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CORNELL 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
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Cornell University Library 
 BR45 .B21 1858a 
 
 Limits, of religious thought examined 
 
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 Cornell University 
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 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924029245698 
 
THE 
 
 LIMITS OF EELIGIOUS THOUGHT 
 EXAMINED 
 
 IN EIGHT LECTURES, 
 
 PREACHED BEFORE 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD. 
 IN THE YEAR M.DCCC.LVIII. 
 
 ON THE FOUNDATION OF 
 
 THE LATE REV. JOHN BAMPTON, M.A. 
 
 CANON OF SALISBURY. 
 
 BY 
 
 HENRY LONGUEVILLE^ANSEL, B.D. 
 
 Beader in Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy at Magdalen College ; 
 Tutor and late Fellow of St. John's College, 
 
 THIRD EDITION, 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET. 
 
 OXFORD : J. H. & JAMES PARKER. 
 
 1859. 
 
The objections made to faith are by no means an effect 
 OF knowledge, but pkoceed bather from an ignorance 
 OF what knowledge is. 
 
 BISHOP BEBKELEY. 
 
 No DIFFICULTY EMERGES IN THEOLOGY, WHICH HAD NOT PRE- 
 VIOUSLY EMERGED IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 SIE W. HAMILTON. 
 
EXTRACT 
 
 FROM 
 
 THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT 
 
 REV. JOHN BAMFrON, 
 
 CANON OF SALISBURY. 
 
 " I give and bequeath my Lands and Estates to 
 
 " the Chancellor, Masters, and Scholars of the University 
 " of Oxford for ever, to have and to hold all and sin- 
 " gular the said Lands or Estates upon trust, and to the 
 "intents and purposes hereinafter mentioned; that is to 
 " say, I will and appoint that the Vice-Chancellor of the 
 " University of Oxford for the time being shall take and 
 " receive all the rents, issues, and profits thereof, and 
 " (after all taxes, reparations, and necessary deductions 
 " made) that he pay all the remainder to the endowment 
 " of eight Divinity Lecture Sermons, to be established for 
 "ever in the said University, and to be performed in the 
 " manner following : 
 
 " I direct and appoint, that, upon the first Tuesday in 
 " Easter Term, a Lecturer be yearly chosen by the Heads 
 " of Colleges only, and by no others, in the room ad- 
 " joining to the Printing-House, between the hours of ten 
 " in the morning and two in the afternoon, to preach 
 " eight Divinity Lecture Sermons, the ye^tr following, at 
 " St. Mary's in Oxford, between the commencement of the 
 
 a2 
 
IV EXTRACT FROM CANON BAMPTON S WILL. 
 
 "last month in Lent Term, and the end of the third week 
 " in Act Term. 
 
 " Also I direct and appoint, that tiie eight Divinity 
 " Lecture Sermons shall be preached upon either of the 
 " following Subjects — to confirm and establish the Christ- 
 " ian Faith, and to confute all heretics and schismatics 
 " — upon the divine authority of the holy Scriptures — 
 •' upon the authority of the writings of the primitive Fa- 
 " thers, as to the faith and practice of the primitive Church 
 " — upon the Divinity of our Lord and Saviour Jesus 
 " Christ — upon the Divinity of the Holy Ghost — upon the 
 " Articles of the Christian Faith, as comprehended in the 
 " Apostles' and Nicene Creeds. 
 
 " Also I direct, that thirty copies of the eight Divinity 
 *' Lecture Sermons shall be always printed, within two 
 " months after they are preached, and one copy shall be 
 " given to the Chancellor of the University, and one copy 
 " to the Head of every College, and one copy to the Mayor 
 " of the city of Oxford, and one copy to be put into the 
 "' Bodleian Library; and the expense of printing them shall 
 " be paid out of the revenue of the Land or Estates given 
 " for establishing the Divinity Lecture Sermons ; and the 
 " Preacher shall not be paid, nor be entitled to the revenue, 
 " before they are printed, 
 
 " Also I direct and appoint, that no person shall be 
 "qualified to preach the Divinity Lecture Sermons, un- 
 " less he hath taken the degree of Master of Arts at least, 
 " in one of the two Universities of Oxford or Cambridge ; 
 *' and that the same person shall never preach the Divinity 
 *' Lecture Sermons twice," 
 
PREFACE 
 
 TO THE THIRD EDITION. 
 
 1 HE various Criticisms to which these Lectures 
 have been subjected since the publication of the 
 last Edition seem to call for a few explanatory re- 
 marks on the positions principally controverted. 
 Such remarks may, it is hoped, contribute to the 
 clearer perception of the argument in places where 
 it has been misunderstood, and are also required in 
 order to justify the republication, with little more 
 than a few verbal alterations, of the entire work in 
 its original form. 
 
 On the whole, I have no reason to complain of 
 my Critics. With one or two exceptions, the tone 
 of their observations has been candid, liberal, and 
 intelligent, and in some instances more favourable 
 than I could have ventured to expect. An argu- 
 ment so abstruse, and in some respects so contro- 
 versial, must almost inevitably call forth a consi- 
 derable amount of opposition ; and such criticism 
 is at least useful in stimulating further inquiry, and 
 in pointing out to an author those among his state- 
 ments which appear most to require explanation or 
 defence. If it has not done more than this, it is 
 because the original argument was not put forth 
 without much previous consideration, nor without 
 
VI 
 
 PREFACE TO 
 
 anticipation of many of the objections to which it 
 was likely to be exposed. 
 
 At present, I must confine myself to those ex- 
 planations which appear to be necessary to the 
 right appreciation of the main purposes of the work, 
 on the supposition that its fundamental principles 
 may be admitted as tenable. To reargue the whole 
 question on first principles, or to reply minutely to 
 the criticisms on subordinate details, would require 
 a larger space than can be allotted to a preface, 
 and would be at least premature at the present 
 stage of the controversy, while the work has in all 
 probability not yet completed the entire course of 
 criticism which a new book is destined to undergo 
 if it succeeds in attracting any amount of public 
 attention. 
 
 In the first place, it may be desirable to obviate 
 some misapprehensions concerning the design of 
 the work as a whole. It should be remembered, 
 that to answer the objections which have been 
 urged against Christianity, or against any reli- 
 gion, is not to prove the religion to be true. It 
 only clears the ground for the production of the 
 proper evidences. It shews, so far as it is success- 
 ful, that the religion may he true, notwithstanding 
 the objections by which it has been assailed ; but 
 it cannot by itself convert this admission into a 
 positive belief. It only calls for an impartial hear- 
 ing of the other grounds on which the question 
 must be decided. 
 
 When therefore a critic objects to the present 
 argument, that " the presence of contradictions is 
 
THE THIRD EDITION. 
 
 Vll 
 
 no proof of the truth of a system ;" that " we are 
 not entitled to erect on this aethereal basis a super- 
 structure of theological doctrine, only because it, 
 too, possesses the same self-contradictions ;" that 
 " the argument places all religions and philoso- 
 phies on precisely the same level ;" — he merely 
 charges it with accomplishing the very purpose 
 which it was intended to accomplish. So far as 
 certain difficulties are inherent in the constitution 
 of the human mind itself, they must of necessity 
 occupy the same position with respect to all reli- 
 gions, the false no less than the true. It is suffi- 
 cient if it can be shewn that they have not, as is 
 too often supposed, any peculiar force against 
 Christianity alone. No sane man dreams of main- 
 taining that a religion is true because of the diffi- 
 culties which it involves : the utmost that can rea- 
 sonably be maintained is that it may be true in 
 spite of them. Such an argument of course re- 
 quires, as its supplement, a further consideration of 
 the direct evidences of Christianity ; and this re- 
 quirement is pointed out in the concluding Lec- 
 ture. But it formed no part of my design to ex- 
 hibit in detail the evidences themselves; — a task 
 which the many excellent works already existing 
 on that subject would have rendered wholly unne- 
 cessary, even if it could have been satisfactorily 
 accomplished within the limits of the single Lec- 
 ture which alone could have been given to it. 
 
 But granting for the present the main position 
 of these Lectures, namely, that the human mind 
 inevitably and by virtue of its essential con^ti- 
 
viii PREFACE TO 
 
 tution finds itself involved in self-contradictions 
 whenever it ventures on certain courses of specu- 
 lation ; it may be asked, in the next place, what 
 conclusion does this admission warrant, as regards 
 the respective positions of Faith and Reason in 
 determining the religious convictions of men. 
 These Lectures have been charged with condemn- 
 ing, under the name of Dogmatism, all Dogmatic 
 Theology ; with censuring " the exercise of Rea- 
 son in defence and illustration of the truths of 
 Revelation ;" with including " schoolmen and saints 
 and infidels alike" in one and the same con- 
 demnation. Such sweeping assertions are surely 
 not warranted by any thing that is maintained in 
 the Lectures themselves. Dogmatism and Ra- 
 tionalism are contrasted with each other, not as 
 employing reason for opposite purposes, but as 
 (employing it in extremes. The contrast was na- 
 turally suggested by the historical connection be- 
 tween the Wolfian philosophy and the Kantian, 
 the one as the stronghold of Dogniatism, the other 
 of Rationalism. The religious philosophy of Wolf 
 and his followers, whose system, and not that of 
 either " schoolmen or saints," is cited as the chief 
 specimen of Dogmatism, was founded on the as- 
 sumption that philosophical proofs of theological 
 doctrines were absolutely necessary in all cases. 
 " He maintained," says a writer quoted in the 
 Notes, " that philosophy was indispensable to theo- 
 logy, and that, together with biblical proofs, a ma- 
 thematical or strictly demonstrative dogmatical sys- 
 tem, according to the principles of reason, was ab- 
 
THE THIRD EDITION. ix 
 
 solutely necessary." Dogmatism, as thus exempli- 
 fied, is surely not the use of reason in theology, 
 but its abuse. Unless a critic is prepared to ac- 
 cept, as legitimate reasoning, Canz's demonstration 
 of the Trinity, cited at p. 274 of the present vo- 
 lume, or the more modern specimen of the same 
 method noticed at p. 12, he must surely admit the 
 conclusion which these instances were adduced to 
 prove ; namely, that the methods of the Dogmatist 
 and the Rationalist are alike open to criticism, " in 
 so far as they keep within or go beyond those limits 
 of sound thought which the laws of man's mind, 
 or the circumstances in which he is placed, have 
 imposed upon him." 
 
 All Dogmatic Theology is not Dogmatism, nor 
 all use of Reason, Rationalism, any more than all 
 drinking is drunkenness. The dogmatic or the 
 rational method may be rightly or wrongly em- 
 ployed ; and the question is to determine the 
 limits of the legitimate or illegitimate use of each. 
 It is expressly as extremes that the two systems 
 are contrasted : each is described as leading to 
 error in its exclusive employment, yet as being, in 
 its utmost error, only a truth abused. If reason 
 may not be used without restriction in the defence 
 any more than in the refutation of religious doc- 
 trines; if there are any mysteries of revelation 
 which it is our duty to believe though we cannot 
 demonstrate them from philosophical premises ; 
 this is sufficient to shew that the provinces of 
 Faith and Reason are not coextensive. But to 
 assert this is surely not to deny that the dogmatic 
 
X PREFACE TO 
 
 method may be and has been rightly used within 
 certain limits. The dogmatism which is con- 
 demned is not system, but the extravagance of 
 system. If systematic completeness is made the 
 end which the theologian is bound to pursue at 
 every cost ; if whatever is left obscure and partial 
 in revealed truth is, as a matter of necessity, to be 
 cleared and completed by definitions and infer- 
 ences, certain or uncertain ; if the declarations of 
 Scripture are in all cases to be treated as conclu- 
 sions to be supported by philosophical premises, or 
 as principles to be developed into philosophical 
 conclusions ; — ^then indeed Dogmatic Theology is 
 in danger of degenerating into mere Dogmatism. 
 But it is only the indiscriminate use of the method 
 which is condemned, and that not simply as an 
 employment of reason in religious questions, but 
 as an employment beyond its just limits. And if, 
 in citing instances of this misuse, it has been occa- 
 sionally necessary to point out the errors of writers 
 whose names are justly honoured in the Church, 
 and whose labours as a whole are entitled to the 
 reverence and gratitude of posterity, I wish dis- 
 tinctly to state, that the censure, such as it is, 
 reaches only to the points directly indicated by 
 reference or quotation, and is not intended to 
 apply further. 
 
 What then is the practical lesson which these 
 Lectures are designed to teach concerning the 
 right use of reason in religious questions ? and 
 what are the just claims of a reasonable faith, as 
 distinguished from a blind credulity ? In the first 
 
THE THIRD EDITION. xi 
 
 place, it is obvious that, if there is any object what- 
 ever of which the human mind is unable to form a 
 dear and distinct conception, the inability equally 
 disqualifies us for proving or for disproving a given 
 doctrine, in all cases in which such a conception is 
 an indispensable condition of the argument. If, for 
 example, we can form no positive notion of the 
 Nature of God as an Infinite Being, we are not en- 
 titled either to demonstrate the mystery of the Tri-* 
 nity as a necessary property of that Nature, or to 
 reject it as necessarily inconsistent therewith. Such 
 mysteries clearly belong, not to Reason, but to 
 Faith ; and the preliminary inquiry which distin- 
 guishes a reasonable from an unreasonable belief, 
 must be directed, not to the premises by which the 
 doctrine can be proved or disproved as reasonable 
 or unreasonable, but to the nature of the authority on 
 which it rests, as revealed or unrevealed. The brief 
 summary of Christian Evidences contained in my 
 concluding Lecture*, and others which might be 
 added to them, are surely sufficient to form an ample 
 field for the use of Reason, even in regard to those 
 mysteries which it cannot directly examine. If to 
 submit to an authority which can stand the test 
 of such investigations, and to believe it when it 
 tells us of things which we are unable to investi- 
 gate, — if this be censured as a blind credulity, it is 
 a blindness which in these things is a better guide 
 than the opposite quality so justly described by 
 the philosopher as " the sharpsightedness of little 
 souls." 
 
 » See below, p. 248. 
 
xii PREFACE TO 
 
 In the second place, a caution is needed con- 
 cerning the kind of evidence which reason is com- 
 petent to furnish within the legitimate sphere of 
 its employment. If we have not such a conception 
 of the Divine Nature as is sufficient for the a 'priori 
 demonstration of religious truths, our rational con- 
 viction in any particular case must be regarded, 
 not as a certainty, but as a probability. We must 
 remember the Aristotelian rule, to be content with 
 such evidence as the nature of the object-matter 
 allows. A single infallible criterion of all religious 
 truth can be obtained only by the possession of a 
 perfect Philosophy of the Infinite. If such a phi- 
 losophy is unattainable; if the infinite can only be 
 apprehended under finite symbols, and the au- 
 thority of those symbols tested by finite evidences, 
 there is always room for error, in consequence of 
 the inadequacy of the conception to express com- 
 pletely the nature of the object. In other words, 
 we must admit that human reason, though not 
 worthless, is at least fallible, in dealing with reli- 
 gious questions ; and that the probability of error 
 is always increased in proportion to the partial 
 nature of the evidence with which it deals. Those 
 who set up some one supreme criterion of religious 
 truth, their " Christian consciousness," their " reli- 
 gious intuitions," their " moral reason," or any 
 other of the favourite idols of the subjective school 
 of theologians, and who treat with contempt every 
 kind of evidence which does not harmonize with 
 this, are especially liable to be led into error. 
 They use the weight without the counterpoise, to 
 
THE THIRD EDITION. xiii 
 
 the imminent peril of their mental equilibrium. 
 This is the caution which it was the object of 
 my concluding Lecture to enforce, principally by 
 means of two practical rules ; namely, first, that 
 the true evidence, for or against a religion, is not 
 to be found in any single criterion, but in the 
 result of many presumptions examined and com- 
 pared together; and, secondly, that in proportion 
 to the weight of the counter-evidence in favour of 
 a religion, is the probability that we may be mis- 
 taken in supposing a particular class of objections 
 to have any real weight at all. 
 
 These considerations are no less applicable to 
 moral than to speculative reasonings. The moral 
 faculty, though furnishing undoubtedly some of 
 the most important elements for the solution of 
 the religious problem, is no more entitled than any 
 other single principle of the human mind to be 
 accepted as a sole and sufficient criterion. It is 
 true that to our sense of moral obligation we owe 
 our primary conception of God as a moral Go- 
 vernor ; and it is also true that, were man left 
 solely to a priori presumptions in forming his esti- 
 mate of the nature and attributes of God, the 
 moral sense, as being that one of all human facul- 
 ties whose judgments are least dependent on ex- 
 perience, would furnish the principal, if not the 
 only characteristics of his highest conception of 
 God. But here, as elsewhere, the original pre- 
 sumption is modified and corrected by subsequent 
 experience. It is a fact which experience forces 
 upon us, and which it is useless, were it possible, 
 
xiv PREFACE TO 
 
 to disguise, that the representation of God after 
 the model of the highest human morality which 
 we are capable of conceiving, is not sufficient to 
 account for all the phenomena exhibited by the 
 course of His natural Providence. The infliction 
 of physical suffering, the permission of moral evil, 
 the adversity of the good, the prosperity of the 
 wicked, the crimes of the guilty involving the 
 misery of the innocent, the tardy appearance and 
 partial distribution of moral and religious know- 
 ledge in the world, — ^these are facts which no doubt 
 are reconcilable, we know not how, with the In- 
 finite Goodness of God ; but which certainly are 
 not to be explained on the supposition that its sole 
 and sufficient type is to be found in the finite 
 goodness of man. What right then has the philo- 
 sopher to assume that a criterion which admits of 
 so many exceptions in the facts of nature may be 
 applied without qualification or exception to the 
 statements of revelation 1 
 
 The assertion that human morality contains in it 
 a temporal and relative element, arid cannot in its 
 highest manifestation be regarded as a complete 
 measure of the absolute Goodness of God, has been 
 condemned by one critic as " rank Occamism''," and 
 
 l* It is in fact the very reverse of the doctrine usually attri- 
 buted to Occam, which admits of no distinction between absolute 
 and relative morality, but maintains that, as all distinction of 
 right and wrong depends upon obedience or disobedience to a 
 higher authority, therefore the Divine Nature must be morally 
 indifferent, and all good and evil the result of God's arbitrary 
 Will. The above assertion, on the other hand, expressly distin- 
 guishes absolute from relative morality, and regards human vir- 
 
THE THIRD EDITION. xv 
 
 contrasted with the teaching of " that marvellously 
 profound, cautious, and temperate thinker," Bishop 
 Butler : it has been denounced by another, of a very 
 different school, as " destructive of healthful moral 
 perception." , That the doctrine in question, in- 
 stead of being opposed to Butler, is directly taken 
 from him, may be seen by any one who will take 
 the trouble to read the extract from the Analogy 
 quoted at p. 243. But it is of little importance 
 by what authority an opinion is sanctioned, if it will 
 not itself stand the test of sound criticism. The 
 admission, that a divine command may under cer- 
 tain circumstances justify an act which would not 
 be justifiable without it, is condemned by some 
 critics as holding out an available excuse for any 
 crime committed under any circumstances. If 
 God can suspend, on any one occasion, the ordi- 
 nary obligations of morality, how, it is asked, are 
 we to know whether any criminal may not equally 
 claim a divine sanction for his crimes ? Now 
 where, as in the present instance, the supposed 
 exceptions are expressly stated as supernatural 
 ones, analogous to the miraculous suspension of 
 the ordinary laws of nature, this objection either 
 proves too much, or proves nothing at all. If we 
 believe in the possibility of a supernatural Provi- 
 
 tue and vice as combining an eternal and a temporal element ; 
 the one an absolute principle grounded in the immutable nature 
 pf God ; the other a relative application, dependent upon the cre- 
 ated constitution of human nature. But I am by no means sure 
 that the ' Invincible Doctor' has been quite fairly dealt with in 
 this matter. 
 
xvi PREFACE TO 
 
 dence at all, we may also believe that God is able 
 to authenticate His own mission by proper evi- 
 dences. The objection has no special relation to 
 questions of moral duty. It may be asked, in like 
 manner, how we are to distinguish a true from a 
 false prophet, or a preacher sent by God from one 
 acting on his own responsibility. The possibility 
 of a special divine mission of any kind will of 
 course be denied by those who reject the super- 
 natural altogether ; but this denial removes the 
 question into an entirely different province of in- 
 quiry, where it has no relation to any peculiar 
 infallibility supposed to attach to the moral reason 
 above the other faculties of the human mind. 
 
 Those who believe, with the Scriptures, that 
 the Almighty has, at certain times in the world's 
 history, manifested Himself to certain nations or 
 individuals in a supernatural manner, distinct from 
 His ordinary government of the world by the in- 
 stitutions of society, will scarcely be disposed to 
 admit the assumption, that God could not on such 
 occasions justify by His own authority such acts 
 as are every day justified by the authority of the 
 civil magistrate whose power is delegated from 
 Him. To assert, with one of my critics, that upon 
 this principle, " the deed which is criminal on earth 
 may be praiseworthy in heaven," is to distort the 
 whole doctrine and to beg the whole question. 
 For we must first answer the previous inquiry : 
 Does not a deed performed under such circum- 
 stances cease to be criminal at all, even upon 
 earth ? The question, so far as moral philosophy is 
 
THE THIRD EDITION. xvii 
 
 concerned, is simply this : Is the moral quality of 
 right or wrong an attribute so essentially adhering 
 to acts as acts, that the same act can never vary 
 in its character, according to the motives by which 
 it is prompted, or the circumstances under which 
 it is committed? If we are compelled, as every 
 moralist is compelled, to answer this question 
 in the negative, we must then ask, in the second 
 place, whether the existence of a direct command 
 from the supreme Governor of the world, supposing 
 such a command ever to have been given, is one 
 of the circumstances which can in any degree 
 affect the character of an act. On this question, 
 to judge merely by the conflicting statements on 
 opposite sides, men whose moral judgments are 
 equally trustworthy may differ one from another; 
 but that very difference is enough to shew that the 
 moral reason is not by itself a sufficient and infal- 
 lible oracle on such questions. The further in- 
 quiry, whether such a command has ever, as a 
 matter of fact, been given ; and how, if given, it 
 can be distinguished from counterfeits, is one 
 which does not fall within the province of moral 
 philosophy, in itself or in its relation to theology. 
 The philosopher, as such, can at most only pre- 
 pare the way for this inquiry, if he can succeed in 
 shewing that there is nothing in the moral reason 
 of man which entitles it to pronounce, on a priori 
 grounds, that such a command is absolutely im- 
 possible. 
 
 It remains to make some remarks on another of the 
 opinions maintained in the following Lectures, on 
 
 b 
 
xviii PREFACE TO 
 
 which, to judge by the criticisms to which it has 
 been subjected, a few words of explanation may be 
 desirable. It has been objected by reviewers of 
 very opposite schools, that to deny to man a know- 
 ledge of the Infinite is to make Revelation itself 
 impossible, and to leave no room for evidences on 
 which reason can be legitimately employed. The 
 objection would be pertinent, if I had ever main- 
 tained that Revelation is or can be a direct mani- 
 festation of the Infinite Nature of God. But I 
 have constantly asserted the very reverse. In Re- 
 velation, as in Natural Religion, God is represented 
 under finite conceptions, adapted to finite minds ; 
 and the evidences on which the authority of Reve- 
 lation rests are finite and comprehensible also. It 
 is true that in Revelation, no less than in the exer- 
 cise of our natural faculties, there is indirectly 
 indicated the existence of a higher and more abso- 
 lute truth, which, as it cannot be grasped by any 
 effort of human thought, cannot be made the 
 vehicle of any valid philosophical criticism. But 
 the comprehension of this higher truth is no more 
 necessary either to a belief in the contents of 
 Revelation or to a reasonable examination of its 
 evidences, than a conception of the infinite divi- 
 sibility of matter is necessary to the child before it 
 can learn to walk. 
 
 But it is a great mistake to suppose, as some of 
 my critics have supposed, that if the Infinite, as an 
 object, is inconceivable, therefore the language 
 which denotes it is wholly without meaning, and 
 the corresponding state of mind one of complete 
 
THE THIRD EDITION. xix 
 
 quiescence. A negative idea by no means implies 
 a negation of all mental activity". It implies an 
 attempt to think, and a failure in accomplishing the 
 attempt. The language by which such ideas are 
 indicated is not like a word in an unknown tongue, 
 which excites no corresponding affection in the 
 mind of the hearer. It indicates a relation, if only 
 of difference, to that of which we are positively con- 
 scious, and a consequent effort to pass from the one 
 to the other. This is the case even with those more 
 obvious negations of thought which arise from the 
 union of two incongruous finite notions. We may 
 attempt to conceive a space enclosed by two straight 
 lines; and it is not till after the effort has been 
 made that we become aware of the impossibility of 
 the conception. And it may frequently happen, 
 owing to the use of language as a substitute for 
 thought, that a process of reasoning may be carried 
 on to a considerable length, without the reasoner 
 being aware of the essentially inconceivable cha- 
 racter of the objects denoted by his terms. This is 
 especially likely when the negative character of the 
 notion depends, not, as in the above instance, on 
 the union of two attributes which cannot be con- 
 ceived in conjunction, but on the separation of 
 those which cannot be conceived apart. We can 
 analyse in language what we cannot analyse in 
 thought ; and the presence of the language often 
 serves to conceal the absence of the thought. Thus, 
 for example, it is impossible to conceive colour 
 apart from extension ; an unextended colour is 
 
 " See Sir W. Hamilton's Discussions, p. 602. 
 b2 
 
XX PREFACE TO 
 
 therefore a purely negative notion. Yet many dis- 
 tinguished philosophers have maintained that the 
 connection between these two ideas is one merely 
 of association, and have argued concerning colour 
 apart from extension, with as much confidence as if 
 their language represented a positive thought. The 
 speculations concerning the seat of the immaterial 
 soul may be cited as another instance of the same 
 kind. Forgetting that, to human thought, position 
 in space and occupation of space are notions es- 
 sentially bound together, and that neither can be 
 conceived apart from the other, men have carried 
 on various elaborate reasonings, and constructed 
 various plausible theories, on the tacit assumption 
 that it is possible to assign a local position to an 
 unextended substance. Yet, considering that ex- 
 tension itself is necessarily conceived as a relation 
 between parts exterior to each other, and that no 
 such relation can be conceived as an ultimate and 
 simple element of things, it would be the mere dog- 
 matism of ignorance to assert that a relation be- 
 tween the extended and the unextended is in itself 
 impossible ; though assuredly we are unable to con- 
 ceive how it is possible. 
 
 It is thus manifest that, even granting that all 
 our positive consciousness is of the Finite only, it 
 may stiU be possible for men to speculate and rea- 
 son concerning the Infinite, without being aware 
 that their language represents, not thought, but its 
 negation. They attempt to separate the condition 
 of finiteness from their conception of a given ob- 
 ject; and it is not till criticism has detected the 
 
THE THIRD EDITION. xxi 
 
 self-contradiction involved in the attempt, that we 
 learn at last that all human efforts to conceive the 
 infinite are derived from the consciousness, not of 
 what it is, but only of what it is nof". 
 
 Whatever value may be attached, in different 
 psychological theories, to that instinct or feeling of 
 our nature which compels us to believe in the ex- 
 istence of the Infinite, it is clear that, so long as it 
 remains a mere instinct or feeling, it cannot be em- 
 ployed for the purpose of theological criticism. 
 The communication of mental phenomena from 
 man to man must always be made in the form of 
 thoughts conveyed through the medium of lan- 
 guage. So long as the unbeliever can only say, 
 " I feel that this doctrine is false, but I cannot say 
 why ; " so long as the believer can only retort, " I 
 feel that it is true, but I can give no reason for my 
 feeling;" — there is no common ground on which 
 either can hope to influence the other. So long 
 as a man's religion is a matter of feeling only, the 
 feeling, whatever may be its influence on himself, 
 forms no basis of argument for or against the truth 
 of what he believes. But as soon as he interprets 
 his feelings into thoughts, and proceeds to make 
 
 d A critic in the National Beview is of opinion that " relative 
 apprehension is always and necessarily of two terms together;" and 
 " if of the finite, then also of the infinite." This is true as regards 
 the meaning of the words ; but by no means as regards the con- 
 ception of the corresponding objects. If extended to the latter, 
 it should in consistency be asserted that the conception of that 
 which is conceivable involves also the conception of that which is 
 inconceivable ; that the consciousness of any thing is also a con- 
 sciousness of nothing ; that the intuition of space and time is 
 likewise an intuition of the absence of both. 
 
xxii PREFACE TO 
 
 those thoughts the instruments of criticism con- 
 structive or destructive, he is bound to submit them 
 to the same logical criteria to which he himself 
 subjects the religion on which he is commenting. 
 In this relation, it matters not what may be the 
 character of our feeling oi the infinite, provided our 
 conception cannot be exhibited without betraying 
 its own inherent weakness by its own self-contra- 
 dictions. That such is the case with that philo- 
 sophical conception of the Absolute and Infinite 
 which has prevailed in almost every philosophy of 
 note, firom Parmenides to Hegel, it has been the 
 aim of these Lectures to shew. If a critic main- 
 tains that philosophy, notwithstanding its past 
 failures, may possibly hereafter succeed in bringing 
 the infinite within the grasp of reason, we may be 
 permitted to doubt the assertion until the task has 
 been actually accomplished. 
 
 The distinction between speculative and regula- 
 tive truths, which has also been a good deal mis- 
 apprehended, is one which follows inevitably from 
 the abandonment of the philosophy of the Abso- 
 lute. If human thought cannot be traced up to 
 an absolutely first principle of all knowledge and 
 all existence ; if our highest attainable truths bear 
 the marks of subordination to something higher 
 and unattainable ; it foUows, if we are to act or 
 believe at all, that our practice and belief must be 
 based on principles which do not satisfy all the 
 requirements of the speculative reason. But it 
 should be remembered that this distinction is not 
 peculiar to the evidences of religion. It is shewn 
 
THE THIRD EDITION. xxiii 
 
 that in all departments of human knowledge alike, 
 • — in the laws of thought, in the movement of our 
 limbs, in the perception of our senses, the truths 
 which guide our practice cannot be reduced to 
 principles which satisfy our reason ; and that, if 
 religious thought is placed under the same restric- 
 tions, this is but in strict analogy to the general 
 conditions to which God has subjected man in his 
 search after truth. One half of the rationalist's ob- 
 jections against revealed religion would fall to the 
 ground, if men would not commit the very irra- 
 tional error of expecting clearer conceptions and 
 more rigid demonstrations of the invisible things of 
 God, than those which they are content to accept 
 and act upon in all the concerns of their earthly 
 life. 
 
 The above are all the explanations which, so far 
 as I can at present judge, appear to be desirable, to 
 obviate probable misapprehensions regarding the 
 general principles advocated in these pages. Had 
 I thought it worth whUe to enter into controversy 
 on minute questions of detail, or to reply to mis- 
 apprehensions which are due solely to the inad- 
 vertence of individual readers^, I might have ex- 
 
 e A writer in the Gh/ristiom Observer has actually mistaken the 
 positions against which the author is contending for those which 
 he maintains, and on the strength of this mistake has blundered 
 through several pages of yehement denunciation of the monstrous 
 consequences which follow from the assumption that the philoso- 
 phical conception of the absolute is the true conception of God. 
 The absolute and the infinite, he tells us, (in opposition to the 
 Lecturer ! ! !) " are names of God unknown to the Scriptures ; " 
 " The conception of infinity is plainly negative :" " the absolute 
 
xxiv PREFACE TO 
 
 tended these remarks to a considerably greater 
 length. For the present I shall content myself 
 with only two further observations ; one on a single 
 sentence, the language of which, having been mis- 
 interpreted in more than one quarter, may perhaps 
 need a brief explanation ; the other on a matter 
 aflFecting, not the literary merit of these Lectures, 
 but the personal honesty of their author. 
 
 The sentence occurs at p. 46, in the following 
 words : " 'What kind of an Absolute Being is that,' 
 says Hegel, ' which does not contain in itself all that 
 is actual, even evil included' ? We may repudiate the 
 conclusion with indignation ; but the reasoning is 
 unassailable. If the Absolute and Infinite is an object 
 of human conception at all, this, and none other, is 
 the conception required." 
 
 This passage has been censured by more than 
 
 and infinite, as defined in the Lectures after the leaders of 
 German metaphysics, is no synonym for the true and living God :" 
 and " a philosophy of the so-called absolute is a spurious theology." 
 Est il possible 1 
 
 The same critic denounces, as " radically and thoroughly un- 
 true," the distinction between speculative and regulative truths, 
 and the consequent assertion that action, and not knowledge, is 
 man's destiny and duty in this life, and- that his highest princi- 
 ples, both in philosophy and in religion, have reference to this 
 end. " On the contrary," he says, " all right action depends on 
 right knowledge." As if this were not the very meaning of a 
 regulative truth, — ^knowledge for the sake of action. 
 
 Another critic asserts that the author " sweeps down school- 
 men and saints and infidels alike, with the assertion that dogmatism 
 and rationalism equally assign to some superior tribunal the right 
 of determining what is essential to religion and what is not." Had 
 he looked a second time at the page which he quotes, he would 
 have seen that this is said of rationalism alone. 
 
THE THIRD EDITION. xxv 
 
 one critic, as involving the sceptical admission that 
 a false conclusion can be logically deduced from 
 true premises. The concluding words may explain 
 the real meaning. The whole argument is designed 
 to shew that to speak of a conception of the Absolute 
 implies a self-contradiction at the outset, and that 
 to reason upon such a conception involves ab initio 
 a violation of the laws of human thought. That rea- 
 soning based on this assumption must end by anni- 
 hilating itself, is surely no very dangerous concession 
 to the sceptic. Suppose that an author had written 
 such a sentence as the following : 
 
 " A circular parallelogram must have its opposite 
 sides and angles equal, and must also be such that 
 aU lines drawn from the centre to the circumference 
 shall be equal to each other. The conclusion is ab- 
 sm-d ; but the reasoning is unassailable, supposing that 
 a circular parallelogram can be conceived at all. 
 
 Would such a statement involve any formidable 
 consequences either to geometry or to logic ? 
 
 It remains only to say a few words on a question 
 of fact, involving one of the most serious accusations 
 that can be brought against the character of an 
 author. A writer in the Rambler, to whom in other 
 respects I feel indebted for a liberal and kindly 
 appreciation of my labours, has qualified his favour- 
 able judgment by the grave charge that the "whole 
 gist of the book" is borrowed without acknowledg- 
 ment from the teaching of Dr. Newman, as a 
 preacher or as a writer. Against a charge of this 
 kind there is but one possible defence. No obliga- 
 tion was acknowledged, simply because none existed. 
 
xxvi PREFACE TO 
 
 I say this, assuredly with no intention to speak slight- 
 ingly of one whose transcendent gifts no differences 
 should hinder me from acknowledging ; but because 
 it is necessary, in justice to myself, to state exactly 
 the relation in which I stand towards him. Dr. 
 Newman's teaching from the University pulpit was 
 almost at its close before my connection with 
 Oxford began : his parochial sermons I had very 
 seldom an opportunity of hearing. His published 
 writings might doubtless have given me much 
 valuable assistance ; but with these I was but very 
 slightly acquainted when these Lectures were first 
 published; and the little that I knew contained 
 nothing which appeared to bear upon my argument. 
 This is but one out of many deficiencies, of 
 which I have been painfully conscious during the 
 progress of the work, and which I would gladly 
 have endeavoured to supply, had circumstances 
 allowed me a longer time for direct preparation. 
 
 The point indeed on which the Reviewer lays 
 most stress is one in which there was little room 
 for originality, either in myself or in my supposed 
 teacher. That Revelation is accommodated to the 
 limitations of man's faculties, and is primarily de- 
 signed for the purposes of practical religion, and 
 not for those of speculative philosophy, has been 
 said over and over again by writers of almost every 
 age, and is indeed a truth so obvious that it might 
 have occurred independently to almost any number 
 of thinkers. Doubtless there is no truth, however 
 trite and obvious, which may not assume a new 
 and striking aspect in the hands of a great and 
 
THE THIRD EDITION. xxvii 
 
 original writer ; and in this, as in other respects, a 
 better acquaintance with Dr. Newman's works 
 might have taught me a better mode of expressing 
 many arguments to which my own language may 
 have done but imperfect justice. Even at this late 
 hour, I am tempted to subjoin, as a conclusion to 
 these observations, one passage of singular beauty 
 and truth, of which, had I known it earlier, I would 
 gladly have availed myself, as pointing out the true 
 spirit in which inquiries like these should be pur- 
 sued, and the practical lesson which they are de- 
 signed to teach. 
 
 " And should any one fear lest thoughts such as 
 these shoidd tend to a dreary and hopeless scepti- 
 cism, let him take into account the Being and Pro- 
 vidence of God, the Merciful and True ; and he 
 will at once be relieved of his anxiety. All is 
 dreary till we believe, what our hearts tell us, that 
 we are subjects of His Governance; nothing is 
 dreary, all inspires hope and trust, directly we 
 understand that we are under His hand, and that 
 whatever comes to us is from Him, as a method of 
 discipline and guidance. What is it to us whether 
 the knowledge He gives us be greater or less, if it 
 be He who gives it ? What is it to us whether it 
 be exact or vague, if He bids us trust it ? What 
 have we to care whether we are or are not given 
 to divide substance from shadow, if He is training 
 us heavenward by means of either ? Why should 
 we vex ourselves to find whether our deductions 
 are philosophical or no, provided they are religious? 
 If our senses supply the media by which we are 
 
xxviii PREFACE. 
 
 put on trial, by which we are all brought toge- 
 ther, and hold intercourse with each other, and are 
 disciplined, and are taught, and enabled to be- 
 nefit others, it is enough. We have an instinct 
 within us, impelling us, we have external necessity- 
 forcing us, to trust our senses, and we may leave 
 the question of their substantial truth for another 
 world, 'till the day break, and the shadows flee 
 away.' And what is true of reliance on our 
 senses, is true of all the information which it has 
 pleased God to vouchsafe to us, whether in nature 
 or in grace ^." 
 
 f University Sermons, p. 351. 
 
 OXFORD, 
 
 February i8th, 1859. 
 
PREFACE 
 
 TO THE FIRST EDITION. 
 
 It has been observed by a thoughtful writer of 
 the present day, that " the theological struggle of 
 this age, in all its more important phases, turns 
 upon the philosophical problem of the limits of 
 knowledge and the true theory of human ignor- 
 ance V The present Lectures may be regarded 
 as an attempt to obtain an answer to this pro- 
 blem, in one at least of its aspects, by shewing 
 what limitations to the construction of a philo- 
 sophical Theology necessarily exist in the con- 
 stitution and laws of the human mind. 
 
 The title selected may perhaps require a few 
 words of explanation. In the expression, religious 
 thought, the term thought is not intended to desig- 
 nate any special mode of acquiring or communi- 
 cating knowledge ; as if truths beyond the reach 
 of thought could be attained by intuition or some 
 other mental process. It is used as a general 
 term, to include all that can be distinctly appre- 
 hended as existing in any man's own conscious- 
 ness, or can be communicated to others by means 
 of language. Those states of mind which do not 
 
 » Professor Fraser, Essays in PMlos<yphy, p. 281. 
 
XXX PREFACE TO 
 
 fulfil these conditions are only indirectly exa- 
 mined in the following pages ; but the very cir- 
 cumstance, that such states, even granting them 
 to exist, can neither be distinctly apprehended 
 nor intelligibly communicated, renders them, 
 whatever may be their supposed effects on indi- 
 vidual minds, unavailable as instruments for the 
 construction or criticism of any religious doc- 
 trine. 
 
 Though the need of such an inquiry as is now 
 attempted was suggested to the Author chiefly by 
 the perusal of theological writings of the present 
 generation, he has not, in the prosecution of it, 
 thought it necessary to confine his remarks exclu- 
 sively to contemporary writers, or to those whose 
 influence is extensively felt in this country. 
 Enough reference will be found to recent pub- 
 lications, to shew, it is believed, that the work 
 is not uncalled for at this time ; but the causes 
 of the evil chiefly assailed lie deep in the tenden- 
 cies of human nature, and are operative, with 
 identity of principle and but little variety of de- 
 tail, at different times and in different places. 
 In Germany, indeed, it may be said that Ra- 
 tionalism, properly so called, is not at present 
 the predominant phase of theological speculation. 
 Still it is found, in no sparing measure, in its 
 own name and character; and still more, it un- 
 derlies and leavens the speculations of many 
 writers who are apparently pursuing a different 
 method. Publications whose professed object is 
 historical or critical, are often undertaken in the 
 
THE FIRST EDITION. xxxi 
 
 interest of a foregone philosophical conclusion. 
 If a writer commences his inquiry by laying 
 down, with Strauss, as a canon of criticism, that 
 whatever is supernatural is necessarily unhis- 
 torical; or if, with Vatke or Baur, he assumes 
 the Hegelian theory of development as the "stand- 
 point" from which to contemplate the history of 
 nations or of doctrines, his researches will be 
 indirectly amenable to any criticism which may 
 affect the philosophical principles on which they 
 are conducted. But, directly, the historical and 
 critical researches of modern theology do not 
 come within the class of inquiries examined in 
 the present work. For, whatever may be their 
 merits or defects in the hands of individual writ- 
 ers, they cannot in themselves be regarded as 
 transcending the legitimate boundaries of human 
 thought; but on the contrary, they are rather 
 to be accepted as legitimate, though often over- 
 estimated, contributions to the general sum of 
 Christian Evidences. 
 
 With regard to the philosophical speculations 
 in Theology which are the direct objects of ex- 
 amination in the following pages, the present 
 work may be considered as an attempt to pursue, 
 in relation to Theology, the inquiry instituted by 
 Kant in relation to Metaphysics; namely. How 
 are synthetical judgments a priori possible? In 
 other words ; Does there exist in the human 
 mind any direct faculty of religious kTiowledge, by 
 which, in its speculative exercise, we are enabled 
 to decide, independently of all external Revela- 
 
xxxii PREFACE TO 
 
 tion, what is the true nature of God, and the 
 manner in which He must manifest Himself to 
 the world ; and by which, in its critical exercise, 
 we are entitled authoritatively to decide for or 
 against the claims of any professed Revelation, 
 as containing a true or a false representation of 
 the Divine -Nature and Attributes ? And if it can 
 be shewn that no such faculty exists, but that 
 the conclusions arrived at in this respect are 
 gained indirectly, by transferring to the region of 
 Theology judgments which properly belong to 
 another province of human thought ; there then 
 arises a second inquiry ; namely, What cautions 
 are necessary to be observed in the process of 
 transferring, and what is the value of the judg- 
 ments when transferred ? The moral and theo- 
 logical writings of Kant and his followers are so 
 far from furnishing a satisfactory answer to these 
 questions, that they rather seem as if they had 
 been written expressly for the purpose of re- 
 versing the method carried out with such good 
 effect in relation to Metaphysics. 
 
 It is rather to a philosopher of our own age 
 and country that we must look for the true 
 theory of the limits of human thought, as ap- 
 plicable to theological, no less than to meta- 
 physical researches, — a theory exhibited indeed 
 in a fragmentary and incomplete form, but con- 
 taining the germ of nearly all that is requisite 
 for a full exposition of the system. The cele- 
 brated article of Sir William Hamilton, on the 
 Philosophy of the Unconditioned, contains the 
 
THE FIRST EDITION. xxxiii 
 
 key to the understanding and appreciation of 
 nearly the whole body of modern German specu- 
 lation. His great principle, that "the Uncon- 
 ditioned is incognisable and inconceivable; its 
 notion being only negative of the Conditioned, 
 which last can alone be positively known or 
 conceived," has suggested the principal part of 
 the inquiries pursued in the present work ; and 
 his practical conclusion, " We are thus taught the 
 salutary lesson, that the capacity of thought is 
 not to be constituted into the measure of exist- 
 ence; and are warned from recognising the do- 
 main of our knowledge as necessarily coextensive 
 with the horizon of our faith," is identical with 
 that which is constantly enforced throughout 
 these Lectures. 
 
 But if the best theoretical exposition of the 
 limits of human thought is to be found in the 
 writings of a philosopher but recently removed 
 from among us ; it is in a work of more than a 
 century old that we find the best instance of the 
 acknowledgment of those limits in practice. The 
 Analogy of Religion, natural and revealed, to the con- 
 stitution and course of Nature furnishes an exam- 
 ple of a profound and searching philosophical 
 spirit, combined with a just perception of the 
 bounds within which all human philosophy must 
 be confined, to which, in the whole range of simi- 
 lar investigations, it would be difficult, if not im- 
 possible, to find a parallel. The author of that 
 work has been justly described as " one to whose 
 deep sayings no thoughtful mind was ever yet 
 
 c 
 
xxxiv PREFACE. 
 
 introduced for the first time, without acknow- 
 ledging the period an epoch in its intellectual 
 history '' ;" and it may be added that the feeling 
 of admiration thus excited will only be increased 
 by a comparison of his writings with the preten- 
 tious failures of more ambitious thinkers. Con- 
 nected as the present Author has been for many 
 years with the studies of Oxford, of which those 
 writings have long formed an important part, he 
 feels that he would be wanting in his duty to the 
 University to which he owes so much, were he to 
 hesitate to declare, at this time, his deep-rooted 
 and increasing conviction, that sound religious 
 philosophy will flourish or fade within her walls, 
 according as she perseveres or neglects to study 
 the works and cultivate the spirit of her great 
 son and teacher, Bishop Butler. 
 
 ^ W. A. Butler, Letters on the Development of Christian Doc- 
 trine, p. 75. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 LECTURE I. 
 
 Dogmatism and Rationalism as methods of religious phi- 
 losophy — meaning of these terms — errors of the respective 
 systems denoted by each; the one forcing reason into 
 agreement with revelation, the other forcing revelation into 
 agreement with reason. — Both methods may be regarded 
 as attempts, from opposite sides, to produce exact coinci- 
 dence between behef and thought. — Instances of each exhi- 
 bited and examined. — Human conceptions are unavoidable 
 in Theology"? but there is need of some principle to deter- 
 mine their proper place in it. — Such a principle can only be 
 gained by an investigation of the Limits of Human Thought. 
 — The proper object of criticism is not religion, but the 
 human mind in its relation to religion. — A direct criticism 
 of religion as a representation of God can only be accom- 
 plished by the construction of a Philosophy of the Infinite. 
 — It is therefore necessary to inquire whether such a philo- 
 sophy is possible ; and this can only be ascertained by an 
 examination of the laws of human thought in general, which 
 will determine those of religious thought in particular. — 
 Analogous difiiculties may be expected in philosophy and in 
 rehgion, arising from the limitations of thought common to 
 both. — Contrast between two opposite statements of the 
 extent of human knowledge, in the words of St. Paul and of 
 Hegel. — Purpose of the following Lectures, as an Examina- 
 tion of the Limits of Religious Thought. 
 
 LECTURE IL 
 
 Statement of the two opposite methods by which a Phi- 
 losophy of Religion may be attempted; the Objective or 
 
 % 
 
xxxvi CONTENTS. 
 
 Metaphysical, based on a supposed knowledge of the na- 
 ture of God, and the Subjective or Psychological, based on 
 a knowledge of the mental faculties of man. — Relation of 
 these methods respectively to the Criticism of Revelation 
 — dependence of the former method upon the latter. — Fur- 
 ther examination of the Objective or Metaphysical method. 
 Two different modes in which man may be supposed to be 
 capable of attaining to a knowledge of God — specimen of 
 each — ^insufficiency of both to found a Rational Theology. 
 — Examination of the fundamental ideas of Rational Theo- 
 logy, — the Absolute — the Infinite — the First Cause — mu- 
 tual contradictions involved in these three ideas — concep- 
 tion of an eternal Causation incompatible with the Abso- 
 lute — conception of a temporal Causation incompatible 
 with the Infinite. — The Absolute cannot be conceived as 
 a necessary and unconscious causOj — nor as a voluntary 
 and conscious cause, — nor as possessing consciousness at 
 all, — nor as containing within itself any kind of relation, 
 — nor as one and simple, out of all relation. Effect of 
 these counter impossibilities on the conceptions of Theo- 
 logy — apparent contradictions in the conception of the 
 Divine Attributes as absolute and infinite. — Further con- 
 tradictions involved in the coexistence of the Relative with 
 the Absolute, and of the Finite with the Infinite. Pan- 
 theism avoids these contradictions by denying the exist- 
 ence of the Finite and Relative — this solution untenable 
 — self-contradictions of the Pantheistic hypothesis. — Alter- 
 native of Atheism, which denies the existence of the In- 
 finite and Absolute — contradictions involved in this hypo- 
 thesis. — Summary of conclusions. — Necessary failure of all 
 attempts to construct a Metaphysical Theology — alterna- 
 tive necessitated by this failure. — Practical result of the 
 above inquiry. 
 
 LECTURE III. 
 
 Recapitulation of the results of the last Lecture. — Ne- 
 cessity of examining the Philosophy of Religion from the 
 Subjective or Psychological side, as dependent upon a 
 
CONTENTS. xxxvii 
 
 knowledge of the laws of the human mind. — General con- 
 ditions of all human Consciousness. — First condition of 
 Consciousness, Distinction between one Object and another 
 — such a distinction necessarily implies Limitation — conse- 
 quent impossibility of conceiving the Infinite. — Explanation 
 of the contradictions involved in the idea of the Infinite — 
 this idea inadmissible as the basis of a scientific Theology. — 
 Second condition of Consciousness, Relation between Sub- 
 ject and Object — consequent impossibility of conceiving the 
 Absolute. — Explanation of the contradictions involved in 
 the idea of the Absolute. — Impossibility of a partial know- 
 ledge of the Infinite and Absolute. — Third condition of 
 Consciousness, Succession and Duration in Time — hence 
 all objects are conceived as finite — consequent impossibility 
 of conceiving Creation, and counter impossibility of conceiv- 
 ing finite existence as uncreated. — Attempt to evade this 
 limitation in Theology by the hypothesis of the existence of 
 God out of Time — this hypothesis untenable in philosophy 
 and unavailable in theology. — Fourth condition of Consci- 
 ousness, Personality — Personality a limitation and a rela- 
 tion, and hence inadequate to represent the Infinite. — Theo- 
 logical consequences of this condition. — Personality the 
 source and type of our conception of Reality, and therefore 
 the only fitting representation of God. — Necessity of think- 
 ing of God as personal and yet of believing in Him as infi- 
 nite—apparent contradiction between these representations 
 — hence Thought cannot be the measure of Belief. — Conse- 
 quent impossibiUty of constructing a Rational Theology, — 
 Attempt to avoid the above conclusions by placing the Phi- 
 losophy of the Infinite in a point beyond Consciousness — 
 necessary failure of this attempt. — Summary of conclusions. 
 — Practical lesson from the above inquiry. 
 
 LECTURE IV. 
 Analysis of the religious Consciousness, reflective and in- 
 tuitive. — Relation of the reflective Consciousness to Theo- 
 logy ; its reasonings sufficient to correct our conception of 
 a Supreme Being, but not to originate it — examination of 
 
xxxviii CONTENTS. 
 
 some current theories on this point — statement of the value 
 of the reflective faculties within their proper limits. — Re- 
 flection, as well as intuition, necessary to distinct conscious- 
 ness ; but intuition is first in the order of nature, though 
 not in that of time. — Two principal modes of religious in- 
 tuition — the Feeling of Dependence and the Conviction of 
 Moral ObUgation, giving rise respectively to Prayer and 
 Expiation. — Examination of these two modes of Conscious- 
 ness. — Dependence implies a Personal Superior ; hence our 
 conviction of the Power of God — Moral Obligation implies a 
 Moral Law^ver ; hence our conviction of the Goodness of 
 God. — Limits of the Religious Consciousness — Sense of 
 Dependence not a consciousness of the Absolute and Infinite 
 — opposite theory of Schleiermacher on this point — objec- 
 tions to his view. — Sense of Moral Obligation not a con- 
 sciousness of the Absolute and Infinite. — Yet the Infinite is 
 indirectly implied by ihe religious consciousness, though not 
 apprehended as such; for the consciousness of limitation 
 carries with it an indirect conviction of the existence of the 
 Infinite beyond consciousness. — Result of the above analysis 
 — our knowledge of God relative and not absolute — the 
 Infinite an object of belief, but not of thought or know- 
 ledge ; hence we may know that an Infinite God exists, but 
 not what He is as infinite. — Further results of an examina- 
 tion of the rehgious consciousness. — God known as a Per- 
 son through the consciousness of ourselves as Persons — 
 this consciousness indispensable to Theism; for the denial 
 of our own Personality, whether in the form of Materialism 
 or of Pantheism, logically leads to Atheism. — Summary of 
 conclusions — our religious knowledge is regulative, but not 
 speculative — importance of this distinction in theological 
 reasoning — conception of the Infinite inadmissible in Theo- 
 logy. — Oflice of religious philosophy, as limited to finite 
 conceptions. — Practical benefits of this limitation. — Conclu- 
 sion. 
 
 LECTURE V. 
 Distinction between Speculative and Regulative Truth 
 
CONTENTS. xxxix 
 
 further pursued. — In Philosophy, as well as in Religion, 
 our highest principles of thought are regulative and not 
 speculative — Instances in the Ideas of Liberty and Neces- 
 sity ; Unity and Plurahty as implied in the conception of 
 any object ; Commerce between Soul and Body ; Exten- 
 sion, as implied in external perception ; and Succession, as 
 implied in the entire consciousness. — Illustration thus af- 
 forded for determining the limits of thought — distinction 
 between legitimate and illegitimate thought, as determined 
 by their relation to the inexplicable and the self-contra- 
 dictory respectively. — Conclusion to be drawn as regards 
 the manner of the mind's operation — all Consciousness 
 implies a relation between Subject and Object, dependent 
 on their mutual action and reaction; and thus no principle 
 of thought can be regarded as absolute and simple, as an 
 ultimate and highest truth. — Analogy in this respect be- 
 tween Philosophy and Natural Religion which apprehends 
 the Infinite under finite forms — corresponding difficulties 
 to be expected in each. — Provinces of Reason and Faith. — 
 Analogy extended to Revealed ReUgion — testimony of 
 Revelation plain and intelligible when regarded as regula- 
 tive, but ultimately incomprehensible to speculation — cor- 
 responding errors in Philosophy and Religion, illustrating 
 this analogy. — Regulative conceptions not therefore untrue. 
 — The above principles confirmed by the teaching of Scrip- 
 ture. — Revelation expressly adapted to the limits of human 
 thought. — Relation of the Infinite to the Personal in the 
 representations of God in the Old Testament. — Further 
 confirmation from the New Testament. — Doctrine of the 
 Incarnation ; its practical position in Theology as a regu- 
 lative truth; its perversion by modern philosophy, in the 
 attempt to exhibit it as a speculative truth. — Instances in 
 Hegel, Marheineke, and Strauss. — Conclusion. 
 
 LECTURE VL 
 
 Result of the previous inquiries — religious ideas con- 
 tain two elements, a Form, common to them with all other 
 ideas, as being human thoughts ; and a Matter, peculiar to 
 
xl CONTENTS. 
 
 themselves^ as thoughts about religious objects — hence 
 there may exist two possible kinds of difficulties ; the one 
 formal, arising from the universal laws of human thought ; 
 the other material, arising from the peculiar nature of reli- 
 gious evidence. — The principal objections suggested by Ra- 
 tionahsm are of the former kind ; common to all human 
 thinking as such, and therefore to Rationalism itself. — 
 Proof of this position by the exhibition of parallel difficul- 
 ties in Theology and Philosophy. — Our ignorance of the 
 nature of God compared with our ignorance of the nature 
 of Causation. — Doctrine of the Trinity compared with the 
 philosophical conception of the Infinite and the Absolute, 
 as One and yet as Many. — Doctrine of the eternal genera- 
 tion of the Son compared with the relation of an Infinite 
 Substance to its Attributes. — Purpose of such comparisons, 
 not to prove the doctrines, but to shew the weakness of 
 human reason with regard to them — true evidence of the 
 doctrines to be found, not in Reason, but in Revelation. — 
 Further parallels. — Doctrine of the twofold nature of Christ 
 compared with the philosophical conception of the Infinite 
 as coexisting with the Finite. — Reason thus shewn not to 
 be the supreme judge of religious truth ; for Rehgion must 
 begin with that which is above Reason. Extension of the 
 same argument to our conceptions of Divine Providence. — 
 Representations of General Law and Special Interposition 
 — supposed difficulty in the conception of the latter shewn 
 to be really common to all human conceptions of the Infi- 
 nite. — Both representations equally imperfect as specula- 
 tive truths, and both equally necessary as regulative. — 
 Imperfections in the conception of General Law and me- 
 chanical action of the universe — this conception is neither 
 philosophically necessary nor empirically universal ; and 
 hence it is not entitled to supersede all other representa- 
 tions—it is inapplicable to the phenomena of mind, and 
 only partially available in relation to those of matter. — 
 Conception of Miraculous Agency, as subordinate to that 
 of Special Providence — no sufficient ground, either from 
 philosophy or from experience, for asserting that mira- 
 
CONTENTS. xli 
 
 cles are impossible. — Comparison between the opposite 
 conceptions of a miracle, as an exception to a law, or as 
 the result of a higher law — both these conceptions are 
 speculatively imperfect, but the former is preferable as a 
 regulative iruth. — Summary of conclusions — parallel diffi- 
 culties must exist in Theology and in Philosophy — true 
 value and province of Reason in relation to both. 
 
 LECTURE VII. 
 Philosophical parallel continued with regard to the sup- 
 posed moral objections to Christian doctrines. — Error of 
 the moral theory of Kant. — Moral convictions how far 
 necessary and trustworthy, how far contingent and fallible 
 — parallel in this respect between moral and mathematical 
 science, as based on the formal conditions of experience — 
 possibility of corresponding errors in both. — Human mo- 
 rality not absolute, but relative. — The Moral Law cannot 
 be conceived as an absolute principle, apart from its tem- 
 poral manifestations — Parallel in the idea of Time and its 
 relations. — Morality as conceived by us necessarily con- 
 tains a human and positive element; and therefore cannot 
 be the measure of the Absolute Nature of God. — Applica- 
 tion of the above principles to Christian Theology. — The 
 Atonement — Weakness of the supposed moral objections 
 to this doctrine — such objections equally applicable to any 
 conceivable scheme of Divine Providence. — Predestination 
 and Free Will — Predestination, as a determination of the 
 Absolute Mind, is speculatively inconceivable, and there- 
 fore cannot be known to be incompatible with human Free- 
 dom — Parallel in this respect between Predestination in 
 Theology and Causation in Philosophy. — Eternal Punish- 
 ment — rashness and ignorance of rationalist criticisms of 
 this doctrine — the difficulties of the doctrine are not pe- 
 culiar to Theology, but common to all Philosophy, and 
 belong to the general problem of the existence of Evil at 
 all, which is itself but a subordinate case of the universal 
 impossibility of conceiving the coexistence of the Infinite 
 with the Finite. — Contrast between illegitimate and legiti- 
 
 d 
 
xlii CONTENTS. 
 
 mate modes of reasoning on evil and its punishment — 
 illustrations to be derived from analogies in the course 
 of nature and in the constitution of the human mind. — 
 Extension of the argument from analogy to other religious 
 doctrines — Original Sin — Justification by Faith — Opera- 
 tion of Divine Grace. — Limits of the Moral Eeason. — Con- 
 clusion. 
 
 LECTURE VIIL 
 
 Right use of Reason in religious questions — Reason en- 
 titled to judge of a Religion in respect of its evidences, as 
 addressed to men, but not in respect of its correspondence 
 with philosophical conceptions of the Absolute Nature of 
 God. — No one faculty of the human mind is entitled to 
 exclusive preference as the criterion of religious truth — 
 the true criterion is to be found in the general result of 
 many and various Evidences — practical neglect of this 
 rule by different writers. — Comparative value of internal 
 and external evidences of religion, the former as negative, 
 the latter as positive. — Cautions requisite in the use of the 
 negative argument from internal evidence — external and 
 internal evidence can only be estimated in conjunction with 
 each other. — Distinction between the proper and improper 
 use of the Moral Sense in questions of reUgious evidence. 
 — Application of this distinction to facts recorded in Sacred 
 History. — Analogy between physical and moral laws as re- 
 gards miraculous interventions. — Probable and partial cha- 
 racter of the moral argument ; error of supposing it to be 
 demonstrative and complete ; possibility of mistakes in its 
 apphcation. — General summary of Christian Evidences — 
 alternative in the case of their rejection — Christ^s teach- 
 ing either wholly divine or wholly human. — Impossibility 
 of an eclectic Christianity. — Value of the a priori pre- 
 sumption against miracles — nothing gained in point of 
 probability by a partial rejection of the supernatural. — 
 Christianity regarded as a Revelation must be accepted 
 wholly or not at all. — Speculative difficulties in religion 
 form a part of our probation — analogy between moral and 
 
CONTENTS. xliii 
 
 intellectual temptations. — General result of an examination 
 of the Limits of Eeligious Thought — Theology not a spe- 
 culative science, nor in the course of progressive develop- 
 ment. — Cautions needed in the treatment of religious know- 
 ledge as regulative — this view does not solve difficulties, but 
 only shews why they are insoluble. — Instance of the neglect 
 of this caution in Archbishop King's rule of scripture in- 
 terpretation as regards the Divine Attributes. — ^No expla- 
 nation possible of those difficulties which arise from the 
 universal laws of human thought — such difficulties are in- 
 herent in our mental constitution, and form part of our 
 training and discipline during this life. — The office of Phi- 
 losophy is not to give us a knowledge of the absolute nature 
 of God, but to teach us to know ourselves and the limits of 
 our faculties. — Conclusion. 
 
LECTURE I. 
 
LECTUEE I. 
 
 DEUTERONOMY IV. 2. 
 
 Ye shall not a^d unto the word which I com- 
 mand you, neither shall ^ ye diminish ought 
 from it. 
 
 Dogmatism and Rationalism are the two 
 extremes between which religious philosophy 
 perpetually oscillates. Each represents a sys- 
 tem from which, when nakedly and openly 
 announced, the well regulated mind almost 
 instinctively shrinks back ; yet which, in 
 some more or less specious disguise, will be 
 found to underlie the antagonist positions 
 of many a theological controversy. Many a 
 man who rejects isolated portions of Christian 
 doctrine, on the ground that they are repug- 
 nant to his reason, would hesitate to avow 
 broadly and unconditionally that reason is 
 the supreme arbiter of all religious truth; 
 though at the same time he would find it 
 hard to point out any particular in which the 
 position of reason, in relation to the truths 
 which he still retains, differs from that which 
 it occupies in relation to those which he re- 
 jects. And on the other hand, there are 
 many who, while they would by no means 
 
2 LECTURE I. 
 
 construct a dogmatic system on the assump- 
 tion that the conclusions of reason may always 
 be made to coincide with those of revelation, 
 yet, for want of an accurate distinction be- 
 tween that which is within the province of 
 human thought and that which is beyond it, 
 are accustomed in. practice to demand the 
 assent of the reason to positions which it is 
 equally incompetent to affirm or to deny. 
 Thus they not only lessen the value of the 
 service which it is capable of rendering within 
 its legitimate sphere, but also indirectly coun- 
 tenance that very intrusion of the human in- 
 tellect into sacred things, which, in some of its 
 other aspects, they so strongly and so justly 
 condemn. 
 
 In using the above terms, it is necessary to 
 state at the outset the sense in which each is 
 employed, and to emancipate them from the 
 various and vague associations connected 
 with their ordinary use. I do not include 
 under the name of Dogmatism the mere 
 enunciation of religious truths, as resting 
 upon authority and not upon reasoning. 
 The Dogmatist, as well as the Rationalist, is 
 the constructor of a system ; and in con- 
 structing it, however much the materials 
 upon which he works may be given by a 
 higher authority, yet in connecting them to- 
 
LECTURE I. 3 
 
 gether and exhibiting their systematic form, 
 it is necessary to call in the aid of human 
 ability. Indeed, whatever may be their actual 
 antagonism in the field of religious contro- 
 versy, the two terms are in their proper sense 
 so little exclusive of each other, that both 
 were originally employed to denote the same 
 persons ; — the name Dogmatists or Rational- 
 ists being indifferently given to those me- 
 dical theorists who insisted on the neces- 
 sity of calling in the aid of rational principles, 
 to support or correct the conclusions fur- 
 nished by experience (1). A like signification 
 is to be found in the later language of philo- 
 sophy, when the term Dogmatists was used to 
 denote those philosophers who endeavoured 
 to explain the phenomena of experience by 
 means of rational conceptions and demon- 
 strations ; the intelligible world being re- 
 garded as the counterpart of the sensible, 
 and the necessary relations of the former as 
 the principles and ground of the observed 
 facts of the latter (2). It is in a sense ana- 
 logous to this that the term may be most 
 accurately used in reference to Theology. 
 Scripture is to the theological Dogmatist 
 what Experience is to the philosophical. It 
 supplies him with the facts to which his sys- 
 tem has to adapt itself. It contains in an 
 
 b2 
 
4 LECTURE I. 
 
 unsystematic form the positive doctrines, 
 which further inquiry has to exhibit as sup- 
 ported by reasonable grounds and connected 
 into a scientific whole. Theological Dogma- 
 tism is thus an application of reason to the 
 support and defence of preexisting statements 
 of Scripture (3). Rationalism, on the other 
 hand, so far as it deals with Scripture at all, 
 deals with it as a thing to be adapted to the 
 independent conclusions of the natural rea- 
 son, and to be rejected where that adaptation 
 cannot conveniently be made. By Ration- 
 alism, without intending to limit the name to 
 any single school or period in theological 
 controversy, I mean generally to designate 
 that system whose final test of 'truth is 
 placed in the direct assent of the human 
 consciousness, whether in the form of logical 
 deduction, or moral judgment, or religious 
 intuition ; by whatever previous process those 
 faculties may have been raised to their as- 
 sumed dignity as arbitrators. The Ration- 
 alist, as such, is not bound to maintain that 
 a divine revelation of religious truth is im- 
 possible, nor even to deny that it has actually 
 been given. He may admit the existence of 
 the revelation as a fact : he may acknow- 
 ledge its utility as a temporary means of in- 
 struction for a ruder age : he may even ac- 
 
LECTURE I. 5 
 
 cept certain portions as of universal and per- 
 manent authority (4). But he assigns to some 
 superior tribunal the right of determining 
 what is essential to religion and what is not : 
 he claims for himself and his age the privi- 
 lege of accepting or rejecting any given re- 
 velation, wholly or in part, according as it 
 does or does not satisfy the conditions of 
 some higher criterion to be supplied by the 
 human consciousness (5). 
 
 In relation to the actual condition of 
 religious truth, as communicated by Holy 
 Scripture, Dogmatism and Rationalism may 
 be considered as severally representing, the 
 one the spirit which adds to the word of 
 God, and the other that which diminishes 
 from it. Whether a complete system of sci- 
 entific Theology could or could not have 
 been given by direct revelation, consistently 
 with the existing laws of human thought 
 and the purposes which Revelation is de- 
 signed to answer, it is at least ertain that 
 such a system is not given in the Revelation 
 which we possess, but, if it is to exist at all, 
 must be constructed out of it by human in- 
 terpretation. And it is in attempting such 
 a construction that Dogmatism and Ration- 
 alism exhibit their most striking contrasts. 
 The one seeks to build up a complete scheme 
 
6 LECTURE I. 
 
 of theological doctrine out of the unsys- 
 tematic materials furnished by Scripture, 
 partly by the more complete development 
 of certain leading ideas ; partly by extend- 
 ing the apparent import of the Revelation 
 to ground which it does not avowedly .oc- 
 cupy, and attempting by inference and 
 analogy to solve problems which the sacred 
 volume may indeed suggest, but which it 
 does not directly answer ; partly by endea- 
 vouring to give additional support to the 
 scriptural statements themselves, treating 
 them as truths, not above, but within the 
 grasp of reason, and capable of demonstration 
 from rational premises. The other aims at 
 the same end by opposite means. It strives 
 to attain to unity and completeness of sys- 
 tem, not by filling up supposed deficiencies, 
 but by paring down supposed excrescences. 
 Commencing with a preconceived theory of 
 the purpose of a revelation and the form 
 which it ought to assume, it proceeds to re- 
 move or reduce all that will not harmonize 
 with this leading idea ; sometimes explaining 
 away in the interpretation that which it ac- 
 cepts as given in the letter ; sometimes deny- 
 ing, on a priori grounds, the genuineness of 
 this or that portion of the sacred text ; some- 
 times pretending to distinguish between the 
 
LECTURE I. 7 
 
 several purposes of Revelation itself, and to 
 determine what portions are intended to con- 
 vey the elements of an absolute religion, valid 
 in all countries and for all ages, and what 
 must be regarded as relative and accidental 
 features of the divine plan, determined by 
 the local or temporal peculiarities of the in- 
 dividuals to whom it was first addressed. 
 
 The two methods thus contrasted may ap- 
 pear at first sight to represent the respective 
 claims of Faith and Reason, each extended 
 to that point at which it encroaches on the 
 domain of the other. But in truth the con- 
 trast between Faith and Reason, if it holds 
 good in this relation at all, does so merely 
 by accident. It may be applicable in some 
 instances to the disciples of the respective 
 systems, but not to the teachers ; and even 
 as regards the former, it is but partially and 
 occasionally true. The disciples of the Ra- 
 tionalist are not necessarily the disciples of 
 reason. It is quite as possible to receive 
 with unquestioning submission a system of 
 religion or philosophy invented by a human > 
 teacher, as it is to believe, upon the authority 
 of Revelation, doctrines which no human rea- 
 son is competent to discover. The so-called 
 freethinker is as often as any other man the 
 slave of some self-chosen master ; and many 
 who scorn the imputation of believing any 
 
8 LECTURE I. 
 
 thing merely because it is found in the Bible 
 would find it hard to give any better reason 
 for their own unbelief than the ipse dixit of 
 some infidel philosopher. But when we turn 
 from the disciples to the teachers, and look 
 to the origin of Dogmatism and Rationalism 
 as systems, we find both alike to be the pro- 
 ducts of thought, operating in different ways 
 upon the same materials. Faith, properly so 
 called, is not constructive, but receptive. It 
 cannot supply the missing portions of an 
 incomplete system, though it may bid us 
 remain content with the deficiency. It can- 
 not of itself give harmony to the discordant 
 voices of religious thought : it cannot reduce 
 to a single focus the many-coloured rays into 
 which the light of God's presence is refracted 
 in its passage through the human soul ; though 
 it may bid us look forward to a time when 
 the eyes of the blind shall be opened, and the 
 ears of the deaf shall be unstopped*; when 
 that apparent discord shall be known but as 
 the echo of a half-heard concert, and those 
 diverging rays shall be blended once more in 
 the pure white light of heaven. But Faith 
 alone cannot suggest any actual solution of 
 our doubts : it can offer no definite recon- 
 ciliation of apparently conflicting truths ; for 
 in order to accomplish that end, the hostile 
 » Isaiah xxxv. 5. 
 
LECTURE I. 9 
 
 elements must be examined, compared, ac- 
 commodated, and joined together, one with 
 another ; and such a process is an act of 
 thought, not of belief. Considered from this 
 point of view, both Dogmatism and Rational- 
 ism may be regarded as emanating from the 
 same source, and amenable to the same prin- 
 ciples of criticism ; in so far as they keep 
 within or go beyond those limits of sound 
 thought which the laws of man's mind, or the 
 circumstances in which he is placed, have im- 
 posed upon him. 
 
 In fact, the two systems may be considered 
 as both aiming, though in different ways, at 
 the same end ; that end being to produce a 
 coincidence between what we believe and 
 what we think ; to remove the boundary 
 which separates the comprehensible from the 
 incomprehensible. The Dogmatist employs 
 reason to prove, almost as much as the Ra- 
 tionalist employs it to disprove. The one, in 
 the character of an advocate, accepts the doc- 
 trines of revealed religion as conclusions, but 
 appeals to the reason, enlightened, it may be, 
 by Revelation, to find premises to support 
 them. The other, in the character of a critic, 
 draws his premises from reason in the first 
 instance ; and, adopting these as his standard, 
 either distorts the revealed doctrine into con- 
 formity with them, or, if it obstinately resists 
 
10 LECTURE I. 
 
 this treatment, sets it aside altogether. The 
 one strives to lift up reason to the point of 
 view occupied by Revelation : the other strives 
 to bring down Revelation to the level of rea- 
 son. And both alike have prejudged or neg- 
 lected the previous inquiry, — Are there not 
 definite and discernible limits to the province 
 of reason itself, whether it be exercised for 
 advocacy or for criticism ? 
 
 Thus, to select one example out of many, 
 the revealed doctrine of Christ's Atonement 
 for the sins of men has been alternately de- 
 fended and assailed by some such arguments 
 as these. We have been told, on the one 
 hand, that man's redemption could not have 
 been brought about by any other means (6) : 
 — that God could not, consistently with His 
 own attributes, have suffered man to perish 
 unredeemed, or have redeemed him by any 
 inferior sacrifice (7) : — that man, redeemed 
 from death, must become the servant of him 
 who redeems him ; and that it was not meet 
 that he should be the servant of any other 
 than God (8) : — that no other sacrifice could 
 have satisfied divine justice (9) : — that no 
 other victim could have endured the burden 
 of God's wrath (10). These and similar ar- 
 guments have been brought forward, as one 
 of the greatest of their authors avows, to de- 
 fend the teaching of the Catholic Faith on 
 
LECTURE I 11 
 
 the ground of a reasonable necessity (11). 
 While, on the other hand, it has been argued 
 that the revealed doctrine itself cannot be 
 accepted as literally true ; because we cannot 
 believe that God was angry, and needed to be 
 propitiated (12): — because it is inconsistent 
 with the Divine Justice that the innocent 
 should suffer for the sins of the guilty (13): — 
 because it is more reasonable to believe that 
 God freely forgives the offences of His crea- 
 tures (14) : — because we cannot conceive how 
 the punishment of one can do away with the 
 guilt of another (15). 
 
 I quote these arguments only as specimens 
 of the method in which Christian doctrines 
 have been handled by writers on opposite 
 sides. To examine them more in detail would 
 detain me too long from my main purpose. 
 I shall not therefore at present consider whe- 
 ther the conclusions actually arrived at, on 
 the one side or on the other, are in themselves 
 reasonable or unreasonable, orthodox or he- 
 retical. I am concerned only with the me- 
 thods respectively employed, and the need of 
 some rule for their employment. May rea- 
 son be used without restriction in defence or 
 refutation of religious doctrines ? And if 
 not, what are the conditions of its legiti- 
 mate use ? It may be that this man has de- 
 
12 LECTURE I. 
 
 fended, on reasonable grounds, none but the 
 most essential articles of the Christian Faith : 
 but has he pointed out any rule which can 
 hinder the same or similar reasoning from 
 being advanced by another in support of the 
 most dangerous errors ? It may be that 
 that man has employed the test of rea- 
 sonableness, only in the refutation of opin- 
 ions concerning which the Church has pro- 
 nounced no positive judgment : but has he 
 fenced his method round with any cautions 
 to prevent its being used for the overthrow 
 of Christianity itself? If we can find no 
 other ground than the arbitrary will of the 
 man himself, why he should stop short at the 
 particular point which he has chosen, we may 
 not perhaps condemn the tenets of the indi- 
 vidual, but we may fairly charge his method 
 with the consequences to which it logically 
 leads us. 
 
 Thus we find a late lamented writer of our 
 own day, and at that time of our own Church, 
 defending the doctrine of the Incarnation of 
 Christ, on the metaphysical assumption of 
 the real existence of an abstract humanity. 
 " This," he tells us, " is why the existence of 
 human nature is a thing too precious to be 
 surrendered to the subtleties of logic, because 
 upon its existence depends that real man- 
 
LECTURE I. 13 
 
 hood of Christ, which renders him a co- 
 partner with ourselves." And again : " To 
 the reality of this work, the existence of that 
 common nature is indispensable, whereby, 
 as the children were partakers of flesh and 
 blood. He Himself took part of the same. 
 Else, how would the perfect assumption of 
 humanity have consisted with His retaining 
 that divine personality which it was impos- 
 sible that He should surrender ? Since it was 
 no new person which He took, it can only 
 have been the substratum, in which person- 
 ality has its existence (16)." In this case, 
 our belief in the undeniable truth of the 
 doctrine defended may dispose us to over- 
 look the questionable character of the de- 
 fence. But if we are inclined for a moment 
 to acquiesce in this unnatural union of me- 
 taphysical premises and theological conclu- 
 sions, we are recalled to ourselves by the re- 
 collection of the fearful consequence which 
 Occam deduces from the same hypothesis, of 
 the assumption by Christ of a "substratum 
 in which personality has its existence ;"-^a 
 consequence drawn in language which we 
 shudder to read, even as it is employed by 
 its author, merely for the purpose of re- 
 ducing to an absurdity the principles of his 
 antagonists (17). 
 
14 LECTURE 1. 
 
 There is an union of Philosophy with Re- 
 ligion in which each contributes to the sup- 
 port of the other ; and there is also an union 
 which, under the appearance of support, does 
 but undermine the foundations and prey 
 upon the life of both. To which of these 
 two the above argument belongs, it needs 
 but a bare statement of its assumption to 
 determine. It tells us that our belief in the 
 doctrine of God manifest in the flesh, indis- 
 pensably depends upon our acceptance of 
 the Realist theory of the nature of universal 
 notions. Philosophy and Theology alike pro- 
 test against such an outrage upon the claims 
 both of Reason and of Revelation, as is im- 
 plied in this association of one of the most 
 fundamental truths of the Christian Faith with 
 one of the most questionable speculations of 
 mediaeval metaphysics. What does Theology 
 gain by this employment of a weapon which 
 may at any moment be turned against her ? 
 Does it make one whit clearer to our under- 
 standings that mysterious twofold nature of 
 one Christ, very God and very Man ? By no 
 means. It was a truth above human com- 
 prehension before ; and it remains a truth 
 above human comprehension still. We be- 
 lieve that Christ is both God and Man ; for 
 this is revealed to us. We know not how He 
 
LECTURE I. 15 
 
 is so ; for this is not revealed ; and we can 
 learn it in no other way. Theology gains 
 nothing ; but she is in danger of losing every- 
 thing. Her most precious truths are cut 
 from the anchor which held them firm, and 
 cast upon the waters of philosophical specu- 
 lation, to float hither and thither with the 
 ever-shifting waves of thought. And what 
 does Philosophy gain ? Her just domains are 
 narrowed, and her free limbs cramped in 
 their onward course. The problems which 
 she has a native right to sift to the uttermost 
 are taken out of the field of free discussion, 
 and fenced about with religious doctrines 
 which it is heresy to call in question. Nei- 
 ther Christian truth nor philosophical inquiry 
 can be advanced by such a system as this, 
 which revives and sanctifies, as essential to 
 the Catholic Faith, the forgotten follies of 
 Scholastic Realism, and endangers the cause 
 of religion, by seeking to explain its greatest 
 mysteries by the lifeless forms of a worn out 
 controversy. " Why seek ye the living among 
 the dead? Christ is not here ''." 
 
 But if the tendency of Dogmatism is to 
 endanger the interests of religious truth, by 
 placing that which is divine and unquestion- 
 able in too close an alliance with that which 
 ^ St. Luke xxiv. 5, 6. 
 
16 LECTURE I. 
 
 is human and doubtful, Rationalism, on the 
 other hand, tends to destroy revealed religion 
 altogether, by obliterating the whole distinc- 
 tion between the human and the divine. Ra- 
 tionalism, if it retains any portion of revealed 
 truth as such, does so, not in consequence of, 
 but in defiance of, its fundamental principle. 
 It does so by virtually declaring that it will 
 follow reason up to a certain point, and no 
 further ; though the conclusions which lie 
 beyond that point are guaranteed by pre- 
 cisely the same evidence as those which fall 
 short of it. We may select a notable example 
 from the writings of a great thinker, who 
 has contributed perhaps more than any other 
 person to give a philosophical sanction to the 
 rationalizing theories of his countrymen, yet 
 from whose speculative principles, rightly em- 
 ployed, might be extracted the best antidote 
 to his own conclusions ; even as the body of 
 the scorpion, crushed upon the wound, is said 
 to be the best cure for its own venom. 
 
 Kant's theory of a rational religion is based 
 upon the assumption that the sole purpose of 
 religion must be to give a divine sanction to 
 man's moral duties (18). He maintains that 
 there can be no duties towards God, distinct 
 from those which we owe towards men ; but 
 that it may be necessary, at certain times and 
 
LECTURE I. 17 
 
 for certain persons, to give to moral duties 
 the authority of Divine commands (19). Let 
 us hear then the philosopher's rational ex- 
 planation, upon this assumption, of the duty 
 of Prayer. It is a mere superstitious delusion, 
 he tells us, to consider prayer as a service 
 addressed to God, and as a means of obtain- 
 ing his favour (20). The true purpose of the 
 act is not to alter or affect in any way God's 
 relation towards us ; but only to quicken our 
 own moral sentiments, by keeping alive within 
 us the idea of God as a moral Lawgiver (21). 
 He therefore neither admits the duty uncon- 
 ditionally, nor rejects it entirely ; but leaves 
 it optional with men to adopt that or any 
 other means, by which, in their own particular 
 case, this moral end may be best promoted ; — 
 as if any moral benefit could possibly accrue 
 from the habitual exercise of an act of con- 
 scious self-deception. 
 
 The origin of such theories is of course to 
 be traced to that morbid horror of what they 
 are pleased to call Anthropomorphism, which 
 poisons the speculations of so many modern 
 philosophers, when they attempt to be wise 
 above what is written, and seek for a meta- 
 physical exposition of God's nature and attri- 
 butes (22). They may not, forsooth, think of 
 the unchangeable God as if He were their fel- 
 
18 LECTURE I. 
 
 low man, influenced by human motives, and 
 moved by human supplications. They want 
 a truer, a juster idea of the Deity as He is, 
 than that under which He has been pleased 
 to reveal Himself; and they call on their rea- 
 son to furnish it. Fools, to dream that man 
 can escape from himself, that human reason 
 can draw aught but a human portrait of 
 God ! They do but substitute a marred and 
 mutilated humanity for one exalted and en- 
 tire : they add nothingsio their conception of 
 God as He is, but only take away a part of 
 their conception of man . Sympathy, and love, 
 and fatherly kindness, and forgiving mercy, 
 have evaporated in the crucible of their phi- 
 losophy ; and what is the caput mortuum that 
 remains, but only the sterner features of hu- 
 manity exhibited in repulsive nakedness ? 
 The God who listens to prayer, we are told, 
 appears in the likeness of human mutability. 
 Be it so. What is the God who does not 
 listen, but the likeness of human obstinacy ? 
 Do we ascribe to Him a fixed purpose ? our 
 conception of a purpose is human. Do we 
 speak of Him as continuing unchanged ? our 
 conception of continuance is human. Do we 
 conceive Him as knowing and determining? 
 what are knowledge and determination but 
 modes of human consciousness? and what 
 
LECTURE I. 19 
 
 know we of consciousness itself, but as the 
 contrast between successive mental states ? 
 But our rational philosopher stops short in 
 the middle of his reasoning. He strips off 
 from humanity just so much as suits his pur- 
 pose ; — "and the residue thereof he maketh a 
 god'= ;" — less pious in his idolatry than the 
 carver of the graven image, in that he does 
 not fall down unto it and pray unto it, but is 
 content to stand afar off and reason concern- 
 ing it. And why does he retain any concep- 
 tion of God at all, but that he retains some 
 portions of an imperfect humanity ? Man is 
 still the residue that is left ; deprived indeed 
 of all that is amiable in humanity, but, in 
 the darker features which remain, still man. 
 Man in his purposes ; man in his inflexibility ; 
 man in that relation to time from which no 
 philosophy, whatever its pretensions, can 
 wholly free itself ; pursuing with indomitable 
 resolution a preconceived design ; deaf to the 
 yearning instincts which compel his creatures 
 to call upon him (23). Yet this, forsooth, is a 
 philosophical conception of the Deity, more 
 worthy of an enlightened reason than the hu- 
 man imagery of the Psalmist : " The eyes of 
 the Lord are over the righteous, and His ears 
 are open unto their prayers'*." 
 
 c Isaiah xliv. 17 ^ Psalm xxxiv. 15. 
 c 2 
 
20 LECTURE I. 
 
 Surely downright idolatry is better than 
 this rational worship of a fragment of hu- 
 manity. Better is the superstition which 
 sees the image of God in the wonderful 
 whole which God has fashioned, than the 
 philosophy which would carve for itself a 
 Deity out of the remnant which man has 
 mutilated. Better to realize the satire of the 
 Eleatic philosopher, to make God in the like- 
 ness of man, even as the ox or the horse 
 might conceive gods in the form of oxen or 
 horses, than to adore some half-hewn Hermes, 
 the head of a man joined to a misshapen 
 block (24). Better to fall down before that 
 marvellous compound of human consciousness 
 whose elements God has joined together, and 
 no man can put asunder, than to strip reason 
 of those cognate elements which together 
 furnish all that we can conceive or imagine 
 of conscious or personal existence, and to 
 deify the emptiest of all abstractions, a some- 
 thing or a nothing, with just enough of its 
 human original left to form a theme for the 
 disputations of philosophy, but not enough 
 to furnish a single ground of appeal to the 
 human feelings of love, of reverence, and of 
 fear. Unmixed idolatry is more religious 
 than this. Undisguised atheism is more lo- 
 gical. 
 
LECTURE I. 21 
 
 Throughout every page of holy Scripture 
 God reveals himself, not as a Law, but as a 
 Person. Throughout the breadth and height 
 and depth of human consciousness, Person- 
 ality manifests itself under one condition, 
 that of a Free Will, influenced, though not 
 coerced, by motives. And to this conscious- 
 ness God addresses Himself, when he adopts 
 its attributes as the image under which to 
 represent to man His own incomprehensible 
 and ineffable nature. Doubtless in this there 
 is much of accommodation to the weakness of 
 man's faculties ; but not more than in any 
 other representation of any of the Divine at- 
 tributes. By what right do we say that the 
 conception of the God who hears and an- 
 swers Prayer" is an accommodation, while 
 that of Him in whom is no variableness nor 
 shadow of turning^ is not so ? By what right 
 do we venture to rob the Deity of half His 
 revealed attributes, in order to set up the 
 other half, which rest on precisely the same 
 evidence, as a more absolute revelation of the 
 truth ? By what right do we enthrone, in the 
 place of the God to whom we pray, an inexor- 
 able Fate or immutable Law ? — a thing with 
 less than even the divinity of a Fetish ; since 
 that may be at least conceived by its worshipper 
 
 e Psalm Ixv. a ; St. James v. 16. ^ St. James i. 17. 
 
22 LECTURE I. 
 
 as capable of being offended by his crimes and 
 propitiated by his supplications ? 
 
 Yet surely there is a principle of truth 
 of which this philosophy is the perversion. 
 Surely there is a sense in which we may not 
 think of God as though He were man ; as 
 there is also a sense in which we cannot help 
 so thinking of Him. When we read in the 
 same narrative, and almost in two consecu- 
 tive verses of Scripture, "The Strength of 
 Israel will not lie nor repent ; for He is not 
 a man that He should repent ;" and again, 
 " The Lord repented that He had made Saul 
 king over Israel^ ;" we are imperfectly con- 
 scious of an appeal to two different principles 
 of representation, involving opposite sides of 
 the same truth : we feel that there is a true 
 foundation for the system which denies hu- 
 man attributes to God ; though the super- 
 structure, which has been raised upon it, logi- 
 cally involves the denial of His very existence. 
 
 What limits then can we find to determine 
 the legitimate provinces of these two opposite 
 methods of religious thought, each of which, 
 in its exclusive employment, leads to errors 
 so fatal ; yet each of which, in its utmost 
 error, is but a truth abused ? If we may not, 
 with the Dogmatist, force Philosophy into 
 s 1 Sam. XV. 29, 35. 
 
LECTURE I. 23 
 
 unnatural union with Revelation, nor yet, 
 with the Rationalist, mutilate Revelation to 
 make it agree with Philosophy, what guide 
 can we find to point out the safe middle 
 course ? what common element of both sys- 
 tems can be employed to mediate between 
 them ? It is obvious that no such element 
 can be found by the mere contemplation of 
 the objects on which religious thought is ex- 
 ercised. We can adequately criticize that only 
 which we know as a whole. The objects of 
 Natural Religion are known to us in and by 
 the ideas which we can form of them ; and 
 those ideas do not of themselves constitute a 
 whole, apart from the remaining phenomena 
 of consciousness. We must not examine them 
 by themselves alone : we must look to their 
 origin, their import, and their relation to the 
 mind of which they are part. Revealed Re- 
 ligion again is not by itself a direct object 
 of criticism : first, because it is but a part of 
 a larger scheme, and that scheme one imper- 
 fectly comprehended ; and secondly, because 
 Revelation implies an accommodation to the 
 mental constitution of its human receiver ; 
 and we must know what that constitution is, 
 before we can pronounce how far the accom- 
 modation extends. But if partial knowledge 
 must not be treated as if it were complete, 
 
24 LECTURE I. 
 
 neither, on the other hand, may it be identi- 
 fied with total ignorance. The false humility 
 which assumes that it can know nothing, is 
 often as dangerous as the false pride which 
 assumes that it knows every thing. The pro- 
 vinces of Reason and Faith, the limits of our 
 knowledge and of our ignorance, must both 
 be clearly determined: otherwise we may 
 find ourselves dogmatically protesting against 
 dogmatism, and reasoning to prove the worth- 
 lessness of reason. 
 
 There is one point from which all religious 
 systems must start, and to which all must 
 finally return ; ]^and which may therefore fur- 
 nish a common ground on which to examine 
 the principles and pretensions of all. The 
 primary and proper object of criticism is not 
 Religion, natural or revealed, but the human 
 mind in its relation to Religion. If the Dog- 
 matist and the Rationalist have heretofore 
 contended as combatants, each beating the 
 air in his own position, without being able 
 to reach his adversary ; if they have been 
 prevented from taking up a common ground 
 of controversy, because each repudiates the 
 fundamental assumptions of the other ; that 
 common ground must be sought in another 
 quarter ; namely, in those laws and processes 
 of the human mind, by means of which both 
 
LECTURE I. 25 
 
 alike accept and elaborate their opposite sys- 
 tems. If human philosophy is not a direct 
 guide to the attainment of religious truth, 
 (and its entire history too truly testifies that 
 it is not,) may it not serve as an indirect 
 guide, by pointing out the limits of our fa- 
 culties, and the conditions of their legitimate 
 exercise ? Witnessing, as it does, the melan- 
 choly spectacle of the household of humanity 
 divided against itself, the reason against the 
 feelings and the feelings against the reason, 
 and the dim half-consciousness of the shadow 
 of the infinite frowning down upon both, may- 
 it not seek, with the heathen Philosopher of 
 old, to find the reconciling and regulating 
 principle in that justice, of which the essen- 
 tial character is, that every member of the 
 system shall do his own duty, and forbear to 
 intrude into the office of his neighbour? {25) 
 A Criticism of the human mind, in relation 
 to religious truth, was one of the many un- 
 realized possibilities of philosophy, sketched 
 out in anticipation by the far-seeing genius 
 of Bacon. " Here therefore," he writes, " I 
 note this deficiency, that there hath not been, 
 to my understanding, sufficiently inquired 
 and handled the true limits and use of rea- 
 son in spiritual things, as a kind of divine 
 dialectic : which for that it is not done, it 
 
26 LECTURE I. 
 
 seemeth to me a thing usual, by pretext of 
 true conceiving that which is revealed, to 
 search and mine into that v^^hich is not re- 
 vealed ; and by pretext of enucleating infer- 
 ences and contradictories, to examine that 
 M^hich is positive : the one sort falling into 
 the error of Nicodemus, demanding to have 
 things made more sensible than it pleaseth 
 God to reveal them, ' Quomodo possit homo 
 nasci cum sit senex ?' the other sort into the 
 error of the disciples, which were scandal- 
 ized at a show of contradiction, ' Quid est hoc 
 quod dicit nobis. Modicum, et non vide- 
 bitis me ; et iterum, modicum, et videbitis 
 me?'" (26) 
 
 An examination of the Limits of Religious 
 Thought is an indispensable preliminary to 
 all Religious Philosophy. And the limits of 
 religious thought are but a special mani- 
 festation of the limits of thought in general. 
 Thus the Philosophy of Religion, on its hu- 
 man side, must be subject to those universal 
 conditions which are binding upon Philoso- 
 phy in general. It has ever fared ill, both 
 with Philosophy and with Religion, when this 
 caution has been neglected. It was an evil 
 hour for both, when Fichte made his first 
 essay, as a disciple of the Kantian school, by 
 an attempted Criticism of all Revelation (27). 
 
LECTURE I. 27 
 
 The very title of Kant's great work, and, in 
 spite of many inconsistencies, the general 
 spirit of its contents also, might have taught 
 him a different lesson, — might have shewn 
 him that Reason, and not Revelation, was the 
 primary object of criticism. If Revelation is 
 a communication from an infinite to a finite 
 intelligence, the conditions of a criticism of 
 Revelation on philosophical grounds must be 
 identical with those which are required for 
 constructing a Philosophy of the Infinite. 
 For Revelation can make known the Infinite 
 Being only in one of two ways ; hy presenting 
 Him as He is, or by representing Him under 
 symbols more or less adequate. A presenta- 
 tive Revelation implies faculties in man which 
 can receive the presentation ; and such facul- 
 ties will also furnish the conditions of con- 
 structing a philosophical theory of the ob- 
 ject presented. If, on the other hand. Re- 
 velation is merely representative, the accuracy 
 of the representation can only be ascertained 
 by a knowledge of the object represented ; 
 and this again implies the possibility of a 
 Philosophy of the Infinite. Whatever imped- 
 iments, therefore, exist to prevent the form- 
 ation of such a Philosophy, the same imped- 
 iments must likewise prevent the accom- 
 plishment of a complete Criticism of Revel- 
 
28 LECTURE I. 
 
 ation. Whatever difficulties or contradictions 
 are involved in the philosophical idea of the 
 Infinite, the same, or similar ones, must na- 
 turally be expected in the corresponding 
 ideas which Revelation either exhibits or im- 
 plies. And if an examination of the problems 
 of Philosophy and the conditions of their so- 
 lution should compel us to admit the exist- 
 ence of principles and modes of thought 
 M^hich must be accepted as true in practice, 
 though they cannot be explained in theory ; 
 the same practical acceptance may be claimed, 
 on philosophical grounds, in behalf of the 
 corresponding doctrines of Revelation. 
 
 If it can be shewn that the limits of reli- 
 gious and philosophical thought are the same ; 
 that corresponding difficulties occur in both, 
 and, from the nature of the case, must occur, 
 the chief foundation of religious Rationalism 
 is cut away from under it. The difficulties 
 which it professes to find in Revelation are 
 shewn to be not peculiar to Revelation, but 
 inherent in the constitution of the human 
 mind, and such as no system of Rationalism 
 can avoid or overcome. The analogy, which 
 Bishop Butler has pointed out, between Reli- 
 gion and the constitution and course of Na- 
 ture, may be in some degree extended to 
 the constitution and processes of the Human 
 
LECTURE I. 29 
 
 Mind. The representations of God which 
 Scripture presents to us may be shewn to 
 be adapted to the needs and accommodated 
 to the limits of that mental constitution which 
 He has given us ; encumbered with no other 
 difficulties than those which arise from the 
 laws of the human mind itself; and therefore 
 such as, notwithstanding those difficulties, 
 may reasonably be regarded as emanating 
 from the same Divine Author. Such an in- 
 quiry occupies indeed but a subordinate place 
 among the direct evidences of Christianity; 
 nor is it intended to usurp the place of those 
 evidences. But indirectly it may have its 
 use, in furnishing an answer to a class of ob- 
 jections which were very popular a few years 
 ago, and are not yet entirely extinguished. 
 Even if it does not contribute materially to 
 strengthen the position occupied by the de- 
 fenders of Christianity, it may serve to ex- 
 pose the weakness of the assailants. Human 
 reason may, in some respects, be weak as a 
 supporter of Religion ; but it is at least 
 strong enough to repel an attack founded on 
 the negation of reason. 
 
