tHv l:^ \ CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY FROM S.TlPaine ^?iHnmii!ui!iyi.ii'!l!i.£^"°'°P'^Y B"v(TeC) to the particular, and the cause to the effect ; but since we know the particular before the universal, and the effect before we seek the cause, the particular and the effect are each prior in respect to us (Trporepov Trpos rjp.a.'s)." Anal. Post., i. 2 ; Top., vi. 4; Metapli. v. (A), xi. 1018, ed. Berol; Thomson's Outlines of the Laws of Thought, 3rd ed., p. 68. A priori is "the common ground of all consciousness of objects." Caird's Philos. of Kant, i. 19. This is now the accepted usage. Cousin's True, Beautiful, and Good. "The existence of Principles," Lects. i. ii. iii., Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, Haldane and Kemp's transL, i. 201. His criticism of Kant's Philosophy, Tb. iii.; Lotze's Logic, transl., § 357 and § 358. For a brief exposition of Kant, Schwegler's History of Philosophy, Stirling, 217-226. ARCHETYPE {ipxri, first or chief ; and -nnroi, form).— A model or original form. " There were other objects of the mind, universal, eternal, immutable, which they called intel- ligible ideas, aU originally contained in one archetypal mind or understanding, and from thence participated by inferior minds or souls." Cudworth, Intell. Sysi., p. 387. "There is an absolute beauty, and an absolute good, and of other things to which the term ' many ' is applied, there is ^n absolute ; for they may be brought under a single idea, called the essence of each." Plato's Republic, vi. 507, Jowett's Tr. "Would a painter be any the worse, because, after having Arg] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 31 delineated with consummate art an ideal of a perfectly beautiful man, he was unable to show that any such man could ever have existed?" lb. v. 472. " There is truth as well as poetry in the Platonic idea of things being formed after the orignial archetypes. But we hold that these archetypes are not uncreated, as Plato seems to suppose ; we maintain that they have no necessary or indepen- dent existence, but that they are the product of Divine wisdom." M'Cosh, Meth. of Div. Gov., bk. ii. ch. i. sec. 4. ARCHITECTONIC.—" By the term Architectonic, I mean the art of constructing a system." Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Meiklejohn's Tr. 503; Max Miiller's Tr. ii. 714. " Human reason is by nature architectonic" Meiklejohn's transl., 297. Kant proposes "to sketch the plan of ^^Architectonic of all cognition given by pure reason," adding that, by Reason he understands " the whole higher faculty of cognition, the ratiorial placed in contradistinction to the empirical." ARGUMENT (arguo, from djoyos, clear, manifest). — The act of reasoning ; procedure towards truth by inference. The term argument in ordinary discourse has several mean- ings : — (1) it is used for the premises in contradiction to the conclusion, e.g., " the conclusion which this argument is intended to establish is," &c. ; (2) it denotes what is a course or series of arguments, as when it is applied to an entire dissertation ; (3) sometimes a disputation or two trains of argument opposed to each other; (4) lastly, the various forms of stating an argument are sometimes spoken of as different kinds of argument, as if the same argument were not capable of being stated in various ways. Whately, Logic, app. i. " In technical propriety argument cannot be used fpr argti- mentation, as Dr Whately thinks, but exclusively for its middle term. In this meaning, the word (though not with uniform consistency) was employed by Cicero, Quintilian, Boethius, &c. ; it was thus subsequently used by the Latin Aristotelians, from whom it passed even to the Eamists ; and this is the meaning which the expression always first, and most naturally, suggests to a logician." Hamilton, Discussions, p. 147. 32 VOCAEULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Arg In this sense the discovery of arguments means the discovery of middle terms. Argument (The Indirect). — It is opposed to the Ostensive or Direct. Of Indirect argwnents several kinds are enumerated by logicians : — Argumentum ad hominem, an appeal to the principles or consistency of an opponent. Argumentum ex concesso, a proof derived from some truth already admitted. Argumentum a fortiori {q.v.). Argumentum ad judicium, an appeal to the common sense of mankind. Argumentum ad verecundiam, an appeal to our rever- ence for some respected authority. Argumentum ad populum, an appeal to the passions and prejudices of the multitude. Argumentum ad ignorantiam, an argument founded on the ignorance of an adversary. Argumentum per impossible, or Reductio ad ab- surdum, the proof of a conclusion derived from the absurdity of a contradictory supposition. These arguments are called Indirect, because the conclusion that is established is not the absolute and general one in question, but some other relative and particular conclusion, to be admitted in order to maintain consistency. The Reductio ad dbsurdum is the form of argument which more particularly comes under this denomination. This mode of reasoning is much employed in geometry, where, instead of demonstrating what is asserted, everything that contradicts the assertion is shown to be absurd. For, if everything which contradicts a proposition is unthinkable, the proposition itself must be accepted as true. ARG-UMBNTATION is opposed to intuition and con- sciousness. It is used by Price as synonymous with deduction. Review, ch. v. " Argumentationis nomine tota disputatio ipsa comprehenditur, constans ex argumento et argumenti confutatione " (Cicero). ART (Latin ars, from Greek a/jer^, excellence or skill ; Art] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 33 " usually referred to apto, apto," White). — (1) Skill in practice ; (2) more generally, skill in giving embodiment or representation to the ideal. Art is defined by Lord Bacon to be " a proper disposal of the things of nature by human thought and experience, so as to make them answer the designs and uses of mankind." On the distinction between Science and Art, see Stewart, Works, ii. 36, Hamilton's edition ; Whewell, Phil, of Induct. SeL, aph. 25 ; Thomson, Outline of Laws of Thought, p. 16, 2nd ed.; p. 13, 3rd ed. ; Harris, Dialogue on Art. The difference between art and science is regarded as merely verbal by Hamilton, Edin. Eev., No. 115; for contrary view see preface of St Hilaire's translation of the Organon, p. 12 ; Whewell, Phil, of Induct. Sci., pt. ii. bk. ii. ch. viii. " The Philosophy of Art is the interpretation of the principles of beauty in Nature, and of the rules in accordance with which ideal beauty may find expression at the hands of a competent artist." Kant's Kritik der dsthetisehen Urtheilskraft, Werke, ed. Eosencranz, iv. ; Kant's Kritik of Judgment, transl. Bernard, pt. i. ; Hegel's Aesthetik, Werke, ed. Michelet, x. "Art is the free reproduction of . . . ideal beauty, as the human imagination conceives it, by the aid of data which nature furnishes. . . . The Ideal is the mysterious ladder which enables the soul to ascend from the finite to the Infinite." Cousin's True, Beautiful, and Good, lect. ix. The method in which the Beautiful can be studied, lb. lect. vi. "The true method makes setting out from man the condition for arriving at things, which are a law for us." Art implies "Invention, Composition, and Expression." " The great end of the art is to strike the imagination." The artist " makes out an abstract idea of the form of things, more perfect than any one original ; and, what may seem a paradox, he learns to design naturally by drawing his figures unlike to any one object. This idea of the perfect state of nature, which the artist calls the Ideal Beauty, is the great leading principle by which works of genius are conducted This is the idea which has acquired, and seems to have a right to, the epithet of divine ; as it may be said to preside, like a supreme 34 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. [ASC judge, over all the productions of nature ; appearing to be possessed of the will and intention of the Creator, as far as they regard the external forms of living beings." Sir Joshua Eeynolds, Discourses, discourse iii. As to execution, "Liberty must move, under necessary control, with perfect, untormented serenity of ease." Euskin, The Gestun of Aglaia, chap. vi. ASCETICISM {aa-KTia-ii, exercise, training). — Practice of rigid self-denial, avowedly for the attainment of a higher moral life. The exercise of severe virtue among the Pythagoreans and Stoics involved abstinence from natural pleasures, as a discipline of the soul. " This name may be applied to every system which teaches man not to govern his wants by subordinating them to reason and the law of duty, but to stifle them entirely, or at least to resist them as much as he can ; and these are not only the wants of the body, but still more those of the heart, the imagination, and the mind.'' Diet. des. Sci. Phil. Abstinence was inculcated by ancient moralists, in order to make the soul more independent of the body. The o-m^poo-uvi; of Socrates, essential to a virtuous life, was a love of self-control, involving readiness for self-denial. Xenophon's Memorabilia, iv. 3, 1. The Stoics, however, regarded pleasure as irrational excitement, and counselled abstinence from it. Diog. Laert., bk. vii., Zeno ; Zeller's Stoics, &c., Eeichel's Tr., 229. ASSERTORY (Assertorische), applied to propositions, as Affirmative of objective reality. — Judgments have been dis- tinguished into prohlematic, assertory, and apodeictic. "The problematic is that which expresses logical possibility only. . . . The assertory, logical reality or truth The apodeictic represents the assertory as determined by the very laws of the understanding, and therefore as asserting a priori, thus express- ing logical necessity.'' Kant's Kritih der reinen Vernunft, Transc. Anal., bk. i. ch. i. sec. 3 ; Max Miiller's transl., ii. 67 ; Meiklejohn's, p. 61. To this threefold distribution Kant adds the following note : — " Just as if Thought were in the first instance a function of the Understanding, in the second of the Judgment, and in the third of the Eeason." Werke, ii. 75. Ass] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 35 ASSOCIATION {associo, to accompany). — Laws of meutal combinations which facilitate recollection — commonly called "Association of Ideas." "The law of association is this — That empirical ideas, which often follow each other, create a habit in the mind, whenever the one is produced, for the other always to follow." Kant, Anthropologie, p. 182. Such associa- tion belongs to the spontaneity of conscious activity, aiding accumulation of Knowledge. The philosophy which traces all knowledge to Experience regards Association as a means of developing higher powers, contemplating masses of ideas as if they were intellectual forces. The laws of association, as commonly stated, are these : — (1) Similarity; (2) Contiguity; (3) Kepetition. Mental pheno- mena, similar, correlated, or often occurring together, recall each other. The bond becomes stronger as the relation in consciousness recurs. These laws presuppose discrimination as a power of mind. Spencer seems to suggest the possibility of Association independently of Intelligence. " Feelings cohere in unlike degrees in different tracts of consciousness." He speaks of the " Associability of feelings." Principles of Psychol., i. p. 228, and p. 250. J. S. Mill, Examination of Hamilton, 3rd ed., p. 220, reasons as if there were a " chemistry of ideas," -^" the fusing of different elements." Locke, Essay, bk. ii. ch. xxiii. ; bk. ii. ch. xxxiii. sec. 5 ; Hume, Essays, essay iii. ; Hartley, Observations on Man ; Eeid, Intellectual Powers, essay iv. ; Stewart, Elements, vol. ii. ch. v. ; Brown, Lectures, lect. xxxiii.; Hamilton's Reid, notes d** and D***, p. 889 ; Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics, ii. 223 ; Herbert Spencer, Principles of Psychology, i. 228 ; Bain's Senses and Intellect, 2nd ed., p. 327 ; Wundt's Physiologische Psycho- logie. On the associative process, — James, Psychology, c. xiv., Text-Boole of Psychol., ch. xvi. ; Ward, " Psychology," Encye. Brit., 9th ed. ; Miiusterberg, Beitrage zur Experimentallen Psy- chologie. Heft. I., p. 123. On the bearing of association on evolu- tion of rational power, — J. S. Mill's Examination of Hamilton, ch. xi. ; Herbert Spencer's First Principles, "The Knowable." Bradley deals with "the fictitious nature of the Laws of Asso- ciation as they have been handed down by our prevalent 36 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [AsS tradition," Logic,, 273. "Things are not associated by their own necessity, and by virtue of some internal connection," ih. On " Association, and the Origin of Moral Ideas," Flint, Mind, i. 321. Calderwood's Handbook of Moral Philosophy, pp. 98- 122; and "Evolution and Man's Place in Nature," ch. vi. See a careful discussion of the questions of Association in Hoffding's Outlines of Psychology, transl. Lowndes, pp. 151- 159; James, Text-Book of Psychology, ch. 16 ; Sully's Human Mind, I. 305. ASSUMPTION (assumo, to take for granted). — An ac- cepted premiss from which an inquiry or argument begins ; or, the subordinate premiss, connected with the more general. Of premises, that which is taken universally is called the proposition, that which is less universal and comes into the mind secondarily is called the assumption. Trendelenburg, Notm in Arist. The assumption is thus the minor proposition in a syllogism, the major being named in contrast the presumption. The terms more commonly in use are, sumption, and subsumption. ATHEISM (a, priv. ; and 6e6|Mtt, from dfiow, to think worthy). — (1) A position of worth or authority, (2) the basis of demonstration, (3) a self-evident proposition. " Philosophers give the name of axioms only to self-evident truths that are necessary, and are not limited to time and place, but must be true at all times and in all places." Reid, Intel- lectual Powers, essay ii. ch. xx. ; Hamilton, Reid's Works, note A, sec. 5 ; Stewart, Elements, pt. ii. ch. i. Aristotle applied the term to all self-evident principles, which are the grounds of all science. Anal. Post, lib. i. ch. ii. 13 and ch. iii. 5, things immediate, to, a/tecra, which do not admit of proof. According to him they were all subordinate to the supreme condition of all demonstration, the principle of identity and contradiction. The Stoics, under the name of axioms, in- cluded every kind of general proposition, whether of necessary or contingent truth. In this sense the term is employed by Bacon, who, not satisfied with submitting axioms to the test of experience, has distinguished several kinds of axioms, some more general than others. Novum Organum, lib. i. aphor. xiii., xvii., xix., &c. Thus, Bacon says : — " There are but two ways of investigating and discovering truth. The one hurries on rapidly from the senses and particulars to the most general axioms. . . . The other constructs, its axioms from the senses and particulars, by ascending continually and gradually, till it finally arrives at the most general axioms." Aph. xix. The Cartesians, in applying the methods of geometry to philosophy, followed Aristotelian usage. "The axioms, as well those which are indemonstrable, as Bea] VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. 43 those which admit of being demonstrated, differ from that other class of fundamental principles (of geometry) which are involved in the definitions, in this, that they are true without any mixture of hypothesis." Mill's Logic, bk. ii. c. 5. BEAUTY. — Quality, or a harmony of qualities, awakening in us admiration. The ideally beautiful is aimed at by art; Intelligence presents an ideal, as the test of excellence. Plato identified the beautiful with the good, to Ka\6v koI d-ya^oi'; maintaining that a man is foolish who "seriously inclines to weigh the beautiful by any other standard." Republic, v. 452. Aristotle took the same position, but with more ethical regard. Nic. Ethics, i. 6. The English moralists of the 18th century abound in refer- ences to moral beauty. " The mind which is the spectator or auditor of other minds, cannot be without its eye and ear, so as to discern proportion, distinguish sound, and scan each senti- ment or thought which comes before it." Shaftesbury, Gorir ceming Virtue, sec. 3. According to Hutcheson, the general foundation or occasion of the ideas of beauty is "urdformity amidst variety.'' Inquiry concerning Beauty, sec. 2. " All the objects we call beautiful agree in two things, which seem to concur in our sense of beauty. (1) When they are perceived, or even imagined, they produce a certain agreeable emotion or feeling in the mind ; and (2) this agreeable emotion is accompanied with an opinion or belief of their having some perfection or excellence belonging to them." Eeid, Intellectual Powers, essay viii. ch. iv. Berkeley, in his Aleiphron, and Hume, in many parts of his works, made utility the foundation of beauty. Others have argued that the sense of the beautiful is determined mainly by association. Kant says : — " The beautiful is that which, apart from con- cepts, is represented as the object of a universal satisfaction." KritiJc of Judgment, div. i. § 6, transl. Bernard, 55. Or, it is " that which, through the harmony of its form with human faculty, awakens satisfaction." Schelling says : — Beauty is "the Infinite finitely represented;" Hegel makes it "the Absolute in sensuous existence." 44 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Bel Stewart, Active Powers, i. 279; Smith, Theory of Mor. Sent, pt. iv. ch. i. ; Alison, Essay on Taste ; Price, in his Review of Principal Questions in Morals, sec. 2 ; art. " Beauty " in the Ency. Brit., 9th ed., by Lord Jeffrey; Karnes, Elements of Criticism, vol. i. ch. iii. ; Burke, On the Sublime and Beautiful ; Reynold's Discourses; Ruskin's Lectures on Art; Knight's Philos. of the Beautiful. — Vide art. jEsthbtics. BEING (to ovtok ov, the existing, as in contrast with to. ovra, existing things; Ens; German, Seyn). — (1) Existence; (2) in the antithesis of Thought and Being, that which is, in contrast to that which is thought; (3) within thought itself, the first and most general of the categories ; (4) Being itself, involving the necessity of its being, The Absolute. "Pure Being, the common basis of existing things." Lotze's Meta- physics, transl. 31. The whole range of Philosophy, from the beginning of its history, has been connected with Being and Becoming — the abiding and the fleeting. This appears in the system of Heraclitus, with its unity of being and not being, maintaining that all is in perpetual flux ; of the Eleatics, notably Parmenides with the formula, only Being is, and becoming is not at all. The mystery of Being constitutes the grand problem of Meta- physics, involving the twofold problem, concerning the meaning of existence, and our powers of knowledge of Being. — Vide Ontology. BELIEF (Fiducia, mo-Tts, Glaube). — (1) The recognition of the reality of an object which is neither present in conscious- ness, nor discovered by the senses ; (2) the mind's assent to the truth of a proposition ; (3) a state of intellectual acquiescence in the order of things, in contrast with scepticism. " Holding for true . . . has the three following degrees : — Opinion, Belief, and Knowledge. Opinion is a consciously in- sufficient judgment, subjectively as well as objectively. Belief is subjectively sufiicient, but is recognised as being objectively insufficient. Knowledge is both subjectively and objectively sufficient." Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Doctrine of Method, Meiklejohn's Tr., p. 498 ; Max Muller's Tr., ii. 705. "Belief, in contradistinction to knowledge, always ought to Ben] VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. 45 indicate some case in which the objective evidence is incom- plete, and of which the opposite does not imply either impos- sibility or absurdity. We cannot, accordingly, in propriety of language, say: — 'I believe I have a pen in my hand and a sheet of paper before me,' or I believe that two and two make four, or I believe in my own existence or the law of gravitation. These are things which we know." Morell, Mental Philos., 325. Hamilton says (Appendix to Metaphysics, ii. 530) : — " The sphere of our belief is much more extensive than the sphere of our knowledge, and therefore when I deny that the Infinite can by us be Itnown, I am far from denying that by us it is, must, and ought to be believed. In the order of nature, belief always precedes knowledge." Hamilton, Metaphysics, i. 44; Jacobi, On the system of Spinoza, 1785; David Hume ilber den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus, 1787. "Belief consists in accepting the affirmations of the soul." Emerson, Representative Men, "Montaigne.'' "The human mind takes no account of geography, language, or legends, but in all utters the same instinct." Emerson, " Immortality ; " Bailey's Letters on Philos. of Human Mind; Formation of Opinions ; Grounds of Disbelief, Mill's Logic, bk. iii. c. 25 ; Psychol, of Belief, W. James, Psychol., c. xxi.. Mind, xiv. 321 ; Article "Belief," by Adamson, Encyc. Brit., 9th ed.; Baldwin, Hand-Book of Psychology, pt. ii. c. vii. BENEVOLENCE (benevolentia, humanitas, fjuXavOpuyrria, well-wishing), love to others ; seeking their good for its own sake. " There are as real and the same kind of indications in human nature, that we were made for society and to do good to our fellow-creatures, as that we were intended to take care of our own life, and health, and private good." Butler, On Human Nature, sermon i. Disinterested Benevolence is maintained by the Intuitional school generally. The Happiness theory of morals, resting on the principle that " happiness is the only thing desirable," has passed from the Egoistic basis to the Altruistic, taking as its maxim — "The 46 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [BiO Greatest Happiness of the greatest number." This theory either assumes that its maxim ought to supply the rule of life, or makes the practical power of the maxim depend on the consideration that, in seeking the happiness of others, we secure our own. According to earlier adherents of this school, our own good is the ultimate and only proper end of human actions, and when we do good to others it is done with a view to our own good. This is Self-regarding, or Egoistic Hedonism. Benevolent feel- ing, being as natural and spontaneous in rise as self-love, the question is, how far can it be subject of Ethical command? To this Kant replies : — " Love is a matter of feeling, not of wUl or volition, and I cannot love because I will to do so, still less be- cause I ought (I cannot be necessitated to love) ; hence there is no such thing as a duty to love. Benevolence, however, {amor benevolentice), as a mode of action, may be subject to a law of duty." Kant's Ethics, Abbot's Tr., p. 312. Duty does not com- mand natural feeling, but governs its exercise and direction. It condemns selfish feeling, infliction of injury, and revenge; it requires that action, even when self-regarding, be beneficent in its wider effects. As to "the influence of Christianity in the extension of practical beneficence," Sidgwick's History of Ethics, 119. "To do good in return for evil, to love your enemy, is a height of morality to which it may be doubted whether the social instincts would, by themselves, have ever led us. It is necessary that these instincts, together with sympathy, should have been highly cultivated and extended by the aid of reason, instruction, and the love or fear of God, before any such golden rule would ever be thought of and obeyed." Darwin, Descent of Man, 12mo, 113, note. For general references, see Happiness Theory. BIOLOGY (/3tos, life ; \oyos, science).— The science of life — a general designation including all scientific investigation applicable to life, and to the relations of difi'erent orders of animate existence. The term Biology thus covers the whole range of Natural History and Physiology, including all inquiry concerned with the problem of Evolution. Natural History Bod] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 47 stops short of the problem of the origin of life, an unsolved problem for science. All life is from life. Whewell's History of Scientific Ideas; Huxley's Elementary Biology; Parker's Zootomy; Parker's Elementary Biology; Asa Gray's Structural Botany ; Darwin's Insectivorous Plants ; Lubbock's Flowers and Insects; Huxley's Anatomy of Invertebrate Animals ; Glaus and Sedgwick's Zoology ; Owen's Anatomy of Vertebrate and Invertebrate Animals ; Balfour's Embryology ; Eutherford's Physiology; Carpenter's Human Physiology; Howe's Atlas of Biology. The grand advance of modern biology has been gained by discovery of evidence for continuity of life, illustrated in pro- gression from simpler forms. Progress has been by slowly advancing differentiation, with attendant expansion of function. The evidence for this is presented in distinct lines. In Palaeontology (iroXaios, ancient ; wv, being ; A.oyos, science), as included in Geology, supplying evidence of the relations of simpler forms to earlier strata. In Embryology, showing that all life originates in a fertilised egg, and that the higher forms of animal life, during embryonic development, pass through stages analogous with those of lower forms. In the inductions of Natural History, involving struggle for existence, survival of the fittest, and hereditary transmission. Darwin's Origin of Species; Wallace's Darwinism; Herbert Spencer's Principles of Biology, 2 vols. ; Elmer's Organic Evolu- tion. For inclusion of man, Darwin's Descent of Man; Haeckel's Evolution of Man ; Eomanes' Mental Evolution in Man ; Wiedersheim's Bau des Menschen. Against the sufficiency of this hypothesis, "Wallace's Darwinism, ch. 15 ; Lloyd Morgan's Animal Life and Intelligence, ch. xii. ; Calderwood's Relations of Mind and Brain, ch. xv. ; and Evolution and Man's Place in Nature ; Stirling, Darwin and Darwinism. BODY. — (1) Material existence, whether organised or un- organised ; (2) organised material being, in contrast with unorganised matter. Body is commonly living organism, in- volving the correlation of muscular and nerve systems. 1. Spinoza uses the word in extended signification. "By Body we understand a certain measure or quantity, having 48 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Bon length, breadth, and thickness, and bounded by a definite outline." Ethics, p. i. prop, xv., Scholium. According to Spinoza, God is res p.xtensa. " A Body, according to the received doctrine of modern metaphysicians, may be defined the external cause to which we ascribe our sensations The sensations are all of which I am directly conscious ; but I consider them as produced by something, not only existing independently of my will, but external to my bodily organs and to my mind. This external something I call a Body." Mill, Logic, bk. i. ch. iii. sec. 7 ; Locke's Essay, bk. ii. c. 23. 2. The more restricted meaning involves the whole range of discussion concerned with the relations of " Mind and Body." Carpenter, Mental Physiology ; Bain, Mind and Body ; Maudsley, Body and Mind, and Physiology of Mind ; Calder- wood. Relations of Mind and Brain ; Hoffding, Psychology, c. ii. BONUM (dya^os, Good).— (1) The agreeable, all that pleasurably affects sensitive organism ; (2) in an ethical sense, the right in conduct ; (3) the consummation of rational efibrt, in attainment of ideal life, — a perfect state, with true blessed- ness ; the chief good, — summum honum. Ancient ethical philosophy was largely moulded in forms suggested by " The Good," as desirable, or the end towards which action is directed ; (4) The Absolute Good, — or perfect Being, — God, — The Platonic use. Republic, vi. 505-9. The Germans distinguish das Gute, good, from das Wohl, weal. " "We express two quite distinct judgments when we consider in an action the good and evil of it, and our weal and woe." Kant's Ethics, Abbot, 150. Aristotle, in the Nicom. Ethics, discusses the whole subject from the standpoint of the chief good, working towards an interpretation of happiness, as the blessedness found in the activity of a perfect life. For illustration of the same tendency during the Eoman period, see Cicero's De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum. Modern Ethical Philosophy seeks an objective standard of right as a first requisite. The Experiential School keeps in closer relation with Bon] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 49 ancient form, in taking Happiness as the one thing desirable. Mill's Utilitarianism; Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics, where see specially, bk. iii. ch. xiv., " The Summum Bonum." This direction belongs specially to the Ethics of Evolution. Spencer's Data of Ethics ; Leslie Stephen's Science of Ethics , Simcox, Natural Law, an Essay in Ethics. For a general view of this course of thought, see Sorley's Ethics of Naturalism. The modern Rational School regards rational law as given by the Reason. Kant is conspicuous as its leader, giving promi- nence to the Categorical Imperative, with its formula, "Act from a maxim at all times fit for law universal." The maxim or law stands first in thought, as the determinator and test of conduct. The end for the agent is thus determined by the law. Under this admission, Ethics may be regarded as a system of ends. The immediate end is right action ; the more remote, perfection of character ; the ultimate, the perfect activity of a perfect life. " The relation of end to duty may be cogitated in a twofold manner, — either beginning with the end to assign the maxim, or beginning with the maxim to determine the end Jurisprudence advances by the first method But Moral Philosophy strikes into an opposite march : here we cannot commence with the ends he may design, and from them deter- mine and formulate the maxims he has to take, i.e., the duty he has to follow, for, in the latter event, the grounds of his maxim would be experiential, which we know beget no obliga- tion, the idea of duty and its categorical imperative taking their rise in pure reason only." Kant's Metaphysics of Ethics, Seinple, 3rd ed., p. 197. The "Summum Bonum," Abbot's Kant's Ethical Theory, Practical Reason, pt. i. bk. ii. ch. i. and ii. p. 202. Butler is the popular expounder of this theory from the standpoint of faculty. " The Supremacy of Conscience," Butler's Sermons, i., ii., iii. By the leaders of the Scottish School, " our Good on the whole '' is discussed as a conception distinct from Duty. Reid's Active Powers, essay iii. pt. 3 ; Dugald Stewart's Philos. of the Moral Powers, bk. iv. sec. 1. "The conception of the summum itself contains an am- biguity, .... the summum may mean either the supreme D 50 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Bra (swpremum) or the perfect (consummatum). The former is that condition which is itself unconditioned, i.e., is not subordinate to any other (originarium) ; the second is that which is not a part of a greater whole of the same kind (jperfectissimum) Virtue (as worthiness to be happy) is the supreme condition of all that can appear to us desirable, and consequently of all our personal happiness, and is therefore the supreme good. But it does not follow that it is the whole and perfect good as the object of the desires of rational finite beings ; for this requires happiness also, and that not merely in the partial eyes of the person who makes himself an end, but even in the judgment of an impartial reason, which regards persons in general as ends in themselves." Kant's Ethics, Abbot, 3rd ed., p. 206. Hegel, dealing with the Good as the dominant feature in a scheme of existence representing all as Dialectic Evolution, says, — "The Good is the Idea, as the unity of the conception of the universal will, and of the particular will." Philos. des Rechts, § 129. " Happiness is not a Good without the Eight ; even so is the Eight not the Good without Happiness," § 130. For Hegel's use of Idea, vide Idea. The British Neo-Hegelian, or Neo-Kantian School, as led by Green, accepting Hegel's representation that " self-realisation " is " the most general expression for the End in itself," makes the Ethical Object to be " a particular self-satisfaction." Green's Prolegomena to Ethics, 108 ; ef. 146. Bradley so far modifies this as to say, "The Act for me means my Act, and there is no end beyond the Act." Ethical Studies, 59. BRAIN. — The portion of the central nervous system which is inclosed within the cranium. The human Brain consists of four main portions — the MeduUa Oblongata, Pons Varolii, Cerebellum, and Cerebrum. These are all protected by three membranes (the Dura Mater, Pia Mater, and Arachnoid) which intervene between the nervous structures and the skull. Between the pia mater and the arachnoid there is a space (the sub-arachnoid space), which is occupied by the Cerebro-spinal fluid. This fluid, which is of a lymphatic nature, protects the substance of the brain from sudden shocks, and probably also (Foster) subserves its nutrition. Bra] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 51 The brain-substance itself is of two kinds, "white matter," consisting of " medullated " nerve-fibres, and " grey matter," composed of nerve-cells and other nervous elements. The circulatory system of the Brain consists of arteries which are derived from the two internal carotids and the two vertebral arteries, along with sinuses, of which there are fifteen ; these sinuses are supplied from veins in the substance of the brain and in the scalp. The following points deserve notice : — 1. The network of capillaries by which blood passes into the substance of the brain is much more dense, and the blood- supply is proportionately greater in the grey than in the white matter of the brain. 2. The four arteries by which blood is supplied are unified in the base of the brain by a remarkable system of anastomoses, which constitute the " circle of Willis." Blood can pass along this circle in a variety of ways, so that the blood-supply of the brain is not necessarily interrupted by the stoppage of any one of the four channels. 3. Arteries enter the skull by a tortuous course, through bony channels, so that the force of the heart-beat is broken. 4. The venous sinuses, which are without valves, act as blood-reservoirs, and reduce the risk of pressure by. the blood- supply on the brain-substance. 5. The supply of blood to the brain appears to be small in ■relation to the importance of the organ. " the blood- supply of even the human brain must be small ; and making every allowance for rapidity of current, the interchange be- tween the blood and the nervous elements must also be small. In other words, the metabolism of the brain-substance is of importance, not so much on account of its quantity, as of its special qualities " (Foster). The brain itself appears, at first sight, to be an oval mass of nervous substance. On further examination it proves to be (1) bilaterally almost symmetrical, and (2) composed of four distinct parts. (1) The medulla oblongata lies under the cerebrum, and in front of the cerebellum. It is continuous with the spinal cord, which it serves to connect with the brain. In front of the 52 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Bra upper part of the medulla lies (2) the Pons Varolii, which con- nects the two sides of the cerebellum. Below the hack part of the cerebrum, and partly separated from it by a fold of the dura mater (tentorium cerebelli) lies (3) the cerebellum. Occu- pying the upper part of the cranial cavity, and completely covering from above the other portions of the brain, we have (4) the cerebrum. 1. The Medulla Oblongata is continuous with and an expan- sion of the spinal cord. It is divided by anterior and posterior clefts into lateral segments. On its under side are " pyramidal " decussations, or crossings, of certain nerve-fibres, in front of which the " olivary body '' projects. Behind, it is convex, but flattened in its upper part to form the floor of the 4th ventricle. It is about \\ inches long, 1 inch wide, and | inch thick. The most characteristic and important feature of the medulla is the decussation of fibres noticed above. The significance of this arrangement consists in the explanation which it affords of the fact that the left side of the brain controls the right side of the body, and vice versa. The meduUa oblongata is also important as the seat of those nervous centres which control the functions of organic life — inspiration, circulation, digestion, &c. 2. The Pons Varolii is a band of grey and white matter which connects the anterior surfaces of the two halves of the cerebellum. From its upper border spring the two crura or peduncles of the cerebrum. 3. The Cerebellum (Little Brain) consists of three parts — a central division (the vermiform process) lying between two hemispheres. The central part (which greatly preponderates in some mammals, and stands alone in birds, reptiles, and fishes) is clearly divided from the hemispheres. The cerebellar hemispheres consist of crescent-shaped layers of grey matter, with a core of white lying horizontally and with thin convex edges backwards. They are grouped into lobes, but so vaguely that the division is of little importance. The upper surface of each hemisphere is concave; and the hemi- spheres are not separate on this surface. But, below, behind, and in front they lie apart. A fold of dura mater (falx cere- Bra] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 53 belli) lies in the back part of the cleft between them. The cerebellum is connected by three pairs of peduncles to the pons, medulla, and cerebrum. The special function of the cerebellum has been regarded by Flourens as the co-ordination of muscular movements, and by Ferrier as the co-ordination of the movements of equilibration. This latter view has been supported by a large number of experiments, and is further rendered probable by the anatomical relations which obtain between the cerebellum and the semi- circular canals. 4. The Cerebrum is far the largest and most important part of the human brain. It is partly divided, by a deep longitu- dinal cleft, into two nearly equal hemispheres, which are centrally united by a transverse band or commissure of nerve fibres — the corpus callosum. The cleft is occupied by a fold of dura mater (falx cerebri). The outer surface of the cerebrum constitutes what is known as the cerebral cortex, which is composed of five layers or zones (Foster) of variously shaped nerve-cells. Within this covering of grey matter (which varies considerably in thickness in different parts of the surface) lie the peduncles of white matter — nerve-fibres. The extent of the surface, and conse- quently of the cortex, is greatly increased by the fact that the substance of the cerebrum (in the adult human being) is folded, so as to consist of " lobes " and " convolutions " divided from one another by fissures of various extent and depth. The lobes are five in number. The Frontal lobe, occupying the front of the cranium, extends backwards about half way along the middle line, and is divided by the fissure of Eolando from the Parietal lobe. The Parietal lobe extends backwards from the fissure of Eolando to the Parieto-occipital fissure, which separates it from the Occipital lobe. Below, it is divided from the Temporo-sphenoidal lobe by the deep and important fissure of Sylvius. Deeply imbedded within this latter fissure, and not in contact with the cranial bones, nor forming any part of the external surface of the cerebrum, lies the Central lobe, or Isle of Eeil. 54 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Bra Each of these lobes is divided into a number of convolutions, separated by less important, intra-lobular, fissures. On the under surface of the cerebrum are the olfactory and optic nerves — the latter partly decussating in the optic com- missure. The Yentrioles (four in number) constitute within the brain a cavity which represents the upper end of the primitive cerebro- spinal canal. They communicate with one another so as to form actually a single intra-cerebral cavity. What is called the fifth Ventricle is not continuous with these, and is not really a Ventricle, being distinct from the others both in origin and in character. The point of chief interest to the student of philosophy or psychology, in connection with cerebral as distinct from other nervous structures, is their relation to mental life. The fibres of the brain have not as a rule that distinctively efferent or afferent character which we find in other nerve- fibres. The fibres seem to serve rather to connect with one another the cells in which nervous energy is stored than to convey impulses in a recognisably central or peripheral direction. We have, indeed, not so much a single organ, or aggregate of organs, as an organisin related in infinitely complex ways to our bodily and mental states — an organism, especially, whose characteristic functions correspond with outward impressions and with modi- fications of our mental life. What the character of this correspondence is, and in what details we can discover it, are problems to which students of physiology and psychology may turn their attention, without attempting any solution of the philosophical problem of the relation, in terms of which the correspondence must be explained. The phrenological theory of Gall, which ascribed special mental "faculties," and these of a highly complex order, to circumscribed cerebral areas, is one which is too remote from the results, no less of psychology than of physiology, to be seriously entertained. More recently, careful and serious investigations, in which Bra] VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 55 the results of clinical and pathological observations have been supplemented by experiment, have resulted in localisation of functions. We can readily assure ourselves, to begin with, that in Man the functions of the cerebrum are related to intelligence and volition — to the co-ordination of sensory impressions and initiation of movements. Flourens maintained the indifferent employment of the whole cerebrum ia every mental process. But since 1870 the experiments of Fritsch and Hitzig, and especially of Ferrier, have materially altered the position of the whole question, by discovering constant and precise relations between the stimulation of certain portions of the cortex and the production of definite movements on the opposite side of the body. The " motor areas " of Ferrier, which control move- ments of the face and limbs, are on both sides of the fissure of Rolando. Speech, especially in its motor aspect, is connected with portions of the left frontal lobe, (convolution of Broca), and on its sensory side with the convolution of Wernicke in the temporo-sphenoidal lobe. The determination of sensory areas in the cortex has not in general been carried so far. We cannot, however, reject the con- clusion (Hughlings Jackson) that the cortical representation of somatic functions, and therefore of sensation, must be complete. Centres have been determined, with more or less accuracy, for all the senses. But the localisation of sensory functions is not yet matter of such general agreement as that of motor functions. Text-book, Wundt's Physiologische Psychologie (4rth edition, 2 vols., 1893). An excellent anatomical manual is J. Eyland Whitaker's Anatomy of the Brain and Spinal Cord (2nd ed., 1893). For the physiology of the Brain, Foster's Text-Book of Physiology, pt. iii. (5th edition, 1890). WEwen's Atlas of Head Sections. Bruce, Illustrations of the Mid and Hind Brain. Ferrier's Functions of the Brain (2nd edition, 1886) is indis- pensable for the problems of localisation. See also Calderwood's Mind and Brain (3rd edition, 1892), and James' Principles of Psychology, vol. i. chaps, ii. and iii. (1890). For an account of the embryonic development of the Brain see Quain's Anatomy, 56 VOCABULAKT OF PHILOSOPHY. [Cap vol. i. pt. i. (10th edition, 1890). Bastian's Brain as an Organ of Mind (4th edition, 1890) gives a good account of the phylogenetic development. C. M. Douglas. CAPACITY {capax, containing much, capacious; Swa/tis). — (1) Potentiality or capability. Aristotle distinguishes potenti- ality from activity ; (2) Modern usage, — Receptive power. Taking the twofold view of human power, faculty is power of acting ; capacity is power of receiving impressions. In popular language, capacity is often used as convertible with faculty, — a man of capacity standing for a man of ability. Strictly, capacity is passive power, or natural receptivity. A faculty is a power which we consciously direct towards an end. A capacity is rather a disposition or aptitude to receive certain modifications of our consciousness. Original capacity, though at first passive, may be subjected to will and attention. In sensation, we are in the first instance passive, but our capacity of receiving sensations is employed in various ways under direc- tion of attention, for acquisition of knowledge, or regulation of conduct. CARDINAL {aardo, a hinge). — The Cardinal Virtues of Ancient Philosophy are Wisdom, Courage, Temperance, and Justice. Plato's Republic, bk. iv. 428-443 ; Jowett's Plato, 1st ed., ii. 255. These four virtues were so named as hinges on which other virtues turn. Each is a fons et principium, from which other virtues take their rise. This division of the virtues is as old as moral philosophy. It is found in the teaching of Socrates as recorded by Xenophon, with this difference, that piety (cuo-c/Seia) holds the place of prudence or wisdom (o-o^ia), which, united to virtue, forms true wisdom. According to Plato, wisdom is the govern- ing virtue ; courage is the right kind of fear, on guard against real dangers; temperance is the harmony of desires with intelligence ; and justice consists in every man doing his proper work. CASUISTRY. — (1) Disputation as to conflicting duties, which seem to demand attention at the same time, while they cannot be fulfilled simultaneously. In the best sense. Casuistry is a systematising of the rational grounds for adjustment of Oat] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 57 such conflict. It presupposes the absence of dispute as to right ; (2) in an evil sense, equivalent to sophistry, wilful con- cealment of truth and right under subtleties of dialectic. To casuistry, as ethical, belongs the decision of what are called "cases of conscience," cases in which, from special circum- stances, personal obligation is involved in doubt. Perkins' Cases of Conscience, 1606 ; Selden, De Jure Naturali, 1640 ; Sanderson, Z)e Juramenti Ohligatione, 1647; Hallam's Litera- ture of Europe in the 17th Cent., ch. 21. CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE {Imp&rativ kategor- isch). — Direct command, the " Thou shalt," of the Moral Law. " Such an Imperative as represents an action to be in itself necessary, and without regard to anywhat out of and beyond it.'' TLsint's Metaphysic of Mhics, Semrple, new ed., ^. 27 . "An imperative, which, irrespective of every ulterior end or aim, commands categorically," p. 27. "The representation of an objective principle, so far as it necessitates the will, is called a Commandment of Reason, and a formula expressing such is called an Impehativb," p. 25. The formula Kant presents in three forms : — (1) " act from a maxim at all times fit for law universal ; " (2) " act from that maxim only when thou canst will law universal ; " (3) " act as if the maxim of thy will were to become, by thy adopting it, a universal law of nature." AU three point to universality as characteristic of the Ethical Imperative. The first expresses the authoritative in the law ; the second indicates that the Will must be its own legislator ; and the third, that the imperative belongs to the fixed law of nature. Fichte would state the formula thus, — " Continuously fulfil thy vocation." Hegel says, — "Be a Person, and respect others as Persons." The Ethical Imperative implies that action is an end, and man an end in himself. For criticism of Kant, see Lotze's Practical Philos., Ladd's Tr., 13; Noah Porter's Kant's Ethics, 66 ; Caird's Philos. of Kant, bk. ii. ch. 2. "To say that the Categorical Imperative is also a discriminator of motives and ends through law, is an uncritical position." Laurie's Ethica, 66. The objection holds as to Butler's view of conscience, when the faculty is represented as 58 VOCAEULAKY OF PHILOSOPHV. [Oat " exerting itself magisterially." " I agree with Kaiit in holding that Law is a priori, for it has its genesis the Categories of Reason, and its origin is thus unveiled." Laurie's Ethica, 66. CATEGORY (KarriyopM, predicate, or a category). — (1) A class into which things may be gathered on account of their resemblance ; (2) a general notion, by use of which extended knowledge of things becomes possible. The one is the correla- tive of the other. That which is, becomes known under conditions of the understanding. The former definition pre- supposes things as known, and classification of them according to recognised properties ; the latter indicates the general notions essential to the synthesis of knowledge, — " forms " of the understanding, by use of which, combinations in consciousness become possible. The list of Categories adopted by the Pythagoreans is given by Aristotle, Metaphysics, bk. i. v. 3. It consists in a series of opposites or contraries, as Odd, Even, &c. Aristotle makes the Categories ten in number, viz., ouo-ia, substance ; ttoctov, quantity ; ttoiov, quality ; Trpos n, relation ; Trot), place ; ttote, time ; KucrBai, situation ; f-x^iv, possession, or manner of holding ; Troiiiv, action ; and Trdcrxei-v, suffering. The Cartesians arranged all things under three categories — Substance, Attribute, and Mode ; Locke also under three — Substance, Mode, and Relation; Leibnitz under five — Substance, Quantity, Quality, Action or Passion, and Relation. The categories of Kant are quantity, quality, relation, and modality. According to Kant, the manifold is arranged by us in accordance with the logical functions of our judgment. " The categories are nothing else than these functions of judg- ment, so far as the manifold in a given intuition is determined in relation to them." Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Meikle- john's Tr., p. 88 ; Werke, ed. Rosenkrauz, ii., supplement 14, sec. 20, p. 740. Following on the Kantian view, Hegel recognised the synthetic value of the categories, extended them according to differentiation in the concrete, and made their logical relation the fundamental question in philosophy. The result has been to give increased prominence to the categories, and to make synthesis, rather than analysis the leading feature in Epistem- Oau] VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 59 ology. The structure of thought itself has thus Ipecome the grand problem in philosophy. According to Hegel, the Logic of the Categories and the Logic of Being are one, thus giving us a scheme of Dialectic Evolution. Hutchison Stirling's Secret of Hegel; Wallace's Hegd; TJeberweg's Logic, § 68; Lindsay, p. 200; Caird's Philosophy of Kant, i. 43 L Mill gives the following classification of all namable things : — (1) feelings or state of consciousness; (2) the minds which experience these feelings ; (3) the bodies or external objects which excite certain of these feelings, together with the power or properties whereby they excite them; (4) the successions and coexistence, the likenesses and unlikenesses, between feel- ings or states of consciousness. Logic, bk. i. ch. iii. sec. 3. CAUSE {causa, alria, to o6ev^ Kim^a-is). — (1) Efficient power; (2) Power originating new occurrences. The idea of power is essential to the conception. Causality as a category of relation implies, on the one hand, occurrence ; on the other, its dependence on prior existence. Causation is the mauifestatiou of energy in its effects. The law of Causaliby is a law of mind recognising it as a necessary truth, that there must be power adequate to account for every occurrence. " Cause " in physical science is best represented by transformation of energy ; but cause in the stricter sense implies origin of occurrence, such as is known in consciousness. Guided by the law of causality, research becomes ultimately a search for the First Cause, as the uncaused. Aristotle, using the word Cause (ama) in a wide sense to include all that is concerned in the production of any thing, enumerates four classes^formal, material, efficient, and final, Mefaph., i. 3 ; where he traces previous usage from Thales. The efficient is that with which modern usage connects the name, as the source, apx'^- According to Aristotle, the first is the form proper to each thing, — to tl rjv elvon. This is the quidditas of the schoolmen, the causa formalis. The second is the matter and the subject, — ij vXrj koi to viroKa/xevov, causa materidlis. The third is the principle of movement which produced the thing, — apyrj tijs Ktv^o-cojs, causa efficiens. The 60 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [OaU fourth is the end for the sake of which the thing is done — the reason and good of all things ; for the end of all phenomena and of all movement is good ; — to ov ei/eKa koX to ayaOov, causa "The idea of the beginning of motion we have only from reflection on what passes in ourselves, where we find by experi- ence, that barely by willing it, barely by a thought of the mind, we can move the parts of our bodies which were before at rest." Locke, Essay on Human Understanding, bk. ii. eh. xxi. sec. 4. Hume, reducing the relation of cause and effect to that of " constant conjunction," contended that we have no proper idea of cause as implying power to produce, nor of any necessary connection between the operation of this power and the produc- tion of the effect. All that we see or know is mere succession, antecedent and consequent ; having seen things in this relation, we associate them together, and, imagining that there is some vinculum or connection between them, we call the one the cause and the other the effect. " The idea of cause and effect is derived from experience, which informs us that such parti- cular objects, in all past instances, have been constantly joined with each other.'' Human Nature, pt. iii. sec. 6 ; Green's ed., i. 390. " Thus, not only our reason fails us in the discovery of the ultimate connection of causes and effects, but even after experience has informed us of their constant conjunction, it is impossible for us to satisfy ourselves by our reason why we should extend that experience beyond those particular instances which have fallen under our observation." lb., Green, i. 392. On "necessary connection," when we say that "two objects are necessarily connected together," sec. 14. Green, i. 450. Essays, " Concerning Human Understanding," sec. 7. Of Power, " or the idea of necessary connection." Green's ed., vol. ii. 501 ; Green's Philosophical Works, ii. § 136, p. 296. Berkeley says : — " Thought, reason, intellect introduce us into the knowledge of causes," Siris. He says : — " We perceive a continual succession of ideas ; some are anew excited, others are changed or totally disappear. There is, therefore, some cause of these ideas, whereon they depend, and which produces Oer] VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 61 and changes them." Principles of Human Knowledge, § 26 ; Eraser's Selections, 4th ed., p. 59, where see note. Kant's view of Causality as a category of thought will ap- pear by placing together his views of receptivity, and of intel- lectual activity. We cannot conceive objects as successive — cannot have the representation of succession present to our mind — without regarding the successive phenomena as causally related. Instead, therefore, of the conception of cause being derived from sensation, it is a conception without which sensation could not become knowledge. Being the very condition of knowledge, it is seen to be independent of all experience, — that is, a necessary and universal condition of knowledge. Causality- must, therefore, be regarded as "a pure conception of the understanding, applying a priori to objects of intuition in general." Pure Reason, Transc. Anal., bk, i. ch. i. sec. 3 ; Meiklejohn's Tr., p. 64 ; Max Muller's Tr., ii. 70. As to the law of Causality, MUl represents it as " the law that every consequent has an invariable antecedent." This law is " coextensive with the entire field of successive phenomena, all instances whatever of succession being examples of it. The law is the Law of Causation. It is an universal truth, that every fact which has a beginning has a cause." Otherwise stated, " The truth that every fact which has a beginning has a cause, is coextensive with human experience." Mill's Logic, bk. iii. ch. V. § 1 ; ef. ch. xxi. Mill thus relies upon "induction by simple enumeration " for recognition of the law. Lotze's Microkosmus, Hamilton i. 671 ; Lotze's Logic, Bosan- quet's Tr., 93 ; Bradley's Logic, 484 ; Green's Works, ii. 296 ; Caird's Philos. of Kant, i. 560; "On Causation," Hodgson, Mind, iv. 500 ; " Kant has not answered Hume," Hutchison Stirling, Mind, ix. 531, x. 45; with this, consider Mill's relation to Hume. CERTAINTY (cerium, sure, from cern^, I perceive). Assurance of reality, or of truth. Certainty is obtained (1) in direct consciousness ; (2) by direct observation ; (3) by valid inference ; (4) by intuition of the reason, in recognition of uni- versal truth. Knowledge is certainty. Immediate Knowledge gives certainty; mediate Knowledge, as it involves process, may 62 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Oer involve error, and so calls for criticism of procedure, in order that there may be assurance as to result. The certainty which admits of no doubt is given in consciousness of the facts of experience, and in recognition of universal or necessary truth, axiomatic in force, and may be said to be recognised by an instinct of the soul, inasmuch as its recognition in- volves no dialectic process. See Mill's Logic, vol. i. p. 395, bk. ii. ch. 5. Interpretation of the facts of consciousness, implying pro- cedure of the judgment, and involving analysis, comparison, and generalisation, is involved in risks of error, which cling to intellectual procedure. In case of all such procedure, certainty is to be attained only as the result of deliberate regard to the laws of observation and of induction, in full application of the critical spirit. The interests of truth are concerned in rigid application of the laws of evidence, and of reasoning. Trustworthy observa- tion is not merely careful use of one's eyes, but interpretation of our experience in vision. So it is with the other senses. The variety of the special senses, affords check against error, as well as additional range for observation. " Observation " is not an immediate act, but a mental process, involving continual demand on judgment, with use of all available instruments of knowledge. Descartes conclusively showed that consciousness is the ultimate test of certainty. Method, part iv., Veitch. " There is one thing of which no doubt can be entertained, . . . that is, the momentary consciousness we call a present thought." Huxley's Hume, 55. When we pass to interpretation of the facts of consciousness, including the objective significance of our sensations, we depend on the laws of inference. "Logic is the science of the opera- tions of the understanding which are subservient to the estima- tion of evidence." Mill's Logic, intro., § 7. On the doctrine of truth and error, Hamilton's Logic, ii. 60. Concerning the testing of our generalisations, in view of the difficulty of " getting an inference which amounts to demonstration," Bradley says : — " Considering my reasoning as a number of acts, I conclude that I am fallible throughout the series. But this chance is mere Oha] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 63 aalecedent probability. It may become unmeaning when the instance is present, and actually before us." Logic, 519. " As regards Certitude, I have fully convinced myself that, in this sphere of thought, opinion is perfectly inadmissible, and that everything which bears the least semblance of an hypothesis must be excluded, as of no value in such discussions." Kant, pref. to first ed. of Pure Reason, Meiklejohn's Tr., xxi. Eeliance on the senses alone is impossible, if the meaning of experience is to be ascertained. The position of Protagoras, as given by Diogenes, Laert. ix. 51, was, " Man is the measure of all things " — (iravrimj j^piy/xarojv jxerpov avOpoyTroi). Out of this have arisen the developments of a sensational philosophy. For criticism see, Plato's Thecetelus. Modern Philosophy has gone more rigidly into discussion of the conditions of experience and of thought. The results are seen in "experimental Psycho- logy," and in the " critical theories of knowledge." " The holding of a thing to be true is a phenomenon in our understanding which may rest on objective grounds, but requires also subjective causes in the mind of the person judg- ing. If a judgment is valid for every rational being, then its ground is objectively sufficient, and it is termed a conviction. If, on the other hand, it has its ground in the particular character of the subject, it is termed a persuasion." Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Transc. Doct. of Method, eh. ii. sec. 3 ; Meiklejohn's Tr., 496 ; Max Miiller's Tr., ii. 703. Locke's Essay, bk. ii. c. 6, and bk. iii. c. 4 ; Cudworth's Eternal and Immutable Morality, bk. iv. c. 5 ; Eeid's Intell. Powers, Ess. ii. c. 17; Ferrier's Knowing and Being; Green's Proleg. to Ethics, 13 ; Veitch's Knowing arid Being, 35. CHANCE. — Such occurrences as cannot be computed by application of known natural law. Possible variability of occurrence, because of varying conditions ; in contrast with fixed sequences under natural law. An event or series of events which seems to be the result neither of a necessity inherent in the nature of things, nor of a plan conceived by intelligence, is said to happen by chance. Aristotle's Physics, ii. i. " It is strictly and philosophically true in nature and reason. 64 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Oha that there is no such thing as chance or accident ; it being evident that these words do not signify anything that is truly an agent or the cause of any event ; but they signify merely men's ignorance of the real and immediate cause." Samuel Clarke, ser. xcviii. ; vol. vi. ser. xiii., ed. 1735. "An event occurring by chance may be described as a coincid- ence from which we have no ground to infer an uniformity.'' Mill's Logic, bk. iii. ch. 17, § 2. " Probability has reference partly to our ignorance, partly to our knowledge. We know that among three or more events, one, and only one, must happen, but there is nothing leading us to believe that any one of them will happen rather than the others The theory of chances consists in reducing all events of the same kind to a certain number of cases equally possible, that is, such that we are equally undecided as to their existence ; and in determining the number of these cases which are favourable to the event of which the probability is sought. The ratio of that number to the number of all the possible cases, is the measure of the probability. Laplace, Essai phil. sur les Probabilites, 5th ed., p. 7 ; Hume, Essay on Probability. — Vide Averages, Probabilities. CHASTITY. — (1) Duty, restraining and governing the appetite of sex, so as to maintain purity of thought, speech, and behaviour ; (2) Virtue, an element in human character, essential to the conditions of moral life. Chastity is a phase of the subordination of desire to intel- ligence as directed by moral law. For the rational nature, principle is the rule, not impulse, as in the animal nature. The appetite of sex, while having its definitely fixed end, is subordinated to the higher laws of good-wiU and justice. Sexual impulse cannot release a moral agent from obligation to seek the highest good of another. Propagation of the species, must invariably carry with it responsibilities of parentage. CHOICE. — Voluntary selection from a variety of objects or possible courses of action ; often synonymous with volition. Properly, choice applies to things, volition to forms of action. " Deliberate choice is more accurately an exercise of will in determining personal conduct, after deliberation as to the rule Ola] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 65 of conduct applicable in the circumstances. Thus Aristotle, treating of Trpoatpetris, says : — " Deliberate preference is most intimately connected with Virtue deliberate preference is joined with law or reason and intelligence (juera Xoymi xai Stavoias) We deliberate about those subjects of action which are within our own power." Nicom. Ethics, bk. iii. ch. ii. 3. Choice or preference is strictly an act of the understanding; and when applied to action has for its objects a variety of motives, or different modes of accomplishing an end. There is deliberate preference, in order that there may be voluntary choice in conduct. This is held to be the manifestation of freedom in willing, as when " we decide to prefer some remote and abstract good to immediate pleasures." Whewell, Elements of Morality, bk. i. c. 2. To this Sidgwick adds,— "I cannot object on the score of usage to this apphcation of the term ' free ' to denote voluntary actions in which the seductive solicitations of appetite or passion are successfully resisted." Methods of Ethics, bk. i. c. 5 ; " Choice or Decision," Sully's Out- lines of Psychology, 644. Art. by Hodgson, Mind, xvi., 161. CLASSIFICATION (KXiyo-is, classis, from Kokim, to call, a multitude called together). " Classification is a contrivance for the best possible ordering of the ideas of objects in our minds ; for causing the ideas to accompany or succeed one another in such a way as shall give us the greatest command over our knowledge already acquired, and lead more directly to the acquisition of more." J. S. MiU, Logic, bk. iv. ch. 7. "Abstraction, generalisation, and definition precede classifica- tion/ for if we wish to reduce to regularity the observations we have made, we must compare them, in order to unite them by their essential resemblances, and express their essence with aU possible precision. " In every act of classification two steps must be taken ; certain marks are to be selected, the possession of which is to be the title to admission into the class, and then all the objects that possess them are to be ascertained." Thomson's Outlines of the Laws of Thought, 2ud ed., 377; 3rd ed., E 66 VOCABULAET OF PHILOSOPHY. [Oog 343 ; Mill's Logic, i. 7, 4; M'Cosh, Typical Farms, bk. ill. c. 1. Lotze, Logic, Tr. 163. Bosanquet, Logic, 63. COGNITION (cognosco, to know). — Knowledge in its widest sense, specially, interpretation of sensory impression, appreciation of the objective significance of our experience. Kant says : — "I cannot rest in the mere intuitions, but, if they are to become cognitions, must refer them, as representations, to something as object, and must determine them by means of the former." Preface to 2nd ed. of Pure Reason, Meiklejohn's Tr., xxiy. ; Max Miiller's Tr., supplement ii., vol. i. p. 371. "How is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses'! " Ih., Meiklejohn's Tr., \.