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Cornell University 
 Library 
 
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 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924030753713 
 
NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD 
 OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
 BY 
 
 LLOYD N. SCOTT 
 
 LATE CAPTAIN, -U. S. A. 
 
 AND LIAISON OFFICER TO THE NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD 
 
 AND WAR COMMITTEE OF TECHNICAL SOCIETIES, 
 
 FROM INVENTIONS SECTION 
 
 GENERAL STAFF, U. S. A. 
 
 WASHINGTON 
 
 GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
 
 1920 
 
f\^\\3'\X 
 
 The author desires to express his thanks and appreciation to 
 the Chiefs of Bureaus of the Navy Department; to Rear Admiral 
 William Sthotheb Smith; to Mr. Thomas A. Edison, president 
 of the Board; to Mr. William L. Saunders, chairman of the 
 Board; to its secretary, Mr. Thomas Robins, and to the 
 indi^ddual members of the Naval Consulting Board of the 
 United States, as well as to its examiners and staff, including 
 Mr. George W. Stretch, for their cooperation and assistance 
 in helping him to get together the material for this book. The 
 author assumes responsibility for statements made in this book. 
 
 4 
 
 / 
 
JOSEPHUS DANIELS, 
 Secretary of the Navy. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 It would have been impossible for the Navy to have carried on its 
 efficient part in winning the World War without the intelligent 
 and patriotic contribution of civilian thinkers and workers as well 
 as civilians who enlisted in every department of naval effort. Fore- 
 most among these civilian patriots stand the members of the Xaval 
 Consulting Board. Its members gave themselves fully to the service 
 of their country, bringing scientific and engineering knowledge, with 
 large experience touching the vital problems that confronted the 
 Navy. The membership of this board was chosen by and from the 
 foremost engineering" societies in America, embracing men whose 
 achievements were of world renown. The Navy, indeed the whole 
 country, owes to their scientific patriotism a debt not only for 
 what they wrought but quite as large a debt for the stimulus and 
 inspiration they imparted to the naval personnel and to civilians 
 enlisted in national service. 
 
 The Naval Consulting Board was not a war organization. It was 
 called into being in 1915, long before America entered the World 
 War, and it gave to naval problems study and research and investi- 
 gation before the stress of war laid the imperative hand .upon all 
 Americans. During the war the individual members of the board, 
 eminent and busy men whose services were in demand by the biggest 
 concerns in the world, forgot their private business and individual 
 pursuits and were as fully and wholeheartedly enlisted in the service 
 of their country as any man who fought on land or sea. The presi- 
 dent of the board, Mr. Thomas A. Edison, left his laboratory and 
 practically became a naval officer, spending long months in the 
 Navy Department and extended periods of deep-sea cruising that 
 he might be in the closest touch \»ith the problems to be solved. 
 Other members of the board gave themselves and their talent as 
 
 fully. 
 
 In appreciation of the work of the Navy Civilian Consulting 
 Board for the Navy, the Council of National Defense requested the 
 board to, act as the Board of Inventions for the council, which was 
 effective in mobilizing the industry and genius of the American peo- 
 ple for war. Its work, therefore, burgeoned into the widest field of 
 
 3 
 
4 PREFACE. 
 
 activity and accomplishment, leading- in all the agencies and investi- 
 gations and organizations of American skill and science in making 
 American participation in the war worthy of the Republic. 
 
 The story of the organization and work of the board is interesting 
 and illustrative of American resourcefulness and initiative and effi- 
 ciency. Some of the things it did arc told in this volume. Its spirit 
 glows on every page. Some of its most important work must still 
 be held confidential. AVhen the time comes for the true perspective, 
 the Xaval Consulting Board will stand out as a pioneer and leading 
 organization in the period in which science married to service gave 
 new effectiveness to our new and better Americanism. To me the 
 joy of comradeship and fellowship with the men of the Naval Con- 
 sulting Board will ever be remembered as one of the pleasures and 
 profits of experience in the World ^^^ar. 
 
 JosEPHus Daniels. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Page. 
 
 Chaptek I. Origin and organization 7 
 
 II. Industrial preparedness campaign 26 
 
 III. Part 1. Fuel oil 56 
 
 Part 2. A new naval station on the Pacific coast 64 
 
 IV. Special Problems Committee . 67 
 
 V. Ship Protection Committee 84 
 
 VI. Laboratory 109 
 
 VII. Functions of various organizations, etc 114 
 
 VIII. Inventions from the public 122 
 
 IX. Meritorious inventions from the public 148 
 
 X. Branch offices 156 
 
 XI. Inventive a;ccomplishments of members 160 
 
 XII. Accomplishments (continued) 193 
 
 XIII. Conclusion 220 
 
 Appendix 225 
 
 5 
 
CHAPTER L 
 
 ORIGIN AND ORGANIZATION. 
 
 The creation of the Naval Consulting Board of the United States 
 was a radical departure from the existing policies of the Navy De- 
 partment. 
 
 In order to understand the motives which actuated the Secretary 
 of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, in creating a board of 24 civilian 
 inventors, engineers, and scientists and attaching it to his office, the 
 position of the United States in world affairs in July, 1915, must be 
 considered. 
 
 At that time the World War had been raging since August 1, 
 1914, on the Continent of Europe, with ever increasing violence. 
 It seemed to many that the traditional policy of the United States 
 of keeping aloof from European entanglements might at any time 
 be terminated, as the ruthless policy of the German Empire and its 
 disregard of the traditional rules of international law and conduct 
 seemed to be drawing the United States nearer and nearer to the 
 vortex of the conflict. 
 
 One affront to the United States by Germany succeeded another 
 until finally the German Admiralty conceived the idea of blockading 
 the British Isles by means of a submarine fleet. 
 
 On February 4, 1915, Germany issued a formal proclamation that 
 the waters around Great Britain and Ireland were held to be a war 
 zone, and that from February 18 " every enemy merchant ship found 
 in this region will be destroyed without its always being possible to 
 warn the crews or passengers of the dangers threatening. * * * 
 Neutral ships will also incur danger in the war region, where, in 
 view of the misuse of neutral flags ordered by the British Govern- 
 ment, and incidents unavoidable in sea warfare, attacks intended 
 for hostile ships may affect neutral ships also." 
 
 As it had long been the custom in warfare for the blockading 
 vessel to first hold up and examine the suspected ship before taking 
 any further action, and then if she was found to be an enemy ship 
 to put a prize crew aboard and send her into port, this proclamation, 
 which in effect was designed to destroy ships by the use of torpedoes 
 
 7 
 
8 KAVAL i;o-\.sL'LTiX(,; boai;d of the united states. 
 
 launched from submarines without warning, violated an ancient and 
 humanitarian custom as well as international law. Many citizens of 
 the United States were traveling back and forth on ocean steamers be- 
 tween the United States and Europe on vessels flying the American 
 flag and the flag of other nations, and it was seen that this proclama- 
 tion, if carried out. would imperil their lives. 
 
 It was not long before, in the carrying out of this plan of block- 
 ade, that Germany commenced to sink merchant ships without warn- 
 ing. On March 9, 1915, three merchant ships were torpedoed with- 
 out warning; on March 28, the Elder-Demster liner Falaba, on a 
 voyage from Liverpool to South Africa, was stopped and torpedoed. 
 As the crew and passengers sank, the Germans, looking on from the 
 deck of the U-boat, laughed and jeered at their struggling victims, 
 of whom 111 perished, among whom was one American. 
 
 The greatest insult to citizens of the United States was not com- 
 mitted, however, until April, 1915, when the German Embassy at 
 Washington publicly advertised that passenger vessels like the Lusi- 
 tania were liable to destruction, and that travelers sailing on them 
 would do so at their own risk. 
 
 On May 1, 1915, the Cunard liner Lv.titania sailed from New York 
 for Liverpool, carrying, besides her crew of 651, no less than 1,255 
 passengers. Before she sailed it was widely rumored that the Lusi- 
 tania would be sunk without warning, and many of the passengers 
 received anonymous telegrams warning them that the ship would 
 be sunk. No one, however, believed it would be possible for Ger- 
 many to commit such a crime as to sink a vessel with 1,255 passen- 
 gers without warning from the submarine and making provisions 
 for safety of those on board, for, although Germany was known to 
 be a ruthless antagonist, it was not conceived possible that she would 
 take upon herself the responsibility of drowning the passengers, 
 among whom were many Americans. 
 
 However, at 2.15 p. m. on Friday, May 7, 1915, the Germans tor- 
 pedoed the Lusitania without warning, and at 2.36 she went down. 
 Out of 1,906 souls on board, 1,134 went down with her and were 
 drowned, including over 100 Americans. 
 
 Adding insult to injury, it was not long before reports came from 
 Germany setting forth the attitude which the German people took 
 in regard to this act. The press reports stated that the Germans 
 seemed to revel in this crime, and that various celebrations were 
 held in Germany on account of it. Medals were being struck to 
 commemorate the sinking, and holidays were given to school chil- 
 dren, and subscriptions taken up for the benefit of the crew of the 
 U-boat which sank the Lusitania. 
 
 The Germans tried to justify this act on the ground that she car- 
 ried munitions of war; but an inquiry held by Julius Meyers, judge 
 
ORIGIN AND ORGANIZATION. 9 
 
 of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
 New York, developed the fact that the Lusitania did not carry muni- 
 tions. The following is an extract from the report : 
 
 The evidence presented has disposed without question, and for all time, of 
 any false claims brought forward to justify this inexpressibly cowardly attack 
 on an unarmed passenger steamer. 
 
 On May 12, 1915, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, 
 sent a note to the German Empire which clearly presented the situa- 
 tion that confronted the United States at that time. He said, in 
 part: 
 
 1. The United States Government calls attention to the various incidents in 
 the war zone proclaimed by Germany around the British Isles * * * the 
 sinking of the British liner Falaha with the loss of Leon C. Thresher, an Ameri- 
 can ; the attaclj by German airmen on the American steamer Ciishing; the tor- 
 pedoing without warning of the American steamer Oulflight, flying the Stars 
 and Stripes ; and finally the torpedoing without warning of the Lusitania with 
 the loss of more than 1,000 lives of noncombatants, among them more than 
 100 Americans. 
 
 2. These acts are claimed to be indefensible under international law. The 
 United States points out that it never admitted Germany's right to do them and 
 warned the Imperial Government that it would be held to strict accountability 
 for attacljs on American vessels or lives. A strict accounting, therefore, is 
 now asl5:ed from Germany. 
 
 3. The usual financial reparation will be sought, although Germany is 
 reminded in effect that no reparation can restore the lives of those sacrificed in 
 the sinking of the Lusitania and other .ships. 
 
 4. Expressions of regret may comply with legal precedents, but they are 
 valueless unless accompanied by a cessation of the practices endangering lives 
 of noncombatants. 
 
 5. The right of neutrals to travel to any point of the high seas on neutral 
 or belligerent merchantmen is asserted. 
 
 6. In the name of humanity and international law, the United States demands 
 a guaranty that these rights shall be respected, and that there be no repetition 
 of attacks on merchantmen- carrying noncombatants. 
 
 ****** -^ 
 
 9. In conclusion, Germany's attention is called to the earnestness of the 
 Government and people of the United States in this situation. It is made plain 
 that the United States will leave nothing undone, either by diplomatic repre- 
 sentation or other action, to obtain compliance by Germany with the requests 
 that are made. 
 
 Most Americans were impressed with the menace to the United 
 States. Something had to be done to put America into a position 
 where she could defend herself. 
 
 The press accounts gave daily news of the part that science and 
 invention was playing in the war, of the introduction of new weap- 
 ons, of the fact that those waging the war were utilizing the best 
 inventive and scientific talent of their respective countries. 
 
 A progressive Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, realizing 
 the great part that inventions and new devices were playing- in tiie 
 
10 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 war, sought to find a method of helping to meet the situation. On 
 July 7, 1915, he wrote a letter (see Appendix 286, p. 288) to Mr. 
 Thomas A. Edison in which he complimented Mr. Edison on his atti- 
 tude in refusing in these commercial times to devote his inventive 
 genius to warlike purposes except at the call of his country, and said 
 that he felt that his own ideas and Mr. Edison's coincided, if an inter- 
 view with Mr. Edison, by Mr. Edward Marshall, published in the 
 New York Times, was correct. 
 
 He stated that he felt that one of the important needs of the Navy 
 was machinery and facilities for utilizing the natural inventive 
 genius of Americans to meet the new conditions of warfare as shown 
 abroad, and that he intended to establish at the earliest possible 
 moment a department of invention and development to which all 
 ideas and suggestions from either the service or civilian inventors 
 could be referred to determination as to whether they contain prac- 
 tical suggestions for the Navy to take up and perfect. 
 
 He said that the Navy had no present means of handlirfg inven- 
 tions received from the public except by sending them to the various 
 bureaus of the Navy, which were overcrowded with routine work, 
 and that in the circumstances under which they had to be handled 
 an idea having the germ of an improvement could not always be 
 given the attention it deserved. He felt that naval officers on sea 
 duty were in a position to note improvements, but that they had 
 neither the time nor special training nor in many cases the natural 
 inventive mind needed to put these ideas into definite shape. 
 
 He stated that there was no particular place or particular body of 
 men relieved of other work and charged solely with their devising 
 new things themselves or perfecting the crude ideas that were sub- 
 mitted to the department by the naturally inventive people of the 
 United States, and that he had in mind a general plan of organizing 
 a department for the Navy which met with the ideas of Mr. Edison, 
 as set forth in the interview, for such a department for the Govern- 
 ment in general. 
 
 Mr. Daniels thought that such a department would have to event- 
 ually be supported by Congress with sufficient appropriations, but 
 that they had the means at hand to make a start. 
 
 He therefore asked Mr. Edison if he would be willing, as a service 
 to his country, to act as adviser to such a board, and that with Mr. 
 Edison's knowledge, combined with the practical knowledge of the 
 officers of the Navy, and a department composed of the keenest and 
 most inventive minds that could be gathered together, the Nation 
 would be able to meet the submarine danger with new devices that 
 would assure peace to our country by their effectiveness. 
 
OEIGIN AND OEGANIZATION. 11 
 
 He said that it was on Mr. Edison's aid that he relied mostly, and 
 if he was not able, for any reason, to do this, that he would hesitate 
 to undertake the matter at all. 
 
 On July 13, 1915, Dr. Miller Reese Hutchison, chief engineer to 
 and personal representative of Mr. Edison, at the request of the 
 latter visited Secretary Daniels in Washington, and advised him that 
 Mr. Edison had consented to head such a board as Secretary Daniels 
 had outlined in his letter of July 7, 1915. 
 
 Thereafter Secretary Daniels and his aid visited Mr. Edison at 
 Orange, N. J., and they conferred at his residence on the salient 
 features of the board. 
 
 Secretary Daniels then wrote to the presidents of the 11 largest 
 engineering societies in the United States and asked each, as presi- 
 dent of the organization, to secure the selection of two of its members 
 to serve on this Naval Advisory Board, further stating " The judg- 
 ment of your members as to who is most qualified among you to serve 
 on this board will be far better than my own." 
 
 This action on the part of the Secretary of the Navy of placing 
 the responsibility for the selection of the members of the Naval Ad- 
 visory Board upon the engineering societies insured that its member- 
 ship would be nonpartisan in character.- 
 
 The name " Naval Advisory Board " was used in the earlier com- 
 munications, but at its organization meeting the name " Naval Con- 
 sulting Board of the United States " was adopted as the official title 
 for the organization. 
 
 The step taken by the Secretary of the Navy in creating the Naval 
 Consulting Board was, in effect, the first step taken by any Govern- 
 ment official toward preparing the country for war and, in the organi- 
 zation of the board in the manner above set forth, the Secretary of 
 the Navy incorporated in its organization not only inventors but also 
 engineers who had dealt with constructive problems and who were 
 the heads of large industrial organizations. This placed in the public 
 eye and in a place of great responsibility some 24 men, leaders in the 
 inventive, engineering, and industrial world, who were closely in 
 touch with public opinion of the country and the attitude of the 
 American people toward preparedness. 
 
 This resulted, as is set forth in' a later chapter, in a great campaign 
 for industrial preparedness, which was one of the first things of a 
 constructive nature which the board inaugurated. 
 
 The names of the societies selecting the members of the Naval 
 Consulting Board, the members selected, and the method used to 
 select them were as' follows: 
 
 Thomas A. Edison; selected by the Secretary of the Navy. 
 
 Dr. M. E. Hutchison; selected by the Secretary of the Navy. 
 
12 NAVAL CONSULTING BCARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 American Chemical Society: Dr. L. H. Baekeland and Dr. W. R. 
 Whitney ; selected by letter ballot council of some 150 members. 
 
 American Institute of Electrical Engineers: Frank J. Sprague 
 and B. G. Lamme ; selected by the board of directors of the Ameri- 
 can Institute of Electrical Engineers, after first obtaining sugges- 
 tions from a large group of representative members consisting of 
 the past presidents, members of the board of directors, and the 
 chairmen of the branch organizations located in the principal cities 
 of the country. 
 
 American Mathematical Society: E. S. Woodward and Arthur 
 G. Webster ; selected by the president of the American Mathematical 
 Society under the general power of his office to appoint delegates. 
 
 American Society of Civil Engineers: A. M. Hunt and Alfred 
 Craven; selected by the board of directors of the society. 
 
 American Aeronautical Society: M. B. Sellers^ and Hudson 
 Maxim; these men were selected by canvassing the membership of 
 the ;-ociety and the board of directors at a special meeting convened 
 for that purpose, being guided by the recommendation of the mem- 
 bers at large. 
 
 Inventors" Guild: Thomas Robins and Peter Cooper Hewitt ;2 
 selected by a mail ballot of the entire membership of the society. 
 
 American Society of Automotive Engineers: Howard E. Coffin 
 and Andrew L. Riker; selected by letter ballot of the voting mem- 
 bers of the society. 
 
 American Institute of Mining Engineers: William L. Saunders 
 and Benjamin B. Thayer; selected by ballot at a meeting of the board 
 of directors. 
 
 American Electrochemical Society : Lawrence Addicks and Prof. 
 Jos. W. Richards ;^ selected by the board of directors. 
 
 American Society of Mechanical Engineers : W. L. E. Emmet and 
 Spencer Miller; selected by the council by letter-ballot. The execu- 
 tive committee selected a list of members, which was sent out to all 
 the council members with the request that each man nominate at 
 least six names, which need not, however, be confined to the list sent 
 out. This preliminaiy ballot was followed by a second ballot, of 
 which only two names were requested to be balloted for. The result 
 was that the council then made the appointment of the two names 
 which received the highest votes. 
 
 American Society of Aeronautic Engineers : Elmer A. Sperry and 
 Henry A. Wise Wood ; ^ selected by ballot of the members and i*sso- 
 ciates of the society. 
 
 •Resigned Mar. 6. 1918. 
 « Resigned Nov. 2, 1918. 
 ' Resigned Dec. 24, 1915 ; succeeded by Bion J. Arnold. 
 
ORIGIN AND ORGANIZATION. 13 
 
 War Committee of Technical Societies : D. W. Brunton ; as chair- 
 man of the war committee, appointed to the board after its formation 
 by the Secretary of the Navy. 
 
 On October 7, 1915, the organization meeting of the Naval Con- 
 sulting Board was held at the Navy Department, Washington, D. C. 
 The following members of the board were present : 
 
 Thomas A. Edison (chairman), Lawrence Addicks, Dr. L. H. 
 Baekeland, Howard E. Coffin, Alfred Craven, William Le Roy 
 Emmet, Dr. Peter Cooper Hewitt, Andrew Murray Hunt, B. G. 
 Lamme, Hudson MaXim, Spencer Miller, Prof. Jos. W. Eichards, 
 Andrew L. Riker, Thomas Robins, W. L. Saunders, Matthew Bacon 
 Sellers, Elmer A. Sperry, Frank J. Sprague, Benjamin B. Thayer. 
 Dr. Arthur G. Webster, Dr. W. R. Whitney, Henry A. Wise Wood, 
 Dr. Robert S. Woodward. 
 
 At this meeting of the board the following rules were adopted : 
 
 1. The officers of this board shall be a chairman, a first vice chairman, a 
 second vice chairman, and a secretary, and shall be chosen from the members 
 of the board. 
 
 2. Regular meetings of the board shall be held at intervals of two months 
 and special meetings shall be called by the secretary of the board with at least 
 seven days' notice, upon the request of the Secretary of the Navy, the chairman, 
 a vice chairman, or any five members of the board, the time and place of the 
 meeting to be arranged by the secretary of the board in conference with two of 
 the chairmen. 
 
 3. At any meeting in the absence of the chairman and first and second vice 
 chairmen, any member present may be chosen as chairman pro tempore by a 
 majority of those present. A quorum shall consist of 10 members. 
 
 4. Members absent from a meeting may reccird a vote by mail or telegram, 
 to be cast by the secretary, when a vote is taken on any matter which has been 
 named for action or discussion in the call for the meeting. No vote by proxy 
 shall be recorded. 
 
 5. The proceedings and discussions of this board shall be recorded by the 
 secretary and part or all of them may be made public only by him with the con- 
 currence of the presiding officer and the approval of the Secretary of the Navy. 
 
 6. All matters submitted to the board by the Secretary of the Navy shall be 
 <;ommuhicated to all the members by the secretary of the board, who will for- 
 ward the replies to the appropriate committees, to be collated by them and pre- 
 sented to the members of the board with recommendations for their assent or 
 dissent. 
 
 7. The second vice chairman shall appoint a committee of three members to 
 act with him in the selection of the members of the following subcommittees : 
 (1) Chemistry and physics; (2) aeronautics, including aero motors; (3) inter- 
 nal-combustion motors; (4) electricity; (5) mines and torpedoes; (6) sub- 
 marines; (7) ordnance and explosives ; (8) wireless and communications ; (9) 
 transportation; (10) production, manufacture, and standardization; (11) ship 
 construction; (12) steam engineering and ship propulsion; (13) life-saviuK 
 appliances; (14) aids to navigation; (15) food and sanitation. 
 
 8. Power shall be lodged in the chairman to appoint such additional com- 
 mittees as he may find necessary. These subcommittees are to consist of such 
 
14 NAVAL CONSULTING BCAED OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 a number as, in the opinion of tlie cliairnian of tlie subcommittee, may seem 
 desirable. 
 
 After the first meeting of the board on October 6, 1915, in the 
 office of the Secretary of the Navy the board was received by Presi- 
 dent Wilson in the White House. 
 
 He thanked the board for vohinteering to give its services to the 
 country in the present seeming emergency and stated that it was the 
 first act of preparedness against that which he was afraid could 
 not be avoided. He said that not only should we be prepared to 
 meet the emergency of war, but adequately prepared. He remarked 
 on the high character of the personnel of the board and compli- 
 mented Secretary of the Navy Daniels in putting the movement to 
 mobilize the inventive talent of the country into effect. 
 
 At a meeting of the board held on November 4, 1915, at India 
 House, New York, the board came to the conclusion that its work 
 could best be carried on through the organization of committees, 
 each committee to deal with its own particular subject. The mem- 
 bers indicated on which, of a list of committees on various scientific 
 subjects, they felt best qualified to serve. They thus became members 
 of tliese committees. As a result the following committees were 
 created, and they initiated and dealt with all matters coming before 
 the board that were within the purview of the committee: 
 
 Chemistry and Physics. — Chairman, W. R. Whitney; L. Addiclts, L. H. Baeke- 
 land, J. W. Richards, JI. B. Sellers, A. G. Webster, R. S. Woodward. 
 
 Aeronautics, including Aero Motors. — Chairman, Henry A. Wise Wood; 
 H. E. Coffin, P. C. Hewitt, A. L. Riker, M. B. Sellers, E. A. Sperry, A. G. 
 Webster. 
 
 Internal Combustion Motors. — Chairman, A. L. Riker; H. E. Coffin, M. B. 
 Sellers, E. A. Sperry. 
 
 Electricity. — Chairman, Prank J. Sprague ; L. Addicks, W. L. R. Emmet, 
 P. C. Hewitt, B. G. Lamme, A. G. Webster. 
 
 Mines and Torpedoes. — Chairman, Elmer A. Sperry ; L. H. Baekeland, M. R. 
 Hutchison, Hudson Maxim. 
 
 Sttftmarides.— Chairman, W. L. R. Emmet; A. M. Hunt, M. R. Hutchison, 
 W. L. Saunders, F. J. Sprague. 
 
 Ordnance and Explosives. — Chairman, Hudson Maxim; L. H. Baekeland, 
 A. M. Hunt, M. R. Hutchison, F. J. Sprague, A. G. Webster, W. R. Whitney, 
 H. A. W. Wood, R. S.. Woodward 
 
 Wireless and Communications. — Chairman, P. C. Hewitt; A. G. Webster, 
 W. R. Whitney. 
 
 Transportation. — Chairman, B. B. Thayer ; H. E. Coffin, A. Craven, S. Miller, 
 A. L. Riker, T. Robins, W. L. Saunders. 
 
 Production, Organisation, Manufacture, and Standardization. — Chairman, 
 H. E. Coffin; L. Addicks, W. L. R. Emmet, B. G. Lamme, T. Robins, W. L. 
 Saunders, B. B. Thayer. 
 
 Ship Construction — Chairman, F. J. Sprague; S. Miller, J. W. Richards 
 H. A. W. Wood. 
 
 Steam Engineering and Ship Propulsion. — Chairman, A. M. Hunt ; W. L. R. 
 Emmet, B. G. Lamme, J. W. Richards, M. B. Sellers. 
 
ORIGIN AND ORGANIZATION. 15 
 
 lAve-Saving Appliances. — Chairman, S. Miller ; Hudson Maxim, T. Robins. 
 
 Aids to Navigation. — Chairman, Elmer A. Sperry; A. Craven, A. M. Hunt, 
 H. A. W. Wood, R. S. Woodward. 
 
 Food and Sanitation. — Chairman, L. H. Baekeland ; H. Maxim, B. B. Thayer, 
 W. R. Whitney, R. S. Woodward. 
 
 Public WorJcs, Yards and Docks. — Chairman, A. Craven; L. Addiclis, A. M. 
 Hunt, S. Miller, J. W. Richards. 
 
 The Committee on Chemistry and Physics was later divided as 
 follows into two committees : 
 
 Chemistry. — W. R. Whitney, chairman; L. Addlcks, L. H. Baekeland, A. G. , 
 Webster, R. S. Woodward. 
 
 Physics. — ^A. G. Webster, chairman; L. Addicks, L. H. Baekeland, W. R. 
 Whitney, R. S. Woodward. 
 
 Committees added later were : 
 
 Fuel and Fuel Handling. — S. Miller, chairman ; L. Addlcks, L. H. Baekeland, 
 A. M. Hunt, M. R. Hutchison, Hudson Maxim, T. Robins, B. B. Thayer, A. G. 
 Webster, W. R. Whitney. 
 
 Metallurgy. — Chairman, J. W. Richards (resigned) ; L. Addicks (made chair- 
 man on resignation of Richards), B. G. Lamme, B. B. Thayer, W. R. Whitney. 
 
 Optical glass. — Chairman, L. H. Baekeland ; A. G. Webster, W. R. Whitney. 
 
 Special Problems. — Chairman, B. G. Lamme ; L. Addicks, A. M. Hunt, M. R. 
 Hutchison, E. A. Sperry, F. J. Sprague, A. G. Webster, W. R. Whitney. 
 
 In its early organization no definite responsibility was placed upon 
 any member of the board. Although the rules as adopted at the 
 first meeting stated that there should be a chairman, first vice chair- 
 man, second vice chairman, and a secretary, no specific duties were 
 given to the holders of these offices except such as would ordinarily 
 come within their purview. 
 
 The subjects which were taken up by the board therefore did not 
 necessarily originate with its officers and in most cases originated 
 with individual members and committees. 
 
 It was understood between Mr. Edison and Secretary Daniels 
 when he took the presidency of the board that it was his inventive 
 talent that was wanted and not his administrative and executive 
 ability. 
 
 Mr. Edison had been asked to be advisor to the board and, although 
 he was elected its first chairman, he did not act as the executive officer 
 of the board in the sense usually understood in the business world, 
 where the executive takes responsibility for the policies and the work 
 of an organization. 
 
 The organization structure evolved by the Naval Consulting Board 
 was one in which the first vice chairman, Mr. W. L. Saunders, 
 acted as presiding officer at meetings and coordinated the efi'orts of 
 the members, and there devolved upon the secretary of the board, 
 Mr. Thomas Robins, the duty of becoming the clearing house for all 
 communications between the board and the Navy Department and 
 
16 NAVAL, CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 assisted the vice chairman in coordinating the efforts of the indi- 
 vidual members of the board. Later Mr. Thomas Edison became 
 president of the board and Mr. William L. Saunders its chairman. 
 Although the titles changed their functions remained as above. 
 
 The members of the board not only serve without compensation 
 but for some time paid their own traveling expenses, so that their 
 efforts on behalf of the Government were purely voluntary and 
 gratuitious and rendered out of a spirit of patriotism. After the 
 board was legalized^ however, traveling expenses of the members in 
 discharge of their duties were paid by the Government. 
 
 In order to understand the subsequent history of the Naval Con- 
 sulting Board it is necessary to consider the organization with which 
 it had become associated, viz, the Navy Department. This depart- 
 ment, represented by the Secretary of the Navy in the Cabinet of 
 the President of the United States, is a highly developed branch 
 of the Government in which duties and responsibilities are definitely 
 placed on the officers and men of the department, and which is a 
 complete organization in itself. 
 
 As heretofore stated in Secretary Daniels's letter to Mr. Edison, 
 he desired to create a new department for the Navy for the purpose 
 of handling inventions, and on account of the fact that all the 
 bureaus of the Navy were loaded down with routine work. 
 
 As the duties and responsibilities of the bureau chiefs and officers 
 of the Navy are set forth by congressional act, the fitting of this 
 board into the Navy Department was not an easy matter. It could 
 not be given any definite legal status in the beginning, as that could 
 only come about through congressional enactment, so that the first 
 few months of its activities, and before it became legalized by Con- 
 gress in 1916. it was, in the strict sense of the word, not a part of 
 the Navy Department, and, therefore, the bureau chiefs and officers 
 of the Navy, on whom great responsibilities rested for the operation 
 and maintenance of the Naval Establishment, had some difficulty in 
 knowing just what position they should take in order to help for- 
 ward the work of the Naval Consultihg Board. 
 
 The work of the Navy Department is carried on by a system of 
 bureaus: at the head of each bureau is a bureau chief on whom de- 
 volves responsibility of administering the work of that ' bureau 
 much in the same way as the president of an underlying corporation 
 in the commercial world administrates affairs for the benefit of a 
 holding company. In carrying out this comparison, the holding 
 company would be represented by the office of the Secretary of the 
 Navy. 
 
 The Secretary of the Navy receives his appointment from the 
 President of the United States, who is Commander in Chief of the 
 Navy, so that the source of his po'wer is from the Commander in 
 
ORIGIN AND ORGANIZATION. 17 
 
 Chief rather than by congressional legislation. The Congressional 
 Directory for 1919 defines the official duties of the Secretary of the 
 Navy as follows: 
 
 The Secretary of the Navy performs such duties as the President of the 
 United States, who is Commander in Chief, may assign him, and has the gen- 
 eral superintendence of construction, manning, armament, equipment, and 
 employments of vessels of war. 
 
 The officer in the Navy Department charged with the largest 
 powers and importance is the Chief of Naval Operations. 
 
 The Chief of Naval Operations, under the direction of the Secretary of the 
 Navy, is charged with the operations of the fleet and with the preparation 
 and readiness of plans for its use in war. 
 
 The following is a sketch of the most important duties of the 
 various bureaus and officers of the Navy, as set forth in congressional 
 enactment : 
 
 The Bureau of Navigation issues, records, and enforces the orders 
 of the Secretary to the individual offic&rs of the Navy. 
 
 The Bureau of Yards and Docks designs and constructs the public 
 works, such as dry docks, marine railways, building ways, etc. 
 
 The Bureau of Ordnance has charge of the upkeep, repair, and 
 operation of the torpedo station, naval proving grounds, and maga- 
 zines on shore and the manufacture of offensive and defensive arms 
 and apparatus, including torpedoes and armor, all ammunition and 
 war explosives, etc. 
 
 The Bureau of Construction and Repair is responsible for the 
 structural strength and stability of all ships built for the Navy; 
 all that relates to designing, building, fitting, and repairing the hulls 
 of ships ; turrets, electric turret-turning machinery, etc. It also has 
 charge of the docking of ships, and is charged with the operating 
 and cleaning of dry docks. 
 
 The Bureau of Steam Engineering is in charge of all that relates 
 to the designing, building, fitting out, and repairing machinery used 
 for the propulsion of naval vessels. It inspects all fuel for the fleet, 
 and is specifically charged with the design, supply, installation, 
 maintenance, and repair of all means of interior and exterior electric 
 signal communications, including the repair and operation of radio 
 outfits on shipboard and on shore. It also takes charge of the 
 design, manufacture, installation, maintenance, repair, and opera- 
 tion of aeroplane motors and propellers a"nd their attachments. 
 
 The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery has charge of the upkeep 
 and operation of all hospitals and of the force employed there, etc. 
 
 The Bureau of Supplies and Accounts has charge of all that 
 relates to the purchase, reception, storage, care, custody, transfer, 
 shipment, and issue of all supplies for the Naval Establishment and 
 168537°— 20 2 
 
18 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 the keeping of property accounts for the same; the procuring of 
 provisions, clothing, and small stores and material under the, naval 
 supply account. 
 
 The Paymaster General of the Navy, who is the Chief of the 
 Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, has supervision over the loading 
 and cargoes of supply ships, and he is responsible for the purchase 
 of all supplies for the Naval Establishment, including provisions 
 and clothing and the preparation of contracts and bureau orders in 
 connection with purchases. 
 
 The naval supply account is administered by the Paymaster Gen- 
 eral of the Navy, and governs the charging, crediting, receipt, pur- 
 chase, transfer, manufacture, repair, issue, and consumption of all 
 stores for the Naval Establishment, except for a few items which are 
 specifically exempted. 
 
 Naval clothing factories are also under the control of the Pay- 
 master General of the Navy. He has supervision over all that re- 
 lates to the supply of funds for the disbursing officers, the payment 
 for articles and services for which contract and agreement have been 
 made, and the keeping of the money accounts of the Naval Estab- 
 lishment. 
 
 The duties of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy are as 
 follows : To revise and report on the legal features of and to have 
 recorded proceedings of all courts-martial, courts of inquiry, boards 
 of investigation, etc. 
 
 The duties of the Solicitor relate to the examination and report 
 upon questions of law, including the drafting and interpretation of 
 statutes. 
 
 All the duties of the bureaus are performed under the authority 
 of the Secretary of the Navy, and their orders are considered as 
 emanating from him and have full force and effect as such. 
 
 The chiefs of bureaus issue orders concerning the work of their 
 own bureaus, provided such work is not of a character to alter the 
 military characteristics of any ship. Any proposed work the per- 
 formance of which would alter the military characteristics of any 
 ship is referred to the Secretary of the Navy for decision prior to 
 authorization. 
 
 Each bureau determines on and requires for or has manufactured 
 all material, apparatus, tools, stores, fuel, transportation, etc., needed 
 for its own use in carrying out its duties. It is charged with all that 
 relates to the equipments of ships, according to its allowance, and 
 estimates for and defrays from its own funds the cost necessary to 
 carry out its duties as hereinafter defined.^ 
 
 » Functions of the various bureaus, as proyided by sec. 624 of the Revisod Statutes of 
 the United States, as amended by act of Mar. 3, 1899, sec. 13, and by the acts of May 13, 
 1908, Feb. 16, 1900, and Aug. 22, 1912, ch. 2, sec. 1, par. 2. 
 
OEIGIN AND ORGANIZATION. 19 
 
 When a conference becomes necessary to facilitate the transaction 
 of business aifecting the interest of any bureau or office, the chief of 
 such bureau or head of such office, when notified by the appropriate 
 head, designates a representative to attend to such conference. 
 
 In every case pertaining to the design, alteration, or repair of 
 ships or equipage, wherein any bureau recommends for approval 
 any departure from the recognized standard practice, or any case in 
 variance with any former decision of the department, the bureau 
 invites the attention of the department to (a) the provision, de- 
 cisions, or rulings of the department in regard to the subject in 
 question, and (b) the reasons for recommending any departure from 
 existing practice or change in policy. 
 
 The General Board is composed of the Chief of Naval Operations, 
 Director of Naval Intelligence, President of the Naval War Col- 
 lege, the Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps, and such 
 additional officers as the Secretary may designate. Any officer above 
 the grade of lieutenant is' detailed as secretary of the General Board. 
 
 The General Board, devises measures and plans for the prepara- 
 tion and maintenance of the fleet for war, etc., and prepares and 
 submits to the Secretary of the Na"vy plans of strategy, including co- 
 operation with the Army, and considers the number and types of 
 ships proper to constitute the fleet. It also advises the Secretary con- 
 cerning the location, upkeep, and protection of fuel depots. It co- 
 ordinates the work of the Naval War College and the Office of Naval 
 Intelligence. 
 
 The President may select any officer not below the grade of com- 
 mander on the active list of the Navy and assign him to the command 
 of a squadron with the rank and title of flag officer. 
 
 Not only are the duties of the naval officers in the different bureaus 
 definitely prescribed, as above set forth, but in the early part of 
 each year each buteau is required to make an estimate of its pros- 
 pective expenditures for the fiscal year commencing July 1. A bill 
 founded on this budget is then enacted in Congress and appropria- 
 tions made for the upkeep of the Naval Establishment. The bill, 
 as enacted, specifies the items for which the money is to be expended, 
 even down to prescribing the number of scrubwomen and the rate 
 at which they are to be paid. 
 
 The specific amounts for experimentation and research allowed 
 by Congress are very meager. The result of this system for the 
 maintenance and operation of the Naval Establishment is that the 
 whole organization is set forth in congressional enactments and 
 appropriations are specifically made by Congress for specific pur- 
 poses. Money is provided for the carrying out of the duties above 
 set forth, so that at the beginning of any fiscal year each bureau 
 and office concerned with material knows what its duties are, 
 
20 NAVAL, CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 which are prescribed by Congress, and how much money and ma- 
 terial it is going to have to carry them out. 
 
 Each bureau has facilities for doing work in its own line, but if 
 it attempts to do anything in regard to research or development 
 work, special facilities have to be arranged for that purpose. Men 
 have to be taken off the active routine work upon which they are 
 engaged and special space has to be set aside for the particular thing 
 to be investigated. 
 
 If a big Diesel engine were to be built by the Navy Department, 
 it practically would have to know if the Diesel engine would work 
 before they had it made ; and it is quite unlikely that Congress would 
 make an appropriation to build an experimental engine which would 
 have to be scrapped and another one built before it was sufficiently 
 developed to warrant incorporating it in the equipment of a naval 
 vessel. 
 
 Congress having made appropriations for each bureau, the ex- 
 penditures in said bureaus are made by the chief of the bureau who 
 allots amounts to be allowed for various purposes. The Bureau of 
 Supplies and Accounts draws amounts from the" Treasury of the 
 United States and pays bills in accordance with allotments made by 
 the chief of the bureau. 
 
 The personnel of the Navy is paid directly by the Bureau of Sup- 
 plies and Accounts, which draws checks or drafts on the Secretary 
 of the Treasury. 
 
 Frequently money is needed from the appropriations made to more 
 than one bureau, as, for instance, in the case of an engineering officer 
 engaged on work in one of the navy yards which involves two 
 bureaus. He would be obliged to make an estimate of the requirement 
 from the Bureau of Steam Engineering and the Bureau of Con- 
 struction and Repair, for instance. The commandant of the yard 
 would then be obliged to make requisition on the various bureau 
 chiefs for these amounts. The bureau chiefs would O. K. these 
 requisitions and return them to the commandant of the yard, and the 
 commandant of the yard would then file them with the Treasurer of 
 the United States and draw the necessary money, which would then 
 be placed in the control of the paymaster of the yard. The funds, 
 once in the hands of the paymaster of the yard, could be drawn on 
 by the officer who is expending the money for the purchases for which 
 he made the requisitions. 
 
 The method required to install new devices on shipboard is as 
 follows: If the Bureau of Ordnance decided to install a certain 
 device on shipboard, which incorporated in its mechanism certain elec- 
 trical attachments, which happened to be under the control of the 
 Bureau of Construction and Repair, the Bureau of Ordnance would 
 be obliged to have a conference with the Bureau of Construction and 
 
ORIGIN AND ORGANIZATION. 21 
 
 Repair in regard to the matter of the installation, and in the event 
 of a dispute as to the advisability of installing the device the matter 
 would have to be referred to the Secretary of the Navy, who would, 
 no doubt, select some one from the General Board of the Navy to 
 report to him on the merits of the device. 
 
 It can thus be seen that the rigid organization of the Navy in re- 
 gard to the prescription of "duties of the various men attached to 
 bureaus, the inflexible budget system, by which appropriations are 
 made for specific things for one year in advance, the division of re- 
 sponsibility among several bureaus in regard to the installation of 
 any new device, makes for conservatism in the installation of such 
 new devices. 
 
 By regulation of Navy Department it is provided that where any 
 bureau recommends for approval any departure from recognized 
 standard practice or any case in variance with any former decision 
 of the department, such bureau shall invite the attention of the de- 
 partment (a) to the provision, decisions or rulings of the department 
 in regard to the subject in question and (6) the reasons for recom- 
 mending any departure from existing practice or change in policy. 
 
 Great responsibility is placed by congressional action upon the 
 bureau chiefs, who are selected for a term of four years by the Secre- 
 tary of the Navy, the nominations are approved by the President of 
 the United States and sent to the Senate for confirmation. The four- 
 year terms of the bureau chiefs do not necessarily coincide with the 
 four-year term of the Secretary of the Navy. Some Secretaries of 
 the Navy have been known in the past to ask for the resignation of 
 a bureau chief, as soon as the bureau chief was appointed, in order 
 that they might have control. 
 
 In the event that the Secretary of the Navy directs a change in 
 the material or design of naval equipment, he relieves the bureau 
 or bureau chiefs of all responsibility in regard to it. These men and 
 their suporting organization having the authority and responsibil- 
 ity, and being actively engaged in this work, know more about it than 
 the Secretary of the Navy. He is therefore necessarily very re- 
 luctant to take responsibility for changes from the shoulders of 
 those on whom it rests. His reasons for doing so must be extremely 
 good reasons. 
 
 Not only did changes in material matters of the Navy involve 
 many interests, but this also applies to any change in the organiza- 
 tion of the Navy Department, such as the introduction of another 
 body such as the Naval Consulting Board. And disturbance of the 
 existing system for the administration of the Navy, involved mat- 
 ters of far-rieaching importance. The Navy Department is so or- 
 ganized that each officer is vested with well-defined and clear-cut 
 duties and responsibilities. 
 
22 NAVAIj CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 From the above outline of the duties and responsibilities which 
 are placed upon the bureaus of the Navy Department by congres- 
 sional enactment, it can be readily seen, when the Secretary of the 
 Navy decided to take a radical and progressive step toward pre- 
 paring the country for war by the mobilization of the inventive, 
 scientific, and engineering talent of the country, he had a rather 
 unique problem to solve. 
 
 The functions of the bureaus, being so definitely set forth by 
 congressional enactment, and making a rigid structure, he could 
 not create a new bureau for the Navy Department without special 
 congressional legislation. He could not well make hard and fast 
 rules for cooperative work between the Naval Consulting Board and 
 the bureaus of the Navy, as the Naval Consulting Board, as formed 
 by himself, had no definite governmental status and was not a 
 legalized bureau or department. 
 
 He, therefore, did the only thing possible and that was to attach 
 the Naval Consulting Board to the office of the Secretary of the Navy 
 in an advisory capacity and use his influence and the prestige of his 
 office to bring about a cooperation between the bureaus of the Navy 
 and the inventive, scientific, and engineering talent as represented 
 on and by the Naval Consulting Board. 
 
 The Naval Consulting Board, therefore, was obliged to find itself 
 and work out its own destiny, with the cooperation of the Secre- 
 tary, as best it could, with a rather rigid and firmly established 
 Naval Establishment on the one hand and a public which was trying 
 to express itself through some Government medium to prepare the 
 country for war and mobilize the inventive talent of the country for 
 that purpose. 
 
 Until the Naval Consulting Board was made a focal point for the 
 concentration of the inventive talent of the country for naval use 
 no one knew, before a record of its experience was made, what 
 inventions the country could produce for war purposes. The ex- 
 perience of the board showed that inventions are not created by 
 the waving of a wand, so to speak, but are predicated upon the 
 application of highly technical knowledge and information to the 
 solution of naval problems, which must be exhaustively considered. 
 All of the facts in relation to each problem must be collected, and an 
 attack made upon it by thoroughly equipped scientists of an inven- 
 tive type. It was shown that this can best be done by groups of 
 specialists, each one contributing an increment of knowledge to the 
 solution of the problem. This group work develops new knowledge 
 based on the composite knowledge contributed by members of the 
 group. This new knowledge comes about through observation and 
 experience, and frequently accidental discoveries are made of new 
 
ORIGIN AND ORGANIZATION. 23 
 
 phenomena which, when finally incorporated into a device, make 
 for its success. 
 
 The Special Problems Committee of the Naval Consulting Board, 
 mentioned hereafter, made its attack on the submarine problem in 
 this way, and substantial results were achieved. 
 
 At the first meetings of the board, on the invitation of the Secre- 
 tary, many of the bureau chiefs attended. At one of the early 
 meetings of the Naval Consulting Board it was suggested that a 
 representative of the Navy Department be made a member of each 
 subcommittee of the board. The bureau chiefs, however, who were 
 present at this meeting, stated that they thought this would create 
 the impression that the Naval Consulting -Board was a side issue of 
 the Navy Department and being run by the department, if the 
 officers of the Navy were definitely associated in the membership 
 of these committees, and that they thought it would be best for the 
 Naval Consulting Board to retain its organization absolutely inde- 
 pendent of the Navy Department. This proposal to have representa- 
 tives of the Navy Department on the subcommittees of the Naval 
 Consulting Board was made before the Naval Consulting Board 
 had any official standing, it having been legalized about a year 
 later, and the action of the bureau chiefs was no doubt founded upon 
 their intimate knowledge of the complex organization of the Navy 
 Department and the unofficial status of the Naval Consulting Board. 
 
 It was finally decided that the proper method of liaison between 
 the Navy Department and the Naval Consulting Board was to have 
 an officer of high rank attached to the office of the Secretary of 
 Navy and detailed for work with the board. This plan was carried 
 out and Rear Admiral William Strother Smith was appointed to 
 duty with the Naval Consulting Board, in order that he might keep 
 the board informed of anything of importance that came up in 
 the Navy Department to which their attention should be directed 
 and to coordinate its activities. 
 
 In those early days the organization of the board and prior to its 
 having been legalized, the public was sending in ideas and sugges- 
 tions for new inventions to the Navy Department, and this resulted 
 in the creation of an "Inventions Office" attached to the office of 
 the Secretary of the Navy, through which all inventions which were 
 recommended by the Naval Consulting Board or its committees 
 passed. Admiral Smith was in charge of this office. 
 
 From October 7, 1915, until August 29, 1916, the Naval Consult- 
 ing Board was an unofficial body, but by act of Congress, known 
 as " An act making appropriations for the naval service for the fis- 
 cal year ending June 30, 1917, and for other purposes, approved 
 August 29, 1916," Congress legalized this board in what was thought 
 
24 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 to be the best way. On page 3, the act reads : " For actual expenses 
 incurred by and in connection with the Civilian Naval Consulting 
 Board, $25,000." This, in the opinion of lawyers, fully legalized 
 the board and thereafter its legal status was such as to allow it to 
 undertake duties it had not performed before. 
 
 Immediately after it was legalized, an organization meeting took 
 place in the office of the Secretary of the Navy on the 19th day of 
 September, 1916. After hearing an address by the Secretary and 
 taking the oath of allegiance,^ the party left the Navy Department 
 at 4.30 for the navy yard, boarding the U. S. S. Dolphin. 
 
 Secretary Daniels, accompanied by Admiral Benson, Capt. Wil- 
 liam Strother Smith, and Lieut. Commander Byron McCandless, 
 received the board on shipboard and the party left for Old Point 
 soon thereafter, arriving on the morning of the 20th, where they 
 proceeded to Lynnhaven Bay and boarded the U. S. S. Texas. 
 
 On board the Texas., the Secretary was received by Admiral Mayo, 
 Vice Admiral Coffman, Rear Admiral Fechteler, and their respec- 
 tive staffs. The Texas got underway and proceeded out to the 
 Southern Drill Grounds, where they witnessed target practice by 
 the fleet and also firing from the Texas. 
 
 A seaplane was launched from the U. S. S. North Carolina and 
 executed maneuvers in rather rough water. 
 
 Admiral Mayo, assisted by Capt. Blue, commanding the Texas, 
 entertained the party at luncheon. 
 
 In the afternoon the party returned to the Dolphin in Lynn- 
 haven Bay and arrived in Washington the following morning. 
 
 By resolution, the officers who had served the temporary organiza- 
 tion were made officers of the new organization, and the committees 
 as established by the temporary organization were declared to be the 
 regular committees of the new board, and a committee of three was 
 appointed by the chairman to draft by-laws for the permanent 
 organization, and the following rules and regulations for the con- 
 tinuance and government of the Naval Consulting Board, subject to 
 the approval of the Secretary of the Navy, were adopted : ^ 
 
 Into this environment came the 24 men of the Naval Consulting 
 Board from the civilian activities which had engrossed them up to 
 the time of their appointment. They were all men of strong per- 
 sonalities, successful in their individual activities, mature in their 
 judgment, and the subsequent history of the board is largely the re- 
 action of these men as individuals to the environment in which they 
 found themselves. As pointed out above, they dealt with a rigidly 
 organized Navy Department in the beginning without any official 
 
 'See Appendix, p. 251. ^See Appendix, p. 248. 
 
' ORIGIN AND ORGANIZATION. 25 
 
 status on their part. Their activities reflected a responsiveness to cur- 
 rent thought in regard to preparing of the United States for war, 
 and their unique position enabled them to set in motion forces which 
 later were of the utmost importance in bringing about the mobilizing 
 of the country for war. 
 
 As a result, within a few weeks after its organization an inventory 
 was taken of the industrial resources of the United States. The 
 method evolved for taking this inventory by the use of the engineers 
 of the country without doubt resulted in determining the character 
 of the Government structures for carrying on the war. 
 
 The well-organized publicity campaign which accompanied the 
 taking of the inventory no doubt aroused the people to a point where 
 they were ready to go to war when it was declared April 6, 1917. 
 
CHAPTER 11. 
 
 THE INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS CAMPAIGN. 
 
 In order to understand the industrial preparedness campaign of 
 the Naval Consulting Board one must go back to the work of one of 
 its members, Mr. Howard E. Coffin, in the standardization of ma- 
 terials in the motor-car industry. 
 
 The motor-car industry in 1909 was in such a position that it was 
 almost impossible to obtain even the simplest kind of material for 
 the construction of motor cars. This situation had been brought 
 about because of a lack of standardization, either in specifications, 
 designs, or materials in the industry. The committee formed to 
 investigate this situation found it a very amazing one. The output 
 of motor cars and the growth of the industry were being restricted 
 because of inability to purchase materials, and an analysis of these 
 difficulties lead to the discovery that nearly all of them could be 
 traced to the fact that every concern in the country, and in many 
 instances different dejoartments of the same concern, were ordering 
 for identical purposes widely different materials. For instance, 
 in the case of the Shelby Tube Co., it was found that they were 
 asked to draw for the motor-car industry alone somewhere in the 
 neighborhood of 1,700 different specifications for tubing. The steel 
 industry was being called on for special brands of steel and for 
 special analysis of steel almost as varied as there were engineers in 
 the industry, and even in such minor items as lock washers, we 
 found that the Standard Lock Washer Co. was being asked to sup- 
 ply to the motor-car industry over 800 different specifications for 
 lock washers between the sizes of five-sixteenths and five-eighths. 
 
 Each tire manufacturer insisted upon his peculiar form of rim 
 and mold for the bending of his tire, with the result that no two 
 sizes of tires produced by different manufacturers would fit the 
 same rim. The results of this multiplicity of specification were 
 twofold, both tending to work disaster to the growth of any industry. 
 (1) Since each manufacturing concern was ordering special mate- 
 rial through its engineering department, its purchasing department 
 would have to await delivery under these special specifications until 
 such time as the material could be manufactured; the orders, of 
 26 
 
THE INDUSTRIAL PEEPABEDUESS CAMPAIGIT. 27 
 
 course, taking precedence, in accordance with the time of being 
 placed. (2) The producer of raw materials or of the commodities 
 entering into motor-car construction were unable to manufacture 
 in quantities or in advance of the actual needs, as evidenced by the 
 orders upon their books, because there was no assurance that even 
 the same concern would ever again place an order for the particular 
 specifications which it had once ordered. 
 
 Mr. Coffin, in January, 1910, was elected president of the Society 
 of Automobile Engineers, which was later succeeded by the Society 
 of Automotive Engineers, and, with the cooperation of others, put 
 the society upon a new footing by organizing it on a business basis 
 for the purpose of bringing about standardization of specifications 
 and materials used in the motor-car industry. A general committee 
 of 125 men was divided into a large number of subcommittees, each 
 dealing with some specific phase of the subject. The results of the 
 work of this organization gave the motor-car industry a technical 
 literature which has made possible its present growth to easily the 
 third place in the scale of the business activities of the United States, 
 and every draftsman and engineer in the industry now has on his 
 desk a technical guide— -in short, a Kent of the Motor Car Field — 
 standards of design, specification, and material are at his hand, 
 and purchasing departments are able to purchase and obtain quick 
 delivery upon materials and parts necessary for motor-vehicle con- 
 struction. 
 
 The plan of organization of the Naval Consulting Board into 
 subcommittees followed somewhat the same scheme used by the 
 Society of Automotive Engineers in their work of standardization; 
 and, on account of his prior experience in this field, Mr. Coffin was 
 made chairman of the Committee on Production, Organization, 
 Manufacture, and Standardization of the Naval Consulting Board 
 on or about November 8, 1915, the other members of the committee 
 being William L. Saunders, Lawrence Addicks, William Le Eoy 
 Emmet, Thomas Kobins, Benjamin G. Lamme, and Benjamin B. 
 Thayer. 
 
 Upon being notified of his election as chairman of this com- 
 mittee, Mr. Coffin's reaction to the notification was immediate, and 
 with his experience in connection with the standardization of ma- 
 terials and specifications for the motor-car industry, he set in motion 
 an investigation to find out from the War and Navy Departments 
 what data they had in their files pertaining to production capacities 
 of the industrial plants of the country which were likely to be 
 called upon for the production of war materials in the event of 
 war. It was found that the information was very meager and in 
 no way adequate to meet the needs of the country in the event of 
 hostilities. 
 
28 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 In December, 1915, a meeting of the Committee on Production, 
 Organization, Manufacture, and Standardization was called in the 
 office of the secretary of the board, Mr. Thomas Robins. The name 
 of this committee was later shortened to that of '-'Industrial Pre- 
 paredness." At this meeting ways and means for the accomplish- 
 ment of an industrial inventory of the country were discussed, and 
 as a result of the deliberations of this committee it was decided to 
 call together the presidents of the following five engineering organi- 
 zations—American Society of Civil Engineers, American Institute of 
 Mining Engineers, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 
 American Institute of Electrical Engineers, and American Chemical 
 Society. 
 
 We feel it is safe to say that the industrial preparedness campaign 
 was founded upon the experience of Mr. Howard E. Coffin with the 
 standardization of the specifications and materials in the motor-car 
 industry and his particular reaction to his environment when placed 
 by the Society of Automotive Engineers and the Secretary of the 
 Navy in the position of a member of the Naval Consulting Board. 
 
 It had been estimated that between 80 and 90 per cent of the 
 manufacturing and producing resources of the European countries 
 were engaged in the making of supplies for their armies, and that in 
 the event that the United States should become involved in an armed 
 conflict with any first-class foreign power an equal percentage of the 
 countries manufacturing equipment would be needed in this same 
 service. It was realized that America had numerous plants, great 
 quantities of tools and machinery, and a large number of skilled 
 workers, but that it was unorganized and uneducated for the na- 
 tional service. In European countries engaged in the war motor-car 
 factories had been converted into shell factories, and practically 
 every line of industry found that its equipment was suitable for the 
 making of some article, or part, for the munitioning of the armies 
 and navies. Watchmakers were making and adjusting shell fuses; 
 jewelry houses were making periscopes for both submarines and 
 other uses in making observations from the trenches ; manufacturers 
 of machinery were turning out thousands of shells ; makers of textile 
 machinery were delivering field kitchens, and so on through thou- 
 sands of items which go to make up the needs of a fighting line. It 
 is upon private industry that all hope of quantity production must 
 be based. 
 
 In England no record of skilled labor had been kept prior to the 
 war, and as a result men had gone to the front from the factories 
 and could not be brought back to take up their work. 
 
 Germany had been building up, through some 40 years of effort, 
 plants for the mobilization of its industrial resources in the event of 
 war, and the following story, told by an eyewitness, indicates the 
 
THE INDUSTRIAL, PREPAREDNESS CAMPAIGN. 29 
 
 state of preparedness in which that country found itself at the out- 
 break of hostilities : 
 
 In one well-known manufacturing plant in Germany a telegram announcing 
 the declaration of war was received at 2 o'clock in the afternoon. Bells rang 
 throughout the plant and the men filed past the pay widows. Slips of paper 
 were given them carrying instructions. One part of them left the factory at 
 once on the way to concentration points; others proceeded to the storerooms 
 in which were kept gauges, jigs, and tools for use in the production of that 
 material of war fOF which that plant, through careful governmental prear- 
 rangement, was to be held responsible. Still others of the workmen left to 
 report at once as experts in matters of ignition of aeroplanes and motor ve- 
 hicles. The machinery scarcely stopped. A few hours at the most in shifting 
 jigs and changing set-ups and the change of commercial product to war product 
 had been made. 
 
 Briefly, two years of observation of the European war had taught 
 us that organized industry is the foundation upon which we would 
 be obliged to rest any and every plant for the military defense of the 
 Nation. 
 
 It was realized by the Committee on Industrial Preparedness that 
 the United States, by prearrangement and in time of peace, while it 
 could work calmly and efficiently, should evolve a plan which would 
 (1) give accurate statistics as to the resources of the country for the 
 production of war materials; (2) evolve a plan through which the 
 mills and factories could receive educational orders on war material 
 for which their plants were suited; and (3) get accurate information 
 as to the number of skilled men employed who should be retained in 
 the industry in the event of hostilities. Briefly, so that within a 
 reasonable time the factories of America could be swung from their 
 regular line of production to Army and Navy work. Certain con- 
 cerns were already known to be working on foreign war orders, as, 
 for instance, the Linotype Co., which was manufacturing 6,000 fuses 
 a day for the Russian Government, and an electrical concern manu- 
 facturing 20,000 fuses a day. It was estimated that there were some 
 35,000 such concerns in the United States that could be depended 
 upon to furnish materials for the Army and Navy in time of emer- 
 gency need. It had been found that one of our largest American 
 manufacturers, who started work on an order for one of the foreign 
 Governments, could find only three expert workmen skilled in the 
 manufacturing methods necessary to the production of this particu- 
 lar munition in the United States. It was also realized that the 
 making of munitions was a parts-making business and that parts 
 made in Toledo, Ohio, must fit other parts which may be made in 
 Portland, Oreg., or in Augusta, Ga. ; moreover, that these parts must 
 fit each other to within a small fraction of the one-thousandth part 
 of an inch. 
 
30 NAVAL, CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 The making of munitions thus involved a similar standardization 
 to that required by the motor-car industry, but in a very much more 
 refined degree. 
 
 It was not strange, therefore, that Mr. Coffin should, upon his elec- 
 tion to the Naval Consulting Board and to its Committee on Organi- 
 zation, Manufacture, and Standardization, have the inspiration and 
 incentive to start an industrial preparedness campaign. At that time 
 he could not see its far-reaching importance, or that, based upon it, 
 an organization would be evolved by our National Government for 
 the prosecution of the war. 
 
 On January 4, 1916, the presidents of the American Society of 
 Civil Engineers, American Institute of Mining Engineers, American 
 Society of Mechanical Engineers, American Institute of Electrical 
 Engineers, and American Chemical Society were called together 
 by Mr. Coffin at a luncheon at Delmonico's, Forty-fourth Street and 
 Fifth Avenue, New York City. At this meeting the plan for a pre- 
 paredness campaign and industrial inventory was laid before the 
 presidents in attendance at this meeting, at which were also present 
 Mr. W. L. Saunders and Mr. Thomas Robins, of the Naval Consult- 
 ing Board. The presidents of these societies were asked to consider 
 the proposition for the utilization of the membership of their or- 
 ganizations for taking an industrial inventory of the United States, 
 and about one week later (Friday, January 7, 1915), a meeting was 
 held at the Machinery Club, 30 Church Street, New York City, at 
 which were present the five presidents of the above-mentioned so- 
 cieties, including Mr. John J. Carty, chief engineer of the Ameri- 
 can Telephone & Telegi'aph Co., who was at that time president of 
 !e American Society of Electrical Engineers. Mr. Carty, in his 
 capacity of chief engineer of the American Telephone & Telegraph 
 Co., knew of the ability and capacity of Mr. Walter S. Gifford, chief 
 statistician of the American Telephone & Telegraph Co., and at a 
 conference between Mr. Coffin and Mr. Carty it was decided to re- 
 quest him to undertake the management of the campaign. The com- 
 pany loaned Mr. Gifford to the Industrial Preparedness Committee, 
 and he took entire charge of the management of the New York 
 office, which was established at 29 West Thirty-ninth Street, New 
 York City. 
 
 On January 13, 1916, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United 
 States, wrote a letter to each of the five engineering societies. The 
 following letter to the American Institute of Mining Engineers is 
 the type of letter which was written to each one of the societies : 
 
 The White House, 
 Washington, January 13, 1916. 
 Mt Deab Sie : The work which the American Institute of Mining Engineers 
 has done through its members on the Naval Consulting Board is a patriotic 
 
THE INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS CAMPAIGN. 31 
 
 service which is deeply appreciated. It has been so valuable that I am tempted 
 to ask that you will request the institute to enlarge its usefulness to the 
 Government still further by nominating for the approval of the Secretary of 
 the Navy a representative from its membership for each State in the Union, 
 to act in conjunction with representatives from the American Society of 
 Mechanical Engineers, the American Society of Civil Engineers, the American 
 Institute of Electrical Engineers, and the American Chemical Society for the 
 purpose of assisting the Naval Consulting Board in the work of collecting 
 data for use in organizing the manufacturing resources of the country for 
 the public service in case of emergency. I am sure that I may count upon 
 your cordial cooperation. With sincere regard, 
 
 Cordially, yours, 
 
 WooDBow Wilson. 
 Mr. W. L. Saunders, 
 
 President American Institute of Mining Engineers, New Tork City. 
 
 The following letter was sent to the directors in each State : * 
 
 My Deab : In requesting you, which I herewith take much pleasure in 
 
 doing, to serve as a mernber of the board of directors of the Organization for 
 
 Industrial Preparedness for the State of , and as associate member of the 
 
 Naval Consulting Board, I am given opportunity to impress upon you the value 
 and importance of the work whicli you are now about to take up. At the same 
 time I desire to tender you the hearty thanks and deep appreciation of the 
 department and of the administration for the definite service that you, in the 
 most nonpartisan and unselfish spirit, are about to render to the Government 
 and people of the United States. 
 
 There can be no higher service to the country than that contemplated in the 
 plans of the Committee on Industrial Preparedness of the Naval Consulting 
 Board, which has in hand the general direction of the work in question. The 
 war in Europe has taught us that industrial preparedness is the foundation 
 rock of the national defense, and to the end of accomplishing it in full measure 
 you can contribute a large and patriotic service for the common interest of this 
 Republic. 
 
 Very sincerely, yours, 
 
 JosBffHUS Daniels, 
 
 Secretary of the Navy. 
 
 The secretaries of the five engineering societies which had volun- 
 teered to assist in the campaign met, bringing a complete list of their 
 members, classified by States. It was decided to appoint one member 
 from each society for each State to act for the society without com- 
 pensation and to assist in the carrying out of the work. This made 
 a committee of five for each State, which committee was to have 
 turned over to it the membership of the societies in that State to act 
 as volunteers to assist in the work. The members to be chosen in 
 each State were selected at this conference by the representatives of 
 the five societies. The conference then selected one of the five mem- 
 bers to act as temporary chairman and to assume the responsibilities 
 of calling the first meeting of the five State directors. 
 
 Notices were sent to each of the members of the societies appointed 
 on these State committees, a special notice being sent to the member 
 
 » For List of directors, see Appendix, p. 236-243. 
 
32 NAVAL, CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 who was appointed temporary chairman, urging him to call a meet- 
 ing promptly and to elect a permanent chairman at that meeting. 
 An outline of the plan and a sample of the. questionnaire^ were sent 
 at the same time in order to inform the State committees of the scope 
 and plans of the work. 
 
 In selecting the members of these State committees consideration 
 was given to the affiliations of the society members chosen ; that is, it 
 was thought wise to have at least one man connected with a manu- 
 facturing enterprise, and perhaps one connected with a college, etc. 
 The idea was not to get five college professors on a committee. 
 
 This resulted in the mobilization of some 250 men, among them 
 being some of the leading engineers and scientists of the country. 
 
 It was realized, of course, that a considerable amount of financing 
 would be required in the consummation of the work. In the begin- 
 ning there had been a hazy understanding that the Navy Department 
 would supply the money, but the legal restrictions were found to be 
 such that this was impossible under the law that then existed. The 
 Naval Consulting Board had then no legal status in the govern- 
 mental machinery, it being merely an advisory group of civilians ap- 
 pointed by the Secretary of the Navy without congressional authori- 
 zation or any appropriation to meet its expenses. It was decided, 
 therefore, to carry on the work without financial governmental sup- 
 port and each State committee was notified that it must finance itself 
 from money advanced, either by the members of the local conamittee 
 or by industrial concerns which realized the importance of the task. 
 It is significant of the attitude of American business men and of 
 their realization of the necessity for preparedness that no difficulty 
 was encountered in providing the money for this campaign. 
 
 The expenses of the director's office in New York, amounting to 
 something between $20,000 and $25,000 and including many contin- 
 gent expenses, amounting to probably $10,000 additional, were 
 financed entirely by Mr. Howard E. Coffin personally. The expenses 
 of the New York State organization, amounting to some $15,000 or 
 $20,000, were provided by the business men associated with the New 
 York State campaign. The work in all other States was handled in 
 the same manner. It has been estimated that, all told, something 
 over a quarter of a million dollars were involved in this work, to- 
 gether with actual years in the aggregate of the time of leading engi- 
 neers of the country, whose services were freely given as volunteers, 
 where the Government would have been absolutely unable to pur- 
 chase such ability and effort. 
 
 The United Engineering Societies Corporation contributed the 
 director's offices rent free to the cause. 
 
 »See Appendix, p. 243-247. 
 
THE INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS CAMPAIGN. 33 
 
 It seemed to those who had charge of the work that a large part 
 of its success would depend upon the speed and enthusiasm with 
 which it was carried on. As it was quite impossible to bring all of 
 the members of the State committees into conference and discuss the 
 matter in full, and as the men composing these State committees 
 were, for the most part, of experience and understanding, it seemed 
 wise to allow each State to handle its work in its own way within 
 certain limits. In other words, it was not practical, in view of the 
 desire for speed, to lay down the exact methods of procedure, which 
 might, in many cases, have not fitted the conditions and have really, 
 in the end, interfered with the carrying on of the work. In any 
 case, it would have reduced the members of these committees to the 
 position of clerks, which would have been a mistake, from a psycho- 
 logical standpoint. 
 
 The responsibility for the success of the industrial inventory in 
 each State was placed with the State committee, and in final analysis 
 responsibility for action rested with the chairman of the State com- 
 mittee. The work was carried on with surprising speed and tremen- 
 dous enthusiasm. 
 
 Some committees organized into county units, appointing commit- 
 tees of five in each county, each one of the five repres.enting one of 
 the engineering societies. Every committee found it more advan- 
 tageous to list their large industries and large industrial plants and 
 assign individual plants to individual members of the society in that 
 State. Some committees relied on correspondence, rather than on 
 personal visit. The committees made considerable use of the pub- 
 licity matter which was sent out and they seemed to generally under- 
 stand that nothing could be done without the sympathetic coopera- 
 tion of the public. 
 
 The broad aim of the inventory was to secure information as to 
 the producing facilities of the country in the production of war 
 materials needed to carry on war. That is, it was desired to learn 
 the machinery and equipment (equipment meaning both buildings 
 and working organizations) that could be turned over in time of 
 need for the production of materials for the Army or Navy. With 
 this broad aim it was, therefore, reasonable not only to take the in- 
 ventory of the machine shops, but of ice-cream factories, phono- 
 graph factories, and industries which were apparently remotely 
 connected with any product needed for use in war, the idea being 
 that if it were necessary these factories, in an emergency, could be 
 converted into producing either complete units of equipment needed 
 for war or piece parts. 
 168537°— 20 3 
 
34 NAVAL, CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 President Wilson was impressed by the necessity of taking an 
 industrial inventory of the country and addressed the following 
 letter to the business men of America : 
 
 The White House, 
 Washington, April 21, 1916. 
 To the Business Men of America: 
 
 I bespeak your cordial cooperation in the patriotic service undertaken by 
 the engineers and chemists of this country under the direction of the Indus- 
 trial Preparedness Committee of the Naval Consulting Board of the United 
 States. 
 
 The confidential industrial inventory you are asked to supply is intended for 
 the exclusive benefit of the War and Navy Departments, and will be used in 
 organizing the industrial resources for the public service in national defense. 
 
 At my request, the American Society of Civil Engineers, the American Insti- 
 tute of Mining Engineers, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, the 
 American Institute of Electrical Engineers, and the American Chemical Society 
 are gratuitously assisting the Naval Consulting Board in the work of collecting 
 this data, and I confidently ask your earnest support in the interest of the 
 people and Government of the United States. 
 Faithfully, yours, 
 
 WooDRow Wilson. 
 
 Simultaneously with the appointment of the committees, there was 
 started a publicity campaign to educate the public on the question 
 of preparedness. The backbone of this educational campaign was 
 a straight drive through the newspapers which had its genesis in a 
 luncheon organized by Mr. Coffin at Delmonico's, in New York, on 
 March 14, 1916,' at which were present the leading publishers arid 
 editors of newspapers and magazines centered in New York. 
 
 It was the response given by these men that made possible the 
 success of the campaign which, in essence, was simply a pioneer sell- 
 ing proposition and without whose efforts the work of the commit- 
 tees appointed to take the inventory in the various States and the 
 industrial, engineering, and scientific experts who cooperated with 
 them could not have been brought to a real fruitage. 
 
 As a result of this combination and cooperation of the engineers 
 with the publicity campaign, one of the swiftest pieces of work ever 
 done in the United States, for a job of a similar size, was accom- 
 plished. The entire inventory took about five months. 
 
 Special credit should be given to the artists and the Associated 
 Advertising Clubs of the World, the American Press Association 
 (later absorbed by the Western Newspaper Union), and also the 
 house organs of the country, who' helped so largely to speed the 
 propaganda of preparedness. 
 
 Through the agency of the American Press Association and Mr. 
 Courtlandt Smith, its president, the advertisements of the prepared- 
 
 ' For list of those present, see Appendix, p. 247. 
 
THE INDUSTEIAL PREPAREDNESS CAMPAIGN. 35 
 
 ness campaign were sent to a list of from 15,000 to 20,000 news- 
 papers, and they were asked to run the advertisements in the na- 
 tional interest. A tremendous response was received to this appeal. 
 
 Possibly the most effective work of the advertising clubs was done 
 by the poster division. .It arranged for an enormous lot of space 
 on the billboards over the country, and the following artists designed 
 the posters, which attracted an immense amount of attention: Louis 
 Fancher, James Montgomery Flagg, Charles Dana Gibson, Milton 
 Bancroft, William de Leftwich Dodge, and others. 
 
 Most everyone will remember the cartoon by James Montgomery 
 Flagg entitled "Armless Columbia " (with apologies to Venus de 
 Milo), showing Venus with a blue cap of stars and with her thighs 
 and legs draped with wide red and white stripes, and a naked torso, 
 armless. 
 
 As a partial indication of the extent to which the publicity cam- 
 paign was extended, it is estimated that through 196 newspapers, 
 covering the whole of the United States, a circulation of 5,956,374 
 was reached; 22 magazines carried articles, and a large percentage 
 of the 125 house organs also carried the article. Many of them also 
 ran inspirational material on the industrial movement, besides the 
 publicity that came from articles in 41 trade papers. 
 
 After the first initial movements the situation in regard to the 
 campaign was that the State committees of the societies, who had 
 been appointed as above described, five for each State, and a tempo- 
 rary chairman, had met in their respective States and an outline of 
 the plan of campaign and a sample of the questionnaire were sent to 
 the State committee, who informed them of the scope and plans of 
 the work. 
 
 In May, 1916, there was held in New York City one of the largest 
 parades known, lasting from morning until well after dusk, in which 
 150,000 civilian marchers took part, as an appeal to Congress and 
 the people of the United Sta:tes in behalf of preparedness. Other 
 preparedness parades were held in other cities throughout the coun- 
 try, and there is little doubt but what these perhaps were the out- 
 growth of the propaganda of the Committee of Industrial Pre- 
 paredness of the Naval Consulting Board. 
 
 When it was known that Mr. Thomas A. Edison intended to march 
 in this parade he received many letters threatening his life because 
 of his efforts toward preparedness and because of the fact that his 
 inventive ability would be turned against the foes of the United 
 States should we enter the war. Mr. Edison, notwithstanding these 
 threats, believing that his marching might possibly help the cause 
 of preparedness, and against the wishes of his family and many 
 friends, covered the entire line of march. Two Secret Service men 
 walked on each side of liiln. The members of the Naval Consulting 
 
36 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 Board marched with him, and the board led the engineers' division 
 of this parade. 
 
 No doubt 'Mr. Edison's active participation in the plea for pre- 
 paredness gave the movement much weight. He was enthusiastically 
 greeted and applauded, and seemed to receive more applause than 
 any other marcher. The daily newspapers published his picture as 
 a marcher and commented at length on his part in the parade and 
 its effect on the preparedness campaign. 
 
 While this was going on the publicity work was also going for- 
 ward. As a result, the State committees found the manufacturers 
 and business men more and more responsive as the publicity com- 
 paign matured to cooperating with them in the taking of the in- 
 ventory. 
 
 A brief outline of the organization of the inventory is as follows : 
 
 1. Selection by each of the five great technical societies of one American 
 citizen from each State in the Union, as per President Wilson's request of 
 January 13. 
 
 2. The formal appointment by the Secretary of the Navy of the men so 
 selected as State directors ofthe Organization for Industrial Preparedness and 
 associate members of the Naval Consulting Board. 
 
 3. Each State board of directors consisting of the five men thus appointed 
 to organize for business — electing chairman and secretary. 
 
 4. The organization under each State board of a corps of field aids selected 
 from the combined membership of the five technical societies within that State. 
 
 5. The issuance by the Naval Consulting Board to each State board of com- 
 plete Information as to the work in hand, the objects to be attained, suggested 
 methods of procedure, lists of members within the State of the five technical 
 societies and all available data as to the industries of the State. 
 
 6. Examination by the State board of their territory with reference to the 
 number and geographical distribution of Industries with relation to the field 
 aids available for the inventory. 
 
 7. Issuance by the State boards to the field aids of instructions and blank 
 forms as supplied by the Naval Consulting Board. 
 
 8. Examination and checking by the State boards of all completed field re- 
 ports. Following up men to see that reports are sent In properly. Checking 
 reports and supplying any data lacking before sending them to Consulting 
 Board. 
 
 9. The continuance of the organization thus formed in order to Insure to 
 the Government the backing of the full industrial strength of the country and 
 to secure for the largest practicable number of industrial concerns such an 
 amount of Government business as will keep them in touch with the require- 
 ments of the Army and Navy. 
 
 Note. — For sample of the industrial inventory blank, see Appendix, p. 243-247. 
 
 Among those present, at different times, were Maj. Gen. C. C. 
 Williams (who later became Chief of Ordnance) ; Col. Smith, of the 
 Quartermaster Corps; and Maj. Douglas MacArthur, of the Gen- 
 eral Staff (who later became Gen. MacArthur). 
 
 The actual work of classifying returns in respect to the purpose to 
 which the various plans would be put in case of war was done by 
 Prof. MacLauren, of Princeton University, and Col. R. H. Somers. 
 
THE INDtrSTEIAL PREPAREDNESS CAMPAIGN. 37 
 
 The results of this campaign, which in many ways was one unique 
 in vigor and vision, played a very definite part in the measures for 
 national defense which became a law when the Council of National 
 Defense was formed. It drove home to the people and Government 
 of the United States the vital, irresistible truth that in war, as now 
 waged, battles are won not alone by fighting men, but by the fighting 
 industries of a nation. 
 
 The act creating the Council of National Defense was approved 
 August 29, 1916, but the council was not fully organized until March 
 3, 1917. 
 
 During the time that the industrial preparedness campaign was 
 going on it became more apparent, as it progressed, that a legalized 
 body of some sort, with definite status and authority, should be or- 
 ganized to carry on this work. As pointed out above, the Naval 
 Consulting Board, by its method of creation, had no legal status, and 
 it was evident that if the best results, were to be obtained not only 
 would the existing laws require revision, but there must also be 
 created a properly legalized body, under which might be organized 
 the scientific and industrial resources of the country. To aid in 
 bringing about this legislation several conferences took place be- 
 tween Messrs. Godfrey, Crampton, and Coffin, they being apparently 
 most intimately connected, or most interested in, the accomplishment 
 of this industrial and scientific organization. 
 
 Secretary of War Garrison, impressed as he was with the necessity 
 of preparedness, encouraged Drs. Godfrey and Crampton in their 
 work, and this occurred at a time when the country was being 
 flooded with the publicity matter of the campaign inaugurated by 
 the Naval Consulting Board, and with preparedness parades in our 
 largest cities and other manifestations brought about by the initial 
 movement made by the Committee on Preparedhess of the Naval 
 Consulting Board. People were all beginning to think in terms of 
 industrial preparedness and the necessity for it. The legislation 
 creating the Council of National Defense was added to the Army 
 bill undoubtedly largely in consequence of this educational work. 
 At about this time, Mr. Coffin had many conferences with such men 
 as Maj. Gen. William Crozier, Chief of Ordnance; Eear Admiral 
 Samuel Gowan, head of the Purchase Division of the Navy; and 
 other men on whom the responsibility for the utilization of the in- 
 dustrial resources of the country rested. 
 
 The organization meeting of the Council of National Defense was 
 held in Washington on December 11, 1916, at which meeting the 
 seven civilian members of the Advisory Commission met for the first 
 time with the six Cabinet offiners forming the council. 
 
 The personnel of the council was as follows: Secretary of War, 
 Newton D. Baker (chairman) ; Secretary of the Navy, Josephus 
 
38 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 Daniels; Secretary of the Interior, Franklin K. Lane; Secretary of 
 Agriculture, David F. Houston; Secretary of Commerce, William 
 C. Eedfield ; Secretary of Labor, William B. Wilson. 
 
 The personnel of the Advisory Council was as follows: Daniel 
 Willard (chairman) (president Baltimore & Ohio Eailroad), 
 Howard E. Coffin (vice president Hudson Motor Car Co.), Julius 
 Rosenwald (president Sears, Eoebuck & Co.), Bernard M. Baruch 
 (banker), Dr. Hollis Godfrey (president Drexel Institute), Samuel 
 Gompers (president American Federation of Labor), Dr. Franklin 
 Martin (secretary general American College of Surgeons, Chicago). 
 
 The duties and functions of the council, as defined by section 2 
 of the Army appropriation act approved August 29, 1916, are as 
 follows : 
 
 That a Council of National Defense is hereby established for the coordi- 
 nation of industries and resources for the national security and welfare to 
 consist of the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of 
 the Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, and the 
 Secretary of Labor. 
 
 The Council of National Defense shall nominate to the President, and the 
 President shall appoint, an Advisory Commission consisting of not more 
 than seven persons, each of whom shall have special knowledge of some in- 
 dustry, public utility, or the development of some natural resource, or be 
 otherwise specially qualified, in the opinion of the council, for the performance 
 of the duties hereinafter provided. The members-of the Advisory Commission 
 shall serve without compensation, but shall be allowed actual expenses of 
 travel and subsistence when attending meetings of the commission or engaged 
 in investigations pertaining to its activities. The Advisory Commission shall 
 hold such meetings as shall be called by the council or be provided by the rules 
 and regulations adopted by the council for the conduct of its work. 
 
 It shall be the duty of the Council of National Defense to supervise and 
 direct investigations and make reconmiendations to the President and the 
 heads of executive departments as to the location of railroads with reference 
 to the frontier of the* United States, so as to render possible expeditious con- 
 centration of troops and supplies to points of defense ; the coordination of 
 military, industrial, and commercial purposes in the location of extensive 
 highways and branch lines of railroad ; the utilization of waterways ; the 
 mobilization of military and naval resources for defense ; the increase of do- 
 mestic production of articles and materials essential to the support of armies 
 and of the people during the interruption of foreign commerce ; the .develop- 
 ment of seagoing transportation ; data as to amounts, location, method and 
 means of production, and availability of military supplies; the giving of in- 
 formation to producers and manufacturers as to the class of supplies needed 
 by the military and other services of the Government, the requirements re- 
 lating thereto, and the creation of relations which will render possible in time 
 of need the immediate concentration and utilization of the resources of the 
 Nation. 
 
 That the Council of National Defense shall adopt rules and regulations for 
 the conduct of its work, which rules and regulations shall be subject to the 
 approval of the President, and shall provide for the work of the Advisory Com- 
 mission, to the end that the special knowledge of such commission may be de- 
 veloped by suitable investigation, research, and inquiry and made available 
 in conference and report for the use of the council ; and the council may organ- 
 
THE INDUSTRIAL PKEPAKEDNESS CAMPAIGN. 39 
 
 Ize subordinate bodies for its assistance in specal investgations, either by the 
 employment of experts or by the creation of committees of specially qualified 
 persons to serve without compensation but to direct the investigations of experts 
 so employed. 
 
 That the sum of $200,000, or so much thereof as may be necessary, is hereby 
 appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to 
 be immediately available for experimental work and investigations undertaken 
 by the council, by the Advisory Commission, or subordinate bodies for the de- 
 velopment of a director, expert, and clerical expenses and supplies, and for the 
 necessary expenses of members of the Advisory Commission or subordinate 
 bodies going to and attending meetings of the commission or subordnate bodies. 
 Reports shall be submitted by all subordinate bodies and by the Advisory Com- 
 mission to the council, and from time to time the council shall report to the 
 President or to the heads of executive departments upon special inquiries or 
 subjects appropriate thereto, and an annual report to the Congress shall be 
 submitted through the President, including as full a statement of the activities 
 of the council and the agencies subordinate to it as is consistent with the 
 public interest, including an itemized account of the expenditures made by the 
 council or authorised by it, in as full detail as the public interest will permit: 
 Provided, however, That when deemed proper the President may authorize, in 
 amounts stipulated by him, unvouched expenditures and report the gross sum 
 so authorized not itemized. 
 
 As pointed out in an address delivered by the Hon. Newton D. 
 Baker, Secretary of War, before the CleveLand Chamber of Com- 
 merce on September 26, 1916, Mr. Howard E. Coffin did perhaps 
 the greatest service that has been done for America by any private 
 citizen in the last 50 years by his having inaugurated and conducted 
 the industrial preparedness campaign of the Naval Consulting 
 Board. 
 
 The results of this campaign finally reached the halls of Congress 
 and resulted in a response by that body in the creation of the Coun- 
 cil of National Defense to take over and keep up the work which 
 Mr. Coffin had started through the instrumentality of the industrial 
 preparedness campaign of the Naval Consulting Board. 
 
 It will be recalled that whereas Mr. Coffin had initiated and con- 
 ducted the campaign, Mr. W. S. Gifford acted as supervising director 
 and Mr. G. B. Clarkson as publicity man of the campaign. 
 
 Shortly after the creation of the Council of National Defense all 
 of these men were absorbed by it, Mr. Coffin becoming a member of 
 the Advisory Commission of the council, Mr. Gifford its director, 
 and Mr. Clarkson its secretary. They took with them to Washington 
 all of the files of the industrial inventory of the country which they 
 had taken and turned them over to the Council of National Defense. 
 
 The history of this transition period was very well set forth by 
 Secretary of War Baker in his address before the Cleveland Chamber 
 of Commerce above referred to. In that address he said : 
 
 One of the first manifestations of the response to this difficulty was the ap- 
 pointment of the Naval Advisory Board, with Mr. Edison as its head and con- 
 
40 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 taining a large number of eminent inventors and scientists wliom It was 
 tliouglit could contribute something to tlie national defense. 
 
 They immediately began to mal<e suggestions, some of them very wise and 
 helpful, but in the meantime, Europe was standing by with its spelling book 
 in hand. As fast as they learned to spell one word, Europe propounded an- 
 other, and so this board was driven from its simple and elementary task of 
 merely suggesting ingenious and newly invented devices to the Navy, and it 
 began to realize what I have suggested, that the whole Industrial and com- 
 mercial forces of the Nation had to be organized. And so they appointed a 
 committee of which Mr. Coffin is the chairman, a man who has done perhaps 
 the greatest service that has been done for America by any private citizen In 
 the last 50 years. 
 
 After stating that we must have this great continental empire of 
 ours so organized tha-t every part of it will be intimately corelated 
 with every other part, so as to summon at a touch every part of the 
 Nation for the general defense, he goes on to say : 
 
 I do not know how many of you know what' has been doae, but Mr. Coffin 
 has organized a connnittee. He is himself an automobile engineer, manufac- 
 turer, and expert, a man with large business relations and who knows the 
 manufacturing business from the private side. He has organized his com- 
 mittee and taken up correspondence with 30,000 manufacturers in this country 
 having an annual output of $100,000 or more, and has put to them a series 
 of questions aimed to determine the uses to which those plants could be put 
 in the time of a national emergency, and seeking to find out what the spirit 
 is of the men who operate those plants and own them, as to whether they 
 would be willing to join in a preparedness partnership with the Federal Gov- 
 ernment, so as to organize their private business as not to interfere with its 
 normal operation in peace time, but to put it upon a basis such that in the 
 event of a great national peril all that would be necessary would be to touch 
 a button somewhere in Washington and all those industries, scattered through- 
 out the land, would instantly cease to have the private idea, cease to have the 
 individual idea, and take their places in a coordinated system of national pro- 
 duction for the common defense of the kind that they call preparedness on the 
 other side. Now, this committee of Mr. Coffin has submitted a great list of 
 questions to manufacturers. It has seemed to probe intotheir private business, 
 has asked questions which the ordinary business man conceals from his com- 
 petitor. It has been in a sense an inquisition into private business ; and yet I 
 delight to be able to tell you that the response has been instant and filled with 
 high patriotic promise. Manufacturers throughout the country everywhere 
 have scheduled their businesses and their assets and laid down on paper the 
 possibilities of their plants, so that when that great census is tabulated, when 
 the results of it are summed up, we will have in Mr. Coffin's bureau an in- 
 dexed card catalogue of the industrial and manufacturing resources and 
 possibilities of the Nation. 
 
 Now, at the same time that that has been going on a couple of scientists, 
 closet men, men who burn the midnight oil, and whose names you don't know, 
 and whose names I can't tell you, because they are so modest they wont let 
 me tell it, have been maldng this kind of inventory and getting this kind of 
 information. They have been taking each product that is vital to the life 
 of the Nation and scheduling its integral parts, as, for instance, a chemical 
 compound which might be necessary to the life of the Nation. They are finding 
 out of what ingredients it is made, whence those ingredients can be procured, 
 
THE INDUSTRIAL PEEPAEEDNESS CAMPAIGN. 41 
 
 and how they can be put together, and they are making great illustrative 
 'sheets, so that if we came to a time of stress and the Government, acting for 
 us, should desire, for instance, to have smokeless powder — I use a war-material 
 Illustration, although their Inventory covers the materials of peace as well as 
 of war — it turns over a leaf and finds that it is made of nitric acid and cotton. 
 It finds that cotton is one of the staple products of the country and therefore 
 there need be no worry about it. It finds that nitric acid is made of Chile 
 saltpeter, so that if our communication with Chile were interrupted we would 
 have to rely upon our accumulated supplies of Chile saltpeter. And then 
 they give the substitutes. If we can't get Chile saltpeter, nitric acid can be 
 made out of ammonia liquor, which is a product of ammonia — we find this in 
 the chart — and then it is passed over a nest of heated platinum wires in order 
 to get the nitric acid out of it. And we find the weak point to be the appor- 
 tioning of the ammonia liquor. We find other processes enumerated, the one 
 known as the cyanamid process, and the so-called arc process, and on that chart 
 we have exactly what the Nation's possibilities are. We know where our main 
 reliance is; we know that if that is cut ofE our next best step is to do it In 
 this fashion ; and if that is prevented or is not adequate, that the next step is 
 in another direction. All the way through our industrial and commercial life, 
 not only In war material but those needed in daily life, we find this series of 
 charts, tracing the materials and combinations, pointing out the weak spots, 
 pointing out the substitutes, and sometimes the actual number of days neces- 
 sary to produce certain parts of highly organized and intricate machines. So 
 that we are having a more complete inventory of our national resources along 
 those lines than perhaps most men in this country knew was being prepared. 
 
 And then Congress has responded to that. It has put into one of the Army 
 bills a provision for a Council of National Defense. I rather regret that its 
 name has the defense idea so prominently in It. My brother Houston will 
 recall that when we were discussing names we all took a turn at it, and we 
 finally decided on a name very much more complicated than that — the council 
 of executive Information — and we found out what we meant by it by looking 
 in the dictionary. When we sent that suggestion down to Congress they were 
 too busy to consult the dictionary and decided to take a name they could under- 
 stand without looking it up. And so they provided by law for a Council of 
 National Defense, to consist of the Secretaries of the Navy, of Agriculture, of 
 Commerce, of Labor, of the Interior, and of War, and they are to have an 
 advisory council of citizens, to be appointed by the President because of their 
 peculiar eminence in and their knowledge of the great fundamental and staple 
 industries and commercial undertakings of the Nation. 
 
 Now, when that body is organized it Is to take over and keep up the work 
 which Mr. Coffin has been doing, the work which these individual scientists 
 have been doing, and there will be established down. in Washington a central 
 bureau with an adequate complement of experts and clerical assistants to 
 keep this information up to date, so that it will be a reliable datum when we 
 come to need it. 
 
