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 Psychology of war. 
 
 Cornell University Library 
 
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 3 1924 030 718 542 
 
Cornell University 
 Library 
 
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 the Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924030718542 
 
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 Psychology of War 
 
 Lecture by LeRoy Eltinge, 
 Captain, 15th Cavalry. 
 
 Army Service Schools 
 Dept. of Military Art 
 
 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 
 1911 
 
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR 
 
 Lectures delivered by LeRoy Eltinge 
 Captain, 15th Cavalry, Instructor 
 Department of Military Art 
 The Army Service 
 Schools 
 
 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 
 1911 - 
 
Abmy Service Schools Press 1911 
 
Works Most Largely Quoted in these Lectures. 
 
 General Psychological subjects : 
 
 "The Crowd" by Gustave LeBon pub. by T. F. Unwin, 
 London. 
 
 "Psychology of Peoples, by Gustave LeBon, out of print, 
 published by McMillan Co. 1898. 
 
 "Psychology of Suggestion" by Boris Sidis. 
 
 Psychology of War : — 
 
 (In the order of their value on the subject) 
 
 ""Etudes sur le Combat" Dupicq, Chapelot & Cie., Paris, 
 reprint 1904. 
 
 * "Psychology du Combat del'Infanterie",Louque, Charles- 
 Lavauzelle, Paris, 1909. 
 
 *An article on panics in Revue d'Infanterie of Nov. 1907, 
 translated in Military Information document No. 12149, which 
 is on file in the Army Service Schools Library. 
 
 *"Les Realities du Combat", Gen. Daudignac, Charlen- 
 Lavauzelle, Paris. 
 
 (A partial translation appeared in Infantry Journal of April 
 and July, 1908. ) ,. 
 
 "ActualExperiences in War", Soloviev — Translation given 
 in Military information document No. 9 of the War Depart- 
 ment -Government Printing office, 1906. 
 
 "Tactics", Balck,Kreuger's translation, Cav. Journal, 1911. 
 
 f'lnfantry Masses in Attack" Minarelli-Pitzgerald. 
 
 t"Concerning Crowd Suggestion", Dr. Hans Gudden, 
 Munich (A lecture) 
 
 A Summer Night's Dream— Anonymous — Hudson— Kim - 
 berly Co. 
 
 "War and the World's Life", Maude, London. 
 
 *In French, 
 tin German. 
 
 The works above are all inexpensive i. e. from 50cts. to 
 $1.26 except Tactics $3.00 and "War and the Worlds Life" $4.50. 
 
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR 
 
 ."A doctrine of tactics which does not properly appreciate 
 the psychological element stagnates in lifeless pedantry." 
 (Balck) 
 
 PART I.* 
 
 In our studies, we have seen much about the 
 psychology of war, but most of this has been in the 
 nature of general reference to the subject, such as 
 Napoleon's statement, "In war the moral is to the 
 physical, as 3 to 1." 
 
 In our tactical problems we have been accustomed 
 to assume that 100 men, equals 100 men. This is es- 
 sentially untrue, and is used only because in theoreti- 
 cal exercises there is no other way of deciding the 
 matter. 
 
 "In war there is nothing more important for a 
 leader than the knowledge of the effect of certain 
 things on the human mind. ' ' (Capt. Orr) 
 
 "Leadership, to be efficient, must take account 
 of all moral factors. Every leader of men, from a 
 troop to an army, is necessarily a student of psycho- 
 logy, bound up as it is with the study of all the mor- 
 al forces which play so great a part in war. Not 
 the least important, is a knowledge of the manner in 
 which the opinions and beliefs of the men we are to 
 lead in war may be affected by the ideas engendered 
 
 "The material in these lectures is not original, but will be 
 found among the works cited on the third page. Where prac- 
 ticable quotations have been used. In other cases the same 
 ideas as held by an author have been used but put In different 
 language. 
 
 *Part 1 is largely from "Psychology of Peoples" and "The 
 Crowd" both by M. Gustave LeBon. 
 5 
 
— fi- 
 guring peace. The tendency in peace is to forget the 
 importance of these forces. This is partly due to 
 the fact that it is only under the stress of war that 
 the more important moral factors betray themselves." 
 (Capt. Orr) 
 
 "On the actual field of battle, no two bodies of 
 men of equal numbers, (given equal tactical training, 
 equipment and physical conditon-itself an impossibil- 
 ity) have been, or ever will be, equal in moral force." 
 (Rezanof) On successive days, even, the same body 
 of men will break the first day with a loss of 5 per 
 cent and the next, fight its way to victory, in spite of 
 a loss of 40 per cent. 
 
 On the evening of the first day of the battle of 
 Wagram Napoleon's right wing, possessed of a panic 
 like fright, fled .... On the very next day 
 these same troops were the ones who by their heroic 
 fighting won the battle. 
 
 At Winchester, the surprised Union troops fled in 
 the morning but returned and won a victory before 
 night. 
 
 There are two elements that enter to make these 
 astonishing things possible 1st, Physical condition, 
 2d, Purely psychological conditions. The first to some 
 extent, tends to produce the second. All psycholo- 
 gists agree that physical condition has a powerful ef- 
 fect on psychological susceptibility. A crowd of men 
 that are tired, hungry, sick, thirsty or who have lost 
 sleep, are much more susceptible to psychic sugges- 
 tion, than the same men when in normal health and 
 comfort. With a crowd of men who are worn out, 
 sick, exhausted, the slightest suggestion is liable to 
 produce a quick and most profound effect. What the 
 effect will be depends on the suggestion. This is the 
 basis for Soult's statement "The soldier before din- 
 ner, and the soldier after dinner, are two entirely dif- 
 ferent beings." Remembering then that poor phy- 
 
sical or nervous condition, predisposes to psychic 
 phenomena, we will approach the real reason why the 
 same troops break easily today and fight like heroes 
 tomorrow, which is, that soldiers in battle have 
 the same mental characteristics as a crowd, and a 
 crowd is~easily swayed. On the first day the wrong 
 influence swayed the crowd of soldiers. On that day 
 some man said "We are outflanked", or "The enemy 
 is in our rear" and the whole crowd ran— no one looked 
 to see if the report were true, — most of the men had 
 not even heard the report, but by a sort of mental 
 telepathy, they realized that the crowd was running 
 away, and they ran also. They did not know why they 
 ran, where they were running to, and most were 
 even unconscious that they were running. On the 
 next day they were just as easily swayed. The right 
 man at the right time put in the suggestion that ' 'We 
 have them going now", — "Our other battalion is in 
 their rear, and we will push them back and capture 
 the whole outfit"— Come on let us rush them". Ex- 
 actly the same kind of blind rush, which yesterday 
 they made to the rear, is today made, but it is made 
 to the front. Losses are not noticed, the collective 
 brain of the crowd is now centerd on doing damage, 
 and it forgets for the time, that it is also suffering 
 loss. When an officer commands on the firing line, he 
 must realize that his men are just a crowd, and that 
 they must be handled like a crowd, not like the calm, 
 'respectful, obedient soldier of the drill ground. 
 
 When one starts to investigate the psychology of 
 war, he encounters the greatest difficulty, in finding 
 anything in English that directly treats of the subject. 
 The object of these papers, is to give a general glos- 
 sary of the different works, that I have been able to 
 find in English, French or German, and to tell where 
 enough works can be found, to enable the student to 
 begin the study of the subject, leaving each one to 
 
progress further, according to his individual desirefe. 
 
 ¥he subject of psychology of war naturally di- 
 vided itself into certain sub-heads, viz.:— 
 
 1; Psychology of the suggestion of an idea to 
 the individual man. 
 
 1 Psychology of crowds; 
 
 3L Psychology of crowds as modified by differ; 
 ence in race-that is difference in tnental characterise 
 tied. 
 
 4. Psychological influence on troops of the mass 
 of the population. 
 
 5. Panics among troops. 
 
 6. Psychology of troops in action. 
 
 Napoleon used to deliver harangues to his soldiers, 
 that raised them to the highest pitch of enthusiasm. 
 Such a harangue, delivered to troops of the typical 
 American type would produce only disgust and deri- 
 sion. That is a result of the different mental charac- 
 teristics of the two races. 
 
 The same racial difference has led to the two 
 principal schools of psychology. The French approach 
 the subject by abstract reasoning, reach conclusions 
 therefrom, and then prove these conclusions to be 
 sound by citing historical examples. The trouble with 
 this is, that, while accurate history may enable us to 
 determine what physically occured, it very seldom is 
 able to show accurately the moral or psychological 
 reasons therefor. An officer whose troops have failed 
 him is not apt to want to talk about it. He is not apt 
 to try to discover the reasons— for such an attempt 
 means an investigation that publishes his shame, and 
 the shame of his troops, to the world. He is far more 
 apt to aver that untold hordes of the enemy appeared 
 and that, after an heroic defense, his troops were 
 beaten by vastly superior numbers. Even when the 
 cause of a panic becomes known to a few officers, they 
 are apt to tell it in confidence to their comrades', but 
 
riot to publish it abroad, nor put it in official documents; 
 We attribute our success to our own valor, not to pa- 
 nic among the enemy. The real reasons for the acts 
 of a body of troops are therefor impossible to ascertain; 
 
 The German schools of Psychology— as might be 
 expected from the race— are more prone to proceed; 
 by accurate laboratory experiments, to demonstrate the ' 
 scientific truth of some psychological proposition, and, 
 from this accurate determination of minor facts, pro- 
 ceed to reason out rules of general application. This 
 method is equally unsatisfactory to the average mind 
 because, while we are willing to accept the small facts 
 as proven by the experiment, we have a doubt as to 
 the universal application of the rules so deduced. 
 
 Psychology is defined as "The science of the 
 phenomena of mind" (Century Dictionary.) There are 
 more than a dozen branches of the subject in which 
 we are not directly interested— such as criminal psy- 
 chology, infant psychology, medical psychology, etc. 
 —but we must devote some attention to the "psycho- 
 logy of suggestion", as applied to the individual, the 
 "psychology of crowds" and the "psychology of 
 races" before we can intelligently consider the psy- 
 chology of armies. 
 
 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION 
 
 Instead of trying to define "suggestion" I will 
 cite from "Psychology of Suggestion" (Sidis) two or 
 three examples of the type most familiar to us all and 
 then point out their principle characteristic. (See 
 "Psychology of Suggestion" p. 6.) 
 
 "I hold a newspaper in my hands and begin to 
 roll it up; soon I find that my friend sitting opposite 
 me rolls his in a similar way. That, we say, is a case 
 of suggestion. ' ' 
 
 "My friend Mr. A, is absent minded; he sits near 
 the table, thinking of some abstruse mathematical 
 
-10 - 
 problem that baffles all his efforts to solve it. Absor- 
 bed in the solution of that intricate problem, he is 
 blind and deaf to what is going on around him. His 
 eyes are directed on the table, but he appears not to 
 see any of the objects there. I put two glasses of wa- 
 ter on the table, and at short intervals make passes in 
 the direction of the glasses -passes which he seems 
 not to perceive; then I resolutely stretch out my hand, 
 take one of the glasses, and begin to drink. My friend 
 follows suit— dreamily he raises his hand, takes the 
 glass, and begins to sip, awakening fully to conscious- 
 ness when a good part of the tumbler is emptied." 
 
 "To take an interesting and amusing case given 
 by Ochorowitz in his book Mental Suggestion: 
 
 ' 'My friend P, a man no less absent-minded than 
 he is keen of intellect, was playing chess in a neigh- 
 boring room. Others of us were talking near the 
 door. I had made the remark that it was my friend's 
 habit when he paid the closest attention to the game 
 to whistle an air from Madame Angot. I was about 
 to accompany him by beating time on the table. But 
 this time he whistled something else— a march from 
 Le Prophete. 'Listen', I said to my associates; 'we 
 are going to play a trick upon P. We will (mentally) 
 order him to pass from the Prophete to La Fille de 
 Madame Angot. First I began to drum the march; 
 then, profiting by some notes common to both, I 
 passed quickly to the quicker and more staccato meas- 
 ure of my friend's favorite air. P, on his part sud- 
 denly changed the air and began to whistle Madame 
 Angot. Everyone burst out laughing. My friend 
 was too much absorbed in a check to the queen to no- 
 tice anything. 
 
 'Let us begin again' said I, 'and go back to Le 
 Prophele. And straightway we had Meyerbeer once 
 more. My friend knew that he had whistled some- 
 thing but that was all he knew. ' " 
 
-ii- 
 
 These ardtrifling examples of suggestion but they 
 or similar ones are within our own knowledge. They 
 illustrate what is meant by suggestion and bring out 
 the main point connected therewith, viz: — 
 
 In suggestion "The subject accepts uncritically 
 the idea suggested to him and carries it out almost 
 automatically." (Psychology of Suggestion, p. 8.) 
 
 In all these examples we can see one more cha- 
 racteristic of suggestion, namely that the idea was 
 forced on the subject. Had the subject been comman- 
 ded to roll the newspaper, or drink the water or 
 change the tune he would not have done so. They 
 were forced to do these acts in spite of their will and 
 almost without their knowledge. 
 
 We all know how the street fakir will extol the 
 virtues of something we do not want, till we feel im- 
 pelled to buy it. The fakir understands the applica- 
 tion of the psychology of suggestion, though he pro- 
 bably knows nothing of the subject scientifically. 
 You have heard some person say of such a fakir, ' 'He 
 hypnotized me into buying it". In fact he did not 
 hypnotizethe buyer, but instead influenced the buyer's 
 ordinary mind by suggestion. "Man believes as 
 much as he can, but as a gregarious animal (member 
 of a crowd) man believes whatever is suggested to 
 him." (Prof. James) Psychologists assume that a 
 person has two minds — the conscious mind, and the 
 sub-conscious mind, and that the conscious mind works 
 only during the waking hours, while the sub-conscious 
 mind, (a sort of instinct) is always alive. This as- 
 sumption is made because it is a theory that seems to 
 account for all psychic phenomena and is similar to 
 the atomic theory in chemistry, in that, by its accep- 
 tance we are able to reason correctly, whether the the- 
 ory be true or not. In dreams or the hypnotized state 
 the sub-conscious mind is alone working. In the or- 
 dinary daily life, only the conscious mind works, but 
 
—12 - 
 
 if, by any psychic phenomena, the conscious mind be 
 suppressed in the waking moments, then the sub-con- 
 scious mind takes control of the actions. 
 
 The higher, that is the conscious mind, is the 
 mind of will and reason; the other is the unreasoning 
 sort of instinct which makes us do the most unrea- 
 sonable things in response to suggestion. 
 
 In dealing with the subject of suggestion, it is 
 well at the start to understand that there are two 
 kinds of suggestibility to which the mind is subject, 
 namely, the kind that is applied to what appears to be 
 the plain ordinary, everyday business mind— the 
 normal mind — , though here the sub-conscious mind 
 is also active, and the kind that is applied in hypno- 
 tism - - the mind in an abnormal condition — when the 
 conscious mind is entirely suppressed. This hypothesis 
 of the two minds' in the one body was arrived at from 
 the fact that a person who has been frequently hyp- 
 notized, can, in the hypnotized state, remember about 
 the former hypnotic delusions, but nothing of real life, 
 while, in the conscious state, the same person remem- 
 bers all the things of real life but nothing about the 
 hypnotic delusions. 
 
 The method of influencing the sub-conscious mind 
 in the conscious state and in the hypnotized state are 
 different. 
 
 A hypnotized person is told "Youmwsido so and 
 so" — ' 'You must do it" — ' 'You can not avoid doing it", 
 "you must do it" "Do it now" and it is done. This 
 kind of direct suggestion is the only kind that is effec- 
 tive on the hypnotized mind, but, in the conscious 
 state with the clear everyday mind working, this di- 
 rect suggestion at once arouses opposition and the 
 will says "I won't be dictated to -I will do as I please". 
 
 The everyday, normal mind is spoken of as being 
 in the state of "normal suggestibility" and that of the 
 hypnotized and similar states of mind as being in a 
 
—13- 
 
 state of ' 'abnormal suggestibility " . In a state of nor- 
 mal suggestibility, the mind finds yielding to the dic- 
 tates of another mind repulsive, though it can be 
 cajoled into obedience. Remember the remarks of 
 the street fakir. He did not order you to buy, but 
 instead pictured to you in glowing terms the advan- 
 tages to be derived from becoming the possessor of 
 his wares. 
 
 The conditions of normal suggestibility— that is, 
 both conscious and sub-conscious minds apparently 
 active, are: 
 
 1. Fixation of the attention on the subject of the 
 experiment. 
 
 2. Distraction of the attention from all else. 
 
 3. Monotony— external surroundings must 
 throughout the experiment remain the same. 
 
 4. Limitation of voluntary movement— that is, a 
 person in motion or constantly shifting his position is 
 not apt to respond to suggestion. 
 
 5. Inhibition— that is, the mind must be kept 
 from wandering. 
 
 6. Last, but most important, comes immediate 
 execution. If an interval of time intervenes between 
 the receipt of the suggestion and the beginning of the 
 execution, then the reason takes hold, and the will 
 dictates the action. If the street fakir does not in- 
 duce you to buy at once, you do not buy at all. 
 
 The conditions of abnormal suggestibility, that is 
 hypnosis, are the same, except the 2d and 6th which 
 are not so essential, though the 6th is still a favor- 
 able condition in the hypnotic state. 
 
 Now the soldier on the firing line, with his atten- 
 tion fixed on the enemy with such intensity as to dis- 
 tract it from all else; with the continuous roar of the 
 battle, and his limited range of vision; with his move- 
 ments limited for considerable spaces of time to those 
 necessary to the manipulation of the rifle— in the sup- 
 
—14— 
 
 ports and reserves not even that; with the blank 
 mind that always attends fear, fulfills all the condi- 
 tions to be ripe for the receipt of suggestion. Further- 
 more crowds are more susceptible to suggestion than 
 individuals. So we see why the soldier in the firing line 
 is a specially good subject for psychic suggestion.. 
 The very fact that his attention is held without any 
 action of his own will adds to the soldier's suggestibili- 
 ty. "The less voluntary the attention of a man is 
 fixed, the easier it is held by exterior allurements, the 
 larger will be the degree of suggestibiliy. " (Alfred 
 Lehmann). 
 
 The way in which suggestion must be given, to 
 be effective, is different according to whether the 
 subject is in a state of normal suggestibility or in the 
 hypnotic state. 
 
 "Normal suggestibility varies as indirect sugges- 
 tion and inversely as direct suggestion." (Sidis). 
 
 Abnormal suggestibility, that is hypnotism, is 
 just the reverse of the above law, but, as we are not 
 much concerned therewith, that part of the subject 
 will be pursued no further. On the other hand we 
 may, at anytime, find it useful to know the factors 
 that enter into normal suggestibility. 
 
 First fix it in your mind that direct commands, 
 such as military orders, are not obeyed by the sub- 
 conscious mind, but that, as long as the sub-conscious 
 is controlled by will and reason, so long are these 
 commands obeyed by the will— there is no psychic 
 phenomena about it. Remember also that suggestion 
 acts, not on the will and reason, but on the sub-con- 
 scious. Then get it clearly understood that, innormal 
 suggestibility, the sub-conscious mind will respond to 
 indirect suggestion, but will be revolted by direct sug- 
 gestion. 
 
 In normal suggestibility the strength of the sug- 
 gestion is dependent on the following factors:— 
 
-15- 
 
 1. Last impression— that is, of several impres- 
 sions the last is most likely to be acted upon. 
 
 2. Frequency— that is, repetitions, not one after 
 the other but at intervals separated by other impres- 
 sions. 
 
 3. Repetition —this is distinguished from frequen- 
 cy by being repetitions one after the other without 
 having other kinds of impressions put in between. 
 
 "Repetition" is one-third as powerful as "fre- 
 quency", and one-fifth as powerful as "last impres- 
 sion". 
 
 4. The strongest suggestion is obtained by a com- 
 bination of "frequency" and "last impression". 
 
 The above statements are the results of 1650 la- 
 boratory experiments, the results of which are given 
 by Boris Sidis. 
 
 These factors seem to have the same relative im- 
 portance, whether applied to the individual or to the 
 crowd. 
 
 The authors of speeches and writings which have 
 made a powerful impression on the world have, con- 
 sciously or unconsciously, made use of this law, and 
 curiously, the repetitions in such compositions, are, 
 making allowances for differences in rate of delivery 
 of different persons, at about equal time intervals or 
 multiplest hereof and the speech always ends with 
 the strongest suggestion of the whole lot. Those 
 whose curiosity is aroused in this regard may try it for 
 themselves by reading aloud Anthony's speech at the 
 death of Caesar from Shakespeare or Patrick Henry's 
 "Give me liberty or give me death" speech, and no- 
 tice how the repeated suggestions are each stronger 
 than the preceeding. Good musicians find the same 
 thing to exist in the musical pieces that have made a 
 lasting impression on the musical world. 
 
 Now to illustrate, by an example, just what I 
 take all this to mean, let us take the troops in a second- 
 
—16— 
 
 ary attack. The men are in a state favorable to re- 
 ceiving suggestion. If the officer gives none, some 
 coward's remarks may give the unfavorable sugges- 
 tion that means panic. The officers from time to time 
 repeat the statement that "As soon as the mam at- 
 tack gets in on their flank we will rush them and get 
 the whole outfit " This, and similar suggestions, are 
 frequently made. At the end the time to advance 
 arrives and the order to advance gives the suggestion 
 to each man ' 'Now we have them". Under such con- 
 ditions this advance will certainly have some vim and 
 go to it. 
 
 PSYCHOLOGY OF CROWDS * 
 
 "Anyone, taken as an individual, is tolerably sen- 
 sible and reasonable. As a member of a crowd he at 
 once becomes a blockhead. " (Schiller) . 
 
 "In its ordinary sense the word "crowd" means 
 a gathering of individuals of whatever nationality, 
 profession, or sex; whatever be the chances that have 
 brought them together. From the psychological point 
 of view, the expression "crowd" assumes quite a dif- 
 ferent signification. Under certain given circumstan- 
 ces, and only under these circumstances, an agglome- 
 ration of men, presents new characteristics very diffe- 
 rent from those of the individuals composing it" The 
 sentiments and ideas of all the persons in the gather- 
 ing take one and the same direction, and their con- 
 scious personality vanishes. A collective mind is 
 formed, doubtless transitory, but presenting very 
 clearly defined characteristics. The gathering has 
 thus become what, in the absence of a better expres- 
 sion, I will call an organized crowd, or a psychological 
 
 *In order to let you know that this subject is one of im- 
 portance to the military profession, I will here say that a chair 
 of "The Psychology of Crowds" has been established in the 
 French War College. 
 
-tf- 
 
 cr'owd. It forms a single being, and is subject to 
 the law of mental unity of crowds." (LeBon "The 
 Crowd"). We may put this in another way and say: 
 "From the psychological point of view we schould 
 Understand "crowd" to mean an assemblage of men 
 who are imbued with a definite general incentive, and 
 who become somewhat organized thereunder"; (Dr; 
 Hans Gudden). 
 
 "A thousand individuals accidentally gather in a 
 public place without any specific object in no way 
 constitute a psychological crowd. To acquire the spe- 
 cific characteristics of such a crowd, the influence of 
 certain predisposing causes, of which we shall have 
 to determine the nature, is necessary. The disappear- 
 ance of conscious personality, and the turning of feel- 
 ings and thoughts in a different direction, which are 
 the primary characteristics of a crowd about to be- 
 come organized, do not always involve the simulta- 
 neous presence of a number of individuals on one spot. 
 Thousands of isolated individuals may acquire at cer- 
 tain moments, and under the influence of certain vio- 
 lent emotions— such, for example, as a great national 
 event— the characteristics of a psychological crowd. 
 It will be sufficient in that case that a mere chance 
 should bring them together for their acts to at once 
 assume the characteristics peculiar to the acts of a 
 crowd. ' ' An entire nation, or an entire religious sect, 
 though there may be no visible agglomeration, may 
 become a crowd under the action of certain influences. 
 A psychological crowd once constituted, it acquires 
 certain provisional but determinable general charac- 
 teristics. These vary according to the elements of 
 which the crowd is compared. 
 