—Vide Knowledge. COLLIGATION OF FACTS, in Induction, is employed by Whewell {Phil, of Indue. Sci., ii. 213) to denote the bind- ing together groups of facts by means of some suitable concep- tion. " The descriptive operation which enables a number of details to be summed up in a single proposition. Mill's Logic, bk. iii. c. 2 ; Thomson's Laws of Thought, 2nd ed., 353 ; "Whewell, Nov. Org. Renovatum, 60. COMBINATION AND CONNECTION OP IDEAS, phrases equivalent to Association of Ideas. Locke's Essay, bk. ii. ch. xxxiii., " Of Ideas." See Association. COMMON SENSE (sensus communis, koivtj aia-Orja-K). — Intelligence common to all men. The word " sense " is here used as equivalent to cognitive power, specially as spontaneous or instinctive. " Common Sense " is thus cognitive power common to humanity, implying a general knowledge of necessary truth. Popular usage, making it equivalent to sagacity and prudence combined, involves a mark of distinction among men. The former is the only philosophic use of the term, and is that intended when the early Scottish Philosophy is named the Philosophy of Common Sense. It is that phi- losophy which accepts the testimony of our faculties as trust- worthy within their respective spheres, and rests interpretation of experience on first truths or primitive beliefs, which are the fundamental principles of our rational nature, including the regulating principles of our conduct. This became the descrip- Com] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 67 tive title of the Philosophy of " the Scotch School," as distin- guished by an ultimate appeal not only to consciousness, but to the principles of intelligence common to man. The father of the Scottish Philosophy states his position thus : — " There is a certain degree of sense which is necessary to our being subjects of law and government, capable of managing our own affairs, and answerable for our conduct to others. This is called common sense, because it is common to all men with whom we can transact business, or whom we call to account for their conduct The same degree of under- standing which makes a man capable of acting with common prudence in life, makes him capable of discerning what is true and what is false in matters that are self-evident, and which he distinctly apprehends." Reid, Intellectual Powers, Essay vi. ch. ii., Hamilton's ed., Works, p. 422 ; Stewart's Elements of Philosophy of Human Mind, pt. ii. ch. i., Wm-ks, iii. p. 51. I " A power of the mind which perceives truth, not by pro- gressive argumentation, but by an instinctive and instantaneous impulse; derived neither from education nor from habit, but from nature ; acting independently upon our will, whenever the object is presented, according to an established law ; and, therefore, not improperly, called a sense, and acting in the same manner upon aU mankind ; and, therefore, properly called common sense, the ultimate judge of truth." Beattie, Essay on Truth, pt. 1. ch. i., 10th ed., p. 26. For a full discussion of the Philosophy of Common Sense, with extended reference to authorities — Hamilton, note a to Reid's Works, pp. 743-803. For history of the Scottish School — M'Cosh, The Scottish Philosophy; Seth, Scottish Philosophy. The Philosophy of Common Sense maintains that knowledge cannot be traced merely to sensibility, — " that our cognitions are not all at secondhand," — that there is a common basis of knowledge in possession of all minds, — that all knowledge rests ultimately on "the Catholic principles of all philosophy." This is the sole meaning of the appeal to Common Sense. It is misunderstood when it is regarded as an appeal to uuinstraeted opinion. 68 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Oom COMMUNISM. — Community of property among the members of a state, with repudiation of private property. The theory has been supported partly on economic grounds, partly on ethical. Its pleas are, that by united production, and equal distribution, an increase to the comfort and happiness of human life would be secured ; and that by the same means the jealousies and bitterness of competition and of class interests would be ended. Its criticism of the existing order, as recognis- ing rights of private property, is that it involves multitudes in poverty and suffering, while a few accumvilate wealth. In some forms the theory attacks social life as based on the con- stitution of the family, alleging that this is another fortress of class interests. In this extreme form, the levelling process, after reducing men to a herd, puts the individual life under command of political government for distribution of food, clothing, work, and regulation of social conditions. Under this theory personal rights are disregarded, admitting only an equal claim of each citizen to food, clothing, and shelter. Aristotle condemned communism. "AU cannot govern at the same time, but either by the year or according to some other regulation or time. By this means every one in his turn will be in office, as if shoemakers and carpenters should exchange occupations, and not always be employed in the same calling.'' Aristotle's Politics, ii. 2. " There are two things chiefly inspir- ing mankind with care and affection, the sense of what is one's own, and exclusive possession, neither of which can find a place in this sort of community." lb., ii. 4. See also The Economics, vi. Communism has had its theories and experiments in ancient times, as in the Republic of Plato and the government of Sparta. In the second century, Epiphanes, son of Carpocrates of- Alexandria, vindicates a Communistic scheme, Clem. Al. Strom, iii. 2. In modern times, we have had the Utopia of Sir Thomas More, and various schemes in France, Britain, and America. The leading names associated with the theory are those of the Abbe Morelly, Code de la Nature, 1755; St Simon, Fourier, Augustus Comte, Louis Blanc ; and in Britain, David Dale and Kobert Owen. Hobbes's Leviathan; Locke's Treatise on Civil Government Con] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 69 contains a careful discussion of the question of property. Comte, Co2irs de Philosophie Positive, Martineau's transl.; Mill's Auguste Comte and Positivism; Caird's Social Philo- sophy/ and Religion of Comte. In the 19 th century a revival of Socialistic feeling has favoured a fresh development of Com- munistic theory. Article "Communism," Ency. Brit; Robert Owen's Neto Views of Society, 1812; Janet, Les Grigines du Socialisme Contemporain, 1883; H. von. Schul, Socialismvs and Kommunismus, 1890 ; Eug. L'Eichthal, Socialisme, Com- muiiisme, et Collectivisme, 1892. COMPARISON.— The act of carrying the mind from one object to another, to discover likeness, difference, or relation subsisting between them. The act is an exercise of attention, voluntarily directing the energy of the mind to a class of objects or ideas. The result of comparison is a judg- ment, or affirmation. Comparison is the essential feature of thought. A concept is the result of the comparison of in- dividual phenomena; judgment is further concerned veith comparison of concepts ; and inference is a deduction from several judgments. James, Principles of Psychology, ch. xiii. ; Sully, JSuman Mind, i. 397-413. COMPREHENSION.— Full understanding. For its logi- cal sense, vide Extension. CONCEPTION {con, together ; and capio, I take).— The act of gathering up in a single mental representation qualities belonging to an object, or a group of objects. Conception, the act ; concept, the thing conceived. Conception and notion are commonly taken as synonymous : " notion " is better reserved for the more generalised knowledge, expressed in general or abstract terms. Hamilton would restrict both terms in this way. BAd's Works, p. 360, note. The German name is Begriff, the gathering together, as if into a single grip. Every concept includes, on the cue hand, a variety of attributes, and on the other, comprehends a variety of objects. " Conception consists in a conscious act of the understanding, bringing any given object or impression into the same class with any number of other objects or impressions, by means of some character or characters common to them all. Goncipimus, id est, 70 yOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Oon capimus hoc cum illo — we take hold of both at once, we compre- hend a thing, when we have learned to comprise it in a known class." Coleridge, Church and State, Prelim. Rem., p. 4. " Conceiving, imagining, apprehending, .... are common words used to express .... simple apprehension." Eeid's Intellectual Powers, Essay iv. ch. i. " The words conception, concept, notion, should be limited to the thought of what cannot be represented in the imagina- tion, as the thought suggested by a general term. The Leib- nitzians call this symbolical, in contrast to intuitive knowledge. This is the sense in which conceptio and conceptus have been usually and correctly employed." Hamilton, Reid's Worlts, p. 360, note ; Hamilton, Logic, i. 40. " Qonception must be carefully distinguished as well from mere imagination, as from a mere understanding of the meaning of words. Combinations of attributes, logically impossible, may be expressed in language perfectly intelligible. There is no difficulty in understanding the meaning of the phrase bilinear figure or iron-gold. The language is intelligible, though the object is inconceivable. On the other hand, though all conception implies imagination, yet all imagination does not imply conception Conception, in its lowest degree, implies at least a comparison and distinction of this from that The consciousness of a general notion is thus an instance of symbolical as distinguished from intuitive ■ knowledge." Mansel, Prolegomena Logica, 2nd ed., pp. 24-26. " Intuitions and conceptions constitute the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither conceptions without an intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without con- ceptions, can afford us a cognition. Both are either pure or empirical. They are empirical, when sensation (which pre- supposes the actual presence of the object) is contained in them ; and pure, when no sensation is mixed with the repre- sentation." Kant, Pure Reason, Transc. Logic, introd. Meikle- john, p. 45 ; Max Muller, ii. 42. "A conception may be either an individual conception or intuition, which has to do with one individual (or with what belongs to one individual), or a general conception, which refers Con] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 71 to a mutually related group of individuals (or of what belongs to individuals) and forms the approximate mental (psychic) basis for the notion." TJeberweg's Logic, § 45 ; James, Principles of Psychology, c. xii. ; and Text-Book, c. xiv. Sully, Huvian Mind, i., 412-431. CONCEPTUALISM.— A doctrine intermediate between Realism and Nominalism, in the history of Scholasticism. The Realist maintains that genera and species exist independently ; that besides individual objects and the general notion from them in the mind, there exist certain ideas, the patterns after which the single objects are fashioned. The general notion in our mind is thus the counterpart of the idea without it. The Nominalist says that nothing exists but things, and names of things; and that universals are mere names. The Conceptualist assigns to universals an existence which, as opposed to real or nominal, may be called logical or psychological, that is inde- pendent of individual objects, but dependent upon the mind of the thinking subject, in which they exist as notions or concep- tions. This controversy rested on the difference between Plato's theory of ideas, and Aristotle's position, taken with Porphyry's introduction to Aristotle's Logical Writings. TJeberweg's Hid., i. 365 ; Thomson, Outline of Laws of Thought, 2nd ed., p. 112; 3rd ed., p. 126. Seth, " Scholasticism," Ency. Brit, 9th ed. CONCRETE (concresco, to grow together). — Opposed to abstract ; it is the existing, and that which is directly known, as belonging to the order of nature. A concrete notion is the notion of an object as it exists, invested with all its qualities. An abstract notion, on the contrary, is the notion of some quality or attribute deprived of all the speciahties with which experience invests it, or separated from the object to which it belongs, or from other attributes with which it is associated. " What I call applied logic is a representation of the under- standing, and of the rules of its necessary employment in Concreto, that is to say, under the accidental conditions of the subject, which may either hinder or promote this employment, and which are all given only empirically." Kant, Pure Reason, transl. Meiklejohn, 48. 72 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Oon Hegel holds that the concrete alone is real, insisting on the insufficiency of abstract terms and reasonings, as involved in reflective processes. " The categories are empty, until they are filled with the concrete." " An object, or thought, is concrete when it is seen and known to be the confluence of several elements." " By abstract is meant that a term, thought, or object, is withdrawn from its context, and regarded apart from the elements which enter into its composition, or from the relations which connect it with other things.'"' Wallace's Logic of Hegel, " Vocabulary." CONDITION (con, together ; and dare, to give).- — A con- stituent element in a concrete existence. A pre-requisite in order that something may be. That which is attendant on the cause, or co-operates with it, for accomplishment of the result ; or, that which limits the cause in its operation. In the language of Inductive Logic, the cause is defined as " the sum-total of the conditions positive and negative taken together ; the whole of the contingencies of every description, which, being realised, the consequent invariably follows. But it is common to single out one only of the antecedents, distin- guished by active power or efficiency, under the denomination of Cause, calling the others merely Conditions." Mill, Logic, bk. iii. ch. v. sec. 3. Condition and Conditioned are correlative. The con- dition is the ground presupposed ; the conditioned, conditionate, or conditional is that which is determined by it. " The conditioned " is employed to describe the relative and limited, in contrast with the " unconditioned," which is applied to the absolute and infinite. Hamilton, Discussions ; Mansel, Limits of Religious Thought. CONDITIONED (Law of the).— "I lay it down as a law which, though not generalised by philosophers, can be easily proved to be true by its application to the phenomena ; — that all that is conceivable in thought lies between two extremes, which, as contradictory of each other, cannot both be true, but of which, as mutual contradictories, one must." 'S.amilion's Metaphysics, ii. 368-9. "From this impotence of intellect, we are unable to think aught as absolute." Reid's Con] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 73 Works, note d, p. 911. "The law of mind, that the conceiv- able is in every relation bounded by the inconceivable, I call the Law of the Conditioned." Hamilton, Metaphysics, ii. 373. On this law Hamilton founds his support of the doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge. — Vide Relativity. CONDUCT. — Rational direction of activity, in view of motive, maxims, and opportunities. Conduct is characteristic of rational agents only, being in advance of Action. " Conduct occurs merely in cases where a conscious idea of what is to be attained thereby, forms a point of starting for its own actualisa- tions." Lotze's Practical Philos., § 10, Ladd's Tr., p. 23. CONGRUITY (from conyruo, to come or run together). — The fitness or agreement of one thing with another. Congruity in the relations of the agent is given by some philosophers as the characteristic of all right actions. Thus there is a congruity or fitness in an intelligent creature worshipping his Creator, or in a son honouring his father. This use of the word belongs to the theory which places virtue in " the fitness of things." CONNOTATION.— Correlation of attribute and object. When applied to the Term, it has the same meaning as Intension or Content, applied to the Concept itself. Thus, a Connotative Term is one which, when applied to an object, is such as to imply in its signification some attribute belonging to that object. " It connotes, i.e., no±es along with the object something con- sidered as belonging to it, as ' The founder of Rome.' The founding of Rome is attributed to the person. A term which merely (denotes an object, without implying any attribute of that object, is called absolute or non-connotative ; as Romulus.'' Whately, Logic, bk. ii. ch. v. sec. 1. "A non-connotative term is one which signifies a subject only, or an attribute only. A connotative term is one which denotes a subject and implies an attribute." Mill, Logic, bk. i. ch. ii. sec. 5. According to Mill, the only non-connotative terms are proper names. Some hold that all terms are con- notative. Jevons, Lessons in Elementary Logic, lesson v. Fowler holds that "singular and collective terms are not connotative, except so far as they suggest common terms." Elements of Deductive Logic, p. 20. 74 TOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Con CONSCIENCE {conseientia, [ui,TO^ (fiva-iKov Swaju.£t ^mr/v Ijj^ovtos. De Animd, lib. ii. cap. i. sec. 6. " Entelechy is the opposite to potentiality, yet would be ill translated by that which we often oppose to potentiality, actuality. EiSos expresses the substance of each thing viewed in repose — its form or constitution ; ivipyeia its substance, con- sidered as active and generative ; ivrekixfia seems to be the synthesis or harmony of these two ideas." Maurice, Mor. and Metaph. Phil. ENTHUSIASM (o Oioi iv ynxiv). — Inspiration; ardour of feeling ; sometimes, in an evil sense, unregulated excite- ment. The word is applied in general to extraordinary excitement or exaltation of mind. The raptures of the poet, the deep meditations of the philosopher, the heroism of the warrior, the devotion of the martyr, and the ardour of the patriot, are so many different phases of enthusiasm. More, Enthusi- asmus Triumphatus ; Casaubon, A Treatise concerning Enthusi- asm ; Locke, Essay on Human Understanding, bk. iv. ch. xix. ; Shaftesbury, Of Enthusiasm; Hume, Essays on Superstition Env] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 129 and Enthusiasm; Natural History of Enthusiasm, ty Isaac Taylor ; Kant's Ethics, Semple's Tr., 3rd ed., 215 ; Abbot's Tr., 3rd ed., 320. BNTHYMEMB {hi Oviim, in the mind).— An irregular syllogism, in which one of the premises is unexpressed, but kept in mind ; as " every animal is a substance, therefore every man is a substance ; " in which the premiss, " man is an animal " is suppressed. This, however, is not the Aristotelian meaning of the term. According to him, it is a " rhetorical syllogism," of which the premises are maxims generally true (eiKOTtt), or facts which indicate the existence of some other fact (oTj/xeia) : and which, as generally understood, would be left unstated." Aristotle's Syllogism was an inference in matter necessary ; his Enthymsme was an inference in matter probable. Anal. Pr., ii. 26, 70-72, Bachmann. Gf. Hamilton, BeicVs Works, p. 704, note. ENTITY (entitas). — Being. The Latinised form is adopted to abstract the metaphysical problem from questions as to species. — Vide Being. In the Scholastic philosophy, it is synonymous with Essence. — Vide Essence. ENTOPTIO, applied to sensations consequent on variety of excitation within the eye-baU. ENVIRONMENT. — The whole circumstances external to organism bearing on the activity of the living being. Environ- ment includes position, relations, and all influences ab extra. Darwin's observations have raised into prominence the problem as to the eii'ects in the history of life of its de- pendence on external conditions. The main question is the amount of influence which may be assigned to Environment. This must determine the scope of " natural selection." Does Environment act independently on organism ; or are all results dependent on the adaptation of the organism to its Environment ? " The changes or processes displayed by a living body are specially related to the changes and processes in its environ- ment The life of the organism will be short or long, low or high, according to the extent to which changes in the I 130 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHy. [EnV environment are met by corresponding changes in the organ- ism." Spencer's Principles of Biology. " All evil results from non-adaptation of constitution to conditions." This raises the question as to the limits in power of adaptation. Spencer, Factors of Organic Eoolution ; for reply, Russel Wallace's Danoinism, 411 ; Lotze, Microcosmus, Hamilton's transL, i. 19, 136. ENVY. — Displeasure at the prosperity of another, tending to awaken desire to dispossess him of the advantages possessed, and inducing hatred of the possessor. Butler's Sermons, i. ; Bacon's JSssays, essay ix. Darwin remarks that "dogs are apt to hate both strange men and strange dogs, especially if they live near at hand, but do not belong to the same family, tribe, or clan." He adds that "this feeling would thus seem to be innate." Descent of Man, p. 112, note. BPICHBIRBMA (imxeLpiia, to put one's hand to a thing). — An attempted proof — a syllogism confirmed in its major or minor premiss, or in both, by an incidental proposition. This proposi- tion, with the premiss to which it is attached, forms an enthy- meme or imperfectly expressed syllogism. The incidental pro- position is the expressed premiss of the enthymeme, and the premiss to which it is attached is the conclusion, e.g., "covetous- ness is sin, for it is a transgression." EPICUREANISM.— The philosophy of Epicurus and his followers. Epicurus was born in Samos, 341 or 342 B.C. He came to Athens about 306 B.C., and taught philosophy there for more than thirty years, his disciples being gathered in his own garden, afterwards bequeathed to his followers for a meet- ing-place. His name is specially associated with the doctrine that pleasure Is the chief good. His school thus stood out as antagonistic to the Stoics, these two being historically the part- ing of two streams of thought, represented still in the Utilitarian and Rational Theories of morals. The Stoics and Epicureans represent respectively different tendencies appearing in the Aristotelian Ethics, the Stoics taking the true meaning of Aristotle, and placing in prominence the warning that we are most prone to bo led astray by pleasure ; the Epicureans taking, Epi] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 131 iti their most general sense, the earlier statement of Aristotle, happiness is that which all seek after. The leading Epicureans in Athens were Metrodorus, Poly- senus, Hermarchus, and, at a later period, Apollodorus. The school afterwards gained considerable influence in Rome. In Ethics, Epicurus maintained that pleasure is the chief good, holding that this is proved by the fact that all animals, from the moment of their birth, are delighted with pleasure and offended with paia. By pleasure he means " the freedom of the body from pain, and of the soul from confusion." " Every .pleasure is a good on account of its own nature, but it does not follow that every pleasure is worthy of being chosen." " The beginning and greatest good of all these things is prudence, teaching us that it is not possible to live pleasantly unless we also live prudently and honourably and justly," But he adds, "we choose the virtues for the sake of pleasure, as we seek the skill of the physician for the sake of health." See Diog. Laert., bk. x. ; Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, Eng. transl., Eeichel, ch. XV. p. 382; Guyan, La Morale d' Epicure; W. Wallace, Epicureanism. BPISTBMOLOGrY (Xdyo? i^s iTncrTriiJi.rjg, the science of knowledge), otherwise known as Theory of Knowledge [Erkenntnisstheorie), is a department of philosophical investi- gation which has assumed special prominence in modern philo- sophy, more particularly owing to the influence of Kantian or Critical thought. It has been distinguished from Psychology on the one hand, and from Ontology, or Metaphysics, strictly so called, on the other. Psychology investigates the conditions on which mental states depend, and the laws which govern their combinations and development, but it does not (in its modern acceptation at least) raise the question of the validity of the knowledge of which our conscious states are the vehicle. It is the province of Epistemology to investigate the nature of the cognitive relation as such, with a view to discover its essential conditions, and so to determine whether the circumstances of human knowledge are such as to discredit its claims to be a true account of reality. This distinction of point of view between 132 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Epi psychology and epistemology is embodied in the Cartesian dis- tinction between, the esse fomale sen proprium of an idea, regarded only as a specific mode of consciousness, and its esse ohjectivum sive viearium, when it is taken in its representative capacity, as standing for some object thought of. Locke's Essay, whose design, according to its author, was " to inquire into the original certainty and extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent," impressed an epistemological direction upon English philosophy which was maintained in Berkeley and Hume, and ■vvhich culminated in the critical theory of Kant. It has been contended, and rightly so, by Hegel and others, that Kant essays an impossible task, seeing that it is impossible to sit in judgment upon our cognitive faculties without employ- ing these very faculties, and thereby implying their trustworthi- ness. The validity of knowledge as such is an ultimate and inevitable assumption, and therefore the subjectivism of Kant's intellectual theory is unfounded. This is true, and yet the need for a theory of knowledge remains. By unravelling the misconceptions on which sceptical and relativistic theories depend, a true epistemology disengages and makes explicit this very assumption. An agnostic relativism condemns knowledge because it does not satisfy impossible conditions. By exposing the inherently impossible nature of the demands made, epis- temological analysis deprives such criticism of its basis, and restores us to the original confidence of reason in itself. For the theory of knowledge, it may be added, is, historically, later in appearing than the theory of Being. It is the conflict of metaphysical theories and the rise of sceptical doubts as to the possibility of knowledge, that first call into existence a system- atic theory of cognition. Epistemology, in this sense, includes an investigation into the ultimate nature of proof or evidence, and into what has been called, generally, the foundations of belief. In this aspect its affinities with logic are evident ; some writers would identify the two disciplines, or include what is ordinarily called logic as a part of the theory of knowledge. Besides the general discussion as to the validity of know- ledge, Epistemology includes a critical analysis of the categories Equ] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 133 or conceptions which, we employ to describe and explain the real. Kant's table of the CategorieSj .and Hegel's Logic, would be contributions to such a " Kategorienlehre." Many regard such a criticism of categories — a dissection of the ultimate structure of reason, it might be called — as the only possible Metaphysic, and accordingly identify Epistemology and Meta- physics. But though such criticism must form the only sure basis of ontological speculation, the one cannot be converted immediately into the other. The analysis of knowledge when treated as an Ontology reduces us to the position of " a tran- scendental solipsism." Ethical and teleological considerations must bear their part in shaping our ultimate metaphysical conception of the universe. This is recognised by writers like Mr Shadworth Hodgson in his Philosophy of Reflection, and Professor Laurie in his Metaphydca Nova et Vetusta ; for though they apparently use Metaphysic to designate the theory of knowledge, they expressly leave room for a " constructive " or " speculative " branch of philosophy, to follow upon the analysis of conceptions, which they regard as exhausting meta- physics proper. This constructive theory, however, is precisely what catholic philosophic usage understands by Metaphysics. — Professor A. Seth. EPISYLLOGISM. — In a chain of reasoning, or Sorites (q.v.), the individual syllogisms into which it may be resolved are called pro-syllogisms or epi-syllogisms, according as they are inferences from earlier, or premises of later syllogisms. EQUATION, correlation of equals. — This is one view of the nature of Judgment {g.v.). See Jevous, Substitution of Similars ; Venn, Syrnbolic Logic. EQUITY (iTTiiiKeia, fairness ; or to ta-ov, the equal, as dis- tinguished from TO vofjLiKov, the legal). — The equal between-man and man, in view of natural rights, or of voluntary contract. It is described by Aristotle, Ethics, bk. v. ch. xv., as that kind of justice which corrects the irregularities or rigours of strict legal justice. All written laws must necessarily speak in general terms, and must rest on the law of justice as ultimate, the true determinator of the spirit of civil law. " Equity, in its true and genuine meaning, is synonymous 134 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [EqU with natural justice ; and to this the judge must have recourse ■where the laws are silent, and there is nothing else to guide his decision." Lord Mackenzie, On Roman Law ; c/, Maine, Ancient Law. The equitable may, therefore, be the just, as in contrast with the strictly legal, as Aristotle has said, " a correction of law, where law is defective by reason of its universality." EQUIVOCATION.— Deliberate use of language in a double sense, with the view of deceiving. ERROR. — -Undesigned flaw in observation, or deviation from the laws of Logic in reasoning. Error is not a fault of our knowledge, but a mistake of our judgment, giving assent to that which is not true. The understanding, while liable to error, has a power of self-criticism, fitting it to detect and rectify its own errors. " The power of judging aright, and of distinguishing truth from error, which is properly called Good Sense or Reason, is by nature equal in all men." Descartes, Method, pt. i., transl. Veitch. As to the sources of error, — " I was led to infer that the ground of our opinions is far more custom and example, than any certain knowledge." lb., pt. ii. The source of our errors is not found in our perceptions, b\it in our judgments ; Descartes, Meditation iv., " Of Truth and Error ; " in " sensation itself, or consciousness of seeing or walking, the knowledge is manifestly certain ; " Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, pt. i. 9 ; " We shall never err if we give our assent only to what we clearly and distinctly perceive ; " Ih., pt. i. 43 ; Locke, Essay, bk. iv. ch. 20 ; On the sources of error, Descartes, Principles, pt. i. sees. 71-74 ; Mill, Logic, bk. v. ch. i. The first source of error is inadequate or unwarranted inter- pretation of our observations ; the second is illegitimate infer- ence, either on account of inadequate test of our premises, or illogical reasoning from them. At the basis of self-criticism, for escape from error, lies confidence in our senses, and in rational inference. ESOTERIC, opposed to EXOTERIC {teev, from within; i^w, from without; io-wrepos, inner). — Secret or hidden doctrine, communicated only to the initiated; exoteric being Ess] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 135 doctrine publicly taught ; scientific teaching, in contrast with teaching more popular in form. The distinction of esoteric and exoteric among the Pytha- goreans appears to have been applied to the disciples, accord- ing to the degree of initiation to which they had attained, being fully admitted into the society, or being merely beginners in inquiry. Eitter, History of Ancient Philosophy, i. 342. Aristotle speaks of some of his writings as exoteric; and others as acroamatic, or esoteric. The former treat of the same subjects as the latter, but in a popular and elementary way ; while the esoteric are more scientific in their form and matter. In modern literature the terms are used in this last sense. A technical or scientific statement is said to be esoteric, a popular one exoteric. Grant's Aristotle's Ethics, app. B, 3rd ed., i. 397. Vide Achoamatio. ESSENCE {essentia, from essens, the old participle of esse, to be). — Being, in its necessary properties, apart from accidental. TO n rjv etvai, Aristotle, Metaph., vii. 7. The Greeks had but one word for essence and substance, viz., ova-la. The word viroa-Tao-K, substance, was latterly introduced. Aristotle insisted on the imminence of the form or essence in the matter of the actual phenomenon, as opposed to the transcendence of the Platonic Idea, apart from the sensible world. "The word substance (ova-la) in its primary and proper signification belongs to the concrete and individual ; only in a secondary sense can it be applied to the genus.'' Ueberweg, Hist., Tr., i. 157. In the Scholastic philosophy, the diversity of theory was ex- pressed in the formulae universalia ante rem, — uni-uersalia in re, — universalia post rem. A distinction began to be established between essence and substance. Substance was applied to the abstract notion of matter — -the undetermined subject or sub- stratum of all possible forms, to in-oKet/xevov ; Essence to the qualities expressed in the definition of a thing, or those ideas which represent the genus and species. Descartes defined substance as " that which exists so that it needs nothing but itself to exist" — Principles, part 1, sec. 51 — a definition applicable to God only, and that which Spinoza 136 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Ete made the basis of his theory. Essence he stripped of its logical significance, making it the foundation of all those qualities and modes which we perceive in matter. Among the attributes of every substance there is one only which deserves the name of essence, and on which the others depend as modifications — as extension, in matter ; or thought, in mind. He thus identified essence and substance. With Leibnitz essence and substance were the same, viz., force or power. Spinoza defines Essence as " that which being given, the thing is necessarily given, and which being wanting, the thing necessarily ceases to exist ; or that without which the thing cannot be conceived to be ; or which itself, without the thing, can neither exist nor be con- ceived." Elh., pt. ii. def. 2. According to Hegel, " essence " is first the ground of existence ; next, of the manifestation in phenomena ; finally, of reality, which is the unity of essence, and phenomenon. " It is important to remark the change of meaning which this word has undergone in its transmission 'from the ancient to the modern schools of philosophy. Formerly the word 'essence' {ova-la) meant that part or characteristic of anything which threw an intellectual illumination over all the rest of it. . . . Nowadays it means exactly the reverse. . . . The ' essence ' is the point of darkness, the assumed element in all things which is inaccessible to thought or observation.'' Ferrier, Instit. of Metaph., p. 249. ETERNITY. — Infinite Duration, without beginning and without end. Our conception of Eternity implies a present existence, of which neither beginning nor end can be affirmed. The schoolmen spoke of eternity, a parte ante, and a parte post. Plato said, time is the moving shadow of eternity. Timceus, 37. Spinoza says — In seterno non datur quandn, nee ante, nee post. If there is but one substance, the one condition of truth is that every thing be thought sub specie Eternitatis. Eternity is, according to Spinoza, "existence itself." Locke, Essay, bk. ii. ch. 14 and ch. 28. Mansel, Exam, of Maurice's Theory; The whole discussion of The Infinite, Limits of Religious Thought. " To exist in time is the same thing as to exist imperfectly. Eth] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 137 God, in the language of Plotinus, is necessarily axpovo% time- less." Jules Simon, Hist. de. I'Ecole d'Alexandrie, pref. Kant, in the Esthetic, makes space and time "subjective forms of our mode of intuition," thus avoiding the error, otherwise he thinks unavoidable, of attributing to the Divine intuition the condi- tions of space and time. Pure Reason, p. 43, Meiklejohn, suppl. xi. ; Max Miiller, i. 421. Time is the measure of relations in succession. Eternity is the duration of the Absolute, who is the unchangeable. Eternity, being the transcendence of all relations in succession, is strictly the absence of time. ETHICS.— Synonymous with "Moral Philosophy," the philosophy of the right in conduct. According to Kant, a philosophy of " the laws of freedom," in contrast with " the laws of nature." According to etymological usage (rjOiKoi, from eOo's, custom), that department of moral science which treats of practice as tested by moral law. " The derivation of the term is to some extent misleading ; for Ethics (ridiKd) originally meant what relates to character as distinct from intelligence. . . According to the Aristotelian view — which is that of Greek Philosophers generally, and has been widely taken in later times — the primary subject of ethical investigation is all that is included under the notion of what is ultimately good or desir- able for men." Sidgwick, Hist, of Ethics, 1. Aristotle says that ^6os, which signifies moral character, is derived from Woi, custom ; since it is by repeated acts that character, which is a moral habit, is acquired. N. Eth., lib. ii. Cicero says. Quia peiiinet ad mores quod rjOoi illi .vocant, nos earn partem philosophice, De nwribus appellare solemus ; sed deeet auffentem linguam Latinam nominare Moralem. De Fato, lib. ii. Custom (l^os) gives too wide reference, as human practice is wider than right conduct. The natural history of customs is an inquiry quite beyond Ethics proper, yet ultimately related with it, and even involved so far in Ethical science. A philosophy of practice seeks the basis of rational conduct, that is, the rule or law of conduct, which determines the " ought " for a rational agent. Eor this, we must pass behind custom, to seek the reason for action, — the ultimate reason which must be the test 138 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Eth of all couducfc. Hence it is impossible to sever conduct or character from intelligence. Ethics deals with action, and with its end, even with the common end, as that may be expressed in " the common good ; " but it does so only by seeking the common reason for acting in a given way, the rational basis for " oughtness " in conduct. Aristotle, N. Ethics, Eud. Ethics, Magna Moralia ; Spinoza, Ethics, — Existence interpreted, sub specie Eternitatis , Kant, Metaphysic of Ethics ; Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Reehts ; English expounders of Hegelian Ethics ; Bradley's Ethical Studies; Green, Prolegomena to Ethics; Muirhead, Elements of Ethics. Intuitionalism, Eeid, Active Pow&rs ; Stewart, Active Powers ; Calderwood, Handbook of Mor. Phil. ; Porter, Elements of Moral Science. Ifatural Evolution, Spencer, Data of Ethics. Bain, Emotions and Will ; Darwhi, Descent of Man ; Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics ; Leslie Stephens, Science of Ethics ; Williams, Ethics on the Theory of Evolution ; On modes of stating the problems, Sorley's Ethics of Naturalism, ch. i. ; History, Sidgwick's Outlines of the History of Ethics. ETHNOLOGY (e^i/os, a tribe; and Aoyos, science). — A scien- tific account of the comparative organisation of tribes or nations. Spencer's Descriptive Sociology ; Ethnological Journal. — Vide Anthhopologt. BUDjSjMONISM (eiSaifjiovLa, happiness).— That system of moral philosophy which makes happiness the test of rectitude. On the common basis of the agreeable or desirable, there are two forms of Ethical Theory : (1) the Hedonistic (-^Soi/^, pleasure, voluptas of the Latins), which makes personal pleasure the law of life, and is known as Egoistic Hedonism ; (2) the Eudsemonistic (or Eudaimonistic), which makes the general happiness the test, termed also Altruistic Hedonism, and Utilitarianism, its maxim being " the greatest happiness of the greatest number." Bentham, the original expounder of the Greatest Happiness theory, considers the term " Happiness " not always appropriate, because it " represents pleasure in too elevated a shape " to include the whole requirements of life. Deontology, i. 78. In ancient philosophj', the Sooratic view was that " to live well is to live pleasantly.'' Protagoras, 351; Plato's criticism Evi] VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. 139 of the doctrine that pleasure is the chief good, Philebus; the AristoteHc view that Happiness is the eud, N. Mh., in the successive books of which the definition of Happiness is expanded. That pleasure is the chief good was affirmed by Aristippus of Cyreue ; and again by Epicurus, thus becoming a recognised doctrine with the Cyrenaios and Epicureans. Its modern upholders are Hobbes, who is Egoistic. More recent thinkers take the Altruistic form of the theory, — Bentham, Hume, James Mill, J. S. Mill, — who introduces difference of quality in pleasure, — Bain, Sidgwick. Hobbes' Leviathan; Bentham's Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, and his Deontology; Hume's Inquiry ; Jas. Mill's Fraginent on Mackintosh ; J. S. Mill's Utilitarianism ; Bain's Emotion and Will, and Moral Science; Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics. For criticism of this philosophy, Kant's Ethics, Semple or Abbott ; Grote's Exam, of Utilit. Phil. ; M'Cosh's Exam, of Mill's Phil.; Lorimer's Institutes of Law ; Calder wood's Handiooh of Moral Philosophy ; Bradley's Ethical Studies ; Green's Proleg. " The principle of happiness may, indeed, furnish maxims, but never such as would be competent to be laws of the will, even if universal happiness were made the object. For, since the knowledge of this rests on mere empirical data, since every man's judgment of it depends on his own particular point of view, which is itself, moreover, very variable, it can supply only general rules, not universal." Kant's Practical Reason; Abbot's KanVs Theory of Ethics, p. 125. EVIDENCE (e, from ; and video, to see). — Testimony for reality. For the facts of consciousness, we need no evidence ; for recognition of any existence beyond, evidence is required. Evidence is direct, that of the senses ; indirect, the result of observations, and inductions, and testimony of others. J. S. MiU makes Logic "a connected view of the Principles of Evidence." Locke, Essay, bk. iv. ch. xv. ; Butler, Analogy, introd. ; Glassford, Essay on Principles of Evidence ; Campbell, Philosophy of Rhetm'ic, bk. i. ; Gambier, On Moral Evidence ; Sir G. C. Lewis, On Authority in Matters of Opinion. — Vide TESTIMONy. 140 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Evi Administration under Civil Law is largely dependent on critical regard to the laws of evidence. This need arises from the imperfection of evidence in cases submitted for judicial test, and from common practice of deception. Advance in judicial procedure is associated with more exact interpretation of the laws of evidence, in acceptance of the fundamental maxim, that a man is to be held innocent until he is proved guilty. EVIL. — 1. Physical. — Suffering in every form, — that from which sentient existence shrinks ; in human experience, that which requires voluntary endurance, and even moral courage, to bear. 2. Moral. — Wilful transgression of moral law, — wrong- doing in every form, — violation of the rights of others. Besides these uses, " Evil " is employed in a Metaphysical sense to apply to limitation, the absence of power to accomplish results such as intelligence may contemplate as desirable. The great perplexity for philosophy is the existence of moral evil, — of a state of will at variance with moral law, involving the awful consequences apparent in society. The final form of the problem is, — "Why does the Absolute Being allow the con- tinuance of moral evil ? The question seems transferable into this other : Why does a Being of Absolute Goodness provide for the powers and possibilities of moral life ? This is the root perplexity, aggravated by the large significance given to it, under the laws of social life and of heredity, involving the innocent with the guilty, in the terrible consequences of Evil- doing. Does Divine power pervade all, so that aU is the expression of the necessity of the Divine perfection 1 The problem of the origin of Evil has engaged philosophic thought from the earliest ages. Sometimes it has been taken in wider form, as concerning pain ; sometimes in the higher form, as concerned with moral evil. Philosophic thought has been turned towards every pos.sible hypothesis. Seeking the explanation of existence in some material principle, Evil has been traced to matter regarded as eternal, — the material (SXiy, materia) on which the First Cause operates. Plato, Timceus, 28 seq. Under this hypothesis of Pre-Socratic philosophy, Evil is limitation, defect in the Universe. An Eternal Dualism is represented in a more extreme antagonism of coeval EVO] VOCABULAKT OF PHILOSOPHY. 141 powers. Good and Evil, under the Mauichean doctrine, which is the product of Eastern thought ; and has been accepted iu our day by J. S. Mill, Essays on Religion, 116. This implies limitation of Divine power, restriction of the Eirst Cause. The next alternative is the transition from Dualism to Monism, in which God is all, and all things are thought as in God. The result is Pantheism, with an optimistic view of things, so that " evil " is included in the good, as if it were merely limitation. This is the product of Spinoza's doctrine of Substance ; and of Hegel's doctrine of the Idea. Under both schemes, the Uni- verse is the manifestation of the Divine : moral Evil is denied. Reaction against this has produced Pessimistic thought, which represents existence itself as an evil, to cease to exist being the one good, — Schopenhauer, Hartmanu. The next alternative holds that the First Cause is the Eternal One, — the Creator of the Universe, and its sustainer under fixed law, — ^involving Dual- ism in history ; the supernatural and nature. With origin of moral life comes appearance of moral evil, as a product of free-will. An irrational principle does not rule the world, but an intelligent. There is no sthsolute individualism in human history, but man is responsible under rational law, and " a man just and pious and entirely good " is a man " loved of God." Plato, Pliilebus, 84. " The Good is not the cause of all things, but of the good only. Then God, if he be good, is not the author of all things, as the many assert, but he is the cause of a few things only, and not of most things that happen to men ; for few are the goods of human life, and many are the evils ; and the good is to be attributed to God alone. Of the evils, the causes are to be sought elsewhere, and not in him. Plato, Republic, ii. 379, Jowett ; Plato, Timceus and Gorgias ; Aristotle, Metaph., i. 6 ; Cicero, De Finihus ; On the problem of EvU ; King, Origin of Evil, Government of the World ; Butler, Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature ; Lotze, Philos. of Relig., ch. 7, " Of Government." Vindication of Hegelianism, Green, Proleg. to Ethics ; E. Gaird, Evolution of Religion, vol. ii. p. 82, — " On the Unity of Pantheism and Monotheism." EVOLUTION. — Progress of being in continuity by develop- ment from within, under external conditions conducive to 142 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [EVO advance. Evolution has been held as applicable to the Universe as a whole ; or as an interpretation of the history of life on the earth, a hypothesis in natural history. Evolution was a conception which ruled Pre-Socratic thought in the early Elemental Theories, as preliminary to the search for the first principle of movement. Throughout all this specula- tion the material universe was most in thought ; ethical con- siderations were little in view. The object of study was nature; the search was for the apxfi, the principle of things ; and the range of inquiry concerned the natural elements, water, air, and iire. This inquiry engaged Anaximander, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, and others. The philosophy of Socrates was the reaction against this form of speculation, by concentrating on thought itself, and on the main problems of the rational life. Modern Philosophy, stimulated by advance in all departments of science, shows everywhere the influence of the conception of Evolution ; giving Synthesis precedence in philosophy. Herbert Spencer has developed a " Synthetic Philosophy '' of the Universe, stimulated and sustained by the success of Darwin in his theory of the natural histor;^ of species. Herbert Spencer's starting-point is the assumption that there is " throughout the universe an unceasing redistribution of matter and motion.'' His main contention is that " this redis- tribution constitutes evolution," working throughout the entire universe, including the planetary system, and leading every- where to "a transformation of the homogeneous into the hetero- geneous." Behind all this, lies the unknown and unknowable Absolute, without which the evolution of the universe were unthinkable. "We must regard every phenomenon as " a mani- festation of an unlimited and incomprehensible power.'' In this conclusion Religion and Science are reconciled. The " rhythm of evolution and dissolution, completing itself during short periods in small aggregates, and in the vast aggregates distributed through space, completing itself in periods which are immeasur- able by human thought, in so far as we can see, universal and eternal." This general scheme is illustrated in the history of life on the earth. Matter and motion are presented in a higher phase. Movement is seen within each life for its unfolding ; EVO] VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. 143 dependence on external conditions gives activity wider scope ; the activity of organic life shows " acts adjusted to ends," life and environment act and react ; out of this comes advanc- ing differentiation. The application of this appears "in the aggregate of organisms throughout geologic time ; in the mind ; iu society ; in all products of social activity." Human life and activity are included under the single law, and in this way Ethical thought is interpreted. At this stage, intelligence becomes an instrument for securing " completeness," the " adjustments " which secure gain to the individual life, or to that of the species. " Ethics has for its subject-matter that form which universal conduct assumes during the last stages of its evolution." Herbert Spencer's "Works, First Princ. ; Bio- logy ; Psychol. ; Data of Ethics. See Collins, Epitome of the Synthetic Philos., preface by Spencer, containing summary of the Theory. Darwin deals with Evolution as a theory explanatory of the origin of species by natural selection. In all its main features, the theory belongs to observational science within the depart- ment of natural history. It enters the field of philosophy proper only when seeking to include Man. Its fundamental considerations are these, — rapid multiplication of life in all forms ; variations manifest in the history of species ; struggle for existence in view of the limitation of supplies ; survival of the strongest or fittest for enduring the struggle ; consequent advance by natural selection. The struggle concerns each individual life, and next each species, so leading to a modifica- tion of species in the history of the earth. Beyond this arises the question as to the law of heredity, and the transmission of variations. This has led to the dispute as to Pangenesis, as held by Darwin, Origin of Species, implying transmission of acquired characteristics ; and continuity of Germ-Plasm, as held by Weismann, Essays on Heredity, implying non-transmission of acquired characters. Whichever theory prevail, "natural selection" is a self-acting process, leading to incessant change in the history of life ; and so actiiig, leads to the preservation of favourable variations. Natural history is the history of the modification of species; and amongst species the struggle is 144 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. [EXC severest between allied species. Embryology, with its evidence for continuity, is auxiliary to the theory. Darwin's entrance on the sphere of Philosophy is by way of " comparison of the mental powers of man and of the lower animals," — Descent of Man, chaps, iii. and iv., — and considera- tion of the " development of the intellectual and moral faculties during primeval and civilised times," ch. v. His method is still observational, and does not sufficiently include Psychological Analysis and Synthesis. The distinction between neurosis and psychosis, between nerve sensibility and rational reflection, is not clearly held ; and on this account the evolution of thought from sensation is not formally elucidated. For Darwin, the Ethical Problem. is one of social life and interest, rather than of ultimate principle. Darwin, Origin of Species ; Descent of Man ; Alf . Eussell Wallace, Darwinism ; Haeckel, General Morphology ; Evol. of Man ; Huxley, Man's Place in Nature and Essays ; Romanes, Darwin and after Darwin; Hartmann, Philos. of the Unconscious, trausL, ii. 298; Murphy's Habit and Intelligence, 2nd ed. On the inadequacy of the theory, Lloyd Morgan, Animal Intelligence, chap, xii., " Mental Evolution " ; Calderwood, Relations of Mind and Brain ; Evolution and Man's Place in Nature ; Huxley, Evolution and Ethics ; Pollock, Mind, i. 334 ; and Sidgwick, Mind, i. 52 ; Spencer, Defence of Data of Ethics, Mind, vi. 82. On Hegel's scheme of Dialectic Evolution, by manifestation of the Idea in Nature and in Spirit, see Dialectic. EXCLUDED MIDDLE (Principle, Law, or Axiom of), Principium exclusi medii inter duo contradictoria. — " By the principle of ' Contradiction ' we are forbidden to think that two contradictory attributes can both be present in the same object; by the principle of ' Excluded Middle ' we are forbidden to think that both can be absent. The first tells us that both differentiae must be compatible with the genus : 1 cannot, for example, divide animal into animate and inanimate. The second tells us that one or the other must be found in every member of the genus." Mansel, Prolegom. Logica, ch. vi. p. 208. Exp] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 145 The formula of this principle is — "Everything is either A or not A : everything is either a given thing, or something which is not that given thing." That there is no mean between two contradictory propositions is proved by Aristotle. Metaphysics, bk. iii. eh. vii. "So that if we think a judgment true, we must abandon its contradictory ; if false, the contradictory must be accepted." Thomson, Laws of Thought, pt. iv. sec. 114. Hegel maintains that all existence being a development, truth lies in the synthesis of the diverse. Ueberweg, in defence of the axiom, says that Hegel's attack arises from a confusion of contrary with contradictory. System of Logic, pp. 263 ff., Lindsay's transl. EXISTENCE.— FicZe Being, and Essence. EXOTERIC. — Philosophic teaching popular in substance and form, in contrast with Esoteric. EXPECTATION.— The mind's forecast. Anticipation of recurrence of experience in accordance with the fixed laws of nature; and farther, of increase of knowledge because of the recognised rational basis of things. Kant speaks of the conditions of sensation, as " the anticipa- tions of sensation" or "Anticipation of Perception." "All cognition by means of which I am enabled to cognise and determine a priori what belongs to empirical cognition, may be called an anticipation." Pure Reason, Tr. Meiklejohn, 126. "Perception is empirical consciousness, that is to say, a con- sciousness which contains an element of sensation." lb. According to the more common usage, expectation is the assurance the mind has of the recurrence of events ; and the hope of possible good as the reward of effort. So J. S. Mill, in dealing with " the stream of consciousness," admits that it is a stream which must be represented as having reference both to what is behind and what is before. " That the human mind is capable of expectation." Exam., of Hamilton's Philos., ch. xi. Eelations of Memory and Expectation, Sully's Psychology, 252. EXPERIENCE {ifiimpia, experientia; German, Erfdhrunrf). — The knowledge involved in the facts of consciousness ; a posteriori knowledge, in contrast with a priori ; knowledge accumulated by observation, and by induction from observation. K 146 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Exp According to Aristotle, Analyt. Poster., ii. 19, from sense comes memory, but from repeated remembrance of the same thing we get experience. Bacon and Spinoza characterise our ordinary unsystematic sense-knowledge as experientia vaga. On the other hand, " my experience is what I agree to attend to." James, Priii. of Psyclwl., i. 402. "Experience, in its strict sense, applies to what has occurred within a person's own knowledge. More frequently the word is used to denote that judgment which is derived from experience in the primary sense, by reasoning from that in combination with other data.'' Whately's Logic, app. 1. The Experiential Philosophy makes observation the sole test of reality, denying the a priori recognition of universal truth. Locke was the leader of this school, in open antagonism to Descartes. — See Empirical. The reaction against Experientialism was led by Eeid in Britain, and by Kant in Germany. The Critical Philosophy of Kant, conspicuous in Modern Philosophy, is due to the scepticism which roused him from dogmatic slumber, and led to the criticism of Knowledge for discovery of its a priori conditions. Since Kant, it stands a leading question in Epistemology, — "What are the conditions of certainty in experience?" Still more recently, in the revival of Psychological study, as a reaction against Hegel, " Selective attention " has become a leading feature in Epistemology. In this connection it may weU be urged " how false a notion of experience that is which would make it tantamount to the mere presence to the senses of an outward order.'' James, Principles of Psychol., i. 402. " The ' simple impression ' of Hume, the ' simple idea ' of Locke, are both abstractions, never realised in experience." Ih. The place which experience holds under a scheme giving prominence to an a priori basis for Epistemology will appear from this sentence of Kant : " The possibility of experience is that which gives objective reality to all our apriori cognitions." Pure Season, Meiklejohn's transl., 118. For Kant's view that " the objects of experience are not things in themselves," ib., 308. In Britain, the leaders of the Experiential School have been Ext] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 147 Locke, Hume, Jas. Mill, J. S. Mill, Bain, Herbert Spencer. Its critics have been Eeid, Stewart, Hamilton, Mansel, Martineau, in Britain ; M'Cosh and Noah Porter in America. Kant is the con- spicuous leader, with whatever force he is himself criticised, as by Hutchison Stirling and the Neo-Kantian school. "Experience is trained by hoth association and dissociation, and psychology must be writ hoth in synthetic and in analytic terms.'' James, Prin. of Psychol., i. 487. Cyples, Progress of Experience. EXPERIMENT.— Application of tests for the discovery of truth, in cases in which direct observation is possible. Repetition of experiments supplies the data for inductioa. In experiment we do not passively observe Nature, we m^errof/afe her (Bacon). " Reason must approach nature with the view, indeed, of receiving information from it, not, however, in the character of a pupil, who listens to all that his master chooses to tell him, but in that of a judge, who compels the witnesses to reply to those questions which he himself thinks fit to propose." Kant, Pure Reason, pref. to 2nd ed., p. xxvii., Meiklejohn's transl. " For the purpose of vat-ying the circum- stances, we may have recourse (according to a distinction commonly made) either to observation or to experiment ; we may eithei find an instance in nature suited to our purposes, or, by an artificial arrangement of circumstances, make one.'' Mill, Logic, bk. iii. ch. vii. sec. 2. " When, as in astronomy, we endeavour to ascertain causes by simply watching their effects, we observe; when, as in our laboratories, we interfere arbitrarily with the causes or circumstances of a phenomenon, we are said to experiment." Thomson and Tait's Natural Philosophy, vol. i. sec. 369. Observation proceeds from effect to cause : experiment from cause to effect. Some sciences are most observational, as Astronomy ; others are more experimental, as Chemistry. But the two methods run into one another ; and the distinction between them is one rather of degree than of kind. — Vide. Experience. — [J. S.] EXTENSION {extendo, to stretch from), Physical, is that essential property of matter by which it occupies space ; it implies length, breadth, and thickness. According to the Cartesians, extension is the essence of matter, as thought is the 148 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Ext essence of mind (res extensa and res cogitans). Spinoza made Thought and Extension the attributes of the One Substance. According to Locke, Extension is one of the primary qualities of matter. Locke, Essay on Human Understanding, bk. ii. ch. xiii., also eh. XV. ; Eeid, Inquiry, ch. v. sees. 5, 6 ; Intellectual Powers, essay ii. ch. xix. ; Hobbes, Phil. Prima, pars ii. cap. viii. sec. 1 ; Kant, Pure Reason, Esthetic. Logical. — The number of objects included under a term. Intension or comprehension means the common characters belonging to such objects. " I call the extension of an idea those subjects to which that idea applies ... as the idea of triangle in general extends to all the dififerent sorts of triangles.'' Port Roy. Logic. EXTERNALITY or OUTNESS.