 At the first meeting of the council a plan of organization of the 
 council was formulated and adopted similar to that used by the Com- 
 mittee of Industrial Preparedness of the Naval Consulting Board. 
 Each of the seven civilian members of the Advisory Commission was 
 made the chairman of a subcommittee. 
 
 The work of the Committee of Industrial Preparedness of the 
 Naval Consulting Board was carried forward on a much broader 
 
42 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 scale by the subcommittee on Munitions and Manufacturing of the 
 Council of National Defense, of which Mr. Howard E. Coffin was 
 made the chairman. On December 12, 1916, some 18,654 industrial 
 inventories and steel filing cases of material, together with a con- 
 siderable portion of the working personnel of the New York office 
 of the Committee of Preparedness was moved bodily to Washington, 
 the material being sent down on an express car, and one of the officers 
 of the organization traveling with it. 
 
 The data contained in the inventories had been classified and 
 iabulated and were first used in the report of the board of Army 
 officers, headed by Col. Francis J. Kernan, United States Army, on 
 Government manufacture of arms, munitions, and equipment, dated 
 January 4, 1917, and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs 
 of the United States Senate, same having been printed by the Gov- 
 ernment Printing Office and numbered Docuiflent 664. After the 
 declaration of war, the data in these files were used by the various 
 committees and boards of the council and by the various purchasing 
 divisions of the War and Na^'y Departments. New reports and 
 inventories were being constantly received by the Council of National 
 Defense and the information kept up to date and made available to 
 the Government organizations in need of it. 
 
 Although the Council of National Defense, as set forth above, was 
 authorized by act of Congress August 29, 1916, the appointments to 
 the council were not made until some time in November, and the 
 first meeting, as above set forth, was held December 11, 1916. 
 
 Briefly, the aim of the council and its agencies was to serve as a 
 channel through which the best professional and industrial intelli- 
 gence of the country could make itself most effectively valuable to 
 the Government departments. Necessarily, much of the accomplish- 
 ment implied in such a function had to be carried through by 
 personal contact in the smoothing out of the serious obstacles in 
 the war machinery and to coordinate the governmental and in- 
 dustrial systems of the Nation. 
 
 Although it was not generally recognized, the Council of National 
 Defense was, in fact, the War Cabinet of the administration. The 
 Secretaries of War, Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and 
 Labor that made up the personnel of the council were the executive 
 heads of the various departments which they represented. They 
 were, therefore, in a position to execute, through the machinery of 
 their various departments, the plans which were brought forth in 
 the meetings held by the council itself and its Advisory Commission 
 of seven members. 
 
 The usual procedure, through which action was initiated by the 
 Council of National Defense, was for the Advisory Commission to 
 meet and pass resolutions, recommending to the council, composed 
 
5?HE iNdIjsteiaL preparedness campaign. 4S 
 
 of Cabinet officers, as above described, that certain action be taken. 
 After discussion of such resolutions, either by the council sitting 
 as such, or in a joint meeting of the council and Advisory Commis- 
 sion, the council, if it concurred with the resolution of the com- 
 mission, passed a resolution recommending to the executive depart- 
 ment of the Government interested or involved the action recom- 
 mended by the Advisory Commission. 
 
 As a matter of fact, a resolution passed by the Council of Na- 
 tional Defense stood second only in importance to an Executive 
 order of the President of the United States. It was practically the 
 act of the Cabinet without the President being present. The Presi- 
 dent of the United States was not present at these meetings and 
 did not make it a necessary requisite of action that he be consulted 
 or taken into consideration in the resolutions passed by the council. 
 The Secretary of Was, however, as chairman of the council, con- 
 sulted the President upon matters of importance. 
 
 The governmental departments represented in the council did not 
 have the necessary business experience or information, or the men 
 of proper training for the work involved in conducting the war. 
 The Advisory Commission supplied this deficiency and focused upon 
 the problems knowledge based upon lifetime experience in industry, 
 together with a knowledge of men and affairs and the confidence 
 and good will of the country. 
 
 The Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense 
 might be likened to the clutch of the machine. They connected up 
 the country at large with the executive mechanism, the executive 
 mechanism being the governmental machine, represented by the Sec- 
 retaries of War, Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor. 
 This clutch (the Advisory Commission) was the mechanism which 
 set the country in motion for the purpose of winning the war. 
 
 The law is very clear and explicit and does not permit the Gov- 
 ernment to accept the services of any man without compensation. 
 It says, " Nor shall any department or any officer of the Govern- 
 ment accept voluntary service for the Government, or employ per- 
 sonal service in excess of that authorized by law, except in cases 
 of sudden emergency involving a loss of human life or the destruc- 
 tion of property." This was passed on February 27, 1906, and it 
 is found on page 49, section 3, volume 34, of the Statutes at Large. 
 
 This statute was largely instrumental in giving rise to that great 
 class of voluntary civilian workers which cooperated with the Coun- 
 cil of National Defense, known as " doUar-a-year men." 
 
 The creation of the Council of National Defense bridged over the 
 chaotic period and a period of inadequacy and lack of proper organi- 
 zation and personnel to handle a terrific job. Take, for instance, a 
 good manufacturing concern; it is doing big things to double its 
 
44 NAVAL CONSULTING BOAfiD OF TfiE UNITED STATES. 
 
 capacity in a year, but the War Department was asked to multiply 
 itself so many times that it was a stupendous undertaking. Many of 
 the men who did the preliminary work under the Council of National 
 Defense were later absorbed in the Army and Navy. 
 
 The declaration of war brought about the growth of numerous 
 war organizations and stimulated existing civic, benevolent, and 
 patriotic societies to undertake activities related to the war. All 
 of these organizations naturally turned to Washington for informa- 
 tion and advice, and the office of the Council of National Defense 
 was besieged with requests of one kind or another. It became 
 obvious that decentralization was necessary and that the work of 
 these organizations should be directed by some central body in each 
 State. On the other hand, it was equally necessary that there be 
 some centralizing organization at Washington to act as a clearing 
 house between the States, to make the services of the organization in 
 the several States available to the various branches of the Federal 
 Government. To meet this need, on April 9, 1917, the Secretary of 
 War, in his capacity of chairman of the Council of National Defense, 
 issued to the governors of all the States and to the Commissioners of 
 the District of Columbia a request to create State councils of defense 
 or similar committees, with broad powers, representative of the 
 resources, industries, and activities of each State to cooperate with 
 the National Council. The method of organization was patterned 
 after the organization of the Committee of Industrial Preparedness 
 of the Naval Consulting Board. 
 
 Following this action, a conference was held in Washington on 
 May 2, 1917, and remained in session for two days. Every State 
 in the Union sent representatives, among whom were the governors 
 of 12 States. The conference was opened by the chairman of the 
 Council of National Defense, and was later addressed at the White 
 House by the President of the United States. 
 
 Frank and thoroughgoing explanation of the outstanding needs 
 of the Nation in the prosecution of the war with Germany was 
 given to the State representatives and a specific outline was made as 
 to how the State defense activities could best be linked up with the 
 work of the Federal Government in the most intelligent and efficient 
 coordination for the Nation's defense. 
 
 Within four weeks of the conference State councils had been 
 organized in nearly every State. By the end of June this national 
 chain of State councils of defense had been completed. In all States 
 the councils were created by appointment of the governor or by act 
 of the legislature, and the members were chosen on a nonpartisan 
 basis, representing the various interests of the State. 
 
 Under the State organizations county and other subsidiary coun- 
 cils of defense were organized and in some cases even extending 
 
THE INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS CAMPAIGN, 45 
 
 to townships and municipalities. It was found that local councils 
 which knew the local conditions were better able to undertake work 
 in which personal touch or an understanding of local conditions was 
 of value. These State councils rendered effective aid to the Commer- 
 cial Economy Board to eliminate the return of unsold bread and 
 helped materially to eliminate this wasteful practice, which assisted 
 the Department of Agriculture to increase the food supply; it 
 assisted the Department of Labor in the organization of the Boys' 
 Working Eeserve and in the building of a system of labor exchanges ; 
 the Treasury Department used the organization of State councils to 
 float the first Liberty loan of 1917. 
 
 The method that the council used for getting results was to 
 create a committee on a particular subject, which it selected from 
 well-known men in the manufacturing and business world. These 
 men were then charged with the responsibility of organizing the 
 particular field" in which they worked and were masters of, for war 
 purposes. As a type of thing which the Council of National Defense 
 was doing each day might be mentioned the Committee on Emer- 
 gency Construction. Numerous cantonments had to be constructed 
 in order to provide for the training and housing of troops, and 
 numerous additions had to be made to Government arsenals and 
 other manufacturing concerns engaged in the production of war 
 materials and supplies. Immediately it became apparent that the 
 ordinary method of advertising for bids and awarding the contract 
 to the lowest bidder could not be followed, because of the necessity 
 of getting the work under way at once, prior to the developments 
 of completed plans and specifications which could be used as a basis 
 for competitive estimates. In other words, construction and design 
 would have to go concurrently, especially since the sites for these 
 cantonments had not even been determined. Since no form of Gov- 
 ernment contract met this situation, a new form had to be devel- 
 oped: (a) Inquiries were sent to the leading architectural firms 
 throughout the country; (6) to the chief engineers of leading rail- 
 roads; (e) to engineers of naval stations of the Government; (d) to 
 a selected list of members of the American Society of Civil Engi- 
 neers. In all, some 3,000 inquiry blanks were sent out. 
 
 Lists were made from the returns, which were cross indexed and 
 further subdivided as regards localities and magnitude of opera- 
 tions which, through experience, the various contractors were quali- 
 fied to undertake. The credit rating of the concerns and other infor- 
 mation was added to that received on the inquiry blank. From 
 every available source the list of contractors was expanded and 
 information built up until the committee had in hand probably the 
 most complete survey of the contracting field that has ever been 
 made. From these lists, as the various cantonment sites were 
 
46 NAVAl, CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 selected, recommendations of contractors were made by the com- 
 mittee at the request of the Quartermaster's Department, and upon 
 their being approved by the General Munitions Board of the Council 
 of National Defense the awards of contracts were made. 
 
 In April and May, 1917, the question of the construction of the 
 cantonments confronted the War Department, and Col. I. W. Littell 
 was assigned by the Secretary of War to take charge of cantonment 
 construction. The Committee on Emergency Construction of the 
 Council of National Defense immediately set about to assist him in 
 building up an organization, an engineering division to develop 
 plans and specifications, an administration division to direct actual 
 construction of cantonments in the" field, a purchasing division to 
 mobilize the enormous quantity of material required in connectipn 
 with cantonment construction (the providing of proper transporta- 
 tion facilities, etc.), and a finance division to keep the complex 
 accounts necessitated by the size of the operation. The committee 
 further suggested the names of various men who seemed to them 
 particularly fitted to head the different departments of this work. 
 The suggestions were largely accepted and the chart of the organiza- 
 tion was drawn up under Col. Littcll's direction and submitted to the 
 Secretary of War and approved by him. 
 
 This was in Maj', 1917, at which time the commissioned personnel 
 of the division consisted of only three officers. This step was recom- 
 mended by the General Staff, acting in accordance with the advice 
 of civilian construction experts on the Council of National Defense. 
 
 One year later the personnel of this division had grown to 263 
 officers and 1,100 civilians in Washington — the best constructors, en- 
 gineers, draftsmen, managers, purchasing agents, and other special- 
 ists obtainable by the Government; there were hundreds of other 
 officers and civilian experts in the field for this organization ; it had 
 an enlisted personnel of some 16,000 men and employed over 200,000 
 laborers and craftsmen. 
 
 An investigation of the sites selected for cantonments was made 
 and another subcommittee appointed through which an appeal was 
 made to engineers, town planners, and sanitary engineers to aid in 
 studying the conditions at each cantonment site and submit a report 
 thereon. They studied particularly transportation facilities, topog- 
 raphy, water supply, and sewage disposal and actively cooperated 
 with Col. Littell and the engineering organization in solving the 
 problems that the reports brought in. 
 
 When the construction of cantonments began, representatives of 
 the different industries were called to Washington by the Council 
 of National Defense and requested to organize in such a way that 
 the Government could deal as nearly as might be with a single 
 
*HE INDUSTKIAL PEEPABEDNESS CAMPAIGN. 47 
 
 individual representing that whole industry. The Government was 
 thus put quickly in touch with all lines of the building business. 
 The subcommittee also prepared a report dealing with the form of 
 the Government contract with engineering concerns. It was an 
 effort to standardize the business arrangement for engineers pre- 
 cisely as matters had been standardized for the engagtoent of con- 
 tractors. 
 
 The above is described at length in order to give an idea of the 
 character of the work which the subcommittees of the Council of 
 National Defense performed. Annexed hereto is a list of the com- 
 mittees of the Council of National Defense, which shows how far- 
 reaching the activities of the council and its subcommittees- were. 
 
 Subordinate bodies of the Council of National Defense were Air- 
 craft Production Board, Committee on Coal Production, Commer- 
 cial Economy Board, Committee on Shipping, Committee on 
 Women's Defense Work, International Advisory Committee, General 
 Munitions Board, Munitions Standards Board, Section on Coopera- 
 tion with States, and Committee on Inland Waterways. 
 
 Committees of, and cooperating with, Advisory Commission were 
 those on Telegraphs and Telephones; Eailroad Transportation; 
 Cars; Locomotives; Electric Eailroad Transportation; Gas and 
 Electric Service; Automotive Transport; National Industrial Con- 
 ference Board, Supplies; Cotton Goods; Woolen Manufactures; 
 Shoe and Leather Industries ; Knit Goods ; Leather Equipment ; 
 Mattresses and Pillows ; Canned Goods ; Alcohol ; Aluminum ; As- 
 bestos, Magnesia, and Roofing ; Brass ; Cement ; Chemicals ; Copper ; 
 Lead ; Lumber ; Mica ; Nickel ; Steel and Steel Products ; Oil ; Rubber ; 
 Wool ; Zinc ; Engineering and Education ; Labor ; and General Medi- 
 cal Board. 
 
 Subcommittees of General Medical Board of Council of National 
 Defense were those on State Activities and Examinations, Legisla- 
 tion, Hygiene and Sanitation, Statistics, Public Health Nursing, 
 Research, Dentistry, Medical Schools, Publicity, Hospitals, Surgical 
 Methods, Subcommittee on Shell Shock, Special Editorial Commit- 
 tee, Cooperative Committee of Manufacturers, Committee on Stand- 
 ardization of Medical and Surgical Supplies, and Equipment. 
 
 Before we became involved in the war, in the spring of 1916, a 
 meeting of the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics, for 
 which an appropriation was carried in the naval bill, was held at 
 the Smithsonian Institution at Washington, which was presided 
 over by Dr. Charles D. Walcott, Secretary of the Smithsonian In- 
 stitution. At this meeting the aircraft situation, from a military 
 and naval standpoint, was presented. There were present Navy and 
 Army officers and members of many industrial concerns engaged 
 
48 NAVAL CONSULTING BOAKD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 in motor, automobile, and aircraft production. At this meeting 
 there was discussed the needs of the aeronautical industry and it 
 was suggested that the automobile engineers concentrate upon the 
 design and production of aircraft engines and study generally the 
 problems involved in the development of the aeronautical art. 
 
 Shortly after this meeting in 1916, Mr. Howard E. Coffin's name 
 was used as a focal point for getting together the diversified in- 
 terests involved in aircraft work. It was realized that to make this 
 industry a dependable industry in any war-making program, all 
 factional and legal disagreements must be smoothed out and the 
 manufacturers welded together in a strong business association or 
 organization. 
 
 Under the auspices of the Aero Club of America, the first aero- 
 nautical exposition was held on January 19, 1917. During the ex- 
 position various meetings were held with a view to accomplishing 
 the desired results. First, the possible extension of the National 
 Automobile Chamber of Commerce to include aircraft manufac- 
 turers and the change of its society's name to the " National Auto- 
 motive Chamber of Commerce " ; second, the organization of the 
 manufacturers of the aircraft field into an independent association 
 of their own. To this end committees were appointed, both by the 
 aircraft manufacturers and by the National Automobile Chamber 
 of Commerce, to confer together on this proposal. It seemed to 
 be the opinion of all concerned at the moment that an independent 
 association should be formed — the Manufacturers' Aircraft Associa- 
 tion resulted. Likewise the subsequent agreement upon a cross- 
 licensing policy, based upon an existing agreement in force in the 
 motor-car field. Through this accomplishment a firm business 
 foundation was laid for the subsequent development of the aircraft 
 industry and a single point of contact provided through which the 
 Government could obtain cooperation and support in meeting its 
 needs. 
 
 Mr. Coffin was very active in these matters, and as a result Dr. 
 Charles D. Walcott, chairman of the National Advisory Committee 
 for Aeronautics, requested by letter that the Council of National 
 Defense create an Aircraft Board with Mr. Coffin as Chairman. 
 Mr. Coffin's first act in assuming the chairmanship of this committee 
 was to appoint other members of the committee and to push for- 
 ward and advise concerning the plans for the increase of the air 
 forces of the Military and Naval Establishments. 
 
 An architect of Detroit was called in immediately to coordinate 
 the ideas of the departments relative to the construction and equip- 
 ment of training fields for aviators, and plans prepared under his 
 direction were immediately turned over for construction. Ground 
 was broken on the first fields in the month of May, 1917, and the 
 
THE INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS CAMPAIGN. 
 
 49 
 
 rUNCTIONS AND RELATIONS OF THE AIRCRAFT BOARD. 
 
 [Public Document No. 48— 65th Congress.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 — 
 
 PRESIDENT. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 - SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
 
 
 
 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 AIRC 
 
 RAF 
 
 T BO.^ 
 
 lRD. 
 
 
 
 i 
 
 AR 
 
 MY 
 
 
 Advisory 
 
 and clearing 
 
 
 NAVY 
 
 
 i 
 
 DEPARTMENTS. 
 
 
 bouse functions only. 
 
 , No administrative or 
 executive powers, by 
 
 
 BUREAUS. 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 opinion of Judge Advo- 
 cate Genera) ol the 
 
 
 - 
 
 
 
 
 All administrative and execu- 
 
 
 
 All administrative and execu- 
 
 
 
 tive powers relating to 
 Army aircraft program. 
 
 
 
 
 tive powers relating to 
 ■ Navy aircraft program. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 PBRBONNBL. 
 
 Representing Army. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 All technical and engineering work: 
 
 
 All technical and engineering work: 
 
 Selection of planes and motors. 
 
 Mai. Gen. Geo. 0. Squier. 
 
 
 Selection of planes and motors. 
 
 supply of specifications, designs, 
 
 
 
 supply of specifications, designs, 
 
 and manufacturing information. 
 
 Col.Robt. L.Montgomery. 
 
 
 and manufacturing information. 
 
 Contracting: 
 
 Representing Naty. 
 
 
 Contracting: 
 
 All contracts for engines, aircraft. 
 
 
 
 All contracts for engines, aircraft, . 
 
 accesaories, and materials. 
 
 Capt. N. E. Irwin. 
 
 
 accessories, and materials. 
 
 Accounting: 
 
 Lieut. Com. A. K. Atkins. 
 
 
 Accounting: 
 
 Disbursement of all funds. 
 
 Cim'liana. 
 
 
 Disbursement of all funds. 
 
 Production: 
 
 Howard E. Coffin. 
 
 
 Production: 
 
 Administration of contracts. 
 
 Harry B. Thayer. 
 
 
 Administratidn of contracts. 
 
 Inspection: 
 
 Acceptance or rejection of mate- 
 
 Functions of officer 
 
 
 Inspection: 
 
 Acceptance or rejection of mate- 
 
 rials and manufactured products. 
 
 character, namely. 
 
 
 rials and manufactured products. 
 
 Military uses: 
 Training. 
 Active service. 
 
 advisory as mem- 
 bers of the Board, 
 and executive as 
 heads of the Army 
 
 
 Naval uses: 
 Training. 
 Active service. 
 
 ApjJTOpriations: $640,000,000. (Approx.) 
 
 and Navy Depart- 
 ments. 
 Functions of civilian 
 
 
 Appropriationa: $60,000,000- (Approx.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 members advisory 
 
 
 • 
 
 only. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Appropriation: $100,000. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 168537°— 20- 
 
50 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 first group of fields was in the service of the Government by July 
 15, 1917. 
 
 The Boiling Commission consisted of 103 men and was sent to- 
 Europe to study the aircraft requirements of the Army and Navy^ 
 this commission landing overseas approximately July 1, 1-917. These, 
 activities were some of the earliest of any of the activities of the 
 War Department, it being remembered that the United States went 
 to war with Germany April 6, 1917. 
 
 The effort of the committees was to build up existing govern- 
 mental agencies and to bring to them the best thought of the indus- 
 trial world. The policies and mechanics to put them into operation- 
 were visualized and the governmental departments urged to adopt 
 them. In some instances the personnel was directed to operate them 
 from within the service. 
 
 The Council of National Defense was therefore the mainspHng; 
 of many, in fact most, of the policies which affected the economic 
 and industrial life of the civilian population of the United States. 
 during the war, with the possible exception of the food control,, 
 which, as set forth later, came under Mr. Herbert Hoover. 
 
 The Food Administration was first evolved as the Committee on. 
 Commercial Economy of the Council of National Defense, under 
 A. W. Shaw. About February, 1917, Mr. Herbert Hoover wasr 
 called before the Council of National Defense in order to learn as. 
 to the food problems concerning the country in the preparation for- 
 war. A resolution was passed by the Council of National Defense 
 recalling him from Europe to take charge of the food-conservation 
 activities upon authority of the council. Mr. Hoover, however, very 
 soon saw that the only way that he could handle the situation was-, 
 to get his power direct from the President, in place of being subject 
 to the Council of National Defense and being subject to certain, 
 limitations which would necessarily be imposed through the fact, 
 that the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Com- 
 merce were both concerned in the administration of the food control, 
 and it was very much better for him to have absolute authority over- 
 this matter. This arrangement avoided any conflict that might have- 
 come about through there being three departments concerned with 
 the administration of food — the Department of Agriculture, De- 
 partment of Commerce, and any department that Mr. Hoover might 
 organize to administer the matter. Mr. Hoover was therefore ap- 
 pointed by the President and was directly responsible to him. 
 
 It is interesting to note that on' February 28, 1917, the Council of 
 National Defense, which, as set forth above, was the outgrowth of 
 the industrial preparedness campaign of the Naval Consulting 
 Board, adopted the National Research Council as its Department. 
 
THE INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS CAMPAIGN. 
 
 51 
 
 of Science and Research. The National Research Council had 
 been organized in April, 1916, by the National Academy of Sciences 
 at the request of the President of the United States to organize the 
 scientific resources of the United States in the interest of national 
 security and welfare. 
 
 On February 15, 1917, the Naval Consulting Board was adopted 
 by the council as the Board of Inventions for the Council of Na- 
 tional Defense. By this arrangement there became a diilerentiation 
 between scientific research and inventions, although inventions are 
 frequently the outgrowth of scientific research, particularly where- 
 the arts have reached their highly developed state, as they had at 
 the time of the declaration of war. 
 
 The Council of National Defense therefore became the parent 
 body of these numerous organizations, which it created and connected, 
 up with the war machine. There was overlapping of authority and. 
 responsibility in many instances, especially in the beginning, but a& 
 time went on each organization became more specialized and its 
 duties more clearlj^ defined. From somewhat nebulous organizations, 
 which were created in the beginning, the governmental departments- 
 of the Army and Navy drew succor and support and built up their 
 own organization by commissioning in the service men who were 
 first brought to Washington to perform certain functions for the 
 Council of National Defense. As the Army and Navy grew in 
 strength and personnel, it was, in many instances, largely recruited, 
 at least, from sources made available by the Council of National De- 
 fense. The activities of some of the committees that were most 
 closely allied with the Army and Navy and should have been almost a 
 part of their organization were somewhat diminished in authority 
 and responsibility with the corresponding increase in personnel and 
 of the authority and responsibility in the Army and Navy Depart- 
 ments, which practically took over the working organizations which 
 had been created by the committees. 
 
 The inside history of some of the things of far-reaching in;por- 
 tance are most interesting. For instance, the first British mission 
 to this country came to be sent in this way : 
 
 Lord Northcliffe's confidential man in the United States, Mr^ 
 Pomeroy Burton, on or about April 2, 1917, asked Mr. Howard 
 Coffin, of the Council of National Defense, what ought to be douB to' 
 help out the situation. Mr. Coffin told him that by far the best thing: 
 England could do would be to send a comprehensive mission to this 
 country at once and tell us what to do. Mr. Burton said to Mr. 
 Coffin : " Will you take the responsibility of authorizing me to cdm- 
 municate with Lord Northcliffe on this matter?" Men like Mr.. 
 Coffin, in those days, did not care how much responsibility they as- 
 sumed so long as the work for winning the war went forward^ and it 
 
52 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 was due to men with this point of view that America prepared as 
 tapidly as she did. 
 
 The following telegrams were then exchanged between Mr. 
 Pomeroy Burton and Lord Northcliffe: 
 
 [To Lord Northcliffe.] 
 
 New York, April 2. 
 I am authorized by Howard Coffin, prominent member Council of National 
 Defense, to send personal dispatch to make clear that this body most anxious 
 arrange immediate exchange of commissions of experts on war problems now 
 arising here on such matters as control of raw materials ; contracts ; labor 
 problems; restriction output; dilution of labor; women labor enlistment; 
 training, housing, clothing, equipping of troops ; care of dependents ; transpor- 
 tation ; subsistence ; transport ; medical, hospital, and relief work ; voluntary 
 organization, etc., idea being that this great Nation, with wealth of material 
 and man power, lacks efficiency and organization which allied nations have se- 
 cured through actual war experience past two years. Proposed that American 
 experts be sent to France and England and English and French experts be 
 sent here in quickest possible time, starting this week if possible, cutting red 
 tape, and getting ahead with the work ; extremely desirable that a few men 
 nice Montague of Munitions Department and Le Bas here at once ; publicity end 
 regarded as highly important ; also best English and French authorities latest 
 aeroplane construction and training; whole spirit of National Defense Council, 
 which represents liest organizing brains of country, is to arrange for quick 
 consultation on these and other important matters. Council feels strongly 
 that Instant and decisive action Is desired which will provide it with knowl- 
 edge as to exactly where and how the United States can be of greatest possible 
 inunediate effectiveness in war. Do y(m feel like making their wishes clear in. 
 Informal way. cable me Plaza Hotel, New York, soon as possible, what steps 
 will be taken. Coffin has read and approved this cablegram, also Keeley. 
 
 PoMEnoY Burton. 
 
 London, April Jf, 1917. 
 FoMEROY Burton, Plaza, N. Y. 
 
 Your cable is before war cabinet this Wednesday morning. 
 
 NoRTHCr.IFFE. 
 
 London, April Jf, 1917. 
 PoMEROY Burton, Pla::a. N. 7. 
 
 Prime Minister instantly sending strong mission dealing with all subjects 
 mentioned in cable. 
 
 Northcliffe. 
 
 New York, April Ji, 1917. 
 L,ORD Northcliffe, Timen, London. 
 
 England's prompt action immensely appreciated Washington. 
 
 Burton. 
 When the British Commission came to this country, headed by 
 the Hon. Arthur James Balfour, a joint meeting was arranged of 
 the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense and 
 the Balfour Mission, the Secretary of War presiding. The personnel 
 of this joint meeting was divided into groups, the members of the 
 
THE INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS CAMPAIGN, 53 
 
 A^dvisory Commission and the members of the visiting delegation 
 being assigned to work with the various Army officers concerned with 
 each phase of the program. The ordnance experts of the Balfour 
 Mission were assigned to the Ordnance Department, etc. From that 
 time on there were many group meetings and the information which 
 the British Mission imparted to those concerned with managing the 
 war in America was largely done in these group meetings. Un- 
 doubtedly the information which was brought over by the British 
 Mission and communicated to the Council of National Defense in 
 this manner and to the Army and Navy officers interested influenced 
 many activities in regard to our forces. 
 
 Another instance of the taking of responsibility by members of the 
 Advisory Commission was as follows: 
 
 One of the members received late one Saturday afternoon a tele- 
 gram from the chief engineer of the Vaterland saying " half a million 
 dollars worth of munition tool equipment, which has been stored at 
 the Hamburg- American docks, has been stolen," the inference being 
 it had been gotten out of the way so it could not be used. It being 
 Saturdaj' afternoon, the cabinet officers of the council were not in 
 their offices, so he called the War Department and the War Depart- 
 ment said that they did not want to take charge of it. The Navy 
 Department said it was a Treasury matter, and the Treasury Depart- 
 ment washed its hands of it entirely. No one would do anything, so 
 he wired Mr. Malone, collector of the port of New York, wired the 
 admiral in charge of the Brooklyn Navy Yard, and wired the chief 
 engineer of the vessel to get in touch with these men, and wired them 
 to work it out with him. Then copies of the wires were sent to all 
 the departments, and three weeks later the War Department told him 
 that the action was exactly right. 
 
 The evolution of the War Labor Board was also interesting. This 
 grew out of the Council of National Defense from the National In- 
 dustrial Conference Board. A committee of this latter board, which 
 consisted of Messrs. Osborne, Vandervoort, Barr, and Smith, was 
 appointed at Mr. Coffin's request for general discussion pertaining to 
 labor and capital. These men went before their boards of directors 
 and put the whole labor situation up to them and got them to appoint 
 this committee of five men. The Council of National Defense later 
 called a meeting of the National Industrial Conference Board and 
 probably 100 of their number came to Washington and met in the 
 office of the Secretary of War, presenting their side of the labor ques- 
 tion. They came in and said, " Here, the war is on ; we will do any- 
 thing the Government wants, and will set aside restrictions and regu 7 
 lations of all kinds," and from this conference there was evolved the 
 idea that no labor situation would be disturbed during the war. This 
 
54 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 was one of the first steps made during the war toward getting 
 employer and employee together. 
 
 There originated in the Council of National Defense also the regu- 
 lations for restricting the use of gas and electric service, electric 
 signs, and cutting down the use of coal by the citizens of the United 
 States during the war. The Council of National Defense also organ- 
 ized the transportation interests of the country, and this was the first 
 step in what later became governmental direction of the railroads 
 under the Treasury Department. 
 
 The evolution of the War Industries Board, which was also an 
 outgrowth of the Council of National Defense, was very interesting. 
 It will be recalled that this board expanded into an immense insti- 
 tution before the war closed and occupied a large building in Wash- 
 ington. It was first called " The Munitions Committee of the Coun- 
 cil of National Defense" and was created June 3, 1916. This 
 '• Munitions Committee " was really an amalgamation of several 
 committees into the General Munitions Board. Mr. Frank Scott, 
 -who was chairman of the Ohio State committee on industrial pre- 
 paredness, was its chairman. Upon this committee there were some 
 25 men; it met every morning, and practically every one of the 
 divisions of the Army and Navy Departments sent representatives 
 to its meetings. All contracts of the Army and Navy Departments 
 were cleared by this board on those commodities where any danger 
 point existed, the danger point being the source of supply or quan- 
 tity of supply. A list was maintained of those commodi.ties which 
 could be purchased freely and on which there was no liability ot 
 restriction or conflict between the departments, and another list in 
 which there was danger of difficulty upon those scores, in which 
 latter event any purchases made by any department had to be dis- 
 cussed and cleared by this General Board. This work became so 
 important that the War Industries Board was later, by Executive 
 order, given power directly from the President. 
 
 Mr. Bernard Baruch, formerly chairman of the Raw Material 
 Division of the Council of National Defense, became its chairman. 
 This- board carried on the work of the industrial preparedness cam- 
 paign and became the custodian of the inventories which were taken 
 by the engineers of the country, as heretofore set forth. These inven- 
 tories were supplemented, complemented, and expanded by that 
 board. 
 
 Therefore this board and the Council of National Defense and 
 Army and Navy officers of the Procurement Division of the service 
 were brought in contact with the producing resources of the country, 
 which prior to the creation of the Council of National Defense was 
 almost impossible on account of the prohibition of officers from 
 
THE INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS CAMPAIGN. 55 
 
 Sbecoming too actively associated with business interests of the 
 country. 
 
 The name " Council of National Defense " was given to the 
 parent organization at a time when it would not have been possible 
 to have called such an organization by a more appropriate name, 
 and this also led to confusion in the public mind as to its authority 
 and responsibility. Its authority was broad, because the men who 
 composed it were men of strong personality and understanding and 
 jnade their powers broad enough to fill the gap that was necessary 
 to be filled between the Army and Navy and the industrial life of 
 the country, and at this writing we are almost too close to the achieve- 
 ihents of the Council of National Defense to appreciate the im- 
 portance and magnitude of the work which it so successfully ac- 
 complished. 
 
 It is also very difficult to realize that by the act of Secretary 
 Daniels in creating the Naval Consulting Board there should be set 
 in motion such a tremendous campaign for the preparing of the 
 country for war which would result in the formation of a body 
 such as the Council of National Defense, the Advisory Commission of 
 which was composed of such men as Howard E. Coffin, vice presi- 
 dent of the Hudson Motor Car Co. ; Daniel Willard, president of the 
 Baltimore & Ohio Railroad; Julius Rosenwald, president of Sears, 
 lioebuck Co. ; Bernard M. Baruch, banker ; Dr. Hollis Godfrey, presi- 
 denj; of the Drexel Institute; Samuel Gompers, president of the 
 American Federation of Labor ; and Dr. Franklin Martin, secretary- 
 general of the American College of Surgeons, Chicago, representing 
 business, transportatioii, banking, science, labor, and medicine, the 
 result being that the civilian structure which was evolved by the 
 United States for the conduct of the war, and which in realty was 
 the War Cabinet of the administration, should be determined in its 
 characteristic features by the industrial preparedness campaign of 
 the Naval Consulting Board. 
 
 Had the campaign not been conducted it is not at all unlikely that 
 other means, probably founded on political selection, would have 
 been evolved for doing this very important work. 
 
 Many people during the war were impressed with the fact that 
 politicians had very little to do with the handling of the immense 
 amount of business transacted by the United States Government, and 
 when one considers the character of the men composing the Council 
 of National Defense, their occupations and connections, it is readily 
 understood. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 Part 1. 
 
 FUEL OIL. 
 
 As pointed out in the chapter on " Organization," the TTaval Con- 
 sulting Board consisted of two representatives from each of the 
 large engineering societies of the United States. Some of them 
 Avere executives in the largest industrial organizations in tlie coun- 
 try, others were inventors, others scientists ; but they all had a wide 
 acquaintanceship in scientific, engineering, and business circles, and 
 it might not be unfair to say that they were capable of mobilizing 
 at any time all of the important engineering and scientific informa- 
 tion in regard to any particular industrial matter on which they 
 might seek information. 
 
 This power to coordinate and make available for the Navy Depart- 
 ment all engineering, scientific, and business information in regard 
 to the fuel-oil industry was well exemplified at a meeting in, the 
 spring of 1916. The Navy Department at that time was vitally 
 interested in the fuel-oil situation in the United States in its rela- 
 tion to the United States Navy, particularly in regard to the policy 
 which the Naval Establishment should follow in regard to the burn- 
 ing of fuel oil on the battleships and some pending legislation in 
 Congress in regard to the unpatented lands in the naval petroleum 
 reserves of the United States. This legislation, if enacted, would 
 practically abolish the naval petroleum reserves, and the Navy would 
 be forced to decide whether it should continue to build oil-burning 
 vessels which would depend, for their usefulness to country in the 
 time of danger, upon an uncertain supply of oil, or build fuel-burn- 
 ing vessels which would be admittedly inferior to those of the nation 
 that had a good control of the supply of oil. 
 
 The conference was initiated in the following manner: Early iit 
 1916 the Naval Consulting Board received a communication from 
 Eear Admiral John R. Edwards, chairman of the " Naval Oil Fuel 
 Board," asking for the members' cooperation in obtaining data on 
 fuel oil. 
 
 A special Committee on Fuel and Fuel Handling was appointed 
 to cooperate. Mr. Spencer Miller, a member of the Naval Consult- 
 56 
 
FUEL OIL. 57 
 
 ing Board, was made chairman of the committee with authority to 
 appoint others to serve on it. The other members of the committee 
 were Messrs. Addicks, Baekeland, Hunt, Maxim, Richards, Rob- 
 bins, Thayer. Whitney, and Webster. 
 
 The members of the Naval Fuel Oil Board were Rear Admiral 
 John R. Edwards (chairman), Lieut. Commander John Halli- 
 gan, jr., Lieut. Commander J. O. Richardson, Lieut. O. D. Conger, 
 and Lieut. F. W. Milner, all of the LTnitel States Navy. 
 
 The naval officers had prepared a questionnaire inquiring into the 
 supply of fuel oil, the storage of fuel oil, the transportation of fuel 
 oil, pipe lines for fuel oil, combustion of fuel oil under boilers, chem- 
 ists on fuel oil, the storage on a warship, the attitude of the British 
 Admiralty, specifications of purchase, and commercial consumers. 
 
 In general, the object of the questionnaire was to assist the Navy 
 Department in the solution of the many perplexing problems arising 
 in connection with the ever-increasing employment of fuel oil on 
 battleships, cruisers, dreadnaughts, and destroyers, and the situa- 
 tion was such as to warrant any patriotic citizen to lend such infor- 
 mation as he niight possess to the attainment of this object. 
 
 In all. there were some 8.5 questions thus prepared and immediate 
 answers to which were valuable, if not indispensable, to the Naval 
 Establishment. 
 
 The Naval Consulting Board proposed a joint conference, to be 
 held in New York, where there resided a number of oil-fuel spe- 
 cialists who could be immediately called together for an all-day 
 conference if held in the city of New York. On less than a week's 
 notice, a conference was held Saturday, July 1, 1916, in the Engineer- 
 ing Building, 29 West Thirty-ninth Street, New York. At this 
 conference, at which Mr. Spencer Miller presided, there were 
 present : 
 
 • Rear Admiral John R. Edwards, Lieut. Commander John Hal- 
 ligan, jr., Lieut. Commander J. O. Richardson, Lieut. O. D. Conger, 
 Lieut. F. W. Milner, members Naval Fuel Oil Board; Forrest M. 
 Towl, Dr. Leonard Waldo, W. N. Best, Dr. D. S. Jacobus, H. M. 
 Storey, Walter McFarland, Philip W. Henry, Ernest Peabody, Har- 
 vey Bell, invited guests; Lawrence Addicks, Dr. L. H. Baekelandf 
 A. M. Hunt, Hudson Maxim, Thomas Robins, B. B. Thayer, Dr. 
 W. R. Whitney. Spencer Miller, Dr. A. G. Webster, members Nav^l 
 Consulting Board. 
 
 Every one of the invited guests was an acknowledged expert and 
 master of at least one, if not several, phases of the oil-fuel problems, 
 as outlined in the group of questions, and each one of these men 
 invited was personally known and nominated by some member of 
 the Naval Consulting Board. 
 
58 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 It was possible to get these men to attend the conference, owing 
 to the fact that members of the Naval Consulting Board, in their 
 professional and business connections in civil life, had come in 
 contact with these men, and this enabled them to select men of the 
 caliber and distinction of those invited. The success of the con- 
 ference was largely due to the information which these men con- 
 tributed to the conference. Many members of the Naval Consulting 
 Board itself were also specialists in some phases of the problems. 
 
 Among the men present were some who, if consulted in regard to 
 a fuel-oil question, would no doubt require a large retainer before 
 considering the matter. They gave to this conference the most 
 valuable information without any expectation of compensation and 
 purely out of consideration and patriotism. 
 
 Prior to the conference all the books from the Engineering Library 
 bearing on this question were placed in the conference room for 
 review and examination, and the American Society of Mechanical 
 Engineers donated its board room for the use of the conference. 
 
 The history leading up to this conference was as follows: 
 
 In 1911 the first battleships to contain an exclusively oil-fuel 
 installation were authorized, and this was in some respects a very 
 radical departure and was thought by those in the Navy that, 
 owing to the increased demand for gasoline and other volatile com- 
 ponents of petroleum, within a few years the bulk of the fuel-oil 
 supply for the Navy would be a viscous and heavy product, and the 
 Navy wa particularly interested in the question of an assured 
 fuel-oil supply with the proper characteristics. They also were 
 particularly interested in questions of transportation and storage, 
 oil tankers, and supply ships necessary to meet the demands of the 
 Navy and the amount of fuel-oil storage capacity to supply the Navy. 
 
 It was estimated that when the three-year building program at 
 that time authorized by Congress for the increase in the Navy, there 
 would be required for naval use millions of barrels of fuel oil an- 
 nually during peace and about three times that in the event of war. 
 
 All the proposed new ships were oil burners and the securing of an 
 adequate supply of oil for the future was a matter of prime impor- 
 tance to the Navy. The superiority of oil-burning ships was so 
 great that the Navy Department desired to build oil-burning battle- 
 ships, but were somewhat perturbed over the fear of a failure of 
 the supply of fuel oil. 
 
 In September, 1912, the President, under authority of an act of 
 Congress (36 Stat., 847), set aside from the already withdrawn area 
 of public lands in California, a definite area to be known as the 
 *' Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 1 " ; in December, 1912, the second 
 reserve (No. 2) in California, and in April, 1915, No. 3, in Wyo- 
 ming, were similarly created by the President. The orders creating 
 
FUEL OIL.. 59 
 
 these naval petroleum reserves stated that the area " shall be held 
 for the exclusive use or benefit of the United States Navy." 
 
 It was the intention to hold these areas, which could be wisely 
 ■conserved in reserve and not utilize their oil content until the short- 
 age of domestic production or the increased price of fuel rendered 
 it advisable. These reserves were designed to serve as an assurance 
 against the posibility of having a large fleet of exclusively oil-burn- 
 ing warships with no oil available. 
 
 At this time many of the students of the petroleum reserves of the 
 United States had predicted an early decline in the yield of petro- 
 leum and had estimated that the supply in the ground would last 
 only approximately 22 years. 
 
 Among the important questions taken up at the conference was 
 the question of desirability of the Navy to undertake production of 
 its own fuel and lubricating oils as well as gasoline. The question 
 of the cost to the Government of producing 5,000,000 barrels of fuel 
 oil was discussed, and the matter turned on whether the production 
 of crude petroleum in the United States would reach its maximum 
 in the course of the next few years. In coming to a conclusion in 
 this matter it was necessary to take into consideration prospective 
 fields in Alaska, Arizona, Caribbean Sea, and Hawaiian Islands, 
 as well as the west coast of Mexico, Central America, South America, 
 and an investigation of the stocks of fuel oils carried in foreign 
 ports, together with a detailed outline of existing domestic facilities, 
 including the location of tankage, pipe lines, maximum and' mini- 
 mum quantities of oil on hand, sources of supply, docks and depth 
 of water alongside, etc. 
 
 One of the important points taken into consideration was the ques- 
 tion of storage of fuel oil, and its searching power, and whether 
 liquid fuel could be stored beneath the ground in large quantities in 
 the United States. An understanding of this matter necessarily 
 took into consideration the construction of underground concrete 
 storage tanks, the effect of heat and cold on a concrete construction, 
 and the proportionate constituent parts that would be used in such 
 <X)ncrete, the safety of the tanks, and the effect of explosions of 
 dynamite on them, as well as the covering of the tanks with clay, 
 sand, broken rock, or sand loam. The names of those firms in the 
 United States that had had the most extended experience in oil-tank 
 construction and the latest designs of storage tanks and pumping 
 equipment were also investigated. 
 
 Another interesting phase of the discussion was the determina- 
 tion of number of oil-tank cars in the United States, and the aver- 
 age capacity of each car, as well as the number of cars that were 
 being built. 
 
60 Iv'AYAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 Under marine transportation were considered the number of oil 
 barges in the United States, with their average carrying capacity, 
 !.nd the trend of construction toward craft of larger capacity, and 
 the consideration of sailing ships carrying oil in bulk. 
 
 Under this general head of transportation of fuel oil was also 
 considered the question of extending pipe lines from Point Breeze,. 
 Philadelphia, to the League Island Navy Yard, and from the nearest 
 California pipe lines to the Mare Island Navy Yard. The question 
 of pumping oil from the Tampico fields to some harbor on the west 
 coast of ^Mexico was also considered. The safest method for cleaning 
 oil pipes, the building of pumps for heavy crude oil, and artificial 
 means for making fuel oil fluid, were also discussed. 
 
 The conference went into the question of combustion and dis- 
 cussed furnaces and smokestacks and the desirability of placing 
 baffle plates in a water-tube boiler, also the action of sulphur in fuel 
 oil on the tubes, the difficulty of efficiently operating oil burners and 
 the necessity for providing additional combustion-chamber space for 
 oil fuel beyond that which seemed adequate for coal-burning boilers, 
 the type of boiler used in heavy fighting ships equipped with an 
 exclusively oil-burning installation. The question of whether the 
 lower tubes on Babcock & AVilcox boilers would sag when the boilers 
 are forced for a continuous period was also discussed, as well as 
 how high a flash point should be demanded by naval specifications. 
 
 Under the head of chemists on fuel oil was suggested the question 
 of retaining a chemist on fuel oil who was particularly fitted to ren- 
 der this service to the board. 
 
 The storage of fuel oil on warships involved the consideration 
 of tlie question of whether the (xovernraent should demand a higher 
 flash point for oil that must be stored on battleship's, and as to 
 vv-liether there was some safe chemical to clean tanks to remove the 
 residuum from fuel oil, as well as the question of inspecting the 
 double-bottom compartments of ships in which fuel oil is now stored 
 on battleships, as well as the pumping of such oil from these com- 
 jjartments. 
 
 The specifications of the Navy Department for the purchase of 
 fuel oil, and as to whether they were more safe than those for the 
 merchant service, were gone into, and in considering this matter the 
 nature of contracts which foreign Governments had for the supply 
 of oil in this country were considered. Under this question of 
 specifications, under which oil is produced, came a question of water 
 contents, sulphur, asphaltum or sludge, and flash point, as well as 
 other matters. 
 
 The discussions above outlined were taken down in shorthand and 
 mimeographed copies made, which were sent to those interested, 
 and the majority of the questions, as set forth in the copy of the 
 
FUEL on.. 61 
 
 ■discussions, were answered to the satisfaction of the Naval Fuel 
 Oil Board. 
 
 On August 14 and 15, 1916, a second joint meeting of the Naval 
 Fuel Oil Board and Fuel Oil Committee of the Naval Consulting 
 Board was held in Newport, E. I., and the committee visited and 
 inspected the oil-burning battleships Oklahoma and Navada. A 
 third meeting was held on the 6th of December in New York. The 
 committee gave several months' study to the special problem relat- 
 ing to the future supply of fuel oil for the Navy and reached the 
 following conclusion : 
 
 P"'ipst. The use of fuel oil enables the Navy Department to produce war 
 ■vessels ot a marked superiority in type. The projected battle cruisers, for 
 example, could not be reproduced if required to use coal, nor could they be 
 remodeled for burning coal, even at comparatively prohibitive cost, without 
 seriously curtailing their military value. 
 
 Second. It is the unanimous opinion, therefore, of your committee that the 
 requirements of national defense demand that the Nation hold with unassail- 
 able title reserves of oil land within its own borders, located with reference 
 to economical transportation, and containing sufficient oil to meet the require- 
 ments of our ever-enlarging Navy for a period of not less than 50 years. 
 
 Third. The best estimate at hand, that of the United States Geological Survey, 
 respecting the probable remaining supply of petroleum underground within 
 the United States is 7,629 million barrels. The marketed production of 
 petroleum within the United States in the year 1915 was 281,104,104 barrels. 
 A simple calculation will show that should the consumption of oil remain 
 fixed the estimated available supply will last only 28 years. While forests 
 cut down can be reproduced in time, petroleum taken from the ground and 
 consumed is forever gone. 
 
 Your committee is well aware of the fact that great quantities of fuel oil 
 are to-day imported from Mexico for industrial uses and that the Mexican oil 
 fields are probably the most extensive deposits of oil anywhere in the Western 
 Hemisphere, if not in the world, but it believes that as a means of national 
 defense such oil supply could not and should not be depended upon in the 
 event of war. To-day Great Britain renews her supply of oil fuel from Mexico, 
 and is assured thereof only so long as she maintains undisputed control of 
 the seas. 
 
 For the use of our Navy it is now estimated that there will be an annual 
 consumption in time of peace of quantities increasing from 842,000 barrels 
 during the present fiscal year to 10,000,000 barrels annually in 1927. In time 
 of war this consumption will be increased at least threefold. That is to say, 
 we must face the possibility of a consumption in war time of not less than 
 30,000,000 barrels per annum. Nor does this take any account of oil fuel for 
 aircraft or for industrial processes associated with national defense. 
 
 Your committee has given full consideration to the possibility of diverting 
 from these industries sufficient oil to meet the demands of the Navy in time 
 of war, but has reached the conclusion that this might of itself cripple in- 
 dustrial establishments upon which the Nation must depend for munitions 
 of war. 
 
 Your committee, In view of the foregoing, believes that the representatives 
 of our Nation in Congress now assembled have before them at present a ques- 
 tion of supreme Importance to the national defense, In that certain legislation 
 
62 NAVAL CONSULTING BOAED OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 is pending wliich imperils tlie present oil reserves of the Navy, and there- 
 fore your committee has prepared the following resolutions which it offers to 
 the Naval Consulting BoaVd with a recommendation for their adoption. 
 
 Since the time of the conference in 1916 several large oil fields 
 have been discovered, which have altered the situation which con- 
 fronted the conference on July 1, 1916. 
 
 After thorough consideration of the matter, the following resolu- 
 tion was adopted by the committee of the Naval Consulting Board 
 which arranged the conference and it was presented to the board 
 for adoption: 
 
 Whereas the Navy Department, after years of study and consideration, has 
 definitely committed itself to the use of oil fuel on our naval vessels on ac- 
 count of its superior military advantages ; and 
 Whereas the permanence and continuity of such fuel supply must be assure* 
 
 both for time of peace and of war ; and 
 AA'hereas legislation is now pending in Congress which jeopardizes the in- 
 tegrity of naval petroleum reserves heretofore established for the above 
 purpose ; and 
 Whereas action by Congress adverse to the Navy Department's interests in. 
 these reserves will constitute a precedent for future actions, and make any 
 reserve whatever uncertain and liable to diversion : Therefore be it 
 Resolved, That the Naval Consulting Board, the official civilian advisory 
 board of the Navy, composed of members of 11 national engineering and 
 scientific societies, Is convinced that any legislation which may divert from, 
 the Navy any portions of its reserves will seriously weaken the Navy and 
 imperil the national defense. The Naval Consulting Board, therefore, urges 
 upon the Nation and its representatives in Congress to permit no steps to bfr 
 taken that will impair the integrity of the existing naval petroleum reserves. 
 
 The Naval Consulting Board commends the recent action of the Secretary 
 of the Interior in recommending the creation of additional naval reserves in 
 Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming on lands which have prospective value for oili 
 production. 
 
 The Naval Consulting Board, however, does not believe that these recom- 
 mended reserves can be considered as substitutes for existing reserves. 
 
 Spencer Miller, Chairman, 
 Hudson Maxim, 
 Arthur Gordon Webster. 
 Benjamin B. Thayer. 
 Joseph W. Richards. 
 A. M. Hunt. 
 L. H. Baekeland. 
 Thomas Robins. 
 Lawrence Addicks. 
 W. R. Whitney. 
 
 As a result of this investigation. Secretary Daniels stated that the 
 Navy Department would maintain its legal rights, whatever they 
 might be, to the unpatented lands in the naval oil reserves, and th© 
 legislation which was designed to take these lands away from the 
 Navy Department was never passed. 
 
FUEL OIL. 63 
 
 Secretary Daniels wrote to Mr. Spencer MiUer the following letter : 
 
 Navy Department, 
 Washington, December 22, 1916. 
 Mr. Spencek Millee, 
 
 Chairman Fuel and Fuel Handling Committee, 
 
 Naval Consulting Board, 96 lAberty Street, New York, N. T. 
 My Dear Me. Millee : In acknowledging the receipt of the report of your 
 committee of the Naval Consulting Board on the subject of the supply of fuel 
 oil for the Navy, under date of December 9, 1916, I desire to thank you, and 
 through you the members of the committee for the splendid assistance that has 
 been rendered the Navy in this important matter. 
 
 Through the efforts of you gentlemen there was placed at the disposal of the 
 Naval Fuel Oil Board information on the subject of petroleum which could not 
 have been secured otherwise. The results obtained in this instance exemplify 
 the great good that can come to the Navy through the cooperation of distin- 
 guished civilians actuated by the patriotism and unselfish devotion that has 
 been shown by the members of your committee. 
 Cordially, yours, 
 
 JosEPHUs Daniels, 
 
 Secretary of the Navy. 
 
 It should be noted that the meeting was held on short notice, in 
 order that the members of the board and invited experts might be 
 privileged to give their experience to the United States Navy at the 
 earliest possible moment. 
 
 No doubt results of the conference above mentioned reenforced 
 Secretary Daniels in his position and made the Senate virtually 
 abandon plans for any legislation in regard to leasing potash, oil, 
 and phosphate lands from the Federal Government and refusing to, 
 agree to any remedial legislation affecting claimants to unpatented;^ 
 lands within the naval petroleum reserves. 
 
CHAPTER IIL 
 Part 2. 
 
 NEW NAVAL STATION ON PACIFIC COAST. 
 
 In accoi-dance Avith the naAiil appropriation bill passed in August, 
 1916, by which the President was authorized to appoint a com- 
 mission of five officers of the Navy to investigate and report as 
 to. the necessitj^, desirability, and advisability of establishing an 
 additional naval station on the Pacific coast of the United States, 
 the following commission was appointed: 
 
 Eear Admiral J. ^L Helm, U. S. Navy; Chief Constructor W. L. 
 Capps, U. S. Navy; Chief Engineer H. H. Eousseau, U. S. Navy; 
 Capt. G. AV. McElroy, U. S. Navy; and Commander C. L. Hussey, 
 U. S. Navy. 
 
 Below is an extract from the naval appropriation bill : 
 
 The Presiilent is hereby authorized to appoint a commission of five officers 
 of the Navy not below the rank of commander to investigate and report at the 
 beginning of the next regular session of Congress if practicable, and if not, as 
 soon thereafter as practicable, as to the necessity, desirability, and advisability 
 of establishing an additional navy yard or naval station on the Pacific coast 
 of the United States. And if such a navy yard or naval station be recom- 
 mended as necessary and advisable, said report shall designate the most suit- 
 able site and the estimated cost thereof, together with a detailed state- 
 ment of the reasons for such designation and the nature and scope of the 
 activities for naval purposes of such yard or station. In arriving at such 
 designation the commission shall take into consideration all strategical and 
 other military considerations as well as all industrial eletaents necessary for 
 the economical and successful operation of such a yard or station, including 
 local conditions as to labor and material. Said report shall also contain au 
 estimated cost of the necessary buildings, shops, piers, sea walls, and equipment 
 of said yard or station, together with the estimated annual cost of maintenance 
 thereof. 
 
 Said commission shall also investigate and report upon the necessity, desira- 
 bility, and advisability of improving existing or establishing an additional 
 navy yard or naval station on the Atlantic coast south of Cape Hatteras or on 
 or near the United States coast of the Gulf of Mexico or in the Caribbean Sea 
 of a character adequate for the proper naval defense of that portion of the 
 country. Said report shall contain all the information of like character as 
 directed in the preceding paragraph relating to the investigation and report 
 as to the Pacific coast. 
 
 Said commission shall also investigate and report as to the necessity, de-sira- 
 bllity, and advisability of establishing submarine and aviation bases ou the 
 64 
 
NEW NAVAL STATION ON PACIFIC COAST. 65 
 
 Atlantic, Gulf of Mexico, ancl Pacific coasts and other possessions of the United 
 States, and as to the cost and location thereof : 
 
 Provided, That the sum of $10,000 is hereby appropriated to defray the 
 expenses of said commission, including drafting, technical, and clerical assist- 
 ance in the Navy Department or elsewhere. 
 
 Said commission shall also Investigate and report as to the necessity, 
 desirability, and advisability of abolishing any existing navy yard or naval 
 station, and If such action is recommended, to report fully the reasons there- 
 for and the advantages to be obtained thereby. 
 
 Bear Admiral Helm then wrote the following letter to Mr..Thomas 
 Eobins, secretary of the Naval Consulting Board, and this started in 
 motion the machinery for investigating the necessity and desirability 
 for establishing an additional naval station on the Pacific coast : 
 
 Navy Department, 
 Commission on Navy Yards and Navai Stations, 
 
 Washington, D. C, 25 October, 1916. 
 Mr. Thomas Robins, 
 
 Secretary Naval Consulting Board, 
 
 13 Park Row, New York City. 
 
 Dear Sir : The Commission on Navy Yards and Naval Stations, appointed by 
 direction of the President to carry out certain provisions in the recent naval 
 appropriation bill, as quoted In the inclosure herewith, requests the assistance 
 of the Naval Consulting Board In obtaining information relative to com- 
 mercial facilities and resources that would be available to the Navy in time 
 of war. 
 
 The commission requires complete information In regard to available facilities 
 and resources that, for war operations, might be utilized to advantage by the 
 Naval Establishment, afloat and ashore, along the entire Atlantic, Gulf, and 
 Pacific coasts of the United States^ The commission is not familiar with the 
 character of the information obtained by the Naval Consulting Board and now 
 available. 
 
 In order that it may understand the general scope and character of the avail- 
 able information, the commission requests that data for one section of the coast 
 be now furnished; for practical reasons prefers that the Pacific coast, from 
 San Diego to Puget Sound, be considered first. 
 
 The Information desired is as to existing and projected commercial facilities 
 and resources on the continental coast of the United States, or so near the 
 coast as to be readily available through water or land transportation : 
 
 (a) Dry docks— graving, floating, marine railways. 
 
 (6) Berthing facilities available for naval vessels at commercial wharves, 
 piers, and quays, including statement as to depth of water at each. 
 
 (c) Shipbuilding plants, machine shops, etc., capable of extensive or minor 
 repairs to naval vessels, including small craft, and to aircraft, with a statement 
 of the number of mechanics at each establishment, specifying trades where 
 practicable. 
 
 (d) Fuel suitable for Navy use — coal; oil, both heavy and Diesel engine; 
 gasoline. Storage capacity for each of the above; average amount of each on 
 hand ; annual consumption of each ; facilities for delivery ; time of delivery 
 after, order received ; rate of delivery for 8-hour day and for 24 hours and 
 continuously thereafter ; cost of fuel ; cost of delivery. 
 
 168537°— 20 5 
 
66 NAVAL CONSULTING BOAKD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 Owing to the limited time allowed to conduct the investigations and submit 
 report the commission would appreciate receiving the data in parts, as it may 
 be prepared. When acknowledging receipt of this communication, would you 
 kindly state when the first of the data may be expected. 
 Respectfully, 
 
 J. M. Helm, 
 Rear Admiral, United States Navy, 
 
 Senior Member of Commission. 
 
 The industrial preparedness campaign of the Naval Consulting 
 Board had brought into existence, as associate members of the Naval 
 Consulting Board, men who were particularly qualified to get the 
 information which was desired by the Navy Department^ and they 
 made comprehensive reports to the Navy Department that were of 
 great value. 
 
CHAPTEE IV. 
 
 SPECIAL PROBLEMS COMMITTEE, 
 
 On the 3d day of February, 1917, Count Bernstorff, German am- 
 bassador to the United States, was given his passports by President 
 Woodrow Wilson, and it was felt by members of the Naval Consult- 
 ing Board that some further action to curb the submarine menace 
 should be immediately taken. Mr. Lawrence Addicks, member of the 
 Naval Consulting Board, was particularly impressed with the sit- 
 uation, and in the absence of the chairman and secretary of the 
 Naval Consulting Board, gathered together the available members 
 of the board a day or two after the Bernstorff incident to determine 
 what should be done. At this meeting it was decided to call a meet- 
 ing of the board on due notice to consider the matter. 
 
 At a meeting of the board called on February 10, 1917, a plan 
 was laid before it to organize a committee to be known as the " Spe- 
 cial Problems Committee." Under the previous arrangement of the 
 board, there was a Committee on Submarines, a Committee on Tor- 
 pedoes, and a Committee on Explosi^'es, etc., with the result that 
 experiments or inventions connected with the single issue of the 
 submarine menace were scattered through various committees of the 
 board, and there was no real coordination. The committee was or- 
 ganized at this meeting and the name " Special Problems " was 
 given it to avoid conflicting with the other committees; but the in- 
 tention was to turn over to it all matters relating to the submarine 
 menace, regardless of their nature. 
 
 Mr. Lawrence Addicks was made chairman of this committee, 
 the other members of which were Dr. Miller Eeese Hutchison, Ben- 
 jamin Gr. Lamme, Matthew B. Sellers, Elmer A. Sperry, Dr. A. G. 
 Webster, Dr. W. E. Whitney, and Mr. A. M. Hunt. 
 
 The most promising lines of attack on the submarine were classi- 
 fied and one group was assigned to each member : 
 
 Dr. Whitney was given detection by sound ; Mr. Lamme, detection 
 by magnetic, electromagnetic, and electrical means; Mr. Sellers, 
 detection by sight ; Mr. Sperry, underwater searchlight ; Dr. Hutch- 
 ison bombing from aeroplanes; Mr. Hunt, protection of vessels by 
 nets • and Dr. Webster, miscellaneous special problems. 
 
 A meeting of the committee was called at once in Washington to 
 p-o over all the German matter in the hands of the Intelligence De- 
 partment. Admiral Oliver turned over to the committee without 
 
 67 
 
68 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THK UNITED STATES. 
 
 reserve all the Navy files and reports of the attaches abroad. Very 
 little that was of direct use was obtained, however, the real fact of 
 the matter being that very little had been accomplished in the way 
 of dealing with the submarine. 
 
 The first investigations to determine the value and limitations of 
 listening devices were made off Pensacola, Fla., by the United States 
 naval submarine force during January, February, and March, 1917. 
 The apiDaratus used during these tests was that supplied by the 
 Submarine Signal Co. as a part of this company's standard under- 
 water signaling apparatus. 
 
 At the suggestion of Dr. W. R. Whitney, of the General Electric' 
 Co., Mr. H. J. W. Fay, of the Submarine Signal Co., appeared at a 
 meeting of the Naval Consulting Board in New York on February 
 IT, 1917, and explained the art of submarine signaling as he knew it 
 at that time, and suggested certain lines of investigation which he 
 believed would be profitable in the adaptation of signaling devices 
 for detection of submarines. As a result of the appearance of Mr. 
 Fay before the board, a Special Problems Committee of the Naval 
 Consulting Board visited Boston on February 23, 1917, and wit- 
 nessed a demonstration of the devices then manufactured by the 
 Submarine Signal Co. During the visit of this committee the advis- 
 ability of obtaining a station at which experimental apparatus could 
 be tested was discussed, and the officials of the Submarine Signal 
 Co. stated that the company would probably be willing to provide 
 such a station and its equipment, and to assist in carrying out any 
 experimental work which was deemed necessary by the Navy 
 Department. On March 20, 1917, Mr. Fay, of the Submarine Signal 
 Co., conferred with the Chief of Bureau of Steam Engineering 
 regarding the establishment of an experimental station at Nahant, 
 Mass. At this time, the chief of the bureau approved the plan to 
 establish such a station and suggested that the General Electric Co. 
 and the Western Electric Co. be invited to cooperate with the Sub- 
 marine Signal Co. in work at this station. In April, 1917, the station 
 was completed and the Submarine Signal Co. and the General 
 Electric Co. began experimental work. Early in May, 1917, the 
 Western Electric Co. joined the other two companies in this work. 
 The Submarine Signal Co. furnished the building and the oscillators 
 and some three cables which were run out to sea. oscillators being 
 located at three different points with the idea of getting definite 
 locations of objects by a sort of triangulation. 
 
 The Special Problems Committee being thus formed, it seemed de- 
 sirable to widen the field from which information relative to the sub- 
 marine menace might be had, and therefore there was arranged what 
 was known as the " Submarine defense conference " ^ of the Committee 
 
 ' For a list of those invited to attend the conference, see Appendix, p. 236-236. 
 
SPECIAL PROBLEMS COMMITTEE. 69 
 
 of Special Problems of the Naval Consulting Board, held in the Engi- 
 neering Society's Building at New York on March 3, 1917. Each 
 member of the board was called on to nominate 10 men for each of 
 whom he could vouch as to his loyalty, and who, in his opinion, had 
 special knowledge of some department of science which could be 
 applied to the submarine question. From a very large number of 
 names suggested, the Committee on Special Problems selected 35 
 men. This list was then submitted to the Secretary of the Navy for 
 criticism, and it was understood that the proceedings of the conference 
 would be confidential, and that no other outsiders would be admitted, 
 on which basis the Navy would present full information and answer 
 all questions. 
 
 Bear Admiral William S. Sims, president of the Naval War Col- 
 lege, was asked to present the general problem of defense against the 
 submarine. This selection was particularly fortunate, in view of the 
 fact that Admiral Sims a few days later was sent abroad as com- 
 mander in chief of the United States Navy operating in the war 
 zone. 
 
 Capt. J. K. Eobison, who was then inspector of ordnance at the 
 Newport Torpedo Station, was asked to give a talk- on the torpedo ; 
 and Commander Yates Sterling, jr., in charge of the submarine base 
 at New London, was asked to talk on the submarines. 
 
 The following somewhat detailed account of the conference, show- 
 ing the questions that were in the minds of those attending it and 
 the information developed, are set forth in order that a true pic- 
 tare as near as possible may be given of the problem of the sub- 
 marine menace as it presented itself to the Naval Consulting Board 
 and its invited guests at the time of the conference on March 3, 1917. 
 
 Before the discussions took place an outline of the subjects to be 
 discussed was prepared and the subject analyzed so that discussion 
 would be facilitated. 
 
 The subject was treated, under three general headings: Detec- 
 tion of submarines, annihilation of submarine after detection, and 
 the defeat of the torpedo. 
 
 Under the general head of detection of submarines was considered 
 first the possibility of detection by ships or shore lookouts. This in- 
 volved the question of the best type of marine glasses that were 
 available, the available stock and possible supply of such glasses, 
 and the possibility of the development of any special means for the 
 detection of the wake of the submarine, consisting of a white streak 
 or oil globules on the surface of the water. It was noted that old 
 whalers can readily detect conditions on the water which are im- 
 Tjierceptible to the average observer, and that some wake is apparent 
 even when a submarine is running totally submerged on the energy 
 of her batteries. 
 
70 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 Suggestions were also asked in regard to the detection of sub- 
 marines by aeroplane scouts, and it was noted that the success of 
 this method apparently depended upon the condition of the sea, 
 color of the bottom, and clearness of the water, and that the aver- 
 age conditions along much of our Atlantic coast were not favorable. 
 
 The most important method of detection, however, was that dis- 
 cussed under the heading of underwater observation; and under 
 m.agnetic effects was considered the possibility of planting large 
 compasses corrected for the earth's magnetism and in brass cases, 
 on the bed of a harbor or channel, and by suitable indicating de- 
 vices electrically connected to the shore or locally to an alarm buoy, 
 give warning of an approaching submarine. The question was 
 raised as to whether such a device could be used on shipboard where 
 masses of iron would have to be corrected for. 
 
 A discussion of electrical conductivity effects was also considered, 
 and. the question was asked as to what could be done in the way of 
 utilizing the change of conductance in a given block of sea water by 
 the entrance therein of a submarine, and as to whether suitable meas- 
 uring instruments and power supply would be possible on shipboard. 
 A question was asked as to whether such a scheme would introduce 
 serious problems of electrolytic corrosion. 
 
 Under optical devices the following questions were asked : How far 
 can a beam of light from the most powerful source now known pene- 
 trate under water, and could reflected light rays be made the basis 
 of any system of detection? Could some means other than the eye 
 be employed? "Would not such a scheme indicate your own where- 
 abouts to the submarine? 
 
 Under the general head of sound, the following questions were 
 asked : What is the .source of the characteristic noises made by a sub- 
 marine in motion when sul^merged, by its commutator, propeller, and 
 bow displacement? Can these noises be suppressed so that sound- 
 detecting devices would become valueless? How far can the noises 
 made by existing submarines be heard by microphones or oscillators? 
 How closely can such a system locate a submarine by triangulation 
 from a shore-base line, and is there any hope of reasonable triangula- 
 tion from the shore-base line available on a ship? Can anyone sug- 
 gest any sort of a noise filter to exclude sounds due to noise of 
 motion of ships on which listening device is placed? In case sub- 
 marines become noiseless what are the limitations upon sending out 
 sound waves and listening for the echo? Are there any other types 
 of apparatus available besides the microphone and the oscillator, and 
 can anyone suggest other lines of attack on the problem of detection ? 
 
 Under the general heading of annihilation of submarine after de- 
 tection, the following questions were asked: What is the effective 
 radius of action of an underwater explosion in starting the seams or 
 
SPECIAL PROBLEMS COMMITTEE. 71 
 
 breaking the batteries of a submarine? (The Navy has confidential 
 data based on experiments to determine this point, but the question 
 is suggested in case any present may have information from Euro- 
 pean sources.) At what depth is a bomb most eifective ? Can a shell 
 be designed which will enter the water at such an angle when aimed 
 at a partially submerged submarine so as to continue on its flight 
 under water? (The shape of the nose of a shell has much to do with 
 its ricocheting.) Can a net be devised which will readily ensnare 
 upon contact? (Nets are of small value unless watched. Adequate 
 watching is very difficult in heavy or foggy weather.) What auto- 
 matic signal devices are available to locate a submarine which runs 
 into a net but is able to back out unharmed? (A submarine drags a 
 net at considerable speed before its momentum is absorbed.) Is it 
 possible to anchor devices which would mechanically damage a sub- 
 marine but be harmless to surface craft owing to location by buoy? 
 What developments are possible analogous to spreading oil upon the 
 water in order to cloud the periscope when emerging? 
 
 Under the general head of defeat of the torpedo were asked the 
 following questions: Is. there any way in which torpedo-net defense 
 can be applied to a moving ship? (Nets must be double to offset 
 net-cutting devices on torpedo; they take a great deal of time and 
 labor to rig out and in; they would greatly retard the speed of a 
 moving ship and almost surely foul the propeller.) Can the idea of 
 hanging out plate-iron false work be made practical, and would a 
 ■ false work, say, 20 feet away from the side of a ship save it from 
 torpedo destruction, or would the explosion be transmitted to the 
 ship itself through the water? Would a net-cutting bomb go 
 through any reasonable false work? Could any net or false- work 
 device be mounted to drop in time to encounter an approaching tor- 
 pedo while being out of the way when on safe ground? Would 
 heavy false work tow true or would it slew out of place when ship 
 was in motion and either defeat its own purpose or damage the ship 
 itself? Can the oscillator, etc., be successfully applied to a ship as 
 a listening device which would warn of the approach and bearing 
 of a torpedo which had been launched against it ? Could some form 
 of countermine be sent against the torpedo from the ship? (This 
 might be a bomb similar to those used by aeroplanes against sub- 
 marines.) Would such a bomb have a reasonable radius of action in 
 damaging the torpedo? What are the weak spots in a torpedo 
 which could be attacked? Could any sort of periodic vibration in 
 the water be made to act upon the depth diaphragm so as to send the 
 torpedo off its normal horizontal course? The subject of maneuver- 
 ing was also discussed. 
 
 Perhaps the most important result of this conference and discus- 
 sion was that there was mobilized in this meeting the special knowl- 
 
72 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 edge on the subject which was available, to coordinate and bring to 
 one group of men all of the problems relating to the submarine 
 menace. The civilians at this meeting got their first real under- 
 standing as to the scope and limitations of the problems they were 
 trying to deal with. The naval officers received benefit from the 
 cross-fertilization of ideas with the civilian scientists, inventors, and 
 engineers present as to the possible lines of attack from more or less 
 unconsidered sources which could be made. 
 
 It developed that detection of the submarine was essential to sub- 
 marine destruction. Without means of detection, the handling of 
 submarines is without the first essential necessary for their destruc- 
 tion. 
 
 At this submarine defense conference there was developed the 
 following information in regard to submarines, which was true at 
 that time : First, that they have a speed of from 14 to 15 knots above 
 the water, and below the water perhaps 8 to 10 knots ; that the sub- 
 marine has a very limited radius under the water; when she goes 
 down she puts her engine out of commission and runs on electric bat- 
 teries; when these are exhausted she must come to the surface to re- 
 charge them; while she is underneath she can not remain still, but 
 must move fast enough for her traverse rudders to keep her in a con- 
 dition of equilibrium ; when she is submerged she can see nothing at 
 all, but she is not deaf ; submarines can not submerge more than 200 
 feet safely ; for some reason or other the periscope range of vision is 
 small; that those in a submarine can not see very far from a peri- 
 scope when the submarine is submerged ; the periscope is almost use- 
 less at night. 
 
 There are two kinds of submarines — coast-defense submarines, sup- 
 posed to be used in a short radius and not going very far from home ; 
 seagoing submarines from 800 tons up, with a speed of 15 Imots on 
 the surface and probably about 10 knots submerged. 
 
 When the submarine is on the surface it has no means of protec- 
 tion, and it can not stand a fight with another vessel. An ordinary 
 fishing vessel can outfight it, because a submarine can not stand be- 
 ing punctured, as it prevents her going down again. It is very diffi- 
 cult to hit a submarine ; she is not very much out of the water, and 
 projectile will not penetrate the water at all, especially at a short 
 range, when firing at a submarine. As a submarine can not afford to 
 be hit even once, therefore any ship in her neighborhood that has 
 guns will force her to go down. If a merchantman is armed a sub- 
 marine knows she can not come to the surface, so she remains sub- 
 merged with the periscope out and fires a torpedo when the merchant- 
 man goes by. A torpedo can be fired from a submarine either when 
 it is submerged or on the surface. The range of a torpedo carried 
 by a submarine is not more than 1,000 to 2,000 yards. The submarine 
 
SPECIAL PROBLEMS COMMITTEE. VS 
 
 can not expect to hit a vessel at very great range. The torpedo has 
 a very heavy war head. 
 
 That there is certain signal apparatus on submarines by which 
 it can hear the vibrations of the engine or propeller of a ship ; that 
 all naval authorities would like to know a great deal more about 
 these vibrations; that aeroplanes can detect the presence of t sub- 
 marine by the trail on the surface of the water when the sun is 
 favorable, if the submarine is going at full speed. 
 
 A submarine from the bottom of the hull to the top of the peri- 
 scope is about 40 to 42 feet, therefore submarines must stay in at 
 least 50 to 60 feet of water. For this reason it is very fortunate 
 for the Allies that the English Channel is so narrow and shallow. 
 If it were 150 miles wide and a couple of miles deep, the war might 
 have a different history. The English Channel is constantly pa- 
 trolled and every submarine is reported and plotted on a sectional 
 map. 
 
 That it would be of inestimable value if there were any means 
 by which a torpedo could be turned aside or blown up without re- 
 quiring an impossible degree of vigilance and skill on the part of 
 the people on a merchant vessel. Gunfire against a torpedo is 
 almost impossible for one reason, because visibility from the inside 
 of the turret is not very great. That you can not steam very well 
 with a net which is down, although they can be used by ships at 
 anchor, and were so used until a war head was invented which 
 Mows holes through the net, also scissors have been arranged to cut 
 nets, and a bomb had been devised to place at the end of a torpedo 
 to blow holes in the net. 
 
 That when a vessel is going along at a certain speed which is 
 calculated to be so many knots and a course in such direction, a tor- 
 pedo is fired so as to meet the vessel at a certain point ahead on its 
 course, and no way is known of stopping it; that the track of the 
 torpedo can be seen with great distinctness except when the sun 
 happens to be in the wrong direction, and probably in a smooth sea 
 a distance of some 2,000 to 3,000 yards. 
 
 The German submarines are said to have sufficient storage-battery 
 plates to run submerged at 10 knots for 3 hours, at 8 knots for 12 
 hours, at 4 knots for 36 hours, at 1 knot for 72 hours. Therefore 
 some German submarines can go down and stay out of sight for 
 three days, the result being that the task of hunting it becomes 
 almost hopeless. 
 
 A torpedo for purposes of destruction can be divided into three 
 parts: The business end full of trinitrotoluol; the compressed-air 
 tank which is the source of power and which is used in all types 
 of torpedoes; and the engines that run it. There are two rudders 
 on it one horizontal and one vertical, that run just forward of the 
 
74 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 propellers. On the end of a torpedo is a concussion detonator. 
 When the torpedo strikes a target the discharge is exploded by 
 concussion, but the torpedo also explodes when it stops or when 
 deviated from its course. 
 
 The comiDressed-air charge is a measure of the total power that 
 can be used, which can be used down to a pressure of about 400 
 pounds to the square inch. 
 
 The machinery of a torpedo is run at a constant speed by using 
 a radius available between the compressed-air tank and the engine 
 itself. The Germans used a 3-cylinder engine to drive a torpedo. 
 A torpedo has to be just about the same weight as the water that it 
 displaces. The bigger the diameter of the torpedo the more power 
 it can give. Customary diameters are 18 to 21 inches, or 45 to 55 
 centimeters. 
 
 The problem in regard to torpedoes is_: First, how are we going 
 to keep it from doing what it is trying to do? Secondly, how are 
 we going to keep it from striking entirely? 
 
 A torpedo probably would not do much damage if it is exploded 
 as close as 50 feet distance from the ship, but it might start a few 
 seams; 100 feet away it would not do any damage. The gyroscope 
 of the torpedo regulates its course; it is as delicate as a watch and 
 its bearings have to be just about right. 
 
 It was developed that the Germans were doing everything pos- 
 sible to reduce the sounds emanating from a submarine, and there- 
 fore the problem seemed to be to get a faint sound detector of 
 exceeding delicacy, together with some method of determining the 
 direction from which it came and the distance it had traveled from 
 the submarine in making it. 
 
 The present state of the development of the arts in the other sub- 
 jects which were discussed at the meeting became known to all of 
 the men present; and as a result it served as a starting point for 
 work on the develoiDment of devices in the arts discussed. 
 
 The Special Problems Committee of the Naval Consulting Board 
 decided that the most promising line of attack on the submarine 
 menace was develo]3ment of listening devices. 
 
 On February 28, 1917, the Submarine Signal Co. wrote a letter 
 to Mr. Lawrence Addicks in regard to the starting of a station at 
 Nahant. At a meeting of the Naval Consulting Board on March 10, 
 1917, the board passed a resolution indorsing and appreciating their 
 patriotic cooperation. 
 
 On April 7, 1917, the station was completed at Nahant, and active 
 work at the station begun on antisubmarine devices. 
 
 Dr. W. R. Whitney took Dr. Irving Langmuir, Mr. C. E. Eveleth, 
 and Dr. William D. Coolidge, of the General Electric Research Lab- 
 oratory, of which Dr. Whitney was the head, down to Nahant, which 
 
, SPECIAL PROBLEMS COMMITTEE. 75 
 
 was situated mi the shore of Massachusetts Bay near the end of 
 Nahant Peninsula. 
 
 Three or four small laboratories were put up there and the men 
 who accompaned Dr. Whitney took to these laboratories the devices 
 upon which they were working prior to that time, principally the 
 pliatron for increasing and magnifying the audibility of sound. 
 The pliatron was put on the Fessenden oscillator, which was a 
 standard piece of apparatus buiJt before the war, and used on vessels 
 commonly throughout the war. An oscillator so equipped with a 
 pliatron was placed on a tripod in the Bay of Nahant, and the passage 
 of boats in the harbor and submarines were listened to. 
 
 Experiments were conducted to note the value of Fessenden 
 oscillator without any amplification. With the amplifiers it was 
 hoped to get, and they did get, very much better results. It was 
 decided, however, that the oscillator was not the thing to us6, 
 because it was heavy and couldn't be installed on very small boats. 
 It had a big motor generator as part of its equipment, and therefore 
 work was immediately started to produce portable listening devices 
 that could be put upon any boat. 
 
 In order to provide closer cooperation between each of the three 
 companies working at Nahant and the Navy Department, the Secre- 
 tary of the Navy called a conference in his office on May 9, 1917. This 
 conference resulted in the appointment by the Secretary of a Special 
 Board on Anti-Siibmarine Devices. On May 11, 1917, Admiral Grant 
 was appointed senior member of this board and Commanders McDow- 
 ell and Libbey were made members. A representative from each 
 of the three interested companies and one from the National Research 
 Council were appointed as advisory members. Immediately after 
 this, the Nahant station was placed at the disposal of the Special 
 Board on Anti-Submarine Devices and the desired cooperation was 
 in this manner effected. 
 
 The National Research Council arranged for conferences which 
 were held in Washington in the early part of June, 1917. Scientific 
 representatives from England and France, representatives from 
 the bureaus of the Navy Department and from the General Electric 
 Co., Western Electric Co., and the Submarine Signal Co. were 
 present. Sir Ernest Rutherford, the scientific representative from 
 England, described certain experiments conducted abroad with 
 Broca tubes, employing the binaural principle for the determination 
 of direction. Subsequently, a group of scientists was organized by 
 the National Research Council to carry on experiments at New Lon- 
 don along the lines suggested from the conferences. Dr. Coolidge 
 of the General Electric Co. repeated certain experiments in the 
 "Mohawk River with Broca tubes, employing the binaural principle 
 
76 NAVAL CONSULTING BOAED OP THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 for determining direction. The result of his experimental work in 
 this connection was the invention of the C tube, which is an applica- 
 tion of the binaural principle with modified forms of Broca tubes. 
 A practical demonstration of the C tube was conducted in Boston 
 Harbor in August, 1917. This was the first practical listening device 
 developed in America during the war. The next device was developed 
 at Nahant, and was known as the K tube. This device is an adapta- 
 tion of the rotary compensator developed by Prof. Mason at New 
 London, with microphones so as to enable the device to be towed 
 several hundred feet astern of the listening vessel. Subsequently, the 
 combined work at the Nahant station and at New London resulted 
 in the development of the Y tube, Delta tube, OS tube, and OK tube. 
 These devices are modified forms of the K tube, which were neces- 
 sary for installations on different types of vessels. The work con- 
 ducted at Nahant and at New London has at all times been under 
 the direct supervision of the Navy Department. 
 
 On June 23, 1917, the Secretary of the Navy issued an order approv- 
 ing a plan to coordinate and organize the efforts of various groups 
 considering submarine and antisubmarine devices and placed the 
 whole under the special board mentioned above, of which Rear 
 Admiral Grant was the senior member. (See copy of order in 
 Appendix.) The civilian advisory members appointed on May 11, 
 1917, were Dr. W. R. Whitney, of the Naval Consulting Board; Mr. 
 H. J. W. Fay, of the Submarine Signal Co. ; Prof. R. A. Millikan, 
 of the National Research Council (afterwards Lieut. Col. Millikan, 
 U. S. R.) ; and Dr. F. B. Jewett, of the Western Electric Co. 
 
 Dr. Whitney was fortunate in having associated with him in the 
 laboratory of the General Electric Co. at Schenectady, N. Y., Dr. 
 Irving Langmuir and Mr. C. E. Eveleth, and that company gave its 
 assistance. A great deal of production work was done by the General 
 Electric Co. under contract. 
 
 Dr. Coolidge's discovery came about in this way : He was engaged 
 in tying Broca tubes of different types to brass tubing, by means of 
 rubber connectors, for operation under water, and was studying the 
 effects of dimensions and material on the Broca tubes. He observed 
 the fact that the listening was better, more sensitive, and was aperiodic 
 under these conditions. lie found that the rubber connectors alone 
 were better on the listeners than the Broca tubes, and from that time 
 on the efforts were directed toward the development of rubber listen- 
 ing devices. The longer the rubber connector was the better, until 
 finally it was decided to drop off the Broca tubes and tie one end of 
 the rubber tube with a string, and it was found that it worked better 
 than it would with the Broca tubes. This experiment was done in 
 the Mohawk River near the plant of the General Electric Co. at 
 Schenectady, N. Y. 
 
SPECIAL PKOBLBMS COMMITTEE. 77 
 
 The so-called " C " tube was the tube of Dr. Coolidge, the " C " 
 standing for the name of the man who developed it. It was sometimes 
 called the " Sea " tube without anyone's correcting it. This system 
 of naming the tubes by the first letter of the man's name who devel- 
 oped them was later abandoned. 
 
 Through the courtesy of the Navy Department permission has 
 been given to publish information of certain listening devices devel- 
 oped under the -cognizance of the Navy Department's direction at 
 New London and Nahant, by the associated naval officers and scien- 
 tists representing the special board, the Naval Consulting Board, the 
 National Research Council, General Electric Co., Submarine Signal 
 Co., and Western Electric Co. 
 
 The standard C tube is shown in photograph No. 74-9. It was 
 made in three sizes, 15 feet long with one-half-inch brass tubing, 20 
 feet long with three-quarter-inch tubing, and 25 feet long with three- 
 quarter-inch tubing. The total number of C tubes built was ap- 
 proximately 1,020. 
 
 The method of using the C tube is as follows : 
 
 After the ship has lost headway and the C tube put overboard, the 
 observer seats himself and places the stethoscopes in his ears, care 
 being taken to get the left tube in the left ear and the right tube in 
 the right ear. He then listens without rotating the C tube until 
 hearing a sound. To "obtain a fix" on this sound, if the sound 
 appears to come from the left, turn the handwheel to the left, or in 
 a counter-clockwise direction, until the sound appears to come from 
 the right. Then turn to the right until the sound appears to come 
 from the left again, and repeat this operation several times, making 
 the amount of turning less each time until the sound seems to come 
 from directly ahead, or is " centered." The scale reading will now 
 give the direction of the source of sound in degrees from the ship's 
 head. If this method is not followed and the wheel merely turned 
 in either direction until the sound is centered, the scale reading is 
 apt to be 180° from the true bearing. 
 
 In service, a boat equipped with this device advances in a series 
 of rushes and stops. The usual time from stopping bell to starting 
 bell, including time to take observations, is generally about 90 
 seconds and the accuracy of the angle usually closer than 5°. The 
 range varies from 1,000 to 8,000 yards under different conditions. 
 
 After many further tests with C tubes, magnetophones, and micro- 
 phones suspended from the rail and also from a submerged float 
 at some distance from the ship, it was discovered that while a reced- 
 ing sound could be held longest by the most sensitive magnetophones 
 or microphones, especially of the drifter type and nondirectional, the 
 shorter range C tube almost invariably was the first to pick up a new 
 sound. This showed that the binaural scheme of listening was of 
 
78 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 great advantage on account of the discriminating possibility on the 
 part of tlie observer, due to his being able to apparently shift the 
 sound by moving the device, as compared with the necessity ot 
 original recognition dependent upon detecting the rhythmic beat of 
 the propeller, as in the case of the nondirectional device. 
 
 These tests clearly demonstrated the advantages of a device which 
 would have sensitive microphone receivers arranged for binaural 
 listening and located at some distance from the ship so as not to be 
 affected by troublesome water noises, and every effort was made to 
 produce such a device. After many experiments, both at Nahant 
 and Schenectady, Dr. A. W. Hull and Mr. Chester Eice, of the 
 Research Laboratory, developed a microphone support consisting of 
 a rubber cup slippecl over the end of a brass tube, the other end being 
 inclosed by a suitable stuffing box. This arrangement, with a Sub- 
 marine Signal Co. microphone or " button," gave an almost aperiodic 
 receiver with complete binaural shift of the sound received, similar 
 to the C tube and in its final form became the K tube unit or " rat " 
 and was used in all of the laier General Electric detection devices 
 using microphones. A cross-sectional view is shown by photograph 
 No. 74-271. 
 
 The K tube. — The K tube consists of three " rats," or K tube units, 
 mounted upon a brass or galvanized steel triangle 4 feet apart, to- 
 gether with a metal float, lead weights, wooden floats, four-conductor 
 cable, reel, deck cable, and compensator. It is shown on photograph 
 No. 7-1^242, except for reel and compensator. 
 
 The OS tube. — The OS tube, produced in April, 1918, is a direction 
 finder designed to tow from a ship, which will either listen while 
 under way, if the sounds are satisfactorily loud, or, with power shut 
 off, will listen while way is still on the ship. It was designed to 
 improve the quality, range, and weight of the English listening de- 
 vice known as the " Nash fish." 
 
 "With a chaser running at full speed readings are generally taken 
 in from one to two minutes from the time that power is shut off. A 
 submarine at 4 or 5 knots can be heard at distances from 1 to 5 miles, 
 surface ships from 8 to 15 miles, and direction obtained on the 
 average closer than 10°. The advantage of this device over "at- 
 tached to the hull " devices is in the freedom from water noise, as it 
 is usable under practically any conditions of the sea. It is mate- 
 rially lighter and has greater range and more discriminating power 
 than the previously used English device. Approximately 210 com- 
 plete OS tubes were built at the Lynn works. 
 
 The complete OS tube consists of a steel stream-line spreader, three 
 rubber fish, each containing a K unit or rat, which are towed from 
 the spreader in the form of an equilateral triangle, 4 feet between the 
 receivers, four-conductor towing cable, swivel reel, deck cable, and 
 
78-1 
 
 74-187 
 O. S. TUBE COMPLETE. 
 
THE K TUBE, 
 
74-271 
 THE K-TUBE UNIT. 
 
 7S-3 
 
74-238 
 THE Y-5 TUBE. 
 
74-237 
 THE Y-5 TUBE. 
 
 79-2 
 
THE O. K. A TUBE WITH PROTECTORS. 
 
74-374 
 THE O. K. TUBE. 
 
 79^1 
 
79-5 
 
 74-226 
 THE O. S. UNIT. 
 
SPECIAL PROBLEMS COMMITTEE. 79 
 
 compensator. The compensator is the same as the one used with the 
 K tube. The OS tube complete is shown in photograph No. 74-187. 
 A cross-sectional view is given by photograph No. 74-225. Before 
 shipment every OS tube was given a sea test at Nahant by members 
 of the Nahant group. 
 
 The OK tube. — After the development of the K tube and OS tube 
 it was believed that a listening device combining the advantages of 
 the towed and drifter type would prove very useful. Work was 
 therefore started along these lines, and the OK tube was the result. 
 The final form of the OK tube for surface-craft work is shown in 
 photograph No. 74^374. This device consists of a metal stream-line 
 spreader with metal float, which supports three K tube units inclosed 
 in stream-line rubber protectors. It may be towed and used like an 
 OS tube or used while drifting like a K tube. 
 
 A special light-weight OK tube for aircraft work was also designed 
 and is shown with reel and cable in photograph No. 74r-373. Its 
 weight with protectors filled with water is approximately 30 pounds. 
 With this device submarines were accurately followed while the air- 
 ship was under way at something like 4 or 5 knots and the submarine 
 submerged and distant 1,000 yards. 
 
 The Y tube.— On March 27 and 29, 1918, tests were made of a 
 special K-tube outfit attached to the bow of the submarine G-l. 
 This outfit consisted of a sjDar bolted to and overhanging the bow 
 of the G-J. A head of a rubber fish was attached to the end of the 
 spar and two other fish were held by iron arms bolted to the spar. 
 The K-tube units in the three fish were spaced 4 feet apart. These 
 tests proved so successful that they led to the development of the 
 
 Y tube. 
 