 A homogenious crowd is one composed of elements 
 more or less akin, as sects, castes, races, etc. 
 
 A heterogenious crowd is one composed of dissi- 
 milar elements, and may be further sub-divided into 
 
-18- 
 
 crowds of an anonymous kind, such as street crowds, 
 and crowds not anonymous, such as juries and legis- 
 latures. • 
 
 A heterogenous crowd possesses certain charac- 
 teristics. A homogenious crowd possesses the same 
 characteristics but side by side with them possesses 
 additional ones that are not possessed by the hetero- 
 genious crowd. The more ways in which a crowd is 
 homogenious, the more strongly will these charac- 
 teristics be possessed. Thus, an army going to fight 
 an enemy, that all the individual members hate, would 
 be a homogenious crowd, but if this army was in ad- 
 dition composed of individuals, all of the same race, 
 same language, same customs, same religious belief, 
 and same social class then would it possess these same 
 characteristics in a much more marked degree. 
 
 "It is well known that, in a crowd, a sudden im- 
 pulse will affect men and produce curiously concerted 
 action. The knowledge of this 'psychology of crowds' 
 has often been used by leaders of men. After all, an 
 army is a crowd with a common training, and there- 
 fore easier to move than any other crowd to unani- 
 mous action. Hence the spirit which impels an ad- 
 vance, or a passive defense or a retirement, may well 
 have been transmitted by the leaders." (Capt. Orr). 
 Von Moltke implanted the idea of the "spirit of the 
 offensive" in the minds of the whole German army. 
 The leader whose own ideas are not clearly defined 
 and whose intention is vacillating will get only half- 
 hearted action from his troops, while on the other 
 hand, a determined man who has one clear idea will 
 himself be surprised to see how the troops respond. 
 
 * * * Above all, the personality of the com- 
 mander will imbue a force with the determination 
 to advance" (Black) 
 
 "A couple of months after the battle of Chancel- 
 lorsville, when Hooker had crossed the Rappahannock 
 
with the Army of the Potomac in the campaign of 
 Gettysburg, he was asked by General Doubleday: 
 'Hooker, what was the matter with you at Chancel- 
 lorsville* Some say you were injured by a shell, and 
 others that you were drunk; now tell us what it was. ' 
 Hooker answered frankly and good naturedly: 'Doub- 
 leday, I was not hurt by a shell, and I was not drunk. 
 For once I lost confidence in Hooker, and that is all 
 there is to it. ' *' (The Campaign of Chancellorsville— 
 Bigelow p. 477). 
 
 To illustrate by everyday examples, the action of 
 a crowd, let us take an election crowd and the theatre. 
 The speech of our election candidate causes storms of 
 applause, while should a man of the opposite party, 
 ascend the platform and in a few sharp and decisive 
 sentences, deny the assertions, he would be hissed 
 and jeered. It is a fact, well known to us, that paid 
 claquers in the theatre can lead the whole house to 
 applaud. 
 
 In a crowd each individual becomes a grain in the 
 heap. He loses all his former characteristics and as- 
 sumes, individually, the characteristics of a member 
 of the crowd. The disappearance of the known per- 
 sonality, and the consequent suspending of feelings 
 and thoughts (except in so far as they are part of the 
 feelings and thoughts of the crowd), form the first 
 fingermarks of the organized crowd. A general in- 
 centive may be instilled into thousands of separated 
 individuals through the medium of newspapers or 
 through word of mouth from house to house; it is but 
 necessary that this general incentive cause violent 
 emotions for the fingermarks of a psychological crowd 
 to at once appear. A few of these coming together 
 by mere chance will then act according to the man- 
 ner of organized crowds. 
 
 Effects of crowds can be traced everywhere, at 
 all times, and in all phases of human life, whether 
 
-46- 
 ^olitical, religious or social Not seldom, as in the 
 French Revolution, or the Crusades, have these ef- 
 fects been felt all over the civilized world, 
 
 Now what are the inborn attributes of crowds? 
 We have already pointed out one of them. No mat- 
 ter what the individuality of the people forming a 
 crowd, how similar or dissimilar their modes of life; 
 their occupation, their character or their intelligence, 
 by the mere fact of merging into a crowd they form 
 a sort of collective soul, by means of which they feel, 
 act and think in a manner different from what each 
 individual would, if left to himself. There are ideas 
 which appear in the collective mind of the crowd that 
 do not appear in the minds of the individuals who 
 form that crowd. 
 
 ' 'This explains how it was that among the most 
 savage members of the French Convention were to be 
 found inoffensive citizens who, under ordinary cir- 
 cumstances, would have been peaceable notaries or 
 virtuous magistrates. The storm past, they resumed 
 their normal character of quiet, law-abiding citizens. 
 Napoleon found among them his most docile ser- 
 vants." (Le Bon "The Crowd", p. 28). 
 
 ' ' The chief point to remember is that a crowd's 
 mind is not the average of the sum of the minds of its 
 individuals, but a combination followed by the creation 
 of new characteristics." (Capt. Orr). 
 
 This idea may well be explained by an illustration 
 taken from chemistry. 
 
 Ammonia (a gas) and tincture of iodine (a liquid) 
 can be combined with the result that a black solid, 
 called nitrogen iodide will be precipitated. 
 
 You may pound ammonia or water impregnated by 
 it with a triphammer and get no results; you may 
 similarly pound tincture of iodine with the same lack 
 of result; but after you have combined the two and 
 produced nitrogen iodide you must be careful that no 
 
—21— 
 
 one slams the door of the room if you desire to avoid 
 an explosion. 
 
 Mix oxygen gas and hydrogen gas. Nothing 
 happens. Add a spark to the mixture and there will 
 be a loud report and a few drops of water left. The 
 oxygen and hydrogen, as such, have disappeared. In 
 any agglomeration of people the elements of a mob 
 are present. Add the spark of suggestion and, with 
 the suddenness of an explosion, the mob is formed. 
 
 Several causes may be attributed to bring about 
 the change from personal character to the character 
 of the crowd, which latter is often in the utmost con- 
 trast to the former: 
 
 The first of these causes consists of the fact that 
 in each individual of the crowd there arises, based on 
 the mere fact of being in numbers, a feeling of invin- 
 cible power, which at once nullifies the feeling of per- 
 sonal responsibility and which may further lead to a 
 line of action never thought of were the individual 
 alone or at his usual avocation, or which, if thought 
 of, would have been curbed. The sooner an individu- 
 al perceives that in the crowd he is unobserved and 
 unknown and the more intense the feeling of the crowd 
 is, the quicker disappear the last remnants of the feel- 
 ing of responsibility. 
 
 However, we must not lose sight of the fact that 
 in each and every crowd there are numbers of indi- 
 viduals who call "hurrah", "down with him", "cru- 
 cify him", and "Hosannah", purely and simply be- 
 cause they are afraid that were they to keep still 
 their neighbors in the crowd would think them cow- 
 ards or possibly spies. Undoubtedly many proceed 
 from words to deeds for that reason alone, 
 
 A crowd exercises a sort of hypnotic influence on 
 its members. We have seen that ' 'limitation of vol- 
 untary movement" is one of the necessary factors in 
 producing the hypnotic state. ' 'Nowhere else, except 
 
—22— 
 
 perhaps in solitary confinement, are voluntary move- 
 ments of men so limited as they are in the crowd; and 
 the larger the crowd is the greater is this limitation, 
 the lower sinks the individual self. ' ' (Sidis - Psycho- 
 logy of Suggestion, p. 299). 
 
 Much will power is required to oppose the action 
 of a crowd of which we form a part; only very few 
 people possess that enegy. Most people in a crowd 
 feel that they are doing wrong, but do it because the 
 crowd urges and drives. For these reasons, acts are 
 passed by legislatures and decisions reached by juries 
 that would never have occured had each of the indi- 
 viduals been obliged to reach the decision by himself. 
 We all know that strong action comes from a single 
 strong leader. As Napoleon said "Councils of war 
 never fight." 
 
 The second cause of crowd-sentiment and crowd- 
 treatment lies in imitation. Even with animals, imi- 
 tation plays a great role and that, not only with ani- 
 mals, but also with the lower orders, for instance ants. 
 Scientists have observed the interesting fact that, in 
 a mixed colony of ants, the ants of one species, by 
 imitating the actions of another species succeeded in 
 catching bugs theretofore impossible to them. It is 
 well known that the barking of a single dog immedi- 
 ately induces all dogs in the neighborhood to bark. 
 The desire of imitation is strong in monkeys as to be 
 proverbial. The desire to imitate is not less strong 
 in the human being than in animals. In company one 
 yawns, the others at once follow suit. This yawning 
 in conjunction is an instinctive involuntary imitation 
 and it may be found in everything else. "Society is 
 but a web of similarities, produced by imitation in all 
 possible forms, such as customs, sympathy, usage, 
 instruction, education, etc." (Sighele). Imitation 
 developes its most attractive power just where there 
 is a crowd. In a theatre or in a public assembly, at 
 
—23— 
 
 least for the time being, the clapping of hands or the 
 hissing of a few persons decides the success or fail- 
 ure of a play or an author. 
 
 The undeniable fact of imitation, so closely inter- 
 woven with our daily life, is intimately connected with 
 another general human characteristic, namely, the 
 suggestibility or psychological power of contagion, 
 which in many individuals amounts to hypnotism. 
 Hypnotism and suggestion are merely new designa- 
 tions for appearances of the human soul, which 
 had been practiced from time immemorial, but which 
 up to recent times were screened by mystery and su- 
 perstition and which have only gradually been stripped 
 of their secrecy. In suggestion we have to treat with 
 implanting a certain thing in a man's brain. 
 
 The same thing is true of hypnotism, only in this 
 case there occurs a state of coma, in which the subject 
 loses all knowledge of everything except what is sugges- 
 ted to him by the manipulator and in hypnotism the 
 subject has no power of reasoning. 
 
 In prior centuries, when the degree of general 
 education was very low, when there was an almost 
 total absence of legal or social order, pyschological in- 
 fection was far more frequent and far stronger, so 
 that we may well speak of pyschological infection epi- 
 demics, which like other epidemics were not without 
 their unfortunate consequences. For instance, we 
 will mention the children's crusade in 1212, the main 
 theatre of which was the southern part of France. 
 At that time the minds of the adults were blunted by 
 the experiences of four previous crusades and did not 
 respond to the call for another crusade to redeem the 
 Holy Land; but on the other hand the accounts of 
 events in those crusades and of the wonders of the 
 orient filled the minds and phantasy of the children 
 and the flame was fed by incendiary sermons. In the 
 year 1212 there assembled, under the leadership of a 
 
—24— 
 
 young shepherd boy, Etienne, about 30,000 boys and 
 girls disguised as boys, of all classes, imbued with the 
 idea that the scriptures demanded of them, the mi- 
 nors, the redemtion of the Holy Land. There was no 
 holding them, all Warnings were stifled by the call 
 "To God, To God". 
 
 They refused to obey all parental restraint and 
 those that were locked up to prevent their joining the 
 crusade slowly pined away. 
 
 To these unfortunate boys and girls, there at- 
 tached themselves a lot of unscrupulous loafers and 
 slave dealers. Of the seven ships on which the chil- 
 dren took passage at Marseilles, ostensibly for trans- 
 portation to the Holy Land, two foundered, and the 
 occupants of the other five were sold into slavery in 
 Egypt. In similar manner ended the crusade which 
 was made in two columns across Mts. Cenis and St. 
 Gothard. A part of that crusade arrived at Brindisti, 
 where the Bishop prevented further travel. The re- 
 mainder took passage in ships at Genoa, and also en- 
 ded in slavery. There are a number of pyschological 
 epidemics of mature persons known to history. The 
 most prominent of these are the "dance epidemics" 
 of the middle ages. In the year 1374, societies of men 
 and women were formed, in Aachen first, later on in 
 different places, who danced, hand in hand, for hours 
 until completely exhausted. Many of the onlookers 
 joined the dancers, increased their numbers and trav- 
 elled around the country with them. Farmers left 
 their plows, artisans their tools, women their kitchens, 
 to join the wild dance and to spread the infection. This 
 epidemic spread all over Europe. In Italy there was 
 a curious offshoot of the epidemic which lead to a be- 
 lief that one bitten by a tarantula would die unless he 
 kept dancing to a certain tune. This tune called the 
 "tarantella" and the violent dance of the same name 
 to this day remain in Italy, though no longer used as 
 
—25— 
 
 a cure for insect bites. (See Psychology of Sugges- 
 tion, p. 326). 
 
 A similar dance frenzy is shown by the St. Me- 
 dardus epidemic, lasting a decade, from 1729 to 1739, 
 which was based on the rumor that several lame men 
 had been healed by visiting the grave of a visionary, 
 Francois de Paris, in the cemetery of St. Medardus. 
 Crowds at once congregated at that cemetery and 
 dance orgies took place. Some hopped for hours, 
 others whirled without stopping, while others flayed 
 themselves with slats. There were also cases of vol- 
 untary crucifixion. In vain the authorities tried to 
 call a halt by closing the cemetery— the infection 
 spread all over Paris 
 
 In a similar manner the Huguenot persecution in 
 the mountains of southern France caused the incep- 
 tion of the so called society of "Trembleurs". In 
 their prayer meetings, one would suddenly fall down 
 with cramps, visions and commence to talk incoherent- 
 ly. This movement infected children and adults alike 
 and inspired the Trembleurs to resistance against the 
 King's officers. In one place the country people op- 
 posed the King's troops entirely unarmed, believing 
 that they, supported by the Holy Ghost, could breathe 
 away the troops, while the women sang hymns. The 
 result was a terrible slaughter. 
 
 As very similar epidemics with a religious back- 
 ground may be cited, the pilgrimages of the ' 'Flage- 
 lantes" in the middle ages, the acts of the "Dokobers" 
 in Canada, who seek the savior in the middle of win- 
 ter stripped stark naked, in the snake dances of our 
 American Indians, and in the Voodoo dance of the 
 African negroes. At Cassel, Germany, in 1907, there 
 occurred every day during July, religious meetings, the 
 main features of which were transports of ecstacy, 
 illumination, or enlightment and the so-called "speak- 
 ing with tongues". The crowds were drunk with 
 
—26— 
 
 religious ecstacy. With songs, with profession or re- 
 ligion, with confession of sins and speeches of repen- 
 tance, there were mixed inarticulate sounds, wild mur- 
 murs, moanings and cries. There were seen many 
 kinds of faces in agony, men sinking to the ground 
 unconscious. Suddenly someone would start up, and 
 call out in an unknown tongue. This raised theexcite- 
 ment to the highest pitch. After a while the excite- 
 ment became so intense that people began to get hurt. 
 Then the police took a hand and suppressed the meet- 
 ings. (Dr. Gudden) Nevertheless an article, writ- 
 ten in 1910, declares that the movement is not yet 
 dead, but is actually extending. 
 
 In these epidemics women seem more liable to 
 contagion on account of their more or less hysteri- 
 cal disposition, and women as a rule start the move- 
 ment. Psychological epidemics in Nunneries and 
 other female institutions may be counted by the hun- 
 dreds. In these epidemics the first adherents have 
 been hysterical weak-minded persons or persons of a 
 low degree of intelligence. Still we know of psycho- 
 logical epidemics not originated by hysterics or reli- 
 gious things, but by the ordinary human weakness of 
 seeking quick and easy gain of wealth and by curiosi- 
 ty. Here the originators know what they are about, 
 and the first victims are uneducated or inexperienced 
 persons. 
 
 The "South Sea Bubble" started in England, in 
 1711, was a £10,000,000 company formed to corner 
 the trade with South America. It never had any 
 prospect of success, yet £100 shares rose to a value 
 of £1050 -then the bubble burst and England had a 
 financial panic. 
 
 During the "Tulip mania" in Holland in 1620, 
 the value of one species rose as high as 13,000 florins 
 -before the year was out the same species brought 
 but 5 florins. The entire population had raised tulips 
 
-27— 
 
 having sold farms, jewelry, all personal possessions 
 in order to raise and speculate in them. 
 
 The 1910 "Rubber speculation" of England and 
 her dependencies is the latest similar epidemic. 
 
 Our "bucket shops" are worked on the same 
 psychological principle. 
 
 In large sensational trials we often see a number 
 of witnesses who are so imbued with things suggest- 
 ed to them, by talks or by reading the newspapers, 
 that their own knowledge which they are called upon 
 to testify to, is colored or falsified, and that they in- 
 sert in their testimony happenings that have not the 
 slightest bearing on the case at bar, without being 
 cognizant of their falsification. In the trial of one 
 Berchold in Munich, not less than three women wit- 
 nesses swore to having seen Berchold in a dress 
 which was afterwards proved to be mere imagina- 
 tion, the witnesses having seen the dress in a fashion 
 paper. 
 
 Psychology of crowds sometimes takes a hum- 
 orous side. Lieut. Hobson, after blowing up the 
 Merrimac in Santiago, lectured in the states. After 
 one of these lectures a lady could not curb her feel- 
 ings and had to kiss Hobson. Thereupon all the 
 ladies kissed him. 
 
 As to the "feeling" of a crowd, we may say 
 that it is susceptible, impulsive and changeable. The 
 murderers of the day of the "Terror" in 1792 never 
 took the pocket-books or jewelry of their victims, 
 but turned them over to the authorities. In the same 
 Terror days, a mob wanted to kill a prison guard, 
 because he had refused water to his prisoners for 24 
 hours before their execution; and the same mob 
 murdered the same prisoners so as to give every 
 one of its members chance to see what vengeance 
 could be taken on the aristocrats. 
 
 As a rule man by merely belonging to an organ- 
 
ized crowd descends in the matter- of civilization. By 
 himself he is an educated individual, as a member of 
 a crowd he has the fingermarks of the crowd. This 
 is one of the main reasons why, what in strikes start 
 out to be peaceable meetings to discuss grievances, 
 sooner or later lead to mob violence. LeBon says of 
 man as a member of a crowd ' 'He has the spontaniety, 
 the abandon and also the enthusiasm and heroism of 
 primitive peoples". This fact has been understood 
 for hundreds of years. A Roman emperor said "The 
 senators are courageous people— the senate is a 
 beast". {Dr. Gudden.) 
 
 A German writer has said "One is a man, sever- 
 al are people, many are animals". (Dr. Gudden.) 
 
 Schiller (in "Gelehrte Gesellschaften") says 
 "Anyone, taken as an individual, is tolerably sensi- 
 ble and reasonable. As a member of a crowd he at 
 once becomes a block-head". 
 
 To get down to the things that are of use to us, 
 I will quote from LeBon, the way in which a crowd 
 can be led. (Page 141 and following). 
 
 1. When it is wanted to stir up a crowd for a short 
 space of time,io induce it to commit an act of any nature— to 
 pillage a palace, or die in defense of a stronghold or a barri- 
 cade, for instance —the crowd must be acted upon by rapid 
 suggestions, among which example is the most powerful in 
 effect. To attain this end, however, it is necessary that the 
 crowd should have been previously prepared by certain cir- 
 cumstances, and above all, that he who wishes to work upon 
 it should possess the quality to be studied further on, to which 
 I have given the name of prestige. 
 
 2. When however it is proposed to imbue the mind of 
 a crowd with ideas and belief— with modern social theories, 
 for instance — the leaders have recourse to different expedients. 
 The principal of them are three in number and clearly defi- 
 ned — affirmation, repetition, and contagion. Their action is 
 somewhat slow, but their effects, once produced are very 
 lasting. 
 
 Affirmation pure and simple, kept free of all 
 
 reasoning and all proof, is one of the surest means of 
 
 making an idea enter the mind of crowds. The more 
 
 concise an affirmation is, the more destitute of every 
 
Appearance of proof and demonstration, the more' 
 weight it carries. The religious books and legal 
 codes of all ages have always resorted to simple af- 
 firmation. Statesmen called upon to defend a poli- 
 tical cause, commercial men pushing the sale of their 
 prdducts by means of advertising, are acquainted 
 with the value of affirmation; 
 
 Affirmation, however, has no real influence, un- 
 less it be Constantly repeated, and so far as possible 
 in the same terms. The thing affirmed, comes by 
 repetition, to fix itself in the mind in such a way that 
 it is accepted in the end as a demonstrated truthi 
 (You will note that what LeBon here calls ' repeti- 
 tion", is the same thing that was in the Psychology 
 of Suggestion spoken of as "Frequency"— that is the' 
 repetitions are not a monotonous use of the same 
 words, with no let up, but a repetition of the same 
 words at frequent intervals). This power is due to 
 the fact that the repeated statement, is embedded in 
 the long run in those profound regions of our uncon- 
 scious selves, in which the motives' of our actions are 
 forged. At the end of a certain time we have for- 
 gotten who is the author of the repeated statement, 
 and we finish by believing it. To this circumstance 
 is due the astonishing power of advertisements. 
 
 When an affirmation has been repeated sufficient- 
 ly, and there is unanimity in this repetition-as has 
 occurred in the case of certain famous financial un- 
 dertakings rich enough to purchase powerful assis- 
 tance—what is called a current of opinion is formed, 
 and the powerful mechanism of contagion intervenes. 
 Ideas, sentiments, emotions and beliefs possess 
 in crowds a contagious power, as intense as 
 that of microbes. This phenomena is very natural 
 since it is observed even in animals when they are 
 together in numbers. Should a horse in a stable 
 take to biting his manger, the other horses will im- 
 
—30- 
 
 itate him: A panic that has seized a few sheep, will 
 soon extend to the whole flock. In the case of man 
 collected in a crowd, all emotions are very rapidly 
 contagious, which explains the suddenness of panics. 
 Brain disorders, like madness, are themselves conta? 
 gious. The frequency of madness among doctors 
 who are specialists for the mad is notorious. 
 
 For individuals to succumb to contagion their 
 simultaneous presence on the same spot is not indis- 
 pensable. The action of contagion may be felt from 
 a distance under the influence of events which give 
 all minds an individual trend and the characteristics 
 peculiar to crowds. 
 
 Man, like animals, has a natural tendency to 
 imitation. Imitation is a necessity for him, provided 
 that the imitation is quite easy, It is this necessity 
 , rf that makes the influence of what is called fashion so 
 powerful. Whether in a matter of opinions, ideas, 
 literary manifestations, or merely of dress, how 
 many persons are bold enough to run counter to the 
 fashion? It is by examples not by arguments that 
 crowds are guided. 
 
 "In the danger zone which suddenly surrounds 
 and startles him in war, the soldier feels, in the first 
 place, a desire to have some one assure him that the 
 seemingly critical situation in which he finds him- 
 self is as it should be. His eye is naturally directed 
 upon his officers. If the officer's quiet glance re- 
 minds him that here, as in peace time, the first duty 
 is obedience, and if he subsequently sees the officer 
 advance fearlessly and vigorously, he will, as a rule, 
 not worry about the why or wherefore." (Balck) 
 
 At every period there exists a small number of 
 individualities, which react upon the remainder and 
 are imitated by the unconscious mass. "Reason is 
 incapable of transforming man's convictions. (Psy- 
 chology of Peoples.) 
 
-SI- 
 PRESTIGE 
 
 Great power is given to ideas propagated by 
 affirmation, repetition, and contagion by the circum- 
 stances that they acquire in time that mysterious 
 force known as prestige. 
 
 Whatever has been the ruling power in the world 
 whether it be ideas or man; has, in the main en- 
 forced its authority by means of that irresistible* 
 force known as "prestige". The term is one whose 
 meaning is grasped by everbody, but the word is em^ 
 ployed in ways too different for it to be easy to de- 
 fine it. Prestige may involve such sentiments as 
 admiration or fear. Occasionally even these senti- 
 ments are its basis, but it can perfectly exist with- 
 out them. The greatest measure of prestige is pos- 
 sessed by the dead, by beings, that is, of whom we 
 do not stand in fear— by Alexander, Caeser, Maho- 
 met, and Buddha, for example. 
 