 " We know in part, and we prophesy in 
 part. But when that which is perfect is come, 
 then that which is in part shall be ^one away. 
 For now we see through a glass, darkly ; but 
 
80 LECTURE I. 
 
 then face to face : now I know in part ; but 
 then shall I know even as also I am known ''." 
 Such is the Apostle's declaration of the limits 
 of human knowledge. " The logical concep- 
 tion is the absolute divine conception itself; 
 and the logical process is the immediate 
 exhibition of God's self-determination to 
 Being (28)." Such is the Philosopher's de- 
 claration of the extent of human knowledge. 
 On the first of these statements is founded 
 the entire Theology of Scripture : on the se- 
 cond is founded the latest and most complete 
 exposition of the Theology of Rationalism. 
 The one represents God, not as He is in the 
 brightness of His own glory, dwelling in the 
 light which no man can approach unto ' ; but 
 as He is reflected faintly in broken and fitful 
 rays, glancing back from the restless waters 
 of the human soul. The other identifies the 
 shadow with the substance, not even shrink- 
 ing from the confession that, to know God as 
 He is, man must himself be God (29). It 
 turns from the feeble image of God in the 
 soul of the individual man, to seek the en- 
 tire manifestation of Deity in the collective 
 consciousness of mankind. " Ye shall be as 
 gods''," was the earliest suggestion of the 
 Tempter to the parents of the human race : 
 ^ I Oor. xiii. 9, lo^ 13. ' 1 Tim. vi. 16. ^ Gen. iii. 5. 
 
LECTURE I. 31 
 
 " Ye are God," is the latest assurance of phi- 
 losophy to the human race itself (30). Revela- 
 tion represents the infinite God under finite 
 symbols, in condescension to the finite capa- 
 city of man ; indicating at the same time 
 the existence of a further reality beyond the 
 symbol, and bidding us look forward in faith 
 to the promise of a more perfect knowledge 
 hereafter. Rationalism, in the hands of these 
 expositors, adopts an opposite view of man's 
 powers and duties. It claims to behold God 
 as He is now : it finds a common object for 
 Religion and Philosophy in the explanation 
 of God {SI). It declares Religion to be the 
 Divine Spirit's knowledge of himself through 
 the mediation of the finite Spirit (32). 
 
 " Beloved, now are we the sons of God ; 
 and it doth not yet appear what we shall be : 
 but we know that, when He shall appear, we 
 shall be like Him ; for we shall see Him as 
 He is. And every man that hath this hope in 
 him purifieth himself, even as He is pureV 
 Philosophy too confesses that like must be 
 known by like ; but, reversing the hope of 
 the Apostle, it finds God in the forms of hu- 
 man thought. Its kingdom is proclaimed to 
 be truth absolute and unveiled. It contains 
 in itself the exhibition of God, as He is in 
 
 ^ I St. John iii. 2, 3. 
 
32 LECTURE J. 
 
 His eternal essence, before the creation of a 
 finite world (33). Which of these two re- 
 presentations contains the truer view of the 
 capacities of human reason, it will be the 
 purpose of the following Lectures to inquire. 
 Such an inquiry must necessarily, during a 
 portion at least of its course, assume a philo- 
 sophical, rather than a theological aspect ; yet 
 it will not perhaps on that account be less 
 ultimately serviceable in theological contro- 
 versy. It has been acutely said, that even if 
 Philosophy is useless, it is still useful, as the 
 means of proving its own uselessness (34). 
 But it is not so much the utility as the ne- 
 cessity of the study, which constitutes its pre- 
 sent claim on our attention. So long as man 
 possesses facts of consciousness and powers of 
 reflection, so long he will continue to exercise 
 those powers and study those facts. So long 
 as human consciousness contains the idea of 
 a God and the instincts of worship, so long 
 mental philosophy will walk on common 
 ground with religious belief. Rightly or 
 wrongly, men will think of these things ; and 
 a knowledge of the laws under which they 
 think is the only security for thinking soundly. 
 If it be thought no unworthy occupation for 
 the Christian preacher, to point out the evi- 
 dences of God's Providence in the constitu- 
 
LECTURE 1. 33 
 
 tion of the sensible world and the mechan- 
 ism of the human body ; or to dwell on the 
 analogies which may be traced between the 
 scheme of revelation and the course of na- 
 ture ; it is but a part of the same argument 
 to pursue the inquiry with regard to the 
 structure and laws of the human mind. The 
 path may be one which, of late years at least, 
 has been less frequently trodden : the lan- 
 guage indispensable to such an investigation 
 may sound at times unwonted and uncouth ; 
 but the end is one with that of those plainer 
 and more familiar illustrations which have 
 taken their place among the acknowledged 
 evidences of religion ; and the lesson of the 
 whole, if read aright, will be but to teach us 
 that in mind, no less than in body, we are 
 fearfully and wonderfully made" by Him 
 whose praise both alike declare : that He 
 who "laid the foundations of the earth, and 
 shut up the sea with doors, and said, Hi- 
 therto shalt thou come, but no further," is 
 also He who " hath put wisdom in the in- 
 ward parts, and hath given understanding to 
 the heart "." 
 
 "1 Psalm cxxxix. 14. " Job xxxviii. 4, 8, 11, 36. 
 
 1) 
 
LECTURE IL 
 
 I TIMOTHY VI. 20, 21. 
 
 Keep that which is committed to thy trust, 
 avoiding profane and vain babblings, and 
 oppositions of science falsely so called; 
 which some professing have erred concern- 
 ing the faith. 
 
 A PHILOSOPHY of Religion may be at- 
 tempted from two opposite points of view, 
 and by two opposite modes of development. 
 It may be conceived either as a Philosophy 
 of the Object of Religion ; that is to say, as 
 a scientific exposition of the nature of God ; 
 or as a Philosophy of the Subject of Reli- 
 gion ; that is to say, as a scientific inquiry 
 into the constitution of the human mind, so 
 far as it receives and deals with religious 
 ideas. The former is that branch of Meta- 
 physics which is commonly known by the 
 name of Rational Theology. Its general aim, 
 in common with all metaphysical inquiries, 
 is to disengage the real from the apparent, 
 the true from the false : its special aim, as a 
 
LECTURE II. 35 
 
 Theology, is to exhibit a true representation 
 of the Nature and Attributes of God, purified 
 from foreign accretions, and displaying the 
 exact features of their Divine Original. The 
 latter is a branch of Psychology, which, at its 
 outset at least, contents itself with investigat- 
 ing the phenomena presented to it, leaving 
 their relation to further realities to be deter- 
 mined at a later stage of the inquiry. Its pri- 
 mary concern is with the operations and laws 
 of the human mind ; and its special purpose 
 is to ascertain the nature, the origin, and the 
 limits of the religious element in man ; post- 
 poning, till after that question has been de- 
 cided, the further inquiry into the absolute 
 nature of God. 
 
 As applied to the criticism of Revelation, 
 the first method, supposing its end to be at- 
 tained, would furnish an immediate and di- 
 rect criterion by which the claims of any 
 supposed Revelation to a divine origin might 
 be tested ; while at the same time it would 
 enable those possessed of it to dispense with 
 the services of any Revelation at all. For on 
 the supposition that we possess an exact idea 
 of any attribute of the Divine Nature, we 
 are at liberty to reject at once any portion of 
 the supposed Revelation which contradicts 
 that idea ; and on the supposition that we 
 
 D 2 
 
36 LECTURE II. 
 
 possess a complete idea of that Nature as a 
 whole, we are at liberty to reject whatever 
 goes beyond it. And as, upon either suppo-^ 
 sition, the highest praise to which Revela- 
 tion can aspire is that of coinciding, partially 
 or wholly, with the independent conclusions 
 of Philosophy, it follows that, so far as Phi- 
 losophy extends. Revelation becomes super- 
 fluous (1). On the other hand, the second 
 method of philosophical inquiry does not pro- 
 fess to furnish a direct criticism of Revela- 
 tion, but only of the instruments by which 
 Revelation is to be criticized. It looks to 
 the human, not to the divine, and aspires to 
 teach us no more than the limits of our own 
 powers of thought, and the consequent dis- 
 tinction between what we may and what we 
 may not seek to comprehend. And if, upon 
 examination, it should appear that any por- 
 tion of the contents of Revelation belongs to 
 the latter class of truths, this method will 
 enable us to reconcile with each other the 
 conflicting claims of Reason and Faith, by 
 shewing that Reason itself, rightly inter- 
 preted, teaches the existence of truths that 
 are above Reason. 
 
 Whatever may be the ultimate use of the 
 first of these methods of criticism, it is obvious 
 that the previous question, concerning our 
 
LECTURE II. S7 
 
 right to use it at all, can only be satisfactorily 
 answered by the employment of the second 
 method. The possibility of criticism at all 
 implies that human reason is liable to error : 
 the possibility of a valid criticism implies that 
 the means of distinguishing between its truth 
 and its error may be ascertained by a pre- 
 vious criticism. Let it be granted, for the 
 moment, that a religion whose contents are 
 irreconcilable with human reason is thereby 
 proved not to have come from God, but from 
 man : — still the reason which judges is at 
 least as human as the religion which is 
 judged ; and if the human representation of 
 God is erroneous in the latter, how can we 
 assume its infallibility in the former ? If we 
 grant for the present the fundamental posi- 
 tion of Rationalism, namely, that man by his 
 own reason can attain to a right conception 
 of God, we must at any rate grant also, what 
 every attempt at criticism implies, that he 
 may also attain to a wrong one. We have 
 therefore still to ask by what marks the one 
 is to be distinguished from the other ; by 
 what method we are to seek the truth ; and 
 how we are to assure ourselves that we have 
 found it. And to answer this question, we 
 need a preliminary examination of the con- 
 ditions and limits of human thought. Reli- 
 
38 LECTURE II. 
 
 gious criticism is itself an act of thought ; 
 and its immediate instruments must, under 
 any circumstances, be thoughts also. We are 
 thus compelled in the first instance to in- 
 quire into the origin and value of those 
 thoughts themselves. 
 
 A Philosophy which professes to elicit 
 from its own conceptions all the essential 
 portions of religious belief, is bound to jus- 
 tify its profession, by shewing that those 
 conceptions themselves are above suspicion. 
 The ideas thus exalted to the supreme cri- 
 teria of truth must bear on their front un- 
 questionable evidence that they are true and 
 sufficient representations of the Divine Na- 
 ture, such as may serve all the needs of hu- 
 man thought and human feeling, adequate 
 alike for contemplation and for worship. They 
 must manifest the clearness and distinctness 
 which mark the strong vision of an eye gaz- 
 ing undazzled on the glory of Heaven, not 
 the obscurity and confusion of one that turns 
 away blinded from the glare, and gropes in 
 its own darkness after the fleeting spectrum. 
 The conviction which boasts itself to be su- 
 perior to all external evidence must carry in 
 its own inward constitution some sure indi- 
 cation of its truth and value. 
 
 Such a conviction may be possible in two 
 
LECTURE II. 39 
 
 diiferent ways. It may be the result of a 
 direct intuition of the Divine Nature ; or it 
 may be gained by inference from certain at- 
 tributes of human nature, which, though on 
 a smaller scale, are known to be sufficiently 
 representative of the corresponding proper- 
 ties of the Deity. We may suppose the ex- 
 istence in man of a special faculty of know- 
 ledge, of which God is the immediate object, 
 — a kind of religious sense or reason, by 
 which the Divine attributes are apprehended 
 in their own nature (2) : or we may maintain 
 that the attributes of God differ from those 
 of man in degree only, not in kind ; and 
 hence that certain mental and moral qualities, 
 of which we are immediately conscious in 
 ourselves, furnish at the same time a true and 
 adequate image of the infinite perfections of 
 God (3). The first of these suppositions pro- 
 fesses to convey a knowledge of God by direct 
 apprehension, in a manner similar to the evi- 
 dence of the senses : the second professes to 
 convey the same knowledge by a logical pro- 
 cess, similar to the demonstrations of science. 
 The former is the method of Mysticism, and 
 of that Rationalism which agrees with Mys- 
 ticism, in referring the knowledge of divine 
 things to an extraordinary and abnormal 
 process of intuition or thought (4). The lat- 
 
40 LECTURE H. 
 
 ter is the method of the vulgar Rationalism, 
 which regards the reason of man, in its ordi- 
 nary and normal operation, as the supreme 
 criterion of religious truth. 
 
 On the former supposition, a system of 
 religious philosophy or criticism may be con- 
 structed by starting from the divine and rea- 
 soning down to the human : on the latter, 
 by starting from the human and reasoning 
 up to the divine. The first commences with 
 a supposed immediate knowledge of God as 
 He is in his absolute nature, and proceeds to 
 exhibit the process by which that nature, 
 acting according to its own laws, will mani- 
 fest itself in operation, and become known to 
 man. The second commences with an im- 
 mediate knowledge of the mental and moral 
 attributes of man, and proceeds to exhibit 
 the manner in which those attributes will 
 manifest themselves, when exalted to the de- 
 gree in which they form part of the nature 
 of God. If, for example, the two systems 
 severally undertake to give a representation 
 of the infinite power and wisdom of God, the 
 former will profess to explain how the nature 
 of the infinite manifests itself in the forms of 
 power and wisdom ; while the latter will at- 
 tempt to shew how power and wisdom must 
 manifest themselves when existing in an infi- 
 
LECTURE II. 41 
 
 nite degree. In their criticisms of Revela- 
 tion, in like manner, the former will rather 
 take as its standard- that absolute and essen- 
 tial nature of God, which must remain un- 
 changed in every manifestation ; the latter 
 will judge by reference to those intellectual 
 and moral qualities, which must exist in all 
 their essential features in the divine nature 
 as well as in the human. 
 
 Thus, for example, it has been maintained 
 by a modern philosopher, that the absolute 
 nature of God is that of a pure Will, deter- 
 mining itself solely by a moral law, and subr 
 ject to no affections which can operate as 
 motives. Hence it is inferred that the same 
 law of action must form the rule of God's 
 manifestation to mankind as a moral Gover- 
 nor ; and therefore that no revelation can be 
 of divine origin, which attempts to influence 
 men's actions by the prospect of reward or 
 punishment (5). In this mode of reasoning, 
 an abstract conception of the nature of God 
 is made the criterion to determine the mode 
 in which He must reveal Himself to man. 
 On the other hand, we meet with an opposite 
 style of criticism, which reasons somewhat as 
 follows : All the excellences, it contends, of 
 which we are conscious in the creature, must 
 necessarily exist in the same manner, though 
 
42 LECTURE II. 
 
 in a higher degree, in the Creator. God is 
 indeed more wise, more just, more merciful 
 than man ; but for that very reason, His 
 wisdom and justice and mercy must contain 
 nothing that is incompatible with the cor- 
 responding attributes in their human cha- 
 racter (6). Hence, if the certainty of man's 
 knowledge implies the necessity of the events 
 which he knows, the certainty of God's 
 omniscience implies a like necessity of all 
 things (7) : if man's justice requires that 
 he should punish the guilty alone, it is in- 
 consistent with God's justice to inflict the 
 chastisement of sin upon the innocent (8) : 
 if man's mercy finds its natural exercise in 
 the free forgiveness of offences, God's mercy 
 too must freely forgive the sins of His crea- 
 tures (9). From the same premises, it is 
 consistently concluded that no act which 
 would be wrong, if performed by a man upon 
 his own responsibility, can be justified by 
 the plea of a direct command from God (10). 
 Abraham may not be praised for his readi- 
 ness to slay his son in obedience to God's 
 command ; for the internal prohibition must 
 always be more certain than the external 
 precept (11). Joshua cannot be warranted in 
 obeying the Divine injunction to exterminate 
 the Canaanites ; unless he would be equally 
 
LECTURE II. 43 
 
 warranted in destroying them of his own 
 accord (12). And, as the issuing of such 
 commands is contrary to the moral nature 
 of God, therefore the Book which represents 
 them as so issued is convicted of falsehood, 
 and cannot be regarded as a Divine Reve- 
 lation (13). In this mode of reasoning, the 
 moral or intellectual nature of man is made 
 the rule to determine what ought to be the 
 revealed attributes of God, and in what man- 
 ner they must be exercised. 
 
 Within certain limits, both these argu- 
 ments may have their value ; but each is 
 chiefly useful as a check upon the exclusive 
 authority of the other. The philosophy 
 which reasons downwards from the infinite, 
 is but an exaggeration of the true conviction 
 that God's thoughts are not our thoughts, 
 nor His ways our ways ^ : the philosophy 
 which reasons upwards from the human, 
 bears witness, even in its perversion, to the 
 unextinguishable consciousness, that man, 
 however fallen, was created in the image of 
 God''. But this admission tends rather to 
 weaken than to strengthen the claims of 
 either to be received as the supreme crite- 
 rion of religious truth. The criticisms of 
 rationalism exhibit the weakness as well as 
 
 » Isaiah Iv. 8. ^ Genesis i. 27. 
 
44 LECTURE II. 
 
 the strength of reason ; for the representa- 
 tions which it rejects, as dishonouring to 
 God, are, on its own shewing, the product of 
 human thought, no less than the principle 
 by which they are judged and condemned. 
 If the human mind has passed through suc- 
 cessive stages of religious cultivation, from 
 the grovelling superstition of the savage to 
 the intellectual elevation of the critic of all 
 possible revelations ; who shall assure the 
 critic that the level on which he now stands 
 is the last and highest that can be attained ? 
 If reason is to be the last court of appeal in 
 religious questions, it must find some better 
 proof of its own infallibility than is to be 
 found in its own progressive enlightenment. 
 Its preeminence must be shewn, not by suc- 
 cessive approximations to the truth, but by 
 the possession of the truth itself. Of the 
 limits within which reason may be legiti- 
 mately employed, I shall have occasion to 
 speak hereafter. At present I am concerned 
 only with its pretensions to such a knowledge 
 of the Divine Nature as can constitute the 
 foundation of a Rational Theology. 
 
 There are three terms, familiar as house- 
 hold words in the vocabulary of Philosophy, 
 which must be taken into account in every 
 system of Metaphysical Theology. To con- 
 
LECTURE II. 45 
 
 ceive the Deity as He is, we must conceive 
 Him as First Cause, as Absolute, and as Infi- 
 nite. By the First Cause, is meant that which 
 produces all things, and is itself produced of 
 none. By the Absolute, is meant that which 
 exists in and by itself, having no necessary 
 relation to any other Being (14). By the Infi- 
 nite, is meant that which is free from all pos- 
 sible limitation ; that than vvhich a greater is 
 inconceivable ; and which consequently can 
 receive no additional attribute or mode of ex- 
 istence, which it had not from all eternity. 
 
 The Infinite, as contemplated by this phi- 
 losophy, cannot be regarded as consisting of a 
 limited number of attributes, each unlimited 
 in its kind. It cannot be conceived, for ex- 
 ample, after the analogy of a line, infinite in 
 length, but not in breadth ; or of a surface, 
 infinite in two dimensions of space, but 
 bounded in the third ; or of an intelligent 
 being, possessing some one or more modes of 
 consciousness in an infinite degree, but de- 
 void of others. Even if it be granted, which 
 is not the case, that such a partial infinite 
 may without contradiction be conceived, still 
 it will have a relative infinity only, and be 
 altogether incompatible with the idea of the 
 Absolute (15). The line limited in breadth is 
 thereby necessarily related to the space that 
 
46 LECTURE II. 
 
 limits it : the intelligence endowed with a 
 limited number of attributes, coexists with 
 others which are thereby related to it, as cog- 
 nate or opposite modes of consciousness (16). 
 'I'he metaphysical representation of the Deity, 
 as absolute and infinite, must necessarily, as 
 the profoundest metaphysicians have acknow- 
 ledged, amount to nothing less than the sum 
 of all reality (17). " What kind of an Abso- 
 lute Being is that," says Hegel, " which does 
 not contain in itself all that is actual, even 
 evil included" (18) ? We may repudiate the 
 conclusion with indignation ; but the reason- 
 ing is unassailable. If the Absolute and In- 
 finite is an object of human conception at all, 
 this, and none other, is the conception re- 
 quired. That which is conceived as absolute 
 and infinite must be conceived as containing 
 within itself the sum, not only of all actual, 
 but of all possible modes of being. For if any 
 actual mode can be denied of it, it is related 
 to that mode, and limited by it (19); and if 
 any possible mode can be denied of it, it is 
 capable of becoming more than it now is, and 
 such a capability is a limitation. Indeed it 
 is obvious that the entire distinction between 
 the possible and the actual can have no exist- 
 ence as regards the absolutely infinite; for an 
 unrealized possibility is necessarily a relation 
 
LECTURE II. 47 
 
 and a limit. The scholastic saying, Deus est 
 actus purus (20), ridiculed as it has been by 
 modern critics, is in truth but the expression, 
 in technical language, of the almost unani- 
 mous voice of philosophy, both in earlier and 
 later times (21). 
 
 But these three conceptions, the Cause, the 
 Absolute, the Infinite, all equally indispensa- 
 ble, do they not imply contradiction to each 
 other, when viewed in conjunction, as attri- 
 butes of one and the same Being ? A Cause 
 cannot, as such, be absolute : the Absolute 
 cannot, as such, be a cause. The cause, as 
 such, exists only in relation to its effect : the 
 cause is a cause of the effect ; the effect is an 
 effect of the cause. On the other hand, the 
 conception of the Absolute implies a possible 
 existence out of all relation (22). We attempt 
 to escape from this apparent contradiction, 
 by introducing the idea of succession in time. 
 The Absolute exists first by itself, and after- 
 wards becomes a Cause. But here we are 
 checked by the third conception, that of the 
 Infinite. How can the Infinite become that 
 which it was not from the first? If Causation 
 is a possible mode of existence, that which 
 exists without causing is not infinite ; that 
 which becomes a cause has passed beyond its 
 former limits. Creation at any particular 
 
48 LECTURE 11. 
 
 moment of time being thus inconceivable, the 
 philosopher is reduced to the alternative of 
 Pantheism, which pronounces the effect to be 
 mere appearance, and merges all real exist- 
 ence in the cause (23). The validity of this 
 alternative will be examined presently. 
 
 Meanwhile, to return for a moment to the 
 supposition of a true causation. Supposing 
 the Absolute to become a cause, it will follow 
 that it operates by means of free will and 
 consciousness. For a necessary cause cannot 
 be conceived as absolute and infinite. If ne- 
 cessitated by something beyond itself, it is 
 thereby limited by a superior power ; and if 
 necessitated by itself, it has in its own nature 
 a necessary relation to its effect. The act of 
 causation must therefore be voluntary ; and 
 volition is only possible in a conscious being. 
 But consciousness again is only conceivable 
 as a relation. There must be a conscious sub- 
 ject, and an object of which he is conscious. 
 The subject is a subject to the object; the 
 object is an object to the subject; and nei- 
 ther can exist by itself as the absolute. This 
 difficulty, again, may be for the moment 
 evaded, by distinguishing between the abso- 
 lute as related to another and the absolute 
 as related to itself. The Absolute, it may be 
 said, may possibly be conscious, provided it is 
 
LECTURE 11. 49 
 
 only conscious of itself (24). But this alter- 
 native is, in ultimate analysis, no less self- 
 destructive than the other. For the object of 
 consciousness, whether a mode of the sub- 
 ject's existence or not, is either created in 
 and by the act of consciousness, or has an ex- 
 istence independent of it. In the former case, 
 the object depends upon the subject, and the 
 subject alone is the true absolute. In the 
 latter case, the subject depends upon the ob- 
 ject, and the object alone is the true abso- 
 lute. Or if Mve attempt a third hypothesis, 
 and maintain that each exists independently 
 of the other, we have no absolute at all, but 
 only a pair of relatives ; for coexistence, 
 whether in consciousness or not, is itself a 
 relation (25). 
 
 The corollary from this reasoning is obvi- 
 ous. Not only is the Absolute, as conceived, 
 incapable of a necessary relation to any thing 
 else ; but it is also incapable of containing, by 
 the constitution of its own nature, an essen- 
 tial relation within itself; as a whole, for in- 
 stance, composed of parts, or as a substance 
 consisting of attributes, or as a conscious sub- 
 ject in antithesis to an object (26). For if 
 there is in the absolute any principle of unity, 
 distinct from t.he mere accumulation of parts 
 or attributes, this principle alone is the true 
 
 E 
 
50 LECTURE II. 
 
 absolute. If, on the other hand, there is no 
 such principle, then there is no absolute at 
 all, but only a plurality of relatives (27). The 
 almost unanimous voice of philosophy, in pro- 
 nouncing that the absolute is both one and 
 simple, must be accepted as the voice of rea- 
 son also, so far as reason has any voice in the 
 matter (£8). But this absolute unity, as in- 
 different and containing no attributes, can 
 neither be distinguished from the multipli- 
 city of finite beings by any characteristic fea- 
 ture, nor be identified vs^ith them in their 
 multiplicity (29). Thus we are landed in an 
 inextricable dilemma. The Absolute cannot 
 be conceived as conscious, neither can it be 
 conceived as unconscious: it cannot be con- 
 ceived as complex, neither can it be conceived 
 as simple : it cannot be conceived by differ- 
 ence, neither can it be conceived by the ab- 
 sence of difference: it cannot be identified 
 veith the universe, neither can it be distin- 
 guished from it. The One and the Many, 
 regarded as the beginning of existence, are 
 thus alike incomprehensible. 
 
 The fundamental conceptions of Rational 
 Theology being thus self-destructive, we may 
 naturally expect to find the same antagon- 
 ism manifested in their special applications. 
 These naturally inherit the infirmities of the 
 
LECTURE II. 51 
 
 principle from which they spring. If an ab^ 
 solute and infinite consciousness is a concep- 
 tion which contradicts itself, we need not 
 wonder if its several modifications mutually 
 exclude each other. A mental attribute, to 
 be conceived as infinite, must be in actual 
 exercise on every possible object : otherwise 
 it is potential only with regard to those on 
 which it is not exercised ; and an unrealized 
 potentiality is a limitation. Hence every infi- 
 nite mode of consciousness must be regarded 
 as extending over the field of every other ; 
 and their common action involves a perpe- 
 tual antagonism. How, for example, can In- 
 finite Power be able to do all thingSj and yet 
 Infinite Goodness be unable to do evil ? How 
 can Infinite Justice exact the utmost penalty 
 for every sin, and yet Infinite Mercy pardon 
 the sinner ? How can Infinite Wisdom know 
 all that is to come, and yet Infinite Freedom 
 be at liberty to do or to forbear (30) ? How 
 is the existence of Evil compatible with that 
 of an infinitely perfect Being ; for if he wills 
 it, be is not infinitely good ; and if be wills 
 it not, his will is thwarted aiid his sphere of 
 action limited ? Here, again, the Pantheist is 
 ready with his solution. There is in reality 
 no such thiuig as evil : there is no such thing 
 as punishment : there is no real relation be- 
 
 E 2 
 
52 LECTURE 11. 
 
 tween God and man at all. God is all that 
 really exists : He does, by the necessity of 
 His nature, all that is done : all acts are 
 equally necessary and equally divine : all di- 
 versity is but a distorted representation of 
 unity : all evil is but a delusive appearance 
 of good (31). Unfortunately, the Pantheist 
 does not tell us v^^hence all this delusion 
 derives its seeming existence. 
 
 Let us however suppose for an instant that 
 these difficulties are surmounted, and the ex- 
 istence of the Absolute securely established 
 on the testimony of reason. Still we have 
 not succeeded in reconciling this idea with 
 that of a Cause : we have done nothing to- 
 wards explaining how the absolute can give 
 rise to the relative, the infinite to the finite. 
 If the condition of causal activity is a higher 
 state than that of quiescence, the Absolute, 
 whether acting voluntarily or involuntarily, 
 has passed from a condition of comparative 
 imperfection to one of comparative perfec- 
 tion ; and therefore was not originally per- 
 fect. If the state of activity is an inferior 
 state to that of quiescence, the Absolute, in 
 becoming a cause, has lost its original perfec- 
 tion (32). There remains only the supposi- 
 tion that the two states are equal, and the 
 act of creation one of complete indifference. 
 
LECTURE II. 53 
 
 But this supposition annihilates the unity of 
 the absolute, or it annihilates itself. If the 
 act of creation is real, and yet indifferent, we 
 must admit the possibility of two conceptions 
 of the absolute, the one as productive, the 
 other as non-productive. If the act is not 
 real, the supposition itself vanishes, and we 
 are thrown once more on the alternative of 
 Pantheism. 
 
 Again, how can the Relative be conceived 
 as coming into being ? If it is a distinct 
 reality from the absolute, it must be con- 
 ceived as passing from non-existence into 
 existence. But to conceive an object as non- 
 existent, is again a self-contradiction ; for 
 that which is conceived exists, as an object of 
 thought, in and by that conception. We may 
 abstain from thinking of an object at all; 
 but, if we think of it, we cannot but think of 
 it as existing. It is possible at one time not 
 to think of an object at all, and at another to 
 think of it as already in being ; but to think 
 -of it in the act of becoming, in the progress 
 from not being into being, is to think that 
 which, in the very thought, annihilates itself. 
 Here again the Pantheistic hypothesis seems 
 forced upon us. We can think of creation 
 only as a change in the condition of that 
 which already exists ; and thus the creature 
 
54 LECTURE 11. 
 
 is conceivable only as a phenomenal mode of 
 the being of the Creator (33). 
 
 The whole of this web of contradictions 
 (and it might be extended, if necessary, to a 
 far greater length) is woven from one original 
 warp and woof; — namely, the impossibility 
 of conceiving the coexistence of the infinite 
 and the finite, and the cognate impossibility 
 of conceiving a first commencement of phe- 
 nomena, or the absolute giving birth to the 
 relative. The laws of thought appear to ad- 
 mit of no possible escape from the meshes in 
 which thought is entangled, save by destroy- 
 ing one or the other of the cords of which 
 they are composed. Pantheism or Atheism 
 are thus the alternatives offered to us, ac- 
 cording as we prefer to save the infinite by 
 the sacrifice of the finite, or to maintain the 
 finite by denying the existence of the infi- 
 nite. Pantheism thus presents itself, as to 
 all appearance the only logical conclusion, 
 if we believe in the possibility of a Philo- 
 sophy of the Infinite. But Pantheism, if it 
 avoids self-contradiction in the course of its 
 reasonings, does so only by an act of suicide 
 at the outset. It escapes from some of the 
 minor incongruities of thought, only by the 
 annihilation of thought and thinker alike. 
 It is saved from the necessity of demon- 
 
LECTURE 11. 53 
 
 strating its own falsehood, by abolishing the 
 only conditions under which truth and false- 
 hood can be distinguished from each other. 
 The only conception which I can frame of 
 sulastantive existence at all, as distinguished 
 from the transient accidents which are merely 
 modes of the being of something else, is de- 
 rived from the immediate knowledge of my 
 own personal unity, amidst the various affec- 
 tions which form the successive modes of my 
 consciousness. The Pantheist tells me that 
 this knowledge is a delusion ; that I am no 
 substance, but a mode of the absolute sub- 
 stance, even as my thoughts and passions are 
 modes of me ; and that in order to attairf to 
 a true philosophy of being, I must begin by 
 denying my own being. And for what pur- 
 pose is this act of self-destruction needed? 
 In otder to preserve inviolate certain philo- 
 sophical conclusions, which I, the non-existent 
 thinker, have drawn by virtue of my non- 
 existent powers of thought. But if my per- 
 sonal existence, the great primary fact of all 
 consciousness, is a delusion, what claim have 
 the reasonings of the Pantheist himself to be 
 considered as any thing better than a part of 
 the universal falsehood? If I am mistaken 
 in supposing myself to have a substantial 
 existence at all, why is that existence more 
 
56 LECTURE II. 
 
 true when it is presented to me under the 
 jiarticular form of apprehending and accept- 
 ing the arguments of the pantheistic philoso- 
 phy ? Nay, how do I know that there is any 
 argument at all ? For if my consciousness is 
 mistaken in testifying to the fact of my own 
 existence, it may surely be no less mistaken 
 in testifying to my apparent apprehension of 
 an apparent reasoning. Nay, the very argu- 
 ments which appear to prove the Pantheist's 
 conclusion to be true, may in reality, for 
 aught I know, prove it to be false. Or rather, 
 no Pantheist, if he is consistent with himself, 
 can admit the existence of a distinction be- 
 tween truth and falsehood at all. For if God 
 alone exists, in whatever way that existence 
 may be explained. He alone is the immediate 
 cause of all that takes place. He thinks all 
 that is thought, He does all that is done. 
 There can be no difference between truth 
 and falsehood ; for God is the only thinker ; 
 and all thoughts are equally necessary and 
 equally divine. There can be no difference 
 between right and wrong ; for God is the only 
 agent ; and all acts are equally necessary and 
 equally divine (34). How error and evil, even 
 in appearance, are possible ; — how the finite 
 and the relative can appear to exist, even as 
 a delusion, — is a problem which no system of 
 
LECTURE II. 57 
 
 Pantheism has made the slightest approach 
 towards solving (35). 
 
 Pantheism thus failing us, the last resource 
 of Rationalism is to take refuge in that 
 which, with reference to the highest idea of 
 God, is speculative Atheism, and to deny 
 that the Infinite exists at all (36). And it 
 must be admitted that, so long as we confine 
 ourselves to one side only of the problem, 
 that of the inconceivability of the Infinite, 
 this is the only position logically tenable by 
 those who would make man's power of 
 thought the exact measure of his duty of 
 belief. For the infinite, as inconceivable, is 
 necessarily shewn to be non-existent ; unless 
 we renounce the claiin of reason to supreme 
 authority in matters of faith, by admitting 
 that it is our duty to believe what we are 
 altogether unable to comprehend. But the 
 logical advantage of the atheistic alternative 
 vanishes, as soon as we view the question 
 from the other side, and endeavour positively 
 to represent in thought the sum total of ex- 
 istence as a limited quantity. A limit is itself 
 a relation ; and to conceive a limit as such, is 
 virtually to acknowledge the existence of a 
 correlative on the other side of it (37). By a 
 law of thought, the significance of which has 
 perhaps not yet been fully investigated, it is 
 
58 LECTURE II. 
 
 impossible to conceive a finite object of any 
 kind, without conceiving it as one out of 
 many, — as related to other objects, coexistent 
 and antecedent. A first moment of time, a 
 first unit of space, a definite sum of all ex- 
 istence, are thus as inconceivable as the op- 
 posite suppositions of an infinity of each (38). 
 While it is impossible to represent in thought 
 any object, except as finite, it is equally im- 
 possible to represent any finite object, or any 
 aggregate of finite objects, as exhausting the 
 universe of being. Thus the hypothesis 
 which would annihilate the Infinite is itself 
 shattered to pieces against the rock of the 
 Absolute ; and we are involved in the self- 
 contradictory assumption of a limited uni- 
 verse, which yet can neither contain a limit 
 in itself, nor be limited by any thing beyond 
 itself. For if it contains a limit in itself, it is 
 both limiting and limited, both beyond the 
 limit and within it ; and if it is limited by 
 any thing else, it is not the universe (39). 
 
 To sum up briefly this portion of my ar- 
 gument. The conception of the Absolute and 
 Infinite, from whatever side we view it, ap- 
 pears encompassed with contradictions. There 
 is a contradiction in supposing such an object 
 to exist, whether alone or in conjunction with 
 others ; and there is a contradiction in sup- 
 
LECTURE II. 59 
 
 posing it not to exist. There is a contradic- 
 tion in conceiving it as one ; and there is a 
 contradiction in conceiving it as many. There 
 is a contradiction in conceiving it as personal; 
 and there is a contradiction in conceiving it as 
 impersonal. It cannot without contradiction 
 be represented as active ; nor, without equal 
 contradiction, be represented as inactive. It 
 cannot be conceived as the sum of all exist- 
 ence ; nor yet can it be conceived as a part 
 only of that sum. A contradiction thus tho- 
 roughgoing, while it sufficiently shews the im- 
 potence of human reason as an a priori judge 
 of all truth, yet is not in itself inconsistent 
 with any form of religious belief. For it tells 
 with equal force against all belief and all un- 
 belief, and therefore necessitates the conclu- 
 sion that belief cannot be determined solely 
 by reason. No conclusion can be drawn from 
 it in favour of universal scepticism ; first, be- 
 cause universal scepticism equally destroys it- 
 self; and secondly, because the contradictions 
 thus detected belong not to the use of reason 
 in general, but only to its exercise on one 
 particular object of thought. It may teach 
 us that it is our duty, in some instances, to 
 believe that which we cannot conceive ; but 
 it does not require us to disbelieve any thing 
 which we are capable of conceiving. 
 
60 LECTURE II. 
 
 What we have hitherto been examining, be 
 it remembered, is not the nature of the Abso- 
 lute in itself, but only our own conception of 
 that nature. The distortions of the image 
 reflected may arise only from the inequalities 
 of the mirror reflecting it. And this consi- 
 deration leads us naturally back to the second 
 of the two methods of religious philosophy 
 which were mentioned at the beginning of 
 the present Lecture. If the attempt to grasp 
 the absolute nature of the Divine Object of 
 religious thought thus fails us on every side, 
 we have no resource but to recommence our 
 inquiry by the opposite process, that of in- 
 vestigating the nature of the human Subject. 
 Such an investigation will not indeed solve 
 the contradictions which our previous at- 
 tempt has elicited ; but it may serve to shew 
 us why they are insoluble. If it cannot satisfy 
 to the full the demands of reason, it may at 
 least enable us to lay a reasonable foundation 
 for the rightful claims of belief. If, from an 
 examination of the laws and limits of human 
 consciousness, we can shew that thought is 
 not and cannot be the measure of exist- 
 ence ; if it can be shewn that the contradic- 
 tions which arise in the attempt to conceive 
 the infinite, have their origin, not in the na- 
 ture of that which we would conceive, but 
 
LECTURE II. 61 
 
 in the constitution of the mind conceiving; 
 that they are such as must necessarily ac- 
 company every form of religion, and every 
 renunciation of religion ; we may thus pre- 
 pare the way for a recognition of the sepa- 
 rate provinces of Reason and Faith. This 
 task I shall endeavour to accomplish in my, 
 next Lecture. Meanwhile I would add but 
 a few words, to point out the practical lesson 
 to be drawn from our previous inquiry. It 
 is this : that so far is human reason from 
 being able to construct a scientific Theology, 
 independent of and superior to Revelation, 
 that it cannot even read the alphabet out of 
 which that Theology must be framed. It has 
 not been without much hesitation that I have 
 ventured to address you in language seldom 
 heard in this place, — to transport to the 
 preacher's pulpit the vocabulary of meta- 
 physical speculation. But it was only by 
 such a course that I could hope to bring the 
 antagonist principles of true and false reli- 
 gious philosophy face to face with each other. 
 It needs but a slight acquaintance with the 
 history of opinions, to shew how intimately, 
 in various ages, the current forms of religious 
 belief or unbelief have been connected with 
 the prevailing systems of speculative philoso- 
 phy. It was in no small degree because the 
 
62 LECTURE 11. 
 
 philosophy of Kant identified religion with 
 morality, and maintained that the superna- 
 tural and the historical were not necessary to 
 belief (40) ; that Paulus explained away the 
 miracles of Christ, as misrepresentations of 
 natural events (41) ; and Wegscheider claimed 
 for the moral reason supreme authority in the 
 interpretation of Scripture (42) ; and Rohr 
 promulgated a new Creed, from which all 
 the facts of Christianity are rejected, to make 
 way for ethical precepts (43). It was in like 
 manner because the philosophy of Hegel was 
 felt to be incompatible with the belief in a 
 personal God, and a personal Christ, and a 
 supernatural revelation (44) ; that Vatke re- 
 jected the Old Testament history, as irrecon- 
 cilable with the philosophical law of religious 
 development (45) ; and Strauss endeavoured 
 by minute cavils to invalidate the Gospel nar- 
 rative, in order to make way for the theory 
 of an ideal Christ, manifested in the whole 
 human race (46) ; and Feuerbach maintained 
 that the Supreme Being is but humanity 
 deified, and that the belief in a superhuman 
 God is contradictory in itself, and pernicious 
 in its consequences (47). And if, by wander- 
 ing for a little while in the tangled mazes 
 of metaphysical speculation, we can test the 
 vp^orth of the substitute which this philosophy 
 
LECTURE II. 63 
 
 offers us in the place of the faith which it 
 rejects ; if we can shew how little such a sub- 
 stitute can satisfy even the intellect of man, 
 (to the heart it does not pretend to appeal,) 
 the inquiry may do some service, slight and 
 indirect though it be, to the cause of Christ- 
 ian Truth, by suggesting to the wavering dis- 
 ciple, ere he quits the Master with whom he 
 has hitherto walked, the pregnant question of 
 the Apostle, " Lord, to whom shall we go'^?" 
 When Philosophy succeeds in exhibiting in 
 a clear and consistent form the Infinite Be- 
 ing of God ; when her opposing schools are 
 agreed among themselves as to the manner 
 in which a knowledge of the Infinite takes 
 place, or the marks by which it is to be dis- 
 cerned when known ; then, and not till then, 
 may she claim to speak as one having au- 
 thority in controversies of Faith. But while 
 she speaks with stammering lips and a double 
 tongue; while she gropes her way in dark- 
 ness, and stumbles at every step ; while she 
 has nothing to offer us, but the alternative 
 of principles which abjure consciousness ^ a 
 consciousness which contradicts itself, we may 
 well pause before we appeal to her decisions 
 as the gauge and measure of religious truth. 
 In one respect, indeed, I have perhaps de- 
 
 «= St. John vi. 68. 
 
64 LECTURE II. 
 
 parted from the customary language of the 
 pulpit, to a greater extent than was absolutely 
 necessary; — namely, in dealing with the ideas 
 common to Theology and Metaphysics in the 
 terms of the latter, rather than in those of the 
 former. But there is a line of argument, in 
 which the vague generalities of the Absolute 
 and the Infinite may be more reverently and 
 appropriately employed than the sacred names 
 and titles of God. For we almost instinctively 
 shrink back from the recklessness which 
 thrusts forward, on every occasion, the holiest 
 names and things, to be tossed to and fro, 
 and trampled underfoot, in the excitement of 
 controversy. We feel that the name of Him 
 whom we worship may not lightly be held 
 up as a riddle for prying curiosity to puzzle 
 over : we feel that the Divine Personality of 
 our Father in Heaven is not a thing to be 
 pitted in the arena of disputation, against the 
 lifeless abstractions and sophistical word-jug- 
 glings of Pantheism. We feel that, though 
 God is indeed, in His incomprehensible Es- 
 sev^e, absolute and infinite, it is not as the 
 Absolute and Infinite that He appeals to the 
 love and the fear and the reverence of His 
 creatures. We feel that the life of religion 
 lies in the human relations in which God re- 
 veals Himself to man, not in the divine per- 
 
LECTURE II. 65 
 
 fection which those relations veil and modify, 
 though without wholly concealing. We feel 
 that the God to whom we pray, and in whom 
 we trust, is not so much the God eternal and in- 
 finite, without body, parts, or passions, (though 
 we acknowledge that He is all these,) as the 
 God who is " gracious and merciful, slow to 
 anger, and of great kindness, and repenteth 
 Him of the evil (48)''." Those who have ob- 
 served the prevailing character of certain 
 schools of religious thought, in that country 
 which, more than any other, has made Reli- 
 gion speak the language of Metaphysics ; — 
 those who have observed how often, in mo- 
 dern literature, both at home and abroad, the 
 most sacred names are played with, in fami- 
 liar, almost in contemptuous intimacy, will 
 need no other proof to convince them that we 
 cannot attach too much importance to the 
 duty of separating, as far as it can be effected, 
 the language of prayer and praise from the 
 definitions and distinctions of philosophy. 
 
 The metaphysical difficulties which have 
 been exhibited in the course of this Lecture 
 almost suggest of themselves the manner in 
 which they should be treated. We must 
 begin with that which is within us, not with 
 that which is above us ; with the philosophy 
 
 ■^ Joel ii. 13. 
 F 
 
66 LECTURE II. 
 
 of Man, not with that of God. Instead of 
 asking, what are the facts and laws in the 
 constitution of the universe, or in the Divine 
 Nature, by virtue of which certain concep- 
 tions present certain anomalies to the human 
 mind, we should rather ask, what are the facts 
 and laws in the constitution of the human 
 mind, by virtue of which it finds itself in- 
 volved in contradictions, whenever it ventures 
 on certain courses of speculation. Philosophy, 
 as well as Scripture, rightly employed, will 
 teach a lesson of humility to its disciple ; ex- 
 hibiting, as it does, the spectacle of a creature 
 of finite intuitions, surrounded by partial in- 
 dications of the Unlimited ; of finite concep- 
 tions, in the midst of partial manifestations 
 of the Incomprehensible. Questioned in this 
 spirit, the voice of Philosophy will be but an 
 echo of the inspired language of the Psalmist: 
 " Thou hast beset me behind and before, and 
 laid thine hand upon me. Such knowledge 
 is too wonderful for me : it is high ; I cannot 
 attain unto it^" 
 
 « Psalm exxxix. 5, 6. 
 
LECTURE III. 
 
 EXODUS XXXIII, 20, 21, 22, 23. 
 
 And he said, Thou canst not see my face ; for 
 there shall no man see me, and live. And 
 the Lord said, Behold, there is a place by 
 me, and thou shalt stand upon a rock : and 
 it shall come to pass, ivhile my glory passeth 
 by, that I will put thee in a clift of the rock, 
 and will cover thee with my hand while I 
 pass by : and I will take away mine hand, 
 and thou shalt see my back parts ; but my 
 face shall not be seen. 
 
 J\lY last Lecture was chiefly occupied with 
 an examination of the ideas of the Absolute 
 and the Infinite, — ideas which are indispensa- 
 ble to the foundation of a metaphysical Theo- 
 logy, and of which a clear and distinct con- 
 sciousness must be acquired, if such a Theo- 
 logy is to exist at all. I attempted to shew 
 the inadequacy of these ideas for such a pur- 
 pose, by reason of the contradictions which 
 to our apprehension they necessarily involve 
 from every point of view. The result of that 
 attempt may be briefly summed up as fol- 
 lows. We are compelled, by the constitution 
 
 F 2 
 
68 LECTURE III. 
 
 of our minds, to believe in the existence of 
 an Absolute and Infinite Being, — a belief 
 which appears forced upon us, as the com- 
 plement of our consciousness of the relative 
 and the finite. But the instant we attempt 
 to analyse the ideas thus suggested to us, in 
 the hope of attaining to an intelligible con- 
 ception of them, we are on every side involved 
 in inextricable confusion and contradiction. 
 It is no matter from what point of view we 
 commence our examination ; — whether, with 
 the Theist, we admit the coexistence of the In- 
 finite and the Finite, as distinct realities ; or, 
 with the Pantheist, deny the real existence of 
 the Finite ; or, with the Atheist, deny the real 
 existence of the Infinite ; — on each of these 
 suppositions alike, our reason appears divided 
 against itself, compelled to admit the truth of 
 one hypothesis, and yet unable to overcome 
 the apparent impossibilities of each. The 
 philosophy of Rationalism, thus traced up- 
 wards to its highest principles, finds no legi- 
 timate resting-place, from which to commence 
 its deduction of religious consequences. 
 
 In the present Lecture, it will be my en- 
 deavour to offer some explanation of the sin- 
 gular phenomenon of human thought, which 
 is exhibited in these results. I propose to 
 examine the same ideas of the Absolute and 
 
LECTURE III. 69 
 
 the Infinite from the opposite side, in order 
 to see if any light can be thrown on the 
 anomalies which they present to us, by a re- 
 ference to the mental laws under which they 
 are formed. Contradiction, whatever may be 
 its ultimate import, is in itself not a quality 
 of things, but a mode in which they are 
 viewed by the mind ; and the inquiry which 
 it most immediately suggests is, not an in^ 
 vestigation of the nature of things in them- 
 selves, but an examination of those mental 
 conditions under which it is elicited in 
 thought. Such an examination, if it does 
 not enable us to extend the sphere of thought 
 beyond a certain point, may at least serve to 
 make us more distinctly conscious of its triie 
 boundaries. 
 
 The much-disputed question, to what class 
 of mental phenomena the religious conscious- 
 ness belongs, must be postponed to a later 
 stage of our inquiry. At present, we are 
 concerned with a more general investigation, 
 which the answer to that question will in 
 no wise affect. Whether the relation of man 
 to God be primarily presented to the human 
 mind in the form of knowledge, or of feeling, 
 or of practical impulse, it can be given only 
 as a mode of consciousness, subject to those 
 conditions under which alone consciousness 
 
70 LECTURE III. 
 
 is possible. Whatever knowledge is imparted, 
 whatever impulse is communicated, whatever 
 feeling is excited, in man's mind, must take 
 place in a manner adapted to the constitution 
 of its human recipient, and must exhibit such 
 characteristics as the laws of that constitution 
 impose upon it A brief examination of the 
 conditions of human consciousness in general 
 will thus form a proper preliminary to any in- 
 quiry concerning the religious consciousness 
 in particular. 
 
 Now, in the first place, the very conception 
 of Consciousness, in whatever mode it may 
 be manifested, necessarily implies distinction 
 betiveen one object and another. To be con- 
 scious, we must be conscious of something ; 
 and that something can only be known, as 
 that which it is, by being distinguished from 
 that which it is not(l). But distinction is 
 necessarily limitation ; for, if one object is to 
 be distinguished from another, it must pos- 
 sess some form of existence which the other 
 has not, or it must not possess some form 
 which the other has. But it is obvious that 
 the Infinite cannot be distinguished, as such, 
 from the Finite, by the absence of any quality 
 which the Finite possesses ; for such absence 
 would be a limitation. Nor vet can it be 
 distinguished by the presence of an attribute 
 
LECTURE III. 71 
 
 which the Finite has not ; for, as no finite 
 part can be a constituent of an infinite whole, 
 this differential characteristic must itself be 
 infinite ; and must at the same time have 
 nothing in common with the finite. We are 
 thus thrown back upon our former impossi- 
 bility ; for this second infinite will be distin- 
 guished from the finite by the absence of 
 qualities which the latter possesses. A con- 
 sciousness of the Infinite as such thus ne- 
 cessarily involves a self-contradiction ; for it 
 implies the recognition, by limitation ^nd 
 difference, of that which can only be given 
 as unlimited and indifferent (2). 
 
 That man can be conscious of the Infinite, 
 is thus a supposition which, in the very terms 
 in which it is expressed, annihilates itself. 
 Consciousness is essentially a limitation ; for 
 it is the determination of the mind to one 
 actual out of many possible modifications. 
 But the Infinite, if it is to be conceived at 
 all, must be conceived as potentially every 
 thing and actually nothing; for if there is 
 any thing in general which it cannot become, 
 it is thereby limited; and if there is any 
 thing in particular which it actually is, it is 
 thereby excluded from being any other thing. 
 But again, it must also be conceived as actu- 
 ally every thing and potentially nothing ; for 
 
72 LECTURE III. 
 
 an unrealized potentiality is likewise a limi- 
 tation (3). If the infinite can be that which 
 it is not, it is by that very possibility marked 
 out as incomplete, and capable of a higher 
 perfection. If it is actually every thing, it 
 possesses no characteristic feature, by which 
 it can be distinguished from any thing else, 
 and discerned as an object of consciousness. 
 
 This contradiction, which is utterly inex- 
 plicable on the supposition that the infinite 
 is a positive object of human thought, is at 
 once accounted for, when it is regarded as 
 the mere negation of thought. If all thought 
 is limitation ; — if whatever we conceive is, by 
 the very act of conception, regarded as finite, 
 — the infinite, from a human point of view, is 
 merely a name for the absence of those con- 
 ditions under which thought is possible. To 
 speak of a Conception of the Infinite is, there- 
 fore, at once to affirm those conditions and 
 to deny them. The contradiction, which we 
 discover in such a conception, is only that 
 which we have ourselves placed there, by 
 tacitly assuming the conceivability of the in- 
 conceivable. The condition of consciousness 
 is distinction ; and the condition of distinc- 
 tion is limitation. We can have no conscious- 
 ness of Being in general which is not some 
 Being in particular : a thing, in consciousness. 
 
LECTURE III. 73 
 
 is one thing out of many. In assuming the 
 possibility of an infinite object of conscious- 
 ness, I assume, therefore, that it is at the 
 same time limited and unlimited ; — actually 
 something, without which it could not be an 
 object of consciousness, and actually nothing, 
 without which it could not be infinite (4). 
 
 Rationalism is thus only consistent with 
 itself, when it refuses to attribute conscious- 
 ness to God. Consciousness, in the only form 
 in which we can conceive it, implies limitation 
 and change, — the perception of one object 
 out of many, and a comparison of that object 
 with others. To be always conscious of the 
 same object, is, humanly speaking, not to be 
 conscious at all (5) ; and, beyond its human 
 manifestation, we can have no conception of 
 what consciousness is. Viewed on the side 
 of the object of consciousness, the same prin- 
 ciple will carry us further still. Existence 
 itself, that so-called highest category of 
 thought, is only conceivable in the form of 
 existence modified in some particular man- 
 ner. Strip off its modification, and the ap- 
 parent paradox of the German philosopher 
 becomes literally true ; — pure being is pure 
 nothing (6). We have no conception of ex- 
 istence which is not existence in some parti- 
 cular manner; and if we abstract from the 
 
74 LECTURE III. 
 
 manner, we have nothing left to constitute 
 the existence. Those who, in their horror of 
 what they call anthropomorphism, or anthro- 
 popathy, refuse to represent the Deity under 
 symbols borrowed from the limitations of 
 human consciousness, are bound, in consist- 
 ency, to deny that God exists ; for the con- 
 ception of existence is as human and as li- 
 mited as any other. The conclusion which 
 Fichte boldly announces, awful as it is, is 
 but the legitimate consequence o.f his pre- 
 mises. " The moral order of the universe is 
 itself God : we need no other, and we can 
 comprehend no other (7)-" 
 
 A second characteristic of Consciousness is, 
 that it is only possible in the form of a rela- 
 tion. There must be a Subject, or person 
 conscious, and an Object, or thing of which 
 he is conscious. There can be no conscious- 
 ness without the union of these two factors ; 
 and, in that union, each exists only as it is 
 related to the other (8). The subject is a 
 subject, only in so far as it is conscious of an 
 object : the object is an object, only in so far 
 as it is apprehended by a subject : and the 
 destruction of either is the destruction of 
 consciousness itself It is thus manifest that 
 a consciousness of the Absolute is equally 
 self-contradictory with that of the Infinite. 
 
LECTURE III. 75 
 
 To be conscious of the Absolute as such, we 
 must know that an object, which is given in 
 relation to our consciousness, is identical with 
 one which exists in its own nature, out of all 
 relation to consciousness. But to know this 
 identity, we must be able to compare the two 
 together ; and such a comparison is itself a 
 contradiction. We are in fact required to 
 compare that of which we are conscious with 
 that of which we are not conscious ; the com- 
 parison itself being an act of consciousness, 
 and only possible through the consciousness 
 of both its objects. It is thus manifest that, 
 even if we could be conscious of the absolute, 
 we could not possibly know that it is the 
 absolute : and, as we can be conscious of an 
 object as such, only by knowing it to be what 
 it is, this is equivalent to an admission that 
 we cannot be conscious of the absolute at all. 
 As an object of consciousness, every thing is 
 necessarily relative ; and what a thing may 
 be out of consciousness, no mode of con- 
 sciousness can tell us. 
 
 This contradiction, again, admits of the 
 same explanation as the former. Our whole 
 notion of existence is necessarily relative ; 
 for it is existence as conceived by us. But 
 Ewistenee, as we conceive it, is but a name for 
 the several ways in which objects are pre- 
 
76 LECTURE III. 
 
 sented to our consciousness, — a general term, 
 embracing a variety of relations. The Abso- 
 lute, on the other hand, is a term expressing 
 no object of thought, but only a denial of the 
 relation by which thought is constituted. To 
 assume absolute existence as an object of 
 thought, is thus to suppose a relation exist- 
 ing when the related terms exist no longer. 
 An object of thought exists, as such, in and 
 through its relation to a thinker ; while the 
 Absolute, as such, is independent of all rela- 
 tion. The Conception of the Absolute thus 
 implies at the same time the presence and 
 the absence of the relation by which thought 
 is constituted ; and our various endeavours 
 to represent it are only so many modified 
 forms of the contradiction involved in our 
 original assumption. Here, too, the contra- 
 diction is one which we ourselves have made. 
 It does not imply that the Absolute cannot 
 exist ; but it implies, most certainly, that we 
 cannot conceive it as existing (9). 
 
 Philosophers who are anxious to avoid 
 this conclusion have sometimes attempted to 
 evade it, by asserting that we may have in 
 consciousness a partial, but not a total know- 
 ledge of the infinite and the absolute (10). 
 But here again the supposition refutes itself. 
 To have a partial knowledge of an object, is 
 
LECTURE HI. 77 
 
 to know a part of it, but not the whole. But 
 the part of the infinite which is supposed to 
 be known must be itself either infinite or 
 finite. If it is infinite, it presents the same 
 difficulties as before. If it is finite, the point 
 in question is conceded, and our conscious- 
 ness is allowed to be limited to finite objects. 
 But in truth it is obvious, on a moment's 
 reflection, that neither the Absolute nor the 
 Infinite can be represented in the form of a 
 whole composed of parts. Not the Absolute ; 
 for the existence of a whole is dependent on 
 the existence of its parts. Not the Infinite ; 
 for if any p^rt is infinite, it cannot be distin- 
 guished from the whole ; and if each part is 
 finite, no number of such parts can consti- 
 tute the Infinite. 
 
 It would be possible, did my limits allow, 
 to pursue the same argument at length, 
 through the various special modifications 
 which constitute the subordinate forms of 
 consciousness. But with reference to the 
 present inquiry, it will be sufficient to notice 
 two other conditions, under which all con- 
 sciousness is necessarily manifested ; both of 
 which have a special bearing on the relation 
 of philosophy to theological controversy. 
 
 All human consciousness, as being a change 
 in our mental state, is necessarily' subject to 
 the law of Time, in its two manifestations of 
 
78 LECTURE III. 
 
 Succession and Duration. Every object, of 
 whose existence we can be in any way con- 
 scious, is necessarily apprehended by us as 
 succeeding in time to some former object of 
 consciousness, and as itself occupying a cer- 
 tain portion of time. In the former point of 
 view, it is manifest, from what has been said 
 before, that whatever succeeds something else, 
 and is distinguished from it, is necessarily 
 apprehended as finite; for distinction is itself 
 a limitation. In the latter point of view, 
 it is no less manifest that whatever is con- 
 ceived as having a continuous existence in 
 time is equally apprehended as finite. For 
 continuous existence is necessarily conceived 
 as divisible into successive moments. One 
 portion has already gone by ; another is yet 
 to come ; each successive moment is related 
 to something which has preceded, and to 
 something which is to follow : and out of 
 such relations the entire existence is made 
 up. The acts, by which such existence is 
 manifested, being continuous in time, have, 
 at any given moment, a further activity still 
 to come : the object so existing must there- 
 fore always be regarded as capable of becom- 
 ing something which it is not yet actually, — 
 as having an existence incomplete, and re- 
 ceiving at each instant a further completion. 
 It is manifest therefore that, if all objects of 
 
LECTURE III. 79 
 
 human thought exist in time, no such object 
 can be regarded as exhibiting or representing 
 the true nature of an Infinite Being. 
 
 As a necessary consequence of this limita- 
 tion, it follows, that an act of Creation, in the 
 highest sense of the term, — that is to say, an 
 absolutely first link in the chain of pheno- 
 mena, preceded by no temporal antecedent, — 
 is to human thought inconceivable. To re- 
 present in thought the first act of the first 
 cause of all things, I must conceive myself 
 as placed in imagination at the point at 
 which temporal succession commences, and 
 as thus conscious of the relation between a 
 phenomenon in time and a reality out of time. 
 But the consciousness of such a relation im- 
 plies a consciousness of both the related mem- 
 bers ; to realize which, the mind must be in 
 and out of time at the same moment. Time, 
 therefore, cannot be regarded as limited ; for 
 to conceive a first or last moment of time 
 would be to conceive a consciousness into 
 which time enters, preceded or followed by 
 one from which it is absent. But, on the 
 other hand, an infinite succession in time is 
 equally inconceivable ; for this succession also 
 cannot be bounded by time, an^ therefore 
 can only be apprehended by one who is 
 himself free from the law of conceiving in 
 time. From a human point of view, such a 
 
80 LECTURE III. 
 
 conception could only be formed by thrust- 
 ing back the boundary for ever; — a process 
 which itself would require an infinite time for 
 its accomplishment (11). Clogged by these 
 counter impossibilities of thought, two oppo- 
 site speculations have in vain struggled to 
 find articulate utterance, the one for the 
 hypothesis of an endless duration of finite 
 changes, the other for that of an existence 
 prior to duration itself It is perhaps an- 
 other aspect of the same difficulty, that, 
 among various theories of the generation of 
 the world, the idea of a creation out of no- 
 thing seems to have been altogether foreign 
 to ancient philosophy (12). 
 
 The limited character of all existence which 
 can be conceived as having a continuous du- 
 ration, or as made up of successive moments, 
 is so far manifest, that it has been assumed, 
 almost as an axiom, by philosophical theolo- 
 gians, that in the existence of God there is no 
 distinction between past, present and future. 
 "In the changes of things," says Augustine, 
 " there is a past and a future : in God there 
 is a present, in which neither past nor future 
 can be (13)." " Eternity," says Boethius, "is 
 the perfect, possession of interminable life, and 
 of all that life at once ( ] 4) :" and Aquinas, ac- 
 cepting the definition, adds, " Eternity has no 
 succession, but exists all together" (15). But, 
 
LECTURE III. 81 
 
 whether this assertion be literally true or not, 
 (and this we have no means of ascertaining,) 
 it is clear that such a mode of existence is 
 altogether inconceivable by us, and that the 
 words in which it is described represent not 
 thought, but the refusal to think at all. It 
 is impossible that man, so long as he exists in 
 time, should contemplate an object in whose 
 existence there is no time. For the thought 
 by which he contemplates it must be one of 
 his own mental states : it must have a be- 
 ginning and an end : it must occupy a 
 certain portion of duration, as a fact of 
 human consciousness. There is therefore 
 no manner of resemblance or community of 
 nature between the representative thought 
 and that which it is supposed to represent; 
 for the one cannot exist out of time, and the 
 other cannot exist in it (16). Nay, more: 
 even were a mode of representation out of 
 time possible to a man, it is utterly impos- 
 sible that he should know it to be so, or 
 make any subsequent use of the knowledge 
 thus conveyed to him. To be conscious of a 
 thought as mine, I must know it as a present 
 condition of my consciousness : to know that 
 it has been mine, I must remember it as a 
 past condition : and past and present are 
 alike modes of time. It is manifest, |;herefore, 
 
82 LECTURE III. 
 
 that a knowledge of the infinite, as existing 
 out of time, even supposing it to take place 
 at all, cannot be known to be taking place, 
 cannot be remembered to have taken place, 
 and cannot be made available for any purpose 
 at any period of our temporal life (17)- 
 
 The command, so often urged upon man 
 by philosophers and theologians of various 
 ages and schools, " In contemplating God, 
 transcend time" (18), if meant for any thing 
 more than a figure of rhetoric, is equivalent 
 to saying, " Be man no more ; be thyself 
 God." It amounts to the admission that, to 
 know the infinite, the human mind must it- 
 self be infinite ; because an object of con- 
 sciousness, which is in any way limited by 
 the conditions of human thought, cannot be 
 accepted as a representation of the unlimited. 
 But two infinites cannot be conceived as ex- 
 isting together ; and if the mind of man 
 must become infinite to know God, it must 
 itself be God (19). Pantheism, or self-ac- 
 knowledged falsehood, are thus the only al- 
 ternatives possible under this precept. If the 
 human mind, remaining in reality finite, 
 merely fancies itself to be infinite in its con- 
 templation of God, the knowledge of God is 
 itself based on a falsehood. If, on the other 
 hand, it not merely imagines itself to be, but 
 
LECTURE III. 83 
 
 actually is, infinite, its personality is swal- 
 lowed up in the infinity of the Deity ; its 
 human existence is a delusion : God is, lite- 
 rally and properly, all that exists ; and the 
 Finite, which appears to be, but is not, va- 
 nishes before the single existence of the One 
 and All. 
 
 Subordinate to the general law of Time, to 
 which all consciousness is subject, there are 
 two inferior conditions, to which the two 
 great divisions of consciousness are severally 
 subject. Our knowledge of Body is governed 
 by the condition of Space; our knowledge 
 of Mind by that of Personality. I can con- 
 ceive no qualities of body, save as having a 
 definite local position ; and I can conceive 
 no qualities of mind, save as modes of a con- 
 scious self. With the former of these limita- 
 tions our present argument is not concerned; 
 but the latter, as the necessary condition of 
 the conception of spiritual existence, must be 
 taken into account in estimating the philoso- 
 phical value of man's conception of an Infi- 
 nite Mind. 
 
 The various mental attributes which we 
 ascribe to God, Benevolence, Holiness, Just- 
 ice, Wisdom, for example, can be conceived 
 by us only as existing in a benevolent and 
 holy and just and wise Being, who is not 
 
 G 2 
 
84 LECTURE III. 
 
 identical with any one of his attributes, but 
 the common subject of them all; — in one 
 word, in a Person. But Personality, as we 
 conceive it, is essentially a limitation and a 
 relation (20). Our own personality is pre- 
 sented to us as relative and limited; and it 
 is from that presentation that all our repre- 
 sentative notions of personality are derived. 
 Personality is presented to us as a relation 
 between the conscious self and the various 
 modes of his consciousness. There is no 
 personality in abstract thought without a 
 thinker : there is no thinker, unless he exer- 
 cises some mode of thought. Personality is 
 also a limitation ; for the thought and the 
 thinker are distinguished from and limit 
 each other ; and the several modes of thought 
 are distinguished each from each by limita- 
 tion likewise. If I am any one of my own 
 thoughts, I live and die with each successive 
 moment of my consciousness. If I am not 
 any one of my own thoughts, I am limited 
 by that very difference, and each thought, as 
 different from another, is limited also. This 
 too has been clearly seen by philosophical 
 theologians ; and accordingly, they have main- 
 tained that in God there is^ no distinction 
 between the subject of consciousness and its 
 modes, nor between one mode and another. 
 
LECTURE III. 85 
 
 " God," says Augustine, " is not a Spirit as 
 regards substance, and good as regards qua- 
 lity ; but both as regards substance. The 
 Justice of God is one with His Goodness and 
 with His Blessedness ; and all are one with 
 His Spirituality" (21). But this assertion, if 
 it be literally true, (and of this we have no 
 means of judging,) annihilates Personality 
 itself, in the only form in which we can con- 
 ceive it. We cannot transcend our own per- 
 sonality, as we cannot transcend our own 
 relation to time : and to speak of an Ab- 
 solute and Infinite Person, is simply to use 
 language to which, however true it may be 
 in a superhuman sense, no mode of human 
 thought can possibly attach itself. 
 
 But are we therefore justified, even on 
 philosophical grounds, in denying the Per- 
 sonality of God ? or do we gain a higher or 
 a truer representation of Him, by asserting, 
 with the ancient or the modern Pantheist, 
 that God, as absolute and infinite, can have 
 neither intelligence nor will (22) ? Far from 
 it. We dishonour God far more by identi- 
 fying Him with the feeble and negative im- 
 potence of thought, which we are pleased to 
 style the Infinite, than by remaining content 
 within those limits which He for His own 
 good purposes has imposed upon us, and con- 
 
86 LECTURE III. 
 
 fining ourselves to a manifestation, imperfect 
 indeed and inadequate, and acknowledged to 
 be so, but still the highest idea that we can 
 form, the noblest tribute that we can oifer. 
 Personality, with all its limitations, though 
 far from exhibiting the absolute nature of 
 God as He is, is yet truer, grander, more 
 elevating, more religious, than those barren, 
 vague, meaningless abstractions in which 
 men babble about nothing under the name of 
 the Infinite. Personal, conscious existence, 
 limited though it be, is yet the noblest of all 
 existences of which man can dream ; for it 
 is that by which all existence is revealed to 
 him : it is grander than the grandest object 
 which man can know ; for it is that which 
 knows, not that which is known (23). " Man," 
 says Pascal, "is but a reed, the frailest in 
 nature ; but he' is a reed that thinks. It 
 needs not that the whole universe should 
 arm itself to crush him ; — a vapour, a drop 
 of water, will suffice to destroy him. But 
 should the universe crush him, man would 
 yet be nobler than that which destroys him ; 
 for he knows that he dies ; while of the 
 advantage which the universe has over him, 
 the universe knows nothing" (24). It is by 
 consciousness alone that we know that God 
 exists, or that we are able to offer Him any 
 
LECTURE III. 87 
 
 service. It is only by conceiving Him as 
 a Conscious Being, that we can stand in any 
 religious relation to Him at all ; that we 
 can form such a representation of Him as 
 is demanded by our spiritual wants, insuffi- 
 cient though it be to satisfy our intellectual 
 curiosity. 
 
 It is from the intense consciousness of our 
 own real existence as Persons, that the con- 
 ception of reality takes its rise in our minds : 
 it is through that consciousness alone that we 
 can raise ourselves to the faintest image of 
 the supreme reality of God. What is reality 
 and what is appearance, is the riddle which 
 Philosophy has put forth from the birthday 
 of human thought ; and the only approach to 
 an answer has been a voice from the depths 
 of the personal consciousness : " I think ; 
 therefore I am" (25). In the antithesis be- 
 tween the thinker and the object of his 
 thought, — between myself and that which 
 is related to me, — we find the type and the 
 source of the universal contrast between the 
 one and the many, the permanent and the 
 changeable, the real and the apparent. That 
 which I see, that which I hear, that which I 
 think, that which I feel, changes and passes 
 away with each moment of my varied exist- 
 ence. 1, who see, and hear, and think, and 
 
88 LECTURE III. 
 
 feel, am the one continuous self, whose exist- 
 ence gives unity and connection to the whole. 
 Personality comprises all that we know of 
 that which exists : relation to personality 
 comprises all that we know of that which 
 seems to exist. And when, from the little 
 world of man's consciousness and its objects, 
 we would lift up our eyes to the inexhausti- 
 ble universe beyond, and ask, to whom all 
 this is related, the highest existence is still 
 the highest personality ; and the Source of 
 all Being reveals Himself by His name, I 
 AM " (26). 
 
 If there is one dream of a godless philo- 
 sophy to which, beyond all others, every 
 moment of our consciousness gives the lie, 
 it is that which subordinates the individual 
 to the universal, the person to the species ; 
 which deifies kinds and realizes classifica- 
 tions ; which sees Being in generalization, and 
 Appearance in limitation ; which regards the 
 living and conscious man as a wave on the 
 ocean of the unconscious infinite ; his life, a 
 momentary tossing to and fro on the shifting 
 tide ; his destiny, to be swallowed up in the 
 formless and boundless universe (27). The 
 final conclusion of this philosophy, in direct 
 antagonism to the voice of consciousness, is, 
 » Exodus iii. 14. 
 
LECTURE III. 89 
 
 " I think ; therefore I am not." When men 
 look around them in bewilderment for that 
 which lies within them ; when they talk of 
 the enduring species and the perishing indi- 
 vidual, and would find, in the abstractions 
 which their own minds have made, a higher 
 and truer existence than in the mind which 
 made them ; — they seek for that which they 
 know, and know not that for which they seek 
 (28). They would fain lift up the curtain of 
 their own being, to view the picture which it 
 conceals. Like the painter of old, they know 
 not that the curtain is the picture (29). 
 
 It is our duty, then, to think of God as 
 personal ; and it is our duty to believe that 
 He is infinite. It is true that we cannot 
 reconcile these two representations with each 
 other; as our conception of personality in- 
 volves attributes apparently contradictory to 
 the notion of infinity. But it does not fol- 
 low that this contradiction exists any where 
 but in our own minds : it does not follow 
 that it implies any impossibility in the abso- 
 lute nature of God. The apparent contra- 
 diction, in this case, as in those previously 
 noticed, is the necessary consequence of an 
 attempt on the part of the human thinker 
 to transcend the boundaries of his own con- 
 sciousness. It proves that there are limits 
 
90 LECTURE III. 
 
 to man's power of thought ; and it proves 
 no more. 
 
 The preceding considerations are equally 
 conclusive against both the methods of meta- 
 physical theology described in my last Lec- 
 ture ; that which commences with the divine 
 to reason down to the human, and that which 
 commences with the human to reason up to 
 the divine. For though the mere abstract 
 expression of the infinite, when regarded as 
 indicating nothing more than the negation 
 of limitation, and therefore of conceivability, 
 is not contradictory in itself, it becomes so 
 the instant we attempt to apply it in reason- 
 ing to any object of thought. A thing — an 
 object — an attribute — a person — or any other 
 term signifying one out of many possible ob- 
 jects of consciousness, is by that very relation 
 necessarily declared to be finite. An infinite 
 thing, or object, or attribute, or person, is 
 therefore in the same moment declared to be 
 both finite and infinite. We cannot, there- 
 fore, start from any abstract assumption of 
 the divine infinity, to reason downwards to 
 any object of human thought. And on the 
 other hand, if all human attributes are con- 
 ceived under the conditions of difference, and 
 relation, and time, and personality, we can- 
 not represent in thought any such attribute 
 
LECTURE III. 91 
 
 magnified to infinity ; for this again is to 
 conceive it as finite and infinite at the same 
 time. We can conceive such attributes, at 
 the utmost, only indefinitely : that is to say 
 we may w^ithdraw our thought, for the mo- 
 ment, from the fact of their being limited ; 
 but we cannot conceive them as infinite : 
 that is to say, we cannot positively think of 
 the absence of the limit ; for, the instant we 
 attempt to do so, the antagonist elements 
 of the conception exclude one another, and 
 annihilate the whole. 
 
 There remains but one subterfuge to which 
 Philosophy can have recourse, before she is 
 driven to confess that the Absolute and the 
 Infinite are beyond her grasp. If conscious- 
 ness is against her, she must endeavour to 
 get rid of consciousness itself. And, accord- 
 ingly, the most distinguished representatives 
 of this philosophy in recent times, however 
 widely differing upon other questions, agree 
 in maintaining that the foundation for a 
 knowledge of the infinite must be laid in a 
 point beyond consciousness (30). But a 
 system which starts from this assumption 
 postulates its own failure at the outset. It 
 attempts to prove that consciousness is a de- 
 lusion ; and consciousness itself is made the 
 instrument of proof; for by consciousness its 
 
92 LECTURE III. 
 
 reasonings must be framed and apprehended. 
 It is by reasonings, conducted in conformity 
 to the ordinary laws of thought, that the phi- 
 losopher attempts to shew that the highest 
 manifestations of reason are above those laws. 
 It is by representations, exhibited under the 
 conditions of time and difference, that the 
 philosopher endeavours to prove the exist- 
 ence, and ^deliver the results, of an intuition 
 in which time and difference are annihilated. 
 They thus assume, at the same moment, the 
 truth and the falsehood of the normal con- 
 sciousness ; they divide the human mind 
 against itself; and by that division prove no 
 more than that two supposed faculties of 
 thought mutually invalidate each other's 
 evidence. Thus, by an act of reason, phi- 
 losophy destroys reason itself: it passes at 
 once from rationalism to mysticism, and 
 makes inconceivability the criterion of truth. 
 In dealing with religious truths, the theory 
 which repudiates with scorn the notion of 
 believing a doctrine although it is incompre- 
 hensible, springs at one desperate bound clear 
 over faith into credulity, and proclaims that 
 its own principles must be believed because 
 they are incomprehensible. The rhetori- 
 cal paradox of the fervid African is adopted 
 in cold blood as an axiom of metaphysical 
 
LECTURE III. 93 
 
 speculation : " It is certain, because it is im- 
 possible (31)." Such a theory is open to two 
 fatal objections : — it cannot be communicated, 
 and it cannot be verified. It cannot be com- 
 municated ; for the communication must be 
 made in words ; and the meaning of those 
 words must be understood ; and the under- 
 standing is a state of the normal conscious- 
 ness. It cannot be verified ; for, to verify, 
 we must compare the author's experience 
 with our own ; and such a comparison is 
 again a state of consciousness. Let it be 
 granted for a moment, though the concession 
 refutes itself, that a man may have a cogni- 
 sance of the infinite by some mode of know- 
 ledge which is above consciousness. He can 
 never say that the idea thus acquired is like 
 or unlike that possessed by any other man ; for 
 likeness implies comparison ; and comparison 
 is only possible as a mode of consciousness, 
 and between objects regarded as limited and 
 related to each other. That which is out of 
 consciousness cannot be pronounced true ; 
 for truth is the correspondence between a 
 conscious representation and the object which 
 it represents. Neither can it be pronounced 
 false ; for falsehood consists in the disagree- 
 ment between a similar representation and 
 its object. Here then is the very suicide of 
 
94 LECTURE III. 
 
 Rationalism. To prove its own truth and the 
 falsehood of antagonistic systems, it postu- 
 lates a condition under which neither truth 
 nor falsehood is possible. 
 
 The results, to which an examination of 
 the facts of consciousness has conducted us, 
 may be briefly summed up as follows. Our 
 whole consciousness manifests itself as sub- 
 ject to certain limits, which we are unable, 
 in any act of thought, to transgress. That 
 which falls within these limits, as an object 
 of thought, is known to us as relative and 
 finite. The existence of a limit to our powers 
 of thought is manifested by the consciousness 
 of contradiction, which implies at the same 
 time an attempt to think and an inability to' 
 accomplish that attempt. But a limit is 
 necessarily conceived as a relation between 
 something within and something without it- 
 self ; and thus the consciousness of a limit of 
 thought implies, though it does not directly 
 present to us, the existence of something of 
 which we do not and cannot think. When 
 we lift up our eyes to that blue vault of 
 heaven, which is itself but the limit of our 
 own power of sight, we are compelled to sup- 
 pose, though we cannot perceive, the exist- 
 ence of space beyond, as well as within it ; we 
 regard the boundary of vision as parting the 
 
LECTURE III. 95 
 
 visible from the invisible. And when, in 
 mental contemplation, we are conscious of 
 relation and difference, as the limits of our 
 power of thought, we regard them, in like 
 manner, as the boundary between the con- 
 ceivable and the inconceivable; though we 
 are unable to penetrate, in thought, beyond 
 the nether sphere, to the unrelated and un- 
 limited which it hides from us (32). The 
 Absolute and the Infinite are thus, like the 
 Inconceivable and the Imperceptible, names 
 indicating, not an object of thought or of 
 consciousness at all, but the mere absence of 
 the conditions under which consciousness is 
 possible. The attempt to construct in thought 
 an object answering to such names, neces- 
 sarily results in contradiction ; — a contradic- 
 tion, however, which we have ourselves pro- 
 duced by the attempt to think ; — which exists 
 in the act of thought, but not beyond it ; — 
 which destroys the conception as such, but 
 indicates nothing concerning the existence or 
 non-existence of that which we try to con- 
 ceive. It proves our own impotence, and it 
 proves nothing more. Or rather, it indirectly 
 leads us to believe in the existence of that 
 Infinite which we cannot conceive ; for the 
 denial of its existence involves a contradic- 
 tion, no less than the assertion of Jts con- 
 
96 LECTURE III. 
 
 ceivability. We thus learn that the provinces 
 of Reason and Faith are not coextensive ; — 
 that it is a duty, enjoined by Reason itself, 
 to believe in that which w^eare unable to 
 comprehend. 
 
 I have now concluded that portion of my 
 argument in which it was necessary to in- 
 vestigate in abstract terms the limits of hu- 
 man thought in general, as a preliminary to 
 the examination of religious thought in par- 
 ticular. As yet, we have viewed only the 
 negative side of man's consciousness : — we 
 have seen how it does not represent God, and 
 why it does not so represent Him. There 
 remains still to be attempted the positive 
 side of the same inquiry ; — namely, what does 
 our consciousness actually tell us concerning 
 the Divine Existence and Attributes ; and 
 how does its testimony agree with that fur- 
 nished by Revelation. In prosecuting this 
 further inquiry, I hope to be able to con- 
 fine myself to topics more resembling those 
 usually handled in this place, and to lan- 
 guage more strictly appropriate to the treat- 
 ment of Christian Theology. Yet there are 
 advantages in the method which I have 
 hitherto pursued, which may, I trust, be 
 accepted as a sufficient excuse for whatever 
 may have sounded strange and obscure in its 
 
LECTURE III. 97 
 
 phraseology. So long as the doubts and diffi- 
 culties of philosophical speculation are fami- 
 liar to us only in their religious aspect and 
 language, so long we may be led to think 
 that there is some peculiar defect or per- 
 ple3iity in the evidences of religion, by which 
 it is placed in apparent antagonism to the 
 more obvious and unquestionable conclusions 
 of reason. • A very brief examination of cog- 
 nate questions in their metaphysical aspect, 
 will suffice to dissipate this misapprehension* 
 and to shew that the philosophical difficul- 
 ties, which rationalists profess to discover in 
 Christian doctrines, are in fact inherent in 
 the laws of human thought, and must accom- 
 pany every attempt at religious or irreligious 
 speculation. 
 
 There is also another consideration, which 
 may justify the Christian preacher in exa- 
 mining, at times, the thoughts and language 
 of human philosophy, apart from their special 
 application to religious truths. A religious 
 association may sometimes serve to disguise 
 the real character of a line of thought which, 
 without that association, would have little 
 power to mislead. Speculations which end in 
 unbelief are often (Commenced in a believing 
 spirit. It is painful, but at the same time 
 instructive, to trace the gradual progress, by 
 which an unstable disciple often tears off strip 
 
 H 
 
98 LECTURE III. 
 
 by strip the wedding garment of his faith, — 
 scarce conscious the while of his own in- 
 creasing nakedness ; — and to mark how the 
 language of Christian belief may remain al- 
 most untouched, when the substance and the 
 life have departed from it. While Philo- 
 sophy speaks nothing but the language of 
 Christianity, we may be tempted to think 
 that the two are really one ; that our own 
 speculations are but leading us to Christ by 
 another and a more excellent way. Many a 
 young aspirant after a philosophical faith, 
 trusts himself to the trackless ocean of ra- 
 tionalism in the spirit of the too-confident 
 Apostle : " Lord, bid me come unto thee on 
 the water ''." And for a while he knows not 
 how deep he sinks ; till the treacherous sur- 
 face on which he treads is yielding on every 
 side, and the dark abyss of utter unbelief is 
 yawning to swallow him up. Well is it in- 
 deed with those who, even in that last fearful 
 hour, can yet cry, " Lord, save me," and can 
 feel that supporting hand stretched out to 
 grasp them, and hear that voice, so warning, 
 yet so comforting, " thou of little faith, 
 wherefore didst thou doubt?" 
 
 But who that enters upon his course of 
 mistrust shall dare to say that such will be 
 the end of it ? Far better is it to learn at the 
 b St. Matthew xivi 28. 
 
LECTURE III. 99 
 
 outset the nature of that unstable surface on 
 which' we would tread, without being tempted 
 by the phantom of religious promise, which 
 shines delusively over it. He who hath or- 
 dered all things in measure and number and 
 weight ", has also given to the reason of man, 
 as to his life, its boundaries, which it cannot 
 pass^ And if, in the investigation of those 
 boundaries, we have turned for a little while, 
 to speak the language of human philosophy, 
 the result will but be to shew that philosophy, 
 rightly understood, teaches one lesson with 
 the sacred volume of Revelation. With that 
 lesson let us conclude, as it is given in the 
 words of our own judicious divine and philo- 
 sopher. " Dangerous it were for the feeble 
 brain of man to wade far into the doings of 
 the Most High ; whom although to know be 
 life, and joy to make mention of His name ; 
 yet our soundest knowledge is to know that 
 we know Him not as indeed He is, neither 
 can know Him : and our safest eloquence con- 
 cerning Him is our silence, when we confess 
 without confession that His glory is inexpli- 
 cable. His greatness above our capacity and 
 reach. He is above, and we upon earth ; 
 therefore it behoveth our words to be wary 
 and few (33)." 
 
 "= Wisdom xi. 20. '' Job xiv. 5. 
 
 H 2 
 
LECTURE lY. 
 
 PSALM LXV. 2. 
 
 O thou that hearest prayer, unto thee shall 
 
 all flesh come. 
 
 xHAT the Finite cannot comprehend the 
 Infinite, is a truth more frequently admitted 
 in theory than applied in practice. It has 
 been expressly asserted by men who, almost 
 in the same breath, have proceeded to lay 
 down canons of criticism, concerning the pur- 
 pose of Revelation, and the truth or false- 
 hood, importance or insignificance, of parti- 
 cular doctrines, on grounds which are tenable 
 only on the supposition of a perfect and inti- 
 mate knowledge of God's Nature and Coun- 
 sels (1). Hence it becomes necessary to bring 
 down the above truth from general to special 
 statements; — to inquire more particularly 
 wherein the limitation of man's faculties con- 
 sists, and in what manner it exhibits itself in 
 the products of thought. This task I en- 
 deavoured to accomplish in my last Lecture. 
 To pursue the conclusion thus obtained to its 
 
LECTURE IV. 101 
 
 legitimate consequences in relation to Theo- 
 logy, we must next inquire how the human 
 mind, thus limited, is able to form the idea 
 of a relation between man and God, and 
 what is the nature of that conception of God 
 which arises from the consciousness of this 
 relation. The purpose of our inquiry is to 
 ascertain the limits of religious thought ; and, 
 for this purpose, it is necessary to proceed 
 from the limits of thought and of human 
 consciousness in general, to those particular 
 forms of consciousness which, in thought or 
 in some other mode, especially constitute the 
 essence of Religion. 
 
 Reasonings, probable or demonstrative, in 
 proof of the being and attributes of God, 
 have met with a very different reception at 
 different periods. Elevated at one time, by 
 the injudicious zeal of their advocates, to a 
 certainty and importance to which they have 
 no legitimate claim, at another, by an equally 
 extravagant reaction, they have been sacri- 
 ficed in the mass to some sweeping principle 
 of criticism, or destroyed piecemeal by mi- 
 nute objections in detail. While one school 
 of theologians has endeavoured to raise the 
 whole edifice of the Christian Faith on a basis 
 of metaphysical proof (2) ; others have either 
 expressly maintained that the understanding 
 
102 LECTURE IV. 
 
 has nothing to do with religious belief, or 
 have indirectly attempted to establish the 
 same conclusion by special refutations of the 
 particular reasonings (3). 
 
 An examination of the actual state of the 
 human mind, as regards religious ideas, will 
 lead us to a conclusion intermediate between 
 these two extremes. On the one hand, it 
 must be allowed that it is not through rea- 
 soning that men obtain the first intimation 
 of their relation to the Deity ; and that, had 
 they been left to the guidance of their intel- 
 lectual faculties alone, it is possible that no 
 such intimation might have taken place ; or 
 at best, that it would have been but as one 
 guess, out of many equally plausible and 
 equally natural. Those who lay exclusive 
 stress on the proof of the existence of God 
 from the marks of design in the world, or 
 from the necessity of supposing a first cause 
 of all phenomena, overlook the fact that man 
 learns to pray before he learns to reason, — 
 that he feels within him the consciousness of 
 a Supreme Being, and the instinct of worship, 
 before he can argue from effects to causes, or 
 estimate the traces of wisdom and bienevo- 
 lence scattered through the creation. But on 
 the other hand, arguments which would be 
 insufficient to create the notion of a Supreme 
 
LECTURE IV. 103 
 
 Being in a mind previously destitute of it, 
 may have great force and value in enlarging 
 or correcting a notion already existing, and 
 in justifying to the reason the unreasoning 
 convictions of the heart. The belief in a God, 
 once given, becomes the nucleus round which 
 subsequent experiences cluster and accumu- 
 late ; and evidences which would be obscure 
 or ambiguous, if addressed to the reason only, 
 become clear and convincing, when interpreted 
 by the light of the religious consciousness. 
 
 We may therefore without hesitation ac- 
 cede to the argument of the great Critic of 
 metaphysics, when he tells us that the specu- 
 lative reason is unable to prove the existence 
 of a Supreme Being, but can only correct our 
 conception of such a Being, supposing it to 
 be already obtained (4). But at the same 
 time, it is necessary to protest against the per- 
 nicious extent to which the reaction against 
 the use of the reason in theology has in too 
 many instances been carried. When the same 
 critic tells us that we cannot legitimately in- 
 fer, from the order and design visible in the 
 world, the omnipotence and omniscience of 
 its Creator, because a degree of power* and 
 wisdom short of the very highest might pos- 
 sibly be sufficient to produce all the effects 
 which we are able to discern (5) ; or when a 
 
104 LECTURE IV. 
 
 later writer, following in the same track, con- 
 demns the argument from final causes, be- 
 cause it represents God exclusively in the 
 aspect of an artist (6) ; or when a third writer, 
 of a different school, tells us that the pro- 
 cesses of thought have nothing to do with 
 the soul, the organ of religion (7) ; — we feel 
 that systems which condemn the use of rea- 
 soning in sacred things, may be equally one- 
 sided and extravagant with those which as- 
 sert its supreme authority. Reasoning must 
 not be condemned for failing to accomplish 
 what no possible mode of human conscious- 
 ness ever does or can accomplish. If con- 
 sciousness itself is a limitation ; if every mode 
 of consciousness is a determination of the 
 mind in one particular manner out of many 
 possible ; — it follows indeed that the infinite 
 is beyond the reach of man's arguments ; but 
 only as it is also beyond the reach of his 
 feelings or his volitions. We cannot indeed 
 reason to the existence of an infinite Cause 
 from the presence of finite effects, nor con- 
 template the infinite in a finite mode of 
 knowledge ; but neither can we feel the infi- 
 nite in the form of a finite affection, nor dis- 
 cern it as the law of a finite action. If our 
 whole consciousness of God is partial and 
 incomplete, composed of various attributes 
 
LECTURE IV. 105 
 
 manifested in various relations, why should 
 we condemn the reasoning which represents 
 Him in a single aspect, so long as it neither 
 asserts nor implies that that aspect is the 
 only one in which He can be represented ? 
 If man is not a creature composed solely of 
 intellect, or solely of feeling, or solely of will, 
 why should any one element of his nature be 
 excluded from participating in the pervading 
 consciousness of Him in whom we live, and 
 move, and have our being ?^ A religion based 
 solely on the reason may starve on barren 
 abstractions, or bewilder itself with inex- 
 plicable contradictions ; but a religion which 
 repudiates thought to take refuge in feeling, 
 abandons itself to the wild follies of fanati- 
 cism, or the diseased ecstasies of mysticism : 
 while one which acknowledges the practical 
 energies alone, may indeed attain to Stoicism ; 
 but will fall far short of Christianity. It is 
 our duty indeed to pray with the spirit ; but 
 it is no less our duty to pray with the under- 
 standing also**. 
 
 Taking then, as the basis of our inquiry, 
 the admission that the whole consciousness 
 of man, whether in thought, or in feeling, or 
 in volition, is limited in the manner of its 
 operation and in the objects to which it is 
 * Acts xvii. 38. b I Corinthians xiv. 15. 
 
106 LECTURE JV. 
 
 related, let us endeavour, with regard to the 
 religious consciousness in particular, to sepa- 
 rate from each other the complicated threads 
 which, in their united web, constitute the 
 conviction of man's relation to a Supreme 
 Being, In distinguishing, however, one por- 
 tion of these as forming the origin of this 
 conviction, and another portion as contri- 
 buting rather to its further development and 
 direction, I must not be understood to main- 
 tain or imply that the former could have ex- 
 isted and been recognised, prior to and inde- 
 pendently of the cooperation of the latter. 
 Consciousness, in its earliest discernible form, 
 is only possible as the result of an union of 
 the reflective with the intuitive faculties. A 
 state of mind, to be known at all as existing, 
 must be distinguished from other states ; and, 
 to make this distinction, we must think of it, 
 as well as experience it. Without thought 
 as well as sensation, there could be no con- 
 sciousness of the existence of an external 
 world: without thought as well as emotion 
 and volition, there could be no consciousness 
 of the moral nature of man. Sensation with- 
 out thought would at most amount to no 
 more than an indefinite sense of uneasiness 
 or momentary irritation, without any power 
 of discerning in what manner we are affected, 
 
LECTURE IV. 107 
 
 or of distinguishing our successive affections 
 from each other. To distinguish, for example, 
 in the visible world, any one object from any 
 other, to know the house as a house, or the 
 tree as a tree, we must be able to refer them 
 to distinct notions ; and such reference is an 
 act of thought. The same condition holds 
 good of the religious consciousness also. In 
 whatever mental affection we become con- 
 scious of our relation to a Supreme Being, 
 we can discern that consciousness, as such, 
 only by reflecting upon it as conceived under 
 its proper notion. Without this, we could 
 not know our religious consciousness to be 
 what it is : and, as the knowledge of a fact of 
 consciousness is identical with its existence, 
 — without this, the religious consciousness, 
 as such, could not exist. 
 
 But notwithstanding this necessary cooper- 
 ation of thought in every manifestation of 
 human consciousness, it is not to the reflec- 
 tive faculties that we must look, if we would 
 discover the origin of religion. For to the ex- 
 ercise of reflection, it is necessary that there 
 should exist an object on which to reflect; 
 and though, in the order of time, the distinct 
 recognition of this object is simultaneous with 
 the act of reflecting upon it ; yet, in the order 
 of nature, the latter presupposes the former. 
 
108 LECTURE IV. 
 
 Religious thought, if it is to exist at all, can 
 only exist as representative of some fact of 
 religious intuition, — of some individual state 
 of mind, in which is presented, as an imme- 
 diate fact, that relation of man to God, of 
 v\^hich man, by reflection, may become dis- 
 tinctly and definitely conscious. 
 
 Two such states may be specified, as di- 
 viding between them the rude materials out 
 of which Reflection builds up the edifice of 
 Religious Consciousness. These are the FeeU 
 ing of Dependence and the Conviction of 
 Moral Obligation. To these two facts of the 
 inner consciousness may be traced, as to their 
 sources, the two great outward acts by which 
 religion in various forms has been manifested 
 among men ; — Prayer, by which they seek 
 to win God's blessing upon the future, and 
 Ewpiation, by which they strive to atone for 
 the offences of the past (8). The Feeling of 
 Dependence is the instinct which urges us 
 to pray. It is the feeling that our existence 
 and welfare are in the hands of a superior 
 Power; — not of an inexorable Fate or im- 
 mutable Law ; but of a Being having at least 
 so far the attributes of Personality, that He 
 can shew favour or severity to those de- 
 pendent upon Him, and can be regarded by 
 them with the feelings of hope, and fear, and 
 
LECTURE IV. 109 
 
 reverence, and gratitude. It is a feeling si- 
 milar in kind, though higher in degree, to that 
 which is awakened in the mind of the child 
 towards his parent, who is first manifested to 
 his mind as the giver of such things as are 
 needful, and to whom the first language he 
 addresses is that of entreaty. It is the feel- 
 ing so fully and intensely expressed in the 
 language of the Psalmist : " Thou art he that 
 took me out of my mother's womb : thou 
 wast my hope, when I hanged yet upon my 
 mother's breasts. I have been left unto thee 
 ever since I was born : thou art my God even 
 from my mother's womb. Be not thou far 
 from me, O Lord : thou art my succoUr, 
 haste thee to help me. I will declare thy 
 Name unto my brethren : in the midst of 
 the congregation will I praise thee^" With 
 the first development of consciousness, there 
 grows up, as a part of it, the innate feeling 
 that our life, natural and spiritual, is not in 
 our power to sustain or to prolong; — that 
 there is One above us, on whom we are de- 
 pendent, whose existence we learn, and whose 
 presence we realize, by the sure instinct of 
 Prayer. We have thus, in the Sense of De- 
 pendence, the foundation of one great ele- 
 ment of Religion, — the Fear of God. 
 