— Separateness from self; known object as distinct from the kiiower, and from his experience. In contrast with self, it is the not-self. In contrast with experience through sensation, it is the cause of nerve excitation apart from the conditions of consciousness. It has two aspects — externality to consciousness, and externality in space. Our perceptions are not in space, while the objects of perception are. " The things perceived by sense may be termed ' external,' with regard to their origin, in that they are not generated from within by the mind itself." Berkeley, Principles of Knowledge, part i. § 90 ; Eraser's Selections, 4th ed., 107. " By means of the external sense (das aussern sinnes) (a property of our mind) we represent to ourselves objects as without us." Kant, Pure Reason, Transc. ^^sth., sec. L " Object is not the other side of the subject, but the larger circle which includes it." Lewes, Probs. of Life and Mind, i. 195. We are "in direct contact with nature through sense, and indirect contact through thought." lb., ii. 121 ; Criticism of Lewes, Watson, Kant, 92 ; Spencer's view of an external world, First Principles, part ii. c. 3, p. 158 ; Criticism of it, Watson, Kant, c. ix. ; Ferrier, " Crisis of modern speculation," Lectures, vol. ii. p. 261 ; "Consciousness of External Reality," Hodgson, Mi7id, x. 321 ; " Every thing or quality felt is felt in Fac] VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 149 outer space," James, Text-Book of Psychology, p. 15. "The recognition of things as external . . . seems to imply outness in relation to the bodily organism." Sully, Psychol., 204. BYE. — The terminal organ for vision is the most complex of all the apparatus of special sense. In front is a translucent cornea, consisting of layers of soft fibres ; behind this, a chamber filled with watery iluid ; next, the iris ; next, the crystalline lens; behind this, the large chamber known as the vitreous body ; spread over its membrane is the fine network of nerve fibre, known as the retina, the sensitive terminal fibrils of the optic nerve. Opposite the pupil is the yellow spot, occupied with slender cones and rods. Behind this, the optic nerve passes away to the basis of the brain. Poster's Physiology, b. iii. c. iii. FACT {facio, to do). — That which is done or accomplished ; occurrence ; that which is known as existing. " By a matter of fact, I understand anything of which we obtain a conviction from our internal consciousness, or any individual event or phenomenon which is the object of sensa- tion." Sir G. C. Lewis, Essay on Influmce, of Authority. FACTITIOUS (faetito, to make). — The result of human work or art, as distinguished from a product of nature ; self- produced in consciousness. Descartes calls those i&e,as factitious which are the product of imagination, originated by ourselves, as opposed to innate and to adventitious. Among ideas, " some appear to me to be innate, others adventitious, and others to be made by myself (factitious) ; — . . . inventions of my own mind." Descartes, Meditation, iii. p. 38, Veitch's transl. FACULTY. — A power of the mind, to the action of which a distinct class of facts in consciousness may be referred. The correlative designation is capacity, susceptibility to impression from action, whether external or internal, thus including physical sensibility and emotion. Analysis of experience leads to the recognition of distinct orders of phenomena ; classification of these guides to the discrimination of powers and capacities not immediately known. As the stream ol consciousness is one, all facts within 150 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Pal it must be regarded as the outgoing of the energy of life, with attendant susceptibilities. "Faculties " are not separate entities in mind, but distinct phases of potentiality, known as contribut- ing to the history of experience. Modern psychology is antagonistic to construction of philo- sophy of mind on the basis of Faculties ; first, because the com- pletion of the work begun in analysis must be discovery of the natural synthesis of experience ; and second, because of the dangers of abstraction which beset reasoning on the basis of faculties. A philosophy of the structure of experience must be the main object of psychology. Hence, Synthesis is the leading characteristic of modern philosophy. This does not involve a negative to the recognition of faculties, previously common, but priticism of the references made to these, and insistance on the canon that the coherence of phenomena must present the ultimate problem in psychology. Thought-power is the central and dominant power of rational life, by use of which the life itself, as well as all that belongs to the external world, is to be interpreted. Allowing for a physical basis in neurosis, thought-power is the basis of psychosis, faculties being potentialities, not separate entities. Locke, Essay, ch. xxi. sees. 17, 20 ; Reid, Intellectual Powers, essay i. c. 1 ; Hamilton, Metaph., Lect. x. ; Feuchtersleben, Medical Psychol. ; Morell, Psychol. ; Kant, Pure Reason, Meiklejohn's Tr., 81, 237 ; Hutchison Stirling, Text-Book to Kant, 30; Lotze, Microcosmus, transl., 169; Mansel's Proleg. Log., 38 ; Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, ii. 10. FAITH.— OTcZe Belief. FALLACY (A). —An apparent argument, professing to de- cide the matter at issue, while it really does not. Fallacies were arranged by Aristotle in two classes — according as the fallacy lay in the form, in dictione; or in the viatter, extra dictionem. They have been variously arranged by subsequent logicians, but Aristotle's classification has been generally adopted. Fallacy may occur in either Deductive or Inductive inference. In the former, it may be (1) formal or (2) material I. Fallacies in Deduction : — (1) Foi'mal, or strictly logical, (a) Those arising from the Pal] VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 151 breach of any of the rules of syllogism, as Illicit Major or Undistributed Middle, {b) Those which do not directly break auy syllogistic rule, and therefore may be called semi-logical. The fallacies, in form or expression, are the following : — Fallacia ..^quivocatioms, arising from the use of an equivocal word ; as, the dog is an animal ; Sirius is the dog ; therefore Sirius is an animal. FallacisB Amphibolise, arising from doubtful construc- tion; quod tangitur a Socrate illud sentit; columna tangitur a Socrate ; ergo columna sentit. In the major proposition sentit means "Socrates feels." In the conclusion, it means "feels Socrates." Fallacia Oompositionis, when what is proposed in a divided sense, is afterwards taken collectively; as, two and three are even and odd ; five is two and three ; therefore five is even and odd. Fallacia Divisionis, when what is proposed in a collective, is afterwards taken in a divided sense ; as, the planets are seven ; Mercury and Venus are planets ; therefore Mercury and Venus are seven. Fallacia Accentus, when the same thing is predicated of different terms, if they be only written or pronounced in the same way, e.g., the commandment " Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour," may be made by a slight emphasis of the voice on the last word to imply that we are at liberty to bear false witness against other persons (Jevons, Logic, p. 174). Fallacia Figurae Dictionis, when, from any similitude between two words, what is granted of one is, by a forced application, predicated of another; as, projectors are unfit to be trusted; this man has formed a project, therefore this man is unfit to be trusted. (2) Material fallacies, or fallacies extra dictionem : — Fallacia Accidentis, when what is accidental is confounded with what is essential. This occurs in the application of general rules to particular cases, where the peculiarity of the given case invalidates the application. We are forbidden to kill; using capital pimishment is killing ; we are forbidden to use capital 152 VOCABULAKT OF PHILOSOPHY. [Fal punishment. The converse fallacy of accident occurs when we argue from a particular case (ignoring its peculiarity) to a general rule. These two fallacies are sometimes termed respectively, a dicto sinvpliciter ad dictum secundum quid and a dicta secundum quid ad dictum simplieiter. Fallacia a Dioto Secundum quid ad Dictum Sim- plieiter, when a term is used in one premiss in a limited, and in the other in an unlimited sense ; as, the Ethiopian is white as to his teeth; therefore he is white. The converse a dido simplieiter ad dictum secundum quid is also fallacious — What- ever gives pain should be abstained from ; therefore surgical operations should be abstained from. Fallacia Ignorationis Blenchi, or Irrelevant Conclusion (literally, ignorance of the refutation), is when the point in dispute is intentionally or ignorantly overlooked, and the con- clusion is therefore irrelevant. The principal forms of it are : — 1. Mistaking the question or the point at issue, as when the existence of the external world is proved against Berkeley, who did not deny its existence, but put forward a theory of the nature of that existence. 2. Imputing consequences, or the constructive sophism ; as, " Phrenology leads to Materialism, therefore it is not true." 3. Introduction of rhetorical expedients, as irony, personali- ties, appeals to the passions, &c. Such are the argumenta ad hominem, ad populum, ^c. Fallacia Petitionis Principii (begging the question), when that is taken for granted which ought to have been proved. This fallacy generally occurs in a lengthened argument, and is called argument in a circle. It may occur, however, in a single proposition, e.g., circulus in definiendo, where a term is deiined by its synonym ; or even in a single term or Question-begging Epithet, as innovation, a term which, to the minds of many, implies the idea of wrongness, and therefore, when applied to any proposal, is sufficient without argument to condemn it. Mill maintains that, " in every syllogism, considered as an argument to prove the conclusion, there is a petitio principii. Fam] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 153 When we say, All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, ilierefore Socrates is mm-tal, it is unreasonably urged by the adversaries of the syllogistic theory, that the proposition Socrates is mortal, is presupposed in the more general assumption, All men are mortal ; that we cannot be assured of the mortality of all men, unless we are already certain of the mortality of every individual man ; that, in short, no reasoning from generals to particulars can, as such, prove anything, since from a general principle we cannot infer any particulars but those which the principle itself assumes as known." Loyio, bk. ii. ch. iii. sec. 2. Fallacia a non Causa pro Causaj appears in the follow- ing forms : — (1) Non vera pro vera ; as, when Descartes explains sensation by animal spirits, the existence of which is not ascertained. (2) Non talis pro tali ; as, when the Norwegians attributed the disappearance of the fish from their coast to the introduction of inoculation. (3) Post hoc ergo propter hoc, when accidental antecedence and subsequence are regarded as cause and effect, e.g., the superstition of sailors that it is unlucky to start on a Friday, because such starts have been followed by accidents. Fallacia Plurium Interrogationum, when two or more questions, requiring each a separate answer, are proposed as xine, so that if one answer be given, it must be inapplicable to one of the particulars asked. The fallacy- is overthrown by giving to each particular a separate reply. It is the Fallacia Gowpositionis in an interrogative form. II. Fallacies of Induction. These are classified by Fowler as follows : — (a) Fallacies incident to the subsidiary processes — (1) Fallacy of non-observation ; (2) of mal-observation ; (3) errors in Classification, Nomenclature, Terminology, and Hypothesis. (6) Fallacies incident to the Inductive process itself, or Fallacies of Generalisation — (1) Inductio per Enumerationem simplicem; (2) Errors common to the employment of the various Inductive Methods ; (3) False Analogy. On Inductive Fallacies, — Fowler's Inductive Logic, c. 6 ; Mill, Logic, bk. v. FAMILY (The). — In the order of nature, the beginning of 154 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Pan social organisation. The family is the social unit, by its constitution, guiding us in social organisation on a wider scale. From the family, as from a root, spring wider relations of social life. Beyond these, the will of the community deter- mines the form of civil organisation. Ethics investigates the duty of man in all the relations of life — those of the Family, Society, and the State. Duty first appears as represented in natural relations. The bond of union, which is natural, is of necessity also Ethical. The feeling which attaches parents and children is natural feeling, such as appears in animal life in a germinal form, specially in maternal feeling as that is characteristic of animals. Such speciality disappears in the human family, because of the rational basis of action. Duty is a conception superior to feeling, and calling forth deeper and more sacred forms of feeling in family life. In this appears the distinc- tiveness in human life of the marriage relation, and the con- stitution of the family, disclosing the ethical basis of social life. FANCY (tftavTacTLa, a making visible). — A play of thought and feeling around a subject, lending to it human interest. " It is obvious that a creative imagination, when a person possesses it so habitually that it may be regarded as forming one of the characteristics of his genius, implies a power of summoning up, at pleasure, a particular class of ideas ; and of ideas related to each other in a particular manner ; which power can be the result only of certain habits of association which the individual has acquired. It is to this power of the mind, which is evidently a particular turn of thought, and not one of the common principles of our nature," that we are to apply the name fancy. " The office of this power is to collect materials for the imagination ; and therefore the latter power presupposes the former, while the former does not necessarily suppose the latter. A man whose habits of association present to him, for illustrating or embellishing a subject, a number of resembling or analogous ideas, we call a man of fancy ; but for an effort of imagination various other powers are necessary, particularly the powers of taste and Fat] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 155 judgment; without which we can hope to produce nothing that will be a source of pleasure to others. It is the power ot fancy which supplies the poet with metaphorical language, and with all the analogies which are the foundation of his allusions ; but it is the power of imagination that creates the complex scenes he describes, and the fictitious characters he de- lineates. To fancy we apply the epithets of rich or luxuriant ; to imagination, those of beautiful or sublime.'' Dugald Stewart's Elements, c. v., Hamilton's ed., vol. ii. 259. Fancy was called by Coleridge " the aggregative and asso- ciative power." Wordsworth says : — " To aggregate and to associate, to evoke and to combine, belong as well to imagina- tion as to fancy, ^ui fancy does not require that the materials which she makes use of should be susceptible of change in their constitution from her touch ; and, where they admit of modification, it is enough for her purpose if it be slight, limited, and evanescent. Directly the reverse of these are the desires and demands of the imagination. She recoils from everything but the plastic, the pliant, and the indefinite." AVordsworth, preface to Works. " The contrast between passive and active imagination appears to correspond to one aspect of the ill-defined and much-discussed distinction between Fancy and Imagination." Sully, Outlines of Psychology, p. 304, note. FATALISM ifatum, the thing spoken). — The doctrine that all human actions and forms of experience are inevitably deter- mined in the sequence of events, being fixed by an irrevocable decree. " Fatum is derived from fari; that is, to pronounce, to decree ; and in its right sense it signifies the decree of Providence." Leibnitz, Fifth Paper to Dr Olarke. Fate or destiny has commonly been regarded as a power superior to gods and men — swaying all things irresistibly. Hence, the personification, — The Fates. " Fatalists, that hold the necessity of aU human actions and events, may be reduced to these three classes : — First, such as asserting the Deity, suppose it irrespectively to decree and determine all things, and thereby make all actions necessary to us Secondly, such as suppose a Deity that, acting 156 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. [FeC wisely, but necessarily, did contrive the general frame of things in the world, from whence, by a series of causes, doth unavoidably result whatsoever is so done in it ; which fate is a concatenation of causes, all in themselves necessary, and is that which was asserted by the ancient Stoics, Zeno and Chrysippus. And, lastly, such as hold the material necessity of all things without a Deity ; which /afo Epicurus calls t^v t&v v(Ta bfuiXoyovfievia^ ^rjv, — conveni- enter naturae vivere. In the history of British thought, prominence was given to this representation early in the 18th century, when Clarke, upholding the eternal and immutable obligations of morality, represented that these were " incumbent on men from the very nature and reason of things themselves." Thus " right " was "the fitness of things," aptitudo rerum; wrong, "the unfitness For] VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. 159 of action,'' to the order of the universe. Samuel Clarke, The Being and Attributes of God, and The Obligations of Natural Religion. " Our perception of vice and its desert arises from, and is the result of, a comparison of actions with the nature and capacities of the agent. And hence arises a proper application of the epithets incongruous, unsuitable, disproportionate, unfit, to actions which our moral faculty determines to be vicious." Butler, Dissertation on Virtue. Every theory cast in this form depends upon an accepted interpretation of " Nature," for " fitness " and " unfitness " are only relative terms. FORCE. — The efiiciency of energy in moving objects, or effecting some change in the relations of things. Force is the measure of " Energy " when acting in given circumstances. According to Leibnitz, force and substance are inseparable. Leibnitz, De primx PhilosopJiee emandatione et de notione substantix. According to the Atomic Theory, the phenomena of matter were explained by attraction and repulsion. Modern Material- ism explains all changes by these two factors — matter and force. Biichner's Matter and Force ; Spencer's First Prin- ciples ; Tait's Eecent Advances in Physical Science. FORM. — (1) The outward figure or shape of a material object ; (2) the model or ideal of an object according to its species ; (3) the law of activity, appearing in procedure ; (4) the condition of knowledge in contrast with the material of knowledge. Aristotle placed Form (to eiSos) in contrast with Matter (ri vkri). Form was his substitute for Plato's Idea. It has not, like the latter, an existence apart from the sensible thing, but is realised in its matter. It is defined by Aristotle as Xoyos Trj's ovcrias. In the Critical Philosophy of Kant, form is the a priori condition of knowledge. " That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensa- tion, I term its matter; but that which secures that the content of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain 160 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. [For relations, I call its form." Kant, Pure Reason, Meiklejohn's transl.,p. 21. Stirling, Text-Booh to Kant, pp. 24-34. "Any individual oLject is to us,'' " a compound of matter from the senses, and of form from the mind," p. 24. The Kantian dis- tinction between Form and Matter is criticised by Lotze, Logic, 457, Bosanquet's transl. Caird's PMlos. of Kant, vol. i., 227. Aristotle, Metaphysics, bks. vii., viii. ; Ueberweg's History, i. 157 ; Schwegler's History, 8th ed., i. 105. For Scholastic usage, Ueberweg's History, i. 399. FORTITUDE.— F«c?e Coubagb. FRBB-WILL.^ — Power of self-determination, imder guid- ance of intelligence, involving rational superiority to sensibilities and motive forces. The ability to act according to principle or rule, in the government of impulses and restraints. " The will is that kind of causality belonging to living agents in so far as they are rational, and freedom is such a property of this causality as enables them to originate events, in- dependently of foreign determining causesi" Kant, Metaphysic of Ethics, ch. iii., Semple's Tr., 3rd ed., p. 57 ; Abbot's, 3rd ed., p. 65. Calderwood's Handboolc of Mor. Phil., early editions, p. 165, 14th ed., p. 170. On the genesis of the doctrine of Free- Will, Sully, Sensation and Intuition. On " Conation or Voli- tion " in relation to organic experience, Sully's Human Mind, ii. pp. 172-295. Sidgwick regards Free-Will as an unsolved problem, — Methods of Ethics, p. 45. Bain's Emotions and Will, part ii. c. vii. and chap. xi. Spencer, Principles of Psychology, part iv. c. ix. ; J. S. Mill, Exam, of Hamilton's Philosophy, c. XXV. and note. Logic, bk. iii. c. 5, vol. i. 419 ; Bradley, Ethical Studies, Essay i. ; Green's Proleg., b. ii. c. i. ; Hoffding, Psycho- logy, ch. vii. ; Lotze, Practical PMlos., div. i. ch. iii. ; Micro- eusmus, bk. i. ; James, Principles of Psychology, ii. 569. " Freedom " has had a double reference in philosophy. 1. Freedom from the dominion of external force, — freedom "from co-action"; 2. Freedom in and by intelligence, first in the regulation of thought itself, and further, in the government of motive forces in accordance with the dictates of intelligence. This is the Libertarian doctrine. " Liberty of indifference " is an inconsistency, which has no representation in the philosophy Pre] VOCABULAET OF PHILOSOPHY. 161 of our day. To attribute this to Libertarians, as some still do, is to misunderstand the accepted theory of Free-Will. Difference as to the mode of attaining knowledge of moral distinctions involves nothing in fact or in theory, bearing on the question of freedom in willing. Whether our knowledge is intuitively or inductively reached, nothing is in either case decided affecting the psychology of will. " As soon as the knowledge of the value of different forms of conduct exists, it is precisely by this means that the Will of the spirit, who decides for one form or the other, becomes responsible.'' Lotze, Pract. Philos., transl. Ladd, § 22, p. 46. " Freedom of Will " does not imply a breach of relation between motive and volition. The contrary allegation comes more frequently from the Utilitarian school, than from the Hegehan school. Nevertheless, the law of continuity suggests antagonism to a doctrine of free-will, involving "deliberate preference." On the other hand, we have to explain "those long deliberations " to which Herbert Spencer refers. Data of Ethics, p. 105. Whether a man deliberates, and decides in accordance with deliberation, is a distinct problem in the history of rational Hfe. It is quite independent of any genetic theory, whether biological or dialectic. Hegel's theory of Free- Will as " realised intelligence " is inadequate. Development or unfolding of intelligence is a problem quite distinct from the conditions of regulation of conduct in view of moral law. " A necessary sequence between motive and volition, and again between volition and act, may not be a necessitated sequence, as sensation is a necessitated sequence from contact of an external object with the healthy human organism, or as the understand- ing is necessitated to use the categories, if it is to work at all. Will is essentially different in nature from nerve-sensibility, and also from understanding ; but however such difference be expressed, there can be no exception to the law that all changes are caused." Green, "On Freedom," Worl(s, vol. ii. 308. This statement throughout harmonises with the Libertarian position. For criticism of Kant's theory, Lotze, Practical Philos., L 162 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Fri transl. Ladd, § 18, p. 38. E. Caird, Critical Philos. pf Kant ; Noah Porter, Kant's Ethics (Griggs, Chicago, U.S.A.). Physico-Psychology cannot include the phenomena of Will. To deal with " the feeling of effort," is to leave untouched the history of effort, as known in consciousness. Muscular movement coming under laws of motor action, belongs to the field of neurosis. Whether it is " voluntary,'' cannot he decided by means of physiological observation. The experimentalist's observations are of only one side of the activity. The de- pendence on Will remains. " The only ends which follow immediately upon our willing seem to be movements of our own bodies.'' " Voluntary movements must be secondary, not primary functions of our organism." James, Principles of Psychology, i. 486-7. These are results of observation ah extra. The conditions of "our willing " remain undiscovered. For this, we need a philosophy of " a supply of ideas," and of their use in consciousness. Carpenter's Mental Physiology, c. viii. ; Wundt, Ethik, lect. iii.; Miinsterberg, Die Willenshandlung. FRIENDSHIP. — Special attachment between individuals. On its Ethical significance, Greek thought dealt with much fulness. Aristotle, N. Ethics, bks. viii. and ix. ; Cicero, De Amicitia. For the Greek mind, Friendship stood as the most definite form of benevolence. FUNCTION (Jungor, to perform ; functio, an executing). — The form of activity proper to an organ or power, when operating for the attainment of an end. Action indicates the nature of the power at work. The proper action of a power is sometimes taken to indicate the specific character of the power. " To say that contraction is the function of the muscle only means that it is a certain form and a certain condition of the muscle in movement." Hoffding, Psychol., ch. ii. § 8, h; Tr., p. 60; G. H. Lewes, Psychol, 27 ; cf. Physical Basis of Life, p. 280 ; Hamilton, Metaph., lect. x. GANGLION. — " A swelling or knot from which nerves are given off as from a centre." Glossary to Darwin's Origin of Descent, p. 408. Cren] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 163 There is a unifying process at every advanced point in the nerve-system. " The nerve strand for a special muscle or order of muscles is connected with other strands further up the system ; and thus, in order to secure co-ordination or symmetrical movement of the several parts of the limbs, the arrangement of the nerve plexus becomes more complicated.'' Calderwood, Relations of Mind and Brain, p. 41. In accordance with this general plan, the grand nerve-centres are made up of ganglionic masses. GENERALISATION "is the act of comprehending, under a common name, several objects agreeing in some point ; " or of drawing a general conclusion from repeated observations. It is also used to designate the general proposition or truth which results. Generalisation proper is almost synonymous with Induction. The law of gravitation, e.g., is a great generalisation. Experi- ence gives the particular ; from the particular we rise to the general, affirming that all heavy bodies gravitate. In this is implied a belief that there is order la nature, that under analogous circumstances the same phenomena will occur. " The establishment of general propositions " is Induction, " a process of inference ; it proceeds from the known to the unknown." " A general proposition is one in which the predicate is affirmed or denied of an unlimited number of individuals." Mill, Logic, bk. iii. ch. i. ii. "When once the differentiation of the individual-idea from the class-idea has advanced far enough, the process of generalisation proper, or the grasp of common or general qualities, is able to be carried out." Sully, Human Mind, i. 418. GENERIC IMAGES.— Fit^e Conception. GENIUS (from geno, the old form of the verb gigno, to produce). — (1) In ancient usage, a tutelary god or spirit, appointed to watch over an individual. (2) As the character and capacities of men were supposed to vary according to the higher or lower nature of their genius, the word came to signify the natural powers and abilities of men. (3) In modern usage a high degree of productive or inventive mental power ; spiritual gift appearing in original production. 164 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Gen It is " tlie intellect constructive which we popularly designate by the word genius." " To genius must always go two gifts, the thought and the publication. The first is revelation, always a miracle. ... It is the advent of truth into the world, a form of thought now for the first time bursting into the universe, a child of the old eternal soul, a piece of genuine and immeasure- able greatness.'' Emerson, Essays, first series. On relations to the laws of Heredity, Galton, Hereditary Genius, 1892, in which, however, the author regreting his pre- vious choice of title, restricts now his references to ability " such as a modern European possesses." Preface. G-BNUS. — A higher class which includes a lower, called its species. The genus has the larger extension ; the species the larger intension. The distinction between genus and species is a relative one, the class which is called a species in reference to the next higher becoming in turn a genus in reference to the next lower class. The summum genus is defined as that genus which, being a genus, can never become a species; i.e., it is the term in any series whose extension is the largest possible. It has been denied that there is any summum genus; but whether there be any such absolutely or not — as Being — each science, at all events, and each particular inquiry, has its own summum genus, beyond which it never goes in the ascending series of species and genera, e.g.. Organism is the summum genus of Biology. Those genera which become in turn species are called subalternate. The proximate genus of any species is that between which and the species no other genus intervenes, e.g., animal is the proximate genus of man. — [J. S.] GERM-PLASM.—" That substance which contains all the primary constituents of the whole organism." Weismann, Germ- Plasm, transl. by Parker and Rdnnefeldt. — Vide Hbeeditt. Herbert Spencer, Principles of Biology ; Darwin, Variation of Animals and Plants ; Erancis Galton, "Theory of Heredity," Journal of the Anthropolgical Institute, 1875 ; Brooks, Laws of Heredity, 1883 ; Weismann, Continuity of Germ Plasm, 1885 ; Essays on Heredity, 2 vols. ; Germ Plasm, 1892. Calderwood, Evolution and. Man's Place in Nature, ch. 5. SNOSTICISM (yvSo-ts, knowledge, as distinct from mcms. God] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 165 faith). — A general name for the speculation of the first and second centuries of the Christian era, in attempting to develop a Christian philosophy. This speculation was concerned mainly with the questions of creation, imperfection, and moral evil. The Jewish Christians and the Alexandrian had a con- spicuous share in this movement. It was largely influenced by Platonic thought, and hy Hellenic and Pagan mythology. The theories included the hypotheses of a Demi-urge or world- creator, and supra-mundane ^ons, occupying an intermediate position between the First Cause, — the One, and the universe. These .ffions were represented as active agents in the government of the world. After the authors of Clementines and The I}pistle of Barnabas, the most important leaders were Cerinthus, Saturninus, Carpo- crates, Basilides the Syrian, and Valentinus. Ueberweg's Hist, of Phil,, i. 280 ; Neander's Church History, vol. ii., Eng. transl. ; Bunsen's Analecta Ante-Nicxna; Schafi's History of the Christian Church, vol. i. ; Schaffs Religious Encyclopaedia, based on the Beal-Encyclopadie of Herzog. GOD, Anglo-Saxon, G. Gott, — the Supreme Being, — Deus, €)eos, the Eternal, — the First Cause. The Greek and Latin terms were applied also to spiritual beings superior to man. The true conception of God and of His relation to the universe is the supreme problem of philosophy. — Fit^e Absolute, Infinite. Ancient Philosopht. — The Fragments of Xenophanes include the following passage : — " There is one God, the greatest among gods and men, neither in form nor in thought like unto mortals," Frag. i. The received mythology suiBciently accounts for the contrast with gods and men. Ueberweg, Hist, of Philos., i. 52 ; Burnett, Early Greek Philosophy, 115. Socrates, in rebutting the charge of Atheism, grants that he does not believe in the "gods which the city recognises." Apology, 26. He maintains, however, that "the God orders him to fulfil the philosopher's mission," 28. He adds, — " I do believe there are gods, and in a far higher sense than that in which any of my accusers believe in them," 35. For Plato's several representations of God as First Cause, Zeller's Plato and the Older Academy, 267, note. Plato's view 166 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [GoO of God, Republic, bk. ii. 364, 379, 380, 382. "God is one and the same, immutably fixed in his own proper image." " God is perfectly simple and true, both in word and deed." MoDBEN Philos. — Descabtes makes " the idea of God " the fundamental certainty. Method, pt. iv.; Meditations, iii. and V. ; Principles of Philos., sec. xiii. Kant considers the Idea of God, as related with that of the Soul, and the Universe. Pure Eeason, Transcendental Dialectic, bk. i. sec. iii., " System of Transcendental Ideas " Arguments for the Being of God, bk. ii. c. iii. sec. 3, Meiklejohn's transL, p. 225 and p. 359. Hegel names the absolute source of all, " The Idea," " The Notion," "The Ego." "The concrete totality we name God." Werke, vi. ; Encyelopddie, § 51, p. 113; Wallace's Hegel, p. 92. " Very obscure certainly in many respects is the system of Hegel, and in none, perhaps, obscurer than in how we are to conceive God as a subjective spirit, and man as a subjective spirit ; and God and Man in mutual relations." Hutchison Stirling's Secret of Hegel, i. 244. Proofs for the existence of God, Lotze, Philos. of Relig., chap. i. GOOD. — (1) Common term for the desirable ; (2) the quality of an action which is in harmony with moral law ; (3) " The Good," Hum/mum Bonum, the chief end of life, — that which all seek after (Aristotle); (4) "The Good," the Absolute, — God (Plato). Good under an evolution theory, see Spencer, Data of Ethics, p. 21. The discussion of The Chief God, the Summum Bonum, that which constitutes the true end and blessedness of human life, is the main characteristic of the discussion of Ethics under the ancient philosophy. — Vide Bonttm:. GRAMMAR (Universal).— The Greeks included under ■'■^C"? y/xi/^i'ta'rio-TiK^ the art of writing and reading letters. Language, as the expression of thought, becomes a manifesta- tion of the laws of thought. In Greek, the same word, A.oyos, means reason and language. In Latin, reasoning is called discursus ; hence discourse ; man is a being of "large discourse." Plato, Cratylus. Aristotle, Analytics. Max Miiller, Science Hal] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 167 of Language. "Language as a human function." James, Pnnciples of Pb-yehology, ii. 356. HABIT (l|is, habitus).— {!) The law, "Practice gives facility ; " (2) the physical or mental acquisition resulting from repeated action. In Ethics, a virtue, or acquired tendency, favouring well-doing. By Aristotle efts is defined, Metaph., lib. iv. cap. xx., to be, in one sense, the same with SidOea-is, disposition, a bias of the nature. In the N. Ethics, ii. 5, Aristotle uses the term as equivalent to virtue, a personal excellence resulting from deliberate regard to the great end of life. Mental Habits or excellences of disposition are distinguished by Aristotle into intellectual and moral. The Intellectual virtues are intelligence, wisdom, prudence. The Ethical are liberality and self-control. Aristotle, N. Ethics, Hb. i. ch. xiii. ; ii. ch. V. and vi. ; v. cap. i. " Habit is a principle which obtains in the whole of our mental life." Sully, The Human Mind, i. 57. The application of the law appears first, however, in the history of physical processes. " There is no other elementary causal law of association than the law of neural habit." James, Text-Book of Psychology, 256. HALLUCINATION (alucinor, to wander in mind). — A delusion consequent on a diseased condition of brain, abnormal excitement, or confusion of mind. Hallucination is connected with erroneous interpretation of impression, or of experience. Its physical basis is excitability of sensory nerves ; its mental, imagination. Excitation of sensory nerves may occur in other than the usual ways. Such action may be interpreted as if it were normal. Excitation of the nerve system by application of electricity has shown that the nerve-fibre can be artificially thrown into a state of activity. The experiments of Fritsch and Hitzig in 1870, and of Ferrier in 1873, — Ferrier's Functions of the Brain, — illustrated strikingly the possibility of abnormal excitation. I have given a detailed account of these experiments in The Belations of Mind and Brain. Their value as contributions towards explanation of Hallucination is obvious. Stimulation of the nerve of vision 168 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Hap will convey to us a sense of light, when light has not acted on the terminal organ. So it may happen with other nerves of special sense — hearing, smell, taste. The demand for guarded judgment is constant. The phenomena of brain disorder, of dreaming, and of hypnotism supply in three distinct groups evidence of delusioij. The first group gives results of disease ; the second group shows the activity of thought and imagina- tion during physical repose ; the third group shows the results of playing upon the sensibilities of the nerve system, and voluntarily inducing nerve excitation in an abnormal manner. The practice of this last leads readily to chronic excitability, entailing Hallucination, from which escape is not easy. HAPPINESS. — (1) Agreeable experience in its widest sense ; (2) the higher phases of such experience, resulting from harmonious action of our powers, under guidance of in- telligence. For this higher experience the word Happiness (ivSaifjiovLa) is more commonly reserved, while pleasure (iJSov^) is used to designate the lower and more transient forms of agreeable experience. Happiness is desired for its own sake. But "it is only the pleasure of a definite moment which is perfectly obvious to us." Lotze, Pract. Philos., p. 11. On the ambigTiity of the term " Happiness," see Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, p. 128 j Green's Intro, to Hume's Ethical Worhs, vol. ii. 12. The Greeks called the sum-total of the pleasure allotted to a man €vTV)(ia, that is, good hap (ev, well ; ruyxdvia, to hit) ; or, more religiously, eiSai/Aovta, that is, favourable providence (eS, well ; Satjacov, a genius, or divinity). Coleridge's Aids to Reflection. To live well and to act well is synonymous with being happy. Aristotle, N. Ethics, lib. i. cap. iv. Happiness, according to Aristotle, is the blessedness of a perfect state, in which the whole powers of the agent are in full activity. HAPPINESS THEORY OF MORALS.— That which finds in the agreeable, the criterion of rectitude ; on a lower and wider basis. Hedonism ; on a higher and more restricted, Eudai- monism. In accordance with its fundamental position, all agreeable experience is included within the area of morals. But, in a rational life, comparisons are inevitable. The agree- Hap] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 169 able, considered in itself alone (fulfilled desire), cannot supply the rule of Ufe. The necessity for limitation becomes apparent. For an intelligently directed life, there must be regard to our good on the whole. Prudential considerations direct atten- tion to the ntUity of actions. Hence the theory is named Utilitarianism. The standard of morals under this scheme thus becomes the agreeable, as determined by a rational nature, with regard to our good on the whole. After the discrimina- tion of pleasures, with computation of their comparative value, must come the reference to the interests of all moral agents, as these may be involved in the results of individual conduct. The earlier phase of this theory made individual happiness the test of right conduct, hence named Egoistic Hedonism, Individualism. Hobbes, while stating and expounding "eternal laws of nature," says, "whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth good." Leviathan, pt. i. c. 6. The later phase makes the general happifiess the basis for judg- ing of action. This is Altruistic Hedonism or Eudaimonism, having as its formula — " The Greatest Happiness of the Greatest 2fumber." Ethical thought here assumes the form of a process of calculation, stimulated by de.sire of satisfaction. Bentham, J. S. Mill, Bain, Sidgwick, and Leslie Stephen are its chief supporters. J. S. MiU distinguishes between pleasures by reference to their quality. He gives the preference to the higher or more intellectual pleasures, constituting those who have had experience of all kinds the sole judges. Bain criticises adversely this position, alleging that J. S. Mill has given to opponents " important strategic positions," and main- taining that he "ought to have resolved all the so-called nobler or higher pleasures into the one single circumstance of includ- ing, with the agent's pleasure, the pleasure of others. This is the only position that a supporter of Utility can hold to." J. S. Mill: A Criticism, p. 113. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, has combined an intuitional element with the Utilitarian Ethics, and has critically examined the rival claims of Utilitarianism and Intuitionalism. Sidgwick's object is to secure at the outset 170 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Hap a basis for moral obligation. Criticism of Sidgwick, Bain, Mind, i. 179 ; Calderwood, Mind, i. 197. The Socratic philosophy contained a large Eudaimonistic element. The Ethics of Aristotle rests on the basis that Happiness, as connected with the perfection of human life, is the end of action. Modern Utilitarianism stands in relation with the Cyrenaic and Epicurean Schools of Ancient Philo- sophy. Modern Utilitarianism, — Hobbes, Leviathan ; Paley, Moral Philosophy ; Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legisla- tion; J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism; Bain, Moral Science, and Criticism of J. S. Mill ; Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics ; Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics. There are various forms of presentation. "Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness ; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness." Mill, Utilitarianism, p. 9. " Conduct is a whole, and, in a sense, it is an organic whole, and aggregate of interdependent actions performed by an organism." Spencer, Data of Ethics, p. 5. "Ethics has for its subject-matter that form which universal conduct assumes during the last stages of its evolution." lb., p. 19. " The good is universally the pleasurable." Ih., p. 30. " Morality is utility made compulsory." Bain's Emotions and Will, 3rd ed., p. 276. "Morality is an institution of society. The powers that impose the obligatory sanction are Law and Society, the community acting through the Government, by public judicial acts, or, apart from the Government, by the unofficial expressions of disapprobation, and the exclusion from social good offices." Ih., p. 264. As to the analysis and interpretation of the notion Duty, — Mill says,—" The ultimate sanction of all morality is a sub- jective feeling in our mind." " The internal sanction of Duty, whatever our standard of duty may be, is one and the same, — a feeling in our own mind, a pain more or less intense, attendant on a violation of duty." "This feeling, when disinterested, and connecting itself with the pure idea of duty, ... is the essence of conscience." Utilitarianism, pp. 41, 42. " It is, in fact, very idle to talk about duties ; the word itself has in it something disagreeable and repulsive." Bentham, Deontology, Her] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 171 1, 10. Bain restricts obligation to " the class of actions enforced by the sanction of punishment.'' Emotions and Will, 254. "The imperious word ought seems merely to imply the con- sciousness of the existence of a persistent instinct." Darwin, Descent of Man, 116. HARMONY. — The conception that a philosophy of life can he found in the harmony of relations, guiding action according to definite laws of computation, was a favourite one in Ancient Philosophy. It is a natural outcome of the Pytha- gorean theory of numbers, leading to their doctrine that the soul is a harmony, and consequently that " Virtue is harmony, and also health, and universal good, and God ; on which account everything owes its existence and consistency to harmony.'' Diog. Laert., Kb. viii. ch. i. ; Zeller, Ueberweg, Schwegler, in loc. This conception is prominent in Plato's Ethics, as he makes melody and harmony symbolic of true discipline, music and gymnastic being the two sides of educa- tion. Repullie, bk. iii. 410. Pre-established Harmony is the designation of Leibnitz for the divinely established relations in the Universe, — the movements of monads, and the relation between body aud mind. Syst. Nouv., p. 14 ; Erdmann's ed., pp. 127-133 seq., Theodicee, La Monadologie. HATE. — Revulsion and antagonism of feeling in presence of evil, real or supposed. Ethical Hate is antagonism to moral evil, as the object of condemnation, but includes desire for the good of the agent who is condemned. In this lies the harmony of Natural and Christian Ethics, with its distinctive maxim, — " Love your enemies." Ethical Hate is the force of antagonistic feeling in harmony with moral law, and working for its vindica- tion. HEDONISM {rjZovri, pleasure) is the doctrine that the chief good of man lies in the pursuit of pleasure. According as personal pleasure alone is considered, or general happiness, it is Egoistic Hedonism or Altruistic Hedonism. — Vide Happi- ness Theory. HEREDITY {hereditas, inheritance). — The laws of repro- duction of life, in accordance with which each individual life is 172 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Her an inheritance through progenitors. Life comes from life ; its origin is the blending of elements from both parents ; the germ is according to the species of the parents ; it contains family characteristics according to the doctrine of ampM-mixis. All life is a heritage. Scientific investigation into the laws of heredity belongs to the nineteenth century. Inquiry has been largely quickened under the influence of the hypothesis of evolution. " Germ-plasm " is the name for the substance which provides for reproduction of organic existence. The cell which is the centre of life is so minute as to render investigation very difficult, thus involving us in much uncertainty. The size of the germ-cell is not greater than one-hundreth part of an inch ; it may be much less. Eeproduction in its simplest form arises from division of the cell itself, so constituting two distinct cells. This gives the most vivid illustration of continuity. When difference of sex has appeared, the origin of a new life is by the fusion of the nuclei of two parent cells, constituting a germ cell. In the natural history of this cell, under fixed conditions, organic life will be unfolded according to the species to which the germ-cell belongs. "Like produces like." As to possible variation, diversity of sex provides for increase of this. Each individual life is in some measure a continuity of life from both parents. Characteristics of both parents belong to its history. Beyond this we are left in uncertainty as to the scientific explanation of diversities in family groups, as these depend on undiscovered details in the unfolding of the germ- ceUs. How " a single cell, out of the millions of diversely differ- entiated cells which compose the body," having become " specialised as a sexual cell," obtains its characteristics, and unfolds them, is a question involving a host of perplexities. Herbert Spencer assumed " physiological units," alike in kind, of which the body is composed. Principles of Biology. Germ-cells he takes to be certain small groups of these units, having the power of reproducing the whole. Darwin pro- pounded a theory of Pangenesis, — transference through the blood of "gemmules" from all parts of the parent organism, His] VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. 173 which, being gathered into the germ-cell, make it capable of reproducing the parent form. Variations of Animals and Plants. Weismann denies that the germ-plasm is produced from the parent body in this way. He has substituted the hypothesis of continuity of germ-plasm, through successive generations, giving off from its substance so much for the origin of each fresh life. He holds that " each determinant occupies a fixed position in the germ-plasm," and each " must form a com- plete unit by itself, from which nothing can be removed, and to which nothing can be added." This is the basis on which he has denied the transmission of acquired characteristics. I have stated these theories more fully, and have considered their value, in Evolution and Man's Place in Nature, c. v. Herbert Spencer, Principles of Biology ; Darwin, Variation of Animals and Plants; Galton, "Theory of Heredity," Journal of the Anthropological Institute, 1875 ; Brooks, Laws of Heredity, 1883 ; Weismann, Continuity of Germ-Plasm, 1885 ; Essays on Heredity, 2 vols. ; Gerrrir-Plasm, 1892. Outstretching all this investigation as to the relation of the Germ-cell to Organism, there is the large question as to the genetic theory of Mind. Mind seems distinct from the func- tions of organism ; at the same time, " mind," immanent in organism, yields its own witness for heredity. HETBROG-BNBITY (erepos, other ; yei/os, kind).— Sepa- rateness of nature, in contrast with homogeneity, likeness of nature. According to Spencer's definition, the transition in Evolution is " from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity, to a definite, coherent heterogeneity.'' First Principles, p. 396. HBTBRONOMY (Ircpos, other; vdjuos, law).— An accepted law of conduct which is inconsistent with our Reason. This is Kant's designation for a false principle of morals. " If the Will seeks the law which is to determine it, anywhere else than in the fitness of its maxims to be universal laws of its own dictation ; consequently, if it goes out of itself and seeks this law in the character of any of its objects, there always results heteronomy." Kant's Ethics, Abbott's transl., p. 59 ; Semple'g, p. 93. HISTORY (Philosophy of).— The system of rational 174 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Hol principles guiding the development of events in History. Vico and Hegel are conspicuous as leaders in developing the philosophy of History. The conception of Evolution, both in its physical and dialectical forms, has been brought to bear upon History. Historians of Philosophy also have traced in the development of philosophical systems the necessary march of reason. Hegel, Philosophy of History, transl. in Bohn's series ; Flint, Vico, in Philosophical Classics ; Zeller, Histm-y of GreeJc Philosophy, introd. ; Schwegler, History of Philosophy, introd., Stirling ; Flint, Philos. of History in Europe ; Fhnt, Historical Philosophy in France, and French Belgium and Switzerland, 1893. HOLINESS. — Moral purity. "The perfect accordance of the "Will with the moral Isrw is holiness." Kant, Practical Reason, bk. ii. ch. ii. sec. 4; Abbott's transl. Kant's Ethics, 218. HOMOGENEITY (o/xoios, like; yo-os, feind).— Likeness of nature. Applicable (1) to such similarity among organisms that they can be classified as a species ; (2) to parts of organic existence ; (3) to thoughts closely allied. HOMOLOGUE (o/^ds, like ; Xdyos).— " The corresponding parts in different animals are called homologues." WheweU. " A homologue is defined as the same organ in different animals, under every variety of form and function. Thus, the arms and feet of man, the fore and hind feet of quadrupeds, the wings and feet of birds, and the fins of fishes, are said to be homologous." M'Cosh, Typical Forms, p. 25. Homology is "that relation between parts which results ' from their development from corresponding embryonic parts." Darwin's Origin of Species, Glossary, Dallas, p. 409. HOMOTYPB (6/ids, like ; toVos, type).—" The correspond- ing or serially repeated parts in the same animal are called homotypes. Thus, the fingers and toes of man, indeed the fore and hind limbs of vertebrate animals generally, are said to be homotypal." M'Cosh, Typical Forms. HUMANITY (Religion of),— See Positivism. HYLOZOISM (v\ri, matter ; and ^a^, life).— The doctrine that life and matter are inseparable ; frequently appearing in Hyp] VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 175 Ancient Philosophy with speculation as to the soul of the world, and the producing power of nature. Strato of Lampsacus held that the ultimate particles of matter were each and all of them possessed of life. Ueberweg, Hist, i. 183. The Stoics, without attributing life to every particle of matter, held that the universe, as a whole, was a being animated by a principle which gave to it motion, form, and life. Zeller, Stoics, etc., 125. This doctrine appeared also among the followers of Plotinus, who held that the soul of the universe animated the least particle of matter. Spinoza asserted that all things were alive in different degrees. Omnia quamvis diversis gradihus animata tamen sunt. HYPOSTASIS.— FicZe Entity, Subsistentia. HYPOTHESIS {vTToeea-ii, supposition).— In Logic, Aris- totle gave the name 6ecr« to every proposition which, without being an axiom, served as the basis of demonstration, and did not require itself to be demonstrated. Anal. Post, i. 2, 72. He distinguished two kinds of thesis, the one which expressed the essence of a thing, and the other which expressed its exist- ence or non-existence. The first is the opicr/w's or definition ; the second, the iiiro^ecrts. The Hypothesis he defines as " the taking one of two opposite alternations as true, while it might either be true or false.'' Anal. Post, i. 2. He thus distin- guishes between deinonstrative and hypothetical inference (17 SeiKTiKuts rj i^ {moOicTeois). The scientific significance of Hypothesis could not be appre- ciated till the advance of science had shown the necessity of a logic of Science or of Induction, of which the doctrine of Hypothesis is an important part. Accordingly, it is only in modern times that the nature and importance of Hypothesis have been carefully attended to. Mill defines Hypothesis as "any supposition which we make (either without actual evidence or on evidence avowedly insufficient) in order to endeavour to deduce from it. conclusions in accordance with facts which are known to be real. It is, in short, an assumed law or cause." " Since an hypothesis framed for the purpose of scientific inquiry must relate to something which has real existence (for 176 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Hyp there can be no science respecting non-entities), it follows that any hypothesis we make respecting an object, to facilitate our study of it, must not involve anything which is distinctly false, and repugnant to its real nature." Mill, Logic, bk. ii. c. v. § 2. When a phenomenon that is new to us cannot be explained by any known cause, we try to reconcile it to unity by assign- ing it ad interim to some cause which may appear to explain it. " An hypothesis sufficiently confirmed establishes a Theory, i.e., the explanation of phenomena from their universal laws." Ueberweg, Logic, p. 506, Lindsay's transl. "Nearly everything which is now theory was once hypothesis." Mill, Logic, bk. iii. ch. xiv. sec. 5. As to the relative value of conflicting hypo- theses, Ueberweg says. Logic, p. 506, Lindsay's transl. : — " The hypothesis is the more improbable in proportion as it must be propped up by artificial auxiliary hypotheses (hypotheses sub- sidiarse). It gains in probability by simplicity, and harmony (or partial) identity with other probable or certain presupposi- tions ( causse praeter necessitatem non sunt multipli- candse). The content of the hypothesis acquires absolute certainty, so far as it succeeds in recognising the supposed reason to be the only one possible by excluding all others conceivable, or iu proving it to be the consequence of a truth already established." The course of science is through succes- sive hypotheses to more adequate knowledge. " We arrive, by means of hypotheses, at conclusions not ' hypothetical.' Some- times a single case is sufficient to decide between two rival hypotheses — a case which cannot be explained by the one, and can only be explained by the other." Such a case is called an Experimentum Orueis. Reid, Intellectual Poicers, Essay i. ch. iii. ; Bacon, Nov. Org., i. 104 ; Leibnitz, Nov. Ess., 4, ch. xii. ; Whewell's Nov. Org. Renov. ; Mill, Logic, bk. iii. ch. xiv. : Ueberweg, System of Logic, sec. 134. — [J. S.] "The discipline of Pure Eeason in Hypothesis.'' Kant, Pare Beason, Meikle- john, transl., p. 467. HYPOTHETICAL.— AppUed both to Propositions and to Syllogisms. The hypothetical proposition — sometimes called conjunction — is a species of conditional proposition. It consists of two propositions — called respectively antecedent and con- Ide] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 177 sequent — ^related to each other as condition and conditioned, the truth of the one depending on the truth of the other, e.g., " If it rains I shall not go." The hypothetical or conjunctive syllogism is one whose major premiss is a hypothetical proposi- tion, its minor premiss and conclusion being categorical. It is either constructive (modus ponens) or destructive (modus toUens); in the former case the antecedent is affirmed, in the latter the consequent denied. There is no other alternative. Hence the fallacies of affirming the consequent and denying the antecedent. -[J. S.] HYPOTHETICAL DUALIST.— F«& Cosmothbtio Idealist. IDEA (iSea ciSos, forma, species, image). I. Common modern usage. In its widest sense, every product of intellectual action, or even every modification of consciousness. In more restricted use, a mental image of an external object, or class of objects. II. Special usage. Accord- ing to Plato, Ideas are the archetypes of the manifold varieties of existence in the universe. These archetypes belong to the supersensible world. In the philosophy of Kant, Ideas are products of the Eeason ( Vernunft), transcending the conceptions of the understanding, and named by him " transcendental ideas." In the system of Hegel, the Idea is the Absolute from which all comes and toward which the Evolution of being is moving. I. Common Modem Usage. — Descartes used the word to designate any impression made upon the brain, but more commonly a representation in consciousness, of an external object, — " All that is in our mind when we conceive a thing, in whatever manner we may conceive it.'' Descartes, Lett. Ixxv. ; Gamier IV. 319. He even applies it "to the thing represented." Pref. to the Medits. See Veitch's note ii., 3rd ed., p. 276. " It is the term which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding, when a man thinks; I have used it to express whatever is meant by ■phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking." Locke, Essay, bk, i. ch. i. M 178 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Ide Mill has said : — " The always acute and often profound author ot An Outline of Sematology (Mr B. H. Smart) justly says : ' Locke will be much more intelligible if, in the majority of places, we substitute "knowledge of," for what he calls " the idea of." Among the many criticisms of Locke's use of the word Idea, this is the only one which, as it appears to me, precisely hits the mark." Logic, i. 154, note, bk. i. ch. vi. sec. 3. "The word is often applied to any kind of thought, or notion, or belief; but its proper use is restricted to such thoughts as are images of visible objects, whether actually seen and remembered, or compounded by the faculty of imagina- tion." Taylor's Elements of Thought. Berkeley first uses it in Locke's sense, as equivalent to pheno- menon ; but later he distinguishes between idea and notion, saying that "the term idea would be improper by being extended to signify everything we know or have any notion of." Principles of Human KTiowledge, sec. 89. "We have a notion, not an idea, of spirits and of relations. Hume limits the use of the term still further, distinguishing between impressions and ideas. " The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness. These perceptions which enter with most force and violence, we name impressions; and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions, and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean the first images of these in thinking and reasoning." Treatise on Humxm Nature, bk. i. pt. i. sec. 1. Enquiries, Selby-Bigge, p. 17. Spinoza defined idea " a concept of the mind." Ethics, pt. ii. def. 3. Eeid protested against the use of the term idea to designate a representation of the object known, as favouring a false view of external perception, holding that " the English words thought, notion, apprehension, answer the purpose as well as the Greek word Idea, with this advantage that they are less ambiguous." Intell. Powers, Essay i. c. i. Apart from the theory of. external perception, the psycho- logical problem remains. If our conception of the object is to Ide] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 179 be criticised and verified, how is this to be done ? If idea is identified with a particular state of Consciousness, changing sensations and thought processes must be considered, " No state once gone can recur and be identical with what it was before." James, Prin. of Psychol., i. 230. " What is got twice is the same object. "We hear the same note over and over again ; we see the same quality of green, or smell the same objective perfume, or experience the same species of pain." lb., i. 231. II. Special Usage. — According to Plato, things are only shadows of realities beyond ; ideas are the archetypes of the, manifold of sense. Ideas are the essences of things ; and till we penetrate beyond the manifold to unity, beyond the many beautiful things, which we see, to the idea of Beauty {avro to KoXov) which, hidden from the eye of sense, reveals itself to the eye of the soul, we have no true knowledge. " In the course of the discussion, we have referred to a multitude of things that are beautiful, and good, and so on ; and also to an essential beauty, and an essential good, and so on (or, beauty in itself, or good in itself), reducing aU those things before regarded as manifold to a single form or entity in each case. The manifold are seen, not known ; the ideas are known, not seen." Plato's Republic, bk. vi. p. 507, Jowett's transl. ; Davies and Vaughan's transL, p. 228. Kant applies the term Idea to the "pure conceptions of the Eeason." The "transcendental ideas" are three in number, God, Soul, Universe. These are "conceptions formed from notions." The Metaphysical problem as stated by Kant is this, — i'h\ what warrant can we refer to the field of objective existence that which we caU ideas in us ? Pure conceptions of the understanding, that is, the categories, " do not present objects to the mind, except under sensuous conditions . . . they may, however, when applied to phenomena be presented in concreto. . . But ideas are still further removed from objective reality than categories ; for no phenomenon can ever present them to the human mind in concreto. They contain a certain perfection, attainable by no possible empirical cognition ; and they give to reason a systematic unity, to which the unity of experience attempts to approximate, but can never 180 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Ide completely attain." " Of the Idea in General," Pure Season, Transc. Dial., ii. 3. i. ; Meiklejohn's Tr., p. 350. " A conception formed from notions, which transcends the possibility of experi- ence, is an idea, or conception of reason," ih., 225. " I under- stand by idea a necessary conception of reason, to which no corresponding objects can be discovered in the world of sense. Accordingly, the pure conceptions of reason are transcendental ideas. They are conceptions of pure reason, for they regard all empirical cognition as determined by means of an absolute totality of conditions. They are not mere fictions, but natural and necessary products of reason, and have hence a necessary relation to the whole sphere of the exercise of the understand- ing.'' lb., 228. " Although experience presents the occasion and the starting-point, it is the transcendental idea of reason which guides it in its pilgrimage, and is the goal of aU its struggles." lb., p. 364. Practical reason, dealing with duty, is otherwise placed, inas- much as it does not depend on phenomena. "Virtue and wisdom in their perfect purity, are ideas." " Here the idea provides a rule." 76., 351. " Hence we cannot say of wisdom, in a disparaging way, it is only an idea. For, for the very reason that it is the idea of the necessary unity of all possible aims, it must be, for all practical exertions and endeavours, the primitive condition and rule." lb., 229. " For logical purposes, ideas are symbols, and they are nothing but symbols." " We perceive that a thing is, and what it is. But in anything that is a symbol, we have also a third side, its signification, or that which it means." " Idea is a product of abstraction." Bradley, Logic, p. 9. Hegel employs the term Idea as the designation of the Absolute. "The Idea is truth in itself, and for itself; the absolute unity of the notion and objectivity In the Idea we have nothing to do with the individual, nor with figurative conceptions, nor with external things. And yet, again, everything actual, in so far as it is true, is the Idea, and has its truth by and in virtue of the Idea alone. Every individual being is some one aspect of the Idea The Idea itself is not to be taken as an idea of something or other. Ide] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 181 any more than the notion is to be taken as merely a specific notion. The Absolute is the universal and one Idea, which, as discerning, or in the act of judgment, specialises itself to the system of specific ideas j which, after all, are constrained by their nature to come back to the one Idea where their truth lies." Logic of Hegel, "Wallace's Tr., pp. 304-5. " The Idea may be described in many ways. It may be called reason (and this is the proper philosophical signification of reason) ; a subject- object ; the unity of the ideal and the real, of the finite and the infinite, of soul and body ; the possibility which has its actuality in its own self; that by which the nature can be thought only as extant. AU these descriptions apply, because the idea contains all the relations of understanding, but contains them in their infinite return and identity in themselves." lb., p. 306. " The Idea as a process runs through three stages in its development The first form of the idea is life; that is, the idea in the form of immediacy. The second form is that of mediation or difierentiation ; and this is the idea in the form of knowledge, which appears under the double aspect of the Theoretical and Practical idea. The process of knowledge eventuates in the restoration of the unity enriched by difference. This gives the third form of the idea, the Absolute Idea; which last stage of the logical idea evinces itself to be at the same time really first, and to have a being due to itself alone." lb., p. 309. IDEAL. — That which the mind contemplates as a represen- tation of the normal excellence of any being, or form of action. In intelligent life, what ought to be, in contrast with what is, or is done. In arl, the conception present to the imagination, which the artist seeks to depict. In conventional usage, the representation in a single individual of the excellences of an order. An Ideal is a representation which stands before the mind as a test of all that is presented to observation. " "We were inquiring into the nature of absolute justice, and into the character of the perfectly just, and into injustice and the perfectly unjust, that we might have an ideal." Plato, Jtepublic, V. 472, Jowett's transl. 