 The Y tube, produced in April, 1918, is a listening device for use 
 from a stationary or moving submarine. It consists of two sets, one 
 for the deck and one for the keel, of three K-tube units inclosed 
 in rubber stream line protectors and supported by a steel casting in 
 the form of a triangle and operated with a compensator in the 
 same manner as a K tube. The Y-tube casting with rubber pro- 
 tectors for K-tube units is shown in photographs Nos. 74^237 and 74^ 
 238. Four conductor cables run from the deck and keel installa- 
 tions to a junction box inside the submarine near the compensator. 
 Here the compensator may be connected at will to either the deck 
 or keel installation. The deck installation is used while the sub- 
 marine is submerged, but the keel installation may be used while 
 on the surface. Approximately 80 complete Y tubes each for deck . 
 and keel installation were built at the Lynn works. In addition 25 
 
 Y tubes for deck installation only were also built. The Y tube 
 is now standard equipment for submarines. 
 
80 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 The Delta tube. — The Delta tube devised in December, 1917, is a 
 listening device designed for water or oil tank installations on de- 
 stroyers. It consists of a steel spider supporting three K units 
 spaced 4 feet apart and a compensator. It is operated in the same 
 manner as a K tube or Y tube. Photograph No. 74-217 shows the 
 Delta 5 or water-tank installation. Photograph 74-283 shows the 
 Delta 6 or oil-tank installation. In this type the K units are in- 
 closed in oil-tight metal containers, which are filled with water. A 
 total -of approximately 100 Delta tubes were built at the Lynn works. 
 
 Mr. B. G. Lamme became chairman of the Special Problems Com- 
 mittee, and as such took charge of the direction of experiments to 
 find other methods besides those above described of detecting the sub- 
 marine. Maj. (later Lieut. Col.) Ralph D. Mershon, United States 
 Army, under the direct supervision of Mr. Lamme, conducted this' 
 work. Maj. Mershon devoted all of his time to it, and was attached to 
 the Naval Consulting Board for this purpose. The great bulk of 
 these experiments led to negative results. In work of this nature it 
 was to be expected that by far the greater part of the schemes investi- 
 gated would lead only to negative results. The object aimed at was 
 to try out to a definite and final positive or negative conclusion those 
 schemes for accomplishing a desirable end which were most promis- 
 ing, in view of existing knowledge, or in which lack of knowledge 
 appeared to offer the possibility of a practical result. 
 
 The following is a summary of the results of this work: 
 
 SUBMARINE DETECTION. 
 
 MAGNETIC NEEDLES. 
 (Under direction of Special Problems Committee.) 
 
 This work has to do with the detection of submarines by the 
 deflection of some form of magnetic needle. It had its inception in 
 the work done under the auspices of the Special Problems Committee, 
 by Prof. C. F. Scott, of Yale University, and his assistants, in de- 
 termining the magnetic field in and around a submarine. The 
 problem of detection was then taken up by Profs. Nichols and 
 Zeleny, of Yale University. These two men took up the work sepa- 
 rately and worked along different lines. They both made use of 
 magnetic needles, but they made use of them in distinctly different 
 ways. 
 
 As the result of their preliminary work it became evident that in 
 order to give this method of detection a thorough try out it would 
 be necessary to have a stabilized and oriented platform or table, 
 
74-283 
 THE DELTA-5 TUBE. 
 
 80 
 
81 
 
 74-217 
 THE DELTA-5 TUBE. 
 
SPECIAL PROBLEMS COMMITTEE. 81 
 
 on which to place the detecting instruments. Arrangements were 
 therefore made by the board with the Sperry Gyroscope Co. to supply 
 a gyroscopically stabilized platform. The tests were not completed. 
 
 HIGH FKEQUENCT ALTERNATING MAGNETIC TIELD. 
 
 The method of detecting submarines by an alternating magnetic 
 field involves the setting up of such a field by means of an alter- 
 nating current magnet, and then detecting, through the change in 
 the voltage generated in a coil, or coils, suitably disposed in the field, 
 any modification of the field due to the presence of a submarine. 
 
 The use of an alternating magnetic field in the detection of a sub- 
 marine was independently suggested by a number of people, in- 
 cluding Maj. Mershon and Mr. Lamme. Experimental work was 
 begun at 500 cycles. It was soon realized that the many apparent 
 advantages of a frequency as high as this were accompanied by a 
 number of very serious disadvantages. This made it appear desir- 
 able to experiment at much lower frequencies, as well as at 500 
 cycles. 
 
 At about this time it was ascertained that Prof. V. Bush, of Tufts 
 College, had some time before begun experimenting along the same 
 lines and at 500 cycles. Maj. Mershon visited him and found that he 
 had the work so well in hand as to make it appear expedient for the 
 Special Problems Committee to confine its activities to low frequency 
 and assist Prof. Bush in every way possible in his high-frequency 
 work. This policy was adopted, and every possible assistance that 
 the board was able to give, except financial assistance, was extended 
 to Prof. Bush. The expense of Prof. Bush's work was borne entirely 
 by the American Radio & Eesearch Corporation, at the instigation 
 of its general manager, Mr. H. J. Power. 
 
 Although Prof. Bush has not realized as great a range of detec- 
 tion as was hoped for, he has achieved a range which will make his 
 device of considerable value in the exact location of sleeping sub- 
 marines, and in the accurate dropping of bombs upon them. 
 
 LOW TKEQUENCT ALTERNATING MAGNETIC FIELD. 
 
 A series of experiments was conducted for the Special Problems 
 Committee of the Naval Consulting Board by Mr. J. B. Whitehead 
 and Mr. L. O. Grondahl. 
 
 The plan for the detection of submarines which was tested in these 
 experiments was first suggested by Maj. Mershon. Briefly, it con- 
 sists in locating a magnet excited by alternating current and two 
 coils on the searching vessel. One of these coils is relatively large 
 168537°— 20 6 
 
82 NAVAL, CONSXTLTING BOAED OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 and at a distance from the magnet. The other coil is small and 
 close to the magnet. The electromotive force in the smaller coil is 
 adjusted so that it is exactly equal in magnitude and in phase to 
 that in the larger, or detecting, coil. The two coils are connected in 
 series with each other, the circuit including a delicate detecting 
 instrument. If a submarine is in the neighborhood of a searching 
 vessel it will upset the symmetry of the magnetic field, causing a 
 difference in the electromotive forces in the two coils and a conse- 
 quent indication on the detecting instrument. 
 
 Experiments exploring the possibilities of the method were carried 
 on in three places: (1) In the Laboratory of Electrical Engineering, 
 Johns Hopkins University; (2) at the Engineei-ing Experiment 
 Station, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis ; (3) on submarine 
 chaser No. 326. 
 
 The experiments at Johns Hopkins University consisted of testa 
 of the physical laws underlying the method, the determination of 
 uiilinown constants, and the devising and checking of a method for 
 computing the size and performance of an enlarged equipment. 
 The experiments were performed with a magnet 6 feet long and with 
 submarine models 10 feet long. 
 
 The experiments at the Engineering Experiment Station were per- 
 formed with a magnet 19 feet long and a detecting coil 7 feet in 
 diameter, which were erected on the end of a pier extending into 
 deep water. Detection tests were performed using the iron tug 
 Standish, 180 feet long, and the converted yacht Wasp, 200 feet 
 long. These vessels were detected at distances between 400 and 500 
 feet from the center of the magnet, and the results of a large number 
 of tests were in conformity with predictions based on the Baltimore 
 experiments. 
 
 Navy Depabtment, 
 Washington, June 23, 1917. 
 
 From : Secretary of the Navy. 
 
 To: Bureaus of Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering and Ordnance; 
 Board on Devices and Plans connected with Submarine Warfare; Board to 
 Consider and Experiment with Devices for the Detection of Submarines; 
 Naval Consulting Board and National Research Council. 
 
 Subject: Detection and other Submarine Devices — Coordination and Organiza- 
 tion of Efforts of various groups. 
 
 Inclosure: (o) Organization diagram. 
 
 1. The department has approved the plan to coordinate and organize the 
 efforts of various groups now considering submarine and antisubmarine devices 
 and plans which is shown on the accompanying organization diagram. The 
 cooperation of all concerned is urged in order that useful devices and plans may 
 be put to actual use in the Navy at the earliest possible time. 
 
 2. It is the department's desire that the special board, of which Rear Admiral 
 Grant, U. S. Navy, is senior member, shall have complete charge of the carrying 
 out of experiments on submarine and antisubmarine devices, and that no device 
 
SPECIAL PROBLEMS COMMITTEE. 
 
 83 
 
 of this nature is to be put in use in tlie service until it has been Investigated and 
 such Installation recommended by this board. 
 
 3. It is desired that all devices and plans which are received by the depart- 
 ment, the Naval Consulting Board, the National Research Council, the various 
 bureaus, and other boards in Washington, be considered by them with such 
 communications among themselves as necessary, and that these bodies act as 
 filters to discard all manifestly Impossible schemes and duplications of schemes 
 already tried, these bodies to forward to the special board only such schemes as 
 show promise and to give definite recommendations of what experiments they 
 would consider desirable. If any of these organizations believe that any par- 
 ticular men are especially qualified to conduct certain experiments, they should 
 make such recommendations to the special board. 
 
 JosEPHUS Daniels. 
 
 
 
 
 MAW nFPART^/lFMT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Various 
 Boards 
 
 
 
 Bureaus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Naval Consulting 
 Board 
 
 
 
 
 
 National Research 
 Council 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SUBMARINE-DEVICE ORGANIZATION. 
 
 This plan contemplates the closest possible cooperation between the Navy 
 Department bureaus, Navy Department boards, Naval Consulting Board, and 
 the National Research Council. 
 Approved : 
 
 JosEPHUs Daniels, 
 
 Secretary of the Navy. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 SHIP PROTECTION COMMITTEE. 
 
 As pointed out in the chapter on " Organization," the Naval Con- 
 sulting Board was attached to the Navy Department, and its con- 
 nection with this department was made through the Office of the 
 Secretary of the Navy. Merchant-ship owners and captains of ves- 
 sels were not entirely under the control of the Navy Department, 
 and therefore the Naval Consulting Board, until the creation of the 
 Ship Protection Committee, did not have any satisfactory method 
 of introducing inventions to the merchant marine. 
 
 The campaign of the German submarines was directed against 
 these merchant vessels, and the problem of conquering the submarine 
 revolved about methods of protecting the ships and safely trans- 
 porting their cargoes across the ocean. This great problem con- 
 fronted all organizations that had anything to do with maritime or 
 naval matters. 
 
 The Naval Consulting Board, after its creation, was given a great 
 deal of publicity and the members of the board were widely known 
 individually. It was therefore not surprising that the United 
 States Shipping Board, hereinafter mentioned, and the Emergency 
 Fleet Corporation, also mentioned hereafter, should take up with 
 Mr. W. L. Saunders, chairman of the Naval Consulting Board, 
 some method of organization by which inventions might be handled 
 for merchant vessels. In order to understand the situation a short 
 description is given of the organization of the United States Ship- 
 ping Board and the Emergency Fleet Corporation and the develop- 
 ment of the Ship Protection Committee through the cooperative 
 effort of the Emergency Fleet Corporation and the Naval Consulting 
 Board. 
 
 The United States Shipping Board was organized by act of Con- 
 gress September 7, 1916 (see sec. 3 of the shipping act (30 Stat. L., 
 738, 729)). The act provides as follows: 
 
 That a board is hereby created, to be known as the United States Shipping 
 Board, and hereinafter referred to as the board. The board shall be composed 
 84 
 
SHIP PROTECTION COMMITTEE. 85 
 
 of five commissioners, to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice 
 and consent of the Senate ; said board shall annually elect one of its members 
 as chairman and one as vice chairman. , 
 
 The first commissioners appointed shall continue in office for terms of tvco, 
 three, four, five, and six years, respectively, from the date of their appointment, 
 the term of each to be designated by the President, but their successors shall be 
 appointed for terms of six years, except that any person chosen to fill a vacancy 
 shall be appointed only for the unexpired term of the commissioner whom he 
 succeeds. 
 
 Under this act the Shipping Board became a part of the adminis- 
 trative machinery of the' Government, designed in times of peace to 
 promote the development of an American merchant marine and to 
 regulate foreign and domestic shipping. It was given additional 
 powers of an emergency character, intended to meet the shipping 
 problems incident to consummation by the Government of its vast 
 war purposes. The board, in the exercises of the powers conferred 
 by later legislation, acted solely as the agent of the President of the 
 United States. 
 
 The most important of the board's war powers were exerted by 
 it through the instrumentality of the United States Shipping Board 
 Emergency Fleet Corporation, the details of the organization and 
 purposes of which were as follows : 
 
 The board was authorized by the shipping act to form, with a 
 capifal stock not exceeding $50,000,000, one or more corporations for 
 the " purchase, construction, equipment, lease, charter, maintenance, 
 and operation of merchant vessels in the commerce of the United 
 States." The purpose of this authorization was to place vessels 
 operated under Government appropriation on a competitive equality 
 with private shipping, by exempting the latter on the one hand from 
 governmental restrictions not adapted to commercial practice, and 
 by withholding from them on the other such special immunity in 
 domestic or international law as is customarily associated with gov- 
 ernmental activity. The power under this act to operate ships is 
 greatly restricted, but the power to build ships is limited only by the 
 measure of the appropriations. 
 
 Acting under the authority of the shipping act, the board on April 
 16, 1917, organized under the laws of the District of Columbia, with 
 a capital stock of $50,000,000, what is known as the United States 
 Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, and delegated to 
 that corporation the execution of its construction program. 
 
 The President, by Executive order, delegated to the corporation 
 the comprehensive powers conferred upon him by the urgent de- 
 ficiency appropriation act of June 15, 1917, in so far as they relate 
 to the construction of vessels, and he made available to it the funds 
 appropriated for this purpose. 
 
86 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 The officers of the Emergency Fleet Corporation were president, 
 vice president, second vice president, treasurer, and secretary. The 
 trustees of the corporation, seven in number, were elected by and 
 were under the control of the Shipping Board. 
 
 While in legal form a private corporation, the Emergency Fleet 
 Corporation was in fact completely under governmental control. As 
 a result the activities of the corporation and the board were closely 
 interrelated. 
 
 Some time in May, 1917, Maj. Gen. George W. Goethals, at that 
 time manager of the Emergency Fleet Corporation, requested Mr. 
 William L. Saunders, chairman of the Naval Consulting Board, to 
 have some member of the board visit him and discuss the question of 
 handling the large amount of correspondence which he was receiv- 
 ing containing suggestions of ideas for protecting merchant ships 
 from torpedo attack, and also in regard to various construction de- 
 tails which would render such vessels more immune to attack. At 
 the request of Mr. Saunders, Mr. A. M. Hunt, a member of the Naval 
 Consulting Board, went to Washington and had a conference with 
 Gen. Goethals and also Mr. F; A. Eustis, who was at that time Gen. 
 Goethals's assistant, and Mr. Theodore Brent, one of the com- 
 missioners of the United States Shipping Board. 
 
 Out of this conference there grew the idea that there should be a 
 committee, limited in numbers, chairman of which should be an 
 official of the Emergency Fleet Corporation in order to put behind 
 the committee the authority and prestige of that body, and that one 
 of the members should be a naval architect of experience, and the 
 third member should be a man having experience with the opera- 
 tion of vessels; also that one of the members should be a" member 
 of the Naval Consulting Board. The above ideas were suggested by 
 Mr. Hunt, and a few days after this an interview took place between 
 Gen. Goethals, Mr. William L. Saunders, and Mr. Hunt, in which 
 the general expressed his belief that the ideas suggested were proper, 
 and he appointed the committee, naming Eear Admiral H. H. Rous- 
 seau as chairman of it and Mr. A. M. Hunt as a member. He selected 
 W. T. Donnelly, a naval architect of New York City, as the third 
 member. Eear Admiral A. R. Couden, United States Navy, was 
 made a member of the committee late in the summer of 1917. 
 
 The committee was organized at once and proceeded to go through 
 the large amount of correspondence which had accumulated prior 
 to its appointment. Mr. J. G. De Remer was appointed as technical 
 assistant to the committee and took charge of its office and routine 
 work. After the formation of this committee and conference with 
 the Navy Department it was arranged that all communications re- 
 ceived by the Navy Department directly, or by the Naval Consulting 
 Board, referring to ideas, suggestions, and inventions for the pro- 
 
SHIP PROTECTION COMMITTEE. 87 
 
 tection of merchant ships, should be turned over to the Ship Protec- 
 tion Committee of the Emergency Fleet Corporation for attention 
 Thereafter the Navy Department and the Naval Consulting Board 
 did turn over all devices of this character to that committee. 
 
 As pointed out heretofore, the Navy did not have control over 
 merchant shipping, and the Naval Consulting Board, being attached 
 to the Navy Department, also had no affiliation with merchant ves- 
 sels, so that the formation of this Ship Protection Committee, in the 
 manner above described, was an arrangement by which the United 
 States Shipping Board and the Emergency Fleet Corporation would 
 have the benefit of all ideas and suggestions for the protection of 
 merchant ships that came to the Navy Department or the Naval Con- 
 sulting Board. 
 
 During its early days the committee went forward with the above 
 organization, but later in the summer of 1917 it was felt that the 
 power of the committee might be somewhat increased if there were 
 brought into connection with it other branches of the Government 
 having to do with shipping, such as the Federal War Risk Bureau, 
 the Export License Bureau, the Steamboat-Inspection Service, and 
 the Navy Department. The committee was accordingly enlarged by 
 the appointment of representatives of these Government bodies, and 
 Mr. John A. Donald, one of the commissioners of the Shipping 
 Board, became its chairman. 
 
 This committee was known as the Ship Protection Committee of 
 the United States Shipping Board, and the original Ship Protection 
 Committee above mentioned, started by Maj . Gen. Goethals, manager 
 of Emergency Fleet Corporation, with the inclusion of Rear Ad- 
 miral A. R. Couden, became the executive committee of the enlarged 
 committee, and handled all the routine work. The larger committee 
 was only called together at intervals when it was felt desirable to 
 get the concurrence and cooperation of the departments of the Gov- 
 ernment represented. 
 
 The merchant vessels were under the control of individual owners 
 and they were particularly interested in getting vessels loaded and 
 back and forth across the ocean as quickly as possible. Freight rates 
 were very high, and if a boat was sunk they felt that the insurance 
 people made good their loss. The matter of the enforcement of 
 ship-protection devices was therefore approached through insurance 
 channels, as the only coercive instrument that could be used at that 
 time on the shipowner. Subsequently, when the Shipping Board 
 took over all ships, it had control of them. 
 
 The Ship Protection Committee was not an executive body and 
 could only recommend to the Shipping Board the adoption of these 
 various protecting devices. > There should have been created a divi- 
 sion of ship protection having coordinated authority and responsi- 
 
88 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OP THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 bility with other divisions of the Shipping Board to carry out the 
 recommendations of the Ship Protection Committee. As a result, 
 the committee had great difficulty in getting the adoption of its 
 recommendations. 
 
 As the Ship Protection Committee had as one of its parents the 
 Naval Consulting Board, and as the board was represented on its 
 membership, the activities and conclusions of this committee were 
 presented to the board for indorsement. The board had studied for 
 months the subject of camouflage and smoke reduction in the danger 
 zone. Wlien the Ship Protection Committee made its report on this 
 subject, signed by all the members of the committee and indorsed by 
 Gen. Goethals, the board unanimously approved the recommenda- 
 tions and made an effort to have them put into effect. Much opposi- 
 tion was encountered because of the exjDense, most of the ships being 
 operated by private owners. It was evident to the board that some- 
 thing should be done to distort the line of a vessel by camouflage 
 and to reduce to a minimum the smoke discharged from the funnels 
 of a ship when in the danger zone. Little or no progress was made 
 either with the Government or with private individuals. There was 
 no organized opposition, but nothing was done. The chairman, 
 W. L. Saunders, laid the matter before President Wilson and sug- 
 gested to him the advisability of having William G. McAdoo, Sec- 
 retary of the Treasury, put his initiative and force into an effort to 
 get the recommendations of the board put into effect. The chairman 
 then took the matter up with Mr. McAdoo, who promptly and effec- 
 tively caused a practical movement to be made through the Bureau 
 of War Risk Insurance of the Treasury Department. A circular 
 was issued by this bureau putting a penalty of about one-half of 
 1 per cent in insurance rates on all vessels clearing without a supply 
 of anthracite coal for smoke reduction when passing through the 
 danger zone and without proper camouflage and other safeguards, 
 such as guns, etc., all of which were approved in the Ship Protec- 
 tion Committee report. These instri\ptions placed the responsibility 
 upon the chairman of the Naval Consulting Board to waive the 
 penalty if conditions were found to warrant it. The result of this 
 action was a gradual and general change of policy on the part of 
 shippers, which led ultimately to the adoption of these protective 
 measures. 
 
 Later all shipping was taken over by the United States Shipping 
 Board, and the board began to carry its own insurance. It requisi- 
 tioned these vessels on time charter, and they were operated at the 
 risk of the United States Shipping Board as underwriters. They 
 insured all vessels, and they therefore were in a position to make the 
 vessel owners do as the board required. , On October 15, 1917, the 
 Shipping Board chartered every vessel of 26 tons carrying capacity 
 
SHIP PKOTEOTION COMMITTEE. 89 
 
 or over to the United States Government through the Shipping 
 Board, and they forced neutrals to come to the Shipping Board and 
 take time charters from it by telling them that if they did not take 
 the time charters from the Shipping Board on the same basis that 
 the Shipping Board was paying its own people the Shipping Board 
 would refuse them bunkers and stores. The effect of that was that 
 the freight would be carried to the other side of the Atlantic on the 
 same basis by neutrals as by American ships, the i-esult being that 
 both vessels flying the American flag and neutrals were under time 
 charter to the United States Shipping Board and were therefore, 
 to a certain extent, under its control in the way of insurance rates. 
 The 'Government, to move ships beiore the war, had to provide 
 insurance for them. 
 
 The committee in the meantime had secured a pamphlet of instruc- 
 tions issued by the British Board of Trade containing regulations 
 to be observed by British vessels in the war zone and, using this 
 pamphlet as a basis, prepared a similar one for adoption by the 
 Shipping Board. This pamphlet of regulations was adopted by the 
 board, and at the instance of the committee two inspectors were 
 appointed, one with headquarters in New York City and the other 
 at Norfolk, Va., to inspect all ships leaving this side of the Atlantic 
 to see if the regulations had been complied with and were understood 
 by the officers of the vessels. 
 
 The Navy Department did not allow vessels to sail unless they 
 had guns placed on them in the manner which they directed, and 
 with certain officers and men in the gun crew. The Shipping Board 
 also arranged that all masters and other officers of merchant ships 
 should cooperate heartily with the commander of the naval gun crew 
 assigned to their vessels, and the following letter was addressed to 
 masters and officers of merchant vessels, which was approved by 
 William C. Kedfield, Secretary of Commerce : 
 
 To licensed masters and offlcers of merchant vessels of the United States enter- 
 ing the war zone: 
 
 The department has had under serious consideration the very important 
 proposition of the necessity of adopting and using every means and method to 
 avoid so far as may be possible the attack of the submarine, and to this end 
 it is suggested that when in the war zone or within dangerous areas during 
 the night all lights that can possibly be dispensed with, including the signal 
 lights, should be extinguished and such precautions adopted as will effectually 
 blind every light on board to the observation of the enemy. There is offered 
 for your serious consideration the suggestion also that regular or set courses 
 should not be maintained, and that zigzag be adopted whenever the conditions 
 of the weather and the position of the ship will justify such deviation from 
 established practices of navigation. 
 
 Upon those ships which are armed, and the armament under the authority 
 of an officer of the United States Navy, it is requested that serious considera- 
 tion be given any suggestion "from the naval officer on board respecting the 
 
90 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THK UNITED STATES. 
 
 navigation of the ship, and Ms suggestion adopted unless In the opinion and 
 judgment of tlie master It can not be safely done. 
 
 Licensed masters and other officers are assured that the department will not 
 attack their licenses for any collision or other accident that may result from 
 the adoption of these suggestions respecting irregular navigation while in the 
 war zone or within suspected dangerous areas, as the paramount desire is that 
 every and all precautions be taken against submarine attack, and anything 
 that may result from such precautions will be considered as the lesser of the 
 two dangers. 
 
 Geo. Uhler, 
 Supervising Inspector General. 
 Approved May 25, 1917, 
 
 William C. Redfield, Secrciary. 
 
 The ShipiDing Board also directed that in the event of any dif- 
 ferences arising with the commander of the armed guard the master 
 of the ship should make an entry of such difference in the ship's log 
 and forward copy of such entry to the nearest United States Ship- 
 ping Board inspector, who in turn was directed to forward it im- 
 mediately to the United States Shipping Board at Washington, D. C. 
 The commander of the armed guard made full report to the Navy 
 Department of any difference arising between the ship's officers and 
 himself. It was then arranged that these two reports would be 
 considered by joint conference between the NaVy Department, the 
 United States Shipping Board, and the Steamboat-Inspection Serv- 
 ice, which conference was directed to recommend suitable action to 
 the authorities concerned. 
 
 The regulations of the Shipping Board for the conduct of mer- 
 chant ships were founded upon the report which the Ship Protection 
 Committee made to Gen. Goethals some time in June, 1917. This 
 report and correspondence in relation to it is as follows: 
 
 June 9, 1917. 
 Mr. W. L. Sahnuees, 
 
 President Niirul Consulting Board, Washington, D. C. 
 Deak Sir: I herewith hand you, in duplicate, preliminary report dated June 
 9, of the special committee which I appointed in consultation with you to study 
 and report on the matter of protection of merchant vessels from attack by 
 submarines. 
 
 The suggestions contained in this report are sensible, comparatively eco- 
 nomical, and apparently will be effective. I approve of them and in order to 
 get action on them would request that competent authority direct that they 
 be given such trial and use as the urgency of the situation indicates is neces- 
 sary. 
 
 Yours, very truly, 
 
 Geo. W. Goethals, General Manager. 
 
 June 9, 1917. 
 Maj. Gen. Geo. W. Goethals, U. S. Army, 
 
 General lUanager Emergency Fleet Corporation, Waslnngton, D. C. 
 Dear Sir : The special comioitlee appointed by ,vou to study and report on the 
 matter of protection of merchant vessels from attacks by submarines submits 
 
SHIP PROTECTION COMMITTEE. 91 
 
 the following prelimiuary report on certain specific suggestions with recom- 
 mendations. 
 
 Item 1. Lower visibility of vessels iy special schemes of painting. — Mr. 
 William A. Mackey, of 345 East Thirty-third Street, New York City, has pre- 
 sented to us a system of painting vessels which in our opinion will lower their 
 visibility. Fundamentally, it is based on mottling the surfaces with the three 
 primary colors which at a distance blend to produce a gray having the quality of 
 gray light. He also proposes to shade tints so as to lower high lights and raise 
 low areas of illumination. 
 
 Through cooperation of Commander Fisher, United States Navy, Mr. Mackey 
 is having some submarine chasers painted at the New York yard, which will 
 be under observation next week. We believe that visibility can be reduced 
 by proper methods of painting, and that the importance of so doing will justify 
 the added expense. 
 
 Recommendation : If Mr. Maekey's system bears out its promises on test, we 
 are prepared to recommend that the Federal War Risk Bureau aud other under- 
 writers be asked to require its adoption as a warranty clause in their contracts 
 of insurance. 
 
 Ttem 2. Lower visibility by preventing smoke through the use of special fuel 
 in daytime in danger zone. — Admiral De Chair, of the British Navy, in a con- 
 ference with us stated that the suppression of smoke from the stacks of 
 steamers would materially improve their chances of escaping the observation 
 of submarines and consequent attack. 
 
 A number of elaborate and complicated schemes have been suggested to 
 accomplish this result and have not seemed practicable to us. 
 
 One simple scheme capable of prompt application to all ships sailing from 
 our eastern ports has been proposed. This consists in requiring all vessels 
 that leave this side to carry sufficient smokeless solid fuel (1. e., anthracite) 
 to 'take them through the daylight hours while they are in the submarine zone. 
 Practically any vessel sailing between our coast and English or French ports 
 can run the distance one way through the submarine zone and be exposed only 
 during one daylight period, which as a maximum is 17 hours. The amount of 
 anthracite coal that a steamer will burn in this time will be between 5 and 
 10 per cent of her total requirements, and it can be burned in the same fur- 
 naces and on the same grates as the ordinary fuel. 
 
 We have assurances -from the chairman of the Coal Production Committee 
 of the Council of National Defense that anthracite coal can be made available 
 for this purpose at Atlantic ports. 
 
 Recommendation : We recommend that every steamer engaged in trans- 
 Atlantic service be required to take sufficient approved smokeless fuel to 
 supply her needs for two daylight periods, and be required to use same in 
 accordance with prescribed regulations. This requirement can be promptly 
 enforced by action of the underwriting agencies. 
 
 Item 3. Increasing offensive power by continuing to install naval guns aboard 
 all merchant vessels that traverse the danger zone. — Information received by 
 the committee is to the effect that submarines attacking merchant vessels 
 armed or suspected to be armed generally feel obliged to use torpedoes and 
 fire them at considerable range. They also do not like to come to the surface 
 within gun range. 
 
 Recommendation : It would seem very necessary, therefore, as a means of 
 increasing the defensive power by continuiTig to install naval guns aboard them 
 as rapidly as possible. The committee assumes that this work would be, as 
 heretofore, under the control of the Navy, and does not understand that any 
 further action is necessary as regards this item. 
 
92 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED ■ STATES. 
 
 Item 4. Increasing offensive power hy installing at once on all merchant 
 vessels that traverse the danger zones special hoiviteers, capable of throwing 
 explosive hombs weighing from 100 to 200 pounds a distance of 2,000 yards 
 and providing each merchant vessel with a large supply of bombs. — Submarines 
 rarely come to the surface unless they are practically immune from damage by 
 naval guns. Of equal or greater usefulness, therefore, would be the installation 
 of a howitzer capable of covering the area within torpedo range and pro- 
 viding these howitzers with projectiles that by exploding at different depths, as 
 determined desirable in advance, would practically search out submarines when 
 submerged and would be able to destroy or damage them. This work is 
 understood to have been thoroughly tried out abroad, with very successful 
 results. It is understood that our Government has plans of different type 
 howitzers and projectiles and has available data on all the experimental work 
 and actual results. An ample supply of ammunition from 50 to 100 projectiles 
 per merchant vessel is an essential element for success. Naval Constructor 
 Stocker has suggested the furnishing of special projectiles charged with mate- 
 rial that on exploding will form a smoke screen, which might be of value both in 
 locating the place where the periscope or other object is seen as well as screen- 
 ing the vessel from the enemy. The committee believes that the suggestion 
 should be adopted. 
 
 Recommendation : The committee strongly recommends that immediate steps 
 should be taken to arm all merchant vessels with the greatest possible dis- 
 patch with weapons and ammunition of this general character. In addition to 
 the explosive torpedoes it is recommended that special projectiles be also fur- 
 nished that will on exploding make a smoke screen. This item, the same as the 
 preceding one, would come under the Navy Department for execution, and it 
 may be that steps have already been taken in that direction. 
 
 Item 5. Increased chances of escape by furnishing each mnchant vessel with 
 at least a dozen charges in wooden boxes which thrown overboard would ignite 
 and form a smoke screen. — Recommendation : We j-ecommeiid that all vessels 
 operating through the submarine zone be required to carry on deck one dozen 
 smoke bombs which will evolve smoke when thrown overboard. No detailed 
 discussion of this is necessary. 
 
 Item 6. Increasing flotation of vessel after being struck with torpedo by the 
 method proposed by Mr. Donnelly. — With reference to the possibility of so load- 
 ing steel ships as to render them nonsinkable, discussed by the committee at 
 the meeting on Saturday, June 2. 
 
 On Tuesday, June 5, Mr. W. T. Donnelly, of this committee and Mr. W. L. 
 Saunders, chairman of the Naval Advisory Board, visited the following ships 
 of the Atlantic Transport Line, ilanhattini, City of Cairo, and Cufic, to observe 
 the manner of loading and the interior structure affecting this problem. 
 
 The Manhattan was just commencing loading, the City of Cairo almost com- 
 pletely loaded, and the Cufic partly loaded, thus giving an opportunity for a 
 general study of the problem. 
 
 It is to be understood that the fundamental principle under consideration 
 is to so load a ship that there will not be sufficient space for water to enter in 
 case of being torpedoed, it being understood and recognized that if it is possible 
 to accomplish this, a ship and cargo can not be sunk by torpedo explosion. 
 
 The first observation made was to the effect that a very considerable space 
 in steel ships, between the frames at the sides between the deck beams, and 
 between stiffeners on bulkheads, is never used for cargo. This space is from 10 
 inches to 1 foot in dimension at right angles to the surface, and comprises the 
 total surface area of the outer skin of the cargo holds, the total surface of all 
 decks below the main deck, and the surface on each side of all bulkheads. 
 
SHIP PROTECTION COMMITTEE. 93 
 
 When It Is understood that the flotation of the steel forming the hull of 
 the ship, due to its specific gravity, requires a vacant space within the hull equal 
 to seven times the volume of the steel, and when it is further understood that 
 the thickness of the outer hull of an ordinary merchant vessel would be in the 
 neighborhood of two-thirds of an inch, and that seven times this space will 
 equal 4§ inches, it wiU be seen that the vacant space referred to will admit 
 water of a weight greater than the structural weigh of the ship, hence the im- 
 portance of eliminating this waste space. 
 
 The filling in of the waste space between the ribs and under the deck beams 
 of a vessel, together with the space between the stiffleners on bulkheads, by 
 small, water-tight structures of wood, would add a dependable buoyancy to a 
 loaded vessel of 10,000 tons of 2,361 tons. Adding to this the buoyancy of the 
 double bottom amounting to 1,851 tons would make the total dependable 
 buoyancy to float the ship, independent of cargo, 4i212 tons. Against this we 
 would have the submerged weight of the ste'eL hull as 2,610 tons, and the ma- 
 chinery and stores 885 tons, or a total of 3,495 tons. In other words, it appears 
 to be practical to support the total dead-weight structures of the hull by small 
 water-tight structures placed in portions of the hull now used for cargo. 
 
 The further development of this plan of protection contemplates stowing 
 the cargo to occupy closely all other space, either stowing portions of the cargo 
 in water-tight containers or interspersing the light containers among the cargo, 
 such as empty oil barrels in a cargo of heavy material. 
 
 It must be apparent to anyone that if the cargo itself occupies all the space 
 and is of such a nature as not to absorb water, or if of a nature to absorb 
 water it is so interspersed with other cargo or light containers, it will be 
 entirely possible to have a ship which can be in a sense water-logged but can 
 not be sunk. 
 
 The accompanying drawing No. 1 shows diagramatically the relative dis- 
 tribution of the steel-hull weight, the hull fittings, and machinery and stores; 
 also the cargo-carrying capacity and the reserve flotation capacity due to free- 
 board. 
 
 I am also submitting herewith detail drawing showing the manner of con- 
 structing wooden fillers, and detailed estimate of their weight and displace- 
 ment. It should be understood that it is not necessary to exclude all water 
 from the hull by stowing of cargo. The margin of safety which is admissible 
 is represented by the freeboard tonnage or the displacement between the full- 
 load line and the main deck. Referring to the diagram, this displacement will 
 be seen to amount to approximately one-third of the cargo displacement. In 
 other words, a ship with this manner of stowing cargo would float with a small 
 freeboard with 25 per cent of her cargo space full of water. 
 
 The foregoing is all on the supposition that all compartments have been 
 broken and water enters freely over the entire ship. This, of course, is the 
 most severe and, as a matter of fact, an unreasonable assumption. With one 
 or more compartments intact, the safety of the ship would be entirely assured. 
 
 As an additional precaution, it is recommended that hatch openings be ex- 
 tended downward by an inverted combing of such a depth as to trap under 
 the deck an amount of air which would represent in buoyancy the greatest 
 load from below which the deck would sustain. By this method it would be 
 possible to carry a very definite and considerable load by air under each deck, 
 provided the deck was made water-tight otherwise than at the hatch openings. 
 
 To overcome the difficulty of making a deck absolutely tight, a reasonable 
 amount of compressed air from a compressor located and operated from the 
 upper deck would be an added safety. 
 
94 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 Finally, it is believed that practical absolute safety of ships at sea with or 
 without cargoes could be provided (1) by such water-tight bulkheads and 
 double bottoms as at present exist; (2) supplemented by careful storage of 
 emergency bouyancy in all waste space below the main deck; (3) by careful 
 loading comprising the placing of light cargo in water-tight containers, and 
 supplementing this by dispersing water-tight containers through bulky cargoes 
 such as grain; (4) by adding reverse hatch combings to trap air beneath decks 
 according to the strength of the deck ; ( 5 ) by providing a source of compressed 
 air upon upper deck to be used in pumping double bottom in case of the flooding 
 of engine compartment. 
 
 Recommendation : We are prepared to recommend that the United States 
 Shipping Board put the foregoing method of increasing buoyancy into effect 
 at once on one or more of the vessels which it is opei-ating at the present time, 
 with the understanding that decision as to similar action being authorized on 
 all of the vessels of the United States Shipping Board, both completed and 
 under construction, await the result of this practical trial, and that simul- 
 taneously therewith the matter be taken up with the Federal and other under- 
 writing agencies in an endeavor to secure their cooperation in putting the 
 system generally into effect. 
 Respectfully submitted. 
 
 H. H. Rousseau, Chairman. 
 
 William T. Donnelly, Member. 
 
 A. M. Hunt, Memher. 
 
 The regulations issued by the Bureau of War Eisk Insurance, and 
 the form for collectors relating to the invisibility of vessels, are as 
 follows : 
 
 With a view of minimizing the hazard to vessels trading to or from all ports 
 to Europe and ports on the Mediterranean coast of Africa and vice versa, the 
 following requirements will be insisted upon as to all vessels sailing to the 
 above-named destinations on and after October 1: 
 
 1. Arming. — All vessels must be armed in accordance with the recommenda- 
 tion of the Navy Department, or in event of the Navy Department being unable 
 to furnish such armament, the vessel owners must furnish to the Bureau of 
 War Risk Insurance satisfactory evidence that such armament has been ap- 
 plied for and can not at the time be supplied. 
 
 The bureau will charge an additional rate of 1 per cent on each voyage on 
 vessels failing to comply with this requirement. 
 
 2. Regulations affecting visibility. — (a) Bach vessel shall be painted in ac- 
 cordance with one of the systems that are recommended by the chairman of 
 the Naval Consulting Board and the Ship Protection Committee of the Emer- 
 gency Fleet Corporation, as approved by the Bureau of War Risk Insurance. 
 Information relative to these various methods of painting, and how the paint- 
 ing can be arranged for, will be furnished upon application by the Bureau of 
 AVar Risk Insurance, Treasury Department, Washington, D. 0. 
 
 It is to be understood that shipowners are free to select any one of the ap- 
 proved methods for their own use. Should a shipowner desire to follow his 
 own method, it must first be submitted to and receive the approval of the 
 chairman of the Naval Consulting Board, 11 Broadway, New York City. 
 
 Upon completion the shipowner must furnish the collector of customs at the 
 loading port with a certificate from the party performing the work, certifying 
 that the work has been performed and containing all necessary information. 
 
SHit PROTECTION COMMITTEE. 95 
 
 (h) Ooal : Each steamer at time of sailing from tlie United States must 
 carry a sufficient supply of approved smokeless fuel to carry her for not less 
 than two daylight periods, this coal to be used during the daylight runs while 
 within the submarine zone. 
 
 Any steamer which is equipped with an approved system whereby the vessel 
 may be operated without the emission- of visible smoke from her stack shall 
 be relieved from the above requirement. 
 
 (c) Smoke screen: All vessels operating through the submarine zone must 
 carry on deck one dozen approved smoke boxes which will evolve smoke when 
 thrown overboard. 
 
 Vessels must obtain from the collector of customs a certificate that all the 
 requirements under the heading of No. 2 have been complied with. 
 
 In event of the failure to obtain such a certificate, the bureau will charge 
 an additional premium of one-half per cent for each voyage. 
 
 The bureau reserves the right to decline to insure vessels whose owners 
 have not in the opinion of the bureau made a satisfactory effort to comply 
 with these requirements. 
 
 Note. — For forms of certificate for collectors of customs relating to invisi- 
 bility of vessels, see Appendix, page 234. 
 
 In the early days of participation of the United States in the 
 war the idea of camouflage had not been developed to the extent 
 which later took place. The effort was first made to get reduced 
 visibility, consideration being given to several systems, which in- 
 cluded painting with various shades of gray, painting on the hull of 
 the ships blotches of paint of the three primary colors which would 
 at a distance blend to gray, and various other types which were 
 intended to accomplish a similar purpose. As time went on the 
 difficulties of reducing visibility by paint, owing to variable condi- 
 tions of atmosphere and light, became more apparent. The Ship 
 Protection Committee encouraged those who were engaged in the 
 development of the art of camouflage, and valuable work in this con- 
 nection was done by the Submarine Defense Association of New 
 York, but the final development of the art of camouflage, which was 
 known as the " Dazzle system," had its inception mainly with the 
 British, although the idea may have occured and probably did occur 
 to others on this side of the Atlantic. 
 
 The committee pushed the camouflage work and brought over 
 English experts, who instructed American officers. The most prac- 
 tical method was found to be, as above mentioned, the English system 
 of dazzle painting, which made it impossible through the periscope 
 of a submarine to detect the course which the ship was steering. The 
 Navy Department, which later took over the whole problem of 
 camouflage, adopted this English method of dazzle painting in 
 preference to making the ship invisible. Those on a submarine see 
 a ship through a periscope; when the ship is camouflaged by the 
 dazzle system and you look at it from the surface of the water you 
 can not tell how fast it is going, or in what direction. If you are 
 up at an elevation of 100 feet you could tell the direction, but from 
 
96 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 the surface of the water you can not. Camouflage was therefore 
 successful for the protection against the periscopic view from a 
 submarine. 
 
 Although, as above stated, the dazzle system, was the one in opera- 
 tion at the close of the war, there was a tendency to revert to some 
 of the earlier work of American camoufleurs, as typified by the work 
 of Mr. Williarti A. Mackay, which was first called to the attention 
 of the Naval Consulting Board in April, 1917, a few days after we 
 entered the war. Mr. Mackay's scheme was based on the fact that 
 daylight is made up of three colors — red, green, and violet; that we 
 see them in the rainbow; that the distant horizon gray is also red, 
 green, and violet. His designs incorporated the idea of painting the 
 ship with broken patches of red, green, and violet in such a way as 
 to make the ship melt away at a distance of 2 to 3 miles under most 
 conditions of light. As stated above, the tendency was to come back 
 to this scheme of invisibility from the dazzle system, for the reason 
 that under the dazzle system, with the marking as large as it was, a 
 technique had been developed on the part of the submarines which 
 enabled them to judge the direction of the course that the vessel was 
 taking. 
 
 The Naval Consulting Board, with its connection with the United 
 States Shipping Board through the representation of Mr. A. M. 
 Hunt on the Ship Protection Committee, and with the Navy Depart- 
 ment, was in a position, after having brought about a meeting of the 
 leading camoufleurs in America, to recommend to the Secretary of 
 the Navy and to the Ship Protection Committee that the art of 
 camouflage for use in eliminating ships, men, and other equipment 
 outlined in time of war was founded on scientific truth and promised 
 to be of great value. 
 
 The Naval Consulting Board, after this first meeting in April, 
 1917, continued to take an active interest in promoting the use of 
 camouflage, and brought about having the vessels which had been 
 painted in accordance with schemes of our outline observed by naval 
 patrol boats and reports made thereon. As a result of this arrange- 
 ment the men working on camouflage were able to develop their art 
 based upon actual experience. 
 
 The Ship Protection Committee considered very carefully the pro- 
 posal for reducing smoke issuing from the stacks of the vessels. 
 
 The use of pulverized coal was seriously considered for the fol- 
 lowing reasons: 
 
 1. Pulverized coal as a fuel is extensively employed in the arts 
 for smelting, for burning Portland cement, aiid to a limited extent, 
 for generating steam. It is estimated that 50,000,000 tons of coal 
 have been pulverized and consumed within recent years in the United 
 States. In stationary practice definite economies have been claimed 
 
SHIP PROTECTION COMMITTEE. 97 
 
 over the use of solid coal. From the above it appears that the art 
 of pulverizing and burning coal as a powder has passed the experi- 
 mental stage in certain arts. 
 
 2. Pulverized coal is a smokeless fuel, a fact of considerable mili- 
 tary importance. 
 
 3. By a simple and immediate adjustment of the burners, powdered 
 coal as a fuel may be made to emit dense clouds of smoke to serve 
 as a screen, another fact of military importance. 
 
 4. In an emergency the ship's boilers may be rapidly forced, 
 thereby increasing the steam supply and the speed of the vessel. 
 This is a fact of military importance. 
 
 5. A great reduction in the fireroom force is effected, over using 
 solid coal. This saving in man power has military value. 
 
 6. The supply of fuel oil in the United States, before discoveries 
 in Texas of oil, was limited, and as a means of conserving fuel oil 
 for naval vessels equipped to burn oil exclusively, the Consulting 
 Board felt justified in encouraging the use of powdered coal as a 
 fuel for merchant ships. 
 
 In the opinion of the Fuel and Fuel Handling Committee of the 
 Naval Consulting Board it appeared feasible to equip merchantmen 
 with requisite machinery for pulverizing and burning coal. The 
 committee recommended that the Emergency Fleet Corporation 
 authorize the preparation of the necessary plans and drawings for 
 such an installation upon such ship, and that shore installation be 
 made of such equipment to determine as well as may be the value 
 of such an installation on board ship. Such shore installation could 
 be set up and tested at the Annapolis Experiment Station, An- 
 napolis, Md. 
 
 A ship equipped with pulverizing equipment should be expected 
 to take on coal in any port of any kind available and by the ordi- 
 nary methods. In Atlantic ports this will be run of mine bitu- 
 minous of high volatile and of high grade, sometimes dry and dusty 
 and at other times quite wet. 
 
 Such coal on board ship, following shore practice, would then 
 pass through the following processes: 
 
 (a) Crushing in power rolls and delivering to a storage bin. 
 
 (6) Drying if found essential to remove the moisture prior to 
 pulverizing, delivering to a second storage bin. 
 
 (c) Extraction of iron particles, this being advised to save dam- 
 age to the pulverizing mill; a magnetic separator is commonly 
 used for this purpose. 
 
 (d) Pulverizing, either in mills or their equipment, then storing 
 in a third storage bin. 
 
 (e) Mixing with air, feeding to furnace, and burning. 
 168537°— 20 T 
 
98 NAVAL CONSULTING BOAED OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 After delivery of the raw coal to crushers the fuel will be handled 
 by conveyors or spouts. All storage bins, conveyors, and spouts 
 must be constructed and maintained dust tight as a means to pre- 
 vent explosions, and possibly such may have to be made of non- 
 corrosive material. 
 
 Instead of the use of pulverized coal as a fuel in the vessels build- 
 ing and those already in operation, a definite recommendation was 
 made that all vessels traversing the war zone should be required to 
 carry a sufficient supply of anthracite coal to furnish fuel for two 
 full daylight periods of steam, which would be sufficient to enable 
 them to traverse the submarine zone as it existed at that time; and 
 it was felt that this measure would be of material assistance in pro- 
 ducing the desired result. 
 
 This suggestion met with great antagonism among the officers of 
 the merchant marine, who made the claims that it would be very dif- 
 ficult to get this anthracite coal in the first place, and very difficult 
 to keep it separate from the regular fuel in the second place, and 
 that it would reduce the steaming capacity of the boilers and thereby 
 slow the vessels down in the third place. 
 
 These claims had some merit, and as a result, at the direction of 
 the President of the United States, Dr. Miller Eeese Hutchison, of 
 the Naval Consulting Board, conducted certain steam tests with 
 anthracite coal on one of the Clyde Line steamers. Reports of this 
 test indicate that with proper handling of anthracite coal there was 
 no difficulty in keeping up steam, and the combustion was practically 
 smokeless. Certain special methods of stoking the furnaces had to 
 be adopted, however, to overcome the difficulties in burning anthra- 
 cite coal under these conditions. 
 
 The Committee on Ship Protection also made tests at the United 
 States Naval Engineering Experimental Station, at Annapolis, Md., 
 in burning various mixtures of anthracite and bituminous coal un- 
 der the test boiler at that station. It was found that fairly satis- 
 factory mixtures of anthracite and bituminous coal could be used 
 with very light production of smoke and still maintain boiler ca- 
 pacity approximately normal. 
 
 Mr. Hunt became interested in the possibility of firing boiler fur- 
 naces with what might best be termed granulated coal, or bituminous 
 coal that have been put through a crusher so that there were no 
 particles larger than about one-fourth inch cube. In developing 
 this idea it was finally decided that if this granulated coal could be 
 fed into a stream of air carried in a pipe with continuous discharge 
 on the fire bed, that good results would be obtained. In cooperation 
 with the Bureau of Mines, in determining the relation between the 
 quantity of air and the quantity of coal which could be handled 
 
SHIP PROTECTION COMMITTEE. 99 
 
 in this way, following the experiments an installation was made 
 at Annapolis, Md., under one of the boilers at the experimental 
 station, and was operated at intervals of several months. The re- 
 sults were quite favorable. An installation of this system of firing 
 a steamer was made on one of the boats of the Central Vermont 
 Transportation Co., operating between New London and New York. 
 It was found that there was a marked difference in the results ob- 
 tained at Annapolis and on the steamer, due to different methods 
 followed ; and while the experiments were not carried to a full con- 
 clusion, the results were of such a character as to indicate a rather 
 important development, and seemed to indicate that valuable results 
 would accrue if followed out to a conclusion. 
 
 Consideration was given to the possibility of electrical precipita- 
 tion of smoke from the stack, and after some preliminary work had 
 been done by the Research Corporation of New York in this direc- 
 tion, it was decided not to prosecute the matter further, as it was 
 felt that other methods were simpler, and the difficulties attending 
 such installations for marine work and the requirement for intelli- 
 gent and skilled supervision might possibly render such a device 
 inoperative when most needed. 
 
 Consideration was also given to several suggestions which had 
 been proposed whereby smoke could be discharged through horizontal 
 lateral flues, within which the gases of combustion would be scrubbed 
 by showers of water which would tend to eliminate the carbon par- 
 ticles and also to cool the gases so that they would not rise in the air 
 but lie as a blanket on the surface of the water. 
 
 This idea was afterwards brought out in England by Sir Alfred 
 Yarrow, and one or more vessels were so fitted by the authorities on 
 the other side. 
 
 The committee also made a definite recommendation that tests and 
 experiments should be carried out by the Shipping Board in the 
 adoption of a system of cellular buoyancy in vessels traversing the 
 submarine zone, on a system devised by Mr. Donnelly, who was a 
 member of the committee. Ultimately authority was given to equip 
 one ship in this way, which was finally done after considerable delay 
 due to difficulties in carrying out any new idea of this kind. 
 
 At a meeting of the Naval Consulting Board on February 16, 1918, 
 the following resolution was passed in regard to the Lucia: 
 
 Whereas tlie Naval Consulting Board has had presented to It this date a copy 
 of a resolution passed by the Ship Protection Committee of the United States 
 Shipping Board bearing date of February 11, 1918, and copies of which were 
 transmitted by Mr. Hurley, chairman of the Shipping Board, to the Secretary of 
 War and the Secretary of the Navy : Be it 
 
 Resolved, That the Naval Consulting Board commends to the War and Navy 
 Departments or to such department as has responsibility for the transportation 
 of troops the serious consideration of the system installed upon the steamship 
 
100 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 Lucia, or an equivalent system of reserve buoyancy, for application to troop 
 transports, in order to increase the safety of transportation of our troops to 
 Europe. 
 
 The Lucia was equipped and later torpedoed, and the following 
 is a report on the sinking of the vessel : 
 
 New York, January /,, 1919. 
 
 CONDITION AT TIME OF TORPEDO ATTACK AND SINKING AS DEDUCED FKOM EVIDENCE 
 GIVEN BY OFFICERS OF THE " LUCIA " AND CONCLUSIONS THEREFROM. 
 
 tSee Report of Ship Protection Committee under date of " Washington, D. C, Nov. 8, 
 
 1918."] 
 
 The steamship Lucia vs^as torpedoed about 5 p. m. on October 17, 1918, ap- 
 proximately 1,250 miles oft the Atlantic coast, on her way to the Mediterranean. 
 
 At the time of the attack the Lucia was in company with four or five other 
 vessels, but the fleet was not convoyed. 
 
 According to the evidence of the captain and other officers, the ship was 
 struck in the engine-room compai-tment just forward of the after engine-room 
 bulkhead on the port side, so low down that the double bottom was damaged 
 as well as the pump connections for the double bottom and other water-tight 
 compartments aft. 
 
 The explosion was so low that no damage appeared on the outside of the 
 hull, even when the ship rolled. 
 
 At the time of the attack the Lucia was drawing 27 feet 6 inches forward 
 and 28 feet 6 inches aft. 
 
 The engine and boiler room were one compartment, and hold No. 4, next 
 aft, flooded immediately. Hold No. 5 subsequently flooded over partial bulk- 
 head between 4 and 5, which only extended to upper between decks. Subse- 
 quent soundings showed water entered hold No. 6 from below, evidently coming 
 through broken connections from drainage system. 
 
 From statement of Capt. Leary (see p. 9 of testimony) before committee, 
 one-half hour after torpedoing the Lucia floated with about 4 feet freeboard. 
 
 The Lucia floated through the night, gradually settling aft with about 2 feet 
 freeboard on the morning of the second day. (See p. 11 of Capt. Leary's testi- 
 mony.) 
 
 At the bottom of page 23 and top of page 24 will be found the statement of 
 Capt. Leary, in response to a question by Capt. McAllister, that the Lu,cia 
 was flooded when she sank from No. 2 hold right aft, and that Capt. Leary 
 heard a noise and shock, which he believed to be forward bulkhead of engine 
 room connecting to No. 2 hold let go, sometime the following morning. It is 
 further brought out on page 24 that the ship was capable of defense by both 
 guns until about noon the next day and with the forward gun until a few 
 minutes before leaving the ship. 
 
 At the bottom of page 11 is a statement made in reply to the question if it 
 was the heavy weather that caused the final sinking, Capt. Leary replied it 
 had a little to do with it. She would have floated if it had not been for the 
 trucks smashing in the aft hatch; when she broke In the hatch It filled from 
 the top ; the statement being further amplified that it was the thrashing about 
 of the deck load of trucks which smashed the aft hatch. 
 
 It is noted on page 12 of the testimony of Capt. Leary that the Luda floated 
 the next day with a list of about 3° to port. On page 12 will be found the 
 statement of Capt. Leai-y that the Lucia sunk at 3.20 in the afternoon of Octo- 
 ber 18, slightly more than 22 hours after the torpedoing. 
 
SHIP PROTECTION COMMITTEE. 101 
 
 It Is noted on page 12 that in finally sinking the Lucia settled aft until she 
 stood vertical, with about 175 feet of her length in the air. 
 
 General conclusions deduced from information submitted herewith : 
 
 By referring to tabulated information, sheet No. 1, showing a comparison 
 of weights and displacement of ship and cargo, it will be noted that the total 
 weight to be supported was 12,991 tons and that the total displacement of this 
 cargo, considering displacement of buoyancy boxes, and also that all com- 
 partments and double bottom are flooded, was 11,585 tons. This would make 
 the excess of weights 1,406 long tons more than the displacement. 
 
 By reference to report giving information relative to the equipment of the 
 Lucia, it will be noted that the double bottom, which was depended upon for 
 buoyancy, had a displacement of 1,600 tons. From this it will be seen that 
 had the double bottom remained intact, or any one of the other water-tight 
 compartments aft, the Lucia would have remained afloat iudeflnitely. 
 
 That the Lucia had a freeboard of 4 feet one-half hour after she was struck 
 and a freeboard of approximately 2 feet the next morning, or some 14 hours 
 after being torpedoed, shows that the displacement of the buoyancy boxes, in 
 so far as they provide buoyancy, sustained the vessel in a very remarkable 
 manner. 
 
 Particular attention is called to the fact that the Lucia floated a considerable 
 time after every compartment except No. 1 hold forward had been open to 
 the sea, and that, according to the report of her captain, the final sinking was 
 brought about by the destruction of the aft hatch of hold No. 5 and the com- 
 plete flooding of this hold from the deck. 
 
 Referring to tabulated Information, sheets Nos. 2 and 3, which deal with the 
 specific items of cargo and their weight and measurement, it was found upon 
 carefully reviewing these in connection with stowage plan (see accompanying 
 sheets prepared by Ship Control Committee, also sheet No. 8 and diagram 
 drawing No. 1) that in hold No. 1 there was vacant space of 10,700 cubic feet; 
 in hold No. 2 vacant space 29,928 cubic feet, aft holds being practically full. 
 This makes an aggregate of space not used of approximately 40,000 cubic feet. 
 
 By reference to copy of letter under date of September 25, giving loading 
 agreed upon, and attached copy of comparative figures giving actual loading, if 
 will be noticed that Instead of 700 tons of shrapnel 1,214 tons were actually 
 carried. If this amount of excess shrapnel had been replaced by 500 tons 
 of hay, there would have been left only approximately 7,000 cubic feet of 
 empty space, and the excess of weight over displacement would have been 
 only 550 long tons. 
 
 This comparison is made to show the importance of loading in connec- 
 tion with interior buoyancy. 
 
 Had the Lucia been loaded with 8,800 tons of coal, as originally provided for, 
 the ship and cargo when completely water-logged, other than double bottom and 
 shaft tunnel, would have had a weight of 13,040 tons, with a displacement 
 of 14,180 tons, or a recerve buoyancy of 1,140 tons, it being understood 
 that these figures are made considering the double bottom and shaft tunnel 
 as intact. 
 
 Respectfully submitted. 
 
 William T. Donnelly. 
 
 The committee also recommended that vessels traversing the war 
 zone should be equipped with howitzers of limited range which 
 would be capable of throwing the equivalent of a moderate size depth 
 charge for defense against the submarine when it was submerged. 
 
10^ NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATE§. 
 
 The Xavy Department, which had charge of the arming of merchant 
 vessels, had some of these howitzers in course of construction, which 
 were to have been ultimately tried out. During the later days of the 
 war reports came to the committee that weapons of this type had 
 been fitted to one or more British merchantmen. 
 
 The theory of the use of this weapon was that a submarine submerged 
 after attack by the regular naval guns mounted on the merchant 
 vessel, and if the bomb thrower had been available, it would at least 
 have had a long chance of crippling the submarine or at least 
 demoralizing it and prevent the torpedo attacks which followed. 
 One objection against the use of this type of gun was the fact that 
 the decks of a merchantman would have to be reinforced to take the 
 downward thrust of high-angle fire. To meet this objection it was 
 suggested that a cluster of bomb throwers of small size, of a type of 
 the old pepper-box pistol, consisting of 36 steel pipes, 6 inches in di- 
 ameter and in length from 6 to 8 feet, so mounted that there would 
 be a dispersion of projectiles leaving them, so that the area within 
 which the submarine might be would be peppered by small depth 
 bombs, and there would be a strong probability of a direct hit by one 
 of the bombs on any submarine within that area. It was planned 
 that these 36 bomb throwers would be fired in succession by timing 
 intervals, the time interval between successive discharges being that 
 necessary for the projectile to travel the length of the bore. This 
 would reduce the downAvard thrust materially. 
 
 Early in the summer of 1917 an idea occurred to Mr. A. M. Hunt, 
 the Naval Consulting Board member of the Ship Protection Com- 
 mittee, that a mine might be constructed containing a magnetic de- 
 vice which would be operated by a sufficiently large mass of iron be- 
 ing brought into its field and thereby fired. He made certain pre- 
 liminary tests by placing suspended magnets in proximity to a rail- 
 road track and running a locomotive back and fourth past the in- 
 strument placed at varying distances. The effect noted was sufficient 
 to make the idea seem possible to realization, and an appropriation 
 was made by the Naval Consulting Board to have additional work 
 done under its Special Problems Committee. 
 
 The matter was placed in the hands of Lieut. Col. R. D. Mershon, 
 of the Army, who was detailed for duty with the Naval Consulting 
 Board, and after consultation with Mr. Hunt, the actual work- was 
 undertaken by Prof. Nicholls, of Yale University. After some 
 months' work he had developed a device that was of such a char- 
 acter that it was deemed advisable to bring it to the attention of the 
 Bureau of Ordnance of the Navy Department. Prof. S. J. Brown, 
 United States Navy, was detailed to visit Yale University and look it 
 over. After his inspection, which was some time in December, 1917, 
 
SHIP PROTECTION COMMITTEE. 103 
 
 he stated that the department was already working on a device along 
 somewhat similar lines and suggested that the whole matter, in its 
 then form, be turned over to the Bureau of Ordnance. Thereafter 
 this matter was followed up by the Bureau of Ordnance, and the 
 work contributed by Prof. NichoUs was of value as a contribution to 
 the ultimate result obtained. 
 
 Mr. Hunt also carried out work in connection with the protection 
 of smoke screens for concealment of a vessel in case of attack by 
 submarines. One series of experiments was carried out by the 
 Standard Oil Co. of New York and the Barrett Co. working jointly. 
 The primary idea was that of endeavoring to float a film of oil on 
 the surface of the water and ignite it, the incomplete combustion 
 producing a heavy smoke. The Standard Oil Co. furnished a boat 
 and several tests were made in the lower New York Bay. It was 
 found difficult to get a film of oil to burn on the surface of the 
 water. Fair results were obtained by a crude raft which could be 
 floated astern and on which were placed a mass of oakum and other 
 fibrous materials saturated with the oils. An amount of solid bi- 
 tuminous material was also used by throwing a shovelful in on the 
 fires, so as to quickly and promptly create a dense smoke; this was 
 found to be quite effective. The smoke protection in general use 
 was the so-called phosphorus type, and as there were numerous re- 
 l)orts of accidental fires on board ships carrying this type of smoke 
 box, zinc dust was tried and burned in a torch in order to produce 
 a heavy cloud of white smoke. The results were quite successful. 
 But about this time a more desirable form of smoke protection was 
 devised, and the matter was dropped. 
 
 The committee tried out a scheme for the concealment of vessels 
 by means of a screen consisting of a water spray. The test was 
 made in New York Harbor after certain preliminary tests had been 
 made on the shore. The general results were not satisfactory, al- 
 though it would probably have been desirable to carry the tests to 
 greater extent than was done. 
 
 The Ship Protection Committee and the Naval Consulting Board 
 received thousands of suggestions for all forms of. towiiig shields 
 or nets for the protection of vessels against torpedoes, none of which 
 were practicable or possible of adoption. Reduction of speed by 
 any net or shield that is of a form to offer direct opposition to 
 the passage of a torpedo is so great as to make such a device im- 
 practicable. 
 
 Even a mesh approximately 3 feet on a side and made of five- 
 sixteenths wire strands imposes sufficient resistance to the motion of 
 a vessel to be a very material factor. The function of this type of 
 net was to entangle and divert and possibly cause the explosion of 
 
104 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 a torpedo at a sufficient distance from the ship so that the damage 
 would be limited or negligible, and not to stop it by direct opposition. 
 
 Reports having come to the committee that this type of net had 
 actually stopped a torpedo on several J;ests on the other side of 
 the ocean by entangling the blades of a propeller on a torpedo m 
 the meshes of a net, active vork was taken up on this type of net 
 and an appropriation was made by the Shipping Board to carry it 
 forward. It was placed under the direction of Mr. Hunt, who pro- 
 ceeded to New London, Conn., and made arrangements for carrying 
 out these tests. They were not completed, however, at the time the 
 armistice was signed. 
 
 The work which was done there was directed to the development 
 of a system in which the towing would be done from whisker booms 
 stepped on the side of the ship well forward and extending out at 
 an angle of about 45° with the axis of the vessel. The towing line 
 would in this case lead at a right angle to the axis of the vessel from 
 the- stem around the end of the boom down to the forward edge 
 of the net. 
 
 In nets which were used abroad and in experimental work in this 
 country it was found necessary to use what is termed " water kites " 
 to hold the lower edge of the net down, and in some instances to keep 
 it breasted out from the side of the vessel. These kites were quite 
 erratic in action. A type, however, was developed that was very 
 effective in this connection. 
 
 The decrease in maneuvering ability and speed of a ship depends 
 on the type of net and its resistance to towing. Eesistance to any 
 body moving through the water increases very I'apidly. The power 
 required increases as the cube of the speed or higher function. These 
 facts taken into consideration, also the fact that the head of a torpedo 
 is provided with net cutters has caused practically the discard of the 
 use of a net. It is probable that the Germans did not use these 
 devices, as there was no call for them. But had nets been adopted, 
 it would have been the answer to them. As stated above, therefore, 
 the development work at New London was to entangle and not to 
 stop a torpedo. 
 
 It is essential that a net or other protective device of that char- 
 acter should be such as to permit a prompt lowering of lifeboats. 
 To be successful in preventing serious injury to the vessel, the net 
 should be cairied not less than 35 feet from the side of the vessel and 
 preferably more. This involves carrying them either at the end of 
 long booms attached to the side of the vessel or carrying their weight 
 by means of floats. In the latter case it would, of course, be neces- 
 sary to provide some device that would maintain the net at its proper 
 distance fiom the ship's side. ' As a towing line of a net could not 
 be fastened to any point farther forward than the stem of the vessel 
 
SHIP PROTECTION COMMITTEE. 105 
 
 itself, it is of course evident that it would be very difficult to so 
 fasten a net that it could cover the entire broadside. 
 
 Another matter was given a great deal of thought and study, even 
 to the point of developing designs, and that was the protection of 
 vessels by means of blisters ; and various forms of blisters were tried 
 in cases abroad, but they were not deemed practicable for general 
 use. 
 
 A great number of minor matters were acted on and suggestions 
 made by the committee. For instance, many reports were received 
 that the lights at night were being burned in such a way as to be- 
 tray presence of a vessel. Doors of outside staterooms would be left 
 open with lighted lamps inside. Eecommendations were made to the 
 Division of Operations that all ship wiring should be so fitted that 
 staterooms would have a switch in the door casing, so that when the 
 door was opened the light would be extinguished. It was recom- 
 mended that all deck lights which were necessary to use should be 
 covered by blue shields so that the light would be invisible beyond 
 a few hundred yards. 
 
 The following story is told of the fearlessness of the officers of mer- 
 chant vessels to submarine attack: A chief engineer of a ship sat 
 in his cabin smoking, with the ports open and his lights on. He 
 would not turn them off, and the officer in charge of the guard was 
 obliged to take a revolver and blow his lights out so that he could not 
 use them. 
 
 This is an exceptional case, and as a rule merchant captains and the 
 crews tried to do everything possible to prevent submarine attack. 
 Among certain of them, however, there seemed to be a feeling that 
 it was unsportsmanlike to be overcautious. 
 
 A large number of forms which might be called a breech mat 
 rigged in ways which would enable it to be brought in place before 
 the hull would fill with water were considered. The possibility of 
 the use of such a device would depend very largely on the extent 
 of the injury caused, and in the majority of cases the injury was 
 of such a character that no mat of such a size that could be carried 
 or operated would serve. 
 
 At the time of the signing of the armistice a form of mat had been 
 built and was ready for testing. It was thought that this mat had 
 greater possibilities than any of the others that had been seen. 
 
 In the summer of 1918 steel and wooden bulkheads were placed 
 in the holds of ships to subdivide them. A test was made on the 
 S. S. West Eagle, which was laid up for a month for this purpose. 
 After the bulkheads had been placed in her, her three holds were 
 filled right up to the top deck with water, and it was demonstrated 
 to a large group of scientists and others that the ship could remain 
 afloat with three compartments full, and this method of ship 
 
106 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 protection seemed very good. Calculations made by an eminent naval 
 architect as to the effect and the draft of water that a vessel with a 
 cargo of coal and iron ore which filled one, two, or three compart- 
 ments showed that a vessel would float all right with these compart- 
 ments full, depending on the cargo and the density. In general, 
 the cargoes which were being carried across the ocean were more 
 favorable to a ship than iron ore. These bulkheads could be put in 
 after the cargo was in place, and taken out before the cargo was 
 discharged. 
 
 However, those who were responsible for getting the cargoes, 
 munitions, and troops to France said it would interfere with the 
 stowage of the ship to have so many bulkheads, and there would be 
 loss of time both in the loading and discharging of cargo. As a 
 result, but one ship was fitted with this system of protection. 
 
 The question of operating by means of the convoy system was 
 given consideration by the committee. Convoy operation, of neces- 
 sity, reduces speed and time of passage, as the convoy is limited to 
 the speed of its slowest unit. It is possible that this defect in the 
 convoy system might, to a certain extent, be eliminated if the use 
 of granulated coal could be brought to such a point as to increase 
 the speed of the slowest vessels sailing under convoy, and thereby 
 increaese the average speed of movement of the entire convoy of the 
 increase the average speed of movement of the entire convoy of the 
 pointed out above, could liiive increased their speed, and the convoys 
 could have been made up so that the individual elements of the con- 
 voy would have had closer uniformity, and especially if there had 
 been an opportunity to train officers to operate closely in convoy, 
 the convoy system would have been greatly increased in efficiency. 
 
 There is, however, probably no question that the most effective 
 thing developed during the war for protecting vessels was the con- 
 voy system. After it was adopted, any system of reducing visibility 
 of ships either by suppressing smoke or camouflage became more or 
 less futile, as it is impossible to keep all vessels of a convoy smoke- 
 less all the time. It may be said that one of the convoy would be 
 making smoke all the time, so that with a fleet of vessels steaming 
 in close formation, very little could be done to prevent it from 
 being seen. The safeguarding of the vessels by torpedo-boat des- 
 troyers and armed vessels was very effective, and with a sufficient 
 number of destroyers practically complete immunity from submarine 
 attack might be had. 
 
 At the outset of the introduction of the convoy system practically 
 all the merchant skippers detested it, and there were many instances 
 where the captain of a vessel would take advantage of darkness or 
 fog, or confusion in convoy, to strike out " on his own hook," be- 
 cause in all cases, except that of the slowest vessels, the captain 
 
Ship protection committee, 107 
 
 felt that his speed was being cut down, and his speed was a very im- 
 portant factor in shortening his time in the waters infested by sub- 
 marines, and a quick-moving vessel is better able to a void an at- 
 tack. In other words, he would rather rely on his speed than on 
 the destroyers. 
 
 The convoy system was adopted in the summer of 1917, and the in- 
 tensified moving of American troops to France was greatly facil- 
 itated by it. The German submarines did not torpedo one east- 
 bound troopship, except a ship which was sunk around Ireland. 
 
 The Germans did not like to attack numbers of ships when they 
 were together. The submarines liked to single a ship off, because 
 she is defenseless. Where a submarine comes near a group, there 
 are several defenses, and the naval vessels accompanying the con- 
 voy made it very dangerous for any submarine to attack a convoy. 
 
 It is probably safe to say that the submarine was conquered by 
 tactics rather than devices. However, this is to be noted, that the 
 submarine warfare was not a fixed thing; it varied from time to 
 time. There were times when the operation of the submarines was 
 close inshore and near the entrance to harbors; but when the listen- 
 ing devices and patrol work became active, the submarine found 
 an unsafe game inshore and began to work farther and farther 
 out to set. This was brought about by the large increase in the 
 number of vessels available for patrol work and by the increase 
 in eificiency in detection devices, for even in the earlier and crude 
 forms listening devices played a part. As our listening devices in- 
 creased in accuracy and sensitiveness, the Germans did everything 
 possible to quiet and reduce all noises that a submarine might give 
 out. It was understood that the Germans tested each submarine 
 at various speeds, in order to determine at what speed the least vi- 
 bration and noises occurred. This having been determined, the ves- 
 sel navigated at that speed when it suspected the presence of vessels 
 with listening devices aboard. 
 
 The Shipping Board was overloaded with work and was being 
 pressed at all times to provide ships for the movement of freight, 
 and it was not thinkable that they could divert themselves for one 
 moment from this end and purpose. To a degree, at least, it was 
 the immediate momentary urgency upon them which controlled, and 
 governed their actions. 
 
 It was realized that the whole problem resolved itself into a mat- 
 ter of tonnage movement, and that any protective device or sys- 
 tem of operation which reduced materially the amount of tonnage 
 which could be handled across the ocean could not be adopted. 
 
 There were sent to the Ship Protection Committee an immense 
 number of suggestions for the protection of merchant vessels that 
 were impracticable. The volume of these suggestions can hardly 
 
108 NAVAL CONSULTING BOAED OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 be imagined by those who are not familiar with it. The committee 
 was always careful to give full consideration to everything that it 
 received, even though the ideas were crude, and endeavored to find 
 in them some germ of merit that might be of service. There were, 
 however, very few that were of any value. 
 
 In conclusion, it might be said that tlie object of a ship is to 
 carry material across the ocean. If you reduce the carrying ca- 
 pacity you have lost your purpose, and it is better to lose a few 
 ships, from a naval point of view, and get the cargoes across, so 
 that many of the protective devices which theoretically would have 
 preserved a ship from being sunk by a submarine, in the light of 
 the above objective, could not be used. 
 
 On or about June 27, 1917, the Submarine Defense Association 
 was formed to coojoerate with the United States Government in 
 seeking devices for the protection of merchant ships against attack 
 by submarines. It sought to accomplish this result by bringing de- 
 vices to the attention of shipowners and underwriters. The 
 members of this association were the large insurance and steamship 
 companies and corporations engaged in foreign trade, to whom the 
 question of submarine detection was one of vital business interest. 
 Experts were employed by the committee, who made exhaustive 
 studies of the whole submarine question, particularly camouflage, 
 the maneuvering of vessels as a defense against attack by subma- 
 rines, including tlie different zigzag courses to be taken by ships, 
 and the escort and convoy system. 
 
CHAPTEE VI. 
 
 LABORATORY. 
 
 At the time of the organization meeting of the Naval Consulting 
 Board, October 7, 1915, the members realized the necessity for the 
 construction of a naval laboratory in order to get the best results 
 from the work which they proposed to do along scientific and in- 
 ventive lines. It was realized that the navy yards and their facili- 
 ties were fully occupied with the active work of construction and 
 with the maintenance of the fleet as their primary function, and that 
 anything in the nature of experimental work had to be inevitably 
 subordinated to the exigencies of this primary function, and that it 
 suffered accordingly. It was therefore felt that facilities primarily 
 intended for investigation and experiment should be provided; for 
 instance, if in a new battleship new elements and devices were to be 
 incorporated, orders could be given immediately for getting out and 
 testing at the laboratory such new elements, even before the designs 
 of the ship were started. If the tests were successful on the new 
 elements they could be incorporated in the designs, and the new ship 
 would by this means be made more efficient. Under the present 
 arrangement a naval officer is not justified in suggesting for adop- 
 tion new things which have not been tried out in practice; and if 
 the laboratory were constructed the designs would embrace the very 
 latest ideas, and the United States would not fall behind in naval 
 progress. 
 
 Through the use of the laboratory it would be possible for Con- 
 gress, when it spent money on a naval program, to know that it 
 would have fighting elements of the highest and best type, and this 
 would be brought about by investigation and experimental work 
 which would be conducted at a naval laboratory. 
 
 The civilian members of the Naval Consulting Board attached to 
 such a laboratory would be in a position to consult some 30,000 
 engineers, members of the various societies which had selected them 
 for the board ; and if, for instance, a new laboratory wanted to know 
 what the best bearings for a certain condition were, it qould through 
 
 109 
 
110 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 its instrumentality consult engineers who had spent all their lives 
 building bearings and who without a lot of experimenting give the 
 results of their lifetime work. 
 
 One of the great virtues of the naval laboratory is that there 
 would have been developed during peace times a corps of technically 
 trained men who would be familiar with naval affairs and the present 
 state of the development of the arts used in naval warfare whenever 
 war occurred. They would be able immediately to direct their atten- 
 tion and that of civilian assistants to the creation of war devices. Its 
 technical personnel would be the nucleus for the mobilization of 
 scientists for war. 
 
 This naval laboratory should be for experimental reseai'ch only, 
 and it should be for the purpose of determining what is best for the 
 Government to use for any particular purpose, as, for instance, a 
 good engine for aeroplanes; and in such a plant Government 
 experts would be daily working to ascertain what is best in 
 everything that goes to make up that particular motor. Without 
 the laboratory the Govei"nment is entirely in the hands of some 
 manufacturer who has convinced it that a particular design of valve 
 or cylinder that he makes is better than the one that some other 
 fellow makes and is trying to sell to the Government. In an ex- 
 perimental plant the Government will be able to know through its 
 own experts, who are working in the interest of the Government 
 alone, what is the best form of valve or cylinder. This would be 
 not because some manufacturer told it so but because they would 
 know of their own knowledge. 
 
 It was also realized that discoveries of new things did not come 
 up like mushrooms o\ernight as a rule, but that they are the result 
 of a process of development. The experience of the Naval Con- 
 sulting Board, as set forth in a later chapter, indicated this position 
 to be sound. 
 
 The Navy also has problems which are not concerned with improv- 
 ing some one thing, but of changing some whole thing, and these 
 problems are not the duty of anyone in civilian life. For instance, 
 the question of whether it would be possible to get a sufficient quan- 
 tity of oxygen from the sea by some device as to allow the operation 
 of a submarine under the water indefinitely ; in other words, to pump 
 oxygen from the sea into a submarine and breathe it. 
 
 The Navy, by proper use of such an experimental laboratory, could 
 get away from the idea that it is interested in what is finished and 
 for sale on the market. All manner of problems in wireless opera- 
 tions of one kind or another would come within the purview of such 
 a laboratory. 
 
LABOKATOEY. Ill 
 
 Another idea underlying the laboratory was to arrange so that 
 money could be spent on research and development without first mak- 
 ing an exact estimate of the cost, it being understood that experi- 
 mental work is such that it either by a progressive development leads 
 to the next step which it is necessary to attack in order to accom- 
 plish the desired end or else it is abandoned, and exact appropria- 
 tions or estimates can not be made for this kind of work. It could 
 experiment on new ideas without expecting that the experimenter 
 would necessarily get a usable product out of each experiment. Its 
 object would be to increase the knowledge of the Navy in regard to 
 the arts and sciences experimented with. If the researches of the 
 experimenter necessarily involved a study of the structure of an 
 atom, that he would not be precluded from making this study if it 
 led to an end result and was within the purview of the naval labora- 
 tory. 
 
 As a result of this necessity for a naval laboratory, study was made 
 on the subject by a committee of the members of the board, consist- 
 ing of Messrs. Edison, Baekeland, Whitney, Woodward, and CofBn. 
 The following is an outline of the recommendations of the committee : 
 
 1. The laboratory should be located on tidewater of sufficient depth 
 to permit a dreadnought to come to the dock. (6) It should be near 
 but not in a large city, so supplies may easily be obtained and where 
 labor is obtainable. 
 
 2. The laboratory should be of complete equipment to enable work- 
 ing models to be made and tested. There should be (a) a pattern 
 shop; (b) a brass foundry; (c) a cast-iron and cast-steel foundry; 
 (d) machine shops for large and small work; (e) sheet-metal shop ; 
 (/) forge shop for small and large work; (g) marine railway large 
 enough to build experimental submarines of 1,500 tons; (h) wood- 
 working shop; (i) chemical laboratory; (j) physical laboratory; 
 (k) optical grinding department, etc.; (l) motion-picture developing 
 and printing department; (m) complete drafting rooms; (n) elec- 
 trical laboratory and wireless laboratory; (o) mechanical laboratory 
 and testing machines; (p) explosive laboratory separate from main 
 laboratory. 
 
 3. The building should be of modern concrete construction, with 
 metal sills and doors, wire-glass windows, etc. Ample fire protection. 
 
 4. A naval officer of rank should be in charge. He should be 
 specially fitted, {b) Under him should be naval heads of broad ex- 
 perience in laboratory methods and science in general — practical as 
 well as theoretical men. They should not go to sea. (c) Under 
 them should be staffs of civilian experimenters, chemists, physicists, 
 etc. (d) Each subhead should have his corps of assistants and with 
 shop facilities, without too much red tape, (e) TbergL should be at 
 
112 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 least two and possibly three shifts of men. Time should be the 
 essence of the place. 
 
 5. Secrecy should be a governing factor. The place should be sur- 
 rounded by a high fence and guard maintained at all hours. No 
 visitors allowed. 
 
 6. Facilities should exist for enabling the inventor to assist in the 
 development of the idea he has presented, provided he is a practical 
 man. 
 
 7. The investment for grounds, buildings, and equipment should 
 total approximately $5,000,000. 
 
 8. The annual operating expenses to be between $2,500,000 and 
 $3,000,000. 
 
 Note. — For Mr. Edison's report, see Appendix, pages 230-232. 
 
 On March 15, 1916, Secretary Daniels, Mr. Edison, Dr. Baekeland, 
 Mr. Coffin, Mr. Hunt, and Mr. Saunders appeared before the Com- 
 mittee on Naval Affairs of the House of Eepresentatives, Washington, 
 D. C, and subjected themselves to a thorough examination by the 
 committee as to the purposes of the laboratory and its necessity. As 
 a result. Congress incorporated in "An act making appropriations for 
 the naval service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1917, and for 
 other purposes," approved August 29, 1916, the following provision : 
 
 Experimental and research laboratory : For laboratory and research worlc 
 on the subject of gun erosion, torpedo motive power, the gyroscope, submarine 
 guns, protection against submarine, torpedo, and mine attack, improvement In 
 submarine attachments, improvement and development in submarine engines, 
 storage batteries and propulsion, aeroplanes and air craft, improvement in radio 
 installations, and such other necessary work for the benefit of the Government 
 service, including the construction, equipment, and operation of a laboratory, 
 the employment of scientific civilian assistants as may become necessary, to be 
 expended under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy (limit of cost not to . 
 exceed $1,500,000), $1,000,000: Provided, That nothing herein shall be construed 
 as preventing or interfering with the continuation or undertaking of necessary 
 experimental work during the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, nineteen hun- 
 dred and seventeen, as heretofore conducted under other appropriations : Pro- 
 vided further. That the Secretary of the Navy shall make detailed reports to 
 the Congress not later than June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and seventeen, and 
 annually thereafter, showing the manner in which all expenditures hereunder 
 have been made. 
 
 Secretary Daniels, at one of the first meetings of the board, re- 
 quested that the board immediately investigate the question of a site 
 for the laboratory, and this was done. Among the sites investigated 
 was one near the Naval Academy at Annapolis, Md. ; one at Belle- 
 view Magazine, on the Potomac River a few miles below Washing- 
 ton ; and one at Sandy Hook, just outside New York Harbor. 
 
 The members of the board could not agree upon a site ; some mem- 
 bers, including Mr. Edison, were firmly convinced that the site at 
 
LABORATORY. 
 
 113 
 
 Sandy Hook was the one to be selected, while other members were 
 in favor of the site at Annapolis or below Washington. 
 
 Then war was declared on April 6, 1917, and a combination of 
 these two circumstances prevented the laboratory site from being 
 selected and the laboratory being constructed. As a result the Navy 
 had the money for a laboratory, and no doubt now that hostilities 
 have ceased will use it for the construction of one at one of the sites 
 mentioned. 
 
 The following are the reports on the laboratory sites which were 
 submitted by the committee charged with the duty of investigating 
 it: Majority report of the comimittee was in favor of establishing a 
 laboratory at Annapolis, Md. Mr. Thomas A. Edison, however, made 
 a minority report in favor of Sandy Hook, and Belleview Magazine, 
 on the Potomac Eiver near Washington, was thought of as a com- 
 promise. Belleview Magazine is situated about 4 miles below the 
 Washington Xavy Yard, on the Potoma,c Eiver. It has good solid 
 ground, good depth of water, and has room for an aviation field. 
 North of this tract is an area of reclaimed land which has been made 
 by extending the shore line, filling in from dredging and cutting in 
 the Anacostia Eiver. 
 168537°— 20 8 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 FUNCTIONS OF THE VARIOUS ORGANIZATIONS. 
 
 It will be recalled that the Naval Consulting Board had its or- 
 ganization meeting October 7, 1915, and was the pioneer organiza- 
 tion dealing with inventions and scientific work for war purposes. 
 It therefore, in the early days, covered a very wide field ; but it was 
 not long before, by its own acts, it had limited the scope of its ac- 
 tivities. 
 
 For instance, the industrial preparedness campaign of the Naval 
 Consulting Board led to the formation of the Council of National 
 Defense, as has heretofore been pointed out, and the Council of 
 National Defense adopted the National Research Council as its 
 department of science and research. As pointed out in the chapter 
 on the Ship Protection Committee, that committee was formed with 
 tlie cooperation of the Naval Consulting Board, and one of its 
 active members was a member of the Naval Consulting Board, Mr. 
 A. M. Hunt. 
 
 The Ship Protection Committee took charge of all inventions 
 in regard to protection of merchant vessels, and in that way re- 
 lieved the Naval Consulting Board of certain activities in that 
 direction. 
 
 The Nahant work of the Committee on Special Problems of the 
 Naval Consulting Board was taken over by the Navy June 23, 1917. 
 
 In the summer of 1918 the Inventions Section of the General 
 Staff was created by the following order of the War Department: 
 
 General Okdebs, ] War Department, 
 
 No. 39. J Washington, April 10, 1918. 
 
 [Extract] 
 
 V. Hereafter all communications relating to the submission of inventions to 
 the Government for inspection, test, or sale received from any source in any 
 office of the War Department, staff corps, supply department, or any head- 
 quarters in the United States will be referred directly to " The Inventions 
 Section, General Staff, Army War College, AVashington, D. C." Those de.sir- 
 ing to present their ideas or inventions in person should be referred to the 
 same agency and address. This refers to inventions of a mechanical, elec- 
 trical, or chemical nature as distinct from suggestions or ideas or plans of 
 operations to assist in winning the war. These last should follow their 
 customary course. All men belonging to the service who have ideas for 
 114 
 
FUNCTIONS OF THE VAEIOTIS ORGANIZATIONS. 115 
 
 improvements In any of the material are notified to submit tlieir descriptions 
 of same freely and thus be of aid to the Government in the prosecution of 
 the war. 
 
 [070 A. G. C] 
 By order of the Secretary of War: 
 
 Peyton C. Maech, 
 Major General, Acting Chief of Staff. 
 Official : 
 
 H. P. McCain, 
 
 The Adjutant General. 
 
 The Invention Section of the General Staff, United States Army, 
 took charge of inventions applicable to the Armj'. As the use of cer- 
 tain inventions overlapped in the Army and Navy — for instance, 
 inventions in regard to projectiles, guns, etc. — this further nar- 
 rowed the field of activities of the Naval Consulting Board. 
 
 The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics looked after 
 inventions in regard to aircraft, and the following act of Congress 
 established it: 
 
 [Naral appropriation act (Public No. 271, 63d Cong.) approved Mar. 3, 1915.] 
 An Advisory Committee for Aeronautics is hereby established, and the Presi- 
 dent is authorized to appoint not to exceed twelve members, to consist of two 
 members from the War Department, from the offlce in charge of military 
 aeronautics ; two members from the Navy Department, from the office in charge 
 of naval aeronautics ; a representative each of the Smithsonian Institution, of 
 the United States Weather Bureau, and of the United States Bureau of 
 Standards ; together with not more than five additional persons who shall be 
 acquainted with the needs of aeronautical science, either civil or military, or 
 skilled in aeronautical engineering or its allied sciences : Provided, That the 
 members of the Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, as such, shall serve with- 
 out compensation: Provided further. That it shall be the duty of the Advisory 
 Committee for Aeronautics to supervise and direct the scientific study of the 
 problems of flight, with a view to their practical solution, and to determine 
 the problems which should be experimentally attacked, and to discuss their 
 solution and their application to practical questions. In the event of a labora- 
 tory or laboratories, either in whole or in part, being placed under the direc- 
 tion of the committee, the committee may direct and conduct research and ex- 
 periment in aeronautics in such laboratory or laboratories: And provided fiir- 
 ther. That rules and regulations for the conduct of the work of the committee 
 shall be formulated by the committee and approved by the President. 
 
 That the sum of $5,000 a year, or so much thereof as may be necessary, 
 for five years is hereby appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not 
 otherwise appropriated, to be immediately available, for experimental work 
 and investigations undertaken by the committee, clerical expense and supplies, 
 and necessary expenses of members of the committee in going to, returning 
 from, and while attending, meetings of the committee: Provided, That an an- 
 nual report to the Congress shall be submitted through the President, includ- 
 ing an itemized statement of expenditures. 
 
 In addition to the duties indicated in the act above referred to, 
 the committee acted in a special advisory capacity to the President 
 
116 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 and to the Congress in matters of general Government policy con- 
 cerning aeronautics. Its organization is set forth in appendix. 
 
 Note.— For organization of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics 
 see Appendix, page 232-234. 
 
 The War Committee of Technical Societies appeared on the scene, 
 was adopted by the Naval Consulting Board, and its main function 
 was to link up more thoroughly the membership of the engineering 
 societies with the Army and Navy. 
 
 The War Committee was an organization formed June 27, 1917, and 
 made up by two delegates from each of the following societies : Ameri- 
 can Society of Civil Engineers, American Institute of Electrical En- 
 gineers, xVmerican Society of Mechanical Engineers, American Insti- 
 tute of Mining Engineers, American Gas Institute, American Elec- 
 tro-Chemical Society, Illuminating Engineering Society, Mining and 
 Metallurgical Society of America, American Society of Refrigerat- 
 ing Engineers, American Institute of Chemical Engineers, Society 
 of Automotive Engineers. -In its organization it was somewhat simi- 
 lar to the Naval Consulting Board, in that both boards were formed 
 by elections from the membership of engineering societies. 
 
 The War Committee, however, was not limited in its activities to 
 naval matters. It was partly supported by appropriations made 
 by the Engineering Council, which is an engineering organization 
 representing the four large engineering societies, namely, Ameri- 
 can Institute of Mining Engineers, American Institute of Civil 
 Engineers, American Institute of Mechanical Engineers, American 
 Institute of Electrical Engineers. 
 
 These larger organizations make contributions to the Engineering 
 Council for joint work of the societies mentioned; and the Engi- 
 neering Council, out of these funds so contributed, appropriated 
 certain sums for the financing of the activities of the War Com- 
 mittee of Technical Societies. The four societies represented on 
 the Engineering Council formed a nucleus for the formation of the 
 War Committee, and gradually expanded by taking in additional 
 societies, until there were 11 societies represented in its member- 
 ship, by two delegates from each society. These societies contributed 
 directly to the treasury of the War Committee certain sums for car- 
 rying on its work. The funds from the two sources above men- 
 tioned were not adequate to finance the War Committee, and the 
 Naval Consulting Board very generously provided quarters to house 
 the War Committee, and stationery and other office facilities. 
 
