Thurso. The inward maUs for the Fleet were to be brought to Kirkwall, sent on by road, a distance of three miles, to Scapa Pier, and be distri- buted thence among the various battle squadrons. Outgoing mails were to be received at Scapa Pier, taken to Kirkwall and then forwarded by boat to Scrabster for Thurso. The " base organisation " at Scapa Pier consisted, at the outset, of no more than the sea-going Fleet repair- ships, Cyclops and Assistance, of which the former was, shortly after- wards, connected to a shore telegraph cable off the village of Scapa, becoming a Fleet Post Office as well as a depot for the few drifters which had then been requisitioned as auxiliary vessels. Towards the end of 1914, however, it was found desirable, mainly on account of weather considerations, to remove the base of the Fleet from the north of Scapa Flow to a more sheltered position in the south-west of that expanse of almost land-locked waters, and the site chosen was a bay, known as Long Hope, which already had a naval history of its own. Four miles in length, Long Hope is on the south-east of the island of Hoy, which it separates from South Walls, whilst direct entrance to it for vessels coming from Pentland Firth is prevented by a causeway of sandbanks, forming a further bay, Aith Hope, on the south. In the early part of the nineteenth century. Long Hope became a rendezvous of the Royal Navy sailing-ships of that period, the narrow entrances to the bay, on the north, being defended by martello towers, supple- mented by the provision of a battery at the southern end for the better 515 MM 5i6 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. ORKNEY ISLANDS- ( Southern SecKon ). Sherring //>e t/^uofioa of Sca/aa r/otr in rgjoec/- /g ^he Tcrmi/7Lfj of me Hi gf?/of7. ^I^^^^ f ^ - as^ u a ^M- ^ ."■ ♦ * EUBIH. OTdtniRPI ^^^^^^ ^ _0/^mi5. Jm r ^ OBB. 6eauly.| / /Cromarty FrpTH. v^-^ m THE Highland Pailwav. J \ // /' 'kmm*. the said maintenance ; and, in the opinion of the experts concerned, the northern shore of Cromarty Firth was specially adapted to the desired purpose. The transfer to Cromarty, in the event of war, of a floating dock from one of the southern dockyards had, as Viscount Jellicoe further relates, already been decided on by the Admiralty. Action in this direction was now taken, a floating dock capable of accommodating the largest of British warships arriving at Invergordon, from Portsmouth, on September 6th, 1914. ^ A staff of dockyard workmen was sent to Invergordon * " It can be said with great emphasis," remarks Viscount Jellicoe, " that this floating dock was simply invaluable to the Grand Fleet." INVERGORDON, DALMORE AND U.S. MINES. 535 and a series of important developments followed in rapid succession. The Admiralty acquired and reconstructed the two existing piers, and they built a new one, over 700 ft. in length, with a tee head of 400 ft. X 50 ft., and carrsdng railway lines, oil-pipes and water-mains. They also took over the chemical-manure works of the Highland Agricultural Company. These they converted into an engineering shop, laying down concrete floors, fixing overhead travellers, and installing all the needful machinery. Then, step by step, they absorbed surrounding streets, lands and buildings — and they reclaimed, as well, several acres of land from" the sea — for extensions both of the harbour and of the engine-shops, modern, fully-equipped buildings being eventually constructed. Power was supplied from a power station built at the oil-fuel depot. Meanwhile another floating dock, for light cruisers, had been brought to Cromarty Firth, and, among other things, an existing branch line from Invergorden Station to the pier and the chemical-manure works was adapted to the new requirements by doubling it wherever possible and throwing off sidings to meet the needs of naval stores and depots as these were built. So it was that there sprang into existence, apparently out of nothing, and with a speed that might well make men marvel, a great modern dock- yard — a Northern Portsmouth — perfectly equipped, and emplojdng over 4,000 workmen ; while alongside there arose a model village, having 126 cottages for the married men among the workers, the remainder of whom found accommodation either in ranges of hutments specially constructed for them or in old hulks on the Firth. Other buildings put up included a hostel for female war-workers and a recreation room. Altogether the dockyard itself covered twenty-one acres, and the build- ings, structures, etc.,' outside, including cottages, workmen's hutments, naval hospital and oil-fuel tanks, occupied an additional 124 acres. As for the results secured. Viscount Jellicoe, in stating that by the middle of 1916 the base had attained large proportions, adds : " Work of all kinds was carried out with rapidity and success, including the repairs of the battleships after the Jutland Battle and the great extension in armour-deck protection fitted to ships after the same action." Rail Transport Requirements. When the dockyard at Invergorden was in course of construction, every railway siding from Perth onwards was choked with wagons loaded with traf&c for Invergorden which the main line of the Highland Railway could not accommodate. Included in that traffic were — ^in addition to supplies of all kinds for the Fleet — materials for dockyard buildings, for cottages and for hutments ; furniture and household necessaries ; many thousand pounds' worth of machinery ; pipes for a water-supply service extended on three separate occasions, and all the other necessaxies for a great naval industry and a new centre of population, each of mushroom growth, and each mainly dependent for the supply of its wants on a railway which had so many other demands to satisfy besides. 536 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Transport of the materials required for building the model village necessitated the la3dng down of additional sidings north of Invergordon. Eventually these sidings were extended past the harbour for about half a mile to a borrow pit from which a large quantity of soil, etc., was taken for the reclamation carried out at the harbour, where a long timber jetty into deep water was built. Concurrently with all it was thus doing at Invergordon for the Navy, the Highland Railway had to help in providing, as well, for the needs of the military. Materials for the three camps already spoken of, provisions and supplies for the troops in residence there, ammunition and necessaries of every kind, aU went by rail, while in addition to much other passenger traffic, to or fro, special troop trains were frequently run between Invergordon and Southampton or other places in England. The Northern Barrage. There were other directions, besides, in which Invergordon and the Highland Railway were to do things of exceptional importance to the scheme of national defence. On the subject of mine laying Admiral Viscount JeUicoe says in " The Grand Fleet " :— In 1 91 7, shortly after my return to the Admiralty, I undertook a very extensive mining policy. In the previous year, during Sir Henry Jackson's service as First Sea Lord, a new and much improved mine was designed, the trials of which were carried out after I relieved him. This was one of the raphes to the submarine. One hundred thousand of these mines were ordered by me early in 1917 to carry out various schemes for mining the Hehgoland Bight and the Straits of Dover. Later in 191 7, with the assistance of the United States, provision was made for the large mine-field across the North Sea known as the Northern Barrage. It was not until the large suppUes of mines became available in the autumn that really efiective results against submarines by mining began to be achieved, although the operations of German surface vessels had previously been hampered to a very considerable extent. The arrangement with the United States here referred to was, in effect, that she should undertake the construction of large quantities of com- ponent parts of mines and ship them to Scotland, where they would be " assembled " for conversion into complete mines. These, after testing, would then be put on American mine-layers and sent to the North Sea. Bases for the carrying out of the assembling, etc., on this side by staffs of U.S. naval ratings were to be set up, one near to Inverness and one near to Invergordon. In the latter case, especially, a great amount of additional transport and other work was thrown upon the Highland Railway Company. The Northern Barrage — an immense mine-field stretching across the North Sea from the Orkneys to the Norwegian coast, and designed to exclude enemy submarines from the Atlantic — ^was to constitute the most gigantic undertaking of the kind on record. It is understood that the actual length of the mine-field — practically complete by the time the Armistice was signed — was about 235 miles, and that some seventy INVERGORDON, DALMORE AND U.S. MINES. 537 thousand mines were used, America's contribution in the form of mines must, in itself, and apart from all the further labour she undertook in completing and lajdng them, have been prodigious. When she started on this task, the United States possessed no factories for the production of mines on the great scale that would be requisite, and neither had she the mine-layers that would be wanted. These, how- ever, were matters of detail readily surmounted by good organisation. Contracts were made ;yith automobile and other manufacturers through- out the United States, the arrangement being that each firm was to devote itself exclusively to the production of some particular part or section of a mine. The orders were so subdivided and distributed that, when once the arrangements and the machinery were in full working order, there would be every prospect of a continuous adequate production of complete sets of all the necessary parts. Orders were also given for the construction on the Great Lakes of a fleet of mine-layers, and a number of merchant- men were commandeered and adapted to the transport of the component parts in regular consignments. UfS. Naval. Bases in Scotland. The two bases set up were known as " U.S. Naval Base 18," and " U.S. Naval Base 17 " respectively. Of these the former was alongside'^Muirtown Basin, situate at the eastern end of the Caledonian Canal, and about a mile north-west of Inver- ness. The arrangement made in regard to this base was that the component parts of the mines should be brought across the Atlantic to the western end of the Caledonian Canal at Corpach, just off Fort WiUiam. There they would be transhipped into motor-lighters having a capacity of about 100 tons, and then conveyed through the canal to Muirtown Basin. In order that the traffic could be carried on without interruption, the canal was hghted and buoyed throughout. At Muirtown an area which began at the swing bridge crossing the Caledonian Canal and continued alongside the canal for some distance, taking in Muirtown Hotel, the quay and Glen Albyn distillery, and thence extended due north to the junction of the Highland Railway Caledonian Canal Branch with the Highland Railway main line — a total distance of about half a mile — was commandeered by the Admiralty for the purposes of a Naval Depot officially known as " U.S. Naval Base 18." The Highland Railway Caledonian Canal Branch was taken over for the exclusive use of the base, and its lines were extended — or brought back, in horseshoe fashion — ^from the said junction so that they would pass through the portion of the area north of the distillery and, also, form an adjoining lay-out of sidings, with gridirons for storage. Alongside the railway lines, at a point near the junction, there were set up a bulk stores, 300 ft. X 100 ft. ; an assembling shed, 400 ft. X 100 ft., and a ready-issue store, 400 ft. X 80 ft. Other sheds, stores, works, etc., were also provided on the area, the full extent of which was equal to about forty-five acres. The mine materials, transhipped, by means of 538 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. INVERGORDON, DALMORE AND U.S. MINES. 539 steam cranes, from^the lighters into railway wagons at the quay adjoining Muirtown Bridge, were taken along the Highland Railway Caledonian Canal Branch and its extension to the buildings where they were to be dealt with, and, on completion, they were reloaded into railway wagons and transferred to the lighters in which they were to be conveyed to the mine-layers awaiting them in the Kessock Roads at the eastern end of the canal. As these mine-layers were large vessels, the Inverness Firth was dredged from Fort George to Inverness, and the channel was buoyed and Hghted in order that they could pass more freely. The first of the American staff and equipment arrived at Inverness about the beginning of January, 1918, and the unfurling there of the American flag over a United States War Unit at " U.S. Naval Base 18," marked by a little ceremony lacking nothing in impressive simplicity, may be regarded as a noteworthy event in the history of the two nations (see illustration facing page 511). The staff eventually formed a U.S. Mine Force oi over 1,000 officers and men. The Glen Albyn distillery was utilised for housing accommodation, and the Muirtown Hotel, along- side Muirtown Bridge, was taken over for sick quarters. The component parts of the mines began to arrive in the Muirtown Basin by the motor-lighters from 'Corpach at the beginning of April, 1918, and they continued to be received until the signing of the Armistice in the following November. During this period the sum total of the traffic conveyed along the Caledonian Canal to the depot (including, besides the parts of mines and their sinkers, other items such as explosives, provisions, naval stores, etc., and including, also, small quantities carried subsequently) was 48,000 tons. Dalmore and its Story. "U.S. Naval Base 17," for the further production of mines for the. Northern Barrage, was at Dalmore, a village situate on the north shore of Cromarty Firth about three-quarters of a mile from the Highland Railway Company's station at Alness, itself three miles west of Inver- gorden ; and the component mine-parts for this alternative base were, on their arrival from America, landed at Kyle of Lochalsh, the terminus on the West Coast of the Highland Railway Company's Dingwall and Skye branch, and distant seventy-three miles from Alness. Alness had rendered good service from quite the early days of the war and long, therefore, before there was any idea of establishing a U.S. Naval Base in her immediate vicinity. These conditions were mainly due to the fact that Alness was so near to the encampments being set up at Invergordon and Nigg. It became a common occurrence for Alness to be required to accommodate on her sidings 100 wagons of naval stores and camp-materials which could not then get any farther. The sidings were, indeed, found of great advantage in relieving somewhat the congestion that became chronic at Invergordon ; though when, as frequently happened throughout the war-period, Alness had to deal 00 540 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. with six trains at once, the trains crossing loop and sidings, there was often no little difficulty in fitting things in. Half a mile south of Alness there was opened, in May, 1916, a ballast pit designed to supply material for Invergordon dockyard. This materiid was lo be conveyed to Invergordon by special trains. There were then already about thirty-five other trains passing through Alness station every day, and the specials with the ballast were unable to make more than three journeys per day. They continued to run until the end of January, 1917, and by that time the amount of material they had conveyed for dockyard purposes was equal to about 25,000 tons. In June, 1916, an engineering shop was erected at the extreme end of Dalmore siding (to which further reference will be made a httle later) for the accommodation of workers who were to shape and bore plates to be fixed on the decks of ships which had taken part in the Battle of Jutland. This meant that the Highland Company had to convey to Alness and deliver on to the said sidings — ^in addition to so much other traffic — 2,000 tons of plates from the south. In regard to the further great business which was to follow, the fact should be mentioned that the special advantages offered by Dalmore as a base for the construction, storing and distribution of mines for the North Sea were (1) its proximity to Invergordon and Cromarty Firth, the shipment of the complete mines being thus greatly facilitated, and (2) the existence there of a great modern distillery, capable, like that at Glen Albyn, of ready conversion into a mine-assembling depot and store. Of this distillery the Admiralty took possession in October, 1917 ; and the first big task to be done in connection with it was that of " shift- ing " the whisky stored in its bonded warehouses. The whisky was con- tained in ho fewer than 6,500 casks, estimated to hold over 300,000 gallons. About 4,500 of the casks were removed by rail to a distillery at Edderton, twenty-one miles north of Alness, and this removal involved the running of either one or two special trains, taking about twenty-two wagon loads, day by day, for a period of three weeks. The remainder of the casks were conveyed by motor lorries to a distillery at Novar, four miles to the south. The whisky having been cleared away, the conversion of the distillery into workshops and mine stores was begun, while alongside there were constructed ranges of hutments and sheds, extending over about ten acres of ground, for the accommodation of the staff to be employed at the base or for other purposes. The provision of these hutments and sheds involved, in itself, the transport of 7,000 tons of materials by rail. Measures were also taken to ensure the provision of adequate rail facilities. The distillery had been connected with Alness station by a siding which, though serving its original purpose, terminated at too high a level to suit the requirements now to be met. Accordingly, from a point on the main line of the Highland Railway situate about midway between Alness and Invergordon, and known as Belleport, there was i / ''"^.S k" ^4" \ j^'f^ m ^^tf K. '^T^M ^^|^^^BH|p fflP^V djrj ^kIBH^ ^S f ^^Sk ^^^^^^Bj^^^pBKp^Mf^^^S .^i /?^8W|M^j^^ . ^•'-"•-■^■^f';' -Iv^^..' -..^W^'' ■'' ■■*■ " "* -1 ^P ; '" ' • :' teS- ,...««*>^?^"' " " -v '"l*^- « KHp^:; v^'^H^HI^H ^^/r^^, ^v-^^SSHp^^^^B l^^^^s^ ^^^ -f^^^^BBB IK ^^fcL^w^H r/joto fcy] [Ifi/iim fl- Son. Difn^mall. KuCK CurilNGS ON THE IIlOlILANIJ RMLWAV, NliAR KvLE OF l,OCll A I.SII . [1 (I ia.:c p. 540. INVERGORDON, DALMORE AND U.S. MINES. 541 constructed a new siding which fell by easy gradients to the level of the mine depOt at Dalmore. From Kyle of Lochalsh the mine traffic received from America would first run over the Dingwall and Skye branch to Dingwall ; there it would pass on to the main line, along which it would continue as far as Bellepprt Junction, there to be switched off on to the Dalmore siding and so reach its destination. There was, at first, no pier at Dalmore, and it was decided that until one could be constructed the mines put together and tested at Dalmore should be sent to the pier at Invergorden for shipment to the North Sea. This made it necessary that a " relief line " should be laid along the shore of the Firth from Dalmore to the Naval Yard at Invergordon, a distance of about four miles. To meet the urgent demands for railway material in connection with this particular line and, also, (i) for a line on the pier to be erected at Dalmore, (2) for the needs of Invergordon dockyard, and (3) for the sidings at Muirtown already spoken of, the Highland Railway Company closed their "Buckie and Keith branch, (Elgin), lifted the rails therefrom — ^about twelve and a half miles altogether — ^and gave them over to the Admiralty for the purposes stated. The " relief " or " shore "line thus put down by the Admiralty, and worked by them with engines and wagons borrowed (through the Railway Executive Committee) from the railway companies, was laid along one side of a public road leading from Dalmore to Invergordon. Connections with Invergordon station and the Highland Company's Invergordon Harbour Branch were provided. The line was, also, connected with the sidings at BeUeport Junction and received therefrom the Kyle of Lochalsh traffic, which was then taken on to the Dalmore dep6t by the Admiralty engines. The construction of the pier inside the Dalmore base was not begun until about July, 1918, and it was not ready for use until the end of that year — subsequently, therefore, to the signing of the Armistice. Pre- ceded by an earth embankment 700 yards in length, with a facing of stone 3 ft. deep, a width of 30 ft., and providing for two sets of rails, the pier, built of timber piling, extended from the shore a distance of 220 yards, had itself a width of eighteen yards, accommodated four sets of rails, and terminated at a point in Cromarty Channel where 32 ft. of water at L.W.O.S.T. was available for vessels brought alongside. The building of the pier involved the rail transport of some 13,000 tons of materials conveyed in, approximately, 2,000 wagons. Pending the completion of the work, the many thousands of mines which had been put together at Dalmore had had to be loaded into the railway wagons loaned to the Admiralty, taken to Invergordon pier, and there tran-: shipped into the lighters awaiting them outside Invergordon harbour. The Dalmore pier nevertheless rendered good service later on, when the Northern Barrage was being cleared away, as a place where the mines brought in could be landed and where, also, material returned from the Fleet could be received. Some degree of relief was thus afforded to the state of congestion which had so long prevailed at Invergordon harbour. 00* 542 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Eventually the Dalmore base, with its buildings, hutments, railway sidings, pier, etc., comprised a " reservation" (as it was called) extending over a total of seventy-eight acres. The whole of this area was strictly guarded by sentries. Kyle of Lochalsh. Whilst all the preparations thus far narrated were being carried out on the shores of Cromarty Firth to assist America's efforts in respect to the Northern Barrage, much was also happening at Kyle of Lochalsh, where the traffic would be received, and in connection with the railway lines along which it would pass. In the first place, the sixty-three miles of line between Kyle of Lochalsh and Dingwall, together with the pier and all the other transport facilities at Kyle, were taken over by the British Admiralty for the purposes exclusively of the American mine-traffic, except so far that the Highland Railway was allowed to run one train a day for passengers and mails. All goods trafl&c by this route for Lewis, Skye and the Outer Islands was stopped. Whatever was sent had to be worked from Oban or Glasgow. At Kyle of Lochalsh the sidings on the pier were adapted for the new traffic ; the Highland Railway Company's steam and hydraulic cranes were dismantled to make room for cranes specially suited to the fresh tasks to be undertaken ; storage sidings, the la37ing of which involved much rock excavation, were provided ; the Station Hotel, belonging to the Highland Railway Company, was utilised by the Admiralty for offices and quarters in connection with the work of the Senior Naval Officer at Kyle, and hutting accommodation was erected for U.S. naval ratings. A new train-crossing loop was constructed on the summit of the branch at Loan to facilitate working on the heavily-graded 12- mile section between Achnashellach and Achnasheen, and water supply for the locomotives was provided at certain additional stations. The American naval ratings by whom the work at Dalmore was to be carried on began to arrive in January, 1918. Further contingents followed, in parties of from 50 to 100, until about May, when a maximum of some 1,700 was reached. The first of the mines received at Kyle of Lochalsh from America came early in May, 1918. The supply was continued until the following November. For the purposes of the traffic between Kyle of Lochalsh and Dalmore, the Highland Company arranged, through the Railway Executive Com- mittee, for the loan of four locomotives from the London and South Western Railway and 150 12-ton coal wagons from the South Eastern and Chatham. Four brake vans were also borrowed from other com- panies. The flow of traffic depended mainly on arrivals at Kyle of the vessels from America. This occurred about once a fortnight. Three or four special trains conveying the material brought would then be run each day for a period of seven or eight days. The specials had to be limited to eleven wagons each, owing to the severe gradients and sharp curves on the Skye branch — a line on which deep and rugged cuttings INVERGORDON, DALMORE AND U.S. MINES. 543 t/3 O -) H O O cn ^ ■«! H Pi Mi « n s a- 9 £ cs a> o » a g Mas I §i ■a js £ B w m i 1 « > ^^ o e » CO ^ ig va w CO 2 g _ e s e S " •a Js a n j: ^ J! « _ « Q oe v> S 9 » B M £ S O cn a H in O 111 « Ik % K H 544 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. through rocks rising, in places, to a height on each side of seventy feet, alternate with twists and turns so sharp and so numerous that the traveller loses all sense of geography and seems to be going to every point of the compass in the course of only a few miles. The traffic carried included much more than the component parts of mines for the North Sea. The boats from America brought, also, machinery and appliances to be used in connection with the mines ; equipment for the U.S. naval bases ; supphes for the mine-layers ; food for the men at Dalmore and Inverness ; equipment for the hospitals opened in Scotland for members of the U.S. naval forces ; motor-cars ; hydraulic chairs for barbers' saloons conducted on trans-Atlantic prin- ciples, and among a variety of other luxuries — or necessaries, from the point of view of the American citizen — a generous provision of chewing- gum ! The total amount of mine or other, traf&c from America received at Kyle of Lochalsh between May, 1918, and the following November, when it ceased, was 32,800 tons. Of this total about 24,000 tons were conveyed to Dalmore in, approximately, 400 special trains, each con- sisting of ten or eleven vehicles. In addition thereto, some 3,000 tons of stores were carried from Kyle of Lochalsh either to Inverness or to Alness. ^ The working of the traffic in connection with the raU transport of the mines would have been a great undertaking under any possible conditions. On what was mainly a single-track line, with so many heavy gradients and sharp curves, and often so greatly congested, it became exceptionally so. The traffic was, nevertheless, carried throughout with the greatest smoothness and dispatch, and no hitch or accident of any kind occurred. CHAPTER XXXIX. GRANGEMOUTH IN WAR-TIME. In 1867 the Caledonian Railway Company, being anxious in the interests of their expanding traffic to obtain control over a suitable port on the East Coast of Scotland for the shipment to the Continent and elsewhere of coal from the Lanarkshire coal-fields which they were then already serving, obtained Parliamentary powers to acquire possession of the docks at Grangemouth. Those docks were then on a comparatively small scale ; but, in proportion as the traffic increased, and having regard to the prospects of still further expansion, the company carried out from time to time schemes of improvement on which they expended, altogether, over £2,000,000, The docks as they exist to-day comprise the original dock (now known as the " Old Dock "), which has an area of 4J acres ; the " Junction Dock," 3J acres ; the " Carron Dock," 20 acres, and the " Grange Dock," 30 acres. The total length of quayage inside the docks is about 6,000 lineal yards. In addition there is, inside the sea lock, a basin 10 acres in extent. The docks are equipped with hydraulic coal-hoists, hydraulic cranes and capstans ; commodious shed accommodation is provided, and the whole is Ht by electricity. Prior to the war the principal traffic dealt with at the port was coal from the pits of Lanarkshire and Stirhngshire sent to the Continent, and timber, pulp and esparto grass brought from the Continent. There was, also, a considerable traffic in general merchandise and pig-iron alike with the Continent and with London, HuU, Middlesbrough and other East Coast ports. Eight days after the declaration of war by this country, a military guard was put over Grangemouth Docks, access to which was thencefor- ward refused to all persons not provided with a military pass. On Novem- ber 13th, 1914, the port was taken possession of by the Government, and from this time no merchant vessel was allowed to come within one mile of the Forth Bridge, either from the Eastward or from the West- ward, without first obtaining permission, and every vessel was required to have an authorised pilot on board. On December nth, 1914, the last merchantman in the docks sailed, and Government vessels were then alone allowed to enter or leave the docks. In normal times arrivals and departm-es had been limited to a period of seven hours each tide, namely, four hours before and three hours after high water. In order, however, to prevent delay to H.M. vessels, 545 546 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. it was found expedient, as a war measure, to withdraw this restriction and allow of their entrance or departure at any state of the tide. The port was made use of, by the Government and the War Office, for storage purposes, and, by the Admiralty, not only for the coaling of the Fleet but, also, among other purposes, as a mine-dep6t, a victualHng yard, and an oil-storage dep6t. ^ At different times between March and June, 1915, a total quantity of close on 8,000 tons of Government flour was stored in seven sheds in the docks, the flour having been conveyed there by rail from various floxu: mills in England. It remained in store for periods ranging from three months to seven months, and was then reloaded into the railway wagons and sent elsewhere. In 1915 and 1916 the War Office utilised five of the dock sheds, several large timber sheds and some of the avail- able land for the storage of hay, of which 19,000 tons were brought in by rail and 14,700 tons were afterwards sent out. Welsh coal for the fleet began to arrive at Grangemouth on August loth, 1914, and from that time huge quantities were received either for immediate shipment or to form reserve suppHes, stored on the ground at various points around the docks. All the work in connection with the handling of the coal was done by the Admiralty agents at Grangemouth. The total quantities dealt with down to April 30th, 1919, were : — Received ........ 2,306,000 tons. Shipped .... ... 2,092,000 ,, Stored on ground ...... 333,000 ,, Reloaded ........ 246,000 ,, The shipment of ammunition and mines to and from the port of Grangemouth began in March, 1915. The consignments imported came principally in vessels from Crombie'and Rosyth. Those that were not stored at Grangemouth were either sent on by rail to various depots or " shipped to the Fleet in the Firth of Forth. The exported ammunition and mines were largely received by rail from Government dep6ts in England and were shipped on board mine-layers and other Government vessels. Imports and exports were as follows for the periods mentioned : — Ammunition and Mines. Year Imported. Exported. Tons Tons 1915 2,445 ■ ■ 11,442 1916 13,391 • • 4.608 1917 12,017 ■ • 5,426 1918 5,603 . . 22,128 1919 (To April 30) ... . 5,356 . . 1,223 Totals 38,812 . . 44,827 The traffic by rail in ammunition and mines amounted to 57,600 tons received and 45,875 tons dispatched, a total of 103,475. These figures GRANGEMOUTH IN WAR-TIME. 547 include both Caledonian and North British traffic into and out of the docks, where all the railway working is done by the former company. Concerning the mine traffic, the following additional details may be of interest. The Royal Naval Mining Dep6t at Grangemouth was instituted in January, 1916, when the three largest sheds in Grange Dock — all belong- ing to the Caledonian Railway Company — were requisitioned by the Admiralty for the storage of mines, sinkers, etc., these being removed as wanted and, with the help of the company's hydraulic cranes, placed on board vessels of the destroyer class of mine-layer. At this time the dep6t was in charge of the Officer-in-Charge at Crombie Ammunition Dep6t. In June, 1917, an Engineer-Commander took charge. He and his staff were accommodated in the Caledonian Company's premises within the Grange Dock. A month later, operations were begun to convert the largest of the three sheds into a workshop for the assembling of naine parts, the testing of mines, and various other operations in con- nection with them ; though this new departure was not fully developed until the end of the year. By that time an area in the Grange Dock extending to 31 acres had been acquired from the company, and six large sheds were erected thereon by Admiralty contractors, lines of railway being also laid to connect the sheds with the Caledonian Railway system. About 85,000 tons of slag and ashes were required to bring the land up to the required level. Three of the new sheds were used for the assembling of mine parts. The others were utilised for the storage of mines ready for shipment on the mine-laying vessels. The sheds became available for use in April, 1918. Several dock sheds were also converted into Admiralty workshops ; spacious dining halls, laboratories, instruction rooms, etc., were erected, some additional acres of ground being taken over for the purpose, and before long the Admiralty con- trolled, within the limits of the Grangemouth Docks, an exceptionally large and well-equipped mining dep6t where hundreds of men and women were employed on work in connection with the mines. From January ist, 1918, until well on into 1918 the Caledonian Com- pany, at the instance of the Admiralty, ran workmen's trains between Grahamstown, Grangemouth and the mining depot for the conveyance of the workpeople. At one time four trains were run daily in each direc- tion. Special platforms were erected in or near to the docks for the accommodation of the passengers. Meanwhile, Rear-Admiral L. CMnton Baker, with a staff of about 600 men, had arrived to take charge of the Mine-laying Squadron operating from Grangemouth, and 1,500 lineal yards of quay, with hydraiihc cranes, were placed at his disposal for handling the mines. In order to facihtate the operations, the Caledonian Company dredged these quay berths to the fullest extent. Admiralty contractors dredged in the river Forth, outside the dock entrance, a deep channel 1,500 yards long and 250 yards broad. The course of this channel was clearly defined by lighted buoys and beacons. The docks being lighted by electricity, the Admiralty 548 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. were given the necessary electric current for their extensive signalling. The mines, etc., were received at Grangemouth by rail. Most of the traffic came from England. The wagons containing the mines arrived at the Caledonian Company's marshalling yard alike by Caledonian and by North British trains. They were then taken by Caledonian engines and men to the exchange sidings, where they were handed over to the Admiralty, who sent them on to the depot with their own engines and men. After being inspected and fitted up in the depot, the mines were shipped on to the mine-laying vessels either from railway wagons or from the dock sheds. The Admiralty had four engines and 200 wagons to assist in working the traffic. Ample dock accommodation was provided for the coUier, transport and oil vessels attendant upon the mine-laying squadron. The total tonnage of the mine-traffic received at Grangemouth — that is to say, mines, sinkers and appUances connected therewith — was 19,150 'tons. The principal forwarding places were : Attenboro' (550 tons), Bolton (360 tons), Dagenham (4,680 tons), Fareham (1,100 tons), Faver- sham (860 tons), Littlemore (6,570 tons), Portsmouth (400 tons) and Wool- wich (1,180 tons). Not the whole of the traffic was shipped direct from Grangemouth, about 2,790 tons being sent on mainly to places in the North of Scotland. It is difficult to estimate with any degree of exactitude the number of actual mines represented by the tonnage mentioned, but the sum total of those passing through the docks at Grangemouth under the conditions here described would probably be not far short of 60,000. In June, 1916, an Admiralty Victualling Yard was opened in Carron Dock, five sheds and some offices being taken over, either then or sub- sequently, for the purpose. The work in connection with the depot was done by a local firm of stevedores, who employed forty hands thereon. Up to the end of May, 1919, over 51,000 tons of foodstuffs and stores for the East Coast Main Fleet had been brought to the Victualling Yard by the Caledonian and North British routes, in addition to 9,000 tons which had come by sea. As regards the utilisation of Grangemouth Port for the supply of oil fuel to H.M. Fleet, the first step in this direction was the taking over by the Admiralty of the British Petroleum Company's oil installation in Grange Dock. The next was the conversion into oil-tank vessels of a fleet of boats in use on the Forth and Clyde Canal, which, as the property of the Caledonian Railway Company, had already passed under Govern- ment control in cornmon with other railway-owned canals. By the time that these preparations had been made, some oil ships from overseas began to come up the Clyde as far as Bowling, ten miles below Glasgow. Bowhng is the western terminus of the Forth and Clyde Canal, and here, as the oil vessels lay in the outer harbour, the oil they had brought was pumped direct from them into the canal boats — or, rather, the improvised oil-tank vessels — ^lying at the west end of the inner basin. When full, the vessels were towed by steam lighters along the thirty-five miles of canal from Bowling to Grangemouth Docks. There the oil was pumped GRANGEMOUTH IN WAR-TIME. 549 out of the boats into the tanks of the British Petroleum Oil Company, and was subsequently sent out to the Fleet as required. To facilitate the passage of the boats through the canal, the locks and bridges between Bowling and Grangemouth were double-manned from April 9th, 1918, to January 31st, 1919. Under these arrangements there was conveyed bv boat from the Clyde to Grangemouth Docks a total of 137,514 tons of oil. So much importance, however, was attached to the provision of oil fuel for the Fleet that the Admiralty decided, early in 1918, to lay an oil-pipe from Old Kilpatrick, on the east of Bowling, to Grangemouth Docks in order that the oil, pumped along this pipe for the entire distance, could be obtained in greater voliune and less time. Begun on March 9th, 1918, the work was carried out by the British and the United States Governments in combination, this country being responsible for the excavation, while the United States provided a Naval Pipe-line Unit for the laying of the pipes. These were eight inches in diameter. The pipe-Une was carried along the towing-path of the canal until it had been brought within about a mile and a half of Grangemouth. There it was diverted to the bank of the Grange Burn, whence it con- tinued along the Caledonian Company's dock property to the Admiralty Oil Installation at the new power-house. Grange Dock. Pumping stations were provided at either end of the line, and two intermediate stations were also arranged. At Grangemouth the steam for working the ptmips was generated in the Caledonian Company's hydrauUc power-* house. From the Admiralty Installation the oil was pumped, as required, into oil-tank vessels moored alongside, and so conveyed direct to the Fleet. The difficulties in the way of constructing the pipe-line wiU be better understood if the fact is mentioned that the summit level of the Forth and Clyde Canal is 158 ft. 6 in. above Ordnance datimi. The pipe, fol- lowing the towing-path, had to be taken up to this summit level before it could be brought down again to the level of the Grangemouth Docks. In the circumstances it was not found possible to begin the pumping untU November ist, 1918, or only ten days before the signing of the Armistice. Yet the line proved its practical value, all the same, the amount of fuel oil pumped through it between the date mentioned and the end of April, 1919, being about 220,000 tons. If we add to this figure the quantity carried by the oil-tank canal boats, we find that the total weight of fuel oil conveyed from the Clyde to the Forth along or across the property of the Caledonian Railway Company for practically the entire distance was no less than 357,514 tons. A regular traffic in timber was dealt with at Grangemouth for the Board of Trade Timber Control Department. The total quantity received at the port by rail, apart from 2,700 tons coming by water, was, approxi- mately, 30,000 tons. The timber was mainly stored either on ground belonging to the Caledonian Railway Company situate around the docks or, in the case of timber of the heavier class, in the timber basins. 550 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Following on the signing of the Armistice, a very large number of " liberty " men from the Grand Fleet got Christmas or New Year leave, and were conveyed by tugs to Grangemouth Docks, where they were entrained and dispatched to destinations in England by special trains as under : — Date Number of Number of TRAINS. OFFICERS AND MEN December 6th, 1918 . . 6 . • 3.479 17th . 5 • . 2,589 20th. ,, . . I 266 ., 30th . , . 8 . • 4.094 January loth, 1919 . . 7 . • 3.655 The " liberty " men returned by special train on the expiry of their leave, and were detrained at the docks. On December 25th, 1918, the Commander-in-Chief intimated that the Admiralty had approved of the re-opening of the port to commercial vessels so far as could be done without interfering with naval require- ments. In Marchy 1919, the Admiral and his staff were withdrawn. Grangemouth then finally reverted — as well as it might — to its status quo ante helium. CHAPTER XL. ADMIRALTY WORK AT IMMINGHAM. Just over two years before the outbreak of war, their Majesties the King and Queen opened at Immingham, on the southern bank of the Humber and about equidistant between Grimsby and Hull, a new dock which, constructed by the enterprise of the Great Central Railway Company, was to render much service to the national cause in the World-Conflict so soon to follow. As a general rule, even the most important of docks start with small or comparatively small beginnings and attain their eventual proportions by instalments carried out over a more or less prolonged series of years ; but the Immingham Dock estabUshed a record by being probably the largest work of the kind ever opened straight away as a single undertaking. In other words, it was practically fully grown at the time of its birth. How substantial, too, its proportions were will be easily realised with the help of a few figures. The dock estate itself comprises an aggregate of 1,000 acres, with a river frontage of about one mile and a half, a total length of two miles and a half and a breadth of one mile. The King's Dock has a water area of forty-five acres, the depth thereof varying from thirty to thirty-five feet. There is, also, a timber pond of six acres and a graving dock 740 ft. by 56 ft. by 22 ft. on blocks. The dock equip- ment includes a ferro-concrete grain-elevator which has a capacity of 15,000 tons ; eight hj^draulic coal-hoists ; a plentiful supply of cranes, with a capacity ranging from 30 cwts. to 50 tons ; a mineral quay ; a timber quay ; goods transit sheds, wool warehouses, bonded warehouses and general stores ; 117 miles of running lines and sidings and all the other necessary facihties of a great modern port of the most modern and up-to-date type. Constituting the geographical port for the coal-fields of South York- shire, Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire and for the iron and steel trades of the Frodingham district, and most conveniently located for the wool trades of Yorkshire, Immingham Dock started with every prospect of a great commercial future ; but the Admiralty, on the outbreak of war, speedily recognised and made full use of the great advantage which, in many ways, it also offered to themselves." The mihtary authorities first utilised the large transit sheds and grain warehouse for the mobiUsation of three battalions of the West Riding Territorial Regiment, some 2,200 troops and 180 horses being, quartered there by August nth, 1914. Then, shortly afterwards, the dock was 551 p-p 552 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. selected by the Admiralty as headquarters for the Admiral of Patrols, who flew his flag in H.M.S. St. George until the establishment of a large shore depot which, for the remainder of the war, remained under the command of the respective Rear- and Vice- Admirals Commanding the East Coast of England. Immingham became, also, not only a naval base but a mining base having its own flotilla of mine-laying destroyers for operations in the North Sea, though not necessarily in connection with that Northern Barrage which could be better served from Grangemouth. The part thus played by Immingham as a mine-laying base, may, perhaps, be more conveniently dealt with first, having regard to what has already been said in Chapter XXXIII concerning the rail transport of mines. The construction at Immingham of stores specially adapted to the housing of mines was begun by the Admiralty in the latter part of 1916 ; but the buildings were not in a sufiiciently finished state for use to be made of them when the issue of mines began at the port in February, 1917. In this absence of adequate storage facilities, the mines and sinkers — ^then of the old type were transferred on arrival by rail from contractors' works direct to the mine-laying vessels in dock, to lighters, or to storage-trucks (otherwise railway wagons no longer serviceable for use on the running lines). In August or September, 1917, the new t3T)e of British mine (manufactured on the mass-production system), together with sinkers and components, began to arrive in great numbers at Imming- ham. Transit sheds having a floor space of over 18,000 square yards had been placed at the disposal of the Naval Mining Engineer Officer by the Great Central Railway Company for the accommodation of mines, sinkers, etc., but it was also found necessary to adapt one of the new Admiralty stores — a structure 200 ft. by 90 ft. — to the purposes of a testing and assembling establishment. Within a period, also, of six months, the Admiralty mining staff, which, when the start was made at the port in February, consisted of a single representative of the department, had ADMIRALTY WORK AT IMMINGHAM. 553 increased to 300. By the autumn of 1918 there had been a further expansion to nearly 800. Of these, about 500 were employed in the testing and assembling dep6t and about 300 on transport and store- keeping duties. Most of the staff lived at Grimsby and travelled to and fro on the Great Central Company's electric railway serving the two ports. Mines and sinkers which, on arriving at Immingham, could not be at once removed into the assembly shop were either transferred, still in . the wagons in which they had been brought, and as fast as the available facilities permitted, to the yard or to the storage-wagons serving as movable stores on sidings or were dumped in huge stacks near the mining depot. Such, also, was the abundance of suppHes delivered at Imming- ham, that there was one occasion, at least, when 1,000 trucks loaded with mines and sinkers — that is to say, about 400 wagons from the running lines and 600 storage-wagons — were waiting for their contents to be dealt with in the assembling depot. The stock thus on hand was in addition to the considerable number of assembled units in the Admiralty and Great Central stores utilised for the purpose. Great quantities of mines and sinkers, in the non-assembled stage, were taken on in the railway wagons to an expanse of flat ground, two or three miles out, from which a nulhon tons of soil had been excavated for the building up of embankments or the construction of gravity sidings, etc., in connection with Immingham Dock. The transfer from running wagon to storage wagon, from storage wagon to assembly shop, from shop to store, and from store to the mine- layers coming to Immingham for them, for use in the HeUgoland Bight, on the coast of Jutland, or elsewhere, naturally involved a considerable amount of labour. From all this it will be seen that a really great work in connection with the transport, completion and issuing of the mines which were to have so material an influence on the naval situation ^ was done at Immingham, and more particularly so during the last year of the war. When, in fact, the Armistice was signed, Immingham's available stock of mines and sinkers was still numbered by tens of thousands. Much was done, also, in the shipment of depth charges on trawlers and torpedo-boat destroyers. Immingham was further utilised by the Admiralty as a base for providing submarines with oil and other supplies, and for the carrying out of repairs, a staff being stationed for this purpose on the " mother ship " in the docks. Immingham was, also, a depot for balloons employed in the detection of enemy submarines. In the later stages of the war it became, in addition, an American seaplane dep6t. Records of the very heavy tonnage of mines, sinkers, naval stores, etc., brought to Immingham on Government account are not available ; 1 In " The War Cabinet : Report for the Year 1918," it is said : — " The policy of inten- sive mining of the Heligoland Bight Area, which was pursued during 191 8 with great vigour, probably had great effect in bringing the war to a close ; the constant losses of small craft in this area, combined with a general sense of insecurity, certainly contributed largely to the demoralisation of the German Navy, and culminated in open mutiny." 554 BRITISH Railways and The great waR. but the tonnage of such traffic dispatched from the dock between the beginning of the war and the eventual dismanthng of the mining dep6t and other Admiralty installations showed a total of over 130,000 tons. Of salvage material — sheU cases, boxes, and much more besides — there were imported from France, and dealt with in a large salvage depot that was organised, no fewer than 21,000 tohs. Large quantities of coal were shipped. Of iron-ore wanted more especially for the manufacture of munitions of war there were imported close on 229,500 tons. Of grain, 80,000 tons were handled on account of the Landed Grain Committee, and of pit props and timber 52,000 tons were imported either for the Timber Controller or for timber merchants. Immingham, again, divided honours to a certain extent with her sister- port of Grimsby, also owned by the Great Central Railway Company. In 1917, when the urgent demand for railway material in France was causing great congestion at a number of British ports, Immingham and Grimsby were able to afford them substantial rehef, the amount of such material shipped therefrom being 80,000 tons. Prior, also, to 1917, considerable shipments of hay to France were made from ports on the west coast ; but with a view alike to saving time and to reducing the element of war risks, an extensive hay-pressing plant was installed at Grimsby, and hay and other supphes were sent, partly from that port and partly from Immingham, to the extent of 190,000 tons. Including coal, the total amount of traffic of all kinds shipped from or unloaded at Immingham during the war period was over three and a half million tons. Nor do we come even here to the end of Immingham's war record. So useful, from a naval point of view, were the docks found that there were between 25,000 and 26,000 occasions during the course of the war when they were entered by vessels under Admiralty control, included therein being battleships, cruisers, monitors, and other ships of a large type. A number of prize cargoes were dealt with on behalf of the Admiralty Marshal. The dry dock and repairing shops of the Humber Graving Dock and Engineering Company took under their charge more than evens hundred Admiralty and other vessels in need either of repairs or of overhauls of a more or less extensive nature, in addition to a very large number of vessels on which repairs were effected without any need for dry-docking. Finally mention should be made of the fact that two sea-going tugs belonging to the Great Central Railway Company assisted the naval authorities in the river or at sea, as required, and rendered successful salvage services to naval or commercial vessels on more than forty occasions. CHAPTER XLI. HARWICH PORT AND PARKESTON QUAY. Formed by the combined estuaries of the Essex Stour and the Suffolk Orwell, and offering a considerable expanse of sheltered inland waters accessible from the sea at all states of the tide, Harwich Port began to play an important role in British luval history as far back as the year 1340, when Edward, III embarked there with a British fleet of 260 sail on his encounter with the French off Sluys. Later on, and down to 1836, when the mails were transferred to Dover, Harwich was the most impor- tant place on the East Coast for communications with the Continent ; but it suffered from the inroads of the sea, and, although Defoe described it as able to receive the " biggest " ships of war and " the greatest number that ever the world saw together," the day was to come when it was unequal to receiving the largest warships of modern times. The decline of Harwich as a naval port set in accordingly. It gained, however, a high reputation as a commercial port on becoming the headquarters of the steamship services of the Great Eastern Railway Company between this country and the Continent, and that reputation was especially enhanced by the company's creation of Parkeston Quay at a point on the river Stour which, although about a mile^ by water, to the west of the borough, is still within the hmits of the Port of Harwich. In 1914 six services with the Continent were being operated from Parkeston Quay either by the Great Eastern or by other home or foreign companies. With a shifting, in or about 1911, of the balance of naval power from the Mediterranean to the North Sea, the Admiralty recognised the need on the "East Coast, somewhere between Dover and the Firth of Forth, of a naval base which, supplementary to that at Rosyth, would be specially designed to serve as a headquarters for light cruisers, destroyers, sub- marines, etc., operating in the North Sea ; and the port of Harwich, by reason of its geographical position and the other advantages it offered, seemed to be well adapted to the desired purpose. Certain improvements in the port had recently been carried out, and there was every justifica- tion for the choice eventually made of Harwich both as a naval base south of Rosjrth and as a harbour of refuge, in case of need, for such naval vessels of the smaller type as it would accommodate. So it was that Harwich became the headquarters of the First De- stroyer Flotilla of the First Division of the Home Fleet, consisting of a dep6t ship, a first-class twin-screw protected cruiser of 9,000 tons, three unarmoured cruisers of 3,300 tons each, and twenty-five torpedo-boat 555 556 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. destroyers of the then latest types and ranging in size from 700 to 1,000 tons. The flotilla included some of the fastest ships in the British Navy — vessels equal to a speed at sea of over thirty knots an hour. Each cruiser carried a complement of about three hundred men and each de- stroyer had a crew of about one hundred. In the spring and autumn the flotilla left Harwich for about eight weeks' battle practice on the north- east coast of Scotland, and in the intervals there were firing and tactical exercises, extending over several days at a time, in the North Sea. Har- wich was, also, at this time, the headquarters of a flotilla of nine sub- marines, together with the parent ship Mercury and the sea-going ship Thames, a second-class cruiser of 4,000 tons. There was further to be taken into account the existence, on the other side of the Stour, and immediately facing Harwich, of the Shotley Royal Naval Training School, where some 1,400 boys were under training. Towards the end of 1911, and under these conditions, Harwich had taken on a fresh lease of life as a naval port of great prospective utihty. Significant of much that was happening was the fact that the running on the Great Eastern of " seamen's specials " for the conveyance to London of men on week-end leave had become a well-established and greatly- appreciated institution. By March, 1912, the new naval base had acquired a second flotilla of about twenty-five destroyers, with attendant cruisers, scouts and depot or repair ships ; the Admiralty had provided a floating dock capable of accommodating two destroyers side by side, and plans were being prepared for additional dredging operations for which the Admiralty had undertaken to make a grant. The Great Eastern Railway Company now thought it time, in the interests of the steadily-increasing naval population, to re-open their hotel at Harwich, which had been closed for a period of five years ; and, having regard to all that was to follow, on the outbreak of the war, the fact may be recalled that on the occasion of the said re-opening Lord Claud Hamilton, the Chairman of the company, who presided at the luncheon given, said: — It would be agreed that the Admiralty had made a wise choice in selecting Harwich Harbour as a naval base of the torpedo fleet, since it seemed to be considered that, if any trouble did occur to this country, it would come from the east rather than from the south. The perfect protection afforded by the harbour made it an exceedingly suitable place for one of our great naval bases. Mr. H. K. Newton, M.P., spoke of the port as " easily the best harbour of refuge on the East Coast," and Sir Fortescue Flannery, M.P., declared that " a great national movement had been initiated by the development of Harwich." While taking over, on the outbreak of war, most of the Great Eastern Railway steamships, the Admiralty did not adopt a like procedure with regard to Parkeston Quay, which continued to be managed by the rail- way company throughout the war period. All the same, the quay, with its 2,800 ft. of quay space, affording berths for nine steamers at one time ; HARWICH PORT AND PARKESTON QUAY. 557 its commodious sheds ; its electric and hydraulic cranes, capable of Kft- ing weights ranging from 30 cwts. to 30 tons ; its mechanical means for loading coal into steamers ; its railway station, with spacious waiting- rooms and adjoining hotel, and its direct rail communication with London (only about seventy miles distant), with the Midland arid the Northern Counties, and, through them, with all parts of England, Wales and Scotland, was ready for immediate service for the purposes of the war ; and it was, in effect, occupied by the Admiralty as required, there being occasions when the facihties it afforded were entirely utilised by the naval authorities. Harwich and Parkfeston thus became practically a single establishment from a naval point of view, and, with the Forces stationed there, were to take a large share in the British Navy's control of the North Sea. Such, indeed, was the importance of the work carried on that Harwich, including Parkeston Quay, Dovercourt Bay, Felixstowe and Trimley, was declared a Special Military Area in October, 1916, and remained so until December 2nd, 1918. The light cruisers (strengthened by the addition of others) and the two flotillas of destroyers were required to perform a wide range of duties. They joined in the operations in the Bight of HeUgoland on August 28th, 1914, harassing the enemy and doing invaluable reconnaissance work ; throughout the war, and as a matter of routine duty, they hunted down the enemy's mine-layers ; they escorted our own mine-layers ; they patrolled and protected our mine-fields in the North Sea ; they supplied in the winter of 1916-17 a division to assist the Dover Patrol in maintain- ing the Channel barrage ; they lent sections to the Dover Patrol for service off Ostend and Zeebrugge ; they kept up a continuous look-out along the Dutch Coast and the Frisian Islands for enemy ships which might seek to reach Belgian ports ; they escorted British merchantmen across the North Sea and, also, British sea-plane carriers when air-raids were made on the German mainland or islands ; they had patrols whose ' special duty it was to watch for enemy aircraft crossing the North Sea to make raids on England ; they captured enemy trawlers fishing in German waters, and they played the part of decoys by tempting the enemy's warships to pursue them where British submarines, Ijdng below the surface, would blow them up and so achieve further successes in the way of keeping the North Sea open for British vessels. The Harwich Submarine Flotilla had, prior to August 4th, 1914, been increased from the nine submarines of which it was originally constituted to an average of eighteen, and it was then the only organised flotilla of the kind in this country. The initial duty it was called upon to perform in connection with the war was that of watching the German coast lest any enemy vessel might venture out with a view to interfering with the dispatch of the First Expeditionary Force from Southampton to France. This responsible task fulfilled, the submarines settled down to recon- naissance work ; to patrolling our mine-fields on the east side of the ' North Sea and sending home wireless messages concerning movements 558 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. of the enemy's ships or otherwise ; to the la3dng of mines in connection with the said mine-fields, and to watching for and attacking enemy submarines, many successes being attained by them in this direction. Harwich also became one of the most important of the bases estab- lished around the coasts of the British Isles for the Mine-sweeping Force which, composed of hired or commandeered paddle-steamers, trawlers, drifters and motor-launches, was engaged in the task of patrolling daily, for the duration of the war, some 2,000 square miles of sea in order to sweep up and destroy enemy mines. The work done from Harwich consisted in keeping clear certain channels either along the coast or extending across the North Sea ; and not until the daily sweeping had been accomplished were merchantmen and other vessels — including the Great Eastern steamers engaged on the Holland service — allowed to leave port. Such work was the more arduous and exacting inasmuch as the enemy, who was keenly bent on stopping our communications with the Continent, did his utmost to block effectively the routes from and to the Harwich area. The number of mines he laid there is declared to have been extraordinarily grea,t, and he showed the utmost pertinacity in putting down fresh mines to take the place of those that were constantly being swept up. Channels which had been thoroughly cleared one day were never safe the next day until they had been swept clear over again ; and there was probably no point around our coasts where this precaution was more essential than at Harwich. So far was this the case that out of the 3,400 mines destroyed in home waters during the year 1917, over 1,000 were claimed to have been accounted for by the indefatigable Harwich branch of the British Mine-sweeping Force. * In the accomplishment of this wide range of duties, the quay which had been provided at Parkeston through the enterprise of the Great Eastern Railway Company became a most valuable asset to the Admiralty and one of inestimable value to the country in the prosecution of the war. Apart from the excellence and the ampHtude of the shipping and transport faciUties already spoken of, very little was required to convert the buildings on or adjoining the quay into a complete shore establish- ment offering great advantages to every one concernai. Thus in the early days of the war it was upon their dep6t ship, stationed alongside Parkes- ton Quay, that the submarine crews, on returning to port and leaving the confined quarters in which they discharged their strenuous duties at sea, spent the interval granted to them for rest and relaxation between one exhausting voyage and another. There came a time, however, when the number of men to be provided for led to the accommodation on board the depot ship becoming inadequate, and it was arranged that thenceforward they should spend their rest periods on shore. This was done by placing at their disposal the Great Eastern Railway Company's East Shed and Middle Shed, situate immediately alongside the quay. In these sheds, each about 400 ft. by 60 ft., they could sling their hammocks * See " The Harwich Naval Forces : Their Part in the Great War," by E. F. Knight (London : Hodder and Stoughton, 1919]. HARWICH PORT AND PARKESTON QUAY. 559 at jtiight and spend their leisure hours during the day. In the East Shed a stage or concert platform was provided. The West Shed was reserved for men belonging to the flotillas of destroyers. The offices used in peace times by the company's stafi and the Customs representatives were now utihsed for bilhard and recreation rooms for officers and men of the Harwich Forces. In the station buildings the Naval Pajmiaster was located. The stables were converted into a School of Wireless Telegraphy, and a site was found for some workshops and an experimental tank wanted by the Board of Invention and Research, which was understood to be making researches at Harwich into such matters as the best means of detecting the approach of enemy submarines. A twpedo depot was arranged ; stores were available for naval supplies in general ; there were canteens for the various Forces ; provision was made for the holding of religious services ; parties of actors and artistes from the London theatres and music-haUs paid visits to Parkeston to give performances and entertainments to the men as a relief to the trials of their life on the ocean, and the Great Eastern Railway Musical Society gave a number of concerts. The Railway Hotel at Parkeston, still con- ducted by the company, was a great boon to officers, their families and friends, for whom the accommodation it afforded was specially reserved. Reference has still to be made to the company's Marine Repair Shops. These rendered most valuable service to the naval authorities, the more so as they afforded practically the only efficient means by which repairs to ships could be carried out in the Port of Harwich. The need for them • was all the greater by reason of the large number of instances in which vessels forming part of one or other of the various Forces stationed in the port suffered from the mines that the enemy planted so thickly in the approaches thereto and in other parts of the North Sea. In, perhaps, the majority of cases, the vessels which came in contact with mines were not sunk, but managed to get back to Harwich ; or, if the damage done to them could not be made good there, they might proceed to Chatham. Harwich was generally equal to the occasion, and the amount of repairing and refitting done there by the Great Eastern Railway Company's workmen was enormous. It was a matter of vital importance, also, that this work should be done with the utmost dispatch in order that the vessels concerned could be taken out to sea again with the least possible delay. To this end, the repair shops were kept open not only on weekdays but every Sunday and all holidays. So effective, too, was the work done that some of the vessels in question were mined, repaired and made serviceable again several times over. On the sign- ing of the Armistice the demands upon the shops naturally fell off ; but a considerable volume of work still continued to be done for the naval and transport authorities. Taking the fuU period over which the shops were utihsed for Admiralty purposes, the number of vessels of all classes either repaired or refitted showed an average of about 170 per year. As an example of the pressure under which things had sometimes to be done, reference might be made to the case of Destroyer " S." 56o BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Late one Sunday afternoon in January, 1915, the Senior Naval Officer in charge of the Destroyer Flotilla signalled to the marine shops that repairs were wanted for a vessel which, as inquiry showed, had sustained serious damage to her port-bow plating, and, for the time being, had been rendered unseaworthy. The efficiency attributed to the Harwich flotillas was due in a material degree to their reputation for being always ready to proceed to sea when required ; and it so happened that, at the moment when the machine shops got their message, a " certain liveUness " was expected to arise in the North Sea at any moment. The reniainder of the flotilla were standing-by under one hour's notice, and it was regarded as imperative that not a minute should be lost in making the damaged ship fit to go to sea again. A consultation was held with the responsible naval officers as to the nature and extent of the temporary repairs which would suffice for the purpose ; messages were sent to the workmen then at their homes sum- moning them to the shops ; stages were rigged over the bows of the vessel, and at about 10 p.m. the work of cutting away the damaged plates and frames was begun. Boilermakers and bluejackets laboured together with the greatest ardour, and the work went on uninterruptedly until the early hours of the morning. Then the wind, which had been blowing with much strength throughout the night, increased to hurricane force, and it was no longer possible to keep the oxygen burners alight. With great difficulty a tarpaulin was rigged, the Hghts were adequately sheltered, and the work was proceeded with, a fresh squad of men being put on to relieve the others for a time. Meanwhile, there was much anxiety on the part of those responsible, no one knowing how soon the recall might not be sounded by the sirens of the parent ships. The signal came at 1.30 p.m., just over sixteen hours from the time when the job was started. The work had not then been finished ; but the repairs done would, it was considered, suffice for immediate requirements. As soon as steam was up the Commander, rather than wait for the heaving of the staging, gave the order to " cut everything away." Before the workmen stiU on board could reahse what was happening, they found the vessel steaming down the harbour at a speed of, probably, twenty knots an hour, and on the way, for aught they knew to the contrary, to Heligoland or elsewhere. The Commander, however, whilst the destroyer was still in harbour, signalled to a patrol boat to come alongside and take the workmen off. This having been done. Destroyer " S " continued on her course and took up, in good time, her position in the line, fit and ready once more for anjd;hing that might happen. From all this it should be seen that what has been said as to the value of the services rendered to the national cause by the Great Eastern Rail- way Company's establishment on the river Stour is in no way exagger- ated. The creation there by the Admiralty of such an establishment, on the outbreak of war, had one not already existed, would have involved enormous expense and have occupied considerable time. No possible HARWICH PORT AND PARKESTON QUAY. 561 attempt indeed made in this direction could have succeeded under the conditions of actual warfare and within a sufficiently early period. As it was, the Admiralty found at Parkeston, on the very day that war broke out, practically all the facilities and all the accommodation they required for immediate use as an adjunct to their naval base at Harwich. There certainly were a mumber of additional services in respect to electrical arrangements which had to be provided subsequently in order to meet the entirely new conditions ; but the supply of these was readily undertaken by the company and was most efficiently carried out by their Electrical Engineer. They included installation of electric light- ing, heating, and power, together with supply of current, at the torpedo depot ; installation of additional feeder cable and of lighting and power circuits, and supply of current, at the Invention and Research Depot ; installation of electric lighting, power and heating, and supply of current in workshops, stores and other buildings ; provision of additional tele- phone faciUties ; supply of current for submarines, destroyers, etc., when Ipng at the quay ; repairs to motors, armatures, telephones and various electrical machinery and plant ; provision of H.T. line and additional plant at power station for supply of current to shops, etc. ; installation of H.T. line and supply of current to Beacon Hill Fort and camps at Dovercourt, and installation of electric lighting, supply of current, and fitting up X-ray apparatus (presented by the Chairman and Directors of the Great Eastern Railway Company) for the Harwich Hotel, in use as a military hospital. In this way the efficiency of the Great Eastern Railway Company's already well-organised establishment on the Stour was completed from the point of view of naval needs, and it is not too much to say that, but for Parkeston Quay, many of those operations in the North Sea which had so important a bearing on the whole course of the war could hardly have been carried out at all. CHAPTER XLII. NAVAL AMBULANCE TRAINS. Organisation for naval medical transport on land was practically non-existent in this country when war broke out in August, 1914. Plans had long been prepared for the conversion from ordinary railway rolling stock of such mUitary ambulance trains as might be wanted in the event of operations having to be undertaken against an invader ; but there were no plans ready for ambulance trains adapted to the special requirements of the Navy, which requirements differed in some of their most essential details from those of the Army. The main reason for this apparent defect in national pohcy is to be found in the expectation that, in the event of operations at sea in which our Navy might be engaged, the wounded would be brought to Portsmouth, Plymouth or Chatham, and there transferred direct from ship to the great naval hospital with which each of these ports had been provided, no need thus arising for their conveyance elsewhere by ambulance train. When under these conditions the Grand Fleet reached Scapa Flow, the position was that there were no naval ambulance trains for bringing to the South the large number of wounded certain to be landed in Scotland or on the north-east coast of England if the great battle that might occur in the North Sea at any moment should actually be fought. Neither, too, had arrangements been made for giving immediate attention to wounded who might be landed' — or whose gravely-damaged vessel, to save her from sinking in deep water, naight be beached — ^at any available point along our coasts. Hence in these respects, also, and apart from differences in ambu- lance-train construction, the requirements of the Navy diftered from those of the Army, whose sick and wounded from the Fighting Forces at the various Fronts would be conveyed therefrom to some previously- determined port overseas, and thence brought on to a specified port on this side where ambulance trains for their transport to some inland hospital prepared to receive them would be in waiting. No sooner had these facts been realised than there was brought into being by the Admiralty a Naval Medical Transport Service which was designed to take charge of the transport of naval sick and wounded from the time they left their ship until they arrived at the hospital to which they were to be sent on shore. This Naval Medical Transport Service was originally planned in the 562 NAVAL AMBULANCE TRAINS. 563 Nore Command by Surgeon-General, afterwards Surgeon-Vice-Admiral, Sir James Porter, K.C.B., R.N. Sir James was himself appointed Prin- cipal Medical Transport Officer, assisted by Surgeon-Lieutenant A. V, Elder, R.N.V.R. He was succeeded by Surgeon-Captain Charles S. Woodwright, and finally by Surgeon-Captain Sir Arthur Stanley Nance. In conjunction with the naval ambulance trains forming an essential part of the plan of operations, the Service, which worked with the greatest smoothness throughout, provided an elaborate and remarkable net- work of organised effort, and one that well deserves to rank among the most successful of British endeavours during the course of the war. Organisation of the Ports. The scheme adopted was based primarily on the division of the coasts of Great Britain into five areas. Scotland, with headquarters at Edinburgh, formed one of these areas, and the most important of them all. The others had their headquarters at Chatham, Portsmouth, Plymouth and Hull respectively. At each of these five centres a naval medical officer of high rank was stationed as Medical Transport Officer. He was placed in charge of the area assigned to him and was responsible to the Principal Medical Transport Officer, who, in the first instance, was located at Chatham, though subsequently the Central Office of the Service was removed to the Medical Department of the Admiralty in London. Each Medical Transport Officer had under his direction an Assistant Medical Transport Officer in every port within his area at which there was any likelihood of sick, injured or wounded being landed from the Fleet. The Assistant Medical Transport Officer was generally a local practitioner, and among the duties assigned to him was that of forming local parties of naval stretcher-bearers whom he instructed in first-aid and in the handling of naval cots, the latter being a procedure essentially different from ordinary stretcher drill. In every port, also, to which an Assistant Medical Transport Officer was assigned, provision was made for the setting up either of a Medical Dep6t or of an Emer- gency Medical Depot for the reception and treatment of naval patients until they could be removed by ambulance train to a naval hospital proper. Medical Depots were estabHshed at the larger ports constituting obvious bases for the landing of wounded in the event of an action at sea. Here it was generally possible to make arrangements with local hospitals for dressing-stations and the use of a certain number of beds in case of need. Emergency Medical Depots were arranged at all intermediate ports which ambulance or rescue vessels might enter to discharge wounded conveyed by them or into which damaged vessels from the Fleet might be forced to run for their own safety. At these smaller ports hospital accommodation might not be available. Each Emergency Medical 564 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Depot was, accordingly, supplied with four " Units," known as " Cot," "Clothing." "Hospital" and "Medical" Units respectively. The Cot Unit consisted of completely-equipped service cots which could be used to form the nucleus of a temporary hospital in suitable local build- ings selected in advance for this purpose. The Hospital and Medical Units, containing all the necessary utensUs, drugs, dressings, etc., were kept available for immediate use in these extemporised receiving sta- tions. The Clothing Unit was designed for the benefit of men suffering from immersion. It ensured to them a supply of dry clothing so that, should they otherwise be in fit condition so to do, they could proceed at once on their journey. The canning out of these plans involved a great deal of uncertainty since it was not possible to know in advance which port or ports might not be suddenly called upon to deal with an inrush of wounded ; but, in the result, no likely place around the coasts of Great Britain was left without the means of dealing with any such emergency. This fact can be more clearly estabhshed by the following list of ports at which either Medical or Emergency Medical Depots were established under the conditions stated : — Thurso, Wick, Invergordon, Inverness, Lossie- mouth, Buckie, Banff, Fraserburgh, Peterhead, Aberdeen, Stonehaven, Montrose, Arbroath, Dundee, Methil, Kirkcaldy, Port Edgar, Leith, North Berwick, Blyth, North Shields, South Shields, Middlesbrough, Whitby, Scajborough, Bridlington, Hull, Immingham, Yarmouth, Lowestoft, Harwich, Brightlingsea, Chatham, Dover, Portsmouth, Plymouth, Avonmouth, Liverpool and Glasgow. All these different ports, with the exception of Liverpool and Avonmouth, were included in one or other of the five areas in charge of Medical Transport Officers. The Assistant M.T.O.'s at Liverpool and Avonmouth received their instructions direct from London. Hospital Ships. According to Fleet-Surgeon E. C. Lomas, C.B., D.S.O., M.B., R.N., as told by him in an article on " Hospital Ships " published in the British Medical Journal for April 28th, 1917, there was, before the war, only one British hospital ship in commission, najnely. The Maine, and this went ashore in a thick fog on June 19th, 1914 ; but the arrangements previously made by the Admiralty for the provision of hospital ships " worked admirably." Within four days, he says, of the order to mobilise for war, three ocean liners were converted into hospital " carriers " and, " with their medical and nursing staff and full equipment of cots, bedding, and medical and surgical stores complete, which had been kept ready in a ' lay-apart ' store in one of the large medical depots, were already at sea. Any necessary alterations were completed by the artisan ratings, so that they joined up with the Fleet ready for any emergency." Meanwhile, work in accordance with plans which had NAVAL AMBULANCE TRAINS. 565 been prepared in peace was being pressed forward on six' other ships intended for more permanent service. These other vessels were mostly intermediate liners on which the passenger accommodation and the cargo space could be readily adapted to the desired purposes, and all six were ready for sea in about three weeks. To these details it may be added that the principal decks of the hospital ships, which, as will have been seen, were designed to follow the Fleet into action, were converted into surgical and medical wards. They were each provided with an operating theatre and a bacteriological laboratory, while, in addition to the usual surgeons, they carried speci- alists in surgery and bacteriology, with the addition, in most instances, of an ocuhst and a dentist. Four hospital sisters were included in the staff, the remainder of which consisted of ratings of the naval medical service. Each ship was manned by a mercantile captain and crew. Before long, however, it was found that the proposal to let the hos- pital ships follow the Fleet into action would, for various reasons (includ- ing the disposition shown by the Germans to sink such vessels whenever they could), have to be abandoned. It was then decided that they should remain in deep-water ports where fighting ships could safely transfer wounded to them on returning to their base for coaling, for the purpose of being re-munitioned, or for other reasons. Experience was now further to show, however, that a hospital ship, with its limited amount of space, could not be regarded in the light of a base hospital suitable for any prolonged treatment of naval wounded. With the best possible system of ventilation, there was a tendency for the air in the cabins or saloons to become fetid, and especially so when, after an engagement, congestion or overcrowding might arise owing to the retention for what, in all the circumstances and conditions, would be an unduly long period of the wounded brought in. So the hospital ship in port eventually became the equivalent of a casualty-clearing- station on land, its aim and purpose being to give the patients such immediate attention as they might require and then ensure their removal ashore at the earliest possible moment.^ For these reasons, also, still greater importance attached both to the provision of a sufficiency of base hospitals at the points where the patients would be landed and to the efficient working of a naval ambidance train service. Auxiliary Naval Hospitals. Another and no less important part of the general scheme was the securing in Scotland of such a degree of accommodation for naval sick, injured or wounded landed there that no necessity would arise for bring- ing the whole of them to the established naval hospitals in the South. Various measures were taken towards the attainment of this aim. ' See " A Note on Hospital Ships and their Functions," by Acting- Staff- Surgeon A. Vavasour Elder, R.N.V.R., Journal of the Royal Naval Medical Service. October, 1916. 566 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. There' was already at Queensferry a naval hospital with 159 beds, and later on this accommodation was increased to 259 beds by the provision of additional wards. At Invergordon a Naval Officers' Club which was on the point of completion when the war broke out was converted to the purposes of a naval hospital for officers and men brought to Cromarty Firth. Located close to the railway station, it was in a most convenient situation for the removal of patients to the ambulance trains. It did not, however, accommodate more than fifty beds. Later on a start was made with the erection of a new hospital which was to provide for 250 beds ; but this building had not been finished when the war ended, and it was to the Officers' Club that all the patients landed at Invergordon who were not put direct on to the ambulance trains were first taken. Then arrangements for the reception of naval cases were made with certain civilian hospitals in Scotland, including the Northern Infir- mary, Inverness, the Royal Infirmary, Aberdeen, and the Edinburgh Royal Infirmary, whUe the Edinburgh City Infectious Hospital agreed to take infectious cases landed from the Fleet. A Lunatic Asylum at Larbert (1,200 beds) and the East Pilton Infectious Hospital at Granton (at first 220, eventually 400, beds) were used as general naval hospitals. Various convalescent hospitals were also arranged for in Scotland. In the late autumn of 1917 the Admiralty, exercising the powers conferred on them under the Defence of the Realm Act, took over the extensive hydropathic estabUshment at Peebles as a convalescent hospital for officers. Dungavel House, Strathaven, Lanarkshire, belonging to the Duke of Hamilton, was fitted up as a convalescent hospital by the Church Army. From Wemyss Bay officers and men embarked for Rothesay.i Isle of Bute, where the Marquis of Bute's residence had been adapted to the purposes of a naval convalescent hospital. In addition to what was thus done in Scotland for the British Naval Forces, special hospital accommodation was provided there for the U.S.A. Navy co-operating with our own. For them the Pavilion, the Baths and two of the largest hotels at Strathpeffer were taken over. At Leith the Americans had the use of the Poorhouse and Poorhouse Infirmary for general hospital purposes ; though British as well as American Naval Officers and men were admitted without distinction to both insti- tutions. The Americans also dealt, at Strathpeffer, with the whole of the British infectious cases occurring in the North of Scotland. The measures thus taken in Scotland were supplemented by the secmr- ing of additional accommodation in the South. In London the Homoeo- pathic Hospital reserved a certain number of beds for naval cases. Naval officers were received into various military and civil hospitals in the Metropolis. The Seamen's Hospital at Greenwich was made available for naval ratings, and a large hotel at Southend was taken over and converted into a convalescent hospital for stiU more naval ratings. In the West of England a naval convalescent hospital was opened at Truro in a workhouse fitted up for the purpose by the Cornwall Branch NAVAL AMBULANCE TRAINS. 567 of the British Red Cross Society. A number of other hospitals, existing or extemporised, were also made use of. Standard Naval Ambulance Trains. On August 6th, 1914, when the London and North Western Railway Company were already engaged, at their Wolverton Carriage Works, on the construction of three ambulance trains for the War Office, a re- quest was made .to them that they would, with the utmost possible speed, supply the Admiralty with an ambulance train specially adapted to the needs of the Navy. Telegraphed instructions to this effect were sent from Euston to Wolverton ; the vehicles necessary for conversion into ambulance coaches were collected and taken to the workshops ; a staff of men ^Kas set on to make the needful alterations ; the work was perse- vered in continuously^, night and day, for thirty hours, and at half-past four o'clock in the morning of August 8th, the complete train was dispatched to Chatham Dockyard. With what satisfaction the results were regarded was shown by a letter, dated August 9th, 1914, received by Mr. H. D. Earl, Carriage Superintendent at Wolverton, from Surgeon-General Sir James Porter, who wrote : — Royal Naval Corridor Ambulance Train from Wolverton has arrived to-day, and has gladdened me very much. It is so satisfactory that I am asking the Admir- alty for a second of a similar construction. I consider great praise is due for the manner the department under you has carried out this work. No. I Naval Ambulance Train, as it was called, made its first run with patients on September 17th, 1914. Orders for four more ambtilance trains on Admiralty account were subsequently sent to the North Western, and these, in turn, started to run as foUows : No. 2, June 22nd, 1915 ; No. 3, June 2nd, 1916 ; No. 4, June 9th, 1916, and No. 5, March 21st, 1918. Apart from certain trains of an " emergency " type, to which reference will be made later, these five constituted the fleet of ambu- lance trains working for the Admiralty throughout the war ; and their construction was entrusted to the London and North Western Railway " Company, not only because of the satisfaction that the first of the series had given, but, also, because that company had an exceptionally good supply of the open parcel-vans which were specially suited to naval ambulance train purposes. The trains numbered 2, 3, and 5 respectively were of a full-length " standard " type to which No. i, originally put together on somewhat different Unes, was afterwards adapted except in some minor details. Each train consisted of twelve coaches, as follows : (i) Guard's van, and space for the slinging of 16 hammocks for members of the crew. (2 and 3) Ward cars, each with 24 cots for men. (4) Day coach. (5) Men's kitchen, stores and office. (6, 7 and 8) Ward cars for men, accommo- dating 24, 30 and 24 cots respectively. (9) Ofiicers' ward car, with QQ 568 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. 20 cots. (lo) Of&cers' dining coach and officers' kitchen, (ii) Medical staff coach. (12) Baggage and guard. No. 4 train, designed for service in Scotland, comprised seven coaches only, in order that the steep gradients of the Highland Railway could be surmounted without the need to employ a second locomotive. In this instance the train was made up thus : (i) Guard and crew. (2) Ward car for men, accommodating 36 in cots or seated. (3) Ward car for men, 24 cots. (4) Day coach. (5) Kitchen and stores. (6) Officers' ward car, ac- commodating 16 cot and four sitting cases. (7) Baggage, guard and staff. The chief difference between a military ambulance train and a naval ambulance train is in the fitting up of the ward cars. In the former the cots are a fixture to the sides of the cars. Patients are brought into the train on army stretchers and are moved therefrom on to the mattress of what is, in effect, an iron-framed steel-spring folding bed- stead. In serious cases the stretcher itself is placed on the cot fittings. The patient is not then disturbed, though by remaining on the stretcher throughout the journey he loses the benefit of the spring mattress. In the ward cars of naval ambulance trains the cots are movable, being suspended from hooks fixed in the roof of the vehicle. A naval standard cot is alike a bed and a stretcher. The patient — ^if a cot case — ^is placed in it on board his ship. He may lie in it on deck awaiting the steamship or the boat in which he is to be taken ashore. He and his cot will be slung together from the one vessel to the other at sea. Still in his cot, he will, on arrival at the port, be moved either to the hospital ship stationed there or to a naval hospital on land. In the same way he wiU be carried on the naval ambulance train and will remain in his cot throughout the journey. At the end thereof he is taken from the train to the ambulance that will convey him to the hos- pital to which he has been designated, and he does not leave his cot — which by this time may seem to have become almost part of himself — until he is alongside the bed he is to occupy. Naval medical experts are strong in their preference for this arrange- ment over the " fixed cot " system of the military ambulance trains — the more so as they consider that in cases of severe injury the repeated transfer from bed to stretcher, from stretcher to cot and from cot to stretcher must often be a painful procedure for the patient, if not some- times actually prejudicial to him. On the other hand there is the con- sideration that the movable cot may be better adapted to naval than to military conditions. In the idea of the movable cot itself there is, of course, nothing new. The type in use to-day goes back to the time of Nelson ; and, if it should have escaped the " modern improvements " which attend most human inventions, that is because, by reason of its simplicity and effectiveness, it is considered beyond the scope of improvement. Canvas is stretched over a flat wooden frame in such a way that each of the two end pieces forms a triangle. In the apex of each triangle there is placed an " eye" for the rope — or, in nautical language, the NAVAL AMBULANCE TRAINS. 569 lanyard — to be used when the cot is suspended from the hooks to which it will be attached. The canvas at the sides is extended to such a length that, when the" patient is lying on the cot, with the hair mattress, pillow and two blankets (sometimes supplemented by a third), which form part of the standard-cot equipment, the two sides can be brought over him and attached the one to the other by safety-pins. He thus gets the equivalent of a fixed counterpane which will not only itself contribute to his warmth but make it impossible for the blankets to slip off. These two sides can, also, be laced to the canvas ends, so that eventually the patient is in a sort of enclosed-box bed in which he should be impervious to draughts or chills no matter under what conditions he may be moved, in the open or otherwise. Naval sick or wounded were, in the later stages of the war, even taken in their cots on sledges over the snows of Northern Russia under these conditions. The dimensions, over all, of the standard naval cot are : Length, 5 ft. 10 in,, breadth, 2 ft. 4 in. The " loaded " cot can be moved by four bearers, either by hand — one holding up at each corner — or by raising it on to their shoulders. Inside the ambulance train two more bearers are wanted to fix the cot to the hooks in the roof. Each ward car of a naval ambulance train can, as a rule, accommodate twenty-four cots slung, twelve on each side, in two tiers, upper and lower. Those in the upper tier are attached direct to the hooks by means of the " eye " in each of the triangular ends. Those intbe lower tier are suspended below the upper ones by the aforesaid ropes, hanging from the same hooks. To the sides of the car there is fixed a series of padded buffers against which the cots are pressed by means of an adjust- able spring-clip devised by Staff-Surgeon Elder. It is claimed that, as the combined result of these arrangements, the patient in the movable cot of the naval ambulance train does not form a component part of the vehicle — as in the case of the patient in the fixed bunk of the military ambulance trains-r-the vertical jarring, as the train passes over the metals, being largely neutralised by the suspension, while the lateral jarring, when the train is going round curves, etc., is absorbed by the padded buffers.^ Whenever one of the ward cars was occupied by patients who did not require to remain in their cots throughout the day on a long journey from North to South, sitting accommodation was arranged for them by stacking two rows of cots along one side of the coach, placing thereon, in a slanting position, another row which rested against the sides of the coach to form a back, and covering over with a washable canvas the continuous seat thus formed. As only one side of the coach was utilised in this way, the men could lean back and stretch out their legs without interfering with the passing of other patients or of the staff, * See " Notes on Naval Ambulance Trains and Description of Naval Ambulance Train No. i," by Staff-Surgeon A. Vavasour Elder, R.N.V.R., Journal of the Royal Naval Medical Service, January, 1915 ; and " Account of Land Medical Transport Arrangements of the Navy," by Surgeon-General Sir James Porter, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., M.D., R.N., and Stafi-Surgeon A. Vavasour Elder, R.N.V.R., British Medical Journal, April 28, 1917. 570 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. to and fro. In the evening the cots were readily suspended from the hooks again and the coach re-converted into a sleeping-compartment. On No. 4 train the smaller number of coaches made it especially necessary that the available space should be used to the best advantage, and, as indicated above, one of the ward cars for the men accommodated 36 cots. This result was obtained by substituting for hooks in the roof three tiers of folding-up beds, along the sides, on which the cots could rest. While, therefore, the movable cot was retained there was, in this instance, and with a special purpose in view, a certain concession to the fixed-fittings principle adopted in the military ambulance trains, the advantage being gained that twelve more patients could be carried than if all the cots were suspended from the roof in accordance with the usual naval practice. The number of passengers was generally determined by the number of cots which could be brought into use. On the four full-sized trains, sitting-patients going from Scotland to the South of England would require cots to sleep in at night even if, as invalids, they should not wish to rest in them some time during the day. Sitting-patients in excess of the number of cots could, therefore, be taken for short distances only. In Scotland the conditions were somewhat different ; yet even there it was customary for patients to join, in the evening, at Invergordon, an ambulance train not due to reach Edinburgh until the next morning. Arrangements were made for a continuous supply of the cots so that there would be no risk of a shortage occurring at any point on the line of communication. Not only was a large stock got together in the first instance, but all the principal naval bases undertook the cleansing and disinfecting of the cots and their equipment before they were used a second time. Then, when an ambulance train started on its outward journey, it carried a store of clean, empty and fuUy-equipped standard cots which, in exchange for the " loaded " cots, were to be returned to the ship forwarding the patients taken on the train. In this way the fighting-ships always had their full complement of clean cots. Similarly the ambulance trains received a clean cot at destination for every "loaded" one taken from them for conveyance to a hospital. Another respect in which the naval ambulance train differed from the military ambulance train was in the provision on the former of what was known as the " day coach." The day coach, converted from a parcels van similar to those used for the ward cars, answered a variety of purposes. Fixed against each side were tables at which the sitting-cases could have their food or other- wise spend their time, collapsible forms being provided for seats. Twenty- eight patients could be served at one time with meals. These were brought into the coach from the kitchen in specially-designed wooden boxes in which six plates, one. above the other, could be carried. On the flaps of the tables being raised, washing-basins, with water supply, were found underneath. At one end of the coach were two padded rooms for violent or noisy cases. Ward Car of Naval Ambulance Train. (Showing h')\v tlr M-\Mb'" r-ts wcr ^iRp^nlPi from R">of )^ Ward Car arranged for Sitting Cases. [To.jMC p. 570. NAVAL AMBULANCE TRAINS. 57^ In the same coach, also, there was a " dressing-station " fitted with table, locker, sink, etc., and supplied with instruments and drugs. This took the place of the treatment room on the miUtary ambulance trains. In the opinion of the naval medical authorities concerned, an ambulance trdn is not a suitable place for the carrying out of operations. They hold that any patient likely to require an operation during the journey should not be put on the train at all, and that if, alternatively, the need for an operation should arise unexpectedly en route, it is much better to stop the train at the nearest available station, lift out the patient in his cot, and so convey him at once to a hospital. There was, they considered, the greater reason for the adoption of this course since the carrying out of any operation in the course of the journey would involve delay, shunting on to a siding, temporary stoppage of traffic, or some other inconvenience which it was desirable to avoid. The loading-up of the naval ambulance train was, as far as possible, arranged accordingly ; though, with a view to making provision for every possible emergency, a treatment couch, or table, i ft. 9 in. X 6 ft., on four strong folding legs, was slung in the roof of the day coach in order that it might be available if absolutely necessary. This, however, was mainly a precautionary measure. As a rule the dressing-station was used for no more than dressings, and then only when the train was in a station or otherwise at rest. The day coach was the centre of social life for those of the patients who could move about, and on a long journey it became the equivalent of a much-appreciated living-room. In the officers' dining-coach there was sitting-up accommodation for ten. Sleeping accommodation for eight could, if necessary, be arranged by means of cots specially made to fit across the seats of the saloon, canvas curtains being stretched along both sides of the central gangway to ensure privacy. The guard's van at the end of the train was nominally used for patients* baggage arid effects ; but, if not wanted for this purpose, and if more space should be wanted for an unusually heavy load of patients, 24 extra sitting-down cases could be accommodated here on short journeys by means of folding seats. The same could be done in the other guard's van, at the front of the train. This course was especially adopted when extra provision had to be made for sitting cases going short journeys. The ordinary staff of a standard naval ambulance train consisted af two medical officers and — ^including cooks, clerks and male nurses — 36 men belonging to the Royal Naval AuxiUary Sick Berth Reserve. Accommodation was also provided for two nursing sisters ; but these did not join the train unless there was some special need for their services. Otherwise the staff lived continuously in the train, on which regular sea-watches were kept, night and day. Each train was, in fact, com- missioned like a warship and was equally self-contained and self-support- ing. There was even a port and a starboard side of the trdn, letters 572 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. and figures being coloured accordingly. Externally the train, also, was painted navy grey. When the trains were running, they were heated by steam conveyed from the engine in pipes suspended from the roofs of the cars, obstruction of the floor space thus being avoided. When the engine was not attached, the heating — ^in the interests of the staff living on the train — ^was arranged for by a self-contained high-pressure heating apparatus in the dining and staff cars, whilst at certain depots steam could be supplied from an ordinary stationary boiler, this being connected by a hosepipe to the steam-pipe of the train. Electric fans helped to keep the coaches cool in hot weather. Electric light was provided by means of dynamos when running and by accumu- lators when at rest. Cooking was done by gas, carried under each kitchen car and one adjoining car. There was telephonic communication between most of the cars ; a portable signalling arrangement allowed of direct instructions being given to the driver in regard to such matters as speed and heating ; an ample water supply was carried and baths were available. The phrase " Hospital on Wheels," as applied to what is really no more than an ambulance of the best type adapted to transport by rail, is, of course, a misnomer, the more so as no " hospital ", is a hospital if operations cannot be performed in it. Yet the Naval Ambulance Train, with all its comforts, if not with all its actually luxurious arrangements, was at least the further equivalent of an hotel or a temporary home on wheels ; and the marvel is that the naval medical authorities and the railway experts, in combination, were able to provide for so wide a range of purposes out of little more than a collection of passenger coaches and parcels vans, the transformation thereof being effected with a degree of ingenuity and success which reflected infinite credit upon all concerned. Emergency Ambulance Trains. In addition to the standard naval ambulance trains provided by the London and North Western Railway Company to the order of the Admiralty, there were several other trains, of an " emergency " type, which, put together in the early days of the war, also came into consideration, more or less, from a naval point of view. The South Eastern and Chatham Railway Company were asked on August 1st, 1914, to provide two ambulance trains which were wanted for the conveyance of naval patients to or from the naval hospital at Chatham. The company undertook to supply both trains within 48 hours. The stock required for making them up was at once withdrawn from traffic and sent to the company's carriage works at Ashford for the carrying out- of the necessary alterations, the two trains being in readiness by the time specified. Each consisted of eleven vehicles. Nine of these were bogie brake carriages composed of passenger compartments with NAVAL AMBULANCE TRAINS. 573 a brake and luggage compartment at one end. The former were retained and used for sitting cases, and the latter was fitted with brackets for cots. The two other vehicles were brake vans in which stores and medical appliances were to be carried. The trains made several trips to meet naval requirements. When not in use they were " stabled " within the Chatham area. Though found useful, however, for short journeys, they were not adapted for long ones owing to the fact that the vehicles did not communicate with one another, while the absence of a kitchen would have made it necessary to stop the trains whenever the patients required to be fed. Even as regarded short journeys there was no pro- bability that they would be much wanted for the Chatham district, and, in the circumstances, one train was released in September, 1914, and the other in December of the same year. Another emergency ambulance train — and one, in this instance, of a very primitive kind indeed — was ordered from, the Great North of Scotland Railway Company on August 6th, 1914, by a military officer and a medical officer who wanted to have the train prepared as soon as possible, and themselves gave instructions as to how this should be done. Some ordinary third-class non-corridor carriages were drawn from stock at Inverurie ; they were made up into a train for Inverness, and eight" joiners from the company's Locomotive Works were put into the carriages to convert them into an ambulance train en route. The joiners followed the instructions given to them, and they completed their task within a very short time of the train arriving at its destination. But the ideas of the two officers in question as to what would suffice even for an emer- gency ambulance train were of the most elementary type since nothing was done to the carriages beyond cutting in each of the divisions a hole about three feet by two feet as a means of " communication " between one compartment and another. This meant that the cots or stretchers on which the wounded lay would be placed one along each seat, and that doctors and nurses wanting to pass from one compartment to another would do so by cHmbing over the patients and making their way through the aforesaid holes. The train could not, in fact, be used for cot cases either by the miUtary authorities or by the naval authorities, who, in the event of an early battle in the North Sea, might otherwise have found it of great service. This, however, was obviously not the case, and the train was reconverted into passenger coaches in 1915. As against this unsuccessful experiment, the North British Railway Company rendered much good service by means of an emergency am- bulance train which they got together, also under conditions of great urgency, at about the same time. It was ordered from them by the Scottish Command on the evening of August 6th, 1914, and it was ready for use within twenty-four hours. It consisted of eight vehicles, namely, four parcels vans, converted into" ward cars and fitted with suspended cots ; two brake thirds, for sitting-patients, a composite coach of firsts and thirds for medical officer and staff, and a dining-car. Accommodation was provided for ninety-six cot cases in the train. It was vestibuled 574 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. throughout, so that one could walk from one end to the other. The Chairman of the company, Mr. Whitelaw, took an active part in the formation of the train and continued to interest himself in it during the whole period of the war. From a military point of view, however, the train was not regarded with much favour because of the suspended-cot arrangement, while, although this disadvantage might have been over- come by alterations, the train was, for technical reasons, not suitable for journeys to and from Dover. So, in October, 1915, the military authorities proposed to dismantle it ; but Surgeon-Captain Sir Arthur Stanley Nance, then Naval Medical Transport Officer for Scotland, put in a plea that the train should be retained as a naval ambulance train, the ward-car arrangements being especially adapted thereto, and this proposal was concurred in. Ambulance Train Services. The regular service of naval ambulance trains was arranged on a two- fold basis — a Scottish service and a service between Scotland and England. The former was rendered by Naval Ambulance Train No. 4, which was stationed for a period of two and a half years at Inverness. From thence it made regular trips to Invergordon, in order to coUect patients landed there and take them on to Edinburgh either as the starting point for destinations in the South or as a distributing centre for Scottish convalescent hospitals. Occasional trips were also made as far north as Thurso, though in regard to this port there was no fixed schedule. The service between Scotland and England was worked by the four full-length naval ambulance trains. These' were " stabled," two at Edinburgh, one at Glasgow and one at Chatham. There was, in the first place, a fixed weekly tour which began at Edinburgh and ended at Chatham. All Medical Transport Officers and Assistant Medical Transport Officers who had on hand at their respective ports cases to be brought to hospitals in the South sent messages to headquarters in London giving the number of patients and classifying them into officers and men and cot cases or sitting-cases respectively. The headquarters staff collated these messages and sent instructions to Edinburgh as to the ports at which the regular weekly ambulance train was to call and the total number of patients in the four categories for whom arrangements in the way of supplies, etc., should be made. From Edinburgh the train would travel along the East Coast, calling at all ports specified on the pre-arranged list, and proceed thence to Pljrmouth, Gosport (Ports- mouth Harbour) and Chatham, in the order here stated. Patients from Edinburgh to Chatham were thus taken first to Plymouth. This was certainly a roundabout journey for them, but the trip was based on the idea that all officers and men, either joining at Edinburgh or picked up at any place en route, should be taken to their home port in order to be as near to their friends as possible. Leaving Edinburgh on Wednesday morning, the train arrived at NAVAL AMBULANCE TRAINS. 575 Chatham on Thursday evening, the round journey being generally accom- plished in about thirty-four hours ; and, inasmuch as the patients had comfortable cots, were fed each according to his prescribed dietary, and were well cared for generally, it is not likely that even those from Edinburgh for Chatham found the journey especially trying. This programme was subject to certain alterations. The round tour might, for instance, be started at Invergordon instead of at Edinburgh if any considerable number of patients should have been landed at the former port, a standard train (with an additional engine for the heavy gradients) then taking the place, as between Invergordon and Edinburgh, of No. 4 train ; while every fortnight the ambulance train arriving at Plymouth took patients on from the naval hospital there to the con- valescent hospital at Truro, the arrival at Chatham being, in this case, delayed until Friday morning. Under the arrangements made, one of the four standard naval trains was always at Chatham, ready for any emergency that might arise in the South. This meant, in practice, that the train which got there on Thursday night or Friday morning remained until the next regular train came, the following week, when the train in waiting would start on its own return journey to Edinburgh. Good work was done, again, on this return journey. From Chatham the train took to Greenwich, London and Southend whatever men were in fit condition for removal to convalescent or other hospitals there. A certain number of officers might also start from Chatham for the officers' convalescent hospital at Peebles. On leaving Southend, the train went to WiUesden Junction and there picked up convalescent officers who had come from Plymouth or Portsmouth by ordinary trains and were also going to Peebles. The train "stabled" at Glasgow made the journey to the South viEl Larbert and Edinburgh, taking patients on from Larbert as might be required. In addition to this fixed weekly service, making the tour here described, there was generally a supplementary train once a week from Edinburgh to the South ; though this particular train might go no farther than Plymouth and then return direct. Allowing for all the various services in Scotland and England and the stationing of a train always at Chatham, there was only one of the five left as a " stand-by " in the event of some great emergency arising ; while the needs of the U.S.A. Navy were provided for no less than those of our own. As it happened, also, the American seamen were still more affected by North Sea weather conditions than the British seamen, the former providing, in proportion, a greater number of cases of sickness for the hospitals on shore. Much help was afforded, in these circumstances, by the ambulance train put together by the North British Railway Company, and declared by the naval medical authorities to have rendered good service to the Royal Navy on many occasions. This'good service was done in respect 576 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. to journeys in Scotland itself, as, for instance, in the conveyance of patients from Port Edgar, on the Forth, to Wemyss Bay, on the West Coast, or from Larbert to Edinburgh, when No. 4 might be otherwise engaged. The total number of patients carried in the train down to the end of 1918 was about 600. Naval ambulance trains worked by the Highland Railway Company from Invergorden under a fixed schedule arrangement averaged one per week for the years from 1915 to 1918 inclusive — a. total of, approximately, 208. At stations on the North British Railway naval ambulance trains were dealt with as follows down to the end of 1918 : Edinburgh, 230 ; Port Edgar, 260 ; Rosyth, 50 ; Leith Central, 210 ; Craigentinny, no ; Peebles, 140, and Larbert, 220. These figures give a total of 1,220 ; though this, of course, is not to be regarded as the actual number of trains run, since the same train might call at several of the different stations to set down or to pick up patients. Corresponding figures for the Cale- donian Railway are — Edinburgh, 135 ; Perth, 174 ; Wemyss Bay, 80 ; Strathaven, 41 ; Larbert, 97 ; Dawsholm, 98 ; and Peebles, 5. From Ship to Hospital. In the arrangernents for the collection of wounded troops on the battlefield and their conveyance to Britain there was comparatively little variation. A definite course of procedure was arranged, and this was generally followed as a matter of routine, the various stages in the journey home and the conditions under which they were made being mainly "according to plan." In the removal of sick and wounded from battleship to home hospital the variations in the methods adopted were almost endless. Definite plans and programmes were impracticable. The conditions to be met were almost as changeable as the waves of the ocean itself. Nothing could really be standardised, nor, in attempting to give an idea of what was done, is it possible to generalise. That which was possible on one type of warship might be impossible on another. If, also, the fighting- ships differed greatly, so did the ambulance vessels, as they may be called, on which the patients from them were sent ashore. In either case there might have to be wide differences in the methods of handling. The procedure followed was thus based on the principle of ready adapta- tion of general plans to particular instances. Those concerned had to be prepared to deal with conditions as they found them, however much these might differ from what had occurred elsewhere or in other circumstances. On the biggest battleships, for example, there was the least room for any such collection of the aforesaid naval cots as might seem to be called for by the number of officers and men on board. Space was so limited, having regard to the amount of armament carried, that there was very little spare accommodation available, and greater reliance had to be put on stretchers, which took up less room than cots. Nor could Conveying Wounded in Naval Cot. (Tscd alike on board Ship, Xavai Ambulance Train and Roail Ambulance.) iTo lace p. 576. TiiK Neil Robert^cin Stretcher. IE Neil IvoBERiii^N Streix~iier rx use. [To /,m [>. 5;; NAVAL AMBULANCE TRAINS. 577 the cots be used on destroyers, with their narrow hatchways, while there were numerous occasions when the cot, with its patient, could not be lowered into the hold of the vessel acting as ambulance ship. These last-mentioned conditions were often met by the use of what is known as the " Neil Robertson stretcher," the special purpose of which is to allow of wounded men being passed through narrow spaces where they cannot be carried. Made of canvas and bamboo, the stretcher is strapped round the body, head and legs of the patient in such a way that he is perfectly rigid, while the ropes connected with the stretcher from foot to head allow of stretcher and patient being raised or lowered through any space Or aperture wide enough for the human body to pass. While, again, the standard naval cot is so constructed that it may be not only suspended from hooks in the ambulance train but, also, attached to chains for lowering it on to another vessel alongside, there is the possi- bility that this procedure might distress a sick or wounded man when there was a considerable distance between the deck of a great battle- ship and that of (say) a small steamer, while any sudden shifting of the patient's position in the cot, causing the two sections of his canvas coverlet to come apart, would be not without an element of danger to himself. This risk it has been sought to meet by placing the cot on a wooden " tray " when it is lowered overboard, with the result that a greater degree of safety is assured. In the t5^es of vessels used for collecting the sick and wounded at sea, and bringing them either ashore or to the hospital ships in the ports, there was much variation. At Scapa Flow and Invergordon use was made of steam-drifters which were specially fitted up so that they could accommodate cot cases. These drifters made two regular collecting rounds each day, visiting one section of the Fleet in the morning and another section in the afternoon. Ships having patients awaiting removal would signal accordingly, and the drifters would then draw up alongside and take the cases on board, returning to shore either when they were loaded up or when there were no more patients left for the time being. In the Forth, in addition to drifters two shallow-draft paddle steamers were fitted as carriers under the supervision of the Medical Transport Ofiicer for Scotland. Lifts provided easy loading to the lower decks of these vessels, the shallow draft and high speed of which rendered them handy and serviceable vessels, while each carried 90 cot cases and 100 sitting cases. Their use, together with that of lighters fitted with shelves on which cots could be placed, rendered it possible to clear ships after action in a very short period of time and allowed of those ships proceed- ing to sea again with all dispatch. At Plymouth there was a regular hospital-boat available. Mention has ab-eady been made of the fact that the " loaded " naval cot could be carried either by hand or on the shoulders of its four bearers. The latter was the method more generally adopted. In cases where the patient was not obliged to keep to his cot yet had difiiculty in walking. 578 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. in getting up the side of a ship, or in mounting a ladder when this was necessary, he might be carried on the back of another man by means of a canvas arrangement which ensured his safety, distributed his weight equally on the back of his bearer, and, at the same time, left the latter with full use of both hands. The work of removing patients from ship to hospital or from ship to ambulance train was done at all large naval centres by bearer parties from the Royal Naval Auxiliary Sick Berth Reserve. Elsewhere it was undertaken by Voluntary Aid Detachments of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem Or by members of th:e British Red Cross Society. In either case the bearers were men who had been specially trained in the handling and transport of naval cots. Similar arrangements were made at the various points of arrival of the trains. In January, 1918, having regard to possible emergencies, it was decided to form a special Naval Medical Transport Corps as cot-bearers and for the performance of minor hospital duties on the North- East Coast of * England. Membership of the Corps was limited to men belonging to the St. John Ambulance Brigade who were over age for military service or had been rejected as unfit. Eight Companies of fifty men each were formed, namely, double Companies (100 men each) at North and South Shields and at Hull, and single Companies at Newcastle, Eston, The Hartlepools and Sunderland. For the removal of patients from the railway station at the end of the ambulance- train journey it was, of course, necessary to employ road- ambulance vehicles ; and these had to be specially fitted in order to take the standard naval cot in which the sufferer was to remain until he reached the hospital that constituted his final destina- tion. One of the first measures taken, accordingly, on the institution of the Naval Medical Transport Service, was to arrange for a supply of road ambulances ; and, as an initial step in this direction, thirty motor- omnibuses were obtained from the London General Omnibus Company and provided with spring trestles on which the standard cots could rest. Not even the latest pattern of specially-built ambulance offered, it is said, a greater degree of comfort for the patient than these converted motor-omnibuses. Then, alsoj in the earliest days of the war, twelve ambulances were lent by the Red Cross Society, while through this organisation came, later on, a most acceptable gift of 56 ambu lances from the United Provinces of India War Fund. Three more were presented by the " Silver Thimble Fund " and eight were received from other sources. In this way the Naval Medical Transport Service had, on the cessation of hostilities, a total of 109 ambulances available in different districts. Kaval Raid on Ostend : Wounded from the Viymcr/ii being lowered into Hold. OF Hospital Ship. {To lace p. 576. ( )XE OF FiFlV-SIX JvfiAD AMBULANCES PRESENTED BV THE I'NITED I'ROVINCES OF India War Fl'nd. NAVAL AMBULANCE TRAINS. 579 Naval Sick and Wounded : Statistics. Having regard to the fact that naval engagements during the course of the war were few in number as compared with the battles fought on land, it naight be assumed that, except on certain occasions, there could not, after all, have been any very great demand for the ambulance trains provided in the interests of the Navy. The limited extent of the fighting at sea did not, however, materially affect the situation inasmuch as the proportion of sick carried was far in excess of that of the wounded, the former providing a steady stream of patients when there were none at all of the latter. Here, again, it is necessary to consider the conditions which concern naval as distinct from military services in time of war. Sick men are not wanted on fighting-ships at all. In practice, if any man got ill, or even indisposed, and was not likely to get well again within a very few days, he was sent ashore alike in his own interests — since he would be more likely to effect a speedy recovery there — ^and in those of the Navy itself. With the possibility of an action at any moment, it was undesirable to retain a sick man on board, not only because he was sick, and would require to be looked after, but because it was neces- sary that, even although he might be only temporarily invalided, his place should be taken at the earliest possible moment by a man in sound condition in order that the fighting strength of the vessel might not be impaired. So for every man taken ashore another was at once brought back. This immediate provision of substitutes, not alone for the sick but even for the ailing, became an essential part of the whole scheme, and one, also, for which the most careful provision had to be made. It meant constant work for all branches of the Naval Medical Transport Service, and it meant, as well, that there was always much for the naval ambulance trains to do whether actions were being fought at sea or not. On the other hand the adoption of the poHcy in question led to the introduc- tion into the Fleet of an equally constant flow of fresh life and vigour, and in the special circumstances of the situation this was also of great advantage. There were, again, abnormal circumstances which led to the number of sick attaining abnormal proportions. In the first place the enormous expansion of the Fleet must be borne in mind. What this expansion amounted to is shown by the following figures, giving the number of officers and men in the British Navy at the periods stated : — Date. Number. June, igi3 141,084 June, 1914 146,142 June, 1915 276,958 Date. Number. June, 1916 332,078 June, 19171 .... 381,592 June, 1918 » 398,139 September, 1918 .... 408,997 » Between June, 1917, and June, 1918, about 53,000 Royal Naval Air Service men were transferred to the Royal Air Force. 58o BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. To these figures must be added the 80,700 officers and men of the American Navy who were associated with our own and whose sick were, by arrangement, also conveyed in the ambulance trains provided for the British Navy. Then the conditions of life on the North Sea during war-time were such as to predispose to a good deal of sickness. The vessels were fully manned, and they might, for this reason, be regarded as somewhat over- crowded, while the cooping- up of officers and men in a confined space for four years ; the darkness of the long winter nights ; the effect of trying weather conditions ; the monotony of the daily routine ; the waiting for an enemy who showed himself on such very rare occasions — these and other trying experiences had the effect of imposing a real strain upon all concerned. Men were sent ashore in batches, whenever possible, for a little relaxation. Even the one long street at Invergordon was a pleasant change for a few hours. They also had their periods of leave ; though it happened from time to time that a man who had been away on leave might return with measles or some other contagious disease which would lead to much trouble on board his ship. The worst experience of all in respect to sickness was due to the epidemic of influenza rampant in the Grand Fleet during the spring and early summer of 1918. It started with a few sporadic cases on the " King Orry " at Scapa Flow early in April, assumed epidemic form by the 19th of the same month, and reached a climax on May loth, when the number of fresh cases reported was 744. From that time the daily retiurn steadily decreased in gravity, the figures being reduced to a negligible quantity by the end of May. Within this period the sum total of officers and men who had been attacked, out of a total of 90,000 then forming the Grand Fleet, was no fewer than 10,313. In such numbers, too, had the sufferers been sent ashore that before long they filled up every naval hospital in the country — ^including those taken over by the Americans, who are declared to have rendered " yeoman service " to the British in this emergency — while 500 more, for whom accommodation could not otherwise be provided, were sent to the military hospitals at Glasgow. The distribution of so large a number of patients became, in fact, a matter of great perplexity. Cases of influenza continued to occur during June, July and August, and in September the disease again assumed epidemic form, the number of patients who then had to be dealt with being 5,381. These various considerations will help the reader to imderstand better than he might otherwise do the reasons why, although conditions were against the display of great activity on the part of the allied British and American Fleets as a Fighting Force, the working of the naval ambulance trains from the outset of the war until the end of 1918 showed the following considerable totals : — NAVAL AMBULANCE TRAINS. 581 OfvicUrs : ^ Cot cases ....... 1.44° Non-cot cases ...... 2,936 Total officers 4,376 Men : Cot cases 25,708 Non-cot cases ...... 47,697 Total men . .... 73. 405 Total Officers and Men ..... 77.781 Total Cot Cases 27,148 Total Non-cot Cases 50.633 These figures are, of coiirse, independent of the patients who were brought direct to Plymouth, Portsmouth or Chatham by hospital ship and were removed to hospital without any need for conveyance by train. Jutland and Zeebrugge. The interval which elapsed between the time when naval men received their wounds and the time when they found themselves in a base hospital at home naturally varied according to circumstances. In the naval action off Heligoland on August 28th, 1914, British wounded were received at the Chatham Naval Hospital within twenty-four hours. Wounded from the Naval Brigade which took part in the defence of Antwerp were six or eight days before they reached the same destination. Conveyed first to the Antwerp hospitals, they were, on the approaching fall of that city (October 9th, 1914), removed successively to Ghent, Bruges and Ostend, where they finally embarked for England. How the Naval Medical Transport Service, with its organisation of ambulance trains, worked in practice can, perhaps, best be illustrated by referring to what was done in regard to the Battle of Jutland and the operations at Zeebrugge. The number of wounded in the Battle of Jutland, fought on Wednes- day, May 31st, 1916, was 674. They were mostly taken to Invergordon, Port Edgar or Rosyth, and were there either transferred to the hospital ships or removed direct to hospitals on shore. Nearly aU were severe cases, the patients being badly burned. Owing to the unsuitabihty of hospital ships for prolonged treatment those received on them were sent ashore as soon as possible, mainly to the ambulance trains waiting to convey them elsewhere. In this way the vessels were invariably cleared within two days. At Invergordon a naval ambulance train with wounded from the Jutland Battle was dispatched at 9.24 p.m. on Saturday, June 3rd. Another followed at 8.12 p.m. next day. All the patients conveyed on the two trains came direct from the hospital ships. These were brought close to the harbour and the patients were taken from pier to railway station in ambulance cars. 582 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. The hospital ships certainly rendered good service on this occasion ; but the range of their usefulness was limited by conditions which could not be controlled, while the ambulance trains were able to ensure a speedy avoidance of any congestion of wounded at the ports where they had been landed. The operations of Zeebrugge on April 23rd, 1 91 8, took place in the early hours of the morning. It had been arranged that the wounded should be landed at Dover, and No. 3 naval ambtilance traiil, then at Chatham, was sent to Dover in order to convey them to the Chatham Naval Hospital. On the arrival at the qua^of H.M.S. Vindictive the entraining of cases brought by that vessel began at 9.50 a.m. It was completed at 11.15 a.m., by which time all the wounded on board had been removed. The number taken on to Chatham was 150, this being exclusive of two serious cases sent to the military hospital at Dover and some slightly-wounded cases sent to Deal. During the loading and also during the journey all the cases put on the train were examined and received such immediate attention as was necessary. The train reached Chatham at 1.38 p.m., and the patients were at once removed to the hospital. More wounded were brought to Dover in the afternoon of the same day, and they, also, found a naval ambulance train waiting for them. No. 5 train had left Edinburgh the previous night for Dover, where it arrived at 12.30 p.m. on the 23rd, just as H.M.S. Daffodil came alongside the jetty with one cot and three sitting cases. Two other cases were landed by the Arrogant. At 2.45 p.m. the Iris arrived with eighty-four, and all of these were entrained by 4.25 p.m., when the train started for Chatham. One of the ninety patients, who was suffering from shrapnel wounds in the throat, died in the train just before it left Dover. Chatham was reached by 5.42 p.m., so that, allow- ing for the patient who did not survive the journey, 220 officers and seamen, wounded in an engagement off the coast of Belgium in the early hours of the morning, were all brought across the Channel, landed at Dover, taken on by naval ambulance train to Chatham, and received in hospital there by the evening of the same day. This probably unique event in the history of naval warfare may be regarded as typical of the complete success with which, notwithstanding the state of unpreparedness at the outset of the war, the elaborate organisation brought into being by the Admiralty under the con- ditions here narrated was carried into effect. CHAPTER XLIII. WAR MANUFACTURES IN RAILWAY WORKSHOPS. Within a very short time of the outbreak of hostiUties it was found that many things wanted for the use of the Expeditionary Force were then unobtainable from ordinary manufacturers owing, in part, to the magnitude of the orders to be given and, in part, to the extreme urgency with which the articles in question were needed. Asked by the Govern- ment to assist them in surmounting the difficulty, the railway companies agreed so to do, and thereupon they began a production of " munitions of war " which eventually assumed prodigious dimensions. Happily the leading companies already had at their disposal more or less extensive locomotive, carriage and wagon works equipped on a scale equal to the supply of most of their own requirements in respect to lines, locomotives, rolling-stock and miscellaneous essentials, and these workshops gave emplosonent to large staffs of skilled artisans and other workers, as may be judged from the foUo^ving examples, illustrating the position two years before the outbreak of the war : Great Central (Gorton and Dukinfield), 4,253 ; Great Eastern (Stratford, E^, and Temple Mills, E.), 5,196 ; Great Northern (Doncaster), 6,000 ; Great Western (Swindon), 11,700 ; Lancashire and Yorkshire (Horwich and Newton Heath), 5,810 ; London and North Western (Crewe, Wolverton and Earlstown), 14,800 ; London and South Western (Eastleigh), 3,600 ; Londbn, Brigh- ton and South Coast (Brighton and Lancing), 2,164 '> Midland (Derliy), 8,288 ; North Eastern (Gateshead, Darlington, York, etc.), 8,046 ; South Eastern and Chatham (Ashford), 1,944 ; Caledonian (St. Rollox, Glasgow), 2,695 ; Glasgow and South Western (Kilmarnock and Barassie), 1,255 ; and North British (Cowlairs, Glasgow), 2,297. The first suggestion that the railway workshops should be utilised for the production qf military necessaries came as early as September 2nd, 1914, when the War Office asked the Railway Executive Committee if the companies could supply 12,250 ambulance stretchers of standard War Office pattern. The stretchers, it was stated, were urgently required. A meeting of Carriage and Wagon Superintendents was called to consider the ret[uest, and on September 5th it wals reported that eleven coimpanies had agreed to divide the work between them, that the first deliveries would be made on September 12th, and that thenceforward each company would furnish a stipulated number per week — ^ranging from 100 to 500 until the whole 12,000 had been supplied. Each was to send its account to the Executive Committee, who would obtain a settlement for the 583 R R 584 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. whole from the War Office. The distribution of this initial order among the companies taking it up was as follows : — Railway Company. Total Number Number to be TO BE Made. Made per Week. Great Western .... 1,500 200 Midland ..... 1,500 . 200 (increased to 250, third week). London and North Western . 2,000 300 South Eastern and Chatham 1,000 100 Lancashire and Yorkshire 1,000 200 North Eastern .... 1,000 200 Great Northern .... 750 100 Great Eastern .... 1,000 500 London and South Western 500 100 London, Brighton and South Coast 1,000 200 Great Central .... 1,000 200 A fortnight or so later, the companies agreed to make 5,000 general service wagons for the ArtiUery Section of the War Office. The wagons were supplied at the rate of at least 400 per week, beginning the first week in December, 1914, and delivery was completed by the end of January, 1915. On this occasion the making of the wagons was divided between no fewer than twenty-two companies in England, Scotland and Ireland. Payment for the work was to be on the basis of actual cost, plus the usual factory charges for supervision and general charges. Another 1,000 wagons were asked for early in October by the Artillery Section, and 1,000 more were wanted by the Transport Department. A little later there was a request for a further 2,300, increasing the total order to 9,300. The companies also arranged to convert 500 railway vans for use in Government service, and they eventually raised their supply of ambulance stretchers to 25,195. About the middle of October the officials at Woolwich Arsenal became desirous of enlisting the help of the railway companies in respect more especially to forgings and machinings for guns, rifles, gun carriages, limbers, etc., and Mr. Runciman, then President of the Board of Trade, consulted with Mr. (afterwards Sir Guy) Calthrop and Mr. C. J. Bowen Cooke, General Manager and Chief Mechanical -Engineer respectively of the London and North Western Railway, as to what would be the best course to adopt. Following thereon, Mr. Cooke obtained from Woolwich a collection of drawings of the articles required and went through them, first, with Mr. (now Sir Henry) Fowler, Chief Mechanical Engineer of the Midland Railwa^y, and afterwards with technical representativer of the Great Western, North Eastern, Great Northern and Lancashire and Yorkshire Railways and of Woolwich Arsenal, the result being that the railway companies agreed to manufacture for the Arsenal certain parts for gun carriages and limbers. A week or two later the War Office inquired if the railway companies could- also assist certain armament firms, pressed with Government orderg. WAR MANUFACTURES IN RAILWAY WORKSHOPS, 585 It was replied that they were quite prepared to do the work, but an intimation was given by the Executive Committee that, whilst the railway companies were willing to produce military necessaries for the Govern- ment on pajmient to them of bare cost, without seeking to mak6 any profit thereon, they could not do work on the same terms for private firms who, as contractors for the Goveniment, would naturally seek to make a profit for themselves. Having regard to the fact that the imdertaking by the companies of what had already become a considerable volume of m'unitions work would be prejudicial to ordinary railway maintenance, it was decided by the Railway Executive Committee that a letter to the following effect, signed by their Acting-Chairman, should be addressed to the President of the Board of Trade :— - October zjth, 1914. Sir, Manufacturing Work performed by the Railway Companies for the Government. You will no doubt be aware that the railway companies have to some extent placed their locomotive, carriage and wagon works at the disposal of the Govern- ment, and have promised to undertake the manufacture of any articles which are urgently required by the War Oifice or Admiralty. Arrangements have already been carried out to construct 12,250 stretchers and 7,000 general service wagons, and other matters are at the present time in course of negotiation. The companies have no wish to make a profit out of such work, and they are willing to receive nothing more than bare cost — that is to say, the amounts actually expended in wages and materials, with the usual percentage to cover supervision and general charges. The Executive Committee think that you should be advised of this fact inasmuch as the undertaking of such work necessarily involves the postponement of the usual renewal and repair work which would otherwise have been carried out to the various railway companies' plant, the cost of which would, under the agreement come to with the Government, have been included in the expenses incurred during the period of Government control. All the work so postponed will have to be made good as soon as the manufacture of articles undertaken on behalf of the Government is completed, but as this latter work may occupy some months, and even extend as long as the Government control of railways continues, we think it should be made clear that the railway companies may, sooner or later, have to include in their claim against the Government a sum to cover the cost of the work which is deferred and will have to be undertaken. I am, etc., (Signed) H. A. Walker. The President, Board of Trade, S.W. Such, also, was the prospective expansion of the demands already being made upon the railway companies that it was thought expedient to adopt speciy measures for dealing with them. Hitherto the State departments concerned had, in certain cases, applied direct to the railway companies. On October 22nd the Railway Executive Committee sent to the coxdrolled companies a communication asking that, in order to 586 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. avoid any difficulty or confusion which might arise owiiig to lack of con- centration, all further requests made to them in respect to war manu- factures should be referred to that committee, through whom alone any such work should be undertaken. Railway War Manufactures Sub-Committee. Following on this instruction, the Executive Committee arranged with the War Office, at the end of October, 1914, that a Railway War Manu- factures Sub-Committee should be aippointed " to consider, co-ordinate and report on various requests made by or through the War Office to the railway comipanies to assist in the mamifactiire of war-like stores and equipment." This sub-committee was coristitnted, in the first instance, of Mr. C. H. Dent, General Manager of the Great Northern Railway (chairma^n), and Mr. (afterwards Sir) Guy Calthrpp', representing the Railway Executive; Brigadier-General H. Guthrie Smith, C.B., and Captain (afterwards Brigadier-General) H. O. Mance, D.S.O., repre- senting the War Office, the Chief Mechanical Engineer's of the L. & N.W. (Mr. C. J. Bowen Cooke), Midland (Mr., afterwards Sir Henry Fowler), Great Northern (Mr. H. N. Gresley), Great Western (Mr. G. J. Churchward), and the Lancashire and Yorkshire (Mr. G. Hughes), and the Carriage and Wagon Superintendent of the Midland (Mr, D. Bain). All applications for work to be done in railway workshops either for the War Department or for War Department contractors were to be sub- mitted to the sub-committee through one of the representatives thereon of the War Office. The railway members were to say whether the work was such as could be undertaken by the railway companies, and, in the event of their agreeing that this wais so, they were to report to the Railway Executive Committee accordingly, and ascertain which of the companies could undertake the work, the extent of the assistance that could be given by them, and the approximate dates for deliyefy. The War Office members were to decide as to the priority of the various demands made, but the actual order to each railway company was to be given through the Executive Committee. It was further understood that the productive facilities at the disposal of the railway companies were to be utilised to the greatest advanta.ge, and that the capacity of the companies for important work was not to be impaired by their doing work of less importance which could be equally well done by ordinary manufacturers. Accounts were, as before, to be sent to the Executive Committee, who would assemble them and present them comjplete to the War Office for each set of articles made. The sub-comanittee got to work at once, holding its first meeting on Ndvemher 2nd, 1914. Almost concurrently with this development, the railway companies were aisked to build the carriages for twenty-three 8-in. howitlsers, the guns being supplied by the Government and the wheels by an outside firm. A small committee, consisting of the Chieff Mechanical Engineers One of t,G completed 6-tn, Howitzer Carriages and Guns, made at Derby (Midland Railway). Carriages for 8-in. Howitzers, made at Derby. (Eleven of these carriages, apart from the vvtieels, were constructed by the Midland.) [To lau p. 586. WAR MANUFACTURES IN RAILWAY WORKSHOPS. 587 of the Great Western, London and North Western, Lancashire and York- shire, Great Northern and Midland and the Locomotive Superintendent of the Caledonian, with Mr. Fowler as secretary, was formed, and the various companies concerned divided the work between them according to thq capacity of their shops. So comJ)lete were the arrangements that the whole of the carriages — o;f which twelve were erected at Swindon and eleven at Derby — were ready for dispatch before the end of 1914. They played an important part, in the military operations carried out in the early days of 1915. In various instances railway companies were asked to supply planing machines, intrenching tpol's, etc., but it was thought by the sub-committee that exhaustive inquiries should be made among firms specialising in this class of work before the companies undertook it. Orders for heavy-capacity railway trucks for priVate firms, for the making of 1,200 artillery wheels and the planing of i8-'pdr. guns for engineering firms and the manufacture of picket posts and picketing pegs were approved by the Railway War Manufactures Sub-Committee. The decision in regard to the last-mentioned articles led to a request that the railway companies should supply 200,000 picketing pegs and 20,000 posts. Twenty-four companies in England, Scotland and Ireland divided the order between them. Delivery was to begin about the middle of December and continue at the rate of 5,000 posts and 50,000 pegs per month until completed. Subsequent orders increased the total number of picketing pegs supplied to 268,609, and that of posts to 26,762. Other orders which followed in steady succession included 400 water- tank carts ; a number of miners' tr]Licks ; two heavy-capacity wagons, urgently needed by the Admiralty for mounting 9-2-in. guns ; scanthngs, boilermakers' work and machinery wanted for howitzer carriages by the Woolwich Ordnance Factories, and 2,000 brake blocks for field and trans- port vehicles, also wanted at Woolwich. As the result of further consideration, based on the greater experiences gained, the charges to be made against the Government in respect to war manufactures in railway workshops were, in December, 1914, fixed as follows : — I . — Materials. — If bought specially — At cost price, plus usual charges for carriage and handling. If used out of stock — At replacement prices, plus usual charges for carriage and handling. 2. — Labour. — At cost price. 3. — ^Workshop Expenses. — Usual workshop expenses as applying to the various shops. 4. — Supervision and Establishment Charges. — rzj per cent, to be added to the total of items i, 2, and 3. Subsequently the Executive Committee decided, on the recommenda- tion of the sub-committee, that for work done by the railway companies on behalf of firms carrying out contracts for the Government, a charge of 10 per cent, for profits should be added to the actual cost of the work, 588 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WaR, such actual cost to include all charges — ^workshop expenses, supervision, rent, rates, taxes, etc, A great variety of war manufactures was now undertaken, including two armoured trains for home defence, gun carriages and limbers, fittings for 6o-pdr. guns, sets of elevating gear, drop forgings, limber hooks, wagon hooks and flanges, mountings for 6-pdr. Nordenfeldt guns, to- gether with brass work, of which, it was said, " any quantities that could be made" would be taken. It was further agreed to do the rough- boring as well as the planing of i8-pdr. guns, while four companies took over, for the Admiralty, certain machinery work, early dehvery of which was imperative but, on account of the already congested condition of their works, could not be guaranteed by firms having the necessary machines. Much, also, as already told in Chapter XIX, was being done in the way of constructing ambulance trains for use either at home or overseas. Organisation of Production. From the facts already mentioned, the impression may haye been gained that the railway companies were already fairly active in their output of war necessaries ; but early in April, 1915, the Railway Execu- tiye Committee came to the conclusion that although, by postponing their renewals and work on capital account, the railway companies had been able to execute such orders as they had already received from the War Office, the Government were not making either the fullest or the best use of the railw;ay workshops for the production of military equipment and munitions of war. The procedure hitherto adopted had been that inquiries were made if the railway companies couljd manufabture a given number of a particular article; that, when the reply was in the affirmative, the order was parcelled out between them, and tha;t, when the reply was in the negative, nothing further was done. There was no system under which the Govern- ment either informed the companies ip advance as to its prospective requirements or informed itself as to the possibilities of increased pro- dliction in the railway shops,. These possibilities might, as it appeared to the Executive Committee, be considerably ^developed — urider certain conditions. In thp first place, it ,was thought that the Government shqiiLild indicate the character and number of articles they might require the colmpanies to manufactmre over a given period of time. With this information before them, the companies would be able to deterinine what they could do ,within the said period («) uncier easting circumstances, {b) if railway repair work were curtailed, or (c) if extra plant were laid down, the Government supplying such plant or the.ca'pital for its p'urchase. In the second places it was considered that the Government should definitely assume liability for arrears of maintenance work by the com- panies. This iwork could not be postponed for an indefinite period if the transport business of the railways was to be carried on efficiently. 2O-T0N Covered Wagon, of which 2,500 were made by British Railway Companies FOR use Overseas. Sections of 20-TON Covered Wagons loaded on Trucks (two wagons ter Truck) for conveyance to Port for Shipment. [To lace p. 589. WAR MANUFACTURES IN RAILWAY WORKSHOPS. 589 Some o,f the repairs wdjtdd haye to be done concjirren,tly, but it was anticipated that, for a certain period, the companies as a whole could safely postpone a portion of their repairs, aiid empl6y their staffs on m,anufacturing. for the Government in the railway workshops. If, however, this manufacture should be undertaken on a large scale, the arrejars of maintenance would be very serious. The Treasury had ad- mitted the principle that arrears of maintenance formed a legitimatp claim agaipst the Government, but it was not proposeid to deal wi1;h any sfich claim until the end of the period of control — a delay which opened up the prospect of a number of very complicated arbitrations leading to a position that might be intolerable a,like for the Goveriime,n,t and for the companies. In the third place, if the railway companies were, indeedi to manu- facture war material on a reaUy large scale-^doing this work at baJe cost to themstelves — ^it was felt that the Government should keep them in funds for the payment of wag'e's and for meeting the current outlay on materials, so that it would not be lef;t to the companies to attempt what might well projv;e to be the impossible task of themseiyes financing the Government's war manufadtures on the basis of a substantially augmented qutput from the railway workshops. These views were put before the Secretary of State for War, and thereupon Lord Kitchener sent for Sir Herbert Walker, expressed sur- prise that greater use had not been made of the railway companies' resources for the prodiuction of munitions of war, and asked that the Executive Committee should at once take in hand a complete organisa- tion of those resources, with a view to increasing substantially the eixtent of such production. He also asked that he should be supplied with a memorandum giving the proposals of the companies on the financial side of the question. As a first step towards this more complete organisation it was decided to strengthen the railway representation on the War Manufactures Sub-Committee, which was then reconstituted as follows, the new members being indicated by' an asterisk : — Representatives of the War Office: Brig.-Gen. H. Guthrie Smith, G.B., £md Lieut.-Col. H. O. Mance, D.S.O., together with, later on, Lti-Gol. A. S. Redman. General Managers : Mr. Guy Calthrop (London and North Western), Mr. C. H. Dent (Great Northern), Mr. D. A. Matheson * (Caledonian) and Mr. A. Beasley * (Taff Vale). Locomotive Superintendents : Mr. G. J. Bowen Cooke (London and North Western), Mr. Henry Fowler (Midland), Mr. G. J. Churchward (Great Western), Mr. H. N. Gresley (Great Northern), Mr. G. Hughes (Lancashire and Yorkshire), Mr, W. PickersgUl* (Caledonian), Mr. V. L. (afterwards Sir Vincent) Raven * (North Eastern), Mr. A. J. Hill * (Great Eastern), Mr. J. G,' Robinson* (Great Central), Mr. P. Drummond* (Glasgow and South Western), Mr. J. Cameron * (Taff Vale), and Mr. E. A. Watson * (Great Southern and Western, Ireland). 590 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Carriage Superintendents : Mr. D. Bain (Midland) and Mr. H. D. Earl * (London and North Western). Wagon Superintendent : Mr. A. R. Trevithick * (London and North Western). Subsequently, in addition to the members chosen by the War Office, representatives of the Admiralty and the Ministry of Munitions were appointed on the sub-committee. On the formation of the Ministry of Munitions, Mr. Fowler joined that department, and was succeeded on the sub-committee by Mr. J. E. Anderson, Deputy Chief Mechanical Engineer of the Midland, though Mr. Fowler afterwards returned t© the sub-committee for a time as the representative of the Ministry of Munitions. Appointed in September, 1915, Chief Superintendent of Ordnance Factories at Woolwich, Mr. Vincent Raven (knighted in 1917) was followed on the sub-committee by Mr. A. G. Stamer, Assistant Mechanical Engineer, North Eastern Railway. The place thereon of Mr. Bain was, on his joining the Govern- ment service, taken successively by Mr. H. R. Haigh and Mr. R. W. Reid, whUe Mr. H. W. H. Warneford succeeded Mr. Earl. Members of the sjib-committee were, among other djities, to visit certain arsenals and the works of private firms in order to ascertain in what way the railway companies co,uld assist them in the supply of Government requirements. The Executiye Committee furth,er diyided the United Kingdom into six districts — three for England; one for Scotlanfi', one for Wales and one for Ireland — in each of which there was to be a district sub-committee of railway engi^ieers who would visit arsenals and works in their district, reporting thejreon to the full sub-committee which would, in turn, make recommendations to the Executive Committee and keep that body well informed concerning the situation and its possibilities as a iwhole. The Executive Committee expressed to the railway companies the desire that they would defer all capital and renewal work in their shops as far as could be done consistently with the proper working of the rail- ways ; and with this suggestion the companies expressed concurrence, their representatives at a special meeting of General Managers, held at the Railway Clearing Hduse, undertaking to fall in with the proposals made and do all they could to assist in the manufacture of war munitions in the railway workshops. Mr. M." F. Keogh (Midland Great Western) joined on behalf of the then uncontrolled Irish railway companiesin this undertaking and stated that the Great Souther'n and Western, the Great Northern of Ireland and the Midland Great Western were all prepared to imdertake such work so far as circumsta:nces would permit. In order that the proposed visits of members of the sub-committees to arsenals and to the works of firms under contract with the War Office might be facilitated. Lord Kitchener sent to the Railway Executive Committee the following letter for use on such occasions : — WAR MANUFACTURES IN RAILWAY WORKSHOPS. 