 = Psalm xxii. 9, 10, 19, 22. 
 
no LECTURE IV. 
 
 But the mere consciousness of dependence 
 does not of itself exhibit the character of the 
 Being on whom we depend. It is as con- 
 sistent with superstition as with religion ; — 
 with the belief in a malevolent, as in a bene- 
 volent Deity : it is as much called into ex- 
 istence by the severities, as by the mercies of 
 God ; by the suffering which we are unable 
 to avert, as by the benefits which we did not 
 ourselves procure (9). The Being on whom 
 we depend is, in that single relation, mani- 
 fested in the infliction of pain, as well as in 
 the bestowal of happiness. But in order to 
 make suffering, as well as enjoyment, contri- 
 bute to the religious education of man, it is 
 necessary that he should be conscious, not 
 merely of suffering, but of sin; — that he 
 should look upon pain not merely as inflicted, 
 but as deserved ; and should recognise in its 
 Author the justice that punishes, not merely 
 the anger that harms. In the feeling of de- 
 pendence, we are conscious of the Power of 
 God, but not necessarily of His Goodness. 
 This deficiency, however, is supplied by the 
 other element of religion, — the Conscious- 
 ness of Moral Obligation, — carrying with it, 
 as it necessarily does, the Conviction of Sin. 
 It is impossible to estabHsh, as a great modern 
 philosopher has attempted to do, the theory 
 
LECTURE IV. Ill 
 
 of an absolute Autonomy of the Will ; that 
 is to say, of an obligatory law, resting on no 
 basis but that of its own imperative cha- 
 racter (10). Considered solely in itself, with 
 no relation to any higher authority, the con- 
 sciousness of a law of obligation is a fact of 
 our mental constitution, and it is no more. 
 The fiction of an absolute law, binding on 
 all rational beings, has only an apparent uni- 
 versality; because we can only conceive other 
 rational beings by identifying their constitu- 
 tion with our own, and making human reason 
 the measure and representative of reason in 
 general. Why then has one part of our con- 
 stitution, merely as such, an imperative au- 
 thority over the remainder ? What right has 
 one portion of the human consciousness to 
 represent itself as duty, and another merely 
 as inclination ? There is but one answer pos- 
 sible. The Moral Reason, or Will, or Con- 
 science, of Man, call it by what name we 
 please, can have no authority, save as im- 
 planted in him by some higher Spiritual 
 Being, as a haw emanating from a Lawgiver. 
 Man can be a law unto himself, only on the 
 supposition that he reflects in himself the 
 Law of God ; — that he shews, as the Apostle 
 tells us, the works of that law written in his 
 
112 LECTURE IV. 
 
 hearf*. If he is absolutely a law unto him- 
 self, his duty and his pleasure are undistin- 
 guishable from each other ; for he is subject 
 to no one, and accountable to no one. Duty 
 in this case, becomes only a higher kind of 
 pleasure, — a balance between the present and 
 the future, between the larger and the smaller 
 gratification. We are thus compelled, by the 
 consciousness of moral obligation, to assume 
 the existence of a moral Deity, and to regard 
 the absolute standard of right and wrong as 
 constituted by the nature of that Deity (11). 
 The conception of this standard, in the human 
 mind, may indeed be faint and fluctuating, 
 and must be imperfect : it may vary with the 
 intellectual and moral culture of the nation 
 or the individual : and in its highest human 
 representation, it must fall far short of the 
 reality. But it is present to all mankind, as 
 a basis of moral obligation and an induce- 
 ment to moral progress : it is present in the 
 universal consciousness of sin ; in the convic- 
 tion that we are oiFenders against God ; in 
 the expiatory rites by which, whether in- 
 spired by some natural instinct, or inherited 
 from some primeval tradition, divers nations 
 have, in their various modes, striven to atone 
 ^ Romans ii. 15. 
 
LECTURE IV. 113 
 
 for their transgressions, and to satisfy the 
 wrath of their righteous Judge (12). How- 
 ever erroneously the particular acts of reli- 
 gious service may have been understood by 
 men ; yet, in the universal consciousness of 
 innocence and guilt, of duty and disobedi- 
 ence, of an appeased and offended God, there 
 is exhibited the instinctive confession of all 
 mankind, that the moral nature of man, as 
 subject to a law of obligation, reflects and 
 represents, in some degree, the moral nature 
 of a Deity by whom that obligation is im- 
 posed. 
 
 But these two elements of the religious 
 consciousness, however real and efficient 
 within their own limits, are subject to the 
 same restrictions which we have before no- 
 ticed as binding upon consciousness in ge- 
 neral. Neither in the feeling of dependence, 
 nor in that of obligation, can we be directly 
 conscious of the Absolute or the Infinite, as 
 such. And it is the more necessary to no- 
 tice this limitation, inasmuch as an opposite 
 theory has been maintained by one whose 
 writings have had perhaps more influence 
 than those of any other man, in forming 
 the modern religious philosophy of his own 
 country ; and whose views, in all their es- 
 sential features, have been ably maintained 
 
114 LECTURE IV. 
 
 and widely diffused among ourselves. Ac- 
 cording to Schleiermacher, the essence of 
 Religion is to be found in a feeling of abso- 
 lute and entire dependence, in which the 
 mutual action and reaction of subject and 
 object upon each other, which constitutes the 
 ordinary consciousness of mankind, gives way 
 to a sense of utter, passive helplessness, — to a 
 consciousness that our entire personal agency 
 is annihilated in the presence of the infinite 
 energy of the Godhead. In our intercourse 
 with the world, he tells us, whether in rela- 
 tion to nature or to human society, the feel- 
 ing of freedom and that of dependence are 
 always present in mutual operation upon each 
 other ; sometimes in equilibrium ; sometimes 
 with a vast preponderance of the one or the 
 other feeling ; but never to the entire exclu- 
 sion of either. But in our communion with 
 God, there is always an accompanying con- 
 sciousness that the whole activity is abso- 
 lutely and entirely dependent upon Him ; 
 that, whatever amount of freedom may be 
 apparent in the individual moments of life, 
 these are but detached and isolated portions 
 of a passively dependent whole (IS). The 
 theory is carried still further, and expressed 
 in more positive terms, by an English dis- 
 ciple, who says that, " Although man, while 
 
LECTURE IV. 115 
 
 in the midst of finite objects, always feels 
 himself to a certain extent independent and 
 free ; yet in the presence of that which is 
 self-existent, infinite, and eternal, he may 
 feel the sense of freedom utterly pass away 
 and become absorbed in the sense of absolute 
 dependence." " Let the relation," he con- 
 tinues, " of subject and object in the economy 
 of our emotions become such that the whole 
 independent energy of the former merges in 
 the latter as its prime cause and present sus- 
 tainer ; let the subject become as nothing, — 
 not, indeed, from its intrinsic insignificance 
 or incapacity of moral action, but by virtue 
 of the infinity of the object to which it stands 
 consciously opposed : and the feeling of de- 
 pendence must become absolute ; for all finite 
 power is as nothing in relation to the Infi- 
 nite (14)." 
 
 Of this theory it may be observed, in the 
 first place, that it contemplates God chiefly 
 in the character of an object of infinite mag- 
 nitude. The relations of the object to the 
 subject, in our consciousness of the world, 
 and in that of God, differ from each other in 
 degree rather than in kind. The Deity is 
 manifested with no attribute of personality : 
 He is merely the world magnified to infi- 
 nity : and the feeling of absolute dependence 
 
 I 2 
 
116 LECTURE IV. 
 
 is in fact that of the annihilation of our 
 personal existence in the Infinite Being of 
 the Universe. Of this feeling, the intellectual 
 exponent is pure Pantheism ; and the infi- 
 nite object is but the indefinite abstraction 
 of Being in general, with no distinguishing 
 characteristic to constitute a Deity. For 
 the distinctness of an object of consciousness 
 is in the inverse ratio to the intensity of the 
 passive affection. As the feeling of depend- 
 ence becomes more powerful, the knowledge 
 of the character of the object on which we 
 depend must necessarily become less and less ; 
 for the discernment of any object as such is 
 a state of mental energy and reaction of 
 thought upon that object. Hence the feeling 
 of absolute dependence, supposing it possible, 
 could convey no consciousness of God as 
 God, but merely an indefinite impression of 
 dependence upon something. Towards an 
 object so vague and meaningless, no real 
 religious relation is possible (15). 
 
 In the second place, the consciousness of 
 an absolute dependence in which our activity 
 is annihilated, is a contradiction in terms ; for 
 consciousness itself is an activity. We can be 
 conscious of a state of mind as such, only by 
 attending to it ; and attention is in all cases 
 a mode of our active energy. Thus the state 
 
LECTURE IV. 117 
 
 of absolute dependence, supposing it to exist 
 at all, could not be distinguished from other 
 states ; and, as all consciousness is distinction, 
 it could not, by any mode of consciousness, 
 be known to exist. 
 
 In the third place, the theory is incon- 
 sistent with the duty of Prayer. Prayer is 
 essentially a state in which man is in active 
 relation towards God ; in which he is in- 
 tensely conscious of his personal existence 
 and its wants ; in which he endeavours by 
 entreaty to prevail with God. Let any one 
 consider for a moment the strong energy of 
 the language of the Apostle ; " Now I be- 
 seech you, brethren, for the Lord Jesus 
 Christ's sake, and for the love of the Spirit, 
 that ye strive together with me in your 
 prayers to God for me*:" or the conscious- 
 ness of a personal need, which pervades that 
 Psalm in which David so emphatically de- 
 clares his dependence upon God : "My God, 
 my God, look upon me ; why hast thou for- 
 saken me, and art so far from my health, and 
 from the words of my complaint ? O my God, 
 I cry in the day-time, but thou hearest not ; 
 and in the night season also I take no rest^:" — 
 let him ponder the words of our Lord himself: 
 " Shall not God avenge his own elect, which 
 
 e Eomans xv. 30. f Psalm xxii. 1, 2. 
 
118 LECTURE IV. 
 
 cry day and night unto hira^ :" — and then let 
 him say if such language is compatible with 
 the theory which asserts that man's person- 
 ality is annihilated in his communion with 
 God (16). 
 
 But, lastly, there is another fatal objection 
 to the above theory. It makes our moral 
 and religious consciousness subversive of each 
 other, and reduces us to the dilemma, that 
 either our faith or our practice must be 
 founded on a delusion. The actual relation 
 of man to God is the same, in whatever de- 
 gree man may be conscious of it. If man's 
 dependence on God is not really destructive 
 of his personal freedom, the religious con- 
 sciousness, in denying that freedom, is a false 
 consciousness. If, on the contrary, man is 
 in reality passively dependent upon God, the 
 consciousness of moral responsibility, which 
 bears witness to his free agency, is a lying 
 witness. Actually, in the sight of God, we 
 are either totally dependent, or, partially at 
 least, free. And as this condition must be 
 always the same, whether we are conscious 
 of it or not, it follows, that, in proportion as 
 one of these modes of consciousness reveals 
 to us the truth, the other must be regarded 
 as testifying to a falsehood (17). 
 s St. Luke xviii. 7. 
 
LECTURE IV. 119 
 
 Nor yet is it possible to find in the con- 
 sciousness of moral obligation any immediate 
 apprehension of the Absolute and Infinite. 
 For the free agency of man, which in the 
 feeling of dependence is always present as a 
 subordinate element, becomes here the centre 
 and turning-point of the whole. The con- 
 sciousness of the Infinite is necessarily ex- 
 cluded ; first, by the mere existence of a re- 
 lation between two distinct agents ; and, se- 
 condly, by the conditions under which each 
 must necessarily be conceived in its relation 
 to the other. The moral consciousness of 
 man, as subject to law, is, by that subjection, 
 both limited and related; and hence it cannot 
 in itself be regarded as a representation of 
 the Infinite. Nor yet can such a representa- 
 tion be furnished by the other term of the 
 relation, — that of the Moral Lawgiver, by 
 whom human obligation is enacted. For, in 
 the first place, such a Lawgiver must be con- 
 ceived as a Person ; and the only human 
 conception of Personality is that of limita- 
 tion. In the second place, the moral con- 
 sciousness of such a Lawgiver can only be 
 conceived under the form of a variety of at- 
 tributes ; and different attributes are, by that 
 very diversity, conceived as finite. Nay, the 
 very conception of a moral nature is in itself 
 
120 LECTURE IV. 
 
 the conception of a limit ; for morality is the 
 compliance with a law ; and a law, whether 
 imposed from within or from without, can only 
 be conceived to operate by limiting the range 
 of possible actions. 
 
 Yet along with all this, though our posi- 
 tive religious consciousness is of the finite 
 only, there yet runs through the whole of 
 that consciousness the accompanying convic- 
 tion that the Infinite does exist, and must 
 exist ; — though of the manner of that exist- 
 ence we can form no conception ; and that 
 it exists along with the Finite ; — though we 
 know not how such a coexistence is possible. 
 We cannot be conscious of the Infinite ; but 
 we can be and are conscious of the limits of 
 our own powers of thought ; and therefore we 
 know that the possibility or impossibility of 
 conception is no test of the possibility or im- 
 possibility of existence. We know that, unless 
 we admit the existence of the Infinite, the 
 existence of the Finite is inexplicable and 
 self- contradictory ; and yet we know that the 
 conception of the Infinite itself appears to 
 involve contradictions no less inexplicable. 
 In this impotence of Reason, we are com- 
 pelled to take refuge in Faith, and to believe 
 that an Infinite Being exists, though we know 
 not how ; and that He is the same with that 
 
LECTURE IV. 121 
 
 Being who is made known in consciousness 
 as our Sustainer and our Lawgiver. For to 
 deny that an Infinite Being exists, because 
 we cannot comprehend the manner of His 
 existence, is, of two equally inconceivable 
 alternatives, to accept the one which renders 
 that very inconceivability itself inexplicable. 
 If the Finite is the universe of existence, there 
 is no reason why that universe itself should 
 not be as conceivable as the several parts of 
 which it is composed. Whence comes it then 
 that our whole consciousness is compassed 
 about with restrictions, which we are ever 
 striving to pass, and ever failing in the effort ? 
 Whence comes it that the Finite cannot mea- 
 sure the Finite? The very consciousness of 
 our own limitations of thought bears witness 
 to the existence of the Unlimited, who is be- 
 yond thought. The shadow of the Infinite 
 still broods over the consciousness of the finite; 
 and we wake up at last from the dream of ab- 
 solute wisdom, to confess, " Surely the Lord is 
 in this place ; and I knew it not\" 
 
 We are thus compelled to acquiesce in at 
 least one portion of Bacon's statement con- 
 cerning the relation of human knowledge to 
 its object : " Natura percutit intellectum radio 
 directo; Deus autem, propter medium inse- 
 quale, (creaturas scilicet,) radio refracto (18)." 
 ^ Genesis xxviii. 16. 
 
122 LECTURE IV. 
 
 To have sufficient grounds for believing in 
 God is a very different thing from having 
 suflScient grounds for reasoning about Him. 
 The religious sentiment, which compels men 
 to believe in and worship a Supreme Being, 
 is an evidence of His existence, but not an 
 exhibition of His nature. It proves that 
 God is, and makes known some of His re- 
 lations to us ; but it does not prove what 
 God is in His own Absolute Being (19). 
 The natural senses, it may be, are diverted 
 and coloured by the medium through which 
 they pass to reach the intellect, and present 
 to us, not things in themselves, but things as 
 they appear to us. And this is manifestly 
 the case with the religious consciousness, 
 which can only represent the Infinite God 
 under finite forms. But we are compelled 
 to believe, on the evidence of our senses, that 
 a material world exists, even while we listen 
 to the arguments of the idealist, who reduces 
 it to an idea or a nonentity ; and we are 
 compelled, by our religious consciousness, to 
 believe in the existence of a personal God ; 
 though the reasonings of the Rationalist, 
 logically followed out, may reduce us to Pan- 
 theism or Atheism. But to preserve this be- 
 lief uninjured, we must acknowledge the true 
 limits of our being: we must not claim for any 
 fact of human consciousness the proud prero- 
 
LECTURE IV. 123 
 
 gative of revealing God as He is ; for thus 
 we throw away the only weapon which can 
 be of avail in resisting the assaults of Scepti- 
 cism. We must be content to admit, with 
 regard to the internal consciousness of man, 
 the same restrictions which the great philo- 
 sopher just now quoted has so excellently 
 expressed with reference to the external 
 senses. " For as all works do shew forth the 
 power and skill of the workman, and not his 
 image ; so it is of the works of God, which 
 do shew the omnipotency and wisdom of the 
 
 maker, but not his image Wherefore by 
 
 the contemplation of nature to induce and 
 inforce the acknowledgment of God, and to 
 demonstrate his power, is an excellent argu- 
 ment ; but on the other side, out of the 
 
 contemplation of nature, or ground of human 
 knowledge, to induce any verity or persua- 
 sion concerning the points of faith, is in my 
 
 judgment not safe. For the heathens 
 
 themselves conclude as much in that excel- 
 lent and divine fable of the golden chain : 
 That men and gods were not able to draw 
 Jupiter down to the earth ; but contrari- 
 wise, Jupiter was able to draw them up to 
 heaven (20)." 
 
 One feature deserves especial notice, as 
 common to both of those modes of conscious- 
 
124 LECTURE IV. 
 
 ness which primarily exhibit our relation to- 
 wards God. In both, we are compelled to 
 regard ourselves as Persons related to a Per- 
 son. In the feeling of dependence, however 
 great it may be, the consciousness of myself, 
 the dependent element, remains unextin- 
 guished ; and, indeed, without that element 
 there could be no consciousness of a relation 
 at all. In the sense of moral obligation, I 
 know myself as the agent on whom the law 
 is binding : I am free to choose and to act, as 
 a person whose principle of action is in him- 
 self. And it is important to observe that it 
 is only through this consciousness of person- 
 ality that we have any ground of belief in 
 the existence of a God. If we admit the 
 arguments by which this personality is anni- 
 hilated, whether on the side of Materialism or 
 on that of Pantheism, we cannot escape from 
 the consequence to which those arguments 
 inevitably lead, — the annihilation of God 
 himself If, on the one hand, the spiritual ele- 
 ment within me is merely dependent on the 
 corporeal ; — if myself is a result of my bodily 
 organization, and may be resolved into the 
 operation of a system of material agents, — 
 why should I suppose it to be otherwise in 
 the great world beyond me ? If I, who deem 
 myself a spirit distinct from and superior to 
 
LECTURE IV. 125 
 
 matter, am but the accident and the product 
 of that which I seem to rule, why may not 
 all other spiritual existence, if such there be, 
 be dependent upon the constitution of the 
 material universe (21) ? Or if, on the other 
 hand, I am not a distinct substance, but a 
 mode of the infinite, — a shadow passing over 
 the face of the universe, — what is that uni- 
 verse which you would have me acknowledge 
 as God ? It is, says the Pantheist, the One 
 and All {22). By no means : it is the Many, 
 in which is neither All nor One. You have 
 taught me that within the little world of my 
 own consciousness there is no relation be- 
 tween the one and the many ; but that all is 
 transient and accidental alike. If I accept 
 your conclusion, I must extend it to its legi- 
 timate consequence. Why should the uni- 
 verse itself contain a principle of unity ? why 
 should the Many imply the One ? All that I 
 see, all that I know, are isolated and uncon- 
 nected phenomena ; I myself being one of 
 them. Why should the Universe of Being be 
 otherwise ? It cannot be All ; for its pheno- 
 mena are infinite and innumerable ; and all 
 implies unity and completeness. It need not 
 be One ; for you have yourself shewn me that 
 I am deceived in the only ground which I 
 have for believing that a plurality of modes 
 
126 LECTURE IV. 
 
 implies an unity of substance. If there is no 
 Person to pray ; if there is no Person to be 
 obedient ; — what remains but to conclude 
 that He to whom prayer and obedience are 
 due, — nay, even the mock-king who usurps 
 His name in the realms of philosophy, — is a 
 shadow and a delusion likewise ? 
 
 The result of the preceding considerations 
 may be summed up as follows. There are 
 two modes in which we may endeavour to 
 contemplate the Deity : the one negative, 
 based on a vain attempt to transcend the 
 conditions of human thought, and to expand 
 the religious consciousness to the infinity of 
 its Divine Object : the other positive, which 
 keeps within its proper limits, and views the 
 object in a manner accommodated to the 
 finite capacities of the human thinker. The 
 first aspires to behold God in His absolute 
 nature : the second is content to view Him 
 in those relations in which he has been 
 pleased to manifest Himself to his creatures. 
 The first aims at a speculative knowledge of 
 God as He is ; but, bound by the conditions 
 of finite thought, even in the attempt to 
 transgress them, obtains nothing more than a 
 tissue of ambitious self-contradictions, which 
 indicate only what He is not (23). The se- 
 cond, abandoning the speculative knowledge 
 
LECTURE TV. 127 
 
 of the infinite, as only possible to the Infi- 
 nite Intelligence itself, is content with those 
 regulative ideas of the Deity, which are suffi- 
 cient to guide our practice, but not to satisfy 
 our intellect (24) ; — which tell us, not what 
 God is in Himself, but how He wills that we 
 should think of Him (25). In renouncing 
 all knowledge of the Absolute, it renounces 
 at the same time all .attempts to construct 
 a priori schemes of God's Providence as it 
 ought to be : it does not seek to reconcile 
 this or that phenomenon, whether in nature 
 or in revelation, with the absolute attributes 
 of Deity ; but confines itself to the actual 
 course of that Providence, as manifested in 
 the world ; and seeks no higher internal cri- 
 terion of the truth of a religion, than may be 
 derived from its analogy to other parts of the 
 Divine Government. Guided by this, the only 
 true Philosophy of Religion, man is content 
 to practise where he is unable to speculate. 
 He acts, as one who must give an account 
 of his conduct : he prays, believing that his 
 prayer will be answered. He does not seek 
 to reconcile this belief with any theory of the 
 Infinite ; foj he does not even know how the 
 Infinite and the Finite can exist together. 
 But he feels that his several duties rest upon 
 the same basis : he knows that, if human 
 
128 LECTURE IV. 
 
 action is not incompatible with Infinite Power, 
 neither is human supplication with Infinite 
 Wisdom and Goodness : though it is not as 
 the Infinite that God reveals Himself in His 
 moral government ; nor is it as the Infinite 
 that He promises to answer prayer. 
 
 " O Thou that hearest prayer, unto Thee 
 shall all flesh come." Sacrifice, and offering, 
 and burnt-offerings, and offering for sin, Thou 
 requirest no more ; for He whom these pre- 
 figured has offered Himself as a sacrifice once 
 for all'. But He who fulfilled the sacrifice, 
 commanded the prayer, and Himself taught 
 us how to pray. He tells us that we are de- 
 pendent upon God for our daily bread, for for- 
 giveness of sins, for deliverance from evil ; — 
 and how is that dependence manifested ? Not 
 in the annihilation of our personality ; for we 
 appeal to Him under the tenderest of per- 
 sonal relations, as the children of Our Father 
 who is in heaven. Not as passive in contem- 
 plation, but as active in service ; for we pray, 
 " Thy will be done, as in heaven, so in earth." 
 In this manifestation of God to man, alike in 
 Consciousness as in Scripture, under finite 
 forms to finite minds, as a Person to a Per- 
 son, we see the root and foundation of that 
 religious service, without which belief is a 
 > Hebrews x. 8, lo. 
 
LECTURE IV. 129 
 
 speculation, and worship a delusion ; which 
 whatever would-be philosophical theologians 
 may say to the contrary, is the common bond 
 which unites all men to God. All are God's 
 creatures, bound alike to reverence and obey 
 their Maker. All are God's dependents, bound 
 alike to ask for His sustaining bounties. All 
 are God's rebels, needing 'daily and hourly 
 to implore His forgiveness for their disobe- 
 dience. All are God's redeemed, purchased 
 by the blood of Christ, invited to share in the 
 benefits of His passion and intercession. All 
 are brought by one common channel into 
 communion with that God to whom they are 
 related by so many common ties. All are 
 called upon to acknowledge their Maker, their 
 Governor, their Sustainer, their Redeemer ; 
 and the means of their acknowledgment is 
 Prayer. 
 
 And, apart from the fact of its having been 
 God's good pleasure so to reveal Himself, 
 there are manifest, even to human under- 
 standing, wise reasons why this course should 
 have been adopted, benevolent ends to be an- 
 swered by this gracious condescension. We 
 are not called upon to have two distinct lives 
 in this world. It is not required of us that 
 the household of our nature should be di- 
 vided against itself; — that those feelings of 
 
130 LECTURE IV. 
 
 love, and reverence, and gratitude, which 
 move us in a lower degree towards our hu- 
 man relatives and friends, should be alto- 
 gether thrown aside, and exchanged for some 
 abnormal state of ecstatic contemplation, 
 when we bring our prayers and praises and 
 thanks before the footstool of our Father in 
 heaven. We are none of us able to grasp in 
 speculation the nature of the Infinite and 
 Eternal; but we all live and move among 
 our fellow men, at times needing their assist- 
 ance, at times soliciting their favour, at times 
 seeking to turn away their anger. We have 
 all, as children, felt the need of the support- 
 ing care of parents and guardians : we have 
 all, in the gradual progress of education, re- 
 quired instruction from the wisdom of teach- 
 ers : we have all offended against our neigh- 
 bours, and known the blessing of forgiveness, 
 or the penalty of unappeased anger. We can 
 all, therefore, taught by the inmost conscious- 
 ness of our human feelings, place ourselves 
 in communion with God, when He manifests 
 Himself under human images. " He that 
 loveth not his brother whom he hath seen,'* 
 says the Apostle St. John, " how can he love 
 God whom he hath not seen''?" Our hea- 
 venly affections must in some measure take 
 ^ I St. John iy. 30, 
 
LECTURE IV. 131 
 
 their source and their form from our earthly 
 ones : our love towards God, if it is to be love 
 at all, must not be wholly unlike our love to- 
 wards our neighbour : the motives and influ- 
 ences which prompt us, when we make known 
 our wants and pour forth our supplications to 
 an earthly parent, are graciously permitted 
 by our heavenly Father to be the type and 
 symbol of those by which our intercourse with 
 Him is to be regulated, — with which He bids 
 us " come boldly unto the throne of grace, 
 that we may obtain mercy, and find grace to 
 help in time of need'." 
 
 So should it be during this transitory life, 
 in which we see through a glass, darkly " ; 
 in which God reveals Himself in types and 
 shadows, under human images and attributes, 
 to meet graciously and deal tenderly with the 
 human sympathies of His creatures. And 
 although, even to the sons of God, it doth not 
 yet appear what we shall be, when we shall 
 be like Him, and shall see Him as He is ° ; yet, 
 if it be true that our religious duties in this 
 life are a training and preparation for* that 
 which is to come ; — if we are encouraged to 
 look forward to and anticipate that future 
 state, while we are still encompassed with this 
 
 * Hebrews iv. i6. ^ i Corinthians xiii. la. 
 
 " I St. John iii. a. 
 
 K 2 
 
132 LECTURE IV. 
 
 earthly tabernacle ; — if we are taught to look, 
 as to our great Example, to One who in love 
 and sympathy towards His brethren was Very 
 Man ; — if we are bidden not to sorrow with- 
 out hope concerning them which are asleep °, 
 and are comforted by the promise that the 
 ties of love which are broken on earth shall 
 be united in heaven, — we may trust that not 
 wholly alien to such feelings will be our com- 
 munion with God face to face, when the re- 
 deemed of all flesh shall approach once more 
 to Him that heareth prayer ; — no longer in 
 the chamber of private devotion ; no longer 
 in the temple of public worship ; but in that 
 great City where no temple is ; " for the Lord 
 God Almighty and the Lamb are the temple 
 of it P." 
 
 ° 1 Thessalonians iy. 13. p Revelation xxi. a 3. 
 
LECTUHE Y. 
 
 1 CORINTHIANS I, 21-24. 
 
 For after that in the wisdom of God the world 
 by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by 
 the foolishness of preaching to save them 
 that believe. For the Jews require a sign, 
 and the Greeks seek after wisdom : but we 
 preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a 
 stumblingblock, and unto the Greeks foolish- 
 ness ; but unto them which are called, both 
 Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God, 
 and the wisdom of God. 
 
 *' X HOUGH it were admitted," says Bishop 
 Butler, " that this opinion of Necessity were 
 speculatively true ; yet, with regard to prac- 
 tice, it is as if it were false, so far as our 
 experience reaches ; that is, to the whole of 
 our present life. For the constitution of the 
 present world, and the condition in which 
 we are actually placed, is as if we were free. 
 And it may perhaps justly be concluded that, 
 since the whole process of action, through 
 every step of it, suspense, deliberation, in- 
 
134 LECTURE V. 
 
 dining one way, determining, and at last 
 doing as we determine, is as if we were free, 
 therefore we are so. But the thing here in- 
 sisted upon is, that under the present na- 
 tural government of the world, we find we 
 are treated and dealt with as if we were free, 
 prior to all consideration whether we are or 
 not" (1). 
 
 That this observation has in any degree 
 settled the speculative difficulties involved in 
 the problem of Liberty and Necessity, will not 
 be maintained by any one who is acquainted 
 with the history of the controversy. Nor 
 was it intended by its author to do so. But, 
 like many other pregnant sentences of that 
 great thinker, it introduces a principle ca- 
 pable of a much wider application than to 
 the inquiry which originally suggested it. 
 The vexed question of Liberty and Ne- 
 cessity, whose counter-arguments have be^ 
 come a by-word for endless and unprofitable 
 wrangling, is but one of a large class of 
 problems, some of which meet us at every 
 turn of our daily life and conduct, whenever 
 we attempt to justify in theory that which 
 we are compelled to carry out in practice. 
 Such problems arise inevitably, whenever 
 we attempt to pass from the sensible to the 
 intelligible world, from the sphere of action 
 
LECTURE V. 135 
 
 to that of thought, from that which appears 
 to us to that which is in itself. In religion, 
 in morals, in our daily business, in the care 
 of our lives, in the exercise of our senses, 
 the rules which guide our practice cannot 
 be reduced to principles which satisfy our 
 reason (2). 
 
 The very first Law of Thought, and, 
 through Thought, of all Consciousness, by 
 which alone we are able to discern objects 
 as such, or to distinguish them one from an- 
 other, involves in its constitution a mystery 
 and a doubt, which no effort of Philosophy 
 has been able to penetrate: — How can the 
 One be many, or the Many one ? (3). We are 
 compelled to regard ourselves and our fellow 
 men as persons, and the visible world around 
 us as made up of things : but what is per- 
 sonality, and what is reality, are questions 
 which the wisest have tried to answer, and 
 have tried in vain. Man, as a Person, is one, 
 yet composed of many elements ; — not iden- 
 tical with any one of them, nor yet with the 
 aggregate of them all ; and yet not separable 
 from them by any effort of abstraction. Man 
 is one in his thoughts, in his actions, in his 
 feelings, and in the responsibilities which 
 these involve. It is / who think, I who 
 act, / who feel ; yet I am not thought, nor 
 
136 LECTURE V 
 
 action, nor feeling, nor a combination of 
 thoughts and actions and feelings heaped 
 together. Extension, and resistance, and 
 shape, and the various sensible qualities, 
 make up my conception of each individual 
 body as such ; yet the body is not its exten- 
 sion, nor its shape, nor its hardness, nor its 
 colour, nor its smell, nor its taste ; nor yet is 
 it a mere aggregate of all these with no prin- 
 ciple of unity among them. If these several 
 parts constitute a single whole, the unity, 
 as well as the plurality, must depend upon 
 some principle which that whole contains : 
 if they do not constitute a whole, the diffi- 
 culty is removed but a single step; for the 
 same question, — what constitutes individu- 
 ality ? — must be asked in relation to each 
 separate part. The actual conception of 
 every object, as such, involves the combina- 
 tion of the One and the Many; and that 
 combination is practically made every time we 
 think at all. But at the same time, no effort 
 of reason is able to explain how such a rela- 
 tion is possible ; or to satisfy the intellectual 
 doubt which necessarily arises on the con- 
 templation of it. 
 
 As it is with the first law of Thought, so 
 it is with the first principle of Action and 
 of Feeling. All action, whether free or con- 
 
LECTURE V. 137 
 
 strained, and all passion, implies and rests 
 upon another great mystery of Philosophy, 
 — the Commerce between Mind and Matter. 
 The properties and operations of matter are 
 known only by the external senses : the fa- 
 culties and acts of the mind are known only 
 by the internal apprehension. The energy 
 of the one is motion : the energy of the other 
 is consciousness. What is the middle terra 
 which unites these two ? and how can their 
 reciprocal action, unquestionable as it is in 
 fact, be conceived as possible in theory ? (4). 
 How can a contact between body and body 
 produce consciousness in the immaterial soul? 
 How can a mental self-determination pro- 
 duce the motion of material organs ? (5). 
 How can mind, which is neither extended 
 nor figured nor coloured in itself, represent 
 by its ideas the extension and figure and 
 colour of bodies? How can the body be de- 
 termined to a new position in space by an 
 act of thought, to which space has no rela- 
 tion ? How can thought itself be carried on 
 by bodily instruments, and yet itself have 
 nothing in common with bodily affections ? 
 What is the relation between the last pulsa- 
 tion of the material brain and the first awak- 
 ening of the mental perception ? How does 
 the spoken word, a merely material vibration 
 
138 LECTURE V. 
 
 of the atmosphere, become echoed, as it were, 
 in the silent voice of thought, and take its 
 part in an operation wholly spiritual ? Here 
 again we acknowledge, in our daily practice, 
 a fact which we are unable to represent in 
 theory ; and the various hypotheses to which 
 Philosophy has had recourse, — the Divine 
 Assistance, the Preestablished Harmony, the 
 Plastic Medium, and others (6), are but so 
 many confessions of the existence of the mys- 
 tery, and of the extraordinary, yet wholly 
 insufficient efforts made by human reason to 
 penetrate it (7). 
 
 The very perception of our senses is sub- 
 ject to the same restrictions. " No priestly 
 dogmas," says Hume, " ever shocked common 
 sense more than the infinite divisibility of 
 extension, with its consequences" (8). He 
 should have added, that the antagonist as- 
 sumption of a finite divisibility is equally 
 incomprehensible ; it being as impossible to 
 conceive an ultimate unit, or least possible 
 extension, as it is to conceive the process of 
 division carried on to infinity. Extension is 
 presented to the mind as a relation between 
 parts exterior to each other, whose reality 
 cannot consist merely in their juxtaposition. 
 We are thus compelled to believe that ex- 
 tension itself is dependent upon some higher 
 
LECTURE V. 139 
 
 law ; — that it is not an original principle of 
 things in themselves, but a derived result of 
 their connection with each other. But to 
 conceive how this generation of space is 
 possible, — how unextended objects can by 
 their conjunction produce extension, — baffles 
 the utmost efforts of the wildest imagination 
 or the profoundest reflection (9). We cannot 
 conceive how unextended matter can become 
 extended ; for of unextended matter we know 
 nothing, either in itself or in its relations ; 
 though we are apparently compelled to pos- 
 tulate its existence, as implied in the ap- 
 pearances of which alone we are conscious. 
 The existence of mental succession in time 
 is as inexplicable as that of material exten- 
 sion in space ; — a first moment and an infi- 
 nite regress of moments being both equally 
 inconceivable, no less than the corresponding 
 theories of a first atom and an infinite di- 
 vision. 
 
 The difficulty which meets us in these 
 problems may help to throw some light on 
 the purposes for which human thought is de- 
 signed, and the limits within which it may be 
 legitimately exercised. The primary fact of 
 consciousness, which is accepted as regulating 
 our practice, is in itself ineocplicahle, but not 
 inconceivable. There is mystery; but there is 
 
140 LECTURE V. 
 
 not yet contradiction. Thought is baffled, and 
 unable to pursue the track of investigation ; 
 but it does not grapple with an idea and de- 
 stroy itself in the struggle. Contradiction 
 does not begin till we direct our thoughts, not 
 to the fact itself, but to that which it suggests 
 as beyond itself. This difference is precisely 
 that which exists between following the laws of 
 thought, and striving to transcend them ; — 
 between leaving the mystery of Knowing and 
 Being unsolved, and making unlawful at- 
 tempts to solve it. The facts, — that all objects 
 of thought are conceived as wholes composed 
 of parts ; — that mind acts upon matter, and 
 matter upon mind ; — that bodies are ex- 
 tended in space, and thoughts successive in 
 time ; — do not, in their own statement, seve- 
 rally contain elements repulsive of each 
 other. As mere facts, they are so far from 
 being inconceivable, that they embody the 
 very laws of conception itself, and are expe- 
 rienced at every moment as true : but though 
 we are able, nay, compelled to conceive them 
 as facts, we find it impossible to conceive 
 them as ultimate facts. They are made 
 known to us as relations; and all relations 
 are in themselves complex, and imply 
 simpler principles; — objects to be related, 
 and a ground by which the relation is con- 
 
LECTURE V 141 
 
 stituted. The conception of any such rela- 
 tion as a fact thus involves a further inquiry- 
 concerning its existence as a consequence; 
 and to this inquiry no satisfactory answer 
 can be given. Thus the highest principles 
 of thought and action, to which we can at- 
 tain, are regulative, not speculative : — they do 
 not serve to satisfy the reason, but to guide 
 the conduct : they do not tell us what things 
 are in themselves, but how we must conduct 
 ourselves in relation to them. 
 
 The conclusion which this condition of 
 human consciousness almost irresistibly forces 
 upon us, is one which equally exhibits the 
 strength and the weakness of the human in- 
 tellect. We are compelled to admit that the 
 mind, in its contemplation of objects, is not 
 the mere passive recipient of the things pre- 
 sented to it; but has an activity and a law 
 of its own, by virtue of which it reacts upon 
 the materials existing without, and moulds 
 them into that form in which consciousness 
 is capable of apprehending them. The ex- 
 istence of modes of thought, which we are 
 compelled to accept as at the same time re- 
 latively ultimate and absolutely derived, — 
 as limits beyond which we cannot penetrate, 
 yet which themselves proclaim that there is 
 a further truth behind and above them — • 
 
142 LECTURE V. 
 
 suggests, as its obvious explanation, the hypo- 
 thesis of a mind cramped by its own laws, 
 and bewildered in the contemplation of its 
 own forms. If the mind, in the act of con- 
 sciousness, were merely blank and inert ; — if 
 the entire object of its contemplation came 
 from without, and nothing from within ; — no 
 fact of consciousness would be inexplicable ; 
 for every thing would present itself as it is. 
 No reality would be suggested, beyond what 
 is actually given : no question would be 
 asked which is not already answered. For 
 how can doubt arise, where there is no innate 
 power in the mind to think beyond what is 
 placed before it, — to react upon that which 
 acts upon it ? But upon the contrary suppo- 
 sition, all is regular, and the result such as 
 might naturally be expected. If thought has 
 laws of its own, it cannot by its own act go 
 beyond them ; yet the recognition of law, as 
 a restraint, implies the existence of a sphere 
 of liberty beyond. If the mind contributes 
 its own element to the objects of conscious- 
 ness, it must, in its first recognition of those 
 objects, necessarily regard them as something 
 complex, something generated partly from 
 without and partly from within. Yet in that 
 very recognition of the complex, as such, is 
 implied an impossibility of attaining to the 
 
LECTURE V. 143 
 
 simple; for to resolve the composition is to 
 destroy the very act of knowledge, and the 
 relation by which consciousness is constituted. 
 The object of which we are conscious is thus, 
 to adopt the well-known language of the 
 Kantian philosophy, a phenomenon, not a 
 thing in itself; — a product, resulting from 
 the twofold action of the thing apprehended, 
 on the one side, and the faculties apprehend- 
 ing it, on the other. The perceiving subject 
 alone, and the perceived object alone, are 
 two unmeaning elements, which first acquire 
 a significance in and by the act of their con- 
 junction (10). 
 
 It is thus strictly in analogy with the me- 
 thod of God's Providence in the constitution 
 of man's mental faculties, if we believe that, 
 in Religion also, He has given us truths 
 which are designed to be regulative, rather 
 than speculative ; intended, not to satisfy our 
 reason, but to guide our practice ; not to tell 
 us what God is in His absolute nature, but 
 how He wills that we should think of Him 
 in our present finite state (11). In my last 
 Lecture, I endeavoured to shew that our 
 knowledge of God is not a consciousness of 
 the Infinite as such, but that of the relation 
 of a Person to a Person ; — the conception of 
 personality being, humanly speaking, one of 
 
144 LECTURE V. 
 
 limitation. This amounts to the admission 
 that, in natural religion at least, our know- 
 ledge of God does not satisfy the conditions 
 of speculative philosophy, and is incapable of 
 reduction to an ultimate and absolute truth. 
 And this, as we now see, is in accordance with 
 the analogy which the character of human 
 philosophy in other provinces would natu- 
 rally lead us to expect (12). It is reasonable 
 also that we should expect to find, as part of 
 the same analogy, that the revealed manifes- 
 tation of the Divine nature and attributes 
 should likewise carry on its face the marks of 
 subordination to some higher truth, of which 
 it indicates the existence, but does not make 
 known the substance. It is to be expected 
 that our apprehension of the revealed Deity 
 should involve mysteries inscrutable and 
 doubts insoluble by our present faculties ; 
 while, at the same time, it inculcates the true 
 spirit in which such doubts should be dealt 
 with ; by warning us, as plainly as such a 
 warning is possible, that we see a part only, 
 and not the whole; that we behold effects 
 only, and not causes ; that our knowledge of 
 God, though revealed by Himself, is revealed 
 in relation to human faculties, and subject to 
 the limitations and imperfections inseparable 
 from the constitution of the human mind (18). 
 
LECTURE V. 145 
 
 We may neglect this warning if we please : 
 we may endeavour to supply the imperfec- 
 tion, and thereby make it more imperfect 
 still: we may twist and torture the divine 
 image on the rack of human philosophy, and 
 call its mangled relics by the high-sounding 
 titles of the Absolute and the Infinite ; but 
 these ambitious conceptions, the instant we 
 attempt to employ them in any act of thought, 
 manifest at once, by their inherent absurdi- 
 ties, that they are not that which they pretend 
 to be ; — that in the place of the Absolute 
 and Infinite manifested in its own nature, 
 we have merely the Relative and Finite con- 
 tradicting itself. 
 
 We may indeed believe, and ought to be- 
 lieve, that the knowledge which our Creator 
 has permitted us to attain to, whether by 
 Revelation or by our natural faculties, is not 
 given to us as an instrument of deception. 
 We may believe, and ought to believe, that, 
 intellectually as well as morally, our present 
 life is a state of discipline and preparation 
 for another ; and that the conceptions which 
 we are compelled to adopt, as the guides of 
 our thoughts and actions now, may indeed, 
 in the sight of a higher Intelligence, be but 
 partial truth, but cannot be total falsehood. 
 But in thus believing, we desert the evidence 
 
146 LECTURE V. 
 
 af Reason, to rest on that of Faith ; and of 
 the principles on which Reason itself depends, 
 it is obviously impossible to have any other 
 guarantee. But such a Faith, however well 
 founded, has itself only a regulative and 
 practical, not a speculative and theoretical 
 application. It bids us rest content within 
 the limits which have been assigned to us ; 
 but it cannot enable us to overleap those 
 limits, nor exalt to a more absolute character 
 the conclusions obtained by finite thinkers 
 under the conditions of finite thought. But 
 on the other hand, we must beware of the 
 opposite extreme, — that of mistaking the in- 
 ability to affirm for the ability to deny. We 
 cannot say that our conception of the Divine 
 Nature exactly resembles that Nature in its 
 absolute existence ; for we know not what 
 that absolute existence is. But, for the same 
 reason, we are equally unable to say that it 
 does not resemble ; for, if we know not the 
 Absolute and Infinite at all, we cannot say 
 how far it is or is not capable of likeness or 
 unlikeness to the Relative and Finite. We 
 must remain content with the belief that we 
 have that knowledge of God which is best 
 adapted to our wants and training. How far 
 that knowledge represents God as He is, we 
 know not, and we have no need to know. 
 
LECTURE V. 147 
 
 The testimony of Scripture, like that of 
 our natural faculties, is plain and intelligible, 
 when we are content to accept it as a fact 
 intended for our practical guidance : it be- 
 comes incomprehensible, only when we at- 
 tempt to explain it as a theory capable of 
 speculative analysis. We are distinctly told 
 that there is a mutual relation between God 
 and man, as distinct agents ; — that God in- 
 fluences man by His grace, visits him with 
 rewards or punishments, regards him with 
 love or anger ; — that man, within his own 
 limited sphere, is likewise capable of " pre- 
 vailing with God* ;" that his prayers may ob- 
 tain an answer, his conduct call down God's 
 favour or condemnation. There is nothing 
 self- contradictory or even unintelligible in 
 this, if we are content to believe that it is so, 
 without striving to understand how it is so. 
 But the instant we attempt to analyse the 
 ideas of God as infinite and man as finite ; — 
 to resolve the scriptural statements into the 
 higher principles on which their possibility 
 apparently depends ; — we are surrounded on 
 every side by contradictions of our own rais- 
 ing ; and, unable to comprehend how the 
 Infinite and the Finite can exist in mutual 
 relation, we are tempted to deny the fact of 
 * Genesis xxxii. 28. 
 L 2 
 
148 LECTURE V. 
 
 that relation altogether, and to seek a refuge, 
 though it be but insecure and momentary, in 
 Pantheism, which denies the existence of the 
 Finite, or in Atheism, which rejects the Infi- 
 nite. And here, again, the parallel between 
 Religion and Philosophy holds good : the 
 same limits of thought are discernible in 
 relation to both. The mutual intercourse 
 of mind and matter has been explained away 
 by rival theories of Idealism on the one side 
 and Materialism on the other. The unity 
 and plurality, which are combined in every 
 object of thought, have been assailed, on this 
 side by the Eleatic, who maintains that all 
 things are one, and variety a delusion (14) ; 
 on that side by the Sceptic, who tells us that 
 there is no unity, but merely a mixture of 
 differences ; that nothing is, but all things 
 are ever becoming ; that mind and body, as 
 substances, are mere philosophical fictions, 
 invented for the support of isolated impres- 
 sions and ideas (15). The mystery of Neces- 
 sity and Liberty has its philosophical as well 
 as its theological aspect : and a parallel may 
 be found to both, in the counter-labyrinth of 
 Continuity in Space, whose mazes are suffi- 
 ciently bewildering to shew that the percep- 
 tion of our bodily senses, however certain as 
 a fact, reposes, in its ultimate analysis, upon 
 
LECTURE V. 149 
 
 a mystery no less insoluble than that which 
 envelopes the free agency of man in its re- 
 lation to the Divine Omniscience (16). 
 
 Action, and not knowledge, is man's destiny 
 and duty in this life ; and his highest princi- 
 ples, both in philosophy and in religion, have 
 reference to this end. But it does not follow, 
 on that account, that our representations are 
 untrue, because they are imperfect. To- assert 
 that a representation is Untrue, because it is 
 relative to the mind of the receiver, is to 
 overlook the fact that truth itself is nothing 
 more than a relation. Truth and falsehood 
 are not properties of things in themselves, 
 but of our conceptions, and are tested, not by 
 the comparison of conceptions with things in 
 themselves, but with things as they are given 
 in some other relation. My conception of an 
 object of sense is true, when it corresponds to 
 the characteristics of the object as I perceive 
 it ; but the perception itself is equally a rela- 
 tion, and equally implies the cooperation of 
 human faculties. Truth in relation to no in- 
 telligence is a contradiction in terms : our 
 highest conception of absolute truth is that 
 of truth in relation to all intelligences. But 
 of the consciousness of intelligences diiferent 
 from our own we have no knowledge, and 
 can make no application. Truth, therefore, 
 
150 LECTURE V. 
 
 in relation to man, admits of no other test 
 than the harmonious consent of all human 
 faculties ; and, as no such faculty can take 
 cognisance of the Absolute, it follows that 
 correspondence with the Absolute can never 
 be required as a test of truth (17). The ut- 
 most deficiency that can be charged against 
 human faculties amounts only to this; — that 
 we cannot say that we know God as God 
 knows Himself (18) : — that the truth of which 
 our finite minds are susceptible may, for aught 
 we know, be but the passing shadow of some 
 higher reality, which exists only in the Infi- 
 nite Intelligence. 
 
 That the true conception of the Divine 
 Nature, so far as we are able to receive it, is 
 to be found in those regulative representa- 
 tions which exhibit God under limitations 
 accommodated to the constitution of man ; 
 not in the unmeaning abstractions which, 
 aiming at a higher knowledge, distort, rather 
 than exhibit, the Absolute and the Infinite ; 
 is thus a conclusion warranted, both de- 
 ductively, from the recognition of the limits 
 of human thought, and inductively, by what 
 we can gather from experience and analogy 
 concerning God's general dealings with man- 
 kind. There remains yet a third indispens- 
 able probation, to which the same conclusion 
 
LECTURE V. 151 
 
 must be subjected ; namely, how far does it 
 agree with the teaching of Holy Scripture ? 
 
 In no respect is the Theology of the Bible, 
 as contrasted with the mythologies of human 
 invention, more remarkable, than in the man- 
 ner in which it recognises and adapts itself 
 to that complex and self-limiting constitution 
 of the human mind, which man's wisdom finds 
 so difficult to acknowledge. To human rea- 
 son, the personal and the infinite stand out 
 in apparently irreconcilable antagonism ; and 
 the recognition of the one in a religious sys- 
 tem almost inevitably involves the sacrifice of 
 the other. The Personality of God disap- 
 pears in the Pantheism of India ; His Infi- 
 nity is lost sight of in the Polytheism of 
 Greece (19). In the Hebrew Scriptures, on 
 the contrary, throughout all their variety of 
 Books and Authors, one method of Divine 
 teaching is constantly manifested, appealing 
 alike to the intellect a«d to the feelings of 
 man. From first to last we hear the echo 
 of that first great Commandment : " Hear, O 
 Israel : The Lord our God is one Lord : and 
 thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all 
 thine heart, and with all thy soul, and with 
 all thy might **." God is plainly and uncom- 
 promisingly proclaimed as the One and the 
 b Deuteronomy vi. 4, 5. St. Mark xii. 39, 30. 
 
152 LECTURE V. 
 
 Absolute : " I am the first, and I am the last; 
 and beside me there is no God":" yet this 
 sublime conception is never for an instant so 
 exhibited as to furnish food for that mystical 
 contemplation to which the Oriental mind is 
 naturally so prone. On the contrary, in all 
 that relates to the feelings and duties by 
 which religion is practically to be regulated, 
 we cannot help observing how the Almighty, 
 in communicating with His people, conde- 
 scends to place Himself on what may, hu- 
 manly speaking, be called a lower level than 
 that on which the natural reason of man 
 would be inclined to exhibit Him. While 
 His Personality is never suifered to sink to 
 a merely human representation ; — while it is 
 clearly announced that His thoughts are not 
 our thoughts, nor His ways our ways'', yet 
 His Infinity is never for a moment so mani- 
 fested as to destroy or weaken the vivid re- 
 ality of those human* attributes, under which 
 He appeals to the human sympathies of His 
 creatures. " The Lord spake unto Moses face 
 to face, as a man speaketh unto his friend *." 
 He will listen to our supplications^: He will 
 help those that cry unto Him^ : He reserveth 
 
 «: Isaiah xliv. 6. ^ Isaiah Iv. 8. e Exodus xxxiii. ii. 
 f Psalm cxHi. i, 2. g Psalm cii. 17, 1 8. cxlv. 19. Isaiah 
 Iviii. 9. 
 
LECTURE V. 153 
 
 wrath for His enemies'* : He is appeased by 
 repentance' : He sheweth mercy to them that 
 love Him\ As a King, He listens to the 
 petitions of His subjects': as a Father, He 
 pitieth His own children". It is impossible 
 to contemplate this marvellous union of the 
 human and the divine, so perfectly adapted 
 to the wants of the human servant of a di- 
 vine Master, without feeling that it is indeed 
 the work of Him who formed the spirit of 
 man, and fitted him for the service of his 
 Maker. " He sheweth His word unto Jacob, 
 His statutes and ordinances unto Israel. He 
 hath not dealt so with any nation ; neither 
 have the heathen knowledge of His laws"." 
 
 But if this is the lesson taught us by that 
 earlier manifestation in which God is repre- 
 sented under the likeness of human attri- 
 butes, wTiat may we learn from that later and 
 fuller revelation which tells us of One who 
 is Himself both God and Man ? The Father 
 has revealed Himself to mankind under hu- 
 man types and images, that He may appeal 
 more earnestly and eifectually to man's con- 
 sciousness of the human spirit within him. 
 
 l» Nahum i. 2. > i Kings xxi, 19. Jeremiah xviii. 8, 
 
 Ezekiel xviii. 23, 30. Jonah iii. 10. ^ Exodus xx. 6. 
 
 1 Psalm V. a; Ixxiv. 12. Isaiah xxxiii. 22. >» Psalm 
 
 ciii. 13. " Psalm cxlvii. 19, 20. 
 
154 LECTURE V- 
 
 The Son has done more than this : He be- 
 came for our sakes very Man, made in all 
 things like unto His brethren ° ; the Me- 
 diator between God and men^, being both 
 God and Man (20). Herein is our justifica- 
 tion, if we refuse to aspire beyond those 
 limits of human thought in which He has 
 placed us. Herein is our answer, if any man 
 would spoil us through philosophy and vain 
 deceit *!. Is it irrational to contemplate God 
 under symbols drawn from the human con- 
 sciousness ? Christ is our pattern : " for in 
 Him. dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead 
 bodily "■ (21)." Is it unphilosophical that our 
 thoughts of God should be subject to the law 
 of time ? It was when the fulness of the* time 
 was come, that God sent forth his Son * (22). 
 Does the philosopher bid us strive to tran- 
 scend the human, and to annihilate 6ur own 
 personality in the presence of the Infinite? 
 The Apostle tells us to look forward to the 
 time when we shall " all come in the unity of 
 the faith, and of the knowledge of the Son 
 of God, unto a perfect man, unto the mea- 
 sure of the stature of the fulness of Christ '." 
 Does human wisdom seek, by some transcend- 
 
 ° Hebrews ii. 17. Pi Timothy ii. 5. i Colos- 
 
 sians ii. 8. "^ Colossians ii. 9. « Galatians iv. 4. 
 
 * Ephesians iv. 13. 
 
LECTURE V. 155 
 
 ental form of intuition, to behold God as He 
 is in His infinite nature ; repeating in its own 
 manner the request of Philip, " Lord, shew 
 us the Father, and it suflSceth us?" Christ 
 Himself has given the rebuke and the reply : 
 " He that hath seen me hath seen the Fa- 
 ther ; and how say est thou then. Shew us the 
 Father-?" 
 
 The doctrine of a personal Christ, very 
 God and very Man, has indeed been the 
 great stumblingbloek in the way of those 
 so-called philosophical theologians who, in 
 their contempt for the historical and tem- 
 poral, would throw aside the vivid revelation 
 of a living and acting God, to take refuge in 
 the empty abstraction of an impersonal idea. 
 And accordingly, they have made various ela- 
 borate attempts to substitute in its place a 
 conception more in accordance with the sup- 
 posed requirements of speculative philosophy. 
 Let us hear on this point, and understand 
 as we best may, the language of the great 
 leader of the chief modern school of philo- 
 sophical rationalists. " To grasp rightly and 
 definitely in thought," says Hegel, " the na- 
 ture of God as a Spirit, demands profound 
 speculation. These propositions are first of 
 all contained therein : God is God only in 
 1 St. Johnxiv. 8, .9. 
 
W6 LECTURE V. 
 
 so far as He knows Himself: His own self- 
 knowledge is moreover His self-consciousness 
 in man, and man's knowledge of God, which 
 is developed into man's self-knowledge in 
 God."..." The Form of the Absolute Spirit," 
 he continues, " separates itself from the Sub- 
 stance, and in it the diiferent phases of the 
 conception part into separate spheres or ele- 
 ments, in each of which the Absolute Sub- 
 stance exhibits itself, first as an eternal sub- 
 stance, abiding in its manifestation with it- 
 self; secondly, as a distinguishing of the 
 eternal Essence from its manifestation, which 
 through this distinction becomes the world 
 of appearance, into which the substance of 
 the absolute Spirit enters ; thirdly, as an end- 
 less return and reconciliation of the world 
 thus projected with the eternal Essence, by 
 which that Essence goes back from appear- 
 ance into the unity of its fulness" (23). The 
 remainder of the passage carries out this 
 metaphysical caricature of Christian doctrine 
 into further details, bearing on my present 
 argument, but with even additional obscurity; 
 — an obscurity so great, that the effect of a 
 literal translation would be too ludicrous for 
 an occasion like the present. But enough 
 has been quoted to shew that if rationalizing 
 philosophers have not made much progress, 
 
LECTURE V. 157 
 
 since the days of Job, in the ability to find 
 out the Almighty unto perfection ", they have 
 at least not gone backwards in the art of 
 darkening counsel by words without know- 
 ledge y. 
 
 What is the exact meaning of this pro- 
 found riddle, which the author has repeated 
 in different forms in various parts of his 
 writings (24) ; — whether he really means to 
 assert or to deny the existence of Christ as a 
 man ; — whether he designs to represent the 
 Incarnation and earthly life of the Son of 
 God as a fact, or only as the vulgar repre- 
 sentation of a philosophical idea, — is a point 
 which has been stoutly disputed among his 
 disciples, and which possibly the philosopher 
 himself did not wish to see definitely settled 
 (25). But there is another passage, in which 
 he has spoken somewhat more plainly, and 
 which, without being quite decisive, may be 
 quoted as throwing some light on the ten- 
 dency of his thought. " Christ," says this 
 significant passage, " has been called by the 
 church the God-Man. This monstrous com- 
 bination is to the understanding a direct 
 contradiction ; but the unity of the divine 
 and human nature is in this respect brought 
 into consciousness and certainty in man ; in 
 " Job xi. 7. y Job xxxviii. 2. 
 
158 LECTURE V. 
 
 that the Diversity, or, as we may also express 
 it, the Finiteness, Weakness, Frailty of hu- 
 man nature, is not incompatible with this 
 Unity, as in the eternal Idea Diversity in no 
 wise derogates from the Unity which is God. 
 This is the monstrosity whose necessity we 
 have seen. It is therein implied that the 
 divine and human nature are not in them- 
 selves diiferent. God in human form. The 
 truth is, that there is but one Reason, one 
 Spirit ; that the Spirit as finite has no real 
 existence" (26). 
 
 The dark sentences of the master have 
 been, as might naturally be expected, vari- 
 ously developed by his disciples. Let us hear 
 how the same theory is expressed in the lan- 
 guage of one who is frequently commended 
 as representing the orthodox theology of this 
 school, and who has striven hard to reconcile 
 the demands of his philosophy with the belief 
 in a personal Christ. Marheineke assures us, 
 that " the possibility of God becoming Man 
 shews in itself that the divine and human 
 nature are in themselves not separate :" that, 
 " as the truth of the human nature is the 
 divine, so the reality of the divine nature is 
 the human" (27). And towards the conclu- 
 sion of a statement worthy to rank with that 
 of his master for grandiloquent obscurity, he 
 
LECTURE V 159 
 
 says, "As Spirit, by renouncing Individuality, 
 Man is in truth elevated above himself, with- 
 out having abandoned the human nature : as 
 Spirit renouncing Absoluteness, God has low- 
 ered Himself to human nature, without hav- 
 ing abandoned his existence as Divine Spirit. 
 The unity of the divine and human nature is 
 but the unity in that Spirit whose existence 
 is the knowledge of the truth, with which 
 the doing of good is identical. This Spirit, 
 as God in the human nature and as Man in 
 the divine nature, is the God-Man. The man 
 wise in divine holiness, and holy in divine 
 wisdom, is the God-Man. As a historical 
 fact," he continues, " this union of God with 
 man is manifest and real in the Person of 
 Jesus Christ: in Him the divine manifesta- 
 tion has become perfectly human. The con- 
 ception of the God-Man in the historical 
 Person of Jesus Christ, contains ih itself two 
 phases in one ; first, that God is manifest 
 only through man ; and in this relation 
 Christ is as yet placed on an equality with 
 all other men : He is the Son of Man, and 
 therein at first represents only the possibility 
 of God becoming Man : secondly, that in this 
 Man, Jesus Christ, God is manifest, as in 
 none other : this manifest Man is the mani- 
 fest God; but the manifest God is the Son 
 
160 LECTURE V. 
 
 of God ; and in this relation, Christ is God's 
 Son ; and this is the actual fulfilment of the 
 possibility or promise; it is the reality of God 
 becoming Man" (28). 
 
 But this kind of halting between two opin- 
 ions, which endeavours to combine the histo- 
 rical fact with the philosophical theory, was 
 not of a nature to satisfy the bolder and more 
 logical minds of the same school. In the 
 theory of Strauss, we find the direct antago- 
 nism between the historical and the philoso- 
 phical Christ fairly acknowledged ; and the 
 former is accordingly set aside entirely, to 
 make way for the latter. And here we have 
 at least the advantage, that the trumpet gives 
 no uncertain sound ; — that we are no longer 
 deluded by a phantom of Christian doctrine 
 enveloped in a mist of metaphysical obscu- 
 rity ; but the two systems stand out sharply 
 and clearly defined, in their utter contrariety 
 to each other. " In an individual, a God- 
 Man," he tells us, " the properties and func- 
 tions which the church ascribes to Christ 
 contradict themselves; in the idea of the race, 
 they perfectly agree. Humanity is the union 
 of the two natures — God become Man, the 
 infinite manifesting itself in the finite, and 
 the finite Spirit remembering its infinitude : 
 it is the child of the visible Mother and the 
 
LECTURE V. 161 
 
 invisible Father, Nature and Spirit : it is the 
 worker of miracles, in so far as in the course 
 of human history the spirit more and more 
 completely subjugates nature, both within 
 and around man, until it lies before him as 
 the inert matter on which he exercises his 
 active power: it is the sinless one, for the 
 course of its development is a blameless one ; 
 pollution cleaves to the individual only, but 
 in the race and its history it is taken away. 
 It is Humanity that dies, rises, and ascends to 
 heaven ; for from the negation of its natural 
 state there ever proceeds a higher spiritual 
 life ; from the suppression of its finite cha- 
 racter as a personal, national, and terrestrial 
 Spirit, arises its union with the infinite Spirit 
 of the heavens. By faith in this Christ, espe- 
 cially in his death and resurrection, man is 
 justified before God : that is, by the kindling 
 within him of the idea of Humanity, the in- 
 dividual man participates in the divinely 
 human life of the species. Now the main 
 element of that idea is, that the negation of 
 the merely natural and sensual life, which is 
 itself the negation of the spirit, (the negation 
 of negation, therefore,) is the sole way to true 
 spiritual life" (29). 
 
 These be thy gods, O Philosophy : these 
 are the Metaphysics of Salvation (30). This 
 
 M 
 
162 LECTURE V. 
 
 is that knowledge of things divine and hu- 
 man, which we are called upon to substitute 
 for the revealed doctrine of the Incarnation 
 of the eternal Son in the fulness of time. 
 It is for this philosophical idea, so superior 
 to all history and fact, — this necessary process 
 of the unconscious and impersonal Infinite, — 
 that we are to sacrifice that blessed miracle 
 of Divine Love and Mercy, by which the Son 
 of God, of His own free act and will, took 
 man's nature upon Him for man's redemp- 
 tion. It is for this that we are to obliterate 
 from our faith that touching picture of the 
 pure and holy Jesus, to which mankind for 
 eighteen centuries has ever turned, with the 
 devotion of man to God rendered only more 
 heartfelt by the sympathy of love between 
 man and man : which from generation to 
 generation has nurtured the first seeds of re- 
 ligion in the opening mind of childhood, by 
 the image of that Divine Child who was 
 cradled in the manger of Bethlehem, and was 
 subject to His parents at Nazareth : which 
 has checked the fiery temptations of youth, 
 by the thought of Him who " was in all 
 points tempted like as we are, yet without 
 sin'':" which has consoled the man strug- 
 gling with poverty and sorrow, by the pa- 
 * Hebrews iv. i j. 
 
LECTURE V. 163 
 
 thetic remembrance of Him who on earth 
 had not where to lay His head * : which has 
 blended into one brotherhood the rich and 
 the poor, the mighty and the mean among 
 mankind, by the example of Him who, though 
 He was rich, yet for our sakes became poor**; 
 though He was equal with God, yet took 
 upon Him the form of a servant" : which has 
 given to the highest and purest precepts of 
 morality an additional weight and sanction, 
 by the records of that life in which the mar- 
 vellous and the familiar are so strangely yet 
 so perfectly united ; — that life so natural in 
 its human virtue, so supernatural in its di- 
 vine power : which has robbed death of its 
 sting, and the grave of its victory, by faith 
 in Him who " was delivered for our offences, 
 and was raised again for our justification * :" 
 which has ennobled and sanctified even the 
 wants and weaknesses of our mortal nature, 
 by the memory of Him who was an hungered 
 in the wilderness and athirst upon the cross ; 
 who mourned over the destruction of Jerusa- 
 lem, and wept at the grave of Lazarus. 
 
 Let Philosophy say what she will, the fact 
 remains unshaken. It is the consciousness 
 of the deep wants of our human nature, that 
 
 a St. Luke ix. 58. b 3 Corinthians viii. 9. 
 
 <= Philippians ii. 6, 7. d Komans iv. 25. 
 
 M 2 
 
164 LECTURE V 
 
 first awakens God's presence in the soul : it 
 is by adapting His Revelation to those wants 
 that God graciously condescends to satisfy 
 them. The time may indeed come, though 
 not in this life, when these various manifes- 
 tations of God, " at sundry times and in di- 
 vers mannersV' niay be seen to be but dif- 
 ferent sides and partial representations of one 
 and the same Divine Reality ;— when the light 
 which now gleams in restless flashes from the 
 ruffled waters of the human soul, will settle 
 into the steadfast image of God's face shining 
 on its unbroken surface. But ere this shall 
 be, that which is perfect must come, and that 
 which is in part must be done away^ But 
 as regards the human wisdom which would 
 lead us to this consummation now, there is 
 but one lesson which it can teach us ; and 
 that it teaches in spite of itself. It teaches 
 the lesson which the wise king of Israel 
 learned from his own experience : " I gave 
 my heart to seek and search out by wisdom 
 concerning all things that are done under 
 heaven : I have seen all the works that are 
 done under the sun : and, behold, all is vanity 
 and vexation of spirit. And I gave my heart 
 to know wisdom, and to know madness and 
 folly : I perceived that this also is vexation of 
 « Hebrews i. i. ^ i Corinthians xiii. lo. 
 
LECTURE V. 165 
 
 spirit^." And if ever the time should come 
 to any of us, when, in the bitter conviction 
 of that vanity and vexation, we, who would 
 be as gods in knowledge, wake up only to the 
 consciousness of our own nakedness, happy 
 shall we be, if then we may still hear, ringing 
 in our ears and piercing to our hearts, an 
 echo from that personal life of Jesus which 
 our philosophy has striven in vain to pervert 
 or to destroy : " Lord, to whom shall we go ? 
 thou hast the words of eternal life : and we 
 believe and are sure that thou art that Christ, 
 the Son of the living God''." 
 
 " Ecclesiastes i. 13, 14, 1 7. ^ St. John vi. 68, 69. 
 
LECTURE YI. 
 
 1 CORINTHIANS II, ii. 
 
 For what man knoweth the things of a man, 
 save the spirit of man which is in him 9 
 even so the things of God knoweth no man, 
 but the Spirit of God. 
 
 J. HE conclusion to be drawn from our 
 previous inquiries is, that the doctrines of 
 Revealed Religion, like all other objects of 
 human thought, have a relation to the consti- 
 tution of the thinker to whom they are ad- 
 dressed ; within which relation their practical 
 application and significance is confined. At 
 the same time, this very relation indicates the 
 existence of a higher form of the same truths, 
 beyond the range of human intelligence, and 
 therefore not capable of representation in 
 any positive mode of thought. Religious 
 ideas, in short, like all other objects of man's 
 consciousness, are composed of two distinct 
 elements, — a Matter, furnished from without, 
 and a Form, imposed from within by the 
 laws of the mind itself. The latter element 
 
LECTURE VI. 167 
 
 is common to all objects of thought as such : 
 the former is the peculiar and distinguishing 
 feature, by which the doctrines of Revelation 
 are distinguished from other religious repre- 
 sentations, derived from natural sources ; or 
 by which, in more remote comparison, reli- 
 gious ideas in general maybe distinguished 
 from those relating to other objects. Now 
 it is indispensable, before we can rightly 
 estimate the value of the various objections 
 which are adduced against this or that repre- 
 sentation of Christian doctrine, to ascertain 
 which of these elements it is, against which 
 the force of the objection really makes itself 
 felt. There may be objections whose force, 
 such as it is, tells against the revealed doc- 
 trine al€i^ aaad which are harmless when 
 directed against aay <oiher mode of religious 
 representation. And tliBTe may also be ob- 
 jections which are applicable to the /orm 
 which revealed religion shares in common 
 with other modes of human thinking, and 
 whose force, if they have any, is in reality 
 directed, not against Revelation in particular, 
 but against all Religion, and indeed against 
 all Philosophy also. Now if, upon exami- 
 nation, it should appear that the principal 
 objections which are raised on the side of Ra- 
 tionalism properly so called, — those, namely. 
 
168 LECTURE VI. 
 
 which turn on a supposed incompatibility 
 between the doctrines of Scripture and the 
 deductions of human reason, — are of the 
 latter kind, and not of the former, Christ- 
 ianity is at least so far secure from any appre- 
 hension of danger from the side of rational 
 philosophy. For the weapon with which 
 she is assailed exhibits its own weakness in 
 the very act of assailing. If there is error or 
 imperfection in the essential forms of human 
 thought, it must adhere to the thought criti- 
 cizing, no less than to the thought criticized ; 
 and the result admits of but two legitimate 
 alternatives. Either we must abandon our- 
 selves to an absolute Scepticism, which be- 
 lieves nothing and disbelieves nothing, and 
 which thereby destroys itself in believing 
 that nothing is to be believed ; or we must 
 confess that reason, in thus criticizing, has 
 transcended its legitimate province : that it 
 has failed, not through its inherent weakness, 
 but through being misdirected in its aim. 
 We must then shift the inquiry to another 
 field, and allow our belief to be determined, 
 not solely by the internal character of the 
 doctrines themselves, as reasonable or unrea- 
 sonable, but, partly at least, by the evidence 
 which can be produced in favour of their 
 asserted origin as a fact. The reasonable 
 
LECTURE VI. 169 
 
 believer, in short, must abstain from pro- 
 nouncing judgment on the nature of the 
 message, until he has fairly examined the 
 credentials of the messenger. 
 
 There are two methods by which such 
 an examination of objections may be con- 
 ducted. We may commence by an analysis of 
 thought in general, distinguishing the Form, 
 or permanent element, from the Matter, or 
 variable element ; and then, by applying the 
 results of that analysis to special instances, 
 we may shew, upon deductive grounds, the 
 formal or material character of this or that 
 class of objections. Or we may reverse the 
 process, commencing by an examination of 
 the objections themselves; and, by exhibiting 
 them in their relation to other doctrines be- 
 sides those of Revelation, we may arriv& at 
 the same conclusion as to their general or 
 special applicability. The former method is 
 perhaps the most searching and complete, 
 but could hardly be adequately carried out 
 within my present limits, nor without the 
 employment of a language more technical 
 than would be suitable on this occasion. In 
 selecting the latter method, as the more ap- 
 propriate, I must request my hearers to bear 
 in mind the general principles which it is 
 proposed to exhibit in one or two special in- 
 
170 LECTURE VI. 
 
 stances. These are, first, that there is no ra- 
 tional difficulty in Christian Theology which 
 has not its corresponding difficulty in human 
 Philosophy ; and, secondly, that therefore we 
 may reasonably conclude that the stumbling- 
 blocks which the rationalist professes to find 
 in the doctrines of revealed religion arise, 
 not from defects peculiar to revelation, but 
 from the laws and limits of human thought 
 in general, and ate thus inherent in the me- 
 thod of rationalism itself, not in the objects 
 which it pretends to criticize. 
 
 But, before applying this method to the 
 peculiar doctrines of the Christian revela- 
 tion, it will be desirable to say a few words 
 on a preliminary condition, on which our be- 
 lief in the possibility of any revelation at all 
 is 4ependent. We must justify, in the first 
 instance, the limitations which have been 
 assigned to human reason in relation to the 
 great foundation of all religious belief what- 
 soever : we must shew how far the same me- 
 thod warrants the assertion which has been 
 already made on other grounds ; namely, that 
 we may and ought to believe in the existence 
 of a God whose nature we are unable to com- 
 prehend ; that we are bound to believe that 
 God exists ; and to acknowledge Him as our 
 Sustainer and our Moral Governor: though 
 
LECTURE VI. 171 
 
 we are wholly unable to declare what He is 
 in His own Absolute E^ence (1). 
 
 Many philosophical theologians^ who are 
 far from rejecting any of the essential (doc- 
 trines of revelation, are yet unwilling to 
 ground their acceptance of them on the duty 
 of believing in the inconceivable. " The doc- 
 trine of the incognizability of the Divine 
 Essence," says the learned and deep-thinking 
 Julius Miiller, "with the intention of exalt- 
 ing God to the highest, deprives Him of the 
 realities, without which, as it is itself obliged 
 to confess, we cannot really think of Him. 
 That this negative result, just as decidedly as 
 the assumption of an absolute knowledge of 
 God, contradicts the Holy Scriptures, which 
 especially teach that God becomes revealed 
 in Christ, as it does that of the simple Christ- 
 ian consciousness, may be too easily shewn 
 for it to be requisite that we should here 
 enter upon the same : it is also of itself clear 
 into what a strange position theology must 
 fall by the renunciation of the knowledge 
 of its essential object" (2). As regards the 
 former part of this objection, I endeavoured, 
 in my last Lecture, to shew that a full belief 
 in God, as revealed in Christ, is not incom- 
 patible with a speculative inability to appre- 
 hend the Divine Essence. As regards the 
 
172 LECTURE VI. 
 
 latter part, it is important to observe the 
 exact parallel which in this respect exists 
 between the fundamental conception of The- 
 ology and that of Philosophy. The Principle 
 of Causality, the father, as it has been called, 
 of metaphysical science (S), is to the philoso- 
 pher what the belief in the existence of God 
 is to the theologian. Both are principles 
 inherent in our nature, exhibiting, whatever 
 may be their origin, those characteristics of 
 universality and certainty which mark them 
 as part of the inalienable inheritance of the 
 human mind. Neither can be reduced to a 
 mere logical inference from the facts of a 
 limited and contingent experience. Both are 
 equally indispensable to their respective sci- 
 ences: without Causation, there can be no 
 Philosophy ; as without God there can be no 
 Theology. Yet to this day, while enunciating 
 now, as ever, the fundamental axiom, that 
 for every event there must be a Cause, Phi- 
 losophy has never been able to determine 
 what Causation is ; to analyse the elements 
 which the causal nexus involves; or to shew 
 by what law she is justified in assuming the 
 universal postulate upon which all her rea- 
 sonings depend (4). The Principle of Caus- 
 ality has ever been, and probably ever will 
 be, the battle ground on which, from genera- 
 
LECTURE VI. 173 
 
 tion to generation, Philosophy has struggled 
 for her very existence in the death-gripe of 
 Scepticism ; and at every pause in the con- 
 test, the answer has been still the same : 
 " We cannot explain it, but we must believe 
 it." Causation is not the mere invariable 
 association of antecedent and consequent : we 
 feel that it implies something more than this 
 (5). Yet, beyond the little sphere of our own 
 volitions, what more can we discover? and 
 within that sphere, what do we discover that 
 we can explain (6)? The unknown something, 
 call it by what name you will, — power, effort, 
 tendency, — still remains absolutely concealed, 
 yet is still conceived as absolutely indispen- 
 sable. Of Causality, as of Deity, we may 
 almost say, in the emphatic language of Au- 
 gustine, " Cujus nulla scientia est in anima, 
 nisi scire quomodo eum nesciat" (7). We can 
 speak out boldly and clearly of each, if we 
 are asked, what it is not : we are silent only 
 when we are asked, what it is. The eloquent 
 words of the same great father are as ap- 
 plicable to human as to divine Philosophy: 
 " Deus ineffabilis est : facilius dicimus quid 
 non sit, quam quid sit. Terram cogitas ; non 
 est hoc Deus : mare cogitas ; non est hoc 
 Deus : omnia quae sunt in terra, homines et 
 animalia ; non est hoc Deus : omnia quee sunt 
 
174 LECTURE VI. 
 
 in mari, quae volant per aerem ; non est hoc 
 Deus : quidquid lucet in coelo, stellae, sol et 
 luna; non est hoc Deus : ipsum coelum; non 
 est hoc Deus. Angelos cogita, Virtutes, Po- 
 testates, Archangelos, Thronos, Sedes, Domi- 
 nationes ; non est hoc Deus. Et quid est ? 
 Hoc solum potui dicere, quid non sit" (8). 
 
 From the fundamental doctrine of Reli- 
 gion in general, let us pass on to that of 
 Christianity in particular. " The Catholic 
 Faith is this : that we worship one God in 
 Trinity, and Trinity in Unity." How, asks 
 the objector, can the One be Many, or the 
 Many One ? or how is a distinction of Per- 
 sons compatible with their perfect equality 
 (9) ? Is it not a contradiction to say, that we 
 are compelled by the Christian Verity to ac- 
 knowledge every Person by Himself to be 
 God and Lord ; and yet are forbidden by the 
 Catholic Religion to say, There be three 
 Gods, or three Lords (10) ? 
 
 To exhibit the philosophical value of this 
 objection, we need only make a slight change 
 in the language of the doctrine criticized. 
 Instead of a Plurality of Persons in the Di- 
 vine Unity, we have only to speak of a Plu- 
 rality of Attributes in the Divine Essence. 
 How can there be a variety of Attributes, 
 each infinite in its kind, and yet all together 
 
LECTURE VI. 175 
 
 constituting but one Infinite ? or how, on the 
 other hand, can the Infinite be conceived as 
 existing without diversity at all ? We know, 
 indeed, that various attributes exist in man, 
 constituting in their plurality one and the 
 same conscious self. Even here, there is a 
 mystery which we cannot explain ; but the 
 fact is one which we are compelled, by the 
 direct testimony of consciousness, to accept 
 without explanation. But in admitting, as we 
 are compelled to do, the coexistence of many 
 attributes in one person, we can conceive 
 those attributes only as distinct from each 
 other, and as limiting each other. Each men- 
 tal attribute is manifested as a separate and 
 determinate mode of consciousness, marked 
 off and limited, by the very fact of its mani- 
 festation as such. Each is developed in acti- 
 vities and operations from which the others 
 are excluded. But this type of conscious ex- 
 istence fails us altogether, when we attempt 
 to transfer it to the region of the Infinite. 
 That there can be but one Infinite, appears 
 to be a necessary conclusion of reasoning; for 
 diversity is itself a limitation : yet here we 
 have many Infinites, each distinct from the 
 other, yet all constituting one Infinite, which 
 is neither identical with them nor distinguish- 
 able from them. If Reason, thus baffled, falls 
 
176 LECTURE VI. 
 
 back on the conception of a simple Infinite 
 Nature, composed of no attributes, her case 
 is still more hopeless. That which has no 
 attributes is nothing conceivable ; for things 
 are conceived by their attributes. Strip the 
 Infinite of the Attributes by which it is dis- 
 tinguished as infinite, and the Finite of those 
 by which it is distinguished as finite; and the 
 residue is neither the Infinite as such, nor the 
 Finite as such, nor any one being as distin- 
 guished from any other being. It is the vague 
 and empty conception of Being in general, 
 which is no being in particular : — a shape, 
 
 " If Shape it might be called, that shape had none 
 Distinguishable in member, joint, or limb. 
 Or Substance might be called, that Shadow seemed, 
 For each seemed either" (ii). 
 
 The objection, " How can the One be Many, 
 or the Many One ? " is thus so far from telling 
 with peculiar force against the Catholic doc- 
 trine of the Holy Trinity, that it has pre- 
 cisely the same power, or want of power, and 
 may be urged with precisely the same effect, 
 or want of effect, against any conception, the- 
 ological or philosophical, in which we may 
 attempt to represent the Divine Nature and 
 Attributes as infinite, or, indeed, to exhibit 
 the Infinite at all. The same argument ap- 
 plies with equa;l force to the conception of 
 
LECTURE VI. 177 
 
 the Absolute. If the Divine Nature is con- 
 ceived as being nothing more than the sum 
 of the Divine Attributes, it is not Absolute ; 
 for the existence of the whole v\?ill be de- 
 pendent on the existence of its several parts. 
 If, on the other hand, it is something distinct 
 from the Attributes, and capable of existing 
 without them, it becomes, in its absolute es- 
 sence, an absolute void, — an existence mani- 
 fested by no characteristic features, — a concep- 
 tion constituted by nothing conceivable (12). 
 The same principle may be also applied to 
 another portion of this great fundamental 
 truth. The doctrine of the Son of God, be- 
 gotten of the Father, and yet coeternal with 
 the Father, is in no wise more or less com- 
 prehensible by human reason, than the rela- 
 tion between the Divine Essence and its At- 
 tributes (13). In the order of Thought, or 
 of Nature, the substance to which attributes 
 belong has a logical priority to the attributes 
 which exist in relation to it. The Attributes 
 are attributes of a Substance. The former 
 are conceived as the dependent and derived ; 
 the latter as the independent and original 
 existence. Yet in the order of Time, (and 
 to the order of Time all human thought is 
 limited,) it is as impossible to conceive the 
 Substance existing before its Attributes, as 
 
 N 
 
178 LECTURE VI. 
 
 the Attributes before the Substance (14). We 
 cannot conceive a being originally simple, 
 developing itself in the course of time into 
 a complexity of attributes ; for absolute sim- 
 plicity cannot be conceived as containing 
 within itself a principle of development, nor 
 as differently related to different periods of 
 time, so as to commence its development at 
 any particular moment (15). Nor yet can we 
 conceive the attributes as existing prior to 
 the substance ; for the very conception of an 
 attribute implies relation to a substance. Yet 
 the third hypothesis, that of their coexist- 
 ence in all time, is equally incomprehensible; 
 for this is to merge the Absolute and Infinite 
 in an eternal relation and difference. We 
 cannot conceive God as first existing, and 
 then as creating His own attributes ; for the 
 creative power must then itself be created. 
 Nor yet can we conceive the Divine Essence 
 as constituted by the eternal coexistence of 
 attributes ; for then we have many Infinites, 
 with no bond of unity between them. The 
 mystery of the Many and the One, which has 
 baffled philosophy ever since philosophy be- 
 gan, meets it here, as every where, with its 
 eternal riddle. Reason gains nothing by 
 repudiating Revelation ; for the mystery of 
 Revelation is the mystery of Reason also. 
 
LECTURE VI. 179 
 
 I should not for an instant dream of ad- 
 ducing this metaphysical parallel as offering 
 the slightest approach to a proof oi the Christ- 
 ian doctrine of the Trinity in Unity. What 
 it really illustrates is, not God's Nature, but 
 man's ignorance. Without an Absolute Know- 
 ing there can be no comprehension of Abso- 
 lute Being (16). The position of human rea- 
 son, with regard to the ideas of the Absolute 
 and the Infinite, is such as equally to ex- 
 clude the Dogmatism which would demon- 
 strate Christian Doctrine from philosophical 
 premises, and the Rationalism which rejects 
 it on the ground of philosophical difficulties, 
 as well as that monstrous combination of 
 both, which distorts it in pretending to sys- 
 tematize it. The Infinite is known to hu- 
 man reason, merely as the negation of the 
 Finite : we know what it is not ; and that is 
 all. The conviction, that an Infinite Being 
 exists, seems forced upon us by the manifest 
 incompleteness of our finite knowledge ; but 
 we have no rational means whatever of deter- 
 mining what is the nature of that Being (17). 
 The mind is thus perfectly blank with regard 
 to any speculative representation of the Di- 
 vine Essence ; and for that very reason, Phi- 
 losophy is not entitled, on internal evidence, 
 to accept any, or to reject any. The only 
 
 N 2 
 
180 LECTURE VI. 
 
 question which we are reasonably at liberty 
 to ask in this matter, relates to the evidences 
 of the Revelation as a fact. If there is suf- 
 ficient evidence, on other grounds, to shew 
 that the Scripture, in which this doctrine is 
 contained, is a Revelation from God, the doc- 
 trine itself must be unconditionally received, 
 not as reasonable, nor as unreasonable, but as 
 scriptural. If there is not such evidence, the 
 doctrine itself will lack its proper support ; 
 but the Reason which rejects it is utterly 
 incompetent to substitute any other repre- 
 sentation in its place. 
 
 Let us pass on to the second great doctrine 
 of the Catholic Faith, — that which asserts the 
 union of two Natures in the Person of Christ. 
 " The right faith is, that we believe and con- 
 fess, that our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of 
 God, is God and Man : God of the Substance 
 of the Father, begotten before the worlds ; 
 and Man, of the Substance of His Mother, 
 born in the world" (18). 
 
 Our former parallel was drawn from the 
 impossibility of conceiving, in any form, a re- 
 lation between the Infinite and the Infinite. 
 Our present parallel may be found in the 
 equal impossibility of conceiving, by the na- 
 tural reason, a relation between the Infinite 
 and the Finite ; — an impossibility equally in- 
 
LECTURE VI. 181 
 
 surmountable, whether the two natures are 
 conceived as existing in one Being, or in di- 
 vers. Let us attempt, if we can, to conceive, 
 at any moment of time, a finite world coming 
 into existence by the fiat of an Infinite Cre- 
 ator. Can we conceive that the amount of 
 existence is thereby increased, — that the In- 
 finite and the Finite together contain more 
 reality than formerly existed in the Infinite 
 alone ? The supposition annihilates itself; for 
 it represents Infinite Existence as capable of 
 becoming greater still. But, on the other 
 hand, can we have recourse to the opposite 
 alternative, and conceive the Creator as evolv- 
 ing the world out of His own Essence ; the 
 amount of Being remaining as before, yet the 
 Infinite and the Finite both existing ? This 
 supposition also annihilates itself ; for if the 
 Infinite suffers diminution by that portion of 
 it which becomes the Finite, it is infinite no 
 longer ; and if it suifers no diminution, the 
 two together are but equal to the Infinite 
 alone, and the Finite is reduced to absolute 
 nonentity (19). In any mode whatever of 
 human thought, the coexistence of the Infi- 
 nite and the Finite is inconceivable ; and yet 
 the non-existence of either is, by the same 
 laws of consciousness, equally inconceivable. 
 If Keason is to be the supreme Judge of Di- 
 
182 LECTURE VI. 
 
 vine Truths, it will not be sufficient to follow 
 its guidance up to a certain point, and to stop 
 when it is inconvenient to proceed further. 
 There is no logical break in the chain of con- 
 sequences, from Socinianism to Pantheism, 
 and from Pantheism to Atheism, and from 
 Atheism to Pyrrhonism ; and Pyrrhonism is 
 but the suicide of Reason itself. "Nature," 
 says Pascal, " confounds the Pyrrhonists, and 
 reason confounds the Dogmatists. What then 
 becomes of man, if he seeks to discover his 
 true condition by his natural reason ? He 
 cannot avoid one of these sects, and he cannot 
 subsist in either" (20). 
 
 Let Religion begin where it will, it must 
 begin with that which is above Reason. What 
 then do we gain by that parsimony of belief, 
 which strives to deal out the Infinite in infi- 
 nitesimal fragments, and to erect the largest 
 possible superstructure of deduction upon the 
 smallest possible foundation of faith? We gain 
 just this : that we forsake an incomprehen- 
 sible doctrine, which rests upon the word of 
 God, for one equally incomprehensible, which 
 rests upon the word of man. Religion, to be 
 a relation between God and man at all, must 
 rest on a belief in the Infinite, and also on a 
 belief in the Finite ; for if we deny the first, 
 there is no God ; and if we deny the second. 
 
LECTURE VI. 183 
 
 there is no Man. But the coexistence of the 
 Infinite and the Finite, in any manner what- 
 ever, is inconceivable by reason ; and the only 
 ground that can be taken for accepting one 
 representation of it, rather than another, is 
 that one is revealed, and another is not re- 
 vealed. "We jnay seek as we will for a " Reli- 
 gion within the limits of the bare Reason ;" 
 and we shall not find it ; simply because no 
 such thing exists ; and if we dream for a 
 moment that it does exist, it is only because 
 we are unable or unwilling to pursue reason 
 to its final consequences. But if we do not, 
 others will ; and the system which we have 
 raised on the shifting basis of our arbitrary 
 resting-place, waits only till the wind of con- 
 troversy blows against it, and the flood of 
 unbelief descends upon it, to manifest itself 
 as the work of the " foolish man which built 
 his house upon the sand^." 
 
 Having thus endeavoured to exhibit the 
 limits of human reason in relation to those 
 doctrines of Holy Scripture which reveal to 
 us the nature of God, I shall next attempt 
 briefly to apply the same argument to those 
 representations which more directly declare 
 His relation to the world. 
 
 The course of Divine Providence, in the 
 
 " St. Matthew vii. '2,6. 
 
184 LECTURE VI. 
 
 government of the world, is represented in 
 Scripture under the twofold aspect of General 
 Laiu and Special Interposition. Not only is 
 God the Author of the universe, and of those 
 regular laws by which the periodical recur- 
 rence of its natural phenomena is deter- 
 mined '' ; but He is also exhibited as stand- 
 ing in a special relation to mankind ; as the 
 direct cause of events by which their tem- 
 poral or spiritual welfare is affected ; as ac- 
 cessible to the prayers of His servants ; as to 
 be praised for His special mercies towards 
 each of us in particular''. But this scrip- 
 tural representation has been discovered by 
 Philosophy to be irrational. God is un- 
 changeable ; and therefore He cannot be 
 moved by man's entreaty. He is infinitely 
 wise and good ; and therefore He ought not 
 to deviate from the perfection of His Eternal 
 Counsels. " The religious man," says a writer 
 of the present day, "who believes that all 
 events, mental as well as physical, are pre- 
 ordered and arranged according to the de- 
 crees of infinite wisdom, and the philosopher, 
 who knows that, by the wise and eternal 
 laws of the universe, cause and effect are 
 indissolubly chained together, and that one 
 
 b Genesis i. 14 ; viii. 22 ; Job xxxviii, xxxix ; Psalm xix. 
 1-6 ; Ixxiv. 17 ; civ. 5-31 ; cxxxv. 7 ; cxlviii. 6. 
 c Psalm Ixv. 2 ; cii. 17, 18 ; ciii. 1,3; cxliii. 1,2; cxlv.19. 
 
LECTURE VI. 185 
 
 follows the other in inevitable succession, — 
 equally feel that this ordination — this chain 
 — cannot be changeable at the cry of man. 
 ... If the purposes of God were not wise, 
 they would not be formed : — if wise, they 
 cannot be changed, for then they would be- 
 come unwise The devout philosopher, 
 
 trained to the investigation of universal sys- 
 tem, — the serene astronomer, fresh from the 
 study of the changeless laws which govern 
 innumerable worlds, — shrinks from the mon- 
 strous irrationality of asking the great Archi- 
 tect and Governor of all to work a miracle 
 in his behalf — to interfere, for the sake of 
 his convenience or his plans, with the sub- 
 lime order conceived by the Ancient of Days 
 in the far Eternity of the Past ; for what is a 
 special providence but an interference with 
 established laws ? and what is such inter- 
 ference but a miracle ?" (21). 
 
 Now here, as in the objections previously 
 noticed, the rationalist mistakes a general 
 difficulty of all human thought for a special 
 difficulty of Christian belief. The really in- 
 soluble problem is, how to conceive God as 
 acting at all ; not how to conceive Him as 
 acting in this way, rather than in that. The 
 creation of the world at any period of time ; 
 — the establishment, at any moment, of im- 
 
186 LECTURE Vi. 
 
 mutable laws for the future government of 
 that world ; — this is the real mystery which 
 Reason is unable to fathom : this is the repre- 
 sentation which seems to contradict our con- 
 ceptions of the Divine Perfection. To that 
 pretentious perversion of the finite which 
 philosophy dignifies with the name of the 
 Infinite, it is a contradiction to suppose that 
 any change can take place at any moment ; 
 — that any thing can begin to exist, which 
 was not from all eternity. To conceive the 
 Infinite Creator, at any moment of time, 
 calling into existence a finite world, is, in the 
 human point of view, to suppose an imper- 
 fection, either before the act, or after it. It 
 is to suppose the development of a power 
 hitherto unexercised, or the limiting to a de- 
 terminate act that which was before general 
 and indeterminate. 
 
 May we not then repeat our author's objec- 
 tion in another form ? How can a Being of 
 Infinite Wisdom and Goodness, without an 
 act of self - deterioration, change the laws 
 which have governed His own solitary exist- 
 ence in the far Eternity when the world was 
 not ? Or rather, may we not ask what these 
 very phrases of "changeless laws" and "far 
 Eternity" really mean ? Do they not repre- 
 sent God's existence as manifested under the 
 
LECTURE VI. 187 
 
 conditions of duration and succession, — con- 
 ditions which necessarily involve the concep- 
 tion of the imperfect and the finite ? They 
 have not emancipated the Deity from the 
 law of Time : they have only placed Him in 
 a different relation to it. They have merely 
 substituted, for the revealed representation 
 of the God who from time to time vouch- 
 safes His aid to the needs of His creatures, 
 the rationalizing representation of the God 
 who, throughout all time, steadfastly refuses 
 to do so (22). 
 
 If then the condition of Time is insepa- 
 rable from all human conceptions of the Di- 
 vine Nature, what advantage do we gain, even 
 in philosophy, by substituting the supposi- 
 tion of immutable order in time for that of 
 special interposition in time ? Both of these 
 representations are doubtless speculatively im- 
 perfect : both depict the Infinite God under 
 finite symbols. But for the regulative pur- 
 poses of human conduct in this life, each is 
 equally necessary : and who may dare, from 
 the depths of his own ignorance, to say that 
 each may not have its prototype in the inef- 
 fable Being of God ? (£3). We are sometimes 
 told that it gives us a more elevated idea of 
 the Divine Wisdom and Power, to regard the 
 Creator as having finished His work once for 
 
188 LECTURE VI. 
 
 all, and then abandoned it to its own un- 
 erring laws, than to represent Him as in- 
 terfering, from lime to time, by the way of 
 direct personal superintendence : — just as it 
 implies higher mechanical skill to make an 
 engine which shall go on perpetually by its 
 own motion, than one which requires to be 
 continually regulated by the hand of its 
 maker (24). This ingenious simile fails only 
 in the important particular, that both its 
 terms are utterly unlike the objects which 
 they profess, to represent. The world is not 
 a machine ; and God is not a mechanic. The 
 world is not a machine ; for it consists, not 
 merely of wheels of brass, and springs of 
 steel, and the fixed properties of inanimate 
 matter ; but of living and intelligent and 
 free-acting persons, capable of personal rela- 
 tions to a living and intelligent and free-act- 
 ing Ruler. And God is not a mechanic ; for 
 the mechanic is separated from his machine 
 by, the whole diameter of being ; as mind, 
 giving birth to material results ; as the con- 
 scious workman, who meets with no reci- 
 procal consciousness in his work. It may 
 be a higher evidence of mechanical skill, to 
 abandon brute matter once for all to its own 
 laws ; but to take this as the analogy of 
 God's dealings with His living creatures — as 
 
LECTURE VI. 189 
 
 well tell us that the highest image of parental 
 love and forethought is that of the ostrich, 
 " which leaveth her eggs in the earth, and 
 warraeth them in dust^" (25). 
 