 Prestige, in reality, is a sort of domination exer- 
 cised on our mind by an individual, a work, or an 
 idea. This domination entirely paralyses our critical 
 faculty, and fills our soul with astonishment and res- 
 pect. The sentiment provoked is inexplicable, like 
 all sentiments, but it would appear to be of the same 
 kind as the fascination to which a magnetized person 
 is subjected. Prestige is the main-spring of all au- 
 thority. Neither gods, kings or women have ever 
 reigned without it, The various kinds of prestige 
 may be grouped under two principal heads; acquired 
 prestige, and personal prestige. Acquired prestige 
 is that resulting from name, fortune and reputation. 
 It may be independent of personal prestige. Personal 
 prestige on the contrary, is something peculiar to the 
 individual; it may co-exist with reputation, glory and 
 fortune, or be strengthened by them, but it is per- 
 fectly able to exist in their absence. 
 
 Acquired or artificial prestige is much the most 
 
common. The mere fact that a person occupies a Cer- 
 tain position, possesses a certain fortune, or bears 
 certain titles, endows him witn prestige, however 
 slight his own personal worth. An officer with his 
 shoulder-straps or a judge in his robes always enjoys 
 prestige. The most unbending socialist is always 
 somewhat impressed by the sight of a prince 
 or a marquis. The prestige of which I have 
 spoken is exercised by persons; side by side with it 
 may be placed that exercised by opinions, literary 
 and artistic works etc. Prestige of the latter sort is 
 most often the result of accumulated repetitions. 
 History, literary and artistic history especially, being 
 nothing more than the repetition of identical judge- 
 ments, which nobody endeavors to verify, everyone 
 ends by repeating what he learned at school, till 
 there come to be names and "things which nobody 
 would venture to meddle with. 
 
 Now I come to "personal prestige". Its nature 
 is very different from that of artificial or acquired 
 prestige, with which we have just been concerned. 
 It is a faculty independent of all titles, of all author- 
 ity, and possessed by a small number of persons, 
 whom it enables to exercise a veritable magnetic fas- 
 cination on those around them, although they are 
 socially their equals, and lack all ordinary means of 
 domination. They force the acceptance of their 
 ideas and sentiments on those about, and they are 
 obeyed, as is the tamer of wild animals, by the beast 
 that could easily devour him. 
 
 The great leaders of crowds, such as Buddha, 
 Jesus, Mahomet, Joan of Arc and Napoleon, have 
 possessed this form of prestige in a high degree, and 
 to this endowment is more particularly due the posi- 
 tion they attained. Gods, heroes and dogmas win ' 
 their way in the world of their own inward strength. 
 They are not to be discussed: they disappear, indeed 
 
-33- 
 
 as soon they are discussed. "The age of decadence 
 of gods, institutions and . dogmas has always begun 
 as soon as they are exposed to discussion". (Psycho- 
 logy of Peoples. ) 
 
 The great personages I have named were in pos- 
 session of their . power of fascination, long before 
 they became illustrious, and never would have be- 
 come so without it. An example in point is taken 
 from Train, who cites contemporary memoirs as his 
 authority, and gives an account of the arrival of Na- 
 poleon in Italy to take command of the army there. 
 Remember that this was before Napoleon had won 
 any victories. 
 
 "The generals of divisions, amongst them Au- 
 gereau, a sort of swashbuckler, uncouth and heroic, 
 proud of his height and his bravery, arrived at the 
 staff quarters, very badly disposed toward the little 
 upstart dispatched them from Paris. On the strength 
 of the description of him that has been given them, 
 Augereau is inclined to be insolent and insubordinate 
 (to one who is) a favorite of Barras, a general who 
 owes his rank to the events of Vendemiaire, who has 
 won his grade by street fighting, who is looked upon 
 as bearish, because he is always thinking in solitude, 
 of poor aspect, and with the reputation of a mathe- 
 matician and a dreamer. They are introduced (into 
 the ante-room), and Napoleon keeps them waiting. 
 At last he appears, girt with his sword: he puts on 
 his hat, explains the measures he has taken, gives 
 his orders and dismisses them. Augereau has re- 
 mained silent; it is only when he is outside that he 
 regains his self-possession and is able to deliver him- 
 self of a stream of profanity. He admits with Mes- 
 sena that this little devil of a general has inspired 
 him with awe; he cannot understand -the ascendancy 
 by which from the very first he has felt himself 
 overwhelmed". 
 
-84- 
 
 Later in 1815, after Napoleon had acquired the 
 prestige of all of his victories, General Vendamme 
 said to another marshal as they went together up the 
 steps of the palace. "That devil of a man exercises a 
 fascination on me that I cannot explain, even to my- 
 self, and in such a degree that, though I fear neither 
 God nor devil, yet when I am in his presence, I am 
 ready to tremble like a child, and he could make me 
 go through the eye of a needle, to throw myself in 
 the fire." 
 
 His prestige outlived him and continued to grow. 
 It was his prestige that made an emperor of his 
 obscure nephew. How powerful his memory still is 
 may be seen by the resurrection of Napoleonic his- 
 tory at the present day. 
 
 Ill-treat men as you will, massacre them by the 
 millions, be the cause of invasion on invasion, all is 
 permitted you if you possess prestige in a sufficient 
 degree and the talent necessary to uphold it. (This 
 part on psychology of crowds is taken, sometimes 
 quoted, from LeBon's "The Crowd".) 
 
 EFFECT OF MASS OF THE POPULATION ON ARMIES 
 
 History repeats itself, that is a certain psycholo- 
 logical phenomena in the nation or the world with its 
 accompanying results, is followed in turn by another 
 and another till at last the circle has been completed 
 and the round begins again. 
 
 Isolated communities combine with adjoining 
 ones for mutual protection and we have small states. 
 Instead of suffering meekly, they combine to fight off 
 their enemies. This begets the more prominent military 
 virtues of courage and mutual confidence. Small com- 
 munities more or less expect to protect themselves. 
 Large ones rely on the state furnishing them protection. 
 Team work is more to be "expected between small 
 communities and small states than among larger ones, 
 
-isl- 
 and this characteristic extends to armies formed from 
 their inhabitants. These small states combine with 
 others till one is formed that, to its constituents, 
 seems powerful enough to defy the world. Then, 
 freed from menace from the outside, commercial 
 pursuits become the sole enthusiasm of the indivi- 
 duals composing the state; luxury increases till men, 
 voicing the cry "I want what I want when I want it" 
 lapse into effiminacy and selfishness and forget that 
 the protection that the nation will be able to furnish 
 them in their commercial pursuits is wholly depen- 
 dent on a spirit among them of self-sacrifice for the 
 mutual good. 
 
 ' 'Selfish and wordly activity, looking only toward 
 the gratification of all desires of the individual, un- 
 dermines the foundations of higher moral philosophy 
 and the belief in ideals. Fools arrive at the vain 
 conclusion that the life object of the individual is ac- 
 quisition and enjoyment; that the purpose of the state 
 is simply to facilitate the business affairs of its citi- 
 zens; that man is appointed by an all wise provi- 
 dence to buy cheaply and sell at a profit; they con- 
 clude that war, which interferes with . man's activi- 
 ties, is the greatest evil. * * * *."-{VonMoltke) 
 
 The individuals seek personal advantage against 
 the interests of the state or even against the state 
 itself. The state has become decadent and it begins 
 to break up or to have portions of its territory taken 
 by others. When this state of luxury and fulfillment 
 of individual desires has reached a certain degree, 
 then will a severe war break up the state entirely or 
 else it will break up the individual's pursuit of luxu- 
 ry as a first consideration and make him turn to the 
 preservation of the state as the essential. 
 
 As it is not always the largest army that wins, 
 so it is not always the apparently strongest state 
 that wins. A long war is a test of endurance. A 
 
-36- 
 
 gtate composed of individuals who will suffer rather 
 than yield may be exterminated but it cannot be con- 
 quered. The soldiers of such a state are honored by 
 the citizens, who. while they stay at home and pro- 
 duce the supplies necessary to the state xio not re- 
 gard production and speculation as the sole honor- 
 able means of getting a livelihood, but, if able bodied 
 they expect at sometime to change places with the 
 fighting men. 
 
 In modern times, the highly specialized soldiery 
 of a century or two ago have given place to armed 
 masses, proportionately greater in number but not 
 so highly trained. Whether these masses are volun- 
 teers or conscripts, they come from all classes of 
 society and consist of the bulk of all the able bodied 
 citizens. They are all in constant .communication 
 with the rest of the population. Newspapers and 
 electrical means of communication also produce unity 
 of thought between the part of the population that is 
 in the field and the part that is at home. Any psy- 
 chological manifestation in one part will almost cer- 
 tainly appear in the other with about equal strength. 
 If those at home get tired of the struggle, the army 
 will show moral weakness' Panic in the one will 
 produce panic in the other. Accustomed to more 
 luxury and less hardship than in years gone by, 
 neither part will hold out to extremity as in former 
 times. This is the reason that modern wars are 
 expected to be short. A big reverse and both army 
 and populace lose their nerve. Neither is willing to 
 pay the price of success. 
 
 While modern means of communication tend to 
 reduce the time that a psychological epidemic will 
 last, at the same time they allow one to spread more 
 rapidly. A violent psychological epidemic that en- 
 courages to war will spread like wild-fire and will 
 reach the whole nation at the same time. 
 
- 37— 
 
 The united front of Germany in 1870 or Japan in 
 1904 will be possible in any coming war. The side 
 that has such intense feeling among all classes will be 
 well nigh invincible, while the thought wave lasts. 
 
 One of the most likely results of these conditions 
 is a sudden and resistless demand for war, everthing 
 carried to the top pitch of enthusiasm, that will force 
 an unprepared government into- war, followed after- 
 one severe defeat, by an equally deep dejection that 
 will culminate in an equally resistless demand for 
 peace at any price. The people and the army are so 
 bound up together that unless the military virtues of 
 courage, mutual confidence and self-sacrifice for the 
 good of the state are developed among the people 
 they will not exist in the army, for in these days the 
 populace is the army. 
 
 PSYCHOLOGY OF RACES 
 
 The psychologist distinguishes between peoples 
 by their main mental, just as the naturalist distin- 
 guishes between species by a few main physical cha- 
 racteristics. The superior degree of will power, in- 
 domitable energy, great initiative, absolute self-con- 
 trol and strong sentiment of independence of the 
 pure Anglo-Saxon distinguishes him from other hu- 
 man beings just as fins and gills distinguish the fish 
 from other vertebrates. A fish may be large or 
 small; chunky or slim; red, white, blue, black or 
 drab; live in salt or fresh water; have eyes or be 
 sightless; and prey on others or not, but if he 
 has fins and gills he is a fish. All the non-es- 
 sentials may be changed by environment, but the 
 essential characteristics remain, being subject to 
 change only by the slow transformations of evolution 
 that require countless ages for their completion. So 
 the main mental characteristics of a race are their 
 inheritance from countless generations of dead an- 
 
—38— 
 
 cestors and change very slowly or remain unchanged 
 under the influence of education and environment. 
 
 ' 'The influences of environment only become ef- 
 fective when heredity has caused their action to be 
 continued in the same direction during a long 
 period." (LeBon, Psychology of Peoples, p. 9) 
 
 Applied to one Anglo-Saxon these main charac- 
 teristics may be so hidden by changes in minor but 
 more noticeable ones, as to make one think the main 
 ones have changed or disappeared. But applied 
 to a thousand Anglo-Saxons anywhere we will at 
 once see that they are plainly noticeable. Applied 
 to one Englishmen or one Jew what we consider the 
 typical Englishmen or the typical Jew may seem to 
 be imperfectly represented, but applied to a thou- 
 sand of each we at once see the typical Englishmen 
 or typical Jew in spite of all the minor changes that 
 education or environment may have produced. 
 
 Burbank may so change a fruit or a vegetable 
 that the eye cannot detect that it is a member of the 
 family from which it springs, but the one or two 
 main characteristics of that family will remain un- 
 changed and the scientist will by these character- 
 istics still unhesitatingly place it in the family from 
 which it came. 
 
 So with us ' 'we are the children at once of our 
 parents and our race." (Psychology of Peoples, p. 9) 
 
 One of the strongest forces that tends to pro- 
 duce a uniform trend of mind in any fairly homogen- 
 ious people is religious belief. We can plainly see 
 the different mental attitudes of the Christian, 
 Mohammedan and Buddhist. 
 
 So great is the mental difference between differ- 
 ent peoples that they can never fully understand 
 one another. You think with not only a different 
 brain but a different kind of brain than does your 
 Filipino servant. The impression that a series of 
 
words or a series of events makes on your brain dif- 
 fers from that made on his brain by the same words 
 or events. This is so marked that it impossible to 
 accurately translate any idea from one language to 
 another. For example, the dictionaries give pan 
 (Spanish) and bread (English) as equivalent. To 
 you the word "bread" brings to mind a mental picture 
 of a large loaf, made without much if any lard and with 
 a small preportion of crust and much soft interior, 
 but to the Spaniard the word '"pan" brings up a 
 mental picture of a small hard loaf, all crust and 
 made with much lard. 
 
 In a similar manner events make different im- 
 pressions on different kinds of brains. 
 
 Education and environment may quickly change 
 x the more noticeable expressions of a brain but they 
 do not change its kind. 
 
 In tea years a fairly intelligent Japanese can ac- 
 quire all the education and exterior social graces of an 
 Englishmen. To transform the Japanese so that a ser- 
 ies of events would give him the same mental picture 
 that they give, to an Englishman a thousand years 
 would not be sufficient. 
 
 We think with much the same kind of a brain as 
 does the Englishmen. Given a particular set of cir- 
 cumstances we can predict within one or two alter- 
 native lines of action just what an Englishmen will 
 do, but what a Japanese, a Chinaman, or a Filipino 
 will do under these same circumstances, or why, is 
 entirely beyond our comprehension. By association 
 with one of these peoples we may come to know 
 more nearly what they will do but never why. 
 
 When peoples of different mental characteristics 
 mix and intermarry three conditions may arise:— 
 
 1st. When the higher civilization constitutes but 
 a small proportion it at once reverts to the 
 lower. 
 
—40— 
 
 2d. When the higher civilization is a large pro- 
 portion of the whole the lower dies out and 
 ceases to exist. A higher civilization can swal- 
 low up and entirely eradicate a larger propor- 
 tion of the other than can a lower. In neither 
 case do the two amalgamate and produce an 
 average of the two. 
 
 3d. When two or more civilizations mix all in 
 large proportion, still amalgamation does not 
 ensue. On the contrary the different main 
 mental characteristics mutually exterminate 
 each other and a new civilization is formed. 
 The old is gone and a new grows up from vir- 
 gin soil. 
 
 After the mixing is complete, generations will 
 be necessary before a new civilization with 
 fixed mental characteristics is fully established. 
 In the United States at the present day we have 
 the mixture that will soon eradicate the mental cha- 
 racteristics of the constituent parts and if left to our- 
 selves we will eventually produce a race and a civili- 
 zation of our own, different in mental attitude from 
 that of any of the constituent parts or an average 
 of them. 
 
 As a practical measure, however, we have today 
 to deal with the mixture of many parts and with 
 different kinds of peoples. 
 
 The Anglo-Saxon and allied stock we had before 
 the Civil War. We know them and know what they 
 will do in war. Now for military purposes let us 
 consider the rest. 
 
 First we have taken in the negro. There are 
 something like 11,000,000 of him. By association we 
 know something of what he will do but as we think 
 with a different kind of brain we do not perceive the 
 why of his acts. In other words we will not be able 
 to get the best out of him as a' soldier because we do 
 not underrtand how to touch the mainsprings of his 
 character. 
 
-41— 
 
 Another large proportion of our population is 
 made up from the Jews. It is said that there are 
 today more Jews in Chicago than in Palestine. For 
 generations the Jew has been a trader. For centur- 
 ies he has been without a country. He don't know 
 what patriotism means. Recruiting officers find 
 he does not average up with the other applicants 
 physically. He has not been a soldier for over 2,000 
 years. For the same length of time he has prefer- 
 red trading to doing work with his hands. The sol- 
 dier's lot is hard physical work. This the Jew des- 
 pises. He does not have any of the qualities of a 
 good soldier. Nevertheless he is highly religious and 
 very susceptible to the moral sentiments that are 
 characteristic of his race. He has tenacity of pur- 
 pose and under pressure can patiently endure much. 
 In a cause which appealed to his peculiar kind of 
 mind and led by officers who knew how to get the 
 best out of him he might do surprisingly well as a 
 soldier, but unless we can touch the latent main- 
 springs of character that 2500 years ago made him a 
 soldier to be respected we will find him of little 
 account. 
 
 Another large proportion of our citizens come 
 from southern Europe. Their number is increasing 
 each year. These men have the mental character- 
 istics that Napoleon's soldiers had. One of the prin- 
 cipal of these is the instinctive demand for a leader 
 more than for a cause. The cause gets the Vocal al- 
 legiance but they follow a leader not an idea. 
 
 The French demanded liberty and equality and 
 thought they made the Revolution to get it, Yet 
 there was even less freedom under the Republic than 
 there had been under the kings. The names of all 
 the old institutions were changed but all the institu- 
 tions themselves remained, with their characteristics 
 essentially unchanged. The turmoil continued till 
 
—42— 
 
 another leader, Napoleon, arose. We laugh at the 
 harangues that Napoleon made use of in order to 
 raise his subject to enthusiasm in his service, but 
 we will now have in our armies a considerable pro- 
 portion of men with just the mental characteristics 
 of those same subjects. We do not understand their 
 brains. From the same events or words we do not 
 get the same mental picture that they do. 
 
 The Anglo-Saxon fights stubbornly in defeat. 
 TheLatin makesa more enthusiastic and dangerousat- 
 tack but sinks into the deepest dejection and hope- 
 lessness under a reverse. 
 
 A big war will now make it necessary to combine 
 all these unfusible elements into one whole. 
 
 The organization, the methods, the leaders that 
 suit one part will be unsuitable to the others. 
 
 In the Civil War the population of each of the 
 contending parties was fairly homogenious in race 
 and character. Though neither side well under- 
 stood the mental characteristics of the other each 
 well understood itself. Each had its physical strength 
 pushed into action by a strong fixed idea. Today it 
 is impossible to think of an idea which would make a 
 strong mental and psychological impression on the 
 whole mass of the population. It is therefore im- 
 probable that the Civil War can furnish any reliable 
 information as to what we may expect our people to 
 accomplish today. 
 
PART II 
 
 PANIC IN WAR 
 
 Prepared mostly from an article in Revue d'Infanterle of Noyember, 
 1907, translated in Military Information Document No. 12149, of School 
 Library file, and an article by Colonel Bmil Pfluelf on the same subject, 
 translated from the German. 
 
 When in prehistoric times, as the great god 
 "Pan" still had his existence in the mind of a 
 people rich in imagination and love of nature, a 
 loving couple hidden in the forest or a wanderer 
 overtaken by darkness and inclement weather be- 
 lieved to hear in the rustling of the leaves or in the 
 other noises of the forest the steps of the angry god 
 —when they in fright and fear ran out of the forest 
 to the protection of the nearby huts, they experienced 
 what the Greeks at that period designated as "fright 
 of Pan." 
 
 From this we get the derivation of the word 
 "panic," the meaning of which, after centuries 
 have elapsed, is still applicable to paroxisms of 
 fright. However, the word "panic" has a some- 
 what different meaning to-day. By it we understand 
 to-day the sudden, precipitate, unreasoning fright 
 taking possession of a crowd which, unlike fear or 
 fright originating in the depth of the individual 
 human mind, cannot be combatted or curbed by 
 reasoning. . 
 
 Such a fright, which may have its origin possibly 
 in an utterly unimportant happening in a crowd, 
 suddenly calls into existence the crudest features of 
 self-preservation, features which existed from time 
 
 43 
 
—44— 
 
 immemorial in the human race, but which we over- 
 come by advancing civilization; such a fright entirely 
 fills the human mind by driving into the back-ground 
 every other feeling; governs the movements of and 
 drives the crowd, causing each individual of the 
 crowd to lose his power of judgment, reasoning and 
 self-command, and leads it, incapable of resistance, 
 into purely brute actions. This is what Le Bon 
 speaks of as a "psychological crowd." Once the 
 same general incentive has taken possession of the 
 minds of the individuals and the psychological crowd 
 has become organized, it forms a "collective soul" 
 which has not the psychic attributes of the separate 
 individuals, nor an average of these individual attri- 
 butes, but which takes on an entirely new personality 
 — the personality of the crowd. 
 
 In the psychological crowd, the individual is no 
 longer himself; he feels and acts, but in the sense of 
 the "collective soul" and shares its peculiarities and 
 desires. 
 
 The general finger-marks of the psychological 
 crowds are: 
 
 The extinction of personal feeling or conscious- 
 ness, the knowledge of being one of many in the 
 crowd. 
 
 The absence of any feeling of responsibility. 
 
 Susceptibility to suggestion. 
 
 An exaggerated independence. 
 
 Subjection to being easily led. 
 
 A certain willingness to do things, without regard 
 to right, justice or consequences. 
 
 That under such conditions all bounds set by 
 education, culture and reason are driven into the 
 back-ground; that the "human'beast" comes to the 
 surface is self-evident. 
 
 Now, a body of troops, under certain conditions, 
 is a psychological crowd. In a state of rest, during 
 
—45— 
 
 a lull of the battle, or while on the march, out of 
 contact with the enemy, it may not be a psychological 
 crowd, but in times of stress it will always be such. 
 
 The more heterogenous the elements that com- 
 pose an army, the more susceptible will it be to the 
 wild, unreasoning acts of the psychological crowd^ 
 the more subject will it be to panic. 
 
 On the other hand, troops that are composed of 
 individuals who are all of the same race, same class 
 of society, same language, same political and re- 
 ligious faith, and who are uniformly educated and 
 instructed till they have confidence in their officers, 
 their comrades and themselves, will be little subject 
 to panic, though even such will sometimes have 
 panics among them. 
 
 The study of cases of panic, which have occurred 
 at various times and in various armies, show that if, 
 in combat, the determining cause of the evil has 
 always been the same, namely, a powerful suggestion 
 in the form of a cry or gesture, yet the real cause, 
 concealed behind the apparent one, is an unexpected 
 modification in the physical or moral conditions 
 affecting the troops, a modification which resulted in 
 diminishing or destroying their resistance to sug- 
 gestion. 
 
 In campaign, this resisting force is subject to 
 incessant fluctuations, according to circumstances, 
 the condition of the troops, and their sentiments. 
 We shall see that these sentiments, even the best of 
 them, are far from being able to balance this de- 
 vastating and blind force of panic. 
 
 Unfortunately the study of panics is rendered 
 very difficult by the scarcity of records and by the 
 lack of historical certainty in the official accounts 
 submitted. There are perhaps no matters of history 
 where the truth, voluntarily or involuntarily, has 
 been more perverted. The winner of a fight 
 
exalts the heroism of his troops, but does not 
 hint at there having been a panic among the 
 enemy. The facts are sometimes voluntarily sup- 
 pressed by military commanders from considera- 
 tions of humanity, because they wish to conceal, 
 as a blemish, the weakness of the troops under 
 their orders, and because they are unwilling to 
 publicly dishonor men whose worth, courage and 
 even heroism they knew. (The German official ac- 
 counts of their own wars are known to have hidden 
 all such facts as related to themselves through 
 motives of public policy.) The real facts are not re- 
 vealed sometimes because of the involuntary action 
 of commanders, who are themselves actors in the 
 drama and have been subjected to the perturbing in- 
 fluence, the first effect of which is the loss of the 
 faculty of observation. 
 
 Therefore, if one wishes to extract from the past 
 a few particulars of the truth on such a subject, he 
 should preferably consult the memoirs of subordinates 
 and soldiers, who relate simply what they have seen 
 or have experienced, without care of publicity. Even 
 these must be subjected to strong historical criticism 
 before being accepted. 
 
 From no source do we find any attempt to ex- 
 plain the characteristics of the phenomena of panic. 
 At times, experience has shown to commanders 
 palliatives of a moral kind, but generally the one 
 remedy understood and made use of was sanguinary 
 repression. In all ages military commanders have 
 dreaded panic as a scourge. The tremendous and 
 long continued strain of the modern battle will tend 
 to such terrible nervous and physical strain as to put 
 troops in a psychological state that is highly con- 
 ducive to panics. At the same time it 'will be less 
 often possible to turn to account the sudden waves 
 of enthusiasm, analogous to, but of course the direct 
 
Ml— 
 
 Opposite of panic* which lead to the most con- 
 spicuous gallantry. The modern fight calls for 
 powers of nervous, physical and moral endurance 
 which come only from sterling moral character* 
 backed up by sturdy physical condition. Dash will 
 be called for sometimes, but endurance will be the 
 key to success. 
 
