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America 
 and the Canal Title 
 
 OR 
 
 An examination, sifting and interpreta- 
 tion of the data bearing on the wresting 
 of the Province of Panama from the 
 Repyhlic of Colombia by the Roosevelt 
 Administration in 1903 in order to secure 
 title to the Canal Zone 
 
 BY 
 JOSEPH C. FREEHOFF, Ph.D. 
 
 Statiatician with the Public Service CommiBsion 
 for New York City 
 
 PUBLISHED BY THE AUTHOR 
 
 373 Fourth Avenue (Room 806) 
 NEW YORK 
 
F3s 
 
 ',-1, /s^"^ ^ 
 
 Copyright, 1916 
 
 by 
 
 Joseph C. Fbeebopt 
 
 J, F. TAPLEY CO. 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
DEDICATED 
 TO 
 
 JOHN FREEHOFF 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Preface i 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 I Clear 4;he Enterprise of Every Stain ... 15 
 
 II Roosevelt's Article — " The Panama Blackmail 
 
 Treaty" 32 
 
 ^III President Roosevelt Attempted to Coerce 
 
 Colombia 104 
 
 , IV The " Vaudeville " Revolution on the Isthmus 138 
 
 V Violation of the Treaty of 1846 .... 214 
 
 VI President Roosevelt " Took " the Canal Zone 255 , 
 
 VII Acting as the Mandatory of Civilization . .310 
 
 APPENDICES 
 
 I From President Roosevelt's Message to Con- 
 gress — December 7, 1903 351 
 
 II President Roosevelt's Message to the Con- 
 gress — January 4, 1904 366 
 
PREFACE 
 
 In this book the writer shows that the Roose- \ 
 velt Administration in 1903 collaborated with a 
 small party of separatists on the Isthmus, Bunau- 
 Varilla acting as intetmediary, for the purpose of 
 devising a plan to wrest the Canal Zone and lit- , 
 toral from the Republic of Colombia by force, and | 
 that it gave assurance to these separatists that/ 
 it would protect secession in Panama. It did aci. 
 tually do the latter. In doing so, it ( i ) violated \ 
 international law, (2) violated the Treaty of ; 
 1846, and (3) rent asunder a sister republic. — ' 
 
 The critical reader will want to know how the 
 damaging evidence found in this book that is not 
 in the nature of an original official document 
 was obtained. This has, of course, a bearing on 
 its credibility. It was obtained through rogatory 
 proceedings, instituted by the New York World 
 on the Isthmus while preparing its defense for 
 libel in an action brought against it by the Federal 
 Government. It is, therefore, sworn testimony 
 in part wrenched from unwilling witnesses in a 
 
2 Preface 
 
 court of record. This testimony corroborates the 
 inferences suggested by official documents pub- 
 lished by our Government. 
 
 It is the mature judgment of the writer that in 
 the conferences between the Roosevelt Adminis- 
 tration and the separatists the following were the 
 important provisions that were agreed to: 
 '''" I. The separatists were to persuade ($, $) the 
 military and political representatives of Colombia 
 on the Isthmus to cooperate in the secession of the 
 Province of Panama, and, in addition, they were 
 V to arrange to take over its civil government. 
 
 2. Our Government was to recognize the new 
 republic not later than forty-eight hours after the 
 Declaration of Independence, and to prevent Co- 
 lombia from landing troops on the Isthmus to re- 
 store her sovereignty. 
 
 It is proper that we should offset this sweeping 
 indictment of our then Administration with an 
 excerpt from an article by Roosevelt which ap- 
 peared in The Outlook on October 7, 191 1 : 
 
 On December 7, 1903, and again on January 4, 1904, 
 as President of the United States, in messages to the two 
 Houses of Congress, I set forth in full and in detail every 
 essential fact connected with the recognition of the Re- 
 public of Panama, the negotiation of a treaty with that 
 Republic for building the Panama Canal, and the actions 
 which led up to that negotiation— actions without which 
 
Preface 3 
 
 the canal could not have been built, and would not now 
 have been even begun. Not one important fact was omit- 
 ted, and no fact of any importance bearing upon the actions 
 or negotiations of the representatives of the United States 
 not there set forth has been, or ever will be, discovered^^ 
 simply because there is none to discover. It must be a 
 matter of pride to every honest American, proud of the 
 good name of his country, that the acquisition of the canal 
 and the building of the canal, in all their details, were as 
 free from scandal as the public acts of George Washington 
 and Abraham Lincoln. 
 