 But if such conclusions are not justified by 
 our a priori knowledge of the Divine nature, 
 are they borne out empirically by the actual 
 constitution of the world? Is there any truth 
 in the assertion, so often put forth as an un- 
 deniable discovery of modern science, " that 
 cause and effect are indissolubly chained 
 together, and that one follows the other in 
 inevitable succession?" There is just that 
 amount of half-truth which makes an error 
 dangerous; and there is no more. Experi- 
 ence is of two kinds, and Philosophy is of 
 two kinds ; — that of the world of matter, and 
 that of the world of mind, — that of physical 
 succession, and that of moral action. In the 
 material world, if it be true that the re- 
 searches of science tend towards (though who 
 can say that they will ever reach ?) the esta- 
 blishment of a system of fixed and orderly 
 recurrence ; in the mental world, we are no 
 less confronted, at every instant, by the pre- 
 sence of contingency and free will (26). In 
 the one we are conscious of a chain of phe- 
 nomenal effects ; in the other of self, as an 
 ^ Job xxxix. 14. 
 
190 LECTURE VI. 
 
 acting and originating cause. Nay, the very 
 conception of the immutability of the law of 
 cause and effect, is not so much derived from 
 the positive evidence of the former, as from 
 the negative evidence of the latter. We be- 
 lieve the succession to be necessary, because 
 nothing but mind can be conceived as inter- 
 fering with the successions of matter ; and, 
 where mind is excluded, we are unable to 
 imagine contingence (27). But what right 
 has this so-called philosophy to build a 
 theory of the universe on material principles 
 alone, and to neglect what experience daily 
 and hourly forces upon our notice, — the per- 
 petual interchange of the relations of matter 
 and mind ? In passing from the material to 
 the moral world, we pass at once from the 
 phenomenal to the real ; from the successive 
 to the continuous; from the many to the 
 one; from an endless chain of mutual de- 
 pendence to an originating and self-deter- 
 mining source of power. That mysterious, 
 yet unquestionable presence of Will: — ^that 
 agent, uncompelled, yet not uninfluenced, 
 whose continuous existence and productive 
 energy are summed up in the word Myself: 
 — that perpetual struggle of good with evil : 
 — those warnings and promptings of a Spirit, 
 striving with our spirit, commanding, yet not 
 
LECTURE VI. 191 
 
 compelling; acting upon us, yet leaving us 
 free to act for ourselves : — that twofold con- 
 sciousness of infirmity and strength in the 
 hour of temptation : — that grand ideal of 
 what we ought to be, so little, alas ! to be 
 gathered from the observation of what we 
 are:-— that overwhelming conviction of Sin 
 in the sight of One higher and holier than 
 we : — that irresistible impulse to Prayer, 
 which bids us pour out our sorrows and 
 make our wants known to One who hears 
 and will answer us : — that indefinable yet 
 inextinguishable consciousness of a direct in- 
 tercourse and communion of man with God, 
 of God's influence upon man, yea, and (with 
 reverence be it spoken) of man's influence 
 upon God : — these are facts of experience, to 
 the full as real and as certain as the laws of 
 planetary motions and chemical affinities ; — 
 facts which Philosophy is bound to take into 
 account, or to stand convicted as shallow and 
 one-sided ; — facts which can deceive us, only 
 if our whole Consciousness is a liar, and the 
 boasted voice of Reason itself but an echo of 
 the universal lie. 
 
 Even within the domain of Physical Sci- 
 ence, however much analogy may lead us to 
 conjecture the universal prevalence of law 
 
19S LECTURE VI. 
 
 and orderly sequence, it has been acutely 
 remarked, that the phenomena which are 
 most immediately important to the life and 
 welfare of man, are precisely those which he 
 never has been, and probably never will be, 
 able to reduce to a scientific calculation (28). 
 The astronomer, who can predict the exact 
 position of a planet in the heavens a thousand 
 years hence, knows not what may be his own 
 state of health to-morrow, nor how the wind 
 which blows upon him will vary from day to 
 day. May we not be permitted to conclude, 
 with a distinguished Christian philosopher 
 of the present day, that there is a Divine 
 Purpose in this arrangement of nature ; that, 
 while enough is displayed to stimulate the 
 intellectual and practical energies of man, 
 enough is still concealed to make him feel 
 his dependence upon God (29) ? 
 
 For man's training in this life, the concep- 
 tions of General Law and of Special Provi- 
 dence are both equally necessary ; the one, 
 that he may labour for God's blessings, and 
 the other, that he may pray for them. He 
 sows, and reaps, and gathers in his produce, 
 to meet the different seasons, as they roll 
 their unchanging course : he acknowledges 
 also that " neither is he that planteth any 
 
LECTURE VI. 193 
 
 thing, neither he that watereth ; but God 
 that giveth the increase*." He labours in 
 the moral training of himself and others, in 
 obedience to the general laws of means and 
 ends, of motives and influences ; while he 
 asks, at the same time, for wisdom from 
 above to guide his course aright, and for 
 grace to enable him to follow that guidance. 
 Necessary alike during this our state of trial, 
 it may be that both conceptions alike are but 
 shadows of some higher truth, in which their 
 apparent oppositions are merged in one har- 
 monious whole. But when we attempt, from 
 our limited point of view, to destroy the one, 
 in order to establish the other more surely, 
 we overlook the fact that our conception of 
 General Law is to the full as human as that 
 of Special Interposition ; — that we are not 
 really thereby acquiring a truer knowledge 
 of the hidden things of God, but are mea- 
 suring Him by a standard derived from the 
 limited representations of man (30). 
 
 Subordinate to the conception of Special 
 Providence, and subject to the same laws 
 of thought in its application, is that of Mi- 
 raculous Agency. I am not now going to 
 waste an additional argument in answer to 
 that shallowest and crudest of all the as- 
 « I Corinthians iii. 7. 
 o 
 
194 LECTURE VI. 
 
 sumptions of unbelief, which dictatorially 
 pronounces that Miracles are impossible ; — 
 an assumption which is repudiated by the 
 more philosophical among the leaders of Ra- 
 tionalism itself (31) ; and which implies, that 
 he who maintains it has such a perfect and 
 intimate acquaintance with the Divine Na- 
 ture and Purposes, as to warrant him in as- 
 serting that God cannot or will not depart 
 from the ordinary course of His Providence 
 on any occasion whatever. If, as I have en- 
 deavoured to shew, the doctrine of Divine 
 Interposition is not in itself more opposed to 
 reason than that of General Law ; and if the 
 asserted immutability of the laws of nature 
 is, at the utmost, tenable only on the suppo- 
 sition that material nature alone is spoken 
 of, — we are not warranted, on any ground, 
 whether of deduction from principles or of 
 induction from experience, in denying the 
 possible suspension of the Laws of Matter 
 by the will of the Divine Mind. But the 
 question on which it may still be desirable 
 to say a few words, before concluding this 
 portion of my argument, is one which is 
 disputed, not necessarily between the be- 
 liever and the unbeliever, but often between 
 believers equally sincere and equally pious, 
 differing only in their modes of representing 
 
LECTURE VI. 195 
 
 to their own minds the facts and doctrines 
 which both accept. Granting, that is to say, 
 that variations from the established sequence 
 of physical phenomena may take place, and 
 have taken place, as Scripture bears witness ; 
 — are such variations to be represented as 
 departures from or suspensions of natural 
 law ; or rather, as themselves the result of 
 some higher law to us unknown, and as mi- 
 raculous only from the point of view of our 
 present ignorance (32) ? 
 
 Which of these representations, or whether 
 either of them, is the true one, when such 
 occurrences are considered in their relation 
 to the Absolute Nature of God, our igno- 
 rance of that Nature forbids us to determine. 
 Speculatively, to human understanding, it 
 appears as little consistent with the nature 
 of the Absolute and Infinite, to be subject to 
 universal law, as it is to act at particular 
 moments. But as a regulative truth, adapted 
 to the religious wants of man's constitution, 
 the more natural representation, that of a de- 
 parture from the general law, seems to be also 
 the more accurate. We are liable, in consider- 
 ing this question, to confound together two 
 distinct notions under the equivocal name of 
 Law. The first is a positive notion, derived 
 from the observation of facts, and founded, 
 
 o 2 
 
196 LECTURE VI. 
 
 with various modifications, upon the general 
 idea of the periodical recurrence of phenomena. 
 The other is a merely negative notion, deduced 
 from a supposed apprehension of the Divine 
 Nature, and professing to be based on the idea 
 of the eternal Purposes of God. Of the former, 
 the ideas of succession and repetition form an 
 essential part. To the latter, the idea of Time, 
 in any form, has no legitimate application ; 
 and it is thus placed beyond the sphere of 
 human thought. Now when we speak of a 
 Miracle as the possible result of some higher 
 law, do we employ the term law in the former 
 sense, or in the latter ? do we mean, a law 
 which actually exists in the knowledge of 
 God; or one which, in the progress of sci- 
 ence, may come to the knowledge of man ? — 
 one which might be discovered by a better 
 acquaintance with the Divine Counsels ; or 
 one which might be inferred from a larger 
 experience of natural phenomena ? If we 
 mean the former, we do not know that a 
 more perfect acquaintance with the Divine 
 Counsels, implying, as it does, the elevation 
 of our faculties to a superhuman level, might 
 not abolish the conception of Law altogether. 
 If we mean the latter, we assume that which 
 no experience warrants us in assuming ; we 
 endanger the religious significance and value 
 
LECTURE VI. 197 
 
 of the miracle, only for the sake of removing 
 God a few degrees further back from that 
 chain of phenomena which is admitted ulti- 
 mately to depend upon Him. A miracle, in 
 one sense, need not be necessarily a viola- 
 tion of the laws of nature. God may make 
 use of natural instruments, acting after their 
 kind ; as man himself, within his own sphere, 
 does in the production of artificial combina- 
 tions. The great question, however, still re- 
 mains : Has God ever, for religious purposes, 
 exhibited phenomena in certain relations, 
 which the observed course of nature, and 
 the artistic skill of man, are unable to bring 
 about, or to account for ? 
 
 I have thus far endeavoured to apply the 
 principle of the Limits of Religious Thought 
 to some of those representations which are 
 usually objected to by the Rationalist, as in 
 apparent opposition to the Speculative Reason 
 of man. In my next Lecture, I shall attempt 
 to pursue the same argument, in relation to 
 those doctrines which are sometimes regarded 
 as repugnant to man's Moral Reason. The 
 lesson to be derived from our present in- 
 quiry may be given in the pregnant sentence 
 of a great philosopher, but recently taken 
 from us: "No difficulty emerges in Theo- 
 logy, which had not previously emerged in 
 
198 LECTURE VI. 
 
 Philosophy" (S3). The intellectual stum- 
 blingblocks, which men find in the doctrines 
 of Revelation, are not the consequence of 
 any improbability or error peculiar to the 
 things revealed ; but are such as the thinker 
 brings with him to the examination of the 
 question ; — such as meet him on every side, 
 whether he thinks with or against the testi- 
 mony of Scripture ; being inherent in the 
 constitution and laws of the Human Mind 
 itself. But must we therefore acquiesce in 
 the melancholy conclusion, that self-contra- 
 diction is the law of our intellectual being ; 
 — that the light of Reason, which is God's 
 gift, no less than Revelation, is a delusive 
 light, which we follow to our own deception ? 
 Far from it : the examination of the Limits 
 of Thought leads to a conclusion the very 
 opposite of this. Reason does not deceive 
 us, if we will only read her witness aright ; 
 and Reason herself gives us warning, when 
 we are in danger of reading it wrong. The 
 light that is within us is not darkness ; only 
 it cannot illuminate that which is beyond 
 the sphere of its rays. The self-contradic- 
 tions, into which we inevitably fall, when we 
 attempt certain courses of speculation, are 
 the beacons placed by the hand of God in 
 the mind of man, to warn us that we are 
 
LECTURE VI. 199 
 
 deviating from the track that He designs us 
 to pursue ; that we are striving to pass the 
 barriers v\rhich He has planted around us. 
 The flaming sword turns every way against 
 those who strive, in the strength of their own 
 reason, to force their passage to the tree of 
 life. Within her own province, and among 
 her own objects, let Reason go forth, con- 
 quering and to conquer. The finite objects, 
 which she can clearly and distinctly conceive, 
 are her lawful empire and her true glory. 
 The countless phenomena of the visible 
 world ; the unseen things which lie in the 
 depths of the human soul ; — these are given 
 into her hand ; and over them she may reign 
 in unquestioned dominion. But when she 
 strives to approach too near to the hidden 
 mysteries of the Infinite; — when, not con- 
 tent with beholding afar off the partial and 
 relative manifestations of God's presence, she 
 would " turn aside and see this great sight," 
 and know why God hath revealed Himself 
 thus ; — the voice of the Lord Himself is 
 heard, as it were, speaking in warning from 
 the midst : " Draw not nigh hither : put off 
 thy shoes from off thy feet; for the place 
 whereon thou standest is holy ground V' 
 ^ Exodus iii. 5. 
 
LECTURE YII. 
 
 EZEKIEL XVIII. 25. 
 Yet ye say, The way of the Lord is not equal. 
 Hear now, O house of Israel ; Is not my 
 way equal P are not your ways unequal P 
 
 " If I build again the things which I de- 
 stroyed, I make myself a transgressor"." 
 This text might be appropriately prefixed to 
 an examination of that system of moral and 
 religious criticism which, at the close of the 
 last century, succeeded for a time in giving 
 a philosophical connection to the hitherto 
 loose and floating theological rationalism of 
 its age and country (1). It was indeed a mar- 
 vellous attempt to send forth from the same 
 fountain sweet waters and bitter, to pull 
 down and to build up by the same act and 
 method. The result of the Critical Philosophy, 
 as applied to the speculative side of human 
 Reason, was to prove beyond all question the 
 existence of certain necessary forms and laws 
 of intuition and thought, which impart a 
 corresponding character to all the objects of 
 " Galatians ii. i8. 
 
LECTURE VII. 201 
 
 which Consciousness, intuitive or reflective, 
 can take cognisance. Consciousness was thus 
 exhibited as a Relation between the human 
 mind and its object ; and this conclusion, 
 once established, is fatal to the very concep- 
 tion of a Philosophy of the Absolute. But 
 by an inconsistency scarcely to be paralleled 
 in the history of philosophy, the author of 
 this comprehensive criticism attempted to 
 deduce a partial conclusion from universal 
 premises, and to exempt the speculations of 
 moral and religious thought from the rela- 
 tive character with which, upon his own 
 principles, all the products of human con- 
 sciousness were necessarily invested. The 
 Moral Law, and the ideas which it carries 
 with it, are, according to this theory, not 
 merely facts of human consciousness, con- 
 ceived under the laws of human thought, but 
 absolute, transcendental realities, implied in 
 the conception of all Reasonable Beings as 
 such, and therefore independent of the law 
 of Time, and binding, not on man as man, 
 but on all possible intelligent beings, created 
 or uncreated (2). The Moral Reason is thus 
 a source of absolute and unchangeable reali- 
 ties ; while the Speculative Reason is con- 
 cerned only with phenomena, or things mo- 
 dified by the constitution of the human 
 
202 LECTURE VTI. 
 
 mind (3). As a corollary to this theory, it 
 follows, that the law of human morality must 
 be regarded as the measure and adequate 
 representative of the moral nature of God; — 
 in fact, that our knowledge of the Divine 
 Being is identical with that of our own moral 
 duties ; — for God is made known to us, as ex- 
 isting at all, only in and by the moral reason: 
 we do not look upon actions as binding be- 
 cause they are commanded by God ; but we 
 know them to be divine commands because 
 we are bound by them (4). Applying these 
 principles to the criticism of Revealed Reli- 
 gion, the philosopher maintains that no code 
 of laws claiming divine authority can have 
 any religious value, except as approved by 
 the moral reason (5) ; that there can be no 
 duties of faith or practice towards God, dis- 
 tinct from the moral obligations which reason 
 enjoins (6); and that, consequently, every doc- 
 trine to which this test is inapplicable is 
 either no part of revelation at all, or at best 
 can only be given for local and temporary 
 purposes, of which the enlightened reason 
 need no longer take any account (7). 
 
 Amid much that is true and noble in this 
 teaching when confined within its proper li- 
 mits, its fundamental weakness as an abso- 
 lute criterion of religious truth is so manifest 
 
LECTURE VII. 203 
 
 as hardly to need exposure. The fiction of 
 a moral law binding in a particular form 
 upon all possible intelligences, acquires this 
 seeming universality, only because human in- 
 telligence is made the representative of all. 
 I can conceive moral attributes only as I 
 know them in consciousness : 1 can imagine 
 other minds only by first assuming their 
 likeness to my own. To construct a theory, 
 whether of practical or of speculative reason, 
 which shall be valid for other than human 
 intelligences, it is necessary that the author 
 should himself be emancipated from the con- 
 ditions of human thought. Till this is done, 
 the so-called Absolute is but the Relative 
 under another name : the universal consci- 
 ousness is but the human mind striving to 
 transcend itself. 
 
 The very characteristics of Universality and 
 Necessity, with which our moral obligations 
 are invested, point to an origin the very re- 
 verse of that which the above theory sup- 
 poses. For these characteristics are in all 
 cases due to the presence of the formal and 
 personal element in the phenomena of con- 
 sciousness, and appear most evidently in 
 those conceptions in which the matter as well 
 as the manner of thinking is drawn from the 
 laws or formal conditions of experience. Of 
 
204 LECTURE VII. 
 
 these conditions, I have in a former Lecture 
 enumerated three, Time, Space, and Person- 
 ality: the first as the condition of human 
 consciousness in general : the second and 
 third as the conditions of the same conscious- 
 ness in relation to the phenomena of matter 
 and of mind respectively (8). From these are 
 derived three corresponding systems of ne- 
 cessary truths in the highest human sense of 
 the term : the science of Numbers being con- 
 nected with the condition of Time ; that of 
 Magnitudes v^ith Space ; and that of Morals 
 v^ith Personality. These three sciences rest 
 on similar bases, and are confined v^^ithin the 
 same limits : all being equally necessary and 
 valid within the legitimate bounds of human 
 intelligence ; and all equally negative and 
 self- contradictory, when we attempt to pass 
 beyond those bounds. The contradictions in- 
 volved in the conceptions of Infinite Number 
 and Infinite Magnitude find their parallel 
 when we attempt to conceive the attributes 
 of an Infinite Morality : the necessity which 
 is manifested in the finite relations of the 
 two former is the counterpart of that which 
 accompanies those of the latter (9). That 
 Moral Obligation, conceived as a law binding 
 upon man, must be regarded as immutable so 
 long as man's nature remains unchanged, is 
 
LECTURE VII. 205 
 
 manifest from the character of the conception 
 itself, and follows naturally from a knowledge 
 of its origin. An act of Duty is presented to 
 my consciousness as enjoined by a Law whose 
 obligation upon myself is directly and intui- 
 tively discerned. It thus differs essentially 
 from the phenomena of external nature, whose 
 laws are not immediately perceived, but in- 
 ferred from the observed recurrence of facts. 
 The immediate consciousness of Law un- 
 avoidably carries with it the conviction of 
 necessity and immutability in relation to the 
 agent who is subject to it. For to suppose 
 that a moral law can be reversed or sus- 
 pended in relation to myself; — to suppose 
 a conviction of right unaccompanied by an 
 obligation to act, or a conviction of wrong 
 unaccompanied by an obligation to forbear — 
 is to suppose a reversal of the conditions of 
 my personal existence ; — a supposition which 
 annihilates itself; since those conditions are 
 implied in the attempt to conceive my per- 
 sonal existence at all. The Moral Sense is 
 thus, like the intuitions of Time and Space, 
 an a priori law of the human mind, not de- 
 termined by experience as it is, but deter- 
 mining beforehand what experience ought to 
 be. But it is not thereby elevated above the 
 conditions of human intelligence ; and the 
 
206 LECTURE VII. 
 
 attempt so to elevate it is especially inadmis- 
 sible in that philosophy which resolves Time 
 and Space into forms of the human consci- 
 ousness, and limits their operation to the 
 field of the phenomenal and the relative. 
 
 That there is an Absolute Morality, based 
 upon, or rather identical with, the Eternal 
 Nature of God, is indeed a conviction forced 
 upon us by the same evidence as that on 
 which we believe that God exists at all. But 
 what that Absolute Morality is, we are as un- 
 able to fix in any human conception, as we 
 are to define the other attributes of the same 
 Divine Nature. To human conception it 
 seems impossible that absolute morality 
 should be manifested in the form of a law 
 of obligation ; for such a law implies relation 
 and subjection to the authority of a lawgiver. 
 And, as all human morality is manifested in 
 this form, the conclusion seems unavoidable, 
 that human morality, even in its highest ele- 
 vation, is not identical with, nor adequate to 
 measure, the Absolute Morality of God (10). 
 
 A like conclusion is forced upon us by a 
 closer examination of human morality itself. 
 To maintain the immutability of moral prin- 
 ciples in the abstract is a very different thing 
 from maintaining the immutability of the 
 particular acts by which those principles are 
 
LECTURE VII. 207 
 
 manifested in practice. The parallel between 
 the mathematical and the moral sciences, as 
 systems of necessary truth, holds good in this 
 respect also. As principles in the abstract, 
 the laws of morality are as unchangeable as 
 the axioms of geometry. That duty ought 
 in all cases to be followed in preference to 
 inclination, is as certain a truth as that two 
 straight lines cannot enclose a space. In 
 their concrete application both principles are 
 equally liable to error : — we may err in sup- 
 posing a particular visible line to be perfectly 
 straight ; as we may err in supposing a parti- 
 cular act to be one of duty (11). But the two 
 errors, though equally possible, are by no 
 means equally important. For mathematical 
 science, as such, is complete in its merely 
 theoretical aspect ; while moral science is va- 
 luable chiefly in its application to practice. 
 It is in their concrete form that moral prin- 
 ciples are adopted as guides of conduct and 
 canons of judgment; and in this form they 
 admit of various degrees of uncertainty or of 
 positive error. But the difference between the 
 highest and the lowest conception of moral 
 duty is one of degree, not of kind ; the inter- 
 val between them is occupied by intermediate 
 stages, separated from each other by minute 
 and scarcely appreciable differences ; and the 
 
208 LECTURE VII. 
 
 very conception of a gradual progress in mo- 
 ral enlightenment implies the possibility of 
 a further advance, of a more exalted intel- 
 lect, and a more enlightened conscience. 
 While we repudiate, as subversive of all mo- 
 rality, the theory which maintains that each 
 man is the measure of his own moral acts ; 
 we must repudiate also, as subversive of all 
 religion, the opposite theory, which virtually 
 maintains that man may become the measure 
 of the absolute Nature of God. 
 
 God did not create Absolute Morality : it 
 is coeternal with Himself; and it were blas- 
 phemy to say that there ever was a time 
 when God was and Goodness was not. But 
 God did create the human manifestation of 
 morality, when He created the moral consti- 
 tution of man, and placed him in those cir- 
 cumstances by which the eternal principles 
 of right and wrong are modified in relation 
 to this present life (12). For it is manifest, 
 to take the simplest instances, that the sixth 
 Commandment of the Decalogue, in its literal 
 obligation, is relative to that state of things 
 in which men are subject to death ; and the 
 seventh, to that in which there is marrying 
 and giving in marriage ; and the eighth, to 
 that in which men possess temporal goods. 
 It is manifest, to take a more general ground, 
 
LECTURE VII. 209 
 
 that the very conception of moral obligation 
 implies a superior authority, and an ability 
 to transgress what that authority commands : 
 that it implies a complex, and therefore a 
 limited nature in the moral agent ; the intel- 
 lect, which apprehends the duty, being dis- 
 tinct from the will, which obeys or disobeys. 
 That there is a higher and unchangeable 
 principle embodied in these forms, we have 
 abundant reason to believe ; and yet we can- 
 not, from our present point of view, examine 
 the same duties apart from their human ele- 
 ment, and separate that which is relative and 
 peculiar to man in this life from that which 
 is absolute and common to all moral beings. 
 In this respect, again, our moral conceptions 
 offer a remarkable analogy to the cognate 
 phenomena on which other systems of neces- 
 sary truth are based. Take, for example, the 
 idea of Time, the foundation of the science 
 of Number. We find no difficulty in con- 
 ceiving that this present world was created 
 at some definite point of time ; but we are 
 unable to conceive the same moment as the 
 creation of Time itself. On the contrary, we 
 are compelled to believe that there was a 
 time before as well as after the creation of 
 the world: that the being of God reaches 
 back in boundless duration beyond the mo- 
 
210 LECTURE VII. 
 
 ment when He said, Let there be light ; 
 and there was light. But when we attempt 
 to unite this conviction with another, neces- 
 sary to the completion of the thought ; — 
 when we try to conceive God as an Infinite 
 Being, existing in continuous duration, — the 
 contradictions, which beset us on every side, 
 admonish us that we have transcended the 
 boundary within which alone human thought 
 is possible. And so too, while we are com- 
 pelled to believe that the creation of man's 
 moral nature was not identical with the crea- 
 tion of morality itself; — that the great prin- 
 ciples of all that is holy and righteous existed 
 in God, before they assumed their finite form 
 in the heart of man ; — we still find ourselves 
 baffled in every attempt to conceive an infi- 
 nite moral nature, or its condition, an infinite 
 personality : we find ourselves compelled to 
 walk by faith, and not by sight ; — to admit 
 that we have knowledge enough to guide us 
 in our moral training here ; but not enough 
 to unveil the hidden things of God (18). 
 
 In so far, then, as Morality, in its human 
 character, depends upon conditions not co- 
 eternal with God, but created along with 
 man, in so far we are not justified in re- 
 garding the occasional suspension of human 
 duties, by the same authority which enacted 
 
LECTURE VIT. 211 
 
 them, as a violation of the immutable prin- 
 ciples of morality itself. That there are limits 
 indeed, within which alone this rule can be 
 safely applied ; — that there are doctrines and 
 practices which carry on their front convinc- 
 ing proof that they cannot have been revealed 
 or commanded by God ; — that there are sys- 
 tems of religion which by this criterion may 
 be shewn to have sprung, not from divine ap- 
 pointment, but from human corruption, — is 
 not for an instant denied. In my concluding 
 Lecture, I shall endeavour to point out some 
 of the conditions under which this kind of 
 evidence is admissible. For the present, my 
 argument is concerned, not with special and 
 occasional commands, but with universal and 
 perpetual doctrines ; not with isolated facts 
 recorded in sacred history, but with revealed 
 truths, forming an integral portion of reli- 
 gious belief. In this point of view, I propose 
 to apply the principle hitherto maintained, of 
 the Limits of Religious Thought, to the ex- 
 amination of those doctrines of the Christian 
 Faith which are sometimes regarded as con- 
 taining something repugnant to the Moral 
 Reason of man. 
 
 The Atoning Sacrifice of Christ has been 
 the mark assailed by various attacks of this 
 kind ; some of them not v^ry consistent with 
 
 p 2 
 
212 LECTURE VII. 
 
 each other ; but all founded on some supposed 
 incongruity between this doctrine and the 
 moral attributes of the Divine Nature. By 
 one critic, the doctrine is rejected because it 
 is more consistent with the infinite mercy of 
 God to pardon sin freely, without any atone- 
 ment whatsoever (14). By another, because, 
 from the unchangeable nature of God's laws, 
 it is impossible that sin can be pardoned at 
 all (15). A third maintains that it is unjust 
 that the innocent should suffer for the sins 
 of the guilty (16). A fourth is indignant at 
 the supposition that God can be angry (17) ; 
 while a fifth cannot see by what moral fit- 
 ness the shedding of blood can do away with 
 sin or its punishment (18). The principle 
 which governs these and similar objections is, 
 that we have a right to assume that there is, 
 if not a perfect identity, at least an exact 
 resemblance between the moral nature of 
 man and that of God ; that the laws and 
 principles of infinite justice and mercy are 
 but magnified images of those which are 
 manifested on a finite scale ; — that nothing 
 can be compatible with the boundless goodness 
 of God, which is incompatible with the little 
 goodness of which man may be conscious in 
 himself. 
 
 The value of this principle, as an absolute 
 
LECTURE VII. 213 
 
 criterion of religious truth, may be tested by 
 the simple experiment of applying the same 
 reasoning to an imaginary revelation con- 
 structed on the rational principles of some 
 one of the objectors. Let us suppose then, 
 that, instead of the Christian doctrine of the 
 Atonement, the Scriptures had told us of an 
 absolute and unconditional pardon of sin, 
 following upon the mere repentance of the 
 sinner. It is easy to imagine how ready our 
 reasoning theologians would be with their 
 philosophical criticisms, speculative or moral. 
 Does it not, they might say, represent man 
 as influencing God ; — the Finite as control- 
 ling, by the act of repentance, the unchange- 
 able self-determinations of the Infinite ? Does 
 it not depict the Deity as acting in time, as 
 influenced by motives and occasions, as sub- 
 ject to human feelings ? Does it not tend to 
 weaken our impression of the hatefulness of 
 sin, and to encourage carelessness in the sin- 
 ner, by the easy terms on which he is pro- 
 mised forgiveness (19) ? If it is unworthy of 
 God to represent Him as angry and needing 
 to be propitiated, how can philosophy tolerate 
 the conception that He is placable, and to 
 be softened by repentance ? And what moral 
 fitness has repentance to do away with the 
 guilt or punishment of a past transgression ? 
 Whatever moral fitness there exists between 
 
214 LECTURE VII. 
 
 righteousness and God's favour, the same 
 must exist between sin and God's anger : in 
 whatever degree that which deserves punish- 
 ment is not punished, in that degree God's 
 justice is limited in its operation. A strictly 
 moral theory requires, therefore, not free for- 
 giveness, but an exactly graduated proportion 
 between guilt and suffering, virtue and happi- 
 ness (20). If, on the other hand, we maintain 
 that there is no moral jBtness in either case, 
 we virtually deny the existence of a moral 
 Deity at all : we make God indifferent to 
 good or evil as such : we represent Him as 
 rewarding and punishing arbitrarily and with 
 respect of persons. The moral objection, in 
 truth, so far as it has any weight at all, has 
 no special application to the Christian doc- 
 trine : it lies against the entire supposition 
 of the remission of sins on any terms and by 
 any means : and if it has been more strongly 
 urged by Rationalists against the Christian 
 representation than against others, this is 
 merely because the former has had the mis- 
 fortune to provoke hostility by being found 
 in the Bible. 
 
 It is obvious indeed, on a moment's reflec- 
 tion, that the duty of man to forgive the 
 trespasses of his neighbour, rests precisely 
 upon those features of human nature which 
 cannot by any analogy be regarded as repre- 
 
LECTURE VII. 215 
 
 senting an image of God (21). Man is not 
 the author of the moral law : he is not, as 
 man, the moral governor of his fellows : he 
 has no authority, merely as man, to punish 
 moral transgressions as such. It is not as 
 sin, but as injury, that vice is a transgression 
 against man : it is not that his holiness is 
 outraged, but that his rights or his interests 
 are impaired. The duty of forgiveness is 
 imposed as a check, not upon the justice, but 
 upon the selfishness of man : it is not de- 
 signed to extinguish his indignation against 
 vice, but to restrain his tendency to exag- 
 gerate his own personal injuries (22). The 
 reasoner who maintains, " it is a duty in man 
 tp forgive sins, therefore it must be morally 
 fitting for God to forgive them also," over- 
 looks the fact that this duty is binding upon 
 man on account of the weakness and ignor- 
 ance and sinfulness of his nature ; that he is 
 bound to forgive, as one who himself needs 
 forgiveness; as one whose weakness renders 
 him liable to suffering ; as one whose self- 
 love is ever ready to arouse his passions and 
 pervert his judgment. 
 
 Nor yet would the advocates of the Moral 
 Reason gain any thing in Theology by the 
 substitution of a rigid system of reward and 
 punishment, in which nothing is forgiven, 
 
216 LECTURE VII. 
 
 but every act meets with its appropriate re- 
 compense. We have only to suppose that this 
 were the doctrine of Revelation, to imagine 
 the outcry with which it would be assailed. 
 " It is moral," the objector might urge, " only 
 in the harsher and less amiable features of 
 human morality : it gives us a God whom 
 we may fear, but whom we cannot love ; who 
 has given us affections with which He has 
 no sympathy, and passions for whose conse- 
 quences He allows no redress ; who created 
 man liable to fall, and placed him in a world 
 of temptations, knowing that he would fall, 
 and purposing to take advaiitage of his frailty 
 to the utmost." Criticisms of this kind may 
 be imagined without number ; — nay, they 
 are actually found in more than one modern 
 work, the writers of which have erroneously 
 imagined that they were assailing the real' 
 teaching of Scripture (23). Verily, this vaunted 
 Moral Reason is a " Lesbian rule" (£4). It 
 may be applied with equal facility to the 
 criticism of every possible scheme of Divine 
 Providence ; and therefore we may be per- 
 mitted to suspect that it is not entitled to 
 implicit confidence against any (25). 
 
 The endless controversy concerning Pre- 
 destination and Free Will, whether viewed in 
 its speculative or in its moral aspect, is but 
 
LECTURE VII. 217 
 
 another example of the hardihood of human 
 ignorance. The question, as I have observed 
 before, has its philosophical as well as its 
 theological aspect: it has no difficulties pe- 
 culiar to itself: it is but a special form of the 
 fundamental mystery of the coexistence of 
 the Infinite and the Finite. Yet, with this 
 mystery meeting and baffling human reason 
 at every turn, theologians have not scrupled 
 to trace in their petty channels the exact 
 flow and course of Infinite wisdom ; one 
 school boldly maintaining that even Omni- 
 science itself has no knowledge of contingent 
 events ; another asserting, with equal confi- 
 dence, that God's knowledge must be a re- 
 straint on man's freedom (26). If philosophy 
 offers for the moment an apparent escape 
 from the dilemma, by suggesting that God's 
 knowledge is not properly foreknowledge, as 
 having no relation to time (27) ; the sugges- 
 tion itself is one which can neither be verified 
 as a truth nor even intelligibly exhibited as a 
 thought ; and the Rationalist evades the so- 
 lution by shifting the ground of attack, and 
 retorts that Prophecy at least ' is anterior to 
 the event which it foretells ; and that a 
 prediction of human actions is irreconcilable 
 with human freedom (28). But the whole 
 meaning of the difficulty vanishes, as soon as 
 
218 LECTURE VII. 
 
 we acknowledge that the Infinite is not an 
 object of human thought at all. There can 
 be no consciousness of a relation,, whether of 
 agreement or of opposition, where there is 
 not a consciousness of both the objects re- 
 lated. That a man, by his own power, should 
 be able with certainty to foretell the future, 
 implies that the laws of that future are fixed 
 and unchangeable ; for man can only foresee 
 particular occurrences through a knowledge 
 of the general law on which they depend. 
 But is this relation of cause to effect, of law 
 to its consequences, really a knowledge or an 
 ignorance ? Is the causal relation itself a law 
 of things, or only a human mode of repre- 
 senting phenomena ? Supposing it were pos- 
 sible for man, in some other state of intelli- 
 gence, to foresee a future event without fore- 
 seeing it as the result of a law, — would that 
 knowledge be a higher or a lower one than 
 he at present possesses ? — would it be the re- 
 moval of some reality which he now sees, or 
 only of some limitation under which he now 
 sees it (29) ? -Man can only foresee what is 
 certain ; and from his point of view, the fore- 
 knowledge depends upon the certainty. But, 
 apart from the human conditions of thought, 
 in relation to a more perfect intelligence, can 
 we venture to say, even as regards temporal 
 
LECTURE VII. 219 
 
 succession, whether necessity is the condition 
 of foreknowledge, or foreknowledge of neces- 
 sity, or whether indeed necessity itself has 
 any existence at all (SO) ? May not the whole 
 scheme of Law and Determinism indicate a 
 weakness, rather than a power of the human 
 mind ; and are there not facts of conscious- 
 ness which give some support to this con- 
 jecture (31) ? Can any thing be necessary to 
 an intellect whose thought creates its own 
 objects ? Can any necessity of things deter- 
 mine the cognitions of the Absolute Mind, 
 even if those cognitions take place in succes- 
 sion to each other? These questions admit 
 of no certain answer; but the very inability 
 to answer them proves that dogmatic deci- 
 sions on either side are the decisions of igno- 
 rance, not of knowledge. 
 
 But the problem, be its difficulties and 
 their origin what they may, is not peculiar 
 to Theology, and receives no additional com- 
 plication from its position in Holy Writ. 
 The very same question may be discussed 
 in a purely metaphysical form, by merely 
 substituting the universal law of causation 
 for the universal knowledge of God. What 
 is the meaning and value of that law of the 
 human mind which apparently compels us 
 to think that every event whatever has its 
 
220 LECTURE VII. 
 
 determining cause? And how is that con- 
 viction reconcilable with a liberty in the hu- 
 man will to choose between two alternatives ? 
 The answer is substantially the same as be- 
 fore. The freedom of the will is a positive 
 fact of our consciousness : — as for the prin- 
 ciple of causality, we know not whence it is, 
 nor what it is. We know not whether it is a 
 law of things, or a mode of human represen- 
 tation ; whether it denotes an impotence or 
 a power ; whether it is innate or acquired. 
 We know not in what the causal relation 
 itself consists ; nor by what authority we are 
 warranted in extending its significance be- 
 yond the temporal sequence which suggests 
 it and the material phenomena in which that 
 sequence is undisturbed. 
 
 And is not the same conviction of the 
 ignorance of man, and of his rashness in the 
 midst of ignorance, forced upon us by the 
 spectacle of the arbitrary and summary de- 
 cisions of human reason on the most myste- 
 rious as well as the most awful of God's re- 
 vealed judgments against sin, — the sentence 
 of Etennal Punishment ? We know not what 
 is the relation of Sin to Infinite Justice. We 
 know'not under what conditions, consistently 
 with the freedom of man, the final spiritual 
 restoration of the impenitent sinner is possi- 
 
LECTURE VII. 221 
 
 ble ; nor how, without such a restoration, 
 guilt and misery can ever cease. We know 
 not whether the future punishment of sin 
 will be inflicted by way of natural conse- 
 quence or of supernatural visitation ; whether 
 it will be produced from v\rithin or inflicted 
 from without. We know not how man can be 
 rescued from sin and suffering without the 
 cooperation of his own will ; nor what means 
 can cooperate with that will, beyond those 
 which are off'ered to all of us during our state 
 of trial (32). It becomes us to speak cau- 
 tiously and reverently on a matter of which 
 God has revealed so little, and that little of 
 such awful moment ; but if we may be per- 
 mitted to criticize the arguments of the oppo- 
 nents of this doctrine with the same freedom 
 with which they have criticized the ways of 
 God, we may remark that the whole apparent 
 force of the moral objection rests upon two 
 purely gratuitous assumptions. It is assumed, 
 in the first place, that God's punishment of 
 sin in the world to come is so far analogous 
 to man's administration of punishment in 
 this world, that it will take place as a special 
 infliction, not as a natural consequence. And 
 it is assumed, in the second place, that punish- 
 ment will be inflicted solely with reference to 
 the sins committed during the earthly life ; 
 
222 LECTURE VII. 
 
 — that the guilt will continue finite, while 
 the misery is prolonged to infinity (33). Are 
 we then so sure, it may be asked, that there 
 can be no sin beyond the grave ? Can an im- 
 mortal soul incur God's wrath and condem- 
 nation, only so long as it is united to a mortal 
 body ? With as much reason might we assert 
 that the angels are incapable of obedience to 
 God, that the devils are incapable of rebel- 
 lion. What if the sin perpetuates itself, — if 
 the prolonged misery be the offspring of the 
 prolonged guilt (34) ? 
 
 Against this it is urged that sin cannot for 
 ever be triumphant against God (35). As if 
 the whole mystery of iniquity were contained 
 in the words for ever ! The real riddle of 
 existence, — the problem which confounds all 
 philosophy, — aye, and all religion too, so far 
 as religion is a thing of man's reason, — is the 
 fact that evil exists at all ; not that it exists 
 for a longer or a shorter duration. Is not 
 God infinitely wise and holy and powerful 
 now 9 and does not sin exist along with that 
 infinite holiness and wisdom and power ? Is 
 God to become more holy, more wise, more 
 powerful hereafter; and must evil be anni- 
 hilated to make room for His perfections 
 to expand ? Does the infinity of His eternal 
 nature ebb and flow with every increase or 
 
LECTURE VII. 223 
 
 diminution in the sum of human guilt and 
 misery ? Against this immovable barrier of 
 the existence of evil, the waves of philosophy 
 have dashed themselves unceasingly since the 
 birthday of human thought, and have retired 
 broken and powerless, without displacing the 
 minutest fragment of the stubborn rock, 
 without softening one feature of its dark and 
 rugged surface (36). We may be told that 
 evil is a privation, or a negation, or a partial 
 aspect of the universal good, or some other 
 equally unmeaning abstraction ; whilst all 
 the while our own hearts bear testimony to 
 its fearful reality, to its direct antagonism to 
 every possible form of good (37). But this 
 mystery, vast and inscrutable as it is, is but 
 one aspect of a more general problem ; it is 
 but the moral form of the ever-recurring 
 secret of the Infinite. How the Infinite and 
 the Finite, in any form of antagonism or 
 other relation, can exist together; — how in- 
 finite power can coexist with finite activity : 
 how infinite wisdom can coexist with finite 
 contingency : how infinite goodness can co- 
 exist with finite evil : — how the Infinite can 
 exist in any manner without exhausting the 
 universe of reality : — this is the riddle which 
 Infinite Wisdom alone can solve, the problem 
 whose very conception belongs only to that 
 
224 LECTURE VII. 
 
 Universal Knowing which fills and embraces 
 the Universe of Being. When Philosophy can 
 answer this question; — when she can even 
 state intelligibly the notions which its terms 
 involve, — then, and not till then, she may 
 be entitled to demand a solution of the far 
 smaller difficulties which she finds in re- 
 vealed religion: — ^or rather, she will have 
 solved them already; for from this they all 
 proceed, and to this they all ultimately re- 
 turn. 
 
 The reflections which this great and terri- 
 ble mystery of Divine Judgment has sug- 
 gested, receive perhaps some further support 
 when we contemplate it in another aspect, 
 and one more legitimately within the pro- 
 vince of human reason : — that is to say, in its 
 analogy to the actual constitution and course 
 of nature. " The Divine moral government 
 which religion teaches us," says Bishop But- 
 ler, " implies that the consequence of vice 
 shall be misery, in some future state, by the 
 righteous judgment of God. That such con- 
 sequent punishment shall take effect by His 
 appointment, is necessarily implied. But, as 
 it is not in any sort to be supposed that we 
 are made acquainted with all the ends or 
 reasons, for which it is fit future punishment 
 should be inflicted, or why God has appointed 
 
LECTURE VII. 225 
 
 such and such consequent misery should fol- 
 low vice ; and as we are altogether in the 
 dark, how or in what manner it shall follow, 
 by what immediate occasions, or by the in- 
 strumentality of what means ; there is no 
 absurdity in supposing it may follow in a way 
 analogous to that in which many miseries 
 follow such and such courses of action at 
 present; poverty, sickness, infamy, untimely 
 death from diseases, death from the hands of 
 civil justice. There is no absurdity in sup- 
 posing future punishment may follow wicked- 
 ness of course, as we speak, or in the way of 
 natural consequence from God's original con^ 
 stitution of the world; from the nature He 
 has given us, and from the condition in which 
 He places us ; or in a like manner as a person 
 rashly trifling upon a precipice, in the way of 
 natural consequence, falls down ; in the way 
 of natural consequence, breaks his limbs, sup- 
 pose ; in the way of natural consequence of 
 this, without help perishes" (58). 
 
 And if we may be permitted to extend the 
 same analogy from the constitution of exter- 
 nal nature to that of the human mind ; may 
 we not trace something not wholly unlike 
 the irrevocable sentence of the future, in that 
 dark and fearful, yet too certain law of our 
 nature, by which sin and misery ever tend to 
 
 Q 
 
226 LECTURE VII. 
 
 perpetuate themselves ; by which evil habits 
 gather strength with every fresh indulgence, 
 till it is no longer, humanly speaking, in the 
 power of the sinner to shake off the burden 
 which his own deeds have laid upon him ? 
 In that mysterious condition of the depraved 
 will, compelled, and yet free, — the slave of 
 sinful habit, yet responsible for every act of 
 sin, and gathering deeper condemnation as 
 the power of amendment grows less and less ; 
 — may we not see some possible foreshadow- 
 ing of the yet deeper guilt and the yet more 
 hopeless misery of the worm that dieth not, 
 and the fire that is not quenched ? The fact, 
 awful as it is, is one to which our every day's 
 experience bears witness : and who shall say 
 that the invisible things of God may not, in 
 this as in other instances, be shadowed forth 
 to us in the things that are seen ? 
 
 The same argument from analogy is in- 
 deed applicable to every one of the difficul- 
 ties which Rationalism professes to discover 
 in the revealed ways of God's dealings with 
 man. The Fall of Adam, and the inherited 
 corruption of his posterity, find their parallel 
 in the liability to sin which remains unex- 
 tinguished throughout man's moral progress ; 
 and in that mysterious, though certain dis- 
 pensation of Providence, which ordains that 
 
LECTURE VII. 227 
 
 not only bodily taints and infirmities, but even 
 moral dispositions and tendencies, should, 
 in many instances, descend from father to 
 son ; and which permits the child of sinful 
 parents to be depraved by evil example, be- 
 fore he knows how, by his own reason, clearly 
 to discern between right and wrong ; before 
 he has strength, of his own will, to refuse the 
 evil and choose the good (39). There is a 
 parallel too in that strange, yet too familiar 
 fact, of vice persisted in, with the clearest 
 and strongest conviction of its viciousness 
 and wretchedness : and the scepticism which 
 denies that man, if created sinless, could so 
 easily have fallen from innocence, finds its 
 philosophical counterpart in the paradox of 
 the ancient moralist, who maintained that 
 conscious sin is impossible, because nothing 
 can be stronger than knowledge (40). Justi- 
 fication by faith through the merits of Christ 
 is at least in harmony with that course of 
 things established by Divine Providence in 
 this world ; in which so many benefits, which 
 we cannot procure for ourselves or deserve 
 by any merit of our own, are obtained for us 
 by the instrumentality of others ; and in 
 which we are so often compelled, as an indis- 
 pensable condition of obtaining the benefit, 
 to trust in the power and good will of those 
 
 Q 2 
 
228 LECTURE Vll. 
 
 whom we have never tried, and to believe in 
 the efficacy of means whose manner of work- 
 ing we know not (41). The operations of 
 Divine Grace, influencing, yet not necessitat- 
 ing, the movements of the human soul, find 
 their corresponding fact and their corre- 
 sponding mystery in the determinations of 
 the Will ; — in that Freedom to do or leave 
 undone, so certain in fact, so inexplicable in 
 theory, which consists neither in absolute in- 
 difference nor in absolute subjection ; which 
 is acted upon and influenced by motives, yet 
 in its turn acts upon and controls their in- 
 fluences, prevented by them, and yet work- 
 ing with them (42). But it is unnecessary 
 to pursue further an argument which, in all 
 its essential features, has already been fully 
 exhibited by a philosopher whose profound 
 and searching wisdom has answered by anti- 
 cipation nearly every cavil of the latest form 
 of Rationalism, no less than those of his own 
 day. We may add here and there a detail 
 of application, as the exigencies of contro- 
 versy may suggest ; but the principle of the 
 whole, and its most important consequences, 
 have been established and worked out more 
 than a century ago, in the unanswerable ar- 
 gument of Butler. 
 
 The warning which his great work contains 
 
LECTURE VII. 229 
 
 against " that idle and not very innocent em- 
 ployment of forming imaginary models of a 
 world, and schemes of governing it" (43), is 
 as necessary now as then, as applicable to 
 moral as to speculative theories. Neither 
 with regard to the physical nor to the moral 
 world, is man capable of constructing a Cos- 
 mogony ; and those Babels of Reason, which 
 Philosophy has built for itself, under the 
 names of Rational Theories of Religion, and 
 Criticisms of every Revelation, are but the 
 successors of those elder children of chaos and 
 night, which with no greater knowledge, but 
 with less presumption, sought to describe the 
 generation of the visible universe. It is no 
 disparagement of the value and authority of 
 the Moral Reason in its regulative capacity, 
 within its proper sphere of human action, if 
 we refuse to exalt it to the measure and 
 standard of the Absolute and Infinite Good- 
 ness of God. The very Philosopher whose 
 writings have most contributed to establish 
 the supreme authority of Conscience in man, 
 is also the one who has pointed out most 
 clearly the existence of analogous moral diffi- 
 culties in nature and in religion, and the true 
 answer to both, — the admission that God's 
 Government, natural as well as spiritual, is 
 a scheme imperfectly comprehended. 
 
230 LECTURE VII. 
 
 In His Moral Attributes, no less than in 
 the rest of His Infinite Being, God's judg- 
 ments are unsearchable, and His ways past 
 finding out*". While He manifests Himself 
 clearly as a Moral Governor and Legislator, by 
 the witness of the Moral Law which He has 
 established in the hearts of men, we cannot 
 help feeling, at the same time, that that Law, 
 grand as it is, is no measure of His Grandeur, 
 that He Himself is beyond it, though not 
 opposed to it, distinct, though not alien from 
 it. We feel that He who planted in man's 
 conscience that stern unyielding Imperative 
 of Duty, must Himself be true and righteous 
 altogether ; that He from whom all holy de- 
 sires, all good counsels, and all just works do 
 proceed, must Himself be more holy, more 
 good, more just than these. But when we 
 try to realize in thought this sure convic- 
 tion of our faith, we find that here, as every 
 where, the Finite cannot fathom the Infinite, 
 that, while in our hearts we believe, yet our 
 thoughts at times are sore troubled. It is 
 consonant to the whole analogy of our earthly 
 state of trial, that, in this as in other features 
 of God's Providence, we should meet with 
 things impossible to understand and difficult 
 to believe ; by which reason is baffled and 
 •> Romans xi. 33. 
 
LECTURE VII. 231 
 
 faith tried ; — acts whose purpose we see not ; 
 dispensations whose wisdom is above us ; 
 thoughts which are not our thoughts, and 
 ways which are not our ways. In these 
 things we hear, as it were, the same loving 
 voice which spoke to the wondering disciple 
 of old : " What I do, thou knowest not now ; 
 but thou shalt know hereafter"." The lu- 
 minary by whose influence the ebb and flow 
 of man's moral being is regulated, moves 
 around and along with man's little world, in 
 a regular and bounded orbit : one side, and 
 one side only, looks downwards upon its 
 earthly centre ; the other, which we see not, 
 is ever turned upwards to the all-surrounding 
 Infinite. And those tides have their seasons 
 of rise and fall, their places of strength and 
 weakness; and that light waxes and wanes 
 with the growth or decay of man's mental 
 and moral and religious culture ; and its bor- 
 rowed rays seem at times to shine as with 
 their own lustre, in rivalry, even in opposi- 
 tion, to the source from which they emanate. 
 Yet is that light still but a faint and partial 
 reflection of the hidden glories of the Sun of 
 Righteousness, waiting but the brighter il- 
 lumination of His presence, to fade and be 
 swallowed up in the full blaze of the heaven 
 « St. John xiii. 7. 
 
232 LECTURE VII. 
 
 kindling around it; — not cast down indeed 
 from its orbit, nor shorn of its true bright- 
 ness and influence, but still felt and acknow- 
 ledged in its real existence and power, in the 
 memory of the past discipline, in the product 
 of the present perfectness, — though now dis- 
 tinct no more, but vanishing from sight, to 
 be made one with the Glory that beams from 
 the " Father of lights, with whom is no varia- 
 bleness, neither shadow of turning'*." 
 
 ^ St. James i. 17. 
 
LECTUEE YIII. 
 
 ST. JOHN V, 36. 
 
 The works which the Father hath given me to 
 finish, the same works that I do, bear witness 
 of me, that the Father hath sent me. 
 
 JlO construct a complete Criticism of any 
 Revelation, it is necessary that the Critic 
 should be in possession of a perfect Philo- 
 sophy of the Infinite. For, except on the 
 supposition that we possess an exact know- 
 ledge of the whole Nature of God, such as 
 only that Philosophy can furnish, we cannot 
 know for certain what are the purposes which 
 God intends to accomplish by means of Re- 
 velation, and what are the instruments by 
 which those purposes may be best carried 
 out. If then it can be shewn, as 1 have at- 
 tempted to shew in the previous Lectures, 
 that the attainment of a Philosophy of the 
 Infinite is utterly impossible under the ex- 
 isting laws of human thought, it follows that 
 it is not by means of philosophical criticism 
 that the claims of a supposed Revelation can 
 
234 LECTURE VIII. 
 
 be adequately tested. We are thus com- 
 pelled to seek another field for the right use 
 of Reason in religious questions ; and what 
 that field is, it will not be difficult to deter- 
 mine. To Reason, rightly employed, within 
 its proper limits and on its proper objects, 
 our Lord himself and his Apostles openly 
 appealed in proof of their divine mission ; 
 and the same proof has been unhesitatingly 
 claimed by the defenders of Christianity in 
 all subsequent ages. In other words, the le- 
 gitimate object of a rational criticism of re- 
 vealed religion, is not to be found in the eon- 
 tents of that religion, but in its evidences. 
 
 At first sight it may appear as if this dis- 
 tinction involved no real difference; for the 
 contents of a revelation, it might be objected, 
 are included among its evidences. In one 
 sense, no doubt they are ; but that very in- 
 clusion gives them a totally different signi- 
 ficance and weight from that to whi^h they 
 lay claim when considered as the basis of a 
 philosophical criticism. In the one case, they 
 are judged by their conformity to th€ sup- 
 posed nature and purposes of God : in the 
 other, by their adaptation to the actual cir- 
 cumstances and wants of man. In the one 
 case they are regarded as furnishing a single 
 and a certain criterion ; for on the supposi- 
 
LECTURE VIII. 235 
 
 tion that our reason is competent to deter- 
 mine, from our knowledge of the Divine 
 Nature, what the characteristics of a true 
 Revelation ought to be, we are entitled, by 
 virtue of that criterion alone, to reject with- 
 out hesitation whatever does not satisfy its 
 requirements. In the other case, they are 
 regarded as furnishing only one probable 
 presumption out of many ; — a presumption 
 which may confirm and be confirmed by co- 
 inciding testimony from other sources, or, on 
 the contrary, may be outweighed, when we 
 come to balance probabilities, by conflicting 
 evidence on the other side. 
 
 The practical conclusion, which may be 
 deduced from the whole previous survey of 
 the Limits of Religious Thought, is this : 
 that if no one faculty of the human mind is 
 competent to convey a direct knowledge of 
 the Absolute and the Infinite, no one faculty 
 is entitled to claim preeminence over the 
 rest, as furnishing especially the criterion of 
 the truth or falsehood of a supposed Revela- 
 tion. There are presumptions to be drawn 
 from the internal character of the doctrines 
 which the revelation contains : there are pre- 
 sumptions to be drawn from the facts con- 
 nected with its first promulgation : there are 
 presumptions to be drawn from its subse- 
 
236 LECTURE VIII. 
 
 quent history and the effects which it has 
 produced among mankind. But the true 
 evidence, for or against the religion, is not 
 to be found in any one of these taken singly 
 and exclusively ; but in the resultant of all, 
 fairly examined and compared together ; the 
 apparently conflicting evidences being ba- 
 lanced against each other, and the appa- 
 rently concurring evidences estimated by 
 their united efficacy. 
 
 A truth so obvious as this may perhaps be 
 thought hardly worth announcing as the re- 
 sult of an elaborate inquiry. But the whole 
 history of religious controversy bears witness 
 that, however evident in theory, there is no 
 truth more liable to be neglected in practice. 
 The defenders of Christianity are not alto- 
 gether free from the charge of insisting ex- 
 clusively or preeminently upon some one 
 alone of its evidences : the assailants, under 
 the influence of a still more exclusive re- 
 action, have assumed that a method which 
 fails to accomplish every thing has suc- 
 ceeded in accomplishing nothing; and, fly- 
 ing at once to the opposite extreme, have in 
 their turn appealed to some one infallible 
 criterion, as constituting a royal road to phi- 
 losophical unbelief. 
 
 In the present day we are feeling the per- 
 
LECTURE VIII. 237 
 
 nicious effects of a reaction of this kind. Be- 
 cause the writings of Paley and his followers 
 in the last generation laid a principal stress 
 on the direct historical evidences of Christia- 
 nity, we meet now with an antagonist school 
 of writers, who perpetually assure us that his- 
 tory has nothing whatever to do with reli- 
 gion (1); that an external revelation of reli- 
 gious truth is impossible (2) ; that we may 
 learn all that is essential to the Gospel by in- 
 ward and spiritual evidence only (S). In the 
 spirit of the Pharisees of old, who said, " This 
 man is not of God, because he keepeth not 
 the sabbath day*," we are now told that the 
 doctrine must in all cases prove the miracles, 
 and not the miracles the doctrine (4) ; that 
 the external evidence of miracles is entirely 
 useless for the support of the religious philo- 
 sophy of Christ (5) ; that man no more needs 
 a miraculous revelation of things pertaining 
 to religion than of things pertaining to agri- 
 culture or manufactures (6). And, as is usually 
 the case in such reactions, the last state has 
 become worse than the first : — a slight com- 
 parative neglect of the internal evidence on 
 the one side has been replaced by an utter 
 repudiation of all external evidence on the 
 other : a trifling disproportion in the edifice 
 a St. John ix. T.6. 
 
238 LECTURE VIII. 
 
 of the Christian Faith has been remedied by 
 the entire removal of some of its main pillars 
 of support. The crying evil of the present 
 day in religious controversy is the neglect or 
 contempt of the external evidences of Christ- 
 ianity: the first step towards the establish- 
 ment of a sound religious philosophy must 
 consist in the restoration of those evidences 
 to their true place in the Theological system. 
 The evidence derived from the internal 
 character of a religion, whatever may be its 
 value within its proper limits, is, as regards 
 the divine origin of the religion, purely nega- 
 tive. It may prove in certain cases (though 
 even here the argument requires much cau- 
 tion in its employment) that a religion has 
 not come from God ; but it is in no case suf- 
 ficient to prove that it has come from Him(7). 
 For the doctrines revealed must either be 
 such as are within the power of man's natural 
 reason to verify, or such as are beyond it. 
 In the former case, the reason which is com- 
 petent to verify may also be competent to 
 discover: the doctrine is tested by its con- 
 formity to the conclusions of human philo- 
 sophy : and the wisdom which sits in judg- 
 ment on the truth of a doctrine must itself 
 be presumed to have an equal power of dis- 
 cerning the truth. In the latter case, where 
 
LECTURE VIII. 2S9 
 
 the doctrine is beyond the power of human 
 reason to discover, it can be accepted only as 
 resting on the authority of the teacher who 
 proclaims- it ; and that authority itself must 
 then be guaranteed by the external evidence 
 of a superhuman mission. To advance a step 
 beyond the merely negative argument, it is 
 necessary that the evidence contained in the 
 character of the doctrine itself should be 
 combined with that derived from the exte- 
 rior history. When, for example, the Divine 
 Origin of Christianity is maintained, on the 
 ground of its vast moral superiority to all 
 Heathen systems of Ethics ; or on that of 
 the improbability that such a system could 
 have been conceived by a Galilean peasant 
 among the influences of the contemporary 
 Judaism ; the argument is legitimate and 
 powerful ; but its positive force depends not 
 merely on the internal character of the doc- 
 trine, but principally on its relation to cer- 
 tain external facts (8). 
 
 And even the negative argument, which 
 concludes from the character of the contents 
 of a religion that it cannot have come from 
 God, however legitimate within its proper 
 limits, is one which requires considerable 
 caution in the application. The lesson to 
 be learnt from an examination of the Limits 
 
240 LECTURE VIII. 
 
 of Religious Thought is not that man's 
 judgments are worthless in relation to divine 
 things ; but that they are fallible : and the 
 probability of error in any particular case 
 can never be fairly estimated, without giving 
 their full weight to all collateral considera- 
 tions. We are indeed bound to believe that 
 a Revelation given by God can never con- 
 tain any thing that is really unwise or un- 
 righteous ; but we are not always capable of 
 estimating exactly the wisdom or righteous- 
 ness of particular doctrines or precepts. And 
 we are bound to bear in mind that eocactly in 
 proportion to the strength of the remaining evi- 
 dence for the divine origin of a religion, is the 
 probability that we may be mistaken in sup- 
 posing this or that portion of its contents to be 
 unworthy of God. Taken in conjunction, the 
 two argumients may confirm or correct each 
 other : taken singly and absolutely, each may 
 vitiate the result which should follow from 
 their joint application. We do not certainly 
 know the exact nature and operation of the 
 moral attributes of God: we can but infer 
 and conjecture from what we know of the 
 moral attributes of man : and the analogy 
 between the Finite and the Infinite can never 
 be so perfect as to preclude all possibility of 
 error in the process. But the possibility be- 
 
LECTURE VIII. 241 
 
 comes almost a certainty, when any one hu- 
 man faculty is elevated by itself into an au- 
 thoritative criterion of religious truth, with- 
 out regard to those collateral evidences by 
 which its decisions may be modified and 
 corrected. 
 
 "The human mind," says a writer of the pre- 
 sent day, " is competent to sit in moral and 
 */?mVMa/ judgment on a professed revelation ; 
 and to decide, if the case seem to require it, 
 in the following tone : This doctrine attri- 
 butes to God, that which we should all call 
 harsh, cruel, or unjust in man: it is there- 
 fore intrinsically inadmissible."..." In fact," he 
 continues, "all Christian apostles and mis- 
 sionaries, like the Hebrew prophets, have al- 
 ways refuted Paganism by direct attacks on 
 its immoral and unspiritual doctrines ; and 
 have appealed to the consciences of heathens, 
 as competent to decide in the contro- 
 versy" (9)- Now an appeal of this kind may 
 be legitimate or not, according to the pur- 
 pose for which it is made, and the manner in 
 which it is applied. The primary and proper 
 employment of man's moral sense, as of his 
 other faculties, is not speculative, but regu- 
 lative. It is not designed to tell us what 
 are the absolute and immutable principles 
 of Right, as existing in the eternal nature of 
 
 R 
 
242 LECTURE VIII. 
 
 God ; but to discern those relative and tem- 
 porary manifestations of them, which are ne- 
 cessary for human training in this present 
 life. But if morality, in its human mani- 
 festation, contains a relative and temporary, 
 as well as an absolute and eternal element, 
 an occasional suspension of the human Law 
 is by no means to be confounded with a viola- 
 tion of the divine Principle. We can only 
 partially judge of the moral government of 
 God, on the assumption that there is an ana- 
 logy between the divine nature and the hu- 
 man : and in proportion as the analogy re- 
 cedes from perfect likeness, the decisions of 
 the human reason necessarily become more 
 and more doubtful. The primary and direct 
 inquiry, which human reason is entitled to 
 make concerning a professed revelation, is, — 
 how far does it tend to promote or to hinder 
 the moral discipline of man. It is but a 
 secondary and indirect question, and one very 
 liable to mislead, to ask how far it is compa- 
 tible with the Infinite Goodness of God. 
 
 Thus, for example, it is one thing to con- 
 demn a religion on account of the habitual 
 observance of licentious or inhuman rites of 
 worship, and another to pronounce judgment 
 on isolated facts, historically recorded as hav- 
 ing been done by divine command. Taut not 
 
LECTURE VIII. 243 
 
 perpetuated in precepts for the imitation of 
 posterity. The former are condemned for their 
 regulative character, as contributing to the 
 perpetual corruption of mankind ; the latter 
 are condemned on speculative grounds, as in- 
 consistent with our preconceived notions of 
 the character of God. " There are some par- 
 ticular precepts in Scripture," says Bishop 
 Butler, " given to particular persons, requir- 
 ing actions, which would be immoral and vi- 
 cious, were it not for such precepts. But it 
 is easy to see, that all these are of such a 
 kind, as that the precept changes the whole 
 nature of the case and of the action ; and 
 both constitutes and shews that not to be un- 
 just or immoral, which, prior to the precept, 
 must have appeared, and really have been 
 so : which may well be, since none of these 
 precepts are contrary to immutable morality. 
 If it were commanded to cultivate the prin- 
 ciples and act from the spirit of treachery, 
 ingratitude, cruelty ; the command would not 
 alter the nature of the case or of the action, 
 in any of these instances. But it is quite 
 otherwise in precepts which require only the 
 doing an external action ; for instance, taking 
 away the property or life of any. For men 
 have no right to either life or property, but 
 what arises solely from the grant t)f God : 
 
 R 2 
 
244 LECTURE VIII. 
 
 when this grant is revoked, they cease to 
 have any right at all in either : and vehen 
 this revocation is made known, as surely it is 
 possible it may be, it must cease to be unjust 
 to deprive them of either. And though a 
 course of external acts, which without com- 
 mand would be immoral, must make an im- 
 moral habit ; yet a few detached commands 
 have no such natural tendency. . . . There 
 seems no difficulty at all in these precepts, 
 but what arises from their being offences : 
 i. e. from their being liable to be perverted, 
 as indeed they are, by wicked designing men, 
 to serve the most horrid purposes ; and, per- 
 haps, to mislead the weak and enthusiastic. 
 And objections from this head are not ob- 
 jections against revelation ; but against the 
 whole notion of religion, as a trial ; and 
 against the general constitution of na- 
 ture" (10). 
 
 There is indeed an obvious analogy between 
 these temporary suspensions of the laws of 
 moral obligation and that corresponding sus- 
 pension of the laws of natural phenomena 
 which constitutes our ordinary conception of 
 a Miracle. So much so, indeed, that the 
 former might without impropriety be desig- 
 nated as Moral Miracles. In both, the Al- 
 mighty is regarded as suspending, for special 
 
LECTURE VIII. 245 
 
 purposes, not the eternal laws which consti- 
 tute His own absolute Nature, but the created 
 laws, which He imposed at a certain time 
 upon a particular portion of his creatures. 
 Both are isolated and rare in their occur- 
 rence ; and apparently, from the nature of 
 the case, must be so, in order to unite har- 
 moniously with the normal manifestations of 
 God's government of the world. A perpetual 
 series of physical miracles would destroy that 
 confidence in the regularity of the course of 
 nature, which is indispensable to the culti- 
 vation of man's intellectual and productive 
 energies : a permanent suspension of prac- 
 tical duties would be similarly prejudicial to 
 the cultivation of his moral character. But 
 the isolated character of both classes of phe- 
 nomena removes the objection which might 
 otherwise be brought against them on this 
 account : and this objection is the only one 
 which can legitimately be urged, on philoso- 
 phical grounds, against the conception of such 
 cases as possible ; as distinguished from, the 
 historical evidence, which may be adduced 
 for or against their actual occurrence. 
 
 Even within its own legitimate province, 
 an argument of this kind may have more 
 or less weight, varying from the lowest pre- 
 sumption to the highest moral certainty, ac- 
 
246 LECTURE VIII. 
 
 cording to the nature of the offence which 
 we believe ourselves to have detected, and 
 the means which we possess of estimating its 
 character or consequences. It is certain that 
 we are not competent judges of the Absolute 
 Nature of God : it is not certain that we are 
 competent judges, in all cases, of what is best 
 fitted for the moral discipline of man. But 
 granting to the above argument its full value 
 in this relation ; it is still important to re- 
 member that we are dealing, not with de- 
 monstrative but with probable evidence, not 
 with a single line of reasoning, but with a 
 common focus, to which many and various 
 rays converge ; that we have not solved the 
 entire problem, but only obtained one of the 
 elements contributing to its solution. And 
 the combined result of all these elements is 
 by no means identical with the sum of their 
 separate effects. The image, hitherto em- 
 ployed, of a balance of probabilities, is, in 
 one respect at least, very inadequate to ex- 
 press the character of Christian evidence. It 
 may be used with some propriety to express 
 the provisional stage of the inquiry, while we 
 are still uncertain to which side the evidence 
 inclines ; but it becomes inapplicable as soon 
 as our decision is made. For the objections 
 urged against a religion are not like the 
 
LECTURE VIII. 247 
 
 weights in a scale, which retain their full 
 value, even when outweighed on the other 
 side: — on the contrary, they become abso- 
 lutely worthless, as soon as we are convinced 
 that there is superior evidence to prove that 
 the religion is true. We may not say, for 
 example, that certain parts of the Christian 
 scheme are unwise or unrighteous, though 
 outweighed by greater acts of righteousness 
 and wisdom: — we are bound to believe that 
 we were mistaken from the first in supposing 
 them to be unwise or unrighteous at all. In 
 a matter of which we are so ignorant and so 
 liable to be deceived, the objection which 
 fails to prove every thing proves nothing : 
 from him that hath not, is taken away even 
 that which he seemeth to have. And on the 
 other hand, an objection which really proves 
 any thing proves every thing. If the teach- 
 ing of Christ is in any one thing not the 
 teaching of God, it is in all things the teach- 
 ing of man : its doctrines are subject to all 
 the imperfections inseparable from man's sin- 
 fulness and ignorance : its effects must be 
 such as can fully be accounted for as the re- 
 sults of man's wisdom, with all its weakness 
 and all its error. 
 
 Here then is the issue, which the waver- 
 ing disciple is bound seriously to consider. 
 Taking into account the various questioj^g 
 
MS LECTURE VIII. 
 
 whose answers, on the one side or the other, 
 form the sum total of Evidences for or against 
 the claims of the Christian Faith; — the genu- 
 ineness and authenticity of the documents ; 
 the judgment and good faith of the writers ; 
 the testimony to the actual occurrence of 
 prophecies and miracles, and their relation 
 to the religious teaching with which they are 
 connected; the character of the Teacher Him- 
 self, that one portrait, which, in its perfect 
 purity and holiness and beauty, stands alone 
 and unapproached in human history or hu- 
 man fiction; those rites and ceremonies of the 
 elder Law, so significant as typical of Christ, 
 so strange and meaningless without Him ; 
 those predictions of the promised Messiah, 
 whose obvious meaning is rendered still more 
 manifest by the futile ingenuity which strives 
 to pervert them (11) ; the history of the rise 
 and progress of Christianity, and its com- 
 parison with that of other religions ; the 
 ability or inability of human means to bring 
 about the results which it actually accom- 
 plished ; its antagonism to the current ideas 
 of the age and country of its origin ; its 
 effects as a system on the moral and social 
 condition of subsequent generations of man- 
 kind ; its fitness to satisfy the wants and con- 
 sole the sufferings of human nature; the cha- 
 racter of those by whom it was first promul- 
 
LECTURE VIII. 249 
 
 gated and received ; the sufferings which at- 
 tested the sincerity of their convictions ; the 
 comparative trustworthiness of ancient testi- 
 mony and modern conjecture ; the mutual 
 contradictions of conflicting theories of un- 
 belief, and the inadequacy of all of them to 
 explain the facts for which they are bound to 
 account ; — taking all these and similar ques- 
 tions into full consideration, are you prepared 
 to affirm, as the result of the whole inquiry, 
 that Jesus of Nazareth was an impostor, or 
 an enthusiast, or a mythical figment ; and his 
 disciples crafty and designing, or well-mean- 
 ing but deluded men ? For be assured, that 
 nothing short of this is the conclusion which 
 you must maintain, if you reject one jot or 
 one tittle of the whole doctrine of Christ. 
 Either He was what He proclaimed Himself 
 to be — the Incarnate Son of God, the Divine 
 Saviour of a fallen world, — and if so, we may 
 not divide God's Revelation, and dare to put 
 asunder what He has joined together, — or 
 the civilized world for eighteen centuries has 
 been deluded by a cunningly devised fable ; 
 and He from whom that fable came has turned 
 that world from darkness to light, from Satan 
 to God, with a lie in His right hand. 
 
 Many who would shrink with horror from 
 the idea of rejecting Christ altogether, will 
 yet speak and act as if they were at liberty 
 
250 LECTURE VIIJ. 
 
 to set up for themselves an eclectic Christ- 
 ianity ; separating the essential from the su- 
 perfluous portions of Christ's teaching ; de- 
 ciding for themselves how much is permanent 
 and necessary for all men, and how much is 
 temporary and designed only for a particular 
 age and people (12). Yet if Christ is indeed 
 God manifest in the flesh, it is surely scarcely 
 less impious to attempt to improve His teach- 
 ing, than to reject it altogether. Nay, in one 
 respect it is more so ; for it is to acknowledge 
 a doctrine as the revelation of God, and at 
 the same time to proclaim that it is inferior 
 to the wisdom of man. That it may indeed 
 come, and has come, within the purposes of 
 God's Providence, to give to mankind a Re- 
 velation partly at least designed for a tem- 
 porary purpose, and for a limited portion of 
 mankind; — a Law in which something was 
 permitted to the hardness of men's hearts'", 
 and much was designed but as a shiadow of 
 good things to come*"; — this we know, to 
 whom a more perfect Revelation has been 
 given. But to admit that God may make 
 His own Revelation more perfect from time 
 to time, is very different from admitting 
 that human reason, by its own knowledge, is 
 competent to separate the perfect from the 
 imperfect, and to construct for itself an 
 h St. Matthew xix. 8. " Hebrews x. i . 
 
LECTURE Vm. 251 
 
 absolute religion out of the fragments of an 
 incomplete Revelation. The experiment has 
 been tried under the elder and less perfect 
 dispensation ; but the result can hardly be 
 considered so successful as to encourage a 
 repetition of the attempt. The philosophical 
 improvement of the Hebrew Scriptures pro- 
 duced, not the Sermon on the Mount, but 
 the Creed of the Sadducee. The ripened in- 
 telligence of the Jewish people, instructed, 
 as modern critics would assure us, by the 
 enlightening influence of time, and by inter- 
 course with foreign nations, bore fruit in a 
 conclusion singularly coinciding with that of 
 modern rationalism : " The Sadducees say 
 that there is no resurrection, neither angel, 
 nor spirif^llS)." And doubtless there were 
 many then, as now, to applaud this wonderful 
 discovery, as a proof that " religious truth is 
 necessarily progressive, because our powers 
 are progressive (14) ;" and to find a mythical 
 or critical theory, to explain or to set aside 
 those passages of Scripture which appeared 
 to inculcate a contrary doctrine. Unfortun- 
 ately for human wisdom, Prometheus himself 
 needs a Prometheus. The lapse of time, as all 
 history bears witness, is at least as fruitful in 
 corruption as in enlightenment ; and reason, 
 ^ Acts xxiii. 8. 
 
252 LECTURE VIII. 
 
 when it has done its best, still needs a higher 
 reason to decide between its conflicting theo- 
 ries, and to tell us which is the advanced, 
 which the retrograde Theology (15). 
 
 In one respect indeed, this semi-rationalism, 
 which admits the authority of Revelation up 
 to a certain point and no further, rests on a 
 far less reasonable basis than the firm belief 
 which accepts the whole, or the complete un- 
 belief which accepts nothing. For whatever 
 may be the antecedent improbability which 
 attaches to a miraculous narrative, as com- 
 pared with one of ordinary events, it can 
 affect only the narrative taken as a whole, 
 and the entire series of miracles from the 
 greatest to the least. If a single miracle is 
 once admitted as supported by competent 
 evidence, the entire history is at once re- 
 moved from the ordinary calculations of more 
 or less probability. One miracle is sufficient 
 to shew that the series of events, with which 
 it is connected, is one which the Almighty 
 has seen fit to mark by exceptions to the 
 ordinary course of His Providence : and this 
 being once granted, we have no a priori 
 grounds to warrant us in asserting that the 
 number of such exceptions ought to be larger 
 or smaller. If any one miracle recorded in 
 the Gospels, — the Resurrection of Christ, for 
 
LECTURE Vm. 253 
 
 example, — be once admitted as true ; the re- 
 mainder cease to have any antecedent im- 
 probabihty at all, and require no greater evi- 
 dence to prove them than is needed for the 
 most ordinary events of any other history. 
 For the improbability, such as it is, reaches no 
 further than to shew that it is unlikely that 
 God should work miracles at all ; not that it 
 is unlikely that He should work more than a 
 certain number. 
 
 Our right to criticize at all depends upon 
 this one question: "What think ye of Christ? 
 whose Son is He*?" What is it that consti- 
 tutes our need of Christ ? Is it a conviction 
 of guilt and wretchedness, or a taste for Phi- 
 losophy ? Do we want a Redeemer to save us 
 from our sins, or a moral Teacher to give us 
 a plausible theory of human duties ? Christ 
 can be our Redeemer only if He is what He 
 proclaims Himself to be, the Son of God, sent 
 into the world, that the world through Him 
 might be saved ^ If He is not this. His mo^ 
 ral teaching began with falsehood, and was 
 propagated by delusion. And if He is this, 
 what but contempt and insult can be found 
 in that half-allegiance which criticizes while 
 it bows ; which sifts and selects while it sub- 
 mits; which approves or rejects as its reason or 
 
 e St. Matthew xxii. 4a. ^ St. John iii. 17. 
 
254 LECTURE VIII. 
 
 its feelings or its nervous sensibilities may dic- 
 tate ; which condescends to acknowledge Him 
 as the teacher of a dark age and an ignorant 
 people ; bowing the knee before Him, half in 
 reverence, half in mockery, and crying, ' Hail, 
 King of the Jews.' If Christ is a mere hu- 
 man teacher, we of this nineteenth century 
 can no more be Christians than we can be 
 Platonists or Aristotelians. He belongs to 
 that past which cannot repeat itself: His 
 modes of thought are not ours : His difficul- 
 ties are not ours : His needs are not ours. 
 He may be our Teacher, but not our Master ; 
 for no man is master over the free thoughts 
 of his fellow men : we may learn from him, 
 but we sit in judgment while we learn: we 
 modify his teaching by the wisdom of later 
 ages : we refuse the evil and choose the good. 
 But remember that we can do this, only if 
 Christ is a mere human teacher, or if we of 
 these latter days have received a newer and 
 a better revelation. If now, as of old, He 
 speaks as never man spake ^ ;— if God, who 
 at sundry times and in divers manners spake 
 in time past unto the fathers by the prophets, 
 hath in these last days spoken unto us by 
 His Son\ — what remains for us to do, but to 
 cast down imaginations, and every high thing 
 
 S St. John vii. 46. h Hebrews i. i, 2. 
 
LECTURE VIII. 255 
 
 that exalteth itself against the knowledge of 
 God, and to bring into captivity every thought 
 to the obedience of Christ'. The witness 
 which Christ oiFers of Himself either proves 
 every thing, or it proves nothing. No man 
 has a right to say, " I will accept Christ as I 
 like, and reject Him as I like : I will follow 
 the holy Example ; I will turn away from the 
 atoning Sacrifice : I will listen to His teach- 
 ing ; I will have nothing to do with His me- 
 diation : I will believe Him when He tells me 
 that He came from the Father, because I feel 
 that His doctrine has a divine beauty and 
 fitness ; but 1 will not believe Him when He 
 tells me that He is one with the Father ; be- 
 cause I cannot conceive how this unity is 
 possible." This is not philosophy, which thus 
 mutilates man : this is not Christianity, which 
 thus divides Christ (16). If Christ is no more 
 than one of us, let us honestly renounce the 
 shadow of allegiance to an usurped authority, 
 and boldly proclaim that every man is his own 
 Redeemer. If Christ is God, no less than man^ 
 let us bevy^are, lest haply we be found even to 
 fight against God ^. 
 
 Beyond question, every doubt which our 
 reason may suggest in matters of religion is 
 entitled to its due place in the examination 
 • 3 Corinthians x. 5. ''Acts v. 39. 
 
256 LECTURE VIII. 
 
 of the evidences of religion ; if we will treat 
 it as a part only and not the whole ; if we will 
 not insist on a positive solution of that which, 
 it may be, is given us for another purpose 
 than to be solved. It is reasonable to believe 
 that, in matters of belief as well as of prac- 
 tice, God has not thought fit to annihilate 
 the free will of man ; but has permitted spe- 
 culative difficulties to exist as the trial and 
 the discipline of sharp and subtle intellects, 
 as He has permitted moral temptations to 
 form the trial and the discipline of strong 
 and eager passions (17). Our passions are not 
 annihilated when we resist the temptation to 
 sin : why should we expect that our doubts 
 must be annihilated if we are to resist the 
 temptation to unbelief? This correspondence 
 of difficulties is so far from throwing doubt 
 on the divine origin of Revelation, that it 
 rather strengthens the proof that it has ema- 
 nated from that Giver whose other gifts are 
 subject to like conditions. We do not doubt 
 that the conditions of our moral trial tend 
 towards good and not towards evil : that hu- 
 man nature, even in its fallen state, bears 
 traces of the image of its Maker, and is fitted 
 to be an instrument in His moral govern- 
 ment. And we believe this, notwithstanding 
 the existence of passions and appetites which. 
 
LECTURE VIII. 257 
 
 isolated and uncontrolled, appear to lead in 
 an opposite direction. It is then more rea- 
 sonable to deny that a system of revealed 
 religion, whose unquestionable tendency as a 
 whole is to promote the glory of God and the 
 welfare of mankind, can have proceeded from 
 the same Author, merely because we may be 
 unable to detect the same character in some 
 of its minuter features, viewed apart from 
 the system to which they belong? 
 
 It would of course be impossible now to 
 enter upon any detailed examination of the 
 positive Evidences of Christianity. The pur- 
 pose of the foregoing Lectures will have been 
 answered, if they can only succeed in clearing 
 the way for a candid and impartial inquiry ; 
 by shewing what are the limits within which 
 it must be confined, and what kind of rea- 
 soning is inadmissible, as transgressing those 
 limits. The conclusion, which an examina- 
 tion of the conditions of human thought un- 
 avoidably forces upon us, is this : There can 
 be no such thing as a positive science of Spe- 
 culative Theology ; for such a science must 
 necessarily be based on an apprehension of 
 the Infinite ; and the Infinite, though we are 
 compelled to believe in its existence, cannot 
 be positively apprehended in any mode of 
 the human Consciousness. The same impedi- 
 
258 LECTURE VIII. 
 
 ment which prevents the formation of The- 
 ology as a science, is also manifestly fatal to 
 the theory which asserts its progressive de- 
 velopment. We can test the progress of 
 knowledge, only by comparing its successive 
 representations with the objects which they 
 profess to represent : and as the object in this 
 case is inaccessible to human faculties, we 
 have no criterion by which to distinguish be- 
 tween progress and mere fluctuation. The 
 so-called progress in Theology is in truth only 
 an advance in those conceptions of man's 
 moral and religious duties which form the 
 basis of natural .religion ; — an advance which 
 is regulative and not speculative ; which is 
 primarily and properly a knowledge, not of 
 God's nature, but of man's obligations ; and 
 which is the result, not of an immediate in- 
 tuition of the Nature of the Infinite, but of a 
 closer study of the Laws of the Finite. A 
 progress of this kind can obviously have no 
 place in relation to those truths, if such there 
 be, which human reason is incapable of dis- 
 covering for itself: and to assert its appli- 
 cability to the criticism of Revealed Religion, 
 is to beg the entire question in dispute, by 
 assuming, without the slightest authority, 
 that Revelation cannot he any thing more 
 than a republication of Natural Religion (18). 
 
LECTURE Vlll. 259 
 
 But, on the other hand, there is an opposite 
 caution no less needed, in making use of the 
 counter -theory, which regards the doctrines 
 of Revelation as truths accommodated to the 
 finite capacities of man ; as serving for regu- 
 lative, not for speculative knowledge ; and as 
 not amenable to any criticism based on hu- 
 man representations of the Infinite. This 
 theory is useful, not as explaining the diffi- 
 culties involved in religious thought, but as 
 shewing why we must leave them unex- 
 plained ; not as removing the mysteries of 
 revelation, but as shewing why such myste- 
 ries must exist. This caution has not always 
 been sufficiently observed, even by those theo- 
 logians who have shewn the most just appre- 
 ciation of the limits of man's faculties in the 
 comprehension of divine things. Thus, to 
 mention an example of an ancient method of 
 interpretation which has been revived with 
 considerable ability and effect in modern 
 times, — the rule, that the Attributes ascribed 
 to God in Scripture must be understood as 
 denoting correspondence in Effects, but not 
 similarity of Causes, is one which is liable to 
 considerable misapplication : it contains in- 
 deed a portion of the truth, but a portion 
 which is sometimes treated as if it were the 
 whole. " Affectus in Deo," says Aquinas, 
 " denotat effectum" (19) : and the canon has 
 
 s 2 
 
260 LECTURE VIII. 
 
 been applied by a distinguished Prelate of 
 our own Church, in language probably fami- 
 liar to many of us. " The meaning," says 
 Archbishop King, " confessedly is, that He 
 will as certainly punish the wicked as if He 
 were inflamed with the passion of anger 
 against them ; that He will as infallibly re- 
 ward the good, as we will those for whom we 
 have a particular and affectionate love ; that 
 when men turn from their wickedness, and 
 do what is agreeable to the divine command, 
 He will as surely change His dispensations 
 towards them, as if He really repented, and 
 had changed His mind" (20). 
 
 This is no doubt a portion of the meaning; 
 but is it the whole ? Does Scripture intend 
 merely to assert a resemblance in the effects 
 and none at all in the causes ? If so, it is dif- 
 ficult to see why the natural rule of accom- 
 modation should have been reversed ; why a 
 plain and intelligible statement concerning 
 the Divine Acts should have been veiled un- 
 der an obscure and mysterious image of the 
 Divine Attributes. If God's Anger means no 
 more than His infliction of punishments ; if 
 His Love means no more than His bestowal 
 of rewards ; it would surely have been suffi- 
 cient to have told us that God punishes sin 
 and rewards obedience, without the inter- 
 position of a fictitious feeling as the basis of 
 
LECTURE VIII. 261 
 
 the relation. The conception of a God who 
 acts is at least as human as that of a God 
 who feels; and though both are but imper- 
 fect representations of the Infinite under 
 finite images, yet, while both rest upon the 
 same authority of Scripture, it is surely going 
 beyond the limits of a just reserve in speak- 
 ing of divine mysteries, to assume that the 
 one is merely the symbol, and the other the 
 interpretation. It is surely more reasonable, 
 as well as more reverent, to believe that these 
 partial representations of the Divine Con- 
 sciousness, though, as finite, thay are unable 
 speculatively to represent the Absolute Na- 
 ture of God, have yet each of them a regula- 
 tive purpose to fulfil in the training of the 
 mind of man : that there is a religious in- 
 fluence to be imparted to us by the thought 
 of God's Anger, no less than by that of His 
 Punishments ; by the thought of His Love, 
 no less than by that of His Benefits : that 
 both, inadequate and human as they are, yet 
 dimly indicate some corresponding reality in 
 the Divine Nature : and that to merge one 
 in the other is not to gain a purer represen- 
 tation of God as He is, but only to mutilate 
 that under which He has been pleased to 
 reveal Himself (21). 
 
 It is obvious indeed that the theory of an 
 
262 LECTURE VIII. 
 
 adaptation of divine truths to human facul- 
 ties, entirely changes its significance, as soon 
 as we attempt to give a further adaptation to 
 the adapted symbol itself; — to modify into a 
 still lower truth that which is itself a modi- 
 fication of a higher. The instant we under- 
 take to say that this or that speculative or 
 practical interpretation is the only real mean- 
 ing of that which Scripture represents to us 
 under a different image, we abandon at once 
 the supposition of an accommodation to the 
 necessary limits of human thought, and vir- 
 tually admit that the ulterior significance of 
 the representation falls as much within those 
 limits as the representation itself (22). Thus 
 interpreted, the principle no longer offers 
 the slightest safeguard against Rationalism : 
 — nay, it becomes identified with the funda- 
 mental vice of Rationalism itself; — that of 
 explaining away what we are unable to com- 
 prehend. 
 
 The adaptation for which I contend is one 
 which admits of no such explanation. It is 
 not an adaptation to the ignorance of one 
 man, to be seen through by the superior 
 knowledge of another ; but one which exists 
 in relation to the whole human race, as men, 
 bound by the laws of man's thought ; as 
 creatures of time, instructed in the things of 
 
LECTURE VIII. 263 
 
 eternity ; as finite beings, placed in relation 
 to and communication with the Infinite. I 
 believe that Scripture teaches, to each and 
 all of us, the lesson which it was designed to 
 teach, so long as we are men upon earth, and 
 not as the angels in heaven (23). I believe 
 that " now we see through a glass darkly," — 
 in an enigma ; — but that now is one which 
 encompasses the whole race of mankind, from 
 the cradle to the grave, from the creation to 
 the day of judgment : that dark enigma is 
 one which no human wisdom can solve ; 
 which Reason is unable to penetrate ; and 
 which Faith can only rest content with here, 
 in hope of a clearer vision to be granted 
 hereafter. If there be any who think that 
 the Laws of Thought themselves may change 
 with the changing knowledge of man ; that 
 the limitations of Subject and Object, of Du- 
 ration and Succession, of Space and Time, 
 belong to the vulgar only, and not to the 
 philosopher : — if there be any who believe 
 that they can think without the conscious- 
 ness of themselves as thinking, or of any thing 
 about which they think ; that they can be in 
 such or such a mental state, and yet for no 
 period of duration ; that they can remember 
 this state and make subsequent use of it, 
 without conceiving it as antecedent, or as 
 
264 LECTURE VIII. 
 
 standing in any order of time to their pre- 
 sent consciousness ; that they can reflect 
 upon God without their reflections following 
 each other, without their succeeding to any 
 earlier or being succeeded by any later state 
 of mind : — if there be any who maintain that 
 they can conceive Justice and Mercy and 
 Wisdom, as neither existing in a just and 
 merciful and wise Being, nor in any way dis- 
 tinguishable from each other : — if there be 
 any who imagine that they can be conscious 
 without variety, or discern without differ- 
 ences ; — these and these alone may aspire to 
 correct Revelation by the aid of Philosophy ; 
 for such alone are the conditions under which 
 Philosophy can attain to a rational knowledge 
 of the Infinite God. 
 
 The intellectual difficulties which Ration- 
 alism discovers in the contents of Revelation 
 (I do not now speak of those which belong 
 to its external evidences) are such as no 
 system of Rational Theology can hope to 
 remove ; for they are inherent in the consti- 
 tution of Reason itself. Our mental laws, 
 like our moral passions, are designed to serve 
 the purposes of our earthly culture and dis- 
 cipline : both have their part to perform in 
 moulding the intellect and the will of man 
 through the slow stages of that training here. 
 
LECTURE VIII. 265 
 
 whose completion is to be looked for here- 
 after. Without the possibility of tempta- 
 tion, where would be the merit of obedience ? 
 Without room for doubt, where would be 
 the righteousness of faith (24) ? But there is 
 no temptation which taketh us, as Christians, 
 but such as is common to man'; and there 
 is no doubt that taketh us, but such as is 
 common to man also. It is the province of 
 Philosophy to teach us this ; and it is the 
 province of Religion to turn the lesson to 
 account. The proud definition of ancient 
 sages, which bade the philosopher, as a lover 
 of wisdom, strive after the knowledge of 
 things divine and human, would speak more 
 soberly and more truly by enjoining a Know- 
 ledge of things human, as subservient and 
 auxiliary to Faith in things divine (25). Of 
 the Nature and Attributes of God in His In- 
 finite Being, Philosophy can tell us nothing : 
 of man's inability to apprehend that Nature, 
 and why he is thus unable, she tells us all 
 that we can know, and all that we need to 
 know. " Know thyself," was the precept in- 
 scribed in the Delphic Temple, as the best 
 lesson of Heathen wisdom (26). " Know thy- 
 self," was the exhortation of the Christian 
 Teacher to his disciple, adding, " if any man 
 1 I Corinthians x. i^. 
 
266 LECTURE VIII. 
 
 know himself, he will also know God" (27). 
 He will at least be content to know so much 
 of God's nature as God Himself has been 
 pleased to reveal ; and, where Revelation is 
 silent, to worship without seeking to know 
 more. 
 
 Know thyself in the various elements of 
 thy intellectual and moral being : all alike 
 will point reverently upward to the throne 
 of the Invisible ; but none will scale that 
 throne itself, or pierce through the glory 
 which conceals Him that sitteth thereon. 
 Know thyself in thy powers of Thought, 
 which, cramped and confined on every side, 
 yet bear witness, in their very limits, to the 
 Illimitable beyond. Know thyself in the 
 energies of thy Will, which, free and yet 
 bound, the master at once and the servant 
 of Law, bows itself under the imperfect con- 
 sciousness of a higher Lawgiver, and asserts 
 its freedom but by the permission of the Al- 
 mighty. Know thyself in the yearnings of 
 thy Affections, which, marvellously adapted 
 as they are to their several finite ends, yet 
 testify in their restlessness to the deep need 
 of something better (28). Know thyself in 
 that fearful and wonderful system of Human 
 Nature as a whole, which is composed of all 
 these, and yet not one with any nor with all 
 
LECTURE VIII. 267 
 
 of them; — that system to whose inmost centre 
 and utmost circumference the whole system 
 of Christian Faith so strangely yet so fully 
 adapts itself. It is to the whole Man that 
 Christianity appeals : it is as a Whole and 
 in relation to the whole Man that it must 
 be judged (29). It is not an object for the 
 thought alone, nor for the will alone, nor 
 for the feelings alone. It may not be judged 
 by reference to this petty cavil or that mi- 
 nute scruple : it may not be cut down to the 
 dimensions and wants of any single ruling 
 principle or passion. We have no right to say 
 that we will be Christians as far as pleases 
 us, and no further; that we will accept or 
 reject, according as our understanding is sa- 
 tisfied or perplexed (30). The tree is not 
 then most flourishing, when its branches are 
 lopped, and its trunk peeled, and its whole 
 body cut down to one hard unyielding 
 mass ; but when one principle of life per- 
 vades it throughout ; when the trunk and 
 the branches claim brotherhood and fellow- 
 ship with the leaf that quivers, and the twig 
 that bends to the breeze, and the bark that 
 is delicate and easily wounded, and the root 
 that lies lowly and unnoticed in the earth. 
 And man is never so weak as when he seems 
 to be strongest, standing alone in the confi- 
 
268 LECTURE VIII. 
 
 dence of an isolated and self-sufficing Intel- 
 lect : he is never so strong as when he seems 
 to be weakest, with every thought and resolve, 
 and passion and affection, from the highest 
 to the lowest, bound together in one by the 
 common tie of a frail and feeble Humanity. 
 He is never so weak as when he casts off his 
 burdens, and stands upright and unincum- 
 bered in the strength of his own will : he is 
 never so strong as when, bowed down in his 
 feebleness, and tottering under the whole 
 load that God has laid upon him, he comes 
 humbly before the throne of grace, to cast 
 his care upon the God who careth for him"". 
 The life of man is one, and the system of 
 Christian Faith is one : each part supplying 
 something that another lacks ; each element 
 making good some missing link in the evi- 
 dence furnished by the rest. But we may 
 avail ourselves of that which satisfies our own 
 peculiar needs, only by accepting it as part 
 and parcel of the one indivisible Whole. Thus 
 only shall we grow in our Christian Life in 
 just proportion of every part; the intellect 
 instructed, the will controlled, the affections 
 purified, " till we all come, in the unity of 
 the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of 
 God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure 
 
 ™ I St. Peter v. 7. 
 
LECTURE VIII. 269 
 
 of the stature of the fulness of Christ : that 
 we henceforth be no more children, tossed to 
 and fro, and carried about with every wind 
 of doctrine, by the sleight of men, and cun- 
 ning cr&,ftiness, whereby they lie in wait to 
 deceive ; but speaking the truth in love, may 
 grow up into Him in all things, which is the 
 Head, even Christ ; from whom the whole 
 body, fitly joined together and compacted by 
 that which every joint supplieth, according 
 to the effectual working in the measure of 
 every part, maketh increase of the body unto 
 the edifying of itself in love ".'* 
 
 ° Ephesians iv. 13-16. 
 
