CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY FROM (''.-. i^bine .... Cornell University Library arV1310 A history of Rome to the death of Csar 3 1924 031 232 253 olm.anx Cornell University Library The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924031232253 A HISTORY OF ROME A HISTORY OF ROME TO THE DEATH OF CLESAR W. W. HOW, M.A. FELLOW AND TUTOR OF MERTON COLLEGE, OXFORD AND H. D. LEIGH M.A. FELLOW AND TUTOR OF CORPUS CHR1STI COLLEGE, OXFORD CONTORNIATE. URB3 ROMA, AND WOLF WITH TWINS NEW EDITION LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO. 39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON NEW YORK AND BOMBAY 1898 AH rights reserved Printed by Bali.antvne, Hanson & Co. At the Ballantyne Press PREFACE In writing this short history of Rome the authors have endeavoured to meet the requirements of the upper forms in schools and of the pass examinations at the Universities. With this object in view they have dwelt at some length on the more important and eventful wars, and on the history of the Roman army. Literature, which never at Rome reached the heart of the people, they have designedly omitted. A mere outline, which is all that space would allow, would have lbeen worse than useless, since it might have led to the neglect of the separate histories of the subject. On the other hand they have attempted to describe clearly, if briefly, the de- velopment of a constitution, interesting to Englishmen both from its likeness and its unlikeness to that of their own country. In so doing they have derived assistance from the researches of many scholars, both at home and abroad ; but their deepest debt is due to the master of all modern his- torians of Rome, Professor Mommsen. On constitutional and antiquarian questions they have bowed to his paramount authority, and even from his somewhat sweeping judgments of parties and persons they have never dissented without hesitation. Like other Oxford students they owe much to the lectures and articles of Professor Pelham ; they have also drawn upon Mr. Warde Fowler's works, and Mr. Strachan Davidson's Cicero and Polybius. From the latter, through the kindness of the Clarendon Press, they have been allowed viii PKEFA CE to take a plan of Cannse; for other maps and plans they are indebted to Kraner's " Cassar," to Mr. R. Bosworth Smith, and to Mr. R. F. Horton, who has been good enough to permit them to revise the useful series appended to his History of the Romans. It is needless to say that they are intended not to supersede but only to supplement the classical atlas. For the insertion of numerous illustrations the authors have to thank Messrs. Longmans ; for their selection they are indebted to Mr. Cecil Smith of the British Museum. They are in all cases derived from authentic archreological sources, and have been taken, so far as possible, from well-known and accessible collections, above all from the British Museum. In the list which follows references have been given to standard works. The authors are not without hope that even scholars and teachers not primarily interested in history may welcome the appearance of trustworthy copies from many among the coins and inscriptions which illustrate the art, language, and writing of the Romans in the days of the Republic. The authors have as a rule adopted modern improvements in the spelling of Latin, but in accordance with English custom they have retained the familiar forms of well-known names, such as Pompey and Catiline, and in the Index they have sacrificed scientific accuracy to convenience of reference. Oxford, April 1S96. CONTENTS CHAP. I. THE LAND OF ITALY ....... II. PEOPLES OF ITALY III. THE LEGENDS OF THE KINGS IV. THE REGAL PERIOD V. THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE NEW REPUBLIC VI. THE FIRST STRUGGLES OF THE PLEBEIANS VII. EARLY WARS AND ALLIANCES OF THE REPUBLIC VIII. THE DECEiMVIEATE IX. PROGRESS OF THE PLEBEIANS X. WARS FROM THE DECEMVIRATE TO THE FALL OF VEII XI. THE GAULS XII. THE I.ICINIAN LAWS AND THE EQUALISATION OF THE ORDERS XIII. THE SUBJUGATION OF LATIUM AND CAMPANIA XIV. THE SECOND SAMNITE WAR XV. THE CONQUEST OF THE ITALIANS .... XVI. THE WAR WITH TARENTUM AND l'YRRHUS XVII. THE POSITION AND RESOURCES OF ROME AND CARTHAGE XVIII. THE FIRST PUNIC WAR XIX. THE EXTENSION OF ITALY TO ITS NATURAL BOUNDARIES XX. HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL XXI. THE SECOND PUNIC WAR UP TO THE BATTLE OF CANN/E XXII. THE SECOND PUNIC WAR FROM CANN.E TO ZAMA . XXIII. FIFTY YEARS OF CONQUEST — THE WARS IN THE WEST XXIV. FIFTY YEARS OF CONQUEST — AFRICA XXV. FIFTY YEARS OF CONQUEST — THE EASTERN STATES AND THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR XXVI. FIFTY YEARS OF CONQUEST — THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS XXVII. FIFTY YEARS OF CONQUEST — THE FALL OF MACEDON AND GREECE PAGE I I I 20 34 47 52 58 65 72 77 S4 01 97 105 114 120 131 149 162 169 174 199 = 34 245 253 265 273 CONTENTS CHAl'. XXVIII. XXXI. XXXII. XXXIII. XXXIV, XXXV. XXXVI. XXXVII. xxxviii. XXXIX. XL. XI.I. XLII. XLIII. XLIV. XLV. XLVI. XI.VII. XLVIII. XLIX. L. LI. l.II. INTERNAL HISTORY (266-I46 B. C. )— RELIGIOUS AND CON- STITUTIONAL ....... INTERNAL HISTORY (266-I46 B.C.)— POLITICS AND AD MINISTRATION INTERNAL HISTORY (266-I46 B.C.) — SOCIAL AND ECO- NOMIC I'ROBLEMS ...... CAUSES OE THE FALL OF THE REPUBLIC FOREIGN AND PROVINCIAL AFFAIRS (146-I29 B.C.) INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND TIBERIUS GRACCHUS (133B.C. GAIUS GRACCHUS THE RESTORED OLIGARCHY AND THE WAR WITH JUGURTHA THE WARS IN THE NORTH SATURNINUS, MARIU3, AND THEIR TIMES THE LAWS OF DRUSUS .... THE SOCIAL WAR ..... SULITCIUS, MARIUS, AND SULLA (88 B.C.) THE FIRST MITHRADATIC WAR THE CINNAN REVOLUTION AND THE CIVIL WAR THE PROSCRIPTIONS AND THE NEW DICTATORSHIP THE CONSTITUTION OF SULLA. THE RULE OF THE SULLAN RESTORATION THE WARS WITH THE PIRATES AND MITHRADATES POMPEY IN THE EAST .... CICERO AND CATILINE THE FORMATION OF THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE THE CONQUEST OF GAUL ..... THE RULE OF THE TRIUMVIRATE AND ITS DISSOLUTION THE CIVIL WAR THE RULE OF OESAR .... APPENDIX I. — ASSEMBLIES AT ROME .... APPENDIX II. — LIST OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ROMAN OF REPUBLICAN TIMES INDEX :...,,,.,, 2S7 302 316 322 326 33 1 343 357 37i 384 394 399 412 419 434 445 449 471 4S4 496 503 5.6 5-6 539 553 555 557 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Etruscan Temple and Altar, restored (Semper, Der Stil, plate xiii.) Frontispiece Contorniate— Urbs Roma, and Wolf with Twins (Sabatier, plate 14A) Title-page View of the Campagna, with Aqueduct ...... 10 Model of a Primitive Etruscan House (Baumeister, fig. 146) . . 13 Wall and Gateway of Perugia, showing Etruscan Work ... 14 Contorniate. -Eneas leaving Troy — Head of Trajan (Sabatier, plate 14. 10) 21 Wolf with Romulus and Remus. Bronze in the Palace of the Con- servatori at Rome ......... 22 Denarius of First Century B.C. — Titus Tatius and the Rape of the Sabines (Babelon, ii. 496, 7) . . . . . . .23 Wall of Servius Tullius (Baumeister, fig. 1591) . ' . .27 Roman Coin after 26S B.C. — Head of Rome ; Castor and Pollux (Head, Coins of the Ancients, plate 44. 2) .... 34 Ficus Ruminalis, with Picus and Parra ; Urbs Roma; and Wolf suckling Twins (Rom. Mitth., i. plate 1, 1S86) .... 36 Wall on the Aventine (Parker, Historical Photographs of Rome) . 39 Cloaca Maxima .......... 41 Ground-Plan and Elevation of the Temple of Vesta, restored (Jordan, Tempel der Vesta, plate 4) . . . . . .43 Sella Curulis and Fasces (Menard, La Vie Privee des Anciens, i. 4S2) 49 Etruscan Helmet (Dennis, Etruria, vol. ii. p. 103) .... 63 Suovetaurilia. Sacrifice after the Numbering of the People (P. Bouillon, Musee des Antiques, torn. ii. 98) .... 75 Etruscan Helmet dedicated by Hiero I. after his Victory in 474 B.C. (British Museum, Etruscan Saloon, c. 93) . . . -78 Etruscan Terra-Cotta Sarcophagus from Clusium (British Museum) . 83 Faliscan Vase in the British Museum, 4 feet 3 inches in height . . 89 The Libral As (/Es Grave). From a Cast in the British Museum . 93 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS I'A'.E Romano-Campanian Coin, 33S-317 B.C. (Head, op. cit., plate 33. 5) 105 Chimai-ra. Etruscan Bronze in the Archceological Museum at Florence . . . . . . . . . . .113 Tomb of L. Cornelius Scipio Barbatus, now in the Vatican (Baumeister, fig. 1621) , .117 Faliscan Vase in the British Museum ...... 121 Tetradiachm of Pyrrhus struck in Italy — Head of Zeus of Dodona, and the Goddess Dione (Head, op. cit., plate 46. 27) . .127 King in Chariot. Terra-Cotta of 1'unic Workmanship (Heuzey, Les Figurines Antiques de Terre Cuite du Musee de Louvre, plate v.) 132 Plan of Roman Camp (Seyffert-Sandys, 117) .... 140 The Smaller Cisterns at Carthage (Bosworth Smith, Carthage) . 144 Siculo-Punic Tetradrachm — Head of f J ersephone, with Lolphins, copied from Syracuse (Head, op. cit., plate 35. 38) . . . 145 Siculo-Punic Tetradrachm — Head of Persephone, with Dolphins, copied from Syracuse (Head, op. cit., plate j=,. 37) . . . 147 Siculo-Punic Tetradrachm — Plead of Herakles (Melkarlh), copied from Alexander's Coins (Head, op. cit., plate 35. 36) 149 The Columna Rostrata, restored (Fougere, fig. 60S) . 153 Epitaph of Lucius Scipio (Ritschl, plate 3S) ..... 154 Denarius struck circa 133 B.C., to commemorate Victory of Panormus (Babelon, i. 263) 1 58 Milestone of P. Claudius Pulcher and of C. Furius, .Ediles (C. I. P., x. 6S38, and Rom. Mitth., iv. 84, 1S89) ... . 159 Remains of the Town of Eryx (Duruy, i, 490) ..... 161 Coin struck at Carthage — Head of Persephone (Head, op. cit., plate 35-35; 163 Denarius of circa 45 B.C. — Marcellus and Spolia Opima (Babelon i- 35 2 ) 168 Roman in Toga (Statue in the British Museum) .... 173 Tombstone of Roman Horse-Soldier from Plexham (by kind per- mission of the Society of Antiquaries of Newcastle-on-Tyne, from Bruce's Roman Wall, handbook, p. 7S) . . . . 1S4 The Aufidus near Cannte ■■■•.... ine Carthaginian Helmet found at Canna; (British Museum) . . iq8 Coin of Hiero II. of Syracuse (Head, op. cit., plate 46. 31) . . 205 Bust of Scipio Africanus, in the Capitoiine Museum at Rome (Ber nouilli, Rom. Ikon., vol. i. plate 1) . . . , ,216 Panoramic View of the Peninsula of Carthage . . . 2 °7 Carthaginian Dodecadrachm — Head of Persephone (Head, op. cit., 47-42) 234 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS xni PAGE Decree of L. .Emilius Paullus, Proetor of Further Spain, regulating the Position of a Spanish Client-Community, 1S9 B.C. (C. I. L., ii. 5041) 241 Remains of Ancient Harbours at Carthage (Bosworth Smith) . . 246 Trilingual Inscription on an Altar dedicated to the God Eshmiin, by 252 Cleon, an Officer of the Salt-Revenue, circ, 150 B.C. (Cast in the British Museum) ........ 252 Tetradrachm of Philip V. — Athena Alius hurling Fulmen (Head, op. cit., 41. S) . . . 259 Gold Octadrachm of Antiochus III. — Apollo seated on Omphalos (Head, op. cit., 3S. 19) 266 Cippus of a Roman Marine of late date (Schreiber- Anderson, xliii. 20) 269 Tetradrachm of Perseus (Head, op. cit., 54. 10) .... 275 Temple and Acropolis, Corinth . . . . . . . 2S4 Dedicatory Inscription of L. Mummius (Ritschl, 51A) . . . 2S6 A Roman sacrificing (Baumeister, fig. 1304) ..... 2S9 Letter of the Consuls to Local Magistrates, containing the Senatus Consultum de Bacchanalibus (Ritschl, plate iS) . . . 292 Extispicia (Schreiber- Anderson, plate 17. 3) . . . . . 293 Epitaph of P. Cornelius Scipio, Flamen Dialis, (?) Son of Africanus, who died young (Ritschl, plate 39F) ..... 301 Roman in Toga (Baumeister, fig. 1917) ...... 307 Roman Soldiers with Scutum, of a late period (Schreiber- Anderson, 42- S) 314 Lamp with Circus Scene (British Museum, Terra-Cotta Room, Case C.) 319 Gladiators. From a Pompeian Wall- Painting (Les Ruines de Pompeii, F. Mazois, vol. iv. plate 4S) 321 Milestone set up by P. Popillius Lamas, in Lucania, as Consul, 132 B.C. (C. I. L., i. 551, Ritschl, plate 51B) .... 339 Termini set up by the Land Commission in the Land of the Hirpini, 130-129 B.C. (Ritschl, plate 55C.D.) 344 Ruins of Aqueduct, Carthage ........ 348 A Camillus, or Attendant at Sacrifice (Baumeister, fig. 1305) . . 355 View of Cirta (Delamare, Expedition Scientifique d'Algerie) . . 3^3 Plan and Section of the Mamertine Prison. (Middleton, Ancient Rome) ........... 370 Roman Soldier (Lindenschmidt, Tracht und Bewaffnung, plate I. 6) 376 Combat of Gladiators : the vanquished Combatant appealing to the Audience. From a Pompeian Painting (Baumeister, fig. 2347) . 3S0 Denarius struck 101 B.C. — Triumph of Marius the Goddess, Rome (Babelon, i. 515) 3S3 xiv LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Part of a Statue of a Vestal (Museo alle Terme, Rome) Denarius of the Confederates — Taking the Oath ; and Head of Italia (Head, op. cit. , plate 6S. 14) ....... Denarius of Mntilus — Samnite L'ull goring Wolf; Head of Bac- chante (Head, op. cit., plate 6S. 15) ..... Sling-Bullets from Asculnm (Duruy, ii. 570) ..... Temple of Fortuna (?) at Rome (so-called Fortuna Virilis) Tetradrachm of Mithradates VI. [(Head, op. cit., plate Co. 2) . Tetradracbm struck by Sulla in Athens— Athena and the Owl (British Museum) .......... Etruscan Arch at Volaterrce ........ Head of Pompey on a Coin struck circ. 3S— 36 B.C. (Babelon, s. v. Nasidius, ii. 251, 2) . Gladiators — Combats of Secutor and Retiarius (Baumeister, fig. 2352) Helmet of a Gladiator (Baumeister, fig. 2346) ..... Coin of Tigranes struck in Syria before Cg };.c. — (1) Head of Tigranes ; (2) Antioch seated on a Rock ( Head, op. cit. , 61. 13) Gold Stater of Mithraclates VI. (Head, op. cit., 60. 1 ) Tombs of the Kings of Pontus (Perrot, Exploration Arch, de la Galatie) .......... Golden Gate of Temple at Jerusalem (Duruy, ii. S3 1 ) Bust of Cicero (Bernouilli, Rom. Ikon., i. plate 11), in the Vatican Sacrarium in a House at Pompeii (Overbeck, Pompeii, p. 299) Bust of Julius Caesar (Naples Museum) ..... Stater of Philip I. of Macedon — (1) Head of Apollo ; (2) Chariote (Head, op. cit., plate 22. 17) Gallic Imitation of Stater of Philip (Head, op. cit., plate 57. 1) Figure-head of Roman Ship (Torr, Ancient Ships, plate S) Roman Arch at S. Remy (France) ...... Head of Cleopatra (British Museum) ..... Denarius struck 44 B.C.— (1) Head of Caesar ; (2) Venus with Victor) {Babelon, ii. 20. 21) . Bust of C. Octavius, afterwards Augustus (in the Vatican) Bust of Brutus (in the Capitoline Museum at Rome) Parody of a Scene in School (Rom. Mirth., v. plate I. 1S90) 386 400 404 409 415 421 43° 444 463 467 469 473 474 4S1 4S3 4S9 49S 501 505 5°5 5°9 5i5 537 539 543 549 The Illustrations and Plans engraved by Messrs. I] 'alker and Boittall. MAPS AND PLANS I. MAPS LITHOGRAPHED Italia, before the Roman Conquest Urbs Roma, Republic (Horton, Hist, of the Romans) .... Italia, showing the Colonies (Horton, Hist. ) of the Romans) .... Sicily (Bosworth Smith, Carthage) The Carthaginian Empire (Bosworth Smith, ) Carthage) . . . , . . \ Carthage and her Neighbourhood (Bosworth Smith, Carthage) ..... Rome and her Neighbours (Horton) . . Between pages 402 and 403 Gallia (after Kiepert, in Kraner's Caesar) . ,, 506 and 507 The Roman Empire ..... ,, 552 and 553 Before page 1 Between pages 38 and 39 J Between pages 134 and 135 To faee page 150 Between pages 174 and 175 To faee page 249 II. PLANS AND MAPS IN TEXT Battle of Ecnomus (Bosworth Smith) Battle of Lake Trasimene ..... Battle of Canna? (from Strachan Davidson, Polybius Campania ........ The Harbours at Carthage (Bosworth Smith) . The East when Rome began to interfere . Greece ........ The East, temp. Mithradates and Tigranes Alesia (Kraner) Ilerda (Kraner) Macedonia and Greece (Kraner) Battles near Dyrrhachium (Kraner) . 155 189 197 20S 250 256 274 423 5i5 53° 532 533 HISTORY OF ROME CHAPTER I THE LAND OF ITALY Rome and Italy. — The history of Rome is the history of Italy. It has been much more ; it has never been much less. Her early efforts aimed at predominance in Italy ; she wielded the strength of Italy in her wars of defence and aggression, and if in her selfish and centralising" policy she merged the land in the city, and sacri- ficed its population and prosperity to her own interests, she made Italy mistress of the world, and stood to the end as the head and representative of the Italian land. In her beginnings, and indeed constitutionally throughout, she was but a city-state of the sole type recognised by Pericles or Aristotle, as distinct and individual as ancient Athens or mediaeval Florence : she became in later days an imperial power, stamping the civilised world with the unity of the Roman name. But the Rome of Augustus is, equally with the Rome of the Fabii, Italian in sentiment, interests, and policy. Her youth was singularly free from non-Italian influences ; and, however much her maturer age received and diffused an alien cultivation, she remained rooted and grounded in Italy, as Italy was in that West to which its face is turned. The struggle of Octavian and Antony, of East and West, is typical of her history from first to last. Hence to understand the place of Rome in history, we must understand the place of Rome in Italy, and the place of Italy in the Mediterranean basin. To comprehend the special character of her own laws and institutions, and of the ideas and civilisation which she implanted, we must comprehend the relation of Rome to Italian peoples, and of the Italian country to its immediate neighbours. Historically, only those features of a country are important which affect the power of a nation for offence or defence, which A 2 HISTORY OF HOME determine its sphere of action and the nature of its resources, or which influence its national character and type of life. The work of Rome in history was twofold, — first and foremost to create Italian unity, and then, with the power so gained, to solve the problem her rivals could not solve, the maintenance of peace and order in the Mediterranean, the civilisation of the ruder races round its coasts, and the defence of that civilisation against the barbarians of the East and North. The place of Rome in Italy partly explains the union of Italy under Roman supremacy ; the place of Italy in the Mediterranean is a still larger factor in the extension of that supremacy over the civilised world. Marked Features. — Italy, the central peninsula of the three masses of land projecting into the southern sea, with the islands that essentially belong to her, enjoys a position favourable to independent development, and, in the hands of a strong people with adequate sea-power, admirably adapted for the control of the Mediterranean. Apart from the untrustworthy barriers of the Alps and Po, her great depth and narrow front were a powerful aid to her defences on the north ; by her central position she severed the East from the West, and holding the inner lines, could meet with security the combinations of Hannibal or Pompey. She lay back to back with Greece, her more accessible coast turned to the lands and waters of the West. The tip of her toe touches Sicily, the meeting-place of Hellene, Phoenician, Sicel, and Latin, and, through Sicily, touches upon the hump of Africa which projects Carthage upon the Sicilian shores. To her front lay Spain, the Eldorado of antiquity, blocked as yet by Phoenician cruisers. To the north the Celtic and Germanic tribes swarmed round and through the mountain-passes. In addition to these points in her position which materially influenced the destinies of Italy and Rome, the most striking features of the land are the projecting boot-like shape, the peculiar mountain-system which is its cause, the double length of coast which is its effect, and which exposes both flanks to naval attack as much as it opens them to friendly intercourse, and finally the marked contrast between the northern plain of the Po and the central and southern hill-country. Contrast with Greece and Spain. — Not only in position, but in form and character, Italy stands intermediate between the striking contrasts of Greece and Spain. Greece has no single definite mountain-barrier ; Spain is abruptly severed from Europe by the frowning lines of the Pyrenees ; the Alps partially protect, but do not isolate, Italy. Italy, diversified by sweeping bays and fertile MOUNTAINS OF ITALY 3 coast-lands, by northern plain and southern slopes, remains one land, the land of the Apennines ; Spain surrounds her vast and single plateau with a regular and little-broken coast ; Greece is split by winding chains and deep indented gulfs into geographical and political atoms. Greece, facing eastwards, expanded eastwards, and early assimilated Oriental culture ; Spain, till Columbus the western limit of the world, remained for centuries a barbarous country fringed by factories ; Italy, expanding to the west, passed on to Spain what she had received from Greece, and returned with increased power to absorb the sources of her own culture. Size. — The land of Italy lies roughly between parallels 37° and 46° of north latitude. Its greatest length, from N.W. to S.E., is a little over 700 miles ; its average breadth hardly exceeds 100, though from the western Alps to the head of the Adriatic it extends to 340 miles. The total area may be put at 90,000 square miles. In size, therefore, though not in shape, Italy bears some resemblance to Great Britain. Mountains. — The frontier of the peninsula to the north is formed by the wavering line of the Alps, which, stretching for 700 miles, with abundant passes, forms a rampart more striking than formid- able, and one that has never sufficed to shelter the sunny south from the inroads of the cevetous north. Rising precipitously enough from the Lombard plain, the Alps slope less steeply to the north. A short march brings the enemy who has climbed the less difficult ascent down at one swoop upon the plain. But the Alps are not Italian as a matter of geography or history. For centuries they remained beyond the sphere of Italian life. Not till Augustus were their robber-tribes thoroughly tamed and their passes paved with roads ; scarcely then did they cease to the true Roman mind to be a dubious defence, a commercial barrier, and a limit of Italian land and life. The Apennines, on the contrary, are the backbone of the country. Breaking off from the Maritime Alps above Savona, they stretch away E. and S.E. from coast to coast, severing the great triangle of Cisalpine Gaul from the true soil of Roman Italy. Above Genoa the range reaches but a moderate height (3000-4000 feet) ; rising rapidly to cover Etruria, it thrusts up higher peaks (5000- 7000 feet) both here and in northern Umbria, where it turns de- finitely S.E. After a slight break in Lower Umbria comes the massive quadrilateral of the Abruzzi, a group of lofty summits (9000 feet), cleft by torrents into deep ravines, and breaking down to pleasant upland vales. Such, too, but of lesser height, is the 4 HISTORY OF ROME mountain girdle of Samnium. Henceforth the main mass changes direction to the south, runs down to form the projecting toe, and jumping the narrow rift at Rhegium, spreads itself out into the three corners of Sicily. Apart from their natural beauties, the Apennines have exercised a decisive influence on the history of the land and the character of its people. This single and continu- ous backbone has given to Italy the regular conformation, which contrasts so markedly with the complexity of outline stamped upon Greece by its chaos of mountains. The difference, too, between its eastern and western slopes determines the different character of the Adriatic and Tyrrhenian coasts. From the steep eastern side run down short spurs and swift torrents, which seam the narrow seaward strip with deep ravines. Scant room is left for cultivation ; and until the mountains leave the coast and we reach the good harbours of Brindisi and Otranto fBrundisium and Hydruntum), in the Apulian plain, there is no natural harbour of refuge from the Adriatic storms, except the open roadstead of Ancona, and the useless lagoons beneath Mount Garganus. The western side presents a marked contrast ; fertile plains are watered by ample streams, good and spacious ports formed at the river-mouths, or flanked and fronted by jutting headlands and sheltering islands, foster navigation and commerce on the tideless waters of the Tyrrhene sea. Italy, in fact, if we except Apulia in the extreme south-east and the lower valley of the Po in the extreme north, which maintained some connection with Greece and Illyria, turns her face westward, and found in the civilisation of the west her most important work. This decisive fact in her history is due to the Apennine range. Again, the mountains of Greece divide; the Apennines may be even said to unite. A dividing line between peoples they have never been. Even in the most rugged region of the Abruzzi, the easy intersecting passes, the table-lands, and upland valleys fit them for the labour and habitation of men. When the grass of the lower country is parched, the flocks and herds are driven up from the plain of Apulia to the mountain-pastures of Samnium. This happy combination is a special characteristic of Italy. In early times, indeed, the freebooters of the highlands, the Rob Roys of those days, harried and blackmailed the rich dwellers on the sunny coasts. 'I he struggle of highland and lowland, and the final victory of civilisation under the leadership of Rome, achieving their natural union, is another marked feature which Italian history owes to the Apennines. RIVERS OF ITALY 5 Volcanic forces have been largely at work in the formation of Italy. Apart from the active craters of /Etna, Stromboli, and Vesuvius, the Campanian plain owes to its volcanic origin its peculiar beauty and richness ; while in the Roman land itself, stretching from Clusium to the Alban hills, and from the Apennines to the sea, lovely lakes fill the extinct craters, and from their pre- historic lava-streams and dust-showers come the tufa and the famous concrete of which Rome was built. Rivers. — The river-system of a country usually exercises an influence on its history only second to its general position and its relation to the sea. In Roman history it has played a lesser part. For centuries the largest river of Italy flowed unregarded through an alien territory. Gradually the Roman outposts were pushed up to Arretium and Ariminum, and thence to Placentia and Aquileia ; but in Caesar's time the Cisalpine plain was still a province, and Roman Italy ended at the Rubicon. The contrast of the two regions is marked and obvious. The rivers of the peninsula proper are naturally small in size, and, however famous in story, geographically far less important. Upper Italy forms the basin of a single large stream, the Padus (Po), or, as Virgil calls it, Erida- nus, king of rivers, a great central artery whose network of veins stretches on either hand to the Alps and the Apennines. Spring- ing from its sources in Monte Viso (Mons Vesulus), it rushes to its junction with the Ticino, swollen by the torrents of the two Doras (Duria), the Sesia, and the Tanaro. But in its long and winding lower course its sluggish stream needs the impulse of swifter tributaries, the Ticino, the Adda, and the Mincio, which act as outlets for the large northern lakes, and draw through them the waters of the Alps. Of the smaller feeders from the southern ridges the most famous is the Trebia ; the largest are the Taro and Secchia. About its mouths the Po forms a vast system of marshes and lagoons. In this work it is aided by the Adige (Athesis), which descends from the Tyrol, affording an important issue to the north, and enters the Lombard plain at Verona, and by the Reno, from the Apennines, which reaches the lowlands near Bologna (Bononia). The ever-growing deposit and the constant floods have made this district an Italian Netherlands, a labyrinth of streams and canals, of lagoons and sandbanks, of reedy swamps and grassy meadows, noisy with frogs, and plagued by low fevers and mosquitos. Venice, by diverting the Brenta, keeps her waters intact, but Ravenna, the naval harbour of Augustus, is now six miles from the sea, and the same fate, yet earlier, befell both Atria and Spina. 6 HISTORY OF ROME Many of the southern tributaries of the Po are in summer nothing more than wide, dry water-courses, but the main stream, though its unhealthy swamps prevented towns from clustering on its banks, as on the Rhine or Rhone, was yet the highway of internal commerce, and with its numerous branches and canals irrigated and fertilised the entire plain, whose extraordinary productiveness is recorded by Polybius. At the same time there is constant danger of flood from the melting snows in May and from the autumnal rains. To meet this danger, the lower courses of the larger rivers are lined with double rows of massive dykes. But the disease grows by the remedy. The mud, unable to escape, chokes the channel and raises the river-bed above the level of the land. There comes a time when the ever-rising bank fails to bear the pressure of the confined waters, which burst the barriers in a raging torrent. 1 Of the rivers of the peninsula proper, the Arno and the Tiber are the largest, and furnish the key to the formation of central Italy. Separated at their sources by less than thirty miles, their lower courses widely diverge. The Arno (160 miles) at first flows southward, but turns abruptly to the north-west at Arezzo (Arre- tium), and thence past Florence westward to the sea. Its marshes formed a line of defence which almost baffled Hannibal ; otherwise its place in Roman history is but slight. The Tiber, running nearly due south, receives as its main tributaries, on the right bank the Chiana (Clanis), and on the left the Nera (Nar) and Teverone (Anio). Of these the Chiana, whose upper waters have recently been diverted into the Arno, rising above Chiusi (Clusium), comes in below Orvieto ; the Nar has carried the waters of the Sabine highlands since Manius Curius cut the rocks that hem the Veline lake and formed the falls of Terni (Interamna) ; while the Anio, issuing from the ^Equian hills, makes Tivoli (Tibur) beautiful with its waterfalls, and enters the main stream above the city, below which the Tiber turns westward to Ostia and the sea. The tawny mud (flavus Tiberis) has now partially silted up the river-bed, but in ancient days, though it was more usual to unload at Ostia, ships of burthen could make their way to Rome. The wine, corn, and timber of the inland districts were floated down in barges from the upper waters to the quays of the capital. It was this river- commerce which first made Rome the trading centre of middle Italy ; but her position, if favourable to trade, exposed her then, as now, to the ravages of floods, which wasted the swarming slums in the valleys (not then filled in with rubbish or levelled 1 Cf. Verg. Georg., i. 481, iv. 372; Lucan, Phars., vi. 272. RIVERS OF ITALY 7 by the engineer), and called for constant regulation and careful embankment. The next considerable stream, the Liris (Garigliano), rises near Lacus Fucinus, and flowing S.E. by S., edges gradually westward between the Volscian and the central range, then turning sharply beyond Interamna, falls into the Mediterranean at Mintumse. Be- neath Fregellae it is joined by its chief feeder, the Trerus (Sacco), along whose valley ran the great Latin road from Latium to the Hernican country, and thence by the bridge of Fregellae to Casinum and Capua. From its junction with the Trerus the Liris ceases to be fordable, and serves as a defensive line to the south for the coast-land of Latium. The Yolturnus from the north and the Calor from the south drain the mountain-valleys of Samnium ; their united stream, turning to the west, leaves Capua on the left, and passing the tete-de-pont of Casilinum, where the Appian and Latin roads converge, forms the natural highway from the hill -country to the sea, and an equally natural bone of contention in the long and keen struggle of Romans and Samnites for the mastery of Italy. The Silarus (Sele), the last considerable western stream, rises in the Lucanian Apennines, and enters the sea near Passtum. Henceforward the closeness of the watershed to the sea admits but of short, swift torrents. From the less abrupt slopes that skirt the instep of the boot there flow into the Gulf of Tarentum four streams of moderate size, Siris and Aciris, Bradanus and Casuentus. One stream of mark alone threads the poorly watered levels of Apulia, Horace's loud-roaring Aufidus (Ofanto), which, rushing rapidly down from the mountain angle of Samnium and Lucania, winds gently through the plain past Canusium and the fated field of Cannae. North of Mount Garganus, again, which juts like a misplaced spur above the heel, the one large stream among in- numerable rivulets and swift-falling torrents is the Aternus (Pes- cara). Its valley served as a natural link between the hills and the small emporium at the river's mouth, Aternum, and gave an obvious route for the Via Claudia Valeria, the direct road from Rome to the Adriatic. Corfinium, at the sharp angle of the stream where it turns on itself to the north and east, the most central point in the widest part of the valley, became, in the last struggle of the Marsic highlanders with Rome, the headquarters and formal capital of the insurgent tribes. The roll of Italian rivers may well close with the historic name of Metaurus in the Gallic march of Umbria. Lakes. — The lakes of Italy deserve a passing mention for their 8 HISTORY OF ROME geological interest and marvellous beauty. Here once more ap- pears the contrast of north and south. The great lakes of northern Italy, natural reservoirs, which store and regulate the waters of the Alpine feeders of the Po, Maggiore (Verbanus) on the Ticino, Como (Larius) on the Adda, and Garda (Benacus) on the smooth-sliding Mincius, rich with the praise of poets from Catullus to our own Tennyson, are chasms carved, it may be, in some age of ice, and filled at a later time, like fjords in Norway, by the sea which once rolled its waves to wash the feet of the Alps. The lakes of the peninsula are inferior in size and depth. Some, like the pools of Greece, are shallow meres with no out- let, due to accumulation of water in upland valleys. Such was Lacus Fucinus in the Marsic hills, which, like Lake Copais in Bceotia, has recently (1875) been drained, by an extension of the " emissarium " of Claudius ; such still are the famous mere of " reedy Trasimene," threatened with a like fate, and the smaller lake of Clusium, both in Etruria. Others again are found thickly scattered in the volcanic districts of central Italy. The Alban lakes and the Ciminian pool fill deep cup-shaped craters of extinct volcanoes ; the basins of the "great Volsinian mere " and the Lacus Sabatinus may have been formed by subsidence and erosion. The two latter are linked by small rivers to the sea ; in other cases the water, as in Greece, pierces a subterranean passage, or is carried off in artificial channels often of remote antiquity. Climate and Products. — Taken as a whole, Italy is a healthy country. The summer's heat is tempered by the mountain breezes, the winter's cold by the nearness of the sea. Yet differences of latitude and the natural configuration of the land cause a consider- able variety in climate. In the basin of the Po the conditions are continental rather than Mediterranean. In winter bitter winds blow from the Alps, snow lies even on the plain, and the olive barely survives the keenness of the frost ; the rains of summer save the land from all danger of drought. The southern sea- board, with its sub-tropical climate, presents a direct antithesis. Campania, the coasts of the Tarentine gulf, and the Italian islands are seldom shrouded in snow ; their winter is pleasant as a genial spring. Both regions were early occupied by strangers, the north by the roving Gaul, the coasts and islands by the adventurous Greek. The land of the native Italians, which falls between the two extremes, is itself far from uniform in character, the chief contrast being between the seaward fringe and the central hills. The Tuscan and Apulian plains under adequate irrigation are CLIMATE AND PRODUCTS 9 still of great fertility, for all the ruin wrought by slavery, by war, and by the heavy hand of Sulla. The lower slopes of the hills, especially on the western side, bear the most characteristic products of Italy, the vine and the olive, as well as corn. The higher hills, now bleak and bare, were once partly clothed with beeches and chestnuts, or gave a summer pasture to flocks and herds. In winter snow covers the Samnite and Sabine highlands. A rich variety of products corresponds to this marked diversity of climate. It is true that the lemons and oranges of the south, the rice and maize of the north, with the mulberry-tree and the silk-worm, have been introduced in modern times. The plain of Lombardy, the market-garden of more than Italy, was, in the days of Poly- bius, studded with oak-coppices, where herds of swine fattened on acorns. But wheat, the olive, and the vine were from an early age common, if not indigenous, in the land. In the production of olive-oil Italy early took, and still holds, the foremost place in Europe ; her wines from the Massic hill and the Falernian fields stood high with the connoisseurs of the early empire, if they yield to-day before the rival vintages of France and Spain. These staple products were partially protected by the policy of the Senate from foreign competition. Corn-growing soon became unprofitable, and failed to hold its own against imported wheat, sheep-farming, and market-gardening, whose economic effects were exaggerated by bad legislation and capitalism resting on slave -labour. Of manufactures Italy had little to boast, though the wool industry must have attained a great development. Essentially an agricul- tural land, with the decline of field industries, and the growth of foreign speculation, militarism, and luxury, the balance of com- merce must have gone increasingly against her, and the drain in payment for the food-stuffs, the art-products, the wines and luxuries of the East, only came back in the dangerous shape of tribute, of extorted interest and official plunder. But with all its advantages of climate, Italy suffers from one deadly scourge, the fever- laden air {malaria). The western plains, the southern coast, the margins of the islands, above all the Maremma and the Campagna of Rome, studded once with prosperous cities, thronged with hurrying feet, crowned with towers and beautified with temples, lie waste and desolate. Even in the first century of our era the Tuscan coast was becoming dangerous, and more than one Punic army had long since melted away by the marshes of Syracuse. Far wider tracts have been smitten with the curse in the Middle Ages and in modern times. HISTORY OF ROME RACES OF NORTH ITALY n Land in Etruria and Latium now given up to the frog- and the buffalo was in antiquity well drained and well tilled. The people were kept warm by the woollen clothing and blazing- hearths dear to the Romans, and dwelt in cities whose great walls, as the Sardinians still find, helped to keep out the deadly mist. Even now the malaria retires before the advancing- plough, and crops of corn wave once more by the abandoned temples of Paestum. CHAPTER II PEOPLES OF ITALY The variety of races within the peninsula was no less marked than the variety of its products and of its climate. The causes are not far to seek. Waves of wandering barbarians, pushed by pressure from the north and east, or tempted by the famed fertility and beauty of the land, stormed one after another through the undefended passes, while its long coasts lay open to every bark of adventurous mariners from Hellas or the Punic settle- ments. Moreover, though Italy enjoys a unity denied to Greece, yet the frequent intersection of the peninsula by mountains favoured the division of the soil among a number of tribes, whose differences were naturally accentuated by the divergences of local conditions. Races of North Italy. — The Apennines of the north-west and the shores of the gulf of Genoa were the home of the Ligurians. Into these mountain-fastnesses stronger races had driven them from their once wide territory, which had stretched northwards over the valley of the Po, westward to the Rhone, and southward to the Arno. The men, a small dark race, wild as their own land, hunters, cragsmen, and robbers, fought stoutly for their huts and caves with Gauls, Etruscans, and Romans alike. To the legions, which they long harassed with guerrilla warfare, they contributed later an admirable light infantry. The Gauls or Celts, who gave their name to the Cisalpine district, the latest wave of immigrants, descended the Alps, and pushing before them their Etruscan predecessors, seized the upper valley of the Po as far as the Mincio. Wandering bands pene- trated deep into the peninsula, but the genuine settlements of the Celts were closed by the Apennines and the yEsis. To the Roman, 12 HISTORY OF ROME as to the Greek, the Gaul is the type of the northern barbarian, a name indiscriminately applied to the Celt and the Teuton. The steadfast courage of disciplined troops prevailed at length over the impulsive valour and impetuous charges of the chivalrous but unstable northerners. But the terror of a Gallic tumult brought Italy as one man to the aid of Rome, and the memory of the terrible day on the Allia survived in Roman minds to give additional lustre to the victories of Cassar. By the end of the Hannibalic war the corn-lands of Cisalpine Gaul were won, and became the most prosperous in Italy. In the time of Polybius the Celts were largely merged or extinct, and Roman life and culture pressed steadily up to the Alps. The province of Venetia still recalls the name of its most ancient inhabitants, the Veneti, an Illyrian stock, who held the land at the head of the Adriatic as far inland as the Mincio against the intruding Gauls. In the fifth century B.C. they were partially civilised by the Greek colony of Atria founded on their coast, and in later days acted with Rome against their more barbarous neighbours. The Etruscans. — Beyond the Apennines, from the Macra to the Tiber, dwelt the mysterious people of the Rasenna known to the Romans as Etruscans, to the Greeks as Tyrrhenians, the standing riddle of Italian history. Neither language nor customs enable us to connect them assuredly with any known nation. They l entered Italy almost certainly by land over the Alps, and before the coming of the Gauls ruled on both sides the Po. Atria, Melpum, and Mantua were once Etruscan cities, and Felsina (Bononia) proudly styled herself head of Etruria. For a time, too, they held Campania and an Etruscan dynasty lorded it in Rome itself, but their per- manent home lay in the district called Etruria, where the twelve great cities long outlived the sister-leagues of Campania and Gaul. To the north they had a double line of defence in the Apennines and the marshes of the Arno ; to the south they were severed from the Italian races by the Tiber, and sheltered from the rising power of Rome behind the barrier of the Ciminian forest, a line unbroken till the famous march of Fabius. The Rasenna were to the Romans a foreign nation speaking an unknown tongue. In contrast with the slender Italians, their monu- ments represent them as a sturdy, thick-set, large-headed race ; their 1 The Rosti, in Switzerland, spoke Etruscan, and have left behind them inscrip- tions in that language near Lugano and in the Valtellina. The Lydian origin of the Etruscans is an hypothesis due to confusion of names (Herod., i. 94). ETRUSCANS i religion was apparently a gloomy mysticism, which readily degene rated into superstition. Their cities, which in earlier times were governed by monarchs, and afterwards by close and long-lived aristo cracies, were formed into three loosely-knit leagues of twelve cities one in the Po valley, one in Campania, and one in Etruria itself. Each league recognised a federal metropolis at least for religious purposes, but there was little concerted action even in time of war At first the Etruscans showed vigour on water as on land Their galleys infested the sea, which took from them its name "Tyrrhenian," and joined the Carthaginians in their effort to keep the Greeks from gaining a foothold in Sardinia and Corsica. Not MODEL OF A PRIMITIVE ETRUSCAN HOUSE. till Hiero I. of Syracuse defeated the allied powers off Cumas (474 B.C.) were the Etruscan Corsairs driven from the seas. To fasten their grip upon the land, they crowned the steepest and most isolated hills with fortress-cities, whose mighty walls, arched gates, and huge drains still testify to the skill and power of their builders ; witness the city-gate of Perusia, the frowning hold of Volaterrae, or Cortona's " diadem of towers." But in his- torical times the vigour of the race is on the wane. The Greeks destroy their navy ; the Gauls overrun their country. Campania is lost to the Samnites (450 B.C.). Etruria, south of the Ciminian hills, submits to Rome. Hard-pressed and inwardly decayed, the Rasenna yielded, after a few faint struggles, to their most resolute i 4 HISTORY OF ROME enemy. The causes of this feeble resistance lay partly in the disunion of the cities, partly in the deep discontent of the op- pressed masses, but more than all in the enervating effects of luxury. Gross materialism, that found its expression in feasting and drunkenness, in tasteless display and the cruel sports of the amphitheatre, is the leading characteristic of the later Etruscans. Their influence was deeply felt in the early art and architecture, in the religious ideas, the soothsaying and divination, as well as in the gladiatorial shows and the later agricultural villeinage of Rome. BH , Ki Kill ^ '0S9f- '",■ r;f.v\,. : ■'. - mtir; ;i#X'' 1 - -;:^^i|ffil^da*iEJr*-' .,',.1 as'T^^n. :.'■■.■:■ *w ■ ■■ tlBb&Kinl^.'J- ■ ., ' -,-.-l'>- ■:; ft ... e^. .,.'.„. —. . .i..-!.... '..'il-J . ,., m. j 1 WALL AND GATEWAY OF PERUGIA. Italian Stocks. — The genuine Italian race may be divided into four branches, the Umbrians of the north, the Oscans in the south, and in Central Italy, the men of the plain (Latium), and the hill-tribes, who, claiming descent from the Sabines, may be styled Sabellian. The Umbrians, reputed the most ancient race in Italy, who had once held the country on either side the mountains from the Adriatic to the Tyrrhene Sea, were early expelled from Etruria SABELLIANS 1 5 by the invading Rasenna, and lost their eastern coast to the Senones, the latest immigrants from Gaul. In historical times they were confined within the district which still bears their name between the Tiber and the Apennines. In the struggle with the Etruscans the petty divisions of their numerous communities were fatal to a common defence, and, to purchase revenge on their ancient enemy, they sacrificed their independence later to Rome. The great Flaminian road, secured by the fortresses of Narnia and Spoletium, riveted their allegiance to their new mistress. Central Italy. — The small people of the Sabines, who dwelt in the hills and dales east of Tiber, from the Nar to the Anio, a folk of primitive virtues and proverbial simplicity, were held to be the parent stock whence sprang the hill-tribes of Central and Southern Italy. Tradition tells how, during a war with the Urn- brians, the pious folk vowed to the gods a sacred spring (ver sacrum), and sent in due time their sons and daughters born in the next year to seek new homes wheresoever the gods should please. From two such bands which journeyed to the south was formed the nation of the Samnites (Sabinites) ; whereof one com- memorated the ox of Mars, their guide, in the name of their city, Bovianum ; the other called itself " the tribe of the wolf" that led them on their way (Hirpini, from hirpus). The clans of the centre were even more closely related to the Sabines. The Picentines of the coast took their name from another emblem of Mars, the wood-pecker ipicus) ; while the Marsi, grouped round the Fucine lake, arrogated to themselves, as bravest of the brave, the name of the war-god himself. Near akin to these latter tribes were the other peoples of the Abruzzi, such as the Marrucini, the Vestini, and Paeligni, between whom and the Oscan races of Samnium and Apulia lay the Frentani, a people of mixed blood. In the long wars of Rome and Samnium, all these Sabellian tribes, closely connected as they were in origin and history, adhered generally to the Latin power ; and although in the Social War, the last struggle for independence, the Marsi took the lead, the contest was fought out to the bitter end by Samnites and Lucanians alone. In their customs and institutions, again, there is great similarity. The mountains which split them into fractions were at once a bar to intercourse and a strong protection. Content with their scattered hamlets, nestling in secluded valleys, they never de- veloped an urban civilisation, and, like the Arcadians in Greece, formed not organised states but loose confederacies of cantons. 16 HISTORY OF ROME The -£iqui, Hernici, and Volsci. — South-east of the Sabines lived the kindred tribe of the /Equi, fierce enemies of rising- Rome, but curbed later by the fortresses of Alba Fucens and Carsioli. On the rocky hills of the Trerus valley were perched the strongholds of the Hernici, Anagnia, Ferentinum, and Frusino. The hostility of this tribe to the /Equi and Volsci, between whom its land is sandwiched, explains its persistent and most useful loyalty to Rome. The Volsci, whose more level territory included the coast from Antiurn to the Pomptine marshes and the lower valley of the Liris, were a nation of obscure origin, equally opposed to Roman and Samnite. In early times the chief enemies of Rome and Latium, pushing their conquests to the southern slopes of the Alban hills, they fell at length before the combined attacks of Samnites and Romans, and left their land as a prize for " the fell, incensed opposites" to wrangle over. Latins. — The Roman Campagna, now a type of picturesque desolation, was once thickly peopled by Rome's nearest kinsmen and closest friends — the Latins. Their league of thirty cities filled the plain from the Tiber and the Anio to the Volscian hills, from the sea-shore to the western spurs of the Apennines. On these spurs stood two of their strongest and most famous cities, Tibur and Praaneste (Palestrina), but the centre and capital of the con- federacy was the ancient town of Alba Longa, raised on an isolated ridge of volcanic hills, which stands out boldly above the surround- ing plain. On the Alban mount was held the Latin festival, when all Latin towns joined in annual sacrifices to Jupiter Latiaris. With the religious festival was connected a meeting of deputies from the several communities, which formed a federal court of justice and arbitration. In both assemblies Alba presided, but it is unlikely that this titular leadership implied a real political supremacy. Each city retained its independence, but the possession of a common centre and the habit of common action quickened in the Latin race the sense of national unity. Oscans.— As the Apennines grow more regular and uniform the tribal divisions become larger and less marked. There are but three branches of the great Oscan race which spread itself over the highlands of South Italy. Of these, by far the most important are the Samnites, the Lucanians and Bruttians being impure and inferior representatives of the same stock. The Samnite mountains were the refuge of the Oscans when Greeks and Iapygians occupied their coasts, and the stronghold from which they swooped down later to reclaim their ancient TRIBES OF SOUTH ITALY 17 heritage. Their wandering bands of warlike adventurers seized for themselves large tracts of the Apulian and Campanian plains, but neither here nor there could they cope with the masterly and resolute policy of Rome. The league of the four cantons, 1 firm for defence, was ill organised for aggression. Their random conquests were achieved in pursuance of no definite policy and supported without concentrated purpose. They founded no town like Rome, to be their leader in war and peace. The long- struggle of Rome and Samnium is the struggle of lowland and urban civilisation against a people of highlanders, husbandmen and freebooters, content with the old-fashioned village life and tribal ties. Samnium fought to the death ; and even after superior policy and the forces of civilisa- tion had prevailed, their undying love of liberty and restless valour broke out in bloody revolts from the days of Pyrrhus and Hannibal till Sulla destroyed the nation root and branch. The population of Campania was made up of many elements. The older Oscan inhabitants were conquered and civilised partly by Greeks and partly by Etruscans. Some centuries later (450 B.C.) new streams of Oscans poured down on the bright and pleasant coast-lands, and turned the tables on the foreign colonists. About the same time the Samnites, spreading southward, formed the new nation of Lucanians, whose weight pressed heavily on the Greek cities of the south, and hastened their decline. From the Lucanians, a century later, broke off the Bruttians, rude robber-herdsmen who lived in the deep forests and inacces- sible granite mountains of the toe of Italy. Always subject to foreign lords, these savage tribesmen remained under the Romans little better than slaves. Iapygians. — Sharply distinguished from the Oscan races are the Iapygian clans — Daunians, Peucetians, Messapians, who par- celled out among themselves the heel and spur of Italy. Con- nected doubtless with the Illyrians of the opposite coast, they must have crossed thence to Apulia by sea. Their natural affinity to the Greeks is proved by their ready adoption of Greek writing and civilisation, and by the similarity of local and tribal names. But the persistence of the primitive authority of the chieftain in the clan dates their settlement in Italy ages before the era of the Greek colonies. After resisting for centuries the attempts of Tarentum to enslave them, they were forced by the aggression of the Samnites to welcome the intervention of Rome. Greeks. — The coast of Southern Italy from Cumas to Tarentum 1 In order from north to south, Caraceni, Pentri, Caudini, Hirpini. E i8 HISTORY OF ROME was so studded with Greek settlements as to earn for the district the name of Magna Graecia. The description of the colonies of Italy and Sicily belongs properly to Hellenic history. But a cer- tain number play an important part in the history of Rome. The Ionian colony of Cumae, on the Campanian coast, the earliest and boldest of these great adventures, was the first centre of Greek culture and influence in Italy. Dorian Tarentum, the queen of the south, the first of Italian cities in manufactures and commerce, with its sheltered harbour, its purple-fisheries, and its wool, led the Italiot Greeks in their struggle with Rome. Messana and Rhegmm commanded the passage of the straits, a point of vital importance in the Punic wars. In those wars Neapolis and the Greek sea- ports manned with their sailors the young fleet that won the sovereignty of the seas. Syracuse, long preserved from subjection by the wise policy of Hiero II. , who held the balance between Rome and Carthage, became the capital of a rich province. Wealthy and luxurious Sybaris, it is true, had perished and left its place desolate ; Acragas, the most western stronghold of Hellenism, ceased to be a Greek city ; and Croton, the home of philosophy, athleticism, and medicine, fell to the Bruttians ; but the persistence of the Greek language in Italy and Sicily forces us to recognise this foreign element in the population. Sicily. — Sicily is an Italian island, but it is no mere appendage of Italy. Largest and most fertile of Mediterranean islands, it lies in the centre of the sea, at once parting and uniting its eastern and western halves. It offered many attractions to the great colonists of antiquity, the Phoenicians and the Greeks. There are, indeed, no navigable rivers, and the central districts are obstructed by mountains, but a long series of harbours welcomes the sailor everywhere but on the dangerous southern coast, and the plains and valleys of the isle, known later as " the granary of Rome," grew rich crops of corn and pastured a famous breed of horses. Thus Sicily became the meeting-place of the nations, the battle-ground of East and West. The native races, Sicels and Sicans, Italian perhaps in origin, became by adoption Greek in speech and manners, and the story of Sicily was henceforth the story of the struggle of the Carthaginian and the Greek, till Rome, the successor of the Syracusan tyrants and of Pyrrhus the Epirot, as champion of Europe against Asia, and Hellene against Semite, drove the Punic ships from the seas, and their garrisons from the great fortresses of the western coast. Greek civilisation was saved, but independence was lost, and Sicily became the earliest province of POSITION OF ROME 19 Rome, to whose destinies her own were united for nearly seven hundred years. Sicily owed its early civilisation to its central position on the main trade-route of the ancient world ; Corsica and Sardinia re- mained in a backward state not so much from natural poverty as from the exclusive policy of Carthage, and the fact that they lay out of the beaten path of commerce. The Punic settlers who tilled the plains and worked the mines of Sardinia, and the Etruscans who held the fringe of Corsica, failed themselves to introduce even the elements of civilisation, and, from selfish fear of Greek competition, combined to expel the Phocasans from Alalia. Under Roman rule, Sardinia, malarial as it was, rivalled Sicily in her output of corn, and Corsican forests supplied excellent timber to the dockyards. Position of Rome. — Such being the geographical conditions of Italy, and such and so many its tribes and states, what were the special advantages and qualifications of Rome for welding these divided elements into a coherent whole ? In the first place, she was allowed to develop without interference on Italian lines. The policy of Carthage was content with the monopoly of com- merce and navigation, and aimed only at the reduction of her Greek rivals. The Greeks, absorbed in their intestine struggles and with minds turned to the East, had no eyes for the growth of Rome. The ambitious projects of Athens were shattered in the harbour of Syracuse. The Etruscan power was on the wane, and the casual incursions of marauding Gauls served only to unite Italy round its strongest state. In herself she was fitted for her mission not only by the excellence of her military system, the steady courage of her soldiers, and the tenacious policy of her statesmen, but also by her geographical situation. The eternal city lies in the very centre of Italy, on the one navigable river of the peninsula. The seven hills, flanked by the great outwork of Janiculum, are the most defensible position on the lower Tiber. Near enough to the sea for purposes of commerce, — and Rome was ever a commercial city, — it was far enough from it to be safe from pirates. Rome, in fact, was the predestined capital of Latium and the mart of Central Italy. The leader of Latium became the champion of the plains against the highland clans. During the long contest for the supremacy of Italy, her masterly diplomacy was powerfully aided by her central position in the task of isolating her foes and beating them in detail. Her legions, moving on inner lines, struck with concentrated force against her scattered enemies. She bestrid the narrow peninsula and severed the north from the 20 HISTORY OF ROME south. Acknowledged mistress of Italy, it became her duty to provide for its defence and to wrest from its Semitic foes the control of its seas and islands. The inevitable conflict with the Punic sea-power, and the equally inevitable extension of the Italian frontier to the Alps, launched Rome on a career of victory which ended only with the subjugation of the world. CHAPTER III THE LEGENDS OF THE KINGS TRADITIONAL DATES Romulus Numa Pompilius Tullus Hostilius Ancus Marcius L. Tarquinius Priscus Servius Tullius L. Tarquinius Superbus B.C. A.U.C. 753-7*7 J-37 715-673 39-81 673-642 81-112 642-617 I 12-137 616-579 138-175 578-535 176-219 535-5io 219-244 It is as hopeless to retell as it is impossible to omit the legendary stories of the birth and growth of Rome. Shadowy as are the personages, and unhistorical as are their achievements, the genius of poets and painters and the unquestioning faith of a people has thrown a halo of consecration around them. They may have no foundation in fact, they remain a part of history. The Founding of Rome. — When Troy was taken by the Greeks, the hero .Eneas fled, bearing with him his father, Anchises, and his household gods. Led by the star of his mother, Venus, at length he reached his fated home on the far-off western shore. The king of the land, Latinus, welcomed the stranger, and would have given his daughter, Lavinia, to be his bride. But the king's people and the new folk quarrelled, and by-and-by Latinus was slain and his city taken. Then yEneas married Lavinia, and built a city and called its name Lavinium ; and the peoples became one, and were called Latins after the old king. But Turnus, king of the Rutulians, took to him Mezentius, king of Etruscan Caere, and fought with yEneas at the river Numicius, and was slain. And ^Eneas vanished away, but was worshipped of his people as a god. And Ascanius, his son, who was also called lulus, reigned in his stead. Ascanius slew Mezentius in battle, and built a city on a high hill, and called it Alba Longa. There he reigned, he and his children, for three hundred years. FOUNDATION OF ROME 21 But when the appointed times were fulfilled the king Numitor was reigning in Alba, and his younger brother, Amulius, rose up against him. He took his kingdom and slew his sons, and his daughter, Rhea Silvia, he set to watch the sacred fire of Vesta that she might be a virgin and not marry. But the god Mars loved the maiden, and she bore him twins. And Amulius cast the babes into the Tiber to drown them ; but the river had overflowed, and the floods floated the basket in which the twins were to the foot of the Palatine hill by the sacred fig-tree ; and they were thrown out on land, and a she-wolf from the cave of Lupercus suckled them. Then Faustulus, the king's herdsman, found the twins and brought them up as his own sons, and called them Romulus and Remus. But when they were grown men, it chanced, out of a CONTOKNIATE. .-"ENEAS LEAVING TKOY — HEAD OF TRAJAN. certain quarrel of the herdsmen, that they were made known to their grandfather, and, when they had slain the tyrant, they set Numitor again on his throne. And from Alba they went forth to build a new city on the banks of the Tiber where they had been saved ; and a question arose between them who should be its founder, and they sought answer of the gods by the flight of birds, watching the heavens all night. At sunrise Remus beheld from the Aventine hill six vultures, but Romulus from the Palatine saw twelve. So he built the city there and called it by his own name, and when Remus leaped the unfinished wall and scorned the work, he smote him that he died, and said, " So be it with any who dare cross this wall." And the city was called Rome. Romulus. — To fill his new town with men, King Romulus made an asylum or place of refuge on the Capitol for the bloodguilty 22 HISTORY OF ROME and the exile. And to win wives for the outcasts he devised a festival and games, to which the men of the country-side and, above all, the Sabines brought their wives and daughters. But in the midst of the shows armed men, at a sign from the king, bore off the women to be their wives. This was the " Rape of the Sabines," which brought many wars upon Rome. But Romulus slew Acron, king of Caenina, with his own hand and dedicated his arms to Jupiter {sfio/ia oftimd), and drove back the men of Crustumerium and Antemnas. Then came the Sabines with WOLF WITH ROMULUS AND REMUS. {Bronze in the Palace of the Conservatori at Rome.) Titus Tatius, their king, and made their camp on the Qiurinal hill. And they took the Capitol by treachery and gave treason its meed. For Tarpeia, daughter of the captain of the citadel, for the promise of the bright things they wore on their left arms, — their golden rings and armlets, — opened to them the gate ; but they cast their shields on her that she died. Then the Sabines fought with the Romans in the valley between the Capitol and the Pala- tine, and drove them back to the very gate of their city, till Romulus vowed a temple to Jupiter, " the Stayer of Flight." So the flight was stayed, but as the batt'e raged anew the Sabine wives ROMULUS 23 of the Romans rushed in between their husbands and their kinsmen, and made them at peace with one another. So they became one people, and the two kings Romulus and Tatius ruled over them. But after Tatius had been killed by the men of Laurentum, Romulus reigned alone and made laws for his people. He parted them into three tribes, the Ramnians, Titians, and Luceres, and in each tribe he made ten divisions called curia. From each curia he chose one hundred men to fight on foot and ten on horseback, so that the number of the legion was 3000 footmen, and of the horsemen, called celeres, three hundred. And when the bur- gesses met together at the summons of the king, they voted by curia, — that is, the voice of each curia went by the majority of votes in that curia, and that of the whole people by the majority of curia:. Then from the heads of houses Romulus chose his Senate or council of elders, that they might advise him for the DENARIUS OF FIRST CENTURY B.C. — TITUS TATIUS AND THE RAPE OF THE SAEINES. common weal. But in private each burgess father of a family ruled his household with power of life and death ; and he was bound to protect his dependents (clientes) from wrong, while they must do him loyal and faithful service. Now when Romulus had ruled for nearly forty years, there was one day an assembly in the Field of Mars ; and a great storm befell, with thunder and lightning, so that the people were scattered. And when the storm passed Romulus was not. But as one Julius Proculus came from Alba, he appeared to him on the way, and bade the Romans be of good cheer, for Rome should rule the earth ; and, so saying, departed heavenward. So he became a god, and they worshipped him as Quirinus, "the Lord of Spears." Numa Pompilius. — But the senators would choose no one to be king after him, but ruled in turn each man five days. And there was strife among the people for a year between Roman and Sabine. At last they so devised that the Romans should choose a king 24 HISTORY OF ROME from among the Sabines. So they chose Numa Pompilius, for he was wise and holy ; and he took the kingdom when he had inquired of the gods by the flight of birds and the curia had consented to him. Now King Numa was a man of peace, and cared most for the worship of the gods and the ways of husbandry. And he learned wisdom of his wife, the nymph Egeria, who met him by night in her sacred grove. So he set up the holy brotherhoods, the Pontifkes, who ordered the rites of the gods, and the Augurs, to divine their will, and the Flamines to minister to the great gods, Jupiter, Mars, and Quirinus, and the Salii to worship them with song and dance and to keep the shield that fell from heaven. And he made the Vestal Virgins to watch the fire on the holy hearth of the city. Moreover, he divided the lands that Romulus had won, and set up landmarks sacred to Terminus, laying a curse on any who should move the same. Also he parted the crafts- men by their callings into nine guilds, and built a temple of Faith. So in his days there was peace in the land and the gates of Janus were closed. And he died at a good old age, and was buried under the hill Janiculum, and the books of his ordinances by him ; and Tullus Hostilius was chosen in his place. Tullus Hostilius. — In the days of Tullus there was war between Alba and Rome. For when a quarrel arose upon the border, each sent heralds to the other and would have satisfaction for the wrong. But Tullus kept the men of Alba without answer till word came that their city had denied justice, and that the Roman Fetiales had declared war, so that the reproach might lie with Alba. Then Cluilius led the Albans against Rome, and the trench of his camp is called to this day "the ditch of Cluilius," and it lies within five miles of the city. And when he died Mettus Fufetius was made dictator in his room. But, ere the armies met, the chiefs agreed together and chose champions to decide the quarrel, for each side three brothers born at a birth — the Horatii for the Romans, and for the Albans the Curiatii. So they fought before the hosts, and two Romans were slain, and the Alban three were wounded. Then the last Horatias made show of flight that he might separate his enemies as they pursued, and so turned and slew each as he came up, for they were hindered by their wounds. But as the Romans returned in triumph, with Horatius at their head bearing his triple spoils, his sister, who was betrothed to one of the dead, came forth to meet him by the gate ; and when she saw the cloak her own hands had broidered for her lover on her brother's shoulders, she cried out and wept. And Horatius, angered, stabbed her to the EARLY KINGS 25 heart, with bitter words, because she wept for her country's foe. For this thing" the two judges of blood sentenced him to death. But he made appeal to the people with the king's will ; and the people remembered the deeds he had done for them, and gave ear to his father's prayer. So he was set free from the guilt, after he had passed beneath the yoke and made offering to the spirit of the dead. And the yoke was called thereafter " the sister's beam " {sororium tigilluni), but the spoils were hung on a pillar in the Forum — the pila Horatio. — to be a memorial in later days. But when Tullus bade the Albans aid him, according to their bond, in battle with the men of Veii and Fidenae, Mettus came with his host, but stood aloof waiting on the end. So Tullus, after he had won the battle, called the Albans together unarmed, as the custom was, for a speech, and placed armed Romans round that they might neither fight nor flee. Then he took the traitor and bound him to two chariots and drave them different ways, so that he was torn asunder. And he sent horsemen to destroy Alba, but the people he set to live on Mons Cselius in Rome. But when he had prevailed in war against the Etruscans and Sabines, his heart was puffed up and he forgot the service of the gods. And after that he had reigned thirty-two years, Jupiter smote him with lightning and consumed him and his house. Ancus Marcius. — Now the next king was the grandson of Numa, and he brought back his ordinances and set them up in the Forum on wooden tablets for all to see. Ancus loved peace, but, when the Latins plundered his lands, he took their cities by the sword, and set their people on the Aventine hill. So he made the city larger, and dug a great trench across the valleys to strengthen it without, and for evil-doers within he built a prison under the citadel hard by the Forum. He also fortified the hill Janiculum and joined it to the city by a wooden bridge, and at the mouth of the Tiber he built the harbour of Ostia and made a colony there. So Ancus ruled honourably for three-and-twenty years, and went down to the grave in peace. Lucius Tarquinius Priscus — In the days of Ancus Martius came one Lucumo to Rome from Tarquinii in Etruria, whither his father, the noble Demaratus, had fled from Corinth. Lucumo left Tar- quinii by counsel of his wife, Tanaquil, for there he was denied ad- vancement, because his father was a stranger, though his mother was a noble Etruscan. Now at Rome she hoped he would win honour and worship by reason of a sign ; for, as they drew near in their chariot, an eagle bore off his cap on high, and wheeling 26 HISTORY OF ROME replaced it on his head. And the Romans called him, after the name of his city, Lucius Tarquinius, and he served King Ancus well in council and in war. So the king made him guardian of his sons ; but Tarquin persuaded the people to choose him to reign over them, for the kingship went by choice. And he overcame the nations round about and took their cities, so that the Etruscans sent him the golden crown and the sceptre, the ivory chair, the purple robe, and the twelve axes in the bundles of rods {fasces), which were the emblems of royalty among them. Then Tarquin began the great temple on the Capitol which he had vowed in war to Jupiter, and built huge drains to carry off the water from the valleys between the hills, and levelled the market-place or Forum, surrounding" it with booths and a covered walk. Moreover, he made a circus or racecourse for horses and chariots, after the manner of the Etruscans. But when he pur- posed to make new tribes, and centuries of horsemen, the augur Attus Navius forbade it. Then the king mocked at him, and asked, " Can the thought of my mind be fulfilled ? " and the augur answered by the birds that it might. So the king said, " Cut me, then, this whetstone with this knife ; " and he did so, and the omen of the birds was made true. And from that time forth the king obeyed his voice. Yet did he double the number of noble houses in each tribe, and so did he with the centuries of the knights and the Senate also. Now there was a certain slave of the king named Servius Tullius, and men said he was the child of the hearth-god, for one day, as he slept, a flame played round his head and did him no hurt. So Tanaquil made him free, and he served the king faithfully and was in favour with all men. But when the sons of Ancus heard that the king- had wedded him to his daughter and would make him heir, they plotted to slay Tarquin and strike for the crown. And they smote the king by the hands of hirelings, as he sat to give judgment, but got no profit of their treason ; for Tanaquil shut the gates of the palace and gave out that the king was not dead, but had appointed Servius to rule till he should be healed of his wound. And even when men knew that the king was dead indeed, Servius kept his state and ruled the land without consent of Senate or people. Servius Tullius. — This Servius won the goodwill of the com- mons, for he divided among them the conquered lands, and upheld the cause of the poor, so that in later ages men still loved the memory of" good King Servius." He subdued the Etruscans under SERVIUS TULLIUS 27 him, but made alliance with the Latins and built a temple to Diana on the Aventine, where Latins and Romans might make common sacrifice. And he brought the Quirinal and Viminal and the Esquiline hills within the city, and all the seven hills he com- passed about with a great ditch and rampart, which is known to this day as the wall and the mound of Servius. Moreover, he divided the city in four parts — the Suburan, Esquiline, Colline, and Palatine — and the land without into twenty- six, and the parts he called " Tribus." The tribes were made up of men who dwelt together in one place, and they had common WALL OF SERVIUS TULLIUS. sanctuaries and common feasts and head-men over them. And he arranged the assembly of the people so that men should vote according to their wealth in land and cattle, and to the order of the army in the field. For he divided the whole people into five classes, and in each class he parted the elder and the younger, the younger from seventeen to forty-five years for service in the field, the elder men for the defence of the town. And the ordering of the classes was this : — Each man's place in the assembly was as his place in the ranks of battle, and his place in the ranks was as his power to clothe himself with armour and bear the burdens of war ; so his place went by his estate, by his acres of land, and by 2S HISTORY OF ROME his sheep and oxen. Moreover, he divided the classes into hundreds or centuries for service, and to each century he gave one vote in the assembly ; yet he left not the classes equal, but gave the chief power to the richer men who served the state on horseback or on foot in full armour. For to the first class he assigned eighty centuries, forty of the older and forty of the younger men ; to the fifth class he gave thirty centuries, divided in like manner ; but to each of the other three he gave but twenty. Of the trumpeters, the armourers, and carpenters he made four centuries ; but the other craftsmen and men who had less than a certain sum he suffered not to serve in the army, but made of them a separate century, that of the Proletarians. Lastly, he made of the horse- men eighteen centuries, adding to the six old twelve new ones formed of the richest and noblest citizens ; and they received a horse from the state, so long as they served, and were called " Knights of the Public Horse." 1 TABLE OF CLASSES AND CENTURIES. EXERCITUS. Number. Census. 1 Arms. Equites. iS centuries 100,000 asses Pedites. j Cavalry equipment and \ equus publicus. ( Helmet, shield (clipeus), < greaves, breastplate, ' lance, and sword. ist Class So centuries 100,000 asses 2 centuries of smiths 1 and carpenters. [ ( Helmet, shield^'^Avw), -, greaves, lance, and I sword. 2nd ,, 20 centuries : 75,ooo ,, 3rd , , -o ,, c;o,ooo ,, 1 Helmut, shield, lance, ( and sword. 4lS ., -o , , 25,000 ,, Lance and javelin. 5'h ,, 30 , , 2 centuries of trum- peters. 11,000 Darts and slings. 1 century of proletari ■ 1 N.B, — The term class, as applied to the four lower grades, is an anticipation of later usage (vide pp. 46 and 296). Similarly, the rates given are the later money-equivalents of original assessments by land and cattle. THE LAST KINGS 29 So the king gave votes to the poorest and lowest, but no power in the state. Nor were there many poor nor many rich in those days, for the holdings of land were small, and trade was but simple as yet. The stout farmers had the chief voice, and though the younger were more in number than the elder, yet Servius gave equal weight to the centuries of the seniors, that age might have its say. Thus was made the great assembly of the centuries, that suffered change, but was not done away till the people lost their freedom. King Servius had no son, but two daughters, and them he had wedded to the two sons of King Tarquin. Now the sweeter maid he gave of set purpose to the haughty Lucius ; to Aruns, the good- natured, he gave the proud and cruel Tullia. But the thing fell out otherwise. For those evil ones, when they had rid them of their gentler mates, came together, as their souls desired, to work wickedness. Now Tarquinius feared the purpose of the king to do away with the kingship and set the people free, and made a conspiracy against him with the young nobles, who hated him for his goodness to the common folk. So when the appointed day came he seized the king's throne, and sat thereon. And when the king came and rebuked him, young Lucius claimed it for his father's son, and took the old man and cast him down the steps of the senate-house, and sent armed men who slew him as he fled. And Tullia, his wife, drove furiously to the Forum to greet her lord as king, and as she went back her father's body lay bleeding in the way. But she turned not aside from her driving, so her chariot and dress were splashed with her father's blood. Wherefore men called that street " the street of crime " {vicus sceleratus). Tarquinius Superbus. — So by bloodshed and violence came the proud Tarquin to the throne, and so by violence he kept it, till they made an end of him and his house. He reigned as a tyrant, neither regarded he justice and judgment, but he spoiled the rich and oppressed the poor. Moreover, he joined himself to Octavius Mamilius of Tusculum, and set up his power over Latium. And when Herdonius of Aricia spake against him in the federal meeting he compassed his death by false witness, and that easily, for all men feared him. But the men of Gabii stood out against him, till Sextus, his son, betrayed them into his hands by craft. For he fled to Gabii for refuge from his father's wrath. And the men of the city received him gladly, and by degrees they moved him to the chief place, for the young man prospered in all he undertook, the Romans ever fleeing before him, as the king bade them. Then 30 HISTORY OF ROME he sent a messenger to know his father's will. Now Tarquin walked with the messenger in a garden and said no word, but smote down the tallest poppies with his stick. And Sextus under- stood the thing, and by false charges brought the chief men of Gabii to death, and then gave up the town into the hands of Tarquin. The king finished the great works which his father had begun. He built the great temple on the Capitol, and removed from the site many shrines of the gods of the Sabines ; but the shrines of Terminus and of Youth would not be moved, so he enclosed them within his temple. Moreover, as they dug for foundations, they lighted on a human head. Now these things were signs that Rome should be head of the earth, and that its youth should not fade nor its bounds go back. And he dedicated the temple to the great Etruscan three, to Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva. And on a certain time there came a strange woman to the king, who would have him buy at a price nine books of the pro- phecies of the Sibyl of Cumae ; and when he refused, she burnt three and offered the rest at the same price. But he mocked at her for a mad woman. And she came yet again with but three left and asked the same price : so the king was astonished, and took counsel of the augurs and bought the books. These were the Sibylline books that were kept in a stone chest beneath the Capitol, and two men were set to keep them and consult them in the hour of need. And on another time a snake came out of the altar in the king's house and ate the offering on the altar. So Tarquin sent his sons Titus and Aruns even to Delphi to inquire of the oracle of the Greeks, and with them their cousin Lucius Junius, whom men called Brutus, the dullard, because he feigned to be witless for fear of the tyrant. And his offering was like to himself, for he gave a simple staff, but within it was filled with pure gold. Now when the young men had inquired for the king, they asked Apollo which of them should reign at Rome. So the voice said, "Whichever of you shall first kiss his mother." Then Titus and Aruns drew lots for this, but Brutus, as they left the temple, fell down as by chance, and kissed our common mother . Earth. But the end of the Tarquins came on this wise. When the host was besieging Ardea of the Rutulians, and the king's sons were supping with their cousin, Tarquinius of Collatia, they dis- puted of their wives which was worthiest. So they rode to Rome to see. There found they the wives of Aruns and Titus and FALL OF THE MONARCHY 31 Sextus making merry ; but when they came to Collatia at dead of night, they found Lucretia, Collatinus' wife, working with her hand- maids at the loom. So they judged her worthiest, and rode back to camp. But Sextus was smitten with an unholy passion for Lucrece, and he came alone to Collatia, and was welcomed as a near kinsman. But he paid back good with evil, and wrought his wicked will by foul threats. Then good Lucretia sent for her father, Lucretius, and her husband, and they came with their trusty friends, Publius Valerius and Junius Brutus. And when she had told them her tale and bidden them avenge her of her shame, she drove a knife into her heart. Then Brutus drew out the knife from the wound, and swore to visit her blood on Tarquin and upon all his race, and that no man should henceforth be king in Rome. And they took her body to the market-place that men might see the deeds of the Tarquins. Moreover, Brutus, the captain of the horse (tribunus celerwn), assembled the people, and won them to depose the tyrant and banish his whole house. And he went down to the camp and drave out the king's sons, for Tarquin had gone to Rome to quell the tumult. But he found the gates shut in his face, and he fled with his sons to C;ere in Etruria. And this was the end of kings in Rome. The First Consuls. — Then the people gathered in their centuries in the Field of Mars, and were minded to choose year by year two men to share the royal power, to be called consuls. So they chose Brutus, and with him at the first Collatinus. But the people feared Collatinus for his name's sake, because he was a Tarquin, and they prayed him to depart from Rome. And in his room they chose Publius Valerius. And the consuls filled up the places in the Senate which the king had left empty, and each ruled for a month at a time, and had the lictors then to bear the fasces before him. Then came men from the banished king to claim his goods, and they made a plot with many of the young nobles to bring the king back, and among these were the two sons of Brutus. But the consuls were warned, and had the young men seized. And Brutus sat on the judgment-seat, and bade scourge and behead them all, nor spared his two sons, nor turned his face from the sight, for he loved his country more than his own flesh and blood. And the goods of the Tarquins they gave for a prey to the commons, to break all thought of peace between the princes and the people of Rome. Then Tarquin stirred up the men of Veil and Tarquinii, in 32 HISTORY OF ROME Etruria, to make war on Rome. And ere the battle was joined, Aruns spurred hotly upon Brutus, when he saw him in royal array marshalling the horse ; and each ran upon the other with the spear that they died. Then the hosts fought stubbornly till even- ing. But in the night the Etruscans went home, hearkening to a divine voice. And the Romans bore Brutus back to the city and buried him ; and the matrons mourned for him a full year because he had avenged Lucrece. Valerius now ruled alone, and built a great house on the hill Velia, above the Forum, and men feared that he would make him- self king, and use the hill as a hold for his guards. Therefore he assembled the people and came with lowered fasces for a sign of submission, and pulled down his house and rebuilt it at the foot of the hill. Then he passed two laws to protect the people. The first declared that man accursed and worthy of death who should seek to become king; the second allowed a citizen condemned to death to appeal from the magistrate to the general assembly. So Valerius was hailed the People's Friend (Publicola). And in P5rutus' place the people chose Spurius Lucretius, and when he died, Marcus Horatius. Now both Valerius and Horatius wished to dedicate the temple on the Capitol which Tarquin had built, but the lot fell on Horatius, to the great displeasure of the friends of Valerius. So he dedicated the temple, but even as he was praying with his hand on the door-post, one told him that his son was dead. But he said simply, " Then let them bury him," and made no lament of evil omen, because he honoured the gods above his son. Lars Porsenna. — And by-and-by came Lars Porsenna, king of Clusium and head of Etruria, with a great host to bring back Tarquin, and took the fortress on the hill Janiculum, and drove the Romans back over the Tiber-bridge. Now the bridge was of wood, and as the rest fled, three brave men turned in the narrow way, and faced the Etruscan army, even Horatius Codes, Spurius Lartius, and Titus Herminius. These three made good their post till the bridge was cut down behind them. As the last supports gave way Lartius and Herminius ran back, but still Horatius stood alone on the farther bank. And when the bridge had fallen, he prayed to Father Tiber and gave his life and his arms into his keeping, and so swam back to the city he had saved, sore spent, but unhurt by flood or foe. And for this deed the Romans set up his statue in the Comitium, and gave him as much of.the common land as he could plough in a day. LEGENDS OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC 33 But Rome was hard beset by siege and famine. So Caius Mucius, a young" noble, went forth to slay Porsenna and make an end. He found entrance to the camp ; and when he saw a man in a purple robe sitting- on a throne and giving" pay to the soldiers, he went up into the crowd, and stabbed him for the king ; yet was it but the king's scribe. So they dragged him before the k ; ng. But when they threatened torture if he revealed not the whole matter, he thrust his hand into the fire that was on an altar, crying that pain was a small thing compared with glory. But Porsenna marvelled, and bade him go in peace. So Mucius was won bv kindness to tell the king what no torture could wring from him, how three hundred noble Romans had sworn to take Porsenna's life, and would follow the first adventure, each in his turn. Thus won Mucius his name of Scsevola, the left-handed. But Porsenna made peace with the Romans, taking from them all the land of Veii, and for hostages ten youths and ten maidens. And when Clcelia taught her fellows to escape, and they swam across the Tiber to the city, the Romans kept faith and sent the maidens back. Then Porsenna marvelled again both at the courage and the good faith of the Romans, and he set Clcelia free. And the land and the other hostages he gave back later, because the Romans entreated his beaten armies kindly, what time they fled before the Latins to the gates of Rome. Battle of Lake Regillus. — So Tarquin, foiled once more, went to Tusculum, unto his son-in-law, Octavius Mamilius, the chief of all the Latins. Then the Romans, fearing the power of the great League, named a single leader to rule the people as king for six months, lest with two chiefs their counsels should be divided. So Titus Lartius was the first Dictator, and two years after, they chose Aulus Postumius, who made Titus ^Ebutius his Master of the Horse. Then the Latins came with the house of Tarquin and the Roman exiles, and fought with the Romans by the Lake Regillus, in the land of Tusculum. In the centre the banished king charged the Dictator, but fell wounded, and was borne out of the throng. But on the left Mamilius ran ^butius through the arm, and pressing on for all his wounds, restored the fight. And the battle swayed this way and that : here fell M. Valerius ; there Herminius smote Mamilius down, but fell himself ere he could spoil him of his armour. At last Postumius vowed a temple to the twin brethren, Castor and Pollux, if they would give him the victory. And, as he spake, two youths on horses white as snow rode in the Roman front, and pressed the Latins back, and drove them to their C 34 HISTORY OF ROME camp. And when men sought them, they found no trace of them save a hoof-mark on the rock, that no earthly horse had made. But as the old men sat in Rome waiting for news, behold two horsemen young- and beautiful on white horses bathed with the foam of battle, who washed their horses in the pool by Vesta's House, and told the people of Rome's victory. And when they had done this they rode away and were seen no more. So the Romans built a rich temple, as Aulus had vowed, to Castor and Pollux on the spot where they washed their horses ; and its pillars stand in Rome to this day. But Ring Tarquin went to Aristodemus, the Greek tyrant of Cumas, alone, for all his sons had fallen in the wars. So evil met its reward, and Rome was delivered from the rule of kings. HEAD OF ROME. CASTOR AND POLLUX. CHAPTER IV THE REGAL PERIOD The Legends are Unhistorical. — The legends told by Roman chroniclers about the founding and the early history of the city cannot be regarded as sober narratives of real events. They rest on the insecure basis of oral tradition alone, for the written records perished at the sack of Rome by the Gauls in 390 B.C. Nor are the traditions in themselves so probable as to inspire belief. They give us, indeed, admirable pictures of old Roman ideals and institu- tions, but the personages and events portrayed in them are shadowy and unreal. Romulus and Niima, for instance, simply personify the two great elements of ancient law, the secular and the religious, which find a later and weaker embodiment in the slightly different figures of Tullus Hostilius and Ancus Marcius. But formal criti- SOURCES OF THE LEGENDS 35 cism is not now needed to prove that we have here to do with myth, not history. Euhemerism. — What then is the origin of these myths, and to what causes may their growth be ascribed ? The first and most obvious source is to be found in Euhemerism, : which turned into plain history the tales told of the gods. The method was intro- duced at Rome by Ennius, and was readily followed by the Augustan writers, who rationalised the legends by the omission of the supernatural and the conversion of Italian gods into primitive kings. It suited the more prosaic and literal mind of the Roman, and harmonised with his view of things spiritual. The vivid imagination of the Greeks peopled the hills and streams with Naiads and Oreads, and saw in the motion of the cloud the hand of Zeus, the bounty of Demeter in the produce of the earth. The art of their sculptors fashioned ideal forms in the likeness of men and women, whose sayings and doings made an ever-growing story full of human interest, enriched and fixed by the genius of their great poets. The Italians, on the other hand, worshipped with deeper but more distant reverence shadowy beings, rarely em- bodied in wood or stone, whose name, attributes, and cult alone were saved from oblivion. And so the very reverence of the Italian mind, together with its literalness, as scepticism advanced, made the historical explanation a natural and popular method. To take examples from the legend of Romulus : the twin-brothers are the two Lares or guardian-deities of the city ; in the story they are born of a Vestal, because their worship was closely con- nected with that of the Hearth-goddess ; their names are derived from that of the town, for Remus is but a variant of Romulus. So, again, Titus Tatius is the eponymous hero of the religious brotherhood, the Sodales Titii, and of the ancient tribe of the Tities. Quirinusis the old Italian god of war, identified by Diony- sius of Halicarnassus with Mars ; hence even the legend, which deifies Romulus as Quirinus, represents him as the son of Mars. ./Etiological Legends. — In the story of a founder we naturally look for the mythical element ; elsewhere other influences are more marked. Setting deliberate fiction aside, the most potent factor in the making of traditional history is the desire to explain obsolete usages and half-forgotten institutions, and to give some account of the origin of public buildings and ancient monuments. In the wedding-ceremony of the Romans are observed traces of : Euhemerus was a Greek (circ. 300 B.C. ) who first systematically explained myths as history, treating the gods as heroes worshipped for their valour. 