182 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Ide " As the idea provides a rule, so the ideal serves as an archetype for the perfect and complete determination of the copy." Kant, Pwe iZeosow, Meiklejohn's transl., 351. "Even the Holy One of the Gospels must first be compared with our ideal of moral perfection before we can recognise him as such." Kant, Groundwork, Abbott's transl., p. 25. " Nature or experience gives me the occasion for conceiving the ideal, but the ideal is something entirely different from experience or nature ; so that, if we apply it to natural, or even to artificial figures, they cannot fiU up the condition of the ideal conception, and we are obliged to imagine them exact. The word ideal corresponds to an absolute and independent idea, and not to a collective one." Cousin, The True, Beautiful, and Good. IDEAL LEGALITY.— Kant's phrase to designate the form of moral law as simple or direct command, — " Thou shalt." Its formula is, — Act from a maxim at all times fit for law universal. Groundwork of Metaphysic of Ethics. IDEALISM. — A theory of " external existence " of the Universe as a whole. The former makes our knowledge of the external indirect by restricting knowledge to ideas. Realism is the term for all theories of external perception which maintain immediate knowledge of the external. Idealism treats the so- called " external " as the objectifying of subjective conditions. In its more extended application. Idealism is a unifying of real- ity ; a representation of the totality of being as explained under a single conception, or according to an ideal scheme. Idealism wears a variety of aspects. 1. Subjective Idealism. — This regards the subjective pheno- mena as the only phenomena of which we can be assured. It holds that the existence of an outer world cannot be demon- strated, the hypothesis of such a world depending on interpreta- tion of mental phenomena. All things known to us are the phenomena included in the succession of our own conscious states. The esse of what we name external, material, or non- thinking things, is percepi. This has also been named Psycho- logical or Phenomenal IdeaUsm ; and by Kant " Material Idealism," declaring the existence of objects without us to be Ide] TOCABULAET OF PHILOSOPHY. 183 " either (1) douTDtful and indemonstrable, or (2) false and im- possible." " The first is the problematic idealism of Descartes ; the second is the dogmatic idealism of Berkeley." Kant, Pure .Reasow, Meiklejohn'sTr.,p. 166; supplement xxi. in Eosenkranz's edition of Works ; Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge ; Eraser's Selections from Berkeley ; Rchte, Wissenschaftslehre ; Ueberweg's History, ii. 88 ; Schwegler's History, p. 176. 2. Critical Idealism maintains that the objects known are the facts of sensuous experience according to their synthesis as determined by the categories of the understanding ; therefore " things in themselves" cannot be known. This is the position of Kant's Critical Philosophy, in contrast with " material idealism." According to this view, the external may exist apart from consciousness, but it cannot be known as thus exist- ing. Kant has therefore been classified as an Idealist, and the allegation has occasioned considerable controversy. That Kant objects to a subjective or " psychological idealism " appears from the reference above ; that he holds to the existence of an outer world is obvious from what he says of sensuous experi- ence, and the dependence of all knowledge upon such experi- ence ; but, the positions that the " thing-in-itself " cannot be known, and that mind must in a sense be said to originate Nature, favour the allegation that his theory is a Transcendental Idealism. The second edition of the Critique was modified in many passages so as to obviate the suggestion that his philo- sophy was analogous with that of Berkeley. In the preface to the second edition he says : — " The only addition .... con- sists of a new refutation of psychological Idealism However harmless Idealism may be considered — although in reality it is not so — in regard to the essential ends of meta- physics, it must stiU remain a scandal to philosophy and to the general human reason, to be obliged to assume as an article of mere belief, the existence of things external to ourselves." Critique, Meiklejohn's Tr., xl. For the leading . points in the discussion affecting our interpretation of the Kantian theory of knowledge of' the external, see Ueberweg, History, ii. 169, and addenda, p. 526 ; Hutchison Stirling's Text-Booh to Kant, commentary, pp. 446-452. 184 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Me 3. Absolute Idealism. — According to Hegel, the Absolute, or the Idea, as pure thought manifests itself first in Nature, next in Spirit, and through this returns upon Itself. The unity of being is thus essential to the system. The representation of outer and inner in consciousness as if they were distinct is only an abstract, or one-sided representation. The relation of the two is the real, for there is no reality save in the movement of Being in accordance with the logical order of the categories. This is the Absolute Idealism of Hegel. " The Idea is the Truth : for Truth is the correspondence of objectivity with the notion. By that correspondence, however, is not meant the correspondence of external things with my conceptions, for these are only correct conceptions held by me, the individual person. In the Idea we have nothing to do with the individual, nor with figurative conceptions, nor with external things. And yet, again, everything actual, in so far as it is true, is the Idea, and has its truth by and in virtue of the Idea alone. Every individual being is some one aspect of the Idea The Absolute is the universal and one Idea which, as discerning, or in the act of judgment, specialises itself to the system of specific ideas, which, after all, are constrained by their nature to come back to the one Idea where their truth lies." Logic of Hegel, Wallace, p. 304. " The Idealism of Philosophy consists in nothing else than in recognising the individual as not a true being." Hegel, Werke, iii. 171 ; Wissenschaft der Logik, bk. i. c. 2 ; Anmerk. 2 ; Hutchison Stirling, Secret of Hegel, i. 423. Faults of Idealism, — Seth, Scottish Philos., 192 ; Seth, Hegelianism and Personality. " Who but an Hegelian philo- sopher ever pretended that reason in action was per se a sufficient explanation of the political changes in Europe." James, Principles of Psychology, i. 553. IDEATION. — The term employed generally by the Experi- ential school, and especially by Evolutionists, to describe exercise of intelligence. It is also used to indicate the product, as if ideation were a natural evolution from sensation. " The word Idea denotes an individual idea ; and we have not a name for that complex notion which embraces, as one whole, Ide] VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 185 all the different phenomena to which the term Idea relates. As we say sensation, we might also say ideation ; it would be a very useful word ; and there is no objection to it, except the pedantic habit of decrying a new term. Sensation would, in that case, be the general name for one part of our constitution ; ideation for another." Jas. Mill, Anal, of Phen. of Human Mind, ch. ii., 1st ed., voL i. p. 40. "Carpenter, Prin. of Hum. Phys., applies the adjective ideational to a state of consciousness excited by a sensation. Impressions through the special senses, whether sights, sounds, tastes, smeUs, or feelings, become idealised and registered ; that \s perceived, remembered, and associated; where, too, the idea- tion of outward individualities is effected Ideation is the first step in the intellectual progress of man. Ideas are thepabula of thought, and form equally a constituent element in the composite nature of our animal propensities, and of our emotional and moral feelings. Ideation is as essential to the very existence of memory, as memory is to the operation of thought. For what, in reality, is memory but the fact of retained idealised impressions in the mind? And without these retained idealisations, embodied in the memory as representative ideas, where are the materials of thought? and how are the processes of thought to be effected?" Jour, of Psych. Med., Jan. 1857, pp. 139, Ui. The requirements of Epistemology include an adequate synthesis of all that is " idealised, registered, perceived." This includes two questions, — Is there a physical basis of ideation, as of sensation ? What is the intellectual process ? Or by what means is the synthesis of experience accomplished? If we take the representation of a class, such as horse, what is " that spiritual activity which actually puts together in consciousness the sensations." Ladd, Phys. Psychol., p. ii. c. 10, § 23. In addition to this, "how are we to explain our conception of abstraction, or of any purely intellectual exercise, quite in advance of sensation ? Is there any difference in these cases in our conclusions in relation to the statement that "brain- processes occasion knowledge " ? James, Prin. of Psychol., i. 689. "The assumption that ideational and sensorial centres 186 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. [He are locally distinct appears to be supported by no facts drawn from the observation of Imman beings." lb., ii. 73. Is there a physical basis for Ideation? Granting that "there are mechani- cal conditions on which thought depends, and which, to say the least, determine the order in which is presented the content or material for her comparisons," ib., i. 553, how are the com- parisons to be explained as processes of thought ? " Properly speaking, there is before the mind at no time a plurality of ideas, properly so called." Ib., i. 405. "Each feels the total object in a unitary, undivided way. This is what I mean by denying that in the thought any parts can be found correspond- ing to the object's parts." Ib., i. 279. IDBATUM. — Spinoza's term for the existing object, or thing perceived, of which the Idea is the representation ; the correlate. "Idea vera est diversum quid a suo ideato," De IntellectiLs Emendatione, p. 11. Cf. Ethics, pt. ii., props. 40-43. Prop. 43 runs thus : — " He who has a true idea is aware at the same time that he has a true idea, and cannot doubt of the truth of the thing perceived." Prop. 43, schol., " to have a true idea signifies nothing less than to know a thing intimately, perfectly." There is ambiguity in his use of " true idea," for in a sense every idea is a true idea as a reality in consciousness ; in another sense " All ideas are true in so far as they are in God." Prop. ii. 32, "for all ideas that are in God accord entirely with their ideates." Demonstr. According to prop, vii., " The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things." But how this is made good is not quite apparent by reference to the relation between the idea and the Ideatum. " Spinoza does not say, be it observed, that every apparent certainty is true knowledge, but that there is no true knowledge without certainty, and the certainty is given in the knowledge itself." Pollock's Spinoza, p. 129. " At the same time, there is no reason to doubt that Spinoza did underrate (as almost all constructive philosophers have underrated) the difficulty of ascertaining what the ultimate data of sense and thought really are." Ib., p. 130. "It does not seem to strike him that, in the absence of. causation, it is incumbent on him to explain how we can be sure of agreement between idea and Ide] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 187 ideatum, belonging as they do to spheres incapable of com- munication." Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, i. 303. IDENTICAL PROPOSITION.— A proposition in which the attribute is contained in the subject, so that the subject cannot be conceived as not containing the attribute, as when we say " a body is solid.'' "It is Locke, I believe, who introduced, or at least gave currency to the expression identical proposition, in philosophic language.'' Cousin, Hist, of Mod. Phil., lect. xxiv. It is, according to Locke, one of the class of "trifling propositions" which " bring no increase to our knowledge." Essay, bk. iv. eh. viii. sec. 2. Of. the distinction between Analytic and Synthetic Judgments, as defined by Kant. Pure Reason, introd., sec. 4. "Analytic judgments are those in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is cogitated through identity ; those in which this connection is cogitated without identity are called synthetic judgments." We must, however, distinguish between analytic and tauto- logous judgments. "Whilst the analytic display the meaning of the subject, and put the same matter in a new form, the tauto- logous only repeat the subject, and give us the same matter, in the same form, as, " Whatever is, is." Thomson, Laws of Thought, p. 187, 3rd ed, IDENTITY (Philosophy of), {idem, the same).— See Absolute Idealism. ScheUing applied this term to his own philosophy. " By reason," he says, " I mean absolute reason, or reason so far as it is thought as total indifierence of subjective and objective." All the differences of spiritual and material existence, even the difference between spirit and matter themselves, are but " poten- cies " of that which is in itself indifferent or identical. IDENTITY (Law of). — It is usually expressed thus — a thing is what it is ; A is A, or A = A. Like the principle of contradiction, of which it is the positive expression, it is a necessary law of self-consistent thought. IDENTITY (Personal). — The continuity of personal ex- perience in the exercise of intelligent causal energy, the results being associated in memory. 188 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Me " Consciousness is inseparable from thinking ; and since it is so, and is that which makes everyone to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from aU other thinking beings, in this alone consists personal identity, i.e., the sameness of a rational being. And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person." Locke, Essay, bk. ii. ch. xxvii. Hume would account for the idea of Identity by the easiness of the transition of the mind from one idea to another in the series. " The smooth and uninterrupted progress of the thought readily deceives the mind, and makes us ascribe our identity to the changeable succes- sion of connected qualities.'' Treatise of Human Nature, pt. iv. sec. iii. Leibnitz (Theodicee) called it a metaphysical communication by which soul and body make up one supjpositum, which we call a person. "Though consciousness of what is past does ascertain our personal identity to ourselves, yet to say that it makes personal identity, or is necessary to our being the same persons, is to say that a person has not existed a single moment, nor done one action but what he can remember.'' Butler, Dissertation, i. As recognition of personal identity is matter of consciousness connected with recollection and use of acquisitions, the know- ledge of identity belongs to the conscious life. Only as collateral to this does it apply to the bodily life, known as our own life. As this is independent of consciousness and will, it is not included in our knowledge of personal identity, not being an essential part in personality. But our knowledge of bodily sensibility and power, being matter of consciousness, our knowledge of personal identity carries with it a knowledge of the identity of bodily life. But these are two lives. The loss of a limb is not a breach of personal identity. In its strict sense, personal identity is the unity and continuity of intelligent existence, as represented in each state of consciousness. The relation of somatic and psychic life is, however, so close, that disturbance of the normal conditions of body, and specially of the nerve-system, readily occasions disturbed consciousness. Idi] VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 189 According to the persistence of an unnatural experience, occasioned by a disturbed physical condition, there may arise faulty interpretation, on account of ignorance of causes. Ab- normal experiences, however, cannot be regarded as " mutations of the Self," but only as faulty attempts at the interpretation of the abnormal, rendered more likely of acceptance in con- sciousness, by reason of failures in memory, and distraction under suffering. James includes under "Mutations of the Self," " Alterations of memory ; and alterations in the present bodily and spiritual selves." But in this case. Self is used in a wider sense, as if changes of experience were changes of the self. Thus, when it is said " Alterations of memory are either losses or false recollections;" and "in either case the me is changed," no more is implied than a changed experience. No one forgetting the address of a friend considers on this account that " the me is changed." It was the same me who knew the address, and is now conscious of having forgotten it. " These losses of memory are a normal incident of extreme old age, and the person's me shrinks, in the ratio of the facts that have dis- appeared." James, Prins. of Psychology, i. 373. This means only restriction of brain action, — and consequent restriction of experience, just as when one is blinded by accident. To speak of "mutation of the self" on these grounds, would imply change in the me, with every acquisition, as with every loss, of knowledge, as if the me were not the cause operating. Insane delusions illustrate aggravated disturbance, influencing more or less seriously both feeling and imagination, leading the distracted person to speak as if he were a different person at one moment from what he is at another. The facts of Hypno- tism show how readily this can be induced under brain excita- tion in abnormal conditions. When a person has been thrown into the Hypnotic state, suggestion suffices to lead a man to imagine himself young or old, a soldier or a civilian, a prince or a mechanic. Under insane delusions, the suggestion comes from neural excitement, interpreted by the sufferer as if ex- perience were normal. IDIOSYNCRASY (tStos, one's own; v). In the former case the agent acts in ignorance of the facts ; in the latter, the agent acts not knowing what he is doing. (3) Juridical, regarded in two aspects, ignorantia juris and ignorantia facti. Ignorantia faeti excusat. This is ignorance of what is legally involved, as when a contract is signed under a wrong impression as to the mean- ing of the terms. Ignorantia juris quod quisque tenetur scire neminem excusat. Every man is supposed to know the laws of the land in which he lives, and is not excused if he transgress any of them. ILLATION {illatum, from infero, to bring in). — Logical inference. Ima] VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 191 ILLICIT. — lu Logic, a term is said to be used illicitly ■when it is distributed in the conclusion, although undistributed in the premises. ILLUMINATION.— The peculiar intellectual develop- ment of the 18th century in France and Germany is variously designated as the Ulumination, Enlightenment, or Aufltldrung. In France, the movement took the form of extreme material- ism, the issue of the sensationalism of Condillac. Its spokes- men were Voltaire, the Encyclopaedists, and especially La Mettrie and Von Holbach in the Systhme de la Nature. The attitude towards religion was not merely negative, it was a period of sheer atheism. Ueberweg's Hist of Philos., ii. p. 122 ; Schwegler's Hist, of Philos., xxxii. p. 187 ; Flint, Historical Philos. in France, p. 289. In Germany this same century was the period of negative Rationalism, the outcome of the extreme subjectivity of the time. AU dogma, especially religion, was subjected to the judgment of the individual, and simply rejected if it did not stand the test. — [J. S.] ILLUSION. — A deceptive appearance, as of the representa- tion of an object, occasioned by organic or functional disorder. SuUy's Illusions ; James, Principles of Psychol., ii. p. 86 ; his Text-Booh, 317. — Vide Hallucination. IMAGINATION (imaginor, to picture to oneself). — The faculty of representation by which the mind keeps before it an image of visible forms. This power is (1) simply reproductive ; (2) creative. "Nihil aUud est imaginari quam rei corporeae figuram seu imagLnem contemplari," Descartes, Medit. Secunda. Experience depends largely on imagination, still more on rational power. Imagination is associated with Memory. While a past knowledge is being recalled, objects in themselves and their relations are figured to the mind. In advance of this, new combinations are presented as visions of the mind. In a higher form of original activity, imagination contributes to the eleva- tion of intellectual life. in the exercise of literary and poetic gift. " Memory retains and. recalls the past in the form which it 192 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Ima assumed when it was previously before the mind. Imagination brings up the past in new shapes and combinations." M'Cosh, Typical Forms. " In so far as imagination is spontaneity, I sometimes call it also the productive imagination, and distinguish it from the reproductive, the synthesis of which is subject entirely to empirical laws, those of association namely." Kant, Pure Reason, Meiklejohn's Tr., 93. Imagination is thus a power connected with sensuous impres- sion, reproduction of knowledge or memory, and conception, for this last also depends upon imagination. " In truth, it is not images of objects, but schemata, which lie at the foundation of our pure sensuous conceptions. No image could ever be adequate to our conception of a triangle in general The image is a product of the empirical faculty of the productive imagination, — the schema of sensuous conceptions (of figures in space, for example) is a product, and, as it were, a monogram of the pure imagination a priori, whereby and according to which images must first become possible." lb., pp. 109, 110. " The necessity of imagination towards the possibility of what synthetic processes are involved, is obvious ; for through that faculty only can the past be reproduced for summation with the present." Hutchison Stirling, Text-Book to Kant, Repro- duction, p. 97. "Imagination holds at once of sense and of intellect ; it is sensuous in that it exhibits, and it is intellectual in that it is self-determinant and can exhibit an object, even when no object is presented to it." lb., commentary, p. 416. " I look upon imagination as the active portion of the intel- ligence, that in which the life of the intelligent consists, and from which, as the intelligence advances, new deposits are ever made of actual knowledge, which thenceforward loses a portion of its interest, and becomes for some purposes dead." J. Grote, Moral Ideals, 43. Spinoza distinguishes imagination, as passive ; understand- ing, as active ; and traces aU error to the neglect of this dis- tinction. Cf, Pollock, Spinoza, p. 144. According to Wordsworth, " Imagination, in the sense of the poet, has no reference to images that are merely a faithful copy. Imm] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 193 existing in the mind, of absent external objects ; but is a word of higher import, denoting operations of the mind upon these objects, and processes of creation or composition governed by fixed laws." Preface to his WorJcs, 1836. To imagine in this sense, is to realise the ideal, to make intelligible truths descend into the forms of sensible nature, to represent the invisible by the visible, the iafinite by the finite. Hunt, Imagin. and Fancy ; Wordsworth, pref. to Lyrical Ballads ; Hamilton, Metaph., lect. xxxiii. ; Tyndall, Scientific Uses of the Imagination. IMMANENT (immaneo, to remain in ; in and maneo). — In- dwelling, in contrast with transcending, transitive. Applied to such mental operations as are restricted to consciousness, but specially to the First Cause, as connected with the universe, not by external relations, but as an indwelling power. The doctrine of Spinoza, Ethic., pars i. prop. 18, is, Deus est omnium rerum causa immanens, non vera transiens. All that exists, exists in God. There is no difference in sub- stance between the universe and God ; therefore God is truly i TnTn a.Tip.Tit. Kant's use of the word is applicable to the functions of intel- ligence. "We shall term those principles, the application of which is confined entirely within the limits of possible experi- ence, immanent; those, on the other hand, which transgress these limits, we shall caU transcendent principles." Pure Reason, Meiklejohn's Tr., p. 210. By transgression here, he does not point to " misuse of the categories," or errors of judgment. He refers to " real principles which exhort us to break down all barriers, and to lay claim to a perfectly new field of cogni- tion, which recognises no line of demarcation." " Immanence " with Kant describes principles restricted by their nature to the constitution of experience. IMMATBRIALISM.— The doctrine of Berkeley, that there is no material substance. " Berkeley's philosophy, in its most comprehensive aspect, is a philosophy of the causation that is in the universe, rather than a philosophy of the mere material world." Eraser, Life of Berlteley, p. 365. See also Eraser's Berkeley in Philosophical Glassies, where he distinguishes N 194 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Imm between Berkeley's "Visual Immaterialism,'' in the Essay towards a Neio Theory of Vision and tte Dialogue on Divine Visual Language, and his " Universal Immaterialism," in the Principles of Human Knowledge. IMMEDIATE [in, not ; medius, middle ; German, Unmit- telbar). — Direct relation, analogous to contact ; generally applied to Knowledge. " Immediate Knowledge " is knowledge of the thing itself, in contrast with knowledge of one thing by the intervention of another. Consciousness is a perfect example of Immediate Knowledge, constituting experience. The intervention of the sensory, as the condition of knowledge of the external, interposes a difficulty for philosophy, giving rise to the complicated discus- sions as to External Perception. What is meant by imme- diate knowledge of the external may be explained thus : The sensory does not give us our knowledge, but only by excitation carries an impression to consciousness ; it does not convey an image of the thing to the mind, from the presence of which we gather our knowledge of the object. Even the organ of vision, with its picture on the retina, does not by aid of the nerve of vision transfer a picture to the brain. The mind itself forms the knowledge, by comparing the sensations resulting from contact of organism with the external, for all sensibility results from contact. Our knowledge is concerned with the thing itself, notwithstanding that it is obtained through the intervention of the sensory system. It is knowledge by the agency of sensory, but not knowledge of the thing through an image of it, as if by a reflection on a mirror. The impressions on the sensory have no resemblance to the qualities of the object ; our know- ledge is thus gathered by exercise of an intelligent nature, in- terpreting the experience awakened. Knowledge of impressions in consciousness is distinct from the knowledge in consciousness of the object giving occasion to these impressions. This gives the knowledge of observation, as distinct from knowledge by inference. " The psychologist's attitude towards cognition " involves " a thoroughgoing dualism. It supposes two elements, mind knowing and thing known, and treats them as irreducible. Imm] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 195 liTeither gets out of itself or into the other, neither in any way- is the other, neither makes the other. They just stand face to face in a common ■world, and the one simply knows, or is known to its counterpart." James, Princ. of Psychol., i. 218. For a criticism of the distinction between Immediate and Mediate Knowledge, see Logic of Hegel, by "Wallace, pp. 1 03-1 2 1 . IMMORTALITY.— The doctrine of immortality has its philosophic basis exclusively in the distinctive characteristics of the rational nature. Organism has no place within the circle of facts raising the problem of a life beyond the present. As concerns the life of man, philosophy contemplates two distinct lives in the one life, — an organic life subject to the common laws of organism passing from germ to maturity, from that to decay ; and a life for which advance in knowledge and in virtue is the sole test of development. For such life, limits are not visible, as in the case of organism ; and the philosophic problem concern- ing immortality is thus before us. Ifeglect of this contrast, places out of range much of the reasoning of the ancient philosophy, as when the argument proceeds upon motion, and on the assumption that the soul brings life to the body. These inconsistencies appearing in the PJuedrus, Phcedo, Timseus, and Republic of Plato, need to be eliminated, in order to assign their true logical and ethical value to Plato's otherwise strong reasoning on the subject of immortality. Socrates, facing the question as one whose -life was threatened, and who regarded human virtue as involving a demand to surrender life itself rather than do a dishonourable deed, reasons altogether on ethical grounds for the common belief in inimortality. Apology,^!. " Wherever a man's post is, . . . there it is his duty to remain, and face the danger, without thinking of death, or of any other thing, except dishonour." lb., 28, Church's transl. As to departure to the other world, he. says, " If death is a journey to another place, and the common belief be true, that there are all who have died, what good could be greater than this?" lb., 40. 196 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Imm Plato continues on this course of thought. " The whole period of three score years and ten is surely but a little thing in comparison with eternity," and " the soul of man is immortal and imperishable." Republic, x. 608. The force of the common conviction in favour of immortality rests on a moral basis. The data on which the expectation of future life rests, are presented in the distinction between right and wrong ; in individual duty ; and in our recognition of responsibility. The logical worth of such thought is not affected by the history of organism ; or by reference to the limits of knowledge, sustaining a doctrine of agnosticism; or by modern substitutes for individual immortality under a law of continuity, which finds a quasi immortality in the race. The conditions of personal life, including man's relation to moral law and government, imply a relation to the Deity, the full signifi- cance of which is not found in the present life. As clearly as the physical life is a finished life here, the moral is a life unfinished here. The discussion of Justice, which has exercised philosophic thought from its rise, points human expectation to a tribunal before which the doings of man have yet to be tested. In the implications of moral law, rather than in the distinctive nature of the soul, the evidence for future life is found. In so far as modern thought has contemplated human life as the life of organism alone, capable of being interpreted by physiological laws, there has been surrender of the hopes of immortality. "What such surrender involves has been indicated by J, S. Mill in these words : — " One advantage, such as it is, the super- natural religions must always possess over the Religion of Humanity : the prospect they hold out to the individual of a life after death. For, though the scepticism of the understand- ing does not necessarily exclude the Theism of the imagination and feelings, and this again gives opportunity for a hope that the power which has done so much for us may be able and willing to do this also, such vague possibility must ever stop far short of a conviction. , . . l^or can I perceive that the sceptic loses by his scepticism any real and valuable consolation except one : the hope of reunion with those dear to him who have ended their earthly life before him. That loss, indeed, is Imp] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 197 neither to be denied nor extenuated." Essays on Religion, pp. 118, 120. IMPERATIVE (imperatum, command, from impero, to enjoin, to order). — The "ought," the "Thou shalt," of moral law ; the demand of ethical law, regarded as a dictate of the reason, known to all, and placing aU rational agents under common obligations. The distinctive characteristic of ethical law lies in this, that it is of the nature of a command, its fulfil- ment depending on intelligence and will. "The representation of an objective principle, so far as it necessitates the will, is called a commandment (of reason) ; and a formula expressing such is called an imperative. An impera- tive commands hypothetically or categorically. The former expresses that an action is necessary as a mean towards some- what further ; but the latter is such an imperative as represents an action to be in itself necessary and without regard had to anywhat out of and beyond it, i.e., objectively necessary When we attend to the dissimilar grades of necessitation ex- pressed by the imperative they might be called (1) Eules of art, (2) Dictates of prudence, (3) Laws of morality. The first and second are hypothetical imperatives. The third involves a con- ception of an immediate and objective and universally valid necessity." Kant, Groundwork of Metaphysie of Ethics, ch. ii. Thus in Ethical Law, we have a simple direct command ; — the right contains the ought ; — -Justice means " thou shall be just ; " aU rational agents use it in this sense, making thus their demand upon others, owning also an equivalent demand upon themselves. The authority which Butler attributes to Conscience, belongs to the law itself. Kant's Ethical philosophy, resting on the analysis of the notion "duty," — as a notion admitted under every scheme, experiential and intuitional, — gives the most thorough elaboration of its implications. But he connects this notion with "iaward hindrances." "An Imperative is no more than a formula, expressing the relation betwixt objective laws of voHtion and the subjective imperfection of particular wills {e.g., the human)." Kant, Metaphysics of Ethics, ch. ii. ; Semple, 3rd ed., p. 24 ; Abbot, 3rd ed., p. 31 ; Werke, viii. 38. 198 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. [I^P "The Categorical Imperative is single and one, 'Act from that maxim only when thou canst will law -universal.'" lb., Semple, 31 ; Abbot, 38 ; Werke, viii. 47. IMPRESSION {imprimo, to press in, or on). — Any effect on the susceptibilities of life, consequent on contact with the external, or on agency from without, or from within. — (1) The effect on the sensory system arising from contact of an external object. (2) The effect of thought upon mental sensibility, or "sentiment.'' Thus, we speak of moral impressions, religious impressions, impressions of sublimity and beauty. Hume divided all modifications of mind into impressions and ideas. " All the perceptions of the human mind resolve them- selves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call Impressions and Ideas. The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness, with which they strike upon the mind and make their way into our thought or consciousness.'' Under impressions " I comprehend all our sensations, passions, and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By Ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reason- ing." "All our simple Ideas on their first appearance are derived from simple impressions, which are correspondent, and which they exactly represent." Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, pt. i. bk. i. c. 1. Enquiries, Selby-Bigge, 12, 17, 49. Green, Introduction to Hume ; Huxley, Hume ; Porter, Criticism of Huxley's Hume; Science and Sentiment, 293. " Words corresponding to impression were among the ancients familiarly applied to the processes of external perception, imagination, etc., in the Atomistic, the Platonic, the Aristo- telian, and the Stoic philosophies ; while, among modem psychologists (as Descartes and Gassendi), the term was like- wise in common use." Hamilton, Reid's Works, p. 294, note. IMPULSE {impello, to drive on). — A vital force, urging to action. The term is applied to desire, appetite, and passion, as well as to affections dependent on intellectual action. In primordial form it is " the impulse to seek that which is agree- able and beneficial ; and to avoid what is painful and harmful." Sully, Mind, ii. 179. Green distinguishes Impulse from Desire; Ind] VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 199 hunger, e.g., as a "force of nature," from desire of self-satisfac- tion. Proleg. to Ethies, p. 90. Impulses of the nature are their own reason until they conflict with reason, which is the guide to higher activity. Ethical impulse is the sense of duty, involving natural rever- ence for moral law, and desire to accomplish the end prescribed, in acknowledgment of personal obligation. " Impulse " is synonymous with motive ; and as a term has the advantage of restricting to vital force, physical or mental. This twofold reference, however, involves a measure of ambi- guity, leaving it doubtful whether the primordial principle is somatic in character, or belongs to consciousness. Sully's Human Mind,, ii. p. 179 and p. 186. There are three phases of impulse, as it is the origin of automatic movement, of instinc- tive movement, or of voluntary movement. INDEFINITE {in, not, and definitum, distinct).— The undefined ; applicable to inadequate knowledge, in a case in which the object is known, without exact inclusion of its limits or bounds. The definite or defined, is that of which the form and limits are determined and are apprehended by us. The indefinite, is that of which we do not know the limits. Inde- finite is a characteristic of our knowledge ; Infinite is not, but is a characteristic of the Absolute Being. INDIFFERENT, applied to vital action which is not differentiated as moral. — An action is said to be indifferent, that is, neither right nor wrong, when, considered in itself or in specie, it does not come under moral law. But such an action may become dutiful when regard is had to the end for which it is to be done. It is then contemplated in individuo, as a means to an end. In the field of action, the word has no application to a state of mind which determines activity. " Liberty of indifference " is an inconsistent representation of freedom in willing. There can be no such experience as indifference. To determine, yet not determine, is a contradiction. It is to move while unmoved. INDIVIDUALITY (from in, and divido, to divide).— (1) A distinct, circumscribed existence; such as a molecule, or atom, or living being ; (2) distinctiveness of being belonging to 200 TOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Ind personality, rendering it possible to distinguisli from each other the members of the race. INDIVIDUALISM.— The theory of knowledge, or of practice, which reduces all to individual sensibility, as the sole ultimate test of the knowable, or the dutiful. It presents the doctrine of relativity in such a form as to make diversities of in- dividual sensibility, or of impressions, equally reliable as tests of truth, and of rectitude. Individual experience bcomes the sole test of truth, not the universal, — not even the consensus gentium. The theory necessarily involves scepticism, by assigning equal authority to contradictory affirmations. This theory is that involved in the commonly received view of the doctrine of Protagoras, Homo mensura, — "Man is the measure of the universe," — TrdvTWv ^rj/JidTwv /jLeTpof avOpunrCK. Plato, Thex- tatus, 152 ; Diog. Laert., xi. 51 ; and also in some types of modern sensationalism. Individualism in Ethics, makes individual preference the rule of conduct, disregarding social organism ; so representing each man as a law to himself, that Egoistic Hedonism is taken as an adequate theory of the right in conduct. INDUCTION (eiraywyri, inducUo, in duco, to lead into). — Reasoning from particulars to generals. The warrant for the general conclusion is not found in a perfect induction, but in an , induction sufficiently wide to warrant a belief in the uniformity of the occurrence contem- plated. "Induction is that operation of mind by which we infer that what we know to be true in a particular case or cases, will be true in all cases which resemble the former in certain assignable respects. In other words, induction is the process by which we conclude that what is true of certain individuals of a class, is true of the whole class, or that what is true at certain times vnll be true, under similar circumstances, at all times." Mill, Logic, bk. iii. ch. ii. sec. 1. Aristotle, Metwph., xiii. 4, attributes the discovery of induc- tion to Socrates, who, in his search for true ethical notions, inquired what was the common characteristics of things and actions otherwise diverse. Aristotle himself, from the limited Inf] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 201 view he took of, the nature of induction, did Uttle to advance the science. Nor was it till the modern scientific spirit awakened in Bacon that its importance was appreciated. He boldly proclaimed the necessity of substituting for the old Aristotelian and scholastic method of deduction the new method of inductive inquiry. Spes una est in inductione vera (De Augm. Scient, i. 18). Bacon, however, did not himself build the system of inductive logic. This task was reserved for Mill, who formulated the methods of inductive inference. The ground of induction, is the principle of the Uniformity of Nature, of the constancy of the causal relation among phenomena. In the language of Newton, Effeetuum naturalium ejmdem generis exdem sunt caitsx. The same causes produce the same effects. According to some, our belief in the estab- lished order of nature is recognition of the law of causality as a first principle of knowledge. According to others, this belief is an inference derived from experience, the highest generalisation from experience. On the diiferent views as to this point, cf. Mill, Logic, bk. iii. ch. iii., with "Whewell's Philosophy of Inductive Sciences, bk. i. ch. vi. On the subject of Induction in general, see Bacon, Novum Organum, De Augmentis Scientia- rum ; Mill, Logic, bk. iii. Inductive Canons, are rules for legitimate inference of general laws from particular facts. Bacon, in the second book of the Novum Organum, approximated to a statement of these ; and Herschel, in his Discourse on the Study of Natural Philo- sophy, stated them. Mill, however, was the first to formulate them clearly and accurately, and to signalise their importance for inductive investigation. He calls them (1) the method of agreement, (2) the method of difference, (3) ^e joint or double method of agreement and difference, (4) the method of residues, and (5) the method of concomitant variations. Mill, Logic, bk. iii. ; Fowler, Inductive Logic, ch. iii., with notes. IN ESSE : IN POSSE.^Equivalent to actual and possible. INFINITE (i», finitum). — Unlimited, limitless. According to Spinoza's definition, God is Being absolutely infinite ; sub- stance consisting in infinite attributes of which each one expresses an eternal and infinite essence. 202 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Inh " The Infinite expresses the absence of all limitation, and is applicable to the one infinite Being in all His attributes. The Absolute expresses perfect independence both in being and in action, and is applicable to God as self-existent. The Uncondi- tioned embraces both, and indicates entire freedom from every restriction, whether in its own nature, or in relation to other beings." Calderwood, Philosopliy of the Infinite, p. 37 ; 3rd ed., p. 179. Knowledge of the infinite has been declared impossible, simply on the ground of the limitation of our faculties. But this is mere logical definition of opposites, — antithesis of naming. Granting a First Cause, knowledge of the universe implies knowledge of the cause. The laws of knowledge imply this. Eecognition of the self-existent, implies an idea, notion, or con- ception of God. According to some, the idea of the Infinite is purely negative. On the other hand, it is held that the idea of the infinite is the idea of an objective reality. By Descartes, Medit, iii., it was regarded as a necessary condition of know- ledge. While we cannot comprehend the Infinite, or reach it by enlarging of the finite, we may apprehend it in relation with the finite. This the common sense of men rests in, without attempting the metaphysical difficulty of reconciling the exist- ence of the infinite with that of the finite. Descartes, Meditations ; Cousin, Cows de Phil, et Hist, de la Phil. ; Hamilton, Discussions on Philosophy, etc. ; Hansel's Limits of Religious Thought ; Calderwood's Philosophy of the Infinite; Herbert Spencer's First Principles, chap. i. ; Lotze, Microcosmus, i. 381-387. INHIBITION {inhibeo, to curb, or check). — Restraint of action. First, a power common to organic life, belonging to the whole motor system, providing for immediate check on move- ment when sensibility induces recoil, or withdrawal from the disagreeable or injurious. This is essential to healthy organic existence. In analogy with this, psychic life has also its natu- ral restraints, operating spontaneously, as involuntary checks on activity ; and taking advantage of the inhibitory power belonging to the nerve system. Inn] VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 203 When the unity in dualism characteristic of human life is "considered, a healthy ethical condition has associated with it vigorous inhibitory power in the muscular system. The laws ■of health for man involve the unity of the somatic and psychic. The " thou shalt not " of moral law, has associated in normal «omatic life an inhibitory power which favours moral restraint. Discipline of mind and body must keep pace. Physical develop- ment has in itself value for the intellectual and moral life. The restraining power belonging to the motor nerves, to the controlling processes in the brain, and to physical instincts, is all, though quite unconsciously, in the service of rational life. The inhibitory power in the physical nature is so distributed that inhibition is " exerted by different parts of the nerve centres, when excited, on the activity of distant parts." James, Princ. of Psychol., i. 67. See Sully, Human Mind, ii. 246 ; Foster and Langley's Practical Physiology. INNATE (innatus, inborn, — inimscor). — Native to the mind ; rational principle, so given in mental constitution, that develop- ment will disclose it as essential to the rational life ; a priori, in the logical relations of knowledge, as antecedent to experi- ence, — even given as the condition of experience. In this we have the basis of Intuitionalism. The claim was latent in the ancient philosophy, in the "'general conceptions" of Socrates, and in the "Ideas" of Plato. Cicero, in various passages of his treatise De Natura Deorum, speaks of the idea of God and of immortality as being inserted, or inhom in the mind. " Intelligi necesse est, esse deos, quoniam insitas eorum, vel potius innatas eognitiones hahemus," lib. i. sec. 17. This has been the common position of the Christian Fathers, " That men would not be guilty, if they did not carry in their mind common notions of morality innate and written in divine letters." Origen, Adv. Gelsum, lib. i. cap. iv. Descartes, in making a beginning for modern philosophy, by using doubt as an instrument for test of thought, developed a doctrine of " innate ideas." The '•' idea of God " was for him the first certainty, after " cogito, ergo sum," — the certainty of self-consciousness. In this idea, he found the assurance of the 204 vocABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Inn existence of the Deity, inasmuch, as the thinker could not himself be the source of this idea, and the sensory could not give it. The idea of God thus stands with him as the symbol of " innate ideas." Ideas were distinguished by Descartes into adventitious, or such as we receive from the objects of external nature ; facti- tious, or such as we frame out of ideas already acquired ; and innate, or such as are inborn and belong to the mind from its. birth, the idea of God being symbolic. Meditation, iii. Veitch's transl. 6th ed., p. 118. The expression " innate ideas " is unsuitable, since " idea " is- used for image or representation, a meaning which cannot be associated with any knowledge which can be warrantably classified as native to the mind. " By innate idea, Descartes meant merely a mental modification which, existing in the mind antecedently to all experience, possesses, however, only a potential existence, until, on occasion of experience, it is called forth into actual consciousness." Veitch, Works of' Descartes, note vi. Locke's polemic against " innate ideas," rests on the conten- tion that there are no principles " universally agreed upon by all mankind." Essay, bk. i. c. 2. He maintains that truths- alleged to be innate are hot so, because " they are not assented to by those who understand not the terms ; " and because, they are not "the first that appear" in the mind. His position is that " the Senses at first let in particular ideas, and furnish the yet empty cabinet." "Let us then suppose the mind to be,, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas, how comes it to be furnishedV bk. ii. c. 1. His reply is " from experience." ... " Our observation employed either- about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our own minds, perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understanding with all the materials of thinking," ib. The one phase of experience he calls sensation, the other reflection. The recoil against a pure Sensationalism came from the. Scepticism of Hume, showing that mind and matter are equally subjects of doubt, if all is included in the series of sensations.. Inn] VOCABULATIY OF PHILOSOPHY. 205 Verification is impossible, if it be impossible to transcend the series. The defence of necessary truth, for guidance of intelligence, was led by Eeid and by Kant, the one the leader of the Scottish School, the other of the German. Reid's defence of necessary truth was that there is truth incapable of proof, and independent of experience, axiomatic in nature. Kant changed the whole aspect of Epistemology by insisting that the question could be settled only by investigating the conditions of knowledge itself. The central point here is the action of the understanding. We seek a philosophy of Thought. Sensation is not knowledge. If it supply materials for know- ledge, knowledge can be had only on conditions which experi- ence cannot supply. The understanding cannot act except by use of its own categories. These general notions are necessary in order that the understanding may deal with differences in extension and in succession. Thus a priori conditions are essential for a beginning in experience. The whole question of " innate ideas '' is permanently widened and deepened. The polemic of Locke has become historic merely. Modern philo- sophy has no place for a representation of mind as an unfurnished cabinet, or a surface of white paper. " Innate " now includes aU that is essential to the constitution of mind. From the days of Kant, " innate " concerns the conditions of activity belonging to the intellectual life itself. These conditions include " forms " of the understanding ; use of categories, such as quantity and quality; use of necessary principles, — first of pure intelligence, such as the law of causality ; second, of practice, such as the law of justice. The intricacy of Thought, as appears from these conditions, is such that sensation and reflection are only single elements. Epistemology requires a philosophy of their relations, and of much which completely transcends experience. The inlet of simple ideas to furnish an empty cabinet, is left behind as an antiquated curiosity. The modern question is the synthesis of knowledge, — the conditions in accordance with which our knowledge is con- structed. There is no knowledge without experience, and 206 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Inn. there can be none if we depend on experience alone. Neither sensation, nor consciousness of the impressions thereby awak- ened, can give us a philosophy of knowledge. A rational life has the principles of rational procedure given in its own movements. The sensory is not an avenue for inlet of ideas, but an instrument for use of intelligence under given condi- tions, provided in the rational life. Hegel has lifted a protest against drawing a hard and fast line between experience and its conditions native to mind. " One thing may be obser\red with reference to the immediate knowledge of God, of abstract right, and of social morality (including under the head of immediate knowledge, what is otherwise termed Instinct, Implanted or Innate Ideas, Common Sense, Natural Keason, or whatever form, in short, we give to the original spontaneity), that it is a matter of common experi- ence that education or development is required to bring out into consciousness what is therein contained. . . The adherents no less than the assailants of the doctrine of Innate Ideas have been guilty throughout of the like exclusiveness and narrow- ness as is here noted. They have drawn a hard and fast line between the essentially immediate or spontaneous union (as it may be described) of certain universal ideas within the soul, and another union which has to be brought about in an external fashion, and through the channel of objects and conceptions given to us. There is one objection borrowed from experience which is raised against the doctrine of lunate Ideas. All men, it is said, must have these ideas — such, for example, as the maxim of contradiction — present to the mind ; they must know them ; for this maxim, and others like it, were included in the class of Innate Ideas. The objection may be set down to mis- conception ; for the ideas or characteristics in question, though innate, need not on that account have the form of ideas or con- ceptions of something known. Still the objection completely meets and overthrows the crude theory of immediate knowledge, which expressly asserts its formulae in so far as they are in con- sciousness." Werhe, vi. § 67, p. 135. Encyclopddie, Wallace's transl. ; The Logic of Hegel, p. 111. M'Cosh, Method of Divine Govt, p. 508, 7th ed. ; Sully's Ins] VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. 207 Outlines of Psychology, p. 60 ; Lotze, Microcosmus (Hamilton's transl.), i. 236 ; Lotze, Logic, § 324, transl. Bosanquet, p. 454. INSTINCT {instinguo, to incite, to impel). — Immediate stimulus to action, apart from prior experience and intelligence. The term includes every impulse, organic and psychic, fulfilling its function directly of itself. It is named "blind impulse," because it does not wait upon intelligence for its rise, nor does it find aid from intelligence in reaching its end. " Every instinct is an impulse." James, Principles of Psychol., ii. 383. This appears in "purposive action without consciousness of the purpose.'' Von Hartmann, Hist, of the Unconscious, Tr. i. 79. Even within consciousness, where its presence is known, its purpose is not intelligently contemplated and guided. " Instinct is usually defined as the faculty of acting in such a way as to produce certain ends, without foresight of the ends, and without previous education in the performance." James, Princ. of Psychol., ii. 383 ; Sully, Human Mind, i. 136 ; Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, 2nd ed., i. 137. Com- parison of Instinct in Animal and in Man, Darwin, Descent of Man, 12mo, p. 67 ; A. Russel Wallace, Darwinism, 441. For classification of instincts, attention must be directed on the functions of different phases of Ufe. The term may be applied even to plants in their search for nourishment, and their turning towards the light. Most obviously and extensively it applies to animal life ; in a more restricted degree, but quite markedly, to the action of feeling in mind, in so far as this is in- dependent of the exercise of our intelligence. When comparison is made between these, the force of Darwin's observation is apparent : " The fewness and the comparative simplicity of the instincts in the higher animals are remarkable in contrast with those of the lower animals.'' Descent of Man, 12mo, 67. If instinct is more wonderful lower in the scale than it appears to be " in the higher animals," the claim that instinct is preparatory for intelligence, or is a phase of power from which intelligence may be evolved, must be abandoned. The' logical necessity for this I have dwelt upon elsewhere, — Belations of Mind and Brain, 262 ; Evolution and Man's Place in Nature, 191. We cannot appeal to instinct as a testimony 208 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY, [InS for intelligence. There are many inconsistencies in familiar representations of instinct. " Those insects which possess the most wonderful instincts are the most intelligent." Darwin, Descent of Man, 67. " The more complex instincts seem to have originated independently of intelligence," ib., 67. It is difficult to find a harmonious reading of these two sentences. Wallace is not more fortunate in this suggestion, — " Much of the mystery of instinct arises from the persistent refusal to recognise the agency of imitation, memory, observation, and reason as often forming part of it." Darwinism, 442. What have these to do with the skill of a bird in beginning the work of nest building; or with the peck of a chicken when emerging from its shell ; or with the first action of maternal care in a ewe towards her lamb ? Por theoretic requirements, we must get behind " imitation, memory, observation, and reason." Towards a theory of instinct, there is more help in the reference to " reflex action." Spencer's Prin. of Psychol., 418 ; Darwin, Descent, 67. " Reflex action '' is the most simple and common illustration of instinctive action. The prick of a pin induces instantaneous recoil. Action and reaction is provided for by a nerve centre as a medium of communication, and an instrument of vital activity. Sensory and motor nerves respond to each other by reason of their relation in the centre. Differentiation will involve increase in reflexes. Amplification of the central organ will carry with it "multiplication and co-ordination of reflex actions." Lobes of special sense expand the susceptibilities, and enlarge the possibilities. Action in response to vision is instinctive. An enlarged olfactory lobe will give proportionate facility in smell, with extended range of instinctive action. Acute smell is in no way connected with intelligence. Impregnation, growth of offspring in the uterus, lactation, all lead up to the instinctive action of the mother manifested after the birth of the young ; but there is no intel- ligence implied ; and when, with physiological changes, maternal interest and care pass away, there has been no loss of intel- ligence. More difficult of explanation are the phenomena indicating adaptation of means to ends in a manner impossible to us, save Int] VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 209 by action of intelligent purpose. The perplexity is considerably increased by the fact, that these phenomena are observed in the activity of insects, even more than in the life of higher animals, as in the history of bees, wasps, and ants. Very marked specialties in structure are accompanied by specialties in action. An ant is much more wonderful in its doings than an ox. "Much of the mystery of instinct" remains unex- plained; but the evidence of observation is sufficient to con- vince us that " imitation, memory, observation, and reason " lie quite apart from the lives most marked for the singularity of results secured. An ant may travel quite needlessly for what it seeks, but it makes astonishing use of what it does gather. Instinctive action extends largely into the history of rational life. The superiority of reason, great as that is, allows for ex- ceedingly varied forms of instinctive action. The spontaneous is the instinctive. Of this, there is much in intelligent life, in association, memory, and thought, while feeling common to the race, and deeper emotion, are spontaneous in rise, exercising a large influence distinct from the ordinary course of reflective and voluntary determination. The race is largely swayed by emotion, reverential, sympathetic, or antagonistic, rising spon- taneously with changing circumstances. As to instinct in animals, Darwin, Origin of Species, — Variation of Animals, — Descent of Man ; Wallace, Darwinism; Lubbock, Ants, Bees, and Wasps, International Scientific Series; M'Cook, The Agricultural Ant of Texas; and The Honey Ants and the Occident Ants; Cheshire, Bees and Bee- Jceeping ; Romanes, Animal Intelligence, 2 vols. ; Lloyd Morgan, Animal Life and Intelligence; Garner, Speech of Monkeys; Calderwood, Relations of Mind and Brain, chap. vii. ; Evoln- tion and Man's Place in Nature. As to instinct in mental life. Carpenter's Mental Physiology; Sully, Human Mind, i. 136; James, Principles of Psychology, ii. 383. INTELLIGENCE {intelligo, to understand, to compare so as to comprehend). — Power of interpretation of sensible experience. In a higher phase, power of reasoning, so as to reach general truth by induction from particulars, or to ascertain by deduction particular applications of a general principle. 210 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Int " Intelligence '' has been used as the general term under which may be included all that belongs to the rational life as it exercises a power of interpretation. In this way it includes everything in our life, which may not he attributed to feeling on the one side, and to will on the other. Within intelligence itself, there has from ancient times been drawn a distinction among intellectual powers, or phases of intellectual actions. Greek thought distinguished vovs, from Stavota, the former indicating intelligence in a higher phase, the latter in a lower ; but as the higher includes the lower, vovi has been taken for mind itself. When the two are set in contrast, the one signifies the higher faculty of the soul, reason proper; the other, the rationalising or discursive power, engaged in comparisons, and by comparison reaching its results. Aris- totle, De Anima, bk. ii. By Aristotle, vovi is used " in two principal significations." 1. " Our higher faculties of thought and knowledge.'' 