NOTES. 
 
NOTES. 
 
 LECTURE I. 
 
 Note 1. p. 3. 
 
 oEE Gralen, De Sectis, 0. i. In this sense, the Dogmatists 
 or Rationalists were distinguished from the Empirics. For 
 the corresponding philosophical sense of the term, see 
 Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrh. Hyp. I. § i — 3. 
 
 Note 2. p. 3. 
 "Der Dogmatismus hat seinen Namen davon, dass er 
 das Verhaltniss zwischen den Dingen an sich und den 
 Erscheinungen als einen Causalzusammenhang zu demon- 
 striren, d. h. dogmatisch festzusetzen, sich anmasst ; und 
 behauptet dass die Dinge an sich den Grund von allem 
 enthalten, was wir an dem Menschen und in der Naturwelt 
 wahrnehmen." Poelitz, Kanfs Vorlesungm uher die Meta- 
 physik. Einleitung, p. xxi. 
 
 Note 3. p. 4. 
 Of the theological method of Wolf, the leader of philo- 
 sophical dogmatism in the eighteenth century, Mr. Rose 
 observes, " He maintained that philosophy was indispens- 
 able to theology, and that, together with biblical proofs, 
 a mathematical or strictly demonstrative dogmatical sys- 
 tem, according to the principles of reason, was absolutely 
 necessary. His own works carried this theory into practice, 
 and after the first clamours against them had subsided, his 
 opinions gained more attention, and it was not long before 
 he had a school of vehement admirers who far outstripped 
 him in the use of his own principles. We find some of 
 them not content with applying demonstration to the truth 
 
274 NOTES. 
 
 of the system, but endeavouring to establish each separate 
 dogma, the Trinity, the nature of the Eedeeraer, the In- 
 carnation, the eternity of punishment, on philosophical, 
 and, strange as it may appear, some of these truths on 
 mathematical grounds^." 
 
 The language of Wolf himself may be quoted as ex- 
 pressing exactly the relation between Scripture and human 
 reason mentioned in the text. " Scriptura sacra Tlieologice 
 naturali adfumenio est. Etenim in Scriptura sacra ea quo- 
 que de Deo docentur, quse ex principiis rationis de eodera 
 demonstrari possunt : id quod nemo negat, qui in lectione 
 Scripturae sacrse fuerit versatus. Suppeditat igitur Theo- 
 logise naturali propositiones, quae in ea demonstrari debent, 
 consequenter philosophus eas non demum invenire, sed tan- 
 tummodo demonstrare tenetur''." 
 
 The writings of Oanz, a disciple of the Wolfian philo- 
 sophy, are mentioned by Mr. Rose, and by Dr. Pusey, 
 {Historical Inquiry, p. 116), as exemplifying the manner in 
 which this philosophy was applied to doctrinal theology. 
 The following extracts from his attempted demonstration 
 of the doctrine of the Trinity may be interesting to the 
 reader, not only on account of the extreme rarity of the 
 work from which they are taken, but also as furnishing a 
 specimen of the dogmatic method, and shewing the abuse 
 to which it is liable in injudicious hands. 
 
 " Cum character omnis substantise in vi quadam agendi 
 positus sit, Deus erit judicandus ex infinita agendi vi, idque 
 generatim. Ea vis agendi, quoniam infinita est, complecti- 
 tur omnes perfectiones, ideoque non ponitur in nuda facul- 
 tate, quse ab exercitio agendi nonnunquam cessat, quod 
 iraperfectionis foret ; non coUocatur in viribus hoc aut istud 
 solum agendi; quod similiter cancellos proderet; sed in 
 perdurante actu, eodemque purissimo, omnia operandi, quse- 
 cunque perfectissime, ideoque et sapientissime, una agi licet. 
 Est igitur substantia plane singularis. 
 
 Cum Deus porro actus purissimus sit, qui omnia in omni- 
 bus operatur, sequitur res finitas, quae esse possunt et non 
 
 ^ State of Protestantism in Germany, p. 54. Second edition. 
 ^ Theologia Naturalis, Pars Prior, § 22. 
 
LEOTUEE I. 275 
 
 possunt, rationein suae existentise in se ipsis non invenire, 
 sed in eo qui omnia operatur, i. e, Deo. Est igitur in Deo, 
 quod primo loco intelligimus, Vis infinita Creandi. 
 
 Sed quoniam, quee creata sunt, omnia, ut media et fines, 
 se mutuo respiciunt, ipsa autem, ultimo scopo, referuntur 
 ad gloriam Dei, perspicuum est, esse in Deo infinitam Sa- 
 pientise Vim, sen, ut Soriptura loquitur, \6yov, qui, cum 
 Veritas in harmonia rerum sufficienti ratione coordlnatarum 
 et sibi succedentium ponatur, omnem omnino possibilem 
 veritatem perspicacia sua comprehendat. 
 
 Quemadmodum denique infinita in rebus creatis bona 
 sunt, et vero Deus omnia operans et haec bona prsestitisse 
 judicetur ; ita non est intellectu difficile, esse in Deo sum- 
 mam Amandi Vim. Hie enim amat, qui, quoties potest, 
 aliorum felicitatem variis bonis auget, 
 
 Subsistere dicitur quod existit, si complemento suo poti- 
 tum est, nee procedit ultra. Fit enim progressus a possibili 
 ad agendi vim, ab agendi vi, ad actum operandi, eumque 
 talem quem determinavi. Tum subsistitur, nee proceditur 
 quasi ultra. 
 
 Quidquid hoc modo in existendo ultra non proeedit, id 
 v(j)iaTdi/.evov vocant Metaphysiei, cui si donum intelligentise 
 sen ratio aceesserit, tum existit Persona. 
 
 His prsemissis videamus an in Dei natura quidquam sit, 
 quod trium Personarum titulo dignum. Est utique in 
 Deo immensa vis agendi, ideoque Substantias singularis- 
 eimse indicium. Invenire etiam licet triplicem actum, qui 
 illam vim, omnia operando, in omni triplici rerum genere, 
 complet. 
 
 Triplex ilia operandi actus non solum existit quia prae- 
 struit vim agendi ; sed et subsistit quilibet, quia nee pars 
 est, nee pars socia alterius, nee denique operatio unius 
 alterius est. 
 
 Atqui cadit in hunc triplicem immensum, qua divina 
 vis completur, actum, sui conscientia, et prseteritorum 
 pariter ae futurorum sensus. Est igitur quisque intelli- 
 gens, ideoque Persona. 
 
 Cum tres ejusmodi actus sint in Deo, seu in Divina 
 
 T a 
 
276 NOTES. 
 
 Natura, quse immensa vis agendi est, sequitur in eadem 
 Tres esse Personas, quae unam illam infinitam vim immensa 
 operatione triplici compleant et exerceant. 
 
 Quoniam in omni quodcunque creatum et intelligendi 
 facultate prseditum est, vis operandi, intelligendi, amandi, 
 non nisi Una operatione totali, sen Uno Actu compleri 
 potest ; sequitur in omni finito non esse posse nisi unicam 
 personam. 
 
 Ternio igitur Personarum in Deo a Natura Infinita 
 qua tali profioiscitur. Quod erat demonstrationis proposi- 
 tum<=." 
 
 Leibnitz, the great master of Wolf and his disciples, 
 in the Discours de la Conformit6 de la Foi avec la liaison, 
 prefixed to his Thiodicie, § 59, decidedly condemns all at- 
 tempts to render the mysteries of religion comprehensible 
 by demonstration. 
 
 Note 4. p. 5. 
 Kant defines Eationalism, as distinguished from Natu- 
 ralism and Supernaturahsm, in the following terms. " Der, 
 vyelcher bios die natiirliche Religion fiir moralischnoth- 
 wendig, d. i. fiir Pflicht erklart, kann auch der Rationalist 
 (in Glaubenssachen) genannt werden. Wenn dieser die 
 Wirklichkeit aller iibernatiirlichen gottlichen Offenbarung 
 verneint, so heisst er Naturalist; lasst er nun diese zwar 
 zu, behauptet aber dass sie zu kennen und fiir wirklich 
 anzunehmen, zur Religion nicht nothwendig erfordert wird, 
 so wiirde er ein reiner Rationalist genannt v^erden konnen ; 
 halt er aber den Glauben an dieselbe zur allgemeinen Re- 
 ligion fiir nothwendig, so wiirde er der reine Supernatural- 
 ist in Glaubenssachen heissen konnen^." In the text, the 
 term is used in a somewhat wider extent than that of the 
 
 "= PhilosophicB Wolfiancs Consensus cum Theologia, Francofurti et 
 Lipsise, 1737. This volume forms the third part of the Philosophies 
 LeibnitiantB et WolfiancB usus in Theologia, of which the first part was 
 pubhshed in 1728, and the second in 1732. The third part is ex- 
 tremely rare. The two former parts were reprinted in 1749. 
 
 <^ Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, {Werke, ed. 
 Rosenkranz, x. p. iSg.) For different senses in which the term Ra- 
 tionalist has been used, see Wegscheider, Instit. Theol. § 10; Rose, 
 
LECTURE I. 277 
 
 above definition. It is not necessary to limit the name of 
 nationalist to those who maintain that Revelation as a 
 whole is unnecessary to religion ; nor to those whose sys- 
 tem is based solely on moral principles. There may be a 
 partial as well as a total rationalism : it is possible to ac- 
 knowledge in general terms the authority of Scripture, and 
 yet to exercise considerable license in rejecting particular 
 portions as speculatively incomprehensible or morally un- 
 necessary. The term is sometimes specially applied to the 
 Kantian school of theologians, of whom Paulus and Weg- 
 scheider are representatives. In this sense, Hegel declares 
 his antagonism to the Rationalism of his day; and Strauss, 
 in his controversies with the naturalist critics of the Go- 
 spels, frequently speaks of their method as " Rationalism." 
 In the sense in which the term is employed in the text, 
 Hegel and Strauss are themselves as thoroughly rational- 
 ists as their opponents. Even Schleiermacher, though a 
 decided antagonist of the naturalist school, is himself a par- 
 tial Rationalist of another kind ; for with him the Christ- 
 ian Consciousness, i. e. the internal experience resulting to 
 the individual from his connection with the Christian com- 
 munity, is made a test of religious truth almost as arbitrary 
 as the Moral Reason of Kant. On the strength of this self- 
 chosen criterion, Schleiermacher sets aside, among other 
 doctrines, as unessential to Christian belief, the super- 
 natural conception of Jesus, the facts of his resurrection, 
 ascension, and the prediction of his future judgment of the 
 world ; asserting that it is impossible to see how such facts 
 can be connected with the redeeming power of Christ f. 
 Indeed in some of the details of his system he falls into 
 pure Rationalism ; as in his speculations on the existence 
 of Angels, good and evil, on the Fall of Man, on eternal 
 Punishment, on the two Natures of Christ, and on the 
 equality of the Persons in the Holy Trinity. 
 
 The so-called Spiritualism of the present day is again 
 
 State of Protestantism in Germany, Introd. p. xvii. second edition; 
 Kahnis, Internal History of German Protestantism, p. 169, Meyer's 
 translation. 
 
 ^ Geschichte der Philosophie, {Werke, XIII. p. g6.) 
 
 f Christliche Glaube, § 97, 99. 
 
278 NOTES. 
 
 only Rationalism disguised ; for feeling or intuition is but 
 an arbitrary standard, resting solely on the personal con- 
 sciousness, and moreover must be translated into distinct 
 thought, before it can be available for the purposes of re- 
 ligious criticism. 
 
 Note 5. p. 5. 
 Thus Wegscheider represents the claim of the Rational- 
 ists. " Sanse rationi facultatem vindicant religionis doctri- 
 nam qualemcunque a revelatione opinata supernaturali de- 
 rivatam dijudicandi, ejusque argumentum non nisi ad leges 
 cogitandi agendique rationi insitas exactum probandi." 
 Inst. Theol. § to. See also Rohr, Brief e uber den Bational- 
 
 Note 6. p. 10, 
 " Quapropter si non decet Deum aliquid injuste aut in- 
 ordinate facere, non pertinet ad ejus libertatem, aut benig- 
 nitatem, aut voluntatem, peccantem qui non solvit Deo, 
 quod abstulit, impunitum dimittere." Anselm, Cur Deus 
 Homo, i. 13. " Ipsa namque perversitatis spontanea satis- 
 factio, vel a non satisfaciente poense exactio (excepto hoc 
 quod Deus de malis multimodis bona facit) in eadem uni- 
 vei'sitate locum tenent suum et ordinis pulchritudinem. 
 Quas si divina sapientia, ubi perversitas rectum ordinem 
 perturbare nititur, non adderet, fieret in ipsa universitate, 
 quam Deus debet ordinare, qusedam ex violata ordinis pul- 
 chritudine deformitas, et Deus in sua dispositione videretur 
 deficere. Quae duo quoniam sicut sunt ineonvenientia, ita 
 sunt impossibilia, necesse est ut omne peccatum satisfactio 
 aut poena sequatur." Ibid. i. 15. " Si ergo, sicut constat, 
 necesse est ut de hominibus perficiatur ilia superna civitas; 
 nee hoc esse valet, nisi fiat prsedicta satisfactio, quam nee 
 potest facere, nisi Deus, nee debet nisi homo ; necesse est 
 ut cam faciat Deus homo." Ihid. ii. 6. Compare Alex, ab 
 Ales. Summa Theologice, P. III. Memb. 7, where the same 
 argument is concisely stated. 
 
 Note 7. p. 10. 
 Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, 1. II. c. 16. 
 
LECTURE I. 279 
 
 Note 8. p. lo. 
 Anselra, Cur Deus Homo, 1. 1. c, 5. 
 
 Note 9. p. 10. 
 "Deus ita misericors est, ut sit etiam simul Justus; 
 raiserioordia non excludit in eo aeternam justitise regulam, 
 sed summum et admirabile est in eo misericordise et justi- 
 tise temperamentum ; ergo non potuit peccatum salva di- 
 vina justitia absque sequivalente pretio in Dei judicio 
 homini remitti. Nullum ergo aliud supererat remedium, 
 quam ut ipse Dei Filius humanam naturam assumeret, ac 
 in ea et per earn satisfaceret. Deus non debebat; homo 
 non poterat." J. Gerhard, Loci Theohgici, De Persona ei 
 Officio Christi, c. VIII. 
 
 Note 10. p. TO. 
 " Quia nuda creatura non potuisset sustinere immensum 
 onus irse Dei, totius mundi pecoatis debitse." Chemnitz, 
 De duahus Naturis in Christo, c. XI. 
 
 Note 11. p. II. 
 Such is the demand of Anselm's interlocutor, which he 
 himself undertakes to satisfy. " Ut rationabili necessitate 
 intelligam esse oportere omnia ilia quae nobis Fides Catho- 
 lica de Christo credere prsecipit." Cur Deus Homo, 1. I. 
 c. 25. To arguments founded on this principle the judi- 
 cious remarks of Bishop Butler may be applied, " It may be 
 needful to mention that several questions, which have been 
 brought into the subject before us, and determined, are 
 not in the least entered into here : questions which have 
 been, I fear, rashly determined, and perhaps with equal 
 rashness contrary ways. For instance, whether God could 
 have saved the world by other means than the death of 
 Christ, consistently with the general laws of his govern- 
 ment?." 
 
 Note 12. p. ir. 
 
 " In what did this satisfaction consist ? Was it that God 
 was angry, and needed to be propitiated like some heathen 
 
 e Analogy, Part II. Ch. 5. 
 
280 NOTES. 
 
 deity of old ? Such a thought refutes itself by the very 
 indignation which it calls up in the human bosom." 
 Jowett, Epistles of St. Paul, vol. ii. p. 472. "Neither can 
 there be any such thing as vicarious atonement or punish- 
 ment, which, again, is a relic of heathen conceptions of an 
 angered Deity, to be propitiated by offerings and sacri- 
 fices." Greg, Greed of Christendom, p. 0,6^. " The rehgion 
 of types and notions can travel only in a circle from whence 
 there is no escape. It is but an elaborate process of self- 
 confutation. After much verbiage it demolishes what it 
 created, and having begun by assuming God to be angry, 
 ends, not by admitting its own gross mistake, but by 
 asserting Him to be changed and reconciled." Mackay, 
 Progress of the Intellect, vol. ii. p. 504. Compare Weg- 
 sch eider, Inst. Theol. § 141. 
 
 Note 18. p. II. 
 " Quid enim iniquius, quam insontem pro sontibus puniri, 
 prsesertim cum ipsi sontes adsunt, qui ipsi puniri possunt." 
 F. Socinus, Prcelect. Theol., c. xviii. "That each should 
 have his exact due is just — ^is the best for himself. That 
 the consequence of his guilt should be transferred from him 
 to one who is innocent, (although that innocent one be 
 himself willing to accept it,) whatever else it be, is not 
 justice." 'FvoViAe, Nemesis of Faith, ■^.']o. Compare New- 
 man, Phases of Faith, p. 93 ; Greg, Greed of Christendom, 
 p. 265. A similar objection is introduced, and apparently 
 approved, by Mr. Maurice, Theological Essays, p.J^g. 
 
 Note 14. p. II. 
 
 "Nemo est qui injurias sibi allatas, debitaque secum 
 contracta, summo jure condonare et remittere non queat, 
 nulla vera pro ipsis satisfactions accepta. Igitur, nisi 
 velimus Deo minus concedere quam hominibus ipsis conce- 
 datur, confitendum omnino est, Deum jure potuisse nobis 
 peccata nostra ignoscere, nulla pro ipsis vera satisfactione 
 accepta." F. Socinus, Prcelect. Theol. c. xvi. 
 
 " Now it is certainly required of us, that if our brother 
 only repent, we should forgive him, even though he should 
 
LECTURE I. . 281 
 
 repeat his offence seven times a day. On the same gene- 
 rous maxim, therefore, we cannot but conclude that the 
 Divine Being acts towards us." Priestley, History of Corrup- 
 tions, vol. i. p. 1 5 1 . " Every good man has learnt to for- 
 give, and when the offender is penitent, to forgive freely — 
 without punishment or retribution : whence the conclu- 
 sion is inevitable, that God also forgives, as soon as sin is 
 repented of." Newman, The Soul, pp.99, 100. "Was it 
 that there was a debt due to Him, which must be paid ere 
 its consequences could be done away ? But even " a man's" 
 debt may be freely forgiven." Jcrwett, Epistles of St. Paul. 
 vol. ii. p. 473. Compare also Maurice, Theol. Essays, p. 138, 
 and Garve, quoted by Rohr, Briefe ilher den Rationalismus, 
 p. 44a. 
 
 Note 15. p. II. 
 " Pecuniarise pcense ideo pro altero pendi possunt, quia 
 unius pecunia alterius effici potest ; ut cum quis pecuniam 
 pcenas nomine pro alio quopiam solvit, tunc is, pro quo sol- 
 vitur, tacite reipsa prius ea pecunia donatur, ipseque earn 
 solvisse censetur. At mors unius, corporisve ulla vexatio, 
 alterius fieri non potest." F. Socinus, Prcslect. Theol. c. 
 xviii. " Est siquidem pecunia,, ut jurisconsulti loquuntur, 
 reale quiddam, et idcirco ab alio in alium tranferri potest. 
 Pcense vero, et quae peccatis hominum ex lege Dei deben- 
 tur, sunt quiddam personale, et propterea ejusmodi, quse 
 illi ipsi, qui eas dat, perpetuo adhsereant, nee in alium 
 queant transferri." F. Socinus, Christiance Beligionis Insti- 
 iutio. {Opera, 1656. vol. i. p. 665.) " Diese urspriinghche, 
 oder iiberhaupt vor jedem Guten, das er immer thun mag, 
 vorhergehende Schuld, die auoh dasjenige ist, das, und 
 nichts mehr, wir unter dem radicalen Bosen verstanden, 
 kann aber auch, so viel wir nach unserem Venunftrecht 
 einsehen, nicht von einem andern getilgt werden, denn sie 
 ist keine trammissihile Verbindlichkeit, die etwa, wie eine 
 Geldschuld (bei der es dem Glaiibiger einerlei ist, ob der 
 Schuldner selbst oder ein Anderer fiir ihn bezahlt) auf 
 einen Andern iibertragen werden kann, soodern die Al- 
 lerpersonlichste, namlich die Siindenschuld, die nur der 
 
283 NOTES. 
 
 Strafbare, nicht der Unschuldige, er mag auch noch so 
 grossmiithig seyn sio fiir jenen iibernehmen zu wollen, 
 tragen kann." Kant, Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der 
 blossen Vernunft, p. 84. ed. Eosenkranz. Compare Cole- 
 ridge, Aids to Reflection, p. 249, ed. 1839. His argument 
 is chiefly an expansion of Kant's, 
 
 Note 16. p. 13. 
 Wilberforoe, Doctrine of the Incarnation, pp. 44, 45. 4th 
 edition. The germ of this theory may perhaps be found 
 in Daraascenus, De Fide Orthod. lib. iii. c. 6. See Dorner, 
 Lehre von der Person Ghristi, p. 115. It also partially ap- 
 pears, in a form more adapted to the realistic controversy, 
 in Anselm, particularly in his treatise De Fide Trinitatis 
 et de Incarnatione Verbi, written to refute the theological 
 errors of the nominalist Koscelin. In modern times, a 
 similar theory has found favour with those philosophers of 
 the Hegelian school, who, in opposition to the develop- 
 ment represented by Strauss, have undertaken the difficult 
 task of reconciling the philosophy of their master with 
 historical Christianity. In this point of view it has been 
 adopted by Schaller in his " Der historische Christus und 
 die Philosophie," and by, Goschel in his " Beitrage zur 
 Speculativen Philosophie von G-ott und dem Menschen und 
 von dem Gottmenschen." For an account of these theories 
 see Dorner, p. 462.477. A similar view is maintained by 
 Marheineke, Grundleliren der ChristUchen Dogmatik, § 338, 
 and by Dorner himself, LeJire von der Person Christi, p. 
 
 527- 
 
 Note 17. p. 13. 
 
 " Item sequitur quod aliquid de essentia Christi erit mi- 
 serum et damnatum, quia ilia natura communis existens 
 realiter in Christo et in damnato erit damnatum, quia in 
 Juda." Occam, Logica, P. i . 0. 1 5. 
 
 Note 18. p. 16. 
 " Religion ist (subjectiv betrachtet) das Erkenntniss aller 
 unserer Pflichten als gottlicher Gebote." Kant, Religion 
 innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, p. 184. ed. 
 
LECTURE I. 283 
 
 Rosenkranz. In the same spirit, Fichte says, " Da alle 
 Religion Gott nur als moralischen Gesetzgeber darstellt, 
 so ist alles, was nicht Gebot des Moralgesetztes in uns ist, 
 auch nicht das seinige, und es ist kein Mittel ihra zu 
 gefallen, als durch Beobachtung desselben." Fersuch einer 
 Kritik aller Offenharung, ( WerJce, v. p. 1 27). This is exactly 
 the theory of Religion which is refuted in anticipation by 
 Bishop Butler (Analogy, P. ii. ch. i.) as the opinion of 
 those who hold that the " only design" of Revelation "must 
 be to establish a belief of the moral system of nature, and 
 to enforce the practice of natural piety and virtue." 
 
 Note 19. p. 17. 
 Ibid. pp. 184, 186. 
 
 Note 20. p. 1 7. 
 
 " Das Beten, als ein innerer formlicher Gottesdienst, 
 und darum als Gnadensmittel gedacht, ist ein aberglaii- 
 bischer Wahn." Ibid. p. 235. 
 
 Note 21. p. 17. 
 "Ein herzlicher Wunsch, Gott in allem unserm Thun 
 und Lassen wohlgefallig zu seyn, d. i. die alle unsere 
 Handlungen begleitende Gesinnung, sie als ob sie im 
 Dienste Gottes geschehen, zu betreiben, ist der Geist des 
 Gebets, der ohne Unterlass in uns stattfinden kann und 
 soil. Dieser Wunsch aber (es sey auch nur innerlich) in 
 "Worte und Formeln einzukleiden, kann hochstens nur den 
 Werth eines Mittels zu wiederholter Belebung jener Ge- 
 sinnung in uns selbst bei sich fiihren, unmittelbar aber 
 keine Beziehung aufs gottliche Wohlgefallen haben, eben 
 darum auch nicht fiir Jedermann Pflicht seyn, weil ein 
 Mittel nur dem vorgeschrieben werden kann, der es zu 
 gewissen Zwecken bedarf."..." In jenem Wunsche, als dem 
 Geiste des Gebets, sucht der Mensch nur auf sich selbst 
 (zu Belebung seiner Gesinnungen vermittelst der Idee von 
 Gott, in diesem aber, da er sich durch Worte, mithin aus- 
 serlich erklart, aw/ Gott zu wirken." Kant, Religion, u.s.w. 
 p. 235. Of. Fichte, Kritik aller Offenbarvrng, p. 127. For 
 an account of a similar view advocated in Scotland in the 
 
284 NOTES. 
 
 last century, by Dr. Leechman and others, see Combe's 
 Constitution of Mom, ch. ix. Subsequent writers have re- 
 peated the above theory in various forms, and in various 
 spirits, but all urging the same objection, from the sup- 
 posed unchangeable nature of God. See Schleiermacher, 
 Ghristliclie Glaube, § 147, and his sermon "Die Kraft des 
 Gebetes," Predigten, I. p. 24 ; Strauss, Glauhenslehre, II. 
 p. 387; Foxton, Popular Christianity, p. 113; Parker, 
 Theism, Atheism, and Popular Theology, p. 6^ ; Emerson, 
 Essay on Self-Beliance ; and a remarkable passage from 
 Greg's Creed of Christendom, quoted in Lecture VI. p. 1 84. 
 Some valuable remarks on the other side will be found in 
 two writers, usually opposed to each other, but for once 
 united in vindicating the religious instincts of mankind 
 from the perversions of a false philosophy. See F.W. 
 Newman, The Soul, p. 118, and "Correspondence of 
 E. E. H. Greyson, Esq." Vol. i. p. 278. Kant's theory is 
 ably criticised by Drobisch, Grundlehren der Beligionsphi- 
 losopMe, p. 267. 
 
 Note 22. p. 17. 
 Thus Fichte lays it down, as one of the tests of a 
 true Revelation, that it must not countenance an objective 
 Anthropomorphism of God. In illustration of this canon, 
 he says, "Konnen wir Gott wirklich durch unsere Emp- 
 findungen bestimmen, ihn zum Mitleiden, zum Erbarmen, 
 zur Freude bewegen, so jst er nicht der Unveranderliche, 
 der Alleingenugsame, der AUeinselige, so ist er noch 
 durch etwas anderes, als durch das Moralgesetz bestimm- 
 bar ; so konnen wir auch wohl hoffen, ihn durch Winseln 
 und Zerknirschung zu bewegen, dass er anders mit uns 
 verfahre, als der Grad unserer Moralitat es vendient hatte. 
 AUe diese sinnlichen Darstellungen gottlicher Eigen- 
 schaften miissen also nicht als objectiv giiltig angekundigt 
 werden: es muss nicht zweideutig gelassen werden, ob 
 Gott an sich so beschaffen sey, oder ob er uns nur zum 
 Behuf unseres sinnHchen Bediirfnisses erlauben wolle, ihn 
 so zu denkent." On this principle, he considers the no- 
 
 h Versuch einer Kritik alter Offenbarung, {Werke,Y. p. 135.) 
 
LECTURE I. 285 
 
 tions of a Eesurrection and a Day of Judgment as having 
 a merely subjective validity'. In another passage, he 
 speaks of the representation of God under conditions of 
 time as "eine grobe Anthropomorphose'';" apparently not 
 seeing that the notion of unchangeableness is at least as 
 much one of time, and therefore of Anthropomorphism, as 
 that of compassion or joy. In a similar spirit, a later 
 writer observes, "Bei dem grossen Gewicht, das man so 
 oft auf die Personlichkeit Gottes legt, mischt sich gar zu 
 leicht das Interesse des Anthropopathismus und Anthro- 
 pomorphismus ein'." In another passage, Fichte says, 
 " Wer da sagt : du sollst dir keinen Begriff von Gott 
 machen, sagt mit anderen Worten : du sollst dir keinen 
 Gotzen machen ; und sein Gebot bedeutet geistig dasselbe 
 was das uralte Mosaische sinnlich : Du sollst dir kein Bild- 
 niss machen™." These words may perhaps have suggested 
 the cognate remarks of Professor Jowett : " It would be 
 little better than idolatry to fill the mind with an idea of 
 God which represented Him in fashion as a man. And in 
 using a figure of speech, we are bound to explain to all who 
 are capable of miderstanding, that we speak in a figure 
 only, and to remind them that logical categories may give 
 as false and imperfect a conception of the Divine nature 
 in our own age, as graven images in the days of the pa- 
 triarchs"." If by logical categories are meant analogical 
 representations formed from the facts of human conscious- 
 ness, this passage may be so interpreted as to imply either 
 an important truth, or a dangerous error. If interpreted 
 to mean that such representations of God cannot be re- 
 garded as adequate expressions of His absolute and infi- 
 nite nature, it states a truth, the importance of which can 
 
 i Versuch einer Kritik alter Offenbarung, {Werke, V. p. 136, 137.) 
 
 ^ Ibid. p. 109. 
 
 1 Baur, Christliehe Gnosis, p. 705. 
 
 Jn Gerichtliche Verantwortung, {Werke, V. p. 267.) In like manner. 
 Herder says, "Also wenn wir von Gott reden, lieber keine Bilder! 
 Auch in der Philosophie ist dies unser erstes Gebot, wie im Gesetz 
 Moses." Gott, EinigeGespracheuher Spinoza's System. (PFerAre, VIII. 
 p. 228.) 
 
 " Epistles of St. Paul, Vol. ii. p. 404. 
 
286 NOTES. 
 
 hardly be over-estimated; but if it be meant, as Fichte 
 undoubtedly meant, to signify that mental no less than 
 bodily images, are, regarded from a human point of view, 
 false and idolatrous, the author would do well to tell us 
 what we can substitute in their place. " We may con- 
 fidently challenge all natural Theology," says Kant, "to 
 name a single distinctive attribute of the Deity, whether 
 denoting intelligence or will, which, apart fi'om Anthropo- 
 morphism, is any thing more than a mere word, to which 
 not the slightest notion can be attached, which can serve 
 to extend our theoretical knowledge"." Kant, however, 
 attempts to avoid the conclusion to which this admission 
 necessarily leads ; — namely, that Anthropomorphism, in 
 this sense of the term, is the indispensable condition of all 
 human theology. As regards the charge of Idolatry, it is 
 best answered in the words of Storr : " Hanc Dei imagi- 
 nem non nosmet ipsi nobis fecimus, sed Deus proposuitP." 
 The very Commandment which forbids the representation 
 of God by a bodily likeness, does so by means of two other 
 human representations, that of a mental state, and that of 
 a consequent course of action. " Thou shalt not make to 
 thyself any graven image ; for I the Lord thy God am a 
 jealous God, and visit the sins of the fathers upon the 
 children." The Satire of Xenophanes has been repeated 
 by modern critics in a manner which deprives it entirely of 
 its original point. Thus Mr. Theodore Parker says, " A 
 Beaver or a Reindeer, if possessed of religious faculties, 
 would also conceive of the Deity with the limitations of its 
 own personahty, as a Beaver or a Eeindeer^." The satire 
 
 Kritik der prdktischen Vernunft, p. 282. ed. Rosenkranz. Compare 
 the remarkable words of Jacobi, {Von den gottUchen Dingen, Werke, 
 III. p. 418, 422.) Den Menscben erschaffend tbeomorphisirte Gott. 
 Nothwendig anthropomorphisirt darum der Mensch .... Wir bekennen 
 uns demnach zu einem von der Ueberzeugung : dass der Mensch 
 Gottes Ebenbild in sich trage — unzertrennhchen Anthropomorphis- 
 mus, und behaupten, ausser diesem Anthropomorphismus, der von 
 jeher Theismus genannt wurde, ist nur Gotteslaugnung oder Fetichis- 
 mus." 
 
 P Annotationes qucedam Theohgica, p. 10. 
 
 1 Discourse of Matters pertaining to Religion, p. 100. 
 
LECTURE I. 287 
 
 loses its entire force, when transferred from bodily forms 
 to mental attributes. In imagining a Beaver or a Eeindeer 
 with a personal consciousness, we so far imagine him as 
 resembling man, notwithstanding the difference of bodily 
 form. The sarcasm therefore amounts to no more than 
 this ; that human consciousness in another body would be 
 subject to the same limits of religious thought as in its 
 present one. The latest specimen of this kind of would-be 
 philosophy js furnished by Professor Baden Powell, in his 
 " Christianity without Judaism," p. 108. " It is not one 
 of the least remarkable of these' Anthropomorphisms/' he 
 says, " that (as in former instances) the disclosure of the 
 Divine purposes is made under the figure of Jehovah 
 entering into a covenant with his people, — an idea specially 
 adapted to a nation of the lowest moral capacity.'' One 
 would have thought that the fact that this image was 
 selected by God Himself, as the symbol of His relation 
 to His chosen people, (to say nothing of its repetition in 
 the New Testament,) might have insured it more respectful 
 treatment at the hands of a Clergyman. But Mr. Powell, 
 in his zeal for " Christianity without Judaism," seems at 
 times to forget that Judaism, as well as Christianity, was 
 a Revelation from God. 
 
 Note 23. p. 19. 
 This remark may seem at first sight not so appro- 
 priate in relation to Kant as to some other advocates of 
 a similar theory, such, for instance, as Mr. Greg, whose 
 remarks on prayer are quoted in Lecture VI. p. 184. For 
 Kant, in language at least, expressly denies that any tem- 
 poral consecution can be included in the conception of 
 God'. But, in truth, this denial is and must be merely 
 verbal. For the moral law, in Kant's own theory, is re- 
 garded as a divine command because it is conceived as a 
 perpetual obhgation, binding upon all human acts; and 
 the perpetuity of the obligation, in relation to successive 
 acts, necessarily implies the idea of Time. Thus God in 
 
 >■ Religitm innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Verrmnft, p. 57. ed. 
 Rosenkranz. 
 
288 NOTES. 
 
 relation to man, as a moral Governor, is necessarily mani- 
 fested under the condition of time ; and this manifestation 
 is the only philosophical representation of God which the 
 Kantian philosophy recognises as valid. Indeed, if Time 
 be, as Kant maintains, a necessary form of human conscious- 
 ness, the language which speaks of a Being existing out of 
 time can have no significance to any human thinker. 
 
 Note 24>. p. ao. 
 
 Xenophanes, apud Olem. Alex. Stromata, V. p. 6oi : 
 
 'AW' etroL xeipds y {Ly^v j36es ije Xiovres, 
 *H ypdyfrai, \dpi(T(ri koL epya reA.eii' &mp &vbpes, 
 "linroi ixev ff hriroia-i, /3oes be re l3ovaiv djuotoi [ofxoias] 
 KaC KS de&v iSeas lypa<l)ov koI a-dixar enolow 
 Toiavff oiov TTep Kavrol befxas ei)(ov ofioiov. 
 
 Note 25. p. 25. 
 Plato, Republic, IV. p. 433. 
 
 Note 26. p. 26. 
 
 Advancement 0/ Learning. {Works, ed. Montagu, vol. ii. 
 
 P-303-) 
 
 Note 27. p. 26. 
 
 Versuch einer Kritik oiler Offenharwng, Konigsberg, 1792, 
 2nd Ed. 1793. (Fichte's Werke, V. p. 9.) A few specimens 
 of the criticisms hazarded in this work will be sufficient to 
 shew the arbitrary character of the method on which it 
 proceeds. The author assumes that God is determined 
 entirely and solely by the moral law as conceived by man ; 
 and that Religion, therefore, must consist solely in moral 
 duties 3. Hence he lays down, among others, the following 
 criteria, without satisfying which, no Eevelation can be 
 accepted as of divine origin. 
 
 There must have been a moral necessity for it at the 
 time of its publication (p. 113). 
 
 It must not draw men to obedience by any other motive 
 
 s Werke, V. pp. 42, 55. 
 
LECTURE I. 289 
 
 than reverence for God''s holiness. Hence it must not con- 
 tain any prospect of future reward or punishment (p. 1 1^). 
 
 It must not communicate any knowledge unattainable 
 by the natural reason (p. 122). 
 
 It must contain only such moral rules as may be de- 
 duced from the principle of the practical reason (p. 124). 
 
 It must not promise any supernatural aids to men in the 
 performance of their duty (p. 129). 
 
 Kant's own work, Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der 
 hlossen Vernunft, Konigsberg, 1793, is based on a similar 
 principle ; and many of his conclusions are identical with 
 those of Fiohte. He agrees with his disciple in maintain- 
 ing that no doctrine can be received on the authority of 
 Revelation, without the concurrent testimony of Reason* ; 
 and that a moral life is the only duty which God can re- 
 quire of man". Hence he defines Religion as "the ac- 
 knowledgment of all our duties as divine commands ;" and 
 asserts that there can be no special duties towards God 
 distinct from our moral obligations to our fellow men". 
 In accordance with these principles, he advocates, and in 
 some instances applies, a method of Scripture interpreta- 
 tion, which consists in forcing every available doctrine and 
 precept into a so-called moral significance, and rejecting 
 as unessential whatever will not bear this treatment^. 
 Thus in the 59th Psalm, the enemies of David are inter- 
 preted to mean the evil passions which he wished to over- 
 come. 
 
 The narrowness of Kant's fundamental assumption, even 
 as regards the human side of religion only, is pointed out 
 by Willm, Histoire de la Philosophie Allemande, vol. ii. 
 p. 47 : "A force de voir dans la religion surtout un moyen 
 de moralisation, Kant en a trop borne la divine mission ; 
 il a oublie que la religion doit ^tre de plus une source de 
 consolation et d'esperance au milieu des miseres de la vie 
 presente, et que par de puissants motifs et de hautes me- 
 ditations elle doit venir au secours de la fragilite humaine, 
 
 t Werhe, X. p. 228. " Ibid. p. 122. 
 
 * Ibid. p. 184. y Ibid. pp. 98, 130. 
 
 u 
 
290 NOTES. 
 
 nous servir d'appui dans la double lutte que nous avons k 
 soutenir contre la tentation au mal et contre la souffrance.'^ 
 See also Drobisch, Grimdlehren der BeligionspMlosophie, 
 p. 264, who adopts a similar ground of criticism. 
 
 Note 28. p. 30. 
 " Bei der Exposition des reinen Begriffes ist noch weiter 
 angedeutet worden, dass derselbe der absolute, gottliche 
 Begriff selbst ist, so dass in Wahrheit nicht das Verhaltniss 
 einer Anwendung stattfinden wiirde, sondern jener logische 
 Verlauf die unmittelbare Darstellung der Selbstbestim- 
 mung Gottes zum Seyn ware." Hegel, LogiJc. ( Werke, Y. 
 p. 170). In like manner his disciple Marheineke says, 
 " Nur in diese Idee aufgenommen und in ihr aufgehoben 
 ist der menschliche Geist fahig, Gott zu erkennen. Sein 
 wahres Sicherheben zu Gott durchs Denken ist aber stets 
 zugleich ein Erhobenseyn, das Eingeriicktseyn des mensch- 
 lichen Denkens Gottes in das gottliche Denken Gottes^^." 
 Such passages are instructive as shewing the only condi- 
 tions under which, according to the admission of its ablest 
 advocates, a Philosophy of the Absolute is attainable by 
 human thought. In reference to these lofty pretensions, 
 Sir William Hamilton justly speaks of " the scheme of 
 pantheistic omniscience, so prevalent among the sequacious 
 thinkers of the day»." 
 
 Note 29. p. 30. 
 " Es ist, ausser Gott, gar nichts wahrhaftig Und in der 
 eigentliohen Bedeutung des Wortes da, denn — dass Wissen: 
 und dieses Wissen ist das gottliche Daseyn selber, schlechthin 
 und unmittelbar, und inwiefern wir dass Wissen sind, sind 
 wir selber in unserer tiefsten Wurzel das gottliche Daseyn." 
 
 ^ Grundlehren der Christlichen Dogmatik, §.21. In another passage 
 of the same work (§. 84) he says, " Wie Gott in der Erkenntniss seiner 
 selbst sich nicht ausser sich hat, noch als der sich erkennende ein an- 
 deres ist, als der erkannte, der Geist vielmehr beider Einheit und 
 Wesen, so ist die Idee des Ahsoluten selber die absolute, und als 
 solche der Standpunct des Wissens und der Wissenschaft." 
 
 » Discussions, p. 787. 
 
LECTURE I. ^91 
 
 Fichte, Anweisungeii zum seligen Leben {Werke, V. p. 448 ) 
 " Der Menscli, das Vernunftwesen iiberhaupt, iat hinge- 
 stellt, eine Erganzung der Welterscheiniing zu seyn : aus 
 ihm, aus seiner Thatigkeit soil sich entwickeln, was zur 
 Totalitat der Offenbarung Gottes feiilt, da die Natur zwar 
 das ganze gottliche Wesen, aber nur im Realen empfangt ;" 
 das Vernunftwesen soil das Bild derselben gottlichen Na- 
 tur, wie sie an sich selbst ist, demnaeh im Idealen aus- 
 driicken." Schelling, Vorlesungen ilber die Methode des Aca- 
 demischen Studivm, p. 1 8. " Gott ist unendlich, Ich end- 
 lioh, dies sind falsche, schlechte Ausdriicke, Formen, die 
 dem nicht angemessen sind, was die Idee ist, was die 
 Natur der Sache ist. Das Endliche ist nicht das Seyende, 
 eben so ist das Unendliche nicht fest ; diese Bestimmungen 
 sind nur Blomente des Processes. Gott ist ebenso auch als 
 
 Endliches, und das Ich ebenso als Unendliches Gott ist 
 
 die Bewegung zum Endlichen und dadiirch als Aufhebung 
 desselben zu sich selbst ; im Ich, als dem sich als endlich 
 aufhebenden, kehrt Gott zu sich zuriick, und ist nur Gott 
 als diese Riickkehr. Ohne Welt ist Gott nicht Gott." 
 Hegel, Vorlesungen iiher die Philosopliie der Religion ( Werke, 
 XI. p. 194.) " Dass der Mensch von Gott weiss, ist nach 
 derWesentlichen Gemeinschaft ein gemeinschaftliches Wis- 
 sen. — d. i. der Mensch weiss nur von Gott, insofern Gott 
 im Menschen von sich selbst weiss, diess Wissen ist Selbst- 
 bewusstseyn Gottes, aber ebenso ein Wissen desselben von 
 Menschen, und diess Wissen Gottes vom Menschen ist 
 Wissen des Menschen von Gott. Der Geist des Men- 
 schen, von Gott zu wissen, ist nur der Geist Gottes 
 selbst." Ibid. XII. p. 496. "Das vernunftige Wissen 
 der Wahrheit ist zunachst als ein Wissen von Gott das 
 Wissen durch Gott, das Wissen in seinem Geiste und 
 durch ihn. Von dem endlichen, relativen Denken kann 
 Gott, der nichts endliches und relatives ist, nicht gedacht 
 und gewusst warden. In diesem Wissen hinhegen ist das 
 Ich iiber sich und die Subjectivitat des isolirten Bewusst- 
 seyns seiner selbst hinaus, es ist in Gott und Gott in ihm. 
 In dem menschlichdn- Geiste ist Gott sich nicht durch die- 
 sen, sondern durch sich selbst offenbar, und so auch dem 
 
 u 2 
 
292 NOTES. 
 
 menschlichen Geiste offenbar." Marheineke, Grundlehren 
 der Christliclien Dogmatik, § 115. 
 
 Rationalism here takes up a common ground with Mys- 
 ticism, and the logical process of the Hegelians becomes 
 identical with the ecstatic intuition of the Neo-Platonists. 
 Compare the language of Plotinus, Enn. VI. L. ix. c. 9. 
 'Opqv brj eariv evravda naKeivov Kai kavrov, as opav Oifiis, 
 kavTov fiev riyKdi(T}i,ivov, (parbs "nXrjpri voryrov, y.aXKov 8e (^c5? 
 aiiTo KaOapov, &l3aprj, KOV(pov, 6ebv yevoptevov, ptaXXov bi ovra. 
 In the same strain sings the " Cherubic Wanderer " An- 
 gelus Silesius : 
 
 " In Gott wird nichts erkannt ; er ist ein einig Ein : 
 Was man in ihm erkennt, das muss man selber sein*." 
 
 For an exactly similar doetrinCj asserted in the Hindu 
 Vedas, see Dr. Mill's Observations on the application of 
 pantheistic principles to the criticism of the Gospel, p. 159. 
 
 Note 30. p. 30. 
 
 Hegel, in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, 
 thus interprets the history of Christ. " In dieser ganzen 
 Geschichte ist den Menschen zum Bewusstseyn gekom- 
 men, und das ist die Wahrheit, zu der sie gelangt sind : 
 dass die Idee Gottes fiir sie Gewissheit hat, dass das 
 Menschliche unmittelbarer, prasenter Gott ist und zwar 
 so, dass in dieser Geschichte, wis sie der Geist auffasst, 
 selbst die Darstellung des Processes ist dessen, was der 
 Mensch, der Geist ist"^." The view here obscurely inti- 
 mated is more explicitly stated by his disciple, Strauss, 
 whose theory is little more than the legitimate develop- 
 ment of his master's. In his Christliche Glauhenslehre, § 33, 
 he sums up the result of the speculations of modern philo- 
 sophy concerning the Personality of God, in the following 
 words : " Weil Gott an sich die ewige Personlichkeit selbst 
 ist, so hat er ewig das Andere seiner, die Natur, aus sich 
 hervorgehen lassen, um ewig als selbstbewusster Geist in 
 
 •> Cherwbinischer Wandersmann, I. 285. Quoted by Strauss, Christ- 
 liche Glauhenslehre, I. p. 531. 
 " Werlie, XII. p. 307. 
 
LECTURE I. 293 
 
 sich zuriickzukehren. Oder, die Personliohkeit Grottes 
 muss nicht als Einzelpersonlichkeit, sondern als AUpereon- 
 lichkeit gedaoht werden ; statt unsrerseits das Absolute 
 zu personificiren, miissen wir es als das in^s Unendliche 
 sich selbst personificirende begreifen lernen." This view is 
 still more plainly stated in a fearful passage of his Leben 
 Jesu, § 151, which the reader will find quoted at length in 
 Lecture V. p. 160. The critic of Strauss, Bruno Bauer, 
 in his Kritik der evangelischen GescMchte der Synopliher, 
 §91, adopts the same view, observing, " Ueberhaupt das 
 religiose Bewusstseyn der sich selbst entfremdete Geist 
 ist ;" and to this origin he ascribes the doctrine of Christ's 
 Divinity : " Der historiche Christus ist der Mensch, den 
 das rehgiose Bewusstseyn in den Himmel erhoben hat." 
 Feuerbach, in his Wesen des Christenthums'^, from a differ- 
 ent point of view, arrives at a similar conclusion, maintain- 
 ing that God is but the personification of the general 
 notion of humanity. Emerson gives us occasional glimpses 
 of the same philosophy. Thus in his " Christian Teacher" 
 he explains the Divinity of Christ : " He saw that God 
 incarnates himself in man, and evermore goes forth anew 
 to take possession of his world. He said in this jubilee of 
 sublime emotion : ' I am divine. Through me, God acts ; 
 through me, speaks. Would you see God, see me ; or see 
 thee, when thou also thinkest as I now thinks.' " And, in 
 the " Over-Soul," in still more daring language, he says : 
 " In all conversation between two persons, tacit reference 
 is made as to a third party, to a common nature. That 
 third party or common nature is not social ; it is impersonal, 
 is Godf." 
 
 Another form of this deification of humanity is that of 
 M. Comte, who agrees with Strauss and Feuerbach, in 
 finding God only in the human race. This discovery is 
 announced as the grand consummation of the Positive Phi- 
 losophy. " Cette appreciation finale condense I'ensemble 
 
 <• See Ewerbeck, Qu'est ce que la Religion d'apris la nouvelle Philo- 
 sophie Allemande, pp. 271, 390, 413. 
 e Essays, (Orr's Edition, 1851,) p. 511. 
 f Ibid. p. 135. 
 
294 .NOTES. 
 
 des conceptions positives dans la seule notion d'un etre 
 immense et Sterne), I'Humanite, dont les destinees socio- 
 logiques se developpent toujours sous la preponderance 
 necessaire des fatalifces biologiques et cosmologiques. Au- 
 tour de ce vrai Grand-Etre, moteur immediat de chaque 
 existence individuelle ou coltective, nos affections se con- 
 centrent aussi spontanement que nos pensees et nos 
 actions S." From this grand ideal of humanity, un- 
 worthy individuals of the race are excluded ; but, " si, ces 
 producteurs de fumier ne font vraiment point partie de 
 I'Humanit^, une juste compensation vous prescrit de join- 
 dre au nouvel Etre-Supreme tous ses dignes auxiliaires 
 animaux''." Such is the brilliant discovery vt'hich entitles 
 its author, in his own modest estimate, to be considered as 
 uniting in his own person the characters of St. Paul and 
 Aristotle, as the founder at once of true religion and sound 
 philosophy'. 
 
 " Oh worthy thou of Egypt's wise abodes, 
 A decent priest, where monkeys were the gods ! " 
 
 Note 31. p. 31. 
 " Die Gegenstand der Rehgion wie der Philosophic ist 
 die ewige Wahrheii' in ihrer Objeotivitat selbst, Gott und 
 
 s CatecMsme Positiviste, p. 19. 
 
 h Catechisme Positimste, p. 31. Thus, under the auspices of the 
 positive philosophy, we return once more to the worship of the ibis, 
 the ichneumon, and the cat. The Egyptians had the same reverence 
 for their " dignes auxiliaires animaux." " NiiUam beluam, nisi ob 
 aliquam utUitatem, quam ex ea caperent, consecraverunt." (Cicero, De 
 Natura Deorum, I. 36.) 
 
 ' This exquisite passage must be quoted in the original to be pro- 
 perly appreciated. " En appliquant aussit6t ce principe evident, je 
 devais spontanement choisir I'angflique interlocutrice, qui aprSs une 
 seule annde d'influence objective, se trouve, depuis plus de six ans, sub- 
 jectivement associde a toutes mes pensfes comme S.tous mes sentiments. 
 C'est par elle qui je suis enfin devenu, pour I'Humanite, un organe 
 vraiment double, comme quiconque a dignement subi I'ascendant femi- 
 nin. Sans elle, je n'aurais jamais pu faire activement succeder le car- 
 riere de saint Paul a celle d'Aristote, en fondant la religion universelle 
 sur la saine philosophic, apres avoir tire celle-ci de la science reelle." — 
 Preface, p. xxii. 
 
LECTURE I. 295 
 
 Nichts als Gott und die Explication Gottes." Hegel, 
 Philosophie der Beligion, (Werhe, XI. p. ai.) 
 
 Note 32. p. 31. 
 " So ist die Religion Wissen des gottlichen Geistes von 
 sich dwch Vermittlung des endlichen Geistes.'''' Hegel, Werke, 
 XI. p. 200. " Wir haben die Religion naher bestimmfc als 
 Selbstbewusstseyn Gottes." Ihid. XII. p. 191. Compare 
 Marheineke; Grundlehren der ChristUchen Dogmatik, § 420. 
 " Die Religion ist demnach gar nichts anders, als das 
 Daseyn des gottlichen Geistes im menschlichen, aber ein 
 Daseyn, welches Leben, ein Leben, welches Bewusstseyu, 
 ein Bewusstseyn, welches in seiner Wahrheit das Wissen 
 ist. Dieses Wissen des Menschen ist wesentlich gottlich ; 
 denn es ist zunachst das Wissen des gottlichen Geistes 
 selbst, und die Religion an und fiir sich." 
 
 Note 33. p. 31. 
 " Die Logik ist sonach als das System der reinen Ver- 
 nunft, als das Reich des reinen Gedankens zu fassen. 
 Dieses Reich ist die Wahrheit, wie sie ohne Hulle an und fiir 
 sich selbst ist. Man kann sich deswegen ausdriicken, dass 
 dieser Inhalt die Darstellung Gottes ist, wie er in, seinem 
 ewigen Wesen vor der Erschaffung der Natur und eines end- 
 liclien Geistes ist" Hegel, Logik, (Werke, III. p. 33.) 
 
 Note 34. p. 33. 
 Clemens Alex. Stromata, i. 2. ITpmroi' joiei', ei kw. hxprivros 
 eiri (f>iko(ro(li(a, d fvxp'ri(TTos fj ttjs axpqa-TCas ^e^aCoxris, evxpr]- 
 
 OTOS. 
 
NOTES. 
 
 LECTURE II. 
 
 Note 1. p. 36. 
 
 " UNLESS we have independent means of knowing that 
 God Icnows the truth, and is disposed to tell it to us, his word 
 (if we be ever so certain that it is really his word) might as 
 well not have been spoken. But if we know, independently 
 of the Bible, that God knows the truth, and is disposed 
 to tell it toi us, obviously we know a great deal more also. 
 We know not only the existence of God, but much con- 
 cerning his character. Fol^),only by discerning that he has 
 Virtues similar in kind to human Virtues, do we know of 
 his truthfulness and his goodness. Without this a priori 
 belief, a book-revelation is a useless impertinence." F.W. 
 Newman, The Soul, p. 58. With this a priori belief, it is 
 obvious that a book revelation is, as far as our independent 
 knowledge extends, still more impertinent ; for it merely 
 tells us what we knew before. See an able criticism of 
 this theory in the Eclipse of Faith, p. 73 sqq. 
 
 Note 2. p. 39. 
 " Da uns ferner das, was ein grosser Theil der Philoso- 
 phen vor uns fiir die Vernunft ausgegeben haben, noch 
 unter die Sphare des Verstandes fallt, so werden wir fiir die 
 hochste Erkenntnissart eine von jenen unerreichte Stelle 
 haben, und sie als diejenige bestimmen, durch welche 
 Endliches und Unendliches im Ewigen, nicht aber das 
 Ewige im Endlichen oder Unendlichen erblickt wird." 
 Schelling, Bruno, p. 163, (compare p. 69.) " Es giebt aber 
 noch andere Spharen, die beobachtet werden konnen, nicht 
 
LECTURE II. 297 
 
 bloss diese, deren Inhalt nur Endliches gegen Endliches ist, 
 sondern solche, wo das Gottliche als aa und fiir sich sey- 
 endes im Bewusstseyn ist." Hegel, PhilosopMe der Religion, 
 {WerJce, XI. p. 196.) In like manner, Mr. Newman speaks 
 of the Soul as "the organ of specific information to us'' 
 respecting things spiritual* ; and Mr. Parker says, " that 
 there is a connection between God and the soul, as be- 
 tween light and the eye, sound and the ear, food and the 
 palate, &c.^" 
 
 Note 3. p. 39. 
 " Cette substance simple primitive doit renfermer emi- 
 nemment les perfections contenues dans les substances de- 
 rivatives qui en sont les effets ; ainsi elle aura la puissance, 
 la connoissance, et la volonti parfaites, c'est-k-dire, elle aura 
 une toute-puissance, une omniscience, et une bonte sou- 
 veraines. Et comme la justice, prise generalement, n'est 
 autre chose que la bonte conforme k la sagesse, il faut bien 
 qu'il y ait aussi une justice souveraine en Dieu." Leibnitz, 
 Principes de la Nature et de la Grace, § 9. " Being con- 
 scious that I have personally a little Love, and a little 
 Goodness, I ask concerning it, as concerning Intelligence, 
 — where did I pick it up ? and I feel an invincible per- 
 suasion, that if I have some moral goodness, the great 
 Author of my being has infinitely more. He did not merely 
 make rooks and seas and stars and brutes, but the human 
 Soul also ; and therefore I am assured, he possesses all the 
 powers and excellencies of that soul in an infinitely higher 
 degree." F. W. Newman, Reply to the Eclipse of Faith, p. 
 26. This argument, however true in its general principle, 
 is liable to considerable error in its special applications. 
 The remarks of Bishop Browne are worth consideration, 
 as furnishing a caution on the other side. " To say that 
 God is infinite in perfection, means nothing real and posi- 
 tive in him, unless we say, in a kimd of perfection altogether 
 inconceivable to us as it is in itself. For the multiplying 
 or magnifying the greatest perfections whereof we have 
 any direct conception or idea, and then adding our gross 
 
 "■ The Soul, p. 3. 
 
 b Discourse of Matters pertaining to Religion, p. 130. 
 
S98 NOTES. 
 
 notion only of indefinite to them, is no other than heaping 
 up together a number of imperfections to form a chimera 
 of our imagination." Divine Analogy, p. 27 1 . 
 
 Note 4. p. 39. 
 Compare Wegscheider's definition of Mysticism, Instit. 
 Theol. § 5. " Ad superstitionem propius accedit vel ejus 
 species est mysticismus ille, sen persuasio de singulari animse, 
 sensibus quidem acrioribus irabutse et phantasiee ludibriis 
 deditse, facultate ad immediatum cum numine ipso aut natu- 
 ris coelestibus commercium jam in hac vita perveniendi, quo 
 mens immediate cognitione rerum divinarum ac beatitudine 
 perfruatur." 
 
 Note 5. p. 41. 
 
 Fichte, Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenharung. ( Werie, 
 V. pp. 40, 115.) The following remarks of Mr. Parker 
 are another application of the same principle, substituting 
 however, as if on purpose to shew the contradictory con- 
 clusions to which such a method of reasoning may lead, 
 the conception of perfect love and future compensation, 
 for that of a moral nature with no affections and no future 
 promises. "This we know, that the Infinite God must be 
 a perfect Creator, the sole and undisturbed author of all 
 
 that is in Nature Now a perfect Motive for creation, 
 
 — what will that be l It must be absolute Love, producing 
 
 a desire to bless every thing which He creates If 
 
 God be infinite, then He must make and administer the 
 world from perfect motives, for a perfect purpose, and as 
 a perfect means, — all tending to the ultimate and absolute 
 blessedness of each thing He directly or mediately creates ; 
 the world must be administered so as to achieve that pur- 
 pose for each thing. Else God has made some things 
 from a motive and for a purpose not benevolent, or as a 
 means not adequate to the benevolent purpose. These 
 suppositions are at variance with the nature of the Infinite 
 God. I do not see how this benevolent purpose can be 
 accomplished unless all animals are immortal, and find re- 
 tribution in another life." Theism, Atheism and the Popular 
 Theology, pp. 108, 109, J98. 
 
LECTUKE II. 299 
 
 •Note 6. p. 4a. 
 " The nature of the case imphes, that the human mind 
 is competent to sit in moral and spiritual judgment on a 
 professed revelation, and to decide (if the case seem to 
 require it) in the following tone : ' This doctrine attributes 
 to God that which we should all call harsh, cruel, or un- 
 just in man : it is therefore intrinsically inadmissible.' " 
 Newman, The Soul, p. 58. For an able refutation of this 
 reasoning, see the Defence of the Eclipse of Faith, p. 38. 
 
 Note 7. p. 42. 
 " To suppose the future volitions of moral agents not to 
 be necessary events; or, which is the same thing, events 
 which it is not impossible but that they may not come to 
 pass ; and yet to suppose that God certainly foreknows 
 them, and knows all things ; is to suppose God^s Know- 
 ledge to be inconsistent with itself." Edwards, On the 
 Freedom of the Will, part 11. sect. xii. 
 
 Note 8. p. 42. 
 " Let us suppose a great prince governing a wicked and 
 rebellious people. He. has it in his power to punish, he 
 thinks fit to pardon them. But he orders his only and 
 well beloved son to be put to death, to expiate their sins, 
 and to satisfy his royal vengeance. Would this proceeding 
 appear to the eye of reason, and in the unprejudiced light 
 of nature, wise, or just, or good ?" Bolingbroke, Fragments 
 or Minutes of Essays, {WorJcs, vol. v. p. 289, ed. 1754.) 
 Compare Newman, Phases of Faith, p. 93. See also above. 
 Lecture I. note 13, 
 
 Note 9. p. 42. 
 " Intellectually, we of necessity hold that the highest 
 human perfection is the best type of the divine .... Every 
 good man has learnt to forgive, and when the offender is 
 penitent, to forgive freely — without punishment or retri- 
 bution : whence the conclusion is inevitable, that God also 
 forgives, as soon as sin is repented of." Newman, The Soul, 
 p. 99. It may be collected from the principles of Natural 
 Beligion, that God, on the sincere repentance of offenders. 
 
300 NOTES. 
 
 will receive them again into favour, and render them ca- 
 pable of those rewards naturally attendant on right beha- 
 viour."''' Warburton, Divine Legation, b. ix. ch. 2. Compare, 
 on the other side, Magee on the Atonement, notes iv. and 
 xxiv. See also above, Lecture I. note 14. 
 
 Note 10. p. 42. 
 " A divine command is pleaded in vain, except it can. be 
 shewn that the thing supposed to be commanded is not in- 
 consistent with the law of nature ; which if God can dispense 
 with in any one case, he may in all." Tindal, Christianity 
 as old as the Creation, p. 272, quoted and answered by 
 Waterland, Scripture Vindicated, on Numbers xxi. 2,3. 
 
 Note 11. p. 42. 
 Kant, Streit der Facultdten, p. 321. ed. Rosenkranz. 
 Newman, Phases of Faith, p. J50. Parker, Discourse of 
 Matters pertaining to Religion, p. 84. 
 
 Note 12. p. 43. 
 Tindal, apud Waterland I. c. Newman, Phases of Faith, 
 p. 151. 
 
 Note 13. p. 43. 
 
 Newman, The Soul, p. 60. Grreg, Greed of Christendom, 
 p. 8. 
 
 Note 14. p. 45. 
 
 " The Absolute is that which is free from all necessary 
 relation, that is, which is free from every relation as a con- 
 dition of existence ; but it may exist in relation, provided 
 that relation be not a necessary condition of its existence ; 
 that is, provided the relation may be removed without 
 affecting its existence.'' . . . . " The Infinite expresses the 
 entire absence of all limitation, and is applicable to the one 
 Infinite Being in all his attributes." Calderwood, Philosophy 
 of the Infinite, pp. 2,6, 37. The definitions may be accepted, 
 though they lead to conclusions the very opposite of those 
 which the ingenious author has attempted to estabhsh. 
 The Absolute, as above defined, is taken in the first of the 
 two senses distinguished by Sir W. Hamilton, Discussions, 
 
LECTURE II. 301 
 
 p. 14 ; and in this sense it is the necessary complement of 
 the idea of the Infinite. The other sense, in which the 
 Absolute is contradictory of the Infinite, is irrelevant to 
 the present argument. 
 
 Note 15. p. 45. 
 " Infinitum absolute sic dictum est, quod continet omnem 
 rem, sive omnem perfectionem quae aut esse ant conoipi 
 potest : id vos infinitum perfectione vocare soletis. Infini- 
 tum secundum quid, verbi causa, extensionem, est, quod om- 
 nem extensionem complectitur, quae esse potest et intelligi.'" 
 Werenfels, De Finibus Mundi Dialogus, (Dissertationes,iy 1 6. 
 vol. ii. p. 192.) In the latter sense, Clarke speaks of the 
 error of " imagining all Infinites to be equal, when in things 
 disparate they manifestly are not so ; an infinite Line being 
 not only not equal to, but infinitely less than an infinite 
 Surface, and an infinite Surface than Space infinite in all 
 Dimensions'' r This remark assumes that an infinite ex- 
 tension is a possible object of conception at all ; whereas, 
 in fact, the attempt to conceive it involves the same funda- 
 mental contradictions which accompany the notion of the 
 Infinite in every other aspect. This is ingeniously shewn 
 by Werenfels, in the above Dialogue, p. 2t8. " D. Sed 
 tune existimas igitur, lineam infinitam omnino sine repug- 
 nantia coneipi non posse ? Ph. Ita sane ; et ab hac sen- 
 tentia abduci nequeo, nisi solide quis vestrum ad banc 
 demonstrationem respondeat ; eam autem, nisi vestra audi- 
 endi patientia deficit, breviter hie denuo proponam. Videtis 
 hanc lineam b a c. Constituamus eam esse in- 
 finitam, et ultra terminos 5 et c in infinitum protendi. 
 Dividatur hsec linea in puncto a. Manifestum est has 
 partes inter se esse sequales ; quia utraque incipit in puncto 
 a, et protenditur in infinitum. Nunc te, Dsedale, rogo ; 
 hse duse partes suntne finitse an infinitse ? D. Finitse. 
 Ph. Ita ex duobus finitis componeretur infinitum ; quod 
 repugnat. D. Fateor errorem. Infinitse sunt. Ph. Jam 
 in Scyllara incidis : ita partes essent sequales toti ; infi- 
 
 <= Demonstration of the Being' and Attributes of God, Prop. I. 
 
302 NOTES. 
 
 nitum enim influito sequale est. Praeterea vides, iitramque 
 partem in puneto a terminari ; non igitur finibus et ter- 
 minis caret. Quid tu, Polyraathes, ad haec ? Po. Ilabeo 
 quod respondeam. Utraque harum partium ab una parte 
 finita est, nempe in puneto a, ab altera infinita, quia ultra 
 puncta S et c in infinitum extenditur. Ph. Oallide, acute, 
 nihil supra. At ego qusero, an numerus partium talium, 
 qualis linea ah et ac, in utravis sectione lineae infinitse sit 
 infinitus ? Po. Aio. Ph. Sed num ille numerus cui sequa- 
 lis potest addi, et oujus duplum non raodo concipio, sed 
 est revera in rerum natura, infinitus est ? Quod si etiam 
 hoc ais, numerus infinitus non omnes habet unitateSj sed 
 prseter eum concipi possunt totidem unitates, quibus ille 
 careat, eique possunt addi. Hoc autem si non repugnat, 
 quid tandem erit quod repugnet ? Po. Sed quid, si finito 
 partium numero hujus magnitudinis qualis linea ah constare 
 dico utramvis sectionem datse lineae ? Ph. Linea igitur 
 data est finita ; quia duo nuraeri finiti inter se additi effi- 
 ciunt numerum finitum : id quod erat demonstrandum." 
 The contradictions thus involved in the notion of infinite 
 magnitudes in space, are not solved by maintaining, with 
 Spinoza and Clarke, that infinite quantity is not composed 
 of parts'! : for space with no parts is as inconceivable as 
 space composed of an infinite number of parts. These 
 contradictions sufficiently shew that relative infinity, no 
 less than absolute, is not a positive object of thought at 
 all ; the so-called infinites and infinitesimals of the ma- 
 thematicians being in fact only negative expressions, de- 
 noting magnitudes which bear no relation to any assignable 
 quantity, however great or small. They are thus appre- 
 
 " See Spinoza, Epist. XXIX, Ethica, P. I. Prop, xv; and Clarke, 
 Demonstration, Prop.i. A curious psychological discrepancy may be 
 observed in relation to this controversy. Spinoza maintains that quan- 
 tity as represented in the imagination is finite, but that as conceived by 
 the intellect it is infinite. Werenfels, on the contrary, asserts that the 
 imagined quantity is infinite, the conceived finite. The truth is, that 
 in relation to Space, which is not a general notion containing indi- 
 viduals under it, conception and imagination are identical ; and the no- 
 tions of an ultimate limit of extension and of an unlimited extension, 
 are both equally self-contradictory from every point of view. 
 
LECTURE II. 303 
 
 hended only by reference to their inconceivability ; being 
 merely the expression of our inability to represent in thought 
 a first or last unit of space or time. See Leibnitz, Theo- 
 dicie, Discours, § 70. " On s'embarrasse dans les series des 
 nombres qui vont h, I'infini. On congoit un dernier terme, 
 un nonibre infini, ou infiniment petit; mais tout cela ne sont 
 que des fictions. Tout nombre est fini et assignable, toute 
 ligne Test de m^me, et les infinis ou infiniment petits n'y 
 signifient que des grandeurs qu'on peut prendre aussi 
 grandes ou aussi petites que I'on voudra, pour montrer 
 qu'une erreur est moindre que celle qu'on a assign e'e, c'est- 
 a-dire qu'il n'y a auoune erreur : ou bien on entend par 
 Pinfiniment petit, I'etat de I'evanouissement ou du com- 
 mencement d'une grandeur, congue h limitation des gran- 
 deurs deja formees." Compare Pascal, Pensies, Partie I. 
 Art. II. C'est-a-dire, en un mot, que quelque mouvement, 
 quelque nombre, quelque espace, quelque temps que ce soit, il 
 y en a toujours un plus grand et un moindre ; de sorte qu'ils 
 se soutiennent tous entre le neant et I'infini, 6tant toujours 
 infiniment eloignes de ces extremes." Some ingenious rea- 
 soning on this question will be' found in a note by Mosheim 
 on Cud worth's Intellectual System, b. I. ch. V, translated 
 in Harrison's edition of Cudworth, vol. II. p. 541 ; though 
 the entire discussion is by no means satisfactory. 
 
 Note 16. p. 46. 
 " Per Dewm intelligo ens absolute infinitum, hoc est, 
 substantiam constantem infinitis attributis, quorum unum- 
 quodque seternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit. Dico 
 absolute infinitum, non autem in suo genere. Quicquid enim 
 in suo genere tantum infinitum est, infinita de eo atiributa 
 negare possumus ; quod autem absolute infinitum est, ad ejus 
 essentiam pertinef quicquid essentiam evprimit et negationem 
 Spinoza^ EtMca, P. I. Def. VI. 
 
 Note 17. p. 46. 
 See Spinoza, I. c; Malebranche, Recherche le la Veriti, 
 L. IV. Ch. XI ; Wolf, Theologia Naturalis, P. II. § 15 ; 
 Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. 450. ed. Rosenkranz; 
 
304, NOTES. 
 
 Vorlesungen ilher die MetaphysiJc, ed. Poelitz, p. 276; Sehel- 
 ling, Vom Ich, § i o. The assumption ultimately annihilates 
 itself; for if any object of conception exhausts the universe 
 of reality, it follows that the mind which conceives it has 
 no existence.* The older form of this representation is 
 criticized by Hegel, EncyMopddie, § 36. His own concep- 
 tion of God, however, virtually amounts to the same thing. 
 A similar view is implied in his criticism of Aristotle, whom 
 he censures for regarding God as one object out of many. 
 See Geschichte der PMlosopMe, Werhe, XIV. p. 283. 
 
 Note 18. p. 46. 
 Geschichte der Philosophie, WerJce, XV. p. 275. See also, 
 Philosophie der Religion, Werke, XI. p. 24. EncyMopddie, 
 § 19, 20, 21 . Compare Schelling, Philosophie und Religion, 
 p. 35, quoted by Willm, Histoire de la Philosophie Alle- 
 mande, vol. iii. p. 301. Schleiermacher (CJiristliche Glaube, 
 § 80.) is compelled in like manner to assert that God must 
 be in some manner the author of evil ; an opinion which is 
 also maintained by Mr. Parker, Theism, Atheism, and the 
 Popular Theology, p. 119. 
 
 Note 19. p. 46. 
 " Ea res dicitur in suo genere finita, quse alia ejusdem 
 naturae terminari potest. Ex. gr. corpus dicitur finitum, 
 quia aliud semper majus concipimus. Sic cogitatio alia 
 cogitatione terminatur." Spinoza, Ethica, P. I. Def. II. 
 
 Note 20. p. 47. 
 See Aquinas, Swmma, P. I. Qu. II. Art. 3. Qu. IX. Art. i. 
 " Actus simplicissimus," says Hobbes contemptuously, " sig- 
 nifieth nothing e." And Clarke in like manner observes, 
 " Either the words signify nothing, or else they 'express 
 only the perfection of his powerf." 
 
 e Questions concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance, Animadver- 
 sions, No. XXIV. See, on the other side, Bramhall, Works, vol. IV. 
 p. 524. 
 
 f Demonstration, Prop. IV. See, on the other side, Hegel, Geschichte 
 der Philosophie, Werke, XIV. p. 290. 
 
LECTURE II. 305 
 
 Note 21, p. 47. 
 See Plato, Repullic, II. p. 381 ; Aristotle, MetapJi. VIII. 
 8, 15; Augustine, Enarratio in Ps. IX. 11, De Trinitafe, 
 XV. c. 1^ ; Hooker, E. P. b. I. c. 5 ; Descartes, Meditafio 
 Tertia, p. 22. ed. 1685; Spinoza, Ethica, Ft I. Prop. xvii. 
 Schol. ; Hartley, O'bser'BaiiomS on Man, Prop. cxv. ; Her- 
 dei-, Gott, Werke, VIII. p. i8oj Schleiernlaeher, CAm#/M« 
 Glduhe, § 54 ; Hegel, TFerfe, XIV. p. 290 ; Marhein6ke, 
 Grundhliren der ChrisflicJien Dogmaiik, § 195. The' con- 
 clusion, that God actually does all that he can do ; and, 
 consequently, that there is no possibility of free action in 
 any finite being, can only be avoided by the admission, 
 which is ultimately forced' upon us, that our human con- 
 ception of the infinite is not the true one. Miiller, {Christ- 
 Uche Lehre von der Siinde, II. p. 251, third edit.), endea- 
 vours to meet this conclusion by a counter-argument. He 
 shews that it is equally a, limitation of the Divine Nature 
 to suppose that God is compelled of necessity to realize in 
 act every thing which he has the power to accomplish. 
 This argument completes the diremma. and brings into 
 full view the counter-impoteneieS of human thought in 
 relation to the infinite. We cannot conceive an Infinite 
 Being as capable of becoming that which he is not ; nor, 
 on the other hand, can we conceive him as actually being 
 all that he can be. 
 
 Note 22. p. 47. 
 "Now it is sufficiently manifest, that a thing existing 
 absolutely («. e. not under relation), and a thing existing 
 dBsshiely as a cause, are contradictory. The former' is the 
 absolute negation of all relation ; the latter is the' absoliite 
 affirmation of a particular relation. A cause is a relative, 
 and what exists absolutely as a cause, exists absolutely 
 under relation." Sir W. Hamilton, Discussions, p. 34. 
 
 Note 23; p. 48. 
 That a belief in Creation is incompatible with a philo- 
 sophy of the. Absolute, was clearly seen by Fichte, who con- 
 sistently denounces it, as a Jewish and Heathenish notion' 
 
 X 
 
306 NOTES. 
 
 and the fundamental error of all false Metaphysics. He 
 even goes so far as to maintain that St. John, the only 
 teacher of true Christianity, did not believe in the Creation, 
 and that the beginning of his Gospel was designed to con- 
 tradict the Moeaic narrative. See his Anweisung zum se- 
 ligen Leben, ( Werke, v. p. 479). Compare Schelling, Brwm, 
 p. 60, who regards the finite as necessarily coeternal with 
 the infinite. So also Eothe, Theologische Ethik, § 40, asserts 
 that the doctrine of a creation in time is inconsistent with 
 the essential nature of God, as unchangeable and neces- 
 sarily creative. Spinoza's attempted demonstration that 
 one substance cannot be produced from another^, though 
 in itself a mere juggle of equivocal terms, yet testifies in 
 like manner to his conviction, that to deny the possibility 
 of creation is an indispensable step to a philosophy of the 
 Absolute. Cognate to these theories are the speculations 
 of Hermogenes, mentioned by TertuUian, Adv. Herm. c. 2 ; 
 and of Origen, De Princ. I. 2. 10. Of the latter, Neander 
 well observes : " Here, therefore, there occurred to him 
 those reasons against a beginning of creation generally, 
 which must ever suggest themselves to the reflecting mind, 
 which cannot rest satisfied with simple faith in that which 
 to itself is incomprehensible. Supposing that to create is 
 agreeable to the divine essence, how is it conceivable that 
 what is thus conformable to God's nature should at any 
 time have been wanting? Why should not those attri- 
 butes which belong to the very essence of the Deity, His 
 almighty power and goodness, be always active ? A transi- 
 tion from the state of not-creating to the act of creation 
 is inconceivable without a change, which is incompatible 
 with the being of God^i." 
 
 Note M. p. 49. 
 Arist. Metcuph. XI. 9. E^re yap \tn\Q\v voei, rl hv eXy] to 
 aefivov ; dA\' i.-yei &a-irfp &v el 6 KaOe'ibcav. etre wet, tovtov 
 8' &Wo Kvpiov {pv ydp iari tovto S icrnv avTov f/ ova-la v6r\(ns, 
 
 e Ethica, P. I. Prop. vi. 
 
 h CJiurch History, English translation. Vol. II. p. 281, Bohn's edi- 
 tion. 
 
LECTURE II. 307 
 
 a\Xa b-ivafjus)', ovk Sk fi ^piarrf oixria el^Tj. hia yap tov vofiv rb 
 TlfMov aivT^ vitapyei .... hirbv &pa voel, ihtep eorl ro xpd- 
 Tiarov, KoH iariv fi vorfns vorjcreas vorjo-is. Plotinus, on the 
 other hand, shews that even self-consciousness, as involving 
 a logical distinction between subject aud object, is incom- 
 patible with the notion of the Absolute. See Enn. V. 
 1. VI. c. 2. 
 
 Note 25. p. 49. 
 
 Plotinus, Enn. III. 1. IX. c. 3. Anrkovv $^ ro voow, kuI 
 avTo voei, Koi eWenres, Sn ev t(S voelv Ix*' ''o ^^> ovk kv rf 
 vtrocTTda-ei. Enn. V. 1. VI. c. 2. Up&Tov re ovk eorai bvo Sv, o 
 re vovs 6 ro voi]Tov ^cav ovk &,v trvaraCr] firj oiajjg ov(rtos xada- 
 p&s V07]T0v, 6 TTpos filv TOV vovv I'O^Toj' eoTa(, Kafl' eavTO 8^ 
 oSre voovv oire vorjTbv Kvpuov lorotf 70 re yap vorirbv, eTip<a' 
 S re vovs rb e77t;3<iXA.oi' tj) vori<m Kevbv ^x*'> ^^^^ '"''^ \aj3eLii 
 Kul kkeXv TO porjTov 8 voei. Enn. V. 1. VI. c. 6. "Eireira oW 
 ^ v6rj<Tis voei, &k\a rb e\ov Tr\v v6r]<nv. Avo ovu Ttdhip aS 
 iv r<3 yooiJi'Tt yiyz^eraf roCro bi ovbafuj bvo. Of. Porphyr. 
 Seni. XV. Ei 6e iroWa xal to vor/rti' iroWa yap 6 vovs I'oet, 
 (tal o^x ei'" I'oXA.ct &i' e?77 e£ dmy/cjjs nm avro's. Keirai bi vpb 
 T&v TioW&v rb Ir, (Sore avAyKrf irpb tov vov etvai to ev. " The 
 Absolute, as absolutely universal, is absolutely otie; abso- 
 lute unity is convertible with the absolute negation of 
 plurality and difference ; the Absolute, and the Knowledge 
 of the Absolute^, are therefore identical. But knowledge, or 
 intelligence, supposes a plurality of terms — the plurality of 
 subject and object. Intelligence, whose essence is plurality, 
 cannot therefore be identified with the Absolute, whose 
 essence is unity; and if known, the Absolute, as known, 
 must be different from the Absolute, as existing; that is, 
 there must be two Absolutes — an Absolute in knowledge, 
 and an Absolute in existence : which is contradictory." 
 Sir W. Hamilton, Discussions, p. 33. 
 
 Note 26. p. 49. 
 
 Clem. Alex. Strom.Y. iz. p. 587. Ovk hv bi oKov eiirot ns 
 
 avTbv 6p6&s' im i^eyeOei yap rtirrerai ro oKov, Kai eort t&v. 
 
 oKav vaTTjp. ovbl ixtjv p-ipr) tlvo, avrov keKTtov' abialpsTov yhp 
 
 ro 'iv. Plotinus, Enn. V. 1. VI. c. 5. *0 d' lort -nAvTr) %v. iiov 
 
 X 2 
 
308 NOTES. 
 
 Xajp^creraj Tipbs amo ; ■nov 5' h,v hiouro crvvaicr6ri(T.ea>s ; On this 
 point, the earlier and later forms of Pantheism are divided 
 against each other. Spinoza {EtL P. I. Def. 6.) defines 
 the Deity as composed of an infinite number of attributes. 
 "Per Deum intelligo ens absolute infinitum, hoc est, sub- 
 stantiam constantera infinitis attributis, quorum unum- 
 quodque seternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit."" He- 
 gel, on the contrary, in bis Lectures on the proofs of the 
 existence of God, regards a plurality of attributes as in- 
 compatible with the idea of the Infinite. " Hier zeigt sick- 
 die Verschiedenheit, die Trennung, Mehrheit der Pradicate, 
 die nur in der Einheit daa Subject yerkniipft, an ihnen 
 selbst aber in Unterschiedenheit, womit sie selbst in Ge- 
 gensatz und damit in Widerstreit kamen, waren^ somit 
 aufs, entschiedenste als etwas Unwahres, und die Mehrheit 
 von Bestimmungen als ungehorige Kategorie^" The lesson 
 to be learnt from both is thp same. No human form of 
 thought can represent the Infinite : — a truth which Spinoza 
 attempts to evade by multiplying such forms to infinity, 
 and Hegel by renouncing human thought altogether. 
 
 Note 27. p. 50. 
 
 That the Absolute cannot be conceived as composed of 
 
 a plurality of attributes, but only- as the one substance: 
 
 conceived apart from all plurality, is shewn by Plotinus, 
 
 JEJnn. V. 1. VI. c. 3. Et bk ttoWo, t6 aiiTO ovb^v KOikveiv (jyi^- 
 
 (fovinv, €V ToijTois vnoKeCfjLevov ea-rac ov byvarai yap Tiokka, 
 
 fL-q kvos ovTos, acj) ov, rj kv w, r] oA.(d$ Ivos, /cat tovtov Trpdrov 
 
 X&v &XXa)v api6p,oviJ.svov, o avro 6(f>' kavvov 5et Xa^eiv p,6vov. 
 
 Et 8e 6pm etTj pera t&v aXKcav, 8ei tovto (TvKKa^6vTa aiirh' 
 
 pera t&v HXkaiv, opas 8e efepov t&v &X\(av Sv, eqv &s per' 
 
 &kka>v, fijrew 8e tovto to VTtOKelpfvov roty aXhois, pjqKeTi pfTo, 
 
 T&v aKkmv, d\\' avTo nad^ eavTo. Compare ProcluSj Inst. 
 
 Theol. c. I. nSj' Ttky\Qoi periy^i tttj tov evos' el yap pr]bapfj 
 
 perexoi, oijTe to oKov Iz/ eorai, oM ekavTov t&v ttoW&v, ef &v 
 
 TO TtkfiBos, dW Icrrot Kal Ik tlvoiv sKacrTov Ttk^dos, Kal toSto 
 
 els aireipov, Kal t&v aireipoDv Toirotv ^Kaa-Tov ecrraL irdkiv Trkrf- 
 
 i Werke, XII. p. 419. See also Encyklbpadie, § 28 {Werke, VI. 
 p. 62. 
 
LECTURE II. 309 
 
 6o<s &TreLpov. To the same effect is the reasoning of Augus- 
 tine, J)e Trinitate, vi. c. 6. 7. "In unoquoque corpora aliud 
 est magnitudo, aliud color, aliud figura. Potest enim et 
 diminuta magnitudime manere idem color et eadem figura, 
 et colore mutato manere eadera figura et eadeni magni- 
 tudo, et figura eadem non manente tam magnum esse et 
 eodem modo coloratum : et qusecunque alia simul dicuntur 
 de corpore, possunt et simul et plura sine cseteris commu- 
 tari. Ac per hoc mutiplex esse convincitur natura corporis, 
 simplex autem nullo modo .... Sed tamen etiam in anima 
 cum aliud sit artificiosum esse, aliud inertem, aliud acutum, 
 aliud memorem, aliud cupiditas, aliud timor, aliud Isetitia, 
 aliud tristitia, possintque et alia sine aliis, et alia magis, 
 alia minus, innumerabilia et innumerabiliter in animse 
 natura inveniri ; manifestum est non siraplicem sed multi- 
 plicem esse naturam. Nihil enim simplex mutabile est ; 
 omnis autem creatura mutabilis. Deus vero multiplieiter 
 quidem dicitur magnus, bonus, sapiens, beatus, verus, et 
 quidquid aliud non indigne dici videtur : sed eadem mag- 
 nitudo ejus est, quae sapientia; non enim mole magnus 
 est, sed vif tute : et eadem bonitas quae sapientia et magni- 
 tudo, et eadem Veritas quae ilia omnia : et non est ibi aliud 
 beatum esse, et aliud magnum, aut sapientem, aut verum 
 aut bonum esse, aut omnino ipsum esse." See also Aqui- 
 nas, Summa, P. I. Qu. III. Art. 5, 6, 7. Schleierraaoher, 
 Ohristliche Qlauhe, § 50. 
 
 Note 28. p. 50. 
 See Plato, Republic, II. p. 380, VI. p- 51 ij VII. p. 517 ; 
 Timwm, p. 31. Aristotle, Metaph. XI. 8, 18 : 10, 14 ; Eth. 
 Nic. VII. 14, 8. Cicero, Tme. Qucest. I. 29 ; DeNat.Deor. 
 II. 1 1. PlotinuSj Enn. II. 9, i , III. 9, 3, V. 4, x, VI. 5, i : 
 9, 6. Proclus, Inst. Tkeol. c. i. xxii. lix. cxxxiii. Cle- 
 mens Alex., AVram.V. p. 587. Origen, Z>e Pn'Mc. I. 1 , 6. Au- 
 gustine, Ds Oiv. Dei, VIII. 6 : De Trimtate,YI. 6, VII. i, 
 XV. 5, 13. Aquinas, 8umma, P.I. Qil. III. Art. 7, Qu.YH- 
 Art. 3. Qu. XI. Art. 3. Leibnitz, Mdnadohpie, § 39,40,47. 
 Clarke, Demomtration, Prop. vi. vii. Schelliiig, Vom Ich, § 9 ; 
 Brum, p. 185. Rothe, Theol. EtUJc, § 8. 
 
310 NOTES. 
 
 Note 29. p. 50. 
 " Hinc ergo clare patet, nullam rem unam aut unicam 
 nominari, nisi postquam alia res concepta fuit, qua) (ut 
 dictum est) cum ea convenit. Quoniam vero Dei existentia 
 jpsius sit essentia, deque ejus essentia universafem non 
 possimus formare ideam, certum est, eum qui Deum unum 
 vel unicum nuncupat, nullam de Deo habere ideam, vel im- 
 proprie de eo loqui." Spinoza, Epist. L. Compare Sohleier- 
 macher, Christliche Glauhe, § ^6. 
 
 Note 30. p. 51. 
 " Quod enim dicebat si posdhile est, non ad potentiam 
 Dei referebat solum, sed etiam ad justitiam ejus ; quoniam 
 in quantum ad potentiam quidem Dei, omnia possibilia 
 sunt, sive justa sive injusta ; quantum autem ad justitiam 
 ejus, qui non solum potens est, sed etiam Justus, non sunt 
 omnia possibilia, sed ea solum quae justa sunt." Origeh, in 
 S.Matt. xxvi. 42 ; compare c. Celsum, III. 70. Origen speaks 
 still more strongly in a remarkable fragment of the De 
 Principiis, which has been preserved in the original : 'Ev 
 TTJ fTitvoovf/,^i>ri apxfi toctovtov apiOfxov ru /3oii\evjiiaTt avrov 
 VTiO(rTrj(TaL rov d(ov voep&v ovcri&v ocrov rjhvvaTO biapKecraf 
 ireirepaarpiivrji' yap eivai Kot ttjv bivapiLV tov &eov KsKreov, koI 
 ixri '7Tpo(j>d(Tei iv<prmlai ttjw Treptypacpriv avT^s Trepiaiperiov iav 
 yap r) aTreipos fi OfCa bvvaiJiis, avir/KX) avT7]V jxrjbe favTr)V voelv. 
 The language of Hooker {E. P. h. I. eh. 2. § 3-) is more 
 cautious and reverent, but contains the same acknowledg- 
 ment of what, from a human point of view, is limitation. 
 " If therefore it be demanded why, God having power and 
 ability infinite, the effects notwithstanding of that power 
 are all so limited as we see they are ; the reason hereof is 
 the end which he hath proposed, and the law whereby his 
 wisdom hath sthited the effects of his power in such sort, 
 that it doth not work infinitely, but correspondently 
 unto that end for which it worketh." Some excellent 
 remarks on the limitation of man's faculties with regard 
 to the Divine Attributes, will be found in Mr. Meyrick's 
 sermon, God^s Revelation and Man's Moral Sense considered 
 in reference to the Sacrifice of the Cross, p. 14. See the 
 
LECTURE II. 311 
 
 Collection of Sermons on Christian Faith and the Atone- 
 ment, Oxfordj 1856. 
 
 Note 31. p. 52. 
 Thus Spinoza {Ethica, P. I. Prop. a6.) says, " Res quae 
 ad aliquid operandum determiuata est, a Deo necessario 
 sic fuit determinata ;" and, carrying the same theoi-y to its 
 inevitable consequence, he consistently maintains (P. IV. 
 Prop. 64.) that the notion of evil only exists in consequence 
 of the inadequacy of our ideas. Hegel in like manner 
 (EncyM. § 35.) reduces evil to a mere negation, which 
 may be identified with good in the absolute. See also 
 above, note 18, p. 304. 
 
 Note S2. p. 53. 
 Plato, Hep. II. p. 381. Uorepov ovv em to jSe^riov re Koi 
 kAKKlov {/.eraj^aWei eavrov, ri fitl to \eipov koI to at<r)(^wv 
 favTov ; AvdyKT), e(f>r], ^tiI to \(apov, elnep aWoiovraf ov y&p 
 TTOi' evbea ye (prjaop-ev tov Qebv KdKKovs ^ ctperTjs elvai. 'Op66- 
 roTO, ^v 6' iyd. keyeis. Koi ovtois Ix.ovtos Soicet av tCs (toi, S> 
 ^ ASeCpLavTf, sk^v ovtov X^^P"^ roteiy oirrjovv ri de&v rj av6p(&- 
 Trmv ; 'kbivaTov, e<\>T). Compare Augustine, In Joannis Evan, 
 gelium. Tract. XXIII. 9. "Non invenis in Deo aliquid 
 mutabilitatis, non aliquid quod aliter nunc sit, alitor paulo 
 ante fuerit. Nam ubi invenis aliter et aliter, facta est ibi 
 qusedam mors : mors enim est, non esse quod fuit .... 
 Quidquid ergo-et a meliore in deterius, et a deteriore in 
 melius moritur, non est hoc Deus." And so Jaeobi ( Von 
 den gottlichen Dingen, Werke, III. p. 391.), says of the sys- 
 tem of Schelling : " Man erwage, dass der allein wahre 
 und lebendige Gott (die Natur) sich weder vermehren noch 
 vermindern, weder erhohen noch erniedern kann ; sondern 
 dass dieser Gott, cequal Natur oder Universum, von Ewig- 
 keit zu Ewigkeit, sowohl der Qualitat als der Quantitat 
 nach, immer einer und derselbe bleibt. Es wiirde darum 
 auch absolut unmoglich seyn, dass er irgend einen Wechsel 
 in sich vernrsachte, sich als Veranderungskraft darthate, 
 wenn er nicht die Veranderlichkeit, die Zeitlickkeit, der 
 Wechsel selbst ware. Diese Veranderlichkeit selbst ist 
 aber, sagt man uns, in ihrer Wurzel ein UnmrdnderUches 
 
312 NOTES. 
 
 namlich die heilige ewig sehaflfende Urkraft der Welt ; ift 
 ihrer Frucht hingegen, in der expliciten wirklichen Welt, 
 ein absolut Veranderliches, so dasa in jedem einzelnen be- 
 stimmten Moment, das All der Wesen nichts ist. Demnach 
 ist unwidersprechlich das Schopfervvort des naturalistischen 
 Gottes, welches er von Ewigkeit zu Ewigkeit ausspricht : 
 Bs werde Nichts ! Er ruft hervor aus dem Seyn das Nicht- 
 seyn ; wie der Gott des Theismus a%s dem Nichtseyn hervor- 
 ruft das Seyn." Compare Sir W. Hamilton's criticism of 
 Cousin, Discussions, p. 36 ; and see also above, note 23, 
 P- 305- 
 
 Note 33. p. 54. 
 "What,'" says Sir W. Hamilton, "is our thought of 
 creation ? It is not a thought of the mere springing of 
 nothing into something. On the contrary, creation is con- 
 ceived, and is by us coneeivable, only as the evolution of 
 existence from possibility into actuality, by the fiat of the 
 Deity .... And what is true of our concept of creation, 
 holds of our concept of annihilation. We can think no 
 real annihilation, — no absolute sinking of something into 
 nothing. But as creation is cogitable by us, only as a 
 putting forth of Divine power, so is annihilation by us only 
 conceivable, as a withdrawal of that same power. All that 
 is now actually existent in the universe, this we think and 
 must think, as having, prior to creation, virtuaMy existed 
 in the Creator ; and in imagining the universe to be anni- 
 hilated, we can only conceive this, as the retractation by 
 the Deity of an overt energy into latent power. In short, 
 it is impossible for the human mind to think what it thinks 
 existent, lapsing into absolute non-existence, either in time 
 past or in time future''." With all deference to this great 
 
 * Discussions, p. 620. Compare a remarkable passage in Herder's 
 Gott, (Werke, VIII. p. 241.), where the author maintains a similar view 
 of the impossibility of conceiving creation from or reduction to nothing. 
 But Herder is speaking as a professed defender of Spinoza. Sir W. 
 Hamilton's system is in all its essential features the direct antagonist 
 of Spinoza ; and even in the present passage the apparently pantheistic 
 hypothesis is represented as the result not of thought, but of an in- 
 
LECTUEE II. 313 
 
 philosopher, I cannot help thinking that a di-fiferent repre- 
 sentation would have been more in harmony with the main 
 principles of his own system. We cannot conceive creation 
 at all, neither as a springing of nothing into something, nor 
 as an evolution of the relative from the absolute ; for the 
 simple reason that the first terms of both hypotheses, 
 nothing and the absolute, are equally beyond the reach of 
 human conception. But while creation as a process in the 
 act of being accomplished, is equally inconceivable on every 
 hypothesis, creation as a result already completed, presents 
 no insurmountable difficulty to human thoughtj if we con- 
 sent to abandon the attempt to apprehend the absolute. 
 There is no difficulty in conceiving that the amount of ex- 
 istence in the universe may at one time be represented by 
 A, and at another \i^ A-\-B\ though we are equally un- 
 -able to conceive how B can come out of nothing, and how 
 A or any part of A can become B while A remains undi- 
 minished. But the result, no less than the process, be- 
 comes self-contradictory, when we attempt to conceive A 
 as absolute and infinite ; for in that case A-^B must be 
 something greater than infinity. 
 
 Note 34. p. 56. 
 " Der Pantheismus lehrt dass, alles gut sei, denn alles 
 sei nur eines, und jeder Anschein von dem, was wir Unrecht 
 oder Schlecht nennen, nur eine leere Tauschung. Daher 
 der zerstorende Einfluss desselben auf das Leben^ in dem, 
 man mag sich nun in den Ausdriicken auch drehen, und 
 an den durch die Stimme des Gewissens iiberall hervor- 
 tretenden Glauben anschliessen wie man will, im Grunde 
 doch, wenn man dem verderblichen Principe nur getreu 
 bleibt, die Handlungen des JVlenschen fiir gleichgultig, und 
 der ewige Unterschied zwischen Gut und Bose, zwischen 
 Recht und Unrecht, ganz aufgehoben, und fur nichtig er- 
 klart werden muss." F. Schlegel, Ueher die Sprache und 
 
 ability to think. Still it is to be regretted that the distinguished author 
 should have used language liable to be misunderstood in this respect, 
 especially as it scarcely accords with the general principles of his own 
 system. 
 