5^1 War Office, London, S.W., April gth, 1915. To the Directors of Arsenals and to Firms providing Munitions of War for the War Office. Gentlemen, The Railway Companies of Great Britain have undertaken to do all they possibly can in their locomotive and wagon shops to facilitate the output of munitions of war, and for this purpose have appointed a Committee of Engineers to visit the arsenals and works belonging to firms who are under contract with the War Office. It is possible that by this means valuable assistance may be rendered to you, either by the Railway Companies taking over on your behalf the work on certain portions of the manufactures you are turning out, or by taking over on your behalf the complete manufacture of certain articles, thereby releasing your men for other important Government work. So far as firms manufacturing munitions are concerned, the contracts existing between your firm and the Government wUl in neither case be interfered with, the Railway Companies acting in the nature of sub-contractors, which, I understand, they are prepared to do on terms to be agreed with you. I will ask you to be good enough to receive the Committee of Engineers and to grant them every facility for demonstrating in what way they can assist you in arriving at the end we all have in view. Yours very truly. Kitchener. War Manufactures Finance. Before dealing with the results to which this improved system of organisation led, the basis of the new financial arrangements should, perhaps, be made clear. Lord Kitchener's request that he might be supplied with a memoran- dum on the subject was referred to a Finance Sub-Committee of General Managers and. Accountants, with instructions to formulate in the desired memorandum a proposal under which the railway companies would obtain payment on account for Government work, and, also, to report as to ,what charges should be made to manufacturers for war work done on their account by the railway companies. The memorandum was duly prepared and approved, and was submitted to Lord Kitchener on May 2oth,'i9i5. It dealt under three heads with the financial questions calling for decision in consequen,ce of the railway companies undertaking the manufacture of war necessaries on an extended scale, namely, (i) the charge to be made ; (2) the mode of pa37ment ; (3) the effect of such manufactures upon the ordinary work of the companies and the safeguards necessary in coimection therewith. In regard to (i), the charge to be made for work done direct for the War Office, it was thought that the case was fairly met by the scale already in operation. The amounts put down fdr workshop e;xpenses, supervision and establishment charges were immaterial since they would all be credited to the Government. In the case of work for private armament firms, it was assumed that steps would be taken by the Government to ensmre that those fii^ns did not make a profit on anj^hing done at cost price by a railway com- 592 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. pany. If the price paid by the Government to a manufacturing firm included work performed by a railway company, the position would, perhaps, be adequately met by the charge of lo per cent, for profit already added to cost, such charge being credited to working expenses. Under heading (2), mode of payment, the need that the railway companies should be adequately ifinanced, inasmuch as they would be work- ing without profit to themselves, was pointed to, and it was suggested that a system of payments for work in progress, as detailed in the agreement eventually arrived at, should be adopted. The essential features of this proposed system were thought to be that the shareholders of the companies shotild not be called upon to find money for executing Govern- ment work at a loss to themselves on account of interest charges, and that the accounts relating to each order should be finally settled as and when the order had been completely executed. The co;nsiderations presented under heading (3) dealt with the effect of an accelerated output of war munitions in railway workshops upon the normal work of renewals and maintenance, and showed that the case would not be ,met, in regard to renewals, by the allowance already ,made on the increased cost of labour and materials :^or renewal work carried out during the peiriod of Government control, since the more that a company did in the way of war manufactures the less would it be able to do in the way of renewals ; while in regard to maintenance, the undesira- bUity of leaving all settlements on this account over until after the end of the control period was again strongly urged. Early in June, 1915, the new financial arrangements which had by then been agreed to with the War Office were laid down in a revised memorandum to the following effect : — MANUFACTURE BY RAILWAY COMPANIES OF MUNITIONS OF WAR. Financial Arrangements. (I) Basis of Charges. (o) Work done direct for Government. Charges will be made up as follows : — (i) Materials If bought specially — at cost price plus usual charges for carriage and handling. If used out of stock — at replacement prices plus usual charges for carriage and handling. (ii) Labour ..... At cost price. (iii) Workshop expenses . . Usual workshop expenses as applying to the various shops, (iv) Supervision and establish- Calculated at 12J per cent, on the total ment charges of (i), (ii) and (iii). Percentages charged for storekeeping under (i) and those under (iii) and (iv) above are to be credited to revenue account. A certificate that these charges have been or will be credited in the revenue account will be given : (i) In the case of accounts submitted by individual Companies by the Company's Accountant, (2) In the case of Joint Accounts submitted by the Railway Executive Committee by the Chairman of the Committee, War Manufactures m railway workshops. 593 No interest will be chargeable in view of the arrangements for advance payments. (See below.) (6) Work for Contractors. So far as practicable, work done by a Railway Company as sub- contractor to a firm holding a contract at fixed prices with the Government will be excluded from the contract of the Government with the firm. Where this is not possible, Railway Companies will assess their charges on the basis fixed for direct work for the Government and will add a further charge of lo per cent, to the cost of the work as profit. This percentage, as in the case of the shop costs and supervision charges, will be credited to revenue account. {II) Method of Payment. The Executive Committee will from time to time submit to the War Ofiice an estimate of the total cost of all new manufacturing services undertaken for the Government, and at the beginning of each month they wUl submit to the War Ofi&ce a statement compiled by the Committee of Railway Accountants showing the anticipated expenditure in wages and materials during the coming four weeks. The War Office will within fourteen days of receipt of the monthly statement place to the credit of the Executive Committee a sum equal to such anticipated expenditure. Accounts of the actual amount expended by each Company during each period of four weeks, together with such certificates as may be required for audit purposes, wiU be submitted each month to the War Office. The actual outgoings will be compared with the sums paid to the credit of the Executive Committee and any surplus or shortage will be carried forward to the following month's account. The sums received by each Company from time to time will be treated as pa3anents on account, and as soon as each manufacturing order is completed the account for that order will be settled, and the necessary adjustments made. Down to this time the accounts of the individual railway companies for each separate piece of work allocated to them were still sent, in the first instance, to the Executive Committee, which collated them and presented a combined account for the sum total. Pajonent by warrant was made to the Executive Conmiittee, and the amounts due were then distributed among the companies concerned. Some of these collated accounts were for consideraHe sums not- withst2inding the fact (i) that they referred only to single orders or even to part-deliveries of single orders, and (2) that they represented only actual cost of work done. Thus the 6,000 general service wagons wanted for the Artillery Section in the early days of the war were charged for on three separate accounts (according to deKvefy), the amounts thereof being £309,950, £39,375, and £21,864, or a total of £371,189. In respect to ambulance trains, accounts were submitted for such sums as £23,984, £13.759 and £79,205. The supply of ambulance stretchers in large quantities led to bills for £19,154, £6,089, and £3,800. The cost of adapting 500 railway vans to the Government seryice was put down as £25,898. For the construction of the two armoured trains the charges made came to £7,353 and £7,680 respectively. The sum total of all the items paid for by warrant to June 30, 1915, was £801,962 ; but this method of payment was unsatisfactory from the 594 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. point of vie^v of the railway companies since it meant that they had first to finance the work they were doing for the Government and then run the risk of having to wait what became, at times, an inconveniently long period for the refunding of their outlay. The new arrangement— which was so obtviously preferable to the warrant system — came into operation on and from July ist, 1915, when a statement was submitted to the War Gifice showing that the estimated expenditure on wages and materials during the ensuing month, together with expenditure on uncompleted work still on hand, was £224,925. A cheque for this amount was received on July 9th. Down to November, 1915, the estimates for all work done were submitted to the War Office, month by month; but from December those for work ordered by the Ministry of Munitions were sent direct to that department, to be dealt with, however, by the same method of payment. Differences between the estimated and the actual expenditure for one month were credited or debited to the accounts for the following month. In October, 1915, the companies were instructed by the Executive Committee that the 12^ per cent, for supervision and establishment charges was to be debited against the Government in respect to war manufactures carried out in railway workshops whether the material for the work was supplied by the Government or not ; but, in the case of work done for outside firms, when the whole or an^ part of the material was supplied by the firms the price should in no case be less than a reason- a:ble market price, and a percentage of not less than 25 per cent, should be added for supervision and establishment charges in order to obtain this, while a further 10 per cent, should be added for profit.^ Until March, 1917, the Ministry of Munitions supplied, .without charge, a certain amount of new and raw material to the railway com- panies for the manufacture of munitions of war ; but thenceforward the Ministry was to impose a charge, according to its standard rates, ^or all such material, and the railway companies were to include the charges in the accounts they sent to the Ministry for work done. Visits to Arsenals and Wor^ks. Whilst the earlier of these financial arra.ngements were being com- pleted, the various district sub-committees appointed by the Railway War Manufactures Sub-Committee had visited a number of arsenals and niunition works in ordeir to ascertain in what way the railway companies could help them. 1 The firms, etc., for whom (in addition to what was done for the War Office, the Ministry of Munitions, the Admiralty, Woolwich Arsenal, the Trench Warfare Supply Department, the Enfield Small Arms Factory, the Royal Aircraft Factory and local munitions commit- tees) the railway companies undertook work in the supply of munitions of war included Messrs. Sir W. Armstrong, Whitworth and Co., Messrs. Vickers, the Coventry Ordnance Company, the Associated Equipment Company, John I. Thornycroft and Co., W. Beard- more and Co., the Birmingham Wagon Co., BoultonandCo., John Brown and Co., Thomas Firth and Sons, CammeU Laird and Co., Dewrance and Co., Dick, Kerr and Co., Harland and Wolff (Southampton), the Leyland Motor Company, Laurence, Scott and Co., Mechan and Co., and others, the sum total exceeding one hundred. WAR MANUFACTURES IN RAILWAY WORKSHOPS. 595 As the result of a visit paid in April, 1915, by the Mechanical Engineers of the Great Central, Great Northern, Great Wiesteirn, Lancashire and Yorkshire, London and North Western, Midland and North Eastern •Railway Companies to Woolwich Arsenal, it was arranged that each company should send to Wool)yich periodically, or when requested, a representative haying authority to undertake alriy manufactures in regard to which the Arsenal might desire assistance. At the works of Armstrong, Whitworth & Co., Ltd. (Elsjwick and Openshaw), the Coventi^y Ordnance Company, and those of Vickers, Ltd. (Erith and Barrow-in-Furness), it was found desirable to have a more dirett means o^ communication between them and the railway workshops. Four railway companies, the London and North Western, the Midland, the North Eastern and the Great Eastern, accordingly undertook each to send to one of the works a re^resenta:tive who would keep in touch alike with the firm and with the ca'pabilities of the larger railway shops. Such representativte, having settled what his own company could do for the firm, and having malde what arrangements he could with other of the larger ones in respect to the balance, was then to commTmicate, through his company's Chief Mechanical Engineer, with the secretary of the District Sub-Committee, who would allocate the remainder of the work among the smaller railway shops in his district. These earliest visits to arsenals and engineering factories led to the railway companies undertaking for them, in May, 1915, an even greater variety of work than before. The first list thereof extended over eleven pages of typed foolscap, and included such items as 30,000 shells per week ; various kinds of bombs ; steel forgings for guns ; equipment for anti-aircraft guns ; 6-pdr. Hotchkiss guns and the repairing of i8-pdr. cartridge cases, together with the production of such minor matters as travelling kitchens, kettles, drinking cups, etc. Shell Production. Early in May, 1915, came that news of a lamentable shortage of high explosive on the Western Front ^ which was to make a profound impression on the country and lead to the forming of a Coalition Govern- ment, the creation of a Ministry of Munitions, and the setting up of a great number of munition factories throughout Great Britain to supple- ment existing establishments in which the work of shell production was already being, or could be, carried on. 1 The Military Correspondent of The Times, writing in the issue of thafjoumal for May 4th, 1915. said concerning the British attack towards Lille : " We found the enemy much more strongly posted than we expected. We had not sufficient high explosive to level his parapets to the ground, after the French practice. We could not maintain ourselves in the trenches won, and our reserves were not thrown in because the conditions for success m an assault were not present. The attacks were weU planned and valiantly conducted. The infantry did splendidly, but the conditions were too hard. The want of an unlimited supply of high explosive was a fatal bar to our success." Speaking of the French offensive on the right, ^he correspondent further said : " By dint of the expenditure of 276 rounds of high explosive per gun in one day, all the German defences, except the villages, were levelled with the ground." 596 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. It was evident that some time must elapse before the new factories could be biult, equipped with the necessary machinery, and placed in a position to begin their production of munitions; and meanwhile it became a matter of vital importance that the supply therecrf should be* increased with the least possible delay. In these circumstances the question arose as to whether it would be possible for the railway companies to render further aissistance, in this fresh emergency, by undertaking the manufacture of shells in their workshops. The North Eastern had been asked by the War Office in February, 1915, to join with Armstrong, Whitworth & Co. in the machining of 18- pdr. H.E. shells at Darlington, and, with the approval of the Executive Committee, they had agreed so to do ; but the carrying through of this work involved the erection of a new shop which would not be ready until July.^ Following almost immediately on the depressing news of the munition shortage at the Front, there came before the Railway War Manufactures Sub-Committee (May 14th) a request from the War Office that the companies in general would machine any number of 6-in. lyddite shells which they could produce up to a total of 1,000 a week. Four weeks later there was a further inquiry whether the companies would also be able to machine 4'5-in. shells. Meanwhile the BiU for the creation of the Ministry of Mimitions had received the Royal Assent (June 8th, 1915). On June i6th Mr. Lloyd George took the oath as Minister of Munitions, and on June 24th he had an interview with certain rnembers of the Railway War Manufactures Sub-Committee to whom he expressed the hope that, in view of the urgent need for a greater output of munitions, all the railway companies would assist, as far as possible, in the forging and machining of high explosive shells and in the production of other mihtary material. It was especially desired that they would, between them, machine 2,000 6-in. lyddite shells per week. Subject to their being able to get back certain turners and machine- men who had joined the Colours, seven companies, viz., the Great Western, the London and North Western, the Lancashire and Yorkshire, the North Eastern, the Great Northern, the Great Central and the Great Eastern (and Southern Companies), agreed to machine an aggregate of 2,250 shells per week, and the Great Western offered to forge up to 2,000 6-in. H.E. shells per week in order both to provide its own forgings and to have a surplus available for other companies which might experience difficulty in getting them.* ^ The shop in question was constructed partly by Armstrong, Whitworth and Co., and partly by the North Eastern Railway Company. Designed specially for shell production, it was taken over by the Ministry of Munitions on the understanding that at the end of the war it would, in turn, be taken over by the North Eastern Railway Compg.ny, together with such of the fixed plant and machinery as would be useful for railway engineering pur- poses. ' It was afterwards arranged that the London and North Western should take the surplus for the purposes of machining. North ICasihrx IvAILWa'i- Siii;li. Siioi': I'x.ind SmKi-;. WAR MANUFACTURES IN RAILWAY WORKSHOPS. 597 Purchase of Machinery. By this time, and as the result of the earlier developments in May and June, 1915, the Executive Committee and the Railway War Manufac- tures 'Sub-Committee were already dealing actively with the whole sub- ject of the manufacture of shells in railway workshops. ' Whilst willing enough so to do, some of the companies could not iiicrease their production of shells, and others could not take on the manufacture of shells at all, partly because their shops were akeady '%dfking under high pressure, and partly because such an undertaking vrovid involve the purchase of additional lathes and other machines not necessarily required for ordinary railway work. It was, however, sug- gested to the War Office, by the Executive Committee, in July, that if a greater supply of shells were imperatively required, there would be no insviperable difficulty in the way of the railway companies doing more in this direction provided they were authorised to purchase the necessary lathes which, used for the desired purpose, would remain the property of the .Government until the end of the war, when they could, if the companies so wished, be taken over by them at a proper valuation. This suggestion was approved by the War Office, and not only was action at once taken, but the same principle was applied to the purchase of special machinery for the making of other munitions, apart from shells, in the railway workshops. In practice, the companies made up lists of the new machines they would require for the carrjdng out of specified orders, and these lists, referred by the War Office to the Ministry of Munitions, were finally approved by the Railway Executive Committee, which thus kept in touch with aU that was done. Between the middle of June and the middle of September, 1915, the ejipenditmre incurred in respect to new machinery, under the conditions stated, had. already amoxmted to ;f55,ooo. By the end of 1917 it had risen to £120,000, and the sum total, when the Armistice was signed^ stood at £130,930. Shortage of Labour. In addition to the shortage of shell-making machinery, thus happily overcome, the railway companies were also experiencing a shortage of labour — in their workshops no less than on their lines — owing to the fact that so many of their shopmen had either joined the Colours or had left the railway service to go into the works of private firms who had offered them higher pay. A number of railway artisans had, also, been " borrowed " by the Ministry of Munitions for controlled factories which were short-handed and could not themselves get sufficient men for urgent work. These shrinkages in the workshop staffs were pro- .ceeding concurrently with the continuous requests that the ijompanies would -provide more and still more munitions. In the first instance strong efforts were made to secure the return of skilled railway artisans from the Front, and a certain number were sent back, owing to the representations made ; though many of them. 598 BRITISH RAILWAYS. AND THE GREAT WAR. instead of taking Up their old position,s, were induced to enter private engineering works or munition factories elsewhere on higher terms — a^ procedure against which the railway companies strongly protested. A piore successful surmounting of the dififtculty which had arisen was gained through the employment of women. It was found they could carry on various branches of munition work, and especially so as regarded " running orders," with comparatively little male supervision, and, with their help, the railway companies were able to increase very considerably their output of munitions, already augmented in so substantial a degree by the arrangement in regard to the purchase of special machinery. It was, indeed, the women who saved the situation. ^ Increased Output. Following on the creation of the Ministry of Munitions and the immense activities it developed, the railway output underwent a great impetus, notwithstanding the strict adherence by the companies to the principle they had laid down — that they were to do only such work as, on account of urgency or for some other reason, could not be provided for elsewhere. Munition factories were springing up all over the land, and it might have been thought that the railway companies — which, as we have seen, had started on their patriotic task of helping to provide for the rieeds of the Army more than nine months before the Ministry of Munitions was created — would now be able to reduce, if not to dis- continue, their own munition wOrk, and revert to their repairs and renewals of rolling stock and plant, left more or less in abeyance. Demands upon the railway workshops for war manufactures were, however, now being made upon a larger scale, if not, also, with greater urgency, than before. Not only did the Orders from the Ministry of Munitions supplement those previously given by the War Office, but there came a time when the former were fourfold greater than the latter. There were received, also, still more numerous requests for assistance from munition firms, ^themselves being pressed to deliver with a speed, and to an extent, beyond the capacity of their works. It was under these conditions that the then President of the Board of Trade suggested on various occasions between December, 1915, and the spring of 1916 that the railway companies should consider whether they were not really doing too much munition work, and whether they should not devote the activities of their workshops to a greater degree to the upkeep of rpUing stock and plant — which had, indeed, in the case of certain of the companies,- admittedly got very much into arrear. To these suggestions by Mr. Runciman it was replied, early in April, that the members of the Railway Executive were themselves of opinion that the time had arrived when they should be authoritatively instructed by the Government whether, and to what extent, the railway companies were to continue their manufacture of munitions. In the memorandum sent to Lord Kitcheaer a year previously the Executive Committee had WAR MANUFACTURES IN RAILWAY WORKSHOPS. 599 pointed out that, at a certain disadvantage to theinselves, the companies were in a position further to assist in war manufactures, though this would involve serious arrears in renewals and repairs of rolling stock and plant. Some of this work had, in fact, been given to outside firms, owing to the inability of the companies to do it for themselves. The demands made upon them for munition work had been both extensive and insistent, while a large number of their men had now either joined the Forces or taken emplosonent with manufacturing firms. Except to a limited extent, it was not possible for repairs, at least, to be post- poned, if the work of the railways was to be carried on. If, it was suggested, considering that the Munitions Department had now been in existence about ten months and had made arrangements throughout the country for an enormously increased production of munitions, it should be possible for the companies, without prejudice to the national interests, to discontinue or reduce the manufacture of munitions in their workshops, and devote more attention to the upkeep and renewal of rolling stock and plant, they would be only too glad of the opportunity so to do. The circumstances of the individual companies differed considerably. Some who were seriously behind with their repairs were doing but little mimition work, or none at aU. Others, doing a considerable amount of munition work, were well forward with repairs ; while others, again, though not yet seriously behind with repairs, anticipated difficulties imless they could get relief within the course of the next few months. This question even of repairs — as distinct from renewals — did not, however, necessarily affect the output of munitions, much of which was assured by female labour and the use of special machinery ; but it was affected by the insufficiency both of labour and of materials for repair work. It was in these directions that reUef was specially required. " The other side of the picture," the communication proceeded, " is that it has been very forcibly impressed upon the railway companies that the part they are taking in mimition work is, in certain cases, vital to the programme of the departments requiring munitions, and that although the railway companies may not be, in all cases, completing an entire unit, they are completing a part which enables either Woolwich or some other factory to carry out a complete programme in the required time." In the opinion of the Executive Committee, the whole subject was one that should be reviewed by the departments concerned and the companies definitely instructed whether they were to continue all the munition work they were asked to undertake — subject to the efficient maintenance of roUing stock and plant — or whether they should dis- continue their munition work either wholly or in part. It was further suggested that a meeting should be held between the Railway War Manufactures Sub-Committee and experts from the War Ofi&ce, Admiralty and Ministry of Munitions in order that the matter might be considered from the point of view of what the companies could do for the Govem- ss 6oo BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. ment without interfering unduly with their own renewals and repairs, the representatives of the three State departments deciding, in turn, how such amount of work as could be done should be allocated to each of them respectively. While concurring in this proposal in regard to a joint conference Mr. Runciman, in April, 1916, addressed a sufHciently serious warning to the Executive Committee, saying : — If the railway service is impeded, or if any accident occurs owing to the railway roUing stock getting out of condition in consequence of the railway workshops being engaged in the manufacture of munitions of war, I must hold the Railway Executive Committee responsible. Considering that what the Executive Committee had done in the way of assisting in the production of munitions had been done at the urgent request of the War Office, the Admiralty and the Ministry of Munitions without the sHghtest prospect of gain for the companies but, rather, to their detriment, this intimation from the then President of the Board of Trade must have been both disconcerting and discouraging. Such a warning from the official Chairman of the Railway Executive Committee could not, however, be disregarded, and when the suggested conference between representatives of the War Office, the Admiralty, the Ministry of Mimitions and the Railway War Manufactures Sub- Committee was duly held, on May 20th and 30th — on which occasion the prospective needs of the three departments were detailed — ^it was intimated by the sub-committee that, whUe there were various branches of munition work which, on account of the emplojnnent of female labour or for other reasons, could be undertaken without interfering with the upkeep of the rolling stock, the railway companies would thenceforward be prepared to accept only such orders as would not interfere with main- tenance of their rolling stock. Should there be received from any department a demand the carrying out of which would involve the said interference, the companies would not undertake it without an order from the Government, received through the President of the Board of Trade. In August, 1916, the Ministry of Munitions made an urgent request that the railway companies would construct, by the end of the following November, sixty 6-in. gun carriages and sixteen hmbers. These were so much wanted that the companies were begged to supply them even if their doing so should interfere with their locomotive repairs. The Railway War Manufactures Sub-Committee found that four companies could undertake the work with the assistance of others, who would supply certain parts, though in the case of three of the companies con- siderable interference with locomotive repairs would be involved. A communication was thereupon addressed to Mr. Runciman, informing him of the situation, and stating that, in the ordinary course, the Railway Executive Committee would have given orders for the work to proceed, but that, in view of the communication referred to above, they must defer doing so until they heard from him. WAR MANUFACTURES IN RAILWAY WORKSHOPS. 6oi Mr, Runciman replied that he understood the matter was very urgent, and that, in the circumstances, it was desirable the companies should assist in carrying out the work — ^which they accordingly did. Nor, in effect, weis there any such diminution in the output of war manufactures in the railway workshops as might have been expected to follow from Mr. Runciman's war^jihg and the announcement, based thereon, as to the future pohcy of the railway companies. The demands of the War Office and the Ministry of Munitions for war material of all kinds continued to increase not only in urgency but in magnitude, so that whereas, in April, 1915, when Mr. Runciman wrote, the estimated cost of Government work to be done, and supplies or material to be fur- nished, by the railway companies during that month was £183,000, the corresponding figure for the following December was £341,000, while before the end of the war the maximum for any single month in respect to work done for the War Office and the Ministry of Munitions rose to over £1,000,000. In October, 1917, there came a request from the Air Board that the railway companies would undertake the complete construction by April, 1918, of fifty or a hundred aeroplanes of a certain type. The companies thought they could, between them, supply thirty by the date mentioned, though certain structural alterations would be necessary in some of the carriage and wagon works. On further consideration, however, there appeared to be a prospect of labour troubles arising in regard to the rates of pay to the staff who would be engaged on this class of work in the railway shops as compared with the rates of pay for similar work else- where, and the Ministry of Munitions concluded that, in the circumstances, it would be better not to proceed with the scheme. The Ministry of Munitions foreshadowed to the Railway Executive Committee early in 1918 the prospect of a considerable curtailment or cancellation of their munition work owing to recent changes in the Ministry's munition programme. It would appear, also, that Mr. ChurchiU, then Minister of Munitions, regarded with disfavour the system under which the railway companies undertook munition work without any definite contracts being placed with them, although, in point of fact, the position of the railway companies, who had entered upon the manufacture of munitions in the national interests and without making any profit thereon, was not comparable with that of ordinary manufac- turers who were working at a profit and whose position in regard to contracts was, therefore, wholly different. Much of the gun ammunition work on which the railways had been engaged was now withdrawn, though fresh orders in other directions were given, and the companies, while not so^busy as they had been, were still actively employed on munitions when "the Armistice was signed in November, 1918. Most of the existing orders to the railway companies were then formally cancelled, though a certain amount of work was continued for a time with a view to avoiding any undue congestion of the labour 6o2 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. market. No meeting of the Railway War Manufactures Sub-Committee was held subsequent to November 22nd, 1918, and the sub-committee itself automatically lapsed when the Railway Executive Committee came to an end on December 31st, 1919. The Work Done. An official record, issued in March, 1920, of munition work done by railway companies through the Railway War Manufactures Sub- Committee for Government departments and controlled private firms gave no more than a list of the separate items of such work undertaken (i) by the railway companies as a whole, and (2) by each company individually ; yet the said list of items extended to no fewer than 121 quarto pages. This fact in itself is sufficiently suggestive of the great variety and extent of what was accompUshed, and a complete account thereof would be far beyond the limits of the space here available. A few details concerning the ultimate output in respect to leading manu- factures by the companies asawhole,^ and supplementing the facts and figures already given, may, nevertheless, be of interest to the reader and sufiice for present purposes. The manufacture of 6-in. H.E. shells by the railway companies so far surpassed the 1,000 per week first spoken of by the War Office, and, also, the 2,000 per week suggested by Mr. Lloyd George on his appoint- ment as Minister of Munitions, that the average weekly production during the first six, months of 1917 was 4,861, with a maximvim during that period of 5,455 in the week ending March 31st. The record week of all was the one ending December 8th, 1917, when the output rose to 5,796, while the total for various marks of these shells made by the railway companies during the war-period amounted to 614,769. In addition to this, the companies did 162,141 forgings or re-forgings of the same descriptions of sheUs, and they supplied a very large number of components. Of i8-pdr. shrapnel shell, 1,064,665 came from Darlington, where they had been turned out under the supervision of the North Eastern Railway Company in the new shop referred to on page 596. Of 45-in. shell only 26,654 were produced. Bombs numbered 9,500. Much was done in the painting of various kinds of shell, the total so dealt with being 1,780,721. Of copper bands 4,910,000 were pressed and 95,732 were cast. Nose cap forgings and stampings were supplied to the extent of 353,321. In respect to these and other forgings, standing orders were given for a stated number per week until instructions should be given to the contrary. Fuses, gaines and adapters, required for shell, were produced in what ultimately attained to very large quantities. At the end of March, 1915, the railway companies were asked by the ' Some references will be made in later Chapters to munition work done by certain individual companies. War manufactures in railway workshops. 603 War Office to undertake the manufacture of No. lOO graze fuse — a new kind of fuse for which gauges had not then been made. An imdertaking was given that the companies would provide up to 3,000 per week, the Midland contributing 1,000 per week towards the total. The work was distributed among a number of companies and at first some of the parts were obtained from outside manufacturers. The Midland, however, arranged to supply gauges to the companies, and itself sent off to Wool- wich a consignment of fuses which were passed on inspection within ten weeks of the order having been given. Considering the various diffi- culties which had to be overcome in starting on what was so entirely new a manufacture for railway companies, this was a remarkable achieve- ment. While still having no more than pre-war machines at their disposal, the Midland increased their output of fuses to 3,000 per week ; but, under the arrangements made with the War Office in regard to new machinery, the company eventually got together an exceptionally fine plant of auto and other machines equal to the production of 30,000 fuses per week, including the manufacture of all details, and providing employ- ment for 550 girls and women. The maximum weekly production of the railway companies as a whole was : Fuses (without adapters), 40,750 ; gaines, 19,800 ; adapters, 48,000. At one period of the war the need for gaines was so urgent that each day's production in the railway workshops was sent off to Woolwich the same night by special messenger. The sum total of fuses of different kinds (and including 134,170 without adapters) furnished by the railway companies was 3,478,839. Of gaines. No. i and No. 2, the total number made was 1,387,106, while 901,686 of No. i were altered to No. 2. Of adapters 4,504,734 were made and 100,572 were converted to old pattern No. 100, complete with fuse. Large quantities of component parts alike for fuses, gaines and adapters were also supplied. Tin cylinders for fuse No. 100 were at one time being made at the rate of 11,000 per -week. The total number of cylinders supphed was 469,850. Of body stampings for fuses 1,460,521 were provided. In June, 1915, Woolwich Arsenal had on hand a collection of 750,000 i8-pdr. brass cartridge cases which, after being fired at the Front, had been sent here to be reformed. The railway companies were asked if they would assist in the work. They agreed to guarantee the repair of 50,000 per week as a minimum, but offered to do 75,000 per week if necessary. In August they were requested to undertake 70,000 per week, and they then offered to increase the number to 89,000. In November there were 500,000 fired cases at Woolwich, and the companies were told that the repair of these, with the speed they were able to guarantee, was a matter of vital importance to our Armies at the Front. Thereupon eight companies arranged to build up a repairing plant equal to an aggregate output of 102,000 per week. By the autumn of 1916 the agreed weekly total (that is to say, the number up to which the companies would be able to work, according to the machinery made available) had increased to 206,000. About the same time it was 6o4 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. reported that a Central Factory, capable of repairing cartridge cases on a very large scale, was about to be opened by the Ministry of Munitions, and inquiry was made of the department whether, under these condi- tions, there would be any possibUity of the railway companies — which, it was pointed out, had installed a considerable amount of plant and were employing some thousands of hands on the work — finding a lack of cases to repair. In reply they were informed that the proposed Central Factory would not in any way decrease the supply to themselves, and that the fresh arrangements were designed to deal only with quantities in excess of their own capacity. Not only, in fact, was there no diminution in the supplies coming forward, but the companies were encouraged to increase their production and to lay down stiU more machinery. The Lancashire and Yorkshire, for instance, arranged to do 50,000 cases per week in place of 25,000, and the Midland were authorised to install additional machinery by means of which it would be possible for them to raise their output from 35,000 to 100,000'per week.i So it was that, by the end of April, 1917, the total for the eight railway companies concerned averaged 225,000 per week, with a maximum of 273,000 ; though by June the new machinery which had been obtained increased the capacity of the railway workshops to 376,000 cases per week. Nor was this the limit. Fired 45-in. howitzer cartridge cases, 13-pdr. cases and 6-pdr. cases, returned from overseas, were also sent to the railway workshops to be reformed. The number of 4"5-in. howitzer cases dealt with attained a maximum of 36,000 per week. Some of the i8-pdr. cartridge cases came back (after firing), were reformed and then returned to the Front, for use over again, six times in succession. Many of them arrived here with the mouth spht, and a certain number, also, developed sphts in the course of the reforming process. These, at first, the railway workshops were not invited to repair ; but the Great Western experts at Swindon hit upon a method of brazing " splits " by means of an oxy-acetylene blow-pipe, instead of over a fire, and then repairing them. Later on the Great Eastern Company, who were able to make a speciahty of this class of work, were authorised to spend ;f500 on machinery for the brazing of i8-pdr. cartridge cases having sphts which did not exceed i^ in. in length. So it was that when, in November, 1916, a fresh allocation of " sphts " was made, the Great Western agreed to do 300 per week, the Great Centred 200 per week, and the Great Eastern 20,000 per week. The Great Western method of repairing spht cases was afterwards applied also to other cartridge cases. A further development was brought about early in 1917, when new i8-pdr. and 4'5-in. cartridge cases which had been made by outside firms but were defective in some respect or other were sent to the railway workshops to have their faults rectified. 1 Up to 136,000 per week were eventually repaired at Derby. WAR MANUFACTURES IN RAILWAY WORKSHOPS. 605 What elU the work thus done by the railway companies for the War Of&ce, the Ministry of Munitions and Woolwich in connection with cartridge cases during the war period reaUy amounted to, in the aggre- gate, ■wdU be seen from the following table : — 18-POTJNDER : Reformed '. . . . , 29,251,992 Brazed .... 1.579.382 Rectified new cases 281,698 13-POUNDER : Reformed .... 652,892 Brazed ..... 49.670 6-POUNDER : Reformed .... 30,791 45 in. : Reformed .... . 3.318,553 Brazed ..... 289,446 Rectified new cases 6,648 The repair of fired primers was carried on to the extent of 900,284. Work done in connection with mines comprised : Hemispherical pressings, 48,923 ; register rings, 24,380 ; mine sinkers, machining, assembling, etc., 1,500 sets ; and mine-sinker details, 43,700. Shell steel was dealt with thus : Bars, sorted and dispatched, 15,714 tons ; bOlets rolled down to bars, i,iSo tons ; billets broken, 149,712 tons ; crop ends, 14,691 tons ; scrap, 2,009 tons. Of boxes_for empty cartridge cases the companies made 34,509, and of bomb cases 2,516. Work done in the supply of gun carriages and equipment included the following : — 15-in. Carriage limber parts. 9'2-in. Carriage B.L. garrison barbette. 8-in. Howitzer carriages, complete, including erection. 8-in. Howitzer carriage limbers, complete. 8-in. Howitzer carriages, converted. 8-in. Howitzer equipment. 6-in. and 8-in. Howitzer carriages (complete limbers, various details and spare parts). 6-in. Gun carriages, complete, including erection. 6-in. Gun carriage limbers, complete. 47-in. Mountings. 4'5-in. Howitzer gun carriages. 4-5-in. Howitzer gun carriage limbers. 4-5-in. Howitzer wagon bodies. 4'5-in. Howitzer wagon limbers. 4"5-in. Howitzer cradle bodies. 4'5-in, Howitzer parts and details. 4-in. and 3-in. Naval gun mountings. 3 •6-in. Mountings. 3-in. Mountings. 275-in. Pack saddlery. 2-in. Trench howitzers, complete. 2-in. Beds and fittings. 2-in. Various parts. 6o6 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. 112-pdr. Trench howitzer. 6o-pdr. Bomb gun mountings. 6o-pdr. Ammunition wagon details. 6o-pdr. Carriage parts. 6o-pdr. Limber parts, etc. i8-pdr. Gun carriage wagon and limber parts, mountings, etc. 13-pdr. Gun limbers, mountings, pedestals and carriage details. i2-pdr. Carriage parts, mountings, details, etc. lo-pdr. Pack saddlery. 6-pdr. Single tube guns, with and without breech mechanism, rifled, etc. 6-pdr. Nordenfeldt parts. 6-pdr. Hotchkiss guns, with and without breech mechanism, rifled, repaired, retubed, carriage limber details, mounting, etc. Work for the Admiralty included the reforming of 138,168 cartridge cases (namely, 6-pdr. Hotchkiss, 98,394 ; 3-pdr. Hotchkiss, 19,006 ; and 3-pdr. Vickers, 20,768) ; supply of shot, bombs, mines and mine work, cradles for conveying motor-boats, brackets, drums, steel bars, plates, 9,000 grapnels, 2,452 sets of small parts, and 2,825 various parts, of paravanes, together with guns, gun carriages and equipment as follows : — 6-in. complete, including erection, 12. 4-in. anti-aircraft pedestal mounting pivots, 144. 3-in. anti-aircraft road carriage mounting, i. 6-pdr. Hotchkiss, with breech mechanism, 90 ; without breech, 201 ; rifled, 536 ; repaired and retubed, 4 ; jacket forgings — ^machined, 12 ; " A " tubes, 12. 6-pdr. Single tube ; with breech mechanism, 5 ; without breech, 29 ; rifled, 143 ; converted to Hotchkiss pattern, 2. Work in connection with the construction of paravanes was also done by the companies for Vickers, Ltd., Armstrong, Whitworth and Co., Ltd., and other firms under contract with the Admirtdty. A considerable variety of work was done for the Royal Aircraft Factory and the Department of Aeronautical Supplies, included therein being 148,303 pressings, 35,113 stampings, together with engine parts, etc. Among the supphes furnished to the Small Arms Factory, Enfield, were 119,907 body forgings and stampings, 203,484 breech bolts and 123,660 nose caps ; stampings and ammunition work were done for the Aberdeen Munitions Board, the Birmingham Munitions Committee, the East AngHan Munitions Committee, the Metropolitan Munitions Committee and the Sussex Munitions Board, while the work done for various firms in the way of castings, machinings, stampings, forgings, guns, gun carriages, gun equipment, supplies of shells and tools, sub- marine mines, details for paravanes, and many other things, assumed, in the aggregate, very considerable proportions. The Companies Concerned. The railway companies which took part (though some of them to only a very limited extent) in this production of munitions of war for WAR MANUFACTURES IN RAILWAY WORKSHOPS. 607 Government departments, private firms or Munitions Committees, or by way of assisting other railway companies, were as follows : — Barry Brecon and Merthyr Cambrian Furness Great Central Great Eastern Great Northern Great Western Hull and Barnsley Lancashire and Yorkshire London and North Western London and South Western London, Brighton and South Coast Metropolitan Metropolitan District Midland Midland and Great Northern Joint North Eastern North StafEordshire Rhjrmney South Eastern and Chatham Taff Vale Caledonian Glasgow and South Western Great North of Scotland Highland North British Dublin and South Eastern Great Southern and Western Great Northern of Ireland Midland Great Western (Ireland) Northern Counties (Ireland) Payments Made. For the purposes of accounts, the phrase " munitions of war " was regarded as including, not only guns and ammunition, but, with certain exceptions coming under other categories, practically everything it was possible for the railway companies either to manufacture or to supply for the prosecution of the war. Nor was this arrangement one that lacked justification, though the use of the phrase might, in the absence of an explanation, convey a wrong idea. If guns and ammuni- tion were wanted for the destruction of hfe, ambulance trains were also wanted for the saving of hfe ; and when those trains conveyed our wounded and were a means by which the early return of the men to the battle-front could be assured, they became, in effect, war material, or " munitions of war," in the broadest sense of the word. Under the same designation were included, also, the armoured trains made for use at home in case of need ; the locomotives and the rolling-stock sent over- seas for the use of British troops, and the permanent-way materials forwarded for the construction of mihtary railways in France or other- wise. So it was that these particular items, more especially, constantly recurred in those monthly estimates of the cost of " munitions of war " which were presented by the Railway Executive Committee to the War Ofl&ce and the Ministry of Munitions in accordance with the arrangement that came into force on July ist, 1915. In regard to the ambulance trains, there was first of all the cost of their conversion or of their construction ; then came the cost of spare parts, while when the war was over the cost of the dismantling and reconversion of those on loan and in use in this country which reverted to ordinary railway purposes had to be charged for. Similar conditions appUed to roUing stock loaned to the War Office. Various alterations might be necessary, before the stock was sent across the Channel, in 6o8 BRITISH RAaWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. order to adapt it either to the special purposes for whith it was required or to the conditions of railway working in France. On the return of the wagons, work in the way of repairs and reconversion would have to be done before they could once more serve their original purpose. Allow- ance had also to be made for the repair of locomotives returned from overseas, for work done or stores supplied in connection with transport overseas, and for various other items which, inasmuch as the railways were concerned in them, it was found convenient to include in their " munitions of war " account. This account was running for a considerable period after the close of the war, owing to the work that required to be done on the loco- motives and rolling stock on loan then still being returned ; but for present purposes it will suffice if we confine ourselves to the position down to the end of 1919. Mention has been made on page 593 of the fact that the amount paid to the railway companies by warrant in respect to war manufactures, ambulance trains, etc., down to June 30th, 1915, was £801,962. We have now to turn to the payments made under the monthly-estimates arrange- ment which came into force on and from July ist, 1915, and were charged to the Ministry of Munitions and the War Office respectively. Taking, in the first place, payments by the Ministry of Munitions, the simi total thereof down to the end of 1919 was £10,216,859. The largest item was for " manufacturing works," otherwise mimitions of war proper — guns, ammunition, etc., and these accounted for no less than £10,064,470. The next largest item was the £130,930 expended by the railway companies under the arrangement made with the Govern- ment in respect to new machinery needed to allow of an increase in their output of shells and other war supplies. The two other items debited to the Ministry of Munitions were £13,659 for the provision of naval ambulance trains (conversion from rolling stock and subsequent dis- mantling and reconversion), and £7,800 for spare parts and other expenses in connection with ambulance trains. Pa57ments made by the War Office to the railways down to the same date amounted to £6,333,588. Thefirst item here was one of £1,129,332 for conversion or construction of ambulance trains for the use of British troops at home or overseas, cost of shipment, spare parts, and other expenses in connection with the trains. There was a further sum of £1,668,894 paid for ambulance trains supplied by the British railway companies for the use of American troops overseas, the arrangement which had been made in respect to these being that the War Office would reimburse the companies for the cost of the trains, and recover the payments from the United States Government. The balance was made up mainly by a wide range of items falhng under the head of stores supplied, work done in connection with locomotives and rolling stock loaned or suppHed, and so on. The sum total of these pajTments by the Ministry of Munitions and the War Office to the Railway Executive Committee for division among WAR MANUFACTURES IN RAILWAY WORKSHOPS. 609 individual companies on the basis of the monthly estimates was thus £16,550,447. In addition thereto, other payments were made direct to the com- panies for work done by them for private firms engaged on urgent Government work. Military Commands, local Munitions Committees, etc. These sums, so far as they represented work authorised by the War Manufactures Sub-Committee, were as follows :— £ Vickers, Ltd 98,269 Armstrong, Whitworth & Co., Ltd 93.45° Coventry Ordnance Works 68,482 Beaxdmore, Wm. & Co., Ltd 11,978 Other Firms (104 in number) 98.453 Local Command Orders ....••• 1.138 Local Munitions Committees ....•• 54.262 Ministry o{ Munitions ....••■ 7.387 War Office 3.693 Other Government Departinents .... • 2,425 Total ;£439,537 Putting together the totals of the various accounts coming under the distinctly comprehensive definition of " munitions of war," we get the following figures as representing the grand total of what was paid to the railway companies in respect to war material of aU kinds manu- factured or supplied by them directly or indirectly on Goverrmient account from the outbreak of the war to December 31st, 1919 : — £ Paid by warrant to June 30th, 1915 .... 801,962 Payments made through monthly estimates, July ist, 1915, to December 30th, 1919 16,550,447 Payments to railway companies direct by firms and Govern- ment departments for work authorised by Railway War Manufactures Sub-Committee 439.537 ;£i 7,791, 946 The significance of these figures lies, not alone in the further evidence they afford as to the magnitude of the war-work undertaken by the railway companies apart from all that related to the transport of men and material, but in the financial gain to the Government in their obtain- ing a prodigious volume of war material at practically cost price, as against what they would have had to pay to ordiaary commercial under- takings. Nor are these considerations of quantity and economy alone to be considered, since much of the work done in the railway workshops was carried out at times when the manufacturing conditions were such that, if the execution of the work had depended exclusively upon other means of supply, the said munitions could not have been obtained in such quantity and with such speedy dehvery as were called for by the imperative needs of the military situation. The value of the services 610 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. rendered to the country by the railways even in this respect alone was incalculable. It may be suggested that the railway companies, after all, did not work exclusively at cost price inasmuch as they added lo per cent., in the way of profit, to their charges for the munition work which they undertook for outside firms. This is perfectly true ; but the " profit " they thus made, being added to their revenue, inured to the advantage of the Government, whose obhgations in the way of making good the railway deficit were reduced proportionately. From every point of view, in fact, the gain was to the Government and the country, while the results, in addition to being of no direct benefit to the companies, involved them in still greater difficulties through the prejudice done to the upkeep and renewal of engines and rolling stock and the consequent curtailment of transport faciUties subjected, concurrently, to so abnormal a strain. CHAPTER XLIV. BRITISH RAILWAY WORK OVERSEAS. Within a very short time of the arrival of the first British Expeditionary Force in France, the fact had become evident that this country woiild itself have to undertake much railway \^ork, in many different directions, on the Western Front. It was seen that there would be need for far greater armies to be sent there than had at first been anticipated, and, even if the pre-war facihties in France had remained in their normal condition, they would still have been unequal to requirements. Not only, however, did these facihties, at the ports and elsewhere, need to be strengthened or supplemented, but the enemy, driven back from his first attempted advance on Paris, had done his best to destroy railway lines, railway bridges and other railway works which required to be restored at the earMest possible moment if the AUied Forces were to make good their position. So it was that, apart from miHtary transport pure and simple, there was a great and steadily-increasing amount of reconstruction, maintenance and other work to be done. Belgian railwaymen had been mostly scattered to the four winds. Many of the French railwaymen had been taken prisoner and carried off to Germany. Of the others, a large proportion had joined the French army and were helping to repel the invader, while those who remained available for railway work were already fully occupied, and could not be expected to undertake much. more. There was, it is true, the excellent body known as the " Sections de Chemins de Fer de Campagne." These sections were originally created as the result of the difficulties experienced in restoring railway communications in France during the Franco-German War of 1870-71. Their purpose was to form a permanent miUtary organisation of railwaymen who, while remaining in the railway service in time of peace, would, in time of war, and concurrently with the Railway Units of the French Army, undertake the construction, repair and operation of railway lines the working of which could not then be assured by the Railway Administrations. The permanent sections, nine in number (the Minister of War being authorised to form still more in case of an emergency arising), were recruited from the staffs of the five Great Companies and of the State Railways. The Paris, Lyons and Mediterranean and the State Railways each formed two sections and the others each formed one, while Section 8 was constituted by three of the companies in combination. Each section formed a separate and complete unit comprising — a central service ; three divisions, namely, 611 6i2 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. (i) operation, (2) permanent-way and (3) haulage ; a depot common alike to the central service and the three divisions, and territorial sub- divisions, attached to the central depot. So far was the idea of complete units carried that each of the three companies concerned in Section 8 took over one of the three divisions. Among other advantages of this reserve force of railway workers was the fact that the men not only of each section but of each division were under the command of railway officers with whom they had been associated in their ordinary avocations. The sections had, also, a form of self-government distinct from that of the regular Army. While being under military law, they corresponded to the ordinary French railway service, in which they remained until mobihsation. The active force of a section comprised 1,325 officers and men, apart from 141 connected with the central depot. Special rates of pay were allowed in time of peace as well as in time of war.* While, under the conditions brought about by the outbreak of war in 1914, these Sections de Chemins de Fer de Campagne could be reHed upon to justify abundantly their peace-time existence,' they were not in sufficient number, even with the calling up of the territorial sub- divisions, to do aU that was wanted in the way alike of reconstruction and maintenance of lines and of ensuring the transport of British as well as French armies, together with the huge volume of their varied requirements. It thus became indispensable that the British Fighting Forces should be either preceded or closely followed by British Railway Forces who would themselves provide, more especially, and as far as practicable, the further transport facihties which the former would require in France. In England, however, the only British Troops in existence on the out- break of war were the Railway Units of the Royal Engineers, and these were wholly inadequate for the formidable task which was to be developed. As already narrated in Chapter III, the General Managers on the War Railway Council of former days were, in 1905, and again in 1911, invited by the military authorities to enter upon negotiations for the creation, on lines somewhat similar to those on which the French Sections de Chemins de Fer were based, of a permanent Railway Corps composed of railway of&cers and employees who were to be always available for wars or expeditions overseas in case of need. If this scheme had been carried through, instead of breaking down because the War Office could not assure to the members of the proposed Corps what the General Managers regarded as a reasonable remuneration, the organisation, though on a comparatively smaU scale, would have been of immediate service when war broke out in 1914. As it was, the War Office had to appeal almost at once, through the Railway Executive Committee, to the British railway companies both to raise Railway Troops from their ^ For details as to the organisation of these French Railway Troops, see " Mouvements et Transports : Sections de Chemins de Fer de Campagne." Paris : Henri Charles- Lavauzelle. ' BRITISH RAILWAY WORK OVERSEAS. 613 staffs and to undertake railway work in France by means of civilian forces. The Raising of British Railway Troops. The first steps in the former direction were taken about the middle of August, 1914, when the Railway Executive Committee were asked if they thought there would be any difficulty in raising a special corps of Railway Troops, Royal Engineers, on the basis of a scheme which had been imder the consideration of the War Office. The position at this time was that, although the Government had, under the Act of 1871, acquired control, not only over the British railways but, also, over the railway staffs necessary for operating them, they had no right, pending the adoption of compulsory national service, to commandeer any of the companies' employees for the construction, repair or working of railways overseas. Anything done by them in this direction was then to be done voluntarily aJike by the railwaymen and by the railway companies ; though there could be no doubt that, from patriotic motives, and having regard to the state of public feeling at that time, both would respond loyally to any proposals likely to be made to -them on the lines in question. Under the scheme above-mentioned, recruits from the operating and maintenance staffs of the British railways were to be enlisted in the Royal Engineers for the duration of the war. The work to be done was of a non-combatant character, but the enlistment of the men in the Royal Engineers, instead of their remaining civilians, offered a two-fold advantage. As the positions they were invited to accept would be more profitable to themselves there would be the greater probability of their coming forward to take' them, while they would, in the event of their being captured by the enemy, rank as soldiers and have the right to be treated accordingly. It was further desirable that large bodies of men employed behind the fighting lines should themselves be under military discipline. Except inspectors and foremen, who might be taken up to forty-five years of age, all were to be between the ages of nineteen and forty. From the day of attestation until the day of discharge, each man was to draw pay and engineer pay, according to rank, at a specified rate, supple- mented by separation allowance, disability pension, and pensions for widows and orphans. The Railway Executive informed the War Office that no difficulty was Mkely to be found in the way of raising a corps of railwaymen, and they referred the matter to Mr. (afterwards Sir William) Forbes, General Manager of the London, Brighton and South Coast Railway, who, as Commandant of the Engineer and Railway Staff Corps, was specially qualified to deal with the subject. In the first instance there was a call for 1,000 permanent- way men, carpenters, timbermen, blacksmiths, telegraphists and others, who were to relay destroyed Hues, repair damaged bridges, build sidings, put in 6i4 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. rail-heads and undertake other such work in France. EngUsh railway- men were not then wanted to operate the railways there, as well, the French being at that time equal thereto, although they needed help in the directions stated. The 1,000 recruits from England were to go out in four companies, and all had been recruited by the first days of Decem- ber, 1914. The greater part of those selected were platelayers. The work of setting up the machinery for the enlistment of Railway Troops devolved at the outset mainly upon Sir William Forbes and Mr. (afterwards Sir Francis) Dent, General Manager of the South Eastern and Chatham Railway, who personally saw all applicants for positions as officers or non-commissioned officers, recommending them for- those to which, by reason of their railway qualifications, it was considered they were specially adapted. Subsequently, while the same course was followed as regarded officers, it was thought better that all the men should enUst as sappers, the mihtary authorities being left to select from among them those whom they considered best suited for positions as N.C.O.'s. In the first instance, also, individual railway companies sought to raise complete sections of officers and men in their own service in order that aU could work together ; but this practice was abandoned when it was found that the military authorities had to distribute the men according to requirements, and were unable to act upon the " com- plete section " principle. The procedure adopted was that any railway enjployee desirous of enlisting in the R.E. Railway Troops was to apply to the local head of his department, who, if the man should be thought suitable, and could be spared, would give him a certificate of identity and send him on to the medical officer appointed by the railway company. In the early days, before the first Mihtary Service Act came into operation, the men who had passed the doctor at various points on a railway company's system were brought on to London, and, headed by a band, taken through the streets to the Central Recruiting Office, Old Scotland Yard ; but later on the form of enhstment in regard to men elsewhere than in London was gone through locally. In either case, the recruits were sent on to Longmoor, there to be equipped, vaccinated, inoculated, and put through a short course of training. They did not have rifle or bayonet exercises as they were not to carry arms. In some instances they returned for a time to their railway work ; but, generally speaking, they remained at Longmoor for the short period that usually elapsed before they were sent overseas. Commissioned officers continued their studies at Longmoor until they entered on active service. No sooner had the first four companies of the R.E. Railway Troops been §ent to France than there came an intimation that another thousand platelayers were wanted for construction work, and this, in turn, was followed by requests for men in other grades for other units, concerning which some details will be given later on. In April, 1915, the railway companies were asked to take in hand the formation of a British Railway Operating Division for service on the BRITISH RAILWAY WORK OVERSEAS- 615 Continent. The original idea that, even though few of the Belgian railwaymen were available, the French Railway Administrations, with the help of the French Sections de Chemins de Fer, would operate the lines which the British Railway Troops were restoring or constructing was not realised owing to, among other causes, the steady multiplication of the British Forces on the Western Front ; and it was, therefore, con- sidered indispensable that the French and Belgian railwaymen should be supplemented by officers and men drawn from British railways, and undertaking, more especially, the operation of railways behind the British lines. While, however, the earlier requests made to the railway companies for Railway Troops had related mainly to platelayers- and others engaged in construction or repair work, a Railway Operating Division, having for its function the working of certain lines of railway, would require to be recruited from higher grades of the railway service, such as station- masters, inspectors, drivers, signalmen, shunters, etc., and it was thought desirable to ensure that good men should be selected, that special depots should, if possible, be set up for their military training and equipment, and that, after they had undergone this training, they should still be at the disposal of the raUway companies for such period as circumstances would permit. There was, again, some difficulty in responding fully to the wishes of the military authorities in respect to further recruits for Railway Troops in general owing to the fact that so many railwaymen who would have been desirable accessions to those units had, in the early days of the war, enlisted in the Fighting Forces. By this time the work of raising the various sections called for as Railway Troops had been divided between Sir William Forbes, Sir Francis Dent and Mr. Arthur Watson (Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway), Sir WiUiam Forbes continuing to take charge of the Construction Companies, while Sir Francis Dent supervised the enlistment of the Railway Operat- ing Division and Mr. Watson the Military Forwarding Establishment, the Army Service Corps Labour Companies and the Railway Transport Establishment. All three gentlemen worked — at first independently— on the general lines already indicated, and much labour was necessarily involved in dealing with the multitudinous questions which arose in regard to methods of enlistment, rates of pay, nature of duties, etc. ; in interviewing applicants and deciding as to their respective quahfica- tions ; in conducting a volvmiinous correspondence, and in other ways besides. A Railway Tkoops Sub-Committee. With the prospective increase in all this work and in the difficulties likely to be experienced in meeting the fresh demands that were being made, it was thought expedient by the Railway Executive Committee that, with a view to the securing of greater co-ordination, to the preven- tion of overlapping and to the better distribution among the different units of men belonging to the same grades, the three gentlemen mentioned T T ' 6i6 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. should be formed into a sub-committee to take charge of all matters relating to Railway Troops. This was accordingly done, and, while the work was still divided between them on the basis given above, the members of the sub-committee were able to deal with the details and comphcations of a steadily-expand- ing situation much more effectively than would otherwise have been possible. Between them they had already enHsted 2,566 men in the Royal Engineer Railway Troops, and they stiU had on hand unsatisfied demands for, in the aggregate, 1,050 more. Having regard to these figures and to the serious shortage of men on the home railways, the sub-committee recom- mended to the Executive Committee that representations should be made to the War Office for the setting up of some machinery which would enable the railway companies to secure tiie return to them (in uniform, if neces- sary) of men of the operating class who had left the railway service to enlist in Line Regiments but who, by reason of their having been placed in a low medical category, were not physically fit for service abroad, and were engaged on ordinary military duties at home. The idea was that, if these men were returned to their civil occupations on the railways, the railway companies would be able to release a larger number of their men who were fit for service overseas. The Railway Executive Com- mittee approved of this proposal and made representations accordingly ; but the companies got back very few, if, indeed, any at all, of the men in question. By this time, also, there was greater resort to a practice initiated as soon as the first rush of recruits for the Railway Troops was over and increasing difficulty began to be experienced in finding a sufficient number of railwajnnen who not only were weU qualified for the particular grades they would be required to fill overseas but could, also, be spared without impairing the efficiency of railway operation at home. The practice in question consisted in taking men from one grade and, by a course of training, adapting them to the work of a higher or of another grade. This was done, not alone by individual companies, but by the members of the Railway Troops Sub-Committee, who would send to their own railways, for the purposes of such training, men on the lists who appeared to them capable of filling the particular positions in respect to which the requirements had arisen, the said training process being gone through before the men enlisted. In this way fitters' mates qualified as fitters, scaffold-men became riggers, and so on ; but the most striking example of this procedure related to railway clerks. In the spring of 1916 there were indications that the Railway Operat- ing Division would require a much larger number of signalmen, guards, shunters, brakesmen, etc., and thereupon the Railway Troops Sub-Com- mittee, foreseeing the difficulty likely to be experienced by the railway companies in meeting this demand, arranged that some 1,200 railway clerks, who were certain to be called up in any case, should be given the option of undergoing a course of training in one or other of the grades BRITISH RAILWAY WORK OVERSEAS. 617 mentioned, so that they could quahfy for enhstment in the Railway Troops as, it was understood, they wished to do. To this extent, there- fore, a means was afforded for supplsdng requirements which were pressed forward with increasing urgency during the autumn and winter of that year. At one time there was an impression that the railway companies were becoming merely recruiting agents for the War Ofhce. In the early days of the war Sir WiUiam Forbes, Sir Francis Dent, and Mr. Watson not only devoted much attention to the choice of men for the Railway Troops but were accustomed to " father " them, more or less, providing in various ways for their needs and well-being ; while the General Managers of the various companies kept in close touch with all that was done in regard to the enhstment of their men. Later on, when the demands for Railway Troops assumed such large proportions, and especially when compulsory national service was adopted, these fatherly or personal interests in individuals were more difficult to maintain. Yet, by reason of their system of training, the companies were stiU much more than " merely recruiting agents for the War Office," and the success of the railway work done overseas was, in effect, further assured by the course they pursued under the conditions here narrated. In March, 1917, there was a prospect that at least another 3,000 men would be wanted for the Railway Operating Division, the Railway Con- struction Corps and the Railway Transport EstabUshment, in combina- tion, and a conference between representatives of the Railway Executive Committee and of the War Office was held to consider the best means to adopt for meeting the further requirements thus arising, not only in France, but on the other Fronts, as well. The conclusion was then arrived at (i) that a considerable proportion of the total number of men needed could be provided direct by the British railway companies, who, under the arrangements made in regard to the recruiting of railwaymen in general, should withhold from men specially quahfied permission to enhst otherwise than in the Railway Troops ; and (2) that, as regarded certain grades, such as mechanics, drivers and shunters, the railway companies should supply further lists of men belonging thereto who had .joined infantry or other non-technical corps, the name of their present unit being also stated. Thereupon the Railway Executive advised the railway companies that, in order to meet the requirements of the War Office, it would be necessary that the three sections of Railway Troops for which the addi- tional 3,000 recruits were wanted should have the first claim upon all railwaymen who had not then been called up for service with the Colours. No more permits, therefore, should be given to men to leave the service of the companies until an intimation was given that the units in question had been completed. The companies were also asked to supply complete hsts of aU men then in their service who had enhsted under Lord Derby's scheme, or were ehgible under the Military Service Act, 1916, and could be spared when the time came for their being called up. The require- 6i8 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. ments of the sections would be met from these lists, which were to show the grade of each man, those who were not wanted for the Railway Troops being marked as available for service with the Fighting Forces. The hsts supphed in accordance with this recommendation were referred by the Executive Committee to the Railway Troops Sub-Com- mittee and were then dealt with exhaustively by a further sub-committee consisting of Mr. W. G. Pape (representing Sir William Forbes), Mr. W. F. Latta (representing Sir Francis Dent), Mr. T. W. Royle (representing Mr. Arthur Watson), and Mr. G. Stocks (for the Secretary of the Railway Executive Committee), the meetings held being also attended by repre- sentatives of the War Office and the Recruiting Directorate. Men for the Railway Troops were selected from the hsts according to their qualifi- cations apd the requirements of the military authorities ; but the process gone through entailed a vast amount of labour. The lists sent in during March and April, 1917 — without reckoning those that followed later on — contained, for example, no fewer than 9,250 names. Difficulties and Anomalies. This work of selection was, also, attended by various difficulties and anomaHes. The railway companies had to meet, and reconcile as best they could, two directly conflicting demands. On the one hand the Mihtary Railways section of the War Office was urging them to release every railwayman in certain grades, as far as possible, in order that he could take up railway work overseas. On[the other hand the Adjutant- General's Department was still more emphatic in claiming for the Fight- ing Forces every individual who was fit and cotild be secured ; and, as it happened, the Adjutant-General was in the stronger position since the railway companies were not then allowed to post Category I railway- men of certain ages to other than combatant units except under special conditions, as in the case, for example, of engine drivers. Each of the Departments was represented on the Selection Sub-Committee by an officer keen on effecting all the captures he could make for his own side ; and, when the case of a railwayman in Category I came up for considera- tion, there was often a friendly competition between the rival War Office claimants as to which should get possession of him. On such occasions as these the railway representatives on the Selection Sub-Committee were generally unable to do more than suggest that, since there were very few more men of the grade in question likely to be available, it might be better to let the individual thus contested for go to the Railway Troops. Suggestions of this kind often resulted in a settlement being arrived at accordingly. AH the same, there was a decided disadvantage in the state of uncertainty in which, owing to the absence of any definite directions, the railways were left as to the comparative urgency of the claims advanced by different State departments representing the Fighting Services and the Mihtary Railways respectively. While, again, in view of the great need for additions to the Combatant BRITISH RAILWAY WORK OVERSEAS. 619 Forces, the ruling that railway companies were not to allocate Category I men to Railway Troops may have appeared just and reasonable, there were repeated occasions when the need, in turn, for Railway Troops became so urgent that the system of transferring skilled railwasmien thereto from the Combatant Forces was adopted. In other words, the railway companies might have been prevented from posting to the Railway Troops, in the first instance, the very individuals who, after they had undergone a thorough, if not a costly, training in military duties, and become experienced soldiers, were transferred to railway work instead ; whUe, concurrently therewith, the railway companies were still left under the obligation to post other Category I men to Combatant Units, the whole procedure being thus begun afresh in each instance. If a greater discretion had been allowed to the companies, the shunters, signalmen, guards and others so much required for the Railway Troops could have been sent to them direct in the course of two or three weeks, without their having first to pass through the trenches, or otherwise serving in Line Regiments where their technical skill was of no special advantage. Aid from Dominions and U.S.A. So great, as the war progressed, did the need for Railway Troops be- come that the British Government took steps with a view to the raising by the Dominions and the United States of units for construction and operation work in France and elsewhere, whUe the system of transferring raUwaymen from the Fighting Forces to the Railway Troops was also carried out in the Colonial contingents already in the field. Total Enlistments through Railway Companies. Thanks to the assistance thus rendered, a great force of Railway Troops was eventualy got togetiier for service either on the Western or on other of the Fronts, and the extreme pressure which would other- wise have fallen upon the British railway companies in the need to provide still more freely from their own staffs for meeting requirements than they were already doing was somewhat relieved. All the same, taking the enUstments to the Railway Troops directly effected through the instrumentaUty of the British railway companies, and not including railwaymen already in the Army who were transferred to those troops by the military authorities, the total number provided between August, 1914, and September, 1918, was no fewer than 24,176. The conditions under which the British Railway Troops in general were recruited and organised having thus been made clear, it may be of interest if a few facts and figures are added as to the work done by the various sections into which the troops themselves were divided. 620 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Construction Companies. The chief functions to be discharged by the sections of Railway Troops known as Construction Companies were (i) restoration of railway -lines and railway structures damaged by the enemy ; (2) destruction of lines or bridges to check the advance of an enemy ; (3) subsequent renewal, when the enemy had been driven back ; (4) maintenance of lines, and (5) the building of new railways for the purpose of facilitating troop movements, ensuring the provision of food supplies and war material to the Fighting Lines, and removing wounded, prisoners and unwanted material to the rear. From the earliest days of their use for the purposes of warfare, rail- ways were seen to be a means of transport easily interrupted and consti- tuting a delicate piece of machinery that could be readily thrown out of gear ; but the experiences of the Federals in the American Civil War (1861-65) established the fact that, with the help of weU-organised Construction Corps, repairs could be effected, bridges renewed, or alterna- tive means of transport provided with such speed that, as a rule, the restoring of communications, even when apparently serious damage had been done, was generally a matter only of days, if not of hours. The American Civil War offered such examples as the rebuilding of the Akakeek bridge, a single span of 120 ft. at an elevation of 30 feet, in fifteen working hours ; the rebuilding of the Potomac Creek bridge, 414 feet long, with an elevation of 82 feet above the water, in forty working hours ; the building of a bridge 780 feet long and 90 feet high across the Chattahoochee River in four and a half days ; and the laying in three days of three miles of track under such conditions that 3,000 sleepers had first to be prepared from lumber cut down for the purpose in a forest situate at a distance of a mile and a half from the track. ^ After the initial requests made to the Railway Executive Committee, in 1914, for two forces of men, each 1,000 strong, and mainly plate- layers, who were wanted for repair and construction work in France and Belgium, there came a succession of applications for more and stiU more men, generally in companies of about 250 each. In some instances these were formed entirely from individual railways. No. 115 Company, for example, was raised from the London and North Western staff, while Nos. ii6 and 262 consisted wholly of Great Western men. By July, 1915, the number of recruits for tiie Construction Companies had risen to 2,430, while by the end of 1918 the number who had erdisted for those companies direct from the British railways — apart from transfers from Fighting Units — was over 7,000. With the distribution of British Armies among the various theatres of war throughout the world, the need for Construction Corps steadily increased, and before long they were to be found, not only on the Western Front, but in Egypt, Salonika, Russia, Italy, and wherever, in fact, 1 See Chapter III, " Rise Of Rail-Power in War and Conquest." BRITISH RAILWAY WORK OVERSEAS. 621 there was fighting to be done. The 117th Company, for example, was sent first to the Dardanelles and thence on to Mesopotamia. The interruption of railway communication and the destruction of railway structures by enemy aircraft was a new feature in modem war- fare, and one that increased still further the need of the said Corps ; though experience was to show that, so far as railway lines were con- cerned, the dropping of bombs upon them generally caused no more than a local damage, which could be speedUy set right again. On the other hand the enemy employed every possible means, on their withdrawal from a position they could no longer hold, to leave nothing but the wreck of a railway system behind them, destroying nearly all the bridges ^ and water supply services and rendering a large portion of the track useless. The method adopted by them on the Western Front in the latter connection was, in some instances, that of blowing up every alternate rail joint for a distance of, say, eighty or 100 miles, breaking each joint, and making a hole about three feet deep underneath. Great destruction was also caused by the blowing up of complete train-loads of ammunition in railway stations. Nor were they content to do no more than immediate destruction. They showed, also, considerable advance in resorting to an especially insidious form of mischief by the use of delay-action mines. These mines, operated by means of acids, could be so timed that their explosion would be delayed for periods extending over weeks or even months, the object aimed at being to ensure the destruction of railway lines or struc- tures subsequent to the retirement of the German forces and at a time when the Allies might think they were in safe and secme possession of the re-occupied territory. When, for instance, the enemy were pushed back from the Somme Valley towards Cambrai and St. Quentin in August, 1918, they laid under the railway lines a large number of mines which exploded eight or ten weeks later. In one locality mines laid in August did not go off till the end of the following April. Mines not located by the Allies might be most destructive in their results, causing huge craters, much damage to track and serious casualties. Apart from repairs and restorations, there was a vast amount of construction work proper which required to .be done. Sorting yards and stores yards had to be laid out, ammunition sidings provided, and single-track lines converted into double-track hnes. New branch lines up to railheads were wanted ; extensions of the existing broad-gauge railways became indispensable ; Mnes had to be specially laid for getting big guns to their emplacements, and a great net-work of light railways was needed on the Western JFront, more especially for the push forward as the enemy retired, for sending food supplies, shells for the big guns, ammunition in general and other necessaries to the trenches or the Fight- * The blowing up of a railway bridge was not necessarily so serious a matter as might be supposed. It was often possible to ensure a speedy resumption of traffic by the con- struction alongside of a double-track pile bridge carrjring deviation lines on the level, the reconstruction of the original bridge being left until a convenient opportunity occurred, later on. 622 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. ing Lines, for bringing back the wounded, or for other purposes. In regard especially to ammunition, the greater the production of shells at home the greater the need for railways to transport them at the Front ; and, just as there had been no previous war in which more shells were used, so, too, had there been no previous war in which, if only on this account, military railways were more absolutdy essential. When the preparations for the battle of the Somme were being made, not merely were further railway lines laid, but a complete system of mili- tary railways, broad-gauge and narrow-gauge in combination, had to be created, mainly for the purpose of bringing up adequate supplies of munitions and other materiel from the rear to the nearest point that could then be reached in the direction of the objective. This meant, not merely the putting down of pairs of rails in a rough and ready sort of way, but the building of special bridges and the opening of quarries for the ballast necessary to ensure that the lines would be capable of bearing the guns and the other heavy loads they would be required to carry. In the result, the allied troops had at their command, when the advance was made, i,ooo km. (621 miles) of military railways and more than 100 stations. The following table shows the total amount of British railway con- struction, etc., of standard and metre gauge carried out on the Western Front by the Railway Construction Troops from tiie begiiming of the war to the end of December, 1918 : — Year. 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 Total New Lines Lines Re- Track Constructed. Constructed. Dismantled Miles. MUes. MUes. 2 - - . 104 . - • 417 - - . 814 . 94 . 759 1,581 245 2,096 1,581 339 Included in the reconstruction in 1918 of 1,581 miles of track was the entire relaying of 589 miles of new track, and this relaying involved, in turn, the reconstruction of every bridge and culvert on the line of route. Inasmuch as some examples have been given above of the work done in the American Civil War by the pioneer Construction Corps, a few instances of what was accomplished by the Construction Companies in the War of 1914-18 might also be quoted. Early in 1917 the laying down of broad gauge and metre gauge was carried on at the rate of eight nailes per week. This may be regarded as good work, but in May of the same year as many as forty-five miles of new lines, including cuttings, embankments and bridges, were completed and opened for traffic within a single week, while the average for the month was thirty-two miles per week. BRITISH RAILWAY WORK OVERSEAS. 623 On November nth, 1918, a stretch of twenty miles on the Arras- Douai-Valenciennes-Mons Hne was destroyed by the enemy, who did their work so thoroughly that thirteen bridges, having a total length of 650 feet, had to be reconstructed. A single track, allowing of through railway traffic with the Army, was connected through to Mons within fifteen days ; a double track had been completed throughout by December 13th, and double-hne working was started again on December 14th. The wrecking of a stretch of thirty mUes on the Courtrai-Audenarde- Sotteghem-Grammont hne included the complete destruction of a bridge 100 feet wide over the Scheldt, while several minor bridges with a span of 30 feet had to be repaired. The substitution of a temporary trestle bridge for the Scheldt bridge had been completed within four days and a half, and through running was resumed within three weeks of the work having been taken in hand. After the evacuation of Lille by the Germans on October 17th, 1918, it was found that a new bridge would have to be thrown over tiie Lys at Armentieres before any trains could pass into LiUe. The brieve was completed within four days, and the first train with suppUes for the civil population was taken into Lille within eight days of the German retreat. In this same month there was carried out the reconstruction of 148 miles of railroad — ^involving the use of fifty-seven miles of new material — within a single week. In regard to hght railways of the 60 cm. (DecauviUe) type, those in operation on the Western Front down to the autumn of 1916 were con- structed of very hght rails (9 lbs. per yard) on which vehicles were pro- pelled by man power. A heavier type of rail was then introduced, but no general development took place until towards the end of the year. The Commander-in-Chief then decided to adopt a complete system of light railways for the distribution and conveyance of ammunition and other stores beyond railhead to the gun positions and also for the con- veyance of road-stone. Thereupon 1,000 miles of 20-lbs. track, together with a large number of steam and petrol locomotives and wagons, were ordered. Further suppHes were obtained in 1917, when 1,022 miles of track were laid. In tiie following year 768 miles were laid and 580 miles reconstructed. Fluctuations in the campaign led to the loss of some sections of the track and to the dismantling of others, no longer required ; but eight hundred route miles of hght railway were being worked in October, 1918, against only ninety-six miles at the end of 1916. As an example of the achievements attained in light-railway con- struction, the fact might be mentioned that in the area of the Fourth Army a demohshed timber viaduct, 250 feet long, was reconstructed and made available for traffic in forty-eight hours. Military Forwarding Department. The Mihtary Forwarding Department in France began on a very small scale and developed into a widespread organisation which did a 624 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. great amount of work in many different directions, all contributing either to the advantage of traf&c-manipulation or to the personal benefit of the troops. As early as August 26th, 1914, the need had arisen for the adoption of some means by which to ensure the sending from Base to Front of (i) private parcels exceeding the maximum weight allowed by the Army Postal Service, (2) "comforts" for general distribution among the troops, and (3) newspapers forwarded as free gifts. An Army Service Corps officer, who had a staff of four clerks placed at his disposal, was, at the outset, delegated to open a parcels depot at Havre for the said purposes, and the first consignment of comforts left Havre for railhead on September 3rd, 1914. Meanwhile the War Office had informed the Railway Executive Committee of their intention to set up a Mihtary Forwarding Office in France and had asked if the British railway com- panies would provide from their staffs the personnel to form the nucleus of this Office, or Establishment, as it was called a Httle later. The Railway Executive Committee undertook that this should be done, and, on their recommendation, Mr. E. C. Simpson, of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway, was entrusted by the War Office with the mission of creating the proposed organisation. Mr. Simpson had been a representative of the Lancashire and York- shire Railway Company at Antwerp ; he had a perfect knowledge of French, and he was in every respect qualified for the position entrusted to him. He received his commission as Lieutenant (being promoted to the rank of Captain shortly afterwards), went to France at forty-eight hours' notice, and, with the help of four clerks, opened the first Mihtary Forwarding Depot at Nantes on September 22nd, 1914. He had for some time a difficult task before him. The Estabhshment constituted what was no less a new departure in military organisation than the steady and continuous flow of comforts and daily papers to troops at the Front was a new development in modem warfare. The need, also, for such an establishment was not at first recognised by those with whom Captain Simpson had to deal, and, in making his initial efforts, he got very httle assistance. As a matter of history, the fact may be recalled that he was even looked down upon somewhat by the military men he met, on accoimt of his being a mere civilian ; though that, of course, was at a time when mere civilians were not yet taking so active a part in the carrying on of the war as they were invited to take later on, when railway officers, especially, were appointed to all kinds of important positions. Captain Simpson persevered with bis task, and, if ther Military Forwarding Depart- ment, as it was finally called, attained a high measure of success, that result was attributable in no slight degree to the foresight and energy he had shown when laying the foundations. Within a short time of the opening of the pioneer dep6t at Nantes, there was a transfer to Havre, the work previously done there by the Army Service Corps officer being then taken over. Two Assistant Mihtary Forwarding Officers left about the same time with their staffs BRITISH RAILWAY WORK OVERSEAS. 625 to take up duties at railheads, and the department became further responsible for the dispatch to England of non-effective officers' kits, warehouses for that purpose being opened at Havre and Boulogne. Before the end of 1914, military forwarding depots had been opened at Boulogne and Rouen, while on December 19th a special train conveying the first consignment of Christmas puddings for British troops at the Front was dispatched from Havre. Later on other mihtary forwarding dep6ts were opened at Abbeville, Etaples, Calais, Marseilles, Dunkirk, Audruicq, Les Attaques, Dieppe, TrouviUe, St. Valery, and elsewhere. On November ist, 1917, a depot was set up in Paris, and stiU another was created a few days later for the Italian Expeditionary Force. Meanwhile the growth of the work had rendered necessary the open- ing, in June, 1915, at Abb6viUe, of the first of four Repacking Depots established at railway regulating stations with a view to providing a quick and efficient service for traffic to and from all points in the zone of the British armies, and, also, in order to economise in the user of wagon stock. These repacking depots gave a direct service to and from a certain number of railheads according to the facilities available at the regulating station. Each of them provided, in addition, a service to aU the other repacking depots and bases. In July, 1915, after several intermediate changes, the control of the department passed to the Director of Railway Transport, the military forwarding staffs at railheads were placed under the control of the Railway Transport Officers, and an Assistant MUitary Forwarding Officer was appointed to each Army Railway Traffic Office. Towards the end of 1916 the control of the department was transferred, in turn, to the Director of Transportation. Down to June, 1917, when the mihtary authorities themselves decided to what particular section of Railway Troops railwaymen enhsted therein should go, the Railway Troops Sub-Committee of the Railway Executive Committee had been the means of recruiting thirteen commissioned officers and 201 non-commissioned officers and men direct from the staffs of the British railways for the department ; but a number of other raUwajnnen, found unfit for the trenches or otherwise transferred from the Fighting Units, were sent to the base and put on to the forward- ing work. The complete strength of the department eventually comprised eighteen officers and 489 N.C.O.'s and men, exclusive of personnel attached temporarily as occasion required. From the few items of traffic with which the department dealt at the outset the scope of its activities steadily broadened so that eventually the staff had to deal, also, with Ministry of Munitions traffic to and from England ; Royal Fl3dng Corps traffic ; Royal Naval Air Service traffic ; Government stores returned to England ; sick and wounded men's effects ; goods for the Expeditionary Force Canteens, the Young Men's Christian Association and other organisations ; medical stores ; Red Cross stores ; veterinary stores ; signal stores ; Royal Engineer works' stores ; Army Service Corps stores ; anti-aircraft stores, etc. When the various services, departments and organisations concerned 626 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. had not got sufficient traffic of their own to make up fuU wagon loads, the Military Forwarding Department grouped the consigimients in such a way as to secure complete wagon loads for the various destinations, thus using the wagons to the best advantage while maintaining, also, regular services. The flow of traffic eventually became a three-fold one — (i) that which originated in England and was dispatched by the MUitary Forwarding Officer there to the Military Forwarding Officer in France, who sent it on to destinations in that country, in Belgium, Italy and, later on, Germany ; (2) that handed in at stations in France, Belgium or Germany for other stations in those countries ; and (3) that which originated in France, Belgium, Italy or Germany and was to be forwarded to England. Eventually the Military Forwarding Department formed an organisa- tion which comprised a number of special sections for the achievement of specific purposes, those in operation at its headquarters being — I. — A Staff Section, dealing with all stafE questions. 2. — A Locating Section, which located every unit among the British Forces in the Field in order to ensure that all goods sent on by the Department were forwarded to correct destinations. 3. — A General Inquiry Section, the function of which was to give proofs of dehvery to all persons, military or civil, making inquiries as to the whereabouts of goods dealt with by the service. 4. — A Rating and Charging Section, formed for the purpose of preparing accounts in respect to goods carried on behalf of Expeditionary Force Canteens, the Young Men's Christian Association and other organisations. 5. — ^A Statistical Section, for the compilation of data respecting the traffic conveyed. 6. — A Losses, Pilferage and Damages Section, which recorded and investigated all cases of this kind occurring in connection with the work done. In the office of the Assistant Military Forwarding Officer at the main base (Havre and, later, Vendroux), there were established : (i) A Men's Effects Section, which received, recorded and forwarded to certain destinations sick and wounded men's effects sent direct from imits by registered post ; (2) a General Comforts Section, designed to ensure an even distribution to aU units of comforts sent out for the troops, including gifts forwarded by the Director-General of Voluntary Organisations ; and (3) a Query Section, the purpose of which was the obtaining of instructions as to the final disposal of goods received insufficiently addressed. The Assistant Military Forwarding Officer at Boulogne had charge of — (i) an Officers' Kit Section, organised for the purpose of receiving, recording and dispatching the kits of officers who were sick, wounded, missing, killed or deceased, together with " surplus " or " found " kits, and for answering all inquiries in respect thereto, and (2) a Newspaper Section, which distributed and dispatched the free copies of newspapers sent out daily to the troops. Various methods were adopted for handling the traffic, according BRITISH RAILWAY WORK OVERSEAS. 627 to whether it was dealt with at the bases, at the repacking depots or at railheads. At the bases the system followed was that of receiving, sorting, check- ing, waybiUing and loading goods handed in for dispatch ; checking goods received by rail or barge, and arranging for their deUvery, and transferring traffic to, or taking traffic from, the French railways. At the repacking depots, wagons containing mihtary forwarding traffic for transhipment were received from bases, railheads or from other repacking depots, and their contents, after being checked with the way- bills, were transhipped into other wagons for forward conveyance. At railheads the procedure adopted was — (i) checking goods which arrived by rail and arranging dehvery either by handing them over to Supply Officers (who would forward them to units by road transport) or by delivery to consignees, who would be advised of their arrival, and (2) receiving, sorting, checking, waybiUing and loading goods handed in for dispatch. Wagons containing mihtary forwarding traffic were at aU points sealed and padlocked before dispatch. The bulk of the traffic went by rail, but sometimes it was found of advantage to make use, instead, of motor lorries or of barges on canals controlled by the Director of Inland Water Transport. To the foregoing details might be added a few figures showing the great expansion which the traffic dealt with underwent. Packages of interdepartmental stores rose from 1,770 for the month of January, 1915, to a maximum of 164,653 for that of July, 1917. Parcels and consignments of comforts for the troops increased from 44,487 in July, 1915, to 176,080 in December, 1916. Though diminishing from that date, they still numbered over 78,000 in December, 1918. Packages for the Expeditionary Force Canteens and the Young Men's Christian Association amounted to 8,335 ^ J"ly» ^9^5- ^^ December, 1918, they reached a maximum for any one month of no fewer than 352,568. Officers' kits sent to England attained their greatest niunber — 13,211 — in the month of July, 1916. Men's effects dealt with rose from 143 in July, 1915, to 9,894 in December, 1917. For December, 1918, they were 1,747. Taking all five of the various classes of traffic here mentioned, the highest figures for any one month during the war-period were those for December, 1917, when the total number of packages handled was over 609,000. Miscellaneous traffic dealt with at Havre for the Ministry of Munitions and other State departments started at thirteen tons in January, 1915, rose to a maximum of 6,036 tons in July, 1917, and fell to 739 tons in December, 1918. As the war developed there was a still further extension of the work done by the Mihtary Forwarding Department, members thereof being sent out from the Western Front to form branches in Salonika and West 628 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Africa. The one in Salonika was set up by Captain Simpson, the original organiser of the work in France, and it was when returning to Salonika from leave in England that he lost his life, the vessel in which he was sailing being torpedoed by the enemy in the Mediterranean. Railway Transport Establishment. In September, 1914, the War Office asked the Railway Executive Committee whether they could recommend any British railwa5mien who, possessing a knowledge of French, could be commissioned as Rail- way Transport Officers for duty overseas, and whether, also, other men, belonging to the clerical and porter grades on the railways, could be enlisted to work on the Lines of Communication in the various theatres of war. The Railway Executive Committee undertook to do what could be done in the desired direction, and the recrtiiting of men for a Railway Transport Establishment to operate in the interests of the British Forces was among the various duties in connection with Railway Troops in general which were taken in hand by Mr. Arthur Watson at the London offices of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company, Great College Street, Westminster. Railway Transport Officers serving with the British armies overseas fulfilled to a certain extent duties similar to those of Railway Transport Officers at home ; but their powers and responsibilities were on a broader scale. Like the R.T.O.'S in England, they were on duty at ports, railway junctions arid railway termini, where they assumed responsibility for the entraining and detraining of troops, the loading and unloading of guns, horses, ammunition, etc., and other duties. They also discharged similar functions at railheads and along the Lines of Commimication. Further than this, however, the fact that France was within the Zone of Operations led to their having much more to do with the making of military-traffic arrangements than fell to the lot of R.T.O.'s in this country. Whereas in England the need for certain troop movements was communicated by the Commanding Officer of a Command to the railway company acting as Secretary Company to the lines concerned, such company thereupon undertaking the necessary arrangements, the practice in France, owing to the difference in the military situation, was^that the British Commanders communicated direct with the Railway Transport Officers, who themselves had to arrange for the provision of rolling stock, the timing of the trains, and so on, for the desired move- ments, advising the military authorities when the trains would be ready. The R.T.O. in France was thus not only the link of communication between the British military and the French railway authorities but the person directly responsible for seeing that the needs of the former were supplied without making impracticable demands on the available traffic facilities of the latter. So it was that the R.T.d.'s overseas required to possess certain special qualifications. BRITISH RAILWAY WORK OVERSEAS. 629 In the first place it was essential that they should have a good com- mand of French, and each railway officer recommended to the Railway Executive Committee by the Railway Troops Sub-Committee for one of these positions was required by them to pass an oral examination in French by the Civil Service Commissioners. In the early days of thfe war, when the need for R.T.O.'s of this type was not generally known, some difficulty was experienced in getting sufficient candidates from the railway companies' staffs ; though later on there was no lack of railway- men who were not only ready to undertake the work but whose qualifica- tions included an excellent knowledge of French. In the next place, it was desirable, if not essential, under the conditions stated, that R.T.O.'s overseas should be experienced railwaymen, capable of appreciating and deaUng with the technical questions and difficulties certain to arise in connection with military-traffic arrangements. So long as the Railway-Troops Sub-Committee were responsible for the recommendations, their approval was accorded to railwaymen exclu- sively ; but there are suggestions that, from and after June, 1917, when the allocation of officers and men to the various sections of Railway Troops was taken over by the rmHtary authorities, appointments as R.T.O.'s overseas were, in some instances, conferred on officers, no longer equal to active service, who possessed only an elementary knowledge of railway working, the results being not always satisfactory from an operating point of view. Finally, the R.T.O.'s across the Channel had to be men of intelligence, resource and influence who could arrive at an immediate decision in case of need, and ensure the surmounting of such difficulties as might arise in the carrying of that decision into effect. Each R.T.O. had under him a staff of non-commissioned officers and men who assisted the troops in the loading and unloading of wagons and undertook other duties in connection with mihtary transport. These NX.O.'s and men were also specially selected by the Railway Troops Sub-Committee from the staffs of the British railway companies until June, 1917. Altogether, and down to this date, the sub-committee was responsible for the enlistment, direct from the staffs of the British railway companies, of forty-nine officers and 1,017 other ranks, these figures being once more independent of transfers carried out by the military authorities themselves from the Forces overseas. Railway Operating Division. At the outset of the war the assumption was that, while the assistance of British Railway Troops would be of the greatest value in helping to secure the restoration and construction of hnes in the invaded districts, the French and Belgian Railway Administrations, aided by the French Sections de Chemins de Fer, would be fully equal to all that might be required in regard to the operation of their railways, and the conveyance of the British Forces, in their respective countries. Hence the formation 630 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. of a British Railway Operating Corps, in addition to a British Railway Construction Corps, was not at first contemplated, so that for some time nothing was done in this direction. As the result, however, of the rapid advance of the enemy, and the conditions to which it led, a much greater strain was thrown upon the French Sections de Chemins de Fer, and representations were made to the British Director of Railway Transport by the French authorities as to the expediency of raising a British corps for the operation of the railways behind the British lines. There was the more reason for the adoption of this course having regard to the great expansion in the strength of the British Forces on the Western Front throughout the spring of 1915, and the increasing certainty that the war was hkely to be a far more formidable business than had at first been contemplated. It was under these conditions that the Railway Executive Committee undertook, in April, 1915, at the request of the War Office, the creation of a Railway Operating Division, R.E. There was the possibility of making a start by drafting into the Division a certain proportion of the British railway officers who had been given commissions in the Railway Trans- port Estabhshment, but the Division would necessarily have to be recruited mainly from the staffs of the railway companies. The first two sections of the Division comprised a Mechanical Section and an Operating Section. The personnel of each consisted of three officers and 266 non-commissioned officers and sappers, enlisted as the result of invitations for volunteers addressed to the operating and main- tenance staffs of the British railway companies. Mr., afterwards Lieu- tenant-Colonel, Cecil Paget, General Superintendent of the Midland Railway Company, was appointed Officer Commanding the new unit. Sent first to Longmoor Camp for equipment and a short military training, the men were dispatched to France with as little delay as possible, those in the mechanical section being wanted for the repair and over- hauMng at Pont d'Ardres of the locomotives brought into France by the retreating Belgians, while the men in the operating section were wanted for working the new sidings, etc., laid down at the Bassin Loubet, Boulogne, by the South Eastern and Chatham Railway Company under conditions which will be detailed later on in the present Chapter. Operat- ing with a small stock of South Eastern and Chatham tank engines, they became responsible for all dock shunting and the formation of all outgoing trains for the British Army. In July, 1915, a third section, officered and manned entirely by railwaymen from the London and North Western system, was raised, and in August the first section of main line railway — the Hazebrouck- Poperinghe line — was taken over from the Freach authorities by the Railway Operating Division for working by them. The raising of two more sections, the 4th and 5th, was approved in September ; but, having regard to the comparative deadlock in the military situation on the Western Front at this time, it was arranged that, on completing their training at Longmoor, the men joining these sections should return to BRITISH RAILWAY WORK OVERSEAS. 631 their railway employment untU their services were required overseas. The engine depot and yard at Audruicq (where more of the Belgian locomotives were under repair) and the R.E. Base Park at Les Attaques were, in December, 1916, taken over by the Division, which, in February of the following year, also assumed responsibility for theAbancourt R.E. yard, the Rouen Ammunition Depot and the Candas-Acheux line. This Une — a single one, with frequent passing points, and having severe grades — ^had been laid by the British Construction Corps to supplement the Nord system, then unable to carry all the trafhc offering, and the responsibiUty of working it was undertaken by the Operating Division. It was found especially serviceable during the Somme offensive, when much heavy traffic was handled with complete success. By this time there was the prospect of a vast demand being made on the activities of the Railway Operating Division, and between March, 1916, and the following November there was a call for no fewer than thirty more sections, namely, twenty-two operating sections (now sub- divided into two groups for broad-gauge and narrow-gauge lines respectively) and eight mechanical sections, the latter being wanted for maintenance of engines, truck erection, etc. It was the pressure of these demands that led to the special training being given to railway clerks so that they could take over positions in the operating grades, as men- mentioned on page 616, over 1,200 additional shunters and brakesmen being, in this way, acquired by the Railway Operating Division towards the end of 1916. Notwithstanding the addition thus made to the strength of the Division, the number" of men still wanted for the operation of either broad or narrow-gauge railways on the different Fronts was about 17,500. This included 5,000 unskilled workers who might be obtained from Class B men then serving in the Army. After allowing, also, for Colonial Railway Troop contingents, for men of railway experience transferred from the Dominion Forces, and for transfers of skilled men then serving in En^and, there was a balance of about 8,000 still to be provided for by the British railway companies or otherwise. With, however, a closer transfer to the R.O.D. ahke of railwaymen of the Class B standard already serving in France, of railwaymen from the Colonial contingents, and of Class B men serving in England, the further direct contribution by the railway companies was reduced to 2,500. In 1917 the demand for men for the Fighting Units became so acute that drastic restrictions as to medical classification were placed on candi- dates for enlistment in the Railway Troops. At the end of 1918 the number of men attached to the RaUway Operating Division (including the light railway operating companies and the Chief Mechanical Engineers' Establishment) was, approximately, 24,000. In addition to France and the occupied German Rhineland, members of the Division were doing duty in Russia, Egypt and Salonika. ^ * No attempt can be made here to give an adequate account of the work done by the British Operating Division in all these various theatres of war. For such an account, u u 633 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Army Service Corps Labour Companies. Still another direction in which the railway companies were asked to find Railway Troops for service overseas was in the enlisting of railway- men of the porter class for Army Service Corps Labour Companies. Requests to this, effect were first made by the War Office towards the end of 1914. The men were required mainly to assist in the loading and unloading of railway wagons at ports, railheads and junctions where the trafi&c was especially heavy ; but, in practice, they formed a sort of relief staff which could be sent to assist at various points along the Lines of Communication where there was more to do than the local staff could manage for themselves. This meant, at times, that the Labour Com- panies might be distributed among a dozen different places in Northern France. In their capacity, also, as odd- job men, they were not devoted exclusively to railway work, and they further made themselves generally useful by handling heavy stores for the Royal Engineers or other units when their help was desired. The direct enlistments to these Labour Companies effected by the Railway Troops Sub-Committee to June, 1917, comprised nine commis- sioned officers and 900 N.C.O.'s and men. Comforts for Railway Troops. In the early days of December, 1914, the Railway Executive Com- mittee appointed a sub-committee, consisting of Mr. William Forbes, Mr. Francis Dent and Mr. Arthur Watson to inquire into a suggestion made by the War Office that the Executive Committee should assist in providing " comforts " for the Railway Troops, R.E., at the Front. The preparation, collection and forwarding of such comforts to the British Forces in general had, by this time, assumed the proportions of a great national movement ; but inquiry showed that, thus far, the Railway Troops had not been provided for by any territorial association or kindred body. It was, accordingly, recommended by the sub-com- mittee that the railway companies should themselves undertake to provide for them. A suggestion to this effect was made by the Railway Executive Committee to the companies, and in response thereto the companies sent in a large number of articles and a considerable sum of money. Provision for the collection and distribution of the gifts received and of others that might follow was made by adding to the sub-committee Mr. W. L. Livesay, secretary of the London, Chatham and Dover Railway Company, whose place was subsequently fiUed by his successor, Mr. J. R. Dowdall ; Mr. W. G. Pape, of the General Manager's office, London, Brighton and South Coast Railway, who acted as hon. secretary to the as well as for fuller details of tlie work done by the Railway Construction Companies, the reader may be referred to the series of articles published in Modem Transport, between September 6th, 1919, and January 24th, 1920, orto the " Special War Transporta- tion Number" of The Railway Gazette (The Railway Gazette, Queen Anne's Chambers, Westminster, S.W.i). BRITISH RAILWAY WORK OVERSEAS. 633 sub-committee, and Mr. W. P. Ward, stores superijitendent. South Eastern and Chatham Railway, who took over the duties of purchasing agent. At the time the sub-committee commenced their operations, the number of men serving in the Railway Troops overseas did not exceed 1,000, and all were in France. The task of suppljdng them with comforts presented, therefore, no great difficulty ; but with the progress of the war the number rapidly increased, and when the Armistice was signed the total was over 85,000. Inasmuch, also, as the members of the unit were distributed among all the theatres of war, the comforts designed for them had to be sent, not only to France, but to Belgium, Italy, Salonika, Mesopotamia, Egypt, British East Africa, Russia and Turkey. The total amount collected by the sub-committee for the purchase of comforts was £17,467. The money was raised by contributions from the railway companies, their staff and the public, and by the exhibition of ambulance trains at railway stations, charges being made for admission. From the exhibition of an ambulance train built in this country for the use of the American Army overseas a sum of £606 was raised for comforts which were sent to American Railway Troops taking part in the war. The articles forwarded ranged from underwear and mackintoshes to fpotballs, cricket sets, games, pipes, tobacco and cigarettes. The aggre- gates attained by particular items may be judged from the following examples : Handkerchiefs, 77,103 ; vests, 38,620 ; socks, 38,309 ; pants, 32,545 ; canvas shoes, 16,216 ; mufflers, 10,379 ; slippers, 7,584 ; gloves, 6,279 ; and Balaclava helmets, 5,194. On the fact being made known to the sub-committee that the Railway Troops would greatily appreciate, in addition, some occasional contribu- tions of reading matter, an arrangement was made that any books or magazines left for the purpose in the railway carriages by the traveUing public should be collected and sent on to the Railway Troops by the sub-committee. The number so forwarded was no fewer than 143,676. After paying all their accounts, the sub-committee found there was a balance on hand of £34. This remainder they sent as a donation to the Railway Benevolent Institution. S.E. AND C. Railway Work at BotJLOGNE. When the War Department decided, in December, 1914, upon the conversion of Boulogne into a military base for the British Armies on the Western Front, it was evident that much would have to be done to increase the available facilities of what had hitherto been a purely commercial port in order to make them equal to deahng with the great volume of traffic that would require to be handled there. The need which, it was seen, must more especially arise was for an augmentation on a large scale alike of railway sidings and of storage accommodation ; and the provision of requirements in these directions, with other essentials in addition, became a matter of extreme urgency, having regard to the 634 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. needs both of the first Expeditionary Force and of the armies which were to follow. The accomplishment of this task, in addition to all the other duties then crowding upon them, was beyond the powers of the Royal Engineer Railway Units, and at this time the Inland Waterways and Docks Depart- ment, which was afterwards to carry out such great works as the " mystery port " of Richborough, had not yet been created. In these circumstances the War Office invited the Railway Executive Committee to arrange for the carr5dng out of the work. It was under- taken by the South Eastern and Chatham Railway Company, whose Chief Engineer, Mr. P. C. Tempest (now General Manager), started at once on the necessary plans and preparations. Those who know Boulogne may be aware that, in addition to the quay on which the Gare Maritime is situated, there are two docks, the Bassin a Flot, directly south, and the Bassin Loubet, south-west of that station. At the south-west corner of the Bassin Loubet there was, 'when war was declared, some waste land between the cliffs and the sea, and on this it was proposed to lay in two nests of sidings for marshalling purposes ; to erect hangars ; to level the ground for storage areas ; to provide roadways ; to increase the siding accommodation on the quays, and, also, to construct a Royal Engineers' park, with sidings, loading platforms, stores and workshops. The work presented some degree of difficulty. The waste ground in question consisted of water-logged clay, sand and marl excavated from the Bassin Loubet during the construction of that dock and dumped down alongside, while the parts thereof on which the group of sidings nearest to the basin was to be laid stood, on an average, from four to five feet higher than the required level. It thus became necessary to deal with 34,000 cubic yards of soil, the whole of which was removed by a light railway to a piece of waste ground three-quarters of a mile along the coast and west of the Digue Carnot — the sea wall whiph protects the whole of the harbour from south' and south-west gales. Later on this dumping groutrd was, in turn, utiUsed for a third group of sidings and for a munition dump. The Royal Engineers' park was constructed at the foot of the chfi in line with the western quay of the Bassin Loubet. The ground here was undulating and boggy in parts, and was composed of marl and the weatherings of a limestone chff. In addition to all the excavation work necessary before the laying down of sidings and the making of roads could be entered upon, an extensive drainage system had to be carried out, and this entailed the use of two and three-quarter miles of drain pipes and the provision of 143 manholes, or gulHes, with grids. Even then the construction of the roads (which had a total length of 1,317 yards, with an area of 10,377 square yards) and of the hangar floors and storage spaces (aggregating 56,774 square yards, or eleven and three-quarter acres) was a matter of extreme difficulty, owing to the nature of the soil. BRITISH RAILWAY WORK OVERSEAS. 635 The new sidings laid on these various sites and around the quays had a total length of eight miles thirty-seven chains. In addition to this, one mUe and forty-five chains of existing sidings were relaid. The total length of sidings dealt with was, therefore, ten miles two chains. At one place a retaining wall 700 feet long had to be constructed to sup- port the toe of the chff. Construction was begun in December, 1914, with the help of a staff of men nine-tenths of whom were navvies and labourers sent from England for the purpose. It was completed in September, 1916. Various sec- tions of the sidings were utilised from time to time as they were ready, the second of the sections raised by the Railway Operating Division being sent to Boulogne in April, 1915. So long as construction was in progress the working of the traffic in the interests of the British Army was under the control of the South Eastern and Chatham Railway Com- pany. That company sent over to Botilogne some of their own shunting engines, and they appointed as Of&cer Commanding the yard a member of their staff who was responsible to the General Manager for aU technical details. With him was associated a Deputy-Assistant-Director of Railway Transport who represented the British military authorities, was the channel through whom their orders and directions were communi- cated to the Railway Officer Commanding, and constituted with him a Joint Commission which, during the period in question, carried on the work of the yard independently of the Railway Transport Establishment. With the completion of the work of construction, the control of the yard was transferred from the railway company to the Railway Operating Division. Other engineering works carried out by the South Eastern and Chat- ham Railway Company at Boulogne included the following : A system of high-pressure water-mains for fire service, one mile and 148 yards of piping being laid, with thirty-one hydrants; the provision of a traverser at the extreme end of the north quay of the Bassin Loubet to carry trucks up to twenty-one tons in weight from one line to another, as required, there being no space for the making of any ordinary connec- tion ; installation of electric capstans to work the traverser ; electrifi- cation of the 40-ton crane at the Bassin a Flot ; extension of the crane road, and the erection of a Customs House on the Gare Maritime. Civilian Platelayers for France. The dispatch overseas in the early part of 1917 of a considerable body of civilian platelayers to faciMtate communications on the Western Front was one of the results which followed from the appointment, in October, 1916, of Sir Eric Geddes as Director-General of Military Railways and Inspector-General of Transportation. His visits to France had conviaced him there was urgent need of greater railway faciUties for the British Armies both from the bases to the railheads and from the railheads to the trenches. For the provision of this need there was 636 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. then available in France (i) a large number of Labour Companies and (2) a steadily-increasing force of Royal Engineer Troops and Rail- way Troops forming R.E. Companies. The Labour Companies, which consisted principally of men of the navvy t3^e, had then already prepared the earthworks of many of the lines required between the bases and the railheads ; but these men were not equal to the skilled work of laying the rails as well, and most of the platelayers in the Railway Troops were wanted for the lines between the railheads and the trenches, where civilians could not work. The immediate need of the situation was, in these circumstances, for a body of platelayers who could lay and maintain the permanent-way on the lines in question. So it was that, early in 1917, Sir Eric Geddes wrote to the Railway Executive Committee saying there was urgent need in France for 3,000 civilian platelayers for temporary construction work on the Lines of Communication outside the danger zone. They were wanted for a period, not exceeding three months, and an essential factor in the situation was that they should be dispatched within the next week or so. Thereupon the Railway Executive Committee, under date February 12th, 1917, addressed a Circular Letter to the railway companies, asking them to call for volunteers, and saying : — The men should be selected with the utmost care and regard to their suitabiUty for the work and their physical fitness. Men who are usually employed on big relaying works would be specially suitable. Under normal conditions the railway companies carry out a good deal of relasdng work on their lines in the summer and early auttunn of each year, and, at the time Sir Eric Geddes made his request, they still had at their call a fair number of platelayers who were to be put on relaying work in the summer of 1917 in the special interests of the heavy military traffic then passing over the lines. Some of these men were fifty-five, sixty or even up to seventy years of age ; but many of them were younger men of military age who, under the arrangements then existing between the Railway Executive Committee and the Govern- ment, were not to be either called up or allowed to join the Fighting Forces without permission, their continuance at railway work being regarded as indispensable to the upkeep of the lines. It was< thought, however, that the ordinary summer relaying might be delayed until later in the .year in order that a sufficient number could be spared to go to France for the period stated, and arrangements were made accordingly. Companies of about 250 men each were to be formed, made up, approximately, as follows, though the actual strength of the companies ranged from 240 to 260 each : Senior engineer, one ; junior engineers, two ; storekeepers, two ; cashier, one ; clerk, one ; timekeeper, one ; draughtsman, one ; permanent-way surveyor, one ; permanent-way inspector, one; foremen, four; gangers, eight; sub-gangers, sixteen; platelayers, 180 ; blacksmiths, six ; carpenters, ten ; timber-men, four ; signal and interlocking fitters, two ; cooks, two ; officers' servants, three. BRITISH RAILWAY WORK OVERSEAS. 637 and motor-cyclists, two. Men in possession of military exemption cards might be accepted. The rates of pay were to include war bonuses. A guaranteed week's wages, comprising fifty-four hours, was to be paid in France, but the men would have to work any hours of the twenty-four, including Sundays, when required so to do, without additional payment for time worked in excess of fifty-four hours. The British Government undertook to supply free lodging, free food, free travel, camp equipment and all necessary tools. Compensation for injury was to be on the basis of a War Office scheme more favourable than the ordinary workmen's compensation allowances. The men were to remain civiUans, but other- wise they would be under the direction of a railway officer as chief or "executive" engineer. This responsible post was entrusted to and ably discharged by Mr. E. H. Townshend, one of the Divisional Engineers of the London and North Western Railway Company. So readily was the call for volunteers responded to that Companies Nos. I and 2, which consisted exclusively of London and North Western men, left London for Folkestone, en route for France, within a fortnight of the railway companies being approached on the subject. Six other companiesfollowed at convenient intervals within a period of four weeks. No. 3 Company was formed by Great Western men. No. 4 by North Eastern men, and No. 5 by men from the Great Central and the Great Eastern. The remaining British companies consisted of employees from various railways as follows : — No. 6 : London and South Western (which contributed 105 out of a total of 247), Great Northern, Great North of Scotland, Metropohtan District, Cambrian, MetropoHtan, Midland and Great Northern Joint, and Alexandra Docks and Railway. No. 7 : North Eastern, Midland, North Staffordshire, Fumess, and Mary- port and Carlisle, No. 8 : South Eastern and Chatham, Lancashire and Yorkshire, Taf£ Vale, Brecon and Merthyr, Hull and Barnsley, Port- patrick and Wigtownshire, Lynton and Barnstaple, and the Cockermouth, Keswick and Penrith. The total number of men thus suppUed by the English and Scottish Companies was, approximately, 2,000. ^ None of these were ordinary labourers. Some of the men were over sixty years of age. The work done by the men in France was considerably hampered by the delay in providing them with the necessary tools and equipment — apart, that is, from Companies i and 2, which were suppUed direct by the London and North Western, while Companies 3 and 4 were furnished with most of their tools by their respective railway companies. Motor transport, also, was very inadequate at the outset. Then there was, in some instances, and especially at first, a shortage of ballast and permanent- way material. These conditions, however, together with the difficulty in respect to tools, were accounted for to some extent by the fact that at the time the civihan companies began to arrive in France — early in March, 1917 — the Germans had suddenly retreated on the Somme from ^ Certain Irish civilian companies were also formed. 638 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. the position they had taken up before Albert, and this retirement, for a distance of about five miles, had led to an immense rush of railway work on the British Front. As a consequence thereof, all the tools and materials which could be found were taken possession of for inamediate use, and the arrangements made in France by the Railway Construction Department for the companies of civilian platelayers became temporarily disorganised. Pending the arrival of fresh supplies, some of the civilian platelayers — ^ready to turn their hands to anything that was wanted — employed their time in excavating and drainage work, or even in unloading wagons, while the carpenters, rather than remain idle, erected and fitted up a dozen huts for other units, and made a considerable quantity of office furniture for general Army use. The work thus done by these two com- panies was an example of the class of work carried out in various places by the companies generally. The sphere of operations of the civilian companies extended north- wards from a line drawn from Havre to Rouen and embraced the Zone of the British Armies up to within a few miles of the trenches. The duties undertaken within this extensive area included the construction of new lines ; th^ relasmig or the doubling of existing lines ; the provision of extensive triages (sorting sidings of the " gridiron " type) and connec- tions ; improvement and maintenance of lines and goods yards ; altera- tions at stations ; dock work ; road construction, drainage work, and much more, besides. From an engineering point of view none of the work presented any special feature ; but ever3^hing undertaken had to be done at express speed, and in this respect the companies gained much to their credit. For reasons which will be made clear later on, it is desirable that the nature and extent of the work actually accomplished should be placed on record. No. I Company spent the whole of their time at Audruicq, an impOT- tant railway depot situate half-way between Calais and St. Omer. Here they constructed a stores park for the handling and accommodation of enormous quantities both of railway-construction material and of explo- sives. An area of about 50 acres was covered, and twenty-four sidings, in pairs, parallel to the through roads connecting them, and allowing space between each pair for storage purposes, were laid. The total length of the sidings was equal to fifteen miles of plain road and two and three- quarter miles of points and crossings, measured in single line. The work here was much hampered by shortage of material, while the need for the sidings was so urgent that shunting was begun on the rails as soon as these had been laid on the clayey soil, and before they had been ballasted. This meant that rails laid one day were often completely buried in the soft formation by the next day, and had then to be dug out and raised afresh . About ao,ooo cubic yards of ballast were handled, altogether, and a considerable amount of excavation for the permanent-way was also carried out. Notwithstanding the delays in getting materials, the sidings BRITISH RAILWAY WORK OVERSEAS. 639 were completed in nine weeks. When they were ready it was a matter of frequent occurrence for 7,000 tons of traffic, inwards and outwards, to be handled on them daily. Other work was also done at Audruicq. No. 2 Company spent two months in carrying out point and crossing work in connection with the widening of fourteen miles of line between Arques and Berguette by the 119th Company, Royal Engineers. They then moved on to Vendroux, near Calais, where a very important under- taking was accomplished in record time. It consisted in the construction of a departure triage, nine lines broad and over 800 yards long, with, at each side, single-line connections to the Nord Railway having a total length of about 1,500 yards. From the triage to the site of some proposed R.E. Dep6ts four sets of double-line extensions were provided, each set being about 800 yards long. A case depot, an ordnance depot, an oats dep6t and a gas dep6t, with connections of the same length as those for the R.E. Dep6ts, were also put in. The area thus covered formed a square 2,600 yards long by 700 yards broad, comprising about 370 acres, and the work was practically completed between May 3rd and June 2nd, a wide stretch of grass and tillage fields being, within that period, con- verted into a busy goods yard covered with rails, wagons and trains. This was regarded as the greatest achievement attained by the civilian platelayers in France ; but the company which accomplished the feat was specially favoured by having unlimited material, ample space, and the assistance of a daily average of 800 German prisoners, who did the fetching and carr57ing for them. It should, also, be pointed out that the other civilian companies were capable of equally good work and would certainly have accomplished it if they had had an equally good opportunity. No. 3 Company was divided into two sections, " A " and " B." Sec- tion " A " reconstructed eleven miles of road which had been very roughly laid ; put down some extensive sidings at Strazeel, and distinguished itself by^ fine piece of emergency work at Steenwerck, on the line between Bailleul and Lille. The military authorities desired the construction at this point of a set of broad-gauge sidings which, connected with the main lines of the Nord system, would spread out like a fan and allow of narrow-gauge hnes being laid in between them by Royal Engineers for the transhipment and the conveyance thence direct to the trenches of enormous quantities of shells. Once again speed was of the greatest importance ; and so well did these Great Western men acquit themselves that, although they were within four and a half miles of the firing line — nearer, in fact, than any of the other civilians concerned — and although th€ enemy's shells fell on their camp, they kept at work over eleven hours a day for ten consecutive days, and completed their task in less than scheduled time. Subsequently, Section " A " joined Section " B," which had started work on the laying-in of a large goods yard at Dunkirk, maintaining it, also, for a short time, and had then taken over the main- tenance of the Arques-Berguette widening, togeliier with th« carrjdng out of extensive alterations at Arques station. , 640 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. No. 4 Company also operated in two sections. One of these laid five miles of double track and connections on the Hazebrouck Avoiding Line ; the other lifted and packed five and a half mUes of hne near West CapeUe, and the two then moved to Saignville to carry out the Hfting and repairing of about twenty-four miles of main Hne, sidings and goods yards. Companies Nos. 5 and 6 arrived at Havre on March 24th and were sent to a rest camp where they were joined on March 31st by Companies Nos. 7 and 8. All four companies were hampered by the shortage of supplies, but theiy did some good work, notwithstanding. Company No. 5, employed at the Berguette Light Railway Depot, laid fifteen miles of permanent-way, with numerous connections, and maintained the whole yard under very disadvantageous conditions, formation and ballast being alike extremely bad. Company No. 6 divided into two sections. Section " A " did impor- tant work on the docks at Dunkirk, where they had the experience of numerous air raids at night, supplemented by a bombardment from the sea ; but they are said to have " behaved extremely well under the circum- stances." Section " B " maintained a large depot at Zeneghem and laid a considerable number of sidings. Altogether the company laid and maintained seven and a half miles of new track, with sixty leads, and maintained about forty-five miles of sidings. Company No. 7 was also divided. Section " A " was stationed all the time at Dannes, where three mUes of new line were laid, ten miles hfted and ballasted, and twenty-five imles, with niunerous connections, maintained. Section " B " lifted and ballasted nine miles of the Saign- viUe-Mautort hne, and maintained some large sidings, with numerous points and crossings. Company No. 8 undertook road-construction and drainage work until it could be provided with plate-laying tools. Thereupon it leiid in about six miles of sidings, maintained a large yard, and took out, relaid and improved the permanent-way over a large area. The work done by the civihan platelayers was thus not only of con- siderable extent, in the aggregate, but of much ndhtary importance. It was impeded, however, not alone by shortage of tools, baUast and per- manent-way material, but by prolonged speUs of bad weather, hard frosts alternating with snow and rain. In one way or another the men certainly experienced considerable hardships, but they accepted them in a patriotic spirit as an unavoidable accompaniment of war-time conditions. It must be admitted that the position of these companies of civilian platelayers amid an otherwise purely military element was distinctly anomalous. There was no precedent for such a situation. It did not fit into the estabhshed order of things. They were doing what was Royal Engineers' work for the Army, and they were doing it in the most exem- plary manner, notwithstanding all their difficulties and privations ; but they did not belong to the Army, they were not under military control, ^ they may not always have shown an adequate appreciation of military BRITISH RAILWAY WORK OVERSEAS. 641 routine, while the Army was at a loss to know exactly how they should be regarded and treated. So there was, at times, a certain amount of friction between the two elements. Yet the little troubles and incidents which arose as, perhajps, an inevitable result of the said anomalous situation were invariably set right, as far as was possible, by the higher authorities in France, who themselves showed every consideration for those in control, and rendered them all the assistance in their power. Having regard to the extent and nature of the work done, and leaving out of account some unfortunate incidents in connection with the Irish contingent, it must be admitted even by those who regarded the whole procedure as an anomaly that this sending of civiHan platelayers to the seat of war on a temporary mission in a time of serious need was a procedure abundantly justified by the results attained. CHAPTER XLV RAILWAY MATERIAL FOR OVERSEAS We have seen how the sending of British Railway Troops overseas to supplement the British Fighting Forces and undertake most of the additional railway work due in part to the great increase in our Armies and in part to developments in the military situation had been rendered necessary by the inability of the French and Belgian railway administra- tions themselves to discharge these additional obligations even as regarded that working of trains behind the British lines which they had been expected to undertake. As time went on and our armies on the Western Front expanded more and more, it was found that the dispatch there of railway personnel • from this country would, in turn, have to be supplemented by the supply from this side, not alone of ambulance trains, but of locomotives, rolling stock and other railway material which it had become no less beyond the power of the said administrations themselves to furnish for the use of our troops. Under the arrangements adopted in France in regard to the Sections de Chemin de Fer de Campagne, it was the railway administrations on whose systems these bodies of French Railway Troops originated who supplied the engines and the rolling stock requisite for operating the lines to be worked by their own personnel among those troops ; and it had been understood from the outset that the French would further provide all the rolling stock which the British Forces would require ; that they would themselves work the railways in what was known as " the French zone," namely, the territory south-west of a line drawn from Hazebrouck through LiUe, Valenciennes and Maubeuge, and that, so far as regarded the zone extending north-east from the seiid line up to the Rhine, the necessary locomotives for working the railways would be provided by an International Commission, a " pool " of locomotives being formed with the Belgians as the chief contributors thereto. This would have left the British with no more to do in the way of actual railway operation on the Western Front than that which related to our own depots and a certain amount of shunting elsewhere. At first, indeed, the French not only undertook, but even claimed to retain in their own hands, the working of all traffic on the running lines and the ordinary public yards ; but the transport demands made upon them became so great and, as time went on, so increasingly heavy, as against their own diminishing resources, that they may well have 642 RAILWAY MATERIAL FOR OVERSEAS. 643 found it impossible to adhere to the original understanding of providing for the British Armies as well as for their own. The initial couverture movement, for example, required the provision of 385 trains for the Northern and Eastern systems alone ; mobilisation proper involved the dispatch of nearly 3,000 trains, comprising 147,000 coaches ; 345 trains were wanted on the Northern line and about the same number on the State railways for the concentration of the British Expeditionary Force when it was landed in France; the advance of the Germans towards Paris led to such a flight of citizens therefrom that from the Orleans station alone no fewer than 50,000 passengers left by train on September 3rd, 1914, while, as the result of this same advance, the French railway administrations lost 83 locomotives and 45,000 units of rolling stock. Then, in the " race to the sea," in the following November, 1,270 trains were used for the transport of troops on the Amiens-Boulogne-CEilais line, apart from others employed elsewhere in connection with the same movement. In 1915 the P.L.M. carried 70,000 Sikhs and Gurkhas, landed at Marseilles from fifty-two troop-ships arriving there from India, and in the same year the Orleans Mne provided 400 trains for the conveyance of Indian troops from Toulouse to Orleans. The greatest strain of aU, however, that fell upon the French railways was in connec- tion with strategic troop movements. Between March and June, 1916, covering the most critical stage of the battle of Verdun, which had begun on February 21st, the Eastern Railway had to provide for the transport of ninety divisions, or more than 1,500,000 men, necessitating the dis- patch of 3,592 trains. Even these figures were exceeded in the battle of the Somme, begun Jufy ist, 1916, when 6,768 trains had to be run, apart from return loads. ^ tj. If, in this combination of circumstances, coupled with the further demands made upon them in respect to the needs of the civil population, the position of the French Railways began to assume a critical aspect in 1916, leading to appeals for assistance from this country, there can be no occasion for surprise. Already, in November, 1915, representations had been made to the Railway Executive Committee that, according to information received by our Ambassador in Paris, on the authority of the French Director- General of Military Transport, there was a terrible shortage of rolling stock in France since, in addition to the wagons lost in the invasion, about 9,000 others had been thrown out of service for want of repairs which could not be carried out owing to the further shortage of labour. More wagons were greatly wanted, and especially so for the conveyance of pit-props (regarded as war material), and for the transit trade to Switzerland. A large number had been ordered in Canada, the United States and Spain, but the first deUveries could not be expected before the following January, and it was asked if the British railway companies could themselves supply 2,000 wagons at once. It was added that " a * See an article on " French Railways : Mobilisation for War," by General G. Gassouin, Director-General of Military Transport, published in The Times of September 6th, 1919. 644 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. considerable number to foUow " would be most welcome. The Executive Committee replied that the demand for railway wagons in this country was already so great that the companies were unable to satisfy the demands of home traders, while the working of the traffic here would be prejudiced if trucks were sent out to France, as suggested. On January i8th, 1916, the Journal Officiel reported that a deputy, M. le Marquis de Ludre, had asked the Minister of War whether, in order that more wagons could be put at the disposal of the French traders, negotiations should not be opened up with the British Government with a view to securing from England the loan of such number of locomotives and wagons as would correspond to the number of French locomotives and wagons then being used in connection with the British Armies in France. Negotiations with this object in view were, the Minister replied, already proceeding. Following thereon, a definite suggestion would seem to have been put forward by the French military authorities, towards the end of May, 1916, that we should ourselves make provision on the Western Front for the transport requirements of our Armies there in respect alike to material and to personnel. So it was that, early in June, a communication addressed to the Railway Executive Committee from the War Office pointed to the improb- ability of the French and Belgian railways being in a position to furnish the whole of the locomotives for the lines which would be worked by the British Railway Operating Division, ia addition to meeting the require- ments of their own Railway Troops. In these circumstances it might be necessary to send over to France a considerable number of locomotives from this country. The possible requirements were stUl under considera- tion, but it was thought desirable, as a preliminary measure, that up to 200 locomotives from British railways should be earmarked for dispatch to the Continent if and when desired. In respect to wagons, of which a supply would also be required, it was not then expected that the railway companies or thie private-wagon owners would be asked to provide more than about 1,500. The matter was, in the first instance, referred by the Railway Execu- tive Committee to a sub-committee of that body, and subsequently a letter was sent to the Ministry of Munitions informing them of the intima- tion which had just been given by the military authorities at a time when the railways here were being pressed to desd with a very heavy traffic in munitions. The considerable number of engines required for use overseas could, it was stated, be supplied only out of existing stock, and the result thereof would be to reduce the number available for dealing with the heavy traffic at home. The difficulty might, however, be met to a certain extent if a firm of locomotive engineers from whom two of the British railway companies had ordered forty locomotives, understood to be in an advanced stage of construction, were pressed to complete the order as soon as possible. To this suggestion the Ministry of Munitions replied that the firm in question were fully occupied with work for the Ministry which was of RAILWAY MATERIAL FOR OVERSEAS. 645 the greatest urgency, and it would not be possible for them to resume the construction of the locomotives in question for some months. At the same time the Ministry noted with much concern that the provision of locomotives for use overseas would increase the difficulties of the railway companies in dealing with the heavy traffic in munitions likely to pass during the next few months, and they desired to impress upon the Railway Executive Committee the importance of adequate steps being taken to ensure the efficient transport of the traffic, the more so as any failure in this respect would have the most serious results in disorganising the programme of the Ministry in regard to munitions output in the immediate future. In the conditions which thus arose, the railway companies were placed in a position of considerable embarrassment. On the one hand, the War Office was pressing for the release of a large stock of locomotives for use overseas. On the other hand, the Ministry of Munitions were urging as a matter of almost vital importance that the companies should be prepared to deal with a very large increase in munitions and in the transport of material for their manufacture. Meanwhile, in order to assist alike the War Office and the Ministry of Munitions in the provi- sion of war supplies required by them, the railway companies had placed their locomotive shops at the disposal of those two departments, with the result that they had been hampered in their own work of repair and construction and were not now in the same position to deal with a heavy increase of traffic as they would have been before the war. Assuming, further, that their position in regard to the building of locomotives in their own workshops might be improved by a reduction in their output of munitions of war and by a return to the workshops of railway artisans serving in H.M. Forces, there was still no prospect of their being able to secure the necessary supplies of materials, while, concurrently there- with, the hope of their obtaining locomotives already under construction on their account by outside firms had been withdrawn from them. The difficulty, it was felt, could be overcome only by (i) resumption of the building of new locomotives ; (2) maintenance of supplies of materials for repairs of dxisting stock ; (3) increase in the number of men available for repairs of locomotives and the building of new ones, or (4) stoppage of the manufacture of war stores by the railway companies. Unless the building of locomotives both in the railway workshops and in the workshops of manufacturers with whom the companies had placed orders could be assured, it would not be possible to spare any locomotives from this country for service overseas without seriously prejudicing the trans- port of munitions of war on the greatly increased scale contemplated. With a view to dealing effectively with the complicated situation which had thus arisen, there was held at the Board of Trade on August 17th, 1916, a meeting of representatives of that department, the War Office, the Ministry of Munitions and the Railway Executive Committee, at which, it is understood, the Ministry of Munitions promised that the railway companies should be placed in a position to obtain all the materials 646 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. necessary for the construction in this country of the engines required by the companies to replace those needed for dispatch overseas. The number of locomotives which the War Office now desired should be ear- marked for the use of British troops in France was seventy, and of this number twenty were wanted at once. The seventy, it had been arranged, would be provided by the London and North Western, to whom, however, engines would be sent by other companies to help to make up for the depletion in stock which the North Western would thus sustain ; but all the companies concerned — and the Railway Executive Committee con- curred in the view they took — were agreed that none could be spared until the material was forthcoming for the construction of the engines wanted to take the place of those sent away. Much trouble was gone to by the railway companies in compiling lists of their requirements in regard to the materials necessary, not alone for the seventy, but for a sum total of three hundred new engines which, in their judgment, should be put in hand at once, the 230 over and above the seventy being the minimum number with which the companies could alone hope to handle the munitions traffic expected to be put on the railways during 1917. Materials for engine repairs were also specified. These lists were duly supplied to the Ministry of Munitions ; but, although the question as to the sending of engines overseas had been first raised in June, 1916, and although there was understood to have been a definite promise on the part of the Ministry of Munitions in the following August that the requisite materials should be supplied to the railway companies, the shortage in steel and other supplies, of which vast quantities were needed for the manufacture of munitions, was then so great that no tangible assistance whatever had been rendered to the companies by November nth, 1916. As the pressure on the part of the mihtary authorities for the release of twenty out of the seventy engines continued (six at least being urgently ' required), the Railway Executive Committee communicated with the President of the Board of Trade in regard to the general position, and said : — It would appear that the time has now arrived when some further steps must be taken. It is not necessary to remind you that this committee has no desire to avoid acceptance of any responsibility which is its due, but, unless the assurances asked for are forthcoming, it would seem that a decision must be reached by a higher authority, and this committee must be instructed as to what course to pursue with regard to the dispatch of these locomotives. Another communication was addressed to the Director of Transport, Ministry of Munitions, in which the Executive Committee said : — It would appear beyond the power of this committee to take the responsibility of deciding whether it is more important that the conveyance of munitions of war trafl&c, of food for the civil populace of this country and of the general trade of the country should be carried on unhindered by the retention here of the locomotives the War Office require, or whether the conveyance of these traffics should be harassed and detrimentally afEected by the release of the engines for transmission overseas. RAILWAY MATERIAL FOR OVERSEAS. 