 In the ancient battles, as DuPicq has shown* 
 • 'panic was the inevitable issue, and he was victor 
 who was able to resist it the longer." The ancient 
 commanders attempted to conquer by instilling in the 
 soldier the dominating fear of their own commanders. 
 It was necessary, according to a Greek commander, 
 "that the soldier fear his captain more than the 
 enemy." In Rome, where an admirable esprit du 
 corps existed", tactics were adapted to the moral 
 character of the combatant; but in addition, they 
 took extreme measures against fugitives. ' Every 
 soldier who fled from the combat perished under the 
 baton, all troops guilty of cowardice were decimated. 
 
 Indeed it is a fact that in war success often de- 
 pends less upon the skill of the combinations than 
 upon the stubbornness of the combatants. Still, it is 
 necessary that this stubbornness be general, for 
 panic of a few men can, in an instant, destroy the 
 tenacity of the greatest number. 
 
 We shall not study the psychology of the com- 
 batant in rational and methodical flight, which is 
 only combat in retreat: for there is a great difference 
 between flight — even disorderly flight— and panic. 
 
 Panic derives its birth and is developed in man- 
 ners always identical, which can be described in a 
 few words. Troops in the peculiar crowded state, 
 brought into being by the combat, in anticipation of 
 •the combat or later as a result of the combat, are 
 broken up in consequence of a cry of distress that is 
 repeated by a few men who accompany it with ges- 
 
tures of terror and run away in one or several direc- 
 tions, habitually away from the enemy, blind with 
 fear and deaf to every voice. 
 
 In this condition, there are for these troops no 
 longer any comrades, commanders, or colors; and in 
 the fields strewn with abandoned arms, it is flight, 
 howling and disgraceful, where each tries to procure 
 his own safety— and where all find defeat, death and 
 shame. 
 
 Panic is not confined to man. Animals all have 
 it. The nervous and excitable horse is even more 
 given to causeless panic than is man. Panic in 
 mounted troops spreads more rapidly and is even less 
 possible to check than in dismounted troops. Panics 
 are frequent among the horses by themselves. Only 
 a year or two ago there was a disastrous and 
 causeless panic among the animals at the British 
 maneuvers. 
 
 Such was the panic that seized the Prussians on 
 the evening of Jena. At the cry "Save himself who 
 can," a sudden panic took possession of every soul. 
 They took to running confusedly on the roads, seeing 
 enemy everywhere and taking fugitives, themselves 
 full of fright, for victorious Frenchmen. To increase 
 their misfortune, they encountered that enormous 
 quantity of baggage which the Prussian army always 
 brought along with it. The cavalry turned out of the 
 roads and took to the fields by whole squadrons. 
 The infantry broke ranks, looting and overturning 
 the baggage. 
 
 After the first Bull Run the beaten troops fled in 
 utter route by the way they had come. They ran 
 back by Sudley Springs, though they could have 
 saved many miles by cutting straight across. This 
 wild scramble kept up all night till they reached 
 Washington. Yet no one pursued. The drawn faces 
 and utter exhaustion of the stragglers as they arrived 
 
-4fr- 
 
 in Washington have often been described. The 
 physical exertion they had undergone would account 
 for their personal appearance, but the descriptions of 
 all other panics contain the same notice of the drawn 
 faces and utter exhaustion of those who have been in 
 a panic. In order to arrive at a conception of panic, 
 one must consider certain phenomena still little un- 
 derstood. These are illusion, hallucination, sugges- 
 tion and contagion. 
 
 Panic is indeed a sort of collective hallucination. 
 Illusion and hallucination are both at first individual 
 and are manifested in the subjects who are the most 
 nervous, the most impressionable, or the most de- 
 pressed physically. By their gestures and cries they 
 offer suggestions to their immediate neighbors. 
 Then contagion does its work with frightful rapidity. 
 
 Let us examine a few details of these different 
 phenomena. 
 
 ' ' Illusion is an error which simulates actual knowl- 
 edge, evident in itself, or intuitive in the form of a 
 perception of the senses" (Sully). It has, therefore, 
 for a point of departure a real impression. For ex- 
 ample, a sentinel sees a bush and hears it rustle in 
 the breeze. He really sees something, but believes 
 that he sees an enemy sneaking up to kill him. 
 
 A similar illusion was that which led the Russian 
 fleet to see Japanese torpedo craft in what was really 
 English fishing vessels peacefully at work off their 
 own coast. 
 
 In hallucination, on the contrary, there is no real 
 impression. A person who pictures to himself the 
 face of a friend or of an enemy so vividly that he 
 believes he sees him for a few moments is a victim 
 of hallucination. 
 
 Under the influence of the nervous over-excite- 
 ment of the battle-field such phenomena are frequent. 
 Every one who has gone to war has verified it. ' ' It 
 
-50- 
 
 seems," says Montluc, "that for each one of your 
 enemies you see ten before your eyes, like a drunk- 
 ard who sees a thousand candles all at once." 
 
 The commanders, themselves, being more imag- 
 inative and having their attention constantly under 
 strain, are frequently the victims of illusion and hal- 
 lucination. That is what a French general wished to 
 say in 1870, when he said to his chiefs of informa- 
 tion: "You have Prussians in your eyes." No doubt 
 most of you can recall similar results to secret service 
 work in our own army. 
 
 A curious example of hallucination "in the chief is 
 that of the brigade commander Felix. During the 
 campaign of 1793, while posted in an advance posi- 
 tion, he abandoned his detachment before the first 
 shot was fired and fled whip and spur to headquarters 
 (13 miles) where he asserted that his troops had been 
 annihilated by the enemy. 
 
 Now it can not be admitted that this officer fled 
 through treason, since he had already distinguished 
 himself in several combats. Here is the official report 
 that was made of the matter, to the minister of war: 
 
 "I have the honor to report to you that in the 
 affair of the 13th, brigade commander Felix, occu- 
 pied with the 1st Battalion of the 44th Regiment and 
 an independent company the post of Neukirch, quitted 
 it at the instant his troops were attacked and fled to 
 headquarters, distant from his post five leagues, to 
 tell me all out of breath that his battalion was cut to 
 pieces or taken prisoners as well as the colors and 
 guns, and that a very small part had escaped into the 
 woods. As this report did not have the air of truth, 
 I asked this commander to compose and collect him- 
 self a little. Seeing that he still persisted in this re- 
 port, I took him to General Hedouville, Chief of Staff , 
 to whom he confirmed again what he had told me. 
 As a commander should not quit his post, I had him 
 
-51- 
 
 arrested and made report to the representatives bf 
 the people, who, a few hours afterwards, proceeded 
 to the advance guard, where they learned with the 
 greatest astonishment that every individual of this 
 battalion had conducted himself like a hero under the 
 leadership of their battalion commander. ' ' 
 
 Personally, the worst scared man I ever saw was 
 a trooper who came back to camp about midnight 
 and reported that his outpost had been attacked and 
 wiped out by bolomen. No shots had been fired and 
 the officers were skeptical, still the man stuck to his 
 story and was full of details of the catastrophe. 
 What had really happened was that his mate on a 
 double sentinel post had stepped through a hole into 
 a covered well and had made considerable fuss about 
 it. 
 
 In an army a* few individuals become thus victims 
 of illusion or hallucination,, and so are created the 
 first germs of panic. 
 
 Obsessed by the image he believes he sees and 
 lost to all notion of the outside world, the victim im- 
 mediately exerts all his energy and all his power to 
 obey the feeling of attraction or repulsion which the 
 " image imperiously imposes upon him. When seized 
 by fear, his features become convulsed, he conceals 
 his frenzied eyes with his arms to escape the hor- 
 rible vision, and his mouth utters cries of fright. It 
 is then that is introduced the phenomena of suggestion. 
 
 In order to understand the great power of this 
 phenomenon, it is necessary to remember that a per- 
 son may be put to sleep artificially and placed under 
 complete control of another person, who compels the 
 former to obey all his suggestions and to perform 
 deeds diametrically opposed to the subject's will. 
 
 "The most careful observations seem to prove 
 that an individual merged for some time in a crowd 
 in action finds himself —either in consequence of the 
 
—52— 
 
 Magnetic influence given out by the crowd, or from 
 some other cause of which we are ignorant— in a 
 special state, which much resembles the state of fas- 
 cination in which the hypnotized individual finds 
 himself in the hands of the hypnotizer. The activity 
 of the brain being paralyzed in the case of the hyp- 
 notized subject, the latter becomes the slave of all 
 the unconscious activities caused by the reflx actions 
 of the spinal cord, which the hypnotizer directs at 
 will. The conscious personality has vanished; will 
 and discernment are lost. (Le Bon p. 34, 35.) As 
 we saw in the last lecture, the man on the firing line 
 is in a state almost hypnotic in its character, which 
 renders him particularly subject to suggestion. 
 
 This phenomena of suggestion is well understood 
 by military commanders, who know that conform- 
 ably to suggestion, soldiers will dash to the assault 
 of, a position with an irresistible impetuosity. The 
 battle of Glisnelle presents a very extraordinary case 
 of suggestion to troops. 
 
 "At the instant the order to retreat was given, 
 General Gouvion perceived that instead of executing 
 a retrograde movement, one battalion was advancing 
 toward the enemy. He sent an aide de camp to en- 
 join it to return to the rear. The battalion refused 
 to obey and continued to march forward. Gouvion, 
 though admiring this exalted courage, then went 
 forward himself and gave in an animated voice the 
 order to retire. Scarcely had he begun to speak 
 when a bullet struck him to earth. The soldiers of 
 this brave and obstinate battalion, instead of being 
 crushed by this depressing death, were rather ani- 
 mated by the thought of revenging the loss of their 
 general. They charged the Austrian battalions fur- 
 iously. The first ones that they met were overturned, 
 but soon they were surrounded on all sides, and re- 
 fusing to ask quarter, they perished to a man." (Jean 
 Lombard, Volunteers of '92.) 
 
-53— 
 
 Unfortunately, suggestion does not always come 
 from chiefs and is not always directed in the channel 
 of duty and the safety of the army. Nor is it of less 
 effect on this account; for, under its influence— and 
 this is a point to be noticed— the soldier will abandon 
 himself to shameful flight as well as to heroic assault. 
 "The spectre of panic stalks by the side of enthu- 
 siasm." (Balck). 
 
 In the crisis of the fight, the action of sug- 
 gestion would not be so formidable if it could be 
 localized and if it could be made to influence the 
 minds of only the nearest neighbors. 
 
 But this is not the case by any means; for con- 
 tagion soon intervenes to disseminate the influence 
 with incredible rapidity. ' 'It is a phenomenon often 
 verified, but unexplained, that every act, every sen- 
 timent in a crowd is contagious, and contagious to a 
 point where the individual very easily sacrifices his 
 personal interests for those of the collective body." 
 (LeBon.) In an instant, contagion carries fright to 
 the bravest hearts, destroys the faculty of reasoning, 
 and brings all of the intellects to the same level. 
 The troops, by putting together into a common being 
 what scarcely exists in each one to the same degree, 
 that is instinct, form a morally compact mass. In 
 this mass, every sentiment born of civilization and 
 intellectual culture is immediately banished, and 
 there emanates from it no longer anything but vio- 
 lence, ferocity and fear. 
 
 Thus the reading of the accounts of dramatic 
 panics depicts only the image of a furious, fleeing, 
 unconscious beast, seeking an instinctive shelter from 
 the storm in ravines, woods, villages and mountains, 
 which nature and the industry of man have prepared 
 for the refuge of beings threatened with an imminent 
 danger, With men in a panic, they are seen, after 
 being well started, to herd together in sombre silence 
 
their faces reflecting their sinister fright. After the 
 first start, they press on in silence, their eyes cast 
 obstinately on the ground. Crushed by fatigue, they 
 throw away knapsacks, hats, rifles, canteens— any- 
 thing that impedes their progress. The descriptions 
 of all panics dwell more or less on the utter exhaus- 
 tion of those who have participated therein. It ap- 
 pears to be a result, not of the physical exertion they 
 have undergone, but of the nervous excitement and 
 nervous strain. 
 
 "During the night of Saint Privat, " says General 
 Castex, "we were proceeding toward the Ban-Saint- 
 Martin in the midst of the retreating infantry columns 
 when we were almost deafened by a strange noise 
 like that of an earth tremor, which seemed produced 
 far in our rear, but which was increasing in loudness. 
 
 Mixed with the clanking of arms, there were vo- 
 ciferations, cries, exclamations — a sort of infernal 
 clamor. We were enveloped in a cloud of dust so 
 thick that it obstructed the sky and we had difficulty 
 distinguishing cavalrymen riding at a frantic galop, 
 Pressed together in a human mass, they seemed to 
 flee before a terrifying spectre as if impelled by an 
 avalanche. It was a panic. How could it have been" 
 produced after the guns had ceased firing and after 
 the battle had been completed? How many valient 
 commanders were unable, not only to subdue it, but 
 even to escape themselves from this mad ride?" 
 
 Here we see the panic before the final stage. 
 Here are cries, inarticulate, but still human sounds. 
 When a panic has continued for a longer time, the 
 mass settles into sombre silence, utter weariness, and 
 hurrying along in profound dejection is even less pos- 
 sible to control than when the first rush started. 
 
 We have seen that troops seized with panic had 
 received through suggestion an extremely vivid im- 
 
-55— 
 
 pression and that hallucination presents to the eyes 
 of each soldier a frightful danger. 
 
 Immediately, by a psychological law, the organs 
 involuntarily react to avoid the danger and with all 
 the more violence because the exciting influence has 
 been most vivid. Then ensue disordered actions 
 causing the man, in order to rid himself of every ob- 
 stacle to his flight, to precipitate himself upon his 
 neighbors with a frenzy that extends sometimes even 
 to murder, and to hurl himself upon obstacles which 
 he can neither clear nor overturn. 
 
 It has been proved, moreover, that strong emo- 
 tions lead to serious perturbations of the respiratory 
 systems in consequence of a disturbance of the ner- 
 vous centers, the mechanism of which is not known. 
 
 "Moral impressions," says Dr. Lagrange, "as 
 well as physical sensation can diminish the respir- 
 atory apititude only by reflex effects that happen to 
 disturb the regular play of the pulmonary bellows. 
 Under the influence of fear, the movements of the 
 chest are sometimes seen to be accelerated immeas- 
 ureably, sometimes to suceed one another at unequal 
 intervals, and sometimes to be retarded and momen- 
 tarily suspended. The defect of coordination and 
 the disorder of respiratory movements very .much re- 
 sembles that incoherent movement of the lips which 
 prevents an excited. man from clearly articulating 
 his words." Thus are explained the cries, the sobs, 
 the shrieks uttered by the fugitives who involuntar- 
 ily favor the contagion of panic. 
 
 Respiratory disorders likewise cause an extreme- 
 ly rapid fatigue even at the time when the troops 
 have just begun movement, and the details of this 
 fatigue fill the accounts of panic. We see soldiers 
 strew unconsciously over fields— by a movement, so 
 to speak reflexive— helmets, muskets, knapsacks, 
 -cartridges, precious articles, everything hindering 
 
—56— 
 
 them, everything added to their fatigue or bowing 
 them down. This thing is certain and is seen in 
 every panic. 
 
 It can be said, indeed, that from the instant 
 when cries of fright become general, when all feel- 
 ings and all thoughts are directed toward the one 
 end, fight, troops have acquired a physiognomy en- 
 tirely new, and there are manifested in them charac- 
 teristics peculiar to this state. 
 
 This annihilation of the intellectual faculties 
 shows of what little importance, from the special 
 view point of panic, is the coefficient of intelligence 
 sometimes spoken of- as one of the great advantages 
 of our American army. Remembering that the army 
 that can longest resist panic is the victor and that 
 crowds, and especially crowds under strong excite- 
 ment, are the same no r matter what the grade of in- 
 telligence of the individuals composing the crowd, it 
 seems that except in the way of leaders, intelligence 
 is of little value in war. One might go further and 
 say that in the fight itself, right in the scrimmage, 
 that bull-headed determination or fanatical enthusi- 
 asm as far more likely to exercise an influence than 
 intelligence, even among the officers. 
 
 In combat, qualities of character alone permit 
 resistance to the wild current of the flood. If they 
 are defective, panic becomes sovereign and everyone 
 is swept away, chiefs and soldiers, in irresistable 
 ruin. Troops seized by panic are so incapable of the 
 least reason that even the sense of direction often 
 leaves them; and it is not rare to see soldiers dash 
 into the ranks of the enemy with such gestures of 
 terror that fear overcomes the adversary also. Such 
 was the case in the combat of Limbach, where the 
 surrounded French delivered so opportunely two 
 salvos of artillery against the Austrians advancing 
 behind them, that the latter were put into utter 
 
-57— 
 
 route and fled in all directions. "Many of them," 
 says an eye-witness, "came into our ranks and the 
 melee became general. On both sides, the astonished 
 soldiers halted, looked at one another, and much per- 
 turbed, disbanded, abandoning the battlefield."— 
 (Journal of a One Year Volunteer) . Although the 
 enemy may be in a situation as. desperate as that of 
 the fugitive, it seems to the latter, that the former 
 possesses a great power, omnipotence. However, as 
 intelligence has disappeared, no one preceives this 
 fact. Troops overcome by fright are totally deprived 
 of the critical sense, and so one of the consequences 
 of the loss of reason is the creation of an extraordi- 
 nary credulity. It is thus that a rumor, known at 
 once to be false if one stopped to think, will fre- 
 quently turn a retreat into a demoralized route. 
 
 In panic, the sentiments of each one are equally 
 modified so that those of individuals are unrecogniz- 
 able. Generally speaking, the traits of the primitive 
 man appear with great power. These are violence, 
 egotism, ferocity and fear. On the other hand the 
 sentiments which have been acquired or developed 
 through civilization, such as devotion, pity, military 
 honor, etc., are entirely annihilated. 
 
 The absence of responsibility and a sense that 
 there is no authority with power to punish, contri- 
 bute not a little to the unleashing of the primitive 
 sentiments with an exaggeration of which only col- 
 lections of men can offer examples. 
 
 It is not the courage of the individual which is 
 changed into the most imbicile cowardice, but this 
 change takes place in the mind of the crowd. The 
 individual minds have ceased to exist— the crowd has 
 a single mind of its own, separate and distinct from 
 the mind of the individuals composing it. Troops 
 composed of men of proved individual courage will 
 not be inaccessible to collective fear. The gladiators 
 
—58— 
 
 of Sparticus, in revolt, were put into full route by an 
 army of soldiers of little individual courage, but of 
 better organization and leadership. MacDonald with 
 a handful of men in the campaign of 179& defeated 
 the Neapolitans, Thiebalt says of this: "Armed 
 and banded into troops of fanatics, these Neapolitans, 
 who had taught us to dread them as men, were ter- 
 rible, but from the moment they formed regular 
 platoons, they became nobodies." 
 
 It would be as unjust to accuse the Neapolitans 
 of cowardice and to brand them with the seal of in- 
 famy as it would the men whom the storm of panic 
 had swept away. Everything depends upon sugges- 
 tion, and the same troops may deliver themselves 
 within a few days, often within a few hours, to the 
 worst routs or to the most magnificent acts of hero- 
 ism. 
 
 We thus see that physical depression, loss of the 
 faculty of reasoning, the unleashing of primitive 
 instincts and sentiments, are the essential character- 
 istics of men seized by the crisis of fear. They 
 become easy prey to their adversaries, who need 
 only to have enough physical power to strike in order 
 to slaughter them. 
 
 Pursuit under these conditions becomes a sort of 
 cruel play— a chase where the pursuer has no longer 
 anything to dread for himself excepting fatigue. 
 As DuPicq has shown us, in the ancient battles the 
 winner lost a few hundred, the loser fifty or a hun- 
 dred thousand. Here the losses must have been 
 about equal till the break. Then one side, overcome 
 by panic, fled, and the victors without further fight- 
 ing had but to follow along and kill the helpless, 
 panic-stricken mob. 
 
 FACTORS IN PANICS 
 
 In order that troops may be influenced in an 
 
—59- 
 
 irresistable manner by the suggestion of fear, we 
 have said that is was necessary that they be placed 
 previously in a condition favorable to the contagion 
 of suggestion. This state of predisposition is brought 
 about by two series of factors: 
 
 1. Immediate factors, events, almost always 
 unforeseen, which often pave the way for panic in a 
 few minutes, without in themselves causing it. 
 
 2. Indirect factors, those which, operating for 
 a time more or less extended, have created a soil 
 favorable to its development. 
 
 Among the first may be mentioned treachery, 
 the absence or scarcity of arms, the absence of the 
 commander, surprise, and expectant waiting. Among 
 the second, race, physical depression, and moral de- 
 pression. 
 
 The definition of treachery we all know. When 
 it occurs with troops while waging hostile battle, 
 even if they have already accomplished prodigies of 
 valor— even if they are in full victory, and even if 
 treason be the act of only a few isolated individuals, 
 yet demoralization becomes almost inevitable. 
 
 It is a fact that the reasonings of collectives 
 operate only by. the association of images and by 
 generalizations, often absurd. 
 
 The image of treachery is first erected before 
 the frightened soldier who sees himself surrounded 
 to his ruin by maddened traitors. Let the cry of 
 treason be raised and the deed is done; panic is let 
 loose. 
 
 On April 20, 1794, the garrison of Cambrai and 
 Bouchain, after having followed up from Cateau and 
 from Villers-en-Cauchiers, the Austrians, whom the 
 cavalry still pursued, were suddenly seized by panic 
 in consequence of the defection of a few hussars. 
 They came back to Cambrai and Bouchain in abomi- 
 
—60— 
 
 nable disorder, demanding the death of the traitors, 
 seven of whom were afterward executed. 
 
 The lack of arms gives the soldier the impression 
 of being delivered over to the enemy with feet and 
 hands bound. We have a curious example of this in 
 the combat of Saint-Hermagor, where Major Roulier 
 was abandoned by all his men because the muskets 
 were, on account of rain, no longer able to be fired. 
 The enemy was, of course, in exactly the same fix. 
 An individual would have known this at once, but 
 the crowd, with the usual lack of reasoning qualities 
 inherent in crowds, and the extreme egotism of 
 crowds, thought only of itself and its own plight. 
 
 The absence of chiefs disarranges the bearings 
 of troops, accustomed to act only upon orders and 
 having for direction only the will and judgment of 
 the chief. The latter appears in the eyes of all as 
 the one person who understands the military task 
 and is capable of directing affairs. 
 
 Action by surprise is recommended by all tacti- 
 cians; for its power to demoralize the enemy is a 
 considerable force in the hands of the assailant. It 
 suppresses, indeed, in the one who encounters it, not 
 only the possibility of maneuvering, but also that of 
 measuring the extent of the danger threatening him. 
 At the same time it removes the two factors neces- 
 sary to all reasoning— time and calmness. Peril 
 then appears all the more frightful, because it is 
 sudden and apparently inevitable. Before having 
 suffered even the first ill, troops are morally turned 
 foot-loose and are ripe for panic, which is propagated 
 by contagion in a very few minutes. 
 
 The fight at the Carigan bridge, related by 
 Montluc, illustrates well the character of combat by 
 surprise, and of the consequent panic. It was a 
 question of seizing the bridge, defended by the Im- 
 perialists, and of destroying it. Montluc had seized 
 
-ei- 
 
 the bridge on a moonlight night and was at work 
 destroying it, when about two hundred of the enemy 
 at the head of a column appeared and opened fire; 
 About the time of the arrival of the enemy the moon 
 had been hid by clouds and a mist arose. The French 
 were surprised, started to form, and then suddenly 
 broke. About the same time reinforcements arrived 
 from the other side and opened fire indiscriminately 
 on both parties to the original fight at the bridge! 
 Montluc loudly cried his own name and "France, 
 France!" He was able to rally about thirty young 
 gentlemen who had been attached to his force. 
 With these he charged the enemy's original two hun- 
 dred, who were at the other end of the bridge. They 
 broke back, threw their supports into confusion and 
 they also ran. In a few minutes Montluc and thirty 
 men held the bridge while all the other troops on both 
 sides were rushing to the rear in utter panic. Both 
 forces were completely routed. Here we see circum- 
 stances especially favorable to panic. Both forces 
 were of mixed nationalities. On one side French and 
 Italians, on the other Spanish, German and Swiss. 
 Further they were engaged in night operations. A 
 student of the psychology of war might have pre- 
 dicted just this result before the fight began. None 
 of the French side came back during the night. On 
 the Spanish side the disorderly flight was such that 
 the commander of the town from which they had 
 started reports that, after reaching the town on the 
 return, more than four hundred jumped over the for- 
 tification and continued the flight beyond. 
 