314 NOTES. 
 
 WeisTieit der Indier, b. III. c. 2, (Werke, VIII. p. 324). 
 " Si c'est Dieu qui pense en moi, ma pensee est absolue ; 
 non seulement je ne puis penser autrement que je ne pense, 
 . . . mais je ne puis choisir parmi mes conceptions, approuver 
 ou rechercher les unes, rejeter et fuir les autres, toutes 
 etant necessaires et parfaites, toutes divines; je deviens 
 enfin une machine h. penser, une machine intelligente, mais 
 irresponsable." Bartholomess, Histoire des doctrines reli- 
 gieuses de la pMlosophie moderne, Introduction, p. xxxvii. 
 These necessary consequences of Pantheism are fully exhi- 
 bited by Spinoza, JEthica, P. I. Prop. 26 ; P. II. Props. 32, 
 33> 34. 35 ; P- IV. Prop. 64. Hegel {Werh, XL pp. 95, 
 208, 390) endeavours, not very successfully, to defend his 
 own philosophy from the charge of Pantheism and its con- 
 sequences. His defence amounts to no more than the 
 assertion that God cannot be identified with the universe 
 of finite objects, in a system in which finite objects have no 
 real existence. Thus explained, the system is identical 
 with Pantheism in the strictest sense of the term. All 
 that is proved is, that it cannot with equal propriety be 
 called Pantatheism. 
 
 Note 35. p. 57. 
 " The dialectic intellect, by the exertion of its own 
 powers exclusively, can lead us to a general affirmation 
 of the supreme reality, of an absolute being. But here 
 it stops. It is utterly incapable of communicating insight 
 or conviction concerning the existence or possibility of the 
 world, as different from Deity. It finds itself constrained 
 to identify, more truly to confound, the Creator with the 
 aggregate of his creatures, and, cutting the knot which it 
 cannot untwist, to deny altogether the reality of all finite ex- 
 istence, and then to shelter itself from its own dissatisfaction, 
 its own importunate queries, in the wretched evasion, that of 
 nothings, no solution can be required : till pain haply, and 
 anguish, and remorse, with bitter scoff and moody laughter 
 inquire ; — Are we then indeed nothings ? — till through every 
 organ of sense nature herself asks; — How and whence did 
 this sterile and pertinacious nothing acquire its plural 
 number ? — Unde, queeso, hcec nihili in nihila tarn portentosa 
 
LECTURE II. 315 
 
 transnihilaiio ?— and lastly ;- — What is that inward mirror, 
 in and for which these nothings have at least relative exist- 
 ence?" Coleridge, The Friend, vol. III. p. 213. 
 
 Note 36. p. 57. 
 The limitation, speculative Atheism, is necessary ; for the 
 denial of the Infinite does not in every case constitute 
 practical Atheism. For it is not under the form of the 
 Infinite that the idea of God is distinctly presented in 
 worship ; and it is possible to adore a superior Being, with- 
 out positively asking how far that superiority extends. It 
 is only when we are able to investigate the problem of the 
 relation between the infinite and the finite, and to perceive 
 that the latter cannot be regarded as expressing the true 
 idea of the Deity, that the denial of the infinite becomes 
 Atheism in speculation. On the alternative between Christ- 
 ianity and Atheism, some excellent remarks will be found 
 in the Restoration of Belief, p. 248. 
 
 Note 37. p. 57. 
 " Es pflegt viel auf die Schranken des Denkens gehalten 
 zu werden, und es wird behauptet, es konne iiber die 
 Schranke nicht hinausgegangen werden. In dieser Be- 
 hauptung liegt die Bewusstlosigkeit, dass darin selbst, dass 
 etwas als Schranke bestimmt ist, dariiber bereits hinaus- 
 gegangen ist. Denn eine Bestimmtheit, Grenze, ist als 
 Schranke nur bestimmt, in Gegensatz gegen sein Anderes 
 iiberhaupt, als gegen sein Unheschranhtes ; das Andere 
 einer Schranke ist eben das Hinaus iiber dieselbe." Hegel, 
 Logik, (Werke, III. p. 136). Compare EncyclopacHe, § 60, 
 {Werke, VI. p. 121). In maintaining that a limit as such 
 always implies something beyond, and, consequently, that 
 the notion of a limited universe is self-contradictory, He- 
 gel is unquestionably right ; but he is wrong in attempting 
 to infer from thence the non-limitation of thought. For 
 that which is limited is not necessarily limited by some- 
 thing of the same kind ; — nay, the very conception of kinds 
 is itself a limitation. Hence the consciousness that thought 
 is limited by something beyond itself, by no means implies 
 
316 NOTES. 
 
 th^t thought itself transcends that limit. A prisoner 
 chained up feels that his motion is limited, by his inability 
 to move into the space which he sees or imagines beyond the 
 length of his chain. On Hegel's principles, he ought to 
 know his inability by actually moving into it. 
 
 Note 38. p. 58. 
 These opposite limitations fall under the general Law of 
 the Conditioned enunciated by Sir W. Hamilton. "The 
 mind is astricted to think in certain forms; and, under 
 these, thought is possible only in the conditioned interval 
 between two unconditioned contradictory extremes or 
 poles, each of which is altogether inconceivable, but of 
 which, on the principle of Excluded Middle, the one or the 
 other is necessarily true^.'' The lamented author has left 
 us only a few fragmentary specimens of the application of 
 this canon to the vexed questions of metaphysical specula- 
 tion, and the principal one of these, in some of its details, 
 may be open to objections ; but the truth of the principle 
 itself is unquestionable ; and its value, rightly applied, in 
 confining the inquiries of philosophy within their legitimate 
 boundaries, can hardly be estimated too highly. 
 
 Note 39. p. 58. 
 " AUes Endliche ist, vermoge seines Begrififes, begrenzt 
 durch sein Entgegengesetztes : and absolute Endliehkeit 
 ist ein sich selbst widerspreehender Begriff." Fichte, Gnnd- 
 lage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, {WerJie, I. p. 185.) 
 
 Note 40. p. 6a. 
 Religion irmerJialb der Grenzen der hlossen VemvMfi, p. 
 98, 122, 137. For the influence of Kant on the rationalist 
 theology, see Rosenkranz, Gescliichte der Kanfscken Philo- 
 sophie, b. III. cap. 2. Amand Saintes, Histoire du Bationat- 
 isme en AUemagne, 1. II. ch. 1 1. Kahnis, History of German 
 Protestantism, translated by Meyer, p.*i67. 
 
 ' Discussions, p. 618. 
 
LECTURE II. 317 
 
 Note 41. p. 62. 
 Plaulus, in the preface to his Lebem Jem, expressly adopts, 
 though without nanxing the author, Kant's theory, that 
 miracles are indifferent to religion, and that the whole 
 essence of Christianity consists in morality. Consistently 
 with these principles, he maintains (§ 2) that the historical 
 inquirer can admit no event as credible which cannot be 
 e.splained by natural causes. The entire details of the 
 evangelical narrative are explained by this method. The 
 miracles: of healing were performed by medical skill, which 
 Christ iinparted to his disciples, and thus was enabled to 
 heal, not by a word, but by deputy. Thus he coolly trans- 
 lates! the words of the centurion. Matt. viii. 8, " Wenn 
 auch Er nur einen Befehl an einen der Seinigen geben 
 wolle, um in seinem Namen fiir die Heilung zu sorgen.'" 
 The feeding of the five thousand consisted merely in per- 
 suading the richer travellers to share their provisions with 
 the poorer. The stilling of the tempest was effectedi by- 
 steering round at point which cut off the wind. Lazarus 
 and the widow's son of Nain, were both cases of premature 
 interment. Our Lord's own death was merely a swoon, 
 from which, he was restored by the warmth of the sepulchre 
 and the stimulating effect of the spices. Such are a few 
 specimens of historical inquiry. The various explanations 
 of Paulus are examined in detail, and complietely refuted' 
 by Strauss. The natural hypothesis had to- be annihilated, 
 to make way for the mythical. 
 
 Note is. p, 62. 
 Wegscheidei", though he expressly rejects. Kant's alle- 
 gorizing interpretations of ScriptuiDe,. {see Institwtiones The- 
 Qlog^cB,, § 35.),' agrees with him in maintaining the supreme 
 authority of reason in all religious questions,, and. in ac- 
 commodating all religious doctirines; to Ethical preceptst 
 [fPrcef. p. viii. ixi.) Accordingly, in. the: place of the allegouy... 
 he adopts the convenient theoEyof adaptation to the pre- 
 judices of the age ; by which a* critic, is enabled at once to' 
 set aside all doctrines which- do, not harmonize with his. 
 
318 NOTES. 
 
 own views. Among the doctrines thus rejected, as powerless 
 for the true end of religion, and useless or even prejudicial 
 to piety, are those of the Trinity, the Atonement, the Cor- 
 ruption of human nature, Justification, and the Resurrec- 
 tion of the body. See §51. 
 
 Note 43. p. 6a. 
 
 See his Grund-und-Glaubens-Sdtze der Evangelisch-Pro- 
 testantischen Kircke, p. 70 (and edition). This work of 
 Eohr was principally directed against the Lutheran sym- 
 bolical books; but the Catholic Creeds are also included 
 in his sweeping condemnations. Of the Apostles' Creed he 
 observes: "Our age needs a more logically correct, and a 
 more comprehensive survey of the pure evangelical faith 
 than is afforded by the so-called Apostles' Creed, which is 
 good for its immediate and ordinary purpose, but too short, 
 too aphoristic, and too historical for that which is here 
 proposed." (p. 49.) Of the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds 
 he remarks in a note : " The Niceno-Constantinopolitan 
 and the pseudo-Athanasian Creeds, with their decidedly 
 antiscriptural dogmas, are here altogether out of the ques- 
 tion, however much they were admitted by the reformers, 
 in all honesty and faith, as truly scriptural." Eohr agrees 
 with Kant in separating the historical facts of Christianity 
 from the religion itself (p. 157), and in maintaining that 
 morality is the only mode of honouring God. (p. 56.) His 
 proposed creed, from which every thing " historical" is 
 studiously excluded, runs as follows : — 
 
 There is one true God, proclaimed to us by his only- 
 begotten Son, Jesus Christ. To this God, as the most 
 perfect of all Beings, as the Creator, Sustainer, and Go- 
 vernor of the world, and as the Father and Instructor of 
 men and of all rational spirits, the deepest veneration is 
 due. This veneration is best rendered by active striving 
 after virtue and righteousness, by zealous control of the 
 inclinations and passions of our sensual and evilly-disposed 
 nature, and by honest entire fulfilment of our duty, ac- 
 cording to the exalted example of Jesus, whereby we may 
 assure ourselves of the aid of his divine Spirit. In the 
 
LECTURE II. 319 
 
 consciousness of the filial relation into which we thereby 
 enter with him, we may, in earthly need, reckon with con- 
 fidence on his fatherly help, in the feeling of our moral 
 weakness and unworthiness, upon his grace and mercy 
 assured to us through Ohi-ist, and in the moment of death 
 be assured that we shall continue to exist immortally and 
 receive a recompense in a better life." 
 
 The celebrated Briefs uber den Rationalismus, by the 
 same author, have at least the merit of being an honest 
 and logical exposition of Rationalist principles and their 
 consequences, without disguise or compromise. The com- 
 mendation, however, to which in this respect the work is 
 partly entitled, cannot be extended to the concluding 
 letter, in which the author endeavours to establish, for 
 himself and his fellow rationalists, the right to discharge 
 the spiritual functions, and subscribe to the confessions, of 
 a church whose doctrines they disbelieve : and even to 
 make use of their position to unsettle the faith of the 
 young committed to their instruction. 
 
 Note 44. p. 63. 
 The character of HegeFs philosophy in this respect is 
 sufficiently shewn by Strauss, Streitschri/ten, Heft III. 
 
 p- 57 sqq- 
 
 Note 45. p. 62. 
 Vatke's Religion des Alten Testamentes, forms the first part 
 of his Biblische Theologie wissenschaftlich dargestellt ; Berlin, 
 1835. In the Introduction (§ 7, la, 13.) the author lays 
 down a law of the development of religion as a process of 
 the infinite Spirit in self-revelation, according to the prin- 
 ciples of the Hegelian philosophy. As a consequence of 
 this law, he maintains that it is impossible for an individual 
 to raise himself, even by the aid of divine revelation, above 
 the spiritual position of his age, or for a nation to rise or 
 fall from its normal stage of religious cultivation (pp. 87, 
 181). By this canon the entire narrative of Scripture is 
 made to stand or fall. The account of a primitive revela- 
 tion and subsequent alienation from God, must be rejected, 
 because the human consciousness must attain to perfection 
 
320 NOTES. 
 
 through a succession of progressive stages (p. 102). The 
 book of Genesis has no historical value ; and we cannot de- 
 cide whether the patriarchs before Moses had any know- 
 ledge of the one true God (pp. i8oj 184)., Moses himself, 
 as represented in the scriptural account, is altogether in- 
 conceivable ; for he appears at a period when, according to 
 the laws of historical development, the time was not yet 
 ripe for him (p. 183). Much of the history of Moses must 
 be regarded as a mythus, invented by the priests at a later 
 period (p. 186). The political institutions attributed to 
 him could not possibly have been founded by him (p. 211). 
 The ceremonial laws are such as could neither have been 
 discovered- by an individual nor made known hy divine' reve- 
 lation (p. a 1 8). The Passover was originally a feast of 
 the sun, in celebration of his entering into the sign Aries ; 
 which fully accounts' for the offering of a male lamb (p. 492.) 
 As regards the decalogue, the second commandment must 
 be considered as an interpolation of a later date ; for it 
 implies a higher degree of abstraction than could have been 
 reached in the Mosaic age (p. 234). The lapses into idolatry 
 recorded in the book of Judges, are highly improbable ; for 
 a whole people cannot fall back from a higher to a lower 
 state of religious culture (p. 181). The books of Samuel 
 betray their legendary origin by the occuri'ence of round 
 numbers, and by the significant names of the first three 
 kings (p. 289.) The wisdom attributed to Solomon is irre- 
 concilable with his subsequent idolatry ; and the account 
 must therefore be regarded as legendary (p. 309). Such 
 are a few of the results of the so-called philosophy of his- 
 tory, exercised on the narrative of Scripture. The book 
 is valuablie in one respect, and in one only. It shews the 
 reckless manner in which rationalism finds it necessary to 
 deal with the sacred text, before it can be accommodated 
 to the antisupernatural hypothesis. To those, who believe 
 that a record of facts as they are is more trustworthy than- 
 a theory of facts as they ought to be on philosophical 
 principles, the very features which the critic is' compelled 
 to reject, become additional evidence of the truth of the 
 scripture narrative. 
 
LECTURE II. 321 
 
 Note 46. p. 62. 
 The Hegelian element of Strauss's Leben Jesu is briefly 
 exhibited at the end of the book (§ 150). The body of the 
 work is mainly occupied with various cavils, some of them 
 of the very minutest philosophy, designed to invalidate the 
 historical character of the Gospel narratives. Among these 
 precious morsels of criticism, we meet with such objections 
 as the following. That the name of the angel Gabriel is 
 of Hebrew origin (§ 17). That the angel, instead of in- 
 flicting dumbness on Zacharias, ought to have merely 
 reprimanded him (ibid.). That a real angel would not 
 have proclaimed the advent of the Messiah in language so 
 strictly Jewish (§ 25). That the appearance of the star to 
 the magi would have strengthened the popular belief in the 
 false science of astrology (§ 34). That John the Baptist, 
 being an ascetic, and therefore necessarily prejudiced and 
 narrow-mindedj could not have considered himself inferior 
 to one who did not practise similar mortifications (§ 46). 
 That Jesus could not have submitted to the rite of bap- 
 tism, because that rite symbolized a future Messiah (| 49). 
 That if there is a personal devil, he cannot take a visible 
 form (§ 54). That it is improbable that Jesus, when he 
 read in the synagogue at Nazareth, should have lighted on 
 an apposite passage of the prophet Isaiah (§ 58). That 
 Jesus could not have known that the woman of Samaria 
 had had five husbands, because it is not probable that each 
 of them had left a distinct image in her mind, and because 
 a minute knowledge of the history of individuals is de- 
 grading to the prophetic dignity (§ 69). That it is impos- 
 sible to understand " how he, whose vocation had reference 
 to the depths of the human heart, should be tempted to 
 occupy himself with the fish-frequented depths of the 
 waters" (§ 71). That Jesus could not have ridden into 
 Jerusalem on an ass whereon never man sat, because un- 
 broken asses are difficult to manage (§ 110). That the 
 resurrection of the dead is impossible, because the infe- 
 rior principles, whose work is corruption, will not be in- 
 clined to surrender back the dominion of the b®dy to its 
 former master, the soul (§ 140). That the ascension of 
 
S22 NOTES. 
 
 Christ is impossible, because a body which has flesh and 
 bones cannot be qualified for a heavenly abode ; because it 
 cannot liberate itself from the laws of gravity ; and because 
 it is childish to regard heaven as a definite locality (§ 142). 
 — It is not creditable to the boasted enlightenment of the 
 age, that a work which can seriously urge such petty 
 quibbles as these should have obtained so much reputation 
 and influence. In studying the philosophy which has given 
 birth to such consequences, we see a new verification of 
 the significant remark of Clemens Alexandrinus : 'H yap 
 Kara Trjv deiav Tiapddocnv (j>iKocro(j)(a hrrjo-i Trjv Ttpovotav /cat 
 jSe^aioi" rjs avaipeOiCtrrjs, fwdos fj vepX top ^caTrjpa olKOVOf^Ca 
 ^afoerai™. " Strauss, the Hegelian theologian," says Sir 
 W. Hamiltouj "sees in Christianity only a mythus. Na- 
 turally : for his Hegelian ' Idea,' itself a myth, and con- 
 fessedly finding itself in every thing, of course finds in 
 anything a myth"!." As the labours of Strauss on the 
 Gospel narratives have been sometimes compared to 
 those of Niebuhr on the history of Kome, it may be in- 
 structive to peruse the opinion of the great historian on 
 the cognate theories of a few years' earlier date. " In 
 my opinion," writes Niebuhr in 181 8, "he is not a Pro- 
 testant Christian, who does not receive the historical facts 
 of Christ's earthly life, in their literal acceptation, with 
 all their miracles, as equally authentic with any event 
 recorded in history, and whose belief in them is not as 
 firm and tranquil as his belief in the latter ; who has not 
 the most absolute faith in the articles of the Apostles' 
 Creed, taken in their grammatical sense ; who does not 
 consider every doctrine and every precept of the New Tes- 
 tament as undoubted divine revelation, in the sense of the 
 Christians of the first century, who knew nothing of a 
 Theopneustia. Moreover, a Christianity after the fashion 
 of the modern philosophers and pantheists, without a 
 personal God, without immortality, without human indi- 
 viduality, without historical faith, is no Christianity at all 
 to me ; though it may be a very intellectual, very ingenious 
 philosophy. I have often said that I do not know what to 
 "■ Stromata, 1. 11, p. 296. "> Discussions, p. 787. 
 
LECTURE II. 323 
 
 do with a metaphysical God, and that I will have none but 
 the God of the Bible, who is heart to heart with us°." 
 
 Niebuhr did not live to witness the publication of the 
 Lebm Jem ; but the above passage is as appropriate as if 
 it had been part of an actual review of that work. 
 
 Note 47. p. 63. 
 With Feuerbach's Wesm des Christenthums I am only 
 acquainted through the French translation by M. Ewer- 
 beck, which forms the principal portion of the volume en- 
 titled, Qu'est-ce qiie la Religion cTaprh la noumlle Philoso- 
 pMe Allemande. The following extracts will sufficiently 
 shew the character of the work. " Le grand mystere, ou 
 plut6t le grand secret, de la religion, le voici : I'homme 
 objective son ^tre, et apres I'avoir objective il se rend lui- 
 m^me objet de ce nouveau sujet." (p. 129). " Dieu est la no- 
 tion, I'id^e personnifiee de la personnalite, il est Tapotheose 
 de la personne humaine, le moi sans le toi, la fi^re subjec- 
 tivite separee d'avec I'univers, P^goite qui se suffit a elle- 
 meme" (p. 319). " Dieu est la notion du genre, mais cette 
 notion personnifiee et individualisee a son tour; il est la 
 notion du genre ou son essence, et cette essence comme 
 entitd universelle, comme renfermant toutes les perfections 
 possibles, comme possedant toutes les qualites humaines 
 debarrassees de leurs limites" (p. 271). " Lk, ou la religion 
 exprime le rapport entre I'homme et I'essence humaine, eUe 
 est bonne et humanitaire. JA, oh. la religion exprime le 
 rapport entre I'homme et I'essence humaine changee en un 
 itre surnaturel, elle ist illogique, menteuse, et porte dans ses 
 flancs le germe de toutes les horreurs qui d^solent la so- 
 ci^td depuis soixante sifecles" (p. 340). " L'atheisme est le 
 
 fruit de la contradiction dans Texistence de Dieu On 
 
 nous dit que Dieu existe reellement et non r^ellement a la 
 fois, nous avons done parfaitement le droit de couper court 
 a cette existence absurde et de dire : il n'y a pas de Dieu" 
 (p. 350). " Nous inferons de ce qui precede que la per- 
 sonnalite divine, dont I'homme se sert pour attribuer ses 
 propres id^es et ses propres qualit(!s k un 6tre surhumain, 
 
 ° Life and Letters of B. G. Niebuhr, vol. II. p. 123. 
 Y 3 
 
324 NOTES. 
 
 n'est rien autre chose que la personnalite humaine mise en 
 dehors du moi. O'est cet acte psychologique qui est de- 
 venu la base de la doctrine speculative de Hegel, qui 
 enseigne que la conscience que Thomme a de Dieu est la 
 conscience que Dieu a de lui-mSme" (p. 390). The occa- 
 sional notes which the translator has added to this work 
 are, if possible, still more detestable than the text. So 
 much disregard of truth and decency as is shewn in some 
 of his remarks on Christianity has probably seldom been 
 compressed into the same compass. 
 
 Note 48. p. 6s. 
 " Christ, who taught his disciples, and us in them, how 
 to pray, propounded not the knowledge of God, though 
 without that he could not hear us ; neither represented he 
 his power, though without that he cannot help us ; but 
 comprehended all in this relation, When ye pray, say, Our 
 Father.'''' Pearson on the Creed, article I. 
 
NOTES. 
 
 LECTURE III. 
 
 Note 1. p. 70. 
 ALLES, was fur uns Etwas ist, ist es nur, inwiefern es 
 etwas anderes auch nicht ist ; alle Position ist nur moglich 
 durch Negation; wie denn das Wort hesfimmen selbst nichts 
 anderes bedeutet, als heschriinken." Fichte, GerichtUche 
 Verantwortung, ( Werhe, V, p. 265). " Das Endliche besteht 
 in Beziehung auf sein Anderes, welches seine Negation ist 
 und sich als dessen Granze darstellt." Hegel, Encykl. § a8, 
 ( WerJce, VI. p. 63). Compare Plotinus, Enn. V. 1. III. c. i %. 
 To he ecTTiv, &vev tov ti, &. el ydp n ^v, ovk hv avTo iv to 
 yap avrb -npo Toi3 ti. Enn.YI. 1. VII. c.39. Aetyap tov vovv 
 del fTepoTTjTa Koi TavTorrjTa Xafi^&veiv, eXirep vorjcrei, Eavrov 
 re yap ov biaKpivei cltto tov votjtov Trj Trpos ovro eT^pov (ruiaei, 
 T& Te -navTa ov Oecap-qaei, [xribefiCas eTepoVijros yevofiivris, ets to 
 Ttavra etvai. Spinoza, E^st. 50. " Hsec ergo determinatio 
 ad rem juxta suum esse non pertinet; sed e contra est 
 ejus non-esse." The canon, undeniable from a human 
 point of view, that all consciousness is limitation, seems to 
 have had some influence on modern philosophical theories 
 concerning the Divine Nature. Thus Hegel maintains that 
 God must become limited to be conscious of himself », and 
 defines Eeligion as the Divine Spirit's knowledge of him- 
 self, by means of the finite Spirit^. 
 
 Note % p. 7 1 . 
 " Ita nuUis unquam fatigabimur disputationibus de in- 
 nito. Nam sane quum simus finiti, absurdum esset nos 
 
 « Werke, XI. p. 193. b Ibid. p. 200. 
 
826 NOTES.' 
 
 aliquid de ipso determinare, atque sic illud quasi finire ac 
 comprehendere conari." Descartes, Principia, I. 26. " The 
 second reason of our short and imperfect notions of the 
 Deity is^ the Infinity of it. For this we must observe, That 
 we can perfectly know and comprehend nothing,- but as it 
 is represented to us under some certain Bounds and Limita- 
 tions .... Upon which account, what a loss must we needs 
 be at, in understanding or knowing the Divine Nature, 
 when the very way of our knowing seems to carry in it 
 something opposite to the thing known. For the way of 
 knowing is by defining, limiting, and determining ; and the 
 thing known is that of which there neither are nor can 
 be any Bounds, Limits, Definitions, or Determinations." 
 South, Animadversions wpon Sherlock, ch. II. p. ^^. ed. 1693, 
 "Alles unser Denken ist ein Beschranken; und eben in 
 dieser Riicksicht heisst es begreifen; zusammengreifen etwas 
 aus einer Masse von hestimmbaren ; so dass immer ausser- 
 halb der gezogenen Grenze noch etwas bleibe, das nicht 
 mit hineingegriffen ist, und also dem Begriffenen nicht 
 zukommt." Fichte, GerichtUche Verantwortwng, ( Werke, V. 
 p. 365). " Was ich begreife, wird durch mein blosses Be- 
 greifen zum Endlichen, und dieses lasst auch durch unend- 
 liohe Steigerung und Erhohung sich nie ins Unendliche 
 umwandeln." Fichte, Bestimmwig des Memchen, {Werke, 
 II. p. 304). " Das Subject ohne PrddHcat ist, was in der 
 Erscheinung das Ding ohne Eigenschaften, das Ding-a/n-sich 
 ist, ein leerer unbestimmter Grund ; es ist so der Begriff 
 in sich selbst, welcher erst am Predicate eine Unterscheid- 
 ung und Bestimmtheit erhalt." Hegel, Logik, Th. II. 
 {Werke, V. p. 70). Compare Philosophie der Religion, 
 {Werke, XI. p. 30). EncykhpadAe, § a8, 29, {Werke, VI. 
 
 p. 6s). 
 
 Note 3. p. 72. 
 
 The opposite sides of this contradiction are indicated in 
 the following passages. Aristotle, Phys. III. 6, 13 : 'Eori 
 yap TO &iteipov rrjs toC [xeyeOovs reXeioTTjTos iXr) Kal to bvvdixei 
 
 8\ov, evTekfx^^'i ^ °^ ^'o "<*' ayvaxTTov ^ S/neipov. etSos 
 
 yap ovK ^xei fi S\r). Compare Metaph. viii. 8, 16: T^ apa 
 hvvaTov elvai ivbiyerai Kal dvai koX uh ttvav to mno &oa bv- 
 
LECTURE III. 327 
 
 iJaroz; koi etvai koI firj etvai. To 8^ twarov jxri eivai ^vbix^^ai 
 
 fJ-T] etvai' TO 6' kvte)(6[i.evov juij etvaij (^Oaprov Ov&kv apa 
 
 T&v &(j}96,pra)v dTrXws bwdixei lortv 6i> ai:\m. For a full dis- 
 cussion of the distinction between potentiality and actuaUty, 
 (the hivap.i's and evreXextia or evepyeia of Aristotle), see 
 Trendelenburg on Arist. De Anima, p. 295. Compare Arist. 
 Metaph. viii. 6. 3 : "EerTt 8' rj ^vipyeia ro xns6.pxiiv to ■npayp.a, 
 jxri oUrais Scnrep \4yop.ev bwdfjiei. Aiyop-ep bl bvv&fj,u olov kv 
 Tw ^jJXo) 'EpjUTji' /cat kv rfj SAjj TTJi) '^fxCtreiav, on acfxupeOeirj &v, 
 Koi imcTT'qiJ.ova koI tov [xri OempovvTa, &v bwuTos y Oecaprjarw 
 TO 8' fvepyeCq. This distinction plays a part in the con- 
 troversy between Bramhall and Hobbes, the former of 
 whom says, " The nearer that any thing comes to the es- 
 sence of God, the more remote it is from our apprehension. 
 But shall we therefore make potentialities, and successive 
 duration, and former and latter, or a part without a part 
 (as they say), to be in God ? Because we are not able to 
 understand clearly the Divine perfection, we must not there- 
 fore attribute any imperfection to Him"." To this Hobbes 
 replies, " Nor do I understand what derogation it can be to 
 the divine perfection, to attribute to it potentiality, that is, 
 in English, power d." " By potentiality," retorts Bramhall, 
 " he understandeth ' power' or might ; others understand 
 possibility or indetermination. Is not he likely to confute 
 the Schoolmen to good purpose^?" Hobbes concludes by 
 saying, " There is no such word as potentiality in the Scrip- 
 tures, nor in any author of the Latin tongue. It is found 
 only in School divinity, as a word of art, or rather as a word 
 of craft, to amaze and puzzle the laityf." This charge may 
 be answered in the words of Trendelenburg. " In expli- 
 candis his notionibus, ex ipso philosophise secessu deprom- 
 tis, Latinse linguae in philosophicis et laxa remissio et Iseva 
 inopia in angustias quasdam nos rediget, ut perspicuitatis 
 gratia ad scholasticos terminos confugiendum sits." 
 
 But to go from the word to the thing. The contradic- 
 tion thus involved in the notion of the Infinite has given 
 
 = WbrJcs, vol. IV. p. 158. d Works, ed. Molesworth, vol. V. p. 342. 
 e Works, vol. IV. p. 425. ' Works, ed. Molesworth, vol. IV. p. 299. 
 B In Arist. de Anima, p. 295. 
 
328 NOTES. 
 
 rise to two opposite representations of it ; the one, as the 
 affirmation of all reality ; the other, as the negation of all 
 reality. The older metaphysicians endeavoured to exhaust 
 the infinite by an endless addition of predicates ; hence 
 arose the favourite representation of God, as the Ens per- 
 fectissimum, or sum of all realities, which prevailed in the 
 Wolfian Philosophy, and was accepted by Kantl». On the 
 other hand, the post -Kantian metaphysicians perceived 
 clearly that all predication is necessarily limitation, and 
 that to multiply attributes is merely to represent the infi- 
 nite under a variety of finite determinations. The con- 
 summation of this point of view was attained in the prin- 
 ciple of Hegel, that pure being is pure nothing, and that 
 all determinate being (Daseyn) is necessarily limited'. 
 Hence his constant assertion that God cannot be repre- 
 sented by predicates i'. Both schools of philosophy are 
 right in what they deny, and wrong in what they affirm. 
 The earlier metaphysicians were right in assuming that 
 thought is only possible by means of definite conceptions ; 
 but they were wrong in supposing that any multiplication 
 of such conceptions can amount to a representation of the 
 infinite. The later metaphysicians were right in opposing 
 this error ; but they fell into the opposite extreme of ima- 
 gining that by the removal of determinations the act of 
 thought and its object could become infinite. In truth, a 
 thought about nothing is no thought at all; and the re- 
 jection of determinations is simply the refusal to think. 
 The conclusion to be drawn from the entire controversy 
 is, that the infinite, as such, is not an object of human 
 thought. 
 
 Note 4. p. 73. 
 
 " The adding infinity to any idea or conception necessarily 
 finite, makes up no other than a curious contradiction for 
 a divine attribute You "make up an attribute of know- 
 ledge or wisdom infinitely finite ; which is as chimerical and 
 
 h See Wolf, Theologia Naturalis, Pars II. § 6, 145 Kant, Kritik der 
 reinen Vernmift, p. 450, ed. Rosenkranz. 
 
 i See Werhe, III. p. 73; IV. p. 26, 27; V. p. 70; VI. p. 63. 
 k See fTerie, VI. p. 65 ; XI. p. 31, 153; XII. p. 229, 418. 
 
LEOTUEE III. 329 
 
 gigantic an idea as an infinite human body." Bp. Browne, 
 Divine Analogy, P- 77- Bedingungen des Unbedingten 
 entdecken, dem absolut Nffthwendigen eine Moglichkeit 
 erjmdm, und es construiren zu woUen, um es hegreifen zu 
 konnen, scheint als ein ungereimtes Unternehmen sogleich 
 einleuchten zu mussen." Jacobi, Ueher die Lehre des Spinoza, 
 ( Werhe, IV. Abth. II. p. 153). " Du bist vom Endlichen 
 nicht dem Grade, sondern der Art nach verschieden. Sie 
 machen dich durch jene Steigerung nur zu einem grosseren 
 Menschen, und immer zu einem grosseren j nie aber zum 
 Gotte, zum Unendlichen, der keines Maasses fahig ist." 
 Fichte, Bestimm.ung des Menschen {Werke, II. p. 304.). 
 
 Note 5. p. 73. 
 
 " Si supponeremus esse hominem, oculis quidem claris 
 cseterisque videndi organis recte se habentibus compositum, 
 nullo autem alio sensu prseditum, eumque ad eandem rem 
 eodem semper colore et specie sine ulla vel minima varie- 
 tate apparentem obversum esse, mihi carte, quicquid dicant 
 alii, non magis videre videretur, quam ego videor mihi 
 per tactus organa sentire lacertorum meorum ossa. Ea 
 tamen perpetuo et undiquaque sensibilissima membrana 
 continguntur. Attonitum esse et fortasse aspectare eum, 
 sed stupentem dicerem, videre non dicerem ; adeo sentire 
 semper idem, et non sentire, ad idem recidunt." Hobbes, 
 Elementa PhilosopMa, Sect. I. P. IV. 0. 25, 5. 
 
 Note 6. p. 73. 
 
 The paradox of Hegel, if applied, where alone we have 
 any data for applying it, to the necessary limits of human 
 thought, becomes no paradox at all, but an obvious truth, 
 almost a truism. Our conceptions are limited to the finite 
 and the determinate ; and a thought which is not of any 
 definite object, is but the negation of all thinking. He- 
 gel's error consists in mistaking an impotence of thought 
 for a condition of existence. That pure being is in itself 
 pure nothing, is more than we can be warranted in assum- 
 ing ; for we have no conception of pure being at all, and no 
 means of judging of the possibility of its existence. The 
 
330 NOTES 
 
 absurdity becomes still more glaring, when this pure no- 
 thing is represented as containing in itself a process of 
 self-development, — when being and non-being, which are 
 absolutely one and the same, are regarded at the same 
 time as two opposite elements, which by their union con- 
 stitute becoming, and thus give rise to finite existence. But 
 this absurdity is unavoidable in a system which starts with 
 the assumption that thought and being are identical, and 
 thus abolishes at the outset the possibility of distinguish- 
 ing between the impotence of thought and its activity. 
 
 Note 7. p. 74. 
 Ueier den Grund imseres Glaubens an eine gbttUche Welt- 
 regierung ( TVerke,Y. p. 186). In a subsequent work written 
 in defence of this opinion, Fichte explains himself as mean- 
 ing that existence, as a conception of sensible origin, cannot 
 be ascribed to God'. That the conception of existence 
 is, like all other human representations, incompetent to 
 express the nature of the Absolute, has been frequently 
 admitted, by philosophers and theologians. Thus Plato 
 describes the supreme good, ovk ova-lai ovtos tov ayaOov, 
 a\K' en sTtiKeiva ttjs overlaps •npea-^ela Ka\ bvv&fiei VTrepexpv- 
 Tos ™, and his language is borrowed by Justin Martyr and 
 Athanasius, to express the absolute nature of God" ; Plo- 
 tinus in like manner says that the One is above being"; 
 and Schelling, the Plotinus of Germany, asserts that the 
 Absolute in its essence is neither ideal nor real, neither 
 thought nor being P. This position is perfectly tenable so 
 
 1 Apellation an das Publicum gegen die AnklagedesAtheismus{WerTce, 
 V. p. 220). 
 
 ™ Republic, VI. p. 509. 
 
 " Justin, Dial. c. Tryph. c. 4.' AXXa ri hv roCr avrh, (jirjiu, hv iireiuiva 
 irdfTrjs ovtrlas, oijTe prjrbvf ovre dyopevrov, aWa povov KoKov Kai aya66v, 
 Athanasius, c. Gentes, c. 2. 6 vTtfpeKeiva ircurqs oicrias Koi dv6pamvr]f 
 fTTivoias vnapxtov, arc S^ dyad&s koj vTrepKoKos &v. Compare Dama- 
 scenus, De Fide Orthod, I. 4. ovbev yap r&v ovtchv ecTTLV' ovy a>s prj &>v, 
 dXX as vTvep TrdvTa ra ovra, Koi virep avTo to eivai av, 
 
 ° Enn.Y. 1. 10. to iirfKuva ovrosrh ev. Compare Proclus, Inst.Theol. 
 c. iTg. S^Xoy S!j on ndvrav itrriv incKfiva tSiv elprjpsvav airas 6eos, oi- 
 a-ias, Kol fm^r, Kai vov. 
 
 P Bruno, p. gy. " Das Absolute nun haben wir bestimmt als, dem 
 Wesen nach, weder ideal noch real, weder als Denken, noch als Seyn." 
 
LECTURE III. 331 
 
 long as it is confessed that the Absolute is not the object of 
 theological or philosophical speculation, and, consequently, 
 that the provinces of thought and existence are not coex- 
 tensive. But without this safeguard, there is no middle 
 course between an illogical theology and an atheistical logic. 
 The more pious minds will take refuge in mysticism, and 
 seek to reach the absolute by a superhuman process : the 
 more consistent reasoners will rush into the opposite ex- 
 treme, and boldly conclude that that which is inconceivable 
 is also non-existent. 
 
 Note 8. p. 74. 
 Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. VII. 311. "OAoi^ 6' ovto's 
 Tov KaraXaix^dvovTOi ovb^v sti kcrrai to KaTaXaiJ,l3av6iJi,evov 
 T&v hi d\oya>TdT(ov ea-Ti to ttvai fikv tov KaTaXaixj3dvovTa, //.j) 
 eimi 8e 70 ov ^(ttIv fj KaTd\r)\jns. Plotinus, Enn. V. III. 10. 
 Aei Tolvvv TO i/ooiii», orav vorj, kv hvcrXv elvai, koX tj ^£a> ddrepov, 
 rj kv Tu airu ^ju^o), Koi del iv eTepoTrjTi ttjv v6r]cnv etvai. 
 Compare Hegel, Philosophie der Itelicfion,{Werk0,'Xl. p. 167.) 
 " Im Bewusstseyn, insofern ich von einem Gegenstande 
 weiss und ich in mich gegen denselben reflectirt bin, weiss 
 ich den Gegenstand als das Andere meiner, mich daher durch 
 ihn beschrdnkt und endlich." Marheineke, Grundlehren, 
 § 84. " Dieses aber geschieht so, dass in der absoluten 
 Idee, in der die Wissenschaft ihren Standpunct nimmt, das 
 Subject nicht ein Anderes, als das Object, sondern, wie sie 
 die Idee des Absoluten ist, als des Objects, es so auch in 
 ihr, als der absoluten Idee, Subject, und also die absolute 
 Idee nicht von Gott selbst verschieden ist." 
 
 Note 9. p. 76. 
 In exhibiting the two universal conditions of human con- 
 sciousness, that of difference between objects, and that of 
 relation between object and subject, I have considered each 
 with reference to its more immediate and obvious applica- 
 tion ; the former being viewed in connection with the In- 
 finite, and the latter with the Absolute. But at the same 
 time it is obvious that the two conditions are so intimately 
 connected together, and the ideas to which they relate so 
 mutuallv involved in each other, that either argument 
 
332 NOTES. 
 
 might be employed with equal force in the other direction. 
 For difference is a relation, as well as a limit ; that which 
 is one out of many being related to the objects from which 
 it is distinguished. And the subject and object of con- 
 sciousness, in like manner, are not only related to, but 
 distinguished from, each other ; and thus each is a limit 
 to the other : while, if either of them could be destroyed, 
 a conception of the infinite by the finite would be still im- 
 possible ; for either there would be no infinite to be con- 
 ceived, or there would be no finite to conceive it. 
 
 The three Laws of Thought commonly acknowledged by, 
 logicians, those of Identity, Contradiction, and Excluded 
 Middle, are but the above two conditions viewed in rela- 
 tion to a given notion. For in the first place, every definite 
 notion, as such, is discerned in the two relations of identity 
 and difference, as being that which it is, and as distin- 
 guished from that which it is not. These two relations are 
 expressed by the Laws of Identity and Contradiction. And 
 in the second place, a notion is distinguished from all that 
 it is not {A from not-.4), by means of the mutual relation 
 of both objects to a common subject, the universe of whose 
 consciousness is constituted by this distinction. This mu- 
 tual relation is expressed by the Law of Excluded Middle. 
 
 Note 10. p. 76. 
 " Though we cannot fully comprehend the Deity, nor 
 exhaust the infiniteness of its perfection, yet may we have 
 an idea or conception of a Being absolutely perfect ; such 
 a one as is nostro modulo conformis, ' agreeable and pro- 
 portionate to our measure and scantling ;' as we may ap- 
 proach near to a mountain, and touch it with our hands, 
 though we cannot encompass it all round, and enclasp it 
 within our arms." Cudworth, Intellectual System, ch. 5, 
 (vol. II. p, 518, ed. Harrison). " We grant that the mind 
 is limited, but does it thence follow that the object of 
 thought must be limited ? We think not. We grant that 
 the mind cannot embrace the Infinite, but we nevertheless 
 consider that the mind may have a notion of the Infinite. 
 No more do we beHeve that the mind, as finite, can only 
 
LECTURE III. 333 
 
 recognise finite objects, than we believe that the eye, be- 
 cause limited in its power, can only recognise those objects 
 whose entire extension comes within the range of vision. 
 As well tell us that because a mountain is too large for the 
 eye of a mole, therefore the mole can recognise no moun- 
 tain : as well tell us that because the world is too large for 
 the eye of a man, therefore man can recognise no world, — 
 as tell us that because the Infinite cannot be embraced by 
 the finite mind, therefore the mind can recognise no Infi- 
 nite." Oalderwood, Philosophy of the Infinite, p. 12. The 
 illustrations employed by both authors are unfortunate. 
 The part of the mountain, touched by the hand of the man, 
 or seen by the eye of the mole, is, eao hypothesi, as a part 
 of a larger object, imperfect, relative, and finite. And the 
 world, which is confessedly too large for the eye of a man, 
 must, in its unseen portion, be apprehended, not by sight, 
 but by some other faculty. If therefore the Infinite is too 
 large for the mind of man, it can only be recognised by 
 some other mind, or by some faculty in man which is not 
 mind. But no such faculty is or can be assumed. In ad- 
 mitting that we do not recognise the Infinite in its entire 
 extension, it is admitted that we do not recognise it as in- 
 finite. The attempted distinction is sufficiently refuted in 
 the words of Bishop Browne. " If it is said that we may 
 then apprehend God directly, though not comprehend him ; 
 that we may have a direct and immediate knowledge 
 partly, and in some degree ; and though not of his Essence, 
 yet of the Perfections flowing from it : I answer. That all 
 the Attributes and Perfections of God are in their real 
 Nature as infinite as his very Essence ; so that there can 
 be no such thing as having a direct view of him in part ; 
 for whatever is in God is equally Infinite. If God is to be 
 apprehended at all by any direct and immediate idea, he 
 must be apprehended as Infinite ; and in that very act of 
 the mind, he would be comprehended; and there is no 
 medium between apprehending an Infinite Being directly 
 and analogically V." 
 
 p Divine Analogy, p. 37. The author is speaking of our knowledge 
 
334 NOTES. 
 
 Note 11. p. 80. 
 
 The brevity with which this argument is necessarily ex- 
 pressed in the text, may render a few words of explanation 
 desirable. Of course, it is not meant that no period of 
 time can be conceived, except in a time equally long ; for 
 this would make a thousand years as inconceivable as an 
 eternity. But though there is nothing inconceivable in the 
 notion of a thousand years, or any other large amount of 
 time, such a notion is conceivable only under the form of 
 a portion of time, having other time before and after it. 
 An infinite duration, on the other hand, can only be con- 
 ceived as having no time before or after it, and hence as 
 having no relation or resemblance to any amount of finite 
 time, however great. The mere conception of an indefinite 
 duration, bounding every conceivable portion of time, is 
 thus wholly distinct from that of infinite duration ; for in- 
 finity can neither bound nor be bounded by any duration 
 beyond itself. 
 
 This distinction has perhaps not been sufficiently ob- 
 served by an able and excellent writer of the present day, 
 in a work, the principal portions of which are worthy of 
 the highest commendation. Dr. M^Cosh argues in behalf 
 of a positive conception, as the foundation of our belief in 
 the infinite <J, in opposition to the theory of Sir W. Hamil- 
 ton, in the following manner : " To whatever point we go 
 
 in a future state ; but his arguments are more properly applicable to 
 our present condition. 
 
 9 In the former editions, I wrote, " argues in behalf of a positive con- 
 ception of infinity." This expression Dr. M'^Cosh, in the last edition 
 of his work, points out as a misrepresentation, adding, " it is not an 
 adequate conception of infinity, but still the behef is positive, and there 
 is the positive mental conception or apprehension of an object beUeved 
 in." I gladly accept the correction, and have altered the language of 
 my remarks accordingly ; though it seems to me that this explanation 
 reduces the theory of the Author almost if not quite to an identity with 
 that of Sir W. Hamilton, which he is professedly opposing. For this 
 "positive conception of an object believed in," if it is not a positive con- 
 ception of the infinite as such, can only be a conception of the finite or 
 of the indefinite. That such a conception, positive as regards the finite 
 
LECTURE III. 335 
 
 out in imagination, we are sure that we are not at the 
 limits of existence ; nay, we believe that, to whatever far- 
 ther point we might go, there would be something still 
 farther on." " Such," he continues, " seems to us to be the 
 true psychological nature of the mind's conviction in re- 
 gard to the infinite. It is not, as Sir W. Hamilton repre- 
 sents it, a mere impotence to conceive that existence, that 
 time or space, should cease, but a positive affirmation that 
 they do not cease '^." 
 
 This theory, as explained by the author in his last 
 edition, differs from that of Sir W. Hamilton rather in 
 language than in substance. Indeed the discrepancy is so 
 small that it would hardly be necessary to notice it, had 
 not the excellent author, by his mode of stating his view, 
 given it the appearance of an antagonism greater than on 
 examination will be found to exist. A " positive affirma- 
 tion" is not in itself opposed to an ''impotence to con- 
 ceive : " we may be, by the constitution of our minds, com- 
 pelled to believe in the one rather than the other of two 
 contradictory alternatives, neither of which can be compre- 
 hended in the form of a positive conception. That this is 
 the case in the present instance; — that the affirmation, 
 however positive; cannot, as Dr. M^Oosh himself admits, 
 he referred to a positive conception of the Infinite as 
 affirmed, may be shewn, among other grounds, by the 
 following considerations. 
 
 In the first place, this " something still farther on" is 
 not itself primarily an object of conception, but merely the 
 boundary of conception. It is a condition unavoidable by 
 all finite thought, that whatever we conceive must be re- 
 lated to something else which we do not conceive. I think 
 
 or indefinite, but negative as regards the infinite, may give rise to a posi- 
 tive belief in the latter, is not, as far as I am aware, opposed to any 
 principle of the philosophy of the conditioned. But, whatever shade of 
 diflference more acute minds may detect between the two doctrines, I am 
 glad to find my apparent line of separation from so able and reverent a 
 thinker as Dr. M<=Cosh, reduced to even smaller 'dimensions than I had 
 originally supposed. 
 
 ' Method of the Divine Government, p. 534, 6th edition. 
 
336 NOTES. 
 
 of a thousand years as bounded by a further duration 
 beyond it. But if, secondarily, we turn our attention to 
 this boundary itself, it is not then actually conceived as 
 either limited or unlimited on its remoter side : we do 
 not positively think of it as having no boundary ; but we 
 are unable to think of it as having a boundary. It is 
 thus presented to us as indefinite, but not as infinite. And 
 the result will be the same, if to our conception of a 
 thousand years we add cycle upon cycle, till we are 
 wearied with the effort. An idea which we tend towards, 
 but never reach, is indefinite, but not infinite ; for, at 
 whatever point we rest, there are conditions beyond, which 
 remain unexhausted. 
 
 In the second place, even if we could positively conceive 
 this further duration as going on for ever, we should still 
 be far removed from the conception of infinity. For such 
 a duration is given to us as bounding and bounded by our 
 original conception of a thousand years : it is limited at its 
 nearer extremity, though unlimited at the other. If this 
 be regarded as infinite, we are reduced to the self-contra- 
 dictory notion of infinity related to a time beyond itself. 
 Is a thousand years, plus its infinite boundary, greater 
 than that boundary alone, or not? If it is, we have the 
 absurdity of a greater than the infinite. If it is not, the 
 original conception of a thousand years, from relation to 
 which that of infinity is supposed to arise, is itself reduced 
 to a non-entity, and cannot be related to any thing. This 
 contradiction may be avoided if we admit that our con- 
 ception of time, as bounded, implies an apprehension of 
 the indefinite, but not of the infinite. 
 
 The difference between Dr. M<^Oosh's view and that of Sir 
 W. Hamilton is at any rate so slight that the subsequent 
 remarks of the former might be fully accepted by the most 
 uncompromising adherent of the latter. " The mind seeks 
 in vain to embrace the infinite in a positive image, but is 
 constrained to believe, when its efforts fail, that there is a 
 something to which no hmits can be put." AH that need 
 practically be contended for by the supporters of the nega- 
 tive theory, is, first, that this inability to assign limits 
 
LECTURE III. 337 
 
 indicates directly only an indefiniteness in our manner of 
 thinking, but not necessarily an infinity in the object about 
 which we think; and, secondly, that our indirect belief in 
 the infinite, whether referred to an impotence or to a 
 power of mind, is not of such a character that we can 
 deduce from it any logical consequences available in philo- 
 sophy or in theology. The sober and reverent tone of reli- 
 gious thought which characterizes Dr. M^Cosh's writings, 
 warrants the belief that he would not himself repudiate 
 these conclusions. 
 
 Note 12. p. 80. 
 For the antagonist thiPories of a beginning of time itself, 
 and of an eternal succession in time, see Plato, TimcBus, 
 p. 37, 38, and Aristotle, Phys.Ylll. i. The two theories 
 are ably contrasted in Professor Butler's Lectures on the 
 History of Ancient Philosophy, vol.11, p. 185 sqq. Plato 
 does not appear to regard the beginning of time as the 
 beginning of material existence, but only of the sensible 
 phenomena of matter. The insensible substratum of the 
 phenomena seems to have been regarded by him as co- 
 eternal with the Deity. It has been conjectured, indeed, 
 that to this matter was attributed a perpetual existence in 
 successive duration, as distinguished from the existence of 
 the Deity, in a manner devoid of all succession^. This 
 hypothesis perhaps relieves the theory from the apparent 
 paradox of an existence before time, (befot^e being itself a 
 temporal relation,) but it cannot be easily reconciled with 
 the language of Plato ; and moreover, it only avoids one 
 paradox by the introduction of another, — that of a 
 state of existence out of time contemporaneous with one 
 in time. 
 
 ' See Timmiis, p. 49-53. Plato's opinion however has been variously 
 represented. For some account of the controversies on this point, see 
 Mosheim's Dissertation, De Creations ex Nihilo, translated in Harri- 
 son's edition of Cudworth, vol. III. p. 140 j Brucker, Historia Philo- 
 sopJiiee, vol. I. p. 676. Compare also Professor Thompson's note, in 
 Butler's Lectures on the History of Ancient Philosophy, vol. II. p. 189. 
 
 s See Mosheim's note in Harrison's Cudworth, vol. II. p. 551. 
 
 z 
 
338 NOTES. 
 
 Note 13. p. 80. 
 
 In Joann. Evang. Tract. XXXVIII. 10. " Discute reruns 
 mutationes, invenies Fuit et Erit : cogita Deum, inveniea 
 Est, ubi Fuit et Erit esse non possit." Compare Confess. 
 XI. 0. T I ; Enarr. in Ps. II. 7 ; De Civ. Dei, XI. 2 1 . See 
 also Cudworth, vol. II. p. 529. ed. Harrison ; Herder, Gott, 
 Werke, VIII. p. 139, 
 
 Note 14. p. 80. 
 
 De Consol. Philos. L. V. Pr. 6. "^^ternitas igitur est in- 
 terminabilis vitse tota simul et perfecta possessio." 
 
 Note 15. p. 80. 
 
 Swnma, P. I. Qu. X. Art. I. " Sic ergo ex duobus noti- 
 ficatur seternitas. Primo ex hoc, quod id quod est in 
 seternitate est interminabile, id est, principio et fine carens ; 
 ut terminus ad utrumque referatur. Secundo per hoc, 
 quod ipsa seternitas successione caret, tota simul existens." 
 Compare Plotinus, Enn. II. 1. vii. c. %. Ylavra ravra lha>v 
 al&va etbiv, Ibbiv fta^v fxivovcrav iv ru avr^, det -napov to ttclv 
 e\ov(Tav, dAA.' ov vvv jikv rode, aWn 5' Irepov, dW' &iui to. 
 ■n&VTa. Proclus, Inst. Theol. c. ^2. Ylav to aicaviov o\ov &iJ.a 
 icrrCv. Several historical notices relating to this theory 
 are given by PetaviuSj Theologica Dogmata, De Deo, 1. III. 
 c. 4. 
 
 Note 16. p. 81. 
 
 "Nee tamen fieri potest, ut recordemur nos ante corpus 
 exstitisse, quandoquidem nee in corpore ulla ejus vestigia 
 dari, nee seternitas tempore definiri, nee uUam ad tempus 
 relationem habere potest. Spinoza, Eihica, P. V. Prop. 23. 
 "Ewigkeit im reinen Sinne des Worts kann durch keine 
 Zeitdauer erklart werden, gesetzt, dass man diese auch 
 endlos {indefinite) annahme. Dauer ist eine unbestimmte 
 Fortsetzung des Daseyns, die schon in jedem Moment ein 
 Mass der Verganglichkeit, des Zukunftigen wie des Vor- 
 gangenen, mit sich fiihret. Dem Unverganglichen, durch 
 sich Unveranderlichen kann sie so wenig zugeschrieben 
 
LECTURE III. 339 
 
 werden, dass vielmehr sein reiner Begriff mit dieser zvi 
 gemischten Fantasie verschwindet.'" Herder, Gott, (Werke, 
 VIII. p. 140). " Insofern das Ich ewig ist, hat es gar 
 keine Dauer. Denn Dauer ist nur in Bezug auf Objekte 
 denkbar. Man spricht von einer Ewigkeit der Dauer 
 (seviternitas), d. i. von eineni Daseyn in aller Zeit, aber 
 Ewigkeit im reinen Sinne des Worts (seternitas) ist Seyn 
 in keiner Zeit." Schelling, Vom Ich, § 15. Cognate to, or 
 rather identical with, these speculations, is the theory ad- 
 vocated by Mr. Maurice {Theological Essays, p. 42a sqq.), 
 " that eternity is not a lengthening out or continuation of 
 time; that they are generically different." 
 
 Note 17. p. 82. 
 In the acute and decisive criticism of Schelling by Sir 
 W. Hamilton, this objection is urged with great effect. 
 " We cannot, at the same moment, be in the intellectual 
 intuition and in common consciousness ; we must therefore 
 be able to connect them by an act of memory — of recol- 
 lection. But how can there be a remembromce of the Ab- 
 solute and its Intuition ? As out of time, and space, and 
 relation, and difference, it is admitted that the Absolute 
 cannot be construed to the understanding. But as remem- 
 brance is only possible under the conditions of the under- 
 standing, it is consequently impossible to remember any 
 thing anterior to the moment when we awaken into con- 
 sciousness ; and the clairvoyance of the Absolute, even 
 granting its reality, is thus, after the crisis, as if it had 
 never been." Discussions, p. 23. 
 
 Note 18. p. 83. 
 See Augustine, In Joa/rm. Evamg. Tract. XXXVIII. 10. 
 " Cogita Deum, invenies Est, ubi Fuit et Erit esse non 
 possit. Ut ergo et tu sis, transcende tempus. Sed quis 
 transcendet viribus suis ? Levet illuc ille qui Patri dixit. 
 Volo ut ubi ego sum, et ipsi sint mecum." This precept 
 has found great favour with mystical theologians. Thus 
 Eckart, in a sermon published among those of Tauler, says, 
 " Nothing hinders the soul so much in its knowledge of 
 
 z 2 
 
340 NOTES. 
 
 God as time and place. Time and place are parts, and 
 God is one ; therefore, if our soul is to know God, it must 
 know Him above time and place*." And the author of 
 the Theologia Germanica, c. 7 : " If the soul shall see with 
 the right eye into eternity, then the left eye must close 
 itself and refrain from working, and be as, though it were 
 dead. For if the left eye be fulfilling its office toward 
 outward things; that is, holding converse with time and 
 the creatures ; then must the right eye be hindered in its 
 working; that is, in its contemplation"." So too Sweden- 
 borg, in his Angelic Wisdom concerning Divine Providence, 
 § 48 : " What is infinite in itself and eternal in itself is 
 divine, can be seen, and yet cannot be seen by men : it can 
 be seen by those who think of infinite not from space, and 
 of eternal not from time ; but cannot be seen by those who 
 think of infinite and eternal from space and time ^." In 
 the same spirit sings Angelus Silesius : 
 
 " Menech, wo du deinen Geist sohwingst iiber Ort und Zeit, 
 So kannst du jeden Blick sein in der Ewigkeity." 
 
 The modern German mysticism is in this respect nowise 
 behind the earlier. Schelling says of his Intuition of the 
 Absolute, " Das reine Selbstbewusstseyn ist ein Act, der 
 ausserhalb aller Zeit liegt und alle Zeit erst constituirt^." 
 And again, " Da aber im Absoluten das Denken mit dem 
 Anschauen schlechthin Eins, so werden auch die Dinge 
 nicht bloss durch ihre Begriffe als unendlich, sondern durch 
 ihre Ideen als ewig, mithin ohne alle Beziehung, selbst die 
 der Entgegensetzung, auf Zeit, und mit absoluter Einheit 
 der Moglichkeit und Wirklichkeit, in ihm, als der hochsten 
 Einheit des Denkens und Anschauens, ausgedriickt seyn »." 
 Schleiermacher (ChristUche Glaube, § 52) endeavours to find 
 
 * lAfe and Sermons of Dr. John Tauler, translated by Susanna Wink- 
 worth, p. 190. 
 
 " Theologia Germanica, translated by Susanna Winkworth, p. 20. 
 
 ^ English translation, p. 27. 
 
 y Cherubiniseher Wandersmann, 1. 12. Quoted by Strauss, Glaubens- 
 lehre, 11. p. 738. 
 
 2 System des Transeendentalem Idealismus, p. 59. ( Werke, III.'p.37S.) 
 
 a Bruno, p. 58. 
 
LECTURE III. 341 
 
 something analogous to the Divine Eternity, in the timeless 
 existence of the personal self, as the permanent subject of 
 successiTe modes of consciousness. The analogy however 
 fails in two respects ; first, because the permanent self 
 cannot be contemplated apart from its successive modes, 
 but is discerned only in relation to them ; and, secondly, 
 because, though not itself subject to the condition of suc- 
 cession, it is still in time under that of duration. Kant 
 truly remarks on all such mystical efforts to transcend 
 time : " Alles lediglich darum, damit die Menschen sich 
 endlich doch einer ewigen Buhe zu. erfreuen haben moch- 
 ten, welche denn ihr vermeintes seliges Ende aller Dinge 
 ausmacht ; eigentlich ein Begriff, mit dem ihnen zugleich 
 der Verstand ausgeht und alles Denken selbst ein Ende 
 hat"." 
 
 Note 19. p. 83. 
 
 This is directly admitted by Fichte, who says, in his 
 earliest work, " Wie der unendliche Verstand sein Daseyn 
 und seine Eigenschaften anschauen moge, konnen wir, ohne 
 selbst der unendliche Verstand zu seyn, nicht wissen^." 
 But of the two alternatives which this important admission 
 offers, Fichte himself, in his subsequent writings, as well 
 as his successors in philosophy, chose the wrong one. See 
 above, Lecture L note 29. 
 
 Note 20. p. 84. 
 
 " Ueber den Sprachgebrauch der Worte Person, Ferson- 
 lichkeit, u. f. schlage man Worterbiicher auf .... alle sagen 
 in ihren gesammelten Stellen, dass diese Worte ein Eigen- 
 thiimUches oder Besondres wnter einer gewissen Apparenz 
 bezeichnen ; welcher Nebenbegriflf dem Unendlichen im 
 Gegensatz der Welt gar nicht zukommt." Herder, Gott, 
 ( Werke, VIII. p. 199). " Was nennt ihr denn nun Person- 
 lichkeit und Bewusstseyn ? doch wohl dasjenige, was ihr in 
 euch selbst gefunden, an eucli selbst kennen gelernt, und mit 
 diesem Namen bezeichnet habt ? Dass ihr aber dieses ohne 
 
 i" Das Ende aller Dinge, {Werke, VII. p. 422.) 
 
 '^ Versueh einer Kritik aller Offenharung, {Werke, V. p. 42.) 
 
342 NOTES. 
 
 Beschrankung und Endlichkeit schlechterdings nicht denkt, 
 noch denken konnt, kann euch die geringste Aufmerk- 
 samkeit auf eure Construction dieses Begriffs lehren." 
 Fichte, XJeler gottUche Weltregierung, {Werke, V. p. 187). 
 Sohleiermacher, in like manner, in his second Discourse on 
 Religion, offers a half apology for Pantheism, on the ground 
 of the Umitation implied in the notions of personality and 
 consciousness d. And Strauss remarks: " Als Personen 
 fiihlen und wissen wir uns nur im Unterschiede von andern 
 gleichartigen Personen ausser uns, von denen wir uns un- 
 tersoheiden, mithin als endliche; in diesem Gebiete der 
 Endlichkeit und fiir dasselbe gebildet, soheint folglich der 
 Begriff der Personlichkeit ausserhalb desselben jeden Sinn 
 zu verlieren, und ein Wesen, welches kein Anderes seines- 
 gleichen ausser sich hat, auch keine Person sein zu kon- 
 nen,'" Christliche Glaubenslehre, I. p. 504. 
 
 Note 21. p. 85. 
 
 De Trinitate, XV. c.5. "Proinde si dicamus, jEternus, 
 immortalis, inoorruptibilis, vivus, sapiens, potens, speciosus, 
 Justus, bonus, beatus, spiritus ; horum omnium novissimum 
 quod posui quasi tanturamodo videtur significare substan- 
 tiam, osetera vero hujus substantise qualitates : sed non ita 
 est in ilia ineffabili simplicique natura. Quidquid enim se- 
 cundum qualitates illic dici videtur, secundum substantiam 
 vel essentiam est intelligendum. Absit enim ut spiritus se- 
 cundum substantiam dicatur Deus, et bonus secundum qua- 
 litatem : sed utrumque secundum substantiam .... quamvis 
 in Deo idem sit justum esse quod bonum, quod beatum, 
 idemque spiritum esse quod justum et bonum et beatum 
 esse." Ibid. VI. c. 4. " Deo autem hoc est esse quod est 
 fortem esse, aut justum esse, aut sapientem esse, et si quid 
 de ilia simplici multiplicitate, vel multiplioi simplicitate dix- 
 eris, quo substantia ejus significetur." Compare Aquinas, 
 Summa, P. I. Qu. XL. Art. i : "Considerandum tamen est, 
 quod propter divinani simplicitatem consideratur duplex 
 identitas realis in divinis, eorum quae differunt in rebus 
 
 * Werke, I, pp. 259, 280. 
 
LECTURE III. 343 
 
 oreatis. Quia enim divina sitnplicitas excludit compoaitio- 
 nem formse et materise, sequitur, quod in divinis idem est 
 abstractura et conoretum, ut Deitas et Deus. Quia vero 
 divina simplicitaa excludit oompositionem subject! et acci- 
 dentia, sequitur, quod quicquid attribuitur Deo, est ejus 
 essentia : et propter hoc, sapientia et virtus idem sunt in 
 Deo, quia ambo sunt in divina essentia." See also above, 
 Lecture IL note 27. 
 
 Note 22. p. 85. 
 Plotinus, Enn. VL 1. ix. c. 6. ITai' 8' h hv kiyrjrai, evbeks, 
 Tov eS Koi rov crddovTos icrnv ei'Sees" toore ra evl ovbkv ayadov 
 ia-Tiv, ovb^ ^o-6\ri(ns Toivvv oiibevos' dA.A' eariv {mepdyadov, 
 Koi avTo ovx eavra, toXs 6' HWols &ya9bv, ft rt avrov buvarai, 
 IxeraKafifidveiV ovbi v&qvn, tva /x^ kreporrjs, ovb^ Klvrjo-is' ttpo 
 yap Kivri(TS(os koX irpo voTfcrews. Ti yap Ktxi vorjcrei ; kavT6v. 
 Upb vorjcrecos toCvvv ayvo&v eorat, koI roijo-eus Se7j(rerai, tva yv^ 
 kauTov 6 awdpxrjs eavr^. Spinoza, £!th. P. I. Prop. 17. Schol. 
 " Si intellectus ad divinam naturam pertinet, non poterit, 
 uti noster intellectus, posterior (ut plerisque placet) vel si- 
 mul natura esse cum rebus intellectis, quandoquidem Deus 
 omnibus rebus prior est causalitate : sed contra Veritas et 
 formalis rerum essentia ideo talis est, quia talis in Dei in- 
 tellectu existit objective .... Quum itaque Dei intellectus 
 sit unica rerum causa, videlicet (ut ostendimus) tarn earum 
 essentise, quam earum existentise, debet ipse necessario ab 
 iisdem differre tam ratione essentise, quam ratione existen- 
 tise. Nam causatum differt a sua causa praecise in eo, 
 
 quod a causa habet Atqui Dei intellectus est et 
 
 essentise et existentise nostri intellectus causa: ergo Dei 
 intellectus, quatenus divinam essentiam constituere con- 
 cipitur, a nostro intellectu tam ratione essentise, quam ra- 
 tione existentise differt, nee in ulla re, prseterquam in 
 nomine, cum eo convenire potest, ut volebamus. Circa 
 voluntatem eodem modo proceditur, ut facile unusquisque 
 videre potest." Compare P. L Prop. 32. Cor. 1,2, and P. II. 
 Prop. 11. Cor., where Spinoza maintains that God is not 
 conscious in so far as he is infinite, but becomes conscious 
 in man ; — a conclusion identical with that of the extreme 
 
344 NOTES. 
 
 Hegelian school ; and indeed substantially the same with 
 that of Hegel himself. See above, Lecture I, notes 
 
 Note 23. p. 86. 
 Anselm. Monolog. c. 66. " Cum igitur pateat quia nihil 
 de hac natura possit percipi per suam proprietatem, sed 
 per aliud, certum est quia per illud magis ad ejus cognitio- 
 nem acceditur, quod illi magis per similitudinem propin- 
 quat. Quicquid enim inter creata constat illi esse similius, 
 id necesse est esse sua natura praestantius .... Proculdubio 
 itaque tanto altius creatrix essentia cognoscitur, quanto per 
 propinquiorem sibi creaturam indagatur. . . .Patet itaque 
 quia sicut sola est mens rationalis inter omnes creaturas, 
 quae ad ejus investigationem assurgere valeat; ita nihilo- 
 minus eadem sola est, per quam maxime ipsamet ad ejus 
 dem inventionem proficere queat." Compare Aquinas, 
 Sumnm, P. I. Qu. XXIX. Art. 3. " Persona significat id 
 quod est perfectissimum in tota natura, sive subsistens in 
 rationali natura. Unde, cum omne illud quod est perfec- 
 tionis, Deo sit attribuendum, eo quod ejus essentia continet 
 in se omnem perfectionem, conveniens est ut hoc nomen, 
 persona, de Deo dicatur, non tamen eodem modo quo dici- 
 tur de creaturis ; sed excellentiori modo : sicut et alia 
 nomina quse creaturis a nobis imposita Deo attribuuntur." 
 And Jacobi, at the conclusion of an eloquent denunciation 
 of the Pantheism of his own day, truly observes, " Ein Seyn 
 ohne Selbstseyn ist durchaus und allgemein unmoglich. 
 Ein Selbstseyn aber ohne Bewusstseyn, und wieder ein 
 Bewusetseyn ohne Selbstbewusstseyn, ohne Substanzialitat 
 und wenigstens angelegte Personlichkeit, voUkommen eben 
 so unmoglich ; eines wie das andre nur gedankenloser 
 Wortschall. Also Gott ist nicht, ist das Nichtseyende im 
 hochsten Sinne, wenn er nicht ein Geist ist; und er ist 
 kein Geist, vs^enn ihm die Grundeigenschaft des Geistes, das 
 Selbstbewusstseyn, Substanzialitat und Personlichkeit, man- 
 gelt«." In the same spirit, and with a just recognition of the 
 
 6 Ueher eine Weissagung lAohtenberg's, {Werke,\\\.Tp. 2^0.) Com- 
 pare also the Preface to Vol. IV. p. xlv. 
 
LECTURE ITI. 345 
 
 limits of human thought, M. Bartholmess says, " Celui qui 
 repugne k emprunter quelques traits de ressemblance k la 
 partie morale de la creation, sera force d'en tirer de la 
 partie physique, de la partie mathematique, de la partie 
 logique ; il fera Dieu k Timage du monde corporel, a I'image 
 d'une grandeur geometrique ou arithmetique, a I'image 
 d'une abstraction dialectique ; toujours, en s'elangant au 
 Oreateur, il s'appuiera sur un endroit quelconque de la 
 creation f." To the same effect, a distinguished living writer 
 of our own country observes, " The worshipper carried 
 through the long avenues of columns and statues, and the 
 splendid halls of the ancient tempi? of Egyptian Thebes, 
 was not conducted at last to a more miserable termination, 
 when in the inner shrine he found one of the lower animals, 
 than the follower of a modern philosopher, when conducted 
 through processes, laws, and developments, to a divinity 
 who has less of separate sensation, consciousness, and life, 
 than the very brutes which Egypt declared to be its 
 gods s." 
 
 Note 24. p. 86. 
 
 Pensies, P. I. Art. IV. § 6. In like manner, in another 
 passage, Pascal says, " Tous les corps, le firmament, les 
 etoiles, la terre, et les royaumes, ne valent pas le moindre 
 des esprits ; car il connait tout cela, et soi-m^me ; et le 
 corps, rien^." 
 
 The following spirited translation of Jacobi • is from the 
 pen of Sir W. Hamilton, and occurs in the second of his 
 Lectures on Metaphysics, shortly to be published. The 
 entire Lecture from which it is taken constitutes a forcible 
 and admirably illustrated argument to the same effect. 
 " Nature conceals God: for through her whole domain Nature 
 reveals only fate, only an indissoluble chain of mere efficient 
 causes without beginning and without end, excluding, with 
 
 * Histoire des doctrines religieuses de la Philosophie Moderne, Intro- 
 duction, p. xli. 
 
 e M<=Cosh, Method of the Divine Government, p. 461, (4th edition), 
 h Pens^es, P. II. Art. X. §.i. 
 
 • Von den gottlichen Dingen, {Werke, III. p. 425). " 
 
3,46 NOTES. 
 
 equal necessity, both providence and chance. An inde- 
 pendent agency^ a free original commencement, within her 
 sphere and proceeding from her powers, is absolutely im- 
 possible. Working without will, she takes counsel neither 
 of the good nor of the beautiful ; creating nothing, she 
 casts off from her dark abyss only eternal transformations 
 of herself, unconsciously and without an end ; furthering 
 with the same ceaseless industry decline and increase, death 
 and life, — never producing what alone is of God and what 
 supposes liberty, — the virtuous, the immortal. Man reveals 
 God: for Man by his intelligence rises above nature, and 
 in virtue of this intelligence is conscious of himself, as a 
 power not only independent of, but opposed to, nature, and 
 capable of resisting, conquering, and controlling her. As 
 man has a living faith in this power, superior to nature, 
 which dwells in him, so has he a belief in God, a feeling, an 
 experience of his existence. A s he does not believe in this 
 power, so does he not believe in God : he sees, he expe- 
 riences naught in existence but nature, — necessity, — fate." 
 
 Note 25. p. 87. 
 Descartes, Discours de la Methode, P. IV, Principia, P. I. 
 § 7. That the Cartesian cogito, ergo sum, is not intended 
 as a syllogism, in which thought and existence are two dis- 
 tinct attributes, but as a statement of the fact, that per- 
 sonal existence consists in consciousness, has been suffi- 
 ciently shewn by M. Cousin, in his Essay " Sur le vrai sens 
 du cogito, ergo stim." The same view has been well stated 
 by Mr.Veitch, in the introduction to his translation of the 
 Discours de la Methode, p. xxii. M. Bartholmess (Ilistoire 
 des doctrines religiemes, I. p. «3) happily renders ergo by 
 c''est-d-dire. It must be remembered, however, that the 
 cogito of Descartes is not designed to express the phe- 
 nomena of reflection alone, but is coextensive with the 
 entire consciousness. This is expressly affirmed in the 
 Principia, P. I. § 9. " Cogitationis nomine intelligo ilia 
 omnia, quae nobis consciis in nobis fiunt, quatenus eorum 
 in nobis conscientia est. Atque ita non modo intelligere 
 velle, imaginari, sed etiam sentire, idem est hie quod cogi- 
 
LECTUEE III. 347 
 
 tare." The dictum, thus extended, may perhaps be ad- 
 vantageously modified by disengaging the essential from 
 the accidental features of consciousness ; but its main prin- 
 ciple remains unshaken ; namely, that our conception of 
 real existence, as distinguished from appearance, is derived 
 from, and depends upon, the distinction between the one 
 conscious subject and the several objects of which he is 
 conscious. The rejection of consciousness, as the primary 
 constituent of substantive existence, constitutes Spinoza's 
 point of departure from the principles of Descartes, and 
 at the same time, the fundamental error of his system. 
 Spinoza in fact transfers the notion of substance, which is 
 originally derived from the consciousness of personality, 
 and has no positive significance out of that consciousness, 
 to the absolute, which exists and is conceived by itself, — 
 an object to whose existence consciousness bears no direct 
 testimony, and whose conception involves a self-contra- 
 diction. 
 
 Note 26. p. 88. 
 " Ich bin, der ich bin. Dieser Machtspruch begriindet 
 alles. Sein Echo in der menschlichen Seele ist die OfFen- 
 
 barung Grottes in ihr Was den Menschen zum Mensch- 
 
 en, d. i. zum Ebenbilde Gottes macht, heisset Vernwnft. 
 
 Diese beginnet mit dem — Ich bin Vernunft ohne Per- 
 
 sonlichkeit ist Unding, das gleiche Unding mit jener Grund- 
 materie oder jenem Vrgrunde, welcher Alles und nicht 
 EineSj oder Eines und Keines, die Vollkommenheit des 
 UnvoUkommenen, das absolut Unbestiramte ist, und Goit 
 genannt wird von denen, die nicht wissen woUen von dem 
 wahren Gott, aber dennoch sich scheuen ihn zu laugnen 
 — ^mit den Lippen." Jacobi, Von den gottUchen Dingen, 
 (TTez-fo, III. p.418). 
 
 Note 27. p. 88. 
 
 For notices of Schelling's philosophy in this respect, see 
 
 Bartholmess, Histoire des doctrines religieuses, II. p. 116, 
 
 siaAWi\hn, Histoiredela PhilosophieAllemande, III. p. 318. 
 
 " L'ecole de Schelling," says M™^ de Stael, " suppose que 
 
348 NOTES. 
 
 rindividu perit en nous, niais que les qualites intimes que 
 nous possedons rentrent dans le grand tout de la creation 
 eternelle. Cette iiumortalite-l^ ressemble terriblement a 
 la morft." Schelling's views on this point are more com- 
 pletely developed by his disciple Blasche, in his Phih- 
 sopMsche Unsterhlichkeitlekre, especially §§ i8, ,55, 56, 72. 
 The tendency of HegePs teaching is in the same direction ; 
 the individual being with him only an imperfect and insig- 
 nificant phase of the universal' : and a personal immor- 
 tality, though not openly denied, seems excluded by infer- 
 ence ; an inference which his successors have not hesitated 
 to make™. Schleiermacher concludeshis Second Discourse 
 on Religi^ with these remarkable words : " Eben so ist 
 das Ziel und der Charakter eines religiosen Lebens nicht 
 die Unsterblichkeit, wie viele sie wiinschen und an sie 
 glauben, oder auch nur zu glauben vorgeben . . . nicht jene 
 Unsterblichkeit ausser der Zeit und hinter der Zeit, oder 
 
 k De I'Allemagne, Partie III. ch. 7. 
 ' Phdnomenologie des Geistes, Vorrede, {Werke, II. p. 22.) 
 "" See Michelet, Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie, II. 
 p. 638. Strauss, in his Christliche Glaubenslehre, § 106-110, gives an 
 instructive account of some of the speculations of recent German 
 writers on this question ; his own commentary being not the least sig- 
 nificant portion. " Damit," he says, " legt ja das Ich denWillen an den 
 Tag, nicht bios seine Subjectivitat iiberhaupt, sondern auch deren 
 particulars Bestimmungen und Verhaltnisse, in alle Ewigkeit fortzu- 
 fuhren, d. h. aus seiner Endlichkeit keinen Sohritt herauszugehen.' 
 And again : " Nur die Anlage der Gattung ist unendlich und uner- 
 schopflich :. ... die des Einzelwesens, als Momentes der Gattung, kann 
 nur eine endliche sein." His inquiry concludes with the well known 
 words, " Das Jenseits ist zwar in alien der Eine, in seiner Gestalt als 
 zukiinftiges aber der letzte Feind, welchen die speculative Kritik zu 
 bekampfen und wo moglich zu iiberwinden hat." And Feuerbach, 
 another 'advanced' disciple of the Hegelian school, has written an 
 essay on Death and Immortahty, for the purpose of shewing that a be- 
 lief in personal annihilation is indispensable to sound morality and true 
 religion; that the opposite belief is connected with all that is " satanic" 
 and "bestial;" and that temporal death is but an image of God, the 
 "great objective negation :" and has indicated significantly, in another 
 work, the philosophical basis of his theory, by an aphorism the direct 
 contradictory to that of Descartes, " Cogitans nemo sum. Cogito, ergo 
 omnes sum homines." 
 
LECTURE III. 349 
 
 vielraehr nur nach dieser Zeit aber doch in der Zeit, 
 sondern die Unsterblichkeit, die wir schon in diesem 
 zeitlichen Leben unmittelbar haben konnen, und die eine 
 Aufgabe ist, in deren Losung wir immerfort begriffen 
 sind. Mitten in der Endlichkeit Eins werden rnit dam 
 unendlichen und ewig sein in jedem Augenblick, das ist 
 die Unsterblichkeit der Religion." And later, in his 
 Ckristliche Glauhe, § 158, while admitting that the belief 
 in a personal immortality follows naturally from the doc- 
 trine of the twofold nature of Christ, he notwithstanding 
 thinks it necessary to apologize for those who reject this 
 belief on pantheistic principles : " Denn von hier aus 
 lasst sich auf gleiche Weise behaupten, einerseits dass 
 das Gottesbewusstseyn das Wesen jedes im hciheren Sinne 
 selbstbewussten oder verniinftigen Lebens constituire, auf 
 der andern Seite aber aueh, dass wenn der Geist in dieser 
 Produotivitat wesentlich unsterblich ist, doch die einzelne 
 Seele nur eine voriibergehende Action dieser Productivitat 
 
 sei, mithin eben so wesentlich verganglich Mit einer 
 
 solchen Entsagung auf die Fortdauer der PersonUchkeit 
 wii'rde sich eine Herrschaft des Grottesbewusstseyns voU- 
 kommen vertragen, welche auch die reinste Sittlichkeit und 
 die hochste Geistigkeit des Lebens verlangte.^' Mr. Atkin- 
 son, from the side of materialism, arrives at a similar con- 
 clusion : " What more noble and glorious than a calm and 
 joyful indifference about self and the future, in merging 
 the individual in the general good, — the general good in 
 universal nature"." And M. Comte comes forward with 
 his substitute of " subjective immortality," i. e. being re- 
 membered by other people, as a far nobler and truer con- 
 ception of a future life than that held by theologians". 
 But the most systematic and thoroughgoing exponent of 
 this philosophy is Schopenhauer. With him, the species 
 is the exhibition in time of the idea or real being, of which 
 the individual is but the finite and transient expression P. 
 In the same sense in which the individual was generated 
 
 n Letters on the Laws of Man's Nature and Development, p. 1S9. 
 
 o Catichisme Positiviste, p. 169. 
 
 P Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, II. p. 484, 487, 511. 
 
350 NOTES. 
 
 from nothing, he returns to nothing by deaths. To desire a 
 personal immortality is to desire to perpetuate an error to 
 infinity ; for individual existence is the error from which it 
 should be the aim of life to extricate ourselves f. Judaism, 
 which teaches a creation out of nothing, consistently asserts 
 that death is annihilation ; while Christianity has borrowed 
 its belief in immortality from India, and inconsistently en- 
 grafted it on a Jewish stem '. The true doctrine however 
 is not to be found in these, but in the Indian Vedas, whose 
 superior wisdom can only be ascribed to the fact, that their 
 authors, living nearer in point of time to the origin of the 
 human race, comprehended more clearly and profoundly the 
 true nature of things*. As a relief from this desolating 
 pantheism, it is refreshing to turn to the opposite language 
 of Neander. " Man could not become conscious of God as 
 his God, if he were not a personal spirit, divinely allied, 
 and destined for eternity, an eternal object (as an indi- 
 vidual) of God ; and thereby far above all natural and 
 perishable beings, whose perpetuity is that of the species, 
 not the individual "." 
 
 Note 28. p. 89. 
 " On a grande raison de se recrier sur la maniere etrange 
 des hommes, qui se tourmentent en agitant des questions 
 mal-congues. lis cherchent ce qu'ils savent, et ne savent 
 pas ce qu'ils cherchent." Leibnitz, Noumaux Essais, L. II. 
 Ch. ai. §. 14. 
 
 Note 29. p. 89. 
 See the acute criticism of the Kantian distinction be- 
 tween things and phenomena, by M. Willm, in his Histoire 
 de la PhilosopMe Allemande, Vol. I. p. 177. " II n'est pas 
 necessaire d'admettre que ce qui s'interpose entre les 
 objets et la raison, altere et fausse pour ainsi dire la vue 
 des objets, et il se pent que les lois de Pesprit soient en 
 meme temps les lois des choses telles qu'elles sont. Hegel 
 a dit justement qu'il se pourrait fort 'bien, qu'apres avoir 
 
 <i Ibid. p. 482, 498. r Ibid. p. 494. 
 
 ■ s jjjj;. p. 489, 617. tJ6W. p. 487. 
 
 « Life of Jesus Christ, p. 399. (Bohn's edition.) 
 
LECTURE TIL 351 
 
 p^netre derriere la scene qui est ouverte devant nous, nous 
 n'y trouvassions rien ; ajoutons qu'il se pourrait que ce 
 pretendu voile qui semble couvrir le tableau et que nous 
 cherchons h lever fut le tableau lui-m^me." Kant un- 
 questionably went too far, in asserting that things in them- 
 selves are not as they appear to our faculties^ : the utmost 
 that his premises could warrant him in asserting is, that 
 we cannot tell whether they are so or not. And even this 
 degree of scepticism, though tenable as far as external ob- 
 jects are concerned, cannot legitimately be extended to the 
 personal self. I exist as I am conscious of existing ; and 
 this conscious self is itself the Ding an sich, the standard 
 by which all representations of personality must be judged, 
 and from which our notion of reality, as distinguished from 
 appearance, is originally derived. To this extent Jacobi's 
 criticism of Kant is just and decisive. " AUes unser Phi- 
 losophiren ist ein Bestreben, hinter die Gestalt der Sache, 
 d. i. zur Sache selbst, zu kommen ; aber wie konnten wir 
 dies, da wir alsdann hinter uns selbst, ja hinter die ge- 
 samte Natur der Dinge, hinter ihren Ursprung kommen 
 miissteny? 
 
 Note 30. p. 91. 
 
 The Intellectual Intuition of Schelling has been noticed 
 above. See notes 16, 17, 18, pp. 338 sqq. The method of 
 Hegel, in its aim identical with that of Schelling, differs 
 
 ^ A critic in the National Review (No. xv. p. 219) " cannot persuade 
 himself" that Kant ever said any such thing j adding, that if he did so, 
 " he fell into variance with the whole spirit of his philosophy." Kant's 
 own words are sufficiently explicit on this point. " Wir hahen also 
 sagen wollen : dass alle unsere Anschauung nichts als die Vorstellung 
 von Erscheinung sey : dass die Dinge, die wir anschauen, nicht das an 
 sich selbst sind, wofiir wir sie anschauen, noch ihre Verhaltnisse so an 
 sich selbst beschaffen sind, als sie uns erscheinen." Kriiik der r. V- 
 p. 49, ed. Rosenkranz. This assertion, originally made in the first 
 edition of the Kritik, stands unaltered in the subsequent impressions. 
 It will be found at p. 59 of the fifth edition, published in 1799. Indeed 
 it is so far from being at variance with the whole spirit of Kant's philo- 
 sophy, that it follows naturally from his theory of the mere subjectivity 
 of space and time. 
 
 y Ueber das Unternehmen des Kriticisnms, {Werke, III. p. 176.) 
 
352 NOTES. 
 
 from it chiefly in making thought, instead of intuition, the 
 instrument of reaching the Absolute. As Schelling as- 
 sumes the possibility of an intuition superior to time and 
 difference, so Hegel postulates the existence of a logical 
 process emancipated from the laws of identity and contra- 
 diction. The Understanding and the Reason are placed in 
 sharp antagonism to each other. The one is a faculty of 
 finite thinking, subject to the ordinary laws of thought : 
 the other is a faculty of infinite thinking, to which those 
 laws are inapplicable. Hence the principles of Identity, of 
 Contradiction, and of Excluded Middle are declared to be 
 valid merely for the abstract understanding, from which 
 reason is distinguished by the principle of the Identity of 
 Contradictories^. But this assertion, indispensable as it is 
 to HegePs system, involves more consequences than the 
 author himself would be willing to admit. The important 
 admission, that an infinite object of thought can only be 
 apprehended by an infinite act of thinking, involves the 
 conclusion, that the understanding and the reason have no 
 common ground on which either can make itself intelligible 
 to the other ; for the very principles which to the one are 
 a criterion of truth, are to the other an evidence of false- 
 hood. Moreover, the philosophy which regards the union 
 of contradictories as essential to the conceptions of the 
 reason, is bound in consistency to extend the same condi- 
 tion to its judgments and deductions ; for whatever is one- 
 sided and partial in the analysis of a notion, must be 
 equally so in those more complex forms of thought into 
 which notions enter. The logic of the understanding must 
 be banished entirely, or not at all. Hence the philosopher 
 may neither defend his own system, nor refute his adver- 
 sary, by arguments reducible to the ordinary logical forms ; 
 
 ^ See Logik, B. II. c. 2; Encyklopadie, §. 28, 115, 119, Oeschichte 
 der Philosophie, Werke, XV. p. 598. See also his attempt to rescue 
 speculative philosophy from the assaults of scepticism, Werke, XIV. 
 p. 511, 512. He charges the sceptic with first making reason finite, in 
 order to overthrow it by the principles of finite thought. The defence 
 amounts to no more than this : "The laws of thought are against me; 
 but I refuse to be bound by their authority." 
 
LECTURE III. 353 
 
 for these forms rest on the very laws of thought which the 
 higher philosophy is supposed to repudiate. Hegel's own 
 polemic is thus self-condemned ; and his attempted refuta- 
 tion of the older metaphysicians is a virtual acknowledg- 
 ment of the validity of their fundamental principles. If the 
 so-called infinite thinking is a process of thought at all, it 
 must be a process entirely sui generis, isolated and unap- 
 proachable, as incapable as the intuition of Schelling of 
 being expressed in ordinary language, or compared, even 
 in antagonism, with the processes of ordinary reasoning. 
 The very attempt to expound it thus necessarily postulates 
 its own failure. 
 
 But this great thinker has rendered one invaluable ser- 
 vice to philosophy. He has shewn clearly what are the only 
 conditions under which a philosophy of the Absolute could 
 be realized ; and his attempt has done much to facilitate 
 the conclusion, to which philosophy must finally comei, that 
 the Absolute is beyond the reach of human thought. If 
 such a philosophy were possible at all, it would be in the 
 form of the philosophy of Hegel. And Hegel's failure 
 points to one inevitable moral. All the above incon- 
 sistency and division of the human mind against itself, 
 might be avoided by acknowledging the supreme authority 
 of the laws of thought over all human speculation ; and by 
 recognising the consequent distinction between positive 
 and negative thinking, — between the lawful exercise of the 
 reason within its own province, and its abortive efforts to 
 pass beyond it. But such an acknowledgment amounts to 
 a confession that thought and being are not identical, and 
 that reason itself requires us to believe in truths that are 
 beyond reason. And to this conclusion speculative philo- 
 sophy itself leads us, if in no other way, at least by the 
 wholesome warning of its own pretensions and failures. 
 
 Note 31. p. 93. 
 TertuUian, De Came Christi, c. 5. " Natus est Dei 
 Filius ; non pudet, quia pudendum est : et mortuus est 
 Dei Filius ; prorsus credibile est, quia ineptum est : et se- 
 pultus, resurrexit ; certum est, quia impossibile." 
 
 A a 
 
354 NOTES. 
 
 Note 32. p. 95. 
 See above, Lecture II, note 37. 
 
 Note 33. p. 99. 
 
 Hooker, E. P. b. I. ch. ii. § 2. Very similar to the lan- 
 guage of Hooker is that of Walter Oharleton. " For who- 
 ever shall duly consider how impossible it must be for 
 humanity, dull, gross, and narrow humanity, to behold 
 Invisibility, derive Independency, calculate Eternity, circum- 
 scribe Incircumscription, limit Omnipotence, understand 
 Omniscience, &c., and how dangerous a phrensy that brain 
 must be disordered withal, that attempts to describe what 
 it doth not, cannot know, will soon be satisfied that amaze- 
 ment and pious silence is the best lecture that can be read 
 on that immense subject, of which when we have said all we 
 can, we have said nothing, if we look forward upon that 
 inexhaustible abyss of excellencies, which must remain 
 unspoken of, and indeed uncomprehended ; that a professed 
 Nescience in this particular is the complement or zenith of 
 all other Science which the mind of man is capable of in 
 this life." The Darkness of Atheism dispelled hy the Light of 
 Nature, (165a) p. 2. Compare also the words of Jacobi, 
 An Fichte, (Werke, III. p. 7.) " Ein Gott, der gewusst 
 werden konnte, ware gar kein Gott." 
 
NOTES, 
 
 LECTURE IV. 
 
 Note 1. p. loo. 
 
 JL H U S Wegsoheider, after expressly admitting (Instii. 
 Theol. § 53) that the infinite cannot be comprehended by 
 the finite, and that its idea can only be represented by 
 analogy and symbol, proceeds to assert, with the utmost 
 confidence, that the attributes of omnipotence and omni- 
 science do not truly represent the internal nature of God 
 (§ 69) ; that a plurality of persons in the Godhead is mani- 
 festly repugnant to reason, and that the infinite God can- 
 not assume the nature of finite man (§ 92) ; that the fall 
 of man is inconsistent with the divine attributes (§ 117); 
 that repentance is the only mode of expiating sin recon- 
 cilable with the moral nature of God (§ 13S) ; that the 
 doctrine of Christ's intercession is repugnant to the divine 
 nature (§ 143). 
 
 By a somewhat similar inconsistency, Mr. Newman, while 
 -fully acknowledging that we cannot have any perfect know- 
 ledge of an infinite mind, and that infinity itself is but 
 a negative idea, yet thinks it necessary to regard the soul 
 as a separate organ of specific information, by which we 
 are in contact with the infinite ; and dogmatizes concern- 
 ing the similarity of divine and human attributes, in a man- 
 ner which nothing short of absolute knowledge can justify. 
 (See The Soul, pp. i, 3, 34, 54, 58). He compares the infi- 
 nite to the " illimitable haziness" which bounds the sphere 
 of distinct vision. The analogy would be servi(JeabIe to his 
 
 A. a, qr- 
 
356 NOTES. 
 
 argument, if we possessed two sets of eyes, one for clear- 
 ness, and one for haziness ; one to be limited, and the 
 other to discern the Hmitation. The hypothesis of a sepa- 
 rate faculty of consciousness, whether called soul, reason, 
 or intellectual intuition, to take cognisance of the infinite, 
 is only needed for those philosophers who undertake to 
 develope a complete philosophy of the infinite as such. 
 But the success of the various attempts in this province 
 has not been such as to give any trustworthy evidence of 
 the existence of such a faculty. 
 
 Note 2. p. loi. 
 See above, Lecture I. note 3. 
 
 Note 3. p. 102. 
 See Mr. Rose's remarks on the reaction against the 
 Wolfian demonstrative method. State of Protestantism in 
 Germany, p. 306 (second edition). 
 
 Note 4. p. 103. 
 See Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p- 497. ed. Rosen- 
 kranz. This admission, rightly understood, need not be 
 considered as detracting from the value of the speculative 
 arguments as auxiliaries. All that is contended for is, 
 that the foundation must be laid elsewhere, before their 
 assistance, valuable as it is, can be made available. Thus 
 understood, this view coincides with that expressed by 
 Sir W. Hamilton, in the second of the Lectures on Meta- 
 physics, shortly to be published, " that the phenomena of 
 matter, taken by themselves, (you will observe the qualifi- 
 cation, taken by themselves,) so far from warranting any 
 inference to the existence of a God, would, on the contrary, 
 ground even an argument to his negation, — that the study 
 of the external world, taken with and in subordination to 
 that of the internal, not only loses its atheistic tendency, 
 but, under such subservience, may be rendered conducive 
 to the great conclusion, from which, if left to itself, it 
 would dissuade us." The atheistic tendency is perhaps too 
 strongly stated ; as the same phenomena may be surveyed. 
 
LECTURE IV. 357 
 
 by different individuals, in different spirits and with differ- 
 ent results ; but the main position, that the belief in God is 
 primarily based on mental, and not on material phenomena, 
 accords with the view taken in the text. 
 
 Note 5. p. 103. 
 Kant, Kritik der r. V., p. 488. Compare Hume, Dia- 
 logues concerning Natural Religion, Part V. Kant's argu- 
 ment is approved by Hegel, Philosophie der Edigion ( Werke, 
 XII. p. 37). The objection which it urges is of no value, 
 unless we admit that man possesses an adequate notion of 
 the infinite as such. Otherwise, the notion of power inde- 
 finitely great, which the phenomena certainly suggest, is, 
 both theoretically and practically, undistinguishable from 
 the infinite itself. This has been well remarked by a recent 
 writer. See Selections from the Correspondence ofB.E.H. 
 Gre^son, Vol. II. p. 329. 
 
 Note 6. p. 1 04. 
 Jowett, Epistles of St. Paul, Vol. II. p. 406. Professor 
 Jowett considers the comparison between the works of 
 nature and those of art as not merely inadequate, but 
 positively "erroneous. He says, "As certainly as the man 
 who found a watch or piece of mechanism on the sea-shore 
 would conclude, ' here are marks of design, indications of 
 an intelligent artist,' so certainly, if he came across the 
 meanest or the highest of the works of nature, would he 
 infer, ' this was not made by man, nor by any human art 
 and skill.' He sees at first sight that the sea- weed beneath 
 his feet is something different in kind from the produc- 
 tions of man a." But surely the force of the teleological 
 argument does not turn upon the similarity of the objects, 
 but on their analogy. The point of comparison is, that in 
 
 * This argument is substantially the same with that of Hume, jDia- 
 logues concerning Natural Religion, Part II. " If we see a house, we 
 conclude, with the greatest certainty, that it had an architect or 
 builder . . . But surely you will not affirm that the universe bears such 
 a resemblance to a house, that we can with the same certainty infer a 
 similar cause." 
 