647 Alike by the Ministry of Munitions and the Board of Trade the sug- gestion was made that engines might be released by effecting stiU further reductions in passenger traffic ; but additional assurances in regard to the supply of materials were now forthcoming, and on November 22nd, 1916, Mr. Guy Calthrop informed the Railway Executive Committee that his company (the London and North Western) had released seven engines for dispatch overseas and would release thirteen more forthwith on the understanding that certain of the companies would assist to the extent of at least seven either by handing over locomotives to the North Western or by undertaking work then bdng done by North Western engines. It was left to him to make arrangements with the other com- panies in this direction. The Transport SfxuAxioN in France. By this time, save for the undertaking just given on behalf of the London and North Western Railway Company, matters were, practically, at a deadlock ; though within the course of another week a complete change in the situation, exercising a powerful effect on the future of the war, and bringing home to the British pubUc the stern realities of the conflict more thoroughly than had ever been the case before, was effected with a suddenness almost dramatic in its nature. Here, however, one must first recall certain previous developments. Early in 1915, Lord Kitchener had enlisted the services of the Deputy General Manager of the North Eastern Railway, Mr. Eric C. Geddes, as he then was, to assist in speeding up the production of munitions of war, and, on the formation of the Ministry of Munitions in May of the same year, Mr. Geddes became Deputy Director-General of Munitions Supply. He received the honoxir of knighthood in June, 1916. Some six weeks or so later, following on the information received from France as to the condi- tion of transport arrangements there, the services of Sir Eric Geddes were temporarily placed at the disposal of the Army Council by the Ministry of Munitions in order that he might make an investigation into the said arrangements so far as they affected the British Expeditionary Force in respect alike to rail, road, canal, dock and any other form of transport with which that Force might be concerned. The proposal for this inquiry was made by Mr. Lloyd George, who had become Secretary of State for War on the death of Lord Kitchener in Jtme, 1916, and it was approved by Sir Douglas Haig, who himself recommended that the inquiry should be made by Sir Eric Geddes. The desired report was duly presented by Sir Eric, and on October 7th, 1916, it was announced by the Secretary of the War Office that Mr. Lloyd George had coriferred the appointment of Director-General of Military Railways on Sir Eric Geddes, who would act as Deputy to the Quartermaster-General in matters affecting transport services, and would also direct and organise such services in France under the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief. This was closely fol- lowed by the announcOTient, on October 23rd, that the Commander-iii- X X 648 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Chief had appointed Sir Eric Geddes Inspector-General of Transportation to the British Army in France, which post he would hold in addition to that of Director-General of Military Railways in the War Of&ce. In order, also, to provide adequately for the conduct flf all classes of trans- port work dealt with in the department of the Director-General of Military Railways, the Secretary of State for War appointed Sir W. Guy Granet, General Manager of theMidland Railway, whose serViceshad been placed at his disposal by the directors of that railway, to be Deputy Director-General of Mihtary Railways in the War Office. The dramatic change in the situation, asreferred to above, was brought about when, on November 24th, 1916, Sir Eric Geddes and Sir Guy Granet sent home a joint report on the military transport conditions in France at that date, the demands made upon the British Government by the French authorities in respect to those conditions, and the obliga- tions which must, in any case, devolve upon ourselves. It was shown, for instance, that to carry out aU the work, in the way of shunting or otherwise, we had already agreed to do, or to meet our undoubted requirements, would render necessary the use of 156 locomo- tives, and towards this number we had available in France no more than forty-five. In addition to this, however, we were being asked by the French to provide our own substitutes for their fifty-four shunting loco- motives and their 490 main-line locomotives then exclusively in use for the British Anny. The French had also asked the British military authorities to undertake, from the spring of 1917, all transport work for the British Armies up to the Hazebrouck-Maubeuge line. Such an undertaking would, according to the French figures, require the provi- sion, by midsummer, 1917, of nine hundred additional locomotives, together with the necessary crews and repairing facilities. Nor was this all, there being suggestions that we should further undertake the complete working of certain sections of line, this being done by us in regard not alone to military but to civilian traffic ; that British railway artisans should be sent to France to work in the Nord workshops and provide repairing facihties for all our additional engines, and that we should take over the maintenance of permanent way on certain sections of the railways. The conclusions arrived at by Sir Eric Geddes and Sir Guy Granet as the result of a close investigation they had themselves made into the situation were : — That even if the French were capable of maintaining their quantum of transportation (at that date) for the British Army, a large addition to the locomotives and the rolling stock would be indispensable if the tonnage requirements, for the spring of 1917, of the British Army on its existing lines were to be met. That if the British Army were to be in a position to advance through Belgium a further increase of locomotives and wagons would have to be assured. That the French would be unable to maintain even their present RAILWAY MATERIAL FOR OVERSEAS. 649 quantum of transportation services for the British Army, and that, in the circumstances, there was a dual reason why we should have to pro- vide an increased supply of locomotives and rolling stock. That there was no prospect of obtaining within the period of time contemplated (say the end of May, 1917) the material in question from locomotive and wagon companies in England, the United States and Canada. That the only sources of supply remaining available were to be found in the engines and roUing stock of British railway companies, supple- mented by private owners' wagons. As regarded the extent of the provision requisite to meet the said reqtdrements, the opinion of the two authorities making the report was that from 200 to 300 freight engines and from 10,000 to 20,000 wagons (or the equivalent thereof on the basis of lo-ton freight units), with the necessary crews to work the engines and staff to keep the engines and wagons in repair, would be wanted by the British Army in France within the next three months if the transportation arrangements there were not to break down, and, also, that from 800 to 1,000 miles of track would have to be available within the next six months if the fuU needs of the British Army were to be met in the event of an advance. Sir Eric Geddes and Sir Guy Granet recognised the difficulties under which the British railways were being operated and the enormous volume and military value of the traffic that was being carried ; but the position was such that, in their opinion, the issue must be faced and a decision come to as to whether the British railways could render the necessary assistance without prejudicing the conduct of the war to a greater extent than if the transportation arrangements for our Armies in France were to break down. It might, indeed, be impossible to reduce the goods, mineral and military traffic at home without adversely affecting our military effort. They nevertheless considered that this necessity could be much reduced by a ruthless cutting down of passenger traffic and non-essential goods traffic. From this testimony as to the real nature of the transport situation in France, it was evident that, we were on the verge of a crisis calling for immediate and even drastic action, and the fact was recognised alike by the Government, the military authorities at home, the Railway Execu- tive Committee and the individual railway compahies that such action could best be taken along the lines laid down in the closing sentence of the last paragraph. Nor was there any loss of time in taking the necessary steps in this direction. The report sent from France by the Director-General of Transporta- tion and the Deputy Director-General of Military Railways was, as we have seen, dated November 24th. On November 28th, Mr. Lloyd George held at the War Office a consultation to which he invited the President of the Board of Trade, Mr. Runciman, who, at the close of the meeting, g,ent ward to the secretary of the Railway Executive Committee that he 650 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. wished to see the members the following day with a view to bringing about such modifications in British railway working as would allow of a very considerable assistance being rendered to the railways operating on behalf of the British Army on the Western Front. With the communi- cation to this effect addressed to the committee there was enclosed a copy of the above-mentioned report which Sir Guy Granet, who was also to attend, desired that the members of the committee should read in advance in order that they might be made fully aware of the facts of the situation. The conference with the President of the Board of Trade was duly held on November 29th, and on the following day a meeting of Goods Managers of the leading railway companies, summoned by the Railway Executive Committee, came to the conclusion that arrangements could be made for the provision by the railway companies of 20,000 wagons, for use overseas, subject to certain specified conditions. On December ist a similar meeting of Superintendents of the Line drew up a detailed scheme of travel restrictions, reduction of services, and a variety of other measures designed to have the effect of releasing engines and rolling stock and increasing the number of railwaymen who would be available for taking up railway work overseas. On the same day the Goods Managers held another meeting at which they confirmed the decision they had already arrived at as to the possibility of providing the 20,000 wagons, but agreed to recommend that, with a view to rendering an adequate number of wagons available for this purpose, steps should be taken to secure the adoption of a series of measures, included therein being the common user of (with certain exceptions) open wagons belong- ing to the controlled companies, this being done under a balancing system such as that already in operation between various groups of companies ; reduction in the free-time allowance for the loading and unloading of wagons ; increase of the demurrage penalties ; and curtailment in the acceptance of unessential traffic. . On December and a communication addressed to the President of the Board of Trade by the Railway Executive Committee gave a statement as to the demands which were being made upon the railway companies on account of the British Armies in France — ^mentionirig, also, that they understood these demands were likely to be largely increased in the near future, — and went on to assure the President that, provided a substantial abridgement of the existing facihties for passenger travel and the transport of mails and merchandise could be effected, and provided, also, that the Government were wUling either to exercise or to confer upon the com- panies certain necessary powers, they would be in a position to supply the number of engines and wagons demanded. Circumstances, it was pointed out, precluded the companies from parting, at that time, with rolling stock and men without some corre- sponding abatement in the work performed by them. They had, almost without exception, ceased to build new engines, and in some instances they had been unable to prevent arrears of repairs. In spite, also, of depletion of staff, they were carrjdng a heavier traffic than ever before, RAILWAY MATERIAL FOR OVERSEAS. 651 and staff and plant were alike being worked to their full capacity. In these circtunstances the resources of the railways were aheady over- strained, while there was the prospect of a large increase in Ministry of Munitions traffic in the near future. Recognising, however, the urgent and vital necessity for meeting the situation in France, they were prepared to say that, subject to certain conditions, they would be able to meet the requirements there in respect to locomotives and wagons ; though they would be unable to say what could be done in regard to the provision of 1,000 miles of track until the total wants of all Government depart- ments in respect to railways and sidings in connection with munition factories and Government works were made known. The Executive Committee's Proposals. The conditions upon which the companies felt they would be able to meet the demands in question were based mainly on the recommendations made by the Goods Managers and the Superintendents, as revised and finally approved by the Railway Executive Committee. Those relating to passenger-train traffic have already been detailed in Chapter XV, " Restrictions on Travel." In regard to freight traffic, it was pointed out that in normal times it might have been possible for the railway companies to spare 10,000 or 20,000 wagons without any very serious disturbance of their ordinary arrangements ; but under war-time condi- tions they were carrying an exceptionally large and increasing traffic, making abnormally heavy demands on their wagon stock the supply of which it had been impossible for them to increase, while few of the com- panies had been able to carry out even normal renewals and repairs. In these circumstances the demand that 20,000 wagons should be supplied for use overseas was a serious matter. In effect, if the companies agreed to give up such number, it would be essential that the loss thereof should in some way be made good to them through a better user of the wagons that remained, whether these belonged to the companies themselves or to other parties. What was done in these directions may be left over for consideration in the next Chapter. Dealing here, more especially, with the supply of railway material for use by our Forces overseas, an account should be given of certain further developments which had occurred whilst the matters just dealt with were still under consideration. An Appeal from Sir Douglas Haig. At the meeting of the Railway Executive Committee on November 28th, 1916, thfere was submitted for consideration a letter from Sir Douglas Haig which^ dated November 19th, had thus been written five days in advance of the joint report of November 24th made by the Director-General of Transportation and the Deputy Director-General of Military Railways. The letter from the Commander-in-Chief, addressed to Sir Herbert Walker, was as follows : — 652 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. General Headquarters, British Armies in the Field, November igth, 1916. Dear Sir Herbert Walker, — You will be aware that I have recently reorganised my Transportation Services in France, and have appointed Sir Eric Geddes as Director-General of Transporta- tion. With the co-operation of Sir Guy Granet in London, he is doing what is possible to meet the transportation needs of the Armies under my Osmmand. I require very large supplies of railway material, rolling stock, locomotives and personnel. Our needs are very seriously increased by the fact that the French, on whom we have relied mainly for railway transportation, are now finding that the means at their disposal are inadequate for the task which must be accomplished if we are to successfully prosecute the campaign. In France the French Armies have drawn entirely upon their national railways. They have recently intimated to us that they must look to us to accept fuller respon- sibility for the transportation of men and material for our own lairge armies in France. In addition to that, the intensity with which fighting has developed necessitates enormous extension of both broad and 6o-cm. gauge railways, and very extensive operations on roads in advance of railhead, to which point the French have heretofore done the working. In these circumstances 1 appeal with confidence to the RaUway Executive Committee to render the fullest possible assistance and support to Sir Eric Geddes and Sir Guy Granet .in the task with which they are charged. I fear that it may be necessary for me to urge the Government at home to make such demands as they have not hitherto contemplated as possible upon the British railways for locomotives, rolling stock, permanent-way, and personnel. I realise what it will mean to the British railways to be asked to still further reduce their already depleted resources to meet the demands of my Transportation Departments in France. I feel that when those demands are made they will be the more sjrmpathetically met, and my needs more thoroughly appreciated, if you and the railway General Managers who form the RaUway Executive Committee have had an opportunity of seeing for yourselves the difficulties which my Transportation Departments have to overcome. I therefore write to ask you, Mr. Aspinall, Sir Alexander Butterworth, Mr. Calthrop, Sir Sam Fay, Mr. Matheson, Mr. Potter, Sir Robert Turnbull, Mr. Thorn- ton, Mr. C. H. Dent, Sir William Forbes, and, also, if they can coiiie, Mr. Tatlow and Mr. Watson, together with Sir Guy Granet, to pay a visit to the Somme Front. I feel sure that when you have seen the conditions for yourselves, and have heard from Sir Eric Geddes, who will explain the situation to you when you are out here, of the difficulties which confront us you will realise that no effort, sacrifice, or inconvenience is too great to enable the Armies under my Command to be adequately equipped with transportation facilities. Upon hearing from you that you and your colleagues will come and see for yourselves what we have to overcome, I will instruct my Director-General of Trans- portation to communicate with you and make the necessary arrangements for your visit. Yours very truly, D. Haig, General. Commander-in-Chief, British Armies in the Field. Sir Herbert A. Walker, Chairman, Railway Executive Committee, 35, Parliament Street, London, S.W. RAILWAY MATERIAL FOR OVERSEAS. 653 Visit of the Railway Executive to France. Sir Guy Granet, who attended the meeting of the Railway Executive Conunittee, of which, as General Manager of the Midland Railway Com- pany, he was still a member, supplemented Sir Douglas Haig's statement by giving further details concerning the situation in France, and he impressed upon the members of the Railway Executive the extreme desirability of their becoming personally acquainted with the difficulties of transport overseas in order that they could realise the magnitude of the task before the military authorities in France, and decide in what way the benefit of their advice might best be made available. Thereupon it was decided that Sir Douglas Haig's invitation should be accepted, and the following eventually represented the Executive Committee on the occasion, other members of the committee being unable to take part in the visit : Mr. J. A. F. Aspinall, Sir A. K. Butterworth, Mr. Guy Calthrop, Mr. C. H. Dent, Mr. D. A. Matheson, Mr. F. Tatlow, Mr. H. W. Thornton, Sir Robert TumbuII, Mr. A. Watson and Major G. S. Szlumper (secretary). Leaving London on the morning of Saturday, December 9th, they returned from France on the following Tuesday. During the course of their stay, the representatives of the Railway Executive Committee had an interview with the Director-General of Transportation, and gleaned from him much additional information concerning the nature and needs of the transport situation there at that time. In the first place there was the question as to the difficulties in which the French railway administrations themselves were placed. It was ascertained, for example, that, owing to the advance of the enemy, the Nord Company controlled only 54 per cent, of their pre-war mileage, and on this portiort of their system they had to deal with 105 per cent, more trafiic th£in the sum total of what they carried in peace-time when aU their fines were available. On the Etat the increase in trafiic was 146 per cent. ; on the P.L.M. it was 149 per cent., and so on with other systems. There had, also, been a great expansion of trafiic at the ports, while it was anticipated that through the ports placed at the disposal of the British for the purposes of the war 250,000 tons per week would have to be handled early in 1917, increasing to 350,000 tons per week the total trafiic in stores, ammunition, etc., which would then require to be dealt with in France for the British Army. While these figures in themselves indicated the magnitude of the demand being made on the general transport facilities on account of the British Forces, the greatest difiiculty of all was shown to be experienced in the " destroyed zone," lying between the combatant armies and devastated by shell fire. Here the problem to be solved was as to how a sufiiciency of roads and railways could be provided to allow of our Forces advancing across that zone. 654 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. In regard to the position as a whole, it was explained that two systems of railways were being utilised for the transport of supplies and ammuni- tion to the troops in the Field. One of these was that of the broad- gauge railways which constituted the arterial lines and were used mainly for the conveyance of food, and the other system consisted of the 60- cm. (i ft. ii|- in.) gauge lines which carried heavy gun ammunition and R.E. stores. According to the arrangements made at the outset, the French were to work all traffic up to a line drawn through Hazebrouck-Lille- Valen- ciennes and Maubeuge, but beyond that point it would be necessary for the British to work two, and perhaps three, lines of railway across Belgium to the Rhine, and, in addition, the network of lines necessary between the different railheads behind the British Army. Eleven broad-gauge trains per mile of Front were required when an operation was in progress, and included in the commodities to be con- veyed in these eleven trains were 500 tons of road metal per mile peT day. As regarded the actual needs of the British military authorities, from the point of view of improved railway communications, 300 miles of track complete, with sleepers and a certain proportion of points and crossings, were required immediately. Thenceforward a further supply at the rate of 150 miles per month (excluding sleepers) would be wanted. Up to 400 miles of bull-headed or double-headed raUs, weighing from 60 to 80 lbs. per yard, with chairs, sleepers and fastenings, could be taken ; but anything beyond this mileage would have to be flat-bottomed rails, it being imperative that rails of this type, and weighing 75 lbs. per yard, should be used in advance of railhead. As to the 60-cm. track, of which 1,000 miles were required, it was not expected that there would be much difficulty in obtaining this quantity. In respect to locomotives, it was anticipated that about 400 would be necessary. Of wagons, all to be fitted with screw coupUngs, 20,000 were wanted as soon as possible, this number — of the traders' type — being in addition to others to be built by the British railway companies under arrangements then proceeding. In addition to all this material, there was a great need in France for every grade of British railwaymen. The sum total of those hkely to be required was about 30,000. Arrangements had been made that every railwajonan then in the Army in France who was not engaged on special work should be made available for service in the department of the Director-General of Transportation. Finally, Sir Eric Geddes undertook to let the Railway Executive Committee have as soon as possible full details concerning each item of the requirements he had indicated, and the representatives of the Execu- tive Committee promised, in turn, that particulars should be furnished to him as to the exact types of locomotives it was proposed, or which it might be found possible, to supply to him. On the return of the members of the Executive Committee to London Sir Herbert Walker wrote to Sir Douglas Haig as follows : — RAILWAY MAtERlAL FOR OVERSEAS. 655 Railway Executive Committee, December i6th, 1916. Dear Sir Douglas Haig, — I beg to refer to your letter of the 19th November in which you kindly extended an invitation to the members of the Railway Executive Committee to visit the Front in France in order that they might gain first-hand knowledge of the condi- tions that exist there, particularly with regard to the transport arrangements for troops and supplies. Twelve of our members responded to that invitation, and upon their return they have individually and collectively asked me to write to you to say how much they appreciate the excellent arrangements made on their behalf, and how much they owe to you for the courtesy and consideration shown to them by yourself and by your Staff. You may rest assured that the members of the Railway Executive Committee are keenly alive to the difiiculties under which transportation is carried on in France, and they are one and all determined that the railways in this country shall leave nothing undone to assist in overcoming those difficulties, and so enable you to carry out the great work you have in hand, and thus bring the war to a successful conclusion. Steps have already been taken, and matters are progressing towards the pro- vision of the permanent-way material, locomotives and wagons which the British railway companies have undertaken to contribute towards the total requirements. I am sorry that owing to ill-health I was unable to accompany the party. Believe me to be. Yours sincerely, H. A. Walker, Acting Chairman. General Headquarters, France. By December 20th, 1916, the requirements in respect to main-line locomotives for France had increased to 370, including the seventy promised by the London and North Western Railway Company, of which twenty had then been dispatched. Thanks to the savings effected in engine power by the travel and traf&c restrictions enforced, the full number of locomotives was duly supplied, though not, it must be con- fessed, without the greatest difficulty. Much trouble was, also, involved in getting together the 20,000 wagons, and at the end of 1917 there was a small number of these which had then still to be delivered. There were difficulties, as well, in regard to the provision of the 200 miles of rails, with chairs, sleepers and other accessories. The arrange- ments were taken charge of by a sub-committee of which Mr. Donald A. Matheson, General Manager of the Caledonian Railway Company, acted as chairman, and the first inquiries made among the companies showed that eleven of them were prepared to find a total of 247 mUes of single track, whether out of their stock on hand, by the conversion of double- track branch lines into single track or by taking up certain short lines altogether. Much of the material thus offered, however, consisted of rails of different weights, whereas rails which would make up complete sections of uniform weight were specially desired, while the supply of rails of this type was limited, partly by the fact that the companies had been unable adequately to replenish their stocks, and partly because 656 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. some of them had already given up a good deal of permanent-way material for lines in steel works, for munition-works sidings, or for other similar purposes. Then, when a definite programme had been made up by the companies, there was great delay in thei provision of shipping for the conveyance of the material to France, so that although the first consign- ments were dispatched in January, 1916, and the last might, so far as the companies were concerned, have gone by about the end of February, it was not until the end of April that the order could be definitely com- pleted. The total length of rails, single track, actually supphed was 206 miles, made up by eight companies, as follows : London and North Western, fifty-six miles ; Great Western, forty miles ; North Eastern, thirty-one miles ; Midland, twenty-eight miles ; Lancashire and York- shire, fifteen mUes ; and the Great Northern, the London arid South Western and the Caledonian twelve miles each. The twelve miles con- tributed to the total by the London and South Western were obtained by closing the Basingstoke and Alton Light Railway, and taking up the rails with sleepers and fastenings complete. Still more Locomotives Wanted. In February, 1917, there was an urgent call for fifty 0-8-0 locomotives which were wanted by the French Government to meet a deficiency in their own supply. Two companies undertook to supply them. In June there came demands for locomotives for various theatres of war — once more under the most " urgent " conditions. For the Western Front the British authorities had, it seemed, tmder- taken to. provide, in one way or another, 709 main-line locomotives ; but the position of the French railway administrations in respect to locomo- tives had gone from bad to worse, and the view was taken by the British authorities there that, in order to assure the movement of our traffic, we should have to provide no fewer than 910 more engines. Of these the number already ordered was 569, leaving 341 to be provided. For the Cherbourg-Taranto service on the Mediterranean Line of Communications 113 would be wanted ; for the coming campaign in Egypt, 84 would be indispensable to the maintenance of the force with which it was to be carried on, and there were, also, " urgent " demands for engines for Salonika and Mesopotamia. There had been some hope that the needs of the situation would be met, to a certain extent, at least, by the obtaining of locomotives from the United States or by the utilisation of Belgian locomotives then at Rouen ; but it was doubted if American locomotives would be suitable for running on French railways, and the Belgian locomotives were being held specially in reserve for any advance that might' be made across Belgium. Nor was there any prospect of building fresh locomotives in England in sufficient time to answer the desired purpose. Hence the only available source of supply was the existing locomotive stock of the British railways, and it was asked that, in order to serve immediate requirements, RAILWAY MATERIAL FOR OVERSEAS. 657 the companies should supply 200 more engines for overseas by the end of July, and an additional 400 by the end of the year. At a conference held at the Board of Trade, an intimation was given to the representatives of the Railway Executive Committee who were present that the War Council proposed to request the War Cabinet to call upon the railway companies to provide the 600 locomotives in question. Thereupon the Railway Executive Committee arranged for meetings of Locomotive Engineers, Goods Managers and Superintendents of the Lme to be at once held with a view to deciding how this fresh threatened depletion of locomotive stock — for such it would be inasmuch as, by this time, 420 engines had already been sent out of the country— could be met in view of all the heavy demands for munitions and other transport at home by which the companies were still faced. When the Locomotive Superintendents and the Superintendents of the Line held a joint meeting on June 8th, the War Cabinet had referred the whole question to a sub-committee which was to meet the following week. A fresh series of drastic trafi&c restrictions, designed to effect the release of more engines from both passenger and goods traffic, was now proposed on behalf of the companies. Included therein were the follow- ing : Further curtailment of passenger-train services ; reduction more especially of midday services ; control of the large holiday traffic ; with- drawal of all express services, stopping-trains alone being run ; the drawing up of a list of non-essential commodities which, with the sanction of the Government, the railway companies might refuse to carry at all, and curtailment of the number of Ughtly loaded special goods trains run for Goverimient departments. Three days later the Locomotive Engineers met again. They now made a full examination into the position of the various companies in respect to their available locomotive power and its relation to the traffic then being carried, coming to the conclusioi^ that there was no available margin to draw upon, and that, if more engines were to be sent overseas, the existing services would have to be reduced to an equivalent extent. The locomotive power of the various companies, they found, was gradually becoming less efficient, and the number of engines in working condition was already insufficient to meet punctually the demands constantly being made for special trains for the conveyance of coal, military and naval material, etc. The position was due to {a) shortage of skilled men in locomotive estabUshments ; (b) a general shortage of material ; (c) stoppage of the supply of copper for locomotive fire-boxes Eind failure to furnish suitable steel, as promised, and (d) the overworking of locomotives on account of the number being insufficient to admit of timely attention to repairs and adjustments. A large number of engines were stated to be out of service owing to non-supply of the materials promised by the authorities when the 420 engines already sent overseas were released. No fewer, in fact, than 1,400 engines had been stppped for repairs in excess of the number nor- mally under or awaiting repair, and, even as regarded maintenance under 658 BRittSH RAILWAYS AKD tHE CHEAT WAR. existing conditions, failure to supply promptly the materials asked for would place the companies in a worse position than they were in already, apart from any question as to the sending of more engines overseas. One company had sixty locomotive boilers waiting for copper or steel plates. Engines were also waiting for axles, crank-axles, tubes or other essentials. It was anticipated, too, that when the steel fire-boxes which the companies were now obliged to instal instead of copper came into general use, a larger proportion of locomotives than before would be laid off from time to time for boiler attention. Every effort should be made at once to provide the maximum possible amount of copper-plate for the use of the railways. Finally, the Locomotive Engineers expressed the view that unless the prompt supply of materials already specified by them, and, also, the return to the locomotive estabhshments of the skilled men asked for, could be assured, a seiious disorganisation of home- railway transport would have to be anticipated in the coming autumn and winter — and this, too, quite apart from the taking of 600 more engines from the still available stock. If 600 were positively needed, one-third of the number was the utmost that the British companies could provide. The remainder would have to be sought in the United States. If, on the other hand, material could be assured, six companies could undertake to construct new engines at the rate of fourteen per month, thus releasing heavy ones for use in France. At the request of the President of the Board of Trade, the Railway Executive Committee drew up, for presentation to Lord Milner, a state- ment setting forth their views in regard to the demand for more locomo- tives for overseas. After setting forth the facts of the situation in general, the committee went on to say that if, in face of the position as detailed, it should still be decided that 600 locomotives must be sent overseas before the end of the year, it would be necessary that the Government should assist the railway companies (i) to get all the material they required, and (2) to reduce travel to a minimum. In order to give effect to these requirements, the committee suggested the adoption of the following measures : — (a) The Ministry of Munitions to be instructed that the railway companies must have all the material they require for the repair of their locomotives, wagons and permanent-way. (6) All manufacturers who have orders on hand from the railway companies for materials or locomotives to be instructed immediately to concentrate on the output of such materials and locomotives, and to be given all facilities for so doing. (c) The War Office to be instructed that they must release from military service all men who were previously engaged in the railway shops and who are now required for the repair of locomotives. {d) The arrangement which is in contemplation, and which has to a certain extent been given effect to, to divert shipping from the eastern ports to the western ports of England and Scotland, to be annulled. (e) The conveyance of merchandise traffic both on civilian account and on Government account to be considerably restricted. (/) Steps to be taken still further to reduce week-end travelling for pleasure RAILWAY MATERIAL FOR OVERSEAS. 659 purposes on behalf of men employed under the control of the Army, Navy and Ministry of Munitions. (g) The Government to make a strong public announcement on the subject of the necessity for still further restricting travel. Towards the end of June, Sir Herbert Walker and Mr. Potter, late General Manager of the Great Western Railway, attended a meeting held in Lord MUner's room at the offices of the War Cabinet to discuss the whole situation, and early in July it was announced that the imme- diate demands upon the British railway companies had been reduced to 160 locomotives for prance, to be dispatched by the following November, and about fifteen for the Mediterranean Lines of Cominunication. Still hoping that they would be able to secure materials for the repair of those of their engines which were then out of service, the companies promised to do their utmost to meet requirements, and the British Government gave a definite undertaking to the French Government that the additional locomotives wanted should be supplied. Once more, however, disappointment was Experienced by the British railway companies in the procuring of the repair-materials', and at first the dispatch of the promised further engines to France proceeded so slowly that solne of the authorities on this side who were concerned in the matter grew distinctly uneasy. Then it became obvious to the railway companies that it would, indeed, be necessary for th^m, if the undertaking given to the French wer.e to be carried out, to depend on their existing available stock of engines, without waiting any longer for the repair of the others. The questions which thus arose were — Gould the depleted home supply render the desired assistance to France as well as meet British requirements, and, if so, would it be possible for this to be arranged in such a way that the burden to be borne would fall equally on all the British companies, and not alone on the largest among them, by reason of the fact that the latter were best equipped with those high-power locomotives which the French specially desired should be lent to them ? As a means of effecting this dual purpose, a statement was drawn up showing the total number of engines — ^iitespective of power or class — ■ owned by each railway company in Great Britain on December 31st, 1916. AU these engines were then formed into a " pool," and a certain proportion of the engines to be sent overseas was allocated to each com- pany ownintg twenty-five or more engines on the date mentioned. Some of these compMiies, however, had no engines of the t3rpe wanted in France ; others could not furnish the full number allocated to them, while others, again, were in a position to exceed their quota. The arrangement made, therefore, was that the last-mentioned companies should send to France as many engines of the required type as they could, and be com- pensated for so doing by receiving from the other companies, for home service, the use of such number of " substituted " wagons as would be equivalent to the engines dispatched in excess of the said quota. 66o BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Under this system of combined allocation and substitution — though not without a vast amount of labour in the balancing of the engine stock as between the different companies, great or small — there was eventually drawn up a scheme which led to the dispatch overseas of 155 more British locomotives — 123 to France and (following on later arrangements) thirty-two to Eastern Fronts — all of these being started on their journey by the middle of November, 1917, save for a few which did not get away until early in December. Financial Arrangements. So great was the urgency with which the demands for material for overseas were made in December, 1916, that there was no time to spare in settling at that time the details of the financial arrangements which would necessarily have to be made between the Government and the railway companies in respect thereto. As a temporary expedient and as a matter of principle, the Railway Executive Committee did no more than point out that the provision of rolUng stock, or other railway material, for use overseas formed no part of the duties undertaken by the railway companies under the Act of 1871, and that the agreement as to compensation did not cover pa57ment for such services. It was presumed to be the intention of the Govern- ment that the locomotives and wagons sent to France should be returned to the companies at the end of the war, but, in the meantime, and pending the receipt by them of further information, the Executive Committee thought it should be clearly understood that terms of compensation outside the general agreement would have to be arranged with respect to any rolling stock sent abroad and either not returned to the owning company or returned in a damaged or deteriorated condition. Later' on it was represented to the Goverrmient that, whilst the rail- way companies could not press for payment outright for locomotives and wagons sent to France and returned to them in due course in a serviceable condition, they did think the War Office should pay them outright for (i) engines and wagons sent to France in regard to which it was known that they could not either be returned at all, as in the case of those sunk in crossing, or could hot be returned intact owing to damage sustained through collision or otherwise ; (2) vehicles which had been so altered in construction — ambulance trains, for example — as to render rebuilding necessary to fit them for use in this country again ; and (3) all locomo- tives, carriages and wagons sent to Salonika, Egjrpt and other Fronts than France. This principle was approved by the Government, and the material suppUed by the companies for overseas purposes fell, accordingly, though subject to the settlement of final details, under two main categories — that which was furnished on loan for use in France during the period of Government control, and that which was sold to the Government for use RAILWAY MATERIAL FOR OVERSEAS. 66i elsewhere than in France. The latter category also included material expressly constructed or made for the Government. In regard to material supplied on loan, the heads of the arrangement eventually drawn up between the railway companies and the Government, and approved by the Treasury, were as follows : — 1. Locomotives and wagons as far as practicable to be returned within six months after the declaration of Peace. 2. Subject to the following clause, the companies to be at liberty at cost of Government to execute such repairs as may be necessary to put such locomotives or wagons as are returned in substantially as good a condition as they were in when sent to France. Any sums expended by any company to be repaid by the Govern- ment as a special item in the month following the expenditure. 3. Before any such repairs are executed opportunity to be given to the Govern- ment of inspecting any locomotive or wagon which it is proposed to repair, and, if the Government so desire, a statement to be given to some person nominated by them setting out the nature and extent of the intended repairs and the estimated cost of the same, in which case it shall be open to the Government, if they so decide, and give notice of such decision, before the repairs are taken in hand, instead of paying the actual cost of the repairs carried out, to pay the estimated cost of such repairs as are "necessary " within the meaning of Clause 2. Any dispute as to what repairs are so necessary or as to the estimated cost of the same to be referred, to an experienced Locomotive Engineer to be appointed unless otherwise agreed by the President of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, whose decision shall be final. 4. Locomotives and wagons known to be lost or destroyed, and replaced during Government control, to be paid for by the Government at the prices current when the replacements are effected. Such payment to be made either as soon as the company concerned has made good its arrears of normal renewals which have accumulated during Government control, or at the end of Government control, whichever shall first happen. 5. Any locomotives or wagons which are not returned at the end of the Govern- ment control, other than those referred to in Clause 4, to be paid for by the Govern- ment as and when replacements are effected at the prices then current, and whether arrears of normal renewals have been made good or not. Provided that it shall be open to any company at the end of the Government control to claim immediate payment for any such locomotives or wagons, in which event the Government shall thereupon make a payment on account at normal (pre-war) values, subject to adjustment when the actual cost of replacement shall have been duly ascertained. Provided also-that, it such a payment on account is made, and the company con- cerned shall establish a claim upon the Government in respect of loss of traffic receipts or otherwise arising out of shortage of rolling stock after the end of the Government control, then interest at the rate of £/^ per centum per annum upon the amount paid on account and calculated from the date of such pajonent shall be set off against such claim. 6. From the amounts payable to any company under Clauses 4 and 5 there shall be deducted — (fl) In the case of locomotives, a sum equal to the depreciation of the locomotives not returned, the amount of such depreciation in case of difference between the War OfiB.ce and the raUway company concerned to be settled by an experienced Locomotive Engineer to be appointed as mentioned in Clause 3. (6) In the case of wagons, a sum calculated in accordance with the table set out in RaUway Executive Committee Circular Letter No. 415 on the original cost. 7. In the event of any sum due to any company under these Heads of Arrange- 662 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. ment not being paid within one month after a claim for the sum has been rendered, interest at the rate of 4 per centum per annum to be paid by the Government on such sum from the expiration of such month to the date of payment. 8. The cost of all repairs carried out overseas to be borne by the Government. For permanent-way material supplied for use overseas, a special arrangement, to the following effect, was drawn up between the railway companies and the Ministry of Munitions, acting on behalf of the Govern- ment : — Class A. — Materials taken from a running line which would have to he restored : The Government to pay at once the prices for materials in this class as shown in a schedule agreed to. In addition, the extra cost, if any, of providing all the materials required in replacing such lines, together with the whole of the cost of labour involved in such replacements, to be paid for by the Government as and when such costs were incurred. While, also, the Government would bear all costs attaching to the materials provided in restoration, they would not, in the event of such restored articles costing less than the agreed-on prices, ask the railway companies to refund the difierence between such prices and the actual cost of the restored materials. Class B. — Materials supplied out of stock : As a payment on account, the Government to pay at once for these materials the prices set out in Class A, as shown in the schedule, and, in addition, to bear the extra cost, if any, incurred in replacing the stock, when this was done. Class C. — Materials taken from a running line which would not be restored : The Government to pay at once the prices as set out in Class C, as shown in the schedule. It was further agreed that, in addition to paying the unit prices as specified, the Government would bear the cost of lifting and handling the materials and aU other costs incidental to the dispatch of them over- seas, together with their reinstatement, including therein the cost of any necessary alterations the railway companies had made, or might have to make in, for example, the conversion of a double line into a single one, and the reconversion of a single line into a double one. Still more Wagons Wanted. In June, 1918, a request came from France for another thousand wagons, and the supply of these was at once undertaken by certain of the. companies. In July, 1918, transport conditions in France and Italy, so far as the supply of wagons was concerned, became positively acute. There were occasions when the shortage was felt in regard, not alone to the movement of (more especially) the American troops and their supplies, but even to the forwarding of ammunition to the firing lines. So it was that still more urgent appeals were made to the British Govermnent, and the War Cabinet asked the railway companies if they could supply a further 10,000 wagons, in addition to the 21,000 they had already lent for use overseas. The Railway Executive Committee undertook that the 10,000 should be provided ; but they represented that this could be done only on the distinct understanding that the Controller of Coal RAILWAY MATERIAL FOR OVERSEAS. 66j Mines would agree to an equivalent number of wagons belonging to coUiery proprietors and other private owners being taken over by the railway companies. Much more was involved in the furnishing of the desired 10,000 wagons than their withdrawal from service on the British railways and the for- warding of them to France. It was required in regard to 5,000 of them that, before they were dispatched from this country, they should be fitted with international screw-couplings (a procedure which would also involve the packing out of the buffers), while a great number of them would have to be supplied with oil-boxes in place of their grease-boxes. Screw- couplings and oil-boxes would alike have to be manufactured, and under the most favourable conditions some time would necessarily elapse before the complete number could be supplied. Notwithstanding the difficulties arising on this account — ^in addition to others — 7,720 of the wagons had been dispatched to France by the beginning of November, Nor did the signing of the Armistice bring any relief to this particular situation. There was declared to be still an urgent need in Italy for the remainder of the promised 10,000 ; but when, towards the end of February, 1919, the British companies had increased their deliveries to 9,469, it was arranged that the balance should be furnished from those at the disposal of the British War Department in France. Further evidence as to the gravity of the wagon situation in Italy and on the Western Front in general was afforded in September, 1918, when the home railways were asked if, in addition to all that they had done or were still doing, they could undertake to build during the course of the next six months, 5,000 covered wagons, mostly of 20-ton or 12-ton capacity. Several of the companies expressed regret that, owing to their own work being so much in arrear, it was impossible for them to .undertake more. In one instance a General Manager declared that his company were nearly 1,000 behind in their wagon-renewal programme. Three companies, however, agreed to build, between them, a total of i ,450 wagons of the type desired, and orders were given accordingly ; but by the time that thirty of this number had been sent off, the War Office authorities found that, owing to the change in the military situation, there was no need to proceed further with the orders given, and a settle- ment was arranged with the three companies in regard to the work they had already done. Railway Companies' Material sent Overseas on Loan. The following table shows the number of locomotives, wagons and coaching stock vehicles handed over to the War Office on loan for use overseas, and the amount thereof which had been returned to them to March 31st, 1921 : — , YY 664 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Coaching Stock : Locomotives. Wagons. Vehicles. No. Returned No. Returned No. Returned Company. sent to sent to sent to Over- March 31st, Over- March 31st, Over- March 31st, seas. 1921. seas. 1921. seas. 1921. Caledonian . . . 25 25 — — 25 35 Fumess . . — — — — 6 6 Glasgow & S. Western — 7 7 Great Central . . 33 33 3,267 3,204 20 18 Great Eastern . . 43 43 — — Gt. North of Scotland 31 31 Great Northern 26 26 1,000 933 Great Western 73 57 5-772 5,694 27 27 Hull & Bamsley . — — ^^ — — 20 20 Lane & Yorks . . 32 32 1,560 1,487 — — L.B. &S.C.. . . 12 12 — — 2 2 L. & N.W III 64 6,370 6,119 90 89 L. & S.W. . . . — — — — 94 93 Midland. 78 78 6,128 6,008 6 677 Mid. & G.N. Jt. . — 20 19 20 20 North British . . 25 25 — — — — North Eastern 50 50 4,545 4,448 — — North StafEs . . — — — — 16 16 S.E. & C 8 8 1,042 1,031 24 23 Totals 516 458 29,704 28,943 388 382 It will be seen that, according to the details given, most of the stock lent had been returned by the date mentioned ; but a large proportion of it then stood in need of more or less repair, while a good deal had rendered such good service that it was only fit to be scrapped and^ — save perhaps for the wheels — was hardly worth the trouble involved in sending it back. Claims were made accordingly. Material Sold, Constructed or Adapted. The material which was sold outright to, or paid for by, the Govern- ment for use overseas may, in turn, be subdivided into (i) material specially manufactured or constructed by the railway companies in their workshops to serve specific purposes, and {2) material taken direct from their existing stocks. In regard to the former, the greatest proportion of the commodities mentioned in Chapter XLIII — that is to say, articles such as general service wagons, water tank carts, miners' trucks (used by sappers for the removal of soil when they were digging out tunnels under the enemy*s position) and a wide variety of other things — was wanted for overseas ; but the fact should be mentioned that, in regard to wagons and permanent- way, the British railway companies did much more than supply second- hand or already-existing surplus material for use in France or elsewhere. In addition to the large number of open wagons so urgently required for France towards the end of 19 16, there was much need for a supply RAILWAY MATERIAL FOR OVERSEAS. 665 of 20-ton covered goods wagons which would have to be built, and the railway companies were invited, in the first instance, to supply 2,250, the number required being subsequently increased to 2,500. In the first instance, after construction, the covered wagons were taken to pieces and loaded on to trucks so that each of these carried two complete sections. The wagons were so conveyed to the port of embarkation, there to be shipped to France where they would be built up again in the railway workshops. When, however, the Channel ferries were ready, the wagons were taken across on their own wheels. The 2,500 wanted were built as follows : Midland, 750 ; London and North Western, 400 ; Great Western, 400 ; North Eastern, 400 ; Great Eastern, 225 ; South Eastern and Chatham, 150 ; London, Brighton and South Coast, 100 ; London and South Western, 50 ; North Staffordshire, 25. Then in the spring of 1915 it was foreseen that, with the steady increase of our Annies in France, the need would certainly arise during the succeeding summer for an adequate provision of insulated trucks for the conveyance by rail 'of fresh meat for the troops. Here, again, no such adequate provision could be made from existing stock in this coun- try. The London and South Western Railway Company were able to let the War Office have fifty insulated banana-vans which could be adapted to the transport Of meat, but 250 other vans were wanted as well, and it was arranged that 100 of these should be constructed by the Midland Railway Company and the remaining 150 by the Lancashire and Yorkshire, the latter company having undertaken to turn them out at the rate of ten per week. The Midland completed their order early in July, and the Lancashire and Yorkshire finished off theirs early in August It might be added that the vans in question were of the " insulated," and not of the " refrigerator," type, the distinction between the two being that, whilst both are made of insulating materials, fixed between their interior and exterior boards, the refrigerator van has) in addition, tanks which are filled with ice, as required, from the outside of the vehicle. As regards the ordinary type of wagons supplied from existing British stock for service overseas, these were not really adapted for working with French rolling stock, by reason of the difference in their couplings, and in November, 1916, a request was made that the railway companies would manufacture in their workshops a supply of 10,000 screw couplings of the " Nord " ts^pe, complete with links, pins and cotters, for fitting to the British rolling stock in order that it could operate with the French. The work was distributed among a group of companies. Apart from the ambulance trains supplied by the companies in general for use overseas, special interest attached to two trains which were constructed, one by the London and North Western Railway Com- pany as a Mobile Advanced Headquarters Train for the personal use of Sir Douglas Hai'g, arid the other by the North Eastern Railway Company for the use of the Director-General of Transportation in France. Of these two trains, the former, built at Wolverton to the order of 666 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. the War Office, comprised fourteen bogie vehicles, namely, (i) private car for the Commander-in-Chief, with sitting-room and office, bedroom and bathroom ; (2) car, with office, for private secretary ; (3) car for personal staff ; (4) car and office for G.G.S. ; (5) car, with office, for two Generals ; (6) car for one General, and reception room ; (7) officers' mess ; (8) kitchen, with a compartment containing a petrol-driven lighting set ; (9) servants' mess and quarters ; (10) clerks' (juarters ; (ii) car, with office, for staff clerk ; (12) telegraph and telephone car, furnished underneath with drums for cables which, when required, could be run off and connected with the nearest telegraph or telephone wires ; (13) stores and a stationary boiler provided for the supply of steam for hfeating purposes when the train was not connected with the locomotive, and (14) brake van. The vehicles forming the train were converted entirely from picnic saloons with the exception of the three last-mentioned, these being, originally, brake vans. AU were electrically lighted, each was connected with a telephone switch board, and some of them had telephonic communication between themselves*, with further facilities for speaking over the line wires. In June, 1917, the Commander-in-Chief wrote to the Railway Execu- tive Committee asking that his thanks should be given to those of its members and, also, to others who had assisted in the preparation of the Mobile Headquarters Train. Of locomotives for use in Egypt, Salonika and Mesopotamia the London and South Western Railway Company sold fifty to the Govern- ment. Most of these went to Egypt, and concerning their emplo3niient on that front, the special correspondent of The Times, Mr. W. T. Massey, said in an article on the defence of the Suez Canal, published in that journal December 28th, 1916 : — Were it not for the railways and motor roads, the defence might require a force twice the size of that which is doing its work so thoroughly, and if the expenditure of money has been an economy in men, the price was worth the result. There are Decauville railways, lines of metre gauge, and a remarkable railway of standard gauge. Running over it to-day are London and South Western engines, with loads as heavy as they have hauled between Southampton Docks and Nine Elms. Without cessation night and day, week in, week out, they move on a journey out and home of 200 miles to a time-table jealously guarded by R.T.O.'s and their stafEs. Goods locomotives from the Great Western were sent out alike to Salonika and to the Serbian State Railways. Some 600 or so of dead- buffered wagons were obtained from the Caledonian, the North British and the Glasgow and South Western Company for service in Salonika. Great Central goods brake vans were bought for Egypt, and fifty timber trucks for France were furnished by the London and South Western. Platelayers' lorries were supplied by different companies, in fifties and hundreds, more especially for France and Egypt, in which latter country some coal engines from the London and North Western also did good work. Of steam or hydraulic cranes, ranging in capacity from 5 tons to 30 tons, the number obtained from various companies for use in France RAILWAY MATERIAL FOR OVERSEAS. 667 was twenty-one. Platelayers' tools were obtained from the London and North Western and the South Eastern and Chatham Companies. Many other items were also procured on purchase terms by the Govern- ment from different companies for use overseas. There was, in fact, a tendency to regard the British railways as general providers of every commodity or appliance that could possibly be either borrowed or bought from them for the use of our Forces in any part of the world where they were carrying on operations. Repair Shop Trains. When the need for the setting up of locomotive, carriage and wagon repair or construction shops for the British Forces in France first arose, an appeal was made to the British companies to contribute all the spare or discarded though still serviceable machinery, tools and appUances they possibly could in order that these shops might be set going with the least delay. The companies did all they could in this direction, and a beginning was made with the provision of a series of railway shops which were most efficiently operated and rendered the greatest possible service in the interests of transport on the Western Front and elsewhere. Much occasion for repair work, however, occurred under conditions which suggested that it would be far preferable to do what was necessary on the spot rather than take the vehicle or the appliance needing attention to the aforesaid workshops, possibly a considerable distance away. Hence the idea of workshop trains which, unlike the fixed workshops, could be moved about wherever they were wanted and, to a certain extent, perhaps, avoid the setting up of other permanent workshops in places where they would otherwise be indispensable. Sbc of these trains were built in the first instance by the jGloucester Railway ^Carriage and Wagon Company, who had submitted to the Ministry of Munitions designs which were approved and adopted by that department, and all were sent over to France for use on the 6o-cm, gauge railways ; but subsequently two other similar trains were con- structed by the Great Eastern Railway Company for use on the standard- gauge railways in 'Egypt. In the case of the last-mentioned trains, photographs of which are re- produced overleaf, each consisted of live vehicles, namely, a generating van, two machinery tool vans, a fitters' and tool van, and an officers' and stores van. This was one vehicle less per train than in the case of the six trains constructed by the Gloucester Railway Carriage and Wagon Company, each of these having six vehicles owing to the provision of separate vans for officers and stores respectively. Otherwise the general arrangements were the same in each instance. The sides of the converted vans used by the Great Eastern Railway Company for the purpose were so arranged that the main portion of them could be lowered by chains and supported on feet in such a way as to constitute working platforms alongside the vans, increasing proper- 668 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. tionately the available workshop space, while the upper portion cotild be raised and fixed in position as an awning or a shelter against sun or rain. The raising and the lowering of these two sections of each side gave the equivalent of a reconstructed box-van which could be taken on elsewhere without any risk of damage to the contents. The vans were fitted with, as far as the limitations of the available space permitted, aU the machinery, tools, stores and apphances likely to be needed for the carrying out of such repair work as they might be required or be able to undertake, while the loose equipment, as distinct from the fixtures, included portable forges, an anvil with stand, water troughs and a portable saw-bench with a 15 horse-power motor. The electric generator sets in the first vehicle provided all the necessary power for driving the motors in the others, and, in addition, it suppHed the electric current for lighting the whole train. In regard to all the repair workshop trains here in question, the tools, machinery and appliances were furnished by the Ministry of Munitions to the company concerned in the work of construction, such company fixing them in position according to the plaiis previously drawn up. In February, 1917, the Railway Executive Committee were informed that a request had been made by the British mihtary authorities in France that fifty six-wheeled passenger vans should be sent there to be used for the fitting up of workshop trains to be brought into use in the rear of the Front, though it was specially asked that they should, if possible, be all of the same type. There was some difficulty in meeting these requirements, but the London and South Western, had twenty brake vans used by them for fruit traffic only, and, on the War Office authorities announcing that these would suffice and would serve the desired purpose, they were handed over accordingly ; though the vans alone were sent to France, any fitting of them up with machinery, etc., being done there. Sir Eric Geddes' Appreciation. By way of completing this brief and inadequate account of what the British railway companies sought to do in order to provide material, as well as personnel, to meet the needs of the situation overseas, it may be of interest to reproduce the following letter which was laid before the Railway Executive Committee in May, .1917, as having been received from Sir Eric Geddes on his retirement from the position of Director- General of Transportation : — Admiralty, S.W. May 2/^th, 1917. I think you will be aware that I have, at any rate temporarily, severed my close connection with the Transportation of the British Armies in France, although Sir Douglas Haig is retaining me on his staft in an advisory capacity. I feel that I would not like the occasion to pass without writing to thank you, as Chairman, and the Executive Committee, for the very great help given me during the past eight or nine months since I took up transportation in Fran.ce. Workshop Repair Train constructed by the Great Eastern Railway Company FOR use in Egypt. j^>.m |BB_i.iiiiii*( ,Pi — -" . _ — -'.1. .._^;:: i - Jti^; ' '- ■ 'i'r-''^T"fii'i !■ 'fi" Electric-Power Generating Van. Machinery Van Mo. [Tu lace p. 06S. WuKKsiKip Retair Train constructed by the Great Eastern Railway Company FOR USE IN Egypt. Maciiinek\" \"an ^i The \'ans closed ui' for Kcnning. [I'u face p. GOg. RAILWAY MATERIAL FOR OVERSEAS. 669 Not only has the Railway Executive Gammittee spared its own members, who have become colleagues of mine, but individual members of the committee have, at all times, given me the greatest possible assistance. Apart from personal help, however, the Railway Executive Committee has met the requests of the War Of&ce in the most co-operative way, and out of its own shortage of men and material it has spared men and material for France. I fear that the requests are not yet finished, but I feel sure that you will all help when you possibly can. I know I may say that transportation in France is now getting thoroughly on its feet, and has earned the confidence of Sir Douglas Haig and of the Army. It would not have been possible for it to develop as it is developing without the help of the Railway Executive Committee, whom we have always looked to for assistance in our difficulties. I therefore wish to convey to you, the Railway Executive Committee, and the railway companies and officers who gave us such valuable help, my very great appreciation of all you have done to help me officially, and your very kind treatment of me personally. I feel sure that my successor in France — General Nash — will receive the help and support of the Railway Executive Committee as I have throughout. £. Geddss. Sir H. A. Walker, K.C.B., Railway Executive Committee, 35, Parliament Street, S.W.i. CHAPTER XL VI. GOODS TRAFFIC RESTRICTIONS. On the day following the declaration of war the railway companies issued through the Railway Clearing House a notice warning the public of the difficulties likely to be experienced in dealing with merchandise, live stock and mineral-train traffic, and of the possible curtailment in, or interruption of, the train services that might result therefrom.' Nor was it long before the troubles which had been anticipated, together with many others which had not been foreseen, began to develop in a form and to an extent that threatened for some time to become more and still more acute and called for the adoption of a prolonged series of measures designed, not alone to overcome the inevitable results of an RIMY ClEUmi HOIISL . . nsNS Hoajo, usbob; ^--.i/* «» AUBVSJ, 1314. REBCHINDISEUyE STOCK AND B HEBflLTBHIIITBIlFF IC. « NDTKE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT IN CONSEQUENCE OF THE EUROPEAN WAR CRISIS THE REGULAR GOODS TRAIN AND CARGO BOAfT SERVICES USUAUY RUN BY THE RAILWAY COMPANIES MAY BE CON- SIDERABLY CURTAILED OR INTERRUPTED, ANDTHATTRAmCCANONLYBE ACCEPTED AS IT CAN BE DEALT WITH AND THEN ONLY ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT RESPONSIBILITY WIU NOT BE ACCEPTED FOR ANY DELAY, DAMAGE, OR LOSS WHICH MAY ARISE THROUGH ANY SUCH CURTAILMENT OR WTERRUPTION. BT ORDER,. 670 GOODS TRAFFIC RESTRICTIONS. 671 abnormal increase in the traffic to be carried, but to meet the abuses to which, in the absence (at the outset) of an efficient system of traffic control and regulation, the action, not alone of traders but of Government departments, had given rise. A full account of all these things has already been given in Chapter XXlV of the present work, and there is no need to deal further with that part of our story. Under stress, however, of the developments brought about in Decem- ber, 1916, the transport situation entered upon a new phase. It was found that much more was to be undertaken than the surmounting of what had hitherto been mainly domestic difficulties in the provision of adequate transport facilities. British locomotives and rolling stock which had already seemed to be inadequate to meet home demands — so that the bitter cry of the inconvenienced trader was being raised with ever-increasing vigour — would, it was learned, now have to be shared on a most generous scale with our Forces, not alone on the Western but on all other Fronts, in order that adequate means of transport for troops, ammunition and supplies of all kinds could be assured. So it was that among the various proposals laid before the President of the Board of Trade by the Railway Executive Committee on December gth, 1916, following on the reports received by the Government as to the urgency of the need for making better provision for the transport ^of men, materials and supplies in France, there were some which directly con- cerned goods traffic, as distinct from those relating to passenger traffic, while two of these were proposals which not only required Govermnent sanction but would necessitate the acquiring of increased powers by the Board of Trade itself under the Defence of the Realm Regulations. One of them was a proposal that privately-owned wagons should be placed under the control of the railway companies, and the other was that the free time allowed to traders for loading and unloading wagons should be reduced, and that the charges for demurrage, whgre this was incurred, should be increased. These recommendations were so far concurred in by the Government that the additions to Regulation 7A in the Defence of the Realm Act, as given on pp. 14:^-2, were gazetted on December 13th. There were, however, subsequent extensions of the powers then conferred on the Board of Trade to make orders for, among other things, " enforcing the prompt loading or unloading of wagons, by making failure to load" or unload in accordance with the Order an offence." This was eventually made to read : — (6) For enforcing the prompt loading or unloading of wagons, by prescribing the time after the expiration of which charges may be made by railway companies for the detention of wagons or trucks or the use or occupation of any accommodation whether before or after the conveyance of any goods and by making failure to load or unload in accordance with the order an oflEence and for enabling wagons which are not promptly unloaded by the consignee to be unloaded, and their contents to be dealt with, at the risk and expense of the consignee in manner provided by the Order. 672 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Under the powers thus conferred upon him, the President of the Board of Trade, Sir Albert Stanley (now Lord Ashfield), issued on March i6th, 1917, a series of Orders relating to Detention of Wagons and Sheets, Unloading of Wagons and, Private Owners'. Wagons. In the Order concerning Detention of Wagon and Sheets (England and Wales) it was stated that — I. On and after the ist April, 1917, the trader responsible for the loading or unloading of any merchandise (excluding coal, coke and patent fuel) conveyed or to be conveyed by railway shall load, unload, or cause to be loaded or unloaded, and tender to, or place at the disposal of the Railway Company the wagon employed together with the covering sheet or sheets, if any, within such number of days after the day on which the wagon and sheet or sheets have been placed at the disposal of the trader as is specified in the Schedule hereto. STATUTORY RUfS AND OBDERSi DEFENCE OF HE REAIM OBNGI-AND A WALES). lAaroh 16, 1017, mad* by th« Board of Trada under Raculatlon 7b of tha Dafanoa of tha Raalm Ragu laUona. Whnna by SainlBtloii Tb of the Doteua ot tlw Itailm Bcgnlstlaiu tlw Boud of Aula hav* powor tor tha Dupne of DaUBg the mcMt efflolMit OM of nUwny plut or Ubour. with a view to the nicceMlU proMcntioD of ibe w, to mke onun, utoBfit othei tfctn gy, fyf tBioicias ths proinpt lowUiw or "^'f'n^f pf of wtgoni bj mkUBg Ulara to load or naloadla aocorduca with tbo order u mmot. Now. therefore, In paiBnuee of thrir power oitder that BegnlaUoo end of wU other powe n "'■ Vn in Ihanib) that befaBtttheSoudofTradohere^ Older, eelUlotra: 1. (ta ud lAtr th* let AFBIL. UlT. Iks lnd*r mpoqilU* br Hit loidlBl sr oibidlB« ot ibt BsrebudlM (adsdlDl ML nk* ud painthilieeaverAei tobaooDnTwl by nUwif •hall b>id.uloiJl w mm I* ta iMdtA (w aaloubtLMul Under u. m pbM »\ IIM dlipoul of tb« BiUwu CoBiaar Ik* mfaa •nikytd Ufdkw Mlfa Iba botiiUI (hnt m ihcMi, 1! lav, wUkla twh — ^^*'>*tkidVM*Uchlhew4aBuaiEMioribMUkan tMarlM«dallk/dli;Mila(lk«lndM uli ipulM ,1)1 Ihi tchttaU hmte, 3, Fw Ik* parpM _ ^ __„ kf nlhnj u wkBM ItopoMj a wi|ae. vkithn i^At ar lowU. ma ta vriUaa w vwfeallr or MM kj pM or bj Wtpui at k; lilnbaa*. I btto ihilJ wUkoot Ih* wrltta eoumt at tht XaUmj rarikiparpoHtfiUiOrdir tk4t«B - Indw' tsoliiln un 1 *-- 1 ItopMuJ a wiioe. vkithn i^tr ar louU. b^ nUw»TCMpMj.wMijwittctwklelic«MtMr*»a»Twi»MwitkWMifaf Miiaiia>a«iiT»gMaa»**|w (*} lOdDfiD WA00N9 AFTai COIWErAMOt. «f oranoaa tf a>aw «r rMlp If tk* m Wm— »■ ■» —lima mil »>■■< m IUU»i u lia (nS^dtopaHL^' THE RAILWAY EXECUTIVE COMMinEE. NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on and after lit APRIL. 1917, Ih* number of e aa shewn in the above Schedule, after which Demurrage will Iwcome payable for each Waffon or Sheet detained at the rates per day for the time being in force in accordance with the Regulations of the Railway Companies. BT ORDER. 2. For the purpose of this Order, the term " trader " includes any person sending or desiring to send or receiving merchandise by railway at whose dispose GOODS TRAFFIC RESTRICTIONS. 673 a wagon, whether empty or loaded, may be placed. All notices referred to in this Order may te given in writing or verbally or sent by post or by telegram or by telephone. 3. No trader shall without the written consent of the Railway Company use for internal purposes any wagon or sheet belonging to a Railway Company, or any wagon or sheet of which the Board of Trade have taken possession under any order made in that behalf. 4. If a trader acts in contravention of, or fails to comply with, any provision of this Order, he is. guilty of a summary ofience against the Defence of the Realm Regulations. 5. Nothing contained in this Order shall prejudice or affect the right of a Rail- way Company to recover demurrage or other charges on wagons or sheets or the liability of a trader therefor. A separate Order issued for Scotland was identical with the above paragraphs, except for the substitution of " (including coal, coke and patent fuel) " for " (excluding coal, coke and patent fuel)," but the schedules varied in order to meet the differences in EngUsh and Scottish conditions. The number of free days within which railway wagons were to be loaded or unloaded under the new Orders in the case of England and Wales and Scotland respectively, as compared with previous regulations, may be shown in tabular form, as under; though the fact should be borne in mind that by " free days " was meant days exclusive of the day on which the wagon was placed at the trader's disposal or the day of receipt by him of the notice of arrival, while the term " day," as used in the schedules, meant the twentyTfour hours beginning at 6 a.m., excluding the twenty-four hours begiiming at 6 a.m. on a Sunday morning : — England and Wales. Prior to Under Merchandise, excluding Coal, Coke and Patent Fuel. the new the new Orders. Orders 1. Wagons supplied empty for loading : Days. Days (a) At Stations ........ 1 i (6) At Private Sidings, Docks, Wharves, etc. . . a i 2. Loaded wagons after conveyance : (a) At Stations ........ 2 2 (6) At Ports (Shipment Traffic only) .... 4 3 (c) At Private Sidings, Docks, Wharves, etc. (i) If not reloaded ...... 3 2 (ii) If reloaded ....... 5 3 Scotland. 1. Wagons supplied empty for loading : {a) All traffic except Coal, Coke, and Dross for shipment i i (6) Coal, Coke, and Dross for shipment ... 2 2 2. Loaded wagons after conveyance : (a) At Stations. (i) Coal, Coke and Dross .... 4 2 (ii) Traffic (including shipment traffic delivered from stations) other than Coal, Coke, and Dross 2 2 674 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. (6) At Ports. (i) Traf&c for shipment .... (ii) Traffic other than that for shipment : (i) Coal, Coke, and Dross . (2) Traffic other than Coal, Coke, and Dross («) At Private Sidings. All traffic ...... If reloaded ...... Prior to Under the new the new Orders. Orders. Days. Days. 4 4 4 2 2 2 4 2 5 3 Note. — These free days applied to loaded wagons. At private sidings when a wagon arrived loaded and was dispatched loaded the free times before and after conveyance were combined. The Unloading of Wagons Order, which also applied equally to Eng- land and Wales and to Scotland, save for differences in the respective schedules, laid down that if a wagon on any railway should not be un- STATUTORY RULES AND ORDERS, 319a7, XWo. defengeofhereiilm UNLOAIHIIfi or WiGONS (England and WaksL Order, dated March 16th, 1917, made by the Board of Trade under Regulation 7b of the Defence of the Realm Regulations. Whoreu by Re^Ution 7b of tli* Dafence of iha R«alnt Reg^tions iba Soud of Trad* havB power, for tba puipoaa of nuJung tha tooit affidmt use of rmilwaj pUot or labour, with a view to tba auooeaaftil prtnaoutioB of th* war, to nuka ordara, unonpt athar tbini^, for aaablin^ waffona whiah am aot promptlj un^)a4*d to ba ouloadad uul thair oontaata to bo daall with at tiw risk asd axpetiM of tha tndar in Bumnar providod b; tha orin Now. thsratbra, in pnraiuneo of thmr powar nadoi that Rafnlation aod of aU Othar powara anablinr them is that bahaUH tha BiMrd of Trada baraby ordar, u felfowa 1 ir a wagoD OQ any Radwaj' U Bo^iuiloadad by the trader within tha time abown Lb the Sobadula to thi( Order, tha Bulnaj CoinpaDp may causa the wagoo to ba ubloidod. and the conteata thereof to b« wuchouBad or itoied at the owaeri nak. In UKonlaiwe with any dtraotlona given l«r tha puipoaa bj the Boant o( Trade 3 Anr expeniea locurrcd bj tho Bailwar Company in nnloadiog tha wi«on and anj caitaia wsrebouw or itoruo chirgaa abill b« paid bf the trader and. in addlUOQ to any other remedy avallabTa, Iha sooda In reipocE ol which the ocpanaea an Inourred may ba dsialaad unU theae aspenMt and ohaigaa 4 Kelthnr tho trader nor any other panon ihall obetraot, intoitere with, or Impede the exaiolae br.liba Stallway Company of tha powata slvea by Ifela Ordar Any paiBOD aoUos In oontraTentlOD at. at blling to ooinply with, any ol iha prevlslou oI thla T^...Pr !!*^___ .-„ '--t tha Oafaneo of the Beabn BoealatloBa. __. -_, , 1 noticci referred to is thla Older may be fiTeo in wnGng or verbally or iani by poet or by toloetam or by telephone. 7 Tbii Order ihall apply to Bnxltnd ud Walea. and may ba cited aa tha Uatoadlni of Waiou Snglwid and Walea, Order ^17 ^ ^ BTAHLW. SCHEDULE. NUMBER OP DAYS FOR UNLOADIK6 MCRCHANDI8C (Cxcrudrnc Coal, Coka and Patent Pu«l). AT STATIONS TvB laji •ulmlr* of tb* 4iy o( netlpt bj lb« indir of bcUm af utinL AT PORTS 'Shlpinant Traffic onlyi. , nm iv* ticlauin at lb* dij gf irrtfd AT PBIVATB 0IDINO8. DOOKa WHAflTM. *». ■ -^, Tm dJifi »clDun •( ik< tki *a nUah th« n|M la pUeal U Iki taalin tipMll Th« tan *»7 utta fcbi*ile«aMi ■■ - ^^ tt^udDf ti A am ea ■ laaday MnliA GOODS TRAFFIC RESTRICTIONS. 675 loaded within the time specified, the company might cause the wagon to be unloaded, and the Contents stored or warehoused, at the owner's risk and expense. The reasons for which, from a railway point of view, these restrictions had been sought were, in effect, that it was impossible to obtain from the stock of railway wagons anything approaching the maximum of efficiency unless they were more promptly loaded and unloaded than had hitherto been the case ; that traders frequently found it convenient to use the wagons as temporary storage places ; that the companies were, as a rule, powerless to prevent this practice by means of demurrage charges fixed with reference to the costs of construction and miaintenance of the wagons rather than on their value to the owning company and the loss caused to such company by undue detention, and that a certain improve- ment had been effected in recent years through a more rigid enforcement of demurrage charges, though the adoption of this policy still left the free time allowed to traders too long to allow of a wagon being used to anything like its full capacity, while the charges themselves were far too low to deter the trader from detaining a wagon if it suited his convenience so to do. Hence the committee of Goods Managers who originally dealt with the question came to the opinion that the only means of effecting any material improvement in the turnover of the wagon stock was to reduce the free time by, speaking generally, something like twenty-four hours all round. The special significance of the Detention of Wagons and Sheets Order, apart from the reduction in the free periods, lay in the fact that persons offending against it would be liable, not only to demurrage charges, as before, but, also, to summary conviction for an offence against the Defence of the Realm Regulations. The greatest reason of aU for this more stringent time-limitation in the free periods of user of the wagons lay, however, in the improved position in which the railway companies would be placed for sending overseas the wagons so urgently required there in the prosecution of the war. CHAPTER XLVII. POOLING OF WAGONS: RAILWAY-OWNED. Among the proposals put before the President of the Board of Trade by the Railway Executive Committee in the early days of December, 1916, with a view to making better provision for the transportation needs of British Armies in France, there were two which attracted pubUc attention in an especial degree. One, which came under the head of " Proposals not Requiring Government Sanction," was : " To extend the arrange- ment now existing between certain groups of companies for common user of those classes of wagons which are in most general use so as to include all controlled companies." The other, classed among " Proposals Requiring Government Sanction," was : " Privately-owned wagons to be placed under the control of the railways." Each of these recom- mendations claims some degree of attention here. Almost concurrently with the difficulties which arose, quite early in the war, in connection with the supply of railway wagons to traders — difificulties due, in the first instance, as we have seen, to misusage rather than to actual shortage — suggestions were made in various directions that the best way of meeting the difficulty would be by the adoption of a general pool of wagons. These suggestions were made in ParUament, in the Press, by Government departments, by War Committees, by commercial organisations and more especially by " the Man in the Street." The adoption of such a policy seemed to be generally regarded as the one and obvious panacea for most of the trafiic troubles then in steady coiurse of development. There were, however, practical difficulties in the way of fuUy carrjdng out that policy which persons unfamiliar with the technical details of railway operation may weU have failed to realise. Dealing here, in the first place, with railway-owned stock, it was claimed that if the wagons coming within this category could be used in any direction, by any railway company, regardless of ownership, a vast amount of shunting would be avoided at station yards, dep6ts, and docks ; there would be much saving of wagon, if not also of train, mileage, when stock had no longer to be returned empty to owning companies or exchange points, and the movement of traffic generally would be acceler- ated. These advantages, also, were to be gained without risk of the financial complications that would arise from a general taking over of traders' wagons. Under the terms and conditions of the railway agree- ment with the State, it would not be necessary to keep account of the use of one company's rolling stock by another, while the making of a common- user arrangement between the comparatively small number of controlled 676 POOLING OF WAGONS: RAILWAY-OWNED. 677 * railway companies would be a very different proposition from the settle- ment of a mutually satisfactory scheme with a large number of private- wagon owners. Number of Railway-owned Wagons. Replying, in November, 1916, to an inquiry made by the Ministry of Munitions, the Railway Executive Committee wrote that the number of wagons owned or hired by railways in Great Britain, and used in private traffic, was 728,751, viz.. Open merchandise wagons, 391,482 ; covered wagons, 85,422 ; mineral wagons, 196,167 ; special wagons, 2,365 ; cattle wagons, 19,783 ; and rail and timber wagons, 33,532. A census of British raUway-owned wagons (excluding service and cattle wagons) found on railway lines or in arsenals, factories, etc., on November i6th, 1919, showed (after making the necessary adjustments) a total of 698,120. Booked stock on the same date (excluding service and cattle wagons, but including 21,122 wagons sent overseas) numbered 733,627. Varieties of Wagons. On the other hand, there were diflBculties in the way of common-user which applied to raUway-owned no less than to privately-owned wagons. In the one case as in the other, coiistruction had not been standardised. Just as traders' wagons had been built to suit the special requirements of particular firms, so had railway wagons been built to meet what were regarded as the special needs of different lines. Each company had its own standard, and the standards differed as between themselves, no two companies having the same. Then, also, wagons btiilt to meet the traf&c conditions of one system, or even one part of a system, would not neces- sarily be adapted to those of another. There were, again, differences in conditions at sidings and depots no less than at collieries and ports, and these, in turn, could not be standardised without physical recon- struction on a scale far greater than could be undertaken in war-time. For such reasons as these, it was held that no complete general user even of railway-owned wagons could be estabhshed and rendered operative for the whole of Great Britain diiring the war period ; but stiU further hindrances thereto were presented by the fact that wagons designed for the transport of one commodity might be quite unsuited for others, or, alternatively, that many of the wagons were used either for specified traf&cs between certain points or for classes of merchandise which varied greatly va. bulk as between company and company, so that in these instances, at least, the principle of a general common-user could not be adopted without risk of dislocation and delay. In the case of open merchandise-wagons, for instance, there was vacumn-fitted stock, intended for running with fast goods trains, which would be much too costly to employ on slow goods trains ; and there were wagons specially adapted for the transport of slate, glass, timber, and other special classes of traffic. The companies, equally with the traders, had cocil wagons fitted with 678 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. end, side or bottom doors, according to the character of the shipping facilities of the ports or the works to which the coal would be sent. Other wagons were specially adapted to the conveyance of coke. Mineral wagons included some 25,000 (belonging to the North Eastern) which had end brakes. They also included hoppered iron-ore wagons, lime wagons, and others, kept for specific commodities. Among covered wagons were refrigerator vans, insulated meat, fruit and banana vans, and a large number of vacuum pipe-fitted vans used for running with particular trains. Many of these covered wagons were, in fact, of exceptional design or otherwise built to serve some special requirement of the owning company, and it would hardly have been fair to deprive such company of their use by converting them to common stock, the consideration in this case being not so much a financial one as a matter of traffic convenience and advantage in the employment of special wagons for special purposes. However excellent, also, the principle of common-user might be in theory, there could not be an indiscriminate user of the same wagons for such diverse commodities as coal, lime, salt, cauliflowers, gas purifying • refuse, potatoes, and tarred materials. Many exceptions to the appli- cation of the principle were thus ineX^table. It was admitted that cattle wagons would be excluded from the application of the common-user principle, equally with wagons built either for loads of exceptional proportions or for weights in excess of, say, twelve tons, such as those built by certain of the companies for the transport of " exceptional " loads. It did not seem right that a company which had shown special enterprise in acquiring wagons of the last- mentioned type, for the convenience of traffic on or from its own lines, should have to throw them, as it were, into the common pot, and take its share in the further use of them with other companies which did not possess wagons of an equivalent capacity. Whether a partial or a general user were introduced, there was, again, the possibility that, without some very efficient system of control, some of the companies which were not so weU off for wagons as others, in proportion to the amount of their traffic, might seek to benefit from a common-user arrangement at the expense of their neighbours. Further suggestions were made as to possible trouble in arranging for repairs away from the parent line ; though here the prospective difficulties were not likely to be so great as in the case of private-owners' wagons passing under the control of the railways. With, also, the best of intentions on the part of all concerned, it would still be necessary to secure such a system of distribution and constant " balancing " of wagons that, under a common-user system, there would be no danger of one company being denuded of wagons while another, owing to the flow of traffic in a particu- lar direction, had a superabundance. The whole position even so far as railway-owned wagons were con- cerned was thus much more complicated than critics and theorists not acquainted with the facts of the situation may have supposed. POOLING OF WAGONS: RAILWAY-OWNED. 679 A Restricted Form of Common-user. All the same, there were certain things that could be done to secure a better user by one railway company of rolling stock belonging to another. Thus in July, 1915, the Railway Executive Committee were able to announce that arrangements had been made to amplify the Railway Clearing House regulations for the return of " foreign " companies' wagons and sheets. Every effort was to be made, not only to release the wagons and sheets promptly, but to employ them for the conveyance of traffic on the return journey. Except in certain specified instances, in which, as indicated above, wagons used for particular traffics would not be suitable for others, " foreign " wagons on their way back to the lines of the owning company were to be loaded with any kind of traffic for stations or sidings on, beyond, or in the direction of any junction with the owning company's lines. Wagons might, also, be loaded more than once towards any such junction ; though in this case they were always to go forward in the same direction. These and other subsidiary arrange- ments designed to serve the same purpose applied, also, to sheets. The earlier regulations were, however, 'stUl to be observed in regard to vehicles specially constructed to carry heavy weights, as well as to fish trucks, cattle wagons, automatic brake-fitted vehicles and gunpowder vans. Refrigerator cars, insulated banana, fruit and meat vans, and certain wagons specially lettered for military purposes were to be returned immediately they were unloaded. This, it will be seen, was a restricted form of common-user in one direction only, namely, on return journeys, It embraced, of course, all the railways, but the question arose whether^ although the application of a general common-user (that is to say, one for the use of wagons in any direction), might not yet be practicable as regarded the whole of the railway systems, it could not be adopted by certain groups of railways, operating in districts where combination might be effected under specially favourable conditions. Modified Schemes of Railway Groups. An initial war-time effort in this direction was made by the Great Central, the Great Eastern and the Great Northern Railway Companies, whose General Managers issued in December, 1915, a circular in which it was said : — Commencing Monday, December 13th, 1915, and until further notice, Great Northern, Great Central, and Great Eastern ordinary open goods wagons having sides of three or more planks, and, also, the wagon sheets of those companies, must be dealt with and used as common stock for the purposes of the three companies. All other vehicles must continue to be dealt with under existing instructions. It was further significant of the difficulties in the way of applying the common-user principle that no provision for it had been included in the working agreement made between the London and North Western and zz 68o BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. the Midland Companies in 1908, and extended to the Lancashire and Yorkshire in the following year. Under the stress, however, of war-time conditions, there was issued in March, 1916, by the General Managers of the London and North Western, the Midland, the Lancashire and York- shire, the Great Western, and the North Eastern Railways a joint circular which announced that : — Commencing at 4 p.m. on Sunday, April and, 1916, and until further notice, all open deep-sided wagons of tliree or more planks, with doors on each side, belonging to the Great Western, London and North Western, Midland and North Eastern Companies, and those of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Company specially marked with four white crosses on each side, will be available for use as common stock for the purpose of the five companies, with the following exceptions : — All coke wagons. All wagons which have not side doors the full depth of the wagon. All wagons exceeding 21 ft. in length over buffers and 10 ft. 6 in. inwheelbase. Great Western vacuum-fitted stock. Great Western high-sided wagons used for military horses. Midland hopper bottom, end door, and iz-ton high-sided wagons. North Eastern open fish, salt, and sleeper wagons. All other vehicles, including the exceptions, must continue to be dealt with in accordance with existing regulations. On dock estates, harbours, collieries, and works served by either one or more of the five companies parties to the common-user arrangement, Ihe user of the five companies' wagons in common is permissible to or via the lines of any of the five companies concerned, but not otherwise. All companies outside these arrangements must return the wagons of the five companies named directly and promptly to the owning companies. The actual effect of the arrangement, which applied to approximately 200,000 wagons, was thus explained in the issue of the Great Western Railway Magazine for April, 1916 : — This is an extension of what is known as the " back-loading " system, whereby the empty haulage of rolling stock is minimised. Under present arrangements, when one company receives a wagon from another it has to be promptly returned to the owning line, but it may be loaded to a station on, beyond, or in the direction of the owning line. If there is no traffic for conveyance it has necessaxily to be hauled empty. The five companies named have now agreed to use most of their standard open goods rolling stock in common, any inequality in the number of vehicles exchanged between the respective systems being adjusted daily. Under the common-user system, the daily adjustment here referred to was done by number-takers stationed at all junctions where exchange of traffic between different companies was done or at places where exchange was effected by, possibly, several companies with collieries, docks, etc. The men in question took a record of all loaded or empty wagons of the-common-user type so exchanged, and any excess in number of the former over the latter passing from the lines of one company to those of another was adjusted to an agreed scale by the " payment " of a corresponding number of empty wagons. In June, 1916, there was brought into operation a common-user scheme between still another group of companies. For some years prior to the outbreak of the war the question of either POOLING OF WAGONS: RAILWAY-OWNED. 68i a pooling or a common-user of railway wagons had attracted much attention among the Scottish railway companies, partly because Scotland seemed to constitute an especially favourable unit for the making of an experiment, and partly because of the reports as to the success of the German State Railways' Wagon-Union, then being pointed to as an example that might very well be followed. Originally apphed to the State Railways of Prussia, Oldenburg, and Mecklenburg and the Imperial Railways of Alsace-Lorraine, the Wagon- Union had, since 1909, been extended to practically the whole of the railways in Germany, including company-owned railways and light railways, all alike contributing wagons to, and receiving wagons from, a common stock, under a well-organised system of control. In Germany, however, the position was not complicated by the question of private- owners' wagons. Such wagons were, indeed, allowed to run on the German railways, but only for the conveyance of some twenty articles specified in the regulations, while, in practice, the bulk of the private wagons were used for the transport of either beer or oil, their emplo3mient in the beer trade being general. No reduction, however, was made in the tariff when they were so used, and the resort to them seetned to be mainly a matter of convenience to the traders, the more so as the railways themselves provided comparatively few wagons for the transport of beer.^ In 1911 three of the Scottish companies, the Caledonian, the Glasgow and South Western and the North British, sent a deputation to Germany to inquire into the working of the Wagon-Union ; but the conclusion then arrived at was that, although the Union had secured excellent results, a mere reproduction of it in Scotland would not be practicable, having regard to the comparatively large number of traders' wagons in use there and to other material points of difference between Scottish and German transport conditions in general. The whole matter was, nevertheless, still under consideration towards the end of 1915, when the Railway Executive Committee asked the controlled companies to consider the pooling of railway-owned wagons in territorial districts, with a view to relieving the situation in regard to wagon supply, and suggested that Scotland, as a whole, might very well be regarded as a typical district for the piupose. A series of conferences was accordingly held by the Scottish companies to consider what could be done, and although, at that time, the Highland and the Great North of Scotland thought the small number of wagons they themselves would be able to contribute rendered it undesirable that they should enter into the proposed arrangement, a common-user scheme was drawn up between the Caledonian, the Glasgow and South Western and the North British Companies. It came into operation on June 5th, 1916. > See " Die Verwaltung der Eisenbahnen," von L. Wehrmann (Berlin, 1915), and ■• Report on Railways in Germany," by'^C. H. Pearson and N. S. Reyntiens, in •"Report of the Board of Trade Railway Conference " Cd. 4677] . 682 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Under this scheme, which was to operate in Scotland only, the total number of wagons made available by the three companies for the purposes of common-user was 102,366. The common-user stock was not, however, to include, among goods wagons, 6-wheeled and 8-wheeled wagons and sixteen different kinds of special-class wagons or, among mineral wagons, those for coke or for pig iron, hopper wagons, wagons plated to carry more than 10 tons, and North British wagons lettered for certain firms. Nor was the common-user to apply to cattle wagons or to covered wagons of any description, while out of 49,000 furnished by the North British, 6,868 were to be for " local use only." In order to ensure the efficient operation of the scheme there was set up at the general offices of the North British Railway Company in Glasgow — ^which offered the advantage of a central situation — a " Com- mon-user Wagon Office," the staff thereof being formed by two clerks from each of the three companies. It was the duty of these clerks to summarise each morning the returns received from various points, bringing out the plus or the minus balance for or against each company, and equating the balances accordingly. There was also formed, from the outset of the arrangement, a Control Committee which; constituted by the Goods Managers and Superintendents of the three companies, was to meet twice a week for the settlement of any difficulty that might arise. Notwithstanding the tendency of the traffic to flow in certain direc- tions — ^with the result that, whenever delays in shipping or traffic occurred, it was not always possible immediately to " equate the balance " — ^the new arrangement worked with such success as to warrant an extension of its scope from January 2nd, 1917. The Great North of Scotland and the Highland Railway Companies then came in, and it was arranged that the scheme should be linked up with the aforesaid common-user arrange- ments of certain groups of Enghsh companies, which, in turn, as we have now further to teU, were to be extended to all the English companies under Government control. The Demands from Overseas. With the heavy demands made upon the British railway companies towards the end of 1916 for rolling stock for the use of our forces in France, the subject of wagon supply entered upon a still more acute stage than before. Concurrently, also, with the urgent appeals from overseas, the Director, Munitions Railway Transport, Ministry of Muni- tions, wrote to the Railway Executive Committee on November 23rd, 1916, bringing under their notice the fact that the question of wagon supply during the coming winter for the increasing quantity of munitions traffic then passing was causing some concern to the Ministry. Mr. Howard Williams further said : — There is no doubt that the arrangement whereby certain groups of railway companies are working their wagons as common stock, has had a beneficial efiect upon the supply, and in view of the present serious position as regards men and the difficulties in the supply of raw material for locomotive and other purposes, I am to POOLING OF WAGONS: RAILWAY-OWNED. 683 state that the Ministry attach great importance to the extension of the pooling arrangement to epibrace all railway companies under the control of the Railway Executive Committee in England, Scotland, and Wales with a view to facilitating the wagon supply and reducing the demand upon the already curtailed locomotive power by economy in shunting, light running, etc. I am, therefore, to inquire whether the Railway Executive Committee has considered and arrived at a decision respecting this important matter, and to re- quest that the Committee will be so good as to inform me if a general pooling scheme is likely to materialise within a measurably short period, so that its effects may be felt before the winter season is far advanced. In connection with this question, I am also to invite the opinion of your Com- mittee as to the proposal to throw into the pool all private owners' wagons, although it is assumed that it would first be necessary for a general pooling of all Railway Companies' stock to be put into operation before this can be brought about. Combination and Extension of the Schemes. On November 28th, 1916, the Railway Executive decided that repre- sentatives (either the Superintendent, the Goods Manager or the RoUing Stock Superintendent) of each of the Executive Committee companies should meet and report (among other things) whether a general pool of railway-owned wagons would be advantageous or otherwise to the general railway transportation in this country, and whether they considered it was practicable to give effect to such a pool. As the result of a series of meetings, a report recommending the adoption of a common-user scheme for stock owned by all controlled companies was presented to the Railway Executive, by whose direction a scheme to this effect was then prepared by oiificers on the staffs of the companies which had already gained experience in common-user arrangements. Revised at a meeting of the Goods Managers of thirty-seven English, Welsh, and Scottish companies, held at the Railway Clearing House on December 8th, 1916, it was afterwards submitted to, further revised, and approved by, the Railway Executive, which decided that it should come into oper- ation on January 2nd, 1917., The new arrangement apphed to ordinary open goods, mineral, and coal wagons having sides of three or more planks and doors on both sides the full depth of the wagon. Subject to certain exceptions, all stock of this type belonging to the controlled railway companies throughout Great Britain was to be loaded to or from any station on the lines of any of those companies, irrespective of ownerships. The exceptions were as follow : — Wagons with through top planks or fixed sides, exceeding 21 ft. in length over bufEers. ,, 10 ft. 6 in. wheelbase. marked as service vehicles — e.g., loco. coal, specially constructed for conveying coke. ,, lettered as reserved for military traffic. Great Western Company's vacuum fitted wagons. Lancashire and Yorkshire Company's wagons not marked with four white crosses on each side. 684 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR Midland Company's hopper bottom, end-door and 12-ton high-sided wagon?. Covered vans of all descriptions. Vehicles specially constructed for the conveyance of heavy and bulky traffic. Cattle wagons. Bolster trucks. Also wagons belonging to the following railways :— * Bishops Castle. Llanelly and Mynydd Mawr. Derwent Valley. Manchester Ship Canal. Felixstowe Dock and Railway. Redruth and Chacewater. Gwendraeth Valley. Stocksbridge. The total number of wagons brought within the operation of the combined scheme was about 300,000. These, owing to the exceptions agreed to, were of a generally useful type, and corresponded to the wagons included in the experimental five-company common-user arrangement initiated in April, 1916. Many of the difficulties which had been suggested were overcome by the making of the exceptions in question ; but these, in turn, led to the exclusion from the arrangement of a very considerable number of wagons not coming within the class mentioned. While, for instance, the North Eastern Company were able to contribute about 26,000 wagons, or, approximately, 50 per cent, of their " goods wagon " stock, practically the whole of their " mineral wagon " stock, comprising some 60,000 wagons, was excluded by reason of the fact that, with few exceptions, the latter consisted of hoppered wagons, or wagons with bottom doors of a type specially required for shipment purposes at ports on the north-east coast as well as for discharging at works, etc., under conditions which, as an almost invariable rule, would render them unsuitable for use by other companies not similarly circumstanced. Grouping of Companies. As in the case of the earlier common-user schemes between certain groups of companies, the system adopted for securing a proper distribu- tion of the wagons, so as to avoid shortage in one direction and excess in another, was based on records taken of the wagons exchanged between conipanies at junctions and elsewhere, balances of stock being prepared beforehand, daily or otherwise, in order that it might be seen what number of empty wagons each company had either to receive from or pay back to the others in return for loaded ones, the period within which the neces- sary adjustments were to be made being one week. To allow of this balancing of the common-user stock being done with as little difficulty and delay as possible, it was agreed that the controlled companies throughout Great Britain should be divided into twelve groups, each presided over by a leading company acting for the different systems allocated thereto. From the records supplied by the number-takers at the different junc- tions, etc., the Railway Clearing House would compile statements show- ing the debit or credit balance of each controlled company, and these balances would then be brought to separate summaries, under the POOLING OF WAGONS : RAILWAY-OWNED 685 head of the twelve companies, showing the debit or credit position alike of the twelve and of the companies grouped with them. Each of the twelve would then arrange with the companies within the group as to the points where the necessary adjustments should be made. The companies between which the railways were divided for the ptir- poses of this grouping system were as follows : — (i) Great Central. {7) London and N.-Westem. (2) Great Eastern. (8) London and S.-Westem. (3) Great Northern. \g) Midland. (4) Great Western. , (10) North Eastern. (5) Lancashire and Yorkshire. (ii) S. Eastern and Chatham. (6) London Brighton and South Coast. (12) Caledonian and North British. " Rolling Stock Representatives " of these companies in combination were to form a Common-User Control Committee which would have full power to settle all questions that might arise on matters of detail in regard to the working of the scheme. Should, for instance, any company require a supply of empty wagons in excess of the number to which it was entitled under the balancing arrangements, it would be for the committee to decide what should be done. With a view to simplif5dng still further the work of recording the movements of wagons, a number of small English and Welsh lines, whether under State control or otherwise, were, for the purposes of the scheme, to be regarded as " merged " with the systems of neighbouring large companies. Among the thirty-nine so dealt with were, for example, the Cockermouth Keswick and Penrith, the Maryport and Carlisle, the North London, the Central London, the Gwendraeth Valleys, and the Plymouth, Devonport and South Western. As regards Scotland, it was agreed that the balancing arrangements already being carried out locally in Glasgow should be continued as between the Scottish companies themselves ; but balances with the English companies were to be made at the periodical meetings of the Committee of Rolling Stock Representatives. Thus the existing common- user scheme for Scotland was continued on, as we have already seen, a widened basis, whereas the earlier separate schemes for the two inde- pendent groups of English companies were now superseded by the fresh arrangements. How 300,000 Wagons were " Balanced." The apparent magnitude of the task of equating, or balancing, over 300,000 railway-owned wagons among all the controlled companies, so as to ensure, as far as possible, the conservation of each company's position and a fair distribution according to a well-kept and impartially- administered debtor and creditor account, might suggest that a big organisation was necessary for its accomplishment. In effect, however, the whole scheme was introduced and operated with a simplicity no less marked than its complete efficiency. The number-takers of the Railway Clearing House or of the individual railway companies were already at 686 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. work on checking the wagons at exchange junctions and elsewhere, and in their case an alteration in the methods of preparing and rendering returns to the Railway Clearing House was all that was needed. Much the same may be said of the arrangements at the Railway Clearing House, to which the returns were sent for analysis. Under the new conditions, the analyses were laid before the weekly meeting of the appointed repre- sentatives of the thirteen companies (allowing two for Scotland) with which, as we have seen, the smaller companies were grouped for the purposes of the scheme, and these representatives decided among them- selves as to the particular junctions where it would be most convenient — having regard to the position either of their own respective companies or of the companies associated with them for common-user purposes — • either to pay or to receive wagons on the basis of the debtor or creditor balances shown by the analyses. As the companies were required to begin the daily adjustment of the balances of wagons due to be paid or received on the day following that of the meetings, the dispatch of a number of messages was involved ; but the average length of time necessary to dispose of the whole of the balancing business, week by week, at these meetings did not exceed an hour and a half. Any difficulty presenting itself in connection with the scheme was dealt with on the same occasions. The working of the scheme became, from the outset of its inauguration, almost automatic, whUe, as will be gathered from what has here been told, it involved neither the creation of cumbersome machinery nor the setting up of a new and costly establishment. Its organisation and success might be attributed entirely to co-operation between the^railway com- panies at a time when the demand for wagons was so great and when it was realised that some unprecedented step must be taken to enable the railways, in the national interest, to provide more adequately for the carriage of the considerable quantities of traffic, largely passing on account of the Government, then being offered for conveyance. In addition to this, there was the consideration that the wagons brought within the scheme were more or less interchangeable, the working of the scheme being thus greatly simplified. If different classes of wagons had been brought into the pool, a much more complicated system of distribution would have had to be instituted. Repairs of Wagons. Another phase of. the organisation involved in the adoption of the scheme related to the repairs of common-user wagons. Under the conditions agreed to, only repairs of a simple character were to be undertaken off the owning company's line. Wagons requiring extensive repairs were to be sent home, as usual. This question of repairs had been complicated by certain considerations which suggested possible difficulties. Wagons hitherto used for the conveyance of such traffic as agricultural produce would be liable to more wear and tear if, as the result of a system POOLING OF WAGONS : RAILWAY-OWNED. 687 of indiscriminate user, they were employed for the transport of, say, bricks, iron, coal, or the heavier classes of trafi&c for munitions, ship- building, etc., and they would thus be in more frequent need of attention. Owing, however, to the lack of standardisation of railway-owned no less than of privately-owned wagons, the necessary parts or materials might not always be available at the place where the repairs would otherwise be done. There was, again, an impression that a company not the actual owner of a wagon in need of slight repairs might be less attentive than the owning company itself in seeing that they were done. Omission to carry out repairs promptly would be the more serious inasmuch as a common-user wagon might be away from the owning company for weeks or even months together. In effect, considerable difficulties did arise ; but they were met to a certain extent, at least, by the necessary parts being dispatched, on requisition, to the places where they were wanted. Advantages Gained. If we now inquire what were the advantages derived from the common- user of raUway-owned wagons, we find that the greatest, if not, also, the most obvious, of the benefits gained was their increased availability, this being equivalent to such an increase in the supply as (notwithstanding the considerable number excluded from the arrangement by reason of the exceptions made) conferred a very substantial measure of relief on the traffic situation. Apart from this general consideration, however, various working advantages were secured by the railway companies. One of these related to the reduction in the number of empty wagons exchanged between the system of one company and that of another, as shown by the figures furnished to the Railway Clearing House through their number-takers. Evidence of an appreciable decrease in the per- centage of empty to the total number of loaded and empty wagons exchanged had already been afforded by the lines party to the five- company arrangement, and experience gained since the adoption of the general scheme in. January, 1917, gave proof of a further material decrease in the number if empties exchanged by all companies. In the next place, there was the saving of empty-wagon haulage, measured by the empty-wagon mUes as compared with the loaded-wagon miles of all wagons worked on freight trains. This advantage, again, was shared by many, though probably not all, of the companies Concerned. The actual extent of the advantage was suggested by some statistics which, compiled by the North Eastern Company, established the fact of a further fall in the percentage of empty-wagon miles run as compared, not only with a corresponding pre-common-user period, but, also, with the period when the five-company arrangement was in operation. Greater economy in shunting was gained at all points and (in combina- tion with the saving in dead haulage) with special advantage to those companies which, like the London and South Western, for instance, were 688 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR mainly receivers of traffic from other systems. Under the common- user scheme these companies had necessarily to " pay back " empty wagons for balancing purposes ; but whereas they formerly had to sort out, shunt and return empty to the owning company all the " foreign " wagons they received in excess of their requirements for back- loading in the homeward direction, they now simply paid to the common stock such number of wagons as they were required to return, regardless of any consideration as to ownership. In the case of " buffer," or inter- mediate, companies, over whose lines a good deal of traffic passed in going, say, between north or west and south (as happened to a considerable extent on the Great Western), the decrease in empty-wagon haulage was not so great in proportion to the sum total of the traffic. Thanks, also, to the saving effected in engine power through economy in shunting, provision of the locomotives so urgently needed by our armies in France was facihtated. In fact, but for the advantages secured in this direction, the railway companies would hardly have been able to send overseas as many engines as they now found it possible to spare. Congestion at the stations was diminished, if not avoided, and the facilities of the yards and sheds were enhanced by reason of the fact that " foreign " wagons and " local " wagons could alike be loaded up afresh and sent off again at once, instead of being kept until they could be dealt with under the system formerly in vogue. The potential capacity of stations, goods sheds and private sidings was increased, there being no longer any need for particular wagons to be put aside or drawn out because they did not belong to the company which had received them. A gain was secured, also, in regard to what is known as the intercepting of traffic. When, under the earlier system. Company A forwarded to an exchange siding some loaded wagons for places on the system of Company B, the latter (and especially so if it were mainly a receiving company) might intercept the load at a certain point and transfer the consignments to its own local wagons, in order to avoid the foreign-wagon mileage charge it would otherwise have to pay to the wagon-owning company. It might happen, also, under this arrangement, that Company B would be able to save the use of several wagons, either by securing a better loading when the transfer was made or because the " local " wagons had a larger capacity than the " foreign " wagons. On the other hand two wagons had to be used; accommodation and additional labour had to be provided at the intercepting point ; the sidings themselves required to be on such a scale as would permit of these operations ; and, even then, there was a greater risk of congestion and delay at the sidings than if the traffic could have gone right through. With the adoption of the common-user principle, the traffic did go right through, and iftuch was gained thereby. The receiving company might have to haul more incoming wagons than it would have done under the earlier conditions of transfer, but the dispatching companies sought to avoid this by arranging for a heavier loading of the through wagons. POOLII^G OF WAGONS: RAILWAY-OWNED. 689 Nor were the advantages suppleraentary to increased availability of the wagons confined to the railway companies. Under the new conditions, all traders having works or private sidings of their own saved both labour and private-engine working through having no longer to separate or shunt " foreign " wagons and turn them out empty when these wagons could not be loaded within the regulations either because the firm's traffic was not for the Une of the wagon-owning company or because the wagons could not be worked from the discharging point to the spot where traffic for the owning-company's line was to be loaded. Common-User OF Sheets and Ropes. Within a few weeks of the adoption of common-user of railway- owned wagons, the conclusion was formed that the common-user of sheets must be regarded as a necessary corollary thereto. In a large number of instances goods cannot be sent in open wagons without a sheet or sheets to cover them ; yet while, under the new arrangements, a railway wagon might be forwarded in any direction, the continuance of the old regulations in regard to sheets made it necessary that traffic sent on to the line of another company should be covered with a sheet or sheets belonging to that company, while " foreign " sheets were to be used only for traffic going to the company to which it belonged. So, on February 20th, 1917, there was brought into operation a scheme for the common-user of sheets under conditions as to checking and balancing practically identical with the arrangements appljdng to railway-owned wagons. No additional staff was reqviired, the existing machinery being utilised for the purpose. There was simply an alteration — ^in accordance with the principle already adopted — ^in the records taken, and the work of adjustment was done by the same Common-User Control Committee at their weekly meetings. Strict regulations, also, were laid down to avoid that detention and misuse which, in the past, had done so much to reduce the utility of the sheets from a traffic point of view. Government dep6ts, dockyards, miUtary railways and munition works had more especially been offenders in this respect by using railway- wagon sheets for all kinds of purposes other than those they should properly serve, and it was declared to be of imperative importance that the departments concerned should themselves take further action in the matter. The departments readily undertook so to do. After the sheets followed, once more in logical sequence, the ropes used for securing the loads. To these the common-user principle was applied as from July 31st, 1917, on the same general basis in regard to checking and balancing, while the co-operation of Government depart- ments was again sought in the avoidance of unnecessary detentions and the prevention of misuse. Extension of Common-User. With the ever-increasing demands for wagons, for use either at home or overseas, the question of extending the common-user of railway- 690 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. owned wagons in the Great Britain pool to types of wagons then excluded therefrom came under the consideration of the Goods Managers and Opera- ting Superintendents from time to time, and in March, 1918, it was reported to the Railway Executive Committee that various companies were prepared to include in the common-user scheme additional wagons to the extent of 86,724. Inasmuch as the number of open wagons already contributed to the pool was 307,238, the said addition increased the total to 393.962, and revised arrangements came into operation accordingly, as and from April 2nd, 1918, Even now, however, there were still many exceptions, included therein being, generally. Open Wagons : — Fish Wagons. Hopper-bottomed Wagons. Service Vehicles (as, for example, Ballast, Locomotive Coal, Stores Dept.). Bolster and Rail Trucks. Wagons specially constructed for the conveyance ofj— {a) Articles of exceptional dimensions or weight. (b) Traffic on wheels. (c) Coke. Wagons specially marked for military traffic, and certain wagons belonging to particular companies, among the last- mentioned being, more especially, end-door wagons, about 70,000 in number, owned by the Scottish companies. In view of the representations which were being made, to the effect that it had become a matter of the utmost national importance that all wagons possible should be included in the pool, the negotiations already entered upon with a view to reducing still further the number of wagons excluded from the pool were continued. Certain difficulties which had arisen in this direction were eventually so far surmounted by the early part of May, 1918, that 51,799 more wagons, including the end-door mineral wagons of lo-ton capacity and under belonging to the Scottish railway companies, had been added to the Great Britain pool of railway-owned wagons, which thus attained a total of 445.761- Under the arrangements made, all these common-user wagons might be used from docks, harbours, collieries and works, as well as by railway companies, in any direction ; though this privilege was not to apply in cases where the throughout journey was made over the hues of a non-controlled railway or dock line. Covered vehicles and the classes of stock coming under the head of " exceptions " were to be dealt with as heretofore, in accordance with existing regulations ; though on and from June 3rd, 1919, covered vans not fitted with automatic brakes or pipes were also made available for " common-user " by all companies in Great Britain. This resulted in the addition to the scheme of a further 65,542 vehicles. CHAPTER XLVIII. POOLING OF WAGONS: PRIVATELY -OWNED. The proposal that privately-owned wagons should be brought under the control of the railway companies was primarily due to a survival of the conditions attending the original creation of the railway system in Great Britain, those, namely, under which it was assumed that a railway company would do no more than construct the " iron road " — just as a canal company constructed a waterway — and that traders or the public would provide their own engines, carriages, and wagons to run upon it. The impracticability of this arrangement so far as engines and passenger " coaches " were concerned was speedily recognised ; but in regard to certain commodities the traders retained, and do still retain, a statutory right to run their own wagons, the railway companies supplying, in this case, only the motive power. The said right was definitely established by section 92 of the Railway Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, which laid down that — Upon payment of the tolls from time to time demandable all companies and persons shall be entitled to use the railway with the engines and carriages properly constructed, as by this and the Special Act directed, subject, nevertheless, etc The railway companies, in turn, were exempted by the Railway Rates and Charges Order Confirmation Acts, 1891 and 1892, from the obligation to provide wagons for all kinds of commodities without excep- tion, section 2 {a) of the Scheme of Maximum Rates and Charges stating that— The provision of trucks is not scheduled in the maximum rates applicable to merchandise specified in Class A of the classification,^ and the company shall not be required to provide .trucks for the conveyance of such merchandise, or for the conveyance of lime in bulk or salt in bulk, or of the following articles when carried in such a manner as to injure the trucks of the company ; that is to say, ammoniacal liquor, coal-tar, gas-water, or gravel tarred for paving. Under these conditions, and with the expansion of British industries concerned in the commodities here in question, not only have colliery owners and other classes of traders provided their own railway wagons, but there have been brought into existence wagon-finance corporations, wagon-building companies, wagon-repairing companies, and influential societies, associations or federations formed to promote or to defend the ' The merchandise so specified as belonging to Class A includes basic slag, coal, coke, creosote, gravel, ironstone, manure (street, stable, farmyard, in bulk), sand, stone and undressed material for the repair of roads, and stone, wholly undressed and straight from a quarry, 691 692 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. common interests of those concerned. The wagon-finance corporations finance wagon-building companies or traders desirous of acquiring wagons of their own. The wagon-building companies construct wagons for or sell wagons direct to coUiery companies or traders ; dispose of them on hire-purchase agreements ; let them out on repairing leases, or, alter- natively, dispose of them to companies whose sole business it is to acquire wagons and let them out on hire on what are often very remunerative terms for the lenders, who, unHke the railway companies, are subject to no statutory Umitations in respect to the charges they make. Number of Privately-owned Wagons. It was not until after the signing of the Armistice that, as the result of an inquiry held under the Railway Wagons Census Order, 1918, definite information was available as to the exact number of privately-owned railway wagons in Great Britain. The statistics then compiled showed that, on the basis of the figures recorded in the census held on August ist, 1918, there were 626,223 private traders' wagons registered to run on railway companies' lines, and 91,460 standard-gauge wagons not allowed to run on railway companies' lines ; though of the latter number 4,012 were reported to be only temporarily disqualified for main-fine service. The total number of separate owners or hirers of wagons was 6,450, included therein being 700 colliery owners, with an average holding of 642 each, and 4,043 coal merchants, with an average holding of thirty- six. Wagons registered to run on railway companies' Hnes were owned or had been hired as follows : — Owners or Users. Open. Covered. Tank. Other Totals. Colliery Proprietors Coal Factors, Merchants and other Distributors . . Mine and Quarry Owners, Manu- facturers and Oil Distributors Railway Companies and Govern- ment Departments . . Totals The number of traders' wagons which the railway companies had on hire on August ist, 1918, was 13,521. It wiU be seen from this table that the question of privatdy-owned wagons was mainly a question of their use for the transport of coal. As regards other commodities, the traffic generally carried in 13,000 wagons was found to be iron ore and other minerals ; in 12,000, clay, sand, broken stone and materials for builders or road contractors ; in 9,000, stone, and in 8,800, general railway traffic. Of the 2,587 covered wagons, 1,126 were used for the transport of salt, while the 9,322 tank wagons were employed as follows : Petroleum and allied products, 2,444 ; coal-tar and ammoniacal liquor, and products derived therefrom, 4,456 ; other traffic (including acids, bleaching hquor, etc.), 2,422. 338,754 129 396 Kinds. 23 384.302 146,663 9 2 — 146,674 50.449 2.243 7.265 — 59,957 32,261 614,127 206 2,587 1.659 9.322 164 187 35.290 626,223 POOLING OF WAGONS : PRIVATELY-OWNED. 693 " The Bane of the English Railways." By the railway companies these privately-owned wagons had long been regarded as a nuisance, and there was no reason to doubt the satisfaction they would have felt if that nuisance could, by the adoption of some possible and practicable measure, have been dispensed with altogether Referring to the subject in the course of an address delivered by him at the Institution of Civil Engineers'on November i6th, 1909, Mr. (now Sir) John A. F. AspinaU said he did not think he was putting the matter too strongly when he spoke of them as "the bane of the EngUsh railways." They were, he declared, " a bane to progress ; they involved the risk of safety, and they were a constant source of unprofitable expenditure." In practice, the privately-owned wagon, having discharged its load, had to be sorted out specially from, it might be, a considerable number of others, and returned to its owner, the railway companies having no right to make use of it for back-loading. This meant that the companies had to incur, in the aggregate, a great expenditure in the provision of larger shunting yards and many miles of extra sidings as well as in supply- ing the locomotive power and the labour involved in shunting or hauhng a heavy flow of empty wagons alike in goods yards and depots, at points of exchange, and at junctions where trains are broken up and re-formed. In the case, for example, of coal sent from the Midlands by the London and North Western Railway to places south of the Thames, the empty wagons had first to be marshalled on the sidings at Willesden, in what was known as " coUiery area order." They were then sent to some point within such area, where they were sorted out afresh according to the special collieries to which they would have to be dispatched to final destination. Not only was the immense amount of empty haulage unprofitable, but it tended both to cause congestion and to reduce the power of the railway companies to secure the best results from their lines and their traffic resources. Apart from the question of expense and the possible delay of other traffic, a double waste of wagon and engine power was experienced, privately-owned wagons being run empty in one direction at the same time that railway-owned wagons were running empty in the other. In one instance, at least, a colliery company sending coal in their own wagons to a certain port refused permission to the railway company to make use of those wagons for the conveyance to them of consignments of hay for the ponies in their own collieries, the railway companies being thus com- pelled to return the coal wagons empty and provide another set of wagons for the hay going to the same destination. Prior, also, to the requirement that private owners' stock running on railway companies' lines should be buat to Railway Clearing House specifications, accidents due to inefficient construction or faulty condition were of frequent occurrence, and even to-day the risk of breakdown and of consequent interruptions of traffic i? greater than it would be if the whole of the wagons running on railways were under the control of the railway companies. The securing of such control had, in principle, been regarded by the 694 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. railway companies for a generation and more as one of the most desirable of possible improvements in railway operation. Had the wagons in question been available for general transport purposes in any direction a vast amount of shunting and empty haulage would have been saved ; a smaller capital expenditure on yards and sidings would have sufficed, and the risk of traffic congestion or traffic delays at the ports would have been diminished, if not, indeed, nullified, by the loading up with incoming traffic of, in the aggregate, many thousands of wagons which had to be returned empty to the senders because the railway companies had no right to make use of them. In these circumstances, the whole business of having to deal with private owners' wagons may well have appeared inexpedient, wasteful and uneconomic. Whatever justification, also, there may have been for it in the days when the railway was in its infancy, the system was directly opposed to the most advanced principles of railway transportation. While there was the further question whether it was in accordance with the best interests of the pubhc that certain traders should constitute a specially- privileged class who could run their own wagons on the railways, not only employing them exclusively for their own benefit, but doing so regardless of any disadvantages resulting therefrom to other traders or to the efficient operation of railways the primary duty of which wa? to serve the interests of the community as a whole. So the railway companies certainly favoured the principle of taking over private owners' wagons, and as fax back as 1875 the Midland Railway proposed to acquire by purchase the whole of the 40,000 wagons then being run on that system by 300 different owners. This proposal was not put into effect, however, until 1882, between which date and August, 1884, some 35,000 were so acquired with the idea that in this way the " bane " or the " nuisance " would be got rid of so far, at least, as the Midland were concerned ; though there is reason to beheve that what really hap- pened was that the owners of the wagons — many of which were in such a condition as to be fit only for breaking up — at once proceeded to acquire, with the money they had received from the Midland Company, new stock in place of that with which they had parted. Hence it was felt that, even if the companies in general had been wiUing to undertake the great expendi- ture involved in buying up the existing stock of private owners' wagons, there would be no guarantee that the traders might not start providing themselves with a fresh supply whenever they thought it expedient so to do. Apart, therefore, from the financial considerations involved, the desired change in conditions could have been secured, and the interests of the railway companies could, as it seemed, be adequately protected, only by the passing of an Act of Parhament which, while empowering the railway companies to acquiire the existing wagon stock of private owners, must also have deprived British traders of their statutory rights to run their own wagons on the railway. The attempt to pass such an Act would inevitably have provoked a formidable opposition from the POOLING OF WAGONS : PRIVATELY-OWNED. 695 interests concerned, and these interests were so widespread and so powerful that down to the outbreak of the war and, indeed, for some time afterwards, no action had been taken by the railway companies as a whole to secure the bringing of traders' wagons under their own control. Action by the Coal Mining Organisation Committee. Owing to the view they had adopted — that the wagon troubles experi- enced at the outset of the war were due to misusage rather than to shortage of wagons — the Railway Executive Committee took no steps, in the first instance, to promote any scheme designed to secure railway control over privately-owned wagons ; but much public attention continued to be paid to the subject of a pooUng of wagons, and in the autumn of 1915 the Coal Mining Organisation Committee, appointed by the Government in the early part of that year, suggested to the Railway Executive that, with a view to faciUtate the production of coal by lessening the risk of coUieries having to stop through a shortage of wagons, the Government should assume control over the coUiery-owned wagons in certain districts and (while paying a reasonable sum to the owners for the hire) transfer them to the railways, so that all the wagons in each district concerned would be available for coal-transport purposes, independently of distinc- tions of ownership. It was thought that, if this were done, there would be a great saving in time and in the use of engine power for shunting since there would no longer be any need to sort out and return particular wagons to particular collieries. On this proposal being inquired into by a sub-committee of the Railway Executive Committee, it was intimated that the suggestion would be favourably entertained by the railway interests provided a financial scheme satisfactory to all concerned could be evolved ; though it was further pointed out to the Coal Mining Organisation Committee that there were a number of compUcations which had not been sufficiently taken into account. In their second report [Cd. 8147], issued December loth, 1915, the Coal Mining Organisation Committee referred to the fact that collieries had been standing at intervals for lack of transport, both railway and shipping, and proceeded ; — In this connection we have been advised that considerable advantage would be secured by some system of pooling of traders' and railway wagons in different districts. We recognise, however, that the value of any such proposal would depend on the simplicity and efficiency of the system of pooling that might be adopted, and, also, that it would be most desirable that the proposed system should, if possible, be adopted with the concurrence of the coalowners and other interested parties in different parts of the country. We recommend, therefore, that without delay the Railway Executive be advised to prepare a scheme of pooling' suitable to the different districts, and that it be submitted to the coalowners and' others for their consideration in the national interest. The Government might consider, upon the situation thus disclosed, as to the advisability of legislation upon the question. It should be understood that any such scheme would operate only during the period of the war. , 3A 696 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. The committee reverted to the subject in their third report [Cd. 8345], issued in September, 1916. The question of devising a general pooling, district by district, of coal-wagons had, they said, proceeded a little further, but nothing had been done towards putting into effect a pooling of privately-owned wagons. The proposal for the working out of such a scheme had met with great opposition from the owners of wagons, although a conference held at the Board of Trade in December, 1915, had " somewhat allayed the storm of opposition." Since that meeting the British Wagon Co., Ltd., had written to the Board of Trade that, although its directors were still strongly of opinion that it would be exceedingly difficult to establish a pooUng scheme, they would, if the national interests rendered the adoption of such a course necessary, be prepared to give what assistance they could. The report continued : " The Railway Depart- ment of the Board of Trade, however, concluded that it was not desirable to proceed further in this direction, and so the matter stands." The proposal of the Coal Mining Organisation Committee for a pooHng of wagons in certain districts in the interests of a particular industry would, in any case, have been an inadequate solution of a far-reaching problem, and it was not carried further. An effective remedy for the difficulties experienced was to be sought for, rather, in other directions. There had, in fact, already been established a scheme which was to have an important bearing on the further development of the subject. A Lancashire and Yorkshire Precedent. In the early months of 1912 the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company found themselves faced by exceptional difficulties in handling their traffic in the port of Liverpool The company had long been dealing there with considerable quantities of coal worked over their lines from collieries in South and West Yorkshire, as weU as from nearer pits in Lanca- shire, for shipment, but the usual practice was that the wagons which conveyed the coal to Liverpool should be worked back empty to the various collieries. This arrangement was the more unfortunate since it tended to increase the -normal deficiency of wagons at Liverpool due to the fact that the ordinary import trade was greater than the export business. While, therefore, trains of empty wagons were being sent away from Liverpool, other trains of empty wagons were being taken to Liverpool to make up the number required over and above those which had brought goods to the port for shipment. The situation became especially difficult in February of the year mentioned when, simultaneously with the national coal strike (whch led alike to over a million miners and surfacemen coming out and to an almost general paralysis of the industries of the c&untry), the traffic passing through the port of Liverpool was especially heavy. Under these circumstances, the supply of railway-owned wagons was insufficient to meet the requirements of the port, and, as a temporary measure, the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company arranged with various colliery companies in the districts served by them that, on the basis of terms and conditions agreed to, they should load up the POOLING OF WAGONS : PRIVATELY-OWNED. 697 empty coal-wagons with merchandise at the Liverpool goods depots, situate close to the spot where the coal was tipped, and attach them to the fast goods trains going to stations on the line of route " homeward " towards the collieries to which the wagons were to be returned. This arrangement remained in force until traffic assumed more normal condi- tions and the ordinary supply of railway-owned wagons (coupled with the better weather and the longer periods of dayhght during which the wagons could be discharged at the stations) sufficed to meet requirements. In December, 1915, the wagon resources of the Lancashire and York- shire (in common with those of other British railway companies) were severely taxed owing to the enormous volume of munitions and other Government traffic to be dealt with, and the use of private wagons was thereupon resorted to by the company for a further period of six months. The earlier experiences as to the great advantage to be derived from the system were now fully confirmed. The working of the traffic was carried on with greater freedom and efficiency and the amount of empty coal- wagon running was reduced to the lowest point. Towards the end of 1916 a stiU greater increase in Government business had to be dealt with on the railways under weather conditions which were exceedingly bad, if not actually the worst on record. Wagon movements were hampered, not only through difficulties in working over the railway lines but, also, because of delays in discharging at stations and the slow cartage over bad roads. The Lancashire and Yorkshire, accordingly, again approached the owners of private wagons, a large majority of whom readily acquiesced in the use of their wagons for goods traffic on the return journey, they having found that, on the whole, no delay occurred as the result of such user. Under the working scheme adopted by the company, a private wagon, after being emptied of its load, was taken possession of, loaded up afresh, and shunted out with other traffix for conveyance to destination, taking its place with ordinary loads carried in Lancashire and Yorkshire or other railway-owned wagons. The period of user extended from the time the wagon was thus taken possession of until it had been discharged at the destination station, and was ready for empty transit to the colliery to which it was labelled. For the user during each day or part of a day (exclusive of Sunday) included in this period the railway company paid one shiUing. Special arrangements were mad© to ensure the return of the wagons with the least possible delay. The invoice issued by the sending station for goods contained in privately-owned wagons was stamped as follows : — The wagons shown on this invoice being private owners' vehicles MUST be discharged and sent forward to colliery ON DAY OF ARRIVAL. The sending station was to supply the Chief Goods Manager, at the end of each day, with full particulars of all privately-owned wagons used for goods traffic, and the Chief Goods Manager was then to advise each receiving station that the wagons must be discharged and sent forward 698 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. to the collieries on the day of arrival. The receiving agent, in turn, was required to complete the form, showing actual date of arrival and dis- charge, and then return it to the Chief Goods Manager, by whom any undue detention at the receiving station would be noted and investigated. Provision was made for advising each owner, the day after dispatch, of the use being made of his wagons and payment of the amounts due for wagon hire was to be monthly. Under these conditions, the general experience of traders on the Lancashire and Yorkshire was that, not only was there no delay in the return to them of wagons loaded up on the homeward journey, but such wagons were even arriving sooner than if they had been sent back as empties. From the point of view of the railway interests the back-loading arrangement offered the further advantage that while the railway company could make use, whenever convenient, of the wagons coming into the scheme, it paid only for those it used, and, in respect to these, only for the period of actual user. ■ Wagons for Overseas : Compensation at Home. When, in December, 1916, the British railway companies undertook to provide the 20,000 wagons needed to meet the requirements of our troops overseas, they did so with the expectation and on the understanding that they would be able to obtain compensation, in the way of an equivalent number of wagons in other directions, and thus be enabled, still to supply the needs of the traffic situation at home, such compensation being afforded to them, in part by the better working of the railway-owned wagons remaining in the country, and in part by their being enabled to obtain control over the available stock of privately-owned wagons. It was regarded as preferable, from the point of view of our Armies, that the 20,000 wagons to be sent to France should aU be provided out of railway-owned stock in order that the number of types could be reduced to the lowest possible number ; but the view was taken that, although railway managers had been accustomed to regard privately-owned wagons as a " bane," a " nuisance " and even as a " curse," control of those wagons by the railway companies would, at least, effect a considerable reduction in the numbers of locomotives and men engaged on empty-wagon haulage and shunting; and increase the efficiency of the working stock. Much pressure, also, was being brought to bear by various Government departments with a view to inducing them to adopt this policy, and on December 5th, 1916, the Railway Executive appointed a committee of experts to consider and report as to the best means of giving effect to the proposal that private owners' wagons should, with certain exceptions, be placed under the control of the companies. On December 8th, follow- ing on the report made by the said committee, the Railway Executive requested nine of the leading companies each to appoint a representative to sit on a committee which would consider (i) the most practical measures to be adopted for the carrying out of the proposal in question ; (2) the POOLING OF WAGONS: PRIVATELY-OWNED. 699 restrictions which should be put into force for the proper working and distribution of the wagons when brought under thecontrol of the railway companies, and (3) the best means of raising charges for the use of the wagons after they had been taken over. So it was that the Railway Executive Committee included among their proposals to the President of the Board of Trade the placing of privately-owned wagons under the control of the railway companies, and so it was that the President of the Board of Trade, in turn, secured the power, through the Order in Council gazetted December 13th, 1916, to make orders for, among other purposes, enabling the Board " to take possession of any private owner's wagons and to use those wagons in such manner as they think best in the interests of the country, as a whole, on such conditions as to payment, use or otherwise as may be provided by the Order." (See p. 141.) The whole subject was, admittedly, taken up, discussed and decided upon with an express speed in keeping. with the urgency of the needs of the transport situation overseas. It is no less certain that the Railway Executive Committee, in a spirit of optimism and influenced by the best of intentions, believed at the time that the scheme in question might be made a practicable one ; though as the result of much conference and negotiation with the interests concerned, leading to a fuller appreciation of the difficulties and disadvantages to be faced, the conclusion had to be formed that a general handing over of privately-owned wagons to the railway companies under war-time conditions would lead only to any existing confusion becoming still worse confounded. A National Scheme Unattainable. Almost at once it was found that, if the common-user of privately- owned stock in general were adopted, it would have to be confined to certain areas inasmuch as there was no hope of appljdng it on a national basis. A conference held at Cardiff in January, 1917, between representa- tives of the London and North Western and the Great Western Railways on the one side and of the South Wales railway companies on the other led to the conclusion that South Wales would have to be omitted from the proposal because the local conditions there in connection with the shipment of coal — and it was, of course, a question in which coal-wagons were mainly concerned — were altogether different from local conditions in the colliery districts of England. Then it became obvious that Durham and Northumberland would also have to be left out since most of the coal put on rail in those districts was conveyed in .railway-owned wagons. The figures obtained by the census of privately-owned wagons carried out in August, 1918, showed, in fact, that the sum total of wagons of this type in the two counties in question was only 4,231. In Scotland, also, a separate scheme would be necessary owing to the difference in the condi- tions there as compared with those in England, and a distinct scheme, applying to Scotland only, was, in fact, already under consideration. 