 Expectancy is the disposition of our minds to an- 
 ticipant coming events, a disposition all the more ac- 
 tive when the mental images associated with these 
 events have an emotional character. "To expect a 
 thing is to give an impulse to the active instincts, in- 
 cluding the faculty of attention. It is to find oneself 
 
-62-- 
 
 oh the qui vive and to begin a general rehearsal of 
 the acts which the real occurrence of the event might 
 create." (James Sully) 
 
 The phenomena of anxious expectancy explains 
 the numerous shots that sentinels in the field fire dur- 
 ing the night at bushes and trees, which they take 
 for the enemy's patrols. It explains also why re- 
 serve battalions during battle, having before their 
 minds eyes, the spectacle, less the animation of the 
 struggle, retreat without even waiting for their en- 
 trance into the fighting line. 
 
 The above are immediate factors of panic. They 
 often influence troops independently, but often they 
 are grafted on the indirect factors, which favor their 
 action, and therefore take a preponderating part in 
 the origin of panic. 
 
 From this point of view, that unchangeable -soil 
 from which spring all our sentiments, race, has a 
 capital importance. It is upon it that depend in great 
 part the impulsiveness of troops, their variableness 
 and their susceptibility to suggestion. The Latin 
 races are more peculiarly feminine, and if they are 
 . susceptible to great enthusiasm and to limitless de- 
 votion, they are also liable to the greatest weaknesses 
 and to the gravest disorders. There have been con- 
 stantly opposed, in the history of wars, Russian te- 
 nacity and English coolness to the fury of the French, 
 who are imaginative and nervous, all animation and 
 excitement, irresistible in success, but frightfully de- 
 pressed in reverses. 
 
 We in the United States, have a combination of 
 these qualities to deal with. Some of our people have 
 a mixture of these characteristics, others have one 
 or the other form in a pure or nearly pure state. 
 Will our armies then have an average of these char- 
 acteristics? A crowd does not have a character 
 which is the average of the characters of the in- 
 
dividuals that compose it, nor is it always swayed by 
 the same influences. It has a character of its own, 
 independent of the individuals of which it is com- 
 posed. If a crowd influence starts in a small group 
 it will soon spread by contagion to the whole and will 
 often cause individuals to act, in a manner wholly 
 foreign to their natural disposition: The predomin- 
 ating factor in our mixed crowd, will then depend on 
 which fraction first receives a strong moral impress- 
 ion and by suggestion disseminates it through the 
 whole. Our army, of mixed nationalities, will not 
 have an average of the characterislics of the races 
 represented, but rather will tend to have the faults 
 of all. 
 
 Physical wretchedness is one of the most rapid 
 agents of demorilization. By physical wretchedness 
 must be understood, not only the absence of rations, 
 but also the fatigues resulting from marches and 
 combats and the anemia that so rapidly overcomes 
 troops in campaign. Among the causes that create a 
 soil suitable for hallucination and illusion may be 
 cited excessive fatigue, hunger or thirst, strong men- 
 tal tension, profound mental or bodily exhaustion 
 and morbidly emotional conditions such as fear. 
 Panic, the daughter of hallucination, becomes ex- 
 tremely frequent with troops physicially depressed. 
 
 On the other hand, a certain amount of hardship 
 seems to be good for the morale of troops. To a lim- 
 ited extent, man enjoys hardship. If it were not so, 
 people would not go hunting, fishing or exploring. 
 The amount that a man will find beneficial depends 
 on his previous experiences, his bringing up. As to 
 ourselves we may say that the amount which the 
 average man is able to bear with equanimity has by 
 the change in the mode of living, been steadily de- 
 creasing Since the Civil War. An amount, that in 
 the Civil War, was to a certain extent pleasurable 
 
-64— 
 
 and exciting would now be felt as terrible suffering; 
 We must understand, however, that troops inflamed 
 by victory and whose morale is exalted by success, 
 can endure cheerfully the greatest privations and 
 fatigues. 
 
 However, when to physical suffering is added 
 demoralization, when wretchedness breaks down the 
 body and defeat undermines the courage, panic be- 
 comes the uncontested mistress, before whom the 
 commanders themselves bow, repulsing the idea of 
 battle, in order to avoid irreparable disaster. 
 
 It has been justly said that the moral forces are 
 the preponderating ones in war. Moral force, which 
 gives to troops the will to surmount all obstacles, to 
 dread no danger and to desire to conquer at any price, 
 springs from sentiments, varying according to cir- 
 cumstances, which animate soldiers and place them 
 in a condition to be influenced by the suggestion of 
 victory in combat. 
 
 In a general way, these sentiments are, religious 
 fanaticism, patriotism, enthusiasm for a commander, 
 discipline and most of all, confidence resulting from 
 experience. 
 
 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 After having reviewed the different causes of 
 panic, there still remains for us to determine whether 
 or not there are practical means for rendering them 
 less frequent;of lessening their effects, and of check- 
 ing them after the evil has been produced. 
 
 Among the indirect and immediate causes of 
 panics, it is evident that several, such as race, are 
 beyond control, or such as treason and surprise can- 
 not be foreseen. If known in advance, they could 
 not exist. 
 
 Against these two factors of panic, only general 
 preventive measures, designed to render them less 
 
-SB- 
 frequent can be taken. We must, therefore resign 
 ourselves to submit to them as an inevitable evil. 
 
 Other factors, on the contrary, depend . on the 
 commander, who is able, within certain limits, to 
 suppress them. 
 
 It is a question of understanding troops, of ad- 
 ministrative diligence, of discipline; and it is espec- 
 ially in this respect that past experience imparts 
 instruction. 
 
 Thus the panic of the Tuillerie, in the battle 
 of LeMans demonstrates conclusively that it would 
 be preferable to leave at home men who were neither 
 armed or instructed, rather then to lead them into 
 combat, where they become a center of extremely 
 dangerous demoralization. It is therefore most suit- 
 ably the work of times of peace to make such prepa- 
 ration for war that means of giving the soldier in the 
 field resources to maintain existence, powerful arms, 
 and a skillful chief shall be provided, so that it may be 
 possible to lead them into combat in such physical 
 and moral condition that the chances for panic will 
 be considerably diminished. 
 
 These chances would be still further reduced if 
 troops be drilled to fight according to methods appro- 
 priate to their racial temperaments. It is necessary, 
 indeed, that instruction, while taking into account 
 arms, terrain, situations and numerical strength, be 
 based upon the moral forces of the combatants. The 
 penalty for doing otherwise is to find them useless 
 on the day of battle. 
 
 Man is but little changeable, but little transform- 
 able. It is therefore from perfect knowledge of him 
 that tactics must especially be derived, and that 
 mathematical theories must be met. 
 
 Panic is an abberration of assemblages of men, 
 an actual scourge, of which tactics must take account. 
 
 With this in view, the following principles can 
 be deduced from what has preceded. 
 
—68— 
 
 1. Joint responsibility and confidence are twd 
 essential factors for steadfastness of troops in combat, 
 and for their resistance to panic. 
 
 2. Troops must fight in the organization they 
 are used to in time of peace, each man in his habitual 
 place and with his proper unit. 
 
 In order that a man or troops may fight energeti- 
 cally, without apprehension, it is necessary that there 
 be protection on both sides and in rear. The Roman 
 soldier fought thus, being concerned only with the 
 adversary in front, the men in the second, third and 
 fourth ranks protecting him on the flanks and in rear 
 and replacing him in the first rank if he were disabled. 
 
 Consequently, reserves should not be too far dis- 
 tant from the fighting line, in order that they may 
 give the latter confidence by their promptnes in 
 supporting. 
 
 3. The different arms must give each other con- 
 stant support. The artillery, especially, the effect of 
 whose fire is universally recognized, should support 
 the infantry from near points, and should march, so 
 to speak in the midst of them. The soldier in com- 
 bat must never feel himself isolated or separated 
 from his brothers in arms. 
 
 Artillery in combat, because of the grouping of 
 men around immobile objects (the guns) and because 
 of the widely separated pieces, each with its little 
 squad immediately under the eyes of its chief, is least 
 subject to panic of all the arms and for that reason, 
 artillery in action forms a strong supporting and ral- 
 lying point. 
 
 4. The best troops, those whose steadfastness 
 is assured, should be placed on the second line. Those 
 who are struggling directly with the enemy have in 
 action, a powerful deterrent from emotion, namely 
 the centering of their attention on the incidents of 
 the fight, without it being possible for them to think 
 about their own personality. 
 
-87- 
 
 On the other hand, the reserves have tq endure 
 the waiting, often for a long time, before their en- 
 trance into the fighting line; they have before 
 them the spectacle of the battle and the sight of 
 the wounded* and they are sometimes subjected to a 
 fire to which they cannot reply. Troops with but 
 little experience in war do not resist such emotions. 
 
 If the best troops be placed in the first line, the 
 least recoil on their part causes the disintegration 
 of the reserves. 
 
 5. Adequate ammunition supply is absolutely 
 essential. Troops out of ammunition can not and 
 will not fight, except at the very closest range. Such 
 troops will not only break themselves, but their panic 
 will, by contagion, be spread to .their neighbors, 
 
 This is an affair to be thought out and practiced 
 in time of peace, remembering that the less highly 
 trained the troops the greater will be the consump- 
 tion of ammunition. 
 
 In the combats near Dijon, in 1870, mobilized 
 national guards, who were placed in the second line, 
 were seen to flee ■ by whole battalions, even though 
 the first line was victorious. 
 
 To avoid surprise at any cost, troops should, not 
 only cover themselves in all directions from which 
 the enemy may approach, but they should also, if 
 possible, be warned in advance of the probable inci- 
 dents of the combat. DuPicq observed that Hanni- 
 bal was in the habit of thus treating the troops of 
 the center of his line of battle, who, though always 
 broken, nevertheless never fled. 
 
 Morgan, at Cowpens, realizing that his militia 
 was going to flee anyway, told them to fire a volley 
 or two and then run. They did this and thus every- 
 thing being expected, they were so encouraged that 
 they had the nerve to come back and materially as- 
 sisted in winning the victory.. 
 
During the action, but not by any means during 
 the preliminaries, the proper post of the chief is be- 
 hind, not in 'front of his troops. It is under his eye 
 that they must fight, the surveillance that he exer- 
 ercises being sometimes sufficient to repress the first 
 faint desire for flight. In addition, the commander 
 should Jtake before the fight certain measures de- 
 signed to diminish the chances for fright and suit- 
 able for keeping men under fire. The orders on this 
 subject given by General Chanzy on the 10th of Jan- 
 uary, 1871, at LeMans, have been celebrated. 
 
 "The approach of LeMans is formally forbidden 
 to troops • and officers of every grade. Any move- 
 ment from front to rear on the battlefield must not 
 be made at the trot or gallop. Each army cfirps will 
 guard its rear by cavalry to pick up fugitives and to 
 prevent all straggling. Fugitives will be brought 
 back to the position and kept on the first firing line. 
 They will be shot if they seek to flee. If disbanding 
 should happen to take place, the general in chief 
 would not hesitate to have the bridges in rear of the 
 lines cut in order to force the utmost defense.*" 
 
 Some of the regular cavalry regiments were used 
 in a similar manner during the combats of the Civil 
 war. 
 
 Complete supply and organization, providing 
 largely against material wants, appropriate tactics, 
 and instructed nuclii of the units are the elements in 
 troops, other than valor, suitable for warding off 
 panics. These elements, which, added to discipline, 
 endurance and exalted morale, constitute an appre- 
 ciable force, are still insufficient in themselves. Only 
 joint responsibility, born of experience in war, can 
 ever offer an impenetrable resistance to the conta- 
 gion of fear. Therefore, panics among troops will 
 occur, whatever the cares the commander may have 
 taken to prevent them. Can they be stopped at the" 
 
—69— 
 
 very moment of combat? Yes, if the chiefs are en- 
 ergetic and know how to take suitable measures in 
 time. 
 
 "Collectives are the playthings of all exterior ex- 
 citants, and the latter' s incessant fluctuations are 
 reflected in them. They are the slaves of impulses 
 they receive." It follows that troops influenced by 
 suggestion to panic can, if a sufficiently strong will 
 be imposed upon them, receive an absolutely contrary 
 suggestion, which they will obey with the same do- 
 cility that they did the first one. 
 
 History is full of deeds where the attitude of a 
 chief, a happy word, or a gesture have changed in an 
 instant the sentiments of troops. It was Caesar, in 
 the battle of Munda, dashing afoot fin front of his 
 fleeing lines, who cried: "See what chief you are 
 about to betray and on what occasion. " It was Ney, 
 standing in the stirrups, calm and impassive under 
 the musketry fire, who addressed his broken soldiers 
 thus: "Death strikes only those who hesitate. Look 
 at me. It has not struck me. " 
 
 Washington, at Princeton, rode out between the 
 lines and sat on his horse fully exposed to the volleys 
 of both sides; and this steadied his men. (Sheridan at 
 Winchester:) It is not the words, which few if any 
 hear, nor the gestures which more, but not a large 
 percentage of the whole, see, that brings back the 
 whole mass. It is the words or gestures that influence 
 a few— then contagion spreads the effect through the 
 mass, which knows no more why it turned back than 
 why it first started to fly. 
 
 Prestige is the first element of the habit of obe- 
 dience. It causes the acceptance of an idea without 
 discussion or controversy. If the one from whom 
 the idea eminates possesses prestige, the suggestion 
 is received from the outset and appears most logical 
 and true in the eyes of all. Orders 'given under 
 
—70— 
 
 these conditions partake of a peculiar force; and it 
 may be said that the best obeyed commanders are 
 neither the best instructed, the most intelligent, the 
 most paternal, nor the most severe, but are those 
 who Jhave innate or acquired prestige. It is neces- 
 sary then, that prestige be the dominating quality 
 in a leader of men. It is because of it that his sug- 
 gestions take on an irresitable power, that he is able 
 to throw his soldiers against the enemy in an enthu- 
 siastic assault, and that he can stop with a gesture 
 the first fugitives, transforming them into heroes. 
 
 So, for that moral abberation of collectives, 
 panic, two remedies of a moral nature present them- 
 selves: Prestige of the commander, and joint respon- 
 sibility of the troops. 
 
 Some have prestige inherently in their composi- 
 tion, others seem to have acquired it almost by acci- 
 dent, while a certain amount of it is acquired through 
 exterior surroundings. 
 
 Military organization, in giving an officer uni- 
 form, instruction and extensive powers, favors the 
 acquisition of this quality, which he, nevertheless, 
 can not actually possess without a profound under- 
 standing' of the sentiments that animate his troops, 
 without a surveillance of their persons and acts and 
 without the worship of military honor. In addition, 
 it is essential that he have the words and gestures 
 of a chief. 
 
 More difficult is it to inculcate in troops the sen- 
 timent of joint responsibility based upon mutual con- 
 fidence. It can exist in a high decree only in soldiers 
 who have gone to war together; for souls are revealed 
 only in crises, and characters are verified only in suf- 
 fering and dangers. If no one knows himself until 
 he has suffered, still less does he know others until 
 he has suffered with them. Napoleon said of the 
 soldiers at Waterloo: "They had not eaten soup to- 
 
—71— 
 
 gether long enough. " The important thing is not to 
 eat in the same room and at the same hours, but 
 rather at the close of the same fatigues and in the 
 midst of the same dangers. This is because the only 
 means we have of developing joint responsibility 
 among soldiers is to subject them to the same harsh 
 proofs, which grow more and more painful, and 
 which are wisely graduated and energetically en- 
 dured. 
 
Psychology of Infantry Combat* 
 
 "Cowardiqe is fear yielded to; 
 Courage is fear vanquished." 
 
 — Legouvb. 
 
 In approaching this subject, the first thing to 
 consider is the attitude of man when under the 
 emotions of a fight. 
 
 Combat is the final end of armies, and man is 
 the first weapon of the combat; there can be nothing 
 well understood about an army without an exact 
 knowledge of this first weapon, man, and of his 
 moral state during the excitement of the action. 
 
 It often happens that those who treat of warlike 
 things take the arm for the basis of the argument, 
 thinking that the man called to serve it can always 
 be counted upon and ruled by their precepts and 
 regulations. But the combatant, as a reasoning 
 being, abdicating his mobile and variable nature to 
 become a pawn in the game of war, is a creature of 
 the imagination, not the man of reality. The latter 
 is flesh and blood, of body and soul, though the soul 
 has often dominated the body and forced a revolted 
 and unwilling body into the maelstrom of destruction. 
 
 It has been said that in our day war has become 
 a thing of knowledge and calculation. Not so— war, 
 so long as there shall be war, and one risks his life 
 
 *Taken to large extent from " Psychologie du Combat de 
 V Infanterie" by Lieutenant Louque, itself mostly made up of 
 quotations. The greater part of these quotations, where 
 used, have been verified from the originals. 
 
 72 
 
—73- 
 
 therein will be essentially a thing of instinct, of 
 psychology. 
 
 We will then commence by a study of the indi- 
 vidual. 
 
 MAN UNDER FIRE 
 
 In order to have all the data of the problem, let 
 us first look into the state of mind of the man when 
 the action begins. 
 
 Torn a short time ago from his work, his in- 
 terests, his affections, the volunteer (the element 
 that makes the majority) has been brutally thrown 
 into the chaos of a feverish mobilization, without 
 having had the time to fully arrange his business 
 affairs or the affairs of his heart. He has been 
 rushed to mobilization camps or camps of instruction. 
 He has had some drill and gained some instruction. 
 He has also suffered from bad camps, selected for 
 political considerations; from bad clothes, because 
 we have no adequate reserve of clothes for issue and 
 the contractor for war clothing can use poor work- 
 manship and worse material with impunity; from 
 bad food, because transportation facilities were 
 paralyzed, deliveries delayed, and most of all because 
 no one in his company knew how to use the ration; 
 worst of all he has suffered from loss of morale be- 
 cause the yellow journals have been publishing all 
 kinds of stories of the horrors of war and the in- 
 efficiencies of his commanders. Added to this he 
 worries over the family he left behind, perhaps to 
 suffering and want during his absence. 
 
 Now let us make as exact a picture as possible 
 of real combat. 
 
 "When one reasons in full security, after dinner, 
 in full moral and physical contentment about war, 
 about combat, one feels himself animated with the 
 noblest ardor, and he denies the reality. Neverthe- 
 less, if you take just such circumstances, how many 
 
—74— 
 
 would be willing at once to rise and risk his life? 
 Then how about those who have been obliged to 
 march in discomfort for days and weeks to reach the ' 
 hour of combat— who, on the day of combat, have 
 waited in a state of expectation for hours before the 
 moment arrives? If we are sincere, we can see how 
 the physical fatigue and moral anguish have weak- 
 ened the morale— how much less willing we would 
 be to participate in an action than thirty days before, 
 just after a good dinner. " —DuPicq. 
 
 General Dandignac, in order to give an idea of 
 combat, puts before our eyes the sad agitation of 
 some, the depressed abasement of others, the silence 
 of officers ordinarily loquacious; the paralysis of wits 
 which, habit not holding in place, are now not only 
 incapable of leading, but of being led; the weakness 
 of the soldiers in whom emotion conceals all senti- 
 ment and who crouch or lie down, and those, on the 
 contrary, who have appeared timid and mild, but 
 who now shine out suddenly as tranquil and brilliant 
 and who will be the heroes of the action to the as- 
 tonishment of everyone, including themselves; imag- 
 ine the air filled with screaming projectiles, the 
 zones of dust where projectiles strike between us 
 and the sun; the spat of a projectile striking a human 
 body, the clatter of the gun of a man who falls. 
 
 As the zone of artillery fire is entered organiza- 
 tions subdivide, they advance into this zone and the 
 subdivisions divide into groups. Bullets sing close, 
 "I want you," "I'll get you." The sound is not 
 reassuring. 
 
 Little by little ground is gained under the cover 
 of accidents of the terrain. But the bullets become 
 more menacing. Now it is necessary to advance small 
 groups while the others fire. This is not easy. The 
 men of advanced groups gain cover. Eventually 
 others come up. Again comes the cry "forward". 
 
-75— 
 
 The soldier is down behind cover and fear says "stay 
 here" while duty should say "go forward". This 
 struggle in the soldier's mind goes on at each halt. 
 Now the buzz of ricochets is more frequent, they can 
 be distinguished plainly from the whistle of the high 
 shots. What a demoralizing effect this has on sup- 
 ports that are suffering loss and cannot reply. Final- 
 ly in their turn they will arrive where they can 
 shoot— but where is the enemy? Nothing can be 
 seen. What has become of the soldier's old com- 
 rades? Who are his new neighbors? They are more 
 numerous, but he knows no one. Where is the offi- 
 cer to whom he has always looked for orders? Who 
 is this new chief? He is not alone, but he feels as if 
 he were, and it is necessary that his morale be good, 
 his patriotism great, for he feels that under the or- 
 ders of chiefs that do not know him his glorious deeds 
 will never be recorded— perhaps infamous deeds will 
 never be recorded either. 
 
 Each forward move requires great mental strain 
 —takes perhaps hours to accomplish. Even the halts 
 give no rest— no let up to the nervous tension. The 
 men crouch in uncomfortable positions behind insuffi- 
 cient cover, with deadly projectiles constantly sing- 
 ing in their ears and a knowledge that each move- 
 ment constitutes an additional danger of death. The 
 human organism is not constituted to endure danger 
 of this intensity and above all of this continous du- 
 ration." The fire of the defense does not destroy 
 the assailant but demoralizies him to such an extent 
 as to suppress all effort."" {Grandmaisori) . 
 
 The duration of the test besides is considerable. 
 In place of battles that lasted an hour or so we now 
 have battles that last a week or ten days. Night 
 even gives no rest. Day succeeds day and the strug- 
 gle is eternally going on. The cessations in the firing 
 are more terrible than the periods of activity. The 
 
—76— 
 
 nervous strain continues and the least exposure brings 
 a hail of bullets. No one knows what turn affairs 
 will take. The soldier cannot take bis mind off this 
 enemy: whose position, strength and resources of 
 ammunition are unknown. He remembers the car- 
 tridges he has fired and the difficulty and uncertainty 
 of their replacement. The cries of more or less dis- 
 tant wounded comrades strike his ear. All this tends 
 to break down his nervous system. 
 
 The exhaustion of mind and body 'is complete. 
 Troops even go to sleep on the firing line from sheer 
 exhaustion. 
 
 The Russian Captain Soloviev, speaking of the 
 soldier in the Russo-Jap war says:— 
 
 ''As a general rule our soldier in battle has an 
 astonishingly simple and everyday demeanor. He 
 . who expects to see something out of the ordinary, 
 something heroic on his face at these decisive mo- 
 ments, something picturesque and dramatic, is mis- 
 taken. The soldier remains the same ordinary man 
 as before, only his face is somewhat paler, and its 
 expression more concentrated and serious. His ner- 
 vous and rapid firing alone betrays the inner strug- 
 gle. It is at that moment that it is necessary to 
 master the soldier's impressions and bring him to a 
 normal condition, as far as this may be done in bat- 
 tle." {Soloviev) 
 
 "Each eye-witness of battle may confirm how 
 narrowly the men watch their officer. The soldiers 
 judge by their officer the condition of affairs, the 
 greater or less danger, the success or failure.- * * * * 
 Woe to the unit which in time of peace did not be- 
 come impregnated with the spirit of iron discipline. 
 It will pay dearly for it in war." 
 