2. The faculty, habit, or place of principles, that is, of self-evident and self-evidencing notions and judgments. " The schoolmen, following Boethius, translated it by intel- lectus and intelligentia ; and some of them appropriated the former of these terms to its first or general signification, the latter to its second or special." Hamilton, Reid's Works, note A, sec. 5. "On the essential imperfections of the intellect," Schopen- haur, The World as Will and Idea, transL, ii. 330. The modern problem introduces a wider range, so as to include comparative intelligence, thus directing attention to the relations of animals to men. This range of inquiry is in harmony with the modern tendency, assigning to synthesis a value in advance of analysis. The hypothesis of Evolution has lent its influence towards formulating this new statement of the problem concerning intelligent life on the earth. When we attribute intelligence to animals and to man jointly, what are the common characteristics included under the term 1 Experimental Psychology includes the whole action of the sensory and motor systems within its scope. Definition of Intelligence cannot be found within this sphere, where observa- tion deals only with movements. Sensory excitation and mere Int] VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY, 211 motor action supply no features of intelligence. Nor can the definition be found by reference to phenomena of Instinct, whether Instinct belongs to the somatic life, or to the intel- ligent life. Instinct does not illustrate a phase of intelligence, but the absence of intelligence, appearing in spontaneity of impulse. The need for rigid definition here is as obvious, as is the di£5culty of obtaining it. James says Instinct is usually defined as " the faculty of acting in such a way as to produce certain ends, without foresight of the ends, and without pre- vious education in the performance." Principles of Psychol., ii. 383. This marks an absence of Intelligence. When the definition of Intelligence is sought, James says, "with intel- ligent agents, altering the conditions changes the activity dis- played, but not the end reached," ib., i. 8. This is marked when " inorganic " is in contrast with "intelligent." It must be restated when Instinct, animal or mental, appears ; and this is not so readily done. James says, — " The pursuance of future ends, and the choice of means for their attainment, are the mark and criterion of mentality in a phenomenon." However true this may be, there is a double disadvantage in such a statement. It defines Intelligence in the language of results, passing even to the field of external action ; and it does not adequately distinguish it from Instinct. Either " mentality " in- cludes more than Intelligence, and the definition of the latter is abandoned ; or the definition itself is not clear. We have still to express the difference between instinctive actions, and intelligent. Compare the two statements above, and it will appear that education is excluded from the definition of instinct ; and education is only one phase of the experience of " intelligent agents " ; yet there is a clear sense in which Instinct, such as in the building of a nest, is "the pursuance of future ends, and the choice of means for their attainment." The consequence of this vagueness is apparent when " Goltz ascribes intelligence to the frog's optic lobes and cerebellum." Intelligence as known to us in consciousness needs to be defined, and that in such manner as to include its lowest phase, which may conceivably be found present in some of the higher animals. The definition should be of the procedure itself, — 212 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Int not of the sensory, as its auxiliary, providing materials of knowledge, — nor of its End, or the results of its interposition. " Intelligence " appears in the interpretation of signs so as to recognise their meaning. By this its field in " mentality " is defined, being distinguished from " feeling," resulting from excitation of sensitive organism; from "End," as this is fixed after comparison of interests, and of means for their realisation ; and from " results " as these emerge in the history of external events. This definition is inadequate as a representation of " human intelligence," but it presents the specific distinction of intelligence, which may be the possession of other forms of life than the human. Intelligence is the interpretation of the meaning of feeling, or sign, or thing, or relations of things. INTENTION {in-tendo, to stretch towards). — Cherished purpose, taking effect in directing the use of means for the attainment of a selected end. In morals and in law, intention is the design of the agent, and is the key to the responsibility involved in action. INTEREST {inter, between; esse, to be). — The pleasure the agent feels in his occupation. Interest, as a motive, usually means the stimulating power of individual happiness. Butler applies the term as equivalent to self-love. "Men form a general notion of interest, . . . which is owing to self- love." "The very idea of an interested pursuit, necessarily pre- supposes particular passions or appetites." Preface to Sermons. "Interest is that by which reason becomes practical, i.e., a cause determining the will. Hence we say of rational beings only, that they take an interest in all things ; irrational beings only feel sensual appetites. Reason takes a direct interest in action, then, only when the universal validity of its maxims is alone sufficient to determine the will. Such an interest alone is pure." Kant, Practical Reason, Abbot, p. 116, note ; Semple, p. 73. " The interests in whose favour " consciousness exerts it- self, " are its interests and its alone, interests which it creates, and which, but for it, would have no status in the realm of being whatever." James, Prins. of Psyaliol. ; his Text-Booh of Int] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 213 Psijchology, p. 170. Lotze, M&tqphydc, § 264, Bosanquet's transl, p. 464. INTROSPECTION {intro, within; spedo, to see).— Observation directed upon personal experience. The exercise in which consciousness turns upon itself, — or notes its own procedure. Consciousness is direct knowledge of the facts of experience ; Introspection is voluntary concentration of consciousness- on our states of experience, apart from the objective significance of what is felt, thought, or purposed. In practical life, its familiar exercise is in self-scrutiny with a view to decide the worth of one's motive in acting. In philo- sophy, it is the reflective process by which the mind turns its attention upon itself, so as to distinguish the constituent elements in any state of consciousness. Internal observation is the condition on which it is possible to discriminate the facts present in consciousness, to consider their relations, and to understand the synthesis giving unity to rational procedure. Comte maintained that any attempt at self-observation must involve disturbance of the mental activity to be contemplated. Comte, Positive Philos., Martineau's transl., i. 11. There is escape from this. The power needs to be acquired ; facility in the exercise is gained by practice. " Introspective observation is what we have to rely on first and foremost and always. The word introspection need hardly be defined — it means, of course, the looking into our own minds and reporting what we there discover." James, Prins. of Psychol., i. 185. INTUITION (from intueor, to behold j German, Anschau- ung). — Immediate knowledge, as in the presentation of the object. Intuitions are of two orders, lower and higher : (1) The presentations of the senses, — direct sensuous experience is intuition; (2) The presentations of the Eeason, in its know- ledge of necessary truth. Direct recognition of self-evident truth illustrates intuition. Between these, intuition of sense, and intuition of reason, — what is evident to the senses, and what is evident to the reason, — lies the range of discursive and inferential thought. "There are only two conditions of the 214 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Int possibility of a cognition of objects : firstly, Intuition, by means of which the object, though only as phenomenon, is given ; secondly. Conception, by means of which the object which corresponds to this intuition is thought.'' Kant, Pure Reason, Meiklejohn's Tr., 77. There is direct knowledge in observation and in conscious- ness. The main philosophic problem connected with intuition concerns immediate knowledge of the universal. Intuition of the lower order recognises an individual object ; the further question stands thus, — Is there an immediate knowledge of general truth ? Are the first principles of knowledge directly known? The principle of Causality, and the principle of Justice, may be taken as symbols of the class of truths named "necessary," or "universal" truths. Immediate knowledge of these is intuition. By the Intuitional School, it is held that the higher intui- tions are at once elements of knowledge, and conditions for attainment of wider knowledge. Knowledge of first principles is a priori, — independent of experience, — given as a prior con- dition for attainment of knowledge through experience ; but a priori has a wider application, inclusive of formal conditions of knowledge, such as the categories, and the spontaneous impulses of human life. Variations in usage will appear from the following references and quotations. According to Spinoza, Intuitive Knowledge " depends on the mind itself, as its real cause (formalis causa), in virtue of the mind itself being eternal." Spinoza, Ethics, v., prop. 29, Schol. " Intuitive knowledge is the perception of the certain agreement or disagreement of two ideas, immediately compared together." Locke, Essay, bk. iv. ch. ii. sec. 17. " In this, the mind is at no pains of proving or examining, but perceives the truth as the eye doth the light, only by being directed towards it." lb., sec. 1. Kant's position is disclosed in the following passages. "By means of sensibility objects are given to us, and it alone furnishes us with intuitions. By the understanding, they are thought, and from it arise conceptions. . . . That sort of intui- Int] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 215 tion -which relates to an object by means of sensation, is called an empirical intuition." Kant, Pure Reason, intro. to Transc. -i3*lsthetic. "That presentation which can be given previously to all thought, is called intuition. All the diversity or manifold content of intuition has therefore a necessary relation to the Ithinh, in the subject, in which this diversity is found." lb., Meiklejohn's transl., 81. "Intuition, in English, is restricted to perceptions a priori ; but the established logical use and wont applies the word to every incomplex representation whatever ; and it is left for further and more deep inq[uiry to ascertain what intuitions are founded on observation and experience, and what arise from a priori sources." Semple, introd. to Kant's Metaphysics of Ethics. "Certainly the highest ideas of reason, the eternal, the divine, are not to be attained or proved by means of demonstra- tion; but this indemonstrableness, this inaccessibleness, is the very nature of the divine." Schwegler, Hist, of Philos. : " On Jacobi." " Intuition is used in the extent of the German Anschauung, to include all the products of the perceptive (external or internal) and imaginative faculties ; every act of consciousness, in short, of which the immediate object is an indimdual thing, act, or state of mind, presented under the condition of distinct existence in space or time." Mansel, Proleg. Log., p. 9, note ; Hamilton, Reid's Works, note b. "Every concrete, actually performed psychological result is an intuition, or knowledge of an individual." Dewey, Psychol., 236. " The name prepares us to meet some mode of apprehension at a glance, in which all process is dispensed with, and the end is struck by a flash." Martineau, Types of Ethics, i. 331. "Experiences of utility, organised and consolidated during all past generations of the human race, have been producing nervous modifications, which, by continued transmission and accumulation, have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition, certain emotions responding to right and wrong 216 TOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Jud conduct, which have no apparent basis in the individual experi- ence of utility." Herbert Spencer, Zeiffer to Jfj'ZZ ; ^ain, Mental and Moral Science, 721. Intuitionalism, vs^hether in Intellectual Philosophy or in Ethical, rests on an immediate knowledge of necessary truth, the recognition of which is the natural function of reason, the highest power of the rational life. This is the basis of the Rational School in Epistemology and in Ethics, as opposed to Sensationalism and Utilitarianism. " According to intuitionalism, the mind does not at birth possess ready-made intuitions ; on the contrary, the material of experience as supplied by the senses are necessary to the proper development of these intuitions As between recent exprientialists and iutuitionalists, the question may be put as follows,- — Is knowledge a mere outcome of sensations conjoined according to known psychological laws, or does it involve, as a further factor, the co-operant activity of rational principle 1 " Sully, Human Mind, ii. 351. For a presentation of Intuitionalism, see Price, Review ; Eeid, Intellectual and Active Powers ; Kant, Ethics ; M'Cosh's Method of Divine Government ; Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory , Calderwood, Handbooh of Moral Philosophy ; Porter, Elements of Moral Science. For criticism of the theory, refer to Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, bk. iii. For reply to this, see Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, ii. 277. " Intuitive Judgments " is a contradiction in terms, even though we admit " automatic " action in mind. For Physiological and Physico-psychical relations, Carpenter's Mental Physiology, ch. xi. p. 478. Herbert Spencer, as above ; Sully, Human Mind, i. 465, ii. 330 ; on higher intuition, 351. JUDGMENT (judico, to declare or decide ; jus, right ; diao, to say). — (1) The act of comparison, (2) its result. Com- parison may, however, be more or less complex. It may be (1) the comparison of individual qualities, the result being the for- mation of a Concept ; (2) the comparison of concepts, the result being the affirmation of their agreement or the reverse, which is strictly called a Judgment ; (3) the comparison of Judgments Jur] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 217 themselves, the result being an Inference. All these are in- stances of the same operation, viz., Judgment or Comparison, though only the second is called Judgment. The Judgment (called, when expressed in language, the Proposition) consists of three parts : the Subject, Predicate, and Copula (q.v.). There are two main views as to the Nature of Judgment — (1) the Attributive view, (2) the Equational view. (1) The Attributive theory is that of Aristotle and of most subsequent logicians. On this view, the subject is to be taken extensively and the predicate intensively, and the judgment is to be regarded as an assertion or denial that the individual or class denoted by the subject-term possesses the attribute or attributes connoted by the predicate-term. (2) The Equational theory is upheld by Jevons and others. It takes both the Subject and Predicate in an extensive sense, and regards the Judgment as an assertion of the co-extension of the classes denoted by the Subject and Predicate terms respectively. Judgments have been classified with reference to (1) Quantity, (2) Quality, (3) Modality. They have further been classified as Analytic, Synthetic, and Identical, or Tautologous {q.v.). See Ueberweg, System of Logic, Lindsay's transl., pt. iv. pp. 187-224, Lindsay's app., a and B).— [J. S.] " Judgment in general is the faculty of thinking the parti- cular under the universal." Kant, Gritik of Judgment, Bernard's transl., 16. "Judgment is impossible when truth and falsehood, with their difference, are not known ; and this difference cannot^be known when ideas are not recognised, and where nothing exists for the mind but fact." Bradley, Logic, § 18, p. 30. JURISPRUDENCE (Jurisprudentia ; jus, law ; prudentia, foresight, knowledge). — The science of law, as the expression of individual and social rights. Personal rights are based upon what is right in conduct. Jurisprudence is thus in closest relation with Moral Philosophy. Jurisprudence is the science of law in general, and " investi- gates the principles which are common to all positive systems 218 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. [JUS of law." Only in a subordinate way, as illustrative of its prin- ciples, is it concerned with the laws of particular states. Jurisprudence and Moral Philosophy both rest upon the great law of right and wrong as made known by the light of nature. Moral Philosophy is the philosophy of our knowledge and of our application of the laws of right conduct. Jurispru- dence is the philosophy of the applications of the law of justice, as these provide for a system of personal rights essential to organisation of society ; and as they may find expression in general principles, or in formal enactments. Jurisprudence seeks to ascertain the principles of legislation, as these ought to regulate the legislation of all nations. "To say that there is nothing just or unjust but what is commanded or prohibited by positive laws, is like saying that the radii of a circle were not equal till you had drawn the circumference.'' Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws. Grotius, De Jure Belli at Pads ; Puffendorf, De Officio Hominis et Civis ; Leibnitz, Jurisprudentia ; Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws ; Mackintosh, Discourse of the Laws of Nature and of Nations ; Bentham, in trod, to Principles of Morals and Legislation; Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined; Lorimer's Lnstitutes of Law. JUSTICE (StKaiocnjvr;, justitia ; jus, law, right). — The equal between man and man as equal, in so far as all are subject to moral law. The definition applies in the abstract, as expressing law, or rule of conduct ; in the interpretation of Ethical life, as the motive in action, or the virtue of character ; and in the adjustment of personal rights and claims, as the end secured. "When we ask what is the thing we name justice, our ultimate appeal must be to the rule of conduct itself. An obligation superior to our choice, must become subject of choice, in order that Justice may be done, securing the rights of aU concerned. In the abstract. Justice is universal law ; in the concrete, it includes the minutest detail in human interest. The range of application belonging to Justice, as the guardian of all human rights and interests, has secured for it, from ancient times till now, the largest place in ethical discussion. In ancient ethical philosophy, there is no discussion more Jus] YOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 219 constantly renewed, and none more certainly unfinished, than that concerning the nature of Justice. It is often used as equivalent to righteousness, uprightness, — moral excellence. Its manifold aspects are touched in succession ; when one is studied, the others are neglected ; the consequence is a sense of the inadequacy of what is said. Now, it is Eetribution; again, it is the majesty of law; next, it is the harmony of all interests; and once again, it is the distribution of advantages. This con- fusion results naturally from moving amidst its applications, instead of seeking the ultimatum in the law itself. The Pythagoreans, using the symbolism of number and form, represented Justice as the square, the form which is equal in aU directions, as broad as it is long, — apSfios Urd.KK icros. Aris- totle, N. Ethics, V. 8 ; Mag. Mor. i. 1 ; i. 34. To do things " squarely " is a modern echo. The Pythagorean view had reference to penalty, — that which is due to a man on account of his conduct, as the action measures the consequences. Socrates, considering Justice as the giving to every man his due, as in the paying of a debt, insists that this can be done only if by each man regard is shown for the good of his neighbour ; inasmuch as Justice cannot allow of injury even to an enemy. RepuTilia, i. 331. " Speaking the truth and pay- ing your debts, is not a correct definition of justice." Plato, placing Justice as the fourth of the Cardinal Virtues, of which Wisdom, Courage, and Temperance are the other three, repre- sents Justice in its political aspect, in accordance with the con- ception of the "Republic," as the law requiring "that every one shall do his own part," Repub. 433. When in the indi- vidual life, " each part of him is doing its own business," 443 ; it is concerned "not with the outward man, but with the inward," for "he sets in order his own inner life." Aristotle devotes book v. of the iV. Ethics to the discussion of Justice. Taken as a virtue in the character, it is " perfect virtue with reference to others," v. 3. Viewed in relation to civil life, it is distributive as concerned with the circulation of property, honours, and other forms of good ; and it is commutative as applicable to contracts, and infliction of penalty. For Roman thought, see Cicero, De Finihus, v. 23 ; and Tiiscul., i. 45. 220 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. [KnO In modern philosophy, attention has been turned more upon law, as an expression of the principle of action, favouring greater exactness of definition. Modern philosophy has thus discussed largely the question of natural rights, contemplated as inalienable. Locke, in considering " what estate all men are naturally in," says " it is a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature." Treatise on Government, c. ii. So in Hobbes, Leviathan, " Laws of Nature," c. 14, — jus naturals. Justice, implying a natural right, seems to involve a special difficulty for Utilitarian Ethics, which makes happiness the test of the right. Accord- ingly, special prominence has been given to Justice in Mill's Utilitarianism, c. v. ; and in Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics, bk. iii. c. V. Herbert Spencer has devoted a division of his Ethical System to the subject of Justice. KNOWLEDGE (yvcoo-ts, cognitio).— Th.e, mind's conscious relations with external existence, or with internal occurrence, and its interpretation of these relations. Its basis is conscious- ness ; its causality is the voluntary activity of conscious life ; its method, interpretation by difference ; its result, knowledge of existence, external or internal. Knowledge is immediate, as consciousness itself; mediate, as depending on process of reasoning, inductive or deductive. Immediate knowledge in consciousness is indubitable ; Know- ledge by reasoning requires criticism of its own procedure, by reference to laws of evidence and of thought, — verification by testing of its own process, in accordance with its recognised laws. Epistemology is the philosophy of knowledge, and this must supply the foundation of all philosophy. In the midst of general agreement, there has been consider- able variety in the mode of describing knowledge and its condi- tions. " Of my thoughts some are as it were images of things, and to these alone properly belongs the name idea." "Ideas con- sidered only in themselves . . . cannot, properly speaking, be false.'' There thus only remain our judgments, in which we must take diligent heed that we be not deceived. " Among Kno] VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 221 these ideas some appear to me to be innate, others adventi- tious, and others to be made by myself, factitious.'' Descartes, Medit., iii. Knowledge "may be either inadequate or adequate, — and symbolic or intuitive." Leibnitz, Medit. de Cognitione Ventate et Ideis. " Knowledge is the perception of the connection and agree- ment, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas. In this alone it consists," Locke, Essay, iv. 1. 2. " If the word idea be used as . . . sometimes to signify thought, sometimes to signify those internal objects of thought," which are images of things, "this must occasion confusion." Eeid, Intell. Powers, Essay ii. c. 9. " All our knowledge begins with experience." " It by no means follows that it all originates from experience." " By what means should the faculty of knowledge be aroused to activity but by objects, which, acting upon our senses, partly of themselves produce ideas in us, and partly set our under- standing at work to compare these ideas with one another, and, by combining or separating them, to convert the raw material of our sensible impressions into that knowledge of objects which is called experience ? " Kant, Pure Reas., Intro. " All human cognition begins with intuitions, proceeds from thence to conceptions, and ends with ideas." Kant, Pure Reason, Transc. Dial., bk. ii. c. 3. " The relation of knowing is the most mysterious thing in the world. If we ask how one thing can know another, we are led into the heart of Erlcentnissfheorie and metaphysics. The psychologist, for his part, does not consider the matter as curiously as this. Finding a world before him which he cannot but believe he knows, and setting himself to study his own past thoughts, . . . knowledge becomes for him an ultimate relation that must be admitted." "There are two kinds of knowledge broadly and practically distinguishable ; we call them respec- tively knowledge of acquaintance and knowledge about . . . I am acquainted with many people and things, which I know very little about. . . . The less we analyse a thing, and the fewer of its relations we perceive, the less we know about it, 222 vocABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Lan and th.e more our familiarity is of the acquaintance type." James, Prins. of Psyclwl., i. 215, 221. Mchte, Science of Knowledge ; Lotze, Logic ; Green, Prolegomena to Ethics ; John Grote, Exploratio Philosophica ; Veitch, Knowing and Being ; Bradley, Logic ; Laurie, Nova Metaphysica. LANGUAGE {lingua, the tongue ; hence " tongues," languages). — Expression of thought, feeling, and purpose, by use of names and general terms, and their grammatical association, in accordance with conditions of thought. It implies use of vocalisation by physiological appliances, moved from the brain, the function being localised in the cortex. Ferrier, Functions of Brain. Vocalisation, being a physical function, belongs to animal life generally, and may be secured as a reflex -motor, from sensory impression, as in the dog. lb.; described, Calder- wood's Relations of Mind and Brain, p. 99. The variety of vocalisation in animals may be named " language " as being the symbol of feeling. Garner, Speech of Monlteys. But language as the symbol of thought, is the use of vocables, in grammatical relation. Max Miiller, Origin of Language. "Language is a system of signs, different from the things signified, but able to suggest them. No doubt brutes have a number of such signs, . . . but when we come to Man, we find a great difference. He has a deliberate intention to apply a sign to every thing. The linguistic impulse is with him generalised and systematic." James, Prins. of Psychol., ii. 356. " On Lip-reading," Carpenter, Mental Physiol., 204. Language, as expressing thoughts, becomes an aid in think- ing. " Language is evidently, and by the admission of all philosophers, one of the principal instruments or helps of thought." Mill, Logic, bk. i. c. 1. Language is related to the problem of Evolution of Intel- ligence in the world. Darwin, 'Descent of Man, 12mo, 86. " The lower animals differ from Man solely in his almost in- finitely larger power of, associating together the most diversified sounds and ideas; and this obviously depends on the high development of his mental powers." lb., 85. Romanes, Animal Intelligence, and Mental Evolution in Man. Lloyd Morgan, Animal Life and Intelligence. Garner, Law] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 223 Speech ofMotikeys. Calderwood, Evolution and Man's Place in Nature ; and Relations of Mind and Brain. LATENT MODIFICATIONS OP MIND.— Activity of mind not present in consciousness, or not observed as present, nevertheless inferred as apparently essential to what is con- sciously done. One considerable part of the explanation of such action may be " unconscious cerebration.'' Carpenter, MeiitaZ Physiology. Another and more important part is the complexity of mental exercise, and the occupation of attention with more prominent features in a mental state. Sully, Human Mind, i. 465. The action of mind is so marvellous, and a philosophy of its procedure so difficult, that it seems needful to recognise a con- siderable amount of unexplained activity. The phenomena of Hypnotism, involving the use of suggestion by an operator, have illustrated how largely mind may act upon an accepted basis, not consciously ascertained or verified. LAW" (Anglo-Saxon, from verb signifying " to lay down " ; lex, law; Xeyio, to arrange). — The expression of a systematised order of events in nature. The significance of the word varies according to the diversity of sphere in which it applies — (1) Physical Law, a uniform sequence of material phenomena ; (2) Intellectual Law, a'condition of rational procedure essential for attainment of truth ; (3) Moral Law, an imperative of conduct, requiring right action ; (4) Civil Law, a statute issued by the Legislature regulating the relations and actions of the people of the State. The general conception of Law is that of a fixed order in Ifature, which must be accepted as such by a rational agent. Its secondary seuse, is the fixed order established in society by constituted authority. For Science and Philosophy, the conception of Law is funda- mental. " Metaphysics must start from the ideal of law,'' involving a teleology. Lotze, Metaphy., transl., p. 15. What is called " uniformity of law " in physical nature, is resolvable into " the persistence of relations among forces." Herbert Spencer, First Principles. In this sphere. Laws are " those highest generalisations now being disclosed by Science 224 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Lib which are severally true not of one class of phenomena, but of all classes of phenomena." The Epistemological problem involved is this, — Are all laws of Nature known as inductions ; or are the laws of thought and of right conduct, known as necessary truths 1 This is the fundamental question of Epistemology, brought into view by the inductions of Science. All laws of the physical order in the universe are inductions, expressive of a uniform relation of things. They are conclusions formulated from observations. When we enter the sphere of rational life, " law " becomes rule of conduct, to be interpreted and applied by a rational agent, in order that the end may be secured. Here we have a dis- tinct phase of law ; — " prescribed rule," application of which is possible only in the life of a rational agent. Ethical law is depicted by Kant as "The Imperative of Eeason" which declares an action to be objectively necessary. In this view "Duty is the necessity of acting from respect for the law." Moral laws are " those maxims by the observance of which our conduct acquires an approbation that is independent of all consequences." Lotze, Outlines of Pract. Philos., transl., 2. LIBERTARIAN.— Applicable to the doctrine of Eree-Will, and to its supporters. This doctrine is that "Will-power implies capability of rational self-control in government of motives. — See Freedom of Will. LOCAL SIGNS. — A phrase used to describe the means employed for conversion of the non-spatial data of sense into a spatial world. "The single impressions exist together in the soul in a completely non-spatial way, and are distin- guished simply by their qualitative content From this non-spatial material, the soul has to re-create entirely afresh the spatial image that has disappeared ; and in order to do this, it must be able to assign to each single impression the position it is to take up in this image relating to the rest, and side by side with them. Presupposing this .... that for unknown reasons the soul can and must apprehend in spatial forms what comes to it as a number of non-spatial impressions, some clue will be needed, by the help of which it may find for each Log] VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. 225 impression the plan it must take, in order that the image that is to arise in idea may he like the spatial figure that has dis- appeared." Lotze, Metaphysics, hk. iii. ch. iv., Bosanquet's Tr., p. 485. The means of this " localisation " of the impressions are " local signs." " A token of its former spatial position must be possessed by each impression, and retained throughout the time when that impression, together with all the rest, was present in a non-spatial way in the unity of the soul. Where, then, does this token come from ? . . . . It is not until these similar stimula come in contact with our bodies that they are distin- guished, and then they are distinguished according to the different points at which they meet the extended surface of our organs of sense. This accordingly may be the spot at which the token I am describing has its origin, a token which is given along with the stimulus, in consequence of the effects produced by it at this spot, and which in the case of each single stimulus is distinguished from that given along with any other stimulus." lb., pp. 485-6. See "Wundt, Grundmge der Physiol. Fsychologie. LOGIC (XoytKij, Xdyos, reason, reasoning, language). — The word logica was early used in Latin ; while ■q Aoyi/oj and to A.oyiKoi' were late in coming into use in Greek. Aristotle did not use either of them. His writings, which treat of the syllo- gism and of demonstration, were entitled Analytics. The name Organon was given to the collected series of his writings upon logic by the Peripatetics (ef. Topics, viii. 14). The reason of the name is, that logic was regarded as not so much a science in itself, as the instrument of all science. The Epicureans called it KavoviKTi, the rule by which true and false are to be tried. Plato, in the Phasdrus, had called it a part (fiipog), and in the Parmenides the organ (opyavov) of philosophy (see Trendelen- burg, Elementa Log. Arist.). An old division of philosophy, originating with the Stoics, was into logic, ethics, and physics. The name Logic is used in a variety of senses. First, there is a most restricted use, which limits to Formal Logic — the science of the laws of thought, as thought. Hamil- ton, Mansel, Thomson. " Logic is the science of the laws of thought as thought ; that is, of the necessary conditions to which thought, con- P 226 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [LOg sidered in itself, is subject." Hamilton, Reid's Works, p. 698, note. " It is the science of the form or formal laws of thinking, and not of the matter." Thomson, Outlines of the Laws of Thought. Second, the theory of evidence, or philosophy of the whole mental processes by which the mind attains to truth. " The science of the operations of the understanding which are sub- servient to the estimation of evidence." Mill's Logic, Intro., § 7. On the question how far Logic is concerned with the method, and not with the mere form of thought, see Lotze, Logic, p. 26, Bosanquet's transl. Third, an account of the ultimate principles of knowledge in their systematic connection. This is the Transcendental Logic, according to the Critical Method of Kant. " Logic may be considered as twofold, namely, as Logic of the general, or of the particular use of the understanding. . . . General Logic is, again, either pure or applied. In the former, we abstract all the empirical conditions under which the understanding is exercised." In the latter, Logic " is directed to the use of the understanding, under the subjective empirical conditions which psychology teaches us." Critique of Pure Reason, Transc. Analytic, Introd. Fourth, a rationalised theory of existence. Thus Hegel calls his entire system a Logic of Being. The process of ex- istence and of thought alike being a dialectic movement, the following out of that movement in either of its aspects is a Logic. All thought-movement, having in every advance these three moments, affirmation, negation, and absorption, is the key to existence as a totality, for aU is movement of the rational. Logic has been variously subdivided, as Pure, and Mixed or Applied. The former would embrace the Logic of Deduction ; the latter that of Induction and Testimony. Deductive Logic consists of three parts, corresponding to the three forms in which thought manifests itself, viz., the Concept, the Judgment, and the Syllogism. Method, or the scientific arrangement of thoughts, is frequently added as a fourth head. For a state- ment and criticism of the doctrines of the leading logical schools, as well as the discussion of the nature and province Maj] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 227 of Logic, see art. " Logic," by Adamson, Encydopxdia Britan- niea, 9th ed. LOVE. — Benevoleu't disposition, involving regard, admira- tion of the person, and readiness to help. Love and Hate are the affections of mind from which all the others take their rise. The former is awakened by the coijtemplation of that which is regarded as good; the latter by contemplation of that which is regarded as evil. This in the rational life is the form in which the common law of attraction and repulsion manifests itself. MACROCOSM (/iaicpos, large ; Koa-fio^, world). — The opin-, ion of many ancient philosophers that the world consists of a soul and a body, was exaggerated by the mystics into the theory of the macrocosm and the microcosm, according to which the universe represented man on a grand scale, and man was an epitome of creation. MAGNANIMITY (magnus, great ; miimvs, mind). — Great- ness of soul. The crowning element in character, springing from appreciation of the dignity of human nature, in view of its powers and responsibilities. Aristotle's description of " the great-souled man " appears in N. Ethics, bk. iv. c. iii. MAGNETISM (Animal).— The hypothesis that the phe- nomena of Hypnotism can be explained by a magnetic current passing from one organism to another. The hypothesis is un- supported by recent observations. — Vide Hypnotism. MAGNITUDE— Perception of this is by touch and by vision. " The real magnitude of an object is directly known by means of active touch. . . . All that the eye gives us directly is an apparent magnitude determined by the area of the retinal image." Sully, Human Mind, i. 250 ; James, Text^ Book of Psychology, p. 342. MAJOR. — Applied both to terms and to propositions, regarded as parts of the syllogism. The major term is that which is the predicate of the conclusion; the minor, that which is the subject of the conclusion. The reason of their being thus designated is that in the Aristotelian logic, the subject and predicate of the conclusion are respectively included and including. The premiss in which the major term is compared 228 VOCABULAET OF PHILOSOPHY. [Man with the middle is called the major premiss ; that in which the minor and middle terms are compared being called the minor premiss. — [J. S.] MANICHuSlISM. — The doctrine that there are two eternal principles, the one good and the other evil, to which the happiness and misery of all beings may be traced. It is attributed to Manes, a Persian philosopher, who flourished about the beginning of the third century. It has been questioned whether this doctrine was ever maintained to the extent of denying the Divine unity, or of affirming that the system of things had not an ultimate tendency to good. It is said that the Persians, before Manes, maintained a dualism giving the supremacy to the good principle ; Manes maintained both to be equally eternal and absolute. The Manichean doctrine is favoured by J. S. Mill, Essays on Religion, p. 116, who regards it as more consonant with the facts of history, than is the conception of an all-powerful God, providing for the good of all sentient beings. This is his inter- pretation of the evil in the universe. See Martineau, Types of Ethical Theories, ii. 89. MATERIALISM reduces a,ll existence to unity in matter. I. Ancient. — Materialistic thought in ancient Grace is repre- sented by Leucippus and Democritus, who were " the founders of the Atomistic philosophy," and later by Epicurus, who main- tained that atoms and space exist from eternity. Lucretius is the expounder of the doctrine among the Komans. II. Modern Materialism foUows on lines essentially the same as ancient atomism. It is, however, more conscious : the dis- tinction between mind and matter having been more deeply reaUsed. Modern materialism is more sharply defined and more dogmatically expressed than the corresponding ancient systems. Gassendi, Hobbes, Hartley, Priestley (England) ; La Mettrie and Von Holbach (France). See Lange's History of Materialism (transL by Thomas), "Materialism in England," bk. i. sec. 3, c. 3; ZeUer's History of Greek Philosophy, Pre-Socratic Period (on the Atomists) ; Sellar's Roman Poets of the Republic (Essay on Lucretius) ; Veitch's Lucretius and the Atomic Theory ; Mat] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 229 Munro's Lucretius ; Flint's Anti-Theistic Theories, lects. ii. iii. iv., app. v.-xix ; John Masson, Lucretius. Priestley, Disquisitions on Matter and Spirit ; Three Dis- sertations on the Doctrine of Materialism and Philosophical Necessity; Price, Letters on Materialism and Philosophical Necessity. Under this doctrine, mind is only a function of the brain. The structure of this organ is held to account for aU that dis- tinguishes the intellect of man. " The brain secretes thought, as the liver secretes bile." Cabanis, Rapport du Physique et du Moral de V Homme. MATHEjMATICS (^liaOtjixaTiKri [sc. eirio-T-i;/!?;] ; to fiaO'qfJiaTa). — ^The science of spatial and quantitative relations. Pythagoras and his followers found the ultimate explana- tion of things in their mathematical relations. Spinoza applied to philosophy the mathematical method of demonstra- tion from Definitions and Axioms. The philosophic problem at the • basis of mathematical thought, concerns the question whether mathematics supplies an illustration of necessary truth, recognised as self-evident. On this problem, Kant and J. S. Mill may be taken as repre- sentatives of the conflicting views. " That in the sphere of human cognition, we have judgments which are necessary, and in the strictest sense universal, con- sequently pure a priori, it will be an easy matter to show. If we desire an example from the sciences, we need only take any proposition in mathematics." Kant, Pure Reason, Intro., ii., Meiklejohn's transL, p. 3. " Geometrical principles are always apodeictic, that is, united with the consciousness of their necessity, as "Space has only three dimensions." lb., Esthetic, transL, p. 25 ; of. Kant's Prolegomena, sees. 6-13. " When it is aifirmed that the conclusions of geometry are necessary truths, the necessity consists in reality only in this, that they necessarily follow from the suppositions from which they are deduced." Mill, Logic, bk. iL ch. v. sec. 1. Thus he maintains that " our reasonings are grounded on the matters of fact postulated in definitions, and not on the definitions them- selves." Logic, bk. i. ch. viii. sec. 6, 230 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Mat "MATTER. — Extended substance; res externa, measurable according to length., breadth, and thickness ; divisible accord- ing to quantity. " Body, from its nature, is always divisible." Descartes, Medit, vi. Its recognition by mind involves a dualism, res cogitans, as distinct from res externa. Extended substance does not know. Mind knows extended substance as different and apart from itself, through the sensory, and by its interpretation of sensible experience. Aristotle distinguished between matter and form, — vX-q and etSos. Treating these abstractly, he represented matter void of form as vX-q Trfxarrj, prima materia. The question arises whether this is first in the order of time. If so, how are we to explain the variety of form 1 The real is the concrete unity, form and matter, to (rivoXov. Kant has a special use of " matter," in the interpretation of our Knowledge. "Our Empirical Knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself." Pure Reason, Intro. " The undetermined object of an empirical intuition, is called phenomenon. That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation, I term its matter ; but that which effects that the content of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations, I call its form." Pure Reason, Transe. ^sthet., § 1. MAXIM {maxima propositio, a proposition of the greatest weight), synonymous with axiom; a rule of conduct, a self- evident truth ; Hamilton, Reid's Works, note a, sec. 5. " There are a sort of propositions which, under the name of maxims and axioms, have passed for principles of science." Locke, Essay on Human Understanding, bk. iv. ch. vii. In the Ethics of Kant, Law is "the objective principle," carrying direct command. " Maxim is the subjective principle of volition." " Duty is the necessity for acting from respect for the law." One's maxim may be a self-made rule. True Ethical life is action in accordance with the dictate of the reasori. Here " nothing remains which can determine the will except objectively the law, and subjectively pure respect (rever- Meg] VOGABDLAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 231 eiice) for this practical law, and consequently the Maxim to follow this law even to the thwarting of all my inclinations." Groundioork of the Metaphysics of Morals, sec. 1. MEAN (The), (to fjiicrov or /tco-oTijs). — The middle course between passion and apathy. This is the watchword of the Aristotelian ethics. The term emphasises the great distinction between the ethics as well as the metaphysics of Plato and of Aristotle. According to Aristotle, Virtue is concerned with pleasures and pains ; these follow upon our actions ; hence our actions are liable to be determined by reference to happiness as the End. But all desire tends to excess, wherein is the danger of life. Virtue depends on the energy of the soul, directed according to reason, Kara rov opOov \6yov {N. Eth. ii. 2, 2), in view of the honourable and expedient. Virtuous action is that which finds the happy mean, the action which takes the middle course, shunning extremes. Thus Virtue itself is a mean, a Habit formed by deliberate preference, seeing life's risks and its rewards. Virtue is that by which man becomes good, and attains to true blessedness, such as the great-souled man experiences. Aristotle, N. Ethics, books i. ii. iii. ; Grant, Aristotle's Ethics, Essay iv. vol. i. 251 ; E. Wallace, Outlines of the Philos. of Aristotle ; Beun, Greek Philosophers, i. 397. MEDULLA OBLONGATA.— An oblong body, constitu- ing a part of the great nerve centre, situated above the spinal cord, and just below the Pons. It consists of eight elongated bodies, which together afford a subordinate centre. Here the nerve fibres are arranged in bands or columns ; and the cellular or grey matter is distributed through the substance. It is a centre of distribution in close relation with the spinal cord. MEGARICS (The).— The school founded by Euclid of Megara reckons as one of the three Socratic schools. Its interest was more dialectical than ethical. The teaching of the Megarics is described by Schwegler as " a Socratic trans- formation of the Eleatic doctrine." Intellectually, the Megarics busied themselves with a negative existence, intended to dis- prove the reality of the sensuous and manifold, and preparing the way for the post- Aristotelian Scepticism ; whUe, Ethically, their inculcation of the necessity of a Jife of pure reason, in 232 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Mem which sense and passion were utterly annihilated, has been well called " only a finer, more intellectual Cynicism." Zeller, Socrates and the Socratic Schools, Eng. transl. ; Schwegler and Ueberweg, Histories of Philosophy, in lac. MEMORY {memini, to remember, to recall). — The power of recalling to consciousness experience and knowledge. There are two sides to the process of recollection, the one physi- cal, the other mental; the one in the field of neurosis, the other in the field of psychosis. The sensory centres, being in constant use, are readily thrown into activity, at times even reproducing impressions without contact with the external object. On the side of intelligence, there is conscious association of impressions, conceptions, and experiences such as are dependent on power of comparison. This is the intel- ligent phase of recollection, — remembrance of what has cost us effort to reach and retain, — a continually recurring testimony for the continuity of the conscious life. The Intellectual phase of memory is the dominant, the physical being only auxiliary ; but so far auxiliary that, in the recalling of scenes and inci- dents, there is good reason for supposing that there is renewed excitation of the sensory centres. Continuous action of both sides, physical and mental, is the natural harmony. " The cause both of retention and of recollection is the law of habit in the nervous system, working as it does in the ' Association of ideas.' " James, Prin. of Psychol., i. 653. " All improvement of memory consists in the improvement of one's habitual methods of recording facts." lb., i. 667. There is obvious need for distinguishing the two sides ; next contemplating them in combination. Memory includes all that belongs to the activity of our life ; but the centre of its power is the rational activity which concerns itself with interpreta- tion of experience. " AU improvement of memory consists in better thinking." Spontaneous memory is remembrance. Intentional memory is recollection or reminiscence. The former is passive, the latter active, memory. Sully, Outlines of Psyeliology, p. 276. Carpenter, Mental Physiology, c. ii. ; Wundt, Physiol. Psyehologie, I. 559, 594 ; Ladd, Physiological Psychology, 545-549 ; Calderwood, Mind and Brain, c. ix. ; Met] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 233 Ribot, Diseases of Memory ; Ziehen, Outlines of Physiological Psychology, c. xi. Plato, in seeking to account for our knowledge of the ideal, supposes the pre-existence of the soul, and adopts the hypothesis that knowledge of truth transcending our present experience is to be regarded as a phase of remembrance, ctva/xi/jjcns. Meno, 86 ; Pheedo, 73. MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.— A rational explanation of the facts of consciousness (Psychology), of the conditions of knowledge (Epistomology), and of the problem of Being (Meta- physics). Philosophy is Intellectual, as dealing specially with the cognitive power ; Ethical, as concerned with the conditions of right conduct. These two divisions are mutually dependent, and are complementary in the interpretation of existence. MSBIT (meritum, deserving ; fiipo^, a part, share, or portion). — The good desert of the moral agent in his fulfilling of moral law, as deserving of praise or reward. Self-approba- tion in well-doing has its social equivalent in the approbation of all moral beings. Thus good desert is recognition in moral government of fulfilled obligation, in view of individual re- sponsibility for conduct. MESMERIC SLEEP.— Artificially induced slumber, dur- ing which mental activity is maintained under direction of an operator. Vide Hypnotism. METAPHYSICS (/iera, with, coming next with; (^uVis, nature). — Speculative philosophy, transcending questions as to the nature of mind, and including the general problems of Being, — Ontology. This department of philosophy is concerned with the whole range of speculative problems, beyond the nature and relations of things, thus expressly transcending empirical j)sychology. The origin of the term is commonly referred to Andronicus of Rhodes, the collector of the works of Aristotle, about 70 B.C., who inscribed upon a portion of them the words Ta fUTa TO fl>va-iKd. Whether the phrase was intended merely to indicate that this portion should stand after the Physics in the order of the collected works of Aristotle, or to mark the philosophic significance of the work as the trpiiyrq (j>i\oa-oia — (the fuuda- 234 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Met mental or ultimate philosophy), — dealing with ov y ov, — is not clear. Ueberweg's Hist, i. 145 ; Schwegler's Hist, p. 98. " The name ' Metaphysics ' is a creation of Aristotelian com- mentators. Plato's word for it was ' Dialectics,' and Aristotle used instead of it the phrase ' first (fundamental) philosophy,' while Physics in a like connection is for him 'a second philo- sophy.' Every science selects for investigation a special sphere, a particular species of being, but none of them applies itself to the notion of Being as such. There is a science necessary, therefore, which shall make an object of inquiry on its own account, of that which the other sciences accept from experi- ence, and as it were hypothetically. This is the office of the first philosophy, which occupies itself therefore with being as being, whereas the other sciences have to do with special concrete being. Metaphysics constituting, then, as this science of being and its elementary grouuds, a presupposition for the other disciplines, are naturally _^rsi philosophy. If there were, says Aristotle, only physical beings, physics would be the first and only philosophy ; but if there is an immaterial and unmoved essence which is the ground of all being, there must be also an earlier, and, as earlier, universal philosophy. This first ground of all being is God, and for that reason Aristotle sometimes also calls his first philosophy Theology.'' Schwegler, History of Philosophy, 8th ed., p. 98, Stirling's Tr. In common usage, "Metaphysics" includes all problems concerned with the Universe, regarded as a systematised whole, within the sphere of science ; and, beyond this, with the Totality of Being, for which the known Universe is witness. It presupposes a Philosophy of Observation, — -Science and Philosophy taken together. Its method implies that the results of observation are accepted as data, while observation itself is inadequate to deal with the problems which it raises, and that Eeason must pursue its own course for its own satisfaction, relying on the laws of thought themselves. Thought must complete its self-imposed task, seeking a system of Being, in harmony with observation, external and internal, always giving precedence to " the facts of consciousness." Met] yOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 235 For a Rational Philosophy, this is the ultimate philosophy. Its antagonistic scheme is Positivism, which knows only facts, and, ignoring causes, assigns " Metaphysic " to the infancy of the race, circumscrihes inquiry by a boundary-line of "Agnosticism," and denies the possibihty of " Metaphysics " as defined above. Kant, devoting his main efforts to secure an adequate theory of knowledge, gives a subjective, rather than an objective rendering of the term "Metaphysic." He is less concerned with the sphere of knowledge ; more with the mode of know- ing, and more especially with the conditions of knowledge. His aim is to find along with the empirical^ and in the midst of it, the Transcendental, — the presence in experience of conditions not supplied by experience, — and for him this is the "Meta- physical" in knowledge, that which is along with, and yet beyond, all questions as to the nature of the things known. The first result under his method is destructive, for the Ideas of the Eeason, — God, the Soul, the Universe, — are merely regulative of our procedure, and have no objective significance, such as Descartes claimed, — Descartes, Method. But, the " Metaphysical " in Epistemology must lead on the more surely to " Metaphysics " as a branch of Philosophy. This Kant at once recognises when he passes to Practical Philosophy, where the authority of moral law is the essential fact. The following quotations illustrate Kant's positions : — " Reason finds itself compelled to have recourse to principles which transcend the region of experience, while they are regarded by common-sense without distrust. It thus falls into confusion and contradictions. . . . The arena of these endless contests is called metaphysic." Preface to 1st edition of Pure Reason, Meiklejohn's Tr., xvii. Metaphysic is thus "a science which shall determine the possibility, principles, and extent of human knowledge a priori." "In this transcendental or supersensible sphere, where experience affords us neither instruction nor guidance, lie the investigations of Reason. . . . The unavoidable problems of mere pure reason are God, Free- dom (of wiU), and Immortality. The science which, with all its preliminaries, has for its special object the solution of these problems, is named Metaphysics." 76., 4, 5. " Metaphysic is 236 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Met divided into that of the speculative and that of the practical use of pure reason, and is, accordingly, either the metaphysio of nature, or the metaphysic of ethics. The former contains all the pure rational principles ... of all theoretical cogni- tion ; the latter the principles which determine and necessitate a priori all action. . . . The metaphysic of speculative reason is what is commonly called metaphysic in the more limited sense. But as a pure moral philosophy properly forms a part of this system of cognition, we must allow it to retain the name metaphysic." lb., p. 509. "Metaphysics means nothing but an unusually obstinate effort to think clearly." James, Princ. of Psychol., i. 145. Metaphysical Method in Philosophy, Hodgson, Mind, ix. 48. MBTBMPIEICAL {iix.Ta., beyond; e/i7rcipta, experience). — •" Since we are to rise to Metaphysics through Science, we must never forsake the method of science ; and further, if, in con- formity with inductive principles, we are never to invoke aid from any higher source than experience, we must, perforce, discard all inquiries whatever which transcend the ascertained or ascertainable data of experience. Hence the necessity for a new word which will clearly designate this discarded remainder — a word which must characterise the nature of the inquiries rejected. If, then, the empirical designates the province we include within the range of science, the province we exclude may fitly be styled the Metempirical." Problems of Life and Mind, 1st series, p. 16, G. H. Lewes. METEMPSYCHOSIS (/xera, beyond; i/julrvxoi, having life ; — ev, in ; ^xVj breath, life, soul). — The transmigration of the soul from one body to another. According to Herodotus (ii. 53, 81, 123), the Egyptians were the first to espouse this doctrine of transmigration of the soul through a variety of animal forms. The conception passed over to the Pythagoreans, and was adopted by Plato, as accounting for the present disordered condition of our race, as captives to sense. The Pythagoreans had previously repre- sented the soul as chained to the body, dwelling in it as in a prison. To this Plato seems to refer, — Phssdo, 62. " Those men, for whom it would be better to die, may not do themselves Min] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 237 a service, but they must await a 'benefactor from without. . ; The reason which the teaching gives " (apparently the Pythai goreans) " is, that man is in a kind of prison, and that he may not set himself free, nor escape from it, seems to me rather profound, and not easy to fathom." Church's Transl. Pater, Plato and Platonism, p. 57. METHOD (/xe^oSos ; /tera, with, and 68os, a way). — Systema^ tised conditions for advancing from one position to another ; the rule of procedure for thought, in accordance with which truth may be reached ; the essential conditions for Epistem- ology. " We ought to see well what demonstration (or proof) suits each particular subject ; for it would be absurd to mix together the research of science and that of method." Aristotle, Metaphys., lib. ii. Aristotle first developed Formal Logic, giving us the Deductive method, inference from a general truth to particulars. Modern Philosophy has made conspicuous the Inductive Method, — inference of general truth from observed examples. Method "involves the two great questions, what is the distinction, and what is the road to the distinction." Baldwin, Mements of Psych., 12. Aristotle's Organon; Descartes, Method, Yeitch's transl. ; Kuno Pischer, Descartes and his School, Gordy's Tr. ; MiU, Logic; Jbyotis, Principles of Science; Lotze, Logic, Bosanquet's Tr. ; Cyples, Process of Human Experience. MICROCOSM (/ti/cpos, small ; Koa-fiog, world). — Commonly applied to Man, whose nature, physical and spiritual in one, is representative of the cosmos as a whole. Bacon, Advancement of Learning, bk. ii. ; Eeid, Active Powers, iii. 1. 1 ; Lotze, Microkosmus, translated by Hamilton and Jones, i. 401. MIND (mens ; vovs ; Anglo-Saxon, ge-mynd, to think ; German, meinon). — Intelligence, as seen in self-conscious activity, gathering knowledge of existence. Mind appears in relation with organic life, but is known in consciousness as distinct from organism in exercise, and in the results of activity. It stands in contrast with organism : its feeling is distinct from nerve sensibiUty ; its activity is different from motor activity. While in man's experience the relation of organism and mind is constant, it is a relation disclosing at 238 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Mill every point the superiority of mind to organism. The Sensory is subject to excitation by contact with the external ; Mind inter- prets consequent experience. In the field of activity, mind con- templates the conditions of action, and the end to be reached ; forms a purpose, and utilises muscular activity in the exercise of will-power. Intelligence is directly known by man in the activity of his own consciousness. Thought is its essential characteristic. We attribute intelligence to our fellow-men only as they give ex- pression to intelligence in word or action. Language is the first index to the intelligence of others ; range of activity is the next. The question, does Mind appear in relation with organic life lower than the human, can be answered only by observation of animals. In default of language, their actions must supply the evidence. Within animal experience, we distinguish sensibility, instinct, and interpretation of signs other than those which are the expression of their physical feeling. The great difiiculty in conducting observations is to find an exact definition of " mind." That the exercise of thought by use of general terms does not belong to animals, is clear. The definition of " Intel- ligence " must exclude this, and must include that in our own intelligent life which falls beneath this. Interpretation of signs, arbitrary yet intelligible, seems the test most available. On the relation of animal to human intelligence, consult Darwin, Descent of Man, c. iii. ; Wallace, Darwinism, p. 461 ; Herbert Spencer's Psychology, part iv. c. 5 ; Sully, Psychology, 481 ; Lloyd Morgan, Animal Life and Intelligence ; Romanes, Animal Intelligence and Mental Eoolution in Animals ; Calder- wood. Relations of Mind and Brain ; and Evolution and Man's Place in Nature ; Murphy, Habit and Intelligence. As Mind concerns itself with the source of all finite exist- ence. Philosophy must refer to an Intelligent First Cause. Anaxagoras was the first of the Greek philosophers to speak of " mind," NoSs, as the source of all things in the Universe. This seemed to Socrates a wiser suggestion than " eccentricities," such as air, water, fire. " I heard of some one who had a book of Anaxagoras, as he said, out of which he read that Mind was the disposer and Cause of all ; and I was quite delighted at the notion of this." Plato, Phxdo, 97, Jowett's transl. Min] VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 239 As to Mind in man, consciousness is the witness, and its testi- mony is on all hands admitted to be indubitable. Since the direct questioning of Consciousness was begun by Descartes, there has been no debate as to the certainty of what is revealed by consciousness. No less certain is the other side of the Cartesian statement, " Cogito,'' " I think." Thought, strictly interpreted, is the distinguishing characteristic of the intelligent life in man. "By Mind (Gemuth), there is only to be understood the faculty of combining given represental.ions, and so producing unity of empirical apperception (Animus), not the substance {Anima), as in nature altogether distinct from matter." Kant, Anthropologie, Werke, vii. 119. Adamson, Philos. of Kant, 241. For analysis of consciousness, see "Ward's " Psychology," Eneydqpsedia Brifan., 9th ed. With "Psychology" must be considered the physical basis of mental activity, as revealed by "Physiology," involving the relations of Brain and Mind. Lotze, Metaph., bk. iii. c. 5 ; Clifford, Lectures and Essays, ii. 71 ; Prince, The Nature of Mind and Human Automatism. The theory of Evolution has given force to this inquiry, — At what point does mind first appear in the scale of life ? The biological question is one of science and of philosophy; the question of fact depends on the definition of " Mind." From one point of view. Mind is presupposed in Evolution. This Darwin recognised. In the opening of his chapter on Instinct is this prefatory statement : " I may here premise, that I have nothing to do with the origin of the mental powers, any more than I have with that of life itself." Origin of Species, 191. "If Evolution is to work smoothly, consciousness in some shape must have been present at the origin of things." James, Principles of Psychol., ii. 149. From another point of view, Evolution only presupposes Organism, which is held to account for the appearance of Mind. The tendency here has been to escape or to ignore the chasm, by making Mind commen- surate with life, suggesting that "mind-stuff," or "soul-stuff," belongs to life in its germinal or protoplasmic form. In this hypothesis then is evidence of the difficulty of a monistic scheme. Sensibility and Motion are coextensive with life, but these are not equivalent to Intelligence, as they do not involve know- 240 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Mod ledge. The contrast between sensibility of the nerve-fibre and the interpretation of sensory impressions is vast. A philosophy of " mind-stuff" does not exist. Observation affords no warrant for the hypothesis, that " self-consciousness " belongs to all life. Granting the existence of mind, as a distinct spiritual entity, having strictly spiritual functions, it exists in complete and constant unison with organic life. So much is a parallelism of function apparent, that there seems evidence favouring the con- clusion that " the immediate condition of a state of conscious- ness is activity of some sort in the cerebral hemispheres," — James, Teat-Booh of Psychology, 5, — ^but obscurity stUl hangs over the interpretation of this " condition." MODE (modus, measure, standard, quantity). — Modification of form, quality, or relations of qualities, such as mark indi- viduality within a species. A mode is variable, and does not affect the essence of the object. Modes are secondary or subsidiary ; variable conditions of existence. Modification is properly the bringing of a thing into a mode, but is used also to denote the made of itself. Spinoza distinguishes mode from attribute : — •" By attribute I understand that which the mind perceives of substance as con- stituting its essence. By mode I understand the affections of substance, or that which is in something else, through which also it is conceived." Ethics, pt. i. defs. 4 and 5. MOLECULE {moles, mass ; moleculd, a little mass). — Dis- tinguished from atom, as the smallest particle of matter (elementary or compound) which can exist apart. MOMENT. — A constituent point in the history of move- ment ; an essential element in thought, such as " affirmation." According to Hegel, there are three moments in all thought- movement. These are, affirmation, contradiction or difference, absorption. This is the trilogy of the Hegelian Logic, which regards the Dialectic movement of thought as the true philo- sophy of Being. MONAD (/tovas, unity, one). — According to Leibnitz, the elementary particles of matter are vital forces, acting not mechanically, but from an internal principle. They develop from within, constituting a system by the agency of the Monad Mor] YOCABULAET OF PHILOSOPHY. 