700 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. The idea of a " general pool " of privately-owned wagons was thus doomed from the outset to a limitation within certain areas of the king- dom ; but the railway experts who spent not only weeks but months, if not the best part of a year, in endeavouring to draw up a really practical working scheme which could be applied even within these said areas only found that the purposes especially aimed at were beyond the range of practical railway economics. The Railway Managers certainly retained throughout, as a matter of principle, their opinion that great economies in the working of the trafl&c would, in addition to other advantages, be gained if the whole of the wagons used in the trade of the country were controlled by the jailway companies ; but their expression of this view was subject to the proviso that such wagons were, in the main, built to a standard pattern suitable generally for carrying aU classes of traffic. This was an entirely different proposition from that of taking over the existing stock of privately-owned wagons which, with the almost endless diversity both in their types and in the conditions for which they were used, or to which they might alone be applied, were in no wide or general sense interchangeable with railway-owned wagons or even with one another. The situation in these respects was, at the time — and the same is prob- ably the case to-day — not appreciated by the advocates, official or other- wise, of a general pool of all railway wagons, by whomsoever owned ; and it may be in the public interest that the factors in a question Hkely, no doubt, to be raised afresh at some future time, should be made clear. Varying Types of Peivately-Owned Wagons. Privately-owned wagons, which, as already shown, are used mainly in the transport of coal, are built specially for the class of trade they are designed to serve, and they are constructed in such a way as to suit to the best advantage the local conditions of the coUierieS, works, ports or places in or at which such particular class of trade is carried on. Even when, as in the case of those constructed in recent years, they conform on general hues to a standard specification, they may stiU represent, in regard to matters of detail, variations which impose strict Hmitations on the scope of their employment from the point of view of common-user. The greatest variation of all is in regard to their doors. Many of those used for the shipment of coal have end doors in order that, on the wagons being raised from the railway lines by the hoists provided for that purpose, the coal may be tipped direct into the vessel alongside. Such end-door wagons are set apart for this particular trade. Large niunbers of other wagons have bottom doors, or (in smaller proportion) " hoppers," so that the coal may be dropped between the railway lines into bunkers or on to conveyors at the gas works, electricity works, iron works or other industrial establishments to which alone, under these circumstances, they can be loaded. StiU other wagons have side doors, end doors, and bottom doors in varying combinations. Thus a classification in regard to the position of their doors of colliery-owned coal -wagons included in POOLING OF WAGONS: PRIVATELY-OWNED. 701 the Census of Private Traders' Wagons, 1919, showed the following per- centages : End doors only, 2 per cent. ; side doors only, S per cent. ; end and side, 55 per cent. ; end, side and bottom, 33 per cent. ; side and bottom, 3 per cent. ; hopper wagons, 2 per cent. It was found, also, when the census was taken, that particular coUiery or shipping districts favoured certain t37pes of coal-wagons as being those best suited to their own requirements. - In South Wales the number of wagons in use which had both end and side doors attained a percentage of no less than 93.9. A similar strong preference for the same kind of wagons prevailed in Scotland, Gloucester and Somerset. In Yorkshire, Derbyshire, Nottinghamshire, Leicestershire and Warwickshire wagons having end, side and bottom doors were favoured to the extent of 75 per cent. In the North- Western Counties wagons of the two tj^jes here in question were found in nearly equal proportions. In the Staffordshire, Salop and Worcestershire districts wagons having side doors only and wagons with end doors as well as side doors were the chief classes and nearly equal, though a number of other wagons all having end, side and bottom doors were in use there. The number of coUiery-owned, as distinct from railway-owned, coal-wagons in use in the counties of North- umberland and Durham was found to be only 4,231, and, of these, 3,938 were hopper wagons out of a total of 7,096 wagons of this type reported for the whole of Great Britain. Wagons adapted to one part of the country or to one district on a company's system, might thus be of no service elsewhere. Then the trucks varied in dimensions — ^there were, more especially, 8-ton, lo-ton, and 12-ton trucks ; and they differed in height or in other details to meet the special requirements of the screens and weighbridges at the collieries for which they had been provided. Even when the wagons had side doors, and may thus have appeared to be better adapted for common-user purposes, this advantage was handicapped, if not negatived, by the fact that, in a vast majority of instances, the door did not open right up to the top of the wagon-side, but was surmounted by a rigid plank extending the entire length of the .wagon, rendering the conveyance of general merchandise on to or off the wagon a matter of considerable inconvenience. The proportion of those found by the wagon census to be equipped with this rigid top-plank was 84 per cent. Fixed Points and Short Journeys. For the most part, privately-owned wagons were run between more or less fixed points. Their destinations were, in many instances, painted upon them— an arrangement which facilitated shunting. These fixed points, also, often represented short or comparatively short distances, and it might well happen that the wagons, though answering the purposes for which they were specially wanted, were not fit for longer runs or for general user even in respect to the coal industry for which, hitherto, they may have been expressly employed. When the Admiralty began to 702 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. supplement their consignments by sea of coal from South Wales to the North, forwarding others by rail, the sidings in the initial stages of the journey were soon occupied by broken-down coal-wagons unequal to the longer run ; and when, on the outbreak of the war. Admiralty coal went in ever-increasing quantities by the land in preference to the sea route, special steps had to be taken to ensure that only such wagons as would be able to make the journey to Scotland or the North were used for the purpose. Repair Arrangements. Arrangements for the repair, greasing, overhaul, etc., of coal wagons were also largely governed by the fact of the wagons running mainly between fixed points. Contracts for periods ranging from one month to ten, fourteen and even twenty-one years were made with repairing firms who had set up extensive works and engaged large staffs for the purpose, and who kept, either at points on the routes taken by the wagons or at the usual terminal points, supplies of all the spare parts, axles, springs, etc., likely to be required for the repair of the particular types of wagons in respect to which their contracts had been made. In the types of materials used for the construction and repair of privately-owned wagons in general there was infinite variety, and no ordinary firm could undertake to stock a complete collection thereof, whether at its head establishment or at its branches. During the course of the discussions which arose on these and cognate questions in 1917 it was stated that of axle boxes alone over 500 patterns had been scheduled. Of brasses there were over 250 patterns. In many cases, also, the parts were not interchangeable. Under existing conditions these arrangements might continue without serious incon- venience ; but if, under a general-common-user, the wagons were diverted from their usual employment and broke down at a considerable distance from their present line of route, much delay and inconvenience might arise. In any case the arrangements in question would be upset, and the railway companies would have to assume responsibility for the repair of practically the whole stock of privately-owned wagons passing under their control, and this, too, in addition to their corresponding obligations in respect to their own wagons. Taking into consideration the difficulties they were already experiencing in connection with the securing of adequate staff and materials, they coiild not possibly hope, under war-time con- ditions, at least, to fulfil the new and greatly-increased obligations which would thus devolve upon them. Organisation for Distribution. One essential need in the working of a control and general-common- user by the railway companies of the entire stock of privately-owned wagons would have been the creation by them of an organisation for the distribution of that stock among the colliery owners, coal merchants and other traders who would require to make use, under a hire system, of what might previously have been their own property. The work thus POOLING OF WAGONS : PRIVATELY-OWNED. 703 to be done would include the allocation to each particular colliery, works, or factory of the exact type of wagon which, as we have seen, might alofte suit the local conditions either there or at the port of shipment. There would, in effect, be no really " common-user " of the wagons in regard to distribution. The wagons sent (say) to collieries A, B and C respectively wovild at least have to be of the same type as before. The forwarding there of others might involve trouble, delay and grave inconvenience to every one concerned — the railway companies included. There would be a risk of congestion and empty running becoming worse than ever. At present these iijjportant matters of detail are looked after by the traders who now control the wagons. Under the new conditions the railway companies would require to get together a large staff of expert manipulators who would have to become acquainted with the local conditions of every possible applicant for common-user wagons, know exactly where the wagons that- alone would suit him might be found when they were required, and be able to ensure not alone their prompt supply and their efficient running, but, also, their prompt return to stock-on- hand when no longer wanted. In regard to the last-mentioned con- sideration, it might be pointed out that the owners of existing private traders' wagons are free to use their own property as warehouses on wheels for such periods as they may think fit — subject to payment of siding rent if the wagons are standing on railway sidings — ^though it would be to their own interest to get as much use out of them as they could. When they hired the wagons from the railway companies controlling them under a common-user system, they might still find it of advantage to employ them, at times, on the warehouse principle, and the obligation of ensuring that the wagons were returned to common stock within reasonable time would then devolve upon the railway companies. In that case two questions would arise : (i) What would be the nature and extent of the power the companies might have, under the law, to interfere ? and, (2) assuming they had the legal right of interference, would they, whilst the war was stiU proceeding — whatever might be possible at a later date — be able to get together the necessary staff, and to create the elaborate organisation, by means of which they could alone hope to enforce their right? A demurrage system having its ramifications throughout the entire systems of the railways on which privately-owned wagons are now worked would be among the needs of the situation ; and this in itself, apart from all the other things that would have had to be done, was more than the railway companies could possibly have undertaken in 1917-18. Financial Considerations. For these and for various other reasons, into which it is unnecessary here to enter, the conclusion was reached that the taking-over, for the purposes of a common-user pool, of the entire stock of privately-owned wagons, which in themselves did not possess the fundamental principle of interchangeabUity, was not only impracticable but would add new 704 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. difficulties to the railway situation, and might well lead to such a state of dislocation on the lines as would render their operation more or less impossible. It became no less certain, also, that, even if the scheme had been practicable from a working point of view, it would, financially, have involved an enormous additional cost which could not possibly be justified by the value and extent of any advantages to which it might lead. Control of the entire stock of privately-owned wagons would, pre- sumably, have been based on the principle, not of purchase outright, but of a dual hire-system — ^the Government guaranteeing to pay to the owners certain rates of hire for the wagons, according to their capacity, etc., while the railway companies, in turn, would charge rates of hire to the individual traders to whom they allocated the wagons, according to their requirements. This was understood to be the main idea in a scheme, specially designed for application to Scotland, which was under considera- tion early in 1917, though not actually brought into operation. Financially, however, and apart altogether from other possible objections, the unsoundness of the proposal speedily became apparent. The Government would have paid to the owners a fixed rental for the whole of the period during which they had the wagons under their control ; the traders would have paid the charges in respect to hire for such periods only as they were using the wagons, and receipts on the latter account must necessarily have failed to cover outgoings on the former since it was impossible that the one could be made to equate the other. Thou- sands, also, of wagons would still have had to run back empty where the flow of traffic was in one direction only. Under existing conditions, this was the affair of the private trader who owned the wagons. Under the new conditions it would be the affair of the Government, who would pay the owners for the continuous hire of the wagons whether these were still bringing in revenue or not. Assuming, for the sake of illustration, that the figures applying to the original Scottish scheme would apply to the entire stock of private traders' wagons in Great Britain, it was calculated that the net annual deficit to be borne by the British Government, as the outcome of the financial situation thus likely to arise, would be over ^4,000,000. Common-User in Instalments. While this question of wagon-pooling had been taken up in the earHest stages of the traffic troubles arising out of the war, one must bear well in mind that it began to be discussed with especial emphasis in the winter of 1916-17 owing, in part, to the prospect of a greatly-increased movement in explosives, and, in part, to the need which then arose that the railway companies should get " compensation " for those of their own wagons they were preparing to send to France. A letter from the Ministry of Munitions, written in January, 1917, called attention to what was repre- sented to be the serious position in regard to the supply of wagons at home ; to the number of complaints the Ministry were receiving ; to the POOLING OF WAGONS : PRIVATELY-OWNED. 705 length of time the question of the pooling of wagons had been under consideration, and to the very partial nature of the results thus far obtained. The letter further said : " In Mr. Addison's opinion, nothing less than the common-user of the whole of the wagons in the covmtry, both railway-owned and belonging to private traders, will adequately relieve the present serious situation." The Railway Executive Committee, however, had themselves arrived at the definite conclusion that, apart from the prospective heavy cost to the Government for the hire of privately-owned wagons under a pooling scheme arrangement, and apart, also, from the uncertain nature of the results likely to be obtained, it would be impossible for the railway companies to handle the entire stock of privately-owned wagons if suddenly added to their own. What they did was to summon to the Railway Clearing House, on February i6th, 1917, a meeting of Goods Managers and Superintendents to whom Sir Robert Turnbull, acting on behalf of the Railway Executive, explained the views of that body, concluding with a suggestion that they should direct their attention to a possible taking over of the said wagons, not in their entirety, but in piecemeal fashion, further dividing the country into areas, if necessary, for the purposes of any scheme they might draw up. The Goods Managers and Superintendents discussed the subject, as desired, but left to the Goods Managers of certain leading companies, viz., Great Central, Great Eastern, Great Northern, Great Western, Lancashire and Yorkshire, London and North Western, London and South Western, Midland and North Eastern — ^the responsibiUty of making the recommendations. The officers in question met on February 26th, and, while reaffirming, as a general principle, the desirability of the railway companies having control over all wagons running on their lines, decided to recommend, as a tentative arrangement : — 1. That the Board of Trade should be asked to issue an Order empowering the railway companies to load on the homeward journey private owners' wagons after being unloaded on the outward journey, on terms to be arranged. 2. That the Board of Trade be also asked to issue an Order empowering the railway companies to hire from private wagon owners, on terms to be arranged, certain of their wagons to supplement the railway companies' common-user stock. It is suggested that this hiring should be at least to the extent necessary to replace the wagons sent, or to be sent, overseas. Recommendations were made accordingly to the Board of Trade. They were cordially endorsed by the President, Sir Albert Stanley, who, at a conference over which he presided on March ist, 1917, attended by the Controller of ^fines, and representatives of the Railway Department, Board of Trade, the Railway Executive Committee, the Mining Association of Great Britain, the leading associations outside those of the coal-owners in connection with private owners' wagons (namely, London Coal Mer- chants' Society, Railway Carriage and Wagon Builders and Financiers' ParUamentary Association, Association of Private Owners of Railway RoUing Stock and the London Factors' Society), and leading individual 7o6 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. firms of coal merchants, etc., explained the nature of the position in which the railway companies were placed ; declared it was absolutely necessary that some degree of relief should be given to them in return for the wagons they were sending overseas, and intimated that, should the need for so doing arise, the Board of Trade would be prepared to give to the railway companies at once authority to take general control over all kinds of wagons and use them as they might think best, whether for general use or for use on their return journey when empty. " We are not," he added, " going to enter into any particular scheme for pooling at once. There are grave difficulties. in the way of establishing a complete system of pooUng immediately. We have got to do it in stages." Sir Albert Stanley further informed the conference that the interests concerned in wagons owned or used by colliery proprietors would bef dealt with thr.ough the Controller of Mines. A Back-Loading Order. So it was that, on March i6th, 1917, the President of the Board of Trade issued, under Regulation 7b of the Defence of 'the Realm Regulations, an Order giving power to the railway companies, on terms to be arranged, to take temporary possession of jJrivately-owned wagons and use them for back-loading on the return journey when they would otherwise travel empty. In itself the course thus taken was an application to the railways in common of the back-loading system already brought into operation on the Lancashire and Yorkshire (see pp. 696-9), with, however, this very material difference — ^that whilst the working of the Lancashire and Yorkshire scheme was dependent on the good-wiU of the wagon-owners concerned, the issue of the new Order gave to all railway companies power to make use of the wagons, under the conditions stated, as a matter of right. The Order also avoided all the complications involved in the main question ; but the railway companies regarded it as one of those proposals which might very well be taken in the first instance, in advance of any adoption of general-common-user, although it was understood that the committee which already had this matter under consideration would continue their inquiries. As agreed with the owners, the payment to be made to them by the railway companies for the use of the wagons for back-loading was not to exceed one shilling per wagon per day, exclusive of Sundays and Bank Holidays, to apply as from the day of loading. In the first instance, the day of loading and the day of unloading were to count as one ; but in June, 1917, it was arranged that thenceforward they should be reckoned separately. The company's traffic rates were to be charged to the trader for any traffic that might be carried for him. With a view to ensuring that the use of the wagons shotild be properly regulated, an elaborate series of regulations, to be observed by all concerned, was issued by the Railway Executive Committee. POOLING OF WAGONS : PRIVATELY-OWNED. 707 Considerable use of the wagons on their homeward journey was made by the railway companies and much advantage in the working of the traffic was derived by them therefrom. The difficulties which had been experienced as a result of the shortage of wagons were, in fact, much reduced by the back-loading arrangement. The number of wagons actually made use of under the terms of the Order from March i6th. DBEWEOFTKREIIUI PBITATE OWHERSr WABOHS (Ike when Empty). Order, dated March 16, 1917, made by the Board of Trade under Regulation 7b of the Defence of the Realm R egulations. Whereas by Regulation 7b of the Defence of the Realm Regulations the Board of Trade have power, for the purpoee of nuiking the most efficient use of railway plant or labour, with a view to the successful prosecution of the war, to make orders, amongst other things, for enabling the Board of Trade to take possession of any private owners' wagons and to use those wagons in such manner as they think best in the interests of the country as a whole on such conditions as to payment, use and otherwise ss tnay be provided by the order. Now, therefore, in pursuance of their power under that Regulation and of all other powers enabling them in that behali; the Board of Trade hereby order, as tbllows: 1. Whn* m privftte ow&ar'i myon would oUmwiM b« Mat on a jonrsvj empty tlu Boud of Tndo may taka pomuion of tbo wa^on fer tbmt jonner, and pTo ■uoh dirtotaono mtk raoMot to dift cMoo u whioh pouofliion u to bo w tuoo and tho nio md loadiaf of • wuos ox which poMonion is lo tAhm M tboy think fit. ■ so tahm M tb«7 think fit. a Whon po fln i i oi i on ia M takm of » wafOB. dura abaU ba paid to the ownar tar tha «ia of tha waffoD aiuh amount aa may ba acroad or aa may bo dataniunad, in dafkolt of actaamantk hj tlia Bailway and Canal Commiaaion or by an Arbitrator appoiutad bf that OomuiMiuL 3. Tha ownar of any wacon and any othar panon aflbctad by diraotiona Man nndar thia Oidar ahall comfOj with any diractions ao ciran and gin all naaonabla &a£tiaa fbr mnjiam eat thoaa diraotiona. 4. Any paraon acting in aootrarention of, or &i]in( to oomply with, any of tha proviaiena of Ihia Oidar ia pulty of a annunaiy oflbnoa afainat tha Daftnoa of tha Baalm Bagobtiona. w4J?nM°;?h«'S?p^)''&£. MW *"^ "»• ■»»'•»«-*. I««u Ow«.- £l. H. STANLE7, 1917, to the end of February, 1919, was, approxiiiiately, 280,000. Nor was there evidence of any material inconvenience having been suffered by the owners themselves. Cases did occur from time to time in which there had been a certain amount of detention in the return of wagons (though even then compensation was paid to the owners in the form of wagon hire) ; but the more general experience was that the owners got their wagons back as soon as they had done before. 7o8 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. The Hire of Privately-owned Wagons. When the various questions arising in connection with the Back- Loading Order had been satisfactorily arranged, attention could be concentrated to a greater degree on the further proposal that the railway companies should hire from private-wagon owners, on terms to be arranged, certain of their wagons to supplement the companies' own common-user stock. In this latter proposal there was nothing new. Railway companies had long been accustomed to hiring wagons from private owners to meet temporary deficiencies in their own supplies in times of a pressure of traffic, and at the opening of the war they aheady had, in the aggregate, some thousands of those wagons at their disposal. AU, therefore, that was now aimed at was an extension of the practice, and the present needs of the railway companies resolved themselves into clearly-defined Umits. The companies were sending 20,000 wagons overseas, and they wanted another 20,000 to take the place of these in order that they could still meet transport requirements at home. They did not want, and they felt that they absolutely could not then do with, the entire stock of wagons belonging to private traders which certain State departments were urging upon them with so much persistency to take over. " Let us have what we really require," said the companies, in effect. " If 20,000, of the type most likely to be of service to us, should not be sufficient, and if we find that the arrangement is one that can be worked to advantage, we can come again, and ask for, perhaps, another 20,000 ; but don't expect us, in the middle of a great war, to take over hundreds of thousands of wagons more than we want and involve ourselves in such complications and disorganisation as would threaten to dislocate the entire railway system." It was hoped, and understood, that 12,000 of the said 20,000 wagons would be supplied to the companies, on hire, by coal factors and other traders apart from colUery owners, and that the Coal Controller would himself arrange to obtain the balance from the colliery owners. The railway companies had thus to ascertain from the factors and others, in the first instance, the terms on which they would be prepared to lend their wagons. On March 7th, 1917, the Railway Executive Committee appointed a sub-committee to meet representatives of private-wagon owners to consider whether it would be possible to effect some arrangement for the acquiring of control of private wagons as and when necessary by railway companies, and the leading organisations of owners and workers of private wagons, acting on a suggestion made to them by the President of the Board of Trade, appointed, in turn, a sub-committee of their own to facilitate the carrying on of the negotiations. This latter sub- committee consisted of representatives of the Society of Coal Merchants, the Association of Private Wagon Owners, the Wholesale Factors' Association, the Association of Wagon Financing Companies, Messrs. POOLING OF WAGONS: PRIVATELY-OWNED. 709 Hurst, Nelson & Co., Messrs. Wm. Cory & Sons, Ltd., and the British Wagon Company. On March 21st, 1917, the two sub-committees met in order to discuss the general question, the hope being entertained that it would be possible to make such arrangements as would obviate any necessity for the President of the Board of Trade to make the Order he had spoken of on March ist, 1917, which would have given the railway companies the right to take over privately-owned wagons compulsorily, in case of need. Certain terms, which were to include cost of repairs at present rates and prices, were handed to the representatives of the Rail- way Executive as those which the private owners were prepared to offer, and it was further arranged at the meeting that Mr. G. C. Locket, on behalf of the Association of Private Wagon Owners, should submit a statement of the difficulties they anticipated in the adoption of a scheme for handing over to the railway companies the control of privately-owned wagons. The statement was presented shortly afterwards, and on April 25th there was a meeting between members of the Railway Executive Committee (supported by the Goods Managers of some of the leading companies) and representatives of the private-wagon owners to discuss in detail the difficulties thus suggested as likely to arise. The statement dealt with the arrangements under which (as mentioned in the earlier part of the present Chapter), the repairs of privately-owned wagons were carried out ; it foreshadowed the troubles that might be experienced in this connection under a system of common-user ; it alluded to the different t37pes of wagons and to the confusion Ukely to arise on the withdrawal of the present watchful care on the part of the owners to ensure the forwarding of the right kind of wagon to particular destinations ; it laid special emphasis on the importance of maintaining intact the distribution of coal throughout the country, and, in regard to any system of general pooling, it said : — In the opinion of my committee, it would be unwise and hazardous in the extreme to make any change of such a far-reaching character at a time of stress and diffi- culty like the present. They would therefore much prefer to see some arrangement made for a limited general-user of privately-owned wagons and where necessary on equitable terms, and they believe this would go far to relieve the present diffi- culty. If found reasonably adequate, it would certainly be far less expensive than any pooling scheme and would not dislocate existing trade conditions. Many matters of detail were discussed at the meeting, and it was considered by the railway representatives that certain, at least, of the difficulties suggested should be capable of adjustment. The General Question. It will have been noticed that, although the Railway Executive Committee had arrived at a pretty definite conclusion as to the limits in the number of privately-owned wagons they really wanted to help them out of a difficulty, they had not shelved the question as to a complete taking over of the wagons on the lines originally suggested, but had 710 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. arranged to have further inquiries made into the subject as a whole. These inquiries were carried on by the sub-committee appointed on March 7th, 1917, and an instructive report was presented by them towards the end of August, 1917. Among other things the report helped to show more clearly why it was that the idea of a common-user of privately-owned wagons failed to be regarded with favour by, at least, the interests represented on the private owners' sub-committee. Among the reasons given as those which had been advanced against the proposition were the following : — The ownership by merchants and factors of wagons is not of itself a profitable speculation, but for the purposes of carrying on their business such ownership is necessary for meeting their contracts. The fact that their wagons to-day are delivered by the railway companies to the collieries from whom they purchase their coal assures to them the coal being put into them, and, these wagons being part of the daily supply to the pits, the collieries are left no option but to load them out. Any interference with this method of conducting business, and particularly the adoption of the principle of common-user by the railways and the colliery owners, would, to a large extent, if not altogether, destroy this advantage and leave them entirely in the hands of the latter as to continuity of supply. Reference was made in the report to the variety of arrangements under which the wagons were built, purchased or let out under different kinds of contracts ; the complications as to repairs, and so on. The sub-committee did not think these particular difficulties insuperable, but there were other considerations which would necessarily influence a final decision. On the question of terms, for example, it had been stated on behalf of the wagon owners that they would require the following pa3niients : — Wagons not exceeding 8 tons capacity of a lo-tons capacity >. 12 ,, ,, ., 15 .. ,. 20 6/- per week. 7/- .. 8/- .. 10/- .. 12/6 These figures would include cost of repairs at contract rates and prices then existing. Having gone closely into the matter, the sub-committee were of opinion that if the whole of the private wagons in question — ^that is to say, wagons other than those owned by colliery proprietors — ^were taken over on these terms, the pa3mients would amount to about £6,000,000 per year. The Coal Controller, while most insistent upon the importance of securing that a pooling of wagons did not in any way impair the supply of wagons to the colheries, had intimated that it might be taken that, in the event of any scheme of pooling privately-owned wagons being adopted or recommended, colliery-owned wagons could be included therein. Assuming that the payments for the hire of these wagons would be the same as in the case of the non-colHery-owned, this would make the total cost of a common-user scheme applying to privately-owned POOLING OF WAGONS: PRIVATELY-OWNED. 711 wagons in general somewhere between £12,000,000 and £14,000,000 per year. Against these outgoings there would have to be put the earning capacity of the wagons. On the basis of such figures as were available, the sub-committee thought the earnings of the wagons might be estimated at, approximately, seven and three-quarter million pounds per annum ; but this would still leave an annual deficit of, possibly, up to six millions per annum. As regards the use to which the railway companies would be able to put the wagons when they had them under their control, the sub- committee said : — We have found that out of 107,812 private wagons (other than those belonging to colliery companies), particulars of the construction of which have been furnished to us by members of the committee, 78,522 have a rigid top plank, and could only be used for general traffic purposes with great inconvenience and delay in shed- working operations, whUst 2,037 would be of no use whatever for merchandise. This information goes to show that only between 20 and 30 per cent, of privately- owned wagons would be really useful for ordinary merchandise business. We have no reason to believe that a higher percentage of coUiery-owned wagons would be available for general traffic than in the case of other privately-owned wagons. Apart from the limitations thus imposed on the possible utihty of privately-owned wagons for purposes other than those for which they had been constructed, it was the impression of the private owners with whom the sub-committee conferred that there were no more of those wagons in the country than were necessary for the business in which they were already being used. In this case there would be a further direct conflict with the idea that a general pool would place at the disposal of the railway companies any considerable number of privately-owned wagons for ordinary merchandise traffic. Some advantage would undoubtedly be secured by railway control and common-user of the wagons ; but in the judgment of the sub- committee this advantage had, to an appreciable extent, been obtained by the back-loading arrangement already sanctioned and in operation, while the fact that the scheme launched by the Coal Controller for the allocation of coal to districts having distinct relation to the area in which the coal was raised was to come into operation on September loth, 1917, made it extremely inexpedient that two changes of such far-reaching character as this and a general transfer of privately-owned wagons to the railway companies should both be attempted at one and the same time. . To the general principle of control of all privately-owned wagons by the railway companies the sub-committee still adhered ; " but," they said : — Having ascertained the amount of direct loss which would be entailed by the transaction, and having regard to the fact that so large a percentage of the wagons are not suited for dealing with merchandise traffic, we are forced to the conclusion that the circumstances would not justify us in recommending that the Government should take over the control of privately-owned wagons. 3 B 712 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Finally the report stated : — While the conclusions of the committee are as set out in this report, based as they are upon existing conditions and circumstances, the committee feel it to be necessary to express the considered opinion that, as a general proposition, the existence of private owners' wagons is an anomaly operating against the most economical use of rolling stock on the railway, and will, therefore, sooner or later render,it imperative for such steps as may be necessary to be taken in the direction prohibiting their construction in the future, and fixing a date beyond which those already running on the railways shall not be permitted to continue to do so. The concluding words of this paragraph foreshadowed an alternative proposal to which a good deal of attention was to be paid later on. Attitude of the Ministry of Munitions. Throughout the whole of 1917, the chief advocacy of the general pooling of railway wagons continued to come from the Ministry of Munitions. We have seen how, in January of that year, it was announced to be Dr. Addison's opinion that " nothing less than the common-user of the whole of the wagons in the country, both railway-owned and belonging to private traders, will adequately relieve the present serious situation." We have seen, also, that, subsequently to January, the railway companies carried on exhaustive inquiries which, in effect, led them to the conclusion that the adoption of the course recommended by Dr. Addison was wholly impracticable and would not only fail to relieve the situation but tend to make it stiU more comphcated. Yet, in the middle of October, there came a further inquiry from the Ministry of Munitions, of which Mr. ChurchiU was then in charge, as to " whether the general pooling of both privately and railway-owned wagons was Ukely to materialise within a measurably short period." Following on this inquiry, memoranda were drawn up setting out in much detail, for the information of the Ministry, the actual position in regard to the pooling of wagons and the conclusions at which the rail- way companies had arrived ; but in December it was intimated that " Mr. Churchill was still of opinion that substantial benefits could be obtained from the common-user of all wagons in Great Britain," and that he felt the difficulties which had been detailed were " not insurmountable." Substitutes for the 20,000. Meanwhile the Goods Managers had, early in November, 1917, informed the Railway Executive Committee that of the wagons to be sent overseas in accordance with the undertaking given at the end of 1916 there had already been forwarded, or there would be forwarded, a total of 20,403, the number stiU to be dispatched being only 1,802. They now reiterated the opinion that compensation for these wagons should be obtained from the private owners' stock available in the country, of which, they said, a large number were constantly out of use. Failing the securing from thi§ source of the full number required, they recom- POOLING OF WAGONS : PRIVATELY-OWNED. 713 mended that the residue should be made up by those companies which were in a position to build being authorised so to do, the Government being asked to give certificates for the necessary materials. Thereupon a fresh series of negotiations was opened with the private owners, by direction of the Railway Executive Committee, with a view to the hiring of a sufficient number of their wagons to meet immediate requirements ; but the progress made was very slow, and early in December the Goods Managers again emphasised the necessity for obtaining 20,000 wagons from the private owners as soon as possible. Renewed efforts were made by the Railway Executive, who suggested to the various associations of owners of non-colliery-owned wagons that their members should contribute to the proportion of 5 per cent, of all wagons owned, leased or on hire by them. Early in 1918 stiU another effort was made by the Ministry of Munitions in favour of the scheme for a general pool of railway wagons. The Minister (Mr. Churchill) summoned a conference which, held at the Ministry on January 17th, and presided over by himself, was further attended by the President of the Board of Trade (Sir Albert Stanley), Sir William Marwood, some of the higher officials of the Ministry of Munitions, and representatives of the Railway Executive Committee. In reply to questions as to " what progress was being made," the Minister was informed that in Scotland a provisional agreement had been entered into with the traders twelve months previously for the hire of their wagons ; but when the negotiations were reopened, the traders refused to go on with them, declaring that from their own point of view the whole thing was impracticable. In England and Wales no progress at all had been made on the general question. All that the companies were seeking to do was to secure, on hire, from the private owners the use of 20,000 wagons of a particular type to make good the shortage caused by their having to send 20,000 of their own wagons over to France. Then came a prolonged argument on the advantages and disadvantages of a general pool of wagons, the representatives of the Ministry once more taking up the case in favour of pooling while the railwaymen gave afresh the case against, declaring, among other things, that the pooUng of privately-owned wagons would, under- existing circumstances, be no good to them ; that it would be detrimental to the working of the rail- ways ; that it would be an enormous expense to the country for which there could be no corresponding return ; that, generally speaking, if the scheme were given effect to, the railway companies would not be able to carry out the manipulation of traffic, and so on, and so on. All this had, of course, been heard before, over and over again ; but there was no longer scope for fresh arguments on the one side or the other. Two incidents, only, there were at the conference which seemed to strike a fresh note. The one was when a representative of the Railway Executive Committee observed : " With regard to the 20,000, we have a committee sitting to deal with the question of hire, and probably we shall come to some arrangement in respect to it if only it is once settled that this fooling 714 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. is not to be pressed." The other was when it was incidentally suggested, rather than actually alleged, that it looked as though the Ministry of Munitions were seeking to induce the railway companies to adopt a course which the latter were convinced was not practicable under existing conditions. Any such intention on the part of the Ministry was at once denied ; but, from the holding of this conference, the advocacy by the Ministry of, in Dr. Addison's words, " the common-user of the. whole of the wagons in the country " practically ceased, and the railway companies were left in a better position to continue their negotiations for the hire of the wagons they wanted. Another meeting was now held between the sub-committee appointed by the Railway Executive and representatives of the Association of Private Wagon Owners, and the latter announced that they were authorised to offer to the railway companies the following terms in respect to the hire of wagons : 8-ton wagons, 6s. 6d. per week ; lo-ton wagons, 7s. 3RIVATELY-OWME]D. 715 On May 6th, 1918, Sir Albert Stanley presided over a meeting at the Board of Trade which, attended by Mr. Guy Calthrop, Coal Controller, Sir E. Moir, Ministry of Munitions, and representatives both of the Railway Executive Committee and of the various private- wagon organi- sations, had been called to see if something more could not be done to ensure the provision to the railway companies of those 20,000 wagons in regard to which, as Sir Albert informed the meeting, "practically no pro-' gress " had yet been made. He gave details concerning the urgency of the companies' requirements and he intimated that, if a drastic Order were needed to ensure their receiving assistance, such Order would certainly be madie ; but he hoped the matter would be arranged by a friendly settlement. The discussion which followed, however, bore upon the difficulties which naight arise if traders who had already hired the wagons they controlled, and who held them subject to certain repairing agree- ments, were to sublet them to third parties, namely, to railway companies, the question at issue being as to whether or not such subletting would invalidate the said arrangements so far as repairs were concerned. It was felt that, in any case, the legal position under the various kinds of agreements entered into would require to be very care- fully looked into, while these considerations would further affect any Order for compulsory hiring which the Board of Trade might pass. For these reasons no real progress was made at the meeting ; but towards the middle of June it was announced that all difficulties in regard to repairs of factors and merchants' wagons had been surmounted ; that the rates for hire to be paid by the companies would include repairs on the basis of aU existing repair obhgations continuing ; and that, in regard to coUiery-owned wagons, the Coal Controller had himself allocated the number of wagons with which, on the apphcation of the railway companies, each colliery was to part, the sum total to be contributed under the levy being 8,000. Once more, therefore, everything looked promising ; but now it was thought indispensable that there should be a proper agreement between the Mining Association of Great Britain and the railway companies covering the conditions under which the transfer of the 8,000 colliery- owned wagons was to take place. Steps were accordingly taken for the preparation of a draft agreement. The weekly rental for the wagons was to be as stated above ; but the precise conditions of the hiring were the subject of prolonged controversy and negotiations, and it was not until November 26th, 1918, that the form of agreement had been definitely decided upon. Meanwhile all this delay had meant that not alone coUiery-owned but non-colliery-owned wagons were being held back, many of the factors and merchants also wanting to know what the terms of agreement, as affecting the wagons in general, were to be before they parted with their own stock. By the time, also, that, absolutely the last difficulty in the way of the railway companies getting the 20,000 wagons seemed to have been 7i6 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. cleared away, the Armistice had been signed, the fighting had stopped, and the transport situation had materially changed. So, on December loth, 1918, the Mining Association might well raise the question whether, under the altered circumstances, the demand for wagons under which the original levy upon the colUery owners had been made was still as pressing as before. A week later the Railway Executive Committee 'advised the Coal Controller that, having regard to the altered circum- stances, they proposed to defer further action in the hiring of colliery wagons. The final outcome of these two years' continuous efforts on the part of the railway companies to obtain the loan of the 20,000 private traders' wagons they had asked for — ^the original idea of pooHng having been abandoned, for the time being — ^may be shown by the following figures, which give the position as on January ist, 1919 : — Privately-owned wagons obtained by English companies ^ : From colliery-owners, through the intermediary of the Coal Controller ......... 7,604 From factors, merchants, and other traders, apart from colliery owners . . . . . . . .2,415 Total . . 10,019 1 The Scottish companies did not obtain any wagons under the provisional agreement referred to on p. 713, nor did they hire any of the 20,000 wagons which the Board of Trade authorised the railway companies to secure. Powers of the Ministry of Transport. A hew phase in the long controversy as to the pooling of private owners' wagons was entered upon with the passing, in the autumn of 1919, of the Ministry of Transport Act. Under Section 13 (i) of this Act, the Minister of Transport was authorised to purchase privately-owned railway wagons on terms and conditions approved by an Order in Council ; and he was also empowered to work or to lease such wagons, when so purchased, or to apportion them among the railway undertakings on terms and under conditions to be provided for by the Order in Council. Clause 5 of the same section further enacted that — ^ Notwithstanding any statutory or other provision to the contrary, it shall be lawful for the Minister to make regulations prohibiting or restricting the use on railways of privately-owned wagons or limiting the number of wagons to be so used and prescribing the type and capacity thereof. Assuming the desirability and the expediency of effecting the abolition of privately-owned railway wagons, the position brought about by the Ministry of Transport Act thus offered a choice between (i) purchase and (2) prohibition. Purchase was, admittedly, likely to be attended by many difficulties — financial and practical. Financially, the acquiring of over 600,000 wagons, controlled by 6,000 or more owners or hirers, was bound to be a huge and complicated business, and one involving interference with POOLING OF WAGONS: PRIVATELY-OWNED. ^17, a wide circle of private and commercial interests. Practically, there would arise such questions as (i) the future relations between the State, which bought the wagons, and the railway companies, on whose lines they would be used ; {2) the position of the companies if they took over hundreds of thousands of wagons with which their existing organisation was inadequate to deal, and (3) the situation that might be evolved when, as the Ministry of Transport Act seemed to foreshadow, contracts now in force for the repair of privately-owned wagons were determined, on purchase (unless otherwise agreed with the Minister), and when, also, particular wagons in jespect to which those contracts had been made were no longer on their ordinary run and broke down under such con- ditions that their use would increase rather than relieve any possible congestion of the line. Then, of course, there was that further range of questions, as to restrictions in the usefulness of the existing stock of wagons and otherwise, dealt with earlier in the present Chapter ; though as a set-off to all these difficulties, purchase outright would allow of an immediate realisation of the desire that all wagons employed on the railway lines throughout the country should be under railway-company control. The alternative to purchase of the existing stock of private traders' wagons was offered in Clause 5, which clause had evidently been based on the lines of policy indicated in the concluding words of the report of the Railway Executive sub-committee referred to on p. 712, foreshadowing a possible prohibition of the building of any more privately-owned wagons and the fixing of a date beyond which those already in existence would not be allowed to run. Under this alternative, traders' wagons (save for certain special tj^es — ^tank wagons, for example' — ^still to be allowed) would become extinct with the efflux of time and without the paying of many millions in purchase money for stock most of which, at least, would not be of general utility to the railway companies when they had it. On the other hand, if the policy of prohibition and gradual extinction were adopted, the obhgation of providing other wagons to take the place of those not to be renewed, or eventually to be stopped from running at all, would devolve upon the railway companies, who would then certainly have the opportunity of supplanting the present varied types of traders' wagons by that stock built (in the main) " to a standard pattern suitable generally for carrying all classes of traffic " which it was their aspiration to attain. Efforts in this direction would, however, naturally have to start more or less concurrently with the imposition of a time-limit on the traders' wagons so as to ensure that new wagons would be available for use in such numbers, and under such terms and conditions, as would be hkely to meet all reasonable requirements, as these arose ; and although a heavy immediate outlay on purchase of existing stock would be avoided, the obligation to provide the new and improved substitute-wagons would naturally have thrown a heavy finan- cial responsibility upon the railway companies. <.7I8 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. These and other matters involved in the general question became the subject of prolonged consideration on the part of the railway companies and of repeated conferences with State authorities both prior to and subsequently to the passing of the Ministry of Transport Act. Having regard both to the uncertainties of the railway position in 1920-21 and to the high costs of labour and materials requisite for the construction and repair of railway wagons, it was felt that no further progress cotdd then be made towards a settlement of the matters at issue ; but the discussions entered upon and the powers conferred by the Ministry of Transport Act may be assumed to have laid down those alternative Uhes of purchase and prohibition on which the problem of privately- owned wagons will be dealt with afresh when, as may be the case in the not-far-distant future, it again becomes a railway question of the day. In this event it is hoped that the brief account here given as to what happened in connection with the subject during the Great War will, if only as an historical record for the purposes of reference, be found of practical utility. CHAPTER XLIX. OTHER REMEDIAL MEASURES. Whilst the common user of a large variety of wagons owned by the railway companies themselves and the hire, by arrangement of wagons belonging to or under the control of private traders, had been among the leading steps to be taken, in regard to goods transport, by the Railway Executive Committee as a means of overcoming the difficulties which had culminated in November-December, 1916, in the demands for the sending of so many locomotives and so much rolling stock overseas, there were adopted other remedial measures (apart from those relating to passenger traffic dealt with in an earlier part of the present work) to which attention should here be called. Allocation of Goods Traffic. In the list of proposals submitted to the President of the Board of Trade, the following was given, among others, under the heading " Pro- posals not requiring Government Sanction " : — iv. Tra£B.c which is now worked between the same places over two or more routes to be allocated, as far as possible, to one route. The object here in view was that of securing the most effective use of the railway system in the national emergency which had arisen. For the attainment of this purpose it was thought essential that traffic passing between competitive points should be allocated to a single route, care being taken to select for the purpose the one that was best adapted — on account either of distance or of superior facilities — ^for quick working. Railway companies owning the circuitous routes between the same pairs of points would then cease to convey the traffic and refer traders to the allocated company or route in question. To an Allocation Committee formed by representatives of the com- mercial and operating departments of leading companies there was given the duty of preparing schemes which would allocate traffic between various pairs of points for the attainment of the purposes in question, and these schemes, when ready, were to be submitted for approval to the Goods Managers Committee, authorised by the Railway Executive to carry out details. In the first instance, tonnage and wagon particulars for a specified week were obtained from all places in England and Wales which might be in any way concerned in the adoption of the allocation principle. These particulars related to the total tonnage of traffic (except coal and 719 720 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. coke) and the number of wagons dealt with by each of the " resident " companies, the information given being tabulated as follows : — I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Compe- titive Towns To be allocated to Company by whom Traffic is now conveyed Present Route Forwarded Received C. & D. Tfc included in Cols. 5 and 6 Proposed Route Wgns Tons Wgns Tons Fwd Tons Reed Tons Compilation of these statistics involved a great amount of labour ; but by the end of April, 1917, a considerable list of possible allocations was ready, the principles upon which they were based being (in what was regarded as their order of importance) as follows : (i) The direct route ; (2) terminal facilities at each end ; (3) avoidance of exchange between companies at junctions ; and (4) maintenance of the flow of traffic by routes stlong which it was already passing, in order to avoid disturbance of trade. Regard had naturally to be paid to the position at other terminals, and if the proposals made indicated a probable increase of traffic thereto, means were taken to secure relief in some other direction which would still maintain the principle of direct routes. It was proposed that a beginning should be made with some of these schemes as from June ist, 1917, and, with the approval of the Railway Executive, this comrse was adopted. ' The results in these initial stages were carefully watched in order to ensure that, before further schemes were put into operation, the new methods were really leading to the objects aimed at and gave an assurance that no terminal station would be taxed beyond its capacity for deaUng expeditiously with the business to be done. Each scheme was submitted to the operative departments of the railways with a view to avoid congestion at exchange points and the working of allocation traffic in excess of the maximum capacity for the various lines. For the better attainment of the latter purpose, running records were kept. Then the responsibility, under allocation, of each company was defined, and each was to maintain a service equal to the requirements it would be expected to meet. The balancing of the allocated traffic in such a way as to avoid the undue taxing of any one route and its terminals can be illustrated by what was done in connection with the partial " London " allocation arrangement. The Midland had undertaken to deal with traffic between London and Derby, and in order to afford the necessary relief at Derby the London and North Western agreed to take on traffic from Derby to stations north thereof. It was not, however, necessary to have recourse to any great extent to measures of this kind. These earher schemes were so satisfactory — ^in so far as they enabled OTHER REMEDIAL MEASURES. 721 the companies to deal more expeditiously with the traffic offered, and, also, with larger quantities at a time — that the adoption of others followed, while in October, 1917, there was brought forward a scheme much more ambitious than any that had gone before — one, namely, for the allocation of goods traffic passing between England and Scotland. Several months of detailed work had been spent on the preparation of the scheme, which, in effect, provided that goods traffic between any one town in England or Wales and any one town in Scotland should be concentrated on and conveyed by one route and one station only ; though the fact was recognised that private-siding traffic, having defined starting and destination points, could not be disturbed to any appreciable extent, and would still have to be taken from or put into such private sidings. Notwithstanding this restriction, the new scheme meant the allocation of consignments carried in over 4,000 wagons per day. Apart from the private-siding traffic, it embraced all traffic between England and Scotland except coal and coke, seasonal fruit and vegetables, and certain Govern- ment stores in full train loads. The principle aimed at was a geogra- phical division of Great Britain ; and, to assist in the application thereof, a map was prepared and colomred in order to show the areas in England to be served by each of the three main English routes to Scotland. Traffic arising in, or destined for, a town within, for example, the area coloured yellow on the map, would be conveyed by the East Coast route only and be refused if offered for consignment by the West Coast or the Midland route. Towns served by two or more companies were (with the exception of a few of the more important, having special local conditions), allocated exclusively to one or other of the three main routes. Evidence in justification of resort to this particular scheme, as affect- ing Scotland, was more especially to be found in the situation of towns m the South of England. Many of these are so located in regard to rail communication that they have at least ten main routes of their own by which connection with the three routes crossing the Scottish border can be gained. Based on past carryings, the scheme was so arranged that each com- pany was to carry an amount of traffic approximately equal to what it carried before, though not necessarily between the same pairs of points. The wagons exchanged at each junction would thus remain propor- tionately the same. Statistics compiled for the purposes of the scheme showed that the wagons — forwarded and received — exchanged with Scotland during one week in February, 1917, by the various routes were: East Coast, 12,554; West Coast, 11,866; Midland, 8,970. The Railway Executive Committee decided that the scheme shotild be put into operation experimentally from December ist, 1917, for a period of six months. To Glasgow goods traffic from London was to go by the Midland and to Edinburgh by the Great Northern. General merchandise between (for instance) Glasgow and Northampton, dealt with before the war 722 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. by three Scottish companies, was now allocated to the Caledonian exclusively. Early in 1918 there were representations that allocation could not be regarded as a success inasmuch as the railway companies were finding it necessary to put frequent " stops " on traffic between England and Scotland, such stops being for periods ranging from one day to fourteen and applying to all traffic except Government traffic, food-stuffs, perish- ables, fertilisers, seeds, live-stock, etc- Throughout, in fact, the winter of 1917-18 the conditions had given rise to much difficulty, and especially so in regard to the East Coast route. There were occasions when thousands of wagons were standing on the exchange sidings of the North British and the North Eastern companies owing to sheer inabihty to get them through, the lines and the facilities available at the points in question having never been designed for dealing with traffic on such a scale as was then being offered. Comparing January, 1916, with January, 1914, and, also, February, 1918, with January, 1914, it was shown that increases in the total number of wagons — including Admiralty coal wagons, loaded and empty — passing in both directions at Berwick and Carlisle had been as under : — January, 1916 . . . 173,906 ^ February, 1918 . . 206,973 ^ ,, 1914 • . ■ 117,410 January, 1914 . . 117,410 Increase . . . 56,496 ...... 89,563 Percentage of Increase 48-12 ...... 76-28 1 Includes North Eastern figures via Kelso, via Hexham and via Morpeth. " Via Berwick and Carlisle only. How the East Coast route was especially affected will be seen from the following tables, the first of which deals with the exchange of wagons to or from the South between the North British and the North Eastern companies at Berwick for the years or for the period stated : — Year or Period. Gross Total. Average per "Week. 1914 119,160 .. 3.830 1915 278,870 5,363 1916 326,270 . . 6,274 1917 410,044 . . 7.886 1918 (January to May inclusive) 189,270 . . 8,775 The second table gives the aggregate number of loaded wagons (i) to the South and (2) from the South exchanged between the same two companies at Berwick during the months of February, March and April in the years 1918 and 1914 respectively : — Years. To the South. From the South. Total. 1918 61,249 .. 52,991 .. 114,240 1914 29,569 . . 18,785 . . 48,354 Increases ..... 31,680 . . 34,206 . . 65,886 These figures show an increase of 136 per cent. OTHER REMEDIAL MEASURES. 723 Among the causes leading to this great expansion, apart from the transport of Admiralty coal, munitions, and other war supphes, there had to be included the diversion of so much sea traffic to rail ; the arrival of large cargoes at ports where they had not usually been unloaded, longer rail hauls thus becoming necessary ; a very heavy traffic, during the early months of 1918, in Scotch seed potatoes and seed grains con- signed to the South under priority conditions, and a greatly-increased traffic in timber and various other commodities, while the difficulties experienced in dealing with all this business on lines unequal to the abnormal demands made upon them were further augmented by the shortage alike of locomotives, wagons and staff. A strict regulation imposed on traffic allowed of the acciunulations that arose at Berwick being overcome by about April, and measures were also taken to secure the provision there of increased exchange facihties alike on the North Eastern and the North British lines. The operation of this England-Scotland scheme and its attendant routing arrangements was thenceforward sanctioned for successive periods of six months each. While the working of the allocation principle on these lines had been so successful from a railway point of view, the innovation not unnaturally led to complaints on the part of traders, and at one time many questions concerning it were asked in the House of Commons. The chief complaint was that in towns having two or more goods depots the inability of a trader to forward or to receive consignments by the route which suited him best involved longer cartage to or from a depot some distance away from his works or premises as compared with a short cartage when he could make use of a depot in the vicinity of his place of business or com- paratively near to it. Alternatively, the allocated dep6t might involve awkward cartage on account of a steep inchne. Another complaint was that if a trader had engaged fixed space in a yard or in a warehouse at Depot A, and found his traffic allocated to Depot B, he would be deprived of the facilities and advantages he had derived from being a tenant of the company owning the former of the two depots. Then it was represented that traders could not be served so promptly in regard to bulk orders when all the traffic was carried by one route as they were when it could be sent or received by two or more. Hence, they alleged, there was a certain restriction on their output. The view adopted by the Allocation Committee, with the approval of the Goods Managers Committee, in regard to these complaints was that, while the principle of allocation was, as an economical measure, essen- tially, in accordance with national interests, it would not be right that the individual trader should be unduly penalised. When, therefore, the complaints came up for consideration, it was a fixed policy that they should be looked at from the most favourable point of view that circum- stances would permit, although all deviations from the rules laid down were dealt with as a whole, to allow of consistency being maintained. Under these conditions, and having regard to the advantages gained 724 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. from the economies effected, efforts were made to extend allocation still further ; and this policy had been carried so far by the time the Armis- tice was signed that there were then over sixty complete allocation schemes in operation. They included, in addition to the one applying to the whole of the Scottish traffic, schemes embracing the North Eastern and the Great Eastern systems and others which laid down a defined route and exchange-point for all traffic to or from a large number of leading towns in England and Wales served by more than one railway company. Additional schemes, designed to cover the rest of the kingdom, were in preparation ; but, with the cessation of hostilities, they were not proceeded with. Those, however, already in operation were con,tinued, subject to modifications rendered necessary by the changed conditions. As an example of the possible savings to be effected, the fact might be mentioned that in the case of one large town in the North fpr which an allocation scheme was projected, it was found that if, under alloca- tion, traffic had been dealt with on the same scale as in the basis week upon which the principle was adopted in the first instance, there would have been a decreased wagon mileage of 19,695 miles per week, or 1,024,140 per year. In March, 1920, it was estimated that the volume of traffic under allocation schemes then in operation amounted to, approximately, 110,000 loaded wagons per week, or about I9.per cent, of the sum total of traffic dealt with in England and Scotland. Taking, however, the schemes as a whole, the total traffic disturbed from its original route was comparatively small. Still more was this the case inasmuch as the private-siding traffic, referred to above, accounted for 36 per cent, of the whole of the traffic passing. All the same, in the spring of 1920, it was considered by the Goods Managers inexpedient to proceed with the projected further schemes, having regard to the uncertainty as to the future of the railways. Later on the question of continuing the existing schemes was discussed from time to time. Representations were now being made by the traders that, however justifiable, from the point of view of national interests, the resort to allocation might have been during the period of the war, that period was over, and the railway companies, as " common carriers," should, they held, now afford them liberty of action to consign their goods by the routes, and have them dealt with at the stations, best suited to the needs of their business. Then there were the considerations that departures from the agreed allocation schemes already in force necessitated constant revision of the agreements ; that traffic was now being dealt with satisfactorily by the railway companies in general ; that the engine and wagon position was rapidly improving, and that the staff and equipment position had become more or less normal. Finally, having regard to the contemplated cessation of Government control in August, 1921, the General Managers decided that the question of alloca- tion of goods traffic as between the railway companies should be remitted to the Goods Managers for consideration and report. Thereupon the Goods Ma,nagers, after an exhaustive review of the OTHER REMEDIAL MEASURES. 725 subject in the light of existing conditions, resolved in January, 1921, to recommend that the arrangements which had operated during and since the war for the allocation of traffic to specified railway routes should cease on March ist, 1921, traders being free, on and after that date, to consign their trafl&c by recognised routes as before. The recommendation was adopted by the General Managers, and the goods allocation schemes were withdrawn accordingly — though without prejudice to the fact that they had served a most useful piurpose, from a railway traffic point of view, under war-time conditions. Allocation of Parcels Traffic. In the interests of economical working, the railway companies had already arranged for an allocation of passenger traffic which automatically provided for certain destinations being served by particular companies. Passenger traffic between London and Edinburgh, for instance, was left to one company ; that between London and Glasgow to another ; London and Liverpool to another, and London and Birkenhead to still another. This arrangement necessitated, in turn, a corresponding modification in the carrying of parcels and miscellaneous traffic conveyed by passenger train, and in their case, also, the same channels had to be adopted. The advantages derived from the new system were common both to the trader and to the railway companies. The traffic was allocated in each instance to the company having the best service, while, apart from the giving of the quickest transit, the plan adopted led to an avoid- ance of the difficulty previously experienced by reason of the transfer from one line to another at various points en route as was necessary when each company carried whatever traffic was offered to it. There was, also, in some instances a saving of cartage, the collection and delivery of parcels being more expeditiously carried out where transfer had to be made in certain towns from one company to another. It also offered the advantage of allowing the traffic to be worked at a minimum mileage. Nominated Loading. Long before the outbreak of war it had become the established practice of probably the majority of retail traders throughout the United Kingdom to replenish their stocks in small quantities, received at frequent intervals, reliance being placed by them on the speedy delivery thereof by the railway companies, who took a pride in the fact that small consignments of goods handed to them one day were to a very great extent, at least, delivered by them to the consignees on the following day, if not actually the next morning. The system was of immense advantage to the trading community. It enabled them to make the best use of their capital ; to keep their ware- house or storage accommodation down to smaller limits than would otherwise have been possible, rent, rates and taxes thus being saved, and to take up other branches of business which they could carry on 726 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. by a show of samples with a certainty that a telegram or a telephone message would bring them promptly the goods they wanted for their customer. On the other hand, while the railway companies certainly did their best to cultivate the business, it meant a great amount of work for them in the handling day by day at any one of their goods depots of many thousands of packages weighing, on an average, less than i cwt. each, and requiring not only invoicing, checking, sorting and loading at the point of departure, but, possibly, two or three transhipments en route before, sent off on the day of receipt or collection, they reached the consignee. The tendency in the direction stated increased under those war-time conditions when the control systems introduced led to retail traders having to depend more than they had ever done before on a hand-to- mouth system of shopkeeping, while, concurrently with the greater congestion of the small-parcels traffic at the railway stations, there were the decreases experienced alike in the men and in the rolling stock available for dealing with it. So it became necessary to find some new method of handling this small-parcels traffic— one, that is to say, which would relieve the rail- ways without putting the traders to any serious inconvenience ; and this necessity led to the introduction on the Midland Railway, in August, 1915, of a practice which became known under the somewhat mysterious appellation of " Nominated Loading." In effect, the innovation was one under which the company, instead of sending off small packages to all destinations night by night, as received, fixed upon certain days for the dispatch of combined wagon-loads (as far as possible,) to certain destinations, the company collecting only according to appointed days in the week, and working in harmony with the traders, who soon adapted their business arrangements to this new system, doing so with an assurance that the goods would go direct to destination on the fixed days ; that extra handling, transhipment and delay at intermediate stations would be avoided, or, at least, reduced, and that they themselves would secure real benefits no less than the railway companies. Started on a comparatively small scale, "nominated loading " (so called because specified days were " nominated " for particular desti- nations) steadily became an established success. The advantages it offered were more and more appreciated in proportion as the difficulties of the railway companies in dealing with the traffic increased, though it was mainly the troubles experienced during the course of 1917 that offered the greatest incentive to the companies in general to accept methods which, it must be confessed, had not at first been regarded in every quarter as really feasible. If the new system succeeded, it did so on its merits, and the time came when it had been adopted by practically all the leading railway companies, with excellent results in the way alike of economy of labour, better user of rolling stock and greater economy and efficiency in working. OTHER REMEDIAL MEASURES. >7'2.^ Coal Transport Reorganisation Scheme. Within the first thirteen monthsof the war the number of enlistments of men concerned in the mining industry of this country was, according to the second report of the Coal Mining Organisation Committee (see p, 695), 250,750, while the falling off in production during the first twelve months of the war, as compared with the corresponding pre-war period, was 29,925,000 tons. Early measures were taken by the Government to deal alike with this shortage of supplies and with the advance in prices following thereon. In February, 1915, the Board of Trade appointed a Departmental Com- mittee on Retail Coal Prices, and, shortly afterwards, on the recom- mendation of that committee, the Government adopted their first measure in the direction of exercising State control over the industry, this initial effort being in the direction of restricting coal exports through the issue of licences. In July, 1915, there was passed a Price of Coal Limitation Act, which enacted that, except under special circumstances justifying exemption by the Board of Trade, the price chargeable for any class of coal should not exceed by more than 4s. per ton the price charged in the year ending June 30th, 1914. In 1916 coalowners, exporters and shipowners voluntarily agreed, in the interests of our Allies, to maximum prices for coal exported to Allied countries and maximum freights for its conveyance thereto. Labour troubles which arose in the Welsh coalfields in November, 1916, threatened to hamper the supply of smokeless steam coal to the British Navy. To meet this situation, the Government took over as from December ist, in that year, under the authority of the Defence of the Realm Regulations, the control of the South Wales mines, with their annual output of about 52,000,000 tons. In the Spring of 1917 the vital need for maintaining the coal supply of the country, the difficul- ties which had arisen in regard to transport (mainly owing to the diversion to the railways of so much coal traffic hitherto carried by sea), and, also, the labour troubles now developing in England and Scotland, led the Government to determine that the State control they were then exercising over the South Wales mines should be extended to the entire coal industry of Great Britain on and from March ist, 1917. Tor the carrjdng out of this policy, the President of the Board of Trade set up a new department which was to control the coal mines and exercise the other powers and duties of the Board of Trade with regard to coal, and, at the request of the Government, the Chairman and Directors of the London and North Western Railway Company placed the services of their General Manager, Mr. Guy Calthrop, at the disposal of the President of the Board of Trade to take charge of the new department. Mr. Calthrop's official designation was that of Con- troller of Coal Mines. By arrangement with. the Home Secretary, Sir Richard R. Redmayne, K.C.B., Chief Inspector of Mines, and Chairman of the Coal Mining Organisation Committee, was to assist the Coal Con- 3c 728 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. troUer, who was to receive the further aid of an Advisory Committee consisting of persons selected to represent coal owners and coal miners. Maintenance of production was the subject that first claimed the attention of the new department, and then came the problem of dis- tribution, with a view both to securing the most efificient user of rail transport and to ensuring that one district did not have a superabundance of coal whUe others failed to get a sufficiency. The situation to be met was thus explained in " The War Cabinet : Report for the Year 1917 " : — Before the war coal represented something like one-third of the railway traffic of the country. But, in addition to the quantity rail-borne, 23,000,000 tons of coal was carried by sea to London and other home centres of consumption from ports in or bordering on coalfields. With decreased shipping and abnormal sea risks, this great tonnage, practically all of which required conveyance over long distances, was thrown on to our over-pressed railways. One of the effects of this was the grave difficulty, resulting in a good deal of suffering, experienced last winter [1916-17] in providing coal for domestic purposes, particularly in London. To find a solution, an inquiry was at once instituted into the whole question of the conveyance of coal, the coalfields from which each market was suppUed and the routes and distances over which the coal was carried. It was found that in innumerable instances coal was delivered from distant coalfields to districts which could equally well be supplied by nearer pits from which a much shorter railway journey would be required. On the creation of the department of the Controller of Coal Mines, the Board of Trade, once more under authority of the Defence of the Realm Regulations, issued on July 4th, 1917, a Coal Transport Order which set forth that, with a view to effecting economies in transport and of facilitating the supply of coal, such restrictions might be placed on the transport of coal from particular areas or particular collieries in the United Kingdom to particular areas or destinations as the Board of Trade might consider necessary. Existing contracts for the sale of coal would be abrogated to such extent and from such dates as the Board of Trade might deem necessary, while the requirements of the Board under the Order would be notified in the form of directions issued from time to time by the Controller of Coal Mines. It was under the powers thus conferred upon him that Mr. Calthrop gave out, concurrently with the making of this Order, " Directions of the Controller of Coal Mines for the Purpose of Reorganising the Transport of Coal by public Railway, for Inland Consumption." As an organisation designed to relieve transport by the elimination of long-distance and cross-country journeys the scheme was based on four main issues, namely : — (i) That consumption of coal should take place as near the producing point as possible. (2) That in view of the superior facilities afforded by the main trunk-lines, the movement of traffic should follow these routes wherever possible. (3) That the movement of coal should, as far as possible, be in well-defined directions, viz. : — North to South ; North to South-East ; North to South-West ; East to West. (4) That an area producing less coal thai? suffices for its own needs should OTHER REMEDIAL MEASURES. 729 not send any portion of its output to other areas. That an area producing more coal than it requires for consumption within the area itself should only distribute the balance to adjacent or convenient areas. For the purposes of the scheme Great Britain was divided into twenty areas, as follows : — 11. Northants to Essejc. 12. South Wales and Monmouthshire. 13. South-Western Counties. 1 4. South-Eastern Counties and London . 15. Derby and Nottingham. 16. Leicester. 17. Scotland, S.E. 18. Scotland, N.W. 19. Scotland, N.E. 20. Scotland, S.W. 1. Northumberland. 2. Cumberland. 3. Durham. 4. Lancashire. 5. Yorkshire. 6. North Wales. 7. North Staffordshire. 8. Eastern Counties. 9. Shropshire. 10. Birmingham and District. From September 8th, 1917, no person might, without the consent of the Controller of Mines, buy or sell coal to be forwarded by public railway for inland consumption from any area of production to any area other than those specially allocated thereto for (i) steam and manu- facturing, (2) gas and cooking, and (3) household coal, respectively. Ship- ment coal and, also, coal for use within the area of production would remain unaffected ; but all contracts at variance with the new arrange- ments in respect to the removal of coal from one area to another would be abrogated as from 6 p.m. on September 8th, the new contracts for the sale of coal affected by the scheme coming into operation on and from September loth. The making of these fresh contracts was to be facilitated by the District Coal and Coke Supplies Committees, which, originally formed in January,, 1916, in combination with a Central Coal and Coke Supplies Committee in London (itself discontinued on the appointment of the Controller of Coal Mines), would constitute a bond of communication between coalowners and merchants, factors, etc., collecting all necessary information and putting the one class into touch with the other in addition to exercising general local control and regulation. Where certain types of coal, obtainable only from a prohibited area, were required for mechanical stokers, gas producers or other special purposes, certificates authorising consumers to purchase supplies of these particular grades would be issued, the allocation thereof — with priority, where necessary, for traders doing business of special national importance — being also arranged by the District Committees. The benefits expected to be derived from the scheme were thus indicated in a statement issued by the Controller of Coal Mines : — South Wales and Monmouth have hitherto sent coal to thirteen areas and received from nine. They will henceforth send only to two and receive from one. At the present time Yorkshire sends coal to fifteen different areas near and far and receives from ten. Under the new scheme it will distribute to nine areas only, mostly near at hand, and will consume only coal produced in the area itself. Lancashire will send to one area only instead of twelve, London and South- 730 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Eastern counties now draw their supplies from twelve areas, the South-Western counties from twelve. These sources will now be reduced to five in each case. The forecast, however, which more especially attracted public atten- tion at the time was one to the effect that the scheme was expected to lead to a saving in railway transport of not less than 700,000,000 ton-miles annually. What were the results actually attained cannot be shown by definite figures. In principle the scheme was, undoubtedly, an excellent one, and reflected high credit on the good intentions of its author. Designed, from a railway point of view, to reduce length of haul, to avoid the very considerable amount of cross-working known to be going on, and to relieve the pressure at junctions in regard both to marshalling and shunting, it may well have been regarded at the outset as likely to bring about advantages of considerable benefit to the railways whilst still ensuring to traders the supply of their requirements. There were, however, complications and difficulties from the first. The great extent of the transfer of coal traffic from sea to rail ; the magnitude of the Admiralty requirements in the way of coal transport ; the special arrange- ments necessary from time to time for the meeting of emergencies ; the numerous, if not the almost endless, exceptions which had to be made to the main body of the scheme in order to suit the special require- ments of traders, and the constant changes in conditions generally — all these things might well disturb the smooth working of even the best- thought-out plans introducing a new system of transport operation under wholly abnormal circumstances. In the case of the Scottish railways, whose forwardings under the scheme were confined exclusively to the four Scottish areas, there was, undoubtedly, a considerable economy and a very decided advantage in working ; but in regard to the experiences of the English companies, no general statement could be made. Some of them kept no separate records relating to coal traffic only, as distinct from goods traffic in general. In other instances the statistics available had been prepared on different bases, and were not comparable. So far, however, as regarded the reports that were made, these fell into three main groups, viz., (i) " increased haulage," (2) " decreased haulage," and (3) " no appreciable effect." The London and North Western, for instance, had found the scheme advantageous from a traffic-working point of view, whereas the Great Western considered that they had not gained at all, but had, rather, experienced an increase in their traffic difficulties. Owing to the large falling off in the shipment of coal from South Wales ports, owing in part to the shortage in shipping and in part to the restrictions on exports, designed to preserve coal for home use, large quantities of coal which, under pre-war conditions, were dealt with by the local South Wales railways were now put on to the Great Western system for transport, vik the Severn Tunnel, to the South-Western districts of England in place of the coal from the northern collieries which, under the scheme, OTHER REMEDIAL MEASURES. ^it should have gone there instead. This meant for the Great Western great difficulties in handling the traffic at sidings not equal to the greater demands made upon them ; a substantial increase in shunting ; long haulage of the coal to inland stations ; congestion of the Severn Tunnel, accelerated by the magnitude of the Admiralty coal traffic, and the employment by the company, as the result either directly or indirectly of the Coal Transport Reorganisation Scheme, of twenty-four additional engines making a daily additional run of over 2,000 miles. The question was certainly raised by the Controller of Mines as to whether all these results could fairly be attributed to his scheme, and whether they should not be attributed in part, at least, to other causes ; but, although the final issues of the scheme as a whole were uncertain, the advantages gained, whatever their actual extent, must have fallen very far short of the original anticipations. Created a Baronet in June, 1918, " for public services as Controller of Coal Mines," Sir Guy Calthrop continued to devote himself with the utmost ardour, energy and perseverance to the further working of the scheme, and it is to be feared that the strenuous zeal shown by him in carrying out the formidable task he had undertaken was a contributory cause to his early and untimely decease on February 23rd, 1919. Locomotive Repairs and Renewals : Materials from U.S.A. By July, 1917, the British railway companies were getting very hard pressed, and found themselves drifting into a position of increasingly grave difficulty, owing to the trouble they were experiencing in obtaining manufactured parts for the repair and renewal of locomotives. From the very outset of the war, the strain put upon their engine resources had been intense. The dispatch of the Expeditionary Force had been followed, in turn, by an enormous movement in the concentra- tion of men at the various training centres throughout the country and by the transport, first, of raw materials for the making of munitions of war and then of the finished articles. With the vast increase in the traffic thus brought about, the locomotives should have received an even greater amount of attention than in normal times ; but, in effect, they were getting less, owing, in part, to the shortage in the workshop staffs and, in part, to the devotion of the workshops themselves mainly to the production of munitions of war for the Government, repairs and renewals thus getting greatly behind. On the top of this the companies were sending a considerable number of locomotives overseas ; they were supplying others for use by Government Departments at home, and they were providing plant and machinery for the equipment of operating and repair estabUshments in France or elsewhere. Meanwhile the building of locomotives in this country had almost entirely ceased, and the considerable increase which, under normal conditions, should have been brought about during the last three years had not been realised. Nor had it been possible to obtain an adequate supply of materials 732 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. even for the repair of the diminished stock stiU in the country, the amount of steel available in Great Britain being unequal to requirements, and more especially in regard to those for the making of guns, shells and other munitions of war. Thus it was, under this combination of circumstances, that in the summer of 1917 the railway companies, though called upon to handle a greater amount of traffic than ever before, had a total shortage of about 2,000 in their available stock of locomotives, while of those remain- ing in service the efficiency of a considerable number had been impaired by the impossibility of giving them the systematic overhaul which, considering the amount of work they had done, they should more especi- ally have received. Having in view the increasing gravity of the position in which the railway companies were thus being placed and the apparent inability of the Ministry of Munitions to release more steel for locomotive purposes, even although the efficiency of the home railways for transport purposes was being endangered, the Railway Executive Committee resorted to the expedient of appealing to the American railways to come to their assistance. An urgent message was sent in the early days of July, 1917, briefly indicating the general position, and on July 14th, a deputa- tion, consisting of Sir Francis Dent, General Manager of the South Eastern and Chatham Railway and a member of the Railway Executive, Mr. J. Bowen Cooke, Locomotive Engineer of the London and North Western Railway, and Mr. A. J. Hill, Locomotive Engineer of the Great Eastern Railway, left Liverpool for the United States to support the appeal and carry through the necessary arrangements. The American railway companies were themselves unable to supply the manufactured parts of which the British companies were especially in need, but authority was given by the U.S.A. Railway Executive Com- mittee, Washington, to Mr. Daniel Willard, President of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and Chairman of the Advisory Committee of National Defence, to deal with the matter, and he, in turn, arranged through Mr. Vauclain, managing director of Baldwins, Ltd., that his firm shotild, as far as possible, obtain for the British railway companies the materials of which they stood in need. Arrangements for the shipment of the supplies were made with the representative of the British Ministry of Shipping in the United States, and the Treasury agreed, at the request of the British Railway Executive, to pay for the materials, on Govern- ment account, in the United States, the English railway companies reimbursing them subsequently through the Accountants Sub-committee of the Railway Executive. The amount of material it had been hoped to obtain in the United States was about 18,000 tons. The orders placed amounted to over 15,000 tons. Some of the materials thus obtained were almost unprocurable in England at the time the deputation went to America. Speaking generally, the pm-chases made — including as they did a large variety of OTHER REMEDIAL MEASURES. 733 railway requirements — were the means of rendering very great assistance to the British railways. Appeals to Traders. Throughout the entire period of the war frequent appeals were made to traders by the railway companies, the Board of Trade or other public authorities to do what they could to help in overcoming the transport difficulties of the day, and these appeals were made with especial force as the result of the conditions brought about by the situation overseas in the winter of i9i;6-X7. A few examples of what was done in these directions may be offered. In March, 1916, the President of the Board of Agriculture addressed to the agricultural community of the country a circular letter on the reasons for and the possible remedy of the delays in the delivery of transport which, he said, were then causing great inconvenience to farmers. The situation, he suggested, could be materially improved if consignors and consignees would adjust their arrangements so as to meet the needs of the situation. He proceeded : — One of the principal causes of delay in transport at present is the consignment of small lots. It is not reasonable to expect that a truck capable of containing, say, 8 tons should be used for a consignment of, say, 2 tons. Such consignments are necessarily held over till they can be combined with others to make up a reasonable load. Lord Selborne hopes that fanners will consult the public interest as well as their own by ordering either on their own account, or in combina- tion with others, full truckloads of the goods they require to be conveyed by rail. Further, whenever possible, agriculturists should arrange not merely for truck- loads made up of a variety of small lots, but for truckloads of goods of one kind. Delay is caused by the failure of consignors and consignees to load and unload raUway trucks promptly. General appeals to traders have already been issued, but Lord Selborne desires to bring this point specially under the notice of farmers, as the saving which could be effected by loading and unloading trucks at country stations at the earliest possible moment would be suflScient to make an appreciable improvement in the position. The necessity for ordering supplies early is generally recognised. Farmers are, however, reminded at the present time of the need for making early arrange- ments for the purchase and repair of machines and implements, and also for the purchase of binder twine, so as to allow ample time for delivery. Ordering early and in truckloads may involve the necessity for storage. The question of hiring or improvising storage should therefore be kept in view, and in this connection Lord Selborne desires to call attention to the fact that railway companies are prepared to arrange for storage at low rates at many of their stations. Goods should be ordered from the source of supply which seems to offer the best prospect of reasonable delivery, having regard to the length and character of the route and other circumstances affecting the question of transport. In the case of basic slag difficulties of transport are accentuated by the fact that this manure is generally produced in districts where the manufacture of large quantities of munitions is now being carried on, and where, in consequence, there, is likely to be some congestion and delay of both inward and outward traffic. Lord Selborne recommends farmers to secure supplies of basic slag as far as possible during the summer months, when, owing to the longer days, larger traffic can be handled. In August, 191:6, the Board of Agriculture issued a leaflet to fruit 734 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. growers and salesmen impressing upon them the necessity of assisting the railway companies to avoid undue delay in the transport of fruit and empties by rail during the continuance of the war. They were told, among other things, that fruit should be sent to the most accessible markets in approximately regular daily quantities, and not rushed up in large quantities on particular days ; that growers, instead of forwarding in small lots, thus causing delay, should make up consignments to sales- men in lots of from two to four tons, lower rates being further obtained by means of this system of pooling ; that the growers should advise the local railway officials overnight as to the approximate quantities they would be likely to forward on the following day ; that, with a view to avoiding the detention of railway vans containing the earlier consign- ments, all salesmen should open their stands by the time the first deliveries of fruit were made by the railway companies, and discharge the vans immediately, and, also, that a variety of labour- and time- saving methods should be adopted in regard to empties. In November, 1916, the railway companies called the attention of the traders to the necessity of making every efiEort to avoid the wastage of rolling stock. The demand for railway wagons and sheets was, they were told, extremely heavy owing to the large amount of urgent Government traffic and material for the manufacture of munitions which the railways were called upon to handle specially. It was hoped, therefore, that the companies would be able to " rely upon the loyal co-operation of the traders of the country " in assisting them to cope with the heavy traffic which was being worked under such exceptionally difficult conditions. Material assistance, it was suggested, could be rendered in the following directions : — Traffic should not "be loaded in railway trucks until senders have ascertained that consignees are able to take immediate delivery and have obtained confirma- tion from the railway company. Wagons received with inward traffic should be loaded and handed back to the railway company with all possible dispatch. It should not be overlooked that when wagons are kept under load after the day of arrival it is a serious loss to the country and, in a sense, is playing into the hands of the enemy. Concurrently with the efforts thus being made by the railway companies, the President of the Board of Trade issued a notice in which he said : — The Board of Trade desire also to impress upon all traders the urgent importance of taking every step in their power to avoid delays to wagons both in loading and unloading, The saving of a day all round means in effect a substantial addition to the rolUng stock of the country. Economy and dispatch in the use of sheets for covering wagons is also of great importance. The heavy and urgent demands for the conveyance of vast quantities of war material render some delay to other traffic inevitable. The Board of Trade have urged the railway companies on their part to adopt all possible measures to expedite the handling of the traffic, and they rely on the traders to co-operate with the companies in dealing with the difficulties that must necessarily arise. OTHER REMEDIAL MEASURES. 735 Repeated appeals were also made to the traders by the railway companies to avoid causing them unnecessary trouble by the faulty addressing of goods, by inadequate packing, or in other ways. LOSS OF AND DAMAGE TO GOODS. ANAPPEALTOTRADERI The Railway Companies are much concerned at the serious loss of and damage to goods, forwarded by Goods or Passenger train service, due in a great measure to unsatisfactory packing and faulty addressing. 70U CAN HELP TO PREVENT THIS AVOIDABLE WASTE BT TTsing containers strong enough to withstand ordinary transit conditions. Addressing packages Ailly and plainly. Printing or typing addressea TTsing strong labels and affixing them securely. Placing duplicate addressed label inside each package. Removing all old labels and conflicting addresses. Typing consignment notes, if possible, if not by writing distinctly; and by entering particulars FULLY AND CORRECTLY thereon. HE RiawiT Exicimn comarni. BfcaaMr ma. Goods under Mark For many years prior to the war the railway companies had experi- enced great difficulty in dealing with certain classes of goods traflftc owing to an apparent desire on the part of the traders concerned to conceal the names of destination stations and the names and addresses of sender and consignee, lest the secrets of their business might become known to their competitors. The system they favoured was that of consigning under marks which, while conveying no information to any one who happened to see the goods en route, were supposed to be amply sufficient for the railwaymen who handled the goods and could refer to invoice entries or delivery sheets. Much trouble was apt to arise, however (among other ways), in identifying the goods with the marks, and especially so when only certain of the articles forming a collective consign- 736 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. ment would be labelled at all, or when, as happened from time to time, several traders all adopted the same markings. After prolonged negotiations with Chambers of Commerce and indi- vidual traders throughout the country, much opposition being shown towards any departure from established practices, some new regulations came into force on January ist, 1:914, and a certain degree of improve- ment was obtained ; but, under war-time conditions, a considerable increase was found at already-congested terminal stations in the number of consignments on hand the destinations of which could not be traced (partly owing to the fact that the lady clerks taken on as substitutes for men who had joined the Forces might have failed to realise the significance of the marks and have omitted to reproduce them on the delivery sheets), and it was regarded as essential that a fresh set of regulations should be made in respect to the addressing both of parcels and of goods. These new regulations were made accordingly and they came into operation on September ist, 1915. A public notice issued in respect to those applying to parcels and other traffic conveyed by passenger train stated that, on and from the date mentioned — 1 . Parcels and other traffic will only be accepted for conveyance by passenger train or similar service provided each article or package is fully addressed, including the name of the destination station, except as set out below. 2. Where there is more than one article or package of the same or sinular description for the same consignee, the following system of labelhng will be permitted, i.e. : — Up to ten articles or packages. — Each article or package to comply with the provisions of clause i, above. Above ten and up to 100 articles or packages. — One article or package in every five to comply with the provisions of clause i, above (with a minimum of ten articles or packages labelled), but each label must also show the total number of articles or packages in the consignment. Over 100 articles or packages. — One article or package in every ten (with a minimum of twenty articles or packages labelled) to comply with the provisions of clause I, above, but each label must also show the total number of packages in the consignment. The existing regulations in regard to the labelling of milk traffic wiU be continued. The notice in regard to the addressing of goods stated that, again from the date already mentioned — Except as otherwise hereinafter provided, goods will only be accepted ,for conveyance when such article or package — [a) Is fully addressed, or \b) Bears a legible distinguishing mark together with the name of destination station on a la^el (on the letter-card principle, showing inside the names and addresses of both sender and consignee), which may be opened by the railway company if and when occasion requires. Where there was more than one article or package of the same or similar description for the same consignee, the system of labelling to be followed, when the aggregate weight of the consignment was less than two tons, was to be, in general, the same as in the case of parcels, as OTHER REMEDIAL MEASURES. 737 mentioned above ; but there were, in addition, regulations applying to a variety of articles not susceptible of being labelled in the ordinary way. Certain exemptions were also allowed for. Parcel Stamps. Various expedients were resorted to by the railway companies from time to time in order to reduce the amount of clerical work to be done in connection with the traffic carried, the dual purpose specially sought to be obtained being that of releasing more men for service with H.M. Forces and of lightening the burdens left to be done by those remaining behind or by the inexperienced substitutes engaged in place of those who had left. Among other measures thus taken was the adoption, in July, 191:5. of a parcel stamp system under which the companies agreed to introduce " Paid " and " To Pay " stamps and labels for parcels traffic and to honour one another's stamps and labels, the effect thereof being to reduce the work to be done in the abstracting and summarising of way-bills in respect to traffic passing between different companies. Prepayment of Parcels and Miscellaneous Traffic. Much advantage was unidoubtedly gained from the adoption of the stamp system, but traders were still left free either to send their parcels and miscellaneous traffic prepaid by passenger train or to leave the carriage charges to be collected at the receiving stations, as might be more convenient to them. In effect a large proportion of the said traffic continued to be sent " Carriage forward," and a heavy amount of clerical and accounts work had still to be done in consequence, owing to the obligation devolving upon the receiving company to collect the carriage charges. Towards the end of 1916 the Superintendents raised the question as to whether, with a view to effecting an economy in labour and allowing still more of the clerical staff being released for military service, the rule should not be made that, on and from a certain date, the carriage charges of aU descriptions of traffic — parcels and miscellaneous — conveyed by passenger train, with the exception of traffic from the Continent, should be prepaid. They made a recommendation accordingly to the Railway Executive Comrnittee. That body approved the idea, commuuicated with the President of the Board of Trade on the subiect, and issued a notice in January, 1917, that on and from April 2nd, 1917, the carriage charges for all descriptions of traffic for conveyance by passenger train or other similar service would have to be paid by the sender at the forwarding station. 73^ BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Then on January a4th, 1917, came a proposal from a Joint Committer of Superintendents and Accountants of certain of the controlled companies that, concurrently with the enforcement of the foregoing new regulation, and with a view to effecting a further reduction in clerical staff, the stamp system then operating in respect to passenger traffic shpuld be HftHnilL imfflTlliyNMFIG NOTICE IS HEREBY 6ITEH THAT, ON AND FROM 2nd APRIL; 1917, THE CARRIAGE CHARGES FOR ALL DESCRIPTIONS OF TRAFFIC FOR CONVEYANCE BY PASSENGER TRAIN OR OTHER SIMILAR SERVICE MUST BE PAID BY THE SENDER AT THE FORWARDING STATION. By Order, THE RAIUVAY EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE. extended to miscellaneous traffic (except that from the Continent); conveyed by passenger train or other similar service between controlled companies in Great Britain, and that the abstracts and summaries forwarded to the Railway Clearing House should be abolished except for recharges, traffic from the Continent and traffic in which non-controlled companies were interested, traffic coming within these categories being way-billed and abstracted as before. The Railway Executive Committee agreed that this course should be adopted. It was thus arranged, first, OTHER REMEDIAL MEASURES. 739 that the traffic in question should be prepaid, and, secondly, that the prepa5mient should be made by means of railway stamps. It was inevitable that the adoption by the railway companies of this compulsory prepayment system should arouse a certain degree of protest. On Marclf 14th the Superintendents received a deputation from associa- " tions representing the fish, fruit and vegetable trades, who represented that the new regulation as to payment by the sender of charges on traffic sent by passenger train would interfere with the supply and distribution of the food supplies of the country ; but Mr. Watson (Lancashire and Yorkshire), who presided on the occasion, said that, while the railway companies were desirous that trade, and especially that in perishable traffics, should be disturbed as little as possible, they were, by their introduction of the prepayment system, only adopting a principle of commerce in transferring the obligation for payment from the receiving to the forwarding end. The railway companies had considered the question in all its bearings before deciding to introduce the system, which would result in a saving of laboiir, and, in view of the pressure then being brought to bear upon them for the release of further staff for service with the Colours, they considered there was full justification for the course they had taken. Communications came, also, from Chambers of Commerce, from various trading organisations and even from the War Office-, which represented that a large amount of work and inconvenience would be thrown by the new system upon departments concerned in the forwarding of traffic ; but the reply given in each instance was that no departure could be made from the arrangements agreed upon. The new order accordingly came into operation on the appointed date, though by then an exception to the prepayment obligation had been made in favour of fish landed in Scotland. On and from October ist, 19x7, the stamp system was, by agreement with the Irish Railway Executive Committee and the non-controlled steamship companies, extended to parcels and miscellaneous traffic conveyed by all routes between stations in England and stations in Ireland. Increase in Parcels Rates. An advance in June, 1918, in the rates charged by the Post Office for parcels up to eleven pounds in weight forwarded by parcel post had the effect of diverting to the railways a considerable number of the small parcels, under the said weight, which had formerly gone through the Post Office, the senders seeking to take advantage of what were now the lower rates charged by the railway companies^ On November ist, 19x8, there was brought into operation on the railways in Great Britain and Ireland a new scale of rates for parcels conveyed by passenger train, the charges in respect to parcels weighing up to eleven pounds being standardised as between the companies and the ^ost Office, while the railway scale was much simplified, the respective 740 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. rates applying to any distance in place of the previous gradations baaed on distance. The railway scale also still offered lower rates for " owner's risk " than for " company's risk." Limitation in Weight of Parcels and Packages. In June, 1915, a notice issued by the Railway Executive Committee " requested " traders and others not to forward by passenger train any package weighing more than 3 cwt. PACKAGES tendered for conTeyince P ftSSEHgBTmU II OWING TO THE LARGE NUMBER OF RAILWRrMEN WHO HAVE ENUSIID. AND THE CONSEQUENT SHORTAGE OF STAFF, TRADERS AND OTHERS ARE REQUESTED NOT TO FORWARD BY PASSENGER TRAIN ANY PACKAGE WEIGHING MORE THAN 3 CWT. Br Order •( Um RAILWAY EXECinnECOMMinE IMAHON IN WEIGHT OF SIN6l£ PARGEIS OR PACKAGES BY PASSENGER TRAIN ONACGOMPANO BY PASSEN GERS NOTICE IS HER.EBT 6ITEN Uul, on and alter Uth DEGEHBEB, 1916, no Sln^e Panel or Package exceeding 112 lbs. la wel^t, maccompanled by f asfeajen, irill be accepted for conveyaace by PASSEnsm TRAin, rabject to tbe foUowIng exceptions ;- FISH. MEAT, in through truck loads to destination. MILK, in cans, chums, or butts. LIVE STOCK. CASTINGS & PIECES OF MACHINERY (in cases of proved urgency). By Order, THERAIINAYEXECUIlllECOMiiim Towards the end of 1916 the position on the railways had become much more acute, and in November notice was given that from December nth no single parcel or package, weighing more than 112 lbs. in weight, unaccompanied by passengers, would, subject to certain exceptions, be conveyed by passenger train. Proposed Prepayment of Charges on Goods Traffic. So successful, from a labour-saving point of view, was the system of prepayment of charges on parcels and miscellaneous traffic sent by passenger train that the question arose whether the same system could not be made to apply, as well, to the general merchandise traffic. The Goods Managers' Sub-committee recommended that the Association of Chambers of Commerce of the United Kingdom should be invited to send a deputation to discuss the matter with representatives of the rail- ways, and a communication to this effect was made to the Association OTHER REMEDIAL MEASURES. 741 by the Executive Committee. It was discussed at the June meeting of the Executive Council of the Association. It^tated that — Owing to the difficulties which the railway companies are experiencing in the collection of their carriage accounts and the attendant clerical work because of there being in operation two systems of payment (i.e., either by consignor or con- signee), this committee proposes to extend to general merchandise trafi&c the arrange- ment already in operation for passenger-train traffic, to fix upon the consignor the responsibility for pa3rment. A conference upon the subject was therefore proposed. A deputation from the Association accordingly attended a meeting of Goods Managers held at the Railway Clearing House on July 29th, tgiS, under the chair- manship of Mr. G. A. Roberts (Great Western Railway), and it was repre- sented to them on behalf of the railway companies that the scheme did not necessarily imply a cash payment by senders before each consignment was forwarded, though senders would be required to accept the responsi- bility for the charges before the traffic was sent forward. The proposal had been under consideration for some years, but the special reasons now appl5dng were that the companies were experiencing considerable difficulty in dealing with their accounts, no less than 40 per cent, of their clerical staff having joined H.M. Forces, while the companies were now being called upon to release still more men. It was absolutely necessary that any means by which economy of man-power and simplification in working could be obtained should be adopted. A large proportion of the traders already consigned carriage-paid, and if the remainder were to do so it would remove the considerable trouble the companies experi- enced in dealing with the collection of items which were referred by the consignees to the senders for payment. It was not proposed to make any change in regard to traffic from the Continent. On behalf of the Association of Chambers of Commerce, the deputation assured the Goods Managers that it would be impossible for the traders to accept such a proposal under the conditions then prevailing. They considered that the time was most inopportune for such a wholesale change in trade customs. The traders had lost approximately 80 per cent, of their clerical staffs, and they were strongly against any further disturbance of their business. Any enforcement of the scheme under the conditions then existing would, they declared, be disastrous from the point of view of trading interests. Following on this conference, the whole situation was reviewed afresh by the Railway Executive Committee, who decided that, having regard tathe views advanced on behalf of the traders, it would be better that any further action in regard to the proposal should stand over until circumstances and conditions were more favourable thereto. CHAPTER L. STATE CONTROL OF CANALS. When, on August 4th, 1914, the State took under its control, for the purposes of the war, almost the entire railway system of Great Britain, it also automatically took over, in addition, such of the canals in England, Wales and Scotland as were owned by the railway companies in ques- tion. The total length of the canals and " navigations " — ^the latter being mainly canalised rivers— ^in the United Kingdom is 4,670 miles, in the proportions of 3,639 in England and Wales, 183 in Scotland, and 848 in Ireland, and of the sum total 1,360 miles are owned or controlled by railway companies and 3,310 by public bodies or non-railway com- panies. Of canals owned, leased or controlled by railway companies in Great Britain, the total mileage is 1,268, made up as follows : — England AND Wales. Scotland. Total. Railway owned or leased . 965 84 1,049 Railway controlled . 219 — 219 1,184 84 1,268 Upon the railway-owned canals State control conferred many advan- tages which, in turn, reflected upon the general transport conditions. The men employed on them, being railway employees, were subject to the same special arrangements in regard to recruiting for military service as railway men in general, the railway companies being thus enabled to keep their canal staffs more or less intact. Then the men employed on railway-owned canals received the war bonuses paid to men on the Government-controlled railways. As against these conditions, indis- criminate recruiting went on unchecked in regard to boatmen, boat- repairers and other men employed either by the owners of independent canals or by the canal carriers when, as was generally the case, the actueJ carrying was not done by the canal-owning companies, who then took only their statutory tolls and charges. The effect of these conditions was that the interests in question suffered a depletion of their staffs by theioss of men, who, as the result either of voluntary enlistment or of .the Military Service Acts, joined the Colours, while still further depletion was suffered when canal men who were receiving no war bonus took up more remunerative emplojnnent in munition factories or elsewhere. So, although there was a fairly large traffic along the principal canals 742 STATE CONTROL OF CANALS 743 at the time of the outbreak of the war, the running of boats on those of the independent type, at least, could not be maintained as before owing to the absence of a sufficient number of men to operate them, and many boats that might, otherwise, have been kept in service had to be laid by for want of the repairs which, once more on account of the shortage of men, could not be carried out. On the top of all this, the canal carriers, or bye-traders, finding the cost of everything going up, sought to improve their financial position by increasing their charges for canal transport. Being under no statutory obligations and in the position of ordinary carriers by road, they were at fuU liberty to do this, although the same course could not be taken by the canal-owning companies who were also carriers, their tolls and charges being restricted by their Parliamentary powers. Inasmuch, however, as the railway rates had remained at their pre-war level, owing to the Government control of the lines, the effect of such increase in the rates on the independent canals as was brought about was, in many cases, to nuUify the advantage which traders had previously had in consigning by water in preference to rail ; and this fact still further accelerated the tendency which the shortage in water-transport facilities had already set in for the diversion of traffic in steadily-increasing volume from the canals to the overburdened railways. Towards the end of 1916 it became obvious that, unless some special measures were taken, a number of the independent canals would soon have to close down altogether, and in that case the outlook for the railways would become worse than before. Concurrently with the still more critical situation thus likely to be brought about there were those urgent appeals to the railway companies to save the transport situation on the Western Front by sending there locomotives, wagons and railway staff in such number or in such force as left the companies to wonder how, if they did all they were asked to do, they could possibly expect to provide for home requirements as well. Such were the conditions under which the following letter was addressed by the Acting Chairman of the Railway Executive Committee to the Secretary of the Ministry of Munitions : — Railway Executive Committee, 7th December, 1916. Sir,— We think the time has come when the Ministry of Munitions should take in hand the question of the better user of canals throughout the country for the transport of raw materials used in the manufacture of munitions of war. There must be considerable opportunity for relieving the railway companies by this method, and we think the matter should be taken in hand at once with a view to steps being taken which would enable the canals to be used to a much greater extent than they are at the present time. Another point we think should receive consideration is the transport of munitions of war from the filling factories to the sea-port. We understand a scheme is being prepared for taking munitions traffic across to France by means of large sea-going barges, capable of negotiating the caiials in France. It will not be possible for 3D 744 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. the self-same barges to work over the canals in this country, but if possible steps should be taken to convey the traffic by means of barge from the place of origin to some other point at which the traffic can be transferred from canal barge to sea-going barge. We shall be glad to hear that the Ministry of Munitions will take the matter in hand with the canal companies, and with the Government Departments affected to see in what way assistance can be given to the railway companies. I am. Sir, Your obedient Servant, H. A. Walker, Acting Chairman. The Secretary, .^ Ministry of Munitions of War, Whitehall Place, S.W. Further inquiries were to show that the suggestion contained in the second paragraph of this letter, in regard to the direct transport of munitions of war from filling factories to France by water, could not be carried out, save in certain instances, owing to so many of the factories having no direct water connection with the coast ; but the main proposal was acted upon almost at once, and led to important results. On December 2oth, 1916, Mr. Howard Williams, on behalf of the Ministry of Munitions, had a conference with representatives of the leading independent canal companies and canal carriers, explaining to them the general position and the need for affording relief to the railways by a greater utilisation of the canals. He was assured, in turn, that the one great difficulty experienced by the canal interests was want of labour ; that boatmen were born and bred on canals ; that impromptu substitutes could not be provided for those who had joined the Army or taken up other employment, and that unless something could be done to secure exemption from military service for the remainder of the canal staffs, it would soon be impossible to maintain even the remain- ing canal services. The position of the uncontrolled independent canals in respect to the controlled railways, more especially as regarded the payment of war bonuses, was also pointed to as a leading cause for the situation which had arisen. As the outcome of the conference, the canal interests agreed to appoint a sub-committee which would draw up for the Ministry of Munitions a detailed report covering the entire question, and action was at once taken accordingly. Repljdng to Sir Herbert Walker's letter, the Ministry, while expressing full sympathy with the proposal of the railway companies for a greater utilisation of the canals, suggested that the Railway Execu- tive should furnish the Ministry with full particulars of the traffic of which the railways desired to be relieved, the points between which it was passing and the tonnage it was thought the canal companies and canal carriers concerned would be able to handle. Lists of such traffic, though only in so far as it was travelling in quantities aggregating not less than 50 tons per month, were supplied to the Ministry shortly after- wards. On February ist, 1917, a meeting of representatives of the Board STATE CONTROL OF CANALS. 745 of Trade, the Ministry of Munitions, the War Office and the Railway Executive Committee was held at the Board of Trade, and at this meeting, it is understood, the conclusions were arrived at that it was essential the important canals should be kept open and utilised to the f«^est extent possible; that to effect this object it was necessary th^t the Government should take over the canals or as many of them as might be considered desirable, paying a war bonus to the employees in the same way as in the case of the railway-men; that efforts should at once be made to secure the exemption of boatmen and other canal workers from military service, and that an Executive Committee consisting of representatives of the railway-owned canals, the independent canals, the bye-traders, the Ministry of Munitions, the War Office and the Board of Trade should be formed. These proposals were strongly supported by the President of the Board of Trade, who was understood to have formed the opinion that, under the transport conditions of the day, canal traffic had become almost as important as railway traffic. Independent Canals Taken Over. On February i6th, 1917, the following addition was made to the Defence of the Realm Regulations : — Control of Canals. 9H. — (i) Where the Board of Trade are of opinion that, for securing the pubUc safety and the defence of the Realm, it is expedient that this regulation should be applied to any canals, the Board may. by order apply this regulation, subject to any exceptions for which provision may be made in the order, either generally to all canals or to canals in any special area or to any special canal. (2) Any canals to which this regulation is so applied shall, by viitue of the order, pass into the possession of the Board of Trade as from the date of the order, or from any later date mentioned in the order ; and the owner of every such canal and every person -concerned in the management or working thereof, and where the owner of the canal is a company, every director of the company, shall comply with the directions of the Board of Trade as to the management and user of the canal, and if he fails to do so he shall be guilty of a summary ofience against these regulations. (3) Any order of the Board of Trade under this regulation may be revoked or varied as occasion requires. (4) In this regulation the expression " canal " includes all buildings, barges, machinery, and plant used in connection with the working of the canal. (5) Where the Board of Trade have taken possession of any canal, the Board may by order prohibit persons, not being the owner of the canal, who own any barges used thereon, or any machinery or plant used in connection with the loading or unloading of any such barges, from disposing of any such barges, machinery, or plant, without the consent of the Board of Trade or some person or body of persons acting on their behalf, and if any person acts in contravention of any such order he shall be guilty of a summary ofience against these regulations. (6) The Board of Trade shall have power by order to apply this regulation to undertakings of carriers by canal in like manner and with the like consequences as in the case of canals, and for the purposes of this provision the expression " carrier 746 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. by canal " means a person, not being an owner of a canal, who carries on the business of transporting goods by canal, and the expression " undertaking" includes all buildings, Tjarges, machinery and plant used by the owner thereof in connection with such business. On February 23rd, 1917, it was announced that, in accordance with this regulation, the Board of Trade had made an Order taking possession of a number of canals as from March ist, and that they had appointed a committee to control, on their behalf, the canals so taken over. The final constitution of this committee was as follows : — Sir Maurice Fitz- maurice, G.M.G. (Chairman), Sir Ernest Moir (Ministry of Munitions), Mr. E. G. Moggridge (Board of Trade), Lieut.-Col. Redman (War Office), Mr. (afterwards Sir Thomas) Williams (Chief Goods Manager and Acting General Manager of the London and North Western RaUway and Chair- man of the Goods Managers Conference), Mr. J. A. Saner (Weaver Navigation), Mr. A. Peploe (Leeds and Liverpool Canal), and Mr. A. J. Ash (Fellows, Morton and Clas^ton), with Mr. R. B. Dunwoody as Secretary. The main purpose of this Canal Control Committee was to be that of ensuring such use of the canals in question as would give the greatest possible degree of relief to traffic on the railways. In the attainment of this purpose, one of the first steps taken by the committee was to divide into groups the canals coming under their control, and to appoint in each instance a sub-committee which would exercise the local executive functions under the direction of the Central Committee, the latter body co-ordinating the work done, and ensuring adherence to such principles and practices as might be deemed expedient. The groups thus formed were three in number, and were known as the Northern, the Midland, and the Southern, with headquarters at Leeds, Birmingham, and London respectively. Each sub-committee was to have its independent Chaimian, and the gentlemen so appointed were . Northern, Sir John Eaglesome, K.C.M.G. ; Midland, Mr. Howard Humphreys, M.Inst.G.E. ; and Southern, Mr. Sidney Preston, CLE. The other members of the sub-committees were representatives of the canal companies, the canal carriers, the War Office (or the Ministry of National Service) and the Ministry of Munitions, with, in each instance, a representative of the railways, the gentlemen so appointed, at the request of the Railway Executive Committee, by the Lancashire and Yorkshire, the London and North Western and the Great Western Railway Companies, respectively, being Mr. H. Manock, Northern ; Mr. Rees Howell, Midland; and Mr. H. L. Bowles, Southern. Acting on the general instructions they received from the Central Committee, the sub-committees were to meet weekly and submit reports of their proceedings to headquarters, to be dealt with at the Central Committee's own weekly meeting. The canals placed under the charge of the sub-committees in the first instance were as follows : — Northern. — Leeds and Liverpool Canal, 145 miles ; Aire and Calder Navigation, 85 r Bradford Canal, 3 ; Sheffield and South Yorkshire STATE CONTROL OF CANALS. 747 Navigation, 60 ; New Junction Canal, 6 ; Calder and Hebble Navigation, 27 ; Rochdale Canal, 34 ; Bridgwater Canals, 52 ; total, 412 miles. Midland. — Trent Navigation (including Newark Navigation), 68 Kules ; Weaver Navigation, 20 ; Staffordshire and Worcester Canal, 52 ; Birmingham Canals, 159 ; Coventry Canal, 32 ; Loughborough Naviga- tion, 9 ; Leicester Navigation, 16^ Shropshire Union Canals, 202 ; Worcester and Birmingham Canal, 38 ; Severn Navigation, 45 ; Glouces- ter and Berkeley Ship Canal, 17 ; total, 658 miles. Southern. — Birmingham and Warwick Junction, 2 miles ; Warwick and Birmingham Caaal, 22 ; Warwick and Napton Ca,nal, 14 ; Oxford Canal, 82 ; Grand Junction Canal, 189 ; Regent's Canal, 11 ; total, 320 mUes. Total length of the three groups, 1,390 miles. A fourth sub-committee, with headquarters in Dublin, was afterwards appointed to deal with Irish canals. Pkotection Cards for Canal Workers. After completing their organisation on the basis here stated, the Canal Control Committee dealt with the qufestion of ensuring the retention of those canal workers whose withdrawal for service with the Colours had become a matter of such grave concern for the canal industry. This subject was eventually dealt with under an Army Council Instruction, dated April 25th, 1917. The Instruction stated that the canals then controlled by the State fell into two categories, (i) those controlled by the Central Canal Control Committee, and (2) railway-owned canals controlled by the Railway Executive Committee, acting under the Board of Trade ; and, whilst men directly employed by the railway companies would, for the present, be treated as railwajonen, there were others engaged in the carr3dng trade on railway-owned canals, though not actually employed by the railway companies, who would also be dealt with under this Instruction. The duties of each Canal Control Sub-committee included the ascertain- ment of those group and class men who should be retained on the canals and in the emplojntnent of canal. carriers and bye-traders, and alterna- tively, those who could be released for military or other national service ; and a recruiting representative had been appointed to serve on each of these sub-committees when questions of recruiting and protection of employees were being considered. Lists of employees who were con- sidered indispensable would be submitted to the appropriate sub-com- mittees who would, after inquiries, grant protection cards to all essential men — except those under twenty-five years of age in Category A — ^in the employment of canal companies and, also, those engaged in connection with the carrying trade on canals, whether independent or railway owned. The protection card was to be withdrawn if the holder dis- continued working on canals or was continually unsatisfactory in regard to that work. 748 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GfiEAT WAR. Help from Transport Workers' Battalions. The issue of protection cards to men still working on canals and otherwise Uable for military service checked any further decline on account of compulsory joining up, just as the concession of war bonuses offered greater inducements to the men still at canal work to remain where they were ; but these expedients were not likely to ensure that greater increase in the number of canal employees which was no less one of the essential needs of the situation. Here it was sought to meet the difficulty by securing, through the Port and Transit Executive Committee, the assistance for canal work of some of those Transport Workers' Battalions which had been brought into being under the conditions narrated in Chapter XXVII. A circular issued by that committee, under date June 23rd, 1917, announced that, under the instructions of the War Cabinet, t^ie men of the Transport Workers' Battalions were to be used, as necessity arose, to maintain the flow of traffic through the canals ; though they were to be so employed oilly under conditions similar to those applying to their employment on railway work — that is to say, they were to be used to supplement the existing labour supply, the question as to whether or not there was a deficiency of civilian labour in a district being a matter of fact which was to be decided by a local committee comprising one representative of the Canal Control Committee, one representative of the War Office and one representative of labour. When, however, it was thought that one difficulty had thus been met, another arose to take its place. The idea was that men in the Transport Workers' Battalion who were already experienced boatmen, in addition to being in catagories below Class A, should take up the canal work. But the number who could be regarded as experienced boatmen was very limited, and the canal interests showed a decided reluctance to entrust their work to men whom they regarded as essentially amateurs. Thereupon it was decided to give the men from the Transport Workers' Battalion a training in the work they were to do, and, by arrangement with the Great Western Railway Company, Mr. Sidney Preston, chairman of the Southern Canal Control Sub-Committee, organised a training school for boatmen which was opened at Devizes, on the Kennet and Avon Canal, owned by that company and very little used for ordinary traffic, though well adapted to the purposes to which it was now to be applied. The men were sent to Devizes in batches of thirty, and they went through a course of training which generally extended over a period of about three weeks, though in some instances a longer period was necessary. The instruction given included the loading and unloading of boats and the taking of these along the canal and passing them through a series of locks. Boats and horses were purchased for the purposes of the training given. When the men were considered to be sufficiently qualified, they were drafted to canals where labour was especially desired, and STATE CONTROL OF CANALS. 749 before long they had secured so much confidence from the canal interests that there grew up an active demand for their services. When, too, it was found that men really could be trained to work on the canals without having been actually born and bred thereon, the canal companies began to train men on their own account and it became no longer necessary to continue the training at Devizes, where, however, before the work was brought to a close, over 200 had passed through the " school." As mentioned on p. 346, the total number of days' work done by members of the Transport Workers' Battalions on or in connection with canals in Great Britain during the period of their activity was 357.570- It may be of interest to add that among the figures which went to make up this total in respect to work done either for canal companies, for private .firms or for canal carriers were the following : — Northern Area : Rochdale Canal, 26,408 days ; Manchester Ship Canal, 17,828 ; Sheffield and South Yorkshire, 14,717 ; Leeds and Liverpool, 13,334, ^^^ Aire and Calder, 7,754. Midland Area : Birmingham Canal, 40,206 ; Fellows, Morton and Clayton, 12,561 ; other firms (grouped), 44,437. Southern Area : Grand Junction, 14,186. Financial Arrangements. The main basis on which the independent canal companies were taken over by the State was that of a guarantee of their net profits for the year 1913 ; but in certain cases there were variations from this arrangement. Later on, also, an optional control, with financial guarantees, was introduced in the case of a few of the larger of the canal carriers, some of whom were carrsdng over railway-owned canals. Results Attained. From the outset of their operations, the aim of the Canal Control Committee was not so much that of securing the transfer to the canals of any great volume of traffic then being carried by the railways as that of arresting the decadence of the canals and preventing the transfer of still more traffic from the canals to the railways. They started with the fact that in March, 1917, the canal companies and carriers had about 1,200 boats lying idle for want of boatmen and crews, and, though conditions in these respects gradually improved, the obtaining of cargoes for the boats, when these were at last equipped with the labour they had lacked, was a decidedly uphill task. The Canal Control Committee were most strenuous in their endeavours to do all they could. They sent letters to all the Chambers of Commerce in the country and to all the principal local authorities urging them to use their best endeavours to secure the use of the canals for the heavier goods coming into their districts. They issued two successive editions of a sixpenny pamphlet giving much useful information concerning the canal transport of goods, the names and addresses of canal carriers, etc., and the organisation put into operation by the Canal Control Committee, the pamphlets 750 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. being further accompanied by maps showing the canal system of the country. Then the sub-committees got into personal communication with local traders, and brought every possible argument to bear in their efforts to ensure the sending of traffic by canal instead of by rail. Good results were certainly obtained in some directions, and this was especially the case when the Canal Control Committee could deal with such a body, for example, as the Wheat Commission, about 400,000 tons of wheat being conveyed by the northern canals from Liverpool and Manchester to inland points in Lancashire and Yorkshire during the twelve months ending June, 1918, while in February, 1918, there were sent by lighters from Hull to Goole some 1,500 tons of sugar, the railways being relieved proportionately in each ' instance. The presence of railway representatives on the district sub-committees allowed of the local transport conditions being constantly reviewed from the point of view of seeing what traffic could be conveyed by water as against that which must necessarily go by rail ; but although the railway companies submitted partictilars from time to time of, in the aggregate, large volumes of traffic which, in their opinion, might just as well go by water as by rail, difficulties arose either because the canal boats and canal staffs might not be able to deal with much more traffic than they were doing already, or because the traders showed a distinct prefer- ence to consigning by rail instead of by water. The position in this last-mentioned respect was well indicated by a letter written in September, 1917, to the Chairman of the Midland Sub- committee by Mr. Rees Howell, the railway representative thereon. Mr. Howell, Goods Agent at Great Bridge, Staffordshire, for the London and North Western, had not only been nominated by his company to act for the railways in general on the sub-committee, but he had been relieved for the time being of all other duties in order that he might devote himself exclusively to the task of securing the transfer from rail to water of as much traffic in the district as he possibly could. To this end he carried out what amounted to an active personal canvass against the railways and in favour of the canals, and his experiences were thus told by him in the letter in question : — The results of my efforts up to the present are anything but encouraging, for two apparent reasons. First, the traders have had such excellent railway facilities in the past that they fight shy of canal transit. They will not grasp the difficulties under which the railways are working, and which wiU become more acute as the winter approaches. Secondly, the traders do not care to face the extra cost of water transit and the obtaining of additional labour required for collecting, loading, steering, unloading, distributing, etc. Personally I cannot see how this committee can make much progress in th« diversion of traffic from rail to canal unless the railway companies take definite action and insist upon certain traffic being conveyed by water. The main objection of the traders to the use of canals instead of railways was understood to be that, even when their works might be alongside the canal, the raw materials brought by boat would have to STATE CONTROL OF CANALS. 75i be unloaded on to the canal bank, or the wharf alongside, and then, possibly, have to be put into wagons for conveyance to the section of the works where they were wanted, this arrangement involving much trouble and expense as compared with the direct transport of the com- modity by rail to the particular spot where it was wanted. There were, however, a variety of other reasons, besides, the situation in general being thus summed up by Mr. I. T. Williams in the evidence he gave before the Select Committee on Transport, October 22nd, 1918, as to the superiority of the facilities of rail over canal transport : — {a) More speedy transit. (6) Quick delivery enables traders to maintain only small stocks and order by telegraph or telepihone sriiall quantities of goods as they require them. (c) One railway in any town will collect or accept for conveyance traffic for a given destination, and tiie whole operation is carried through as one transaction. On canals several carriers may operate over one route and must be individually approached. (d) Conveyance rates over railways are known and are accessible to the public ; •bye-traders on the waterways, with tiie exception of a few statutory canal carrymg- companies, are not subject to ParUamentary maxima and their charges are a matter of bargaining. (e) Owing to war conditions, canal freights are, in many cases, as high as or higher than those on the railways. (/) The uniformity of railway gauge enables a truck load to be conveyed for any distance and to any part of the country without transhipment ; on the canals transhipment is necessary from broad to narrow canals. {g) Superior facilities by railway in regard to collection, delivery, warehousing, etc., at through and inclusive charges. (A) A large proportion of the trade of the country is dealt with through private sidings by means of which wagons can be placed in convenient positions at any part of the works where they are required. (4) In regard to coal traffic, wagons can be loaded at pit mouth and conveyed to depots in the neighbourhood of consignee's premises or private houses, reducing cartage to a minimum, or, in the case of factories, blast furnaces, etc., having private sidings, to the spot where it is actually required for use. {j) Coal for shipment can be loaded into truck at pit mouth and tipped direct into vessels at docks. (k) Railways are not subject to stoppage in the same way as canals, which freeze over in the winter or are subject to shortage of water in dry seasons. (I) Stoppages for repairs are complete and absolute on canals, whereas on rail- ways single-line working can be resorted to or alternative routes used in order to maintain the flow of traffic. In regard to the proposal put forward that the railway companies should decline to carry by rail commodities which might go by canal instead, the Railway Executive pointed out that, as common carriers, they had no power to refuse commodities offered to them for transport. The general question as to the Board of Trade acquiring power by an addition to the Defence of the Realm Regulations for making an Order which would authorise railway companies to refuse trafi&c that might go either by coasting vessel or by canal was under discussion for some time ; but, although such an Order was drafted by the Board of Trade, it was, as shown on p. 275, never actually made. It is, indeed, doubtful 752 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. if, even if it had been made, it would have been of much real help in regard to canal traffic since there was no guarantee that the canal facilities would have been equal to the conveyance of all that the railway com- panies might, under the new conditions, have wanted to transfer from rail to water. How the traffic on the canals had already declined prior to the forma- tion of the Canal Control Committee on March ist, 1917, may be shown by the following figures, which give the position in 1913 and 1916 respect- ively in regard to some of the leading companies : — Canal. Aire and Calder Navigation Birmingham Navigation Canals Bridgwater Canal Gloucester and Berkeley Canal Grand Junction Canal Regent's Canal . Weaver Navigation Stafiordshire and Worcestershire That the decrease was continuous, notwithstanding the control, is proved by the following further table, in which the tonnage handled on the controlled canals is shown for the months of August and September respectively for the years 1916-1917 and 1918 : — Tons Carried. 1913- 1916. Decrease, 3,598,000 2,095,000 1,503,000 7,090,000 6,600,000 490,000 2,204,000 1,642,000 562,000 1,022,000 543.000 479,000 1,668,000 1,236,000 432,000 967,000 746,000 221,000 1,134,000 885,000 249,000 722,000 566,000 156,000 Decrease Decrease Month of compared Month of compared Year. August. with 1916. September. with 1916. Tons. Tons. Tons. Tons. 1916 . . 1,724,207 — 1,679,293 — 1917 . . 1,600,311 123,896 1,600,208 79,085 1918 . . 1,491,952 232,255 1,517,098 162,195 All that can be said concerning these particular figures is that the decline they indicate would doubtless have been considerably greater but for the control. The Ministry of Transport and the Controlled Canals. Following on the creation of the Ministry of Transport, the powers of the Board of Trade in respect to canals formally passed to the Ministry on September 23rd, 1919, and the control over the independent canals which had been exercised by the Canal Control Committee under the Board of Trade was merged in the Ministry of Transport, to be continued under these new conditions stiU a short time longer. On June 30th, 1920, the optional control which had been extended to some of the larger carriers and bye-traders, as distinct from the canal companies, was brought to a close, and the decontrol of the canal companies them- selves followed on August 31st, 1920, the guarantee of their net profits on the basis of the year 1913 ceasing as and from that date. This procedure left the canal companies in the disadvantageous STATE CONTROL OF CANALS. 