36 HISTORY OF ROME the primitive system of marriage by capture, relics without doubt from an earlier stage of society. The feigned violence with which the bride was snatched from her mother's arms and her hair parted with a spear is found in the marriage-ritual of savage tribes throughout the world. The Romans explained this by a legend, "the Rape of the Sabines," and expressed its antiquity by telling the story of the founder himself. So, too, the legend of Remus symbolises the inviolability of the city-wall. FICUS KUMINALIS, WITH PICUS AND PARKA ; SUCKLING TWINS. URBS ROMA ; AND WOLF Again, legends tend to gather about places of worship and memorials of a forgotten past. The story of the infancy of Romulus and Remus centres round the sacred fig-tree {Fiats Rumijialis) and the worship of Faunus Lupercus in the cave hard by. Faunus, the god who keeps the flock, is transformed into Faustulus, the shepherd who scares the wolf from the twins. The temple of Jupiter Stator may have suggested the legend of the rally of SOURCES OF THE LEGENDS 37 the Romans there, while the details at least of the tale of the Horatii may well have been invented to account for a group of monuments 1 which stood together near the Carina;. Greek Fiction. — The remaining source of tradition is deliberate fiction, probably due to Greek influence. The connection of /Eneas with Egesta (.En. v.) and Cuius can be traced back to the Sicilian poet Stesichorus, and to the tradition of the colonisation of the Italian from the /Eolic Cyme. The fable that Numa was a pupil of Pythagoras was invented by some ingenious Greek so ignorant of Roman chronology that he ante-dated the philosopher by two centuries. Especially deep is the debt of the Greek historical novelists to their father Herodotus. Not to speak of the marked resem- blances between the tales of the childhood of Cyrus and of Romulus, the stratagem of Sextus Tarquinius at Gabii, and the story of the poppy-heads are taken straight from Herodotus' narrative of the capture of Babylon (iii. 154), and of the strange behaviour of the tyrant Thrasybulus (v. 92). With equal certainty we may ascribe the embassy to Delphi to the lively fancy of some patriotic Greek. The Truth in the Legends. — Such being the main sources of error in the traditional history, it remains to discover and piece together the scattered fragments of truth preserved in the legends, like flies in amber. In this task we gain great help from two sources. The researches of archaeologists into the early buildings of ancient Rome reveal some glimpses of the city's material growth, while the study of the laws and customs of a later day, with the aid of the science of comparative law, sheds some rays oflightonthe original institutions of the Roman state. To deal first with the growth and history of regal Rome. The Original Settlements. — The germ of the eternal city lay in that square town (Roma Quadrata), whose well-built tufa walls may still be traced on the slopes of the Palatine. Here stood the relics of Romulus, the sacred fig-tree and the thatched hut ; round it ran the Pomerium traced by the founder's plough ; by one of its gates was the shrine of Jupiter Stator. An extension of this square city of the Palatine is found in the Septimontium — the original seven hills — which included the Palatine mount with its two outlying ridges (the Cermalus overhanging the swampy Velabrum, and the 1 These were the altar of Janus Curiatius, near the sororium Tigillum (cf. p. 25), and that of Juno sororia at which the Horatii sacrificed, and the Pila Horatia in the Forum. 3S HISTORY OF ROME Velia running towards the Esquiline), together with the three peaks of the latter hill, Fagutal, Oppius, and Cispius, and the fortress built to protect the low valley of the Subura. But this settlement of the Septimontium was not the only city enclosed in the circuit of the later walls. On the Quirinal and Viminal, opposite, stood a town perhaps Sabine, perhaps merely Latin, in origin, distinct certainly from the Palatine city and probably hostile. Of the existence of this separate settlement there are many proofs. Dis- tinctive names survived to later days. There were duplicate worships of Mars and double colleges of Salii and Luperci, while the legends of the double kingship and the twofold door of the double-headed Janus may point to the same conclusion. Hence the hypothesis that there were originally two rival towns, divided at first, united afterwards, the settlement of the Montani on the Palatine mounts, and of the Collini on the Quirinal hills. The Unification of the City. — In the next period of develop- ment, the age of the Tarquins, the names and remains of Roman buildings serve more fully to confirm the substance of the tradi- tional account. The legends themselves show that no great ex- tension of Roman territory took place under the first four kings. Fidenas remains Etruscan, the Anio is the boundary towards the Sabines, and in all probability the fossa Cluilia, but five miles from Rome, served to mark the frontier towards Latium. Only along the Tiber towards the sea does Rome extend her boundaries, securing command of the river by the fortification of Janiculum and the foundation of Ostia. But with the advent of the Tarquins, Rome becomes an important state, mistress of Latium and Southern Etruria — a position she again loses on the expulsion of the kings. To the same monarchs are ascribed the buildings which first made Rome a great city. Round the scattered settlements, already noticed, Servius Tullius built a wall, whose colossal size may be estimated from the remains still existing on the Aventine, and the rampart {agger) recently destroyed in part, to make room for a railway station. Within this wall was included the whole of Republican Rome, as well the older towns on the Palatine and Esquiline, the Quirinal and Viminal, as three more hills now first brought within the bounds of the city, the Caelian, the Aventine, and the Capitol. On this last, the most famous of the seven hills, was built the citadel, with the well-house (Tullianum) and prison, the treasury, and the great temple of Jupiter, the chief monument of the Tarquins. To the Tarquins, too, are attributed the great drains {cloaca), which turned the marsh-lands of the Subura, THE PRIMITIVE CITY 30 the Forum, and Velabrum into firm ground. On the land thus reclaimed was the Comitium, or place of assembly, and the Forum, or market-place of the united Roman people. Near the north-west corner of this oblong- stood the Curia, or senate- house, and on the south-east the buildings that typified the unity WALL ON THE AVENTINE. of the new city, the temple of Vesta, the city hearth, and the house of the king iregid). The Etruscan Kings of Rome. — It is hard to resist the impres- sion that all these great undertakings are the handiwork of the master-builders of Italy, the Etruscans. The massive walls, the 40 HISTORY Of ROME arched drains, and the Capitoline temple, with its three shrines of Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva set side by side, and its long, low front, resting on but six pillars, are all eminently characteristic of Etruscan architects ; and when we find that great nation spreading in early times from the Alps to the Bay of Naples, we cannot but suppose that Rome and Latium came beneath its sway. Nor are there wanting traditions of their ride in this district. In the /Eneid, Turnus (Turrhenus or Tuscan) of Ardea is closely allied with Mezentius, the Etruscan tyrant of Caere. Cato declares the Volsci were once subject to Etruscan rule, and his statement is borne out by the name of one of their cities, Tarracina ( = city of Tarchon), and the Etruscan remains found at Yelitne. Roman legends assert the Etruscan origin of the Tarquins, whose name (Tarchon or Tarchnas) means lord or prince ; Tuscan tradition, preserved to us by the Emperor Claudius and a tomb at Volci, makes Servius Tullius an Etruscan prince, Mastarna, the friend of Caeles Vibenna. The legend of Porsenna is but another attempt to conceal the fact of an Etruscan conquest of Rome. Hence we infer that the monarchy of the Tarquins represents the rule of Etruscan princes over a conquered Latin race, and their expulsion a rising" of the natives of the land against their foreign rulers. The Institutions of Rome :— The Familia. — Yet, though there may have been a Sabine settlement on one of the Roman hills, and though Etruscan princes once were lords of the city, primitive Rome is essentially a Latin town, Latin in its character, its customs, and its institutions. The foreign elements were absorbed or thrown off; they modified, may even have profoundly affected, but never controlled its true development. The unit of the Roman state was the family, built up of father and mother, sons and daughters, slaves and clients. In law the household was governed absolutely by the paterfamilias ; to its master each member was subject, wife and child as much as slave and dependent. He is absolute owner of all property possessed or acquired by its members ; he disposes of their persons and their goods at pleasure. By custom, however, though not by law, the house-father acts as representative rather than despot ; he is con- trolled by the mos maiorum, by public opinion, and by the council of the near relations. He, too, is priest of the household, and maintains the worship of the ancestors and the household gods. By his side within the gates stood the mistress, high in reverence and dignity, who kept the house and ruled the maidens working at the distaff. When the father died the sons or nearest males EARLY INSTITUTIONS 41 inherited his goods and his authority ; the daughters remained as children or as wives in the hand of their male protectors. The Gens and the Clients.- -From the family develops the house or clan {gens). All descendants in the male line of a single ancestor, whether by blood or adoption, regarded themselves as members of one house. Bound to the house by ties of dependence were the clients, enfranchised slaves, or refugees who placed themselves under the protection of some Roman chief, and handed down the CLOACA MAXIMA, relation to their children. In strict law their persons and property were wholly at the disposal of the head of the house ; by custom they enjoyed almost complete freedom. The patronus, indeed, was morally bound to protect the person and advance the interests of his client in return for the services rendered by the client to his protectors. The Plebs. — From these dependents in the first instance arose a new class in the community, the "plebs" or common people. Men who for years had enjoyed this practical freedom gradually 4 2. HISTORY OF ROME emancipated themselves from the legal bonds of clientship, and gained a right to the protection of the state against their ancient masters. The number and importance of this protected popula- tion grew apace, as Rome became a power in Central Italy. Com- merce drew within her strong walls merchants from less favoured towns, who lived as settlers under the king's guardianship. And to these elements of the new body must be added the inhabitants of conquered cities brought to Rome, as tradition tells us, and settled there as clients of the community, that is, of the king. The King-. — The Roman state sprang from the union of clans and families. Its institutions grew naturally from those of the smaller associations, and upon their model. At the head of the united community was the father and ruler of the state, the rex or king. The Roman kingship is compounded of three elements. From one point of view, the king is the hereditary and patriarchal chief of the people, as the father is of the household ; from another, the chief priest of the nation, as the father is of the family ; but most distinctively, differing- herein from the father of the family, he is the elected representative and magistrate of a free state. The compromise on which the monarchy rested is best seen in the traditional method of election. On the death of the king the supreme power reverted to the assembled " fathers " (patrcs), the representatives of the old houses {gentes). This council of elders appoints an inter-rex, who holds office for five days, and then nominates another elder to take his place ; eventually, by some inter-rex so nominated, the new king is, with the advice of the elders, chosen. Next the inter-rex proposes to the assembled people the election of the king thus designated. Finally, the vote of the people is ratified by the approval of the gods, as given in the solemn ceremony of inauguration, and by the assent of the fathers, the guardians of the religion of Rome. Thus the king is nominated by his predecessor, chosen by the Senate, elected by the people, who bestow on him the sovereign power (imfierium), and confirmed in his office by the assent of Heaven. He is, during his life, the sole magistrate of the state, the guardian of the city hearth and high priest of its religion, the leader of his people in war, and the supreme judge in peace. His orders and his judgments are not fettered by written statutes ; all officials, whether religious or secular, derive their authority from him and are but his assistants or deputies ; he alone can convene the Senate or people, and has the right to propose new laws to the people, and to address them publicly in their assemblies. Yet the THE KING 43 CROUND-PLAN and elevation of the temple of vesta {restored). 44 HISTORY OF ROME authority of the king is limited, not absolute, for he is the minister, not the maker, of the law. His plenary power is given him by the assembled burgesses, whose allegiance is due to the law-abiding ruler, not the lawless lord, of the state. When the kings trans- gressed the ancient customs (mos maioruni) of the land, they forfeited their claim on the allegiance of the people. The Senate. — By the side of the monarch stands the Senate, the council of the "fathers" or heads of the great houses of Rome. Originally, no doubt, the elders had been chieftains of the separate clans from whose union the Roman people was formed. Thus in one aspect the Senate is a representative council of chiefs, whose ancient independence is proved by their lifelong tenure of office, and whose claim to be the ultimate source of authority, civil and religious, is shown by the appointment of the inter-rex, and by its right to confirm or annul all resolutions of the people (patrum auctoritas), including the election of the king. But when the allied clans became one people, under one chief magistrate, the Senate lost its ancient supremacy. Nor is there any relic left in historical times of its representative character. The king, as head of the united state, nominates whom he will to fill up its ranks, and may at his pleasure refuse to consult his council, or reject the advice it has tendered. The Comitia Curiata. — The earliest assembly of the Roman people was that in which the free men voted by curies {comitia curiata). The whole Roman people, plebeian as well as patrician, were members of the thirty curies, and were summoned to the assemblies in the Comitium. Originally, however, the plebeians were purely passive members o. the assembly, and only acquired the right to vote at a later period. Each curia comprised several gentes, knit together by participation in common rites and festivals, by the possession of a common chapel, hall, and hearth, and the tradition of a common ancestry. The curies were, in the earliest days which history records, the only important division of the Roman people. Their number, it is true, reminds us of the shadowy triple division of the people into Ramnes, Tities, and Luceres, and the traditional number of the Senate, three hun- dred. A comparison of the figures with the ordinary number in colonies — ten curies and a hundred decurions or senators — taken in conjunction with the derivation of the old Roman name for a division of the people (tribus = a. third), confirms the suggestion that the city was formed by the aggregation of three distinct settlements. REFORMS OF SERVIUS 45 But these three obsolete tribes and the ancient houses were no longer effective political divisions ; for such purposes the curia is the only unit recognised by the primitive constitution. In the assembly the vote of each curia was decided by the majority of individual voters ; that of the whole people by the majority of curies. The assembly, however, only met when summoned by the king or inter-rex, and in the earliest times had but few oppor- tunities of exercising its powers. Its right to elect magistrates is limited to the acceptance or rejection of a new king ; the necessity for its concurrence in all important innovations is exemplified only perhaps in the case of the rupture of an existing treaty with a foreign power, in the grant of the franchise to a non-citizen, or the transference of a citizen from one family to another by the ceremony of adoption. But the assembly was also called to- gether to witness the most solemn acts of a private or religious character, the making of wills, the inauguration of flamens, and the proclamation of festivals. Of the three powers in the Roman state, the king, the Senate, and the people, the first alone is constantly active ; yet for all great changes the concurrence of the people and the sanction of the Senate are requisite, so that the monarchy is limited on all sides by the rights of the burgesses. But to these rights is attached the corresponding duty of the defence of the state in war, for on the burgesses fell the burden of personal service in the legion and of building the city walls. The Reforms of Servius Tullius. — The first great constitutional reform, the foundation of the comitia centuriata, is ascribed to one of the Etruscan kings of Rome, Servius Tullius. But it is probable that the changes made by these princes were in the first instance financial and military. The royal army had been composed of 1000 footmen and 100 horse from each of the old three tribes. Tar- quinius Priscus meant, we are told, to create three new tribes and centuries of horsemen, but, daunted by the opposition of the augurs, left the old forms unchanged, while he accomplished his purpose by doubling the strength of each division. Servius Tullius undertook a more thorough reform, by reorganising the army on a new basis, that of property. Though the old six centuries of horsemen were left untouched, twelve fresh squadrons were formed of the richest citizens ; and in the ranks of the footmen were included the rest of the freeholders, patri- cians and plebeians alike, arranged according to the value of their landed estate. The unit adopted in the new organisation 46 HISTORY OF ROME was the existing- century or company of a hundred men ; these companies were grouped in grades, and drawn up in phalanx. The richest citizens, in complete armour, formed the four front ranks of the phalanx (classis). Behind them stood the less perfectly armed spearmen of the second and third grades, while the fourth and fifth grades served as light-armed skirmishers, all four inferior grades counting technically as infra classcm. The whole force is divided into two equal parts, the field army, composed of the younger men (juniores), and the army of reserve of older men (seniorcs), each part containing eighty-five centuries and forming most probably two legions {cf. pp. 2S and 296). Traces of the Military Origin of the Comitia Centuriata. — That the original purpose of the Servian reform was military is sufficiently proved by the forms retained in the later assembly. The people in the comitia centuriata is called the army (exercitus), and organised for war, not peace. Its divisions are the century or company of horse or foot, the "classis" representing an original distinction by armament, the corps of juniors and seniors. The president, who is of necessity invested with full military power (iuiperhim), summons the burghers to meet him outside the walls, in the field of Mars, by the sounding of the war-trumpet and the hoisting of the standard. In the earliest times the citizens as- sembled in arms, and were arrayed under their standards in order of battle, and even in later days the companies of smiths and trumpeters maintained their separate existence in the assembly. The original purpose of the Servian reform was the imposition of military service and the war-tax (tributuni) on all freeholders [assidui), but the duty of defending the state could not long be separated from the right of deciding its policy. The natural consequence was, that the Servian army was converted into the comitia centuriata, which, at least from the establishment of the Republic, ranked as the chief assembly of the Roman people. The Local Tribes. — Another institution ascribed to King Servius underwent a similar transformation. To facilitate the levying of troops, Servius divided the city and its territory into four local districts, the Palatine, Esquiline, Suburan, and Colline tribes. Each tribe at first included not only a district of the city, but also a portion of the country outside the walls. In later days the four original tribes were confined to the city, while the country was portioned out in new tribes. Throughout history the tribe is a local district, marked off for administrative purposes ; but just as the Servian classification was originally military, and only later THE CONSULATE 47 political, so the tribe, at first intended to serve as the basi's for the levying of troops, became in its turn the most important political division in the Roman people. It would therefore appear that the memory of good King Servius has been preserved rather by the consequences which followed in the course of years from his reforms than by their original pur- pose. Yet we cannot doubt that those reforms were conceived by a master-mind. They have not the air of being a compromise reached by hard conflict between two hostile parties, but bear the stamp of a great legislator. Rome would seem to owe to Servius the debt which Athens acknowledges to Solon and England to Alfred. CHAPTER V THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE NEW REPUBLIC The Consulate. — The traditional account of the expulsion of the kings is no doubt an historical romance, but it is a romance founded on fact. The bitter and abiding hatred of the very name of king at Rome proves the truth of the tradition that the monarchy became a tyranny and was abolished by a revolution. But it is characteristic of the Roman people to retain as far as possible existing institutions. Hence, even in abolishing the mon- archy, they retained the title of king for a priestly functionary (rex sacrorum) debarred from holding any other office. A more important legacy left by the monarchy to the new- Republic is the conception of sovereign power (impcriinn). This power, it is true, is no longer held for life by a single individual, but entrusted to two colleagues, the consuls, for the term of a single year. Yet the consuls, though only annual magistrates, are true successors of the king, and joint-inheritors of his authority. For if in practice there must have been from the first a division of functions, the law recognised no such distinction. A consul had in all cases the right to forbid what his colleague had enjoined, and by his intercession to annul the force of the command. By this peculiar institution of co-ordinate magistrates the Romans contrived to maintain the sovereign power intact, and yet to provide against its abuse by individual self-will. With the same purpose, the tenure of office was limited to a 48 HISTORY OF ROME single year ; and though in law the official acts of a consul were valid, even if he refused to resign his magistracy at the end of the appointed term, in practice the consuls seldom dared to disregard in this way the spirit of the new constitution. Hence, whereas the king had been practically irresponsible because his authority ceased only with his life, the consul, on his retirement from office, was responsible for the use he had made of his power. The two great differences which distinguished the position of a consul from that of a king were the existence of a colleague and the annual tenure of office ; but others of the old royal prerogatives were also lost in the change of the constitution. By the Valerian law the consul was compelled to allow an appeal to the people against a sentence which affected the life or status {caput) of a citizen. This measure, though it prescribed no penalty but infamy for its transgression, and needed repeated re-enactment, was for centuries the Habeas Corpus Act of Rome and the keystone of her citizens' liberties. Another royal prerogative much limited at this time was the right to delegate powers. The two lieutenants of the king for peace and war, the guardian of the city (prccfectus urbi) and the master of the horse (jnagister cquituin) play no part under the Republic. The praefectship becomes a mere form, and the mastership of the horse is called to life only when a serious emergency demands the temporary restoration o r monarchy in the shape of the dictatorship. The consuls may delegate their military functions, but they cannot name at pleasure deputies to represent them as judges or magistrates. Their assistants in these departments attain the rank of standing officials with definite functions. The quaestores parricidii, if they existed at all under the kings, were mere deputies ; they are now regularly entrusted with criminal jurisdiction and the care of the state chest. Till the year 447 B.C. these officials were appointed by the consuls, but the annual tenure and the clearly marked duties of their office made them in a measure independent of the superior magistrate. Again, though the consul, like the king, had the right of naming his successor, yet his prerogative was limited by the people's claim to designate the man on whom the nomination should fall. He was, it is true, no mere returning officer at a Roman election. He might, and did, reject particular candidates, either refusing to record votes tendered for them or recalling to the poll centuries who had given them their suffrages. But, though at a crisis the consul might reassert the old right of a supreme magistrate to name his THE IMPERIUM 49 successor, as a rule he bowed to the expressed will of the people. Lastly, the appointment of the priests was withdrawn from the consuls. The priestly colleges obtained the right of filling" up their ranks by co-optation, while the Vestals were nominated by the chief college, that of the pontifices. In this way a separation is made between civil and religious authority. Imperium Domi and Imperium Militiae. — Another distinction of greater significance in history first appears at this time, that be- tween civil and military authority. In war the consul retains SELLA CURULIS AND FASCES. absolute power of life and death, in token of which the lictors bear the axes before him, but in peace his authority is subject to the right of appeal to the sovereign people, in deference to whom, within the city, the axe is laid aside by the lictors. Thus there is a clear distinction between the absolute power of the general over his army in the field {imperium militia) and the constitutional authority of the magistrate over the people at home (imperium domi). Dictatorship.— This limitation and division of the powers of the magistrates secured in ordinary times the liberties of the people, 50 HISTORY OF ROME but in lime of war the divided command was a source of serious danger. To meet such emergencies the Romans retained the monarchical principle in the dictatorship. After consulting the Senate, either consul had the right of nominating whom he would as dictator, or master of the people. The dictator possessed the old royal powers untrammelled and unlimited ; he disposed at will of the treasure of the state and the lives of the citizens. From his sentence there was no appeal, and all magistrates were subor- dinate to him. In fine, he was a temporary monarch, and as such named his second in command, the master of the horse ; and was accompanied by four-and-twenty lictors bearing axes in the fasces. But in no case might the dictator retain office for more than six months, nor name a successor to take his place. Broadly speaking, then, though kingship was abolished, royal power was retained, and that power might be revived at a crisis in all its ancient fulness and entrusted to a singde man ; yet the essence of the new consti- tution was the limitation of the old regal authority by the collegiate character and annual tenure of the magistracy, and by the explicit recognition of the sovereignty of the people. The Senate. — The abolition of the monarchy left the legal position of the Senate unaltered. The consuls called the Senate together, presided over its debates, and enforced its resolutions just as the king" had done in the past. The Senate cannot legally give commands to the magistrate, but may only offer advice. Yet in practice the permanence of the Senate gave it a decisive influence over a shifting and divided magistracy, and enabled it to dictate the policy of Rome. It is probable that plebeians were at this period first admitted into the ranks of the Senate, but this infusion of new blood did not alter the character of the council, which remained the chief bulwark of the old patrician aristocracy. One most important privilege, the right to ratify or reject all proceedings of the centuries, the election of magistrates, as well as the passing of laws, was reserved for its patrician members. By withholding their sanction (patrwu auctoritas) the heads of the old burgess houses could make the decisions of the assembly void, and so keep the commons in subjection to the will of the patricians. Assembly. — By the expulsion of the kings the people had acquired the important rights of annually electing its rulers and of acting as a court of appeal in capital cases. The sovereign people to whom these rights belong-ed was the army of freeholders (comitia centuriata) created by Servius Tullius, not the old curiate assembly, which was now gradually confined to mere formalities, such as the PATRICIAN GOVERNMENT 51 confirmation of the magistrates, already chosen by the assembly of the centuries, in their authority (lex curiata dc imperio). All the chief prerogatives of the sovereign people, the right of legislation and the power of peace and war, as well as the election of magis- trates and the decision of criminal appeals, passed to the new comitia centuriata. In this assembly the plebeians doubtless formed the large mass of the voters, but since it was a majority of centuries, not of individual votes, that determined the decision of the people, their numerical superiority was of little service to them. For the centuries of the knights and of the first class, which mainly consisted of old burgesses, outnumbered those of the lower classes ; and, further, the six patrician centuries of knights possessed the valuable privilege of voting first (prcErogativa). Thus, while the comitia centuriata formally secured the liberties of the commons, it left the substance of power in the hands of the upper classes (cf. Table, p. 28). Patrician Government. — Nobles and commons had united to throw off the galling yoke of despotic monarchs, but, now that this overshadowing authority was gone, there begins a long and fierce struggle between the orders for the fruits of victory. The lion's share fell in the first instance to the patricians. The plebeians had indeed gained the clear recognition of their rights as citizens of Rome ; they had won the right to vote in the assembly of freeholders, and the right to appeal from the sentence of the patrician magistrate to the verdict of that assembly. Never- theless, while the plebeians won the shadow of liberty, the old burgesses, now become a patrician nobility, retained the substance of power. In the comitia centuriata their vote and influence could as a rule secure them a safe majority ; but even had it been other- wise, that body had too little independence of action seriously to contest their supremacy. Resolutions in the comitia were intro- duced by patrician magistrates after consultation with an aristocratic Senate, and subsequently required the sanction of the patrician members of the Senate (patnan aicctoritas). In elections the voters could only choose patrician candidates nominated by patrician magi- strates, and subject to the approval of the curies, in which patrician influence preponderated, and to that of the patrician senators. The useful machinery of the omens and the working of the calendar was controlled by patrician priests. Thus the legal supremacy of the people in their assembly was at every turn hedged in and crippled by the powers of a patrician magistracy and Senate. The first effect of the Revolution was the transference of power 52 HISTORY OF ROME from an individual king to a close corporation, represented by its special organ, the Senate, and working through the magis- trates. The ensuing period of constitutional history is naturally filled with the long struggles by which the plebeian masses wrung from the patricians those cherished privileges which secured them the monopoly of office and authority. The ruling corporation was far more influenced by aristocratic prejudice than the monarch, who, standing on a height above all his subjects, was more likely to be a just judge between different classes and different orders. The king might, and probably did, lean on the support of the masses against the power of the aristocracy, but the annual republican magistrate had neither time nor inclination to shake himself free from the fetters of patrician prejudice. Even if there arose a man bold enough to defy his order, his actions could be thwarted by the opposition of his colleague or the gloomy pre- dictions of patrician priests, and, in the last resort, his power suspended by the appointment of a dictator. Thus at first sight it would appear as if the commons of Rome had escaped the tyranny of a single monarch only to place on their necks the harder yoke of a narrow aristocracy. Yet the privileges gained, the clear re- cognition of their claims as individuals to citizenship, and of the full sovereignty of the whole people assembled in their centuries though at the time rendered nugatory by the powers entrusted to the patricians, were an earnest of their future victory in the struggle between the orders, and of the complete equality between patrician and plebeian which crowned that victory. CHAPTER VI THE FIRST STRUGGLES OF THE PLEBEIANS TRADITIONAL DATES B.C. A.U.C. Secession of the Plebs . . 494 260 Spurius Cassius' Agrarian Law 486 268 Publilian Law 472 282 Grievances of the Plebeians. — The plebeians were not slow to discover the real meaning of the late changes. To them the new oligarchy was as oppressive, at the least, as the old monarchy. It was, indeed, the natural and obvious policy of the patriciate to thwart the rising ambition and depress the social status of their discarded GRIEVANCES OF THE PLEBEIANS 53 allies. Class feeling and political interest alike urged them to exclude the rich plebeian from the charmed circle of the official order, and, by robbing the poor farmer of his hard-won liberties, to re-establish the client system in full force for their own benefit. Political and social inequalities, however, formed a small part of the burden which afflicted the lower classes, whose sufferings from direct oppression were further aggravated by the losses sustained by Rome in the wars which followed the fall of the monarchy. Material distress, in the first instance, precipitated the inevitable conflict, and, like true Romans, the plebeians attacked first, not the rule of the aristocracy in the abstract, but the practical oppressions of the patrician magistrates and Senate. The most glaring examples of cruelty and misgovernment were the savage law of debtor and creditor, the arbitrary action of the executive magistrates, and the exclusive use and shameful maladministra- tion of the public lands. As regards the last, the magistrates and Senate had leagued themselves together to exclude the plebeians from all use of the common pastures and all share in the arable domains, the enjoyment of which was confined to the privileged class. At the same time they failed to exact the legal dues for the usufruct of the land, and thus robbed the treasury of present revenue and gave the occupant a claim to the equitable forbear- ance of the state in future. With a decreasing territory allotments to the poor were out of the question. Thus the public domain was monopolised by the old burgesses to the detriment alike of the poor and the public. Against this monopoly the plebeians were to fight many a weary battle, but their first efforts were aimed against the arbitrary sentences imposed by patrician magistrates, and the stern cruelty of the old Roman law of debt. The horrible injustice perpetrated in the name of law moved the masses, not so much to diminish the power of the magistrates, as to provide them- selves with a refuge from its abuse. The First Secession. — If we may trust Livy and Dionysius, it was the law of debt which first caused an open revolt of the poor against the government. The small farmer was called away from home by continual wars, and often returned only to find his home- stead a heap of ashes. In his distress he fell into the hands of some patrician money-lender, and finally found his way into a private prison, there to be loaded with chains and torn with stripes. Driven to despair at length, the plebeians refused to serve in a war against the Volscians, and only enrolled them- selves in the legions after the consul Servilius had freed the 54 HISTORY OF ROME debtors from prison and promised them his protection for the future. But when the troops returned victorious from the field, the other consul, Appius Claudius, enforced the law of debt with merciless severity. So, on the renewal of the war, the plebeians again refused to serve, till Manius Valerius, of the "house that loved the people well," was made dictator. Victory again crowned the Roman arms ; but when the dictator proposed reform in the Senate, he was met by a selfish and obstinate opposition. At length the patience of the army waiting before the gates gave way ; they deserted their general, and marched in full array to the "Sacred Mount" between the Anio and the Tiber. Here the leaders of the secession threatened to found a new plebeian city, a rival to the old Rome of the burgesses and their clients. But at this point the Senate yielded, and authorised Valerius to treat with the plebeians. The seceding party, too, had the sense to see the community of interest which bound them to the other half of Rome, and recognised in the old fable of the belly and the members, told them by Menenius Agrippa, the moral that union is strength. They stipulated, however, that the misery of the lower classes should be relieved by the foundation of colonies for poor farmers on the public land. Tribunes of the Plebs. — But the kernel of the covenant between the orders lay in the provision for the appointment of two tribunes of the plebs, to be chosen annually by the plebeians from their own body, who received power to protect the commons from the high-handed injustice of patrician magistrates, and whose personal security (sacro sanctum) was guaranteed for ever by the solemn oath of the people. The tribunate thus created was henceforward the representative of the plebeian body, its constant safeguard and sanctuary, and the instrument of its political victories. The first duty of the tribune was to succour the oppressed, his chief function to cancel any command of a consul which infringed the liberties of a citizen. But his "intercession" was in no case valid against the "imperium" of a dictator, or even of the ordinary magistrate a mile beyond the walls. His power was confined to the city, and his protest, limited to the acts of executive magistrates, must be made in person. Hence he must always sleep in his own house at Rome, with his door open night and day, that none might seek his aid in vain. This right of interference with special acts was at first used simply for the protection of an aggrieved individual, but was gradually stretched till the tribune could forbid almost any administrative act. THE TRIBUNATE 55 The Judicial Powers of the Tribune. — The judicial powers of the tribunes were large and undefined. They claimed the right to arrest even the consul, to imprison him, and eventually to con- demn him to death. In minor cases, where the penalty was but a fine, they were assisted by the plebeian ;ediles, and probably by a board of ten judges {decemviri litibus iudicandis). It may be questioned whether the power, claimed by the tribunes, of condemning and executing offenders against the rights of the commons was ever strictly legal, or fully recognised by the Senate, but their jurisdiction in minor cases was authorised and regulated by later laws. Concilia Plebis Tributa. — The most momentous consequence of the tribunes' judicial position was the formation of a new assembly to serve as a court of appeal from their sentences. This is the assembly of plebeians in which they voted by tribes, or local districts. These tribes included, in all, four urban and seventeen country wards ; and in this mode of voting the influence of birth and wealth was entirely ignored. The right of the tribunes to hold assemblies of the plebeians was guaranteed by the Icilian law, which forbade any magistrate to disperse such assemblies, or to interrupt a tribune's speech to them. This law, or rather " resolution of the commons " (plebiscitum), was itself but an instance of the growing custom of taking the votes of the commons on legislative proposals. Such resolutions were binding on the plebeians who passed them, but not as yet on the whole Roman people. The final step in this organisation of the plebeians as a sepa- rate corporation was an alteration in the mode of election of the tribunes. At first, it would seem, they were elected by the plebeians, voting by curies, but after the plebiscitum of Publilius Volero (472 B.C.) the plebeians adopted for elections, as well as for other purposes, the division by tribes. The gradual increase in the number of tribunes, from two to ten, no doubt secured more efficiently the primary aim of the institution, the protection of the oppressed. Value of the Tribunate. — On a general review of the effects of this formation of a new plebeian state within the pale of the Roman people, with officers at its head, whose permanent duty it was to oppose the magistrates of the whole community, the anomalies and inconveniences of such a system are more obvious and prominent than its merits. The tribune, resting on the personal inviolability accorded him by the solemn law and covenant {lex 56 HISTORY OF ROME sacrata) of the people, was strong for resistance but weak for reform. He could obstruct the action and restrain the injustice of the patrician magistrate by the exercise of his right of inter- cession, but he could not, without a new revolution, get the unjust laws, which the consul enforced, repealed ; nor could he cure the worst diseases of the state, the occupation of the domain land and the other economic evils which impoverished the plebeians. Yet, though the tribunate, in early days, rather legalised than remedied the duality of the Roman state and the dissensions of its two parts, nevertheless before the Punic wars it had served to secure the equality of the orders, and thus to promote and maintain the unity of the people. When this object was attained it became an anach- ronism. The tribune of later Rome is an officer of a markedly different character from the old protector of the unprivileged plebs. The Public Land. — The other chief grievance of the ple- beians, the occupation of the public land by the patricians, needs further explanation. The common land {pi/blicus agcr) of Rome, mainly derived from conquest, had formed the royal domain of the monarchs. The minute size of the traditional Roman farm (2 jugera = \\ acres) makes it certain that the citizen from the first had licence to pasture sheep and cattle, to cut wood, and perhaps even to grow corn on the common-land. When the government passed from the king to the nobles, the latter seem to have claimed and secured, as a right and privilege of their order, the exclusive management of this public property. There were two methods of dealing with the soil which were peculiarly advan- tageous to the rich and powerful. Firstly, the state might allow its citizens to take over and cultivate the arable land without con- ferring absolute ownership. Thus, by means of their clients, the patricians occupied (occupare) and enclosed large tracts, for which, whether legally or not, they paid the state no rent. This system of tenure, called possession, which made the domains a monopoly of the ruling class, was a deep and lasting injury to the smaller farmers. Secondly, the effect of this was aggravated by the exclusion of the yeomanry from the public pastures. As stock- raising grew in importance the right to use the common pastures, formerly granted to all on payment of a tax (scriphira), was con- fined more and more to the upper classes, from whom the magis- trates neglected to exact the fees due to the state. This double privilege of patrician landholders was a twofold injustice to the yeoman-farmer. AGRARIAN LAWS 57 Agrarian Laws. — As might be expected, the tribunes were con- stantly protesting against this misuse of the public land, and pro- posing "agrarian laws" designed to distribute some portion of the soil among the Roman poor. Before dealing- with particulars, it is necessary to restate the truism, that agrarian laws at Rome never confiscated private land, but dealt simply and solely with the state's domains won in war by the sword of her soldiers. Their object was to rescue public land from the stock-farmers and squatters (possessores) who absorbed it, and distribute it in small allotments to the poor. Sometimes a group of three hundred or more citizens were planted — in later years far larger numbers — together on the land in a single settlement or " colony," which, like an Athenian cleruchy, served indeed as an outlet for surplus popula- tion and a means of relieving the necessities of the poor, but mainly as a centre of Roman influence in peace and a well-garrisoned for- tress in war. 1 Sometimes particular portions of land were assigned to individuals {assignatio viritim). But, in either case, to make the landless man a peasant proprietor was to bestow on him not only a livelihood, but also political rights, which were, in early times, confined to freeholders, who alone could be enrolled in a tribe. Thus both the political and social interests of the plebeians were bound up with the distribution of the public land by agrarian laws. Tradition has associated the name of Spurius Cassius, the author of the league with the Latins and Hernicans, with the first agrarian law. But of its provisions we can learn nothing- from the confused and contradictory statements of Livy and Dionysius. Patrician obstruction appears, legally or illegally, to have thwarted the operation of the law ; patrician vengeance fell upon the man who had dared to come forward as the friend of the poor. Spurius Cassius was accused of aiming at absolute power, and sentenced to death by the assembly, or, according to another account, by his own father, in virtue of the tremendous powers entrusted by Roman law to the head of a family. Here, as in two later cases, the patricians turned the hatred felt by all true Romans towards the very name of king to good account, in discrediting the cham- pions of the lower orders. Yet the agitation begun by the proposals of Cassius was not ended by his death. Again and again the tribunes demanded the 1 The colonies founded by Rome were either (1) burgess-colonies, or (2), after 384 B.C., also Latin colonies, i.e., communities whose members, of what- ever origin, received Latin rights, v. infra pp. 134, 135. Previous Latin colonies were joint foundations of Rome and the Latin League, 58 HISTORY OF ROME execution of his measure, or at least some distribution of lands to the poor. Nor were they intimidated by the assassination of one of the most energetic among them, Cn. Genucius. At length their efforts were crowned with partial success ; for in 467 B.C., by the foundation of a Latin colony at Antium, a number of the poorer Romans were provided with lands, and in 456 B.C. the Aventine was portioned out in building-lots for the lower classes. In the last case, if not in both, it would appear that the tribunes compelled the consuls to bring the petition of the plebeians before the Senate. Then the consuls, with the assent of the Senate, carried the measure through the assembly of the whole people in their centuries. This interesting innovation closes for a while the agrarian question, and leads us back to the constitutional and legal reforms demanded at this time by the plebeians. Note. — Mommsen holds that the agrarian law of Sp. Cassias is a late invention, fie grants that his consulships and alliance with the Latins rest on good evidence, and believes that the record of his condemnation on the charge of treason was to be found in the earliest chronicles. But he points out how unlikely it is that such documents contained an account of a law which was never carried, and dwells uj on the confusions and contradictions in the account of its contents, and of the trial of its author. lie concludes that the agrarian law of Cassius and his championship of the Latins are fictions of the age of Sulla, founded upon the real proposals of the Gracchi and Livius Lrusus. {Rom. Forsch., ii. 153 //.) CHAPTER VII EARLY WARS AND ALLIANCES OF THE REPUBLIC TRADITIONAL DATES B.C. A. ICC Alliance with Latins and Capture of Corioli . , 493 2 6i Disaster at the Cremera 477 277 Cincinnatus Dictator 458 296 The new Republic hard pressed on all sides With the fall of the monarchy came a great loss of power and territory for the Roman state. While the later kings had gained a miniature empire over the neighbouring tribes, in the early days of the Republic Rome has to fight for her very existence. The beautiful legends, which tell us of the patriotic self-devotion of Horatius LEGENDS OF EARLY REPUBLIC 59 Codes and of Scaevola, must not blind us to the fact that Rome had failed to maintain her hold on Southern Etruria, nor the glamour of the heroic combats of Lake Regillus conceal the loss of her suzerainty in Latium. In fine, for sixty years after the foundation of the Republic the Roman armies fought for the most part in defence of their homes, almost within sight of the city. Often was the flag on Janiculum struck, and the burgher summoned from the assembly in the field of Mars, to repel the raids of the Yeientine on the north, or the more serious assaults of the ^Equian and Volscian on the south. The Sabines pressed across the Anio, the ^Equians settled like a thunder-cloud on Mount Algidus, while the Volscians overran the coast-land as far as Antium, and even gained a footing at Velitrae and Corioli. on the southern slopes of the Alban hills. Legendary Victories. — Throughout the period the Roman annals tell us of many splendid triumphs, but as we hear nothing of the fruits of victory, we may safely ascribe their glories to the imagination of patriotic orators and chroniclers. Each of the great houses had its own fabled exploits, extolled in the orations delivered at the funerals of its chief members, and afterwards in- corporated in the family chronicles. From this source Fabius Pictor (circ. 200 B.C.) and the later annalists drew those stirring narratives of adventure, and graphic portraits of individuals, pre- served for us by Livy and Plutarch. But we can put no trust in these legends, which owe their life and colour to the imagina- tion of the chroniclers. The official records in early times con- tained little more than lists of names ; the annals of the priests noticed only subjects of religious interest. Even these scanty documents perished in the sack of Rome by the Gauls (390 B.C.), and were but imperfectly restored, from memory or by conjecture. Yet these meagre outlines are the only historical evidence we possess. In the legends we must not hope to find truth, yet they remain a part of history, for belief in them has influenced later generations more than many facts. As typical instances we may take the stories of Coriolanus, of Cincinnatus, and of the Fabii. Legend of Coriolanus. — Gnasus Marcius was a noble of the race of King Ancus, brought up by his mother, Veturia, 1 in the strict old Roman ways. And when the Romans were besieging Corioli, the men of the city broke forth, and drove them back even to their camp. But Marcius rallied the runaways and turned the 1 The names in Shakespeare's play are derived from a slightly different version given by Plutarch, 6o HISTORY OF ROME pursuers to flight ; and, as they fled through the gates of the town, Marcius entered with them, and by his single might van- quished the enemy and took the city. So men called him Corio- lanus because he had "fluttered the Volscians in Corioli." And afterward there was a famine in Rome, and the commons were sore distressed. But when the king of Syracuse sent corn to the Senate, Coriolanus counselled it not to sell the commons bread, unless they would give up their tribunes. For which cause the people was much angered, and the tribunes summoned him to appear before the assembly of the commons. Then Corio- lanus stayed not for a trial, in which he looked for neither justice nor mercy, but fled to the Volscians ; and Attius Tullius, their chief, received him kindly ; but he could not persuade the Volscians to make war with Rome, for they were afraid. Now at that time Jupiter had bidden the Romans to celebrate the great games anew, and many of the Volscians went up to see the sight. But Attius Tullius, going by stealth to the consuls, bade them remember the mischief wrought in Rome by a tumult of the Sabines, and counselled them to prevent the Volscians doing the like. And when the consuls told this to the Senate, they made proclamation that before sunset every Volscian should be gone from Rome. So they went homewards full of wrath at the dis- honour done to them. And as they passed by the spring of Ferentina, in the Alban hills, Attius met them and stirred them up to make war with the Romans, who had thus put them to shame. So the Volscians gathered a great host, and^iver it they set Attius and Cn. Marcius, the banished Roman. Then the two generals took all the towns of the Latins, and encamped at length by the Cluilian dyke. And the Romans went not out to meet the foe, for within the city the strife between burghers and commons waxed fierce. But the poorer sort cried to the Senate to send an em- bassy to the Volscians. And five of the chief senators were sent to sue for peace ; but Marcius would give them no peace which Romans could accept. Next the Senate sent the priests and augurs clothed in their sacred robes ; yet would not Marcius hearken to them, but drove them back to the city. But when all men's hearts failed them for fear, Rome was delivered by the help of the gods. For Jupiter put it into the mind of the noble Lady Valeria to bid Veturia, the mother of Coriolanus, and Volumnia, his wife, to come with her and the other women of Rome to pray for mercy. So the whole train of matrons came to the camp of Coriolanus. And when he saw his mother, and his wife leading CORIOLANUS AND CINCINNATUS 61 his two boys by the hand, he would have kissed them. But his mother stopped him and asked whether he was her son or an enemy, and she his mother or a prisoner. And when he could not answer she cried out, " Had I never borne a son, Rome should never have been besieged ! Had I remained childless, I might have died free ! But I am too old to bear for long thy shame or my misery. Look rather at thy wife and children, whom thou doomest to an untimely death or a lifelong slavery." And Marcius quailed at his mother's words, and melted at his wife's and chil- dren's kisses. So he cried out in an agony, " Mother, thine is the victory ; thou hast saved Rome, but destroyed thy son." So Coriolanus led away the Volscian army, and troubled Rome no more, but lived many years among the Yolscians, and in his lonely old age felt the full bitterness of exile. And the Romans built a temple to Woman's Fortune, to do honour to the noble matrons by whose prayer the city was saved, and made Valeria its first priestess. Legend of Cincinnatus. — There was peace between Rome and the yEquians, but Gracchus Clcelius, their chief, pitched his camp on Mount Algidus, and plundered the lands of Tusculum. And when the Romans sent ambassadors to complain of the wrong, Gracchus mocked them, and bade them tell their message to the oak above his tent. So the Romans took the sacred oak to witness that Gracchus had treacherously broken the peace, and made them ready for war. But Lucius Minucius, the consul, led his army into a narrow valley near Mount Algidus, and there was he compassed about on all sides by the /Equians. Nevertheless five horsemen broke through the enemy, and carried the sad news to Rome. And the Senate agreed that there was but one man who could deliver the army, Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus, so he was named dictator. This L. Quinctius, called for his crisp curling locks {cinciniii) Cincinnatus, tilled his own little farm beyond the Tiber. The deputies of the Senate came thither early in the morning, and found him digging in his field. And when he had sent to fetch his toga, and was now in fit guise to hear the message of the Senate, they hailed him dictator, and told him in what peril the consul and his army lay. So he went with four-and-twenty lictors before him to his house in Rome, and chose L. Tarquitius, a brave man but poor, to be master of the horse. On that day the dictator made all business to cease in the Forum, and summoned all who could bear arms to meet in the Field of Mars before sunset, 62 HISTORY OF ROME ordering each man to bring with him victuals for five days and twelve wooden stakes. So at nightfall, when everything was in readiness, the dictator marched with all speed to Mount Algidus. And after that he had discovered where the enemy lay, he made his soldiers surround them on every side. When this was done they raised a yreat shout, and began digging a trench and driving in their stakes right round the ^Equian camp. Then the consul's army, that was in the valley, heard the Roman war-cry, and attacked the foe from behind so fiercely that he could not hinder the work of the dictator's men. And in the morning the ^Equians saw that there was no escape, for they were hemmed in by a ditch and palisade, and prayed for mercy. Then Cincinnatus answered that they must deliver over to him Gracchus and their other chiefs bound, and yield up all their goods, even their arms and cloaks. And he set up two spears, and bound a third across them at the top, and made the /Equians pass beneath the yoke, and sent them away full of shame. Thus did Cincinnatus deliver the consul and his army. One evening he marched out to Mount Algidus ; the next he returned victorious. And the Senate decreed that the dictator should enter the city in triumph riding in his chariot, while his prisoners were led bound before him, and his soldiers with their spoil followed behind him. But afterward he went home quietly to his wife and farm. Legend of the Fabii. — The Etruscans had not, since the days of King Porsenna, pressed the Romans so hard as the ^Equians and the Volscians. But the men of Veii, though they dared not meet the Romans in battle, harried the land up to the Tiber, while the consuls were fighting with the Equians and Volscians, and there was none to hinder them. Wherefore the men of the great Fabian house took counsel together, and bade Ka;so Fabius tell the Senate that the family of the Fabii would take upon itself the war with the men of Veii. And when they had gained the consent of the Senate, all the Fabii, to the number of three hundred and six warriors, gathered together at the house of Kasso on the Quirinal Hill, and marched out of the city by the right-hand passage of the gate Carmentalis. And they made them a stronghold in the country of the A'eientines, by the river Cremera, and for a whole year spoiled the men of Veii of their cattle and goods. But there was a certain day on which the house of the Fabii were accustomed to meet together for a sacrifice at the home of their fathers on the Quirinal. And as they went joyfully towards Rome, thinking that none would attack men bound on a sacred errand, the Veientines LEGEND OF THE FABII 63 laid an ambush before them, and pursued with a great host behind them. So the Fabii were compassed about, and set upon on all sides, and fell beneath a shower of darts and arrows, for none of the Etruscans dared come within the reach of their spears and swords. So the whole house of the Fabii was cut off, for there was not one full-grown man left, but only a boy, who, on account of his youth, had been left behind in Rome. Him the gods pre- served, that in after-ages his children might do good service to ETRUSCAN HELMET. the commonwealth, mindful of the glories of their forefathers. And there was peace between Rome and Veii for forty years. The Leagues with the Latins and Hernici. — It was not, how- ever, the real or fabled exploits of the noble houses that saved Rome from the assaults of the Sabellian tribes, but the masterly policy of a far-sighted statesman. If we may believe an inscription, cited both by Cicero and Livy, within ten years of the battle of Lake Regillus, Sp. Cassius, the consul (493 B.C.), formed that great and lasting league with the cities of Latium which proved Rome's best defence in the days of adversity, and the sure founda- tion of her future prosperity. For, whatever be the exact terms 64 HISTORY OF ROME or origin of the league, this much may be regarded as certain. It was at first an equal alliance between the two powers of the lowlands, to defend their borders against the incursions of the hill- tribes, and to stay the rising tide of /Equian and Volscian aggres- sion. At the same time Rome had the inestimable advantage of comparative immunity from invasion. The Latin cities stood like a bulwark between her territories and the Sabellian hill-tribes, securing her safety at the cost of their own. If the fortune of war was adverse, Latin towns fell into the hands of the ^Equians and Volscians ; if favourable, Rome claimed her share of the fruits of victory. Thus the brunt of the battle fell always on the Latins, while Rome grew strong behind the barrier formed by her allies. In this way the old equal league paved the way for the dominion of Rome over Latium. Scarcely less important was the adhesion of the Hernici to the league. These mountaineers held the rocky fastnesses of the valley of the Trerus, bordered on one side by the /Equians, on the other by the Volscians. Roman historians, misled by national pride, tell us that the treaty with the Hernici (486 B.C.), concluded, like the league with Latium, by Sp. Cassius, was pre- ceded by their conquest. But no doubt the Romans and Latins were glad to admit them into their alliance on equal terms, for their position midway between the /Equians and Volscians rendered their aid most valuable in any attack on those tribes. This triple league served for fifty years to protect Rome against assaults from the south, while the Etruscans were too hard pressed by the Celts on their northern frontiers to regain their dominion on the left bank of the Tiber. So the new Republic, though unable to maintain the position won by the later kings, succeeded in pre- serving the Campagna from the domination of Sabellians and Etruscans. Note. — It may be well to take the tale of Coriolanus as an example, and, by analysing its composition, to prove the untrustworthiness of similar legends which space forbids us to treat in full. Mommsen has shown that, in all probability, it is a late insertion in the Roman annals. Evidently the name of the hero was not to be found in the official lists of magistrates ; on no occasion is he at the head of the home government, or of the regular army in the field. In its original form the story was entirely free from fixed dates. The consuls play no part either in the distribution of the corn, or at the trial of Coriolanus, or in opposing the Volscian march on Rome. The assertion that Cominius (consul 493 B.C.) commanded the army that took Corioli is, as Livy naively confesses, a mere inference from the absence of his name on the brazen pillar which recorded the treaty CRITICISM OF LEGENDS 6$ made with the Latins by his colleague, Sp. Cassius. With more flagrant disregard of chronology, the old tradition made Dionysius of Syracuse (circ. 400 B.C.) the benefactor who relieved the famine at Rome (circ. 490) ; nor was the error corrected till a Greek antiquary substituted the name of Gelo for that of the later tyrant. Consistency was as little respected as chronology. Elsewhere in the chronicles Corioli is a Latin, and not a Volscian town, just as the spring of Ferentina is the Latin, not the Volscian, place of assembly. A trial before the tribes is impossible at so early a date, for, before the Publilian law, the plebeians voted by curies. Indeed, quite apart from errors of detail, the whole tone and character of the legend is utterly opposed to the dry, official character of the earliest chronicles of Rome. The picture of the hero, forced by the ingratitude of his countrymen to seek refuge with his bitterest enemy, who yet in the hour of his triumph foregoes his revenge at the bidding of his mother, is one which even Greek imagination never equalled. The moral of the tale, that Rome was saved in the hour of need by the patriotism of her women, is alien from the spirit of primitive times, when the mission of woman was confined to the family. In fine, the legend is a romance in- tended to glorify the great plebeian houses, the March, the Yeturii, and the Volumnii, by connecting them with the old patriciate, and, in the account of the trial, attempts to justify the claim of the plebeian assembly to rule the state. Its origin may be found in the century after the Licinian laws, when the new nobility had established its position. The legend of Cincinnatus bears on its face the stamp of a popular tale, and is proved, by its frequent repetition at different dates, to have had no place in the earliest chronicles. In the story of the Fabii, Mommsen sees a condemnation of that system of private warfare (coniuratio) which in early times supplemented the summer campaigns of the citizen army {militia legitima), but which, after its disuse, was misunderstood by the Roman annalists. (Rivii. Forsch., ii. 1 13-152, &c.) CHAPTER VIII T H E I) E C E M V I R A T E TRADITIONAL DATES B.C. A.U.C Proposals of C. Terentilius Arsa ...... 462 292 Appointment of Decemviri 451 303 Valerio-Horatian Laws . 449 305 Proposal to codify the Laws of Rome. — The tribunate no doubt did something to protect the interests and redress the injuries of the plebeians, but, so long as the laws of Rome remained unwritten, it was impossible to secure their just and equitable administration. E 66 IITSTORY OF ROME Roman law rested on a basis of custom and command, and consisted largely of semi-religious usages and ceremonies, clogged with antique forms, and closely connected with gentile worships. The knowledge of the law was to the orthodox patrician, as to the Brahman of India, a mysterious science, to be jealously guarded from the vulgar gaze, and handed down by tradition only from generation to generation, as a sacred heritage of the ruling class, who alone had part or lot in the old religion of Rome. This exclusive property in law was at once a bulwark of patrician power and a stumbling-block in the path of the plebeians, and as such was marked out for tribunician assault. In 462 B.C. a tribune, C. Terentilius Arsa, proposed that a commission, consisting of five plebeians, should be appointed to codify and publish the laws of Rome. It does not appear that the proposal in its original shape sought either to reform the civil law, or to alter in any way the constitution of the state. Its effect would have been simply to deprive the patricians of their monopoly of the knowledge of law, and so to protect the plebeians against the misuse of legal technicalities, by which the magistrates perverted the course of justice. Resistance of the Senate overcome. — But though the proposed measure was at once just and moderate, it excited the most vehement opposition. For ten years the Senate obstructed its passage into law, and for ten years the commons elected tribunes pledged to support it. During the struggle the Senate tried in vain to appease the discontent, and divert the attention of the people by various concessions, by assenting to an increase in the number of tribunes (457 B.C.), to the distribution of the Aventine in allotments to plebeians (456 B.C.), and, finally, to the limitation of the maximum fines a consul might impose to two sheep or thirty bullocks. The concessions failed to satisfy the people, who were bent on carrying the proposal of Terentilius. At last the Senate was forced to yield, and accepted the measure, though in a modified form. As a preliminary, three commissioners were despatched to Greece, to report on the laws of Solon, and other Greek codes ; and on their return, two years later, it was agreed that ten men should be appointed to draw up a code of law {decemviri co?isidari imperio legibus scribendis), and to act for the year as sole and supreme magistrates. At the same time, the tribunate and the right of appeal were suspended, in order that the decemvirs might enjoy the advantage of unfettered and unlimited authority. The Rule of the Decemvirs. — Clearly the purpose of these THE DECEMV/JRATE 6y measures was to substitute for the uncertain working of the tribune's veto the fixed barrier of written law as a permanent safeguard of plebeian liberties. They were probably the result of a compromise, by which the commons on their part sacrificed the tribunate, and the nobles surrendered the monopoly of legal principles. The nobles got rid of a hated office, while the people hoped to secure, in a system of laws whose publicity raised them above all suspicion of patrician manipulation, an effective check on the power of the consuls. It would also appear that the decem- virate was legally open to plebeians as well as to patricians, and was intended to serve as an impartial board of arbitration between the orders. But all hope that the new magistracy might reconcile old dissensions, and weld the two orders at once into an united state, was frustrated by the action of the patricians, who contrived to monopolise all ten places at the first election. Satisfied with this victory, the dominant party made a sensible and moderate use of its power, so that the ten tables of laws issued by the board were at once approved by the people, and engraved on brazen tablets hung on the rostra in the Forum. But the task of publication could not be completed within a single year, so it was agreed to choose decemvirs for the next year to complete the code. At this election Appius Claudius, of the proud and noble house of the Claudii, leagued himself with the plebeian chiefs, the Icilii and Duilii, and courted the favour of the lower orders with all the arts of a demagogue. In vain the rest of the board conferred on this dangerous colleague the honour of presiding- at the Comitia. Appius, perfectly alive to their meaning and thoroughly careless of precedent, not merely accepted votes for himself, but procured his own re-election to office in conjunction with men of inferior weight and position, to the exclusion of the leading patricians. Three at least, it may be five, of the new decemvirs were plebeian. Once their election was secured, the decemvirs, neglecting the work for which they were appointed, abandoned themselves to the enjoyment of absolute power, careless alike of the lives and property of their fellow-citizens. On the pretext that their duties were not accomplished — for the last two tables had not even then been submitted to the approval of the people — they refused to abdicate at the end of their year of office, in violation of the spirit if not of the letter of the constitution. Their government became an open tyranny, whose oppression recalled the days of the Tar- quins, and was in like manner commemorated in popular legends. Whatever be the historical value of these tales, the wrongs of 6S HISTORY OF ROME Virginia, like those of Lucretia, were deeply engraved on the hearts of the people. The real history of the fall of the decem- virate is hidden in mists due to popular animosity or the partiality of chroniclers. It is impossible to do more than repeat the oft- told tale of Appius Claudius, and suggest a probable interpretation of the inconsistencies and contradictions in the narratives of Livy and Dionysius. Legend of Virginia. — When their year of office was over, the decemvirs refused to lay down their powers. The most part of them led forth the army against the ^Equians and the Sabines, but they were driven back, for their soldiers hated them and would not fight. So the)- laid a plot against one of the chief of the malcontents, L. Sicinius, sometime tribune of the plebs, and had him murdered by his own troops. And for a while the deed was kept secret from all men, until, in the general uprising of all true Romans against the tyranny of the ten, it was brought to light. For meanwhile Appius Claudius stayed in Rome to watch over the city. And when he saw a young maiden, Virginia, daughter of a centurion, Virginius, pass his judgment-seat in the Forum day by day as she went to school, he lusted after her in his heart, and suborned his client, M. Claudius, to swear that the maiden's real mother was a slave of his own, who had given the child to the childless wife of Virginius. And Appius would have handed her over forthwith to slavery, but L. Icilius, her betrothed, and P. Numitorius, her uncle, cried out that by law all were to be considered free till they were proved to be slaves. At length Appius promised to stay judgment for a day, so that Virginius might come from the camp and plead his cause. So Virginia's friends sent one messenger to her father, praying him to come with speed, and Appius another to his colleagues, bidding them not to let him go ; but his message did not come till Virginius had set out for Rome. So in the morning Virginius came to the Forum with his daughter and his friends, and prayed the people to stand by him. Then Appius would not hear him, but as soon as Claudius had spoken, adjudged the maiden to her master's custody until she should be proved free. And he overawed the people with a band of armed men. So Virginius asked leave to speak with the maiden and her nurse aside, that he might learn the truth of Claudius' story. And when leave was given him, he snatched up a knife from a butcher's stall, and plunged it in his daughter's heart, that so he might save her freedom and her honour. Then he called down on Appius the curse of blood, and so went forth from the Forum LEGEND OF VIRGINIA 69 to the camp, for none dared obey the tyrant's order to seize him. And Icilius and Numitorius made great mourning" for Virginia, so that the people rose and drove Appius and his satellites to flee for their lives, and broke their power in Rome. Then the armies, too, moved by the story of Virginia's wrongs, marched from their camps to the Aventine, and elected tribunes to lead them instead of the decemvirs. But the Senate did not force the decemvirs to resign their office, until the armies and the commons had gone once more to the sacred mount, and again threatened to build them a city there. The legend goes on to tell how two popular patricians, L. Valerius Potitus and M. Horatius Barbatus, who were empowered to negotiate with the seceding plebeians, by yielding to their demands for the restoration of the tribunate, and for the right of appeal from the decision of all magistrates, and by granting an amnesty to the promoters of the secession, won them back to their allegiance. The fate of the Decemvirs remains uncertain. Tradition declares that Appius Claudius and Sp. Oppius, his chief plebeian supporter, died in prison, either by their own hands or by the sentence of the tribunes ; their colleagues were punished by the confiscation of their goods and banishment from Rome. Criticism of the Tradition. — The whole account of the decem- virate is vitiated by the partisan prejudice which discolours the narratives of our historians. The view of the Claudii found in Livy, which represents them as the proudest and stiffest of the patrician houses, has been disproved by Mommsen. Even in Livy, Appius Claudius, the decemvir, poses as the friend of the people, and by this means wins his commanding influence over his colleagues, and his re-election in conjunction with three plebeians. Obviously the democratic leanings of Appius were too clear to be entirely suppressed even by a partial chronicler. The true position of Appius is that of the noble leader of the commons, the patrician turned demagogue. The later transforma- tion of the demagogue into a tyrant may possibly be the invention of patrician hatred ; but there is nothing inconsistent in the two characters, and as the story of Virginia has the ring of genuine tradition, it is safer to assume the truth of the picture. The haughty decemvir prostituting" justice for. the satisfaction of his desires, and the lying retainer ready to do any service for his patron, reproduce so faithfully the features of the Greek tyrannies, that we may most reasonably believe that in Appius Claudius we have yet another instance of a noble obtaining power by the Jo HISTORY OF ROME pretence of popular sympathies, and using it for personal ends, to the degradation of nobles and commons alike. The Laws of the Twelve Tables. — But if the decemvirs perished with ignominy, their work lived, and was regarded by after-ages as the source and foundation of all law. In reality it was little more than the formulation of old Roman custom ; for, though we need not reject the story of the embassy to Greece, and the co- operation of Hermodorus, the Ephesian, doubtless Greek influence is to be seen rather in the form than the matter of the decemviral legislation. The constitutional innovations contained in the laws of the twelve tables are of less interest than the statutes which regulate the relations between private individuals, and thus illus- trate the social condition of the people. The immense importance attached to the forms of litigation, and the inclusion of ceremonial rules, such as those which regulate the place and method of burial, reveal the primitive character of Roman civilisation. Everywhere we can trace the spirit of compromise, which softens, while it retains, the harsh principles of the older law. Thus the authority of the father (patria potcstas) is maintained, but a thrice-repeated sale of a son severs the bond of connection between him and the head of the family. Again, by the side of the old patrician methods of making wills and contracting marriages, the law now recognises new forms, suitable to plebeians as well as patricians. For the religious ceremony of marriage (confarreatio) it allowed the substitution of a pretended purchase (co-emptio), and, in place of the solemn announcement of the will before the assembled burgesses (calata comitid), the decemvirs authorised a fictitious sale (per trs ct librcmi). Thus, while the law preserved intact the rights of relations by male descent (agnati) to succeed to property where there was no will, it also facilitated the making of wills, just as it ordained that a civil ceremony (coemptio), and even uninterrupted cohabitation (usus), should confer the same rights on a husband as the old religious marriage. The rights of pro- perty are sternly maintained in the decemviral code. The in- solvent debtor is liable to the extremest penalties both in property and in person, the only- modification of the older law being the restriction of interest to 10 per cent, (unciarium ftenus), and the punishment of usury. As is common in early codes, theft is more severely dealt with than violence ; while, curiously enough, libel, false witness, and judicial corruption are among the offences visited with death. Most notable is the fact that, whereas in the eye of the law patrician and plebeian are equal, a difference is recognised THE TWELVE TABLES fi between the landed and the landless man. The prohibition of the inter-marriage of patricians and plebeians, long enforced by custom, now first acquired the sanction of law ; but against this unpopular statute must be set the permission given to voluntary associations {collegia) to make what rules they chose for their own gover- nance, provided they did not transgress the law of the land. This statute, taken, it is said, from Solon's legislation, protected plebeian associations from the arbitrary interference of the magistrates. The enactments on public matters define and confirm the existing law. The right of appeal, given already by the Lex Valeria, is reasserted and guaranteed. With this is closely connected the prohibition of all laws directed against a private individual {firivi- legiii), and the reservation of all capital cases for the decision of the assembly of the centuries. Taken together these laws pro- tected all citizens, on the one hand from the arbitrary sentences of patrician magistrates, and on the other from the irregular pro- ceedings of tribunes backed by plebeian assemblies, and secured them a trial before the whole body of their fellow-citizens. Lastly, capricious selection of precedents by the magistrate was prevented by the express enactment, that the latest decision of the people should in all cases be preferred to the earlier. The Valerio-Horatian Laws. — The constitutional reforms which the decemvirate failed to initiate were achieved by the second secession of the plebeians, and embodied in the Valerio-Horatian laws. Even these laws rather vindicate and re-establish the ancient liberties of the plebeians than introduce new principles. The first was in substance only a reassertion of the old right of appeal, but it further forbade expressly the creation of any magistrate whose decisions were not subject to such appeal, 1 and prescribed the penalty of death for the transgression of this pro- vision. The second guaranteed the inviolability of the tribunes and their subordinates, the aediles and ten judges, declaring that he who lifted his hand against them was accursed. The old oath of the plebeians was replaced by a positive law, which prescribed the penalty of death and confiscation against offenders. The third contains the important and novel principle that the resolu- tions of the people, assembled in their tribes, have the binding force of law. The subject is beset with difficulties, but the most probable explanation is, that at this time patricians were admitted to the assembly of tribes, which thus developed into an assembly 1 This was held to apply even to the dictatorship. 