 Among the 30,000 members represented by the War Committee of 
 Technical Societies were to be found specialists in every department 
 of science and the industrial arts; hence these men, if provided by 
 bulletins and correspondence with live, concrete problems relating 
 
FUNCTIONS OF THE VARIOUS ORGANIZATIONS. 117 
 
 to the war, could furnish ideas, suggestions, and inventions of a 
 much higher and more useful class than were being received then 
 from the general public, who had neither the initial training nor the 
 information necessary to guide them in their work. 
 
 The committee was in a position to provide specialists who were 
 competent to examine and furnish valuable reports on any of the 
 various problems arising in the prosecution of the war by both land 
 and sea. 
 
 As the volume of business between the War Committee of Techni- 
 cal Societies and the Inventions Section of the General Staff, United 
 States Army, increased, the necessity for closer cooperation became 
 evident, and the last of August, 1918, Capt. Lloyd N. Scott, assigned 
 for duty with the General Staff, Inventions Section, was appointed 
 liaison officer to the War Committee and the Naval Consulting 
 Board, 
 
 On February 8, 1918, the War Committee of Technical Societies 
 was appointed the civilian branch of the Information Section of the 
 Ordnance Department, and after that date inventions and problems 
 which it was considered civilian inventors could more readily solve 
 were sent by the Information Section to the War Committee. This 
 connection proved extremely useful and satisfactory to all parties 
 concerned. 
 
 The chairman of the War Committee, Mr. David W. Brunton, 
 was, in accordance with the following resolution, elected a member of 
 the Naval Consulting Board : 
 
 Resolved, That this board approves the recommendation of its officers that 
 the War Committee otE Technical Societies be asked to recommend to the Sec- 
 retary of the Navy a representative from the War Committee for membership 
 on the Naval Consulting Board. 
 
 He later became the member in charge of the Naval Consulting 
 Board in Washington, D. C, and in this capacity and that of chair- 
 man of the War Committee of Technical Societies was enabled to 
 effectively coordinate the work of these organizations with the In- 
 ventions Sections of the General Staff, United States Army, and 
 other organizations. 
 
 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL. 
 
 Some six months after the Naval Consulting Board was formed, 
 when the relations of the United States with Germany werei already 
 tense, and the industrial preparedness campaign of the Naval Con- 
 sulting Board was well under way, the National Academy of Sciences 
 offered its services to the President to organize the scientific and 
 technical resources of the country in the "broadest and most effective 
 manner, to solve the military and naval problems of the Nation. 
 
118 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 The National Academy of Sciences was organized during the 
 Civil War by a congressional charter which provided that " the 
 academy shall, whenever called upon by any department of the 
 Government, investigate, examine, experiment, and report upon any 
 subject of science or art." Under this provision the academy had 
 acted since the time of its establishment as the official adviser of the 
 Government on a wide variety of questions. During the Ci\'il War 
 its members dealt actively with military and naval problems of 
 precisely the same type of those which would likely press for solu- 
 tion if the United States went to war. 
 
 The President, on May 11, 1918, issued the following Executive 
 order : 
 
 The National Research Council was organized in 1916 at the request of the 
 pre.sident of the National Academy of Science, under its congressional charter, 
 as a measure of national preparedness. The work accomplished by the council 
 in organizing research and in securing cooperation of military and civilian 
 agencies in the solution of military problems demonstrates its capacity for 
 larger service. The National Academy of Sciences is therefore requested to 
 perpetuate the National Research Council, the duties of which shall be as 
 follows : 
 
 1. In general, to stimulate research in the mathematical, physical, and bio- 
 logical sciences, and in the application of these sciences to engineering, agri- 
 culture, medicine, and other useful arts, with the object of increasing knowl- 
 edge, of strengthening the national defense, and of contributing in other ways 
 to the public welfare. 
 
 2. To survey the larger possibilities of science, to formulate comprehensive 
 projects of research, and to develop effective means of utilizing the scientific 
 and technical i-esources of the country for dealing with these projects. 
 
 3. To promote cooperation in research, at home and abroad, in order to 
 secure concentration of effort, minimize duplication, and stimulate progress; 
 but in all cooperative undertakings to give encouragement to individual initia- 
 tive, as fundamentally Important to the advancement of science. 
 
 4. To serve as a means of bringing Americans and foreign investigators into 
 active cooperation with the scientific and technical services of the War and 
 Navy Departments and with those of the civil branches of the Government. 
 
 5. To direct the attention of scientific and technical investigators to the 
 I)resent importance of military and industrial problems in connection with the 
 war, and to aid in the solution of these problems by organizing specific 
 researches. 
 
 6. To gather and collate scientific and technical information at home and 
 abroad, in cooperation with governmental and other agencies, and to render 
 such information available to duly accredited persons. 
 
 Effective prosecution of the council's work required the cordial collaboration 
 of tlie scientific and technical branches of the Government, both mUltary and 
 civil. To -this end representatives of the Government, upon the nomination of 
 the president of the National Academy of Sciences, will be designated by the 
 I'resident as members of the council, as heretofore, and the heads of the de- 
 partments immediately concerned will continue to cooperate in every way 
 that may be required. 
 
 WooDEOw Wilson. 
 
 The White House, May 11, 1918, 
 
FUNCTIONS OF THE VARIOUS ORGANIZATIONS. 119 
 
 The work of the National Eesearch Council was financed by 
 money received from the President's fund through the Council of 
 National Defense and other sources. 
 
 Many of the other bodies, including the Naval Consulting Board, 
 were advisory, but under the method of organization of the Na- 
 tional Research Council it was in a position to do a specific thing. 
 It was made the Department of Science and Eesearch of the Signal 
 Corps of the United States Army, and received Army funds from 
 that source. It carried to the point of production many of the de- 
 vices of the Signal Corps which concerned radio and other branches 
 of communication, such as light and other means, which were of a 
 highly technical and scientific character. After war was declared, 
 comparatively large sums were placed at the disposal of the coun- 
 cil for scientific experimental work. This work was done by officers 
 of the Army and Navy, civilians in their homes, and civilians 
 brought to Washington, and sent to the Bureau of Standards, the 
 "Western Electric and General Electric companies, and other insti- 
 tutions. It helped build up the scientific departments of the Army 
 and Navy by bringing men to Washington whose scientific reputa- 
 tions it knew, and having them commissioned by the Army and 
 Navy, where their services were most needed. Private funds were 
 also put at their disposal by philanthropic individuals and the Car- 
 negie Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation. 
 
 As most inventions in modern warfare are based upon highly 
 technical data and information, it was not long before the activi- 
 ties of the National Research Council led it into the field of the 
 scientific subjects upon which naval inventions were founded. 
 
 The council was in a position, as a body having authority and 
 responsibility, together with funds, to undertake organization work 
 that would correlate the scientific information of the Allies with 
 our own. As a result, they established a research information serv- 
 ice with attaches in London and Paris; and on April 16, 1918, by 
 circular letter No. 21, Admiral Sims; in command of the United 
 States naval forces operating in European waters, created a scien- 
 tific division of his staff and placed the scientific attache of the 
 National Eesearch Council at its head. He called for the fviU co- 
 operation of the officers connected with our vessels abroad. 
 
 By special memorandum No. 61, the chief of staff of Admiral 
 Sims, Capt. N. C. Twining, called the attention of the staff to cir- 
 cular letter No. 21, and directed that certain naval officers keep in 
 closest touch with the scientific attache. 
 
 Through the channels thus created by the National Research Coun- 
 cil information in regard to the scientific problems of the Navy and 
 the scientific achievements of scientists in the United States passed. 
 This was a benefit to the Navy operating in European waters, so 
 
120 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THl! UNITED STATES. 
 
 that the National Eesearch Council performed one of the functions 
 that might have been performed by the Naval Consulting Board had 
 it been organized with the definite authority and responsibility that 
 was vested in the National Eesearch Council. It will be recalled, in 
 an earlier part of this book, that the Naval Consulting Board by 
 necessity was organized without authority or responsibility, and was 
 made an advisory body connected with the Secretary of the Navy's 
 office. 
 
 The work of the National Eesearch Council and the Naval Con- 
 sulting Board was not coordinated, the result being that the Eesearch 
 Council built up an organization separate and distinct from the 
 Naval Consulting Board. The council furnished information on 
 technical and scientific subjects to the Navy, as well as other branches 
 of the Government, and brought forth inventions and improvements 
 on the highly technical matters involved, without coming into inti- 
 mate contact with the Naval Consulting Board. 
 
 The result of this differentiation and specialization of functions 
 was that the Naval Consulting Board finally became the Inventions 
 Board for the Navy, and later, through appointment by the Council 
 of National Defense, for the United States Government. As such 
 it passed upon, as hereinafter described, inventiol^s received from 
 the public. Its members, many of them eminent inventors, devoted 
 themselves individually to the development of devices of their own 
 invention. 
 
 At a meeting of the Naval Consulting Board, held on February 10, 
 1917, the following resolution was passed : 
 
 That the Secretary of the Navy be informed that this board holds itself at 
 the service of the Department of War or of the Council of National Defense 
 to act as a board of inventions, or in any other capacity which may be of use 
 to the Government in the present emergency 
 
 Copies of this resolution were forwarded to the Secretary of the 
 Navy and to the Council of National Defense. 
 
 On February 15, 1917, the following resolution was passed by the 
 Council of National Defense : 
 
 Whereas the Naval Consulting Board has informed the Secretary of the 
 Navy that it holds itself at the service of the Department of War or the Coun- 
 cil of National Defense to act as a board of inventions, or in any other 
 capacity which may be of use to the Government in the present emergency : 
 
 Be it resolved. That the Council of National Defense hereby express its ap- 
 preciation of this action on the part of the Naval Consulting Board ; 
 
 Ayid he it further resolved, That the council call upon the board for advice 
 and assistance whenever the occasion therefor shall arise. 
 
 At the time of the armistice the summary of the situation in regard 
 to scientific research and invention would be about as follows : 
 
 The Naval Consulting Board acted as a board of inventions for the 
 Navy and the United States Government, and received hundreds of 
 
FUNCTIONS OP THE VAKIOUS ORGANIZATIONS. 121 
 
 suggestions weekly from inventors throughout the country, princi- 
 pally for Naval use. 
 
 The Inventions Section of the General Staff, United States Army, 
 received inventions from the public to be passed upon for Army use. 
 
 The Ship Protection Committee of the United States Shipping 
 Board received ideas and suggestions from the public to be passed 
 upon for use on merchant ships. 
 
 The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics received ideas 
 and suggestions from the public and passed upon their practicability 
 for aircraft use. 
 
 The National Eesearch Council acted as the department of science 
 and research of the Council of National Defense and the Science and 
 Eesearch Division of the Signal Corps of the United States Army. 
 This corps had charge of all means of communication in the Army, 
 including radio. The ramifications of National Research activities 
 led it into naval aviation, naval communications, radio work of all 
 kinds, as well as submarine detection. There was thus a great over- 
 lapping of spheres of activity in the scientific work which could 
 have been avoided by a proper organization. 
 
 The Naval Consulting Board fostered and nurtured many early 
 organizations which later became great Government structures, and 
 its members, as individuals, served on the National Eesearch Council 
 and other organizations. 
 
CHAPTEE VIII. 
 
 INVENTIONS FROM THE PUBLIC. 
 
 All bureaus of the Navy and departments of the Army, and most 
 of the governmental departments in Washington, received ideas, sug- 
 gestions, and inventions in great numbers from the public. Long 
 before we entered into the war these communications to the Navy 
 Department increased manyf old ; and, as pointed out in the chapter 
 on " Organization," there was created an inventions office attached 
 to the office of the Secretary of Navy, through which all inventions 
 that came from the public and directed to the Navy Department were 
 handled directly in this office. Rear Admiral Smith, who had charge 
 of this office, considered many of these inventions. 
 
 The Naval Consulting Board also received thousands of inven- 
 tions from the public. 
 
 On April 6, 1917, at the time the United States entered the war, the 
 work of examining inventions was being carried on by the secretary 
 of the board, Mr. Thomas Robins, with the assistance from other 
 members of the board, and his own private office staff. A tidal wave 
 of inventions, however, deluged the office at that time, and it became 
 necessary to expand the force and organize the handling of inven- 
 tions from the public on a business basis. By June the office force 
 had been expanded to 12 office employees and 8 examiners, besides the 
 executive work done by the secretary of the board, Mr. Robins, and 
 his two assistants. By August, 1917, the board was obliged to take 
 a suite of five offices to replace the limited office space which it had 
 used prior to that time. 
 
 The quantity of incoming material was greatly stimulated by 
 articles which appeared in various publications describing the work 
 of the Naval Consulting Board, and by every new disaster to mer- 
 chant vessels which was accompanied by great loss of life. 
 
 At the request of the secretary of the board, Lieut. Charles Mes- 
 sick, U. S. N. R. F., was detailed to the office and put in charge of 
 organizing the office force and machinery for handling inventions. 
 At the time of the armistice Mr. Alan T. Burleigh had charge of 
 this branch of the work. Later four yeomen were also detailed to 
 122 
 
INVENTIONS FROM THE PUBLIC. 123 
 
 this office and assisted in handling the work, and following is a list 
 of the staff utilized : 
 
 Five technical examiners of inventions, three junior examiners of 
 inventions, personal assistant to the secretary, head file clerk, chief 
 stenographer, three stenographers, three file clerks, switchboard op- 
 erator, four yeomen who performed miscellaneous duties. 
 
 At the time of its greatest activities, in 1917, this force during a 
 single day handled some 600 letters, which really meant that some- 
 thing slightly less than that number of individual cases were given 
 attention. 
 
 The method of examination was as follows : A preliminary exami- 
 nation was given by the junior examiners ; if an invention appeared 
 to have the slightest merit it was turned over to the senior exami- 
 ners for further and deeper consideration. The senior examiners 
 then sent to the various chairmen of the committees of the Naval 
 Consulting Board those inventions which had special merit for their 
 expert opinions. The chairman of the committee then sent the in- 
 ventions to each member of his committee for comments and sugges- 
 tions. The invention came back to the chairman with annotations of 
 each member of the committee. The report of the committee was 
 then made up by the chairman after a meeting of the committee, 
 and either sent to the secretary of the board or presented to the board 
 in open meeting, according as the circumstances seemed to warrant. 
 If the report was made to the open board, it was usually done where 
 an appropriation was necessary in order to either test the invention 
 or to develop it. 
 
 At the meeting of the board the chairman of each committee was 
 called on for his report, and if he wanted an appropriation for con- 
 ducting experiments he would ask for the appropriation at that 
 time. Board members asked the chairman of the committee ques- 
 tions to satisfy themselves on the different points involved in the 
 invention, and general discussion would ensue. A vote would then 
 be taken, and if a majority were in favor an appropriation was 
 approved by the Secretary of the Navy. The chairman of the 
 committee which had reported favorably on the invention, and 
 which had thus received an appropriation, would appoint one or 
 more members of his committee to conduct the experiment with 
 the invention. The chairman of the committee would frequently 
 ask the member knowing most about a certain invention to address 
 the board; and if an appropriation was made the chairman usually 
 appointed this man to supervise and conduct the experiment, with 
 authority to associate with himself any outside or inside talent that 
 he might wish. He would make necessary expenditures and do the 
 necessary traveling and pay the necessary traveling expenses of the 
 inventor and such outside civilians as he might enlist to help him on 
 
124 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 his experiments. He was also given power to make the necessary 
 arrangements with the Armj^, Navy, or outside concerns to make tlie 
 experiment, and would keep his chairman advised during the progress 
 of the work. The chairman usually witnessed the final test of the 
 device before the experiment was completed, so that the report which 
 was made on the device was made not only by the man vested with 
 authority to conduct the experiment, but also by the concurrence and 
 indorsement of the chairman of the committee. 
 
 The report which was made would then go to the open board, and 
 if a favorable one would be turned over to the bureau of the Navy 
 Department interested in the device, through Rear Admiral William 
 Strother Smith, liaison officer between the office of the Secretary of 
 the Navy and the Naval Consulting Board. 
 
 Inventors who had devices of merit appeared before the com- 
 mittee in charge of the particular subject under which the device 
 came, and when advisable they were invited to appear before the 
 entire board. 
 
 It was soon found that inventions received could be readily classi- 
 fied, and this greatly facilitated the handling of them. As an in- 
 dication of the general classes into which the inventions fell, the 
 following estimate of the total in each of the larger classes has been 
 made based on the cross indexing of some 30,000 out of 110,000 : 
 
 Submarines 4,007 
 
 Ideas to combat submarines 2,072 
 
 Submarine destroyer 1, 517 
 
 Submarine detectors 691 
 
 Submarine destruction 1,180 
 
 Submarine detection 1 895 
 
 Ship protection 9, 420 
 
 Nets 3, 570 
 
 Shields 2,486 
 
 Plates 684 
 
 Guards 403 
 
 Armor 136 
 
 Submarine bases 233 
 
 Boats 2, 053 
 
 Bombs 1, 986 
 
 Camouflage 99 
 
 Convoy 88 
 
 Crews 136 
 
 Engines 1, 572 
 
 Forts 151 
 
 Guns : 1,720 
 
 Life-saving devices 814 
 
 Mines 1, 605 
 
 Motors 629 
 
 Nets 943 
 
 Periscopes 592 
 
 Power 351 
 
INVENTIONS FROM THE PUBLIC. 125 
 
 Propellers 999 
 
 Ship protection deflectors 125 
 
 Fences 74 
 
 Fenders 81 
 
 Hull 229 
 
 Mats 218 
 
 Torpedoes 2, 571 
 
 Torpedo catcher 643 
 
 Aerial torpedo 462 
 
 Torpedo deflector 751 
 
 Vessels 4,218 
 
 Aircraft devices 3, 966 
 
 In the beginning the board was without knowledge as to the re- 
 action of inventors with whom it entered into correspondence, and 
 therefore stated specific reasons for rejecting their inventions. This 
 precipitated a voluminous correspondence with inventors who be- 
 came dissatisfied and wanted to argue the question of rejection, and 
 as a result, the board finally adopted the policy of not disclosing 
 specific reasons for rejecting inventions, as by written communica- 
 tions it seemed almost impossible to convince any inventor, how- 
 ever worthless his invention might be, that it was valueless. 
 
 Inventors, however, who were located near one of the offices of 
 the board, and had an opportunity to talk with the examiners, were 
 more lilcely to be convinced and see wherein their devices were either 
 old, inapplicable, or defective in some way. Inventors came to the 
 office from every walk of life, and were rich and poor, cultured and 
 uncultured; but the majority seemed to be persons of limited culture. 
 
 The offices of the board were at 13 Park Eow, New York City, 
 and examiners and members of the board were in touch with one of 
 the largest navy yards in the United States, situated at Brooklyn, in 
 the third naval district. Lieut. Messick, who was detailed to service 
 with the board, had acqess at all times to conference with the officers 
 on active duty and acted as liaison officer between the civilian ex- 
 aminers and the operating forces of the Navy. 
 
 Although no actual statistics are available as to what proportion 
 of inventions were sent to the committees of the board for considera- 
 tion, it has been estimated that not over one in a thousand- was worth 
 sending by the examiners to the various committee of the board for 
 consideration. 
 
 Of the 110,000 which came to the board and the Navy Department 
 from the public, approximately 110 thereof were of requisite stand- 
 ard to be submitted to committees, and of these 110 but 1 was put 
 into production, although several others were developed and might 
 have later been used. 
 
 It is understood that the Inventions Section of the General Staff, 
 United States Army, received 25,000 ideas and suggestions from the 
 public, of which but 25 were of value. 
 
126 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 The experience of the French Government was similar to that of 
 the Naval Consulting Board in regard to the inventions received 
 from the public. 
 
 The superior inventions commission, which was created by decree 
 on August 11, 1914, received and examined between August, 1914, 
 and November, 1918, 44,976 proposals, out of which 1,958 were re- 
 tained by it, which is about 4.3 per cent of those received. 
 
 The administration of inventions was created November 13, 1915, 
 and between that date and the armistice, the superior inventions 
 commission, above referred to, turned over to the administration 
 of inventions 35,313 proposals, out of which 1,654 (4.6 per cent) 
 were transmitted to the officers of invention under the administra- 
 tion. Of these 1,654 which had been submitted to the officers for 
 study, 781 were worked out in detail and were susceptible of im- 
 mediate application, and were transmitted to the technical bureaus 
 interested. Therefore about 2.2 per cent of the 35,313 inventions 
 were turned over to the technical bureaus. 
 
 In considering the inventions received by the French Government 
 it should be noted that for a great length of time it had maintained 
 large standing armies, as well as factories for the production of 
 war materials. It is therefore not surprising that the high grade 
 of material received by them was of a somewhat higher character 
 than that received by the Naval Consulting Board. 
 
 The Under Secretary of State had, under his direct control, the 
 entire work of the munitions ministry, and was thus entrusted with 
 the close and coojjerative administration of this entire field of work. 
 
 The impressive thing about the French schemes for handling in- 
 ventions were the facilities which they accorded for study and tech- 
 nical experiment. The Naval Consulting Board had no laboratory, 
 no place to conduct experiments, and no staff to carry them on. 
 Facilities which were used were those that were open to any citizen 
 who could pay for the services that commercial concerns were will- 
 ing to render. This, of course, is with the exception of large labo- 
 ratories and shops which individual members of the board owned 
 and controlled. Had the laboratory been constructed, for which 
 Congress made an appropriation, this would all have been remedied. 
 
 Although a board of inventions and research which the British 
 Government created for the handling of research and inventions 
 during the war received up to July, 1918, some 53,000 inventions 
 and proposals, of which 36,000 related to the submarine, the mine, 
 and naval engineering, 13,000 to ordnance, and about 4,000 to air- 
 craft, yet no figures are available which indicate what proportion of 
 these ideas were adopted by the British Government. 
 
 The organization of the board of inventions and research of the 
 British Government was somewhat different from that of the Naval 
 
INVENTIONS FROM THE PUBLIC. 
 
 127 
 
 Consulting Board. It was composed of a central committee of three 
 members, whicH consisted of the Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Fisher 
 of Kilverstone, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O., LL.D., president; Prof. 
 Sir Joseph J. Thomson, O. M., F. E. S. ; and the Hon. Sir Charles A. 
 Parsons, K. C. B., F. E. S. The heads of the technical departments 
 of the Admiralty were associate members of this committee on the 
 understanding that these officials should only be summoned to meet- 
 ings when specially required. 
 
 A consulting panel of scientific experts was also part of the organi- 
 zation. It was composed the following members : Prof. H. B. Baker, 
 F. E. S.; Prof. W. H. Bragg, F. E. S.; Prof. H. C. H. Carpenter; 
 Prof. Sir William Croolces, O. M., pres. E. S.; Mr. W. Duddell, 
 F. E. S. ; Prof. Percy F. Frankland, F. E. S. ; Prof. Bertram Hop- 
 kinson, F. E. S. ; Sir Oliver Lodge, F. E. S. ; Prof. W. J. Pope, 
 F. E. S.; Prof. Sir Ernest Eutherford, F. E. S.; Mr. G. Gerald 
 Stoney, F. E. S.; Prof. E. J. Strutt, F. E. S. Sir Dugald Clerk, 
 K. B. E., F. E. S., and Sir Eichard Threlfall, K. B. E., F. E. S., 
 were subsequently added. 
 
 A secretarial staff of the board dealt with the preliminary sifting 
 of the proposals from inventors and others and handled the arrange- 
 ments for special inquiries, experiments, and the financial side of 
 the work. 
 
 The board soon determined that the most important function that 
 it could perform was to first concentrate expert scientific inquiry on 
 certain definite problems the solution of which were of importance 
 to the naval service. Second, to encourage research in the direction 
 in which it was probable that results of value to the Navy might be 
 obtained by organized scientific effort. Third, to consider schemes or 
 suggestions put forward by inventors and other members of the 
 general public. In other words, the experience of this board was 
 similar to that of the Naval Consulting Board in that the best re- 
 sults were obtained by concentrating scientific inquiry on definite 
 problems and encouraging research in definite directions rather than 
 by relying upon the schemes or suggestions from the public. This 
 was so, even though flag ofiicers and senior officers of the Eoyal 
 Navy were invited to collect suggestions from the service afloat and 
 forward them to the board for consideration. 
 
 The board ran along with this organization until January, 1918, 
 when it was found desirable to organize more completely the neces- 
 .sary experimental and research work and bring to bear upon it 
 sufficient scientific and technical knowledge through insuring a closer 
 contact between the naval officers, the scientists, and the engineers. 
 The department of experiment and research was therefore founded 
 at the Admiralty. The director of this department, Mr. Charles H. 
 
128 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 Merz, M. Inst., C. E., was appointed a member of the central com- 
 mittee of the board of invention and research and this board con- 
 tinued to investigate and advise upon ideas submitted by the public ; 
 and the department of experiment and research dealt with the actual 
 experimental and research matters dealing with specific problems, 
 which arose in the course of naval work. It organized an effective 
 link between the Admiralty and the leading scientists and the great 
 manufacturing organizations of the country. 
 
 Finally, on the 31st of December, 1918, the board of inventions 
 and research was abolished and the functions of the board and of the 
 department of experiment and research were merged in a depart- 
 ment of scientific research and experiment. 
 
 In other words, the evolution of the handling of inventions in 
 Great Britain went through very much the same course that they 
 did in this country. There was first the creation of a board of illus- 
 trious scientists and inventors who met weekly or monthly. The 
 actual routine of the board, however, was carried on by a secretarial 
 staff who dealt with the preliminary sifting of proposals from in- 
 ventors and others. The central committee and the panel main- 
 tained touch with the six sections and subcommittees which had been 
 appointed to deal with the several subjects. The department of 
 experiment and research was then organized at the Admiralty to 
 effectively deal with the directing and coordinating of the work on 
 special problems. 
 
 They therefore found it absolutely necessary to create an organiza- 
 tion in the Admiralty with full authority and power to deal with 
 all aspects of scientific and inventive problems in a businesslike and 
 efficient way; not relying upon voluntary contributions of the 
 public but rather the teamwork of scientists, each contributing 
 something toward the solution of her perfectly definite problems. 
 
 The experimental work in Great Britain was undertaken in the 
 naval establishments which were instituted in various parts of the 
 country and by scientific laboratories in the principal towns fre- 
 quently connected with manufacturing establishments, so that Great 
 Britain also had her difficulties, for the reason that she apparently 
 had no central laboratory such as was contemplated for the Navy 
 when Congress made its appropriation for that purpose. 
 
 The experience of the Naval Consulting Board indicated that the 
 inventions of isolated inventors, who did not have access to the naval 
 information and whose single source of information came from news- 
 papers and public prints which were under heavy censorship and 
 which did not divulge much technical information, had little or 
 no value. 
 
 In order to get results from inventors the most essential thing is 
 to get information to them. This involves practically the organiza- 
 
INVENTIONS FROM THE PUBLIC. 
 
 129 
 
 tion of a correspondence school for inventors, with all of its inherent 
 difficulties, among them being the distributing of confidential infor- 
 mation which may ultimately reach the enemy. 
 
 As the whole progress of civilization is dependent on invention, 
 some instrumentality, either private or governmental, should be 
 'Created to supply to groups of mechanics, scientists, and others of an 
 inventive turn of mind instruction and informa,tion in regard to the 
 present state of the particular arts which they are trying to improve. 
 Sources of information should be. put at the disposal of would-be 
 inventors from which they could obtain ideas and information so that 
 their inventions would be built on a firm foundation of accurate 
 knowledge. 
 
 On accoimt of the low grade of material received from the public 
 and the diagnosis of the board that this was on account of the fact 
 that the public was not informed on the problems confronting the 
 Navy Department, a campaign for the spreading broadcast of 
 knowledge in connection with the particular subjects in which the 
 iiavy and the public were interested was undertaken. 
 
 Through the cooperation of the War Committee of Technical 
 Societies two bulletins were distributed to the public, one on " The 
 Enemy Submarine " May 1, 1918, and the other on " Problems of 
 Aeroplane Improvement " August 1, 1918. These two bulletins were 
 preceded by a bulletin issued by the Naval Consulting Board on 
 ■July 14, 1917, on " The Submarine and Kindred Problems," and it 
 was the experience gained through this bulletin that actuated the 
 l)oard to send out the subsequent bulletins with the cooperation of 
 the War Committee.^ 
 
 The results obtained from the issue of these bulletins were to a 
 -certain extent of a negative character in that the bulletins reduced 
 the number of incoming suggestions that were of no value and 
 raised slightly the average quality of ideas and suggestions which 
 Tvere received thereafter. 
 
 The majority of the suggestions received by the board from the 
 public sought to reach goals which had been the common property 
 of human minds and the students of the respective arts concerned 
 for a long time. If the goals could have been reached there would 
 have been no difficulty in solving the problem. It was a question of 
 accomplishment. The inventors formulated the goal to be achieved, 
 ibut did not show how to reach it. Many inventions were not in 
 ^accordance with the laws of nature as known. A clear understand- 
 ing of the inventions was almost in all cases difficult because of de- 
 fective expression on the part of the inventor. 
 
 > See Appendix, pp. 252 to 288. 
 168537°— 20 9 
 
130 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES* 
 
 Many of the inventors suggested something already in use, or that 
 had been used and abandoned for the sake of a better thing. There 
 was a great lack of kno^vledge on the part of inventors as to devices 
 already existing that served the same purpose proposed by the inven- 
 tor. Most of the inventors did not have knowledge as to the behavior 
 of a boat at sea, and did not know what the conditions on shipboard 
 were when it encountered a bad storm that would wash the decks of 
 the ship. They failed to realize the action of salt water as a corrod- 
 ing agency. They failed to realize that there was a limit to deck space 
 and that there was a limit to the amount of equipment that could 
 be placed on the decks. And they also failed to realize the value of 
 spacing on a ship and the fact that you can not put a ton of one thing 
 in a position where there is a ton of something else ; that everything 
 that goes into a ship means the exclusion of something which may bo 
 more valuable. Inventors also failed to understand that even if a 
 device were good, it would necessarily have to pass through a long 
 experimental period before it cpuld be adopted, and that after adop- 
 tion all the men on board the ship that would operate it would have 
 to be instructed as to its operation. However perfect a machine- 
 may be in the hands of the inventor it might not work well in the 
 hands of the ordinary man, on shipboard. 
 
 Instruction books, regulations, and drill practice have to be ar- 
 ranged for before a new machine or improvement can find its place on 
 shipboard, already overloaded with more mechanical devices than 
 the average man is capable of handling quickly. 
 
 A ncAV and untried device would work no particular injury if it 
 found itself on a farm or in a factory, but on shipboard it is so much 
 dead-weight if it is not used, or else it calls upon the services of men 
 already overloaded with responsibilities. It is very difficult to pro- 
 duce a device which is foolproof, and a machine that is not fool- 
 proof is one to be carefully scrutinized before placed on board a 
 ship. 
 
 Take, for instance, the inventions in regard to aeroplanes. Most of 
 the proposed inventions in regard to aeroplanes were for attachments, 
 or improvements, such as details of the motor adjuncts, or a car- 
 bureter suited for high altitudes, or a supercharging device; there' 
 were also two general classes of parachutes, one attached to the avia- 
 tor and one to save the whole machine. Three-fourths of these inven- 
 tors were not familiar with the principles of aero dynamics. Prob- 
 ably not over 2 per cent had had any practical experience in flying. 
 Many of the things which were proposed would have been useful if 
 they could have been produced, but there were mechanical difficulties 
 M'hich the inventor did not solve. 
 
 Most of the inventors did not understand the present state of the 
 art which they sought to improve. 
 
INVENTIONS FROM THE PUBLIC. 131 
 
 Inventors suggested the same ideas over and over again, whicii 
 ■were duplications of things already suggested, and where there were 
 not duplications, in many cases they had been anticipated by exist- 
 ing inventions. The same mistake was made over and over again 
 by different inventors. Their minds seemed to work in the same 
 channels and along the same lines. They thought of something that 
 it was desirable to accomplish and suggested that it be accomplished, 
 ignoring the difficulties involved in accomplishing it. 
 
 Most of the inventions submitted were in the nature of ideas and 
 not concrete devices. For instance, a man would send in such a tech- 
 nical thing as a helicopter and with a pencil drawing, but without 
 relative dimensions of the different parts, weights, etc. The success 
 or failure of such a device depends on these factors. 
 
 Inventors did not seem to realize how large a balloon was required 
 to lift a given load. The inventor would picture a small balloon 
 holding up an aeroplane with broken wings. He did not realize 
 that if the balloon were sufficiently large to hold up any considerable 
 weight it would be large and impracticable. 
 
 Inventors suggested aeroplane propellers which they claimed would 
 have three or four times the efficiency of propellers in use, but they 
 did not know the present relatively high efficiency of propellers. 
 
 In examining the mass of material submitted, one is impressed 
 with the fact that the inventors submitted ideas poorly conceived 
 without plans showing details. The idea was not put into such 
 tangible shape that it could be utilized. 
 
 The results of an analysis of the ideas and suggestions sent in 
 to the Naval Consulting Board, set forth below,, indicates that by 
 mental process alone, without experimentation, and without famili- 
 arity with the subject matter of the art, very little need be expected 
 in the way of valuable inventions. 
 
 Only those men on the frontiers of scientific development and 
 on the frontiers of development of the various arts concerned in 
 naval warfare would be at all likely to discover anything that was 
 new or could be used by the Navy Department. On the assumption 
 that invention is the conscious striving of an inventor toward a 
 certain end result, it is necessary in order to make a successful inven- 
 tion for him to know the present state of the art he is seeking to 
 improve, the difficulties surrounding that art, and the ideal to be 
 achieved. Applying this test to most inventions, it was found that 
 the majority of the inventors did not know the present state of 
 the art which they were seeking to improve and, as a matter of 
 fact, knew very little about the art and its difficulties. They did 
 not kn,ow what was desired; ideals which were the obvious ones, 
 which, every man who reads the newspapers would think about, were 
 the ones which they worked on. For instance, hundreds of sugges- 
 
132 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 tions were sent in with regard to nets and plates for protection of 
 ships. As a rule, however, the inventor did not know anything 
 about the skin resistance of a plate in its passage through the water, 
 or the resistance offered by a net, and the decrease in the maneuver- 
 ing ability of a ship brought about by its use. Many sought to stop 
 torpedoes by various means without knowing that many torpedoes 
 are designed to explode when stopped or are deflected from their 
 course. 
 
 Many inventors without knowing the limitations of the action of 
 a magnet Upon steel or iron suggested the use of magnets at such 
 distances as to make them impracticable. In other words, if the 
 inventors had, before sending in their suggestions, gone to any public 
 library or looked up the subject which they were seeking to improve 
 in one of the standard encyclopedias, they would have spared exami- 
 ners of the Naval Consulting Board an infinite amount of work. 
 
 The following estimates are based on the results of the examina- 
 tion of samples impartially taken of the 110,000 ideas and suggestions 
 leiei^ed from the public by the Naval Consulting Board and the 
 Xavy Department. 
 
 Seventy-five per cent: Approximately this number of inventions 
 vs-ere shown to be an amateurish mental attempt, without any ex- 
 perimental work on behalf of the inventor, to solve a problem, with 
 only part knowledge of the facts, particularly the highly technical 
 subject matter involved, and without knowledge of difficulties sur- 
 rounding its solution. In this 75 per cent the idea Mas not based 
 on observations but rather on deductions from what were thought 
 to be facts. They were creations of the inventor's mind, not reduced 
 to concrete form, showing that the inventor had little or no ex- 
 joerience with the subject matter of the invention. 
 
 Twenty-five per cent: There was some merit in this remaining 
 number, and they seemed to understand the subject matter of the 
 invention; but of this 25 per cent the following classification was 
 made: 16 per cent were old, or were no improvement over present 
 devices, or were not so good as present devices; 7 per cent were im- 
 practicable; 1 per cent Army inventions; 1 per cent inventors still 
 -working on development. 
 
 Forty-three per cent wei'e written in longhand and 47 per cent 
 ■were typewritten (in these the diction was that of a fairly weJl edu- 
 cated person) ; 11 per cent were written in longhand, uneducated dic- 
 tion; 57.2 per cent inclosed sketches poorly made, or none at all; 
 8.2 per cent were commercial circulars, processes or patents, of which 
 a small percentage were in commercial use; 13.6 per cent seemed to 
 have made experiments with their devices; 1 per cent were appar- 
 ently from crazy persons. 
 
IKVEXTIONS FROM THE PUBLIC. 133 
 
 lyiost of the ideas suggested seemed to be actuated by patriotic 
 and altruistic motives, and not from any idea of gain to the inventor, 
 although this was not always the case. The following extracts from 
 letters taken at random show the general class of material that was 
 submitted. 
 
 " Dear Sir — I nm an old miner, past 70, sitting in his lonely cabin this 
 stormy day studying how he could do his bit. Have been thinking about the 
 uiisinkable ship. I have drawn rude diagram of a ship sawed in two. If I 
 can give an idea that would help I would be awful glad. No. 1 for the soldiers,. 
 No. 2 hold to be cut up into watertight compartment, No. 3 to be tilled with; 
 some material that would protect the steel bottom. Should a torpedo explode 
 underneath it. No. 4 will act as a keel or centerboard in an old-fashioned yacht. 
 I would recommend the vessel should be made wide. There would be more 
 .'ihciw for the torpedo to deflect should, it strike high. Hoping some of youir 
 experts may get a good idea from this. Very respectfully * * *." 
 
 " I have done no experimental work on the idea presented to you regard- 
 ing the * * *. The principle was reached by a speculative process, and in) 
 my belief quite inerrable, and having followed the light of reason thru a series 
 of phenomena, and emerged from them with a purely intellectual conclusion,, 
 I considered it my duty to bring it to your attention, in the hopes that the- 
 Navy, finding it plausible, would have that conclusion brought to an experi- 
 mental test, for our country's defense. I wiU try to reach the confines of the 
 subject by more study, and later on produce a model * * *.' 
 
 " Dear Sir — Please excuse my liberty. I have an Idea that may be of 
 Benefit to the " Navy " also to the " Merchant Marine." It is in form of Pro- 
 tection against Submarine attack. I will submit Idea, &, if adopted I am to 
 receive a liberal payment for same. Were I Financially able I would not ask 
 a Cent for any means whereby it would help my Country. I am Respectfully 
 Yours * * *." 
 
 " I am sending the plans of a * * *. There are a few minor details 
 left out, but I know you and your expert mechanics can find what is needed. 
 I have seen different models of * * * with every kind of motor power 
 except steam. Knowing what steam can do as I fired boilers for four years 
 I thought of the * * *. Motor trucks could convey coal and water be- 
 hind * * *." 
 
 " Enclosed you will find rough sketch to bear out my idea, which is to- 
 build * * *.' 
 
 " I am w-riting you merely to offer a suggestion, which may or may not be 
 practical. My idea is to manufacture a * * *. This * * * is to be 
 of such w-eight as will remain afloat * * *." (No information as to howr 
 it is to be constructed or operated.) 
 
 " I am submitting this without detail * * *." 
 
 " Can there not be constructed a * * *." 
 
 " Enclosed is a rough sketch of * * *. The advantage of this- are 
 * * *." (No details of device ever having been made or how it could be 
 made. ) 
 
 " Dear Sib — I have several ideas on aeroplanes, and I have always wanted 
 to try them out, but I have been a working man and have a large family I did 
 not save the money to get the things I xieeded. Now it will not cost much to- 
 try the same. I will be glad to explain them to you." 
 
 " Gentlemen — I see by the papers that you a.re expecting suggestions on the- 
 submarine menace. I would suggest the using of a * * * ," (No draw- 
 
134 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 inss, or details, or specification attaclied and the inventor does not understand 
 tlie fundamental principles.) 
 
 " Wliy could not * * * similar to * * * be used on floats? I am 
 sending you this thinking the idea might be worked out some way and be of 
 some use to you." 
 
 " Dear Sir : I am sending you a rough sketch, of a plan to save our merchant 
 ships, from being destroyed, by the deadly torpedo of the German Submarine. 
 Altho this plan may not be practical, and there may be similar methods used ; 
 I have never heard of such. And having the interests of my country, at heart 
 I feel it is my duty to submit my plan for your consideration. And if such a 
 plan is practical and is put into use, and proves to be what I sincerel,v hope, 
 a means of saving our Ships from destruction, and the lives of American 
 citizens on the high seas, then I shall feel that I have rendered my country 
 a service worth while. My plan is to have a number of * * * around the 
 ship, and a sufficient distance from the ship to stop the torpedo and explode 
 it away from the vessel. These * * * should extend from below the water 
 nigh enough above the surface to stop the torpedo and still not be observed 
 by the submarine crew. Hoping this plan will be of service, I am Yours very 
 truly * * * ." 
 
 " Dear Sir : I am too old and with too much affliction to be of any very active 
 service to the Nation but not too old to think and I been thinking about those 
 torpedoes that cause so much destruction by coming in contact with some hard 
 solid substance and which I know but very little about it but if coming in con- 
 tact with a hard solid substance is the cause of the explosion why not try 
 something soft and springy on the hull of the vessel say springs surrounded by 
 cork and rubber that might cause the torpedo to bounce off. Am just making 
 fl suggestion altho it may not be worth anything." 
 
 The conclusion to be diawn from the character of the material 
 "n'hich came to the Xaval Consulting Board was that a thought was 
 suggested to the mind of the inventor by reading in a newspaper or 
 other source of information certain difficulties surrounding the 
 problem of a submarine, for instance, and next the leaping of the 
 mind of the inventor toward some kind of a solution based on 
 such faulty information of the subject as he had before him. In 
 other words, it was the first thing which came into the inventor's 
 mind in regard to the matter, without knowledge of the surrounding 
 facts. There were waves of this information which went broadcast 
 through the country, and corresponding waves of inventive ideas 
 and proposals which came back to the Xaval Consulting Board. 
 
 The examiners of the Naval Consulting Board finally became so 
 skilled in this matter of prognosis that after the torpedoing of a 
 merchant ship which was given wide publicity in the papers they 
 would remark, " Well, we will have an increase in ship-protection 
 devices, nets, and plates as a result of that sinking," and in a few 
 days there would be an increase in the number of such ideas and 
 suggestions received by the board. 
 
 It is not likely that a man having lack of information, in the first 
 place, and lack of experience with maritime matters, in the second 
 place, will invent devices of any importance. A conclusion is no 
 
INVENTIONS FROM THE PUBLIC. 135 
 
 better tlian the facts on which it is founded, and an invention is also 
 no better than the facts on which it is founded. Faulty assumptions 
 by an inventor lead to a faulty invention. 
 
 It is often said that inventions come like a flash of inspiration and 
 without any aid from experience or education; but the results of 
 an analysis of materials received by the Xaval Consulting Board 
 would indicate that although there may be a flash of inspiration, 
 yet that flash is no better than the information and experience on 
 which it is founded, and that if the information and experience is 
 faulty, the flash of inspiration is of no value. 
 
 Xo doubt the inventor who creates an invention founded on 
 faulty premises feels the same sensation of actual creation as the 
 man who creates an invention founded on right premises. Both, 
 no doubt, get the same sensation of pleasure from the act of crea- 
 tion, but on the one hand one is valuable, and on the other hand one 
 is not valuable. 
 
 Instruments of naval warfare are of such a technical character 
 that any man devoting himself to their improvement must have a 
 high degree of technical training. It is a work of specialization. 
 The men who are developing an invention are more likely to make 
 discoveries and improvements than those who are not familiar with 
 the subject matter. 
 
 As an example, take the case of Dr. Coolidge, mentioned in the 
 chapter on the " Special Problems Committee," who, while experi- 
 menting with the Broca tubes, found that when the coupling of 
 rubber between two pieces of metal was disconnected he got better 
 results than when the metal was present, and deduced from this 
 observation that rubber was a better substance to use in the detec- 
 tion of sounds under water than metal. He was working with a 
 particular device with which he was familiar, and was seeking to 
 overcome a difficulty, and the result was a discovery and an in- 
 vention. 
 
 An invention has been well said to be the conscious striving to 
 achieve an end result which is pictured in the inventor's mind. In 
 order to accomplish this end he must know the present state of the 
 art which he is seeking to improve, the difficulties encountered in 
 using present devices and equipment, and the ideal to be achieved. 
 Discoveries of new properties of matter may lead, by the use of 
 interpretative intelligence, to the creation of new inventions with- 
 out the arduous labor involved in creating something new by above 
 method; but most of the problems confronting the Navy required 
 laborious effort to achieve the end result desired. 
 
 The following illustrates the improvement of an art through dis- 
 covery : 
 
136 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE ITNITED STATES.. 
 
 A new insulating material was said to have been discovered iih 
 the following manner : A workman noticed that he burned his hand 
 whenever he touched the steam pipes in the lower part of a tank 
 which he was cleaning and did not burn his hand when he touched 
 those in the upper part of the tank. This came about through the 
 fact that in the tank the carbonate of magnesia tended to float and 
 the carbonate of lime tended to settle, and in the upper part of the: 
 tank the carbonate of magnesia predominated, which coated, the^ 
 pipes and insulated them. 
 
 If this same workman made the same observation to-day, now 
 that carbonate of magnesia is largely used as an insulating material^ 
 he would have made a discovery which to himself would be' just as 
 real as to the original discoverer, but in the one case a valuable con- 
 tribution was made to the arts and in the other it would simply- 
 be a rediscovery of something old. 
 
 Take the X ray, for instance, developed many years ago; there- 
 was no doubt, no design, or thought in the mind of the discoverer of" 
 this ray of a scheme whereby you could see through the human- 
 body. Seeing through the body was incidental' to the investigation^ 
 of the subject matter with which he was working. 
 
 Another example of an invention said to have been made by acci- 
 dental discovery was as follows : The man who put calcium carbide 
 on the market was looking for a process to produce aluminum; Dur- 
 ing his experiment calcium carbide was being produced and he- 
 thought nothing about its value. One day an associate stumbled and 
 dropped a bucket of water over a pile of refuse. Gas immediately 
 Tirose from the reaction of the water on the mass of material on which 
 it had dropped. The experimenter, being a chemist, discovered that 
 he had acetylene gas; in other words, he was producing something; 
 of a commercial value. 
 
 On the other hand, ^Ir. AV. G. Ruggles, who invented the Rug- 
 gles orientator for testing the physical a,nd psychological charac- 
 teristics for candidates for the flying service, which was developed 
 under the auspices of the Naval Consulting Board and adopted by 
 the Navy Department, came about in another way. 
 
 This device was conceived in the following manner :: As a child' 
 Mr. Euggles discovered that when he was upside down he could 
 not direct his muscles the same as when he was upright, and when 
 he came to study aviation with the idea of actually flying, he be- 
 came interested in the problem of trying to determine whether tie- 
 was fit for the Aviation Service. He had lived with surgeons and 
 was familiar with their work, had done a great deal of gymnasium' 
 work, and had some idea of surgery and the peculiar ways the 
 human body is constructed. He had a leaning toward mechanics. 
 and this gave him some mechanical ideas,, and when these ideas- 
 
IN\'ENT]ONS FROM THE PUBLIC. 
 
 137 
 
 were fused together and focused upon the problem of determining 
 whether he was properly fitted to become an aviator, there was a 
 cross fertilization of ideas and he made an invention which incor- 
 porated physiological, electrical, and mechanical features. 
 
 The inventor, in these cases, was working with the materials out 
 of which his invention grew, and his invention was either incidental 
 to his work, as in the case of the X ray, or accidental, as in the case 
 of carbonate of magnesia or calcium carbide. 
 
 The experience of the Naval Consulting Board in dealing with 
 inventions received from the public makes it safe to say that there 
 is little likelihood of anything of value being produced by one not 
 working with the materials, or at least familiar with them and tlio 
 state of the art. It is also very unlikely that anything of value 
 will be produced by mental dreaming without physical effort by 
 one who knows nothing of ships, shipping, or the instrumentalities 
 used in naval warfare, and who is not in a position to make experi- 
 ments. 
 
 Many of the most important inventions in these days come about 
 by teamwork, and the development of listening devices at Nahant 
 and New London, as set forth in the chapter on that subject, was 
 a type of the application of industrial organization to the achieve-, 
 ment of certain results, which are brought about by the combined 
 efforts of many brilliant minds. The modern engineering under-, 
 takings and research work are so vast that they far exceed the 
 capabilities of any one individual, and it is only by the united 
 efforts of many brilliant minds that results can be obtained. Each 
 step or development usually offends some proven practice, and it is, 
 only by the utmost ingenuity and painstaking study of many minds 
 that these difficulties are overcome. 
 
 The progress of the arts and sciences is largely brought about 
 through the accumulation of facts in regard to the physical and 
 mechanical properties of matter. Myriads of facts must be stored 
 up, which are available for those working in the particular arts 
 and sciences concerned, and the modern inventor must have access 
 to this data in order to round out his invention. For however 
 wonderful a conception he may have in his mind, he will in the 
 course of development come to a point where he stumbles for want 
 of knowledge in regard to a particular fact. It is then that he calls 
 on those having made specialties of certain things, and endeavors 
 to get by the point at which he is obstructed. If that information 
 does not exist, he is then obliged to either make investigations and 
 research on his own account, or wait until the art in that particular 
 line has developed to a point where he can overcome the obstacle 
 which has obstructed him. This is demonstrated in the case of the. 
 aeroplane and tiie work of Prof. Langley, of the Smithsonian In- 
 
138 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 stitution. Prof. Langley had worked on the laws of flight and 
 made a machine which did not fly successfully at the time of the 
 original experiment, but was later flown after his death, when in- 
 ternal combustion engines were placed in it that were lighter than 
 the propelling power which he was obliged to use in his experiment. 
 Each increase in knowledge therefore reacts on exevj other art, 
 and the process of scientific advancement in inventions come through 
 the cross fertilization of one art upon another. 
 
 To those who are working on the frontiers of naval technical 
 matters there is no dearth of inspiration as to what they would like 
 to accomplish. But they realize that there must be a selection made 
 of the most promising ideas and the energy of the engineers ex- 
 pended on them, rather than on all sorts of devices of minor im- 
 portance. In other words, as it has been tersely said, there is no 
 shortage of inspiration but there is a shortage of perspiration. The 
 inventions that were submitted to the Naval Consulting Board had 
 very little perspiration in them, and were mostly all, as pointed out 
 above, faulty inspiration, which was the outgrowth of faulty in- 
 formation. 
 
 Even members of the Naval Consulting Board, whose training 
 was such as to make it possible to invent new devices for the im- 
 provement of naval equipment, did not do all they could have done 
 in this particular, on account of lack of information as to the re- 
 quirements. If, in connection with this board there had been or- 
 ganized a force of critical inspectors whose duty it should have been 
 to inspect and constructively criticize equipment of the Navy from 
 the standpoint of its defects, and possible improvement thereon, 
 which criticisms would be referred to the board, there is no question 
 but what the board would have been able to make many more sug- 
 gestions. 
 
 The inventors who sought to invent devices for the Navy and sub- 
 mitted ideas to the Naval Consulting Board did not have the facts 
 in regard to naval problems, they did not have the knowledge of the 
 development of the arts concerned, and they largely drew on inac- 
 curate descriptions of naval devices set forth in the public prints. 
 Their devices were more or less a reflection of what they read in the 
 newspapers. 
 
 Many of these men who came to the Naval Consulting Board, 
 when they sat down and talked with the examiners, who explained 
 the problem to them which they were seeking to solve, would, after 
 the explanation laugh and walk out, being entirely convinced them- 
 selves of the futility of their idea. 
 
 Of course, it is possible that a man may invent something that on 
 theoretical grounds would be turned down by an examing board, and 
 
INVENTIONS FROM THE PUBLIC. 
 
 139 
 
 this would be ncessarily so until the man could make a working 
 model of his invention and demonstrate his idea. 
 
 The examiners were obliged to assume the truth of certain known 
 laws, such as gravity, etc., and if a man came in and said " I have a 
 little thing in my pocket that would overcome gravity," they would 
 necessarily be very skeptical. He would have to demonstrate it by 
 going into the air a certain distance and stay there. And so it was 
 with a majority of the ideas and suggestions submitted to the board. 
 They were passed upon, applying the well-known physical, chemical, 
 mechanical, and electrical laws, and turned down if they were not in 
 harmony with them. But always with the opportunity for the in- 
 ventor to demonstrate that he had overcome these laws. 
 
 Many perpetual motion cranks sent in ideas to the board, and 
 those men were asked to present a working model. It goes without 
 saying that none of them did present a working model, but they were 
 always convinced that just some little thing kept their device from 
 being a success. For instance, the board sent a man 90 miles to in- 
 vestigate a counterweight flywheel. The inventor claimed a 15 per 
 cent saving of energy ; when he gave it a slight push it made almost 
 a complete revolution, within, say, 5 degrees of completion, and all 
 he wanted some one else to do was to put it over the 5 degrees. He 
 was sent a letter asking for a working model, and he said he did not 
 submit working models. 
 
 One method of placing sources of information at the disposal of 
 would-be inventors so that their inventions would be built on accu- 
 rate knowledge would be to maintain in every large industrial 
 community an information bureau for inventors. The bureau should 
 be in charge of a technically trained man, thoroughly familiar with 
 all publications of a technical character, as well as with the shop 
 and laboratory facilities of the locality in which the bureau of in- 
 formation is situated. He should also be familiar with the names of 
 specialists in the scientific world capable of supplying the inventor 
 with high-grade information on points that he is puzzled about. 
 The bureau should preferably be near a good library to which the 
 inventor could be directed by the man in charge of the bureau, and 
 put in touch with books and papers dealing with the art in which he 
 is working. In this manner he would learn what others had done 
 in the same art. 
 
 Arrangements should be made so that this information could be 
 imparted to the inventor without obliging him to disclose his inven- 
 tion to the man in charge of the information bureau. 
 
 The following is a summary of the functions which the bureau 
 should perform, and the facilities which it should have. It should— 
 
 (1) Acquaint inventors with everything which has been attempted 
 
140 NAVAL CONSULTING BOAKD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 already along the same lines, because most of them are absolutely 
 ignorant of all that has been attempted by others. 
 
 (2) Invoke the aid of the most competent persons in working out 
 the details of worthy problems which the inventor himself might 
 not be able to work out. 
 
 (3) Furnish to inventors the means for a practical realization of 
 their inventions, as regards material, workmen, specialists, etc. 
 
 (4) Influence manufacturers and constructors to make a practical 
 test of worthy inventions. 
 
 (5) Afford the inventor protection so that his idea may not be- 
 stolen and that he may retain an adequate interest in the returns 
 from its commercial development. 
 
 There are a surprisingly large number of people in the country 
 of an inventive turn of mind and if their capacity in the directioni 
 of invention could be efficiently utilized there would be a great gain 
 to civilization. Under present conditions this energy is dissipated 
 on objects unworthy of the ability of the inventors owing to lack of 
 knowledge on their part of some of the most elementary things. 
 At the same time that this energy is being wasted there are crying- 
 needs for its application to the solution of certain problems. 
 
 There should not be any great difficulty in having the inventive- 
 p>roblems confronting the Army, Navy, and civilian industries of 
 the country formidated and placed in the hands of these bureaus of 
 information. Under such a plan it would not be long before the 
 bureau, by keeping its information up to date, would be a store- 
 house of information for inventors. Workshops for the making of 
 models should be made available, and manual-training schools might 
 render some assistance in this direction. 
 
 Such a bureau would no doubt find its greatest field for usefulness 
 in coordinating and helping men well grounded in scientific and 
 technical subjects and also men who work with their hands in the 
 large industrial concerns of the country. In the laboratories and 
 universities and scientific schools many men each year write theses 
 upon various subjects in order to get their degrees and their writ- 
 ing involves a great deal of painstaking work. If such a bureau 
 should bring to the attention of the jDrofessors and instructors in the- 
 schools certain problems which those in the active conduct of the in- 
 dustries were concerned ^yith, many students could be put upon the 
 work of solving it. 
 
 In the case of the men who work with their hands, as above de- 
 scribed, their approach to the subject of creation of inventions would' 
 be along different lines, for they would, in the working with the 
 machines and appliances with which they were familiar, see the 
 opportunities for improvement and also have the opportunity of 
 suggesting solutions of difficulties involving the use of devices with 
 
INVENTIONS FROM THE PUBLIC. 
 
 141 
 
 which they are working. If they were encouraged and helped by 
 such a bureau they would be very much more inclined to attempt the 
 development of their ideas. 
 
 The value of the bureau to thoSe without either of the above 
 qualifications wo.uld no doubt be more or less of a negMive character, 
 in that it would prevent would-be inventors from expending use- 
 lessly their energies on devices in an art which is very much de- 
 veloped beyond the point which they are seeking to improve. 
 
 It will be recalled that the results of the work of the Naval Con- 
 sulting Board and the War Committee of Technical Societies in- 
 dicated that the sending out of bulletins on the submarine and on 
 aircraft problems, resulted in decreasing the number of poor inven- 
 tions and it slightly raised the standards of those which were re- 
 ceived. 
 
 During the war the Army and Navy widely used methods of com- 
 munication between departments of the service and as well as civilian 
 institutions which were found very useful, and which made short 
 cuts between the various departments. If one department com- 
 jnunicated with another, officially, it was necessary to do so by bring- 
 ing it to the attention of the head of the department. But by thu 
 detailing of liaison officers to various departments and civilian or- 
 ganizations, an unofficial means of communication was established 
 which enabled each department to keep in close touch with the 
 ■other departments, and supply information and data so that there 
 would be harmony in their relationship. 
 
 What is needed by inventors, manufacturers, and scientists, is a 
 anethod of liaison by which the inventor and scientist can be kept in 
 ■close touch with the inventive problems of commercial organizations. 
 Many of the larger ones now maintain research and development 
 departments which are a successful adjunct to the business. But 
 there should be established by the Government or some other agency 
 ■such an organization as outlined above to do this same work for the 
 •country at large. 
 
 Such bureau, if properly established and directed by men having 
 initiative, imagination, and driving force, would be of untold bene- 
 fit to the country as a whole. 
 
 In making a survey of the methods involved in handling of in- 
 -ventions from the public, one is impressed by the fact that all who 
 oindertook this work soon got into a negative frame of mind in re- 
 crard to inventions. This frame of mind does not seem to pertain 
 simply to Navy and Army officers, but even to civilians who were 
 obliged to examine day after day a multitude of ideas and sugges- 
 tions from the public. It is difficult to determine whether this is 
 brought about by the fact that the average human being is a con- 
 servative person with a desire not to be too much disturbed by radi- 
 cal improvements, or whether it is due to the fact that on account 
 
142 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES, 
 
 of the low grade of the average material received one gets pessi- 
 mistic and finally feels that there is very little virtue in in^'entions 
 that come through the mail or are presented in person. 
 
 One is almost led to believe that the method of organization for 
 the examination of inventions should be very carefully considered 
 before adoption, and that there should be incorporated in such an 
 organization departments whose sole duty would be to grade in- 
 ventions without passing upon their applicability, so that the first 
 grade material would be handled by men who had retained an opti- 
 mistic expectation of finding something of value, and would not 
 have their mind affected by the examination of a great mass of 
 worthless material. 
 
 There should also be taken into consideration the fac^ that if the 
 examiners are loaded with work and they are not in a position to 
 let their imagination dwell upon a suggestion, very little is likely 
 to be developed. Frequently if an examiner had nothing else to do 
 except to consider a suggestion sent in by an inventor, he could, if 
 he were of an imaginative turn of mind, allow his imagination to 
 work and follow the idea into all its absurdities and ramifications 
 with a possibility of hitting upon something which would be an 
 outgrowth of the idea and which would be of value and on which 
 money might be spent to advantage. 
 
 If, however, the examiner's time is fully occupied, he is likely to 
 judge of the idea simply on the facts presented and without the ad- 
 dition of any imaginative contributions on his own part. 
 
 The conditions under which most inventions are usually examined 
 are those where examiners have plenty of ideas as to where money 
 might be spent to the best advantage in regard to the development 
 of devices for improving the war equipment of the Navy, but feel 
 that with the pressing duties surrounding them they can not devote 
 the necessary energy to develop them. Therefore, when an idea 
 comes in to build something, unless on its face it is of a wonderfully 
 novel character, it wo.uld be relegated to a position secondary to the 
 other ideas on their lists for development. 
 
 In its essence the introduction of inventions and their develop- 
 ment is a selling proposition in that the people who are ultimately 
 to become interested must become thoroughly convinced of the 
 value of the idea and enthused in regard to its adoption. An idea 
 therefore poorly presented, even if a good one, could not be " sold," 
 to use a slang expression. Even if an idea is " sold " to a Navy officer 
 who believes in it, and he gets to the point of giving time and 
 knowledge to further its development, he is obliged, after its de- 
 velopment, to " sell " the developed device to the department of the 
 Navy that could use it, and this involves showing it to high officers 
 and giving demonstrations of its usefulness in an adequate manner. 
 
INVENTIONS FROM THE PUBLIC. 143 
 
 The path of an inventor in his introduction of an invention to 
 any department of the Navy or Army, and in fact as well as to 
 civilian manufacturers if it be a civilian device, is a long and ardu- 
 ous one. If he is a poor man he is obliged to first sell his idea to 
 some one who will put up capital for the making of experiments 
 and small-sized models. Then he must get additional capital to 
 make working models and tests, each working model and test involv- 
 ing usually the incorporation of change. After the working model 
 is made he must sell his idea to some officer in the Navy and con- 
 vince him of its usefulness and efficiency, and finally that officer of 
 the Navy must sell the idea to other officers who are concerned with 
 the incorporation of it on shipboard. 
 
 It is therefore an obstacle race, and the first jumps over which 
 the inventor is obliged to go are likely to eliminate him from the 
 contest. As pointed out in this book, the ideas submitted to the 
 Naval Consulting Board were in a large portion of the cases simply 
 ideas on which no money had been spent for tests or models. 
 
 The inventor should no longer be neglected, misdirected, and ex- 
 ploited, but should be encouraged, directed, and supported in his 
 efforts to improve the appliances that make for human welfare and 
 happiness. 
 
 This is especially so now that the productive capacity of the world 
 has been so much reduced on account of the World War. Every 
 statesman who discusses the problem states that the destruction of 
 property and the reduction in production during the War have re- 
 sulted in a great shortage in necessities which must be made up. 
 
 Increase of productive capacity of the human race has been 
 largely brought about through invention, yet strangely the produc- 
 tion of inventions has never been organized. Inventions have been 
 largely developed by uncoordinated individualistic effort. From now 
 on the inventive ability of peoples must be organized, coordinated, 
 and fostered by centralized agencies in order to increase the pro- 
 ductivity of man. 
 
 One invention frequently does the work of hundreds of men, and 
 if attention is given to increasing the number of labor-saving de- 
 vices increase in production automatically takes place. 
 
 The broad question as to how to best utilize the inventive and 
 scientific resources of the country for the Navy in case of war is a 
 most interesting one, and predicated upon the experience of the 
 Naval Consulting Board the following suggestions if not already in 
 use are offered by the author. 
 
 In the first place there should be a body of men whose entire time 
 and attention should be devoted to the problem of improving the 
 equipment and devices in use by the Navy Department. This re- 
 sponsibilitv should be definite and fixedj and adequate authority 
 
144 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 should be coupled with it. If the equipment of the Navy is not 
 improved as rapidly as it should be, then there would be some one 
 upon whom the responsibility for such a condition could be fixed. 
 
 The responsibility having once been vested in such a person or 
 body, it should be incumbent upon the one having the responsibility 
 to thoroughly inspect at stated intervals the inventions and devices 
 on all ships and floating equipment and at navy yards, testing sta- 
 tions, laboratories, etc. Eeports having been made by the inspec- 
 tors, it should then be the duty of this person to point out wherein 
 our equipment could be improved, and he should take steps to im- 
 prove it. Scientific research should be undertaken when circum- 
 stances indicated it as necessarj'. 
 
 There should be established a close connection between this de- 
 partment, the inventors, engineers, and scientists throughout the 
 country in order to focus their attention on certain problems. 
 
 If this person or body vested with the responsibility of improving 
 equipment were made up of naval officers, they should be encourged 
 and directed to become members of scientific societies, and keep in 
 close touch with scientific progress. 
 
 As the devices used on shipboard usually originate on land, and 
 the arts on which they are founded usually make more rapid progress 
 on land than those on sea have any idea or conception, some of the 
 inspectors should be men thoroughly familiar with the arts in use on 
 land. This body of critics should also arrange to get the cooperation 
 of all line officers and men for the improvement of equipment and 
 should arrange for a suggestion box or other instrumentality on 
 ships and in navy yards, into which officers and men of the service 
 could drop suggestions for the improvement of the equipment which 
 they were daily operating. These ideas and suggestions should then 
 be handled in such a way that those who pass on them would not 
 know from what source they came and who was the originator of 
 them. This might be done by giving a number to each communica- 
 tion, making a copy of the suggestion with simply a number, and 
 then submitting the suggestion to certain persons who were changed 
 with the duty of finding suggestions for new devises and who 
 were not charged with the duty of trying to dispose of suggestions 
 in order to get them out of the way. The examiners of these devices 
 should not know whether the suggestion came from the commanding 
 officer of a ship or from a sailor. The recipient of the idea should 
 be put on his mettle to use his utmost skill in the working out of 
 the idea, and he should be in such contact with the scientists and in- 
 ventors of the country that he could call on any of them at any time 
 for expert assistance and advice. 
 
 The work should have liberal appropriation from Congress. In 
 connection Tvith this direct drive to give the Navy the best inventions 
 
INVENTIONS FROM THE PUBLIC. 145 
 
 possible, it might be desirable to formulate certain general problems 
 for the improvement of the equipment in the naval service, of such 
 a nature that they could be distributed to the engineering and tech- 
 nical societies, in order that those members of the societies with a 
 taste for invention and research, might have an opportunity to work 
 on them. Such problems could also be distributed through otliey 
 agencies. 
 
 This organization, charged with the duty of improving the equip- 
 ment, should have at its disposal adequate funds and laboratory 
 facilities for working upon and developing the ideas of importance, 
 and should have requisite power to organize the work from the top 
 down, without interference, and held responsible for results. 
 
 The members of the board metaphorically took off their coats and 
 did work which, under a properly organized board, should have been 
 done by salaried employees who could devote their entire time and 
 attention to it. It was very much as if the individual members of a 
 board of trustees of a university were to do the work of the president 
 of the university, and the secretary of the university, as well as the 
 work of the instructors and professors. By this analogy Mr. W. L. 
 Saunders could be likened to the trustee who acted as president of 
 the university, and Mr. Thomas Robins as secretary and treasurer. 
 Both of these men were heads of large industrial enterprises, Mr. 
 Saunders being president of the Ingersoll-Rand Co. and Mr. Robins 
 of the Robins Conveying Belt Co., and they both devoted an immense 
 amount of time to the work of the board. 
 
 Other members of the board did work along the lines of experi- 
 mentation and research which might be likened, in carrying out the 
 figure of the university to trustees doing the professorial work of 
 the university. 
 
 As those organizations are most effective which have specializa- 
 tion and differentiation of functions, so the Naval Consulting Board 
 should have had this same specialization and differentiation so that 
 the board could act as a board of advisors to others who would actu- 
 ally do the work on a salaried basis. 
 
 The Naval Consulting Board, organized without authority or 
 responsibility, could do very little but suggest; it had no power to 
 organize this work as it should have been organized and no power 
 within itself to carry out the improvements of naval equipment. The 
 responsibility for the improvement of naval equipment and adoption 
 of inventions by the Navy Department was vested in the Naval 
 Establishment itself. This was properly so under the circumstances. 
 
 It would not have been advisable for the Secretary of the Navy 
 to give too much power to the Naval Consulting Board before know- 
 ing who the individual members of the board would be, as well ag 
 168537°— 20 10 
 
146 NAVAL CONStTLTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 their reaction to their new environment, which consisted of a rigidly 
 organized Naval Establishment in which the duties of the officers 
 and men were prescribed with great detail, and a civilian public 
 interested in inventions, engineering, and scientific matters generally. 
 
 The Navy Department, through long custom and usage, had de- 
 veloped certain methods for the adoption of new devices which made 
 for conservatism, some of them due to the peculiar limitations im- 
 posed upon all inventions to be used on shipboard where space is 
 limited, and where sea conditions might render successful land in- 
 ventions inadaptable. 
 
 Up to the time that the board had had its experience with the 
 public, which has been pointed out in this book, no one knew just 
 where the valuable inventive talent of the country was located or 
 how best it could be mobilized. 
 
 The Naval Consulting Board was composed of brilliant men of 
 strong individuality, successful in their own undertakings and car- 
 rying heavy business responsibilities. Most of them had become 
 executives of corporations employing large numbers of men, but 
 they patriotically gave an immense amount of time to the work of 
 the board. Had the Secretary of the Navy, at the time that the 
 board was formed, known that the engineering societies would have 
 selected for service on the board men of the character and ability 
 of those chosen, and if he had also known that the general public, 
 unacquainted with highly technical and scientific matters which are 
 concerned in the improvement of naval equipment, would not pro- 
 duce anything of great value, it is the author's opinion that he would 
 have been justified in giving the Naval Consulting Board more 
 definite authority and responsibility. 
 
 This would have 'made it possible for the board to create a staff 
 of salaried employees of high scientific attainments, with command 
 of adequate laboratory and shop equipment, so that the development 
 and improvement of naval equipment could be handled by men who 
 made it their sole duty. The executives could then initiate methods 
 for fostering and developing the best ideas from men throughout 
 the service for the improvement of equipment and also work up the 
 best of the ideas from civilian inventors, scientists, and engineers.. 
 It could also have been arranged for the civilian talent to work upon 
 the solution of naval problems. 
 
 The Naval Consulting Board would then act as the board of ad- 
 visers to such salaried officers and employees very much as the board 
 of directors of a business corporation acts in regard to the president 
 and other executives in such an organization. 
 
 Under the scheme proposed, the persons holding executive posi- 
 tions would devote their entire time and attention to the improve- 
 
INVENTIONS FROM THE PUBLIC. 147 
 
 Kient of naval equipment, and they would be in a position, with the 
 support of the Naval Consulting Board, to make themselves very 
 eifective. ' 
 
 Although by methods of organization a great deal can be accom- 
 plished to stimulate scientific research and invention, yet in its last 
 analysis the whole question is one of creating a human organiza- 
 tion, built up around leaders in each scientific and inventive field. 
 Each of these men should be the rallying point for gathering to- 
 gether men who desired to be the disciples of this great scientist. 
 They should respect his leadership to such an extent that, as cap- 
 tain, they would follow him into the unchartered lands of knowledge. 
 
 Men interested in certain subjects always seek the master of that 
 subject. The little group of men around the master would devote 
 their whole time and attention to the cultivation of the master's 
 field. As a result, the extension of knowledge in this field would 
 react on all other fields, and out of this reaction would grow scien- 
 tific progress and invention. 
 
 However perfect an organization might be, if it should lack this 
 human contact, mediocre results would likely be obtained," as scien- 
 tific research is essentially human and an organic phenomena rather 
 than an inorganic phenomena. The creation of inorganic rules and 
 regulations and red tape for the development of scientific research 
 would avail nothing if the organic matter were not also incorporated 
 in the scheme so that there would be the warmth of personal con- 
 tact and stimulation of one mind by another. 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
 MERITORIOUS INVENTIONS FROM THE PUBLIC. 
 
 Although but one device received by the board from the public waa 
 put into production, yet there were several others which might have 
 been used had the exigencies of the war demanded them. These 
 inventions were separate and distinct from any that were made by 
 the members of the Naval Consulting Board themselves, which are 
 described in another place in this book. 
 
 In this chapter is gi^•en a short description of the history of those 
 devices which were received from the public by the board and which 
 were considered to be of merit. 
 
 First of these is the Ruggles orientator, which was used by the 
 Navy Department before the signing of the armistice. 
 
 On January 19, 1918, Mr. W. Guy Ruggles presented to the Naval 
 Consulting Board a device for the training of aviators in the sense 
 of equilibration. This matter having been brought to the attention 
 of the board through its secretary, Mr. Thomas Robins, he was 
 appointed a committee of one, with power to act and develop the 
 device. 
 
 Before presenting his idea to the Naval Consulting Board, Mr. 
 Ruggles had presented his idea to many others, but was unable to 
 convince them of the desirability of making the experiments which 
 he recommended, probably owing to the very intricate and involved 
 nature of the problem which he sought to solve. 
 
 The device of Mr. Ruggles was based on the following theory : 
 
 From the time the aeroplane leaves the earth until it returns to 
 the earth it is sustained by a mobile medium and is capable of motion 
 in every conceivable direction. Therefore the piloting of an aero- 
 plane involves a problem in physiology somewhat different from the 
 customary activities of man while on earth. 
 
 Just what the man in a falling, spinning aeroplane might be called 
 upon to do in his efforts to recover a normal flying position became 
 more intricate as the problem was studied. Mr. Ruggles became con- 
 vinced that the semicircular canal system of the inner ear, generally 
 referred to as the static labyrinth, played a very important part in 
 functioning those muscles which a pilot uses in guiding his aeroplane. 
 148 
 
RUGGLES ORIENTATOR. NORMAL FLYING. 
 
 RUGGLES ORIENTATOR. SIMULATING NOSE DIVE. 
 
149 
 
 RUGGLES ORIENTATOR. SIMULATING TAILSPIN. 
 
MERITORIOUS INVENTIONS FROM THE PUBLIC. 149 
 
 This was substantiated by careful perusal of the work and experi- 
 ments of famous otologists. 
 
 These scientists, by most delicate surgical operations, established 
 the fact that an animal whose semicircular canals had been removed 
 was unable to direct its movements intelligently ; aifd, furthermore, 
 that while animals so operated upon might in time learn to direct 
 their movements intelligently on the ground, they could not while 
 in space. 
 
 For instance, the pigeon so operated on learned to walk, but could 
 not fly; a dog so operated on was unable to jump from a height and 
 land on his feet squarely ; a man who has by accident or disease lost 
 the labyrinth suffers terrible vertigo and never recovers his certainty 
 and delicacy of muscular movement. 
 
 It is perfectly apparent that the labyrinth and its associated fac- 
 ulties and muscular reactions is capable of extensive development. 
 Spinning dancers and skaters, by practice, rotate with considerable 
 velocity without noticeable dizziness, and trained acrobats perform 
 feats of equilibrium totally impossible in the early stages of their 
 training. 
 
 He believed that if means were available, the student aviator 
 might so develop his faculties of equilibration and muscular con- 
 trol that the piloting of an aeroplane might be mastered with a 
 minimum of danger. The static labyrinth being an entirely invol- 
 untary organ, operating through the involuntary system when under 
 the excitation of unaccustomed- spinning motions and unusual posi- 
 tions, until more completely developed and trained, (.auses involun- 
 tary muscular actions entirely beyond the control of the student 
 aviator. A means that might contribute to the development of this 
 faculty in student aviators seemed desirable. 
 
 It obviously must consist of a seat for the student aviator resem- 
 bling as closely as possible the seat of an aeroplane, and the con- 
 trol members used to guide the aeroplane properly, placed in rela- 
 tion to the seat. This apparatus should then be so mounted that 
 it might have free rotational possibilities in three planes of direc- 
 tion simultaneously, and in addition to this should possess the pos- 
 sibility of a falling motion in the vertical plane. He did not think 
 it desirable to incorporate the progressive motion on account of the 
 fact that human faculties do not sense a uniform progressive mo- 
 tion. The falling motion, however, was of vital importance, for 
 the labyrinth contains as a part of its mechanism six small otoliths, 
 which sense the acceleration in the beginning of each falling mo- 
 tion and are responsible for the most violent muscular reactions of 
 the involuntary system. 
 
 His plan was to design an amplified gimbal construction apparatus 
 which would consist primarily of a rectangular frame in which 
 
150 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 rotated a tubular steel ring about 9 feet in diameter, which rotated 
 about a vertical axis. Within this a smaller ring was to be mounted 
 for rotation about a horizontal axis, and within this a still smaller 
 ring was to be mounted for rotation about an axis at right angles to 
 either of the others, and within this third ring was to be mounted a 
 section of the fuselage of an aeroplane for the student aviator, con- 
 sisting of a seat and control members of an aeroplane. The apparatus 
 was to be controlled electrically, the current being introduced by 
 means of a series of rings and sliding contacts mounted on one jour- 
 nal of the axis of each of the rings, and an electrical motor and suit- 
 able gear reduction mounted on the opposite axis of each ring. The 
 electric current first led to the seat for the person on the innermost 
 ring, and from there it was 'to be distributed to switches directly 
 connected to each of the control members (the joy stick and foot 
 bar), and from these switches through rheostats to the motors on the 
 various axes of the apparatus. I 
 
 By this arrangement it was to be made possible by the movement 
 of the foot bar and the joy stick to close the switches which would 
 operate the motors, so that the student aviator would be given a 
 turning motion in any of the three planes of direction. Pressure 
 with the left foot on the foot bar closed the switch operating the 
 motor on the vertical axis, causing the student aviator to turn to the 
 left as in an aeroplane. Neutralizing the foot bar would stop the 
 motor, and pressure on the right foot would reverse the motor, caus- 
 ing the apparatus to turn in the opposite direction. The moving of 
 the joy stick forward caused the motor on the horizontal axis to dip 
 the seat forward; throwing the joy stick backward would cause the 
 seat to turn backward by operating a motor on the horizontal axis 
 corresponding to the action of an elevator in the flying aeroplane. 
 ^Movement of the joy stick to the right or left would cause the seat to 
 revolve to the right or left, as the aileron of the aeroplane. The 
 speed of each of these motors was to be controlled through a rheo- 
 stat which was gradually cut out by the advance of any of the con- 
 trols. The speed of rotation was therefore to be regulated to suit the 
 wishes of the occupant. 
 
 Rotational possibilities were made to include a maximum speed of 
 30 turns a minute. While this would be faster than the rotational 
 possibilities of an aeroplane in ordinary maneuvers, it had beeii 
 proved that the static labyrinth of the ear of the aviator becomes ac- 
 customed to a rapid turning movement and is never affected by a 
 movement slower than the one it has become accustomed to. By 
 means of the rheostat, the speed could be reduced to a very few turns 
 a minute, thus providing a possibility of greatly increased speed as 
 the training of the student aviator progressed. 
 
tiioM /UJu^ mLvA ayuM-- Am-cjia^.. /-^ 
 
 ^'^ y-^ P^ ^tf^ .6a^. /a 
 
 HANDWRITING OF STUDENT AVIATORS IN DIFFERENT POSITIONS WHEN 
 BEING TRAINED IN A RDGGLES ORIENTATOR. 
 
 150-1 
 
MERITORIOUS INVENTIONS FROM THE PUBLIC. 151 
 
 A control station was also established outside the apparatus con- 
 sisting of a series of switches and rheostats by means of which the 
 instructor outside the apparatus might take the control away from 
 the man inside and operate any or all of the motors to rotate the 
 student aviator as desired. 
 
 The apparatus was to be designed to rotate the student aviator in 
 any plane of direction, and give him some of the falling sensations 
 which he would be required to assimilate in flying in an aeroplane. 
 It also made possible the careful study of the peculiar muscular re- 
 action attending the unusual positions in which a student aviator 
 finds himself while in this machine, or in an aeroplane. 
 
 The Naval Consulting Board proceeded immediately to have a 
 machine constructed, and following is the way that the machine im- 
 pressed an accomplished observer: ' 
 
 * * * It has a joy stick, which works exactly like the one in a plane — 
 direction by the feet, so all the controls simulate the aeroplane. You are 
 strapped in the seat, which is cardan mounted, that is, a ring within a ring 
 within a ring, an electric motor driving each axis mounted on the next ring 
 outside, the last one being mounted on stationary supports and driving an 
 orientating member about a vertical axis. These motors are driven from a little 
 controller outside, which acts through a relay to take the control away from the 
 man inside and hand the control back to him whenever the stationary opera- 
 tor desires. 
 
 With this machine you can perform all of the functions of the aeroplane so 
 far as angles and angular velocity are concerned, and its primary object, I 
 should think, is to train the mind so that it can discern and separate real 
 phenomena from hallucinations created by the continued action of the little 
 cuneiform located near each ear. 
 
 The length of time taken to develop the Ruggles device may be 
 taken as an indication of the length of time that is required to de- 
 velop devices in war time. It was brought to the attention of the 
 board on January 19, 1918, and the necessary appropriations were 
 then made to construct it. Arrangements had to be made with a 
 machine shop and workmeji to complete a machine already partly 
 finished. It was not ready for inspection before July, 1918, a period 
 of some six months ; so that if an in^'entor is given a reasonable time 
 to develop the device before he presents it to the Government, of, say, 
 six months, and it takes six months under conditions prevailing 
 during the war to get out a full-sized working model, it can be 
 readily understood why so many devices were just about ready to be 
 used at the time of the armistice, which occurred on November 11, 
 1918, war having been declared April 6, 1917. 
 
 The claims which Mr. Euggles made in regard to the advantage 
 that could be gained from training aviators on the ground before 
 they took their first flight seemed to be borne out by tests on student 
 aviators at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, in Boston, 
 Mass. Naval observers who had observed the flying records of men 
 
152 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 who had been trained in the Ruggles orientator came to the con- 
 clusion that the data furnished by their training course in that ma- 
 chine were a fair index of what their ability as fliers would be. It 
 seemed to show that men who operated the orientator successfully 
 were more likely to become aces in aviation than men who did not 
 do so. 
 
 The Army also became interested in the device, and it placed 
 orders for 15 of them, for use in training Army aviators at the 
 time of the armistice. 
 
 In March, 1917, Dr. Miller Eeese Hutchison made rather com- 
 plete tests of a bomb dropping device which was to be dropped from 
 aeroplanes upon enemy submarines. It consisted of a network of 
 wire with bombs distributed throughout the network, so this net 
 would wrap about objects on which it fell in much the same way as 
 a cast net would wrap around a school of fish. The tests of this de- 
 vice were rather elaborate and were conducted off Sandy Hook, 
 where an aeroplane dropped these bombs on a target which had been 
 provided. 
 
 Changes "in submarine warfare, through which submarines went 
 farther ovit to sea and beyond the range of aeroplanes operating 
 from the shore, together with other considerations, including the 
 question of the safety of the aviator flying with bombs suspended in 
 this manner, prevented this device from being adopted. 
 
 Dr. Hutchison conducted a series of tests on a rapid-firing infan- 
 try rifle. The gun was recommended by the Naval Consulting Board 
 for the consideration of the Ordnance Department, United States 
 Army. 
 
 It had been assumed that it was impracticable to tow nets or plates 
 alongside of a ship to protect it from torpedo attack. One of tke 
 objections being the difficulty of towing them vertically. In the 
 autumn of 1917, however, S. Davis Robins presented a device to the 
 Naval Consulting Board which gave such promise of success that the 
 board decided that exhaustive tests to check the opinion of the 
 experts above mentioned should be made. Mr. Robins's device con- 
 sisted of : 
 
 The function of this screen or plate was to detonate the torpedo 
 at a safe distance, from the hull of the vessel. It was so designed 
 that it had no tendency to depart from the normal vertical position 
 in the water, although it was not braced and was free to yield to the 
 thrust of waves and the motion of the ship. The flexibility of this 
 device and its construction of smooth steel plates caused it to create 
 the minimum of friction, while its construction required the mini- 
 mum quantity and weight of material. In a heavy sea or when the 
 vessel was not in the danger zone the screen was designed to be 
 housed against the side of the vessel. The flexibility and vertical 
 
MERITORIOUS INVENTIONS FROM THE PUBLIC. 153 
 
 position of the plate were maintained by placing the point of sup- 
 port on the forward end of each plate so that it would be slightly 
 lower than the aft one, the result being that the plate was hinged 
 upon a slanting axis. Any movement of the plate from a normal 
 position was met by an increased resistance of the water. To avoid 
 this resistance the plate therefore retained its vertical position. Each 
 plate was supported by two booms, which were hinged against the 
 side of the vessel above the water line. Lifts running from the ship's 
 rail to the outer end of the booms supported them when lowered. 
 A guy running diagonally forward from the after end of the plate 
 was used to relieve the longitudinal stress caused by the movement of 
 the vessel. To house a plate a few turns were taken with a line 
 around a revolving shaft which was inside of the rail and operated 
 by a donkey engine. 
 
 On a ship 425 feet long, 60 feet beam, and 15 feet draft there 
 would be nine plates 20 feet long, 90 feet forward end and 15 feet 
 at the aft end. These plates were carried by booms which extended 
 out from the ship, there being a boom for each plate. The aft end 
 of the plate was supported directly from this boom. The forward 
 end of the plate was supported from a bridle which attached to the 
 side of the ship through a sheave. The forward end of the plate was 
 towed by a line from the boom next ahead, which was also used to 
 support the rear end of the preceding plate. 
 
 The committee which was appointed by the Naval Consulting 
 Board to test this plate reported that it had been demonstrated in 
 experiments with one full-sized plate that it maintained its vertical 
 plane by the stability imparted by the method of suspension and 
 towing and that the only experiment still to be tried was its opera- 
 tion in weather at sea not rougher than would permit the opera- 
 tion of a submarine. The committee reported that the speed of a 
 vessel towing sufficient plates to protect it would not be reduced 
 over 1 knot per hour on a vessel having a speed of 10 knots. The 
 committee reported that further sums should be expended for full- 
 scale experiments. These experiments were, however, not carried 
 out at the time of the armistice. 
 
 Among the inventions submitted by Mr. Hudson Maxim, chairman 
 of the Committee on Ordnance and Explosives, which were found to 
 possess the greatest promise, were the following : 
 
 An invention for making gun tubes with great hydraulic pressure. 
 Before final machining of gun and rifling, the metal was stretched by 
 hydraulic pressure so that all layers of the cylinder would be equally 
 stressed in firing. This permitted of gun manufacture in one piece 
 with decreased thickness of wall for equal sizes. 
 
 Owing to the strenuous activities of the Naval Consulting Board 
 in combating U-boats, especially in the North Sea, the Bureau of 
 
154 NAVAL CONSULTING BOAKD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 Ordnance deemed it wise to take no active measures in the develop- 
 ment of this invention during the maximum stress of the war. 
 
 It is interesting to note here tliat after the United States entered 
 the war it was learned that the French liad for some time been em- 
 pl',)jang a method essentially the same as the Emery method for forg- 
 ing their large field guns. 
 
 An invention for mounting large guns on railroad cars and secur- 
 ing the cars in concrete emplacements, forming a mobile, rigid and 
 effectual gun mount for immediate action, together with means for 
 detaching the car mount carrying the gun and running it by rail to 
 any other emplacement, the same being mainly intended for coast de- 
 fense. The United States Army has, during the past two years, been 
 devoting considerable attention to mounting guns in essentially this 
 manner. 
 
 Amorphous graphite in an exceedingly fine state of division, called 
 colloidal graphite, was submitted to the Committee on Ordnance and 
 Explosives as a lubricant for gun barrels to lessen friction and mini- 
 mize erosion. Experiments with 6-inch guns had been made in Eng- 
 land with this form of graphite, and it was found that when a gun 
 was swabbed with aquadag the range was materially increased, but 
 it was necessarj' to use a charge of quicker powder. Mr. Maxim 
 recommended that the Navy Department conduct the necessary ex- 
 periments with this form of graphite. 
 
 An illuminating flare was brought to Mr. Maxim's attention, and 
 experiments were made with it at Maxim Park, with marked suc- 
 cess. He brought this invention to the attention of the Committee 
 on Ordnance and Explosives, but the matter was referred to the 
 I>ureau of Ordnance of the Navy Department, and Mr. Maxim was 
 delegated to take it up with the bureau, which he did. 
 
 Mr. Maxim was informed that the Navy Department had ordered 
 large numbers of the flares. 
 
 A sea sled was brought to the attention of Mr. Maxim by its in- 
 ventor. The sea sled is a craft of very peculiar construction. It 
 draws but very little water indeed, in fact, it skims over the surface 
 of the water, the water passing under it in such wise that the boat 
 is held rigidly to its course against rolling, and is capable of making 
 comparatively short turns at high speed. The craft makes a remark- 
 ably stable platform and would be excellent for a depth-bomb gun 
 platform for throwing depth bombs at submarines. 
 
 The inventor offered to build a boat capable of traveling from 
 40 to 50 miles an hour, and capable of carrying one full-sized 21-inch 
 torpedo, or an equivalent weight in depth bombs. Reports on the 
 trial of the sea sled seemed to bear out the claims of the inventor 
 that it was a good rough-water boat, and could keep the open sea 
 at high speed. 
 
MEEITOKIOUS INVENTIONS FROM: THE PUBLIC. 155 
 
 A machine-gun mount, which was adapted particularly to trench 
 warfare, and could be raised and lowered with great facility, sighted, 
 trained, and fired by the gunner from a position of comparative 
 safety, considerably below the gun, was submitted to the Committee 
 on Ordnance and Explosives by the inventor. 
 
 The mount functioned well in all positions, giving practically uni- 
 versal movement to the gun. On account of the numerous points 
 of adjustment necessitating loose joints there developed quite a little 
 vibration or " whipping " of the gun during firing. Whether or 
 not this was more or less than the vibration of the gun when mounted 
 on the usual tripod could not be determined as there was no means 
 of comparison. A clamping device for each adjustment is used for 
 taking up lost motion, but these should be made more accessible to 
 the operator. 
 
 The mount is unnecessarily complicated and heavy, but this objec- 
 tion could be overcome by introducing better mechanical design of 
 some of the parts. The periscope and extended trigger functioned 
 properly and would be of advantage when gun is used in exposed 
 position. 
 
 It may be said that the mount accomplishes the purpose for which 
 designed, that is, rendering possibl-e universal training of the gun 
 without moving the tripod of the mount and with an increase of 
 safety to the gunner, but before quantity production could be con- 
 sidered, a redesigning of the essential features would be necessary. 
 
 Two inventions by independent inventors relating to means for 
 accurately determining the position of a hidden big gun by the dif- 
 ference in the arrival of the sound of its report at distance stations, 
 were also looked upon favorably by Mr. Maxim. 
 
 Mr. Maxim, chief of the Committee on Ordnance and Explosives 
 of the Naval Consulting Board, also investigated noncorrosive alloy 
 with antifriction characteristics as well as toughness, which made 
 them important as bearing metals, and came to the conclusion that 
 this alloy had important characteristics distinguishing it from 
 others of the same class, which made it of considerable value for cer- 
 tain purposes. 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 
 BRANCH OFFICES. 
 
 SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE. 
 
 In the early part of the board's activities a number of inventions 
 were forwarded from the Pacific slope and the board needed some 
 one to investigate them who was living there. As a result, Mr. 
 A. H. Babcock, a well-known engineer of San Francisco, was se- 
 lected. The investigations increased rapidly in number, and it be- 
 came desirable to establish a branch office of the Naval Consulting 
 Board in San Francisco, and he was placed in charge of that office. 
 