753 position that, being statutory companies, they were unable to increase their tolls, or, when they were, also, carrying companies, their charges, as the canal carriers who were not themselves canal owners were free to do. The companies might, of course, have applied to Parliament for a new Act, in each instance, giving them authority to increase their tolls and charges, and in the case of the Bridgwater Canal, owned by the Manchester Ship Canal Company, this course was adopted ; but an alternative course had been provided by the Ministry of Transport Act, which authorised the Minister, after giving not less than one month's notice, to take possession, in the name and on behalf of his Majesty, and for a period of two yearsj of, among other properties, the whole or any part of any canal or inland undertaking. In this case he would have power to authorise the canal companies in question to raise their tolls and carrying rates within limits and subject to conditions to be approved by the Rates Department of the Ministry of Transport. The bulk of the canal companies who had been under control accord- ingly appUed to the Minister of Transport, when the end of the control period was drawing to a close, that he should take formal possession of them under the Ministry of Transport Act, and, the necessary notices having been given, the new conditions came into force on September ist, 1920, immediately following, therefore, the cessation of control on August 31st. Meanwhile it had been understood that the total increase to be allowed by the Ministry of Transport in the charges of the canal com- panies was not to exceed 150 per cent, of those in operation prior to the taking possession of the canals; but the effect of such increase was expected to be that the companies would be in a position to support themselves when the subsidies which had been paid to them were with- drawn. The canal companies would, in fact, be more or less levelled up with the railway companies, the more so as the increase in charges sanctioned to the latter had met the disadvantage in which the canal companies were placed when they were competing with railways still operating on the basis of their pre-war rates and charges. CHAPTER LI. TIMBER CONTROL, SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT. Under pre-war conditions, Great Britain had become accustomed to rely almost exclusively upon overseas resources for her supplies of timber. For softwoods or " picked " timber her merchants drew practically all they wanted from Continental countries, so that in these respects even Newfoundland, and still less Canada, then had but comparatively little chance on our timber markets. Of the 3,000,000 loads of picked timber from Europe, about one-half came from Russia and one-third from France, Sweden and Norway, with contributions on a smaller scale from Portugal. Having regard to their proximity to the United Kingdom, and the ease with which the whole business could be carried on, these Continental countries naturally got the preference, while the organisation of the industry was so complete that it was found preferable to depend on Russia and Norway for British requirements rather than on the already available home supplies, except in regard to particular varieties of timber or, on a comparatively small scale, to specially favourable local conditions. Altogether, our imports of timber, including mining timber, in 19x3, amounted to over 1:1,500,000 tons. Of railway sleepers alone our total imports in 1914 amounted to 216,000 loads, and of these the number coming from Russia was 1:06,000 loads. With the advent of war, what may be described as the Timber Trouble in this country began almost at once. As early as October, 1914, it was found that special measures woiild be required to provide for the needs of the military situation. Timber was wanted for a great variety of purposes, and the demand for it increased in extent and intensity almost day by day from that time onward. It was wanted most urgently for the construction of huts for the new Armies which Lord Kitchener was seeking to raise. It was wanted for barracks and ordnance dep6ts, for supplementary Government offices, for hospital buildings, for use in the trenches overseas, for the building of munition or other factories or works, for munition-workers' hutments, for boxes and cases to be used in the forwarding of shells, etc., and for a thousand and one other pur- poses. It was not long, therefore, before a strain began to be put upon the meeting of requirements from the supplies already on hand, while concurrently therewith the absorption of so much shipping for war purposes foreshadowed the coming shortage in sea transport which was to develop with almost startling rapidity. So it was that within three months of the outbreak of war the Office 754 TIMBER CONTROL, SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT. 755 of Works, at the request of the War Office, undertook the necessary purchases on account of that department, appointing a firm of timber merchants as official buyers. This expedient was extended until eventually the Office of Works was supplying practically all the soft- timber requirements not only of the War Office but of most of the other Government departments as well. In the autumn of 1915 the diminishing imports and the increasing demands on tonnage led the Government to the conclusion that it had become desirable to utilise more fully the timber resources of our own country, more especially for the supply of railway sleepers, and thus ensure the release of a greater amount of shipping for other purposes. They accordingly set up, as a Branch of the Board of Agriculture, a Home-Grown Timber Committee, which was to acquire woods, erect mills, employ labour direct, and make provision for meeting Government requirements to such extent as might be practicable. Difficulties soon began to be experienced by the committee in the direction of their pur- chasing the woods they were to utilise for the said purpose, and in April, 191:6, an addition (2c) made to the Defence of the Realm Regulations empowered the Army Council, the Board of Trade, or any person author- ised by either of them to enter on any land for the purpose of inspecting, marking and taking possession of any trees, whether standing or felled ; to take possession of any land or buildings for the purpose of felling standing trees, converting trees, or storing or removing such trees ; to take possession, also, of any vehicles, locomotives or animals required for the purposes of transport in connection therewith ; to provide housing accommodation for workmen employed for any of the said purposes by taking possession of any land or unoccupied premises ; and to utilise any water supply or motive power available for any of the said purposes. Lumbermen from Overseas. Meanwhile another serious difficulty had presented itself in the form of a shortage of labour. Britain's comparative neglect of home forestry, in favour of importa- tion of needful supplies, had led to there being X)nly a small number of really expert workers in the country even in peace-time conditions, whilst of those that there were, when war broke out, a considerable proportion had joined or been swept into the ranks of the Army, regard- less of any thought that they might be wanted to continue at essential home occupations for which new beginners would be quite unfit. While, therefore, steps were being taken to acquire compulsory possession of timber to be felled or otherwise dealt with, it was no less necessary to get the men who could do the work. In this extremity Mr. Bonar Law, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, cabled in February, 1916, to the Governor-General of Canada to the feffect that H.M. Government would be grateful if the Canadian Government would assist in the production of timber for war purposes by recruiting quickly, and sending to us, a battalion of lumbermen to get 756 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. timber from the forests of Britain. Thereupon the 224th Canadian Forestry Battalion was organised ; the first draft arrived in England on April 1st ; a camp, with mill and all necessary machinery, was set up at Virginia Water, Surrey, and within three months of the sending of Mr. Bonar Law's cable Canadian lumbermen were furnishing to the British authorities supplies of sawn home-grown timber with a regularity and a constant flow which might almost have suggested that they had been doing nothing else all their lives. Before long, also, other detachments from Canada were working at other camps in England and Scotland, and the eventual strength of the battalion was 1,609, all ranks. Shortly after the arrival of the 224th battalion in England, the Colonial Secretary cabled again to Canada. The shortage in the supply of timber, he said, was still causing serious concern, while the acute shortage of transportation necessitated a more rapid exploitation of the timber reserves in allied countries. The French Government had placed certain forests in France at the disposal of the British authorities, and, the message concluded : " H.M. Government again turns to Canada for assistance." Nor did they turn in vain. Another Canadian Forestry Battalion, the 238th, was now formed, and it arrived here in September, 1916. In the meantime plans had been arranged for the extension of Canadian forestry operations to the Western Front ; authority was given in October, 1916, for the formation of a Canadian Forestry Corps, of which the two Forestry Battalions then in England were to form the nucleus, all further arrivals being added thereto, and arrangements wereanade for the purchase in Canada of machinery and equipment for saw mills, etc., sufficient for the employment of at least 10,000 men. A small force of the corps started operations in France in December, 191:6. By the time the Armistice was signed, the work being done by the corps in France had extended almost to the frontiers alike of Spain, Switzerland and Germany. The total strength of the corps in France, including attached officers and men from Imperial units, Portuguese, Finlanders and prisoners of war, was over 18,000, while the larger proportion of that total timber-output in France which, as stated in Sir Douglas Haig's dispatch of December 25th, 191:7, had rendered our Army self-supporting in this respect, was produced by the Canadian forestry forces. In Great Britain the operations of the corps extended over six dis- tricts by the time of the Armistice, namely, four in England — Egham, East Sheen, Southampton and Carlisle, and two in Scotland — Stirling and Inverness. The total strength of the corps in Great Britain at that date was 13,207, included therein being, as in France, attached officers and men, Portuguese, Finlanders, and prisoners of war. The base depot remained in Windsor Great Park, where it eventually extended over an area of 125 acres. In the spring of 1917 a Newfoundland Forestry Battalion was formed, and the members thereof were soon at work at Craignevearn, Perthshire, where, a century ago, John, Fourth Duke of Atholl, with patriotic fore- TIMBER CONTROL, SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT. 757 sight of his country's future needs, and impressed, more especially, by the lessons of the Napoleonic wars, planted close on i6,ooo acres, mainly on barren mountain sides, with over 27.000,000 young trees of spruce and larch, now to become an invaluable national asset. Here the men from Newfoundland cut trees up to a level of i,8oo ft., the trunks they felled — ^in some instances over 100 ft. long^ — being brought down into the valleys by means of chutes, otherwise running troughs formed of a triple line of trunks of trees permitting of a direct vertical fall. Work was afterwards done by the Newfoundland men in other parts of Scotland as well. Still further, the President of the National Shawmut Bank of Boston received a cablegram from England on April 3;6th, 1:917, suggesting that America could help this country best by sending to her aid a contingent of lumbermen who would help to produce supplies of home-grown timber to take the place of that which could not be imported owing to the shortage of ships. The result of this message was that the Common- wealths and citizens of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Ham- shire, Rhode Island and Vermont combined to raise ten New England Sawmill Units for service in Old England, 350 men being enlisted, 120 horses obtained, ten portable sawmills, with complete equipment pur- chased, and substantial funds raised, within one month. The units reached Liverpool on July 4th, went on to Ardgay, near the head of Dornoch Firth, were mostly in full operation throughout the surrounding district by the middle of August, and, during the course of less than ten months, produced about 20,000,000 board feet of timber products, including over 60,000 sleepers. From Ardgay the operations of the units were extended over, more or less, the greater part of Scotland. A Timber Supplies Department. Whilst the various measures, just detailed, for the acquiring of more labour from overseas to aid in the production of home-grown timber supplies were proceeding, the Government had appointed a committee to consider in what way the pressure on shipping could be relieved by cutting ofi all supplies from abroad which could possibly be dispensed with ; and this committee, which sat under the presidency of Lord Curzon, presented a report in February, 1917, recommending, among other things, that timber imports, which had already been cut down by 1,600,000 tons during 1916, should now undergo a further reduction of 3,600,000 tons. The difference, it was suggested, should be made good mainly by increased exploitation of home supplies. This recommendation was adopted by the War Cabinet, and there was forthwith created, under the War Office, a Timber Supplies Depart- ment, designed to take over the functions then exercised by a variety of other bodies, including the Office of Works and the Home-Grown Timber Committee, in regard to the supply (then almost exclusively) of softwoods. On February 22nd, 1917, the Secretary of the War Office announced 75,8 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. that Sir Bajnpfylde Fuller had been appointed Director of Timber Supplies, and that in the discharge of the duties of that office he would have the assistance of an advisory committee. On April 28th Sir Bampfylde Fuller issued a circular in which he alluded to the " alarming shortage of sawn-wood," and impressed upon the timber trade the absolute necessity of developing the home-grown timber industry. He offered to do all in his power to provide labour, and he called on the mill- owners to supply him with information showing the extent of their plant, the amount of labour they employed and their output. Control of the timber industry, owipg not alone to the pressure on shipping but to the incteasing activity of the enemy submarine danger, had thus formally begun, and it was to undergo a variety of other developments in rapid succession. At the end of May, 1917, the Timber Supplies Department was transferred from the War Offic6 to the Board of Trade, and Mr. (after- wards Sir) James B. Ball who, in February of that year, had taken over the position of Chief Engineer of the London, Brighton and South Coast Railway, on the retirement of Mr. G. L. Morgan, was appointed Controller of Timber Supplies. Apart from the fixing of prices for timber, with which we have here no concern, the main duty devolving upon the Timber Supplies Depart- ment had, from the first, been that of acquiring, felling and preparing home-grown timber to take the place of that which was no longer coming from overseas ; and in this connection the questions which more especially arose related to labour, plant and machinery, cutting and milling, and provision of motor tractors or other vehicles for the transport of the timber from the woods to the railway. What the Timber Supplies Department did in these various directions was designed to supplement, and not to supplant, the activities of the Timber Trade itself ; but in respect more especially to labour, the department rendered invaluable service in securing the help of the Dominions and New England con- tingents, of whose operations it took charge, first acquiring (with the exercise of compulsory powers, where necessary) standing timber from various owners, and then making the necessary arrangements for the work to be done. Suitable labour was also employed by the timber merchants or otherwise from every possible source in this country, even women being taken on, in part as fellers though more especially as measurers. In 1917 the additions made to the number of forestry workers in Great Britain reached a total of about 15,000. By the end, also, of the same year, the imports of timber, including pit timber, had fallen to 2,857,000 tons as compared with over 11,500,000 tons in 1913, while the output of home-grown timber had expanded to 3,000,000 tons in 1917, as compared with 900,000 tons in I9i;3 and 1,250,000 in 1916. Before the end of 1918, the output of home-grown timber had still further risen to 4,250,000 tons, included therein being about 2,000,000 tons of mining timber. TIMBER CONTROL, SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT. 759 Effect on Rail Transport. While the sum total of the timber traffic conveyed by rail remained considerably below that which was carried in the pre-war period, the changes brought about had a most marked effect on rail transport conditions. Under normal circumstances the timber arriving in such great quan- tities could be received at one or other of the large number of ports around the coasts of the United Kingdom representing the point nearest to, or most conveniently situated for, ultimate destination, and the railway lines were laid out, and the local railway arrangements were made, at such port or ports accordingly, the traffic being carried inland on regular programmes, as occasion required. With, first of aU, the limita- tion in the number of ports at which the traffic could be received, and then the severe restrictions imposed on any imports of timber at All, the position underwent a complete change, from a railway point of view. One of the first efforts made by the railway companies to meet the situation was the concession of emergency rates for the transport by rail of timber, and especiaHy imported pit-timber, which could no longer be conveyed by sea to the port at which it had hitherto been received. There came a time, for instance, when, owing to the shortage of tonnage, and for other reasons, the importation of timber from Scandinavia was restricted mainly to the North-East Coast, with the result that supplies required elsewhere might have to be hauled for considerable distances by rail, instead of going direct by water. The companies more especially concerned, in the first instance, were the North-Eastern, the Great Central and the Great Eastern, though all companies over whose lines the traffic required to pass would find a proportionate addition to the traffic they had to handle. In Scotland the railway companies agreed to a flat rate of los. per ton for the transport of wood by rail for any distance in Scotland itself, though this arrangement did not apply to traffic for destinations in England. Then, in proportion as the production of home-grown timber increased in all the forest or woodland districts of England, Wales and Scotland, the companies found themselves called upon to handle what were often great quantities of timber at places or along routes where, previously, little or none might have had to be dealt with before. Country stations having no facilities for other than the ordinary traffic of the district were linked up by the lumbermen's lines with woods and forests from which there came an apparently never-ending flow of timber or timber products, while in the return direction the railway company concerned had to convey a wide range of requisites for the setting up and maintenance of the camps. Apart from the special arrangements which often had to be made in the way of providmg additional sidings, or otherwise, the traffic to be dealt with assumed in many instances prodigious proportions, as compared with pre-war conditions in the same districts or localities, and the amount of trouble involved was, on the whole, vastly, greater 3E 76o BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. than that which had been experienced in dealing with far greater consignments at and from the ports under normal conditions. The traffic was further encouraged by the concession of emergency rates for the transport of home-grown pitwood from the producing areas to the colliery districts. The railway companies were anxious to do all they possibly could to maintain the coal supplies of the country, and enormous quantities of pit timber were, in the aggregate, carried at these rates. With a view to affording some degree of relief to the railways, by reducing long haulage of mining timber, the Board of Trade issued on July 29th, X918, under the authority of the Defence of the Realm Regula- tions, a " Pitwood Order, 1918," which, it was understood, had been inspired in the first instance by the Controller of Coal Mines, whose Coal Transport Reorganisation Scheme it closely followed. " Pitwood " was defined as meaning, for the purposes of the Order, pit-props, sawn props, and timber in the round which is intended for use in mines. Great Britain was divided into eight areas of pitwood supply for the minefields districts of (I) Scotland, (11) Northumberland and Durham, (III) Cumberland, (IV) Yorkshire, Derbyshire and Notts, (V) Lancashire, Cheshire and North Wales, (VI) South Wales and Mon- mouthshire, (VII) Somerset, Gloucestershire and Bristol, and (VIII) Staffordshire, Warwickshire, Shropshire, Leicestershire, Worcestershire and Kent respectively, and it was laid down in the Order that — On and from the 12th day of August, 1916, no person shall deliver, move or consign or cause or permit to be delivered, moved or consigned, pitwood from one area of supply to another except under and in accordance with the terms of- a permit granted by the Controller of Timber Supplies or by a person' duly authorised on his behalf. This Order (which also fixed maximum prices for pitwood, home-grown or imported) remained in force until April 30th, 1919, when it was revoked by Pitwood Order, 1919, which reduced the number of pitwood area;s of supply to three, namely : — (I) South Wales and Monmouthshire, com- prising the counties of Cardigan, Pembroke, Brecon, Monmouth, Devon, Dorset, Radnor, Carmarthen, Glamorgan, Cornwall, Somerset, Wilts (excluding the' portion of Somerset and Wilts within ten miles of the Somerset collieries), Berkshire and Hampshire (including the Isle of Wight). (II) England and Wales, except South Wales and Monmouth- shire, but including the whole of England and Wales with the exception of counties or portions of counties named in Area of Supply No. I. (Ill) Scotland. The Order laid down that from April 30th, 1919, pitwood was not to be forwarded from Area of Supply No. I to any other area unless consigned direct to a colliery or mine, and, also, except under and in accordance with the terms of a permit granted by the Controller of Coal Mines. The same Order also fixed revised prices of home-grown or imported pitwood according to the three areas of supply. After the Armistice the timber control was removed as soon as possible. TIMBER CONTROL, SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT. 761 No figures are available as regards the sum total of home-grown timber carried by the railways in England, but the following table, compiled by the Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade) in Scotland shows the extent of the home-grown timber carridd by Scottish railways for that department (as distinct from other similar traffic conveyed for timber merchants), and delivered to collieries, mines and other destina- tions in Scotland and England respectively from the outbreak of war to March 31st, 1919 : — To Places on Scottish Railways Year or Collieries Period. and Mines. Tons. 1914, Aug.-Dec. . 63,567 1915 244,794 1916 405.464 1917 ..... 418,021 1918 . . . . . 501,378 1919, Jan.-March . 106,115 Totals . . 1,739,339 Sawmills and Wood-yards. Tons. 11,482 43.198 90,197 2x8,389 549,556 95.722 To Places on English Railways Collieries Sawmills and and Mines. Wood-yards. Tons. Tons. 4.752 16,9x1 25,180 106,262 134.196 28,835 320 2,166 7.375 54.733 155,416 36,323 Totals Toflss. 80,121; 307,069 528,216 797.405 1,340,546 266,995 1,008,544 316,136 256,333 3,320,352 CHAPTER LII. PROVISION OF RAILWAY SUPPLIES. Having previously relied upon Baltic redwood for practically the whole of their timber requirements in respect to sleepers and crossing timbers, the British railway companies found themselves, almost immediately on the outbreak of war, in a position of great disadvantage owing, first, to the decline, and then to the cessation, of imports from this source. There was the probability, also, that difficulties would arise in the way of securing supplies or other materials which were essential to railway working, and the need to take immediate steps to meet the situation was recognised. In the very month, therefore, that hostilities began, there was appointed by the Railway Executive a C9riimittee, known as the Stores Superintendents' Conference, the special fimction of which was to be that of co-ordinating requirements, purchases and deliveries of the said materials in the interests of the British railways in common. Of this committee Mr. S. H. Hunt (London and North Western Railway) was the chairman and Mr. E. Cook the secretary. The committee, in turn, divided itself into various sub-committees, each of which dealt specially with some particular article or articles, such as timber, lubricating oils and fats, canvas, cement, etc. In regard to timber, the practical closing of the Baltic ports to com- mercial vessels made it necessary to look elsewhere for supplies, and these were sought, in the first instance, from the United States, joint purchases and deliveries being arranged for by the Stores Superintendents' Conference. In 1915, however, the shipping problem became more acute, and the time came when it was no longer possible, without Govern- ment assistance, to import the sleepers, etc., which had been purchased in America. Negotiations were accordingly entered into with the Admiralty, which undertook that vessels shotdd be placed at the disposal of the railway companies for the transport of the said materials to this country, the companies to repay to the Admiralty the costs incurred by them. Under this arrangement fifteen shipments were brought across the Atlantic in 1915 and 1916. Towards the end of 1916 the Government demands on the reduced amount of shipping available rendered it no longer possible for further tonnage to be allocated to the railways, and in order-that the interests of the companies in the matter of supplies could be more closely watched, the Railway Executive Committee appointed a Timber Supply Committee, consisting of Sir Robert TurnbuU (London and North Western), Mr. F. 762 IPROVISION OF RAILWAY SUPPLIES. 763 Potter (Great Western) and Mr. F. Tatlow (Midland), with Mr. W. H. Stanier (Great Western) as secretary. When, early in 1917, a Timber Supply Department was set up by the Board of Trade, the companies may have thought that the meeting of their own requirements would now be facilitated ; but one of the first things the Timber Controller had to do was to ask the railway companies to provide, in the interests of our Armies overseas, and in addition to the locomotives, the rolling stock and the rails already spoken of in Chapter XLV, no fewer than 200,000 sleepers from the stocks they already had on hand, the need for new lines of railway on the Western Front being so urgent as not to permit of the delay that would be involved in obtaining the sleepers from other sources. The companies promptly supplied the 200,000, the bulk of these being shipped to France vik Richborough. The Timber Supply Sub-committee worked, however, in close co-operation throughout with the Timber Controller ; they arranged for the limited supplies of timber available to be distributed to the best advantage, and the sleepers eventually produced from home-grown timber in the various Canadian and other forestry camps set up throughout Great Britain alone ran into several millions. Maintenance of permanent way was further interfered with owing to the restrictions imposed in regard to the supply of creosote, required for ensuring the preservation of the sleepers. At one time the needs of the Navy for fuel oil were so great that the use of creosote for the purpose stated was prohibited during a period extending over several months. Such prohibition made it necessary for the railway companies to use uncreosoted sleepers to a certain extent— an expedient which, though it had to be resorted to for a short period, was most undesirable since it meant that uncreosoted sleepers had only half the life of those which had been creosoted. Distribution of other controlled materials was also referred by the Railway Executive to their Timber Supply Sub-committee, the principal articles dealt with being oils and fats, canvas, cement, turpentine and paper. The demands for oils and fats alike for the manufacture of munitions and for thepurpose of food led to a considerable shortage in these materials, which are no less indispensable for the lubrication of railway rolling stodk, and close co-operation with the Food Control Committee was necessary in order to ensure that such limited supplies as could be obtained for the railways month by month might be distributed to the best advantage. A committee oiE railway chemists conducted experiments with a view to using substitutes for palm oil, rape oil and tallow, meeting with a large measure of success in the utilisation of fatty acids (otherwise fats and oils from which the glycerine had been extracted) and mineral oils. Another department of railway work in which difficulty was experi- enced was the manufacture of wagon sheets or tarpaulins. The chief materials required for this purpose are canvas and linseed oil. Of the 764 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. former the most suitable variety is that made of flax ; but only limited quantities were obtainable for the railways owing to the heavy demands made on account of military and naval needs. Production of the wagon sheets was nevertheless carried on, as far as might be, with the help of hemp and flax tow. Such supplies both of canvas and of linseed oil as could be obtained were allocated by the Timber Supply Sub-committee according to the urgency of the needs of the companies' concerned. The fact should be mentioned that the Flax Control Board and the Ministry of Food gave every assistance in their power in ensuring that the minimum quantities of canvas and oils requisite for the efficient working of the railways should be forthcoming. During the last year of the war the demand for Portland cement for military purposes was so great that the quantities remaining for other purposes were materially restricted, and supplies for the railways were allocated only on the presentation of a Railway Executive Committee's certificate testifjdng to the urgency of the need. Government demands and the limitations of shipping also led to restrictions in the supplies of turpentine, mineral spirit, paper and various other materials. Here, again, the Timber Supply Sub-committee served as the medium for communication between the railway companies and the Government Control Departments, arranging for the distribution of the available supplies under such conditions as to meet, at least, all urgent requirements. After the Armistice the position in regard to most of the articles to which reference has been made became easier, control, where this had been enforced, being removed as soon as practicable ; but the supply of timber, and more particularly of sleepers, crossing timbers and shunting poles, still required to be specially dealt with so far as the British railways were concerned. During 1918 the Timber Controller, in co-operation with the Timber Supply Sub-Committee, placed contracts in British Columbia and the United States for several millions of sleepers and crossing timbers, and in the United States for a large number of hickory shunting poles. It was further arranged that, in addition to several hundred thousand sleepers made from home-grown timber, upwards of a million of those to be returned from France or in Government stocks should be placed at the disposal of the Railway Executive Committee. When, however. Government control of timber ceased in March, 1919, only a very small proportion of the additional supplies thus arranged for had reached this country, and the Timber Supply Department of the Board of Trade carried on their operations for a time in order to complete their commitments. Concurrently therewith the Railway Executive Committee transferred the functions of their Timber Supply Sub-committee to a Timber Allocation Sub-committee (Stores Superintendents' Conference) consisting of Mr. F. D. Stones (London and North Western Railway), chairman, Mr. T. H. Ward (Mid- land), Mr. H. Deans (Great Western), Mr. A. J. Easton (Caledonian) PROVISION OF RAILWAY SUPPLIES. 765 and Mr. E. Cook, secretary. This sub-committee, working in co-opera- tion with the Timber Supply Department, was advised of the sailing of vessels containing cargoes of materials for railway purposes, and, having regard to the urgent needs of the various companies and the state of congestion prevailing at practically every port in the country, the sub- committee was required to nominate the port of arrival and to decide in each instance the railway company by which the imports should be handled. Altogether 130 shipments were dealt with, the number of sleepers, crossing timbers and other items included therein being no fewer than six millions. That the British railway companies experienced enormous difficulties in obtaining the materials essential to the maintenance of their lines, their locomotives, their wagons and their transport arrangements generally in a state of efficiency is beyond all possible doubt ; but in regard to the articles dealt with in the present Chapter, and apart from all that was done in other directions, it will be seen that the most practical of steps in the way of really effective organisation were taken to surmount those diffi- culties, that the maintenance and operation of the lines were assured to a far greater extent than would otherwise have been possible, and that' the country as a whole is, in common with the railway companies them- selves, greatly indebted to the committees and sub-committees in question for the zeal and success with which they acquitted themselves of the duties entrusted to them. CHAPTER LIII. WAR-TIME LABOUR CONDITIONS. In considering war-time labour conditions on the railways, the principal factor is what is known as the "Truce Agreement." Under the terms of the Conciliation Scheme of 1911, it was open to the men to determine that scheme at the expiration of three years, and notice to this effect was given by the majority of the members of the employees' side of the boards on the several railways in November, 1913, though it was made dear that what was desired was a revision of the scheme, and not its abolition. In the summer of 191^ meetings took place between a committee of General Managers, representing the majority of the railway companies of Great Britain, and representatives of the National Union of Railwaymen and the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen. In July, 1914, the basis of a new ConciMation Scheme had been agreed to ; but when war broke out the fact was realised that no good purpose would be served by proceeding with the establish- ment of new conciliation machinery. Accordingly, the negotiating bodies entered into the " Truce Agreement," as follows : — Notwithstanding the notice of determination which expires on November 30th, 1914, the Scheme of Conciliation settled at the Board of Trade Conference on December nth, 1911, shall remain in force, and the men's side of the boards on, each of the several railways as at present constituted shall continue to act, provided that either the railway companies, the National Union of Railwaymen, or the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen may give six weeks' notice to determine the agreement, and thereupon the parties hereto shall agree as to the arrangements to be adopted for the future. It was further agreed that all existing contracts and conditions of service shall remain in operation, and that no new agreements shall be made by the companies either with deputations or Conciliation Boards during this suspensory period. Whatever may have been the intention at the time, there is no doubt that the " Truce Agreement," in stereotyping conditions of service and in taking from the railway companies and the Conciliation Boards all power to vary the conditions of service, had the effect of enormously strengthening the development of trade union principles among railway- men, the unions becoming the negotiating parties in all subsequent labour questioiis. War Bonus. These were not long in making their appearance. In January, 1915, the trade unions agitated for a war bonus, and a committee of General 766 WAR-TIME LABOUR CONDITIONS. 767 Managers was appointed to meet them. The outcome was an agreement, dated February 13th, 1915, which granted to railway operating staff over eighteen years of age a bonus of 3s. per week to those in receipt of l^s than 30s. per week, and 2s. per week to those whose wages were 30s. per week or more. It was left open to the trade unions to ask for a review of the arrangement at the end of three months. The cost of this first war bonus was the subject of a separate agreement between the companies and the Government, and it was arranged that, while three-quarters of the amount might be included as a working expense in the companies' accounts, one-quarter should be borne by them out of their own funds. In due course notices were given by the trade unions for a review of the Februaxy agreement, and on June nth, 1915, a meeting was held between a committee of General Managers and representatives of the two unions, at which it was agreed that a bonus of is. 6d. per week should be granted to boys under eighteen years of age, this arrangement to be an appendix to the agreement entered into in February, and, with it, to remain in force during the period of Government control. Further demands were, however, made by the trade unions in September, 1915, and on October 13th an agreement was arrived at under which the war bonus then being paid was increased to 5s. per week in the case of men and 2s. 6d. per week in the case of boys, and an undertaking was given by the unions that— During the pendency of this agreement, they will not present to the railway companies any fresh demands for increased bonus or wages, or general alterations in conditions of service, and they will not give countenance or support either to a demand on the part pf any of their members to re-open the settlement now made or to any strike that might be entered upon in furtherance of such demand. Notwithstanding this pledge, the unions, in August, 1916, again came forward with applications for an increase in the war bonus. They stat#d that the prolongation of the war and the continuous rise in the ccBt of Uving had compelled them to ask the companies for a reconsider?i- tion of the position. Meetings took place in September between repre- sentatives of the railway companies and the trade unions, with the result that the war bonus for men was increased to los. per week, and that for boys to 5s. per week. Owing to the further continuous rise in prices, the unions again approached the companies in March, 1917, with a request for an increase in the bonus. On this and subsequent occasions the negotiations were conducted by the Railway Executive Committee, acting on behalf of the Government, instead of by a Committee of General Managers representing the railway companies. Meetings took place with the uniops, and on April lath it was agreed to increase the amount of tiw bonus by 5s. in the case of men and zs. 6d. in the case of boys, making the revised bonus 15s. per week and 7s. 6d. per week respectively. 768 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. War Wages. In July, 1917, applications were made by the National Union of RailwajTmen for the war bonus to be converted into war wages and by the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen for the adoption of what was known as their "National Programme." At a meeting between the Railway Executive Committee and representatives of the National Union of Railwaymen, on August 8th, the request for the conversion of the war bonus into war wages was acceded to. This meant that the war allowance would, in future, be taken into consideration in the calculation of pa57ment for overtime and Sunday duty. A similar concession offered to the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen was decMned ; but arrangements were made by the railway companies that the conversion should apply to all their employees. The apphcation from the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen was referred to the Committee on Production, and the case was heard on November 9th and 12th. The award of the committee, dated November 19th, gave an increase in the war wages paid to members of the Society of 5s. per week to men and 2s. 6d. per week to boys, i.e., totals of 20s. and los. respectively. In the meantime an application had been made by the National Union of RailwajTmen for a review of the agreement made in August. Meetings with the Railway Executive Committee were held on November 15th, 19th, 27th and 29th, and the decision was arrived at that the war wages then being paid should be increased to 21s. per week for adults and los. 6d. per week for boys. It was provided that — This agreement is supplemental to previous agreements entered into between the Committee of General Managers or the Railway Executive Committee and the trade unions, and shall remain in operation without amendment until March 31st, 1 9 1 8, and shall then be subj ect to revision only if there shall have been a considerable alteration in the cost of living as shown by the Board of Trade Returns since the date of this agreement. On November 30th the Committee on Production issued an award supplementary to that dated November 19th, making the war wage for adult members of the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen 21s. per week, and that for boys los. 6d. per week. In April, 1918, negotiations again took place between the Railway Executive Committee and representatives of the National Union of Railwajmien in regard to an application by that union for an increase in the existing war wage of 21s. per week. It was admitted by the imion representatives that there had been no considerable alteration in the cost of living since the date of the last agreement, but it was stated that the situation had altered as a result of the 12J per cent, bonus granted to munition workers having been extended to a large section of railway shopmen. The outcome of the negotiations was an agreement, dated April 25th, which increased the war wage to 25s. per week and recorded an undertaking by the representatives of thf National Union of Railway- WAR-TIME LABOUR CONDITIONS. 769 men that they would not bring forward any further demands for, or based on, the I2| per cent, bonus on earnings, or give support to any such demand put forward on behalf of any body of railwa3mien concerned in the manipulation of traffic. An application was also made in April by the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen for the pa37ment to their members of the i2| per cent, bonus. This application was subsequently withdrawn, and it was agreed to increase the bonus from 21s. to 25s. per week. The agreement come to on April 25th provided that an opportunity would be afforded to either party concerned to ask for reconsideration when necessity arose, it being understood that the men's representatives would not bring forward any demand for, or based upon, the 12J per cent, bonus on earnings. Introduction of a Sliding Scale. In the following July demands were made by the trade unions for an advance of los. per week in the amount of the war wages, based on the increase in the cost of hving since the date of the last agreement and on the advances granted to miners and workers in the engineering and foundry trades. In September meetings were held between the Railway Executive Committee and representatives of the trade unions, and an offer was made by the former to increase the war wages by 4s. per week to all adult workers and by 2s. to all under eighteen years of age. That offer was rejected by both unions, and, as the result of further conversa- tions, the committee increased their offer to 5s. and 2s. 6d. respectively. This offer was also rejected by the unions. Meetings were then arranged between members of the Government and representatives of the imions. It was made clear on behalf of the Government that they were not prepared to make any increase in the amounts offered by the Railway Executive Committee, but it was agreed that there should be set up immediately a committee composed of equal numbers of either side whose duty it would be to arrange for the introduction of a " sliding scale " to regulate future advances, the datum line being August 5th,, when the increase was no per cent., the war wage to be reckoned as 30s. per week. The function of this committee was to arrange for further alterations in the war wage to be given effect to automatically without any new application being made. Unfortunately, some of the railwa3anen were not disposed to accept this settlement, and a partial strike occurred." It lasted from the 20th to the 27th of September, the Great Western line, in particular, being seriously affected. The Government maintained a firm attitude through- out the strike, and the men returned to work without having obtained any alteration in the terms of the settlement. In consequence of the strike the General Secretary of the National Union of Railwa37men, Mr. J. H. Thomas, M.P., resigned that post, but was ultimately prevailed upon by the members of the union to withdraw his resignation. An agreement arrived at in November by the committee appointed 770 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. to set up a "sliding scale " provided that the amount of the war wage to be paid to railwaymen should be based upon the official estimate of the cost of living as shown in the Labour Gazette, the datum line being a war wage of 30S. per week and an increase in the cost of living of no per cent., as mentioned above. Meetings between the Railway Executive Committee and representatives of the two trade unions were to be held in January, April, July and October to agree on the amoxmt of war wage payable from the first day in the month following the meeting. The first advance in war wages under this agreement operated from November ist, 1918, and amounted to 3s. for adults and is. dd. for workers under eighteen. Concession of the Eight Hotjrs' Day. Immediately after the signing of the Armistice, on November nth, 1918, applications were submitted by the National Union of Railwaymen and the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen for a reduction in the hours of duty and for revised conditions of service. The first matter to be considered was the queslion of the hours of duty, and in January, 1919, the Government conceded to all grades of railwajmien an eight hours' day as from February ist. Standardisation and Stabilisation. In the course of the discussions in regard to hours of duty it was agreed that a committee of representatives of the railway companies should be appointed to act on behalf of the Government and to discuss with the representatives of the trade unions the question of the standardisation of rates of pay and conditions of service for the men employed on all railways. A series of meetings between this committee and representatives of the unions resulted, in March, 1919, in an agreement which dealt with the following subjects : Guaranteed day ; Guaranteed week ; Overtime ; Ni^ht duty; Sunday duty; Rest period and Holidays. It was also agreed that wages should be stabilised until December 31st, 1919. The following is an extract from the Agreement : — Wages and Standard Rates of Pay. The present wages to be stabilised till December 3ist, 1919, and any reduction of the war wage under the agreement of November, 191 8, to be waived. As regards standardisal^ipn of rates of pay and removal of present anomalies, this can only be dealt with in connection with a general revision of permanent wages, and, therefore, it is proposed that the present negotiations shall be continued for fixing new standard rates, so as to ensure that all men throughout the country shall receive the same payment for the same work under the same conditions. This will involve a transfer of a part of the war wage to the permanent wage, but the Government agrees that up tp December 31st, 1919, no man shall receive less in weekly rate of wage, plus war wage, than he is receiving at present, while anyone to whom the new war wage and new rate jrield more than they are receiving at present shall receive the advantage as soon as an arrangement is arrived at. At the end of the year the whole situation will be reviewed. The war wage will have to be looked at in the light of the circumstances of the time generally. WAR-TIME LABOUR CONDITIONS. 771 and it will be open to the men to ask for a revision of the new standard rates if they think a case can be made for it. But the anomalies of varying pay for similar work under similar conditions will have been removed, and future negotiations will be rendered much easier through there being only one set of figures to work upon. From th's date meetings were held almost continuously, ■ and in June an agreement was arrived at standardising the conditions under the following headings : Calculation of time ; Fogging and snowstorm duties ; Pa5mient for special duties on Sundays to permanent-way men, signal linemen and telegraph linemen ; Meal times ; Higher-duty pay ; Special train duties — drivers, firemen and goods guards; Pa37ment for Good Friday and Christmas Day ; Payment for Sunday-to-Monday turns of duty; Pajonent of enginemen reduced in grade owing to defective eyesight ; Hybrid grades ; Rest (amendment of March agreement) ; Lodging allowances; clothing for engitiemeh; Piecework, bonus and tonnage working, and Payment for Saturday-to-Sunday turns of duty. Following this agreement further attention was directed to rates of wages, and various offers were submitted in respect to all grades on a basis appUcable to all companies. In August, 1919, a settlement was come to in regard to the rates of wages for engine drivers, firemen and cleaners, appUcable from August i8th. A General Strike. The representatives of the men decHned to accept the rates proposed for other grades, contending that they were altogether too low, and intimated that they desired a standard rate reasonably comparable with rates which were being fixed for other industries. Further proposals were made providing for rates which represented an advance of approxi- mately 100 per cent, on pre-war rates. These offers were submitted to the National Union of Railwajmien on September i8th and 19th, the minimum rate being 40s. and the maximum 70s. The President of the Board of Trade intimated to the National Union of Railwajmien, in forwarding these offers, that they were to be considered, not in the Ught of a jumping-ofE ground, but as the considered view of the Government as to what should apply ; and he suggested a meeting to discuss the method of their appHcation. In reply a communication was addressed to the Government by the National Union of Railwaymen on September 24th in the following terms : Having received further proposals from the Government lajdng down basic rates of wages for the various grades in the Conciliation Board scheme other than drivers, firemen and cleaners, this Executive Committee notes the great difference between the rates suggested by this organisation and those submitted by the Government, varying in certain cases up to 16s. per week ; and, as this offer would ultimately mean such a serious reduction to many of our members that would not allow them to maintain a decent standard of life, we instruct the General Secretary to at once inform the Government that their offer cannot be accepted by us, and that this committee is at present in session awaiting a further offer. 772 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. In the event of such further offer not being received by 1 2 o 'clock, noon, on Thursday the 25th instant, we shall have no alternative but to instruct our members to cease work in support of our claims. We further instruct the General Secretary to immediately get into touch with our branches and instruct our members to hold themselves in readiness to act upon any instructions issued by this Executive Committee. It should be noted that no reference was made to the fact that the Agreement of March provided that the existing rates of wages and war wages should continue in force until the end of the year, when the whole situation would be reviewed and the war wage looked at in the light of the circumstances of the time. Following this communication a series of meetings took place between members of the Government and the Executive Committee of the National Union of Railwaymen. The verbatim report of an interview between the Prime Minister and the Executive Committee of the National Union of Railwaymen, on September 26th, 1919, records that the Prime Minister said : — In dealing with any portion of the war wage which may remain when the new standard rates come into operation, the Government undertake that such residue will not be reduced until the cost of living has fallen and remained for three months at not more than no per cent. — it is now 115 per cent. ; it was 125 per cent, when the war wage of 335. was fixed — no per cent, addition to the pre-war cost of living. It must be borne in mind that the present war wage of 33s. was fixed under the sliding-scale when the cost of living was 125 per cent, above the pre-war cost. The Government promised : — No reduction in war wage — Except under Sliding Scale based on cost of living or settled by any other way that might be arranged between the Government and the Railwaymen. No reduction, at all — (a) Before Deceml^er 31st, 1919. (6) Even after that date, unless the cost of living fell to no per cent, above pre-war level and remained below that figure for three months. (c) No reduction at any time below a figure which will on the average give every grade twice as much as it got before the war, even when the cost of living gets back to pre-war prices. Notwithstanding this, the National Union of Railwaymen declined to withdraw the strike notices issued to the staff, and a general strike was declared on Friday, September 26th. Negotiations took place between the Government and representatives of the transport unions, and a settlement of the strike was come to on Sunday, October 5th. The terms of the settlement were : — 1. Work to be resumed forthwith. 2. On the full resumption of work negotiations shall be continued with the understanding that they shall be completed before December 31st, 191 9. 3. Wages shall be established in the United Kingdom at the present level up to September 30th, 1920. Any time after August ist, 1920, they may be reviewed in the light of the circumstances then existing. WAR TIME-LABOUR CONDITIONS. 773 4. No adult railwayinen in Great Britain shall receive less than 515. so long as the cost of living is not less than no per cent, above the pre-war level. 5. The National Union of Railwaymen and the Associated Society of Loco- motive Engineers and Firemen agree that the men shall work harmoniously with the railway servants who have remained at or returned to work, and the Government and the National Union of Railwaymen and the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen agree that no man shall be prejudiced in any way as the result of the strike. 6. The arrears of wages which have been withheld in consequence of breach of contract will be paid after the resumption of work. Standard Rates. On October 14th, negotiations between the Government and the unions were resumed in accordance with the terms of the settlement. A scheme was formulated by the Government which provided for an increase of approximately 100 per cent, above the pre-war average rates of wages paid by the fifteen larger companies. These rates were to be known as the Standard Rates. Whilst this scheme was under discussion the Interim Court of Arbitra- tion awarded an increase of 5s. per week in the war wages paid to engineering and foundry employees. In view of this award the Govern- ment agreed to increase the war wages paid to railwaymen from 33s. to 38s. per week, thereby increasing the difference between current wages, plus war wages, and the proposed standard rates. The Govern- ment proposed to combine wages and war wages and apply to the combined figure a sliding scale under which there was to be an increase or decrease of is. in wages for every corresponding variation of five points in the cost of living, but no wage was to fall below the new standard rates. Taking the lowest grade — a country porter — this meant that the rate which would be paid would be 56s. per week, and the standard rate of the grade would be 40s. per week, which figure would be reached only when the cost of living had fallen eighty points, viz., from 125 per cent, to 45 per cent. This offer was provisionally accepted by Mr. Thomas and Mr. Cramp on behalf of the National Union of Railwajmien, subject to confirmation by a meeting of delegates of that union. After considerable discussion and further negotiations with the Government, which resulted in certain modifications affecting hardship cases, retrospective payment, grades out- side the Conciliation Scheme, etc., the delegates decided, on January 15th, 1920, to accept the offer. The scheme as finally agreed to appUed from January ist, 1920, and provided for a flat-rate pajmient of 20s. to men eighteen years of age and over, and los. to boys under eighteen years (other than drivers, firemen and cleaners), in grades embraced in the Conciliation Scheme, in settlement of claims for retrospective pajonent from August i8th (the date from which the enginemen's settlement applied) to December 31st, 1919. The agreement was completed on March 20th, and the first payment of the revised rates of wages was made during the week ended March 27th. 774 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Fresh Demands. Immediately afterwards the National Union of Railwasonen made a demand for a further increase of £i per week. No period of duration of the settlement had been specifically mentioned in the agreement of March 20th, but it was hoped that the adoption of a sliding scale would obviate for a reasonable period the presentation of fresh demands. It was certainly never anticipated that an application for an all-round increase would be made within a few days of the introduction of the agreement. A demand was also made on behalf of drivers and firemen for an increase in wages of 15 per cent. Wages Boards. At this stage it would be well to refer to the setting up of Wages Boards by the Minister of Transport to deal with questions relating to the rates of wages and conditions of employment of railway servants. On December 8th, 1919, Sir Eric Geddes, in reply to a question in the House of Commons said : — It will be convenient if I explain the position as regards the negotiations with the railway companies and the men. There are three aspects. The first point is the present negotiations on wages. On this, as the Prime Minister stated last Thursday, no public statement can yet be made. I fully appreciate the anxiety of the House, and wiU make one at the earliest possible moment. The second point is that an arrangement has been made between the Government and the two unions concerned in the conciUation grades on the railways that, apart from the present negotiations, questions of wages and conditions of service Shall, during the period of the present control of railways, under the Ministry of Transport Act, be dealt with by a Central Board, consisting of five railway managers and five representatives of the trade unions, the latter being composed as to three from the National Union of RaUwaymen and two from the Amalgamated Society of Locomotive Engine Drivers and Firemen, with power to each side to add a sixth member. Failing agreement by this Central Board, matters in dispute and belonging to the category mentioned, namely, wages and conditions of service, will be referred to a National Wages Board, consisting of four railway managers, four railway workers (or their representatives), and four users of railways (of which one shall be nominated by the Parliamentary Committee of the Trade Union Congress, one by the Co-operative Union, one by the Federation of British Industries after consultation with other industrial organisations, and one by the Associated Chamber of Commerce after similar consultation) with an independent chairman, appointed by the Government. It has been agreed by the unions concerned that no strike shall take place on account of a dispute arising on these matters until one month after the question.in dispute has been referred to the National Wages Board. Local committees, to which matters of purely local and other than national importance are to be referred, will be set up, and discussions are taking place at the present time as to their constitution, scope and functions. The third matter which has formed the subject of conversation with the railway- men is their representation in connection with the control exercised under the Ministry of Transport Act. The Railway Executive Committee — as such — will cease to exist (probably on the ist of January and an Advisbry Committee will then be set up. It will consist of twelve General Managers, and four representatives of the workers. WAR-TIME LABOUR CONDITIONS. 775 The composition of the Central and National Wages Boards as originally constituted was as under : — Mr. W. Glower „ K. Kerr . „ F. J. C. Pole . „ G. G. Senior ,, Howard Williams Mr. Central Wages Board. Representing the Railway Companies : . Midland Railway. . North Eastern Railway. . Great Western Railway. . Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway. . London & North Western Railway. C. T. Cramp ) J. C. Allen L D. Thomas j J. Bromley ) W. W. Cooke ) ■ Representing the Trade Unions : National Union of Railwayman. /Associated Society of Locomotive \ Engineers and Firemen. National Wages Board. Chairman— Sir William W. Mackenzie, K.C.. K.B.E. Sir Herbert Walker, K.C.B ,, Henryi Thornton, K.B.E. .... ,, Thomas Williams ..... Mr. C. Aldington, C.B.E The Rt. Hon. J. H. Thomas, P.C, M.P. (N.U.R.) Mr. W. J. Abrahams (N.U.R.) .... „ W. J. R. Squance (A.S.L.E. & F.) . „ W. Stevenson (A.S.L.E. & F.) . Sir Thomas Robinson, M.P. (Federation of British Industries) Mr. E. ManviUe, MP. (Associated Chambers of Commerce) Mr. H. J. May (Co-operative Congress) Mr. J. B. Williams (Trades Union Parliamentary Committee) I Representing the I Railway Manage- ment. f Representing Rail- way Employees. ^Representing Users I of Railways. Further Advances. The new demands were referred to the Central Wages Board, and meetings took place on March 24th and April 9th and 13th. The demand for drivers and firemen was modified from 15 per cent, on wages to an all-round advance of 6s. per week, this being claimed on the ground that since August other grades of railwaymen had been given an advance of 5s. and were now due to receive is. under the sliding scale. It was eventually agreed that drivers and firemen and adult cleaners should have the following advances under the sliding scale, viz. : — 15. per week from November ist, igig, when the cost of living stood at 120 per cent, above normal. A further is., making ■zs. per week, from December ist, when the cost of living stood at 125 per cent, above normal. A further is., making 3s. per week, from March ist, 1920, when the cost of living stood at 130 per cent, above normal. Cleaners under eighteen to receive half these amounts. 3F 776 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. It was also agreed that an increase of is. per week be granted as from April ist, 1920, to all adult male staff employed in the ConciMation grades on the railways in Great Britain (other than engine drivers, firemen and cleaners) in accordance with the agreed sliding scale. Con- sideration of the demand for an increase of £1 per week was deferred. In the meantime the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen put forward an appUcation for the wages of drivers, firemen and cleaners to be increased to 20s., 15s. and los. per day respectively. A meeting of the Central Wages Board took place on May 4th to consider the demands of the two unions. After a full discussion the Board was unable to reach an agreement, and it was decided to hold a further meeting to settle the exact terms of reference to the National Wages Board. The first meeting of the National Wages Board took place on May 17th. The cases of the National Union of Railwajniien and the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen were presented by Mr. Cramp and Mr. Bromley respectively. Their arguments were based mainly on comparisons of raUwaymen's wages with those paid to dockers, miners, policemen and workers in other industries. Employees in various grades of the railways were called as witnesses. The case for the railway companies was submitted by Mr. E. A. Pamwell, Assistant General Manager of the Great Eastern Railway, and Mr. H. Wheeler, secretary of the company's side of the Great Western Railway Conciliation Boards. It was contended by them that the percentage increases in wages granted to railwaymen since 1914 compared favourably with those given to men in other industries, and attention was directed to the fact that the daily rate of pay which had recently been awarded to dockers was based on the casual nature of emplojmient at the docks, and that one of the men's advocates had stated that a docker worked, on an average, only four days a week. Evidence for the railway companies was given by Mr. R. Cope, Chief Accountant of the Great Western Railway, and Mr. Arthur Watson, General Manager of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway. The hearings were concluded on May 27th, and the report of the Board, published on June 3rd, recommended the payment as from June 14th of increases varying from 4s. to 8s. 6d. per week in industrial areas, and from 2s. to 3s. 6d. per week in rural areas, to men embraced in the Conciliation Scheme other than enginemen. In the case of the locomotive grades, it was agreed that to the 3s. per week already granted to these men to meet the increase in the cost of living there should be added the following sums in the case of employees over eighteen years of age : Drivers, ys. per week ; firemen, 4s. per week ; and cleaners 2s. per week; , In addition to these increases an advance of 2s. per week was to be paid to all grades in the Conciliation Scheme from April 12th under the Sliding Scale Agreement as a result of the cost of living having advanced from 132 per cent, to 141 per cent, above pre-war cost since the end of March, when an increeise of is. per week was granted. WAR-TIME LABOUR CONDITIONS. 777 In the case of signalmen it was recommended that, pending the completion of the classification of boxes which was in hand, new rates should be estabUshed based on the pre-war maximum plus the existing war wage of 39s.,: plus 2s. accrued under the sUding scale from April 12th, and a further addition of from 4s. to 8s. 6d. per week in industrial areas, and from 2s. to 3s. per week in rural areas. At subsequent meetings of the Central Wages Board, held in accord- ance with the settlement of March 20th, it was agreed that the rates of wages of railwaymen in grades embraced in the Conciliation Scheme should be advanced by 2s. per week from July ist, a further 2s. per week from October ist, and is. per week from January ist, 1921, as a result of increases in the cost of living as indicated by the figures published by the Ministry of Labour. Women Employees. So far as the war-time conditions of women employed in operating grades were concerned, a definite understanding in regard to them had been arrived at between the railway companies and the National Union of Railwa57men, in August, 1915. In the agreement drawn up it was stated : — An assurance was asked for and given that the emplo5mient of women in capacities in which they had not formerly been employed was an emergency provision arising out of circumstances created by the war, and would not prejudice in any way any undertaking given by the companies as to the re-employment of men who had joined the Colours on the conclusion of the war. It was agreed that the employment of women during the war in capacities in which they had not previously been employed is an emergency provision arising entirely out of the war, and is without prejudice to the general question of the emplojnnent of women. The pay of women employed in grades in which they were not einployed prior to August, 1914, shall, for the duration of the war, be the minimum pay of the grade. In September, 1916, an apphcation was made to the railway companies by the National Union of Rsdlwaymen for an increase in the pay of women employees. The representatives of the union stated that they did not desire to disturb the arrangement entered into in August, 1915, but. they asked that a war bonus should be granted to the women. It was agreed at a meeting held on November 2nd that, beginning with the week ending September i6th, a war bonus of 3s. per week should be paid to women, and that half the amount should be given to girls under eighteen years of age. In April, 1917, and on subsequent occasions when the war bonus paid to men and boys came under review, the bonus granted to women and^girls was also dealt with, and this eventually amounted to 29s. 6d, per week for women when the cost of living was 169 per cent, above the pre-war figure. ^^^ British railways and the great war. Workshop Staff. The men employed in railway companies' workshops were not dealt • with in the matter of war wages on quite the same basis as those engaged in the manipulation of traffic, i.e., the operating staff. The arrangement previously referred to under which members of the operating staff were given a war bonus of 2s. and 3s. in 1915 was extended voluntarily by the railway companies to their shopmen ; but this did not give satisfaction to the craft unions. A conference of these unions was held at Newcastle-on-Tyne, and a committee, styled the " Railway Shops Organisation Committee of Craft Unions," was instituted. This committee made application to the railway companies for an advance of wages of 5s. per week, with a corresponding increase on piece-work prices. As the result of individual negotiations between the railway companies and representatives of their shops staff or of the craft unions concerned, and following awards made by the Committee on Production in the case of some companies, the war bonus previously given was cancelled, and an increase in wages of 3s. per week, with an advance of 'j\ per cent, on piece-work prices, was granted to railway shopmen. In December, 1915, a further application was made by the Railway Shops Organisation Committee of Craft Unions for an increase in wages to shopmen. The application was not granted by the railway companies, but in the case of some companies reference was made to the Committee on Production, who, in June, 1916, awarded an advance of is. per week on time rates and 2\ per cent, on piece-work prices from the beginning of AprU, making a total increase on pre-war rates of 4s. and 10 per cent, respectively. In October, 1916, following an increase in the war bonus to the railway operating staff from 5s. to los. per week, an application for a similar increase was made to the Board of Trade on behalf of the shopmen, and it was agreed to give a war bonus of 5s. per week to all men over eighteen years of age employed in the railway companies' workshops, and one of 2s. bd. per week to boys under eighteen. In April, 1917, meetings took place between the Railway Executive Committee, acting on behalf of the Government, and representatives of the Railway Shops Organisation Committee of Craft Unions and the National Union of Railwaymen to discuss an application for a further increase in the wages of shopmen. As a result of the negotiations an agreement was arrived at, on April 12th, whereby additional war bonuses were granted as follows : Men, 5s. per week ; boys and women, 2s. 6«i. per week ; girls, is. 3^. per week. The position was again reviewed in August, 1917. Increases in rates of wages, piece-work prices, or bonus granted to railway shopmen since August 4th, 1914, as the result of awards given by the Committee on Production, or of negotiations with representatives of the railways or the Railway Executive Committee, were then cancelled, and, in WAR-TIME LABOUR CONDITIONS. 779 lieu thereof, the following increases were granted as from August 1st : — Men employed on time work . .15s. per week war wage. 8s. „ „ „ „ ; and Men employed on piece-work . . -j 7^- per week on time rates or (17J per cent, increase on piece-work prices. The amended bonus to be paid to boys, women and girls was as under : — Boys : An increase of 2s. per week to the war bonus then paid, the total amount to be regarded as war wages. Women : An increase of bonus of 2s. per week. Girls : An increase of bonus of is. per week. By an award dated November 6th, 1917, the Committee on Production awarded to workers in the engineering and foundry trades an advance of 5s. per week to men and 2s. 6d. per week to boys as from the beginning of the first full pay in December. The Government decided that the railway companies should extend to their shopmen the advance contained in this award. It was also decided that the war bonus paid to adult women employees in railway workshops should be increased by 2s. 6d. per week, and the bonus to women employees under eighteen years of age by is. 3d. per week. This made the total amount paid to adult railway shopmen 20s. per week, as compared with 21s. per week paid to men employed in railway operating grades. The National Union of Railwaymen took exception to this decision and appHed for pajnnent of an additional is. per week to members of their union employed in railway workshops. The claim was heard by the Committee on Production, who found that it had not been estabhshed. The next phase was an apphcation by the craft unions and the National Union of Railwaymen for the bonus of i2| per cent, on earnings given under Statutory Rules and Orders Nos. 1061 and 1301 to Munition Workers as from the beginning of the first full pay following October 12th, 1917, to be extended to all male employees twenty-one years of age or over — sldUed, semi-skilled, or unskilled — who were plain time-workers employed on munition work (including the repair, maintenance or construction of locomotives, carriages or wagons) in the railway companies' locomotive, carriage and wagon shops, including the locomotive running sheds and out station carriage and wagon depots. The claim was referred to a special Arbitration Tribunal for settlement, and the award of the Tribunal, dated January 28th, 1918, provided that the plain time-workers employed in the departments included in the reference to the tribimal should receive the bonus of i2| per cent, given under Orders 1061 and 1301, and that piece-workers twenty-one years of age or over should - receive the bonus of 7^ per cent, on earnings granted to munition workers by the Government as from the beginning of the first fiiU pay after January ist. In March, 1918, the Committee on Production had before them an application by the unions for the payment to artisans and ajtisans' 78o BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT- WAR. labourers employed on the railways, in or in connection with the railway shops, of the bonus of 12 J per cent, to men employed on time rates, and of 7J per cent, to men employed on piece or bonus rates. On March 26th the committee issued an award conceding the claim to men twenty-one years of age and over. Following the periodical review of awards in the engineering and foundry trades in June, 1918, the various unions representing railway shopmen subniitted a claim for an advance of 100 per cent, on pre-war rates. The application was referred to the Committee on Production, and, under their award of September 19th, 1918, an increase of 3s. 6d. per week was given to men, and one of is. gd. to boys as from the pay day in the week ending August loth. At the hearing before the Committee on Production it was intimated that an agreement had been arrived at as the result of which advances given in the engineering trades under an agreement for periodical revision of wages would be followed in regard to railway shopmen. The latter agreement was made in February, 1917, between the Engineering Employers' Federation and the Federation of Engineering Trades Unions. It provided for the suspension, until the determination of the war, of agreements or practices in regard to the means of dealing with applications for general alterations in wages in the establishments of members of the Engineering Federation. In their place an arrangement was come to whereby, in the months of February, June and October, the Committee on Production would consider what general alteration in wages, if any, was warranted by the abnormal conditions due to the war. On the same date as the above-mentioned award (September 19th, 1918), the Committee on Production issued their finding in regard to a claim by the National Union of Railwaymen for an increase in the war wages payable to women and lads employed in or in connection with railway shops, in heu of the 12^ per cent, bonus which had not been gremted to them. The award provided for the following increases as from the first full pay following August ist : — Women, eighteen years of age and over . . .5s. per week. Women under eighteen years of age . . . . 2s. 6d. ,, ,, Boys and youths eighteen to twenty-one years of age .45. ,, ,, Boys under eighteen years of age . . . . 2s. ,, ,, In October a claim for an advance of 15s. per week to railway shop- men was submitted by the unions. In accordance with the agreement previously arrived at, it was referred to the Committee on Production for settlement. The award of the committee granted an increase .of 5s. to men (making a total war wage to railway shopmen of 28s. 6d. per week, plus 12 j per cent, or 7I per cent, on earnings) and 2s. 6d. per week to boys, to be paid on the pay day in the week ending December nth, 1918. Further demands for increased wages were made on behalf of railway shopmen in February and June, 1919, but the Court of Arbitration decided on both occasions that the claims were not established. In WAR-TIME LABOUR CONDITIONS. 781 October, 1919, the Court of Arbitration heard an appHcation for an advance of 15s. per week to employees in railway shops, and awarded an increase of 5s. per week, making a total of 33s. 6d. per week to adult time-workers as from the beginning of December. In February, 1920, the Industrial Court was asked to grant an increase of 15s. per week to railway shopmen. The award of the Court in this case differed from those issued as a result of previous applications in that the Court did not base their decision on alterations in the cost of living since their last award, but had regard to the general situation in the engineering trade. The Court awarded an advance in the time or day rates of 3s. per week, or 7I per cent, on list or net piece-work prices, as from the beginning of the pay period immediately following March 31st, 1920, and a similar advance from the begiiming of the pay period immedi- ately following May 31st, 1920. The award also differed from previous decisions in that the advance for time workers was to be regarded as an addition to time rates to be taken into account for the purpose of fixing new piece-work prices or calculating bonus earnings. Clerical Staff. The practice of the various railway companies in regard to the pa57ment of a war bonus to members of their salaried and clerical staff varied, but, generally speaking, the amount paid approximated to that paid to the wages staff employed in operating grades. In November, 1918, when the bonus for adult male members of the wages staff stood at 33s. per week, the amounts generally paid to the salaried and clerical staff were as follows : — £ s.. d. Men . . . . . . . . 85 16 o per annum. Boys 42 18 o „ Women . . . . . . .106 per week. Girls . . . . . . . . o 10 3 ,, ,, In Jiily, 1919, it was agreed to apply the Civil Service scale of bonus {£^0, plus 20 per cent, of salary) to staff in receipt of salaries exceeding £150 per annum. Following negotiations with the companies and the Railway Clerks' Association and the National Union of Railwaymen, an agreement was signed on March ist, 1920, standardising rates of pay and conditions of service of railway male clerical staff as from August ist, 1919. This agreement provided for sHding scale adjustments at quarterly periods of £5 per annum for each alteration of five points in the cost-of living figures pubhshed by the Ministry of Labour. Agreements in regard to the rates of pay and conditions of service of station-masters and goods agents and supervisory staff were made on March ist and April 20th, 1920, respectively. These also were applicable from August ist, 1919, and included a similar sliding-scale arrangement. An agreement in regard to the rates of pay of women and girl clerks employed by railway companies, applicable from the same date, was made on August 26th, 1920. This included a sMding-scale arrangement similar to that apphcable to male clerical staff, with the exception that 782 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. the basis was is. 6d. per week for each alteration of five points in the cost of Uving. List of Concessions Made. The tables given below set out in historical form the various increases in the war bonus and war wages granted to railway operating grades and to salaried and clerical staff from the beginning of the war to January, 1920. Similar tables might be given in respect to the railway shop staffs in the locomotive, carriage and wagon departments and to the outside engineering and foundry trades ; but these are rendered so complex by the addition to war bonus or war wages of varying percentages either on piece-work prices or on earnings, that they would hardly be intelligible to others than those directly concerned. War Bonus and War Wages. Railway Operating Grades. Salaried and Clerical Staff. Date Operative. Men Boys Women Girl^ Men Boys Women Girls 18 and under 18 and under 18 and under 18 and under over 18 over 18 over 18 over 18 1915. per wk. per wk. per wk. per wk. per wk. per wk. per wk. per wk. February . t2S.(6)f — — — 3S.(«)1 2S. (6) J IS. 6d. 2S. IS. June .... — IS. 6d. — — — — — — October . . . 5S. 2S. 6d. — — 5S. 2s. 6d. 3S. IS. 6d. 1916. September . . lOS. 5s. 3S- IS. 6d. lOS. 5S. 5s. 2S. 6d. 1917- April .... 15s. ys. 6d. 5s. 6d. 2S. gd. 15s. 7s. 6d. 7S. 6d. 3s. 9 PUUBe insert your name and address here. Address This card must be carefully kept, as it shows you what to do if the Military Authorities give an order that everybody is to leave Colchester. By order of the Military Authorities no sound or other signal is permitted, but should the emergency arise steps will be taken to advise you in the shortest possible delay. You should take with you enough food for yourself and your family for 48 hours. You are told on the back of this card (which you must take with you) the direction you are to follow and by which routes you must go. If the military are met, the civil population must at once clear from the road to allow them to pass. IN CASE OF INVASION. 833 Helpers wearing armlets of the same colour as the instruGtion cards were to be posted at various points for the purpose of guiding the inhabi- tants along the prescribed routes and otherwise rendering such assistance as was practicable. In a circular letter addressed to the inhabitants of Colchester by the Mayor, informing them of these new arrangements, it was said : — An attempt at invasion i6 not at all improbable, and its temporary success is not impossible. It is, therefore, most necessary that the civil population should be organised so that in the event of emergency they can evacuate the town with the least possible danger and discomfort to themselves. To avoid congestion, it is hoped that the routes given will be strictly adhered to. The East Suffolk county authorities made an appeal to the inhabitants of inland areas to render every possible assistance in the way of food and of sleeping accommodation to those passing inland, in the event of an unavoidable movement of civilians taking place on the occasion of a hostile landing. The city of Norwich, active in so many ways in preparing for possi- bihties, also made ready to act as a city of refuge and sustenance for refugees from the coast or from the surrounding district. By arrange- ment with the Dean of Norwich, refugees were to be directed in the first instance to the Cathedral Close, whence they would be distributed either among schools, churches and other public buildings, of which a list showing available accommodation for 25,000 men, women and children had been prepared ; or, alternatively, in houses where soldiers had been billeted, the accommodation in these being for about 20,000 persons. Cards in different colours, for married couples with children, for single men or for single women respectively, specifying the quarters allotted to them, were printed ; food vouchers which would be accepted by local traders were prepared, and a return of the available food supplies in Norwich was compiled, showing, among other things, that there- was sufficient wheat in the city to provide both citizens and refugees with bread for a period of forty days. At Ipswich, a scheme for the evacuation of the civil population in the event of invasion was prepared under the instructions of the miUtary authorities, and local Emergency Committees were formed to carry out the necessary measures in case of need. There was even a rehearsal of the scheme by those directly concerned, though no instructions were issued to the ciyil population. At Yarmouth an Emergency Committee was formed, special constables were appointed, instructions were given to the inhabitants by means of handbills and advertisements in the local papers as to the routes they were to- take when they left their homes, and footbridges were constructed over the dykes to enable them to make their way inland more readily. County Organisation. By way of offering some idea of what was done in the way of county organisation, a few details might be given concerning the county of Kent. 834 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. In the opening days of November, 1914, acting on instructions received from the Home Office, the Lord-Lieutenant formed a small Central Organising Committee having for its main purpose that of bringing into existence the machinery which, in case of emergency, would supplement the existing police organisation in the carrying out of instructions to be received from the military authorities in regard to movements of the civilian population, for whose guidance and direction the local police would, under the conditions stated, become responsible. Of this Central Organising Committee, which had its headquarters at the Sessions House, Maidstone, the Chief Constable of the county became an ex-officio member, he being the chief civil authority through whom notification would be conveyed that a State of Emergency had arisen. The General Officer Commanding-in-Chief also had a representative on the central committee in order to ensure complete co-operation between the military and the county authorities in matters of mutual concern. The Central Organising Committee, among other duties, ensured the formation of local emergency^ committees ; it distributed among these committees the instructions received from time to time from the Home Office or from the military authorities as to the action to be taken locaUy in the event of a landing by the enemy being threatened or actually taking place ; it sent out, on the authority of the Lord-Lieutenant, public notices which could either be issued at once by the local committees or be held in reserve until an emergency arose, and it accumulated at Maidstone a great store of tinned and other provisions which, in case of need, would be distributed by means of motor-yehicles to any part of the county where they might be wanted for the refugee population or otherwise. The composition of the local emergency committees throughout the county was to be detierm;ined, in the first instance, by the Central Organ- ising Committee, and it was understood that in each instance care would be taken to effect the appointment thereon of individuals qualified to take personal charge of and control over some specific phase or branch of the defensive action to be adopted. Lists of discreet and trustworthy persons in the neighbourhood were to be drawn up by the local com- mittees, who, subject to the approval of the police in regard to the individuals selected, would do their best to obtain the aid of those persons ; but much emphasis was laid on the desirability of securing the enrolment as special constables of each and every one of those who might be required to take action in the interests of the community when the occasion arose. The General Officer Commanding-in-Chief was also to have a repre- sentative on each of the local committees, the members of which were first to discuss with him the nature of the said defensive measures to be adopted, and then provide the necessary organisation, so far as this could be done, for carrying those measures into effect. The military repre- sentatives on the local committees would also keep those bodies informed as to the views of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, and the measures to be adopted either in advance or in the event of an emergency. The actual worJdng of the machinery thus prepared for, together with thQ IN CASE OF INVASION. 835 responsibility for any executive action, would, however, devolve upon the police, acting under instructions from the military authorities. It was through the police that the order for^any particular operation or group of operations would usually be given to those concerned ; but the fact was recognised that, without both local committees and special constables to assist them, the local police might find it impossible to accomplish all they would be required to undertake. The local emergency committees formed in Kent were of two general types — (i) rural and (2) urban, and they were based on the assumption that, in case of emergency, their action as a whole would be called for in respect, not alone to the immediate wants of the people living on or close to the threatened coast, but, also, to those inland towns and districts of the coimty through which a coastal population in flight before an invader would require to pass in their efforts to reach parts of the country more in the interior. Emergency committees were thus established, in Kent, not only at Margate, Ramsgate, Sandwich, Deal and Walmer, Dover and Folkestone, but, also, at Canterbury, at Faversham, at Rochester, Chatham and Gillingham (these three towns having a joint committee), Maidstone, Tunbridge Wells, Bromley, and elsewhere throughout the county. The duties to be done by aU these committees would naturally vary, according to local conditions, and it was, therefore, distinctly laid down that the general instructions issued by the Home Office or the military authorities were not absolutely definite but should be adapted to the said local conditions in such way as might be expedient or desirable. As regards local organisations in Kent, it may suffice here if we allude to two only — ^those, namely, of Dover and Folkestone. Precautions at Dover. Early in the war there was an expectation that if the German Fleet should be victorious in some such engagement with the British Naval Forces as was afterwards represented by the Battle of Jutland, it would next attempt a bombardment of Dover. It was assumed, however, that this would probably not be a prolonged business — as the enemy would want to get back home again whilst he could — and, also, that it was not likely to be followed up by any attempt at invasion. There was, accord- ingly, thought to be no need for removing the citizens any distance from the town in order to safeguard them from the consequences of an attack from the sea ; but, as a matter of precaution, it was deemed desirable to arrange that, in the event of bombardment, the populace should leave their homes and withdraw to the back of the town, where, it was assumed,, they would be quite safe under the shelter of the hills between them and. the sea. To this end, the Emergency Committee which had^aheady been formed! divided the town into twelve districts, to each of which there was allocated 836 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. an individual sworn in as a special constable and acting under the immediate supervision of the Chief Constable of Dover. On the news being received — presumably by wireless — ^that the enemy Fleet was advancing on Dover, a siren would be sounded, and the special constables would proceed to the Police Station, at the Town Hall, where each would receive a hand-bell and also a card containing a list of the streets com- prising his particular district. Soundiiig his bell vigorously as he walked along these streets, he would tell the people, when they flocked out of their houses, the particular spot in the background of hills and dales which had been assigned to them for their safety, each district having its allotted place in the area in question. All this was well planned out — on paper ; but when, on the night of April 2ist-22nd, 1917, some of the enemy's ships managed to elude the vigilance of our Fleet, dashed across the Channel, and, after firing a star shell over the town of Dover to ensure certainty of aim, poured out a torrent of thirty shells with the apparent intention of reducing Dover to ruins, there was neither time nor opportunity for the would-be defenders of the town to carry out their pre-arranged programme. The results, however, were to the advantage rather than to the disadvantage.of Dover, the aim of the enemy being so defective that aU the shells fired passed harmlessly over the town, to fall, curiously enough, within the very area behind the hills to which, had time and circumstances permitted, the populace would have flocked as a place of refuge ! Whereas a mmiber of towns and districts in the Eastern Counties and elsewhere had kept their local commtmities well informed concerning the general effect, at least, of the " Instructions " received from the authorities in London as to the measures to be taken in the interests of the civilian population in the event of a hostile landing, the contingency was thought at Dover to be so remote that there was considered to be no need, during the earlier phases of the war, to pass those instructions on at once to the inhabitants, while, before long, the people of Dover, in common with the organisers of the defensive measures, had their minds sufficiently occupied by the succession of enemy air-raids made on the town, as related on pp. 434-8. When, however, in the early summer of 1918, the military situation on the Western Front became especially critical, in view of the German advance in the direction of the Channel ports, it was thought desirable by the authorities at Dover that the defensive arrangements planned at the outset of the war should be revised, and further arrangements made, in the event of an evacuation of Dover becoming necessary. Many meetings of the Emergency Coimnittee were held, Mr. A. G. Leney was appointed Evacuation Officer for the town, a re-arrangement of Dover into ten evacuation districts was effected, and a notice was got ready for issue to the inhabitants of each of these districts whenever the evacuation order was given, such notice stating the place at which the inhabitants of each district were, in the first instance, to assemble. Every horse, pony, donkey and vehicle in Dover had already been scheduled by the IN CASE OF INVASION, 837 Chief Constable, and the whole of these would have had to be taken to the asgaaably points, as well. From their places of assembly the populace were to go, on the first day, by one or other of three prescribed routes (main routes being reserved for the movement of troops), to Acrise Park, situate about seven and a half mUes west of Dover, and about a mUe and a half east of Elham. Acrise Park was to become the concentration point for a great gathering BOROUGH SaMS^^L OF DOVER. The Emergency Committee have received directions to issue the fol- lowing instractlons for the Civil Population in the event of a landing by the enemy in this country, an event less probable now than earlier in the War. It hae come to the notice of the Milit&ry Aiitbonties that thece U Boma doubt on the part of the civil population, particularly in the Eastern and South-Eastern Countiea, as to'the preparations which have been made for the conduct and movement of the civil population in case of invasion or other emergency. In order to allay any apprehension on this point, it Is noti'fied that complete schemes for regulating the action of the inhabitants have been framed by the central organising Gommittee under the Lord Lieu- tenant of the County, but that it is not proposed tu publish these in detail until an emergency actually exists. Meanwhile, however, it is considered that the following instructions may be of service in giving the civil population a general outline of the course of action on their part which will be most helpful in enabling the authorities, both civil and military, to put their plans into execution :~^ People. (1) As it is of primary importance that the free movement of His Majesty's Troops should not be hampered by the presence of civilians on the roods, it is necessary to control the use of roads by non-combatants and to close certain roads. The civil population wilt, therefore, do wisely to remain in their homes (unless otherwise ordered). Owing to military requirements refugees will not be able to use the railways, nor can furniture or baggage be conveyed in any public vehicle. Transport. '(2) All motors, bicycles, carriages, carts, and other vehicles, harness, horses, mules,' S^iifiey^, petrol, launches and lighters will be .taken at once to pre-arranged places of aafieoibly, where further military directions will be given. Those not required for the service of the Troops may be detailed for the use of Civilians, or be ordered to be removed. Any which cannot be removed will, under mitita}-!/ order (conveyed by the Police) be rendered unserviceable or destroyed. Toola, Ao. (3) Tools, such as spades, shovels, picks, axes, saws, barbed Wire, ic, will bo immediately collected «t pre-arranged places ior military disposal. All SvailsUe able bodied men will assemble in gangs wi(b the lools, &c., prepared for work. All persona who leave their homes should take with them their sionvy and food and drink for 1^ hours and such extra clothing as they may lie able to cari^. N.B.— Np property is to be destroyed except under direct military order. E. W. T. FARLEY, im July, ma. mayor. of refugees en route for other destinations ; but the railways were " in no case to be used " on this stage of the journey.* ' Not alone the population of Dover, but those, also, of Margate, Ramsgate and East Kent in general were to make their way on foot or in vehicles to Acrise and so on to Ham Street Station, there to entrain for the West of England. The total number of civilians 838 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. From Acrise there would be two further moves — in stages of about six and seven miles respectively — to Ham Street (on the South Eastern and Chatham Railway, between Ashford and Hastings), where it was " hoped to be able to entrain the people for the West of England," via the South Eastern to Hastings, and thence by the London, Brighton and ■Or^OUQH OJT »OVKl^. HfOrPTC-E THE INHABITANTS OF DOVER ARE INFORMED THAT UJiDUt MILITARY ORDERS THEY ARE TO E t IMMEDIATELY All Civilians resi^^nt in the Ol^trlct described on ihe Ann^x^d Shwt must meet at the PLACS OF Assm&).y, Ct and there await prders tQ i9ave fw the country together on toot. Vehicles wiii as far as possible be provided fof thpse unable to wallt. Each person must carry warm clothing and food and drinlt for 12 hours. Mr, A. C. Leney will act as Evacuation Officer with Headquarters at the Town Hall. MAYOR. Public Notice kepi standing in type at Dover for issue when necessary. South Coast. It will be noted that this first possible use of the railway on the said journey was a " hope " only, and such hope had not much chance of realisation since the evacuation of other south-east or southern towns might be going on simultaneously with that of Dover. thus to be dealt with in these parts of Kent alone would have run into hundreds of th ousands and it was hopeless to expect that the railways, already fully occupied with the movement of troops and suppUes requisite for the expulsion of the invader — assuming that he had actually landed or was about to land on our shores — could undertake the removal as well of an entire community under conditions which would have severely taxed their resources even in times of peace. The question was raised in December, 1914, as to whether there could not be at least a partial user of the railways for populations in flight, civilians being allowed to go west by travelling in the trains which brought troops to Canterbury ; but to this it was replied that the said trains would probably be kept in constant use between Maidstone and Canterbury for the conveyance of troops, supplies, etc., and that it would be inexpedient to complicate a possibly critical situation by any attempt to deal with civilians in addition. IN CASE OF INVASION. 839 Concerning the other plans associated with the scheme, Mr. J. B. Firth says in his book on " Dover and the Great War " (Dover : Alfred Leney & Co., Ltd.) : — Arrangements had been made for water at the Folkestone Water Works, at Church Hougham and at Acrise. The commissariat arrangements were in the hands of the clerk to the Kent County Council and the clerk of the Elham Urban District Council. Special constables had been selected to take up specially-arranged duties upon the country roads, and mounted constables were to accompany each contingent. Arrangements had also been made for dealing with cases of iUness on the roads. So far as possible nothing was left to chance, for it was fully realised how difficult would be the task of inducing a throng of alarmed or panic-stricken people of all ages and classes to move in an orderly way along the country roads to a destination unknown to the majority of them. . . . The evacuation of the civQ population of a town like Dover would have been difficult even in the most favourable circumstances of season and weather ; had the difficulties been aggra- vated by inclemency or severity of weather and by alarming rumours of the proximity of the invaders, the roads to the west of Dover would inevitably have presented a pitiable sight. Happily the thoroughness of the preparations had never to be submitted to the crucial test. On the same subject the Dover Express wrote (" Dover and the European War," Dover Express Printing Office) : " The route was a terrible one for people from Dover to have to traverse, and, if ever the emergency had occurred, it is to be feared that there would have been great confusion and suffering." One local authority who, to enstire the completion of the arrangements, himself went over the entire route, informed the present writer that the roads the people would have to take between or across the hills were in some instances scarcely fit even for cyclists, and that, in the event of a sudden starhpede of populace along them, scores must have perished on the wayside. The historic flight of the Belgians along broad and well-paved high- ways into Holland would, in fact, have been a picnic compared with the flight inland of the people of Dover under the conditions here detailed. Folkestone. The prospects of any attempted invasion of Folkestone were, from the outset of the war, regarded as comparatively remote, if only because the range of hills and heights running parallel with the coast form a natural defence for the town nestling between them and the sea. All the same, a General Emergency Committee was formed at Folkestone in November, 1914, as a precautionary measure, and it was so well organised at the outset that although changes, modifications or additions were introduced from time to time, in accordance with widened experience or new develop- ments, the whole scheme was so complete that no material alterations in it were fornid necessary even in the summer of 1918. To one member of the committee there was delegated the duty of entering into communi- cation with every owner of a horse, donkey, or vehicle, and mstructing him what he was to do with it on an emergency arising, and to another, that of communicating with all owners of motor-cars or motor-cycles 3K 840 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. and giving them their instructions. Still other members had duties allotted to them in respect to cows and sheep, food and forage and petrol. The Borough Engineer compiled lists of tradesmen, builders or individuals possessing tools, barbed wire and other things which an invader would be likely to find useful ; and still further lists were drawn up giving the names of men who, supplied with the necessary tools, could be called on to carry out any field work that might be required. There was, also, particular need for special constables in Folkestone. Not only had the THE WAR . f f -t^tm, p M.iM HMW — ..—...■ PROCLAMATION BY THE MAYOR. To the people of Folkestone. ■...■■■ nm .i.i I M. ■... In order to allay any anxtely that may exist tn view of workA recently carried oat by the mllt(ary authorities in this Boroagh, I wlafa It to be known that H,M. Oovemihent consider the probability of an attempted raid ts no more likely at the present time than fn the eaurlter stages of war. 1 am also aeeurod that full military 'preparattona have already been maHe to aafef^Utird tlie Couotry ofjoinBt snch an improbable and remote contipgeDcy. It would bi f Carlisle. Gretna ei-ic /'ear «, / loc/<£JfS/e 2SO feer. Beattock Summit lOl-* FEET. ^YM/MGTON 79'SPeeT C^i?i tfKB S90 /=£er Glasgow 844 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GR^AT WAR. acute with the constantly-increasing menace of the enemy-submarine danger. Such were the proportions attained by the traffic passing between England and Scotland by the West Coast route that in the twelve months ending December, 1918, the number of loaded wagons dealt with at Carlisle — a busy junction even under ordinary conditions — showed an increase, as compared with the corresponding figures for the twelve months ending December, 1913, of 91 per cent, in those going southwards and 162 per cent, in those going northwards. The number of loaded and empty wagons exchanged at Carlisle during 1918 between railway com- panies south and north aggregated over two and a quarter millions, and of this tot£d 56 per cent, were wagons to or from the Caledonian line proper. In the latter case the bulk of the traffic had to pass over a 90-mile length of main hue having long block-sections, few refuge sidings, and heavy inclines, included' in the last-mentioned being the summit level of the Caledonian situate between Beattock and Elvanfoot, and attaining a height above sea level of 1,014 f^^*- ^^ ^ distance of about ten miles from Beattock Station to Beattock Summit a rise of 600 feet is attained, the gradients varying from i in 75 to 1 in 80. Fifteen banking engines are employed to assist trains to surmount this elevation. Between StirUng and Kinbuck, a distance of seven miles, the gradients vary from 1 in 78 to I in 153, and four banking engines are employed. There are, also, other points on the Caledonian system where assisting engines are used for banking purposes, such as between Motherwell and CraigenhOl, Carstairs and Beattock Summit (assisting engine in front), and Buchanan Street Station (Glasgow) and Robroyston. A Une thus situated, and operating under these conditions, should be able to give a good account of services rendered in defence of the national interests and of all that was at stake in the Great War. Let us, then, see what the Caledonian's story really is. Mobilisation. To begin with the beginning of the war, it may be stated that the order for mobilisation in the early days of August, 1914, found the Cale- donian Railway Company fully prepared to perform their part of the national mobiUsation programme, and the arrangements in which they were concerned were carried through in schedule time and without a hitch. During the same month of August the Caledonian dealt with 342 naval or military trains, the majority of which originated on their Hne. The rolling stock thus had to be supplied by the company, and not only had inost of the trains to be loaded on the Caledonian system, but in many cases they were unloaded thereon, as well. AU this was, of course, a very different matter from simply receiving trains from one company and passing them on to another. The fact, also, that mobilisation move- ments consisted of a few movements on a large scale rather than a series of regular movements on a small scale added Considerably to the difficulties of the situation. THE CALEDONIAN RAILWAY. 845 In the course of one Saturday afternoon and Sunday forenoon during the mobilisation period no fewer than thirty-four military trains were loaded and dispatched from Perth, ten from StirHng and eleven from Blairgowrie. The trains consisted of carriages for officers and men, wagons for equipment, lorries, guns, etc., and cattle trucks for horses. The loading of all these varieties of traffic within so short a time from passenger platforms, goods-loading banks and cattle-loading banks of varying heights and widths, and amidst the additional pressure of dealing with many ordinary trains, constituted in its way a distinctly notable achievement. Scottish Industries and the War. For those industrial organisations on the Caledonian system of which mention has already been made, the outbreak of the war brought a period of extreme activity. Extensions of premises became in many instances a matter of urgent necessity. The great establishments in Lanarkshire and on the Clyde increased their production many times over. Other works, and especially iron and steel works, which had long been more or less idle became hives of strenuous industry. Nor did these developments suffice in themselves, since many new works, great or small, had to be provided as well. Soon, also, the number of trains required to deal with all the traffic arising in these and other directions became so great that it was only by careful organisation and a supreme and sustained effort on the part of the operating staff that the Caledonian was able to keep the traffic moving and prevent the chaos that might, otherwise, easily have arisen. By way of showing, in the first place, how existing works on the Caledonian system were affected, reference might be made to the large steel-works, at Motherwell, of Messrs. David ColviUe and Sons — who also have works at Clydebridge (Rutherglen), and Glengamock (Ayrshire) — and the engineering and other works of Messrs. WiUiam Beardmore and Company, Ltd., at Parkhead (Glasgow), Dalmuir and Mossend, the increase in business in each instance being very substantial alike for the firm and for the Caledonian Railway Company. In the early days of August, 1914, Messrs. Colville employed at their Motherwell works some 2,800 hands. By 1918 this number had increased to about 9,000. This fact, in itself, is suggestive of a great expansion in the business done ; but stiU more convincing evidence is afforded by the following figures, giving the tonnage of the principal traffics passing to or from the works between the years from 1914 to 1918 inclusive : — Year. Traffic Forwarded. Traffic Received Tons. Tons. 1914 .... 244,360 690,247 1915 .... 359.452 958,494 1916 .... 411,785 i.o37.'49o 1917 .... 413,167 1,010,807 1918 .... 375.336 996,699 846 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Practically the whole of the output — which included shell bars, special aircraft steel and biiUet-proof plates — was for the purposes of the war. At the same company's Clydeb'ridge steel-works, Rutherglen, the output of steel rose from 28,600 tons for the year ending December, 1915, to 143,219 tons for the year ending December, 1918. Messrs. Beardmore and Company, in addition to all they had to do in connection with their large engineering works at Parkhead, Glasgow, their steel-works at Mossend and their shipbuilding works at Dalmuir, undertook the management of various National Projectile Factories for the Government. One of the features at the Parkhead works was the manufacture of naval guns. The production of these during the period of the war included the following : — Weight of Gun Number Size of Gun. T. C. MADE. 15-inch 100 — 38 13-5 inch , 74 — 2 12-inch I 67 — 7 9-2 inch 32 15 12 7-2 inch 13 10 9 6-inch . 6 — 30 i2-pounders -Hi . 300 i8-poijnders 8i . 2,000 At Dalmuir the same firm's output included 800 6-in. guns ; 360 i8-pdr. guns ; 740 6-in. gun-carriages ; 210 6-in. gun-carriage hmbers ; 360 i8-pdr. gun-carriages ; 810 i8-pdr. gun-carriage limbers, and 810 ammunition wagons. Works which continued operations — though on a greatly expanded scale — along lines already more or less familiar to them, were, in pro- portion as the war increased in gravity, supplemented alike by entirely new factories estabhshed for the express purpose of suppl57ing munitions and by the activities of various concerns which, previously occupied in entirely different pursuits, now also took up that class of production. Explosives Factories. Prior to the war there were only two works on the Caledonian system engaged in the manufacture of explosives, those, namely, of the Mid- lothian Gunpowder Company, at Harbum, in the county of Edinburgh, and those of Messrs. Nobel's Explosives Company, Limited, at Stevenston, Ayrshire. The latter work's (which are also connected with the Glasgow and South Western Railway Company's line), were greatly extended during the war. The employees numbered, at the busiest period, about 7,600. When the Armistice was signed the explosives works and filling factories on the Caledonian numbered seven. Two of these, both under direct Government control, call for special mention — the Scottish National Filling Factory at Georgetown, near Paisley, and the Explosives Factory at Gretna, near Carlisle. THE CALEDONIAN RAILWAY. 847 Georgetown Scottish National Filling Factory. The Georgetown factory, so named after Mr. Lloyd George, was situate ten miles from Glasgow and three miles from Paisley, and was served exclusively by the Caledonian Railway. It claimed to be a pioneer in the delicate operation of shell-fimng"; but it was launched on a big scale and everything connected with it — rail-transport included — assumed big proportions. The first sod of the factory was cut on September 25th, 1915, and the first consignment of munitions was dispatched on March 13th, 1916 ; though it was about twenty months before everything was complete. The total area covered by tlae factory was 540 acres ; and hereon there was raised, to constitute the factory proper, a varied collection of separate buildings, segregated in order to reduce the consequences of any possible explosion, and supplemented, not alone by offices and dining-rooms, with extensive catering arrangements, but, also, by a hospital, a church, and the inevitable picture-house. The construction of Georgetown necessitated the transport there, in the first instance, and mainly by the Caledonian Railway, of such items as 9,000,000 bricks, 1,500,000 cubic feet of timber, 9,500 tons of cement, 4,000 doors, 9,000 windows, 10 acres of glass, 76 acres of roofing felt, 10 miles of drain-pipes, 12 miles of water- pipes, 80 miles of heating pipes, 12 acres of linoleum, and five miles of barbed wire for the exclusion of undesirable visitors. During the period when the factory had attained the maximum of its production, the number of workers employed was close on 15,000. Of these, about 14,000 were women or girls. The vast majority of them — a proportion which has been put at 95 per cent. — ^lived at Glasgow. The remainder had their homes at Paisley. Between the date of the first consignment, as given above, and the end of December, 1918, the Georgetown factory filled 20,000,000 shells and cartridges of aU calibres from the i8-pd^. to the 12-in. ; 26,000,000 cartridges and 32,000,000 small components, besides engaging in a variety of other work concerned with mines, " Tanks," machine-gun shelters, locomotives and other such items. During the same period, also, the total output of explosives or other traffic from the factory, as handed to the Caledonian for conveyance by rail, was 459,000 tons. The greatest quantity of consignments dispatched in the course of any one day was on August 19th, 1918, when a record of 1,891 tons was attained. These figures would be big enough if they stood alone ; but they do not allow for the previous transport to the factory of an approximately equal weight of materials taken there for the production of the said output ; they do not include the weight of the food-stuffs which, to a large extent, had to be conveyed to Georgetown by train for the supply 6f meals to the 10,000 or so of the workers for whom they were provided day by day, and stiU less do they include the passenger traffic represented by the running every day of 34 trains for the conveyance of those same 10,000 workers from home to factory and back again from factory to 848 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. home — a return journey for the passengers (who thus counted as, in effect, 20,000 separate passengers), which meant a fourfold journey for all the engines and much of the rolling stock. Beyond all this, the Caledonian undertook for the Government the maintenance of about eighteen miles of sidings laid in or adjoining the factory by the contractors, and they themselves put down and worked another four and a half mUes of sidings. They bmlt at Georgetown a passenger station with signal box, goods ofSce and carriage-cleaning platforms, and they altered and extended the existing station and plat- forms at Houston as a further means of meeting the demands of the passenger traihc. Yet, when everything in the way of transport in connection with this great National Factory has been allowed for, we have to bear in mind that, after all, Georgetown was but an incident in the sum total of the traffic demands pouring in from all directions upon the Caledonian Railway Company. Gretna Explosives Factory. The essential difference between Georgetown and Gretna, and the fundamental consideration from a railway-transport point of view — leaving aside any actual difference in the proportions of their respective output — lay in the fact that Georgetown was not much more than a huge workshop, whereas Gretna was an industrial city. Out of a maximum of 15,000 workers at Georgetown, the resident population was not more than 500 — mainly caretakers. At Gretna the maximum attained in the number of workers at any one time was 20,000 — and three-fourths of them had to live on the piremises. For Georgetown there were great resources of female labour to be tapped in Glasgow, and the running of workwomen's (rather than workmen's) trains on the ten-mile journey, day by day, presented no insuperable difficulty to the Caledonian. For Gretna there was no Glasgow. Workers certainly did travel in large numbers daily from and to their homes in Carhsle, Annan, Dumfries, Lockerbie, Penrith, Langholm and Longtown ; but the labour resources of these places were quite unequal to such an occasion, and a large pro- portion of the sum total of workers required had to be gathered together from all parts of the Kingdom. When, too, they had been got, the bulk of them had to be housed, fed, cared for, entertained and looked after generally — at Gretna. Here, therefore, we have the main reason why, while the Georgetown factory covered 540 acres, the area of the Gretna factory extended over nine mUes. The start with the building of the Gretna factory was made in Septem- ber, 1915, and that step was taken because of the serious position into which the country was drifting in regard to cordite. It was felt that without an adequate supply of cordite we should assuredly lose the war. Our existing faciUties for the production of that explosive were inadequate THE CALEDONIAN RAILWAY. 849 to requirements, and, although we were getting good quantities from the United States, we were paying for them a much higher price than it would cost to make them here, while there was the risk that the submarine danger might put a stop altogether to our overseas resources. So it was that the building of a great factory mainly for the making of cordite was resolved upon, and Gretna was chosen as the site for the reason, presum- ably, that an abundance of derelict land, constituting what has been described as " an unprofitable wilderness," on the edge of Solway shoals, was available there ; that Gretna would be safe from enemy aircraft, and, also, that there were excellent transport facilities available, Gretna being served by three railway companies. Gretna Station is on the main line of the Caledonian Railway from Carhsle to Glasgow and Edinburgh. The Glasgow and South Western Company's system terminates at Gretna, but it joins up there with the Caledonian, over which the Glasgow and South Western have running powers between Gretna and Carhsle. Then from Gretna to Longtown there is a short branch railway, known as the Border Union Branch, which, owned by the North British Railway Company but taken over by the Ministry of Munitions on the Gretna factory being built, gave the North British access to Gretna from their main hne between Carhsle and Edinburgh. Carhsle, again, is a great railway centre from which radiate, in addition to the three Scottish lines just mentioned, those of the London and North Western, the Midland, the North Eastern and the Maryport and Carlisle Railway Companies. Carhsle is, in fact, a junction which connects all parts of Scotland with aU parts of England. The building of the new city was in itself a great undertaking, not only for the builders but for the railways which had to carry most of the necessary materials for construction and equipment. The area allotted to the factory proper was 9,200 acres, included therein being a central zone in order that, in the interests of safety, certain processes of manu- facture could be kept separate and distinct. The " townships " in which the workers were housed extended over 620 acres, and the remainder of the land occupied was devoted to the raising of crops for food supply. The factory, which included a power station capable of producing 10,500 kilowatts at 6,000 volts, was built on such a scale that it was equal to the production of a thousand tons of cordite per week, though much other war material, besides cordite, was also made. Then, in the " towoiships," houses were provided for married people and hostels for single women and girls, of whom as many as 12,000 were at one time working in the factory. There was a central kitchen capable of providing meals for 14,000 people daily ; a bakery equal to 13,000 loaves daily, and a laundry that could wash 6,000 articles daily. The city was further supphed with a recreation hall, known as the Border Hall, consisting of three floors and accommodating 1,100 persons, and another haU which would hold 650. There were, stiU further, a number of churches ; a school for 800 or 900 children ; an institute with reading rooms and rooms for games ; a hospital ; a dental institute and two 850 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. picture-houses, one seating 700 and the other 500. The provision of an adequate water supply froiA the river Esk, at a point five miles distant, involved the laying of, altogether, 100 miles of piping. The first consignment of manufactured material from the Gretna factory was dispatched May 9th, 1916. The total capital expenditure on building and equipment has been officially put at £9,184,000, and the cost of working the factory from September, 1916, to the end of September, 1918, at about ;£i2,769,ooo — a total of £21,953,000. Here, however, we are concerned less with questions of finance than with the magnitude of the traffic which, in the first instance, the building of the city and the provision of its machinery and equipment — apart from all the transport of raw materials and of manufactured goods that was to follow — threw upon the railways, and more especially the Cale- donian. It would be too big a task to go into fuU details in respect to all these matters, and it may, perhaps, suffice to mention one single item — stone — as typical of the rest. During the period from September loth, 1915, to July 4th, 1917, the quantity of stone conveyed by the Caledonian Railway from the CorsehiU Quarry, Annan (taken over by the Ministry of Munitions), to the factory at Gretna, for road-making and other purposes, was 164,386 tons. When, indeed, the factory was still under construction, it was found necessary to introduce specieil railway-wagon labels for the purpose of regulating the traffic. These labels, available for a certain period only, were supplied by the Government departments concerned to the con- signors as occasion required and according to the traffic conditions at the receiving end. Consignments for Gretna were not accepted by the railways at the forwarding points unless they were accompanied by the labels in question. Taking the entire volume of Caledonian traffic between England and Scotland which passed over the CarHsle-Gretna section of the company's main hne, and leaving out of account the further traffic carried to or from CarUsle by the Glasgow and South Western over Caledonian lines by virtue of their running powers, the total for 1916 amounted to 2,813,692 tons, against 1,051,279 in 1913, an increase Of 1,762,413 tons. This traffic consisted mainly of such commodities as stores of aU kinds, fittings and equipment, steel and steel-work, guns of heavy cahbre, pig-iron, iron ore, coal, munitions, and so on. AU these things were, doubtless, for more or less urgent delivery ; yet at certain hours of the day the goods and mineral traffic along the short stretch of line in question had to be greatly interrupted in order to allow of the running of workmen's trains. Within the area of the factory there were 80 miles of railway track — 40 miles of nmning lines and 40 miles of sidings. With the working of these interior Unes the railway companies were not directly concerned ; but the fact may be mentioned that the Government rolling stock used for this purpose comprised 38 locomotives, 87 passenger coaches, 95 cordite-paste vans, 54 cordite vans, and 375 open wagons. Seventeen THE CALEDONIAN RAILWAY. 851 platforms were constructed in the factory to serve the various compounds. Double-track lines were worked with Tyers' Double-track Block System and single-track lines with Tyers' Single-Une Tablet system. From the time the building of the factory was begun to the end of March, 1919, the total traffic carried in connection with it by the Cale- donian was 529,957 tons, this, of course, being distinct from what was conveyed by the North British and the Glasgow and South Western Companies. The great expansion of the goods and mineral traffic from and to Gretna by the Caledonian route during the years from 1913 to 1918 inclusive can best be shown by the following table : — Year. Goods. Minerals. Total of Forwarded Receivec . Total. Forwarded Received Total. Goods AND Minerals. Tons. Tons. Tons. Tons. Tons. Tons. Tons. 1913 • 911 687 1.598 399 913 1,312 2,910 1914 • 738 648 1,386 276 1.958 2,234 3,620 1915 • 819 23.366 24,185 1,649 39,670 41.319 65.504 1916 . 9,748 76.158 85,906 65,960 176,585 242.545 328,451 1917 . 24.133 68,994 93.127 17,612 64,153 81,765 174,892 1918 . 14,030 47.471 61,501 I -,640 22,921 24,561 86,062 Nor was the increase in the passenger traffic from and to Gretna by the Caledonian route less marked during the same period, as the following further figures will show : — Number of Passengers Year. Carried. 1913 10,747 1914 8,653 1915 365.436 1916 ........ 1,842,822 1917 2,932,814 1918 1,348,637 This great increase is, of course, to be accounted for by the large number of workers employed at Gretna who lived in neighbouring towns and travelled to and fro each day, while each passenger making a return journey is counted as equal to two passengers for a single journey. With Georgetown wholly, and Gretna in large measure, on their hands, the Caledonian Railway Company would appear to have already an abundance of war-work of which to acquit themselves ; but there was much more besides. Other Factories. Of Government factories on the Caledonian system apart from Georgetown and Gretna, and engaged principally in the manufacture of shells, there were sixteen. In addition to these there were, approximately, seventy factories which, though not staffed by the.. Government, were under Government control, and were either set up or extended during the 852 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. war for the production of shell, aeroplanes (complete), aircraft material. Army rations, ammunition boxes, engines, gun mountings, canvas, cloth, sand-bags, etc. A few facts concerning one or two of the more important of these factories may help to indicate still more clearly the sort of work that was being done in Scotland and the nature and extent of the traffic for which such provision as was possible had to be made. There was, for instance, the National Projectile Factory in David Street, Mile End, Glasgow. This was opened in an old cotton mill acquired by the Ministry of Munitions in September, 1915, and the number of hands eventually employed attained a total of 3,000 — 2,000 women and girls and 1,000 men. Up to the time of the Armistice there had been dispatched from this converted cotton miU over 2,000,000 shells (including 6-in., 6o-pdrs., and i8-pdrs.). A factory at Cardonald, Glasgow, completed about January, 1916, was among those managed by Messrs. William Beardmore and Company, Ltd., on behalf of the Government. Between 4,000 and 5,000 hands, mostly girls, were engaged there in the turning and finishing of 6-in. and 8-in. shells for the various filling factories. The factory was served by two railway systems. The bulk of the traffic by the Caledonian route con- sisted of turnings and cuttings, and the quantities so consigned up to the end of December, 1918, amounted to 72,000 tons. Mention of the works of Messrs. G. and J. Weir, Ltd., Cathcart (Glasgow), should not be omitted. The principal products there, prior to the war, were ships' pumps and pumping machinery. When the war came, Messrs. Weir greatly extended their works, built new factories, and engaged in the manufacture of shell and aeroplanes. Before Armistice Day they had finished 900 complete aeroplanes and 40,000 engine parts, in addition to their output of shell. Practically the whole of the trafiic was railed from the Caledonian Company's Cathcart Station, adjacent to the works. Messrs. Arrol- Johnston, Ltd., Heath Hall, Locharbriggs, Dumfries, makers of motor-cars in the days before the war, also engaged in the manufacture of aeroplane engines and aeroplane parts. The number of workers they employed attained a maximum of 2,300, while the pro- duction during the war-period included 2,500 aeroplane engines, 900 sets of aeroplane wings, 10 aeroplanes, and 7,000 gun-mountings. These examples are t57pical of what went on, more or less, in practically the whole of the seventy factories in question. Aeroplane Depots. Large aerodromes were situated on the Caledonian system at Montrose, Renfrew and Edzell. The Montrose aerodrome, constructed prior to the war, was used as a training ground and, later on, as a distributing centre. Between August 4th, 1914, and December 31st, 1918, the amount of Government traffic THE CALEDONIAN RAILWAY. 853 carried by the Caledonian to or from Montrose Station was, approximately, 12,000 tons. For the construction of the Inchinnan Aerodrome, Renfrew, 9,000 tons of material were dealt with at the Caledonian Company's Paisley (St. James') Station. Large quantities of stores also passed through the Company's Houston Station, the traffic handled there during 1918 in connection with the aerodrome amounting to about 5,000 tons. It was at Renfrew that -" R 34," the first dirigible to cross the Atlantic, was built. Some 26,000 tons of building material, etc., were conveyed for the construction of the aerodrome at Edzell. For the seaplane base at Dundee the company carried about 5,000 tons of building materials, etc., supplemented, during 1918, by 1,500 tons of stores. Military Camps. In addition to the barracks in Glasgow, Edinburgh, Aberdeen and other large towns, various mihtary camps were served by the Caledonian. Over 100,000 tons of building material were carried in connection with the construction of Redford Barracks and Dreghorn and MaUeny Camps, (in the Edinburgh district), though about 25,000 tons of this quantity were carried, for the Redford Barracks, prior to August, 1914. During 1918 the quantity of equipment, stores, etc. , conveyed by goods train to these destinations was about 1,000 tons. At Comton, Bridge of Allan, there was a remount camp to which many thousands of horses were sent by special train from various parts of the country, being afterwards redistributed in the same way. For the setting up of this camp the company carried building materials to the extent of 6,000 tons. Equipment, stores, etc., for the camp during 1918 gave 2,000 tons of traffic. Other camps on the Caledonian system included those at Barry and Buddon (Dundee district), Blairgowrie, Forfar and Stirhng. Timber Traffic. During the course of the war, six timber camps were opened at or near to stations on the Caledonian system, namely, three by the Canadian Forestry Corps, at Floriston, Methven and Stanley, and three by the Forestry Department of the Board of Trade, at Kirriemuir, Maryfield (Dundee) and Stobo. The tonnage _ of timber traffic forwarded from places on the Caledonian Railway during the years 1913,. 1917 and 1918 respectively was as follows : — 1913- 1917. 1918.., Tons. Tons. Tons. 252,437 . . . . 385.5" • • ■ • 407.254 Of the 407,254 tons carried during 1918, 306,650 tons consisted of home-grown timber ; but no comparison can be made with a correspond- 854 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. ing figure for the pre-war period, as no distinction was then made between home-grown and imported timber. Potato Traffic. A great expansion occurred in the conveyance of potatoes over the railway owing to a combination of causes, and notably the lack of shipping, the divergence of traihc from sea to rail on account of the submarine danger, and the imperative need for increased production in the interests of the national food supply — a need felt to be so great in the spring of 1918 that seed potatoes and seed grain from Scotland were given priority over aU descriptions of other traffic, including Government stores. The effect of these conditions on the Caledonian was that the quantity of potatoes carried from stations on that system during the season ending May, 1918, was 150,298 tons, as compared with 50,414 tons during the same period in the previous year— an increase of 99,884 tons, equal to 198 per cent. Goods and Mineral Traffic Totals. The following table shows the amount of goods and mineral traffic, including Government traffic, arising or terminating at stations on the Caledonian system in the years 1913 and 1918 respectively. It also includes " through-through " traffic (not originating or terminating on the Caledonian system), when " carried in Caledonian trains " — that is to say, in trains hauled by Caledonian engines ; but it does not include traffic worked over the system by other companies in the exercise of running powers, so that the sum total of the traffic passing over Cale- donian lines was even greater than the figures given in the table would suggest : — 1913. 1918. Increase. Tons. Tons. Tons. Goods .... 4,986,341 7.099.655 2,113,314 Minerals .... 18,989,129 19,181,990 192,861 Total . . 23,975,470 26,281,645 2,306,175 Traffic Requiring Special Vehicles. Inasmuch as nearly the whole of the large iron, steel and engineering works in Scotland are either directly connected with the Caledonian Railway system or else within convenient reach thereof, the company were, on the outbreak of war, already well provided with vehicles of the special t57pes normally used for the conveyance of manufactures of exceptional size or weight, as, for example, boilers, ingots, ships' propellers, stern frames, plates, machinery, etc., and these vehicles were now found especially suitable for the conveyance of such war material as guns, " Tanks " and aeroplanes. During the period from August 4th, 1914, to June 17th, 1916, the Caledonian Company carried over their lines eighty-four heavy guns, THE CALEDONIAN RAILWAY. 855 weighing from 50 tons to 100 tons each. These were all carried on the company's own gun-sets. Between May 4th, 1918, and the signing of the Armistice, fifteen guns, each weighing from 70 to 100 tons, were conveyed by the Caledonian Company on a new 165-ton gun-set built on Government account by Messrs. Hurst, Nelson and Company, Ltd., of Motherwell. The Caledonian Company also carried on their own special-class wagons and on wagons of a similar type borrowed from other companies 220 " tanks " for shipment to France, and over 1,800 complete aeroplanes forwarded from various points on the system. In addition to the extra trouble occasioned by the work of loading these exceptional traffics and in making the special arrangements they occasioned, over-gauge loads led, in some instances, to a serious retarding of other traffic owing to the need, it might be, to keep the adjoining Hue clear in order that the said loads might pass in safety. Passenger-Train Traffic. In dealing with the volume of passenger trafiic, allowance must be made for, among other items, that which passed to and from the various camps set up on the Caledonian system and, also, for the substantial proportions of that in connection with numerous works and factories, whether expanded or specially created. The total number of passengers carried in Caledonian trains (apart from those conveyed in other companies' trains) on the Caledonian Rail- way in 1918 as compared with 1913 was as follows : — Year. Number. 1918 75.634.391 1913 68,017,251 Increase .... 7,617,140 The figures for 1918 include naval and military passengers carried free. The number of these, from the outbreak of the war to the end of 1918, was : — August 5th,i9i4, to December, 1914 .... 359,719 Year 1915 909,598 1916 575.204 .. 1917 693,918 .. 1918 739.539 Total .... 3.277.978 The number of parcels under 2 cwt. and the weight of other merchan- dise traffic by passenger train in 1918 and 1913, may be shown thus : — Number of Par- Weight of Other Year. cels under % cwt. Traffic. Tons. 1918 4.233.353 83,782 1913 4,959,474 54.097 Decrease . 726,121 Increase 29,685 31- 856 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. The increase in weight, as against the decrease in number, is to be accounted for by the fact that, with a view to securing eariier delivery of urgent consignments, the naval and military authorities sent considerable quantities of munitions, machinery, ship-material, etc., by passenger train instead of forwarding by goods train. New Works. Notwithstanding the shortage in staff and material, much was done in the way. of providing sidings, etc., in order to meet the requirements of Government departments and commercial firms on account of the abnormal traffic requirements to which the war gave rise. The total number of new sidings thus constructed on different parts of the Caledonian system by the company's engineering stjtff, as distinct from what was done in the same direction by Government contractors, amounted to sixty-one miles. This figure includes the four and a quarter mUes of sidings laid at the Georgetown factory. It also includes siding accommodation in connection with military camps, with oil-fuel, engine- shed and mine-storage sidings for the Admiralty at Grangemouth, together with various sidings for the War Department and the Ordnance Department as well as for many different factories and works, those, for instance, in connection with the Lanarkshire Steel Works at Flemington having a length of six and three-quarter nules. In addition to the foregoing, the Caledonian Company constructed, on their own account, at Perth North, exchange sidings capable of storing 144 wagons in order to relieve the congestion to which that section of the line was Uable. Two new platforms, each 700 feet long, were put up at Mossband for the use of workmen employed at Gretna Explosives Factory, who travelled daily in special workers' trains from and to Penrith, Carlisle, Lockerbie, etc. At Glasgow Central Station certain of the waiting rooms were altered to make provision for a canteen for the use of soldiers and sailors. Another was converted into a Red Cross ambulance room. A new platform and awning were provided at Gateside, near Cambuslang, for the detraining of wounded soldiers who were being conveyed to the hospital there. North of Carlisle, a widening of the line between Rockcliffe and Floriston was carried out for a length of 3 miles 68 chains in order to facilitate the traffic between Carhsle and Gretna. Then, also, a new signal cabin was constructed at Rockcliffe, while at Floriston the goods yard was remodelled and extended, and accommodation was provided for dealing with timber traffic. Huts for the use of military guards were erected at four viaducts on the Caledonian system, and in one instance, that of the Gamock viaduct at Kilwinning, on the Lanarkshire and Ayrshire Railway, the hut was supplemented by a footbridge erected over the river Garnock. THE CALEDONIAN RAILWAY. 857 Steamships. The entire fleet of steamers with which the Caledonian Steam Packet Company, Ltd. — operating in connection with the Caledonian Railway Company — ^maintained services between Gourock, Wemyss Bay and Ardrossan and the watering places on the Firth of Clyde, together with the islands of Bute and Arran, was reqviisitioned by the Government for the purposes of the war. The Duchess of Argyll (a turbine steamer, length 250 feet, breadth 30 feet, gross tonnage 740, indicated h.p. 3,600, speed 2i| knots, passenger capacity 1,713) was employed in conveying troops from the South of England to France. While engaged on this work she was caUed to the rescue of two troopships. The first occasion was on September 15th, 1915, when, while Isdng off Boulogne, at 12.15 a.m., she was ordered to go to the assistance of H.M.T. Queen Empress, which, with 1,000 troops on board, had been in collision with a (destroyer. At 1.30 a.m. she took the troopship in tow until several tugs arrived on the scene, and she then stood by until aU danger was past. Then, on February ist, 1918, while the Duchess of Argyll was lying at Havre, the master received orders, at 4.40 a.m., to proceed to the assistance of the Archangel, which had 1,600 troops on board, had been run into by a British destroyer, and was then sinking. The Argyll was alongside at 5.30 a.m. ; she took off all the troops, and she returned with them to Havre by 6.35 a.m. — a truly notable achievement. During the four years the Argyll acted as a troopship she sailed continuously and did not have a single mishap. The other vessels in the company's fleet. Duchess of Hamilton, Duchess of Fife, Dtichess of Rothesay, Duchess of Montrose, Marchioness of Lome, Marchioness of Breadaliane, and Caledonia were requisitioned for mine- sweeping. They did excellent work, but two of them were lost, the Duchess of Hamilton on November 29th, 1915, and the Duchess of Montrose on March 18th, 1917. The others afterwards returned to the Clyde. -Railway Equipment Supplied. The Caledonian provided 309 wagons for dispatch overseas, and they also handed over 231 wagons to other railway companies who had sent overseas a greater number in proportion to their stock. Sixteen modern vehicles were converted into an ambulance train, and six 6-wheeled brake-third carriages, together with twenty 6-wheeled ordinary carriages, were provided for the use of the British Armies in France. Six of the company's 2-ton hydraulic cranes in Grange Dock, Grange- mouth, were dismantled and sent to Rouen in March, 1917. The work of dismantling and of reconstruction in France was done by the company's hydraulic foreman, who, at the beginning of 1919, was sent again to France to dismantle the cranes for their return to Grangemouth. Of permanent-way materials sufficient for about 12 miles of single line 858 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. of railway were lifted from various parts of the Caledonian system during the war and sent to France. The company further supplied four trolley-wagons which were used in making up the two armoured trains stationed on the East Coast of England and Scotland respectively as a precautionary measure in case of an attempted landing by the enemy. Manufacture of Munitions of War. Work done by the company in their locomotive or carriage workshops for the War Office, the Ministry of Munitions and Woolwich Arsenal included the supply of the following articles : — Ammunition : Gaines, 41,640 ; gaine fuzes, 4,215. Guns, gun-carriages and equipment : Mountings for 8-in. howitzers, 23 sets ; brake work for 6-in. gim-carriages, 8 sets ; fixing screws, 40 ; brake blocks, 20. Transport : General service wagons (Artillery section), 274 ; water-tank carts, 25. Miscellaneous : Picketing posts, 500 ; picketing pegs, 8,000. Other work, done by the company to assist Scottish firms under contract with the Government, included the following : — i8-pounders : Extractors, Ordnance Q.F., 71 ; Field equipment forgings machined, 50 ; levers, breech mechanism machined and finished, 161. Submarine mines, 1,370. Ambulance Trains and Ambulance Work. Of loaded military-ambulance trains run on the Caledonian system between August, 1914, and November, 1918, the total number was 962. Of these 763 came from Southampton and 199 from Dover. The desti- nations of the 962 were — Glasgow, 522 ; Edinburgh, 97 ; Perth, 73 ; Dundee, 86 ; and Aberdeen, 184. The empty carriages were invariably returned to the starting point. Of ambulance trains for the. Royal Navy dealt with at Caledonian stations during the continuance of hostilities the number was 630, namely, Edinburgh, 135 ; Perth, 174 ; Wemyss Bay, 80 ; Strathaven, 41 ; Larbert, 97 ; Dawsholm, 98 ; and Peebles, 5. Assistance in the transport of wounded from trains to hospital was rendered by squads from the Caledonian Railway Ambulance Brigade at a number of stations. At places where the transport work was undertaken by the Red Cross Society Caledonian men joined that body and assisted as required. Several members of the Brigade also acted as orderlies in mihtary hospitals in their own time. When the St. Andrew's Ambulance Association organised squads for emergency use in the event of enemy air raids, the various ambulance sections on the Caledonian Railway submitted the names of members willing to help when caUed upon. Lists were kept in the various district police offices so that those whose names were thereon could be called out at the shortest notice whenever a raid might occur. A large number of Caledonian ambulance men served in the Royal THE CALEDONIAN RAILWAY. 859 Army Medical Corps both at home and abroad. Some of them joined the first foreign service units organised by the St. Andrew's Ambulance Association in October, 1914. Enlistments. The number of Caledonian Railway men who had been released to join H.M. Forces down to November, 1918, was 5,229, or 21-9 of the total staff on August 4th, 1914. Employment of Women and Girls. The number of women and girls employed on the Caledonian Railway prior to the war was eighty. Most of them were carriage cleaners. During the course of the war this number was increased to 1,911, namely, Super- intendent of the Line's Department, 1,105 ." Goods Department, 455 ; Locomotive Department, 232; Engineering . Department, 119. Nearly the whole of these — in fact the whole of those in the three last-mentioned departments — took the places of men who had left to join the Forces. Of the total taken on, 387 were clerks and typists. Among the remainder there were 281 booking and parcels clerks, 239 passenger-porters, 106 ticket-collectors, 89 parcel and left-luggage porters, 21 guards, 16 porter- guards, 204 carriage-cleaners, 16 signalwomen, 20 porter signalwomen, 120 labourers in the engineering workshops, 24 machine workers, drillers, screwers and turners, 10 wagon painters, 8 engine coalers, and 4 engine- tube cleaners. Allotments. During the war a special effort was made to induce the company's servants to cultivate plots of land within the fences both of the railway lines and of the Forth and Clyde Canal. Facilities in the same direction were also extended to non-railway men. As the result of these efforts, land was brought under cultivation as follows : — Plots. Acres. By company's servants . . . , 3,869 •. . 200 By the public ...... 452 . . 30 Total . . . 4,321 . . 230 Grangemouth Docks. An account of the war-work done in Grangemouth Docks, owned by the Caledonian Railway Company, will be found in Chapter XXXIX. CHAPTER LIX. GLASGOW AND SOUTH WESTERN RAILWAY. In its full extent of 500 miles, the system of the Glasgow and South Western Railway serves a number of important towns and industrial districts situate between Glasgow and Largs, on the north, and Carlisle and Stranraer, on the south, included in this area being the rich and highly agricultural counties of Ayrshire, Dumfriesshire, Kirkcudbright- shire and the Galloway district so closely associated with the works of Crockett and other writers. The company are owners of the piers at Renfrew, Largs and Fairhe, together with the harbours of Troon and Ayr ; they are part owners of the Girvan and Stranraer harbours ; they have carried on important steamship services on the Firth of Clyde, including those to the Islands of Arran and Bute and various points along the west coast of Scotland, whilst their system as a whole is an important link in the communications between England and central and northern Scotland in general. A railway thus situated was bound to be called upon to render services of many different kinds and on a considerable scale for the purposes of the war, and the story of the company's accomphshed results compares not unfavourably with those attained even by companies possessing greater mileage and more extensive resources. Military Traffic. The number of special military trains run on the company's system from the outbreak of the war to December 31st, 1918, was 1,116, and there were conveyed by them 7,444 officers, 144,066 men, 31,025 horses, 475 vans of stores, and baggage, 310 military vehicles, 3,337 cycles, and 134 motors. As for the large number of naval and military passeiigers carried by ordinary train, there~^re no figures available to show the sum total of these. The majority of them travelled on free warrants, of which the company had no means of obtaining a record. Ambulance Trains. Of ambulance trains from England, a total of forty, conveying 4,937 patients, were run during the war period to destinations on the Glasgow and South Western system. The work of unloading these trains was done by the medical staff travelling with them, aided by members of local Volimtary Aid Detachments. 860 GLASGOW AND SOUTH WESTERN RAILWAY. 86i Passenger Traffic. Greatly increased numbers of workpeople were carried in proportion as more and still more factories for the production of munitions and other military or naval requirements were opened in many different parts of the company's system. A maximmn of twenty trains per day was set aside in the case of the Gretna Factory for the conveyance of workers thereat from and to Dumfries, Aiman and Carlisle. The following table, showing the passenger-train traffic carried between the years 1913-1918 inclusive, gives evidence of good increases notwith- standing the aforesaid absence of statistics as to the naval and military traffic carried on vouchers: — 1ST 3RD Workmen's Total. fEAR. Class. Class. Tickets. I9I3 • 386,705 10,885,688 4,224,385 15.496,778 I9I4 • 347,260 10,465,186 4,441,677 15,254,123 I915 • 336,354 9.778.654 6,019,848 16,134,856 1916 . 398,598 10.237,741 9,578,027 20,214,366 I9I7 ■ 287,784 7.645.887 10,352,016 18,285.687 1918 . 384,075 8,610,536 9,072,133 18,066,745 Goods Traffic. For the company's Traffic Department it became a matter of great concern from the very outbreak of the war as to how, under a great variety of ever-changing conditions, they could best handle the great volumes of traffic which, in one form or another, were to be regarded as constituting mimitions of war. This traffic comprised guns, explosives, ammunition, machinery, horses, mules, fuel and all kinds of food stuffs. In fact, during the last two years of the war the great bulk of the goods and mineral traffic on the Glasgow and South Western consisted — apart from food supplies — either of munitions of war of one kind or another or of raw material for their manufacture. The utilisation by the Admiralty of various ports on the company's system led to large quantities of coal having to be worked to those points from the South Wales collieries, the quantities so carried by rail becoming greater still as the shortage of vessels for sea transport grew more acute. It was under these conditions that from the outbreak of the war to December 31st, 1918, the company carried over their lines 60,000 wagons of Welsh coal, exchanged from English companies at Carlisle, to which point the empty wagons had to be returned en route for the collieries from which they had come. The diversion of shipping from the East to the West Coast ports, and, also, the adoption of the " convoy " system, led to the company having in many instances to undertake the haulage of traffic for longer distances than before. This was especially the case in regard to cargoes of iron ore. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, iron ore from overseas Was, as a rule, discharged at a port convenient to the particular works for 86a BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. which it was destined ; but, as the result of the shipping difficulties, coupled with the general shortage in supplies, each cargo was divided up among a number of works some of which might be at a considerable distance from the port where the ore had been discharged. Although not serving a territory wooded to any particular degree and comparable — ^in this respect — to the districts of other Scottish railway companies further to the north, the Glasgow and South Western was, nevertheless, concerned in tlie greater transport of home-grown timber due to the check on imports, the company having to convey a total of over 336,000 tons of timber which had been cut down in the vicinity of their stations. As regards munition traffic, the only factory on the Glasgow and South Western system at which explosives were manufactured prior to the war was that of Messrs. Nobel, at Ardeer (Ayrshire). In propor- tion as the need of the military situation increased, new works for the making of war material were started at many places on or near the line, and there were few of any consequence among works established prior to the war which did not devote themselves mainly, if not exclu- sively, to the production of one kind or another of war material. Engine shops, for example, naturally took to the production of the much-needed shells or to the manufacture of machinery for making war material; carpet factories diverted their production to that of army blankets ; shipbuilding firms, engineering firms and iron companies made extensive additions to their yards, works or factories in order that their facilities for production might be increased, and so on with many other concerns. The establishments which thus helped to pour great volumes of traffic on to the Glasgow and South Western lines included the National Pro- jectile Factory, Cardonald (shells) ; the National Filling Factory, Car- donald ; the National Projectile Factory, Renfrew ; the Shrapnel Fac- tory, Renfrew ; H.M. Factory, Irvine ; the Standard Chemical Works, Irvine ; the Misk Factory, Ardeer, Stevenston (ammimition) ; the Aerial School of Gunnery, Loch Doon, Dalmellington ; the Aerial School of Gunnery, Turnberry ; and H.M. Factory, Gretna. Of these various establishments the greatest of all was the last-mentioned, and the Glasgow and South Western shared with the two other leading Scottish railway companies in carrying the prodigious quantities of traffic to which the setting up of the factory led. During the period when the factory was under construction, the Glasgow and South Western alone took there as many as 400 wagons of materials on a single day. When, also, the factory had started on the work of production, the same company dealt with up to 100 loaded wagons in a day, and this notwithstanding the fact that the company's route was made use of by the factory for the conveyance of certain by-products only. The factory at Irvine and the Misk Factory at Ardeer both produced explosives on a substantial scale and were important contributors to the G. & S.W. traffic. Mention should also be made of the large training camps established at Gailes and Irvine ; the salvage dump at Renfrew, and the magazines GLASGOW AND SOUTH \VESTERN RAILWAY. 863 for the storage of explosives at Perceton (Dreghom) and Dalricket (New Cumnock). Special trafi&c arrangements had to be made by the company in connection with the last-mentioned. Altogether, the tonnage for Government Departments on which no carriage charges were raised by the company, or, if raised, were subse- quently cleared, in the last three years of the war, were : 1916, 189,581 tons ; 1917, 770,034 tons ; 1918, 776,821 tons. During the same three years the company carried 17,000 horses for the War Office and 20,000 head of cattle and 79,000 sheep in connection with the control exercised by the Ministry of Food. For this traf&c, also, no carriage charges were raised. In the experience of the Glasgow and South Western, the system of control instituted for the Carlisle area on January 3rd, 1916, with a view to avoiding delay to goods trains and dealing more expeditiously with the greatly increased traffic passing between Scotland and England, was very satisfactory from a traffic-working point of view. The Glasgow and South Western gained further advantage from the system of allocating to one company traffic passing by different routes between common points, the object being to economise conveyance and make the best use of the facilities available. For the same reason they adopted at a number of places the plan of accepting only on specified days goods that were consigned in less than full wagon loads for certain destinations. New Works. The increased production at existing factories ; the construction of so many new industrial establishments ; the great expansion of traffic and the need for meeting war-time conditions, in general, all combined to render necessary a wide range of new works by the Engineering Depart- ment as a means of ensuring the provision of increased transport facilities. Widenings of main lines were carried out at different points ; loop sidings and marshalling sidings were provided, and a number of additional sidings either for storing wagons or for the accommodation of general traffic were put in. These included a siding 395 yards in length at Carlisle; two, 535 yards in length, at A}^:; five sidings, to hold 200 wagons, at Barony Junction, near Auchinleck ; additional marshalling sidings, to accommodate a further 320 wagons, at Falkland Junction, Ayr ; nine new sidings at Ayr Harbour, to hold 177 wajgons, and so on at other places besides. Then, at different points on the system, extra office accommodation had to be provided ; platforms and goods sheds were extended ; new goods sheds and engine sheds were built, and electric hoists were substituted for hydraulic hoists. The sidings pro- vided by the company to facilitate traffic to and from the Gretna Factory were on an especially extensive scale. At Gretna Green station the total length of rails laid by the company, for various purposes, was about 3,400 yards ; at Dornock station, where the principal connection of the G. & S.W. to the factory was formed, the total length of lines laid by CHAPTER LX. GREAT CENTRAL RAILWAY. By virtue either of its ovm lines or of important connections with the lines of other companies, the Great Central was able to ensure the trans- part of great volumes of war-time trafific, not only across the country, but from one end of the kingdom to the other ; so that even in this way alone, apart from other considerations which arese, the company deserved well of the State. That the suggestion here offered is warranted will be at once apparent ~ from a glance at a railway map of England. As a member of the Cheshire Lines Committee, the Great Central is joint owner, with the Midland and the Great Northern, of lines coimecting Chester, Liverpool, and Southport, on the west and the country to the east thereof with (among other places) Manchester, the starting point of its own main line, which, after expanding into an intricate network of railways in and around Sheffield, Rotherham, Chesterfield, * Mansfield, Bamsley, Wakefield, Doncaster, etc., and connecting all these industrial centres with Grimsby, Immingham, and Hull, on the East Coast, branches off to the south, and links up the entire system with London, at Marylebone. All this looks promising in itself ; but a further important facility offered by the Great Central for the purposes of the war lay in the fact that from Culworth Junction, on the main line to London, the company have a short branch establishing direct connection between the Great Central system and the Great Western at Banbviry. The effect of this was, in the first place, to allow of military trafiic put on the London and South Western at Southampton, and transferred to the Great Western at Winchester, passing on to the Great Central at Banbury, and con- tinuing thence to destinations on the Great Central itself, on the Great Northern, on the North Eastern, or, still further, on any of the Scottish railways, traffic being equally facilitated in the opposite direction, as well. By means, again, of this Banbury route, possibilities were offered during the course of the war for an exchange of traffic between all these Northern lines and the South Eastern and Chatham and the London, Brighton and South Coast Railways. Armaments, for instance, manu- factured on the East Coast and despatched to Richborough could be sent there viS, Banbury, Reading, Redhill and Tonbridge, and explosives from (say) Gretna would reach Newhaven by way of Banbury and Kens- ington. The route in question became, in fact, an extremely important 866 GREAT CENTRAL RAILWAY. 867 one for the transport of troops, ammunition and foodstirffs for overseas and the conveyance of coal from South Wales to Immingham and Northern ports for the Fleet patrolling the East Coast. It also greatly facilitated the distribution of sick and wounded landed at Southampton among hospitals in the Midlands, in the North of England and in Scotland. The Great Central system was, indeed, so far complete that the only addition which required to be made for the purposes of main-line traffic in the interests of the war was a new link, about 700 yards in length, between Whetstone, a few miles south of Leicester, and Blaby, a station on the London and North Western line from Nuneaton to Wigston Junction, joining, also, at that junction, with the Midland system. This connection, effected in June, 1916, was designed solely for the conveyance of Government traffic. New Works. In the way of new works, apart from this one improvement of the nmning lines, the Great Central Company put in a local connection with the Clipstone Colliery Branch of the Mansfield Railway for the Clipstone Camp Railway, constructed by the War Department. The permanent way and the signalling of the camp railway were maintained by the Great Central ; a platform was erected at the camp for the entraining and the detraining of troops, horses, stores, etc., and a passenger-train service was instituted between the camp and Mansfield. Other camps which brought a good -deal of trafiic to the Great Central lines were situated at Wendover, Northolt, Ruislip, Denham, High Wycombe, Edwinstowe, Worksop, Brocklesby, Stallingboro', Cleethorpes, Imming- ham Dock, and Barton-on-Humber. Halts were constructed at various points to facilitate the movements either of military or of workmen in Government employ, and sidings were needed in connection with the aerodromes established at Ruislip, Welsh Road (near Chester), and Killingholme, It was, however, in connection with the great industrial establishments served by the Great Central that extra siding accommodation was more especially provided on accoimt of the great expansion in the output due to the execution of so much Government work. Almost all the important Sheffield firms having rail connections with the Great Central — ^that is to say, such firms as Hadfields, Jessop, Firth, Edgar Allen, Steel, Peech and Tozer, etc. — required an increase of their siding facilities. The same was the case with Summers and Sons, at Hawarden Bridge, and Cammell Laird and Co., at Penistone. At Frodingham the greatly increased production of the iron firms led to the provision of several additional sidings. These were laid on an embankment for the construction of which about 100,000 cubic yards of filling had to be deposited. A considerable proportion of the work thus necessary was carried out by women. The congested condition of the industrial area in and around Sheffield led to other neighbourhoods being chosen for the additional works which some of the armament firms found indispensable. The adoption of 868 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. this expedient resulted in the erection of four large new works in a distance of about two miles between Grange Lane and Meadow Hall stations, near Rotherham, and in each instance the Great Central had to provide siding accommodation. Then the demand for iron was the cause of greater attention being paid to the Northamptonshire iron-fields than had previously been the case, and the Parkgate Iron and Steel Company, of Rotherham, were given siding facilities from the Great Central main line at Charwelton in connection with the working of a portion of the new field leased by them. Numerous other sidings were constructed over practically the whole of the Great Central system in connection with the production of munitions. Traffic Carried. Turning now to the traffic carried over the Great Central Railway during the period from the outbreak of the war to March 31st, 1919, we find that it included the following : — Officers, 54,862 ; men, 2,601,865 ; horses in boxes, 5,638 ; horses in cattle trucks, 115,431 ; guns and limbers, 896 ; four-wheeled vehicles, 7,333 ; two-wheeled vehicles, 3,150 ; baggage, 28,051 tons ; tanks, 401 ; big guns, 163. For the transport of this traffic during the period stated the rimning of 5,663 special trains was necessary. The figures given in respect to officers and men are exclusive of a large number on leave or on furlough who were conveyed by ordinary passenger train services ; but they include 6,703 officers and 188,318 men belonging to the American troops, who, together with 4,208 tons of baggage, were conveyed from Liverpool and the rest camp at Knotty Ash either to Southampton, for overseas or to various training camps in the South of England. The special trains run during the period under review included 360 for the American troops. Of ambulance trains dealt with on the Great Central during the same period, 399 carried through traffic, 35 carried traffic originating on the Great Central system, and 131 unloaded sick and wounded on that system. The tonnage of goods and coal traffic forwarded on behalf of the Government from Great Central stations during the period from August 5th, 1914, to December 31st, 1918, was as follows : — Coal and „ Goods. Coke. P^^'°°- Tons. Tons. August 5th to Dec. 31st, 1914 . . . 