72 HISTORY OF ROME of the whole people (comitia iributa), over which patrician magis- trates presided, while the tribunes still held the concilia jihbis. In this new assembly were henceforth elected the cjurestors, who had charge of the treasury (cf. p. 48). To this assembly, in all pro- bability, the right of legislation was given. At the same time, the position of the tribunes was raised. Henceforth they arc entitled to attend the debates of the Senate, though not yet admitted within the doors of the house. Gradually they made good their claim to obstruct the action of the Senate's decrees by their "intercession." Thus the attempt of the patricians to get rid of the tribunate ended in the exaltation of that office, and the en- largement of its functions from the protection of individuals to a general power of interference in all affairs of state. The tribunate was too deeply rooted in the affections of the people to be lightly abolished, nor was the attempt repeated in the whole course of Roman history. CHAPTER R\ PROGRESS Or THE PLEBEIANS TRADITIONAL DATES A.U.C. Marriages between Patricians and Plebeians legalised, and Military Tribunate established 445 309 Appointment of Censors * .... 443 311 Sp. M-aslius killed by Ahala ... ... 439 315 Number of Qusstors raised to Four, and Quaestorship opened to Plebeians 421 333 First Plebeian Consular Tribune ...... 400 354 Position of the Plebeians. — The force of the popular movement was not exhausted even by the attainment of the chief demands of the lower classes, the publication of written laws, and the restora- tion and enlargement of the powers of the tribunes. On the con- trary, success inspired the leaders of the plebeians with new hopes, and nerved them to make fresh efforts. Yet there is a change in the character of the demands of the plebeians, and in the nature of the opposition they offer to the governing order. Hitherto the commons had fought to secure freedom — the personal liberties of the individual, and the power to organise themselves as a cor- poration unhindered by patrician interference ; now they aimed PROGRESS OF THE PLEBEIANS 73 at equality, the right to take their place in the government of the state by the side of the old nobles. Obviously the earlier reforms were in the interest of the poor, whom they protected against oppression, while the removal of political disabilities interested the wealthier and more influential plebeians. But for the moment both classes were united in opposition to the patrician govern- ment. Together they had secured the passing of the twelve tables and the Valerio-Horatian laws, and together they assailed the two chief bulwarks of patrician exclusiveness. Inter-marriage between the Orders. — In 445 B.C. the tribune C. Canuleius proposed to legalise marriages between patricians and plebeians. Whereas all children sprung from such unions had up to this time ranked as plebeians, because there could be no legitimate marriage between parents of different orders, after this the offspring of a patrician father and plebeian mother took the rank of the father. By this change the very corner-stone of the edifice of patrician exclusiveness was undermined. The sanctity of the religion of Rome had been the pretence for ex- cluding the plebeians from the government of the state. The patricians had asserted that they alone could take the auspices, and fulfil the duties of the state towards the gods, whose worship must not be profaned by the intrusion of men outside the conse- crated circle of the old families. But when men in whose veins was plebeian blood were admitted to the patrician order, the attempt to maintain a caste-system founded on purity of race was doomed. Thus the social revolution worked by the motion (filebi- scituni) of C. Canuleius necessarily entailed political equalisation. Military Tribunate. — The first step in that direction was taken in the very year in which C. Canuleius passed his resolution. The plebeian demand to share the consulship could no longer be met by contemptuous refusal ; it was evaded by a partial concession. Every year the Senate was to decide whether consuls should be elected, or military tribunes, as a rule six in number, with consular power. To this new office plebeians were eligible, though the con- sulship was still denied to them. We may wonder that patrician statesmen cared to maintain an irritating distinction, while they surrendered the substantial object in dispute. But an aristocracy is apt to be even more tenacious of the badges and honours which are the marks of power than of the power they signify. The con- sular tribune was never allowed the honour of a triumph, nor was his image placed in the family hall, like those of the curule magis- trates. No doubt the sacred name of religion was invoked by the 74 HISTORY OF ROME patricians in defence of their exclusive right to the possession of the supreme magistracy, but the sincerity of the appeal may well be doubted. Throughout the patricians act rather in the spirit of petty hucksters driving a keen bargain for their wares, than of statesmen defending a great principle. There is no grace in their concessions, no strength in their refusals ; their ideal of political wisdom is the craft which neutralises the popular measures it dare not resist. In the forty years before the siege of Veii, the Senate more often than not secured the election of consuls, and even the consular tribunate was in practice, up to the year 400 B.C., confined to patri- cians, so that the formal equality conceded to the plebeians was a fraudulent pretence. If ever the patricians felt the control of the assembly of the centuries slipping from their grasp, the right of the presiding officer to refuse votes for a candidate, and of the patrician part of the Senate to withhold its sanction, were un- scrupulously employed as party weapons in this ignoble struggle. In the last resort the colleges of priests could declare an election null and void for some real or pretended religious informality. Many opportunities for electioneering intrigues were afforded by dissensions among the plebeians themselves. The rank and file of yeomen-farmers still cared only for social and economic reforms, but the leaders aimed rather at the removal of political inequalities. A disunited party, unversed in political warfare, was naturally un- able to cope with the organised obstruction of the patricians. Censorship. — But the men who swayed the counsels of the patricians recognised from the first that obstruction could not for ever thwart the wishes of the people. So they set themselves to diminish the value of the prize for which the plebeians were striving, by severing from the consulship some of its most cherished privi- leges. Within a year or two (443 B.C.) of the time of the establish- ment of the consular tribunate, they devised a new office, the censor- ship, conferred, indeed, by the votes of the centuries, but confined to patricians. No doubt the financial importance and moral dignity of this office are of later growth, but even its original powers made it a worthy object of ambition. The right to fill up vacancies in the ranks of the Senate and the knights most probably was given to the censors a century later, but the solemn numbering and assessment {census) of the citizens at intervals of four or five years (lustrum), from the first invested the new magistracy with peculiar dignity. So fearful were the Romans that this high function might be perverted to personal ends, that from an early period (435 B.C.) the tenure of the censorship was limited to eighteen months, and THE CENSORSHIP 75 to 76 HISTORY OF ROME it was later (^90 B.C.) provided that if one censor died in office, the other should at once resign his powers. Even in this exceptional case the Romans clung firmly to their two cardinal principles, the short tenure and collegiate character of the magistracy. A second attempt to diminish the powers of the consuls was turned to the confusion of its authors. In 421 B.C. the patricians proposed to relieve the consuls of the direct management of the military chest, and confer it on two new quasstors of patrician rank. In this way the practical control of all finance was to be kept in the hands of patrician censors and quaestors (cf. p. 72). But the commons insisted that plebeians should be eligible for the qusestor- ship, and, twelve years after (409 B.C.), the assembly of the tribes actually filled three out of the four qiuestorships with plebeians. Encouraged by this success, the plebeians, ten years later (400 and 399 B.C.), at last carried their candidates in the assembly of the centuries, and elected a plebeian majority on the board of consular tribunes. Spurius Maelius. — The patricians did not fail to employ the last resource of an incompetent government, intimidation. In the year 439 B.C. a terrible famine spread misery among the Roman poor, which all the edicts of L. Minucius, who was commissioned to meet the scarcity, could not relieve. Whereupon a rich plebeian knight, Sp. Maslius, bought corn in Etruria, and distributed it to the starving commons at nominal prices. The consulship, we are told, was the reward he asked in return for his magnificent gene- rosity. Minucius, envious of the man whose success had made his own failure conspicuous, persuaded the Senate that he was conspiring- to overthrow the Republic and make himself a king. The Senate proclaimed him a traitor, and a young patrician, C. Servilius Ahala, undertook to carry out its sentence. Under some pretence, he drew Maelius aside in the Forum and stabbed him with a dagger, which he had hidden under his arm for the purpose. He then justified his deed to the indignant commons, by declaring to them the treason of Moelius to the Republic. The house of the traitor, and with it the evidence of his guilt, or of his innocence, was destroyed, and the corn he had collected distributed by his enemy, Minucius. Yet it cannot be doubted that the real offence of Maslius was his popularity with the commons, which would have secured his election to the consular tribunate, not a treason- able conspiracy to win himself a kingdom. His assassination was not the act of a patriot, but of a partisan blinded by prejudice. Another instance of the bitterness of faction may fitly conclude SPUR! US MMLIUS Ti this discreditable chapter in Roman history. After the conquest of Labici from the ^Equians a settlement was made there, two acres of land being given to each settler ; but when Bote, in the same district, was taken, the patricians stoutly resisted the tribunes' proposal to distribute its land in allotments. At their head was the stern and unbending- consular tribune, M. Postumius Regillensis. He withheld the booty won at Bote from his troops, and threatened to punish any political manifestations with merci- less severity. At this his soldiers rose in open revolt, and stoned to death the general to whom they were bound by the solemn oath of military obedience {sacramcntum), an unparalleled crime as yet in Roman annals. Note. — We have given the earlier version of the fate of Mselius, pre- served fur us by Dionysius. The introduction of Cincinnati as dictator, and the elevation of Ahala into a master of the horse are later fictions, intended to soften our horror of the murder. But the story is evidently intended to glorify tyrannicide, and in its earlier form did so without com- promise or evasion. Again, the etymological point of the tale (the deriva- tion of the name Ahala, from ala, the arm-pit, in which the dagger was concealed) is lost if Servilius is not a secret assassin, but a lawful magis- trate. Yet the absence of the names of ordinary magistrates from the original tradition warns us that it is a family history inserted in the annals at a later date. Indeed in early times even a romance would not dare to make a mere plebeian aspire to the throne. The importance of the legend lies, not in its truth to fact, but in its effect in after-ages. Again and again it is cited to prove that the murder of a traitor is not only the right but the duty of every loyal citizen. (Mommsen, A'. /•'., ii. 199 ff.) CHAPTER X WARS FROM THE DECEMVIRATE TO THE FALL OF VEII TRADITIONAL DATES B.C. 42E A.U.C. 3Z6 406 348 39 6 358 Capture of Fidenas War with Veii Conquest of Veii by M. Furius Camillus Wars with the JEqui and Volsci. — During the sixty years between the fall of the monarchy and the decemvirate Rome had been closely beset on all sides ; in the sixty years after the decemvirate the tide of war turns slowly, but surely, in her favour. 78 HISTORY OF ROME The great reforms carried between 450 and 445 B.C. inspire her citizens with new life and ardour, and at the same time the energies of her enemies are distracted and divided. The yEquians feel the pressure of the Sabellian clans, now established round the Fucine lake ; the Volscians are attacked in rear by a new power, the Samnites. Consequently the ^Equians, who had wasted the country even up to the gates of Rome in 446 B.C., are driven from Labiciin 41S B.C., and Bote in 414 B.C., the first of which at least is secured and garrisoned. Both towns helped to protect the line of communications between Rome and the Hernican country in the ETRUSCAN HELMET DEDICATED BY HIERO I. AFTER HIS VICTORY IX 474 B.C. valley of the Trerus ; nor could the /Equians, after their loss, maintain their hold on their ancient outpost, Mount Algidus. About the same time, the Volscians were obliged to resign their conquests in Latium, such as Satricum and Velitras ; while, if we may believe Livy, the Roman armies pushed on as far south as Circeii and Anxur (Tarracina). Misfortunes of the Etruscans. — On her northern frontier also Rome profited by the misfortunes of her adversaries. The power of the Etruscans had long since passed its zenith ; it now began to decline more rapidly. As early as 474 B.C. Hiero I. of Syracuse DECLINE OF THE ETRUSCANS 79 had annihilated their navy, and made his own city mistress of the Tyrrhene Sea. This supremacy the Syracusans maintained, even after the fall of the great tyrants, by expeditions to Corsica and the coast of Tuscany (453 B.C.). These reverses may help to account for the inaction of the Etruscans for forty years ; a fresh series of disasters opened the way for Roman conquest. The cities of the Rasenna in Campania, whose communications with the mother country, whether by land or sea, were now cut off, surrendered one after another to the assaults of roving bands of Samnites. The fall of Capua, their chief town (424 B.C.), marks the destruction of Etruscan rule in that district. To complete the tale of their dis- asters, Dionysius of Syracuse planted colonies in their dominions round the head of the Adriatic, and ruined the trade of Etruria by the storming of Pyrgi, the rich seaport of Crere (3S7-5 B.C.). But the heaviest blows which fell on the doomed people were dealt by the Gauls, who were pouring over the Alps into the plain of the Po. The most northern of the three leagues of the Rasenna was utterly swept away by the new immigrants ; its great cities became, like Melpum, dim traditions, or, like Felsina (Bononia), were renamed by the Gallic victors, after whom the whole district is henceforth called. Conquest of Fidenae. — Greeks, Samnites, and Gauls each in turn did their part in smoothing the path of Rome. But it was the day of small things. Her petty successes in border warfare gave little promise of future greatness. The small town of Fideme ventured to revolt for the last time, and transferred its allegiance to Lars Tolumnius, king of Veii. It sealed its fidelity to its new master by murdering the Roman settlers and the envoys sent to demand satisfaction. But Lars Tolumnius was routed in battle, and fell himself in single combat with A. Cornelius Cossus, the leader of the Roman cavalry, who dedicated the arms of the Veientine king to Jupiter (sfiolza opinio). Fidenas submitted, and, content with this success, the Romans concluded an armistice with Veii for 200 months. Note. — The spoils dedicated by Cossus to Jupiter Feretrius enable us to correct the narrative of the annalists by archaeological evidence. Augustus, when he restored the temple, found that Cossus was called consul in an inscription on the arms. Now Cossus was consul in 428 B.C. But the chroniclers used by Livy knew of no war in that year, assigning the revolt of Fidenae and the death of Lars Tolumnius to 437 B.C., when Cossus was not a magistrate at all, and a second similar revolt to 426 B.C., when he was consular tribune. Clearly the two wars are mere variations So HISTORY OF ROME of one story. Neither is rightly dated, for the evidence of the inscription in favour of the year 42S B.C. is confirmed by the common opinion that only a general could win the spolia opima. Varro's assertion that a common soldier could do so, if he slew the leader of the enemy, is an attempt to reconcile the accepted tradition about Cossus with the chrono- ■ log)- of Lire annalists. War with Veii. — At length Rome undertook the work of con- quering" Southern Etruria. She was matched with no unworthy foe, for Veii equalled her in size and excelled her in the grandeur and solidity of her buildings. But whereas Rome could rely on the firm support of her true allies, the Latins and Hernicans, Veii could count only on her neighbours, Capena, Falerii, and Tarquinii. The northern Etruscans were fully occupied at home in vain efforts to repel the raids of the Gauls, and their oligarchic govern- ments viewed with dislike the monarchy of Veii. The end of such a conflict could hardly be doubtful, but the siege of the Roman Troy was protracted for ten long" years. For tire first time the Roman army was obliged to keep the field in winter as well as summer. And now that the citizen was pre- vented from returning to his farm after a short summer campaign, the introduction of military pay became a necessity. But despite these measures, the fortune of war was for nine years unfavourable to Rome. The fortified camps before Veii were stormed by the men of Capena and Falerii, and only recovered by a great effort. In the tenth year of the siege the plebeian consular tribunes, Genucius and Titinius, were routed in the field by the same enemies. Panic reigned in the lines before Veii, and even at Rome itself, where the Senate resolved to meet the danger by appointing a dictator. The crisis called forth the needed hero, M. Furius Camillus, with whose advent the dry annals of the chroniclers are transformed into a romantic legend of daring achievements crowned with supernatural success. Legend of Camillus. — In the summer of the eighth year of the siege of Veii the waters of the Alban lake rose mysteriously, until at length they reached the top of the hills around the lake, and poured down into the plain below and thence into the sea. And the Romans, since they might not trust Etruscan soothsayers while they were at war with their nation, sent messengers to Delphi to ask counsel of Apollo. But the meaning of the portent was re- vealed to them before their messengers returned. For an old Veientine cried out to some Roman soldiers, that Veii should not LEGEND OF CAMILLUS Si fall, until the waters of the Alban lake should flow into the sea no more. And one of the soldiers persuaded the old man to go apart with him to a lonely spot, pretending that he wished to consult him about a matter of his own. And, while they talked together, the Roman seized the old man round the bod)- and bore him oft" to the camp. So the soothsayer of Yeii was sent by the generals to the Senate, and prophesied to them that if the waters ot the Alban lake should run into the sea woe should fall on Rome, but if they were drawn off the woe should be turned on Veii. But the Senate would not hearken to his words until they were confirmed by the answer of the oracle at Delphi. Then the Romans bored a tunnel through the side of the hills to make a passage for the water, and dug many channels in the plain below to receive it ; and the tunnel is there to this day. And when the whole flood was spent in watering the fields, so that none flowed into the sea any more, the Romans felt assured that they should take Yeii, as the god foretold. Nor could they be turned from their purpose by the prayers of an embassy from Yeii, nor by their prophecy that the destruction of Veii should be soon followed by the fall of Rome. Capture of Veii. — So Camillus compassed the city round on every side, aided by the Latins and Hernicans. And he cut a tunnel underground from his camp even to the temple of Juno in the citadel of Veii. Then the whole people came forth from Rome to share in the spoil. And while the men of Yeii were guarding" their walls against the main army of the Romans, Camillus led a few men by the secret passage into the very heart of the city. And even as the high priest of Yeii prophesied to the king that he, who should offer on the altar of Juno the victim standing by, should be victorious in the war, Camillus burst forth, and snatching the sacrifice from their hands, offered it himself. Then the Romans opened the gates of the city to their comrades, and together they sacked the town. And as Camillus looked down on the havoc from the citadel, his heart swelled with pride at the greatness of his victory. But soon he bethought him of the fickleness of fortune, and prayed that, if some ill must befall him, to balance this great glory, it might be but small. And, as he prayed with veiled head and turned himself to the right, he tripped and fell to the ground. Then was he comforted in his heart, because he supposed the jealousy of the gods had been ap- peased by this small mishap. And he ordered a chosen band of youths, washed in pure water and clothed in white, to go into the temple of Juno, and ask the goddess whether she would be pleased F S 2 HISTORY OF ROME to come with them to Rome. And the image answered and said, "I will go." Thus Juno forsook Veil, and dwelt ever after in the temple built for her on the Aventine in Rome. Never had Rome seen so splendid a triumph as when Camillus rode up the sacred street to the Capitol in a chariot drawn by white horses. And men feared that his pride might be brought low by the hand of Heaven. Nevertheless Rome still prevailed over her enemies, and forced the men of Capena to beg for peace, and them of Falerii to shut themselves up in their city. But a certain schoolmaster, who had the charge of the sons of the chief men of the town, led the boys to the Roman camp. Scorning his treachery, Camillus ordered the boys to flog their master back into the town ; for Romans, he said fi°ht not with children. And the Faliscans were touched by his noble deed, and submitted themselves to the power of Rome. Lastly, the great city of Volsinii, which took up arms after the fall of Veii, consented soon after to an inglorious peace. Thus Rome became mistress of Etruria as far north as the Ciminian Hills, whose gates were guarded by her allies, Sutrium and Nepete. Fall of Camillus. — The story goes on to tell of domestic dis- cords at Rome. Even during the death-struggle with Veii, the plebeians, headed by their tribunes, had complained bitterly of the burden of the land-tax (tribntuni), which furnished the soldiers with pay, and of the patrician monopoly of the consular tribunate. After its fall they proposed that the empty town of Veii should be repeopled by the migration thither of half the citizens of Rome. This division of the one commonwealth into two cities, which must have distracted and diminished its energy, was strenuously resisted by the patricians. First they persuaded two tribunes to forbid its consideration ; later, they pleaded in person against so fatal a measure to such purpose that it was rejected by the tribes, though only by a bare majority. Content with this victory, the Senate agreed to the division of the Veientine land among the commons, in allotments of the unusual size of seven jugera. But the popularity of the great patrician leader had passed away. In the hour of victory he had vowed a tenth of the spoil of Veii to Apollo, but the soldiers had not set apart any portion of their plunder for the god. Camillus now called on them to pay the promised tithe, and thus lost the favour of the people and prepared the way for his own fall. When he was accused by the tribune Appuleius of embezzlement, because he had taken for himself some doors of bronze, which were a part of the booty won at Veii, even his own tribesmen and clients said they could not acquit him, ROME AND VETI S3 S4 HISTORY OF ROME though they would pay his fine. Then Camillus withdrew in wrath to Ardea, praying that, if he were unjustly condemned, Heaven might cause his ungrateful country to rue his loss. The ministers of vengeance were at hand : the Gauls, who had taken Melpum on the day of the fall of Veii, were next year to burn Rome. Note. — The legend of Camillus is obviously mythical in its details. We can trace both Greek and pure Roman elements in the story. The ten years' siege, with the stratagem by which the town was captured, seem reminiscences of Troy, while the mission and offering to Apollo of Delphi may well be Greek inventions. Purely Italian, on the other hand, are the stories of the Etruscan soothsayer, of the offering in the temple of Juno, and of the removal of her image from Veii to Rome. The outlet of the Alban lake, a tunnel 2000 yards in length, 7 feet in height and 5 in breadth, cut through the solid rock, may still be seen, but it would seem to belong to the days when Etruscan kings ruled in Rome and Latium. It is hardly possible that the Romans should have undertaken so great a work, in the middle of a war, though they might have repaired and reopened the tunnel if it had become blocked. CHAPTER XI THE GAULS B.C. A.U.C. Rome taken and burnt by the Gauls 390 364 War with the Etruscans 356-1 398-403 Last Incursion of the Gauls into Latium .... 349 405 Migrations of the Gauls. — A new nation now makes its appear- ance in Roman history, destined in the end to adopt the language and culture of the Italians, but at first sharply contrasted with them in customs and character. The Gauls or Celts had long since reached the lands in which they still dwell on the shores of the Atlantic ; but their wandering tribes had not as yet been formed into stable communities, nor had they settled down to till the land they had won. They still preferred a nomad pastoral life, and recognised only the military authority of the chieftain. Rest- less vanity and impetuous bravery fitted them for the life of roving soldiers of fortune ; want of discipline and order prevented them from reaping the fruits of the victories won by their chivalrous courage. They remind us of the knights-errant of the Middle Ages in their fondness for single combats and deep carousals, of Italian condottieri in their insatiable greed for gold. Thus they THE GAULS S5 fought, conquered, and destroyed in every land in Europe, but never created a national civilisation, or founded an enduring state. Tradition affirms, with much probability, that the swarm of bar- barians who poured over the Alps into Italy came from the western home of the Celts in Gaul. We are told that, in the days of King Ambiatus, those Gallic tribes, which, then as later, acknowledged the leadership of the Bituriges, sent forth two great conquering hordes, headed by Sigovesus and Bellovesus, nephews of the king. The former sought a home in the wilds of the Hercynian forest ; the latter, more favoured by Heaven, took from the Etiuscans their ancient heritage in the valley of the Po, and made Mediolanum (Milan) the capital of the canton of the Insubres. The Cenomani passed beyond the Adda, and settled round Brixia and Cremona. The Boii and Lingones followed the beaten Etruscans over the Po. Last of all came the Senones, who spread themselves along the coast of the Adriatic from Ariminum to Ancona. But the Senones soon marched forward in quest of plunder and adventures. Crossing the wall of the Apennines, they attacked the great town of Clusium ; whereupon the Etruscans, if we may believe a late tradition, sent to ask the aid of the conquerors of Veii. Accordingly the Senate despatched envoys to warn the Gauls not to molest friends and allies of Rome. The Celts scorned the threats of the strangers, and joined battle with the men of Clusium. In this skirmish the Roman ambassadors took part, one of them slaying a Gallic chieftain in single combat. The bar- barians demanded the surrender of the men who had thus out- raged the law of nations, but the Roman people rejected this reasonable request. Then the Gallic leader broke up the siege of Clusium and marched direct on Rome. Battle of the Allia. 1 — The Gauls had advanced within twelve miles of the gates of the city before a Roman army was ready to bar their path. By the rivulet of the Allia was fought a battle, in which panic fear succeeded to foolish arrogance in the Roman ranks. The fierce rush of the Celts was strange and terrible to the Italians. We hear nothing as yet of the knightly cavalry Cssar found in Gaul, or of the war-chariots used by the Britons. But the barbarians were big men, armed with long, though ill- tempered, swords, and covered with huge shields, who by mere weight and strength broke through the Italian phalanx. Savage 1 Mommsen places the battle on the Etruscan bank of the Tiber, opposite the inflow of the Allia. This is perhaps the meaning of Diodorus, and explains the retreat to Veii, but it makes the flight of the Vestals to Caere absurd, and directly contradicts Livy's narrative. S6 HISTORY OF ROME cries and shaggy locks, which no helmet guarded, added fancied terrors to the furious onset of the clans, whose chieftain, Brennus, shattered the Roman right at the first shock, and so rolled up their whole line of battle in a hideous rout. The bulk of the fugitives plunged into the Tiber, hoping" to escape the swords and javelins of the Gauls, and make good their retreat to Veii. A scanty remnant fled by the direct road to Rome, and brought thither tidings of a calamity never forgotten by the Roman people. Even after centuries of victory, the Roman legionary needs a Caasar or a Marius to inspire and discipline him to meet the fierce barbarian, who had routed his forefathers at the Allia. Sack of Rome. — At Rome all was confusion and dismay. Long trains of fugitives passed over the Tiber and the hill of Janiculum, leaving the doomed city to its fate. With them fled the flamen of Quirinus and the Vestal virgins, who buried some of their sacred things, and carried off with them the eternal fire to the friendly town of Caere. The flower of the patricians resolved to defend to the last the hill of the Capitol, the acropolis of Rome, the true home of its citizens and its gods. Thus when the Gauls at length appeared, on the third day after the battle, they found the walls unguarded and the gates open. Fearing an ambush, they hesitated for a whole day to enter the city, and so gave the Romans time to garrison and provision the Capitol. But not all the citizens of Rome had fled or taken refuge in the citadel. The men who had, in years long past, swayed the counsels and led the armies of the state, and were now too old to fight in its defence, proudly refused to escape death by exile. They met together and devoted themselves to the gods below, for the deliverance of their country. Then they arrayed themselves in robes of state, and sat down, each on his ivory chair, in the gateway of his house. When the Gauls found them, sitting unmoved amidst the destruction of the city, they looked on them as more than mortal. At length one of them ventured to draw near and stroke the beard of M. Papirius, but the old man resented the profane touch of the bar- barian, and smote him on the head with his ivory staff. The Gaul, in fury, cut down Papirius with his sword, and thus aroused in his comrades the savage thirst for blood. The old Romans were sacrificed to the powers of death by the swords of the enemy. After sacking the city and giving its buildings to the flames, the Gauls made an open assault on the Capitol, but were repulsed with loss. They then contented themselves with a blockade, while roving bands plundered the country round. THE SACK OF ROME S7 Defence of the Capitol. — Meanwhile, the fugitives at Veii look heart to resist some marauding Etruscans, and sent to Ardea to ask Camillus, who had already cut to pieces a party of plunderers, to lead them against the Gauls. But the exiled general must first receive authority from the remnant of the Roman people gathered on the Capitol. A young man named Pontius Cominius under- took the dangerous errand. He swam the Tiber, and climbed up the cliff by a precipitous, and therefore unguarded, path. Re- turning, as he came, unhurt, he bore the news to Veii that the Senate recalled Camillus, and appointed him dictator. But next morning the Gauls observed the tracks of his ascent, and resolved at once to follow the same path. Silently they climbed up the cliff in the darkness. The sentinels were asleep, and even the watch-dogs heard them not. But in the Capitoline temple the sacred geese of Juno, which Roman piety, even in the day of need, had spared, cackled with fear. Roused by the sound, M. Manlius seized sword and shield, and rushed to the top of the cliff, just in time to dash the foremost Gaul down the rock. The Gaul, as he fell, bore down those behind him ; the other Romans, coming up, slaughtered them easily. Thus the cackling of the geese and the courage of Manlius saved the Capitol. Nevertheless, despite the unhealthiness of a Roman autumn, the Gauls maintained the blockade of the Capitol, and reduced the garrison to the last extremity of hunger. At length they agreed to ransom themselves by the payment of a thousand pounds of gold, a sum collected with difficulty from the treasures of the Capitol. The gold was weighed in the Forum, but Brennus used unfair weights, and answered the complaints of Quintus Sulpicius by throwing his broadsword into the scale, with the insulting words, " Vae victis." Suddenly Camillus appeared with his troops and declared any agreement made without his sanction null and void. He then drove the Gauls out of the city, and defeated them so utterly that not a man survived to carry home the news of the disaster. Criticism of the Legend. — Such is the legend, by which patriots, like Livy, concealed the humiliation of Rome. But of its falsehood there can be no doubt. We can almost trace the steps by which the legend was fabricated. In Polybius we hear that the Gauls retired unmolested with their booty, having come to terms with the Romans because they heard that their own land was being harried by the Veneti. Suetonius alleges that the ransom of a thousand pounds was indeed paid, but brought back from Cisal- SS HISTORY OF ROME pine Gaul by the praetor M. Livius Drusus a century later, as if barbarians were likely to hoard treasure. Finally, Diodorus de- clares that Camillus was made dictator after the Gauls had left Rome, but defeated them on their return from a raid into Apulia in the following year, and then recovered the ransom. From this to the patriotic fiction of Livy is but a single step. But the manifest exaggerations and contradictions of the legend must not lead us to doubt its substance. It is certain at least that a wan- dering horde of Gauls suddenly invaded the territory of Rome, routed the army, and sacked and burnt the town. It is almost certain that the barbarians besieged the Capitol in vain, and by selling their victory, lost it. Doubtless straggling bands of plunderers were cut to pieces, as they retreated, by the Romans and Latins, which small successes orators and chroniclers magni- fied into the heroic exploits of Camillus. Re-establishment of Roman Power. — But the overthrow of Rome by the Gauls had no permanent effect on her fortunes. The in- vaders departed as suddenly as they had come, and Rome took up again the interrupted work of establishing her supremacy on both sides the Tiber. Once more we hear of a proposition to desert the now ruined city, and seek a new home in Veii. It is defeated, less by the impassioned eloquence of Camillus than by the chance saying of a centurion : " Standard-bearer, plant the standard here ; here we had best remain," which was accepted as an omen first by the Senate and afterwards by the people. The city rose from its ruins, but the narrow and crooked streets of later Rome bear witness to the haste and irregularity of the work of rebuilding. Yet, though the Romans refused to migrate to Veii, they took care to secure their hold on the conquered territory. Sutrium and Nepete are said to have been recovered from the Etruscans once at least by the hero Camillus ; they are finally garrisoned by "Latin" colonists. Four new tribes are formed in the territories of Veii, Capena, and Falerii, and in this way Etruria south of the Ciminian forest was united to Rome by common interests and sympathies. The settlement of Latium, more fully described elsewhere, occupied the Romans during the next thirty years ; when that task was accomplished they turned again to Etruria (356 B.C.). The great city of Tarquinii, aided by volunteers from Caere and Falerii, tried to stem the tide of Roman success. Inspired by religious fury, the Etruscans defeated the legions in a great battle, and sacrificed three hundred and seven prisoners on the altars of their gods. A bloody revenge followed the victory of RESTORATION OF ROME 89 Rome ; three hundred and fifty-eight of the nobles of Tarquinii were scourged and beheaded (351 B.C.). In the end Tarquinii concluded PALISCAN VASE IN THE BRITISH MUSEUM. a truce for forty years, while Csre and Falerii became dependents of Rome. Falerii was compelled to enter into perpetual alliance with the suzerain state ; Caere surrendered her political indepen- go HISTORY OF ROME dencc, and even local self-government. The inhabitants received the private, but not the public, rights of Romans {civitas sine suffragio) ; they shared the burdens but not the honours of citizen- ship. A Roman prefect controlled the administration. Raids of the Gauls. — Marauding- bands of Gauls continued to disturb the peace, though they did not again threaten the exist- ence of Rome. In the simple and credible account of Polybius two such raids are recorded ; on the first occasion (360 B.C.) the Romans were taken by surprise, and did not venture to meet the enemy in the field ; on the second (349 B.C.) they showed a firm front, entirely discomfiting the Gauls, who retreated rapidly and in dis- order. From the highly coloured narrative of Livy, who tells of six invasions and six Roman triumphs, two stories of single combat may be given, interesting as among the last pure legends in Roman history. In 360 B.C. the Romans were encamped over against the Gauls on the Anio, not five miles from Rome. A gigantic Gaul, in splendid armour, challenged any man in the Roman ranks to single combat, and was encountered by young T. Manlius. The Roman champion closed at once ; avoiding the wild sweep of the Gallic broadsword, he thrust his own blade deep into his enemy's body, and so ended the combat. He then took the golden collar {torques) from the Gallic chieftain's neck and put it on his own, thus earning for himself and his family the name of Torquatus. In 349 B.C. the Romans were commanded by the son of their old hero, Camillus. Again a young Roman is per- mitted by the general to accept the challenge of a Gallic warrior. But on this occasion the duel is decided by the direct intervention of Heaven. As the champions closed in conflict, a raven alighted on the Roman's helmet, and during the fight lore the face and eyes of the Gaul with beak and claw. Thus M. Valerius gained an easy victory over the bewildered barbarian, and ever after was known by the name of" Corvus." These legends fitly close the story of the Gallic invasion. Though they may be nothing more than attempts to account for the family names of great houses, yet the pictures they give us of the Gauls are true and interesting. The barbarians fail because they are inferior in arms and discipline to the Italians. Never again were Gauls to bring the Roman state to the brink of destruc- tion ; rather they had served to smooth the path for its triumphal progress, by breaking the strength of the Etruscan nation. Rome was free from all anxieties on her northern frontier when she had to face a new and stubborn foe in the mountains of the south. LICINIAN LAWS 91 CHAPTER XII THE LICINIAN LAW'S AND THE EQUALISATION OF THE ORDERS Execution of Manlius The Bills of Licinius and Sextius Popular Laws of Publilius Philo Censorship of Appius Claudius . Lex Ogulnia Lex Hortensia 384 37° 377-367 377 387 339 4i5 312 442 300 454 287 467 M. Manlius. — The exhausting struggle with Yeii and the sack of Rome by the Gauls for a time distracted the attention of the plebeians from constitutional reform. But the distress caused by these wars among the poorer farmers was widespread and severe. The introduction of pay for service in the legions was but a small compensation for the neglect and devastation of their lands. The impoverished yeomen found a champion in M. Manlius, the saviour of the Capitol. But the government raised again the old cry of treason, and procured his condemnation and execution. Note. — Mommsen discredits the received .story of Manlius, and be- lieves that the oldest chronicles contained only the record of his treason and his condemnation. The tale of the saving of the Capitol was invented to explain his name (Capitolinus), which, however, can be proved to have existed before that time in the Manlian gens, and was doubtless derived from the fact that their house stood on ihe Capitol. The attempt to cancel debts is a fiction of the days when Cinna made their abolition part of the democratic programme. (Cf. p. 5S for his treatment of the story of Sp. Cassius.) Proposals of Licinius and Sextius. — The failure of Manlius proved the powerlessness of the poor in face of an united aristoc- racy, but, by enlisting on their side those richer plebeians who resented their exclusion from political power, they might yet hope to obtain relief from the burden of debt and gain a share in the public lands. A coalition was formed under the able leadership of the tribunes, C. Licinius Stolo and L. Sextius. Their pro- posals dealt with the grievances of both sections of the plebeians. Debtors were relieved by the deduction of the interest they had already paid from the principal, and allowed three years for the payment of the residue. The monopoly of the conquered ter- 92 HISTORY OF ROME ritories by the rich was met by providing that no citizen should hold more than 500 jugera of the public land, nor keep more than 100 head of cattle and 500 sheep on the common pasture. A clause ordering that a certain proportion of the labourers employed on an estate should be freemen belongs, in all proba- bility, to a later age, when slave-labour was cheaper and more plentiful, but is usually ascribed, on Appian's authority, to Licinius. To these social reforms the plebeian leaders tacked a political proposal of the greatest importance, viz., that consuls, and not consular tribunes, be henceforth elected, and that one at least of the consuls be a plebeian. A subsequent Bill provided that the number of the priestly custodians of the Sibylline books be increased from two to ten, and that half the college be plebeian. Opposition of the Patricians. — The measures of Licinius met with the most pertinacious opposition from the patricians. For ten years they obstructed their ratification by procuring the inter- vention of friendly tribunes, and by the nomination of dictators to overawe the agitation. But the two sections of the plebeians held firmly together. The poor farmers cared little for the poli- tical privileges offered to them ; the rich plebeians were not in earnest about social reforms, for their author, Licinius, was him- self condemned for transgressing the agrarian provisions of his law ; but both perceived that union was an absolute necessity. At length their pertinacity triumphed over the obstruction of the patricians, and secured the passage of the measure and the election of the late tribune, L. Scxtius Lateranus, as consul. The patricians managed to mar the grace of this great concession by clipping and paring away some of the powers of the consulate. The ad- ministration of justice was reserved for a patrician official, known as a praetor, who was considered a colleague of the consuls, though inferior to them. At the same time the charge of the market, the organisation of festivals, and various police duties were assigned to two curule a-diles of patrician birth. Admission of the Plebeians to Magistracies. — All the heart was taken out of the patrician opposition by the surrender of the consulship. The wiser aristocrats saw that the cause of political privilege was lost, and loyally accepted the new order of things. Camillus, their great champion, appears for the last time on the stage of history, to found a temple of Concord, as a pledge and sign that the divisions of the orders were now at an end. The more stiff-necked aristocrats found themselves gradually deprived LICINIAN LA WS 93 94 HISTORY OF ROME of their remaining' privileges. The curule axlileship was immedi- ately thrown open by an agreement that this office should be held by plebeians and patricians in alternate years. The dictatorship was first held by a plebeian, C. Marcius Rutilus, in 356 B.C., and the censorship in 351 B.C. Though the patricians succeeded, in open defiance of the Licinian laws, in monopolising the consulate on several occasions, this abuse was finally put down in 342 B.C. by a resolution of the people which declared that both consulships might be held by plebeians. At the same time, (or perhaps in 330 B.C.), the tenure of two ordinary curule offices at once, or of the same office twice within ten years, was forbidden. These restric- tions, by increasing the number of individuals who had held magis- tracies, tended to strengthen the plebeian nobility. Finally, in 339 B.C., a plebeian dictator, Publilius Philo, carried a law which ordained that one censor must be plebeian, and in 337 B.C. the same statesman was elected praetor, and thus broke down the last barrier which excluded the plebeians from offices of state. The Popular Assemblies. — Publilius Philo also secured freedom of action for the popular assemblies. Hitherto the resolutions of the people in the comitia of the centuries had required the subse- quent sanction of the patrician senators (patres). But Publilius Philo made their assent a mere formality, by a law which enacted that it should be given beforehand. By a later, Masnian, law this rule was extended to elections held in that assembly. He also won ampler legislative powers for the comitia tributa, in which assembly all measures brought forward by a praetor are henceforth put to the vote. The emancipation of the comitia centuriata from the supervision of the patres, and the fuller recognition of the competence of the assembly of the tribes, are a fitting crown to the career of this great plebeian statesman. Appius Claudius. — The next step forward was accomplished by an imperious but enlightened aristocrat. Appius Claudius Caucus, censor in 312 B.C., showed, like his ancestor, the Decemvir, a haughty disdain for the narrow traditions of the Roman nobility. In conjunction with his colleague, C. Plautius, he conferred the full franchise on freedmen, and on all residents possessed of the private rights of citizenship (civitas sine suffragio). He thus enfranchised large numbers of tradesmen and artisans, and made the town • population supreme in the assembly. At the same time he admitted men of the same class into the Senate. Eight years later (304 B.C.) his influence procured the election of Cn. Flavius, the son of a freedman, and a clerk in the public service, to the curule icdile- APP1US CLAUDIUS C.-ECUS 95 ship. Together the proud noble and the clerk published a legal calendar and a list of the formulas of the law, which opened to all the sealed book of legal knowledge. But the reformer was before his time. By a judicious compromise the succeeding censor, Q. Fabius Rullianus, confined the newly enfranchised classes to the four city tribes, and left the twenty-seven country tribes to the landed proprietors and yeomen. Nor were the sons of freedmen again admitted to offices of state and seats in the Senate. The Appian Road and Aqueduct. — The censorship of Appius was memorable in another way. During his term of office he carried out two great public works which were models for all time. He built a great aqueduct to carry pure water from the Sabine mountains to the most crowded part of Rome — a work of peculiar necessity owing to the insanitary state of the town and the deficiency of water, — and he constructed the first of those magni- ficent straight level roads which still mark the lands where Rome has ruled. The Appian Road crossed the Campagna to the Alban hills, and then, passing through the Pomptine marshes to Tarracina, threaded its way by Lautute, where the Volscian hills come down to the shore. Thence it led on, across the Liris and Volturnus, to Capua, 120 miles from Rome. It was continued later to Tarentum and Brundisium. To give himself time to complete these great undertakings, Appius retained his office for the full term of five years, instead of laying it down, as custom prescribed, after eighteen months. But there is no ground for supposing that he meditated a revolution or aimed at tyranny. Such fables are the inventions of chroniclers, unable or unwilling to comprehend the genius of a statesman, whose schemes resemble those of Greek reformers in their daring disregard of custom and convention. Final Equality of the Orders. — In 300 B.C. the last strongholds of patrician exclusiveness, the sacred colleges of augurs and pontiffs, were thrown open to plebeians, and the equality of plebeians to patricians before the gods as well as before men proclaimed. 1 The reservation of the offices of the flamens, the rex sacrificulus (cf. p. 47), and the inter-rex (cf, p. 42) for patricians is a mere survival of no historical importance. The last step in the long process of emancipating the popular assemblies from patrician control was taken in 287 E.C. An agrarian proposal of Manius Curius had occasioned serious dissensions, and even a formal 1 The significance of this reform will be pointed out later. 96 HISTORY OF ROME secession to Janiculum. But the breach was healed, and the liberties of the people assured, by a Hortensian law, which declared the resolutions of the meeting of the plebeians {concilium filebis) of binding- force without ratification by any other authority. The struggle between the orders had ended in political equality — Rome had cast off the yoke of the patrician aristocracy, and became in form a pure democracy. At the same time, the con- quest of Italy furnished land for distribution among the poor, and attracted wealth to the growing town. The harshness of the old law was modified by the measure of C. Poetelius (326 or 313 B.C.), which abolished imprisonment for debt, except after a trial by jury, and allowed a debtor to preserve his liberty by ceding his property, if it was worth as much as the debt. The policy of the Licinian laws, which linked together political and social reform, was amply vindicated by the increasing vigour and the awakened patriotism of the united commonwealth. The reconciliation of jarring factions made the armies of Rome triumphant throughout Italy. The Rise of the New Nobility. — Nevertheless, this specious show of republican equality was destined to prove an illusion. Hardly had the old aristocracy of birth lost its privileges, when a new nobility rose in its place. The plebeian was no longer de- barred from office, but poverty was still a most serious hindrance in a political career. Though for a time poor men, like Fabricius and Manius Curius, force their way to the front as popular leaders, yet the wealthy classes gradually monopolise office, and establish their ascendency in the Senate. The sovereignty of the people, absolute in theory, 1 in practice recedes into the background. In the mean- time the magistracy is weakened by the subdivision of the old powers among many holders. The consuls had lost the right to revise the rolls of citizens and senators, the management of finance, and the administration of justice. No other magistrate could take their place at the head of the government ; all alike tend to be- come officials dependent on the will of the Senate. Ascendency of the Senate. — That great council directed the destinies of Rome. By the Ovinian plebiscite, carried during this period, the censors were ordered to inscribe as members all who had held curule offices of state. No doubt men who had not 3 If, indeed, a constitution like the Roman can be said to possess a theory at all, and if the theory of sovereignty can be applied to an ancient state. Theories are apt to be the work of legists and scholars, who tend to over-systematise the whole, or to exaggerate transitional phases. POWER OF THE SEYATE 97 held office were still admitted to fill up the ranks of the Senate, but its core was composed of statesmen elected magistrates by the free choice of the people, but retaining their seats in the Senate for life. This permanent council of state soon reduced the annual magistrates to subordination, and used them as its ministers. It regulated their provinces, and arbitrated in their quarrels. The tribunate, which, after the equalisation of the orders, seemed a useless anachronism, was transformed into a regular instrument of government. The tribunes were given the right of convok- ing the Senate and submitting decrees for its approval. Their powers were used to curb the self-will of consuls who refused com- pliance with the wishes of the Senate, or to manage the burgess assemblies in the interest of the government. But the tribunate was saved from extinction by its popular associations, and, dead as it was to all appearance, it was yet to play a conspicuous part in a new struggle of the masses against the classes who held the reins of power. For a century and a half, however, the tide ran strong in an aristocratic direction. The magistrates and people bowed to the wisdom of the great council which made Rome the mistress of the Mediterranean, and secured for her citizens prosperity at home and honour abroad. CHAPTER XIII THE SUBJUGATION OF LATIUM AND CAMPANIA B.C. A.U.C. Renewed Union between Rome and Latium . . . 358 396 Alliance with Samnites 354 400 Treaty with Carthage 348 406 First Samnite War 343-34 1 4 II_ 4 I 3 Mutiny in Campania ........ 342 412 Great Latin War 340 414 Dissolution of Latin League ...... 338 416 The Latin League. — The ancient league between Rome and Latium, ascribed to Spurius Cassius (p. 63), had been based on the assumption of complete equality between the two contracting powers — Rome and Latium were to contribute equal contingents G 9S HISTORY OF ROME. to the legions, and receive equal shares of the booty and territory won in war. Full equality was likewise secured for individual burgesses. The burgess of any community might at pleasure claim in any other city of the league the privilege of contracting" a legal marriage {ius conubit), and the right to buy and sell, to hold and to bequeath land and other property {ius commercii). Further, all members of the Latin league had full liberty to migrate and settle in Rome, as passive burgesses, possessed of all the private rights of citizens, though debarred from office, and from the suffrage, except in the comiiia tributa, where these settlers voted in a tribe fixed on each occasion by lot. The internal constitutions of the Latin cities resembled as a rule that of Rome in its most remarkable feature, the collegiate tenure of the magistracy. In such instances the supreme magis- trates were called by the name originally given at Rome to the consuls, prretors, while another Roman title, that of dictator, is given to the single annual magistrate found in other Latin cities. We may therefore suppose that the substitution of aristocracy for monarchy at Rome was accompanied by a similar remodelling of the constitutions of the allied cities, and that political sympathies as well as common interests strengthened the bonds of union between the leading state and the Latin league. Disaffection in Latium. — But there is an inevitable tendency in such a confederacy for the chief city to convert her leadership into sovereignty. Without any formal alterations in the treaty of alliance, the Latins lost in practice their right to name the general and staff of the army in alternate years, and the power of making separate treaties. Again, from the nature of the case, the burdens and dangers of the /Equian and Volscian wars pressed most severely on the Latins, while the fruits of victory were reaped by Rome. Hence, when the flood of the Celtic invasion receded, the Latins hastened to cut themselves adrift from the wreck. The strong cities of Tibur and Prasneste had made themselves mistresses of the smaller neighbouring towns, and were anxious to assert their independence. The discontent first came to a head at Praeneste (382-380 B.C.) ; next it showed itself in secret assist- ance to the Volscians, who were struggling desperately to main- tain their separate existence. At last there was a widespread revolt against the suzerain power. Prai-neste again flew to arms ; Tibur leagued herself with a wandering tribe of Gauls ; even the faithful Hernicans were for four years the open enemies of Rome (362 B.C.). But the disunited malcontents were powerless before LATIN LEAGUE CLOSED 99 the masterly policy of the Senate. In a few years the Gauls were repulsed, the Hernicans reduced to submission, and the disaffected Latins compelled again to recognise the supremacy of Rome (35S B.C.), and so set her free to defend her northern frontiers against Tarquinii. At the same time the Volscians were punished by the loss of the Pomptine territory, now formed into two new tribes and incorporated with Rome. The decline of the Volscian power was doubtless in part due to assaults on their flank and rear by the Samnites, a people who were already pressing over the upper Liris on to the Ausonian plain, and with whom Rome soon after concluded a formal alliance. Tibur and Praeneste were (354 B.C.) the last to acknowledge the re-establishment of the Roman suzerainty. Closing; of the Latin League. — The towns of the Latin league were now more obviously dependent on Rome. After this revolt, if not before, 1 the list of confederate cities and the limits of Latium were irrevocably fixed. Up to this time, every colony founded by Rome and Latium had been represented at the festival and diet, though of the forty-seven members of the league only thirty had been entitled to a vote. Later Latin colonies were excluded from the Alban festival and the list of the confederacy, while old mem- bers, such as Tusculum and Satricum, were retained on the list, though absorbed in the Roman state. The policy of separating the allied cities from each other and linking them only with the sovereign state was begun, by preventing all separate alliances within the league, and by completely isolating the new colonies, to whom no rights of intermarriage or of purchasing or inheriting land were granted except with Rome. We can hardly wonder that the smouldering embers of Latin discontent were destined within twenty years to burst again into flame. But for the moment the predominance of Rome was unquestioned, and was even recognised by the great naval power of Carthage, which, in 348 B.C., bound itself to spare the maritime cities of Latium, so long as they remained true to Rome, and, further, to restore to the suzerain power any revolted city that might fall into its hands. The Samnites and Campanians. — Before Rome was brought into closer contact with the mistress of the western seas, she had to make good her claim to supremacy in Italy. Nor were her antagonists unworthy of her high destiny. In the pastures and 1 Mommsen prefers an earlier date, circa 384 B.C. too HISTORY OF ROME valleys which skirt the snow-capped peak of Mount Matese dwelt a hardy race of herdsmen, whose confederate tribes bore the com- mon name of Samnites. These bold warriors poured down from their mountains on to the coast-lands, which Greeks and Etruscans had enriched with cornfields and vineyards, and adorned with stately cities. One swarm of invaders had driven the Etruscans from Capua and the Greeks from Cumae (424-420 B.C.) ; another, turning southward, overran Magna Grascia and made the name of the Lucanians terrible to the Achasan settlers. But these invading hordes broke off their connection with the parent stock in Samnium. Thus the Samnite dominion, extensive as it was, lacked the solid foundation on which Rome built her power. The loose confedera- cies of independent cantons, maintained by the Samnite race in its old mountain-home, and reproduced in its new possessions in Lucania and Campania, were ill fitted to meet the steady advance of a single centralised power. In many towns the conquerors were absorbed by the people with whom they mingled, and learnt from them the culture and civic institutions which were the heritage of the Greek. In Capua they adopted from the conquered Etrus- cans the employment of mercenaries, and the shows of gladi- ators, Rome's direst disgrace in later days. These degenerate offshoots of the Samnite stock trembled before the rude tribes which later followed the path they themselves had opened from the highlands. The townsmen of Campania looked round for a champion of civilisation to protect them from their own brethren, who still preserved the savage customs of their forefathers. First Samnite War. — A vain attempt of the Capuans to pro- tect the Sidicini of Teanum against the mountaineers only drew Samnite vengeance on themselves. A garrison posted on Mount Tifata, right above the town, laid waste the territories and defeated the forces of Capua. In their distress the Campanians implored and obtained the protection of Rome (343 B.C.). The Samnites refused to acknowledge the claims of Rome to rule in Campania, and war ensued. Of the details of this first Samnite war history says nothing. Neither truth nor beauty are to be found in the panegyrics pronounced on Valerius Corvus and Decius Mus. It would seem that the Romans and their allies were strong enough to drive the Samnites from the plains, though unable to penetrate into their mountain-fastnesses. Eventually Capua was retained by the Romans, and Teanum surrendered to the Samnites. Both combatants needed a respite before girding up their loins for the decisive struggle. The Samnites were troubled by the renewed MUTINY IN CAMPANIA 101 activity of Tarentum. Rome, which had but lately suppressed a serious military revolt aggravated by domestic discontent, had now to face a desperate conflict with the whole strength of Latium. The Mutiny in Campania. — After the campaign of 343 B.C. the Roman legions, quartered in Capua for its defence, conspired together to seize the town for themselves. To frustrate this treachery, the consul, C. Marcius Rutilus, discharged the principal malcontents. But they gathered tog-ether at the pass of Lautula;, near Tarracina, and being joined by the mass of the soldier)-, marched on Rome. At the same time the commons in Rome rose in revolt against the oppressions of their creditors. M. Valerius Corvus, who had been appointed dictator, found it necessary to grant an amnesty to the insurgents, and to pass a solemn law and covenant embodying their demands. In future no military tribune could be degraded, and no soldier discharged from the ranks, at the caprice of the consul. Service in the legion at this time entitled the citizen to a share in the fruits of war, pay, plunder, and an allotment of land, while his rank in the legion determined the amount of his share. Hence the power of degrad- ing or discharging a soldier enabled the consul to deprive obnoxious citizens of the due reward of their sendee to the state. The soldiery insisted on the abolition of this arbitrary power, but did not press their petition for the reduction of the pay of the horse- men. To allay the discontent in the city a measure was passed for the relief of debtors, though we can hardly believe that sober Romans ever sanctioned the proposal of the tribune Genucius for the total prohibition of interest. Preparations for War. — These concessions, and the separate alliance concluded by Rome with the Samnites, were devised to meet the threatened defection of Latium and Campania. The Latins were determined not to sink into the position of helpless dependents, but rather to maintain their equality by force of arms. Even when Rome had deserted them they continued the Samnite war with vigour, and thus w-on the support of the Campanians. They now boldly demanded complete union with Rome on an equal footing. One consul and half the Senate were to be of Latin origin, and doubtless this equal division of power was to be carried out also in the popular assemblies. The Senate, led by Manlius Torquatus, indignantly rejected this proposal for an equal union, and appealed at once to the arbitrament of the sword. Rome had now to meet, not a foreign foe, but a people whose 102 HISTOR Y OF ROME institutions were similar to her own, and whose troops had long been trained to fight shoulder to shoulder with her legionaries, and had learnt under the same discipline to use the same arms. If we may believe tradition, the old solid phalanx had been already superseded by a more open order of battle. The legionaries were now drawn up in three divisions, of which the two first were armed with the pilum, a wooden javelin, pointed with iron, six and a half feet in length, while the third still bore the old thrusting-spear (/lasta). At the same time the sword became the principal weapon of the soldiers, who followed up their volleys of javelins by an attack sword in hand. Thus the phalanx of spearmen was broken up into handfuls {inanipuli) of swordsmen, who fought in open order, with marked intervals between the various divisions. Most pro- bably this new method of fighting was perfected in mountain warfare against the Samnites ; it is fully developed at least by the time of Pyrrhus. The weakness of the Latin league was not military but political. Though the old Latin cities, except Lauren- turn, declared for war, the colonies founded outside Latium remained, with but few exceptions, true to Rome. In Capua, and perhaps elsewhere in Campania, the aristocracy, though overpowered for the time by the popular party, refused to forsake her cause. The Hernicans proved their fidelity, and the Samnites their magna- nimity, by rendering loyal aid to their Roman allies. The Latin War. — The hostile regions of Latium and Campania separated Rome from her chief allies, the Samnites. With wise audacity, the consuls, Manlius Torquatus and Decius Mus, left Rome to be defended by the citizens, and marched round through the country of the Marsians and Paelignians to form a junction with the Samnite forces. The united army moved forward to offer battle in the plain of Capua, with their retreat into the Samnite mountains secured in case of disaster. Strict orders were issued by Manlius against all irregular skirmishing with the Latins, but his own son was provoked into a single combat with Geminus Mettius of Tusculum. The young man, forgetting the commands and remembering only the exploit of his father, slew the Latin champion. But when he returned triumphant to lay his spoils at his father's feet, the consul turned gloomily from him, and ordered his immediate execution before the assembled army. This stern sacrifice of private feeling to public duty, so characteristic of a Roman noble, ensured the obedience, though it alienated the affections, of the soldiery. The Battle of Mount Vesuvius. -The battle that decided the THE GREAT LATIN WAR 103 fate of Campania was fought near Mount Vesuvius. 1 The consuls were warned by a dream that the victory of the army must be purchased by the death of the general, and agreed that he whose legions first gave ground in the battle should devote himself to the gods of death. So, when the left wing, where Decius Mus com- manded, fell into disorder, he called for the chief pontiff, and with veiled head repeated after him the solemn formula of self-devotion. And when he had so done and mounted his horse, he plunged into the ranks of the enemy, to seek death for himself and victory for his country. The day was saved by the heroism of Decius ; it was won by the skill of Manlius. Instead of his reserve of veterans (triarii), he brought up the supernumeraries (acceiisi), whom he had armed for the purpose. Deceived by this manoeuvre, the Latins threw their last reserves into the battle, and so had none left to meet the decisive charge of the Roman veterans. The part played by the Samnites and Hemicans in this victory is ignored or misrepresented by the chroniclers of Rome. Fleeing in confusion from Campania, the Latins made a last rally in defence of their liberties at Trifanum, but another defeat drove their troops from the field. Their fortified towns capitulated one after another, and the whole country submitted to the yoke of Rome. Settlement of Latium and Campania. — The victory of Rome entailed the destruction of the Latin league as a political federa- tion, though it survived as a religious association. Those Latin cities which were not absorbed into the Roman state were com- pletely isolated from each other, and connected simply by their common dependence on Rome. Each subject community was bound to the suzerain by a separate treaty. It retained the right of local self-government, but lost all control over foreign policy, in which henceforth it followed the lead of Rome. Complete submission was ensured by a policy of isolation. The old rights of conubium (inter-marriage) and commercium (commerce and settlement (cf. p. 98) were retained by the Latins only in Rome ; all similar intercourse between one Latin town and another was prohibited. Further, Rome took upon herself the duties of the old federal council. She determined the amount of the contingents which the subject cities were bound by treaty to provide and pay, and 1 Mommsen has found reason to suspect the truth of Livy's narrative, summarised above, and follows Diodorus in omitting all but the final battle of Trifanum. 104 HISTORY OF ROME supervised the assessment of their property and the levy of their troops. Even the strongest Latin towns, Tibur and Prajneste, had to cede their domain lands to Rome, and to follow her leadership in war. Other districts of Latium were granted less favourable terms. Lanuvium, Aricia, N omentum, and Pedum were compelled to accept the Crerite franchise (pp. 89, go). Velitra was further punished by the destruction of its walls and the exile of the senatorial aris- tocracy, who had headed the opposition to Rome. The Volscian port of Antium 1 was made a Roman burgess colony ; its inhabitants had to provide land for the new settlers, but were permitted to join the colony (338 B.C.). A few years later Anxur shared the same fate (329 B.C.). The memory of these measures was preserved by the erection of equestrian statues in the Forum to the consuls Msenius and Camillus, and the decoration of the orator's platform {rostra) with the beaks of the Antiate triremes. Two new tribes were formed from the settlers on the confiscated lands of the Latins, and from some recently enfranchised communities. The organi- sation of the Volscian and Campanian districts followed. Fundi, Formiae, Cumee, and Capua where the fidelity of the aristocracy was richly rewarded, received the civitas sine saffragio, without forfeiting local autonomy. Privernum, which once more rebelled (329 B.C.), escaped with the loss of its walls ; but the leader of the revolt, Vitruvius Vaccus of Fundi, paid for his boldness with his life. The strongholds of Cales (334 B.C.), which dominated the entrance to the Campanian plain, and Fregellas (328 B.C.), which commanded the passage of the Liris, were occupied by Latin colonies. In vain the Samnites protested against the occupation of Fregelte and Sora, as an infringement of their rights. Rome, at whose instance they had refrained from attacking Luca and Fabrateria, pursued her course without regard to their complaints. In fifteen years she had conquered Latium and Campania, and secured the newly won territories by a ring of fortresses, but this was the least part of her achievement. With far-sighted policy, the sovereign state, while she severed every link which united the subject cities, drew them each more closely to herself by the promotion of social and commercial intercourse. Already the same language and the same customs prevailed throughout Latium ; Rome introduced a single system of law. Local autonomy satisfied her subjects for the present ; the hope of full citizenship in the future fired their 1 Antium, which had recovered its freedom in 459 B.C., had possibly become once more a Latin colony, 385-377 B.C. [cf. also p. 53). TARENTUM AND THE SAMNITES 105 ambition and ensured their fidelity. The union thus evoked out of discord, a union too strong to be shaken even by a Hannibal, was a proof of Rome's title to the dominion of Italy and a prophecy of her imperial mission. ROMANO-CAMPANIAN COIN, 338-317 B.C. CHAPTER XIV THE SECOND SAMNITE WAR Outbreak of Second Samnite War 32; The Capitulation at the Caudine Forks . Rome drives the Samnites back into the Mountains Etruscan War Revolt of the Hernicans End of the War B.C. A.U.C. 327 4=7 321 433 3'4 440 311-308 443-446 306 448 304 45° Alexander the Molossian. — The Samnites were not indifferent spectators of the establishment of Roman dominion in Latium and Campania, but they were fully occupied in Lower Italy. The wealthy merchants of Tarentum, the leading state in Greek Italy, had long trembled before the Samnites and Lucanians. They now called to their aid mercenary leaders from the mother country'. The Spartan king Archidamus fell in battle against the Lucanians (338 B.C.), but his place was taken by an abler chieftain, Alexander the Molossian, uncle ofthe great Alexander. Under his bannerwere arrayed his countrymen of Epirus, the Greeks of Italy, and even exiled Lucanians. He captured Consentia, the chief town of the Lucanians, and after defeating the combined forces ofthe Samnites and Lucanians near Paestum, made himself master of Lower Italy from sea to sea. Rome, which now feared the rivalry of the Samnites, ungratefully forgot their services in the Latin war, and made an ally of their enemy. But this sudden greatness, which 106 HISTORY OF ROME fired the Epirot prince with the hope of founding a Hellenic Empire in the west, a dream which not even his great successor, Pyrrhus, could realise, proved the precursor of his fall. The Taren- tines, who needed not a master but a mercenary, withdrew their support. The attempt to form a new league of their unwilling adherents, the degenerate Greek cities of Italy, and their old enemies, the Oscan tribes, ended in the assassination of the prince by a Lucanian exile. The death of Alexander left the Greek cities to defend themselves as best they could against the Lucanians, and set the Samnites free to use their whole force against Rome in the decisive struggle for the mastery of Italy. Outbreak of Second Samnite War. — The supremacy of Rome was now undisputed in the plains of Latium and Campania as far south as the Volturnus. Only the Greek citizens of the twin towns Pahx-opolis and Neapolis (Naples) were still independent. Dis- putes arose between the men of Pataopolis and the Roman settlers in Campania, which led the Greeks to appeal for aid to the Samnites, the only power in Italy strong enough to protect them against the encroachments of Rome. The Samnites deter- mined to make a stand in Campania, and despatched a strong garrison to Pateopolis. The formal demand of the Roman ambassadors for its evacuation was met by a complaint of the colonisation of Fregellae. Both nations were firmly convinced of the justice of their cause and the strength of their armies, and appealed with confidence to the judgment of the god of battle. For, in truth, though the occupation of Palaeopolis formed the pre- text for the war, just as that of Messana was later the occasion of the first Punic war, the struggle thus begun was no border war for the possession of a single city or even a particular district, but a mighty duel between two rival races, which was to determine whether Italy should be Latin or Oscan, and her civilisation pro- gressive or stationary. Diplomatic and Military Successes of Rome. — The Romans were keenly alive to the gravity of the issue, and strengthened themselves by alliances with the neighbours and enemies of the Samnites. The inhabitants of the plains of Apulia suffered from the raids of the Samnites, much as in Scotland the Lowlanders did from the Highland clans, and were ready to welcome the legions, for whose operations against the rear and flanks of the enemy they furnished a most serviceable base. The people in Lucania were eager to join their kinsmen in Samnium, to whom they were bound both by sentiment and interest, but the governing nobles SECOND SAMNITE WAR 107 would not sanction an alliance which involved peace with their old enemies, the Greeks of Tarentum. Roman diplomacy succeeded, as so often, in playing off one race against another, and averted the danger of an Oscan coalition. The Sabellian tribes of Central Italy were from the first not unfriendly to Rome. Only the Vestini attempted an independent policy, and they were shortly reduced by the legions to submission. In this way Rome secured her communications with Apulia, a point of the utmost strategic importance. Meanwhile Publilius Philo, the most trusted of her statesmen, pushed on the siege of Pateopolis with energy, and received the unprecedented honour of a command prolonged beyond his year of office. The triumph of the first proconsul was gained rather by diplomacy than by arms. The Roman party in Pateopolis opened their gates to the legions, and forced the Samnite garrison to flee in disorder. The Greeks of the twin cities, old and new, were granted the most favourable terms, a perpetual alliance with full equality of rights. This liberality was rewarded by the fidelity of Neapolis, and may have induced the neighbouring cities of Herculaneum and Pompeii, Nola and Nuceria, to throw in their lot with Rome. The aristocratic party was in all these Oscan towns, as at Capua, the chief support of Roman supremacy. In the meantime the two consuls had advanced into Samnium, and are said to have taken several towns ; at any rate they covered the operations in Campania and Central Italy by keeping the Samnites employed nearer home. Two campaigns sufficed to confine the Samnite power within the narrow bounds of their native mountains, and to secure for Rome a firm base in the cities on either coast, and a safe line of com- munications between them through the cantons of Central Italy. L. Papirius Cursor and Q. Fabius Rullianus. — At this point the real history of the war is obscured by exaggerated tales of the exploits of the two principal heroes of the day, and a lively account of a dispute between them. L. Papirius Cursor, a disciplinarian of the old school, who was now dictator, was recalled from the camp to Rome, to take the auspices afresh. He left his master of the horse, Q. Fabius Rullianus, in command, but charged him most strictly to avoid a battle. Fabius disobeyed his orders and won a great victory. Papirius hastened back, vowing to punish his disobedience with death, but Fabius was saved for the moment by the soldiery, and fled to Rome to implore the protection of the Senate and people. The dictator, who pursued in hot haste, warned the tribunes not to diminish his authority by bringing his io8 HISTORY OF ROME sentence before the assembly, but was softened by the entreaties of the people and the submission of the offender to his mercy. He granted Fabius his life, but deprived him of his command. Timely concessions averted a more serious danger in the fol- lowing year. While the two consuls were engaged far away in Apulia and Samnium, discontent was rife nearer home. Tusculum, Privernum. and Velitrae flew to arms, determined to assert their independence, or extract from Rome, as the price of their support, full citizenship. At dead of night the alarm was given that the enemy were at the gates of Rome. Though the surprise failed, the attempt revealed to the Romans the danger of a general revolt, and induced them to grant the demands of the insurgents. At the next census two new tribes were formed which included the rebellious cities, and, more extraordinary still, L. Fulvius Flaccus, who had been chief magistrate of Tusculum at the time of the revolt, was, in the following year, consul of Rome. After the settlement of these difficulties Rome devoted herself to the war with renewed energy, so that the Samnites in despair sued for peace. They determined to surrender all their prisoners and plunder, and even Brutulus Papius, their bravest general, had not the patriot leader preferred suicide to the tender mercies of Rome. But when they found that nothing but unconditional submission would satisfy Roman pride, the Samnites resolved on a desperate defence of their liberty, and chose for their leader the hero of the war, Gavius Pontius. The Caudine Forks. — The overweening confidence of Rome was to be severely punished. Black as were the days of the Allia and of Cannae, there was one day blacker still in her calendar, the day of the Caudine Forks, because it was not only marked by disaster but branded with shame. The two consuls of the year 321 B.C., T. Veturius and Sp. Postumius, men untried in war, were enticed into the defiles of the Apennines by the news that the whole Samnite force was engaged in Apulia, besieging the town of Luceria. But as the legions pressed forward with all haste from Campania to the relief of their Apulian allies, they found the outlet of the valley of Caudium blocked by the Samnites, and, on retreating to the defile by which they had entered the fatal pass, found that also occupied by the enemy. The surrounding hills were lined with troops who had been lying in ambush ; the Roman army was fairly caught in a trap, where it was hopeless to fight and impossible to fly. Their desperate attempts to break out were easily repulsed, and no resource was left but to throw them- THE CAUDINE FORKS 109 selves on the mercy of the conqueror. Pontius was not deaf to their entreaties. Instead of pressing his advantage, he aimed at an honourable and lasting peace. Rome was to recognise in the Samnites an equal and independent power, to restore the terri- tories (e.g., Campania) taken from them, and demolish the fortresses of Cales and Fregellae, which she had constructed in defiance of the old treaty. These terms were accepted by the consuls, who left six hundred knights in the hands of the Samnites as hostages. Further, the consuls, the quaestors, and all the surviving officers, together with two tribunes who were with the army, swore to procure their ratification by the Senate and people. By this con- vention the Roman soldiers saved their lives, but they had to surrender their arms, their baggage, and even their clothes, except a single garment, and pass beneath the yoke (cf. p. 62). This ceremony was no peculiar insult devised by Pontius, but a regu- lar Italian usage, like that of piling arms in a modern capitulation. After this humiliating confession that they owed their lives to the forbearance of the enemy, the legionaries were not retained as prisoners of war, but suffered to depart unharmed. Rejection of the Compact by Rome. — Pontius little knew the enemies with whom he had to deal. He trusted to the honour of the Roman people to redeem the plighted faith of their consuls and their tribunes ; he hoped that the moderation of his demands would ensure the acceptance of the proffered peace. But the Roman people knew no peace save the submission of their enemies, and cared nothing for the spirit, if only they observed the letter, of their engagements. In shame and dejection the beaten army stole homeward through Campania, and entered the city under cover of the night. A general mourning was proclaimed, and the consuls shut themselves up in their houses, leaving the conduct of the election of their successors, of which they were deemed unworthy, to an inter-rex. But when the Senate met, it resolved at once to cancel the convention. Sp. Postumius was the first to urge that honour would be satisfied by the surrender of its authors to the enemy ; the Roman people could not be bound by the acts of magistrates who had exceeded their powers, but those who had sworn to the treaty must be delivered over to the Samnites, as men whose lives were forfeited by their breach of faith. Accord- ingly, all the officers of the defeated army, and even the tribunes, who protested in vain against this mockery of justice, were solemnly handed over in chains to the enemy, and, to complete the farce, Postumius kicked the Roman herald (fe/ialis), professing thus to no HISTORY OF ROME give Rome a just cause of war against the Samnite nation, to which he now belonged. Pontius utterly refused to allow Rome to release herself in this way from her plighted word. He justly demanded, either the ratification of the peace, or the surrender of the army into his power, as at the Caudine Forks. But, with noble generosity, he refused to wreak his veng-eance on the men whose lives even Roman casuistry pronounced forfeit, the six hundred hostages and the surrendered officers. It is easy to sneer at the simplicity which led him to believe that a great nation might prefer honour to expediency, and surrender at the bidding of justice what might have been extorted at the sword's point. But even the most prejudiced historians cannot obscure the contrast between the double-dyed dishonour of the Romans, who evaded by ignoble trickery the consequences of their cowardly capitulation, and the stainless magnanimity of the Samnite hero. Success of the Samnites. — War was at once renewed. The Roman chroniclers strive to efface the dishonour of the Caudine Forks by fictitious accounts of the recovery of Luceria and the humiliation of Pontius. But in reality Rome had to strain every nerve to keep her hold on Latium and Campania. Satricum, in the Volscian country, revolted, and though within a year the town was betrayed to the Romans, the Samnite garrison expelled, and the authors of the revolt punished, the example was fraught with danger. Still more serious was the loss of Fregelhe, because it commanded the upper road, by the valleys of the Trerus and Liris, from Rome to Campania. In Apulia fear and hatred of Samnium, not the arms of the legions, kept the country true to the Roman alliance. The fall of Luceria was balanced by the adhesion of the cities of Teanum and Canusium, and of the neighbouring tribe of the Frentani. In the following years exhaustion caused both the combatants to relax their efforts. Rome employed the respite thus given her in binding two important cities more closely to herself. The colony of Antium was reorganised, probably in the interest of the old Volscian population, and Capua was made a prefecture, at which justice was henceforth administered for Roman citizens according to the forms of Roman law, by a praefect sent each year from Rome, an ominous encroachment on local liberty. The Crisis of the War.