 He rendered a great deal of service to inventors on the Pacific 
 coast and sa^•e(l them an immense amount of energy and time by 
 consulting with them in regard to their devices before they had 
 expended large sums of money in developing them without adequate 
 information in regard to their applicability and feasibility. 
 
 Inventors on the Pacific slope in certain cases made trips of some 
 1,500 miles to the San Francisco office in order to submit inventions, 
 and if that office had not been established they would no doubt have 
 taken much longer trips in order to present them to the authorities, 
 in AYashington and New York. 
 
 The following correspondence passed between the Secretary of 
 the Navj^ and Mr. A. H. Babcock : 
 
 August 5, 1918. 
 My Dear Mk. Babcock : The Naval Consulting Board have nominated you 
 as the associated member to act as the representative of the board In San 
 Francisco and on the Pacific coast in the work of examining and investigating- 
 inventions, ideas, and devices for the benefit of the Government. 
 
 It will give me pleasure to receive your acceptance of this appointment. 
 Very sincerely, yours, 
 
 JosEPHus Daniels, 
 
 Secretary of the Navy. 
 Mr. A. H. Babcock, 
 
 65 Market Street. San Frunrxsrn, Calif. 
 
 August 19, 1918. 
 From : Western representative, Naval Consulting Board. 
 To : Secretary of the Xavy. 
 Subject : Appointment. 
 
 I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your favor of August 5, 1918,. 
 and to accept the appointment. 
 
 To contribute my services, particularly at this time, In this or in any other- 
 capacity, is both a duty and a pleasure. 
 Very respectfully, 
 
 Allen H. Babcock. 
 156 
 
BRANCH OFFICES. 157 
 
 CHICAGO orricE. 
 
 On or about June 4, 1917, a Chicago office of the Naval Consulting 
 Board was opened. Mr. Frederick K. Copeland and Lieut. Col. 
 Bion J. Arnold, a member of the Naval Consulting Board, were put 
 in charge of the office, which was located at 122 West Adams Street, 
 and which was moved on February 25, 1918, to 72 Adams Street. 
 
 The committee that looked after inventions in Chicago consisted 
 of: Frederick K. Copeland, Lieut. Col. Bion J. Arnold, William 
 Hoskins, Eobert W. Hunt, and Peter Junkersfeld. 
 
 The organization of this office was brought about by order of 
 the Secretary of the Navy, and Rear Admiral William Strother 
 Smith, the liaison officer of the Naval Consulting Board, made a 
 trip to Chicago to get the office started. 
 
 This office handled some 2,456 inventions, and rendered the same 
 service to the district around Chicago that the San Francisco office 
 rendered to the inventors on the Pacific coast. 
 
 WASHINGTON OFFICE. 
 
 It became apparent that owing to the numerous conferences that 
 were necessary between the members of the Naval Consulting Board, 
 Army and Navy officers. Patent Office, and Governnient engineers 
 in Washington, it was desirable to open and maintain a branch office 
 in Washington, D. C. On April 25, 1918, the branch office was opened 
 at 718 Seventeenth Street, and Mr. D. W. Brunton became the mem- 
 ber in charge of the joint offices of the Naval Consulting Board and 
 the War Committee of Technical Societies. Both the Naval Con- 
 sulting Board and the War Committee continued, however, to main- 
 tain their main offices at 13 Park Row, New York City, the War 
 Committee office being in charge of E. B. Kirby, A'ice chairman. 
 
 Between April 26, 1918, when the branch office was first established 
 in Washington, and about September 1, 19'18, at which time the new 
 Navy Building was completed at Eighteenth and B Streets, experi- 
 ence was gained as to the value of having a central office in Wash- 
 ington. As a result, in order to bring about a close relationship 
 between the various bureaus of the Navy Department, the depart- 
 ments of the Army, Government officials and bureaus, it was decided 
 to move the main office of the Naval Consulting Board from 13 Park 
 Eow, New York City, to the ne^w Navy Building, Washington, D. C, 
 and this was done about September 12, 1918. 
 
 These arrangements brought about a consolidation of all work on 
 inventions received from the public. This new arrangement was in 
 operation for about two months before the armistice and the arrange- 
 ment was successful, as it gave the examiners of inventions and those 
 in charge of the direction of the work of the board greater facilities 
 
158 NAVAL CONSULTIl^G BOAKD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 for quickly getting in touch with various bureaus of the Army and 
 Navy Departments and Government officials. 
 
 After the establishment of the Washington office and before mak- 
 ing that office the main office of the Naval Consulting Board, cordial 
 relations had been established with the Inventions Section, General 
 StafP of the Army, and Mr. D. W. Brunton, the member in charge 
 of the Naval Consulting Board's work in Washington, was made ojjl 
 May 10, 1918, a member of the Advisory Board, Inventions Section, 
 General Staff, by order of Gen. Peyton C. March. As the Inven- 
 tions Section had just recently been organized, Mr. Brunton was 
 able to give that body a great deal of information in regard to the 
 experience of the Naval Consulting Board in handling inventions 
 from the public, and rendered to them a needed service. Thereafter 
 cooperative and cordial relations were maintained between the two 
 organizations, and inventions for. Army use were sent to the Inven- 
 tions Section of the General Staff by the Naval Consulting Board 
 and vice versa. 
 
 Mr. Brunton also acted as chairman of the Engineering Council's 
 War Committee of Technical Societies and was a member of the 
 National Eesearch Council. As a result, he was able to bring about 
 relationships with all these organizations which made for their 
 efficiency. 
 
 The facilities of the United States Bureau of Standards were also 
 put at the disposal of the Naval Consulting Board, and as a result 
 a network of relations was established at the close of the war which 
 gave promise of increasing the value of the work of the board. As 
 a result of this move, the files and records of inventions of the Naval 
 Consulting Board were shipped to Washington, D. C, and are in 
 the new Navy Building. 
 
 These changes in the handling of inventions were ))rought about 
 through experience and the reaction of the board to the environ- 
 ment in which it found itsfelf . 
 
 It was the logical thing to establish the first office of the board 
 in New York City, as a large percentage of the members of the 
 board resided in and about New York. But when the organization 
 had developed into one in which there was a staff of paid technical 
 examiners passing upon inventions, and submitting only certain 
 ones which had merit to the committees of the Naval Consulting 
 Board, the situation became one in which it was desirable for those 
 doing the day-to-day work in connection with inventions to have 
 access to all Government sources of information and a close touch 
 with the different bureaus of the Army and Navy. 
 
 After the removal of the main office of the Naval Consulting Board 
 to Washington, the force consisted of Mr. D. W. Brunton, member 
 of the Naval Consulting Board, in charge of that office ; Rear Admiral 
 
BEANCH OFFICES. 159 
 
 William Strotlier Smith, representing the United States Navy, and 
 in charge of the office of Secretary of Navy, inventions; civilian staff 
 of examiners, assistants, stenographers, liaison officers, etc. 
 
 After this arrangement went into effect the meetings of the board 
 Avere held in the offices of the board in the new Navy Building, 
 which was convenient for all concerned. Prior to this time most of 
 the meetings of the board were held at the Carnegie Institution of 
 "\A'ashington, Dr. Robert S. Woodward having extended the hospi^ 
 tality of this institution for meetings of the board, of which he was 
 a member. 
 
 168537°— 20— 11 
 
CHAPTER XI. 
 INVENTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MEMBERS. 
 
 After having selected Mr. Thomas A. Edison to be president of 
 the Naval Consulting Board, it will be recalled that Secretary Dan- 
 iels cast the burden of selecting other members of the board upon 
 the 11 largest engineering societies of the country. It necessarily 
 followed that these societies would have varied ideas as to whom 
 was best qualified to serve on such a board. As a result, there were 
 selected sevei-al members who were particularly noted for their 
 success in the business world and their executive and administrative 
 ability. 
 
 Many were attached to large manufacturing and industrial cor- 
 porations in an executive capacity, and the major part of the time 
 was necessarily taken up with the task of administering the affairs 
 of these corporations. They brought to the board, however, the 
 sup-port of their organizations and the ability to use the inventive 
 talent of their entire organizations whenever that seemed desirable. 
 
 Some of the other members of the board were preeminently en- 
 gineers with some accomplishments as inventors, but their principal 
 ability was that of engineers. Several, however, were preeminently 
 inventors and devoted their entire time to the creation of new 
 devices, either individually or in cooperation with their respective 
 organizations, they having achieved distinction and success through 
 inventions which were being administered by the corporations of 
 which they were the heads. They were, therefore,, particularly well 
 placed to work upon and develop war inventions. 
 
 Those members who were of the executive and administrative type 
 devoted themselves to the use of these talents in behalf of the Naval 
 Consulting Board in its relations with Government bureaus, depart- 
 ments, and in general in building up its contacts and fostering the 
 work of the board by directing the inventive work of others, as well 
 as the promotion of such activities of the board as the preparedness 
 campaign and the fuel-oil conference. 
 
 Those members of the board who were of the inventive type 
 created many inventions and also made contributions of an inventive 
 character which tended to develop the arts to which they devoted 
 themselves. 
 
 Mr. Thomas A. Edison, having been asked to become president of 
 a board which was to be formed, did not know who his colleagues on 
 160 
 
INVENTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MEMBERS. 161 
 
 the board were to be, as they were selected, as pointed out in the 
 first chapter, by the various engineering societies of the United 
 States. He is a man who is and was more interested in inventions 
 and creating of devices tlian in organization, as pointed out in the 
 chapter on " Organization," and it was understood between him 
 and Secretary Daniels, when he took the presidency of the board, 
 that it was his inventive talent and initiative that was desired 
 rather than to make draft upon his time for administrative and ex- 
 ecutive duties. 
 
 In January, 1917, Mr. Edison was asked by Secretary Daniels to 
 come to the aid of the country by devoting himself to the stu.dy and 
 suggestion of such ideas and inventions as might seem to Mr. Edi- 
 son to be useful if the United States should become involved in the 
 war with the Central Powers. 
 
 Accordingly, Mr. Edison put his business affairs entirely in charge 
 of his officials, gave up his other experimental work and investiga- 
 tions, and devoted himself exclusively to this work for the Govern- 
 ment and remained so engaged for about two years. 
 
 At the beginning of this work Mr. Edison gathered around him, 
 as assistants, such young engineers as were at the time in his employ. 
 He also obtained some volunteers from various colleges and uni- 
 versities, and he prevailed upon some industrial concerns to assign 
 a few of their technical men to come to the laboratory and help along 
 in the work. Beside these, Mr. Edison had about 50 skilled me- 
 chanics in his laboratory workshops, on whom he could call for 
 making experimental apparatus. 
 
 The ideas and devices were developed almost entirely by experi- 
 ment, and those mentioned relate to naval equipment or operations 
 and merely decribe the first experimental results, and are not in- 
 tended to be the final word on the subjects and do not go into all de- 
 tails. They were for the purpose of giving the Army and Navy 
 officials the results of Mr. Edison's experiments and were intended 
 to stimulate them to further inquiry for details and to continue the 
 experiments if desirable. 
 
 A great many other experiments on different subjects were carried 
 on but were not brought to a stage where definite reports could be 
 made — such experiments being laid aside for subjects which at the 
 time were deemed of more immediate importance. 
 
 A descriptive list of devices worked on by Mr. Edison follows : 
 
 DETECTING SUBMARINE BY SOUND FROM MOVING VESSEL. 
 
 When submarine activity began to play havoc with shipping the 
 problem of detecting the location of submarines by sound was con- 
 sidered one of the foremost problems of the day, and in a very short 
 
162 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 time it was recognized as being perhaps the most difficult one, as set 
 forth in the chapter on " Special Problems." 
 
 In;mediately on Ix'oinning his war work for the Government, Mr. 
 Edison gave this problem a large part of his attention. He com- 
 menced with exhaustive experiments along the line of the induction 
 balance, but after about two months of intensive work along this 
 line he came to the conclusion that it was hopeless to find a solution 
 in this type of dexice. 
 
 He therefore turned his attention to other means which seemed 
 to him more promisirg. "While conducting studies on the various 
 lines indicated on the other pages hereto attached, he continued giv- 
 ing a great deal of personal attention to this problem all through 
 the t\Yo years that he gave to the Government. 
 
 It is unnecessary to review in detail the vast number of experi- 
 ments that he made in pursuing this line of inquiry. He pa&sed 
 through many stages of employing telephones, audions, towing 
 devices, resonators, etc., and in the summer and fall of 1917 had 
 reached a fair degree of success in detettiug sounds of torpedoes as 
 far as 5,000 yards distance. 
 
 These results were mostly obtained on board a vessel that was 
 not moving, although in the case of the towing devices only fairly 
 good results were had during the progress of the \essel. The noises 
 caused by the wash of the waves against a towing device prevented 
 the obtaining of as good results as in the other cases. 
 
 During the early months of these experiments submarine activity 
 of the enemy had resulted in vast destruction of ships and Mr. 
 Edison began to view the solution of the problem from a different 
 angle. It became evident to his mind that if it were possible to cir- 
 cumvent the submarines and avoid the loss of ships, the result would 
 be as satisfactory as if the submarines themselves were destroyed. 
 He, therefore, decided that if he could provide merchant ships with 
 a listening apparatus that would enable them to hear the sound of 
 the torpedo as soon as it was fired from the submarine and also pro- 
 vide the merchant ships with a means of changing their course 
 speedily to another course at right angles the torpedo would miss 
 its mark and the merchant ship would proceed on its way. If an- 
 other torpedo were launched, the same tactics could be again re- 
 sorted to. 
 
 Mr. Edison, therefore, proceeded along this line from that time 
 on. After a time he discarded towing devices for the reason above 
 given, and he became convinced that if he could install on a ship 
 a device that should be arranged so that it would always be from 
 10 to 20 feet ahead of the bow of the vessel, and if this device should 
 carry a vibrating diaphragm it would not have to contend .with the 
 noises of the ship itself (as these could be compensated for and made 
 
INVEA'TIYE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MEMBERS. 16.'5 
 
 inaudible) noi- with the noise occasioned by the rippling of water 
 along the sides of the vessel, nor water eddies affecting the acoustic 
 apparatus. As the result of a long line of subsequent expernnents 
 he constructed such a device which was in the form of an outrigger 
 suspended from the bowsprit by a special designed appliance. This 
 attachment was one by which the arm and bowsprit were connected 
 to a worm actuated by an electric motor, wliei'eby the bowsprit and 
 arm could be swung in a circle toward the boat and the entire device 
 landed on the deck for making any necessary repairs. By this ar- 
 rangement the listening device could be taken from and returned to 
 position in the sea in a few minutes. 
 
 This device was afterwards given practical tests in very rough 
 seas, fulfilling all requirements, and was not in any way damaged or 
 put out of commission, even in the roughest kind of cross seas, with 
 the vessel going at full speed, 14 knots per hour. 
 
 This listening device was about 20 feet in length by about 16 
 inches in width, and the body was made of brass, both fore and aft 
 ends being tapered. It contained brass tubes with a phonograph 
 diaphragm at the end which hung in the water. The listening ap- 
 paratus was carried in a small room at the bow of the boat. No 
 batteries were used. There was a compensator which could be con- 
 nected with the main shaft by means of which the noise of the vessel's 
 apparatus would be canceled out, and by an adjustment Mr. Edison 
 could also cancel out other boats that made interfering noises. 
 
 With this device boats moving 1,700 yards away could be readily 
 heard while the vessel was going full speed. A submarine bell 5^ 
 miles away could also be heard by the operator while a big storm 
 v> as in progress and the boat also proceeding at full speed, and this 
 with only plain diaphragms. 
 
 With this device there would be no difficulty whatever in hearing 
 a torpedo more than 4,000 yards away, and this is far beyond the 
 effective distance at which a torpedo can be launched from a sub- 
 marine. The noise by a torpedo is very piercing and peculiarly dis- 
 tinctive. So much so that during the course of some of Mr. Edison's 
 experiments at Sag Harbor, Long Island, where practice torpedoes 
 were launched, the telephone connected with the detecting appa- 
 ratus could be laid on the deck and the noise of the torpedo could be 
 plainly heard all over the ship. In fact, the torpedo is the noisiest 
 craft that sails the sea, and is very distinctive and unmistakable. 
 
 During the course of Mr. Edison's experiments on detection by 
 sound he had the use of several small steamers, one at a time, which 
 were placed at his disposal by the Government for these experi- 
 ments. Unfortunately, these respective vessels were not in the best 
 of condition and were laid up for repairs at frequent intervals, and 
 just as Mr. Edison had completed the last experiments above named 
 
164 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 and had devised very sensitive apparatus to replace direct listen- 
 ing, the vessel was withdrawn by the Government and no other sub- 
 stituted, which, of course, put an end to the work. 
 
 QUICK TURNING OF SHIPS. 
 
 In connection with the listening device on board ships, Mr. Edison 
 desired to provide cargo boats with a means of turning the ship very 
 quickly to a right-angle course on hearing the launching of a torpedo 
 by his listening device. He believed he could accomplish this with 
 sea anchors. A sea anchor is a device used for arresting the speed 
 of a vessel on the high sea. It is a strong canvas bag, conical in 
 shape, having two ropes attached, a heavy rope to the larger, or 
 mouth, end and a small rope in a slip noose to the smaller, or tapering, 
 end. The heavy rope is secured to the ship. When cast into the sea 
 the mouth opens and the water fills the bag, thus causing it to act 
 as a drag, which arrests the speed of the ship. When the occasion 
 for the use of the sea anchor has passed, th« small rope is pulled, 
 which opens the smaller end, and the resistance immediately ceases. 
 The bag can then be hauled on board. 
 
 Mr. Edison carried out a number of successful experiments on 
 comparatively small boats, and then arranged for a life-sized test 
 with a 5,000-ton ship loaded with 4,200 tons of coal. 
 
 Mr. Edison's plan included the use of four sea anchors each about 
 
 9 feet in diameter at the mouth, and each attached to a 4-inch rope. 
 The plan was to fasten the ends of these 4-inch ropes securely in 
 
 the bow of the ship and to have the sea anchors placed at the end of 
 the ropes and midway of the ship. If the observer at the listening 
 device reported a torpedo launched by a submarine at a distance, the 
 signal was given and the four sea anchors were to be immediately 
 released and thrown overboard and the helm thrown hard over, 
 bringing the ship almost to a standstill and turning her at right 
 angles to her original course within a very short space of time and 
 advancing only a short distance on her original course. 
 
 It will be seen from a copy of the following report that a loaded 
 vessel 325 feet in length was turned 90° from her course in 2 minutes 
 
 10 seconds, with an advance of only 200 feet, by the use of only four 
 sea anchors. 
 
 The turning curves made on the test above referred to are shown 
 graphically. 
 
 U. S. S. " Sachem " (S. P. 192), 
 New York, N. Y., Septemler 4, 1919. 
 From: Lieut. W. S. Harris, U. S. N. (R). 
 To : Tliomas A. Edison, Esq. 
 
 Subject : Turning curves U. S. S. Clio with and without sea anchores. 
 1. On August 22, 1918, the Division of Operations, U. S. Shipping Board, at 
 New York, furnished the U. S. S. Clio, in command of Oapt J. JefCers, master, 
 
INVENTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MEMBERS. 
 
 165 
 
 for your experiment with the canvas sea anchors to be used in stopping the 
 advance of cargo ships. Below is a table of curves taken from bearings on two 
 buoys at Blue Fish Shoals, in Long Island Sound : 
 
 Number of sea anchors. 
 
 Advance 
 in Jeet. 
 
 Advance 
 
 in per cent 
 
 of advance 
 
 with no 
 
 anchors. 
 
 Taming 
 time, 90°. 
 
 
 
 Feet. 
 1,000 
 860 
 700 
 390 
 200 
 
 Per cent. 
 100 
 86 
 70 
 30 
 20 
 
 m. s. 
 2 10 
 
 1 
 
 2 3 
 
 2 
 
 2 7 
 
 3 ^ 
 
 2 28 
 
 4 t :. .: 
 
 -■ 2 10 
 
 
 
 2. This vessel was loaded with 4,200 tons of coal, her length 325 feet, dr'aft 
 loaded 19.60 feet. This experiment was carried on In slack water under very 
 favorable conditions. The inclosed blue print gives the actual curves. 
 
 W. S. Habkis. 
 
 Sasm CoMtS£ e^ a**/^ ^. 
 
 S'^tO^r: iBotT^r: 
 
 
 STRATEGIC PLANS TOR SAVING CARGO BOATS FROM SUBMARINES. 
 
 After a few months of experiments on listening devices, Mr. Edison 
 concluded he would leave the experimenting for discovering sub- 
 
16(5 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 marines to others, and conceived the idea that it would be more eco- 
 noftiic to save the ships from being sunk, if possible. He, therefore, 
 increased his studies by adding camouflage and strategic plans. 
 
 He therefore went down to Washington with three assistants, in- 
 tending to make a thorough study of the statistics of submarine 
 activities and their results, and to develop therefrom strategic plans 
 according to some ideas that he had in mind. He expected to find 
 on the Government records understandable and full details, charted, 
 of the sinkings that had already taken place. Not finding this, he 
 and his assistants worked day and night to prepare the charts and 
 data. 
 
 From a study of these, it was quite apparent that the steamship 
 comjDanies had been sailing their vessels on the same routes as before 
 the war. From the statistics of the numerous sinkings it appeared 
 that only about 6 per cent of the ships had been sunk at nighttime. 
 It was a fact, also, that a vsi<t number of troops had been transferred 
 between England and France at nighttime without any loss. It was 
 also apparent from the statistics of sinkings that the steamship com- 
 panies had not learned the lesson of night sailing in the danger zone. 
 From an examination of Lloyd's Register it appeared that only 
 about 4 per cent of the first-class British merchant ships had modern 
 sounding apparatus aboard, and at that time wireless apparatus was 
 almost unknown on board the British merchant ship. 
 
 With all these facts and this data before him, Mr. Edison com- 
 menced to work out his plan, which, broadly stated, was for the ships 
 to sail in and out of the danger zone at night ; to forsake as much as 
 possible the old standard lines of travel ; to anchor through the day 
 in comparatively shallow waters and harbors where submarines ' 
 could not approach them, steaming only at night to other ports of 
 anchorage on the way to their ultimate destinations. 
 
 In order to present this plan in concrete form, Mr. Edison made 
 a study of the statistics of shipping passing in and out of British 
 and French ports for a year, and from the information thus obtained 
 he made a graphic chart. He then obtained a full set of Pilot Books 
 covering the British Isles and France, and charted the harbors in 
 which there was safe anchorage for a long distance inshore in com- 
 paratively shallow, but safe, waters, where submarines could not ap- 
 proach submerged. 
 
 The results of Mr. Edison's work are embodied in a report Ivhich 
 he made in November 1917, and in the maps and charts therein re- 
 ferred to. Copies are hereto attached. 
 
 Mr. Edison pursued the same line of work, and in December, 1917, 
 completed and handed in similar strategic maps for handling United 
 
INVENTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MEMBEKS. 
 
 167 
 
 States coiistwise and foreifjn shipping in case any of the submarines 
 appeared on our coast. These were made after Mr. Edison found 
 that no bureau of the Government, even the Bureau of Information, 
 had any statistics of the sailings of coast^Yise boats in and out of the 
 various harbors. AVith the assistance of Secretary Redfield and his 
 assistants approximately accurate data ^Yas finally obtained through 
 customs officials, haibor masters, and from many other sources. 
 These strategic maps were delivered and explained to the officers of 
 the Bureau of Naval Operations at Washington. Copies of these 
 maps and charts are also attached. 
 
 Mr. Edison also made a pegged board covering a chart of the 
 channels and coasts of England, Ireland, and Scotland. This chart 
 was laid oil in squares of 40 miles each, which is the approximate 
 visibility of smoke from a cargo boat as seen from a submarine in 
 the center of the square. Each square was provided, with a peg and 
 a peg hole. One person had the problem of taking into British or 
 French ports, say, 30 vessels. His opponent had a similar pegged 
 board with 13 pegs representing submarines. The first player routed 
 his ships to the various ports at various hours, while his opponent 
 placed his submarine at points where he thought most likely a vessel 
 would come into his visible area, which was then considered sunk. 
 It was found that by following certain methods these 30 vessels 
 could be brought into port with a surprisingly small number having, 
 been seen by the submarine. 
 
 Copies of maps and plans referred to in the foregoing pages were 
 forwarded to Sir Eric Geddes, the head or the British Admiralty, 
 November 21, 1917, with the following letter: 
 
 I herewith forward some strategic maps preparer! for use in diminishing 
 the sinking of cargo boats by submarines. 
 
 Map No. 1 sho\ys all the ships which pass in and out of the ports of Great 
 Britain and France in one (lay. The statistics are for 1913, no later date being 
 possible. 
 
 From this map it will be seen that the handling of this vast system of traffic 
 In such a manner as to minimize the sinkings requires a man or men of 
 imagination. 
 
 Map No. 2 shows at one glance all the vessels and their exact position that 
 have actually been sunk from February 1, 1917, to October 12, 1917. 
 
 This map has been compiled from all the data available, given me by the 
 American, French, and English Governments. The maps of these Governments 
 are so many in number and filled with so much general information not 
 directly pertaining to the boats actually sunk, that they are complicated and 
 no human being could ever draw a general conclusion. 
 
 Map No. 2 is the result obtained from many maps put on one, and shows 
 the boats sunk by a submarine, without any other matters to confuse the mind. 
 The smaller maps, 3, 4, 5, etc., illustrate the stragetic plans. 
 
168 NAVAL CONSULTING BOAED OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATION'S. 
 
 First. Send cargo boats across to France, or along the English Channel only 
 at night. No cargo boat should appear in the channel in daylight. 
 
 Second.- No cargo boat should enter or leave any English or French port 
 except at night. The whole of the night should be utilized for approaching 
 or leaving the coast and with the least delay and best speed possible. 
 
 Third. The density of traffic is very great at certain spots, and very danger- 
 ous. Stop this and route your ships to diminish the density, and spread the 
 traffic over the whole coast of France, England, Ireland, and Scotland, as 
 shown in map No. 4 and not as now, shown in map No. 3. 
 
 Fourth. Shorten the line of traverse through the danger zone as far as 
 possible. 
 
 After having passed through one zone and reached an English or French 
 port, do not attempt to pass through another danger zone, but coast by night 
 only to the port of ultimate destination. 
 
 Fifth. You have two types of submarines to contend with. The ocean- 
 going submarine, which cruises far off the land in the Atlantic, and the small 
 submarine which only frequent waters of 100 fathoms or less. 
 
 By routing the whole of your traffic as per map No. 4, you make it neces- 
 sary for the enemy to build and operate several times as many ocean-going sub- 
 marines as they now operate to sink ships at the present rate. As for the 
 small submarines, the passing of the traffic by coasting at night will almost 
 nullify their efforts. 
 
 Sixth. It will be noticed by referring to map No. 2 that most of the ships 
 have been sunk in the lanes shown by sailing charts published by the different 
 Governments. 
 
 Boats from abroad make the Fastnet Light, the Scillys, or Ushant. Thence 
 by day the captains run by sight from point to point along the coast, and at 
 night by the lighthouses. The Germans knowing this, place their submarines 
 in this line and enfilade thenj. 
 
 You will note that in mid-channel, between the Scillys and the Bristol Chan- 
 nel and Irish coast, scarcely any ships have been sunk on account of the cap- 
 tains of ships clinging to the old sailing lanes. 
 
 It is not necessary for submarines to cruise around to find ships, as has 
 been assumed. This would be a waste of oil when ships are so plenty. Sub- 
 marines do move around, probably on account of the destroyers and chasers, 
 but not by reason of not finding boats to sink. 
 
 Seventh. I find that up to June 1, 191Y, only 19 per cent of the cargo boats 
 going in and out of England and France had any wireless. I suppose this has 
 now been remedied, otherwise it diminishes greatly the value of the destroyers. 
 
 But what is more serious — and absolutely necessary in order to work strate- 
 gic plans — is the installation on each cargo boat of a modern wire and tube 
 sounding apparatus. With this the boats can be continuously making sound- 
 ings without lowering their speed, thus determining their position by means of 
 the hydrographic charts and enabling them to make anchorage at a good port 
 under any condition of weather or gale without running for some sight point, 
 like the Fastnet. 
 
 I am told that only naval vessels and some of the very large cargo boats have 
 this sounding apparatus. The cost Is small and the operation simple, and I 
 strongly urge that all boats should be supplied with them by the Government. 
 
 Eighth. If you can partially blind the enemy, you have him at a great dis- 
 advantage. If you can blind him entirely, you have him whipped. These night 
 
INVENTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MEMBERS. 169 
 
 operations are, of course, equivalent to a camouflage of high efficiency. The 
 camouflage can, of course, be carried on, in a measure, when running through 
 the danger zone in daylight ; but not if bituminous coal is to be used on cargo 
 boats. The smoke makes the use of a large number of submarines by the 
 enemy unnecessary. 
 
 Eliminate the smoke and, all other things being equal, the number of sub- 
 marines necessary to get the same number of sinkings must be doubled. Cut 
 ofC the masts, which are no longer of any use; cut down the smokestack to a 
 minimum ; close the gaps between the various deck constructions on the ships 
 by canvas to make an even contour, and a still further number of submarines 
 will be required. In addition to this, all boats which cross the danger zone in 
 an easterly or westerly direction should sail in line with the rays of the sun, 
 or what I call " shadow sailing." Shadow sailing is sailing to keep the bow or 
 stern of the boat as near as possible to the sun. Map No. 6 shows the direction 
 and mileage in the summer and map No. 5 in the winter. 
 
 The advantage of shadow sailing Is that it lends Itself to camouflaging de- 
 vices. It will be noted by referring to maps No. 5 and No. 6 that the loss of 
 carrying capacity for a round trip is very, very small when shadow sailing is 
 followed. 
 
 I will furnish you with camouflaging devices later on. I shall go to sea next 
 week to perfect them. 
 
 In map No. 18 you will find a plan whereby night camouflaging is carried 
 to the limit. When a boat arrives, say, 250 miles from the port which she in- 
 tends to enter, it should be in the evening. She then runs all night, and at 
 the break of day she will stop. There will be several ships, if convoy system Is 
 used, and at this point the destroyers meet them. 
 
 They keep up steam and move at, say, 2 knots an hour in a narrow area, 
 say, of 10 miles, surrounded with destroyers, cruising at required speed. A 
 very small amount of American or VFelsh anthracite or gas-house coke should 
 be used for a few hours when sun is bright enough to show smoke. Oil-burning 
 destroyers only to be used, no smoke being emitted. 
 
 As night comes, the cargo boats proceed to the second and final night run 
 without destroyers. Outgoing boats should proceed from one harbor and ingo- 
 ing to another, or all inbound boats go in one day and outgoing another day. 
 This would prevent collisions, as an 11-knot boat would not bump very hard 
 into a 10-knot boat, both going in the same direction. It also becomes unneces- 
 sary to have any lights whatever, as there are no destroyers with the boats at 
 night. Zigzagging is unnecessary at night, hence cargo boats could make their 
 normal speed. 
 
 At first thought it would appear that half a dozen cargo boats emerging from 
 the night and practically stopping would be dangerous although destroyers 
 were cruising in close proximity, but a device which I have made for determin- 
 ing the number of cargo boats sighted by submarines in various unknown posi- 
 tions shows that when a boat is about to enter a zone in- which there is one or 
 more submarines and proceeds 120 miles through such a zone by daylight, it is 
 far safer to stop still in one-twelfth of the zone than to pass through the whole 
 of it. The chance of being sighted is very much smaller. 
 
 Of all cargo boats sunk, less than 7 per cent have been sunk in the dark. 
 You will note considerable sinkings around Hull. The boats for Narvik for 
 ore should go in and out at night and spread themselves as much as possible. 
 I have a plan in mind of which I will send particulars if you are interested. 
 
 I think that boats arriving at and leaving ports along the Bast Coast should 
 also run only at night. 
 
170 ^'AYAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 All these sclienies apply only to the 10 and 11 knot cnrso boats. As to the 
 fust steamers, they aii^ in a much more favorable i«isition if this strategy Is 
 adopted. 
 
 While I have no information, I .suspect that you have passed these fast 
 steamers acro.ss the Eni;lish Cliannel hii ni;ihi. Otherwise I can not understand 
 why you have been so successful with troop ships. 
 
 I suggest you establish a routint; nllice coordinating with the American and 
 French. Tliis oflice should be open at all hours, running three shifts — two 
 men on duty per shift. One of these men sliould be familiar with the tech- 
 nique of navigation ; the other a bright, successful business man, and both 
 young. The otHce should have wii'eless and regular telegrai)h and telephone 
 connections and operators. 
 
 It is probable, in fact certain, that if the statements I have made are put 
 up to the average naval oflicer, he will at once make a lot of objections, be- 
 cause these views differ from his previous experience, or, possibly, from a 
 lack of imagination if my statements do not appeal to him. In such a case, I 
 would request that such objections be reduced to' writing, signed by the objector, 
 and forwarded to me for answer. 
 
 I will send other snugestinns for hunting submarines, especially a scheme for 
 employing your submarines to great advantage for this purpose, but I must 
 first try some further e-xperiments at sea. 
 
 COLLISION MATS. 
 
 One of the schemes suggested by Mr. Edison to minimize the loss 
 of torpedoed vessels covered tlie launching of collision mats accord- 
 ing to a plan submitted to Washington. His arrangement contem- 
 plated the installation of 10 collision mats on each side of the vessel, 
 each mat to be 40 feet long and 35 feet wide and rolled on a 6-inch 
 pipe. Photographs of torpedoed ships furnished a clue to the best 
 size for mats. These mats ^vhen rolled up and when not in use to 
 be placed about 15 feet away from the sides of the vessel, so as not 
 to be affected by the explosion and out of the way of interfering with 
 the launching of lifeboats. These mats were so arranged that any 
 one of them could be launched in 15 seconds in such manner as to 
 co^■er the hole made by the explosion. 
 
 Jlr. Edison built a rough model of a merchant ship on a scale of 
 1 in 2.r>, on which the above plan was carried out on a small scale. 
 
 He also launched a 10 by 10 foot collision mat from a boat at sea 
 as an experiment. 
 
 TAKING MERCHANT SHIPS OUT OF MINED H.^RBORS. 
 
 A plan was devised by Mr. Edison and submitted at Washington 
 for taking merchant ships out of harbors liable to be mined by sub- 
 marine mine layers. This plan as proposed would utilize small sub- 
 marine chasers otherwise lying idle. 
 
 The plan was to use two chasers running in parallel, 600 feet apart. 
 Between is a small steel cable, say, one-eighth inch in diameter, se- 
 

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 168537°— 20. (Face p. 170.) 
 
INVE^TIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MEMBEKS. 171 
 
 ciued to each boat. The chasers proceed to sea followed by the mer- 
 chant ship or ships about half a mile astern and sailing midway be- 
 tween the chasers. If an obstruction is met the chasers throw a 
 buoy to mark the spot and endeavor to get through in another direc- 
 tion. The merchant ships, of course, stop on signal. Should the 
 merclirnt ships reach the sea where it is improbable that mines exist, 
 the cliasers return to port and notify the regular mine sweepers, who 
 preceded to the buoy and investigate the obstruction. This apparatus 
 was sent to Guantanamo, Cuba. 
 
 CAMOUFLAGING SHIPS AND BtJBNING ANTHRACITE. 
 
 In July, 1917, officials from the Cunard Steamship Co. and the 
 Submarine Defense Association had several interviews with Mr. Edi- 
 son in regard to means of j^rotection from submarine activity. He 
 visited the steamship docks with a draftsman and after some experi- 
 ments suggested to the Cunard Co. a scheme of camouflage shown in 
 the photographs. The scheme is further described in a report for- 
 warded by him to Washington. The report reads as follows : 
 
 I inclose photographs of an idea which I have given to the Cunard Steam- 
 ship Co. They are from a model I have made. 
 
 The present strongly operated area of submarines is in an area starting from 
 a line drawn from Wexford, Ireland, to Cherbourg, France, and extending out 
 into the Atlantic for 200 miles from Lands End, England. This area is about 
 122,000 circular miles. 
 
 As the distance which the smolie of a steamer can be seen from a sub- 
 marine is about 20 miles, this gives a visibility area a circle 40 miles in diam- 
 eter, or 1,600 circular miles. 
 
 I have also advised the Cunard Co. to carry 200 tons of anthracite coal and 
 to burn this only in the danger zone. This amount of coal will carry the ves- 
 sel in and out of the zone, and the only extra expense for this is $275. I have 
 also had the engineers of the New York Edison Co. teach the Cunard engineers 
 how to effectively burn anthracite so there will be no loss of speed with any 
 cargo boat, which type of boat is the only one that I am working on. 
 
 By the suppression of smoke, the area of visibility is reduced from 1,600 
 circular miles down to 400 circular miles. To reduce this area still further, I 
 suggested that masts be removed, as they are no longer used for sails, so as 
 to help the steam power, and also that the height of the smokestack be dimin- 
 ished to half. With the masts removed and the funnels out, the visible area 
 is still further cut from 400 circular miles to 144 circular miles. 
 
 In addition to removing masts and cutting the stack, I have added a camou- 
 flage line of canvas strips tapering from bow to stern, the highest point being 
 the stack. 
 
 In fair weather a boom pole extends out from both ends of the ship, upon 
 which ropes are hung, the distance apart of each rope being more and more as 
 they recede from the ship. This further reduces the area of visibility. 
 
 Two cargo boats of the Cunard Co. are being changed over to comply with 
 the model and they will leave for England next week. 
 
 The Submarine Defense Association has taken the matter up, and probably 
 all cargo ships will soon make the changes suggested, which I am glad to say 
 is very quickly done and rather inexpensive. 
 
172 NAVAL CONSULTISTG BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 It has occurred to nie that if tlie I'lilted States Is to build eurso ships, 
 it would save time and expense by leaving off the masts and reducing the 
 height of the stack so it is not more than 12 feet above the general deck. 
 After the war, it is easily extended. 
 
 Two very small pipes 2 inches in diameter. In sockets, and provided with 
 very line guy wires, can be used, but only when wireless messages are neces- 
 sary in the zone. 
 
 There are still further chances of diminishing visibility. 
 
 The Valerie, of the Cunard Line, was the first ship to be so camou- 
 flaged and Mr. Edison was told from outside sources that she ran for 
 about a year by lierself, but when put in a convoy was torpedoed and 
 sunk. 
 
 It .should be said that pievious to Mr. Edison's recommandations 
 to the Cunard Co. he had made investigations as to the possibility 
 of changing over from bituminous to anthracite coal without chang- 
 ing grates. This point was definitely settled by actual tests made 
 on voyages of coastwise steamships. 
 
 COAST P.'TKOL BY SUBifARINE BUOYS. 
 
 In April, 1917, Mr. Edison submitted to Washington a plan he 
 proposed for patrolling the coast with a chain of submarine buoys. 
 The proposition, as submitted, is as follows, and a copy of the blue 
 print referred to is attached hereto : 
 
 I herewitli submit a plan for patrol of coast from Nova Scotia to Florida, 
 for detecting submarines and following the same and reporting presence of 
 enemy .ships; all from .50 to 100 miles out at sea along the edge of the con- 
 tinental shelf of shallow water, .">(l to 60 fathoms. 
 
 These reporting stations consist of submarine buoys 11 feet in diameter, 
 anchored up to .50 fathoms, resembling in size, make, and operation tlie Liglvt- 
 house Board's whistling buoys. Each buoy Is manned by three men, one for 
 each shift. They have wireless outfits for sending under worst conditions 50 
 miles. 
 
 The buoy does not roll to any appreciable extent, but has an up and down 
 motion. The Lightlionse Board experts say they are perfectly practical and 
 will last for years. They state that they know of no conditions of weather 
 that a repair boat can not visit them and go aboard within a week. 
 
 The buoy can submerge to 100 feet or more. Compressed air is used to 
 submerge by water-displacement method. A 2-horsepower air compressor is 
 used for compressing air to either 1,000 or 2,000 pounds in cylinders, capacity 
 three submergings daily. 
 
 A sound apparatus is used for detecting submarines or surface vessels and 
 approximately locating their position at all times while in the area or zone 
 patrolled by the buoy. The sound receiving apparatus is lowered to consider- 
 able depths where the sound waves are very much stronger than at the surface. 
 
 The buoy contains tables for the wireless apparatus and electrical parts of 
 the sound detecting apparatus. It also has bunks for the men, four weeks' 
 supply of food and water, and cooking apparatus. It is lighted by storage 
 battery. A small direct and alternating current dynamo is connected to air 
 compressor engines. 
 
VESSEL NOT CAMOUFLAGED. 
 
 SAME VESSEL CAMOUFLAGED. 
 
INVENTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MEMBERS. 
 
 173 
 
 Seven full days' supply of gasoline is carried in a tank outside the buoy 
 proper, sufficient for most abnormal conditions. 
 
 It is coiitempUited that the buoy will normally be on the surface of the sea. 
 Therefore, except in a storm, the men (except man on duty) can be out in 
 the open air. This buoy will be a very comfortable place for the men. If they 
 are relieved every two weeks it should be sufficient, having shore leave one 
 week. 
 
 While watching in daytime, it is believed the detector will warn of presence 
 of top ships or submarines before they can be seen. If in danger of being 
 run down by top ship or being shot at by submarine, they can submerge out 
 of danger. 
 
 At night they will also be forewarned by sound detector and submerge and 
 save themselves from being run down by a top boat running without lights. 
 They will also know when they can safely come to the surface. 
 
 The cost of these buoys complete should not exceed $8,000 each. The area 
 which each buoy can patrol is at present unknown and will not be known until 
 my experiments, together with those of Mr. Fessenden and others are known. 
 I am very confident of a circle 5 miles in diameter, but until more is known 
 about the sounds given out by a submerged submarine, everything is uncertain. 
 
 I feel sure Fessenden will do as well as I can, and perliaps exceed anytning 
 I do, as he has actual experience in this line. However, I am confident that 
 between us we will get what Is desired, or partially so. 
 
 One defect of underwater sound patrols is the great roar set up by white- 
 caps in storms. This will seriously diminish the patrol area, without the use 
 of a little oil In the area. 
 
 The buoys could be manufactured very rapidly. There are at least 300 
 small boiler shops in New York and Pennsylvania who could make them, per- 
 haps one each per week, if they have material. All the appliances are simple 
 and could be made quickly. 
 
 After the war these buoys could be partly stored, partially used for small 
 lightships and for whistling and lighting buoys. 
 
 I inclose a hydrographic map where I have drawn a line' of buoys with tne 
 position of the high-speed armed boats. 
 
 The lines of buoys are 12 miles apart. There are four rows, in many places 
 less. Each high-speed destroyer or other armed boat attends to an area of 
 30 miles in every direction ; so after position of a submarine is sent by wireless, 
 the armed boat can reach the spot in one hour. If more boats are used then, of 
 course, they can reach the position quicker. 
 
 Perhaps the position of buoys is not the best. However, all the data is 
 here, and any disposition can be made of them, and more or less buoys and 
 armed boats used. This scheme is only in the rough and made without any 
 pretention to naval strategics. 
 
 If this scheme has any merit to the Navy experts, I suggest a full-size work- 
 ing buoy be made and actual tests made with it in .50 fathoms, so in storms, 
 etc., defects, if any, can be found, and from this it may be changed and used 
 as a model to build others. 
 
 In addition to the armed boats there should be a fleet of supply boati; it is 
 estimated that one supply boat can visit three buoys daily. 
 
 rt is evident that the size of the buoy might be increased to 15 feet diameter 
 and provide for two or more torpedo tubes on a swivel just below the water 
 line, and also for a cannon on the superstructure, just above the water line 
 and provided with a water break for recoil. But I think its best function is to 
 act as a signaling station only. It will be noticed by referring to the map 
 that there are a few gaps where it is impractical to use buoys on account of 
 
174 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 the gi-eat dcptli of tlie water. In this case hoats would have to be substituted 
 and maintained in position by occasionally starting engines. There is very 
 little hope of detecting submarines at any considerable distance when a boat 
 is moving, as the jar of machinery sends out sounds locally which can not be 
 compensated for sufficiently to hear the weak sounds from a distance. This 
 is what gives the fixed buoy its great value, in addition to its cheapness of 
 cost and operation. 
 
 Data on suhnnirine buoy, nrcoDipfinjiiiifi letter of i/r. Thomas A. Edison, 
 
 April 16, 1917. 
 
 Designed for submerging SO feet — 33 pounds of external pressure. 
 
 Safety factor of 4. 
 
 Frame figured to stand total external load. 
 
 Plates figured to stand only external pressure on their unsupported areas. 
 
 Estimated total weight, including everything except the weight of pounds, 
 anchor chains 44, 000 
 
 E.stimated weiglit of ballast water 24, 300 
 
 Total 68, 300 
 
 Total displacement when submerged » C6, 000 
 
 As total weight exceeds total displacement, it is therefore possible to sub- 
 merge without chain, or witli minimum chain. 
 
 Maximum downward pull of chain and currents, etc., will vary from a few 
 hundred pounds in shallow still water to 18,000 pounds in deep water with 
 strong currents. We then have — 
 
 Pounds. 
 
 AVeight of .shell 44,000 
 
 ■Weight of chain, etc 18,000 
 
 Total 62, 000 
 
 And as this is less than displacement (66 000) it is possible to rise when 
 ballast water is forced out. 
 
 Equilihriniii. — When water is admitted to ballast tanks until buoy is awash, 
 a very small quantity more will cause it to submerge and (if it were not for the 
 anchor ehainx) continue to submerge until compressed air is admitted eject- 
 ing some of the ballast water. 
 
 As soon as this is done it will reverse and start to rise, and thus be in un- 
 stable equilibrium. 
 
 But as the buoy submerges, the anchor chain (whose length is three times 
 the depth of irater) will exert less downward pull, as it becomes shorter; that 
 is, a greater portion of the chain will rest on the bottom. This reduction in the 
 weight will tend to cause the buoy to rise. Thus we can reach a point of 
 stable equilibrium where the admission of a few ounces of water or air will 
 cause the buoy to go up or down until balanced by the changed weight of the 
 chain. 
 
 CARTRIDGE FOR TAKING SOUNDINGS. 
 
 The latest suggestion made by Mr. Edison to Washington con- 
 cerned a small depth bomb which he had produced after experimen- 
 tation. 
 
INVENTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MEMBERS. 175 
 
 The object of the cartridge is (1) to enable the navigator to ascer- 
 tain whether there is a safe depth of water under his vessel, and (2) it 
 may be used for safety signaling in fogs. In both cases it is as- 
 sumed that the listening device in the bow of the boat is used. 
 
 The plan proposed is to expel these cartridges from the bridge. 
 They are of two kinds, one made to explode at any given depth, and 
 the other to explode on touching bottom, irrespective of depth. If, 
 for instance, a cartridge is set for 40 fathoms, it will explode when 
 it reaches that depth. The other type will explode- only on touching 
 bottom. In this latter case the depth can be ascertained by a time 
 table previously calibrated by experiment. 
 
 In either case the explosion may be easily heard a mile or more 
 away at the listening device, the time of expulsion and explosion 
 showing the depth on a recording instrument. 
 
 These cartridges can be made about the size of a shotgun cartridge 
 and produced cheaply. 
 
 SAILING LIGHTS FOE CONVOYS. 
 
 When the system of convoying a number of merchant ships came 
 ■into vogue there arose a demand for a safe sailing light for use at 
 night. The requisite for such a light was that while it should be 
 visible to all the other vessels of the convoy, including destroyers, it 
 should not be visible from. the deck of a submarine sailing on the 
 surface of the sea. 
 
 Mr. Edison devised an apparatus to fulfill this requirement. It 
 consisted of several flat disks about 18 inches in diameter, painted 
 a dead black and separated by only one-thirty-second of an inch 
 space. In the center, so as to show a light between the disks, was 
 placed an incandescent lamp of 6 candlepower. Ordinarily, even 
 such a device, suspended on a mast or otherwise, would move in a 
 manner corresponding to the roll and pitch of the ship, and in a 
 rough sea would betray the presence of the ship to the enemy. To 
 overcome this trouble Mr. Edison included as part of the device a 
 gyroscope actuated by a small electric motor. With this addition 
 the sailing light would be always maintained in a horizontal position 
 irrespective of the motion of the vessel, the beams of light being 
 parallel, rendering the light visible only to the observers on the other 
 convoy vessels, all their observations being made in the crow's nest 
 and at a much higher altitude than the deck or periscope of a sub- 
 marine. 
 
 Preliminary tests were made in Chesapeake Bay and showed the 
 principle to be correct. 
 
 An electrician from one of the United States submarines had been 
 detailed to assist Mr. Edison in these experiments, but while the 
 168537°— 20 12 
 
17fi NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 the work on the perfected model was in progress he was withdrawn 
 and was not thereafter returned to help in the completion of the 
 device. 
 
 SMUDGING SKY LINE. 
 
 In connection with Mr. Edison's numerous experiments with smoke 
 shells, smoke decoys, smudging, etc., he suggested a plan of smudg- 
 ing the sky line with black smoke 3 or 4 miles behind the ships of 
 the United States or Allies if engaged in a naval battle with the 
 enemy, thus enabling our ships to maneuver or change formation 
 without being observed by the enemy. Another advantage was that 
 the enemy at long distances would be unable to get the range, while 
 enemy ships would be clearly visible to us against the sky line. 
 
 It will be readily seen that this is not the same thing as a smoke 
 screen, which was frequently used during the war. , 
 
 In this connection Mr. Edison made some experiments, using 
 boarding 8 by 12 feet on a sky line. The boarding was painted dead 
 black. An observer was placed about 6,000 feet awaj', using the un- 
 assisted eye and also a telescope. Mr. Edison had procured 11 pieces 
 of cloth, each of a different color or shade, and at the blackboard 
 he placed a man who wrapped himself entirely in these sheets of 
 colored cloth, successively, and walked on the sky line and then up 
 and down in front of the blackboard. In all cases the man was 
 visible to the eye when he walked on the sky line, but with cloth of 
 rather dark shades he was invisible by either eye or telescope when 
 in front of the blackboard. 
 
 OBSTRUCTING TORPEDOES WITH NETS. 
 
 Previous to the time that Mr. Edison evolved the idea of the quick 
 turning of a ship to avoid an oncoming torpedo, as described here- 
 tofore, he was experimenting on a plan to enable merchant ships to 
 escape torpedoes launched at them by submarines. 
 
 Part of this plan was to use his listening device, by means of which 
 a torpedo could be heard the moment it was launched. Mr. Edison 
 proposed the use of a simple gun, similar to a trench mortar, from 
 which should be fired an obstruction netting. This consisted of a 
 small flotation tube, say, 25 feet long, over which is wound a net of 
 1-foot mesh made of quarter-inch cable of very fine steel wires, the 
 net being coated each side with thin canvas. The whole would re- 
 semble a large window shade. When the net strikes the water it 
 unwinds and extends down 25 feet. 
 
 The plan was that if the torpedo were heard advancing toward 
 the boat a large number of these nets should be thrown in its path, 
 giving sufficient retardation tha,t it would be stopped or be so delayed 
 as to miss the ship. 
 
TEST OF OLEUM-CLOUD SHELL. 
 
 STEAMSHIP DECOY. 
 
INVENTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MEMBBKS. 177 
 
 The powder suggested for the guns was very slow-burning, of a 
 special character to give a mean effective pressure, possibly of 200 
 to 400 pounds per inch. In Mr. Edison's expermients he gained 
 sufficient data to estimate that these nets could be delivered at least 
 950 feet from the boat. The rolls did not tumble, but could be fired 
 with remarkable accuracy. 
 
 UNDEEWATEK SEAKCHLIOHT. 
 
 One of the problems placed before Mr. Edison was to provide a 
 searchlight to be used under water by submarines. 
 
 At his request the New York Testing Laboratories made sortie ex- 
 periments on arc projectors giving light of different wave lengths 
 through long tubes filled with sea water and distilled water. Their 
 facilities were not adequate for the extended experiments Mr. Edi- 
 son desired to make on the absorption of light by sea water, and he 
 continued the work in his laboratory, using arc lights with com- 
 bination carbons carrying elementary substances. 
 
 After making a great number of experiments he found that the 
 green line of barium in the arc penetrated salt water farther than 
 any other he had observed. It was his impression that in blue 
 water it might be possible to see an object 200 feet ahead with rather 
 powerful apparatus, and so reported to Washington, stating at the 
 same time that he had reached a point where progress could not be 
 made in the laboratory and that further experimenting should be 
 done at sea. 
 
 It may be added that his last experiments were with a 60-foot tube 
 filled with sea water, at the end of which sufficient light was trans- 
 mitted to read print. 
 
 In connection with these experiments Mr. Edison incidentally sug- 
 gested a plan whereby the safest depth of water under a ship could 
 be obtained while running. 
 
 OLEUM CLOUD SHELLS. 
 
 The experiments with shells containing oleum, which on bursting 
 would form a dense white suffocating cloud, were followed up by 
 Mr. Edison for several months. He was greatly impressed with 
 the desirability of this type of shell for many purposes, especially 
 for making a cloud to blind the vision of enemy ships. Their in- 
 expensiveness, both intrinsic and comparative, appealed to his sense 
 of economy, and their effectiveness was in his judgment desirable for 
 the purpose. The oleum shell was in general of similar construction 
 to other shells but contained a can of oleum instead of shrapnel, and 
 also a bursting charge of T. N. T. 
 
 The photograph shows test of this shell at sea. 
 
178 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 A year afterwards it was stated that the Germans were using 
 oleum shells toward the close of the war. 
 
 HIGH-SPEED SIGNALING WITH SEARCHLIGHTS. 
 
 The officials of the Brooklyn Navy Yard having expressed to Mr. 
 Edison a desire for a device which would permit high-speed signaling 
 with searchlights, he proceeded to experiment along this line and 
 produced the device shown in photograph. 
 
 This device consists of a Venetian shutter inclosed in i a frame, 
 the shutter being connected to an electromagnet in circuit with a 
 battery and telegraph key. The working of the key actuated the 
 electromagnet, this causing the shutters to open and close, and Morse 
 signals could be flashed at the rate of 40 words a minute. 
 
 The device was sent to the Brooklyn Navy Yard. 
 
 WATER-PENETRATING PROJECTILE, 
 
 It is well known that an ordinary projectile fired at sea will, on 
 striking the water, ricochet and will not penetrate the water in a 
 direct line so as to make a penetrative hit on a submerged target. 
 During the height of enemy submarine activity, Mr. Edison also 
 devised a type of projectile which would enter the water direct with- 
 out ricochet, and which would continue its course without deflection 
 and make a penetrative hi't. 
 
 His experiments were made at a small lalte in New Jersey, using 
 a 1-pounder gun loaned by the Navy Dei:>artment. 
 
 The projectiles used with this gun were, of course, small and 
 were solid, although his plans for actual war practice included the 
 use of larger ones carrying charges of explosives. 
 
 The device consists of a projectile of the shape shown in accom- 
 panying photograph arranged to be held in a container and fired 
 from a gun of larger caliber than the diameter of the projectile. 
 The container consists of a thin-walled steel cylinder open at the 
 forward end and closed at the rear end by a plug of sufficient strength 
 to withstand the pressure of the gases in the gun. 
 
 The projectile is held central in the container by means of flat 
 steel pieces extending longitudinally. 
 
 At the rear end of the projectile are fixed fins projecting beyond 
 the circumference of the projectile whose purpose is to impart rota- 
 tion to the device and also to introduce an air resistance force at the 
 base to prevent tumbling of the projectile. 
 
 The front end of the projectile is provided with a series of steps 
 as shown. The purpose of this feature is to afford a biting edge 
 

 HIGH SPEED SIGNALING SHUTTER. 
 
 WATER PENETRATING PROJECTILE. 
 
MUZZLE EXTENSION FOR WATER PENETRATING PROJECTILE. 
 
INVENTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MEMBERS. 179 
 
 which will force the projectile to enter water when it strikes the 
 surface of same. 
 
 In operation, when the projectile is fired from the piece, the pro- 
 jectile proper and the container leave the gun together. When 
 traveling through the air the container travels slower than the 
 projectile and is left behind. This is due to the much greater air 
 i:esistance of the container. The projectile fits loosely in the con- 
 tainer to readily permit this to occur. 
 
 Experiments have shown that the projectile and container become 
 separated before they have traveled 100 feet from the muzzle of the 
 piece (1.5-inch gun and f-inch projectile). 
 
 The advantages claimed for this device are as follows : 
 
 1. The projectile may be fired from a standard rifle. 
 
 2. The projectile may be fired from a smoothbore gun which is 
 provided with an extension fitted on the muzzle which contains 
 longitudinal slots to allow the escape of the gases gradually and to 
 provide a guide for the projectile in the region near the muzzle where 
 the escaping powder gases have a tendency to deflect the projectile 
 from its true course. 
 
 3. The decreased head resistance of the projectile results in a flatter 
 trajectory which increases the danger space, a higher striking ve- 
 locity and longer ranges than with the present type of projectile. 
 
 4. The projectile will enter the water and strike a submerged 
 target with effective results. 
 
 The following will be illustrative of the many tests made with 
 this type of projectile. In these tests the gun (smoothbore) was 8 
 feet 3 inches above the water and distant 324 feet -from the sub- 
 merged target. Three-quarter service charged used. 
 
 Weight of projectile, 0.553 pound. 
 
 Weight of container, 0.721 pound. 
 
 Weight of charge, 57 grams of service guncotton. 
 
 Shot Xo. 1 : Water penetration, 7 feet ; effect on target, penetrated 
 a'j-inch sheet iron. 
 
 Shot No. 2 : Water penetration, 80 feet ; effect on target, penetrated 
 7/62-inch steel plate and dented 7/62-inch steel plate situated beyond 
 first plate. 
 
 Shot No. 3: Water penetration, 100 feet; effect on target, pene- 
 trated 7/64-inch 'steel plate and 1/32-inch sheet iron. 
 
 The holes made in the target were clean, round holes indicating 
 projectile had hit same normally. 
 
 OBSERVING PERISCOPES IN SILHOUETTE. 
 
 At various times during three months Mr. Edison made a series 
 of observations with a view of ascertaining how best to detect the 
 
180 KAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 periscope of an enemy submarine. He found that instead of trying 
 to detect a periscope from tlie deck, pilot house, or crow's nest of 
 a vessel it was far more certain to make observation from a port- 
 hole about 30 inches above the water line, from which position the 
 periscope appeared in silhouette, standing and distinctly, and could be 
 instantly detected. 
 
 Of course, he realized that this plan was only feasible when the 
 ocean was not rough. 
 
 STEAMSHIP DECOYS. 
 
 To give the merchant ship a great possibility of escaping sub- 
 marine activity, Mr. Edison devised a cheap form of decoy of which 
 a number could be carried on board. This decoy was constructed of 
 thin sheet iron in the form of a water-tight drum having several 
 chambers containing heavy smoke-producing materials. A funnel 
 completed the arrangement. The idea was that on approaching a 
 danger zone the combustion of the smoke-producing material was 
 started and the decoj' placed in the water, after which the steamer 
 pursued her course. The decoy with smoke pouring from the funnel 
 would drift about, giving the appearance from a distance of a 
 steamer on the horizon and would tend to attract a submarine and 
 mislead the commander, thus wasting time and effort and tend to 
 reduce his battery charge. 
 
 ZIGZAGGING. 
 
 In the latter part of the year 1917 the naval officers of the Allies 
 adopted a plan of having merchant ships in zigzag lines when pro- 
 ceeding through a danger zone. Having made many months' study 
 of the submarine question and having collected a great amount of 
 data, Mr. Edison reached the conclusion that it was useless for mer- 
 chant ships moving less than 10 knots an hour to zigzag and that 
 the results only led to a loss of our total carrying capacity. 
 
 This conclusion was transmitted to Washington, accompanied by 
 an illustrative diagram. Mr. Edison learned subsequently that the 
 French naval officers had arrived at the same conclusion. 
 
 EEDUCING ROLLING OF WARSHIPS. 
 
 In view of the difficulty of accurate gunfire by a warship during 
 heavy weather, Mr. Edison realized that a device for stabilization 
 might be worthy of consideration, and submitted to Washington the 
 following suggestion: 
 
 Vanes in the nature of diving rudders are installed, one on each side of (lie 
 ship near the bottom. These are oscillated back and forth through an arc of 
 about 30 degrees above and below the neutral plane. Electric motors running 
 continuously drive through gearing the reciprocating mechanism connected to 
 the vanes. These motors are run at such a speed that the vanes make a coin- 
 
INVENTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MEMBERS. 181 
 
 plete cycle of oscillation in the same period that the ship makes one complete 
 double roll. The vanes are mounted on a heavy shaft passing through the skin 
 of the ship and are so placed that the pressure is balanced and very little 
 torsion is produced .on the shaft. When the ship is running, an upward or 
 downward pressure is produced by the vanes, depending on the angle they 
 make with the horizontal. If this pressure is properly controlled and timed 
 to be in step with the roll, it will tend to extinguish the roll and will introduce 
 a force directly opposed to the forces tending to set up oscillations of the 
 ship. 
 
 To keep the oscillations of the vanes in step with the roll of the boat, de- 
 vices are used which cause the ship's roll to automatically keep the speed of 
 the motors operating the vanes at such a value that the vanes always move in 
 synchronism with the ship's swing. Two semicircular contacts are provided on 
 the rotating shaft driving the reciprocating mechanism. Bach of these is con- 
 nected to contacts located at either end of a glass tube placed parallel to the deck 
 of the ship. A globule of mercury in the tube rolls backward and forward with 
 the roll of the ship and alternately closes and opens the contacts in the ends 
 of the tube. The wiring is so arranged that when there is perfect synchronism 
 between the oscillations of the vanes and the oscillations of the ship no com- 
 plete electric circuit is made. V^^hen, however, the motor tends to run slightly 
 ahead or behind perfect synchronism, a complete electric circuit is made which 
 causes the field strength of the motor to vary, changing the speed slightly to 
 bring the mechanism back to complete synchronism. 
 
 Roll is set up in a ship by the cumulative action of wave forces which are 
 in step, or nearly so, with the natural period of the ship. From information 
 and data given in an article in the Encyclopedia Brittanica, it appears that the 
 magnitude of these forces in the case of a battleship in the neighborhood of 
 500 to 2,000 foot-tons for rolls of about 15 to 30 degrees, or equivalent to about 
 11 to 45 tons on the sides of the ship (90-foot beam). Vanes or rudders with 
 100 square feet of surface can easily develop pressures up to about 50 tons 
 at a speed of 20 knots. These pressures, if properly controlled, can be made 
 to extinguish or greatly reduce rolling. 
 
 OBTAINING NITROGEN FROM THE AIR. 
 
 Some 17 or 18 years ago Mr. Edison was experimenting with the 
 reduction of iron by hydrogen for his storage battery. In May, 
 1917, he remembered certain phenomena connected with these experi- 
 ments, and communicated the same to Washington, thinking it might 
 be interesting as revealing a process of obtaining nitrogen from the 
 air, for use in explosives. 
 
 The substance of the communication was to the effect that in the 
 experiments above referred to nitrogen and hydrogen were passed 
 over the iron to render it nonpyrophoric. In doing this a consider- 
 able quantity of ammonia developed, which was troublesome, but 
 no special thought was given to it. It having appeared that the 
 Germans were making nitric acid from ammonia, Mr. Edison set 
 up his old apparatus again and found that by mixing lampblack with 
 the reduced iron the passage of nitrogen and hydrogen over it pro- 
 duced ammonia continuously in large quantity, which he absorbed 
 in acid. 
 
182 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 A remarkable feature, to which Mr. Edison called attention, was 
 that while the Germans were compelled to use high pressure, his 
 process worked at ordinary pressure, and the investment required 
 was exceedingly small. 
 
 STABILITY OF SUBMERGED SUBMARINES. 
 
 Mr. Edison forwarded the following suggestion to Washington : 
 
 Submarines, when submerged, must keep moving to preserve their 
 stability, thus wasting their battery charge when an occasion might 
 arise that they would need all the current possible. 
 
 If a drum is put in a recess of the vessel, and controlled by a shaft 
 running into the interior through a stuffing box, a chain may be 
 passed through a hole to the bottom of the sea, 50 fathoms or less. 
 
 If, 3,fter submerging, say, 25 fathoms, the chain is made three and 
 a half times the distance between the keel of the submarine and the 
 bottom of the sea, the boat will be in equilibrium without moving. 
 
 A tendency to rise increases weight of chain, and any tendency to 
 sink lightens the weight of the chain. There will thus be found 
 automatically, the exact place where the submarine is in equilibrium. 
 
 HTDHOGEN DETECTOR FOR SUBMARINES. 
 
 The various explosions on submarines resulting from an excessive 
 accumulation of hydrogen gas rendered it highly desirable to de- 
 velop a reliable and simple hydrogen detector. Mr. Edison there- 
 fore devoted some thought to this subject and after a series of ex- 
 periments produced an accurate and simple instrument which would 
 indicate as small a quantity as three one-hundredths of 1 per cent 
 of hydrogen in the atmosphere of a submarine. This instrument 
 could be made in quantities for about $50. 
 
 Information relative to this hydrogen detector was forwarded to 
 Washington, but the instrument was deemed to be too fragile. Mr. 
 Edison subsequently placed one of tliese instruments on a submarine 
 used constantly for maneuver practice. It remained on board nine 
 months and was still all right at the end of tliat time. 
 
 INDUCTION BALANCE FOR SUBMARINE DETECTION. " 
 
 After more than two months' steady work on the subject and a 
 long line of experiments, Mr. Edison reported that he had no prac- 
 tical success in his endeavor to establish a system of detecting sub- 
 marines by the principle of the induction balance, with many vari- 
 ations and other means, for detecting masses of iron or steel at a 
 distance. 
 
HYDROGEN DETECTOR. 
 
 182-1 
 
TURBINE-HEAD PROJECTILE. 
 
GAS PROTECTER. 
 
 1S3 
 
INVENTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MEMBERS. 183 
 
 PROTECTING OBSER\ERS FROM SMOKESTACK. GAS. 
 
 Mr. Edison had been informed that, under certain conditions of 
 tlie wind, splash observers on top of the masts suffered considerably 
 from the gases emitted from the smokestacks of warships, and that 
 the effects of the sulphurous acid from the sulphur of the oil are 
 very severe. 
 
 He therefore developed a simple device which upon very severe 
 tests proved its practicability to render the observer immune from the 
 effects of the smokestack gas. 
 
 The specifications gi'^en to,Mr. Edison required that the observer 
 should have hands, ears, and eyes free. These were complied with. 
 The usual mask around nose and mouth was dispensed with, as the 
 Bureau of Mines' representatives in the coal regions advised that 
 these masks were impracticable, as they would not fil all faces. 
 
 Photograph of the device is herewith submitted. Mr. Edison 
 personally tested this device by wearing it in a closed room filled 
 with burning sulphur vapors, and experienced no inconvenience 
 whatever. 
 
 TURBINE HEAD FOR PROJECTIL.E. 
 
 One of the earliest subjects on which Mr. Edison worked was to 
 produce a projectile which could be fired from a smoothbore gun, 
 or an eroded gun, and still have rotation and accuracy. 
 
 After some minor experiments Mr. Edison evolved the turbine 
 head, which was capable of being attached to a projectile and of 
 giving to it any desired speed of rotation through changing the 
 angle of the turbine blades. Having no facilities at first to make any 
 actual gun firing tests he tested a 3-inch projectile fitted with turbine 
 head in the apparatus shown in the photograph submitted herewith. 
 A jet of compressed air impinged upon the turbine head causing it 
 to rotate at varying speeds according to the feed of the air jet. 
 Under these tests the projectile was found to act like a gyroscope 
 and if forced to one side would quickly return. 
 
 Subsequently, an old smoothbore l-pounder gun was loaned to 
 Mr. Edison which he used at a range in the mountains to try out the 
 turbine-head projectile. 
 
 In the meantime his preliminary suggestion had been forwarded to 
 Washington, where ordnance experts gave the opinion that the tur- 
 bine-head projectile when fired from a small-bore gun would tumble. 
 
 Mr. Edison made some actual trials with the l-pounder and re- 
 ported that while regular projectiles fired from his l-pounder 
 tumbled badly, those with the turbine head did not tumble under 
 similar conditions. 
 
1,84 NAVAL, CONSULTING BOABD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 MINING ZEEBKUGGE HAEBOE. 
 
 In July, 1917, Mr. Edison suggested to Washington the following 
 scheme for mining the harbor of Zeebrugge : 
 
 Use flat-bottom rowboats about 15 feet long, 4 feet wide, having 
 water-tight covering. 
 
 In this type of boat is a gyrostat run by a motor connected to the 
 rudder. The propeller is driven by a 2-horsepower motor and a 
 storage battery smaller than that used in an electric vehicle. Fastened 
 to the bottom of the boat is a standard mine with chain. In addition, 
 there is also a pole connected to the bottom of the boat extending 
 down about 26 feet, which is the depth of water just off Zeebrugge 
 Breakwater. When the pole strikes the bottom, it releases the mine 
 and chain and sinks the boat. The pole in question can be set for 
 any depth. 
 
 These boats, which only -appear 6 inches above the sea, having a 
 rounding top, are very difficult to see with any searchlight at night, 
 hence are not liable to be shot at. The speed of the boat is about 2^ 
 miles per hour. 
 
 The scheme is that on favorable nights a lot of small vessels 
 approach within, say, 15 miles of Zeebrugge, each boat being pro- ' 
 vided with a half dozen of these skiffs. Knowing then the direction 
 of the searchlights, tide, and drifts, they can set the gyrostatic rudder 
 and aim the boats for the harbor, inner or outer, and they can do 
 this at all kinds of times. The boats are very cheap. 
 
 MIEEOE EEFLECTION STSTEM FOE WAESHIPS. 
 
 Having been informed that when warships are in action there is 
 danger that some parts of their tube and telephone systems might be 
 shot away or become broken, Mr. Edison was requested to suggest 
 some means of establishing communicating signals through a ship. 
 He reported later some experiments he had tried with beams of light 
 reflected from mfrrors. He found that practically any number of 
 corners could be turned with a small loss of light. For instance, a 
 beam of light could be reflected from the masthead, along many 
 passages and decks, around corners and so on to the bottom of the 
 ship. 
 
 In one experiment, with a beam of light 300 feet long, the figures 
 1, 2, 3, after turning eight corners, were plainly visible at the other 
 end; also dots and dashes made by a key tilting the terminal mirror. 
 An incandescent lamp was used. 
 
 In Mr. Edison's laboratory a person in the rear part of the third 
 floor could be plainly seen and identified from the front part of the 
 first floor. 
 
DEVICE FOR LOOKOUT MEN. 
 
 185 
 
INVENTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MEMBERS. 
 
 185 
 
 A criticism was made that on account of the twist and jar of the 
 ship the system of mirrors would get out of alignment and therefore 
 would become valueless. Mr. Edison made further experiments and 
 reported as the result that a ship could twist in any direction 14 
 inches for e\ery 62 feet of length, and could also jar and twist to 
 any probable extent without impairing communication, 
 
 DEVICE FOK LOOKOUT MEN. 
 
 A simple little device for use by lookout men in watching for peri- 
 scopes in bright sunlight was suggested, by Mr. Edison. It consisted 
 of a tapering metallic box, open at both ends, fitted with a light- 
 excluding eyepiece, and having diaphragms placed at intervals along 
 its inside length. It was about 14 inches long and its greatest aper- 
 ture was about 5 by 6 inches. The device was painted a dead black 
 inside and out, and its construction was very cheap. 
 
 In practice about 75 per cent of the general glare would be cut 
 off from the eye, allowing the pupil of the eye to dilate and making 
 the vision much more sensitive. By the use of this device in full 
 light of day objects could be discerned that were otherwise invisible. 
 
 BLINDING SUBMARINES AND SMUDGING PERISCOPES. 
 
 During the great activity of the enemy submarines Mr. Edison 
 devoted a great deal of thought to various plans for preventing 
 sinkings, and he suggested a number of schemes to this end. 
 
 One of these was a proposition to furnish merchant ships with a 
 type of specially designed 3-inch shell filled with an oleum smoke- 
 producing compound with which to blind submarines in cases where 
 they had long-range guns, and where the merchant ships were help- 
 less. The principle of the shell proposed by Mr. Edison had been 
 fully tried out by him on land before submitting to Washington the 
 following design. 
 
 DESIGN OF SMOKE-PEODUCING PEOJEOTILE TOE 3-INCH GUN. 
 
 Head and base same as in the standard specification. 
 
 Shell lengthened 6.68 inches and thickness of walls above diaphragm de- 
 creased tapering from 0.3 inch to 0.2 inch. 
 
 Amount of bursting charges and volume of bursting charge chamber same 
 as in standard. 
 
 Tube to be made of drawn steel instead of brass on account of action of acid. 
 Inner tube of copper as in standard. 
 
 Diaphragm to be sealed with paraffin wax and interior of shell coated with 
 thin layer of paraffin, where in contact with acid. No shellac to be used for 
 coating except in bursting charge chamber. 
 
186 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 The weight of the sample tracer is not included in the total weight. 
 
 Shell to be exploded by time fuze. 
 
 Oleum to contain 60 to 62 per cent excess SO3 ; may be obtained at that 
 concentration from tlie General Chemical Co. at its Bayonne, N. J., plant. 
 
 Calculated weight of shell and contents : 
 
 Pounds. 
 
 Weight of thin walls 8. 13 
 
 Base 2. 18 
 
 Driving band ^ 0. 15 
 
 Diaphragm 0. 47 
 
 Inner tube (approximate) 0.09 
 
 Head 0. 45 
 
 Explosive 0. 17 
 
 Oleum (60.1 cubic inches) (approximate) 4.28 
 
 Washer 0. 02 
 
 Fuse 1. 25 
 
 Total 17. 19 
 
 Total weight of projectile 1.82 pounds in excess of specified weight of 3-incb 
 shrapnel shell. 
 
 On account of lengthening the shell, it may be necessary to use a modified 
 powder train in the tube, or to recalibrate the time fuse. 
 
 To overcome any tendency for " tilting " an increase of velocity may be- 
 neccs.sary. 
 
 ( Standard data taken from Shrapnel Shell Manufacturer, by Douglas T. 
 Hamilton, The Industrial Press (1915), pp. 286-292.) 
 
 EXTINGUISHING FIEES IN COAL BUNKERS. 
 
 One of the problems submitted to Mr. Edison related to means ior 
 extinguishing coal-bunker fires on board warships. 
 
 After a series of experiments he suggested that a small stream of 
 silicate of soda played on a coal or wood fire was surprisingly efficient 
 in extinguishing them. The moment the siliciate of soda strikes the 
 incandescent body the small quantity of water in the silicate evapo- 
 rates and the glowing body becomes coated with a glassy surface, 
 excluding the oxygen and thus extinguishing the fire. Mr. Edi- 
 son offered to give instructions for the manufacture of silicate of 
 soda, calling the attention of the department to the facts of its cheap- 
 ness and that all the requirements of the Xa\y could be made at a 
 navy yard. 
 
 Photographs herewith submitted. 
 
 DIRECTION FINDER FOR HOSTILE .MRPLAXES. 
 
 This development work was undertaken to determine the direction 
 of an hostile airplane before it was visible, by determining the di- 
 rection of the source of sound given off by its engine. 
 
METHOD OF EXTINGUISHING FIRES. 
 
 186 
 
FIG. 1— DIRECTION FINDER. 
 
INVENTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MEMBERS. 187 
 
 Mr. Edison's general plan was to arrange two horns at a fixed 
 angle to one another, arranged to convey the sound to opposite sides 
 of the same diaphragm and to swing the horn system, both in hori- 
 zontal and vertical planes, until there was no movement of the di- 
 aphragm because the sounds conveyed by both horns were of equal 
 value and therefore neutralized one another. 
 
 Preliminary study. — Studies were made on the best arrangement of 
 diaphragm which was used in connection with a magneto type tele- 
 phone circuit, and these studies also included experiments to de- 
 termine the best arrangement of the magnetic system and sound 
 ■chambers for the work required of them. 
 
 Another series of studies was undertaken to find the best angle 
 relationship between the two horns, so as to get maximum and zero 
 readings when in symmetrical position in relation to the source of 
 sound. 
 
 Studies were also made of various forms of horns and reflectors 
 for receiving sound at various distances, in order to determine thei 
 best combination for this particular problem. 
 
 Apfaratus used. — The sound-receiving apparatus (as shown in 
 fig. 1) consists of two horns set on a turntable and conveying sound 
 to either side of a common diaphragm. 
 
 The diaphragm in its. movement generated or controlled the cur- 
 rent which was conveyed to an observer equipped with head band 
 receiver and who was located in a sound-proof booth. 
 
 The observer was provided with a graduated disk which operated 
 in synchronism with the turntable holding the horn, so that he could 
 read the position of the receiving horns, and was able to manipulate 
 their movement from the booth. 
 
 As will be noticed from the photographs, the horns used were cov- 
 ered with a sound-insulating material, so that sounds reaching the 
 diaphragm were only those entering the mouth of the horn. 
 
 Photograph No. 6 shows experiments made with the horn elevated 
 25 feet from the ground to determine the possible advantage of this 
 method over that of placing the horn c|ose to the surface of the 
 earth. 
 
 Tests and results oitamed. — It was found very difficult to get ab- 
 solutely " zero readings," but with some training on the part of the 
 observer the direction eould be determined with considerable 
 accuracy. 
 
 SOUND RANGING. 
 
 The determination of the location of hidden guns by observing 
 the time intervals between which the sound of their discharge 
 reached several known points was early undertaken by Mr. Edison. 
 
188 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 His idea was to develop apparatus that could be practically ap- 
 plied in the field and could be relied upon for accurate results under 
 the varying unfavorable conditions that would likely prevail in 
 practical service. He also considered it important to use the shortest, 
 possible " base line." 
 
 Mr. Edison had already performed a great many experiments 
 with electric magnetic recorders in developing the telescribe, so that 
 he was able to utilize the instruments developed in this study for 
 the recording of gun, sounds. It was found that the phonograph 
 method of recording had peculiar advantages for this work. 
 
 Prdiralnm^ study. — Electrical recording apparatus (shown in 
 fig. 1) was set up, and studies made of the characteristic outlines- 
 of gun shots, to determine how accurately the arrival of the sound 
 wave could be registered. Studies were also made of the following :: 
 
 (1) The effect of obstructions in the path of the sound. 
 
 (2) The effect of wind blowing at various angles to the path of 
 sound. 
 
 (3) The effect of temperature, humidity, etc. 
 
 (4) The effect of refraction and reflection from solid objects and. 
 different air strata. 
 
 (5) Transmission of sound through the earth. 
 
 (6) The emphasizing of the records from the gunshots ovei* other- 
 noises. 
 
 For the above study the use of a large tract of land near the labor- 
 atory was obtained and a great many tests and observations made, 
 with the result that it was found that all of the varying factors 
 that would affect the time intervals between the sound at the various- 
 stations could be corrected, or allowed for, within practical limits. 
 
 Apparatus. — The following apparatus was developed as a result of 
 the preliminary tests : 
 
 Recording machine, which consisted of (as shown in fig. 2), a. 
 very substantially built phonograph, provided with three electro- 
 magnetic recorders which were capable of accurate alignment by 
 means of micrometer screws. This was driven by a powerful spring 
 motor, so as to be independent of electric current supply, and ran 
 at a very uniform speed. 
 
 Eeading instrument (as shown in fig. 3), consisted of a mandrel 
 for holding the cylinder, with a microscope mounted for close read- 
 ing, connected with a finely graduated scale so that relative time in- 
 tervals between sounds could be very quickly and accurately obtained. 
 
 Timing apparatus consisted of electrically operated tuning fork, 
 which made a record of 517.3 periods per second. This was a spe- 
 cial arrangement developed for the purpose, and gave much finer 
 divisions than could be obtained with any commercial timing device 
 that was available for the work. 
 

 jLa 
 
 ^ 
 
 i l"*-'^ • '' '~--»^-f 
 
 ^B^-^'X-at^,—!^ 
 
 1 
 
 ,>^ 9 
 
 ^^-' 
 
 ^^^^^^^ : ^„ma,: ■ • ■■ -j^ ^^^^^1 
 
 ^^:^ ' . [jr,^ 
 
 ^™™^^ — v":^'*^^^ 
 
 FIG. 1.— ELECTRICAL RECORDING APPARATUS. 
 
 FIG. 2. 
 
 183-1 
 
FIG. 3. 
 
 1S8-2 
 
GRAPHIC INDICATION OF GUNFIRE. 
 
 189 
 
INVENTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MEMBEES. 189 
 
 Sound receiving apparatus consisted of special microphone and 
 horns developed for the particular purpose. Microphones used were 
 a special development of the Edison " lampblack " transmitter, which 
 ■were used to make the record directly, or by means of vacuum tube 
 amplifiers to control the initial current, if the sound received was 
 not of great enough energy to make a clear reading record. 
 
 Sound identifying apparatus consisted of a special reproducing 
 phonograph, provided with an electromagnetic operated marker 
 which was controlled by the observers whenever they heard the guii 
 sound as recognized amongst other sounds that might have been 
 recorded. This instrument was used to closely locate a particular 
 gunshot when there were interfering noises of equal intensity, and 
 it was hard to identify the gun sounds by its graphic outline. 
 
 Tests and restilts. — Mr. Edison's constant endeavor was to keep the 
 length .of the base line short, and therefore his efforts were to keep 
 the chance of error as low as possible in all his apparatus. 
 
 Actual tests, made with modern guns, showed that under varying 
 weather conditions the position of an unknown sound could be lo- 
 cated within 2 per cent, plus or minus, of the measured distance, 
 with a base line not exceeding one-sixth of the range distance. Under 
 favorable conditions some remarkably close results were obtained. 
 
 With a base line 1,800 feet long (the longest base line used) the 
 gun has been located over 2\ miles away, within a foot or two of the 
 actual position. 
 
 When records had been obtained on a particular type of gun for 
 study, it could usually be identified by a trained observer from guns 
 of other caliber. 
 
 Peculiar advantages of the phonogra'ph meCJiod of recording . — 
 First. The use of the phonograph for recording the sound per- 
 mitted of the use of an easy portable machine, of rugged construction, 
 much easier to handle than a delicate galvanometer. Second. Rec- 
 ords were available immediately after being made and did not re- 
 quire any further treatment to make them readable. Third. The 
 records, besides being visible, could also be used acoustically, and a 
 double check made m identifying the record of the sound wanted. 
 (It is often much easier to identify a particular sound by the ear 
 than by its graphic outline on the record.) 
 
 TELEPHONE SYSTEM ON SHIPS. 
 
 Having learned that telephone systems on ships were not very 
 reliable, Mr. Edison devised one that was. He discarded the micro- 
 phones that were in use and substituted the receiving phone for a 
 transmitter, thus replacing the microphone with an instrument of 
 
190 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 precision. The signals being ^veak he amplified with an audion up 
 to a point where the signals could be made so loud as to be painful 
 to the ear. Experiments were continued in the development of an 
 improved earpiece and conditions assuring no difficulty in hearing a 
 conversation irrespective of any amount of noise- 
 Officers from the Brooklyn Navy Yard visited Mr. Edison's labora- 
 tory to make tests. 
 
 EXTENSION LADDER FOR SPOTTING TOP. 
 
 One of the requirements of the Navy Department was for increased 
 facilities of observation on warships. Early in 1917, Mr. Edison 
 called the attention of the department to a newly invented extension 
 ladder, which he suggested could be attached to the observation 
 masts in such a way as to be ready to run up into position at any 
 time in a few minutes. This could give an observer a location 87 
 feet above the top of the mast, thus increasing the area of observation 
 and would also have the further advantages of being generally above 
 surface fogs and allow for a better angle of observation. 
 
 Mr. Edison had a model made which is shown in the photograph. 
 It will be noted that the model shows a conventional cross section of 
 a warship, with mast, on which the extension ladder is mounted. It 
 will also be noted that the extension ladder is arranged so as to be 
 always vertical irrespective of the roll of the ship. 
 
 REACTING SHELL. 
 
 A problem was given to Mr. Edison by the Army Department. 
 He was told that it was desirable that shrapnel shells should burst 
 about 6 or 8 feet above the ground, a time fuse being used to ac- 
 complish this end- Sometimes, he was told, the fuse did not act 
 quickly enough, or not at all, and the shell would fall into the mud- 
 If the fuse acted by exploding there it would fail to do the execution 
 for Avhich it was intended. If the fuse did not act at all the shell 
 was a loss. Mr. Edison was asked if he could devise a form of shell 
 that would overcome this trouble, and he subsequently suggested to 
 officers of the Ordnance Department such a type of shell. 
 
 It was a projectile of the regular type with the addition of an 
 additional chamber in its nose containing a small quantity of black 
 powder to be exploded by concussion. If the shell fell into the mud 
 without bursting, the small charge of black powder would be ex- 
 ploded and cause the shell to be thrown up into the air for a few 
 feet, where it would be burst by means of a train of powder leading 
 
SPOTTING TOP. 
 
INVENTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MEMBERS. 
 
 191 
 
 to the bursting charge. Drawings of this proposed shell were given 
 to ordnance officers. 
 
 Mr. Edison was informed that the Germans were using a reacting 
 shell of a similar type toward the end of the war. 
 
 Ouftr shefr 
 
 ,FeltMS/rer 
 
 , Exfiu/shn Char^ 
 
 BetoTiaiorPeVet 
 
 I — f ■ 
 
 NIGHT GLASS. 
 
 4 
 
 For several months Mr. Edison maintained a line of experiments 
 on a telescope for making observations at night. He borrowed a 
 glass from the Brooklyn Navy Yard for use in making comparisons, 
 and constructed another one based on preliminary experiments. 
 This glass in practice showed dim outlines where the Navy glass 
 showed nothing. 
 
 From the experience gained by this glass Mr. Edison made an- 
 other which revealed further improvement and resolved dim out- 
 lines into details. More extended particulars are as follows: 
 
 Theoretically the brightness of the image in a telescope with a given magni- 
 fying power is proportional to the area of the object glass. 
 
 If the magnifying power is increased for an object glass of given diameter 
 the same light has to be spread over an image of greater area, and the bright- 
 ness of the image is inversely proportional to that area, or inversely as the 
 square of the magnifying power. 
 
 The realization of the full theoretical effect is limited by one being able to 
 discover glass with a perfection of certain definite properties. It is also 
 limited by the size of the pupil of the eye, as the pencil of light emerging from 
 the telescope must be small enough to enter the pupil or part of the light will 
 be wasted. 
 
 The specifications regarding definition and color correction, etc., for an 
 astronomical instrument are very exacting, due to the relatively high magnify- 
 ing powers used, and accuracy of measurement demanded. 
 168537°— 20 13 
 
192 NAVAL CONStTLTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 For a night glass the first consideration is brightness of the Image and ex- 
 cellent defination may be obtained with a glass constructed on proportions far 
 beyond the limits ordinarily set for astronomical instruments. 
 
 Brashear made for Mr. Edison an excellent glass of the followinp: specifica- 
 tions : 
 
 Object glass : 151 inches focal length ; 41 Inches aperture. Eyepiece : Huy- 
 genian, 2 inches equivalent focus ; f inch diameter of eye stop. 
 
 Pupils dilated by observer wearing dark glasses and holder allowing no stray 
 light to enter eye while not observing. Just before observing eyes are closed, 
 glasses detached, and eyes placed at eyepiece which also is provided with 
 side blinders so no stray light enters eye. 
 
 SMUDGING PERISCOPES. 
 
 One of the early suggestions made by Mr. Edison was the use of a 
 compound of " straw oil," Cuban asphalt, gilsonite, or Texas 
 asphalted oil for producing a film on the waters in which submarines 
 were operating. The object was to smudge the periscopes and render 
 them useless for purposes of observation. 
 
 Having been informed by the Navy Department that compressed 
 air and a stream of gasoline had been used to clear the periscope of 
 any smudging compound, Mr. Edison continued his experiments, and 
 a few weeks later reported another compound of straw oil and a 
 residue from benzol absorbing plants. This compound could not be 
 removed from the periscope by either compressed air or gasoline. 
 In fact, the use of compressed air or gasoline made the smudging 
 more effective. 
 
 FREEING RANGE FINDER FROM SPRAT. 
 
 An attachment for range-finders for keeping the glass of the 
 finder free from spray was devised by Mr. Edison. 
 
 Referring to the photograph, at the aperture of the casing are 
 shown two magazines filled with plates of glass, 25 in number. 
 They are fed across the aperture one after anothei-, by the wheel, 
 which extends to the operator at center of finder. A guarded vent 
 hole prevents guns from breaking glass. 
 
 A full size working model was sent to Brooklyn Navy Yard. 
 
 PRESERVING SUBMARINE AND OTHER GUNS FROM RUST. 
 
 One of the problems submitted to Mr. Edison was to find some 
 method of preserving submarine guns from rust. 
 
 He made a large number of experiments and finally found that if 
 extra fine zinc dust is mixed with vaseline and smeared over the gun 
 no rust whatever formed, either in air, or sprayed with sea water, or 
 wholly immersed in fresh or sea water. If only plain vaseline was 
 used the polished steel became badly rusted. 
 
 These experiments were conducted for several months in air, also 
 submerged in fresh water and sea water, with entirely successful 
 results. 
 
SPRAY PROTECTOR FOR RANGE FINDER. 
 
CHAPTEE XII. 
 INVENTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MEMBERS— Continued. 
 
 Mr. Elmer A. Sperry, member of the Naval Consulting Board, 
 who was selected by the American Society of Aeronautic Engineers, 
 was also an inventor of merit and the head of a large company, 
 known as the Sperry Gyroscope Co., engaged in the manufacture of 
 gyroscopes and their installation in connection with other devices. 
 As the Navy was a large user of gyroscopes in torpedoes and in 
 many other connections on shipboard, Mr. Sperry was especially 
 qualified on account of his knowledge of the present state of the 
 developments of the arts concerned in naval warfare to make very 
 valuable contributions in new inventions. 
 
 In 1911 and 1912 the Sperry Gyroscope Co. made a start at trying 
 to solve the problem of stabilization of aeroplanes amounting to 
 automatic flight. By the end of 1913 results had been achieved which 
 made those in control of the Sperry Co. justified in representing the 
 United States in a contest at Paris, France, arranged by the war 
 department of the French Government in the spring of 1914 and 
 known as the Aerial Security Contest. A Curtiss flying boat was 
 equipped with the stabilizing apparatus and competed with some 
 53 other machines which were entered in the contest. These trials 
 were conducted before a committee of 15 of the foremost French 
 scientists, engineers, naval and military men in France, and it was a 
 notable gathering. From time to time the committee also called in 
 other experts to witness the contest. 
 