5.443 — Year 1915 -. . 23,326 — „ 1916 105,904 9,417 ,. 1917 510.355 82,241 „ 1918 711,922 90.502 Passenger Traffic. The curtailment of ordinary train services effected in May, 1918, to allow of engines, rolling stock and more men being sent to France and Belgium, and, also, for the purpose of conserving the coal supply, led to a reduction thereof by no less than 40 per cent, as compared with GREAT CENTRAL RAILWAY. 869 the 1913 services. Excursion fares, tourist and week-end bookings and other cheap-travel facilities were abolished ; yet, in spite of this and of the 50 per cent, increase in fares in 1918, the experience of the Great Central, in common with that of other companies, was that passenger traffic, after a set-back of only short duration, assumed greater propor- tions than ever. Comparisons of pre-war and of war-time traffic statistics in respect alike to passengers, goods and minerals are rendered misleading by reason of the difference of the basis on which they are compiled. The pre-war figures included " through through " traffic passing across the system of the company concerned without either originating or being unloaded thereon. The charges in respect to this traffic were collected by some other company, but the one which simply received the traffic and passed it on got its share of the receipts through the Railway Clearing House. When, however, the railways were operated as a single unit under State control, the same clearances were not made by the Railway Clearing House, and an individual company's statistics no longer included " through through " traffic, but related only to traffic in respect to which the charges had been collected by the company itself. The year 1914 was, also, a broken one, the figures between January ist and August 4tli being based on the former, and those from August 5th to December 31st on the latter, of the said principles. For these reasons the comparisons here offered are confined to the years 1915 to 191 8 inclusive ; and those in respect to passenger traffic on the Great Central show that the number of passengers booked at the company's stations and the amounts received from passengers for each of the said years were as follows : — Number OF Passenger Year. Passengers. Receipts. 1915 26,297,705 796,445 1916 28,869,016 844,326 1917 29.448,796 1,123,291 1918 33.793.633 1,420,614 In arriving at the number of passengers, as given in this table, return tickets have been doubled and season tickets calculated on the basis of twelve journeys per week for each ticket. Goods Traffic. Goods-train services underwent many changes during the period of the war. Most of the leading manufacturing firms on the Great Central system had to enlarge their works to permit of the production of muni- tions of war therein, and the traffic not only increased greatly in volume, as compared with pre-war conditions, but flowed in entirely different directions. The demand for raw materials by armament firms, including, in addition to others akeady mentioned, John Brown and Co., Ltd., and Armstrong, Whitworth and Co., was exceptionally heavy. Larger quantities of raw material were wanted for the furnaces of firms at 870 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Frodingham, and the output there was greatly increased. By way of illustrating the flow of traffic from the district, it may be mentioned that Messrs. Lysaghts and Co., of Normanby Park, despatched large quantities of steel bars to South Wales for the manufacture of corrugated iron for huts, and that Messrs. Summers and Son, of Hawarden Bridge, sent away enormous quantities of corrugated iron and other materials required by the armies in the Field. In addition to the locomotives supplied by the various British railway companies for use on the Continent, many were built by private firms, and a number of these were conveyed from Scotland, Newcastle, Dar- lington, or elsewhere via the Great Central and Banbury to the South Eastern and Chatham lines, for shipment from Richborough. Special trains with tanks from Leeds were also run vii Banbury to Richborough and Southampton for conveyance by the Charmel Ferry from those ports. ' Large quantities of Admiralty coal were carried on the Great Central, as many as nine special trains running from South Wales to Immingham on a single day. Altogether the number of special trains with Admiralty coal dealt with by the Great Central between the outbreak of war and March 31st, 1919, was no fewer than 1,930. Traffic to and from the port of Grimsby was less than in the pre-war days ; but this decrease did not reduce the difficulties to any great extent, as coal from the Yorkshire, Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire coalfields was diverted to Western ports for use by the liners and other vessels engaged on transport work. When the enemy submarines became more numerous and more active, the conveyance of coal by sea from Durham and Northumberland coalfields to London had to be abandoned. The traffic then went by rail, and a certain proportion of it was allocated to the Great Central for transit to gas-works and electric-lighting stations in London. The figures in respect to the tonnage of (i) goods and (2) coal arising or terminating on the Great Central, and excluding " through through " traffic (not arising or terminating on, though passing across, the Great Central system), for the years 1915-1918, are as follows : — Goods. Coal. Receipts Receipts Tons Received by Tons Received by Year. Carried. G. C. Rly. Carried. G. C. Rly. i £ 1915 8,705,412 1,888,171 20,256,540 1,941,350 1916 9,219,983 1,932.339 19,898,139 2,045,716 1917 9.069,432 1,812,579 20,368,070 2,105,743 1918 8,882,539 1,651,119 17,861,681 1,792,282 All these figures relate to traffic distinct from that which was carried on Government account. As in the case of other leading railway companies, the greatly increased volume of business was done with a depleted staff and a diminished rolling stock. GREAT CENTRAL RAILWAY. 871 Exceptional Traffic. Much of the traffic carried by the Great Central was of the dimensions known as " out of gauge," and special arrangements had to be made for its conveyance. For example, some case-mate plates made in the neighbourhood of Manchester for ships of the Queen Elizabeth type were so large as to be beyond the load gauge for railways, and it was decided, in the first instance, to carry them to their destinations in the north of England by road. Their weight, however, was so great that trouble arose at certain bridges on the journey, and the Chief Mechanical Engineer of the Great Central Railway was thereupon consulted. After careful consideration he undertook to convey the plates by rail, and this was successfully accomplished. The method adopted was to cut away the transverse girders from well wagons and affix a half-inch longitudinal floor plate to the underside of the main girders so as to carry the load within a very small distance of the under-structure gauge. Even then the height was so great that the overhead load gauge was somewhat exceeded. A number of loo-ton guns were also conveyed by the Great Central Railway, and this was accomplished by equipping two pairs of twinned 30-ton tender wagons, each member running on six wheels, with swivelling cradles and skids. With a gun of such size, the breach end of which is considerably heavier than the muzzle end, it was, of course, necessary to provide some means of distributing the weight evenly over the wheels of the wagons. This was accomplished by supporting the gun upon two swivelling skids set at suitable distances from the centre of gravity of the gun. Each of these two swivelling skids was in turn borne upon a separate cradle, the extremities of which were supported by a pivotal centre, and side bearings over the centre of each of four six-wheeled wagons. It was an indispensable condition that the weight borne by any axle should be acceptable for any railway company's lines. ' In other cases rolling-stock was reconstructed or was otherwise adapted to the serving of other purposes than those for which it had originally been intended. Fifty-five lo-ton covered goods vans, for instance, were utilised as gunpowder vans, and 150 others were converted into insulated vans for the conveyance of meat. Enlistments. The number of those in the company's service who joined H.M. Forces was equal to about 30 per cent, of the total pre-war staff. Railway Material Supplied. The engines and wagons sent to France by the British railway com- panies included eighteen 0-6-0 and fifteen 0-8-0 Great Central engines, together with six new engines built in the company's workshops at Gorton. The company assisted, also, in the provision of material for the repair of Belgian locomotives. 3M 872 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. The further fact should be placed on record that the Ministry of Munitions accepted a design prepared by the Chief Mechanical Engineer of the Great Central for a standard engine for use by that Department. The engine in question was very similar to the 2-8-0 Great Central type, and, like them, was fitted with the " Robinson " superheater and " Inten- sifore " lubricator. No fewer than 2,767 Great Central lo-ton wagons and 500 low-covered wagons were dispatched to France, while thirty-five brake vans were supplied for the use of the Forces in Egypt. Of the ambulance trains provided by the Great Central, two, each consisting of ten coaches, were ordered August 14th, 1914, and, fitted up complete, were supplied twelve days later, and another, also of ten coaches, was ordered in February, 1915, and supplied on the 23rd of the following month. An ambulance train of sixteen vehicles was constructed by the Great Central in April, 1918, for the use of the United States Army in France. Two leave and demobilization trains of ten coaches each were put into condition and loaned to the Government for use in France. Grimsby and Immingham. Apart from those aforesaid special advantages in the transport of naval and military traffic which were due to the geographical situation of the Great Central system, the Government gained benefits to an almost incalculable extent in the prosecution of the war by taking over the Great Central Railway Company's docks at Grimsby and Immingham, the former being converted into a base for the Royal Naval Reserve Trawler or Minesweeping Section, and the latter into a mining, submarine and torpedo-craft base. ., Grimsby, the premier fishing port in the world and an important centre for coal, timber and general shipping trade, was, in its modem size, shape and form, virtually the creation of the Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway Company, predecessors of the Great Central, which, in turn, created the new port of Immingham, situated on the Humber midway between Grimsby and Hull. The King's Dock there, opened by the King and Queen in 1912, offers shipping facilities on a scale and of a type not to be surpassed by any other port in the country so far as regards the special purposes it has been designed to offer. These facilities relate more especially to the desired conversion of Immingham into the recognised, as well as the geographical, port for the South York- shire, Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire coalfields. Hence it is that the equipment of the docks, organised on the most complete and up-to- date basis, has been directed to making every possible provision for the shipment of coal under the most efficient conditions. In effect, the Government acquired for the Admiralty a dock area of close upon 1,500 acres, Immingham itself contributing 1,000 acres towards this total. The aggregate water area available was, approxi- GREAT CENTRAL RAILWAY. 873 mately, 155 acres, namely, fifty-one at Immingham and 104 at Grimsby. The total quay space at the two docks was 44,800 lineal feet. Sheds and buildings allotted to Government Departments covered 4,800 square yards at Immingham and 7,000 square yards at Grimsby. At Imming- ham, also, a lock pit of 840 feet length and 90 feet width, with a depth of water of from 43 to 47 feet, allowed of the docking of large vessels at any state of the tide. The taking over of the company's docks involved considerable work in connection with the provision of sidings and the construction, repair and adjustment of bi^ldings, such as huts and shelters, many of the alterations being on an extensive scale Additional siding accommoda- tion was provided on the north side of the Alexandra Dock at Grimsby, where the Admiralty contractors erected a torpedo factory while 300 yards of new line were put down, also at Grimsby, in connection with the storage of hay. At Immingham the additional sidings were laid in small items for the different depots ; but the sum total thereof amounted to about 3,000 yards. Included therein were sidings laid from the dock estate to a Naval Air Station established at Killingholme and others communicating with the Kite Balloon Dep6t at East Halton. Owing both to the creation of these dep6ts and to the presence of such large numbers of troops and naval ratings, considerable alterations were necessary in the drainage and water service at Immingham. New drains and water mains were laid down, a new six-inch bore was sunk, and the pumping plant was considerably augmented. Additional pump- ing machinery had to be brought into use for working a number of hydrau- Uc hay presses provided by the Governraent. Extra berths for destroyers, necessitating further dredging and timbering, were provided in the Timber Pond at Immingham. Of the use made of Immingham, first by the military and afterwards by the naval authorities, various details have already been given in Chapter XL. ; but in addition thereto it may here be mentioned that the coaling facilities at Immingham were largely used by the Navy, especially during the early stages of the war. From 2,000 to 4,000 wagons of Welsh coal were generally kept on sidings in the dock area, ready for immediate shipment. As a further reserve, in case of emergency, a site was allocated at Immingham where supplies of Welsh coal could be stacked. As many as 35,000 tons were stored there at one time. The total quantity thus held in reserve at different periods amounted to 122,252 tons, of which nearly 108,000 tons were reloaded and shipped or otherwise disposed of. At Grimsby 7,775 tons were stacked under like- conditions. When, also, the demand for tonnage became acute and there was great need to save as many steamers as possible, the French Government arranged to send luggers in tow to England for the coal then being supplied to France, and Immingham and Grimsby were selected as the ports of shipment for this traffic. The number of vessels loaded and the tonnage of coal shipped, on Admiralty account, at each port, were as follows ;— 874 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Number of Vessels Tons of Coal Port. Loaded. Shipped. Immingham ..... 7,778 1,684,146 Grimsby ..... 5.614 429,398 Total on Admiralty account . 13,392 2,113,544 When much delay and congestion arose at other ports in the early part of 1917, owing to the dispatch from them of wagons and other railway material, urgently wanted in France, the Great Central undertook to relieve the situation by sending a quantity of this material from Immingham and Grimsby. This the company did until the following August, when the need for adopting shorter sea passages led to the traffic being transferred to the Thames. During the six months which had then elapsed the company shipped 70,515 tons of the traffic from Imming- ham and 9,834 tons from Grimsby. The steamers received excellent dispatch from each port. The s.s. Ardoyne, for instance, loaded 6,707 tons of sleepers and rails in seventy-eight working hours, and the s.s. Wabana loaded 129 railway wagons and 1,411 tons of other traffic in thirty-four working hours. There was, also, a temporary storage of 30,600 tons at Immingham and 4,000 tons at Grimsby. In this way, in addition to the wagons shipped direct to France, Immingham was used for the accommodation of large numbers which were re-forwarded to other ports, as required, for shipment. A beginning was made with the erection of hydraulic hay presses at Grimsby in June, 1918. By the time the Armistice was signed twenty had been completed and were at work. During this period of five months 29,238 tons were pressed, while the total shipments of hay and straw from the two ports amounted to 145,615 tons, namely — ^Immingham, 46,467 tons, and Grimsby, 98,968 tons. Steamships. The Marine Department of the Great Central Railway rendered excellent service to the Government during the war. In 1914 the company carried on their Continental trade with a fleet of fifteen passenger and cargo steamers, namely — City of Leeds, City of Bradford, Bury, Dewsbury, Stockport, Accrington, Marylehone, Immingham, Wrexham, Staveley, Notts, Leicester, Lutterworth, Chesterfield, and Maccles- field. The City of Leeds, City of Bradford and the Bury were at Hamburg when war broke out, and were seized by the Germans. With the excep- tion of the stewardesses, the crews (eighty-nine in all) were interned at Ruhleben, and none, apart from several men invalided home, were repatriated before the signing of the Armistice. The captain, the chief engineer and, also, an assistant steward of the Bury died during intern- ment. All three vessels were released on the signing of the Armistice and were delivered up on the Tyne by the enemy. The remaining twelve passenger steamers of the company's fleet were all requisitioned by the Government, and practically the whole of them GREAT CENTRAL RAILWAY. 875 were used as store or munition carriers suppljdng H.M. S'hips at Scapa Flow or in the Mediterranean, as well as for transporting supplies to France. Particularly good service was rendered by the vessels of the Stockport and Lutterworth type. Being of comparatively high speed, quickly responsive to the helm, and equipped with gear of the most modern construction (allowing for exceptionally rapid loading and discharge) they were naturally preferred by the naval authorities to the ordinary slow cargo vessels upon which reliance might otherwise have had to be placed. The Wrexham (formerly Nord II) had been built for foreign owners engaged in the ice trade, and, in view of her intended employment in northern latitudes, she had been constructed on hnes designed to give her abnormal strength and power of resistance to ice pressure. On account of these qualities she was selected by the Admiralty for service in the White Sea. Being, however, in the opinion of the naval authorities, not yet sufficiently strong for the purpose, she was, in October, 1916, fitted at Birkenhead with bow sheathing as a further protection against ice. She left Hull in November, 1917, for Murmansk. Arrived in the White Sea, she had a series of trying experiences there,- mainly on account of the heavy ice floes. These were eventually so strong that all the bow sheathing fixed by the Admiralty, under the conditions stated, though (as he afterwards stated) never approved of by the captain, was torn off, water thereupon entering through the holes caused by the dislodged rivets. The captain proceeded to bring his ship closer to shore, to avoid the ice drift ; but the vessel struck a submerged, uncharted rock and was wrecked (June 19th, 1918). Three other vessels of the Great Central Fleet which were lost whilst on Admiralty service were — the Leicester, mined in the Channel, February 12th, 1916 ; the Chesterfield, mined in the Mediterranean, May 18th, 1918, and the Immingham, sunk by collision in Lemnos Bay, June 12th, 1918. These disasters involved the loss of twenty-two lives, namely, one officer, two engineers, fifteen seamen, two naval ratings, and two passengers. The small craft owned by the company also contributed considerably to the national effort. The ferry steamers Killingholme, Brocklesby and Cleethorpes were requisitioned as seaplane carriers. The steam-tender Marple was employed at Boston in connection with the repatriation of prisoners. A large number of small tugs and waterboats were either employed continuously on Admiralty work or were kept available at call. Special mention should be made of the Immingham tugs. Central No. I and Central No. 2. The principal towage assistance required by Admiralty vessels when entering or leaving Immingham Dock was rendered by these tugs, as, also, were the towages within the dock itself. In addition to this the same tugs took duty every night, near Spurn Point, for a period of two years, in order both to deal with any vessels that might be in want of urgent assistance and to light buoys in the river, should any of H.M. ships require to pass. The absence of all the usual aids to navigation led to this work having to be carried out under most difficult and exceptionally trying circumstances. 876 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Warehouses. In addition to the lines, the docks and the vessels taken over by the Government, the Great Central Goods Warehouse at Marylebone was utilised by the Royal Army Clothing Department as a store, four of the floors being placed at their disposal. The number of workpeople em- ployed in the warehouse to carry on the work of the Department was over 1,000. This figure is suggestive alike of the extent of the accommo- dation afforded and of the magnitude of the operations conducted. The latter will be still better realised if it is added that down to the end of May, 1919, there had been passed through the building, on account of the Department, 60,000,000 pairs of boots and 36,684,000 articles of clothing. About 25 per cent, of these totals were received, and about 30 per cent, were dispatched, by rail. A considerable portion of the goods yard at Leicester was used for dismantling " tanks," etc., returned from overseas, and at various periods accommodation for the storage of foodstuffs, etc., was given in the ware- houses at Wakefield, Lincoln, Sheffield and Manchester. War Manufactures. Valuable assistance was given by the company in the manufacture of munitions of war. For this purpose 452 women and girls were employed, the work on which they were engaged including the turning of shells, nose-pieces and base-plates, screwing and milling operations, painting and labouring. The items produced included the following : — Articles Constructed, Etc. Articles Constructed, Etc. Number. Number. General Service carts. 330 Cases for packing fuses . . 76,300 Field water-carts .... 30 High explosive bombs . . 2,608 Gun carriage for 8" Howitzer 10 Incendiary bombs 1,008 Gun travelling carriage 6" gun 10 Air reservoirs 757 Trunnion brackets for 4" guns 88 Ambulance stretchers 2,150 Trunnion brackets for 4-5 Howit- Water lever indicator plates . 9,500 zers (forged and machined) 75 Bullet-proof shield plates 3" H.A. gun pedestals (machined (priessed and formed) . 5,808 and finished) .... 178 Picketing posts .... 2,000 Rocking arms (machined) . 399 Picketing pegs .... 20,000 Block couplings (forged and Top carriage for 4-5 Howitzer 125 machined) 307 Set of steel forgings for gas Director gear training racks generators (60 pieces) . . I (machined) 198 Range dial cases for 4" guns Nose-caps for rifles . . . 5,136 (machined) 133 Breech-bolts for rifles . . 5,647 Striking forks 7.736 Rifle bodies 5,754 Lugs for 65 lb. bombs . . 1,000 6'' High explosive shells 76,909 Lugs for 100 lb. bombs . . 1,000 6" Cast-iron practice shot. . 6,000 Clutch couplings .... 710 12'^ Cast-iron practice shot Primers (repaired and (cast, machined and painted) 800 machined) .... . 28,315 14" Cast-iron practice shot . 388 Sets motor-lorry mountings 73 Nose-end forging 6" H.E. shell 107,018 Steel cutters 75 Base-plate for 6" H.E. sheU . 76,909 13-pdr. gun pedestals . . 85 i8-pdr. cartridge cases Stampings for i8-pdr. field renovated 5.512,745 pieces 600 GREAT CENTRAL RAILWAY. 877 Enlistments, Decorations and Casualties. The number of Great Central men who joined the Colours was 10,190. These included representatives of all the different departments, including that of the General Manager, and they were engaged in every branch of his Majesty's service, filling positions from Priva,te to Lieut. -Colonel. Many of the company's servants were also employed in the Railway Operating, the Railway Transport and the Construction Divisions. The casualties and the respective percentages thereof to the total number of members of the staff who joined the Colours were : — Number. Per Cent. Killed 1,231 i2-o8 Missing 9l , ^.^^ Prisoners ........ 3 J Prisoners repatriated ...... 254 2-49 Wounded . . . . . . . .2,116 2076 3.613 35-45 Women and Girls Employed. In place of those members of the company's male staff who joined H.M. Forces, women and girls were employed to the number of 5,684. Of this total 2,206 rendered good service as shorthand typists, abstractors and telephone operators. The remaining 3,478, engaged for outdoor work, filled in a satisfactory manner such posts as those of porters, messen- gers, weighbridge women, crane-drivers, sack-repairers, number-takers, checkers, loaders, callers-off, time-keepers, ticket-collectors, left-luggage porters, train-recorders, gatewomen, carriage cleaners, lamp attendants, parcels porters, van drivers, signal-women, points-women, coal recorders, goods checkers, goods porters, lorry drivers, car conductors, stewards, etc. Allotments. Recognising the importance of ensuring the production at home of all possible food supplies, the company, in August, 1914, issued a circular to their staff inviting them to take up any ground alongside the line that might be suitable for cultivation. As the result of this policy, the number of allotments on the company's property increased from 2,048 to 4,054, the area eventually devoted to this purpose being equal to an aggregate of over 320 acres. CHAPTER LXI. THE GREAT EASTERN RAILWAY. With the expectation that, on our going to war with Germany, the enemy would inevitably seek to effect a landing on our shores, the Great Eastern Railway assumed a position of exceptional importance from the point of view of national defence. Extending from the Wash to the estuary of the Thames, the district served by the Great Eastern Railway Company is readily accessible from the North Sea, and it constitutes, as it were, the " direct route " for any possible invaders from Northern Europe having the capture of London as their immediate objective. East Anglia occupies, in fact, a peculiarly vulnerable position, and whilst other British railway companies were specially concerned in the transport of troops and supplies overseas, the Great Eastern, in addition to sharing in the war tasks of British railways in general, had to be organised on a strategical basis lest any attempted invasion by the enemy should lead to the Eastern Counties becoming a Home Front on which a des- perate conflict might have to be fought for the defence of our national liberties. FoRthese reasons more had to be done, perhaps, on the Great Eastern system than on any other of the British railways to adapt its lines and transport facilities to war-time conditions. There were, however, still other considerations which arose. The Great Eastern Railway, as it exists to-day, is an amalgamation of many small Unes ; and not only are a number of these once-separate entities still known in railway circles by their original names, but they stiU have only single-track lines, as in the days of their independent existence, and they still offer practically the same station accommodation and the same traffic facilities generally as they did in the days before they became part and parcel of the. Great Eastern Railway. They serve what are mainly agricultural districts, and, under normal conditions, they meet the requirements of those . districts ; but in time of war much more was required of them, while under the emergency conditions of threatened or of actual invasion they would have been required to deal with all the troop and other military traffic they could possibly convey. There was, indeed, the possibility of this military traffic being poured into the Eastern Counties in almost overwhelming volume by means of the numerous connections between the Great Eastern and other rail- ways. Those connections include the following in the London area : Vid the East London Railway (of which the Great Eastern is one of the 878 THE GREAT EASTERN RAILWAY. 879 lessees), withtlie South Eastern and Chatham and the London, Brighton and South Coast, at New Cross ; via the Tottenham and Hampstead Junction Joint Railway (Great Eastern and Midland), with the Midland near Kentish Town and the London and North Western, at Gospel Oak ; and vik Victoria Park Station, with the North London Railway, and, beyond the North London, with the London and North Western, the Great Western and the London and South Western, as well as with the London, Brighton and South Coast Railway and the South Eastern and Chatham via Addison Road, Kensington. At Cambridge the Great Eastern connects wtih the London and North Western branch line to Bletchley and Oxford, and with the Great Northern Railway to Hitchin and London. Connection with the Great Northern system is also available at Hertford. Huntingdon is a meeting point between the Great Eastern, the Midland, and the Great Northern Rail- ways. At Peterborough the Great Eastern once more meets the London and North Western, the Midland, the Great Northern, and the Midland and Great Northern Joint Committee's Unes. From March Junction the Great Eastern trains go over the Great Northern and Great Eastern Joint Railway to Lincoln and Doncaster. At Lincoln the Great Eastern joins the Great Central line, whilst from Doncaster the Great Eastern Company have running arrangements over the North Eastern line to York, and gain direct access to the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway. By one or other of these various routes, emergency, military or muni- tions trafi&c could be sent into the Eastern Counties from any and every part of the Kingdom, with the result that the capacity of the Great Eastern system for dealing with it might well be severely taxed. New Works. Hence it was, also, that, on the outbreak of war, many works of an important character — and especially works permitting of a concentration of troops at any point where the necessity might arise — had to be carried out on the Great Eastern system. While the doubling of the single- track lines was then hardly practicable, much was done in other direc- tions. Platforms at particular stations were lengthened, and ramps and stagings were constructed at important junctions or elsewhere to allow of troops, horses, guns and vehicles being dealt with more rapidly.^ Extra lighting facihties were installed and water-supply arrangements were made in the interests alike of men and of horses. Additional signal cabins, emergency detraining and entraining docks and special cross-over roads were constructed ; approaches to stations and goods yards were carefully surveyed ; fences and other obstructions which might impede the progress of troops or the handling of military equipment were removed ; bridges were strengthened ; new junctions with other railways were laid in at different parts of the system in order to facihtate the exchange of military traffic and avoid any undue congestion at the i^ee illustrations facing p. 78. 88o BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. principal points of transfer, and obstructions which might interfere with the passing on to the Great Eastern of rolling stock from other companies' lines were cleared away. The need for many of these new works as part of the scheme of national defence in the event of an emergency arising at some future date had long been recognised ; and, although the necessity for them had not arisen in the working of the ordinary traffic, the outbreak of war found the Great Eastern Railway Company well prepared to fulfil all require- ments in respect to the adaptation of their lines to war conditions on the basis, more or less, of plans previously discussed with the military authori- ties under the conditions stated. A typical example of what could be done was afforded at one railway station where a lengthening of the platforms, to facilitate an emergency movement of troops, became, on' the outbreak of hostilities, a matter of urgent importance. The War Office, in asking that the work should be put in hand at once, gave the company a time-limit of forty-eight hours in which to complete it. In anticipation of the request made to them, the company had already collected all the necessary materials at the station in question. In- structions were telephoned to the Engineer, a staff was set on, and the work was completed within twenty hours. To meet the requirements of munition workers in the Lpa Valley, a branch Une near Edmonton which had been closed for some time was reopened for the purpose of providing a shuttle service of trains between Cheshunt and Edmonton, connecting at the latter station with trains to and from Enfield, Hackney and London. One section of this double- track Une was also utiUsed for the " stabUng " of mineral and other wagons in order to relieve the sidings and goods yard on the adjoining main Une then deaUng with important Government traffic. At Carterhatch Lane, on this Cheshunt and Edmonton line, a halt was constructed for the convenience of munition workers traveUing between that point and munition factories in the Lea Valley. Between Beckton and Woolwich facilities were provided for the conveyance across the Thames of workers at the Royal Arsenal who lived on the North side of the river. A large number of sidings and other traffic conveniences were arranged in connection with munition factories, Government stores, aerodromes, military camps, etc. In addition to the works actually carried out, there were scheduled for immediate execution in the event of an emergency occurring a large number of others, including the demoUtion of portions of station buildings, etc., in order to faciUtate the movement of military traffic. Preparations for- Eventualities. Then, apart from structural alterations made or provided for, much was done in the organisation of the traffic for actual or possible military needs. The distribution, for example, from agreed centres of food-stuffs, munitions and other suppUes to armies in the Eastern Counties " Field " THE GREAT EASTERN RAILWAY. 88i was carefully planned, and sidings were allocated to such traffic whenever the need for them might arise. Trains specially made up for the conveyance of all classes of military units — artillery^ infantry and cavalry — were available night and day at several points on the line. There was, also, held at the disposal of the Field-Marshal -Commanding-in-Chief a train equipped with every con- venience, including travelling telephone and telegraphic facilities, for the use of the Headquarters Staff in the Field. The possible utilisation of certain main lines as reception or storage roads in a sudden emergency was anticipated, and due provision was made for safeguarding the traffic under such a system of working. Military Traffic. All the emergency schemes drawn up by the railway and the miUtary authorities in combination contemplated, among other things, the need arising for a concentration under the most rapid conditions of troops from any part of Great Britain to any possible point in the Eastern Counties. Alternatively there were schemes for the conveyance at the shortest notice of troops from the Eastern Counties to any other part of the English or Scottish coasts where a real attempt at invasion — follow- ing, perhaps, on a feint elsewhere — might be made by the enemy. In the Eastern Counties there were set up no fewer than forty-four mihtary camps, so that although the emergency provided for with such foresight and elaboration did not actually occur, the Great Eastern stUl had to deal with a considerable volume of military traffic. Between August, 1914, and March, 1919, nearly 13,000 special trains were run on the Great Eastern system for the conveyance of troops. In these special trains there was carried a sum total of 6,231,293 officers and men, 233,477 horses, 40,372 vehicles (including guns), 42,466 cycles and 40,000 tons of baggage. Of troops carried free in ordinary trains during the same period there were 4,234,236, increasing the total to 10,465,529 ; though even this figure was exclusive of, in the aggregate, a further substantial number who travelled at reduced rates by ordinary trains when on furlough. During the demobilisation period the company conveyed each day considerable numbers of men to the various dispersal camps as well as from those camps to their homes. This work involved a great deal of inter-communication and inter-working with other companies. The number of men so dealt with by the Great Eastern between January ist and April 30th, 1919, was about 100,000. For other Government traffic of aU descriptions, and largely consist- ing of baggage, horses, meat, stores, ammunition, etc., the company ran about 11,000 special trains. In addition to this they conveyed many, thousands of consignments of war traffic by ordinary goods train service ; though these consignments still had to be specially watched and expedited to ensure speedy transit. 882 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. The Eastern Counties were, however, much more than a possible battle-ground for the repulse of an invader. They became, also, an important centre for the production of war material for use either at home or overseas. War-time Industries. The ordinary conception of the district served by the Great Eastern Railway Company as — apart from the London suburban area and the coastal towns — mainly an agricultural one had to be very considerably modified under the conditions brought about by the war. Agriculture was in no way neglected, and, with the shortage at one time in our food supplies, it became more important in this respect than ever before ; but the Eastern Counties underwent, all the same, what was really a great industrial transformation in the development there of a wide range of war industries which added very considerably to the provision of military supplies — and, also, to the traffic that had to pass on the Great Eastern system. Before the war came to an end there were on that system, including the London area, approximately 200 works engaged in the production of munitions. Of factories opened or extended during the war there were forty-five. Government factories numbered sixteen, and Government depots nine. Sixteen shipbuilding yards were opened or extended, and thirty-one aeroplane depots and aerodromes were con- structed. Many existing industrial establishments gave up their pre-war business, for the time being, and devoted themselves to the production of war material. Typical of what went on in this respect was the case of a certain pianoforte factory in the suburbs of London. Converted into an aeroplane works, it soon became equal to an output of sixty machines per week. In numerous instances special siding accommodation had to be provided either for new or for extended establishments in order to facilitate the raU transport of raw materials and manufactured goods. Deahng first with Great Eastern traffic in the London area, the fact may be mentioned that at Angel Road, between Tottenham and Ponders End, the Government erected a factory where they employed about 4,000 hands on the production of rifle cartridges for the Russian Govern- ment. The premises were afterwards taken over by the Royal Air Force, and they were subsequently acquired by the Straker Squire Motor Car Company. At Angel Road, also, Messrs. Eley Brothers, Ltd., who were engaged in the manufacture of rifle cartridges, the filling of bombs, etc., arranged for a considerable extension of their factory, and they increased their traffic on the Great Eastern by about 600 per cent. Still another war-time development at Angel Road was the building by Messrs. Trollope and Colls, Ltd. , of a new factory, under the control of the Admir- alty, for the manufacture of sea-mines, of which about fifty were sent away by raU daily. At Brimsdown the number of loaded wagons dis- patched from the Royal Small Arms Factory during 1916 was 18,600. The corresponding number dealt with at the Great Eastern Ponders End THE GREAT EASTERN RAILWAY. 883 Station for the Ponders End Shell Works was 13,000. At Abbey Mills, Canning Town, there was a large Government stores and dep6t which received from or forwarded by the Great Eastern 20,000 loaded wagons during 1918. In each of the foregoing instances special siding accommo- dation was arranged to faciUtate the traffic. Messrs. BuUivant and Co., of Mark Lane, E.C., and MiUwaU, Poplar, K, were largely responsible for the defence-nets used against enemy submarines, and practically the whole of the 6,500 miles of wire rope supphed by them for that purpose, and coming from Middlesbrough and elsewhere, passed over the Great Eastern system. A large traffic in munitions and general stores was dealt with through the Royal Albert and Victoria Docks and the South West India Docks on account of the British, French, Italian and United States Governments. Turning now to the Eastern Counties in general, one finds evidence of great activity there in the production of war supplies. At Ipswich most of the leading firms were engaged in the manufacture of munitions. Messrs. Ransomes, Sims and Jefferies, Ltd., turned out about 3,000,000 shells and fuse components ; 1,000,000 shrapnel shell case forgings ; 5,000 general service and limbered wagons, a number of aeroplanes, and many other articles. Their first aeroplane was the one employed in the destruction of the Zeppelin brought down in Suffolk on June 17th, 1917. The CrittaU Manufacturing Company, Ltd., made considerable exten- sions to their works at Braintree to allow of their producing munitions on a large scale. They also secured special siding accommodation. Their output included 1,000,000 i8-pdr. shells ; 10,000,000 fuses ; 30,000 Lewis gun boxes ; many thousands of steel windows, and other articles in steel or metal. Shells and fuses made by the various munition firms in the East AngUan area were sent in the first instance to the headquarters, at Ips- wich, of the East Anglian Munitions Committee. The main function of this body was, on receiving the munitions, to inspect, paint, and varnish them, and then send them to the various munition depots and filling factories. It is understood that the number of shells and fuses which, produced in the said area, thus passed through the hands of the committee during the war period was over 10,000,000. Much more was done at Ipswich in the production of war material than was represented by the munitions already mentioned. Messrs. Vickers, Ltd., took over the Diesel Engineering Works in 1915 and engaged in the manufacture there of submarine engines, bedplates and a variety of other articles ; Messrs. Reavell and Company did special work for the Admiralty in connection with repairs to submarines ; Messrs. Ransomes and Rapier made a large number of powerful travelling cranes for use in France and elsewhere, and Messrs. Tibbenham, Ltd., made about 18,000 aeroplane propellers. Large numbers of aeroplanes and seaplanes were constructed at Norwich by Messrs. Boulton and Paul, Ltd. On the advent of peace the 884 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. firm turned their attention to the building of portable houses for the devastated regions of Belgium and Northern France. The Government had an Aircraft Acceptance Park at Norwich where machines were received from manufacturing firms, tested, and then dispatched either by air or by rail — mainly the former. At Lowestoft, Messrs. Colby Bros., Messrs. Chambers and Co. and Messrs. Brooke and Co. extended their works for the construction and repair of drifters, motor boats, tugs and other vessels for the Admiralty. Messrs. Jewson and Sons, of Yarmouth, specialised in army hutments, of which they consigned somewhere about i,ooo tons. Other firms in the Eastern Counties made camp furniture, tent poles, or scientific instruments. At Leiston, Suffolk, Messrs. Garrett and Sons, Ltd., were actively employed in the making of (among other things) steam tractors, shells and Government wagons. Norwich produced boots and shoes in large quantities, 120,000 pairs of boots for British and Russian troops, together with 50,000 pairs of canvas rest and hospital shoes, being supplied by Messrs. Holdenstein and Sons, while 523,000 pairs of boots and shoes for the British Forces came from the factories of Messrs. Howlett and White. At Godman- chester there was an Army Clothing Reception Depot where clothing, boots and other necessaries for the troops were checked, sorted, repaired and reissued. As many as 1,250,000 pairs of army boots are known to have been received at the depot at one time. Much of this traffic was dealt with by the Great Eastern. No fewer than 3,000,000 brushes for the use of British and Belgian troops were dispatched from Wymond- ham, Norfolk, by Messrs. S. D. Page and Sons. East Anglia's contribution to food suppUes for the Forces on the various Fronts included rations, in tins, furnished by Messrs. Machonochie Bros., Ltd., Lowestoft, to the extent of 40,000 tons per annum ; 20,000 tons per annum of rations, in tins, from Messrs. Morton, Ltd., also of Lowestoft, and some thousands of tons of preserves made by Messrs. Chi vers and Sons, Ltd., of Histon, Cambridgeshire. Large quantities of chocolate, cider and lime juice were sent from Norwich by Messrs. A. J. Caley and Sons. At Wisbech, Messrs. KeiUers, by arrangement with the Ministry of Food, erected a new pulping factory, and Messrs. Liptons converted an old flour miU into another pulping factory. Owing to the stoppage of importations of sand from abroad, there was a" great demand for home suppHes, and the consignments thereof sent from Middleton, Norfolk, by Messrs. J. Boam, Ltd., showed an increase of 1,330 truck-loads per annum over the firm's pre-war figures. Two gravel and stone pits at Homersfield, Suffolk, containing material specially suited for making the concrete then so much wanted, were opened in 1916. They led to a further increase of traffic on the Great Eastern to the extent of 35,000 tons per annum. Many acres of timber in the Eastern Counties were cut down for conversion into sleepers, pitwood, planks, etc., saw-mills being erected THE GREAT EASTERN RAILWAY. 885 for the purpose. For the South Yorkshire Pitwood Association special sidings, three miles in length, were constructed at Thetford, Norfolk. The amount of pitwood forwarded from them amounted to, approxi- mately, 28,000 tons. Reeds for paper-making were loaded in the neighbourhood of the Broads. Camps, Dep6ts, Aerodromes, etc. The forty-four miliiary camps set up on the Great Eastern system involved, in -the aggregate, an enormous amount of extra traffic for the. railway alike in the transport of materials for the construction and fur- nishing of the camps, the constant passing of troops to and fro and the keeping up of food and other supplies. The estimated number of troops dealt with at one large hutment camp erected in 1915 and 1916 two miles from the Great Eastern station at Thetford, Norfolk, was 500,000. Government depots and dumps were also accoimtable for some substantial traffic items. The Sugar Beet Company's premises at Cant- ley, Norfolk, were taken over by the military authorities and used for the storage of, altogether, 3,300 tons of hay, straw, etc., conveyed there by rail. At a hay dump near to Roudham Junction, Norfolk, 5,000 tons of Government hay wdre stacked in 1917. Eight brickyards at Peter- borough were occupied by the Government for the storage of munitions, hay and straw. During the war the Government took over a large plot of vacant land in the London area and turned it into a " dump " for military stores. Some miles of sidings were laid down in order to connect the " dump " with the Great Eastern system, and a vast amount of traffic, extending over a considerable period and involving a considerable amoimt of special working, was dealt with by the company. Much traffic devolved, directly or indirectly, upon the Great Eastern as the result of the thirty-one aerodromes and aeroplane depots set up on their system. For the construction of the aerodrome at Docking, Norfolk, they carried 20,000 tons of materials ; for the one at Harling, Norfolk, they handled 36,000 tons, and for the two opened at Narborough, Norfolk, in 1916, they had similar traffic to the extent of 40,000 tons. The aerodrome erected at Thetford, Norfolk, during 1915 and 1916 covered 300 acres and accommodated three squadrons. The one at Lakenheath, Suffolk, was connected with the Great Eastern station there by a narrow-gauge railway. The Royal Air Force depot at Ely was provided with a special siding. An old flax factory at Pinchbeck, Lincolnshire, which had been closed for forty years, was taken over by the Board of Agriculture for the de-seeding of flax, the seed and the straw being sent to Peterborough. Practical encouragement was thus given to the production of flax, and the area under cultivation in the district increased to 2,000 acres. 886 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Special Traffics. i A considerable amount of rolling stock was adapted for various classes of military traffic at what was often very short notice. The bolsters and end raves of a number of trucks usually employed for the conveyance of timbers were, for instance, removed in order to admit of the use of the vehicles for the transport of motor chassis for Government purposes. Some six-wheeled vans, employed in the ordinary course for miscellaneous traffic, were adapted for aeroplane traffic by the provision of doors at each end, allowing of the convenient loading of the vans from end-on docks. To reduce the time necessary for loading and unloading guns, limbers, general service wagons, etc., on open trucks, a large num- ber x)f low-sided goods wagons were fitted with ratchet and chain binders — an arrangement which, by avoiding the necessity for securing vehicles with ropes, etc., faciUtated very materially the process of dealing with heavy military transport wagons and effected a considerable economy in the use of ropes and scotches. In the early part of 1918 the Admiralty took over a certain plot of land in the vicinity of London which belonged to the Great Eastern Railway Company and erected on it some premises for the production of mine sinkers to be sent to a Government factory in the North of England for filling. Some adjoining sidings were extended in order to deal with the traffic. The output was considerable, and at the request of the Ministry of Munitions a scheduled service of trains was put on for its conveyance. Steam bakeries were erected in the railway station yards at Norwich and Colchester for the supply of bread to the troops in camps over large areas. The bread was to be conveyed to destination — or as near thereto as it could be taken — by train, and the need arose for specially-ventilated vans in order to avoid the risk of heating and deterioration. The railway company attained this result by fitting up with shelves, etc., a number of ventilated vehicles previously used by them for the fruit traffic. In September, 1917, the War Office opened an abattoir at Colchester for the supply of fresh meat to the troops, and in November of the same year another abattoir was opened at Ipswich. As prompt transit was essential, the company ran scheduled services of trains in each instance for the conveyance of the meat. A large traffic in food supplies and canteen stores for troops at home or overseas passed regularly over the Great Eastern system to and from the London Docks, once more involving a good deal of special working. The docks at King's Lynn dealt with 300,000 tons of timber, 30,000 tons of Ministry of Food potatoes, large quantities of hay, and various other coihmodities. A very large traffic in acids and other materials required for the manufacture of munitions and conveyed in tank wagons passed over the Great Eastern lines throughout the war period. Such was the importance attached to this traffic that a special pamphlet in reference THE GREAT EASTERN RAILWAY. 887 to it was issued for the instruction and guidance of the railway staff concerned. Perhaps the most interesting of all among the special traffics handled on the Great Eastern system was that connected with the transport of " Tanks." It was in June, 1916, that the War Office adopted the district around Barnham, Suffolk, as a trial ground for a new instrument of warfare concerning which, in the initial stages of its introduction, the utmost secrecy had to be observed by every one concerned, the identity of this instrument being carefully concealed under its mystery-name of " Tank." The same district also became a training ground for a new branch of the Army to be called the " Tank Corps." The Great Eastern Railway Company came into the story when a siding connection between their lines and the trial ground was laid down, supplemented by the con- struction of a special dock where the new traffic was to be dealt with. These preparations completed, the unwieldy monsters, as they then appeared, began to arrive in specially-constructed vehicles, their trans- port over the railways being attended by exceptional precautions and regulations as to speed limits on certain sections of line. A number of special trains loaded with " Tanks " which had undergone their trial were made up at Barnham for the various ports of embarkation. Traffic Organisation. As in the case of the other principal hues, and in order to meet the requirements of the military authorities, the Great Eastern Railway Company appointed from its staff a Military Section, some members of which were to be in attendance at the General Offices day and night, week-days and Sundays, for the duration of the war, in order to receive and act upon, with the utmost possible dispatch, any orders or instruc- tions coming to hand from the Railway Executive Committee or from the military authorities with whom, as well as with aU the other companies who might be concerned in any desired movement of troops, or otherwise, they were in direct telephonic communication. The experience of the Great Eastern Mihtary Section was that in many cases whole brigades and divisions would be moved at a few hours' notice, and that the arrange- ments for working a large number of trains over the lines of various companies, involving much complicated organisation of the traffic, might have to be made during the night and often with depleted staffs. Inasmuch, also, as the Great Eastern Company were specially concerned in movements for home-defence purposes, arrangements had to be made at Liverpool Street, not alone for the drawing up either of revised or of entirely new sta£E-time-tables in respect to troop-train specials, but for printing them, in addition, with the least possible delay. Fortunately the company were in an especially favourable position in the latter respect since they have a printing works of their own at Stratford Mar- ket ; but so heavy and so urgent were the, demands made upon the 3N BRITISH RAILWAYS AND TH^ GI^EAT WAR. printing staff, more especially in respect to the said time-tables, that for the first six weeks of the war the printing works were kept open night and day, while they were frequently open on Saturday afternoons and Sundays down to the time the Armistice was signed. Early in the war the company organised a highly-trained staff of men having experience in handUng the various classes of military transports, and this band of workers constituted a traveUing staff, visiting all parts of the system as might be required in connection with the entraining or the detraining of miHtary traffic. Many of them, during aircraft raids, had to carry on their work under enemy fire ; but this they did without any mishap occurring.' On the occasion of all large movements of troops, break-down trains fitted with the needful appliances for the removal of obstructions on the line or for deaHng with any accident that might occur were stationed at suitable intervals throughout the system. Carbic or other flare lamps were provided at places where neither gas nor electric light was available. Signal-fitters furnished with point clips and other apparatus, and gangs of platelayers ready for anything in which they might be of use, went on special duty. Railway police ensured the privacy of the stations, as might be desired, and members of the Great Eastern staff who had qualified in ambulance work were in attendance, with their necessary equipment, at all entraining or detraining stations when bodies of troops were either leaving or arriving. These ambulance men were relieved from the performance of ordinary railway duties on all such occasions in order that they should be ready at a moment's notice to render any first-aid that might be needed. Their valuable assistance in connection with the minor accidents inevitable in dealing with horses, guns and heavy transport traf&c probably averted many serious consequences. As additional evidence of the care and foresight exercised in connec- tion with the conveyance of military traffic, the fact may be mentioned that there were issued to the staff detailed instructions dealing with every conceivable phase of emergency likely to be experienced, with every precaution to be taken, and with every provision to be made. Men were to be retained on duty to take the place of any who might be incapacitated. Spare hand-lamps, properly cleaned and trimmed, additional sheets, ropes, scotches, nails, hammers and other appliances, were to be provided and kept constantly available at all centres likely to be called on at short notice to deal with mihtary traffic. Trains which would arrive at stations after dark were to be lit up before they started. The edges of platforms, docks, ramps, etc., used for entraining or detrain- ing mihtary traffic were to be whitened with lime as a guide to the staff working after dusk. Corners of buildings, point handles and other obstructions in shunting yards and at stations were to be similarly whitened to assist men engaged in shunting and other work. The District Officers were authorised, if necessary, to suspend under proper regulation the ordinary block telegraph working. In order to avoid delay to urgent Government consignments, station-masters and agents THE GREAT EASTERN RAILWAY. 889 were advised in detail as to the order of priority of naval and military traffic according to the special labels and certificates provided for different degrees of urgency. Railway officials at large stations and junctions were to see that horses were watered at the required intervals, that the floors of wagons used for horses were sprinkled with sand or ashes in order to facihtate loading or unloading and to keep the animals from slipping, and that all horse-boxes or other vehicles utihsed for the con- veyance of military horses were thoroughly cleansed and disinfected immediately after use. Special instructions were issued as to the regu- lations applying to the transport of explosives by rail. The necessity for close co-operation between military patrols and the rsiilway staff was not overlooked, detailed instructions on this head being clearly laid down for the information and guidance of the staff, especially drivers, firemen, guards and signalmen. StiU other instructions dealt with the importance of bringing trains to a stand clear of runaway catch points. The staff were also instructed not to allow trains to foul pubhc roads at level crossings which might be required for the passage of troops. Much that has here been told as to these instructions to the Great Eastern staff would equally apply to the action taken by other railway companies in the same direction ; yet the facts mentioned should be placed on record if only because they serve to shoy still more clearly how it was that so huge a volume of military traffic was conveyed on British railways in general with such almost complete absence of delays, complications or accidents. Electrical Engineering Work. A considerable amount of war-service work was done by the depart- ment of the Electrical Engineer, and, although most of it formed part of or was an adjunct to works carried out by other departments, a few items might be mentioned by way of indicating still further the extent and the varied nature of the company's activities in the interests of the national cause. Thus, among other things provided, were block, tele- graph, telephone and other electrical apparatus at temporary signal- boxes which would have been brought into use in the event of a national emergency ; telephones at various points so that, on an emergency arising, a complete system of telephones would be available for use for traffic or War Office purposes at practically every part of the systein, and other telephones for the use of troops engaged in guarding a number of vulner- able places on lines or branches specially important from a military point of view. There was, also, provision or improvement of electric lighting at stations, yards, etc., in connection with war traffic, and many altera- tions had to be made to poles, wires, cables, etc., in the laying out of new sidings and the 'execution of other engineering work. On the initiative of the military authorities, a complete scheme was drawn up whereby the Electrical Engineer and a considerable portion of his staff would, in the event of an invasion, have been attached to certain 890 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Army Commands for the purpose of destroying or re-arranging telegraph or telephone facilities along the East Coast so far as the adoption of such a course might be found necessary or expedient. The scheme included other railway systems, besides that of the Great Eastern ; but the Great Eastern Company were mainly concerned in making the necessary arrange- ments while they acted, also; as intermediary for the other companies in districts extending from the Wash to the English Channel. (See p. 824). Munition Work and Railway Supplies. The sum total of the Great Eastern Railway Company's expenditure on the production of munitions of war and the carr5dng out, through the department of the Chief Mechanical Engineer, at Stratford, of other special work on Government account was over £1,250,000. This figure was nearly equal to the company's expenditure in two years, at pre-war rates, on the maintenance and renewal of locomotives, carriages and wagons. The work was carried out notwithstanding the fact that 1,500 men from the department, or, approximately, 25 per cent, of the normal staff, were serving with the Forces, and in spite, also, of the fact that, although maintenance was considerably in arrears, the rolling stock was maintained sufficiently to meet the very heavy demands made upon it for the transport of passengers and goods. The actual extent of the work done will, perhaps, best be realised by offering a few representative figures. In regard, for example, to muni- tions, the company carried out the re-forming of three and a half million cartridge cases ; the brazing of one and a half million cartridge cases ; the forging of 18,800 47-in. shells ; the breaking of 150,000 tons of steel bars into sheU billets ; the machining and completion, except filling, of 37,000 6-in.Howitzer shells, and the manufacture of £55,000 worth of gun and rifle details. The company also built ten gun carriages and sixteen Umbers for 6-in. long-range guns ; they built, for the use of our Armies overseas, 440 road-transport wagons, and 225 covered goods wagons having a capacity double that of the standard Great Eastern wagon, and they provided two workshop repair trains, each consisting of five vehicles, for Egypt ; five complete ambulance trains for British troops on the Continent ; two similar trains for use in Great Britain and two for the American Army. Among other items were the building of 950 and the converting of 388 miners' trucks, and the making of 30 water-tank carts and 1,750 ambulance stretchers. In addition to aU this, the company provided for service in France — after first subjecting them to a thorough repair — ^43 of their standard goods locon:lotives. They also sent overseas twenty 20-ton loco, coal wagons, one 20-ton steam breakdown crane, twenty of their suburban brake vans (these being altered and equipped to serve as brake vans for goods trains in use in France), and 30,000 sleepers (22,000 new and 8,000 second hand). Munitiori work carried out under arrangements made through the THE GREAT EASTERN RAILWAY. 891 Chief Mechanical Engineer included such items as the following : Detents for graze fuses, 131,150 ; trigger testers, 2,186 ; turning and screwing base plates for 6-in. shells, 803 ; turning and boring axle-trees for 4-5 howitzers, 398; percussion and detonator plugs, 19,500; machining 4-5 limber cases, 1,087, and the following details for percussion fuse loi : graze pellets, 69,934 ; plug pellets, 70,588 ; detent plugs, 145,566 ; centrifugal bolts, 65,970. Priority Work. Mr. A. J. Hill, the company's Chief Mechanical Engineer, was appointed by the Railway Executive Committee as their representative on the Railway Branch of the Ministry of Munitions Priority Committee. This was in February, 1916, and Mr. HiU continued to act until the Priority Committee was dissolved in April, 1919. Diiring this period no fewer than 5,050 appHcations for priority from the various railways of the Kingdom were made to Mr. Hill and submitted by him to the com- mittee. Mr. HUl also dealt with between 400 and 500 questions which arose mainly in connection with the rationing by the Government, and the allocation as between the different railway companies, of materials for the maintenance of rolling stock and permanent-way, such as steel plates and bars, boiler tubes, lead, copper, crank axles and other forgings, rails — in fact, practically aU the material most in demand. The quanti- ties thus dealt with were, in the aggregate, very large, notwithstanding the fact that as compared with pre-war conditions there was a con- siderable shortage in the available supplies. Mr. Hill further acted as chairman of a Committee of Railway Mechani- cal Engineers appointed to consider the post-war requirements of the railways and to advise the Ministry of Reconstruction thereon. Great Eastern Railway Hotel Department. Having regard to the very large number of troops who, owing to the geographical position of the Eastern Counties, were stationed in East Anglia throughout the war, and, also, to the contingents, large or small, continually travelhng to and fro by rail, whether on leave or in connection with either Home Command or Overseas Movements, the Hotel Depart- ment of the Great Eastern Railway Company had to be prepared to supply refreshments to members of his Majesty's Forces at all hours of the day or night, and often at very short notice, if not, on many occasions, at practically no notice at aU. No record was kept of the total number of soldiers, sailors and others actually supplied — the rush was much too great to permit of a careful compilation of statistics ; but the sum total Was vaguely estimated at "many millions." There were occasions when complete train-loads of soldiers were provided with tea, coffee and eat- ables in the space of a few minutes, this being done, not alone at important stations where the company had refreshment rooms, but even at small stations in agricultural areas where, under ordinary conditions, no con- §93 BRITISH R/VILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. veniences at all exist for the supply of hot refresl;iments to large numbers of travellers. Special arrangements were necessary, and these were so far made that in the majority of instances where troop trains were run over the company's system the Hotel Department provided refreshments at one station, at least, on each line of route. Officers and men frequently expressed their gratitude for the consideration thus shown to them, and they did so more especially when, during a night journey in the depth of winter, their train pulled up at some station where they unexpectedly found, thanks to the thoughtfulness of the Hotel Department, a generous provision of hot beverages which seemed to put fresh life into them and were very greatly appreciated indeed. Reduced charges for soldiers and sailors travelling by train were in force at railway stations aU over the company's system. For large parties tea and coffee at one penny per cup were provided throughout the entire war-period. At one country refreshment-room alone the number of wounded soldiers suppMed with refreshments numbered 30,000. The provisions and the equipment required for the Soldiers and Sailors' Free Buffets on the East and West sides at Liverpool Street Station were obtained from the Hotel Department. The number of men served in 1917 was 395,373 and the number in 1918 was 524,082. (See p. 792.) At the Great Eastern Hotel, Liverpool Street, many hundreds of thousands of officers and men of his Majesty's Forces were accommodated, at reduced terms, the hotel being found very convenient for those arriving at or departing from Liverpool Street Station. The company's hotel at Harwich was taken over by the mihtary authorities immediately on the outbreak of war, and was in continuous use as an Army hospital down to 1919. Parkeston Quay Hotel was used almost exclusively by naval officers attached to the important Naval Base established at Harwich. The Sandringham Hotel, Hunstanton, was for a considerable period the headquarters of a Brigade. The refreshment-room and the motor garage in connection with the hotel were occupied by the miUtary authorities. Two of the company's restaurant cars, with staff complete, were running on ambulance trains, with headquarters at Dover or South- ampton, from the outbreak of hostilities. Enlistments. The number of members of the Great Eastern staff who joined H.M. Forces was 9,734. This was 29-38 per cent, of the total staff on August 4th, 1914. Employment of Women and Girls. Women and girls were taken on in all the different departments in place of male staff, and the number so employed had attained such pro- portions by March, 1917, that the company then appointed a Superin- THE GREAT EASTERN RAILWAY. 893 tendent of Women Labour, assisted by a staii of supervisors and " inspec- tresses." In the Operating Department, including the Locomotive Section, 1,148 women and girls were employed as substitutes for male staff. In the Commercial Department the total number of women and girls employed was 1,137, namely, clerical staff, 698, and wages staff, 439. This total compared witTa 18, employed on the clerical staff (exclud- ing waiting-room attendants and office cleaners), under pre-war con- ditions. Those on the wages staff filled such positions as goods porters, goods checkers, goods forewomen, parcels pprters, parcels forewomen, parcels carwomen, messengers and stablewomen. The Secretary and Comptroller's department employed over seventy lady clerks in its various sections to carry on the work of male clerks who had joined the Colours. The Chief Mechanical Engineer's department took on 130 women and girls to do railway work (apart from 400 employed on the making of muni- tions), in place of male staff. This was an increase of a6o per cent, over the pre-war figures. They were employed as clerks, brass polishers, painters' assistants, machinists, core makers and general labourers. The Electrical Engineer employed forty-two women and girls in place of men, and six others on munition works. At the Great Eastern Railway Printing Works, Stratford Market, E., twenty-three women and girls were taken on in place of male staff as clerks, readers, layers-on (letter- press machines), or as ticket printers. Women Workers in the Store Department. One especially interesting phase of the employment of women workers on the Great Eastern system was to be found in the variety of occupations taken up by them in the Stores Department. The Stores Superintendent was not in a position to adapt his factories to the production of munitions of war, but he nevertheless undertook the making of such commodities as grain sacks, wagon covers, binding ropes and other things which the war-time conditions had rendered especially necessary. An abnormal supply of grain sacks was needed to meet the require- ments of the Food Controller ; and what the Great Eastern Railway Stores Department could do in this direction was done entirely by female labour. A number of women and girls were employed on the making and repairing alike of grain sacks and of wagon covers, and, although unaccustomed to work of this description, they rapidly acquired the pro- ficiency which enabled them to accomplish it in a way that gave full satisfaction. Then the collection of waste-paper became, at one time, quite a special branch of war work owing to the shortage of available supplies for paper-making, and other of the company's women-workers were employed on the sorting of waste-paper gathered in, grading it for the paper-miUs. Another feature of the work done was the employment of female labour on the cleaning of sponge cloths and waste. As substitutes, in other branches, for men who had joined the Colours, women fiUed with credit such positions as clerks, packers, and issuers of 894 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. stationery, clothing and general stores. Altogether the number of female staff employed in these and other directions was 120, an increase of 99 over the pre-war total. The output of the department between the years 1915 and 1918 included the following items : — Grain sacks manufactured . 270,000 repaired-. Wagon covers manufactured 2,540,000 31,000 ,, ,, repaired Binding ropes manufactured ,, ,, repaired Waste-paper graded . Sponge cloths washed. Waste washed . 142,000 12,200 23,000 800 tons 82,000 gross 70 tons. Air Raids. Of the active measures taken by the Great Eastern Railway Company in helping to circumvent the enemy air-raids on this country, full par- ticulars will be found on pp. 421-434. Ambulance Work. The Ambulance Centre on the Great Eastern Railway was started in the Locomotive Works at Stratford in 1879, on the suggestion of the late Sir John Furley and others connected with the St. John Ambulance Association, and the first examination took place at Ipswich in 1880. A class was formed in 1881 at Liverpool Street Station where the members, comprising the station-master, the station superintendents and the porters, received their earUest instruction in a lamp-room under the platform. Some ten years later the directors offered to pay the cost of a propagandist effort designed to secure the institution of classes at any and every part of the system where a sufficient number of members could be obtained. The adoption of this policy led to centres being formed in most of the leading towns in the Eastern counties, and these centres were afterwards embodied in one organisation, known as the Great Eastern Ahibulance Corps, St. John Ambulance Brigade. By 1893 the practical value of the work being done was so fully recognised that, in order to encourage it stiU further, the directors and chief officers joined in presenting a cup for which a Great Eastern Railway Challenge Cup Competition was to be held every year. Other companies adopted a like course, and local inter-railway competitions soon came into vogue, preparing the way for the Challenge Shield Competition instituted in 1897. Thirteen Great Eastern Ambulance men volunteered for the South African War, and one went on ambulance duty to the Balkans in 1912. The outbreak of the Great War in 1914 stimulated stiU further the interest of the employees in the ambulance movement, and the number of new accessions well maintained the membership, notwithstanding the depar- THE GREAT EASTERN RAILWAY. 895 ture of so many of the staff on active service. An opening, also, was soon found for the services of those who remained behind. As early in the war as December 24th, 1914, the Chief Trafi&c Manager gave instructions that an ambulance man, furnished with all the necessary appUances, was to be on duty at the entraining and detraining of every considerable number of troops, horses, guns, etc., at any place on the Great Eastern system for the purpose of rendering first aid in case of need. Down to the end of 1918 the number of such occasions oh which Great Eastern ambu- lance men had been in attendance was 2,918, while the " cases " treated comprised 220 officers and soldiers, 143 of the company's servants, seven other persons — and one horse. Great Eastern ambulance men also assisted in the detraining from ambulance trains of wounded soldiers and sailors at many places on the company's system. They took the entire responsibility for this work at Stratford. The following letter, received in the early part of 1918 by Mr. T. O. Mein, honorary secretary of the corps, from the chairman of Queen Mary's Hospital at Stratford, shows the appreciation with which the work done was regarded by the authorities of that institution : — I am pleased to tell you that at a meeting of the Committee of Management held on January gth, reference was made to the very excellent services which have been rendered to the hospital by yourself and the members of the G.E.R. Ambu- lance Corps in dealing with the convoys of wounded soldiers detrained at Stratford, and thanks were expressed for your co-operation and assistance on these occasions. I assure you that the knowledge that we are able to leave the removal of these poor feUows from the train in your hands with the utmost assurance that the work win be satisfactorily and efficiently carried out, is a very great relief to those responsible for the administration of the hospital. Members of the Great Eastern Railway Ambulance Centre also dealt with a number of cases occurring in and around London as the result of enemy air raids. Social Organisations. War-time activities on the part of social and other organisations among the staff of the Great Eastern Railway supplemented in a variety of Ways the efforts made by the company itsfelf to provide for the trans- port and other needs with which it had to deal in a time of national emergency. Among the leading centres of these supplementary activities was the Great Eastern Railway Mechanics' Institution, situate at Stratford, E., where the company have their Locomotive, Carriage and Wagon Works, and where, in the days before the war, they employed over 4,500 persons. Estabhshed as far back as 1851, the Institution has played an important part in the education and social development of Stratford ever since. It constitutes a technical training school for instruction in mechanical engineering to apprentices and others, and it possesses a library of 9,300 volumes, a reading-room, biUiard-room, gymnasium, sUpper baths, rifle range and quoit grounds. 896 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. On the outbreak of hostilities the Institution was at once re-organised on a war footing. The use of the rifle range was thrown open to the public, and members of the Rifle Club attended every night to give instruc- tion in the art of shooting to anyone who desired to become proficient therein. In this way many of those who afterwards left Stratford to join the Army got some preliminary training, while others were qualified to take their part in home defence, should the occasion arise. Physical culture classes, with Swedish driU as a special feature, were opened under the direction of a military instructor, and first-aid and home-nursing classes were attended by a large number of women students, several of whom afterwards enrolled themselves in Voluntary Aid Detachment or other movements. Efforts were made, also, to benefit soldiers' families, to provide Christmas gifts for troops, and to entertain wounded from neighbouring hospitals. In January, 1915, the whole of the buildings, including gymnasium and rifle range, were placed at the disposal of the Mayor of West Ham for a period of several months in order to provide facilities for training the 13th battalion of the Essex Regiment (West Ham), afterwards to distinguish itself in so conspicuous a degree at Cambrai. Another institution which rendered highly-appreciated service, in war-time was the Great Eastern Railway Musical Society, originally established in 1908 for the combined purpose of promoting the social welfare of aU sections of the railway organisation and of encouraging the study and performance of music. It began in quite a small way with an orchestra of about twenty and a male-voice choir of twenty-five. To-day it has a fuU orchestra of 100 and a male-voice choir of 220. The Society consists exclusively of members of the Great Eastern Railway staff employed at Liverpool Street Station, London, the company's Locomotive, Carriage and Wagon Works at Stratford, E., or at leading' provincial stations, such as Cambridge, Ipswich and Norwich. Every grade of the railway service is represented, and the orchestra claims to be unique as an amateur organisation inasmuch as it is self-contained, not having to rely on outside help for any of the instruments. Many concerts have been given by the Society, both in London and elsewhere, with a view to spreading the study and appreciation of music throughout the line and, also, to encourage various local charities. On February 28th, 1914, the members had the honour of performing before their Majesties the King and Queen at the Royal Albert Hall. Within a short period after the outbreak of war many members of the Society had joined the Colours, and the periodical concerts given in Hamilton Hall, the Society's " home " in the Great Eastern Hotel at Liverpool Street Station, had to be temporarily suspended ; though the men who thus responded to their country's call were, happily, able to add in no slight degree to their usefulness by the exercise of their musical powers whenever, in the intervals of the sterner duties of the battle-field, the opportunity for doing so arose. Then, in proportion as men returned home disabled. for further active THE GREAT EASTERN RAILWAY. 897 service though able to devote themselves once more both to railway work and to music, and in proportion, also, as the Society recruited its own ranks alike with men of non-mihtary age and musical members among the increasing feminine forces of the company's staff, it was found possible to form a smaller choir and orchestra (though the choir could not then be continued) for the giving of concerts to soldiers and sailors in camp or at training depots and to the wounded or convalescents either in hospitals or elsewhere. The number of concerts thus given by the Society ^^ was thirty-eight, namely, Aldwych Theatre, Strand, five ; Eagle Hut, Strand, five ; Prince of Wales Hospital for Officers, Marylebone, four ; St. Dunstan's Hostel for the Blind, three ; Royal Victoria HaU, Water- loo, one ; White City, W., two ; Prince's Theatre, W., two ; Brentwood, one ; Crystal Palace, one ; Epsom, six ; Grove Park, one ; Parkeston, three ; Seaford, one ; Southend, one ; and Stratford, two. The total number of members of the Fighting Forces from all parts of the Empire who were entertained at these thirty-eight concerts was upwards of 50,000. The orchestral items consisted of standard overtures, operatic and revue selections and popular music. The whole of these Railwaymen's Concerts for the Forces were given under the conductorship of Colonel W. J. Galloway, a Director of the Great Eastern Railway and a strenuous supporter of the Society, to whom much of the success it has attained may justly be attributed. In addition to the concerts in question, the orchestra took a promin- ent part in the memorial service held at St. Paul's Cathedral on May 14th, 1919, for the railwaymen of the United Kingdom who fell in the war. (See Chapter XXVIIL). On July 8th, 1919, the orchestra provided the music at the service in St. Paul's Cathedral on the occasion of the public burial of Captain Fryatt, master of the Great Eastern Railway Company's s.s. Brussels. On July I2th, 1919, they also provided the music at the memorial service in Ely Cathedral for the men on the Western Division of the Great Eastern Railway who fell in the war. The G.E.R. Staff (Northern Division) Hospital and Benevolent Fund undertook the maintenance in the Norfolk and Norwich Hospital of four beds for wounded soldiers. The Great Eastern Knitting Association, started at Liverpool Street Station, raised funds for the purchase of wool which, distributed among knitters all over the Great Eastern system, was the means of providing generous supplies of knitted comforts for the Great Eastern soldiers and sailors. The Cambridge Station Social Committee helped to secure financial support for the Sailors' and Soldiers' Free Buffet at Liverpool Street Station by means of whist drives,]^ dances, promenade concerts, and musical and dramatic entertainments. The King's Lynn Great Eastern Railway Staff Benevolent Association was called into being in June, 1917, to raise funds by means of whist drives or otherwise for the same beneficent purpose. The Liverpool Street Rifle Club was formed by the clerical staff at Liverpool Street Station in November, 19 14 ; the Cambridge Railways Miniature Rifle Club followed in March, 1915 (both of these clubs had 898 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. lady members), and the Lowestoft Harbour Works Rifle Club in May, 1915. In the case of the last-mentioned club, the directors facilitated the construction of an outdoor range with three distances, namely, 25 yards, 50 yards and 100 yards, while permission to practise rifle shooting at the range three days a week was given to naval men, mine-sweepers, and other national defenders stationed at Lowestoft. Food Production. For many years prior to the war it had been the p6licy of the Great Eastern directors to afford to the staff opportunities for growing their own vegetables on land situate alongside the lines or otherwise available, several fields, for instance, which belonged to the company being con- verted into garden-plots let to members of the staff at nominal rentals. Altogether the total number of allotments on Great Eastern property thus under cultivation by Great Eastern men in the autumn of 1914 was, approximately, 5,000. Early in 1916 came the apprehensions of a possible food shortage, the urgent need for a substantial increase in home-grown supplies, and the request made by the Government that every one who was able so to do should raise garden produce for his own household. There were many Great Eastern men ready enough to act on this recommendation ; but at that time there were not enough allotments available to meet all require- ments. Thereupon it was decided to release for the purpose certain embankments or portions of embankments not hitherto made available for gardening purposes, and to convert into allotments for the staff several more of the company's fields which had previously been let to farmers and others. These increased opportunities were so readily taken advan- tage of by Great Eastern employees that by the end of April, 1919, the number of allotments under cultivation had risen to 8,500 — an increase of 3,500 in just about three years. Meanwhile the Board of Agriculture had made an urgent appeal to the British public that they should grow more potatoes ; and, inasmuch as the supply of seed was limited and controlled, there was a fear that many small cultivators would not be able to obtain supplies, or, alternatively, that the price demanded would rise to a higher figure than they would be able to pay. In order to meet this situation, the company purchased a consignment of the most popular varieties of Scotch seed which was sold to members of the staff at cost price and in just such quantities as they might require. Every station throughout the Great Eastern system was advised of what was being done, and during the course of three seasons 480 tons of seed were thus obtained and distributed. The major- ity of the men were, in fact, enabled to plant the greater portion of their allotments with potatoes. Still another difficulty arose — that, namely, which related to manure supply for the allotments. Stable manure was in most places unobtain- able ; but once more the company came to the aid of their staff by obtain- THE GREAT EASTERN RAILWAY. 899 ing wholesale consignments of a well-known Ipswich fertiliser and retailing them to the allotment holders at cost price. The total quantity obtained and distributed in small lots as required amounted to no less than ninety- seven tons. The Great Eastern Railway Company had for so long a period been honourably associated with the encouragement of agricultural production that there was something especially appropriate in the efforts now made by them in the special interests of their own staff. G.E.R. Steamships : North Sea Services in War-time. Prior to the war the Great Eastern Railway Company were maintain- ing at Parkeston Quay, Harwich, with their own steamships, three Con- tinental services, namely, (i) a daily service to and from the Hook of Holland with three turbine steamers, the St. Petersburg, the Munich and the Copenhagen ; (2) a daily service, Sunday excepted, to and from Ant- werp with the twin-screw steamers Amsterdam, Dresden, Vienna and Brussels ; and (3) a cargo-boat service, six times weekly, to and from Rotterdam with the Clacton, Colchester, Cromer and Newmarket. AU these vessels were commandeered by the Government with the exception of the Brussels, the Colchester and the Cromer. Of the three turbine steamers, the St. Petersburg, re-named the Arch- angel, was used as a transport ship between Channel ports and French ports until the signing of the Armistice, when she was employed to bring repatriated British prisoners of war from Rotterdam to HuU, and, on the return journey, to take back to Rotterdam repatriated German prisoners of war. The Munich, re-named the St. Denis, was employed as a transport untU September, 1915, when she was converted into a hospital ship. The Copenhagen sailed as a transport untU November, 1915 ; was then employed as a hospital ship ; was re-converted into a transport April i6th, 1916 ; ran on a special mail service between Harwich and Holland in October, 1916, at a time when all ordinary mercantile traffic was excluded from the North Sea, and was afterwards used for the carrying of Government passengers or for other Govern- ment purposes on the same service until March 5th, 1917, when she was torpedoed on a passage from Parkeston to Holland. The twin-screw steamers, Amsterdam, Vienna and Dresden (re-named the Louvain) were used by the Government as armed boarding steamers. The Louvain was torpedoed and sunk in the Eastern Mediterranean on January 21st, 1918. Of the four cargo-boats, the Clacton and the Newmarket were used as mine-sweepers. Both were lost through enemy action, the former in August, 1916, and the latter in July, 1917. In August, 1917, the company acquired by purchase the s.s. Kilkenny, which sailed to and from Holland until November, 1918, when she was taken over by the Government for the Irish trade, though afterwards released. The company had hoped to add to their restricted fleet the 900 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. s.s. Antwerp which was being built for their Antwerp service ; but this vessel was acquired by the Government before completion and, when ready, was re-named the Pegasus, and used as a sea-plane carrier. On the declaration of war the G.E.R. steamers conveyed many passen- gers to the Continent, including Germans who were, no doubt, on their way to join the Forces of their own country ; and they brought back great numbers of English people who had been spending their holidays on the Continent. In one steamer from Antwerp there were 300 English children who had been in Belgian schools. The last boat of the pre-war service from Antwerp passed Flushing at the moment when England, entered on the war. The Antwerp service was then officially suspended ; but, in point of fact, the boats continued running six times a week until the occupation of Antwerp by the Germans. They brought over stranded Britishers, Belgian refugees and English goods warehoused in Belgium, and they were, also, of great advantage both to officials and to commercial men crossing to and from Belgium. The Belgian refugees from Antwerp were landed at Tilbury owing to the regulation that no aliens — the more so since there was reason to believe that German spies were entering this country under the pretence that they were Belgians — should pass through the naval port of Harwich. The first party of Belgian refugees to reach this country from Antwerp arrived at Liverpobl Street Station on September iith, and from that date they continued to come by this route as long as it remained open. The last British steamer to leave Antwerp, on October 7th (following immediately after the Brussels, which preceded her just as the bombardment started), was the G.E.R. Amsterdam, which had among her passengers the British Consul-General, Sir Cecil Hertslet and party and a great number of refugees. There was, naturally, intense strain and anxiety thrown upon the officiEds of the company at this exceedingly trying period ; but the work was so well and so successfully done that the thanks of the British Government were conveyed to the company's Agent at Antwerp, Mr. A. C. Pain, for the services he had rendered. From the time of the fall of Antwerp, on October 9th, 1914, no further British steamer entered the port of Antwerp until December 3rd, 1918 ; and the vessel which then did so was one that carried the Great Eastern Railway Company's flag and had on board the same British Consul- General, Sir Cecil Hertslet. The traffic with Antwerp between August 4th and October 7th, 191.^, may be shown thus : — Via Via Parkeston. Tilbury. Total. Number of Voyages : To Antwerp . . . 8 16 24 From Antwerp 7 20 27 Total - . 15 36 51 THE GREAT EASTERN RAILWAY. 901 Number of Passengers : To Antwerp . From Antwerp Belgian Refugees . P . Tons . Tons . Tons Via arkston, 367 1.594 Via Tilbury. 772 2,402 8,007 Total. 1.139 3.996 8,007 Total . 1,961 11,181 13.142 Goods : To Antwerp . From Antwerp 653 750 657 657 ; 1,310 750 Total . 1,403 2,060 Except on occasions when the North Sea was barred by order of the Admiralty, the Great Eastern continued their services with Holland throughout the entire period of the war. It was by the company's s. s. St. Petersburg that the German Ambassador crossed to the Hook of Holland on August 6th, 1914, en route for Germany, when diplomatic relations between his country and ours were broken off, and he afterwards telegraphed his appreciation of the courtesy shown to him on the journey. The ship which took him across in the one direction brought back the British Ambassador, Sir Edward Goschen. In September, 1914, the company's s.s. Copenhagen conveyed to this country a large party of British refugees from Berlin who had been detained in Germany and had only just been released. On the commandeering by the Admiralty, in October, 1914, of the steamships then employed on the Hook of Holland route, the company continued the service with, at first, the Brussels, the Colchester and the Cromer ; but the Brussels (as will be told more fully later on) was cap- tui*ed by the Germans in June, 1916, and the Colchester was seized in September, 1916, and sank while in the possession of the enemy. Follow- ing on these losses, the company continued the service with the Cromer and other vessels placed at their disposal. When the first rush of refugees, Belgian and British, was over, the chief claim made upon the steamers was in respect to the transport from Holland of a large volume of food-stuffs ; though later on a considerable passenger traffic service developed by this route, which, for some time, afforded the only means of communicatiort with HoUand. At the outset of the war it was thought that the chief danger likely to arise to merchant shipping crossing the North Sea would be from sorties of enemy destroyers ; though, in point of fact, the submarine menace began to be experienced by the Great Eastern steamships before the close of 1914. • On December nth, in that year. Captain Lawrence, who was in charge of the Colchester, had got some distance irom the Dutch coast when a German submarine began to make towards his ship. He had the fires double-banked and went ahead at such a speed that although the submarine chased the Colchester for twenty minutes it was easily out- distanced. Captain Lawrence was afterwards presented by the Chair- 902 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. man and Directors of the company with a gold watch " as a marli of their appreciation of his courage and skilful seamanship." Captain Fryatt's first encounters with the enemy submarines were on March 2nd and March 28th, 1915. On August 17th, 1915, the Cromer had a narrow escape from a submarine, the periscope of which was sighted at a distance of only about a quarter of a mile. A torpedo discharged by the submarine passed under the starboard quarter of the Cromer and was seen racing away to port. The enemy vessel then tried to get into position for another shot, but she was kept astern through the skilful manipulation of the English ship. After continuing the chase for twenty minutes the submarine disappeared under the water and was seen no more. In this instance, also, the Captain was presented with a gold watch by the Chair- man and Directors. On the night of April 2nd, 1916, an enemy submarine made another attack on the Cromer, then under the command of Captain Beeching and on her way from the Hook of Holland. Captain Beeching managed his ship so skUfuUy that he not only escaped the threatened danger but succeeded in ramming the submarine. For this he was awarded the D.S.C., while Chief Engineer R. Smith and Chief Officer C. Stiff received honourable mention from the Admiralty. Inscribed watches were presented by the G.E.R. Company to officers and crew. Similar watches were received also by Captains T. Barren and T. Stiff for special services rendered by them in connection with submarine attacks. How greatly the Admiralty appreciated the excellent work which was being done was shown by the following lettei:, sent to the General Manager of the company : — Admiralty, April 8th, 1915. Sir,— I am commanded by My Lords Commissioners of tbe Admiralty to inform you that H.M. Consul-General at Rotterdam has called the attention of the Secre- tary of State for Foreign Affairs to the highly courageous and meritorious conduct of the masters of the s.s. Cromer, Brussels, Colchester, and Wrexham, which have run during the whole period of hostilities between Rotterdam and Hai^ch. The fact of these British boats running regularly is reported to have a great moral effect locally at a time when Dutch and other steamships had ceased running and showed nervousness. Mr. Maxse states further that the Masters of these vessels have rendered him ready assistance on many occasions during the war. In forwarding this report, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has expressed his appreciation of the services rendered by these officers. My Lords endorse Sir E. Grey's approbation, and desire that you will be good enough to convey his thanks and theirs to the officers concerned for their conduct which has reflected credit on British seamanship. I am. Sir, Your obedient Servant, (Signed) W. Graham Greene. The General Manager, G.E.R. Co. On August 7th, 1 91 5, there was received from the Secretary of the THE GREAT EASTERN RAILWAY. 903 Admiralty another letter in whjch reference was made to the five occasions upon which, by then, the Brussels had been attacked by submarines when under the command at different times of Captains C. Fryatt, F. F. Beech- ing and W. J. Hartnell. The letter continued : — My Lords consider that great credit is due to the Masters of the vessel for their behaviour in the face of the repeated attacks to which she has been subjected. Captain Fryatt has already been informed of their Lordships' appreciation, and I am to request that you will now convey to Mr. W. J. HartneU and Mr. F. F. Beeching an expression of their satisfaction at the courage and skill which they displayed on the occasion of the attacks on the Brussels when under their command. Submarine attacks such as those here in question were in full accord with the declared pohcy of the enemy. Germany's Threats. * Early in February, 1915, the German Government had announced that " On and after February i8th, every merchant vessel found in the waters round Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole of the English Channel, will be destroyed without its always being possible to warn the crew and passengers of the dangers threatening." If, by a resort to threats of this kind, the enemy could have intimidated British seamen and succeeded in clearing the waters roimd the United Kingdom of merchant shipping, he would have gained a great strategical advantage ; he would have produced a great moral effect on neutrals in giving them the impression that the supremacy of the sea had at last passed from our own hands to his, and he would have weakened our position by diminish- ing our food resources. The only result of those threats so far as the British people were concerned was to reveal still more clearly the nature ^and the aspirations of the foe with whom we had to deal and to strengthen the spirit and determination with which, on our side, the war was to be fought to a finish. While under the necessity to commandeer so many railway-owned steamers for mUitary or naval purposes, the Government had been no less solicitous that the Great Eastern Railway Company should persevere in their efforts to maintain those communications with Holland to which so great a degree of importance attached. Having regard to the said announcement by the enemy, the continuance of the Great Eastern's cargo service with Holland became a veritable war service in the interests of this country. It was one, also, no less to the detriment of the enemy, who did his best to stop it, not only by his threats and his submarines, but, also, by his plentiful la5dng of mines in the North Sea, and more especially in the neighbourhood of Harwich. The importance and the danger of the situation were recognised by the British Government through the intimation given by the Board of Trade that merchant seamen on the North Sea were to be entitled to compensation on the same basis as naval seamen, while the eventual maturing of plans in other directions was to effect a complete change in the situation. 30 904 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Convoy System. Within a week of the capture of the Brussels (on the night of June 22nd-23rd, 1916) it was decided by the Admiralty to apply the convoy system to merchant vessels crossing the North Sea ; but the system was not, at first, sufficiently complete to prevent the seizure of the G.E.R. s.s. Colchester when on the way to Rotterdam on September 21st, 1916. The steamer was taken by her captors to Zeebrugge, whence the Captain and crew were sent to Ruhleben. Since, also, the beginning of the war, no fewer than twelve attacks on Great Eastern steamships by enemy submarines had been recorded ; but, following on the fuU development now brought about in the convoy system, there were, at least, no more captures of Great Eastern steamships, though the loss of the Copenhagen, torpedoed in March, 1917, is, of course, to be borne in mind. Under the system adopted, the -merchantmen, when a number of them were to be escorted across the North Sea, were collected into parties generally ranging from twelve to twenty. There were, however, occasions when Great Eastern steamers were the only boats to be convoyed. The vessels would then, on leaving Harwich, be directed to proceed to a rendezvous outside the estuaries where they would receive secret instruc- tions as to the course they were to take. As the result of frequent niine-la5dng on the part of the enemy, the presence of submarines, or other enemy movements, the North Sea was frequently closed to traffic by the naval authorities for many days together. The Great Eastern boats would, on these occasions, lay with steam up ready to leave at a moment's notice. Yet, in spite of all the difficulties, dangers and detentions they thus experienced, the steamships accomplished an amount of work which was incredibly great, having regard to all the conditions under which it was accomphshed, and of incalculable benefit to the country. Services with Holland Maintained and Strengthened. In the first place there was the remarkable fact that, not only was the service with Holland maintained throughout the war, save for the occa- sional interruptions mentioned, but it gained steadily in proportions — especially as the result of the convoy system ; so that whilst the company had three vessels on the HoUand route in the early days of the war, the number sealing regularly under their flag, on the same route, when the Armistice was signed was no fewer than nine. Two of these, the Cromer and the Kilkenny, belonged to the Great Eastern. The use of the remainder had, under arrangements made by the Admiralty, been acquired from other railway or steamship companies. Thus the Marylebone, the Staveley and the Notts were Great Central Railway steamers ; the Woodstock, the Quentin and the Glasgow came from the General Steam Navigation Company, and the Princess Irma belonged to the Langlands Line. Other steamers had been employed for short periods — the Matina, for instance, originally a banana ship,, being specially fitted up in September, 1917, for the transport of meat from Holland. • THE GREAT EASTERN RAILWAY. 905 Then, owing in part to occasions arising when the Admiralty required all the accommodation which Parkeston, Quay afforded and in part to the expansion in the trafl&c, the company had to set up an establishment of their own at Tilbury ; though the time was to come when even this did not suffice, and they then found it necessary to secure supplementary accommodation at the East India Docks. Traffic Carried. In regard to the amount of traffic carried to or from Holland, it may be more convenient to deal with this in two periods — the one from the out- break of war to the end of 1914, when conditions were comparatively normal for the Great Eastern Railway Company, and the other from January ist, 1915 — ^in which year the real difficulties of the situation began — to November, 1918, when the Armistice was signed. The total number of passages between Parkeston and Holland (either the Hook of HoUand or Rotterdam) in the former of these periods was ao6, namely, to Holland, 106, and from Holland, 100. The passengers conveyed during the same period numbered 7,447, namely, to Holland, 2,721 ; from HoUand, 4,726. Of goods there were carried 40,230 tons, being 7,007 tons taken to Holland and 33,223 brought from Holland. We come now to the period of greatest trouble ; and here we learn the remarkable fact that in spite of the desperate efforts made by the enemy, with the help of his submarines, his destroyers, his minefields, and Ms aircraft, to sweep British shipping off the North Sea ; in spite of his open avowal of a campaign of merciless destruction, and in spite of the pohcy of " f rightfulness " he adopted, as in the case of Captain Fryatt, with the intention, among other things, of intimidating British seamen, the number of passages made by Great Eastern steamers on the service to and from HoUand during this time of exceptional danger and difficulty was no fewer than 1,222. ' This gave an average of over one passage per day for the period covered, and, even aUowing for the occasions when the steamers were held up for a few days at a time, the service may still be regarded as having been practicaUy a continuous one. The passengers conveyed were : From Parkeston or Tilbury to Hol- land, 5,061 ; from HoUand to Parkeston, 7,060 ; from HoUand to TUbury (including refugees, Belgian workmen, and wives and famiUes of refugees or workmen in England), 17,168 ; total, 29,289. Of goods there were carried : From Parkeston or TUbury to HoUand, 52,656 tons ; from HoUand, 198,943 tons ; total, 251,599 tons. Included in the 199,000 tons of goods brought from HoUand to this country were no fewer than over 159,000 tons of food-stuflfs — a most valuable and most acceptable contribution to our diminished food suppUes at a time when the enemy was bent on starving us into surrender. The detaUs should be of exceptional interest. They are as foUows : Meat, 11,046 tons ; margarine, 99,971 tons ; vegetables, 10,899 tons ; fish, 11,363 tons ; cheese, 6,340 tons ; eggs, 3,298 tons ; bacon, 5,050 tons ; condensed mUk, 7,928 tons ; sugar, 3,606 tons ; total 159,501 tons. 9o6 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. With the evidence of figures such as these, the reader will still better understand why it was that the enemy became so determined to use every effort, fair or foul, to wipe British merchantmen off the North Sea ; and at one period there was at least the risk that he might succeed in so doing. That was at the time when the Admiralty applied to the North Sea traffic the convoy system which was so effectually to upset his plans. The men of the Harwich Forces to whom, as told in Chapter XLL, was delegated the duty of convoying the Great Eastern steamships, gave to this par- ticular duty the happy designation of " The Beef Trip " ; though meat, as shown by the figures given above, bulked far less largely among the supplies carried than margarine, with its total of just under 100,000 tons. For a considerable period during the earher part of the war, the position in regard to this margarine traffic was that Holland, where the processes of manufacture had been developed on a very extensive scale, was experi- encing a great shortage of raw materials, whereas in England the manu- facture had not attained a scale equal to our needs although we were here receiving large consignments of the necessary products. Hence the adoption of the expedient that the Great Eastern steamers should first take raw materials to Holland, and then bring back the finished article in such quantities as were made available. In this way the sum total of the traffic was much greater than even the figures given above would suggest, inasmuch as these relate to transport in one direction only. Later on in the war there was a considerable increase in the production of margarine in this country, so that the period in which the traffic across the North Sea attained its greatest relative proportions and importance in the provision of an essential commodity coincided, more or less, with that in which the enemy submarines were showing their greatest activity. Parcels for Prisoners of War. HappUy, too, the maintenance of the Great Eastern steamship ser- . vices with Holland not only helped to keep up our own food supplies but gave us a vastly better opportunity than we should otherwise have had for sending to British prisoners of war in Germany, Austria and Holland the parcels of provisions but for which a large proportion of those who were in enemy country would probably not have been kept alive. Some- where about three-fourths of the parcel-post prisoner-of-war parcels sent via Holland went by the Great Eastern route to Rotterdam, the remainder being carried to the same port from London by the General Steam Naviga- tion Company ; and these three-fourths came to a total of 1,962,420 bags. On the basis of an average of eight parcels per bag, this would give a sum total of 15,700,000 parcels. Other postal matter carried in Great Eastern steamships during the same period was as follows : To Holland : Ordinary parcel post, 129,657 bags ; letter mails, 68,174 bags. From Holland : Parcel post, 382,206 bags ; letter mails, 154,859 bags ; empty mail bags, 76,021. We thus get, including the figures for the prisoners-of-war parcel post, a grand total of 2,773,337 mail bags, full THE GREAT EASTERN RAILWAY. 907 or empty, carried on Great Eastern steamships to and from Holland during the period mider review, in addition to the foodstuffs and the other items in the goods service as already detailed. Moral Effects. These, in themselves, constituted material benefits the actual value of which it would be scarcely possible to estimate ; but the advantages secured did not end here. Allowance is to be made no less for the moral effect which, as suggested by the Admiralty letter given above, was produced on the Dutch people when they saw the Great Eastern steamers coming into their ports with almost the same regularity as imder pre-war conditions, notwithstanding the determined efforts Germany was known to be making to render it impossible for them to come at all ; and allow- ance must be made, also, for the effect of these things on the mind of the enemy when he began to realise how his plans were likely to miscarry. The combined results of the situation thus brought about suggest, too, the real significance of the~fate that overtook Captain Fryatt, of the Great Eastern steamship Brussels, whose death at the hands of the enemy was a callous, despicable and dehberate crime which has weU been described as " The Crowning German Atrocity." The main facts of the story may, perhaps, here suitably be placed on record, the more so as they would seem to form a sequel to the course of events just narrated. The Judicial Murder of Captain Fryatt. Among those concerned in the working of the Great Eastern Railway Company's steamship services, no one was less likely to be intimidated by Germany's threat, in February, 1915 — that every merchant vessel found in the waters around the British Isles wotdd be destroyed — than Captain Charles Algernon Fryatt, a brave and skilful seaman who was held in high esteem and could be depended upon to maintain in every respect the best traditions of the British mercantile marine. Nor was it long after the making of the threat in question that he had his first encounter with the enemy. This occurred on March 2nd, 1915, Captain Fryatt was then in command of the Wrexham, a Great Central Railway steamer of which use was being made by the Great Eastern Company. On a passage to Rotterdam he sighted in the neighbourhood of Schouwen Bank an enemy submarine then about a mile away. It circled to the northward, signalled to the Wrexham to stop, and made towards that vessel. Captain Fryatt disregarded the signal, altered the course of his ship, ordered the engineers to get the utmost speed out of her, and sent aU the deck hands below to assist the firemen. The maximum speed of the Wrexham was supposed to be thirteen knots ; but the engineers managed to work her up to sixteen knots, and, although chased by the submarine for a distance of forty miles. Captain Fryatt, by skilful seamanship, kept the enemy at such a disadvantage as to deprive him of any opportunity to fire a tor- 9o8 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. pedo. Dodging not only the submarines but the shoals and the floating mines, Captain Fryatt got the Wrexham safely into Dutch waters, though she entered Rotterdam with funnels burnt and blistered and the crew black with coal dust. The master reported that, had it not been for the good work put in by the engineers and the men firing, he could not have escaped ; but his own pluck and skill were recognised by the company, in the presentation to him of a watch which bore the following inscription : — Presented to Captain C. A. Fryatt by the Chairman and Directors of the G.E. Railway Company eis a mark of their appreciation of his courage and skilful seamanship on March 2nd, 1915. Captain Fryatt's next encounter with the enemy, and the one that was made the pretext for the revenge of which he became the victim at the hands of the Germans, occurred a few weeks later, namely, on March 28th, 1915. In command of the Brussels and on a voyage to Rotterdam, he sighted on the afternoon of thai; day a German submarine which was then steering southward at a distance of about four miles but suddenly turned round and began to make in the direction of the Brussels. This it did at a very fast speed, greatly in excess of that which it would be possible for the Brussels herself to attain. The submarine signalled to the Enghsh ship to stop, but by this date the Germans had already sunk twenty-two British merchant ships without warning, and had attempted to sink many others. The tactics of the enemy were, indeed, well shown by the fate allotted to the Elder Line s.s. Falaha on this very same day. Called upon by an enemy submarine to stop, the Falaha did so, and within ten minutes, before all the passengers on her could get into the boats, she was blown up, with the result that 112 Hves were lost. Anticipating what the treatment of his own vessel would be if he obeyed the enemy's signal. Captain Fryatt resolved to save his ship and the lives of those upon her by, if possible, either ramming the submarine or, at least, compelling her to dive. For details as to what followed we may quote from the Great Eastern Railway Magazine for September, 1916 : — He sent down the engineers to get all possible speed ; ordered the crew aft out of the way in case the ship was fired at ; got the chief officer to fire off three socket rockets to make the enemy believe he had a gun, and steered straight for the conning tower of the submarine, then not far away. The latter, seeing his signals ignored and hearing the rockets, immediately submerged. Captain Fryatt steered straight for the spot where the submersion took place, and when he thought he was on top of the enemy saw his periscope come up alongside. He then gave the order to sweep over the periscope, and I have heard that this order was slightly anticipated, the wheel being moved first. The safety of the ship of course depended upon keeping the submarine down — a second chance was not likely to be given to her. The Captain did not feel the ship striking the submarine, but one fireman reported a bumping sensation under the bottom of the ship. The submarine, U 33 as we know now, was one of the large type then coming out, and must have had a remarkable escape. Captain Fryatt thought he must have damaged or sunk it, as he considered it was impossible for it to get clear according to the position of its periscope when it came to the surface. After it passed the Brussels' bridge THE GREAT EASTERN RAILWAY. 909 it came further out of the water, stowing a decided list, after which it disappeared. Although a good look-out was kept, nothing further was seen of it. So brave and gallant an action on the part of the British Captain received well-merited recognition from the Admiralty, who presented him with a watch bearing the following inscription : — Presented by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to Chas. Algernon Fryatt, Master of the s.s. Brussels, in recognition of the example set by that vessel when attacked by a German submarine on March 28th, 1915. The Admiralty also awarded Captain Fryatt a vellum certificate on which it was stated : — The Lord Commissioners of the Admiralty are pleased to express to you their marked approbation of the manner in which you carried out your duty when attacked by a German submariae on March 28th, 1915. For the German naval authorities the defiance on the part of British seamen of the sea-power they had hoped to establish in a supreme degree by reason of their submarine warfare was personified by Captain Fryatt, and, in their sense of the humiliation he had brought upon them in the eyes more especially of the Dutch nation, the brave and gallant Captain became a marked man. He was warned in Rotterdam that the Germans had " sworn to get him " ; but his knowledge of that resolve in no way deterred him from continuing to do his duty. As for the Germans, they were only awaiting an opportunity for attaining the revenge they cherished against him, and that opportunity came some fifteen months after the events already narrated. On the night of June 22nd-23rd, 1916, Captain Fryatt, then in com- mand of the Brussels, left the Hook of Holland for Tilbury with a cargo of food-stuffs and some Belgian refugees. As he did so signals were given from the beach, certain small craft made suspicious movements, and, before the Brussels had got far on her journey. Captain Fryatt saw five German destroyers making towards her. He gave orders that the passen- gers should prepare for the boats, and instructed his chief officer, Mr. Hartnell (who afterwards told the story), to burn all dispatches and other official papers. The last bag had just been destroyed as the ship was taken possession of by German seamen, armed with pistols and bombs. Escorted by the destroyers and, also, by German aeroplanes, the Brussels was taken, first to Zeebrugge and then to Bruges, whence the officers and crew were sent to Ruhleben. A few days later Captain Fryatt and his chief officer were brought back to Bruges, where they were treated, not as prisoners of war, but as criminals. Captain Fryatt was closely questioned as to his action in respect to the submarine on March 28th, 1915, and he stated in reply that, on sighting the enemy vessel, he resolved to save his ship and crew, if possible ; that to turn either to port or to starboard would have meant destruction by torpedo, and that the only course open to iim to adopt was to keep the submarine ahead and force it to submerge. Meanwhile action in the interests of Captain Fryatt had been taken by the British authorities. 910 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. On July i6th, 1916, it was stated in the Amsterdam Telegraaf that Captain Fryatt was to be tried by court-martial at Ghent on a charge of sinking a German submarine. Thereupon the Foreign Office Eisked the United States Ambassador to ascertain by telegraph if the report in question was correct. Sir Edward Grey further wrote : — Sir E. Grey would be greatly obliged if the United States Ambassador at Berlin could be requested by telegraph to take all possible steps to secure the proper defence of Captain Fryatt in the event of the court-martial being held, and if his Excellency could be informed confidentially that his Majesty's Government are satisfied that, in committing the act impugned, Captain Fryatt acted legitimately in self-defence for the purpose of evading capture or destruction. On July 25th Sir Edward Grey wrote again to the United States Ambassador, saying : — Should the allegation on which the charge against Captain Fryatt is under- stood to be based be established by evidence, his Majesty's Government are of opinion that his action was perfectly legitimate. His Majesty's Government consider that the act of a merchant ship in steering for an enemy submarine and forcing her to dive is essentially defensive, and precisely on the same footing as the use by a defensively-armed vessel of her defensive armament in order to resist capture, which both the United States Government" and his Majesty's Government held to be the exercise of an undoubted right. On July 27th, 1916, the Naval Court by which Captain Fryatt was to be tried held its sitting at Bruges. The result was a foregone conclusion. The captain and the chief officer of a captured British ship who were brought to Bruges the first week in July were told by German naval officers in the town that Captain Fryatt and Chief Officer Hartnell were in prison, that the former was to be shot, and that matters would be serious for the latter. Mr. Hartnell's account of the " trial " shows that Captain Fryatt was, indeed, a doomed man from the first. At 4.40 p.m. the two were taken back to the ceUs under a strong escort, and at 6.30 they were told that Captain Fryatt would be shot at 7 o'clock the same evening. Mr. Hartnell was allowed to remain with Captain Fryatt until five minutes before seven. An account of the preparations for what was to follow and of the scene enacted when the brave British seaman met his fate was contained in a report presented the following day to the Bruges Sheriffs' Court and recorded in the minutes of that body.^ The report stated that at six o'clock on the evening of July 27th, 1916, the German Commandant, von Buttlar, summoned the clerk of the Court to his office and gave him an order to the following effect : (i) At seven o'clock that same evening a coffin containing sawdust was to be at the gate of the barracks ; (2) two Sheriffs were to attend at the same time and place in order to witness an execution in the garden of the " Aurore," and (3) a grave was to be at ■once dug for the interment of the person to be executed. A written order ' For a photographic reproduction of an officially-certified extract from the minutes, giving the text, in Flemish, of the report in question, see The Great Eastern Railway Maga- zine for August, 1919. THE GREAT EASTERN RAILWAY. 9I1 for the attendance of the official witnesses was given on a request to that effect being made. In accordance therewith, two members of the Court arrived at the appointed place a few minutes before seven. The con- demned maji was then already 'standing against a wooden post, his face directed towards the firing party. An ofi&cer stepped forward and read out the sentence, a soldier bandaged the eyes of the condemned, and a few moments later the fatal volley resounded. A public notice, in German, Flemish and French, to the following effect was posted up at Bruges : — Notice. — ^The English Captain of the Mercantile Marine, Charles Fryatt, of Southampton, though he did not belong to the armed forces of the enemy, attempted on March 28th, 1915, to destroy a German submarine by running it down. This is the reason why he has been condemned to death by judgment of this day of the War Council o£ the Marine Corps, and has been executed. A perverse action has thus received its punishment, tardy but just. (Signed) Von Schroder, Admiral, Commandant of the Corps de Marine. Bruges, July 27th, 1916. This was followed by the sending out to the Press of an official German telegram in which it was stated : — On Thursday, at Bruges, before the Court-martial of the Marine Corps, the trial took place of Captain Charles Fryatt, of the British steamer Brussels, which was brought in as a prize. The accused was condemned to death because, although he was not a member of a combatant force, he made an attempt, on the afternoon of March 28th, 1915, to ram the German submarine U 33 near the Maas L.V. The accused, as well as the first of&cer and the chief engineer of the steamer, received at the time from the British Admiralty a gold watch as a reward for his brave conduct on that occasion, and his action was mentioned with praise in the House of Commons. On the occasion in question, disregarding the U boat's signal to stop and show his national flag, he turned at a critical moment at high speed on the submarine, which escaped the steamer by a few metres only by immediately diving. He confessed that in doing so he had acted in accordance with the instructions of the Admiralty. The sentence was confirmed yesterday (Thursday) afternoon, and carried out by shooting. One of the many nefarious franc-tireur proceedings of the British merchant marine against our war vessels has thus found a belated but merited example. The assertion that Captain Fryatt was a " nefarious franc-tireur " was, of course, absolutely unwarranted. It could deceive no one except the German pubHc, for whom it was designed. Captain Fryatt had not, as a civilian, voluntarily made war on his own account. All that he had done was to adopt the only means open to him for the defence of his ship, his own hfe, and the Hves of those around him from an impending attack by the enemy ; and such act of defence was in strict accordance with the law of nations and the estabUshed practice of seafaring peoples. It was, in the words of Sir Edward Grey, " the exercise of an undoubted right," and there was no need at all that Captain Fryatt should " belong to the armed forces " of his country in order that he might exercise a right he already possessed. 9-12 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. The Germans themselves can hardly have failed to recognise the fallacy of their contention when seeking to justify their unjustifiable crime. What they really hoped to do — by an act of frightfulness and ferocity which, as we have seen, they had planned and prepared, with characteristic German thoroughness, down to almost the minutest detail — was (i) to gratify their rage against the captains of British merchant- men for the sldll and bravery they were showing, and (2) to intimidate them from attempting to continue North Sea services which Germany had so great an interest in suppressing by any means, fair or foul, she could possibly adopt. These two-fold objects it was sought to obtain by the judicial mmrder of Captain Fryatt for an act that, in itself, was a comparatively minor incident, having regard to all that was happening at sea and on land ; and the speed with which trial, condemnation and execution all took place within the course of a few hours on one and the same day suggested that the German authorities concerned recognised the feebleness of the pretext on which they were acting ; were afraid, in view of the corre- spondence between the British Foreign Ofl&ce and the United States Ambassador, that their victim might escape them, and so had resolved upon putting him to death before there could be any intervention by a neutral Power on his behalf. They achieved their aim in so far as one of the bravest of British seamen suffered martyrdom at their hands, his body riddled with German bullets ; but the dauntless courage which had inspired him became, if possible, even more deeply-rooted among those of his craft and caUing whom he left to carry on the struggle, and the day was to come when the cause in which he had fallen was to be triumphant ; when his remains, brought from Bruges to England were, with every sign of profound national respect, to be conveyed in public procession through the streets of London to a service in St. Paul's Cathedral, and when, in finally committing them to their last resting-place in Dovercourt churchyard, the Bishop of Chelms- ford could most justly declare that " Germany, in the shooting of this brave man, sounded the lowest depths of her national ignonuny." The story of Captain Fryatt is one of those isolated incidents in war- fare which, although relating to the loss of a single life, often constitute an embodiment of some personal quality or of some national character- istic that leads to their standing out more prominently, and commanding a greater degree of public attention, than even the greatest of battles. Thus we find that in the present instance Captain Fryatt personified in many ways the spirit in which his country entered upon the war and fought it to a finish, just as his captors and his murderers typified in an especial degree the aims,, the ideals and the mentality of the enemy. So one may well believe that Captain Fryatt, no less than Edith CaveU, will be remembered and revered as long as any of the Great War traditions bequeathed to future generations are known among men. CHAPTER LXII. GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY. From its southern terminus at King's Cross Station, London, N., the main Une of the Great Northern Railway proceeds in a northerly direction, through Hitchia, Peterborough, Grantham and Doncaster until, a few miles beyond the last-mentioned place, it arrives at Shaftholme Junction, twenty-eight miles south of York. At Shaftholme Junction the Great Northern system, as such, terminates, and the trains for points to the north thereof continue on the North Eastern system, the Great Northern having nmning powers over the North Eastern as far as York. Passing, in turn, over the full extent of the North Eastern from South to North, King's Cross trains for Scotland join, in due course, the North British, the three Unes in question thus combining to form the East Coast Route between London and Scotland. In the opposite direction the Great Northern Unks up, by means of the " widened lines " of the Metropohtan Railways, via Ludgate Hill, with the South Eastern and Chatham, London, Brighton and South Coast, London and South Western and Great Western Railway, thus further constituting a link in a chain of communications extending from the Far North of Scotland to Dover and Folkestone in the extreme South-East of Er gland. Then from a point three miles north of Peterborough, the Great Nor- thern has a Lincolnshire loop passing through Spalding, Lincoln, Boston (^yhence there are branches serving Skegness, Louth and Great Grimsby), Lincoln and Gainsborough, the main line being rejoined by the loop two and a half mUes south of Doncaster ; though the trains running by this route beyond Lincoln do so over the Great Northern and Great Eastern Joinf Railway. At Grantham the Great Northern is in physical connection with a net-work of railway lines serving the coal- fields and manufacturing districts of Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire and Staffordshire, while Doncaster, fifty miles farther north, is, in turn, a centre from which railways radiate to aU the industrial and commercial centres in the West Riding of Yorkshire, among the places served thereby being Leeds, Bradford, Halifax, Wakefield and Dewsbury, together with all the Yorkshire coalfields. War-time Goods Traffic. So, under these various conditions, the Great Northern became a great conveyer of war traffic, whether poured on to its own system from neigh- 913 914 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. bouring lines or originating on that system itself and passed on, as was, in fact, generally the case, to the southern lines. So substantial, indeed, was the volume of traffic carried that the sum total thereof showed an increase of 125 per cent, over the figures for the corresponding pre-war period. The number of wagons worked by the Great Northern between North and South from the outbreak of the war to the signing of the Armistice was estimated at 3,000,000. As significant of what went on, the fact might be mentioned that, in the earlier stages of the war, the Great Northern ran a special through train daily for the conveyance of ammunition from factories in the North to a southern port for conveyance to France ; but when the output of munitions attained to such great proportions, it became necessary to run either three or four of these special ammunition trains every day in place of the one. The coal traffic from Durham and elsewhere in the North for London and other destinations in the South also became excep- tionally heavy, owing more especially to the diversion to rail of so much of this traffic which had formerly been carried by water. The coal traffic passing, for instance, through the company's Ferme Park coal yard en route mainly to gas, electricity or other public utility works south of the Thames, showed an average increase of about 60 per cent. Another important item, from a traffic point of view, was that of fish, of which, during the war period, the Great Northern brought to London for distribution among the Metropolitan markets over 250,000 tons. In the conveyance of this and other goods traffic, the company took every possible • step they could to ensure the better loading of goods trains, and, quite early in the war, they adopted the system of regulating the flow of traffic so as to ensure that the quantities forwarded by rail were not in excess of the handUng and storage powers at the receiving end. In this way much of the congestion which was threatening to overwhelm a number of terminals was avoided. Passenger Traffic. Then, apart from the very considerable amount of naval and military traffic due to sailors or soldiers passing on a through journey of 200 miles or so across the Great Northern lines to or from points not located thereon, the Great Northern had much to do in connection with camps, etc., estabUshed on its system. Within a few months of the outbreak of war, large miUtary camps were set up at Belton Park and Harrowby, both in the neighbourhood of Grantham, and the traffic to and from these camps had all to pass over the Great Northern. Later on the camp at Harrowby became a special centre for machine-gun training. At CranweU, near Sleaford, there was estabhshed a naval aerodrome on excep- tionally extensive lines, and here the traffic had to be dealt with either by the Great Northern or by the Great Northern and Great Eastern Joint Railway. The Great Northern was, also, much concerned in the heavy traffic passing between London and the large camps at Ripon, Catterick, Clipstone and elsewhere in the Northern Command. GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY. 915 The proportion of service men in uniform carried on the Great Northern was about 60 per cent., as against 40 per cent, of civihans, and special steps had to be taken to ensure the provision of a maximum of possible space for passengers. Among other measures taken in this direction was the transfer from passenger trains to independent parcels trains of all parcels, parcel post or other traffic requiring van accommodation, an increased number of passenger coaches per train thus being run. The system answered so well that on one occasion, at least, the number of passengers conveyed in a single train was no fewer than 1,625. Passenger traf&c on the Great Northern was further swoUen owing to the selection of Boston as the first port used, in the one direction, for bringing home British prisoners of war from Germany, and, in the other, sending back German prisoners of war who had been detained in this country. Early in the war, also, thousands of Belgian refugees were conveyed by the Great Northern Railway to Alexandra Palace, whence they were distributed to further destinations, while later on a large number of special trains with German prisoners were run to and from the same building. An incident of special interest in connection with the war-time traffic on the Great Northern was thus related in the Railway Gazette for February 2ist, 1919 : — Whilst the train services generally during the war have been slowed down, there were occasions on which it was shown that a good turn of speed, when required, was forthcoming, as special trains had occasionally to be run conveying high naval or military officers and representatives of the Government for whom at times of great urgency the quickest passage was necessary between London and the North. One instance of this is historic, that is, the journey of Lord Kitchener on his last fateful mission to join the Hampshire in the Far North. About half an hour after the departure of his Lordship and suite, a representative of the Foreign Office arrived at King's Cross with important documents and stated that he must catch the special as it was necessary for him to sail with the party. There was only one thing to do, and it was done. An impromptu special was hastily arranged — being Sunday evening there was little selection in the matter of engines — but the stafE were told what was necessary, and, the road being cleared, the train was worked to . Doncaster so speedily that it passed the 156 mile-post in the record time of 149 min. (after a 4-min. stop to change engines at Grantham and 4 min. lost by relay- ing). Lord Kitchener, who was advised by telephone what was being done, decided to wait a short time at York for the second special, which duly arrived and enabled the passenger to join the party, with whom he subsequently perished. Emergency Schemes. The Great Northern was naturally concerned in the emergency schemes which had been prepared for the protection of our coast against possible invasion by the enemy, and, under those schemes, the company had, among other things, to be prepared to deal, at a few hours' notice, with 500 troop trains and a proportionate number of other trains bringing all kinds of supplies, while about forty stations on the Great Northern system were scheduled for detraining or entraining. 9i6 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Enlistments. The number of members of the staff who joined H.M. Forces was 10,038, or 30 per cent, of the total staff in August, 1914. Of those who thus joined up, 980 lost their hves from wounds or sickness. On June loth, 1920, a memorial which had been erected by the Great Northern Railway Company was unveiled at King's Cross Station by Field-Marshal Earl Haig, who gave a moving address dealing with the great value of the services which British railwaymen had rendered in the prosecution of the Great Conflict. The memorial, a mural tablet, had been con- structed, in the Ionic style, of black Swedish and Aberdeen grey granite, with statuary marble panels containing, in lead letters, the names of the fallen. War Manufactures. The Great Northern Railway Company actively engaged in war manufactures in their locomotive and carriage workshops, and although the class of work required was totally different from that to which the works were accustomed, so well did the staff set about the task that very valuable assistance was rendered to the authorities at Woolwich through- out the war period. Among other things the company were asked to supply fifty pedestals and mountings for i8-pdr. guns, a weapon which was very urgently required for the arming of merchantmen. The actual gun and recupera- tors were supplied to Doncaster, where the cradles were machined, the pedestals and mountings built, and the whole weapon assembled. Early in the war an urgent request was received from Woolwich for assistance in the production of 13-pdr. high-angle gun mountings to be used on motor-lorries for anti-aircraft service. This mounting, which constituted a delicate and complicated piece of work, consisted of three distinct details, (i) the outer carriage, (2) the inner carriage and (3) the cradle, which details, when assembled, required to be in perfect align- ment. The material for the outer and inner frames was nickel steel of I in. thickness. All parts were machined so that a minimum of weight was attained without sacrificing the rigidity of the mounting. The cradles were manganese bronze castings ; they were bored out for the gun ; the trunnions were fitted and the bearings for the recoil cylinders were bored and screwed. The cutting of this screw made an especially great demand on the skill of the operators. The diameter of the bore was 8 in. and a continuous thread 21 in. long was cut to a gauge which did not allow of a greater error than -0003 in. in the maximum length of pitch. Of the outer frames, 168 were supplied, and of the inner frames, with the cradles, thirty-two. In addition to the work already mentioned, the fitting and turning shops at Doncaster manufactured a large number of various gun parts and equipment. GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY. 917 Base plates on which the 3-in high angle gun rotates were turned, and the hard steel roller race path fitted. These base plates were cut from a rolled steel plate 4I in. thick weighing 46 cwts. ; but the finished base plate, which was in the shape of a ring, weighed 9 cwts. 2 qrs. only. Seventy of these base plates were machined. The arc-elevating gear for the same gun was machined from a soHd plate weighing 2 J cwts. This, was purely a milling job, and a great amount of carving had to be done, the finished article weighing only I qr. 12 lbs. Two arcs were required for each gun — one right hand and on.e left hand arc. In all seVenty-six pairs were supplied. Another milling job undertaken was the " arm deflection " for the sight-rocking bar. For this extreme accuracy was essential, and difficulties were presented by reason of the many angles required. Milled on jigs, the rough forgings, weighing i cwt. each, were reduced to 22 lbs. A total of 104 of these deflections was delivered, and the authorities at Woolwich are said to have been very pleased with the workmanship executed in so difficult a job. In March, 1918, a call was received from the Royal Engineers, Wool- wich, for the complete overhaul of 36-in. searchlight projectors. These were of the naval type with mechanical control, and they were to be converted into hand control for land service. The work was undertaken, thirty-one old projectors which had been badly damaged in service were received at Doncaster, and overhaul and conversion were accomplished in a very short time. In addition to the work already mentioned, a large amount of general equipment was produced. Amongst the latter may be mentioned 100- pdr. high explosive bombs and petrol bombs for the aircraft service, together with fuse cases, powder cases and pack saddlery. The Great Northern Railway equipped its turneries and improvised machines for the production of the 6-in. high explosive shell. At the outset the output of these shells was 250 per week ; but this figure was speedily increased to 1,000 per week, and, in all, 124,000 of the shells were machined at Doncaster. Most of this work was done by female labour, and a satisfactoiy feature was the high quality of workmanship displayed, only 017 per cent, of the total production being rejected because of faulty workmanship. The renovation of cartridge cases was also undertaken by the Great Northern Railway, one of the shops being devoted to this particular work. A special furnace was set up for the annealing of the cases, and special machines were built to meet the various operations through which the cases passed before they were finally examined and passed into service again. At the commencement, men and boys were employed, and a total of 5,000 cases per week was handled. As developments took place, the men and boys were entirely replaced by women. The output was soon increased to 50,000 cases per week, and when the work was closed down no fewer than 4,267,000 i8-pdr. cases and 138,000 naval cartridge cases had been rendered fit for service. 9i8 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. In the machine shops 56,100 fuses and 43,000 adapters for shell were machined. The drop-hammer plant at Doncaster was very busy during the war, 150,000 noses for 6-in. shells, 128,000 base plates for 6-in. shells, 47,000 noses for 4-5 shells, 50,000 rifle bodies, 6,000 rifle noses, 4,000 tank track links, and some thousands of other articles being drop-stamped. The total weight of drop stampings for war purposes was 1,060 tons. In the very early days of the war, the carriage shops supplied 750 ambulance stretchers and subsequently over 900 general service wagons were built. The wagons demanded much attention as the component parts of each vehicle had to be interchangeable with similar parts of other vehicles. The Great Northern Railway Company suppUed two 0-6-2 type Metropolitan side tank engines, fitted with condensing gear, for conversion into armoured engines for coast-defence duties. Twenty-six 6-wheeled coupled goods type engines were supplied for service in France. These engines were fitted with water lifters by means of which the tenders could be fiUed from wayside sources, and Mr. Gresley designed a condensing gear which enabled the driver at will to condense the exhaust steam in the tender tank, or conduct it to the rear of the tender and exhaust it upon the ground. This contrivance allowed the engines to be worked in the foremost areas without attracting undue attention. CHAPTER LXIII. GREAT NORTH OF SCOTLAND RAILWAY. There are two points of view from which the war-work done by the Great North of Scotland Railway — a line whose total length, geographi- cally, is only 334 miles — may be more especially regarded, (i;) the relief afforded to the Highland Railway in the provision of an alternative route between North and South, and (2) the handling of, for a compara- tively small railway, a large volume of traffic which either originated or terminated on the Great North of Scotland's own system. The relative proportions of merit and utility as between these two sets of services are not to be readily defined, and the better way of settling the point is, perhaps, to say that the company are entitled to a double share of compliments and congratulations on what they were able to accom- plish. Relieving the Highland. Assistance could be rendered to the Highland Railway by reason of the fact that the Great North of Scotland connects with the Highland , at Keith, and, for all practical purposes, is — apart from the change of ownership — a continuation of that system, giving an almost direct line of communication from that point to Aberdeen. Thus, when the Highland's trunk line from Inverness to Perth, via Aviemore and Dunkeld, was in a congested condition — and this was almost normally the case as long as the war lasted — ^traffic from' Inverness for the South could be taken by the Highland via Forres and Elgin to Keith and there handed over to the Great North of Scotland, who would, in turn, transfer it to the Caledonian at the station jointly owned by the two companies at Aberdeen — the furthest limit South for the Great North of Scotland, save for the branch line to Ballater. From Aberdeen the Caledonian would carry the traffic on to Perth — a point from which any destination in the South of Scotland or in England would be conveniently reached. From Inverness to Perth, via Aberdeen, meant, of course, a considerable detour ; but during the stress and strain of the mobilisation movements the Great North of Scotland ran, one Sunday, for example, no fewer than twenty-one troop specials off the Highland line from Keith to Aberdeen en route for camps in the South. In the five years from August, 1914, to August, 1919, the Great North of Scotland took 48,440 loaded and 9,033 empty wagons to and from Highland stations for conveyance via Aberdeen instead of via Dunkeld, while the total 919 3P 920 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. engine mileage run by Great North of Scotland engines over the High- land lines during the same period was nearly 500,000 miles. Naval ambulance trains from the Highland line were also frequently run at short notice. Naval Base at Aberdeen. How, in January, 1915, the Admiralty adopted Aberdeen as a base for the forwarding of supplies to the Grand Fleet, and how, between that date and December 31st, 1918, the Great North of Scotland Company hauled, between the Caledonian and North British goods yards no fewer than 67,823 wagons, estimated to contain 297,891 tons of Admiralty traffic, has already been fully detailed in Chapter XXXVII. Admiralty Vessels at Peterhead. Peterhead Harbour, North of Aberdeen, was adopted by the Admiralty as a convenient place for the bunkering of mine-sweepers and other vessels, and thither the Great North of Scotland carried, for this purpose, 16,087 tons of Welsh coal and 72,018 tons of Scotch coal — 88,105 tons all together. Timber Traffic. Large quantities of timber for railway sleepers or pit-props (the former being wanted in France as well as in this country) were cut in the district served by the company. The Canadian Forestry Corps had camps at Kemnay, Knockado and Nethybridge, and in each instance the company provided sidings and worked the trains. A large quantity of timber was also cut by German prisoners at a camp on the Strathspey section of the line. The total amount of timber carried by the company in 1918 was 238,328 tons, as against 56,797 tons in 1913 — an increase of 181,531 tons. Airship Station. The Government erected a large Airship Station at Lenabo, three and a half miles from Longside Station on the branch from Maud to Peterhead. The company built a line to connect with the Airship Station, and the total amount of trafi&c they conveyed to the latter during the war-period was 31,913 tons. Fish Traffic. Prior to the war there was carried on at Peterhead, Fraserburgh, Buckie and other ports served by the Great North of Scotland a consider- able industry in the curing of herrings which, after undergoing that pro- cess, were sent in the autumn and winter months to German and other European markets. With the advent of war this business ceased, and GREAT NORTH OF SCOTLAND RAILWAY. 921 the catches of fresh herrings were, as soon as they were landed, dispatched by. special passenger trains to various markets at home. Much extra work was thus thrown on the railway, the company handling 53,302 tons of fresh herrings in 1918, an increase of 46,215 tons over the total for 1913. Seaborne Traffic. Then, also, owing to Admiralty restrictions and the shortage of ships, practically all the ports on the Great North of Scotland system were closed, and the traffic formerly conveyed by the coasting steamers fre- quenting them was transferred to the railway. Exact figures are not available, but there is reason to believe that the amount of traffic thrown upon the Great North of Scotland because of the stopping of the regular coasting steamers to Peterhead, Fraserburgh, Buckie and Lossiemouth amounted to about 50,000 tons per annum. Government Work. From their locomotive workshops at Inverurie the company supplied the Government with 70 transport wagons ; 350 picketing posts ; 3,500 picketing pegs ; 64,090 adapters for graze fuse No. 100 ; 12,017 grenade dischargers ; 24 regulation ambulance stretchers and four snow-ploughs for service in France. Ambulance Vehicles. Immediately on the outbreak of war the company provided an ambulance train under conditions of great urgency. Later on, two of the company's passenger-train vans were fitted up as naval ambulance vans. In addition to being used by the Admiralty, the vans were fre- quently employed, also, by the Red Cross Society to convey wounded men to convalescent hospitals in the district. Rolling Stock For Overseas. Shortly after the Armistice the company were asked to provide a train of passenger carriages for temporary use in France. They did so, dispatching the train, which consisted of 31 vehicles, on January 17th, 1919. It was returned to them at the end of the following March. CHAPTER LXIV. THE GREAT WESTERN. In the case of none of the leading railway companies do geographical considerations constitute the fundamental basis of their war-time accom- plishments to a greater extent than in that of the Great Western. The location of the Great Western Unes gives at once the key-note of the Great Western situation, so far as war traffic was concerned, and the company had to do great things because, among other reasons, they could not do otherwise. It was essentially a case of noblesse oblige. They had shown much enterprise in acquiring, shortening and improving routes which, though designed expressly for commercial uses, became of incalculable value for the purposes of the war. Such value, too, was especially great in the case of lines forming initial, terminal or connecting links in the iron roads giving continuous rail transport from one end, or from one side, of the country to the other. There was, in the first place, the reponsibility that devolved upon the company in respect to the coaling of the Fleet. The Great Western have direct access to the South Wales coalfield, on which the Fleet was so largely dependent for its supplies of fuel, and though the South Wales railway companies rendered valuable service in collecting loaded coal wagons and bringing them to a common centre, it was upon the Great Western that the task devolved of taking the aggregate supplies, in the form of long coal trains, on to junctions whence they would be conveyed by northern companies to Scottish or English ports. (See pp. 489-492.) The Great Western serves, again, manufacturing districts in the Midlands where the production of small arms, guns, " tanks," railway rolling stock and a vast variety of other war essentials was especially great. In the Salisbury Plain district it was one of the lines adjacent to the collection of military camps, practically covering the plain, through which vast bodies of British or overseas troops passed on their way either to or from the theatres of war. Then the value of the Great Western system was greatly enhanced from the point of its connection with the British Channel ports, including those of Avonmouth, Newport, Cardiff, Barry and Swansea. These are all equipped with modem apphances and would have been capable of rendering good service for war purposes under any possible conditions ; but their utility became especially great in view of the enemy submarine menace which so seriously affected the East Coast ports, though leaving the Bristol Channel ports comparatively immune. As the result of these 922 THE GREAT WESTERN. 923 conditions, the latter ports were much used during the course of the war for the shipment of troops, stores and munitions, for the reception of hospital ships, and for the importation of large quantities of food. Much, if not most, of the traffic thus handled passed in one direction or other over the Great Western system, and considerable advantage, in dealing with it, was derived from the fact that the Great Western Company had long made it their settled policy to provide abbreviated connecting hnks on their lines to the West as substitutes for ^he detours which at one time led certain of their patrons to interpret the symbol " G.W.R." as signifying " The Great Way Round." The naval ports of Devonport and Portland were also used for the embarkation and the disembarkation of troops and for the dispatch overseas of stores and munitions, much of this traffic being conveyed to or from the coast by the Great Western. North to South Traffic. The natural outlets from the country for its war munitions and military stores of every description — as distinct from those required for the use of the Grand Fleet, in Northern waters — were the ports on the south-east and the southern seaboards of England, and, with the Midlands and the North of England as great munitions-producing areas, the rail haul to the said outlets brought into prominence a number of routes which under normal conditions had been comparatively obscure. The most notable, as regarded the northern companies, were those between Crewe, Bushbury, Bordesley and Banbury Junctions, and, in the case of the southern companies, Reading and Basingstoke. The traffic carried over these sections of line comprised every kind of war equipment, including the heaviest guns working on their own gun carriages, locomotives and rolling stock for shipment by Channel Ferries, and tanks and other consignments of a heavy or exceptional character which were restricted from passing between North and South by London routes owing to the limitations in load which those routes entailed. The Bushbury and Basingstoke Route. In the provision of these connecting Hnks in the chains of through communication between North and South, the Great Western Railway Company's chief contribution to the series was represented by what is known as " the Bushbury and Basingstoke Route." In days of peace, when ordinary travel and traffic alone came into consideration, this route was quite a subsidiary one, and few, probably, of the general public knew even of its existence ; but, with the passing of such vast quantities of war traffic, the route attained a position of great national importance. Bushbury Junction, located about a mUe and a half north of Wolver- hampton, connects the Great Western with the London and North Western and allows of goods brought by the latter company from the manufacturing districts of Scotland, West Yorkshire, Lancashire and 924 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Staffordshire passing on to the Great Western, to be taken forward to Basingstoke and there handed over to the London and South Western for conveyance to Southampton, Portsmouth or elsewhere. Then, at Banbury, on the same route, the Great Western connects with the Great Central and can thence take on to Basingstoke goods from the North Eastern and East Yorkshire manufacturing districts for the same ports in the South. At Reading, in the later' stages of the war, large quantities of military consignments from the North or the North East, forwarded by either the Bushbury or the Banbury route, were handed over by the Great Western to the South Eastern and Chatham for transport by the Channel Ferry at Richborough to the Western Front. Most of the shell traffic sent from the mimitions factories at George- town, Aintree, Lancaster and Leeds to Southampton went by the Bush- bury-Basingstoke route, and the traffic was, at times, so great that it became a matter of frequent occurrence for seven special trains, each consisting of fifty wagons, t"o be run in a single day. Then, for the reasons stated above, practically the whole of the out-of-gauge traffic from the Midlands or the North for overseas went by the Bushbury route, as, also, did a large proportion of the locomotives and wagons, supplied by the various railway companies or constructed by private firms, sent to Richborough, Southampton or Portsmouth for use overseas. Government Works and Dep6ts. The volume of war traffic to be dealt with by the Great Western was further greatly swollen by the fact that forty-seven munition works. Government storage depots, aeroplane depots, etc., were established on the Great Western system during the course of the war, while there were, also, 230 private estabUshments, all provided with siding accommoda- tion, where Government work was carried on. At Hayes, Middlesex, there was a sheU-fiUing factory where the average nmnber of wagons dealt with per month was about 3,800. Special trains conveying shells ran daily from Hayes to Southampton and Richborough. The number of trains required to convey the workpeople between the factory and their homes attained a maximum of 103 per day. The greatest number of persons conveyed on a working day was 33,000, though 60,000 were carried in one day on the occasion of a sports carnival held in connection with the factory. The approximate number of passen- gers conveyed in connection with the factory during the war-period was 25,000,000. At Lando, near Pembrey, South Wales, there was a large munition factory to or from which the Great Western carried a sum total of 4,057,000 workers during the war-period. The greatest number carried in a single day was 5,100, and the maximum number of workmen's trains run daily was fourteen. It was from Lando that there was dispatched a traffic peculiar to very few other factories in Great Britain — a traffic, namely, in cordite paste. So highly dangerous was this explosive that exceptional measures had to be taken for its safe conveyance, there being THE GREAT WESTERN. 