— In 315 B.C. war was renewed with fresh energy. While the consuls were absent, engaged probably in re- covering Luceria, Rome's hold on Campania was all but lost. Nuceria, Nola, Atella, and Calatia threw in their lot with the Samnites ; Sora, on the Upper Liris, expelled its Roman colonists, SECOND SAMNITE WAR III and a large force of Samnites poured down from the mountains into Campania. Q. Fabius Maximus, the Roman dictator, who had just taken Saticula, was compelled to fall back by the coast road to the pass of Lautuke, near Anxur. Even this defensible post was stormed, and his raw levies were only saved from destruc- tion by the heroism of his master of the horse, Q. Aulius Cerretanus, who fell in covering their retreat. The Ausonians in the country round were ripe for rebellion, and Capua showed her resent- ment at the recent infringement of her liberties. Suddenly the tide turned; possibly at this crisis the consuls returned to the rescue from Apulia, or compelled the Samnites to draw off to defend their own homes ; at any rate Campania was won back as speedily as it had been lost. An inquiry into the conspiracy at Capua was con- ducted by the dictator C. Maenius, whereupon the two Calavii, the heads of the Samnite party in Capua, committed suicide. Sora was recaptured and punished. The Ausonian cities were delivered into the hands of the Romans by aristocratic traitors within their walls, and repaid by a horrible massacre for their wavering fidelity. In Campania the Samnite army was defeated and pursued over the mountains to Bovianum. Nola entered the Roman alliance on favourable terms, and the other Campanian towns followed its example. Finally, the upper road to Campania was reopened by the capture of Fregelke. Rome secures Apulia and Campania. — Rome hastened to secure her conquests by the foundation of colonies (313-312 B.C.), which, as has been explained (p. 57), were fortresses garrisoned by Roman citizens or Latin allies, whose mission it was to protect the frontiers and maintain the dominion of the mother city. Saticula x was made the outpost on the Samnite frontier, the islands of Pontias became Rome's naval station in the Campanian waters, while Suessa, Aurunca, and Interamna served to guard the great road to Capua, built (312 B.C.) by the censor Appius Claudius. At the same time the care of Roman interests in Apulia was entrusted to the 2500 colonists of Luceria. Thus the Samnites were hemmed in on both sides by a chain of fortresses, whose walls were an impregnable barrier for men unskilled in the conduct of sieges. They must soon have been reduced to submission, if they had not found support outside their own borders. Tarentum. — The natural allies of Samnium, the men of Taren- tum, remained supine in Italy, while they frittered away their strength in a naval war with Agathocles of Syracuse. After the 1 These are all Latin colonies {cf. map). ii2 HISTORY OF ROME disaster at Caudium they had aspired to arbitrate between the contending- powers, but Rome had rejected their mediation, a rebuff which the government of Tarentum had not the spirit to resent. Even when the Spartan prince Cleonymus, at the head of their forces, had compelled the Lucanians to make peace with Tarentum, in return for the surrender of Metapontum, they still busied themselves in petty quarrels with other Greeks, instead of throwing the whole weight of South Italy into the scale against Rome. After suffering the Samnites to fall unaided, Tarentum was fortunate in obtaining a renewal of her treaty with Rome on favourable terms. Etruscan War. — The Etruscans, whose forty years' peace with Rome had just expired, assailed the frontier fortress of Sutrium with energy. After defeating the Roman force sent to its relief, they besieged the town. The hero of this war is Q. Fabius Maximus Rullianus. How much of his glory is due to the fancy of his kinsman, Fabius Pictor, the first historian of Rome, or to the family legends, which found in Etruria the most fitting- scene for the exploits of the great Fabian house, we cannot tell ; but his campaigns certainly made a deep impression on the imagination of the people, and first revealed to Rome the funda- mental weakness of the stately edifice of Etruscan power. Fabius found the Etruscan lines too strong to be carried, so he resolved to draw off their forces by an attack on their own homes. Beyond the Ciminian hills and woods no Roman army had ever penetrated, but into this unknown land Fabius boldly led his troops. He had sent forward his brother to explore the country, and now, disre- garding the orders of the Senate's messengers, he dashed into Central Etruria. A series of brilliant victories justified the ad- venturous general. At Sutrium, at Lake Vadimo, and at Perusia he routed the enemy, and brought the chief cities of Etruria, Perusia, Cortona, Arretium, and Tarquinii to consent to peace for forty years. (310-309 B.C.) Fabius. — The conqueror of Etruria made the yet more glo- rious conquest of himself. While he was pushing his successes in Etruria, his colleague, Marcius Rutilus, was hard pressed in Samnium. The reserves which had been raised to cover Rome must be sent to his rescue, and only one man could be entrusted with such a command, Fabius' old enemy, Papirius Cursor. The consul, in the hour of his country's need, stifled private animosity, and named Papirius Cursor dictator. The old general, whose blunt humour reconciled the soldiery to his stern discipline, led SECOND SAMNITE WAR "3 the legions for the last time to victory. The sacred band of the Samnites, who had sworn to conquer or to die, made the triumph of the dictator gay with the white or many-coloured tunics, stripped from their corpses, while their gold and silver shields, which were used to decorate the shops of the Forum on festal-days, preserved the memory of this decisive battle. In the following year Fabius reconquered Nuceria, the last stronghold of the Samnites in Campania. He then marched into Central Italy, and kept the CHIM.=KRA. [Etruscan Bronze hi the Archceological Museum at Florence. Marsians and Paelignians firm in their allegiance to Rome by defeating the Samnite troops and putting down their partisans. Lastly, he marched from Samnium to meet the threatened attack of the Umbrians, and dispersed their levies at the great battle of Mevania. The Umbrians retired from the struggle, and Ocriculum entered the Roman alliance (308 B.C.). End of the Samnite War. — The dying flames of war were re- vived by the rebellion of the old allies of Rome, the Hernicans. The Samnites made a last attempt to break through the iron H 114 HISTORY OF ROME barrier of Roman fortresses, and to force their way to the gates of Rome by the valleys of the Liris and Trerus. They took Sora, Calatia, and Arpinum, but, before they could come to the help of their new allies, Anagnia, the Hernican capital, succumbed to the consul Marcius. The Hernicans, three of whose cities had never joined the insurrection, abandoned a struggle to which their strength, if not their resolution, was plainly unequal, and submitted to the loss of their independence. One more campaign ended the weary struggle with the Samnites. Though the mountaineers fought with unabated courage, and even poured down once more into Campania, their strength was now exhausted. The consuls, Ti. Minucius and L. Postumius Megellus, penetrated into the heart of the country, defeated and captured the Samnite general, Statius Gellius, and stormed Bovianum. The Samnites sued for peace, and were granted tolerable terms. They had to resign all their conquests, but within their native mountains, to which they were henceforth confined, they retained their ancient liberties. Whether they formally acknowledged the supremacy of Rome is uncertain ; at any rate the issue of the war had placed the superiority of Rome beyond dispute, and had proved that no single nation in Italy could hold its own against the city of the seven hills. The Italians were often yet to fight in defence of their liberties ; but no hope of success remained except in wide-reaching coalitions or in the aid of the foreigner, the Gaul, the Greek, or the Carthaginian. CHAPTER XV THE CONQUEST OF THE ITALIANS B.C. A.U.C. Outbreak of the Third Samnite War 298 456 Battle of Sentinum 295 459 The Samnites and Sabines submit to Rome .... 290 464 The Organisation of Central Italy Rome had granted peace to Samnium that she might have leisure to strengthen her hold on Central Italy. Campania she had already secured by a chain of fortresses linked to the capital by the great Appian road ; she now set to work with characteristic energy to perfect the defences and organisation of her other dependencies. The rebellious Herni- can communities were compelled to accept the Crerite franchise ETRURIA AND CENTRAL ITALY 115 {v. supra, p. 90) ; but the three faithful towns, Aletrium, Verulae, and Ferentinum, declined the offer of the full citizenship, and Rome felt bound to respect the rights and liberties guaranteed them by the old equal alliance. In the Yolscian district Arpinum and Trebula had the burdens of citizenship imposed on them without its political privileges {civitas sine suffragio) ; Frusino paid for its disaffection with a third of its territory, and Sora was garrisoned by four thousand colonists. The central hills and the line of com- munication with them along the Anio were, from a military point of view, of vital importance, and so were most carefully secured. A new tribe was formed in the valley of the Anio, and in spite of the resistance of the yEquians and Marsians, two strong fortresses, the Latin colonies, Alba Fucens and Carsioli, were planted in their country, and connected with Rome by a road named later after the Valerian house. (303- 29S B.C.) One more vulnerable point in the armour of Rome, the valley of the Tiber, was guarded by the establishment of a colony, called Narnia(299 B.C.), at the old Umbrian town of Nequinum, and the construction of the first part of the great Flaminian road through Ocriculum to that fortress. About the same time the Picentines joined the central Italian cantons in allying themselves with Rome, and thus completed the strong barrier which separated the northern and southern enemies of the conquering city. Etruria. — On the north, Rome was content to maintain her old military frontier, the Ciminian Hills, unchanged, but made use of the weakness and divisions of the Etruscans to extend her politi- cal influence. At this period the Etruscans were in great straits between their terror of the Gauls, whose tribes were now once more in a state of ferment, and their fear of the steady advance of Rome. One party in that unhappy country wished to bribe the Gallic clans to use their swords for the defence of Italian freedom ; another invoked the protection of Rome against the barbarians. Internal dissension increased the uncertainty of Etrus- can policy. Rome, as her custom was, befriended the nobility, and gained a useful ally by restoring the exiled Cilnii to power at Arretium. Outbreak of War. — The Samnites saw that such a peace was more fatal to the liberties of Italy than the most disastrous war. If Rome were allowed time to consolidate her power in Central Italy, to dominate Etruria and overawe the Gauls, their last hope of independence was gone. Only a coalition of all these jarring elements could make head against the growing power of Rome. n6 HISTORY OF ROME But the Samnites had learnt by bitter experience the danger of leaving an enemy in their rear. Accordingly, while the Romans were engaged in watching the advance of a plundering horde of Gauls, the Samnites suddenly threw themselves on Lucania, and placed their partisans in power throughout that region. Rome at once required the Samnites to withdraw from Lucania, and answered their refusal by declaring war (29S B.C.). The movements of the contending armies in the first years of the war are uncertain or unintelligible, partly perhaps from a want of combination in the plans of the confederates, partly from the contradictions in our records of the war. It seems certain that the Romans won no great victories, for though L. Cornelius Scipio Barbatus, the first of a famous line, is glorified both by Livy and by the epitaph on his tomb, their conflicting stories deserve no credence. The victory at Volaterrae over the Etruscans described by Livy, and the conquest of Lucania mentioned on the tomb seem to be equally imaginary. The more modest-portions of the epitaph 1 which record the capture of two unknown places in Samnium and the reception of hostages from Lucania, taken in connection with the triumph of Fulvius over the Samnites, seem to show that both consuls were engaged in restoring Roman ascend- ency in the south. In the following year the Romans expected to be assailed on all sides, and pressed the consulship on their tried and trusted general, Q. Fabius. The old hero insisted that the honour should be shared by his friend, P. Decius Mus. But the expected storm passed off for the moment ; the Gauls had not come, and the Etruscans would not move, so that the Samnites had to bear the whole brunt of the battle. Their armies were defeated and their country laid waste by both the consuls (297 B.C.). Gellius Egnatius. — Next year the storm broke. Gellius Egna- tius, the Samnite general, had the boldness to conceive and the ability to execute a daring march through Central Italy to Umbria. It was essential to bring the Gauls and Etruscans to strike a great blow for the deliverance of Italy. So the Samnite leader left the ordinary levies to oppose the legions in Samnium and to make a descent on Campania, while he led the flower of his troops to his chosen battle-ground. The consul Volumnius was obliged to hasten from Samnium to the aid of his colleague, Appius Claudius, in Etruria, and then return with speed to preserve Campania from devastation. Yet the year closed without a decisive encounter ; 1 " Taurasia Cisauna Samnio cepit Subigit orane Loucanam opsidesque abdoucit." GELLIUS EGNATIUS 117 each side was bracing its energies for the final struggle in the succeeding spring. The Senate was dismayed when they heard that Gellius Eg na- nus had frustrated their efforts to separate the south from the north, and was gathering to his standards the discontented Etruscans and the restless Gauls. The courts of law were closed, and all citizens, old and young, freedmen as well as free-born, were called to arms. The chief command was entrusted to old Q. Fabius, who again iWiii il;lfHili|iliVfti : iN;ll!li!Jft : ! ' !i ^ TOMB OF L. CORNELIUS SCIPIO BARBATUS. stipulated that Decius Mus should be his colleague. Besides the main army, two reserves were called out, one of which was posted at Falerii to guard the line of communications, and the other retained for the immediate protection of the city. L. Scipio was sent forward with the vanguard towards Clusium, but his forces were surprised and cut to pieces by the Gauls. A movement of the reserve from Falerii into Central Etruria was more successful, as it recalled the Etruscans from Umbria to the defence of their own homes. Etruria, as usual, proved a broken reed in the hour nS HISTORY OF ROME of danger, and the Gauls and Samnites fell back sullenly over the Apennines. Battle of Sentinum. — The consuls, eager to give battle while the Etruscans were away, at once pursued the retreating enemy. On the other side, Gellius Egnatius knew that the Gauls would soon be weary of war, and trembled at the thought that the coali- tion effected by his skill and daring might dissolve away at the very moment when victory was in his grasp. Both armies were eager for the fray when they met on a fair field near the city of Sentinum. On the right wing, Fabius, whose troops were not shaken by the first rush of the enemy, drove back the Samnites foot by foot ; but on the left the Roman horse was thrown into disorder by the charge of the Gallic war-chariots, and in its flight broke the line of the infantry. Decius Mus, remembering his father's example, devoted himself, together with the host of the enemy, to the powers of the grave, and found the death he sought in the serried ranks of the Gauls. His legions rallied, and, sup- ported by the reserves which Fabius sent to their aid, restored the battle. The fortune of the day was decided by the repeated charges of the fine Campanian cavalry, which first turned the Samnites to flight, and then fell on the uncovered flanks and rear of the still unbroken masses of Gallic swordsmen. Gellius Egnatius fell at the gate of the camp in a last attempt to rally the beaten troops ; his followers, disdaining to surrender, fought their way back to their native mountains ; but the Gauls dispersed, and the great coalition, by which Egnatius had hoped to save Italy, was shattered at one blow on the field of Sentinum (295 B.C.). The Samnites alone hold out.— Umbria passed at once into the hands of the Romans ; the disaffected cities of Etruria, in particular Volsinii and Perusia, made their peace in the following year ; and Campania was rescued from the attacks of the Samnite freebooters. But within their highland fastnesses that uncon- querable people still defied the might of Rome. The sturdy Swiss, who scattered the chivalry of Burgundy and of Austria, and made their Alps the cradle and stronghold of liberty, were more fortunate but not more heroic than the shepherds and herdsmen of the Apennines. The consuls of the next year, L. Postumius Megellus and M. Atilius Regulus, were repulsed with loss, and obliged to remain on the defensive both in Apulia and Campania. All they could boast of was the preservation of Luceria and the rescue of Interamna, on the Liris, from the enemy. In 293 B.C. the Romans, THE SAMNIJES SUBDUED 119 who seem to have relaxed their efforts for a while after the great deliverance at Sentinum, returned to the fray with renewed vigour. L. Papirius Cursor, son of the hero of the second Samnite war, invaded Samnium itself, supported by his colleague, Sp. Carvilius. The Samnites on their part are said again to have raised a sacred band, marked by white tunics and nodding plumes, and bound by the most horrible oaths to conquer or to die. Their gloomy resolu- tion was no match for the cheerful courage inspired in the Romans by the homely bluntness of Papirius, who at the crisis of the battle promised Jupiter, not a splendid temple, but a cup of honeyed wine before a drop touched his own lips. The surrender of Cominium and other Samnite strongholds crowned the victory of Aquilonia, and splendid spoils graced the triumph of the conqueror. The last gleams of success which shone on the arms of the Samnites brightened a name already glorious, that of Gavius Pontius. The old general (unless, indeed, it be his son) chastised the rashness of the consul Q. Fabius Gurges, as he pressed in hot haste into the mountains after the retreating Samnites. Another veteran, Fabius Maximus, took the field to save the honour and retrieve the errors of his son. At length the victor of the Caudine Forks was defeated and captured, and the bitter and shameful memories of that day were yet more shamefully avenged by the death of the Samnite hero. The triumphs of Roman conquerors were constantly stained by the unjust execution of vanquished opponents, but no more odious instance of a heartless custom can be given than the cruel fate of Pontius. The task of completing the subjugation of the Samnites fell to Manius Curius, who appears to have granted them an honourable peace (290 B.C.). Roman Colonies. — The Romans at once devoted themselves to the work of securing the ground they had gained in the late war. On the coast of Campania they had already (296 B.C.) established fortresses at Minturnae and Sinuessa, whose inhabitants received the full citizenship, as was the rule in maritime colonies. In 290 B.C. Manius Curius conquered the Sabines, and compelled them to accept Roman citizenship without the franchise ; in the following years Rome strengthened her hold on the eastern coast by the foundation of colonies at H atria, 289 B.C. (Latin), and Castrum Novum, 283 B.C. (burgess). But the chief settlement of the time was Venusia, on the confines of Samnium, Apulia, and Lucania, to which place as many as twenty thousand Latin colonists were sent (291 B.C.). This important fortress, connected with Rome by an extension of the Appian road, was designed to block the 120 HISTORY OF ROME communications of the Samnites with Tarentum. For, though Tarentum had suffered her fears of Agathocles and her troubles with the Lucanians to blind her eyes to the pressing needs of the Samnites, she was the one city left in Italy strong enough to rouse the suspicions of Rome ; and by calling on Greece to redress the balance in Italy, she was yet to give the vanquished one more chance of striking at the heart of Rome, under the banner of the greatest captain of the age. CHAPTER XVI THE WAR WITH TARENTUM AND PYRRHUS B.C. A.U.C. War with the Lucanians breaks out 289 465 Battle of Lake Vadimo 283 471 Declaration of War against Tarentum, which summons Pyrrhus from Epirus ........ 281 473 Battle of Heraclea — Embassy of Cineas. ... 280 474 Battle of Ausculum — Alliance of Rome and Carthage . 279 475 Pyrrhus goes to Sicily ■ . 278 476 Pyrrhus defeated by M. Curius at Beneventum . . . 275 479 Milo surrenders Tarentum — Submission of South Italy 272 482 Rhegium taken ........ . 271 483 War with the Lucanians. — The submission of the Samnites did not secure for Italy the promised respite from trouble. In the late war the Lucanians had been most useful to Rome by oc- cupying the attention of Tarentum ; they now expected to reap their reward in the plunder of the rich cities of Magna Graecia. With this object Sthenius Statilius, the Lucanian general, laid siege to Thurii, which, in despair of all other help, threw itself on the mercy of Rome. That power, which, since the subjugation of Samnium and the foundation of Venusia, no longer needed the help of the Lucanians, lent a ready ear to the prayer of Thurii, and ordered Statilius to cease his assaults on the beleaguered city. The Lucanians replied by the vigorous prosecution of the sieg r e, and by a summons to all South Italy to unite with them in resisting the new pretensions of Rome. Etruria and the Gauls. — A more pressing danger prevented Rome throwing all her energies into the defence of Thurii. The Gauls and Etruscans had, on the whole, kept the peace since the ETKUKIA AND THE GAULS 121 great battle of Sentinum, for the revolt of Falerii (293 B.C.) hardly disturbed the general quiet, but they were now encouraged by the war in the south to tempt fortune again. The forces raised by the Etruscan malcontents, which were composed chiefly of Senonian mercenaries, laid siege to the faithful town of Arretium, and annihilated the Roman army sent to its relief. An embassy was despatched to the chiefs of the Senones, who were nominally FALISCAN VASE IN THE BRITISH MUSEUM. at peace with Rome, to complain that their people had served in the armies of Rome's enemies, and to demand the release of the prisoners. But the Gallic chieftain, Britomaris, slew the sacred envoys in revenge for the death of his father in the late battle. The outrage was signally avenged. The consul, P. Cornelius Dolabella, advanced into the land of the Senones, while the flower of their warriors was in Etruria, and destroyed the whole tribe. The men were slain without quarter, the women and children 122 HISTORY OF ROME enslaved ; the very name of the Senones disappears from the muster-rolls of Italy. The neighbouring clan of the Boii, in whom rage mastered terror, flew to arms to avenge their slaughtered countrymen. They poured over the Apennines, and were joined in their march on Rome by the Etruscans and their Gallic mercenaries. But their combined forces were utterly defeated by Dolabella, while they were attempting to cross the Tiber near Lake Vadimo (283 B.C.). In the following year, after a second defeat near Populonia, the Boii concluded a separate peace. The land of the Senones was given to the burgesses settled at Sena Gallica, which fortress was designed to serve as a check on the Gauls and a station for a Roman fleet on the Adriatic (283 B.C.). 1 The Breach with Tarentum. — Afterthe submission of the Gauls the Roman army took the offensive in Lucania. Hitherto it had been content to defend Thurii ; now C. Fabricius raised the siege by the defeat and capture of the Lucanian general, Statilius. The neighbouring cities of Croton, Locri, and Rhegium, following the example of Thurii, willingly received Roman garrisons. Taren- tum was thus hemmed in on all sides by the outposts of Rome ; even her maritime ascendency was threatened, in the Adriatic by the colonies of Hatria and Sena, and in the home waters by the Greek cities which had allied themselves with the barbarians. Though she had not drawn the sword against Rome, she was sus- pected of having instigated the war which she had not the courage herself to undertake. Suddenly the Roman admiral, Valerius, ap- peared in the bay of Tarentum at the head of a squadron of ten ships of war. Whether Valerius simply intended to put in at a friendly port on his way to the Adriatic, or hoped to enable the aristocratic partisans of Rome in Tarentum to seize the reins of government, is a moot point. In any case his act was contrary to Greek international law, and a direct violation of an existing treaty, which forbade the ships of Rome to sail beyond the Lacinian promontory at the western extremity of the Tarentine gulf. The people of Tarentum, assembled in the theatre overlooking their harbour, saw the Romans advance, and were easily persuaded by the demagogue Philocharis to avenge the insult. The Roman squadron was put to flight by their hastily manned galleys ; the admiral fell ; four ships were sunk 1 The account given in Polybius, ii. iq, 20, and preferred by Mommsen, is different in many points, and lays more stress on the part played by the Gauls. THE BREACH WITH TAKENTUM 123 and one taken. The prisoners were either put to death or sold into slaver)-. The die was now cast. The democrats of Tarentum, who had witnessed unmoved the long death-agonies of the Samnite nation, had been hurried by passion into the conflict which they had so long avoided. They resolved to follow up their first blow with energy. They marched to Thurii, compelled the Roman garrison to withdraw, and punished the principal citizens by exile and con- fiscation for preferring the assistance of barbarians to that of their own neighbours and countrymen (282 B.C.). Outbreak of War. — The Romans, who were afraid of driving Tarentum into the arms of Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, behaved with studied moderation. They despatched, not an army, but an em- bassy to Tarentum to demand satisfaction. The terms proposed were moderate — the release of the captives, the surrender of the demagogues who had instigated the assault on the Roman fleet, and the reversal of the late revolution at Thurii. The statesmen of Rome sought to place her partisans in power in both the Greek cities, and thus secure her ascendency without recourse to arms. But the democrats of Tarentum had gone too far to retreat. When the Roman ambassadors reached Tarentum, their foreign dress and broken Greek were ridiculed by the disorderly rabble gathered in the theatre to celebrate the Dionysia. Gravely and simply L. Postumius delivered his message, heedless of the insults showered upon him. But at last a drunken wretch bespattered the envoy's white toga with dirt, an outrage which was greeted by the riotous mob with shouts of laughter and thunders of applause. The Roman held up the sullied toga to the crowd, and solemnly warned them that the stains upon it would be washed out in their best blood. We may suspect that this tale has been in- vented or exaggerated to exalt the Roman by depreciating the Greek, but the contrast between the staid dignity of the ambas- sador and the insolent levity of the populace points a true moral, even if the anecdote itself is false. Notwithstanding this insult the Roman Senate was unwilling to proceed to extreme measures. They were conscious that the capture of Tarentum was beyond their powers, for its walls were strong enough to defy their rude siege-engines, and its superior fleet made an effective blockade impossible. The city could neither be forced nor starved into a surrender, and the attempt would only precipitate what Rome most feared, a summons to Pyrrhus. But it was still possible that Tarentum might be induced to prefer the peaceful acknow- 124 HISTORY OF ROME ledgment of Rome's supremacy to the hardships of war. Accord- ingly the consul L. /Emilius Barbula was instructed still to offer the same terms, but to begin hostilities at once if satisfaction were again refused. He scattered the troops and laid waste the lands of Tarentum, but spared the lives and properties of the aristocrats. Rome still hoped by wielding the sword with one hand, while with the other she offered the olive-branch, to bring moderate men in Tarentum to listen to reason. Nor were her hopes unfounded. While the principal democrats were absent on a mission to Pyrrhus, the aristocrats secured the election of their leader, Agis, as commander-in-chief. But, before he could take office and come to terms with Rome, the envoys returned from the Epirot court, accompanied by Cineas, the minister of Pyrrhus, who promised immediate support from his master. The demo- cratic party used their restored ascendency to depose Agis, and to promise the king pay and provisions for his troops, as well as the command of all the recruits they could raise in Italy. The admission of his most trusted general, Milo, with 3000 Epirots into the citadel finally committed Tarentum to the cause of the adventurous prince, who hoped to rival Alexander by spreading Hellenic rule and civilisation to the western boundary of the known world (2S1 B.C.). The Early Career of Pyrrhus. — Pyrrhus was the son of /Eacides — a cousin of Alexander the Molossian, and his successor on the throne. /Eacides lost his kingdom and his life through the intrigues of Cassander, the wily regent of Macedon, who thus avenged the support /Eacides had given to the ill-starred family of Alexander the Great. Pyrrhus was protected, and, while yet a boy, restored to the throne by Glaucias, an Ulyrian chieftain. When fresh disturbances drove him again into exile, he joined his brother-in-law, Demetrius Poliorcetes, and fought bravely by his side on the field of Ipsus. After that crushing defeat he was sent as a hostage for Demetrius to the court of Alexandria. There he won the good opinion of King Ptolemy by his soldierly spirit, and the favour of Berenice by his manly beauty and courteous bearing. With the help of the Egyptian king he re- established himself on the throne of his forefathers, and, in the troubles that followed the death of Cassander, won for the Epirots a much-needed outlet to the sea, by gaining command over the Gulf of Ambracia and the island of Corcyra. After some years of peace, Pyrrhus was encouraged by Ptolemy of Egypt, Seleucus of Syria, and Lysimachus of Thrace, who were again PYRRHUS THE EPIROT 125 leagued together against the restless and ambitious Demetrius, to drive that prince from the throne of Macedon. But after a seven months' reign the discontent of the Macedonians and the forces of Lysimachus compelled him to retire once more to his own kingdom of Epirus. In the petty duties of a tribal chieftain Pyrrhus could find no scope for his lofty ambition and military genius, and through six long years looked in vain for employment abroad. At last the appeal of the distressed Hellenic cities of the West for aid came as a message of release for the caged eagle of Epirus. The Schemes of Pyrrhus. — The ideas which animated the Epirot were not less bold than those which led Alexander across the Hellespont to gain the empire of the East. As the Macedonian had ended by his victory the long struggle with Persia, so Pyrrhus aspired to deliver the Greeks of the West from the dominion of the rude Italian and the hated Canaanite. Often in the ages past had the Carthaginian been driven from Eastern Sicily by the captains-general of Western Hellas. In older days Sicily had found leaders in the great tyrants, Gelo Hiero and Dionysius ; more recently she had looked for deliverance to the mother country, and found a saviour in the hero, Timoleon. Pyrrhus believed himself destined to complete and unite the schemes of his kinsman, Alexander of Epirus, and of his father-in-law, Agathocles, to humble Rome and Carthage to the dust, and found on the ruins of their dominions an Hellenic empire of the West. But this empire was the dream of a great adventurer, not the reasoned project of a statesman. When Alexander set but for the East he left Macedon securely guarded and Greece subject. Pyrrhus relied for the safety of Epirus on the good faith of neighbouring princes. Alexander led a sufficient army of Macedonian veterans to scatter the ill-disciplined hordes of Persia ; Pyrrhus had to face the national levies of Italy at the head of a motley army of allies and mercenaries, and for the navy, without which he could not hope to break the power of Carthage, was dependent on the fickle democracies of Syracuse and Tarentum. But though the schemes of Pyrrhus were doomed to failure, their surpassing interest sheds a reflected glory on their author. As the last great effort to deliver the West from the barbarian, and the first meeting of the phalanx and the legion in battle, the expedition of Pyrrhus is a turning-point in history. His defeat left Sicily the helpless prize in a mighty struggle between the rival cities of the West, and showed how powerless was the military science and political craft i 2 6 HISTORY OF ROME of the Greek to meet the unflinching resolution of Roman states- men and the patriotic devotion of the Roman militia. The Beginning of the War. — Pyrrhus landed in Italy at the head of an army raised for the most part in Northern and Western Greece, and consisting of 20,000 heavy-armed footmen, 3000 horse, 2500 archers and slingers, and 20 elephants. He found the hopes and promises of a general rising in Italy utterly vain. Even the men of Tarentum would not join heartily in the war which they had provoked. They had expected to hire a mercenary to fight their battles ; they found the king a stern and exacting master. He compelled the lazy burghers to mount guard on the wall ; he put down their clubs and assemblies, and shut up their theatre and gymnasia ; in fine, he treated Tarentum as a conquered town. The citizens were left no choice in the matter ; their resources were employed to hire Italian mercenaries, and their citadel be- came the base of the operations of the Epirot army. Rome was not behindhand in preparing for the coming con- flict. She repressed discontent among her subjects with a firm hand, and summoned to her standards full contingents both of her allies and her own citizens. A force advanced into Etruria to compel the revolted cities, Volci and Volsinii, to lay down their arms ; a second was held in reserve at Rome. Garrisons were placed in the Greek towns of Lower Italy, while the Lucanians and Samnites were held in check by the colonists of Venusia and a weak corps of observation. P. Valerius Laevinus, with the main army, hastened to meet the invader before he could effect a junction with the Samnites or foster insurrections in Magna Grascia. He found the Epirot troops occupying a position which covered the Tarentine colony of Heraclea. Battle of Heraclea. — Pyrrhus allowed the Romans to force the passage of the Siris, and thus compelled them to fight with a river in their rear. Seven times the legions strove to pierce the serried ranks of the Epirots, and but for the prayers and entreaties of the king the phalanx would have given way. At length each general brought up his last reserves, but the Roman horse would not face the terrors of the elephants. Their disordered flight broke the ranks of the infantry, and the whole army, horse and foot together, fled in confusion over the Siris. The military skill of Pyrrhus had won the day at Heraclea. By enticing the Roman legions into the plain, where his phalanx could maintain unbroken order and repel with ease all assaults on its bristling rows of pikes, he had gained a tactical advantage, which the PVR RHUS IN ITALY 127 terror inspired by the strange and monstrous appearance of the elephants had enabled him to turn to the best account. But it was a victory which could not be often repeated. Many of the best Epirot officers and four thousand veterans were left dead upon the field. Pyrrhus may well have felt that such a victory resembled a defeat. TETKAURACHM OF PYRRHUS STRUCK IN ITALY — HEAD OK ZEUS OF DODONA, AND THE GODDESS DIONE. But the successful encounter with a Roman army in the fidd encouraged South Italy to throw in its lot with the conqueror. When Lsevinus retired into Apulia, the Samnites, the Lucanians, and the Bruttians joined Pyrrhus. All the Greek cities, except Rhegium, now welcomed their deliverer. Even Rhegium was lost to the Romans, for its Campanian garrison seized the town, and entered into a close alliance with their kinsmen and neigh- bours, the Mamertines, who, with like treachery, had deserted Agathocles, and taken Messana for themselves. On the other hand, the Latins remained true to Rome. (2S0 B.C.) Embassy of Cineas. — Pyrrhus resolved to use his victory to make peace with Rome and devote his energies to the conquest of Punic Sicily. He sent his most trusted minister, Cineas the Thessalian, to try the arts of diplomacy, learnt in Hellenistic courts, on the Roman Senate. The concessions demanded were the release of the Greek towns in Italy from their allegiance to Rome, and the surrender of the strongholds of Roman power in South Italy, Venusia, and Luceria. The flattery, if not the gifts, of Cineas all but cajoled the Roman Senate into the acceptance of the proffered peace. But the indomitable resolution of Rome 128 HISTORY OF ROME found voice in the greatest man of her proudest house, the blind old consular, Appius Claudius. Lord Chatham protested in vain with dying voice against the dishonour of yielding to the coalition of France and America ; Appius inspired his countrymen with his own burning patriotism, and first enunciated the proud maxim that Rome never negotiated while foreign troops stood on Italian ground. Cineas, with all his courtier's arts, had failed in his mission, and returned to his master deeply impressed with the majesty of the Senate, which he called an assembly of kings. Pyrrhus, who had advanced into Campania to support by arms the demands of his envoy, was goaded by their rejection into a march on Rome. But the legions recalled from Etruria and the reserve in the capital were ready to repel any assault, and Laevinus, reinforced by two newly levied legions, hung upon his rear. Pyrrhus could only plunder the rich country south of Rome, and retire with his booty, first to Campania, and then to winter quarters at Tarentum. The arrival of a Roman embassy encouraged him to renew his offer of peace. But the consular, Fabricius, could not, we are told, be bribed, cajoled, or terrified into compliance with the king's wishes. Pyrrhus was obliged again to try the fortunes of war. Battle of Ausculum. — The second campaign was fought in Apulia. Pyrrhus, whose keen eye had perceived the value of the open order of battle adopted by the Romans, interspersed Italian cohorts between the subdivisions of his phalanx. But on the first day of the hard-fought battle at Ausculum the device availed him little. On the broken ground by th steep banks of a river his cavalry and elephants could not act. On the second day, however, he managed to deploy his phalanx on the plain beyond, and a second time the legionaries with their short swords hewed in vain at the hedge of pikes, till the arrival of the elephants was once more the signal for a general flight. The Roman army made good its retreat across the river to its camp with the loss of six thousand men ; the conquerors admitted that three thousand five hundred of their number had fallen. Such a victory was not calculated to break up the Roman confederacy, and sadly weakened the Epirot army. (279 B.C.) Pyrrhus goes to Sicily— Alliance of Rome and Carthage. — Pyrrhus was weary of fruitless victories, and anxious to escape with honour from an impossible position. While the indomitable resistance of Rome was wearing out his energies, Syracuse was anxiously expecting deliverance at his hands from the Cartha- PYRRHUS IN SICILY 129 ginians. The king readily accepted the invitation, but the im- mediate effect of his new policy was to unite his enemies. Rome and Carthage entered into a league against him, by which each bound itself to render assistance to the other if its territory was attacked, and to refuse all offers of a separate peace. The Romans thus gained the assistance of the Punic navy ; the Carthaginians hoped to complete the conquest of Sicily, while their allies de- tained the king in Italy. But Pyrrhus seized the first chance offered him of patching up an armistice with the Romans. The consul Fabricius handed over to the king a traitor who proposed to poison him for money, and so paved the way for an interchange of prisoners and a cessation of hostilities. (278 B.C.) Leaving Milo in Tarentum, and his own son Alexander at Locri, Pyrrhus set sail for Syracuse. During his absence the war in Italy languished. The Lucanians and Bruttians were punished for their insurrection, but the Samnites once again repulsed the Roman armies. The Greek cities were gradually subdued ; Heraclea obtained favourable terms ; Croton was cap- tured by a stratagem ; Locri massacred its Epirot garrison, and thus atoned for its earlier treachery to Rome. Only Tarentum was held for the king. Pyrrhus in Sicily. — In Sicily, Pyrrhus won a series of triumphs. City after city was taken, until the Carthaginians were shut up in Lilybaeum and the Mamertines in Messana. The Carthaginians offered as the price of peace to resign all claim to the sovereignty of Sicily if they might keep Lilybaeum. But Pyrrhus rejected the insidious proposal, for he saw that if Carthage kept a foothold in Sicily she could at once regain her dominions when he had gone. He preferred to continue the struggle, and called on his Sicilian allies to build' a fleet. But the fickle Sicilians murmured at the burden of military service, and resented the autocratic rule of the king. They negotiated with their enemies, the Mamer- tines and Carthaginians, and treated their deliverer as a tyrant. In the field Pyrrhus was as brilliant as ever ; he drove the Car- thaginian army, which ventured out from Lilybaeum,' back into its stronghold ; but he felt that the day of his greatness was past. Sicily had shown herself unworthy of the hero to whom she had called for aid. (277-6 B.C.) Defeat and Departure of Pyrrhus. — Turning his back on Sicily, Pyrrhus returned to Tarentum a " soured and disappointed" man. On his way he had to fight the Carthaginian fleet off Syracuse and the Mamertine army near Rhegium. He succeeded I 130 HISTORY OF ROME in surprising Locri, and replenished his treasury with the plunder of the temple of Persephone. But his Sicilian dominions fell away from him as soon as he left the island, and his Italian allies had lost faith in his star. His brave Epirots had fallen on many a well-fought field, and their places had been taken by forced levies or by foreign mercenaries. Yet the Romans took the field for the decisive campaign in 275 B.C. with reluctance and apprehen- sion. While L. Cornelius Lentulus marched into Lucania, Manius Curius faced Pyrrhus in Samnium. The Romans occupied a strong position in the hills near Beneventum, which Pyrrhus de- termined to storm before Lentulus could come to his colleague's assistance. But everything went wrong with the attacking force. A whole division lost its way in the forest, and came up too late ; neither the phalanx nor the cavalry could act, and the elephants, terrified by the storm of burning arrows with which the Romans received them, rushed furiously back through the ranks of their own friends. Pyrrhus could not keep the field after his defeat. His entreaties to his allies, the kings of Macedon, Syria, and Egypt, for help were coldly rejected. With a heavy heart he took leave of Italy, and returned to his own land. There he grasped once more at the crown of Macedon, but his vehement and haughty courage, which still gained him victories, was no match for the cool and cautious policy of Antigonus Gonatas. At length, he fell ingloriously in a street fight at Argos, struck down by a tile thrown by a woman's hand. Surrender of Tarentum. — Milo had been left in Italy to hold Tarentum. So long as his master lived, he withstood boldly the disaffection of the citizens and the attacks of Rome. But when news came of his death, he cared only to secure an honourable retreat for the Epirot garrison. A Roman army was outside the walls, a Carthaginian fleet before the harbour. Each power strained every nerve to win the prize. Milo preferred to treat with the Roman general, L. Papirius, and by the surrender of the citadel purchased a free departure for himself and his troops. The Cartha- ginians, who had doubtless hoped to secure in Tarentum a second Lilybaeum, now disavowed all selfish intentions, and professed to have merely offered naval assistance to the Roman army in con- formity with the treaty. Tarentum, deprived of her army, her ships, and her walls, lost her independence and prosperity, but retained the right of local self-government. (272 B.C.) Submission of Italy to Rome. — In the same year the Samnites, Lucanians, and Bruttians submitted to the inevitable yoke of ROME MISTRESS OF ITALY 131 Rome. Bands of guerrillas still haunted the mountains, but three years later sword and cord established peace even in those wild regions. The sternest punishment was meted out to the mutineers who had seized Rhegium. These freebooters filled up the cup of their iniquity by the sack of Croton and the massacre of its Roman garrison. A strong force was sent against them ; Hiero, the new master of Syracuse, sent help to the Romans, and kept their friends and compatriots, the Mamertines of Messana, occupied at home. After a severe struggle the town was stormed, and its defenders, who survived the assault, executed. The city was restored to its ancient inhabitants and retained its local autonomy. Rome now ruled supreme from the straits of Messina to the river Arno and the headland of Ancona. A new act in the drama begins when the mistress of Italy comes into conflict with the great naval power of Carthage. The struggle had been already foreseen by Pyrrhus, who, when he turned his back on Sicily, repined at leaving so fair a battlefield to the Romans and Car- thaginians. The issue of the great duel secured for Rome the empire of the civilised world. CHAPTER XVII THE POSITION AND RESOURCES ' OF ROME AND CARTHAGE Retrospect and Prospect — Organisation of Italy — Roman Army and Navy — Carthage, Constitution, Organisation and Resources. Rome a Great Power. — The battle of Beneventum and the subjugation of the revolted tribes closes the chapter of Italian struggle and opens the period of external conquest. A new power, with a peculiar organisation and a national army, was revealed to the civilised world, schooled by experience to deal with the new and grave problems presented by the state of foreign affairs. Rome, mistress of Italy from the v£sis to the sea, was recognised in 273 B.C. by Egypt as a great power, and in 272 B.C. the collision with Carthage at Tarentum foreshadowed the course of coming events. Retrospect and Prospect. — We have traced the growth of the united city as the struggle for existence became a struggle for predominance ; we have watched the gradual consolidation of her 132 HISTORY OF ROME orders and her institutions. Her people, strong in its qualities and in its defects, without genius, culture, or elasticity, endowed with a sense of order and discipline, strictly legal and endlessly tenacious, secure in conquered rights, and led by a vigorous and patriotic nobility as yet uncorrupted by the plunder of provinces, had proved itself more than a match for even the picked troops of the finest soldier of the day. It had been welded by constitu- tional conflict, and educated by political action ; it had benefited KING IN CHARIOT. [Terra-cot/a of Punic workmanship.) equally by victory and defeat in civic training and military tactics. It had now to enter on a new path. Ancient policy did not recognise the balance of power. Its scientific frontier was found in a belt of weakness ; it tolerated no rival on its borders whose strength was a possible danger. It was this, and the necessities of the moment, with the natural appetite for expansion and plunder, which urged the Government, not so much to make a bold bid for empire, as to enter on a policy of piecemeal annexation GOVERNMENT OF THE SENATE 133 and half-reluctant aggression, for which the character neither of the people nor of its institutions was thoroughly adequate. We have now to trace the beginnings of the provincial system, the growth of the professional army ; the reaction of both on the city- state and its finance, on morals and religion ; the decay of the constitutional factors, the break-down of the military organisation, the gradual growth of an Italian question, the rise of a proletariate, the extension of slavery, the intensification of the old social and economic difficulties. Here, too, begins with the career of Scipio Africanus the line of commanding personalities, whose life and action, accustoming men to the idea of a single ruler, set the precedents and paved the way for Caesar. In the period immediately before us the democratic movement has subsided. The comitia, hampered by religious and constitu- tional restrictions, weakened by war and the diffusion of the citizen body throughout Italy, fall under the control of the magistrates. The magistrates, coming out of and returning into the Senate, with short tenure of office, saddled with the intercession of colleague or tribune, fall in their turn under the control of the Senate. The Senate, the sole deliberative assembly, permanent in power and patronage, becomes the de facto government of Rome. It directs military operations ; it arranges for the cumulation or prorogation of office ; it manages the departments of finance and foreign policy, in an age when finance and foreign policy are dominant. The day of patrician intrigue and reactionary conservatism is over. With the admission of the plebs to the higher honours, the passing of the Lex Ovinia, and the accession of plebeians to the censorship (351 B.C.), a career had been opened to ability, the emulation of the nobles stirred ; there was an influx into the Senate of younger, abler men of moderate views and tried capacity. The House, filled almost automatically with ex-officers of state, strengthened with a constant supply of new blood, entered on a new course with larger ideas and a broader policy. But in this period, also, the decay of the yeomanry and the growth of capitalism coincides with the extension of the empire. A new political order — the Equites — forms alongside of the official nobility, while the growing contact with Greece and the East tends more and more to affect the simplicity of Roman manners. Italian Organisation. — Rome's territory was compact ; her subjects were divided by no deep cleavage of race, feeling, or culture. Step by step her steady, ceaseless advance was secured 134 HISTORY OF ROME by a network of roads and fortresses. The peoples she annexed were not at once, as in modern times, levelled with their con- querors by allegiance to a common lord. She maintained the distinction of subject and citizen. The Roman franchise was at once an object of desire and a privileged position, granted at discretion to individuals or to whole states. The organisation of Italy was peculiar, and differed essentially from modern methods. There was no division into administrative districts, no uniformity of local government, law, and taxation. Annexation, colonisation, federation, had placed Rome at the head of a species of con- federacy, whose elements formed a congeries of communities with diverse and graduated rights. The national leagues were dis- solved, or limited to religious ceremonies ; joint assemblies and reciprocal franchises x were abolished ; a policy of subdivision and isolation, with a carefully adjusted distribution of privilege, paralysed joint action and drew the separated units closely to Rome. The jealousy of states, and the jealousy of orders in the states, was carefully utilised ; the constitutions were often re- modelled in an aristocratic sense. This system combined to some extent the advantages of local government and centralisa- tion. The weightier questions of internal administration, the whole foreign and intercommunal relations of the several states, were controlled by the paramount power. Local matters were settled by local councils and magistrates in accordance with the law or treaty which regulated the affairs of each community. The prerogatives of sovereignty ex- tended indeed beyond the formal rights of coinage, peace, and war, but the relation of sovereign and subject was left purposely indefinite, and there was no technical name for the Roman hegemony. The burghers of Rome of the thirty-three tribes — finally thirty-five — included, besides the actual inhabitants of the city and its immediate territory, and of the subject or allied towns to which full rights had been granted out of gratitude or policy, those who had been settled on confiscated land throughout Italy, either individually, or collectively in citizen colonies. 2 The latter were a privileged class, with undiminished rights as citizens, rapidly assimilating in each town the subject population along- side them. Beneath these, in various stages of autonomous dependency, 1 The right of intermarriage and settlement, vide p. 98. 2 The citizen-colonies were mainly maritime ; the Latin colonies com- manded the great roads, vide map. ITALIAN ORGANISATION 135 come (1) the different classes of municipia, possessing the private rights of citizens, the civitas sine suffragio et sine iurc honorum, with the ins privatum of Rome administered by Roman praefects, burdened with personal service in the legion and the payment of the tributwn, retaining" or not, according to circumstances, the full or partial administration of local business j 1 (2) the civitates feederatce, whose dependence, nominally in political matters only, was actually more deeply felt. They furnished each a contingent to the army, and enjoyed full local autonomy, the right of coin- age, of jurisdiction, and the ius exilii. Among these come the Latin colonies, or Colonies of Latin Right, the outposts and watch-towers of Rome, dependent on Rome for life and land, with smaller franchise and larger autonomy than the colony of burgesses, with fuller rights than the ordinary ally;" the rest are strictly socii, enjoying various immunities, limited only in foreign policy, and bound to render aid in war with ships or men ; such are Neapolis, Heraclea, or Tarentum. No doubt the rights so granted were gradually curtailed in proportion as the bestowal of the fran- chise was restricted, and the policy of Rome changed from one of incorporation and extension to one of jealous exclusion. The one thing sure was the gradual equalisation of pressure ; the one thing definitely fixed was the contingent of men or ships — deter- mined in the end only by the necessities or the power of Rome. But, in the meantime, policy mitigated despotism ; the allies enjoyed a free communal constitution, exemption from taxation, save that implied in the equipment and payment of their con- scripts, with a large share in the military and political successes which they helped to achieve, and in the august name and destinies of Rome. The strength of the growing Italian feeling, the solidity of this unique organisation, and the value of the Latin fortresses were severely tested in the war of Hannibal ; and the failure to follow up the wise policy of their fathers in this respect brought the Romans of the next period into deadly peril. In contrast with the factious Grecian states, with the loosely organised empire of Carthage, with the decrepit kingdoms of the East and the restless tribes of the North, stands the compacted Italian republic, with its strong national spirit, its willing, obedient subjects. The Army. — In ancient times the form and character of a 1 The term " municipium " conies to mean, later on, a country town of Roman citizens. 2 By the year 268 B.C. they were twenty-two in number, vide map. These, with the relics of the Cassian League, make up the Nomen Latinum. 13O HISTORY OF ROME government was largely determined by the character of the national armaments. The army is a fundamental institution of Rome, with whose history is inseparably bound up the his- tory of her total development. She was essentially a fighting nation. The history of that army follows a general law of ancient military progress. To the system of caste, when a ruling aristocracy retains in its own hands the science of war, succeeds the citizen army or fleet, whose special character is dictated by the local characteristics or political necessities of each state. From the citizen-militia is developed the professional, often the mercenary, army, to be succeeded by the standing armies and palace guard of a military monarchy. Power passes to the trained battalions. The Roman army exhibits such a gradual change in its tactics, its organisation, its recruiting fields, and each change is reflected in the face of current politics. As each new class enters the service, it presses against the limits of the franchise. Extended operations, distant fields of war, the requirements of the provinces, the development of tactics and individual drill combine with moral and economic causes to transform the farmer conscript of Camillus into the professional veteran of Csesar. At this period the backbone of the legions was still formed by that sound yeomanry, whose conservative instincts and fighting qualities made them the bulwark alike of Rome's constitution and power. From the same class came the Italian cohorts. But with the increasing need of troops and the growing distaste of the wealthier classes for their military duties, the property qualification for the legion is gradually lowered, the proletariate press in, and the effect is seen in the remodelling {circ. 241 B.C.) of the comitia centuriata : there is a marked growth in the allied contingents ; the cavalry service passes from the burgesses to the allies, the soldier tends to separate from the citizen, while the appointment of the staff by the people drags the army into the sphere of party politics. Service was at once a duty and a privilege ; every citizen was liable to serve, and, strictly speaking, only a citizen could serve. He was liable from the seventeenth to the forty-sixth year, and for sixteen to twenty campaigns in the infantry, ten in the cavalry. A certain number of campaigns was the condition of civil pro- motion, and the military tribuneship the first step in the career of office (311 B.C.). The capite censi and freedmen, except in a crisis, were relegated to the fleet. Owing to this extension of service, the total force at the disposal of the Senate, with whom rested the THE ARMY 137 control of the army, may be estimated for this period at over 700,000 foot and 70,000 horse, exclusive of the seniors reserved for garrison duty, but inclusive of the contingents of the Latin name and allies. Of this total, the citizens, with the cives sine suffragio? might amount to over 273,000, the allies to over 497,000. A first summons on a great emergency could place above 200,000 soldiers in the field. The proportion of allies to citizens serving with the colours was, strictly speaking, determined in accordance with the original arrangement or treaty, on a scale relative to the number of available men and the number of legions on foot. Theoretically they furnished an equal force of infantry and thrice the cavalry, but the number steadily rose till two allies were summoned for every citizen. At this period, of the normal levy of two consular armies or four legions annually raised and annually discharged — 41,600 men — the allies contributed 20,000 foot and 3600 horse to the 16,800 foot and 1200 horse of the regular army ; i.e., roughly, about 4 to 3 2 — a number not disproportioned to their population. As, however, their population decreased, while that of Rome increased, the burden of the growing contingent, equipped and paid as it was by the various communities, and only main- tained in the field by Rome, became heavier. In the Punic wars the pressure was often severely felt. Besides the allies we have to recognise the corps of auxilia — allies or mercenary — Cretan archers, Moorish javelineers, Spanish infantry, Gallic cavalry, who were needed to meet the light troops of Hannibal. With these additions, we may reckon a consular army at from 20,000 to 24,000 men, consisting of two legions, each containing 4200 (rising occasionally to 5200) legionaries and 300 Roman horse, with 5000 foot and 900 horse of the allies. The number of legions on foot rises in the second Punic war to as many as from eighteen to twenty-three — not, of course, acting in combination. Development of the Legion — The Greek phalanx of the Servian army, as a tactical body, lacked mobility. Against a Gallic charge or for mountain warfare it was useless. Only as strong as any one of its sides, its dislocation was disastrous, and it had no reserve. At the same time, the heavy burden of unpaid 1 Numbering about 50,000 and furnishing the Legio Campana, so named because the largest number came from Campania. 2 In case of necessity, and especially where a district was liable to be the seat of war, the proportion naturally rises. 138 HISTORY OF ROME service and the tributum rendered short campaigns a necessity to the small farmer. Strategy was out of the question. A series of gradual and undated changes in tactics and organisation leads us to the manipular legion. With the introduction of pay in 406 B.C., the burden of payment was shifted from the tribe to the treasury ; the gradual accession of plebeians to high command improved the position of the common soldier. War ceased to be ruinous, and (cf. law of 342 B.C. 1 ) became actually attractive. Recruits pressed in with the prospect of pay, booty, and allotments of land. The civic system of classes gave way before the demand for men and for a more uniform armament required by the change of tactics. Position in the ranks was determined by age and expe- rience rather than by wealth. The new levies were formed upon a reserve of professional, disciplined, experienced soldiers. By a development of principles often attributed to Camillus, and already at work in the fourth century, open order was sub- stituted for close formation. The new system was worked out in the Gallic and Samnite wars. The brigade was drawn up in three divisions. In front stood the younger men — Hastati — 1200 strong ; in the second line the Principes, men in the vigour of life, also 1200. A veteran corps of 600 Triarii acted as reserve ; 1200 light-armed troops, or Velites, organised 211 B.C., take the place of the old Rorarii and Accensi. The heavy-armed troops were broken up into maniples or companies, ten in each line — each an indepen- dent tactical unit — consisting of 120 men, subdivided for mobility into two centuries of 60 (in the Triarii, 60 and 30 respectively). The maniples were arranged with distances of three feet between each rank and file — occasionally six feet — and with intervals of equal size between the companies, each interval covered by its rear com- pany, like squares on a chess-board. The intervals served for the skirmishers, attached to the maniples — twenty to each century, — to advance or retire, left space to receive a broken or throw forward a reserve division, and permitted the passage of cavalry when the companies covered to form a column of cohorts. For probably as early as this, certainly by the time of Marius, the brigade was broken, as to its depth, into teri battalions of three companies, larger tactical bodies, called cohorts. The so-called Quincunx order soon gave way to continuous lines. The names of the three ranks lost all connection with their armament. By this time the Triarii had temporarily dropped the 1 Vide supra, p. 101. THE ARMY 139 pilum, and received the hasta or pike ; the two first lines were armed with the hurling pilum, the characteristic Roman arm, a formidable weapon of considerable range and penetration. The short, straight, stabbing Spanish sword was adopted in the second Punic war ; a short knife, bronze casque with plume, the oblong scutum, greave, and cuirass complete the ordinary equipment. Each legion was officered by six tribunes, of whom those appointed to the regular four legions were chosen by the people, the rest by the commander, noble youths who made their office the first step in civil life, and served their preliminary campaigns in the cavalry or on the general's suite. Promotion in the ranks ceased with the centurions, sixty in number, two to each maniple, the senior commanding the company, among whom a regular order tended to be established from the lowest centurion of the first division to the primus pilus, or senior centurion of the Triarii. Cavalry — The regular cavalry, 300 strong, was divided into ten turmas or squadrons of thirty men, each commanded by the senior decurion, with two decurions and three optiones under his orders. It was, strictly speaking, drawn from the richest citizens, and enjoyed triple pay and other privileges ; but the old eighteen centuries had become a parade corps, and the cavalry was chiefly supplied, first by volunteers, and then by allies and auxiliaries. It had been, and remained, a secondary matter, and proved itself, both in numbers and handling, a lasting weakness of the Roman service. At Capua (211 B.C.) it required to be strength- ened by the new corps of Velites, who either acted as a sort of mounted infantry, riding en croupe, or closed the intervals of the maniples, or skirmished in double line before the heavy-armed. Allies. — The contingents of the allies, armed, equipped, and organised in the Roman fashion, were formed into two alas, each commanded by three Roman prsefecti socium, with local officers beneath them. These were divided into cohorts 420 strong, each under a prefect — according to races — and subdivided into maniples and centuries. 1600 foot and 600 horse were normally selected to form a special corps of Extraordinarii. The cavalry was divided into squadrons 300 strong, with five turmae of sixty each. Tactics, &c. — The legions were levied on the Capitol, the allies raised by the several communities. The military oath was taken for the campaign to the commanding officer. On the march the army moved in a single column, unless in tace of an enemy, 1 40 HISTORY OF ROME with the legions in the centre, the allies in the van and rear, the corps d'dlite acting as advanced or rear guard according to circum- stances. Each night a regularly constructed camp was formed, serving as a base of operations, a support for the line of battle, a refuge in case of defeat. In the order of battle the legions TORTAi iDECUMANA ■ ioo>«->«:i><-ioo>*'x-ioo->-eo-oo--ioo-xioo>"So-c- < " - \- o Iff z x a a. PRI°NCI PALIS SOCIORUM LEGATI 1/1 p £ O 5 -j a. q M p £ O 5 -> Sa QUAESTORIUM^[ PRAE- TORIUM T E S E X - PEDITES EXTRA" T R A R~ ORDI- NARII It a. < > » » - a. Z If) w - " w 2 Q 3 < o z < D < o < 3 D a *■> — fl •9 rt c "£< C o C j ° « rt ■3 « 5.2 ' SI'S ! ^ o u > 8 u tM u S s u •e -a .a Jh ."lis o B-. ™ si „ 5 art u CARTHAGE AND MASSINISSA 247 nervous partiality of the Senate, and in the prohibition of war with Rome's allies, two powerful weapons for the vindictive and am- bitious Massinissa. Under the conduct of Hannibal the city had rapidly recovered. The finances had been reorganised and the government reformed in a democratic sense ; the indemnity was being discharged as fast as Rome would permit, and Hannibal himself was looking hopefully to the East, when, in 195 B.C., on the eve of the war with Antiochus, he was denounced by the oligarchs and Roman spies and his surrender demanded. The suffete fled ; his house was razed, his goods confiscated, and in the ferment of parties the Romanising oligarchs took the lead. But even now the unjust judges at Rome encouraged the Numidian king's encroach- ments. The patient Phoenicians, loyal to their engagements, what- ever the continual rumours to the contrary, appealed regularly to the suzerain, only to receive the visits of commissions, who discussed, reported, adjourned, and carried back stories of the imperishable wealth of the populous and prosperous city. The fertile districts of the Emporia, on the Lesser Syrtis, were already gone, and Carthage had actually paid a large indemnity to the aggressor, when, after an interval of apparent peace, fresh robberies produced fresh com- plaints, and the bitter cry for justice or downright subjection drew some little succour. For the times were still critical, and Massi- nissa had grown too strong. On the ruins of Syphax's nomad state he had founded a real kingdom. With the favour of Rome, he had thrown a girdle of annexation round Carthage, his destined capital, from the borders of Mauretania to the sands of Cyrene. He had filled his treasury, settled his people, and formed an army. He was a true king and tried soldier, tough and unscrupulous, as temperate and enduring as he was supple and cunning, who lived strongly every hour of his ninety years. He had created a capital at Cirta, had fostered a mingled Libyan and Punic civilisa- tion destined to a vigorous life, and founded a nation. He had now to learn, in spite of all his help in the Spanish and Eastern wars, of all his self-abasing flaitery, that the day of vassal king- doms was over. A wiser policy would have kept the balance, as Hiero had done at Syracuse, between the rival states of Rome and Carthage. Cato and Carthage. — In 157 B.C. the commission under M. Por- cius Cato, which, after long delay, came to deal with the seizure by Numidia of Tusca and the plains by the Bagradas, left the question undecided, but brought back the settled conviction that closed each speech of the narrow-minded censor with the phrase, " Censeo 24S HISTORY OF ROME delendam esse Carthaginem." Her docks and shipping, her fair gardens and crowded streets, her full treasury and arsenals, con- demned her. In vain Scipio Nasica and the minority protested. The annexationists prevailed, supported as they were by the in- fluence of commercial jealousy, of the old natural and nervous hatred, and of the zeal, eloquence, and enthusiasm of the aged and powerful Cato. Crippled, insulted, robbed, Carthage was still a terror to Rome, an eyesore to her commerce. The casus belli was not far to seek. In a struggle of factions the national democrats had banished some partisans of Numidia, and refused their re- instatement at the cost of war and in spite of the persuasions or commands of Rome. In 151 B.C. the vain and corpulent Hasdrubal had been thoroughly beaten by Massinissa under the eyes of yEmilianus, sent to Africa to get elephants for the Spanish army. The peace Scipio mediated brqke down. The Punic troops surrendered, were disarmed and massacred. Now that the hard work was done, Rome, who had watched with secret pleasure her allies cut each other's throats, pushed aside her disappointed agent and appeared as principal. Breach with Carthage. — The treaty had been broken, an ally attacked, Rome's demand for disarmament neglected, her legates even roughly handled — at least such was the plea — and the enemy had already fallen. She prepared for war, and Utica, at odds with Carthage, at once surrendered, affording Rome a strong and convenient base. In vain Carthage condemned her leaders to death and offered every satisfaction. In 149 B.C. Manilius and Censorinus, with an unusually powerful force, left Lilybseum with secret orders. Before they left, the Punic plenipotentiaries had made an absolute submission. It was accepted, and they were guaranteed, on condition of giving up 300 hostages and " obeying such further commands as should be imposed by the consuls," their liberty, laws, territory, all but the city itself. The ominous conditions and equally ominous omission were marked, but not realised. Though the hostages were sent, the army sailed, and on its arrival at Utica the master-stroke of perfidy was played. The "further orders" were issued one by one. At last, when walls were stripped, arms delivered, ships surrendered, came the fatal command to destroy the city and settle ten miles from the beloved sea. It was a sentence of death. The ancient feeling for hearth and home, the gods and the dead, for the sacred city and its hallowed soil, for their harbours and their seas, fed by CARTHAGE and its Neighbourhood. Mow & LeigUa Rom-Eist THIRD PUNIC WAR 249 all the power of Punic patience, of Semitic hatred and passionate indignation at the shameless mockery of rig-ht, blazed out in a frenzy of despair. Material and hands were abundant. The whole town became a workshop of war, in which men and women toiled alike. A truce of thirty days, granted by mistaken policy and utilised with super- human energy, concealed by a still more marvellous coolness, pre- pared for the consuls a surprise as ugly as their own. The city, armed in a month, twice repelled an assault ; and Hasdrubal, with 20,000 men outside the walls, prevented a formal blockade. Site of Carthage. — The city proper lay on the southern portion of a low peninsula jutting into the Gulf of Tunis, between Capes Farina and Bon. Except on the west, it is encompassed by water, and the isthmus which connects it with the mainland is about two miles broad, expanding towards the east, and running up into hills at the seaward extremity. On one of these stood the citadel (ISyrsa) of the old town, which was covered on the land- ward side by the most massive fortifications of antiquity. The wall, forty-five feet in height, was towered and battlernented and furnished with vast casemates, serving as stables, store-rooms, and barracks, the whole extending to a breadth of thirty-three feet. Slighter lines protected the rich and beautiful suburb (Megara or Magalia), which, with the necropolis, filled the remainder of the peninsula to the north and west. At the south-east corner lay the double artificial harbour — the inner circular basin (Cothon), with the port-admiral's house on the central island, strongly fortified by the city wall — and the outer rectangular commercial harbour, with its broad quays and weaker walls, and an extension quay running along its seaward side. From this point a long narrow tongue of land ran out south, almost wholly shutting off the shallow lake of Tunis, which, washing the south side of the city, formed a station for ships of lighter draught. The defence was conducted by Hasdrubal, a grandson of Mas- sinissa, with whom co-operated the army of Numidian rebels and Punic emigrants under Hasdrubal the Fat. The Numidian cavalry of Himilco Phameas were especially useful. Manilius lay on the isthmus, while Censorinus operated from the tongue (Taenia) and the bay, where the wall was weakest. The attack was repulsed. The inactivity and death of Massinissa, disease, and famine crippled the Roman offensive. An expedition against Hasdrubal ended in disgrace, and the year's work redounded only to the credit of the tribune Scipio, who crowned his brilliant exploits as a soldier by 250 HISTORY OF ROME the skilful diplomacy with which he settled the Berber king's in- • Onllel PLAN OF HARBOURS AT CARTHAGE. heritance among his sons, Micipsa, Gulussa, and Mastanabal, and SIEGE OF CARTHAGE 251 induced Himilco to bring over his light horse, earning by his energy the praise of the veteran Cato, as the one man among the gliding shades. Numidia was left, by a precarious arrangement, to the common rule, with divided functions, of its three heirs. The next year, 148 B.C., was spent in futile attacks on the coast-towns, while Carthage received the deserter Bithyas, with Soo Numidian horse, and negotiated with the pseudo-Philip of Macedon. Appointment of Scipio. — In 147 B.C. Publius Scipio, the adopted grandson of the hero of Zama, son of L. ^Emilius Paullus, a dis- tinguished officer and gifted statesman, by popular favour and family influence was elected consul, contrary to law, at the age of thirty-seven, and appointed specially to the African command. He was thorough, if not brilliant, and it is highly probable that his services have been overcoloured by the partial estimate of his friend Polybius. Purging the demoralised camp, he tightened up the relaxed discipline and restored the tone of the army. He had simply to apply overwhelming resources with patience and persist- ence. Arriving at a critical moment, he rescued Mancinus, who had contrived, by a bold stroke, to isolate himself on a cliff on the steep seaward side of Magalia, whence he could neither advance nor retreat. The Siege. — The siege began in form. Hasdrubal and Bithyas, who had drawn close to Carthage, were forced to enter the city, abandoning the isthmus and the suburb. But Scipio, despairing of a storm, neglected the advantage, and drew a double line across the isthmus from sea to sea. The usual struggle of fanatics and moderates ensued in the beleaguered city, followed by a coup d'e'/ai and the murder of Roman prisoners and partisans. Hasdrubal received dictatorial power. Carthage had numbered 700,000 souls at the beginning of the siege, and in the narrow compass of the old city, the remnant, crowded, starved, and diseased, depended for supplies on the brilliant blockade-running of Bithyas and the daring merchantmen. To complete his work, Scipio constructed a mole, ninety-six feet broad, from the north end of the Taenia, to close the harbour-mouth. Its approaching success silenced the scoffs of the besieged, but the laugh turned once more when out of a new passage, pierced by the silent and secret work of two months, in the narrow eastern wall of the Cothon, a new-built fleet of fifty ships put out to sea. Losing the chance of a sudden attack on Scipio's dismantled fleet, they returned on the third day, to fight an indecisive battle, and suffered severe damage in effecting 2 52 HISTORY OF ROME their return through the narrow entry. Scipio now attacked the outer quay, defended for the emergency by a hasty rampart. Once the assault was baffled with splendid courage, but a lodgment was at length effected, a position fortified on the quays, and the blockade completed. The fall of Nepheris, whence the supplies had been thrown in, left famine and pestilence to do the rest, and yet Hasdrubal rejected terms for himself and his friends. Carthage Taken and De- stroyed.— In the spring of 146 B.C., when these strong allies had reduced the starving city to de- spair, Scipio advanced to storm. The outer harbour was evacu- ated and burned, and, unper- ceived in the smoke and tumult, C. Laelius scaled the wall and pushed into the Cothon. From the adjoining market-place the legions forced their way in a prolonged and bloody street- fight, from storey to storey, from house to house, up the three narrow lanes that led to the citadel. On the seventh day the remnant on the Byrsa, 50,000 men and women, surrendered. Hasdrubal, who, with the Roman deserters, had fled to the huge and lofty temple of Eshmun on the citadel rock, escaped at the last moment from the flames, in which his comrades and his wife, with bitter taunts on the dastard, perished. FALL OF CARTHAGE 253 By special orders from Rome the city was burned, its site ploughed up and cursed. With vast booty, Scipio returned in triumph, a triumph chastened by melancholy forebodings for the future of Rome herself. As he gazed on the fire, that burned for seventeen days, he burst into tears, and the line escaped his lips — HaaeraL ^j/xap orav tvot 6X^X17 "IAtos ipr}. Of the captives, Hasdrubal, whose services have deserved perhaps better terms than those bestowed by Polybius on the " pot-bellied, strutting, and incapable coward, glutton, and tyrant," remained a prisoner in Italy. The rest died in chains or slavery. Africa a Province.