241 Monadum. Opera PhUosopMea, Erdmann ; Nov. Ess., Theod. ; Epist. 30, p. 740 ; Translation of the Monedology in Journal of Speculative Philos., 1867, edited by Harris, vol. i. p. 129 j Philosophical WorTcs of Leibnitz, translated by Duncan ; " Monadology," abridgment of the "Theodicy," MONISM (juovo'i, alone or single). — The unity of all being. This theory rejects the dualism of mind and matter, affirming either that there is nothing but Mind and its manifestations, or that there is nothing save Matter and its properties. Where the Theistic conception is a preliminary, the theory is Panthe- istic, as in Spinoza and Hegel; in the second form of the theory, it is non-Theistic. "The philosophical Unitarians or Monists reject the testimony of consciousness to the ultimate duality of the subject and object in perception, but they arrive at the unity of these in different ways. Some admit the testimony of consciousness to the equipoise of the mental and material phenomena, and do not attempt to reduce either mind to matter, or matter to mind," but "maintain that mind and matter are only phenomenal modifications of the same common substance." Hamilton, Metaph., lect. xvl. The monistic thought of the present day takes one of two forms: either the empirical formula of continuity of Energy, favoured by physical science; or a monistic Idealism, as in Hegel, which regards all as the expression of the Idea, the manifestation of a spiritualistic movement, first in nature itself, and then in consciousness. For summary of the Hegelian theory of "the one Divine mind reproducing itself in the human soul," refer to Green's Proleg. to Ethics, 189, § 180. Compare Morris's Introduction to the Exposition of Hegel's Philosophy of the State, Griggs' "Philosophical Classics." " Jewish Mediaeval Philosophy and Spinoza," Sorley, Mind, V. 362; Hoffding's Outlines of Psychol., p. 68. MONOTHEISM (/^loVos, alone; ^cos, God).— The belief that God is essentially one. MORAL (moralis, pertaining to manners ; mos, custom). — The approved in practice ; the quality, good or bad, belonging to actions as tested by moral law. When, by abbreviation, we speak of "moral judgments" and "moral sentiments," we 242 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Mor mean judgments and sentiments concerned with right conduct. There is no use of the term " moral " apart from the recognition of universal law — a direct command — implying the necessity of an act. Our theory of the knowledge of such laws does not involve real diversity as to the significance and objective autho- rity of the law itself. MORAL FACULTY.— Conscience ; the power of mind hy which we obtain our knowledge of moral law. The phrase belongs to Epistemology. It is not in any way concerned with the power of doing what the law requires. References to " Moral Faculty " are more common under Ethical Theories which regard moral law as the expression of universal truth. Butler's Sermons "On Human Nature." Such references are less frequent under theories which represent moral distinctions as inductions from experience. See, however, Bain, Emotions and Will, 283. MORAL PHILOSOPHY.— Ethics ; the science of human duty ; the theory of moral life ; of personality as subject to moral law. It is the philosophy of our knowledge of moral law, of the application of such law to conduct, and of our relations as moral beings. " Morality commences with, and begins in, the sacred dis- tinction between thing and person. On this distinction all law, human and divine, is grounded." Coleridge, Aids to Reflection. " Ancient Greek Philosophy was divided into three sciences : Physics, Ethics, and Logic." Ethics is "the science of the laws of freedom." " Ethics must also consider the conditions under which what ought to happen, frequently does not." Kant, Pref. to Gfroundwork of the Metaphysics of Ethics. " In what is commonly known by the name of Moral Philo- sophy there are two sciences : one the science of Virtue (Archaics) ; the other, the science of Happiness (Eudaimonics). The two sciences need each other, and affect each other ; but they start from different points." John Grote, Moral Ideals, p. 1. " We may call aU philosophy empirical, so far as it is based on grounds of experience ; . . . that which delivers its doctrines from a priori principles alone, we may call pure philosophy." " In Ethics, the former may be Taa,meiA. practical Anthropology ; the latter. Morality." Kant, Groundwork, Abbot's Tr., pref., 2. Mor] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 243 With duty and happiness, Fichte includes positive morality, communion with God, and the philosophic knowledge of God. The law of human freedom is the rule of rational law, placing us in relation with the Deity, so giving natural theology a place in moral science. Fichte, System der Sittenlehre. " To show how the ethical universe is to he comprehended " is Hegel's statement of his ohject, as given in the introduction to Philosophie des Rechts. " From the dawn of philosophy, the question concerning the summum honum, or, what is the same thing, concerning the foundation of morality, has been accounted the main problem in speculative thought." J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, p. 1. " A Method of Ethics " may be explained to mean " any rational procedure by which we determine Eight Conduct." Sidgwick, Method of Ethics, p. 1. In lyEoral Philosophy, schools of thought are divided accord- ing as knowledge of moral law is referred to insight of reason, or to induction from experience ; and according as the ethical end is represented as fulfilment of ethical law, or the happiness or perfection of the agents. The modern Eational School is represented by Kant, Eeid, Stewart, Fichte, Hegel, Lotze, Bradley, Green, Porter, M'Cosh, Martineau. The Experiential School, by Hobbes, Bentham, J. S. MUl, Herbert Spencer, Bain, Sidgwick, Leslie Stephen. Within the Eational School, Kantians and Hegelians occupy distinct positions as to the significance of Ethical law, and of free-will. The E"eo-Kantian division of recent times leans more to Hegel than to Kant. For outlines, see Muirhead, Elements of Ethics. Eecent discussions. — Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory ; Green, Prolegomena to Ethics. Criticisms of this work, — Ed. Caird, Mind, viii. 544; Sidgwick, Mind, ix. 169; "Green's Metaph. of Knowledge," A. J. Balfour, Mind, ix. 73, by same author, " The Philosophy of Ethics," Mind, iii. 67 ; " Ethics and Politics," Barratt, Mind, ii. 453; "Evolution of Morality," J. Seth, Mind, xiii. 27. " Idiopsychological Ethics," Sidgwick, Mind, xiL 31 — criticism of Martineau. Lotze, Practical Philo- sophy, transl. by Ladd; art. on Value, Alexander, Mind, n.s. L 31. 24)4 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. [MOP MORAL SENSE. — A designation of the moral faculty, when its functions are interpreted by analogy of the special senses. Such usage belongs to a transition period in British Ethics. Shaftesbury, Inquiry concerning Virtue, 1711, as in The Characteristics ; Huteheson, Inquiry and System of Moral Philosophy ; Kant's objection to such representations. Ethics, Abbot, 3rd ed., 128, 213. Later usage employs the phrase to indicate moral sentiment, awakened by self-criticism, under application of moral law, as reverence for law, and self-approbation or self-condemnation. While law is constant, sentiment is variable, depending on individual reflection. MORPHOLOGY (/top^^, form; Xdyos, science). — Th^ science of organic form. Haeckel, Gen. Morph., i., Introd. ; Spencer, Principles of Biology, i. Article " Morphology,'' P. Geddes, in En^yclopsedia Britannica (9th ed.). MOTIVE {moveo, to move). — Mental impulse or internal spring of action, whether desire, affection, or passion. Motor excitation belongs to organic life ; Motive is impulse within. Physical appetite has its motive power in consciousness. The word principle, as signifying the origin of action, is often used as synonymous with motive. Simultaneous action of a variety of motives may supply a combination of motive force. " By motive I mean the whole of that which moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition, whether that be one thing singly, 01 many things conjunctly. Many particular things may concur and unite their strength to induce the mind; and when it is so, aU together are, as it were, one complex motive What- ever is a motive, in this sense, must be something that is extant in the view or apprehension of the understanding, or perceiving faculty. Nothing can induce or invite the mind to will or act anything, any further than it is perceived, or is in some way or other in the mind's view." Edwards, On the Will, pt. i. sec. 2. As to the Ethical Motive, Kant says : — " Whatever is deduced from the particular natural characteristics of humanity, from certain feelings and propensions, .... may indeed supply us with a subjective principle on which we may have a propension and inclination to act, but not with an objective principle on Mot] VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. 245 which, •we should be enjoined to act, even though all our pro- pensions, inclinations, and natural dispositions were opposed to it." Groundwork, ch. ii. ; Kant's Theory of Ethics, Abbot, 3rd ed., p. 43. Hence Kant's distinction between " patholo- gical " and " rational," in the history of impulse. Conflict of motives is a familiar occurrence. Variety may involve contrariety, rendering combination impossible, and con- flict inevitable. Conflict arises first from the complexity of our nature, and the spontaneity of impulse under laws of sensibility, and of association ; and further, from exercise of will- power in regulation of the motive forces, involving restraint, in order to guidance. Voluntary regulation of conduct, implies choice between motives, — development of one, restriction of another. Our motives in their first appearance are spontaneous J in their subsequent action are voluntarily determined. Green, admitting diversity of desires and aversions in con- sciousness, reasons on the Hegelian basis in favour of " self- realisation " as the end of action, and makes regard to this the sole motive. "The motive necessarily involved in the act of wiU, is not one of the mere desires or aversions. ... It is constituted by the reaction of the man's self upon these, and its identification of itself with one of them, as that by which the satisfaction forms for the time its object." Green, ProlegomenOi to Ethics, p. 108 ; see also Bradley, Ethical Stvdies. " The first point to start from, in understanding voluntary action, and the possible occurrence of it with no fiat or express resolve, is the fact that consciousness is in its very nature im- pulsive." James, Principles of Psychol., ii. 526. What is required here is a clear distinction between mere motor activity and voluntary action. The latter is that which is the product of an act of Will ; — exclusively action which is the result of " express resolve." "All the stimuli to voluntary consciousness may be gathered under a single term, i.e.. Motive, which shall denote any influ- ence whatever, which tends to bring about voluntary action." Baldwin, Elements of Psychology, p. 338. All influences, whether physical or mental, which coming in upon consciousness, move the mind prior to volition, must be 246 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Mot combined in the motive ; but there is need to guard the phrase "tends to bring about voluntary action." It means no more than " quickens interest," — it does not express causality in volition. International Jour, of Ethics, iv. 89 and 229. MOTOR REGION, called also the "Motor Zone."— That portion of the brain in which are localised the centres from which muscular movement is effected. All these are massed together in the centre of the organ, where are localised organic stimuli, and efferent apparatus, for bringing into use the limbs, and more widely the general muscular system. In the early stages of experiment, it became the practice to describe a circle over the region from which response was found in muscular apparatus. Prolonged experiment has shown that this function may be participated in by two collateral convolutions. Though no response is found by application of the electrode in the hollow, it is obtained when excitation is applied on the eminence of neighbouring convolutions. The great central region, both on the outer surface of the hemisphere, and the inner or concealed side, where the hemispheres lie in close relation, being appro- priated to motor action, the front region and the back region of the brain are silent, giving no response in muscular movement to electric excitation, so suggesting that these are sensory centres. See illustrations in Terrier's Localisation; Calderwood, Mind and Brain; James, Text-Book of Psychology. MUSCULAR SENSE. — Sensibihty in consciousness de- pendent on expansion and contraction of the muscles in motor activity. Voluntary use of the muscular system makes experi- ment possible on the whole series of feelings of innervation. Wundt, Orundziige der Physiologischen Psychologie, i. 399 ; Miinsterberg, Beitrdge zur exper. Psychologie ; Carpenter, Mental Physiology; Sully, Human Mind, i. 122; James, Principles of Psychol., i. 61, ii. 189 ; Dewey, Psychol., 56 ; Davis, Elements of Psychol., 20 ; Croom Kobertson, " Munster- berg on Muscular Sense," Mind, xv. 524. MYSTICISM {ixvbi, to shut up ; imiw, to initiate ; /hvo-tikos, secret ; pertaining to /tvo-riypta, mysteries, or secret doctrines). — The term includes philosophical speculation which breaks away from the tests of observation and experience, relying on special Mys] VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 247 exaltation of the spirit, connected with personal abstraction, concentration of attention, or divine afflatus. It recognises the attractions of an intelligible world, purely spiritual in char- acter, and is allured by all speculation which the reality of such a world suggests. Mysticism appears in the eastern religious systems of Brah- minism and Buddhism ; in Greek philosophy, in Neo-Platonism. In the Middle Ages the tendency is seen in Bernard of Clair- vaux. In modern times Germany has been the chief home of Mysticism, under the leadership of Eckhart, Tauler, and, later, Jacob Boehme. "Mysticism has this in common with the true science of reason, — it does not recognise the conceptions of mere sensuous experience as the highest, but strives to raise itself above all experience." Fichte, Characteiistics of the Age, lect. viii. " In the firm reliance on the world of thought as the highest and most excellent, the science of reason and mysticism are completely at one." lb. " Mysticism in philosophy is the belief that God may be known face to face, without anything intermediate. It is a yielding to the sentiment awakened by the idea of the infinite, and a running up of all knowledge and all duty to the contemplation and love of him. Cousin, History of Modern Philosophy, 1st series, vol. ii. lects. ix. x. " Whether in the Vedas, in the Platonists, or in the Hege- lians, mysticism is neither more nor less than ascribing objective existence to the subjective creations of our own faculties, to ideas or feelings of the mind ; and believing that by watching and contemplating these ideas of its own making, it can read in them what takes place in the world without." Mill, Logic, bk. v. ch. iii. sec. 4. Joh. Bapt. van Helmont, Fehrium Doctrina Inaudita, 1642; The Epistles of Jacol Boehme, London, 1649; Glasgow, 1886 ; Jo. Pordage, Mystic Divinitie, 1688 ; Pierre Poiret, Economie Divine, 1680 ; Theologie reelle, 1700. Cousin, History of Modem Philosophy, ii. 94-97 ; Schmidt (Car.), Essai sur le Mystiques de Quatorzihme sieele, Strasburg, 1836. Mysticism as connected with Scholasticism, Ueberweg's 248 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Myt Hist. (Morris), i. 356 ; with German thought, ib., i. 467-470, and ii. 20 ; Jacob Boehme, Schwegler's Hist. (Stirling), 8th ed,, p. 153 ; Jacob Boehme, Martensen ; for Hegel's account of Jacob Boehme, extracted from his History of Philos., Journal of Speculation Philos., 1879, vol. xiii. 269; Vaughan's Hours with the Mystics ; art. " Mysticism," Ericy. Brit, 9th ed. MYTH (jjLvOo^, a tale, or fictitious narrative) is a nar- rative framed for expounding and illustrating some general truth, or phase of virtue. Plato has introduced the myth into several of his dialogues into the Protagoras, Gorgias, Republic, and Timxus. Thus, in the Protagoras, 322, the venerable Sophist is represented as showing that virtue is the gift of the gods, by means of the myth narrating how Zeus sent Hermes to men with the gifts of justice and reverence. In the Eepublic, vii. 514, we have illustration of the limits of our knowledge, and of the need for liberation of the soul by philosophy, supplied by the imagery of pris- oners in a cave. In the Phxdrus, 246, control of the passions is depicted under the representation of a charioteer driving a pair of winged horses. On the use of myth. Cousin, Hist, of Philos., lects. 1, 15 ; Grote, History of Crreece, i. 400 ; Ueberweg, History of Philo- sophy, i. 121; Tylor, Primitive Culture; Lang, Custom and Myth ; Max Muller, Science of Religion. NATURAL (The).— That which belongs to the established order of the cosmos. This includes all that belongs to the constitution of the Universe, with all that results from the activity of life within it. Modern biology correctly places Man within the sphere of the natural. The influence of Man on the natural history of species becomes a prominent feature for the interpretation of the world. NATURALISM. — A theory which explains occurrences by the forces of Ifature alone, maintaining that Nature carries within itself its own explanation. Naturalism is opposed not only to Supernaturalism, but also to Transcendentalism or Idealism. Herbert Spencer's Theory is essentially a naturalistic one, notwithstanding his acknowledgment of the Unknowable as the Nat] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 249 source of all. ITaturalism in Ethics seeks the interpretation of the moral consciousness by reference to impulse and inclination, with the superadded advantage of intelligence capable of calcu- lating the probable quantity of pleasure attainable by human effort. Sorley, Ethics of Naturalism. NATURAL LAW. — In the physical sense, a fixed order of events in the universe, known by induction from uniform sequence. In the juridical sense, a law of conduct recognised by the common intelligence, prior to judicial enactments. Selden, De Jure Naturali, lib. i. cap. iii. ; Grotius, De Jure Belli et Pads, Prolegom., sees. 5, 6, lib. i. cap. i. sec. 10; Hobbes, Leviathan; Puffendorff, De Officio Hominis et Civis, lib. iii. cap. iii.; Sanderson, De Ohlig. Conseientice, Prselect. Quarta, sees. 20-24 ; Tyrell, On Law of Nature ; CulverweU, Discourse on the Light of Nature ; Lorimer, Institutes of Law ; Maine's Ancient Law, ch. iii. and iv. NATURE. — The cosmos, the entire system of existence in the midst of which we find ourselves. The Universe as a totality. The term is sometimes used to describe the material universe, as in contrast with mind, or with the spiritual world. Recent advances in biological science lead to the inclusion of human life with all life besides. The consequence in termin- ology must be the abandonment of the contrast between Man and Nature in philosophic, as well as in scientific reasoning. Nothing can, however, obscure the distinction between knowing and being. Nature, as the existing, must stand as object ; mind, the knowing power, as subject. Mind, even as subject, has, however, its place within objective existence, con- templated as Nature. ' On this account, a philosophy of Nature is a mind product, not a " Nature " product,; the antithesis returns upon us as a condition of philosophy. " Naturphilosophie " is apt to be Physics proper. On the other hand, all philosophy is an interpretation of the conditions of knowledge. Spencer's view. First Principles, part ii. ch. iii. Spinoza made use of the scholastic distinction between Natura naturans, and Natura naturata. In scholastic philosophy, these phrases 250 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [NeC represented respectively the First Cause, and created things. Spinoza, holding that there is but one substance, used Natura natiirans to indicate the essential attributes of God ; Natura naturata, the modes of these attributes as manifested in the Universe. "Nature considered materialiter is the sum-total of all the objects of experience." Kant, Proleg., § 16. As to " subjective purposiveness in Nature," Kant, Gritik of Judgment, translated by Bernard, p. 259. According to Hegel, Nature is the Idea (the Source of Being) in the form of otherness, or externality to itself. " Nature is spirit in alienation from itself." "There is no possibility of explaining Nature apart from spirit if spirit is more than merely a part of nature on a level with the other parts, or if there is anything in it that goes beyond the limits of what is in them." E. Caird, Philosophy of Kant, i. 33. NECESSARY TRUTH.— The universal,— of the essence of truth, — self-evidently true, as opposed to the particular and contingent. Truth independent of occurrence, yet regulative of thought. General truth, whose contrary cannot be thought, and which in our recognition of it is independent of induction. Locke, notwithstanding his polemic against "innate ideas," has no difficulty in recognising " eternal verities." He says there are " two sorts of propositions,'' the one concerned with " knowledge of particulars '' ; the other " may be universal and certain." In the latter, "knowledge is the consequence of the ideas that are in our minds producing their general certain pro- positions. Many of these are called xtemse veritates. .... Wheresoever we caa suppose such a creature as man is, en- dowed with such faculties, and thereby furnished with such ideas as we have, we must conclude he must needs, when he applies his thoughts to the consideration of his ideas, know the truth of certain propositions, that wiU arise from the agreement or disagreement which he will perceive in his own ideas. Such propositions are called Eternal Truths." Locke, Essay, bk. iv. c. zi. § 14. " The truths of mathematics and morality are certain, whether men make true mathematical figures, or Nee] VOCABULATvY OF PHILOSOPHY. 251 suit their actions to the rules of morality or no." See Fraser, Locke, 69. " The proof of the necessity of certain ideas has never been supposed ... to rest upon the fact that every one was aware of having them." Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, 18. " There is no denying the fact that the mind is filled with necessary and eternal relations which it finds between certain of its ideal conceptions, and which form a determinate system, independent of the order and frequency in which experience may have associated the conception's originals in time and space." James, Pnnaiples of Psychology, vol. ii. 661. Cousin, True, Beautiful, and Good, part i. lects. 1, 2, 3 j M'Cosh, Intuitions, part i. c. 2 ; First and Fundamental Truths, part i. c. 1, 2, 3. " On some kinds of necessary truth," Leslie Stephen, Mind, xiii. 50, xiv. 188. NECESSITARIANISM.— The doctrine that volitions fol- low by invariable sequence from internal causes, just as events in the material universe follow by fixed natural law ; that volition is an example of " causation by character and circumstances " ; and, as character is determined by circumstances, man is determined ab extra. " By moral necessity is meant that necessity of connection and consequence which arises from such moral causes as the strength of inclination, or motives, and the connection which there is in many cases between them, and such certain volitions and actions." Edwards, TTie Will, pt. i. sec. 4; Works, i. 116. Spinoza, letter 62 ; Ethics, pt. prop. 355 ; Hobbes, Leviathan, i. 6 ; Spencer, Data of Ethics, 113 ; Hamilton, Reid's Works, 87, note; Bradley, Ethical Studies, p. 13; Sidgwick, Method of Ethics, 61 ; Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics, ch. vii. iv. 2. J. S. Mill regards the word Determinism as preferable to Necessitarianism. " A volition is a moral efiect which follows the corresponding moral causes as certainly and invariably as physical effects follow their physical causes. Whether it must do so, I acknowledge myself to be entirely ignorant, be the pheno- mena moral or physical ; and I condemn accordingly the word necessity as applied to either case. All that I know is that it always does." MUl, Examination of Hamilton, 562. 252 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Nog NEGATION (nego, to deny). — The characteristic of a judg- ment which denies either the truth of a proposition, or the exist- ence of an object. Like Aiflrmation, it is characteristic of Judg- ment. Simple apprehension is direct knowledge, where no room is left for denial ; the process of judgment is that which admits of affirmation and negation. Strictly speaking, there are no purely negative ideas, notions, or conceptions. NBO-PLATONISM.— The latest phase of ancient philo- sophy, partaking largely of religious Mysticism, developed in the early centuries of the Christian Era. It was idealistic, concentrating on the ideal scheme of Plato, mainly on its practical side. Neo-Platonism regarded itself as a return upon Plato, but was in reality a departure from his philosophic stand- point. It abandoned the problem of existence as one of pure thought, attempting to reach a solution in mystic experience, called Ecstasy. This involved surrender of the distinction between subject and object, and loss of self-consciousness in union with God. God is the one, not only above the world, but above reason ; neither Eeason, nor an object of our cog- nition. The world is conceived as an Emanation from God. The Ethical teaching of Neo-Platonism is ascetic, advocating the duty of gradual emancipation from matter, and pointing to final absorption in the Divine. Its chief representatives are Plotinus, A.D. 204-269, educated at Alexandria, taught at Rome ; Porphyry, born a.d. 232, educated at Tyre, taught at Eome, where he died about a.d. 304. Jamblicus, a pupil of Porphyry, became an avowed upholder of polytheistic belief, against Christianity. Proclus, a.d. 412-485, led a reaction against mysticism, and a return upon philosophic methods. Schwegler, History of Philosophy, pp. 138, 143; Ueberweg, History of Philosophy, vol. i. 240. Cud worth's Intelleetttal System, bk. i. ch. 4 ; Harrison, vol. ii. p. 141 and p. 315. NIHILISM (nihil, nothing). — (1) The extreme of Scepti- cism, — denial of all existence ; (2) The extreme of Socialism, — the negation of social differences. " Hume and Pichte have Not] VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. 253 completely shown, that if the thought of consciousness be not unconditionally recognised, Nihilism is the conclusion in which our speculation, if consistent with itself, must end." Hamilton, Reid's WorJcs, note a, p. 748. As a Social theory, Nihilism is an extreme form of Socialism. Its creed is, in theory and in practice, the necessity of levelling all social distinctions, abolishing property, and all established institutions. NOMINALISM (nomen, a name). — The scholastic doctrine that general notions have no objective realities corresponding to them, and have no existence but as names or words. The doctrine directly opposed, is Realism. The controversy be- longs to the eleventh century. Gonceptvalism is closely allied to nominalism, maintaining the logical reality of the general notion, while denying its external reality. "If nominalism sets out from conceptualism, conceptualism should terminate in nominalism." Cousin, Introd. aux Ouvrages inedits d'Abailaird. Universalia ante rem, is the watchword of the Realists; Universalia in re, of the Gonceptiialisis ; Universalia post rem, of the Nominalists. EiOSceUinus, the leader of Nominalism, in the 11th century applied it to the doctrine of the Trinity, and was opposed by Ansehn. Nominalism was revived in the 14th century by WiUiam of Occam. Of. art. by Seth, Ency. Brit., 9th ed. NORM (norma, a square or rule of builders). — A law of existence ; the fixed type of an order of beings. Anything in accordance with law is said to be normal; that which is not in accordance with law, abnormal. NOTION (nosco; to know, Begriff). — The recognition of a general truth. " Notion " and " Conception " are often made interchangeable. " Notion " is best reserved for the recognition of an abstract truth ; " Conception " for the general representa- tion of individual forms of existence, such as tree, river, mountain. The search of Socrates was for the true definition of Justice, Piety, and Temperance, etc., showing how thought rests on general notions. There is large variety in use of the term Notion^ following upon the use of " idea " for perception, or the product of observation. 254 ■VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Not "Complex ideas" are called notions, as they had their original and constant existence more in the thoughts of men than in the reality of things. Locke, Essay, bk. ii. ch. xxii. sec. 2. " Berkeley distinguishes carefully between ' Notion ' and ' Idea.' His idea is equivalent to the genus Vorstellung (object of sense or imagination) ; his notion is an intelligent apprehension of Mind, and of relations among phenomena." Eraser, Selections, p. 57, note. " The distinction of ideas, strictly so called, and notions is one of the most common and important in the philosophy of mind. Nor do we owe it, as has been asserted, to Berkeley. It was virtually taken by Descartes and the Cartesians, in their dis- crimination of ideas of imagination, and ideas of intelligence ; it was in terms vindicated against Locke, by Serjeant, Stilling- fleet, Norris, Z. Mayne, Bishop Brown, and others. Bonnet signalised it; and under the contrast of Ansahauungen and Begriffe, it has long been an established and classical discrimina- tion with the philosophers of Germany. Nay, Reid himself suggests it in the distinction he requires between imagination and conception, — a distinction which he unfortunately did not carry out, and which Mr Stewart still more unhappily again perverted. The terms notion and conception (or more correctly concept in this sense) should be reserved to express what we comprehend but cannot picture in imagination, such as a relation, a general term, etc.'' Hamilton, Eeid's Works, p. 291, note. NOTIONBS COMMUNES, also called prssnotiones, anti- cipationes, communes notitice, Trpoh^xj/cK,' Koival ewoiai, — first truths, principles of common sense. All these are phrases em- ployed to denote notions or cognitions native to the human mind, which are intuitively discerned, being clear and manifest in their own light, and needing no proof, but forming the ground of truth and evidence as to other truths. NOUMBNON (void), to perceive). — The thing in itself, the object to which the qualities recognised by us belong. In the philosophy of Kant, Noumenon is an object in itself, not relatively to us. According to him, we have no knowledge of Num.] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 255 things in themselves. Besides the impressions which things make on us, there is nothing in us but the forms of intelligence. According to Kant, "The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is caM&A. phenomenon." Pure Reason, part i. § 1. "The conception of a noumenon, that is, of a thing which must be cogitated, not as an object of sense, but as a thing in itself, solely through the pure understanding, is not self- contradictory, for we are not entitled to maintain that sensi- bUity is the only possible mode of intuition. . . . Things in themselves, which lie beyond the province of sensuous cognition, are called noumena, for the very purpose of indicating that this cognition does not extend its application to all that the under- standing thinks." Pure Reason, Meiklejohn's Tr., pp. 186-187. See also p. xxxiii, pref. to 2nd ed. " A phenomenal world implies a noumenal, and the assump- tion of such is absolutely necessary in order duly to subordinate and limit the pretensions of sense. It does not follow, never- theless, that its phenomenal nature attaches any character of uselessness and meaninglessness to this, the world of time, which we, in time, inhabit. Here, as evidence from every side assures us, existence is but probationary. . . . Under reason we shall discover those relations to the necessary unconditioned, that round and complete our world as an object of intellect. Our ■practical critique, again, will introduce us to the veritable noumenal world ; whUe our inquiry into judgment will medi- ate and justify transition from the one world to the other." Hutchison Stirling, Text-Book to Kant, p. 110. — See Adamson's Philosophy of Kant, lect. iii. NUMBER {numerus). — The expression of relations in series. This was held by the Pythagoreans to be the ultimate principle of being. This view exercised a wide influence on ancient speculation. As the spirit of philosophy prevailed, numbers were transferred to a separate science. Bitter's Hist, of Ancient Philos., bk. iv. ; Lotze, Logic, 192. On the philosophy of Pythagoras, Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 89. "Number seems to signify primarily the strokes of our attention in discriminating things. These strokes remain in the memory in groups, large or smaD, and the groups can be com- 256 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Obj pared. . . . Little by little in our minds, the number-series is formed. This, like aU lists of terms in which there is a direction of serial increase, carries with it the sense of those mediate relations between its terms, which we expressed by the axiom, ' the more than the more, is more than the less.' " James, Prin. of Psychol., iL 653. Mode of knowing number, Sully, Human Mind, i. 225, 253, 360, 429. The judgment of number and measurement, Bradley, Princvples of Logic, p. 172 ; Bosanquet, Knowledge and Reality, p. 59. OBJECT, OBJECTIVE {objicio, to throw over against, or lay over against). — " Otherness," distinctness of being from the conscious observer, or from the act of observation. Object and subject are, etymologically, opposites and correlatives. In logic, object, m/TLKeifiei/ov {avTiKajxai, to lie opposite to) was that which was the opposite to another thing, oppositum. In Psychology the significance of the correlative terms has varied according to the changing forms of the theory of knowledge. According to the theory which makes a representative "idea" the thing known, or object of attention, all that belongs to such "idea" is objective, whereas the external existence is regarded as the subject of consideration. That existing externally, is the " substance " or " subject" Under a theory of immediate knowledge, the object is the thing known, as distinguished from the mind which knows; the separate reality, the existence as apart from the knower. "Objective" here signifies, pertaining to the object known; whereas " subjective " means pertaining to the mind. This is the accepted usage now. Objective has thus come to mean that which has independent existence or authority, apart from our experience or thought. Hence moral law is said to have objective authority ; that is, authority belonging to itself, and not drawn from anything in our nature, whether feeling or thought. In the Middle Ages, subject meant substance, and this sense is preserved in Descartes and Spinoza, sometimes even in Eeid. By William of Occam, e.g., objective applies to that which the mind produces ; viz., the idea, image, or representation of an object, as opposed to the real object existing independently. Obi] VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 257 This is the realitas objeetiva of Descartes, Med., 3 ; Veitch's Descartes, note iii. Present usage is due chiefly to the influence of Kant, who, holding that the object known must conform to the constitution of the knowing subject, set himself to the analysis of the re- lations between the objective and the subjective in knowledge. Preface to 2nd ed. Pure Reason, p. xxviii, Meiklejohn's Transl. Knowledge itself has thus a subjective side and an objective. OBLIGATION {ohligo, to bind). — Personal subjection to the authority of law ; oughtness ; duty ; the fixed relation of moral life to moral law and to the moral Governor ; a definite phase or measure of this subjection, in view of circumstances ; a requirement under authority of civU law. Obligation is the uniform characteristic of moral life, which as rational represents to itself the law of conduct, and has the power to regulate motive force accordingly. " Duty is the necessity of an act out of reverence felt for law." Kant, Groundwork of the Metaph. of Ethics, c. 1. The moral law is a " Categorical Imperative," which declares an action to be neces- sary in itself, without reference to any purpose, or end beyond the act itself. Every act has its own particular end ; but, above this, is the end which ethical law requires, namely, its own fulfilment. This obligation of the conscious intelligence to fulfil ethical law is implied in every ethical theory. Hegel, while representing moral life as " realised personality," maintained individual obligation for attainment of this, and for sustaining others in their effort to this end. "By a moral ideal we mean some type of man, or character, or personal activity considered as an end in itself." Green's Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 205. Under a utilitarian theory, it is held that to seek the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the duty of all men alike. Hence the need for MUl's question : — " Why am I bound to promote the general happiness ? " To this, his answer is : — " This difficulty wUl always present itself, until the influences which form moral character have taken the same hold of the principle which they have taken of some of the consequences." E 258 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [OCC Mill's Utilitarianism, p. 40. Bain makes obligation refer "to the class of actions enforced by the sanction of punishment." amotions and Will, 3rd ed., p. 264. See also Sully, Human Mind, ii. 156. " Ethics is the study of what ought to be,'' p. xv. " A method of Ethics is any rational procedure by which we determine right conduct," p. 1. " "We shall have to use the received notions of Duty without further definition or analysis . . . as they are found in the moral consciousness of ordi- nary well-meaning persons," and commonly assumed to be " at least approximately valid and trustworthy," p. 160. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, 3rd ed. OCCASIONAL CAUSES (Doctrine of).— The phrase " Occasional Causes " was employed by the Cartesians to ex- plain the mode of communication between mind and matter. The soul being a thinking substance, and extension being the essence of body, they are heterogeneous, and it is supposed that no intercourse can take place between them without the intervention of the First Cause. The Deity himself, therefore, on the occasion of certain modifications in our minds, excites the corresponding movements of body ; and,, on the occasion of certain changes in our body, awakens the corresponding feelings in the mind. This theory, only implied in the philosophy of Descartes, was fully developed by Geulinx, and Malebranche. Malebranche's doctrine is commonly called the "vision of all things in God," — who is the "light of all our seeing," — the place of spirits. Descartes, Principia, pars ii. sec. 36 ; Malebranche, Recherche de la Verite, vi. 2, 3 ; Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics, lect. xvi. i. 300. Leibnitz, in uphold- ing " pre-established harmony," criticised the Cartesian doctrine, referring for illustration to the possible methods of securing con-, stant agreement between two clocks. Leibnitz, Opera Philoso- phica, Erdmann, 133. OLFACTORY NERVES.— "The upper portion of the nasal passage is covered by a soft mucous membrane, on the surface of which are numerous olfactory cells, which constitute the terminal organ of the olfactory nerve. . . . The olfactory nerve fibres are spread out over the membrane in elaborate Opi] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 259 ramifications, and come into close relation to the olfactory cells. These fibres are gathered together in a series of bundles, . . . which terminate in a bulb at the base of the brain." Calder- wood. Mind and Brain, p. 59. ONTOLOGY (ov, being; and Xdyos, science). — The science of Beiag, — Metaphysics proper, — dealing with the problems which transcend our inquiry as to distinct orders of existence within the world. It is concerned with a theory of Being as such. Ontology has been generally used as a name for Metaphysics, as distinguished from Psychology and Epistemology. Aristotle defines the philosophia prima as eirurnqfjur] tov ovtos g ojTos — Sdemtia Entis quatenibs Entis, — the science of the essence of things ; the science of the attributes and conditions of Being in general. Aristotle's Metaphysics. Modern philo- sophy approaches the problem of Being through that of Know- ledge. Epistemology afibrds the basis for Ontology. Wolff (1679-1754), in claiming for Philosophy the whole field of knowledge, placed Ontology in a conspicuous position as the crowning feature; — ontology, rational psychology, rational cosmology, and rational theology. Ontology he regarded as occupied with the general notions which He at the basis of all philosophising. Kant accepts this terminology. Pure Reason, Meiklejohn's transl., 512. Eeferring to the persistence of metaphysical speculation, Lotze has said, — " When we try to weigh the amount of tenable result which has been won from such protracted labour, we are justified in beginning with that which is first m the order of things, though not in the order of our knowledge ; I mean with Ontology, which, as a doctrine of the being and relations of all reality, had precedence given to it over Cos- mology and Psychology — the two branches of inquiry which follow the reality iato its opposite distinctive forms." Lotze, Metaphysics, p. 20, Eng. Transl. For the Ontological argument for the being of God, as developed by Anselm and by Descartes, see Ueberweg's History of Philosophy, i. 378, ii. 42. OPINION (ppinor, to think). — Unverified thought. Plato defines Opinion as acquaintance with the surface of 260 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Opp things, knowledge of particular forms and occurrences, without knowledge of their causes. "Those who see the many beautiful things, and who yet neither see absolute beauty, nor can follow any guide who points the way thither, . . . such persons may be said to have opinion, but not knowledge." Republic, v. 479, Jowett. Hence the subordinate worth even of true opinions. "Do you not know that aU mere opinions are bad, and the best of them blind ? You would not deny that those who have any true notion without intelligence are only like blind men who feel their way along the road ? " lb., yi. 506. Locke defines Opinion as " the admitting or receiving any proposition for true, without certain knowledge that it is so." Essay, bk. iv. ch. xv. sec. 3. " Opinion is a consciously insufificient judgment, subjectively as well as objectively." Kant, Pure Reason, p. 498, Meikle- john's Tr. " The essential idea of opinion seems to be that it is a matter about which doubt can reasonably exist, as to which two persons can without absurdity think differently. . . . Any proposition, the contrary of which can' be maintained with probability, is matter of opinion." G. C. Lewis, Essay on Opinion. OPPOSITION (in Logic). — " Two propositions are said to be opposed to each other when, having the same subject and predicate, they differ in quantity, or quality, or both. It is evident that, with any given subject and predicate, you may state four distinct propositions, viz.. A, E, I, and ; any two of which are said to be opposed ; hence there are four different kinds of opposition, viz., 1st, the two universals (A and E) are called contraries to each other ; 2nd, the two particular (I and 0), subcontraries ; 3rd, A and I, or E and 0, subalterns ; 4th, A and 0, or E and I, contradictories.'' Whately, Logic, bk. ii. ch. ii. sec. 3. OPTIO NERVES.— The pair of nerves passing from the organs of vision to the brain almost immediately opposite the^ lens of the eyeball. At the rear of the vitreous body is the " dark spot," or yellow spot, so coloured from the presence of pigment in the anterior layers. " On the inner side of this Org] VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. 261 yellow spot the optic nerve enters the retina, and thence dis- tributes its fibres towards the front border." Calderwood, Mind and Brain, 62. Light-impressions are made on this sensitive surface. OPTIMISM {optimum, best). — Thedoctrine thatthe universe, as existing, is the best in its system and order that could be created. The optimist does not hold that the present state of things brings the best possible results to individuals, or to classes of beings ; but that, under a system of fixed law, steady progress is secured towards the highest attainable results. Leibnitz is the most distinguished modern philosopher who has maintained that this is the best of all possible worlds. In accordance with his theory of "pre-established harmony" between soul and body, he passes to view the universe as a whole, as a perfect harmony, — an expression of the perfection of the Deity, the embodiment of the Divine Ideas. TModicie. If evil be inevitable, the progress manifest in the world's history is move- ment towards a spiritual perfection. OBDEH. — Intelligent arrangement of objects, or of means to ends, or of parts to the whole. Unam post aliam. In the widest sense, the system of things existing in the universe. ORGANISM. — The material structure of vital existence, organised being. " An organised product of nature is that in which all the parts are mutually ends and means " (Kant). " The apparatus of Organic Life, serves in the first instance to construct or buUd up the apparatus of animal life, and then to maintain it in working order." Carpenter, Mental Physi- ology, p. 30. ORGANON, or ORGANUM {opyavov, an instrument). The name is appUed to Aristotle's treatises on logic. By the Peripatetics, logic was regarded as the instrument of science. The Organon of Aristotle consists of the following treatises : — The Categories, the De Interpretatione, the Analytics, Prior and Posterior, the Topics, and the Sophistical Fallacies. Bacon gave the name of Novum Organum to the second part of his Instauratio Magna. " The Organon of Aristotle and the Organum of Bacon stand in relation, hut the relation of contrariety : the one considers 262 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Ori the laws under which the subject thinks, the other the laws under which the object is to be known." Hamilton, Reid's Works, p. 711, note 2. ORIGIN (origo, that by which occurrence is produced). — Beginning ; the source of being ; the efficient power from whose action comes any existence, or series of occurrences. ORIGIN OF SPECIES.— FicZe Evolution. OUGHTNBSS.— F«t?e Obligation. OUTNESS.^ FicZe Externality. PAIN. — Suffering; disturbed or distressed experience con- sequent on physical injury ; in rational life, sense of wrong. Pain has its physical basis in the structure of the sensory nerve. The contrast between contact, awakening sensation ; and stroke, or shock, illustrates the contrast between the agree- able and the painful in experience. Sensibility, which is the condition of knowledge, is at the same time possibility of suffer- ing. This law extends through all vital processes in all organic life. From the physical basis, we are led to the adjustments which secure increased duration of life, or increased amount of life. By contrast, disturbance or frustration of these, leads to diminution of life's value, or destruction of life. Herbert Spencer, Principles of Biology. As organism becomes complicated, the possibilities of pain become extended and intensified, either by extension of the area of possible injury, or by disintegration of what is in organic combination. " Pain arises whenever an established nervous co-ordination — in other words, a natural or habitual grouping of fibrils — is in act disintegrated." Cyples, Human Experience, 55. Erom the physical, the law passes over to the conscious life. According as we think of things, so do we experience pleasure or pain. If we do what we judge to be wrong, we endure the pain of self-reproach; if we are wronged by another, we are pained at the loss endured, or the injury done, and at the dis- position manifested, and we feel resentment against the agent. In this way, pain experienced, or, more strictly, the resentment awakened, becomes an impulse to action. " Objects and thoughts of objects start our action, but the pleasures and pains which action brings modify its course and Pan] VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. 263 regulate it ; and later the thoughts of the pleasures and the pains acquire themselves impulsive and inhibitive power. . . . Present pains are tremendous inhibitors of whatever action leads to them." James, Principles of Psychology, ii. 549. " The physiology of pain is still an enigma. ... , It is cer- tain that sensations, of every order, which in moderate degrees are rather pleasant than otherwise, become painful when their intensity grows strong." James, Text-Book of Psychol., 67. PANGENESIS. — A hypothesis as to the mode in which the law of heredity is to be interpreted. " According to this hypothesis, every unit or cell of the body throws off gemmules or undeveloped atoms, which are transmitted to the otfspring of both sexes, and are multiplied by self-division." Darwin, Descent of Man, 228. This is the hypothesis Darwin accepted. Turner, " Cell Theory, Past and Present," Nature, vol. xl.; Calderwood, Evolution and Man's Place in Nature, p. 95. PANTHEISM (ttSs, all ; to ttSv ; Oeo^, God). — Monism : the doctrine that God is all, all Nature being a mode of the Divine existence. This hypothesis implies the necessary and eternal coexistence of the finite and the infinite : the consubstantiality of God and nature, considered as two different but inseparable aspects of universal existence. It may take either of two forms. The higher is the absorption of aU things in God (Acomism) ; the lower, the absorption of God in all things, which is practi- cally Atheism. Personality, Freedom, and Moral Eesponsibility are sacrificed under either phase of the theory. In Greek thought, the Eleatic school, of which the founder was Xenophanes and the chief philosopher Parmenides, main- tained the unity and identity of Being, denying the existence of the finite and changing. The most outstanding example in modern times is presented in the Theory of Spinoza. Ethics. Holding that the universe is explained only by reference to the single notion of God, his main positions are, that there is but One Substance ; that the attributes of the One Substance are infinite ; that all the manifold appearances in Nature are only modes of these attri- butes. God is at once res cogitans and res exiensa ; and there is no existence besides. 264 TOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Par Hegel makes Nature and Spirit successive stages in the manifestation of the absolute Idea, takes dialectic evolution as the key to the unfolding of existence. He represents the Absolute as returning upon itself, so that aU existence is again absorbed in the One. The Logic. Saisset, Modem Pantheism ; Flint, Anti-Theistic Theories ; Plumptre, Hid. of Pantheism, 2 vols. ; Pollock, Spinoza ; Martineau, Study of Spinoza ; Hutchison Stirling, Secret of Hegel ; Wallace, Hegel's Logic ; Green, Prolegomena to Ethics. PARADOX (Trapa So^a, beyond, or contrary to, appearance). — An utterance wearing the semblance of incongruity, yet capable of being interpreted in such a manner as to gain assent. For example, if we aim directly at happiness, we miss it. Mill's Utilitarianism, 23. PARALOGISM (7ra/3aA.oyio-/x,ds, from ■TrapaXoyl^ofJLai, to reason wrongly) is a formal fallacy or pseudo-syllogism, in which the conclusion does not follow from the premises. The Sophism is a fallacy intended to deceive. Under "Paralogism," Kant contemplates the perplexities in which our reason is involved by its own forms. " The logical paralogism consists in the falsity of an argument in respect of its form, be the content what it may. But a transcendental paralogism has a transcendental foundation, and concludes falsely, while the form is correct and unexceptionable. In this inanner the paralogism has its foundation in the nature of human reason, and is the parent of an unavoidable, though not insoluble, mental illusion." Kant, Pure Reason, p. 237, Meikle- john's Tr. It is a ^'sophism, not of man, but of pure reason her- self, from which the wisest cannot free himself." Kant limits the application of the term Paralogism to that illusion which is at the root of Rationed Psychology, viz., the inference, " from the transcendental conception of the subject which contains no manifold," to " the absolute unity of the subject itself." PARCIMONY (Law of), (jiarcimonia, sparingness). — Entia nan sunt multiplicanda prceter necessitateni. Frustra fit per plura quod fieri potest per paueiora. " That substances are not to be multiplied without necessity ; " " that several principles are not to be assumed, when the phenomena can Per] VOCABULAET OF PHILOSOPHY. 265 possibly be explained by one.'' Hamilton, Beid's Works, note a, p. 751. Lotze, Metaphysie, Eng. Tr., p. 373. PARTHENOGENESIS {irapOivoi, virgin; yeVco-is, origin). — " The production of living organisms from uuimpregnated eggs or seeds.'' Darwin, Origin of Species, Glossary, p. 412. PASSION (jpatior, to bear, undergo, endure ; iracrxw, to suffer, or to be afEected by anything). — Highly excited feeling, violently urging towards action ; intense emotion, suffering. " The Passions " is a phrase applied to turbulent feeling, which weakens power of self-command. Plato distinguished feelings as concupiscent and irascible, hnBviua and Ov/jms, desire and anger. The distinguishing of these two was characteristic of his more advanced thought. He starts the question, "Is passion different from reason, or only a kind of reason ? " Repuh., iv. 440. Aristotle included all our active principles under one general designation of Orectic (opeii^, desire). He distinguished them into the appetite irascible, the appetite concupiscible, both of which have their origin in the body ; and the appetite rational (^ovXrja-i's), which is the will, under the guidance of reason. Spinoza, Ethics, pts. iii.-iv. ; Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, bk. ii., "Of the Passions." On the power of the passions to bias the mind, and even to blind intelligence, — MUl, Logic, bk. v. sect. 3. "Any strong passion renders us credulous." PASSIVE. — Inactive. " Passive experience " is the result of physical or mental susceptibility, as acted upon by external objects, or by thought and imagination. PATHOLOGY OF BRAIN.— Science of diseased condi- tions of the central organs of the nerve system. This depart- ment of observation is of special value in Experimental Psy- chology, as illustrating restraints on normal action of mind ; abnormal excitement or depression; delusions, and interpreta- tions of abnormal experience. Feuchtersleben, Medical Psy- chology ; Ferrier, Localisation of Cerebral Disease; Clouston, Mental Diseases ; Yirchow, Gellular Pathologie ; Maudsley, Re- sponsibility in Mental Disease. PERCEPTION {capio, to take ; per, by means of). — Simple 266 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Per apprehension, commonly applied to the recognition of an ex- ternal object by means of the senses. Its essential conditions are, (a) sensibility of organism, excited by contact; (b) the consequent sensation in consciousness ; (c) judgment, a com- paring power dealing with present fact, and with previous knowledge. Internal perception is — simple apprehension of any modification present in consciousness. This is in itself a condition of consciousness. "All the modes of thinking which we experience may be reduced to two classes, viz., perception, or the operation of the understanding, and volition, or the operation of the will." Descartes, Prin. Phil., pars. i. sec. 32. " The two principal actions of the mind are these two : perception or thinking, and volition or willing.'' Locke, Essay, bk. II. ch. vi. "By means of sensibility, objects are given to us, and it alone furnishes us with intuitions ; by the understanding they are thought, and from it arise conceptions." Kant, Pure Reason, pt. first. Introductory. (1) " Perceptio, in its primary philosophical signification, as in the mouths of Cicero and Quintilian, is vaguely equivalent to comprehension, notion, cognition in general; (2) an apprehension, a becoming aware of a consciousness. Perception, the Cartesians really identified with idea, and allowed them only a logical distinction; the same representative act being called idea, inasmuch as we regard it as a representation ; and perception, inasmuch as we regard it as a consciousness of such representation; (3) perception is limited to the apprehension of sense alone. This limitation was first formally imposed by Eeid, and thereafter by Kant. (Kant also distinguishes between sensation, or the matter of perception, which must be given to the mind, and its form which is imposed upon this matter by the mind itself) ; (4) a still more restricted meaning, through the authority of Eeid, is perception (proper), in contrast to sensa- tion (proper). He defines sensitive perception, or perception simply, as that act of consciousness whereby we apprehend in our body, (a) certain special affections, whereof, as an animated organism, it is contingently susceptible; and (6) Per] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 267 those general relations of extension, under which, as a material organism, it necessarily exists. Of these perceptions, the former, which is thus conversant ahout a subject-object, is sensation proper; the latter, which is thus conversant about an object-object, is perception proper." Hamilton, Reid's Works, 876. PERFECTION {perfleio, to do thoroughly, to finish; perfectum, completeness). — Full development; attainment of ideal excellence. " By perfection is meant the full and harmonious develop- ment of aU our faculties, corporeal and mental, intellectual and moral. . . . Human perfection and human happiness coincide, and thus constitute, in reality, but a single end." Hamilton, Metaph., i. 20. " Self-realisation " is the Hegelian representation of the ethical end.' In accordance with a scheme of evolution, it is the unfolding of the life according to its ideal, given in. consciousness. Hegel's Philos. of History and of the State, translated in summary by Morris ; Griggs, Philos. Classics ; Caird, Hegel; Bradley, Ethical Studies; Green, Prolegomena to Ethics. PERIPATETIC (7repi7raT£0), to walk about) is applied to Aristotle and his followers, who carried on their philosophical discussions while walking up and down. Diogenes Laertius says, on the authority of Hermippus : — "He chose a promenade in the Lyceum, in which he walked up and down with his disciples discussing subjects of philosophy, till the time for anointing themselves came ; hence he was called (IlepLiraTriTiKov) Peripatetic. But others say, it was on account of walking with Alexander when he was recovering from an illness." Diog. Laert., bk. v. The disciples of Aristotle are known as the Peripatetics. PERSON (persona). — A self-conscious intelligence exercis- ing understanding and will in the regulation of life. Persona meant the mask worn by an actor, within which the sounds of the voice were concentrated, and through which he made himself heard (personuit) by the audience. It came next to be applied to the actor, then to the character acted, 268 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. [PeS then to any assumed character, and lastly, to each one having the characteristics of a rational agent. "Person stands for a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places." Locke, Essay, bk. ii. 27. " He to whom actions can be imputed is called person." Kant, Metaphysics of Ethics, Semple, 3rd ed., p. 172. " Man and every reasonable agent exists as an end in himself." Ih., p. 41. Only a self -determining agent can be the subject of moral law. Hegel's formula for the ethical imperative is, "Be a person, and respect others as persons." Gnmdlinien der Philosophie des Bechts, sec. 36, p. 42 ; Werke, viii. 75. Green,. Proleg. to Ethics, pp. 84, 191. A. Seth, Hegelianism and Personality. On Personality as belonging to the Absolute, Mansel, Limits of EeUgious Thought; Lotze, Philosophy of Religion, § 25, p. 41 ; Herbert Spencer, First Principles. PESSIMISM.— The theory that evil so prevails in the world, as to make it the worst possible of worlds. In its recent forms this theory is a reaction against Hegel's identi- fication of the rational and the existing. Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, uses "Will" as equivalent to impulse and action in all forms, including even the forces of nature. In these appears the objectification of Will. He holds to a progression in the universe from lower to higher forms of impulse, but considers that in the process excess of pain and evil is inevitable, and therefore that the world is the worst possible. Eng. Transl. by Haldane and Kemp. Hartmann, in his Philosophy of the Unconscious (Eng. Transl. by Coupland), takes a similar view, maintaining that progression is at the cost of suffering to such a degree that it were better the world did not exist, and yet he grants that development implies that the world is the best possible under the conditions. Hartmann's Pessimism thus involves a modified Optimism. Sully's Pessimism; Flint, Anti-Theistic Theories; TJeberweg's History, ii. 255 and 236. Pessimism favours as- ceticism, in order to escape the evil, anticipating unconscious- ness as the end of all. For this theory, the evil thing in the Phi] VOCABULAET OF PHILOSOPHY. 269 direction of conduct is the vdll to live, — the eagerness to sustain and protect our life. The one blessing is found in the Mrvana, celebrated by the Buddhist. PHENOMENON {(JKuvofievov, from (JKuvofiai, to appear; German, Erscheiriung). Appearance, — any transitory element in our experience, — generally applied to sensible appearance. In mental philosophy, it includes the changing states of mind. We thus have " phenomena of nature," and " phenomena of mind," placed in contrast. " The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called pTicnomenon. That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation, I term its matter; but that which secures' that the content of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations, I call its form." Kant's Pure Reason, Meiklejohn's Transl., p. 21. "The empirical intuition is a mere phenomenon in which nothing that can appertain to a thing in itself can be found : ... in the whole range of the sensuous world, investigate as we may, we have to do with nothing but pheno- mena." lb., p. 36. As to self-consciousness, — "The subject intuites itself, not as it would represent itself immediately and spontaneously, but according to the manner in which the mind is internally affected ; consequently, as it appears, not as it is." lb., 4:1. "Things in themselves, which lie beyond the province of sensuous cognition, are called noum^na." lb., p. 187. " The existence of phenomena always conditioned and never self-- subsistent, requires us to look for an object different from phenomena, — an intelHgible object, with which all contingency must cease." lb., 349. These positions involve a thorough-going phenomenalism, which threatens the whole theory of Knowledge. Hence the force of Hutchison Stirling's criticism. Spencer's criticism of the use of " phenomenon," First Prin- ciples, part ii. c. iii. p. 158. PHILANTHROPY (•^iXav^puTTia; ^I'Xos, a friend; avOpmo?, man). — The love of mankind, — the good-will due between man and man as moral beings, possessing the powers, possibilities, and responsibilities of moral life. PHILOSOPHY {ia; (fxXia, love; a-ocjiia, wisdom). — 270 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. [PttT The first use of the word is traced to Pythagoras, who did not call himself (ro^6la.?. Philosophy is the rationalised view of existence; "the thinking view of things;" "the attainment of truth by the way of reason," interpreting the conditions of know- ledge. Technically, Philosophy is the ultimate rational explanation of things, by discovery of the reason of their existence, showing why they exist. Science is a rational explanation of external phenomena, a discovery of invariable sequence in their occur- rence, warranting us to postulate a "law of nature." As in- vestigating the presuppositions of Science, Philosophy has been called "First Philosophy," Ontology, — a philosophy of Being, — " the science of principles." Philosophy thus contemplates the whole of existence, while science deals with selected parts. "Philosophy began in wonder," Aia yap to 6avijA^f.w oi avOpoiiroi, Koi vvv Koi to irptaTov iqp^avTo e'iv. Aristotle, Metaph., i. 2. Rerum divinarum et humarig/rum, causarumque quibus hx res continentur, scientia. Cicero, De Offiaiis, lib. iL cap. ii. " The contemplations of man do either penetrate unto God, or are circumferred to nature, or are reflected or reverted upon himself. Out of which several inquiries there do arise three knowledges. Divine philosophy, natural philosophy, and human philosophy." Bacon, Advancement of Learning, bk. ii. PHRENOLOGY (<^p^v, mind; Aoyos, science). — The hypo- thesis that mind can be interpreted by reference to subdivisions of the Cranium ; a hypothesis set aside by discovery of the relation of the cranium to the brain, and of localisation of functions in the cortex of the cerebrum. Ferrier, Functions of the Brain; Carpenter, Mental Physiology ; James, Prins. of Psychol., i. 27 ; Hoffding, Psychology ; Sully, Human Mind. PHYSIOS. — Science as concerned with the laws of unor- ganised matter. PHYSIOLOGY.