925 provided for it by the Great Western Company special dust-proof vans which were steam-fitted in order to ensure the maintenance of an even temperature throughout the journey. The traffic was carried in special trains of about seven vehicles each, going from Lando to Faversham and Chilworth (Surrey), via Reading and the South Eastern and Chatham Railway. At Rotherwas, a suburb of Hereford, there was set up a very large shell- filhng factory from which, during the closing years of the war, considerable quantities of shells were dispatched to the ports of Richborough, New- haven, Littlehampton and Southampton. The making up of three special trains of ammunition per day was a frequent occurrence, and there were occasions when as many as five in a single day were forwarded. There was, also, a heavy inwards traffic, in the form of shell cases from the North and the Midlands, together with consignments of many different kinds of explosives. In addition to this, the Great Western had to provide travelling facilities for the many'workpeople employed, the total number of passengers carried to and from the factory in workmen's trains during the course of the war being about 1,978,000. The greatest number on any one day was 7,000. In the case of another large factory, at Avonmouth, the total passenger traffic for the war-period was 2,051,000. Up to 11,700 were carried in a day, while the maximum number of trains run daily was twenty-four. The Mechanical Transport Depot at Slough was only projected in 1918, and construction had not made much progress by the time the Armistice was signed. Inasmuch as ninety of the seven hundred acres over which the depot extended were covered with buildings, there was, in the first instance, much demand made upon the Great Western Railway for the transport aUke of materials and of workmen engaged in construction. On August 7th, 1919, Mr. Kellaway stated in the House of Commons that the number of men employed in the repairing dep6t, including those employed on constructional work by the contractors, was 5,344, of whom 3,882 were conveyed to and from the depot by special trains. To this it might be added that the first special workmen's train to Slough began to run from Paddington on June 17th, 1918. The train service was increased later, and on March 17th, 1919, the trains were run to the new station constructed inside the depot. In February, 1920, the Great Western were running daily two special trains from London and one from Acton and intermediate places to the depot stations, and one from Reading and intermediate stations to Burnham Beeches, which also served the depot. Taking the chief factories served by the Great Western on their own system, including those already mentioned, the sum total of additional trains run daily by the company for the accommodation of workpeople employed thereat was 360. The chief Ordnance Dep6t cqnnected with the Great Western Railway was at Didcot, and this was on such a scale that the total length of sidings laid there by the company was no less than thirty-two miles. Stores were dispatched daily during the war by special trains to Newhaven, 926 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Littlehampton, Southampton, London Docks and Avonmouth. Five specials were frequently sent off in a single day. During the course of one month as many as 18,650 wagons were received or forwarded from this one depot. The average number of wagons worked in and out per day was 209 and 215 respectively. At Swindon a dump for steel billets for shell making was formed. The construction of a subsidiary stores depot at Bramley, Hants, led to the throwing upon the Great Western of a considerable amount of extra traffic in the way of hutments, road metal and other material necessary for camp construction work. Much traffic had also to be worked over Great Western lines for the construction of the National Shipbuilding Yard at Chepstow and Beach- ley. At Chepstow the number of wagons dealt with between March, 1918, and April, 1920, was 34,685, namely, 17,211 inwards and 17,474 outwards, whilst at Beachley the corresponding figures for the years 1918 and 1919, together with the first four months of 1920, were 68,813, made up of 33,974 inwards and 34,839 outwards, a total for the two places during the period mentioned of 103,498. Newbury, situate on the Berks and Hants Une between Reading and Savernake, was used by the Government authorities as a concentration point for supplies of forage, the racecourse being admirably adapted to the purpose. Hay and straw were received in great quantities from the Western and the South Western Counties and were redistributed by special trains to stations in the Aldershot Command. At Newbury, also, there was established a dump for shell cases and steel billets, while towards the end of the war there was further arranged at Newbury a trial ground and storage depot for tanks ; though comparatively little was done there in this direction. Freight Trains. Special Government freight trains run on the Great Western system numbered 63,349. ^^ these, 41,312 carried Government stores and 13,676 conveyed Admiralty coal. The balance (8,361) was made up of trains of wagons which, used for the transit of Admiralty coal in one direction, went back as empties. The stores and war material convejred in the 41,312 freight trains included various kinds of explosives (all requiring special care and regulations for safe transit) ; " tanks " (con- veyed to ports for shipment overseas) ; paravenes (for fitting to ships to prevent contact with mines) ; ammunition (in daily train-load lots) ; large guns (weighing from 50 to 180 tons each and requiring, in some instances, the strengthening of the railway bridges in order that they could pass in safety), together with locomotives and empty wagons dispatched to the ports for use overseas. The distribution of the 41,312 trains over the war-period was as follows : — 1914, 1,460 ; 1915, 5,478 ; 1916, 8,941 ; 1917, 13,201 ; 1918, 12,232. The majority of the Admiralty coal trains were.run from South Wales to Scottish and North-Eastem ports, and the total quantity of coal thus THE GREAT WESTERN. 927 conveyed over Great Western lines down to the signing of the Armistice was about. five and a half million tons. On some occasions as many as nineteen coal specials were rim per day from South Wales to Scotland, while the number per week was seldom below eighty. (See pp. 488-92.) In addition to coal the Great Western caters specially for agriculture, which forms the staple industry of many of the districts it serves ; and the company were, in consequence, directly concerned in the conveyance of great quantities of hay from those districts for the use of Army horses both in France and in this country. For the former some thousands of tons were sent across the Channel every day. In order to meet the requirements 'of the traffic, in its two-fold phase, the company had to allocate thereto no fewer than 2,500 trucks per week, with the necessary sheets and ropes. The sum total of Government freight traffic forwarded from Great Western stations during the year 1918 was 5,000,000 tons. This quantity was, of course, exclusive of traffic originating on other companies' systems and passing on to or across the Great Western system, the work involved in the former class of traffic being naturally much greater than that involved in the latter. How the freight traffic as a whole increased on the Great Western under war-time conditions wiU best be reaUsed if we take the freight- train mileage for 1913 and compare with it the corresponding figures for the five years from 1914 to 1918 inclusive. On the basis of this com- parison it is estimated that an additional 15,000,000 freight-train miles were run during that period. Such increase was, of course, mainly due to Government traffic ; but one has further to take into consideration that the shortage of shipping and the submarine danger combined to throw upon the railway a vast amount of coal and other freight which formerly went by sea, and, also, that the Coal Transport Reorganisation Scheme initiated by the Coal Mines Department added to the pressure of traffic on Great Western lines already heavily burdened. The diversion of traffic from sea to rail meant, for instance, that the Great Western were carrying by rail great quantities, not alone pi coal, but, in connection with South Wales indus- tries, great quantities of tinplates, pig iron, scrap iron, steel billets, iron ore, etc., which would formerly have gone by coasting vessels, and that their new and regular war-time traffics included such examples as the following : — Steel bars, iron ore and scrap, from Frodingham and else- where on the North East coast vik Banbury to South Wales, two trains per day ; iron, from Hawarden Bridge to Southampton, two trains per week ; stone, Ludlow (Salop) to Salisbury, one train daily ; and loco, coal for the London and South Western, the Midland and the South Eastern and Chatham Railways, drawn in larger quantities from South Wales. Among other items were large quantities of Admiralty stores consigned to Newport, Cardiff, and Barry for shipment, and often kept waiting at those ports for further orders, there being, at one time, about two hundred loaded wagons occupying sidings daily at Cardiff on this 928 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. account. As for the Coal Transport Reorganisation Scheme, dealt with in detail on pp. 727-731, this meant for the Great Western Company that in South Wales they had to handle additional quantities of coal equal to, approximately, 58,760 tons per month. Exchange of Wagons at Junctions. The combined effect alike of these increases in traffic and of the changes of route by which the traffic was carried, as compared with normal conditions, is indicated somewhat by the following table, which suggests the extent of the additional strain caused to the Great Western at certain exchange junctions with other companies who, in turn, must have experienced no less the pressure due to the new conditions : — Junction. Exchange of Wagons. 1913 1917 Increase Bushbury . . 89,553 140,132 50,579 Banbury . 226,191 455.145 228,954 Basingstoke 88,203 365,102 276,899 Bordesley • 492,437 519,902 27,465 Crewe • 275,756 361,465 85,709 Salisbury . . 220,830 263,497 42,667 Bristol . 101,456 171,203 69,747 Naval and Military Passenger Trains. The total number of special naval and military passenger trains either provided by the Great Western Company or running over the Great Western system (ambulance trains being included in the latter) from the declaration of war to the close of hostilities was 33,615, namely, in 1914, 3,376 ; 1915, 9,077 ; 1916, 7,904 ; 1917, 6,681 ; 1918, 6,577. Of this total 1,139 were special trains conveying American troops, meiinly from Liverpool and Glasgow, who were on their way to France and passed, in part, over Great Western lines, while an approximately equal number of empty trains had to be returned to the landing ports. AU this American traffic was concentrated within a period of eight or nine months of 1918. For soldiers and sailors travelling on leave a total of 2,145 special trains were run on the Great Western during the period of the war, this figure including 550 trains provided for the Home Forces getting Christmas and New Year leave in 1918-19. However suggestive all these figures in regard to special trains may be of a huge volume of war traffic, they still do not include naval and military passengers and employees in Government Departments who travelled in ordinary trains. The exact number so carried on the Great Western is not known, but it is roughly estimated at " some millions." The accommodation provided in the ordinary public trains was also taxed by the conveyance in them of an immensely increased quantity of personal luggage and of miscellaneous naval and military consignments which either could not go by freight train or else were sent by passenger train as offering the quicker transit when urgency was a matter of importance. THE GREAT WESTERN. 929 The figures are also exclusive of trains run for Government work- people, as shown above, and of the transport of sick and wounded. Ambulance Trains and Ambulance Work. Of ambulance trains for home service the Great Western Company supplied four, each consisting of eleven gangwayed vehicles. Two spare coaches per train were also provided for sitting cases. Of similar trains for overseas the company constructed eight for use by British troops and four for the American Army on the Continent. These trains comprised from fifteen to twenty gangwayed vehicles. Eleven other vehicles were sent for pharmacy cars and for supplementing, as required, the accommodation in the standard trains. Two coaches were also forwarded to France to help in the making up of trains for use in the repatriation of British prisoners of war then in Switzerland. Three of the ambulance trains were exhibited to the public at Padding- ton, Birmingham, Bristol and other large stations on the Great Western system. A charge was made for admission, and the proceeds, amounting to close on £2,600, were divided between the Red Cross funds, the G.W.R. fund for providing comforts for the Railway Troops, and various railway charities. Of ambulance trains conveying sick and wounded the number passing over Great Western lines was about 6,000. Allowing for a similar number of empty trains in the reverse direction, the mileagerun was approxi- mately 1,000,000. The 5,000 loaded trains included 2,848, which left patients at forty-five Great Western stations, as follows : — Stations at which Ambulance Trains were dealt with. No. OF Trains. Avonmouth, Royal Edward Dock 49 Aylesbury 2 Baschurch 2 Berrington 69 Birkenhead 134 Birmingham 200 Bridgnorth 5 Bristol (T.M.) 395 BuUdwas Burghclere Cardiff Cheltenham (St. James) . Chester Codford Denham Devizes Exeter (St. Davids) Gloucester Hereford ...... Highclere Ironbridge Much Wenlock .... 6 2 207 57 62 3 7 6 I 39 13 I 4 2 Stations at which Ambulance No. of Trains were dealt with. Trains Newbury 9 Newport 51 NewLon Abbot 7 Oswestry 9 Oxford 154 Paddington . . . . . .351 Plymouth (N. Road) .... 239 Paignton 99 Portland . , • 36 Reading i^Q Shrewsbury 42 SouthaU I Stourbridge 75 Stratford-on-Avon .... 33 Taplow 116 Torquay 49 Torre 39 Truro 46 Warminster 18 Whitchurch 2 Winchester 38 Windsor 4 Wrexham s 930 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. From the time of the outbreak of hostilities, members of the Great Western Railway Ambulance Centre, which extends to the whole of the company's system, willingly gave their services in every department of ambulance work where the knowledge gained by them in the classes held could be utilised for the benefit of their fellow-men and the successful prosecution of the war. No fewer than 282 members of the Centre served with the various medical units in the Army and Navy, and some of them gained military awards for their devotion to the wounded and general efficiency in the department for which they were equipped by reason of their railway- ambulance training. Those remaining at home did excellent work in the transport of wounded to and from ambulance trains. Information received from all divisions throughout the line showed a great and continued sacrifice of leisure on the part of ambulance men, the work being done by them (gratuitously) in their spare time, and often under conditions which involved the loss or the curtailment of their night's rest. The total number of ambulance trains attended by the Great Western staff to the end of 1918 was 2,658. No figures are available as to the average number of men on duty for each train or the total number who assisted in the unloading of wounded ; but the information concerning those in attendance shows that the men were engaged for an average of from thcee and a half to four hours on each occasion. Much >vas also done by the members of the Centre as orderlies, or otherwise, in hospitals. Great Western Railway men rendered most useful public service, also, in connection with the enemy air raids in London. Members of the G.W.R. Division of the St. John Ambulance Brigade went on duty on the occasion of each and every one of those raids, reporting either at Padding- ton Station (twenty-two occasions), at the St. John Ambulance Head- quarters, St. John's Gate, or at the Westbourne Park PoUce Station (on from fifty to sixty occasions). In this way they were able to deal with many casualties. Their worst experience, perhaps, was in connec- tion with the dropping of bombs on Warrington Crescent, Maida Vale, about three-quarters of a mile distant from Paddington Station. On that occasion four houses were wrecked and a number of people were killed or wounded ; but the members of the G.W.R. Division were quickly on the scene and were able to render valuable assistance, in the form of first aid, to the sufferers. War Manufactures, etc. During the war the company carried out a vast amount of work in their workshops for the War Office, the Ministry of Munitions, Woolwich Arsenal, the Admiralty and a number of private firms who were under contract with the Government. Such work included the manufacture of gun parts, shell parts, shells and bombs, ammunition fuses and cases, THE GREAT WESTERN. 931 spare parts for engines and rolling stock in use overseas, and an almost endless variety of other essentials to modem warfare. A mere catalogue of the items would extend over many pages ; but the following may convey some idea of the extent and variety of the work undertaken : — Completion of 327 6-pdr. Hotchkiss guns, the forgings (rough turned and rough bored) for which were suppUed to the company ; 682 guns of the same type, rifled only, at Swindon ; forty travelling carriages for 6-in. naval guns sent to Swindon for conversion into land use ; carriages for twelve 8-in. howitzer guns, undergoing Uke conversion ; sets for 4-5-in. howitzers, as follows : — 338 (involving 27,662 parts) for the gun carriage ; 1,078 (126,004 parts) for the ammunition wagon ; 1,078 (53.854 parts) for the limber ; and 338 (17,249 parts), for the carriage hmber ; 17,825 hemispherical pressings (mine work) ; unloading, sorting and reloading of steel billets from America ; rolhng of billets -for shells ; reforging of large proof shot to smaller sizes ; roUing of 9-2-in. bars to 3-in. diameter to make i8-pdr. shells ; manufacture from the billet of 265,652 tons of forgings for 6-in. high explosive or howitzer shells, the output thereof being 2,500 shells per week ; or a sum total of 103,127 ; graze fuses complete with adapters, 240,000 ; fuses without adapters, 11,210 ; cast-iron fuses, 45,108 ; gaines, 428,248 ; nose stampings, 144,665 ; fuse body stampings, 83,437 '• ^^-se plate stampings, 76,484 ; fuse adapters, 74,493; base adapter forgings, 5,572; copper bands, 1,863,000 ; cartridge cases (i8-pdr.), reformed, 5,329,000 ; ditto, brazed, 43i328 ; general service wagons, 1,100 ; water tank carts, 50 ; picketing postsf 3,850 ; picketing pegs, 38,000 ; ambulance stretchers, 2,950 ; and a wide range of other items, far too numerous to mention in detail. Road Motor Vehicle Department.' It was in 1903 that the Great Western Railway Company began the use of road motor vehicles as an adjunct to their rail facilities, and the experiment was found so great a success that it eventually developed into a special organisation which had charge of some 230 mechanically- operated vehicles, comprised, generally, within the following classes : — (i) Passenger road-service motors, ' forming a hnk between the railway and outljdng villages or places of interest the construction to which of branch lines of railway would not be practicable, while these services were so greatly appreciated that in the last pre-war year (1913) they conveyed, apart from luggage and mails, 1,590,000 passengers, doing a total mileage of close on 945,000 ; (2) three-ton motor lorries carrying goods and parcels traffic between railway stations and certain country towns ; (3) parcels vans for transfer and collection and delivery work in large cities ; (4) goods lorries and tractors for heavier weights under like conditions, and (5) electric platform-trucks at Paddington Station. An essential feature of the special organisation thus set up was a central depot both for repairs and for the stores which would require to be distributed among the numerous outstation depots established in 932 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. all sections of the Great Western system. The said central depot was located at Slough, and, by arrangements made between the company and the Ministry of Munitions, the staff employed at Slough undertook, from the early days of the war, the repair of Army Service Corps motor lorries and engines, in addition to their other labours. An extension of the premises thus becoming necessary, an existing open shed was converted into a four-bay chassis erecting shop, in which much useful work was done, various types of British and U.S.A.-made chassis and engines being overhauled for the Army Service Corps. Among other services rendered by the staff was, for instance, the overhauling of ten Bema chassis which were next sent on to the company's works at Swindon to have G.W.R. charabanc-type bodies fitted to them, the vehicles being eventually used for the conveyance of munition workers in various parts of the country. In addition to heavy chassis of such makes as Pagefield, Maudslay, Bema and Kelly, a set of Ught Sunbeam chassis — to be used, it was understood, for the conveyance of Ministry of Munitions or other officials about London — were put through the Slough shpps in 1917. While serving as engineer in charge of the company's road-motor department during the war, Mr. George Bulkeley also acted as consulting engineer to a committee of the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries set up for the purpose of providing paraffin engines to a large number of fishing vessels utilised for war service, individual propellers being, also, designed for each in order that the greatest propulsive efficiency, when trawls were being towed, could be obtained. Rolling Stock. In anticipation of the need that was certain to arise for a greater amount of rolling stock suitable for the transport of horses, lorries, guns, limbers and carts, steps were taken by the company immediately on the outbreak of hostilities to adapt a number of their ordinary trucks to these particular requirements. Those so adapted were — For horses : High-sided open wagons . . . . . . .410 For guns, limbers, carts, etc : Unfinished open wagons . . . . . . .101 Sets of twin timber trucks ....... 61 Bogie 45-ft. rail and timber trucks ...... 82 Total 654 Down to the end of 1918 the company had allocated 216,350 of their wagons exclusively to naval and military movements in this country, included therein being a large number of 45-ft. bogie trucks, each of which was equal to three open trucks. In addition to this, the company set aside 638 passenger coaches to meet the requirements of new services run for munition workers. THE GREAT WESTERN. 933 For use overseas, there were furnished 95 engines, 105 tenders, 6,567 wagons, and 238 coaching vehicles. Railway Supplies. In addition to the rolling stock just mentioned the company provided, at the request of the Government, and also for use overseas, more than forty-nine miles of permanent-way complete, with an addition of 50,000 sleepers and spare parts, the aggregate weight thereof being over 15,000 tons. A large amount of permanent -way materials was also found for use in connection with Government factories, military camps, etc., in this country. Requisition of Horses. Under the Army Horse Reserve Agreement, the company were liable to supply the War Office with 221 horses at cost price, plus 50 per cent. These were taken early in August, 1914. In addition, forty other light draft horses were specially requisitioned, and twelve were commandeered at Birmingham, making a total of 273. Enlistments. The number of Great Western men who joined the Colours during the course of the war was 25,479, °^ 32'6 per cent, of the pre-war establish- ment. Of those who thus joined up, 2,129 lost their Uves, or about 8 per cent, of those who enlisted. Three Companies of Constructional Railway Troops, attached to the Royal Engineers, and including twelve ofi&cers, were formed from the staff of the Engineering Department. The first of the three was raised for service in Egypt. The two others were sent to France. Two civilian companies, numbering 287 men, were recruited in 1917, also from the Engineering Department, for railway work to be done in France under the War Office. Employment of Women and Girls. On August 4th, 1914, the Great Western Railway Company employed a total of 1,371 women and girls, namely, 497 on railway work proper and 874 in other capacities, such as waitresses, hotel staff, charwomen, washerwomen, waiting-room attendants, etc. The 497 on railway work proper included 278 who were engaged on clerical duties — mainly typists, shorthand writers, telegraphists and telephone operators. Women and girls had been employed in these particular capacities by the Great Western since 1909. With the steady depletion of aU grades of male workers through enUstments there was brought about a substantial increase in the employ- 934 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. ment of women and girls as substitutes. By August, 1918, the number in the company's service had attained a maximum of 6,345, namely, 5,214 on railway work proper and 1,131 in other capacities. The number engaged on clerical work of various kinds had by then increased to 2,900, or 55'4 per cent, of the total clerical staff, as compared with 37 per cent, when the war began. Other typical grades showed that the comparative totals of women and men employed by the company at the date mentioned were — Porters, 346 women and 1,346 men ; ticket-collectors, 323 women and 155 men ; goods porters, 616 women and 777 men ; carriage cleaners, 594 women and 153 men ; messengers, iii women and 495 men. Steamships. On the outbreak of hostilities the Great Western Railway Company's fleet of steamships consisted of the turbine vessels St. David, St. Patrick and St. Andrew, which were employed on the Fishguard-Rosslare service ; the Great Western, Great Southern, and Waterford, by which the Fishguard- Waterford service was conducted, and the Ibex, Reindeer and Roebuck, which, together with the cargo boats Lynx and Gazelle,- were running the Weymouth and Channel Islands service. Of these eleven vessds, seven, namely, the three turbines and the Roebuck, Reindeer, Lynx and Gazelle, were speedily commandeered by the Admiralty. The turbines were converted into hospital ships, and the four others were attached to the Navy and utilised for various purposes in connection with the Fleets. The equipment of the turbines for the discharge of their new duties was carried out by the company's Marine Factory staff, at Fishguard. It included the making of provision on each ship for 200 cot cases and the construction of lifts by means of which the cots and the patients occupying them could be transferred readily to or from the main and lower decks. When ready for service, the hospital ships, or " ambulance transports " as they were subsequently called, collected sick and wounded at various French ports, such as Rouen and St. Nazaire, and brought them to the ports here from which they were to be distributed among hospitals throughout the country. The total number of patients so con- veyed by them was, approximately, 380,000 and this great and beneficent task was accomplished in a way that met with the highest commendation from the naval, military and medical authorities. The three vessels naturally had some narrow escapes from submarine and aircraft perils when crossing the English Channel ; but the only untoward incident in the record of their services was the sinking of a destroyer by the St. David, though even then there was no loss of life. Subsequent to the signing of the Armistice, the turbines were converted into troopships and used in connection with the demobilisation of the British armies in France. Of the four other vessels commandeered by the Admiralty, the Roebuck, renamed by the Admiralty the Roedean, was lost at Scapa Flow in January, 1915, owing to collision (during unfavourable weather conditions) THE GREAT WESTERN. 935 with a French battleship. The Reindeer, the Lynx and the Gazelle were sent to the Mediterranean and were there used for mine sweeping in the Dardanelles at the time of the attack by the British Fleet, for patrol work, for the chasing of submarines and for a great variety of other naval or military purposes. The Lynx further distinguished herself by ramming an enemy submarine with, it was believed, the desired result. Though retained on her normal Channel Island service, the Hex still did some useful war work. She sank an enemy submarine by gun fire — an achievement for which she was handsomely rewarded by the Admiralty; she was used for a short time as a troopship when, in March, 1918, rein- forcements were being rushed to France to stem the great German advance, and on the cessation of hostihties she helped to bring troops back from France for demobilisation. The five tenders owned by the company at Plymouth were also requisi- tioned by the Government on the outbreak of war. They were used in the examination of ships approaching the port of Plymouth and for the embarkation and landing of troops, the. aggregate pumber they thus transferred between shore and ship, or vice versa, being about 250,000. One of the five, the Atalanta, was also equipped for salvage purposes and rendered good service in connection with the submarine campaign. Another, the Smeaton, was loaned to the U.S.A. authorities at the time of the arrival of the American Forces in France. Notwithstanding the depletion of their fleet, the company maintained all their steamship services during the war (although on a very reduced scale compared with their pre-war services), and they were, happily, able to do so without loss. Some of their vessels, nevertheless, had exciting experiences and narrow escapes, the Pembroke, for example, put on to assist in the service between Weymouth and the Channel Islands, being on several occasions subjected to gun fire from enemy submarines. The continuation of the services, notwithstanding the difficulties and the dangers of the situation, was of great public advantage in regard to the maintenance alike of communications and of the country's food supply. Allotments. The anxiety of the company to encourage the members of their staff in the cultivation of allotments, with a view to ensuring an increased food supply, was shown by the issue of the following notices, under the dates mentioned, and all bearing the name of the late Mr. Frank Potter, then General Manager : — Paddington Station, December, 1916. The company ofier their stafi tenancies of garden ground alongside the railway at an annual rent of ■^d. or /^d. per rod (or perch) according to locality. In the case of any tenancies arranged not later than March 25th next, the land will be granted RENT FREE for two years should it not have been previously cultivated. 3Q 936 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. March, 1917. It has been brought to notice that in some districts the land alongside the railway within the fences is not suitable for cultivation, or is insufificient to meet the applica- tions which have been made by the staff for garden ground. In such cases, where the company own land outside the fences, and such land has been let for purposes other than cultivation, endeavours will be made to obtain possession in order that allotments may be provided. Where this is possible, the land wiU be let to the company's servants RENT FREE for two years in cases of applications received not later than the 31st instant, at the expiration of which period the rent charged will be that prevailing in the respective localities for allot- ments provided by the Local Authorities. January, 1918. In view of the continued necessity for home food production, the Directors have decided to renew the offer of uncultivated land alongside, or adjacent to, the line for use as garden ground on the basis of a rent free period for two years as from the 1st instant, the annual rent thereafter to be ^d. or ^d. per rod (or perch) in the case of land within the fences, and the rents prevailing in the respective districts for allotments in the case of land outside the fences. Each notice gave instructions as to where applications for land were ±0 be made, and the last of the three further stated that arrangements had been made with a firm of seed merchants to supply Great Western Railway employees with collections of vegetable seeds — on, presumably, special terms. The issue of these notices had excellent results. In the pre-war period the number of Great Western men who had taken up allotments on the company's land was 7,653. In the war period this figure was increased by 13,059. Newport Docks and Railway. During the first year or two of the war, the West Coast was, practically speaking, out of the war zone, inasmuch as the activities of the German submarines did not then extend so far. Consequently great use was made of certain western ports for traffic which, in pre-war days, had been received at ports on the East Coast, one of the results thereof being a great increase in the amount of rail traffic requiring to be handled by the Great Western Railway Company. A detailed account of all that occurred in this connection cannot here be given, but some reference should be made to the experiences which the Alexandra (Newport and South Wales) Docks and Railway Company and the Great Western Company mainly shared in common, though the Alexandra Railway Company's Hne to Pontypridd also connects with the Brecon and Merthyr, Rhymney and Taff Vale Railways. Only three weeks before the outbreak of the war, the great sea-lock entrance to the Newport Docks was opened by Prince Arthur of Connaught, together with the remaining section of the large new dock. The entrance lock, which is 1,000 ft. long and 100 ft. wide, and allows of the largest class of vessel being dealt with, is claimed to be the largest sea-lock in the world, while the new dock extension of seventy-five acres of deep water increased the area of the Newport Docks to 136 THE GREAT WESTERN. 937 acres. Once more, therefore, one finds how opportunely important extensions of transport faciHties by private enterprise came in for use by the Government on their going to war. Full advantage, in fact, was taken by the Government of the increased accommodation at Newport, where the ordinary commercial traffic from South Wales and the Midlands was soon being more and more ' displaced by what was essentially war traffic. From Newport Docks, for instance, there were shipped, more especially in the early days of the war, several million tons of South Wales coal for Admiralty purposes. Some 2,000,000 tons of iron ore were, from 1914 onward, imported into Newport docks for distribution, mainly by the Great Western, in the first instance, at least, among the great iron works of the country, on Ministry of Munitions account or otherwise. In March, 1918, Newport attained the position of holding the record for the whole of the United Kingdom in the discharge of iron ore. Another large traffic brought to Newport on Government account for like distribution was nitrate of soda. Of this commodity there were dealt with at Newport between March, 1916, and December, 1918, no fewer than 197,000 tons. Extensive transit sheds were specially erected to facilitate the. traffic, and high records for dispatch were attained. In 1916, the Government decided to establish a large factory at the Alexandra Docks for the purpose of rectifying i8-pdr. and 45 brass cartridge cases. Nearly forty acres of land belonging to the Docks and Railway Company and adjacent to the new lock entrance and South Quay were taken over by the Ministry of Munitions, and a large ware- house covering thirteen acres was erected. A line of steamers was put on to bring the salved shell cases and cartridge boxes from the French and Belgian battlefields to Newport Docks, where the vessels were dis- charged and the material transported by conveyers to the Government factory. There the boxes were repaired and the brass shell cases rectified by an extensive and specially installed plant, and they were afterwards sent by rail to filHng factories inland, the G.W.R. being thus once more concerned in the business. As many as 3,500 women and girls were employed on the work, and the number of boxes and cases dealt with ran into many millions. Apart from the main traffics of coal, pitwood, iron ore, nitrate, etc., a large quantity of miscellaneous traffic on war account, amounting in the aggregate to hundreds of thousands of tons, was also dealt with. Amongst such traffics were " tanks," " caterpillars," locomotives, aeroplanes, motor-cars, guns, ammunition, railway wagons, rails, sleepers, hutments, machinery of all kinds, trench covers, hospital stores and clothing, barges, motor-boats, etc. Large quantities of cereals, flour, meat, bacon, butter, tea, coffee, sugar, oranges, lemons and grapes were also received, including 44,000 barrels of grapes in one consignment. Practically everything passed, in one direction or the other, on the railway. The port was further utilised for disembarking American troops, of whom 1,500 were landed there by the s.s. Miltiades. 938 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Port of Avonmouth. The extensive use made by the Government of the Port of Avonmouth, situate six miles N.W. of Bristol, whose citizens own the extensive and well-equipped dock system provided there, also brought a great amount of additional traffic to the lines of the Great Western Railway Company. The number of special trains dealt with at Avonmouth on Government account during the course of the war ran into thousands. Over 200,000 troops, belonging to the British, Colonial and American Forces, were either received there from overseas, or dispatched thence to various war Fronts, and especially to those in the East. French reservists, Serbian recruits and prisoners of war also passed through the port in large numbers. Of wounded or invalids from the Mediterranean there were received at Avonmouth and sent on mainly to London, Bristol or Manchester by ambulance train, i,6oo officers and 23,500 men. In addition to these, there were received at Avonrnouth by ambulance train 660 officers and 12,000 men who, sent there from various camps or hospitals, had so far recovered as to be able to return to their homes overseas. Altogether, sixty -five hospital ships and 250 ambulance trains were dealt with at Avonmouth. Auxihary cruisers used the port to a large extent, and seamen on leave passed through in considerable numbers. As an example of the troop traffic dealt with, the fact might be mentioned that in the four days, between February 7th and nth, 1916, a division, consisting of 17,973 officers and men and 5,061 horses, with material and equipment, were conveyed to Avonmouth in ninety- two trains and sent overseas in nineteen vessels. Great numbers of motor- vehicles of all descriptions, and more especially the London omnibuses used by the Expeditionary Force in France, were shipped from Avonmouth. Over 130,000 trucks of guns, ammuni- tion, aircraft, tanks, naval stores, etc., were received at Avonmouth from various parts of Great Britain and sent to different Fronts. Inwards traffic from overseas included large quantities of shells, oleum and materials for the manufacture of munitions. The estabUshment of a base supply depot at Avonmouth meant the forwarding inland of some 57,000 truck-loads of food-stuffs, forage, etc. Then a tractor depot was set up on the Dock Committee's estate, with the result that a large number of " caterpillar " tractors had also to be conveyed by train. Many thousands of parcels for the Military Forwarding Officer were taken to the port, thousands of bags of mails were dispatched, while the convojdng of ships and the changes in destination to which they were subjected led to the receipt at Avonmouth of many valuable consignments of bullion. Following on the close of hostilities, there arrived at Avon- mouth, during the first six months of peace, about 1,768 wagon-loads of returned Government stores for transport to various inland destinations. Avonmouth, again, was the port used for the landing of the large number of mules and horses brought to this country from South America THE GREAT WESTERN. 939 and other places overseas, the operations in connection therewith being facihtated by the setting up, at Shirehampton, in the immediate neigh- bourhood of Avonmouth, of a Remount Depot which was itself on so considerable a scale that the Great Western Railway Company had to convey to it over 14,000 tons of building materials, fodder, etc. Alto- gether, over 339,000 mules and horses were landed at the docks and dispatched inland from Avonmouth Dock Joint Station, while 36,500 were received by train at the same station for or from the Remount Depot, including some thousands returned from France via Southamp- ton or Tilbury. Much traffic was also handled in connection with the Government factories at Henbury, Chittening and Avonmouth, and, altogether, the total amount of goods traffic with which the Great Western had to deal at Avonmouth during the war period may be put at over 3,500,000 tons. CHAPTER LXV. THE HIGHLAND RAILWAY. " Certain companies, such as the Highland, have had very heavy burdens thrown upon them in the shape of traffic. ... I think the Highland has been hit more than any other company." In these few words, spoken in the course of the evidence he gave before the Select Committee on Transport in October, 1918, Sir Herbert A. Walker, K.C.B., Acting-Chairman of the Railway Executive Committee, summed up what is probably one of the most remarkable stories of trials, responsibilities and achievements, of a type aU more or less unique in their way, that are to be told of any railway company or any railway administration in the history of the Great War. Starting at Perth from a General Station owned jointly by the High- land, the North British and the Caledonian Railway Companies, the Highland receives there all the accumulated traffic brought by or from important main lines in the South for destinations beyond Inverness, at least. North, in fact, of a line drawn from Aberdeen through Fort Augustus, on the Caledonian Canal, to the West Coast, the whole of the Highlands, save for the section in the North-East served by the Great North of Scotland, is dependent on the Highland Railway Company for rail transport. So it was over the Highland that the vast quantities of naval and military traffic passing to or from the Far North of Scotland — together with much to or from points in the Mid-North of Scotland — had to pass. The Highland, thus called upon to accomplish a great task, is but a small railway, as the world's railways go. In length of line it has no more than 485 geographical miles, and in this figure are included 272 miles of main line between Perth and Thurso, the nearest starting point for the sea journey to Scapa Flow. From Dingwall, on the western extremity of Cromarty Firth, there is a branch, fifty-three miles long,, to Kyle of Lochalsh, from whence steamers go to Portree and Stornoway, as well as to the nearest point on the Isle of Skye — a crossing which takes no more than five minutes. Another branch serves Nairn, Forres, etc., provides an alternative route to the South, and links up, on the East,, with the Great North of Scotland. The Highland also operates two light railways, one connecting the main line with Dornoch, the county- town of Sutherlandshire and a famous golfing centre, and the other extending the real terminus of the Highland Railway, at Wick, to Lybster — a coast line serving a number of fishing villages. 940 THE HIGHLAND RAILWAY. 94t Nor is the mileage of running track supplemented to any material extent by sidings. Of these, on the outbreak of war, the Highland had only seventy-five miles — an extraordinarily small proportion, even for a small line. Then the Highland Railway consists of, mainly, single track, its total length of 485 miles being made up thus : Single track, 411 miles ; double track, seventy miles (including train-crossing loops at stations and elsewhere) ; treble track, four miles. These figures give a track mileage, reduced to single track, of 563. In the 272 miles between Perth and Thurso there are only forty-one miles of double track, and the single- track sections between stations, with no intermediate passing points. 942 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. have lengths of up to twelve miles. By a fortunate chance, the outbreak of war coincided with the completion of the widening of the main line for a distance of six miles from Clachnaharry, one mile west of Inverness, h i I § ! I 3 >■ S 5 SSif •J«S53IS!J « u. ui btctiib iS .-., Perth ySruNLEr Jn: OUNKELD. SIB Fcet. ■^ Pitlochry. 340Feet. \BLJllfl^THOLL. 4i7 ^eer. Drumochter Summit r 1484 Feet. NewroNMORE . HiNaussie . t4s Feet. yJnSMOffe 637 femr. '^^^^^ Slochd Summit. 1315 Feet. ^Moy. Inverness, zsfeft-.- to Clunes, on the southern shore of Beauly Firth ; but this improvement ^till left long stretches of non-widened hnes farther North. THE HIGHLAND RAILWAY. 943 The large proportion of single track on the Highland Railway was attributable in part, at least, to the exceptional difficulties and the unavoidably heavy expenditure by which construction was attended. The Highland Railway might, alternatively, be called " The Highland Switchback." In the journey of 118 miles from Perth to Inverness — both practically at sea level — the railway passes at right angles over the general trend of a series of mountain ranges, attaining at one point on the Grampians, Drumochter Summit (Gaelic : Druimuachdar = " the top ridge "), an elevation of 1,484 feet, the greatest height reached by any railway in the United Kingdom. Between Aviemore (697 feet) and Inverness (29 feet), a distance of thirty-five miles, there is a further rise to 1,325 feet, the summit level of this portion of the line. From Inverness to Thurso the journey of 154 miles is little more than a suc- cession of heavy gradients and exceptionally sharp curves. Not far from Lairg there is a rise of 484 feet above sea level, followed by another of 708 feet when the county of Caithness is entered. Bridges are numerous in all parts of the system, and important northern rivers, such as the Tay, the Spey, the Fihdhorn, the Nairn, the Ness and the Beauly are crossed by long and important viaducts, some of which represent notable engineering achievements. Inasmuch, also, as the Highland line traverses the most mountainous, the most rugged, and, in parts, the bleakest and most desolate region in Great Britain — a region where the climate in winter is often extremely rigorous — ^it is exposfed, and especially so in the Far North, to snowstorms, blizzards and floods of a kind and a frequency not equalled on any other railway in the British Isles. Fighting the Snow. Snowstorms are the subject of precautions which are regarded as especially complete and perfect. Many miles of snow fences, made of old sleepers, have been built alongside the lines in the more exposed situations as a barrier to snow-drifts. When the snow does come, there is an immediate resort to one or other of three types of snow-ploughs — small, medium and large — kept in reserve for attaching to the front of locomotives. If the fall has been comparatively light, or if it should have been undisturbed by the wind, there is no serious danger, and one of the smaller ploughs can generally clear a way without difficulty. The trouble comes when the drifting snow, blown for long distances by winds, gales or bhzzards, has either accumulated to a considerable depth on some open space or been deposited in the railway cuttings, filling them to a depth of, it may be, eight or ten feet. These drifts accumulate with surprising rapidity, and, even when cleared away, they would quickly collect again and refill the cuttings with an impenetrable mass of snow ■unless they were dispersed at short intervals. Occasions arise when it is necessary to bring three powerful locomotives into action, two others being coupled to the one to which the largest-sized 944 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. snow-plough — a construction as broad and as high as the engine itself — has been attached in front. The three locomotives, starting from a point a mile or so distant, and in charge of drivers and firemen experienced in the work, get up full steam and then dash with terrific force into the obstruction. This is known as " the charge." If results are achieved as desired, the snow will be scattered either in immense wreaths on either side or in great clouds — if not, rather, in great eruptions — arising high into the sky, and presenting an impressive spectacle. A clear track for the passing of trains will thus be secured — until still more drifting makes it necessary to repeat the operation. It may, however, happen that the snow is so deep that even the strength of three locomotives is unavailing, and the first of them, with the plough in front, will be so tightly wedged into the solid mass that it cannot be drawn out again. Thereupon gangs of men, who may have been brought together from all parts of the line for the purpose, will be set to work to dig the engines out and clear the cuttings in front to such a depth as will permit of another " charge " being made. When these processes become necessary in a cutting, the men work in three or four " terraces," the snow being shovelled successively from the lowest to each of the higher terraces until it can be thrown clear of the line. The process is a tedious one, since it means the handling four times over of the great masses of snow dealt with ; but it is got through at last. The engines having been freed, a fresh attempt is made, this time, one may hope, with the deserved success ; though it may be a question of only a few hours before the drifts will have filled up the cuttings anew. \Vhen allowance is made for a succession, not alone of snowstorms, but, also, of intense frosts and almost overpowering blizzards, often rendering it impossible for the men to work, and forcing them to seek the protection of the railway carriages which form their temporary lodgings, and when, also, it is borne in mind that snow-plough and relief engines may themselves be subjected to successive buryings and disinterments, then the fact will be realised that, under specially severe conditions of this kind, a week or so may very well elapse before the line in the Far North is sufficiently clear to allow of a resumption of traffic. A Summer Line. Such is the Highland Railway in its winter aspect ; but, under pre- war conditions, it always ranked as a "Summer Line." It worked mainly on a summer time-table operating from July ist to September 30th. This was its " season " ; and in these three months — or practi- cally so — the company looked to reap what harvest they could get out of the patronage mainly of sportsmen, golfers and tourists capable of appreciating some of the finest scenery the British Isles can offer, and not even yet sufficiently known and appreciated. The remainder of the year counted as " winter months " ; and these the staff devoted to THE HIGHLAND RAILWAY. 945 repairs or renewals of engines and rolling stock, together with a " tuning up " of line and plant, for the requirements of the next season. Any suggestion of their ever being called upon to play their role in warfare — apart from a winter struggle with the elements — had probably never entered the minds of the said staff ; yet within a very short time of the outbreak of hostilities it was seen that the Highland Railway, wholly unprepared though it was for any such task, would be called upon to render transport services of almost transcendent value from the point of view, more especially, of the British Navy and of national defence. Railway Work at Invergordon. Of the developments which took place at Invergordon and Dalmore following on the outbreak of war a detailed account has already been given in Chapter XXXVIII. It will naturally be assumed that, under all the conditions there narrated, the traffic at Invergordon, wayside station though it was, must have become prodigious. It did. The normal hours of duty of the railway staff (this was, of course, prior to the introduction of " eight hours "on railways) were from six o'clock one morning until one o'clock the next morning. How such toil as this was got through for the full period of the war is a marvel to those who undertook it — though, be it added, they appeared to remain as full of grit and energy as ever. Let us see, however, what this railway work at Invergordon really amounted to. Taking passenger traffic first, it is interesting to learn that between August 4th, 1914, and the same date in 1919 there were dealt with at Invergordon, in addition to the ordinary train services, a total of 1,02a troop and naval specials, or an average of seventeen per month, exclusive of naval ambulance trains. The troop and naval specials averaged about thirteen vehicles, and generally carried from 300 to 400 men. The average number of patients put on each ambiilance train leaving Inver- gordon was fifty. On two occasions there were specials which brought his Majesty the King on a visit to Invergordon. On another occasion a special was run for Lord French, whose mission was that of making an inspection cf the troops at Invergordon and neighbourhood. Here it may be mentioned, in connection with the troops, that those at Cromarty and Nigg, as well as those at Invergordon, were all supplied with rations from the last-mentioned place, such rations being worked thence to Cromarty by sea and to Nigg by passenger train. Drafts cf soldiers belonging to these training camps were continually passing up and down the line, together with sailors from the Fleet and numerous^ dockyard men. The platforms of the railway station-^-originally intended to deal with only a comparatively small amount of traffic, and, owing to its situation, incapable of reconstruction or enlargement under war- time conditions — ^were frequently in such a state of congestion that it 946 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. was a matter of extreme difficulty for the railway staff to get through their ordinary duties, though, happily to say, not a single accident occurred at the station throughout the whole period in question. Whenever a battleship went into dry-dock at Invergordon for repairs, the officers and men got leave ; and this meant the running of special trains to the South, carriages to make up the trains having to be borrowed from the southern companies and hauled empty by the Highland from Perth to Invergordon. At the expiration of the leave period the process was reversed unless arrangements could be made for full loads back from Invergordon. As the war progressed, Invergordon became a port through which a certain amount of traffic passed between Russia and this country. On October 4th, 1917, there arrived in Cromarty Firth, from North Russia, three vessels, the Tsar, the Tsaritza and the Dvinsk, bringing 161 officers and 2,993 men, mostly Russian troops, with a certain propor- tion of Serbians. They were sent to the South in seven special trains, and they were accompanied by eleven trucks of field kitchens, water- carts and other mihtary gear which they had brought with them. It was understood that, after being fitted up at Winchester — or elsewhere — — they would go on to France.^ By the same three steamers there were brought, also, 300 refugees from North Russia, comprising men, women and children of all ages and of various nationalities, though the majority of them were French. All were sent to London in a special train arranged for by the Home Office. The same train took three vans of baggage belonging to the refugees and another van which contained specie for the Russian authorities in London. On July 9th, 1918, there were dispatched from Invergordon for the South two special trains conve5ring military and other passengers, mainly foreigners, who had come from North Russia in the s.s. City of Marseilles. One train-load consisted entirely of foreign troops, namely : — French : officers, seventeen ; other ranks, seventy-eight. Poles : officers, eight ; other ranks, four. Czechs : officers, two, and one private. Serbs : officers, forty-four ; other ranks, 323. This train was sent to Southamp- ton. The other train conveyed civilian refugees from Russia, namely, three Czechs, eight Poles, fifty-four Serbs, fifty-six Belgians, two Italians, 1 On September 20th, 1919, the White Star liner, Vedic, then being used as a troop- ship, went aground on the Orkney coast when returning from Archangel to Leith with 45 officers and 273 other ranks, British troops ; 10 officers and 500 other ranks, Russian troops ; 327 anti-Bolshevist refugees for Odessa, and 88 refugees of various nationalities for destinations in England. Refloated as the result of the efforts of some American mine-sweepers and other war vessels, the Vedic was towed into Cromarty Firth, and landed all her passengers safely at the New Quay, Invergordon. During their stay at Invergordon — which they left in two special trains for the South on September 25th — ^the foreigners iad a route march in the direction of Alness, singing lustily their stirring national airs as they went along. In reporting the event the Highland News of September 27th, 1919, said : "In this connection it may be stated that this is not the first occasion on which Russian soldiers have been seen on the streets of ' the progressive burgh.' Two years ago — it was not permissible to record the fact at the time — several thousands of Muscovites and Serbs, who had arrived by transport, marched along High Street on their way from the new pier to the railway station, where they entrained for the South." THE HIGHLAND RAILWAY. 947 three Greeks, three Rumanians, six Luxenaburgers, 152 French, and forty-four British. This train, arranged for by the Home Office, went to London. With it there were sent 522 bags of mails from Russia, landed by the same steamer and addressed to all parts of the world. In addition to the troops and civilians who travelled by these two specials, one French officer and seventy-six sick and wotmded Serbs were brought south by a miUtary ambulance train sent to Invergordon to pick them up. Having landed her passengers, the City of Marseilles left again with British troops and Red Cross supplies for Murmansk. Invergordon was, also, adopted on at least two occasions for the dispatch of bullion to some destination overseas. On December 15th, 1916, there arrived from London a special train which consisted of four vans, loaded with bullion, and three saloons, supplemented by one composite carriage, for the accommodation of a military escort. Just about a month later came a second special with three vans of bidlion and a mihtary escort in five corridor carriages. In regard to goods traffic, the average number of loaded wagons received at Invergordon daily during the first three years of war was seventy-two. The loads included great quantities of building materials, among which were plates for the construction of additional oil tanks ; corrugated iron and timber for the Invergordon and Cromarty Camps, both set up in 1915 ; corrugated iron and timber for dockyard workers' hutments, of which thirty blocks were erected in 1915-16, and cement, cement blocks, timber, slates, bricks, baths and all classes of joinery for the cottages, the hostel and the hospital. Other traf&c included thou- sands of tons of gravel from Alness, and thousands of tons of stones for road-making. All such commodities as these were first lodged on the railway sidings and afterwards taken to the hutments or to the Naval Yard ".between trains," as circumstances permitted. The railway arrangements were facilitated by the laying of two miles of contractors' lines ; but consider- able difficulty was experienced in so managing this particular traffic so as not to delay ordinary and special trains. The number of wagons which passed from the Invergordon Station goods yard to the dockyard during the first three years of war was 19,900-. The loads included armour plate, coal, oil, cylinders, bricks, stones, buoys, torpedoes, torpedo nets, anchors, boats, chain cables, cranes, rails, sleepers, contractors' wagons, steam navvies, all kinds of iron, machinery, ships' stores, victualling stores and large quantities of ballast for the area reclaimed from the sea. Between February, 1918, and September, 1918, the traffic on the siding made between the main line and Alness amounted to close on 5,000 wagons. Along the " relief line " from Dahnore to the Naval Yard at Invergordon a train ran three or four times daily with mines for the North Sea. 948 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. The Encampment at Nigg. Down to the time when the war began to bring into prominence so many places of which the wprld at large had never heard before, the diminutive station of Nigg, situate — on the main line of the Highland Railway system — eight miles to the north-east of Invergordon, served, not a town, and not even a village, but a straggling country parish com- prising the agricultural district known as " Easter Ross " — an expanse of fields and pastures broken only here and there by scattered houses, the nearest approach even to a collected group thereof being Nigg Ferry, where some clusters of more or less ancient dwellings sheltered a few hundred souls. The population of the entire parish probably did not exceed about fifteen hundred people. As for Nigg Station, the small amount of traffic dealt with there consisted mainly of grain, agricultural produce and live stock, with just sufficient passengers daily to establish the fact that there really was a resident population. Yet this very unpretending country parish was destined to play in the Great War a part which effected within its limits a transformation scene no less striking in its way than those enacted at Invergordon and Dalmore. Nigg, in fact, suddenly became a place of importance from the point of view of national defence. It overlooks Nigg Bay, at the northern end of Cromarty Firth, and it was marked out from the earliest days of the war as a link in the chain of defences designed to protect the naval base at Invergordon — a base which it always seemed possible the enemy might attempt to raid and destroy. So it was decided that the hills, known as the " Sutor?," guarding the entrance to Cromarty Firth, should themselves be protected and strengthened, on the one side of the Firth by the camp at Cromarty, and on the other side by an encampment to be established on the uplands of Nigg. Nigg was thus one of the first places on the East Coast of Scotland to which a defensive force was sent. That force consisted of the 4th and 5th Seaforths (Territorials). No provision whatever had been made for them in advance, and they went under canvas on a farm about four miles from Nigg Station. After a few days' stay, they left in special trains for Bedford and were replaced by the 3rd Black Watch and the 3rd Scottish Rifles, who also went under canvas. In September, 1914, the military authorities decided to provide huts for the troops, in place of canvas, and the railway lines — which had already become busy with the conveyance, not only of the troops themselves, but of all kinds of stores — were now required to deal with considerable quantities of timber, sheet iron, cement and a varied assortment of other building materials. The small sidings at Nigg were soon unable to cope with the traffic, and the Highland Railway Company had to acquire land for a new and longer siding where the unloading of wagons could be effected at an accelerated rate. The average number of wagons dealt with was about 500 per month until April, 1915, when the building of the huts was approaching THE HIGHLAND RAILWAY. 949 completion. There were, eventually, two camps of ninety huts each. Other buildings were put up alongside by the Young Men's Christian Association and the Salvation Army. Others, again, were designed to serve the purposes of canteens, etc. Each received large quantities of food-stuffs by rail, apart from those sent direct to the camps. From this time the traffic was of a more settled character. It now ■consisted mainly of the usual military stores and camp necessaries, though aU in substantial quantities. Coal alone amounted to about 450 tons a month during the winter period. It was hauled to the camps by traction engines. Other stores, equal to another 250 tons a month, were conveyed between station and camps by horse transport. With the passing along them of all this traf&c, the roads which had satisfied pre-war conditions soon became very trying ; but their condition was improved by the laying of old railway sleepers across them, a fairly solid road being thus provided for vehicles, though the troops never -completely reconciled themselves to the mud and to the long distance between camp and station. In addition to the Nigg encampments, the Royal Marine Garrison at North Sutor was served by Nigg Station and received therefrom periodical consignments of coal, stores, etc., while the officers and men of the garrison made use of the same station on their journeys to and fro. Altogether the population of the district was increased to the extent of about 5,000, and, apart from the expansion in goods traf&c resulting therefrom, the passenger traf&c became so heavy that it was an almost daily experience for the small platform at Nigg Station to be so crowded with men going either on leave or on military journeys that there was scarcely even standing room left for later arrivals. The position be- came still more acute when drafts were being sent away in special trains or otherwise ; and this sometimes happened as often as three times a week. The booking of passengers was a very heavy business for the station staff during the first two years of the war, when each man on leave had to be in possession of a railway ticket ; but the work became much easier in this respect under the arrangement by which soldiers could travel on their warrants, without any need for getting tickets at the stations. From November, 1917, there were a number of changes in the com- position of the troops in the Nigg encampments, involving rail movements on a considerable scale ; but the biggest movement of all came in February, 1918, when the Scottish Command Depot arrived at Nigg from Randals- town, and took over the entire camp as a convalescent centre for the remainder of the war. The Command Depot comprised about 4,000 men, belonging to aU Scottish regiments, and it was over a week before they and the large quantities of stores, medical equipment, etc., by -which they were accompanied could be brought to Nigg by rail. Shortly after this came two contingents of the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps, and these remained until the spring of 1919, when the dep6t began .gradually to close down. Early in the succeeding summer the Board of 950 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Agriculture for Scotland started on the removal of the huts for use else- where as farm buildings ; but this was not done before a night had been spent in them by the German Admiral and his crews who had scuttled the German ships in Scapa Flow and were now on their way to the South. The Nigg encampment had the reputation of being one of the healthi- est, and, apart from the distance to or from the station, one of the most agreeable of camps in Scotland. It was at first laid out on a scale almost regardless of expense (although towards the close of the war the most rigorous economies were enforced and practised), while the cost incurred in other directions must have attained to very con- siderable proportions. In addition to the sleeper-roads by which it was intersected, the camp had a perfect water-supply, good drainage, baths, electric light, recreation rooms and concert rooms. It was, also, beautifully laid out with plants and walks. It became, in fact, having regard to the speed at which it had been raised, a place suggestive of an Arabian Night's dream ; although the stern nature of the purposes it was designed to serve was shown by the miles of trenches dug on Nigg Hill and the adjacent lands either for training or for defensive purposes, by the fact that thousands of cases of cartridges and grenades were used by men undergoing training, and by the barbed-wire entanglements of the most bewildering description which had been constructed all over the district. Our immediate concern here, however, with the story of Nigg, is that of showing still further the magnitude and the variety of the traffic dealt with on the railway which carried all these things, water transport to the hill-encampments not being practicable. It was estimated that the goods and minerals passing through Nigg Station for the camps during the war period amounted to somewhere about 50,000 tons. As for the passenger traffic, the number of men who entrained at Nigg — apart from those arriving there — ^is put at probably 100,000. At least 200 special trains must have been provided for the carrjdng out of military movements, independently of the addition of special carriages to ordinary trains or to the travelling by those trains of soldiers on leave. And all this was done at a little wayside station on a single-track line in the Highlands, where no preparations whatever had been made in advance, and where any pre-war suggestion that so great a volume of business could possibly be handled would have been regarded with absolute though quite pardonable incredulity. Timber Traffic. With the rushing to the Far North of large quantities of timber for boom-defence works to be constructed at Scapa Flow and elsewhere, on the principle of the anti-submarine defences adopted at the entrance to Cromarty Firth, there began a traffic in timber which was to assume huge, if not, in the circumstances of the situation, stupendous propor- tions, and such as, even by itself, without reckoning all the other traffic. THE HIGHLAND RAILWAY. 951 in other directions, would have sufficed to put an extremely severe strain on the available resources of the Highland Railway Company. For the defence works in question something Hke 40,000 fathoms of cable, with floats attached, and about 3,000 anchors, were used. The number of floats, made out of 9'X9"X9" baulks, was, approximately, 100,000. A large proportion of the timber required for them was cut in the North of Scotland, the floats being built and distributed as required ; but great quantities of floats were also taken there by rail — often in complete train loads. Following almost immediately on the transport of boom-timber northwards came urgent, persistent and ever-increasing demands for pit-timber to be sent southwards. The supplies of pit-props, for which the coal-pits of Scotland and England had so long depended mainly on other countries, were steadily becoming more and more difficult to procure on accotmt of the closing of East Coast ports and other war conditions. But in Inverness-shire and elsewhere in Scotland there were extensive areas covered with timber suitable for pit-props, and, inasmuch as coal had in many directions become an indispensable munition of war, it was a matter of great national importance that these pit-props, without which the continued working of the coal-mines could not be assured, should be procurable within the limits of the United Kingdom. Immense quantities of timber were also wanted for railway sleepers, hutments, munition works, and a wide range of other purposes. The increasing gravity of the enemy submarine campaign and the Government restrictions imposed on timber imports, in order to economise shipping, led to the dependence on home-grown timber be- coming greater than ever ; yet while there was an abundance of suitable timber to be procured in the Highlands, there was a great insufficiency of labour available for cutting and preparing it. Happily this difficulty was surmounted to a very material extent by the arrival, as narrated in. Chapter LI, of contingents of lumbermen from overseas. The Canadian Forestry Battahon — afterwards ex- panded into a Canadian Forestry Corps — carried on extensive operations in the Highlands of Scotland as well as in England and in France. The Newfoimdland Forestry Battalion set up a camp between Duhkeld and Dalguise, Perthshire. The New England Sawnaill Units established themselves near to the Highland Company's Bonar Bridge Station, at the head of Dornoch Firth. Similar camps were eventually distributed all over the North of Scotland. Then it was found that there were among the German prisoners in Great Britain a large number who had had experience in forestry work, and in order that their services might be utilised to advantage, these men were collected and formed irito forestry camps, of which one was set up at Carr Bridge and another at Lentran, near Inverness. One effect of all these conditions was that the timber traffic on the Highland, which was more concerned therein than any of the other Scottish railways, assumed enormous proportions, and taxed to the 3R 952 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. utmost the resources of almost every station throughout the system. At those of the stations which directly served the headquarters of any of the forestry camps special sidings and loading-banks for handling the traffic were set up. From these same stations light railways were laid into the very heart of the forests where the timber was being cut. At stations on the Highland system not directly concerned in the loading of the timber difficulty might still be experienced owing to the congested condition to which the traffic reduced the limited amount of space avail- able on the sidings provided there. The best idea of what the timber traffic on the Highland Railway in war time really amounted to will be obtained with the help of a few typical figures. Thus the aggregate weight of that dealt with at Bonar Bridge was over 17,000 tons. At a group of five of the various centres where the Canadians were located, namely, Nairn, Auldearn, Brodie, Forres and Orton, the quantity put on rail was close on 37,000 tons. The Newfoundland Contingent, which at the time of the Armistice comprised two companies, with about 436 of all ranks, produced over 1,000,000 cubic feet of sawn timber, and nearly 1,250,000 lineal feet of pitwood. The total amount of pitwood, round timber, railway sleepers and sawn timber carried by the Highland Railway during the year 1918 was 293,560 tons, the quantities month by month being as follows : — tons July. 30.175 tons August, 29,074 September, 23,214 October, 23,335 November, 22,664 December, 19,320 Other classes of timber carried during 1918, in addition to those here specified, amounted to (approximately) 110,000 tons. This made a grand total for the year of 403,560 tons, an average of 33,630 tons per month. The aggregate was further equal to 80,712 wagon loads of five tons each, or 2,690 train loads of 30 wagons each. Timber traffic forwarded from the Highland system had already shown an average increase of over 300 per cent, in 1917 as compared with 1913. In the summer of 1918 the loading of timber was ten times the amount carried on the Highland under normal conditions. Most of the timber in question went as " free " traffic — ^in other words, was carried on Government account, so that no payment on account of transport would be made to the Highland Railway Company. _ Nor do the 400,000 tons include all the traffic directly due to the timber-felling and kindred occupations. There was, as well, the consider- able amount of passenger traffic to and from the various camps, and there was the transport to the camps of, among other things, furniture, fittings and other necessaries for the hutments ; provisions for the men ; provender for the horses employed in carting timber ; tools ; machinery and January, 14,422 February, 18,623 March, 22,382 April, 29.633 May, 30.839 June, 29,849 THE HIGHLAND RAILWAY. 953 appliances for the saw-mills, and. fuel and lubricating oils for the mo tor - tractors. Other Traffics and Services. Concurrently with the outbreak of hostilities, there began what was to be a long-continued passing of officers and men between the South and Thurso in connection with the Grand Fleet. At first this particular traffic was irregular, lacking in organisation, and the cause of much uncertainty and trouble from a railway point of view. From February 15th, 1917, however, the running of the Euston- Thurso Naval Special every weekday in each direction, on the basis of a regular time-table, with connecting services to and from all other parts of Great Britain, greatly simplified the work involved, though the Highland Railway still, of course, had to take charge of the train on the section of the journey between Thurso and Perth. The train con- tinued running until April 30th, 1919, and carried, altogether, close on half a million passengers. (See Chapter XXXV.) In addition to the camps established at Invergorden, Nigg and Cromarty, others were set up at Tain, Dornoch, Dunrobin and elsewhere on the Highland system. This, again, led to the sending by rail of immense quantities of hutting and tenting material, together with stores, food supphes, fuel, etc. Fish traffic underwent considerable expansion by reason of the fact that supplies formerly sent to the Continent had to be kept at home. In 1913 fish was carried on the Highland to the extent of 9,244 tons. In 1916 the total was 12,008 tons, an increase of 29-90 per cent. From Inverness, alone, in the last three months of 1918, there were forwarded 4,000 tons of herrings. Prior to the war, coal for the North of Scotland, including that which was wanted for drifters engaged in the sea fisheries, was carried almost exclusively by coasting vessels. Owing to the decrease in ship- ping, the increase in sea-going risks and the eventual' expansion of sea freights to three times the amount of the railway rates, the bulk of this traffic was diverted to the railway. There were occasions when nearly all the stations between Inverness and Wick were blocked with coal wagons, loaded or empty, which could not be moved owing to the con- gested condition of the lines. The Highland Railway Company, on whose system there are no coal-fields at all, had, also, to obtain from collieries south of Perth the greatly-increased quantities of locomotive coal they themselves needed for the heavier traffic they were carrying, and the haulage of this coal was in itself no inconsiderable item in the sum total of all that required to be done. Details concerning traffic at Inverness and Kyle of Lochalsh will be found in Chapters XXXIV and XXXVIII respectively. For about twelve months the Highland Hotel, Strathpefter, was occupied by a Young Officers' Training Company. It was afterwards 954 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. commandeered by the Admiralty and used by the U.S. Naval authorities as a surgical hospital. The Highland Company's Station Hotel at Dornoch was taken over in 1915 by the nth Batt. Gordon Highlanders, who were training there for some months. In 1917 the top floor of the hotel was occupied by members of the Canadian Forestry Corps, and the three large garages were sued by them as mess-room, kitchen and stores. Mention has already been made of the occupation by the Admiralty of the company's Station Hotel at Kyle of Lochalsh. Expansion of Traffic and Earnings. The proportions which the sum total of the transport demands made upon the Highland Railway Company really attained can best be shown, perhaps, if we take the two principal items, (i) passengers and (2) goods — as distinct from parcels, live stock and mails — and give, for each year from 1913 to 1918, number or tonnage (inclusive of Government traffic) ; actual receipts, plus the estimated amounts which would also have been received had the company been paid for traffic carried " free " on Govern- ment account, the combined sums being described as " earnings " rather than as " receipts " ; and the total of these earnings in respect of the two classes of traffic in question. Owing to the discontinuance to Railway Clearing House accounts of tonnages, etc., in the returns, together with the absence of other relative data, the figures are, to a certain extent, approximate only ; but they may be regarded as fairly indicative of the general position : — Passengers. Goods, Etc. Total Year. Earnings. (Psgrs. and Number. Earnings. Tonnage. Earnings. Goods.) £ £ £ 1913 2,222,703 243,716 653,589 193,531 437,247 1914 2,292,435 306,872 771,454 213,527 520,399 1915 3,477.787 464,452 928,874 239,608 704,060 1916 4,516,277 577,560 1,134.615 340,539 918,099 1917 3,779,659 598,710* 1,305.659 426,894 1,025,604 1918 3,344,480 632,073* 1.323,437 442,593 1,074,666 * Includes the 50 per cent, increase in fares. The bulk of the traffic thus carried was connected with the war directly or indirectly. Golfers, sportsmen and tourists formed an ex- tremely small, if not a practically non-existent, percentage of the greater number of passengers, and, apart from fish and a few other commodities. THE HIGHLAND RAILWAY. 955 most of the goods and minerals were either conveyed on Government account or had been diverted from sea to rail because of the war. Concurrently with these substantial increases in traffic there had been a steady decrease in staff, owing to enlistments. Before the end of the war the Highland Railway Company had released 668 men, or 25 per cent, of its pre-war total number of employees, for service with the Colours. Then the length of haul on the Highland Railway had to be taken into account. Most of the traffic received at Perth went to Thurso, to Inver- gordon or, at least, to Inverness ; and these places were the starting points for most of the traffic that went via Perth to the South. The average haul on the Highland Railway under pre-war conditions was probably equal to twice the average haul in the more densely-populated districts served by the English lines ; but under war conditions, when the " principal trader " — the Grand Fleet — was in Scapa Flow and Invergordon, any average pre-war haul on the Highland was probably doubled. As for the shareholders of the Highland Railway, they may be excused if, on looking at the " increased earnings " of their line, as shown in the foregoing table, they try to calculate what the advantage to themselves would have been if the far greater amounts thus earned had been paid to their company as distinct from the guarantee only of the net receipts of 1913. Difficulties of the Highland Company. Should the reader have borne in mind what was said at the outset as to the Highland being,. when war broke out, a " summer," and mainly a single-track, line which had not much greater requirements to provide for than the transport of golfers, sportsmen, and tourists for about three months of the year, and had the remainder of the year in which to get ready for its next " season," he will have wondered how not merely the abnormal, but the apparently overwhelming demands upon the company's transport facilities could have been met. Initial difficulties of a really serious type began to develop in the summer and early autumn of 1915. The continuous transport work since August, 1914, had rendered impossible the carrying out of the usual programme in so far as it provided for the repair or the renewal of locomotives during the " winter " months. The locomotives were, partly for this reason, and partly because of the excessive strain to which they were being subjected, breaking down. Nor was it then possible to remedy these conditions. Owing to so many of the engine fitters in the employ of the company having been called up to join the Colours, there were not enough left in the workshops to carry out the repairs, while engines sent to repairing firms in the South were detained so long by reason of the large amount of Government work on hand, to which precedence had to be given, that there was no hope of getting them back 956 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. for at least a year. The actual position at the end of August, 1915, was that out of 152 engines owned by the Highland Company fifty were in such a condition that they had had to be withdrawn, and fifty others were badly in need of repair, though these were still being kept on. Important trains required by the Admiralty could not be provided because there were no more engines available to work them, and there was a prospect of Government traffic being seriously jeopardised unless the difficulties in question could be overcome. Thereupon an appeal was made to the Railway Executive Committee, and the Chief Mechanical Engineers of the London and North Western and the Great Central, the Locomotive Superintendent of the Caledonian and the Locomotive Engineer of the London, Brighton and South Coast were deputed to meet the General Manager, the Engineer-in-Chief and the Locomotive Superintendent of the Highland Railway at Perth, to see what could be done. The other controlled companies were all ex- periencing similar difficulties, more or less ; but the exceptional gravity of the position on the Highland was recognised, and, as the result of the meeting, it was arranged through the Railway Executive that twenty locomotives should be loaned to the Highland by other companies ; that -any fitters whom those other companies could possibly spare should also be loaned, for temporary employment, and that efforts should be made with a view to inducing the War Office to sanction the return to their railway duties of some of the Highland fitters then serving in the Forces overseas. But for the locomotives thus lent (subject to fluctuations in the number from time to time), the Highland Company would, no doubt, have been in great straits so far as the maintenance of transport was concerned, the more so as no success was attained in the way of secur- ing the recall of fitters from the Army or of obtaining fitters from other companies. By the autumn of 1916 the troubles of the Highland had become intensified in various directions. The line was greatly congested with important naval and military traffic, and especially so between Perth and Invergordon. Many of the main-line trains required to be duplicated, or even triplicated, daily. There were then nineteen engines on loan from Southern companies, but forty-two of the company's own engines were either undergoing or awaiting repair. Three crossing loops on the section between Perth and Inverness had had to be closed for lack of signalmen. There were now, also, signs of still another difficulty — and one that was soon to become acute — in the form of a shortage of wagons. During the month of August, 1916, there had been carried from High- land stations a total of 10,000 tons of pitwood, and it was predicted that this tonnage would become much larger in the near future as great quantities of pit -props were being cut at various places on the Highland system. In October of the same year the Home-grown Timber Committee (predecessors of the Timber Supply Department) wanted wagons to carry 50,000 tons of pit-props from Beauly — ^a station near Inverness, THE HIGHLAND RAILWAY. 957 and situate on a single-line section — to Tyneside collieries. In March, 1917, the daily requirements at Highland stations of the Home-grown Timber Committee amounted to about 240 wagons, apart from other large orders for wagons in respect to timber for Scottish and English collieries. By July, 1917, the Canadian and New England lumbermen, the forestry camps of German prisoners, and the employees of private timber merchants were all actively at work, and the position on the Highland Railway then was that the tonnage of pitwood alone, apart from other timber,, had increased from 10,000 to close on 20,000 tons per month. The available wagon supply was totally inadequate to meet the demand, while there was every prospect of still further heavy increases in production. One appreciable measure of relief afforded to the company followed from an arrangement under which a certain amount of traflSc that would otherwise have had to go by the main line of the Highland Railway between Inverness and Perth, via Dunkeld, was passed on to the Great North of Scotland system at Eeith, and went via Aberdeen, instead. In addition, however, to the great expansion in the timber traffic, the fixed goods trains on the Highland had, in July, 1918, increased by 63 per cent. The working of numerous specials had been found necessary in order to clear arrears of traffic ; but the line was still terribly con- gested. So it was that a still further appeal had to be made to the Rail- way Executive Committee. The position at this time was that 850 wagons had already been loaned to the Highland by other Scottish and English Railway Com- panies ; but 200 of these had been recalled by the Glasgow and South Western in order that it .could deal with urgent traffic of its own, and other Scottish companies who- had lent the Highland an aggregate of 500 wagons had intimated that they would require to have them back in the autumn. This would leave the Highland with a remainder of 150 on loan — those borrowed from the South Eastern and Chatham for the special purposes of the Kyle of Lochalsh traffic — whereas the needs of the Highland Company at this time were for 1,300 wagons in addition to those to which it was entitled under the common-user arrangement. It was agreed -that further wagons should be lent to the Highland by various Scottish and Enghsh companies, and from September, 1918, the wagons thus loaned for general traf&c purposes numbered 1,150, exclusive of the 150 for the Kyle of Lochalsh route. It was not long before even these extra supplies were found inadequate ; though the Highland had to confess that, even if it got more wagons, it would not be able to use them owing to the chronic deficiency in engine power from which it still suffered, the twenty locomotives, or thereabouts, that the other companies had alone been able to spare being no less unequal to the Highland's traffic requirements. Nor did the advent of peace render the Highland independent of help from other companies. There was certainly a decline in the naval and military traffic, and especially so after the dispersal of the Grand 958 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Fleet ; but in July, 1919, the timber traffic on the line was almost as heavy as it had ever been. It was even about nine per cent, greater than at the corresponding period of 1918, while thousands of tons were waiting at Highland stations for transport to destination. This may have been due to the fact that, as suggested in the special issue of Timber for June 30th, 1919, the Timber Controller had thought it prudent to cater for the needs of the country for at least six months beyond the abolition of timber control, on March 31st, 1919. The indications were, however, that it would take a much longer period than six months before the timber trafi&c on the Highland Railway reached anything like its normal proportions. Government trafiftc still waiting to go forward from various stations ranged from 15,000 to 40,000 tons at each of them, and this was independent of still greater quantities to be dealt with, for timber merchants, at places practically all over the line. Advantages of Unified Control. The story of how, in spite of its restricted facilities, and in spite of so many hampering circumstances and conditions, the Highland Railway carried so immense a trafi&c, and rendered services of inestimable value in the prosecution of the war, is one that reflects the highest credit upon the responsible railway officers and the staff from whom they received such loyal and strenuous support. It is the story of a compara- tively small railway, little known to the vast majority of English people, but one that accomplished a task distinguished even among the many striking records of what Transport achieved in a World Conflict that has well been called a Railway War. All the same, the fact must be recognised that the results attained are attributable, not alone to the sterling quahties of the Scottish railwaymen concerned, but to the principle on which State control of the railways for the purposes of the war was primarily based, namely, that under war-time conditions the railways of the country should operate as a single unit. __ Thanks to this arrangement, the Highland became part of a State- controlled system of railways, and it had not only the privilege but the right, when grave difficulties arose, to look to its partners in that system for such support and assistance as their own restricted circumstances would permit them to render, while the Railway Executive Conunittee, exercising powers of direction under the authority of the Government, was in a position to arrange that everything either possible or practicable should be done. It was these facts which saved the situation and enabled the Highland to avoid the breakdown that must, otherwise, inevitably have occurred. National Policy and the Highland Railway. In an article published in The Times of Septembei; gth, 1919, Admiral THE HIGHLAND RAILWAY. 959 of the Fleet Lord Fisher announced to an interested world that he was the original discoverer of Scapa Flow. He told how — When once looking at the chart in my secluded room at the Admiralty in 1905, I saw a large inland landlocked sheet of water unsurveyed and nameless. It was Scapa Flow. One hour after I thus gazed on the chart an Admiralty surveying vessel was en route there. Secretly she went, for none but myself and my most excellent friend the Hydrographer knew. No one, however talented, except myself could explain how playing with a pair of compasses I took the German Fleet as the Centre for one leg of the Compass and swept the chart with the other leg to find a place for our Fleet beyond practicability of surprise by the Germans. The Fleet was there at Scapa Flow before the War broke out. . . . Nothing on earth is so deadly to sea fighting as the dispersal in peace time of smaU ships and small squadrons over the face of the globe. A big Fleet and a drastic admiral, and always on their battle-ground, that's fighting perfection ! That's how the Fleet got to Scapa Flow before the outbreak of war, immune from torpedo attack. The story thus placed on record by Lord Fisher is instructive and significant from more points of view than one. It was designed to throw a clearer light on the working of naval poUcy ; but that policy is seen to be characterised no less by its limitations than by its foresight. The fact seems to have been overlooked — or, at least, in no way acted upon — that the choice of Scapa Flow as the battle-ground of the Fleet in the said contingency would, among other things, necessitate the use of long lines of communication to such points on the Scottish coast as were best suited for the transport of men and material, and that between Perth and Thurso the Highland Railway, over which so much of the traffic to be carried would have to pass, had little more than forty miles of double track in a total distance of 272 miles. Nothing whatever was done by the State to improve the land approaches to Scapa Flow ; and this fact may suggest a distinct failure to recognise the part that railways must play even in naval warfare. Possible steps that might have been taken before 1914 were the widening of the main line of the Highland Railway from Perth to the Far North ; the provision of additional sidings, and the rendering of the available traffic facilities better adapted in other ways to future ' requirements. The neglect of our Government to secure an improvement in the Highland Railway's Lines of Communication with Thurso, even in the interests of national defence, pure and simple, might be further com- pared with the action of Germany in her pre-war construction of a perfect network of strategical lines in the direction of, and along, the Russian frontiers, and, also, in her building of new lines, double-tracking existing • lines, and construction of many miles of otherwise unnecessary sidings along the frontiers of Belgium, all for the purpose of facilitating her in- vasion of those CQuntries when " The Day " for which she was preparing should at last arrive. These things have their bearing on the history of the war as an event of the past. They also offer consideration in regards to the future. 96o BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the recent conflict, or any approach thereto, should be renewed at some future time, there must necessarily be a renewal, also, of the Northern Barrage, in order that the Northern end of the North Sea may be " fenced " no less effectively against Germany or any other hostile Power than would be done at the Southern end, namely, in the Straits of Dover. But the construction and the maintenance of this further Northern Barrage could not be guaranteed unless our Grand Fleet once more had its locus in the Orkneys, from which point, no doubt, the barrage would again be stretched across to the coasts of Norway. One may further assume that, in the eventuahty suggested, Cromarty Firth and Invergordon would be made use of for just such services as they have already rendered ; that, with the United States on our side, there would be a repetition of American traf&c via Kyle of Lochalsh, and that we should, for a second time, be more or less dependent on our home-grown timber supply. We are led to the conclusion that the country should profit by the lesson which recent experiences have taught, and not leave in its present state a line of such national importance as the Highland Railway has now proved itself to be. Whatever the future may have in reserve for British railways in general, the one thing needful in the case of the Highland Railway, from the point of view of national policy, is that the doubling of the lines should be carried out as soon as circumstances will permit. Pre- ferably, this should be done as regards the whole of the existing single track between Perth and Thurso. Alternatively, intermediate cabins and crossing loops should be arranged in order to reduce the length of the present single-track sections, and double track should, without fail, be laid between Inverness and Invergordon (a stretch that seemed to be in a state of chronic congestion throughout the war-period) and, also, between Dalwhinnie and Aviemore. These widenings, at least, are absolutely essential if delays in carrying heavy trafldc are to be avoided. CHAPTER LXVI. THE LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE RAILWAY. The system of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway extends right across the North of England from Liverpool and Fleetwood; on the West Coast, to Goole, on the East Coast. Between these two extremes it serves and Mnks up practically every important town in the two counties from which it derives its name, and, while it can hardly claim to have a " main line," in the sense in which the London and North Western, for example, has a main line from Euston to Carlisle, the bewildering network of small railways, joined into one, connects and caters for the greatest of aU the industrial districts of England, its chief goods traffic being derived from the cotton spinning and weaving carried on in Lancashire, the woollen trades of Yorkshire, and the coal-fields of both, not to speak of countless other undertakings making up a per- fect hive of British industries. Goods Traffic. Normal manufactures were naturally greatly upset by the outbreak of war, but within a very short period almost every industrial establish- ment on the L. & Y. system which was able so to do had taken up the production of munitions for our troops. Practically every engineering firm, at least, whether large or smaU, was engaged on Government contracts, and if the Lancashire and Yorkshire found a falling off in the amount of raw cotton and of cotton products they were called on to carry, the difference wels soon more than made up by the conveyance of the raw materials and the finished articles concerned in the supply of the said munitions of war. This development was noticed more or less over the entire system ; but it was more especially marked at Aintree' (Liver- pool), at which place alone there were dealt with by the Lancashire and Yorkshire during the war period 151,678 loaded wagons and 66,141 empty ones, while the total weight of the traffic received or forwarded amounted to 1,039,771 tons. One important item in the list of commodities handled was that of aeroplanes. For the transport of these the Lancashire and Yorkshire had to adapt seventy-nine vehicles specially for their conveyance, and the number of loads so conveyed was 1,327. Coal traffic carried for the Admiralty attained to considerable propor- tions, there being run over the Lancashire and Yorkshire lines during 961 962 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. the course of the war 4,823 special coal trains convesdng 1,736,370 tons of coal in 217,046 wagons. Then at Lathom Patk, near Ormskirk, there was set up one of the largest remount dep6ts in the country, and at this point alone the number of horses received or forwarded over the hnts of the Lancashire and Yorkshire during the course of the war was 515,360. The sum total of the goods traffic in 1918 as compared with 1913 was as follows (in tons) : — 1913- 1918. Goods 7,111,907 6,164,576 Mineral ...... 3,436,284 2,570,869 Coal and Coke ..... 15,918,702 14,645,332 Total . . . 26,466,893 23,380,777 These figures would suggest that there was a decrease in the tonnage handled in 1918, as compared with 1913 ; but the fact has to be borne in mind that the tonnage for 1918 does not include " through-through " traffic (neither originating nor terminating on the Lancashire and Yorkshire), although, as a matter of fact, a large amount of such traffic passed in 1918, and this, also, under conditions which entailed a con- siderably longer haulage than the through-through traffic of the pre-war period. There was, again, an increase of 219 miles in the average haul of the accounted goods tonnage, mainly owing to the fact that the practical closing of the eastern ports of Goole and Hull led to a diversion of much traffic from the Yorkshire district to the western port of Liverpool. The diversion of the coal traffic from South Yorkshire to Liverpool resulted, for example, in an increased haulage of 577 miles, whUe the haulage of the heavy coal traffic almost the whole length of the Une, including sections thereof which were among those most densely crowded, led to special attention having to be given to this particular traffic. In addition to this, it was, of course, essential that practically the whole of the empty wagons should be returned to the Yorkshire district. Passenger Traffic. The conveyance of troops was also on a considerable scale. From the outbreak of the war to the end of April, 1919, there were run 5,751 special trains, conveying 22,122 officers and 960,781 men, while 13,707 officers and 1,121,527 men were conveyed by ordinary trains, making a grand total of 2,118,137 officers and men. Of vans and trucks used for military transport 5,268, containing 12,194 tons of guns, baggage, etc., were dealt with. Of ambulance trains 796, conveying close on 134,000 cases, were run over the company's system. At Aintree and Halifax the whole of the work connected with the detraining of the wounded was done by members of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Ambulance Centre. During the opening months of the war detachments of the railway ambulance men at Aintree were THE LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE RAILWAY. 963 also posted to the First Western General Hospital at Fazakerley (Liver- pool) to assist the staff there in conveying the wounded to the different wards of the hospital. Altogether some 400 ambulance trains, with close on 72,000 wounded, and 100 trains, with 15,440 wounded, were received and unloaded by Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Ambulance men at Aintree and Hali- fax respectively ; and inasmuch as a large proportion, at least, of these trains arrived late in the evening or in the early hours of the morning, the service undertaken voluntarily by members of the L. & Y. staff, as an addition to their ordinary railway duties, must have imposed considerable strain upon them, though the help they gave was always gladly and most cheerfully rendered. Comparing 1918 with 1913, the sum total of the passenger traffic carried in those two years was as follows : — 1913 Passengers ..... 69,170,122 1918 do. (ordinary) .... 67,281,252 J918 do. (military) .... 475.552 Total for 1918 .... 67,756,804 War Manufactures. Eight ambulance trains were constructed at the company's Carriage and Wagon Works at Newton Heath, Manchester, namely, two for use in Great Britain, three for the British Expeditionary Forces and three for the United States Army. Of general service wagons, having a carrying capacity of 30 cwts., and consisting of a front and a hind carriage coupled together by means of a perch pole and pin, the company suppUed 723 in the early days of the war. At the same period they also provided thirty-five water-tank carts, which consisted of a circular galvanised tank with a capacity of 118 gEillons, and having on each side a clarifying cylinder to the back of which was coupled a hand-pump used for forcing the vi^ater through' the filters into the large tank, the water being drawn off for drinking purposes through a series of taps placed on a cross pipe at the end of the cart. On the top of the vehicle was carried the suction hose, together with the cork floats and strainers. Store-boxes, for holding pickaxes and shovels, and various other contrivances were also attached to the cart. Picket posts were suppHed to the number of 1,500, and picketing pegs to that of 25,000. Of " rectank " wagons for the conveyance of tanks, forty were built at Newton Heath in 1918, the wagons being used for the conveyance of the tanks direct from this country to the Continent by Channel Ferry. One of the various war manufactures in which the Lancashire and Yorkshire specialised was in the construction of motor-lorries for the Government. There was a great shortage of such lorries towards the end of 1914, and the Government made a request that the Lancashire and Yorkshire would join with the Leyland Motor Company in helping 964 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. to supply the needs of the Army, then being urgently felt. The company agreed so to do, and they undertook to manufacture, for the desired type of machine, the front axles, chassis frames, brake compensating shafts, pedal shafts and gate changes. These units were then sent to Leyland Motors, Ltd., who assembled them, together with the engine and other parts, to make the complete chassis. This done, the chassis were sent to the Newton Heath workshops, where the Lancashire and Yorkshire staff added bodies, canopies and cabs, so completing the lorries, which were then forwarded to destination. This work was carried on for a period of over three years by the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway "Company, Who entered into five successive contracts with the Government in respect thereto. Their output of chassis frames was gradually increased to a maximum of one hundred per week, with a further maximum of eleven complete machines for any one day. The total number supplied by them during the war period was 5,318. Other motor-lorry units provided by the company included — front axles, 2,228 ; brake compensating shafts, 6,108 ; pedal shafts, 3,020 ; gate changes, 1,343 ; bodies, canopies, hoods and cushions, 1,504- In addition to the foregoing, and after conferences with the authorities at Woolwich Arsenal, a multitudinous amount of work was done at the Lancashire and Yorkshire Company's works at Horwich in the way of gun equipments, field carriages and barbettes, included therein being some heavy steel castings and forgings. In respect to steel castings alone, no fewer than 10,000 articles, having a total weight of 850 tons, were made. These castings ranged from gun cradles for 9-2-in. carriage garrison barbettes, weighing about two and a half tons each, down to caps and raising screws for 13-pdr. M.D. mountings, weighing 6 lbs. each. The parts were machined and fitted complete into mountings. The company also provided a number of Hotchkiss guns for the Admiralty, anti-aircraft and anti-submarine gun mountings, and hundreds of master gauges, ranging down to 0'028-in. needles, and correct to 00003 in., in order to pass the severe specifications of the National Physical Laboratory, Teddington. Three new departments were organised at the Horwich workshops to manufacture fuses and shells and for the reforming of cartridge cases. Of the well-known fuses, marks 100, loi, 102 and 103, over 142,000 were cast, rolled and finally machined, the last-mentioned process being done by female labour. The same was the case in respect to 103,000 adapters and 137,000 gaines. Shells up to 13-5 were machined, a portion of the erecting shops at Horwich being utilised to turn out thousands of 6-in. shells, of various marks, by female labour, while the reforming of i8-pdr., 13-pdr. and 6-pdr. cartridge cases by women and girls ran into millions. In regard to i8-pdr. cartridge cases, for example, the output was : Cases reformed, 3,283,607 ; fired primers extracted, 3,146,761. Not only was all this work carried out by the company's own staff, but a number of the members of that staff were, at the request of the THE LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE RAILWAY. 965 Government, liberated for service with the Ministry of Munitions alike at home and overseas. In addition to still other work that was done, a number of 0-6-0 goods engines and tenders were overhauled and fitted with suitable drawgear, to comply with French conditions prior to being sent overseas, and a considerable quantity of 6o-cm. light-railway material, consisting^ of points and crossings, sleepers and fishplates, was made, assembled and dispatched overseas. The fact might be added that, notwithstanding the execution of aU these extensive and varied manufactures on Government account, the company carried on their usual routine of locomotive, - carriage and wagon repairs; they continued the rebuilding and repair of electric motor-cars, etc., and they proceeded with the making of the electric stock for the Manchester and Bury electrification. L. & Y. Steamships : The Story of Zeebrugge. The Lancashire and Yorkshire were the railway company which had the largest number of steamships on the outbreak of war. They owned twenty-eight cargo and passenger vessels, and they were joint owners with the London and North Western of five others. The fleet was a dual one, being divided into a west-coast and an east-coast section. The former comprised a service between Liverpool and Drogheda, carried on by the Lancashire and Yorkshire with its own boats, and a service between Fleetwood and Belfast which, originally estabhshed in 1843 by the North Lancashire Steam Navigation Company, was taken over in 1873 by the Lancashire and Yorkshire and the London and North Western, in combination. The east-coast fleet carried on a number of services with Continental ports ; and how these were estabhshed is a matter of some interest from the point of view both of railway enter- prise and of war-time events on the Belgian coast. Having regard to the fact that, as already mentioned, the system of the Lancashire and Yorkshire extends right across England from the West CoEist to Goole, the most inland of British ports on the East Coast, it was to the interest of the company to do aU they could to develop the traffic to and from that port. In 1904, accordingly, they sought for Parhamentary powers to run independent services of steamships from Goole to certain Continental ports ; but while their Bill was still under consideration they adopted the alternative course of acquiring the entire property of the Goole Steam Shipping Company, which, with a fleet of about eighteen steamships, was then trading from Goole to Bruges (via the canal from Ostend), Antwerp, Ghent, Delfziel, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Hamburg, and Dunkirk. These various services (to which was added, subsequently, one to Copenhagen) were taken over and con- tinued by the Lancashire and Yorkshire from the beginning of 1905, There was, however, another development which the company then already had in view. On September 29th, 1895, there had been great rejoicings in Bruges gee BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. owing to an expectation that the commercial prosperity of this once world-famed city was on the point of revival, inasmuch as the Belgian Government had granted a concession for the building of a ship-canal, six miles in length, direct from Heyst, on the Belgian coast, to Bruges. This canal was to be supplemented, on its western extremity, by an avant-port and a pier which, having a total length of 2,000 yards, would curve round on the north so that the end would be 930 yards from the coast. Quays having a length of over 1,000 yards were to be provided, together with railway lines, warehouses, cranes, etc., and aU the other 'requisites of a modern port designed to become a recognised outlet for the products more especially of the Ghent and Charleroi districts ; to serve as a port of caU for 6cean-going steamships ; to give Belgium a new and supplementary port (reheving Antwerp, but free from the poUtical disadvantages of Antwerp in the approach thereto by the foreign waters of the Scheldt), and, incidentally, convert Bruges once more into a great entrepot for Continental traffic. Financial support was to be given to the scheme by the Belgian Government, the city of Bruges and the province of West Flanders, the remainder of the capital being found by a limited liability company. So it was that the ship-canal to Bruges was built, that Bruges prepared to take on a new lease of life, and that there was constructed on the Bel- gian coast a new port where, in the Great War, some of the most famous deeds in British naval history were to be enacted — the port of Zeebrugge. Cherishing their own particular aspirations, the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company kept a close watch on the development of the scheme in question, and on May 29th, 1905 — within five months, that is, of their starting the aforesaid Continental services, and at the earHest moment when the state of the new works allowed of their so doing — a party of directors and principal officers of the company crossed to Belgium in one of the vessels of the newly-acquired fleet and went in it along the ship-canal to Bruges. There they had an enthusiastic reception from the city and provincial functionaries and the local popu- lace, the Burgomaster heral(Mng their visit as " I'aurore de la renovation commerciale de I'aiicieime Venise du Nord." The Lancashire and Yorkshire did what they could to bring about the fulfilment of this prediction by themselves annexing — ^in a commercial sense — ^first, the port of Bruges, vii the new ship-canal (the old route to Bruges via Ostend had become a very unsatisfactory one), and then, when it had been completed, the port of Zeebrugge. In this later stage, the Lancashire and Yorkshire and the North Eastern Railways, in combination, maintained a service three times a week in each direction between HuU and Zeebrugge Quay during the summer and autumn. Through corridor express boat trains ran between the principal towns on the two railway systems and the North Eastern Riverside Quay station at Hull, while on Zeebrugge Quay passengers joined a special express train for Bruges, Ghent, or Brussels, with connections at Brussels for all parts of Belgium and important towns in Germany and Switzerland. THE LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE RAILWAY. 967 The effect, therefore, of the enterprise of Belgium, on the one hand, and that of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company on the other, was to open a new gateway to Northern and Central Europe. The L. & Y. increased their original east-coast fleet from eighteen to twenty- six by the addition of some modern and up-to-date boats suitable for all trades, and on the outbreak of the war the company had weekly sailings of steamers as follows : — From Goole : Five to Hamburg ; six to HoUand (Rotterdam, three ; Amsterdam, two ; Delfziel, one) ; six to Belgium (Antwerp, three ; Ghent, two ; Bruges, one) ; one to France (Dunkirk), and one to Denmark (Copenhagen). From Hull : Three to Zeebrugge. By these various steamers large quantities of coal and general goods were carried. The sailings of the company's fleet between Goole and the Continent were suspended on and from July 29th, 1914. Four of the vessels were then at Hamburg and one was at Copenhagen. Of the four, two, after much difficulty, were allowed to leave Hamburg in ballast. They were stopped and turned back several times before getting out of the Elbe, but eventually they managed to arrive safely at Goole. The two others hnd not been completely discharged, and these were detained, their crews being subsequently interned in German camps where most of them remained until the Armistice was signed. One of the two ships in ques- tion was among a number of vessels surrendered by the Germans and brought over to England in December, 1918. The other, according to German records, was lost while in use by the enemy. The steamer at Copenhagen was at first left there ; but, owing to the shortage of ships, the Government (which had taken over the whole of the company's East Coast fleet then available) desired that this vessel should be sent for. Master, officers and engineers volunteered for the work, went to Copenhagen, brought the ship away, and joined a large group of merchantmen which were safely convoyed to this country by British naval forces. As regards the Hull-Zeebrugge service, the first sailing in 1914 was on May 30th, from which date two voyages a week in each direction were made until June 25th, when the number was increased to three per week. The last voyage from Zeebrugge was on Wednesday, August 5th, 1914, the day following the declaration of war by this country. It may be of interest to add, in order to show the extent of the traffic by this route, that during the 1914 season, thus cut short by the war, the company carried 2,684 firsf-class and 1,492 second-class passengers and considerable cargo, consisting principally of fish on the outward and fruit and yeast on the homeward journey. As regards the physical conditions at Zeebrugge, the fact may be mentioned that the steamer employed on the service never experienced any difficulty in entering or leaving at any state of the tide. Excluding the two ships detained at Hamburg, but including the one brought back from Copenhagen, the Government assumed control over twenty-four L. & Y. Continental steamers, and these, together with 3s -q68 SMS^Isa RAILWAYS AJID TUS, SREAT WAR. S«ttnfe of the Wfe"st Gdastiste^Siai^/they'isnsploy-edioi- avariety af >jmj-poses. Vhe 'chief use te which the vessels wete pat was that 'of tral&pbtimg atnmunitioii, aeroplanes, railway carriages, foodsttlffs and war materials •of ■'aJl kinds between tht sdfltherii ports of ^flaaad :a;nd the northern ports ijf F]*a*icie. Soine 'filtet 'the TSte ai colliers ; c^heis conveyed ammunition %o the Gr^ftd Fie^. Two Were pat m. ciKble ivock. 'Oae was first used -as an atmed b(«t-diag ^ip ifi the Neath Sea:; later ;c«i she acted ^as a le&S^t tot- the -Nbf^^giate «fli JEast <3oast •mtim!fy&. After th^e :agfaiig 'of thfe AVfliistiefe, she W^ 'employed •«& ibflngifig tr©6p§ '-back Jfitsm EtSMce to •Soatha^ptoft, 'VS4llst a, 'sistar Ship iM-oafht British tSMsfs iiom^ from ^otterdaiti an.4 'coH'P^eygd -t^atsiated GeHma3i civilian •prisoners to Holland. StiU another of the company's boats was sent to the "Darda- iieUes ahd theFfc -haKi an e^(«ntfui expe'rience. 'She worked m comiefction With the GaHipofi Expeditid^tiaJy Fotee :; icaPtne 'under Are of the Tiiarkish batteries, tho\igh sufiered 5iO the itsmaander of the crews bei«ig saved after SaffeSlig ;great cprtvations. The company were responsible throaghout for the managemeast ®f 1?he'ships, iifcltidittg 1itepfoVisiKniiig^ofth«'Gr^ws, payaieht of^wag^and fepatr '^ashd tipkesp ai v^^s. -The awards imadfe "to masteis, oficeiis ^a/nd isrews-'for services :i:eiideTed, Slid 'the e'*{j^®ides they^had in'the discharge -of their ^iuti^.iinclMded the fdllowtog :-— Capffeatn land «rew-«f 'Steamer .•-^;£ioo for damaging a submarine. -Ga^pitaAa of steamer :-^Gold ^watch fdr encounter -with and supposed sinking of submarine. Captain 6i steamer : — Gol3 watch for 'saving his ship Irom submarine attack. CaptalfiB and crews 'o!f two -Sferamers :— iGiatuities 'f ot ^ictltig tip staplane and 'a«rtipla,ne ^a*t sea. ^CaptatMB vOif iht&e steamers :"-6TBttiit;ies for reporting floatiBg Tmines. Five Chief Officers : — ;£ioo divided between them for sighting submarines. Csvptain and crew of steamer : — Gratuity for salvage of Government ship with cafgo of ammunition.' Cajrtalns and cre^s of four steamers : — Picked up survivors of sunken '■^lip. Onte Gstptaito reoeiveia -an aAKiatd of ^2'5. THE LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE RAILWAY. 969 Captain of steamer : — Specially commended in " Gazette " for coolness and presence of mind in collision case. Captains of four steamers : — Had experiences with enemy submarines. Captains of two steamers : — Destroyed floating mines. In addition to the foregoing, one master was awarded the O.B.E. and another the M.B.E. CHAPTER LXVII. THE LONDON AND NORTH WESTERN. Everyone knows that the main streams of traffic on the London and North Western Railway are between Euston and Scotland, via CarHsle and the West Coast Route, in one direction, and between Euston and Ireland, via Holyhead, in another. Every one, consequently, will take it for granted that a vast amount of war traffic must have been carried by the company between these points. The fact is, however, much less generally known that the ramifications of the North Western system permit of cross-currents in these main streams of traffic which were also of great value under war-time conditions, when a heavy strain was being put on the available transport facilities in every possible direction, and not alone by direct main routes. Thus the London and North Western has a branch from Leeds to Crewe and thence on to Shrewsbury, a direct run being afforded between the North-East of England and the West and South- West of England. Lines from Peterborough and Cambridge respectively to Oxford form connecting links between the Eastern Counties and the West and South- West of England. The North Western " Hampstead Junction " hne offers another link for traffic between the East Coast and the West, South-West and South of England. Then, still further, the North London Line — an offspring of the L. & N.W. — is the main artery between the Northern trunk lines and the railway systems South of the Thames. It also serves to link up the Great Eastern and the Great Western. This North London route, as shown in Chapter IX, was used to a very con- siderable extent throughout the war. It became, in fact, an exceptionally busy section of the railway systems of the country, and rendered invaluable service in military movements. So the London and North Western does much more even than con- stitute the main artery of steam communication running through the centre of England between South and North. It serves, in addition, many of the most important centres of industry in the country, and it offered, for the purposes of war traffic, alternative routes for the movement of troops to or from the East Coast which were of much utility and might have been of incalculable advantage in case of emergencies that, happily, did not arise. Peace-time Preparations. Not only for the reasons here stated, was the London and North Western, as a railway system — and apart from certain new works to 970 THE LONDON AND NORTH WESTERN. 971 which reference will be made in due course — ^well adapted to take a leading part in naval and military movements whenever a national emergency did arise, but the company's chief officers had had exceptional opportunities for becoming thoroughly acquainted with the nature of the demands that would have to be met, under these conditions, and the duties and responsibihties Ukely to devolve upon themselves. In this connection the fact may be recalled that when, under the system introduced by the War Railway Council in 1904, the railway companies in general had prepared their Mobihsation Time-tables, it was (except under certain conditions) to the London and North Western that these were sent in order that they might be collated before being forwarded to the War Office. Then the North Western was Secretary Company for the Western Command — and, therefore, directly concerned in the arrangements for all strategic movements by rail within that Command — from 1911 untU the main troop movements had been com- pleted on the outbreak of war in August, 1914. A different system was then introduced, the London and North Western becoming the Secretary Company for the Eastern Command, and, also, for the London District, in addition to the Western Command. Finally, one should also bear in mind that Sir Frank Ree, late General Manager of the London and North Western, took a leading part on behalf of the railway companies in the negotiations with the War Office and the Board of Trade which preceded the formation of the Railway Executive Committee in November, 1912 ; that he was the first Acting-Chairman, and that Mr. L. W. Home, now C.B.E., M.V.O., and Superintendent of the Line on the London and North Western (being promoted thereto, from the position of Assistant Super- intendent, towards the end of 1914), was Secretary of the Railway Execu- tive Committee down to the end of April, 1914, and thus had a complete knowledge of all the arrangements that had been made. This knowledge can hardly have failed to be of great advantage in the carrying out of the various measures devolving upon the North Western itself on the eventful advent of the national crisis which was to show that all these peace-time precautionary measures had not been taken in vain. There was a still further reason for the company's condition of pre- paredness for whatever might happen in the direction in question. The revisions introduced by the War Office in the winter of 1912-13 into the Mobilisation Time-tables of that date were of so drastic a nature, and foreshadowed the prospect of so much work for the individual companies — and more especially for the London and North Western, on account of its " secretarial " position in relation to emergency moves — ^that the Board of Directors created in 19 13 a special department which, attached to the office of the Superintendent of the Line, and placed in charge of Mr. W. E. Bradbury (now M.B.E.), Chief of the Time-table Office in the Southern Division, was to devote itself exclusively to these particular matters. The staff taking over these duties had a very laborious task, involving much overtime, in keeping everything up to date ; but so thoroughly was the work done that when mobilisation became imminent 972 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. at the end of July, 1914, the company were able to send out to each of their District Superintendents, under private cover, an advance copy of the complete North Western scheme, thus giving those officers several days in which to make themselves famihar with the arrangements to be carried out, while the company's special time-tables and working sheets, numbering many thousands, were ready for issue instantly the order for mobilisation was given by the Government. ~ '■- New Works. Mention has been made of new engineering works which had to be carried out in order to adapt to the exigencies of warfare hues or sections of lines originally designed and built to serve only the purposes of peace. It is not to be assumed, however, in the case either of the London and North Western or of any other of the British companies, that the need for such works as those here in question necessarily implied any lack of reasonable foresight, or any actual deficiencies, on the part of railways essentially of a commercial and non-strategical t5^e. The need for a number of these works, whenever the emergency of war might arise, had, in fact, been clearly defined as the result of peace-time con- sultations on the spot between responsible officers of the London and North Western and the military authorities, and plans had been prepared in order that alterations or additional f acihties, not wanted for commercial traffic, could be effected, or provided — and that, too, in good time — ■ immediately the lines had to be operated on a war footing ; though in proportion as the war increased in gravity and necessitated the rai^g ef new armies, the establishment of great camps and the setting up of munition works, etc., on a vast scale, much had to be done tO' meet new conditions that no one, admittedly, had or could have foreseen. So far as related to the provision of new Unks with the lines of. other coanpanies, the London and North Western engineers had to do no more than construct, at the desire of the War Office, the double junction at Gospel Oak between the Hampstead Junction Railway of the North Western and the Midland and Great Eastern Joint Tottenham and Hampstead Junction hne, and the short line connecting the L. & N.W. South Leicester branch mih. the Great Central at Blaby. The eariier of the other works, and those more especially of the previausly-plaimed type, included the construction of temporary landings for entraining and detraining troops at fourteen stations, principally hetweeiL London and, Rugby. In a number of, other instances platforms were extended in order to ensure the provision of adequate accommoda- tion fear long troop trains. In order to deal with military traffic on the single-Hne portiQn- of, the Cambridge Branch, extensioiiais of the passing places at Bhmham artd WtUingtoaa were niccessary. A new passing place was also made between Bedford and Wilington., Junctions and sidings were put dow-n at Bow and Willesden, and, also, at Trefriw, in North Wales; Considerable work was involved in the pro-vision Vm LCWDQN AND' NQRTU WEgTl^N:. 973-. of additional sidings on the Northwich Branch, b^tweeai Nprthwich and Sandbach, and at Edge Hill, Liverpool, incluffejg stacking-ground accommodation at the latter place. The enormous traffic in munitions manufactured in the Coventry district made it necessary to lay an extensive system, of sorting sidings g-t Three $pire$ Jvinction and Hawkesbuxy- Lane.. These sidings comprised between five and six. miles of perm-swent-way. Others, to se^ve a like purpose, were ■wanted Qia the Coventry and Leamington line,, at Coventry-. Abotst seven, or eight miies; of sidings w^re constructed to deal with, the traffic turned out by the large Goy^n^gi^afe; factory- b,et^5^-e^ Queens^ ferry [nsav Rhyl) and S^indycroft. At Quee»sferry il^^lf a. new station, with platforms 6oq ft. long, had to be provided fo? the ^accommodation oi munition wofkejs coming from places as fa^ aiVay as. Chester apd Holyw^U. Much wa.s done, also, 151 connection with mtmition work?, etc. , in other parts of the, country, Abqu.t four tples of permanent-way were put doivra undej these, cQijditiQiis ajf Ba|ibuii[y. Between two aryj three miles of sidings were laid. in. g-t WsttfQ^d, A seherfie. of sidings was carried oiat on the Coventry a,nd Nuifieaton linq at Foleshill ajftdi Chilvers. Coton, where, also, the company had to erect a footbridge aijd shelters. An electric-staif station and platfor-nfi, shelter was provided at CaUowland Halt^ near Watford Junction. Still other places where special provision was made in cormeetioo with niiunition works included Wq^W Sands, Bicester, Weedos. Soho Pool and b^twe^n Cambridge anij Lpr-ds Bridge, on the e^^ibiidge Branch. For mihtary camps set up at various places (^ th% London and No^th Western system, the company laid in junctions an^ sidtQgs at Hednesfor^ (Briixdley Heath)., Milfoxd and Broctoji, Pr-ees Heath and Foryd (Kinpiel Park). The company further provided a large ritunib^iF of ^hel^rs-^inostly made of did carriage bodiesr-r^nd about i^q sentry boxes for the \^se of the troops or other guards who, in the early days of the war, were assigned by the mihtary authoritifsg the duty of • protecting certain bridges and other structures on iroportaut Unes of communication. J^e use of platelayers' cabins and of gtatioit waiting-rooms was also grated to rneii engaged on these duties. On main lines, branch Unes and sidings, e^^isting, provided or adapted to war-time conditions, as the case plight be, ^nd under the circumstances detailed, the company were required to carry an immense volume of traffic; and, just because the North Western serves so many interests and so many different parts of the United Kingdom, so it was that the traffic in question was as varied as it was great, It included, for example, personnel, guns, horses and army service-wagons ; food for army ba§es ; tanks for overseas or for training parks ; heavy guns, requiring excep- tional conditions of haulage ; exceptional " out of gs^ijge " loads, necessitating special precautions in working ; seaborne coal diverted to the railways ; munitions ; remount? ; engines and rolling stock for overseas, and innumerable other tbinga, ag well- It may be convenient 974 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. if we deal here first with the passenger-train traffic, and see what was done in this direction. Passenger-Train Traffic. Between August 2nd and September 30th, 1914, the number of special trains run over the London and North Western and North London lines (though not necessarily starting or finishing on them) was 2,465, namely, naval and mihtary trains, 1,465 ; Government stores, 751 ; Admiralty coal, 165 ; and miscellaneous (ambulance, prisoners, refugees, etc.), 84. There were conveyed by them 361,798 officers and men ; 63,551 horses and 8,169 guns and transport vehicles. This number of special trains run was exclusive of specials conve5dng empty stock to entraining stations or returned empties from detraining stations. On some days the number of troop trains passing was so large that it was necessary to close certain sections of the line — the North London Railway and the Oxford and Cambridge branches, for example — to ordinary trafi&c. From Ireland to England there was at this time a very large movement of troops, some 70 trains being run from Holyhead or Liverpool to Cambridge and district. The supply of rolling stock and the making-up of troop trains of the required composition was naturally a big task, and this was more especially the case when only comparatively short notice was given for certain large movements ; but in no instance did the company's Rolling Stock Department fail to provide the necessary trains in ample time. Taking the period from the opening of the war to the end of June, 1919, the number of special trains run on the North Western system for the conveyance of troops, horses, guns, etc., by passenger- train services was 38,470. There were conveyed by these trains 14,967,000 officers and men ; 500,000 horses ; 5,476 guns ; 72,868 military transport vehicles ; 45,517 cycles ; and 89,745 tons of baggage. In addition to the 38,000 troop trains proper, 18,000 other specials were run for the conveyance of officers and men on leave, the number so carried being, approximately, 7,300,000. Then there were small units of troops travel- ling, as pre-arranged, in ordinary trains. These numbered 2,864,000. There were, also, many thousands of troops conveyed every week in small units by ordinary passenger-train services, without any pre-arrangement ; but no figures as to the number of these are available. Of special ambu- lance trains and trains with refugees or prisoners of war the number was 13.318. More than 20,000 of the special trains had to be returned empty for re-loading. In aU cases ambulance trains loading up at a port and conveying wounded to inland hospitals had to return empty by the same route. Prior to February 12th, 1919, men on leave who arrived at Euston on their return from the North had to make their way across London to the South Eastern and Chatham Railway in order to join a train for Folkestone ; but on and from that date the London and North Western ran special trains direct from Euston to Folkestone, in order that the THE LONDON AND NORTH WESTERN. 975 men might make the journey with greater convenience. On some days five of these special trains, conveying over 3,000 men, were started from Euston between 5 a.m. and Sam. The total number of specials so run down to the end of June, 1919, was 214, and the number of men conveyed in them was over 93,000. In connection with demobilisation the London and North Western ran, down to the first week of July, 1919, a total of 2,376 special trains, conveying 709,437 officers and men. Demobilisation camps were set up all over the country. To the Frees Heath mihtary camp, situate near Whitchurch, on the North Western system, the company ran, over a single line, from January 3rd, 1919, to the date mentioned, 1,587 special trains, conveying 343,458 officers and men, together with 51 guns and 680 transport vehicles. In the early days of the war there was developed a tendency to consign Government stores by passenger train instead of by goods train, and this practice steadUy increased with the greater production of munitions, the effect thereof on the London and North Western being that at one time the company were running each day four trains between London and Scotland, and four between London and Lancashire, for the conveyance of goods traffic requiring passenger-train transit. Apart from all this military traffic, the requirements of the Fleet on the East and the North-east coast of Scotland led to the development of a considerable traffic in respect alike to personnel and to supplies, and the whole of this was concentrated by the Admiralty on the West Coast Route. Beginning February 15th, 1917, the traffic in question was further faciUtated by the running between Euston and Thurso every week-day in each direction of a special train for the exclusive use of naval officers and men. It continued running until April 30th, 1919, and the mUeage over the London and North Western system alone during that period was 388,700 nules. The number of trains either starting from or arriving at Euston in connection with this " Naval Special " during the period stated was over 1,300. The aggregate number of passengers carried was close on half a million ; though a certain proportion of these would travel between stations North of Carlisle, and not, therefore, on the London and North Western system. (See Chapter XXXV.) The Passing of Troops through Liverpool. Down to the beginning of 1918, the London and North Western dealt with the reception and distribution of practically all troops and transport arriving at Liverpool from overseas; and even subsequently to that date, when the eissistance of other companies had to be called for owing to the great increase in the arrivals, the North Western still had control of the starting and regulating of the troop trains working under the elaborate scheme of operations then more especially needed. On the other hand it must be admitted that the early months of the war did not in themselves call for much strenuous effort in the direction <^> BRITISH RAILWAYS AND- TEK GREAT WAR. stated. Divisions, of troops, with their transporti. Jreirt Jreland:,. aasidt various Biritish battalions from Indiat and other parts, of the worjjd,. were received at, Liveupjool and semt on without oosasioiiittg any paEticmlatt trouble. In May, 1915,- two more divisions arrived fromi Ireland with their transport, followed almost immediately afterwards, by eaarly srrivafe fcomi the Canadian ArrcEy who were di^)aix;hed to; Qrowborotrgh, Shocrudiffe, Tidworth,. Seaford',, ShoreEhami, Famham, Farnborough* MilfoJid (iSlaill^"ey)^ Liphoofc, Bordom, Am3iesbu(r3r,. Purfleet and Stofobs., Jn 1916 the Cana- dians begaani to com)e in maeh greaieB force,, the totab for that year being, of&cers and nurses, 2,542;,. and other ranks,. 54,28oj,. as ccampaared witk 3,73. and 4,660, respectively for the. previous year.. When, alsov the. Irish tromblea occurred in 1916., tie whole; o€ the artillery and transport of the two divisions sent across the ChanioeJ! converged on Riverside Station, Liverpool. It had, been arranged that sixty-four troop trains, should arrive at Lime Stieet Station, and that the) men they brought shomld march therefrom down: tO' the: Landing Stage ; but at the last moment the police thought it would be more prndent ift the troops were all to; detrain at Riverside, and this was arranged accord- ingly. Riverside. Station caja, UBder normal coinditiQns, deal with only one train every half -hour, owing to the fact that the Mae from tbeLfaxdon and North Western's Waterloo Goods. Station iis a. sinigte one and takes ten maroutes for a traiaa toj traverse ; buA, in effect, the trains were con- verging on Riverside at inirtervals of less than haM an boiui, and it becaime necessary to unload them with the uitmaost possdMe speeds The. railway staff was, accordingly, considerably augmented, aaad befoiire long many ol the. trains; were steaming out empty ten minmtes after they had arrived. In 1:9x7 the Canadians came in still greater numbers ; the advance guard of the American Army also, began to. arrive, and amuttaneottsly therewith came Australian and New Zealand troops by way oi the Panama Canal, together with Chinese labourers (over 47,000 in the one year), and 4,000 South Africans. It was, however, in March, igrS, that the big rush of American troops began, and before the end of the year there had arrived at Liverpool, in addition to those coming in 1917, no fewer than 38,873 officers and nurses and 721,270 other ranks. There were, also, nmnerous aixivals of Canadians, though these were not in such great force as the year before. Further contingents of Australian and New Zealand troops arrived, and there were, also, still more Chinese labourers, together with a fair number of Maories and Fijians. It was, of course, the larger convoys of Americans which gave rise to the new problems calling for solution, and in their case the questions at issue were, not alone the numbers in which they came, but the special circumstances attendant upon their arrival. Etown to about the end of March, 1918, the largest convoy of arrivals at Liverpool did not exceed about 5,000, and the London and North Western was fully equal to dealing with this number by itself ; but towards the end of March the rush began in good earnest. It started with American engineering troops, and THE LCBJIBON AMD- NQRTH WESTERN. 977 other units who^ for special reasons, were so mnch. wanted om. the AHied Front that as soon as they' landed, any time dnring March and April, they were sent off direct to Dover or Folkestone in special trains which took precedence, over all others. Very soon, also, the average convoy leachbig Liverpool: had increased to twelve ships, bringing about 22,000 troops. The largest convoy of all arrived on May 31st. It landed 33,000 troops and their baggage, and no fewer than sixty-four trains were needed to carry them to one or other of the destinations assigned to the United States Forces, namely; Winchester, Southamptonv Romsey {HaHts), Codiford (Wilts), Folkestone or Dover. Between the months of April and September, igiSycloseon 800,000 American troops werereceived and entrained at Liverpool, the actual figures, comparing 1917 with rgiS, being as follows : — Year. Officers and Nurses Other Ranks ToTAt 1917 7.698 . . 77.145 ■ ■ 84.^4-3 rgrS 38*873 . . 721,270 . . 760,143 Total 46,571 . . 798.415 • • 844,986 With the great increase in numbers* in 1918,. other railway companies serving Liverpool — the Lancashire and Yorkshire, the Great Central and the Midland,, together with tine Great Western,, at Birkenhead — had to be called on to assist the London and North Western, the stations for entrainment being then fixed as follows : — London and North Western : Riverside, Ca.nada Dock,, Alexandra Dock,, and Birkenhead (Woodsideand Cathcart Street) ; LancasMre amd Yorkshire : Exchange. Station, Bootle, North Mersey and Bankfieid ; Great Central : Central Station, Huskisson Dock, LaE^on Dock, and Walton-on-the-Hill ; Great Western r Birken- head (Woodsideand Cathcart Street). There were, however, many difiiculties. tobe overcome in the carr jnng out of this entrainment. Except as regards the Leviathan- {Vakrland, re-chsEistened),. belong- ing to the U.Si Navy, and the transport vessels Mauretania^ Aquitania, Olympic and the armed escorting cruisers belonging to the British Royal Navy, the American troops were brought across the Atlantic by cargo and food-carrying ships run by shipping companies under the direction of the Ministry of Shipping, which department asserted and upheld the principle that the first call upon the vessels in question was f oodrstuffs,, and that, in turning round to get back to sea, they were not to be delayed by the fact of their halving troops on board. Consequently the most convenient facilities for unloading troops at the Liv^pool Landing Stage could not be made use of if such user meant that the ships would miss the tide in getting into dock. It was, indeed, owing to Liverpool being the chief port for food supplies from overseas that American troops came to England— in the food- earrying ships — mainly by that route. A certain number did, indeed, 978 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. arrive at Glasgow, Manchester, Avonmouth and Newport, "Mon., and there was at least one convoy which reached this country by way of the Thames. The troops thus carried were, however, small in number as compared with those coming to the Mersey, and there is reason to believe that the vessels conveying them consisted in some instances of one or two ships detached from the main convoy coming to Liverpool and sent to other ports for cargo purposes. The Liverpool docks have, approximately, a total length of eight miles, and it was never known until about twenty-four hours before a convoy arrived into which docks the ships would eventually go, while the method and place of unloading the ships also depended on the time they arrived in the river and the relation of this time to the state of the tide. If the whole of a convoy just missed high tide, as many as eight large ships would be dealt with at the Landing Stage, whereas if, on the other hand, the convoy arrived four hours before high tide, not more than four ships would be disembarked at the Landing Stage. So impressed, in fact, were the captains of the vessels with the necessity of their not missing a tide in getting into dock that occasionally they would cast off in the middle of disembarking the troops at the Landing Stage and make for a dock some miles away, taking along with them the troops, baggage and stores they had not been able to land at the stage. On one occasion, at least, a ship crossed the river, under these conditions, taking half of the troops and the baggage on board into dock at Birkenhead. Many of the ships, again, carried units for separate destinations, and it frequently happened that no one unit on a single ship constituted a train-load. Arrangements were accordingly made. to group, as far as possible, certain ships so that they could be disembarked next to or adjacent to each other ; but this plan was frequently upset owing to tidal difficulties or weather conditions. In that case units for certain trains would be spread out over a distance of, possibly, eight miles, with the result that they would have to be collected so that they could entrain at one point. All these and other conditions rendered it expedient that there should be set up within easy reach of the Liverpool docks a rest camp at which those of the American troops who could not be entrained direct from the docks would remain until they could be taken to their destination in the South. Such a rest camp offered the further great advantage that the railway companies would be able to economise in the number of trains they had to keep in readiness for thie uncertain arrivals of the convoys. Troops would still be entrained at once, as far as this could be done with the number of trains on hand ; but the surplus number of men would go into camp and remain there until the trains had returned and were able to deal with them, in turn. Then, again, the shipping companies had represented that they could not unload the vessels whilst the troops were on board ; but there was no difficulty in withdrawing the troops from the ships immediately on arrival in dock and sending them to the camp for twenty-four hours or so without regard THE LONDON AND NORTH WESTERN. 979 to the amount of train accommodation which might be available on the spot at that precise moment. An American Rest Camp was constructed accordingly, to the account of the United States Government, at Knotty Ash, on each side of the Cheshire Lines Station of that name, situate about five miles from the nearest of the Liverpool docks. Construction of the camp began in May, 1918. It was at first composed entirely of American Field Service tents, but later on huts were adopted, instead. Work on the camp was still proceeding when the Armistice was signed. The original intention, also, was that the camp should afford accommodation for 15,000 troops, but the greatest number there at any one time did not exceed 8,000. The troops always marched from the docks to the camp except during October, 1918, when so many of those arriving in Liverpool were either suffering from or sickening for influenza that trains were then- provided which took the men from Riverside, Canada and Alexandra Docks via the London and North Western Railway to AUerton Junction, and thence to Knotty Ash over the Cheshire Lines. In the dispatch of the American troops southwards from the Liverpool docks there were various other complications for which provision had to be made. All were to be fed en route with coffee and sandwiches — those leaving by the London and North Western and the Lancashire and Yorkshire routes at Birmingham or Rugby ; those by the Midland route at Derby, and those by the Great Central route at Leicester ; but in regard to these feeding arrangements, the London and North Western could not deal with more than one train every thirty-five minutes ; the Midland with more than one every fifty minutes, and the Great Central with more than one every sixty minutes. Then the North Western, the Great Western and the Great Central routes to Winchester and Romsey converged at Banbury, where only one train could be dealt with every thirty-five minutes, and the Great Central, Great Western and London and North Western routes to Folkestone and Dover all converged at Old Oak Jimction, near Willesden, where trains could not be dealt with oftener than one every thirty minutes. At destination points trains could not be taken oftener than as follows : Winchester, one every forty minutes ; Romsey, one every forty minutes ; Southampton, one every fifteen minutes (though if a Winchester train were in front it blocked a Southamp- ton train for forty minutes) ; Folkestone and Dover, one every thirty minutes. It was essential, therefore, that the trains should be regulated from Liverpool in such a way that they would not clash at the converging junction, and that they should be dispatched at such intervals as would allow adequate time for dealing with them at the arrival points. The London and North Western had supreme control over the regula- tion and starting of these trains, and no train was allowed to leave any station on any company's system without being given authority by the Regulating Office. The uncertainty of the arrival of the ships in the river made it impossible to lay down in advance any definite timings for 98d BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THtE GREAT WAR. ihe trains, wJaick, nevertheless, had schedule point-to-ipcmit timings so that it was known that if a train left Liverpool at a certain time it would reach a junction so many hours or minutes later. In practice, as soon as the Jniliiary authorities received particulars from the United States as to the number^ etc., of units on board the ships Doming across they, in conjunction with the London and North Western officials on this side, put these units and the shiploads inito train-loads, there being prepared for the approaching convoy a list whicii showed the name of each vessel .; the number of trains, generaMy ranging from one to five, reqmred to accommodate the units from each and every one of the vessels, a distinctive number being given to each train ; the number of officers and men, respectively ; the destination of the units on this side, the route to be taken, and whether the units were to start from the diocfcs or from the rest caanp. When the train-lists were prepared, it was often unknown into which docks the ships would go, and the departure stations could not then be settled ; but when, on the -ships actually entering the river, the closed until further notice:— ASPLEY GUISE HALT BATH ROAD HALT BOW BRICKHILl HALT CARPENDERS PARK CARR MILL CHALK FARM CHARLTON HALT CHEADLE CHURCH BRAMPTON CHURWELL FRIEZUND HALEBANK HAMMERSMITH & CHISWICK HOOLEY HILL HUSBORNE CRAWLEY HALT KEMPSTON AND ELSTOW HALT KEMPSTON HARDWICK HALT KILBURN & MAIDA VALE LLONG LOUDOUN ROAD LOWrON MAIDEN LANE MOCHDRE & PABO MONMORE GREEN MOORE NANTLLE ODDINGTON HALT OVER & WHARTON OXFORD ROAD HALT PLECK PONT RUG PORT MEADOW HALT QUEEN'S PARK {mmSSm) RHOSNEIGR RUGBY ROAD HALT SANKEY BRIDGES STAINCUFFE & BATLEV CARR STAR CROSSING HALT UPPERMILL WENDLEBURY HALT WOLVERCOTE HALT WOODSTOCK ROAD HALT WOOTTON BROADMEAD HALT WOOnON FILUNGE HALT GUY CALTHROP. CmrJ Hma^ they ran a restricted cargo service between Holyhead and Greenore. In this way they helped not only to keep up the passenger communi- cation between England and Ireland but, in a time of food shortage, to continue the supply of Irish produce for English markets. %^^ The Holyhead and Dublin route, more especially, was greatly taxed during the war, but a very regular service was maintained both for passengers and for cargo. On this route there was, in fact, kept up a more constant service during the dark days of the submarine menace Ioo6 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. than on any other West Coast sea route with the exception, perhaps, of the one via Lame and Stranraer, which, also, is fed by the London and North Western Railway. The increased strain involved in working the North Western Irish traffic was accentuated by the fact that most of the other routes were periodically closed against general traffic, and, in particular, against women and children, during the period when the submarine danger was especially severe. The traffic so diverted was carried mainly by the Holyhead and DubUn (North Wall) boats and by the City of Dubhn Steam Packet Company's boats. Another route to Ireland is the one via Fleetwood and Belfast, and in this case the whole of the traffic between England and the North of Ireland, with the exception of that from or to Lancashire, passed over the London and North Western Company's system. Allotments. During the time the stress of war existed, the London and North Western Company, who had already let about 6,8go plots of land to members of their staff for garden purposes, announced that, as an emergency measure, they would let plots either within or outside the railway fences to non-employees and employees alike at a nonainal rental of one shilling per plot per annum. Their offer was so far taken advantage of that a further 7,050 plots, or thereabouts, were cultivated. This made a total of close on 14,000 plots. Assuming that each of them supplied vegetables for, on an average, a family of five persons, the result was that the total number of those who were thus assisted in meeting the shortage of food supplies was, approximately, 70,000. CHAPTER LXVIII. THE LONDON AND SOUTH WESTERN. By reason of the fact that even in pre-war times it served a number of important military centres, notably Aldershot, Bordon, Pirbright, Bisley, Portsmouth, Salisbury Plain, We3miouth and Plymouth, and already carried probably more troops than any other railway in the Kingdom, the London and South Western had long been known as England's " MiUtary Line." It further justified its claim to this title by the way in which it handled England's military traffic during the South African War of 1899-1902, when nearly the whole of the personnel and material wanted for the campaign passed through Southampton. That port was no less marked out from the first as the port of embarka- tion for such body of troops as would ever have to be dispatched from our shores to take part in any war in which we might be concerned in Western Europe. No other port on the South, the South-East or the East coasts of England offered equal facihtifes for the shipment of large armies, their guns, horses, stores, and other necessaries, with the same degree of ease, speed and general efficiency. Not only this but, just as all roads are said to lead to Rome, so do all railway Mnes in Great Britain lead, directly or indirectly, to Southampton. Thus it was that while other of our home ports were assigned their special duties in the Great War, Southampton became, at the outset, the chief gateway for the flow of troop traffic to and from the Western and other Fronts, while the past poHcy of the London and South Western Railway Company in regard to Southampton was most brilhantly justified by results which were of incalculable advantage to the country. Acquiring the docks (1892) when these were in a moribund condition and their previous owners had got to the end of their financial resources, . the London and South Western expended millions on their reconstruction and enlargement, making them so complete that they rank to-day among the largest and best-equipped of any in the world. Of these docks the Government, without having contributed one single penny to their cost, were, on the outbreak of the war, able to take possession with the equivalent of a stroke of the pen ; but no other siiigle hnk in the chain of miUtary movements in connection with the war was to offer more striking and more convincing proof of the practical advantage gained by the nation from the enterprise of British railway companies than was afforded by the magnitude of the traffic that, under 1007 ioo8 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. the conditions here stated, and, and as will be shown more fully later on, was able to pass through the railway-owned docks of Southampton. The total area covered by the Inner, Outer, Empress and Deep Water Docks — each of the berths therein having its accompanying passenger and cargo sheds, warehouses, etc. — is equal to 60 acres, whilst the depth Diagram showing how all (Railway) Roads lead to Southampton. of these docks ranges from 28 feet to 40 feet (L.W.O.S.T.). With double tides and high water four times every day, there is never less than 28 ft. alongside the Old Extension and Ocean Quay in the Itchen River, or 32 ft. at the quays in the Test River. Railway lines, already in com- THE LONDON AND SOUTH WESTERN. 