 During the exhibition of the Sperry device it was arranged to have 
 a passenger leave his seat in the aeroplane during the automatic 
 flight of the jjlane and climb out some distance laterally on the plane, 
 later returning to his seat, in order to demonstrate that the controls 
 automatically took care of this very large upsetting force without 
 the slightest interfering with complete automatic flight. The result 
 of the flights was very successful, so much so that a second series of 
 trials were made of this device before the full committee of judges 
 and other experts, and on July 4, 1914, the Sperry Gyroscope Co. 
 was awarded the grand prix by the judges. The French called this 
 device the automatic pilot. 
 
 193 
 
194 NAVAL CONSTJI.XENG BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 In less than a month from that time Germany had invaded Belgium. 
 Although some sets of apparatus were sent to England and to France, 
 to aid them in the war, which were installed, yet the repeated ad- 
 vances of the Germans and the fact that every available aeroplane 
 was requisitioned the moment it was turned out of the shop resulted 
 in a great delaj^ in the application of the stabilizer to aeroplanes. 
 
 Another most interesting and useful contribution by Mr. Sperry 
 was a device known as the " submarine alarm " which sent in an 
 alarm by wireless whenever a submarine passed through a net sub- 
 merged and anchored, so that when the net was carried away by a 
 submarine, alarm would be given. Following is a brief description 
 of the device and of the experiments made in connection with it : 
 
 The submarine alarm consisted of an anchored net with wireless 
 buoys submerged and anchored at the bottom connected with the 
 net at intervals so that when the net was carried away the nearest 
 wireless buoy would be detached from its anchor and rise to the 
 surface. Mounted vertically on the buoy was a tall mast having 
 wireless antennae. Within the buoy, which was 37 inches in diameter, 
 was a complete wireless outfit with an automatic key, each one giving 
 a different number. A number of these were made and experimented 
 with in lower New York Bay and in the bay off Bath Beach, Brook- 
 lyn, and also in Long Island Sound, and they invariably would, 
 when the net was encumbered, come to the surface, float, and at once 
 start out and repeat a number — for instance, 383, 383, 383 — at in- 
 tervals of about once in a minute and a half, for about one hour. 
 The useful radius of the device was 20 to 30 miles. From Bath 
 Beach the number was picked up on the antennae on top of the 
 Sperry Building, at the Manhattan Bridge Plaza, Brooklyn, 15 
 miles or so distant. 
 
 He made a further contribution to the art of projecting light 
 through water. This involved a great amount of construction and 
 many tests. A clue was obtained from the work of the Prince of 
 Monaco, that the myriads of animalcula in sea water give almost a 
 total reflection of any light beam projected through it. It was de- 
 termined that water is not like glass, as had been supposed ; and that 
 instead of being able to project a beam of light through it, the beam 
 is reflected by the animalcula. An experiment was conducted with 
 a very large light, using 150 amperes, 75 volts, condensed and di- 
 rected by a 36-inch projector, and with' 60,000,000 candlepower in 
 the beam. The beam from the same light has been seen for 62 miles 
 in the air. 
 
 This light was placed in the bottom of a steel well, in which were 
 several tons of lead, and in which a lateral window had been pro- 
 vided near the bottom, made from plate glass about 1 inch thick 
 
SUBMARINE ALARM. 
 
 194 
 
APPARATUS FOR TESTING UNDERWATER ILLUMINATION. 
 
INVENTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MEMBERS. 195 
 
 and 40 inches in diameter. The well was about 25 feet deep,' and 
 was hung by a bale from a crane. Ladders were placed inside the 
 well, and the necessary switchboard, ammeter, voltmeter, and other 
 equipment necessary to operate the light. 
 
 The light was first tested in the muddy waters of the New York 
 Navy Yard at a depth of 10 or 15 feet below the surface. It was 
 noticed that there was a total reflection of the light, but this was at- 
 tributed at that time to the muddy water. It was observed that a 
 sphere of light, 80 feet in diameter, surrounded the window at the 
 bottom of the well. It was brilliantly luminescent. This lumi- 
 nescence was wonderfully brilliant and acted as a fog to obscure 
 vision. Brilliance of luminescence seemed to be about the same at all 
 points in this sphere, even exactly back of the well in the rear of the 
 window through which the light was projecting. After this ex- 
 periment the clearest ocean water possible was looked for, and an 
 experimental place was selected at a bay at the end of Long Island. 
 The big barge with the heavy steel well dangling at the end of its 
 crane was towed to this point, and additional observations were 
 made with naval officers present. It was also found here that the 
 beam of light could not be projected through the water as had been 
 hoped, and that a globe of luminescence was produced as in the ex- 
 periments in the New York Navy Yard. The globe of luminescence 
 was visible through this comparatively clear water for possibly a 
 quarter of a mile, and it could be used for the purpose of silhouetting 
 mines, anchors, cables, and other things of this nature against its 
 white background with very great distinctness up to this distance of 
 a quarter of a mile. It is obvious that the presence of animalcula 
 was the cause of this phenomena of total reflection of the light. 
 
 He further developed the goniometer, which was an instrument to 
 determine the altitude of an aeroplane when it is the target for 
 people on the ground, and the pretelemeter, which is a device for 
 antiaircraft guns to determine the fuse setter's range and the exact 
 locality of a target in terms of azimuth and elevation, the latter hav- 
 ing range deflection. Both of these devices were actually made and 
 put into service. 
 
 A searchlight was also developed by him for aeroplane defense, 
 the problem being to throw the beam from the searchlight vertically 
 without harm to the mirror. Up to the time that this was accom- 
 plished, 50° was the highest elevation at which it was safe to operate 
 a searchlight. 
 
 Mr. Sperry also invented two solutions for the problem of drop- 
 ping bombs from aeroplanes. The antiaircraft guns frequently 
 drive aeroplanes so high that in dropping bombs from them it is 
 almost impossible to reach a target. It has been humorously said 
 
196 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 that " they were fortunate if they hit the same county." The device 
 developed was an automatic bomb dropper with a stabilizer equip- 
 ment for automatically l^.andling the vertical components to a high 
 degree of accuracy. The device was completed and the tests were 
 very successful, bombs being dropped with great exactness. The 
 stabilizer on this device always pointed to the center of the earth, 
 which was a great advantage to the pilot. 
 
 A second solution of the bomb-dropping problem was also de- 
 veloped, incorporating the use of complete wireless control of a bomb 
 as it was being dropped. The bomb was directed by wireless through 
 an antenna attached to the bomb. 
 
 These messages when received by the antenna would set in motion 
 a mechanism which automatically adjusted mechanism to direct the 
 flight of the bomb. A big mark was placed on top of the umbrella in 
 the shape of an arrow, which could be seen from the aeroplane. 
 This arrow was painted with aluminum paint, which is actinic, and 
 was clearly visible on the black background of the umbrella. From 
 an aeroplane the descending bomb looked like a big 8-foot ball with 
 a 14-inch mark on it. This allowed the operators to direct it by 
 the methods above mentioned. In solving this problem many difR- 
 culties had to be overcome. The mechanism could be and was actu- 
 ally controlled over a distance of 4 miles. 
 
 Another device of far-reaching importance was one by means of 
 which the operator of a machine gun on an aeroplane, in combat 
 with another plane, could introduce the element of range, and all the 
 deflections necessary for hits automatically. All aeroplane engage- 
 ments, up to the close of the war, had been at point-blank range, and 
 the virtue of the device above mentioned was that the range would 
 have been very greatly extended, so that machine-gun fire by the use 
 of this device would have been effective at up to some 1,000 yards by 
 automatic action, and this should have given us a control of the air, 
 because the enemy's fire would not have been effective at the ranges 
 at which we would have been able to score hits. 
 
 The apparatus was entirely automatic and introduced all of the 
 factors in the aiming of the weapon that the operator of the , gun 
 would be obliged to take into consideration, and which it was almost 
 impossible for him to do, owing to the variables involved. The de- 
 vice had been humorously called "the social secretary to the air- 
 craft gun," in that it constantly made appointments for the gun with 
 the distant enemy aircraft. 
 
 In the creation of this device there was involved the introduction 
 of all of the mathematical outside ballistics of the projectiles in the 
 terms of angular velocity. An engagement between aeroplanes ex- 
 tends over so brief a period of time that it is impossible for a gunner 
 
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 BOMB-DROPPING SIGHTING DEVICE. 
 
AUTOMATIC GUN SIGHT CONTROLLING MECHANISM. 
 
 197 
 
INVENTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MEMBERS. 1 9 7 
 
 to make the requisite calculations for all of his deflection factors, 
 or even probably any of them. This device introduced all of them 
 automatically. 
 
 In connection with this work there was developed a very remark- 
 able gun sight designed around two points : First, so that it could be 
 used perfectly by people who do not know how even to shut one eye ; 
 second, about a large angular deviation of the eye position; in other 
 words, a large eye field so that if the eye was anywhere within this 
 field the observation was instantaneous as to where the target was lo- 
 cated in reference to the cross hairs in the gun sight. The wonderful 
 advantage of this sight is apparent when it is compared with an 
 open sight where three things have to be arranged in an exact align- 
 ment to become of the slightest use, the three things being the for- 
 ward sight, the rear sight, and the eye. 
 
 With this device the eye, in any position of the wide-angled eye 
 field, however much the eye might be bobbing around, as is always 
 the case in an aeroplane, an automatic device was placed at the con- 
 jugate foci of the sight, bringing the range into the field at all times, 
 so the gunner did not have to take his eye from the sight. 
 
 Besides the above, Mr. Sperry and his force made valuable con- 
 tributions to the art of depth charges. As mentioned above, the 
 depth charge used generally by the United States Navy during the 
 war was made up of contributions by many different scientists, men, 
 and institutions, and Mr. Sperry made his contribution to the de- 
 velopment, like many others. The Sperry firing was tried experi- 
 mentally on the first depth charges constructed in the United States. 
 
 He devoted a great deal of attention to the construction and use 
 of submarine nets, and did painstaking work on determinations in 
 regard, to steel aeroplane propellers, as well as the detection of 
 hydrogen on submarines. Hydrogen is generated by the Edison 
 storage battery on submarines under certain conditions, and the 
 investigations were undertaken to devise an automatic hydrogen 
 detector which would give an alarm when 2 per cent hydrogen 
 was present in the air. The principle used was the fact that there 
 was an increased heat conductivity in the presence of hydrogen, pro- 
 portional to the percentage of hydrogen. This was made use of by 
 electrically energizing a small but highly radiant body. 
 
 Mr. Hudson Maxim, member of the Naval Consulting Board and 
 delegate from American Aeronautical Society, who is an expert on 
 explosives, naturally found this branch of warfare most interesting 
 to him, and he was therefore made chairman of the Committee on 
 Ordnance and Explosives of the Naval Consulting Board. Besides de- 
 voting his time to work on the committee, he experimented on his 
 own behalf, and among other things invented a method for driving 
 
198 NAVAL CONSULTING BOAED OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 torpedoes by means of a self-combustive material, which is called 
 motorite, a compound substantially of the same composition as 
 British cordite, containing about 50 to 70 per cent nitroglycerin and 
 made into a dense col'loid by means of guncotton. Mr. Maxim main- 
 tained that motorite could be employed safely and successfully in- 
 stead of compressed air for driving torpedoes, and that by its means 
 several times as much energy for the torpedo's propulsion could be 
 utilized as by the means of compressed air, provided this energy 
 could be controlled. 
 
 Motorite is made into long bars several inches in diameter, coated 
 on the outside and forced into steel tubes, and the tubes are screwed 
 into a combustion chamber into which water is admitted and sup- 
 plied continuously in the right quantity immediately upon the igni- 
 tion of the motorite, the water being instantly converted into steam 
 by the flame blast of the burning motorite, the combustion of which 
 must be confined entirely to the exposed end of the bar in order that 
 its energy may be controlled. 
 
 The armistice was signed before the experiments were completed 
 on this method of driving torpedoes. 
 
 Mr. Maxim made contributions to the development of the art of 
 firing mechanisms for contact mines, and invented a device by which 
 a mine could be exploded by slight contact, the firing mechanism 
 of which could not be set off or actuated by the explosion of an ad- 
 jacent mine. 
 
 Many mines were presented to the Government, and each type 
 possessed certain advantages; and the Government combined and 
 utilized the advantages of these different methods in experimental 
 development of mines. 
 
 Mr. Maxim also devoted a great deal of time on designs and 
 drawings of a torpedo-proof ship, in which pulverized coal was to 
 be employed in inclosed steel cylinders as the main buffer cargo or 
 protective barrier- In developing this method it was necessary for 
 Mr. Maxim to prove that it was safe to carry pulverized coal in 
 closed steel cylinders on shipboard, it having been asserted that there 
 was danger of spontaneous combustion. His investigations indi- 
 cated that there is less than a ten-thousandth part of the necessary 
 air contained in coal to burn the coal, so that such an infinitesimal 
 part of the coal is capable of combustion as to render the fact of 
 spontaneous combustion negligible. 
 
 In connection with the investigation various methods of produc- 
 tion, storage, and burning of pulverized coal as practiced on shore 
 were studied, and it was found that millions of tons of pulverized 
 coal per year were being successfully employed throughout the 
 country; but its main object on shipboard was to lessen the smoke 
 
INVENTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MEMBERS. 199 
 
 frorti the stack and consequently to reduce the visibility of vessels as 
 a protective measure against submarine attack. 
 
 This work was done under the auspices of the United States Ship- 
 ping Board. Mr. Maxim received the cooperation of several special- 
 ists, who patriotically contributed their service to this work. 
 
 The armistice was signed before a ship was constructed, and 
 further progress on the matter was therefore deferred. 
 
 With the cooperation of noted steel experts, and particularly Prof. 
 Henry M. Howe, a study was made of gun erosion and of finding 
 ways and means of minimizing it, especially in our big caliber guns. 
 At the time that this investigation was started it was thought that 
 the bore of our 14-inch naval guns suffered such enlargement through 
 erosion that loss of accuracy was very rapid, and that after between 
 75 and 100 rounds were fired the guns required relining, for which 
 purpose it would have to be taken off the ship and taken to a gun 
 factory, involving much delay and expense. 
 
 In investigating this matter analyses were made of the section of a 
 tube of a 4-inch German fieldpiece captured at the front. The 
 thorough consideration of propellants was considered, particularly 
 the use of American pure nitrocellulose smokeless powder which in- 
 dicated that guns would last much longer by its use without losing 
 the accuaracy. A final conclusion was reached that under the con- 
 ditions of operation now used the matter of erosion was far less 
 serious than was thought to be the case when the committee began its 
 investigations, and it was found that a 14-inch gun had been fired 
 more than 250 rounds without much loss of accuracy, which would 
 enable the large naval guns to fire twice as much ammunition as the 
 ship ever carries. It was also found that the method of relining 
 large guns and handling them had been so developed that guns 
 could be taken off the ships for relining and could be replaced on the 
 ship in three weeks. As a supply of spare guns is always kept, the 
 ship would not have to wait for its guns to be relined ; and that the 
 ship itself, after having been at sea long enough to fire ammunition 
 enough to cause its guns to need relining, would need attention 
 itself as well as time for reloading, so that the ship would not be de- 
 layed on its return to sea. 
 
 Mr. Frank J. Sprague, member of the Naval Consulting Board, 
 and a delegate from the American Institute of Electrical Engineers, 
 made the following contributions: 
 
 Net system. — A system of nets floated by supports consisting of 
 a double line of buoys so connected and proportioned as to slow down 
 the vertical motion of the nets and any bombs attached thereto in 
 rough water, to reduce the strains on all fastenings, and to minimize 
 the visibility of the supports. 
 
200 NAVAL CONSULTING BOAED OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 This was accomplished by using, in the place of a single main buoy 
 partially submerged, a pair of buoys, one large and one small, con- 
 nected together vertically, the upper one free and the lower one at- 
 tached to the net. The large buoy was to be always submerged, 15 
 or 20 feet under water, and of such size as to provide about 95 per 
 cent of the necessary flotation. The smaller buoy when about half 
 submerged provided the other 5 per cent of flotation. 
 
 The wave movement being greatest on the surface, and the vio- 
 lence diminishing rapidly below it, the small buoys only would be 
 individualy tossed up and down, sometimes hardly submerged and 
 with a slack chain, and at other times fully submerged and with a 
 taut chain. As a result the net system and the submerged main 
 buoys would rise and fall slowly, even in a rough sea, with a mini- 
 mum of strain, impelled by a plus or minus buoyancy varying from 
 nothing to, say, 5 per cent either way. 
 
 He did not actually construct any of these, nets, but made the model 
 and described the system to the board. This system was also pro- 
 posed to the Navy Department by others. 
 
 Net system xoith trailing homis. — In this a system of loosely con- 
 nected nets, suspended as above described, had at intervals of one 
 two hundred feet pendants secured, to the free ends of which were to 
 be attached bombs with mechanisms primed for explosion but so 
 constructed that they could only be released after the bombs had 
 been trailed a certain distance, the release being affected by a small 
 propeller. The object of this system was to provide means for en- 
 tangling a submarine with a net section, easily detached with its 
 bombs from the rest of the system by the forward movement of the 
 submarine, the bombs trailing up against the sides of the latter be- 
 fore being exploded. Provision had to be made so that the bombs 
 would not be operated by the tidal current. 
 
 A similar idea was independently proposed from outside ■ sources, 
 in which the propeller was made to set and release the firing mech- 
 anism, the pendant being attached to a ring, but without means to 
 prevent action by tidal currents. 
 
 Air bomis with leaders. — In these, when the bomb was released 
 from an aeroplane, the leader was given a slight advance such that 
 when the bomb was freed the locked position of the firing mechanism 
 was shifted to the connection with the leader, tension on this being 
 maintained by a difference in rates of fall between the leader, which 
 was a stream-line lead plummet, and the bomb, which had means 
 for retarding its fall. 
 
 On striking the ground the sudden slacking of the leader connec- 
 tion would release the firing mechanism and permit the bomb to be 
 exploded a short distance above the surface, and hence be more de- 
 structive to personnel. 
 
INVENTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MEMBERS. 201 
 
 An alternative means for firing was to have the impact of the 
 leader close an electrical circuit which included the detonator of 
 the bomb. 
 
 After demonstrating the success of the principle it was found that 
 a similaii proposal had been patented in England. 
 
 Depth charges. — Of these there were three devised or experimented 
 with. The first was a modification of the return-action shrapnel 
 shell just mentioned; that is, there was a main part containing a 
 charge, detonator, and firing mechanism, and a flotation member con- 
 nected to it by a cable 15 or 20 feet long, the two parts being nor- 
 mally held together. On dropping overboard they were unlocked, 
 and on striking the water the main charge would go down while the 
 flotation member would be retarded, causing detonation when the 
 cable was pulled taut. 
 
 A second type was designed to operate either by mechanical re- 
 lease of a firing mechanism or the closing of electrical circuit, by 
 water admitted through a valve opening which could be set for 
 various depths. 
 
 Meanwhile, the English authorities had developed a depth bomb 
 depending upon seepage of water through a variable inlet, and our 
 own Bureau of Ordnance had developed a depth charge which op- 
 erated by the building up and then release of a ball-lock firing mech- 
 anism by the movement of a piston connection to a siphon under 
 hydrostatic pressure, with means for varying the depth at which it 
 would operate. 
 
 As an alternative, Mr. Sprague developed and carried through a 
 long series of tests, which are not yet complete, on a depth charge 
 in which both seepaige and hydrostatic control was provided, and 
 with means for maintaining the apparatus locked until it was actu- 
 ally in the water. This form seems to present some advantages over 
 the very excellent one in ordinary use. 
 
 Delay-action mechanical fuses. — Beginning with an invention 
 originally proposed to him by his son, F. D. Sprague, for an air 
 piston delay-action fuse, there has been, with many variations, three 
 general classes of apparatus developed and tested, which depend 
 upon the inertia of certain parts as influenced by their relation to 
 each other by changes of speeds, both in the air and on impact. 
 
 Fuses for under-water submarine attack. — These are for use with 
 
 flat-nose nonricochet shells, are released (so that they can be armed) 
 
 ' by the centrifugal action due to the rifling, armed when they strike 
 
 the water, and fire either on impact with the submarine under the 
 
 water or when their rate of retardation has fallen sufficiently. 
 
 Fuses for armor-piercing shells. — These are intended for use 
 against thick and thin plates, to be proof against premature detona- 
 tion, to arm on striking the plate if a sufficiently thick one, or after 
 
202 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 passing through it, if a very thin one, and to detonate on a thick 
 plate onlj' when coming to. rest in the plate or directly after passing 
 through it or within a definite distance after passing through a very 
 thin plate. 
 
 There have been two general forms of this fuse. The «two con- 
 ditions are very difficult to meet under the extraordinarily limited 
 test requirements, which, on account of the short distance between 
 gun and plate fixed by the limitations at the Indian Head Proving 
 Ground, do not correspond to actual service conditions. There has 
 been action on both thick and thin plates, sometimes 100 per cent 
 record on the latter, and recently Mr. Sprague devised a machine 
 for recording the variation of friction and for determining the en- 
 ergy of impact, as well as the rate of movement or creep of the deto- 
 nator in a shell under flight conditions. 
 
 Associated with these developments is a new type of fuse, de- 
 pending upon similar principles, and designed to be used in an air 
 bomb to be launched from a double-control cradle, immune or sub- 
 ject to arming at will. Even when subject to arming, such can take 
 place only on striking the water or the ground, with almost instan- 
 taneous action if a hard subject is met, but with a delayed action in 
 water, so as to permit detonation some distance below the surface, 
 or on impact with the shell of a submarine if only a short distance 
 under surface. 
 
 All of these types of fuses are still under experimental manufac- 
 ture and test, although many successful tests have been already made. 
 
 Lieut. Charles Messick, a Naval Eeserve officer attached to the 
 ' Naval Consulting Board, demonstrated two forms of vibration com- 
 municated from the ordinary two-bladed aeroplane propeller to the 
 aeroplane motor, no means of overcoming which appears to have 
 been previously attempted. 
 
 This phenomenon consists, first, of the periodical maxima and 
 minima of the gyroscopic effect of a two-bladed propeller occuring 
 twice in each revolution of the engine shaft when an aeroplane flies 
 other than in a straight line, and second, the vibration occasioned 
 by the unbalanced air thrust when an aeroplane is side slipping 
 or whenever the propeller is moving with relation to the air in other 
 than a straight line. The blade advancing against the cross-air 
 current thrusts harder than the receding blade." 
 
 Lieut. Messick's compensating propeller is provided with a uni- 
 versal joint at the hub, where it is attached to the engine shaft, and 
 centrifugal force holds the blades approximately perpendicular to 
 the shaft. The unbalanced air thrust is additionally compensated 
 for by mounting the propeller upon a swivel pin at a leading angle 
 to the length of the blades but perpendicular to the engine shaft, so 
 
INVENTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MEMBERS. 203 
 
 that when one of the two blades tends to lag, its pitch is increased 
 while the pitch of the advancing blade is decreased automatically. 
 This also balances the variable air thrust against the gyroscopic 
 eflfect of the propeller. 
 
 The Naval Consulting Board built two of these propellers which 
 underwent a successful flying test at the Mineola Flying Field of 
 the United States Army, and demonstrated that an aeroplane thus 
 equipped turns to the right or the left with equal ease, eliminating 
 the tendency to dip when turning in one direction and to nose up 
 when turning in the other direction caused by a rigid propeller. De- 
 velopment of this propeller is being continued by the Army. 
 
 Mr. William Le Roy Emmet, member of Naval Consulting Board 
 and delegate from the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 
 worked on an unsinkable ship, directing his attention toward the ac- 
 cumulation of experimental knowledge in regard to the action of 
 explosives against plates with air spaces and bulkheads, arranged so 
 that the experiment on a small scale with reduced amounts of ex- 
 plosives would give an indication of what type of construction was 
 necessary in order to make ships unsinkable by the incorporation of 
 these principles in the construction of ships. 
 
 His experiments were made on eighth size of a section of a side 
 of a ship, and he would take a plate backed by certain structures 
 representing a diminished part of the side of a ship and blow a hole 
 in it with an explosive, using from 1 to 2 pounds of trinitrotoluol 
 (T. N. T.) , as compared with 200 or 400. He developed the fact that 
 in this type of construction air spaces and inertia are necessary to 
 get results ; in other words, you need something behind the air space 
 that had such an inertia that it will not acquire velocity very readily. 
 He designed a ship of the so-called blister type, the blisters repre- 
 senting those structural changes in the hull of a ship which were 
 necessary to make the ship safe when a torpedo exploded against it. 
 
 The building of these special ships was contingent upon there be- 
 ing no other way of defeating the submarine and getting men and 
 cargoes across the ocean. The blisters on a ship with a 60- foot beam 
 would be about 12 feet in thickness, which would be 24 feet, taking 
 into account the blisters on both sides. 
 
 Mr. Emmet, an expert on electric drive and turbines and other 
 marine propulsion machinery, was in active charge of that depart- 
 ment of the General Electric Co. which was equipping warships 
 and merchant ships with machinery, and therefore was extremely 
 busy with Navy work, and his contributions to the knowledge of the 
 ship-propulsioji situation in the Navy and the merchant marine and 
 his special skill in this field was at all times available to the Navy 
 and to the members of the board. 
 
204 NAVAL OONStTLTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 Dr. Miller Eeese Hutchison, who became a member of the board 
 by special appointment of the Secretary of the Navy, had been 
 chief engineer to and personal representative of Mr. Thomas A. 
 Edison for a number of years. 
 
 In July, 1916, he designed and constructed for the Russian Gov- 
 ernment, before fixed-position warfare had been done away with 
 and the Russian Government had collapsed, a complete electrical 
 unit for the electrical illumination of " No Man's Land " from the 
 front-line trenches. This unit consisted of: 
 
 (a) Five 650,000-candlepower searchlights, having no dispersion of 
 the beam in the vertical plane, mounted upon a light wooden pole 
 having ferrule which articulated with an iron pipe driven into the 
 ground. The entire searchlight, mountiifg and pole, weighed only 
 30 pounds. Quickly operative from the ground. 
 
 (5) Eight powerful but very lightweight storage batteries to 
 furnish power for the lights. 
 
 (c) A two-wheeled cart for the conveyance of the searchlights and 
 batteries, with complete facilities for charging the storage batteries. 
 
 This equipment was tested by commissions from Russia, France, 
 England, and officers from the United States Army and Navy, and 
 they seemed to- be pleased with the results. 
 
 In 1917 Dr. Hutchison received an old gun for experimental work 
 from the Bureau of Ordnance, United States Navy, for the purpose 
 of conducting experiments to demonstrate the practicability of re- 
 lining guns that are taken in from field of battle, or from their 
 position on shipboard. The scheme consisted of a method for heat- 
 ing by an electric current the outer part of the barrel of the gun, so 
 that the inner tube might be withdrawn. The system consists of 
 the following: 
 
 (a) To the outer periphery of the gun, for the entire length, is 
 applied a series of coils properly insulated. 
 
 (b) Alternating current, of low frequency, is supplied thereto. 
 
 (c) The gun becomes a closed circuited secondary of a trans- 
 former and within a short time the metal is heated by induction and 
 hysteresis. 
 
 (d) When hot enough the inner tube or liner is filled with water, 
 shrinks away from the outer tube, and may be readily removed. 
 
 (e) A new liner, previously rifled and ready for application, is 
 inserted, the current turned off successive coils, beginning at the 
 breech, and the outer tube is thereby shrunk on. 
 
 The Naval Consulting Board recommended this device for use of 
 the United States Navy. The armistice was declared before this 
 could be introduced into practice. 
 
PORTABLE ELEVATED SEARCHLIGHT, 
 
 SEARCHLIGHT CARRIER. 
 
ELECTRICAL HEATER OF GUN TUBES FOR REMOVAL OF LINER. 
 
 205 
 
INVENTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MEMBERS. 205 
 
 Dr. Hutchison also worked on and designed and constructed a 
 dynamo for light mobile units, but orders came from the American 
 Expeditionary Forces that no electrical lighting equipment should 
 be supplied on trucks shipped overseas. 
 
 He worked on a headlight for automobiles which had no tell- 
 tale dispersion of the beam of light, which was amber colored, and 
 was designed to enable trucks to carry lights on tree-shaded and 
 dark roads of France without attracting the attention of the enemy. 
 
 A listening-in device was designed by him in order to enable intelli- 
 gence officers to listen in on conversations on the telephone. 
 
 He also worked on the taking of photographs of projectiles in 
 flight, for the Bureau of Ordnance, United States Navy, with a 
 special camera, which successfully photographed 14-inch shells when 
 leaving and after leaving the nozzle of a gun with a velocity of 
 2,750 feet per second. Results of the photographs were very inter- 
 esting and instructive. 
 
 As a committee of one, he was appointed by Mr. Hudson Maxim, 
 chairman of the Committee on Ordnance and Explosives of the 
 Naval Consulting Board, to carry through certain experiments on 
 an extension fuse for detonating a shell before it can bury itself 
 and waste energy in cratering. The idea was originally submitted 
 by Maj. G. O. Watts, of the British Army, and Dr. Hutchison car- 
 ried through his work in cooperation with Lieut. Ralph Coxhead, 
 United States Army, who was assigned to duty with the Naval Con- 
 sulting Board and who devoted practically all his time and attention 
 to the extension-fuse idea. Lieut. Coxhead was assisted by Mr. Leon- 
 ard Kebler, of Bronxville, N. Y., who volunteered his services in this 
 connection. 
 
 As a result of the combined efforts of these men a very promising 
 construction was evolved. At the time of the armistice some of 
 these fuses were made up for practical tests at the front. The tests 
 of this fuse at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds disclosed the fact 
 that a 6-inch shell so equipped detonates far enough above the soft 
 ground to make a very small crater, with result in increased danger 
 area from fragments. 
 
 Results of this work indicated that the extension fuse would no 
 doubt be valuable for many purposes. Its use for barrage work, 
 however, would be limited, owing to the somewhat erratic exterior 
 ballistics of the shell so equipped and the danger to our own forces 
 therefrom when used in barrages. 
 
 He also worked on the question of methods of communication be- 
 tween the observer and pilot of an aeroplane and constructed some 
 special transmitters, which were of a better quality than the stand- 
 ard transmitter but not quite so distinct. They were therefore not 
 adopted. 
 
206 NAVAL CONSULTING BOAED OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 In July, 1918, Dr. Hutchison submitted to the Medical Depart- 
 ment of the United States Army a model of a new special surgical 
 needle, in which the gut or silk led out of the end of a needle through 
 a hole provided for the purpose, in order to obviate the disadvan- 
 tage of the ordinary surgical needles, in which the gut or silk is 
 threaded through the needle as in the ordinary cambric needle 
 apparatus. 
 
 Dr. Hutchison also investigated and prepared a detailed report 
 on the burning of anthracite coal on merchant vessels at the request 
 of President Wilson. This work resulted in the development of a 
 scheme of firing this coal so that it could be readily used on merchant 
 vessels. 
 
 Dr. Peter Cooper Hewitt, of the Naval Consulting Board and 
 delegate from the Inventors' Guild, did some very extensive work on 
 the helicopter, and following is a description of it : 
 
 The fundamental object of the helicopter is to obtain a lift more 
 than equal to the entire weight of the machine ; that is, to obtain an 
 upward pull by means of dynamic action of propellers greater than 
 the total weight of the machine, including motors, fuel, and load, so 
 that the machine will be forced upward and lifted into the air. 
 
 The helicopter that he designed, hereafter called helicopter No. 1, 
 has propellers of large diameter adapted to act upon a large mass of 
 air, and the blades are designed to approximate the action of aero- 
 plane wings to obtain the advantage of their lift. 
 
 In earlier considerations of this problem it was thought possible 
 to accomplish ascension by the simple reaction resulting from the 
 downward acceleration of the mass of air acted upon by the pro- 
 peller. 
 
 The laws relating to reaction due to acceleration of a fluid (air) 
 are perfectly understood and exact calculation can be made for ob- 
 taining the required lift for any specific weight of machine. The 
 conditions being that the dynamic reaction in pounds obtained per 
 horsepower multiplied by the available horsepower must exceed the 
 total weight of the machine and motor in order that the machine may 
 rise from the ground. 
 
 The laws of momentum and consideration of resulting distribution 
 of energy due to the action of the propeller must be taken into ac- 
 count. This requires a careful determination of the size of the pro- 
 peller used, and it must be so chosen that the weight of air acted 
 upon per second and the velocity imparted to the air will give the 
 desired thrust or pull, lift per horsepower being proportional to the 
 size. 
 
 It appears that up to the present it has been considered very im- 
 portant to have a very light machine and very light motors. This is 
 
INVENTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MEMBERS. 207 
 
 not necessary, as the lift obtainable with a motor — that is, the lift per 
 horsepower — is proportional to the quantity of air handled or pro- 
 portional to the size of the propeller used. The propellers used be- 
 fore Dr. Hewitt's experiments appeared to him to be too small in 
 diameter for the horsepower designed for their operation. Eecent 
 dynamic research has brought forward new and most important dis- 
 coveries whereby great advantages have been obtained by the form 
 of lifting surfaces used. The investigation of supporting surfaces 
 for aeroplanes has developed planes where the lift obtained from 
 the upper and lower surfaces of the plane are not the same, that 
 obtained from the upper surface being much greater than that ob- 
 tained from the lower surface. The resulting total lift is much 
 greater per horsepower than was formerly considered as possible by 
 simple dynamic action. 
 
 In order to avail of the advantages of these discoveries and apply 
 them in a helicopter it is necessary to know how the conditions of 
 lift are affected-when a plane is rotated as the blade of a propeller 
 and when the plane is acting as a propeller blade to obtain results as 
 advantageous as those obtained by an aeroplane wing. It is also 
 very important to know how these results are modified and influenced 
 by the diameter of the propeller, the size of the propeller blade, the 
 speed of revolution of the propeller, and the relation of the size of 
 the propeller to the horsepower with which it is driven. 
 
 Helicopter No. 1 was designed =:o that it might be operated to 
 furnish practical data relative to these various problems and enable 
 their solution, and particularly for obtaining data relative to the 
 relation of diameter to lift per horsepower for the horsepower used. 
 It was designed to be operated with 200 horsepower at 100 revolu- 
 tions and sustain a lift of 4,000 pounds and withstand the unequal 
 strains due to buffeting of the air. It was built entirely of steel, ex- 
 cept the ribs of the propeller blades and the blade covering, which 
 are of sheet aluminum. The design, size, material of construction, 
 and strength were such as to serve as a guide for estimating the 
 necessary weight of the whole and the various parts in future de- 
 signs and suggest desirable modification of design. 
 
 The experimental data furnished by tests of helicopter No. 1 show 
 that the aeroplane-wing lifts are obtained, and that the lift per 
 horsepower for a given diameter is in excess of that formerly thought 
 possible to be obtained by simple dynamic reaction. 
 
 Although for various reasons it has as yet only been operated with 
 about six-tenths of the horsepower for which it was designed, it has 
 given a lift more than its own weight and the weight of standard 
 motors of this horsepower and a surplus of more than the weight of 
 a man and fuel. (See capitulation of tests.) 
 168537°— 20 14 
 
208 NAVAL OONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 Helicopter No. 1 consisted of two propellers, one above the other, 
 each 51 feet in diameter, one being right hand, the other left, ro- 
 tating in opposite directions in operation. The power-transmission 
 shafts are concentric and driven by two motors, whereby the torque 
 is transmitted without load on the bearings or working stress trans- 
 mitted through the frame. 
 
 In operation there is but little, if any, tendency of the motive 
 power support to rotate, balance of the propeller torque being more 
 easily obtained than was expected. 
 
 The propellers are designed so that the center of support of the 
 blade is forward of the center of lift in order to promote smooth 
 action and avoid chattering (the practical working is perfect). This 
 gives a small torsional moment to the tube which acts as the com- 
 pression member or arm of the propeller which is held at the hub. 
 This tube runs through the blades to which they are fastened. The 
 operation of the propellers is most satisfactory. 
 
 The shape of the propeller blade i? that of Eiffel wing No^ 63. 
 This wing was selected because of the exhaustive treatment of it in 
 " Nouvelles Eecherches sur la Resistance de L'Air et L'Aviation, 
 Faites au Laboratoire D'Anteul," which was thought might prove 
 useful in case of eccentricities being observed during the tests and 
 would enable modification to be intelligently made. Wing No. 63 
 has only 75 per cent the efficiency of wing No. 32, which Dr. Hewitt 
 hoped to substitute for it and obtain 25 per cent advantage in lift. 
 
 In a test the blade, being set at an angle of 12° at the circumfer- 
 ence, gave in operation at vaiious speeds a lift fairly accurately 
 corresponding to the lift such a blade should give if acting as the 
 wing of an aeroplane set at about 6°, demonstrating the faithfulness 
 of the action of the blade and also giving very valuable data for 
 consideration respecting its action in this connection and suggesting 
 the great importance of further investigation. This apparent angu- 
 lar loss of power will become, no doubt, useful power for movement 
 when the machine is not stationary, and during the tests a side wind 
 caused the machine to develop great additional lift. 
 
 Helicopter No. 1 weighs about 1,500 pounds and has an excess of 
 weight of more than 300 pounds which is capable of being removed. 
 This excess weight is due to not being able to obtain standard tubing 
 of suitable size at the time of construction. Standard Hess-Bright 
 ball bearings are used throughout and are entirely out of proportion 
 to the work required of them. Suitable gear were not obtainable, 
 so a makeshift set was installed to save time. Suitable gears would 
 have been easily obtained in ordinary times. 
 
 The machine set up for testing is mounted on a platform together 
 with its motors, which stand on scales, the platform resting on a 
 
INVENTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MEMBERS. 209 
 
 small ball-thrust bearing which is between it and the scales so that 
 the machine is free to rotate. This enables measuring any inequality 
 of torque of the propellers and any tendency of the motors to ro- 
 tate. The balance is so perfect that the whole may be turned with 
 one finger. 
 
 The total weight of machine and motors, before starting the tests, 
 is taken, being about 9,000 pounds, which is read on a dial of the 
 scales graduated to 10 pounds, and can be read accurately to 5 pounds. 
 During the test the original weight is reduced by the amount of the 
 lift obtained, which the scales continually registers and is shown by 
 the dial. As more power is used and the lift becomes greater, the 
 scales register less weight. The machine during the tests is operated 
 by calibrated electric motors for accurately obtaining momentary 
 power reading. 
 
 The following results of tests explain themselves : 
 
 Approximate summary of helicopter No. 1 operated with gasoline motors. 
 
 Pounds. 
 
 Weight of helicopter No. 1 1, 500 
 
 Two Gnome motors, weight 96 kilos each 423 
 
 Addition to frame 100 
 
 Total weight 2, 023 
 
 Lift (test No. 35) with 126 horsepower 2, 550 
 
 Excess lift (for fuel tank and man) 477 
 
 Being excess lift per horsepower 3. 77 
 
 Removing 300 pounds excess weight from machine weight 1, 200 
 
 Substituting wing No. 82 for wing No. 63, No. 63 being only 75 per cent 
 
 efficiency of wing No. 32, modified machine lift 3, 090 
 
 Machine weight 1, 200 
 
 Motors 423 
 
 Addition to frame 100 
 
 1. 723 
 
 Excess lift 1, 367 
 
 Lift per horsepower In excess of weight 10. 8 
 
 Much better results would have been obtained with the use of more horse- 
 power. 
 
 The peripheral speed of the propeller blades (at 2,550 pounds lift 
 and 70 revolutions per minute) is 187 feet per second or 11,220 per 
 minute, and the mean average blade speed (at 20 foot radius) 146.5 
 feet per second or 8,800 feet per minute, which should give a possible 
 horizontal movement of about 4,400 feet per minute, or, say, 40 to 
 50 miles per hour. By using smaller blades or smaller blade angle 
 
210 WAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 higher peripheral speeds may be used and higher lateral speed ob- 
 tained. 
 
 Substituting wing Xo. 32 for wing No. 63, greater peripheral 
 speeds can be used, which, under substantially the same conditions, 
 will give greater speed of lateral flight. 
 
 One important thing that was demonstrated was that propellers 
 of large diameter could be operated successfully. The propellers 
 used were 51 feet in diameter, and no objection was found to operat- 
 ing propellers 100 feet in diameter. The propellers were probably 
 lighter in construction in proportion to their size than any other 
 propellers ever built, and were amply strong to lift 4,000 pounds. 
 There are certain reasons why these propellers worked successfully 
 and whj' other propellers would not. The reason is that the center 
 of support is forward of the center of the lift, so that the propeller 
 has no tendency to chatter. It has a uniform drag. 
 
 The data developed by Mr. Hewitt in regard to the helicopter 
 placed us in the possession of information which would have been 
 extremely useful in the event of a helicopter appearing over the Ger- 
 man lines, as it would have given us the necessary information to 
 proceed at once to manufacture helicopters. We had nearly every- 
 thing except the data necessary to their construction, and this was 
 obtained by these tests, although the machine worked with by Mr. 
 Hewitt never left its scales. 
 
 Mr. Hewitt made contributions to many arts before the war, par- 
 ticularly in regard to vacuum tubes. One of the essential features 
 of the wireless telephone, which was one of the greatest inventions 
 made during the war, incorporated tubes which generated the cur- 
 rents for operating these devices. As advances in one art react on 
 all other arts, it is very difficult to make valuations of contributions 
 to the arts which are made by men like Mr. Peter Cooper Hewitt. 
 
 He also did a great deal of development work upon the question 
 of a rotary motor to be operated by gasoline. 
 
 Mr. David W. Brunton, a member of the Naval Consulting Board, 
 representing the War Committee of Technical Societies, was fortunate 
 enough to have four of his instruments accepted for use in the war. 
 These were the pocket transit, combination alidade and protractor, 
 fire-control instrument, and instrument for locating snipers. 
 
 The pocket transit (figs. 1 and 2) was originally designed for 
 use in underground surveying and has come into almost universal 
 use for both surface and underground work by mining engineers 
 all over the world. It has also been adopted by the United States 
 Geological Survey for use in geological and topographic work, and 
 is used in large numbers by the Forest Service and by civil and 
 hydraulic engineers in making reconnaissance surveys. 
 
INVENTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MEMBERS. 211 
 
 When war was declared the Engineer officers going to the front 
 naturally took their instruments with them, and their compactness, 
 coupled with their extreme accuracy and the rapidity with which 
 readings could be obtained, brought them into general favor with 
 Army officers. 
 
 On the instrument (fig. 3) as constructed for military use the 
 under side of the cover glass carries a graduated circle on which 
 the divisions and figures are made with a radioactive material which 
 has permanent luminosity and per^iits the use of the instrument for 
 night reconnaissance in the immediate vicinity of the enemy. This 
 circle is smaller than the metallic graduated circle underneath and 
 does not in any way interfere with its use in daylight. The upper 
 side of the needle is also made luminous with the same material. 
 
 Many of the Engineer officers, from long practice, were extraor- 
 dinarily expert in the use of this instrument, and some very un- 
 usual work was performed with it at the front. 
 
 The most spectacular of these exploits was the blowing up of the 
 Austrian fort on the summit of the Col di Lana by Capt. Gelasia 
 Caetani, of the Italian Army. With a radium illuminated Brun- 
 ton pocket transit the captain made a survey through the Austrian 
 lines at night to obtain the exact location of the fort, after which he 
 drove a long tunnel and an upraise, from the end of which the fort 
 and its garrison were blown to pieces. When the work was done, 
 out of curiosity to see how correct his midnight survey had been, the 
 captain made an examination and found he had not missed the 
 center of the fort more than 3 feet. 
 
 The " alidade protractor " is an attachment for the pocket transit 
 which enables it to be used in plane-table surveys, where it bears 
 the same relation to the large telescopic alidade that the pocket 
 transit does to the theodolite. 
 
 The device (fig. 4) consists of a celluloid protractor and scale 
 with a central opening which fits closely around the guard ring of 
 the pocket transit, which is held in alignment with the sights by a 
 small stud. 
 
 Sighting is performed in the same manner as in reading courses, 
 i. e., by viewing the object in the mirrored lid by reflected light, 
 with the center line bisecting the opening in the front sight. This 
 enables the operator to work in a comfortable attitude without 
 changing his position from sighting to line drawing and vice versa, 
 which, of course, conduces greatly to both speed and accuracy. 
 
 The graduations and figures in the alidade attachment are clear 
 and distinct, and, by a new process, are placed on the inside of the 
 celluloid, where they are completely protected from wear. 
 
 The thickness of the alidade protractor is only 0.06 of an inch, and 
 it can be very conveniently carried in a note or sketch book. 
 
212 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 Three orders were received from the Government for this device, 
 totaling in all 7,905 alidades, but only the first order for 2,910 was 
 completed before the armistice was signed. 
 
 brunton's fiee-coktkol instrument. 
 
 This instrument is an adaptation from the pocket transit and is 
 designed principally for use with heavy nonportable machine guns, 
 but may also be used for surveying. It differs considerably from the 
 transit in design, one of the principal points of difference being the 
 graduated circle, which is divided according to the French system 
 into 6,400 mils instead of 360 degrees. 
 
 The Government ordered 1,600 of these instruments, all of which 
 were promptly manufactured and accepted. 
 
 INSTRUMENT FOE LOCATING SNIPERS. 
 
 In modern warfare, when trenches or other cover are used for de- 
 fensive purposes, sharpshooters, or '' snipers," as they are sometimes 
 called, are stationed at intervals along the line of front for the pur- 
 pose of " picking off " any enemy who shows his head above the 
 parapet of his trench. When a man is hit by a sniper, it is very dif- 
 ficult, and in fact well nigh impossible, to locate the sniper, because 
 no one knows, except in a general way, from what direction the 
 bullet came. 
 
 The object of this invention is to provide an instrument for lo- 
 cating the positions of enemy snipers so. that they may be dislodged 
 and thus prevented from disabling or killing men who must neces- 
 sarily at times expose themselves for taking observations and for 
 other purposes. 
 
 The invention consists of an instrument mounted on an extension 
 tripod, carrying on an adjustable head which can be elevated and 
 lowered by a rack-and-pinion movement through a vertical range of 
 30 inches. This head carries a papier-mache model of a soldier's 
 face and cap, behind which are placed, 14 inches apart, a pair of 
 thin diaphragms of soft wood veneer, a registering adjustable plate, 
 and a periscopic telescope with a 12-irich drop. 
 
 When in use the instrument is set up in a trench with the adjust- 
 able tripod legs clamped to such a length as will allow the decoy 
 head, when fully elevated, to show above the parapet. When in this 
 position, in order to attract attention and draw the enemy's fire, the 
 decoy head may be lowered and raised just as if an officer was en- 
 gaged in taking observations. 
 
 When the enemy sniper registers a hit, the head is lowered by the 
 rack-and-pinion control tube, after which the bullet holes in the 
 
INVENTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MEMBERS. 
 
 213 
 
 spaced-apart diaphragms are centered by a simple device and the 
 powerful periscopic telescope adjusted so that its line of collimation 
 is exactly in the path of the bullet. As the instrument- head in its 
 lowered position is 2 feet below the parapet, these operations are 
 carried on in comfort and safety, thus leaving no excuse for careless 
 work or hurried adjustments. When the instrument is again raised, 
 the position of the sniper, or at least his nest, is plainly visible in 
 
 Fig. 5. — Instrument for locating snipers set up in trench. 
 
 the cross hairs of the telescope, after which his days of usefulness are 
 soon ended. 
 
 As another indication of the wide field of usefulness of the Naval 
 •Consulting Board, it should be mentioned that Dr. Leo H. Baeke- 
 land, one of its members, early in the history of the board became 
 impressed with the necessity of making the United States inde- 
 pendent of Chile for its supply of nitrates, by the erection of a 
 synthetic nitric acid plant. On March 8, 1916, a unanimous resolu- 
 
214 NAVAL CONSULTING BOAED OF THE 'DNITED STATES. 
 
 tion of the Naval Consulting Board was transmitted to the Secre- 
 tary of the Navy to this effect. Thereafter Dr. Baekeland endeav- 
 ored to educate Congress, the Navy and the Army, and the people 
 of the country to the urgency of this problem by publishing articles 
 in magazines, technical and scientific journals, as well as by public 
 lectures. He appeared on this subject before the Senate committee, 
 and helped to prepare the first bill, which on its final passage pro- 
 vided an appropriation of $20,000,000, for the starting of the first 
 synthetic nitric acid plant in the United States. 
 
 He was thereafter appointed a member of the first Nitrate Supply 
 Committee, which presented the first definite recommendations as 
 to what processes were most available. His associates on this com- 
 mittee were A. A. Noyes, Gano Dunn, George Ellery Hale, C. H. 
 Herty, W. K. Lewis, M. I. Pupin, T. W. Richards, Elihu Thomson, 
 and W. R. Whitney. 
 
 He was appointed on the second Nitrate Supply Committee or- 
 ganized at the request of President Wilson, which held its first meet- 
 ing on May 11, 1917, the other members of the committee being Gen. 
 William Crozier, Rear Admiral Ralph Earle, representatives of the 
 Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Mines, Bureau of Standards, 
 besides Prof. Chas. H. Herty, Prof. A. A. Noyes, and Gano Dunn. 
 
 Early in 1917 he undertook, at the request of the Navy Depart- 
 ment, the then rather new problem of smoke-screen bombs, which 
 work was later taken up and continued by the Bureau of Mines. 
 
 He initiated the first steps for supplying aeroplanes with cyclo- 
 hexane as an improved fuel for high altitudes, and organized the 
 first committee for determining the qualities of a standardized fuel 
 for aviation, which could be adapted to the needs of all the Allies 
 and which could be supplied in sufficient quantity. 
 
 He cooperated with many other committees and other war boards 
 on numerous war problems involving chemical questions. 
 
 Dr. A. G. Webster took up the question of emitting a musical 
 sound under water, and at the request of a member of the staff at 
 New London, where they were working on listening devices, he in- 
 vented an apparatus which he exhibited at the American Physical 
 Society and the National Academy of Sciences. It was a mechanical 
 imitation of the human lips which, if applied to any brass instru- 
 ment like a bugle or other horn, played it automatically by com- 
 pressed air in air ; or, if played under water or furnished with water 
 under pressure, played it there. 
 
 Through private means he established a ballistic laboratory in 
 which valuable results were obtained, chief of which was the inven- 
 tion of a gauge for measuring the pressure in a gun as a function 
 of the time, and an instrument for drawing trajectories of all sorts. 
 
INVENTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MEMBERS. 215 
 
 OPTICAL GLASS. 
 
 The optical industry in this country before the war was in the 
 hands of a few firms. Several of these were under German influence, 
 and one firm was directly affiliated with the Carl Zeiss works of 
 Jena, Germany. The workmen were largely Germans or German 
 origin; the kinds and design of apparatus produced were for the 
 most part essentially European in character. Optical glass was pro- 
 cured entirely from abroad and chiefly from Germany. 
 
 It was easier and cheaper for manufacturers to order glass from 
 abroad than to develop its manufacture in this country. Educa- 
 tional and research institutions obtained a large part of their equip- 
 ment from Germany and offered no special inducement for Ameri- 
 can manufacturers to provide such apparatus. 
 
 With our entrance in the war the European sources of supply for 
 optical glass and optical instruments were cut off abruptly and we 
 were brought face to face with the problem of furnishing these 
 items to the Army and Navy for use in the field. An immense 
 amount of optical glass was needed by almost every department of 
 the Army and Navy for fire-control instruments of different kinds, 
 telescopes, field glasses, and various instruments, including peri- 
 scopes, depression position finders, azimuth instruments, telescopic 
 musket sights, etc. 
 
 The laigftst order for fire-control equipment which our Army had 
 ever placed prior to 1917 amounted to $1,202,000. The total orders 
 placed for such instruments by the Ordnance Department during the 
 19 months of war exceeded $50,000,000, while the total orders for 
 fire-control apparatus placed by the Army and Navy exceeded 
 $100,000,000. 
 
 In 1915, after the European war broke out, the situation in regard 
 to optical glass was appreciated by various optical concerns in the 
 country, who experirriented in a limited way in order to rectify it, 
 but very little progress was made. The United States Bureau of 
 Standards at Pittsburgh, Pa., had done some work, but in 1917 
 Dr. Leo H. Baekeland, a member of the Naval Consulting Board and 
 chairman of the Committee on Optical Glass of the board, who was 
 following the optical-glass situation very carefully, came to the con- 
 clusion that energetic steps must be taken to meet the situation. He 
 took this matter up with his colleague on the Naval Consulting 
 Board, Dr. E. S. Woodward, president of the Carnegie Institution in 
 Washington, D. C, and acquainted him with the serious nature of 
 the situation. 
 
 Dr. Woodward very patriotically offered the facilities of the geo- 
 physical laboratory of the Carnegie Institution to solve this problem. 
 This laboratory had been engaged for many years in the study of 
 
216 NAVAL, CONSULTING BOAED OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 solutions, such as that of optical glass at high temperatures, and had 
 a corps of scientists trained along lines essential to the successful 
 production of optical glass. It was the only organization in the 
 country with a personnel adequate and competent to undertake a 
 manufacturing problem of this character and magnitude. Accord- 
 ingly, in April, 1917, a group of scientists was placed at the Bausch 
 & Lomb Optical Co. and given virtual charge of the plant, and its 
 men were assigned to the different factory operations and made 
 responsible for them. 
 
 The first step that was taken by these scientists was to make an 
 analysis of optical glass from Germany, and to find out its com- 
 position. Results of this analysis enabled these men to make 
 formulae, and they then went into the factories and tackled the 
 problem of production. They had some 20 men in the various fac- 
 tories, and these men developed methods of making glass forms, 
 stirring the glass when melting, and annealing it. They were also 
 obliged to go into the question of making the proper kinds of cru- 
 cibles in which to melt the glass. 
 
 Up to this time there were only two men in the United States who 
 were at all ecpert in making optical glass. There was one man at 
 the Bausch & Lomb Co. who knew something about the art, but his 
 knowledge was more that of an operator than that of a scientist, 
 and he had no knowledge of the stirring or mixing or the purities of 
 the materials, etc. These factors were worked out by the staff of the 
 Carnegie Institution. After the optical glass had been produced, it 
 was examined by a competent optician who was the leading man in 
 that line in this country, and he developed the tests of the finished 
 product at the Bausch & Lomb factory. 
 
 To sum up the situation, it might be said that these men furnished 
 to the art in this country the annealing process, the stirring process, 
 and that they cooperated in the development of a type of crucible 
 used for melting glass. They also evolved the physical tests for 
 purity of material and optical properties of the finished product. 
 
 This cooperation on the part of the Carnegie Institution labora- 
 tories was largely instrumental in helping the Bausch & Lomb 
 Optical Co., the Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., and the Spencer Lens 
 Co. to establish quantity production of optical glass. 
 
 One of the difficulties that was encountered in the solution of this 
 problem was that of getting pure sand, and those having charge of 
 this work scoured the United States and finally found a deposit of 
 sand in southern Michigan which answered the purpose. The re- 
 sults of the work were that from a quantity production of less than 
 1 ton per month in April, 1917, there was an increase to 100 tons per 
 month at the time of the armistice. The glass produced was as good 
 as the best German glass, except for a slight cloudiness due to im- 
 
INVENTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MEMBERS. 217 
 
 purity in the sand, but for all practical purposes the glass was just 
 as good as the best German glass. 
 
 The interlocking activities of the members of the Naval Consulting 
 Board in various scientific activities of the Government has been 
 pointed out in another place in this book, but it may not be amiss to 
 state that both Dr. Baekeland and Dr. Woodward were members of the 
 National Research Council as well as the Naval Consulting Board, 
 and although the evidence seems to be sufficient to warrant the state- 
 ment that Dr. Baekeland's activities brought about the hearty cooper- 
 ation of the Carnegie Institution in the production of optical, glass, 
 yet the National Research Council also had put in a request for the 
 use of the geophysical laboratory of the Carnegie Institution almost 
 simultaneously with that made by Dr. Baekeland in his capacity as 
 a member of the Naval Consulting Board. The subsequent work of 
 the Carnegie Institution in the production of optical instruments 
 for artillery, at Pasadena, Calif., was conducted under the direction 
 of Dr. G«orge E. Hale, director of the Mount Wilson Observatory 
 and laboratory at Pasadena, and was also chairman of the National 
 Research Council. Therefore the relation between the Carnegie 
 Institution and the National Research Council was just as close, if 
 not closer, than that between the Naval Consulting Board and the 
 institution. 
 
 The men on the Naval Consulting Board were anxious to help win 
 the war, and the question of the capacity in which they were acting 
 at the time they initiated or developed certain instrumentalities for 
 winning the war was of a secondary consideration. Probably it did 
 not enter Dr. Woodward's mind whether his activities were con- 
 ducted in his capacity as a member of the Naval Consulting Board 
 or as a member of the National Research Council. The cardinal 
 thing is that the cost to the physical laboratory of the Carnegie 
 Institute, of its contribution to the Government in the solution of the 
 optical-glass problem, amounted to about $200,000, and that the re- 
 sults justified this expenditure. 
 
 To show how matters like the solution of the optical instrument 
 and glass problems touched different organizations, it should be men- 
 tioned that when the supply of optical instruments was seriously 
 behind its schedule in 1918, the War Industries Board took charge 
 of the entire optical instruments industry in the country. 
 
 It will be recalled that the Naval Consulting Board started the 
 industrial preparedness campaign, that the outgrowth of that cam- 
 paign was the Council of National Defense, and that the outgrowth 
 of one of the committees of the Council of National Defense was the 
 War Industries Board, which received the results of the activities of 
 the Carnegie Institution in the production of optical glass, which 
 
218 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 activity on the part of the Carnegie Institution had been evolved by 
 two members of the Naval Consulting Board, Dr. Baekland and Dr. 
 AA^oodward. 
 
 NORTH SEA MINE BAEKIER. 
 
 The wide publicity -which was given the Naval Consulting Board 
 in its formation no doubt started many men on the development of 
 ideas for devices to win the war, and it is almost impossible to say 
 to what an extent the act of creating the Naval Consulting Board in- 
 fluenced the subsequent development and production of new inven- 
 tions. 
 
 Many indentions were submitted directly to the governmental de- 
 partments which were dealing with the particular subject of the in- 
 vention, and this also occurred in regard to the Navy Department, 
 for although the Naval Consulting Board received thousands of ideas 
 and suggestions, yet this did not preclude men of ability from going 
 directly to the various bureaus of the Navy with their inventions. 
 
 Probably one of the most important naval inventions made during 
 the war was that of Ralph C. Browne, of Salem, Mass., who devel- 
 oped a design for a submarine gun which incorporated in it certain 
 elements which had great possibilities if adopted for use in mines. 
 This fact was recognized by the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, 
 Ralph Earle, and Assistant Chief, Capt. T. A. Kearney, together 
 with Commander S. P. Fullinwider, United States Navy, and his 
 assistant, Lieut. Commander T. S. Wilkinson, jr.. United States 
 Navy. As a result of the recognition by these men of the device 
 cieated by Mr. Browne, it became an important part of the mines 
 which were used in creating the North Sea mine barrier between the 
 Orkney Islands and Norway, which project had been under consider- 
 ation for many months by the Bureau of Ordnance. 
 
 This invention of Mr. Browne's was called to the attention of the 
 Naval Consulting Board at a meeting of the members, which had 
 been arranged in the Engineering Building, New York City; but, 
 owing to the circumstances under which the meeting took place, 
 there being a great number of people present, and the fact that Mr. 
 Browne, under these circumstances, did not feel at liberty to disclose 
 the important features of his invention, its value was not disclosed 
 to those of the Naval Consulting Board who talked with him. Mr. 
 Browne immediately took the matter up with the Navy Department 
 directly, and the value of this contribution was immediately recog- 
 nized, as above stated. 
 
 As the North Sea barrier was one of the important elements in 
 defeating the submarine, it being understood that between 17 and 23 
 submarines were lost there, and the fact that many people hold that 
 the surrender of the German fleet and the armistice were brought 
 
INVENTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MEMBEES. 
 
 219 
 
 about largely by the failure of the submarine warfare, and that thig 
 failure occurred almost as soon as the mine barrier was found to be 
 effective, the value of this contribution of Mr. Browne's is realized. 
 The whole barrier contained some 70,117 mines, of which 56,571, 
 or four-fifths, were laid by the United States. This mine field cov- 
 ered a distance of 230 miles. 
 
CHAPTER XIII. 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 The results obtained by Secretary Daniels through the creation of 
 machinery and facilities for utilizing the inventive genius of Ameri- 
 cans to meet the new conditions of warfare as shown abroad, by the 
 organization of the Naval Consulting Board in the manner in which 
 it was formed — that is, by inviting Mr. Thomas A. Edison to head 
 such a board, and then by having 11 of the large engineering socie- 
 ties of the country make up the personnel of the board — brought 
 about results which were in harmony with the method taken in the 
 formation of the board. 
 
 By this method of selection there was gathered together in this 
 board, together with certain men of inventive talent, a lar'^e number 
 of business executives whose success had come about through their 
 ability as engineers and inventors, but who, at the time that they 
 were selected for the board, were preeminently executives of large 
 business enterprises, with an outlook on life which comes from the 
 point of view obtained by the control over large forces of men. 
 
 It is not surprising, therefore, that the first work undertaken by the 
 board was one of a fundamental character that went to the very 
 roots of the question of national defense — that is, industrial pre- 
 paredness. As pointed out in the chapter on the " Industrial Pre- 
 paredness Campaign," this was inaugurated largely through the 
 efforts of Mr. Howard E. Coffin ; but he had the hearty cooperation 
 and sympathy of all members of the board and the benefit of the 
 executive and administrative ability of the members of the board 
 who were particularly qualified to rende*r him such aid. 
 
 It would have been difficult for Secretary Daniels to realize in 
 July. 1915, when he wrote his letter to Mr. Edison asking him to be 
 advisor to a board which would mobilize the inventive talent of the 
 country, tliat he would thus set in motion forces that would bring 
 about the rebirth of the country's thought in regard to preparedness 
 and war, and determine to some extent at least that the war should 
 be conducted by the business men and engineers of the country in 
 place of those having high political places in national affairs. 
 
 Had an industrial inventory of the country been taken by Govern- 
 ment officials instead of by the engineering societies, and without the 
 220 
 
CONCLUSION. 221 
 
 Nation-wide propaganda and advertisement by which the country 
 was educated in preparedness by the Naval Consulting Board, there 
 is every probability that the Nation would not have been ready for 
 the war when it did come. It is also probable that some other organi- 
 zation would have been evolved to bring about the union of the 
 Army, Navy, and the industries of the country, other than such a 
 unique body as the Council of National Defense and its Advisory 
 Commission with its broad powers, which were little short of those 
 of a War Cabinet. 
 
 The next important thing which the board took up after the in- 
 ventory, was the solving of the fuel-oil problem of the Navy Depart- 
 ment, which enabled the department to formulate its policy for 
 naval development and the use of fuel oil on battleships on the firm 
 foundation of the best knowledge in the country on that point. 
 Here again the ability of the engineers, business men, and executives 
 of the board was displayed in their knowledge of men and affairs 
 and ability to gather together men of such a character as to put at 
 the disposal of the Navy Department the requisite information. 
 
 This same method of handling things was displayed in the method 
 that the board took to meet the submarine menace at the time we 
 entered the war. As heretofore pointed out, the first thought was 
 to investigate the whole problem from the bottom up, and come to 
 a conclusion as to the best method of attack on it. 
 
 It will also be recalled that a conference was called before we 
 entered the war to which prominent naval officers and scientists were 
 invited, and that as a result of this conference it was decided that 
 the proper line of attack was to evolve some method for locating 
 submarines by listening devices. In the chapter on special problems 
 was pointed out the history of the development of this movement, 
 and the resultant successful solution of the problem. The submarine 
 menace was solved by a combination of the listening device, the depth 
 bomb, the destroyer, and the convoy system. 
 
 The conquering of the submarine was a dual problem, in that it 
 also involved protecting the merchant vessels with the best inven- 
 tions possible, as well as equipping warcraft with devices; and here 
 the business judgment of the members of the board was displayed 
 in their cooperation in the formation of the Ship Protection Com- 
 mittee of the United States Shipping Board, and the placing of one 
 of the Naval Consulting Board members upon that committee, thus 
 bringing about a close cooperation between the Navy and the Naval 
 Consulting Board and those in control of the merchant marine. 
 
 This same ability was also displayed in the handling of the mat- 
 ter of getting reports on a new naval base for the Pacific coast. The 
 machinery which had been evolved for the taking of the industrial 
 
222 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 in\-entory was used in getting the facts for the solution of this 
 problem. 
 
 The board also saw the necessity during the first few months of 
 its activities of having adequate laboratory facilities for the de- 
 velopment of ideas of an inventive character. Largely through the 
 influence of the members of the board and their reputation in the com- 
 munity, Congress, after thorough hearings on this matter, made an 
 appropriation for a naval laboratory which the Navy had been un- 
 able to get from Congress therefore, although it had been desired 
 for many years. 
 
 There were, however, selected for membership on the board men of 
 recognized inventive ability, many of them with laboratories and 
 staffs of their own which they were utilizing themselves for the 
 creation of war inventions. These men therefore devoted themselves 
 to the creation of inventions, and the results of their work, which 
 are fully set forth in the chapter on " Inventive Accomplishments of 
 Members," is most interesting and instructive, especially when the 
 accomplishments of these few men are compared with the accom- 
 plishments of the public in general, who submitted more than one 
 hundred thousand ideas, out of which but one, possibly two, were 
 put into production for the use of the Navy. 
 
 This shows conclusively that in mobilizing inventive talent there 
 must be a selective mobilization of those who are best qualified to 
 do the work, and not the mobilization of the untrained talent of the 
 country on the hope that a brilliant invention will come from it. 
 
 The members of the board were not limited by their specialties, 
 but there was a tendency for members to gravitate to and work with 
 the particular arts with which they were most familiar. 
 
 Those who had indented appliances in the electrical art devoted 
 themselves to those things which are closely related to their knowl- 
 edge; those who had long been working with explosives naturally 
 devoted a great deal of their time to devices incorporating the prin- 
 ciples of that art ; those familiar with machinery on warships turned 
 their attention to those things and worked upon the designs of 
 torpedo-proof ships. 
 
 Others devoted themselves to marine inventions for the protection 
 of merchant vessels; others to miscellaneous inventions as would 
 naturally be expected from them; others to the development of 
 scientific instruments for Army and Navy use and the creation of 
 additional devices in the same class. On the whole, through the work 
 of these men in the Naval Consulting Board, many scientific prob- 
 lems were advanced for future use and development even thougli 
 they were not brought into effective use in the World War. 
 
 Everyone expected that the board would evolve some invention 
 that would conquer the Central Powers with one fell swoop, and 
 
CONCLUSION. 223 
 
 had the war lasted another year an important and confidential device 
 not described herein would have probably justified this expectation 
 in a degree at least ; and other devices evolved by the board, such as 
 Tvireless-controlled bombs, devices for the automatic introduction of 
 all the factors in the aiming of machine guns on aeroplanes, as well 
 as others, gave promise of such results. 
 
 In its handling of inventions from the public, the board collected 
 information as to where the available inventive talent of tlie country 
 is to be found, and deduced that the best results came from team 
 work on inventions, such as that utilized by the Special Problems 
 Committee of the board in its work of developing listening devices 
 at Nahant, especially so when such teams are made up of highly 
 trained technical men, each contributing something to the solution 
 of the problem. 
 
 In conclusion it may be said that the patriotic and whole-hearted 
 service which members of the Naval Consulting Board at the request 
 of a progressive Secretary of the Navy rendered to the Government 
 during one of the most trying periods in the history of the United 
 States, was something to reinforce our faith in human nature and 
 the democratic institutions on which our Government is founded. 
 168537°— 20 15 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 NAVAL LABORATORY. 
 
 Repoet or Committee on Sites. 
 
 In arriving at a conclusion as to which site on the whole presents the greater 
 advantages under existing conditions, It is essential to consider, first, the 
 authority for and functions of the naval laboratory, and, second, the manner 
 in which it must he operated. 
 
 The act making appropriations for the Naval Service for the fiscal year end- 
 ing June 30, 1917, provided as follows : 
 
 Experimental and kesearch laboratory : For laboratory and research work 
 on the subject of gun erosion, torpedo motive power, the gyroscope, submarine 
 guns, protection against submarine, torpedo and mine attack, improvement in 
 submarine attachments, improvement and development In submarine engines, 
 storage batteries and propulsion, aeroplanes and aircraft, improvement in radio 
 installations, and such other necessary work for the benefit of the Government 
 service, including the construction, equipment, and operation of a laboratory, 
 the employment of scientific civilian assistants as may become necessary, to be 
 expended upon the direction of the Secretary of the Navy (limit of cost not 
 to exceed $1,500,000), $1,000,000: Provided, That nothing herein shall be con- 
 strued as preventing or interfering with the continuation or undertaking of 
 necessary experimental work during the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, nine- 
 teen hundred and seventeen, as heretofore conducted under other appropria- 
 tions: Provided further, That the Secretary of the Navy shall make detailed 
 reports to the Congress not later than June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and 
 seventeen, and annually thereafter, showing the manner in which all expendi- 
 tures hereunder have been made. 
 
 The original conception was for a laboratory involving an outlay of almost 
 $5,000,000, in which not only research and experimental work but heavy con- 
 struction of all kinds could be rapidly carried on ; but after full hearing by 
 the Naval Committees the total proposed for construction and operation was 
 cut to $1,500,000, of which only $1,000,000 has actually been authorized; and 
 this at a time of increases of from 25 to 100 per cent in costs of labor and 
 materials. The terms of the act make even this appropriation cover not only 
 construction and equipment but all operating expenses until further provision. 
 
 Because of this great, and in many respects, regrettable reduction in the ap- 
 propriation, and the serious limitations resulting therefrom, it is vital that in 
 order to make the most of the available funds there should be no unnecessary 
 duplication of equipment and facilities which already exist in other Govern- 
 ment plants, and no avoidable expenditures outside of buildings and equipment. 
 
 For instance, land and water approach costs must be minimized, and the idea 
 of construction of large guns, or vessels of any type, or the manufacture along 
 commercial lines of large numbers of any kind of equipment must be aban- 
 doned. All heavy work must be and should be built, and undoubtedly can be 
 
 225 
 
226 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 better built, iit other places, and only comparatively light work based upon re- 
 search and experiment should be carried on at the laboratory. 
 
 As to the manner in which it should be operated, the idea that the work 
 should be more or less under the direction of bureau chiefs, individually or 
 OdUectively, or the members of the Naval Consulting Board, should be dis- 
 <'arded, for such would lead to a many-headed and inefUcient organization. 
 
 Instead, the laboratory should be under a responsible officer of high rank, to 
 whom the various bureau chiefs should turn over their problems, accompanied 
 liy all available information. And so, too, with regard to problems which may 
 be submitted to the Consulting Board. 
 
 It will undoubtedly be necessary to frequently call upon the bureaus for 
 advice and information, but it will not be necessary for the chiefs to make fre- 
 quent visits to the lalioratory. This fact, while making reasonable access from 
 Washington desirable, removes the necessity of the laboratory being immedi- 
 ately in the iiroximity of the Navy Department. Moreover, a large part of the 
 work will consist of purely scientific research and experiment, which will re- 
 quire a reasonable amount of isolation and freedom from interference and 
 criticism. 
 
 With the foregoing general concepts, consideration of various sites was taken 
 lip, with specific reference to a number of characteristics each more or less 
 influential in arriving at a decision. 
 
 Of the nearly (JU sites which have been formally presented, on public and 
 private lands, from New Hampshire to Louisiana and all east of the Mississippi 
 Iliver, but few could be considered favorably ; In any event, before investigating 
 privately owned lands, it was necessary to ascertain whether there was avail- 
 able land directly contrcjlled by the Navy Department which would meet the 
 iiece.s.sary requirements. 
 
 With these considerations in view, members of the committee have made a 
 detailed Investigation of a number of localities In and about New York, and 
 also of the League Island Navy Yard at Philadelphia, the site of the present 
 experimental station at Annapolis, and the Belleview Magazine site at Wash- 
 ington. 
 
 Eacli of the above places possesses a number of the requirements which are 
 deemed essential ; none, of course, possesses them all. 
 
 Broadly speaking, the decision as to site finally narrowed down to a selection 
 in the vicinity of the National Capital or New York, the ptesldent of the 
 board, Jlr. Thomas Edison, preferring the latter and the remaining five members 
 of the committee being unanimously in favor of the former. 
 
 The difCerence of opinion is based upon somewhat different conceptions of the 
 functions of the experiment station and laboratory and especially of the relation 
 of the Navy to it. 
 
 The president's point of view may be expressed briefly as follows : That 
 Sandy Hook has ample ground available, and, although an Army reservatiou, 
 probably can, without unrea.sonable delay, be transferred to the Navy Depart- 
 ment ; that it has water on both sides of fair depth ; that it Is within a com- 
 paratively short distance from New York, where there Is a large market for 
 materials and labor, and is reasonably accessible to workmen and visit by 
 members of the Naval Consulting Board. He feels that the laboratory should 
 be essentially a development machine shop run at high pressure when necessary, 
 and with but limited research facilities ; that mo.st of the basic facts necessary 
 are already known ; and that such extra research work as may be required 
 ca:n be carried on at such places as the Bureau of Standards, Washington, or 
 at various private experimental research laboratories throughout the country. 
 He also thinks that both direction and operation should be essentially civilian 
 
APPENDIX. 227 
 
 and largely divorced from naval influences and control, while with regard to 
 future requirements lie believes that if the laboratory makes good there will 
 be no difficulty in getting all the money that is necessary. 
 
 Disagreeing with these opinions, the remaining five members of the com- 
 mittee state their views, first, as to Sandy Hook, and, second, as to their final 
 choice, iis follows : 
 
 The acquisition of Sandy- Hook, being part of an Army reservation, might 
 be materially delayed, while time is the essence of successful development not 
 merely in machine construction but in getting the laboratory started and 
 letting the Navy Department and Congress see tangible results. It is not, we 
 believe, as accessible as claimed, for the experience of individual members 
 has been that to spend any appreciable time for investigation, even at the 
 present proving grounds, the entire day must be given to the work. 
 
 While naval officers vary in their opinions as to other places, for and against, 
 not a single one has expressed himself as in favoi' of this particular location. 
 The speeding of work, so far as the handling of machine tools and men are 
 concerned, can under proper regulations and authority be conducted in one 
 place as well as in another. 
 
 In the determination of locations for the proposed nitrate and armor-plate 
 plants freedom from attack has been given due importance. Sandy Hook is 
 subject to direct naval attack at long range. The presence of the proving 
 grounds, with heavy and irregular gunfire, is objectionable and the place offers 
 poor facilities for aeroplane or other outside tests in winter. 
 
 It is impossible to separate proper research and machine development, and 
 since the problems to be solved are essentially naval ones, to disassociate con- 
 trol and operation of the plant from the naval service, for whose specific 
 benefit it is being projected, would be most unfortunate. The calling in of 
 outside research or experimental laboratories on confidential matters would 
 be a matter of grave concern, and the experience of the Navy Department, as 
 well as that of some of the members of the board, in this connection affords 
 little ground to hope for efficiency by such references. 
 
 It is with reluctance that the majority members of the committee find them- 
 selves obliged to disagree with the chairman in the conclusions arrived at, con- 
 clusions which it seems are in the main essential, especially in view of the 
 wide difference between the cost and scope as originally outlined of the experi- 
 ment station and as finally authorized in the naval appropriation bill. 
 
 FINAL CONCLUSIONS. 
 
 After -careful consideration of the whole subject we recommend as the best 
 selection the site on which the present experimental station at Annapolis, 
 now under the Bureau of Steam Engineering, is situated; also that this 
 station be removed from bureau control and consolidated with the proposed 
 laboratory and experimental station, under the direction of a naval officer 
 distinguished by his scientific attainments and managerial capacity, who should 
 report directly, so far as it is practicable, to the Navy Department. 
 
 The special characteristics noted are as follows : 
 
 (1) Location, ownership, and available area, both of land and water. — On 
 the bank of the Severn River, opposite the Naval Academy, and at present 
 under the general jurisdiction of its superintendent; nearly 100 acres out of 
 a total of about 300 are available ; ample water front. 
 
 (2) Character of land and purchase cost, or the cost of changing contour. — - 
 No purchase cost and but low cost of changing contour, even with extensive 
 building operations; land offers excellent foundations. 
 
228 NAVAL, CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 (3) ^Vate|■ front, depth of water, and proximity of nariga'ble channel. — ■ 
 Ample frontage, with a fine masonry dock already constructed, a 29-foot 
 channel, and room within three miles to anchor the entire Atlantic Fleet. 
 The channel from Baltimore to the mouth of the Severn is dredged to a min- 
 imum depth of 35 feet. 
 
 (4) Character of bottoms and stahilitj/ of channel. — Easily dredged, if re- 
 quired, and with practically no shifting changes in channel. 
 
 (5) .'Uno'unt of drcdiiiii if necessary, and lilclihood of ice. — Depends upon how 
 large a ship is desiied to bring close to the laboratory, but it would seem that 
 accessibility of a dreadnought to the dock is unnecessary ; there is but little 
 ice formation. 
 
 (6) Range of tide and character of uHitcr — whether fresh, hrackish, or .lalt.— 
 Low tidal change; water unusually clean and clear from sand and sewerage, 
 and although not strictly sea water of the same composition as the ocean, 
 contains a considerable amount of salt. 
 
 (7) General climatic conditions. — Good for all-year work, and better In sum- 
 mer than Washington. 
 
 (8) Character of neighborhood, considered from a residential, standpoint. — 
 In the main excellent, and near enough to Washington for reasonable additional 
 social diversions. 
 
 (9) Character of labor marlet. — While not a manufacturing center, and 
 hence not available for quickly changing demands for mechanics, such would 
 form but a moderate proportion of the people employed, many of whom would 
 be civilian scientists, naval ofhcers and possibly men from the enlisted forces 
 who have developed special aptitude. About 100 men are already employed, 
 some of whom actually live in Baltimore ; but it is a trite saying that labor 
 follows the market, and if there should be here established a larger and more 
 important experimental station of the kind now authorized, employing, not 
 spasmodically and erratically, but steadily, skilled men, many would eventually 
 make Annapolis their home. 
 
 (10) Market for materials. — Ordinary operation does not require a hand-to- 
 raouth condition calling for daily dependence upon the jobbers of a great city. 
 Of the manufacturing eslablishments throughout the country large numbers 
 are remotely situated from, and are independent of. New York, and there is no 
 good reason why with proi)er management the proposed laboratory should not 
 be well enough stocked to be similarly independent. Baltimore is within 50 
 minutes by trolley and 24 miles by water, and materials can be delivered every 
 day of the year. 
 
 (11) Availahility of other Government machinery and facilities. — The nearest 
 Government shops wliere large work can be done are at Washington, Norfolk, 
 and Philadelphia, but all are available; and once it is necessary to have such 
 work done outside of the experimental statloft a few miles more or less 
 is a matter of small importance. Moreover, the important Indian Head prov- 
 ing grounds are within a comparatively short distance. 
 
 (12) Availability of Corernment records, .■fcientifl.o and patent information, 
 and offlcers of bureaus for consultation. — Washington is within two hours by 
 electric railway; and, in addition, the governor of Maryland states that there 
 will be constructed within two years a 26-mile boulevard direct to Washington, 
 which can be easily covered by automobile within an hour. Recent rules per- 
 mit the purchase of service automobiles in all departments of the Navy when 
 this is required for prompt transportation. From the Navy Department must 
 issue all original plans of construction, and there, too, all records are avail- 
 able. In Washington there are the Government's most important large gun 
 factory, the experimental l)asin and wind tunnel, the Patent Office, Bureau of 
 Standards, and various other sources of such special information as may be 
 occasionally required. All are within reasonable traveling distance and short 
 telephonic communication. 
 
 (13) Aeeessibiliti/ of historical models and records, as well as standard and 
 proposed naval equipments. — In addition to those available in Washington, 
 the steam and electrical engineering laboratories at the Naval Academy and 
 the products of the existing experimental laboratory are at hand. 
 
 (14) Accessibility for cirilian scientists, whether members of the Consulting 
 Board or regularly employed. — Convenience to the members of the board itself 
 is not of first importance, as they will not be employed in the laboratory and 
 can not, of course, operate it. Moreover, the present composition and resi- 
 dence of the board are subject to radical changes. As to the other scientists. 
 
APPENDIX. 229 
 
 Annapolis, Washington, and Baltimore are all available, In less time, for ex- 
 ample, than the residential part of New York would be from Sandy Hook. 
 
 (15) Sentiment of naval offloers. — The sentiment of most of those of wide 
 experience seems to be strongly in favor of either Annapolis or Washington, 
 ■while some who have not seen Annapolis in a score of years prefer New York. 
 Where a difference of opinion does exist, it seems to largely be founded upon the 
 assumption that the laboratory is to be an annex to the various bureaus, and 
 largely under their direction, which point of view seems incorrect. Where a 
 preference for New York has been voiced, it has been invariably accompanied 
 by the opinion that the location should be on the mainland, easily accessible to 
 either Manhattan or Brooklyn. There is no such land available. 
 
 (16) Secrecy and efflciency of operation and safety from enemy assault. — 
 Admirably situated to be free from ordinary interference and unauthorized 
 visits, and offers much easier supervision of employees. It is reasonably free 
 from enemy attacks and easily defended if necessary by a fleet. Climatic con- 
 ditions and lay of land and water lend themselves to outside tests, for example, 
 of aeroplanes throughout the year. The location is also free from the dis- 
 turbance of" gunfire. 
 
 (17) Concentration of experimental work and development. — The present 
 experimental station, in operation for some years, represents a direct invest- 
 ment of about a half million dollars, and the existing facilities and equipment 
 could not now be duplicated for less than an additional quarter of a million. 
 About half a million dollars has been expended in carrying on important in- 
 vestigation and. tests, now requiring the work of 100 men. This condition is a 
 good beginning, and if there b6 now added to it such extensions in buildings, 
 equipment, and operation as are possible by the proper expenditure of the 
 million dollars now available and are in view, as well as such as are ordinarily 
 available for the present station, there will be established a dignified and effec- 
 tive equipment, more impressive in results and costing less to operate than two 
 separate experimental stations of like total expenditure. In fact, a considerable 
 more extensive equipment can be insured by extending the present station than 
 by the construction of an independent one; it can be more quickly begun and 
 put in operating condition, and important experimental work would not need 
 to await the completion of the whole. Besides the provisional plans outlined 
 sometime ago by the chairman other plans showing how the present plant can 
 be extended have been outlined, and as soon as an agreement on general fea- 
 tures is arrived at work can be instantly begun. 
 
 (18) Congressional sv/pport. — It is vitally important to avoid those sectional 
 Influences which often times interfere with administration and especially con- 
 gressional support, instances of which are too numerous to need specific men- 
 tion. At Annapolis, as at Washington, the laboratory would be on national 
 territory and can be developed along national lines, in connection with an 
 institution in which every member of Congress has an individual interest, and 
 which can be more readily visited by him than any other place under cousid- 
 eration except Washington. 
 
 There are some additional important considerations which must enter into 
 any broad view of this matter, and which should carry weight if this project 
 is to be developed on the highest and most effective plans. 
 
 Annapolis is the seat of the United States Naval Academy, the prime source 
 of the professional education of the officers who are especially concerned. It 
 shares with Washington the individuality of national distinction. At the 
 academy itself the Government has within recent years expended in superb 
 housing and educational buildings and electrical and machine equipment con- 
 siderably over $10,000,000, and this is being constantly augmented. In addition 
 to the educational facilities now extended to naval officers at Columbia, Har- 
 vard, and elsewhere, there is here established a post-graduate course which it 
 is hoped may be extended so as to ultimately make less necessary the utilizing 
 of other university facilities. 
 
 The graduates of the academy, all of whom must in every way be trained 
 In the practical as well as the theoretical side of their profession, in laboratory 
 and machine shop as well as in the field or on the water, representing in the 
 highest degree the democracy of the country, comprise many men of special 
 
230 NAVAX, CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 fitness for scientific research, to whom the presence of a well-equipped research 
 laboratory and experimental station will be a constant source of inspiration 
 and the ultimate scene of their activities. 
 
 This laboratory is primarily designed to benefit the professional service for 
 which these men are being trained, not for the benefit of civilian ' scientists. 
 It must deal with the peculiarly individual problems of an organization con- 
 cerning the details and needs of which few laymen, no matter what their 
 experience and attainments in other lines, are familiar. It must necessarily 
 be a Government laboratory and experimental station for the development of 
 specific naval ideas and a contributor to naval needs. 
 
 At the same time the actual and possible limitations of Its activities must 
 not be lost sight of. It is not intended to rival In investment, equipment, or 
 output great industrial factories or machine shops or do the work legitimately 
 belonging to the navy yards or gun shops. It is primarily intended for a 
 research laboratory, with sufficient ample up-to-date machine-shop facilities 
 to undertake and carry through successfully and rapidly such mechanical work 
 as may properly come within its sphere. 
 
 These functions, not those of great construction, if properly carried out, will 
 give this laboratory a national standing, command the confidence of the Navy 
 Department and Congress, and be a source of inspiration and pride to the 
 professional offifers of the service, most of whom spend at least four years of 
 the formative period of their professional life at Annapolis, and large numbers 
 of whom are constantly on duty there or at the Capitol. 
 
 Frank .T. Spkague. 
 Lawrence Addicks. 
 
 Minority Report. 
 
 I do not agree with the majority of the committee on the selection of 
 Annapolis as a site for the proposed naval laboratory. I believe this would be 
 a very bad .selection if rapidity of construction is to be a dominating feature 
 of the laboratory. I believe the best place for such a laboratory is on the 
 Sandy Hook Peninsula. 
 
 The practical advantages of Sandy Hook are as follows: 
 
 1. Unlimited amount of flat land away from inhabited places, where experi- 
 ments can be made unobserved. 
 
 2. Where there is an ofieratlng proving ground right at hand. 
 
 3. Where, near by, there is a highland nearly 300 feet high. Invaluable for 
 experimenting on certain strategic devices. 
 
 4. Where, on account of the narrow strip of land projecting into the sea, 
 certain experiments and tests can be carried out under more nearly practice 
 conditions than at any other point. 
 
 5. That it is an ideal place for aeroplane work, with both smooth and deep- 
 sea conditions, in view of the long coast and beach line of the State. 
 
 6. That it gives every facility for experiments with and oi)eration of sub- 
 marines. 
 
 7. That no ornamental or expensive buildings need be constructed, as nece.s- 
 sarily there will be no visitors to impress. 
 
 8. That the country around Navesink Highlands is the finest in the State 
 for residence. Jlonmouth County is the richest farming county in New Jersey, 
 and living is cheaper than in almo.st any other part of the State. 
 
 9. That there is ample and rapid transportation facilities for all the men 
 likely to be employed in the laboratory. 
 
APPENDIX. 231 
 
 10. That there are more houses, at very moderate rents, procurable in the 
 13 cities 11 ml towns adjacent to the Hook than at any other point. My investi- 
 gator already reports houses for 500 families can be obtained at very moderate 
 rental close by the Hook and that conditions in that respect are Ideal. 
 
 11. That the laboratory buyer in New York can by telephone procure and 
 ship any supplies to the Hook by the small motor boat owned by the laboratory 
 quicker than at any other site, the distance requiring one hour by this boat 
 and two and a half hours by railway. 
 
 12. That freight from two railways can be taken right to the laboratory on 
 the Government railroad at the Hook, and water-borne freight can be delivered 
 at the dock of the laboratory. 
 
 13. In ordinary manufacturing districts employees are constantly coming 
 and going, the number in most cases amounting to about 60 per cent of the 
 turnover of all employed. Sandy Hook region not being a manufacturing dis- 
 trict, I think the men employed at the laboratory will not be so liable to 
 change. 
 
 14. New York now is, I believe, the largest city in the world. It is the 
 greatest market in this country. In New York nearly every article sold in the 
 United States can be found in stock. In the city and vicinity of New York 
 is the greatest collection of factories in the country making the most diverse 
 articles, and all this vast variety of materials can be instantly placed at the 
 disposal of the laboratory. 
 
 15. A majority of the great industries of the country have a New York 
 office, and most of the higher officials reside there. To these men we can 
 appeal for small supplies urgently needed at once, thus eliminating the usual 
 months' mill delay, and in my opinion we will get them. 
 
 16. Jhere are certain strategic devices which can only be perfected over 
 the ocean itself, especially where many large ocean-going steamers are passing 
 night and day, where haze, fogs, and high winds often prevail, and these 
 necessary conditions are found at Sandy Hook. 
 
 17. The Navy will be certain to have more problems to solve than those set 
 forth in the appropriation bill, and it may also be expected soon that Congress 
 may want the laboratory to construct and test Army devices cooperatively with 
 the Navy: 
 
 This I have taken in consideration in suggesting Sandy Hook. 
 
 As to the character of the laboratory itself, I recommend that it be one that 
 is constructed, arranged, and run as a works for the rapid construction and 
 test of experimental machines and devices ; that it be operated on a war basis, 
 where speed of construction is the dominating motto; that it be operated in 
 three shifts of eight full hours each ; that every machine should be given out 
 to the workmen in parts, one man to a part, to the end that when the part 
 which takes the longest time to make is finished, the whole machine is finished ; 
 that these parts are spread all over the works and then brought together in an 
 assembly shop, v^ere they can be put together by trustworthy men, preserving 
 a secrecy which is practically impossible in the usual shop. 
 
 I do not think that scientific research work to any great extent will be neces- 
 sary. Research work in every branch of science and industry, costing count- 
 less millions of dollars and the labor of multitudes of men of the highest 
 minds, has been carried on for many years. All of this has been recorded, and 
 yet only a ridiculously small percentage has as yet been applied and utilized. 
 It is therefore useless to go on piling up more data at great expense and delay 
 while we are free to use this ocean of facts. 
 
232 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 There will, of course, arise many things that require a special research. 
 Much of this can be done at the proposed laboratory, but in certain branches 
 of science it would be better to use the facilities and the researchers at the 
 other Government bureaus, such as the Bureau of Standards, Bureau of Chem- 
 istry, and many others and also the exceptionally able men \^'ho are the heads 
 of many industrial research laboratories. I do not fear that there would be 
 trouble about secrecy among the latter. 
 
 As to the niunagement of the proposed laboratory, I believe it should be 
 civilian. Also that the civilian Secretary of the Navy should control through 
 an appointed naval officer, preiViably one who has been or now is an industrial 
 manager of a navy yard, and that no naval officers who have their own duties 
 should interfere in any way. I also think that we should proceed to experiment on 
 the special devices mentioned in the appropriation, as well as such other devices 
 as the naval officers sketch out and pass on to the laboratory through the 
 secretary; also any other devices suggested from outside sources which the 
 Secretary of the Navy thinks should be made. 
 
 In concluding this report I want to suggest that it may be well to consider 
 the (H-ectiou of temjiorary buildings, very inexpensive but really as good as more' 
 costly ones, and wliich would last for many years and be fireproof. At any 
 time the site could be changed or permanent buildings erected and any mistake 
 of judgment could be corrected at small expense, and the laboratory would 
 quickly be put in operation. 
 