— Africa became a province (stretching along the coast from the Tusca to Thenae), whose capital was the free city of Utica, the centre of Roman trade. It paid a moderate stipendium, or definite fixed tribute, raised directly from the subject communities, who kept their lands and liberties on sufferance. The allied cities were declared free ; the territory of those destroyed was leased as domain land by the censors. Numidia, with definite limits, was left to defend the frontier, and retained its possessions, surrounding the province on three sides. CHAPTER XXV FIFTY YEARS OF CONQUEST THE EASTERN STATES AND THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR B.C. A.U.C. Rome declares war on Philip - 200 554 Flamininus appointed General 198 556 Battle of Cynoscephalce 197 557 Peace made— Settlement of Greece 195 358 The Eastern States. — The story of the nations beyond the Adriatic concerns us only so far as they enter the Roman sphere of influence. Even so, it is difficult enough to give any brief and clear account of the internal condition of the several communi- ties, or of their constantly changing relations to each other at this epoch. The powers, of the East may be roughly classified as rrwnarchies and free republics, from which standpoint we may say, on the whole, that Rome and the free states stood together 254 HISTORY OF ROME against the kings ; or they may be divided into essentially peace- ful and essentially aggressive states, when Rome may be said to give support to the pacific governments. Macedon. — Of the three great monarchies carved by his suc- cessors out of the empire of Alexander, which maintained at this time an unstable equilibrium, Macedon, under the personal rule of Philip V. (r.c. 220-179), was the soundest and strongest. The vigorous peasantry, although wasted by war and by the recent incursions of the Gauls, retained its national spirit and its ancient fidelity to the half-constitutional despotism of its kings. Her compact and imposing phalanx, the one genuine fighting-force of the East, except the Parthian cavalry, with her hold on the "fetters of Greece," the fortresses of Demetrias, Chalcis, and Corinth, made Macedon the dominant power in Greece. /Etolia had been humbled in the " Social War," which ended with the peace of Naupactus (217 B.C.), Macedon controlled Thessaly ; she held the keys of the Peloponnese, and, since Aratus, dreading the designs and jealous of the talents of Cleomenes, the reformer-king of Sparta, had flung the Achivan league into her hands, Achaean policy followed her lead. Sparta had been crushed at Sellasia (221 B.C.), and only the death of Antigonus Doson and the lack of sea-power had prevented the organisation of Macedonian hege- mony. But neither the disposition and policy of Philip nor the character of his people and their form of government were calcu- lated to render Macedon the real centre of Greek political life. The meddling of the kings provoked reaction in the free states ; the race of the Antigonids had degenerated ; their efforts were directed to mere aggrandisement ; of an Hellenic ideal there is no trace. Syria. — The kingdom of "Asia," under the third Antiochus (228-187 B.C.), nominally the premier state, with its shallow culture, corrupt court, and lax Oriental methods, was rotten to the core. Asiatic in its pretensions as in its armaments, it was European only in the creation and maintenance of numerous and important cities. The empire of the Seleucids, supposed to extend from the /Egean to the Indus, was fast breaking up. Pressed by the rising power of the Parthians, it was shedding its Eastern satrapies. The rising tide of Oriental reaction was steadily thrusting back the intruders from the West. In Asia Minor it kept a wavering grasp on its possessions in Caria, Phrygia, and Lydia, and on the narrow line of communication that passed inland through level Cilicia to Antioch. From the sea it was cut off in almost every diUHttgri by the naval power of Egypt. Its ever-active kings, pushing their THE EASTERN STATES 255 dynastic interests, and engaged in constant interference abroad and constant struggle at home, held together as they could a loose aggregate of half-independent provinces, autonomous towns, and restless tribes, a Greek caricature of the empire of Darius. Egypt. — Egypt in the hands of the Lagidffi and their clever ministers, with a centralised administration, squeezing an ample revenue from the passive fellaheen, and pursuing an unscrupulous, clear-sighted, and selfish policy, had used her favourable strategic position to extend her dominion and influence. The state en- couraged art, enterprise, and inquiry with a business eye, and Alexandria became at once the centre of learning and of Eastern commerce. The first financial and maritime power of the Levant, she had annexed Cyrene and Cyprus, Ccelesyria and Phoenicia. Her influence was predominant along the southern coast of Asia Minor — West Cilicia, Pamphylia, Lycia. She had stations in the yEgean, at Ephesus, Samos, and elsewhere ; she enjoyed good relations with Rhodes, and "protected" to some extent most of the towns and islands of the Asian sea-board up to the Thracian shore. But this expansion demanded a strong hand and a strong navy, and, by exposing her to attack, cost her the privilege of isolation. Egypt had nothing more to get ; her policy is now directed to fostering the minor powers and maintaining the status quo. But the race of the Ptolemies rapidly deteriorated. To Ptolemy II., Philadelphia, the statesman who had recognised Rome in 273 B.C., and Ptolemy III., Euergetes, an energetic soldier, had succeeded the fourth of that name, Philopator, an indolent and vicious debauchee (224-204 B.C.). His young son, Epiphanes (204-181 B.C.), was, and remained, a puppet in the hands of a suc- cession of ministers whose resignations were effected by riot and murder. The native element asserted itself in politics, manners and religion, and with its wild mobs, ceaseless cabals, and corrupt kings, the land of the Pharaohs drifted into the hands of Rome. Gauls: Pergamum, and Rhodes. — Omitting the states that ac- knowledged a nominal allegiance to Syria, or those, like Pontus or Parthia, whose important but obscure development lies beyond our present scope, there remain to notice in Asia the Celts, the free republics, and Pergamum. Bithynia, indeed, under the able and vigorous Prusias I. (228-185 B.C.), and his son, Prusias II. (c. 185 to c. 149 B.C.), pursued a crafty, and often contemptible, policy with undeserved success. But neither this state nor Cappadocia (Ariarathes IV., 220-163 B.C.) are of any immediate moment. The Galatian freebooters and mercenaries, a race of restless THE EASTERN STATES 257 intruders, divided into three tribes, Tolistoboii, Trocmi, and Tectosages, and organised in cantons under tetrarchs, plundered right and left, and were an especial thorn in the side of Pergamum and the Greek cities. Pergamum, in the valley of the Caicus, a " miniature Egypt," was the domain of the rich and sagacious Attalids, whose power, founded on wealth, was maintained by subtle statesmanship, by alliances, and the use of mercenary troops. They had no people behind them ; their strength lay in their strong citadel and in the power of the purse, and they acted as champions of the coast-towns against the Celts. They played off the great states against each other, and directed their efforts to weakening their dangerous neighbours, building a navy, foster- ing commerce, and creating a new school of art and literature. The reigning king of this bourgeois dynasty was Attalus I. (241- 197 B.C.), who inherited the possessions of his cousin Eumenes and his uncle Philetaerus, the founder of the house. Last and best of all come the free Greek cities, the centres of Greek culture and civic freedom, such as Byzantium, which attempted to control the important Pontic trade, Cyzicus, Abydos, the key of the Hellespont, or Rhodes, the great peace-power and head of a sort of Hansa league of the commercial coast-towns. The good position of Rhodes secured her a great carrying-trade ; her strong fleet policed the sea and protected her allies ; her impar- tial policy and noble character made her the arbitrator of the /Egean. For the rest, their actual status largely depended on the ever-changing circumstances of the moment and the presence of stronger powers, curtailing though not destroying their theoretical freedom. Achaean and ./Etolian Leagues. — In Greece itself there was Athens, the university of the world, starving on the memories of her past, wisely if somewhat ignobly neutral, holding aloof from general politics, while she cultivated good relations with the sea- powers and her ally, Rome. In Sparta, the standing obstacle to Greek union, whose last chance perished with the hero Cleomenes, ruled the brigand and pirate Nabis (207-192 B.C.). Setting aside the dependencies of Macedon, and the petty communities of Bceotia, Epirus, and Acarnania, there remain but two powers of importance, the /Etolian and Achaean leagues. The constitution of the rival leagues was in essential points similar. Each had a federal executive, at the head of which stood the annual strategus ; each apparently had a council, or some sort of permanent com- mittee, a common centre, and general assemblies, which met for R 25S HISTORY OF ROME the .Etolian League at Thermon, for the Achaean at JEg'mm. The yEtolians also called meetings at Delphi for the benefit of their outside members, while Philopcemen later enabled the Achaean assemblies to meet in other places than the ancestral and religious centre. Both represent an important advance on the old Greek alternative of separatism or hegemony, and the Achaeans in par- ticular boasted with justice of the generosity and liberalism of their institutions. But neither constitution was completely worked out, and neither could overcome the disunion of Greece. The /Etolian League was a combination of peasants, reckless and rest- less, the chartered libertines of Greece, ready for fighting on any side and in any land. They subsisted on plunder and their pay as mercenaries. At this epoch their power was considerable, both in Central Greece, where they held Delphi, Thermopylae, and Nau- pactus ; in the Peloponnesus, where they controlled Elis and part of Arcadia, and on the Hellespont, where several important cities were allies or actual members of the league. Their dubious policy was largely determined by the rivalries and passions of the moment. The Achaean Federation had a greater moral worth and more real significance. Revived and reconstructed as the power of Macedon waned, the ancient league gained political importance by the gradual accession of Sicyon, Corinth, Megalopolis, Argos, and other considerable towns in Peloponnesus, a growth due in the main to the wealth and tactics of the politician and diplomatis. , Aratus. 1 To him also was due in part the weakness of its military organisation, and to his fear of Spartan hegemony and the social revolution Achaea owed her unworthy subservience to Macedon, to whom he sacrificed the citadel of Corinth. Under the guidance of the patriotic soldier, Philopoemen (Strat. 208 B.C., &c), and later on of Lycortas, father of Polybius, the league assumed a more dignified and independent attitude ; and, on the whole, it stands out, by its attempt at political fairness and its genuine effort to effect the union at least of Peloponnesus, if not of all Greece, in a national democratic confederacy of a moderate type. The expansion of Rome gave it no chance of success, nor had it sufficient force to maintain its independence of Macedon or overpower the nagging resistance of Sparta, Elis, and Messene. But the real rock ahead was the impatience of restraint, the invincible separatism, the intense party-feeling which made larger politics impossible, which 1 Born 271 B.C. ; poisoned by Philip, 213 B.C. THE STATES OF GREECE 259 preferred treason to compromise, and readily invoked the common enemy to win a triumph over a political opponent. To draw these jarring atoms to a cohesive mass the league lacked both attractive and coercive power. Philip V. — Philip had the force but not the ability. In his con- tradictory character we trace a rapid deterioration. Corrupted by power, the gifted if arrogant autocrat of eighteen, the keen soldier and clever speaker, the strenuous, active, and skilful king degenerated into a bloodthirsty, grasping, and obstinate despot. Bent on being king indeed, he was misled by ill-chosen counsellors. He mingled refinement and vandalism, cruelty and good-humour, indolence and restlessness. His cold heart and inconstant pur- pose, his short-sighted jealousy, marred at the critical moment the far-reaching plans of Hannibal, shattered his own schemes, and alienated his natural allies. He lacked grip and concentra- tion ; he was incapable of conceiving large purposes, and disgraced his crown and his country by the use of poison, by aimless barbarism and sheer brutality. To sum up the situation. The disturbing elements in the Hellenic world were the kings of Syria and Macedon, and the half-piratic /Etolian League ; the powers that made for peace were Egypt, Pergamum, and Rhodes, and in non-Peloponnesian politics, the Achaeans. Rome, on good TETRADRACHM OF PHILIP V. — ATHENA ALKIS HURLING FULMEN. terms with the peaceful states, was irritated with the yEtolians and suspicious of Macedon. Philip and Antiochus. — The peace of Naupactus (217 B.C.) had been made under the impression of the Hannibalic struggle. But the warning of Agelaus to beware of " the thunder-cloud from the 260 HISTORY OF ROME West," bore little fruit. Philip turned lightly from his half-hearted attack on Rome to seek compensation for failure, in the East and South. On the death of Ptolemy Philopator (204 B.C.), he com- bined with Antiochus III. against his successor, a boy of five, in a nefarious partition treaty. Each played for his own hand, without regard to his partner. Philip, on his side, in alliance with Prusias, invaded Asia Minor, attacking towns and islands which were under Egyptian or /Etolian protection, and captured Chalcedon, Lysimachia, Cius, and Thasos. His atrocities only sharpened the indignation of the Greek communities, who saw a common danger in the advance of the Macedonian tyrant. Rhodes, Pergamum, and Byzantium took up arms ; and behind them, invisible to the short- sighted schemer, loomed the power of Rome. Philip's great ships were roughly treated near Chios by the lighter and well-handled fleet of the allies, but his defeat, if such it was, did not prevent him from beating Rhodes at Lade, occupying- Miletus, and ravaging Caria. The campaign was suspended by the natural hindrances of the season and the country, and leaving garrisons to secure his conquests, Philip slipped through the combined fleets and returned to Macedon. Already Valerius Lsevinus had entered the /Egean with thirty-eight sail ; yet, blinded by his adventurous advisers, the king pursued his plans (200 B.C.), and by the reduc- tion of the Thracian coast-towns and the bloody butchery of Abydos, secured the passage of the straits and his communica- tions with Antiochus in the face of superior fleets. Interference of Rome. — Before Abydos he received, and politely put aside, the remonstrances of M. ^Emilius Lepidus, who, at the request of Egypt, had been appointed guardian of Epiphanes. The envoy, whose "impertinence the king pardoned because he was youngs handsome, and a Roman," contrived, however, in the course of this mission to the East, to secure the neutrality of Antiochus at the expense of Egypt, and negotiated a coalition of the minor states against Philip. The kingdom of the Ptolemies appears henceforth as the client of Rome, though its actual cession and complete reduction were long deferred. To the Greek republics the Roman Senate seemed a more natural and less dangerous friend than the Greek monarchs. If they appealed to the foreigner once more, it was in the cause of freedom and culture. For Rome the position was difficult. She was free to act since Zama, but reluctant, in her exhaustion, to undertake fresh adventures ; yet she was compelled to lorce on the unpopular war. ROME AND PHILIP 261 Apart from the unsatisfactory nature of the armistice of 205 B.C., Philip was upsetting the equilibrium in the East. The disappear- ance of the minor states, the paralysis of Egypt, and the growth of Macedon threatened Roman interests. Hannibal was alive, and Carthage reviving. If Rome had no formal ground for inter- ference, her real reasons were adequate. But her action was not wholly selfish nor her aims ambitious. Sympathy and the claims of friendly and protected states strengthened considerations of policy. A casus belli was soon afforded by action that could be construed as an aggression on Rome's ancient ally, Athens. The object of the war was not to conquer but to weaken Macedon, and the plan of campaign was to husband the strength of Rome and utilise her Greek allies. Second Macedonian War (200-196 B.C.). — The declaration of war, at first rejected by the Comitia, which felt only the exhaustion of Italy, blind to ulterior reasons, was finally granted in return for concessions, made at the cost of the overburdened socii l and of military efficiency. The veterans of the Punic war were dis- charged, the Italian garrisons were constituted by socii alone, and six legions of so-called volunteers were impressed for service in the city, and in Etruria and Macedon. Besides his garrisons in Thrace and Asia, his small fleet and coastguards, Philip could only muster 20,000 foot and 2000 horse. The year 200 B.C. was mainly spent in diplomatic preliminaries, in which Attalus played a leading part, and Philip's enterprises materially assisted Rome. He had angered the yEtolians, alienated the free cities, attacked Egypt ; all whose interest it would have been to exclude Western interference were now leagued against him. His lukewarm ally, Antiochus, pushed his own schemes. He could only count on Acarnania, Bceotia, and the honest neutrality of the Achaean League, led by the patriot Philopcemen, which had failed, by its proffered mediation between the Greek disputants, to avoid an appeal to Rome. P. Sulpicius Galba, with two legions, arrived at Apollonia too late to pierce the mountain barrier, but a detachment from the fleet at Corcyra, under Claudius Cento, relieved Athens and burnt the magazines of Chalcis. For the second campaign Galba organised a combined attack by the Dardanians from the north, the allied fleet on the east, and by the Athamanes and yEtolians, whose flattered arrogance finally accepted the more promising of 1 i.e. Italian allies. 262 HISTORY OF ROME their two suitors, from the south, while he himself was to break through by the defiles of the Apsus, reconnoitred in the preced- ing year. The attack failed on all hands. Galba neither entered Macedon nor formed a junction, and owed his safe retreat, after hard fighting on difficult ground, more to the diversions effected by the allies than to his own soldiership. The king's active strategy, after baffling Galba, drove the yEtolians from Thessaly, scattered the Dardani, and left him master of the field. The fleet wasted its superiority in idle plunder, so ignorant was ancient warfare of the value of combined naval and military operations. Antiochus retired from Pergamum in obedience to Rome, and maintained his short-sighted neutrality. Flamininus — In 198 B.C. Philip was encouraged to take the offensive, advancing to watch the Roman movements from a strong position on the Aous. Here he was confronted by the consul T. Quinctius Flamininus, elected by powerful influence at the age of thirty, a Roman of the new type, a respectable officer and skilful diplomatist, a cool and clear-headed statesman, whose keen sympathy with Hellenic culture and knowledge of Hellenic affairs was henceforth used by the Senate, in its half-subtle, half- generous policy of playing off the Greek communities against Macedon. After the fall of Macedon the subtlety got the better of the sentiment, as Rome turned the factions of Hellas to its own profit. And even now, though there was yet room for generous idealism, it hardly affected the main lines of Roman policy, even as interpreted by Flamininus, the unofficial manager of Greek affairs in the Senate. Such was the man who, now succeeding to the command, was able at length, after a vain attempt at negotia- tion, by the treachery of the Epirot Charops, to turn Philip's flank, and force a hasty retreat to Tempe. The Epirots at once deserted, while the ^Etolians overran Thessaly, whose faithful fortresses alone remained to Philip in the north. The advance of Flamininus with the army to Phocis and the fleet to Cenchreas determined the Achasans, under the guidance of Aristasnus, to abandon an unten- able neutrality. The price of this inevitable decision, arrived at in a stormy congress at Sicyon, was the reversion of the powerful city of Corinth, whither their forces proceeded to support the siege. Corinth, desperately defended, was relieved by the Macedonian Philocles from Chalcis, who also succeeded in securing Argos. To buy Spartan support, Philip presented Argos to Nabis, who, with equal cynicism, accepted the present and betrayed the donor. An attempt to treat broke upon the stern terms of the Roman CYNOSCEPMALAi 263 ultimatum, and Flamininus, whose command had been specially prolonged, proceeded in the spring of 197 B.C. to secure his com- munications by the capture of Thebes, and masking Corinth with the allied troops, advanced northward by the direct route through Thermopylae on Tempe, depending for supplies on his accom- panying fleet. Battle of Cynoscephalae. — His heterogeneous army, including a strong yEtolian contingent, was superior in cavalry alone to the Macedonian army, raised by strict levies to nearly 26,000 men, of whom 16,000 formed the trusted phalanx. With this force Philip, eager for battle and fearing for his fortresses, advanced by Larissa on Pheras, close to which the Romans had encamped. Here the advanced guards met, but after a skirmish of reconnoitring parties both generals, embarrassed by the difficult ground and anxious to secure supplies, moved by parallel lines on Scotussa, separated by a range of hills, and groping about through the mist and rain of autumn, in ignorance of each other's movements. On the third day, a casual encounter, in dark and dirty weather, between the Macedonian reserve, posted to secure the flanking heights, and a scouting party of Flamininus brought on a general engagement. The Romans were getting the worst of the skirmish, till their supports reinforced the attack, when the tables were turned again by the advent of the Macedonian cavalry and light infantry. Their victorious charge was only stemmed by the gallantry of the ^tolian horse, inferior as skirmishers to the Numidians alone, who gave the proconsul time to draw out his whole force for action. Then Philip yielded, against his better judgment, to the desire of his troops. With the right wing of the phalanx he hastily climbed the hill, formed on the ridge, received his retreating troops on the right, and charging at once in dense, deep column, with the weight of the phalanx on the sloping ground drove in and shattered the Roman left. But the rapid advance had dislocated his line. Flamininus, passing to his right, hurled his maniples, with the elephants in front, upon the unformed Macedonian left, disordered by haste and the uneven ground, as Nicanor hurried it up to support his king. The battle was decided by the brilliant stroke of a nameless tribune, who, disengaging some companies from the victorious right, fell with disastrous effect upon Philip's defenceless rear. The Phalanx and the Legion. — Cynoscephalae was a soldiers' battle, brought on by chance, and won by superiority of formation. The famous phalanx, with its close order, long pikes, and crushing 264 HISTORY OF ROME weight of sixteen files, 1 irresistible in a charge and impregnable to a front attack, could not be handled easily in the field. It had lost what mobility it had possessed in its creator's hands ; it was readily dislocated by movement ; it was useless on unfavourable ground ; exposed to attack on flank and rear, and incapable of manoeuvring rapidly, as a whole or in detachments, it had no chance against the flexible formation, the easy movement, and individual train- ing of the legionaries, who, once within the enemy's guard, made short work of their stiffly drilled opponents. Settlement of Macedon and Greece. — The reduction of Macedon cost 700 men. With a loss of 13,000, coupled with serious reverses elsewhere, Philip had no choice. An armistice was conceded, and Flamininus, severely snubbing the ^Etolian " victors of Cynos- cephalae," and to the disappointment of the spiteful Greeks, arranged a peace in 196 B.C., on terms whose moderation was due as well to a chivalrous feeling as to the need of maintaining the equilibrium in the East and of providing a bulwark against northern incursions. The king surrendered his foreign posses- sions, his ships, and the province of Orestis, reduced his forces, paid an indemnity of a thousand talents, entered into alliance, and subjected his foreign policy to the control of Rome. Macedon, as a power, ceased to exist, but Rome neither annexed nor per- mitted encroachment. Scodra was indeed strengthened and Athens enriched ; discontented vEtolia received a few towns and was denied more ; the Achaean League profited by the incorporation of the surrendered possessions in Peloponnesus and the isthmus; Rhodes and Pergamum by the maintenance of the status quo; while Thessaly was neutralised and divided into four independent con- federacies. Finally, Rome, unable or unwilling to settle the con- flicting claims of the jarring polities, proclaimed by the mouth of Flamininus to the assembled Greeks at the Isthmian games the freedom of Hellas. If Greece, as the ^Ftolians complained, had only changed masters, the new relation was carefully concealed. In the following year Nabis was compelled by the combined forces to disgorge the cruelly oppressed Argos, Messene, the Cretan cities, and the Spartan coast on which the sufferers by his reign of terror were planted as free Laconians and members of the League. Thus crippled and fined, the Spartan " Boar of Ardennes" was left independent, his other acts uncancelled, to 1 Five spears (sarissa) over 20 feet in length projected in a descending scale from 15 to 3 feet in front of each man, so that every Roman soldier in his looser order confronted two phalangites and ten spears. SETTLEMENT OF GREECE 265 the deep discontent of Greece, as a check on the Achaean League. State of Greece. — Flamininus, with some fairness and much policy, refrained from unnecessary interference ; the factious opposi- tion of the pig-headed Boeotians was borne with patience. Wherever possible, the ascendency of the wealthier and Romanising party was secured in the various communities. For the rest, they were left to stew in their own juice. However tickled by Greek flattery or sensitive to Greek satire, however strong" her fashionable Hellenism, Rome showed as much contempt as kindness, and still more astuteness, in that degrading gift of freedom, so unwisely, if generously, confirmed by the evacuation of the Greek fortresses in 194 B.C. Rent by faction, corrupt in morals, decayed in population, permeated by socialism, the Greek states with their petty politics were overshadowed by the power and proximity of Rome. She had destroyed Macedon, hampered Achaia, she suffered no predomi- nance, and instituted no control. It was a blunder, almost a crime. At the same time direct annexation was as yet unnecessary to Rome. Her commercial and political interests were secured by the existence of a free and friendly system of powers, acting as check upon one another and upon possible enemies. Annexation would have been a shock to sentiment at home and to Roman influence in the East, no less than a breach of her traditional policy. CHAPTER XXVI FIFTY YEARS OF CONQUEST THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS B.C. A.U.C. Antiochus lands in Greece 192 562 Battle of Thermopylae 191 563 Battle of Magnesia 190 564 Settlement of Asia and Greece 189-188 565-566 Deaths of Hannibal, Scipio, and Philopcemen . 183 571 Antiochus. — We have seen that during the Macedonian war Roman diplomacy had kept Antiochus III. quiet. The short- sighted monarch, whose early energy had earned him the sur- name of " Great," and whose designs on Egypt, checked by the bloody defeat of Raphia in 217 B.C., had been renewed in the Par- tition Treaty with Philip, had, in his covetous rivalry, not only failed to support his ally, but had utilised his fall and earned his 266 HISTORY OF ROME deadly hatred for the future. In 201 and 200 B.C. he had attacked the Syrian coast, and in 19S B.C. reduced Egypt to terms by the victory of Mount Panium, securing his conquests in the Levant, the reversion of Philip's Egyptian conquests on the Asia Minor GOLD OCTADEACHM OF ANTIOCHUS III. — APOLLO SEATED ON OMPHALOS. sea-board, and the betrothal of the boy-king, Epiphanes, to his daughter Cleopatra. Rome and Antiochus. — Nevertheless, except in protecting Per- gamum, the Senate had practised a "masterly inactivity." In 197 B.C. a strong Syrian fleet and army threatened the ceded dis- tricts, and even the free states of the ^Egean coasts, whose liberty Rome had demanded from Philip. In spite of the resistance of Rhodes, by 196 B.C. Antiochus had occupied Ephesus and other positions, whence he crossed into Europe, restored and fortified Lysimachia, meeting the protests of the Romans and the warnings of Flamininus with a curt request that they would mind their own business. Their claim to a protectorate was, in his view, untenable. He had now a footing in Europe ; Thrace was a satrapy ; Rome's allies had been attacked, her predominance threatened. In 195 B.C. Hannibal was received at Ephesus with marked honour. Antiochus avoided a direct rupture, and Rome took the wind out of her diplomacy by withdrawing her Greek garrisons. She had many reasons for war, but no casus belli. This hesitation fostered the arrogance of Antiochus and the dis- affection of Greece. Embassies passed to and fro (193-192 B.C.), till Rome, disappointed of a bloodless victory by the rejection of her ultimatum, was forced to meet in arms an enemy to whom her own sloth had given the choice of time, place, and allies. Attitude of the Minor States. — Meanwhile the king, by con- ROME AMD ANTIOCHUS 267 cessions to the leading" free cities, by marriages and presents, attempted to conciliate his subjects and rivals, Pergamum, Cap- padocia, Egypt, Rhodes, and to secure his rear in Asia Minor. Greece, already impatient of the new order and given over to the play of party, was fermenting with discontent. His chances ap- peared good, but neither did his combinations succeed nor were his ideas consistently carried out. The scheme of Hannibal for a descent on Italy served only to alarm Rome and endanger Car- thage, and Hannibal, suspected and disliked, was left to " cut blocks with a razor" among the petty courtiers of the "great" king. Bithynia, Pergamum, Rhodes, Byzantium, and Egypt sided with Rome, when the restless yEtolians, discontented with their share of Macedonian booty, made themselves the agents of Antiochus in Greece, and precipitated the conflict. Antiochus lands in Greece. — The wavering monarch, landing in 192 B.C. as the liberator of Greece, at once deceiver and deceived, brought inadequate levies to meet fictitious allies. The ^Etolians, indignant at peace, dreaming, in their ignorance and arrogance, of a campaign on the Tiber, declared formal war with Rome. At their instigation Nabis had already broken out, and been exemplarily punished (192 B.C.) by Philopcemen ; and now, to egg on their ally and fire anti-Roman feeling by a successful stroke, they attempted to surprise Sparta, Chalcis, and Demetrias. At Sparta the plot succeeded only in joining that state to the Achaean league, a result hastened by the appearance of the Roman fleet under Atilius Ser- ranus at Gythium. Chalcis was saved ; Demetrias fell. To secure his advantage, in the autumn of 192 E.C. the king entered Greece with a small force, intended to serve as a nucleus of a Greco- Asiatic host. But Philip preferred an open conqueror to a disloyal ally. Epirus was doubtful, and the Achaean league, solicited by both, with wise fidelity adhered to Rome, and garrisoned the Piraeus and Chalcis. Except the /Etolians and Boeotians, only a few insignificant states, impelled more by party-feeling than patriotism, joined the liberator. The supineness of the enemy enabled him to secure a base at Chalcis, in Eubcea. Hence he advanced to demonstrate with some success in Thessaly, and hither retired from before Larissa, on the approach of Appius Claudius from Apollonia, to celebrate a marriage with a Chal- cidian dame and wage a war of pen and ink. Antiochus expelled from Greece (191 B.C.). — In the following spring the Romans, who had neglected a vigorous offensive, from uncertainty where the enemy's blow would fall, an uncertainty 26S HISTORY OF ROME encouraged by the smallness of his force in Greece, having now provided for the security of Italy and the islands, doubled their fleet and took up the war in earnest. They raised the army of the East, whose vanguard was already in Epirus, to 40,000, with an increased proportion of allies and auxiliaries, including African cavalry and elephants. M'. Acilius Glabrio was in command, assisted by the consulars Cato and Flaccus serving as simple tribunes. Swelled by the Greek contingents, the army overran Athamania, cleared Thessaly and concentrated at Larissa. The aimless king, whose reinforcements had failed him, and whose communications were cut by the stronger fleet, instead of promptly evacuating, drew together the rotten remnant of his host in the entrenchments of Thermopylae, there to await his main force. Hence he was quickly driven in complete rout, when Cato sur- prised the careless yEtolians on the heights of Callidromos, and the phalanx, attacked in flank and front, was cut to pieces in the pass. The king fled to Ephesus ; all was lost but Thrace ; only the ^Etolians, driven to despair by the contemptuous harshness of Glabrio, stood at bay in Naupactus, till Flamininus, with wiser policy, arranged an armistice to permit an embassy to Rome. Elis and Messene reluctantly entered the League, and Peloponnesus became, with some reservations, Achaean. But when the League desired Zacynthus, Flamininus reminded them that the tortoise was safest in its shell. Naval War. — The allied fleet, which had broken the king's communications, now took the offensive. To prepare for the pas- sage into Asia, C. Livius attacked and defeated Polyxenidas at Cyssus, or Corycus, near Chios, and with the aid of the Rhodians shut him up in Ephesus. Rome held the seas and could prepare for a home-blow, an adventure more dangerous in appearance than reality. While many of the Asiatic small states, such as Smyrna, Samos, and Chios, followed the lead of their aristocracy and went over to Rome, Antiochus levied a huge host, increased his fleet at Ephesus, and directed Hannibal to raise new ships in Syria and Phoenicia. Rome leisurely strengthened her fleets and armies all along the line ; and in March 190 B.C. P. Cornelius Scipio Afri- canus, as legate, with his incompetent brother Lucius, consul by family influence, as nominal superior, and 5000 volunteer veterans, took up the command. Pacifying the ^Etolians, once more exas- perated by a harsh ultimatum, with a six months' armistice, he pushed on for the Hellespont, selecting the long and arduous land- route, made possible only by the loyalty of Philip and the submission WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS 269 of Bithynia, in preference to the chances of the sea, where Roman superiority was not yet absolute. Meanwhile Livius, who had gone to the Hellespont to reduce Sestos and Abydos, the fortresses commanding the passage, had been recalled by the defeat of the CIPPUS OF A ROMAN MARINE OF LATER DATE. Rhodian observing squadron at Samos, and had once more shut up the Syrian admiral in Ephesus. He was presently succeeded by L. yEmilius Regillus, whose task was threefold— to facilitate the crossing, to watch Polyxenidas, and to prevent the junction of Hannibal's belated fleet. The last object was effected by the well- 270 HISTORY OF ROME built and well-handled Rhodian squadron, who defeated off Aspen- dus, in Pamphylia, the final effort of the Punic hero. About the end of August the blockading fleet, whose Pergamene division had sailed to the Hellespont, was attacked by a slightly superior force. At Myonnesus, near Colophon, Polyxenidas was swept from the seas, with a loss of forty-two sail, a result mainly due to the tactics of the Rhodian admiral, Eudamus. The effect was immediate. Antiochus, whose Gallic mercenaries had been driven back from Pergamum by Eumenes, was stunned by the blow. As he had neglected to harass the march through Thrace, so now he hastily evacuated the Hellespont, sacrificed his stores, and per- mitted the enemy to land unopposed, instead of intimidating Prusias and forcing Scipio to take up his winter quarters in his distant and dangerous position. Battle of Magnesia. — These errors he crowned when, having failed to bribe the legate and refused his demand for a full in- demnity and the cession of Asia up to Mount Taurus, he flung his unwieldy, undisciplined, and motley mass in the way of the Roman legions, whose one desire was decisive action before winter. At Magnesia, under Sipylus, in the late autumn of 190 B.C., while Scipio was still sick at Ekca, Cn. Domitius drew the irre- solute Antiochus out of his powerful lines beyond the Hermus on the mountain slopes, from which he threatened Smyrna and covered Ephesus, Sardis, and the great eastern road. Never had the Roman soldiers so despised an enemy. The army, 30,000 strong, including 5000 Achaians and Pergamenes, with 2000 Macedonians and Thracians to guard the camp, rested its left on the river Phrygius, scarcely covered by a few squadrons ; the cavalry and light infantry, under Eumenes, were massed on the right ; the legions took post in the centre. The armaments of the East, 12,000 horse and 60,000 foot, stretched to an invisible length, through the thick mist of an autumn morning. In the centre, dangerously deepened to thirty-two file, broken into ten divisions, each with a front of fifty, a wall of steel marked as with battle- ments and towers by the huge forms of elephants, posted two and two on its flanks and in its intervals, stood the grand but cumbrous phalanx. Its deep and naked flanks were covered by a long line of peltasts and the swarms of cavalry, on which the king relied, heavy dragoons, cuirassiers, and light horse, with archers and slingers, their strings and slings useless in the damp air. Re- serves of elephants strengthened the fighting line ; to the front skirmished the camel corps, the mounted archers, and the idle BATTLE OF MAGNESIA 271 menace of the scythed chariots. It was the Roman cue to shatter the wings, to drive them on the crowded phalanx, and plough their way into flanks and rear. With the eye of a soldier, Eumenes, drawing out his skirmishers from the right, by a storm of missiles drove the infuriated chariot teams on the camels, hurl- ing both back on the left front, spreading a general panic. Then charging with his whole brigade, he routed the confused and cowardly masses on the left, baring the side of the central column, now forced to halt and form square. Meanwhile Antiochus had pressed up to the Roman camp, vigorously resisted by the garri- son. As he retired victoriously he became aware of the whole disaster and fled. For the phalanx, stripped of its supports, taken in front and rear, decimated by the showers of missiles, had retired at first in good order and grim despair, till the frightened ele- phants tore through the ranks. Then the incredible slaughter was only enhanced by a futile effort to hold the camp. The legions, unemployed, watched the destruction of Syria ; the con- trol of Asia had cost the blood of a handful of allies. Peace and Settlement of Asia. — The effect on the Oriental imagination was crushing. Asia Minor yielded to the fortune of Rome. Peace was concluded by a commission of ten under Cn. Manlius Volso, and its ratification secured by the presence of the army at the king's expense. The terms included an indemnity of 15,000 talents and the surrender of all possessions west of Mount Taurus and the Halys. His rights of levying war and of navigation in the West, of raising troops and building ships, were strictly limited. Antiochus as a great king stood abolished. He retained Cilicia, but Cappadocia became frankly independent under Aria- rathes, the Armenian satrapies became principalities, and the Artaxiads began their career of greatness. For the rest, Rome strove to keep a balance among the jarring claims of her various clients. She made no province, stood aloof from purely Asian affairs, and when her armies evacuated Asia (188 B.C.) she took away only gold and honour. Meanwhile Volso occupied his troops, and served his own pockets and the Greek states, by crushing the Asiatic Celts and levying contributions all round. His action illustrates once more the dangerous powers of the imperium exercised at a distance from control by annually changing officers. Prusias kept Bithynia. In the West, Eumenes, the victor of Magnesia, received the Chersonese and the majority of the ceded districts in Asia, with the protectorate of such Greek cities as were not declared free. Pergamum, delivered from Celtic incursions, 272 HISTORY OF ROME thus became a powerful wedge between Syria and Macedon in the interests of Rome. The free cities which had joined Rome had their charters confirmed. Rhodes was gratified with Lycia and most of Caria. Roman policy left in Asia no dangerous power behind, but it left also no permanent security against formidable growths. The sea remained in the control of her Rhodian allies. Treatment of Macedon and Greece. — In Greece the Italians, deluded by false news, had risen with some success against Philip. Magnesia closed the day of truces, and in 189 B.C. M. Fulvius Nobilior captured Ambracia, and with the aid of the Achffians and Macedon, stamped out the gallant resistance of these wild-cats of the mountain. Reasonable terms were granted. Rome completed her chain of Adriatic posts with Cephallenia and Zacynthus, secured the cession of all captured lands and cities, a substantial but not crushing indemnity, and the control of foreign relations, leaving /Etolia, now an ally, as a thorn in the side of Macedon. Philip received but a scanty reward for his loyal and useful support. He saw, with indignation, the growth of Pergamum. Nor was he alone aggrieved by the policy of equilibrium. The Achasans, who had, in the course of these proceedings, dragged Sparta, Elis, and Messene into their league, were annoyed by the limits set by Rome to Hellenic nationalism. Apart from Rome's open policy of Divide et imperii, the very existence of a universal referee, only too pleased to intervene, was fatal to the growth of a national life. Even within the Peloponnesus the League failed to create a real unity ; to create a power was impossible. The wisest course would have been to bow with dignity to the inevitable, and, accepting a foreign supremacy, to secure internal peace and prosperity. It is hard no doubt to acknowledge political nullity, to give up traditions and ideals, but if Philopcemen deserves our sympathy, the policy of Callicrates was expedient. To invoke and then repudiate inter- ference, to indulge in "tail-twisting," to parody the life of a free state when independence was impossible, was to waste power, to caricature patriotism. Deaths of Philopoemen and Hannibal. — Trouble ensued in the Peloponnesus. The union of Messene and Sparta with the League resulted in revolutions and counter-revolutions, judicial murders, intestine strife, appeals and counter-appeals. Rome neither abstained from intervention nor acted with consistency and energy — a huge Gulliver watching with contemptuous amusement the antics of her Lilliputian allies. If she had meant the freedom she gave, she neither acted upon the declaration nor was Greece DEATH OF HANNIBAL AND SCIP10 273 capable of using it. In the end Sparta remained a member of the League, with special privileges ; Messene was repressed by Lycortas, the worthy successor of the soldier and statesman, Philopcemen. The latter was poisoned in prison by the rebel Messenians. In the same year (183 B.C.) the same means, self- administered, delivered Hannibal from the treachery of Prusias, to whose court he had fled, and from the machinations of Flamininus, at the age of sixty-six (?), fighting, as he had sworn, to the last against Rome or the allies of Rome. Hunted down, in spite of the protests of the noblest Romans, he filled up the failure of his life, balked by fate and the folly of his colleagues and masters. End of Scipio. — Possibly during the same year, still in the prime of life, in self-inflicted exile, died his proud and fortunate rival, his glories and his titles turned to bitterness by calumny and disappointed pride. The first man at Rome, the earliest pre- cursor of the Princeps, with all his fascinating personality, his brilliant fortunes, his powerful influence, self-conscious and sensi- tive, a little more than a Roman, a little less than a hero, his achievements and ideals ended in vanity and vexation of spirit. One ray of light gilded the setting, when, at the trial of Lucius for alleged embezzlement and corruption, with indignant pride, he seized and tore before the court the account-books put in as evidence, and led the people, in a burst of enthusiasm, to celebrate in the Capitol the anniversary of Zama. But Lucius was fined, and Publius retired to eat his heart in exile. CHAPTER XXVII FIFTY YEARS OF CONQUEST THE FALL OF MACEDON AND GREECE B.C. A.U.C. Third Macedonian War breaks out 171 583 Battle of Pydna — Egypt accepts Roman Protectorate 168 586 Revolt of Andriscus put down by Metellus — Macedonia made a Province 149-148 560-606 The Achseans defeated by Metellus and Mummius— Destruction of Corinth 146 608 Philip. — Philip of Macedon had gained little by the war. Vexed by hostile neighbours, harried by Roman commissions, put continually on his defence before the Senate, and forced to s 274 HISTORY OF ROME surrender his conquests in Thessaly, yEtolia, and Thrace, he stifled his resentment, and cloaking his purpose with submission, resolutely prepared for a decisive struggle. He reorganised his revenue, fostered population, founded colonies and towns, strength- ened his frontier, and negotiated with the tribes beyond. In 183 B.C. a rupture was averted by the mediation of his son Demetrius, the GREECE ENGLISH MILES 3 20 40 60 80 '0 ROMAN MILES O 20 40 60 80 100 i .SWj* IValker GrBoutaltsc hostage and favourite of Rome. Through him Flamininus and the Senate worked to create a Roman party in Macedon, but the favour of Rome was fatal to the unconscious victim. He fell by the intrigues of Perseus, the elder son by an unequal marriage, and destined heir, who saw in him a dangerous rival. Unable to recall the dead or retrieve the past, defrauded of the fruit of PERSEUS 275 his labours, the victim of his own schemes and passions, the king died of a broken heart (179 B.C.), leaving to the detected but un- punished Perseus the inheritance of revenge. Perseus. — Perseus, a " fine figure of a man," schooled by adversity, the pride of a loyal and warlike nation, the hope of Hellenic patriots, was sober, subtle, and persevering, with few passions and fewer scruples, with many kingly qualities, but, like Conacher in the "Fair Maid of Perth," his composition was crossed with a strain of weakness, narrowness, even cowardice. Penny-wise and pound-foolish, strong in preparation, weak in action, he was incapable of wise daring and generous expenditure. He lacked that rapid decision and unfaltering resolve that could alone have borne his enterprise to success. The resources of Macedon had been nursed for twenty-six years ; his treasury and magazines were full ; his army might amount, all told, to over 40,000 trained men. The administration had profited by the lessons of the last war. His policy was conciliatory, his rule un- questioned. But he had not the fortresses and influence of his father ; the phalanx had lost some of its prestige ; Rome's position in Greece was stronger. Abroad it was more difficult to win sup- port. His marriage alliances with Syria and Bithynia promised as little as the probably fabulous intrigues of Carthage or hopes from Samnium. Nothing had come of his reported attempt to launch a horde of barbarians on Italy, through the passes of the TETKADKACHM OF PERSEUS. Eastern Alps, but the founding of the fortress of Aquileia and the destruction of the invading Bastarnffi in their retreat from Dardania. The chief of the Odrysians, the " brave and gentle Cotys," was a useful ally ; in Dalmatia he secured the drunkard 276 HISTORY OF ROME Genthius, prince of Scodra. The eyes of Gieece, moreover, were turning to Macedon. A native at least was better than a bar- barian hegemony, and the action of Roman partisans irritated popular feeling. Eumenes was boycotted as a traitor, his gifts rejected, and his statues dishonoured. Several even of his subject cities, and politic Rhodes itself, recognised by striking demonstra- tions the growing power of Perseus. Except Peloponnesus, Greece was ripe for revolution, and Perseus made his market of the pre- valent bankruptcy and socialism. His decrees of amnesty, his offers of sympathy, called to his banner the debtors, criminals, and exiles of Hellas. The banner of Macedon was the banner of plunder and patriotism, of liberty and revolution. Rupture with Rome. — Rome was not without a casus belli, the encroachment on an ally or breach of treaty, nor was she slow to see the danger to her influence in Greece. The flame was fed by the assiduous complaints of Eumenes, who in 172 B.C. persuaded the Senate, in spite of Perseus' remonstrances, to prepare secretly for war. Nor was its temper softened by the firm language of the king's envoy. The rupture, imminent in 173 B.C., was however postponed. Senate and consul were still wrangling over the insubordinate action of M. Popillius Lrenas in the Ligurian war, and the conflict of powers resulted in a complete deadlock. The struggle between traditional authority and the ill-controlled executive ended in the submission of the acting consul and his rebellious brother. Perseus took no advantage of this, although at the close of 172 B.C., by denouncing the treaty of Cynoscephalae and claiming equal treatment, in answer to an imperious message from the Senate, he had made war inevitable. He suffered himself to be hood- winked by Q. Marcius Philippus with a pretence of negotiation, while Rome prepared her forces and undermined his popularity in the East. The fruits of immediate action were lost. Lyciscus secured yEtolia for Rome, the Achaean League garrisoned Chal- cis, while advanced corps occupied the route from Apollonia to Larissa. Success of Perseus. — The king, still hoping for peace or adhering stubbornly to the defensive, shut himself up within his mountains. The day for which he had sharpened the sword so long found him dallying with the scabbard. His allies proved a broken reed ; Rhodes, Syria, Bithynia, Byzantium, stood neutral or acted for Rome. For a time the blunders of the enemy saved him. In 171 B.C. P. Licinius Crassus landed in Greece. Besides the strong allied fleet under C. Lucretius, operating from Chalcis, he THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR 277 controlled a force of nearly 50,000 Italians and Greeks. Leav- ing a large reserve in Illyria, and advancing, undisturbed by the dispirited Perseus, to Larissa, he was able to isolate the king and get touch with his fleet and his Greek supporters. Here he re- mained inactive till Perseus, having fortified the passes of Tempe, moved up to observe him from the slopes of Ossa. The consul was provoked, harassed, drawn out, and finally beaten with loss in a brilliant cavalry engagement at Callicinus, and retired behind the Peneius. But instead of pressing the success and reaping the fruits of Greek enthusiasm, Perseus sued for peace, which was at once refused. After a second and indecisive encounter at Phalanna he evacuated Thessaly, and proceeded, with the aid of Cotys, to clear his northern and western frontier, while the Romans leisurely secured their position in Thessaly and Bceotia, where the bungling and brutal colleagues, Lucretius and Crassus, by lax discipline and shameless outrage on friend and foe alike, demoralised their troops and kindled an outburst of fierce indig- nation. Epirus went over to Perseus. The failures of Hostilius in restoring discipline and penetrating Macedon, and the scandalous cruelty and incompetence of the admiral Hortensius in the following year, branded on the Roman name a deeper stamp of military and moral corruption. Licensed robbery, libertinage, and free furlough had rotted the morale of the army — men and officers alike. The chronicle of plunder and blunder was crowned by the repeated disasters of Appius Claudius and the army of communication in Illyria. The ill-informed Senate attempted to interfere, and an admiral was condemned, hut the allies gained little, and Perseus securely repelled attacks, and continued his work in the north and west. A lack of dash and energy marked the whole war on both sides ; it was a war of mistakes and worse. Rome had lost all, even honour ; the king had failed to use his chance. The consul of 169 B.C., Q. Marcius Philippus, hero of a disaster in a Ligurian ambush, shrewder diplomatist than soldier, succeeded by sheer luck and impudence, helped by the negligence of an outpost, in masking the strong forts of Tempe, turning the fourfold barrier by a flank march over mountain paths, and piercing' the rocky wall of Macedon, only to find himself, like Cromwell at Dunbar, jammed in on a narrow plain between the enemy, the mountain, and the sea, and depen- dent on a still invisible fleet. The easy prey was rescued by the panic-stricken retreat of Perseus from his impregnable lines at Dium, closing the coast-road, along which alone could Macedon 278 HISTORY OF ROME be safely entered with the co-operation of a fleet, and within striking distance of the capital and Pella. But Philippus' ad- vance was checked by failing supplies, and he was only saved once more from annihilation in his retreat by the timely fall of the forts and magazines of Tempe in his rear. Perseus still blocked the way along the Elpius, and the net result of the year's work was the capture of the gates of Macedon. The king, while he left no stone unturned to end the war, used his improved position to influence surrounding states. Genthius he was able to involve in strife ; he negotiated secretly with Syria, Bithynia, and Rhodes; he hoped to obtain the mediation, or at least the benevolent neutrality, of Eumenes. But Syria had her Egyptian policy ; mutual distrust and personal avarice shattered his dealings with Eumenes ; Rhodes attempted intervention too late for her own safety. The services of a Gallic horde he de- clined as dangerous and burdensome ; from Greece came no effective help. ^Emilius Paullus. — At length, in 16S B.C., public feeling rose. The Western army had been reduced to inaction, the fleet paralysed by desertion and disease ; the consul was marking time in his pre- carious position ; Macedon was intact. L. yEmilius Paullus, father of ^Emihanus, son of the general of Cannae, a man in the sixties, twice consul, a strict old-fashioned officer, with a creditable record in Spain and Liguria, poor, upright, noble, with real modern refinement to blend with his old Roman virtues, arrived with strong resolves and overwhelming resources. The Illyrian corsairs vanished from the seas ; the praetor Anicius defeated Genthius and took his capital in thirty days. The army was rapidly reorganised, and the hopes and proposed mediation of the Greek states discon- certed and forestalled by the still more rapid collapse of Macedon. Occupying attention with a feint in front, he turned the line of the Elpius by a flank march through the pass of Pythium (or Gythium), compelling a retreat on Pydna. Here, on the 22nd of June 168 B.C., after a night marked by a lunar eclipse, foretold, as was said, by a Roman officer, a skirmish of watering-parties brought on the unexpected battle which was to decide the fate of Greece, and finally settle on Rome the supremacy of the world. Battle of Pydna : Fall of Perseus.— Scarcely were the Romans formed in line when, out of the confusion of the fight in front, the phalanx burst upon them with its bristling forest of spears, striking awe into the heart of the veteran consul. In vain the brave Pa?lignian cohort impaled their bodies on the pikes. The whole BATTLE OF PYDNA 279 line shrank from that iron wall. There was hesitation, and finally retreat. The impending rout was changed to victory by the skill of the general, the tactical superiority of the maniple, and the cool head and brave hand of the Roman soldier. Renouncing resist- ance front to front, and profiting by the dislocation in the phalanx caused by the rapid advance and rush of battle, Paullus broke up his fighting line and thrust his maniples and cohorts into the gaps and intervals of its flanks and rear, avoiding its collective force and splitting it into its weaker elements. Well in hand and trained to independent action in open order, the legionary with his short sword dealt havoc in the shattered mass. The cavalry that should have covered the flanks fled, with their king to lead them. The phalanx as a fighting machine died, as it was born, in Macedon, whose power was broken with the force that made it. Macedon sub- mitted within two days. Perseus, hunted down and forsaken, fell, with his treasures, into the hands of Rome, to point the moralisings and adorn the triumph of the consul. His rapid fall startled the Hellenic East. With the doubtful stigma of cruelty and cowardice, and the sure reproach of avarice and irresolution, he may be dis- missed to end his days at Alba Fucens, where his son, the heir of Macedon, earned his living as a clerk. Macedon and Greece. — The land was settled by the generous Roman, aided by the usual commission of ten. Rome was once more in a dilemma. Unwilling to overload the structure of the state, anxious to keep the forms and spirit of the Republic, warned as she was by example of the dangers of conceding that free hand to her officers which it was almost impossible to refuse, without the genius or the impulse to create new forms of govern- ment to meet the novel situation, she was even more unwilling to leave a chance of the restoration of a dangerous power. She tried to evade her responsibility, and by a temporary expedient to stem the flowing tide of annexation. At the Congress of Amphi- polis (167 B.C.) Macedon was declared free ; the national kingship and national army were abolished ; except for a few frontier guards in the north, the country was disarmed. The compact state was split into four republics, isolated by restrictions on commerce, on reciprocal land-holding, and intermarriage ; local government was thrown into the hands of the nobles. Otherwise the old institutions were retained ; a tribute was imposed, as the price of the pro tectorate — i.e., half the former land - tax, assessed on the new commonwealths, a fixed sum of 100 talents. For a time the gold and silver mines were closed, and the royal domains were kept 2S0 HISTORY OF ROME by Rome. This insidious constitution was guaranteed by the de- portation of the civil and military officers of the crown to Italy. But the date of independence was out for more than Macedon. Not only was Illyria broken up by a similar scheme, its fleet confiscated, and the land divided into three "free" states, paying tribute — a real boon to commerce — but the subservience of the independent states was everywhere, by fair means or foul, assured. In each the Roman partisans, Lyciscus, Callicrates, Charops, and their like, at least unpunished by Rome, carried on a campaign of informations, confiscations, and executions against the patriotic party. Those were more fortunate who were de- tained in Italy, escaping- the reign of terror in Greece. Above iooo Achaeans, among whom was Polybius, together with the indepen- dent leaders in other districts, were selected for this purpose by a party commission, and all application for trial or release disregarded during at least sixteen years. It was a poor return for the loyal support of the Achaean government, whatever had been the out- bursts of childish irritation on the part of the people. Callicrates, the friend of Rome, was boycotted in the public baths and hissed by schoolboys in the street. A worse fate befell Epirus. By the orders of the Senate, to satisfy an ancient grudge, seventy of its towns were sacked and 150,000 souls enslaved, ^itolia lost Amphipolis, Acarnania, and Leucas ; while Athens received Delos and Lemnos. Rhodes and Pergamum. —Rhodes, the old and favoured ally, paid the penalty for its independent attitude, and for the one mis- take in that consummate statesmanship which had hitherto secured her freedom of action and an honourable neutrality. Suffering in her commerce by the war and jealous of Pergamum, the pro-Mace- donian feeling of her people encouraged by Rome's mistakes, she had allowed herself to be lured by her own vanity and the artifices of Philippus into proposing, if not an armed intervention, at least a somewhat peremptory mediation. Rapidly as this outburst of Hellenism oozed away when Rome's weakness turned to strength, it was too late to avert the consequences. The Senate was not sorry for the chance, and the patriotic Rhodian leaders found that the civilised world was but the prison of Rome. Barely, by abject submission and the banishment orexecution of her chiefs, did Rhodes evade a declaration of war ; and when at last the cup of bitterness was full, and the Senate, to her humble petition, conceded an alliance, she had lost her valuable possessions on the mainland, while her commercial pre-eminence was ruined and her revenues ROME AND THE EJS7' 281 curtailed by trade restrictions and the establishment of the free port of Delos. Similar suspicions of intrigue with Macedon, true or fictitious, had rankled in the Roman mind about their own creature and instrument, Pergamum. Eumenes soon found himself no longer necessary, was bowed out of Italy, and undermined at home. Pamphylia and Galatia were declared independent, the attacks of the Celts covertly encouraged. Of the spoil he received no share, while Rome listened eagerly to complaints of the hated upstart. But it was not easy to destroy the astute prince, and in vain Rome practised on the loyalty of his brother Attalus. The cringing Prusias of Bithynia, " being" so contemptible, received a reward." Egypt and Syria — In 168 B.C. Rome practically extended her protectorate over Egypt by her abrupt intervention in the Syro- Egyptian war. The quarrel had risen over Ccele-Syria and Palestine, which had been charged with the dowry of Cleopatra, the daughter of Antiochus the Great. On her death (173 B.C.) Egypt claimed the provinces, but Antiochus Epiphanes defeated the aggressor at Pelusium (171 B.C.). With his nephew, Ptolemy VI. Philometor, in his hands, he renewed his project of conquest. In spite of the temporary success of the resistance at Alexandria under Ptolemy's younger brother Euergetes, surnamed Physcon (the pot- bellied), he once more lay before the town (168 B.C.), opposed by both brothers, when he was met by the Roman ambassador, C. Popilius Lasnas. Drawing with his vine staff a circle round the king, Laenas demanded an answer to his ultimatum before Epiphanes stepped from the circle. The king obeyed and withdrew, and his obedience set the seal to Rome's mastery of the East. Position of Rome. — Zama, Cynoscephalae, Magnesia, and Pydna, left the Romans nothing to do but organise, pacify, and defend their dominions, to convert their sphere of influence into adminis- trative divisions, and so to construct a stable and compact empire. Amid the homage of kings and peoples, Paullus, the general of the transition, celebrated in solemn triumph the last great victory of the citizen army, typically due to the staying power of Rome and the sterling qualities of her troops. But the temper of those troops, surly at the loss of Macedonian plunder, reserved for the state by the honesty of Paullus, and the disgraceful management of the first campaign, were full of omens for the future. The citizen soldier was soon to become as rare as the citizen general. Nor is it here alone that the transition is seen. Not only does subtle diplomacy take the place of force, but there is a growing tendency abroad and at home to reduce friends to 2 S2 HISTORY OF ROME dependents and dependents to subjects. The force of circum- stances, the methods of the conservatives themselves, played into the hands of the annexationists. It was the plain duty of Rome to put an end to the complicated and ruinous system of protec- torates. It was the plain duty of the Senate to set up where she had thrown down, to substitute standing garrisons for enfeebled militias, and a civil organisation for a chaos of authorities worse confounded by her own position as referee. She must recognise the duties as well as the rights of supremacy. In her attempt to secure an unassailable position she had been drawn on from victory to victory. There was no stable power but her own to maintain peace, keep the seas, and guard the frontier of civilisa- tion. Whatever the danger to her own form of government, the heiress of Carthage and Alexander must take up her inheritance, the liabilities as well as the assets. Revolt of Macedon suppressed — Some steps in the new direc- tion we have already traced. Nor was it long before the unworkable arrangements in Greece collapsed. Nineteen years after Pydna (149 B.C.) a pretender appeared in Macedon. His name was Andris- cus, the son of a fuller of Adramyttium, and he personated Philip, son of Perseus and the Syrian Laodice, who had died a prisoner in Italy. His pretended uncle, Demetrius Soter, king of Syria, had sent the Mysian Warbeck in chains to Rome. He had escaped once and again from custody by the contemptuous negligence of the Senate, and now, with some support from Teres of Thrace, and even the Byzantines, favoured by the prevailing confusion and irritation, he invaded Macedon, routed the local militia, drew to his standard the malcontent loyalists, defeated a praetor, and recovered Thessaly. The rebellion, for which Rome and her com- missions were directly responsible, was suppressed with energy. Q. Caecilius Metellus, with a strong army and the fleet of Per- gamum, crushed and captured the impostor, and thereby relieved a critical year (148 B.C.) of one source of anxiety. The blunder was not repeated ; Macedon became a province, including r Epirus, the Ionian Islands, and the ports of Apollonia and Epidamnus, with the general protectorate of Greece. The arrangements of Paullus were otherwise retained. Local institutions remained, as usual, fairly intact. For the defence of the North and East Rome had now to answer. Her work was inefficiently done, and continued inadequate till the era of Augustus ; but to secure communications the Via Egnatia was constructed, from Dyrrhachium and Apol- lonia to Thessalonica, and later to the Hebrus. There was one AFFAIRS OF GREECE 283 last struggle in 142 B.C., when the pseudo- Alexander was crushed by the quaestor Tremellius. Greece and Rome. — As the reign of terror passed and the tools of Rome vanished one by one from the stage of politics, some measure of peace had returned to Hellas. But deeper sores re- mained ; social democracy, the fruit of wild theory and wilder revolutions, was rampant in thought and act. Public and private bankruptcy, debt, brigandage, depopulation, marked the ruin of the country. There was war between rich and poor, faction and faction, city and city. Marriage was neglected, property insecure. Peloponnesus had become the recruiting ground of the mercenary soldier. The foul story of the plunder of Oropus by indigent Athens (1 56 B.C.) blots the page of history. To apologise for national burglary and avert its heavy penalty came the leaders of philo- sophy, Carneades, Diogenes, and Critolaus, tickling with sophistries the unpractised ears of Rome, and kindling the indignant fears of Cato for the morality of his countrymen. The subservience of Callicrates and his party had preserved the integrity and independence of the Achaean League. Exhaustion and the lack of leaders secured a seeming acquiescence, in spite of latent discontent exasperated by the detention of the exiles. At length, in 151-150E.C, the Senate conceded this point to the prayer of Polybius, the friend and instructor of the Scipionic circle, and the impatient appeal of Cato to " waste no more time in debating whether some old Greek dotards should be buried by Italian or Achaean undertakers." In answer to a second petition for the restoration of their lost rights, Cato advised Ulysses not to return to the Cyclops' cave to get his cap and belt. Return of the Greek Exiles. — But the new policy was as little calculated to ensure peace and a union of hearts as the old. Rome understood neither the qualities nor the defects of her Greek clients ; nor did she even attempt patiently to master the problem — almost insoluble by the wit of man — of reconciling her own ends with a stable Achaean Home Rule. The exiles of seventeen years — a wretched remnant — with their unsatisfied claims and their hatred of Rome, were a danger to the state. One of these restored hostages, Diaeus, a violent and dishonest man, President in 149 B.C., raised a storm of patriotism to conceal his share in a dirty job. His attack on the privileges guaranteed to Sparta as a member of the League w : as a demonstration against Rome. Sparta appealed to the Senate ; its ambiguous answers were sedulously perverted by both parties. At last the Achaeans, disregarding express protests, 284 HISTORY OF ROME and relying on Rome's embarrassment in Africa, her tried com- plaisance, and their own recent services in Macedon, urged on the struggle, invaded Sparta (148 B.C.), and gained a decisive victory under Damocritus. The Achaean League force on War. — Next year L. Aurelius Orestes met the Diet at Corinth. He demanded the renunciation of Corinth, Argos, Sparta, and the most recent acquisitions of the League. Its extension had been only reluctantly allowed. It had TEMPLE AND ACROPOLIS, CORINTH. become a nuisance, and the Romans had no further use for it. The' demand was a sentence of extinction, brutal, but not wholly unde- served, and it raised a tempest of indignation, which scarcely spared the persons of the ambassadors, and fell heavily on the Spartan residents in Corinth. The Senate, however, whether from policy or lingering respect for the last relics of Greek freedom, was content to despatch Sext. Julius Caesar (147 B.C.) to remonstrate with the Diet at jEgium. His attempts at conciliation were baffled by the THE FALL OF CORINTH 285 folly of the incapable demagogue Critolaus [strategics, 147-146 B.C.), who, inferring Rome's weakness from her mildness, frustrated the conference arranged at Tegea, insulted the Roman embassy, and stumped the country to preach a sacred war. He sought supplies by an attack on capital and a suspension of cash payments. The envoys of Metellus were hissed from the theatre at Corinth ; the mob of the capital, controlling the assembly, intimidated the moderates and cheered the idle vapourings of their leader. War was declared with Sparta, and Rome requested to keep hands off. She was friend, not mistress. Metellus and Critolaus. — With some support from Thebes and Chalcis, Critolaus marched upon Heraclea under Oeta, which had seceded in obedience to Rome ; but on the advance of Metellus from Macedon, the Achaeans retreated precipitately into Locris, abandoning even Thermopylae. They were routed at Scarpheia, their supports cut to pieces, the sorry remnant vanishing over the isthmus. Metellus, anxious to end the business, acted with moderation, even mercy, but the criminal obstinacy of Diaeus dragged on the war. By sheer terrorism, by the liberation of slaves and forced contributions, supported by the infuriated rabble, he collected forces, stamped out opposition, and hurried his country to ruin, amid mingled madness and dismay. Mummius and the Fall of Corinth. — The Achaean vanguard had already slunk from Megara before Metellus, when Mummius, a novas homo, an upright, good-natured ignoramus, of little wealth or personal distinction, but not unpopular with the conquered Greeks, arrived, and greedily accepting battle, scattered their feeble forces to the wind. Deserted Corinth, left open to the incredulous consul, was given over to plunder, its remaining inhabitants killed or sold, its buildings razed, its site cursed by the express order of the Senate. Its land was confiscated, together with some tracts in Eubcea and Bceotia, as ager pitbliais. Its place was taken by Argos, the Roman com- mercial headquarters, and Delos, the centre of the transport traffic of the East. Diaeus fell by his own hand, while rude legionaries played dice on the masterpieces of painting preserved to adorn the towns of Italy and the temples of Greece. To ensure their safe transport, Mummius provided that any lost treasure should be replaced by one of equal value ! Settlement of Achaia : Polybius. — Thebes and Chalcis were reduced to villages and the leaders punished. On the whole, the conqueror showed striking moderation and still more striking 2S6 HISTORY OF ROME rectitude. The statesman and historian Polybius was actively employed in arranging the new system, and was able to improve materially the position of his countrymen. The confederacies, though they regained later a shadowy recognition, were sup- pressed. The communities were isolated, and restrictions on land-holding for the present enforced. But Achaia did not yet become a province. The states remained formally free, subject only, with some exceptions, to the payment of a fixed tribute, b AAVAA AA |-L f' Coj'DVd AV5PIGO-IAAPERIO.QVE £jvs'acha i acapkorinto deleto-roaaam-redieit triv/wphans-ob'hasce RES-BENE-CESTAS-QVOD IN-BELLO-VOVERAT HANOAEDEMET-SICNV HERCVLIS-VICTORis lAAPERATOR-DEDlCAT DEDICATORY INSCRIPTION OF L. MUMMIUS. assessed on the several communities, and to the control of foreign relations by Rome. Power in each was thrown into the hands of the rich, and in respect of their mutual relations and of high judicial and administrative questions they were subject to the general supervision of the governor of Macedon. Like Massilia, in Gaul, and the " free towns " generally, they were formally ex- cluded, virtually included in the province, or "command" of the Roman officer. The destruction of Corinth was a dark deed due to commercial SETTLEMENT OF ACHAT A 287 jealousy, a mark of the growing selfishness of Roman policy. But the rapidity of her ruin saved Greece from the extremities of war and the furies of faction. The regime of fussy confederacies, of political hysterics, of social disorganisation and ceaseless Roman commissions, had ended. There was at least a chance of peace, security, and progress. Unfortunately, the confusions of the Mithridatic and civil wars cut short the work of regeneration. No doubt Rome had sown discord and reaped rebellion, but the true cause of the ruin of Greece is to be found in her political vices. By their narrow patriotism and incapacity for combination, by their lack of tolerance and their quarrelsome intrigues, at once invoking and despising the dreaded barbarians, her leaders pulled down destruction on their own heads. CHAPTER XXVIII INTERNAL HISTORY (266-I '6 B.C.). General Characteristics — Actual Changes : (1) Religious Regulations ; (2) Reform of Comitia Centuriata ; (3) Administrative Changes— Growth of Power of Senate and Decay of Comitia— Growth of Oligarchy and the Great Houses. General Characteristics. — The Republic had received its final form in 287 B.C., with the definite recognition of the Concilium plebis. In the present period is developed that glaring contrast of form and fact which stamps so strongly the political institutions of Rome. The germs of the revolution, which, by concentrating power in the Senate, resulted in the creation of an oligarchy, were doubtless contained in the original state-system. They only needed favourable circumstances to work out their true nature. The movement which destroyed the patriciate left in its place an aris- tocracy of office, a " nobilitas," faced by a growing aristocracy of wealth. The normal development of the ancient city-state was suspended, the orderly succession of broadening constitutions checked. The arrest of growth was due to the defects of the popular assemblies, which possessed none of the powers or the spirit of the Ecclesia or the House of Commons, to the various restrictions on their activity, to the absence of an organised party-system, to the conservatism of the people, and, above all, to the peculiar excel- lences of the Senate, favoured by the demands of continuous and 2SS HISTORY OR ROME desperate war. In the preceding period change had succeeded change. The old democratic movement had swept away political disabilities and patrician privilege, had bridled an arbitrary exe- cutive, had dealt after a fashion with economic distress, and had secured for the once excluded plebeian a commanding position in the state. There was now a formal equality of rights and duties. Except for its social status and a few relics of privilege soon to disappear, the patriciate had ceased to exist. But here the growth of free institutions stopped. During 120 years of incessant fighting the government passed into the hands of a practically hereditary oligarchy, ruling under the forms of a moderate democracy. And yet there was no recognised order of nobles ; the Senate and the offices were nominally open, the formal powers of the sovereign Comitia were actually increased, and the burgesses, enjoying full rights and large privileges, bore few but military burdens. New statutes were rare ; no fresh principles were invoked ; there were indeed few who perceived the drift of events, and for active opposition there was neither time nor inclination. A state cannot change front in the face of an enemy. Beneath the surface, indeed, were maturing social and econo- mical problems, which were destined to produce a fresh and more formidable agitation, while the rapid extension of territory, de- scribed above, by aggravating the difficulties of administration, led to the final revolution of all. But for the present these dangers were masked by the rapid rush and pressing interest of foreign affairs, and though we can detect grave symptoms of change, there are few domestic events to chronicle. The plebs was satis- fied with its victory ; the poor had not found out how little they had gained ; all parties acquiesced in facts, and presented a united front at once to foreign foes and Italian outsiders. In the few points that remained the equalisation of rights was completed without difficulty, and the strife of patres and plebs became an anachronism. What is left is the story of a silent change. Religion — In 300 B.C. the Lex Ogulnia had admitted the plebs to the augural and pontifical colleges. In 253 B.C. a plebeian became chief pontiff, the most dignified permanent official at Rome, and with this is possibly connected a change in the method of appointing priests. Hitherto co-optation had been the rule to preserve the consecrated succession. But with the increasing influence exerted by the colleges on politics, it became of real importance to secure some form of control by the community. Hence about this time the selection of the Pontifex Maximus, ROMAN RELIGION and, later on, by the Lex Domitia of 104 B.C., of all the more pro- minent priests, was transferred from the colleges to the minority of the tribes (seventeen out of thirty-five), chosen by lot. This compromise avoided a direct command of the people, and the A ROMAN SACRIFICING. consequent breach of divine law, while it gave a sort of veiled designation or conge d'elirc which could not be disregarded. The importance of these questions lay in the relation of the Roman state to its religion. 290 HISTORY OF ROME This religion was a peculiar one. It had no theological dogma, no moral code to inculcate ; it had none of the rich poetry, the abundant originality, of Greek mythology, nothing of the sombre gloom of the Etruscan, nothing of the passion and mystic emotion of Asia. The numina of Rome, shadowy deities indistinctly conceived, were represented rather by symbols than by images, manifestations of divine power, deriving their names from their functions, indeed with no distinct names, traits, or fives of their own, save those borrowed from the lively fancy of the Greek. It was a faith of little spiritual value, and afforded no scope for religious movements or pious fanaticism. A gentile, or family, or political rather than a personal matter, it had always a formal and ceremonial character. Closely related as it was to Roman civil law — a relation natural and peculiar to early times — there was always something of a contract about it, of obligations well under- stood on both sides. Religion was lost in worship ; the Church was merged in the state. There was no priestly caste to utilise, for the subjection of the secular power, the scrupulous piety and reverence of the people ; the priesthoods were filled by the warriors and lawyers and statesmen of the Republic. The details of the ritual were elaborated by the same series of men" who worked out the details of civil jurisprudence. Here again Roman con- servatism adhered closely to the letter of the law. The spirit and character of institutions might change, the consecrated word or form remained. The prosaic literalism of the Romans made piety consist in the exact performance of obligations undertaken, at the altars of the gods as in the praetor's court. With the gods also it was necessary to be strict and thrifty, to regulate accounts, to be cautious in stipulation and exact a rigorous return. Nor was all this without its value for conduct and character. The faith ex- pressed the man, typified his grave dignity, his self-respect and power of discipline. Its minute formalism acted as a restraint on excess ; its gods were moral guardians of engagements, of treaties, of hearth and home. Its very vagueness and absence of dogma, its attention to ritual and the letter, made its forms expansive and left thought free. They enabled Roman civilisation, by bestowing the franchise of the city on foreign worships, to avoid shipwreck on the rock of intolerance. They made a respectable conformity possible. They left abundant loopholes for skilful in- terpretation and religious fictions, which did as much to relieve conscience and expand ideas as the legal fictions and equitable constructions of jurisconsults did to enlarge and humanise the ROMAN RELIGION 291 strict letter of the Roman code. But Rome had to thank its strong political sense, its reverent conservatism and power of adapting institutions, for the fact that die old worship of nature, the old homage to the dead chief, "ssed into a serviceable political instrument. Religion and Politics. — It was this lay aspect of the Roman religion that made the question of the auspices and the religious colleges important. To the auspices the plebeian gained admis- sion when he entered the gates of office, and in a short time only a few priesthoods remained the uncoveted monopoly of the patrician. The relation of the people to its national religion had two sides — the state, as an assemblage of gentes and familitz, is a religious family, which owes worship to its protecting deities, and that protection is ensured by the exact performance of rites and ceremonies, by the state as by the citizen. The Romans set great store by piety, but they drove hard bargains with gods as well as men. The other side consisted in the attempt to find out the will of the gods as to some definite action — auspiria — and this practice of divination, exercised at the will of the government in the interes^^fcyie state and restricted to experts, passed into a cold and c^^MEated science. The Sen^re had a general control over the state faith. It kept an eye on foreign gods and rites, and upon unauthorised divina- tion and oracle-mongering. In 186 B.C., by the S. C. De Baccha- nalibus, it suppressed with a strong hand a dangerous secret society, which cloaked murder and lust with the garb of religion. After long investigations the licentious cult was stamped out in blood. Roman faith and morality, already sapped by the natu- ralisation of Greek and Asiatic worships, especially that of the Magna Mater of Pessinus (205 B.C.), was threatened by this uneasy craving for outlandish superstitions. Assisted by the various colleges, the Senate also dealt with omens of danger, with cases of sacrilege, with vows and thanksgivings. The ius auspiciorum belonged to the magistrate, originally to the patrician magistrate, who consulted the divine will upon all im- portant public acts. His power of reporting evil omens was used with effect to impede legislation. Of the three great colleges, the Pontifices 1 were the interpreters of sacred law. They arranged the calendar, whose movable feasts and general confusion were 1 The pontifices probably derived their name from the special ceremonies necessary to appease the river-god, injured by the erection of a bridge. 292 HISTORY OF ROME utilised to restrict still further the scanty time available for the Comitia. They, too, built up the body of scientific jurisprudence. The Quindecemviri managed the Sibylline books ; the Augurs could decide if a bill were in orlter or a magistrate duly created. It is i^MMXpmF ■ W>o>TV/v\WS-bF- cqf JENAtVm $°NJOUV£RVNlW °Cr°B'Ar vP aepeM \ pvttoN*.lSC/VVA\aA l VC>/MF+VAl.£RI'P-Fa-MlA'YCICF- D£.(5Av/ATVo5.s£Nre'WTM ji DV/V\£JE_ MINVJSfNAToftlBViCAPEJ^rt^OMEAREJCdtO^EIUTVRIOViliENTrEX^!^ j AtERDos-NEaVIJVlR E5ET-MACI JTER NE.ayEVl(^avFMVWEfcp^*7rt^-*J|T MEVEI poA^ACUJMT v C>-NE(WgVIR.VW\^£av£ ,v)J#( 0.V la-VAM-FEXiEVEttT roMouvT; N EVE ro.IT HAt/N/TER^0t0W'O^RAj^(lt^€^C0AAVlCpVI$E NEVf (OWPoMDIj.E NEV£CoNP/to^-5UFjVEl£J^*etfE?5!7Ea^^ J^CRAlNPQy0l.70OeWISaVAM(:ec/JfV£tET NEVE'NpOrMcQPNEVElM f>ROV ajo^/^ve rxyMP-v R.B em jAcgAavb qv A^Fe cmyci CT - ^'' JEl psVR ^A^MAAPIEJ£T■l^avEX)E^E^ft'fVc>sjE^^EK^Iy'i)■Di^■|■'^' NVJ 5EI>JA TofUBV J- CADEifNT-ciVOvvEA REi c050t£R.E7VB; loVj^McENSVEKE HCAAWES-r't.ovjV <3lNV«^SCI'ViRE/ATavEMVHEp.ri.W^NEaVf>*VAyv\ FFET N£VfimERl6£1VmEir'P0V^I>\/oftY5AW[.iEU/BvyrtgVP"H(fiVS "R.I //>&vEl^A'T•^'lSD•P^•pRV^A^l^5FNAJvoiavE•5E^rr£ > ^^nAi)■VTEliV/-M^ j CM/w-^ tiT- H^icEVT£/wIQSFf c«Wf ^^WVPRAO SCRirWM£jr-reOM>^CArV.rAt^M F^OETyMM CTNiV E ^^ TavE . ^ C1 HOCEINIABOWA'A- AHEMA^TNCFIPERETISITA-JENATViAloyoAVCr/vJrvi, VTEiaVEEAM.FlCilER10V/&EArl 5 WeKACIUVA^PCNQJCJEA.r0TyiT. AT av£ vTEiFAflA-OMVA-5E*«»V/P-i0f/.