1009 munication with every railway system in Great Britain, are laid to the extent of thirty-seven miles throughout the docks, forming a perfect network of ' rails running along all the quays and into and alongside the warehouses and cargo sheds, no tender to connect trains and steamers being required. Equipment for loading, unloading, and the carrjdng on of the work of the port generally is exceptionally complete. Dredged to a depth of 35 ft. at L.W.O.S.T., the channel to the docks is, also, well lighted by gas buoys, vessels of the largest dimensions being thus able to pass as readily at night as by day. Such was the great port of which, thanks to the enterprise of the London and South Western Railway Company, the Government were able to take advantage and convert into " No. i Military Embarkation Port." It passed under miHtary control immediately on the outbreak of war, and the dispatch of the Expeditionary Force became only the prelude to a vast amount of naval and miUtary business that was to foUow. Practically the whole of the docks was utilised for embarkation purposes of one kind or another. The entire area, in fact, was closed to civilian traffic with the exception of a small part of the Outer Dock, from which the London and South Western were allowed to continue the running of their cross-Channel services ; though these, owing to military requirements, were reduced to a minimum. Early Days of the War. When, on July 28th, 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war against Serbia, arrangements had already been made on the South Western for the 1st London Division to leave London for Wareham and Wool on Sunday, August 2nd, and by 1.30 p.m. on that day ten special trains, with members of the Division, had reached their destination and eight others were en route. Meanwhile, the order had been given for general mobilisation in Russia ; Germany had declared war on Russia, and the whole outlook appeared to the British military authorities so threatening that at the hour mentioned further entrainment of the Territorials was stopped. The eight trains en route were ordered back ; the men who had arrived at Wareham and Wool rejoined the trains in which they had travelled, and the Division returned to London the same day. Then the Home Counties Brigade (Territorials), encamped on Salisbury Plain, got short notice to return to their home stations, and thirty-eight special trains for their conveyance were run from Amesbury, the first leaving at 10.20 p.m. on August 3rd, and the last at 3.30 p.m. on August 5th. These trains took about 14,000 officers and men, 1,387 horses, 78 guns, 211 vehicles, 222 cycles and 310 tons of baggage. Commencing on August 5th, and continuing until August 20th, the Volvmteers and Reservists were mobilised and conveyed to headquarters, depot and war stations. How the Expeditionary Force was dispatched from Southampton has already been told in detail in Chapter XIII ; but the fact may here roro BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. be added that during the movement the service of business trains to and from London was maintained on the South Western, and although it was necessary to suspend some of the ordinary trains over the routes followed by the troop specials the public were not inconvenienced to any great extent. The normal service was, in fact, maintained on nearly all parts of the South Western system; Later Movements. As the new Army came into being,, and when other troops from overseas began to arrive, the company were called upon to provide for the dispatch of further large bodies of troops and supplies, Southampton, which had done so well with the embarkation of the British Expeditionary Force, being almost exclusively relied upon for the sending of reinforce- ments to the Western Front until about March, 1915, when a certain measure of relief was given to the port by the greater use thenceforward made of Folkestone as an alternative and nearer route to the northern districts of France. During one day in September, 1914, no fewer than 100 loaded trains were run to Southampton, conve3Haig 565 officers, 30,627 men, 4,626 horses, 72 guns, 701 vehicles,. 377 cycles and 502 tons of stores. These figures may have been exceptionally high for a single day, yet they do but typify the almost unceasing stream of men and material that passed through Southampton' from aU parts of the country, while they take no account of the flow in the other direction of men on leave, of sick and wounded and of prisoners of war. Some statistics from ofEcial sources wiU be given later on with a view to showing what the traffic through the port during the war-period reaUy amoimted to ; but the fact must be borne in mind that there was a vast amount of other traffic, either prior to the Southampton Docks stage or independently thereof, with which the South Western had to deal. It may be a matter of pubUc interest to give a few facts and figures in relation thereto in order to convey some idea, however inadequate, of the sum total of the work that reqioired to be done. Canadian and American Forces. Amongst the heaviest movements involved in dealing with the various contingents from overseas was that in respect to the arrival of the first body of Canadian troops, reaching Plymouth on October i6thj 1914. To convey these Canadians, together with the material they brought with them, to Amesbury, for Sahsbury Plain, the London and^ South Western had to provide ninety-two special trains, and in these there were carried 549 officers, 10,781 men, 127 guns, 919 vehicles, 75 cycles and 1,188 tons of stores, etc. When the United States joined the AUies, American troops arrived in large numbers at Liverpool, Holyhead, Glasgow, Avonmouth, Barry, Cardiff, Newport, Plymouth, Southampton, Swansea aiJd the Royal THE LONDON AJSTD SOUTH WESTERN. loii Albert Docks, Tilbury. Those landing at Soutbampton were taken on to Dover and Folkestone. The remainder were conveyed to Winchester, Bomsey, Southampton, Brookwood, Bordon, Bnlford, Fovant, or Wareham> — all on the South Western system, over which, between July 20th, 1917, and December 27th, Z918, the following U-S.A. traffic passed: Number of special trains, 1,695 ; officers carried, 38,852 ,; other ranks, 825,205 ; doctors and nurses, 4,520 ; tons of baggage, 23,824. In the z8 hours 45 minutes between 3.30 p.m. on July loth, 1918, and 8.J5 p.m. on the following day, the company received fifty-three of these U.S.A. troop-train specials, namely, forty-one from Liverpool, eleven from Glasgow, and one from Avonmouth, for Winchester, Romsey and Southampton. These trains conveyed 1,207 officers, 23,013 men and 837 tons of baggage. New Camps. • Before the interference with the flow of goods traffic which was due to the movement of the British Expeditionary Force could be overcome, the necessity arose for handling great quantities of materials of the most varied type required for setting up new camps to supplement the con- siderable number already established on the London and South Western system. These new camps were wanted for the new British Armies then being or about to be raised ; they were wanted for the contingents coming from Canada, Australasia and India, and they were afterwards no less wanted for a large proportion of the troops from the United States who were to come to this country before proceeding to France. The districts served by the South Western were specially adapted, also, for the said purpose by reason both of their nearness to Southampton and of the open spaces, accommodation and facilities in general which they afforded. Other camps were set up for m^nbers of the Royal Air Force and for German prisoners. At Bovington, near Wool, Dorset, there was a camp which served as a training ground for the Tank Corps, and tanks were sent there from aU parts of the country for the purpose of being tested before they were dispatched overseas. At Romsey and Swaythling two of the largest horse camps in the kingdom were established. Not only was there, in the aggregate, a huge traffic in materials, supplies and necessaries for the camps themselves, but thousands of wagon loads of stone from quarries situate in North Wales or in other districts, involving a long haul, had to be worked into the neighbourhood of the camps for the formation of roads to them. Such was the volume of business dealt with that during the period from January ist to July 19th, 1915, the number of wagons convesdng traffic in connection with the camps, either for the Government or for Government contractors, and unloaded at fourteen stations on the South Western Railway, was 83,929. Unfortunately, also, many of the stations serving the new camps were small wayside stations, having only very I0I2 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. limited siding accommodation, and in a number of instances much had to be done in the way of providing them with increased facilities. It was on Salisbury Plain that the greatest transformation of all, under the conditions here in question, was brought about ; though in this instance other railway companies besides the South Western were concerned. Taking the irregular parallelogram formed by Westbury, Savernake, Sahsbury, and Andover, extending about thirty miles in one direction and twenty miles in another, and bordered on two sides by the Great Western Railway, on one side by the London and South Western and on the fourth side by the Midland and South Junction Railway, the whole of this district was converted into what was practically one vast military camp. The total number of camps, new and old, served either exclusively or in part by the London and South Western Railway was no fewer than 176, distributed among different districts as follows : — London District (30) : Walton, Staines, Epsom (3), Kingston, Sunbury, Hounslow (4), Windsor (2), Hampton Court (2), Woking, Teddington, Feltham (3), Datchet, Cliiswick, Wimbledon (2), Barnes (4), and Esher (2). Aldershot District {95) : Aldershot (33), Farnborough {3), Fleet (2), Cam- berley, Milford (2), Bordon (3), Liphiook, Wokingham, Basingstoke, Brookwood (6), Gosport (3), Alresford, Winchester (7), Portsmouth (17), Fareham (3), Cosham (8), Swaythling, Southampton and Swanwick. Salisbury District (21) : Romsey (3), Dinton, Tidworth (3), Ludgershall {3), Bulford (4), Bulford or Amesbury (7), and Chisledon. Exeter District (30) : Christchurch (3), Wareham, Swanage, Wool (2), Dorchester {2), Weymouth (4), Portland, Upwey, Exeter (3), Plymouth, Devon- port (5), Plymstock {2), St. Budeaux {2), Bridstowe and Okehampton. The full story of all these camps would make a book in itself — and a very interesting book it would be. Here, however, we are mainly concerned in questions of rail transport, and in this connection it may be pointed out that, apart from the traffic in materials and suppUes, the conveyance of personnel to the camps in the first instance, and, subse- quently, in large proportion, from the camps to Southampton for destina- tions overseas, must in itself have meant a big business for the South Western. Yet this was far from being all. There was the week-end leave, as well. Such leave began to be given on an approximately large scale to troops in camp on the South Western system as early in the war as September, 1914. Eventually the average per week worked out at about 16,500 men. For their transport the South Western had to provide about twenty-one special trains per week to London or elsewhere during Friday night and Saturday, and about twenty^nine specials to take them back to camp on Sunday night and Monday morning. Beginning, also, with 1914, the troops in camp were given extended leave at Christmas, and for the South Western this meant the running, as between December loth and 31st of that year, of an aggregate of 237 special trains, conveying 164,780 men. Similar arrangements were also made during the Christmas-leave periods of 1915 and 1916. THE LONDON AND SOUTH WESTERN. 1013 War Industries. The construction of munition works, Government factories, aeroplane dep6ts, etc., in many different parts of the London and South Western system brought to the company an increase of traffic in the four-fold direction of building apphances, raw materials, workpeople and manu- factured goods. In addition, also, to establishments specially constructed to meet war-time conditions, one must take into account the large number of those already existing which underwent expansion in order to adapt them either to greater production or to new processes. It would be difficult to give even an approximate estimate of the sum total of war industries on the South Western system which fell under these two categories, but the following examples might be noted : — Government Rolling Mills constructed at Woolston, on the side of the Itchen opposite Southampton, and engaged in the production on a large scale of steel plates and plates for shells. Naval Cordite Factory set up at Holton Heath, near Wareham. Wood Distillation Factory, installed at Bideford by the military authorities. Extension of Messrs. Thomycroft's factory at Basingstoke for motor traction. Kempton Park Racecourse, used as a store for motor-vehicles. Old brickyard at Oxshott, used for storing shells. Brickyard at Rowland's Castle, used as ammunition dump. Brick and Tile Company's works at Exeter, and Messrs. Saunders' brick and tile works at Poltimore, Pinhoe, Devon, used as magazines. Construction or expansion of aircraft factories, aircraft-acceptance parks, etc., the traffic in this connection arising more especially at Farnborough (National Aircraft Factory), Ascot (Aircraft Distribution Depot), Feltham and Richmond (Messrs. Whitehead), Kingston* (Messrs. Sopwith), and Woking (Messrs. Martynside). During 1918, when the production of aircraft in this country reached its maximum, no fewer than 5,437 covered vans were loaded on the South Western with uncased aeroplanes and sent by passenger train, apart from the very large traffic conveyed by goods train. Several munition depots on the Cattewater Branch (Plymouth) of the London and South Western. Munition factory for Belgian workers, established at Twickenham. Staines Linoleum Company's factory, utiHsed for making shell cases. Munition factory and lorry works of Messrs. Dennis Brothers, at Guildford. The setting up of many of these war industries in remote country districts — as in the case of the Royal Naval Cordite Factory at Holton Heath — led to the gathering together of all the available labour over considerable areas, and this, in turn, necessitated the introduction of workmen's trains where they had not been run before, the increase of station facilities, and the re-arrangement of existing passenger services in order to meet the new requirements. I0I4 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Aerodromes, Etc. Aerodromes were constructed at the following places on the South Western system : Andover, Beauheu, Blandford, Eastleigh, Farnboraugh, Gosport, Hounslow Heath, Netley, Salisbury, Salisbury Plain (several), Stockbridge (two), Weybiidge (Brooklands), and Winchester. Naval airship- sheds and depots were set up at Hamworthy Junction and Morton, and seaplane depots at Calshot, Hamble and Lee-on-the- Solent. A ground for training in baUoon observation was established at Roehampton. Military Railways." Certain of the new camps were connected by military railways with, the London and South Western system. There was one such link established between Dinton Station and Fovant Camp ; a seJcond between Wool and Bovington ; a third, from Amesbury, served several camps (Larkhill, Stondienge and Rolleston) on Sahsbury Plain, and a fourth gave direct communication between Bisley Camp and the Deepcut and Blackdown Camp. —• The hnes of these special railways wet^taid by the military, but most of the material for them was conveyed over the South Western, with which the necessary connections w€re made by the company. In some instances the military railways were originally little better than con- tractors' lines, designed for the conveyance of material only, the troops marching between camp and main-line railway ; but when the condition of the roads went from bad to worse, until at last they became almost impassable, the military railways were adapted for troop traffic, also. Passenger rolling-stock was supplied for the Fovant and Deepcut lines by the London and South Western Railway Company, who subse- quently themselves took over the working of the Deepcut and the Bovington Camp Unes. Sidings, Halts, Etc. Special or additional siding accommodation was provided on an extensive scale in cormection with the war-traffic requiring to be carried. At Eastleigh, for example, three miles of sidings were laid for the accommodation of trains of munitions, etc., en route for Southampton Docks. These sidings were afterwards extended for the berthing of empty trains during demobihsation. Siding accommodation was provided for Government traffic at Brockenhurst, Chandler's Ford, Netley, Highbridge, Stockbridge, Stone- house Pool and elsewhere, and for timber traffic at Brockenhurst, Lynd- hurst Road, Wilton and Woodfidly. An extra mile of sidings was laid at Farnham to meet the needs of the increased traffic. Sidings, halts and other transport facilities were also supplied in connection with munition factories, Government stores, aerodromes, military camps, etc. For the Naval Cordite Factory at Holton Heath THE LONDON AND SOUTH WESTERN. 1015 the work done, in addition to sidings, incli^ded the building of a new railway station, with platforms 400 ft. in length. This was rendered necessary by reason of the large number of workpeople employed and the need for running so many trains for their conveyance between home and factory. At Winchester, where the American troops were in such great force, a platform 780 ft. long was built in the special interest of the U.S.A. camp. It was further necessary to supplement this platform by a special signal box with thirteen levers. ' Among many other new works carried out by the company in connec- tion with war- traffic requirements were sidings and a loading-bank at Wool for dealing with " tanks " ; sidings for the prisoners-of-war camp established at Blandford ; halt platforms and sidings for the Explpsives Inspection Establishment at Bursledon, together with new or additional sidings at the works of many different firms engaged on the procjuction of military requirements. Munitions Traffic. In connection with the transport of munitions, it may be of interest to state that even prior to the setting up in this country of iiew factories for their production on so enormous a scale as that eventually attained, the South Western Company were already carrying large quantities qf munitions traffic discharged from ships at Portland and Plymouth for conveyance by special goods trains to depots located in aU parts of the coxmtry. This traffic extended over a period of several months. Home-grown Timber Supplies. Inasmuch as the greater part of the London and South Western Railway runs through a well-wooded country, that Mne was naturally affected by the abnormal demand for home-grown timber — and especially pit-wood — due to the impossibility of procuring the forei^ suppUes previously depended upon to so great an extent. So it was that the timber traffic on the South Western, which had amounted to 11,025 tons in 1913, increased to 168,500 tons in 1916 and 223,690 -tons in 1917. There was a slight decline in 1918^ but the total for -that year still stood at 191,662 tons. War-time Work at Nine Elms. How great the pressure of the traffic thus far described, and of much more besides, must have been on the company's le.ading goods stations may be illustrated by the following figures relating to the work done at Nine Elms during the war-period : — Total number of goods trains dealt with . Total number of wagons dealt with . Gross tonnage in and out Gross tonnage handled by staff. Total weight carted by company's vehicles 56,400 2,400,000 4,180,000 3,6oOjOOO (tons) 1,320,000 3X ioi6 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Colossal Transport Figures. Taking the war-traffic dealt with on the London and South Western system as a whole, whether passing through the port of Southampton or not, we get figures which are positively immense as indicating the work done by a single railway company. Thus the total amount of naval and military traffic for which arrangements were made by the Military Department in the office of the Superintendent of the Line at Waterloo Station from the outbreak of the war until the end of November, 1918, was as under : — Officers ... . . 522,768 Men . .... 19,701,186 Horses . . . . Guns Road Vehicles . ... Bicycles ....... Tanks ....... Trucks of Ammunition, Stores, Baggage, etc. 1,477,148 11,208 114,278 37.418 2,166 481,357 The total number of officers and men carried by train down to and including November, 1918, is thus shown to have been close on twenty and a quarter millions ; but to these figures might be added at least another milUon for small parties of whose journeys no record is available. The detailed figures given above come down, also, no later than the month in which the Armistice was signed ; but a great amount of military traffic was, of course, dealt with subsequent thereto. If we include an estimate of the personnel conveyed between November, 1918, and November, 1919, we get no less than 26,000,000 as the approximate total number of officers and men carried on the London and South Western system down to that later date in connection with the war. Reverting to the foregoing list, the further fact may be mentioned that the conveyance of this immense volume of traffic involved — apart from all that was done by ordinary trains — the running of 58,859 loaded special trains, included therein being 10,175 ambulance trains, with 1,814,810 invalids and attendants, and 4,237 ammunition trains, with 170,720 trucks of shells, etc. This figure of close on 59,000 special trains, great as it is, fails to convey in itself a complete idea of the amount of work it represents. Generally speaking, each loaded special necessitated the running of one and sometimes two empty trains, namely, from rolling-stock dep6t to entraining point, and, unless the emptied special could be at once used over again in another direction, back from detraining point to roUing- stock depot. Ambulance trains were in each case returned with staffs from detraining point to their port for future service. Southampton's Record. From these details in respect to the London and South Western Railway system in general we may pass on to consider the nature and THE LONDON AND SOUTH WESTERN. 10X7 extent of the traffic dealt with in the port of Southampton. Oificikl statistics as to the work done in this connection from August 9th, 1914, to December 31st, 1918, were issued from the Embarkation Staff Office at Southampton in February, 1919 ; and although their main purpose was, apparently, to show what had been accomplished by the military and naval Transport Officers and their staffs at Britain's No. i Military Port, practically the whole of the traffic dealt with must necessarily have been carried, in one direction or the other, over the lines of the London and South Western, and may no less be placed to the credit of that company, also. The total number of personnel passing through the docks during the period in question was 7,136,797. Of these, 4,848,683 embarked for, and 2,288,114 were arrivals from overseas. The embarkations of officers and other ranks were as follows : — Officers. Other Ranks, British Indian Belgian American . Other Allies Furlough . Native Details Native Labour 78,021 3,094,745 126 6,720 1,633 48,757 45.314 868,955 2,759 37,963 39,315 455,810 4,727 33,086 97 4,900 Total 271,992 4,550.936 4,822,928 and members of Queen The number of German Of nursing sisters (British, American, etc.) Mary's Army Auxiliary Corps 20,757 embarked prisoners who left was 4,998. The arrivals at Southampton included 15,250 from British Dominions and Colonies. Officers and other ranks came from France and elsewhere as under : — Drafts Demobilisation . ,, (Colonials) Repatriated Total Officers. 26,465 371 127 229 Other Ranks, 266,862 16,778 7,248 6,555 27,192 297.443 324.635 British women and children who disembarked at Southampton numbered 5,402. Of nursing sisters (British, American, etc.) the arrivals were 3,950. Of officers on furlough there were 43,171 and of other ranks 478,263. Sick and wounded 1 totalled 1,234,248, the figures being made up thus : — • The subject of ambulance-train traffic on the L. & S.W. is dealt with fully in Chapter XIX. ?oi8 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Officers. Other Ranks. British, .... 55,262 1,119,531 Indian .... 335 13,522 Belgian .... 244 9.098 German .... 900 26,756 U.S.A 382 8,106 Native Labour . 122 Total .... 57.123 1,177,125, Under the Salomiika E and Y Scheme, 404 officers and 34,840; other ranks disembarked at Southampton. Troops arrivmg- there from, the. United States numbered 67,086, namely, 4,559 officers and 62,527 other ranks'. Of Belgian refugees 7,700 were brought to Southamptoni., Prisoners of war returning through, that port comprised 5,736 officers and 67,429 other ranks — a total of 73,165. Of horses and mules 799,287 were embarked. The number returned down to the end of 1918 was 22,873. Guns and limbers shipped numbered 7,484, as against 5,914 returned. In addition to 98,182 " vehicles," there were embarked 1,233 side-cars and trailers ; 10,249 motors and tractors ; 34,184 bicycles and motor-bicycles ; 1,198 aeroplanes ; 4,950 War Department trucks and 496 pontoons. Supplies sent overseas attained a total of 2,680,536 tons, the items being made up thus : Hay and straw, 572,145 tons ; oats, iio,3ir tons ; wood, charcoal, etc., 36,433 tons ; frozen meat and other food, 38,876 tons ; ammunition,. 1,839,376 tons, and stores, Mediterranean Expedi- tionary Force, 83,395 tons. Stores were put on transports to the extent of 604,912 tons, while storeships took away 2,680,536 tons — a total of 3,285,448 tons. Commencing October ist, 1915, a special train was run from Waterloo to Southampton for the conveyance of the Array mails for overseas. The average number of bags so forwarded at this time was about 2,200 daily. A steady increase in the weight of the postal matter was experi- enced, so that by February, 1916, the average number of bags sent from Waterloo daily was between 3,000 and 4,000. On April 13th in the same year the figure rose to 5,500 bags. By November, 1916, the other traffic connected with the war which required to be dealt with at Waterloo was so heavy that it became necessary to transfer the mail services to the Nine Elms goods station, whence a special train was dispatched daily to Southampton at 10 p.m. Early in 1917, at the request of the Army Postal authorities and on account of the shortage of petrol,' the traffic was transferred to Marylebone (Great Central Railway), that station bdmg much nearer tham Nine Elms to the Army Mail Office in Regent's Park. Two specials', both worked by London and South Western engines and stock, were then run daily to Southampton — the first leaving at r,3o p.m., with parcels mail traffic, and the other at ro.io p.m., with letter maUs. The latter train was suspended on June 12th, 1917. The sum total of the Army mail traffic, together with Military For- warding Office traffic, which passed through Southampton between THE LONDON AND SOUTH WESTERN. 1019 October ist, 1915, and December 31st, 1918, was as follows : Mail ba^ embarked, 3,067,335 ; Military Forwarding Ofi&ce parcels embeirked, 4,198,839 ; Military Forwarding Office parcels disembarked, 170,742 ; total of parcels and mail bags dealt with, 7,436,916. This gave an average of 4,633 bags per day. Of ships loaded and imloaded at Southampton the numbers were : — Transports Storeships Hospital ships Furlough ships Total Loaded. Unloaded 6,135 2,786 366 503 2,153 418 2,631 669 9,790 5,871 15,661 To the foregoing details may be added the following " record " items : — Largest shipment on any one day (August 24th, 1914) : 536 officers ; 16,364 other ranks ; 4,572 horses ; 72 guns ; 690 vehicles ; 260 motor-bicycles. Largest shipment of horses in a week (1917) : 10,572. Largest amount of ammunition loaded in one day (May 23rd, 1917) : 5,076 tons. Largest amount of ammunition in the docks at any one time (February 21st, 1917) : 24,861 tons, valued at ;^7,458,30o. Largest amount of ammunition dispatched on any one day (April 14th, 1917) : 10,342 tons.i Largest amount of unaccompanied stores in one day, exclusive of stores vnfh units (May 24th, 1917) : 7,061 tons. Heaviest lift dealt with by cranes in the docks: Pcation of 12-in. gun on railway mounting, 52f tons. Largest shell dealt with : 17-in. Austrian shell. Htiight, 5 ft. 4 in. Weight, I J tons. Much of the credit for the success with which this immense volume of traffic was handled was attributable to the Docks and Marine Manager and his stafE, who, in conjunction with the naval authorities, controlled the arrival, berthing and departure of vessels of aU kinds. There were occasions when arrangements had to be made for the departure of between twenty-five and thirty vessels during a single night, while concurrently therewith arrangements had also to be made for the reception and location of other vessels which were to take the place of those leaving. Difficiilties were naturally experienced, at times, in planning this double movement in such a way as to avoid accident, delay or confusion ; but these difficulties were invariably so far overcome that no serious trouble arose in the carrjdng out of a distinctly comphcated scheme of operations. Dock Engineering Works. While, again, all this traffic was being dealt with, some important structural works were carried out in the docks by the London and South ' The average value of tie daily shipment of ammunition was ^1,000,000. 1020 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Western Railway Company's engineering staff, partly to increase the accommodation for war purposes, and partly to reinstate certain structures which, on account either of age or of severe conditions, might otherwise have become useless or dangerous ; though only such new works as were absolutely necessary were undertaken during the war. Among these indispensable improvements was the renewal of the quay at Berths 34 to 36. This quay was in constant use during the war- period, but the timber of which it was partly constructed had been almost eaten away by the action of marine borers, and it was deemed expedient to remove the weakened timbers and substitute concrete piers in their place. The work was done without any interruption of traffic. A somewhat similar task was accomplished, under like conditions, on the quay at Berths 30 to 33, where the deck was renewed piecemeal in order that traffic should not be delayed. The new deck was constructed of reinforced concrete. Another important work was the remodelling of No. 3 Dry Dock, the floor of which was partly cut away to allow of accommodation being offered to a larger type of vessel than had previously been able to enter. Unfortunately, while this process of reconstruction was being proceeded with, the old stone sill of the dock developed a bad fracture, and it became necessary to build a large temporary dam at the entrance in order to exclude water and permit of the repairs being effected in the dry. The dock had, consequently, to be closed to traffic for seven months during the course of 1916 ; though both before and subsequently to this period the dock was in constant use and rendered invaluable service in the repairing of damaged ships. At No. I Dry Dock a new sump had to be sunk alongside to increase the pumping plant and obviate the occasional iloodings which had from time to time delayed work in the dock. Here it was found necessary to put in the foundation for the new sump under compressed air ; yet, in spite of this fact, there was no discontinuance of the repair of ships in the dock. When such great masses of war material were passing through the docks, it was not surprising that more storage accommodation was required there. Two very large sheds were built — a cargo and passenger shed, for military purposes, at Berth 41, and a fine store-shed, near Berth 34, which was used as a temporary barracks as weU as for the storing of war material. Other structural works included extensive repairs to the grain elevator and to the foundation of the road for the 30-ton travelling crane at No. 5 Dry Dock. In doing all these things the Docks Engineer was greatly hampered by the substantial reduction in his available staff, owing to enlistments, and, also, by the difficulty in getting materials ; yet everything necessary was accomplished without any serious interruption to the business of war as represented by those vastly-swollen streams of traffic with which. THE LONDON AND SOUTH WESTERN. 1021 as a matter of vital concern to the nation, the docks at Southampton were required to deal. Provision against Accidents. Having regard to the number of troops and the quantity of material passing through the docks, it was, at the outset, thought desirable to make special provision for dealing with the accidents which might naturally be expected to occur. The ordinary Docks Ambulance was, accordingly, supplemented by the local Voluntary Aid Detachment Corps, stations for the rendering of aid to the injured who might need attention being formed at various points in the docks. This additional precaution was, however, found to be unnecessary, and it was discontinued at the end of a few weeks. No accident of a serious nature occurred at Southampton during the course of the war, and the ordinary arrangements of the Docks Ambulance were found equal to all requirements. War-time Incidents at Southampton. In the early days of the war, H.M.S. Enchantress, used by the Admiralty as a motor-boat base, caught fire whilst in the docks. When she had burned almost to the water's edge she was towed out into the river and put on the mud ; but the adoption of this course involved a certain amount of risk on account both of the large quantity of ammuni- tion then in the docks and of the burning ship having to pass near to a number of London and South Western Railway Company's vessels, against which there was a possibility that it might be driven by the fresh wind blowing at the time. When the enemy submarines increased their activity, ships which had been torpedoed or mined were constantly arriving at Southampton with their flooded holds fuU of meat or other food-stuffs which had become putrid. In these conditions there were possibHities of danger to the public health that required to be dealt with at once, and thousands of tons of such cargoes were loaded on to hoppers and sent out to sea to be dumped. Action was also taken to prevent any possible corner of the docks becoming a breeding-ground for epidemic germs. As a means of helping to maintain the food supply of the country at the time when a shortage thereof was threatened — once more on account of the enemy submarine campaign — the officers of transports sailing from Southampton were instructed by the authorities to prevent any waste of food in the galleys, and, as the result of an organised collection which was made, hundreds of tons of what would otherwise have been treated as " pig food " were saved for human consumption. Southampton Train-Ferry and Barge Services. On the decision being arrived at by the War Cabinet, early in January, 1917, that the cross-Channel barge service already in operation from lo22 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Richborough, on the South-East Coast, should be supplemented by a train-ferry, it was thought expedient to establish a second train-ferry at a port on the South Coast, so that if, in any emergency, Richborough — regarded as the northern rbute — should no longer be available, an alterna- tive southern route could still be made use of. The choice of a port for this southern route was not made without a certain degree of consideration. Portsmouth, Hamble River, Langston Harbour, Chichester and Keyhaven were all passed under review ; but the decision eventually arrived at was in favour of Southampton. Here a suitable site for a train-ferry jetty, and one ofierihg many natural advantages, was found on the western shore, immediately west of the Royal Pier. The position was sheltered ; there was good access from the sea ; very Mttle dredging was required ; ample space was available for manoeuvring the train-ferries in and out of a berth provided at the end of a jetty stretching out from a stone embankment on shore ; no interference with existing traffic arrangements would be involved ; a marshalling yard capable of holding about 500 wagons and communicating with eight berthing sidings, equal to another 200 wagons, could be readily laid out oh reclaimed land along the foreshore, while connection between the jetty and the Londbn and South Western hues could be established by a new railway, about one tnUe in length, leaving the main line of that system at Southampton West Station, and continuing to the end of the jetty, where the loaded trains would pass direct on to the ferry- boat awaiting them in the berth. Such was the plan adopted for the South Coast terrhinal, and, in the result, it operated with coinplete success. The berth was accessible at all states of the tide, which here has a range of 13 ft., and the variations in level were readily overcome by the provision, at the end of t-he jetty, of an adjustable bridge — 120 ft. long, with a vertical range of 12 ft. — across which the railway wagons could pass direct on to the train-ferry steamer. This arran^eirient was practically identical with the system adopted at Richborough, the only diffeirence being that the bridge at Southampton was somewhat longer, to suit local conditions. Dieppe, 130 miles distant, was selected as the terminal on the French coast for the Southampton rbute, that port being adopted owing to the fact that it offered the advantage of more suitable railway connections than were available elsewhere. The facilities provided at Dieppe were similar to those arrangfed for at Southampton West ; though in the former port it was found necessary to locate the train-ferry berth in the outer basin, entrance to, or departure from which by the train-ferry steamers was restricted by the tidal range at Dieppe — a range so great, in fact, that the port is left almost dry at low water. In the first instance the train-ferry steamer used at Southampton was similar to the two employed on the Richborough service, the four sets of railway lines on the main train-deck line accommodating fifty-four cbmmon-uSer wagdns, while the specified deck load was 850 tons and the total deadweight load 960 tons. It was with a steamer of this capaicity THE LONDON AND SOUTH WESTERN. 1025 that a start was made on February 22nd, 1918, the passage between Southampton and Dieppe being thenceforward made three times a week, in each direction, and on alternate days, at hours dependent upon the state of the tide. Great advantages in the dispatch of war material to the Western Front were secured ; but in June, 1918, the whole situation had to be reconsidered owing to the gravity of the military situation. The possibility of the Channel ports being captured by the enemy was recognised, and, among other measures taken as a matter of prudence and precaution, in the event of such a contingency actually arising, was that of providing for the evacuation of Richborough. Evidence was now afforded of the foresight shown in the establishment of a southern as well as a northern terminal for the cross-Channel train- fetry sernces ; but the mere transfer to Southampton of the ferry- steamers which had been running from Richborough would not, it was felt, suf&ce in itself under the conditions that might now arise. Action had already been taken in the direction of creating a large fleet of 1,000-ton cross-Channel barges which were to proceed no farther than ports on the French coast, and not attempt to pass along the inland waterways ; but Richborough, whatever the military situation, would not be able to accommodate all these vessels. So it was decided that the Town Quay at Southampton, and, also, Poole Harbour, should be utilised as places from which war material could be sent overseas by a barge service. In the case of Southampton this barge service would supplement thte train-ferry just as, in the case of Richborough, the train-ferry had supplemented the initial barge service there ; whilst the Town Quayjat Southampton and the harbour at Poole would be still more useful if the emergency that might be brought about did actually occur. These proposals were carried out at the earliest possible moment as regards the Town Pier at Southampton, where a barge service was begun in July, 1918. About twenty barges were employed altogether and, as a rule, two or three of them were towed across the Channel daily to such destinations as Cherbourg, Calais, Havre and Boulogne, with one or two trips to Dunkirk. Action was also taken at Poole Harbour to provide for the new traffic with which the port might have to deal. Alterations had to be made at the Town Quay, additional wharves were required, and a rail- connection with the main line of the London and South Western system WEis established ; but the coinpletion of the full programme of con- templated work was rendered unnecessary by the defeat of the enemy and the passing of the emergency against which provision was to %e made. On November 6th, 1918, and only a few days, therefore, before the signing of the Armistice, another train-ferry service, one between South- ampton and Cherbourg, was begun with a fourth steamer which differed essentially from the three d:ready in operation. Built in England, in 1914, on the account of the Canadian Government, as a train^-f ferry for the 1024 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. transport of passengers and goods across the River St. Lawrence during the construction of the Quebec bridge, and now purchased by the British Government, the Leonard, as the vessel was called, had three lengths of track, giving accommodation for thirty-nine lo-ton wagons, representing a load of 550 tons, while the train-deck could be lifted bodily to a height of 18 ft. by means of hydrauUc gear in order to overcome differences of level when connecting with the shore tracks, no adjustable communication bridge being therefore necessary. For this reason, and on account of differences in size and construction, special berths were provided for the Leonard alike at Southampton and at Cherbourg, to which route the vessel was restricted. The two-train ferries from Southampton continued to run until early in 1919, the period of service of the second started there being thus extremely short. So the traffic carried since the opening of the Southampton-Dieppe route in February, 1918, related almost entirely to the ferry-steamer engaged thereon, and this traffic covered the convey- ance of, among other items, eight engines, forty-two coaches and 6,763 wagons to France, and of 272 engines and 1,250 wagons from France to Southampton. London and South Western Steamships. Immediately preceding the war, the company owned sixteen vessels operating mail, passenger and cargo services between Southampton and the Channel Islands, Havre, St. Malo, Cherbourg, and Honfleur. On the declaration of war, eight of these vessels were commandeered by the Government for the transport of troops, horses and material of the British Expeditionary Force to France. These were all returned to the company by the end of September, 1914. The Ccesarea and the Sarnia were commissioned by the Admiralty in November; 1914, and fitted out as armed boarding vessels, to operate in the North Sea, English Channel, and elsewhere, as required. Later on the Sarnia was transferred to the Mediterranean, where she remained until sunk by enemy action on September 12th, 1918, while acting as armed convoy to a troopship from Port Said. In March, 1915^ the Ccesarea was taken over by the Admiralty as a requisitioned ship and used as a troop transport, as were, also, the Lydia, on the same date, and the new turbine steamer, Lorina, on delivery from the builders in December, 1918. These three ships remained in the trooping service until October, 1919. They were engaged in the convey- ance of troops to and from France and in the repatriation of refugees, prisoners of war, etc. While on trooping service the Lydia had an exciting adventure with a submarine which chased her and kept her under fire for some time ; but the skilful handling of the vessel by the captain, combined with her capacities in the way of speed, enabled her to escape unhurt. During the whole of the war-period the company were able to maintain a regular daily service with mails and passengers between Southampton THE LONDON AND SOUTH WESTERN. 1025 and Havre, and from March, 1916, when the London, Brighton and South -Goast Railway Company's steamer Sussex was torpedoed and, after being Tepaired, was taken over by the French Marine, this was the only route open to civilian passengers to and from France. Practically all the civil mails for the Continent, the bulk of the mails for the Near East and a large proportion of those for the Expeditionary Forces in France (supplementing the military mails which were being sent via Folkestone) passed via Southampton and Havre. A reduced mail and passenger service to the Channel Islands was kept up. The cargo services to Honfleur, Cherbourg and St. Malo were fully maintained. The steamers in these services did good work in bringing food-stuffs from France. In addition to the ordinary commercial freights passing between England and France they carried, also, large quantities of military and Government stores. Having regard to the fact that the company had three and, at times, four or five, of their steamers in the Channel every night of the week, they were fortunate in losing only two of them by enemy action, namely, the cargo steamer Normandy, on January 25th, 1918, while on passage to Cherbourg, and the small passenger steamer South Western, on March i6th, 1918, while on the passage to St. Malo. In both cases there was, unfortunately, some loss of life. In appreciation of the great advantages gained from the main- tenance of communications on the Havre route, and in recognition of the skUl and bravery which had been shown in the attainment of this resiilt, the captains of the three steamers concerned received illuminated addresses of thanks, accompanied by handsome cheques, from the British Base Staff at Havre and the British Chamber of Commerce in Paris. The latter body also made a money present to each member of the crew of the three vessels. Apart from the cross-Channel-service vessels already mentioned, four of the six jointly owned by the London and South Western and the London, Brighton and South Coast Railway Companies and employed on the Portsmouth-Isle of Wight service were taken over by the Govern- ment for use as Fleet auxiliaries. One of the four, the Duchess of Richmond, was mined in the Mediterranean, June 28th, 1919. War Manufactures. The Locomotive workshops at Eastleigh contributed the following items, among others, to the great production of war manufactures in railway workshops : About 2,600 fittings of a varied character for 6-in. howitzer carriages ; 650 fittings for 2-in. trench howitzers ; 47,430 adapters for 18-pdr. shell, and 36,200 nose caps and 40,130 base plates for 6-in. shell. Out of plates, 44,560 copper bands were made, pressed and turned for 9-2-in. shell, and 16,480 for 4-5-in. and 6-in. sheU. Of nickel steel cranked axle-trees for 4"5-in. howitzers 735 were forged, rough bored and machined. For the 6oo-m/m. narrow-gauge railways in France, 200 turnouts were machined and fitted together. Various ship 1026 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. fittings, to the number of about 20,000, were supplied to Messrs. Harland and Wolff and Messrs'. John I. Thornycroft and Co. for the boats they had in hand at Southampton. The fittings, which were for all sorts and sizes of sea-going craft, included diaphragms, rotors and geared wheels for turbines, fuel heaters, steam-pipe flanges, shafting, stern- tube deitaUs, pistons, crossheads, valves, etc. The Carriage and Wagon Department supplied 1,5150 ambulance stretchers ; 380 general service wagons ; 3,700 air-cone supports ; 23,596 picketing pegs ; 2,350 picket posts ; 286 pairs of stretcher trestles ; 39 open vehicles for carrying aeroplanes ; no bodies for War Department motor-lorri«s ; 64,960 trigger-guard stampings ; 260 spindles for Maxim- gun stands ; 5,400 rifle-body forgings ; 20 motor-hinge forgiags, and 1,500 sets of mine-sinker parts. By the same department there were also provided two complete ambulance trains and six specially-fitted ambulance coaches, for home use, and two complete ambulance trains for use overseas. Two other ambulance trains for use overseas were in hand when the Armistice was signed. The order for them was then cancelled. Railway Material Provided. The company provided for use overseas, and after an extensive overhaul, fifty goods engines (0-6-0) , of which thirty-six went to Egypt, nine to Mesopotamia, and five to Salonika. Considerable quantities of spare parts were afterwards made and sent out. The company built fifty special 20-ton covered goods wagons for France ; they supplied also for overseas, forty converted brake-vans, fifty insulated meat-vans, fifty timber trucks, and, of standard rolling stock, fifty-one carriages, besides a large number of spare parts. The company also provided six- teen corridor vehicles which were converted into a complete ambulance train for the use of the United States troops in France. The whole of the permaiaent-way materials on the Basingstoke and Alton Branch— a single line twelve miles in length — were taken up and removed complete for use in France. For use at home in munition factories or on military railways, etc., the company furnished eleven tank engines, of which three were of the 0-4-0 type, seven of the 0-2-2 type and one of the 4-4-2 t5^e. They also converted 103 covered goods wagons into improvised gunpowder vans. Premises taken over by the Government. For use as stores or for other purposes, the Government took over the South Western Company's Ocean Quay Station at Devonport (Stonehouse Pool) ,; at Padstow a portion of the Harbour Commissioners' new jetty and the Quay Berth were occupied by the Naval authorities for the accommodation of naval patrol boats ; Stokes Bay Pier (Hampshire) was taken over by the Admiralty as a torpedo-firing point, while much of the company's property at Bridgwater, Basingstoke, Micheldever, THE LONDON AND SOUTH WESTERN. 1027 Ringwood and Topsliain was occupied for the storage of hay in large quantiiies. Exchange of Foreign Money. Inasmuch as troops on leave from the various Fronts were constantly arriving at Waterloo, via Southampton, bringing with them foreign money in various currencies which they reqmred to exchange into EngUsh,. measures were taken by the company in November, 1915, to aftord them faciUties for doing this in Waterloo Station. Six boxes were provided for the purpose on the arrival platforms, and arrangements were also made for the changing of money at certain of the booking-office windows. During 1915, a^d 19x6 special trains with troops on leave, were run during the night and in the early hours of the morning, but subsequently to 1916 the arrival at Waterloo was generally during the day-time. It was then decided to open the exchange boxes on the platforms, only when the special leave- trains were due, but to keep the exchange windows at the booking offices continuously open to suit the convenience of men who had travelled from Southampton by ordinary trains, of others who had not exchanged their foreign money immediately on arrival at Waterloo, and of still others who had come to Loudon otherwise than via Southampton. Among those in the last-mentioned category were more especially holders of Russian money, and in their case exchange was compUcated by the fact that two rates were running at the same time. Special difficulty in making the necessary arrangements was experi- enced at Waterloo by reason of the fact that the amount of exchange business to be done did not warrant the appointment of a special staff. Consequently, and owing also to the shortage of staff, the work had to be done in conjunction with ordinary duties, the performance of which was retarded with the result that the arrears therein had to be made good by working late. The arrangements continued in force until October, 1919. By that time the sum total of the money exchanged amounted to ;£i,5,82,924, the various currencies included therein being as follows : — £ French and Belgian ....... 1,473,508 Italian Greek Russian German 102,187 3.520 2,751 958 Enlistments. The number of members of the London and South Western Railway staff who joined His Majesty's Forces was 6,621, equal to 27-3 per cent, of the sum total of employees on August 4th, 1914. Women Workers. Employment of women and girls to take the place of male workers who had been released for active service or to assist in railway transport 1028 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. work overseas was well distributed among the various departments throughout the London and South Western system. At the outset they were taken on mainly for the performance of clerical duties ; but when, in 1916, greater pressure was brought to bear on the railway companies to respond as far as they could to the demands of the military authorities for " More men — and still more men ! " women were engaged by the South Western Company — as on other railways throughout the country — in a wider range of occupations and to a much greater extent than had been the case before. Thus in the Traffic Department they were employed as booking clerks, ticket collectors, carriage cleaners, passenger porters, goods porters, parcels-office porters, messengers and lift attendants. The Carriage and Wagon Department, which already had a certain proportion of women on its permanent staff, now took on still more ; the Goods Department employed a large number in various capacities, including those of porters, checkers and truckers, while the Engineering Department had about 100 women chiefly as painters, utilising them, more especially, for the painting of bridges and other railway structures. Perhaps the severest test of all that women employees on the South Western underwent was in connection with the goods work at Southamp- ton Docks in and from the year 1916. Daily cargoes of produce from the Channel Islands were arriving there, but, owing to Admiralty require- ments, the produce had to be discharged from the boats on a pubUc quay instead of in the usual dock where it could have been dealt with mainly under cover. WhUe labour required for the transfer from boat to train was supphed by the port authorities, the railway company had to provide the necessary staff for " tallying," or recording, the loads. No men were then available for this duty, and the local railway officials found them- selves in a difficulty. The employment of women was suggested ; but this was in the days when female labour on railways had not yet got much beyond office work, and the idea of employing young women as " load recorders " was regarded as quite impracticable. It had to be adopted, all the same, in the absence of any possible alternative, and a feminine staff, consisting mainly of young women whose ages ranged from twenty to thirty, supplemented by one or two older women related to members of the male staff, was organised. The work was very tr3dng, as it had to be done on an open quay in all weathers and, on occasions, until late at night ; but the members of the new brigade kept steadily to their task, none of them raising any objections. From the male staff of dock workers they received cordial co-operation and the best of treatment. The men voluntarily gave up their own cabin on the quay for the use of the women as a mess-room ; they gallantly lent them their coats in case of rain, and they adopted among themselves a code of honour which led to the immediate rebuke of any among their number who made use of expressions not suited to the cars of the new " comrades." In addition to this, the members of the feminine contingent appointed as " Mother " one of the older women, who was THE LONDON AND SOUTH WESTERN. 1029 unremitting in her efforts to act up to the responsibilities of the post allotted to her. In 1 917 the continued shortage of staff and the need for releasing every man who could be spared led to the employment of women in the -goods warehouses at Southampton and Portsmouth. They were taken on first as goods porters, and the wheeling about of trucks loaded up with heavy packages may well have imposed a severe strain on their physical powers, although, it is said, they would never admit that men could do any work better than they could do it themselves. After gaining initial experience as goods porters the best of them were promoted to the position of checker. Other women and girls were taken on as general workers, and eventually so many were being employed at the two ports that, with the further assistance of male casuals of non-military age, the railway officials were able to release 50 per cent, of the male wages staff for active service. Ambulance Work. When war was declared a large number of the company's ambulance staff were in camp with the Territorial units, and they were, consequently, added to the Expeditionary Force which left for France shortly afterwards. The Hants Territorial Regiment was largely composed of members of the staff employed in the company's workshops at Eastleigh, and prac- tically the whole of the Eastleigh Ambulance Brigade was mobilised, only a few of the older men being left to carry on the ambulance work. Thus, from the outset of the war the " First Aid " workers on the South Western were severely handicapped by the reduction in their numbers, whether in the workshops or on the railway generally ; but those who remained showed themselves fully equal to requirements, and many instances of real life-saving were recorded. Nor were they content to discharge only the duties which arose in connection with the railway itself. A number of the staff sacrificed their spare time, and often, also, their hours of rest, by undertaking Voluntary Aid Detachment work at hospitals in the vicinity of the stations or the workshops at which they were employed. There were at least two hospitals in the South- west of London where the night patrol duty was mainly performed by South Western men who were well qualified in the work and had offered to take on the duty. Others of the staff undertook the detraining of the sick and wounded from the ambulance trains dealt with at various stations on the company's system. What was done by South Western ambulance men during the enemy air-raids on London has already been told on pp. 452-3. South Western Railway Musical Society. In 1906 some of the musical members of the London and South Western Railway staff in London formed themselves, into what was then known as the Waterloo Orchestral Society. Four years later their example was followed by the vocalists among their colleagues who, in 1030 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. turn, established a South Western Railway Male-Voice Choir. These two organisations amalgamated in September, 1911, under the title of the South Western Railway Musical Society. Some very successful gatherings were held from time to time, much was done in the way of promoting social intercourse among South Western workers, and the new Society underwent such development that on the outbreak of the war it numbered about eighty members. Owing, however, mainly to the fact that so many had joined the Colours, the Orchestral Section had to be suspended, though the Male-Voice Choir was able to continue, notwith- standing the depletion in its numbers. Before long it was found that increased opportunities for usefulness were arising. Instead of simply entertaining themselves or their friends, th-ere was good scope for the members to entertain sick or wounded soldiers and sailors who, back froiii the war and in need of relaxation, would be certain to form especially appreciative audiences. Then, also, whilst the available number of " male voices " had declined, the company were engaging feminine staff-substitutes who also had voices, and many of whom were eager to do what they could to give pleasure to the brave ones who had been fighting for their country's cause and been temporarily laid aside. So the Male- Voice Choir became a Mixed- Voice Choir, the help of the lady members allowing, more especially, of repeated renderings oi " Merrie England." Altogether more than 100 concerts for the entertainment of sick and wounded were given during the course of the war in hospitals or elsewhere in places as far apart as Seaford and Brockenhurst. Included in this number were thirty for the special benefit of members af Colonial con- tingents. Most of the concerts, and espefcially those involving rail journeys, were given by the male members of the Choir, assisted by a certain number of artistes who were relatives or friends ; but all was done entirely free of expense to the authorities of the institutions concerned. Not only was this the case, but the efforts of the Choir led to the raising of more than £500 on behalf of charities connected with or arising out of the war. As for the sick and wounded who were entertained, the number of these is estimated at over 100,000, while many letters received by the Society from medical officers of the various institutions expressed cordial thanks for the services rendered, and bore testimony to the beneficial effects thereof on the patients. Thus the kindly vocalists on the South Western Railway staff who themselves may have been unable to join the Fighting Forces at the Front still did some good, useful and well-appreciated work at home. Allotments. When, in the year 1916, there was every prospect of a serious shortage in the food supply of the country, representations were made to the General Manager of the London and South Western as to the great possibilities that would be opened out in the way of increased food THE LONDON AND SOUTH WESTERN. 1031 production if increased facilities were given to the staff to cultivate the spare land alongside the company's hues ; and the Directors, acting on the General Manager's recommendation, agreed that all such spare land as might be suitable for the purpose should be placed at the disposal of the staff. The necessary arrangements were entrusted to a " Garden Plots Committee," formed of representatives of each department of the company's service, and this committee was also authorised by the Directors to obtain seed potatoes in bulk direct from Scotland for disposal among the company's employees in small lots at cost price. A Uke policy was followed in each succeeding year during the war- period, and eventually the number of allotments under cultivation on the company's land in various parts of the South Western system was over 7,000. Such indeed was the eagerness of the staff to avail themselves of a concession likely to confer so practical an advantage .on their families that, in the absence of other available land in the essentially non- agricultural neighbourhood of Nine Elms, some of the men started to dig up part of an old locomotive yard there ; and, although they had very hard work in the initial stages, they persevered ^until they had converted so apparently uncongenial a plot of land into a vegetable garden which yielded excellent crops. In the summer of 1917 the King and Queen inspected the allotments adjoining the company's electric power station at Wimbledon, and their Majesties cordially congratulated several of the allotment holders on the success of their efforts as cultivators of the soil and in the direction of increasing food production. One interesting development to which the allotments have led hsis been the holding of annual fruit and vegetable shows in London and at Bournemouth, Eastleigh, Exeter and Ringwood, South Western Railway employees competing thereat for the valuable prizes by means of which the Directors and the General Manager have further sought to encourage the attainment of the best possible results. Then, also, early in 1918, copies of a useful illustrated " Guide for Allotment Holders " were distributed free among the company's employees, and lectures on the cultivation of vegetable crops were given in London and at Exeter by an expert in horticulture. These efforts led to a letter of appreciation to the following effect being addressed by the Right Hon. R. E. Prothero, P.C, M.P., at that time President of the Board of Agriculture, to the Chairman of the Garden Plots Committee, Mr. W. Buckmaster :— February 7tli, 1918. I heartily congratulate your Company on the inducements they have so patriotically ofEered to their employees to increase food production. I should be grateful if you would take the earliest opportunity of telling those who have been responsible for this extremely useful piece of work how deeply I appreciate their efforts. If such a high standard of patriotism existed throughout the country my apprehensions as to our food supply would be much reUeved. 3Y CHAPTER LXI-X. LONDON, BRIGHTON .AND -SQUTH COAST -RAILWAY. When, immediately on tke outbreak of war, special duties were being assigned to certain of the railways which the Government had taken over with the idea of operating them as one unified system, the function allo- cated to the London, Brighton and Sotith Coast Railway, apart from the ordina;iy movements of troops, etc., was that of undertaking tlie dispatch rfrom .Newhaven (Littlehampton being added some months later) of tlie iprodigious quantities alike of munitions and of war stoires in .genetal to France or other destinations overseas. The wisdom of the choice thus made of Newhaven for the achievement of this purpose was beyond all question. The Rise of Newhaven. Formed by thfe outlet of the River Ouse into Seaford Bay, at a point on the Sussex coast situate fifty-six miles south' Of London and eiglrt and-a 4ialf ttiiles --east -of (Btighton, the seaport of Newhaven was once a mere 'fiver channd with sloping -banks and a few landing-stages for fisMng •boats or coasting Vessels, while the entrance to it was then halDle to %e choked 'up by -an admixture Of silt brought down the river by tlie ciirrent and 'Of ' shingle cashed along from the wes^tward by the flow -of the ti^e. Under these conditions Newhaven was ©f 'but little maritime importance ^dbwn to the Middle of the nineteenth century, -although the 'value Of having a haftoitr of tefuge for naval vessels in war time, and for the ■metcatftSe marinfe in time of 'peace, at a point in the Channel midway between Dover and Southampton, was generally reteognised. Then, at la^, the good fairy of Newhaven came along in 'the 'form *Gf the London, Brighton and South Coast Railway Company, whi^, -'created -by an amalgamation of smaller lines, assumed that title in 1846 and built, in 1847, a brandh railway linking up Newhaven with Lewes and giving the port through connection with London. The company further constructed a continuous quay, or wharf, with landing-stages, sheds, etc., on the east side of the river ; they extended their lines to the quay ; 'they built a harbour station with an adjoining hotel, and, in conjunOtion with the Western of France Railway Company, they started a service of steamboats between Newhaven and Dieppe. All this was, however, only the beginning of things as regarded the benefits which the railway interests were to confer on the port. 1032 LONDON, BRIGHTON AND SOUTH COAST RAILWAY. 1033 When, in 1850, the need was recognised for a systema-tic dredging of the haf bonts and the bar, the railway company undertodk the work in return for a stipulated annual pdytneiiA. When, in 1863, the 'HaLrbour Trtist^es wanted tb straighten the cduirse of the river, build a new bridge across the harbour, and ptdvide landing-stages and wharves on the other side, it was Vith the financial assistance of the Brighton Coihpariy that they carried out their scheme. Wheti, also, in 1878, a long catalogue of improvemerits — including the construction of a breakwater, about 1,000 yaMs ill length, to be TUn out seaward from the shore west of the liarboui: ; new entrance 'piers ; a sea wall, and a new eastern quay — 'was'pi'ojeoted, and a Newhaven Harbour Company formed in succession to the Harbour Trustees, it was the Brighton Company who, either Isy direct subscription or by guarantee of interest, provided practically the whole of the capital. Such, in fact, was the exftot of the finahlctal irtterfest 'of the railway company in the whole undertaking iJha't t'he harbotfr company thottght i-t 'expedient to delegate future cdhtrol and naanagement to theili ; and this method of operation ha's continued ever since. In effect, therefore, Newhaven Harbour 'is the property Of the Newfcaven Harbour Company, but is worked by the London, Brighton and South Coast Railway Company. In all these cireurhstances and conditions, the harbour may fairly be regarded as the creation of the Brighton Coftipahy, thanks to whose enterprise and heavy capital expenditure the Government were able to take over in August, 1914, an additional Tneans of cross-Channel comrrrtmication which, as in the ease of other railway-owned or railway- provided ports, was to confer -upon ^em tiransport facilities of incalculable advantage in the -prosecution of the war. Newhaven passed under naVal and military control immediately foHo'Wi'ng the 'ontbreak of hostilities. The Harbour Station was closed %) the public forthwith, the only trains allowed to stop there being those that did so to sfet down or pick up military authorities. On and from September 22nd, 1916, the town of Newhaven and all the land within the limits of the -military defences became a special rriilitary area under the Defence of the Realm Regidations, and no passengers arriving 'at Newhaven Town Station were allowed 'to leave it unless they held a permit issued by the Commandant of the area. Newhaven was thus given up to the handling of Go'vernihent traffic for the duration Of the war. These conditions were in force 'until December 2nd, 1918, when the restriction was suspended " until further notice." Harbour and Qjjays. Geogra'phically the situation was a most favourable one. Protedted t)y its breakwater, the harbour e^dtends inland for a distance of about a mile in what is now a perfectly straight hne, while the railway sidings, Ivarehouses, sheds, etc., are alongside quays throughout, so that cargo can be trainsferred, by cranes or otherwise, direct from railway truck to 1034 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. ship, or vice versa, with the 'least possible trouble and in the shortest possible time. The quays, forming extensions of one another, are three in number, namely, the East Quay, the Railway Quay and the North Quay ; and they afford accommodation for the loading of, alto- gether, fourteen ships simultaneously- — six at the East Quay and four at each of the two others. This fact made it possible, during the war period, to tranship goods and material up to 10,000 tons a day. Along aU three quays there is a continuous line of cranes, twenty-six new steam cranes having, since the outbreak of war, been added to the twenty-three stiU serviceable steam and hydraulic cranes then already in use. The average capacity of these forty-nine cranes ranges -from three tons to five tons. The East Quay is the one familiar to travellers as that from which boats started for, or arrived from, Dieppe. Trains still drew up on the landing-stage throughout the war ; but they came in far greater number, and they brought, not passengers from London, but war supplies from every part of Great Britain, the traffic allocated to Newhaven, from the time that the State took control over the railways, being exclusively goods traffic. No troops at all passed through the port. The supplies handled on the East Quay were mainly provisions for the fighting forces overseas. Removed from the wagons on the railway lines alongside, the boxes containing the provisions were placed on a " scale board," connected by chains at each comer with one of the cranes, which then raised the boards, was swung round, and lowered board and boxes direct into the hold of the vessel. The goods transports employed were generally ships ranging from 750 tons to 2,500 tons, the smallest being especially serviceable for the passage to St. Valery, a small port between Dieppe and Le Havre which offered direct rail connection with Rouen. After the signing of the Armistice, when many of the ordinary transports were released, use was made at Newhaven, of five Port of London mud barges, the interiors of which (duly cleansed) constituted holds in the form of huge tanks. In the'se holds considerable stores, finally covered by hatchways and tarpaulins, could be loaded for conveyance across the Channel. In addition to the six transports for which berths were provided, there was ample accommodation in the quay, not only for others waiting their turn= — as many as thirty-seven transports have been in the port at one time — but for a goodly collection (on the other side of the quay) of trawlers, torpedo-boats, motor-boats and dredgers ; though care was at all times taken to keep the waterway clear in the centre for the passage of vessels to or from the inner quays. The Continental Station, with its waiting-rooms, Customs examina- tion room, sheds and warehouses, was devoted mainly to the storage of reserve supplies by the Royal Army Service Corps. Thus, in place of a crowd of Channel passengers, departing or arriving, the waiting-rooms were filled to the ceiling with piles of boxes containing biscuits, safety- matches, candles, soap, or other of the endless variety of things without LONDON, BRIGHTON AND SOUTH COAST RAILWAY. 1035 which no properly-equipped army could be expected to engage in warfare under the conditions of to-day. The London and Paris Hotel — favoured in pre-war times by passengers who went to Newhaven by an early train, in advance of the starting of the boat, in order to prepare for the crossing alike by a short rest arid a good meal — had a number of rooms commandeered for naval and embarka- tion offices ; but enough were left to allow of the carrying on of the hotel business in the special interests of naval and military officers, for whom alone accommodation was provided. The Railway Quay was utiUsed chiefly for the shipment, from its four berths, of ordnance stores, ammunition and army equipment in general. The four berths and the extensive sidings on the North Quay were used mainly for the loading of ammunition, conveyed to Newhaven from aU parts of Great Britain for shipment overseas. At first the men engaged in handling this traffic were very nervous about it ; but, on the principle of familiarity breeding contempt, it became frequently necessary, later on, to warn them to take more precautions. Happily no accident occurred, apart from such mishaps as might have resulted from deahng with ordinary goods. Various sheds on the North Quay which, prior to the war, had been used for the stacking of timber, were taken over and converted into Government stores. On the same quay, also, there were accumulated hundreds of tons of charcoal, of which great quantities were sent across the Channel for the purposes of fires in the trenches. Return Traffic. Nor did the war business done at Newhaven finish with the end of the war. On the signing of the Armistice there was no longer the need to send overseas the same great volume of supplies and ammunition as before ; but, although the traffic to France began steadily to decline, there set in an increasing flow of return traffic from France to England. The sheds and warehouses filled up afresh, this time with stacks of boxes containing the engines of aeroplanes sent home (as the only part thereof then worth troubling about), machine-guns, mattresses, stretchers, cycles, iron and steel bars, bolts, pontoons, picks and shovels, wagons, spare wheels, and a miscellaneous collection of other stores or military salvage in general. New Works. In order to provide adequate facilities for dealing with the great volume of traffic passing through the port, new sidings had to be con- structed on an extensive scale, while these, in turn, necessitated the provision of a new signal box and an extension of the telephonic com- munication. Nor did the existing range of station buildings, warehouses and sheds afford sufficient storage accommodation, the necessity arising for the further provision of one large general warehouse and a smaller 1936 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND. THE GREAT WAR. oil-warehouse, the latter being furnished with a- concrete weU. Then, also, on the ample space available alongside the railway quay there was erected, at an early period of- the war, an additional and, exceptionally well-equipped power-station which ensured a supply of electricity for the lighting of- the whole harbour on a far more efficient scale than before — the harbour becoming one of the most brilliantly-lighted places on the coasts of Britain — and power for the marine shops- The briUiant lighting of- the harbour throughout the war period may, perhaps, be thought to have introduced an element of dan^r on account of' the air-raids. NewhaveUj however, was too far to the south-west to suit the convenience of the raiders ; the harbour nestles in a naTOW vaUey between two ranges of hiUs so situated that, by the time the raiders, proceeding at a good speed, might have discovered its situation, the rapidity of their flight would have carried them beyond the point at which they could alone have dropped their bombs with any hope of success ; while, to make assurance doubly sure, all air-raid warnings were sent to Newhaven whenever the raiders made their appearance, and conditions of absolute darkness over the entire area were secured by the turning of a switch. For these reasons alone, and apart from other considerations that arose, the selection of Newhaven as the port from which prodigious quantities of explosives were to be sent across the seas was an eminently wise one. Nor were the new works carried out in the interests of the Newhaven traffic confined to' that port alone, congestion on the Hues leading there from London being guarded against by the provision of additional sidings at Gatwick, where trains on their way down could be held back in case of need. Then, also, additional facilities were provided at Hay- wards Heath Station to allow of goods' trains being shunted so that other trains could pass. Traffic and Labour Arrangements. Work at the harbeur went on continutmsly, night and day, weekdays and- Sundays, for the duration of the war. It was planned on the basis of oiie inwards train of, on an average, forty or forty-five trucks being receiS^ed and dealt with every hour of the twenty-four ; and in busy times itom sixteen to" twenty trains Were so handled, apart from the dispatch of empties. The flow of traffic was regulated in the department of the Superintendent of the Line at London Bridge, word being sent by telephone each morning as to how many wagons were still under load at Newhaven and how many could be dealt with during the day, whereupon instructions were given from London Bridge to the other companies concerned as to the exact number of trains which might be sent forward to Ne'whaven, any others that these companies might have on hand for the same destination being held back for the time being. As a rule the sidings at Newhaven were kept as full up as possible, in order to ensure a continuance in the flow of supplies overseas and the avoidance LONDON, :BRIGHT0N AND SOUTH COAST RAILWAY. 1037. of any delay through, for example, an obstruction of traffic on the ims^ It was for Kke reasons that the sheds andr warehouses were: kept, w^ll, stocked. The number of loaded trucks on, hand in, the. sidings at oae^ time was generally about i,2Q0. The average number of persons engaged; in; carr5^ing on the worfe pfi the port was 2,500, the bulk of these being labourers hying in Brixton, or Lewes who travelled (free) to and from Newhaven in special trsi8§; run every day. They worked in three shifts: of eight hours each,. the fix^st shift arriving at 6-.2.0 a.m:, the second at 2.30 p.m.,,, and the thi-^d at 10.20 p.m. In February, 1918, it was found that a. sufficiency of, mal^/ labour was no longer available, and arrangements were made for bringing about 500 women and girls from Brighton and Lewes day by day to assist in the work of the port. This arrangement was continued from that time untU. the signing of the. Armistice. The women and girls worked during the daytime only. They dealt with the. lighter kind of commodities, iiv tbe loading of the ships. In no case were they allowed to work in the holds of the vessels, men alone being, employed there. At times, >Kbep. male labour was especially scarce, the services of members of the Xt^IJSt, port Workers' Battahon were obtainedr—with excellent results from th^ point of view of the efficiency with whieh the work was dcsne.. The special, arrangements made for feeding the woiikers: included! the construction of a distinctly novel " dining -hall:" A number of old railway carriages were brought together and placed, end to end in such a way as to form a parajlelogram', spaces being left for doors between ; the interior fittings, together with the inner doors and, windows, wene removed; and the entire group of carriagiBS- was roofed oveEwithiboaiids, and tarpaulin so that the space between them formed a " dining-hall/" accommodating two long tables, while the carriages constituted " private' boxes," each with a table of its own. Space was thus, obtained for, feeding 350 persons at a time, or about 2.,qqq in a day of tvijenty-four hours. No charge was made for the meals supplied. In. a shed alongsidft there was a well-equipped Idtchen. A separate diningrhall aa>d rest-roQiR, also made of old railway carriages, formed an cmnexe for women workers. Another old carriage became, first, a sleeping compartment, aajd aftsf- wards an office, for the manager in charge. StiU. other raipLway vehicles were converted into quarters for the kitchen stafiE. Labour-saving Appliances. Large as was the number of persons, employed at the port,, it would have had to be larger gtiU but for the resort to a number of labour-^sawing appliances as war-time expedients. These iofiluded,, for example, la^ad conveyers worked by electricity, and carrying along the quay? anytMiag up to I cwt. or 2 cwt. They were supplemented by side conveyers, placed at right angles, boxes or parcels being removed irmsb one band tQ another by a man stationed at the point of junction. Thg use o| tihese conveyers meamt a saving not alone in labour but in 1?iK)*., Thea there I038 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. were gravity rollers, put together in sections, and capable of being readily removed elsewhere, according to need. Heavy boxes, lifted from the railway trucks and placed on top of the rollers, at about the same level, made their own way to the end of the section. There they were raised by an electric stacker to the top of another set of rollers which took them a stage farther, and so on until they reached the spot where they were wanted. In the case, again, of the warehouses, there were stackers or elevators on one side to raise the goods from the trucks to the upper storeys, and shoots on the other side to bring them down again when they were to be sent away. Extent of the Traffic. The total number of special trains run to Newhaven for the convey- ance of Government stores, from the outbreak of the war down to the end of 191 8, apart from the considerable amount of traffic carried by ordinary goods trains, was 19,750. An approximately corresponding number were sent from Newhaven as empties. The largest number of loaded specials dealt with in any one day was twenty-one. The number of loaded trucks received was 866,021. Of these 336,153 contained explosives and 529,868 brought other stores. The total tonnage shipped from Newhaven during the same period was 6,018,465 tons, namely, 2,682,756 tons of ammunition and 3,335,709 tons of other stores. Nothing less than a prodigious effort, sustained day and night for close on four and a half years, would have sufi&ced to get through the continuous work and the practically ceaseless strain involved in this immense volume of business at a port which, in pre-war days, had pro- vided for little more than the needs of cross-Channel passengers and a certain amount of goods traffic. It is true that Newhaven, unlike certain other ports, can offer no big figures in respect to troop traffic dealt with ; but one must bear in mind that, whilst troop traffic walks on board, good traffic has to be put there. That so vast an amount of labour, in itself so specially exacting, should have been accomplished at Newhaven with almost a perfection of smoothiiess of working and general efficiency, reflects the highest credit on every one concerned. In addition to aU that was done at Newhaven, much use was also made, from an early period of the war, of Littlehampton as a port of embarka- tion for munitions, military stores and foodstuffs brought- — as at New- haven-:-in continuous streams from all parts of the country. The total volume of this traffic conveyed to the two ports down to the end of 1918 — apart from a substantial tonnage passing over the Brighton lines to other places on the system — amounted to 6,805,810 tons. The number of loaded wagons handled at Newhaven and Littlehampton during the same period was close on one million. The number of special trains run over the Brighton system as a whole in connection with Government traffic was 53,376. The largest number LONDON, BRIGHTON AND SOUTH COAST RAILWAY. 1039 of loaded specials dealt with on any one day was sixty-four. A consider- able amount of war trafiEc was also conveyed by ordinary goods trains. The number of transports, drawn from various sources, entered at the two ports during the course of the war was 11,159, namely, g,o6i at Newhaven and 2,098 at Littlehampton. The wages bill for casual labour alone at the ports to the end of 1918 amounted to £1,127,648. Passenger Traffic. The passenger train traffic on the London, Brighton and South Coast Railway, although it did not equal the goods traffic in volume, was considerable, and comprised the conveyance of troops to and from the many camps on the system or to join the Armies abroad. A large number of horses, guns and stores were also conveyed. A substantial part of this business was dealt with by the ordinary, passenger train services, but 27,366 special passenger trains were employed in addition. This makes an aggregate number of 80,742 special passenger and goods trains used for the purpose of the war, and if the running had been constant there would have been a train for every half-hour from the day war broke out until the day the Armistice was signed. There were also ambulance trains coming from other railways to various hospital depots on the company's system, more particularly Brighton, where a large number of wounded men were treated in the Royal Pavilion and elsewhere in the town, and the company's staff, some of whom are highly trained first-aid experts, contributed very materially to the safe and comfortable transfer of the wounded men from the rail to the road vehicles at the various stations. The number of ambulance trains run on the London, Brighton and South Coast system from the outbreak of war to the end of December, 1918, was — Destination. Brighton ... ... Other stations . Total . . . 678 79,407 Munitions of War. A considerable amount of munitions work was done in the company's locomotive shops at Brighton for the War Ofi&ce, the Ministry of Muni- tions, the Admiralty, Woolwich, the Sussex Munitions Board and various private firms. The ammunition items included the following : 45-in. shell nose stampings and dies, 24,000 ; i8-pdr. Q.F. cartridge cases repaired, 15,485 ; fuses, graze No. 100, machined, 14,884, and over 2,000 parts of various kinds supplied for use in the construction of 2-in. trench-howitzers by the Great Eastern Railway Company. Among the items done for the Trains Patients Run. Conveyed 233 37.070 445 42,337 1040 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Admiralty was the production of a. variety of parts required for paravanes, and the making of 10,000 four-pronged grapnels of an improved type. To Vickers, Ltd., the company supplied swivels, bridge pieces, levers and link-connecting sights for 6- in. howitzer carriages„together with stampings for different parts of 3-pdr., 13-pdr. and i8-pdr. gun mechanisms. For the Sussex Munitions Board the company made numerous adapters for fuse No. loi, and did milling, stamping, machining and plating- work in connection with fuse hole plugs No. 3. One especially notable feature in the company's war manufacture was the output, for a firm under con- tract with the Government, of close on 10,000 Mills hand grenades. In the Carriage and Wagon Department, at Lancing, the- work done included, the. buUding of the ambulance train of. eight coaches provided by the late Lord Michelham, in the early days, of the war ; a., standard ambulance- train ordered by the Govemmeat for use in France, and 100 20-ton- covered goods wagons.,. also- designed for use. in France,- whilst the company further contributed to the supply of general service w.agons„ ambidance stretchers,, picketing pegs, picket, posta, etc. The company's Marine. Department al Newhaven. did. much, most useful emergency work. on. trawlers, torpedo boats and transports, carr5dng out repairs, etc., which, in many cases,, avoided. the sending of the vessels to. Scotland or elsewKere,, and enabling them to return to, active service ■ much sooner than, would otherwisa have been, possible. Passengek and Cargo Ships" Requisitioned. The fleet of passenger and cargo ships, owned. joiatLy by the. Brigliton and French State. Railway adnainistra-tion was reqxiisitiDned at the out- break of war, some by the English and some by the French. Government.. The s.s. Aj'undel and Brighton were fitted out as troopships.,, and in-, the coiirse of, 969 voyages across the Channel, the ArundeL carried 657,816a officers and men. The Brighton was afterwards converted into a-hospital and ambulance ship, and in that service has made 973 voyages and con- veyed. 122,636 sick and wounded men. The Brighton also conveyed his Majesty in 1914 from Newhaven to Dieppe, and subsequently the Presi- dent of the U.S.A. and Mrs. Wilson both ways between Dover and- Calais on the occasion of their visit to this country. The Dieppe was engaged in the first place as a transport from New- haven to Rouen, Havre, Boulogne, Calais, Dunkirk, Ostend, Zeebrugge and Bruges, in which service she carried stores, ammunition and occa- sionally troops. She was aiterwards fitted out- as a hospital ship, and subsequently converted into- a troopship,, and in that capacity conveyed 459,636 troops across the Channel. The France became a troopship, working from Southampton, Dover and FoUcestome,, and in, the- course of. this service conveyed 207,319 troops. The Mewhaven was employed by the Freach. Admiralrty during the early part of the war, and was thea transferred, to. the English Admir- alty, by whom, she was fitted out as a hospital skip.. In this service LONDON, BRIGHTON AND SOUTH COAST RAILWAY. 1041 she was engaged until the autumn of 1918, when she was converted into a troopship. Altogether she made over 1,000 voyages. The Rouen was mobilised as an auxiliary scout, in which capacity she assisted French submarines and had engagements with enemy submarines in the Channel, including one of twenty-five minutes' duration, at the end of which the submarine was presumed to be sunk or badly damaged. In December, 1916, she was torpiedoed on returning from an expedition against an enemy submarine in the Bay of St. Malo, and not only was she badly damaged, but &v@ of those on board were kiUed and several severely wounded. She drifted towards Dieppe, but was taken in tow to Cherbomrg, where she was repaired, and afterwards employed for some time on the: transport of troops between Corfu and Taranto and Itea. Om on© occasion in the: course of her service she was in the A-dria-tic Sea in the company of ite French cruiser Chateau Renault, and was. only a short distance away^when that ship was torpedoed and sunk. The Sussex was first employed as a troopship between Dieppe arid Havre, and afterwards in th« Folkestone passeng'er service. She was torpedoed when crossing the Channel in March, 1916, bu,t was not a total loss, aad after repair was requisitioned by thje French Marine at Havre. The Paris, the last addition to- the Newhaven and Dieppe passenger fleet, was taken over by the British Admiralty as a coimmissioned ship in his. Majesty's. Navy for the special service, of mine laying in the North Sea, more particularly off the Flandiers coast and Enaden. The six cargo boats, viz., Cherbourg,, Portsmouth,. Brest, Maine, Anjow and Bordefaux, were leq^uisitioned for various war purposes, including mine sweeping, patrol and; transport work,, in. the course of which the Cherbourg struck a mine and was so badly damaged that she had to be broken, up. The Maine- andAnjou were totally lost by torpedo and mine, isdth regrettable loss of life. Those ships which ran between Dover, Folkestone, Boulogne and Calais were especially exposed to attacks fcom the enemy air-raiders. Thirty-four bombs droppeid near to the Newhave-n at one time ox another, some from planes flying in relays covering a period of six hours, and the Dieppe,, on one occasion in a Belgian part and on another at Calais, had bombs dropped within a few feet of her, the latter occurrence causing damage to some «f her gear. Enlistments. The total number of the Brighton Railway staff who left to join H.M. Forces, numbered 5,.635, being 346 per cent, of those in the company's service on Augus-t 4th, 1914. The number of those who fell in the war was 530, apart from over 900 who were wounded, made prisoners or reported missing. It, is the company's intention to erect at their Victoria. Station a hand- some memorial to those of the staff who made the sacrifice of their lives in their country's service. Replicas of the memorial wiU be placed at the other principal stations on the company's system. CHAPTER LXX. THE MIDLAND. War-time traffic on the Midland Railway must, for its complete com- prehension, be regarded from a threefold point of view — (i) that whicli originated on the company's system ; (2) that which resulted from the exceptional role played by the Midland as a link in the chain of communi- cations created by the conversion of the controlled railways into a single unit for the purposes of the war ; and (3) the combination of (i) and (2). Taking, in the first place, what may be regarded as Midland traffic proper, this was bound to be heavy by reason alik^ of the ramifications of a system having a geographical length of 1,585 miles (excluding joint lines not worked by the company, and their lines in Ireland), and the industrial character of so many of the districts through which it passes. As regards the former, one must remember that, from its headquarters at Derby, the Midland extends, on the North, to Carlisle, serving en route, among other great manufacturing centres, Sheffield, Rotherham, Barns- ley', Dewsbury, Huddersfield, Leeds and Bradford ; that on the North- West it extends to Manchester, to Liverpool and to a port of its own at Heysham, whence a service of Midland steamships plies to and from Belfast ; that in the Midlands the system passes through or connects with Nottingham, Leicester, Northampton, Bedford, Birmingham, Wolverhampton, Walsall, and Worcester ; that on the East it stretches out to Lincoln, Peterborough and Huntingdon ; that on the South-East it continues to London, with an extension to Tilbury and Southend^ and that on the South-West the main-line goes through Cheltenham and Gloucester to Bristol and Bath, with local sections in the Hereford and Swansea districts. So it was that, when the war broke out, the Midland was already carrying a heavy traffic to and from many of our greatest industrial centres, situate upon its own lines ; but, with the advent of war manu- factures, as developed either in those centres or elsewhere, the traffic originating or terminating on the Midland system underwent a great expansion. This fact will be better appreciated if one bears in mind that the number of munition works, factories, depots, etc., on the Midland system which were either taken over by the Government or specially set up for the production of war material was no fewer than 258. Of this total, ninety-seven were of entirely new construction.'^ Very many of the existing works were extended, their output being largely increased, while much of the traffic which required to be handled underwent a 1042 THE MIDLAND. 1043 complete alteration in character. The number of factories or other establishments engaged on war work for which the Midland Company laid in schemes of sidings wholly or in part was thirty-three. Then, in addition to all that had to be done for the transport of raw materials and finished or partly-finished articles, the situation was further comphcated by the need to provide for the conveyance of large numbers of workpeople between munition and other works and their homes, the problems thus arising being rendered the more difficult of solution since many of the works were located at points where station accommodation and train services had not previously existed. [Government Traffic. A comprehensive survey of all that was done at or in connection with the various works would give a profoundly interesting account of " Indus- trial England in War-time " ; but such a task cannot be undertaken here, and one or two t5rpical examples must suffice for present purposes. At Attenborough, Notts, the Chilwell National Shell Filling Factory provided the Midland with traffic on such a scale that the maximum attained for any one year during the course of the war reached the pro- digious total — for a single works — of 1,091,000 tons. The greatest daily number of wagons of shells worked away from the place by the Midland Company was 539. The corresponding maximum for trains of shells per day was eleven. In order to facilitate this traffic, thfe Midland Company laid down at the factory two and a half miles of sidings. At the Quedgeley FilUng Factory, near Gloucester, the company pro- vided nearly three miles of sidings, and they had further to undertake the conveyance of 4,500 workpeople daily between the factory and their homes in the surrounding district. A new junction was constructed to connect the main line with the factory branch, and a special platform was built with rail accommodation to allow of engines running round trains clear of the main lines. This platform was of sufficient length to admit of trains carrjdng 1,000 passen- gers being dealt with. By means of the special siding accommoda- tion a train, when unloaded, could be immediately cleared from the platform and another train admitted. The number of workmen's trains run between Gloucester and Quedgeley per day was fourteen (seven in each direction). Conveyance of Factory Workpeople. The passenger traffic to be dealt with in connection with the Govern- ment factories at Longbridge (Birmingham district) was still heavier. The works had been established prior to the war by the Austin Motor Company ; but the Government took them over and not only extended the existing premises, adapting them to the manufacture of munitions, but put up two additional factories. The work carried on was chiefly concerned in the re-lining of guns and the production of aeroplane engines ia44 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. and shdls. The number of 'workpeople employed at the factory and Teqniring to 'be conveyed daily from and back to thdr homes was, approxi- mately, 12,000. They lived in all parts of the Birmingham district — some di them as far away as Worcester, teach day, on the dhatige of " shifts," the Midland had as Triatiy as 10,000 passengers to provide for within the short period of one 'hotir and a quarter. Between Long- Ijridge and Birmingham twenty workmen's trains were run every day (ten in each direction), atid between 'Longbridge and Worcester four per day were ruii (two in each direction). In order that the traffic cOuld be'dfealt with at all, -it was necessa^ry to carry out a special scheme of siding accommodation. For the purposes of the passenger traffic, more especia-Uy, a section of the single line was ■converted -into a double line with an island platform and a one-sided platform Jiaving a footbridge connection. A special system of signals was provided to allow of trains running in either direction being dealt with on either side of the island platform. The total number of workmen's trains run to and from Longbridge and Quedg-eley per month was 1,026. Taking the whole of the Midland systern, the total number of trains run by the company daily for munition workers was seventy-three^ In addition to this, -large nurfibers of workers traveled by ordinary trains. Stations for the special accommodation of workpeople engaged on munitions, etc., were erected alike at Quedgeky, Longbridge, Torrisholme, Lancaster,, Hotwells, Cardington and Halesowen Junction. In a number of other instances additional platform accommodation had to be provided at existing stations in the special interests of munition workers. War Material Carried. The extent and nature of the demands made upon the transportation facilities of the Midland Railway Company in connection with war manufactures produced under the conditions here indicated may be judged from the following instances : — ^Birmingham district : A large number of aircraft engines ; 40,000 motor-cycles, 500,000 bicycles ; 12,000 tons of saddleiy ; 5,500 tons of parts for wire entanglements ; 3,200 general service wagons. Manchester : 80,000 tons of steel bUlets. Northampton : 15,000 tons of boots, etc. Cheltenham : 6,000 tons of material for aeroplane construction. Mangotsfield : 20,000 tons of explosives. Earby : 89,000 tons of explosives. Warmley : 9,000,000 hand grenades. Transport DrFFicuLtiEs. Great difficulties Were -experienced in providing vehicles for the increased volume otf traffic w-hich tequired the use of special vehicles, included therein being such consignments as aeroplanes, " tanks,'" tractors, heavy 'guns and armour plates. iThese difficulties arose, not only on account of the greater extent 'O^f tbe traffic, but also because of tfee THE MIDLAND. 1045 increase in «ize, weight, etc., of the individual articles compared with the pre-war standards for which the company's rolling stock had been designed. There were carried, for example, armour plates weighing as much as 32 tons each. In one instance the plate measured 47J feet in length. An anvilblock weighed as much as 131 tons ; a hammer block weighed 80 tons, while the numerous shafts carried were up to 14 tons in weight and 8o| feet in length. Naval and Military Personnel. The conveyance of naval and military personnel and their baggage, etc., created a very large traffic, some of which went by the company's CHTdinary public services ; though the number of special passenger trains run by -the company for this traffic during the war-period was 11,502. Thenumber of officers and men eonveyed in these special trains was 2,282yOOO. The working of this particular traffic imposed an especially heavy strain upon the staff during the mobilisation period on the outbreak of the war. Between 7 a.m. on Saturday, August 15th, and i a.m. on Sunday, -August i6th, -1914, there were, for example, loaded and worked from -Derby and -Burton to the Luton area sixty-five special trains, and between 5 p.m. on Saturday, August -15th, and 10.30 p.m. on Sunday, August i6th, sixty-^seven special trains were worked from Carlisle to Bedford, the two movements overlapping for a considerable period. They entailed, in combination, the running in two dajrs of over 50,000 train- miles ; but they were accomplished withoiat any serious mishap. Through Traffic. Tirming now to the T61e played by the Midland as an especially important link in the Chain of cdmmunications in what, for the purposes of the war, had become a national system of railways, one finds that vast quantities of war material from Scotland, the North Eastern Railway, the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway, and ihe ports of Liverpool and Manchester passed over the Midland lines and were transferred 'to those of other companies for camps, arsenals, munition factories, poifts and 'dockyards ftiaiiily in the Soirth. As indicating the real iiature of the situation occupied by the Midland in the direction stated, the fact may be mentioned that, in the event oi an invasion or a threatened invasion of this country "by the enemy, the Midland Company's line had been selected under the scheme di " Stan- dard Routes and Timings'" as the trunk railway over whose systetti the greater part of the special trains conveying troops, etc., would have passed. The number ai troop trains cori^^eyed by the Midland route between Englaiid and Scotland during the course of the war was not exceptionally "large, but wai material carried in goods trains wetit in very consideralsle "volume. This was more especially so in proportion as the munition 1046 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. factories multiplied and the transfer of coastal traffic to the railways increased owing to war-time conditions. During one typical week there were hauled between England and Scotland (apart from Admiralty coal traffic) a total of over 45,000 v/agons, and of these approximately 38 per cent, went by the North Eastern route, 29 per cent, by the Midland, 29 per cent, by the London and North Western and 4 per cent, by the Maryport and Carlisle. After the completion of the Georgetown Filling Factory, in 1917, a constant service of trains for the conveyance of shells to be shipped from Newhaven to France was maintained by the Midland Company between Carlisle and Battersea, where they were handed over to the Brighton and South Coast Railway Company. It was in no way unusual for the traffic imported through the Manchester Docks for destinations in Scotland to reach a total of 600 wagons per week, and the whole of this passed intermediately over Midland rails. A large quantity of the pipes used for the construction of the Admiralty oil-pipe laid between the Clyde and Grangemouth also went from Manchester by the Midland route. The Midland Company are joint owners with the Great Central and the Great Northern of the Cheshire Lines, over which Midland trains run to and from Liverpool. Large numbers of American troops, proceed- ing to the South, were worked by Midland engines from Liverpool over the Cheshire Lines to Cheadle Heath, where the Midland system was reached, the trains continuing thence via Derby, Cheltenham and Andover. Smaller numbers, for Dover, were taken by the Midland from Liverpool to Clapham Junction, the trains being there handed over to the South Eastern and Chatham. During the whole course of the War the West Coast ports had to deal with a large proportion of the imports and exports which had previously psissed through East Coast ports and harbours, and a good deal of this traffic fell to the share of the Midland, who have various connections with the said West Coast ports. These connections are either direct, as in the case of the Midland line to Heysham and the Bridgewater " exchange " with the Manchester Ship Canal Company ; or indirect, as in respect to (i) Liverpool, via the Cheshire Lines ; (2) Birkenhead, via the Cheshire Lines or the London and North Western, and (3) Barrow-in-Furness and the West Cumberland ports generally, via Carnforth. War material of all kinds went in great volume by Midland trains from Liverpool over the Cheshire Lines and thence to aU parts of the country. Huge quan- tities of West Cumberland iron and iron ore were carried for use in ironworks situate either on the Midland system or on those of other companies. With the East Coast the Midland is connected by means of the Midland and Great Northern Joint Railway. There was, however, no great volume either of passenger or of goods traffic by this route to or from the Midland system during the course of the war. Occasionally a train of troops passed, and in May, igi8, several cycle corps were conveyed THE MIDLAND. 1047 between the Cromer district and Holyhead. In regard to goods, the considerable fish traffic passing this way in normal times was quiescent, and agricultural produce and implements fonned the bulk of the traffic dealt with. Not much was done in the conveyance of military supplies beyond the forwarding from this district of large quantities of hay for steam-pressing in the Manchester Docks and shipment thence overseas. Most of the East Coast traffic in which the Midland were interested was exchanged with the Great Eastern. In this case, also, agricultural produce and implements formed a good proportion of the commodities carried, though a heavy traffic in aU kinds of munitions passed between the two companies through their junctions at Peterborough, Huntingdon and Stratford. This was due to the fact that many factories on the Great Eastern system, and notably the East Anglia Munitions Committee's establishment, at Ipswich, and the Enfield Small Arms Factory, were producing supplies in large quantities ; though very little of the traffic handed over to the Midland was for places off their own system. On the London, Tilbury and Southend Railway, worked by the Midland Railway Company as an integral portion of their system, a good deal of war traffic was carried. Many American troops, arrived at Tilbury and were conveyed thence with their stores and equipment via Tottenham and Carlton Road Junction, to large camps in the South of England such as Tidworth, Farnham, Winchester, etc. Purfleet Station, on the same line of railway, was made a concentration point for stores, and great quantities of traffic were worked there for shipment overseas for the Expeditionary Forces. Then, also, after the Armistice, Purfleet became an important demobilisation centre. A dispersal camp was established at the local rifle range, and 5,100 officers and 215,900 other ranks — a total of 221,000 altogether— first went by train to the camp and then, when formalities had been completed, went away again by train to their homes. In respect to goods traffic on the London, Tilbury and Southend, large numbers of mine cases from Scotland and the North of England were dealt with at Dagenham Dock on behalf of the Admiralty ; heavy guns, necessitating special arrangements and special vehicles, went by the Midland route from Barrow-in-Furness and Sheffield to Shoeburyness ; oil and petrol passed from the Tilbury Docks, and a considerable amount of other traffic, leaving or joining the Midland main line at Carlton Road Jimction, was conveyed to or from the stores at Thames Haven and Purfleet, By means of the Somerset and Dorset Railway, jointly leased by the Midland and the London and South Western, the former of these two systems is, from its extreme limit at Bath, linked up with the latter at two junctions immediately to the north of Poole ; and, although no great amount of military passenger traffic passed this way, a heavy goods traffic was exchanged. This consisted mostly of large quantities of grain from Avonmouth, provisions from Bristol, munitions from the factory at Quedgeley, and pther eonsignments from the Bristo} ^nd Gloucester 1048 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. dis'tricts for destmations on the London and South Western systefm. Passenger trafcc and, also, the bulk of the taortihern and thr6iligh goods traffic exchanged betweeh the Midland and the South Western went via Brent. The following examples of 6ther miscellaneous wa'r traffic convefyed over the Midlatid as part of a through journey fhay be of interest : — Special 't'fcLin's of d6rdite paste from Scotland were wdrked over the Midland 'lines between Carlisle atid, in one direction, firerit, en fotlte to Paversham, or, in another direction, to Bathi, en route t6 Walreham. This tralffic, owing to its 'highly explosive nature, was carried under veiy stringent regulations and conditions. A heavy coal traffic, which formerly went cd'aStwise frorii Dtirham, was worked in pirt over the Midland system both t6 London (fdr ptiblic utility purposes) and to the West of England. In the same Way the Midland Company took their part in the convey- ance of train loads of iron ore froin the rtiines served by the Stratford- upon-Avon and Midland Junction Railway to the North Staffordshire and North Eastern S.ailways. Shells froth the factory at Park Royal 'Went in 'train-load lots over the Midlatid lines to Ydrk, en route to Barnbow, on the Ndrth Eastern. When, during the critical stages 'of the war, the prospett began to be opened ttp of a serious ihbrtage of food supplies, Shergetic action was taken by the Ministry of Food to secure a large-scale developtnerit of the oil-seed industry here, the purpose aiitieda:t being that of incteasing the supplies alike of margarine and of feeding stuffs 'for cattle. TKlo^t of the oil-seeds exported from Nigeria had hitherto '"been sent to Holland, Germany and Belgitim. It was now found possible to divert them almbst entirely to 'England, and a greit and remarkable' expansion of the indus- tries concerned was the result. The Midland Railway Company had the opportunity of rendering good service on this occasion, thbUskhds' of tons bf oil-seeds being conveyed by their route from Liverpool and the Tilan- che^ter 'Docks to the crushing plants at Selby, Hull and London. American tfbops travelled froth Glasgow to the South via Edinburgh and' Carlisle, from which latter point 'Midland engines wbrked them for- ward to Southampton, Winchester, Romsey, etc. Ambulance trains passed on to the Midland' lines from Southampton, via Cheltenham, and from Dover, via Glapham Junction and Brent. Horses from Ireland to the remount depot at Melton Mowbray were conveyed by the London and North Western to Leicester, via Nuneaton, and thence' by Midland to destination. Nttoabers Of goats sfent from 'Ireland to NeWton Tony, Wiltshire, were conveyed via Holyhe'a'd to Bitteingham, vi^here they were' taken forward, via Cheltenhath, by the Midland, on a further stage' of their journey. Increases in Traffic. Cbfnparing their heaviest war year with 1913, the Midland carried therein i8,6do,obo hiore |passehgers, an increase of 14 per cent., and THE MIDLAND. 1049 3,220,000 tons more of goods and minerals, an increase of 6 per cent. The increase in tonnage was due, not alone to the transport of war material, but, also, to the conveyance of immense quantities of traffic which in pre-war days had gone by coasting steamers. The maximum weight of Government " free " traffic received and forwarded by the company in any one war year (excluding through- through traffic), was 4,188,479 tons. Alterations in the Flow of Traffic. The Midland was materially affected by the various alterations which (Occurred in the flow of traffic. By reason of its wide-spread ramifica- tions, it was especially concerned in the diversion of shipping from -East Coast to West Coast Ports, while the fact that the Midland serves some of the most important of English mining districts made it no less -concerned in the operation of the Coal Transport Re-organisation Scheme. , In regard to the last-mentioned development, the fact may be mentioned that in 1913 the Midland worked 13,052 coal trains into London, whereas the total for 1917 was 22,348 trains^ an increase of 71 per cent. The greatest -number of coal trains worked to London by the Midland in any one day during the war-period was eighty. Ambulance Train Traffic The number of ambulance trains dealt with at stations on the Midland system was 3,982. The number of patients carried was 339,000, namely, 190,000 cot cases and 149,000 sitting cases. The stations at which the sick and wounded were dealt with were Cheltenham, Rubery, Derby, Leeds, Keighley, Nottingham, St. Pancras, Selly Oak, Bath, Sheffield, Bradford, Leicester and Napsbury. At Derby, Bradford and Keighley the whole of the arrangements for the detraining and the transfer of the patients to the motor ambulances were undertaken by qualified members of the Midland staff, who also freely and regularly rendered assistance at the other places mentioned. At a number of the stations members of the staff accompanied the ambulance convoys to the hospitals and assisted in the transfer of the men to the wards. Members of the staff further rendered regular help at the hospitals as orderlies or in other capacities. AU this assistance, whether at the stations or in the hospitals, was given by the staff in their own time and without any remuneration. Railway Material for Overseas. The Midland Company loaned to the Government, for use overseas, seventy-eight engines, over 6,000 lo-ton and other wagons, and fifty brake-vans. They also supplied twenty-eight miles of track, with the necessary sleepers, chairs, plates, etc. The provision of these articles involved the closing of the branch line between Bennerley Junction and 1050 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Kimberley (Notts), the closing also of Kimberley and Watnall Stations, and the conversion of twenty-five miles of double track to single. Storage Accommodation. Very large areas of their shed floors were placed by the company at the disposal of the Government for the storage of food-stuffs, munitions, etc. Enlistments of Staff. The number of members of the staff who joined the Forces was 21,813, namely, salaried staff, 3,574 ; wages staff, 18,239. The first meiitioned figure was equal to 29 per cent, of the total male staff. The number who received commissions was 350. Medals or other decorations were awarded to 359. There was, unfortunately, a heavy casualty list, 6,451 being reported as either killed, wounded or missing. Employment of Women and Girls. For many years prior to the outbreak of the war, the Midland Railway Company had employed women and girls (i) in certain sections of the carriage-building and repairing shops ; (2) in what may be termed the domestic side of railway service, and (3) to a very small extent in clerical work. The total number employed by the company in one or other of these capacities in August, 1914, was 1,396. At the beginning of 1916 it was found necessary to extend in substantial measure the employment of women as substitutes for the large number of men who had joined the Forces. More were accordingly taken on, alike for manual and for clerical duties, and this was done to so steadily increasing an extent that by August, 1917, the number of women and girls in the employment of the company was 9,000. Of these, nearly 2,500 fiUed clerical positions, and in regard to such work as typing, eopjdng, etc., they gave every satisfaction. About the same number were employed in the locomotive and carriage and wagon workshops, in attending to automatic machines, or doing other work for which they were suitable. The remainder were employed as ticket-collectors, parcels and general porters, messengers, dining-car attendants, engine and carriage cleaners, goods porters, etc. Physical limitations made it impossible for a woman to be so successful as a man in any duties involving heavy manual toil, but the experience of the Midland was that, within their limitations, the women taken on did their work exceedingly well. Manufacture of Munitions of War. The manufacture of munitions of war was actively carried on by the company at their Derby works, their existing plant being, by arrange- ment with the Government, supplemented by special plant obtained for the purpose. The output included the following items : — THE MIDLAND. 105 1 7,400,000 cartridge cases renovated. 2,500,000 complete fuses made. 1,350,000 fuse adapters and gaines. 1,300,000 copper driving bands. 25,000 gun mountings. 4,500 aircraft, etc., bombs. 48 howitzer carriages complete. Hundreds of thousands of details for guns, armoured cars, aircraft, tanks, etc. 1,500 general service wagons. 100 meat vans. 750 twenty-ton covered wagons. 40 trollies for conveyance of tanks. 9 complete ambulance trains for use in this country, France and Egypt. Mention has been made on pp. 586-7 of the part taken early in the war by the Midland Company and their Chief Mechanical Engineer, Mr. (afterwards Sir Henry) Fowler in the building for the Government of carriages for 8-in. howitzers. Here it may be added that on January 27th, 1915, the company got into touch with Messrs. Vickers with a view to carrying out work in connection with what was then an entirely new proposition in howitzer work. It was agreed that the Midland should deal with the whole of the work of the 6-in. howitzer carriage and gun with the exception of the gun itself and the recuperator body. This included not only fine limits of machining which were entirely different from any the company had been accustomed to, but a very large number of most complicated pressings in a harder grade of steel than such articles were usually made of. It should be mentioned, too, that the main axle of the carriage was in its earhest inception a much more complicated job from a machining standpoint than the form it finally developed into. By July 23rd, 1915, in spite of the many alterations during construction which are an essential part of such work, the first carriage was dispatched. This was followed by three, making the first four of this type of howitzer which were manufactured. Afterwards the number was increased to thirty-six, whilst 550 sets of pressings (amounting to over 22,000 pieces) were suppUed to various manufacturers who were engaged on this class of munition work. A photograph of the completed gun is shown facing page 586. In addition to the gun carriages already mentioned, ninety-one limbers were made throughout in the erecting shop at Derby, including the compKcated trailer pressing which starts as a square and finishes up a circle. A large number of details, such as axles, trailer pressings, perch eyes, etc., were made for Woolwich and various firms. At the same time that this work was being carried out, the Chief Mechanical Engineer had promised the War Office, on March 30th, 1915, on behalf of the War Manufactures Sub-Committee, that the railway companies would supply up to 3,000 of the new No. 100 fuses per week, to which number the Midland Company would contribute 1,000. The results actually attained are told on p. 603. 1052: BRITISH RAILWAYS AND' THE GREAT WAR. In 1916, the question of the supply of copper bands for larger-sized shells became acute. In the boiler shop at Derby there was devised a method of making these bands out of a fiat plate by means of a collapsible plunger consisting of three parts, the centre portion, being taper. This expedient answered so weU that at one time between 70. and 80 per cent, of the whole productioti of copper bands- for 8-in. and 9.-2-in. shell were manufactured from flat plates in the Midland Railway shops. The centre portions of the cup were utilised for smaller' bands. The total number manufactured at Derby was 1,300,000, of which 1,000,000 were 9-2-in. and 8-in. bands. Over 7,000,000 i8-pdr. cartridge cases were dealt with, by the Mid- land Company at Derby. One of the tender shops was handed over entirely to this work which, starting on quite a small scale, developed very rapidly as an increasing number of used cases became available. Machines were specially devised, for extracting the primer, for rolling out the dents in the case itself, for machining the case after reforming, for tapping out the primer hale, and for other processes. The rolling-out machine, devised by one of the Derby foremen, was adopted in, practically speaking) every shop in which cartridge cases were repaired. AU possible measures were adopted for ensuring that neither time nor motion was lost, not only in the thirteen operations which the cartridge case had to undergo, but, also, in the passage from one operation to another. The resiolt was that the cost of the whole of these operations when the shop was in full swing, and after full shop chargeshad been added, was well under ^d. per case. The work, with the exception of a, few. supervisors, was entirely carried out by women. Up to 136,000 cases per week were repaired. The total number of cases repaired was equivalent to 1,560 railway- wagon loads when ready for dispatch. Steamships. The Midland Company's peace-time fleet consisted of six sea-going steamers, six ferry-steamers and a sea-going tug. All the sea-going steamers, together with the sea-going tug, were taken over by the Government. The six ferry-steamers, which had been employed to work the ferry between Tilbury and Gravesend, and, also, to tender ocean-going vessels Ijdng in the River Thames, were retained' on these duties throughout the war. Of the sea-going, steamers three, namely, the Antrim, the Donegal and th,e Londonderry, were used for troop-transport and other purposes. The Donegal, whilst carrying wounded from France to Southampton, was torpedoed and sunk, April 17th, 19x7. Eleven of> the crew were drowned and six were injured. For their commendable conduct on this occasion the captain and three of the ■ officers were mentioned in the Gazette. Two other of the sea-going steamers, the Duchess of , Devonshire, and the City of Belfast, yiexe used as armed boarders. The. other sea-going boat, the Manxman, was used as a sea-plane ship, and was subsequently sold THE MIDLAND. 1053 to the Government. It is claimed that she was the first of H.M. ships to pass through the Narrows from Cape Helles to the Sea of Marmora. The tug Wyvern was used as an Admiral's tug and boarding steamer. All the vessels taken over for Government transport service were manned, equipped, run and maintained by the company, the cost thereof being added to the working expenses falling within the scope of the agree- ment made between the Government and the railway companies on the taking over of the controlled lines. Allotments. In connection with the campaign which was instituted to prqmote food production in this country, the cornpany offered further fapilities to their staff to cultivate plots of land alongside the railway. The following figures shqw the acreage of allotments and the nupiber of allotment-holders prior to the war and in 1918 respectively : — 4.CRES. HpLDERS. Allotments prior to the war .... 507 . . 5,858 Allotments provided during th,e war . . . 2^5 . . 3,599 Total in 1918 ...... 752 , . . 9,457 CHAPTER LXXI. NORTH BRITISH RAILWAY. With the eastern part of its system stretching along the shores of the North Sea from Berwick to Aberdeen ; with its trunk lines radiating from Edinburgh to Carhsle, Perth, Stirling, Glasgow, Fort Wilham and Mallaig, and with its direct connection between the Further North of Scotland and the railways of England — through its association with the Highland Railway at Perth, its partnership with the Great Northern and the North-Eastem in the East Coast Route between London (King's Cross) and Scotland, and its co-operation with the Midland in respect to the Waverley Route, vik Carlisle, Galashiels and Edinburgh — the North British Railway was bound to come into immediate prominence as one of the vital means of communication in Great Britain for the purposes of the Great War. There were, however, various special reasons, the direct outcome of the situation that arose, which tended still more to accentuate the fact here stated. It was, for example, quite within the range of possibility that an invasion of this country by the enemy might be attempted on the East Coast of Scotland. Hence the North British Railway Company were called upon in the earliest days of the war to convey to their appointed destinations the troops to be massed for defensive purposes at various points along the coast. Many military training centres were, also, set up within convenient distance of the North British lines, their location being, no doubt, inspired to a certain extent by the idea of having still more men available in case the enemy should attempt a landing. The importance of North British territory was also shown by the stationing there of one of the two armoured trains constructed in the early days of the war for the defence of our shores against possible invasion. The train, which was the property of the War Department, had its headquarters near to Edinburgh for the whole period of the war ; though practice-runs were frequently made therefrom over all the coast lines on the East of Scotland as well as on the Firth of Clyde. Then the demands made upon the North British in respect to naval traffic were no less heavy than those in respect to military traffic, its position, in this respect, differing materially from that of most of the other British railway companies. Thus the North British alone had rail access to the great naval base at Rosyth, on the northern shore of the Firth of Forth, such access being gained by means of a branch line which, constructed by the Admiralty, connected Rosyth with the North 1054 NORTH BRITISH RAILWAY. 1055 British main line between Edinburgh and Aberdeen at Inverkeithing Junction. With the smaller bases at Port Edgar (the Forth destroyer- base, near South Queensferry), and elsewhere in the Firth of Forth, and with those, also, at Dundee, Aberdeen, etc., the great amount of work the company were called upon to perform for the Navy, in addition to all the services rendered in many other directions, is at once placed beyond any possible doubt. " Secretary Company " for Scotland. There was still another respect in which the position of the company had its special features. The North British is the " Secretary Company " for the Scottish railways in regard to all military matters, and it was through the North British that arrangements were made between the Headquarters of the Scottish Command (situate in Edinburgh, in close proximity to the North British Company's Waverley Station), and the Scottish railway companies in general for the transport of troops, material, etc. In order that these arrangements could be carried out with the utmost dispatch and the greatest efficiency, the offices of the Scottish Command and that of the Operating Superintendent of the North British were connected by private telephone, and both were kept open day and night, Sundays and week days, for the duration of the war and for some time after, so that any emergency could be dealt with at a moment's notice. As Secretary Company, also, the North British represented the Scottish railway companies in regard to the measures to be adopted by them in the event of enemy air raids on Scotland. Troop Traffic. So far as regarded the movement of troops, the North British shared fuUy in the completeness with which the railway companies of the United Kingdom had prepared for the mobihsation of the Army whenever and under whatever conditions a national emergency might arise. On Sunday, August i6th, 1914, twelve days after the outbreak of war, there passed through Waverley Station, Edinburgh, without hitch or delay, no fewer than seventy special trains conveying troops from North of the Forth to destinations in the South of England. From this time, for a period of nearly five years, the North British dealt, unmarred by accident, with a continuous flow of troops, stores and armaments. The principal military training centres on the North British line were situated at Edinburgh, Glencorse, Peebles, Galashiels, Stobs, Hawick, Haddington, Berwick, North Berwick, Dunbar, Falkirk, Glasgow, Hamilton, Dumbarton, Inverkeithing, Kinghorn, Stirling, Tilhcoultry, Kirkcaldy, Dunfermline, Kinross, Perth, Leven, Ladybank, Cupar, St. Andrews, Wormit, Dundee, Barry Links, Montrose and Aberdeen. From these centres between the outbreak of war and December, 1918, there were transported, in special and ordinary trains, 250,000 officers and men for overseas, while the number undergoing training who were carried between different camps was 700,000. 1056 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. A very large leave traffic had. to be provided for, alike by special and by ordinary tjainfi. It is, in fact, estitmated that the arrivals at and the departures from Waverley Station, Edinburgh, ol officers and men on leave numbered, on an average, 4„o©o daily. These were the normal conditions ; but there were times of abnormal pressure,, as, for instance, when special leave was given to the troops in the Home Com- mands at Christmas, 1918, and New Year, igig. On these two occasions the number of officers and men who travelled by the North British, in special or ordinary trains, attained a total of no fewer than 45,000. Great importance was naturally attached to the. Forth apd Tay Defences. The railway bridges by which: thei estugiries there are spanned carry the main trunk lines from Edinburgh and the South to Duiidee and Aberdeen ; and,, in order to ensure their protection, large garrisons were stationed on both banks of each of the firths, as well as on several of the islands^ — a measure of precaution which, ipcidentailly, meant still more traffic for the railway.. In connection with the demobilisation of the Army,, dispersal camps were formed on the North British line at Duddingston, near Edinburgh, and at Kinross, on the main line between Edinburgh and. Perth, and special trains to and from these places were run daily as long as was necessary. Down to the closing of the Duddingston Camp, on March 8th, 1919, there had been passed through it, on their return to civil life, no fewer than 52,206 officers and men. Thenceforward the Kinross Dispersal Camp dealt with all the demobilised men for Scotland, and by July 5th, 1919, there had) been taken to. it, and brought away 3.g,aia, by rail, 72,130 officers and men. Allowing for the double journey, the number of passengers provided for the railway by these two dispersal camps was 248,672. The North British had to deal, as well, with special- train contingents of men en route for Georgetown Dispersal Gamp, on the Caledonian Railway. ; Special trains were also in demand for the conveyance of military horses, vii the Waverley route .and Carlisle,, ffrom the depots at St. Boswells, Gorgi«, Cupar, and MaryhJH-to Swaythling, the collecting dep6t for the Continent. American Troops. When the United States of America threw in their lot with the AUies and her Armies were ready for the field, several convoys with American troops arrived at Glasgow,. and special trains were run from the, docks at both sides of ithe River Clyde to the South. of England. The trains run by the Noirth British Company were started from Prince's iDock, one, of the principal docks on the sputU,§id.e.of the river, and travelled to Carhsle v\k Falkirk, the Edinburgh Suburban Line and the Waveiley route., The Military Embarkation Officer was in possession of the details concerning the officers and men on bo9,rd' each .ship some (iays, before the transports arrived, and, as the result of a meeting with the railway com- NORTH BRITISH RAILWAY. 1057 f any's operating officers, the troops were allocated, in advance to particular special trains and to particular carriages in those trains. The trains were brought alongside the steamers, and before the troops were disembarked the military officers in charge of them were in possession of the; number of the carriage and the number of the train in which each man would be accommodated. The arrangements worked admirably and without any hitch. Each train carried approximately twenty-five officers, 440 men, six nurses and ten tons of baggage. The trains were hauled by one engine from Prince's Dock to Niddrie West Junction, on the Edinburgh Suburban Line, and from that point an additional engine was requisitioned on account of the heavy gradients on the Waverley route. Meals for the men were provided, generally at Carhsle or Crewe. Naval TeAefic. In regard to naval passenger traffic, special leave trains were run \^feekly between Rosyth, Invergordon, Thurso, or other naval bases in Scotland, and Chatham, Portsmouth, Plymouth, or other naval ports in England. The number of passengers conveyed by these trains over the North British system down to the end of 1918 was 375,000. These figures are exclusive of the passengers who travelled by the Euston-Thurso Naval Special which, from May 21st, 1917, to> April 30th, 1919, followed the North British " Waverley " route between Carlisle and Perth, the use of two powerful engines being necessary in order to get the train over the heavy gradients. The figures are exclusive, also, of the passengers by the naval short-leave trains run daily between Rosyth dockyard and Edinburgh a'nd Dunfermline, and between Port Edgar and Edinburgh, the number so carried from and to Rosyth and Port Edgar averaging 2,000 per day. These latter were provided for by a booked daily service of leave trains supplemented by special trains as the exigencies of the traffic demanded. ■The destroyers were based at Port Edgar, on the south side of' the Firth of Forth, immediately to the west of Queensferry. A single-hne branch, worked under the train-tablet system from Port Edgar, connects with the Edinburgh-Aberdeen main Une at Dalmeny South Junction, and the crews of the destroyers entrained and detrained at the Port Edgar Depot. Rosyth Dockyard, situate at St. Margaret's Hope, on the northern shore of the Firth of Forth, almost directly opposite Port Edgar, is served by a branch line, part of which is single, connecting- with the Edinburgh- Aberdeen main line at Inverkeithing. South Junction, and it was at Rosyth Dockyard Station that the men of the larger ships of the Fleet were dealt with. In. December, 1918, the whole of the personnel of the Grand Fleet were granted leave for twelve days. The men left in parties of about 14,000 at a^time, and the strain involved on the resources of the North British Company was such that on some days there had to be run as many as thirty-two special trains out of or into Rosyth Dockyard or Port 1058 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. Edgar, this being in addition to the numerous other specials on account of tlie leave allowed simultaneously to the Army. The men for Yarmouth, Lowestoft, Felixstowe, Harwich, London, Chatham, Sheerness, Dover, Brighton, and southern and eastern ports generally went vik Berwick and the East Coast route, and those for the Midlands and the West and South- West of England by the Waverley and Midland routes. The trains starting from Rosyth Dockyard or Port Edgar bore on each carriage a large printed number with the letters " G.F." (Grand Fleet), and every man was provided with a card before leaving his ship giving information in regard to the starting time and number of the train by which he was required to travel both on the out- going and on the return journey. In connection with this special leave, the naval authorities instituted a water-transport system whereby^the men for particular destinations were collected from the different ships and landed as Rosyth or Port Edgar according to the starting point of the train. On the occasion of the first leave some sixteen trains were dispatched from Rosyth Dockyard and Port Edgar, and these were alternated to the Berwick and Carlisle lines in order to give greater freedom in the working. The second and subsequent leaves presented greater difficulties because on these occasions the return and outgoing trains were dealt with on the same days. The acconmiodation for the handling of passenger trains both at Port Edgar and Rosyth Dockyard is somewhat limited, and to prevent confusion between the incoming and the outgoing traffic it was arranged that the last of the return specials should arrive before 11.30 a.m., in order that the first outgoing train might be dispatched before noon. On arrival each train was at once thoroughly cleaned, re- labelled for dispatch, and hauled to storage sidings in the vicinity of the dockyards, in readiness for the southward journey. The trains maintained punctual working in both directions, and the arrangements were in every way successful. At the conclusion of the special leave Sir David Beatty, Commander- in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, addressed a letter of appreciation to the General Manager of the North British Railway on the excellence of the arrangements. Ambulance Trains. One of the naval ambulance trains which went regularly between various hospitals in Scotland and England made a weekly run with sick officers and men from Larbert (where there was a naval hospital), from Port Edgar (where sick and wounded were taken from the ships), and from hospitals in and around Edinburgh to Portsmouth, Plymouth and Chatham. Altogether the number of trips made by naval ambulance trains over the North British system exceeded 1,200. Of military ambulance trains, convej^ng sick and wounded soldiers from Dover or Southampton by either the East Coast or the Waverley route, for hospitals at Edinburgh and Bangour (where, some fifteen NORTH BRITISH RAILWAY. 1059 miles from Edinburgh, a large military hospital had been set up), the number was close on 600. Aeroplane Dep6ts. Aeroplane dep6ts, or aerodromes, directly served by the North British included those situate at East Fortune (the starting-point of airship R ,34 on its memorable flight to the United States), Gullane, Turnhouse, Aberdour, Donibristle (near Inverkeithing), Crail, Leuchars, Dundee , Montrose and Aberdeen. To and from these centres there was a daily flow of officers and men, while trains with aeroplanes had frequently to be run when the squadrons changed their quarters. Passenger Traffic. Workmen's trains, put on to suit war-time conditions, further helped materially to swell the proportions of the passenger traffic. The con- struction of the dockyard at Rosyth was still far from complete on the outbreak of the war, and twenty-four workmen's trains per day, con- veying between the Dockyard Station and Edinburgh, Dunfermline, Kirkcaldy, etc., the workers who were still engaged thereon, were con- tinued d\u:ing the entire period of hostilities. Numerous workmen's trains had also to be run on various parts of the system in connection with the setting up of aerodromes and munition works. The National Munitions Factory at Gretna was served off the Edinburgh and Carlisle main line by a branch from Longtown, formerly the property of the North British, but taken over for the purposes of the war as a Govern- ment railway. During the construction period, the North British pro- vided special trains for the conveyance of workers between Longtown and Langholm, and also between Longtown and Carlisle ; and when production at the factory was begun extra trains were put on to accommo- date the munition workers. In the West of Scotland workmen's trains were run between Glasgow and various places along the banks of the Clyde and in the Vale of Leven in furtherance of the production of war material carried on either in existing factories or works or in new ones set up for the purpose. German prisoners made a substantial contribution to the sum total of the passenger traffic carried. Some years prior to the outbreak of hostilities there was formed at Stobs, near Hawick, on the main line between London fSt. Pancras) and Edinburgh, a military camp for the training of Territorials ; and when German prisoners of war began to arrive in considerable numbers this camp was one of the places allotted to them for their accommodation. They travelled to Stobs, from the South, in special trains, and great numbers of them were afterwards dispersed throughout Scotland by special or ordinary trains to engage in such peaceful pursuits as quarrying, road-making, timber-felling, fruit- picking, etc. Over 500,000 were dealt with on the North British in io6o BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. this way. In the later stages of the war, the camp at Stobs was con- verted into a hospital for wounded Germans who, brought from Franqe or Flanders to a southern port, were taken on by special ambulance trains to Scotland. During the course of the war there passed over the North British lines on several occasions, from various parts of the country, en route for Leith or Aberdeen, special trains of undesirable aliens, whose expul- sion from the United Kingdom had been ordered^ and who were to be sent back to the Continent from one or other of those ports. Of repatriated prisoners of war landed in Great Britain after the signing of the Armistice, the North British received 34,000 at Leith Docks, sending them on in special trains to Ripon, London or elsewhere. Ambulance trains were provided for the large proportion among the of&cers and men who were sick or wounded. On the cessation of hostilities the Belgians who had sought refuge in Scotland when their own country was overrun by Germans and had settled down, for the time being, mainly in and around Glasgow, were conveyed in special trains to Leith Docks or to Hull, where they embarked on the vessels provided for their return. The North British took its share in this work, transporting 4,000 of the refugees, together with 300 tons of baggage. In , common with other railway companies, the North British found it necessary, on account of the serious shortage of engine power and staff, coupled with the heavy and urgent demands made in respect to naval, military, munition and food-supplies traffic, to introduce reductions in the ordinary passenger service on and from February, 1915. The result of these unavoidable curtailments was that in 1918 the decrease in the number of passenger trains nmning on the company's system, as compared with 1914, was nearly 45 per oemt. No fewer, also, than fifty-seven stations were temporarily closed, this being done wherever an alternative service was available by another railway, or where the public could be served by tramways or by motor omnibuses. Goods and Mineral Traffic. • When we pass on to consider what the experiences of the company were in regard to goods and mineral traffic, we come to figures and facts which bring out still more clearly alike the magnitude of the work done and the difficulties, or, at least, the exceptional conditions, which attended its accomplishment. Without attempting to offer an elaborate collection of statistics, it may suffice here, first, to mention that the loaded wagons — exclusive of unloaded wagons — which the North British received from or passed on to cither companies at exchange sidings during the year 1918, as compared with 1914, showed an increase of 65 per cent. ; and then to supplement this t3^ical fact by the following short table, showing, for the first tfour months of 1918, as compared with the corresponding period NORTH BRITISH RAILWAY. 1061 of 1914, the increase in the business in loaded wagons exchanged between the North British and the Nerth-Eastem Companies on the East Coast (Berwick) route — themGst heavily taxed section of the former company's system under war-time conditions : — 1914 1918 N.B. TO N.E. N.E. TO N.B. N.B. TO N.E. N.E. TO N.B. Month. Loaded. Loaded. Total. Loaded. Loaded. Total. Increase. Jan. . 8,971 5,923 I4,8'94 18,617 16,689 35, 306 20,412 Feb. . 9,4*4 6,206 15,620 18,110 i'6,6ig 34,725 19,105 March . 10,725 6,616 17,341 20,608 19,717 40.325 22,984 April . 9,430 5,963 15,393 22,531 16,659 39,190 23,797 Totals . 38,540 24,708 63,248 79,866 69,680 149,546 86,298 equal to 136 % Up Increase— 41,326, equal to 107 % Down Increase — ^44,972, equal to 182 % Not only did the volume of business bandied undergo this great expansion, but the traffic in question was mainly long-distance traffic ; and this involved, among other things, a very serious problem from an operating point of view, inasmuch as the longer haulage necessarily led to more long-distance trains being placed upon trunk lines already congested "wiHh special troop trains, naval specials, amrbulance trains, etc., to which preGtedence naturally had to be accorded. The large increa-se in the movement of traffic conveyed vi4 the East Coast route was directly due to heavy consignments of Government materia;l passing between North and South, such as pig iron from the Middlesbrough district to the iron and steel works in the ^Glasgow area of the North British system ; Government and naval traffic to and from the large seaports on the East Coast, as well as to the naval base at Rosyth, and naval stores for the Fleet, the ;principal dep6t for these stores being Aberdeen. One exceptionally heavy traffic dealt with on the Berwick route- consisted of Admiralty coal from South Wales to Scottish East Coast ports, such as South Leith, Grangemouth and Burntisland. During the war period the proportion of this traffic worked by the North British route, via Berwick, was 129,000 wagons, or, approximately, 1,290,000 tons, involving an average haulage on the North British system of seventy- five miles per train, with the working of a like number of empty wagons in the reverse direction. The North British also undertook the haulage from Glasgow (Cor kef hill) -to Grangemouth of the Admiralty coal traffic conveyied viS, the Glasgow and South- Western Company's route. This amounted to a further 38,000 wagons, or, roughly, 380,000 tons, with the haulage of the same number of empty wagons from Grangemouth to Corkerhill on the return journey. In the case of mineral traffic as well as of general merchandise, the closing of the East Coast ports led to the North British having to convey- io62 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. over their lines great quantities of consignments which had previously gone by sea, and this fact was in itself sufficient to tax severely the resources of the company in engine power and men. New Traffics. As the war progressed, the normal flow of traffic on the North British, which, under normal conditions, is mainly a forwarding company, was seriously disorganised by the creation at various large centres on the system of new traffics designed to meet the exigencies of the times, and flowing mainly to the South. The extent of these traffics, consisting almost exclusively of munitions, war material and camp equipment, became prodigious when regarded from the point of view of the facili- ties available for dealing with them. Apart from the share taken by the North British in the transport of consigimients to and from Gretna, the majority of the factories and shipbuilding yards existing on the company's system on the outbreak of hostilities undertook Government work and were engaged thereon throughout the war, while in almost every instance an extension of premises or of yards became necessary. Many new factories, also, were erected during the same period, and this fact, coupled with the extensions just mentioned, led, in the first instance, to heavy demands on the rail- way for the transport of btiilding material and contractors' plant, including pug-engines, steam navvies and large cranes. Then the structural engineers were ever anxious that the railway should accept steel work for conveyance in as complete a form as possible, in order that riveting might be saved on the arrival at destination ; and although this meant, at times, some especially awkward loading, the company were, on the whole, very successful in facilitating building operations by this means, considering that they had only a limited supply of wagons equal to the transport of structures such as those thus put together. When the old works had been extended, or the new works erected, the railway company had next to carry to them machinery of all sizes, shapes and weights ; and then came, in the opposite direction, an apparently unending stream of manufactured articles required for the purposes of the war. Exceptional Traffics. Among other special features of the work done may be mentioned the wide range of exceptional trafiics dealt with — traffics, that is, which, on account of their dimensions or weight, necessitated the provision of specially-constructed or specially-adapted vehicles, and the making, also, of special arrangements for their conveyance by rail. NORTH BRITISH RAILWAY. 1063 Many of tke consignments sent either to or from Rosyth im connection with ships, armament or aircraft were of such bulk that, even with special vehicles, it became a difficult problem, at times, as to how they could be conveyed on railway wagons at all. The equipment, also, of the dockyard contractors at Rosyth consisted to a large extent of traffic of exceptional proportions, while the railway company had fiurther to carry to the dockyard some large oil tanks, girders and machinery for works and shops, and, also, a 250-ton ielectric crane, in parts. Other exceptional traffics arose in connection with the various arma- ment works and industrial establishments on the North British system. Altogether these traffics included : aeroplanes complete ; aeroplanes in cases ; aeroplane wings ; airship cases ; anchors ; armatures j armour plates ; boilers ; bridge work ; buoys ; castings ; columns ; condensers ; cylinders (marine) ; dock gates ; electric cranes (in parts) ; fljTvheels ; forgings ; girder work ; guns ; gun mountings, pedestals and shields ; gunnery targets ; hoppers ; hutments ; lathes ; lattice girders ; life- saving rafts ; locomotives (in parts, in steam and " dead " on wheels) ; motor cars ; motor lorries ; propellers ; railway trucks (in parts, for overseas) ; seaplanes (in cases) ; shafts ; ships' brackets, cables and plates ; spars ; steam launches ; steam road-rollers ; steel masts ; " tanks " (hulls and complete) ; traction engines ; travelling cranes and vertical drilling machines. A large number of heavy guns attached to their own special bogie gun carriages were conveyed to Silloth and Reedsmouth for testing purposes. When the combined load was too heavy for the line the guns were carried separately on ordinary gun sets. On a range opened at Inchterif Siding, Gavellj hundreds of guns, manufactured by Messrs. Beardmore & Co., and taken there by rail, were tested. For the conveyance of " tanks," whether as hulls or the finished article, the company adapted their own wagons to requirements until the new Government " rectank " wagons were available. Inasmuch as the dimensions of the exceptional traffics frequently exceeded the loading gauge, such consignments had to be worked with extreme caution to ensure that they would pass through tunnels, under bridges, or without risk to other traffic alongside. The proportions of the articles carried were often such that the use of both main lines was necessary. It was further needful to ensure, before traffics of these tjTpes were dispatched, that they could pass, not only over the North British lines, but over the lines of all the other companies who might be concerned in the proposed route to destination or to the port of shipment. In almost every instance there had to be a prior consultation with these other com- panies, and on many occasions it was found impracticable, for engineering reasons, to send the traffic by what might be the shortest or the most desirable route. An alternative route, involving, possibly, a considerable detour, had then to be adopted instead. These difficulties arose more 4A io64 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. especially in connection with heavy guns and out-of-gauge locomotives, destined for France. Speeding the Traffic. The expeditious working of naval and military traffic received at all times very close attention. On one occasion a serious mishap occurred to a submarine on one of the Western lochs, and a request was made to the company that they would provide a special train, with the utmost dispatch, for the conveyance of certain material from Rosyth Dockyard to the scene of the accident. The special was ready and in waiting for some time before it could be loaded up with the material it was to convey. When the train was able to start with its load, it made the journey to destination in record time, notwithstanding the fact that just previously the lines might have been thought to be in a state of hopeless congestion. Congested they undoubtedly were ; but they were speedily cleared as the result of some imperative orders sent out by the railway officers. The naval authorities afterwards expressed their appreciation of the prompt and efficient manner in which the movement had been carried out. Enlistments. In regard to enlistments, the number of members of the North British staff who joined his Majesty's Forces was 4,836, out of a total of 24,625 in the employment of the company on the outbreak of the war. Employment of Women and Girls. The need which arose both to make good the depletion of the staff and to provide, as far as possible, for the great increase in the volume of work to be done led to the taking on of a considerable number of women and girls. In the Operating Department 119 women were employed, principally as gatekeepers, in August, 1914 ; but with the advent of war-time conditions this number steadily increased to nearly 800, these being engaged principally as porters, ticket collectors, lamp- women, signalwomen and clerks. In the Goods Department no women were employed prior to August, 1914 ; but during the war there were, at one time, 534 women and girls engaged in clerical or manual work. CHAPTER LXXII. NORTH-EASTERN RAILWAY. There were three separate and distinct aspects, directly due to the location of the system, which combined to swell to proportions of great magnitude the war-time traf&c handled on the North -Eastern Railway. In the first place the district served by the company, including the extensive engineering and shipbuilding industries on the North -East coast and the coalfields of Northumberland, Durham and part of West Yorkshire, constitutes for them a territory in which, from a railway point of view, they have a transport monopoly ; though it is a monopoly which, in spite of public prejudices in favour of " competition," has in no way hampered the expansion of the district in question into one of the busiest and most flourishing industrial areas in the British Isles. For many years before the war, the coal and mineral traffic on the North- Eastern was heavier than on any other railway in the United Kingdom, while, with the advent of war, there was an immediate adaptation of those North-East Coast engineering and shipbuilding industries to the purposes of war, with, in consequence, further great demands on the company for transport facilities. Existing industries had to be extended, or expanded, in order that they could help to supply the enormous require- ments of our Fighting Forces, while the fact that the North-Eastem district was already so productive in raw materials, and already so markedly industrial, led to a number of new factories and other concerns being set up there for the production of Government supplies. Thus, dviring the course of the war, forty-eight factories already existing on the North-Eastem system had to be enlarged ; thirteen new factories for the production of war material were set up ; four shipbuilding yards were extended, seven new ones were started, and three new quarries were opened. Secondly, as the North-Eastem Company is the largest dock-owning railway company in the United Kingdom, the shipping restrictions imposed by the Admiralty in the North Sea on account of the submarine menace, combined with those imposed by the Government on imports and exports, curtailed very considerably the normal flow of traffic to and from the company's docks. These conditions led to the requirements of the district having to be met to a much greater extent by rail-borne traffic. Grain, for instance, was sent from Liverpool to Hull by rail. In normal times a considerable tonnage of traf&c passed coastwise to and from the company's docks, and this included a large tonnage of coal from Durham and Northumberland to London and places in the South, 1065 io66 BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE GREAT WAR. which tonnage, during the war period, had to be conveyed the entire distance by rail instead of a short distance by rail from the collieries to the adjacent port and thence by water to destination. Thirdly, the North-Eastern is a link between North and South. It forms the central portion of the East Coast route, connecting with the Great Northern at Shaftholme Junction, near Doncaster, and with the North British near Berwick. Its ramifications extend, also, to West- morland and Cumberland. The Increase in Traffic. Under these conditions there was a two-fold increase in North -Eastern traffic, namely, traffic originating on the North -Eastern itself, and traffic passing over the North-Eastern system en route from one part of the country to another. Much, also, of this great volume of traffic was not only new to the North-Eastern but was traffic which, as the result of war conditions, involved a considerable increase in the length of haul. As typical of what occurred iji these directions, the following examples might be mentioned : — I. — Traffic for the North-East of England was