 To quiet the men, it is useful to make remarks 
 concerning the service alone. For example: "Why 
 are the sights not set in that squad? Squad comman- 
 
—17- 
 
 der, What are you thinking about? Examine and cor» 
 rect immediately. ' ' If the commander is angry, re- 
 proves neglect: this means that there is nothing un- 
 usual— that everthing is going as it ought and that 
 there is no cause for fear. The men grow calmer 
 and forget that bullets are whistling about them * * . 
 (Soloviev). 
 
 A threat or a joke may bring men to their senses; 
 ' 'But a threat must be serious and the jnen must feel 
 that it will be executed if need be. Angry words and 
 shouts can do nothing." (Soloviev). 
 
 ' 'It must not be overlooked that the soldier, sep- 
 arated from his comrades in (a thin skirmish) line 
 during the advance, and withdrawn from the influ- 
 ence of his officers, succumbs more easily to tem- 
 porary spells of weakness and is more apt to remain 
 behind than the skirmishers in a dense firing line." 
 (Balck). 
 
 In South Africa the British used thin firing lines 
 and failed. The Japanese used them as a maneuver 
 formation to reach a position from which effective 
 fire could be opened and then promptly thickened the 
 firing line by sending successive thin lines to join it. 
 
 EXAMPLES OF SKULKING. 
 
 Hohenlohe tells of crossing the battlefield in the 
 war of 1870 and finding it covered with skulkers — 
 whole battalions of them— Some were lying down with 
 their guns pointing forward like skirmishers — evi- 
 dently they had remained there when their comrades 
 advanced. Others were hiding in holes and ravines. 
 All had an indifferent air. It seemed to be sufficient 
 for them, that the party of officers riding by did not 
 belong to their corps. Some cried "Look, here are 
 some more who are going forward to get killed." 
 
 Captain Culmann describes finding at Woerth 5 
 
-78— 
 
 men in Indian file behind a small sapling, who had 
 remained there several hours. 
 
 Quotation from a French description of the de- 
 fense of Saint Hubert-18 August, 1870: "Pour 
 hours! Rain of bullets, all high. Ah! Look! Aline 
 of battle coming to support us, well aligned. The 
 marshal in the centee, the Colonel on the right, 
 Sourdrille on the left. It is the 3d Battalion. From 
 my place I see holes made in the line, which soon 
 reaches us and wishes to share our shelter, hardly 
 sufficient for us. They get in two and three ranks; 
 the occupants refuse to yield the place which they 
 have had all day. They need not have sent all the 
 soldiers in the world. We needed only cartridges. 
 
 What is that? We are turned. No. Our friends 
 200 meters in our rear are firing on us, taking us for 
 the enemy. We sound "cease firing," we make the 
 signal but the fire continues. My under lieutenant 
 asks permission to go over there ; he rushes forward 
 through a storm of bullets, reaches their officers and 
 finds among them some who ask if he really is a 
 Frenchman. However, the fire ceased. That bat- 
 talion rose up and rushed to join us. Where could 
 we put them? Every one got behind something and 
 began to shoot. We were in 10 ranks. The front 
 rank cried that the fire of those in rear menaced them. 
 I struck those nearest me with my cane and finally 
 ended by turning my back to the fire of a Prussian 
 battery which was less dangerous than my comrades." 
 
 A Prussian captain wrote in 1870: 
 
 "I see many people occupied in trying to devise 
 means to make the enemy's fire less effective but I 
 acknowledge with regret no one seems disquieted by 
 the serious losses caused by men of the same troop 
 firing on each other." 
 
 We see above the demoralized individual. Prev- 
 iously I have given you something about demoralized 
 crowds, i. e. panics. 
 
PEAR. 
 
 "Courage is neither so common nor so invariable 
 as the public suppose. A person is very variable as 
 to* courage, he has his good and his bad days, depend- 
 ing on exterior circumstances such as physical or 
 mental fatigue* cold, heat, hunger, thirst, or the 
 news received. 
 
 As to the average, the ordinary man it is neces- 
 sary to flatter a little to appease public opinion: 
 Without doubt he is capable of many fine moves, but 
 subject also to strange reactions. It is said everyone 
 is brave," but when one comes to the fact one finds 
 few of uniform courage."— La Guerre et l'Komme. 
 
 "Of all animals, man is the most cowardly. If 
 one studies the faces before the battle, he will realize 
 this. For a man to sacrifice his life for the success. 
 of the end that the army pursues is a rare thing. 
 Are there so few absolutely brave among so many 
 brave men? Alas, yes! Gideon found 300 among 
 30,000 and he was surprisingly lucky." "The ab- 
 solute bravery that does not refuse to fight even 
 against odds, trusting in God or destiny, this bravery 
 is not natural to man; it is the result of moral culti- 
 vation ; and it is infinitely rare. For always in danger 
 the animal sentiment of self preservation bobs up ; 
 man calculates his chances and makes how many 
 errors? 
 
 Man has a horror of death. Among corps d'elite 
 . a grand sense of duty, which they alone are able to 
 understand and reach, sometimes makes them march 
 forward; but the mass always recoils at the sight of 
 destruction. Discipline has as its end to do violence 
 to this horror, by a greater horror, that of punish- 
 ment or of shame. But there always arrives an in- 
 stant when this natural horror takes the upper hand 
 of discipline and the combatant flies. When the com- 
 batant is long under fire, there is produced the selec- 
 
—80— 
 
 tion of which Skobeleff speaks. The brave and the 
 men of good intentions keep up; the others, the cow- 
 ards, waiting under cover weaken themselves and 
 the others, delaying the execution of orders, break- 
 ing up the movement and impeding the effectives. 
 Fire, even from a great distance has then produced 
 disunion material and moral. ' ' (DuPicq. ) 
 
 "Fear is then an enemy that we have not taken 
 into account, yet it is. really more terrible than the 
 real enemy, for it weakens the effective strength 
 more than the latter." 
 
 "Fear! Does it pass the chiefs or the soldiers 
 by? Those passed by are of a rare character. The 
 mass shudders for the flesh is weak; and this shud- 
 dering must, under pain of making a mistake, enter 
 into calculation, as a given essential in all organiza- 
 tion, discipline, dispositions, movements, methods of 
 action, all things that have for their end the separa- 
 tion of mortification and fear, to make it leave us 
 and go to the enemy." (DuPicq.) 
 
 Patriotism, love of liberty, religious spirit, fa- 
 naticism, amour-propre, these are all the factors, all 
 the components which added up make the spirit of 
 self-sacrifice. The spirit of sacrifice always encoun- 
 ters an enemy— fear. 
 
 Fear— that is the thing to vanquish in order to 
 assure the victory. 
 
 Battle is a terrible drama, a bloody tragedy, 
 which unfolds itself to the hearts, of all soldiers, 
 from the humblest to the most exalted. It is a 
 struggle of two moral powers; the conquered are not 
 those who fall dead or wounded, but those who fol- 
 lowed and who rushed away because they were 
 afraid. Fear is a very natural human sentiment. 
 Those who are reputed to have been the most brave 
 have acknowledged it. 
 
 Ney said; "The one who says he never knew 
 fear is a compound liar." 
 
 Grant said that he realized that the enemy was 
 as afraid of him as he was of the enemy and that 
 
-81- 
 
 this thought helped sustain him through his battles. 
 
 Turenne said to himself before a fight: "You 
 tremble body. Well you would tremble more if you 
 knew where I am going to take you. ' ' 
 
 Skobeleff, always admired for his coolness even 
 in the most perilous moments, always impassive un- 
 der fire said to a friend: "It is folly to believe that 
 I am brave and that I fear nothing; I confess that I 
 am a coward. Every time I enter an engagement I 
 say to myself that it will be my last." This confes- 
 sion of Skobeleff makes one think that the various 
 stories of men forseeing their death in the coming 
 battle may be accounted for by the fact that many 
 have Skobeleff's feeling on entering a fight and of 
 course some of them are killed. 
 
 Fear manifests itself by trembling. Under the 
 influence of fear it is impossible to manipulate a 
 small and complex mechanical device for the fingers 
 are trembling and convulsed. This is a reason why 
 the mechanism of small arms should be very simple, 
 and the trembling of human muscles in fear is one 
 of the two principal reasons why battle scores are 
 only from ¥ V to T V as good as target scores. Inability 
 to accurately determine the range and uncertainty 
 as to where the bullets are going is the other reason. 
 To go back to the first reason— fear dilates the pupil 
 of the eye and interferes with its focusing. It con- 
 tracts the muscles of the chest and interferes with 
 breathing and lessens endurance. The man who 
 stays to fight and will stay to the end, is not free 
 from fear. His muscles tremble and the pupil of his 
 eye dilates. The target is not clearly outlined be- 
 cause of the imperfect focus of the eyes and the rifle 
 is not held steadily because though he grits his teeth 
 and tries his hardest still he can not keep the mus- 
 cles from trembling. Is it any wonder that battle 
 practice is far inferior to target practice? Is it any 
 
— 82-r 
 
 wonder that foreign nations consider our refinements 
 of target instruction as time wasted? 
 
 "For what is perfection one should recall the 
 Spartan. If ever man had been perfected with a 
 view to war it was he, and nevertheless he was beat- 
 en and he ran. Then, unhappily for education, moral 
 and physical force has its limitations, since the Spar- 
 tans ran away— they who should have remained to 
 the end on the field of battle." The prominence of 
 the story of Thermopole shows how exceptional was 
 the case when even a comparatively small force 
 would fight on till the end. 
 
 Modern combat is more terrifying than ancient 
 combat. The losses suffered are perhaps less, but 
 the conditions are not the same. In ancient times 
 the warrior who had confidence in himself and his 
 neighbors could expect- to come out unscathed. Now 
 bullets are annonymous and come out of space to 
 strike the brave and the expert as easily as the cow- 
 ardly and untrained. Formerly losses came almost 
 entirely after the break— now they begin at 4000 
 yards from the enemy and may continue for days. 
 In ranks the old warrior had little to fear, combat 
 was not dangerous. He received and gave many blows 
 but nearly all were parried. If well trained and well 
 supported by his fellows he had little to fear. Now the 
 soldier feels isolated. He becomes separated from 
 his officers and comrades. Neither officers nor com- 
 rades can visibly protect him from the unseen blows 
 of flying bullets. The length of the struggle and the 
 feeling of contending with the unseen, combined with 
 the sense of isolation, makes the strain of battle 
 much more intense than formerly. 
 
 During the long days of battle.the man will be 
 subjected to all kinds of discomforts, including diffi- 
 culty as to subsistence. Often the wounded cannot 
 
-88— 
 
 be removed from the firing line till night. Their 
 cries still further add to the depression. 
 
 When high explosive shells burst the effect is 
 small, almost nothing, against living targets; the 
 pieces are too small, being almost dust. On the 
 other hand, "It does but little damage, but the noise 
 is fearful and its explosion throws up a great column 
 of black smoke, mud, pebbles and fire which produces 
 a great impression upon inexperienced soldiers. The 
 moral effect is absolute."— Soloviev. 
 
 The results of fire will vary from nothing to a 
 maximum. When the enemy is cool and has a good 
 target losses will be great and very sudden. At 
 Magersfontein a British regiment returned the Boer 
 fire for three minutes and then broke. It lost 10 per 
 cent of its effective strength. It may be said that 
 10 per cent is not an excessive loss, but 10 per cent 
 loss in three minutes is sufficient to make any regi- 
 ment break, for such quick and severe loss will at 
 once give the enemy the ascendant morale. This is 
 the. argument for the use of machine guns. If they 
 can be used effectively the losses they will inflict 
 will be so sudden and so great as to break the morale 
 of any troops exposed to their fire. 
 
 Comparing a mounted to a dismounted action 
 under* modern conditions, Lieutenant Colonel de 
 Mand'huy says: "The charge is a spoonful of bitter 
 medicine to swallow. First one makes a face and 
 then swallows it at a gulp. For infantry it is not a 
 spoonful of medicine s to swallow at a gulp— it is a 
 large bottle to be taken drop by drop and each drop 
 is more bitter than the last." 
 
 METHOD OF COMBAT IN HARMONY WITH INSTINCT 
 
 One of the impressions most regularly received 
 from recent combats is the almost complete impossi- 
 bility of conducting the fight on the firing line itself. 
 
—84— 
 
 Subaltern officers, obliged to seek cover like their 
 men, find their zone of influence to be very small. 
 
 At a distance from the enemy officers are able to 
 give precise directions and see that they are carried 
 out, but as they close with the enemy these directions 
 become more vague and supervision of the details of 
 how they are carried out becomes impossible. The 
 valor of the individual combatants becomes the 
 principal factor of success. In reality all the officers 
 can do is to exercise an influence toward decreasing 
 the disorder and keep confusion from becoming 
 worse confounded. 
 
 The officers being human, follow the common 
 rule— they are afraid themselves. At a given 
 moment they have felt that their men were escaping 
 their influence, and they have been struck with the 
 same feeling themselves. They dare not acknowledge 
 that their men got out of hand. They do not like to 
 speak of it, which is natural. Really they were not 
 responsible. It was the peace-time education which 
 made them believe in impossibilities that was. re- 
 sponsible. 
 
 We must learn to modify the mathematical and 
 dynamic theories of material things when we apply 
 them to combat; to throw out the illusions of 
 the drill and maneuver ground where our experi- 
 ences are with the man in his normal condition, 
 calm, attentive and obedient, intelligent and do- 
 cile. In combat the human instrument, from chief 
 to soldier, is nervous, impressionable, distrait, ex- 
 cited. Complex movements are impossible to man in 
 this condition. To order such a movement is to order 
 the impossible— and the impossible ordered, discipline 
 is at an end. The effect is to disconcert both officers 
 and men by the unforeseen and by the contrast be- 
 tween exercises at drill and a real battle. Battle 
 
—85— 
 
 always has its surprises, but it is not therefore 
 necessary to add these unnecessary surprises. 
 
 At drills we have confined the soldier within 
 bounds that we set, but in battle he escapes from 
 these bounds and the officer feels lost. 
 
 Truly, if to the causes of fright already de- 
 scribed be added that of seeing at the time of test in 
 war that the peace time formations dissolve and are 
 useless, then will we have everything necessary to 
 total demoralization. The soldier would have more 
 confidence in chiefs that he accused of lack of fore- 
 sight and incapacity. 
 
 Xenophon said, „" Anything, be it agreeable or 
 terrible, the less it is foreseen the greater will be the 
 pleasure or fear it causes. " " This is nowhere more 
 true than in war where every surprise strikes even 
 the strongest with terror. ' ' 
 
 Physical or moral fear has its germ always pre- 
 existing, and it is the sole true enemy, the cardinal 
 enemy to fight, to master, to watch without ceasing. 
 The least unforseen event, the least surprise is always 
 liable to unchain this contagion of fear which shat- 
 ters all morale. 
 
 One must keep abreast of his time. The army 
 must progress in company with science and arma- 
 ment. Jt is not possible to so progress when we 
 have an iron clad "normal attack." Such a thing is 
 as foolish as an old French idea of laying out a drill- 
 ground with stakes to mark the point for firing vol- 
 leys, for extending to a flank, for changing to indi- 
 vidual fire, etc. , so that their drill book could be ex- 
 actly followed. Why teach an absurdity that any 
 thinking man can see will be not only useless but 
 dangerous to try to apply in reality. 
 
 All this formality will inevitably crumble under 
 the first hostile fire. 
 
 In our service we saw enough in 1898 to convince 
 
anyone that normal formations of any kind were ut- 
 terly useless and senseless and improvised something 
 to take their place. Yet we are still teaching a " nor- 
 mal attack." The Franco-German war should have 
 shown us that a highly centralized bureau system of 
 supply would utterly break down in time of war. 
 
 In 1898 we got a stronger hint to the effect that 
 our supply system was not a thing of which to be 
 proud. As Mr. Dooley said "The army can not live 
 on general orders." Now look at your file of general 
 orders. It is a formidable looking volume is it not. 
 In fact that volume of general orders is getting 
 heavier each year — In exactly the same proportion 
 is the difficulty of transacting the ordinary everyday 
 business of a troop or company increasing. 
 
 Will those methods stand the test of war? Never! 
 No company commander on active operations could 
 keep up this mass of required paper work. With the 
 additional papers required by army, division, and 
 brigade headquarters a company commander with 
 two clerks and a full set of modern office equipment 
 could not keep his papers up to date. He would need 
 half an escort wagon to carry around the blanks and 
 office devices necessary for him to make even a rea- 
 sonable attempt to do so. What system then will be 
 used in war? None — there will be chaos and the 
 most successful commanders will likely be those who 
 entirely neglect the requirements of orders and grab 
 any supplies they can get their hands on. That leads 
 to still worse confusion, yet it will be simply a case 
 of self-preservation to do it. 
 
 Perhaps the next hint we get that it is time to 
 change our supply and record system will be stronger 
 —it certainly will if we go up against an enemy of 
 any strength. In a severe struggle on our own terri- 
 tory soldiers will starve to death and die from fatigue 
 and exposure because their officers were absolutely 
 
-87— 
 
 unable to obtain proper supplies and have them de- 
 livered, while at the same time ample supplies will 
 be on hand but at a point where they are not needed. 
 
 Since the above was originally written our new 
 Field Service Regulations have greatly improved our 
 system of supply for war service as far as concerns 
 the Commissary and Ordnance departments. Though 
 these new methods seem good in themselves, they 
 will be new to the troops and are as yet untried in 
 practice. We still lack a suitable system for the sup- 
 ply of shoes, clothing, etc., and most of all we have 
 absolutely no system arranged for replacing losses in 
 men. 
 
 The excuse for the numerous reports and returns 
 and approved requisitions is that such a system in- 
 sures the government against fraud. We all know 
 it does not do so in peace and in war when the whole 
 system breaks ^iown of its own weight the door will 
 be opened for wholesale fraud that can never be de- 
 tected. The ultimate insurance of the government 
 against fraud is in the integrity of its officers. We 
 can never make war till we acknowledge this and 
 base our sy stem of administration on that alone. 
 
 A French author says -"In 1870 I had but six 
 months experience as an officer. I had great confi- 
 dence in my captain who had made the Italian Cam- 
 paign. I told him of my feeling of weakness because 
 of my lack of knowledge of military regulations. He 
 replied — 'Reassure yourself -In war there are no 
 regulations." 
 
 To go back to my subject— the following state- 
 ment about the necessities of modern battle seem to 
 me reasonable. 
 
 The firing line must be strong enough for the 
 soldier to feel that the line is full and strong thus 
 inspiring confidence but it must not be overcrowded. 
 Troops lying down under fire do not tolerate the near 
 
—88— 
 
 presence of reenforcements or of an officer which 
 draws the hostile fire upon them. 
 
 There is no danger in leaving considerable inter- 
 vals between companies on the firing line. It is not 
 like it used to be when effective range was 100 
 yards. Now no one can throw himself into these in- 
 tervals. If it becomes necessary to reenforce, such 
 intervals allow formed bodies of reenforcements un- 
 der their own officers and with their own complete 
 organizations to join the firing line. 
 
 These principles may be said to state the forma- 
 tions best adapted psychologically to the battlefield 
 of today: 
 
 "Tactics is, has always been or at least should 
 have been, the art or science of making men fight 
 with the maximum of energy, a maximum which or- 
 ganization alone is able to develop against fear." 
 (Du Picq). 
 
 MORAL AND MATERIAL SUPPORT FROM ARTILLERY 
 AND MACHINE GUNS 
 
 It takes very little sense for even a frightened 
 man to realize that friendly shells that pass over his 
 head on the way to do damage to the enemy are an 
 advantage to him. If only he is not confused and 
 thus believes the shell hostile to him, such fire will 
 strengthen not weaken his morale. The man who is 
 unaccustomed to the sound may make this mistake 
 before he realizes that the shells are friendly. A 
 panic may result from this mistake. For this reason 
 it would be of advantage to troops to have a little 
 drill vith such fire passing over them. 
 
 Here is what happened at Laio-Yang. Kuroki 
 had before him 300 pieces of artillery that fired with- 
 out ceasing for eleven days. The consumption of 
 ammunition was enormous and has been placed at 
 500,000 projecticles, including fragments of the 
 
—89— 
 
 shrapnel, fired by one battery in one day. Result, 
 750 men were reached. That is to say that each bat- 
 tery touched in some manner one man in a day. 
 This is reassuring against danger but not against 
 fear. All those pieces did not kill as many as one 
 would have believed, nevertheless they attained 
 their end; the demoralization of the enemy, for the 
 enemy did not know in advance what the results 
 would be." (de Mand'huy). 
 
 A Japanese general said to M. Kahn, war cor- 
 correspondent: "See that battery firing in front of 
 us; it aims at the Russian redouts at 3500 meters and 
 it is composed of mountain guns. I am sure at this 
 distance of not killing many Russians, but I have no 
 doubt of the pleasure with which our infantry two 
 kilometers in front of us take in hearing the shells 
 go over their heads." 
 
 The moral support of machine guns, especially 
 if permanently attached to the regiment, will be 
 greater still, for the rattle of their fire once heard is 
 never forgotten. 
 
 "The employment of machine guns was for the 
 first time quite great in the Russo-Jap War. Both 
 sides have attributed to these machines a principal 
 r61e both in attack and defense. In moments of 
 crisis they invariably constitute a strong point of 
 support. These guns are free from the effect of 
 trembling nerves and muscles and for that reason 
 are especially valuable in supreme moments." 
 
 Right here we get a good idea as to the proper 
 use of machine guns. In supreme moments their ef- 
 fect is great, their moral support being as great as 
 the physical. If they are pushed too far forward in 
 the attack or held to the last minute in defense and 
 thus are captured still the material loss is small. 
 Used too liberally during the action such guns con- 
 sume enormous quantities of ammunition— far too 
 
—90— 
 
 much -but used right, their support both moral and 
 physical will be invaluable. 
 
 MORALE— HOW DEVELOPED 
 
 To give a definition of morale is difficult. It is a 
 compound of various sentiments such as self-confi- 
 dence, confidence in ones comrades in ones chief, 
 solidarity, a sense of honor, etc. ; but it has its found- 
 ation in a previous moral education begun in the 
 family, added to at school and completed in the reg- 
 iment. 
 
 Improvements in fire arms have increased the 
 distance between the different arms in battle while 
 their need of mutual support is still as great as ever 
 —perhaps greater. The more one arm feels itself 
 isolated the greater is its need of morale. This con- 
 sideration applies particularly to infantry with re- 
 spect to artillery support. Artillery is the support- 
 ing arm par excellence. It is composed of arms 
 served by men but here man is the second part. The 
 material here unites the men, and the power of the 
 piece is the reason for their being. The man fights 
 only by serving the machine. 
 
 Within certain limits losses of men do not effect 
 the fighting efficiency of the battery.. Trembling 
 nerves and muscles do not diminish the accuracy of its 
 fire-its sole fighting power. Even with severe losses 
 it can continue firing, which suffers in effectiveness 
 only as a frightened brain and trembling muscles 
 cause errors in setting of sights and fuses. 
 
 So the artillery constitutes as it were in the bone 
 of an army— its solid part. Its morale— and here we 
 may give morale its true definition, namely resisting 
 power— its resisting power, therefore, resides in its 
 fixed position, its relative weight of metal thrown 
 and in its collective employment. The artillery per- 
 sonnel is collected in one place and always under 
 
—91— 
 
 direct command, that is the individual artilleryman 
 never feels himself isolated. As a fighting engine 
 the artilleryman as an individual does not exist— the 
 fighting unit is a collective not an individual. 
 
 From this it results that artillery even with 
 volunteer personnel is capable of solidity, of com- 
 plete fire control, of withholding its fire at the will 
 of the chief. In artillery the men are capable of a 
 unity of action that is not possible to the other arms. 
 