^ t ^ lff , T frAVTB-iVPRADWWTy^ 1 ' ' N D,E&VJ * aV '^W0re-TA0&Aj.0AT4r lERVAJT-F^C/AT^VIflDl/A^OTASIEN' ; |M A 9 ^o • TE VRAN o LETTER OF THE CONSULS TO LOCAL MAGISTRATES, CONTAINING THE SENATUS CONSULTUM DE BACCHANALIBUS. thus evident how necessary it was for the plebeians to share in the control of the religious machinery of the state. On the other side, it became equally necessary to place their assembly under those religious restrictions from which, as plebeian, it had been free. Secular in its character, it stood outside the old religious RELIGION AND POLITICS 293 system. In 156 B.C., by the Lex ALlia Fufia, a stronghold of the aristocratic party, power was given to the magistrates to apply to the Concilium Plebis the device of obnuntiatio ; i.e., of dispers- ing the assembly by reporting unfavourable omens. This law was specially directed against tribunician agitators, and hencefor- ward we find officials not merely announcing omens on the spot, but proclaiming their intention of. observing the sky on every available day. The auspices thus became a species of religious veto, a trusted weapon of the Senate. i / ^_ ^ i ill i^~^ffl$$ %> Kf^i IWw//|!kl fS A i 5 i Ywl ML u[x^_^ * i mm, \ rc f^JIM ' i i>"jf\ EXTISPICIA. Centuriate Assembly. — In the year 241 B.C., with the addition of the two last created, the number of the tribes was definitely closed at thirty-five, and with this was in all probability connected the reorganisation of the Comitia Centuriata. There was also the fact that the government had been compelled for want of troops to reduce the minimum census required for service in the legions to 4000 asses, a minimum that was further reduced in the naval service, and in case of need even for the army. The change could not fail to be of political importance, when military service rather than taxation gave a claim to civil rights and privileges. Hence the position of the freedmen, who had also 294 HISTORY OP ROME been recruited, and the extension of popular liberties became prominent questions. The organisation of the Centuriata had been military. Its grades and centuries had immediate reference to the tactics and armament of the phalanx. In every detail it pointed to the time when the semi-feudal royal army had passed into the citizen in- fantry of an agricultural and commercial state, formed as a phalanx in which the best armed stood in the front ranks or acted as cavalry on the flank, while the rearward units, with their slighter equipment, increased the weight of the wedge, the lightest armed skirmishing in front and flank. The arrangement, therefore, has a double reference to the results of the census and the needs of war. But since the original settlement, or rather since the time at which the amounts valued in land and cattle had been translated into cash (312 B.C.), the value of the as had sunk heavily. Meanwhile the phalanx had become obsolete, and with the introduction of the manipular army the old machinery was, from a military standpoint, useless. With the introduction of pay and the growth of booty, war became a profitable profession. The rich shirked service ; the cavalry of the public horse became a farce ; the obligation of the census was meaningless ; tribunes even protected the shirkers and arrested the conscribing officer. The whole system would have perished but for the importance of the civil functions of the Comitia. But even for this secondary purpose the exercitus urbanus gradually became obsolete. The substantial middle class which had formed the bulk of the first division gradually disappeared. The census was cooked by aristocratic officials, and the poorer classes {v. note, p. 296) were swollen, apart from the natural increase in population, by the influx of ruined farmers and the swarms attracted by a capital. The lower centuries became fuller and fuller, the higher were steadily thinned. Increased wealth was more unequally distributed. Now the method of group-voting gave but one voice to each century, however large. The eighteen centuries of knights voted first, then the eighty centuries of the first class, and if these were unanimous the matter ended. The third class rarely voted, the fifth never. Thus the whole power fell into the hands of the few. Moreover, the working of the assembly was hampered by its cumbrous machinery and by religious obstruction. Hence political life and judicial busi- ness became concentrated in the more manageable, but, at the same time, more democratic, Comitia Tributa. Between a plebiscitum and a Lex Populi there was now no practical difference ; nor was the formal distinction between the assembly of the tribesand the Con- COMtTIA CENTVklATA 295 Cilium Plebisof any serious value. In the more democratic assembly the influence and ability of the nobles, even of the few remaining patricians, could make itself felt ; its procedure was comparatively simple and rapid. Each tribe possessed a single suffrage, and within the tribe "one man had one vote." The mass of the proletariate, the landless freemen, and freedmen, were confined to the four urban tribes, a judicious restriction, which lost its effect later owing to the number of rural tribesmen who came to settle in Rome, where the conservative peasantry rarely appeared to vote. The immigrants apparently retained their original tribe. Nature of the Reform. — The development of the republican constitution had been due to the action of this assembly and its leaders, and it became more and more the working organ of the Roman people. It even ventured, though rarely, to inter- fere in the conduct of war and finance. Yet it was too demo- cratic entirely to supersede the military Comitia. Plebeian nobles could not ignore the claims of age, wealth, and rank, nor was it in the spirit of Rome ever to do so. It became, therefore, a problem of statesmanship to remove the flagrant anomaly of a scarcely veiled minority controlling the sovereign body, and, while retaining the conservative principles, to give them the maximum of democratic form. The change was managed so carefully and with so little friction as to leave but scanty traces of its character. Probably it excited little interest. It was ap- parently effected by running the lines of the local division by- tribes across the lines of the classes distinguished by age and property. Thus thirty-five tribes, divided each into five classes, and again into two ages, produce 350 centuries, which with the eighteen centuries of Equites and that of the capite censi make up a total of 369 ; the centuries of engineers and trumpeters henceforth subsist- ing merely as guilds, or, if retained, swelling the total to 373. The application of the census and classes to the urban, as dis- tinguished from the rural, tribes was made easy by the fact that land and cattle had long ceased to be the sole standard of wealth and basis of taxation. The census had been extended to include capital and cash, and indeed, with the disappearance of the war-loan {tributuni) and the strict levy, had largely lost its financial and military importance, and become a matter of voting and social posi- tion. As for the Equites equo publico, their original military char- acter was a thing of the past. The nobles, especially the senators, had kept their horse when their days of service had long been over, and the censor's periodic review was a mere ceremony. 296 HISTORY OF ROME They had become a close noble corps, whose raison ctltre lay in their right of voting first. In the eighteen centuries voted the majority of the Senators ; for the rest, they were composed of young nobles who served as officers in the general's suite, acting occasionally as a sort of bodyguard. Their insubordination and special privi- leges made them a nuisance to a business-like commander. By the present reform this body was deprived of the prero- gative vote. The significance of this change was due to the weight of the first vote as an omen ; it lessened the impression made on the ignorant rural and suburban voters by the solid suffrages of the wealthier classes. The prerogative passed to a century chosen by lot out of the first class, the rest following by classes. The number of centuries in each class was equalised ; so that the numerical superiority of the Equites and the first class together disappeared, while an absolute majority implied a larger number of votes. Age and wealth still preponderated, but a distinct step had been taken in liberalising the old assembly. A later reform completed the equalising process, for all included in the census, by determining the order of voting for all the centuries by lot. The freedmen, in recognition of their services in war, were treated as free-born, a privilege cancelled by the democrat Flaminius, 1 who, as censor, in 220 B.C., again confined them to the four urban tribes. The restriction on the city proletariate remained. The whole re- form, a clever stroke of the nobility to " dish the Whigs," had no practical value. It formally settled the equality of Roman citizens, except the cives sine sicffragio and the paupers of the capital, and did nothing else. No tinkering with the Comitia, as things now stood, could impede the growth of political privilege and the power of the Senate. It meant nothing now that in 172 B.C. and 163 B.C. both consuls were plebeian. 2 1 In this year he also built, or rather extended, the Northern road — via Flaminia — from Narnia and Spoletium to Ariminum. - Mommsen now holds — (1) that the 350 centuries, for voting purposes at least, were grouped so as to maintain the primitive number of 193. The votes of the first class, indeed, were reduced from 80 to 70, two centuries — senior and junior— being assigned to each tribe. But the votes of the four lower classes were restricted to 100, an increase of 10 only. It is difficult, however, to see how these composite groups could be distributed among the thirty-five tribes. (2) That the term ' ' classis ' ' only now began to be applied to the inferior grades, which were before " infra classem." (3) That the reform was the work of the democratic statesman Flaminius as censor (220 B.C.). This seems scarcely probable. (4) That the fall in value of the as did not affect the rates of the census, the traditional figures representing the value at this time of smaller sums in the older heavy coin. By 241 B.C. the as had sunk to two ounces. LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 297 Praetors and Quaestors. — The division of the praetorship between the Praetor Urbanus and Peregrinus in 243 B.C. was due to the block in the courts and to the growth of cases involving a knowledge of non-Roman legal principles. Although their main function was to settle the law of the case and the proper procedure, while indices appointed by them decided the facts, their hands were full of work, without reckoning the administrative and military business which fell to them on an emergency or in the absence of the consuls. In 227 B.C. their number was raised to four, and in 197 B.C. to six, to provide for the increase in the provincial commands which could not be governed directly from the capital. In 267 B.C. there were eight quaestors, and their number also was probably raised to correspond with the number of new officers. Law and Equity. — If there was little formal legislation, the sure and silent development of Roman institutions is the more to be marked. The transition in the army from citizen service to pro- fessionalism has been already noted. In the field of jurisprudence, the special Roman science, there was a great and continuous advance. The lawyers, by their official edicts as praetors or by their responses to applicants, created a body of legal doctrine, apart from statutes, incessantly revised, expanded, and improved. Alongside of the strictly Roman law, moreover, there grew with the growth of commercial and international relations a collection of universal principles, common to all civilised nations, Italian, Hellenic, or Phoenician, which was embodied in the edict of the Praetor Peregrinus and applied in dealings with aliens. The simplicity and universality of this system recommended it to the great jurisconsults of the second century B.C., who grafted on to it the Stoical doctrines of the Law of Nature and the Equality of Man. Thus was created the famous Ius gentium, the Roman Equity, which, disguised as Natural Law, played a momentous part in later history. Administration. — In the same typically Roman manner, the executive officers could, with the advice of the Senate, merely by their edicts, earn,- through far-reaching measures, opening or closing the franchise, reforming Comitia, manipulating elections. From hand-to-mouth ordinances sprang up the provincial system and the proconsular power. With rare interference from outside, the Senate arranged at will for the necessary prolongations of command and the requirements of finance and war. Emergencies were met as they rose. No organic statute settled the govern- ment of the foreign dominions. The old dictatorship again gradu- 298 HISTORY OF ROME ally lapsed. Its power had been broken in 217 B.C. Junius Pera (216 B.C.) was the last active dictator ; the last of the old sort at all just held the elections of 202 B.C. It had been an unpopular but useful office, which gave at a crisis that unity of command so sadly needed by the Roman executive. No doubt, while the Senate, as a sort of dictatorship in commission, could neutralise by its authority the checks and balances of the constitution, energetic action was still possible, but, when that authority was once sapped, its decretum ultimuin, which armed the magistrates with dictatorial power, became a weak, and therefore dangerous, as it was always a legally dubious, expedient. Senate, Comitia, and Magistrates. — Most striking of all is the growth of the power of the Senate. The logic of facts and Roman respect for government, its own merits and the feebleness of its competitors, had created out of this consulting committee and council of the magistrate a supreme and independent organ of state. Its resolutions, which had no binding power except by constitutional custom, became omnipotent decrees. Its name in the official title of the Republic precedes the symbol of the sovereign people (S.P.Q.R.). It alone was permanent ; it alone had deli- berative power. It controlled the magistrate, on whose summons it depended, by sentiment, by interest, and, in the last resort, by the interference of his colleagues or the veto of the tribune. The magistrates came of senatorial families, passed by virtue of their offices into the Senate, and depended upon it for their provinces and their supplies. Elected on no common platform, they had no solidarity as a body. The division of functions and restriction of tenure made permanent resistance impossible. The various members of the different official colleges were often at daggers drawn ; consul quarrelled with consul, and censor degraded censor. A refractory officer could produce a deadlock ; of re- volution as yet he did not dream. The tribunate itself was usually filled by young nobles in due course after the quaestorship. Having no special department, its wide powers could be used to coerce the executive, to control the Comitia, and enforce the decrees of the Senate. The tribunes acted as public prosecutors, and enjoyed a seat in the Senate-house. If one abused his power or broke the understanding, another could readily be got to act or obstruct as the Senate pleased. The Comitia was reduced to an elective and legislative machine, worked by its presidents in the interest of the oligarchy. It was an "atrophied member" of the body politic, whose necessary co- POWER OF THE SENATE 299 operation in government became daily more of an anachronism. Its days of meeting, casual to start with, were abridged by religion and amusement ; it had no deliberative or executive powers ; it was open to every form of obstruction. Unattended by the more solid burgesses scattered throughout Italy, it came to represent the starving bellies and clamorous throats of the city mob. It reigned, but did not govern. To rely on its shifting and selfish majorities was to court destruction, and yet its sovereign powers offered a ready weapon to any misguided idealist, plausible agitator, or bankrupt noble who might use the tribunate for purposes of revolution. Strength of the Senate. — The Senate alone could deal with the grave problems of war, foreign relations, and the provincial empire. The management of finance drifted naturally into its hands, for the untaxed burghers had no interest in controlling expenditure. Nor was it unworthy of its high position ; the Senate was the author of Roman greatness. Superior to the House of Lords, for it was not, in theory, hereditary or exclusive ; superior to the Athenian Boule in its independence and authority, it represented at first no one class, generation, or set of principles. As it consisted mainly of ex-magistrates, it was based indirectly on popular choice. It was, in fact, the fine flower of that great aristocracy which resulted from the fusion of the orders, and con- centrated in itself the experience, the traditions, and the states- manship of Rome. Its consistent and tenacious, if narrow-minded, patriotism had saved the state and built up the fabric of empire. Its members had served an apprenticeship in arms and politics, by land and sea, in the provinces and in the forum. They were called to their places by the selection of the censors from among the chosen officers of the Republic. Debarred from com- mercial pursuits (218 B.C.), restricted to the holding of land and the public service, they formed that professional governing class demanded at once by ancient political thinkers and the increasing complexity of national business. Growth of Oligarchy. — But the aristocracy inevitably de- generated into oligarchy. The rich plebeians soon became even more exclusive than the old patricians. It was no longer a ques- tion of religious rights and antique privilege, but of office, wealth, and clique. The new nobility took over the existing tokens of honour, and, adding fresh badges to distinguish themselves from the vulgar citizens, became a compact body aiming at exclusive power. It monopolised office, controlled the Senate, filled up the 300 HISTORY OF ROME eighteen centuries. It enjoyed the ius imagintim, the purple stripe, and the gold ring, and since 194 B.C. the special seats in the theatre assigned by Africanus. Thus imperceptibly freedom and equality were undermined, the alternation of civil rule and obedience, true mark of the ancient republic, done away, and a new object defined for the attacks of the democrat. Popular election became a delusion. The novus homo, the man whose ancestors had filled no curule chair, however wealthy or able, was elbowed out of office ; the mere man of the people was still more vigorously debarred. The honores passed in rotation among the members of the great houses by birth and seniority, and few new families could conquer a place in the fast-narrowing circle. Custom, formulated by the Lex Villia Annalis of 180 B.C., fixed the ages necessary for holding the different offices ; there arose zcertus ordo magistra- tuum, every noble youth expecting to succeed suo anno to each office in turn. The Senate, carrying out in its own interest an estab- lished principle (342 B.C.), first limited the possibility of re-election, as by a law of 265 B.C. affecting the censors, and by a later measure {arc. 151 B.C.), entirely forbade it, in the case of the consulship. Again, by refusing to increase the numberof available elected officers, it kept in its own gift the most profitable and important posts. Even the censorship, whose existence gave the Senate a useful certificate of character, found its freedom of action checked by the recognised claims of ex-magistrates, by the need of publicly specifying the grounds of exclusion from the lists of honour, and by the presence of a colleague. The " Cursus Honorum." — The public service was unpaid, and this, with the methods of election, led to a vicious circle of corrup- tion and embezzlement. The long series of Bribery and Ballot Acts were useless. The young noble, after serving his time in the cavalry or on the staff, canvassed for the quaestorship. As quaestor he replenished his purse and gained an insight into financial and provincial business, generally in attendance on a magistrate. Thence he passed possibly to the tribunate of the plebs. In the military service, where a distinction had grown up between the officer and the common soldier, who rarely rose beyond first centurion {primus pilui), he would be created tribwius militum, by nomination or popular election, and this important office be- came a rung of the political ladder. The aedileship, with its shows and care of corn and markets, soon became a sure step to debt and popularity. As praetor or propraetor he drew from his province the means to pay his debts and the cost of the consulship. From GROWTH OF OLIGARCHY 301 the same source the proconsul extracted his famous triple fortune {vide p. 547). Finally, he crowned his career with the censorship, the peculiar glory and stronghold of the oligarchy. The path to power lay in family influence, in a strong clientele,, in the arts of the advocate, the showman, and the election-manager. The outsider must trust to these same arts, aided by noble patronage or populai agitation. Extent of the Evil. — As it was necessary that the Senate should usurp authority, so no doubt the new conditions of life, public and private, were bound to create a race of consuls and praetors very different from the simple farmers of old Rome. Class distinctions were bound to arise. But the jealousy of indi- vidual eminence inherent in an oligarchy, fatal as it was to good foVEI APICEINSIGNE-DIAU TAMlNjlSGESISrEI AAORSPERJEf /l VAVTESSENTOAANfA BR.EVIA HOi PSFAMAVIRTVSOVE CLORIAATOV yN£ENIVM O.VIBYS5EI INLONGALICX /SETTIBEVTIERVITA FACILE-FACTE! JvrERASES-CLORIAM MAlOfcVAA cWARE-LVBENS-TEINGRiMiv SCINO RECirlT" TERRAPVBLL rR OGNATVA\VrV6LlO-COR.NEL] EPITAPH OF P. CORNELIUS SCIPIO, FLAMEN DIALIS, (?) SON OF AFRICANUS, WHO DIED YOUNG. government, was equally fatal to the class. Lack of new blood de- stroyed, as the infusion of new blood had strengthened, the Senate. It sank from an assembly of kings to a cabal of selfish aristocrats, who confounded the welfare of the empire with the miserable interests of their own misgovernment. Yet these evils were only gradually developed. Though the Hannibalic war was largely directed by a small set of nobles, whose policy, favoured by the failure of the popular heroes, was justified by success, room was found for an able outsider like Marcellus, good generals were re- elected, and Scipio could rely on public feeling to back him in vigorous action. At the same time the existence of a virtual oligarchy aided Roman discipline and patriotism in curbing the ambition of individuals and the excessive power of a single family. 302 HISTORY OF ROME The extraordinary successes and brilliant personality of Africanus raised him to an exceptional position and enhanced the vast influence of his house, which had treated Spain almost as its private property. Flamininus controlled for years the Eastern policy of the Senate. Metellus succeeded Metellus on the curule chairs. The power and pride of the Claudii were proverbial. But Scipio himself, fifteen years princeps Senatus and first man in Rome, incapable of an idea of treason, as he was ill adapted for political manoeuvres, frittered away his strength in family feuds and personal quarrels, and fell, with his whole house, in the great Asiatic trials {vide supra, p. 273, infra, p. 303), a victim to the dogged enmity of Cato and the rest, who attacked in him and his brother the predominance of an overweening house. Yet Scipio, apart from his personal claims, had no party, no projects of re- form. He was a noble, and supported the nobility. The rivalries of the Roman houses or of individual senators must not be mis- interpreted as the struggles of genuine parties. CHAPTER XXIX internal history (266-146 B.C.) — continued Cato the Censor and the Conservative Reaction— Gaius Flaminius and the Popular Movement— State of Italy and the Provinces— The Army and Navy — Finance — The Ordo Equester. Misgovernment. — Had the power thus transferred from the nominal sovereign and its officers to the governing nobility con- tinued to be exercised for the public good, the usurpation would perhaps have been justified. But, with few exceptions, the mem- bers of the oligarchy aimed merely at the retention of their privi- leges and the aggrandisement of the family or the individual. The ill-protected provinces were plundered to pay the cost of games, buildings, and festivals, to feed the mob and bribe the electors. Neighbouring nations were harried to provide triumphs and titles. Italy, neglected in her agriculture, denied the franchise, and drained for recruits, was sacrificed to the prejudices and in- terests of the capital. The army, and, above all, the fleet, degene- rated ; the frontiers were undefended. Already the passion for distinction, the greed of big estates, the necessities of debt, leave CATO THE CENSOR 303 burning marks behind them in useless wars, savage evictions, em- bezzlement, and extortion. Already protests were raised against pride, luxury, and effeminacy, against foreign culture and strange worships, against monopoly of office and nepotism. Cato the Censor. — The protest did not come solely from the excluded classes or their spokesmen. Its strongest voice was heard in the tirades of the great censor, M. Porcius Cato, a Sabine farmer who rose from the plough to the highest honours of the Re- public. Bomin234B.C, asoldierat seventeen,pra;torin io,8B.C.,and consul in 195 B.C., a veteran in the fields of war and oratory, he was the last representative of old-fashioned, middle-class conservatism, a bitter foe to new men and new manners, a latter-day Cincinnatus. He had served from the Trasimene to Zama, in Sardinia, Spain, Macedon, with skill, courage, and success. Accused forty-four times, accuser as often, the grey-eyed, red-haired man had literally fought his way up with his rough-and-ready wit, his nervous ora- tory, his practical ability and business habits. For thirty-five years the most influential man in Rome, he had acted in every capacity, as general, administrator, and envoy. He was a man whose virtues served his own ends, whose real but well-trumpeted austerity was a stalking-horse for his personal acrimony and ambition. Narrow, reactionary, and self-righteous as he was honest, active, and well- meaning, a good hater and a persistent critic, at once a bully and a moralist, he took up his text daily against the backslidings and iniquities of the time, against Hellenism, luxury, immorality, and corruption, especially as personified in the Scipios and Flaminini of his day. At bottom he was a genuine man, but it was unlucky that the strongest reforming force should have taken shape in this political gladiator and typical Roman, this hard-hitting, sharp- witted, keenly commercial, upright, vulgar Philistine. Work of Cato. — Cato led no reform-party. He fought for his own hand, and stalwartly defended Roman morality and husbandry, but he had no wide aims and was no opponent of senatorial government. Cato's quarrel with the spirit of his age was a quarrel within the senatorial body. His attack on the Scipios, useful as it was to the oligarchy, was largely an attack on personal opponents. In 187 B.C. he succeeded in forcing through the prosecution of Lucius Scipio for alleged embezzlement ; he obtained a special inquiry, and secured the condemnation of the unfortunate Asiaticus, whose poverty demonstrated his innocence. Among the incidents of this obscure campaign, which was aimed at both the brothers, are recorded the famous speech of Scipio's enemy, Ti. Sempronius Gracchus the 304 HISTORY OF ROME Elder, for the defence, and the yet more famous appeal of Publius (vide supra, p. 273). Whatever may have happened, the power of the great house was broken, and Cato secured his coveted censorship, the prize of the struggle, in 184 B.C. In concert with Valerius Flaccus, he visited the sins of their order on the heads of the nobles, striking out from the lists of senators and Equites scions of the proudest families of Rome. The stalwart novus homo had played a strong and successful game, but his work as a reformer amounted to little. His measures, like his speeches and impeachments, were counter- blasts to public and private vices. But just as he had no fruitful political principles to champion, so his narrow and boorish ideals of a life devoted to public work and rural economy on the strictest lines of profit and loss, were powerless to touch hearts and inspire conduct. He defended the Lusitanians against Galba, and pro- tested against the spoliation of Rhodes, but he destroyed Carthage. Yet this foe to culture took up Greek in his old age ; and credit is due to him for his repeated efforts to secure justice and economy, to restrain aggression, and to protect the treasury and the pro- vincials from fraud and extortion. Symptoms of Opposition and Decay of People. — Here and there, however, can be traced the beginnings of a real opposition to the government on the part of the poorer classes, a resistance which becomes more definite as the new oligarchy makes itself more clearly felt. There is no party-system and no recognised programme as yet ; but certain questions tend to recur in which opposite interests are apparent and the lines of the corning struggle are being marked out. The occasional attempts to interfere with the conduct of the Hannibalic war had ended in disaster, and the deadly nature of the struggle prevented further and more serious developments. Conscious of incompetence, the Assembly rarely interfered with imperial policy or finance. The Roman Commons had no need or power to use the control of Supply as a weapon of opposition. The nobles were as yet too loyal to manipulate the Assembly against the Senate. The Senate knew when to give way to public opinion. Already, indeed, the Assembly had demurred to the declaration of war with Macedon, and the ill-paid toils and disgraces of the Spanish campaigns had produced a crop of discon- tent and mutiny ; but in the end the Senate got its way. For the bulk of the war-period the Comitia, with sober deference to wiser judgments, with large-hearted if narrow-minded loyalty, worked for the saving of Rome. But if there had been a danger even with the older body of solid, sensible farmers when the needs of a small DECAY OF COMITIA 305 state were more easily judged, the defects of the Comitia came glaringly out with the extension of the franchise over Latium, Sabina, and Campania, and the diffusion of settlers and colonists over the whole peninsula. The tribes became more and more bulky, there was no organisation of the out-voters, and communi- cations were slow. The sovereign Assembly tended to become a purely urban gathering, and many causes combined to ruin and corrupt the populace of the capital. The steady working of manu- mission, contempt for manual labour, the institution of clientship, and the agricultural depression, aided by the cheap living, largesses, and games, collected in the city an ever-growing mass of paupers and parasites. They swelled the retinues of the great, who held their votes in their pocket. The Forum began to swarm with slaves and freedmen, servile Orientals, and " starveling Greeks/' carelessly registered in the falsified census, " stepchildren of Italy," whose shouts drowned the voices of Rome's genuine sons. As yet the forms of corruption were mainly indirect. Fed at the expense of allies and provincials, amused by the oediles, flattered for their votes, and feared for their riots, at once corrupted and corrupting, these modern Romans formed the germ of that un- stable mob, denounced by Cicero — in private — as the " leech of the treasury," " the dregs of Romulus," which with its clamorous wants and perilous prerogatives exhausted the empire, dis- turbed the streets, and baffled the statesmen of Rome. Of this great mischief there were at present but signs and symptoms. When Polybius dates the beginning of evil from the laws of Flaminius, he is giving the ideas of his friends rather than historical fact. Such symptoms have been found in the appoint- ments of Flaminius, Minucius, and Yarro, in the decay of the dicta- torship, in the threatened appeal of Scipio, and the actual appeal of Flaminius, from Senate to people, and in the reform of the priestly elections. But these are merely isolated phenomena. They are indeed signs of the times ; nor was the hour far distant when tribune and soldier alike would use the powers of a casual crowd to push their policy and secure their ends. As yet the changes made were due as much to the natural growth of existing institutions, to the conservative Cato, or to casual excitement, as to any "pernicious radical agitator. ' Flaminius and the Land. — Once more it was an economic ques- tion which caused a serious, even passionate contest. There was the ordinary attempt to check usury in 193 B.C.— Lex Sempronia de ■pecunia credita — but the real struggle came earlier over the land- 306 HISTORY OF ROME question. In 232 B.C. the tribune Gaius Flaminius proposed the allotment of the Picenian and Senonian ager publicus, south of Ariminum. This raised again the question stirred by Cassius and Licinius, the question of the growing poverty of the poor. Things had gone from bad to worse during the long agony of the Sicilian war. Capital had accumulated in the hands of nobles and contractors ; the small farmers had succumbed under the pressure of political and economical causes (vide infra, p. 316). The population of rural Italy had declined, and the perilous surplus of landless peasants, paupers, and adventurers was mounting up. The ordinary method of providing an outlet for labour, of re- peopling the wasted districts and depleting the city, had been by the assignation of allotments, and the creation of colonies. These measures tended to prevent the decay of husbandry and the monopoly of land by the rich and noble, while they helped to secure the position, extend the civilisation, and reward the veterans of Rome. Many settlements of this type were founded during the period, especially at the close of the Hannibalic war, in the Cispadane conquests and on the confiscated tracts in Italy. Allot- ments were distributed in 173 B.C. out of Gallic and Ligurian land, and in 165 B.C. the occupiers who had squatted on the Campanian domain were ejected with compensation, and the soil allotted in heritable leaseholds. These distributions, due partly to a sense of danger, partly to the conservative reformer Cato, anxious for the future of the yeomanry, owed most to the effect produced by the agitation of the detested Flaminius. The evil Flaminius had to meet was serious. No acre of the Sicilian or Sardinian conquests had been divided ; no new rural tribes, necessitating fresh allotments, could now be formed. The remnant of the ager publicus was still enjoyed by the rich in usufruct or leased out by the censors. Side by side with their vast private estates, the nobles held as occupiers large slices of the state-land, whose legal rent they neglected to pay. The small holder, bought out, squeezed out, and economically ruined, found no outlet in migration to newly annexed districts. With the yeomanry of Italy fell Italian agriculture and the Italian army ; the structure of the state was being sapped at its foundation. Flaminius and his supporters saw the danger. Their remedy, which met but a portion of the problem, was to break up the land monopoly and restore the farmer to the soil, by the creation of small holdings on a large scale. The moment was favourable. There was space available for the experiment without confisca- I GAIUS FLAMIN1US 3°7 tion. But the government added to the error of neglecting to do a conservative and popular thing the error of bitter and futile obstruction. Flaminius appealed to the people. There was a sharp conflict between vested interests and the fair claims of the veterans. There were scenes in the Assembly, but the impassioned eloquence of the tribune, whom his indignant father attempted to drag from the platform, and public feeling for popular rights 308 HISTORY OF ROME carried the day. The Bill was passed without the previous approval or subsequent sanction of the Senate. Nor was the excitement soon allayed. The execution of the measure was obstructed, and partisan hatred persecuted in life and death the well-meaning and ill-fated reformer. Flaminius, if he was a poor strategist, was a brave man and a courageous statesman. But in this instance his impatience set a precedent that could not fail to be abused. The danger, no doubt, was largely due to the folly of the Senate, which permitted the popular leaders to discover their own power, and precipitated the first great revolt against its authority since the fusion of the orders. For hitherto measures brought before the Assembly had, by the spirit and custom of the constitution, come from the Senate, with which the tribunes had generally worked in harmony. Between them Flaminius and the Senate allowed a casual Assembly to tamper with high matters of state, and opened the door to future disorders. In his aims and means Flaminius was the political father of the Gracchi. Result. — Thus, though we find no definite attempt in this period to alter the methods and traditions of government or to oust the Senate from its place, yet the old struggle of poor and rich, debtor and creditor, yeoman and capitalist, disengaged from the artificial distinction between patrician and plebeian, is be- coming more prominent. The tribune is returning with added power to his old post of leader of a new type of "people." There are signs that the rift between form and fact in the constitution is widening to rupture, that the friction of jarring powers may produce fire. The questions at issue are not in themselves fraught with the gravest danger. The neglect to deal with them, compli- cated with the effects of social corruption, economic errors, and weak government, might prove fatal. The Administration. — And there were signs that the strong and steady government which had conquered Italy, worn down Hannibal, and mastered the world, which had compensated loss of liberty with empire, was itself being eaten away by the solvents of wealth and luxury, and was incapable of grasping the problem which destiny and its own action had set before it. It was now that the defects of a narrow oligarchy resting upon sham elections, hedged round by jealous restrictions, and working by a system of checks and balances fatal to continuous and scientific adminis- tration, began to appear. i. Italy. — In Italy the main questions were the state of agri- culture and the position of the allies. Of the first, it is enough CONDITION OF ITALY 309 at present to say that the same causes which had ruined the Roman farmer were aggravated for the Italians by the effects of war and the confiscations and conscription of Rome. Of the various classes of Italian communities, the municipia sine suffragio had either received the full franchise, or lost their status, like Capua, as the reward of rebellion. The Bruttians and degraded Campanians appear in a new and oppressive position as a sort of public serfs, deprived of civic freedom and the right of carrying arms. More independent, but formally excluded from the Roman franchise, stood the Celtic communities across the Po. Of the non-Latin allies, only those retained their old status absolutely who, like Neapolis, Nola, and Heraclea, had adhered to Rome. The position of the others steadily deteriorated. Even the Latins, whose loyalty had saved the state — Tibur, Praeneste, and the colonies — suffered in increased military service, especially for garrison duty and the Spanish wars, and, as in 177 B.C., in curtailed allotments and largesses. Moreover, there was a tendency to diminish their rights and liberties. In the case of Ariminum (268 B.C.) and all Latin communities founded later, the right of acquiring the civitas by migration was cancelled and in the case of the older states it was limited. In 187 B.C. and 177 B.C. {Lex Claudia) large numbers of Latins and allies were ejected from Rome, on the pretext of pre- venting the depopulation of their native places. The last Latin colony in Italy, Aquileia, was founded in J 84 B.C. The new colonies were meant for Roman citizens, and not even the poorest Roman nowadays was willing to surrender the privileges of that franchise. For the same reasons the bestowal of the citizenship was the more jealously confined, as it was the more eagerly coveted. The policy of wholesale incorporation, dropped when Rome was strong and de- centralisation appeared dangerous, was not resumed now that Rome was co-extensive with Italy, while the disappearance of the passive franchise and the limits set to migration closed the city to all but favoured individuals, and the magistrates of Latin towns who became citizens ex-officio. The old policy of graduated privilege and regular promotion fell into oblivion ; exclusion was the order of the day. At home the oligarchy masqueraded as a republic ; in Italy despotism masqueraded as alliance. Roman liberalism began and ended at home, and meant little enough even there. Hence the struggle against privilege passed from the plebeian to the Italian, as it passed later from the Italian to the provincial. This conduct was as impolitic as it was ungenerous. It merged faithful allies with conquered subjects. It broke up the unity of 310 HISTORY OF ROME the Latin race, substituted a local for a national patriotism, and destroyed that use of the franchise for consolidating power which has been so justly praised. The proposal of Carvilius in the crisis of the great war, to give representative Latins seats in the Senate, was premature, but a wiser policy would at least have retained existing privileges. As yet the rights of self-government were respected and no taxation was imposed, but the expense of the contingents grew heavier, especially for the cavalry, while popula- tion steadily decreased. The restrictions on marriage and com- merce hindered the circulation of capital, and impoverished the allies by concentrating business in Rome. The interference of Senate and consuls in local affairs became more frequent, and the Italians suffered from the severity of martial law, from the unfair distribution of rewards, and, last but not least, from the illegal violence of Roman troops and Roman magistrates. 2. The Provinces : (a.) Organisation. — But tyranny was worst where there was least restraint, in the government of the provinces. At first conservative Rome had avoided annexation, but, stimulated by trade and speculation, the appetite came with eating. At the close of this period she possessed Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica, the Spains, Macedonia and Achaia, and Africa. Their organisa- tion was a patchwork of existing methods and Roman additions. It was a system of makeshifts. As the provinces were acquired piece- meal, so no complete machinery was invented, no central offices created. The old Italian state-ideas were applied with a difference. The subject communities were neither admitted to the franchise nor reduced to slavery. With few exceptions they remained sepa- rate states, allies or dependents of Rome. The province, in fact, is an aggregate of different communities, with diverse rank and status, constituted as a department (provincia) under a special magistrate. Its organisation, laid down originally by a commis- sion, and modified by laws and decrees from time to time, depended in each case on the history and character of the people, on the nature of its previous government, and on its earlier relations with Rome. Existing" institutions were respected and municipal autonomy retained, but in the hands of aristocratic boards. Some states indeed, were technically free and extra provinciam, enjoying by treaty or decree exemption from taxation and interference. The rest were liable to the payment of tribute and subject to the jurisdiction of the governor. As in Italy, the supremacy of Rome was secured by division and isolation, and by the graduation of rights and immunities ; but in Italy there was no PRO VINCI AL GO VERNMENT 3" governor, no garrison, no taxation, and no disarmament. Taxation in the provinces was based on the old systems, and was in theory moderate. Sometimes, as in Sicily, it consisted mainly of tithes of produce (decumce) ; in others, as in Spain, of fixed money-payments (stipendia). The tithes were farmed out to the highest bidder, on the spot, or, in later days, at Rome ; the money-taxes were paid in by the communities. In Sicily the arrangements of Hiero were substantially adopted, and furnished a sort of model. There were, besides, customs, and requisitions for military purposes. Often the proceeds only covered, or even failed to cover, the cost of govern- ment, to provide for which may have been the original theory of taxation, but the revenue from Macedon relieved the burgess of the tributum, and the provinces became the milch-cows of the Roman nobles, and the prcedia populi Roman!, while the duties of defence and administration were shamefully neglected. {b.) The Governor. — The hinge of the whole system was the resident governor, who at first was one of the magistrates, generally one of the praetors of the year. As business grew at home and abroad, the home and foreign commands gradually came to be separated, and the imperium was exercised in the pro- vinces by propraetors and proconsuls. As a rule there was no special selection made, the available officials dividing the depart- ments, as determined by the Senate, which filled up any deficien- cies by combining or proroguing commands. In the end it meant that the great families passed the appointments round from hand to hand. To manipulate the rotation was even more easy than managing elections ; the sacred lot itself could be worked with a little ingenuity. The tenure of office, limited by a ruinous principle to one year, was occasionally extended, while, to meet a special crisis, wider authority could be conferred by Senate or people on a single individual. The tendency was naturally to increase the independence of the governor, whose power, in spite of treaties, charters, and customs, stretched as far as his will. He possessed civil jurisdiction and military command ; he controlled finance through his quaestor ; his staff was responsible only to himself. Free from the checks that operated at home and safe of the favourable verdict of his peers, he could set at naught paper guar- antees, ineffective laws, and appeals to the distant central govern- ment. The state might limit exactions, but the "great unpaid," inadequately furnished for ordinary expenses, with hungry credi- tors and dependents, and still hungrier publicani and negotiatores, tax-farmers and business-men, to satisfy, exhausted his province. 312 HISTORY OF ROME with exactions. The province filled his purse, paid his debts, furnished for the mob its corn and wild beasts, and spent its last farthing in loading its tyrant with praises and presents. It was systematic extortion, rather than the unsatisfied aspirations of the provincials, which produced the occasional outbursts of smouldering resentment and the terrible reprisals of the oppressed Asiatics. (c.) General Result. — In theory Roman rule was tolerant, mode- rate, and responsible ; in practice it was an irresponsible autocracy aggravated by annual changes. Moreover, the whole system re- acted dangerously on national character and the home government. Exceptional power and the license of plunder spoiled the honest republican and destroyed Roman equality. The provincial empire was responsible for the rise of the formidable imperhem ftrocon- sulare which stood outside the city-constitution, for the standing armies owing allegiance to their general, for the extension of slavery and the corruption of manners. Perilous, again, was the evidence it afforded of wholesale misgovernment. Yet in the age of Cato and Paullus the subjects were better off than they had been under their previous rulers, life was safe and commerce pro- tected, the publicum were kept in order, the old integrity and discipline were not yet extinct. It was this even more than her jealous policy, and the absence of any strong national feeling or military organisation among the subjects, that made Rome's dominion secure. The variety of method and the conservatism of the system had its merits. Speci- ally marked is the difference of East and West. In the barbaric West the new civilisation had a free field ; in the East the pro- tectors of Hellas shrank from imposing a strict regime on the peoples whose culture they adopted. On the other hand, the lack of unity and control was felt in every direction. It gave the pro- consul a free hand, an army, and a base. It made a scientific frontier impossible. It left each province as a single unit to itself, and sacrificed efficient rule to the caprices of badly chosen officials. The influx of provincial wealth into the coffers of the state and the pockets of its rulers debauched the public conscience, created an appetite for empire as a source of profit, and ruined the sense of imperial responsibility. (d.) Attempts at Control. — Individuals were sometimes called to account ; the Senate occasionally interfered, as in 171 B.C., when it regulated the price of supplies in Spain ; and the governor after resignation was liable to prosecution. But the courts were distant, PRO VINCIAL GO VERNMENT 313 the routes difficult, and the alien plaintiff must seek justice from the defendant's friends and accomplices. Even the institution of public clientship, which protected the conquered 1 by the power of the conqueror's house, was humiliating to the protigj and dangerous to the state. The rapine and outrage described by Cicero belong to a later period, but corruption spread so fast that in 149 B.C. a standing court {quczstio perpetud) was created for the trial of extortion by the Lex Calpurnia de pecuniis repetundis. In this, the type of subsequent qwzstiones, the people exercised juris- diction indirectly through a delegated body, from whose sentence there was no appeal. The offence and its punishment were deter- mined by law ; a praetor or his deputy acted as president {vide infra, p. 352). It was a step to the formation of a criminal code ; but the composition of the court soon became a political question, which impaired its judicial value. That the supervision of the home government was equally ineffectual may be inferred from the con- duct of generals in Spain, Asia, and Macedonia. This indepen- dence of the proconsul was fatal alike to equality within the ruling class and to the subordination of the executive to the Senate, the two foundations of oligarchy. Hence the natural aversion of the older statesmen from annexation, and the attempts to limit the tenure of command and to control finance at least by the appoint- ment of quaestors. The Army and Navy. — That the army rapidly deteriorated needs no proof. The greed, cruelty, and incapacity of the average commander have been already abundantly illustrated. The de- moralisation of the soldiery became no less apparent. There was cowardice in the field, mutiny in the camp ; at the end of the period the insubordination and corruption of the Spanish and African legions called forth the stern rebukes and chastisement of yEmilianus. In truth, the Roman army had ceased to be a civic militia, without receiving the organisation and discipline of a standing army of regular troops. To meet the evasion of service by the upper and middle classes, candidates for office were in 180 B.C. compelled to show evidence of at least ten years' service. In 152 B.C. selection by ballot had to be substituted for selection by the officers in levying recruits. The ranks were filled by volunteers attracted by the hope of plunder, and veterans retained with the colours. Men were enlisted from lower and lower strata of society. The civic horse especially had ceased to be effective. On service 1 E.g.y Allobroges and Fabii, Syracusans and Marcelli, &c. 3'4 HISTORY OF ROME the cavalry was composed mainly of Italians, supplemented by Numidians and /Etolians. The drill, tactics, and organisation were all becoming obsolete. The art of war had developed. Long service in distant fields, garrison duty, pay and plunder, had produced the professional soldier. The staff, too, was becoming professional ; veterans form the core of the legions, and veteran settlements abroad, e.g., Italica and Carteia, begin to appear. But further disasters were needed before the facts were recognised and Marius ROMAN SOLDIERS WITH SCUTUM (OF A LATER PERIOD). began what the Caesars completed, the reorganisation of the army on a purely military basis. Navy there was none. The great fleet, mistress of the seas, to whose silent but effective action the defeat of Hannibal was largely due, fell into decay ; the navies of conquered nations were destroyed ; the police of the sea was left to the maritime allies. Pirates infested the trade-routes, and soon menaced the supplies of Rome and the safety of the coast-towns. Revenue. — The revenue had materially increased. Tribute in kind or cash and huge war indemnities supplemented the internal FINANCE AND THE EQUITES 315 resources of customs, dues, rents, and royalties, together with the proceeds of the 5 per cent, tax on manumissions. The tributum was not exacted after 167 B.C. Against this income were to be set the ornatio provincice, l the maintenance of the armies, and of public roads and buildings, the repayment of forced loans, the expenses of the corn supply and the salt monopoly, besides the cost of con- stant warfare. Half the items of a modern Budget were absent. Public service was unpaid ; the administration of justice cost little ; there were no estimates for education, local government, or police, and yet the financial results were not brilliant. Public honesty at Rome might compare favourably with the notorious dishonesty of the Greek, but, apart from actual embezzlement and mismanage- ment by the magistrates, they at least permitted state dues to remain unpaid and state property to be plundered. The method of collecting revenue through tax-farmers was at once expensive and oppressive. While expenditure on public works diminished, the reserve was slender in proportion to the receipts. There was no attempt to extend the census over the provinces, to balance expenditure and taxation, and to base the latter on plain and uniform principles. The dependence of the quaestor on the governor frustrated attempts at control. Ordo Equester. — A new class had grown up. The eighteen Servian centuries of knights {equo publico) had been supple- mented in the field by squadrons of volunteers of the necessary census serving with their own horse. As first the one and then the other disappeared from active service, the term eques, losing its military significance, came to mean primarily any person possessing an estate, valued later at a minimum of 400,000 sesterces, and therefore liable to the conscription as a cavalry soldier. For a time it would apply to the whole body of wealthy nobles in the Senate or out of it. Meanwhile the growth of speculation, of tax-farming and contracting gave rise to a moneyed as contrasted with a noble class. The Claudian law of 2 1 8 B.C., which excluded senators from the shipping trade, and the social taboo on commerce began the severance between the landed nobility and the capitalist. The severance was completed by a later ordinance of 129 B.C., which compelled an eques equo publico to surrender his horse on entering the Senate. These enactments created a plutocracy whose political influence is marked by the destruction of Carthage and Corinth and the attack on Rhodes. As tax-collectors and business men 1 I.e. , money disbursed to the provincial governor for payment of troops and official expenses. 316 HISTORY OF ROME the Equites pervaded the provinces, to be restrained or connived at by the various governors according to their honesty. As a political body they offered an instrument to an able agitator. The existence of this class and the resulting division of interests were an additional problem for the government. The eighteen centuries continued to exist as voting divisions constituted and revised by the censors. CHAPTER XXX INTERNAL HISTORY (266-146 B.C.) — continued. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS Slavery — Agriculture— Capitalism — Clientship — Society — Hellenism. Slavery. — Without slavery the ancient state was impossible. It was the necessary condition of universal soldiership, of unfettered political activity, and of literary and artistic cultivation. It is pre- supposed by Plato and defended by Aristotle. But developed as it was at Rome, it injured every department of civil and social life. It allowed the capitalist to accumulate wealth without dis- tributing wages, it supplanted free labour in its only honourable form (agriculture), made sound husbandry impossible, and vitiated the perhaps inevitable system of large-farming. In the lower forms of industry, it destroyed competition and cast a slur on all manual labour, while it filled up the minor offices and employments. The freedmen, usurping all the better berths, as agents, overseers, and tutors, transacted the bulk of commercial and domestic busi- ness. Useful as political dependents and bribery-managers, they swamped the Comitia and corrupted society. The slave-system, which depopulated the East, the main source of supply, by raids and man-hunts, helped to import foreign ideas of a low type, to break down the old family-life and strict morality. It filled Rome with intrigue, ruined the minds of the young, fostered despotism and vice, and menaced the state itself with dangerous insurrec- tions. Its poisonous workings are, however, peculiarly traceable in the departments of agriculture and finance. Agriculture. — Landed properties in Italy at this time were either (1) small holdings worked by the owner and his family with a few slaves ; (2) large estates, as yet comparatively moderate in extent, whose proprietor commonly managed several by means of slave- DECAY OF AGRICULTURE 317 stewards and serfs, bought, worked, and kept on the least humane and most strictly commercial principles ; or (3) large cattle-ranches and sheep-walks, held by "occupation" and tended by armed and mounted slaves. There were few tenant farmers, and free labour was rarely called in. Rural economy had been rude enough, but frugality, thrift, and energy had enabled the small holder for a time to make head against his besetting difficulties, want of capital, the high rate of interest, and the severity of the law of debt. The oppression of the usurer had been diminished by the influx of wealth and the diversion of speculation to more profitable invest- ments. But the natural tendency of small holdings to disappear, owing to subdivision among children, the improvement of agricul- ture, and the application of capital to farming, was intensified by vicious legislation and unfair competition. Corn paid as tithe, or supplied as a gift, or bought by the government abroad at low prices, fed the armies, glutted the markets, and was often distri- buted at cheap rates to the populace. With low freights and rapid transit Sicily could undersell the home-grower at any time ; when importation was favoured and the price artificially lowered competition became impossible. Yet agriculture was the staple industry of Italy. The flow of labour to the armies and the capital drained the country districts. At the same time the Claudian law drove the nobility to invest in land. Apart from violent evictions — a comparatively small factor in this problem — the wealth derived from extortion, speculation, and public plunder made it easy for the ruling classes to force the prices and buy up the small owners. Their holdings combined in large estates and worked by unmarried slaves, free from conscription, were developed into vineyards and olive-gardens, or fell, more often, into pastures, preserves, and parks. The natural results followed. Not only was the yeoman heavily handicapped and capital unfairly favoured, but the margin of useful cultivation receded, as the freeman was replaced, not by machines, but by the slave ; the area of pasturage increased ; the price of food rose, and was only checked by large importations at the cost of the exchequer, a remedy worse than the disease. On the top of the whole came the occupation-system and the monopoly of the public lands by the rich. A landless and labourless proletariate threatened the development of Italy. "The cost of Rome's growth fell on the people ; the profits went to a class." The valley of the Po and the central Apennines had suffered least, and Campania still flourished ; but Etruria, oppressed by its ancient lords and drained by requisi- tions, and Southern Italy, barely recovering from the Samnite wars 31S HISTORY OF ROME and Hannibal, were slowly ruined. Malaria invaded the lowlands ; the census dropped ; towns decayed ; recruits fell off; the riots and risings of the slaves became a public danger. Rome had learned the economic methods of Carthage, and must now gather the fruits. Ignorance and neglect wrought more evil than all the wars and conscriptions, than all the usurpations and land-grabbing of the ruling classes. The urban assembly had no interest in the question ; the Senate meant well, and showed its appreciation of affairs by publishing a translation of Mago's treatise on the management of slave- worked plantations ! Business. — The same tendencies pervaded business. The Romans had been always a commercial people, but the wealth of the great families rested not upon productive labour and legi- timate exchange, but rather upon speculation, usury, and plunder. The world swarmed with Roman bankers, agents, and contractors, enjoying special privileges. Capitalist associations, in which every- body, even the nobles, shared as active or sleeping partners, con- tracted for the collection of taxes, for public buildings, for army supplies ; and the system favoured by the state prevailed every- where. Its basis, also, was the labour of slaves and freedmen. It not merely expanded with the empire, it preceded the flag. Rome supplanted Carthage as the moneyed centre of the world. The standard of wealth rose ; luxury and extravagance undermined the strongest houses; the speculative spirit pervaded morals and politics. As yet punctuality, energy, and integrity were the rule, and busi- ness was comparatively solid, but land and capital were becoming congested, the middle and lower classes were slowly squeezed out, and the great fabric of wealth, resting on a rotten basis, was subject to sudden collapses. Satire and invective were as useless as the efforts of honest governors abroad and well-meaning reformers at home. The Senate had no love for the capitalist, but its own members were thickly tarred with the same brush, and the evil was too deep for the crude economics of the day. Clientship. — The ancient legal and half-religious relation of patron and client had suffered a natural decay, but fresh forms of dependence appeared. The connection of conquered communities with Roman nobles has been noticed. Of similar type were the clientship of country people to local magnates, of suitors to advocates. Last and worst of all was the crowd of parasites and dependents who thronged the halls and formed the suites of their patrons. This new relation helped to destroy equality and em- phasise class distinctions. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS 319 Society. — The patrons, too, were no longer the simple heroes of the Republic. Eager for distinctions, they manufactured triumphs, LAMP WITH CIRCUS SCENE. paid for their own statues, and coined titles of honour. New faiths and new ideas were the mode ; the serious life of duty, the real if rude 320 HISTORY OF ROME dignity of the older time, were out of date. Celibacy and divorce increased, moral rules were relaxed ; women began to emancipate themselves from the strict guardianship, tutela, and to take an open part in public and private life. Sumptuary laws restricted in vain the number of guests and courses at dinner. Display in dress, build- ings, feasts, and funerals flourished in despite of Cato's protests. Prices and rents rose, leading in a vicious circle to a race for wealth. Expensive games and festivals were introduced for re- ligious reasons, or more often to cater for the amusement and buy the votes of the mob. Such were the festival of Apollo (212 B.C.,), the Megalesia (204 B.C.), the feast of Ceres (202 B.C.). Gladiatorial shows were imported from Campania and Etruria (264 B.C.), and the baiting of beasts and athletic contests in 186 B.C. More serious than the decay of Puritanism cr the natural love of amusement was the innate vulgarity and depraved taste which held the prize-ring better than the drama and fastened on the poorest forms of entertainment. Hellenism. — The first influence of Hellas upon Rome had been exercised in early days through Massilia and the Greek towns of South Italy To South Italy again belong the first be- lated germs of Latin literature. So far it was the ordinary in- fluence of a higher civilisation upon a lower. As intercourse increased with Sicily and Greece itself, and with the opening of the East, a new fashion of Hellenism arose. The upper classes eagerly adopted the philosophy, art, and literature of Hellas. The influence of Egypt and Asia Minor was felt in the inroads of Eastern luxury, and of those superstitions which filtered through the slave population into the life of its masters. In this time of expansion men felt the need of a wider life and a broader range of thought. They were deeply susceptible to the penetrating and subversive influences of this cosmopolitan culture, which came to them as a revelation. But with the exception of a few choicer spirits, such as the Scipios, Paullus, or the Gracchi, educated by personal contact with a Polybius or a Panastius, its power was not wholly for good. Roman vulgarity veneered itself with an imported polish that ate into the old wood. Literature, oratory, and jurisprudence gained vastly, but in politics Greek sympathies confused Roman judgment, and the attempt to apply Greek pre- cedents to Roman problems was a disastrous failure. Even in literature the new learning was fatal to the growth of a national epic or national drama. In faith and morality it was an active sol- vent of the ruder Roman virtues. From the character of Roman HELLENISM 321 religion had resulted a natural indifference verging on scepti- cism. A Claudius could jeer at the sacred chickens ; a notorious rake, to purify his life, could be appointed Flamen Dialis, and the experiment could succeed ! Meanwhile a crop of superstitions native to the soil, divination of all kinds, and spiritualism, had sprung up, and both products, scepticism and superstition, were reinforced by imports from the East. On the one hand we find Chaldsean astrology, the sensual rites of Cybele, the fouler orgies of the Bacchanalia, condemned by Hellenist and Roman alike ; on the other hand, rationalism and Euhemerism (vide supra, p. 35) became the vogue, infinitely more popular than the grave doctrine of the Stoics which influenced so deeply for their good both Roman thought and Roman jurisprudence. GLADIATORS. [Fro?n a Pompeian wall-painting.) With such fashions and movements government cannot deal. It was useless to expel Epicurean thinkers (173 B.C.), or teachers of rhetoric and philosophy (161 B.C.), or even the Chaldasans (139 B.C.). Only a healthy nation can throw off moral disease, and it must do so spontaneously. At first the inevitable outburst and emancipation of thought did as much good as harm. The great mischief lay not in the praiseworthy docility of Rome, but in the corrupted state of Greece and the intermixture with Hellenism of Oriental influences. There were many true Hellenic scholars who already went to the older and purer sources ; a later reaction attempted to develop the Latin spirit, while retaining the forms which Hellas invented, X 322 HISTORY OF ROME CHAPTER XXXI CAUSES OF THE FALL OF THE REPUBLIC Introductory — Causes of the Fall of the Republic — Party Government — Problems of Administration. Senate and Empire. — The fall of the Republic dates from the ruthless destruction of Carthage. With no fear to curb her in- solence, no centre of resistance to brace her energies, Rome staggered, with energies relaxed, under the weight of empire. Four centuries had been needed to secure the hegemony of Latium ; a century of hard fighting had carried the champion of the lowlands to the headship of Italy ; from the deadly wrestle with Carthage she had emerged mistress of her own seas and heiress to her rival's dominions, and thenceforward the logic of events and the lust of empire had carried her arms East and West in a promenade of victory. Fifty years from Zama nothing re- mained for the civilised world but to bow its neck to the decrees of Rome. The " thunder-cloud from the West " had indeed broken, and overwhelmed at once the rotten relics of the Macedonian monarchies and the jarring polities of Hellas. Rome was the centre of the world. To the capital of empire and civilisation were attracted the commercial riches, the artistic glories, the intellectual ability of the age. But the vast fabric of power bore in its defective structure manifest tokens of unpremeditated exten- sion and the original absence of design {vide sup)-a, p. 234). To this fact as much as to any original flaws in the constitution or any moral decay the fall of the Republic was due. The Senate, indeed, as we have seen, was dimly aware of the danger to a city- state involved in unlimited expansion. It had even shirked its plain duties as a predominant power, and clung to the narrow idea of an Italian hegemony, protected by buffer states. But its hand had been forced, and the destiny which had created the empire had made the Senate its supreme head. It had now, if we may repeat, to deal with the situation created by its own success. It was high time to recognise accomplished facts, accept responsibility fully, and to extend with a firm hand the direct sovereignty of Rome over the protected territories, restoring and reorganising what she had destroyed. Rome must expand her political system to take in the new elements as parts and members of herself, and prove FAILURE OF THE REPUBLIC 323 her title to govern by securing" peace and prosperity, by combining imperium et libertas. Growth of Monarchical Ideas. — It was the Republic, and not merely the Senate, that failed, by whatever party controlled ; failed even to grasp, much more to deal with, the problem. And the failure condemned the Republic as such, and led directly to the Empire. For the period of the revolution is the preparation of Cassarism. All lines converge on a single point, the necessity of a new departure. All forces work inevitably in a single direction, the centralisation of administrative power. There is the pressure of the barbarian from without, the pressure of the provincial from within, the defects of the constitution, and the demands of extended dominion. The effects of these causes are disastrously augmented by the breathless rapidity with which Rome's diffi- culties came tumbling on her. Coming events cast their shadows before. From Scipio to Pompeius there is a growing tendency to place the single man above the state ; monarchical ideas develop unconsciously, and the trend of external events favours the development. The discomfiture of successive pretenders does but clear the way and set the precedents for the Caasars, while the failure of each republican party and office is one more obstacle removed. Conservatism a Cause of Failure. — One cause of this great failure lay in the character of the people and the nature of its polity. The tenacity of forms, the legalism, and conservatism of the Roman mind became a stumbling-block to progress. All the cleverness of all the lawyers and statesmen, in changing the spirit and main- taining the letter, in modifying institutions and multiplying fictions, was here inadequate. There is a lack of original statesmanship, as of every other originality, at Rome. Militarism did its work on congenial temperaments. Growth was arrested. Rome sacri- ficed to her empire the free play of national life and character : — "Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento." Her horizon widened faster materially than it did intellectually ; stability became rigidity at Rome, as movement became restless- ness at Athens. Division of Classes. — Another important cause is to be found in the cleavage of classes and the resulting division of interest. For, with all its struggles, the old Republic had been strong in common feelings, common ideas, and a fair average equality of possessions. All this was gone, and the social contrast was 324 IN STORY OF ROME rendered still more perilous by the equally startling contrast between the actual position and theoretical powers of the dis- contented masses. The remaining causes lie in the political and social phenomena described in the previous chapter, which all contributed something towards the final result. Reform and the Parties. — Reform was urgently demanded in every direction, and that reform must clearly begin at home. The need was already obvious. Accordingly we hear henceforth of government and opposition, of democratic and conservative parties, of optimates and populares. Such phrases and analogies, drawn from English politics, are misleading'. Between Rome and Eng- land there is all the difference that divides a city-state from a modern nation. Language that applies to representative institu- tions and cabinet government does not apply to totally opposite conditions. At Rome the Assembly is primary, the legislative body is restricted, the deliberative council is permanent, the executive is an executive and nothing more, and finance plays a subordinate part. For modern party methods and party organisa- tion the conditions were not forthcoming. Enough has been said of the conduct of Roman elections and the character of the Roman magistracy to make this clear. The see-saw of party administra- tion would have been unintelligible to the average Roman. All sections were agreed as to the main forms and principles of government. No one dreamed of dispensing with Senate, magis- trate, or Assembly. Hence so often an attack on the government appeared and was resisted as an attack on the state itself. All citizens being nominally equal, the main questions at issue were social and economic, and became political only by mismanage- ment ; the rest affected merely allies and subjects. Where the wealthy classes devote themselves mainly to material interests, where there is no strong middle class, no intelligent industrial population, no permanent and powerful organ of the popular will, the politicians have it all their own way, party becomes faction, and popular government is a mere delusion. Hence opposition at Rome remains a mere opposition. The same grievances, the same methods recur, but there is no clear and continuous progress. Party movements mean generally changes in tactics, displacement of persons, and temporary shiftings of the centre of gravity from one constitutional faction to another. All moves in a narrow circle, partly because the reformers of all shades are destitute of fundamentally new ideas, partly because there is no possible basis for a continuous policy of reform in the magistracy or the Comitia. THE PARTIES AND REFORM 325 If the Senate could not achieve the task the Republic became impossible. Problems of Reform. — The necessary preliminary to any salu- tary measures was the reorganisation of the government. The Senate had owed the maintenance of its power to the loyalty of its officers, the acquiescence of the people ; in a word, to its own ability and success. But these conditions were beginning to fail. Identified with a clique, the Senate lost its moral authority, the magistrates became restive, the people mutinous, or at best in- different, while the opposition of the Equites and the indepen- dence of the proconsuls menaced it with new dangers. The obsolete sovereignty of the actual Comitia must be set aside, and if it was impossible to reorganise the Assembly with larger powers on an extended franchise, it remained possible either to reform the Senate or to introduce a new power into the constitution. In any case a vigorous central executive was needed which could feel and impose responsibility, which could emancipate itself from a narrow and purely Roman policy, which could control the pro- consul and the army, which could be acceptable to the masses, and offer to the Equites a position and career, and all this without wholly breaking with the traditions and feelings of the past. It would be its duty (1) to restore the basis of the military and political system by reviving agriculture and replacing the yeomanry on the land ; (2) to provide for the relief of the poor and the police of the capital ; (3) to enfranchise the Italians and develop local government ; (4) to consolidate the provinces by upright rule and gradual Romanisation ; (5) to reorganise the army and navy on a professional basis, with adequate checks on the action of the officers ; and (6), lastly, to establish a defensible frontier, a syste- matic budget, and easy communication within the empire. The Empire a Necessity. — The issue of the long and bloody struggle which follows was a compromise which veiled a despotism. The Gracchi demonstrated the futility of Tribune and Comitia with- out an army, Marius the incapacity of the mere soldier armed with consular power. Sulla failed in his attempt at reaction, and with him perished the chances of the Senate, for Cicero ; s coalition of moderates was doomed from the outset. In Pompeius the power of that army which Marius created and Sulla utilised found clearer expression ; he laid one of the foundations of the Prin- cipate in his indefinite Imperitim Proconsulare. Julius Caesar in his administration and his campaigns worked out the ideas of Gracchus and the lessons of Sulla and Pompeius. Finally, the 326 HISTORY OF ROME civil wars cleared the way for Augustus, who gathered up the pre- cedents of his predecessors in the masterly mixture of new and old, which, cloaking military autocracy under civil forms, com- bined in one person the necessary powers of the discordant magistracy, gave a centre to the system, a chief to the civil service, a head to the army, a sovereign to the subjects, a pro- tector to the provinces, and peace to the world. The Principate was arrived at by a process of exhaustion ; it was a military and political necessity. It solved for a time the more tangible prob- lems of material organisation, and held in check the swordsmen of the North and the cavalry of the desert. The deeper economic and spiritual problems it could not solve. No marriage or sump- tuary laws, no revivals of dead sentiment and dying faith, could mend these evils. Little enough could be done even for the money-market or the land. It was to other sources, or even to other times, that the world owed the new economic principles, the new moral ideas and religious enthusiasm, the new political hopes, that were needed to give a fresh impulse to human life. But for some of these things the empire made space and room. CHAPTER XXXII FOREIGN AND PROVINCIAL AFFAIRS (146-I29 B.C.). B.C. A.U.C. Slave War in Sicily 1 35 -I 3 Z 619-622 Attalus of Pergamum bequeaths his Kingdom to Rome .......... 133 621 Rising of Aristonicus 132-130 622-624 Province of Asia organised ...... 