 I expected to have this minority report ready to be forwarded with the ma- 
 jority report, but I was busy and did not have time to prepare it quickly 
 enough. 
 
 Thomas A. Edison. 
 
 Functions and Okganization of Subcommittees of Executive Committee of 
 National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. 
 
 t Approved by resolution of executive coramlttee, May 20, 1919.] 
 
 The executive committee shall have six subcommittees, to be known as stand- 
 ing committees on (a) aerodynamics; (b) power plants for aircraft; (o) ma- 
 terials for aircraft; (d) personnel, buildings, and equipment; (e) publications 
 and intelligence; (f) governmental relations. 
 
 These standing commiltces may, from time to time, appoint special subcom- 
 mittees with the approval of the executive committee. 
 
 The (unctions and membership of the standing committees shall be as follows : 
 
 AERODYNAMICS. 
 
 Fnnctionn. — The functions and duties of this committee shall be: 
 
 1. To aid in determining the problems relating to the theoretical and experi- 
 mental study of aerodynamics to be experimentally attacked by governmental 
 and private agencies. 
 
 2. To endeavor to coordinate, by counsel and suggestion, the research and 
 experimental work involved in the investigation of such problems. 
 
 3. To act as a medium for the interchange or information regarding aero- 
 dynamic investigations in progress or proposed. 
 
 4. The committee may direct and conduct re.search and experiment in aerody- 
 naiuics in such laboratory or laboratories, either in whole or in part, as may be 
 placed under its direction. 
 
 5. The committee shall meet from time to time on call of the chairman, and 
 report its actions and recommendations to the executive committee. 
 
APPENDIX. 233 
 
 Organization. — Chairman, Dr. John F. Hayford ; vice chairman, Dr. .Joseph 
 S. Ames ; Prof. Charles F. Marvin ; Col. T. H. Bane, U. S. Army ; Lieut. Col. 
 T. E. Clark, U. S. Army ; Dr. A. F. Zahm ; Lieut. Commander J. C. Hunsaker, 
 1J. S. Navy ; Dr L. J. Briggs ; Mr. M. D. Hersey ; Mr. B. P. Warner, secretary. 
 
 POWEB PLANTS FOK AIKCRAJTT. 
 
 Functions. — The functions and duties of this committee shall be: 
 
 1. To aid in determining the problems relating to power plants for aircraft 
 to be experimentally attacked by governmental and private agencies. 
 
 2. To endeavor to coordinate, by counsel and suggestion, the research and 
 experimental work involved in the investigation of such problems. 
 
 3. To act as a medium for the interchange of information regarding aero- 
 nautic power-plant investigations, in progress or proposed. 
 
 -4. The committee may direct and conduct research and experiment on aero- 
 nautic power-plant problems in such laboratory or laboratories, either in whole 
 or in part, as may be placed under its direction. 
 
 5. The committee shall meet from time to time on call of the chairman, and 
 report its actions and recommendations to the executive committee. 
 
 Organization. — Dr. S. W. Stratton, chairman; Mr. L. M. Griffith; Prof. George 
 W. Lewis; Maj. George E. A. Hallett, U. S. Army; Mr. J. G. Vincent; Mr. 
 Harvey N. Davis ; Dr. H. C. Dickinson, acting secretary ; one member to be 
 nominated by the Navy Department. 
 
 MATERIALS FOR AIECKAFT. 
 
 Functions. — The functions and duties of this committee shall be: 
 
 1. To aid in determining the problems relating to materials for aircraft to 
 be experimentally attacked by governmental and private agencies. 
 
 2. To endeavor to coordinate, by counsel and suggestion, the research and 
 experimental work involved in the investigation of such problems. 
 
 3. To act as a medium for the Interchange of information regarding investi- 
 gations of materials for aircraft, in progress or proposed. 
 
 4. The committee may direct and conduct research and experiment on ma- 
 terials for aircraft in such laboratory or laboratories, either in whole or in 
 part, as may be placed under its direction. 
 
 ' 5. The committee shall meet from time to time on call of the chairman, and 
 report Its actions and recommendations to the executive committee. 
 
 Organization. — Dr. S. W. Stratton, chairman; Dr. G. K. Burgess, vice chair- 
 man ; Lieut. Col. H. C. K. Muhlenberg, U. S. Army ; Lieut. Commander J. C. 
 Hunsaker, U. S. Navy ; Mr. H. L. Whittemore, acting secretary. 
 
 PERSONNEL, BUILDINGS, AND EQUIPMENT. 
 
 Functions. — The functions and duties of this committee shall be : 
 
 1. To handle all matters relating to personnel, including the employment, 
 promotion, discharge, and duties of all employees and others assigned to the 
 committee for duty. 
 
 2. To consider questions referred to it and initiate projects concerning the 
 erection or alteration of buildings and the equipment of buildings, offices, and 
 houses, etc. 
 
 3. To meet from time to time on call of the chairman, and report its actions 
 and recommendations to the executive committee. 
 
234 NAVAL CONSTILTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 4. To supervise such construction and equipment work as may be authorlzecl 
 by the executive committee. 
 
 Organization. — Dr. Joseph S. Ames, chairman; Dr. S. W. Stratton, vice 
 chairman ; Prof. Charles P. Marvin ; Mr, J. F. Victory, secretary. 
 
 PUBLICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE. 
 
 Functions. — The functions and duties of this committee shall be : 
 
 1. The collection, classification, and diffusion of useful knowledge on the 
 subject of aeronautics, including the results of research and experimental work 
 done in all parts of the world. 
 
 2. The encouragement of the study of the subject of aeronautics in institutions 
 of learning. 
 
 3. Supervision of the office of aeronautical intelligence. 
 
 4. Supervision of the foreign office in Paris. 
 
 5. The collection and preparation for publication of the annual report and 
 Its appendixes. 
 
 Organization. — Dr. Joseph S. Ames, chairman ; Prof. Charles F. Marvin, 
 vice chairman ; Miss M. M. Muller, secretary. 
 
 GOVERNMENTAL RELATION. 
 
 Functions. — The functions and duties of this committee shall be: 
 
 1. Relations of the committee with executive departments and other branches 
 of the Government. 
 
 2. Governmental relations with civil agencies. 
 
 Organization. — l>r. Charles D. Walcott, chairman; Dr. S. W. Stratton; 
 Mr. J. P. Victory, secretary. 
 
 [Treasury Department, Bureau of War Risk Insurance. Form 26.1 
 
 Form of Certificate for Collectors of Cistojis Relating to the Invisiiulity 
 OF Vessels Navigating Through the War Zone. 
 
 Date 
 
 This is to certify that S i 
 
 now at this port, bound for 
 
 (o) Has been satisfactorily painted in accordance with the scheme furnished 
 
 by the Bureau. 
 
 (6) Has a supply of tons of anthracite coal in bunkers, 
 
 which I consider sufficient for two daylight runs ; 
 Or- 
 is fitted with an improved system of smoke prevention, 
 (c) Is equipped with one dozen approved smoke boxes which will evolve 
 
 smoke when thrown overboard. 
 
 [Treasury Department, Bureau of War Rink Insurance. Form 29.1 
 
 , 191__ 
 
 This is to certify that S. S 
 
 owned by 
 
 has been painted in accordance with a system for low visibility sul)mitted by 
 
 and approved 
 
 by the Chairman of the Naval Consulting Board, 11 Broadway, New York City. 
 
 (Shipowner.) 
 Painting completed, , 191 — 
 
APPENDIX. 235 
 
 List of Those Invited to Attend Submakine Defense Confeeence. 
 
 Rear Admiral W. S. Sims, TT. S. Navy, president Naval War College, com- 
 mander Narragansett Bay Naval Station. 
 
 Capt. W. S. Smith, TJ. S. Navy, special duty. Navy Department, in connection 
 with Naval Consulting Board and Inventions. 
 
 Commander J. K. Robison, U. S. Navy, inspector of ordnance, torpedo station, 
 Newport, R. I. 
 
 Commander Xates Stirling, jr., U. S. Navy, commanding submarine base. New 
 London, Conn. 
 
 Lieut. Commander G. W. S. Castle, U. S. Navy, Bureau of Steam Engineering, 
 Navy Department, Electrical Division. 
 
 Naval Constructor K S. Land, U. S. Navy, Bureau of Construction and Repair, 
 Navy Department, Electrical Division. 
 
 Mr. E. O'C. Acker, Bethlehem Steel Co., South Bethlehem, Pa. 
 
 Prof. P. W. Bridgman, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 
 
 Mr. A. P. Brush, General Motors Co., Detroit, Mich. 
 
 Prof. W. H. Burr, Columbia University, New York City. 
 
 Mr. Louis S. Clarke, vice president Auto Car Co., Ardmore, Pa. 
 
 Mr. G. Herbert Condict, electricial engineer, Plainfleld, N. J. 
 
 Dr. F. G. Cottrell, chief physicist. Bureau of Mines, Washington, D. C. 
 
 Mr. G. C. Davison, Electric Boat Co., New London, Conn. 
 
 Mr. Francis I. du Pont, Wilmington, Del. 
 
 Mr. Reginald A. Fessenden, Submarine Signal Co., poston, Mass. 
 
 Mr. Henry W. Fisher, chief engineer. Standard Underground Cable Co., Perth 
 Amboy, N. J. 
 
 Mr. Hannibal C. Ford, Ford Instrument Co., New York City. 
 
 Mr. James R. Freeman, consulting engineer. Providence, R. I. 
 
 Mr. C. F. Kettering, Dayton Electrical Laboratories, Dayton, Ohio. 
 
 Mr. Albert Kingsbury, mechanical engineer, Pittsburgh, Pa. 
 
 Mr. S. M. Kintner, general manager. National Electric Signaling Co., Pitts- 
 burgh, Pa. 
 
 Dr. Irving Langmuir, Research Laboratory, General Electric Co., Schnec- 
 tady, N. Y. 
 
 Mr. Frank Leavitt, E. W. Bliss Co., Brooklyn, N. Y. 
 
 Dr. A. R. Ledoux, consulting engineer, 99 John Street, New York City. 
 
 Mr. Lamar Lyndon, consulting engineer, 30 Church Street, New York City. 
 
 Mr. Ralph D. Mershon, consulting engineer, 80 Maiden Lane, New York City. 
 
 Prof. A. A. Mickelson, University of Chicago, Chicago, 111. 
 
 Prof. R. A. Milllkan, University of Chicago, Chicago, 111. 
 
 Prof. Edwin F. Northrup, Princeton University, Princeton, N. J. 
 
 Prof. G. W. Pierce, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 
 
 Mr. R. H. M. Robinson, managing director. Lake Torpedo Boat Co., Bridgeport, 
 Conn. 
 
 Prof. C. F. Scott, Yale University, New Haven, Conn. 
 
 Mr. Buckner Speed, Research Laboratory, Western Electric Co., New York City. 
 
 Mr. Joseph A. Steinmetz, .Tanney & Steinmetz, Philadelphia, Pa. 
 
 Prof. Harold B. Smith, Worcester Institute of Technology, Worcester, Mass. 
 
 Mr. Henry R. Sutphen, vice president Submarine Boat Corporation, New York 
 City. 
 
 Mr. Percy H. Thomas, consulting engineer, 2 Rector Street, New York City. 
 
 Dr. Blihu Thompson, consulting engineer. General Electric Co., Swampscott, 
 Mass. 
 
236 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 Jlr. R. B. Williamson, electrical engineer, Allis Chalmers Co., Milwaukee, Wis. 
 Prof. R. W. Wood, Johns Hopkins Universit.v, Baltimore, Md. 
 
 NAVAL CONSULTING BOAKD. 
 
 Lawrence Addicks, consulting engineer, 126 Liberty Street, New York City. 
 
 Bion J. Arnold, consulting engineer, Chicago, 111. 
 
 Dr. L. H. Baekeland, research chemist, Yonkers, N. Y. 
 
 Howard E. Coffin, vice president, Hudson Motor Car Co., Detroit, Mich. 
 
 Aired Craven, consulting engineer. Public Service Commission, New York City. 
 
 Thomas A. Edison, Orange, N. J. 
 
 W. L. R. Bmmett, mechanical engineer. General Electric Co., Schenectady, N. Y. 
 
 Peter Cooper Hewitt, Madison Square Garden Tower, New York City. 
 
 A. M. Hunt, consulting engineer, 55 Liberty Street, New York City. 
 Dr. M. R. Hutchinson, Edison Laboratories, Orange, N. J. 
 
 B. G. Lamme, chief engineer, Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co., East 
 Pittsburgh, Pa. 
 
 Hudson Maxim, 698 Saint Marks Avenue, Brooklyn, N. Y. 
 Spencer Miller, Lidgerwood Manufacturing Co., New York City. 
 Prof. J. W. Richards, Lehigh University, South Bethlehem, Pa. 
 
 A. L. Riker, vice president Locomobile Co. of America, Bridgeport, Conn. 
 Thomas Robins, president, Robins Conveying Belt Co., New York City. 
 
 W. L. Saunders, chairman of the board, Ingersoll-Rand Co., New York City. 
 M. B. Sellars, 801 North Arlington Avenue, Baltimore, Md. 
 
 E. A. Sperry, Sperry Gyroscope Co., Brooklyn, N. Y. 
 
 F. J. Sprague, consulting engineer, 165 Broadway, New York City. 
 
 B. B. Thayer, vice president, Anaconda Copper Mining Co., New York City. 
 Prof. A. G. Webster, Clark University, Worcester, Mass. 
 
 Dr. W. R. Whitney, directory Research Laboratory, General Electric Co., 
 
 Schenectady, N. Y. 
 Dr. R. S. Woodward, president Carnegie Institution, Washington, D. C. 
 
 State directors of the organization for industrial preparedness and, associate 
 members of the Naval Consulting Board of the United States appointed from 
 the American Society of Civil Engineers, the American Institute of Mininff 
 Engineers, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, the American, 
 Institute of Electrical Engineers, the American Chemical Society. 
 
 Alabama : 
 
 A. S. C. E. — J. S. Sewell, Gantt's Quarry ; vice president and general manager 
 Alabama Marble Co. 
 
 A. I. M. B. — Priestly Toulmin, 1508 American Trust Building, Birmingham; president 
 Lehigh Coal Co. 
 
 A. S. M. E. — F. H. Crockard, 1524 Brown-JIarx Building, Birmingham ; vice president 
 Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. 
 
 A. I. E. E. — Theo. Swann, Birmingham ; sales manager Alabama Tower Co. 
 
 A. C. S. — B. B. Ross, Auburn ; professor of chemistry, Alabama Polytechnic Institute. 
 Alaska r 
 
 A. S. C. E. — R. John Wulzen, Thane ; Alaska Gold Mines Co. 
 
 A. I. M. R.— Philip R. Bradley, Treadwell ; Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co. 
 
 A. S. M. E. — George A. Diamond, Nome ; manager Scheld & Co. 
 
 A. I. E. E. — Eouis E. McCoy, box 63, Juneau. 
 
 A. C. S. — W. P. Lass, Juneau. 
 Arizona : 
 
 A. S. C. E. — J. R. Girand, Central Building, Phoenix ; city engineer. 
 
 A. I. M. E. — John C. Greenway, Warren ; general manager Calumet & Arizona 
 Mining Co. 
 
 A. S. M. B. — A. G, McGregor, Warren ; Calumet & Arizona Mining Co. 
 
APPENDIX. 237 
 
 Arizona — Continued. 
 
 A. I. E. E. — David W Jones, post-office box 716, Clifton ; chief electrician Arizona 
 Copper Co. (Ltd.). 
 
 A. C. S. — Franl£ N. Guild, room 19, Science Hall, University of Arizona, Tucson ; 
 professor of chemistry and minerology. 
 Arkansas : 
 
 A. S. C. E. — Charles H. Miller, 621 Southern Trust Building, Little RoclJ ; president 
 Miller Engineering Co. 
 
 A. I. M. E. — J. E. Fordyce, Little Rock ; president Thomas Fordyce Manufacturing Co. 
 
 A. S. M. E. — B. N. Wilson, Fayetteville ; professor of mechanical engineering. Uni- 
 versity of Arkansas. 
 
 A. I. E. E. — W. N. Gladson, Fayetteville ; dean of college of engineering. University 
 of Arkansas. 
 
 A. C. S. — J. B. Eather, Fayetteville; agricultural experiment station, professor of 
 agricultural chemistry. 
 California : 
 
 A. S. C. E.. — Wynn Meredith, 909 Nevada Bank Building, San Francisco ; Sanderson 
 & Porter. 
 
 A. I. M. E. — G. W. Dickie, 24 California Street, San Francisco. 
 
 A. S. M. E. — C. W. Merrill, 121 Second Street, San Francisco ; Merrill Metallurgical 
 Co. 
 
 A. I. E. B. — A. H. Babeock, room 1044 Flood Building, San Francisco ; Southern 
 Pacific Power Co. 
 
 A. C. S.. — Edmund O'Neill, Berkeley ; professor of chemistry. University of California. 
 Colorado : 
 
 A. S. C. B. — H. S. Crocker, 308 Trarnvray Building, Denver. 
 
 A. I. M. E. — D. W. Brunton, 730 Symes Building, Denver. 
 
 A. S. M. E. — T. B. Stearns, 1720 California Street, Denver. 
 
 A. C. S. — K. B. Moore, 502 Foster Building, Denver ; United States Bureau of Mines. 
 Connecticut : 
 
 A. S. C. B. — H. R. Buck, 60 Prospect Street, Hartford; Ford, Buck & Sheldon (Inc.). 
 
 A. I. M. E. — Ell Whitney, 100 Crown Street, New Haven ; president N. & N. H. 
 Trust Co. 
 
 A. S. M. E. — H. B. Sargent, New Haven ; vice president Sargent & Co. 
 
 A. I. E. E. — Samuel Ferguson, 266 Pearl Street, Hartford ; vice president Hartford 
 Electric Light Co. 
 
 A. C. S. — E. W. Morley, 8 Westland Avenue, West Hartford. 
 Delaware : 
 
 A. S. C. B..:^Andrew Bryson, New Castle. 
 
 A. I. M. E. — Thomas Coleman du Pont, 120 Broadway, New York City. 
 
 A. S. M. E. — E. W. Smith, Wilmington ; vice president Hilles & Jones Co. 
 
 A. I. E. E. — W. C. Spruance, jr., room 760 du Pont Building, Wilmington ; E. I. 
 du Pont de Nemours & Co. 
 
 A. C. S. — Charles L. Reese, 878 du Pont Building, Wilmington ; E. I. Du Pont de 
 Nemours & Co. 
 District of Columbia : 
 
 A. S. C. E. — C. B. Hunt, District Building, Washington ; engineer of highways. 
 
 A. I. M. E. — Hennen Jennings, 2221 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington. 
 
 A. S. M. E. — Dr. W. S. Stratton, Washington; Director Buroau of Standards. 
 
 A. I. E. E. — John H. Finney, 509 Metropolitan Bank Building, Washington ; seuthern 
 manager Aluminum Co. of America. 
 
 A. C. S. — Charles L. Parsons, box 505, Washington ; United States Bureau of Mines. 
 Florida : 
 
 A. S. C. E. — Louis R. McLain, Drawer 25, St. Augustine. 
 
 A. I. M. E. — Robert N. Dickman, 170 Bay Street, St. Augustine. 
 
 A. S. M. E. — E. E. Chandler, Gainesville ; professor of mechanical engineering, Uni- 
 versity of Florida. 
 
 A. I. B. B. — C. S. Hammatt, 20 Ocean Street, Jacksonville ; president Consolidated 
 Engineering Co. 
 
 A. C. S. — E. E. Flint, Gainesville ; professor of chemistry, University of Florida. 
 Georgia ; 
 
 A. S. C. E. — G. E. Solomon, 1622 Chandler Building, Atlanta ; Solomon-Norcross Co. 
 
 A. I. M. E. — S. W. McCallie, State Geological Survey, Atlanta ; State geologist. 
 
 A. S. M. E. — Oscar Elsas, Atlanta ; president Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills. 
 
 A. I. E. E. — A. M. Schoen, Trust Co. of Georgia Building, Atlanta ; S. E. Under- 
 writers' Association. 
 
 ^ C. S. — F. N. Smalley, Savannah; chief chemist. Southern Cotton Oil Co. 
 
■238 NAVAL CONStlLTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 Idaho : 
 
 A. S. C. E. — M. S. Parker, St. Maries. 
 
 A. I. M. E. — Stanley A. Baston, Kellogg. 
 
 A. S. M. E. — Geo. F. Waddell, Squirrel], Fremont County. 
 
 A. I. E. E. — O. G. F. Markhus, 701 Bannock Street, Boise ; general superintendent 
 
 Electric Investment Co. 
 A. C. S. — J. Shirley Jones, Moscow ; director of experiment stations and chemist, 
 
 University of Idaho. 
 Illinois : 
 
 A. S. C. B. — R. W. Hunt, 2200 Insurance Building, Chicago. 
 
 A. I. M. B. — Frederick K. Copeland, 122 South Michigan Avenue, Chicago ; president 
 
 Sullivan Machinery Co. 
 A. S. M. E. — Dr. W. F. M. Goss, Urbana ; dean college of engineering, University of 
 
 Illinois. 
 A. I. B. B. — P. Junkersteld, 72 West Adams Street, Chicago ; Commonwealth Edi- 
 son Co. 
 A. C. S. — William Hoskins, Room 2009, 111 West Monroe Street, Chicago ; Mariner 
 
 & Hoskins. 
 Indiana : 
 
 A. S. C. E. — Wm. K. Hatt, Lafayette ; professor of civil engineering, Purdue Dniversity. 
 A. I. M. E. — Geo. P. Ilulst, One hundred and flfty-flrst Street and McCook Avenue, 
 
 East Chicago ; International Lead Refining Co. 
 A. S. M. E. Geo. O. Rockwood, 1801 English Avenue, Indianapolis ; president Rock- 
 wood Manufacturing Co. 
 A. I. B. E. — F. S. Hunting, Fort Wayne; vice president and general manager Fort 
 
 Wayne Works of General Electric Co, 
 A. C. S. — U. E. Barnard, Statehouse, Indianapolis ; State food and drug inspector, 
 
 commissioner weights and measures. 
 Iowa : 
 
 A. S. C. E. — Geo. H. Boynton, German-American Savings Bank Building, Muscatine ; 
 
 president Northern Gravel Co. 
 A. I. M. E. — B. A. Sayre, 201 Seventh Street, Des Moines ; general manager Eagle 
 
 Coal & Mining Co. 
 A. S. M. E. — S. M. Woodward, Iowa City ; professor of mechanics. State University of 
 
 Iowa. 
 A. I. B. B. — Norman T. Wilcox, Keokuk ; sales manager Mississippi River Power Co. 
 A. C. S. — W. F. Coover, Ames ; chairman department of chemistry, Iowa State College. 
 Kansas : 
 
 A. S. C. E. — D. H. Whitmer, P. O. Box 233, Pittsburg ; president and general 
 
 manager Whitmer Contracting Co. 
 A. I. M. E. — T. B. Gearhart, lola ; metallurgist. Prime Western Spelter Co. 
 A. S. M. E. — A. A. Potter, Manhattan ; dean division of engineering, Kansas State 
 
 Agricultural College. 
 A. I. E. E. — Geo. C. Shaad, Lawrence ; professor of electrical engineering. University 
 
 of Kansas. 
 A. C. S. — W. A. Whitaker, Lawrence ; associate professor of metallurgy and division 
 
 State chemical research, University of Kansas. 
 Kentucky : 
 
 A. S. C. E. — Richard Montfort, Louisville ; Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. 
 
 A." I. M. E. — Frank D. Rash, Barlington ; vice president and general manager St. 
 
 Bernard Mining Co. 
 A. S. M. E. — W. S. Speed, 325 West Main Street, Louisville; president Louisville 
 
 Cement Co. 
 A. I. E. B. — Carl P. Nachod, 4777 Louisville Avenue, Louisville ; president NachM 
 
 Signal Co. 
 A. C. S. — A. M. Breckler, 503 Kentucky Title Building, Louisville ; Janes & Breck'er. 
 Xouisiana : 
 
 A. S. C. E. — Arsene Perrilliat, 822 Hibernia Building, New Orleans; M. B, Hercules 
 
 Co. (Ltd.). 
 A. I. M. B. — John B. Hawley, Shreveport. 
 A. S. M. E. — A. M. Lockett, 533 Baronne Street, New Orleans ; president A. M. 
 
 Lockett Co. (Ltd.). 
 A. I. E. E. — M. S. Sloan, 201 Baronne Street, New Orleans ; general manager New 
 
 Orleans Railway & Light Co. 
 A. C. S. — W. L. Howell, Room 314, United Slates customhouse, New Urleaus ; chemist 
 
 in charge. Appraiser's Laboratory, 
 
APPENDIX. 239 
 
 Maine : 
 
 A. S. C. B. — H. C. Jordan, 31 J Exchange Street, Portland; temporary. 
 
 A. I. M. E. — R. H. Richards, Boston, Mass. ; professor of mining engineering, Massa- 
 
 chuetts Institute of Technology. 
 A. S. M. E. — J. S. Hyde, Bath ; president Bath Iron Works. 
 A. I. E. B, — W. S. Wyman, Augusta ; treasurer and general manager Central Maine 
 
 Power Co. 
 A. C. S. — Martin L. Griffln, Eumford Falls. 
 
 Maryland : 
 
 A. S. C. E. — H. D. Bush, Box 1152, Baltimore ; general superintendent, Baltimore 
 warehouse Carnegie Steel Co. 
 
 A. I. M. B. — W. H. Peirce, Highlandtown. Baltimore ; vice president and general 
 manager, Baltimore Copper Smelting & Rolling Co. 
 
 A. S. M. E. — C. C. Thomas, Baltimore ; prollessor of mining engineering, Johns Hop- 
 kins University. 
 
 A. I. B. B. — J. B. Whitehead, Baltimore ; professor of electrical engineering, Johns 
 Hopkins University. 
 
 A. C. S. — W. B. D. Pennlman, 215 East Payette Street, Baltimore ; Penniman & 
 Browne. 
 
 Massachusetts : 
 
 A. S. C. E. — Fayette S. Curtis, 421 South Terminal Station, Boston ; president Old 
 
 Colony Railroad Co. 
 A. I. M. E. — W. E. C. Bustis, 131 State Street, Boston. 
 
 A. S. M. B. — Ira N. Hollis, Worcester, president, Worcester Polytechnic Institute. 
 A. I. B. E. — C. L. Edgar, 70 State Street, Boston ; president and general manager, 
 
 Bdisou Electric Illuminating Co. of Boston. 
 A. C. S. — A. D. Little, 93 Broad Street, Boston; president, A. D. Little (Inc.). 
 
 Michigan : 
 
 A. S. C. E. — G. S. Williams, CornweU Building, Ann Arbor. 
 
 A. I. M. E. — M. M. Duncan, Ishpeming ; general manager, Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co. 
 
 A. S. M. B. — Alex Dow, 18 Washington Avenue, Detroit ; President and general 
 
 manager, Detroit Edison Co. 
 A. I. E. E. — H. H. Crowwell, Grand Rapids ; president, Michigan Railway Co. 
 A. C. S. — H. T. Graber, Detroit ; chief chemist. Digestive Ferments Co. 
 
 Minnesota : 
 
 A. S. C. E. — Wm. L. Darling, Railroad Building, St. Paul ; chief engineer. Northern 
 Pacific Railway Co. 
 
 A. I. M. E. — H. V. Winchell, 826 First National-Soo Building, Minneapolis. 
 
 A. S. M. E. — J. J. Flather, Minneapolis ; professor of mechanical engineering, Uni- 
 versity of Minnesota. 
 
 A. I. E. B. Wm. N. Ryerson, Duluth ; general manager. Great Northern Power Co. 
 
 A. C. S. — G. B. Frankforter, Minneapolis ; professor of chemistry, dean school of 
 chemistry. University of Minnesota. 
 
 MissifKippi : 
 
 A. S. C. B. — M. L. Lynch, 425 Hamilton Avenue, Jackson. 
 
 A. I. M. E. — No resident member. 
 
 A. S. M. B. — E. C. Carpenter, Agricultural College ; professor of mechanical en- 
 gineering. 
 
 A. I. E. B. — J. T. Robertson, 503 First National Bank Building, Vicksburg ; secre- 
 tary, Mississippi Inspection & Advisory Eating Co. 
 
 A. C. S. — Wm. F. Hand, Agricultural College ; professor, chemistry, Mississippi 
 Agricultural Mechanical College. 
 
 Missouri : 
 
 A. S. C. B. — Daniel Bontecou, 502 Dwight Building, Kansas City. 
 
 A. I. M. E. — P. N. Moore, 611 Merchants-Laclede Building, St. Louis. 
 
 A. S. M. E. — B. Flad, DeMenil Building, St. Louis. 
 
 A. I. E. E. — Chas. S. Eutfner, 412 Star Building, St. Louis ; president, Mississippi 
 
 Elver Power Distributing Co. et al. 
 A. C. S. — L. F. Nlckell, St. Louis ; assistant professor chemistry, Washington Uni- 
 versity. 
 
 168537°— 20 16 
 
240 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 Montana : 
 
 A. S. C. E. — Eugene Carroll, Butte ; vice president and general manager, Butte 
 Water Co. 
 
 A. I. M. E. — J. L. Bruce, Box 170S, Butte ; manager, Butte & Superior Copper Co. 
 
 A. S. M. E. C. V. Nordberg, 30.5 Electrical Building, Butte ; Nordberg Manufactur- 
 ing Co. 
 
 A. I. E. E. — M. H. Gerry, jr., Helena ; president, Engineering Corporation. 
 
 Nebraska : 
 
 A. S. C. E. Elliot Holbrook, 1011 Union Pacific Building, Omaha ; Soutbern 
 
 Pacific Co. 
 A. I. M. E. Walter T. Page, Omaba ; manager, Omaba plant, American Smelting 
 
 & Refining Co. 
 A. S. M. B. — Wm. E. McKeen, 1222 Webster Avenue, Omaba ; president, McKeen 
 
 Motor Car Co. 
 A. I. B. B. — H. A. Holdredge, Omaba ; general manager, Omaha Electric Light & 
 
 Power Co. 
 A. C. S. — C. P. Crowley, Fourteenth and Davenport Streets, Omaba ; professor of 
 
 chemistry, Creighton University. 
 Nevada : 
 
 A. S. C. B. — W. T. Gould, Reno ; Nevada-California-Oregon Railway. 
 
 A. I. M. B. — W. E. Trent, Reno ; Trent Engineering Co. 
 
 A. S. M. E. — James G. Scrugham, Reno ; dean, engineering college. University of 
 
 Nevada. 
 A. I. B. B. — W. K. Preudenberger, Box 263, Carson City, chief engineer, public 
 
 service and railroad commissioners of Nevada. 
 A. C. S. — Maxwell Adams, Reno ; professor of chemistry. University of Nevada. 
 New Hampshire : 
 
 A. S. C. E. — Robert Fletcher, Hanover ; director and professor of engineering, 
 
 Thaylor School of Engineering. 
 A. I. M. E. — I-I. R. Batcheller, Box 21 Washington. 
 
 A. S. M. E. — Thomas W. Fry, Claremont ; secretary Sullivan Machinery Co. 
 A. I. B. E. — J. Brodie Smith, 46 Hanover Street, Manchester ; vice president and 
 
 general manager Manchester Traction Light & Power Co. 
 A. C. S. — Hugh K. Moore, Berlin ; chief chemist research laboratory, Berlin Mills Co. 
 
 New Jersey : 
 
 A. S. C. E. — Morris B. Shei'rerd, City Hall, Newark ; chief engineer Department I'ublic 
 
 Works. 
 A. I. M. E. — B. F. Cresson, Jr., 75 Montgomery street, Jersey City ; chief engineer 
 
 New Jersey State Board Commerce and Navigation. 
 A. S. M. B.— H. L. Gantt, 2905 Singer Building, New York City. 
 A. I. E. B. — Farley Osgood, 759 Broad Street, Newark ; assistant general manager 
 
 Public Service Electric Co. 
 A. C. S. — H. S. Miner, Gloucester ; chief chemist Welsbach Light Co., near Camden. 
 
 New Mexico : 
 
 A. S. C. E. — O. H. B. Turner, Raton ; chief engineer St. Louis, Rocky Mountain & 
 Pacific Co. 
 
 A. I. M. B. — Stephen O. Androi, Room 5, First National Bank Building, Albuquerque. 
 
 A. S. M. E. — L. J. Charles, Elephant Butte ; civil engineer. United States Reclama- 
 tion Service. 
 
 A. I. E. E. — J. L. Brenneman, Albuquerque ; professor physical and electrical engi- 
 neering. University of New Mexico. 
 
 A. C. S. — John D. Clark, Albuquerque ; prof^sor chemistry. University of New 
 Mexico. 
 
 New York : 
 
 W. M. Rose, secretary, 43 Exchange Place, New York. 
 
 A. S. C. E. — James G. White, 43 Hxchange Place, New York City ; president 
 
 J. G. White & Co. 
 A. I. M. B. — Cbas. F. Rand, 71 Broadway, New York City ; Spanish-American Iron Co. 
 A. S. M. B. — W. H. Marshall, 30 Church Street, New York City ; president American 
 
 Locomotive Co. 
 A. I. B. E. — Wm. McClellan, 141 Broadway, New York. 
 A. C. S. — T. B. Wagner, 17 Battery Place, New York City ; manager Corn Products 
 
 Refining Co. 
 
APPENDIX. 241 
 
 North Carolina : 
 
 A. S. C. E. — J. L. Luaiow, Board of Trade Building, Winston-Salem ; consulting, 
 municipal, sanitary, and hydraulic engineer. 
 
 A. I. M. E. — Joseph H. Pratt, Chapel Hill ; State geologist. 
 
 A. S. M. E. — Wm. S. Lee, Mercantile Building, Charlotte; vice president and chief 
 engineer Southern Power Co. 
 
 A. I. E. B. Chas. I. Burkholder, Mercantile Building, Charlotte ; general manager 
 Southern Power Co. 
 
 A. C. S. — P. P. Venable, Chapel Hill ; professor of chemistry, University of North 
 Carolina. 
 North Dakota : 
 
 A. S. 0. E. — T. E. Atkinson, City Hall, Bismarck ; city engineer. 
 
 A. 1. M. E. — Dean E J. Babcock, University of North Dakota ; Grand Forks. 
 
 A. S. M. B. — Calvin H. Crouch, 513 South Sixth Street, Grand Porks ; dean college 
 of m'?chanieal and electrical engineering. University of North Dakota. 
 
 A. I. te. B. — John F. Stevens, Box 1242, University ; assistant professor of electric 
 engineering. University of North Dakota. 
 
 A. C. S. — Edwin F. Ladd, Fargo ; president North Dakota Agriculture Colloge. 
 Ohio : 
 
 A. S. C. E. — Chester W. Larner, 7000 Central Avenue, Cleveland ; hydrographic engi- 
 neer Wellman-Seaver-Morgan Co. 
 
 A. I. M. E. — Chas. S. Robinson, Toungstown ; second vice president Youngstown 
 Sheet & Tube Co. 
 
 A. S. M. B. — Frank A. Scott, 5701 Carnegie Avenue, Cleveland ; vice president The 
 Warner & Swasey Co. 
 
 A. I. E. B. — Samuel G. McMeen, 1003 Huntington Bank Building, Columbus ; presi- 
 dent Ohio State Telephone Co. 
 
 A. C. S. — James R. Withrow, Columbus ; professor of industrial chemistry, Oliio 
 State University. 
 Oklahoma : 
 
 A. S. C. E. — H. V. Hinckley, 1018 North Harvey Street, Oklahoma City. 
 
 A. I. M. E. — M. M. Valerius, 319 Clinton Building, Tulsa ; Valerius, McNutt & 
 Hughes. 
 
 A. S. M. E. — J. P. Fisher, Bartleville. 
 
 A. I. B. E. — H. V. Bozell, Norman ; director school of electrical engineering. 
 University of Oklahoma. 
 
 A. C. S. — Edwin DeBarr, Norman ; professor of chemistry. University of Oklahoma. 
 Oregon : 
 
 A. S. C. B. — Geo. C. Mason, Worcester Building, Portland ; vice president Hurley- 
 Mason Co. 
 
 A. 1. M. B. — A. M. Swartley, Corvallis ; bureau of mines and geology. 
 
 A. S. M. B. — Bert C. Ball, Portland ; president and manager Willamette Iron & 
 Steel Works. 
 
 A. I. B._E. — O. B. Coldwell, 602 Electric Building, Portland; general superintendent 
 Portland Railway Light & Power Co. 
 
 A. C. S. — O. F. Stafford, Eugene ; professor of chemistry and director chemical 
 laboratories. University of Oregon. 
 Pennsylvania : 
 
 A. S. C. E. — George S. Davison, Frick Annex Building, Pittsburgh ; president Gulf 
 Refining Co. 
 
 A. I. M. E — Vance C. McCormick, Bergner Building, Harrlsburg ; publisher, trustee 
 for estates, etc. 
 
 A. S. M. E. — Julian Kennedy, 1217 Bessemer Building, Pittsburgh. 
 
 A. I. B. E. — Paul Spencer, 1401 Arch Street, Philadelphia ; electrical engineer, United 
 Gas & Improvement Co. 
 
 A. C. S. — R. F. Bacon, Pittsburgh ; director Mellon institute of industrial research. 
 University of Pittsburgh. 
 Shode Island : 
 
 A. I. M. E. — Walter M. Saunders, 184 Whittier Avenue, Providence ; Saunders & 
 Franklin. 
 
 A. S. M. E. — Henry D. Sharpe, Providence ; treasurer Brown & Sharpe Manufac- 
 turing Co. 
 
 A. I. E. E. — L. W. Downes, Providence ; vice president and general manager D. & W. 
 Fuse Co. 
 
 A. C. S. — J. E. Bucher, Providence ; professor of chemistry, Brown University. 
 
242 NAVAL CONSULTING BOAKD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 South Carolina : 
 
 A. S. C. E. — Joliii lIcNoal, City ITall, Columbia ; city engineer. 
 
 A. I. M. B. — H. L. Sciiite, Clinton ; moved to rennsylvaiiia ; lawyer and manager of 
 
 mining companies. 
 A. S. il. U. — .T. L. Coker, jr.. Hartsville ; vice president Carolina Fiber Co. 
 
 A. I. B. E. W. JI, Riggs, Clemson College ; president Clemson Agricultural College. 
 
 A. C. S. — R. N. Brackett, Clemson College ; director of chemistry department, Clemson 
 
 Agricultural College. 
 South Dakota : 
 
 A. S. C. E. Bruce C. Yates, 113 Durango Street, Lead ; assistant superintendent 
 
 Homestake Mining Co. 
 A. I. M. B. — Allan J. Clark, Lead ; metallurgist, Homestake Mining Co. 
 A. S. M. E. — M. W. Davidson, Vermillion ; professor of mining engineering. University 
 
 of South Dakota. 
 A. I. E. E. — B. B. Brackett, Brookings ; professor of electrical engineering. South 
 
 Dakota State College. 
 A. C. S. — William J. Sharwood, Lead ; metallurgy and chemistry, Homestake Mining 
 
 Co. 
 Tennessee : 
 
 A. S. C. E. — William W. Carson, 1705 Clinch Avenue, Knoxville ; professor of 
 
 chemical engineering, T'niversity of Tennessee. 
 A. I. M. E. — A. A. Blow, Holston Bank Building, Knoxville ; pri'.sldent Carolina 
 
 Copper Co. 
 A. S. M. E. — Newell Sander.'!, Chattanooga ; Newell Sanders now Co. 
 A. I. Jl. B. — F. G. Proutt, Memphis. 
 A. C. S. — W. H. Hollinshead, Vaudcrbilt University, Nashville. 
 
 Texas : , 
 
 A. S. C. B. — John B. Hawley, F. & M. Bank Building, Fort Worth. 
 
 A. 1. M. E. — Arthur J. McQuatters, Mills Building, El I'aso ; Wells-Fargo Express. 
 
 A. S. M. E. — W. B. Tuttle, 30.5 East Houston Street, San Antonio ; vice president 
 San Antonio Traction Co. and San Antonio Gas & Electric Co. 
 
 A. I. E. E. — Fred A. .Tones, Sumpter Building, Itallas. 
 
 A. C. S. — George W. Gray, Houston ; chairman manufacturing committee. The Texas 
 Co. 
 Utah: 
 
 A. S. C. E. — A. F. Parker, 2482 Washington Avenue, Ogden. 
 
 A. I. M. E. — Lafayette llnnchelt. National Copper Bank, Salt Lake City : director 
 National Copper Bank and Bankers' Trust Co. 
 
 A. S. M. E. — William Wraith, 618 Kcarns Building, Salt Lake City ; general manager 
 International Smelting Co. 
 
 A. I. E. E. — Markham Cheever, 523 Kearns Building, Salt Lake City; chief engineer, 
 Utah Power cSc Light Co. 
 
 A. C. S. — William C. Ebaugh, 809 Kearns Building, Salt Lake City ; United States 
 Smelting Co. 
 Vermont : 
 
 A. I. M. E. — C. B. Hollls, Randolph ; general superintendent Eastern Talc Co. 
 
 A. S. M. E. — J. Hartness, Spriiigfleld ; president .Jones & Lamson Machine Co. 
 
 A. I. E. B. — B. T. Burt, Rutland ; vice president and general manager Rutland Rail- 
 way, Light & Power Co. 
 
 A. C. S. — G. H. Burrows, Burlington ; professor of chemistry. University of Vermont. 
 Virginia : 
 
 A. S. C. E. — B. T. D. Myers, Jr., 1201 Mutual Building, Richmond ; director Com- 
 monwealth Coal Corporation. 
 
 A. I. M. B. Frank U. Humbert, Low Moor; manager mines. Low Moor Mining Co. 
 
 A. S. M. E. — W. D. Mount, Saltville ; general manager Mathieson Alkali Works. 
 
 A. I. B. B. — Walter S. Rodman, University ; professor electrical engineering. Uni- 
 versity of Virginia. 
 
 A. C. S. — Frank B. Carpenter, 11 South Twelfth Street, Richmond ; chief chemist 
 Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. 
 Washington : 
 
 A. S. C. E. — A. 0. Powell, 404 Central Building, Seattle. 
 
 A. I. M. B. — .7. C. Ralston, 2421 West Mis.iion Avenue, Spokane ; vice presideUv 
 Pacific Coa.st Pipe Co. 
 
 A. S. M. E. — James V. Paterson, 1025 Boylston Avenue north, Seattle. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 243 
 
 Washington — Continued. 
 
 A. I. B. B. — John Harisberger, Blectrie Bldg., Seventh and Olive Streets, Seattle; 
 general superintendent light and power department, Puget Sound Traction, Light 
 & Power Co. 
 
 A. C. S. — H. K. Benson, Seattle ; professor of industrial chemistry, director bureau 
 industrial research, University of Washington. 
 West Virginia : 
 
 A. S. C. E. — A. M. Scott, Charleston. 
 
 A. I. M. B. — I. C. White, 141 Willpy Street, Morgantown ; State geologist. 
 
 A. S. M. B. — Charles B. Ward, Box G47, Charleston ; president Charles Ward Engi- 
 neering Woriis. 
 
 A. I. B. E. — H. S. Sands, 47 Eleventh Street, Wheeling ; president H. S. Sands Electric 
 & Manufacturing Co. 
 
 A. C. S. — A. E. Whitehill, Morgantown ; professor of chemistry. West Virginia Uni- 
 versity. 
 Wisconsin : 
 
 A. S. C. B. — D. W. Mead, 530 State Street, Madison ; professor hydraulic engineer- 
 ing, University of Wisconsin. 
 
 A. I. M. B. — F. W. O'Neill, Milwaukee ; sales manager, Nordberg Manufacturing Co. 
 
 A. S. M. E. — L. B. Strothman, Milwaukee ; department manager, AUis-Chalmers 
 Manufacturing Co. 
 
 A. I. B. E. — C. H. Kelsey, First National Bank Building, Milwaukee. 
 
 A. C. S. — C. F. Burgess, Madison ; president C. F. Burgess Laboratories. 
 Wyoming : 
 
 A. S. C. B. — Edward Gillette, Sheridan. 
 
 A. I. M. B. — W. D. Waltman, Casper ; general manager Franco-Wyoming Oil Co. 
 
 A. S. M. E. — E. G. Hoefer, Laramie ; head department of mechanical and electrical 
 engineering. University of Wyoming. 
 
 A. I. B. B. — P. N. Nunn, Casper ; president Wyoming Electric Co. 
 
 A. c. S. — R. B. Moudy, Laramie ; State chemist, professor of chemistry. University of 
 Wyoming. 
 
 The form of questionnaire is as follows : 
 
 [Sample inventory.] 
 Industrial inventory, 1916, for Army and Nary. 
 A strictly confidential, nonpartisan, nonpolitical, and wholly patriotic inventory of our 
 country's manufacturing and producing resources for the benefit of the War and Navy 
 Departments. The information given upon this form is to be used in effecting the 
 industrial organization necessary to the plans for national defense. The value of this 
 patriotic work can best be insured by making this report complete in every detail. 
 
 Instructions. — (1) Inquiries that are followed by a question mark (?) should be 
 answered " yes " or *' no." If additional space is required for any of the questions, 
 use back of schedule, and the printed " supplemental " sheets, if necessar.v, designating 
 the answers by numbers corresponding to those in this schedule. Every question should 
 he answered. If not applicable, write word "none." (2) Section I. "Business and 
 administrative " may be answered for the company as a w'hole, but separate reports, 
 under the remaining sections of the schedule, should be made for all plants having dif- 
 ferent locations. 
 
 I. BUSINESS ANn ADMINISTR.\TIVE. 
 
 1. Name of establishment, X Y Z Co. 
 
 2. Character of organization, corporation. 
 
 3. Post-office address of general office,. Market Street, San Francisco, Calif. 
 
 4. Date business was established, 1S90. 
 
 5. Does this report and attached schedules cover all the business of this company and 
 its subsidiaries? Yes. 
 
 6. Officers — 
 
 Name. 
 
 Age. 
 
 Ameri- 
 can 
 citizen. 
 
 It not 
 
 .Vmerican 
 
 citizen, 
 
 country of 
 
 birth. 
 
 Name. 
 
 Age. 
 
 / mcri- 
 
 ean 
 citi.'.en. 
 
 If not 
 
 -'^me^irl^n 
 
 citizen, 
 
 country uf 
 
 birth. 
 
 John Doe, president 
 
 Bichard Roe, vice presi- 
 dent. 
 
 John Smith, general 
 manager. 
 
 7ohn Jones, treasurer — 
 
 38 
 
 42 
 
 40 
 35 
 
 Yes 
 
 
 John Doe, secretary 
 
 Richard Hoe. chief 
 
 engineer. 
 John Jones, works 
 
 manager. 
 
 3S 
 42 
 
 35 
 
 Yes 
 
 
 Yes 
 
 
 No — 
 Yes 
 
 i.ugland. 
 
 Yes... 
 
 
 Yes. 
 
 
 
 
244 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 7. Owners or principal stocliholders — 
 
 Name. 
 
 Address. 
 
 American 
 citizen. 
 
 If not American citizen. 
 
 City. 
 
 State. 
 
 country of birtli. 
 
 
 San Francisco 
 
 do 
 
 California 
 
 do 
 
 Yes. 
 Yes. 
 Yes. 
 Yes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 do 
 
 do 
 
 
 
 do 
 
 do 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8. Directors- 
 
 Name. 
 
 Address. 
 
 American 
 citizen. 
 
 If not American citizen. 
 
 City. 
 
 Stale. 
 
 country of birth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 John Jones ' , 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 9. Representatives abroad (names, business relation, and location), none. 
 
 10. Approximate value of physical plant $2,500,000. 
 
 11. Principal hsink or banks with whicb business is done (names and locations) , First 
 National Bank of San Francisco. 
 
 II. PL.ANT. 
 
 1. (a) Location of plant, San Francisco, Calif. Occupies block bounded by Market 
 Street, Broadway, and Sixth Avenue. (6) Number of buildings, 4. (c) Are buildings 
 owned or rented? Owned. 
 
 2. Plant surroundings, open but not isolated. 
 
 3. Population of city, 100,000. 
 
 4. City map attached 7 Yes. 
 
 5. Blue prints attached (a) ground plan with building locations? Yes. (6) Floor 
 plans? Yes. 
 
 0. Total ground area, .300,000 square feet. 
 
 7. Ground area unoccupied available for expansion, 180,000 square feet. 
 
 8. Building construction, concrete. 
 
 9. Number of stories, 2. 
 
 10. Insurance rate, $0.45. 
 
 11. Floor space, 210,000 square feet. 
 
 12. Approximate carryins capacity of floors per square foot, 2,000 pounds. 
 
 13. (a) Can stories be added? No. 
 
 14. Company oiHcos in plan or separate? Separate. 
 
 15. Description of flre protection standpipes with hose on each floor ; automatic sprin- 
 kler system with tanks on roof. 
 
 IC. Sprinkler system, automatic. 
 
 17. (a) Heat — developed in plant? Yes. (6) Light — developed in plant? No. Pur- 
 chased, electric, (c) Water supply, private ; outside in case of need. 
 
 18. (a) Power developed in plant, electric. (6) Power now operating, 2,500 horse- 
 power, (c) Maximum capacity, 3,000 horsepower. 
 
 19. Can plant be operated at night? Yes. 
 
 20. Elevators — (a) Number of freight, 6. (6) Capacity of largest, 6,000 pounds, (c) 
 Platform of largest, length, 13 feet ; width, 10 feet. 
 
 21. (a) Are facilities ample for feeding employees? None. 
 
 22. (a) Are facilities ample for housing employees? None. 
 
 23. Wash rooms? Yes. 
 
 24. Lockers for employees? Yes. 
 
 25. (a) Postal or Western Union office In plant? Western Union, (h) Number of 
 telegraph operators, 1. (c) How many are not American rilizens? None. 
 
 26. (o) Telephone switchboard in plant? Yes. (6) Number of telephone operators, 2. 
 (c) How many are not American citizens? None, (d) Number of departmental exten- 
 sions, none, (e) Number of trunk lines to outside, 2. 
 
 27. Auto call or other signaling system in plant? No. 
 
 28. Pneumatic tubes between departments? No. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 245 
 
 III. MANUFACTURE AND PKODUCTIOX. 
 
 1. Normal yearly slact season, from June 1 to September 1. 
 
 2. Approximate percentage of machine and tool equipment idle in slack season, 20 
 per cent. 
 
 3. Is there a planning or routing department In factory' Yes. 
 
 4. To what limits in precision in machine work does factory operate? To one one- 
 thousandth of an inch. 
 
 5. Principal materials used and from whom purchased : 
 
 Kind. 
 
 Unit ot 
 
 measure (tons, 
 
 etc.). 
 
 Approxi- 
 mate 
 
 amoimt 
 
 used 
 annually. 
 
 Name (optional). 
 
 Location. 
 
 Pig iron 
 
 Coal 
 
 Coke 
 
 Foundry sand 
 
 Special alloys 
 
 Tool steel 
 
 Billets and shops 
 
 Copper, zinc, etc., 
 amounts 
 
 Tons... 
 
 do.. 
 
 do.. 
 
 Cans... 
 Tons... 
 
 do.. 
 
 do.. 
 
 100,000 
 
 500 
 
 200 
 
 30 
 
 3 
 
 1 
 
 30,000 
 
 Chicago, III. 
 Pittsburgh, Pa. 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 6. Principal products manufactured : 
 
 Kind. 
 
 Unit of 
 
 measure (tons, 
 
 etc.). 
 
 Approxi- 
 mate 
 amount 
 
 manufac- 
 tured 
 
 annually. 
 
 Approxi- 
 mate 
 proportion 
 exported. 
 
 To what countries 
 (optional). 
 
 Steel castlnss Tons... 
 
 Mine machinery do.. 
 
 Drop lorgings do.. 
 
 Nuts, bolts, etc ' do.. 
 
 50,000 
 30,000 
 20,000 
 10,000 
 
 I 
 
 7. How are products marketed — (o) direct? Yes. (6) Jobbers? Yes. (c) Wholesale? 
 No. (d) Retail ? No. 
 
 8. Catalogue of products attached? Yes (set of Bulletins). 
 
 9. (a) Are branch offices or depots maintained for distributing purposes? Yes. (h) 
 If so, where? Chicago, Birmingham, Salt Lake, San Francisco. 
 
 10. (o) Have Army and Navy goods been supplied to the Government within past two 
 years ? Yes. If so, in what kinds and in what quantities : 
 
 (b) For XJ. S. Government- 
 
 (c) For foreign Governments — 
 
 Principal kinds. 
 
 Approximate 
 quantities. 
 
 Principal kinds. 
 
 .Approximate 
 quantities. 
 
 Package handling portable elevator 
 
 at Brooklyn Navy Yard. 
 De Mayo coaling plant, same location. 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 11. Has plant facilities for construction of jigs and tools? No. 
 
 12. Has company a Government contract department? No. 
 
 IV. LABOR. 
 
 1. (o) Is labor, easy to obtain? Yes. (6) If factory was enlarged? Yes. (c) 
 Union shop? No. 
 
 2. General labor conditions: (a) Any labor trouble within past year? None. 
 
 3. Number clerical and office force — (o) Total, 100. (6) Men, 10. (e) Women, 90. 
 
246 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 4. (a) Number of men In shop (busy season), 1,000. (6) Approximate number skilled, 
 S(Ui. (c) Approximate number unskilled, -00. 
 
 5. Number of toolmakcrs, 50. 
 
 i'>. («) Number of women in sliop (busy season), 200. (6) On what lines work, light 
 ass'?mblj . 
 
 7. In which departments, if absolutely necessai-y, can women replace men. and in 
 what numbers? Light machine department; about 100 men could be so replaced. 
 
 8. General system of pay — piecework or hour? Hour. 
 
 9. (o) Numlier of hours per day or per shift, 10. (6) Number of shifts per day, 1. 
 (c) Number of hours per week for each shift, 60. 
 
 10. Is overtime work done willingly? No. 
 
 11. Is night work possible? Yes. 
 
 12. Approximate percentage of employees that are not American citizens, 13 per cent. 
 
 V. TU.^.N'SPORTATION. 
 
 1. (a) Railroad shipping point, if outside of plant, . (6) Trucking diis- 
 
 tance, . (c) Kind and quality of street surface en route, . 
 
 2. Number of trucks owned, horse-drawn, ; motor, 6. ' 
 
 3. Railroad trunk lines accessible. Southern Paciflc ; Union Pacific. 
 
 4. (a) Shipping facilities inside of plant? Yes. (d) Car capacity of sidings, .50. 
 (c) Switching by railroad or self? Self. 
 
 5. Car capacity of sidings adjacent to plant, 1,000. 
 
 6. (o) Shipping facilities by water? Yes. (!)) Docks, length in running feet, 1,000. 
 (e) Maximum draft of vessels which can reach docks, 12 feet, (d) Trucking distance 
 between plant and docks, one-eighth mile, (c) Kind and quality of street surface 
 en route, wooden block, (f) Crane capacity on docks, 75 tons. 
 
 VI. POSSIBLE PlTTURIiJ ARRANOEMBNTS. 
 
 1. Would consider bidding upon regular United States Army and Navy contracts 
 in time of peace? Yes. 
 
 2. Would consider accepting United States ,\rmy and Navy business in time of war 
 on cost plus reasonable profit basis? Yes. 
 
 3. Would consider accepting " Minimum annual educational order " (see Clause A be- 
 low) ? Yes. 
 
 4. Would consider accepting payment in accordance Clause B? Yes. 
 
 5. Would favoi the enrolling of skilled labor in " Industrial Reserve " (see Clause 
 C) ? Yes, 
 
 ClauKe A. — Minimum order for annual production of Army and Navy goods will be 
 accepted with the understanding that such order will be restricted to that product for 
 which the m:iDufacturer's equipment is best fitted} also, that such order shall be for 
 only such a quantity of product as will insui'e familiarity with the work upon the part 
 of the manufacturer's organization. The manufacturer agrees that this minimum 
 annual educational order shall be put through the factory in regular course and in 
 such manner that foremen and those holding positions of responsibility shall become 
 familiar with the peculiarities incident to the manufacture of these goods. In event 
 of war the manufacturer will be expected to concentrate upon this same product, and 
 it is essential, therefore, that bis entire organization, including purchasing, manufac- 
 turing, inspection, shipping, engineering, cost keeping, and administrative departments, 
 be made familiar with the work Minimum orders >vill not be of sufHcient quantities 
 to interfere with manufacturer's regular production. 
 
 Clause B. — It is proposed that payments for " Minimum annual orders," covered In 
 Clause A, shall be made upon the basis of the actual cost of production, inclusive of 
 all special tools, jigs, etc., plus a reasonable profit. In cnse special jigs, tools, gauges, or 
 fittings are necessary for the production of these goods, a minimum supply shall be 
 kept on hand, and if they can be made in the plant, the engineering or designing depart- 
 ment shall maintain at all times corrected drawings from which the shop may, upon 
 short notice, construct the necessary equipment for quantity production. 
 
 Clause C. — In war as now waged the industrial force has become quite as important 
 as the fighting army. Skilled mechanics in all lines of production work must he kept 
 from enlistment in the Army and must be retained in the factories, mills, and mnies for 
 the production of munitions. It is essentia], therefore, that the names of these skilled 
 workmen be listed and that the men themselves be enrolled in the Industrial Reserve. 
 It is proposed that a button or other distinguishing mark will be supplied by the 
 Government, in the event of war, to skilled workmen enrolled in the Industrial Eewive, 
 and such enrollment will be considered to carry with it honors equal to enrollment in 
 the flghtinir army. It is also proposed that a Government card will be Issued to each 
 man enlisted. 
 
 VII. INVENTORY, MANUFACTURING AND PRODUCING EfJUIPMENT. 
 
 Describe in such detail as will permit of intelligent decision as to work for which 
 equipment is best fitted. Summarize classes of tools and types of machinery or pro- 
 ducing equipment. 
 
APPENDIX. 247 
 
 Foundry : One 20-ton cupola ; one DO-ton cupola ; one 15-ton converter ; one 20-pot 
 crucible furnace for brass and bronze, crown capacity 25 tons ; well-equipped co];e room. 
 
 Forge shop : Thirty 30n-pounil hammers ; one 25-ton steam hammer ; five 5-ton 
 steam hammers ; 25 anvils and forgea. 
 
 Machine shop : Sixteen engine lathes, 12-inch and under ; 10 engine lathes, over 12-inch ; 
 50 automatic lathes, 6-inch and 8-inch ; 3 planers, 36-inch ; 1 planer, GO-inch ; 5 mill- 
 ing machines, 12-inch ; 12 milling machines, 10-inch ; 25 drill presses, 22-inch ; 4 radial 
 drills, 5-foot ; 8 shapers, 20-inch ; 6 multiple-spindle drills, 10 spindles ; 5 boring and 
 turning mills, 4-toot ; 2 boring and turning mills, 8-foot. 
 
 Well-equipped tool room ; usual amount of grinders and other auxiliary machine tools. 
 
 1. (o) Is there a chemical testing laboratory? Yes. (6) Physical laboratory? Yes. 
 (c) What, it any, other special equipment for scientific testing? Apparatus for metal- 
 lographic examinations ; complete hydrometer equipped in shops and laboratory. 
 
 VIII. FIELD NOTES. 
 
 (This page to be used by board representative.) 
 
 This firm is up to date and very willing to cooperate in every way In carrying out 
 the idea of preparedness. 
 
 Name and title of official giving the information for this report. John Doe. 
 
 Report secured by John Brown. Date, June 6, 1916. Member of American Insti- 
 tute of Electrical Engineers. 
 
 Received and transmitted by Thomas Jones, State director. 
 
 Some of the Guests at a Luncheon Given at Dei.monico's, Tuesday, Makch 
 14, 1916, BY Howakd E. Coffin, Chaikman of the Committee on Industrial 
 Pkepakedness of the Navai. Consulting Boakd of the United States. 
 
 Ogden Reid, of the New York Tribune; George JIcAneny, of the New York 
 Times ; Charles H .Grasty, of the New York Times ; Arthur Page, of World's 
 Work; Col. W. C. Church, of the Army and Navy Journal; Howard E. Coffin, 
 chairman of committee; William L. Saunders, second vice chairman of the 
 Naval Consulting Board ; Dr. Albert Shaw of the American Review of Reviews ; 
 W. S. Glfford, supervising director, Committee on Industrial Preparedness ; M. 
 N. Stiles, of the Associated Press ; Henry C. Bate, of the New York Press ; Del- 
 tus M. Edwards, of the New York Herald ; Milton Bronner, of the Scripps- 
 MacRae League ; Courtland Smith, of the American Press Association ; W'illiam 
 S. W'oods, of the Literary Digest ; AVllIiam Shillaber, jr., of the New York Globe ; 
 Dr. Edward A. Rumely, of the New York Evening Hall ; Ernest Abbott, of the 
 Outlook ; Grosvenor B. Clarkson ; Allan Dawson, of the New York Globe ; Wil- 
 liam Menkel, of the American Review of Reviews ; Edwin A. Slosson, of the 
 Independent ; Bascom Little, president of the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce 
 and chairman of the National Defense Committee of the Chamber of Commerce 
 of the United States ; Charles A. Munn, of the Scientific American ; Henry 
 Souther, of the Henry Souther Engineering Co. ; Herbert L. Bridgman, of the 
 Brooklyn Standard-Union ; Arthur Brisbane, of the New York American ; 
 Henry James Forman, of Collier's Weekly ; Herbert F. Gunnison, of the Brook- 
 lyn Eagle ; Herbert S. Houston, of Doubleday, Page & Co., president of the 
 Associated Advertising Clubs of the World ; Roy W. Howard, president of the 
 United Press Associations ; Waldemar Kaempffert, of the Popular Science 
 Monthly ; Stoddard King, of Harper's Weekly ; Charles M. Lincoln, of the New 
 York World ; Geor.ge Smith, of the New York Sun ; Carl Snyder ; F. J. Split- 
 stone, of Leslie's Weekly ; Nathan Straus, jr., of Puck ; J. Bernard Walker, of 
 the Scientific American. 
 
248 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 Rules and Regulations of the Naval Consulting Board of the United 
 
 States. 
 
 pkbamble. 
 
 The Naval Consulting Board was formed in 1916 by the Secretary of the 
 Navy by the appointment of Mr. Thomas A. Edison as Its head, one personal 
 nominee by Mr. Edison, and two delegates selected from and representing each 
 of the following-named technical societies: American Chemical Society, Ameri- 
 can Institute of Electrical Engineers, American Mathematical Society, American 
 Society of Civil Engineers, American Aeronautical Society, Inventors' Guild, 
 American Society of Automobile Engineers, American Institute of Mining 
 Engineers, American Electro-Chemical Society, American Society of Meclianical 
 Engineers, American Society of Aeronautic Engineers, and in an act of Congress 
 passed in 1916 this board was legalized. 
 
 The board has adopted the following set of rules and regulations for its 
 continuance and government, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the 
 Navy. 
 
 I. NAME. 
 
 The name of the board shall be " The Naval Consulting Board of the United 
 States." 
 
 II. purpose. 
 
 The purpose of this board shall be to assist the United States Navy De- 
 . partment in any manner that it may, by supplying technical advice when called 
 upon by any bureau or board of the department organized by law or appointed 
 by the Secretary of the Navy, and to bring to the attention of the Navy De- 
 partment through the proper channels such technical matters as it considers 
 may have value to the Naval Service, with suggestions and recommendations 
 relating thereto. 
 
 III. MEJIBHliSHIP. 
 
 1. The tenure of office of each member of this board shall be for such a term 
 as, in the judgment of the Secretary of the Navy and the society which nomi- 
 nated him, his services are desirable. 
 
 2. The board may at any time by a vote of two-thirds of its full membership 
 request the Secretary to remove from the board any member thereof. 
 
 3. If any member retires from the board for any reason, the society which 
 delegated him or his predecessor shall nominate his successor, who upon 
 approval of and appointment by the Secretary of the Navy shall become a 
 member of the board. 
 
 4. Any person hereafter appointed to membership on this board shall be a 
 citizen of the United States of not less than five years' standing. 
 
 IV. officers. 
 
 1. The officers of the board shall be : 
 
 Thomas A. Edison, president 
 
 A vice president. 
 
 A chairman of the board. 
 
 A secretary of the board.' 
 The three latter shall be elected annually by written ballot by the board 
 from among its members at its annual meeting, which shall take place in 
 
APPENDIX. 249 
 
 March. Due notices of such election shall be sent to each member of the 
 hoard at least 10 days' in advance of such annual meeting. 
 
 2. The terms of office of the vice president, chairman, and secretary shall be 
 for one year. 
 
 V. MEETINGS. 
 
 1. Regular meetings of the board shall be held at intervals of one month, 
 excepting that there shall be no regular meetings during the monts of July 
 and August, and special meetings shall be called by the secretary of the board, 
 with at least five days' notice, upon request of the Secretary of the Navy or 
 the president or the vice president or the chairman or any five members of 
 the board ; the time, date, and place of the meeting to be arranged by the 
 secretary of the board in conference with those officers or members at whose 
 request the secretary called the meeting. 
 
 2. The chairman shall preside at all meetings of the board, and in the event 
 of his absence the vice president, if present, otherwise any member of the 
 board may be chosen as chairman pro tempore by a majority of those present. 
 
 3. A quorum shall consist of 10 members. 
 
 4. A member absent from a meeting may record a vote, aye or nay, by mail 
 or telegram, but only for or against a resolution whicli shall have been referred 
 to him by mail five days in advance of the meeting. 
 
 VI. COMMITTEES. 
 
 1. The membership of this board shall subdivide itself into technical com- 
 mittees at its discretion. 
 
 2. Special or temporary committees may be appointed from time to time by 
 the chairman of the board unless the board elects to name such committees by 
 ballot. 
 
 3. Any committeeman may request the cooperation of any individual or indi- 
 viduals not members of the board at any committee meeting for conference. 
 
 VII. FUNCTIONS. 
 
 1. All matters submitted to tlie board by the Secretary of the Navy shall be 
 communicated to all members by the secretary of the board, who shall forward 
 the replies to the appropriate committefes to be collated and reported to the 
 full board with recommendations for its action thereon. 
 
 2. The board, In addition to the consideration of such matters as may be 
 referred to it by the Navy Department or any of its bureaus or boards, may of 
 its own initiative, or through the initiative of any of its committees, take up 
 any matter which it or such committee may deem advisable and in the interests 
 of the Naval Service, formulate reports thereon and submit same through the 
 proper channels to the Navy Department for its consideration. 
 
 VIII. KECOEDS. 
 
 1. The proceedings of this board and of tlie committees of the board shall 
 be recorded and be regarded as confidential, and no part of the same shall be 
 made public except by the authority of the board. 
 
 2. The minutes of meetings of the board shall consist of actions taken by the 
 board and reports of committees, which shall be submitted in writing and after 
 action by the board shall be filed. 
 
250 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 IX. AMENDMENTS. 
 
 No amendment to these rules and regulations shall be made except in accord- 
 ance with the following procedure: 
 
 (a) Amendments to these rules and regulations may be proposed at any 
 regular meeting, and shall be voted upon at the next regular meeting of the- 
 board. 
 
 (6) The secretary of the board shall send to each member a copy of any- 
 proposed amendment at least t\vo weeks prior to the meeting at which time- 
 it is to be voted upon. 
 
 (c) It shall require a favorable two-thirds vote of the entire membership 
 of the board, expressed either verbally or in writing, to adopt any amendment 
 to these rules and regulations. 
 
 (d) No amendment shall be efCective until it shall have been approved by 
 the Secretary of the Navy. 
 
 Letter Sent by Secketaky of the Navy Josephus Daniels to Mr. Thomas A. 
 
 Edison. 
 I September 19, 1916. 
 
 Sir : In pursuance of authority conferred by the act of Congress entitled "An 
 act making appropriations for the naval service for the fiscal year ending Jun& 
 thirtieth, nineteen hundred and seventeen, and for other purposes," approved 
 August 29, 1916, a board, legally designated the " Naval Consulting Board," Is 
 hereby constituted and appointed for the purpose of consulting and making 
 recommendations to the department concerning matters affecting the Naval 
 Establishment. 
 
 The members of such board are, as you are aware, not to receive any salary 
 or compensation, their services being voluntary. 
 
 Provision is made by the law for the expenses incurred by and in connection 
 with the board, and ap])ropriate instructions will be issued to the Paymaster 
 General of the Navy relative to the defraying of such expenses. 
 
 The board will meet at the Navy Department, Washington, D. C, on Tuesday, 
 the 19th instant, for the purpose of organization, and will meet thereafter 
 when convened by the department, and at such, other times and places as may 
 be specified by you. 
 
 The board will prescribe rules and regulations for its own government, fur- 
 nishing the department a copy thereof, with report, when organization shall 
 have been eft'ected. 
 
 It is desired that all matters submitted to or considered by the board be 
 regarded and treated as strictly confidential, unless and until this restriction 
 shall be removed by the department. 
 Sincerely, yours, 
 
 Josephus Daniels. 
 
 The President or the Naval Consulting Board, 
 Navy Departtnent, Washington, D. C. 
 
 Letter Sent by Secbetaey of the Navy Josephus Daniels to Board Members. 
 
 Septemiskr 19, 1916. 
 Sir : In pur.suance of authority conferred by the act of Congress entitled "An 
 act making appropriations for the naval service for the fiscal year ending .Tune 
 thirtieth, nineteen hundred and seventeen, and for other purposes," approved 
 
APPENDIX. 251 
 
 August 29, 1916, a board, legally designated tlie " Naval Consulting Board," is 
 lereby constituted and appointed for the purpose of consulting and making 
 recommendations to the department concerning matters afEecting the Naval 
 ]5stablishmeut. Being already assured that you will accept duty in such ca- 
 pacity, I hereby designate you a member of the Naval Cousulting Board, 
 yineereiy, yours, 
 
 JosEPHUs Daniels. 
 
 Oath of Ofi'ICE. 
 Having been appointed a member of the Naval Consulting Board, I, 
 
 , do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Con- 
 stitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic ; that 
 I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same ; that I take this obligation 
 Ireely. without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion ; and that I will 
 -well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to 
 ■enter. So help me God. 
 
 State of , county of , ss: 
 
 Sworn to and subscribed before me this day of , 19 — . 
 
THE "SUBMARINE AND KINDRED PROBLEMS. 
 
 [Bulletin No. 1, July 14, 1917. Naval Consulting Board oJ tlie United States.] 
 
 The thousands of suggestions and phins presented to the Naval Consulting: 
 Board for assisting the Government in the present emergency indicate the pa- 
 triotic fervor of the mass of our citizens. 
 
 The board makes a careful examination of every proposal presented. To- 
 facilitate this work, by suggesting the elimination of impractical ideas, the- 
 board calls to the attention of those who desire to assist It some of the popular 
 misconceptions as to certain fundamental principles which are most frequently 
 misunderstood by the layman. 
 
 A careful consideration of the following statements will greatly simplify th& 
 \\ork of the Naval Consulting Board. 
 
 ELBCTKO MAGNETS AND MAGNETISM. 
 
 The electro magnet, the magnetic needle, permanent magnets, and magnetism 
 have been carefully studied for many years ; and the laws governing their ap- 
 plication may be found in any book on the subject. 
 
 Although these laws are generally known, and applied in a practical manner,, 
 in a multitude of devices in common use, even the man of wide exeprience will 
 be astonished at the limited range of practical effect of electro magnets of 
 large size. For instance, the magnets used in our manufacturing plants for 
 lifting heavy masses of iron or steel are designed to exercise maximum mag- 
 netic eifect, and for operation require a very considerable amount of electrical, 
 energy ; yet a magnet which can lift 20 tons, when placed in contact with an 
 iron plate of that weight, will not lift a 2-inch cube of iron or steel if separated, 
 from it a distance of 2 feet. Therefore proposed devices which depend on the 
 attractive power of magnets for their operation in deflecting or arresting tor- 
 pedoes, mines, or submarines must be governed by the simple laws of mag- 
 netism. A torpedo weighing approximately 2,500 pounds, and traveling at a 
 speed of 25 to 45 miles an hour, will not be deflected to any practical degree by- 
 any known application of magnetism ; and it is not believed that an enemy" 
 torpedo, mine, or submarine will ever be found in a position to be interfered, 
 with effectively by any electro-magnetic means, however powerful. 
 
 Electkical Effects in Geneeax. 
 
 There is a general misconception regarding the "electrification " of water and 
 the atmosphere. There is no known method of "chargiuK the sea with elec- 
 tricity," or " shooting a bomb of electricity," or of " charging the atmosphere- 
 with electrocuting current." Suggestions along these lines should show that 
 the writer has made research in the laws governing the application of electrical; 
 energy and should contain .sufficient proof of their feasibility to insure serious- 
 consideration. 
 
 On the other hand, applications of the transmission of electrical energy by- 
 means of alternating or pulsating currents — as used in wireless systems, for 
 example — belong to a different class of electrical development. Inventive 
 252 
 
APPENDIX. 253 
 
 genius Is rapidly Improving apparatus of tliis type for the sending and receiv- 
 ing of signals and messages, and the possibility of valuable results in this field 
 Is unlimited. 
 
 Pkotection Against Stjbmakinb Attack. 
 
 This subject, vi^hich is occupying the public mind as is no other, divides it- 
 self into a number of problems, the most important being the following : 
 
 (o) Means of discovering the approach of a hostile submarine and locating 
 it so as to permit of prompt action for combating its attack. 
 
 (6) Protection of cargo-carrying ships by nets, guards, and screens. 
 
 (c) Protection through decreasing the visibility of vessels. 
 
 (d) Methods of destroying or blinding a hostile submarine. 
 
 Submarines, to operate most effectively, must approach within close range 
 of the vessel which is intended to be torpedoed. The installation of offensive 
 weapons on the merchant marine has increased the necessity for the utmost 
 care being exercised by the submarine commander in remaining unseen by 
 the officers on the vessel to be attacked. 
 
 Reports from abroad indicate that in many cases submarines must have 
 remained along certain lanes of travel for periods extending into weeks ot wail- 
 ing with the expectation of torpedoing certain vessels. Under certain favorable 
 conditions, where the waters are less than 200 feet in depth, a submarine 
 might lie at rest on the bottom, and if equipped with sensitive listening devices 
 attempt to detect the approach of a vessel. As soon as this evidence was 
 secured the submarine might come to the surface for a quick observation by 
 means of the periscope and in this manner obtain the proper aim which would 
 be required to register an effective hit. 
 
 In case the water is more than 200 feet in depth a submarine must be kept 
 in motion to obtain steerage way in order to hold its proper depth of sub- 
 mergence. This speed may not exceed 4 or 5 miles per hour, but to remain 
 submerged, and at the same time unobserved, the water must be nt least 60 
 feet deep. 
 
 The latest type of submarine which is being used abroad has a surface speed 
 of at least 17 knots per hour and a submerged speed of probably less than 10 
 knots. The superior gunfire from the merchantman which has been properly 
 equipped would make it necessary for the submarine commander to obtain his 
 observations, such as vould permit accurate aiming of the torpedo, during the 
 very brief interval of time required to come to. the surface for obseivation 
 through the periscope and to again submerge. 
 
 If running near the surface, the periscope might be raised, a quick observa- 
 tion taken, and lowered again within 30 seconds. If, however, the submarine 
 is on the surface and hatches uncovered, from one to four minutes will be 
 required to completely submerge, depending upon circumstances. 
 
 A submarine of recent type probably has a total radius of action of as much 
 as 8,000 miles when traveling at a moderate cruising speed of from 10 to 11 
 knots, and may remain away from its home base for as much as one month, 
 without requiring either fuel or other supplies during this period. 
 
 This type of submarine may have as many as three periscopes, two conning 
 towers, and two rapid-fire guns attached to the upper portion of its hull. 
 
 The vessel is steered by very efficient gyroscopic compasses, which are un- 
 affected by extraneous magnetic or electrical influences. 
 
 A general understanding of the capabilities of the modern submarine for 
 offensive operations will make it easier to appreciate the importance of the 
 three problems which follow: 
 
254 NAVAL, CONSULTING BOARD OF THE LFNITED STATES. 
 
 (a) means fob discovery. 
 
 Tlw aeroplane. — When the condition of sea and air are favorable, a sulimarine 
 is readily discernible from an aeroplane flying at a sufficient height even though 
 the submarine be submerged to a considerable depth. 
 
 While aerophiues have thus been used successfully in the English Channel, 
 they are unable to fly far out to sea where the submarines are now most active. 
 Mother ships for carrying and launching aeroplanes might be used in this con- 
 nection, but there are only a small number of such ships in operation and the 
 construction of others under present conditions is necessarily a slow" process. 
 
 Various sound-recording devices, intended to locate surface vessels, subma- 
 rines, and even moving torpedoes, are now being carefully tested. Water is an 
 excellent conductor of sound, and the development and improvement of such 
 apparatus offers a promising field for Inventive endeavor to those who possess 
 adequate scientific training and laboratory facilities. 
 
 Many devices are suggested which depend upon optical means of detection, 
 such as special forms of telescopes and field glasses to be mounted on ships, or 
 on scouting vessels. Many special forms of searchlights and projectors have been 
 suggested. The fact that a moving torpedo leaves in its wake a stream of air 
 bubbles caused by the exhaust air from its propelling engines, offers, under 
 favorable conditions, one means for discovering the approach of a torpedo. 
 This evidence is, however, difficult to detect in a rough sea or at night, and, 
 furthermore, the bubbles do not reach the surface of the water until after the 
 torpedo has traveled onward a distance of from 50 to 200 feet toward i*"s target. 
 
 Tile dragging of trawls, or nets, by special guard boats, not only with the 
 view of locating submerged submarines but also to sweep up floating and sta- 
 tionary mines, is fiequently suggested. Under certain conditions this operation 
 Is practicable and effective. 
 
 It will be seen that each of the above methods, however useful, has its 
 limitations, and scientists and inventors should apply themselves not only to the 
 task of improving these, but also of finding supplementary methods and devices. 
 
 (e) PEOTECTION of CAEGO-CAKKYING SHIPS BY NETS OB SCEEEN8. 
 
 Many design.s of such devices are suggested, and most of them are intended 
 to be attached to the bull of the vessel to be protected. Many other suggestions 
 along these lines, and differing only in some of their minor characteristics from 
 the foregoing, have been received by the board. Up to the present time not one 
 of these proposals involving screens of any kind has received the approval of 
 the Navy Department or of the merchant marine. The principal objections 
 offered to these devices are that they are heavy, difficult to hold in position, 
 unmanageable in a heavy sea, and that they interfere with the speed and with 
 the ability of the vessel to maneuver. The undeniable evidence which has 
 been accumulated during the past few months of submarine activity has 
 demonstrated that the immunity of a vessel to submarine attack is dependent 
 very largely on its speed and also its maneuvering ability. The percentage of 
 vessels having speeds of 15 knots or more which have suffered from submarine 
 attack is very small, while the losses of slow vessels, whose speed is less than 
 that of a submerged submarine, is practically 100 per cent of those attacked. Many 
 of the suggested devices would prevent the launching of lifeboats or rafts from 
 the vessel to be protected. It is barely possible, however, that there may be 
 developed some form of this general plan which will be found practicable. In 
 no other field have so many suggestions or so many duplicate inventions been 
 presented to the board. 
 
APPENDIX. 255 
 
 (C) PROTECTION THROUGH INVISIBILITY. 
 
 The point of lookout on a submarine being close to the water, the position 
 of a vessel at a distance can only be determined by observing Its smolie, which 
 floats high in the air. Improved sinolseless combustion is therefore desirable. 
 Relative invisibility may also be afforded by methods of painting. 
 
 (D) DESTRUCTION AND BLINDING OF THE SUBMARINES. 
 
 A rapid-flre gun is effective when the submarine is seen within accurate range 
 of the gun ; but the target is so small that it is difficult to hit. 
 
 The powerful effect of any submarine explosion on all neighboring bodies 
 provides a simple means of destroying or crippling an undersea boat. Once it 
 has been even approximately located, the setting off of a heavy charge of 
 high explosive well submerged in the vicinity of the submarine will bring 
 about this result. 
 
 In certain areas a quantity of heavy, blacl^ petroleum, or similar substance, 
 which will float on the surface of the water, has proved an effective means of 
 clouding the optical glass in the periscope's exposed end. 
 
 Under favorable conditions of wind and position, many vessels have saved 
 themselves from torpedo attacli by the production of a smolce screen. This 
 may be formed either by incomplete combustion of the oil used for fuel by most 
 naval vessels, or it may be created by burning chemicals, such as phosphorus 
 and coal tar, or mixtures in which both of these and other materials are used. 
 
 After hiding itself from the submarine in a cloud of dense smolie, the vessel, 
 if possessed of sufficient speed, may be able by a quick maneuver to change her 
 position and escape before the submarine is able to discharge a torpedo. 
 
 Mines and Torpedoes for Naval Operations. 
 
 (A) mines. 
 
 Ever since the first use of gunpowder in the prosecution of war, mines and 
 ■ torpedoes have received great attention both from the warrior and the inventor. 
 Mines are either fixed or. floating. The fixed or stationary submarine mine is 
 fired by contact, electricity, timing device, or fuse. Such mines, which are ex- 
 tensively used by all navies, are rugged in design and may contain large charges 
 of explosives. They are placed in position by especially equipped mine-laying 
 vessels. Such a mine is provided with an anchoring device. 
 
 Floating mines differ from fixed mines in that they are unanchored, and, 
 unless guard boats are at hand to warn friendly vessels of their proximity, may 
 be as dangerous to friend as to foe. Such mines must be, according to laws 
 of war, designed to become inoperative within a few hours after being set adrift. 
 
 (b) torpedoes. 
 
 The modern submarine torpedo is about 20 inches in diameter and 20 feet 
 in length ; is self-propelled ; is not steered by magnetic means ; and keeps a 
 fairly accurate course for several thousand yards at an average speed of more 
 than 30 miles an hour. Its weight is approximately a ton and a quarter, and 
 when traveling at normal speed possesses great momentum — ^In fact, in one 
 case, when the high-explosive charge in the " warhead " failed properly to 
 detonate, the body of the torpedo penetrated the steel hull of the ship attacked. 
 Torpedoes are also provided with means to more or less effectively cut through 
 screens, nets, or guards placed in their path. 
 168537°— 20 17 
 
256 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 A torpedo is projected from a submarine or other vessel by means of a special 
 form of tube or gun. A small charge of gunpowder or compressed air is em- 
 ployed to start the torpedo, after which — if of the usual self-propelling type — 
 it is driven through the water by its own compressed air motor, the air being 
 supplied from a strongly built reservoir within the body of the torpedo itself. 
 The torpedo is kept upon its course by a gyroscope steering mechanism, which is 
 immune to outside magnetic disturbances. 
 
 The detonation of the torpedo is accomplished through a mechanism placed 
 within its warhead; and if the torpedo is either abruptly diverted from its 
 course or is checked in its forward motion, tlie firing device, which is operated 
 by arrested momentum rather than by any form of a projecting firing pin, 
 Instantly ignites the heavy charge of explosive contained within the warhead. 
 The explosion, if it takes place within 20 feet of the vessel, will usually rupture 
 the ship's plating, because of the terrific blow transmitted through the water 
 from the point of the explosion to the sliip's side. Tlie depth at which a tor- 
 pedo travels is usually between 12 and 15 feet below the surface. 
 
 CONFINING THE SUBMAKINES. 
 
 The question as to why submarines are not destroyed before they reach the 
 open sea is a most natural one, and the best answer which it is possible to 
 give, according to the officers of our Navy and those of the foreign commis- 
 sions who have visited this country, is as follows : 
 
 The submarine bases are very strongly protected by land batteries, aeroplane 
 observers, and large areas of tliickly mined waters extending to such distances 
 that the largest naval gun can not get within range of the bases. In spite of 
 these protections, there is now going on a continuous attempt on the part of the 
 allied navies to entrap or otherwise defeat the submarines as they emerge 
 from the protected area.s. Nets are laid and as promptly removed by the enemy, 
 whose trawlers are in turn attacked by our destroyers. The design of these 
 nets and the detailed arrangement of their fastenings and attachments offer a 
 broad field for invention, hut it should be remembered that they must be ca- 
 pable of being used in waters in which there is a tidal current running from 
 2 to 5 miles per hour. Many suggestions for " bottlhig up " these Bases have 
 been offered, but, as will be realized, it is not desirable to publish information 
 which would indicate even in the smallest degree this country's plans. 
 
 SHIPS AND SHIPBUILDING. 
 
 Many suggestions are made for ships of unusual form to provide for safety 
 In case of a torpedo or mine exploding near or against the hull. Most of these 
 plans are an elaboration of the usual water-tight bulkhead construction now 
 required as structural design for all modern ships. 
 
 The multiplicity of water-tight compartments in any hull design tends to 
 add to the vessel's safety. 
 
 The -modern tank steamer used to carry fluid cargoes, such as petroleum 
 products or molasses, is a good example of this design, which has been in 
 general use for many years. 
 
 The explosion of a near-by submarine mine or torpedo frequently tears 
 great rents in the ship's plating, in some cases opening a jagged hole 10 feet or 
 more across, but the de.structive effect on the hull of a ship caused by the 
 explosion of a mine or torpedo may be greatly diminished by special hull 
 construction. 
 
APPENDIX, 257 
 
 Senebal Instructtons to Those Offebing Suggestion to the Naval Con- 
 sulting BOAKl). 
 
 A very large proportion of the letters and phins that are received describe 
 devices or schemes which are obviously impracticable or which show no novelty 
 or improvement as compared with existing methods. After the elimination 
 of these, the more meritorious inventions are submitted to the various standing 
 committees of the board for examination. If an invention receives the ap- 
 proval of a standing committee, it is presented to the board with a favorable 
 report and, if then again approved, it is forwarded to the Navy Department 
 with the indorsement of the board. 
 
 The fact that inventions, plans, and devices must be forwarded to the various 
 departments of the board for examination makes it essential that everything 
 be presented in writing. 
 
 Communications should be addressed: Thomas Robins, Secretary Naval Con- 
 sulting Board, 13 Park Row, New York, N. Y. 
 
 By means of the condensed information contained in bulletins, It is hoped 
 that inventors and others who Avish to present matters for examination will 
 cooperate with the board by analyzing their own inventions. The board will 
 thus be enabled by this help to spend a larger part of its time in the develop- 
 ment of inventions, plans, or devices which are believed to be promising of 
 assistance to the Government in prosecuting the war. 
 
 Presumably the Government intends to pay for inventions which it adopts, 
 but as yet no specific provision has been made by law for this purpose. 
 
 Inventions and suggestions received by the Naval Consulting Board are 
 examined in a preliminary way by the secretary, who is aided by the following 
 committee of engineers : 
 
 Charles Messick — Tjeutenant (j. g.), U. S. N. R. F., detailed to secretary's 
 office. Naval Consulting Board ; member American Institute of Electrical Engi- 
 neers ; patent attorney ; developed and patented electrical hoisting and convey- 
 ing machinery ; developed and patented new methods in continuous casting of 
 soft metal, including "Anti-slip metal tread " ; developed and patented the 
 combined clutch and adjustments device used on all modern motor cycles, etc. 
 
 G. Herbert Condict — Consulting en.gincer ; member American Institute of 
 Electrical Engineers ; Franklin Institute ; member executive committee, Ameri- 
 can Peat Society ; past president New York Electrical Society. Among other 
 activities, 1896-97. general mana.ger and chief engineer Englewood-Chicago 
 Electric Railway ; 1897-1902, chief and consulting engineer Electric Vehicle 
 Co., New York and Hartford ; 1903-1906, vice president and general manager 
 Electro-Dynamic Co. in New Y^ork ; 1906-1909, general manager Box Electric 
 Drill Co. ; invented the series parallel resistance controller used on all trolley 
 cars. 
 
 Howard AV. Starr — B. A., Yale, 189-5; M. E., Stevens Institute, 1900; vice 
 president and manager Schenectady Power Co. : president Bast (_'reek Electric 
 Light & Power Co., of St. .Johnsville, N. Y. ; vice president Slohawk GaSVCo., 
 Schenectady, N. Y. ; vice president Theodore B. Starr (Inc.), New York City. 
 
 Carl K. MacPadden — Technical advisor of companies interested in petroleum ; 
 member Society Naval Architects and Marine Engineers ; associate member 
 American Society Naval Engineers ; fuel-oil expert and consulting engineer (or 
 American and foreign companies. 
 
 Percy Adams Hutchison — Ph. D., Harvard ; special correspondent with 
 Atlantic Fleet in Mexican waters, 1914; naval training cruise for civilians, 
 1916. 
 
 Alfred Addison Thresher— Lieutenant (j. g.), TJ. S. N. R. F. ; A. M., Denison 
 University. 1891; formerly member American Society Mechanical Engineers, 
 American Institute Electrical Engineers; associate member Society Naval 
 Architects and Marine Engineers. 
 
258 NAVAL, CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 Members of Naval Consulting Board of the United States. 
 
 Adrticks, Lawrence ; Arnold, Bion J. ; Baekeland, Dr. L. H. ; Coffin, Hownrd 
 E. ; Craven, Alfred ; Edison, Thomas A. ; Emmet, William Le Roy ; Hewitt, 
 Dr. Peter Cooper ; Hunt, Andrew Murray ; Hutchison, Dr. M. R. ; Lamme, B. G. ; 
 Maxim, Hudson; Miller, Spencer; Richards, Prof. Joseph W. ; Riker, Andrew 
 L. ; Robins, Thomas ; Saunders, W. L. ; Sellers, Matthew Bacon ; Sperry, 
 Elmer A. ; Sprague, Frank J. ; Thaj'er, .Benjamin B. ; Webster, Dr. A. Gordon 
 Whitne.v, Dr. W. R. ; Woodward, Dr. Robert S. 
 
 Officers. — President, Tomas A. Edison; vice president. Dr. Peter Cooper 
 Hewitt; chairman, W. L. Saunders; secretary, Thomas Robins. 
 
 THE ENEMY SUBMARINE. 
 
 [Bulletin No. 2, May 1, 1018. Compiled by the Naval ConsiUling Board and Wai- Com- 
 mittee of Technical Societies from information already published and other recently 
 released.] 
 
 Foreword. 
 
 This bulletin is prepared to supersede Bulletin No. 1, " The Submarine and 
 Kindred Problems," issued on July 14, 1917, by the Naval Consulting Board ; 
 to indicate more fully the requirements for war inventions; to slate the limita- 
 tions outside of whicli creative effort may not be expected to produce results 
 of value and to assist the student in avoiding the duplication of previous nccoin- 
 plishment. It is also intended to give wide publicity to certain general informa- 
 tion already whII known to the enemy, in order that the difficulties in overcom- 
 ing the German submarine may be understood. 
 