 Cavalry on the contrary is the arm of movement, 
 of rapidity and of improvisation. As de Brack says 
 "its rapidity is its value." In mounted action caval- 
 ry has an advantage due to the fact that horse and 
 rider are one unit and the horse a headstrong and 
 excitable member of this dual unit; is ever anxious 
 to stay with his comrades. In mounted action there 
 are no skulkers— if the officer's force is leaving him 
 he can know it. In dismounted action, also, the 
 horse helps to prevent skulkers. The dismounted 
 cavalryman does not know where his horse is or how- 
 to find him. The captain does. The soldier feels the 
 horse as a part and himself the other part of the fight- 
 ing unit. Separated from his horse when the troop 
 moves elsewhere, the cavalryman will be left to 
 shift for himself. He therefore desires to keep open 
 the connection with his horse, and the troop com- 
 mander being the connecting link, he stays with the 
 troop commander. It is frequently stated in books 
 that cavalry dismounted to fight on foot has less 
 skulkers than infantry, and the above assigned as 
 the reason. 
 
 On the other hand in reconnaissance the cavalry- 
 man is habitually isolated and here he needs a self- 
 assurance and morale that is greater that that re- 
 quired of any other arm. This can only be devel- 
 oped when a man is thoroughly at home on his horse, 
 knows the capabilities of the animal and his indivi- 
 
—92- 
 
 dual peculiarities and has himself been thoroughly 
 trained. That is to say cavalry worthy of any confi- 
 dence cannot be improvised— it must have long years 
 of training. 
 
 In infantry the human element dominates all the 
 rest. Its essential is solid character, unity of action 
 and mutual confidence. The man and the man alone 
 makes the measure of these elements. All the pow- 
 er of the arm resides in the man himself. His solid 
 personal character is his birth-right— unity of action 
 and mutual confidence come from the military edu- 
 cation his nation has given him. 
 
 In this arm in battle there is no heavy and col- 
 lective material to serve as in the artillery. Its 
 strength is not due to position; armament is indivi- 
 dual, cohesion can not be forced, it is an affair of the 
 will of the individuals. In the combat the mounts 
 do not instinctively" group themselves as in cavalry, 
 there is no headlong rush; but men weighed down 
 under the weight of human feelings advance slowly 
 and painfully by an intense effort of their own wills. 
 It is the duty of the officer to educate his men to a 
 morale capable of this mental strain. By instruction 
 and example he can do this if the recruit in his 
 childhood has had ideas of honor and duty to country 
 instilled in him— otherwise not. 
 
 Our children don't get the love of country incul- 
 cated in them In the schools as we did ourselves. In 
 the average family this is the case as well. We 
 amuse the children by taking them to see the moving 
 pictures not by telling them stories of the deeds of 
 our ancestors. We do not lay the foundation for strong 
 patriotic character as did our fathers. Our population 
 is becoming more and more mixed in character. No 
 longer can we raise regiments where every man will 
 be of the characteristic American stock, of the same 
 general level of education and ability, of the same 
 
—Os- 
 good average, honest, faithful personal character. No 
 longer can we count on our average man making 
 the best of what he can get in the way of rations— 
 instead we will try to furnish infinitely more and will 
 nleet much more grumbling for our pains; We could 
 not hold an army together a month on the food of 
 the Civil War. 
 
 The education that the officer gives his men 
 should tend to develop their morale by developing all 
 the human faculties that inspire:— 
 Sentiments of duty and honor* 
 A sense of the value of discipline) 
 Love of country, 
 A willingness to do his duty, 
 Audacity and contempt of danger, 
 Self-respect, 
 
 A spirit of devotion and self-sacrifice, 
 Confidence in his leader, 
 Reliance on his comrades in battle. 
 Before an action it is of use to say to the men a 
 few words, that, if they do not inflame the imagina- 
 tion of the men, will at least show them that their 
 leader is there and that he is confident. 
 
 At Pickett's advance, last day at Gettysburg, 
 General Gibbon rode down the lines, cool and calm, 
 and in an unimpassioned voice he said to his men: 
 "Do not hurry, men, and fire too fast; let them come 
 up close before you fire, and then aim low and 
 steadily." "The coolness of their general was re- 
 flected in the faces of his men." 
 
 The nature of these remarks, even the utility of 
 making them at all depends on the character, or bet- 
 ter the race, of the soldier. For a Frenchman such 
 attempts to inflame the imagination and excite en- 
 thusiasm might be continued at every halt during the 
 deployment and even after the first shells began to 
 arrive and be crowned by a supreme effort just as 
 
-iji- 
 
 the serious action began. This was the idea of 
 Napoleon who used to ride along his lines at the be- 
 ginning of an action to increase the enthusiasm of 
 his men. With us a cool, cheerful, confident bearing 
 of the officer, even a joke cracked at another officer 
 would better answer the purpose than a fiery speech. 
 The main point is to keep the command from sinking 
 into the • silent, self -centered dejection that comes 
 from letting each man have time to brood over his 
 personal danger. In making any effort in this direc- 
 tion it may be well to remember that it is always 
 easier to secure the attention of a crowd than of 
 isolated individuals. 
 
 Here arises one of our many difficulties in hand- 
 ling our troops of today. We have a predominent 
 percentage of the typical American men, but we are 
 yearly getting a larger percentage of people of differ- 
 ent mental characteristics. A harangue that would 
 enthuse the people from Southern Europe would not 
 have any good effect on the typical American stock, 
 neither would our officers be capable of such a 
 harangue. It does not seem that we will ever be 
 able to separate these elements into regiments ac- 
 cording to nationality each with officers of its own 
 kind of people. That makes a heterogeniousness to 
 the rank and file that mitigates strongly against de- 
 veloping a strong morale. A couple of instances of 
 how morale can be quickly developed with our typical 
 American stock may be quoted. Grant, when his 
 men were constructing intrenchments under fire and 
 fast getting out of hand, cooly walked to the top of 
 the intrenchment and sat down in plain sight to 
 smoke a cigar. That, without a word being said, 
 was sufficient to steady his men. Another example — 
 During the fight at the Zapote river in 1899, several 
 companies for hours faced the Insurrecto trenches 
 across the river but at very short range, holding the 
 
-96- 
 
 insurgents to the trenches while search was made for 
 a passage for a turning movement. The Filipino fire 
 was heavy but inaccurate. One of our infantry com- 
 panies expended a surprisingly small amount of am- 
 munition and the company was in the best of spirits 
 throughout because the company commander went 
 along his line and assigned each man a small area to 
 cover and told him that that short stretch of hostile 
 trench was his— that he could lie still with his guh 
 at a ready and when a head showed he could get it— 
 also that any dead later found there would show how 
 good a shot he was. In a short time this snipping at 
 the other fellows head became a sort of game, all 
 sense of fear was lost, each man trying to score a 
 hit and in becoming the hunter each man lost all 
 thought of being hunted. When Grant at Donelsoh 
 sent all his staff to spread the news that the Confed- 
 erates were trying to escape and called on his men to 
 prevent their escape he showed a thorough grasp of 
 the psychological change that would result from let- 
 ting his men feel that they were the hunters, not the 
 hunted. 
 
 To continue with our subject: 
 
 If you know a certain danger threatens it is bet- 
 ter to warn your men to expect it, for an expected 
 danger is better withstood than one that comes as a 
 surprise. The French regulations of 1809, made up 
 by Napoleon, laid it down as a principle that the men 
 should always be forewarned of the danger to which 
 they were about to be exposed— that if an extraordi- 
 nary effort was to be demanded of them they should 
 be so told but that in any case, though warned of the 
 danger, it should not be exaggerated to them. 
 
 A French author also suggests that any feeling 
 of being in communication with the officers helps 
 steady the men and he suggests that for that reason 
 it is advisable to make pauses in the fire and to have 
 
tiie men habitually trained to repeat and help to 
 transmit the order to open or to cease fire. 
 
 Physical exercises develop in the recruit a feel- 
 ing of control over his own muscles— self-confidence 
 that makes gymnastic and athletic exercises of bene- 
 fit in developing morale. This is much more true in 
 the dismounted service, as in the mounted service 
 the practice of equitation is fully as good for the 
 purpose and has the advantage of keeping the man 
 and horse more in communion, thus developing 
 mutual confidence. 
 
 Again we come back to the fact that morale be- 
 gins in childhood, for exercises in athletics or horse- 
 manship are of much greater and more lasting value 
 when their practice was begun in childhood. In the 
 practice of either, the child gets a certain amount of 
 buffeting that serves to make him in after life feel 
 more or less joy in privations and knocks that he 
 would otherwise regard as terrible hardships. 
 
 Night marches will be necessary in war. Per- 
 haps our men will not see an enemy behind • every 
 bush if they have had a few night marches in time 
 of peace. 
 
 Similarly, the noise of blank cartridges, especially 
 artillery fire, in maneuvers in time of peace serves to 
 accustom the men and officers to giving and receiving 
 orders in a hubbub and turmoil that, while it is not as 
 great as in war, is nevertheless similar to it. It is 
 easier to write clear orders at your desk than to give 
 them on the battlefield. 
 
 In modern combats the supervision of officers is 
 more difficult than formerly. Yet we can see that 
 team play is necessary to win. This team play under 
 such adverse conditions can be secured only when 
 the men are instructed and also when they have a 
 certain uniformity of mental characteristics. Man 
 is still the essential weapon and his character does 
 
hbt change. Uniformity of action and confidence 
 cannot be improvised. They are born only of mutual 
 confidence .based on a mutual knowledge of what 
 constitutes honorable action; what makes united 
 action, from whence comes a feeling of strength 
 which gives courage to face and morale to surmount 
 danger. Courage, which is the domination of will 
 over instinct, makes victory or defeat. 
 
 The element above all others which makes the 
 combatant capable of obedience and susceptible to 
 direction in action is discipline, which is his con- 
 fidence in and respect for his chiefs and confidence 
 in his comrades; his fear that they will reproach him; 
 his spirit of emulation, that makes him wish to go as 
 far as the others and show no more fear; his espirit 
 de corps— in a word, organization alone gives these 
 qualities. 
 
 A surveillance which cannot be escaped ought to 
 guarantee brave and concerted action among the 
 men. To guarantee this, the surveillance must be of 
 each man by his neighbor. Where the adjoining 
 men all know each other, where they come from the 
 same town and write to each others' friends, this 
 surveillance of each man by his comrades furnishes 
 a strong incentive against skulking. 
 
 During the War of 1866, Prince Frederic Charles 
 permitted friends and relatives to be placed in the 
 same squad, irrespective of height. A company 
 formed in this fashion would not look so well on 
 parade, but it could be expected to give a better 
 account of itself in battle.— Balck. 
 
 In former times a man could not fall down from 
 a wound that was invisible from the outside. It was 
 easier then to detect skulkers. DuPicq recommends 
 the practice of calling the roll at every respite in the 
 action, both in maneuvers and war, as a powerful 
 deterrent to skulking; in maneuvers, to accustom 
 
the nien to expect it and the officers to order it. In 
 battle the benefit is evident, but it is likely to be for- 
 gotten. If such roll calls are habitually .made the 
 skulker will know that his chance of manufacturing 
 a plausible explanation of his absence will be small. 
 The only excuse that could be accepted would be a 
 note from an officer of another company to the effect 
 that so-and-so had joined his company, stating he 
 was lost, and that he had comported himself well 
 while with the other organization. 
 
 THE EXAMPLES OF THE LEADER 
 
 So long as one goes forward, neither officers nor 
 men become disturbed if they are directed; but, be 
 the combat a little warm, they should see their chief 
 and know that he is near; though he may be without 
 initiative, incapable of giving an order, it makes no 
 difference. 
 
 Be this understood : Thrown in the middle of 
 destruction in the chaos of combat, man is completely 
 lost. Instinctively he turns to his chief. If the 
 chief be new, still by definition the soldier knows 
 that he is superior in knowledge by reason of studies 
 of war. It is then for the chief to justify this by 
 personal example. 
 
 The field service regulations (French) says: 
 
 "The officer's grades should be well permeated 
 with the idea that their first and greatest mission 
 consists of giving an example to their troops. No- 
 where is the soldier more obedient and more devoted 
 than in battle. His eyes are constantly fixed on his 
 chiefs. Their bravery and coolness will pass into his 
 soul; they render him capable of all exertion and all 
 sacrifice." 
 
 The new German regulations (par. 266) say: 
 "The officer is the model for his troops. His exam- 
 ple leads them forward, maintains among them the 
 
strictest discipline, leads them to victory among the 
 greatest difficulties, at the price of the most severe 
 losses. He should be the faithful guide to his men, 
 partaking of their joys, sorrows and privations and 
 thus gain their absolute confidence." 
 
 The officer should harden himself and prepare 
 himself, by a severe personal education in time of 
 peace, for his high mission in time of war. 
 
 Then in a group of men, emotion predominates, 
 the faculty of judgment diminishes and instinct de- 
 velops. The latter is manifested by an unreasoning 
 tendency to imitation. 
 
 Thus example has a supreme importance. It 
 can lead to enthusiasm or to panic. The soldier de- 
 ployed as skirmishers, instead of in lines of battle as 
 formerly, is not so much in hand and hence it is in 
 dispensable that the leaders give the example contin- 
 uously. 
 
 The officer should overcome his impression of 
 fear and hold to his coolness. It is of prime impor- 
 tance that he give the example of calmness under 
 fire. He should have the energy and the strength 
 of will to be obeyed, which by suggestion forces im- 
 mediate obedience. This force of suggestion is the 
 possession of strong character, of unconquerable 
 wills. By virtue of their commission, officers should 
 possess these qualities, nevertheless, they will not be 
 exempt from the emotions of the struggle. They 
 will also find a powerful stimulant in their sense of 
 honor; by the comprehension of the height of their 
 mission, they will more easily conquer instinct. 
 
 FIRST IMPRESSIONS IN BATTLE 
 
 "It is difficult to depict in words the impression 
 made upon an inexperienced man by battle. The 
 first projectile bursting alongside or the first bullet 
 
— ioO— 
 
 hurtling past awakens such varied feelings and im=- 
 pressions. 
 
 It is of the greatest importance to take oneself 
 well in hand during the first moments of the fight. 
 A great support is found in the consciousness of the 
 thousands of soldier's eyes studying one's first steps, 
 and that the authorities likewise examine the "new 
 man." The soldiers look especially intently at the 
 new commander and form their judgment of him on 
 the spot (a very critical judgment). On the other 
 hand, the newness of one's impressions helps to 
 drown the inner voice apprising one of surrounding 
 danger. 
 
 Modern rifle fire produces a strong impression; 
 the air seems to be literally filled with bullets; their 
 plaintive whistling pervades the atmosphere like a 
 continuous moan, above below, and everywhere. 
 
 As soon as the first shot is heard the soldiers 
 grow serious, take off their caps and cross them- 
 selves, all jokes and conversation ceases. At the 
 given order all march bravely as during maneuvers. 
 
 The courage and calmness with which the sol- 
 diers go into battle produce a strong impression. 
 
 The infantry soon grows accustomed to rifle fire, 
 but the artillery fire, especially the shells, produce a 
 decided impression. It seems to me that this is not 
 due so much to the losses inflcted by artillery as to 
 the ear splitting noise produced by the explosion of 
 the projectiles. The effect is produced only on the 
 ear, but it is strong. The shimose shells have a 
 specially powerful effect upon the inexperienced, and 
 the shrapnel upon those unaccustomed to. battle. 
 The young soldiers throw themselves face downward 
 at each bursting of a shell. Thus the infantry which 
 suffers most from rifle fire, pays least attention to it; 
 the artillerymen on the contrary are much impressed 
 
— 101— _ 
 
 by rifle fire. This may be explained by the fact that 
 the men are accustomed to their own arm. 
 
 At the firing of the first shot the center of grav- 
 ity is brought to rest on the officer and it is then 
 that is manifested their true r61e and the enormous 
 responsibility that rests on them." (Soloviev). 
 
 The more the conditions of combat are punishing, 
 the struggle bloody, the losses considerable, the more 
 fatigue and tension of nerves are crying out for re- 
 lief, the grander becomes the officer's role. 
 
 The resulting action of his men depends entirely 
 on the company commander. One might say that 
 war of the present time is the war of company com- 
 manders. (Note. —See DuPicct, p. 51, "Csesar lost 
 in this battle 200 men of whom 30 were centurians" 
 —i.e. 15% were company commanders.) All occular 
 testimony to actual combat confirms this view. The 
 soldiers observe their officers with incessant atten- 
 tion. It is on his knowledge, his energy, his personal 
 bravery, that all their existences depend. ' 'It is from 
 his attitude that the men judge of the situation, of 
 the greater or less peril or the greater or less success 
 or failure." (Soloviev.) The authority of the officer 
 can raise itself very high or fall very low. 
 
 "In war the officer himself will most often not 
 have been under fire. He will be astonished on 
 reaching the field of battle, but his previous military 
 education, the studies he has made, the subjects he 
 has thought about, all should exercise on his mind 
 such an influence that the events which are taking 
 place before his eyes have the appearance of having 
 been seen before and that the measures to be taken 
 seem natural enough for him to prescribe them with- 
 out precipitation and almost without emotion. 
 
 And if, besides, he gives proof at the desired 
 moment of that reasoning bravery and coolness, 
 which is the true triumph of the will over instinct, 
 
-102— 
 
 one may be certain that he will have the confidence 
 of his men and that all will follow him wherever he 
 leads. 
 
 PUNISHMENT 
 
 I would have nothing more to say on this subject 
 if we had to lead only brave and honest men. Un- 
 fortunately, as we have seen, one finds in all armies 
 a certain percentage of cowards, weak perhaps, but 
 whose pernicious examples will be felt by the rest 
 unless we take care. These are the men that start 
 panics. 
 
 There remains for them a last means, of which I 
 would have liked not to speak, but it is necessary to 
 do so— I mean punishment. 
 
 The regulations give officers terrible but neces- 
 sary rights in this respect. 
 
 About discipline Soloviev says: "In combat, the 
 officer must be more than ever a chief, a leader, and 
 the discipline must be of iron. Never does the need 
 of discipline manifest itself so much as in combat. 
 Woe to the unit, which in time of peace, has been 
 only lightly imbued with the spirit of discipline, in 
 war it will pay dearly for it." 
 
 Should measures of discipline be preventive? 
 Must one warn the men before battle that punish- 
 ment will follow cowardice? Certainly, yes. You 
 say, "Our men do not like to work under threats." 
 It is true. Nevertheless, but tactfully, though ener- 
 getically, one should remind them of the coercive 
 measures which may be adopted. The good soldier 
 will know to whom such threats are addressed. 
 
 "It is necessary to warn the men", says Bugeaud, 
 against cries of alarm in rear of ranks, such as "Save 
 himself who can", "We are cut off", etc. "They 
 should be warned that file closers and battle police 
 have orders to run the sword through the hostile 
 
—103— 
 
 emissaries or bad soldiers who give out such cries of 
 alarm." 
 
 I cite this anecdote : ' 'Turning toward the column, 
 the colonel said: 'Major, march in rear as support; 
 the grenadiers are incapable of running away; but if 
 they do, fire on them and on me." 
 
 On the same order of ideas, it is said, that the 
 Japanese turned machine gun and artillery fire into 
 an assaulting column which had suddenly retreated 
 in a panic. 
 
 On June 10, 1871, General Chanzy gave the fol- 
 lowing order: "Each army corps will have its rear 
 guarded by cavalry, who will gather up fugitives and 
 arrest stragglers. These fugitives will be taken back 
 to their places and held on the front firing line. They 
 will be shot if they try to run away." 
 
 Let us hope that we shall not need to make use 
 of this method, but let us be ready to make an ex- 
 ample on occasion, that will calm hesitation and 
 often avoid a panic more terrible in its consequences 
 than the death of a coward or two. 
 
 Finally, above all other mefais, is the popularity 
 of the war. The last war was not so in Russia, 
 where few understood what it was about. With us that 
 can never be. Our democratic regime forbids to us 
 all such wars of conquest; it is, then, only grave in- 
 sults to our national honor or our interests that will 
 lead us to shed blood. In such case the war will be 
 popular, and conviction of the justice of the cause, 
 anchored in the minds of the combatants, will be not 
 the least lever to support moral force. 
 
 OPENING OF FIRE 
 
 Of all the incidents of modern combat, writes 
 Maurice, the one that is the most difficult to concieve 
 is the intense need of the simple fact of firing which 
 seizes man almost like a catalepsy. 
 
—104— 
 
 It is, however, not difficult to conceive. "To 
 fight at a distance is natural to man; from ancient 
 times, all man's ingenuity has been devoted to ob- 
 taining this result." 
 
 Napoleon said, "The instinct of every man is 
 not to let himself be killed without defending him- 
 self." And, in fact, man in the fight, is a being 
 in whom the instinct of self-preservation, at certain 
 moments, dominates all the sentiments. Discipline 
 has for its end to dominate this instinct by a greater 
 fear, that of shame or of punishment; but this result 
 can never be absolutely attained; it can be reached 
 only to a certain point; that cannot be passed. This 
 point reached, the soldier must fire or he will run 
 either forward or back. "Fire is then, so to speak, 
 the safety valve of emotion."— DuPicq. 
 
 This leads us to long distance fire. Is long dis- 
 tance fire necessary ? It is against the interests of the 
 firers to suppress the losses which they can, or believe 
 they can inflict on their adversaries, by firing during 
 all this time, if the supply of ammunition permits; 
 so, in spite of all that is said or done, the men have 
 always fired at great distances. 
 
 Thus, if one does not make the soldier fire, he 
 will fire of himself, in order to distract his attention 
 and to forget danger. The fire of Frederic's Prus- 
 sians had no other object; Marshal Saxe had well 
 devined that fact. "The quickness with which the 
 Prussians charge their guns, he tells us, is advan- 
 tageous because it occupies the soldier and prevents 
 reflection while he is in the presence of the enemy. 
 It is error to believe that the last five victories that 
 the nation gained in the last war are due to their 
 fire, since it has been noticed that in the greater 
 part of these actions there were more Prussians 
 than of their adversaries killed by rifle fire." 
 
 It is not always the conqueror who kills the most 
 
—105— 
 
 people; the victory is to the one that gains the 
 ascendent morale. At Trautenau in 1866, the Prus- 
 sians, who were slightly superior in numbers, were 
 defeated with a loss of 3£ per cent; the Austrian loss 
 was 15 per cent. -One should not count on the cool- 
 ness of the men, and, as it is necessary above all to 
 guard the morale, one must try to occupy them and to 
 divert them; one means of doing so is to have them 
 fire; the effect produced is of no importance and it 
 will be perfectly absurd, impossible, furthermore, to 
 require of them sufficient coolness to fire only at long 
 intervals, to set their sights carefully and to watch 
 attentively. These words of DuPicq are confirmed 
 by Soloviev (p. Ill) who says: "The conduct of fire 
 (fire control) in battle is a very difficult thing. The 
 men strive to open fire immediately on taking up 
 their position, even without awaiting orders to fire, 
 the designation of the objective, range or kind of 
 fire. This haste is, first of all, brought about by the 
 desire of drowning the consciousness of danger 
 through increased activity, yet this is what most im- 
 pedes the effectiveness of fire, the maintenance of 
 order in battle, and fire discipline. ' ' 
 
 It is then very difficult to determine the distance 
 at which fire should be opened; it is a question of 
 circumstances. 
 
 So long as troops have not suffered losses, so 
 long as the men have not seen their comrades fall 
 and heard their cries, it seems as though they should 
 have enough coolness to keep from firing; but as 
 soon as death shall have commenced its work, it will 
 be necessary to ' ' open the safety valve of the emotions. ' ' 
 To wish to continue the advance without doing so 
 leads to panic. 
 
 VALUE OF BATTLE FIRE 
 
 "The soldiers have emotions; fear, even. The 
 
—106— 
 
 sentiment of duty, discipline, self-esteem, example 
 of officers, and above all, coolness, maintains them 
 and keeps back the fear of becoming frightened. 
 Their emotion does not permit them to see clearly, to 
 more than partly adjust their sights, when they do 
 not really fire in the air. 
 
 The rifle, like the cannon, keeps power, the fac- 
 ulty of adjusting sights, but the agitation of the 
 heart, and nervous system is opposed to the im- 
 mobility of the arm in the hands; the arm being sup- 
 ported, takes part always, in the trembling of the 
 man. The latter is in haste to launch the shot that 
 will stop the ball destined for him before it can leave 
 the enemy's gun. And for fear the enemy will fire 
 first, this vague sort of reasoning, though actually 
 never formulated in the soldiers mind, still leads him 
 to fire, without even bringing the gun to his shoul- 
 der. " —DuPibq. 
 