129 625 Between B.C. 146 and 133 there is little external history to claim attention beyond the facts already mentioned. The Spanish wars dragged on till the capture of Numantia(i33 B.C.). A Macedonian pretender called Alexander was crushed by a quaestor in 142 B.C. ; a Macedonian proconsul was condemned for extortion in 141 B.C. About the same time Appius Claudius conquered the Salassi, seized the gold-washings of the Duria, and treated himself to an illegal triumph. There was fighting in Illyria in 135 B.C. ; the Vardaei were reduced ; the Scordisci chastised. Slave War in Sicily. — In this year too the slaves of Sicily re- SICILIAN SLAVE WARS 327 belled to the number of 70,000. The rising bore grim witness to the watchfulness of the government, the tender mercies of the owners, and the advantages of the system. Sicilian slavery belonged to the worst type of agricultural serfdom. The oldest and most organised province of Rome, the chief source of its corn and wool, was the happy hunting-ground of the speculator. Not merely was the territory of Leontini leased to a few Roman absentees, but they and their Sicilian imitators covered the island with their estates, arable and pasture, worked mainly by imported slaves. It was not the kindlier system of indigenous and heredi- tary serfdom. The plantations were tilled on Punic principles by gangs of shackled and branded human cattle penned in under- ground barracks, while armed and mounted herdsmen guarded the flocks and lived by sheer brigandage. Brutally treated as they were, left to feed and clothe themselves as they could, flung aside when useless through age or sickness, the waste of life was great. The supply was only kept up by slave-hunts and organised kidnapping in Western Asia, executed not only by Cilician and Cretan pirates, but by the Roman publicani. In the market of Delos 10,000 slaves were bought and sold in one day. In Sicily the demand had been stimulated by a period of peace ; and cruelty and lust, inefficient surveillance, and a fatal sense of security, joined to the exceptional numbers, prepared a dangerous crisis. Troubles of the same kind broke out in Delos, Attica, and Asia Minor, even in Italy, and were stamped out in blood. In Italy, however, the worst evils of the plantation system had only, appeared in Etruria, where it flourished ; the condition of the ordinary slave 'was better, and free agriculture existed. Special peril in Sicily lay partly in the mounted slaves, partly in the superior qualities of many of the Orientals, who seem to have formed the bulk of them, but chiefly in the weakness of the military force and the utter failure of the government to control either the slaves or their masters. In 135 B.C. the dire distress produced an outbreak. The rural serfs of a brutal proprietor surprised the fortress of Enna and massacred the owners. This was followed by a general rising, stained by similar atrocities. The insurgents elected as king a Syrian juggler, a prophet and impostor named Eunus — the self- styled Antiochus, king of the Syrians, whose officer Achaeus, a Greek of genuine ability, roused the labourers to join the slaves, organised an army, and checked pillage and bloodshed. A Cilician bandit, Cleon, took Agrigentum ; even Messana fell 328 HISTORY OF ROME The leaders coalesced, and practically mastered Sicily. The king formed a court, and some sort of order was introduced. More than one Roman commander was defeated, notably Hypsasus the praetor and his local militia (134 B.C.). Aided by the cowardice of the soldiers and the incapacity of the officers, the war dragged on dubiously till 132 B.C., when P. Rupilius drove the insurgents from the open country, captured Tauromenium and Enna, took the king (131 B.C.), and closed the war. The slaves were crucified en masse, to the indignation of the masters. The country was reorganised, and the regulations of Rupilius remained the basis of Sicilian government. After this there was peace for thirty years. The material loss lit most heavily on the landlords, but the scandal and shame of such a war fell on the government. The Province of Asia. — In the East there were fewer disasters than in Spain and Portugal because there was less fighting, but the state of things reveals that weakness and indecision in dealing with Orientals which had come over the foreign policy of Rome. The adroit Attalids had kept themselves by Roman favour on the throne of Pergamum in spite of Bithynian and Celtic aggressions and the intrigues of Greek rivals, had lulled the jealousy of their suzerain, and had interfered with effect in the troubles of their neighbours. But with Attains III., a cruel and bloodthirsty dilet- tante (whose uncle had acted for twenty years as king or regent for life), the line came to an end (133 B.C.). His testament was alleged to have left his kingdom and treasures, in default of heirs, to the Roman Republic, as if a people could be disposed of by will. But the document, whether a Roman forgery or authentic, gave effect to facts. Certainly the gift fell at an opportune moment like ripe fruit into a thirsting mouth. The inheritance was disputed by Aristonicus, a natural son of Eumenes II., the father of Attalus, who, though defeated by the Ephesians at sea, called to arms slaves and adventurers, and at the head of his band of socialist " Heliopolites," scattered the local contingents, mastered the greater part of Pergamum, and in 131 B.C. defeated and killed the consul, P. Crassus Mucianus, the orator and jurist, who, though Pontifex Maximus, had evaded the sacred law to claim a lucrative command abroad. M. Perperna defeated and captured the Pretender in 130 B.C., and the following year M\ Aquillius organised the new province as Asia. His arrangements, modified by Sulla, Lucullus, and Pompeius, remained the basis of the pro- vincial constitution. A regular garrison was saved by entrusting the defence to buffer states. The subjects were treated with EVENTS IN THE EAST 329 moderation, but the mode of collecting the taxes rendered them oppressive, and the wealth of Attalus helped to corrupt Roman manners. The Client Kingdoms of the East. — Bithynia retained its independence. Cappadocia kept its position as a friend and ally, and began to imbue itself with the vices and accomplishments of Hellas. Cappadocia by the sea, or Pontus, under Mithra- dates V. (Euergetes) received Great Phrygia as the reward of her services against Aristonicus, and of the king's judicious bribery of Aquillius. Mithradates, the future great king, succeeded his murdered father in 121 B.C., under the regency of the queen-mother. The Romans were masters of Asia Minor, but their careless supervision permitted the growth of dangerous enemies. It was the same elsewhere. Syria, which had evacuated Egypt (16S B.C.) in obedience to Rome and allowed Roman diplo- macy to decide a disputed succession, set her at naught by the assassination of Cn. Octavius, the guardian appointed for the son of Antiochus Epiphanes (162 B.C.). The throne was seized by Demetrius, whom the Senate had set aside, and the usurper was actually recognised. In Egypt, Ptolemy Philometor, expelled by his brother Euergetes, was restored by Rome (163 B.C.), Euergetes receiving Cyrene. When they quarrelled over Cyprus, the Senate acquiesced in the retention of the island by Egypt in defiance of its original decision, and finally, in 146 B.C., stultified its own policy by allowing Euergetes II., a bloated tyrant, surnamed Physcon, to re- unite the two kingdoms. Anxious to avoid a forward policy, the Senate left the East to stew in its own juice, but by doing so the Romans neglected their interests and responsibilities, and the Orientals treated them with contempt. Moreover, events were preparing in Farther Asia which needed vigilance. Parthia. — After Magnesia Syria rapidly decayed, torn by in- testine feuds, disintegrated by ambitious satraps and interfering neighbours, and pressed by the growing power of Parthia. Cappa- docia and Sophene were free ; the Maccabees had asserted the national and religious independence of Judaea against Epiphanes, who hoped by a policy of persecution and plunder to reduce to unity and conformity the various religious and political elements of his motley monarchy. Rome gladly recognised Jewish autonomy as a useful check on Syria, but confined her help to paper. Of far greater importance was the rise of Parthia under the alien Scythian dynasty of the Arsacidas. The sixth Arsaces, Mithra- dates I. (175-136 B.C.), overpowered the weakened kingdom of 330 HISTORY OF ROME Bactria, one of the half-Hellenic fragments of Alexander's empire, took advantage of the dynastic broils and rotten organisation of Syria to annex its eastern provinces, and founded a national monarchy of the old Oriental type. The new state, however superficially Philhellenic, reacted distinctly in language, religion, warfare, and politics against Western ideas. The East with renewed vigour flung away the legacy of Alexander and pushed back retreating Hellas. Only internal strife in Parthia and the diversion caused by the attacks of the Scythians rescued the remnants of Syria. Rome neglected to support her vassal. Ignorant of the drift of events, she preserved a " masterly inactivity " whose bitter harvest was soon reaped in full. Behind the fringe of protectorates which concealed the movements of Asia, Armenia, Pontus, and Parthia were growing up from weakness to strength. Piracy. — On the seas things were rapidly becoming worse. The fleets of Syria and Carthage were destroyed, Rhodes was exhausted, Egypt enervated. Rome ceased to maintain a regular navy, and relied on ships requisitioned from the allies when wanted. As a result, the pirates swept the waters, levied blackmail on the coast-towns, infested the trade-routes, and drove a brisk trade in kidnapped slaves. The headquarters of the buccaneers were in the island of Crete, the home of civil war, the recruiting-ground of mercenaries, filled with corrupt and quarrelsome democracies, and among the rocky fastnesses and secret inlets of Cilicia. Their depredations were connived at and even encouraged by Syrian pretenders and Roman slave-dealers. The Dalmatian and Ligurian waters were cleared earlier, and in 123 B.C. Q. Metellus occupied the Baliaric Islands and founded Palma and Pollentia, but in the ^Egean and the East the pirates were masters. Roman commissioners appeared from time to time in the Levant. /Emilianus in 143 B.C., with a small party and a roving commission, visited Egypt and passed through Greece and the eastern dependencies, reporting", arbitrating, and reconnoitring the ground. A more vigorous action might have anticipated the inevitable. A strong force guarding a definite frontier would have ensured the peaceful development of the East, but recruits were scarce and the service expensive, and the policy of the Senate was one of drift. It had neither relinquished the old nor embraced the new principles earnestly. To leave everything to the caprice of its officers and the courage of local militias was to court failure and encourage attack. In Spain mole-hills were made mountains by irresponsible stupidity and treachery, and no serious penalties WEAKNESS OF ROME 331 were exacted. The interests of the subjects and of the government itself were sacrificed to the greed of the governor and the capitalist. The conquest of a Spanish village, of a Portuguese shepherd, or of a Syrian slave, these were the triumphs of Roman wars — triumphs stained by perfidy, assassination, and cowardice. CHAPTER XXXIII INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND TIBERIUS GRACCHUS (133 B.C.). Decay of Rome. — In internal affairs, the tendencies already noticed went on unchecked. The Senate continued to govern, as being the only possible government, and custom, precedent, and necessity sanctioned its rule. Its power was the result of a true and genuine constitutional growth ; a system of checks and balances can only be worked by the effective preponderance of the strongest element in the state. An exact balance of powers and a division of sovereignty are a theoretical delusion. The Magistrates remained ministers of the Senate. The people had practically lost its functions one by one to more competent and more active instru- ments. But as the days of struggle ended and the external restraint of foreign rivals ceased to act, as the antique virtues which had justified command were corrupted by the influence of wealth and power, with despotism rampant abroad and capitalism at home, it was time for a new and internal check to be created sufficient to arrest decay. /Emilianus prayed the gods to save the state. The need of some centre of resistance was as clear to Nasica, who for that very reason opposed the destruction of Carthage, as it was to the censor Cato. Where was it to be found ? The ideas of Cato were obsolete. To put back the hands on the clock was impossible. Empire cannot be surrendered because it is burden- some ; morality cannot be restored by sumptuary laws. It is absurd to attempt to reduce the standard of comfort or to check the march of intellect. To revive the Comitia were a still more dangerous expedient (the more so, perhaps, that it was legally and formally possible), unless its constitution and composition could be seriously modified in the interests of Italy and the subjects. Such an attempt, even if it could be made, would seem doomed to failure in the existing conflict of interests between capital and 33^ HISTORY OF ROME country, the burgess and the Italian, the Italian and the provincial. In its actual state the Assembly could be made a weapon of annoy- ance, but not of serious resistance. The causes that had limited the activity of the magistrates made any effectual check by com- bination on their part equally impossible. The dictatorship was extinct. Hence, unless reformers could capture the Senate, nothing short of revolution could bring about any real change. Mean- while there was a period of calm and prosperity, unmarked by political agitation. The Republic was waiting unconsciously for its malady to come to a head. So rare is the power of prescience in statesmen ; so slight is the influence of politicians on the course of events ; so difficult was it, between a " decaying oligarchy and a democracy cankered in the bud," to provide a remedy which should not be more dangerous than the disease. No help could be expected from the equestrian order whose whole policy as a class was one of material interests ; there was friction enough between the aristocracies of birth and wealth both at home and abroad ; but while the Equites would join the reformers to bring down Privilege to their own level, they were more likely to combine with the nobles for purposes of plunder. The peasantry had lost all influence and showed a growing indifference to urban politics. No True Parties. — Nor indeed was there any distinct party of reform or genuine leaders of a popular movement. There grew up a party system with party names, but it had all the dangers and none of the merits of its modern counterpart. Individuals came forward to redress abuses, and even the Senate occasionally took up the work, but there is nowhere any definite programme ; the ideas and methods of the best men of all parties are at bottom the same, however different the aim and spirit of the worker. Speak- ing generally, there were partisans but no parties ; there were no large political principles at stake. There was, too, a notable absence of great men. The Senate identified the maintenance of its privileges, to the exclusion of outsiders, with the true interests of the country. The magistrates plundered and blundered, content with the duties and emoluments of office. The people accepted their share of the spoils. There was plenty of excitement at the elections, but the contests turned on purely personal issues, and roused no interest outside Rome. There was merely an energetic competition among qualified candidates, who in turn canvassed and bribed their way to office. Scipio .lEmilianus. — A typical figure of the time is the adopted grandson of the great Scipio, P. Cornelius Scipio jdnilianus (184- PARTIES AND REFORMS 333 129 b.c). He was an honest and capable administrator, a good officer, a vigorous censor, and a polished diplomatist. Himself a man of taste and education, he was the friend of Greek statesmen and philosophers and the centre of a cultivated circle. An enemy of mob violence, a friend of the Italians, a moderate constitu- tionalist, averse from extremes, he was unfit for the stress and strain of angry politics. His healthy and refined life, his amiable and ingenuous character, the real distinction of his manners, his liberal ideas and dislike of sordid speculation, put him in touch with all the best elements of the time and marked him out as the leader of a national reform. He did indeed purge the army, cleanse the census, convict governors, and purify justice. His liberalism earned the suspicion of the oligarchs, his stern rebukes the dis- like of the rabble, but he had neither the genius nor the courage to conceive and carry through a radical reorganisation. He de- plored evils he felt unable to remedy. Futile Reforms. — The Senate then, which still absorbed the avail- able brain of the community, continued to govern, avoiding trouble- some questions at home and complications abroad. The resistance, too, was slight. In 149 B.C. the law of L. Calpurnius Piso, already mentioned, superseded the action of the popular courts and the special commissions of the Senate by the creation of a standing court to deal with extortion in the provinces. The jurymen, however, were selected from the body of senators. A premature attempt to trans- fer the election of priests from the colleges to the people by a Rogatio Licinia de Sacerdotiis failed. Yet a series of laws intro- duced and extended the use of the ballot 1 for elections, legislation, and judicial verdicts. One of these, the Lex Cassia, was supported by /Emilianus to secure the administration of justice from the influence of intimidation and bribery. Such measures were resisted by the nobles, who preferred open voting to secret ballot, and a popular assembly to a properly constituted court. The laws were useless, and merely developed corruption into an organised busi- ness on a large scale. The decree of 129 B.C. which compelled a senator on taking his seat to resign his horse and his vote as an eques failed equally to emancipate the Assembly from undue influ- ence. The public preferred exemption from taxation and military service, with cheap corn and games, to any reform. Social and Economic Crisis. — Political changes sprangonce more 1 LexGatinia Tabellaria, for elections, 139 B.C.; Lex Cassia Tal>ellaria,iov law-courts, 137 B.C. ; Lex Papiria, for legislation, 131 B.C. 334 HISTORY OF ROME from economic causes. The story of the Roman revolution begins with a social question, and social questions in the old world were as regularly connected with land and usury as those of a modern nation with wages. The old democratic movement had begun with the assertion of personal liberties against the usurer and the landlord. A succession of agrarian and debt laws and contemporary re-enactments of the law of appeal show the persistence of the difficulty and the connection of economic and political questions. Political rights are primarily sought as a means to obtain social and economic benefits. Politically, the struggle had ended with the apparent destruction of privilege, but the essential questions of free labour and free land had not been settled. Only capital and landholding had received new and more fatal developments. Hence arose, with the growth of the new governing order, that ill-defined and irregular opposition which we see dimly through the dust of battlefields, and which grows in vigour with the decline of the oligarchy. Ruin of Agriculture. — The strongest feeling had been shown over the agrarian question and the proposals of Flaminius. In the period of peace that followed things ripened fast, and the slackness of the government combined with the rash enthusiasm of idealist democrats, on whom its failure threw the burden of reform, to precipitate a crisis. The shock came once more over the agri- cultural question. The causes of the decay of agriculture have been already described. We may briefly repeat them : the natural decay of small holdings, the growth of capital and improved methods, the slave system, the competition of artificially cheapened corn, the constant drain of war, and the ill-judged legislation which stimulated the absorption of land by the senatorial nobility or associations of capitalists. Perhaps the least important part, as we see in the case of France, was played by the drain of war. No campaign does so much harm as a bad law. Moreover, land- grabbing was carried on by the nobles to such an extent that a pratorian edict was needed to restrain illegal evictions. The natural result had been the extinction of the yeoman farmer, especially in Etruria and South Italy, the spread of plantations and cattle-ranches, the immigration of the labourers into the towns, and the depopulation of the rural districts. Corn was giving place to the olive and vine, cattle and game ; the laborious yeoman to the unproductive slave ; the true basis of the Comitia and of the army was being destroyed, industry demoralised, and civic equality annihilated. The veteran was left with no career THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 335 before him but that of brigand or beggar. The peasant, without capital, liable to conscription, with his family dependent upon him, could not compete with the imported corn which supplied the army and the capital, or with the big estate worked by cheap slaves, exempt from service and without family. Even Cato's model estate was worked by serfs. And yet no economy can be lasting that is not firmly based on the internal resources of a land and the industry of its people. The yeomanry was the backbone of Rome. Her military and political system had been founded on a fair and moderate distribution of land, and this foundation had been entirely sapped. The freeholders were sinking into metayer tenants, labourers or serfs, or drifting into the proletariate and the army, while Italy depended upon foreign supplies. Emigration, even if possible to Roman sentiment, would be no remedy. Redis- tribution of the soil spelled revolution. Land purchase was not feasible. The Public Land. — The orthodox remedy had been to allot land in newly conquered districts to the poorer citizens and veterans. If such land were wanting, law and precedent allowed the government to reclaim the public land held on sufferance by squatters, and divide this among deserving claimants. Of this public land Rome possessed a large amount, confiscated after victory in Italy or abroad, arable, pasture, or waste. The arable land was rarely sold ; occasionally, as with Capua and Leontini, it was let on lease, but the traditional method was to allot it in small freehold plots to the members of some colony or settlement then founded. The waste land, needing capital and slaves to turn it to account, was handed over to occupiers, who squatted at will on condition of cultivating the soil, and paid a fixed proportion as a rent to the state. They held their lands subject to resump- tion by the state, but were protected in their holdings by equit- able injunctions. The state remained owner ; the occupier enjoyed the usufruct. The defects of the system lay in the risk of encroachment, and in the tendency to evade legal restrictions and apply it to arable or unauthorised land. The government neglected to enforce the conditions, and allowed a sense of owner- ship to spring up by uninterrupted tenure. The districts suitable to pasturage in Apulia and Bruttium were mainly occupied by syndicates, who bred cattle on a large scale, and attempted to evade their dues, which in this case were more carefully exacted. Occupation supersedes Allotment. — This simple and natural way of dealing with the land was upset when the allotment system, 336 HISTORY OF ROME which favoured the poor, practically ceased, and the rich man's occupations and pasture lands spread unchecked. The same state of things prevailed among the allies, partly because the wealthy Italians imitated their Roman brethren, partly because the restrictions on landholding favoured the transference of land to Roman citizens. Hence the struggle, which lasted till in B.C., between the rich and the poor man's method, an agitation directed to obtain a fair share of the land for those who had won it. The Licinian rogations had failed for want of machinery. Their regu- lations were set aside or evaded by putting in men of straw. The plebeian nobles had used these proposals as a stalking-horse for their own purposes. They were indeed a solemn imposture, and had sanctioned the evils they pretended to check. For some time the process of absorption was checked by the formation of colonies and the distribution of allotments, but after 1 77 B.C. the assignations practically stopped, as there was no new land to divide. Occu- pation went on till it monopolised the bulk of the public land, and thus the natural outlet for the impoverished farmer was closed. Foreign colonies were considered to endanger the position of Italy. The nobles, by not paying the dues, increased the burdens of the state, whose land they plundered and converted into private pro- perty. The census began to show a steady decrease during a quiet and prosperous period. Laslius, the friend of Scipio, expressed the ideas of his circle when he proposed to deal with the question, but, with characteristic timidity, withdrew his bill in deference to advice, and earned the title of" Sapiens." The Parents and Teachers of the Gracchi. — So matters stood when Ti. Sempronius Gracchus took up the question in 133 B.C. The Gracchi were the sons of a distinguished plebeian noble, great-grandsons of the general who raised a slave-legion in the Punic wars. The father, a Roman of the old school, had served as a soldier and diplomatist throughout the world, had filled every office of the state, had enjoyed two triumphs, and had won the affec- tion of the subjects and a high reputation by his pacification of Spain. In his consulship he reduced Sardinia (177 B.C.), as censor (169 B.C.) he restricted the franchise of the freedmen, and received a second consulship in 163 B.C. He was aman of chivalrous character and some cultivation. His wife, to whom he was deeply attached, Cornelia, the " mother of the Gracchi," a daughter of Africanus, is said to have refused the throne of Egypt for the sake of her children. She was a woman of real culture and liberal ideas, to whom her sons largely owed their careful education, their THE GRACCHI 337 eloquence, their skill in the Latin tongue, and, above all, their power of passionate sympathy with suffering and indignation with wrong. These tendencies were strengthened and stimulated by the de- mocratic ideas and philosophic politics instilled by their Greek teachers, Blossius of Cumas and Diophanes of Mitylene, and by the humanism of the Scipionic circle, whose dilettante ideas were translated into action by the enthusiasm of Tiberius and the passionat e energy of Gaius. For the first time in Roman history the precedents of Greek legislators like Solon and Lycurgus, and the precepts of political theorists like Plato, influenced the course of politics, as they had already at Sparta inspired the reforming efforts of Agis and Cleomenes. Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus. — The brothers were both brave, temperate, high-minded, and talented, both diligent in office and generous in their behaviour to the subjects and allies ; but while Tiberius was more gentle and sedate, the younger man was more animated and impetuous. His oratory was marked by excited movement and gesture, his style was impressive and impassioned, his diction exuberant and persuasive. It is said that he employed a slave to sound a soft note when excitement was carrying him too far. The style of Tiberius was sweeter and more pathetic, his diction pure and exact, his reasoning acute and sensible. The same contrast pervaded their habits and character. Tiberius, first man on the wall at the storm of Carthage, was elected augur in early youth, married the daughter of the consular Appius Claudius Pulcher, and served as quaestor to Mancinus in Spain. The repudia- tion of the treaty {vide supra, p. 244) negotiated on his personal honour, however little it explains his action, sharpened his insight into the weakness of the government. It was the spectacle of the misery and depopulation of Etruria which fired a heart already penetrated with ideas of reform and indignant at the inaction of his circle. He was encouraged to proceed by the support of his father-in-law, a political opponent of the Scipios, and ready, like his ancestors, to gird at his own caste ; by the great jurist, Crassus Mucianus, his brother's father-in-law ; and by a still greater lawyer, P. Mucius Scsevola, the consul of 133 B.C. ; while the aims at least of the reformers were approved by that pattern of antique virtue, Q. Metellus Macedonicus. Agrarian Law of Tiberius Gracchus. — Elected tribune (133 B.C.) in ordinary course, not on this particular platform, he could count on no party to back him. Scipio was averse from an open struggle ; his supporters in the Senate were lawyers or family Y 33S HISTORY OF ROME friends. On the other hand, there was nothing" revolutionary in the measures he proposed. Agrarian reform was not a party question. The class he would benefit had been always conserva- tive ; the method to be employed was traditional. It was not the end but the means he adopted which, aided by the obstructive policy of the Senate, made this bill the turning-point in the fall of the Republic. Without securing the previous approbation of the Senate, he laid his proposal, contrary to the custom, but in accord- ance with the letter of the constitution, before the assembly of the tribes. The general aim of the Agrarian Law was to reclaim and redistribute the public lands now occupied by the wealthy pos- sessors in excess of the limit permitted by the Licinian Law. He did not mean to resume the whole of the land of which the state was the legal owner, but (i) all occupations beyond the legal limit, (2) all common land enclosed clam vi aut firecario, and (3) avail- able pasture lands. By way of compensation for disturbance, the legal holdings were confirmed in ownership, i.e., 500 iugera, with the addition of 250 for each son up to a maximum of 1000. Further proposals of compensation for improvement were dropped on account of the hostility shown to the bill. The reclaimed land was to be allotted to poor citizens in small holdings, which were not assigned in freehold, but as heritable leaseholds at a small rent, which might not be sold or disposed of. He hoped by these means to prevent absorption and to reimburse the state. The capital required for starting the new system was to be furnished out of the treasures of Attalus. The necessary machinery was pro- vided by the creation of a commission with powers to determine the available land and to carry out the distribution. The allot- ments were probably limited to Roman citizens. For, although the Gracchi were favourable to the Italian claims, public opinion was not yet ripe for such an extension of privilege. These pro- posals were both legal and constitutional. They asserted an ancient right which had been the subject of constant struggle ; they enforced the sound legal maxim that prescription did not avail against the state — and in this case the men who pleaded prescription had created it by evading payments. The end proposed was the resto- ration of the yeomanry to the land. The only new features were the titles granted to the possessors, the inalienability of the lots, the imposition of a rent, and the attempt to secure the continuous execution of the law by a permanent commission. Objections to the Law. — Tiberius was no common demagogue, but a distinguished soldier and orator belonging to the highest TIBERIUS GRACCHUS 339 society. His reform was well meant, and the moment chosen was not unfavourable. The slave war and the Spanish disasters were making the failure of the government clear to the meanest capacity. But it was impolitic to attack the Senate single-handed, with no organised party, with colleagues he could not trust, with no force behind him but a fickle and corrupted mob, from a position which lasted only for a year, without possibility of re- election. His action ignored the real nature of the constitution VIAMFECEIAB-RECIO- ADCAPVAM-ET IN-EAVlA-rONTElSOMNEISAAILIARlOS TABELARlOSoyE-poSEIVEl-HINlCE-SVNT NOVCERlAM-MEIUA-11-CArVAM-XXCHH AAVRANVAAXXXIIII-COSENTIAAACXXIII VALFNTIA/WC±XXX»- AD-FRETVM'Ar STATVA/A-CCXXXIi- RECIVMCCXXXVI' SVMAAFCAPVARECIVM-MEILIACCC ETEIDEAAPRAE TOR-IN v*X* SICILIA-FVGITEIVOS-1TALICORVAA CONQ.VAEISIVE l-RE PIDEIOVE HOMINES-BCCCCXVII- EIDEMQVE P RlMVS-F E CE IV T-DE-AC ROf OPL1CO ARATORIBVSCEDERENTPAASTORES FORVM-AEDISOyE-POPUCAS-HElCFECEl MILESTONE SET UP BY P. POPILLIUS LyENAS, IN LUCANIA, AS CONSUL, 132 B.C. 1 by its appeal to the formal powers of the Comitia against the authority of the Senate. Again, if it was proposed to confiscate land occupied by allies on sufferance or by treaty, without giving them a share in the redivision, the gross iniquity of the proposal would raise dangerous opposition. Economically the objections were also serious. In its disturbance of ancient claims and vested interests, the bill, in its final shape, took no sufficient account of 1 This illustrates (t2) roadmaking, vide infra, p. 553 ; [b) Sicilian slave-war ; ic) Agrarian Law of Gracchus. 340 HISTORY OF ROME the change in the standard of landed wealth and in the methods of industry since 367 B.C., and of the proper compensation for permanent improvements, for bond fide investments and the displacement of capital. When Cato evicted the occupiers in Campania (165 B.C.), though the encroachments were recent and unauthorised, there had been at least compensation. The lapse of time made the resumption, in many cases, actual confiscation. It was a menace to all uncertain titles, and opened a ready way to vexatious prosecutions, a difficulty increased by the absence of exact registers, the lapse of payments, the working of sale and bequest. It would be hard enough even to get sufficient land, harder still to make farmers out of city loafers, while for the pasture land the system of allotment was unfitted. The clause prohibiting alienation was unworkable. The measure did not touch the real economic causes of depression in agriculture — slave labour, cheap corn, and bad laws. There is a curious mixture of legalism and youthful impatience in this impulsive attack on the landlord and oligarch. Octavius deposed and the Law carried. — A storm of opposition followed, not merely from noble lords, who clung half honestly, half unscrupulously, to their privileges, but from the moderates, who feared revolution more than they loved reform, and later on from the spokesman of the exasperated Italians. There were crowded meetings, eloquently harangued by the impassioned tribune ; the rural voters, on whom he depended, poured into the city. The Senate, the organ of the landowners, resorted to obstruction. M. Octavius, a friend and colleague of Gracchus, interposed his veto, to which Tiberius, equally constitutionally, replied by placing his seal on the treasury and blocking every executive act. He did more. Eager to avail himself of the presence of the country voters and the momentary consternation of the landlords, he declined to wait for the slow pressure of time and opinion, and pushed his proposal while the iron was still hot. The bill, once more moved, was again vetoed in spite of personal appeals to Octavius. Finally, after a fruitless negotiation with the Senate and repeated efforts to appease his colleague, he reluctantly proposed and carried the deposition of the refractory tribune. One or the other of them must go, he said ; and when Octavius refused to allow such an alternative to be put, he asked the people to declare that a tribune who acted against the popular will, ipso facto forfeited his office. Octavius was deposed and dragged away. It was a coup d'etat. A magistrate could only resign ; he could not be deposed. In an FALL OF TIBERIUS GRACCHUS 341 apology which he felt bound to offer later, Tiberius descanted on the right of the people to control their magistrate : it was mere sophistry. Government becomes impossible if the people can cancel their mandate for every passing whim. To defy the right of intercession cut the ground from his own feet. Moreover, the tribunate had been of late years a valuable instrument of govern- ment ; to revive its earlier use as a weapon of opposition was a dangerous anachronism. A successor to Octavius was appointed, and the law carried by a single vote of the people. The two brothers and Appius Claudius were placed on the commission — a mere family conclave. The Senate amused itself by docking their allowance. Fall of Tiberius Gracchus. — But Tiberius had to prepare him- self for attack, especially for infringing the sacred rights of the tribunate. He must buy the favour of the urban electors, and ensure, if possible, his appointment for a second year, if he was to avoid impeachment and the ruin of his work. To this end he entered on a series of popular proposals, promising to extend the right of appeal, to shorten the term of service, &c. He meant perhaps to curtail the judicial and administrative prerogatives of the Senate, possibly in the end to give the franchise to Italy. The charge of aiming at the kingship was a fabrication of the nobles to justify their violence, to meet which he had provided himself with a large retinue, but personal peril and the logic of necessity pushed him further than he meant. Re-election to the tribunate was unconstitutional, but surely the people might make their own precedents. On this issue the question was fought out. The elections were fixed for a time when his rural supporters were busy with harvest. The nobles were able to postpone them to the following day. For that day both sides prepared, and Gracchus appealed alike to compassion, gratitude, and force. Strengthened by popular sympathy, he met the tribes once more in front of the Capitoline Temple. The Assembly was tumultuous. Obstruction was followed by riot, and the partisans of the Senate were ex- pelled. The wildest rumours circulated. A gesture of Gracchus was taken to mean a demand for the crown. Rumours reached the Senate, sitting in the temple of Fides, and when the wise consul Scasvola refused indignantly to slay citizens without trial, the optimates, headed by the younger Nasica, who summoned all patriots to take the place of a consul who betrayed the state, rushed forth and, followed by a mass of knights, clients, and gladiators, flung themselves, with bludgeons and bench-legs in their hands, on the overawed and cowardly mob. Tiberius, as he turned to escape, 342 HISTORY OF ROME was felled to the ground with 300 of his associates : the bodies were thrown into the Tiber. Thus on this first day of wholesale murder in the streets of Rome the series of civil massacres was inaugu- rated by the party of order. The illegal executions were confirmed, in the following year, by the judicial execution of the Gracchans, of whom a large number, mainly of the lower classes, were condemned by a special commission under the consul P. Popillius. Nasica was rewarded with the pontificate in 150 B.C. The moderates ac- quiesced in the proceedings, and ^milianus, when he heard the news before the walls of Numantia, cried in the words of Homer — " ujs &7t6\oito Kal &\\os OTIS TOLaurd ~y€ p^'OL." Weakness of his Position. — The building collapsed with its architect. His aim was good, and approved itself to good men — the regeneration of Italy based on a restored yeomanry and an extended franchise. Thus he hoped to infuse fresh blood into the Comitia and army, to stem the tide of corruption and pauperism, and place an invigorated people as a check on the government. The measure he proposed as a first step was, under the circumstances, a natural one. If it was oppressive to the rich, they had their own greed and negligence to thank. But he failed because he tried a revolution without understanding that it was a revolution, and without the means to carry it through. A rash and impetuous idealist, who failed to grasp the true nature of the constitution and the de- generacy of the Comitia, he was hurried into false steps, struck down the platform on which he himself stood, and set in motion forces which would make a republican system impossible. He had no original intention of changing the form of government, aimed at no tyranny, was mainly interested in social questions. But by turning the tribunate against the Senate and ruling Rome by popular meetings, he put the feet above the head and pam- pered the riotous arrogance of the sovereign mob. The Comitia had neither the morale nor the organisation necessary to make it a genuine organ of popular government. Such a body had no right to control provinces, direct administration, and vote itself land and money. The precedent set by Flaminius and copied by Gracchus was a caricature and not a revival of older pro- cedure, and its sure end was an oligarchic restoration or a saviour of society. For the present the nobles held their own and the storm passed by, its warnings unheeded. They gave their enemies' cause a baptism of blood, and raised by murder a mis- taken enthusiast to the rank of a hero and martyr. TIBERIUS GKACC/IUS AND AFTER 343 CHAPTER XXXIV GAIUS GRACCHUS U.C. A.U.C. Death of Scipio /Emilianus 129 625 Fulvius Flaccus proposes to enfranchise the Italians— Revolt of Fregellce 125 629 Tribunate of C. Gracchus 123-122 631-632 Deaths of C. Gracchus and Fulvius ,121 633 The interval between the tribunates of Tiberius and Gaius is marked on the whole by moderation. The violence of the ultras strengthened the hands of the more liberal members of the Senate, men like Metellus, Sca^vola, and Scipio, averse to either extreme of oligarchy or democracy. The optimates, half ashamed of their work, were not unready to adopt the dead man's law, and get what favour they could by its execution. The opposition was for the moment powerless ; nor did the personal rivalries or divergences of opinion in the Senate amount to any real party division. But credit is mainly due to the sound sense of /Emilianus, whose real influence with all sections bears witness to his political honesty and independence. The Agrarian Commission. — The commission of three went to work with the approval of the Senate, P. Crassus receiving the vacant place. After his death in 130 B.C., and that of Appius, their places were taken by the active agitators M. Fulvius Flaccus and C. Papirius Carbo, the latter of whom, a distinguished orator, passed over later on to the optimates. Their accession gave energy to the work. As to its extent and value opinions differ, but there is evidence of distributions in South Italy, and the rapid increase in the census, said to amount to 80,000, may be attributed to the number of poor citizens, hitherto carelessly enumerated, who passed from the capite censi to the register of men able to bear arms. But it caused great and natural irritation. Exact returns could not be secured ; recourse was had to informations. The arbitrary decisions of a partisan court, empowered to define as well as to distribute the public lands, and acting often on imperfect evidence, disturbed not only recent and obvious occupiers, but bond Jide possessors, even genuine owners whose titles were not forthcoming. The feeling of in- security and resentment became general ; and when, in 1 29 B.C., the commissioners began to deal with those lands which the Latin. 344 HISTORY OF ROME or allied communities had occupied by express or implied per- mission of the people as a reward for their services or in default of sufficient citizens, it appeared high time to bring operations to a close. To assert in these cases the legal ownership of Rome was vexatious and impolitic. Action of Scipio. — Africanus took up the cause of his old soldiers, and mainly by his influence the judicial powers of the commission were transferred to the consuls. Sempronius Tudi- tanus, to whom they passed, avoided the inevitable odium by betaking himself promptly to the army of Illyria. It was not the (WFOLVn/^, Vl . . - Ar 0/ E /VvP RO N\\/ST I fCR A€ r-PAPERIvr-OF-C-ARB. IRE'AIA „ c . . .TRONlVf-Ti-F'-. JHVfRFA'iM TERMINI SET UP BY THE LAND COMMISSION IN THE LAND OF THE HIKPINI, 130-129 B.C. first time that Scipio had resisted popular feeling. In the heads of the commission the party of progress had found leaders whose ideas were visibly widening. Carbo in 131 B.C. not merely passed a Ballot Act, but attempted to legalise the re-election of tribunes and so remove the obstacle that had been fatal to Gracchus. Scipio, in a vehement speech, resisted the proposal, justified the execution of Tiberius, and silenced the howlings of the mob with bitter sarcasms. He at least was not afraid of the " stepchildren of Italy, these freedmen whom he had sent in chains to the slave- market." The Bill, rejected for the present, may have passed afterwards in a modified form. SCIPIO MMILIANUS 345 Death of Scipio. — In 125 B.C. Flaccus, now consul, proposed that every ally should be allowed to petition for the franchise or for the right of appeal only if he so preferred, — a rather sweeping' proposal. What Scipio would have said to this mea- sure of relief on behalf of his proteges we cannot tell. Soon after his defence of their claims in the matter of the land law, when on the point of delivering a further speech on the question, he was struck down by a sudden and mysterious death, at the age of fifty-six, in the fulness of his vigour and influence (129 B.C.). The foulest rumours were current, and suspicion has fallen on the democratic leaders. At the time there was no inquiry, and the evidence is conflicting. The assassination, if it was such, was the work of a few malcontents. The esteem of the world followed the last great Scipio to the tomb, whither he was borne by the four sons of his personal enemy, Metcllus. He was "the noblest Roman of them all," this sober student of the simple wisdom of Xenophon, the friend of Polybius, Laslius, and Pana> tius ; the patron of Terence and Lucilius ; the proud, generous, and unselfish gentleman, who did his best for Rome, and, careless of popularity, steered clear of all her factions. The Italians and the Franchise The idea of extending the franchise, already mooted by Carvilius, was in the air before Flaccus proposed his Bill. No doubt the very thought of it seemed treason at Rome, and the people were as unwilling as the Senate to share the rapidly increasing benefits enjoyed by the privileged minority. But the situation was becoming- impossible ; the allies were restless, and the longer heads among the reformers saw their way to remove the stumbling-block to the Land Act, to strengthen their party and counteract the urban voters by a just and generous stroke of policy. They were not supported. A law of the tribune M. Junius Pennus (126 B.C.) enabled the authorities to expel non-citizens from Rome, and so prevent an influx of Italians from usurping votes or in- timidating opinion, and when Flaccus brought forward his Bill he met such universal resistance that he was as glad to take as the . Senate was eager to give a military command in Gaul. But his proposal had brought the question into practical politics, and its re- jection was followed by the revolt of Fregellae, the loyal and pros- perous Latin colony which commanded the passage of the Liris. When L. Opimius had captured it by treachery, it was dismantled and reduced to a village, and a Roman colony, Fabrateria, was founded on its confiscated lands. With its fall collapsed whatever 346 HISTORY OF ROME other agitation may have existed, but the fate of Fregellas sank deep into the Italian heart, as its revolt was the forerunner of a more terrible rebellion. C. Gracchus. — C. Gracchus was absent for the time. H^had supported the Bill for the re-election of tribunes, had opposed the Junian Law, and had worked as a land commissioner, while he cultivated his natural gifts for rhetoric and business. In 126 B.C. he went, with the consul L. Aurelius Orestes, as quaestor to Sardinia, and distinguished himself by his integrity, humanity, and diligence. The Senate tried to keep him out of the way by twice prolonging his superior's command, but at the end of the second year he re- turned without his chief, and successfully defended his actions before the censors and the people. He had served in the army twelve years instead of the legal ten, and two years instead of one as quaestor. He had taken a full purse to the province, and had brought it back empty. Others filled with their plunder the empty casks which they had taken out filled with wine. He escaped the censor's brand, and when charged with aiding and abetting the Fregellan outbreak, once more foiled the attempt to discredit his candidature. In 124 B.C. he was elected tribune amid great enthusiasm, though the influx of country voters was unable to secure him the first place. He was a stronger man than his brother in gifts and character Equally unselfish and idealistic, equally ardent and sympathetic, he had been disciplined by suffering and self-repression ; with a clear eye and unfaltering purpose, aided by an extraordinary power of work and an attractive personality, he took up his brother's ideas undaunted by his brother's fate, with an almost supersti- tious feeling of his summons to serve the people, avenge his cause, and die. Before coming to his measures, it may be noticed that there were two plebeian censors in 131 B.C., of whom Q. Metellus Mace- donicus delivered a curious harangue against celibacy, just as Scipio, in his censorship, had attacked the fashion of dancing and the loose education of Roman children. Another sign of the times was the acquittal of at least two eminent governors, one of whom was the notoriously guilty Aquillius, by corrupted jurors in the court of extortion. His Programme. — The usual storm of prodigies heralded the reforms of C. Gracchus. His active work extended over the two years 123-122 B.C. Of its drift and purpose it is easy to form a general conception ; it is impossible to settle the details or de- termine the order of the several laws. Even of its drift, divergent MEASURES OF C. GRACCHUS J47 views are possible ; it may be wilfully exaggerated into a tyrant's progress, and blessed or cursed as such ; it may be as easily belittled as exaggerated. It will be best to group his measures and proposals without regard to chronological order, and consider their general meaning afterwards. But this too is difficult, because to carry out his social programme and avenge his brother's death it would be necessary to secure a basis of power in and beyond the Roman populace, and to reduce the Senate to impotence by dividing- and neutralising the strength of the upper classes. Hence there runs throughout a perplexing mixture of motives, reform and revenge, and the means he took must be carefully distinguished from the end desired. Agrarian Law revived.— To take first the measures intended to relieve distress and to confirm his hold on the popular vote. He revived the dormant Land Law and restored to the commis- sion its indispensable judicial powers. Sure of the sympathy of the allies, whose cause his party had espoused, he could include the Italian lands, whose wealthy occupiers would hope to be com- pensated by the franchise, while the poor, at least the Latins, were by a special clause to share as citizens in the colonial dis- tributions. But as the bulk of the available land had been dis- tributed, his real gift to Italian agriculture lay in the system of roads, whose construction, on improved methods, he personally superintended, and which were designed for the service of in- dustry and commerce. Scheme of Colonisation. — To this he added a large scheme of colonisation, but few of his foundations survived him. The proposed revival of Capua, now reduced to a shelter of shepherds, would have meant the resumption of public land, let by a new system on profitable leases, and would have roused bitter memories and jealousies. Neptunia was designed to restore Tarentum, hard hit by the competition of Brundisium, and to give an outlet to the Apulian allotments, as Minervia (Scylacium) would to those in Bruttium. The new colonies were no longer military outposts, but served to deplete the capital and restore the trade and popula- tion of the ruined south. To Gracchus also was due the first attempt at foreign colonisation, the first Emigration Act. To revive and repeople the sites of Carthage and Corinth, to repair the injury done to the world's commerce in their destruction, to relieve the pressure of population, and, by Romanising the pro- vinces, to pave the way to a unity of feeling and interest, was, if grasped by Gracchus in this large sense, an idea as imperial and 34S HISTORY OF ROME far-sighted as it was premature. Possibly he only meant to utilise two pieces of domain favourably situated for strong and compact settlements, lying waste under a special curse, with none but divine interests to disturb. The attempt was seriously made at Carthage, where, under the name of Junonia, he intended to form a settlement of 6000 Romans and allies, with large allotments. These allies were to become Roman citizens, exactly reversing the old custom. Its fulfilment was frustrated by religious prejudice and the fear of weakening Rome by establishing citizen centres RUINS OF AQUEDUCT, CAKTHAGE. abroad, but the idea bore fruit later under the Cjesars. Junonia was of a different type from the ordinary fortress colonies or from the later colonies of veterans, different even from Narbo, founded by the democrats in 11S B.C., the oldest transmarine colony of burgesses, guarding the communications with Spain along the Domitian and Aurelian roads. Lex Frumentaria. — As he had won the rural voters by the Land Law, and the artisans by his great works, so he attached the city mob to himself by the Lex Frumentaria, The supply of LEX ERUMENTARIA 349 necessaries like corn and salt at moderate prices was often con- sidered the duty of government. Of salt the Roman state held a monopoly. A constant flow of corn from Syracuse to Ostia and the markets was secured by the arrangements with the Sicilian tithe-collectors, under the supervision of the a^diles and the Ostian quaestor. Later on Egyptian and African corn poured into Puteoli. Free distribution by conquerors and candidates, or by the state in case of need, had been fairly frequent. On these precedents Gaius established a regular system by which every citizen who should apply personally in the capital would receive 5 modii (\\ bushels) of corn a month, at b\ asses (3d.) a modius, or not quite half of a low average price. The loss would fall on the treasury and the subjects ; recent annexations enabled Gracchus and his successors to organise the supply, and large granaries were built. One hostile senator took advantage of its general terms to discredit the measure by applying himself — he wished at least to have a share if his property was to be plundered. But the Bill was fatally popular. Gracchus, who borrowed the idea from similar Greek enactments, may have justified it as a payment of the citizens for their work in govern- ment, which gave them a share in the spoils of empire, and was some compensation for the land they had lost. He hoped above all to make them independent of the nobles and their doles, secure a firm support for future action, and buy their consent to Italian franchise and agricultural reform. His hope was vain. The prejudices of the mob could be excited and its votes bought as easily as before. The additional value of the franchise tightened the voters grip on it. Gracchus had just taught him to use his power for his own benefit. His gigantic system of indiscriminate outdoor relief fostered pauperism, drained the ex- chequer, stimulated the rush to Rome, and ruined the agriculture he sought to develop. The Roman plebs henceforth means the pauper members of the thirty-five tribes, whether rustic or urban, now resident in the capital, fed by the largesses and organised for electoral purposes. The country voters rarely appeared, and could not be counted upon. At first it succeeded. To strengthen his hold on the Comitia, he carried out the reform of the Centuriata to its logical con- clusion by directing the centuries to vote throughout in an order fixed on each occasion by lot. He lightened the condition of service by shortening the legal term, which constant warfare made oppressive, by providing for the free supply of clothing 350 HISTORY OF ROME to the troops without stoppages, and by extending the right of appeal to citizens under martial law. 1 The Jury-Courts transferred to the Equites. — Having thus secured the patronage of the plebs, he tried to find allies in the enemies' camp. Nowhere is the mixture of motives more obvious and more embarrassing. Hitherto the judices in all important processes, except the few that still came before the people, were taken from the body of senators, a course which tradition and their legal knowledge made natural. This privilege, when political and judicial functions were closely connected and party considera- tions decided legal issues, was a bulwark of senatorial authority, but collusion and corruption, especially in the court of extortion, in the interest of their order, had roused indignation and destroyed confidence. To transfer the courts to the people was absurd. Another class was available — that class of moneyed men which had gradually consolidated itself under the name of equites, i.e., the rich men of the first class who were not senators. These, not yet formally constituted as a separate order by a distinct census, were separated by law and by interest from the ruling nobility. Between the two classes there was mutual antipathy for social reasons, besides the constant friction in the provinces. This division of feeling was utilised by Gracchus, who created out of these elements a new order, an intermediate and privileged class — iudices, publicani, ordo equester — with honorary distinc- tions and probably a peculiar census — 400,000 seslerces. To it he transferred the right of sitting as judices, registered in an official list or album, to the exclusion of senators, and thus at one blow placed it on the neck of the Senate and founded that wavering alliance of capital and democracy which proved so broken a reed to those who leaned upon it. The judices were practically identical in interest, if not personally, with the publi- cani, to whom the control of the courts was a great object. Politi- cally, and for the moment, Gracchus gained his object ; as a re- former he failed. Corruption and collusion went on as merrily as ever. Honest governors suffered ; the dishonest, who connived at the extortion of the tax-farmers and business men, escaped. The whole Equestrian body strenuously resisted every attempt to make judicial bribery penal. 1 The old limit for active service was seventeen to forty-five inclusive. The rule, however, arose that six years' continuous service gave a discharge, while twenty years in the infantry and ten in the cavalry gave exemption. Of the above arrangements, some, if passed, « ere not permanent. OA'DO EQUESTER 351 The Taxation of Asia and the Equites. — He strengthened this alliance, while he struck at the administrative monopoly of the Senate by his arrangements for the taxation of Asia. Cancelling those made in 129 B.C. by which the communities paid moderate sums and the middlemen were restricted to the collection of dues and customs, he reimposed on the province the old Oriental system of tithes {decumiz), besides large indirect taxes, and ordered the right of collecting the revenue to be put up for auction at Rome, and not, as in Sicily and Sardinia, locally, thus excluding the wholesome competition of the provincials, and handing over Rome's richest province to the tender mercies of a gigantic associa- tion, uncontrolled by the governors or the courts. Further to re- strict the discretion of the Senate, the conditions of the contracts were minutely fixed by law. So was established, at the expense of the nobles, a new order, a power to be reckoned with at home and abroad. The Republic became two-headed. Money and rank, capital and land, were thrown into collision. Under a colourable pretext of reform that imposed upon himself, the rash young man satisfied his political interests and his revenge. He divided to conquer, and even boasted of the dagger he had thrown down into the Forum with which his foes might cut each other's throats. But he sacrificed the prosperity of Asia to his Corn Laws and his Equestrian alliance, and plunged the courts deeper into the whirlpool of politics. The Assignment of Provinces. — Setting aside the docked and curtailed Senate, the tribune, relying on the support of the people and the knights, proceeded to utilise to the full the rights of his office and the prerogatives of the Comitia, with the apparent acqui- escence of his colleagues. He monopolised business and exercised an almost monarchical power. He interfered with financial and provincial and judicial affairs, distributed grain, selected jurymen, made roads, conducted settlements, guided the Assembly, led the dumbfounded Senate, with omnipresent and omnivorous industry. He limited the traditional right of the latter body to determine the firovzneia of the consuls for the ensuing year. Ordinarily this was done after the election, and the personal distribution was settled by the lot or by mutual agreement. This led to intrigue and jobbery, for the foreign command was the road to riches and triumphs. The disposal of this patronage was a stronghold of the Senate, and the appointments were decided largely on personal or partisan grounds. A Lex Sempronia directed the consular pro- vinces to be settled before the elections, and, to prevent obstruc- 352 HISTORY OF ROME tion by the tribunes, forbade the use of the veto. But its only effect was to organise more perfectly the art of manipulating the polls ; the slight check on jobbery was counterbalanced by the additional clement of chance in the selection of men for im- portant positions. Indeed, as the custom grew of detaining the magistrates of the year to do business in Rome, a man's pro- vince might be determined a year and a half before he became available. Law of Appeal. — Another blow at the Senate was struck by the Law of Appeal, which, reaffirming and fortifying the Leges Valeria:, the XII. Tables, and the Porcian Laws (198-184 B.C.), declared the indefeasible right of the people in the Comitia Centuriata to try and decide capital cases, enacting " ne de capite civium Romanorum iniussu populi iudicaretur." Primarily it was directed against the usurped jurisdiction of the Senate, which had arbitrarily andby decree appointed extraordinary commissions of treason, &c, in exceptional cases. As reasserting existing laws it applied retrospectively to Popillius, who went into exile. In the case of Tiberius Gracchus, the Senate had not merely summoned the consul to take the sword against citizens, but on his refusal had carried out a coicp d'etat, which it attempted to legalise by declaring the tribune a public enemy and executing his adherents without appeal. No doubt in a crisis demanding immediate action the executive needed to be armed with exceptional powers, and custom both before and after the Gracchi permitted the Senate to confer such powers as against subjects and allies, and in extreme danger against citizens, by the ultimiim decretum, " videant Consules ne quid Respublica detrimenti capiat" But its employment against citizens was never legal, and the asserted right of the Senate to declare a domestic foe a public hostis remained a matter of political but scarcely legal dispute. The use of extraordinary qu&stiones by the Senate stood abolished. Permanent Courts.— About the same time the Quastio de Repe- titndis was reorganised under the new judicial law, to be a scourge of senatorial governors, and possibly a new quaestio was provided to deal with miscarriages of justice — " ne quis iudicio circum- veniretur." This type of court, which soon took over the mass of criminal business, being a delegation of the people, admitted of no intercession or appeal. Hence its sentence did not go beyond exile or outlawry, and the accused apparently retained as a rule his power of avoiding sentence by voluntary exile. Thus, besides improving the administration of justice, Gracchus limited the REFORMS OF C. GRACCHUS 353 action of the popular courts, and indirectly the infliction of the penalty of death. He had intended to punish the upright Octavius for his obsti- nacy by excluding from further promotion any official deprived of his functions by the people. His mother induced him to withdraw the measure dictated by personal revenge. Proposed Extension of the Franchise. — So far his energy, elo- quence, and honesty had carried him through. Withbitter invectives he lashed the corruption of senators and diplomatists, and the cruelty of the magistrates to the allies and subjects. His passionate laments for his murdered brother moved the hearts of his opponents. He secured his own re-election for 122 B.C., with M. Flaccus, the consul of 125 B.C., as colleague, and the election of C. Fannius as consul. For all this mass of work a second year at least was indispensable, and the re-election was apparently unopposed, though the legality of the act is questioned. So far he had been able to combine various interests in an attack on an unpopular body and win support for his own schemes. The hardest question of all remained. The plan of regeneration and reform demanded the incorporation of Italy in Rome. Forgetting Fregellae, he dreamed himself strong enough to propose a measure whose details are unknown, but which perhaps offered the full franchise to the Latins, and to the Italians the Ius Latmnm. The Bill, if carried, would swamp the electorate, assist agrarian reform, strengthen his party, but it was also just and reasonable. Yet, in spite of all his appeals to patriotism and pro- phecies of peril, of all his startling stories of Roman tyranny, of magistrates flogged for a dirty bath or a peasant murdered for a harmless jest, the meaner instincts of the mob applauded the argu- ments of Fannius, and refused to be crowded out of their places at the games or share their cherished doles. The Senate outbids Gracchus : Livius Drusus. — The Senate posed as the friend of the people, whose champion was whittling away the value of his own gifts. Nor were the knights prepared to share their privileges and profits with Latins and Italians. In defiance of the tribune's promised protection, all non-Romans were ejected by the consul, and when Livius Drusus, his sena- torian colleague, threatened intercession Gracchus had to with- draw. The failure of the Bill opened the way for the manoeuvres of the Senate, who set up Drusus to outbid the enemy and play the Tory demagogue. The Leges Livicc proposed (1) to remit the rent of lands distributed by the Gracchan laws ; (2) to establish twelve colonies in Italy of 3000 settlers each, who were to z 354 HISTORY OF ROME pay no rent and enjoy freedom of sale ; and (3) to abolish the flogging" of Latin soldiers by Roman officers. Drusus ostenta- tiously refused any personal share in their execution. It was a mere game of bluff. There was no land for the colonies, which were, in fact, not founded ; the flogging law, a sop to the allies, was, if carried, repealed. But the clumsy dodge succeeded. The Bills were passed while Gains was away in Africa and ill-repre- sented at home by headstrong Flaccus. He could not hold together the discordant elements of his party, could not reconcile their interests in a common policy ; least of all could he trust the way- ward mob. In vain, on his return, he tried to recover popularity. He failed to obtain a second re-election, and his determined foe, Opimius, was elected consul. A handle against him was found in the matter of the colony at Carthage. He had gone to Africa as commissioner to arrange the settlement, and, after a short absence, had returned to select colonists, when the Senate was moved by the report of terrible omens to counsel the repeal of the Act which established it {Lex Rubria). The colony was not popular ; it was far away ; the land was accursed ; the whole thing was new ; the settlers were to be partly Italians. But it was a test case, and Gracchus was bound to fight it. After December 10, 122 B.C., he was a private citizen open to attack. Death of C. Gracchus. — The end came after the New Year, but the story of his death is confused. Early on the critical morning, while Fulvius was haranguing the Assembly summoned on the Capitol, Gracchus with his armed adherents, himself un- armed, came to secure the rejection of the Senate's Bill. As he awaited the issue walking apart in the porch of the temple, he was accosted and apparently insulted by a servant of the consul, then officiating at the usual sacrifice, who, bearing the sacred entrails in his hands, bade evil citizens avaunt. Antullius fell, stabbed by a Gracchan. In the tumult that followed apology was vain. Gracchus only succeeded in giving a fresh handle to his enemies by interrupting the inviolable tribune. The Assembly dispersed in disorder. Opimius, calling on the senators to arm for the defence of the constitution, summoned them and the loyal knights to bring their slaves armed, and occupied the Capitol, Senate-house, and Forum. Next morning, by a stage-trick, the corpse was solemnly paraded before the Senate, and Opimius was duly empowered to save the state. Meanwhile the riotous Flaccus had armed a rabble with his Gallic spoils, and called the slaves to aid. Friends guarded the house of his saddened comrade. FALL OF C. GRACCHUS 355 When morning' came Fulvius occupied the old popular stronghold, the Aventine, whither Gracchus followed, irresolute and without weapons. The Senate turned a deaf ear to negotiations and demanded unconditional surrender. A proclamation of amnesty A CAMILLAS, OR ATTENDANT AT SACRIFICE. thinned the rebel ranks, and, offering their weight in gold for the leaders' heads, the consul, with the veteran generals Metellus and Brutus, stormed the half-held height. Flaccus was hunted out and killed. Gaius fled reluctantly, defended by the heroism 356 HISTORY OF ROME of his friends, and when further flight was vain, within the sacred grove of Furina, fell on the sword of a slave, who slew himself on his master's body. One Septumuleius, a nobleman, earned the price of blood, doubled by the weight of lead with which he filled the skull. The body was flung into the Tiber. The murder was followed, as before, by a special commission, under Opimius, which executed 3000 victims. The houses of the reformers were plundered, and from the proceeds of their estates the consul built that temple and basilica of Concord beneath whose dedicatory inscription the wit wrote, " The work of discord makes the temple of Concord." The city was purified of blood, but the memory of the murdered brothers was dear to the people they sought to serve, and an almost religious veneration clung to the spots where they fell. Criticism of C. Gracchus. — The Senate was right to crush an armed revolt, and the conduct of Gaius shows that in this last scene he was acting with men whose methods he could not approve. He had rather die than fight his countrymen or fall into their hands. For this dilemma his own rashness was partly to blame, partly the Senate, which deliberately utilised a riot to crush a party. The ease with which he accom plished his work, and the equal ease with which its author was beaten down, bear witness to the uncertainty in all men's minds, as much as to the lack of any civic force behind either government or reformers. Gaius Gracchus had no idea of a constitutional revolution. We have no evidence that he meant to establish a tyranny based on plebiscites. He abolished nothing and introduced nothing. His aim was to reduce the Senate to something like its strictly constitutional position, and to make the sovereignty of the people a reality, while he gave the Comitia new blood by the restoration of the yeomanry, by the inclusion of the Italians, and by making the masses independent of their patrons. He meant to make the tribunate once more the ministry of the people, and, steeped as he was in Greek ideas, may have hoped to reproduce in his own person the govern- ment of Pericles, Xoyaj ftev Sn/xOKpar/a epyco Sf wo tov irpiorov avftpos apxrj- An energetic administrator, with an insatiable appetite for work, he found fresh spheres of activity continually opening out before him, and, like the emperors later, he concentrated many offices in one person. In this, as in his attitude to the Senate, he set precedents for monarchy, while he handed down to his successors ideas that remained the common stock of reformers, CRITICISM OF C. GRACCHUS 357 and from them passed to the Empire. He enforced the principle that the land of the subjects was the property of the state, to be utilised for the creation of colonies and the maintenance of the Romans. He founded the democratic alliance with the equites. Administrative reform, Italian franchise, foreign emigra- tion, and possibly Romanisation of the provinces were Gracchan ideas. But his work was largely frustrated by his own vehemence and by his passion for revenge. If his end was patriotic, the means he used were dangerous, and indeed concealed a latent revolution. His Corn Law debauched the masses and ruined the farmer. He plundered Asia to buy a party. In raising up the equites against the Senate, he drove out Satan by Beelzebub. An idealist in a hurry, he failed to see facts as they were, and succeeded, in his ignorance of the true character of the constitution, in weaken- ing the only possible government without creating a permanent substitute. The time was not ripe for monarchy ; to a republican the idea of it was impossible. For his Periclean ideal the Comitia and the tribunate offered no sufficient instruments. The nett result of his work and that of his successors was to demonstrate the hope- lessness of any genuine democracy. The two Gracchi, in their effort to bring about a social reform, in their hope to regenerate Italy, were drawn on to attempt a political revolution whose nature they did not realise, whose difficulties they did not understand, and for which their means were inadequate. They pursued a chimasra. They were not revolutionists, but they were the fathers of revolution. They aimed at no tyranny and were the precursors of the principate. CHAPTER XXXV THE RESTORED OLIGARCHY AND THE WAR WITH JUGURTHA B.C. A.n.c. Agrarian Legislation 119-111 635-643 Fall of Cirta 112 642 Jugurtha at Rome "i 643 Metellus in Numidia 109-107 645-647 Marius conquers Jugurtha 106-103 648-649 The restored Oligarchy. — The Senate, having stamped out the Gracchan movement, resumed its old position with curtailed powers and a chastened spirit. It had been superseded, not destroyed, shaken but not shattered. The opposition leaders 358 HISTORY OF ROME were dead, and there was none to take their place. After all, the only solid and definite party, hammered together by attack and welded by common interests, was the party of privilege. The Gracchi and some few of their successors may have dreamed dreams of popular regeneration, but they failed to organise a genuine and lasting movement. The populares of the future, aiming vaguely at the limitation of the Senate and the humiliation of the ruling class, have at bottom no ideas of value to realise beyond their personal advancement. Between the factions there is little to choose, and for the present the chances are in favour of the more solid and organised party, which always emerges from the revolutions produced by its own incompetence safe if not sound, and somewhat the worse for wear. But the fabric of state was weakened by these continued shocks. Action and reaction destroyed all feeling of stability, impaired the Roman reverence for law and constituted authority, and, in the absence of any civil force to maintain order, brought about a growing disregard for constitutional methods. The restored oligarchy behaved for a time with prudence, but otherwise had learned nothing by its fall. No attempt was made to reform the composition or change the policy of the Senate, or, on the other hand, to limit the powers of the tribunate and the Comitia, which still remained easy weapons for the popular agitator. It was content to keep the peace, humour the people, and out- manoeuvre its opponents. Fate of Gracchus' Measures. — The colonies of Drusus were dropped, but as the Senate had beaten Gracchus at his own game, it dared not repeal the Corn Laws or reclaim the allotments. The Corn Law particularly could be used to buy the loyalty of the mob, which cared for the gift and not the giver. The equites, too strong to attack, retained their control of the courts, their new insignia, and the Asian taxes. Popillius, however, was recalled, and when Opimius was impeached for the murder of citizens without trial, he was formally acquitted. The accused was defended by the renegade Carbo, and the verdict served as a valuable precedent for the use of the supreme decree to suspend the constitution in time of danger. Carbo, impeached on the same charge, committed suicide. The wider and wiser ideas of the Gracchi were thrown aside — the Italian franchise, transmarine colonisation, and Romanisation of the provinces. The assignments made, even at Carthage, were ratified, but the colony at Capua was cancelled, and the formation of new communities in Italy and abroad mostly suspended. Narbo, LATER AGRARIAN' LAWS 359 founded 1 18 B.C., was rather a garrison, a fortress of the old type, and a centre of trade for the Roman business men, like Utica, Delos, and Argos, in rivalry to Massilia. For settlements at Carthage and Corinth the equites had no use. Agrarian Laws. — As to the Leges Agrarice, the indemnity to the exchequer imposed by Tiberius had been abolished by Drusus, and soon after Gaius's death the clause prohibiting alienation of the new allotments was repealed. It was an impossible clause. It tied men, however unfit in means or talents, to the soil. But it was an essential provision in the original scheme, and its repeal, if it relieved the peasantry, favoured the reabsorption of the land by the rich. Purchase, mortgage, and land-grabbing went on merrily. Not long after, a moderate statesman could assert that there were only 2000 rich burgesses in Italy. In Africa, in later years, half-a-dozen men owned half the province. With regard to occupation, a law of 119 B.C. abolished the allotment commission, stopped all further distribution, and imposed a fixed rent on the possessors everywhere, who were henceforth to hold their land undisturbed. The money so obtained was to be used for the purchase of corn or land, or simply for distribution in cash, for the citizens. Finally, in ill B.C., by what is probably to be called the Lex Thoria, the agrarian dispute as to the- public land was terminated. By it all occupations became private pro- perty rent free, and the bulk of the public was converted into private land. There were excluded only certain tracts, e.g., the Ager Campanus, which were let on lease, and common pastures, on which cattle up to a low maximum could be grazed. The law secured the titles of all allotments and occupations granted in or since the year 1 33 B.C., and though it represents the final triumph of vested interests over the allotment laws, it was, on the whole, a wise statute. It removed a handle for agitation, it guaranteed the rights of the Latins and allies to their usufructs, it recog- nised titles acquired by recent legislation, and did away with the system of occupation for the future. Henceforward agrarian laws concern not the rights of the community to its own land, but the duty of the state to provide for its veterans and its poor. It is no longer a question of checking the growth of large estates by settling individuals on state domains, but of using public money to create a peasant proprietorship by purchase. The same law dealt with the public land round the sites of Carthage and Corinth, where similar causes produced a similar monopoly of the soil by the rich, Thus the attempt of the Gracchi to establish ari 360 HISTORY OF ROME independent peasantry failed, but the failure was due more to natural forces than to adverse legislation. In 115 B.C. Scaurus did something to restrict the freedmen ; in 119 B.C. the tribune C. Marius, as yet an honest soldier from the country, the client of the Herennii, who owed his position to the support of the Metelli, showed his integrity and independence by at once opposing the extension of the corn-doles and forcing through a law, against the earnest resistance of the Senate, to secure voters from corruption and intimidation by narrowing the passages which led to the polling-booths. Later on (106 B.C.) a Lex Scruilia proposed to restore the judicia to the senators with dubious success (vide infra, p. 384). Corruption of the Government. — Thus of the Gracchan con- stitution only the more questionable parts remained. Obliged to share its power with two uncertain allies, the equites and the populace, who were perfectly ready to owe their perquisites to any other donor, the Senate was as unable to carry out its own policy as it was unwilling to devise new methods. Its government is marked by corruption and vacillation at home and abroad. It had learned nothing and forgotten nothing ; it had been alarmed and embittered, but not reformed. Its ranks were more tightly closed, its treatment of the poorer classes and the subjects more arrogant than ever. Metellus succeeded Metellus as by destiny in the consulship, and noble officers primed with a hasty smattering of Greek tactics flung away their armies, and owed their triumphs to the talents of some low-born officer. A terrible picture has been drawn of the immorality and luxury of the upper classes, of the decline in faith and manners, of the foul and sordid crimes which defiled public and private life. The story of the foreign wars, the state of Italy and the provinces, the prevalence of piracy and servile riots, bear witness to the lack of statesmen and soldiers, to the weakness alike of government and opposition. Numidia. — Among the worst fiascos of this period may be reckoned the Numidian war, which owes to the political issues raised and to the genius of Sallust its utterly factitious import- ance. An ordinary frontier war, of a type familiar to Englishmen, it was dragged out to a preposterous length by blundering and corruption. The kingdom of Numidia had been consolidated by Massi- nissa during his long reign, and it now stretched from the Molo- chath, on the border of Mauretania, to the Syrtes and Cyrene, JUGURTHA 361 surrounding' with a girdle the Roman province of Africa. Its capital, Cirta (Constantine), standing in an almost impregnable position on a rocky promontory, round which the river Ampsaga flowed in a deep ravine, was a populous and prosperous centre of commerce and civilisation. There were several considerable towns, including the ports of Hippo Regius and Great Leptis. Massinissa had left a full treasury and a thriving country. The wilder districts supplied a good and numerous cavalry. At Massinissa's death Timilianus divided the kingdom between his sons, but the convenient decease of his brothers soon left Micipsa sole ruler, who in a reign of thirty years was able to develop his country and propitiate Rome, while he devoted himself to the society of philosophic Greeks. In 1 iS B.C. he bequeathed his kingdom to his two sons Hiempsal and Adherbal, but joined with them their elder cousin Jugurtha, a natural son of his brother Mastanabal, whom he had adopted. Jugurtha. — Jugurtha was a strong, handsome, active man, a keen hunter, a brilliant soldier, a clever ruler, greedy of power and popular with his countrymen. He had served with distinction at Numantia (134 B.C.), where Marius also won reputation, and had earned Scipio's favour by courage and dexterity. This opportunity he had used to gain friends among the Roman nobles, to study their character and learn the ways of Roman politics, a lesson whose value far outweighed the stern rebukes which his efforts drew from Scipio. There he learned Romce omnia venalia esse. On his return he became a trusted agent of his adoptive father, but when the heirs succeeded to the throne, quarrels broke out which made their joint sovereignty impossible. An attempt to divide the heritage led to a rupture, and amid the disputes the rash, high-spirited Hiempsal was assassinated by Jugurtha (1 16 B.C.). Civil war ensued between the remaining competitors, and Jugurtha, with his fewer but finer troops, ousted Adherbal, an easy-going, unwarlike man, who carried his complaints to the Senate. At Rome, which had hitherto ignored the wrangling princes, feeling favoured Adherbal, but Jugurtha, by a liberal use of gold, effected a rapid and even scandalous change of opinion. M. Scaurus, possibly retained by Adherbal, succeeded so far in his resistance to the job that the Senate, while it condoned the past, decided on a compromise and decreed the equal division of the kingdom (116 B.C.). The award was carried out by L. Opimius and a commission, who allotted to Adherbal the eastern part, including the capital, with the largest towns and ports, while Jugurtha 362 HISTORY OF ROME received the more fertile and populous west, with its warlike tribes. Opimius was afterwards condemned for bribery, but the division was not unfair, and protected Roman interests by removing the more dangerous Jugurtha from the frontier of the province. The award was accepted, and for three or four years there was compara- tive peace, while Jugurtha prepared for attack. Whatever were the rights and wrongs of this wretched business, Rome could scarcely interfere in every disputed succession among barbarians ; and it must be remembered that the Jugurtha of the Roman historian is painted, like Hannibal and Mithradates, in the blackest colours. Siege of Cirta. — At last, in 112 B.C., after tamely enduring con- stant provocation while he appealed to the protecting power, Ad- herbal was forced into war, defeated between Cirta and the sea, driven into his capital, and there besieged. During the siege appeared a Roman embassy, in answer to the earlier appeals, composed, as often, of young nobles serving their political apprenticeship. Politely but firmly baffled by Jugurtha, who was at no loss for excuses, refused admission to Cirta, and confronted by an un- expected situation, the young men returned. Scaurus. — In the fifth month of the blockade an escaped messenger brought an urgent prayer for help, which produced yet another mission, headed by the eminent Scaurus, the son of an impoverished patrician, whose talents and birth had won him the consulship^ 1 5 B.C.). As consul he had defeated the Kami, an Alpine tribe at the head of the Adriatic, and was now princeps Senatus, and in 109 B.C. became censor. Orator, author, and builder, he figured as the pattern aristocrat and leading statesman of his time, andyet has been painted by an adversary as greedy, ambitious, and venal, skilled in steering near the wind, a man who knew and waited for his price. Him also Jugurtha amused to his face at Utica with protracted discussions, and when he departed, relied so far on his own strength in the Senate that, on the surrender of Cirta, he tortured and murdered his cousin with all and sundry his adherents. Among these he was mad enough, if our reports can be trusted, to massacre a number of Italian merchants who are said to have been the main authors of the defence. The whole story sounds suspicious. Roman Intervention. — So far, whether it was due to that in- exhaustible gold of his or to the lack of interest at Rome, Jugurtha had been left to work his will. The Senate was disinclined for African adventures, nor was the state responsible for the protection of combative traders. Jugurtha hoped that the Senate would acquiesce ROMAN INTERVENTION 363 VIEW OK CIKTA, 364 HISTORY OF ROME in accomplished facts. But the massacre of Cirta roused the merchants and the public to back up the minority in the Senate. Rome's orders had been defied, her flag dragged in the mire, her blood shed through the base intrigues of noble senators. A strong and united Numidia, under an active soldier, was a menace to the province. Suspicion was fostered by the obstructive tactics of the Senate. A storm broke out. Gaius Memmius, tribune-elect (112 B.C.), a bitter democrat, fanned the flame. The Senate, in alarm, permitted the declaration of war, Jugurtha's envoys were dismissed the country, and in 1 1 1 B.C. the consul L. Calpurnius Piso Bestia, a capable officer spoiled by avarice, with Scaurus as legate, and a staff of nobles chosen to screen his transactions, entered Numidia and gained some successes. The offered alliance of Bocchus, king of Mauretania, one of Jugurtha's fathers-in-law, was refused. The wily Numidian, however, who had apparently offered little resist- ance, soon secured, by liberal bribes to Bestia and Scaurus — a point neglected by the inexperienced Moor — not merely an armis- tice, but a treaty of peace. In return for a formal submission, a small fine, and the surrender of some horses and elephants, repurchased later from the corrupted army, he received his kingdom entire. When Bestia came back the storm broke out again. The war was popular, and it offered a prospect of slight risk and heavy booty from those famous treasures. Political feeling ran high. And yet, apart from the bribery, the treaty was defensible. There had been terrible disasters in Macedonia and the north : the Cimbri were at the gates of Italy ; it would be something to be well out of this troublesome and possibly dangerous desert warfare against tough and patriotic tribesmen ; Jugurtha's cavalry might be useful once more as allies. But Memmius, with inflammatory harangues, denounced the nobility, and demanded instant inquiry into the scamped and irregular negotiations. Jugurtha at Rome. — The validity of the treaty was impugned in the Senate. It is said that Memmius procured the presence of the king himself at Rome, to be questioned publicly as a witness about the nefarious job ; that the king appeared in suppliant garb, under safe conduct, before the maddened populace ; was there and then indicted by Memmius, and advised to save himself by acting" as in- former ; and, finally, that a hired tribune sealed by his veto the royal lips, and baffled alike his colleague and the people. Such is the effective scene depicted by the pen of Sallust. The king certainly came to Rome on business connected with the ratification of the treaty, and Memmius may have tried to use the occasion to obtain WAR WITH JUGURTHA 365 startling disclosures. The attempt was foiled, but the discussion of the treaty went on. Jugurtha, who remained to watch events, might yet have succeeded, but a blundering stroke of craft and cruelty ruined his chances. He procured the assassination in Rome itself of a possible rival, Massiva, son of Gulussa and grandson of Massinissa, the candidate held in reserve by the opposition, through his confidant Bomilcar, whom he aided to escape from justice. It was the last straw. He was expelled from Italy, the peace was cancelled, and Sp. Postumius Albinus, the consul, who had attacked the treaty in the hope of getting the command, passed over into Africa (no B.C.). The election for this year had been delayed by the attempt of two obscure tribunes to prolong their tenure of office. Capitulation of Albinus. — As the king left Rome he looked back again and again, and at last broke into the cry, " L'rbem venalem, et mature perituram, si emptorem invenerit? Albinus found a demoralised army, corrupted by its foes, and terrible only to its friends, an enemy inactive and ready for terms. He could do nothing ; but when, fooled, bribed, or merely baffled, he returned for the elections, his brother and legate, Aulus, ambitious of conquest or urged by avarice, set off on a wild-goose chase in midwinter, to surprise a distant depot named Suthul or Calama. The attempt failed owing to the difficulties of the situation and the season, and Aulus, lured out into the desert, was himself surprised by night, his camp taken by treachery, his troops scattered. Next day he was forced to surrender, to send his army beneath the yoke, and evacuate Numidia within ten days (beginning of 109 B.C.). The disgraceful treaty, while it kindled Numidian patriotism, roused to fury the indignation of the Roman public against the misgovernment of the nobility. Senate and consul might discuss the treaty, but the tribune C. Mamilius Limetanus, with the support of the equites, and against the secret resistance of the nobles, carried the appointment of an extraordinary court of inquiry into the corruption, collusion, and treason connected with the African business. L. Bestia, C. Cato, Sp. Albinus, L. Opimius, C. Sulpicius Galba, among others, guilty or innocent, unpopular at any rate and suspected, were swept into exile by the hasty sentences of a partisan commission, on which the judicious Scaurus contrived to find a place. Metellus. — The Senate, having thrown overboard the most responsible men, was allowed to deal with what was now a serious scandal, so strong and so indispensable did that body remain. The 366 HISTORY OF ROME treaty was cancelled, as having been concluded without the con- sent of the Senate and people. The rebel king, who, deliberately refraining from offensive action, had left Africa unmolested, did not receive even the person of the repudiated legate. The command was given to the haughty aristocrat, Q. Caecilius Metellus, nephew of Macedonicus, an honest governor, an upright man, a good disciplinarian, and a fairly capable officer, whose treacherous deal- ings with a mere barbarian are more shocking to modern than ancient notions.. As chiefs of his staff he selected tried soldiers of lower birth, and, above all, 1'. Rutilius Rufus, the author of an improved drill, and Gaius Marius, the farmer's son of Arpinum, who had fought his way from the ranks. Battle on the Muthul. — Metellus, with his new levies, ap- peared in Africa late in 109 B.C., and probably spent the rest of the summer in reorganising the dissolute bandits, whom Albinus had found, on his return as proconsul, unfit to satisfy his burning desire to wipe out his brother's disgrace. Jugurtha, genuinely afraid, proffered a real surrender to the man he could not bribe. The consul, covering his treachery with a pretence of negotiation, tried through the envoys to secure the person of the king alive or dead, as a murderer liable to justice, whose power and popularity made him dangerous to Rome. Meanwhile he advanced cautiously into Numidia (close of 109 or beginning of 108 B.C.), where he was received with elaborate submission, and occupied A^aga, a busy and populous town, frequented by Italian merchants, not far from the frontier, as a depot and garrison. At last Jugurtha awoke, and prepared for resistance. On the line of march to the enemy's objective, Cirta, somewhere by the river Muthul (? Rubricatus), he laid a skilful trap, a half- completed African Trasimene. As the Roman issued from the mountain pass, and debouched on the river-plain, his retreat was cut, his access to the water blocked, and as he advanced, his infantry was harassed by swarms of horse in rear and flank. The fight for the Muthul is a regular African desert battle, with its story of broken squares and thronging natives, the heat, the dust, the struggle for the stream, the victory snatched from disaster by the coolness of the chief, by the stability of the men, by the skill and courage of Marius and Rufus. Metellus had been outmanoeuvred. Only the weakness of the Numidian infantry had spoiled the calcu- lations of Jugurtha. Flying columns under Metellus and Marius now raided the country, while the king maintained an active guer- rilla warfare. The march on Cirta was clearly abandoned, and ME TELL US IN A ERIC A 367 Metellus, with small results for his labour, apparently retired on the province, and when next heard of is besieging the neighbouring town of Zama Regia, in the valley of the Bagradas, on the old Punic territory, in the hope of compelling a decisive action. But the besieged were so vigorously supported by the king that Metellus, unable to capture the town or force a battle, was compelled to re- treat into winter quarters. Thus the campaign of 108 B.C. (109), in spite of triumphant bulletins and state thanksgivings, afforded some grounds for the complaints of Roman business men and the caustic if insubordinate criticisms of Marius. The general had again re- course to treachery. Through Bomilcar, whom he contrived to corrupt, he induced the king to capitulate, and then employed the old device of a gradually widening ultimatum to delude, disarm, and crush his enemy, whose person he intended finally to entrap. Jugurtha surrendered his elephants, horses, and arms, promised an indemnity, furnished hostages, and handed over deserters, but when summoned to surrender himself, suspected treason, discovered the plot, and executed the traitor Bomilcar. Campaign of 107 B.C. — In the following winter (108-107 B.C.) Vaga, close as it was to the Roman frontier, revolted, and killed its garrison. The commandant, a Latin named Turpilius, who alone escaped, was scourged and beheaded by Metellus, and within two days the revolt was crushed. But the national feeling was unbroken, and Jugurtha, strong in his loyal tribesmen, had every means for irregular war. In the desultory fighting that ensued (107 3.C.) the Romans gained some successes, after one of which Jugurtha fled, with his family and treasures, to the strong- hold of Thala, situated on an oasis south of the province. Hither Metellus pursued him, hoping to end the war by a surprise ; but though Thala fell, the bird was flown. The war extended itself; the Gstulians of the desert responded to the king's call ; and Bocchus, the rejected, in alarm for himself, received his son-in-law, abandoned his neutrality, and took up the cause. With a swarm of horsemen the princes advanced on Cirta, the impregnable city, which had apparently fallen into Roman hands. Marius. — In the meantime Metellus had been superseded. His legate, C. Marius, had been elected consul, and. appointed general in Africa by special decree of the people. The son of a day- labourer, born at Cereatas (Casamare), then a dependency of Arpinum, in 155 B.C., he passed from the plough-tail to the camp. He was inured to fatigue by his country training, and schooled in war under the stern command of Scipio, whose respect he earned 36S HISTORY OF ROME by his soldierly qualities. By soldiership he had forced his way up, assisted by lucky speculations and the connections gained by marriage. In 115 B.C. he had been praetor, and as propraetor had done good work in Farther Spain. He had failed to obtain the aedileship, and hitherto had not ventured to sue for the consulship, which the nobles defended with bitterness from the "pollution" of an able parvenu. Yet his wife Julia, aunt of the dictator, belonged to the patrician house of the Julii. At length the consciousness of merit and favourable prophecies pushed the ambitious and super- stitious man to make good his claims. He was indeed peculiarly fitted, by his integrity and industry, by his powers of discipline and organisation, by his strict but sympathetic attitude to the common soldiers, his thorough knowledge of their needs, and of the defects of the system, for the work of restoring the military prestige of Rome and asserting her superiority to African and Gallic barbarians. He was a popular commander and a leader of the first rank in the age of the second-rate. A plain, blunt soldier, with a great knowledge of war, and an equal ignorance of politics, as free from the vices as he was untouched by the elegances of his time, as unfitted for the Forum and the courts as he was for the salon, his sound qualities were marred alone by a fierce and fatal ambition. It was his misfortune to become the figure-head and instrument of a party ; it was the fault of the nobles to drive into opposition a character essentially conservative and commonplace. Marius made Consul.