— The science of the vital conditions, and organic functions, of living organism. In its relation with mental philosophy, it is its province to deal with the brain and nervous system of man, as instruments Phy] VOCABULAET OF PHILOSOPHY. 271 of experience, thus tracing the external conditions of our feel- ing and knowledge. The facts of experience must he assumed on the testimony of consciousness, in order that observation may seek an explanation of these, so far as physiological law can be found to carry such explanation. Physiology must ascertain the physical basis of experience. In accepting consciousness, it is granted that com- parison and knowledge are distinct from the functions of nerve and brain ; that experience is constituted by the facts to be interpreted ; but that the facts of nerve action are not matter of common knowledge, — not belonging to experience. Hence the utmost that Physiology can accomplish is to ascertain what is the physical basis of a set of facts unknown to Physiology. The philosophy of these facts of experience must be otherwise ascertained, by interpretation of experience itself. Psychology must begin by accepting the testimony of con- sciousness, as Physiology must. While the one ascertains the physical basis of mental life, the other must provide the science of this life ftself, must supply a philosophy of experi- ence. In a Philosophy of mind-action, and mind-history. Physio- logy includes organic structure, the laws of sensibility, the laws of reflex, and of sensori- motor, action, the functions of the several nerve centres, specially the paths and currents traceable in each hemispherical cortex and in the relations of the two hemispheres. This, in rough outline, gives the range of what may be named Physiological-Psychology or Experimental Psy- chology. The transition from the action of fibres and cells, to activity in consciousness, remains a mystery, and cannot be included within the work either of Physiology or of Psychology. We can make out a paraUeHsm between organic function and conscious experience ; but how they are connected and mutually dependent, we are unable to ascertain. Spencer, Principles of Biology. On the relation of Physiology to Psychology, see Carpenter's Mental Physiology; Maudsley's Physiology and Pathology of Mind; Ferrier's Functions of the Brain; Calderwood, Evolu- tion and Man's Place in Nature ; Wundt, Physiologische Psycho- 272 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Pie logie ; Waitz, Lehrhuch der Psyehologie ; Volkmann, Lehrhueh der Psyehologie ; Miinsterberg, Beitrdge zur exper. Psyehologie ; Lotze, Microkosmus ; Ladd, Physiol. Psychology; James, Principles of Psychology; Hoffding, Psychology; Baldwin, Handbook of Psychology and Elements of Psychology. PLBASUEB. — Agreeable experience, whether it have a physical or mental basis. The pleasure-feeling belongs to all life. In so far as experience has origin in organism, some phase of the agreeable is connected with all healthy action. In so far as it depends on thought, experience being psychic in character, the law of the pleasurable is continued, but with more complex arrangement. Here, agreeable experience is partly spontaneous, partly voluntary, as when it is the result of appreciation of " the true, the beautiful, and the good." Behind these contrasts, comes the induction of modern biology that the agreeable in experience is generally associated with the beneficial in action. On this primary fact rests the scheme of biological evolution. Alongside of this must be placed an earlier induction bearing on the characteristics of moral life, to which Aristotle gave prominence, that our dangers are connected mainly with our pleasures. " Guard chiefly against the pleasurable and pleasure itself." N. Ethics, bk. ii. ch. ix. The pursuit of pleasure in- volves many in the loss of life. Out of this acknowledgment comes naturally, Mill's distinc- tion of qualities of pleasures, higher and lower, more and less preferable, as the pleasures are connected with what is higher or lower in the powers exercised. "Human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites." Utilitarian- ism, p. 11. "Sensuous pleasure is natural, but not meritorious to strive for." Lotze, Practical Philos., § 10, p. 23, trans. Ladd. — Vide Happiness Thboet. POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.— The Science of Civil Government ; rational exposition of the principles concerned with security for the liberties, industries, and possessions of men, as this may be provided for in the government of communities. The aim of Political Philosophy is to recognise the laws affecting the relations of persons in organised Pol] VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 273 communities ; and to trace their application through all the intricacies of organisation and government of the state. At its basis lies the principle of Justice, the equality of men as men, under common obligations, and having equal rights of liberty and labour, production and possession. On its practical side, it treats of the application of fundamental principles to the constantly changing conditions of life, the enterprise and com- petition, induced by advancing civilisation. — Vide Political ECONOMT. Hume's Political Essays ; Ferguson's Civil Society ; Hegefs Philos. of History and of the State, Morris's Tr.j Vinet on Social Philosophy, in Outlines of Philosophy and Literature; Lorimer's Institutes of Law ; PoUoek's Jurissprudence and Ethics ; Stephen's Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity ; Buckle's History of Civilisation; Spencer's Sociology; The English Citizen Series, The State's relation to Law, Government, Education, Trade, Labour, Land, Poor Law, Electorate. POLITICAL ECONOMY.— The science of the laws of Wealth, including the laws of production, distribution, and exchange of commodities. "The annual labour of every nation is the fund which originally supplies it with all the necessaries and conveniences of life which it annually consumes, and which consist always either in the immediate produce of that labour, or in what is purchased with that produce from other nations." Smith, Wealth of Nations, i. 1. " Wealth may be defined. All useful or agreeable things, which possess exchangeable value." Mill, Polit. Ec, intro. "The economist regards man as a being who produces, dis- tributes, exchanges, and consumes wealth, and considers him as a member of society, one of the objects of which is to deal with wealth." But " no economist imagines that wealth can be treated quite independently of other social phenomena." Nichol- son, Principles of Political Economy, i. p. 13. " The chief motives which induce the saving of capital are supplied by the family affections." Marshall, Principles of Economies, i. 701. On "the fundamental scientific unity which underlies the whole theory of normal value," see S 274 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Pol Marshall, i. 698. On "the law of diminishing return," and " the law of increasing return," see Nicholson's Principles, bk. i. c. X., vol. i., p. 151. For more recent problems and developments, — Sidgwick, Prins. of Political Economy ; Marshall, Principles of Economics, vol. i., and Economics of Industry ; Nicholson's Principles of Pol. Economy, vol. i. ; Ingram, Hist, of Polit. Econ. ; Palgrave, Dictionary of Polit. Econ. ; Say, Dictionaire UEconomie Politique, 2 vols. ; F. A. Walker, The Wages Question, and Money in relation to Trade and Industry. Literature of Economics, by Professor J. Shield Nicholson, D.Sc, University of Edinburgh :■ — "Mill absorbed all that was best in previous writers, and is the starting-point — in the way of criticism or development — of most of the recent advances. Certain parts of Adam Smith (say, bk. iv.) and Eicardo (say, on Currency) should be read at first hand — great writers cannot be compressed without loss. Sidgwick's Principles is especially good iu definitions ; and, on the ' art of Political Economy and governmental interference,' is suitable for advanced students. Marshall's Principles is ex- cellent on the theory of value. Prof. F. A. Walker, Yale (U.S.A.), has written several text- books which are very good. Dr Keynes (the formal logician) has a very good book on the ' Logical Method of Political Economy,' which gives all the latest (and also oldest) ideas on the subject. The works of Prof. Bastable on Public Finance and Foreign Trade are good iu themselves, and carry on the development on English lines. Bagehot's Lombard Street is a good introduction to money and banking ; and Gr. J. Goschen on the Theory of the Foreign Exchanges is already a classic. In German, consult Schonberg's Handbuch {ayiglice, Fkcyclo- pmdia) of 3000 pages compiled by the joint labour of many Professors. Gide, Principles d'economie politiques, 3rd ed., 1890, is an example of French clearness, brevity, and point. Cossa's (Italian) Guide to Political Economy, translated by Louis Dyer, gives a very good survey of the principal writers. POS] VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. 275 On special points there are some excellent books, e.g., Seebohm's English Village Community is to most people a revela- tion like MaiQe's Ancient Law." — [J. S. N.] POLYTHEISM (iroXvs, many ; 0eos, God).— The belief in many gods has appeared among races the lowest in intelligence, and, at the opposite extreme, flourished in Ancient Greece and Rome. Shaftesbury, Characteristics, bk. i. pt. i. sec. 2. Flint, Antitlieistic Them-ies, app. xxxii. p. 533. Polytheism testifies to the prevalence of religious belief, with the tendency to personify Divine agency, according to the sphere of action contemplated. The action of Socrates in condemning the prevalent religious beliefs of the people of Athens, brought upon him the charge of Atheism. Plato, Apology, 26. PORPHYRY (Tree of).— In the 3rd century Porphyry wrote Eio-ayoiyi;, Introduction to the Categories of Aristotle. In this he represented the five predicdbles under the form of a tree with its trunk and branches ; hence the name. By the Greek logicians, it was called the ladder {kKlfia^) of Porphyry. The Wiaayisr/r] is translated in Owen's ed. of Aristotle's Organon. POSITIVISM. — The name given by Comte to his system of philosophy, as professedly based upon facts, with denial of the possibility of any knowledge of causes; a philosophy of uniform sequences. M. Auguste Comte, Cours de Philosqphie Positive :- — " This is the mission of Positivism, to generalise science, and to systematise sociality ; in other words, it aims at creating a philosophy of the sciences, as a basis for a new social faith." A social doctrine is the aim of Positivism, — a scientific doctrine the means. " The leading conception of M. Comte, named ' the law of the three states,' is that there are but three phases of intellec- tual evolution— the theological (supernatural), the metaphysical, and the positive. In the supernatural phase, the mind seeks causes , unusual phenomena are interpreted as the signs of the pleasure or displeasure of some god. In the metaphysical phase, the supernatural agents are set a^ide for abstract forces inherent in substances. In the positive phase, the mind 276 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [PoS restricts itself to the discovery of the laws of phenomena." Lewes, Comte's Philosophy of Sciences, 1853, sec. 1. Positivism has, however, its system of religion. Its god is Humanity, its worship is le cults systematique de VHumanite. The object of its homage is the human race in its totality, which is conceived as le Grand-Mre. Martineau, The Positive Philosophy of Comte, 2 vols. ; J. S. Mill, Augusts Comte and Positivism; E. Caird, Social Philosophy of Comte; Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, i. 401 ff. ; F. Harrison, articles in Contemporary Review ; M'Cosh, Positivism and Christianity; Flint, Antitheistic Theories, lect. v.; Calderwood, Handbook of Moral Philosophy, p. 59. POSTULATE (postulatum, aiTy]iJ.a, that which is asked or assumed). — An assumed basis from which to reason. Kant's Postulates of Empirical Thought are these : — (1) that which agrees with the formal conditions of experience is possible ; (2) that which coheres with the material conditions of experience (sensation) is real ; (3) that whose coherence with the real is determined according to universal conditions of experience is necessary. Pure Reason, Meiklejohn's Tr., p. 161 ; Stirling's Text-Booh to Kant, p. 323. Kant's Postulates of Pure Practical Eeason " all proceed from the principle of morality, which is not a postulate but a law." They are suppositions practically necessary. " These postulates are those of immortality, freedom, positively considered (as the causality of a being so far as he belongs to the intelligible world), and the existence of God." Kant's Theory of Ethics, Abbott, p. 231. POTENTIAL. — That which can be accomplished, because of power existing in an agent, — the possible, as opposed to the actual, — Swa/iis as opposed to ivipyaa. This antithesis is a fundamental feature in the Aristotelian philosophy. Accord- ing to Aristotle, the universe is a constant process of evolution of the actual from the potential. POWER (potentia, posse, to be able; 8wa/Ats). — Force, as e.g., water-power ; that which originates activity, whether mechanical Pre] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 277 or mental. Direct knowledge of originating power is given only in the consciousness of our own agency. " In the strict sense, 'power and agency are attributes of mind only ; and, I think, that mind only can be a cause in the strict sense." Eeid, Correspondence, pp. 77, 78. " Power may be considered as twofold, viz., as able to make, or able to receive, any change : the one may be called active, and the other passive power." Locke, Essay, bk. ii. ch. xxi. sec. 2. " The terms of efficacy, agency, power, force, energy, necessary connection, and ■productive quality, are nearly all synonymous." Hume, Treatise, pt. iii. sec. 14. " There are no ideas, which occur in metaphysics, more obscure and uncertain than those of power, force, energy, or necessary connection, of which it is every moment necessary for us to treat in all our disquisitions." Hume, Inquiry, sec. 7. Hume's Enquiries, Selby-Bigge, p. 62. Energy maj be taken as the term which includes all in the universe which operates so as to produce change ; force as the measurable amount of potency actually at work ; while self- determined effort in consciousness is the only representation of causality. PRACTICAL (German, praJctisch). — Kant's description of Eeason when regarded as the guide of WiU, in contrast with Reason regarded as a knowing power. "Eeason is bestowed on man as a practical faculty of action, i.e., such a faculty as influences his wUl and choice.'' Metaph. of Ethics, Semple, 3rd ed., ch. 1. It is "the governor of the WiU to constitute it good." " Thus is the common reason of man compelled to go out of its sphere, and to take a step into the field of practical philosophy, not to satisfy any speculative want (which never occurs to it, as long as it is content to be mere sound reason), but even on practical grounds, in order to attain in it information 'and clear instruction respecting the source of its principle, and the correct determination of it, in opposition to the maxims which are based on wants and inclinations." Tb., Abbot's transl. PREDICATE (prsedico, to ^.ffirm).— That which is affirmed 278 vocABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Pre of any one, as wisdom of Peter. A predicdble is that which may be affirmed of many, as sun may be affirmed of other suns besides that of our system. A predicament is a series, order, or arrangement of predicates and predicables under some summum genus, as substance, or quality. What is affirmed or denied is called the predicate ; and that of which it is affirmed or denied is called the subject. PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY.— FiV^e Occasional Causes. PREMISES (propositiones prcemissce) are propositions which go before the conclusion, and from which it is inferred. — A regular syllogism consists of two premises and a conclusion. The premises are called respectively the Major and Minor. PRIMARY QUALITY {primus, first), as opposed to secondary, is such as is essential to the object. The secondary is such as awakens in us a phase of experience which is dis- tinct from the essential property of the object. This contrast has been largely abandoned, being a subjective distinction rather than an objective one, and springing out of the contrast between general sensibility and the sensibility of the special senses. Primary Qualities are "such as are inseparable from the body, in what state soever it be," such as solidity, extension, figure, motion, rest, and number. Locke, Essay, bk. ii. ch. viii. sec. 9. " Our senses give us a direct and distinct notion of the primary qualities, and inform us what they are in themselves. But of the secondary qualities, our senses give us only a relative and obscure notion. They inform us only that they are qualities that affect us in a certain manner." Eeid, Intellectual Powers, Ess. ii. c. 17. PRINCIPLE {prineipium, apx^, a beginning). — Origin, or originating condition. In respect of intelligence, a first truth ; in respect of activity, impulse ; the source of intelligent move- ment, motive jiower. Hence principles have been divided into those of being, and those of knowledge ; or principia essendi and prineipia cog- noscendi. Aristotle, Metaph., lib iv. cap. 1, distinguishes several mean- Pro] VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 279 ings of a.p)(rj, and adds, " What is common to all first principles is that they are the primary source from which anything is, becomes, or is Jcnoum." Principles of Knowledge are original truths hy means of which other truth is known. These are first truths, primitive beliefs, or " the principles of common-sense " of the Scottish Philosophy. Principles of Action may mean either (a) the laws of right conduct, or (6) the motive forces, the impulses, which urge to action. The former is the origin of rational conduct ; the latter, being prior in experience, may warrantably be named the principle of action, when life-action is taken as a unity. There is no exercise of Intelligence and Will save on the con- dition of the presence of some impulse. PROBABILITY (prohabilis, probable). — Likely, according to known conditions of existence. That which, while not demonstrated, does not involve absurdity or contradiction, is probable. " As demonstration is the showing the agreement or disagree- ment of two ideas, by the intervention of one or more proofs, so probability is nothing but the appearance of such an agreement or disagreement, by the intervention of proofs, whose connection is not constant and immutable, or at least is not perceived to be so, but is enough to induce the mind to judge the proposition to be true or false, rather than the contrary." Locke, Essay, bk. iv. ch. xv. sec. 1 ; Eeid, Intellectual Powers, Ess. vii. c. 3 ; Stewart, Elements, pt. ii. c. 2, § 4 ; Bradley, Logic, 201. PROBLEMATIC. — "Problematic judgments are those in which the affirmation or negation is accepted as merely possible." Kant, Pure Reason, Meiklejohn's Tr., p. 61. PROOF. — Evidence, either confirmatory of a proposition, or adequate to establish it. "By proofs we mean such arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition." Hume, Inquiry, sec. 6, note. Proving may be defined " the assigning of a reason or argument for the support of a given proposition." Whately, Logic. 280 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. [PrO PROPERTY (Proprium). — Logically, a subordinate quality connected with those qualities or attributes which constitute the connotation of a Term. In Ethics, and in Economics, Personal possession, to which the individual has an Ethical right. Primarily, proprietorship springs from production. That which a man makes is his own. PROPOSITION. — A judgment expressed in words, and consisting of three parts, the Subject, Predicate, and Copula. Propositions are affirmative or negative, according as the pre- dicate is said to agree or not to agree with the subject. A Categorical proposition declares a thing absolutely, as, "Man is fallible.'' A Conditional proposition asserts only hypo- thetically. Conditional propositions are either Conjunctive, also called Hypothetical, or Disjunctive. Propositions are universal or particular, according as the predicate is aiifirmed or denied of the whole of the subject, or only oi part of the subject. PROTOPLASM {irpSyros, first ; and TrXdio-o-o), I form).— The primary homogeneous substance from which organism is sustained, and which contributes to the development of life in all its forms. " A semi-fluid substance," found in living cells " transparent, colourless, not diffluent, but tenacious, and slimy." Quain's Anatomy, i. xv., 7th ed. " The physical basis of life." Huxley, Lay Sermons, p. 132. " It appears to be a matter of no great moment what animal or what plant I lay under contribution for protoplasm I share this catholicity of assimilation with other animals, all of which, so far as we know, could thrive equally well on the protoplasm of any of their fellows, or of any plant." lb., 147. "Plants can manufacture fresh protoplasm out of mineral compounds, whereas animals are obliged to have it ready-made, and hence, in the long-run, depend upon plants." lb., 138 > Hutchison Stirling, As Regards Protoplasm. PRUDENCE — (prtidentia, contracted for providentia, fore- sight or forethought ; provideo, to foresee). — The habit of act- ing with deliberation and forethought, in view of the lessons of experience. In ancient Ethics, the prudential considerations are con- Psy] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 281 spicuous. Protagoras explains to Socrates that he professes to teach iv^ovXia, good-counsel, or the prudential regulation of life, in Greek thought always associated with the life of the State, — "the political art." Tlaio, Protagoras, 328. Socrates also takes " well-living" as the account of a virtuous life. IL, 351. Plato, in enumerating the Cardinal Virtues, places wisdom, o-otjiia, first in order, — " the wise, as heing good in counsel," as that which should direct the State. The Republic, bk. iv. 428. Aristotle, in view of the difficulty of hitting the mean, laid down these rules of prudence : — (1) of the two extremes, shun the worst ; (2) avoid the evil to which you are personally prone ; (3) guard chiefly against the pleasurable, and pleasure itself. N. Ethics, ii. 9. PSYCHIC (xjrvxri, the soul). — Pertaining to the soul, or to any process distinctive of consciousness. Applied to phenomena special to mind ; and used in contrast with physical. Ambiguity in the use of this term arises from diversity in defining " mind," and commonly from including the phenomena of nerve-sensibility within the " mental." The latter belong to the Physiological, which is without doubt the physical. If nerve-action is a mental phenomenon, no claim can be main- tained for a distinctive term, such as Psychic. Either the term " soul " is the designation for an order of life, distinguishable from the body, or there is no warrant for classification of psychic phenomena. PSYCHOLOGY (ijnix^, the soul; Xo'yos, science).— A theory of the nature and powers of the Mind ; interpretation of the facts of consciousness. Its method is observational, by means of introspection, and is inductive. Its first requirement is Analysis, distinguishing things which differ; its second. Syn- thesis, interpreting the laws of coherence in accordance with which the unity of consciousness is secured. This constitutes the first division of Mental Philosophy. For Ancient Philosophy, from the days of Socrates, yvS>6L a-eavrov became the guiding phrase ; Cogito, ergo sum, gave its start to Modern Philosophy, when Descartes sought a basis of certainty. Psychology has been described as empirical, having for its object the phenomena of experience ; and rational, having for 282 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Psy its object the nature of the soul, or the unity of life finding its transitory expression in the phenomena of consciousness. Vide Kant, Pure Reason, Intro, to " Esthetic." Psychology is " the science of that which thinks, feels, and wills, in contrast with that which moves in space and occupies space." 'KoWd.mg, Psychology,!. "Psychology is as little bound to begin with an explanation of what mind is, as Physics is obliged to begin with an explanation of what matter is." lb. " Psychology stands at a point where natural science and mental science intersect ; where the one passes over into the other." lb., 27. Hence " Physiological Psychology." Psychology has frequently been identified with Theory of Knowledge, or Epistemology, and even with Metaphysics, or Philosophy itself. These are now more strictly defined. Psychology is being confined to Empirical Psychology, regarded as a science, therefore not directly belonging to Philosophy ; and is differentiated from the other sciences by its province and its mode of inquiry. Hence " Comparative Psychology." Empirical Psychology " must be placed by the side of em- pirical physics or physics proper, that is, must be regarded as forming a part of applied philosophy. . . . Empirical psycho- logy must therefore be banished from the sphere of Meta- physics." Kant, Pure Reason, Meiklejohn's transl., 513. Article " Psycholggt," by Ward, Encycl. Britannica, 9th Ed. "Relation of Physical Phenomena to Psychical," Sully, Human Mind, i. p. 1 ; Hamilton's Metaph., lect. viii.; Sully, Outlines of Psychology ; Ladd, Elements of Physical Psychol.; James, Principles of Psychology, and Handbook; Hdffding, Psychology; Dewey, Psychol.; Davis, Elements of Psychol. ; Baldwin, Handbook of Psychology and Elements of Psychology ; Wundt, Grundziige der Physiologische Psychologie; Volkmann, Lehrbuch der Psychologie ; Miinsterberg, Beitrdge zur exper. Psychologie. " Psychologically, the evolution hypothesis is a great advance : it opens up a wider horizon, a prospect of explanation previously closed to us. Psychologically, as physiologically, the doctrine that that which is inexplicable in the individual may be exphcable in the race, is fully justified, and will certainly prove more and Psy] VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. 283 more a fruitful principle. But from the point of view of the theory of knowledge, it is a different affair." Hoffding, Outlines of Psychology, p. 355. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. — By C. M. Douglas, D.Sc. Experimental Psychology (the experimental study of mental phenomena) is a special branch of observational psychology. It consists in observation of consciousness under conditions which are artificially imposed for the purpose of the observation. Experimental Psychology is not to be confused with Physio- logical Psychology. Experimental methods are not essentially physiological in their aim. Their use in Psychology is very generally associated with study of the physical conditions of mental life ; and this is, no doubt, partly due to the increased accuracy and coherence which recognition of those physical conditions imparts to the investigation of mental facts. But mental facts themselves are no less susceptible to experimental investigation, than their physical concomitants ; and the name "Experimental Psychology " properly applies to the observation only of mental and not of cerebral or other nervous phenomena. Psychological Experiment is of two kinds — direct and in- direct. 1. Experiment may, e.g., consist in observation of our own mental states under conditions which have been devised for the purpose of the experiment. This is the simplest case of direct experiment. But under this head we must also include all experiments which are carried out with the knowledge, com- prehension, and consent of the subjects — those subjects being healthy adults in a normal state of consciousness. Such ex- periments are, in point of fact, acts of introspection, since, in making them, we do not merely argue to the mental state of the subject indirectly, from external signs, but accept his account of it, as the result of an intelligent and reliable self- observation. 2. Experimental methods may also be applied to the indirect observation of mental states — to observation, i.e., not of con- sciousness itself, but of external signs from which we are able, on the analogy of the results of introspection, to argue to 284 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Psy conscious processes. We may, e.g., observe experimentally, or under artificial conditions, those reactions from which we infer the mental processes of animals, children, or insane persons. In hypnotism we have a specially suitable means for such in- direct experiment, since we can modify at will the artificially induced abnormal state of hypnosis. But, important as such indirect experiments may be, the main interest and use 6f experimental method in psychology consist in its application to the development of direct or intro- spective observation ; and it is to this application that the name "Experimental Psychology" really belongs. The classification of psychological experiments is attended with some diificulty. The attempt to classify them in relation to their methods inevitably separates methods which only exist in combination, and involves considerable risk of subordinating "psychology" to "experiment." On the other hand, a clas- sification of experiments according to the problems to whose solution they are directed is not whoUy satisfactory ; since there are many departments of psychology to which experimental method has as yet made no real contribution. Such a classifi- cation appears, nevertheless, to be preferable to any other, specially in view of the danger of dissociating experiment from other psychological methods. A triple division of the problems has been suggested by Miinsterberg, as forming a suitable basis for classification of experiments, according as the processes which these investigate are — (1) Psycho-petal, (2) Psycho-fugal, (3) Psycho-central (Veber Aufgaben und Methoden der Psychologie, pp. 217 ff.). (1) Under Psycho-petal processes are included the modes in which we are affected psychically by stimulation from the outer world or the organism. (2) Under Psycho-fugal processes, we investigate the relation of volitions to muscular contractions, of ideational processes to involuntary and expressive movements, &c. : — in general, the effects of mental causes. (3) In considering Psycho-central processes we do not investigate their relation to stimulations and to motor responses, but use these simply as clues to the mental processes in Psy] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 285 question, as, e.g., when we measure the time-relations of mental processes, and include, in our estimate of these, the total interval between a stimulus and the response to it. Our object is to discover the intimate nature of the mental processes. Such a classification, while it depends on an abstract treat- ment of elements in mental life, is practically useful, and indicates the aims and limits of Experimental Psychology. In practice, psychological experiments have hitherto been mainly directed to the investigation of such problems as, the relation between sensations and the stimuli which produce them : the perception of spatial and temporal relations : the duration of mental processes : the nature of the " association of ideas," and the degree in which that principle serves to explain certain of our more complex mental functions. Experiments of great importance were made by Fechaer and Helmholtz, but these were chiefly confined to sensations and their relations to stimuli. Experimental methods were applied more generally to the study of mental life, by "Wundt, in the Leipzig laboratory. There are now many laboratories — ^specially in Germany and America — devoted to psychological investigations. Psychological experiment is rendered difficult by the imper- fection of instruments and by the necessity of finding "subjects " who are capable and reliable. But these difficulties can be increasingly obviated; they cannot be regarded as fatal to the value or success of the experimental method, which promises to be of the very greatest service to Psychology, and to render our knowledge of mental phenomena much more precise and reliable than it could otherwise have become. — [C. M. D.] Of. Wundt's Physiol. Psychol. ; Miinsterberg, Beitrdge zur Experimentallen Psychologie ; James, Principles of Psychology. PSYCHOMBTRY. — Measurement of the time for transmis- sion of nerve excitation along the nerve-fibres communicating with the cerebrum. In this is found some estimate of the intensity of the stimulus, as correlated with mental experience and with mental action. PSYCHO-PHYSIOS. — A science of the relations between the psychical and the physical, concerned with sensibility and motor activity. — Vide Experimental Psychology. 286 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Plin PUNISHMENT {pcena, penalty ; punio, to inflict punish- ment). — Retributive experience, the consequence of wrong- doing. This is first an inevitable condition of moral life. Wrong-doing brings its own penalty. It is in itself a disturb- ance of the nature, a self-inflicted injury. It carries with it self-condemnation and self-reproach. Punishment is further conspicuously, the vindication of Justice, and the defence of society against its violation. It is the penalty imposed by society on account of misdeeds. It implies condemnation of wrong, and adjudication of penalty as due to the wrong-doer. This is the only Ethical basis of penalty, whether in the family, in society, or in the State. The dispute connected with a philosophy of punishment is concerned mainly with the end warrantably contemplated. The several views may be distinguished as the retributive, the corrective, the "deterrent. These ends have been separated ; one of the three has been preferred ; and this has been raised into prominence as the sole end. A determining consideration has been the theory of "Will-power, or view of motives accepted; and as a subordinate but influential consideration, the view of individual liberty. But, the three cannot be separated. The retributive is fundamental and essential. There is no possible theory of penalty, which does not rest on moral law, sovereign over all moral agents, applicable to the individual life, and to the government of the family, of society, and of the State. The one thing which is stronger than all human authority is Jus- tice. Whensoever it is disregarded, even the worst of men rebel. On the ground of its authority, and on no other, men have warrant to punish others. The warrant for punishment is the absolute authority of fixed law, not the will or choice of men, whether acting as individuals, or under constitutional authority. Save in wrong-doing, there is no warrant for penalty. But moral life being rational, and society being the organisation of rational agents, there cannot be just retribution which is not corrective and deterrent. Diversity of view : — Dutiful actions are "the class of actions enforced by the sanction of punishment." Bain, Emutions and Will, p. 254. Qua] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 287 " On the theory of necessity (we are told) a man cannot help acting as he does, and it cannot be just that he should be punished for what he cannot help. Not if the expectation of punishment enables him to help it, and is the only means by which he can be enabled to help it ? " Mill, Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy, 3rd Ed., p. 575. In order that " the restraints properly distinguished as moral " may be efficient, there is need for a measure of social " compulsion," and for " the element of coerciveness " in use of poUticaJ, religious, and social restraints. Herbert Spencer, Data of Ethics, p. 126. " Punishment, and the expression of moral displeasure, are required to supply the desiderated moral force." Sidgwick, Method of Ethics, p. 63. PURE. — Unmixed with any lower or heterogeneous element. Applied by Kant to an exercise of mind which has no admixture of the results of experience. Pure is thus non-empirical. " Pure Reason " is Reason in itself alone, without any mixture of sensi- bility. " Pure Idea " is an Idea not recognised under direction of experience, and whose object is not represented in experience. " Pure Reverence " is reverence for moral law itself as the sole motive for action, apart from inclination and desire. PURPOSE. — Intelligently selected and deliberately cher- ished aim or end, for the sake of which a person acts. QUALITY (ttoios, TTOionjs, qualis, qualitas, suchness). — Property of an object, distinguishing it from other objects. A category without which it would be impossible for mind to exercise its discriminating power between objects. On the one side, an objective condition; on the other, a category of the understanding, giving to sensible experience its intelHgibility. Aristotle treats quahty as a characteristic of things, Meta- physics, bk. i. 5, 3. Kant treats of quality as a category of the understanding. Pure Reason, Trans. Logic, first div. § 5. QUANTITY (irocrov, quantum, how much). — Objectively, measure of extension or bulk ; that which admits of more or less in size. Subjectively, a category of the understanding essential for comparing of material objects, according to length, breadth, and thickness. 288 VOCABULAKT OF PHILOSOPHY. [Qua The twofold use of the term holds as in the case of " Quality." QUANTIFICATION OF THE PREDICATE.— Formal expression of the extension assigned in thought to the predicate of a proposition. The quantity of a proposition taken as a whole, depends upon that of the subject; and hence in the Aristotelian Logic, only the subject is quantified, the quantity of the predicate being implied in the quality of the proposition. Thus in all affirmative propositions the predicate must be regarded as particular, while in all negative propositions it is universal. AU that we assert in an affirmative proposition is that the predicate includes the subject. Thus in the proposi- tion " all stones are minerals," we only employ the word minerals in so far as it coincides with the word stones ; that is, only in a part of its extension. In a negative proposition, we assert that no part of the subject is contained in any part of the predicate. Thus when I say " no stones are metals," I exclude the notion " stones " from the entire extension of the word " metals," and consequently use it in its whole generality. Morell, Handbook of Logic. Hamilton advocates the Quantification of the Predicate, on the ground, that what we think implicitly, we should state explicitly. Thus, when we say " aU stones are minerals," we think all stones are some minerals, and this should appear in the form of the proposition. The consequence of quantifying the predicate would be, he contends, the increase of the funda- mental prepositional forms from four to eight. In addition to A, E, I, and 0, we should have, according to Hamilton's nomenclature, U, Y, w, and 17. This is the substance of the advance in Logic proposed in Hamilton's New Analytic of Logical Forms. The question turns upon whether we actually in thought quantify the predicate or not, and this again upon whether we naturally think the predicate in extension or in intension, i.e., whether the equational or the attributive view of Judgment is true. If both the subject and predicate are naturally thought in extension, and the proposition is an equation, then both alike should be quantified. But if the predicate is naturally Rat] VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 289 intension, and the proposition is the attributive of its intension to the subject, then the predicate should not be quantified, since such quantification would not be the interpretation of our actual thought. Venn contends that the predicative (or attributive) view, and the four forms of the traditional logic founded upon it, represent with sufficient accuracy our ordinary psychological procedure. This, however, he maintains, would be no objection to Hamilton's theory, provided the latter repre- sented a possible view of the proposition maintained consistently throughout. But he seems to prove that Hamilton's scheme is the result of a confusion between the ordinary view and the view which takes the proposition as asserting the relation of classes to one another (their mutual inclusion or exclusion), i.e., the equational view. The latter view gives, he shows, five possible forms. Hamilton was misled by his love of symmetry to double the original table, though -q and m are not diagram- matically possible, and the assertion of I involves the assertion of O, some, on this scheme, being necessarDy equal to some but not all. See Venn, Symbolic Logic, ch. i. ; Hamilton, Lectures on Logic; Baynes, New Analytic of Logical Forms; Ueberweg, System of Logic, app. b, TransL by Lindsay. — [J. S.] RATIONALISM. — The system of philosophy which makes Rational power the ultimate test of truth, maintaining that the meaning of our sensory experience, and ultimately of things around us, is attained only by tests which inteUigeut nature supplies. Here, Epistemology rests on principles given in the rational nature itself. This gives the basis of Intui- tionalism, and further is the source of German Idealism. The opposite theory is named Sensationalism, or Empiricism, as it makes aU knowledge depend on experience, or on " Sensa- tion and Reflection," Locke. In accordance with this theory, there is " nothing in intelligence which was not previously in the sensory." Here, Epistemology rests on the sensibility of the nerve-system, on the sensations resulting from contact with the external, and on consciousness of our inner states. This sharp contrast favours extreme positions. It has tempted Rationalism to undervalue sensory impression, as if it were a mere " blur " on a sensitive surface j and has tempted T 290 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Rea Empiricism to speak as if the knowledge which begins iu experience, were perfected by it, or even as if mind were only an empty vessel being filled with material through sensory channels. Eationalism is apt to become an exaggeration of one side of Epistemology. Abstracting sensory experience, it seeks, as pure Idealism, to develop a philosophy of Being, in neglect of the physical and psychic basis of experience. Human life can, indeed, be interpreted only as a life according to reason ; Nature can be understood only when we seek " the thinking view of things ; " but philosophy is not independent of sensibility, nor can it systematise the irrational. It is equally impossible to maintain the subordination of physical existence to mind, and the subordination of mind to the physical. The Transcen- dental in knowledge may be held as fact; but a philosophy which figures as a pure Transcendentalism contradicts itself. REAL (The), {res, a thing). — The existing, whether in consciousness, or beyond. In contrast with the real, we speak of the potential, the nominal, the logical, as these are con- ceivable representations in the exercise of thought. Hamilton, Reid's Worlcs, note b, p. 805. The nature of Reality is the leading question in Metaphysics. Plato rises to the Ideal world, as the real. Aristotle's Meta- physics, or first philosophy, is concerned with Being itself. Real cognition must be a knowledge of reality, existence being presupposed. Reality is equally beyond us, and within us. To restrict to either is an abstraction. Divergence in usage, and in philosophy, has been consider- able. "The conception of reality can be nothing more than' some mode of consciousness." "By reality we mean persist- ence iu consciousness." Herbert Spencer, First Principles, 160. " Ideas are subsequent to reality.'' Lotze, Metaphysic, transl., 73. Yet, these are realities in consciousness, even while they are to us symbols of existence beyond. Green maintains that the Real consists in Relations. Prolegomena to Ethics, bk. i. There is also a sense in which it holds true, that " the real is inaccessible by way of ideas." Bradley, Logic, § 20, p. 63. Rea] VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. 291 " We escape from ideas, aud from mere universals, by inference to the real, which appears iu perception." lb., § 28, p. 69. " ReaHty and Thought,"— Bradley, Mind, xiii. 370. " The real as concerned with the Eelated," — Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, 16 ; Green, Introduction to Hume's Works, § 31, vol. i. 24; ilausel, Metaphysics; Bosanquet, Knowledge and Reality. RRAXiISM. — The Scholastic doctrine that general notions, such as those of gemis and species, represent real things, exist- ing independently of our conceptions and expressions. The doctrine is that universals are prior in existence to particulars, unioersalia ante res. The doctrine is the expression of the relation of Scholastic thought to the philosophy of Plato in the first instance, and to that of Aristotle, as guide in dialectics. Ansebn, who was leader of the Realists, about a.d. 1070, argued on this basis, that universals exist independently of individual things. Monologium 6, 1033. Antagonistic to this is the doctrine of the Nominahsts, that genera and species are only names for our classifications of things, not real things. EosceUinus. Intermediate is the doctrine of the Conceptualists, that universals are in the particulars, universalia in rebus. Abelard, 6, 1079. Article "Scholasticism," by Prof. Seth, Ency. Brit., 9th ed. REALISM, Natural. — A doctrine of perception, that there is in this act of mind an immediate or intuitive cognition of the external object ; that the object perceived is the external reality, not any idea or image of that reality. External per- ception is direct knowledge of the thing existing, not an immediate knowledge of some other thing, which represents it. Realism thus stands in contrast with epistemological idealism. " A definite separation must be made between psychological aud epistemological points of view. . . . The final principles which the analysis of our knowledge affords, are the final assumptions attainable for us. All explanations, proofs, and hypotheses . . . rest upon these. It is the business of Epistemology, but not of psychology, to inquire how far this logical basis of all our knowledge is comprehensive." Hofi'ding, Outlines of Psychology, p. 355, Tr. 292 TOCABULAET OF PHILOSOPHY. [Rea REASON {Ratio, a reckoning, from reor, to calculate, to think). — This term is used as a general name for the intel- lectual or interpreting nature of man — as when we speak of "human reason,'' as the distinctive characteristic of the race. " Eeason " is the faculty of the higher intuitions, or of a priori truth, in contrast with " Eeasoning." Its popular use is to dis- tinguish our power of comparison, computation, and inference. The Scottish School had attributed the two phases of know- ledge to one power. " The same degree of understanding which makes a man capable of acting with common prudence in the conduct of life, makes him capable of discovering what is true and what is false in matters that are self-evident, and which he distinctly apprehends.'' Eeid, Intell. Powers, Essay vi. c. 2. The result of Kant's critical philosophy, distinguishing a posteriori from a priori in consciousness, has been the technical use of " Eeason," as the faculty of the higher intuitions. " Eeason is the faculty which furnishes us with the principles of knowledge a priori." Kant, Pure Reason, Introduction, vii., Meiklejohn's transl., p. 15. Its proper function is "to prescribe rules of discipline to all the other powers of the mind." Ih. 433 (Kritik, 437). " Our reason is, subjectively considered, itself a system, and, in the sphere of mere concep- tions, a system of investigation according to principles of unity, the material being supplied by experience alone." lb., 449. REASONING. — The rationalising process; logical pro- cedure of the understanding, leading to inference, whether from facts, or from general principles. " In one of its acceptations it means syllogising, or the mode of inference which may be called concluding from generals to particulars. In another of its senses, to reason is simply to infer aziy assertion from assertions already admitted ; and in this sense Induction is as much entitled to be called reasoning as the demonstrations of geometry." Mill, Logic, Introd., § 2. " To reason directly from particulars to particulars is wholly impossible.'' Bradley, Logic, 332. RBCBPT. — A compound " idea " received directly in the concrete, repeated in experience. "As perception literally Red] VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. 293 means a taking wholly, and conception a taking together, reception means a taking again. Consequently a recept is that which is taken again." Eomanes, Mental Evolution in Man, p. 36. " At the bidding of certain stimuli from without, we construct that mental product which we call the object of sense. These mental constructions, I will call constructs." Lloyd Morgan, Animal Life and Intelligence, p. 312. "Neither construct, nor recept seems to me a felicitous word ; but poor as both are, they form a distinct addition to psychology. . . . Would such a word as influent, sound better than recept ? " James, Text-Book of Psychology, p. 368. Eomanes illustrates " recepts," by the difference of manner in which water-fowl alight on land, from what is common with them when alight- ing on the water. RECEPTIVITY.— The capability for impression belonging to the conscious life, which, associated with rational power, admits of progressive experience, and accumulation of know- ledge. Receptivity illustrates mind as it is subordinated to environment, through action of the sensory. RBOTITUDB {rectus, straight; 6p66i ; rectum factum, that which is rightly done ; KaT6p6mij.a). — Eightuess ; the quality of an action as determined by moral law. To define " Tightness " by reference to Conscience is insufficient, appealing only to the mode of knowing, not to the thing known. " The authority of conscience " is an abbreviated form for " authority of the moral law as made known by conscience." Moral law is the ultimate rational basis of moral distinctions. The imperative belonging to its nature fixes obligation. JFor Latin usage, with Greek equivalents, Cicero, De Finibus, iii. c. 7 and c. 14. REDINTEGRATION (Law of), (re-miegrro).— Eeconstruc- tion. " Parts of any total thought recalled into consciousness are apt to suggest the parts to which they were proximately related." Hamilton's Reid, p. 897. This is a summary state- ment of the Laws of Association. REDUCTION.— The first figure of syllogism is called perfect; as it proceeds directly on the Dictum de omni, &c., and it arranges the terms in the most natural order. All argu- ments, though stated originally in any of the other Figures, 294 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Ref may be, in one way or other, brought into some of the four moods in the first figure : and a syllogism is, in that case, said to be reduced {i.e., to the First Figure) Reduction is of two kinds: Direct or ostensive, which consists in bringing the premises of the original syllogism to a corresponding mood in the First Figure, by transposition or conversion of the premises ; Indirect, or reductio per impossible or ad absurdum, by which we prove (in the First Figure) not directly that the original conclusion is true, but that it cannot he false ; i.e., that an absurdity would follow from the supposition of its being false. REFLECTION {re-fledo, to bend back).— Attention directed upon the facts of personal experience : thought con- centrated on any theme or problem. According to Locke, Sensation and Reflection are the sources of all our knowledge. " By reflection I would be understood to mean that notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of them ; by reason whereof there come to be ideas of these operations in the understanding." Locke, Essay, bk. ii. ch. i. sec. 4. " If the first awakening of comparative thought is a move- ment of perception, active, indeed, but confined to each par- ticular case, and not distinctly conscious of its own procedure, the reflection that embraces in itself these instinctive efforts in their connection as energies of the Ego, and detaches them in their universal form from the particular cases of their applica- tion, undoubtedly forms a new step of development." Lotze, Microcosmus, Tr., i. 654. REFLEX ACTION.— Muscular activity, resulting directly from an impression made upon the sensitive organism, — the motor nerves being excited by sudden excitation, of nerves of sensation. The phrase is applied to action of subordinate divisions of the sensory system, without consciousness, — the movement being effected through a subordinate nerve-centre, named " excito-motor " in contrast with " sensori-motor," which implies consciousness of the impression. Carpenter's Mental Physiology, 7th ed., p. 507 ; Forster's Physiology, 179 ; Ferrier, Functions of Brain, 68 ; Calderwood, Mind and Brain, 202. Reg] VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 295 Whether consciousness be involved or not, the action of the motor system following on sensory stimuli is in all cases reflex. On the other hand, we observe non-continuity in nerve stimulation from the sensory system to the motor, when thought intervenes as to the expedient, or as to the right. REFLEX ' SENSE. — Descriptive of a mental power, analogous to the senses, by which we have a perception of truth concerning relations. Its exercise is an act of perception, but it depends upon the understanding for its materials. The phrase is employed by Shaftesbury, Characteristics, and by Hutcheson, Inquiry into Beauty and Virtus. It belongs to a transition period, when feeling was being abandoned as the key to our recognition of moral distinctions, and thought was being preferred. Both authors regard conscieuce as a Reflex Sense. We see moral truth as by an inner sense, analogous to Vision. The position involves a mixed representation, but is preparatory for more exact views of Intuition. REGULATIVE (German, Regulativ). — Applied to any faculty, or process in consciousness, which directs thought or conduct, — thus Hamilton's " Regulative Faculty," or faculty of first principles. Metaph., ii. 347. It is Kant's designation for conditions of intelligence which are not in themselves tests of objective truth. Kant divides the table of the categories into two — (1) Mathe- matical, Quantity and Quality, applicable to " objects of in- tuition," and (2) Dynamical, Relation and Modality, applicable to " the existence of objects either in relation to one another, or to the understanding." This second division Kant regards as regulative, — affording " analogies of experience," and " postu- lates of empirical thought;" while the two former, — Quantity and Quality, — are constitutive of objects. Kant's Pwe Reason, Meiklejohn, pp. 67, 134, 407 ; Stirling's Text-Book to Kant, pp. 197, 285. This term also applies to Kant's transcendental Ideas of the Reason, — God, the Soul, and the World. " Pure reason never relates immediately to objects, but to the conceptions of these contained in the understanding. . . . They have in truth no relation to any object in experience, for the very reason that 296 VOCABULAfiY OF PHILOSOPHy. [Rel they are only ideas." Kant's Pure Reason, Meiklejohn's Tr., pp. 233-4. " I maintain that transcendental ideas can never be employed as constitutive ideas, that they cannot be conceptions of objects. . . . But, on the other hand, they are capable of an admirable and indispensably necessary application to objects, — as regulative ideas, directing the understanding to a certain aim, the guiding lines towards which all its laws proceed, and in which they all meet in one point. This point, though a mere idea (focus imaginarius), ... for it lies beyond the sphere of possible experience, — serves notwithstanding to give to these the greatest possible unity combined with the greatest possible extension." lb., p. 395. RELATION (relatio, a carrying back; re-fero, to bear back). — The connecting together things or thoughts, or things with thoughts. In reference to material things, the relation may be one of continuity ; to occurrences, one of succession ; to biology, of structure and function ; to mind, of feelings and thoughts, of motives and decisions. "Any sort of connection which is perceived or imagined between two or more things, or any comparison which is made by the mind, is a relation." Taylor, Elements of Thought. Relations may be observed in the outer world, or known in consciousness. The category of relation is fundamental for use of the understanding, as it is concerned with comparisons. Thus, the relation of cause and effect guides in interpretation of all occurrences. Thought is in all its forms a constructing of relations. " Sensational consciousness is something gwasi-material, hardly cognitive. . . . Relating consciousness is quite the reverse, and the mystery of it is unspeakable." James, Prins. of Psychol., i. 687 ; Lotze, Logic, Transl., 472. On Relation as the essential nature of Reality : — Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, pt. i. p. 21 ; Bradley, Principles of Logic, 225 ; Bosanquet, Knowledge and Reality, 159. RELATIVITY OP KNOWLEDGE.— The doctrine that the nature and extent of our knowledge is determined not merely by the qualities of the objects, but also by the con- ditions of our cognitive powers. This is the common position Rel] VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. 297 for all philosophy. We do not know the external object directly, but by the impressions made on our sensibilities, more particularly on the organs of special sense. The knowledge we have is, however, true knowledge^of the thing, by that which is given immediately in the sensory impressions, or which is obtained mediately through inference from these data. The doctrine of Kant is that intelligence by application of its own " forms " to the " intuitions " of the sensory, constitutes the object of knowledge, but " the thing in itself " cannot be known. Pure Reason, 1. This does not escape Hume's sceptical reasoning. Hume affirms that if the forms of intelligence con- stitute an object in consciousness, this object is only a part in the series, and seems to leave externality, and our supposed relation to it unexplained. The sensationalism of Locke, and the idealism of Berkeley involved this perplexity. " All ideas come from sensation and reflection," was Locke's position. Essay, bk. ii. c. 1. Let us suppose the mind to be " without any ideas, how comes it to be furnished ? " " To this I answer in one word, from experi- ence." lb. So it is with Berkeley. "The objects of human knowledge are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses ; or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind." Princip. of Hum. Knowledge, pt. i. p. L So it is with Hume in supporting a sceptical conclusion. " E"o thing is ever really present with the mind but its perceptions, or impressions, and ideas." Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, bk. i. pt. ii. sec. 6. " It cannot be from any of the impressions that the idea of self is derived, and con- sequently there is no such idea," bk. i. pt. iv. sec. 6. Hence, Hume argues " all knowledge degenerates into probability ; " yet he admits that " our reason must be considered as a kind of cause, of which truth is the natural effect." Treatise, bk. i. part iv. sec. 1 ; ed. 1739, vol. i. p. 315. John S. Mill, Exam, of Hamilton, 3rd ed., p. 7. Kant says that " the undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called phenomenon. That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation, I term its matter ; but that which effects that the content of the phenomenon can be arranged 298 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Rel under certain relations, I call its form." Pure Reason, Meikle- jobn's transl., 21. RELIGION (religio, reverence ; religo ; re, back ; ligo, to bind ; relego, by some ; re, back ; lego, to read). — Homage to the Deity in all the forms which pertain to spiritual life. This includes everything that belongs to the culture and expression of piety. Religion stands in contrast vcith Theology, which is the theory of the Divine nature and government. There is some diversity as to the derivation of the term, though that which is above placed first is generally accepted. According to Cicero, De Nat. Deorum, ii. 28, it is compounded of re and legere, to read over again, to reflect upon the relations of life to the First Cause, and on the duties relating to the worship of the gods. According to Lactantius, Div. Instit, it comes from re-ligare, to bind back, because in our relation to the Deity we find the true ground of obligation. Augustine, De Vera Relig., gives the same derivation of the word. Ethical Philosophy as concerned with the foundation of Virtue, includes " natural theology " on its theoretic side ; " natural religion " on its practical side. " Seeing there are no signs, nor fruit of religion, but in man only, there is no cause to doubt, but that the seed of religion is also only in man." Hobbes, Leviathan, pt. i. c. 12 ; Works, Molesworth, vol. iii. 94. The social effects of religion, present one of the leading questions in the philosophy of social life. Mill, Essays on Religion, p. 77. Benjamin Kidd, Social Evolution. The newly awakened interest in the genesis of thought, has stimulated investigation as to the appearance of religious ideas, and also study of comparative religious. The Sacred Books of the East, edited by Max Miiller; The Texts of Confucianism, Legge ; Chinese Buddhism, Edkins ; Hinduism and Christianity, Eobson ; Haug, Essays on the Parsis ; Muir, Life of Mahomet ; Edkins, Early Spread of Religious Ideas in the Far East; Max Miiller, Introduc. to Science of Religion; Whitney, Life and Growth of Language ; John Muir, Metrical Translations from Sansltrit Writers. RELIGION (Philosophy of).— A rational account of Rel] VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 299 Religion, on its subjective and also on its objective side. This must include the correlation of the religious consciousness with the other forms of human experience, and investigation of the rational basis on which the religious element in the con- sciousness rests. Descartes held that the idea of God is the certainty coming next to that of our own existence. Spinoza founded his philosophy of existence on the conception of the One Substance, German thought specially has been quick to recognise the need for philosophic inquiry completing itself in a Philosophy of Religion. Towards the more deliberate investigation of the problem of Religion, Kant led the way, in Die Religion inner- halb der Grenzen den- hlossen Vemunft, 1793. "Religion within the province of bare Reason," Semple's transl. In this work, after dealing with an evil principle in consciousness, he dis- cusses the foundation of a kingdom of God on the earth. ScheUiug published Bruno, oder ilber das natiirliche und gottliche Princip der Dinge, 1802. " Bruno, or On the natural and divine principle of Things." Hegel includes religion with Ethic. "Man, no doubt just because it is his nature' to think, is the only being that possesses law, religion, and morality." Hegel, Logik (Ency.), Intro., translated by Wallace, 3. Philosophic thought is concerned with the basis in reason of the religious consciousness ; the historic method is concerned with the modifications of religious thought and practice appear- ing in the world, and with discovery of the conditions account- ing for their appearance. Each will prove a test of the other ; while the philosophic is the essential and fundamental. From the scientific point of view, that of Agnosticism, there may be, as in Spencer, a negative Philosophy of Religion, or the justification of "religious" emotion in presence of the Unknown and Unknowable. Spencer, First Principles, pt. i. Kant, Religion tdthin the Limits of Pure Reason; Hegel, Philosophy of Religion ; Pfleiderer, Philosophy of Religion ; J. Caird, Philosophy of Religion. On the Kantian and Hegelian schemes, Seth, From Kani to Hegel; Max Mliller, Introduc. to Science of Religion; Schleiermacher, On Religion, Oman's transl.; 300 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Rem T3'lor's Primitive Culture, i. 417 ; Hutchison Stirling, Philo- sophy and, Theology ; Flint, Anti-Theistic Theories; Martineau, Study of Religion; Eobertson, Early Religion of Israel; E. Caird, Evolution of Religion. REMEMBRANCE (reminiscor, to remember; recollection ; reaolligo, to gather together again). — Memory is a function of mind connected with acquisition of knowledge. Knowledge so presented in consciousness is recognised as knowledge which had previously been present. — Vide Memory, which is distinct from " Organic retentiveness." The Platonic doctrine of Reminiscence was the hypothesis that the knowledge of ideal truth is a recollection of what had been seen in a higher state. " They say that the soul of man is immortal, and at one time has an end, which they say is to die, and at another time is born again, but is never destroyed ; . . . . and having seen all things that there are, whether here or in Hades, has knowledge of them all, and it is no wonder she should be able to call to remembrance (ovafLvqcr- OrivaC) all that she ever knew about virtue, and about every- thing." Plato, Meoio, 81 ; the Phxdo, 75 ; Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, ii. 72 ; Pater, Plato and Platonism, p. 57. RESENTMENT.