 It is a matter of keen disappointment to well- 
 informed Americans of high character that there 
 is no resemblance at all between the public acts of 
 George Washington and of Abraham Lincoln on 
 the one hand and those of the Roosevelt Adminis- 
 tration in the taking of the Canal Zone, on the 
 other hand. Of no public act of either Washing- 
 ton or Lincoln can anything like the following be 
 said: 
 
 I am interested in the Panama Canal because I started 
 it. If I had followed traditional, conservative methods I 
 would have submitted a dignified state paper of probably 
 two hundred pages to Congress, and the debate on it would 
 have been going on yet ; but i took the canal zone and 
 let Congress debate, and while the debate goes on, the 
 canal does also. 
 
 The writer has included in the appendix that 
 portion of the message of December 7, 1903, 
 which deals with the events on the Isthmus, and 
 
4 Preface 
 
 the entire message of January 4, 1904. Roose- 
 velt has stated in the first excerpt above that they 
 contain the final word on the subject — all that is 
 knowable and all that will ever be known. The 
 writer hopes that before reading this book the 
 reader will carefully study Roosevelt's full state- 
 ment in these messages. 
 
 Inasmuch as Roosevelt's article in the Metro- 
 politan Magazine for February, 191 5, entitled: 
 "The Panama Blackmail Treaty," is presumably 
 his complete statement against ratification of the 
 pending treaty with Colombia, the writer felt that 
 its incorporation in the appendix of this book was 
 required in order to give as fully as possible the 
 other side of the controversy. He, therefore, re- 
 quested permission to reproduce it. The follow- 
 ing inconclusive letter from the Managing Edi- 
 tor of the magazine is the only communication 
 received in reply: 
 
 Replying to yours of July 24th, in which you request 
 permission to reprint from the Metropolitan Magazine 
 Colonel Roosevelt's article on "The Panama Blackmail 
 Treaty," I am unable to give you that permission with- 
 out first consulting Colonel Roosevelt. As soon as he 
 returns from the West I will take the matter up with 
 him and let you know. 
 
 The writer intended to set over against his own 
 statement the full statement of Roosevelt. Per- 
 
Preface 5 
 
 mission to reproduce the mentioned article not 
 having been granted Roosevelt's side of the con- 
 troversy is not fully stated. 
 
 President Wilson, in an address delivered be- 
 fore the Chamber of Commerce of the United 
 States on February 3, 19 15, stated the method em- 
 ployed by the writer in the examination of our 
 title to the Canal Zone. It is contained in the 
 following excerpt : 
 
 I agreed with a colleague of mine in the cabinet the 
 other day that we had never before in our lives attended 
 a school to compare with that we were now attending 
 for the purpose of gaining a liberal education. 
 
 Of course, I learn a great many things that are not so, 
 but the interesting thing about that is this : Things that 
 are not so do not match. If you hear enough of them, 
 you see there is no pattern whatever ; it is a crazy quilt. 
 Whereas, the truth always matches, piece by piece, with 
 other parts of the truth. No man can lie consistently, 
 and he cannot lie abovit everything if he talks to you 
 long. I would guarantee that if enough liars talked to 
 you, you would get the truth ; because the parts that they 
 did not invent would match one another, and the parts 
 that they did invent would not match one another. Talk 
 long enough, therefore, and see the connections clearly 
 enough, and you can patch together the case as a whole. 
 
 A great mass of evidence was sifted in order to 
 penetrate through plausible falsehoods to basal 
 f^cts. The sifted evidence was marshaled and 
 carefully weighted. It is reproduced lar^ly in 
 
6 Preface 
 
 the form of quotations with the connecting nexus 
 in the form of inferences and conclusions supplied 
 by the writer. It is the first comprehensive ac- 
 count in book form of the events connected with 
 our acquisition of the Canal Zone. 
 
 The conclusions expressed are based on the quo- 
 tations found here and there throughout the book. 
 Moreover, they are not always solely based on the 
 quotations in connection with which the con- 
 clusion is expressed. Viewed thus broadly the 
 writer is convinced that every conclusion is war- 
 ranted. It was his purpose : 
 
 Nothing [to] extenuate, 
 
 Nor to set down aught in malice. 
 
 The data bearing on the taking of the Canal 
 Zone by our Government are widely scattered, 
 and, therefore, inaccessible to the general reader. 
 Those which, so to speak, mirror this chapter of 
 our history are assembled in this book, which thus 
 makes them accessible to the public. 
 