358 NOTES. 
 
 the works of nature, as well as in those of art, there is an 
 adaptation of means to ends, which indicates an intelligent 
 author. And such an adaptation may exist in an organ- 
 ized body, no less than in a machine, notwithstanding 
 numerous diiferenoes in the details of their structure. The 
 evidence of this general analogy is in nowise weakened by 
 Professor Jowett's special exceptions. 
 
 Note 7. p. 104. 
 " When the spiritual man (as such) cannot judge, the 
 question is removed into a totally different court from that 
 of the Soul, the court of the critical understanding. . . . The 
 processes of thought have nothing to quicken the con- 
 science or affect the soul." P. W. Newman, The Soul, 
 p. 245 (second edition). Yet he allows in another place, 
 (not quite consistently,) that " pure intellectual error, 
 depending on causes wholly unmoral, may and does per- 
 petuate moral illusions, which are of the deepest injury to 
 spiritual life." p. 169. Similar in principle, though not 
 pushed to the same extreme consequences, is the theory of 
 Mr. Morell, who says, " Reason up to a God, and the best 
 you can do is to hypostatize and deify the final product of 
 your own faculties ; but admit the reality of an intellectual 
 intuition, (as the mass of mankind virtually do,) and the 
 absolute stands before us in all its living reality''." This 
 distinction he carries so far as to assert that " to speak of 
 logic, as such, being inspired, is a sheer absurdity ;" be- 
 cause " the process either of defining or of reasoning re- 
 quires simply the employment of the formal laws of 
 thought, the accuracy of which can be in no way aifected 
 by any amount of inspiration whatever " :" and in another 
 passage he maintains, to the same effect, that " the essential 
 elements of religion in general, as of Christianity in parti- 
 cular, appertain strictly to the intuitional portion of our 
 nature, and may be realized in all their varied influence 
 without the cooperation of any purely reflective pro- 
 cesses'!." Here he apparently overlooks the fact that the 
 
 '*> Philosophy of Religion, p. 39. "= Ibid. p. 173, 174. 
 
 •* Ibid. p. 193. 
 
LECTURE IV. 359 
 
 intuitive and reflective faculties invariably act in con- 
 junction ; that both are equally necessary to the existence 
 of consciousness as such ; and that logical forms are never 
 called into operation, except in conjunction with the matter 
 on which they are exercised. 
 
 Note 8. p. io8. 
 In acknowledging Expiation as well as Prayer to be 
 prompted by the natural feelings of men, I have no inten- 
 tion of controverting the opinion, so ably maintained by 
 Archbishop Magee and Mr. Faber, of the divine origin of 
 the actual rite of sacrifice. That the religious instincts of 
 men should indicate the need of supplication and expiation, 
 is perfectly consistent with the belief that the particular 
 mode of both may have been first taught by a primitive 
 revelation. That religion, in both its constituent elements, 
 was communicated to the parents of the human race by 
 positive revelation, seems the most natural inference from 
 the Mosaic narrative ^. Yet we may admit that the posi- 
 tive institution must from the first have been adapted to 
 some corresponding instinct of human nature ; without 
 which it would be scarcely possible to account for its 
 continuance and universal diffusion, as well as for its va- 
 rious corruptions. We may thus combine the view of 
 Archbishop Magee with that exhibited by Dr. Thomson. 
 Bampton Lectures, pp. 30, 48. 
 
 Note 9. p. no. 
 That the mere feeling of dependence by itself is not 
 necessarily religious, is shewn by Hegel, Philosophie der 
 Religion, {Werie, XII. p. 173.) Speaking of the Roman 
 worship of evil influences, Angerona, Fames, Robigo, &c., 
 he rightly remarks that in such representations all con- 
 ception of Deity is lost, though the feeling of fear and 
 
 ^ Even Mr. Davison, who contends for the human origin of the 
 patriarchal sacrifices, which he regards as merely eucharistic and 
 penitentiary, expressly admits the divine appointment of expiatory 
 offerings. See his Ingwiry into the Origin of Primitive Sacrifice, 
 {Remains, p. 121.) 
 
360 NOTES. 
 
 dependence remains. To the same effect is his sarcastic 
 remark, that, according to Schleiermacher's theory, the 
 dog is the best Christian^. Mr. Parker (Discourse of 
 BeUgion, Ch. i.) agrees with Schleiermacher in resolving 
 the religious sentiment into a mere sense of dependence ; 
 though he admits that this sentiment does not, itself, dis- 
 close the character of the object on which it depends. 
 Referred to this principle alone, it is impossible to regard 
 religious worship as a moral duty. 
 
 Note 10. p. III. 
 
 See Kant, Metaphysik der Sitten, Abschn. II. (pp. 6i, 71. 
 ed. Eosenkranz.) His theory has been ably combated by 
 Julius Miiller, Ohristliche Lehre von der Sunde, B. I. c. 2. 
 Compare also Hooker, E. P. I. ix. a. Some excellent 
 remarks to the same effect will be found in M^^Cosh's 
 Method of the, Divine Government, p. 298, (fourth edition,) 
 and in Bartholmess, Histoire des doctrines religieuses de la 
 philosophie moderne, vol. i. p. 405. 
 
 Note 11. p. I J 2. 
 The theory which regards absolute morality as based 
 on the immutable nature of God, must not be confounded 
 with that which places it in his arbitrary will. The latter 
 view, which was maintained by Scotus, Occam, and others 
 among the schoolmen, is severely criticized by Sir James 
 Mackintosh, Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philo- 
 sophy, section III, and by Miiller, GhristUche Lehre von der 
 Siinde, B. I. c. 3. The former principle is adopted by 
 Cudworth, as the basis of his treatise on Eternal and Im- 
 mutable Morality. See B. I. 0. 3. B. IV. c. 4. 
 
 Note 12. p. 1 13. 
 On the universality of expiatory rites, see Magee on the 
 Atonement, note V. On their origin, see the same work, 
 notes XLI, XL VI to LI, LIV to LVIII, and Mr. Faber's 
 Treatise on the Origin of Expiatory Sacrifice. 
 
 <= See Rosenkranz, Hegel's Leben, p. 346. 
 
LECTURE IV. 361 
 
 Note 13. p. 114. 
 Schleiermacher, ChristKche Glauhe, § 4. 
 
 Note 14. p. 115. 
 
 Morell, Philosophy of Religion, p. 75. Mr. Morell here 
 goes beyond the theory of his master, Schleiermacher. 
 The latter {ChristUche Glaube, § 4) admits that this sup- 
 posed feeling of absolute dependence can never be com- 
 pletely attained in any single act of consciousness, but is 
 generally suggested by the whole. Mr. Morell speaks as 
 if we could be immediately conscious of our own annihila-r 
 tion, by a direct intuition of the infinite. Both theories 
 are inadequate to prove the intended conclusion. That of 
 Schleiermacher virtually amounts to a confession that the 
 infinite is not a positive object of consciousness, but a mere 
 negation suggested by the direct presence of the finite. 
 That of Mr. Morell saves the intuition of the infinite, but 
 annihilates itself j for if in any act of consciousness the 
 subject becomes absolutely nothing, the consciousness must 
 vanish with it ; and if it stops at any point short of no- 
 thing, the object is not infinite. 
 
 Note 15. p. 116. 
 
 That this is the legitimate result of Schleiermacher's 
 theory, may be gathered from a remarkable passage in 
 the ChristUche Glauhe, § 8, in which the polytheistic and 
 monotheistic feelings of piety are compared together. 
 The former, he says, is always accompanied by a sensible 
 representation of its object, in which there is contained a 
 germ of multiplicity; but in the latter, the higher con- 
 sciousness is so separated from the sensible, that the pious 
 emotions admit of no greater difference than that of the 
 elevating or depressing tone of the feeling. This seems to 
 imply that, in Schleiermacher's opinion, to worship a God 
 of many attributes, is equivalent to worshipping a plurality 
 of Gods. And to those philosophers who make the Infinite 
 in itself a direct object of religious worship, this identifi- 
 cation is natural; for a God of many attributes cannot 
 
362 NOTES. 
 
 be conceived as infinite, and therefore in one sense par- 
 takes of the limited divinity of Polytheism. But, on the 
 other hand, a God of no attributes is no God at all ; afld 
 the so-called monotheistic piety is nothing but an abortive 
 attempt at mystical self-annihilation. Some acute stric- 
 tures on Schleiermacher's theory from this point of view 
 will be found in Drobisch, Grundlehren der Beligionsphih- 
 sopMe, p. 84. 
 
 Note 16. p. 118. 
 
 Schleiermacher himself admits {GhristUche Glauhe, § 33) 
 that the theory of absolute dependence is incompatible with 
 the belief that God can be moved by any human action. 
 He endeavours however to reconcile this admission with 
 the duty of prayer, by maintaining (§ 147) that the true 
 Christian will pray for nothing but that which it comes 
 within God's absolute purpose to grant. This implies 
 something like omniscience in the true Christian, and some- 
 thing like hypocrisy in every act of prayer. 
 
 Note 17. p. 118. 
 
 Schleiermacher {Chr. Glauhe, § 49) attempts, not very 
 successfully, to meet this objection, by maintaining that 
 even our free acts are dependent upon the will of God, 
 This is doubtless true ; but it is true as an article of faith, 
 not as a theory of philosophy: it may be believed, but 
 cannot be conceived, nor represented in any act of human 
 consciousness. The apparent contradiction implied in the 
 coexistence of an infinite and a finite, will remain unsolved ; 
 and is most glaring in the theories of those philosophers 
 who, like Schleiermacher (§ 54), maintain that God actually 
 does all that he can do. The only solution is to confess 
 that we have no true conception of the infinite at all. 
 Schleiermacher himself is unable to avoid the logical con- 
 sequence of his position. He admits (§ 80) that God's 
 omnipotence is limited if we do not allow him to be the 
 author of sin ; though he endeavours to soften this mon- 
 strous admission by taking it in conjunction with the fact 
 that God is also the author of grace. 
 
LECTURE IV. 363 
 
 Note 18. p. lai. 
 
 De Augmentis Scientiarum, 1. III. c. i. Compare Theo- 
 philus of Antioch, Ad Autolycum, I. 5. Ka^aTre/o yap -^vyj] 
 ev av6p<6iT(o ov jSXiTteTai, aoparos oStra hvOpdtiioii, bia 6e t^s 
 KivrjcriOis roC crco/xaros voihTai fj '^vxji, oCrcos ^x"' ^^ ""^ ^^^ 
 &e6v ft,ri hvvacrdaL opadrivai {nrb 6(f>da\iJ,&v avdpa>T:(va)V, bia be 
 Trjs Trpovotas Koi t&v epywv avTov jSXeirerat Kal voeiTai^. And 
 Athanasius, Contra Gentes, c. 35. 'Ek yap t&v ipymv itoXKi,- 
 Kts 6 TeyyiTr]s (caJ jut; 6p(&ixevos yiyvaxTKerai, koX olov ti \4yov(n 
 Tiepi Tov ayaXixaTOTtowv <l?fihiov, coy to, tovtov br][i.iovpyr\iJ,aTa 
 fK T^s (Tvp.p.iTp!.as KcxL TTjs TTpos aXXrjXa T&v p,ep&v avaXoylas 
 ip,^aivuv (cal ju.^ irapovra 'i'eibiav toIs op&aiv ovtw bei voeiv 
 ix TTjs TOV KOO'p.ov Tofecos tov tovtov TtoLTjTriv Kal br]pi,i.ovpyov 
 &ebv, Kav rois rod aduaTos dcjyOaKiJMs p.ri OecoprJTai. On the 
 other hand, Hegel, PMlosopMe der Religion, ( Werke, XII. 
 p. 39.5), insists on the necessity of knowing God as He is, 
 as an indispensable condition of all Theology. 
 
 Note 19. p. laa. 
 Justin. Mart. Apol. II. c. 6. To b'k IlaTTjp, koL 0eos, nal 
 K.Tl(TTr\s, KoL KiJpios, koX Aeerirorr/y, ovk 6v6p,aT& kcrriv, dW ex 
 T&v ivnoii&v Kot t&v ipyav Trpo(rpri(Teis. Basil. Adv. Eunom. 
 I. 12. "OXcos be TO OLeaOai totj evl irAvroiv deov avTrjv ttjv ov- 
 aiav e^evprjKevai, iroVijs VT!ep7]<pavias ea-Tl km (jivcndcreciis ; . . . . 
 e^eTa(T(i>)xev yap avTov iioOev avTrjs (firjcrlv iv irepivoit^ yeyevrj- 
 (jOai ; ap eK Trjs KOivrjs ivvoCas ; d\\' avTrj to etvai tov deov, ov 
 TO TL ftvai fniiv vvo^&hkei. Gregor. Nyssen. Contr. Eunom. 
 Orat. XII. OvTOi koi tov iToirjTriv tov Koa-fxov, otl fiev ea-Tiv 
 olbay.ev, tov b\ ttjs ova-La's Xoyov ayvoely ovk apvovfxeOa. Cy- 
 ril. Hieros. Catech. VI. 2. Ov yap to tC ea-Ti 0eos e^rjyovixeOa' 
 dAA.' otl to UKpi^h itepX avTov ovk otSa/xej', jner evyva>iJ.o(Tvvt}s 
 6fw\oyovij,ev. 'Ev tols yap -nepl @eov, fieydXr] yv&ais to T-qv 
 ayvota-Cav ojnoAoyetj;. Pascal, Pensiest, Partie II. Art. III. 
 § 5. " Nous connaissons qu'il y a un infini, et nous ignorons 
 sa nature. Ainsi, par exemple, nous savons qu'il est faux 
 que les nombres soient finis : done il est vrai qu'il y a un 
 
 ' Compare a similar argument in Bishop Berkeley, Minute Philo- 
 er. Dial. IV. § 4. 
 
364 NOTES. 
 
 infini en nombres. Mais nous ne savons ce qu'il est. II est 
 faux qu'il soit pair ; il est faux qu'il soit impair : car, en 
 ajoutant I'unite, il ne change point de nature ; cependant 
 c'est un nombre .... On peut done bien connaitre qu'il y a 
 un Dieu sans savoir ce qu'il est." The distinction is strongly 
 repudiated by Hegel, Werke, XII. p. 396. Of. IX. p. sg. 
 XIV. p. 219. In the last of these passages, he goes so far 
 as to say, that to deny to man a knowledge of the infinite 
 is the sin against the Holy Ghost. The ground of this 
 awful charge is little more than the repetition of an obser- 
 vation in Aristotle's Metaphysics, that God is not envious, 
 and therefore cannot withhold from us absolute know- 
 ledge. 
 
 Note 20. p.. 123. 
 Advancement of Learning^ p. 128. ed. Montagu. Compare 
 De Augmentis, III. 2. 
 
 Note 21. p. 125. 
 This argument is excellently drawn out in Sir W. Hamil- 
 ton's forthcoming Lectures on Metaphysics, Lecture II. 
 So Mr. F. W. Newman observes, acutely and truly, " No- 
 thing but a consciousness of active originating Will in 
 ourselves suggests or can justify the idea of a mighty Will 
 pervading Nature ; and to merge the former in the latter, 
 is to sacrifice the Premise to the glory of the Conclusion." 
 The Soul, p. 40, (second edition.) 
 
 Note 22. p. 125. 
 Arist. Metaph. 1.55 Sevocfidvris bi ■Kp&ro^ roijTtav evCa-as... 
 rhv oKov ovpavov aTTOjSke^as to Ik etval c^rjo-t tov deov. Cicero, 
 Acad. QucBst. IV. 37. " Xenophanes dixit unum esse omnia, 
 neque id esse mutabile, et id esse deum." Apuleius, Ascle- 
 pius Herm. Trimeg. c. 20. " Non enim spero totius majes- 
 tatis effectorem omniumque rerum patrem vel dominum 
 uno posse quamvis e multis composito nuncupari nomine : 
 hunc vero innominem vel potius omninominem, si quidem 
 is sit unus et omnia, ut sit neeesse aut omnia esse ejus no- 
 mine aut ipsum omnium nominibus nuncupari.'' Lessing, 
 as quoted by Jacobi, Werke, IV. p. 54. " Die orthodoxen 
 
LECTURE IV. 365 
 
 Begriffe von der Gottheit sind nioht mehr fur mich ; ich 
 kann sie nicht geniessen — ''Ev km Tlav. Ich weiss nichts 
 anders." Schelling,_BrMwo, p. 185. "So ist die Allheit 
 Einheit, die Einheit Allheit, . beyde nicht verschieden, son- 
 dern dasselbe." 
 
 Note 23. p. 126. 
 Clemens Alex. Stromata, V. 1 1 . Et roCuvv a(p€\6i/Tes nAv- 
 Ta oaa Trpocreort roTs a-dixacnv, Kot roi? keyoix&ois acnujudT-ois, 
 aTToppi\j/a>ij,fv eavToiis els to jieyeOos tov XptoroC, KaKeWev els 
 TO axO'Ves dytoV?jrt TtpotoLjjiev, Trj vorja-ei tov itavTOKpiropos 
 &p,r]yii;ri •npotrayoip.ev, ov\ o ecrriv, b be p.ri euTi yvcapicravTes. 
 Augustin. Enarr. in Psalm. Ixxxv.ia. "Deus ineffabilis 
 est ; faoihus dicimus quid non sit, quam quid sit." Fichte, 
 Bestimmung des Mensohen, (Werke, II. p. 305.) " Dutojto, 
 denn du willst, dass mein freier Gehorsam Folgen habe 
 in alle Ewigkeit ; den Act deines Willens begreife ich 
 nicht, und weiss nur soviel, dass er nicht ahnlich ist dem 
 meinigen." 
 
 Note 24. p. 127. 
 The distinction between speculatim and regulative know- 
 ledge holds an important place in the philosophy of Kant ; 
 but his mode of applying it is the exact reverse of that 
 adopted in the text. According to Kant, the idea of the 
 absolute or unconditioned has a regulative, but not a spe- 
 culative value : it cannot be positively apprehended by any 
 act of thought ; but it serves to give unity and direction to 
 the lower conceptions of the understanding ; indicating the 
 point to which they tend, though they never actually reach 
 it. But the regulative character thus paradoxically as- 
 ' fiigned, not to thought, but to its negation, in truth belongs 
 to the finite conceptions as actually apprehended, not to 
 any unapprehended idea of the infinite beyond them. 
 Every object of positive thought, being conceived as finite, 
 is necessarily regarded as limited by something beyond it- 
 self ; though this something is not itself actually conceived. 
 The true purpose of this manifest incompleteness of all 
 human thought, is to point out the limits which we cannot 
 pass ; not, as Kant maintains, to seduce us inoi^. vain at- 
 
366 NOTES. 
 
 tempts to pass them If there is but one faculty of thought, 
 that which Kant calls the Understanding, occupied with 
 the finite only, there is an obvious end to be answered in 
 making us aware of its limits, and warning us that the 
 boundaries of thought are not those of existence. But if, 
 with Kant, we distinguish the Understanding from the 
 Reason, and attribute to the latter the delusions necessarily 
 arising from the idea of the unconditioned, we must believe 
 in the existence of a special faculty of lies, created for the 
 express purpose of deceiving those who trust to it. In the 
 philosophy of religion, the true regulative ideas, which are 
 intended to guide our thoughts, are the finite forms under 
 which alone we can think of the infinite Grod ; though these, 
 while we employ them, betray their own speculative insuf- 
 ficiency and the limited character of all human knowledge. 
 
 Note 25. p. I a;. 
 
 "Diese Bemerkungen sollen nur bemerklich machen, 
 
 dass im weitern Fortschritt der Untersuchungen die Frage 
 nicht seyn kann, was und wie beschaffen Gott an sich sey, 
 sondern nur, wie wir ihn in Beziehung auf uns und die ganze 
 sittlichnaturUche Welt zu denken haben. Denn wenn durch 
 den Glauben nicht das Seyn Grottes theoretisch erkannt 
 wird, sondern nur sich filr uns als zur Sittlichkeit bestimmte 
 Wesen sein Daseyn in der hestimmten Beziehung auf den 
 sittUchen Weltzweck offenhart (was in doppelter Hinsicht, 
 namlich durch die Beschrankung auf eine bestimmte Be- 
 schaffenheit des erkennenden Subjects und durch die 
 bestimmte Beziehung des Erkannten eine bios relative 
 Erkenntniss und eben darum keine Erkenntniss eines ab- 
 soluten Seyns ist), so kann auch nicht von der Erkenntniss 
 des Wesens, der Qualitat eines Seyenden, sondern nur von 
 einer nahern Bestimmung der Idee Gottes die Rede seyn, 
 wie vnr sie auf dem uns angewiesenen Standpunkte aus- 
 zubilden haben ; mit andern Worten : wir werden Gott nur 
 durch Belationen zu denken haben." Drobisch, Grundlehren 
 der ReligionsphilosopMe, p. 189. "^The Scripture intimates 
 to us certain facts concerning the Divine Being : but con- 
 veying them to us by the medium of language, it only brings 
 
LECTURE IV. 367 
 
 them before us darkly, under the signs appropriate to the 
 thoughts of the human mind. And though this kind of 
 knowledge is abundantly instructive to us in point of senti- 
 ment and action ; teaches us, that is, both how to feel, and 
 how to act, towards God ; — for it is the language that we 
 understand, the language formed by our own experience 
 and practice; — it is altogether inadequate in point of 
 Science." Hampden, Bampton Lectures, p. 54, (second 
 edition). " We should rather point out to objectors that 
 what is revealed is practical, and not speculative ; — that 
 what the Scriptures are concerned with is, not the philo- 
 sophy of the Human Mind in itself, nor yet the philosophy 
 of the Divine Nature in itself, but (that which is properly 
 Religion) the relation and connexion of the two Beings ; — 
 what God is to us, — what He has done and will do for 
 uSj — and what we are to be and to do, in regard to Him." 
 Whately, Sermons, p. 56, (third edition). Compare Berke- 
 ley, Minute Philosopher, Dial. VH. §11. 
 
NOTES. 
 
 LECTURE V. 
 
 Note 1. p. 134. 
 
 Analogy, Part i. ch.vi. 
 
 Note % p. 135. 
 
 " When he (the Sceptic) awakes from his dream, he will 
 be the first to join in the laugh against himself; and to 
 confess, that all his objections are mere amusement, and 
 can have no other tendency than to show the whimsical 
 condition of mankind, who must act, and reason, and be- 
 lieve; though they are not able, by their most diligent 
 inquiry, to satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of 
 these operations, or to remove the objections which may 
 be raised against them." Hume, Essay on the Academical 
 Philosophy, Part II. 
 
 Note 3. p. 135. 
 See Plato, Parmenides, p. 129, PMlebus, p. 14, Sophistes, 
 p. 251, RepubUcjYW. p. 524. The mystery is insoluble, 
 because thought cannot explain its own laws ; for the laws 
 must necessarily be assumed in the act of explanation. 
 Every object of thought, as being one object, and one out 
 of many, all being related to a common consciousness, must 
 contain in itself a common and a distinctive feature ; and 
 the relation between these two constitutes that very diver- 
 sity in unity, without which no thought is possible. 
 
LECTURE V. 369 
 
 Note 4. p. 137. 
 " Das cormnercivm zwischen Seele und Korper isfc eine 
 wechselseitige Dependenz der Bestimmung. Wir fragen 
 demnach zuerst : Wie ist ein solches commercium zwischen 
 einem denkenden Wesen und einem Korper moglich ? . . . . 
 Der Grund, die Schwierigkeifc dieses commercii einzusehen, 
 beruht darauf: Die Seele ist ein Gegenstand des innern 
 Sinnes, und der Korper ist ein Gegenstand des aussern 
 Sinnes. An dem Korper werde ich nichts Innerliches und 
 an der Seele nichts Aeusserliches* gewahr. Nun Esst es 
 sich durch keine Vernunft begreifen, wie das, was ein 
 Gegenstand des innern Sinnes ist, ein Grund seyn soil, von 
 dem, was ein Gegenstand des aussern Sinnes ist." Kant's 
 
 dk, (18a 1)1 p-«24. 
 
 . Note 5. p. 137. 
 " Quand on examine Tidee que I'on a de tons les esprits 
 finis, on ne voit point de liaison necessaire entre leur 
 volonte et le mouvement de quelque corps que ce soit ; on 
 voit au contraire qu'il n'y en a point, et qu'il n'y en pent 
 avoir." Malehra,Bche, Mecherche de la Verite, L.VI. Part II. 
 Ch. 3. " L'homme est h, lui-meme le plus prodigieux ob- 
 jet de la nature ; car il ne pent concevoir ce que c'est que 
 corps et encore moins ce que c'est qu' esprit, et moins 
 qu'aucune chose comment un corps pent etre uni avec un 
 esprit. Cest la le comble de ses difficultes, et cependant 
 c'est son propre etre." Pascal, PensSes, Partie I. Art. vi. 
 §. 26. " Ich bin freilich genothigt zu glauben, das heisst, 
 zu handeln, als ob ich dachte — dass durch mein WoUen 
 meine Zunge, meine Hand, mein Fuss in Bewegung ge- 
 setzt werden konnten ; wie- aber ein blosser Hauch, ein 
 l^riick der Intelligenz anf sieh selbst, wie der Wille es ist, 
 Prineip einer Bewegung in der ischweren irdischen Masse 
 seyn konne, dariiher kann ich nicht nur nichts denken, 
 sondern selbst die. blosse Behauptung ist vor dem Richtef- 
 stuhle des betrachtenden Verstandes reiner baarer Unver- 
 ■stand." Fichte, Besiimmung des Menschen, {Werke, II. 
 p. 290.) Spinoza, Ethica, III. 2, denies positively that suoh 
 
 Bb 
 
370 NOTES. 
 
 commerce can take place. " Neo corpus mentem ad cogi- 
 tandum, nee mens corpus ad mo turn, neque ad quietem, 
 nee ad aliquid (si quid est) aliud determinare potest." 
 
 Note 6. p. 138. 
 The theory of Divine Assistance and Occasional Causes 
 was partially hinted at by Descartes, and more completely 
 elaborated by his followers, De La Forge and Malebranche. 
 Bee Descartes, Principia, L. TI. § 36. De La Forge, 
 Traite de I'esprit de I'homme, Oh. XVI. Malebranche^ Be- 
 cherche de la Vdriti, L. VL P. IL Ch. 3 ; Entretiens sur la 
 Metaphi/sique, Ent. VIL Cf. Hegel, GescUchte der Phil. 
 {Werke, XV. p. 330.) For Leibnitz's theory of a Preesta- 
 blished Harmony, see his Systkme nouveau de la Nature, 
 § 12—15, Opera, ed. Erdmann, p. 137 ; Troisieme Eclair- 
 cissement, lUd. p. 134; Theodicee, § 61, Ibid. p. 520. A 
 brief account of these two systems, together with that of 
 Physical InfluXj which is rather a statement of the pheno- 
 menon, than a theory to account for it, is given by Euler, 
 Lettres d une Princesse d' Allemagne, Partie IL Lettre 14. 
 ed. Cournot ; and by Krug, Philos. Lessikon ; Art. Gemein- 
 schaft der Seele und des Ijeihes. The hypothesis, that the 
 commerce of soul and body is effected by means of a 
 Plastic Nature in the soul itself, is suggested by Cudworth, 
 Intellectual System, B. I. Oh. III. § 37, and further deve- 
 loped by Leclerc, Bibliotheque Vhoisie, II. p. 113, who sup- 
 poses this plastic nature to be an intermediate principle, 
 distinct from both soul and body. See Mosheim's note in 
 Harrison's edition of Cudworth, Vol. I. p. 248. See also 
 Leibnitz, Sur le Principe de Vie, Opera, ed. Erdniann, 
 p. 429 ; Laromiguiere, Lefons de Philosophie, P. II. 1. 9. 
 
 Note 7. p. 138. 
 These two analogies between our natural and spiritual 
 knowledge are adduced in a remarkable passage of Gregory 
 of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium, Orat. XII. Of the soul, and 
 its relation to the body, he says: "Odev kv ayvola ts&vtwv 
 bidyofjLev, irp&Tov eavTovs ayvoovvres, ol S,v6pooTroi, liretra hi 
 Koi TO, SX\a Tt&VTa. Tts y6.p kariv os i^s ihlas avrov ilmyrts 
 kv KaraX'qxIrei yeydvrjTai ; tCs 6 STriyvovs avrrjs rriv ovcrCav ; 
 
LECTURE V. 371 
 
 vXiKij Tt9 €(rnv ^ &v\os ; KaOap&s i-crdtfiaros, jj tI koL a-aixaro- 
 eiSes Trepl avriqv ', irm yiverai ; ir&s Kipvarat ; Ttodev fla-KpCve- 
 rat, ; tt&s &<j}[(rTaTai ; tI rh (TMvhecrfiovv koL iMfcnrevov e^^' Tipbs 
 rfiv Tov (Tconaros ^iaiv ; k. r. \. (^Opera, Paris. 1615. Vol. II. 
 p. 321.) Of body, as distinguished from its attributes, he 
 says : 'Eav yip tis tu k6y<^ to <^aiv6y-evov els ra if &v 
 (TvyKetTai biaXvarj, koI \lr(\a>(Tas t&v iroiOTriTwv, i<f>' Ifflurov 
 Karavorja-aL (jyiKoveiK'^aT) rb v-noKeip,evov, tl Karakei^'SrjcreTai t|} 
 6f(i>plq ov ffvvopm, orav yap cupekji tov crwjLiaros to xp&iia, to 
 (Txfiiiai TTjv avTiTVTiCav, to fidpos, ttjv Tr?j\iKo'TJjra, ttjv em tottov 
 diaiv, Tr\v Kivr\<nv Tr\v iradririKi^v re /cat ^vepyrjTKt^i', to iipos ti 
 TT(os i)(eiv, &v ^Kaarov ovb^v e(p' eavrov (T&[xi iarrC, irepl bi to 
 a&p,a TO, TrAvTa, tC Koittov eoroi h tov tov (rdnxaTOs 8exeTat 
 koyov ; ovTe bi kavT&v crwibeiv expfxev, aire irapa ttjs ypacjjrji 
 IJ,fiuLOriKap.ev 6 be eavTov ayvo&v, n&s av ti t&v imip avTov 
 iinyvoCri ; Ibid. p. 32 a. 
 
 Note 8. p. 138. 
 
 Essay onthe Academical Philosophy, (Philosophical Works, 
 Vol. IV. p. 182.) 
 
 Note 9. p. 139. 
 The difficulty is ingeniously stated by Pascal, Pensees, 
 Partie I. Art II. " Oar qu'y a-t-il de plus absurde que 
 de pretendre qu'en divisant toujours un espace, on arrive 
 enfin a une division telle, qu'en la divisant en deux, cha- 
 cune des moities reste indivisible et sans aucune etendue 1 
 Je voudrais demander k ceux qui ont cette idee s'ils con- 
 goivent nettement que deux indivisibiles se touchent : si 
 c'est partout, ils ne sont qu'une meme chose, et partant les 
 deux ensemble sont indivisibles ; et si ce n'est pas partout, 
 ce n'est done qu''en une partie ; done ils ont des parties, 
 done ils ne sont pas indivisibles." 
 
 Note 10. p. 143. 
 Kant's theory, that we know phenomena only, not things 
 in themselves, is severely criticized by Dr. M<=Cosh, Method 
 of the Divine Government; p. 536 (4th edition). I have before 
 observed that Kant has, in two points at least, extended 
 his doctrine beyond its legitimate place ; first, in maintain- 
 ing that our knowledge of the personal self is equally phe- 
 
 B b a 
 
S72 NOTES. 
 
 nomenal with that of external objects ; and secondly, in 
 dogmatically asserting that the thing in itself does not re- 
 semble the phenomehon of which we are conscious. Against 
 the first of these statements it may be fairly objected, that 
 my personal existence is identical with my consciousness of 
 that existence ; and that any othet aspect of my personal- 
 ity, if such exists in relation to any other intelligence, is in 
 this case the phenomenon to which my personal conscious- 
 ness furnishes the real counterpart. Against the second, 
 it may be objected, that if, upon Kant's own hypothesis, we 
 are never directly conscious of the thing in itself, we have 
 no ground for saying that it is unlike, any more than that 
 it is like, the object of which we are conscious ; and that, in 
 the absence of all other evidence, the probability is in 
 favour of that aspect which is at least subjectively true. 
 But when these deductions are made, the hypothesis of 
 Kant, in its fundamental position, remains unshaken. It 
 then amounts to no more than this ; that we can see 
 things only as our own faculties present them to us ; and 
 that we can never be sure that the mode of operation of 
 our faculties is identical with that of all other intelligences, 
 embodied or spiritual. Within these limits, the theory 
 more nearly resembles a truism than a paradox, and con- 
 tains nothing that can be regarded as formidable, either by 
 the philosopher or by the theologian. 
 
 In the same article, Dr. M^Cosh criticizes Sir William 
 Hamilton's cognate theory of the relativity of all know- 
 ledge. With the highest respect for Dr. M«Gosh''s philoso- 
 phical ability, I cannot help thinking that he has mis- 
 taken the character of the theory which he censures, and 
 that the objection which he ui-ges is hardly applicable. 
 He attempts to avail himself of Sir W. Hamilton's own 
 theory of the veracity of consciousness. He asks, " Does 
 not the mind in sense-perception hold the object to be 
 a real object ?" Undoubtedly ; but reality in this sense 
 is not identical with absolute existence, if by the latter 
 term is meant the nature of the thing as it exists out 
 of all relation to a percipient mind, or as it must manifest 
 itself to all possible intelligences under all possible laws 
 of apprehension. Man can conceive reality, as he con- 
 
LECTURE V. 373 
 
 oeiv6g other objects, only as the laws of his faculties 
 permit ; and in distinguishing reality from appearance, he 
 is not distinguishing the related from the unrelated. Both 
 appearance and reality must be given in consciousness, to 
 be apprehended at all ; and the distinction is only between 
 some modes of consciousness, such as those of a dream, 
 which are regarded as delusive, and others, as in a waking 
 state, which are regarded as veracious. But consciousness, 
 whatever may be its veracity, can tell us nothing con- 
 cerning the identity of its objects with those of which we 
 are not conscious. The relativity of our knowledge, as 
 maintained by Sir W. Hamilton, does not, if I understand 
 him rightly, imply any other limitation than this. 
 
 Dr. M'^Cosh, in the above criticism, also classes Pro- 
 fessor Ferrier as a representative of the same school with 
 Kant and Hamilton. The resemblance is, I believe, merely 
 accidental. Professor Ferrier's system more nearly ap- 
 proaches to the Philosophy of the Absolute than to that 
 of the Relative. He himself distinctly announces that he 
 undertakes " to lay down the laws, not only of our thinking 
 and knowing, but of all possible thinking and knowing*." 
 Such an undertaking, whether it be successful or not, is in 
 its conception the very opposite of the system which main- 
 tains that our knowledge is relative to our faculties. 
 
 Note 11. p. 143. 
 See above. Lecture IV. note 25. 
 
 Note IS. p. 144. 
 " II en est de meme des autres Mysteres, ou les esprits 
 moderes trouveront toujours une explication suffisante pour 
 croire, et jamais autant qu'il en faut pour comprendre. II 
 nous suffit d'un certain ce que c'est (tC eort) ; mais le com- 
 ment (ttws) nous passe, et ne nous est point neoessaire." 
 Leibnitz, Thiodicie, Dispours de la conformiU de la Foi 
 av.ec la Raison, § 56. 
 
 Note 13. p. 144. 
 " It is plain, that, in any communication from an infini^ 
 
 * Institutes of Metaphysic, p. 55. 
 
374 NOTES. 
 
 Being to creatures of finite capacities, one of two things 
 must happen. Either the former must raise the latter 
 almost to His own level ; or else He must suit the form of 
 
 His communication to their powers of apprehension 
 
 If we turn to Scripture, however, we shall see how this 
 matter is decided. In God's dealings with men we find 
 "wrath," "jealousy," "repentance," and other affections, 
 ascribed to the Divine Being. He is described as " sitting 
 on a throne f His " eyes" are said " to behold the children 
 of men •" not to mention other instances, which must sug- 
 gest themselves to every one, in which God condescends to 
 convey to us, not the very reality indeed, but something 
 as near the reality as He sees it expedient for us to know." 
 Professor Lee, The Inspiration of Holy Scripture, pp. 6^, 64 
 (second edition). 
 
 Note 14. p. 148. 
 Plato, SopMstes, p. 342. To 8e nap fjiuv 'EAeoTt/cov iOvos, 
 OTTO 'S€vo<p&vovs re Koi eri TrpocrOev ap^dfjievov, m evbs ovtos 
 r&v TtAvrmv KdKovp,iva>v o^rco bie^epxerai. rots fiHOois. Sextus 
 Empiricus, Pyrrh. Hyp. I. 225. 'ESoyfttirtCe 6e 6 Eevo^dvTjs 
 •jrapa Ton T&v aXAcov avOpanraiv -npoXiqxjfeis ^v elvai to Trav. 
 Arist. Metaph. II. 4. 30. T^ yap erepov rov ovtos ovk iarnv, 
 &<TTe KaTO, Tov HappievLbov Xoyov <Tvp,^aiviiv avayKt) ev S/iravra 
 etvai TO, ovTa koi tovto etvai to ov. Plato, Parmenides, 
 p. 127. nSs, (pAvai, S> Zrjvoiv, tovto Ae'yets ; d iroAAd eort 
 TO, ovTa, bis &pa bei avTO. oixoid re etvai koX avofioia, tovto be 
 
 brj dMvaTOv ovx ovTut Aeyets ; Ovrto, ^dvai tov Z/rjvmva. 
 
 Arist. Soph. Elench. 10. 2. oloz; lams to 6v t) to tv TtoWa a-r)- 
 IxaCvfi, dAAct Kai 6 amoKpivop-ivos /cat 6 kpuyr&v 7J\va>v %v oto/ne- 
 vos ftvai rip<iTri(re, Koi Icttiv 6 \6yos oti ev irdvra. Arist. De 
 Goelo III. 1. 5. Oi p.'kv yap am&v o\u)s aveiKov y^vecriv KaX 
 ^Oopdv' oid\v yap oitre yiyvecrOai <}>a(nv ovts ejideipfcrdai. t&v 
 ovTMV, aWa fiovov boKeiv rjpZv, oTov 01 Trepl MeXura-ov re Koi 
 Uapfxevlbriv. Diog. Laert. ix. 24. (De MeUsso). 'ESo'/cet 6^ 
 avTa TO TTCLV aireipov etvai, Koi avaXXoCayrov, koi dKivtjTov, kqI 
 iv, op.oiov eavrS, Kal wA^pey dvrjariv re fijj etmt, hoKsiv 6e 
 ftvai. Cf. Plato, ThecBtetus, p. 183. Compare Karsten, 
 Parmenidis BeliqmcB, p. 157, 194. Brandis, Commmta- 
 tiones Eleaticce, p. 213, 214. 
 
LECTURE V. 375 
 
 Note 15. p. 148, 
 Plato, Thewt. p. 153. 'Ey^ fp& koL ijAK' ov ^av\ov X6yov, 
 ws tpa kv fikv avTo ko^' avTO ovbiv e(mv, oiS' S.V n irpoireC'nois 
 6p6&s ovS" dirotoi'oCi' n, dXA.' iav is neya irpoa-ayopevris, Kal 
 afxiKpov (^aveiTOi, Kal ear fiapv, Kbv<j>oi>, ^vjxvavTi re o{!tq)s, <bs 
 fiTjSeros JiTos Ivos fiiijre TLvhs p-i^re oirowvovv Ik 5e 8rj t^opas 
 Te Kol /tii'Tja'eus koI Kpd(Teats Ttpos S.\\riXa yCyverat irdvTa, h 8?j 
 ^afxfv etvai, ovk 6p6&s -npocrayopeiSovTes' tern pikv yap ovbe- 
 TioT ovbiv, &fl be yCyvirai. Koi irepl ro^irov ndvres e^fjs 01 (ro(j)oi 
 TtXriv UapjxevCbov avp,^fpi(r6atv, Upcorayopas re koX 'HpAKXeiTos 
 (cot'EjLnre8oK\7js. Diogenes Laert. ix. 51. 'EXeyi re (6 Upotr- 
 ayopas) pirjbiv etvai '^XV^ irapa ras alcrO^a-fis. Aristot. 1^0 
 Xenophane, Zenone et Gorgia, c. 5. (De Gorgia.) Ovk ehaC 
 <^<nv ovbiv il 6' lorir, dyvaxnov etvai' el be Kal eari km 
 yvoKTTov, &.Xk' ov briXarbv aXXois. Kal Sri jxev ovk lort, avvffeh 
 TO, eripoK eiprip.iva, Stroi iiepl t&v ovtoov Xiyovres ravavrCa, ms 
 boKOvaLv, aTro<pa[vovTa(, avTois, ol p,ev oti%v koX ov noXkd, ol b\ 
 aS oTi TioXXa koI ovx ^v. " What we call a mind, is nothing 
 but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united 
 together by certain relations, and supposed, though falsely, 
 to be endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity." 
 Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Part IV. sect. 3. " 'Tis 
 confessed by the most judicious philosophers, that our ideas 
 of bodies are nothing but collections formed by the mind 
 of the ideas of the several distinct sensible qualities, of 
 which objects are composed, and which we find to have a 
 constant union with each other The smooth and unin- 
 terrupted progress of the thought readily deceives the 
 
 mind, and makes us ascribe an identity to the changeable 
 succession of connected qualities." Ihid. sect. 3. 
 
 Note 16. p. 149. 
 " II faut venir maintenant k la grande Question que 
 M. Bayle a mis sur le tapis depuis peu, savoir, si une 
 Verite, et surtout une Verite de Foi, pourra etre sujette &, 
 
 des objections insolubles II croit que la doctrine de la 
 
 Predestination est de oette nature dans la Th^ologie, et 
 celle de la composition du Continuum dans la Philosophie. 
 
376 NOTES 
 
 Oe sont en effet les deux Labyrjnthes, qui ont exerce de 
 tout terns les The'olpgiens et les Philosophes. Libertus 
 Fromodus, Theologien de Louvain, qui a fort travaille sur 
 la Grace, et qui a aussi fait un Livre expres intitule hahy- 
 rinthus de compositione Continui, a bien exprime les diffi- 
 cultes de I'un et de I'autre : et le fameux Ochin a fort bien 
 represente ce qu'il appelle les Labyrinihes de la Predesti- 
 nation.'''' Leibnitz, Theodicee, Discours de la conformite de 
 la Foi avec la Baison, § 24. Compare Sir W. Hamilton's 
 Discussions, p. 632. 
 
 Note 17. p. 150. 
 
 See Bishop Browne's criticism of Archbishop King, Pro- 
 cedure of the Understanding, p. 15. " He hath unwarily 
 dropped some such shocking expressions as these, The hest 
 representations we can make of God are infinitely short of 
 Truth. Which God forbid, in the sense his adversaries 
 take it ; for then all our reasonings concerning Him would 
 be groundless and false. But the saying is evidently true 
 in a favourable and qualified sense and meaning ; namely, 
 that they are infinitely short of the real, true, internal 
 Nature of God as He is in Himself." Compare Divine 
 Analogy, p. 57. " Though all the Revelations of God are 
 true, as coming from Him who is Truth itself; yet the 
 truth and substance of them doth not consist in this, 
 that they give us any new set of ideas, and express 
 them in a language altogether unknown before; or that 
 both the conceptions and terms are so immediately 
 and properly adapted to the true and real nature of the 
 things revealed, that they could not without great impro- 
 priety and even profaneness be ever applied to the things 
 of this world. But the truth of them consists in this ; that 
 whereas the terms and conceptions made use of in those 
 Revelations are strictly proper to things worldly and ob- 
 vious ; they are from thence transferred analogically to the 
 correspondent objects of another world with as much truth 
 and reality, as when they are made use of in their first and 
 most literal propriety ; and this is a solid foundation both 
 for a clear and certain knowledge, and for a firm and well 
 grounded Faith,'''' 
 
LECTURE V. 377 
 
 Note 18. p. 150. 
 Augustin. Confess. 1. XIII. c. 1 6. " Nam sicut omnino tu 
 es, tu scia solus, qui es inoommutabiliter, et scis incommu- 
 tabiliter, et vis incommutabiliter. Et essentia tua scit et 
 vult incommutabiliter, et scientia tua est et vult incom- 
 mutabiliter, et voluntas tua est et scit incommutabiliter. 
 Neo videtur justum esse coram te, ut quemadmodum se 
 scit lumen incoramutabilcj ita sciatur ab illuminato com- 
 mutabili." 
 
 Note 19. p. 151. 
 See Hegel, PMlosopJiie der GescMchte, Werke, IX. p. 338, 
 398 ; PMhmphie der Religion, Werke, XI. p. 356, XII. p. 
 1 19. Sehleiermaeher substantially admits the same facts, 
 though he attempts to connect them with a different 
 theory ^. He considers that there is a pantheistic and a 
 personal element united in all religions : and this is per- 
 haps true of heathen religions subjected to the philosophi- 
 cal analysis of a later age ; though it may be doubted whe- 
 ther both elements are distinctly recognised by the wor- 
 shipper himself. But even from this point of view, the 
 Jewish religion stands in marked contrast to both Eastern 
 and Western heathenism. In the latter forms of religion, 
 the elements of persOTiality and infinity, so far as they are 
 manifested a,t all, are manifested in different bein^ : this 
 is observable both in the subordinate emanations which 
 give a kind of secondary personality to the Indian Pan- 
 theism, and in the philosophical abstraction of a supreme 
 principle of good, which connects a secondary notion of 
 the infinite with the Grecian Mythology. The Jewish re- 
 ligion still remains distinct and unique, in so far as in it 
 the attributes of personality and infinity are united in one 
 and the same living and only God. 
 
 Note 20. p. 154. 
 "Et Patrem quidem invisibilem et indeterminabilem, 
 quantum ad nos est, cognosoit suum ipsius Verbum, et 
 
 ^ Reden ilber. ReUgion, (Werke, I. pp. 401, 441.) 
 
378 NOTES. 
 
 cum sit inenarrabilis, ipse enarrat eum nobis : rursus autem 
 Verbum suum solus cognoscit Pater: utraque autem hsec 
 sic se habere manifestavit Dominus. Et propter hoc Filius 
 revelat agnitionem Patris per suam manifestationem. Ag- 
 nitio enim Patris est Filii manifestatio : omnia enim per 
 Verbum manifestantur. Ut ergo cognosceremus, quoniam 
 qui advenit Filius, ipse est qui agnitionem Patris facit cre- 
 dentibus sibij dicebat discipulis : ' Nemo cognoscit Patrem 
 nisi Filius, neque Filium nisi Pater, et quibuscunque Filius 
 revelaverit;' docens semetipsum et Patrem, sicut est, ut 
 alterum non recipiamus Patrem, nisi eum qui a Filio reve- 
 latur." Irenseus, Contr. Hcsres. IV. 6, 3. Ovkovv uKoXoijdcos 
 6 Tov @eov Ao'yos cr&ixa aveXa^e, koL avdpairCvm opydvio KexPV- 
 rai, tva Koi fmoTTOt^crjj to (T&(ia, kol tv , &(ntep Iv rfj KrLcrei hih, 
 tSiv epywv yvrnpl^erai, oirai Koi kv avOpditco epyAa'r}Tai, Koi 
 SeC^rj eavTov Travraxpv, fjtribev fprjixov rrjs kavTov OeiorrjTos Kal 
 yvcicreas KaraXiixTrdvcov. Athanasius, De Incarn. Verbi, c. 4,5. 
 " In qua ut fidentius ambularet ad veritatem, ipsa Veritas 
 Deus Dei Filius, homine assumpto, non Deo oonsumpto, 
 eamdem c'onstituit atque fundavit fidem, ut ad hominis 
 Deum iter esset homini per hominem Deum. Hie est enim 
 mediator Dei et hominum homo Christus Jesus. Per hoc 
 enim mediator, per quod homo ; per hoc et via. . . . Sola est 
 autem adversus omnes errores via munitissima, ut idem 
 ipse sit Deus et homo : quo itur, Deus ; qua itur, homo." 
 Augustin. De Civ. Dei, XI. 2,. 
 
 Note 21. p. 154. 
 " Qui credimus Deum etiam in terris egisse, et humani 
 habitus humihtatem suscepisse ex causa humanse salutis, 
 longe sumus a sententia eorum qui nolunt Deum curare 
 quidquam." Tertullian, Adv. Marc. 11. 16. 
 
 Note 22. p. 154. 
 
 It is only a natural consequence of their own principles, 
 when the advocates of a philosophy of the Absolute main- 
 tain that the Incarnation of Christ has no relation to time. 
 Thus Schelling says: "Die Menschenwerdung Gottes in 
 Christo deuten die Theologen eben so empirisch, namlich, 
 
LECTURE Y. 379 
 
 dass Gott in einem bestimmten Moment der Zeit mensch- 
 liche Natur angenommen habe, wobey sohlechterdings 
 nichts zu denken seyn kann, da Gott ewig ausser aller 
 Zeit ist. Die Mensohenwerdung Gottes ist also eine Men- 
 schenwerdung von Ewigkeit. Der Mensch Christus ist 
 in der Erscheinung nur der Gipfel und in so fern auch 
 wieder der Anfang derselben, denn von ihm aus sollte sie 
 dadurch sich fortsetzen, dass alle seine Nachfolger Glieder 
 eines und desselben Leibes waren, von dem er das Haupt 
 ist. Dass in Christo zuerst Gott wahrhaft objectiv gewor- 
 den, zeugt die Geschichte, denn wer vor ihm hat das 
 Unendliche auf solche Weise geoffenbaret" ?" Hegel, in his 
 Lectures on the Philosophy of History^, thus comments on 
 the language of St. Paul : " Ah die Zeit erfullet war, sandte 
 Gott sdnen Sohn,"" heisst es in der Bibel. Das heisst nichts 
 Anderes als : das Selbstbewusstseyn hatte sich zu den- 
 jenigen Momenten erhoben, welche zum Begriff des Geistes 
 gehoren, und zum Bediirfniss, diese Momente auf eine 
 absolute Weise zu fassen." This marvellous elucidation of 
 the sacred text may perhaps receive some further light, or 
 darkness, from the obscure passages of the same author, 
 quoted subsequently in the text of this Lecture : and such 
 is the explanation of his theory given by Baur, ChristlicJte 
 Gnosis, p. 715: " Auf dem Standpunct des speculativen 
 Denkens ist die Menschwerdung Gottes keine einzelne, 
 einmal geschehene, historisohe Thatsache, sondern eine ewige 
 Bestimmung des Wesens Gottes, vermoge weloher Gott 
 nur insofern in der Zeit Mensch wird (in jeden einzelnen 
 Menschen) sofern er von Ewigkeit Mensch ist. Die End- 
 lichkeit und leidensvolle Erniedrigung, welcher sich Christus 
 als Gottmensch unterzog, tragt Gott zu jeder Zeit ala 
 Mensch. Die von Christus voUbrachte Versohnung ist 
 keine zeitlich geschehene That, sondern Gott versohnt sich 
 ewig mit sich eelbst, und die Auferstehung und Erhohung 
 Christi ist nichts anders, als die ewige Riikkehr des Geistes 
 
 ■: Vorksunffen iiber die Methods des Academischen Studium, p. 192. 
 Fichte speaks to the same effect, Anweisvm.g zum seligen Leben, ( Werke, 
 V. p. 482). 
 
 d.JFerte, IX. p.388. 
 
380 NOTES. 
 
 zu sioh und zu seiner Wahrheit. Ohristus als Mensch, als 
 Gottmensch, ist der Mensch in seiner AUgemeinheit, nicht 
 ein einzelnes Individuum, sondern das allgemeine Indivi- 
 duum." It is no wonder that, to a philosophy of these lofty 
 pretensions, the personal existence of Christ should be a 
 question of perfect indifference^. From a similar point of 
 view, Marheineke says : " Die Menschwerdung Gottes, be- 
 griffen in ihrer Moglichkeit, ist zunachst die wirkliche 
 Menschlichwerdung der gottlichen Wahrheit, welche nicht 
 nur das Denken Gottes, sondern zugleich sein Wesen ist, 
 und GottUches und Menschliches, obwohl noch unterschieden, 
 doch nicht mehr von einander getrennt." Grundlehren der 
 Christlichm DogmatiJc, § 31a. It is difficult to see what 
 distinction can be made, in these theories, between the In- 
 carnation of Christ as Man, and His eternal Generation as 
 the Son of God ; and indeed these passages, and those 
 subsequently quoted from Hegel, appear intentionally to 
 identify the two. 
 
 Note 23. p. 156. 
 
 EncyUopddie, § 564, ^66. For the benefit of any reader 
 who may be disposed to play the part of GEdipus, I subjoin 
 the entire passage in the original. The meaning may 
 perhaps, as Professor Terrier observes of Hegel's philo- 
 sophy in general, be extracted by distillation, but certainly 
 not by literal translation. 
 
 "Was Gott als Geist ist, — Dies richtig und bestimmt 
 im Gedanken zu fassen, dazu wird griindliche Speculation 
 erfordert. Es sind ziinachst die Satze darin enthalten : 
 Gott ist Gott nur in sofern er sich selber weiss ; sein sich 
 Sich-wissen ist ferner sein Selbstbewusstseyn im Menschen, 
 und das Wissen des Menschen von Gott, das fortgeht zum 
 Sich-wissen des Menschen in Gott. 
 
 Der absolute Geist in der aufgehobenen Unmittelbarkeit 
 
 E For a criticism of these pantheistic perversions of Christianity, see 
 Drobisch, Grundlehren der Religionsphilosophie, p. 247. The consum- 
 mation of the pantheistic view may be found in Blasche, Philosophisctie 
 Unsterblichheitlehre, § 51-53. Here the eternal Incarnation of God is 
 exhibited as the perpetual production of men, as phenomenal mani- 
 festations of the absolute unity. 
 
LECTURE V. 381 
 
 und Sinnlichkeifc der G-estalt und des Wissens, ist dem 
 Inhalte hach der an-und-fur-sich-seyende Geist der Natur 
 und des Geistes, der Form nach ist er zunachst fiir das sub- 
 jective Wissen der Vorstdlimg. Diese giebt den Momenten 
 seines Inhalts einerseits Selbststandigkeit und macht sie 
 gegen einander zu Voraussetzungen, und zu einander fol- 
 genden Erscheinungen und zu einem Zusammenhang des 
 'Geschehens nach mdlichen Befleseionsbestimmungen ; ander- 
 erseits wird solohe Form endlicher Vorstellungsweise in 
 dem Glauben an den Einen Geist und in der Andaoht des 
 Cultus aufgehoben. 
 
 In diesem Trennen soheidet sich die Form von dem 
 Inhalte, und in jener die untersehiedenen Momente des 
 Begriffs zu besondern HpTiarm oder Elementen ab, in 
 deren jedem sich der absolute Inhalt darstellt, — a) als in 
 seiner Manifestation bei sich selbst bleibender, Ewiger 
 Inhalt; — ^8) als Unterscheidung des ewigen Wesens von 
 seiner Manifestation, welche durch diesen Untersehied die 
 Erscheinungswelt wird, in die der Inhalt tritt; — y) als 
 unendliohe Riickkehr und Versohnung der entausserten 
 Welt mit dem ewigen Wesen, das Zuriickgehen desselben 
 aus der Erscheinung in die Einheit seiner Fiille.'" 
 
 The passage which, though perhaps Bearing more di- 
 rectly on my argument, I have not ventured to attempt to 
 translate, is the following, § 568. 
 
 "Im Momente der BesonderJidt aber des tJrtheils, ist 
 dies concrete ewige Wesen das VoramgesetzU, und seine 
 Bewegung die Erschaffung der Erscheinung, das Zerfallen 
 des ewigen Moments der Vermittlung, des einigen Sohnes, 
 in den selbststandigen Gegensatz, einerseits des Himmels 
 und der Erde, der elementarischen und concreten Natur, 
 andererseits des Geistes als mit ihr im VerhdUniss ste- 
 henden, somit endlichen Geistes, welcher als das Extrem 
 der in sich seyenden Negativitat sich zum Bosen verselbst- 
 standigt, solches Extrem durch seine Beziehung auf eine 
 gegeniiberstehende Natur und durch seine damit gesetete 
 eigene Natiirlichkeit ist, in dieser als denkend zugleich auf 
 das Ewige gerichtet, aber damit in ausserlicher Beziehung 
 steht." 
 
382 NOTES. 
 
 Gorres, in the preface to the second edition of his Atha- 
 nasius, p. ix., exhibits a specimen of a new Creed on 
 HegeUan principles, to be drawn up by a general council 
 composed of the more advanced theologians of the day. 
 The qualifications for a seat in the council are humorously 
 described, and the creed itself contains much just and 
 pointed satire. It will hardly, however, bear quotation; 
 for a caricature on such a subject, however well intended, 
 almost unavoidably carries with it a painful air of irre- 
 verence. 
 
 Note 24. p. 157. 
 
 See especially Phdnomenologie des Geistes, Werke, II. p. 
 557 ; Philosophie der OescMcTiie, Werke, IX. p. 387 ; Phi- 
 losophie der Religion, Werke, XII. p. 347 ; Geschichte der 
 Philosophie, Werke, XIV. p. 222, XV. p. 88. 
 
 Note 25. p. 157. 
 The indecision of Hegel upon this vital question is satis- 
 factorily/ accounted for by his disciple, Strauss. To a phi- 
 losophy which professes to exhibit the universal relations 
 of necessary ideas, it is indifferent whether they have 
 actually been realized in an individual case or not. This 
 question is reserved for the Critic of History. See Streit- 
 schriften. Heft III. p. 68. Dorner too, while pointing out 
 the merits of Hegel's Christology, admits that the belief in 
 a historical Christ has no significance in his system; and 
 that those disciples who reject it carry out that system 
 most fully. See Lehre von der Person Ohristi, p. 409. 
 
 Note 26. p. 158. 
 Philosophie der Religion, Werke, XII. p. 286. In another 
 passage of the same work, p. 281, the Atonement is ex- 
 plained in the following language : " Die Moglichkeit der 
 Versohnung ist dur darin, dass gewusst wird die an sich 
 seyende Einheit der gottlichen und menschlichen Natur ; das 
 ist die nothwendige Grundlage ; so kann der Mensch sich 
 aufgenommen wissen in Gott, insofern ihm Gott nicht ein 
 Fremdes ist, er sich zu ihm nicht als ausserliches Accidenz 
 verhalt, sondern wenn er nach seinera Wesen, nach seiner 
 
LECTURE V. 383 
 
 Freiheit und Subjectivitat in Gott aufgenomnien ist ; diess 
 ist aber nur moglich, insofern in Gott selhst diese Subjectivi- 
 tat der menschlichen Natur ist. Compare also p. 330, and 
 Phanomenohgie des Geistes, Werke, II. p. 544, 572. Philo- 
 sophie der Geschichte, Werke, IX. p. 405. Geschichte der Phi- 
 losophie, Werke, XV. p. 100. 
 
 Note 27. p. 158. 
 Grundlehren der Christlichm Dogmatik, § 319, 320. 
 
 Note 28. p. 160. 
 Ihid. § 325, 326. A similar theory is maintained, almost 
 in the same language, by Rosenkranz, Encyklopddie der 
 theologischen Wissenscha/ten, § 26, 27. The Substance of 
 this view is given by Hegel himself, Werke, IX. p. 394, 457 ; 
 XV. p. 89. Some valuable criticisms on the principle of it 
 may be found in Dr. Mill's Observations on the application 
 of Pantheistic Principles to the Criticism of the Gospel, 
 pp. 16,42. 
 
 Note 29. p. 161. 
 Leben Jesu, § 151. English Translation, Vol. III. p. 437. 
 The passage has also been translated by Dr. Mill in his 
 Observations on the application of Pantheistic Principles, &c. 
 p, 50. I have shghtly corrected the former version by the 
 aid of the latter. A sort of anticipation of the theory may 
 be found in Hegel's Phamomenologie des Geistes, Werke, II. 
 p. 569. 
 
 Note 30. p. 161. 
 "Nur das Metaphysisohe, keinesweges aber das Histo- 
 rische, macht selig.'' Fichte, Anweisung zum seligen Le- 
 hen, ( Werke, V. p. 485.) With this may be compared the 
 language of Spinoza, Ep. XXI. " Dico, ad salutem non 
 esse omnino necesse, Christum secundum carnem noscere ; 
 sed de seterno illo filio Dei, hoc est Dei seterna sapientia, 
 quae sese in omnibus rebus, et maxime in mente humana, 
 et omnium maxime in Christo Jesu manifestavit, longe 
 aliter sentiendum." 
 
NOTES. 
 
 LECTURE VI. 
 
 Note 1. p. 171. 
 OEE above, Lecture IV. p. laa, and note 19. 
 
 Note 2. p. 171. 
 Christliche Lehre von der Siinde, II. p. j g6. third Edition, 
 (English Translation, II. p. 136.) The doctrine that the 
 Divine Essence is speculatively made knov?n through 
 Christ, is a common ground on which theologians of the 
 most opposite schools have met, to diverge again into most 
 adverse conclusions. It is substantially the opinion of 
 Eunomius * ; and it has been maintained in modern times 
 by Hegel and his disciple Marheineke, in a sense very dif- 
 ferent from that which is adopted by MiiUer. See Hegel, 
 PMlosophieder GescMchte, Werke, IX. p. 19. PMlosophieder 
 Bdigion, WerJce, XII. p. 204, and Marheineke, Grundlehren 
 der Ghristlichen DogmatiJc, § 69. 
 
 Note 3. p. 172. * 
 
 See L. Ancillon, in the Memoires de I'Acadimie de Berlin, 
 quoted by Bartholmess, Histoire des Doctrmes reliffiemes, I. 
 p. 368. On the parallel between the mystery of Causation 
 and those of Christian doctrines, compare Magee on the 
 Atonement, Note XIX. See also Motley, Augustinian 
 Doctrine of Predestination, p. 19, and the review of the 
 same work, by Professor Eraser, Essays in Philosophy, ^ 
 p. 274. 
 
 Note 4. p. 172. 
 
 Seven different theories of the causal nexus, and of the 
 » See Neander, vol. iv. p. 60, ed. Bohn. 
 
LECTURE VI. 885 
 
 mode of our apprehension of it, are enumerated and refuted 
 by Sir W. Hamilton, Discussions, p. 6i i. His own, which 
 is the eighth, can hardly be regarded as more satisfactory. 
 For he resolves the causal judgment itself into the inability 
 to conceive an absolute commencement of phenomena, and 
 the consequent necessity of thinking that what appears to 
 us under a new form had previously existed under others. 
 But surely a cause is as much required to account for the 
 change from an old form to a new, as to account for an 
 absolute beginning. On the defects of this theory I have 
 remarked elsewhere. See Encyclopwdia Britannica, eighth 
 edition, vol. XIV. p. 6oi. It has also been criticized by 
 Dr. M<=Cosh, Method of the Divine Government, p. 529, 
 fourth edition ; by Professor Fraser, Essays in Philosophy, 
 p. 1 70 sqq. ; by Mr. Tyler, Progress of Philosophy, p. 1 74; and 
 by Mr. Oalderwood, Philosophy of the Infinite, p. 139 sqq. 
 
 Note 5. p. 1 73.. 
 That Causation implies something more than invariable 
 sequence, though what that something is we are unable to 
 determine, is maintained, among others, by M. Cousin, in 
 his eloquent Lectures on the Philosophy of Locke. " Par 
 cela seul" he says, " qu'un phenomene succede h, un autre, 
 et y succede constamment, en est-il la cause ? est-ce la toute 
 I'idee que vous vous formez de la cause ? Quand vous dites, 
 quand vous pensez que le feu est la cause de Petat de flui- 
 dite de la cire, je vous demande si vous ne croyez pas, si le 
 genre humain tout entier ne croit pas qu'il y a dans le feu 
 je ne sais quoi, une propriiti inconnue qu''il ne s'agit pas ici 
 de determiner, a laquelle vous rapportez la production du 
 phenomene de la fluidity de la cire." Histoire de la Philo- 
 sophie au X VIII^. sihcle, Legon xix. Engel speaks to the 
 same effect in almost the same words. " Dans ce que 
 nous appelons, par exemple, force d'attraction, d'affinite, 
 ou mfime d'impulsion, la seule chose connue, (c'est-k-dire 
 representee a ^imagination et aux sens,) c'est I'eifet opere, 
 savoir, le rapprochement des deux corps attires et attirant. 
 Aucune langue n'a de mot pour exprimer ce/e ne sais quoi 
 {effort, tendance, nisus), qui reste absolument cache, mais 
 
 c c 
 
S86 NOTES. 
 
 que tous les esprits con9oivent necessairement comme 
 ajoute h la representation phenomenalea." Dr. M^Oosh 
 (Method of the Divine Government, p. 525) professes to dis- 
 cover this j'e ne sais quoi, in a substance acting according to 
 its powers or properties. But, apart from the conscious exer- 
 cise of free will, we know nothing oi power, or property, save 
 as manifested in its effects. Compare Berkeley, Minute Phi- 
 her, Dial. VII. § 9. Herder, Gott, Wer/te, VIII. p. 224. 
 
 Note 6. p. 173. 
 That the first idea of Causation is derived from the con- 
 sciousness of the exercise of power in our own volitions, is 
 .established, after a hint from Locke ^, by Maine de Biran, 
 and accepted by M. Cousin <=. To explain the manner in 
 which we transcend our own personal consciousness, and 
 attribute a cause to all changes in the material world, the 
 latter philosopher has recourse to the hypothesis of a 
 necessary law of the reason, by virtue of which it dis- 
 engages, in the fact of consciousness, the necessary element 
 of causal relation, from the contingent element of our 
 personal production of this or that particular movement. 
 This Law, the Principle of Causality, compels the reason 
 to suppose a cause, whenever the senses present a new 
 phenomenon. But this Principle of Causality, even grant- 
 ing it to be true as far as it goes, does not explain what 
 the idea of a Cause, thus extended, contains as its consti- 
 tuent feature : it merely transcends personal causation, 
 and substitutes an unknown something in its room. We do 
 not attribute to the fire a consciousness of its power to 
 melt the wax : and in denying consciousness, we deny the 
 only positive conception of power which can be added to 
 the mere juxtaposition of phenomena. The cause, in all 
 sensible changes, thus remains a Je ne sais quoi. On this 
 
 » Memoires de I'AcadAnie de BerUn, quoted by Maine de Biran, 
 Nouvelles Considerations, p. 23. 
 
 b Essay, B. II. Ch. 21. §§ 4, 5. A similar view is taken by Jacobi, 
 David Hume, oder Idealismus und Realismus, (Werke, II. p. 201.) 
 
 '^ See De Biran, CEuvres Philosophiques, IV. p. 241, 273. Cousin, 
 Cours de I'Histoire de la Philosophie, DeuxiSme S^rie, Le^on 19. 
 Fragments Philosophiques, vol. IV; Preface de la Premiere Edition. 
 
LECTURE VI. 387 
 
 subject I have treated more at length in another place. 
 See Prolegomena Logica, pp, 135, 309. 
 
 And even within the sphere of our own volitions, though 
 we are immediately conscious of the exercise of power, yet 
 the analysis of the conception thus presented to us carries 
 us at once into the region of the incomprehensible. The 
 finite power of man, as an originating cause within his own 
 sphere, seems to come into collision with the infinite power 
 of God, as the originating Cause of all things. Finite 
 power is itself created by and dependent upon God ; yet, 
 at the same time, it seems to be manifested as originating 
 and independent. Power itself acts only on the solicitation 
 of motives ; and this raises the question, Which is prior ? 
 does the motive bring about the state of the will which 
 inclines to it ; or does the state of the will convert the co- 
 incident circumstances into motives ? Am I moved to will, 
 or do I will to be moved 2 Here we are involved in the 
 mystery of endless succession. On this mystery there are 
 some able remarks in Mr. Mozley's Augmtiman theory of 
 Predestination, p. 2, and in Professor Eraser's Essays in 
 PMlosophy, p. 275. 
 
 Note 7. p. 173. 
 
 De Ordine, II. 18. Compare Ibid. II. 16. "de summo 
 illo Deo, qui scitur melius nesciendo." 
 
 Note 8. p. 174. 
 Enarratio in Psdimvm LXXXV. la. Compare Be Tri- 
 nitate, VIII. c. 3. 
 
 Note 9. p. 174. 
 
 F. Socinus, Tractatus de Deo, Christo, et Spiritu Sancto, 
 (Opera, 1656, vol. I. p. 811.) " Ceterum vel ex eo solo, quod 
 Deus unus esse aperte traditur, merito ooncludi potest, eum 
 non esse nee trinum, nee binum. Opposita sunt enim inter 
 se. Unus et Trinus, sive Unus et Binus. Ita ut, si Deus sit 
 trinus aut binus, non possit esse unus.'' Priestley, Tracts 
 in Controversy with Bishop Horsley, p. 78. " They are there- 
 fore both one and mamy in the same respect, viz. in each 
 being perfect God. This is certainly as much a contradic- 
 tion as to say that Peter, James, and John, having each of 
 
 c c a 
 
388 NOTES. 
 
 them every thing that is requisite to constitute a complete 
 man, are yet, all together, not three men, but only one manr 
 F. W. Newman, Phases of Faith, p. 48, " If any one speaks 
 of three men, all that he means is, ' three objects of thought, 
 of whom each separately may be called man.' So also, all 
 that could possibly be meant by three Gods is, ' three objects 
 of thought, of whom each separately may be called God.' 
 To avow the last statement, as the Creed does, and yet 
 repudiate Three Gods, is to object to the phrase, yet con- 
 fess to the only meaning which the phrase can convey." 
 
 Note 10. p. 174. 
 Schleiermacher {Christliche Glauhe, § 171) has some ob- 
 jections against the Catholic Doctrine of the Holy Trinity, 
 conceived in the thorough spirit of Rationalism. In the 
 same spirit Strauss observes {Glaubenslehre, I. p. 460), " Wer 
 das Symboltim Quicv/nque beschworen hatte, der hatte die 
 Gesetze des menschlichen Denkens abgeschworen." The 
 sarcasm comes inconsistently enough from a disciple of 
 Hegel, whose entire philosophy is based on an abjuration 
 of the laws of thought. In one respect, indeed, Hegel is 
 right ; namely, in maintaining that the laws of thought are 
 not applicable to the Infinite. But the true conclusion 
 from this concession is not, as the Hegelians maintain, that 
 a philosophy can be constructed independently of those 
 laws ; but that the Infinite is not an object of human phi- 
 losophy at all. 
 
 Note 11. p. 176. 
 
 Paradise Lost, B. II. 667. In this vague abstraction of 
 Being in general, Malebranche endeavours to discover a 
 positive conception of the Infinite. See Recherche le la 
 VeritS, L. III. P. ii. Ch. 8, L. VI. P. i. Oh. 5 ; Entretiens sur 
 la Metofhysique, Ent. II. VIII. But this is really tanta- 
 mount to a confession that the infinite is inconceivable; 
 for an object can be conceived only by distinction from 
 other objects. 
 
 Note 12. p. 177. 
 
 Compare Anselm, Be Fide Trinitatis, c. 7. " At si 
 negat tria dici posse de uno, et unum de tribus : ut tria 
 
LEOTUKE VI. 389 
 
 non dicantur de invicem; sicut in his tribus personis et 
 uno Deo facimus, quoniam hoc in aliis rebus non videt, nee 
 in Deo intelligere valet; sufferat paulisper aliquid, quod 
 intellectus ejus penetrare non possit, esse in Deo, neo com- 
 paret naturam, quae super omnia est, libera ab omni lege 
 loci et temporis et eompositionis partium, rebus quae loco 
 aut tempore clauduntur, aut partibus componuntur ; sed 
 credat aliquid in ilia esse, quod in istis esse nequit, et 
 acquiescat auctoritati Christianse, nee disputet contra il- 
 1am." 
 
 Note 13. p. 177. 
 See the objections raised against this doctrine by Mr. F. 
 W. Newman, Phases of Faith, p. 84. " The very form of 
 our past participle {hegoUen)," he tells us, " is invented to 
 indicate an event in past time." The true difficulty is not 
 grammatical, but metaphysical. If ordinary language is 
 primarily accommodated to the ordinary laws of thought, 
 it is a mere verbal quibble to press its literal application to 
 the Infinite, which is above thought. 
 
 Note 14). p. 178. 
 The parallel here pointed out may be exhibited more 
 fully by consulting Bishop Pearson^s Exposition of this 
 Doctrine, On the Creed, Art. I. and the authorities cited 
 in his notes. 
 
 Note 15. p. J 78. 
 
 On this ground is estabhshed a profound and decisive 
 criticism of Hegel's System, by Trendelenburg, Logische 
 Untersuchungen, c. a. "Das reine Sein," he says, "ist 
 Ruhe ; das Nichts — das sich selbst Gleiche — ist ebenfalls 
 Ruhe. Wie kommt aus der Einheit zweier ruhenden 
 Vorstellungen das bewegte Werden heraus." M. Bai^ 
 tholmess in like manner remarks, " En convertissant ainsi 
 I'abstraction en reality, ce systeme attribue tacitement h 
 I'etre abstrait des vertus, des qualites qui ng conviennent 
 qu'k un etre concret et individuel, e'est-a-dire h. un 6tre 
 seul capable d'action spontanee et reflechie, d'intelligence 
 et de volonte. II lui accorde tout cela, dans le temps 
 mSme qu'il le represente, et avec raison, comme un ^tre 
 impersonnel. Cet etre abstrait produit des Stres conorets, 
 
390 NOTES. 
 
 cet ^tre impersonnel produit des personnes : il produit les 
 uns et les autres, parce qu'ainsi I'ordonne le systeme !" 
 Histoire des Doctrines religieuses, II. p. 377. 
 Note 16. p. 179. 
 Schelling, Bruno, p. 168. " Im Absoluten ist alles ab- 
 solut; wenn also die Volkommenheit seines Wesens im 
 Eealen als unendliches Seyn, im Idealen als unendliches 
 Erkennen erscheint, so ist im Absoluten das Seyn wie das 
 Erkennen absolute und indem jedes absolut ist, hat auch 
 keines einen Gegensatz ausser sich in dem andern, sondern 
 das absolute Erkennen ist das absolute Wesen, das abso- 
 lute Wesen das absolute Erkennen." 
 
 Note 17. p. 179. 
 Aquinas, Swnma, P. I. Qu. XXXII. Art. i. "Impossi- 
 bile est per rationem naturalem ad cognitionem trinitatis 
 divinarum personarum pervenire. Ostensum est enim su- 
 pra quod homo per rationem naturalem in cognitionem Dei 
 pervenire non potest, nisi ex creaturis. Creaturse autem 
 duount in Dei cognitionem sicut effectus in causam. Hoc 
 igitur solum ratione naturali de Deo cognosci potest, quod 
 competere ei necesse est, secundum quod est omnium rerum 
 principium : et hoc fundament© usi sumus supra in con- 
 sideratione Dei. Virtus autem creativa Dei est communis 
 toti trinitati : unde pertinet ad unitatem essentise, non ad 
 distinctionem personarum. Per rationem igitur naturalem 
 cognosci possunt de Deo ea quae pertinent ad unitatem 
 essentise, non autem ea quse pertinent ad distinctionem 
 personarum." This wise and sound limitation should be 
 borne in mind, as a testimony against that neoplatonizing 
 spirit of modern times, which seeks to strengthen the evi- 
 dence of the Christian Doctrine of the Trinity, by distort- 
 ing it into conformity with the speculations of Heathen 
 Philosophy. The Hegelian Theory of the Trinity is a 
 remarkable instance of this kind. Indeed, Hegel himself 
 expressly regards coincidence with neoplatonism as an evi- 
 dence in favour of an idealist interpretation of Christian 
 doctrines d. A similar spirit occasionally appears in in- 
 fluential writers among ourselves. 
 
 d Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke, IX. p. 402. 
 
LECTURE VI. 391 
 
 Note 18. p. 1 80. 
 For the objection, see Gatech. Bacov. De Persona 
 Christi, Cap. i. (Ed. 1609. p. 43.) "Eationi sanse repugnat. 
 Primo quod duae substantias proprietatibus adversae coire 
 in unam personam nequeant, ut sunt mortalem et immor- 
 talem esse; principiura habere et principio carere; muta- 
 bilem et immutabilem existere : deinde quod duse naturae 
 personam singulae constituentes in unam personam conve- 
 nire itidem nequeant : nam loco unius, duas personas esse 
 oporteret, atque ita duos Ohristos existere, quem unum 
 esse, ut unam ipsius personam, omnes citra omnem contro- 
 versiam agnosount." Spinoza, Epist. XXI. " Cetefum 
 quod qusedam eccleeiae his addunt, quod Deus naturam 
 humanam assumpserit, monui expresse, me quid dicant 
 nescire ; imo, ut verum fatear, non minus absurde mihi 
 loqui videntur, quam si quis mihi dieeret, quod circulus na- 
 turam quadrati induerit." Similar objections are urged by 
 F.W.Newman, Tim Soul, p. 116, and by Theodore Parker, 
 Critical and Miscellaneous Writings, p. 320, Discourse of 
 Matters pertaining to Eeligion, p. 234. 
 
 Note 19. p. 181. 
 One half of this dilemma has been exhibited by Sir W 
 Hamilton, Discussions, p. 609. sqq. It is strange however 
 that this great thinker should not have seen that the 
 second alternative is equally inconceivable; that i^ is as 
 impossible to conceive the creation as a process of evolu- 
 tion from the being of the Creator, as it is to conceive it 
 as a production out of nothing. This double impo'ssibi- 
 lity is much more in harmony with the philosophy of the 
 conditioned, than the hypothesis which Sir W. Hamilton 
 adopts. Indeed, his admirable criticism of Cousin's theory 
 {Discussions, p. 2,6,) contains in substance the same di- 
 lemma as that exhibited in the text. For some addi- 
 tional remarks on this point, see above, Lecture 11. 
 note 33. 
 
 Note 20. p. 182. 
 iies, Partie II. Art. I. § i. 
 
392 NOTES. 
 
 Note 21. p. 185. 
 Greg, Creed of Christmdom, p. 248. sqq. Compare the 
 cognate passages from other Authors, quoted above, Lec- 
 ture I. note 31. 
 
 Note 22. p. 187. 
 For some remarks connected with this and cognate theo- 
 ries, see above, Lecture I. notes 21, 22, 23, Lecture III. 
 notes 16, 18. 
 
 Note 23. p. 187. 
 " Cum enim longe aliud sit universe, rei impossibilitatem 
 intelligere, aliud possibiUtatem rei non intelligere ; turn 
 maxime in iis quse tam vehementer ignoramus, sicut ea 
 quae sensui exposita non sunt, haud profecto impossibilia 
 sunt continuo, quorum possibilitas, modus ac facultas a 
 nobis non perspieitur. Ergo, ut his utamur, philosophum 
 non deoet, universe negare divinam in condito mundo effi- 
 cientiam, seu pro certo dicere, Deum ipsum (immediate) 
 nihil quicquam conferre vel ad rerum naturalium conseou- 
 tionem, veluti conservationem partis cujusque et speciei, 
 quam genus animalium aut plantarum amplectitur, vel ad 
 morales mutationes, ut animi humani emendationem, aut 
 fieri omnino non posse, ut revelatio aliave eventa extra- 
 ordinaria divinitus effecta fuerint." Storr, Annotationes 
 qwcedam TheologiccB, p. 5. 
 
 Note 24. p. 188. 
 " Nam quum virtus et potentia naturse sit ipsa Dei vir- 
 tus et potentia, leges autem et regulse naturse ipsa Dei 
 decreta, omnino credendum est, potentiam naturse infini- 
 tam esse, ejusque leges adeo latas, ut ad omnia, quse et ab 
 ipso divino intellectu concipiuntur, se extendant. Alias 
 enim, quid aliud statuitur, quam quod Deus naturam adeo 
 impotentem creaverit, ejusque leges et regulas adeo steriles 
 statuerit, ut ssepe de novo ei subvesnire cogatur, si earn 
 conservatam vult et ut res ex voto succedant. Quod sane 
 a ratione alienissimum esse existimo." Spinoza, Tractatm 
 Theologico-Politicus, cap. VI. " Hi nimirum, (Supernatu- 
 
LECTURE VI. 393 
 
 ralistse) Deum snmunt res humanas naturali ordine in uni- 
 versum regere, et, ubi hic naturalis ordo voluntati ip- 
 sius baud amplius satisfacere possit, miraculis patrandis 
 ipsi quasi opem ac medicinam ferre : iUi vero (Eationalistse) 
 Deum statuunt ab seterno omnes res continua serie secu- 
 'turas tarn sapienter disposuisse, ut quae v. c. ante plura jam 
 sseoula evenerint, id quod nunc evenit, prsepararent et 
 efficerenfc, nee opus asset miraculis quibusdam quasi inter- 
 calaribus." Wegscheider, Instit. Theol. § 13. From an op- 
 posite point of view to that of Spinoza, Herbart arrives at 
 a similar conclusion. " Es fordert die Religion, dass der- 
 jenige, der als Vater fiir die Menschen gesorgt hat, jetzt 
 in tiefsten Schweigen die Menschheit sich selbst iiberlast, 
 als ob er keinen Theil an ihr habe ; ohne Spur aller solchen 
 Empfindung, welche der menschlichen Sympathie, voUends 
 dem Egoismus gleichen konnte^." The simile of the cal- 
 culating engine, acting by its own laws, is adduced by 
 Mr. Babbage, {Ninth Bridgewater Treatise, ch. a), " to illus- 
 trate the distinction between a system to which the re- 
 storing hand of its contriver is applied, either frequently 
 or at distant intervals, and one which had received at its 
 first formation the impress of the will of its author, fore- 
 seeing the varied but yet necessary laws of its action 
 throughout the whole of its existence ;" and to shew " that 
 that for which, after its original adjustment, no super- 
 intendence is required, displays far greater ingenuity than 
 that which demands, at every change in its law, the direct 
 intervention of its contriver." Mr. Jowett, though reject- 
 ing the analogy of the machine, uses similar language : 
 " The directing power that is able to foresee all things, 
 and provide against them by simple and general rules, is a 
 worthier image of the Divine intelligence than the handi- 
 craftsman ' putting his hand to the hammer,' detaching 
 and isolating portions of matter from the laws by which he 
 has himself put them together^." 
 
 ^ Lehrhuch zur MinJeitung in die Philosophie, § 155 {Werke, I. 
 p. 278.) 
 f Epistles of St. Paul, vol. II. p. 412, 
 
394 NOTES. 
 
 Note 25. p. 189. 
 " The reason why, among men, an artificer is justly 
 esteemed so much the more skilful, as the machine of his 
 composing will continue longer to move regularly without 
 any further interposition of the workman, is, because the 
 skill of all human artificers consists only in composing, ad- 
 justing, or putting together certain movements, the prin- 
 ciples of whose motion are altogether independent upon 
 the artificer .... But with regard to God, the case is quite 
 different; because He not only composes or puts things 
 together, but is himself the Author and continual Pre- 
 server of their original forces or moving powers. And 
 consequently it is not a diminution, but the true glory of 
 his workmanship, that nothing is done without his continual 
 government and inspection."" Clarke, First Beph/ to Leibnitz, 
 
 P-I5- 
 
 Note 26. p. 189. 
 " I do not believe," says Theodore Parker, " there ever 
 was a miracle, or ever will be ; every where I find law, — 
 the constant mode of operation of the infinite God." Some 
 account of my Miwistry, appended to Theism, Atheism, amd 
 the Popular Theology, p. 0,6^. Compare the same work, 
 p. 1 13, 188 ; and Atkinson, MaiUs Nature and Development, 
 p. 341. The statement is not at present true, even as re- 
 gards the material wojld : it is false as regards the world 
 of mind : and were it true in both, it would prove nothing 
 regarding the " infinite God." For the conception of law 
 is, to say the least, quite as finite as that of miraculous in- 
 terposition. Professor Powell, in his latest work, though 
 not absolutely rejecting miracles, yet adopts a tone which, 
 compared with such passages as the above, is at least 
 painfully suggestive. " It is now perceived by all inquiring 
 minds, that the advance of true scientific principles, and 
 the grand inductive conclusions of universal and eternal 
 law and order, are at once the basis of all rational theo- 
 logy, and give the death-blow to superstition." Ghristianiti/ 
 p. II. 
 
LECTURE VI. 395 
 
 Note 37. p. 190. 
 This point has been treated by the author at greater 
 length in the Prolegomena Logica, p. 1355 and in the article 
 Metaphysics, in the 8th edition of the Encyclopmdia Bri- 
 tamiica, vol. XIV, p. 600. 
 
 Note 28. p. 193. 
 See M^Oosh, Method of the Divine Government, p. 162, 
 166. The quotations which the author brings forward in 
 support of this remark, from Humboldt and Oomte, are 
 valuable as shewing the concurrence of the highest scientific 
 authorities as to the facts stated. The religious applica- 
 tion of these facts is Dr. M^Cosh's own, and constitutes 
 one of the most instructive portions of his valuable work. 
 The fact itself has been noticed and commented on with 
 his usual sagacity by Bishop Butler, Analogy, Part II. 
 ch. 3. " Would it not have been thought highly improba- 
 ble, that men should have been so much more capable of 
 discovering, even to certainty, the general laws of matter, 
 and the magnitudes, paths, and revolutions of the heavenly 
 bodies, than the occasions and cures of distempers, and 
 many other things, in which human life seems so much 
 more nearly concerned, than in astronomy I" 
 
 Note 29. p. 19a. 
 " There are domains of nature in which man's foresight 
 is considerably extended and accurate, and other domains 
 in which it is very limited, or very dim and confused. 
 Again, there are departments of nature in which man's 
 influence is considerable, and others which lie altogether 
 beyond his control, directly or indirectly. Now, on com- 
 paring these classes of objects, we find them to have a 
 cross or converse relation to one another. Where man's 
 foreknowledge is extensive, either he has no power, or his 
 power is limited ; and where his power might be exerted, 
 
 his foresight is contracted He can tell in what position 
 
 a satellite of Saturn will be a hundred years after this pre- 
 
396 NOTES. 
 
 sent time, but he cannot say in what state his bodily health 
 
 may be an hour hence We are now in circumstances to 
 
 discover the advantages arising from the mixture of uni- 
 formity and uncertainty in the operations of nature. Both 
 serve most important ends in the government of God. 
 The one renders nature steady and stable, the other active 
 and accommodating. Without the certainty, man would 
 waver as in a dream, and wander as in a trackless desert ; 
 without the unexpected changes, he would make his rounds 
 like the gin-horse in its circuit, or the prisoner on his wheel. 
 Were nature altogether capricious, man would likewise be- 
 come altogether capricious, for he could have no motive to 
 steadfast action : again, were nature altogether fixed, it 
 would make man's character as cold and formal as itself.'' 
 M«Oosh, Method of the Divine Government, pp. 173, 174, 
 (4th edition). 
 
 Note 30. p. 193. 
 The solution usually given by Christian writers of the 
 difficulty of reconciling the efficacy of prayer with the in- 
 finite power and wisdom of God, I cannot help regarding, 
 while thoroughly sympathizing with the purpose of its ad- 
 vocates, as unsatisfactory. That solution may be given in 
 the language of Euler. " Quand un fidele addresse a pre- 
 sent h, Dieu une priere digne d'etre exaucee, il ne faut pas 
 s'imaginer que cette priere ne parvient qu'^ present h, la 
 connaissance de Dieu. II a deja entendu cette priere 
 depuis I'eternite ; et puisque ce pere misericordieux I'a 
 jugee digne d'etre exaucee, il a arrange exprfes le monde en 
 favour de cette priere, en sorte que I'accompUssement fut 
 une suite du cours naturel des evenements^'." In other 
 words, the prayer is foreseen and foreordained, as well as 
 the answer. This solution appears to assume that the 
 conception of la,w and necessity adequately represents the 
 absolute nature of God, while that of contingence and spe- 
 cial interposition is to be subordinated to it. The arrange- 
 
 '^ Lettres h une Princesse d'Allemagne, vol. I. p. 357, ed. Cournot. 
 Compare M<=Cosh, Method of the Divine Government, p. 222. 
 
LECTUEB VI. 397 
 
 raents of God in the government of the world are fixed from 
 all eternity, and if the prayer is part of those arrangements, 
 it becomes a necessary act likewise. It is surely a more 
 reverent, and probably a truer solution, to say that the 
 conception of general law and that of special interposition 
 are equally human. Neither probably represents, as a spe- 
 culative truth, the absolute manner in which God works in 
 His Providence ; both are equally necessary, as regulative 
 truths, to govern man's conduct in this life. In neither 
 aspect are we warranted in making the one conception 
 subordinate to the other. A similar objection may be 
 urged against the theory which represents a miracle as 
 the possible manifestation of a higher and unknown law. 
 There is nothing in the conception of law which entitles 
 it to this preeminence over other human modes of re- 
 presentation. 
 
 Note 31. p. 194. 
 Kant, though he attaches no value to miracles as evi- 
 dences of a moral religion, yet distinctly allows that there 
 is no sufficient reason for denying their possibility as facts, 
 or their utility at certain periods of the history of religion*. 
 This moderation is not imitated by his disciple, Wegscheider, 
 who says, " Persuasio de supernatv/raU et miraculosa eadem- 
 que immediata Dei revelatione baud bene conoiliari videtur 
 cum idea Dei seterni, semper sibi constantis, omnipotentis, 
 omniscii, et sapientissimi'^." Strauss, in like manner, as- 
 sumes that the absolute Cause never disturbs the chain of 
 secondary causes by arbitrary acts of interposition ; and 
 therefore lays it down as a canon, that whatever is mira- 
 culous is unhistoricaP. 
 
 Note 32. p. 195. 
 See, on the one side, Babbage, NiMh Bridgewater 
 Treatise, ch. 8; Hitchcock, Religion of Qeohgy, p. 390. 
 
 • Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der hlossen Vermimft, p. 99, edit. 
 Rosenkranz. 
 ^ Instit. Theol. § 12. 1 heben Jem, § 16. 
 
398 NOTES. 
 
 The same view is also suggested as probable by Butler, 
 Analogy, Part II. ch. 4. On the other side, as regards the 
 limitations within which the idea of law should be applied 
 to the course of God's Providence, see M<=Cosh, Method of 
 Divine Qoverm/mnt, p. 155. Kant, Religion imnerhalh, u.s. w. 
 p. 103, maintains, with reason, that, from a human point of 
 view, a law of miracles is unattainable. 
 
 Note 33. p. 198- 
 Sir William Hamilton, Discussions, p. 6^^. 
 
NOTES 
 
 LECTURE VII. 
 
 Note 1. p. aoo. 
 
 JL H E Moral and Eeligious Philosophy of Kant, which is 
 here referred to, is chiefly contained in his Metaphysik der 
 iSf^V^OT, first published in 1785, his Kritik der praktischen 
 Vermmft, in 1788, and his BeUgion irmerhalh der Grmzen 
 der blossen Vernun/t, in 1793. For Kant's influence on the 
 rationalist theology of Germany, see Rosenkranz, GescMchte 
 der Kant'schen PMlosophie, p. 333. sqq. ; Amand Saintes, 
 Histoire du, Mationalisme en Allemagne, L. II. Oh. xi ; Rose, 
 State of Protestantism in Germany, p. 183 (and edition); 
 Kahnis, History of German Protestaniism, p.88, 167 (Meyer's 
 translation). 
 
 Note 2. p. 201. 
 See Metaphysik der Sitten, pp.5,3i,_5a,87,93; Kritik der 
 praktischen Vermmft, p. 334 (ed. Rosenkranz). 
 
 Note 3. p. 202. 
 A similar view of the superiority of the moral conscious- 
 ness over other phenomena of the human mind, as regards 
 absolute certainty, seems to be held by Mr. Jowett. In 
 reference to certain doubts connected with the Doctrine of 
 the Atonement, he observes, " It is not the pride of human 
 reason which suggests these questions, but the moral sense 
 which He himself has implanted in the breast of each one 
 of us a." It is difficult to see the force of the antithesis 
 
 a Epistles of St, Paul, Vol. II. p. 468. 
 
400 NOTES. 
 
 here suggested. The " moral sense " is not more the gift 
 of God than the " human reason ;" and the decis'ons of the 
 former, to be represented in consciousness at all, require 
 the cooperation of the latter. Even as regards our own 
 personal acts, the intellectual conception must be united 
 with the moral sense in passing judgment ; and in all gene- 
 ral theories concerning the moral nature of God or of man, 
 the rational faculty will necessarily have the larger share. 
 
 Note 4. p. ao2. 
 Kritih der reinen Vemimft, p. 631. ed. Eosenkranz, 
 Mdaphysik der Sittm, p. 31. Religion innerhalb u. s. w. 
 p. 123. 
 
 Note 5. p. 302. 
 Religion u. s. w. p. 1 23. 
 
 Note 6, p. 202. 
 Ibid. p. 122, 184. 
 
 Note 7. p. 202. 
 Ibid. pp. t23j 133. Compare Streit der Facultdten, 
 p. 304. 
 
 Note 8. p. 204. 
 See above. Lecture III. p. 83. 
 
 Note 9. p. 204. 
 On the existence of necessary truths in morals, compara- 
 ble to those of mathematics, see Reid, Intellectual Powers 
 Essay VI. Ch. 6. (p. 453, 454. ed. Hamilton.) 
 
 Note 10. p. 306. 
 Compare Jacobi, An Fichte, Werke,lll. pp. 35,37. " So 
 gewiss ich Vernunft besitze, so gewis3 besitze ich mit dieser 
 meiner menschhchen "Vernunft nicU die Vollkommenheit 
 des Lebens, nicht die Ftille des Guten und des Wahren ; 
 und so gewiss ich dieses mit ihr nicht besitze, und es weiss ; 
 so gewiss weiss ich, es ist ein hbheres Wesen, und ich 
 habe in ihm meinen Ursprung . . . Ich gestehe also, dass ich 
 das an sick Gute, wie das an sick Wahre, nicht kenne, dass 
 ich auch von ihm nur eine feme Ahndung habe." That the 
 
LECTURE VII. 4)01 
 
 moral providence of God cannot be judged by the same 
 standard as the actions of men, see Leibnitz, Thiodicee, De 
 la Conformiti &c. § 33, [Opera, ed. Erdmann, p. 489.) 
 
 Note 11. p. 207. 
 " Wherefore inasmuch as our actions are conversant 
 about things beset with many circumstances, which cause 
 men of sundry wits to be also of sundry judgments con- 
 cerning that which ought to be done ; requisite it cannot 
 but seem the rule of divine law should herein help our im- 
 becility, that we might the more infallibly understand what 
 is good and what evil. The first principles of the Law of 
 Nature are easy ; hard it were to find men ignorant of 
 them. But concerning the duty which Nature's law doth 
 require at the hands of men in a number of things particu- 
 lar, so far hath the natural understanding even of sundry 
 whole nations been darkened, that they have not dis- 
 cerned, no not gross iniquity to be sin." Hooker, E. Ps, 
 I. xii. 2. 
 
 Note 12. p. 208. 
 This corresponds to the distinction drawn by Leibnitz, 
 between eternal and positive truths of the reason. See 
 Th&odicie, Discours de la Gonformite, &c. § 2. {Opera, 
 Erdmann, p. 480.) The latter class of truths, he allows 
 may be subservient to Faith, and even opposed by it, but 
 not the former. 
 
 Note 13. p. 210. 
 