 References from which detailed information in relation to submarine prob- 
 lems may be obtained, and a list of references with extracts in relation to sub- 
 marine strategy and tactics, are included. 
 
 The Naval Consultii g Board is acting officially as a national board of in- 
 ventions and is conducting it.^ work with the active cooperation of the War 
 Committee of Technical Societies. 
 
 By means of the cx)ndensed information contained in bulletins, it is hopcil 
 that inventors and others who wish to present matters for examination will 
 be enabled first to analyze their own inventions. By this help, the examiners 
 can devote a large part of their time to the development of inventions, plans, 
 or devices which give promise of assisting the Government in prosecuting the 
 war. 
 
 Expert srENTs and Development. 
 
 The Army and Navy and the various civilian organizations cooperating with 
 them are continually experimenting with and developing new ways and m<'ans 
 to increase the effectiveness of the machinery of war. The Navy is giving 
 special attention to the submarine and kindred problems, but for obvious rea- 
 sons many of the details of this work can not be disclosed. 
 
 The amount of time and labor necessary to determine the value of a device, 
 as compared with what is already in use, is infinitely greater than can be ap- 
 preciated by the layman or even the average engineer. Few realize the sli-ess, 
 hurry, and lack of facilities in a battle. Any delay or difficulty in the opera- 
 tion of new devices in action is fatal. For these reasons many schemes niid 
 devices appearing practicable and effective in laboratory tests have to be aban- 
 doned when tried out in service. There is, therefore, a very wise reluctance on 
 the part of the Government to undertake experiments with, or development 
 of proposals that appear, on preliminai-y examination, to be of such a delicate 
 or complex nature that they would probably, though perfected, lack the essen- 
 tials of strength, ease of operation, and reliability. 
 
APPENDIX. 259 
 
 No proposal which involves premises not based on the laws of nature, as 
 understood and accepted by authorities, is entitled to be reconimentled for ex- 
 periment and development, unless the inventor shows that he is thoroughly 
 familiar with such laws and can demonstrate that there is a possibility of the 
 accepted understanding being erroneoiis. 
 
 Experiuiei-ts and development are unnecessary in the case of devices which, 
 though apparently operable, do not promise greater efficiency than those already 
 in use. 
 
 It may be stated that the inability of the Government to make use of most 
 of the proposals submitted is due to the fact that the devices suggested are either 
 already in use, less efficient than those now employed, or, for good reasons, are 
 thought to be impracticable and open to one or more of the objections mentioned 
 in the list below : 
 
 1. It has already been suggested and passed upon. 
 
 2. A similar device is already in use. 
 
 3. A desideratum, rather than an invention, is offered. 
 
 4. It is not considered practicable. 
 
 5. According to the authorities, such a device is not required. 
 
 6. Prevailing conditions I'ender its use impossible. 
 
 7. The desired purpose is now more efficiently accomplished. 
 
 8. There is no known method of applying the suggestion. 
 
 9. Not practicable according to natural laws as known. 
 
 10. The facilities for construction are not available. 
 
 11. It would violate laws of war as interpreted by this country and its Allies. 
 
 12. It would be too dangerous to use. 
 
 13. A similar suggestion has been tried and abandoned. 
 
 14. The proposal is not fully understood. 
 
 15. Its use would interfere witli handling a ship. 
 
 16. Not practicable under inarine conditions. 
 
 17. Ineffective against submarines as now built. 
 
 18. Development in the art has progressed beyond that which is indicated 
 
 by the proposal. 
 
 No proposal that is open to any of the foregoing objections will be recom- 
 mended by the examiners. 
 
 Many proposals which depend for their operation upon effects which are 
 contrary to natural laws as known have been submitted. Below is given an 
 outline of some of the most popular misconceptions. 
 
 Electromagnets. — Although the laws governing the use of electromagnets 
 are generally known and applied in a practical manner in a multitude of de- 
 vices in common use, even the man of wide experience will be astonished at 
 the limited range of their effect. For instance, the magnets used in our manu- 
 facturing plants for lifting heavy masses of iron or steel are designed to 
 exercise maximum magnetic effect, and for operation require a very con- 
 siderable amount of electrical energy; yet a niiignet which can lift 20 tons, 
 when placed in contact with an iron plate of that weight, will not lift 2 
 pounds of iron or steel if separated from it a distjince of 2 feet. Therefore 
 proposed devices which depend on the attractive power of mngnets for their 
 operation in deflecting or arresting torpedoes, mines, or suhuuiriiies must be 
 governed b.v the simple laws of magnetism. A torpedo weighing approximately 
 2,500 pounds and traveling at a speed of from 2.5 to 45 miles an hour will not 
 be deflected to any considerable degree by any known application of magnetism ; 
 and it is not believed that an enemy torpedo, mine, or submarine will ever 
 be found in a position to be interfered with effectively by any electromagnetic 
 means, however powerful. 
 
260 NAVAX, CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 Detection by magnetic needle. — Tests made on an actual submarine liave 
 slinwii that the magnetic effects due to this mass of iron are quite limited in 
 range. For instance, at 150 feet distance the magnetic effect due to a sub- 
 marine is only about 1 per cent as much as the earth's magnetic effect. 
 
 Influence on compass. — The submarine is equipped with a gyroscopic compass 
 that can not be affected by any magnetic influence from the outside. 
 
 iline attached by magnet-t. — A magnet deriving its power from any battery 
 that could be contained within a bomb would not be powerful enough to hold 
 the bomb in contact with a boat running through the water ; therefore the 
 scheme is impracticable. Tlie main point would be to locate the submarine. 
 ■\Vhen the submarine is once located, very simple methods of disposing of it 
 are at hand. 
 
 Elect7-ical effects. — There is a general misconception regarding the electrifi- 
 cation of water and the atmosphere. There is no known method of charging 
 tlie sea with electricity ; of shooting a bomb of electricity, or of charging the 
 atnj(i.s'i)here with electrocuting currents. Suggestions along these lines should 
 show that the writer has made research in the laws governing the application 
 of electrical energy, and should contain sufficient proof of their feasibility to 
 insure serious consideration. 
 
 On- the other hand, applications of the transmission of electrical energy by 
 means of alternating or pulsating currents — as used in wireless .systems^ foi* 
 example — belong to a different class of electrical development. Inventive 
 genius is rapidly Improving apparatus of this type for the sending and receiving 
 of signals and messages, and the possibility of valuable results in this field 
 is unlimited. 
 
 The Submaeinb and Its Opekation. 
 
 History. — The first recorded experiment In submarine operation was made by 
 a Hollander, Dr. Cornelius Van Drebbel, who in 1624 constructed a one-man 
 Hubmarine operated by feathering oars, which made a successful underwater 
 trip from Westminster to Greenwich on the Thames. 
 
 Dr. David Bushnell, an American inventor and graduate of Yale in the class 
 of 177.J, nearly sank the Eagle in New York Harbor during the Revolutionary 
 War liy the u.se of his little one-mau-powered submarine, the Anierienn Turtle. 
 
 In England the American inventor Robert Fulton, in the presence of William 
 Pitt, then chancellor, and a large number of spectators, blew up a brig by ex- 
 ploding a mine which he had placed under her bottom by the use of his sub- 
 marine boat. Both of these inventors were discouraged and were refused the 
 necessary assistance to enable them to develop further their ideas regarding 
 submarines, although they had undoubtedly shown that there were great possi- 
 bilities in the underwater type of vessel. 
 
 Various unsuccessful attempts were made to utilize submarines during the 
 Civil War, but at that time their only means of offense was a torpedo on the 
 end of a long spar, and the solitary recorded hit was disastrous to both the 
 warship and the submarine. .lust as the breech-loading rifle, a very ancient 
 device, failed to come into its own until the invention of the metallic cartridge, 
 the submarine had to await the invention of the automotive torpedo before it 
 became a really efficient means of offense. 
 
 TYPES. 
 
 Modem types. — Modern submarines are divided into two general classes — 
 the coast defense type of from 300 to 700 tons surface displacement, and the 
 cruising type of from 800 to 2,500 tons displacement, having a radius of action 
 
APPENDIX. 261 
 
 of from 3,000 to 8,000 miles and capable of operating along the Atlantic coast 
 of the United States from European bases. 
 
 Germany appears to be devoting her energy at present to the construction 
 of a small group of a still larger type, reported to have a displacement of 2,800 
 tons, vyhich also possesses superior gun equipment for surface operations, 
 greater speed when cruising on the surface, very much more habitable quarters 
 for the crew, and storage capacity for a larger number of torpedoes and other 
 supplies. 
 
 " One-man " type. — Many hundreds of proposals have been received advocat- 
 ing one-man submarines and submarines of small size, to be manufactured in 
 great numbers for the purpose of attacking and destroying the larger types of 
 enemy submarines. This subject has been given exhaustive consideration and 
 it has been conclusively proved that no small submarine can be provided with 
 the necessary power, speed, equipment, and living quarters for the crew to 
 enable it to operate successfully in the submarine zone. Even the smallest of 
 modern submarines i-equires a number of devices for its successful operation : 
 An internal-combustion engine, an electric motor — which also can be used as a 
 generator to charge the storage batteries — water ballast and trimming tanks, 
 pumps, air compressors, air-storage tanks, torpedo tubes, storage space for tor- 
 pedoes, quarters for crew, and other machinery and auxiliaries. 
 
 Submarines carried Jiy mother ships. — Proposals to have small submarines 
 carried by mother battleships or merchantmen and put overboard have not 
 received favorable consideration, because of the practical difficulties involved 
 in launching and maintaining them. Although a special type of small sub- 
 marine has been designed with the intention of having it carried upon the deck 
 of a battleship and launched for operations in the immediate vicinity of the 
 ship, no records of successful tests are available. The smallest type of modern 
 coast defense submarines, which can hold the necessary apparatus to have a use- 
 ful range of action, weighs about 300 tons ; the handling of such weights from 
 the deck of a vessel at sea can not be accomplished with any degree of safety. 
 
 Submarines for this purpose have been proposed many times and in some 
 cases carefully designed. No really successful design, however, has been 
 evolved. 
 
 CONSTRUCTION. 
 
 Hull construction. — Generally, the German U-boat — which Is the designation 
 for the enemy ocean-going submarines — is made with a double hull. The bot- 
 tom space between the"<nner and outer hulls is used for water ballast ; the top 
 space is used for carrying fuel oil. Water ballast displaces the fuel oil as it 
 is consumed by the internal-combustion engine. 
 
 The frequent statements that oil has been seen on the sea after a U-boat had 
 been attacked may have merely indicated that the submarine's outer liull had 
 been punctured. However, there is some oil slick on the surface when the ex- 
 haust mufflers are flooded. 
 
 According to recent statements, the conning tower in the latest type of Ger- 
 man submarine is protected by a thin belt of armor plate, and the vital parts 
 of the hull, which are exposed when operating on the surface, are also made 
 heavier than the rest of the hull, to protect them at least from the smaller 
 caliber guns. ^ 
 
 Even if the periscope and conning tower are shot away, the submarine may 
 still be able to keep afloat and operate. 
 
 Source of power. — The internal-combustion oil engine of the Diesel or semi- 
 Diesel type is almost universally employed for surface operation in modern 
 
2G2 KAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 subnmriues, although much experimenting has been done with steam-driven 
 craft, and many engineers believe that, for extremely high power, steam may yet 
 be used effectively if some of the inherent disadvantages — excessive heat, etc. 
 can be overcome. The limit of practical size has almost been reached in the in- 
 ternal-combustion engines used in the latest type of submarine, and if more 
 power is needed the engines themselves will have to be improved, or, perhaps, 
 steam plants will be resorted to. 
 
 Owing to the fact that internal-combustion engines require a great deal of 
 air for their operation, which is not available when a boat is submerged, sub- 
 marines must be equipped with an electric motor run by storage batteries for 
 underwater propulsion. It is, therefore, necessary, after the storage batteries 
 are discharged by use, for the boat to come to the surface while its electric gen- 
 erating apparatus, driven by the internal-combustion engine, recharges the 
 batteries. 
 
 Speed. — The speed of a submarine, like that of other vessels, depends upon 
 the power of its engines or motors in overcoming the resistance of the hull 
 to being driven through the water. For submerged operations the electric 
 motor operates the propeller, the engine being uncoupled and the current for 
 the motor supplied by storage batteries. This electrical equipment. If It be 
 of high pfiwer, occupies much space and is extremely heavy, especially if an 
 extended submerged range of action at high speed is desired. Therefore, the 
 space for such equipment on the underwater craft has to be provided by in- 
 cren.sing the size of the craft. If high surface speed is also required, larger 
 and heavier engines must be installed, which necessitate an additional increase 
 In the size and displacement of the vessel. Maximum surface and submerged 
 speeds can not both be had in one type of submarine, and therefore a com- 
 promise which gives the most efficient general results has to be effected. The 
 main engines in a modern submarine constitute approximately 8 per cent and 
 the storage batteries 16 per cent of the total weight of the boat. If greater 
 surface speed is required, the percentage of weight allotted to the engines is 
 increased; or, if greater submerged speed, the weight of the batteries is In- 
 creased and smaller engines installed. In general, submarines to be capable of 
 the highest possible speed, both for surface and submerged operations, must 
 necessarily be of the largest type, and many predictions of giant submarines 
 are made. 
 
 German cruising submarines have a maximum speed of about 17 knots on 
 the surface and 10 knots submerged. 
 
 Details of submarine construction are of less Immediate importance than 
 ways and means to protect surface vessels from submarine attack, but details 
 of construction and of the many life-saving devices, such as detachable cham- 
 bers or conning towers and other mechanisms which have been proposed, 
 experimented with and discarded, may be found in the references mentioned on 
 a subsequent page. 
 
 EQUIPMENT. 
 
 Listening devices. — The submarine when submerged so that Its periscope 
 does not project above the water is blind, but not deaf, for it Is provided with 
 sound detectors or microphones that will indicate the approach and direction 
 of a ship, if its own machinery Is at rest or moving slowly, with noise so slight 
 as not to interfere with the listening. 
 
 The propagation of sound through water Is more rapid and efficient than 
 through air, because water does not have so great a cushioning effect upon 
 sound waves. While we speak of sound waves, and can measure their amplitude 
 in some cases, there is no bodily displacement of the medium through which 
 
APPENDIX. 263 
 
 they travel. In general the hacder, denser, and more incompressible the 
 medium, the more efficient the transmission of the sound waves. 
 
 The underwater listening devices which are so frequently availed of in subr 
 marines, and patrol boats and destroyers used to attack them, consist primarily 
 of a large diaphragm or its equivalent in some other physical form. The dia- 
 phragm is submerged and the pressure of the water upon it tends to cause it to 
 deflect inwardly to a slight extent. When the sound wave strikes the diaphragm 
 the deflection is increased, and when the wave has expended itself it is fol- 
 lowed by a reduction of pressure which allows the diaphragm to recover until 
 the succeeding wave strikes it. 
 
 The human ear can detect sounds having periods of vibration as low as 
 16 per second and as high as 30,000 or 40,000 in extreme cases, so that there 
 is a very wide range of pitch over which listening devices might be used. 
 
 The vibrations emitted from a submarine are usually of low frequency, and 
 .therefore the listening devices which are particularly designed for submarine 
 detection have to be specially adapted to low frequency, at the expense in 
 many cases of their capacity for receiving the high-frequency vibrations; 
 whereas with submarine signaling devices designed to communicate from one 
 vessel to another a frequency of several hundred vibrations per second is found 
 to give better results. 
 
 In one typical form of listening device the diaphragm is provided with a tele- 
 phone transmitter. The vibrations of the diaphragm vary the electrical resist- 
 ance in the transmitter, which are either listened to by a telephone receiver 
 directly, or amplified by means of relays, such, for instance, as the audion and 
 other similar apparatus, which enable sounds to be heard which otherwise would 
 be inaudible. 
 
 Ways and means to tune out extraneous noises, such as the falling of rain 
 on the surface of the water, the noise of the pumps and other machinery on 
 the boat carrying the listening device, and arrangements to determine the 
 direction of the source of sound, have been given a great deal of study and been 
 developed to a considerable degree of effectiveness. Sound waves tend 
 to emanate from the source radially, which is availed of in the direction- 
 indicating devices. However, the details of these devices are more or less 
 confidential, and only the general principles can be made available to the public. 
 
 Periscopes. — The superior gunfire to be expected from a merchantman which 
 has been properly equipped makes it prudent for the hostile submarine com- 
 mander to obtain his observations, for accurate aiming of the torpedo, through 
 a periscope. 
 
 A submarine is usually equipped with two or three periscopes, extending 
 about 12 feet above the conning tower, the more recent periscopes being of the 
 " housing " type, which permits them to be quickly raised and then drawn down 
 after the observation, thus allowing the undersea boat to operate unseen much 
 nearer the surface and not lose time in changing its depth of submergence. 
 
 It is rumored that the latest German U-boat has a short periscope, of from 
 4 to 6 inches in diameter, extending about 8 feet above the periscope " fair 
 water," which Incloses the stuffing box through- which the periscope slides up 
 and down. The periscope fair water usually extends 4 or 5 feet above the top of 
 the conning tower. The short periscope is used when the boat is moving at 
 considerable speed through the water. An additional periscope, which can be 
 extended to a height of from 14 to 16 feet above the periscope fair water, is 
 also provided. It is used only when the boat is stationary or nearly so. This 
 taller periscope is used to reduce the chances of exposing the conning tower and 
 huU of the submarine while patrolling in a rough sea, with the hull submerged. 
 It Is very small in diameter at the top, and is commonly called the " finger " 
 
264 NAVAL COiTSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 periscope. Owing to tlie vibration prevailing at any speed above 4 knots, It 
 can not be used when a submarine is moving rapidly. A third periscope, 
 smaller in diameter, Is usually provided as a spare, in case of accident to the 
 two periscopes described above. 
 
 A periscope is usually designed to have about a 45° angle of horizontal field 
 of vision, and the vertical field may be less. It is rotated by the observer, in 
 order to scan the whole horizon. 
 
 A^'hen a submarine is cruising on the surface, the top of the periscope may 
 extend to a height of 23 or 24 feet above the water, thus givin'g a range of vision 
 of about 6 miles to the horizon, if the day is bright ; while an observer standing 
 upon the conning tower can see the horizon at a range of only about 4i miles ; 
 however, the observer can usually see much more distinctly by his direct vision 
 than through the periscope. The upper parts of ships can, of course, often be 
 seen beyond the horizon. 
 
 Greatly increased optical efficiency in the periscope is not a theoretical possi- 
 bility, although various sizes and designs of periscopes have been experimented 
 with. Any increase of submerged diameter or length of periscope impedes the 
 .submerged speed of the submarine. The older type gave a great deal of trouble 
 Irom defective mechanical construction; but the more modern devices are 
 heru'.etically sealed by the manufacturer, and are reasonably free from con- 
 den.sation of moisture on the lenses and from vibration. 
 
 Experiments have been performed on the subject of decreasing the visibility 
 of periscopes. It is very difficult to see a periscope, and the artistic use of paint, 
 simulating foam and green water, is one of the best means of making a perl- 
 scope invisible. A periscope so painted, projecting a few feet above the water 
 from a motionless submarine, can be seen at a very short range only, and if it is 
 thrust up in u quick observation and then withdrawn, the presence of the sub- 
 marine is usually not disclosed. 
 
 The u.se of mirrors has been suggested and experimented with, but the con- 
 clusion has been reached that their use is not practicable. Any rolling of the 
 submarine will change the angle of Incidence and reflection and serve to reveal 
 the position of the submarine. 
 
 Periscopes having their upper portions made of glass tubing, to reduce 
 visibility, have also been proposed. 
 
 It is, however, the wake of the periscope on a moving submarine, rather 
 than the periscope itself, that attracts the attention of an observer. 
 
 Torpedoes. — A submarine may be equipped with from one to four, or even 
 more, torpedo tubes. These tulies are usually located in the bow, but some of 
 the larger vessels also have tubes in the stern, and there are some with broad- 
 side tubes. These, however, are not German. The tubes in the submarine 
 usually being built into the hull, it is necessary, in order to aim a torj^edo, to 
 maneuver the vessel so that the tube points at the target. Swiveled torpedo 
 tubes are considered undesirable for submarine work. 
 
 A submarine carries as many torpedoes as possible, the number varying 
 with the size and style of the boat. (See Torpedoes, p. — .) 
 
 Mines. — In addition to being equipped with torpedoes, some German sub- 
 marines carry as many as 20 or more mines. (See Mines, p. — .) 
 
 Guns. — For surface operations, a submarine is usually provided, fore and 
 aft, with guns of from .3 to 6 inch caliber. Sometimes these guns are secured 
 rigidly to the deck, and .sometimes hou.sed within the hull and thrust up when 
 they are to be used. A portable machine gun is also usually provided. 
 
 Wireless. — Telescopic or collapsible masts are provided, and wireless appa- 
 ratus operated upon them, particularly at night, when the masts can not be 
 seen by an enemy even if he Is close at hand. 
 
APPKNDIX. 265 
 
 Net-cutting devices, etc. — Numerous devices and attachments have been pro- 
 vided to enable submarines to cut nets, put out divers, and to send a marl^ing 
 buoy to the surface in case of accident, and have proved more or less ineffective. 
 
 METHODS OF OFFENSE. 
 
 Bases. — Where a surface fleet of naval vessels has control of the seas, it Is 
 customary to have mother ships carry supplies and spare parts and to accom- 
 pany a fleet of submarines ; but unless the seas are so controlled it is necessary 
 to supply the submarines from a shore base. 
 
 A base for submarines, to be of any value, must be easily and safely 
 accessible, and equipped to provide a safe storage point for large supplies of 
 liquid fuel, spare torpedoes, food, and other requisites for their proper main- 
 tenance. Its location, if in enemy territory, must, of course, be l^ept secret, 
 as the discovery of a submarine base leads to the destruction or capture of the 
 submarines dependent upon it. It is reported that one or more German secret 
 bases, along coasts under control of the Allies liave been discovered and 
 destroyed. 
 
 Maneucering. — In areas that are under intensive antisubmarine recon- 
 noissance, both enemy and friendly submarines have to remain submerged a 
 large portion of the time. If they remain on the surface during daylight, they 
 are in constant danger from patrol vessels and aeroplanes. When operating 
 in the open sea, submarines may remain on the surface most of the time, 
 especially at night. 
 
 In maneuvering it requires at least 60 feet — preferably 100 feet — depth of 
 water to remain concealed and safe from gunfire, ramming, or collision with 
 surface craft. Submarines are frequently tested for safe operation at depths 
 of as much as 200 feet, at which depth few effective obstructions, trawls, or 
 nets can be used against them. 
 
 A modern submarine may, if it is in good order and the hull is not punc- 
 tured, remain resting safely on the bottom for a day or more without incon- 
 venience to the crew. Under favorable conditions, where the waters are less 
 than 200 feet in depth, a submarine might lie at rest on the bottom and detect 
 the approach of a vessel several miles away. In case the water is more than 
 200 feet in depth, a submarine must usually be kept in motion, to obtain 
 steerageway, in order to hold its proper depth of submergence. This speed 
 need not exceed 1 knot. 
 
 Method of attack. — Submarines, to operate most effectively, must approach 
 within close range of the vessel which is intended to be torpedoed ; but tne 
 installation of offensive weapons on the merchant marine has increased the 
 necessity for the utmost care being exercised by the submarine commander to 
 remain unseen. It is reported that, many times, a submarine has followed a 
 slow-moving merchant vessel, at a safe distance, during the daylight and has 
 remained undetected, but, as dusk approached and the visibility of the sub- 
 marine decreased, the merchantman has been overhauled, when the submarine 
 moved into a position to discharge one or more torpedoes at short range, 
 with deadly effect. Reports from abroad indicate that in many cases sub- 
 marines have remained along lanes of travel for periods extending into weeks, 
 with the expectation of torpedoing certain vessels. 
 
 In its method of attack the submarine has many advantages over its ad- 
 versary. The ship to be attacked presents a definite target, of comparatively 
 large size, and is easily seen by the submarine commander at a range where the 
 submarine's periscope is usually quite invisible to those on the surface vesseL 
 
2(')^> KAVAL C07.-.7 LXTI5G B^MED OF THE trSTITEI) STATES. 
 
 f-r^ff) th'- j^/i th<; ioJbrfjar.r.'r t^ crulM'tg on the smrface it is not easily seen, be- 
 
 M tt,e Knttiiii>r\aH ar/i^roaetier an eriMuy'g surface Te««i it -Tibmerges, the 
 f;^riv;f/j.^ b<Hrij? the only ev-ldenoe of ir,s prejA-nce. Pen^-opie slghtliiz of the 
 torx^rt i- n'r'-'^^ry, as it lias been fonnd impossible r.. ■»-*!■ throuzh an nnder- 
 V ;,r.<-r wiri'low far enough for practical obs^rrarion. Is the erent of accident 
 to the periscope, a -nbmarine rnn-t come to the sTirfact for ■ f-rtnation or else 
 Biarieu-.er blindly. If the sea be rough, or the weather rr.:--ty or fog^y. the peri- 
 i!Cor>^ rnay not be s*erj until its prey is destroyed by a torpedo, and in some 
 cav-« not ev<-n then. The submarine commander thus has every opportunity to 
 verify hl« adversary's Identity, spe<id, and course, also to decide upon the most 
 vulnerable point of attack, and to place his boat in the best position to dis- 
 charge an effective shot. 
 
 Torpe<lf>es may be discharged %\ith equal effectiveness whether the submarine 
 Is on tlie surface or is submerged, but at the most effec-tive range, say one- 
 half mile or le-s. the superior gunfire and greater accuracy of the guns of 
 arnje<l merciiantmen and war vt-iels (because of their higher and steadier 
 gun platforms) make the defeat of the submarine, operating on the surface, 
 prohublf: — In fact, almost certain — if the torpedo attack is unsuccessful. A 
 single effective shell might disable or sink the submarine, because of its rela- 
 tively small positive buoyancy, while the surface vessel might have many shells 
 strike it and '^till remain in a seaworthy condition. 
 
 Protection of Voyaoing Ships Fbom the Submakin-e. 
 
 This subject, which is occupying the public mind as is no other, divides itself 
 Into a number of problems, the most important being the following: Detecting 
 the presence of suhniurines; nets, screens, guards, etc.; decreasing the visibility 
 of vessels; speed of vessels; special ship construction; convoying. 
 
 DETIXTING THE PKKSENCE OF SUBMARINES. 
 
 MirroplionrM. — Many merchantment and transports are equipped with micro- 
 phones so that they may detect the presence of submarines, take the necessary 
 and available precautions to defend themselves, or make escape. These instru- 
 ments are of the same general tyrie as those used by the submarines and have 
 already been described under " Listening devices." 
 
 NETS, SCUEENS, GUARDS, ETC. 
 
 Nets or srrrens to he attached to vrxscls. — Many de-signs of such devices are 
 suggested, and most of them are intended to be attached to the hull of the 
 vessel to be protected. .Many other suggestions along these lines, differing only 
 In some of I heir minor characteristics from the foregoing, have been received. 
 Up lo the present time not one of these proposals involving screens of any 
 kind has received the approval of the Navy Department or of the merchant 
 marine. The principal objections to these devices are that they are heavy, 
 (liflicult lo hold in position, unmanageable in a heavy sea, and that they inter- 
 fere with the speed and with the ability of the vessel to maneuver. Many of 
 the suggested devices would prevent the launching of lifeboats or rafts from 
 the vessel. It is barely possible, however, that there may be developed some 
 form of this general plan which will be found practicable. In no other field 
 have so many suggestions or so many duplicate inventions been presented to the 
 board. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 267 
 
 Pontoons and guard boats. — Pontoons and boats, from which plates or screens 
 are sometimes designed to be suspended, to intercept a torpedo, either self- 
 propelled or towed on both sides of the vessel or convoy to be protected, have 
 been proposed, but require so much power to propel that they are considered 
 wholly Impracticable. 
 
 Devices projected to intercept torpedoes. — Many forms of furled nets to be 
 opened in front of an approaching torpedo have been proposed ; nets con- 
 tained in shells to be discharged from guns and to be released on striking the 
 water ; nets to be dropped over the side of a vessel when the torpedo's ap- 
 proach is noticed, etc. The operation of these devices, even If practicable as 
 mechanisms, would require an appreciable time interval, and even if the tor- 
 pedo's approach were detected, the few seconds intervening between its being 
 observed and its striking the ship would probably be insufficient to permit of 
 their use. Quick maneuvering of the ship, however, has frequently been ef- 
 fective in dodging a torpedo. 
 
 Torpedo deflectors. — No effective means has been found to destroy a tor- 
 pedo in flight or to divert one from its course. Heavy charges have been ex- 
 ploded, experimentally, directly in front of and at the side of torpedoes, for 
 the purpose of determining the possibilities of deflecting them from their course, 
 but the regulating gyroscope of a torpedo immediately brings it back to fts 
 normal course, so that such methods may be considered as ineffective. More- 
 over, it should be understood that there is usually no knowledge that a torpedo 
 is coming, until it actually hits the vessel. 
 
 The deflection of a torpedo by water or air jets operated at the sides of the 
 vessel has been repeatedly suggested, but the power required to operate the 
 pumps necessary to furnish the streams of water, and to give adequate pro- 
 tection against a rapidly approaching torpedo, would be much greater than 
 that required to propel the ship. If the power were available, it might better 
 be used to drive the vessel at increased speed, by means of the propeller. 
 
 Numerous experiments with devices employing magnets for arresting or de- ■ 
 fleeting 'torpedoes have been tried, with discouraging results. It has been 
 found that magnetic influences are not felt at a practical distance. (See " Mag- 
 nets, etc.," p. — .) \ 
 
 Mine sweepers. — Mine-sweeping boats and devices to precede a vessel enter- 
 ing or leaving port are sometimes used for the purpose of cutting the cables of 
 submerged, anchored mines, sweeping them away or otherwise rendering them 
 harmless. 
 
 DECEEASING THE VISIBILITY OF VESSELS. 
 
 Smokeless combustion. — The point of lookout on a submarine being close to 
 the water, the position of a vessel at a distance can be determined only by 
 observing its smoke, which floats high in the air. Improved smokeless com- 
 bustion is therefore desirable. 
 
 The visible particles in smoke can be scrubbed out with several well-known 
 types of apparatus. The whole subject has been considered at length, and the 
 conclusion reached that to handle the quantity of gases emitted from a vessel's 
 stack would require such an amount of machinery and equipment as to make 
 these systems inadvisable. The small submarine chasers are equipped with 
 internal-combustionr engines and emit no smoke. Torpedo boats and destroyers 
 use oil fuel, and can suppress or emit smoke at will. Anthracite coal and other 
 smokeless fuels have been tried on coal-burning vessels with good results. 
 
 A number of systems for the smokeless combustion of soft coal have been 
 developed for operation in power plants and factories. Most of these systems 
 Involve the use of special types of grates and stokers which are not often found 
 
268 
 
 NAVAL, CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 in the vessels at present in service; however, there, seems to be no theoretically 
 insurmountable obstacle in iidapting the devices to marine work. 
 
 Smoke ncieciis. — Under favorable conditions of wind and position many 
 vessels have saved themselves from torpedo attacli by the production of a 
 smoke screen. This may be formed either by incomplete combustion of the 
 oil used for fuel by most naval vessels, or it may be created l)y burning chem- 
 icals, such as phosphorus and coal tar or mixtures in which both of these and 
 other materials are used. 
 
 After hiding itself from the submarine in a cloud of dense smoke, the vessel, 
 if possessed of sufficient speed, may be able by a ciuick maneuver to change her 
 position and escape before the submarine is able to discharge an effective 
 torpedo. 
 
 Bliiiding eiieiin/ periscopes. — In some cases a quantity of heavy black petro- 
 leum or similar substance which will float on the surface of the water has 
 been used to cloud the optical glass in the periscope's exposed end. However, 
 in view of the ease with which most of these substances may be washed off 
 and the vast area to be covered the use has been abandoned. 
 
 "Camouflage" painting. — Kelative Invisibility may also be afforded by 
 methods of painting. The art of so-called "camouflage" is applied to the 
 painting of ships, as well as to laud warfare. Ships are sometimes painted 
 to resemble the sea, and various devices have been proposed to conceal their 
 character, size, and identity. 
 
 The visibility of ships may be greatly reduced by designing them with a low 
 freeboard and eliminating masts, smokestacks, superstructure, etc., and this 
 matter has been given a great deal of study. 
 
 Suggestions as to any other method of reducing visibility will be of interest. 
 
 SPEED or VESSEL. 
 
 The undeniable evidence of submarine activity which has been accumulated 
 during the past few months has demonstrated that the immunity of .a vessel 
 to submarine attack is dependent very largely on its speed and also its ma- 
 neuvering ability. The percentage of vessels having speeds of 15 knots or 
 more, and which have suffered from submarine attack, is very small ; while 
 the loss of slow vessels, having speeds less than that of a submerged sub- 
 marine, is practically 100 per cent of those attacked. 
 
 The merchantman or other craft of high speed quickly passes beyond the 
 range at which a high percentage of torpedo hits can be scored, bvit slower 
 boats give the submarine ample opportunity to take careful aim and to score a 
 hit with almost every shot. 
 
 A ship steaming at 20 knots will cover a distance of one-half mile in one 
 and one-half minutes, but a ship at 10 knots takes three minutes, showing the 
 greater chance to escape the high-speed ships have when the submarine has finally 
 maneuvered into a position for the proper aiming of a torpedo; but as a sub- 
 marine seldom has time to get into position to aim torpedoes accurately at a 
 fast ship such a ship is almost inmiune to submarine attack, unless the U-boat 
 happens to be lying submerged in its path. 
 
 Merchant vessels, in order to be fast and at the same time economical cargo 
 carriers, must of necessity be of large size. 
 
 SPECIAL SHIP CONSTRUCTION. 
 
 The explosion of a near-by submarine mine or torpedo frequently tears great 
 rents in the ship's plating. In some cases opening a jagged hole 10 feet or more 
 across. The destructive effect at any given distance, at the point of explosion. 
 
APPENDIX. 269 
 
 depends to a large extent upon the framing and plating and may be greatly 
 diminished by special hull construction. 
 
 Water-tight compartments and air cells. — Many suggestions are made for 
 ships of unusual form to provide for safety in case of such explosions ; most 
 of these plans being an elaboration of the usual water-tight bulkhead construc- 
 tion, now required in structural design for all modern ships. 
 
 The multiplicity of water-tight compartments in any hull design tends to add 
 to the vessel's safety. The modern tank steamer, used to carry fluid cargo, 
 such as petroleum products or moiasses, is a good example of this design, 
 which has been in general ue for many years. 
 
 The honeycombing of hulls with air cells has been proposed in an infinite num- 
 ber of variations, and air tanks, such as are now used on life rafts, have also 
 been suggested in various proposed arrangements for installation within the 
 hulls of vessels. 
 
 The ordinary self-baling lifeboat, such as Is used by the Coast Guard Serv- 
 ice, probably represents the most highly developed form of nonsinkable ship 
 that can be constructed. Its hull Is filled with numerous water-tight cans or 
 boxes, so that injury will merely admit water to the space occupied by the 
 boxes, and only a little reduction of the buoyancy of the boat will occur, as each 
 box is an individual float. It is very unusual for a lifeboat of this type to 
 sink, even though the hull is badly wrecked. 
 
 The object of a passenger vessel Is to carry passengers, of a freighter to 
 carry freight, and of a war vessel to carry offensive armament. Air cells and 
 water-tight compartments in their various forms decrease the convenience and 
 carrying capacity of the different types of vessels, and the problem which has 
 to be solved for each type is one of over-all efficiency. In other words, how 
 much capacity is the designer justified in sacrificing in order to Increase the 
 safety from torpedo attack? 
 
 Cargo-carrying submarines. — Cargo-carrying submarines of many designs, 
 either self-propelled or towed, have been suggested. They are expensive to 
 build and operate, and are inefficient. 
 
 Life-saving devices. — Floating superstructure and many other special life- 
 saving devices have been proposed, but an increase in the number of lifeboats, 
 rafts, and regulation life preservers has usually been considered preferable, as 
 most of the special devices are inconvenient and cumbersome. 
 
 CONVOYING. 
 
 It has long been the custom to provide convoys for merchant shipping and 
 transports carrying soldiers. The advantage of the convoy is very great, where 
 a number of unarmed ships can be protected against submarine attack by one 
 or two destroyers, and convoys are being used wherever the need is most im- 
 portant. In many cases, however, the commanders of fast vessels prefer to 
 trust to their speed rather than to allow themselves to be hampered by the 
 necessarily slow speed of a convoyed fleet. 
 
 OrFFENsrvE Against Stjbmakines. 
 
 CONFINING TO BASES. 
 
 The question as to why submarines are not destroyed before they reach the 
 open sea is a most natural one. The best answer which it is possible to give, 
 according to the officers of our Navy and those of the foreign commissions 
 who have visited this country, is as follows : 
 
 The submarine bases are very strongly protected by land batteries, aeroplane 
 observers, and large areas of thickly mined waters, extending to such distances 
 
.270 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 that the largest naval gun can not get within range of the bases. Nets, when 
 laid, are promptly removed by the enemy, whose trawlers are in turn attacked 
 by our destroyers. In spite of thes§ protections, there is now going on a con- 
 tinuous attempt on the part of the allied navies to entrap or otherwise defeat 
 the submarines as they emerge from the protected areas. 
 
 MEANS OF DISCOVERY. 
 
 Nets. — There are three general types of antisubmarine nets — the indicator net, 
 the bomb net, the entangling net. The indicator net is solely for the purpose 
 of detecting the presence of the submarine. These nets are generally made of 
 light one-fourth-inch stranded wire and have about a 10-foot mesh, or they 
 may be made of fiber rope. The bomb nets are also of light material, only 
 sufficiently strong to carry the bombs. The entangling nets are made of much 
 heavier material, but German submarines are now equipped with various 
 devices for clearing themselves. 
 
 Antisubmarine nets are so placed that the upper edge is between 15 and 20 
 feet below the surface of the water. The waters in which nets are used are 
 under such close surveillance that no submarine would operate on the surface 
 there in the daytime. By Iteeping the top of the net under the surface its 
 location is not disclosed to the enemy. 
 
 Nets and bombs. — The value of nets with attached bombs is problematical, 
 owing to the great danger from the very rougli handling which these nets 
 invariably receive, especially when attempts are made to lay them in rough 
 water. The bombs and the apparatus which is usually designed to explode 
 them are heavy, bulky, and require occasional inspection for proper maintenance. 
 
 An almost imperceptible tidal current causes an anchored net to lop over to 
 one side so much as to sink the top of the net to a surprising extent. The be- 
 havior of nets, either towed or anchored in a current, is very difficult to com- 
 prehend, until seen. 
 
 Trawling. — Tlie dragging of trawls, or nets, by trawlers and destroyers, not 
 only with the view of locating submerged submarines but also to sweep up 
 mines, is frequently suggested. Under certain conditions this operation is prac- 
 ticable and effective, and has been constantly employed abroad since the be- 
 ginning of the war. 
 
 Aircraft. — Aeroplanes, dirigible balloons, kites, and aircraft of all sorts are 
 used for detecting the presence of submarines. They may be operated either 
 from shore or from the larger ships, and are sometimes very effective ; as, under 
 favorable conditions, a submarine is discei-nible from aircraft flying at a proper 
 height, even though the submarine be submerged to a considerable depth. 
 
 While aeroplanes have been thus used successfully in the English Channel, 
 they are unable to operate far out at sea, where the submarines are now most 
 active. The construction of mother ships for carrying and launching aero- 
 planes is necessarily a slow process under present conditions, when all ship- 
 yards are overloaded with other important work. 
 
 Optical detection. — Many devices which depend upon optical means of detec- 
 tion, such as special forms of telescopes and field glasses, to be mounted on 
 ships or on scouting vessels, are suggested. Experienced and alert lookouts, 
 however, have proved to be the most essential factor. Without such men, no 
 optical device appears to be of value, and at night, or in bad weather, such 
 devices are apt to be unreliable. 
 
 Wake of submarine or torpedo. — The fact that a moving torpedo leaves in Its 
 wake a stream of air bubbles caused by the exhaust air from its propelling 
 engines ofEers under favorable conditions one means for discovering its ap- 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 271 
 
 proach. This evidence Is, however, diflScult to detect In a rough sea or at 
 night, and, furthermore, the bubbles do not reach the surface of the water until 
 after the torpedo has traveled onward a distance of from 50 to 200 feet toward 
 its target. Only a very small percentage of torpedoes are seen. 
 
 Seeing under water. — Many proposals for boats with glass windows in the 
 bottom and other means for observing submerged objects have been made. The 
 waters in which submarine activity is most pronounced are so lacking in trans- 
 parency that experiments have proved it impossible to see objects such as 
 submarines at an average distance of more than 10 or 15 feet. Even in the 
 clearest sea water, objects under the surface can not be seen if distant more 
 than 100 or 150 feet. 
 
 Many special forms of searchlights and projectors, to enable an observer to 
 see a greater distance through water, have been suggested and experimented 
 with but so far none of these has proved successful. 
 
 It will be seen that each of the above methods, however useful, has its limita- 
 tions ; therefore, scientists and inventors should apply themselves not only to 
 the task of improving these, but also of finding supplementary methods and 
 devices. 
 
 PATKOI. FOE SUBMABINES. 
 
 In open waters, where storms and heavy seas are encountered, the patrol 
 for submarines is generally carried on by large, fast boats of the destroyer 
 type. In the more protected waters the patrol for submarines devolves upon 
 light, fast surface craft, aircraft, and submarines. 
 
 SUBMAKINES "USED AGAINST STJEMAKINES. 
 
 Submarines have very low visibility. They were primarily designed to 
 operate against the large surface vessels, and it has been the general impres- 
 sion that submarines are not effective against submarines. This belief was 
 also held by the general naval staffs of the various combatants at the beginning 
 of the war ; however, allied submarines have been successfully used in destroy- 
 ing enemy submarines. 
 
 In operating against hostile submarines, the hunting submarine may employ 
 one of -two methods — it may remain totally submerged and take observations 
 by thrusting up the periscope every few minutes, or it may remain on the 
 surface and only dive when the enemy submarine is sighted. In both cases 
 the hunting submarine maneuvers very slowly, in order to avoid attracting 
 the attention of the enemy, and to prevent detection by means of listening 
 devices. The method of total submergence is used in restricted waters, such 
 as channels and lanes through which the enemy submarine must pass. Tor- 
 pedoes are used when submarines fight each other, and, if possible, the ex- 
 tremely effective ram. All submarines can ram without specially designed 
 devices for so doing. 
 
 DESTRUCTION OF SUBMARINE. 
 
 A submarine is most vulnerable to attack from gunfire when it is on the 
 surface, recharging the storage batteries; for the gases rising during this 
 operation are stifling and must be vented into the air, and several minutes 
 are required to close the hatches and submerge. 
 
 Quick-firing guns of sufficient caliber and depth charges are used by surface 
 vessels, such as destroyers and chasers when they are unable to discharge 
 an effective torpedo. 
 
 168537°— 20 18 
 
272 NAVAL, CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 Ounfire. — A rapid-fire gun is effective when the submarine is within close 
 range of the gun ; but when only the conning tower is exposed the target Is so 
 small that it is difficult to hit. 
 
 A submerged submarine ran be reached with ordinary service shells only 
 by high angle fire, because at low angles they ricochet on the surface of the 
 water. 
 
 The Navy has one or more types of shell that penetrate the water satis- 
 factorily, and any improvement would be along the line of straighter under- 
 water trajectory and reduced underwater resistance. The screw-nosed shell 
 lias been suggested many times, but it would seem that inventors are laboring 
 under a misapprehension, viz, that the shell will screw its way into the water, 
 whereas a shell rotates only once in about 25 or 30 calibers, and the fraction 
 of a revolution which it makes while entering the water is negligible. 
 
 Depth charges. — The powerful effect of any submarine explosion on all 
 neighboring bodies provides a simple means of destroying or crippling an 
 undersea boat. Once it has been even approximately located, the setting off 
 of a heavy charge of high explosive, well submerged within about 50 feet of 
 the submarine, will bring about this result. 
 
 Howitzers and mortars to throw depth charges at a submarine have been 
 proposed, but the deck of a merchant vessel would have to be reinforced to 
 support the recoil, if heavy charges were to be handled. Catapults have been 
 proposed as a substitute for howitzers, but are believed to be theoretically and 
 practically less efficient for this work. 
 
 Bombing hydro-aeroplanes. — The rapid development and improvement of the 
 
 ■ depth bomb, and the increased carrying capacity of the modern high-powered 
 
 hydro-aeroplane, have made possible a new type of " bombing hydro-aeroplane," 
 
 designed to carry a considerable number of bombs, each containing a heavy 
 
 charge of high explosive. 
 
 Nests of torpedoes. — A great many nest arrangements of torpedoes have been 
 suggested and considered, also torpedoes combined with nets, but the authori- 
 ties do not believe that any of these combinations are as practicable as other 
 means now at hand. 
 
 Totcing mines. — The idea of having chasers towing mines has often been 
 suggested and used to some extent. This is a good method when the wliere- 
 abouts of the submarine are known. 
 
 Torpedoes influenced by sound. — Torpedoes to be controlled by sound have 
 been frequently proposed, the torpedo to be tuned to automatically steer itself 
 and strike the vessel destined to be destroyed. This design has been very care- 
 fully considered by torpedo experts and associated scientists. 
 
 To develop such a weapon would require years of experimentation and wliile 
 a successful design might be attained, the relative increase in value would 
 hardly compensate for the time and study necessary. 
 
 There are many methods for dealing with the submarine when its where- 
 abouts are determined. The problem lies rather in locating the submarine. 
 
 Torpedoes. 
 
 Size.- — The modern submarine torpedo varies in size according to the service 
 for which it is intended, and ranges from 14 inches in diameter and 15 feet in 
 length to 21 Inches in diameter and 21 feet in length, weighing from 1,000 to 
 2,600 pounds, the smaller type being used by the Germans to sink unprotected 
 freight and passenger ships at short range. 
 
 Speed. — It is capable of a speed of more than 30 miles per hour, and when 
 traveling at normal speed, possesses great momentum, about 65,000 foot-second 
 pounds. 
 
APPENDIX. 273 
 
 Method of discharge. — A torpedo is projected by means of a special form of 
 tube or gun. Tlie tube is usually built into the hull of the submarine, in which 
 case it is aimed by maneuvering the boat. In the case of destroyers and battle- 
 ships, the torpedo may be projected from submerged tubes or from deck tubes. 
 
 Generally speaking, torpedoes are projected from submerged tubes by com- 
 pressed air and from deck tubes by a small charge of gunpowder. Submerged 
 tubes on battleships, however, may be designed to use either powder or com- 
 pressed air. When the torpedo is fired from a submerged tube, the compressed 
 air or the gas from the powder follows the torpedo out of the tube with a rush, 
 and causes an eruption on the surface of the sea, which is visible for & consid- 
 erable distance. As a result of the warning given by this eruption, vessels have 
 sometimes been able to escape the torpedoes by a quick maneuver. 
 
 Propulsion. — The modern torpedo is self propelled, being driven through the 
 water by Its own compressed-air motor, the air being supplied from a strongly 
 built reservoir within the body of the torpedo itself. Torpedoes directly oper- 
 ated by internal-combustion engines as motive power have been experimented 
 with and discarded. 
 
 Range. — The range of a torpedo is approximately a mile, those designed for 
 use on battleships and destroyers being longer ranged than those for use on 
 submarines. The great difficulty in getting proper direction and sufficient mo- 
 tive power to give the required speed for a long duration of time renders the 
 long-range torpedo impracticable. It is stated that the latest German torpedo 
 has a range of about 2.000 yards, as the compressed-air storage reservoir has 
 been reduced in size in order to increase the charge of high explosive in the 
 warhead. The charge is said to be from 300 to 400 pounds. 
 
 Method of steering. — The torpedo keeps a fairly accurate course by means 
 of a gyroscopic steering mechanism, which is immune to outside mngnetic dis- 
 turbance. 
 
 Course. — The depth at which a torpedo travels, may be regulated to hit the 
 most vital part of the vessel, and that is usually about 10 feet below the surface. 
 In ease of torpedo attack against an armored ship, the torpedo, to be dangerous, 
 should strike beneath the armor belt, which usually extends about 10 feet below 
 the water line. 
 
 Net-cutting devices. — Torpedoes are usually provided with means to cut, more 
 or less effectively, through nets placed in their paths. 
 
 Detonation. — The detonation of the torpedo is accomplished through a mech- 
 anism placed within its warhead; and if the torpedo is checked in its forward 
 motion, the firing mechanism instantly ignites the heavy charge of explosive con- 
 tained within the warhead. It is not necessary to strike a firing pin on the end 
 of a torpedo to detonate the charge. 
 
 Controlled by cable from ship. — Many suggestions have been submitted to the 
 board for a torpedo to be electrically propelled from a ship by means of a 
 flexible cable connecting it with the ship. This was the first type of tor- 
 pedo built, but was discarded for the present dirigible type, as the weight of 
 cable, difficulties in insulation, etc., render it of no practical value. 
 
 Stationary mines. — Generally speaking, there are two types of mines — fixed 
 and floatjng. The fixed or stationary submarine mine is fired by contact, 
 electricity, timing device, or fuse. Such mines, which are extensively used 
 by all navies, are rugged in design and may contain large charges of explosives. 
 They are placed in position by submarines and other especially equipped mine- 
 laying vessels. Such a mine is provided with an anchoring device And is 
 
274 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 deposited, if possible, in liarbors and cliannels of the enemy or iu the paths of 
 ocean travel. 
 
 Floating mines. — Floating mines difEer from fixed mines in that they are un- 
 anchored, and unless guard boats are at hand to wai-n friendly vessels of their 
 proximity, may be as dangerous to friend as to foe. Such mines must be, ac- 
 cording to laws of war, designed to become Inoperative within a few hours after 
 being set adrift. 
 
 The German floating mines are often cast adrift In pairs connected by a line 
 about 100 feet long. If a ship runs between the two mines they are drawn 
 alongside the ship aud exploded. 
 
 Contact depth )nincs. — Many proposals have been received suggesting the use 
 of a contact depth mine, which will rise to the surface if falling to contact. 
 This type, however, is considered unnecessary and Inadvisable. The essence 
 of the depth charge is that It explodes in the vicinity of the submarine, In case 
 It fails to strike the boat Itself. The use of the contact depth mine presupposes 
 the necessary accuracy to strike the target. The recovery feature is of no 
 particular value, and would necessitate numerous safety precautions to insure 
 absolute safety in picking up. 
 
PROBLEMS OF AEROPLANE IMPROVEMENT. 
 
 rBuUetin No. 3, August 1, 1918. I.ssued by Naval Consulting Board of the United States 
 and Engineering Council's War Committee of Technical Societies.] 
 
 Introduction. 
 
 Many of the greatest improvements in industry have been made by men vs'Iio 
 had but little practical experience or technical training along the line in 
 question. But they brought to the task the requisites most needed — a free brain, 
 a clear insight, and fresh enthusiasm. 
 
 Perhaps yours is the mind that will see the way to some great improvement 
 in aircraft, one of tlie most potent weapons for winning the war. A billion 
 dollars has been set aside for production. The finest shops and the best trained 
 men in the country are working upon design and manufacture and we will 
 soon have machines. But we want the best in the world. The men engaged 
 in the details of the work are just now under a pressure which is not favorable 
 for the exerci.se of creative powers. Technical men who are far enough from 
 the work to see it in a different perspective, therefore, have a special oppor- 
 tunity for useful service. 
 
 In order to save you labor specialists have summarized in the inclosed 
 bulletin the most pressing problems of aircraft improvement and have indi- 
 cated probable lines of progress. Any help you can give will be welcomed. 
 Inventions and Ideas submitted in reply should be addressed to Thomas Robins, 
 istcretary Naval Consulting Board. 1.5 Park Row, New York. 
 
 Aeroplane Motive Power Improvement. 
 
 The present situation with respect to the improvement of aeroplane motive 
 power is that the Government is concentrating all its energies upon the quick 
 production of the best design it has been able to select from present motor de- 
 velopment. For manufacturing reasons it was obviously necessary to standard 
 ize this design and just now the Government is not in a position to consider 
 improved motors and systems of power. Such questions must be deferred if 
 possible until after the pressing needs of the moment have been met. 
 
 At all times, however, advances which are great enough and which have been 
 sufficiently proven, necessarily command a right of way. Power development 
 is moving so swiftly and there is so much room for its advance that nothing 
 is really fixed, and no nation is taking a chance of overlooking anything 
 which is really worth while. Minor improvements, applicable with the present 
 motor, can be considered at any time if they are of sufficient value. 
 
 Possibilities for Radical Advances. 
 
 For war uses the cost of power is immaterial, the important object being: 
 
 (1) To secure steady, reliable operation. 
 
 (2) To obtain lighter weights than the 2 to 2.5 pounds per horsepower now 
 attained (1.75 pounds without radiator, water, piping, propeller, etc.). 
 
 (3) To obtain more work per pound of fuel carried. 
 
 275 
 
276 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 The room for improvement is tn-ideiit from a view of the conditions under 
 which the average aeroplane motor, now operates (figures approximate) : 
 
 Per cent. 
 Energy of fuel delivered by engine shaft to propeller — thermal efficiency — 
 for the indicated horsepower, 30 per lent : For the brake horse- 
 power 2") 
 
 Energy consumed by engine friction 5 
 
 Energy lost by cooling 30 
 
 Energy escaping in exhaust (including that of unburnfed fuel) -40 
 
 Total fuel contents 100 
 
 Mechanical efficiency of propeller ■ 75 
 
 Net energy of fuel delivered by propeller and available f(u- flight 
 
 (0.75 X 0.25) 19 
 
 The field for radical improvements is an extremely broad one, covc^ring 
 all the possibilities of new power cycles and of gas turbine. No su.ggcstioiis 
 can be offered to those who wish to inve.stigate these pussibilities, but they can 
 familiarize themselves with the subject through Uie bibliography attached. 
 
 COXSEKVATIVE IMPROVEMENTS IN AlEPL.\NE MOTORS. 
 
 By E. H. Sherbondy, United States .Virplane I5n!!ineeriiig Department, Bureau of .\lrcraft 
 Production, War Department. 
 
 The following is a brief presentation of some of the problems eiicounrer(Ml 
 by aircraft motor and airplane designers, and also some suggestions relative to 
 the improvement of apparatus and methods of function. 
 
 It is assumed that, those interested in the development of apparatus required 
 In this field of work are informed as to current progress. Engineers who are 
 familiar with the development of power and general machinery, but who are 
 without special knowledge of aircraft motors and their accessories are advised 
 to read back issues of the American, English, and French periodicals devoted 
 to aeronautics and automobile engineering. They should also look up the 
 subject through the works upon internal-combustion engines given in the 
 bibliography attached, which also includes a list of the periodicals which are 
 of the most importance from a technical standpoint. American books upon 
 aircraft motors are often of an elementary character unsuitable for the pur- 
 pose in hand. JIuch valuable information will be found in the journals of 
 technical societies mentioned in the bibliography. 
 
 Tlie problems to be solved mainly refer to impro\-ements in the motor-power 
 apparatus, its specific weight ; its thermal efficiency referred to brake horse- 
 power and the reliability of its mechanical construction. 
 
 In order to do successful work in any line of invention it is desirable to 
 have a definite idea of what is still to be accomplished and also more or less 
 familiarity with the history of the particular art. Many helpful suggestions 
 may be obtained from a study of experiments on various kinds of apparatus 
 which have failed for reasons which may not he operative now through the 
 existence of better materials and more knowledge or through the advance of 
 the physical sciences and of methods of carrying out the intention of the 
 invention. This point is illustrated by the history of automobile rear axle 
 drives. For a long time straight bevel gears were used. The helical bevel 
 gear was known many years ago, but no method had been devised by which 
 it could be economically produced, so that it did not come into practical use 
 until about 1912. 
 
 The present state of the art of designing aircraft motors may be briefly 
 summarized as follows; 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 277 
 
 The engine types are practically sta'ndardized. There are two principal 
 types — one having 6 or 8 vertical cylinders all in line ; the other being the " V " 
 type with either 8 or 12 cylinders. It should be added that the use of aluminum 
 has increased enormously the possibilities of the radial types of motors in 
 moderate powers, these being designed with either fixed or rotating cylinders 
 and with either air or water cooling. To be useful for aircraft work an en- 
 gine must not weigh more than 2.4 pounds per brake horsepower (1.7 pounds 
 without radiator, water, piping, propeller, etc.). It must, moreover, be com- 
 posed of parts which can be readily produced by American manufacturing 
 methods. The thermal efficiency of current types of aircraft motors referred 
 to brake horsepower ranges from 25 to 32 per cent, this being the proportion 
 of the original heat contents of the fuel consumed which appears in shaft horse- 
 power. While the efficiency of these engines is higher than that of any other 
 type of prime mover, including commercial Diesel engines within the output 
 range of aircraft engines, their economy is rather low at less than maximum 
 horsepower, and every effort should be made to improve the economy at part 
 load. The economy varies but little for considerable changes in altitude, so 
 that in this matter the effect of altitude is not often of importance. 
 
 It should be borne in mind that improvements suggested for the present sys- 
 tem of motor power should lend themselves to development to a practical stage 
 within a short time, say, six months ; that is, the apparatus should be experi- 
 mentally proven and ready for production at the end of this period. 
 
 Elements of the power system susceptible to injprovement are dealt with in 
 the following: 
 
 CAKBUKETION. 
 
 For a given motor operating successively at two different altitudes under 
 Identical conditions, i. e., at the same speed and with the same carburetor ad- 
 justment (the same sectional areas for the passage of air, gasoline, and mix- • 
 ture), the amounts of air (by weight) drawn into the motor in the same time 
 are proportional to the barometric pressures at the two altitudes. The volume 
 of air drawn in remains the same. Since the density of the gasoline does not 
 vary with the altitude, we may sumrnarlze the effect of changes In altitude 
 upon the mixture quality as follows: 
 
 The richness of the carburetor mixture increases with the altltyde. It varies 
 inversely as the square root of the ratio of barometric pressures (assuming the 
 motor speed and throttle position to remain constant). While this is approxi- 
 mately correct for ordinary elevations It Is decidedly true at altitudes over 
 15,000 feet. 
 
 This leads us to a consideration of the subject of carburetor regulation for 
 varying altitude. At present this regulation is effected by means of a device 
 called an altimeter, whose function it is to control the flow of gasoline through 
 the carburetor nozzle. This object may be accomplished either by reducing the 
 size of the orifice through which the liquid flows, or by reducing the equivalent 
 head above the orifice. The equivalent head can be reduced by making the 
 pressure In the float chamber dependent upon the pressure above the carburetor 
 throttle, or by adding more air to the carbureted mixture above the mixing 
 chamber. These functions are carried out automatically In two types of car- 
 buretors so far developed. One of these is the product of the Zenith Carburetor 
 Co., of Lyon, France. This comprises a barometric capsule which through a 
 linkage operates a valve regulating the pressure, In the float chamber. The 
 other was developed by the Panhard-Levassor Co., of Paris, France, and In 
 this there Is a diaphragm "acted upon by the atmospheric pressure and the pres- 
 
278 NAVAL, CONSULTING BOAKD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 sure within the carburetor. The motion of this diaphragm controls tin auxiliary 
 air valve above the primary mixing chamber of the carburetor. 
 
 Like the density, the temperature of the air decreases at high altitudes, but 
 the decrease follows no regular law. Figures showing the actual decrease in 
 temperature during several flights up to 20,000 feet altitude were published 
 in the Journal of the Society of Automotive Engineers for September, ]i117. 
 A change in temperature affects the quality of the mixture, since the viscosity 
 of the fuel changes with the temperature, and the quantity flowing llirough a 
 fixed size orifice varies accordingly. However, variation of the mixture quality 
 as a result of temperature changes is very small compared with the variation 
 due to changes in barometric pressure, and the complication of any thermo- 
 static arrangement for correcting the rate of gasoline flow or of air admission 
 might outweigh the practical advantages gained. The value of any such ap- 
 paratus would depend entirely on the practicability of the form in which it 
 appeared. 
 
 PKECOMPSESSION OF AIR SUPPLY FOE JIOTOK. 
 
 This is one of the major problems on which aviation motor designers are at 
 present engaged. Apparatus for this purpose must operate reliably and be light 
 in weight ; it must be designed with a view to very high mechanical and vol- 
 umetric efiiciency. 
 
 mxiTION'. 
 
 This is a most promising field fur experimental investigation. Owing to tlie 
 fact that modern enf;ines develo]) explosion pressin-es of from 400 to Olio pounds 
 per square inch and a II. E. P. of lliO to 135 pounds, the problem of si>ark 
 plugs is a difficult one. 
 
 The insulation must be cai)able of withstanding the enormous temperatures 
 developed, and the plug nmst not leak. A slight leak past tlie insulation for 
 a period of 3i) seconds would cause complete failure of tlie plug. The spark 
 points of the plugs must be maintained at a sufficiently high temperature to 
 prevent an accumulation of carbon on them, and yet their temjierature must 
 not be high enough to cause iireignition of the combustible chai-ge. This means 
 that the spark points nmst be maintained within a critical tenqjerature zone. 
 The chief trouble encountered with spark plugs up to date has been that at 
 low engine power the temperature of the spark points is so low that the points 
 rapidly become carbonized and the plug is short circuited. This carbonizing 
 can be corrected by a better system of lubrication. 
 
 Heating and expansion of the insulated electrode tends to cause the insulator 
 to fail by cracking or otherwise, and the fact that all good electrical insulators 
 are poor conductors of heat makes it difficult to keep the temperature of the 
 insulator down and protect it fnmi in.]ury by overheatiiig. The best minds in 
 this field of activity are now working toward a solution of this pressing 
 problem. References to this subject may Ije looked up in the Journal of the 
 Society of Automotive Engineers under the headings of " Ignition " and " Spark, 
 plugs." The generating and distributing apparatus re(iuired and the ignition 
 wiring have been developed to a high degree of reliability, and unless some 
 entirely new scheme of ignition can be devised wliich overcomes the difficulties 
 of the present system we feel that the jump-si)ark ignition system will main- 
 tain its present unique position, having no competitors. Nevertheless, it is to 
 be observed that in reliability the present ignition systems still leave a good 
 deal to be desired. Moreover, the weights nre too high, and a larger output 
 of energy per cylinder would simplify the plug problem. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 ENGINE PARTS. 
 
 279 
 
 Engine parts of all kinds are generally very reliable, and an analysis of 
 the failures of parts in French aircraft engines during 1915 and 1916 revealed 
 no single part whose failures represented more than 2 per cent of the total 
 number. Thirty per cent. of the interruptions of power were due to hits by 
 projectiles which affected some portion of the power system. 
 
 SELF-STAKTEBS. 
 
 Starting systems may be of three kinds — air, electric, and powder shell. 
 Air starters and electric starters are usually applied to the motors of sea- 
 planes, as seaplanes are not required to operate at very great elevations or at 
 very great speeds ; so the additional weight of the starting apparatus is not a 
 serious objection, but in reconnoissance and fighting planes the weight must 
 be kept at a minimum in order that speeds of 140 to 180 miles per hour and 
 very great altitudes may be attained. In a few cases air starters have been 
 fitted to aircraft engines mounted in fighting planes. The system makes use 
 of an air bottle for supplying tlie required amount of air under the proper 
 pressure. This air is either led through a distributor to the motor cylinders 
 or is used to operate a multiple-cylinder air engine connected with the motor 
 crank shaft by means of an overrunning clutch. 
 At the time of writing all starting systems have been discarded for battle 
 planes. However, as we in America have developed electric starting systems 
 of rather light weight to a high degree of reliability these may be fitted to 
 motors mounted in bombing planes, which are usually equipped with multiple 
 motors and do not necessarily have to be of very high speed. The Sheffield 
 Car Co., of Michigan, has built gasoline railway cars in which the gasoline 
 motor is started by means of a charge of black powder detonated by a special 
 mechanism in the cylinder head, and it is possible that this idea may be 
 developed until practical results are obtained, although the problem is very 
 difficult in motors with a large number of cylinders. 
 
 EXHAUST MUEFLEES. 
 
 Exhaust mufflers would be desirable provided their weight was not excessive 
 and they were effective in muffling and proof against injury from excessive 
 heating. Since aircraft motors of to-day are 200 to 600 shaft horsepower and 
 heat is constantly passing out with the exhaust gases at a rate equal to twice 
 the useful power, it is at once apparent that the construction of a suitable 
 muffler for aircraft engines is not a simple problem. An automobile muffler 
 is called upon to radiate about one-tenth the amount of heat which would 
 pass through the aviation muffler. Experiments in connection with this prob- 
 lem have been carried out at Cornell University, and the results obtained were 
 published in the trade papers. In working out the problem it will be neces- 
 sary to guard against any interference with the cooling of exhaust valves 
 by radiation and conduction. 
 
 COOLING BADIATOES. 
 
 Cooling radiators are one of the most vulnerable points of the modern 
 fighting machine, the system of cooling used being substantially the same as 
 that on automobiles. However, the cooling capacity of a given sized radiator 
 is greatly increased on an airplane by reason of the high speed at which air 
 passes through the tubes. The form of radiator and its location are subjects 
 
280 NAVAL CONSXJLTIjSTG BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 which are usually left to the plane designer. A radiator m;iy absorb 20 per 
 cent of the engine power if it is not properly placed or designed for fri>c air 
 flow. A remarkable paper covering the whole subject of engine cooling ana 
 radiator design was published in 1916 by F. W. Lanchester in the proceedings 
 of the Institution of Automobile Engineers, and should be consulted by anyone! 
 Interested In this subject. 
 
 FUEL SYSTEM, 
 
 Fuel Storage and supply systems are by no means satisfactory, and aUliough 
 a great deal of thought and ingenuity have been spent upon the design of 
 these parts, this still remains a fruitful field for suggestion and invention. 
 The arrangement of the fuel tanks and lines and the method of flitting the fuel 
 tanks to the motors are probably the least settled features of aircraft construc- 
 tion. A suggestion in this connection is to make the tanks and fuel lines of 
 same high resistance steel, so as to make them bullet proof. The objection to 
 this is the great weight entailed, but this might be minimized by the develop- 
 ment of special alloys possessing little weight and great strength. 
 
 The present type of aircraft engine operates successfully only on gasoline 
 having a boiling point not exceeding 250° F. Hydrocarbon fuels of higher 
 boiling points are apt to crack or become dissociated under the combined action 
 of the high temperature and pressure, with the result that compounds are 
 formed which produce a smoky exhaust. If we could find a fuel which carried 
 the oxygen required for its combustion, the power of aviation motors would 
 be affected neither by the altitude nor the temperature of the atmosphere. 
 
 PBOPELI.EES. 
 
 The subject of propeller design and construction Is an extremely difficult 
 one, since propellers mvst operate at enormous speeds in an atmosphere of 
 varying temperature and density, and are subject to very complex stresses. 
 Very important technical papers on the design of propellers have appeared in 
 English and French aeronautic magazines, and in particular the eexperiments 
 of G. Eiffel and A. Guret, which were published in France, are of the first 
 Importance. Propeller design and construction have been discussed also In 
 engineering papers in our own journals of aviation. 
 
 MACHINE-GUN SYNCHHONIZEBS. 
 
 Machine-gun synchronizers originated in France in 1915. Their object is to 
 permit of firing a machine gun through the arc between the propeller blades. 
 An important paper dealing with this apparatus was published in France in 
 1916, under, the title " Les Avions Allemands." Llbrairie Aeronautique, 40 
 Rue de Seine, 40 Paris. (Copies of this pamphlet may be had from the book 
 dealer Brentano, Fifth Avenue, New York City.) 
 
 INSTETJMENTS. 
 
 Many new Instruments have been devised for aircraft. These include baro- 
 graphs, which indicate and record altitude; drift meters, which indicate side 
 slip of the plane through the air; inclinometers, which indicate the angle of 
 the plane ; tachometers, which indicate the engine speed ; oil, gasoline, and 
 water gauges, which indicate the pressure and temperature of these fluids; 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 281 
 
 and speed indicators, wliicli indicate tlie speed of tlie plane relative to the air 
 through which it is traveling. All of these devices are capable of being fur- 
 ther improved. Two instruments v?hich it would be very desirable to have 
 would be one giving the speed of the plane relative to the ground and one show- 
 ing the altitude of the plane above the ground. Pilots flying at night with a 
 barograph know only their altitude above sea level, and as they may not know 
 the character of the ground over which they are flying, when they fly at low 
 elevations (1,000 to 2,000 feet above sea level) they are not at all certain 
 that they are at a safe altitude. 
 
 New cycles of operation for heat motors and the improvement of old ones 
 are possible and desirable. The most available cycle, which is susceptible 
 of immediate practical development, is the two-stroke cycle, and engines of 
 this type have been built in great numbers, though the type has attained an 
 important position only in the Diesel marine and stationary engine fleld. 
 Adhering to the principles that have been found indispensable to the successful 
 development of marine Diesel two-stroke engines, some useful results might be 
 obtained. It is quite possible that an aircraft engine may be developed with 
 a'weight per horsepower not more than one-half that of our present engines 
 and with a thermal efficiency (referred to brake horsepower), especially at 
 less than maximum power, better than has been secured with the four-stroke 
 cycle engine up to date. The subject of charging — that is, supplying the fuel 
 and mixing it with the required amount of air — afCords great possibilities for 
 development. 
 
 Peoblems in Abeonautics. 
 
 By Dr. W. F. Durand, Scientific Attache, American Embassy, France ; Lately Chairman 
 the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. 
 
 MATEEIALS FOE AIEPLANE CONSTRUCTION. 
 
 For wing surface or covering, linen or cotton fabric is now in common or prac- 
 ' tically universal use. 
 
 Sheet metal or metal fabric has received some attention. The chief advan- 
 tage would be noninHammabllity and perhaps greater durability. 
 
 No wing covering can be considered which is markedly heavier than present 
 forms for the same strength. Present coverings weigh from 4 to 4.5 ounces 
 per square yard and have a tensile strength per inch of width of 70 to 80 
 pounds. * 
 
 Any proposed substitute form must also give a smooth and continuous sur- 
 face comparable with present forms. 
 
 For the wing skeleton or frame, spruce and wood veneer are commonly em- 
 ployed. Broadly speaking, the frame is of wood construction of one design or 
 another. 
 
 Steel or aluminum alloys are attracting attention and seem to offer possi- 
 bilities. 
 
 Any form of construction in metal must meet sensibly the present relation 
 between strength and weight. This means that the wing must be capable of 
 sustaining up to the point of rupture a distributed load of not far from 100 
 pounds per square foot. 
 
 No one should undertake the development of such construction without expert 
 advice in applied mechanics, experience in steel construction, and with large 
 shop and fabricating facilities available. 
 
 For fuselage construction the present materials are commonly spruce, ash, 
 and wood veneer. Heavier woods, such as ash, can here be used to some extent. 
 
282 KAVAL CONSULTING BOAKD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 Steel or metal ciiiistniction seems here also to offer hopeful possibilities, but 
 under general limitations of equivalence regarding weight and strength com- 
 pared with wood. 
 
 TIKES AND FASTENINGS. 
 
 The use of steel-wire cable for ties is standard and practically universal. It 
 seems hard to imagine material siiperior to the best modern alloy steel wire, 
 but there seems no reason for assuming that such material represents the last 
 word in the wire maker's art, and there is therefore room for improvement 
 even here, both in the material employed, in the mode of laying up wires to- 
 form a complex tie member, and in the form of section of such member. 
 
 .Joint fastenings are commonly made of sheet steel or sheet bronze. There 
 is room for improvement expressed in terms of ease of manufacture, economical 
 distribution of material, facility for attachment of wire or cable ties, and 
 general adaption to purpose. 
 
 SUPEKCHAKGING ENGINE. i 
 
 The cylinder of the aeronautic engine takes in per cycle a cylinder full of air 
 at substantially the atmospheric pressure about the carburetor. As the air- 
 plane ascends, the density of the air diminishes and there is, therefore, takea 
 in per cycle a decreasing weight of air and hence a decreasing weight of oxygen. 
 This reduces corre.spondingly the amount of fuel which can be burned per cycle 
 and hence the power develnped. 
 
 It results that, as the airplane as'cends to high altitudes meeting air of de- 
 creasing density, the power falls off accordingly, and very nearly in proportion 
 to the density. 
 
 To meet this difficulty means are desired for supplying to the engine or to- 
 the carburetor air at a nearly constant air pressure. This implies soilie 
 form of air compressor taking in air at reduced [pressure arid density and de- 
 livering to the engine air at normal or nearly normal atmospheric pressure 
 and density. 
 
 This problem has already been solved or approxima'tely solved so far a.s- 
 merely compressing the air is concerned. It is primarily a problem of finding 
 the best Avay of meeting the various limiting requirements regarding space» 
 weight, reliability, etc. • 
 
 TWO-CYCLE ENGINE. 
 
 If an engine operating on the two-cycle program can be developed, witli 
 fuel economy and general reliability equal to that of the four-cycle engine, 
 the relation of weight to power should admit of substantial reduction. This- 
 is a favorite field for inventor.?, and a large number of designs and sugges- 
 tions have been submitted. The field is still open. 
 
 PITCH-ADJUSTING PKOPELLEK. 
 
 Closely connected with the maintenance of the jiower of the engine at in- 
 creasing altitudes is the problem of efficiently utilizing such power through 
 the propeller. To this end some variation of pitch is desirable in order to main- 
 tain a proper relation between the torque of the engine and the reisistance of 
 the blade working in air of varying densities. Such variation of pitch is- 
 normally attended with loss in efficiency. Such loss should be reduced to the 
 minimum. The problem here is one partly of propeller design with reference 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 283 
 
 to aerodynamic qualities and partly one of structural design with reference 
 to an operating and reliable form \yhich will admit of adjustment of pitch to 
 meet changing conditions of operation. Such change may be placed under 
 hand control or under automatic or semiautomatic control between the limits 
 imposed by the construction. 
 
 SPAKK PLUGS. 
 
 The general style of modern spark plug is the result of an evolution deter- 
 mined largely by the conditions of operation of the automobile engine. Wit;- 
 the higher compressions which are coming into vogue for the aeronoutic engine, 
 increasing difficulties are met with in the spark plug, particularly as regards 
 the breaking down of Its electrical Insulating qualities. 
 
 A spark plug, apparently good in appearance, may last for many hours' hard 
 service or it may give out after a few hours' running. The problem of Ignition, 
 especially for the aeronautic engine, is one still awaiting satisfactory treatment. 
 
 PABACHIITES. 
 
 These considered as a safety device are not desired as a factor in the equip- 
 ment of military airplanes. No entirely satisfactory disengaging device has 
 yet been developed. Such devices may presumably play some part in civil 
 aeronautics and under peace conditions, but under existing military condi- 
 tions they are not considered a necessary or desirable encumbrance. 
 
 STABILIZING DEVICES. 
 
 The general subject of stabilizing devices is a favorite field for Inventors. 
 Broadly speaking, there is small likelihood for the favorable consideration of 
 such devices under present war conditions. Aeronautic engineers already know 
 perfectly well how to give to an airplane any desired degree of stability in any 
 one of the various senses in which the word is used. The problem is to con- 
 bine judiciously the various modes of stability together with the qualities which 
 are needful for military purposes. Without thorough training as an expert 
 the average student of the subject is not likely to produce anything distinctly 
 new or available in this particular field of aeronautic design. 
 
 SELF-STAKTERS. 
 
 With increase in size and power of engines, the need of mechanical starters 
 is becoming more and more clearly defined. The self-starter is a now recog- 
 nized feature of seaplane equipment, and is attracting increasing interest as a 
 feature for land machines. Both electric and compressed air forms have been 
 developed to a certain degree of efficiency. 'There is room for improvement as 
 regards (1) size, (2) weight, (3) reliability. 
 
 AIBPLANE INSTRUMENTS. 
 
 Bomb-sighting devices form a favorite field for the inventor. No one should 
 enter this field without familiarity with the forms which the French and 
 English have developed, and without a clear understanding of the conditions 
 to be met. Target practice with bombs dropped from considerable altitudes is 
 decidedly poor and apparently is likely to remain so, regardless of the excel- 
 lence of the sighting device as such. There is doubtless room for improvement 
 in present forms, but the problem is not one which should be undertaken with- 
 out a careful consideration of all factors entering into it. 
 
284 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 Speed-indicating devices for showing speed tliroiigli tlie air are in a fairly 
 satisfactory condition. For tlie most part these instruments represent special 
 forms of the Pitot tube and of the Venturi tube. These instruments have been 
 made the subject of a vast amount of scientific investigation and so far as 
 existing forms are concerned, it does not seem liliely that much improvement is 
 to be expected. 
 
 Speed-indicating devices for showing speed over the ground. There is a 
 distinct field of usefulness for a device suited to show continuously or at very 
 brief intervals the speed of an airplane over the ground. 
 
 Altitude indicating devices consist of some specialized form of aneroid barom- 
 eter and are apparently in as satisfactory a condition as the delicate nature of 
 these instruments permits u.s to expect. 
 
 Drift meters for showing the angle between the fore and aft line of the air- 
 plane and the direction of actual motion, have been developed, but there Is 
 room for improvement. 
 
 True vertical indicating devices have been proposed in great numbers, but 
 for the most part of the ordinary pendulum or spirit-level type. All such are 
 worthless. On the other hand, the methods of combining gyroscopic elements in 
 such manner as to secure the desired result within an acceptable margin of 
 error are perfectly well understood. It Is not worth while attempting to de- 
 velop such instiruments by the use of the pendulum or spirit level principle. 
 
 AlKCRAFT PkOBLEMS. 
 
 By W. B. Stout, Xechnical Advisor Aircraft Board. 
 
 AERODrNAMIGS. 
 
 The development of wing curves of greater lift-drift ratio ; that is, a greater 
 lift with less resistance to forward travel. 
 
 The development of wing curves of a high-speed type which will have a small 
 center of pressure movement through large angles of incidence. In making ex- 
 periments to this end it will be necessary to use wind tunnels which give wind 
 speeds exceeding 100 miles per hour. 
 
 PERFORMANCE. 
 
 A study should be made of new mechanical arrangements of known aerody- 
 namic features. In order to increase the range of flying speed, to minimize land- 
 ing danger, and to minimize fuel consumption through the elimination of all 
 parasite resistance possible. 
 
 A study should be made of new plane arrangements designed for greater 
 visibility, for greater gun range, for quicker maneuvering, and for greater 
 stability. 
 
 The further possibilities of lightening the construction of airplanes and of 
 making them more reliable should also be investigated. Anything which would 
 tend to change the airplane from its present kite-type construction to a more 
 stable and long-life design would be in line with this thought. 
 
 PRODUCTION. 
 
 The greatest problem connected with the airplane as related to America Is 
 the development of production constructions which will permit airplanes to be 
 turned out by methods already in use in this country for quantity production. 
 
APPENDIX'. 285 
 
 This problem would include intensive research upon the substitution of metal 
 for wood wherever this is possible ; also experiments with new steels and alloys 
 and their heat treatment, which would enable ribs, spars, struts, ailerons; etc., to 
 be made in thousands by machinery instead of in hundreds by handwork. Our 
 eventual success in the air will depend upon the ingenuity with which we can 
 produce, first, quantity of airplanes, and, second, quality. The Germans lead 
 to-day in the quantity production designs. 
 
 In this connection a new covering for wing? would be valuable which would 
 be fireproof, waterproof, tough, and resilient, and would take the place of the 
 short-lived fabric now used. Fabric should weigh within 4 ounces per square 
 yard and should have a tensile strength of 75 pounds with 1-inch width. 
 
 PEOPELLEKS. 
 
 The airplane propeller presents a large field for research. Wooden pro- 
 pellers are far from satisfactory, though as yet no substitute has been found. 
 Time should be spent in developing propellers which will permit motors to 
 operate at the best speed (around 2,000 revolutions per minute) without the 
 necessity of gearing down from motor to propeller. 
 
 INSTKXJMENTS. 
 
 For airplane navigation better instruments could be developed. The compass 
 is far from satisfactory, with the gyroscope compass not yet developed in light 
 enough form. It is very possible that the future steering of airplanes will 
 be along wireless rather than magnetic lines with definite control between cities. 
 
 ENGINE PROBLEMS. 
 
 Our engine program includes for war service, and very wisely, practically 
 one type of engine. England alone is said to have some 36 types, making the 
 service proposition almost impossible. 
 
 Germany has only three or four makes of engines, developing them to a 
 greater degree of perfection every few weeks. Our own Liberty engine is 50 
 per cent better than it was six months ago and will be better still six months 
 from now. If our dvelopment forces were being expended upon a hundred 
 different engines instead of one, as would be the case if all or even our best 
 engineers were allowed to work on aircraft engines promiscuously, no one of 
 the engines would be fully developed in anywhere near the time that is pos- 
 sible by the present method. 
 
 ' Practically no difficulty is being experienced with the engines themselves, 
 and now there are but few relating to the airplane chassis and fuselage. The 
 main problems are in the connection of the engine with the airplane, and in 
 the accessories which are necessary for the proper control of engine and plane. 
 This includes the arrangement of pipe, wire, radiators, water connections, etc. 
 New ideas for simplifying these parts are worthy of study. 
 
 New arrangements of tanks to make the plane more bullet proof and to 
 decrease fire danger should be studied. 
 
 The recent developments in airplane motors all show that new things are 
 about to be accomplished in the direction of high-speed short-distance work, 
 and this field of research should not be neglected. 
 
286 NAVAL, CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 TYPES OF PLANES. 
 
 After the development of flying instruments reached a certain stage, night 
 flying became popular. There is a demand already existent for planes of ex- 
 ceedingly large type capable of carrying tons of bombs and flying at night. 
 This requires them to be stable. These machines should have from two engines 
 up, and should he fitted with illuminating apparatus.' Electric lights are not 
 suitable, but magnesium flares have been developed for this purpose. Night 
 flying also involves new problems in protective measures relating to anti- 
 aircraft guns, searchlights, and combat tactics. 
 
 Considerable speed can be added to all types of planes. 
 
 LETTER ADDRESSED TO THOMAS A. EDISON BY THE SECRETARY OF THE 
 
 NAVY. 
 
 Dk.ie Mr. Eotson : July 7, 1915. 
 
 I have been intending f(3r some time to write you expressing my admiration 
 at the splendid and partiotic attitude you have taken, as reported in the public 
 press, in refusing to devote your great inventive genius to warlike .subjects 
 except at the call of yoTir own country. Such an attitude, in these all too com- 
 mercial times, is one that should be an inspiration to our young men and a 
 lessdn in the preeminent right of one's own country to the be.st that its citizens 
 have that will be of tremendous benefit to us all. I have deferred writing you, 
 however, because, at the same time, I wanted to take up with you another 
 matter to which I have given a great deal of thought — a matter in which I 
 think your ideas and mine coincide, if an interview with you recently published 
 in the New York Times was correct. There is a very great service that you 
 can render the Navy and the country at large and which I am encouraged to 
 believe, from a paragraph in Mr. Marshall's interview, you will consent to 
 undertake, as it seems to be in line with your own thoughts. 
 
 One of the imi)erative needs of the Navy, in my judgmentr is machinery and 
 facilities for utilizing the natural inventive genius of Americans to meet the 
 new conditions of warfai-e as shown abroad, and it is my intention, if a prac- 
 tical way can be worked out, as I think it can be, to establish, at the earliest 
 moment, a department of invention and development, to which all ideas and 
 suggestions, either from the service or from civilian inventors, can be referred 
 for determination as to whether they contain practical suggestions for us to 
 take up and perfect. We, of course, receive many suggestions, but our only 
 way of handling them at pre.sent is to leave them to various bureaus already 
 overcrowded with routine work, and it is not always possible to give the neces- 
 sary attention to propositions that are not so definitely worked out as to make 
 them immediately available for the service. Ideas which contain the germ 
 of improvement can not alwiiys be given the attention they deserve, as there 
 is at present no adequately equipped department to which to send them for the 
 careful study required. In addition our naval officers, particularly those at 
 sea, are in a position to note where improvements are needed and to devise 
 ways in which tlio.se improvements can be made. They have, however, neither 
 the time nor the special training, nor, in many cases, the natural inventive 
 turn of mind needed to put these ideas into definite shape. Were there a place 
 where they could be sent to be worked out and perfected, I am sure we would 
 get many noteworthy improvements from this course alone. We have, of course, 
 in the Navy Department energetic and wideawake bureaus, headed by experts 
 in their particular lines of work, who devote all the time they possibly can to 
 a study of this problem. They have made important contributions to the 
 
APPENDIX. 287 
 
 Improvements in the implements of naval warfare and are doing all that is 
 possible with their other large duties. There are, unfortunately, no officers 
 now detailed who can take time from the mass of work which they are called 
 upon to do in order to devote it fully to studying new suggestions and Inven- 
 tions. The department is also unprovided with the best facilities for work of 
 pure experimentation and investigation with the exception of our testing sta- 
 tion at Annapolis, which is, as yet, a small affair. Most of all, as I have said, 
 there is no particular place or particular body of men, relieved of other work, 
 charged solely with the duty of either devising new things themselves or perfect- 
 ing the crude ideas that are submitted to the department by our naturally 
 Inventive peoijle. 
 
 I have in mind a general plan of organizing such a department which is 
 still very hazy as to details but which, in a general way, meets, so far as the 
 Navy is concerned, with your ideas of such a department for the Government 
 in general. I want to use such facilities for experimental and investigation 
 work as we have, under the direction of men particularly selected for ability 
 shown in this direction, to whom, would be referred all suggestions of new 
 devices sent in to the department, and who would work out such ideas to a. 
 practical point. Such a department will, of course, have to be eventually sup- 
 ported by Congress, with sufficient appropriations made for its proper develop- 
 ment, although I feel that we can make a start with the means at hand. To. 
 get this support Congress must be made to feel that the idea is supported by 
 the people, and I feel that our chances of getting the public interested andl 
 back of this project will be enormously increased if we can have, at the start, 
 some man whose inventive genius is recognized by the whole world to assist 
 us in consultation from time to time on matters of sufficient importance to 
 bring to his attention. You are recognized by all of us as the one man above 
 all others who can turn dreams into realities and who has at his command, 
 in addition to his own wonderful mind, the finest facilities in the world for 
 such work. 
 
 What I want to ask is if you would be willing, as a service to your country, 
 to act as an adviser to this board, to take such things as seem to you to be of 
 value, but which we are not at present equipped to investigate, and to use , 
 your own magnificent facilities In such investigation If you feel it worth 
 while. For our part we will endeavor not to bother you with trivial matters, 
 as we will probably have sufficient facilities to handle such small matters as 
 they come up. This is a great deal to ask, and I unfortunately have nothing 
 but the thanks of the Navy, and I think of the country at large, together with 
 the feeling of service to your country that you will have, to offer you by way 
 of recompense; yet so clearly have you shown your patriotism and your un- 
 selfish loyalty to your country's interests that I feel justified in making this, 
 request. 
 
 We are confronted with a new and terrible engine of warfare In the sub- 
 marine, to consider only one of the big things which I have in mind ; and l: 
 feel sure that with the practical knowledge of the officers of the Navy, with; 
 a department composed of the keenest and most Inventive minds that we can; 
 gather together, and with your own wonderful brain to aid us, the United: 
 States will be able as in the past to meet this new danger with new devices: 
 that will assure peace to our country by their effectiveness. 
 
 If you feel that you would be willing to do this, I would like, a little later 
 when my plans are somewhat more matured, to consult with you as to the de- 
 tails of the organization proposed so that I can make it as effective as possible 
 for the purpose intended. 
 168537°— 20 19 
 
288 NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 With you it might be well to associate a few men prominent in special lines 
 of inventive research, and I would lilje also to consult with you as to wlio tlii'se 
 men should be. It is, of course, your aid that I rely upon most, and if you are 
 not able for any reason to do this I will frankly hesitate to undertake the 
 matter at all. Should you feel like accepting the task, however, I know the 
 relief which the country would feel in these trying times at the announcement 
 that you are aidiny us in this all important matter. 
 
 If you could let me know, as early as you may, how you feel about this I 
 would appreciate it, as everything waits upon your answer, and I tliink we 
 can not be too expeditious if we are going to take this matter up at all. 
 
 Hon. Thomas A. Edison, 
 
 East Orange, N. J. 
 
168537°— 20. No. 21. (Seep. 167.) 
 
168537° — 20. No. 22. (Seep. 167.) 
 
168537° — 20. No. 23. (Seep. 167.) 
 
168537°— 20. No. 24. (Seep. 167.) 
 
aeSSST"— 20. No. 25.- (Seep. 167.) 
 
NO 35 -36 
 
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 168537°— 20. No. 2C. (See p. 167.) 
 
N° 37-33 
 
 
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 168537°— 20. No. 27. (Seep. 167.) 
 
168537"— 20. No. 28. (Seep. 167.) 
 
168537°— 20, No. 30. (Seep. 167.) 
 
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1GS537°— i;u. No. 3. (See p. 107.) 
 
168537°— 20. No. 4. (See p. 167.) 
 
168537°— 20. No. 5. (Seep. 167.) 
 
Loading st New York 
 N.Y. to Falmouth 2946M. at 
 H.Y. to Falmouth Shadow sa: 
 Unloading at Falmouth 
 Loading at Falmouth - 
 Falmouth to N. Y.Z945M at 9' 
 Falmouth to W .Y. shadow si 
 
 unloattlng at 
 
 Totals 
 Efflolenoy 
 
 I I 1 I ' I ' ' I ' M ' ' I ' ' 1 ' ' I ' ' 
 
 I I M I I I I I I l < M ' I ' I I ' ■ ' ' 
 
 168537°— 20. No. 6. (See p. 167.) 
 
lfiS537°— 20. No. 7, (Seep. 167.) 
 
168537°— 20. No. 8. (Seep. ItiT.) 
 
168537°— 20. No. 9. (See p. 167.) 
 
108537°— 20. No. 10. (Seep. 167.) 
 
168537"— 20. No. 11. (Seep. 167.) 
 
168537°— 20. No. 12. (See p. 167.) 
 
168537°— 20. No. 13. (Sec p. 167.) 
 
108537°— 20. No. 14. (Seep. 167.) 
 
■ I ■ I I I I ' I M I ■ 1 1 n 1 1 I I I I I I I I I I I ■ I I I ■ M I I ' (j I ri I I J I I 1 1 1 I I I n 1 I I n . III I I r I r 1 1 I j 1 I I I I 1 1 ri I I 1 1 n I <l' 
 
 108537°— 20. No. 15. (Seep. 167.) 
 
lUSOai'— liU. i\'u. lU. (Sffl'- lUT.) 
 
168537°— 20. No. 17. (Seep. 167.) 
 
168537°— 20, No. 18. (See p. 167.) 
 
168537°— 20. No. 19. (Seep. 167.) 
 
168537° — 20. No. 20. (Seep. 167.) 
 
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