 The significant facts have been assembled and 
 sifted in our search to determine whether we have 
 a clear title to the Canal Zone. They unmistak- 
 ably show that it was taken by force. The pay- 
 ments to our partner in crime do not clear the 
 title of its stain. It is stolen. Gilding the polit- 
 
Preface 7 
 
 ical crime with the gloss of fine words does not re- 
 move the national disgrace. 
 
 This is a subject on which one is not warranted 
 in expressing an opinion unless he has critically- 
 examined the available evidence. Only the per- 
 son who has a message and can present it without 
 prejudice is entitled to ask audience. Therefore, 
 he who speaks on the subject should state his 
 credentials. In this instance, credentials take the 
 form of political affiliations. The writer voted 
 for Roosevelt for Vice-President in 1900 (in Wis- 
 consin), supported him for President in 1904 (in, 
 New York), and in the Republican primary of 
 1912. After the Republican convention at Chi- 
 cago he joined the Progressive Party and is now 
 a member of that party. 
 
 The writer's interest in Roosevelt dates from 
 the picturesque support that the latter gave to 
 Senator Edmunds for President in the Republi- 
 can national convention of 1884. At the time, 
 Roosevelt was featured in the west as a young 
 Lochinvar of the east valiantly fighting the battle 
 of political righteousness. His vigorous support 
 of Edmunds won the writer's boyhood fancy. 
 
 It now seems that there had grown up in the 
 west a Roosevelt myth commencing with the con- 
 vention named, which he attended as one of the 
 
8 Preface 
 
 big four of New York. His conduct always 
 seemed to be in harmony with exalted moral pur- 
 pose. Social well-being seemed to be the goal 
 toward which he steered with unerring precision. 
 This was the writer's estimate of Roosevelt when 
 the repeal of the tolls-exemption provisions of the 
 Panama Canal Act became a national issue. 
 
 A critical study of the financial policy that the 
 Hay-Pauncefote treaty imposes on the United 
 States in the management of the Panama Canal, 
 and that is imposed on the country by the nature 
 of the enterprise, coupled with an exhaustive 
 study of the method employed to secure the Canal 
 Zone, convinced the writer that the attitude of 
 Roosevelt was foreign to the requirements of na- 
 tional honor. 
 
 It may be urged that citations which justify the 
 course pursued by the Roosevelt Administratioil 
 have been omitted from this volume. The fol- 
 lowing excerpt from the pen of Secretary Hay is 
 typical : 
 
 Any charge that this Government, or any responsible 
 member of it, held intercourse, whether official or unof- 
 ficial, with agents of revolution in Colombia, is utterly; 
 without justffication. ' 
 
 Equally so is the insinuation that any action of this 
 Government, prior to the revolution in Panama, was the 
 result of complicity with the plans of the revolutionists,. 
 
Preface g 
 
 The Department sees fit to make these denials, and it 
 makes them finally. 
 
 Roosevelt cites the following from Secretary 
 Hay as of controlling importance : 
 
 The action of the President in the Panama matter is 
 not only in the strictest accordance with the best prece- 
 dents of our public policy, but it was the only course he 
 could have taken in compliance with our treaty rights 
 and obligations. 
 
 These statements of the late lamented Secre- 
 tary Hay have not survived the scrutiny of his- 
 torical criticism. All commtmications of similar 
 character have crumbled before the searchlight of 
 truth and historical method for separating truth 
 and falsehood. \ 
 
 William Roscoe Thayer published in Harper's 
 Magazine for July, 191 5, a sympathetic article on 
 the connection of the Roosevelt Administration 
 with the Isthmian events in the fall of 1903, which 
 resulted in our securing the Canal Zone. The 
 following excerpts are apropos: 
 
 From the moment of Mr. Roosevelt's accession the 
 State Department felt a new impelling force behind it: 
 the Secretary still conducted the negotiations, but the 
 creation and decision of policy came to rest more and 
 more with the President. 
 
 In no case was this so true as in that of the Panama 
 Canal. In the earlier stages Mr. Roosevelt gave direc- 
 tions which Mr. Hay carried out; before the end, how- 
 
10 Preface 
 
 ever, the President took the business into his own hands; 
 and he has ever since frankly assumed entire responsi- 
 bility for the achievement. . . . 
 
 Throughout October Mr. Hay seems to have had less 
 and less communication with the Isthmus and Bogota, 
 whereas the activity of President Roosevelt increased. 
 
 Responsibility for the dynamic climax to this solution 
 of the Colombia-Panama struggle rested entirely with 
 the President, who seems not always to have informed 
 Secretary Hay and the Cabinet officers of his acts. 
 