 That it is impossible to conceive the Divine Will as ab- 
 solutely indifferent, is shewn by Mviller, ChristUche Lehre 
 von der Sunde, I. p. 128. But on the other hand, we are 
 equally unable to conceive it as necessarily determined by 
 the laws of the Divine Nature. We cannot therefore con- 
 ceive absolute morality either as dependent on, or as inde- 
 pendent of, the Will of God. In other words, we are unable 
 to conceive absolute morality at all. 
 
 Note 14. p. 2ii. 
 
 See above, Lecture I. note 14. 
 
 Dd 
 
402 NOTES. 
 
 Note 15. p. 2T2. 
 
 " Sin contains its own retributive penalty, as surely and 
 as naturally as the acorn contains the oak... It is ordained 
 to follow guilt by God — not as a Judge, but as the Creator 
 and Legislator of the universe . . .We can be redeemed from 
 the punishment of sin only by being redeemed from its 
 commission. Neither can there be any such thing as vica- 
 rious atonement or punishment ... If the foregoing reflec- 
 tions are sound, the awful, yet wholesome conviction, 
 presses upon our minds, that there can he no forgiveness of 
 sins." Greg, Creed of Christendom, p. 265. " I believe God 
 is a just God, rewarding and punishing us exactly as we 
 act well or ill. I believe that such reward and punishment 
 follow necessarily from His will as revealed in natural law, 
 as well as in the Bible. I believe that as the highest 
 justice is the highest mercy, so He is a merciful God. 
 That the guilty should sufl'er the measure of penalty which 
 their guilt has incurred, is justice. Froude, Nemesis of 
 Faith, p. 69. 
 
 Note 16. p. 212. 
 
 See above, Lecture I, note 13. 
 
 Note 17. p. 2x2. 
 See above, Lecture I, note 12. 
 
 Note 18. p. 212. 
 See Newman, Phases of Faith, p. 8. Compare Weg- 
 scheider, Instit. TheoL § 141. 
 
 Note 19. p. 213. 
 Mr. Rigg justly observes of the theory of immediate 
 forgiveness, as substituted for the Christian Atonement, 
 '' Let all men be told that ' God cannot be angry with any,' 
 and that whatever may have been a man's sins, if he will 
 but repent, there is no hindrance to God's freely forgiving 
 him all, without the infliction of any punishment whatever, 
 and without the need of any atonement or intercession. 
 What would be the effect of such a proclamation ? Would 
 it make sin appear " exceeding sinful V Would it enhance 
 
LECTURE VII. 403 
 
 our idea of the holiness of G-od ? Would it not make sin 
 appear a light and trivial thing, tolerated too easily by a 
 ' good-natured' God, to be held as of much account by 
 man^l" Wegscheider indeed actually urges this argument 
 against the Christian doctrine, which it suits his purpose 
 to represent as a scheme of unconditional forgiveness. 
 " Experientia docet, persuasionem hominum de peccatorum 
 remissione absoluta a nequissimo quoque facillime obti- 
 nenda, maximum semper verse virtuti et probitati detri- 
 mentum attulisse." Instit. Theol. § 140. 
 
 Note 20. p. 214. 
 Such is in fact the theory of Kant. See Religion inner- 
 kalb der Grenzen der hlossen Vernunft, p. 84. He does not 
 however carry his principle consistently out, but admits a 
 kind of vicarious suffering in a symbolical sense ; the peni- 
 tent being morally a different individual from the sinner. 
 Even this metaphorical conceit is utterly out of place, 
 according to the main principles of his system. 
 
 Note 21. p. 215. 
 Some excellent remarks on this point will be found in 
 M^Cosh's Method of the Divine Government, p. 475. (4th 
 edition.) 
 
 Note 22. p. 215. 
 
 " This natural indignation is generally moderate and 
 low enough in mankind, in each particular man, when the 
 injury which excites it doth not affect himself, or one whom 
 he considers as himself. Therefore the precepts to for- 
 gm and to love our enemies, do not relate to that general 
 indignation against injury and the authors of it, but to this 
 feeling, or resentment, when raised by private or personal 
 injury." Butler, Sermon IX, On Forgiveness of Injwies. 
 
 Note 23. p. 216. 
 Thus Mr. Froude exclaims, " He ! to have created man- 
 kind liable to fall — to have laid them in the way of a 
 temptation under which He knew they would fall, and then 
 
 b Modem Anglican Theology, p. 317. 
 D d 2 
 
404 NOTES. 
 
 curse them and all who were to come of them, and all 
 the world for their sakes !" Nemesis of Faith, p. ii. This 
 author omits the whole doctrine of the redemption, and 
 treats the fall and the curse as if they were the sole man- 
 ner of God's deaHng with sinners. His objection, stripped 
 of its violent language, is but one form of the universal 
 riddle — the existence of Evil. A similar objection is urged 
 by Mr. Parker, Theism, Atheism, and the Popular Theology, 
 p. 64; and by Mr. Atkinson, Letters on the Laws of MavCs 
 Nature and Development, pp. 173, 174. 
 
 Note 24. p. 3 1 6. 
 Aristotle, Eth. Nic. V. 10. Tov yhp &opCa-Tov otopiaros Kai 
 6 Kavc&v kcTTW, aKTirep Kal Trjs Aetr/Stas olKobofirjs 6 jxaXC^bivos 
 Kavdv Trpoy yap to (JXVH^ '''°^ \ldov iieTaKtveirai Koi ov jjJvei 
 6 Kavdv. 
 
 Note 25. p. 216. 
 
 On this spirit of universal criticism, Augustine remarks : 
 " Sunt autem stulti qui dicunt, Non poterat aliter Sapi- 
 entia Dei homines liberare, nisi susciperet hominem, et 
 nasceretur de femina, et a peccatoribus omnia ilia patere- 
 tur ? Quibus dicimus : Poterat omnino, sed si aliter faceret, 
 similiter vestrse stultitise displiceret." De Agone Christiana, 
 
 C. II. 
 
 The following passage from the Eclipse of Faith, p. 135, 
 is an excellent statement of the versatility of the " moral 
 reason," or " spiritual insight," when set up as a criterion 
 of religious truth. " Even as to that fundamental position, 
 — the existence of a Being of unlimited power and wisdom, 
 (as to his unlimited goodness, I believe that nothing hut an 
 external revelation can absolutely certify us,) I feel that I 
 am much more indebted to those inferences from design, 
 which these writers make so light of, than to any clearness 
 in the imperfect intuition ; for if I found — and surely this 
 is the true test — ^the traces of design less conspicuous in 
 the external world, confusion there as in the moral, and 
 in both greater than is now found in either, I extremely 
 doubt whether the faintest surmise of such a Being would 
 have suggested itself to me. But be that as it may ; as to 
 
LECTURE VII. 405 
 
 their other cardinal sentiments, — the nature of my relations 
 to this Being — ^his placability if offended, the terms of for- 
 giveness, if any, — whether, as these gentlemen affirm, he is 
 accessible to all, without any atonement or mediator : — as 
 to all this, I solemnly declare, that, apart from external in- 
 struction, I cannot by interrogating my racked spirit, catch 
 even a murmur. That it must be faint, indeed, in other 
 men ; so faint as to render the pretensions of the certitude 
 of the internal revelation, and its independence of all ex- 
 ternal revelation, perfectly preposterous, I infer from this, 
 — that they have, for the most part, arrived at diametri- 
 cally opposite conclusions from those of these interpreters 
 of the spiritual revelation. As to the articles, indeed, of 
 man's immortality and a future state, it would be truly 
 difficult for mif ' spiritual insight' to verify theirs ; for, ac- 
 cording to Mr. Parker, his ' insight' affirms that man is 
 immortal, and Mr. Newman's ' insight' declares nothing 
 about the matter ! Nor is my consciousness, so far as I can 
 trace it, mine only. This painful uncertainty has been the 
 confession of multitudes of far greater minds ; they have 
 been so far from contending that we have naturally a clear 
 utterance on these great questions, that they have acknow- 
 ledged the necessity of an external revelation ; and man- 
 kind in general, so far from thinking or feeling such light 
 superfluous, have been constantly gaping after it, and 
 adopted almost any thing that but lore the name. 
 
 What, then, am I to think of this all-sufficient revela- 
 tion from within?'''' 
 
 Note 26. p. 217. 
 
 For the Socinian theory of a limited foreknowledge in 
 God, see Miiller, Christliche Lehre von der Sunde, II. pp. 276, 
 388; Davison, Discourses on Prophecy, p. 360,367. A simi- 
 lar view is held by Rothe, Theol. Ethik, Vol. I. p. 1 18 ; and 
 by Drobisch, Grundlehren der Beligionsphilosophie, p. 209. 
 For the opposite necessitarian theory, see Calvin, Inst. 
 L. II. c. 4. § 6 ; Edwards, On the Freedom of the Will, 
 Part II. Sect. xii. quoted above, Lect. II. note 7; and the 
 authorities cited by Wegscheider, Inst. Theol. § 6^. 
 
406 NOTES. 
 
 Note 27. p. 217. 
 That God's knowledge is not proi^erly foreknowkdcie, as 
 not being subject to the law of time, is maintained by Au- 
 gustine, De Viv. Dei, XI. 21, De Div. Qucest. ad Simpl. 
 L. II. Qu. 2. § 2, and by Boethius, De Consol. Phil. L. V. 
 Pr. 3-6. A similar view is taken by Wegscheider, Inst. 
 Theol. ^6^. As a speculative theory, this view is as un- 
 tenable as the opposite hypothesis of an absolute fore- 
 knowledge and predestination. We can only say that we 
 do not know that the Divine Consciousness is subject to 
 the law of succession ; not that we know that it is not. 
 As a means of saving the infinity of God's knowledge, con- 
 sistently with the free agency of man, the hypothesis be- 
 comes unnecessary, the instant we admit that the infinite 
 is not an object of human conception at all. If this is 
 once conceded, we need no hypothesis to reconcile truths 
 which we cannot certainly know to be in antagonism to 
 each other. We cannot assume the simultaneity of the 
 divine consciousness ; for we know nothing of the infinite, 
 either in itself or in its relation to time. Nor, on the other 
 hand, could we deduce the necessity of human actions from 
 the fact of God's foreknowledge, even if the latter could 
 be assumed as absolutely true ; for we know not whether 
 the conception of necessity itself implies a divine reality, or 
 merely a human mode of representation. 
 
 Note 28. p. 217. 
 Wegscheider {Inst. Theol. § 50) denies the possibility of 
 prophecy, on the ground that a prediction of future events 
 is destructive of human freedom. In this he follows Kant, 
 Anthropologie, ^ i^. 
 
 Note 29. p. 218. 
 
 " As it is certain that prescience does not destroy the 
 liberty of man's will, or impose any necessity upon it, men's 
 actions being not therefore future, because they are fore- 
 known, but therefore foreknown, because future; and were a 
 thing never so contingent, yet upon supposition that it will 
 be done, it must needs have been future from all eternity : 
 
LECTURE VII. 407 
 
 so is it extreme arrogance for men, because themselves can 
 naturally foreknow nothing but by some causes antecedent, 
 as an eclipse of the sun or moon, therefore to presume to 
 measure the knowledge of God Altaighty according to the 
 same scantling, and to deny him the prescience of human 
 actions, not considering that, as his nature is incompre- 
 hensible, so his knowledge may be well looked upon by us 
 as such too ; that which is past our finding out, and too 
 wonderful for us." Cudworth, Intellectual System, Oh. V. 
 (Vol. ITT. p. "ig. ed. Harrison.) " We maybe unable to 
 conceive how a thing not necessary in its hature can be 
 foreknown^-for our foreknowledge is in general limited by 
 that circumstance, and is more or less perfect in proportion 
 to the fixed or necessary nature of the things we contem- 
 plate : . . . but to subject the knowledge of God to any such 
 limitation is surely absurd and unphilosophical, as well as 
 impious." Oopleston, Enquiri/ into the Doctrines of Necessity 
 and Predestination, p. 46. 
 
 Note 30. p. 319. 
 Origen. apud Euseb. Prcep. Evanc/.YI. 1 1. 36. Kat ei XPV 
 \iyfw ov TrjV ■np6yva>(tiv ahiav f&v yivofJ,iv(av, (ov yap e^dwT'e- 
 Tai Tov TrpoeyvaicriMei'ov afjMpTrja-OfjLevov 6 &ebs, orav ajxapTAvrj,) 
 aXKa Ttapaho^oTepov \xev a\r\ffis 8e ^povixev, to eaofievov alriov 
 tov Toidvbe eivai rrjv Irepl avrov Trpoyvoaatv. Leibnitz, Theo- 
 dicee, § 37. " 11 est fort aise de juger que la prescience en 
 elle-m6me n'ajoute rien a la determination de la verite des 
 futurs contingens, sinon que cette determination est connue : 
 ce qui n'augmente point la detertnination, ou la futuritiott 
 (comme on I'appelle) de ces ^venemens, dont nous sommes 
 convenus d'abord." Clarke, Demonstration of the Being and 
 Attributes of God, p. 96. " The certainty of ForekUowledge 
 does not cause the certainty of things, but is itself founded 
 on the reality of their existence. Whatever now is, it is 
 certain that it is ; and it was yesterday and from eternity 
 as certainly true, that the thing ioould he to-day, as 'tis now 
 certain that it is. This certainty of events is equally the 
 same, whether it is supposed that the thing gould be fore- 
 known, or not." 
 
408 NOTES. 
 
 Note 31. p. 219. 
 See above, Lecture VI. p. 190, and note 27. 
 
 Note 32. p. 231. 
 This question is discussed at some length by Euler, 
 Lettres a une Princesse d' Allemagne, Vol. I. p. 360. ed. 
 Cournot. 
 
 Note 33. p. 222:. 
 
 " Peccata finita sunt ; inter finitum et infinitum nulla 
 est proportio ; ergo poense quoque debent esse finitsB." 
 Sonerus apud Leibnitz. Prcef.'^ The same argument is used 
 by Blasche, PhilosopMsche Unsterblichkeitlehre, § 4 ; as well 
 as by Mr. Newman, Phases of Faith, p. 78, and by Mr. 
 Froude, Nemesis of Faith, p. 17. The latter however en- 
 tirely misrepresents Leibnitz's reply to the objection. 
 
 Note 34. p. 222. 
 Thus Leibnitz replies to the objection of Sonerus. 
 " Etiamsi igitur concederemus ipsi, nullum peccatum per 
 se infinitum esse, revera tamen dici potest, damnatorum 
 infinita numero peccata esse ; quoniam per totam seterni- 
 tatem in peccando perseverant." The same argument is 
 repeated in the Theodicee, § 74, 133, 266. The reply which 
 Mr. Froude attributes to Leibnitz ; namely, that sin against 
 an Infinite Being contracts a character of infinity, is merely 
 noticed by him as "la raison vulgaire," urged, among 
 others, by Ursinus. With Leibnitz"'s language may be 
 compared that of Miiller, " Und wenn nun die Erfahi-ung 
 zeigt, dass viele dem heiligsten Werk der gottlichen Liebe 
 wirMich widerstrehen, warum soil es unmoglich sein, das§ 
 dieses Widerstrehen gegen Gott sich auch jenseits des 
 irdischen Lebens immer wieder erneuere, und so in end- 
 lose Zeiten fortsetze." Christliche'Lehre' von der Sunde, 
 
 II. p. 601. 
 
 Note 35. p. 222. 
 Thus Mr. Newman eays, " I saw that the current or- 
 thodoxy made Satan eternal conqueror over Christ, In 
 
 = Published by Lessing, in his tract, Leibnitz von den ewigen Strafen, 
 {Lessing's Schriften, ed. Lachmann, Vol. IX. p. iS4.)j ^^ 
 
LECTURE VII. 409 
 
 vain does the Son of Grod come from heaven and take 
 human flesh and die on the cross. In spite of him, the 
 devil carries off to hell the vast majority of mankind, in 
 whom not misery only, but Sin is triumphant for ever and 
 ever<i." And Mr. Parker, to the same effect, remarks, " I 
 can never believe that Evil is a finality with God^," The 
 remarks of Miiller, in answer to similar theories, are worthy 
 of consideration. " Es scheint nach der Bemerkung, von 
 der wir eben ausgingen, undenkbar, dass die Weltent- 
 wickelung mit einem unaufgeloslen Zwiespalt abschliesse, 
 dass der Gegensatz gegen den gottlichen Willen in dem 
 Willen irgend welches Geschopfes sich behaupte. Diesen 
 Knoten lost indessen zunachst schon ein richtiger Eegriff 
 der Strafe. Der Gegensatz gegen den gottlichen Willen 
 behauptet sich eben nicht, sondern ist ein schlechterdings 
 iiberwundener, wenn der ganze Zustand der Wesen, in 
 denen er ist, Strafzustand ist, so dass das gebundene Bose 
 den reinen Einklang der zum gottlichen Reiche verklarten 
 Welt durchaus nicht mehr zu storen vermagf." 
 
 Note 36. p. 326. 
 See a short treatise by Kant, Ueher das Misslingen alkr 
 philosophischen Versuche in der Theodicie, (Werke, VII. p. 
 385.) For a more detailed account of various theories, see 
 Miiller, Ghristliche Lehre von der Sunde, B. II. An able 
 review of the difficulties of the question will be found in 
 Mr. Mozley's Augwstinian Doctrine of Predestination, p. 
 262 seq. 
 
 Note 37. p. 227. 
 
 The theory which represents evil as a privation or a 
 negation, — a theory adopted by theologians and philo- 
 sophers of almost every shade of opinion, in order to re- 
 concile the goodness of God with the apparent permission 
 of sin, can only be classed among the numerous necessarily 
 fruitless attempts of metaphysicians to explain the primary 
 facts of consciousness, by the arbitrary assumption of a 
 
 d Phases of Faith, p. >j%. 
 
 * Some Account of my Ministry. See Theism, Atheism, &c. p, 261. 
 
 ' ChristKche Lehre von der Siiude, II. p. 599. 
 
410 NOTES. 
 
 principle of which we are not and cannot be conscious, 
 and of whose truth or falsehood we have therefore no pos- 
 sible guarantee. Moral evil, in the only form in which we 
 are conscious of it, appears as the direct transgression of a 
 law whose obligation we feel within us ; and thus mani- 
 fested, it is an act as real and as positive as any performed 
 in the most rigid compliance with that law. And this is 
 the utmost point to which human research can penetrate. 
 Whether, in some absolute mode of existence, out of all 
 relation to human consciousness, the phenomenon of moral 
 evil is ultimately dependent on the addition or the sub- 
 traction of some causative principle, is a question the solu- 
 tion of which is beyond consciousness, and therefore beyond 
 philosophy. To us, as moral agents capable of right and 
 wrong acts, evil is a reality, and its consequences are a 
 reality. What may be the nature of the cause which 
 produces this unquestionably real fact of human conscious- 
 ness, is a mystery which God has not revealed, and which 
 man cannot discover. 
 
 Note 38. p. 225. 
 Analogy, Part II. Ch. ^. In another significant passage, 
 (Part I. Ch. 2) Butler exhibits the argument from analogy 
 as bearing on the final character of punishment. " Though 
 after men have been guilty of folly and extravagance up to 
 a certain degree^ it is often in their power, for instance, to 
 retrieve their affairs, to recover their health and character ; 
 at least in good measure ; yet real reformation is, in many 
 cases, of no avail at all towards preventing the miseries, 
 poverty, sickness, infamy, naturally annexed to folly and 
 
 extravagance exceeding that degree So that many natural 
 
 punishments are final to him who incurs them, if considered 
 only in his temporal capacity." Compare Bishop Browne, 
 Procedure of the Understanding, p. 35 1 . " The difficulty in 
 that question. What proportion endless torments can hear to 
 momentary sins ? is quite removed, by considering that the 
 punishments denounced and threatened are not in them- 
 selves sanctions entirely arbitrary, as it is in punishments 
 annexed to human laws ; but they are withal so many pre- 
 
LECTURE VII. 411 
 
 vious warnings or declarations of the inevitable consequence 
 and natural tendency of Sin in itself to render us miserable 
 in another world." 
 
 Note 39. p. 227. 
 Kant (Religion, u. s. w., Werhe X. p. 45) objects to the 
 doctrine of inherited corruption^ on the ground that a man 
 cannot be responsible for any but his own acts. The ob- 
 jection is carried out more fully by Wegscheider, who says, 
 " Nee benignitas Dei concedere potest, ut per unius homi- 
 nis peccatum universa hominum natura corrumpatur atque 
 depravetur ; nee sapientia pati, ut opus Dei ab initio prse- 
 stantissimis instructum dotibus pauUo post ob causam 
 levissimam in aliam plane deterioremque conditionem 
 transformetur." {Inst. Theol. § 117.) The learned critic 
 does not seem to be aware that the principle of one of 
 these arguments exactly annihilates that of the other ; for 
 if we concede to the first, that every man is born in the 
 state of pristine innocence, we must admit, in opposition to 
 the second, that God's work is destroyed by slight causes, 
 not once only, but millions of times, in every man that sins. 
 The only other supposition possible is, that sin itself is part 
 of God's purpose — in which case we need not trouble our- 
 selves to establish any argument on the hypothesis of the 
 divine wisdom or benevolence. 
 
 Note 40. p. 227. 
 Aristotle, Eth. Nic. VII. a. 'ATropTjo-eie 8' &v rts ttus vtio- 
 Xafx^Avav 6p6&s aKpareiSeTai Tts. 'FiTna-Taixevov jiev ovv ov 
 <j)a<Ti Tives dtov re etvai' hetvbv yap eirtcrTTjjUTjs ivov(rr]s, d>s <pero 
 ScaK/)(ir)js, &\\o ri Kpareiv koI ■jrepteA./ceti' avrbv &a-Kep avhpa- 
 ■nobov. ^WKpdrrjs jJ.^v yap oXo>s l/i(ixf"o irpos top koyov, cos ovk 
 ovorris UKpaaCas' ovdiva yap VTrokafi^dvovTa vpirruv itapa to 
 jSeA.rto-Toi', aWa bt &yvoiav. 
 
 Note 41. p. aa8. 
 For sundry rationalist objections to the doctrine of Jus- 
 tification by Faith, see Wegscheider, § 154, 155. He de- 
 clares the whole doctrine to be the result of the anthropo- 
 patkic notions of a rude age. 
 
412 NOTES. 
 
 Note 42. p. aa8. 
 
 " Uneer Begriff von Freiheit schliesst ja iibrigens nie- 
 mals Motiven des bewussten Handelns aus ; Motiven aber 
 sind nicht Zwangsveranstaltungen, sondern werden immer 
 nur erst durch den Willen wirksam; Motiven fiir den 
 menschlichen Willen konnen also auch von Gott ausgehen, 
 ohne das dadurch der Mensch gezwungen, ohne dass er 
 unfrei, ein blindes Werkzeug der hohern Macht wird." 
 Drobisch, Grundlehren der BeUgionspMlosophie, p. 27a. In 
 like manner, Mr. Mozley, in his learned and philosophical 
 work on the Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination, truly 
 says, " What we have to consider in this question, is not 
 what is the abstract idea of freewill, but what is the free- 
 will which we really and actually have. This actual free- 
 will, we find, is not a simple but a complex thing ; exhibit- 
 ing oppositions and inconsistencies ; appearing on the one 
 side to be a power of doing any thing to which there is no 
 physical hindrance, on the other side to be a restricted 
 faculty" (p. 103). Neither the Pelagian theory on the one 
 side, nor the Augustinian on the other, took sufficient ac- 
 count of the actual condition of the human will in relation 
 to external influences. The question was argued as if the 
 relation of divine grace to human volition must consist 
 wholly in activity on the one side, and passivity on the 
 other ; — in the will of its own motion accepting the grace, 
 or the grace by its irresistible force overpowering the will. 
 The controversy thus becomes precisely analogous to the 
 philosophical dispute between the advocates of freewill and 
 determinism : the one proceeding on the assumption of an 
 absolute indiiference of the will ; the other maintaining its 
 necessary determination by motives. 
 
 Mr. Mozley has thrown considerable light on the true 
 bearings of the predestinarian controversy ; and his work 
 is especially valuable as vindicating the supreme right of 
 Scripture to be accepted in all its statements, instead of 
 being mutilated to suit the demands of human logic. But 
 it cannot be denied that his own theory, however satis- 
 factory in this respect, leaves a painful void on the philo- 
 
LECTURE VII. 413 
 
 sophical side, and apparently vindicates the authority of 
 revelation by the sacrifice of the laws of human thought. 
 He maintains that where our conception of an object is in- 
 distinct, contradictory propositions may be accepted as both 
 equally true ; and he carries this theory so far as to assert of 
 the rival doctrines of Pelagius and Augustine, " Both these 
 positions are true, if held together, and both false, if held 
 apart s." 
 
 Should we not rather say that the very indistinctness of 
 conception prevents the existence of any contradiction at 
 all ? I can only know two ideas to be contradictory by the 
 distinct conception of both ; and, where such a conception is 
 impossible, there is no evidence of contradiction. The actual 
 declarations of Scripture, so far as they deal with matters 
 above human comprehension, are not in themselves contra- 
 dictory to the facts of consciousness : they are only made 
 so by arbitrary interpretation. It is nowhere said in Scrip- 
 ture that God so predestines man as to take from him all 
 power of acting by his own will : — this is an inference from 
 the supposed nature of predestination ; an inference which, 
 if our conception of predestination is indistinct, we have no 
 right to make. Man cannot foreknow unless the event is 
 certain ; nor predestine without coercing the result. Here 
 there is a contradiction between freewill and predestination. 
 But we cannot transfer the same contradiction to Theology, 
 without assuming that God's knowledge and acts are sub- 
 ject to the same conditions as man's. 
 
 The contradictory propositions which Mr. Mozley ex- 
 hibits as equally guaranteed by consciousness, are in reality 
 
 B P. 77. To the same effect are his criticisms on Aquinas, p. 260, in 
 which he says, " The will as an original spring of action is irreconcilahle 
 with the Divine Power, a second first cause in nature being inconsistent 
 with there being only one First Cause." This assumes that we have a 
 sufficient conception of the nature of Divine Power and of the action 
 of a First Cause ; an assumption which the author himself in another 
 passage repudiates, acknowledging that "As an unknown premiss, 
 the Divine Power is no contradiction to the fact of evil ; for we must 
 know what a truth is before we see a contradiction in it to another 
 truth." (p. 276.) This latter admission, consistently carried out, would 
 have considerably modified the author's whole theor}'. 
 
414 NOTES. 
 
 by no means homogeneous. In each pair of contradictories, 
 we have a limited and individual fact of immediate percep- 
 tion, — such as the power of originating an action, — op- 
 posed to an universal maxim, not perceived immediately, 
 but based on some process of general thought, such as 
 that every event must have a cause. To establish these 
 two as contradictory of each other, it should be shewn 
 that in every single act we have a direct consciousness of 
 being coerced, as well as of being free; and that we can 
 gather from each fact a clear and distinct conception. But 
 this is by no means the case. The principle of causality, 
 whatever may be its true import and extent, is not derived 
 from the immediate consciousness of our volition being 
 determined by antecedent causes ; and therefore it may 
 not be applied to human actions, until, from an analysis of 
 the mode in which this maxim is gained, it can be distinctly 
 shewn that these are included under iti^. 
 
 By applying to Mr. Mozley's theory the principles ad- 
 vanced in the preceding Lectures, it may, I believe, be 
 shewn that, in every case, the contradiction is not real, 
 but apparent ; and that it arises from a vain attempt to 
 transcend the limits of human thought. 
 
 Note 43. p. 229. 
 Analogy, Introduction, p. 10. 
 
 h I am happy to be able to refer, in support of this view, to the able 
 criticism of Professor Fraser, in his review of Mr. Mozley's work. 
 " The coexistence," he says, " of a belief in causality with a belief in 
 moral agency, is indeed incomprehensible ; but is it so because the 
 two beliefs are known to be contradictory, and not rather because 
 causality and Divine Power cannot be fathomed by finite intelhgence ?" 
 Essays in Philosophy, p. 271. 
 
NOTE S. 
 
 LECTURE VIII. 
 
 Note 1. p. 337. 
 
 F. W. Newman, Phases of Faith, p. 199; Reply to the 
 Eclipse of Faith, p. i r. 
 
 Note 2. p. 237. 
 " Christianity itself has thus practically confessed, what 
 is theoretically clear, that an authoritative external revela- 
 tion of moral and spiritual truth is essentially impossible 
 to man." F. W. Newman, The Soul, p-59. 
 
 Note 3. p. 237. 
 " In teaching about God and Christ, lay aside the wis- 
 dom of the wise : forswear History and all its apparatus : 
 hold communion with the Father and the Son in the 
 Spirit : from this communion learn all that is essential to 
 the Gospel, and still (if possible) retain every proposition 
 which Paul believed and taught. Propose them to the 
 faith of others, to he tested hy inward and spiritual evidence 
 only; and you will at least be in the time apostolic track." 
 F. W. Newman, The Soul, p. 250. 
 
 Note 4. p. 337. 
 " This question of miracles, whether true or false, is of 
 no religious significance. When Mr. Locke said the doc- 
 trine proved the miracles, not the miracles the doctrine, 
 he admitted their worthlessness. They can be useful only 
 
416 NOTES. 
 
 to such as deny our internal power of discerning truth." 
 Parker, Discourse of matters pertaining to ReUgion, p. 170. 
 Pascal, with far sounder judgment, says, on the other hand, 
 " II faut juger de la doctrine par les miracles, il faut juger 
 des miracles par la doctrine. La doctrine discerne les 
 miracles, et les miracles discernent la doctrine. Tout cela 
 
 est vrai; mais cela ne se contredit pas Jesus Christ 
 
 guerit I'aveugle-ne, et fit quantite de miracles au jour du 
 sabbat, par ou il aveuglait les pharisiens, qui disaient qu'il 
 fallait juger des miracles par la doctrine." " Les phari- 
 siens disaient : Non est hie homo a Deo, qui sabbatum non 
 custodit. Les autres disaient : Quomodo potest homo pecca- 
 tor hcBC signa facere ? Lequel est le plus clair* ? " In like 
 manner Clarke observes, " 'Tis indeed the miracles only, 
 that prove the doctrine ; and not the doctrine, that proves 
 the miracles. But then in order to this end, that the 
 miracles may prove the doctrine, 'tis always necessary to 
 be first supposed that the doctrine be such as is in its 
 nature capable of being proved by miracles. The doctrine 
 must be in itself possible and capable to be proved, and 
 then miracles will prove it to be actually and certainly 
 true*". The judicious remarks of Dean Trench are to the 
 same effect, " When we object to the use often made of 
 these works, it is only because they have been forcibly 
 severed from the whole complex of Christ's life and doc- 
 trine, and presented to the contemplation of men apart 
 from these ; it is only because, when on his head are 
 ' many crowns/ one only has been singled out in proof 
 that He is King of kings, and Lord of lords. The mira- 
 cles have been spoken of as though they borrowed nothing 
 from the truths which they confirmed, but those truths 
 every thing from the miracles by which they were con- 
 
 a PensAs, Partie II. Art. xvi. § i, g, 10. Whatever may be thought 
 of the evidence in behalf of the particular miracle on the occasion of 
 which these remarks were written, the article itself is worthy of the 
 highest praise, as a judicious statement of the religious value of mi- 
 racles, supposing their actual occurrence to be proved by suflScient 
 testimony. 
 
 •> Evidence of Natural and Revealed ReUgion, Prop. xiv. 
 
LECTURE VIII. 417 
 
 firmed ; when indeed the true relation is one of mutual 
 interdependence, the miracles proving the doctrines, and 
 the doctrines approving the miracles, and both held toge- 
 ther for us in a blessed unity, in the person of Him who 
 spake the words and did the works, and through the im- 
 press of highest holiness and of absolute truth and good- 
 ness, which that person leaves stamped on our souls ; — so 
 that it may be more truly said that we believe the miracles 
 for Christ's sake, than Christ for the miracles' sake "." 
 
 Note 5. p. 337. 
 Foxton, Popular Christianity, p. 105. On the other 
 hand, the profound author of the Restoration of BeUef, 
 with a far juster estimate of the value of evidence, observes, 
 '' Remove the supernatural from the Gospels, or, in other 
 words, reduce the evangelical histories, by aid of some un- 
 intelligible hypothesis (German-born) to the level of an 
 inane jumble of credulity, extravagance, and myth-power, 
 (whatever this may be,) and then Christianity will go to its 
 place, as to any effective value, in relation to humanizing 
 and benevolent influences and enterprizes; — a place, say, a 
 few degrees above the level of some passages in Epictetus 
 
 and M. Aurelius The Gospel is a Force in the world, 
 
 it is a force available for the good of man, not because it is 
 
 Wisdom, but because it is Power But the momentum 
 
 supplied by the Gospel is a force which disappears — which 
 is utterly gone, gone for ever, when Belief in its authority, 
 as attested iy miracles, is destroyed." pp. 290, 291, 292. 
 To the same effect are the excellent remarks with which 
 Neander concludes his Life of Jesus Christ. " The end of 
 Christ's appearance on earth corresponds to its beginning. 
 No link in its chain of supernatural facts can be lost, with- 
 out taking away its significance as a whole. Christianity 
 rests upon these facts ; stands or falls with them. By faith 
 in them has the Divine life been generated from the begin- 
 ning ; by faith in them has that life in all ages regenerated 
 mankind, raised them above the limits of earthly life) 
 changed them from glelce adscripti to citizens of heaven, 
 " Notes on the Miracles of our Lord, p. 94. (sth Edition.) 
 
 E e 
 
418 NOTES. 
 
 and formed the stage of transition from an existence 
 chained to nature, to a free^ celestial life, far raised above 
 it. Were this faith gone, there might, indeed, remain 
 many of the effects of what Christianity had been; but as for 
 Christianity in the true sense, as for a Christian Church, 
 there could be none." (EngUsh Translation, p. 487.) 
 
 Note 6. p. 237. 
 Parker, Some account of my ministry^ appended to Theism, 
 Atheism, and the Popular Theology, p. 258. 
 
 Note 7. p. 238. 
 " Alle diese Kriterien sind die moralischen Bedingungen,. 
 unter denen allein, und ausser welchen nicht, eine solche 
 Erscheinung von Gott, dem Begriife einer Offenbarung 
 gemass, bewirkt seyn konnte ; aber gar nicht umgekehrt, 
 — die Bedingungen einer Wirkung, die bloss durch Gott 
 diesem BegriflFe gemass bewirkt seyn konnte. Waren sie 
 das letztere, so berechtigten sie durch Ausschliessung der 
 Causalitat aller iibrigen Wesen zu dem Urtheile : das ist 
 Offenbarung; da sie aber das nicht, sondern nur das 
 erstere sind, so berechtigen sie bloss zu dem Urtheile : das 
 hamn, Offenbarung seyn." Fichte, Versuch einer Kritih aller 
 Offenbarung, ( Vferke, V. p. 146.) 
 
 Note 8. p. 239. 
 " These... v/ ere the outer conditions of the life of Christ, 
 under which his public ministry and his personal character 
 reached their destined development. It is not in that 
 development alone, but in that development imder these con- 
 ditions, that the evidence will be found of his True Origin 
 and of his Personal Preeminence." The Christ of History, 
 by John Young, p. 33. "But this character, in its un- 
 approachable grandeur, must be viewed in connection with 
 the outward circumstances of the Being in whom it was 
 realised, — in connection with a life not only unprivileged, 
 but offering numerous positive hindrances to the origina- 
 tion, the growth, and, most of all, the perfection of spi- 
 ritual excellence. In a Jew of Nazareth— a young man — 
 
LECTURE VIII. 419 
 
 an uneducated mechanic — moral perfection was realised. 
 Can this phenomenon be accounted for? There is here, 
 without doubt, a manifestation of humanity; but the 
 question is, was this a manifestation of mere humanity 
 and no more ?" Ibid. p. 251 ^. 
 
 Note 9. p. 241. 
 Newman, ITie Soul, p. 58. 
 
 Note 10. p. 244. 
 Analogy, Part II. Ch. 3. 
 
 Note 11. p. 248. 
 " Although some circumstances in the description of 
 God's Firstborn and Elect, by whom this change is to be 
 accomplished, may primarily apply to collective Israel, 
 [many others will admit of no such application. Israel 
 surely was not the child whom a virgin was to bear ; Israel 
 did not make his grave with the wicked, and with the rich 
 in his death ; Israel scarcely reconciled that strangely 
 blended variety of suffering and triumph, which was pre- 
 dicted of the Messiah,]" R. Williams, Rational GodUness, 
 p. 56. In a note to this passage, the author adds, " I no 
 longer feel confident of the assertion in brackets ; but now 
 believe that all the prophecies have primarily an applica- 
 tion nearly contemporaneous." As a specimen of this 
 application, we may cite a subsequent passage from the 
 same volume, p. 169. " The same Isaiah sees that Israel, 
 whom God had called out of Egypt, and whom the Eternal 
 had denominated his first-born, trampled, captive, and 
 derided ; he sees the beauty of the sanctuary defiled, and 
 the anointed priests of the Hving God degraded from their 
 
 "* The able and impressive argument of this little work is well 
 worthy of the perusal of those who would see what is the real force of 
 the Christian evidences, even upon the lowest ground to which scep- 
 ticism can attempt to reduce them. Though far from representing the 
 whole strength of the case, it is most valuable as shewing, what may be 
 effected in behalf of Christianity, on the principles of its opponents. 
 
 E e 2 
 
4a0 NOTES. 
 
 office, led as sheep to the slaughter, insulted by their own 
 countrymen, as men smitten of God, cast off by Jehovah. 
 Ah ! he says, it is through the wickedness of the nations 
 that Israel is thus afflicted ; it is through the apostasy of 
 the people that the priesthood is thus smitten and reviled ; 
 they hide their faces from the Lord's servant ; nevertheless, 
 no weapon that is formed against him shall prosper : it is 
 a little thing that He should merely recover Israel, He 
 shall also be a light to the Gentiles, and a salvation to the 
 ends of the earth." 
 
 There are few unprejudiced readers who will not think 
 the author's first thought on this subject preferable to his 
 second. In the interpretation of any profane author, the 
 perverse ingenuity which regards the Fifty-Third chapter 
 of Isaiah, (to say nothing of the other portions of the pro- 
 phecy, which Dr. Williams has divorced from their context,) 
 as a description of the contemporaneous state of the Jewish 
 people and priesthood, would be considered as too extra- 
 vagant to need refutation. That such an interpretation 
 should have found favour with thoroughgoing rationalists, 
 determined at all hazards to expel the supernatural from 
 Scripture, is only to be expected ; and this may explain 
 the adoption of this and similar views by a considerable 
 school of expositors in Germany : but that it should 
 have been received by those who, like Dr. Williams, 
 hold fast the doctrine of the Incarnation of the Son of 
 God, is less easily to be accounted for. If this greatest of 
 all miracles be once conceded, — if it be allowed that " when 
 the fulness of the time was come, God sent, forth His Son, 
 made of a woman ;" — what marvel is it, that, while the time 
 was still incomplete, a prophet should have been divinely 
 inspired to proclaim the future redemption ? Once concede 
 the possibility of the supernatural at all ; and the Messianic 
 interpretation is the only one reconcilable wdth the facts of 
 history and the plain meaning of words. The fiction of a 
 contemporaneous sense, whether with or without a subse- 
 quent Messianic application, is only needed to get rid of 
 direct inspiration ; and nothing is gained by getting, rid 
 of inspiration, so long as a fragment of the supernatural is 
 
LECTURE VIII. 421 
 
 permitted to remain. It is only when we assume, a priori, 
 that the supernatural is impossible, that any thing is 
 gained by forcing the prophetic language into a different 
 meaning. 
 
 Note 12. p. 250. 
 Of this Eclectic Christianity, of which Schleiermacher 
 may be considered as the chief modern representative, a 
 late gifted and lamented writer has truly observed, " He 
 could not effect the rescue of Christianity on these prin- 
 ciples without serious loss to the object of his care. His 
 efforts resemble the benevolent intervention of the deities 
 of the classic legends, who, to save the nymph from her 
 pursuer, changed her into a river or a tree. It may be 
 that the stream and the foliage have their music and their 
 beauty, that we may think we hear a living voice still in 
 the whispers of the one and the murmurs of the other, yet 
 the beauty of divine Truth, our heavenly visitant, cannot 
 but be grievously obscured by the change, for ' the glory 
 of the celestial is one, and the glory of the terrestrial is 
 another. Such ecclesiastical doctrines as contain what he 
 regards as the essence of Christianity are received. AH 
 others, as being feelings embodied in the concrete form of 
 dogmas, as man's objective conceptions of the divine, he 
 
 considers as open to criticism Schleiermacher accounts 
 
 as thus indifferent the doctrine of the Trinity, the super- 
 natural conception of the Saviour, many of his miracles, 
 his ascension, and several other truths of the same cl^^ss. 
 This one reply — ' That doctrine makes no necessary part 
 of our Christian consciousness,' stands solitary, like a Codes 
 at the bridge, and keeps always at bay the whole army of 
 advancing queries. But surely it does constitute an essen- 
 tial part of our Christian consciousness whether we regard 
 the New Testament writers as trustworthy or otherwise. 
 If certain parts of their account are myths, and others the 
 expression of Jewish prejudice, and we are bidden dismiss 
 them accordingly from our faith, how are we sure that in 
 what is left these historians were faithful, or these ex- 
 positors true representatives of the mind of Christ ? Our 
 
4.22 NOTES. 
 
 Christian consciousness is likely to become a consciousness 
 of little else than doubt, if we give credit to the asser- 
 tioHj — Your sole informants on matters of eternal moment 
 were, every here and there, misled by prejudice and im- 
 posed upon by fable*." 
 
 Note 13. p. 251. 
 For the objections of modern Pantheism against the im- 
 mortality of the soulj see Lecture III. note 27. Of the re- 
 surrection of the body in particular, Wegscheider observes, 
 " Tantum vero abest ut resurrectio corporum cum sanse 
 rationis prseceptis bene conciliari queat, ut plurimis gra- 
 vissimisque impediatur difficultatibus. Primum enim dubi- 
 tari nequit, quin hsec opinio e notionibus mancis et im- 
 perfeotis hominum incultiorum originem traxerit, quippe 
 qui, justa numinis divini idea destituti, vitam post mortem 
 futuram e sola vitse terrestris natura sibi fingere soleant ; 
 quo fit, ut apud complures gentes barbaras, itemque in 
 Zoroastrica disciplina, e cujus fonte Judaei ipsi hausisse 
 videntur, eadem ilia deprehendatur. Turn resurrectio cor- 
 porum in 11. N. T. tradita, quae inde ab ipsa apostolica setate 
 hand paucis improbata fuit, tam arete conjuncta cernitur 
 cum opinionibus de Messia mythicis et cum narratione de 
 Jesu in vitam restituto, ut non alia ratione ac mythi isti 
 
 judicari et explicari possit Prceterea Deo sanctissimo 
 
 benignissimoque aperte non convenit, quod homini, qui sine 
 corpore vitam veram degere nequeat, post multa demum 
 
 annorum millia hoc corpus reddere fingitur His et aliis 
 
 ducti rationibus baud fere levioribus, vel Jesum, ubi doc- 
 trinam de resurrectione proposuisse perhibetur, popularium 
 opinionibus indulsissCj vel potius discipulos ipsi tanquam 
 Messise, cujus provinciam e vulgaribus Judseorum com- 
 mentis atque certis ejusdem effatis allegoxicis atque ob- 
 sourioribus perperam judicarent, ejusmodi sententiam ex 
 suis subjecisse censemus^." Concerning angels and spirits, 
 one of the most significant specimens of modern Sadducee- 
 
 ^ Essays and Remains of the Rev. Robert Alfred Vaughan, Vol. I. 
 
 P'93- 
 
 f Institutiones Theoloffica;, § 195. 
 
LECTURE VIII. 423 
 
 ism may be found in Dr. Donaldson's Christian Orthodox^/ 
 reconciled with the conclusions of modern Biblical Learning, 
 p. 347. sqq. He holds, with regard to intermediate Intelli- 
 gences, the same view which Wegacheider suggests with 
 regard to the Resurrection : namely, " that our Lord, in 
 his dealings with the Jews, rather acquiesced in the esta- 
 blished phraseology than sanctioned, the prevalent super- 
 stitions." He adds that " in many respects, our Lord 
 seems to have approved and recommended" the views of 
 the Sadducees ; though " be could not openly adopt a 
 speculative truth, which was saddled with an application 
 diametrically opposed to the cardinal verity of his re- 
 ligion'*." It is obvious thatj by this method of exposition, 
 " Christian Orthodoxy " may mean anything or nothing : 
 any doctrine which this or that expositor finds it con- 
 venient to reject, may be set aside as a concession to 
 popular phraseology ; and thus the teaching of Christ may 
 be stripped of its most essential doctrines by men who 
 profess all the while to believe in His immanent Divinity 
 and Omniscience. Strauss arrives at a similar conclusion, 
 though of course without troubling himself about Scrip- 
 
 s P. 363. That is to say, it is boldly maintained that our Lord, in 
 order to humour the prejudices of the Jews of that day, consented to 
 lend His authority to the dissemination of a religious falsehood for the 
 deception of posterity. This monstrous assertion is stated more plainly 
 by Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-PoUt. c. 2. " Quod nempe suas rationes 
 opinionibus et priiicipiis uniuscujusque accommodavit. Ex. gr. quum 
 Pharisseis dixit, Et si Satanas Satanam ejicit, adversus se ipsum divisus 
 est J quomodo iffitur stare potest regnum ejus ? nihil nisi Pharieaeos ex 
 suis principiis convincere voluit, non autem doeere, dan d8emones 
 aut. aUqnod dsemonum regnum." In like manner, Schleiermacher 
 {Christliche Glaube, § 42) asserts that Christ and his Apostles possibly 
 adopted the popular representations, as we speak of fairies and ghosts. 
 On the other side, it is justly urged by Storr, {Doctrina Christiana, 
 § 52,) that our Lord employed the same language privately with his 
 disciples, as well as publicly with the people j e. g. Matt. xiii. 39, xxv. 
 41 ; Mark iv. 15 ; Luke xxii. 31. See also Mosheim's note, translated 
 in Harrison's edition of Cudworth, Vol. IL p. 661 ; Neander, Life of 
 Christ, p. 157 (Eng. Tr.); Lee, Inspiration of Holy Scripture, p. 69 
 (second edition). 
 
 ^ Pp-372. 373' 
 
4-24 NOTES. 
 
 tural premises. ' " Es ist also nicht genug, mit Schleier- 
 inaoher, die Moglichkeit solcher Wesen, wie die Engeln 
 sind, dahingestellt zu lassen, und nur so viel festzusetzen, 
 dass wir weder in unserem Handeln auf sie Riicksicht zu 
 nehmen, noch fernere Offenbarungen ihres Wesens zu 
 erwarten haben : vielmehr, wenn die moderne Gottesidee 
 nnd Weltvorstellung richtig sind, so kann es dergleiohen 
 Wesen iiberali nicht geben'." In the same spirit, Mr. 
 Parker openly maintains that "Jesus shared the erro- 
 neous notions of the times respecting devils, possessions, 
 and demonology in general'';" — a conclusion which is at 
 least more logical and consistent than that of those who 
 acknowledge the divine authority of the Teacher, yet claim 
 a right to reject as much as they please of his teaching. 
 
 Note 14. p. 251. 
 Grreg, Creed of Christendom, Preface, p. xii. 
 
 Note 15. p. 252. 
 The theory which represents the human race as in a 
 constant state of religious progress, and the various re- 
 ligions of antiquity as successive steps in the education of 
 mankind, has been a favourite with various schools of mo- 
 dern philosophy. Hegel, as might naturally be expected, 
 propounds a theory of the necessary development of re- 
 ligious ideas, as determined by the movements of the uni- 
 versal Spirit'. It is true that he is compelled by the stern 
 necessities of chronology to represent the polytheism of 
 Greece and Rome as an advance on the monotheism of 
 Judea f" ; and perhaps, if we regard the Hegelian philo- 
 
 ' Christliche Glaubenslehre, § 49. To the same effect are his remarks 
 on Evil Spirits, § 34. Among the earlier rationalists, the same view is 
 taken by Rohr, Brief e Uber den Rationalismus, p. 35. 
 
 ^ Discourse of matters pertaining to Religion, p. 176. 
 
 ' See Philosophie der Geschichte, fVerke,lX. p. 14. Phihsophie der 
 
 eligion, Werke, XI. p. 76, 78. 
 
 "1 See his Philosophie der Religion, Werke, XI. p. 82. XII. p. 45. 
 The superiority of the Greek religion appears to consist in its greater 
 acknowledgment of human freedom, and perhaps in being a step in the 
 
LECTURE VIII. 425 
 
 sophy as the final consummation of all religious truth, this 
 retrograde progress may be supported by some plausible 
 argvunentsP. Another form of the same theory is that of 
 Oomte, who traces the progress of humanity through 
 Fetichism, Polytheism, and Monotheism, to culminate 
 at last in the Positive Religion, which worships the idea of 
 humanity, including therein the auxiliary animals". In 
 theories of this kind, the distinction between progress and 
 mere fluctuation depends upon the previous question, 
 Whence, and Whither ? What was the original state of re- 
 ligious knowledge in mankind, and what is the end to 
 which it is advancing? If Pantheism or Atheism is the 
 highest form of religious truth, every step in that direction 
 is unquestionably progressive : if otherwise, it is not pro- 
 gress, but corruption. 
 
 The previous question is clearly stated by Theodore 
 Parker. " From what point did the human race set out, — 
 from civilization and the true worship of one God, or from 
 
 direction of Pantheism. See Werke, XII. 93, 125. Of the Roman re- 
 ligion, he says that it contained in itself all the elements of Christianity, 
 and was a necessary step to the latter. Its evils sprang from the depth 
 of its spirit (XII. pp. 181, 184). The best commentary on this assertion 
 may be found in Augastine, De Civ. Dei, Lib. VI. 
 
 " Among the imperfections of Judaism, Hegel includes the fact that 
 it did not make men conscious of the identity of the human soul with 
 the Absolute, and its absorption therein (Die Anschauung und das 
 Bewusstseyn von der Einheit der Seele mit dem Absoluten, oder von 
 der Aufnahme der Seele in den Schooss des Absoluten ist noch nicht 
 erwacht, Werke, XII, p. 86.) In another place (p. 161) he speaks of it 
 as the rehgion of obstinate, dead understanding. Vatke {Biblische Theo- 
 logie, p. 1 15) carries the absurdity of theory to its climax, by boldly 
 maintaining that the later Judaism had been elevated by its conflict 
 with the religions of Greece and Rome, and thus prepared to become 
 the immediate precursor of Christianity. The Hegelian theory is also 
 adopted by Baur, as representing the law of development of Christian 
 doctrines. The historical aspects of the doctrine are to be regarded as 
 phases of a process, in which the several forms are determined one by 
 another, and all are united together in the totality of the idea. See 
 especially his Christliche Lehre von der Versohnung, p. 11, and the 
 preface to the same work, p. vi. 
 
 <* Cours de Philosophie Positive, Lemons 52, 53, 54. Compare Cate- 
 chisme Positiviste, pp. 31, 184, 243. 
 
426 NOTES. 
 
 cannibalism and the deification of nature ? Has the human 
 race fallen or risen ? The question is purely historical, and 
 to be answered by historical witnesses. But in the pre- 
 sence, and still more in the absence, of such witnesses, the 
 a priori doctrines of the man's philosophy affect his deci- 
 sion. Reasoning with no facts is as easy as all motion in 
 vacuo. The analogy of the geological formation of the 
 earth — its gradual preparation, so to say, for the reception 
 of plants and animals, the ruder first, and then the more 
 complex and beautiful, till at last she opens her bosom to 
 man, — this, in connection with many similar analogies, 
 would tend to shew that a similar order was to be expected 
 in the affairs of men — development from the lower to the 
 higher, and not the reverse. In strict accordance with 
 this analogy, some have taught that man was created in 
 the lowest stage of savage life ; his Religion the rudest 
 -worship of nature ; his Morality that of the cannibal ; 
 that all of the civilised races have risen from this point, 
 and gradually passed through Fetichism and Polytheism, 
 before they reached refinement and true Religion. The 
 spiritual man is the gradual development of germs latent 
 in the natural man P." 
 
 It is to be regretted that Professor Jowett has partially 
 given the sanction of his authority to a theory which it is 
 to be presumed he would not advocate to the full extent of 
 the above statement. " The theory of a primitive religion 
 common to all mankind," he tells us, " has only to be 
 placed distinctly before the mind, to make us aware that 
 it is the baseless fabric of a vision ; there is one stream of 
 revelation only — the Jewish. But even if it were conceiv- 
 able, it would be inconsistent with facts. The earliest his- 
 tory tells nothing of a general religion, but of particular 
 beliefs about stocks and stones, about places and persons, 
 
 p Discourse of Matters pertaining to Religion, p. 68, 69. A similar 
 view is advocated by Mr. Newman, Phases of Faith, p. 233, and by 
 Mr. Greg, Creed of Christendom, p. 71. Mr. Parker does not distinctly 
 adopt this view as his own, but he appears to regard it as preferable to 
 the antagonist theory, which he speaks of as supported by a " party 
 consisting more of poets and dogmatists than of philosophers." 
 
LECTURE VIII. 427 
 
 about animal life, about the sun, moon, and stars, about 
 the divine essence permeating the world, about gods in 
 the likeness of men appearing in battles and directing the 
 course of states, about the world below, about sacrifices, 
 purifications, initiations, magic, mysteries. These were the 
 true religions of nature, varying with different degrees of 
 mental culture or civilisation q." And in an earlier part of 
 the same Essay, he says, " No one who looks at the reli- 
 gions of the world, stretching from east to west, through 
 so many cycles of human history, can avoid seeing in them 
 a sort of order and design. They are like so many steps 
 in the education of mankind. Those countless myriads of 
 human beings who know no other truth than that of reli- 
 gions coeval with the days of the Apostle, or even of Moses, 
 are not wholly uncared for in the sight of Crod'." 
 
 It would be unfair to press these words to a meaning 
 which they do not necessarily bear. We will assume that 
 by the " earliest history," profane history alone is meant, 
 in opposition to the Jewish Revelation ; and that the 
 author does not intend, as some of his critics have sup- 
 posed, to deny the historical character of the Book of 
 Genesis, and the existence of a primitive revelation coeval 
 with the creation of man. Even with this limitation, the 
 evidence is stated far too absolutely. But the words last 
 quoted are, to say the least, incautious, and suggest coin- 
 cidence in a favourite theory of modern philosophy, equally 
 repugnant to Scripture and to natural religion. Two very 
 opposite views may be taken of the false religions of anti- 
 quity. The Scriptures invariably speak of them as cor- 
 ruptions of man's natural reason, and abominations in the 
 sight of God. Some modern writers delight to represent 
 them as instruments of God's providence, and steps in the 
 education of mankind. This view naturally belongs to that 
 pantheistic philosophy which recognises no Deity beyond 
 the actual constitution of the world, which acknowledges 
 all that exists as equally divine, or, which is the same 
 thing, equally godless ; but it is irreconcilable with the 
 
 1 Epistles of St. Paul, Vol. II. p. 395. ' Ibid. p. 386. 
 
428 NOTES. 
 
 belief in a personal God, and in a distinction between the 
 good which He approves and the evil which He condemns. 
 But men will concede much to philosophy who will concede 
 nothing to Scripture. The sickly and sentimental morality 
 which talks of the " ferocious" God of the popular theology s, 
 which is indignant at the faith of Abraham*, which shud- 
 ders over the destruction of the Canaanites", which prides 
 itself in discovering imperfections in the law of Moses'', is 
 content to believe that the God who could not sanction 
 these things, could yet create man with the morality of a 
 cannibal, and the religion of a fetish-worshipper, and ordain 
 for him a law of development through the purifying stages 
 which marked the civilization of Egypt and Babylon and 
 Imperial Rome. Verily this unbelieving Reason makes 
 heavy demands on the faith of its disciples. It will not 
 tolerate the slightest apparent anomaly in the moral go- 
 vernment of God ; but it is ready, when its theories 
 require, to propound a scheme of deified iniquity, which it 
 is hardly exaggeration to designate as the moral govern- 
 ment of Satan. 
 
 We must believe indeed that in the darkest ages of 
 idolatry, God " left not himself without witness :" we must 
 believe that the false religions of the world, like its other 
 evils, are overruled by God to the purposes of His good 
 Providence. But this does not make them the less evils 
 and abominations in the sight of God. Those who speak 
 of the human race as under a law of vegetable development, 
 forget that man has, what vegetables have not, a moral 
 sense and a free will. It is indeed impossible, in our pre- 
 sent state of knowledge, to draw exactly the line between 
 the sins and the misfortunes of individuals, to decide how 
 much of each man's history is due to his own will, and how 
 much to the circumstances in which he is placed. But 
 though Scripture, like Philosophy, offers no complete solu- 
 
 s Parker, Theism., Atheism, and the Popular Theology, p. 103, 104. 
 t Parker, Discourse of Religion, p. 214. Newman, Phases of Faith, 
 p. rso. 
 
 " Parker, Discourse, p. 87. Newman, Phases, p. 151. 
 
 " Parker, Discourse, p. 204, 223. Greg, Creed of Christendom, p. 75. 
 
LECTURE VIII. 429 
 
 tion of the problem of the existence of evil, it at least dis- 
 tinctly points out what the true solution is not. So long 
 as it represents the sin of man as a fall from the state in 
 which God originally placed him, and as a rebellion against 
 a divine command; so long as it represents idolatry as 
 hateful to God, and false religion as a declension towards 
 evil, not as a progress towards good ; — so long it empha- 
 tically Teoords its protest against both the self-delusion 
 which denies that evil exists at all, and the blasphemy 
 which asserts that it exists by the appointment of God. 
 
 Note 16. p. 2,^5. 
 
 " It is an obvious snare, that many, out of such abund- 
 ance of knowledge, should be tempted to forget at times 
 this grand and simple point — that all vital truth is to be 
 sought from Scripture alone. Hence that they should be 
 tempted rather to combine systems for themselves accord- 
 ing to some proportion and fancy of their own, than be 
 content neither to add nor diminish any thing from that 
 which Christ and his Apostles have enjoined ; to make up, 
 as it were^ a cento of doctrines and of precepts ; to take 
 from Christ what pleases them, and from other stores what 
 pleases them ; (of course the best from each, as it appears 
 to their judgment, so as to exhibit the most perfect whole) 
 taking e. g. the blessed hope of everlasting life from Jesus 
 Cheist, but rejecting his atonement ; or honouring highly 
 his example of humanity, but disrobing Him of his divinity ; 
 or accepting all the comfortable things of the dispensation 
 of the Spirit, but refusing its strictness and self-denials ; 
 or forming any other combination whatsoever, to the exclu- 
 sion of the entire Gospel : thus inviting Christian hearers, 
 not to the supper of the king's son, but to a sort of mis- 
 cellaneous banquet of their own ; ' using their liberty,' in 
 short, ' as an occasion' to that natural disposition, which 
 Christ came to correct and to repair. 
 
 " Now that by such methods, enforced by education and 
 strengthened by the best of secondary motives, men may 
 attain to an excellent proficiency in morals, 1 am neither 
 prepared nor disposed to dispute. I am not desirous of 
 
430 NOTES. 
 
 disputing that they may possess therein an excellent reh- 
 gion, as opposed to Mahometanism or Paganism. But that 
 they possess the true account to be given of their steward- 
 ship of that one talent, the GhosPEi- itself, I do doubt in 
 sorrow and in fear. I do doubt whether they ' live the life 
 that now is/ as St. Paul Hved it, ' by the faith of the Son 
 or God ;' by true apprehension of the things that He suf- 
 fered for us, and of the right which He has purchased to 
 command us in all excellent qualities and actions ; and fur- 
 ther, of the invisible but real assistance which he gives us 
 towards the performance of them." Miller, Bamptm Lec- 
 tures, p. 169 (third edition). 
 
 Note 17. p. 256. 
 " Thus in the great variety of religious situations in 
 which men are placed, what constitutes, what chiefly and 
 peculiarly constitutes, the probation, in all senses, of some 
 persons, may be the difficulties in which the evidence of 
 religion is involved : and their principal and distinguished 
 trial may be, how they will behave under and with respect 
 to these difficulties." Butler, Analogy, Part II. ch. 6. 
 
 Note 18. p. 258. 
 I do not mean by these remarks to deny the possibility 
 of any progress whatever in Christian Theology, such, for 
 instance, as may result from the better interpretation of 
 Holy Writ, or the refutation of unauthorized inferences 
 therefrom. But all such developments of doctrine are ad- 
 missible only when confined within the limits so carefully 
 laid down in the sixth Article of our Church. " Holy Scrip- 
 ture containeth all things necessary to salvation : so that 
 whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby, 
 is not to be required of any man, that it should be be- 
 lieved as an Article of the Faith, or be thought requisite 
 or necessary to salvation." Within these limits, the most 
 judicious theologians have not hesitated to allow the pos- 
 sibility of progress, as regards at least the definite state- 
 ment of Christian doctrine. Thus Bishop Butler remarks : 
 "As it is owned the whole scheme of Scripture "is not yet 
 
LECTURE VIII. 431 
 
 understood ; so, if it ever comes to be understood, before 
 the restitution of all things, and without miraculous inter- 
 positions; it must be in the same way as natural knowledge 
 is come at : by the continuance and progress of learning 
 and liberty ; and by particular persons attending to, com- 
 paring, and pursuing intimations scattered up and down 
 it, which are overlooked and disregarded by the generality 
 of the worlds." And a worthy successor to the name has 
 pointed out the distinction between true and false develop- 
 ments of doctrine, in language based upon the same prin.- 
 ciple : " Are there admissible d&oglopmmts of doctrine in 
 Christianity ? Unquestionably there are. But let the term 
 be understood in its legitimate sense or senses to warrant 
 that answer ; and let it be carefully observed how much, 
 and how little, the admission really involves. All varieties 
 of real development, so far as this argument is concerned, 
 may probably be reduced to two general heads, intellectiial 
 developments, and practical developments, of Christian doc- 
 trine. By ' intellectual developments,' I understand logical 
 inferences (and that whether for belief or practical disci- 
 pline), from doctrines, or from the comparison of doctrines ; 
 which, in virtue of the great dialectical maxim, must be 
 true, if legitimately deduced from what is true. ' Practical 
 developments' are the living, actual, historical results oi 
 those true doctrines (original or inferential), when consi- 
 dered as influential on all the infinite varieties of human, 
 kind ; the doctrines embodied in action ; the doctrines mo- 
 difying human nature in ways infinitely various, corre- 
 spondently to the infinite variety of subjects on whom they 
 operate, though ever strictly preserving, amid all their 
 operations for effectually transforming and renewing man- 
 kind, their own unchanged identity. ... In the former case, 
 revealed doctrines may be compared with one another, or 
 with the doctrines of ' natural religion ;' or the conse- 
 quences of revealed doctrines may be compared with other 
 doctrines, or with their consequences, and so on in great 
 variety : the combined result being what is called a System 
 
 » Analogy, Part II. ch.3. 
 
432 NOTES. 
 
 of Theology. What the first principles of Christian truth 
 really are, or how obtained^ is not now the question. But 
 in all cases equally, no doctrine has any claim whatever to 
 be received as obligatory on belief, unless it be either itself 
 some duly authorized principle, or a logical deduction, 
 through whatever number of stages, from some such prin- 
 ciple of religion. Such only are legitimate developments 
 of doctrine for the belief of man ; and such alone ,can 
 the Church of Christ — the Witness and Conservator of 
 His Truth — justly commend to the consciences of her 
 
 members But in truth, as our own liability to error is 
 
 extreme, especially when immersed in the holy obscurity 
 (" the chud on the mercy-seat") of such mysteries as these, 
 we have reason to thank God that there appear to be few 
 doctrinal developments of any importance which are not 
 from the first drawn out and delivered on divine authority 
 to our acceptance*.'" 
 
 It is impossible not to regret deeply the very different 
 language, on this point, of a writer in many respects worthy 
 of better things ; but who, while retaining the essential 
 doctrines of Christianity, has, it is to be feared, done much 
 to unsettle the authority on which they rest. " If the des- 
 tined course of the world," says Dr. Williams, " be really 
 one of providential progress, if there has been such a thing 
 as a childhood of humanity, and if God has been educating 
 either a nation or a Church to understand their duty to 
 Himself and to mankind ; it must follow that when the ful- 
 ness of light is come, there will be childish things to put 
 
 away Hence, if the religious records represent faithfully 
 
 the inner life of each generation, whether a people or a 
 priesthood, the^ will all be, in St. Paul's phrase, dimnely 
 animated, or with a divine life running through them ; and 
 every writing, divinely animated, will be useful ; yet they 
 may, or rather they must be cast in the mould of the 
 generation in which they were written; their words, if 
 they are true words, will express the customs of their 
 
 * W. A. Butler, Letters on the Development of Christian Doctrine, 
 
 pp- ss-ss. 
 
LEOTUEE VIll 433 
 
 country, the conceptions of their times, the feelings or 
 aspirations of their writers ; and the measure of knowledge 
 or of faith to which every one, in his degree, had attained. 
 And the limitation, thus asserted, of their range of know- 
 ledge, will be equally true, whether we suppose the short- 
 coming to be, on an idea of special Providence, from a par- 
 ticular dictation of sentiment in each case ; or whether, on 
 the more reasonable view of a general Providence, we con- 
 sider such things permitted rather than directed ; the 
 natural result of a grand scheme, rather than a minute 
 arrangement of thoughts and words for each individual 
 man. It may be, that the Lord writes the Bible, on the 
 same principle as the Lord builds the city; or that He 
 teaches the Psalmist to sing, in the same sense as He 
 teaches his fingers to fight ; thus that the compgsition of 
 Scripture is attributed to the Almighty, just as sowing and 
 threshing are said to be taught by Him; for every part 
 played by man comes from the Divine Disposer of the 
 scene"." 
 
 It is the misfortune of this sort of language, that it sug- 
 gests far more than it directly asserts, and probably more 
 than the author intends to convey. Dr. Williams probably 
 does not mean to imply that we are no more bound by the 
 authority of Scripture in matters of religion than by the 
 primitive practice in sowing and threshing, or that we are 
 as much at liberty to invent new theological doctrines as 
 new implements of husbandry. But if he does not mean 
 this, it is to be regretted that he has not clearly pointed 
 out the respects in which his comparison does not hold 
 good. 
 
 Note 19. p. 360. 
 %, P. I. Qu. II. Art. a. 
 
 Note 20. p. 260. 
 See Archbishop King's Discourse on, Predestination, 
 edited by Archbishop Whately, p. 10. A different, and 
 
 " Rational Godliness, pp. 291, 292. A similar view is maintained by 
 Mr. Morell, Philosophy of Religion, p. 183, and is criticized by Pro- 
 fessor Lee, Inspiration of Holy Scripture, p. 147. 
 
 Ff 
 
434 NOTES. 
 
 surely a more judicious view, is taken bj a contemporary 
 Prelate of the Irish Church, whose earlier exposition of the 
 same theory" probably furnished the foundation of the 
 Archbishop's discourse. , " Though," says Bishop Browne, 
 " there are literally speaking no such passions in God as 
 Love or Hatred, Joy or Anger, or Pity ; yet there may be 
 Inconceivable Perfections in Him some way answerable to 
 what those passions are in us, under a due regulation and 
 subjection to reason. It is sure that in God those perfec- 
 tions are not attended with any degree of natural disturb- 
 ance or moral irregularity, as the passions are in us. Nay, 
 Fear and Hope, which imply something future for their 
 objects, may have nothing answerable to them in the divine 
 Nature to which every thing is present. But since our 
 reasonable affections are real dispositions of the Soul 
 which is composed of Spirit as well as Matter ; we must 
 conclude something in God analogous to them, as well as to 
 our Knowledge or Power. For it cannot be a thought 
 unworthy of being transferred to him, that he really loves a 
 virtuous and hates a vicious agent ; that he is angry at sin- 
 ners ; pities their moral infirmities ; is pleased with their 
 innocence or repentance, and displeased with their trans- 
 gressions ; though all these Perfections are in Him accom- 
 panied with the utmost serenity, and never-failing tranquil- 
 lity 'i." With this may be compared the language of Ter- 
 tullian, (^Adv. Marc. II. i6,) " Quae omnia patitur suo more, 
 quo eum pati condecet, propter quem homo eadem patitur, 
 seque suo more." 
 
 Note 21. p. 261. 
 Compare the remarks of Hooker, E.P. 1. 3. o,. " Moses, 
 in describing the work of creation, attributeth speech unto 
 God... Was this only the intent of Moses, to signify the in- 
 
 ^ In his Letter in answer to Toland's Christianity not mysterious. 
 
 Y Divine Analogy, pp. 45, 46. King's Theory is also criticized more 
 directly by the same author in the Procedure of the Understanding, 
 p. 1 1. Mr. Davison, {Discourses on Prophecy, p. 513,) has noticed the 
 weak points in King's explanation ; but with too great a leaning to the 
 opposite extreme, which reasons concerning the infinite as if it were a 
 mere expansion of the finite. 
 
LECTURE VIII. 435 
 
 finite greatness of G-od's power by the easiness of his ae- 
 complishing such effects, without travail, pain, or labour? 
 Surely it seemeth that Moses had herein besides this a 
 further purpose, namely, first to teach that God did not 
 work as a necessary but a voluntary agent, intending be- 
 forehand and decreeing with himself that which did out- 
 wardly proceed from him : secondly, to shew that God did 
 then institute a law natural to be observed by creatures, 
 and therefore according to the manner of laws, the insti- 
 tution thereof is described, as being established by solemn 
 injunction." 
 
 Note 22. p. 262. 
 
 " But they urge, there can be no proportion or simili- 
 tude between Finite and Infinite, and consequently there 
 can be no analogy. That there can be no such proportion 
 or similitude as there is between finite created Beings is 
 granted ; or as there is between any material substance 
 and its resemblance in the glass : and therefore wherein 
 the Beal Grovmd of this analogy consists, and what the de- 
 grees of it are, is as incomprehensible as the real Nature 
 of God. But it is such an analogy as he himself hath 
 adapted to our intellect, and made use of in his Revela- 
 tions ; and therefore we are sure it hath such a foundation 
 in the nature both of God and man, as renders our moral 
 reasonings concerning him and his attributes, solid, and 
 just, and true." Bp. Browne, Procedure of the Understand- 
 ing, p. 31. The practical result of this remark is, that we 
 must rest satisfied with a belief in the analogical repre- 
 sentation itself, without seeking to rise above it by sub- 
 stituting an explanation of its ulterior significance or real 
 ground. 
 
 Note 23. p. 263. ' 
 
 I am glad to take this opportunity of expressing, in the 
 above words, my belief in the purpose and authority of 
 Holy Scripture ; inasmuch as it enables me to correct a 
 serious misunderstanding into which a distinguished writer 
 has fallen in a criticism of my supposed views — a criticism 
 to which the celebrity of the author will probably give a far 
 wider circulation than is ever likely to fall to the lot of the 
 
 F f a 
 
436 NOTES. 
 
 small pamphlet which called it forth. Mr. Maurice, in the 
 preface to the second edition of his " Patriarchs and Law- 
 givers of the Old Testament," comments upon the distinc- 
 tion (maintained in the present Lectures and in a small 
 previous publication), between speculative and regulative 
 truths, in the following terms. " The notion of a revela- 
 tion that tells us things which are not in themselves true, 
 but which it is right for us to believe and to act upon as if 
 they were true, has, I fear, penetrated very deeply into the 
 heart of our English schools, and of our English world. It 
 may be traced among persons who are apparently most 
 unlike each other, who live to oppose and confute each 
 other. . . . But their differences are not in the least likely to 
 be adjusted by the discovery of this common ground. How 
 the atmosphere is to be regulated by the regulative Reve- 
 lation ; at what degree of heat or cold this constitution or 
 that can endure it ; who must fix, — since the language of 
 the Revelation is assumed not to be exact, not to express 
 the very lesson which we are to derive from it, — what it 
 does mean; by what contrivances its phrases are to be 
 adapted to various places and times : these are questions 
 which must, of course, give rise to infinite disputations; 
 ever new schools and sects must be called into existence to 
 settle them ; there is scope for permissions, prohibitions, 
 compromises, persecutions, to any extent. The despair 
 which these must cause will probably drive numbers to 
 ask for an infallible human voice, which shall regulate for 
 each period that which the Revelation has so utterly failed 
 to regulate." 
 
 Now I certainly believed, and believe still, that God is 
 infinite, and that no human mode of thought, nor even a 
 Revelation, if it is to be intelligible by the human mind, 
 can represent the infinite, save under finite forms. And it 
 is a legitimate inference from this position, that no human 
 representation, whether derived from without or from within, 
 from Revelation or from natural Religion, can adequately 
 exhibit the absolute nature of God. But I cannot admit 
 as a further legitimate inference, that therefore " the lan- 
 guage of the Revelation does not express the very lesson 
 
LECTURE VIII. 4S7 
 
 which we are to derive from it ;" that it needs any regula- 
 tion to adjust it to " this constitution or that ;" that it re- 
 quires " to be adapted to various places and times." For 
 surely, if all men are subject to the same limitations of 
 thought, the adaptation to their constitutions must be 
 made already, before human interpretation can deal with 
 the Revelation at all. It is not to the peculiarities which 
 distinguish " this" constitution from " that," that the Reve- 
 lation has to be adapted by man ; but, as it is given by God, 
 it is adapted already to the general conditions which are 
 common to all human constitutions alike, which are equally 
 binding in all places and at all times. I have said nothing 
 of a revelation adapted to one man more than to another ; 
 nothing of limitations which any amount of intellect or 
 learning can enable man to overcome. I have not said that 
 the Bible is the teacher of the peasant rather than of the 
 philosopher ; of the Asiatic rather than of the European ; 
 of the first century rather than of the nineteenth. I have 
 said only that it is the teacher of man as man ; and that 
 this is compatible with the possible existence of a more 
 absolute truth in relation to beings of a higher intelligence. 
 We must at any rate admit that man does not know God 
 as God knows Himself; and hence that he does not know 
 Him in the fulness of His Absolute Nature. But surely this 
 admission is so far from implying that Revelation does not 
 teach the very lesson which we are to derive from it, that it 
 makes that lesson the more universal and the more authori- 
 tative. For Revelation is subject to no other limitations 
 than those which encompass all human thought. Man 
 gains nothing by rejecting or perverting its testimony ; for 
 the mystery of Revelation is the mystery of Reason also. 
 
 I do not wish to extend this controversy further ; for I 
 am willing to believe that, on this question at least, my 
 own opinion is substantially one with that of my antagonist. 
 At any rate, I approve as little as he does of allegorical, or 
 metaphysical, or mythical interpretations of Scripture: I 
 believe that he. is generally right in maintaining that " the 
 most literal meaning of Scripture is the most spiritual 
 meaning." And if there are points in the details of his 
 
438 NOTES. 
 
 teaching with which I am unable to agree, I believe that 
 they are not such as legitimately arise from the consistent 
 application of this canon. 
 
 Note 24). p. 265. 
 
 " There seems no possible reason to be given, why we 
 may not be in a state of moral probation, with regard to 
 the exercise of our understanding upon the subject of reh- 
 gion, as we are with regard to our behaviour in common 
 affairs. . . . Thus, that religion is not intuitively true, but a 
 matter of deduction and inference ; that a conviction of its 
 truth is not forced upon every one, but left to be, by some, 
 collected with heedful attention to premises ; this as much 
 constitutes religious probation, as much affords sphere, 
 scope, opportunity, for right and wrong behaviour, as any 
 thing whatever does." Butler, Analogy, Part II. ch. 6. 
 
 Note 25. p. 265. 
 
 Plato, Rep. VI. p. 486 : Kai y.r\v ttov Kai ro'Se 8et a-Koireiv, 
 oTav KpCveiv /ue'AAr/s cpvcrcv (l)iX6(70(p6v n Koi jxtj. To ttoiov ; 
 M77 ere \6,dr] fiere'xoi/cra aveXevdepias' kvavTuaraTov y&p Ttov 
 ai^LKpoXoyla '^vxfj ju.eAXouVrj tov SXov koI T^avros ael iirope^e- 
 a-Qai 6eiov re koI avOpwnivov. Cicero, De Off. II. 2 : " Nee 
 quidquam aliud est philosophia, si interpretari velis, quam 
 studium sapientise. Sapientia autem est (ut a veteribus 
 philosophis definitum est) rerum divinarum et humanarum, 
 causarumque, quibus hse res continentur, scientia." 
 
 Note !i!6. P.-265. 
 
 Plato, Protag. p. 343 : OSrot Kai Kotf^ (vvekOovrei airap- 
 Xfjv rfjs (TO(j)Las aviOecrav rm 'AttJAXcow es tov veuiv tov ev 
 Ae\(po'is, ypa\lravT€s TavTa h br) iravTes vp,vovcn, Vv&Oi aavTov 
 KoL M776ei' &yav. Compare Jacobi, Werhe, IV.; Vorbericht 
 p. xlii. : " ErJcenne, dich selbst, ist nach dem Delphischen 
 Gott und nach Socrates das hoohste Gebot, und sobald es 
 in Anwendung kommt, wird der Mensch gewahr: ohne 
 gottliches Du sey kein menschliches loh, und umgekehrt." 
 
LECTURE VIII. 439 
 
 Note 27. p. 366. 
 Clemens Alex. Poedag. III. i : "'Hj^ Spa, m Uiks, irdvToov 
 fxiyia-Tov fjLadrnxdrcdv, ro yv&vai avrov. kavTov y&p tls iap yv(ar), 
 
 Note 28. p. 266. 
 " It is plain that there is a capacity in the nature of 
 man, which neither riches, nor honours, nor sensual grati- 
 fications, nor any thing in this world, can perfectly fill up 
 or satisfy : there is a deeper and more essential want, than 
 any of these things can be the supply of. Yet surely there 
 is a possibility of somewhat, which may fill up all our 
 capacities of happiness ; somewhat, in which our souls may 
 find rest ; somewhat, which may be to us 4;hat satisfactory 
 good we are inquiring after. But it cannot be any thing 
 
 which is valuable only as it tends to some further end 
 
 As our understanding can contemplate itself, and our affec- 
 tions be exercised upon themselves by reflection, so may 
 each be employed in the same manner upon any other 
 mind : and since the Supreme Mind, the Author and Cause 
 of all things, is the highest possible object to himself, he 
 may be an adequate supply to all the faculties of our souls ; 
 a subject to our understanding, and an object to our affec- 
 tions." Butler, Sermon XIV. 
 
 Note 29. p. 367. 
 " Christianity is not a religion for the religious, but a 
 religion for man. I do not accept it because my tem- 
 perament so disposes me, and because it meets my indi- 
 vidual mood of mind, or my tastes. I accept it as it is 
 suited to that moral condition in respect of which there is 
 no difference of importance between me and the man I 
 may next encounter on my path." The Restoration of Belief, 
 
 P- 335- 
 
 Note 30. p. 267. 
 
 " The Scripture-arguments are arguments of induce- 
 ment, addressed to the whole nature of man — not merely 
 to intellectual man, but to thinking and feeling man living 
 among his fellow men ; — and to be apprehended therefore 
 
440 NOTES. 
 
 in their effect on our whole nature." Hampden, Bampton 
 Lectures, p. 93. " There are persons who complain of the 
 Word, because it is not addressed to some one department 
 of the human soul, on which they set a high value. The 
 systematic divine wonders that it is not a mere scheme of 
 dogmatic theology, forgetting that in such a case it would 
 address itself exclusively to the understanding. The Ger- 
 man speculatists, on the other hand, complain that it is 
 not a mere exhibition of the pure ideas of the true and the 
 good, forgetting that in such a case it would have little or 
 no influence on the more practical faculties. Others seem 
 to regret that it is not a mere code of morality, while a 
 fourth class would wish it to be altogether an appeal to the 
 feelings. But the Word is inspired by the same God who 
 formed man at first, and who knows what is in man ; and 
 he would rectify not merely the understanding or intuitions, 
 not merely the conscience or affections, but the whole man 
 after the image of God." McCosh, Method of the Divine 
 t, p. 509. 
 
Albemable Street, 
 January, 1859. 
 
 MR. MURRAY'S 
 LIST OF NEW WORKS. 
 
 TMEE VISITS TO MADAGASCAB. 
 
 IN 1853—56, INCLUDING A JOURNEY TO "THE CAPITAL, 
 With Notices of the Natural History, and of the Present Civilisation of the People. 
 
 BY REV. W. ELLIS. 
 
 Autlior of " Polynesiau Researches," 
 
 Fourth Thousand. With Map and Illustrations. 8to. 16«. 
 
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 further information by specific inquiries on the spot. For this purpose he paid three 
 visits to the island; and we are glad to receive this volume from his hands. It is agree- 
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 new field of vast importance for European and transatlantic enterprise. That Mada- 
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 after the recent instances of China and Japan." — Civristiwn Observer. 
 
 THE COEKESPONDENCE PUBLIC AND PEIVATE 
 
 OP 
 
 THE MAEQHIS COENWALLIS. 
 
 Relating chiefly to India, America, the Union with Ireland, and the Peace of Amiens, 
 From. Family, Of&cial and other Documents, ke. 
 
 EDITED BY CHARLES ROSS, ESa 
 
 With Portrait and Maps. 3 vols. 8vo. 63s. 
 
MR. MURRAY'S LIST OF NEW WORKS. 
 
 THE FOEEST OF DEAK 
 
 AN HISTORICAL AND DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNT, 
 Derived from Personal Observation and other soiu-oes, Public, Private, Legendary, and Local. 
 
 BY H. G. NICHOLLS, M.A.. 
 
 Perpetual Curate of Holy Trinity, Dean Forest. 
 
 With numerous Woodcuts. Post 8vo. 10s. 6d. 
 
 " A very curious and instructive account of one of the most interesting and remarkable 
 localities in England. Mr. Nicholls has bestowed great pains in the compilation of his 
 volume, -which is fuU of information of the most useful and practical kind." — Notes and 
 
 THE HISTGEY OF HEEODOTUS. 
 
 A New English Version. Edited with Notes and Essays. 
 
 BY REV. G. RAWLINSON, M.A., 
 
 Late Fellow and Tutor of Exeter Colloge, Oxford. 
 
 Assisted by SIR HENRY RAWLINSON ahd SIR J. G. WILKINSON. 
 
 With Maps and Woodcuts. Vols. 1 to 3. 8vo. 18«. each. 
 
 ' ' Mr. Rawlinson's third volume brings us to a portion of the work which is more 
 especially his own. We pass from Assyria, Persia, and Egypt, to Soythia, Gyrene, and 
 Greece — from the specialities of Sir H. Rawlinson and Sir J. G. Wilkinson to the general 
 field of classical history. And the whole of this volume, accordingly — and it is one, of a 
 lower kind no doubt, yet worthy to take rank in its own kind with the works of Thirlwall 
 and Grote and Mure and Gladstone — ^is to be set to the account of Mr. Rawlinson, and of 
 Oxford. And let it be ^d, once for all, that the book is a great book, the book in its 
 own department. It will plainly henceforth rank among standard authorities in all 
 matters of ancient ethnology and in all historical and geographical subjects which come 
 within the wide range of the greatest and most inquisitive of afl ancient travellers. With 
 Drs. Liddell and Scott, Sir A. Grant, Mr. Mansel, and Mr. Rawlinson, Oxford may boldly 
 claim her true place in the front ranks of intellectual progress." — Guardian. 
 
 LIFE OF JAMES WATT, 
 
 (THE INVENTOB OF THE MODERN STEAM ENGINE.) 
 
 Incorporating the most interesting passages from his Private and Public Correspondence. 
 
 BY JAMES P. MUIRHEAD, M.A. 
 
 Portrait, fee. 8vo. 16s. 
 
 ' ' James Watt, the greatest name in the roll of English inventors, left behind him a large 
 store of valuable materials, which liave been puhlislied by his zealous relative, Mr. Muirhead ; 
 who has now crowned his long labours by an elaborate ' Life of Watt,' the expansion of a 
 former Memoir, whieh comprises all that we are likely to learn of a man to whom we 
 mainly owe the greatest commercial and social revolution in the entire history of the 
 world." — Quarterly Review. 
 
 "The work before us is a full and authentic biography of Watt, containing, indeed, 
 matter previously given, to the wgrld in a larger history published some years ago, but 
 re-arranged and so far elucidated by the addition of much private material, to which the 
 author, an intelligent kinsman of Watt's, had access, that the volume may be fairly 
 entitled to claim the interest of the public as a new work." — Athmceum. 
 
MR. MURRAY'S LIST OF NEW WORKS. 
 
 LOED BYRON'S CHILDE HAEOLD. 
 
 ILLUSTRATED. 
 
 With Views of the most remarkable Scenes, Edifices, Statues, &o., described in tlie 
 Poem, from original Sketches. 
 
 [drawn on wood by PBROIVAL SKEIION, ENGRAVED BY WHYMPEK & COOPER.] 
 
 Fcap. 4to. 21s. 
 
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 tions of the scenes and monuments -visited and described in the Childe's pilgrimage ; and 
 so closely and carefully depicts the present appearance of foreign localities that the reader 
 will easily understand that it could only be produced by having recourse to tie designs 
 of a large number of sketching tourists, and the contributory resources of photography. 
 
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 by Mr. Pereival Skelton, with remarkable delicacy, and Messrs. Whymper and Cooper 
 have executed their engraving so finely that it requires a strong light to appreciate all 
 its minutise. 
 
 "The tasteful binding, by Edmonds and Remnant, is far above the average iu design 
 and delicate tooling ; altogether this is the handsomest book of the season." — Times. 
 
 TKE ITALIAN VALLEYS OF THE ALPS. 
 
 A TOTJE THROUGH ALL THE BOMANTIC AND LESS-FREQUENTED "VALS" OF 
 NORTHERN PIEDMONT, FROM THE TARENTAISE TO THE GEIES. 
 
 BY REV. S. W. KING, M.A. 
 
 Maps and Illustrations. Crown 8vo. 18s. 
 
 ' ' Mr. King, in company with his wife, to iike utter astonishment of many of the peasant 
 women of the districts through which he passed, explored the less frequented valleys of 
 Northern Piedmont — running many risks, having many hair-breadth escapes — leading a fine, 
 free, and independent life, and witnessing much of nature's beauty and grandeur in their 
 wildest and most magnificent forms. Mr. King is an intelligent companion, and in his 
 published tour there is a great deal of agreeable reading. He has gone into regions com- 
 paratively unknown, and returned laden with spoil. We thank him for his pictures of 
 snowy Alps, and mighty glaciers, and thundering avalanches — ^of ceaseless torrents running 
 down to the sunny vales, of rare animals, and men and women of a simplicity and honesty 
 rarer still." — Daily News. 
 
 ON NAVAL WAEFAEE BY STEAM. 
 
 BY GENERAL SIR HOWARD DOUGLAS, BART., 
 
 Author of a " Treatise on Naval Gunnery," &e. 
 
 8vo. Ss. 6d. 
 
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 changes which he makes it his business to investigate. We have read his work with 
 pleasure and sympathy as well as ihstruetion. It ought to be known to publie men of 
 eveiy class, and known thoroughly by the great profession to which Sir Howard JJouglas 
 has rendered so many services." — Atheiia:um. 
 
MR. MURRAY'S LIST OF NEW WORKS. 
 
 ON COLOUE; 
 
 AND ON THE NECESSITY FOR A GENERAL DIFFUSION OF TASTE 
 
 AMONG ALL CLASSES. 
 
 Witli Remarks on laying out Dressed or Geometrical Gardens. 
 
 BY SIR J. G. WILKINSON, F.R.S. 
 
 Witli Coloured Illustrations and Woodcuts. 8to. 18s. 
 
 ' ' Sir Gardner Wilkinson produces in this volume one of the best books which have 
 been written on such a subject." — Spectator. 
 
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 passed from the narrower circles of artists and dilettanti to the sympathies of the general 
 reading public. To that public, notwithstanding the abatements we have made from an 
 unqualified commendation, we hope and believe that Sir Gardner Wilkinson's book will 
 be alike welcome and useful." — Saturday Eeview. 
 
 LIMITS OF EELIGIOUS THOUGHT EXAMINED. 
 
 BEING THE BAMPTON LECTURES FOR 1858. 
 
 BY REV. H. L. MANSEL, B.D. 
 
 Reader iu Moral aud Metaphysical Philosophy, Magdalen College ; Tutor and late Fellow of 
 St. John's College, Oxford. 
 
 Second Edition. 8vo. 12s. 
 
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 on the Shinar-plains of falsehood and sophistry. He crushes with the mace of a most 
 incontestable logic, the fairy palaces of the Pantheist and the strong castles of the 
 Rationalist — ^they fall before the steady advance of the forces of his mind. . , . We 
 regard it as one of the most important publications on conservative theology which has 
 recently issued from the press. ... To the students of our colleges we especially 
 commend this book." — Evangelical Magazine. 
 
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 SUPPLEMENTAEY DESPATCHES. 
 
 EDITED BY HIS SON. 
 Vols. I. & II. Svo. 20s. each. 
 
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 TRANSLATED BY J. G. LOCKHART. 
 
 With Coloured Borders, Illuminated Titles, Initial Letters, and numerous Woodcuts. 
 
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 Until perceptions of the beautiful have become didl amongst us, such a book is in no 
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MR. MURRAY'S LIST OF NEW WORKS. 
 
 SILUKIA: 
 
 THE HISTORY OP THE OLDEST FOSSILIFEROUS EOCKS AND THEIR FOUNDATIONS, 
 WITH A BKIDF SKETCH OP THE DISTMBtJTION OF GOLD OVEH IHE EAKTn. 
 
 BY SIR RODERICK I. MURCHISON, D.C.L., F.R.S., 
 
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 Third Edition, with large Coloured Map and Frontispiece, 41 Plates, and 206 
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 " The chief of these consists of natural sections in the North- Western Highlands, which 
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 from which an ascending order is exhibited through Cambrian into Lower Silnrian rocks, 
 which latter, though crystalline, contain characteristic remains. 
 
 "Many proofs are offered of the union of the various members of the Silurian rocks, 
 from their base, the Lingula Flags, to their summit, the Ludlow Eocks, ia one natural 
 system of former life ; and whilst the formation of the Llandeilo Flags is well distin- 
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 under the name of Llandovery Kocks. 
 
 "Much interesting matter is introduced from recent researches in Norway, Russia, 
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 " The Paleontologist will find, it is hoped, considerable interest in an elaborate Table 
 (one of three occurring in the work), which exhibits the duration through successive strata, 
 of every species of fossil yet described in the British Silurian Fauna. 
 
 " A considerable improvement has been made iu the classification of the Devonian or 
 Old Red Rocks, by demonstrating that the lower zone of the group intermediate between 
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 " Under the head of Permian, the vast quantity of new matter which is introduced, is 
 the result of two recent tours in Germany. 
 
 "These and very many other additions, together with the numerous new Illustrations 
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 A HISTORY OF THE AFGHANS. 
 
 BY J. P, FERRIER. 
 
 Author of " Caravan Journeys through Persia, Afglianistau," &c. 
 
 Translated by Capt. WILLIAM JESSE. 
 8vo. 21s. 
 
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 is still so entire and so perilous, ought to have a history. M, Ferrier has done his best 
 to give it us. 
 
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 iu the Afghan countries which has appeared since that of Alexander Bnrnes, is well 
 qualified to tell their story. He gained his knowledge of the Afghans by mixing freely 
 with them, and did not escape without some rough experience of their jealousy and 
 cruelty. The history which he has put together, from materials collected on the spot, 
 tells us probably as much as is worth knowing of the fortunes of the Afghan race."— 
 Guardian, 
 
JIE. MURRAY'S LIST OF NEW WORKS, 
 
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 BY REV. C. WORDSWORTH, D.D. 
 
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 A New Edition. With Maps, Plates, and 600 Woodcuts. Royal 8to. 28s. 
 
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MR. MURBAY'S LIST OF NEW WORKS. 
 
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Albemarle Street, 
 
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 MR. MURRAY'S 
 
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12 MR. MURRAY'S LIST OF ANNOUNCEMENTS. 
 
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MR. MURRAY'S LIST OP ANNOUNCEMENTS. 13 
 
 A DICTIONARY OF BIBLICAL ANTIQUITIES, 
 
 BIOGEAPHY, GEOGEAPHY, AND NATUEAL HISTOEY. 
 Edited bt WILLIAM SMITH, LL.D., 
 
 Classical Examiner iu the University of London. 
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 LIST OF WEITEKS. 
 
 Alfoed, Veey Ret. Henet, D.D., Dean of Canterbury. 
 
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 Betas, Ret. "W. L., M.A., Rector of Hay, Brecknockshire. 
 
 Beown, Ret. T. E., M.A., Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford. 
 
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 Bitilock, Ret. "W. T., M.A., Sec. Soo. for the Propag. Gospel in For. Parts. 
 
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 Faeeae, Ret. F. W., M.A., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. 
 
 Feegtjsson-, James, Esq., F.R.A.S. 
 
 GoTCH, Ret. F. W., M.A., Scriptural Examiner in the UnxTersity of London. 
 
 Geote, Geoege, Esq., Sydenham. 
 
 Hatman, Ret. Henet, M.A,, late Fellow of St. John's College, Oxford. 
 
 Heetet, Hon. and Ret. Loeb Aethtje, M.A. 
 
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 HowsoN, Ret. J. S., M.A., Principal of the Collegiate Institution, LiTerpool. 
 
 Lataed, Austen H., D.C.L. 
 
 Leathes, Ret. Stanley, M.A., Jesus' College, Cambridge. 
 
 Makes, Ret. D. W., Professor of Hebrew in UniTersity College, London. 
 
 Poole, E. Stanley, Esq. 
 
 PooLE, R. Stuaet, Esq, 
 
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 Hebrew and DiTinity Lecturer in King's College, London. 
 Peeowne, Ret. T. T., M.A., Fellow of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge. 
 Plumptee, Ret. E. H., M.A., Prof, of Pastoral Theology, King's Coll., London. 
 Phillott, Ret. H. W., M.A., late Student of Christchuroh, 
 Poetee, Ret. J. L., M.A. 
 
 Peitchaed, Ret. C, M.A., Head Master of the Grammar School, Clapham. 
 Rawlinson, Ret. G., M.Ai, late Fellow and Tutor of Exeter College, Oxford. 
 Rose, Ret. H. J., B.D., late Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge. 
 Stanley, Ret. Aethue P., D,D,, Regius Prof, of Eccles, Hist,, Oxford, 
 Steachey, Sie Edwaed, Bart, 
 
 Theodoees, T., Esq,, Manchester, , , „,, r. ,. ■:. 
 
 Venables, Ret, Edwakd, M. A., of Pembroke College, Cambridge. 
 ■Westcott, Ret. B. P., M.A., late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. 
 "Weight, "William, Esq., M.A., Trinity College,^Camb!;idge. 
 
14 MR. MURRAY'S LIST OF ANNOUNCEMENTS. 
 
 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER POPE. 
 
 AN ENTIRELY NEW EDITION. 
 
 The Text carefully revised, -vrith a. New Life, and more than 300 Unpublished Letters ; 
 
 preceded by a Critical Essay on Pope and his former Editors : 
 
 Edited by the late RIGHT HON, J. W. CHOKER. 
 
 8 Vols. 8to. 
 
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 The Literary Correspondence of Pope will be more complete and correct in this than in 
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ME. MURRAY'S LIST OF ANNOUNCEMENTS. 15 
 
 KUGLER'S HANDBOOK. 
 
 THE GERMAN, FLEMISH, AND DUTCH SCHOOLS 
 
 OF PAINTING. 
 
 A New Edition, re-oast and amplified, from personal knowledge, so as to render It a more 
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 af«*«iro!i)J3/—SlK J. F. W. HERSCHEL. j .BartSsMaitM—R. MALLET. 
 
 Atmospheric Waves— 'W. R. BIRT. ' j Zoology— B.. OWEN. 
 
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f'^wm^msmiM!^.