 General Trochu says: "From my experience, I 
 am convinced that troops in the firing line, under the 
 emotions of battle, never adjust sights, no matter 
 how good the troops. They fire to the front hur- 
 riedly, many of them hardly bringing the gun to the 
 shoulder. 
 
 General DeNegrier says: "Of 100 men who are 
 under fire for the first time, 95 do not even see the 
 the end of their gun and fire very high." He had 
 considerable war experience. 
 
 Under the influence of fear the pupil of the eye 
 expands, the man tries to distinguish the point from 
 which he thinks danger threatens, the eye is ac- 
 commodated to the long distance with such intensity 
 that it can but vaguely see nearby objects. 
 
 Of the 100 men, the 5 or 6 who remain cool, see 
 what they believe to be the point occupied by the 
 enemy. Their bullets strike within a zone of 150 or 
 200 yards — provided the range is correct. The others 
 
—107— 
 
 fire at all kinds of angles. Their bullets go every- 
 where, but principally in a zone from 2700 yards up. 
 
 "The proportion of 5 men out of 100 who remain 
 cool may seem extraordinary to those who have never 
 engaged in a large battle, being themselves on the 
 firing line. It is nevertheless not exaggerated and is 
 sensibly the same in all armies." — DeNegrier. 
 
 A Summer Night's Dream says of the battle of 
 Gravelotte: 
 
 "We were opposite to and about five hundred 
 paces from an extended position of the enemy, and 
 under a brisk fire. My entire company had by this 
 time been necessarily extended. With dismay I 
 marked the growing uneasiness of my men without 
 being able to do anything to stop it. Every one was 
 lying down and firing. I could see rifles whose stocks 
 never left the earth. The upward direction of the 
 muzzles was particularly noticeable at one part of 
 the line. On looking closer, I could see that there 
 was a little rise in the ground in front which pre- 
 vented the men from seeing the enemy. This did 
 not, however, stop the men in question from firing 
 away hotly as the others, and sending all their bul- 
 lets over the rise into space. To my great astonish- 
 ment, I saw among these madmen Lance-Corporal 
 Arnold. Full of anger, I rushed at him, seized him 
 by the shoulder arid shouted: "What are you shoot- 
 ing at? You can't see the enemy." Not feeling cer- 
 tain that amidst the noise he understood my words, 
 I accompanied them with lively and unmistakable 
 gestures. Arnold looked round, but his gaze was 
 vacant. Clearly, he did not recognize his own cap- 
 tain. Then, hearing a few shots whistle close by us, 
 he flopped down again, to fire harder than ever. My 
 anger got the better of me. I hit him with my sword 
 so hard over the helmet as to make a great dent in 
 it, and to knock it off his head in spite of the chin- 
 
—108— 
 
 chain. This had an effect. The man sprang on to 
 his knee as if struck by lightning. His face was 
 deadly pale, and every limb was quivering. I could 
 not understand what he said, but from his face I saw 
 that he now recognized me. Never shall I forget his 
 look, partly pleading, partly reproachful, like the look 
 in a stag's eye when the hunter approaches to cut its 
 throat. He fell down again all in a heap, as though 
 crushed, his eyes staring at the ground. This, how- 
 ever, lasted only an instant. He jumped up quickly, 
 grasped the arms of the men nearest him, and en- 
 couraged them to advance with him to the place- 1 
 had indicated. As his comrades did not understand 
 him at once, he crept forward alone, and although 
 endangered by the wild fire of the men who remained 
 behind, commenced a steady, well-aimed fire from 
 the rising ground. After having, with trouble and 
 by forcible means, induced the other men to move up 
 to where Arnold was, I went off to the other flank of 
 the company. I never saw Arnold again; he fell in 
 this fight." 
 
 This is the way it is necessary to study psychic 
 phenomena and learn their bearing on war. 
 
 QUOTATIONS FROM VARIOUS AUTHORS ON THE 
 SUBJECT 
 
 "All violent emotion automatically dilates the 
 pupil of the eye." (Boissonnet). The opening then 
 becomes too large and admits too much light, thus the 
 vision becomes shadowy and deformed. The man 
 sees as in a fog, his will being totally unable to rec- 
 tify the pupil; this physical defect of emotion does 
 not depend on the will. In this condition it is impos- 
 sible to estimate distances correctly, possibly even to 
 read the numbers on the sight leaf. Under these 
 circumstances, the brain being as befogged as the 
 sight, it is nearly impossible for a commander to at- 
 
—169— 
 
 tract the attention of his men. Strong emotions 
 command the attention and are not commanded by 
 it. A strong image makes all others. In a word, 
 the direction of the attention is then involuntary. 
 
 "The dominant thing at this moment is the en- 
 emy who is firing at one; he turns the attention en- 
 tirely from the Chief in re'ar Who is trying to give 
 commands. ' ' (Blomdus). 
 
 "The psycho-physiologidal troubles whidh are 
 produced in the presence of danger habitually take 
 the form of paleness or of trembling. If you wish 
 more precise indications of the effect of fear from 
 the physiological point of view I will add: 
 
 1. Enervation of the voluntary muscles, tremb- 
 ling, stoppages in movements, (i.e. undecided move- 
 ments) which constantly become uncertain and fee- 
 ble. 
 
 2. Stoppage of breath, oppression, rising of the 
 gorge, from which involuntary oscillations result; 
 the man losing mastery of his organism. 
 
 3. Finally, there is spasmodic contractions of 
 the blood vessels, causing paleness, collection of 
 blood at the heart and dilation of the pupil. 
 
 "The irrigation of the brain cells being modified, 
 man is affected in his intellectual faculties, associa- 
 tion of ideas no longer takes place, his power of at- 
 tention and judgment is diminished; the pupil of the 
 eye is dilated, it no longer sees the sights clearly. 
 He sees only the sight stud, even sees only the end 
 of the muzzle; he can no longer tell just which. 
 
 "Man, dominated by emotion on the field of bat- 
 tle, fires precipitately, does not use his sights, sights 
 with the end of the gun or fires from the hip. If the 
 emotion becomes intense, under the action of the in- 
 stinct of self-preservation, he fires anywhere, so 
 long as he keeps firing; his bullets go in the sky or 
 in the ground a few paces away, he fires whatever 
 
—110— 
 
 be the orders of the chief, that he no longer cori^ 
 sciously sees or hears; he fires after the enemy has 
 disappeared from his front and even fires on his 
 comrades to the rear. 
 
 "This is the fire of war. 
 
 "I have wished to make a complete picture, per- 
 haps even exaggerated, in order to show fully its 
 characteristics. But do not doubt that it will pre- 
 sent itself on our battlefields to a considerable degree 
 and that no one is free from it." (Daudignac). 
 
 CONDUCT OF FIRE 
 
 After the above one may doubt whether battle 
 fire can be directed. 
 
 "A man under fire has the "impression as quick 
 as thought that he is specially and personally seen, 
 that they are after him. It is the logical reaction of 
 the sensation of danger on an organism deprived of 
 the faculty of thought. The observation is, more- 
 over, well enough known and proved by experience. 
 Under the influence of this feeling, man tries to kill, 
 so he will not be killed, and it is one of the most 
 powerful motives of the combatant. From this it re- 
 sults that he will necessarily fire, and, whatever 
 happens he will fire on the ones whom he believes 
 are firing at him; that is on those clearly seen in front 
 of him; this conviction that it is those seen, and no 
 others, which menace him, being the direct conse- 
 quence of a series of unreasoning impulses, will pre- 
 sent themselves to his mind as evidence. The man 
 himself will not often choose his objective, the ob- 
 jective will be imposed upon him. One sees how 
 unreasonable it will be to count on always being able 
 to direct his fire on any point one chooses. ' ' (Grand- 
 maison). 
 
 Let us not expect under a hot fire to be able to 
 use fire with counted cartridges or volley fire. Only 
 
— ill— 
 
 When the firer is himself not in danger will telesco- 
 pic sights and all the other paraphernalia of the tar- 
 get range be of any value. 
 
 Only against an inferior enemy (like savage 
 tribes) where the soldier feels himself safe will it be 
 possible to use a knowledge of probable percentage 
 of hits, split ranges or range finders. 
 
 "The efficiency of fire in time of war reposes above 
 all else in the morale of the combatants." (Daudig- 
 nac). 
 
 Absorbed as the commanders will be in leading 
 their men, they will have little chance to sanely ap^ 
 preciate all the conditions that are necessarily taken 
 account of in range firing. He will have all his fa- 
 culties engaged in solving the tactical problem and 
 the problem of leading his men, without going into 
 the direction or intensity of wind, the direction of 
 light, the temperature, the barometer or even the 
 - use of the range finder. Instead he will be seeing 
 that his men keep some kind of formation, choosing 
 the time for advancing, pushing the men forward, 
 trying to keep control of the opening and cessation 
 of fire, and above all in watching the enemy. 
 
 Will he then always be in a state to transmit 
 more precise directions? Most often he will be lying 
 among his men, or squatted behind the same shelter, 
 in the tumult of the cqmbat. His orders which must 
 be passed down the line f rom'mouth to mouth must be 
 limited to the very simplest, such as "Forward" — 
 "Commence firing" — '-Lie down". 
 
 How can fire discipline be obtained? It will be 
 physchically and psychologically impossible to open 
 and cease firing by command. We must admit, on 
 the contrary, it may be utterly impossible to stop the 
 firing when the men are under fire and believe it 
 possible to hit the ones that are firing at them. 
 
-Hi- 
 
 We must then seek a practical method to em- 
 ploy for opening and ceasing fire. 
 
 "Collective discipline, which lies almost entirely 
 in indirect methods, relates much more to the con- 
 duct of the troops than to the conduct of fire. 
 
 It is necessary to demand only possible things; it 
 leads to bad discipline to teach men, in time of peace, 
 things which can not be executed in combat." 
 
 Our firing regulations which requires the use of 
 a battle sight which shoots from 20 to 30 inches high 
 between 200 and 500 yards are psychologically wrong. 
 All practical experience in war proves they are 
 wrong. At those ranges men under fire always shoot 
 high. Then why in time of peace try to teach them 
 to hold below the target, something that we know 
 they will not do in battle? For target practice, all 
 sights, battle sights or others, should be so arranged 
 that to hit, the soldier must hold on the lower line of 
 the object he expects to reach, but to expect him in 
 battle to estimate 20 to 30 inches below his target 
 and aim off the target is to expect the impossible. 
 
 We admit the following facts: When a man is 
 under fire, he can be kept from returning the fire 
 only by being placed in such a position that to return 
 the fire is impossible or at least very difficult. 
 
 Under heavy fire the firing can be stopped only 
 by making the men sink down behind shelter. This 
 takes advantage of the instinct of self-preservation. 
 If the morale permits, the fire can also be stopped 
 by starting an advance." (Grandmaison) 
 
 Against these views of the effect of fire, you 
 may urge that still it is the rifle bullet that does the 
 execution in war. (In the Russo-Jap war, 85% of all 
 wounds were caused by rifle bullets). That is true; 
 but the bullets that take effect mostly do so by 
 chance, not by the good aim of the firer; it is the 
 
—113— 
 
 shower of bullets that kills, as is shown by the fright- 
 ful consumption of ammunition in that war. 
 
 Captain Soloviev says: — (Solovievp. 14). 
 
 "The fact is, that the long range at which fire is 
 opened, the entire mise en scene of modern warfare, 
 when the enemy is often positively invisible, forces 
 one to have recourse to intensity of fire, to shower a 
 rain of bullets on a certain area." 
 
 But finally, you tell me, if we admit these facts, 
 —and it is necessary to admit them,— from the tes- 
 timony of those who know them to be so— is it ne- 
 cessary to conclude that it is useless to have instruc- 
 tion in target firing and fire control? On the con- 
 trary, we should insist on that instruction, to give 
 the men confidence in themselves and in their wea- 
 pon. 
 
 The soldier must have both arms and morale. 
 Lacking either, the other will not suffice, but it is as 
 useless to teach dependence on the arm without re- 
 gard to morale as it would be to keep up the morale 
 and have no arms. In fact the possession of a good 
 arm which is understood by handling, helps to great- 
 ly raise the morale. That is the final result to be 
 gained by instruction in firing, the giving of a feel- 
 ing of confidence to the troops. 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TACTICAL THEORY OF THE 
 DECISIVE ATTACK 
 
 Now I come to the assault. After the war in the 
 Transvaal where the bayonet was little employed— 
 one knows why —that weapon fell into disfavor. The 
 theoretical believers in fire exulted, and the United 
 States came even to suppress the real bayonet (which 
 after the Russo-Jap war was reestablished). In ef- 
 fect, that war has proved that more than ever as- 
 saults are necessary and possible with good troops. 
 
 It has always been necessary to go in person, in 
 
—114 — 
 
 flesh and',blood, and to go after his hide and occupy 
 the place of the other fellow before his opinion will 
 change and he will acknowledge himself beaten. It 
 is still the same today. Nothing is decided by fire 
 alone. 
 
 The bayonet alone marks a determination to go 
 to the end. It proclaims the necessary understand- 
 ing of the situation. It states the distance at which 
 the enemy must be met in order to accomplish the 
 task. 
 
 Let us now examine the state of mind, the 
 morale, of the defenders of a position. 
 
 In place for hours, for several days perhaps, 
 their passive attitude has only convinced them of 
 their inferiority. They have suffered all the emo- 
 tions of the preparatory combat; volleys of infantry 
 machine guns fire, shrapnel, nothing has been spared 
 them. Their loss is not much perhaps, but their 
 morale is considerably lowered. 
 
 The short bursts of regulated fire, even if ineffi- 
 cient against a masked object, are absolutely de- 
 pressing. 
 
 DeWet, in his Memoirs, tells us that on two 
 different occasions his burghers ran away under the 
 fire of artillery without having lost a single man. A 
 combat is entirely an affair of morale. 
 
 The wounded must most often remain a long 
 time where they fall, it being impossible to remove 
 them under fire, and their presence will only increase 
 the skulkers. 
 
 Further, the man realizes perfectly that the ner- 
 vous trembling which he is unable to overcome, is 
 disarranging his aim, and that his bullets cannot hit 
 the adversary, who, step by step, is approaching him, 
 bayonet already fixed, in order to make him feel 
 what is coming to him if he waits. And that is pre- 
 cisely the reason why attacks succeed. 
 
-iis- 
 
 (§ee "Tactics," Balck, p. 87.) 
 
 At Nicholson's Neck in 1900 the Boers crawled 
 forward firing. The defenders fired also, but, while 
 a storm of bullets swept over them, they could see 
 the v Boers getting nearer and ever nearer.' The 
 psychological effect of this uncanny crawling ad- 
 vance was so great ' that by the time the Boers were 
 within 300 yards the British soldiers were individual- 
 ly showing white handkerchiefs. The Boers feared 
 a trap and continued the attack. Soon the white 
 handkerchiefs were almost universal. When the 
 Boers came up to them many of the British soldiers 
 were weeping and their officers laid the trouble to 
 the constant advance in the crawling line against 
 which the British fire seemed to have no effect. 
 
 At Chattanooga the Confederate soldiers left 
 what their officers thought to be an impregnable po- 
 sition because of the moral effect of seeing Thomas' 
 masses advancing toward them. (See Alexander.) 
 
 ' 'Whoever has made war and observed the events 
 of combat knows that at some distance from the 
 enemy losses are heavy, but by the time you are 
 ready to charge they are so small as to be negli- 
 gible." This is easily understood. If the enemy 
 opens fire at some distance (say 800 yds.) at 200 yards 
 his fire has lost some of its intensity (some men out 
 of ammunition— wounded— skulkers). The approach 
 of the assailant lowers the morale;. he presses for- 
 ward firing with the evident intent to charge— the 
 defender has not lowered his sights as the enemy 
 advanced, probably he is not using the sights at all, 
 and his aim grows worse and worse. 
 
 To show that this has always been so, I will give 
 a quotation : 
 
 "At the battle of Belgrade, in 1717, I saw two 
 battalions at 30 paces distance, lie down and fire into 
 a body of Turks who tore them to pieces. Only two 
 
_ ±id-, 
 
 or three soldiers escaped. The Turks had 32 killed. 
 
 "Before the force of the assailant's moral im- 
 pulsion, the defender's troops are disturbed, fire in 
 the air and disperse immediately before the as- 
 sailant who is emboldened by this ineffective fire to 
 rush forward before a second volley can be deliv- 
 ered." (DuPicq,), 
 
 This shows us the grave risk of adopting a der 
 fensive attitude. 
 
 Let us pass back to the side of the attack. After 
 what I have just said, you will not be astonished that 
 experience has shown that 9 times out of 10 the de- 
 fender does not even wait for the assailant, and that 
 the 10th time he is torn in pieces (if he has not taken 
 the precaution to organize a counter attack). 
 
 Then, should a charge alone, unprepared by fire, 
 succeed? Alas! No. In spite of all the chances of 
 success which we have just enumerated, man is slow 
 to comprehend that, he can conquer by running 
 straight into bullets. . Thus it is that at the moment 
 of the decisive attack the struggle between the in- 
 stinct of the men and will of the chief becomes more 
 intense. 
 
 "Our battalion is 100 paces from the enemy. 
 What is going to happen? This, and one has never 
 seen and never will see with the gun anything else: 
 if the battalion marches resolutely, if it is in good 
 order, it is a bet of ten to one that the enemy has 
 already gone; but what if the enemy holds? Then 
 the man of our day, unarmored against iron or lead, 
 no longer retains his self-possession; the instinct of 
 self-preservation takes command entirely. There are 
 two means of avoiding the danger, not of the best, to 
 run or to rush. We rush. Well! If the distanse is 
 small, the time of exposure short, still instinct 
 shows itself. We rush . . . But the greater 
 part rush with prudence, with after-thought; better 
 
— lit— 
 
 let the most rash and intrepid pass to the front, and 
 thus it is singular, but absolutely true, that we are 
 at the least in broken ranks as we approach the 
 scrimmage, and good bye to the theory of the thrust; 
 and if the head is stopped, those who are in the rear 
 allow themselves to fall sooner than to push; and if; 
 however, they do push forward, they allow them- 
 selves to fall sooner than to advance. It is not to be 
 disputed, it is so."— DuPicq. 
 
 The Gauls and the Greeks believed in the power 
 of mass. That those behind pushed forward the front 
 ranks. They would not believe that the rear ranks 
 are powerless to push forward the front rank when 
 it recoils from danger, from death. Strange error! 
 Believing that the rear ranks are going to go forward 
 in face of what makes the front rank recoil, while 
 the contagion of recoil is so great that the head 
 stopped, those in rear retreat. —DuPicq. 
 
 It is not then in mass, in physical impulsion that 
 we can seek for success in the assault. 
 
 It has been noticed that shock actions are 
 very rare. Physical impulsion is in effect nothing; 
 the sentiment of moral impulsion that animates the 
 attacker is all. The sentiment of moral impulsion is 
 the resolution which animates you, perceived by the 
 enemy, and no one denies that this moral impulsion 
 will be only so strong as one feels himself stronger 
 than the enemy, whom he menaces with the most 
 men, from which the column of attack is stronger 
 than deployed men. 
 
 Still it is necessary to understand what column 
 here means, for the term column does not mean a 
 column of maneuver, but of more troops disposed in 
 depth of formation and with variable distances. We 
 will try to understand this. Behind the firing line, 
 which has reached assaulting distance, the supports 
 are approaching. The first line of the supports 
 
— ii§— 
 
 should be deployed in the sense of being in groups, 
 according to the ground, behind the firing line. It 
 may be said that two deployed lines, one behind the 
 other, constitutes a vulnerable objective; true, but 
 the true difficulty of our task in time of peace results 
 from the obligation— if we wish to make useless 
 work for ourselves— of subordinating even to details 
 the technical elements to the psychological, so much 
 harder to determine and on which it is impossible to 
 directly experiment. 
 
 The fact, for example, of avoiding material losses 
 is only one means, and the end of utilizing the ground 
 is only to lead within striking distance, men physic- 
 ally and morally capable of combat. The most proper 
 formations to avoid loss will not always be most ad- 
 vantageous. 
 
 The reason for having supports in groups all 
 along in rear of the firing line is to give the impres- 
 sion to all the men, who see new comrades arriving 
 around them and to their right and left, that they 
 have received a strong support of men coming to aid 
 them. Besides this the soldier must know that a 
 formed support still further back is ready to inter- 
 vene to his assistance at the most critical moment of 
 the attack. 
 
 Reason and experience are in accord. A few 
 men here and there will never add the moral impul- 
 sion needed for carrying forward the final assault- 
 formed bodies must here join. Lines of smaller 
 groups will carry forward the firing line from halt to 
 halt but only a formed line will carry it forward to 
 the final assault. This last rush of the formed line 
 can not be over too great a distance or it will be 
 winded and will lie down on the firing line. So the 
 assaulting troops must come up as far as possible 
 under cover and then advnnce at quick time in line, 
 under cover of the fire of the firing line, till they are 
 
— 119 — 
 
 within striking distance. Losses may be heavy, but 
 should not be if the firing line has superiority of fire, 
 besides greater losses can be borne by marching troops 
 than by those in position. • 
 
 Assaults should not be made on long fronts, the 
 breaking of one point decides the struggle. It is then 
 better to attack on a relatively short front and make 
 sure of having sufficient depth of formation to carry 
 it through. 
 
 The assault is not an act in which the chief 
 launches all his men in one grand rush. It should be 
 a premeditated act, well planned for; the difficulty is 
 great, but well organized it should succeed. 
 
 The most important question for the commander 
 will be, when and where has he gained superiority 
 of fire, so he can put in his reserves, for to loose the 
 reserves is to give up his control of the battle. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 "The weapon may change and with that the 
 manner of using it; but the arm which employs it, 
 the heart which animates that arm remain eternally 
 the same. ' ' —Dragonierojf. 
 
 The last war, the Russo-Jap, confirms the view 
 that armament and technique may change, but man 
 still remains the first tool of combat. As in all times, 
 moral factors preserve a dominant importance. 
 
 "You should try to count all the weaknesses, 
 they will not keep you from going into the fight with 
 confidence, if you have taken the trouble to develop 
 -the morale of the soldier, to prepare his heart and 
 his mind, even sometimes his arms and legs."— 
 Daudignac. 
 
 If you have attached yourselves to your men, 
 you will have gained their confidence; it will be born 
 of the affection and interest which you have shown 
 in them, the superior intelligence which you have 
 
—120— 
 
 shown them you possess, and the examples which 
 you set them. Then you will see how it is that on 
 active service the soldier adores and has confidence 
 in his chief. 
 
 The role of leaders of men is above all to make 
 them believe the faith for which they fight— give 
 them a belief in the justice of their cause. 
 
 Can the spirit of good infantry be made by some 
 months or years of drill? Let us say that the spirit 
 of good infantry is first of all given by the first moral 
 education of the man; it may depend on an ideal, on a 
 fanaticism; it is a function of the public spirit of the 
 mass of the population. ' 
 
 Infantry is nothing but the nation which feeds 
 it; it is its faithful image. The nation is there re- 
 flected as in a mirror, showing its qualities, its faults, 
 its passions. 
 
 Has it been brought Up from infancy with lessons 
 of unity, of discipline in all degrees? Has it been 
 cultivated by the state? Has it an ideal of loyalty 
 and of patriotism? 
 
 It is in combat that we will find these qualities 
 masters. Then that our infantry, placed between the 
 instinct of self-preservation and the idea of duty, 
 will go to victory and throw away all the en- 
 cumbrances which it finds in its way as it strips for 
 the fight. 
 
 The elbow to elbow fight no longer exists, and 
 the soldier can no longer do his full duty if he simply 
 possesses a sentiment of solidarity powerful enough 
 to unite him to the other combatants, a sentiment 
 that used to be reassuring in the hour of danger. 
 
 Collective education given by society is the only 
 means which will assure to the army the cohesion 
 necessary to march to victory. The task must be as- 
 sumed by the mass of the people— in the home, the 
 school, the workshop. The spirit of duty and dis- 
 cipline must be cultivated by the mass of the people 
 or it will not exist in the depths of the being. 
 
 Are our people doing it?