— Antagonism of feeling directed against an agent whose conduct involves violation of right. Such resentment is natural and spontaneous, and has its rational vindication in the moral law as the basis of human obligation. " The only way in which our reason and understanding can raise anger, is by representing to our mind injustice or injury of some kind or other." Butler, Sermon viii. Butler dis- tinguishes between sudden auger and settled resentment. Antagonism of good and evil in conduct, has its emotional correlative in the antithesis of admiration and resentment in consciousness. Under moral law, resentment must exclude malice, which is a phase of feeling, altogether evil. RESPONSIBILITY.— Accountability for conduct in the case of an agent possessing knowledge of moral law, with power to govern conduct in harmony with such law. Responsibility is manifested in the natural relations of moral agents and in involuntary contracts made in harmony with moral Rig] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 301 law. Our relations to the Moral Governor present the ultimate aspect of auswerableness for personal conduct. Aristotle's Ethics, iii. 5 ; Reid's Active Powers, Essay iii. pt. iii. ch. vii. ; Lotze, Practical Philosophy, Ladd's Tr., p. 63 ; Bradley's Ethical Studies, p. 5 ; Maudsley, Responsibility in Mental Disease. RESTRAINTS UPON ACTION.— Emotions natural to man, which impose a check on the action of Thought. Wonder, Fear, or Grief, may arrest, or even paralyse, power of thought and of muscular activity. These are natural restraints, presenting in consciousness the antithesis to the motive forces of our nature. As inhibition is powerful in the muscular system, so natural emotions are frequent and powerful restraints in the history of conscious- ness. Galderwood, Handhoolc of Moral Philosophy, p. 161. RBVERBNCB (reverentia, revereor, to stand in awe, to honour). — Emotion awakened by intelligent appreciation of greatness, or of authority. Kant uses the term to express the true attitude of man towards Moral Law. This is pure reverence ; which is not a passive feeling, but " an active emotion generated in the mind by an idea of reason." Metaphysie of Ethics, Semple, p. 12. Duty involves "objectively the law, and subjectively pure respect for this practical law, and consequently the maxim to follow this law even to the thwarting of aU my inclinations." Abbot's Transl. Reverence for moral law comes early in experience. Rever- ence for God, as the source of aU being, though it come later, is the broadest and deepest expression of this emotion. RIGHT. — Adjective, the quality of an action which con- forms with moral law. Substantive, the natural title of a person to undisturbed exercise of the powers of a moral agent. Inferentially, the title to possessions acquired by personal effort in recognition of moral freedom and responsibility. In Jurisprudence, the substantive has a technical significance, leading to the use of the phrase "perfect rights," to describe such rights as can be enforced under statute, or under " common law." This distinction depends on the line of severance be- tween Ethics and Jurisprudence. 302 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Rul The notion of Tightness Hes at the foundation of a philo- sophy of practice. " Kightuess may be called the first moral ideal, because the question ' what should I do ? ' comes before the question ' what should I aim at ? ' " J. Grote, Moral Ideals, 35 ; Whewell, Elements of Morality, bk. i. sec. 84 ; Bradley, Ethical Studies, note on "Rights and Duties," p. 187 ; Austin, Province of Jurisprudence ; Pollock, Jurisprudence and Ethics. RULE (regula, a straight piece of wood ; a rule ; regulo, to rule, or govern). — A maxim prescribing means to attain some end. Laio is a wider term, applicable to physical existence, as well as to spiritual. Rule can be interpreted only within the sphere of intelligence, applying to maxims for all varieties of human engagement. " A principle or maxim, which furnishes man with a sure and concise method of attaining to the end he proposes." Burlamaqui, Principles of Natural Law, pt. i. ch. V. ; Price, Revieio of Morals, c. 6. Kant distinguishes Rules of Art, and Dictates of Prudence, from Laws (Commandments) of Morality. Metaph. of Ethics, Semple, 3rd ed., p. 27. SANCTION (sanctio, a decree; sancio, to ratify or con- firm). — Confirmation of a law or rule. It is primarily applied to the test of consequences, encouraging or discouraging, as these are confirmatory of moral law. In Ethics, sanction is the test supplied in experience, as that upholds moral law. Law imposes obligation ; sanction upholds the law's authority. Sanction includes reward and punishment, following in natural order. Sanction presupposes law ; it can- not contribute towards a philosophy of the law's authority. Under Jurisprudence, Sanction is restricted to penalty. Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, c. iii. " The internal sanction of duty, whatever our standard of duty may be, is one and the same — a feeling in our own mind, a pain, more or less intense, attendant on a violation of duty." J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, p. 41 ; Bain, Moral Science, c. 2 ; Fowler, Progressive Morality, p. 4 ; Austin, Province of Jurisprudence Determined. SCEPTICISM {uKiiTTLKO's, thoughtful ; a-KiTTTOfiai, to look about, so as to observe carefully). — Suspense of judgment, on account of insufficient evidence to warrant decision: more See] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 303 commouly, on accouut of the limitatiou of kuowledge and of our powers of knowing. This suspense properly stands associ- ated with expectation of further evidence, or of more reliable reasoning. It is literally, looking around. An absolute scepticism is impossible. The facts of conscious- ness are indubitable. When I doubt, I know that I doubt. Scepticism is at the opposite extreme from Dogmatism. In philosophic character and tendency, it is altogether different from doubt used as a philosophic instrument, as by Descartes, with whom doubt was a defence against too easy assent ; a con- stant demand for test of the conclusions being reached. Scepti- cism, on the other hand, distrusts the very instruments of knowing, and discredits the claims of evidence to warrant certainty. Absolute objective certainty being unattainable, Scepticism holds that, in the contradictions of the reason, truth is as much on one side as on the other — ov8ev (lSXKov. Pyrrho, who flourished in Greece about 340 B.C., vindicated Scepticism, hence sometimes called Pyrrhonism. As a ttjndency, it existed in the teaching and spirit of the Sophists, especially in the maxim of Protagoras, " Man is the measure of aU things." This gives a phenomenalism which favours doubt. Scepticism, even when reasonable, is a halting which has its hazards, because of its depression of rational expectation. On one side it is favourable to intellectual life, stimulating inquiry; on the other, it is unfavourable, threatening atrophy of intel- lectual interest, or a finality unworthy of a rational nature. Scepticism and Dogmatism are equally at variance with the spirit of philosophy, which presses towards the thinking view of things, expecting in wider knowledge more adequate data on which to reason. A Scepticism which distrusts the instruments of knowing is irrational. The Sceptical tendency which throws discredit on the senses, dwelling especially on the delusions which they occasion, has itself been discredited by the progress of observational science. The modern form of Scepticism is consequently modified to a limited Agnosticism, granting certainty to the testimony of the senses, but distrusting the action of the rational powers in their attempt to advance beyond actual observation. This also is being discredited in 304 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Sch turn, by regard to the scientific uses of imagination, and by acknowledgment of the scientific value of rational hypothesis. These being acknowledged, the value of Metaphysical specula- tion cannot be disputed. Of the Sceptics strictly so called, Ueberweg distinguishes three schools: — (1) Pyrrho and his followers ; (2) the Middle Academy, or the Second and Third Academic Schools ; (3) the Later Sceptics, who again made the teaching of Pyrrho their basis. Of these the first and the third were extreme ; the second, less radical, distinguished various degrees of probability. Modern Scepticism is represented by Hume, who, in his Treatise on Human Nature, following out Locke's Epistem- ology, resolves Mind equally with Matter into mere Feeling ; but he at the same time grants, that " those who have denied the reality of moral distinctions may be ranked among the disingenuous disputants.'' Inquiry, Essays, ii. p. 223. Ueberweg's History, Greek, i. 91, 212; Modern, ii. 130; Schwegler's History, pp. 134 and 181, with p. 41.5; Zeller's Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, pt. iv. p. 486. See Kant's references to Hume, Pure Reason ; and Prolegomena, iii., Bax's Tr. ; Life of Kant by Stuckenberg, ch. viii. ; Green's General Introduction to Hume's Works ; Lotze, Logic, p. 414 ; Balfour's Defence of Philosophic Doubt ; MiU, Essays on Religion, p. 120. SCHEMATISM, (crx^/«.a, shape).— Kant's term for " the procedure of the understanding with schemata." The schema is " the formal and pure condition of sensibility,'' the image of the thing with which the imagination aids the understanding in its procedure. Schema is thus employed by Kant to express the manner in which the categories of the Understanding are brought to bear, as " principles," on the phenomena of sensuous perception. These are, in their nature, " quite heterogeneous." For the application of the one to the other, there is required a tertium quid, "which on the one side is homogeneous with the category, and on the other with the phenomenon. . . . This mediating representation must be pure (without empirical content), yet must on the one side be intellectual, on the other sensuous. Such a representation is the transcendental schema.'' Kant, Pure Reason, Meiklejohn's Tr., pp. 107-113; Sch] VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. 305 Stirling, Text-Book to Kant, pp. 248-256 ; E. Caird, Philo- sophy of Kant, i. 431 ; Adamson, Philos. of Kant, 53. Kant refers Schematism to a distinct " faculty," that of the transcendental or productive iinagination. While the synthesis of the Forms of Intuition is sensuous, and the synthesis of the Categories of Understanding is intellectical, the synthesis of Imagination is figurative {synthesis speciosa). It brings the unity of apperception to hear upon the universal form of intui- tion, that of Time. The categories are the " rules " of its pro- cedure ; hut in its actual operation they are not brought into consciousness. "This schematism .... is an art hidden in the depths of the human soul, whose true modes of action we shall only with difficulty discover and unveQ." Meiklejohn's Tr., 109. The Schema is not to be compared with the image or type ; it is rather "a general receipt for a whole infinitude of types," e.g., " no image could ever be equal to our conception of a triangle in general. For it could never attain to the general- ness of the conception The schema of a triangle can exist nowhere else than in thought, and it indicates a rule of the synthesis of the imagination in regard to pure figures in space." It is, " as it were, a monogram of the pure imagination d, priori." SCHOLASTICISM.— The phrase " Scholastic Philosophy " denotes a period, rather than a system of philosophy. Scholasti- cism covers the teaching of the schools during the Middle Ages, from the 9th century to the close of the 15th, mainly founded on the Logic of Aristotle. It is specially distinguished by the discussion between the NominaUsts and Kealists. Its two periods are thus marked out by Ueberweg : — "(1) The commencement of Scholasticism, or the accommodation of the Aristotelian logic and of Neo-Platonic philosophy to the doctrine of the Church, from John Scotus Erigena to the Amalricans, or from the 9th till the hegiiming of the 13th century; (2) the complete development and widest extension of Scholasticism, or the combination of the Aristotelian philo- sophy, which had now become fully known, with the dogmas of the Church, from Alexander of Hales to the close of the Middle Ages." History of Philosophy, Morris's transl., i. 355. U 306 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Sci Besides John Scotus, the great leaders were Abelard, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Eaymond LuIIy, Eoger Bacon, and William of Occam. Cousin, Fragmens Philosophiques, tom. iii., Paris, 1840 ; Schwegler's History, 8th ed., p. 144; Hampden, Scholastic Philosophy; Maurice, Mediseval Philosophy; Hallam, Middle Ages, iii. 426, ch. ix. pt. 2 ; Seth's Art., Enc^. Brit., 9th ed. SCIENCE (Scientia, iTncn-^fjuri). — Eationalised knowledge of observed facts, concerned mainly with the laws regulat- ing occurrences. In its widest application, it is the bringing of the manifold phenomena of Nature to order and system by discovery of the hidden conditions of existence. We distin- guish "observational sciences" from "exact science," such as mathematics, as all departments of the former depend for a beginning on a large accumulation of facts from which induction proceeds, whereas exact science depends on axiomatic truth. Science is distinguished from Philosophy by reservation of the latter to the sphere of mind, and to the Metaphysical Speculation concerned with Being in general, or with the Universe as the grand total of correlated existence, and with Transcendent Being. SECQLiARISM {secularis, from seeulum, the age). — The theory of human life which judges of its interests by reference to its surroundings, and specially to the spirit of the age, as concerned with immediate good. It " may be regarded as the theory of life or conduct, which flows from the theory of belief or knowledge, that constitutes the substance of Positivism." Flint, Anti-Theistic Theories, p. 211. It does not imply Athe- ism, though that is frequently its accompaniment. As to the relation of Secularism to Religion, there is "a fundamental difference of opinion among Secularists." lb., lect. vi. In app. xxiii, 509, Flint sketches the rise of Secularism in the writings of Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, Thomas Paine, Robert Taylor, Richard Carlile, Robert Owen, and others. SBLP-OONSCIOUSNBSS.— The knowledge which the mind has of itself in every phase of its experience. Each state is a subjective state, known to the person as his own. Con- sciousness is the knowledge of each" state as his, with the Sel] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 307 knowledge of himself, as the subject of experience, and as the observer of this experience. In this self-consciousness, Descartes saw the primary indubit- able fact. "I think, therefore I am;" that is, "I am think- ing ; " I know that I am so engaged : doubt is here impossible. To doubt is to refute doubt as to the reliability of self-con- sciousness. Consciousness of the mind's own feelings and operations cannot be disbelieved. The Knowing Self cannot know anything without knowing itself as the knower. This is apperception. Such knowledge is, however, only phenomenal and fragmentary, — a knowledge of self as engaged in a particular exercise, sustained by such seK-knowledge as the past has supplied. What the Self is, in the fulness of its being, is not known to any of us. The mystery of our being remains. But personal-i4enfcity is known to us as the condition of inteUigenb life. " Only because I can connect a variety of given representations in one consciousness, is it possible that I can represent to myself the identity of consciousness in these representations." Kant, Pure Reason, Meiklejohn's transl., 82. In self-regulation of conduct, and all that is involved in it, we have extended knowledge of our personality. "My vocation as moral, and whatever is involved in the consciousness thereof, is the one immediate certainty that is given to me as conscious of Self, — the one thing which makes me for myself a reality." Kant, Werke, v. 210. " Since I am at the same time in all my sensations, conceptions, and states of consciousness, thought is everywhere present." Hegel, Logic, Wallace's Tr., p. 32. E. Caird's Hegel, ch. viii. p. 151 ; Terrier's Metaphysics. The Idea of Self, — Sully, Human Mind, i. 475 ; Dewey, MiTid, XV. 58 ; James, Princips. of Psychol., i. 291. Difficulty of appre- hending Thought as a purely spiritual activity, — James, i. 299. SBLP-BVIDBNCE.— Carrying in itself the evidence of truth. A self-evident proposition is one needing only to have its terms understood to be accepted as true. This is the characteristic of necessary or universal truth ; it neither needs proof, nor admits of it. The recognition of such truth is implied in aU intellectual procedure, and in all regulation of 308 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Sol conduct, by reference to the antithesis of right and wrong. This was the main feature in Eeid's answer to Hume. SELFISHNESS " consists not in the indulging of this or that particular propensity, but in disregarding, for the sake of any kind of personal gratification or advantage, the rights or the feelings of other men." On " the radical evil in human nature,'' Kant, Religion loithin the Limits of mere Reason, Part i. SELF-LOVE. — A rational regard to one's own good. Under this term are included all principles of our nature prompting us to seek our own good. It is used by Butler in two applications : — (1) as a principle co-ordinate with Benevo- lence, i.e., as a conscious principle of voluntary action, — Upon Human Nature, Sermon i. ; (2) as an instinctive disposition, — Analogy of Religion. Self-love and any particular passion may be joined together. Sermons, pref. Sermon xi. " We have to distinguish self-love, the ' general desire that every man hath of his own happiness' or pleasure, from the particular affections, passions, and appetites directed to external objects, which are ' necessarily presupposed ' in ' the very idea of an interested pursuit,' since there would be no pleasure for self-love to aim at, if there were no pre-existing desires directed towards objects other than pleasure, in the satisfaction of which pleasure consists.'' Sidgwick's Outlines of History of Ethics, p. 189. According to Hobbes, Leviathan, pt. i. c. vi., self-love is the basis of all action. Of Ethical theories founded on Happiness, one division is Egoistic, known as the Self-regarding ; another division. Altruistic, making the good of others the criterion of right. Utilitarianism has developed into the latter. '' All minds must have come, by the way of the survival of the fittest, if by no directer path, to take an intense interest in the bodies to which they are yoked, altogether apart from any interest in the Pure Ego which they also possess." James, Text-Book of Psychology, p. 194. The Hegelian or JSTeo-Kantian School deviates from Kant's Categorical Imperative, to treat of fulfilment of desire, in self- realisation, as the basis of all action ; but not without regard to Sel] VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. 309 the " Self," being the member of an infinite whole. Bradley, Ethical Studies, 73 ; Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, 96. Motive is "the consciousness of an object which the man seeks in doing the act. This object, however, as an object of loill, is not merely one of the objects of desire at aversion, of which the man was conscious before he willed. It is a particular self-satisfaction to be gained iu attaining one of these objects, or a combination of them. The 'motive' which the act of will expresses is the desire for this self-satisfaction." Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 107, § 104. SELF-PRESERVATION (Instinct of).— Involuntary shrinking from danger which belongs to organic life, and is manifested primarily in reflex action. As sufieriug induces recoil, fear induces pause, caution, flight, for escape from the presence of that which induces fear. In the case of gregarious animals, the impulse of fear acts on centres of vocalisation, giving the danger-signal. " The instinct of self-preservation is not felt except in the presence of danger." Darwin's Descent of Man, pt. i. ch. iv. p. 112.' It is common to man, with the animals. But there is with him a vastly extended range for application of this instinct, on account of the foresight which thought involves. Ethical considerations intervene, introducing regard to the safety of others as an essential part of duty. On this account, involuntary impulse ceases to rule, and voluntary determination is made to depend upon law regulating the play of natural impulse. SELF-REALISATION.— The Hegelian formula of moral obligation, springing out of a scheme of rational evolution. "Be a person." Hegel, Philosophie des Rechts, sec. 36. "Realise thy true self." Being a Person, realise by exercise of will the idea of Personality. "I am morally realised, not until my personal self has utterly ceased to be my exclusive self, is no more a wiU which is outside others' wills, but finds in the world of others nothing but self. ' Realise yourself as an infinite whole,' means ' Realise yourself as the self-conscious member of an infinite whole, by realising that whole in your- self.'" Bradley, Ethical Studies, p. 73. "Hence, that all will- 310 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Sem ing is self-realisation, is seen not to be in collision with morality.'' Ih., p. 77; cf. Essay ii., passim; Green, Prolego- mena to Ethics, passim. SBMI-CIBCULAR CANALS.— A threefold series of canals, situated within the inner ear, having five openings to- wards the utrioulus, or wider central chamber. In each canal there is a widening of the opening at one end. The outer struc- ture of these canals is bone. Within, there is a membranous structure, floating in clear fluid. By these canals sensibility to rotatory motion is secured. Calderwood, Mind and Brain, p. 73. SENSATION. — The experience resulting from impression on any part of the sensitive organism, i.e., from excitation by contact of an external object with any sensory nerve or set of nerves. Sensation is the simplest element in consciousness. "With this we must begin as the primordial fact iji experience. By reference to the special senses, we have distinctive sensa- tions, such as smell-sensations. All sensations are impressions known in consciousness. "The capacity for receiving representations (receptivity) through the mode in which we are affected by objects, is called Sensibility.'' Kant, Pure Reason, Meiklejohn's Tr., p. 21. " That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation, I term its matter." lb. The physiology of sensation, molecular action within a nerve- fibre, clearly shows that sensation does not supply an exact likeness of an object, and does not in itself necessitate any presentation of an individual object. The chill resulting from a sudden gust of wind, the sting of a nettle, the bite of a mosquito, illustrate experience for which such presentation is not required. There is a "false descriptive psychology involved in the statement that the only things we can mentally picture are individuals completely determinate in all regards." James, Principles of Psychology, i. 471. Sensation is the prerequisite for perception. "Perception always involves sensation as a portion of itself ; and sensation, in turn, never takes place in adult life without perception also being there. They are therefore names for difierent cognitive functions, not for different sorts of mental fact. The nearer Sen] VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 311 the object cognised comes to being a simple quality, like ' hot,' ' cold,' . . . the more the state of mind approaches pure sensa- tion." lb., ii. p. 1, The error of Locke, developing into the scepticism of Hume, was the treatment of sensations as if they were single and separate ; as if Ideas passed into the mind along the sensory fibres. Hence the language of • Hume. " AU events seem entirely loose and separate. One event foUows another ; but we never can observe any tye between them. They seem con- joined, but never connected." Inquiry, sec. vii. part 2. Kant has rendered special service to philosophy by setting about the inquiry, what is meant by "conjoined"] Green has dealt very fully with Hume's position as to " unrelated impressions." Intro, to Hum^s Works, vol. i. p. 19. SENSATIONALISM.— The theory which makes sensation the sole origin of human knowledge ; and regards sensibility as the source from which all mental power is developed. Its formula is — nihil est in intelleetu, nisi prius fuerit in sensu. Locke says : — " All ideas come from sensation or reflection." This is the type of theory to which the evolutionist is shut up, who would maintain that mind has been evolved from matter. Its leading positions are these : — That sensation and conscious- ness are the same, — that sensations repeat themselves, so as to become familiar, — that recurring sensations become associated, and thus afford the conditions of rational life, assuming the different aspects of intellectual, volitional, and emotional experi- ence. Its perplexity lies in the contrast between sensus and intellectus, — in the regard to present and past, in the com- parison of impressions, and in the generalisations and inductions which are the products of intellectual action. Leibnitz sa,js,— Nihil est in intelleetu, etc nisi ipse intellectus. The Rational School holds that Intelligence is a distinct power, inexplicable by reference to sensation, while sensory experience is inexplicable save by exercise of Intelli- gence on principles original to the rational nature. After Locke and Hume, see Herbert Spencer, Psychology; James MiU, Analysis ; J. S. Mill, Exam, of Hamilton's Philos. ; Bain, Senses and Intellect ; Cyples, Process of Human Experience. 312 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Sen SENSE, GENERAL and SPECIAL.— The physical experience dependent ou the action of sensory nerves. General, is that which belongs to the fibres spread over all parts of the organism ; Special, is that connected with a distinct terminal arrangement suited to impressions of difiereut kinds, such as sound and light. See references under Experimental Psychology. George Wilson, Five Gateways of Knowledge ; Thomson (Lord Kelvin), Six Gateways of Knowledge ; Nature, vol. xxix. 438, 462 ; Preyer's Mind of the Child, "The Senses and the "Will." SENSIBILITY (to at(r6l7?TiKdi/).— Used in two senses. (1) Susceptibility belonging to the nerves of sensation. This is the prerequisite for Sensation. (2) Capacity of feeling belong- ing to mind. " Emotional susceptibility," as distinguished from intellect and will. SENSIBLES, COMMON and PROPER.— Aristotle distinguished sensihles into cominon and proper. Be Anima, lib. ii. ch. vi., lib. iii. ch. i. ; De Sensu et Sensili, ch. i. The proper sensihles are those which are peculiar to one sense. SBNSORIUM {aia-6rp-rjpiov). — An organ of sense.- The portion of the cerebrum in which the general nerves of sensi- bility have their centre. SENSORI-MOTOR.— Applied to structure of the nerve system, and also to its activity. (1) The combination of the two sides of the nerve-system in all living organism. The one side consists of the sensory nerves ; the other, of the motor nerves. These two sides constitute one system — the Sensori- Motor. (2) When molecular movement is transmitted along a sensory line, and passes over to a motor line, this is Sensori- motor activity; its result being muscular movement. Carpenter, Mental Physiology, ch. ii.; Calderwood, Mind and Brain, ch. iii. and ix. SBNSUS COMMUNIS (koiv^ ar 340 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Wil but it is a necessary condition of goodness." Green, Proleg., 109. " The rational self in the form of will." Bradley, Ethical Studies, 30. The will's struggle in ethical life is to free itself from dominion of passion, so as to establish dominion of reason. " The particular man has to make that his." Bradley, Ethical Studies, 296. The leading problem here concerns the relation of Will to motive forces. Modern Philosophy has no place for " liberty of indifference." " Motiveless choice " is a contradiction. A man sets "clearly before himself certain objects." Green, Prole- gomena to Ethics, 109. The Libertarian theory maintains that Will controls motives through guidance of the understanding. The Necessitarian or Determinist theory maintains that volitions are determined by the nature and circumstances of the agent. The Libertarian doctrine is thus stated by Kant : — " WiU is that kind of causality attributed to living agents, in so far as they are possessed of reason, and freedom is such a property of that causality as enables them to originate events independ- ently of foreign determining causes." Metaph. of Ethics, Semple's Tr., 3rd ed., p. 57 ; Abbot's Tf., p. 65. The Determinist doctrine is thus stated by J. S. Mill : — " Volitions follow determinate moral antecedents with the same uniformity and with the same certainty, as physical effects follow their physical causes." Exam, of Hamilton, 3rd ed., p. 561. Cf. Utilitarianism, 22. Of Hegelian thinkers. Green may be quoted as a representa- tive. " Free-will is either a name for you know not what, or it is included, is the essential factor, in character." Green, Prole- gomena, p. 113. This is the Deterministic Theory; while "the champions of free-will," it is erroneously said, commonly sup- pose that a man " makes a choice which is not itself determined by any motive." P. 107. The motive is intelligently "de- termined." Por the explanation of human conduct, the Libertarian points to Thought ; the Determinist, to Character. For the former, the ultimate explanation is Thought concerned with facts and Wis] VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 341 principles or rules of conduct. For the latter, the ultimate explanation is Character, " environment," " outward circum- stances suited to call internal incentives into action." On the Libertarian side. — Aristotle, N. Ethics, bk. iii.; Leibnitz, Letters to Clarke; Kant, Metaph. of Ethics, and Practical Reason ; Eeid, Active Powers, Essay ii. and Essay iv. ; Fichte, Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Prineipien der Wis- senschaftslehre ; Dugald Stewart, Active and Moral Powers; Hamilton, Metaph., ii. 410 ; Mansel, Limits of Beligious Thought, lect. v.; Chalmers, Moral Philosophy, ch. iv. ; Tappan, On the Will; M'Cosh, Method of Divine Government; Calder- wood. Handbook of Moral Philos., part iii.; Porter, Elements of Moral Science; Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, .3rd ed., vol. ii. pp. 37-41, and p. 87; Laurie, Metaphysica Nova et Vetusta, and Ethica. Determinism. — Spinoza, Ethics, part ii.; Edwards, On the Will; Hobbes, Leviathan, part i. c. 6 ; Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, bk. ii. pt. 3 ; Essays, " Liberty and Necessity"; Mill, Exam, of Hamilton, ch. 26 ; Bain, Emotions awl Will, p. 246 ; Sidgwick, Method of Ethics, bk. i. ch. 5 ; Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics, c. vii. div. 2 ; Sidgwick, History of Ethics, 253. For Human Freedom and Determinism according to Hegelian thought, — Hegel, Phanoinonologie des Geistes, indicating the stages through which spirit passes in its manifestation, until, in view of " absolute knowledge," " from the chalice of this realm of spirits, infinity pours foaming forth." Hutchison Stirling, Secret of Hegel; Wallace, Hegel's Logic; Bradley, Ethical Studies, Essay i.; Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, bk. ii.; Muir- head. Elements of Ethics, bk. ii., under " Moral Judgment," pp. •45-62. WISDOM (o-o^ta). — Practical sagacity, applied for guidance of life as a whole : prudence in a large sense, connected with wide range of vision. Wisdom is " prudence in counsel " : "a kind of knowledge that makes men deliberate prudently." Plato, Republic, bk. iv. p. 428. Plato sets it first among the " Cardinal Virtues." " We cannot say of wisdom, in a disparaging way, it is only 342 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. [Wor an idea. Eor, for the very reason that it is the idea of the necessary unity of all possible aims, it must be for all practical exertions and endeavours the primitive condition and rule — a rule which, if not constitutive, is at least limitative." Kant, Pure Reason, Meildejohn's Tr., p. 229. WORTH. — Relative excellence either of conduct or of character, in view of moral law. "An action done out of duty has its moral worth, not from any purpose it may subserve, but from the maxim according to which it is determined on ; it depends not on the effecting any given end, but on the principle of volition singly." Groundwork of Metaph. of Ethics, Semple's Tr., 3rd ed., p. 11. " The essence of all moral worth in acting, consists in this, that the moral law be the immediate determinator of the Will." Semple, 3rd ed., p. 109 ; Abbott's Kant's Theory of Ethics, p. 164. True ethical worth is " the fore-realised divine ideal ; and by faith the particular man has to make that his, to identify him- self therewith, behold and feel himself therewith identified, and his own self -consciousness have the witness of it." Bradley, Ethical Studies, 296. GENERAL INDEX OF SUBJECTS AND AUTHORS. Absolute, 1, 328, 334; uses of tlie term, 1 ; possibility of knowing The Absolute, 2. Abstraction, 3 ; Spinoza's condemna- tion of tbe abstract view of things, 5 ; Hegel's, 5 ; Mill's uses of abstract names, 5. Absurd, 5. Academy, 5; diversity of theory in the Old, Middle, and New Acade- mies, 6. Acatalepsy, 7. Accident, applied to Spinoza, 7. Acosmist, 7. Acroamatic, 7. Action, 8 ; Aristotle's view of volun- tary action, 8 ; when " moral," 8 ; " unreasonable," 8. Active Powers, 8 ; xisage of the Scot- tish School, 8. Actual, 8. Adamson, apodeictic, 25 ; dialectic, 104 ; logic, 227 ; mind, 239 ; nou- menon, 255. Addison, taste, 325. Adequate, 9; Spinoza's "adequate idea," 9. Admiration, 9. Esthetic, 9 ; Kant's use of the term, 11. Affection, 11. Afferent, 11. Affirmation, 12. A Fortiori, 12. Agnosticism, 12, 299 ; Huxley's De- fence of, 12 ; Kant on, 13. Altruism, 13 ; Mill's exposition, 13 ; Sidgwiok's, 14. Ambition, 14. Amphiboly, 14. Analogue, 14 ; Darwin on, 14. Analogy, 14 ; Mill on, 15 ; Kant on analogies of experience, 15 ; as related to induction, 15. Analysis, 16 ; its relation to synthesis, 16. Analytic judgments, 187. Analytics, 16. An^xagoras, mind, 238. Anima Mundi, 17 ; Plato's view of the world as a living soul, 17. Animal Intelligence, 17. Animism, 19. AatennsB, 19; Darwin's description, 19. Anthropology, 19. Anthropomorphism, 19 ; Spinoza on, 20 ; Malebranche, 20 ; Mansel on the horror of, 20. Anticipation, 20, 145. Antinomy, 22. Antipathy, 22. A Parte Ante, 23. Apathy, 23. Aphasia, 24. Aphorism, 24. Apodeictic, 24. Appearance, 25. Apperception, 25. Appetite, 27. Apprehension, 28. Approbation, 28. A Priori, 29 ; denial of, 126. Archetype, 3U. Architect, God as, of the world, 96. Architectonic, 31. Argument, 31. Aristotle, on The Good, 48 ; the cate- gories, 58 ; causes, 59 ; chance, 63 ; deliberate preference, 65 ; civil government and property, 68 ; iirst truths, 80 ; contract, 82 ; law of contradiction, 83 ; contrary, 84 ; matter, 86 ; God and Nature, 86 ; deduction 92 ; deliberate prefer- 344 INDEX. eiioe, 95 ; demonstration, 97 ; dia- lectic, 104 ; elementary, 123 ; entelechy, 128 ; exoteric and eso- teric, 135 ; essence, 135 ; happiness the end, 139 ; final cause, 158 ; form, 159 ; habit, 167 ; hypothesis, 175 ; induction, '200 ; justice, 219 ; analytics, 225 ; the great-souled man, 227 ; matter and form, 230 ; The Mean, 231 ; method, 237; philosophia prima, 259 ; desire, 265 ; peripatetic, 267 ; danger of the living of pleasure, 272 ; rules of prudence, 281 ; quality, 287 ; heing, 290 ; soul, 317 ; substance, 321 ; temperance, 327 ; time, 332 ; the voluntary, 339. Art, 32. Asceticism, 34. Assertory, 34. Association, 35. Assumption, 36. Atheism, 36. Atomic theory, 37, 86. Atrophy, 39. Attention, 39 ; "selective," 146. Attribute, 39. Authority, 39. Automaton, 40. Autonomy, 40. Averages, 41. Axiom, 42. Bacon, on aphorisms, 24 ; art, 33 ; axioms, 42 ; empirics or dog- matists, 112 ; experiment, 147 ; idols, 190 ; philosophy, 270. Bagehot, banking, 274. Bain, conscience, 76 ; pleasure, as a rule of conduct, 169 ; morality, 170 ; moral obligation, 258 ; punishment, 287 ; voluntary action, 339. Baldwin, method, 237 ; motive, 245 ; objects of vision, 314. Balfour, A. J., Evolution of Belief, 40. Beattie, " common sense," 67. Beauty, Schelling's deftnition of, 43; Hegel's, 43. Being, 44. Belief, Grounds of, J. S. Mill, 40; evolution of, 40. Benevolence, 45 ; now a subject of law, 46 ; influence of Christianity in extension of, 46. Bentham, deontology, 97 ; happiness, 138 ; duty, 170 ; notion, 254. Berkeley, impossibility of conceiving separately what cannot exist separately, 4 ; cause, 60 ; externality, 148 ; idea, 178 ; causation in the universe, 193. Biology, 46. Body, 47, 230. Boehme, 120. Bonum, 48. Bradley, the end of action, 50; fallibility and certainty, 62 ; dialectic method, 105 ; " ought to be," 117 ; idea, 180 ; judgment, 217 ; reality and ideas, 291 ; reason- ing, 292 ; self-realisation, 309 ; ethical worth, 342. Brain, 50. Brain excitation, inducing delusions, 167. Brown, Samuel, Atomic Theory, 37. Brown, Crum, A., Atomic Theory, 38. Burlamaqui, rule, 302. Butler, appetite, 27 ; approval of conscience, 29 ; benevolence, 45 ; conscience, ■ 74 ; our perception of fitness, 159 ; consciousness and identity, 188 ; interest, 212 ; moral faculty, 242 ; rational resentment, 300. Cabanis, the brain secretes thought, 229. Caird, Edward, a priori, 30 ; nature, 250. Calculation, as characteristic of the happiness theory, 169. Capacity, 56. Capital, 315. Cardinal Virtues, 56. Carpenter, ideational, 185 ; uncon- scious cerebration, 223 ; organic apparatus, 261. Casuistry, 56. Categorical Imperative, 57. Category, 58, 133. Cause, 59, 277. Cerebellum, 52. Cerebrum, 63. Certainty, 61. Chance, 63. Chastity, 64. Choice, 64. Cicero, on anticipation, 21 ; appetite, 27 ; argumentation, 32 ; on The Good, 48 ; moral, 137 ; innate cognitions, 203 ; justice, 219 ; temperance, 327. Clarke, Samuel, chance, 63 ; fitness, 158. Classification, 65. Clemens Alexandrinus, philosophy, 118. INDEX. 345 Clifford, three kinds of room, 110 ; eject, 123. Cognition, 66. Coleridge, on conception, 69 ; morality, 242 ; collectivism, 314 ; nuderstaud- ing, 336. Colligation, 66. Common Good, as related to ethics, 138. Common Sense, 66, 313.' Communism, 68. Comparative Intelligence, 210. Comparison, 69. Comprehension, 69. Comte, Positivism, 275 ; law of the three states, 275. Conception, 69. Conceptions, transcendental and em- pirical, 14. Conceptnalism, 71. Concrete, 71. Condition, 72. Conduct, 73 ; biologically considered, 170. Conflict of motives, 245. Congruity, 73. Connotation, 73. Conscience, 74 ; authority of, 293. Consciousness, 78 ; indubitable, 79 ; stream of, 126. Consent, 79. Conservative Faculty, 80. Constitutive, 80. Constructs, 293. Contingent, 81. Continuity, 81. Contract, 82. Contradiction, Law of, 83. Contradictory, 84. Contraposition, 84. Contrary, 84. Conversion, 85. ' Co-ordination, 85. Copula, 85. Cosmogony, 86. Cosmology, 86. Cosmothetic Idealists, 87. Courage, 87. Cousin, apperception, 27 ; art, 33 ; consciousness, 79 ; eclecticism, 119 ; ideal, 182 ; mysticism, 247 ; nominalism and conceptnalism, 253. Craniology, 87. Creation, 88. Criterion, 88. Critique, 89. Cudworth, archetypal mind, 30; fatalism, 155. Custom, as contrasted with habit, 90 ; with right, 137. Cynic, 90. Cyples, co-ordination at the focal point in the brain, 85 ; time and space, 115 ; pain, 262. Cyrenaio, 91. Daemon of Socrates, 91. Darwin, C, on resemblances in animal structure, 14 ; antennae, 19 ; on the grandeur of the view of creation under the Evolution Theory, 37 ; on possible evolution of the Golden Eule, 46 ; on creation, 88 ; differen- tiation, 108 ; evolution, 143 ; pan- genesis, 143 ; descent of man, 144 ; moral sense, 157 ; ganglion, 162 ; ought, 171 ; instincts few in the higher animals, 207 ; language, 222 ; mind, 238 ; pangenesis, 263 ; par- thenogenesis, 265; self-preservation, 309 ; distinction of species, 318. Deduction, 92. -De Facto and De Jv/re, 92. Definition, 93. Deist, 94. Deliberation, 95. Delusions, 95, 167, 189. Demiurge, 96. Demonstration, 96. Deontology, 97. Descartes, attribute, 39 ; conscious- ness, 78 ; eternal truths, 80 ; doubt as an instrument, 112 ; emiuenter, 124 ; power of judging, equal in man, 134 ; source of error, 134 ; substance, 135 ; factitious, 149 ; idea, 177 ; imagination, 191 ; innate ideas, 203 ; body, 230 ; occasional causes, 258 ; modes of thinking, 266 ; self-consciousness, 309. Design, 97 ; argument from, 158. Desire, 98 ; as related to the ideal. Green's use of, 99. Determinism, 100 ; no theory of indeterminism, 101. Development, 102. Dewey, intuitive knowledge, 215. Dialectic, 103 ; Plato's usage, 103. Dichotomy, 107. Dictum de omni et nullo, 107. Dictum Simpliciter, 107. Difference, 107. Differentiation, 108. Dilemma, 108. Diogenes Laertius, on the Stoics' use of TrpoXri^J/t^, 21 ; KadTjKov, duty, 116 ; element, 124. Discursive, 109. Disjunctive, 109. Disorder, moral, 140, 308. 346 INDEX. Disposition, 109. Dissolution, 110. Distance, 110. Distinct, 111. Distinction, 111. Distribution, 111. Division, 111. Dogma, 111. Dogmatism, 112. Doubt, 112. Douglas, brain, 50 ; experimental psychology, 283. Dreaming, 113. Dualism, 114. Duration, 115, 194. Duration-block, 115. Duty, 116 ; and rights, relation of, 116. Dynamical, 117. Eclecticism, 118. Ecstasy, 120. Education, 120. Edwards, Jonathan, motive, 244 ; moral necessity, 251. Effect, 121. Efferent, 121. Effort, feeling of, 162. Ego, 121. Egoism, 122. Eject, 123. Elaborative Faculty, 123. Element, 123. Emanation, 124. Embryology 124 ; as related to bio- logy, 47. Emerson, belief, 45 ; genius, 164. Eminenter, 124. Emotion, 124. Empiricism, 125. End, 126 ; as test of moral quality, 48. End-in-himself, 127. Energy, 127. Entelechy, 128. Enthusiasm, 128. Enthymeme, 129. Entity, 129. Entoptic, 129. Environment, 129. Envy, 130 ; in the dog, 130. Epicheirema, 130. Epicureanism, 130. Epistemology, 131. Episyllogism, 133. Equation, 133. Equity, 133. Equivocation, 134. Error, 134. Esoteric, 134. Essence, 135. Eternity, 136, 148. Ethical perplexity, 140, 308. Ethics, 137. Ethnology, 138. Eudaemonism, 138. Evidence, 139. Evil, 140 ; Spencer on, 130. Evolution, 141 ; Herbert Spencer's definition of, 108 ; differentiation, 108 ; dissolution or disintegration, 110 ; environment, 129 ; early appearance of the conception, 142 ; heterogeneity, 173 ; mind, 239. Excito-motor, 294. Excluded Middle, 144. Exoteric, 145. Expectation, 145. Experience, 145. Experiment, 147. Extension, 147. Eye, 149. Fact, 149 ; Lewis on, 149. Factitious, 149 ; Descartes' use of, 149. Faculty, 149. Faith, 150. Fallacy, 150. Family, 153. Fancy, 154. Fatalism, 155. Fechner's Law, 156. Feeling, 156. Felicific, 157 ; the standard of morals, 13. Ferrier, essence, 136. Fichte, moral philosophy, 243 ; mys- ticism, 247; consciousness, 252; thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, 329 ; followed by Hegel, 329. Figurative conception, 157. Final cause, 158. Fitness and unfitness, 158. Flint, association, 36 ; secularism, 306. Focal point in nerve centre, 85. Force, 159. Form, 159. Fowler, connotation, 73. Free-Will, 160 ; its meaning, 160 ; not liberty of indifference, 160. Friendship, 162. Function, 162. Galton, genius, 164. Ganglion, 162. Generalisation, 163. Generic images, 163 ; Sully on, 5 ; James on, 5. 1 Genius, 163. INDEX. 347 Genus, 164. Germ-plasm, 164. Gnosticism, 164. God, 165. God, as "world-builder," 96; his existence " timeless," 136. Goltz, use of intelligence, 211. Good, 166. Good, The, as the test of moral action, 48. Gosehen, G. J., Foreign Exchanees, 274. Grammar, 166. Grant, Aristotle's use of esoteric, 135 : Aristotle's view of freedom, 339. Green, T. H., on the relation of the one divine mind to the human soul, 2 ; the end of action, 50 ; on cause, 60 ; use of " desire," 99 ; free-will, 161, 340 ; impulse, as distinct from desire, 198 ; monistic scheme, 241 ; relation of desires to motive, 245 ; knowledge of necessary truths, 251 ; ethical end, 257 ; the real, 290 ; motive, 308 ; Hume's account of unrelated impressions, 311 ; will, 339. Grote, Jo., when action is moral, 8 ; imagination, 192 ; moral philosophy, 242 ; rightness as the first ethical ideal, 302. Grotius, laws of nature, 83. Habit, 167. Hallucination,. 167. Hamilton, use of absolute and infinite, 1 ; use of irpoXn^ts by Stoics and Epicureans, 21 ; argumentation, 31 ; authority, 40; belief, 45; "common sense," 67 ; conception, 70 ; con- ditioned and unconditioned, 72 ; law of contradiction, 84; pleasure and pain, 85 ; cosmothetic idealists, 87 ; definition, 93 ; Ego, 121 ; im- pression, 1 98 ; logic, 225 ; dis- tinction between ideas and notions, 254; quantification of the predicate, 288 ; subject, 321. Happiness, 168 ; ambiguity of term, 168. Happiness Theory, 168 ; the measure- ment it implies, 157. Harmony, 171. Hartmann, evU, 141 ; instinct, 207 ; pessimism, 268. Hate, 171. Hedonism, 171. Hedonism, egoistic, and altruistic, 13; the measurement it implies, 157 ; monists, 241 ; law of parciraony, 264 ; perfection, 267. Hegel, use of idea, 2 ; beauty, 43 ; The Good, 50; the imperative of morals, 57 ; the categories, 68 ; the abstract and the concrete, 72 ; law of contra- diction, 84 ; cosmology, 86 ; dia- lectic, 105: "ought to be," 117; essence, 136; evil, 141 ; use of contra- diction, 145 ; figurative conception, 157 ; theory of will, 161; belief in God, 166 ; idea, 180 ; idealism, 184 ; innate ideas, 206 ; logic, 226 ; moment, 240 ; monistic scheme, 241 ; moral philosophy, 243 ; nature, 250; obligation, 257; self- realisation, 267 ; person, 268 ; re- ligion special to man, 299 ; self- knowledge, 307 ; self-realisation, 309 ; a spiritual principle in nature, 319 ; free-will, 340. Heredity, 143, 171. Heterogeneity, 173. Heteronomy, 173. History, philosophy of, 173. Hobbes, laws of nature, 83 ; desire the rule of conduct, 169 ; religion special to man, 298. Hoffding, function, 162 : psychology, 282 ; evolution as related to psy- chology, 282 ; contrast between psychology and epistemology, 291 ; the thing itself, 330 ; thinking, 331. Holiness, 174. Homogeneity, 174. Homologue, 174. Homotype, 174. Humanity, religion of, 174. Hume, how a particular idea becomes general, 4 ; anthropomorphism, 20 ; cause, 60 ; experience, 146 ; idea, 178 ; consciousness and identity, 188 ; impressions, 1 98 ; conscious- ness, its implications, 252 ; passion, 265 ; power, 277 ; proofs, 279 ; sensations and ideas, ' 297 ; no scepticism as to motel distinctions, 304 ; sensations are loose and separate, 311. Huxley, on the indubitable, 62 ; protoplasm, 280. Hylozoism, 174. Hypnotism, 114, 189. Hypothesis, 175. Hypothetical, 176. Hypothetical Dualist, 177. Idea, 177 ; Hegel's use of, 2. Ideal, 181. 348 INDEX. Ideal legality, 182. Idealism, 182. Idealism of Germany as related to the Absolute, 2. Ideation, 184. Ideatum, 186. Identical Proposition, 187. Identity, 187. Idiosyncrasy, 189. Idol, 190. Ignorance, 190. Illation, 190. Illicit, 191. Illumination, 191. Illusion, 191. Imagination, 191. Immanent, 193. Immaterialism, 193. Immediate, 194. Immortality, 195. Imperative, 197. Impression, 198. Impulse, 198. Indefinite, 199. Indeterminism of will, no such theory promulgated, 101. Indifferent, 199. Individualism, 169, 200. Individuality, 199. Induction, 200. Infinite, 201. Influent, 293. Inhibition, 202. Innate, 203. Instinct, 207. Intellect, imperfections of, 210. Intelligence, 209 ; comparative, 210 ; versus instinct, 211. Intention, 212. Interest, 212. Introspection, 213 ; Comte's criticism, 213. Intuition, 213. James, on the automaton theory, 40 ; delusions of the insane, 96 ; diifer ential discriminations, 108 ; position in space, 110 ; contrast betvpeen doubt and disbelief, 113 ; dreams, 114 ; dualism and monism, 114 ; succession, 118 ; empirical self, 122; instinctive reaction and emotional expression, 125 ; experience, 146 ; outer, what is felt by the senses, 148 ; use of " feeling," 157 ; relation of volition to action, 162 ; language, 167 ; habit, 167 ; recurrence of states, 179 ; ideation, 185 ; muta- tions of self, 189 ; the psychologist's attitude, 194 ; inhibition, 203 ; instinct, 207 ; intelligence, 211 ; personal interest, 212 ; introspec- tion, 213 ; the relation of knowing, 221 ; language, 222 ; memory, as related to brain, 230 ; memory and attention, 232 ; memory and think- ing, 232 ; metaphysics, 236 ; evolu- tion and mind, 239 ; the impulsive in consciousness, 245 ; necessary and eternal relations, 251 ; number, 255, physiology of pain, 263 ; influent, 293 ; sensational consciousness, 296 ; self-interest as concerned with the body, 309 ; power to picture objects, 310 ; sensation and perception, 310 ; does the mind sleep, 314 ; spacial sensibility, 318 ; trains of thought, 331 ; past time, 332. Judgments, analytic, 187. Justice and equity, 133. Kant, Reason's attempt to reach tlie Absolute, 2 ; use of " Ksthetio," 11 ; criticism of Hume, 12 ; the agnostic horizon, 1 3 ; conceptions, transcen- dental and empirical, 14 ; " analogies of experience," 15 ; anticipation, 21 ; antinomy, 22 ; apodeictic, 24 ; apperception, 26 ; apprehension, 28 ; a priori, 29 ; architectonic, 31 ; art, 33 ; assertory, 34 ; association, 35 ; autonomy, 41 ; the beautiful, 43, 325; belief, 44; difference between good and ideal, 48 ; relation of end to duty, 49 ; categorical imperative, 57 ; the categories, 58 ; certitude, 63 ; cognition, 66 ; con- ception, 70 ; concrete, 71 ; con- science, 77 ; constitutive, 80 ; law of contradiction, 84 ; criterion, 89 ; critique, 89 ; theology, 95 ; on argument from design, 98 ; dialectic, 104 ; I dogmatism, 112 ; duration, 115 ; duty, 116 ; dynamical in thought, 117 ; summum bonum, 127 ; " kingdom," 127 ; happiness, 139 ; anticipation of perception, 145 ; conditions of experience, 146 ; experiment, 147 ; external sense, 148 ; form, 159 ; will, 160 ; belief in God, 166 ; heteronomy, 173 ; holiness, 174 ; idea, 177, 179 ; ideal, 182 ; ideal legality, 182 ; idealism, 183 ; imagination, 192 ; immanent, 193 ; imperative of morals, 197 ; innate, 205 ; interest, 212 ; intuitive knowledge, 214 ; judgment, 217 ; knowledge, 221 ; logic, 226 ; mathematics, 229 ; matter and form in knowledge, 230 ;maxim, in morals. INDEX. 349 230 ; raetaphysio, 235 ; mind, 239 ; moral philosophy, 242 ; motive, 244 ; nature, 2aO ; noumenon, 255 ; obligation, 257 ; ontology, 259 ; opinion, 260 ; organism, 261 ; paralogism, 264 ; sensibility and thought, 266 ; phenomenon, 269 ; postulates of the practical reason, ■ 276 ; practical reason, 277 ; pure reason, 287 ; reason, 292 ; regulative, 295 ; transcendental ideas, 296 ; relativity of knowledge, 297 ; re- ligion and pure reason, 299 ; rever- ence, 301 ; schema, 304 ; self- knowledge, 307 ; radical evil in human nature, 308 ; sensibility, 310 ; space, 317 ; spontaneity of understanding, 319 ; synthetical judgments, 324 ; teleology, 326 ; natural theology, 328 ; thing-in- itself, 330 ; time, 332 ; transcendental and transcendent, 333 ; understand- ing, 335 ; will, 339 ; wisdom, 341 ; wortli of action, 341. Keynea' logical method in political economy, 274. Kidd, Benjamin, social evolution and religion, 298 ; sociology, 315. Knowledge, 220. Knowledge of the Infinite, possibility of, 2. Ladd, ideation, 185. Language, 222. Laplace, on probability, 64; origin, 88. Latent modifications of mind, 223. Laurie, categorical imperative, 57. Law, 223 ; ancient law, 275. Leibnitz, apperception, 26 ; fate, 155 ; pre-established harmonj', 258 ; optimism, 261 ; sensationalism, 311 ; spontaneity, 319 ; taiula rasa, 324. Lewes, G. H., psycho-statical con- ditions of action, 102 ; externality, 148 ; metempirical, 236. Lewis, G. C, authority, 40 ; opinion, 260. Libertarian, 224. Liberty of Indifference an incon- sistency, 199. Local signs, 224. Locke, how the mind makes particular ideas to become general, 4 ; cause, 60 ; duration, 115 ; denial of a priori, 126 ; idea, 177 ; consciousness, 188 ; polemic against innate ideas, 204 ; intuitive knowledge, 214; know- ledge, 221 ; maxims and axioms, 230 ; eternal verities, 250 ; notion. 254 ; opinion, 260 ; principal actions of mind, 266 ; person, 268 ; long deliberations, how accomplished, 161 ; primary qualities, 278 ; pro- bability, 279 ; power, 277 ; reflection, 294 ; sensations and ideas, 297 ; volition, 338. Logic, 225. Lore, 227. Lotze, on nature of physical action, 8 ; averages in social history, 42 ; conduct, 73 ; consciousness, 79 ; knowledge of self, 122 ; will-power, 161 ; criticism of Kant's theory of free-will, 161 ; measure of happiness, 168 ; ideal of law, 223 ; maxims of morality, 224 ; local signs, 224 ; pleasure, 272 ; reality and ideas, 290 ; reflection, 292 : sophisms and paralogisms, 316 ; synthesis of apprehension, 324 ; things-in-them- selves, 330 ; will, 339. M'Cosh, analogue as used in biology, 14 ; archetypes, 31 ; homologue, 174 ; imagination, 192. Macrocosm, 227. Magnanimity, 227. Magnetism, 227. Magnitude, 227. Maine, on contract, 83. Major, 227. Malebranche, on anthropomorphism, 20. Manichseism, 228. Mansel, conception, 70 ; definition, 93 ; contradiction and excluded middle, 144 ; intuitive knowledge, 215. Marshall, motives for saving, 273 normal value, 273. Martineau, Spinoza's certainty, 186 intuition, 215 ; Manichasism, 228. Materialism, 228. Mathematics, 229. Matter, 230. Maurice, entelechy, 128. Maxim, 230. Mean, 231. Medulla Oblongata, 52, 231. Megarics, 231. Memory, 232 ; loss of, in old age, 189. Memory-image, 116. Mental Philosophy, 233. Merit, 233. Mesmeric Sleep, 233. Metaphysics, 233. Metempirical, 236. Metempsychosis, 236. Method, 237. 350 INDEX. Microcosm, 237. Mill, James, use of " feeling,'' 156 ; ideation, 184. Mill, J. S., pleasure, the rule of life, 13 ; the altruistic theory, 13 ; analogy as related to induction, 15 ; association, 35 ; attrilmtes, 39 ; axioms, 42 ; benevolence, 45 ; body, 47 ; namable things, 59 ; causality, 61 ; estimate of evidence, 62 ; classi- fication, 65 ; colligation, 66 ; condi- tions, 72; connotation, 73; conscience, 76 ; deduction and induction, 92 ; definition, 93 ; on determinism, 101; volition, 101 ; "ought to be," 117 ; logic, 139 ; evil, 141 ; expectation, 145 ; observation and experiment, 147 ; general proposition, 163 ; pro- portion of happiness, 170 ; and action of morality, 170 ; hypothesis, 175 ; idea, 178 ; hope of a future life, 196 ; induction, 200 ; canons of, 201 ; Justice, 220 ; language, 222 ; logic, 226 ; Manichseism, 228 ; mathematics, 229;; moral philo- sophy, 243 ; mysticism, 247 ; deter- minism, 251 ; moral obligation, 257; passion, 265 ; qualities of pleasure, 272 ; wealth, 273 ; political economy, 274 ; punishment, 287 ; reason- ing, 292 ; social effects of religion, 298 ; sanction, 302 ; determinism, 340. Mind, 237. Mode, 240. Molecule, 240. Moment, 240. Monad, 240. Monism, 241. Monkey, language of the, 222. Monotheism, 241. Montesquieu, justice not the creation of civil law, 218. Moral, 241. Moral dynamic, 117. Moral Faculty, 242. Moral Philosophy, 242. Moral Sense, 244. Morell, apprehension, 28 ; belief, 44. Morgan, Lloyd, constructs, 293. Morphology, 244. Motive, 244, 308 ; conHiot of motives, 245. " Motiveless action," 340. Motor Region, 246. Muirhead, " ought to be," 117. Muscular Sense, 246. Mutations of self, James, 189. Mysticism, 246. Myth, 248. Nature, 249. "Nature," as concerned with fitness and unfitness, 159. Natural, 248. Natural Law, 249. Naturalism, 248. Necessary truth, 250. Necessitarianism, 251. " Necessity," use of word as being an action of will, 101. Negation, 252. Neo-Platonism, 252 ; ecstasy, 120. Nicholson, the economist's view of man, 273 ; diminishing and increas- ing returns, 274. Nihilism, 252. Nominalism, 253. Norm, 253. Notion, 253. Notiones Communes, 254. Noumenon, 264. Number, 255. Object, 256. Objective, 256. Obligation, 257. Occasional Causes, 258. Olfactory Nerves, 258. Ontology, 259, 131. Opinion, "259. Opposition, 260. Optic Nerves, 260. Optimism, 261. Order, 261. Organism, 261, 125. Organon, 261. Origin, 262 ; innate notions, 203. Oughtness, 262. Outness, 262. Pain, 262. Palaeontology, as related to biology, 47. Pangenesis, 263. Pantheism, 263. Paradox, 264. Paralogism, 264. Parcimony, law of, 264. Parthenogenesis, 265. Passion, 265. Passive, 265. Pathology of Brain, 265. Perception, 265. Perfection, 267. Peripatetic, 267. Person, 267; as subject of command, 57. Pessimism, 268. Phenomenon, 269. Philanthropy, 269. Philosophy, 269 ; as distinguished from science, 306. INDEX. 351 Phrenology, 270. Physios, 270. Physiology, 270. Plato, on ideas aud The Good, 2; intellectual vision, 9 ; true art, 10 ; the world a living soul, 17 ; absolute beauty, and good, 30 ; atheism, 36 ; the beautifiu and the good, 43 ; courage, 87 ; dialectic, 104 ; evil, 140 ; God, the author of good only, 141 ; belief in God, 165 ; idea, 179 ; ideal, 181 ; immortality, 195 ; justice, 219 ; reminiscence, 233, 300 ; metempsychosis, 236 ; myth, 248 ; opinion, 260 ; the irascible, 265 ; the soul, 317 ; temperance, 327 : cardinal virtues, 338 ; wisdom, 341. Pleasure, the standard of right, 131 ; nature, degrees, and qualities, 272. Plutarch, "soul" and "mind." 317. Political Economy, 273. Political Philosophy, 272. Pollock, on Spinoza's use of certainty, 186 ; of imagination, 192. Polytheism, 275. Pons Varolii, 52. Porphyry, tree, 275. Port Royal Logic, extension of an idea, 148. Positivism, 27^5. Postulate, 276. Potential, 276. Power, 276. Practical, 277. Predicate, 277. Pre-estabiished Harmony, 278. Premises, 278. Primary Quality, 278. Principle, 278. Probability, 279. Problematic, 279. Proof, 279. Property, 280. Proposition, 280. Protagoras, "man the measure of things," 63. Protoplasm, 280. Prudence, 280. Psychic, 281. Psycho-physics, 285. Psycho-statical conditions of action, 102. Psychology, 281 ; experimental, 283. Psychometry, 285. Punishment, 286. Pure, 287. Purpose, 287. Pythagorean view of virtue, 97. Quality, 287. Quantity, 287. Quantification of the predicate, 288. Rationalism, 289. Real, 290. Realism, 291. Reason, 292 ; in its practical aspect. 277. Reasoning, 292. Reoept, 292. Receptivity, 293. Rectitude, 293. Redintegration, 293. Reduction, 293. Reilection, 294. Reflex Action, 294. Reflex Sense, 295. Regulative, 295. Reid, on the affections, 11 ; appetites. 27 ; axioms, 42 ; the beautiful, 43 "common sense," 67; conception, 70 ; conscience, 76 ; idea, 178 cause, 277 ; primary qualities, 278 common power of reason, 292 sentiment, 313 : temperament, 327 will, 339. Relation, 296. Relativity of Knowledge, 296. Religion, 298 ; social effects of, 298. Remembrance, 300. Resentment, 300. Responsibility, 300. Restraints, 301. Reverence, 301. Reynolds, Joshua, art, 33. Ricardo, currency, 274. Right, 301. Ritter, exoteric and esoteric, 134. Roman law of contract, 82. Romans, recept, 293. Room, three kinds of, Clifford, 110. Rule, 302. Ruskin, artistic execution, 34. Sanction, 302. Scepticism, 302. Schelling, absolute reason, 187. Schematism, 304. Schleiermacher, on Dsemon of Socrates, 92. Scholasticism, 71, 291, 305. Schopenhauer, evil, 141 ; imperfections of intellect, 210 ; pessimism, 268 ; reality, 290. Schwegler, on atomists, 37 ; ecstasy, 120 ; emanation, 124 ; intuitive knowledge, 215 ; metaphysics, 234 ; tabula rasa, 325. 352 INDEX. Science, 306. Scottish School of Philosophy, use of "common sense," 67. Secularism, 306. Selective attention, 146. Self as the member of an infinite whole, 308. Self-consciousness, 306. Self-evidence, 306. Semslmess, 308. Self-love, 308. Self-preservation, 309. Self-realisation, 309. Semi-circular Canals, 310. Sensation, 310. Sensationalism, 311. Sense, 312. Senses, delusions of, 96. Sensibles, 312. Sensibility, 310, 312; Shaftesbury's use of "native sensibility," 9; not the key to knowledge, 200. Sensori-motor, 294, 312. Sensorium, 312. Sensus Coimnunis, 312. Sentiment, 313. Seth, epistemology, 131 ; idealism, 184. Shaftesbury, view of " native sensi- bility," 9 ; moral sense, 43. Sidgwick, H., my good and my neigh- bour's, 13 ; happiness and altruism, 14 ; on influence of Christianity in extending benevolence, 46 ; choice, 65 ; conscience, 75, 77 ; ethics, 137 ; felioific, 157 ; justice, 220 ; moral obligation, 258 ; civil government, 274 ; punishment, 287 ; self-love, 308 ; utilitarianism, 337. Sight, 313. Sign, 314. Simon, God's existence "timeless," 136. Sleep, 314. Smith, Adam, stoic apathy, 23 ; capital, 273 ; systems of political economy, 274. Socialism, 314. Sociology, 315. Socrates, on charge of atheism, 36 ; " know thyself," 121 ; the pleasant life, 138 ; belief in God, 165 ; im- mortality, 195 ; justice, 219 ; tem- perance, 327. Somnambulism, 315. Sophism, 315. Soul, 316; metaphysical conception of, 317. Soul of the world, 17, 317. Space, 317. Spatial sensibility, 318. Species, 318. Speculative, 318. Spencer, Herbert, on our relation to the First Cause, 3 ; association, 35 ; conscience, 76 ; co-ordination, 85 ; environment, 129 ; evolution, 142 ; ethics, 143 ; long deliberations, 161 ; couduct, 170 ; heredity, 172 ; hetero- geneity, 173 ; instinct and reflex action, 208 ; origin of intuitions, 215 ; imil'ormity of law, 222 ; nature, 249 ; pain, 262 ; phenomenon, 269 ; social compulsion, 287 ; religious emotion, 299. Spinoza, definition of substance, 1, 135 ; properly described as an acosmist, not as an atheist, 7; iise of "adequate idea," 9 ; on antlvrqpomorphism, 20 ; attribute, 39 ; body, 47 ; essence, 135 ; eternity, 136 ; objects to "final causes," 168 ; idea, 178 ; ideatura, 186 ; intuitive knowledge, 214 ; mode, 240 ; nature, 249 ; pantheism, 263. Spirit, 319. Spiritual principle in nature, 319. Spontaneity, 319. Stephen, Leslie, necessary truth, Stewart, Dugald, fancy, 154 ; senti- ment, 313. Stimulus, 319. Stirling, Hutchison, dialectic, 106 ; Hegel's view of God, 166 ; noumenon, 255 ; transcendent, 333. Stoics, 320. Sub-conscious, 320. Subject, 320. Subjective, 321. Sublime, 321. Substance, 321. Sufiioient reason, 322. Sully, "outness," 149; fancy, 155 generalisation, 163 ; habit, 167 impulse, 198 ; intuitionalism, 216 magnitude, 227 ; stimulus, 319. Summum Bonum, 48, 323. Suppositum, Leibnitz, 188. Syllogism, 323. Symbolic conception, 4. Symbolic Logic, 323. Synthesis, 323. Synthesis of knowledge, 205. Synthetic judgments, 324. Tabula Rasa, 324. Tait, conservation of energy, 82 ; ex- periment, 147. Taste, 325. INDEX. 353 Taylor, contingent, 81 ; argument from design, 98 ; idea, 178, Teleology, 98, 326. Temperament, 327. Temperance, 327. Term, 327. Theism, 327. Theodicy, 328. Theology, 328. Theosophy, 328. Thesis, 329. Thing-in-itself, 329. Thinking, 330. Thomson (Lord Kelvin) and Tait on experiment, 147. Thomson, on analogy, 15; a priori, 30 ; chance, 41 ; classification, 65; law of contradiction, 145 ; logic, 226. Time, 137, 331. Trains of thought, 331. Transcendent, 332. Transcendental, 332. Trench, apprehend, 28. 'J.'ruth, 333. Ueherweg, conception, 70 ; conscious- ness, 79 ; logical division, 111 ; substance, 135 ; Hegel's use of the law of contradiction, 145 ; hypothe- sis, 176. Unconditioned, 334. Unconscious cerebration, 223, 335. Understanding, 335. Unity, 336. Utilitarianism, 13, 337 ; as concerned with the good of others,14 ; criticism of, 837. Vaughan, mystics, 120 ; theosophist, 329. Veitoh, Descartes' innate idea, 204. Venn, predication, 289. Virtue, 337 ; as a habit of duty, 97 ; harmony, 171. Vision, objects of, 314. VoUtion, 328. Wallace, A. R., evolution, 82 ; in- stinct, 208. Wallace, W., dialectic of Hegel, 106 ; immediate knowledge, 195. Ward, analysis in psychology, 16 ; mind, 239 ; psychology, 282. Weber's Law, 338. Weismann, heredity, 143 ; germ-plasm, 164. Whately, connotation, 73 ; definition, 93 ; distribution, 111 ; experience, 146. Whewell, choice, 65 ; conscience, 77 ; deontology, 97 ; dialectic, 103 ; homologue, 174. Will, 339. Will, deterministic theory, 100 ; there is no indeterrainistio theory, 101 ; necessity, 101. Wisdom, 341. Wolff, divisions of philosophy, 259 ; theology, 328. Wordsworth, fancy, 155 ; imagination, 192. World-builder, God as, 96. Worth, 341. Worth, ethical, 342. Xenophanes, on the unity of God, 165. Zeller, Stoic apathy, 23 ; Cynic, 90 ; Cyrenaic, 91 ; Eclecticism, 118. INDEX OF GREEK TERMS. 'Aya0os, 48. dyvoaiv, 190. aia-Qriffi^j 9. ai(r6tj(re(s Twy dewv, 9. «tT»j;iia, 276. aLTia, 59. *AKa6i]fxia, 5. d/j-fpifioXia, 14. avaXoyta, 14, 'AyaXuTtKa, 16. dya/xyTjerts, 233. duBpeia, 87- ai/x/^atrts, 83. d^LuifjLaf 42. ajjerij, 32, 337. dpidfio^ itra/cis ttros, 219. «PX^/, 8, 59, 278. "/"X'' ttJs Kti/Jjcrews, 59. auTO TO KaXoi/, 10, 179. avTOfxaroVj 40. yvtiiOt ceai/Tov, 281. yvwo-is, 12, 164, 220. oatfiiaVf SaifJLOvLOVj 91. dia ayvoLav, 190. SiaipeffLS, 111. 5fa\»)KTi/a'; tex^'Ij 103. Sidvoia, 210. SLaopd, 107. diKaioffvvij, 218. dLYOTOfltatf 107. fiui/a/ii9, 8, 56, 117, 127, 276. e'eos, 137. eiffaywy?;, 275. etfiwiVoi;, 190. eKtr-rao'L's, 120. efiireipia, 145. evepyeia, 8, 127, 276. ey'reXe)^eta, 8, 128. 6^&lTepi/iO?, 7. e|ts,167i _ e^is Tov SiovTo^, 97. eirietKeLaf 133. e'TTtcrTvfiVt 131, 306. etroiTepiKO^, 7, 134. eufSouXiaf 281. ei/Sai/iovia, 138, 168. 7j5oi/w, 138, 168, 171' ^0iK«, 137. 0eos, 94, 165. laea, 177. KaB^KOI/, 116. fcaXo/cayadm, 10. KaTa.\Tj\ln9, 7- KaTtjyopta, 58. KOTopOtofia, 293. Koii/at evvoiai, 254. (Coti/?; ato-Oijo-ts, 66, 212. /COO'/iO?, 7. KOfffJioVj efi\j/vxoVf 17. KpavtoVf 87. KpLTI^ptOVj 88. fiiffoVj 231 ; TO )ue(roTijs, 231. fMETpoVf avdpwiro^, 200. /jLvcrTiiptaj 246. i/oCs, 210, 237, 317. o/ioXoybu/i6i/a>s tj; f^vtret ^yv, 158, 320. oi-o-ia, 58, 135, 321. 'Trai/TWi' Ypr)/iia.Ttiiu fxeTpov, avdptairo^, 63. iritTTKf 44, 165. 'rrpoaip€(TL9, 65. TTjOoXl/l/flS, 20. INDEX. 355 irpoTcpov TTjoofi iijua?, 30. irpoTtpov Ty ui\o(roLaf 233. (ro0to, 56, 281, 341. (TTOLxetoVj 123. o-i/i/a\\ay/ia, 82. ffui/et^ijo-is, 74,