— When he asked Metellus for leave of absence, to push his candidature, his patron, indignant at the pre- sumption, warned, scolded, and finally detained him to the last moment. " Satis mature ilium cum filio sua consulatum fieti- turum," he sneered. 1 The legate retorted by bitter criticisms of his superior's generalship. His boasts and promises were trans- mitted to Rome by his partisans in Utica and the camp, and a cry was raised for the transference of the command. When at last permitted to leave, twelve days before the elections, in spite of his shortened canvass he was elected by an enormous majority, and received the appointment by exceptional decree, 107 B.C. (108). This result was due to the dissatisfaction of the mercantile class, to the prostration of the nobility by the Mamilian commission, and to the combination of all the malcontents, who at last had a soldier to lead them. Amid popular enthusiasm Marius proceeded to levy troops. He treated his consulship as the spoils 1 "It would be soon enough for him to stand with Metellus' son," i.e., Metellus Pius, cos. 80 B.C. MARIUS IN AFRICA 369 of war, and inveighed bitterly against these "men of antique race, with their Greek culture, their banquets, play-actors, and cooks, with many imagines and no campaigns, who, as soon as they became consuls, read up the deeds of their ancestors and the military manuals of the Greeks, and took for tutor in the field some soldier from the ranks." In selecting troops he set a new and important precedent. He not only called up a large number of veterans, but to avoid the hated conscription, and to secure men on whom he could depend, he enlisted recruits mainly from the capite censi, i.e., from those who possessed less than the minimum of the lowest class, and who had hitherto been drawn only on an emergency or for service as marines. The full bearing of the changes which he effected now, or in the creation of the army of the North, will be pointed out in connection with the Cimbric war {vide infra, pp. 379, 380). Marius in Numidia. — Meanwhile nothing had happened in Africa. Metellus, with almost childish annoyance, refused to act. Bocchus, who held the key of the situation, would not commit him- self. Marius arrived, 106 B.C. (107), trained his army, chastised the Gaetulians, proceeded to attack such cities as remained untaken, and, among others, captured the stronghold of Capsa, situated on an oasis, after a march of immense difficulty, undertaken in the hope of eclipsing the exploit of Metellus at Thala. Having thus cleared Eastern Numidia, he entered on a long and difficult expedition to the Molochath, and took, by a lucky surprise, a certain treasure-hold of the king. Here he was joined by the quaestor L. Cornelius Sulla, with a reinforcement of cavalry. It was Sulla's first campaign, but under so good a master the Roman dandy rapidly learned the elements of war. From his advanced position Marius began a difficult and dangerous retreat. Possibly Bocchus had deluded him by assurances of friendship. Now he joined Jugurtha in force. Twice were the Romans enveloped ; twice through the hostile swarms of cavalry the way was opened by a pitched battle. On the first occasion, surprised in column of route, they were only saved by the military instincts of the soldiery and the negligence of the foe. On the second their safety was due to the brilliant manoeuvres of Sulla. Jugurtha betrayed to Sulla. — From winter quarters at Cirta negotiations were resumed with Bocchus, without whose aid the war was interminable. Envoys passed secretly between Bocchus, Marius, and the Senate. Finally the Moor sent for Sulla to seal the treaty and take over the prisoner. He accepted the perilous 2 A 370 HISTORY OF ROME commission, and boldly traversed the camp of Jugurtha, his small PRESENT FLOOR Or LOWER CHURCH SECTION. 30 Feet PLAN. ni li PLAN AND SECTION OF THE MAMERTINE PRISON. [From Middletori s Rome.) A. Opening in floor over the Tullianum ; the only access. BB. Solid tufa rock. CC. Branch of Cloaca. DE. Position of modern stairs and door, FF. Front wall of prison. G. Pruhable original top of Tullianum. escort lost in a Moorish host, Sulla's firm bearing decided the DEATH OF JUGURTHA 371 waverer. Deluded by the hope of conference, Jugurtha was en- trapped by his kinsman and ally, and carried in chains to Rome, where he adorned the triumph of the conqueror, January 1, 104 B.C., and was starved to death in the foul dungeon carved in the Capi- toline rock. "How cold is your bath !" he cried as he fell into his living grave. He had been caught at last, after the long struggle. He had furnished two generals with a triumph, and Metellus with the title Numidicus. The credit of his capture belonged largely to the cool and resolute Sulla ; the people lauded Marius, the Senate praised its own heroes, and the African war began the rivalry that ended in the proscriptions. Results of the War. — With the king's death the war closed. No province was formed. Bocchus received, as the price of blood, the western half of Numidia ; the remainder was given to Cauda, a grandson of Massinissa. The Gaetulians were declared free allies of Rome. The Senate was reluctant at this crisis (105 B.C.) to main- tain a standing army in Africa. The political results were more striking than the military. Corruption and incapacity had given the democrats their chance. A fairly successful commander had been superseded by a popular vote, and the Senate's control of the military command infringed. There had been bitter war between the equites and the people on the one hand and the Senate on the other. The ground of opposition had shifted from home to foreign policy, and the military power had come to the front. On January I, 104 B.C., Rome's only general entered on a second successive consulate in a panic caused by dis- asters in the North. CHAPTER XXXVI THE WARS IN THE NORTH B.C. A.U.C. Defeat of Allobrogfes and Arverni — Province of Narbo izi 633 Wars in Macedonia 112-110 642-644 The Cimbri defeat the Romans in Gaul .... 109-107 645-647 Battle of Arausio 105 649 Marius Consul 104-100 650-654 Battle of Aquae Sextiae 102 652 Battle on the Raudine Plain 101 653 Holding, as Rome did, Spain, Italy to the Alps, and Macedonia, it was her plain business to provide for the defence of the frontiers, the protection of the subjects, and the security of her communications. In Spain she was bound to chastise the Celtiberian and Lusitanian 372 HISTORY OF ROME tribes, and to hold the passes of the Western Pyrenees ; in Gaul to protect Massilia and the coast route ; in North Italy, to clear the Alpine passes on the west and east and check the invaders from the north ; in Macedonia and Illyria, to defend the ports of the western coast, and act as warder of the Balkans and of Rhodope. No doubt the effective control of the great ranges would precipitate conflict with the wandering hordes which ebbed and flowed behind the barriers, but of this danger Rome was scarcely aware, and nothing was gained by delay. Of all this little was done. Spain. — Of Spain, after the work of D. Brutus (136 B.C.) and the capture of Numantia, there is nothing to record except Marius' suc- cess in checking brigandage (114 B.C.), the repulse of the Cimbri by the warlike Celtiberians (103 B.C.), and the insurrection of the Celtiberians and Lusitanians, excited by the shameful defeats in Gaul, which was crushed by Didius and Crassus between 97 and 93 B.C. Under Didius served with distinction the famous Sertorius. There was hard fighting and some butchery, and Didius occasion- ally removed the troublesome highlanders to peaceful settlements in the plain. North Italy. — Here Roman ideas and habits had spread to the foot of the Alps. The Ligurians in the west had been severely handled and the coast route secured. In 143 B.C. Appius Claudius reduced the Salassi ; in 100 B.C. Eporedia was founded as a citizen colony to control the entrance of the north-western passes. No province was formed as yet and no tribute exacted, the communi- ties retaining their national institutions under the supervision of the consuls, furnishing contingents, especially the light Ligurians, and providing for their own defence. It was the inroads of the barbarians and the extension of the franchise to Italy which first compelled the creation of a distinct command in North Italy, whose necessity only ceased with the conquest of Gaul and Switzerland. Gaul. — Beyond the Alps, the route to Spain, whether by land or along the coast, from Pisa;, Luna, or Massilia to Tarraco, had been secured partly by the fleet, and, after its decay, by the chas- tisement of the Ligurians, by the aid of friendly tribes, but mainly by the ancient alliance with the faithful Massilia, whose naval stations stretched from Nicaea and Antipolis to Agatha and Rhoda. In return for her help, Rome protected Massilia against the bar- barians. In 154 B.C. 1 Opimius defended Antipolis and Nicsea 1 About, this time occurred the attempt to protect the export of wine and oil from Italy, by the prohibition to cultivate the vine and olive in the Massilian dependencies (Cic. , De Rep. iii. 9). WARS IN GAUL 373 against the Ligurians of the Maritime Alps, the first Transalpine war. In 125 B.C. Fulvius Flaccus, the democratic consul, his head full of Gracchan ideas, a true precursor of Caesar, laid the founda- tion of the future province by his victories over the Celto-Ligurian tribes — the Salluvii near Aix, and the Vocontii by Vaucluse. War -with the Allobroges and Arverni. — The area of war rapidly expanded. The chief tribe in South Gaul was the Arverni (capital, Nemossus, near Clermont), who had risen to great wealth and power and a fair civilisation under the magnificent Luerius and his son Betuitus. Their available force amounted to 180,000 men. Their rivals for the hegemony were the weaker /Edui round Bibracte (Autun). The Belgic league of the north-east, with their leading clan, the Suessiones, just enter our horizon. In the south-east, however, the Romans came at once into contact with the strong clan of the Allobroges, in the valley of the Isere, who, coming to aid the Salluvii, were defeated (123 B.C.) by C. Sextius Calvinus, near the modern Aix. In 122 B.C. Cn. Domitius Aheno- barbus entered their land, and the attack upon them brought the Arverni as suzerains into the sphere of action. The refusal of their mediation led to war. The ^Edui at once embraced the Roman alliance, a useful support in the enemies' rear. Ahenobarbus was reinforced (121 B.C.) by Q. Fabius Maximus, grandson of Paullus, who severely defeated the united armies (August S) at the confluence of the Rhone and the Isere, earning the surname Allobrogicus. The Allobroges submitted, and the Arvernian king, Betuitus, who had thought the Roman soldiers too few to feed his dogs, was entrapped by Domitius, figured in the triumph of Fabius, and was interned at Alba by the Senate, which censured the thief, but took the stolen goods. At some date before or after this battle Domitius gained a victory at Vindalium, above Avignon, due in part to the awe created by African elephants. Province of Narbo. — From the land of the Allobroges, who sank into a mutinous, heavily indebted tribe, was founded (121 B.C.) the province of Gallia Braccata or Narbonensis {the province, Provence). It took its later name from the capital, Narbo Martius, an old Celtic town on the Atax, not far from the sea, henceforward the rival of Massilia for the inland traffic and headquarters of the negotiatores. Aquae Sextias, founded 1 22 B.C., famous for its hot and cold springs, was the standing camp of the west. The new acquisi- tion, while it realised to some extent the colonising ideas of the Gracchi, was mainly designed to protect the communications with Spain and tap the trade of Gaul. Between the Alps and the Rhone 374 HISTORY OF ROME the tribes paid tribute to Rome or Massilia ; the Arverni ceded enough land between the Cevennes and the coast for the making of the great Domitian road from the Rhone to the Pyrenees ; the westward limits included the rich and ancient city of Tolosa and the upper waters of the Garonne. The country rapidly assimilated the language, habits, and ideas of its conquerors, and remained at peace till the Germanic invasion. The Balkan Peninsula. — In Illyria, Rome possessed Istria, Scodra, and part of Epirus, but had no effective control over the tribes of the " Hinterland," or of the rugged coasts and rocky isles between Epirus and Istria. In consequence of bitter complaints from the subjects and allies, the rude and insolent pirates of Dal- matia were chastised by P. Scipio Nasica, who took Delminium (155 B.C.), and taught the confederacy "to concern itself about the Romans " for the future. The district was placed, like Cisalpine Gaul, under the consular control, and remained so even after the formation of the Macedonian province. No attempt was made by a regular and combined attack from Italy and Macedon on the mountain tribes from Gaul to Thrace to secure the line of the Alps and Balkans or push the frontier to the Danube. The country was mainly occupied by Celtic clans, remnants of the great wave that spread itself from Spain to Galatia, passing on either side of the Alps, and penetrating alike to Rome and Delphi. In modern Switzerland, and beyond into Germany, along the Upper Rhine, dwelt the Helvetii, who had not yet come into contact with Rome ; next to these, the Boii still held Bavaria and Bohemia ; in Styria and Carinthia dwelt the Taurisci or Norici ; the kindred Kami inhabited the hill-country at the head of the Adriatic. In the Tauriscan country, the mines of iron and gold about Noreia (near Klagenfurt) attracted Italian capital and labour. The in- digenous Rasti pushed their forays and levied blackmail from the heights of Eastern Switzerland and the Tyrol, whither the Celts had driven them ; the Euganei and Veneti lived peaceably round the modern Padua and Venice, a wedge between the Cenomanian and Karnian Celts. Along the Balkans and in the basin of the Danube dwelt, first, the half-IUyrian Iapydes, in Croatia, then the restless and roving Scordisci, above the Illyrians of the coast, in Bosnia and Servia, along the Save, plundering their neighbours from their stronghold of Siscia. The Thracians harried Macedonia on the east. Behind, fermented the obscure masses of the ever-moving north. Fighting can be dimly discerned going on round the Roman THE BALKAN PENINSULA zli territories, whose Sole frontiers were the swords of the legions. In 1 1 S B.C. the Stceni, above Verona, were reduced by Q. Mar- cius ; constant raids paid back in kind the inroads of the moun- taineers. There were conflicts in Thrace in 103 and 99 B.C. The piratical Vardari were deported from Dalmatia into the in- terior (135 B.C.), and the Scordisci attacked and defeated. Tuditanus in 129 B.C., helped by the Spanish veteran D. Brutus, repressed the Iapydes, and secured a temporary peace in Illyria. But in 1 19 B.C. Cotta had to move on Siscia, and L. Metellus cheaply earned the name Dalmaticus by capturing Salonae(ii9 B.C.), which became the Roman headquarters in those parts. But Metellus was shrewdly suspected of manufacturing a triumph from a sham campaign. From about this time dates the commencement of the Via Gabinia from Salons to the interior. Scaurus in 115 B.C. defeated the Kami, crossed the eastern range, and opened up commercial relations with Noricum. But these successes in the Illyrian district were badly balanced by the extermination of the army under the censor's grandson, C. Porcius Cato (consul 114 B.C.), entrapped by the Scordisci among the mountains. Cato was condemned later, on a convenient charge of extortion. The praetor M. Didius was able to check the victors' raids into Macedon. The war was continued with fair success till 109 B.C. M. Livius Drusus, the anti-Gracchan tribune, is said to have been the first Roman general who reached the Danube, in 112 B.C. ; but if he did indeed drive the Scordisci beyond the river, it was left for M. Minucius Rufus (no B.C.) to complete their destruction. Henceforth the Dardani take their place as leading tribe. The Cirnbri. — These new connections and the thinning down of the barrier clans soon brought Rome face to face with a more terrible enemy. Beyond the mountains had been wandering to and fro for some years a tribe of unsettled Germans, driven by pres- sure from behind, by natural convulsions, or by migratory instinct from their homes about the Baltic and the North Sea — a people on the march, women, children, and waggon-houses. Gathering- fresh forces from the tribes they traversed, especially from the powerful Celtic Ambrones, the Cimbri, tall, fair-haired, blue- eyed men, with women as strong and tall, and children flaxen- haired, poured on towards the sunny South, by capricious onsets, harbingers of the final floods which drowned the later Empire, appalling the smaller-statured Romans with their huge forms, their long swords, and their terrific cries. They were rude and rough, brutal even and savage, when they poured the blood of 376 HISTORY OF ROME captives for their white-clad priestesses to prophesy the issues of war ; yet they were chivalrous after a sort, fond of single combats, ROMAN SOLDIER. tourneying with the foe at a chosen time and place. In their copper helmets and coats-of-mail, with their heavy missiles, narrow THE CIMBR1 377 shields, and Celtic swords, they formed in a deep square phalanx, the front ranks, it is said, tied man to man with thongs through their girdles. Defeat of the Romans. — On they came, a strange and motley host, breaking through the thin barrier whence hitherto the Celts of the Danube had repelled them. In 113 B.C. they appeared among the Taurisci. To protect the clients of Rome and cover the passes of the Alps, Cn. Papirius Carbo, brother of the renegade, who was then in Illyria, marched on Noreia, and when the Cimbri offered to evacuate and leave the friends of Rome alone, attempted to mislead and surprise them, but was defeated with great slaughter. Leaving Italy unmolested and passing peace- ably through Helvetia, they entered Gaul by the land of the Sequani and harassed it with devastating rajds. In 109 B.C. they reappeared on the borders of the Gallic province, and being refused settlements and employment as mercenaries, they de- stroyed the army of the consul M. Junius Silanus, who had taken the offensive to protect the Allobroges and the Roman frontier. But so far from pursuing their advantage and pressing the Roman government, embarrassed as it was with the African war and at its wits'-ends for recruits, the Cimbri contented themselves with harrying the prosperous Gallic tribes. Their place was taken by their Celtic imitators and allies, the Tougeni and Tigurini, from Helvetia, who had penetrated into the valley of the Garonne as far as the modern Agen, under Divico, and in 107 B.C. decoyed and annihi- lated the army of the consul L. Cassius Longinus, who fell with his legate L. Piso. The remnant passed ignominiously beneath the yoke, but C. Popillius, who signed the capitulation, was subse- quently convicted of treason. His condemnation was ensured by the passing of a Lex C&lia extending the ballot to trials for per- ituellio. Disaster at Arausio. — This series of disasters shook the credit of Rome, and the rich town of Tolosa, on the western frontier, revolted and seized its garrison. Q. Servilius Caspio (consul 106 B.C.) re- covered the city by a night surprise and sacked the treasures of its ancient sanctuary. What became of these famous treasures no one knew. On the way to Massilia they were seized by robbers, and the consul was accused of connivance. If it was true, he had indeed gained, as the proverb said, " the gold of Tolosa." Disaster over- took the sacrilegious thief. Remaining on the defensive during 106 B.C., he was acting next year with a half-independent com- mand on the right bank of the Rhone, under the consul Cn. 37§ HISTORY OF ROME Mallius Maximus, when the Cimbri and their allies returned under Boiorix. The first to fall was M. Aurelius Scaurus, with a detachment of the consular army. His proud warning to the king to keep his hands off Italy cost him his life. Reluctantly Crepio obeyed his superior's orders and entreaties and crossed to the left bank. Here, possibly at Arausio (Orange), not far from Avignon, the powerful Roman army was concentrated, but its leaders were at discord, immovable by remonstrance even from the Senate. Ca^pio declined to concert action, and when Mallius accepted the negotiations offered by the Cimbri, ap- parently ordered a separate attack. Taken in detail, with the river in rear, the divided armies were murderously defeated ; So,ooo men were reported dead, and the infuriated savages, in obedience to a vow, hung their prisoners, burned their booty, smashed the armour, and pitched the horses into the river. The 6th of October 105 B.C. recalled the deadly day of Cannas. Five armies had now been swept successively away ; the passes were open, the Gauls at the gate. In the panic that followed, able-bodied men were bound on oath to remain in Italy. All exemptions were suspended. The allies gathered in alarm round Rome, and at the elections, in spite of law and custom, the precedent of the Punic wars was revived, and Marius, the victor of Africa, was re- elected in absence, and appointed to Gaul, to be continued in office, like a new Valerius Corvus, four years in succession. Rome's luck did not desert her : again the capricious hordes failed to push their victory, and passed westward to attack the strongholds of the Arverni and break their teeth on the warlike tribes and rocky fastnesses of Spain. There was breathing-time for re- organisation and revenge. Caspio, stripped on the spot of his proconsular command by decree of the people, was in 104 B.C. driven from the Senate by a special law, providing this penalty for those deprived of imperium by the people, an enactment of doubtful validity. Probably in the following year (103 B.C.), in virtue of a plebiscitum, moved by the tribune C. Norbanus and supported by L. Appuleius Saturninus, a commission was ap- pointed to try the treason and embezzlement connected with the Gallic command, which ended in the condemnation, among others, of Mallius, and of Caspio, whose property was confiscated and who barely escaped death, to end his life in beggary and exile. Marius reorganises the Army.— Meanwhile Marius, who had finished his work in Africa in 105 B.C., to which year must be as- MILITARY MEASURES OF MARIUS 379 signed the capture of Jugurtha, had returned to Rome. He busied himself for two years in organising a new army in North Italy and the south of France, where he remained on the defensive. He now completed the military reforms begun in his first consul- ship and made doubly necessary by the dearth of troops and the demoralisation that follows disaster. These disasters had emphasised all the tendencies which were irresistibly creating a professional army. Political, military, and social causes had produced a gradual change from conscription based on property to enlistment of paid volunteers, supplemented by contingents from Italy and abroad. The census ceased to be the basis of the army, and there was no need to enforce an un- popular service when thete was a sufficient supply of eager and willing" recruits. Moreover, the old tactical division into three lines was becoming as obsolete as the Servian institutions them- selves, and the loose arrangements of the maniples clearly needed revision since the recent failures. As to the cavalry, it was notoriously formed of Italians, Thracians, and Numidians, while the Ligurians and Baliares supplied the light-armed foot and slingers. The reforms connected with Marius gave full expres- sion to these changes. Whatever might remain of the old forms of the civic militia, its methods and principles, was now swept away. Though the legal obligation of service remains, the army henceforth is filled by veterans, volunteers, and large drafts of allied troops. All non-military distinctions in equipment and in the line of battle disappear. There is no question of age or of property, only of service approved by the commanding officer. While Marius was still in Africa, Rutilius, the colleague of Mallius, had brought in his new method of training, derived from the masters of the gladiatorial schools. The excellence of the re- modelled army was based on the skill and coolness of the indi- vidual swordsman. The care of Marius, an old ranker himself, improved the weapons, the kit, and comfort of the rank and file. His experience also decided him to make the cohort, which already existed, the main tactical division instead of the maniple, though, of course, the maniple was retained. Ten strong cohorts combined the advantages of solidity and independence to resist the rush of the Germans. Company ensigns were abolished ; the cohort, with its six sections of 100, had its battalion colours ; the legion, 6000 strong, received the famous eagle. The three lines no longer represented separate corps ; military rank went by the numerical order of the cohorts and centuries. The velites dis- 3 to HISTORY OF HOME appeared as the equites had gone, and the only distinct corps was the cohors praetoria, originally created as a company of personal friends by ^milianus in Spain, now a select and privileged guard, retained at headquarters for special service. The rank and file of the army was thus formed mainly of proletarians and the poorer classes, who rarely rose above the rank of centurion, the upper classes acting as officers or serving on the bodyguard. The military tribunes are gradually superseded in the •command of COMBAT -OF GLADIATORS: THE VANQUISHED COMBATANT APPEALING TO THE AUDIENCE. {To illustrate gladiatorial swordsmanship, p. 379). the legion by legati, generally men of senatorian rank, serving as generals of division. The change had been gradually brought about by military necessities. It created a soldier class because the conditions of that class existed. It was no device of an aspiring soldier, and yet we have here all the elements of the imperial army. The basis of the military republic was gone with its civic militia. Attached by his oath to the general, for a war, not for a cam- paign, rewarded and punished by the general, with no state system MAR I US IN GAUL 381 of pension or even poorhouse, the soldier, Roman or allied, owed his allegiance henceforth to the colours, the comrade, and the chief. Marius in Gaul. — Marius proceeded to Gaul with his legate Sulla, an experienced staff, and his Syrian prophetess Martha, with his contingents summoned far and wide, his raw levies and African veterans. There, by strict discipline and sturdy im- partiality, he got his masses in hand and attached them to him- self. During the months of waiting he kept them employed by great military and civil works, especially by cutting a transport canal (Fossae Mariana;) to improve the navigation of the Rhone. From a strong camp near the junction of the Rhone and the I sere he overawed the Tectosages and restored confidence, while he guarded the passage of the Rhone and covered the routes to Italy. To secure his re-election for 102 B.C. he was com- pelled to come to Rome and form an alliance with the popular tribune Saturninus, who forced the appointment in face of the growing discontent at this unconstitutional continuation of power. But the country needed a disciplinarian and a soldier, and though there were other officers available, the government was too un- popular to resist, and, at this crisis, acquiesced in the breach of a fundamental law of the Republic. Marius went through the farce of a pretended reluctance. The full peril of this unlimited power wielded by the general of the democracy at the head of a popular army was not realised till the danger was past. Public opinion enjoyed the defeat of the Senate. At last, in 103 B.C., the Germans reappeared on their way to Italy, their ranks swelled by adventurers and reinforced by the Tougeni and Tigurini, and by the Teutones from the Baltic, under Teutoboduus, whom they had met somewhere in Gaul. Their Gallic raids, re- pulsed by the Belgse alone (103 B.C.), had filled their hands with plunder. This they now left under a powerful guard, which sub- sequently became the people of the Aduatuci, on the Sambre. On their way south they divided their forces, the Teutones Tougeni and Ambrones taking the road by Roman Gaul and the western passes, while the Cimbri and the Tigurini were to cross the Rhine, skirt the Alps, and enter by the eastern defiles which they had surveyed in 113 B.C. The divisions would rejoin in the valley of the Po. Battle of Aquae Sextiae. — In the summer of 102 B.C. the Teutones crossed the Rhone unresisted, while Marius, still uncertain of his troops, watched his opportunity from his camp. For three days 382 HISTORY OF ROME he repelled the assaults of the barbarians, and, it is said, refused to attack, though the enemy for six days, defiling past in long column with their vast baggage-train, offered an extended flank. Unmoved by their bitter taunts, as they asked if the Romans had messages for their wives at home, he waited till they were gone, and followed cautiously in their rear. At last, by Aquse Sextiae, on the road to Italy, twelve Roman miles from Massilia, Marius encamped on a range of hills destitute of water. A skirmish among the watering- parties brought on a regular engagement, in which the Ambrones were defeated. During the anxious night and following day, enveloped by the yelling barbarians, the Romans strengthened their lines and both sides prepared for action. On the third day Marius offered battle. In the night he had posted a small force, with the grooms and camp-followers mounted on baggage-horses, in the enemy's rear, invisible among the hills and trees. His main body was drawn up on the crest. The Teutones anticipated the attack, charging up the slope. The charge was checked at close quarters by a volley of javelins ; the infantry fell at the sword's- point on the blown and staggered Germans, while Marcellus burst from the ambuscade. Alarmed for their rear, broken by the severe struggle in the unwonted heat, the Teutones gave way, the king was captured, the army annihilated, many of the women slew themselves in despair. This decisive battle was fought in the valley of the Arc, on a range of hills still known as Mont St. Victoire. Marius' idea had been to secure the most favourable conditions, by induc- ing the enemy to take the long and difficult coast road, wedged in between the mountains and the sea, where they would be en- cumbered by their waggons and unable to utilise their numbers. Accordingly he had hung on their rear, harassed their march, and waited for a convenient position on ground that he had previously surveyed, to intercept and destroy them. The names in the district still recall the famous fight which saved Rome. Battle on the Raudine Plain. — The victor, re-elected consul for a fifth time, refusing a triumph, sent on his army to North Italy, and proceeded from Rome against the Cimbri in 101 B.C. They had traversed Helvetia, and descended into Italy by the pass of the Brenner and the valley of the Adige. On the Athesis, Q. Lutatius Catulus (consul 102 B.C.) had posted himself to stop their passage somewhere near Verona (neglecting the upper defiles above Tri- dentum), but was forced to retire by the cowardice of his troops, whose retreat he secured with difficulty. To do this he sacrificed a detachment, which was only saved by the heroism of a centurion AQUM SEXTIsE AND CAM PI R AUDIT 353 and the chivalry of the Cimbri. He brought his army with difficulty across the Po, and left the enemy to make themselves comfortable in the prosperous land he had so shamefully evacuated. Catulus, who took great credit to himself for his performance, remained in command as proconsul (101 B.C.), and on the arrival of Marius the two generals crossed the Po with 50,000 men. They met the Cimbri, who had marched up-stream to find a crossing, at Vercelke, not far from the Sesia. The story runs that, on the challenge of Boiorix, Marius consented to appoint a time and place for battle — 30th July 101 B.C., on the Campi Raudii, half-way between Turin and Milan. The plain would be serviceable for the superior Roman cavalry, an arm in which the invaders were throughout deficient. Marius, placing in the centre, which he drew back, the demo- ralised troops of Catulus, distributed his veterans on the flanks. The Cimbric infantry is said to have formed a square 3J miles each side. Their horse, surprised in a morning mist, was forced back on the advancing foot. The heat of summer told on the Northerners ; the wind, dust, and sun were all in their faces ; but the victory was decided by the trained discipline of the Roman infantry and the ability of Marius. Driven back to their waggons, where the women fell upon the fugitives with knives and axes, the Cimbri were annihilated. Their wives and daughters preferred death by the enemy's sword or self-destruction to the doom of Roman slaves. Catulus claimed the chief merit, but to the consul commanding belonged the title of " Saviour oft Rome." With his victories closed the first act of the struggle of the Roman and the Teuton. Marius contented himself with a single triumph, which he shared with Catulus, but the rivalry of DENARIUS STRUCK lot B.C. — TRIUMPH OF MARIUS ; THE GODDESS, ROME. the generals became a political antagonism between the popular and senatorial champions. Catulus, a convinced aristocrat and bitter enemy of Marius, an elegant and accomplished memoir- 384 HISTORY OF ROME writer, orator, and dilettante, was a strong foil to the rude soldier, who had the shocking taste to step from his chariot to the Senate- house without changing his robe of triumph. It was an omen of his fate. He brought to the field of politics a mind and character as unfit for subtle party manoeuvres as it was incapable of the broad strokes of policy needed at this moment. CHAPTER XXXVII SATURNINUS, MARIUS, AND THEIR TIMES B.C. A. U.C. Lex Domitia 104 630 Slave War in Sicily 103-99 °S I -°5S Coalition of Marius and the Demagogues — Laws of Saturninus — Death of Saturninus and Glaucia — Fall of Marius 100 654 Party Struggles. — During the wars party struggles had been bitter at Rome. The populares, supported by public wrath at the failures of the government, had again made head, and matters were fast approaching a crisis. We have mentioned inci- dentally the judicial commissions and convictions which followed the scandals and disasters in Africa and Gaul, and the popular movement, which, with a wave of indignation, swept Marius to the top. For the failures in Gaul, as in Africa, only more so, public opinion made the Senate and its officers responsible. In each case the storm discharged itself upon the wretched scape- goats, who suffered for the sins of their order as much as for their own incompetence and treason. The system was left un- reformed, perhaps because there was no way to reform it, and with an instinctive certainty men turned to the one strong man who, they hoped, would manage better. Party power oscillated a good deal. In 106 B.C. Q. Servilius Caepio, "patron of the Senate," and possibly leader of an anti-democratic movement, proposed a law restoring the judicial power wholly or in part to the Senate, a measure which, if carried, was swept away on his fall by an- other Lex Servilla of the tribune Glaucia. The same year saw the birth of Cicero and the great Pompeius. But for the internal history of this time we have even less authority than for the external. The abundant literature of the period has left but the merest outline and most meagre abridgment behind it. Laws RELIGION 385 were passed and repealed, but no man of mark came forward on either side with a strong" policy. There was a growing tendency towards violence, which left no room for constitutional growth. Lex Domitia. — The deposition of Caepio by popular decree (though not illegal, for proconsular power was not a definite office) was a marked interference with the Senate's prerogative. Equally noticeable is the tribunician Lex Domitia of 104 B.C. {vide supra, p. 2S9), which transferred to the people the right of nomi- nation to the religious colleges. A proposal to this effect had been defeated in 145 B.C., when it formed part of an abortive attempt of the tribune C. Licinius Crassus to anticipate the democratic re- forms of the Gracchi. On this occasion it was carried by a noble ancestor of the Emperor Nero, a candidate who had been black- balled by one of these exclusive clubs. Co-optation, which placed the ordination of priests, under the protection of heaven, in the hands of its ministers, was obsolete now that these ministers formed part and parcel of a government machinery. The priest had become politician ; henceforth the politician would be priest. This new development, however, swept away one more restraint upon hasty and ill-considered legislation, carried through in a single chamber of the most unpromising elements. Superstition at Rome. — Little indeed remained of the old faith now but its form and the superstitious terrors of the masses. During the Cimbric alarms there occurred a hideous scandal, followed by a cruel outburst of religious panic, not unmixed with meaner political intrigues, to which the sacred and high-born vestals and many noble Romans fell victims, and which only ended in a human sacrifice of two Greeks and two Gauls, to pacify the incensed deities — a relic of primeval barbarism forbidden later on by a Senatus Consultant of 97 B.C. There was a special com- mission under the Peducaean law, presided over by the aged and severe Cassius. Prosecutions grew in this ancient version of Titus Oates' plot ; the meanest evidence was raked up. The trial of the noble maidens by a secular court, while it set aside the religious jurisdiction of the chief pontiff, was also an in- direct attack on the upper classes. The sad and disgusting story is equally symptomatic of inner rottenness, whether the gross charges were proved indeed or were merely the result of diseased imagination, party rancour, and vulgar panic. Such things at least were credible of the highest society at Rome. The void of faith was filled more and more with the passionate rites and mystical beliefs of the East, whose frantic ceremonies 2 B 386 HISTORY OF ROME and self-deluded impostors and fakirs found welcome with the gaping mob. The influx of degrading superstitions was at once a cause and an effect of the declining respect for the old religion. The customary remedies of strict censorships and sumptuary PART OF A STATUE OF A VESTAL. legislation were applied with the usual result. Cynical sermons on the duty of marriage and restrictions on the price of dinners were as unavailing to mend morals and hinder extravagance as the condemnation of schools of rhetoric and modern education APPULEIUS SATURNINUS 387 by the cultured orator L. Crassus, censor 92 B.C., was to prevent the new ideas from leavening" the lump of Roman rudeness. The most salutary feature in the new movement was the spread of the Stoic doctrine among thoughtful men. Saturninus. — The main incidents in the political struggle were, after all, the attacks on the Senate involved in the appointment of the two commissions of inquiry. The first belonged to the story of the Jugurthan war ; the second is connected with the first tribunate of L. Appuleius Saturninus. This notorious man, a sensitive and aspiring nature, as a speaker vehement and vigo- rous, who had been superseded by the Senate in the office of corn-quasstor at Ostia, in favour of Scaurus, the Princeps Senatus, had in his mortification reformed his careless and irregular habits, and flung himself into political life as leader of the opposition. He was not precisely the dangerous and turbulent demagogue he has been painted, but for the next three years he was a most troublesome thorn in the side of the Senate. The acts of his two tribunates are not easy to disentangle. He supported the fourth candidature of Marius (103 B.C.), and apparently proposed, and possibly carried by means of violence, an abortive law for distri- buting land in Africa in large allotments to Marius' Roman and Italian veterans. Lex de Maiestate. — To this year also may have belonged the Lex Appuleia de Maiestate, which was largely the work of his colleague Norbanus. It was primarily directed against the persons responsible for the fiascos and scandals in Gaul, and from it arose the commission which condemned the generals of Arausio. Caepio, contrary to precedent, was actually arrested, and would have suffered death, in spite of the stoutest resistance of his friends, but for the self-sacrifice of a loyal tribune. He, indeed, owed his fall as much perhaps to the anger of the equites, who afterwards acquitted his enemy Norbanus, as to his misconduct in Gaul. Nor- banus was brought under its provisions by a reaction in 94 B.C. ; for, though not intended as a general law, its loose wording could readily be stretched. He was defended by the great orator Antonius on the ground that his violence was excused by the necessities of the time. The expression maiestatem minuere, to impair the honour or diminish the power of Rome, was as elastic as the modern phrase, "conduct calculated to bring the government into contempt." Republished by the Lex Varia of 91 B.C., and ex- tended by the Lex Cornelia of Sulla, this law was the foundation of the imperial statute of treason. But it may have been con- 388 HISTORY OF ROME nected, not with the Gallic commission, but with the Appuleian Corn Law of uncertain date ; and the Ciepio impeached may have been the urban quaestor who, as Secretary of the Treasury, had opposed the measure in the Senate, and, when that body resolved that the law was dangerous to the state, attempted by violence to stop the voting in the Comitia. In that case the law would be designed to fortify the power of the tribune and the party of the populares. Glaucia. — In the interval between Appuleius' two tribunates the censor Metellus Numidicus (102 B.C.) tried to remove from the Senate, on the ground of immorality, Saturninus himself and the favourite street-speaker, C. Servilius Glaucia, denounced by Cicero as a vulgar, shameless, and witty fellow, a sort of Roman Hyper- bolus, but obviously a capable orator and a clever politician. His popular gifts had brought him to the top, with the support of the knights, pleased by his abrogation of the law of Csepio. But the attempt to exclude the opposition leaders, frustrated by his col- league, recoiled on the head of its author. Set upon by Satur- ninus in his house and besieged on the Capitol, Metellus was only rescued by the aid of the equites of the eighteen centuries. Another scandal arose when Appuleius attacked the envoys of Mithradates for bribery, and incurred serious danger by his im- prudent revelations. Marius as a Politician. — The elections for 100 B.C. were marked by grave disturbances. Marius had discharged the army, which he had no idea of using to overthrow the constitution. For that the time was not ripe. He relied on his popularity and the votes of his veterans to gain his ends. Forced into opposition by the aristocracy, circumstances made him the natural leader of a party. The great man of the hour, popular as much by his defects as by his virtues, his head turned by his success, he was called to a part for which he was unfit, and became the instrument of men whose aims he scarcely understood. Accustomed to command, and yet incapable of civil eminence, he clung to his seven predicted consulships, when there was no longer room for him in the state. The frugal plebeian, without tact or taste, was out of his element in Roman society ; the plain soldier had no talent for intrigue, no gift for oratory. Hence, like Pompeius, when he took the constitutional path to his wishes he placed himself in the hands of his party managers. He allied himself with Satur- ninus and Glaucia. The interests and aims of the three men coincided. The result was a squalid version of the Gracchan MAKIUS AND SATURNINUS 389 movement. For the popular party had fallen to pieces. The bottom had been knocked out of many ideals, and the more moderate men were afraid of revolution. Apart from brilliant speakers like Memmius and Crassus, who won their spurs in oppo- sition and passed with place to the government, the only leaders were mortified nobles and noisy obstructionists. Power was now in their grasp and public feeling behind them, but the coalition failed ; the popular idol lost his self-possession on the hustings. Like Pompeius again, he had no political courage ; he wanted to secure a prominent position and rewards for his veterans by constitutional means, a loyal dull man, led astray by ambition and his associates. Only once, on the field of Vercellae, had he shown a disposition to transgress the law, when he promised the fran- chise to some brave Italians, saying afterwards that in the din of battle he could not hear the voice of the laws. He was in a dilemma between his honesty and his ambition, pushed on faster than his ideas could grow, and in the crisis which followed he cannot be acquitted of a duplicity and dishonesty foreign to his nature. His associates, again, with all their skill in party intrigues and mob violence, were too wild and impetuous to conceive or carry out a consistent programme. The Laws of Saturninus. — By canvass and bribery, Marius secured his own election, thwarted the senatorial candidate, Metel- lus, and received a harmless colleague in L. Valerius Flaccus. Glaucia was elected prastor. At the tribunician elections there was an uproar. Saturninus only succeeded in getting the tenth place by the murder of the government candidate, Nonius. The coalition had obtained office by hook or by crook. Their first measure, in itself reasonable, was an agrarian law, which proposed to distribute all the land conquered by the Cimbri, which, on Roman principles, became public land by the defeat of its conquerors, and all avail- able soil in Sicily, Achaia, and Macedon, mainly no doubt for the benefit of the veterans. It opened a side-door to the franchise by including a certain number of Italians in each of the burgess colonies to be founded. Marius was to carry out the assigna- tions and the necessary military work, probably by means of con- tinuous consulships, and would thus enjoy a position of indefinite power. Thus the Gracchan ideas of trans-Alpine extension and colonisation, of the limitation of the Senate, and Italian franchise were resumed, but instead of successive tribunates we have suc- cessive consulates and the rise of the military power. The equites were at first inclined to favour their ancient allies and to support 390 HISTORY OF ROME the soldier who promised to secure vigorous government and commercial expansion. They were never unwilling to curtail the powers of the Senate. The coalition bid for the favour of the people by lowering the price of corn to a purely nominal sum. a measure whose date and fate are, it is true, a little uncertain, but the people remained indifferent or hostile. Saturninus' real support lay in the Marian veterans, for whom the agrarian law provided, and who carried it by violence in the teeth of the omens, the populace, and the nobles. There was a not, in which the rustics and veterans dispersed the urban mob, and even the obstructing tribunes were insulted. To the announcement, as an omen, of an impending thunderstorm Saturninus replied by bidding the Senate beware of the hailstones. The Bill contained a clause designed to enforce its execution, by which the senators must, within five days, swear to observe it on pain of fine and forfeiture of their seat — an in- sulting provision, which, precisely reversing the constitutional practice, prevented any discussion or amendment. Marius be- haved in a strange way. At first he refused compliance, and was followed by the Senate ; but when the appointed time had almost lapsed, he summoned the Senate, declared that he was afraid of the people, and took the oath to respect the law " in so far as it was legal," hoping by this device to satisfy the veterans and leave himself a loophole of escape. The Senate accepted the oath with the same proviso, with the solitary exception of Metellus, who alone maintained his self-respect and left Rome to study philosophy in exile. The action of the Senate in taking the oath and sacrificing their leader was fatal to its authority. Failure and Death of Saturninus. — To carry out the law meant the re-election of the coalition. Saturninus, indeed, was elected to a third tribunate, and with him a pseudo-Gracchus, an impostor, who, in spite of Marius himself, was released from prison and raised to office by the people. But the consular elections ended in confusion. The orator Antonius had been chosen for one ; for the second place, C. Memmius, the renegade, was illegally opposed by Glaucia, who, as praetor of the year, was ineligible. Memmius was publicly murdered by bravos, and the next day there was an appeal to arms. On the one side stood the rustics and veterans, whipped up from the country, with whose aid Saturninus and Glaucia seized the Capitol, at the same time opening the prisons and summoning the slaves. On the other were the optimates, with their clients, and the equites of the eighteen centuries, with their armed slaves. The Senate summoned Marius to interfere, PALL OF MAR1US 391 and empowered the magistrates to use force. Reluctantly he prepared to attack his friends. They had gone too far, and the consul must either stamp out riot or proclaim revolution. The Senate turned out en masse; the tottering Scaurus, the aged augur ScEevola, donned their disused armour. The city was guarded within and without. There was a battle in the Forum, the first fought in Rome ; the rebels were driven to the Capitol, and when Marius cut off the water, finally surrendered. Hoping to save them, he placed them in the Curia Hostilia, but when the young nobles stormed the roof and pelted the prisoners to death he was forced to let them perish. Fall of Marius (Dec. io, 100) — In the massacre fell four officers of the Roman people, with other men of note, and with them fell the power and credit of Marius. The cause of the disaster lay partly in the vacillation and incompetence of Marius, who could neither control nor support his associates, partly in the reckless and riotous conduct of Saturninus and Glaucia, which alarmed the wealthier classes and consolidated the opposition. Men were ready to support a strong and upright man in cleansing the ad- ministration, but not to sacrifice material interests to military rowdyism and mob rule. Marius himself was half afraid of his allies, and wished to gain his own ends and wash his hands of the consequences. He is even said, on one occasion, to have passed from room to room of his house, like a man in a comedy, negotiating alternately with senators and conspirators. In the end his colleagues went on without him. They were not prepared to work without wages. For them to resign was destruction. But the murder of Memmius was a blunder ; it forced Marius' hand. Outmanoeuvred by his opponents, and compromised by his friends, he was forced to cut away his own supports, and fell at once, unhonoured, unregretted, unattacked. The coalition had been smashed. The equites drew towards the Senate as the sole hope of order ; Metellus returned in triumph ; a protesting tribune was murdered by the crowd ; the victor of Vercellae, afraid to stand for the censorship, withdrew to the East, and came back to find himself a nonentity, to nurse ambition and meditate revenge in his perverted soul. The populares were scattered ; some fled even to Pontus to join Mithradates. The Appuleian laws were cancelled, and when the tribune Titius, a paltry ape of Saturninus, attempted to revive the Agrarian Bill in 99 B.C., not only was it annulled on religious pretexts, but the tribune and other demo- crats were zealously convicted by the equestrian courts, Norbanus 392 HISTORY OF ROME himself barely escaping because he had punished the hated Caspio. Slave-rising in Sicily. — The fall of Marius left the government in a strong position at home. Abroad there was little to do, and that little was more efficiently done. A rising in Spain was vigorously suppressed (97-93 B.C., vide supra, p. 372), and the year 99 B.C. saw the end of a dangerous insurrection in Sicily. It had resembled its predecessor in all its incidents except its immediate cause. Once more there had been a general ferment among the slaves. Serious riots had occurred at Nuceria and Capua, and at Thurii an enamoured and indebted knight, T. Vettius, to gain his love and escape his creditors, raised a revolt, called himself king, and required the arts and arms of a praetor to crush his mad outbreak. In Attica the slaves and convicts who worked the silver-mines mutinied, and, above all, in Sicily the old causes, lax police, cruel masters, and the excessive numbers of the slaves, produced the old effects. Feeling first found vent when P. Licinius Nerva, the governor, in obedience to a decree of the Senate (B.C. 104), took measures to release free men kidnapped and sent to the planta- tions by pirates or publicani. This decree was due to a statement of Nicomedes II. of Bithynia, in reply to a demand for auxiliaries, that his able-bodied men had been mostly kidnapped. The Senate directed the governor to see to the matter, and Nerva had in consequence set at liberty 800 men. But, frightened by the remonstrances of the aggrieved slave-holders and the excite- ment among the slaves, he suspended action, with the result that the expectant and defrauded suitors fled from Syracuse to sanc- tuary. But the rising was nipped in the bud with the aid of an escaped convict and popular brigand who betrayed the runaways. Tryphon and Athenio.— Suppressed for the moment, it broke out in another place. The defeat of a detachment from Enna gave the insurgents arms and encouragement. Once more there were no effective troops, and the wretched and ruined labourers supported the slaves, the miserable instruments of their own decay. Oncemore a juggling prophet called Salvius was declared king by the Syrians, and took the name of Tryphon, after the slave who had usurped the crown of Syria (142 B.C.). Order and discipline were introduced, and with a powerful force the king took the offensive, fell upon Morgantia, and defeated a relieving army, dispersing the Greek militia, who flung away their arms to save their skins. The town was rescued by the courage of the domestic slaves, whose promised freedom was afterwards refused. In the west, Athenio, a Cilician SLAVE-WARS 393 brigand chief, repeated the part of Cleon. A skilful soldier, a star-reader and dealer in the supernatural, he headed the revolt, organised an army, enforced discipline, and by his ability and clemency earned popularity and success. To the disappointment of the Romans, he submitted to the king. The rebels fortified their headquarters in a strong position called Triocala, in the centre of the island, where Tryphon paraded his royalty as an Eastern despot with Roman insignia. They failed in their attacks on the towns, notably at Lilybasum, but with the help of the free labourers they controlled the plains and spread famine and misery through the land. Even in the towns, with the aid of African contingents, the masters, cut off from their estates, barely controlled the slaves inside. In 103 B.C., in spite of the Cimbric disasters, the government scraped together a mixed force, contain- ing few Italian troops, under L. Lucullus, who gained a victory near Scirthaea over an enemy 40,000 strong. But his negligence or his losses prevented his following it up. He was forced to retire from Triocala, and was afterwards condemned on a charge of peculation. He was succeeded in 102 B.C. by Servilius, who did nothing, and received the reward of his predecessor. Tryphon appears to have died ; but Athenio, who had been left for dead at Scirthaea, revived, and ranged the island unimpeded, nearly captur- ing Messana by surprise. At last, in 101 B.C., M'. Aquillius, the consul, defeated and slew Athenio in single combat, stormed the strongholds, and after two years' hard fighting, pacified the island. The Pirates. — There had been five years of misery, outrage, and anarchy. Sicilv, stripped of its labourers, desolated by ravage, slowly recovered under a short spell of liberal government ; but the old evils were not cured. The administration of the provinces, with rare exceptions, remained what it had been, while the state of the seas was so bad that even this government was obliged to deal with it. In 103 B.C. M. Antonius, the praetor, was sent out with proconsular powers, and a fleet raked together from the allies, to Cilicia, where he destroyed the ships and castles of the buc- caneers. By the occupation of certain positions in the rugged Western Cilicia along the coast, a beginning was made of a pro- vince in that reg-ion ; but the solitary effort was ill sustained, and the pirates reasserted their sovereignty of the sea. The East. — In the East, as in Spain, the Senate was acting with rather more vigour. Ptolemy Apion, natural son of Physcon ( Ptolemy Euergetes II.), who had received Cyrene in 117 B.C., on the death of his father, as a separate appanage, died in 96 B.C. and be- 394 HISTORY OR ROME queathed his kingdom to Rome. The Senate accepted the legacy, but while exercising a nominal supervision from Utica, declared the Greek cities, Cyrene, Ptolemais, and Berenice free, and did not create a regular province till 75 B.C. This curious mixture of in- trigue and negligence, which evaded the responsibility of annexation, while it checked the aggrandisement of Egypt, handed over the important commercial district to intestine strife. It was a more vigorous act when, in 92 B.C., Sulla, the rising man of the senatorial party, was sent, as governor of Cilicia, to check the pirates and settle the affairs of the East. By his resource and audacity he restrained for a time the aggressions of Mithradates and imposed respect on Parthia. CHAPTER XXXVIII THE LAWS OF DRUSUS B.C. A.U-C. Lex Cecilia Didia against Tacking . . ... 98 656 Lex Licinia Mucia alienates the Italians 95 659 Tribunate and Murder of Drusus ...... 91 663 Lex Caecilia Didia. — The failure of Saturninus was naturally followed by a strong reaction. The spectre of anarchy had frightened the capitalists and broken up the purely political alli- ance invented by the vindictive genius of C. Gracchus. In 98 B.C. the government was strong enough to carry through the Lex Ccecilia Didia, proposed by the consuls Q. Metellus Nepos and a ?iovics homo, T. Didius, designed to prevent hasty legislation and the combination of different measures in a single Bill. Itself an example of the abuse it aimed at checking, it provided for an interval of a Roman fortnight between the introduction and passing of a Bill {trinundinum = seventeen days), which, however inade- quate for the discussion of a complicated statute, would at least prevent the scandalous surprises sprung on an ignorant assembly, while it forbade the so-called practice of tacking — legem per saturam ferre — which compelled a legislative body to accept what it did not want, under pain of losing what it did. But the improve- ment came too late and was indeed too slight to affect the increasing oscillation of power and contempt for law, which were the results of weak government, of the degradation of the Comitia, and of the statesmanship of party manoeuvre. LEX LIC INI A MUCIA 395 In the same year Aquillius was acquitted of manifest extor- tions in Sicily, saved by his services and the rhetoric of Antonius. The Italians and the Lex Licinia Mucia. — In 95 B.C. the consuls were the great orator L. Crassus, who failed to scrape a coveted triumph by harrying the Alpine glens, and the great lawyer of a family of lawyers, Q. Mucius Scaevola, Pontifex Maximus, an able, upright, legally minded man. To these two distinguished persons was due the blunder of a mistimed and severe re-enact- ment of the old laws against aliens, intended to prevent the irregular voting and undue influence of Italians in the Comitia. The Lex Licinia Mucia created violent irritation among the allies by prohibiting non-citizens from claiming or exercising the fran- chise, by inquiring into the status of resident aliens, and probably by expelling those who usurped the right. Natural as it may have seemed, useful even to the depopulated townships of the allies, legal as it undoubtedly was, and favourable as the moment ap- peared, the law came as a cruel shock after the patriotic exertions of the Cimbric war, after the hopes so often raised, after the use made of the Italians by both parties in turn. It ended every expec- tation of a liberal policy. Its explicit provisions reduced Rome's faithful allies, without distinction, to the status of aliens, and strictly punished all transgressors. Crassus, the popular accuser of Carbo, the supporter of the colony at Narbonne, the independent and moderate optimate, the ally of Drusus in his attack on the equestrian courts, a re- spected and cautious statesman, and Scasvola, the honest governor, the pattern of rectitude, thoughtful and temperate in policy, no doubt hoped to purify the elections, and, as constitutional lawyers, saw the inevitable results of civic expansion, and meant to maintain existing forms. But the indignation caused by this law was one of the most important antecedents of the Social War. As yet its effect was not apparent. Quarrel between the Senate and the Equites. — Attention was absorbed by the imminent struggle between the Senate and equites, which broke the nine years' interval of peace. The alliance of equites and democrats being dissolved, and the mob, if duly humoured, being at the disposal of the Senate, it only required some scandal exciting public indignation to sweep away the judicial privileges of the knights, who, through the court of ex- tortions, controlled the governors abroad and hampered the Senate at home. It was this which the majority of that body proposed to themselves in supporting the reforms of Drusus — 396 HISTORY OF ROME freedom from blackmail and vexatious proceedings, and the re- storation of their privileges. The opportunity arose from the condemnation (in 92 B.C.) of the able and upright administrator P. Rutilius Rufus, adjutant and friend of the lawyer Q. Mucius Scasvola, the exemplary governor of Asia. Both had earned the deadly hatred of the publicani and the approbation of the Senate by their defence of the provincials and punishment of outrage ; but vengeance fell alone on the less well-friended soldier, the plain Stoic, who despised the artifices of the advocates, and died in honoured and lettered exile at Smyrna. This gross miscarriage of justice, an infamous conviction on a charge preferred by an infamous informer, filled the cup of equestrian misconduct. All who were indignant at the plunder of the provinces were ready to join in an attack which promised at the same time to restore independence to their order. Livius Drusus. — The assault was headed by M. Livius Drusus, tribune of 91 B.C., an enigmatical character whose policy and actions remain a mystery. Emphatically a noble of a conservative family, the son of Gracchus' opponent, a man of good position and large fortune, proud, earnest, ardent, direct, lavish of public and private resources, respected indeed for his high aims and strong per- sonality, but popular neither with weak-kneed senators nor lazy paupers, he had no political tact, no skill in party manoeuvres, and little capacity for guiding men or controlling movements. Among his supporters were Scaurus, the orator Crassus, the augur Sca^vola, the reformer Sulpicius Rufus, and generally the moderate conservatives of the Senate. He was bitterly opposed by the shifty consul L. Marcius Philippus, once spokesman of the demo- crats, and author of a confiscatory land law, now the voice of the equites, destined to be a democratic censor, and finally a Sullan renegade ; by the violent, reactionary Q. Caspio, son of the Tolosa man, and by all the ultra-Tories. His programme of conservative reform on Gracchan lines was borrowed from both parties ; he meant to trump the enemy's cards by utilising their measures for the benefit of the Senate. His main ideas were two — the reconstitution of the Senate and the extension of the franchise to the Italians. To carry these through, and possibly with a hope of checking pauperism, he was prepared to bribe the populace with corn and land, and, while steering clear of assassination and riot, to use, if necessary, the strong hand. The Leges Liviae. — Therefore, keeping for the moment the franchise in the background, he brought forward a Lex Frumcn- LAWS OF DRUSUS 397 taria, probably increasing the doles (covering the expense by depreciation of the coinage), and an Agrarian Law, perhaps pro- viding for the establishment of the colonies promised by his father in 122 B.C. To these was tacked a Lex iudiciaria, involving a sort of compromise between the Senate and the equites. He proposed to institute a new Album iudicum of 300 senators and 300 knights, possibly at the same time raising the selected knights to the dignity of senators to recruit the now emaciated ranks of the order. He also provided a court for the investiga- tion of judicial corruption. This law, if intended to conciliate interests by the creation of senators and the division of powers, was not likely to succeed. The equites lost at least half their privileges, were bitterly opposed to the clause that made jurors amenable to justice, and were not appeased by a concession which they regarded as a snare. The new senators would be popular with neither order. Contrary to the law of 98 B.C., and in the teeth of the equites and their agent Philippus, the laws were carried en bloc, with the lukewarm sup- port of the irresolute Senate. There were violent scenes in the Forum and violent discussions in the House, which refused at first to desert its leader and annul the laws. Philippus, who had publicly declared that with such a Senate government was impos- sible, and that "he must look out for other advisers," was vehe- mently arraigned by Crassus, who died with suspicious suddenness after his great effort, and censured by a formal resolution. In the Assembly both he and Crepio met with rude handling from the city mob and the poorer Italians, who flocked in to support their known friend by intimidation and irregular votes. Failure and Death of Drusus. — But Drusus, with his tatters of borrowed policy, had no force behind him, and when he tried to carry through his great measure of Italian franchise his allies failed him. Uneasiness had already shown itself; his power dwindled as the year went on. The mob, fickle in its attach- ments, was consistent in its refusal to lower the money value of its franchise. In the Senate the majority was keen for privilege, ready to bribe, readier still, in the tribune's words, to leave nothing for an agitator to divide but ccclum aid ccenum, by doing his work for their own profit ; the minority was not unfavourable to enfran- chisement as a measure of safety, which brought allies and evaded dangers at a trifling cost, but no one was prepared for a serious political struggle on behalf of a man whom they suspected perhaps as much as they respected. Gradually were spread about sus- 398 HISTORY OF ROME picious rumours — possibly canards — based on the known Italian sympathies and connections of Drusus, rumours of a far-reaching Italian conspiracy, whose partisans were bound to the Roman tribune by a solemn personal oath. The cuckoo-cry of treason was raised. Only the honour of Drusus had prevented the murder of the consul at the Latin games. An armed band, marching on Rome to coerce the Senate and co-operate with the tribune, had been with difficulty turned back. The form of oath was circulated. At once the old exclusiveness was up in arms ; the timid progres- sives ratted ; Senate and consul were reconciled. With stern dis- dain Drusus acquiesced in the annulment of his illegally passed laws by the body he sought to defend. The loss and the danger were theirs, and theirs the responsibility. They were making their own beds. In the same spirit he cried, when he fell at the door of his house, struck by an assassin's hand in the dusk of evening, " Ecquandnne similem mei civem habebit respublica ? " Indeed, the failure of the unpractical, large-hearted man in his attack on capitalism and civic prejudice, while it shattered the last hopes of the foiled and frustrated allies, drove one more nail in the coffin of senatorial government. The weakness of his friends more than the strength of his foes was too much for him, as had been the case with the Gracchi, between whom and their conservative successor there is little to choose in singleness of purpose, in poli- tical tactics, and reforming ideas, save that the one acted as the patron of a decaying Senate, the others as champions of a decayed Comitia. His supporters had more credit than power, more dis- cretion than courage ; the forces of selfishness and laissez-faire were against him ; even the Italians in each community were divided in interests, the Romanising aristocracy of landowners against the patriotic but needy and half-suppressed populace. As to himself, we cannot decide if his ultimate aim was the reconstitution of the Senate, or if he bought up all forces to support his Italian policy ; nor can we reconcile his refusal to protect his laws with his apparent readiness to use physical force, and even civil war. He was a man clearly of better intentions and larger ideas than he had political ability or good fortune. The mysterious death of their hero was felt deeply by the Italians, who now prepared in earnest for the war which Drusus hoped to avert. The usual reaction followed at Rome. A tribune, Q. Varius, an agent of the equites, carried by intimidation a Lex de Maiesia/e, from which issued a court of inquiry into the alleged conspiracy. Whether the moderates had or had not been tamper- FAILURE OF DRUSUS 399 ing with the Italians, the bare suspicion of intrigue afforded an excellent handle for removing opponents and punishing the Senate. The report of ferments in Italy and the outbreak of the revolt sharpened the edge of the charge. Trials of eminent men went on through 91 and 90 B.C. Bestia and C. Cotta were exiled ; Antonius the orator and Pompeius Strabo were attacked ; old Scaurus, impeached once more, was content with the triumphant sally — " A Spaniard accuses Scaurus, Princeps Senatus, of treason Scaurus denies the charge. Romans, which do you believe ?" By a not uncommon irony, Varius, informer and suspected assassin, perished later by his own law. CHAPTER XXXIX THE SOCIAL WAR n.c. a.u.c Outbreak at Asculum - . . . 91 663 North : Defeat of Rutilius Lupus — Retirement of Marius — South : L Julius Caesar driven from Campania — Lex Julia . . 9° 664 Pompeius Strabo puts down the Insurrection in the North and settles Cisalpine Gaul — Sulla defeats the Samnites — Lex Plautia Papiria — The Varian Commission restored — Economic Crisis and Murder of the Pragtor Asellio . . 89 665 End of the Social War 88 666 Importance of the War. — The Social War was perhaps the most dangerous conflict in which Rome had as yet engaged. No Gallic tumultus, not even " dims Hannibal" himself, brought her power so low or forced from humbled arrogance a recantation of policy, while a victorious enemy yet held the field. The allies had they succeeded finally, would scarcely have been content with the exaction of their just claims. The separatist spirit, exas- perated by an obstinate struggle, would have undone the work of centuries and broken up with the power of Rome the unity of Italy. At best it would have substituted a loose federation, in- capable of preserving the provincial empire and the widespread influence of Rome. As it was, its effects were deeply felt in the history of Italy and the world, and in this lies the interest of the war, of whose course and events we have scanty and fragmen- tary information utterly disproportioned to its deadly nature and real importance. To the statesmen and leaders who brought it to a successful close, and above all to the commanding genius of the 400 HISTORY OF ROME soldier Sulla, Rome owes a debt whose magnitude is concealed by the veil with which time and natural feeling have shrouded a calamitous and unnecessary schism. Occasion of the War. — The immediate causes of the war lay no doubt in the failure of the plans of Drusus, which destroyed the last hope of constitutional agitation, in well-founded alarms for the future due to the Varian Commission and to the restoration of the equites and reactionaries to power, in the negligence of the unsus- pecting Senate and the explosion of popular feeling at Asculum in Picenum. Thither, when the Senate, vaguely aware of restless movement and unwonted intercourse among the allies, had caused secret inquiries to be made by its agents in the various com- munities, came the Roman pnetor Servilius with proconsular power and attended by a legate. He had been informed that the Asculans were exchanging hostages, and now, happening upon a meeting" of the people in the theatre to celebrate the games, by a vehement reprimand he so kindled the passions of his audience that they tore him and his suite to pieces, and sealed the declaration of war by the murder of resident Romans. The hands of the leaders were forced and the revolt spread like wild- fire. Whatever conspiracy may have existed in the name of Drusus and the franchise, the deep disappointment of his death at any rate must have strengthened everywhere the faction of the secessionists against the moderates. Mutual understandings be- came definite treaties ; old associations were revived ; old tribal connections, reduced by Roman policy to religious formalities, sprang again to life. Even wider alliances were contemplated ; DENARIUS OF THE CONFEDERATES — TAKING THE OATH ; HEAD OF ITALIA. armed and drilled troops the allies possessed in the contingents liable for Roman service. The movement, some time in progress, was only precipitated by the revolt of Asculum, CAUSES OF THE SOCIAL WAR 40 1 Causes of the Social War. — For the real causes of the war lay far deeper. The strength of the Roman organisation of Italy had been in its skilful combination of the principle of autonomy with the ascendency of the paramount state. The commercial and political isolation of each city from its neighbours was compensated by its direct connection with Rome, as an immediate ally. By a dexterous use of the franchise and a wise graduation of privileges she had secured a divergency of interest between communities of different status, thus creating no uniform level of servitude, but an ascending scale of subjection. This system was fortified in a political sense by the maintenance of aristocratical governments in each city, whose members were attached by various privileges to Roman interests, and in a military sense by the formation of roads, protected at strategical points by powerful fortresses, whose citizens possessed Latin rights and were doubly bound to allegiance by the ties of interest and personal danger. At the same time the enjoyment of national languages and customs, of local rights and liberties, was ensured, peace maintained, the barbarian repelled, and commerce protected, while Roman conquest opened fresh fields for speculation and enterprise. In earlier times free ad- mission to a foreign franchise, involving the loss of local rights, could be no object to any community, but only to those individuals who should migrate to Roman townships. But when the value of the franchise rose with the rise of Rome and relative decline of the allied states, and there came a growing disinclination to admit new-comers, friction was set up. It was not so much the civic as the material advantages that were in question. In the city-state, with the principle of direct voting in collective assemblies, the extension of the franchise over a wide area was useless to its recipients, who could only vote on the rarest occasions, and added to the difficulties of good municipal government. The gain in new blood was small. But the decay of local politics inevitably drove the more ambitious spirits in Italy to covet a share in imperial business ; their restricted career in the local contingents galled the hearts of able soldiers. To men familiar with Rome the closing of the franchise and expulsion from the capital were a bitter grievance. The middle and lower classes resented their increas- ing burdens, the costly cavalry service, the enlarged contingents of infantry, the severity of martial law, the unfair distribution of land and booty, the exclusion from cheap corn, salt, and allotments. The Senate and people, instead of carrying on the work of gradual assimilation, had unwisely obliterated the distinction of 2 C 4 o2 HISTORY OF ROME Latin, ally, and subject, had closed the doors of the franchise and expelled resident aliens, had permitted their officers to lord it over the Italians in defiance of law and right, and suppressed all protests with contumely and violence. Terrible stories of outrage circulated from town to town. The claims of the allies, acknowledged as just by the best men of all parties, had been a tool in the hands of each party in turn. Every scheme of reform had been shattered on the short-sighted selfishness of reactionary nobles, jealous capitalists, and grudging paupers. Hope had been raised to the highest by the conversion of the majority of the Senate. The failure of this hope meant insurrection. Division of Feeling. — But among the subjects there were divi- sions of interest and feeling. Those districts whose position made the exercise of the franchise possible would be satisfied with this concession ; the wealthy landowners of Etruria and Umbria, where the agricultural depression had effectually destroyed the yeoman farmer, secure in their lordship by the favour of Rome, checked the first movement of revolt among their serfs. In Samntum and Lucania, less penetrated by Latin language and ideas, retaining still the old traditions of farmer life and civic equality, the national spirit, enkindled by the war, turned the demand for equal rights into a battle for national independence. In the particular states, again, even where there was most unity of feeling and action, there are traces of party struggles. Here and there a town like the Vestinian Pinna, or a corps like that of Magius of ^Eclanum, did yeoman service for Rome. The ruling nobilities must often have nursed pro-Roman sympathies, and divided counsels weakened the forces of insurrection. The Latin fortresses remained, in the first instance, loyal. Cam- pania, with Capua as a magazine, served as a second basis and source of revenue and supplies. Neapolis, Rhegium, and the other Greek cities would not sacrifice their favoured position to support their ancient enemies. They provided the nucleus of a fleet, and secured the communications by sea of the Southern armies. From the provinces Rome drew light infantry, archers, and cavalry, ships and supplies. She had the advantage of a central position, an organised constitution, and the tradition of victory. She fought on inner lines, with a power of concentrated action, against a hastily improvised confederacy, without coherence or established form. It was only the sloth of her government and the incapacity of her generals which dissipated her strength by Hmv <£■ Leinh,'