 The writer reached the same conclusion by a 
 comparative study of the diplomatic and other 
 correspondence of the Roosevelt Administration 
 of the period in question. This investigation led 
 him to conclude that Secretary Hay did not know 
 the facts connected with the Isthmian disturbance 
 in 1903. This makes it clear that the certification 
 made by Secretary Hay, of the correctness of the 
 conduct of the President, is based upon belief and 
 not upon knowledge. 
 
 In this book we deal only with the principal 
 events connected with our acquisition of the Canal 
 Zone. A detailed and chronological statement of 
 them can be found with only incidental analysis 
 and interpretation, in "The Story of Panama" by 
 Henry N. Hall, staff correspondent of the New 
 York World. This comprehensive statement of 
 facts constitutes Mr. Hall's testimony before the 
 Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
 
Preface 1 1 
 
 Representatives from January 26 to February 20, 
 19 1 2, and has been printed as an official document. 
 
 The citations in this book whose source is not 
 indicated in connection with their presentation 
 are taken from the "Diplomatic History of the 
 Panama Canal" (official document), "The Story 
 of Panama" (official document) and other official 
 documents, including the Congressional Record. 
 
 This book is the by-product of another work 
 dealing with the Panama Canal finances, tolls, 
 accounts and underlying treaties. The amount 
 of space required to cover all these matters turned 
 out to be such that it was necessary I0 abandon the 
 original plan and treat this one phase of the ques- 
 tion as an independent though related study. 
 The part of the original plan that had already 
 been worked out was, therefore, pigeon-holed to 
 enable the writer to complete the present work. 
 The other section of the work as originally 
 planned will be published later imder the title: 
 "America and the Canal Tolls." 
 
 This book contains more or less repetition. 
 Fundamental principles and important documents 
 are involved in the consideration of a question like 
 this, and, as they have a bearing on the various 
 standpoints from which the question was con- 
 sidered, repetition was inevitable. It would not 
 
12 Preface 
 
 have been desirable to have avoided it entirely if 
 it could have been done. All minds are not 
 equally mature and so it may well be that the 
 method of here a little and there a little from dif- 
 ferent standpoints is the way of correct under- 
 standing. As the writer aimed to instruct as well 
 as to explain official documents and secondary 
 evidence, repetition became a vital part of his 
 method. 
 
 Some of the citations and arguments which 
 show that there was no revolution on the Isthmus 
 in the fall of 1903 also show that the Treaty of 
 1846 was violated and that the Canal Zone was 
 taken by force. Therefore, some of the repeti- 
 tion may be more apparent than actual as the same 
 data and arguments were used to show different 
 contentions. 
 
 Acknowledgments are due to President Jose V. 
 Concha of the Republic of Colombia for a cable- 
 gram in which he gives an official version of a 
 memorandum he, as Minister of the Colombian 
 Legation, handed to our Government in 1902 in 
 which it was provided that the annuity to be paid 
 to Colombia for the canal concession was to be de- 
 termined by arbitration if it could not be deter- 
 mined by diplomacy; to Sefior Francisco Escobar, 
 Consulado General De Colombia, in New York, 
 
Preface 13 
 
 for the cablegram from President Concha of Col- 
 ombia printed on page 35, for several valuable 
 pamphlets, and for having informed the writer of 
 the existence of important official documents and 
 how to gain access to them ; to Roberto Ancizar, 
 Secretary of the Colombian Legation at Washing- 
 ton, for verification of two official documents, for 
 a copy of a Colombian official document not yet 
 printed and for several valuable pamphlets; to 
 Henry N. Hall, for an official copy of "The Story 
 of Panama" comprising his testimony before the 
 House Committee on Foreign Affairs; and to 
 Leander T. Chamberlain for excerpts taken from 
 his pamphlet, "A Chapter in National Dishonor," 
 some of which were adapted to fit into our line 
 of argument without direct acknowledgment. 
 Special acknowledgment is due my colleague, 
 James L. Bahret, for valuable editorial sugges- 
 tions. The author was prevented through lack 
 of strength from carrying out all of them. 
 
 The author is solely and alone responsible for 
 the material incorporated and the views expressed 
 in this book. He received encouragement from 
 Senor Francisco Escobar of the Colombian Con- 
 sulate in New York. The Colombian Legation 
 at Washington was indifferent. The writer's 
 suggestion that it secure for him, if possible, two 
 
14 Preface 
 
 official documents not published and furnish a 
 better translation of an excerpt from a Colombian 
 official communication were ignored. This is 
 merely stated for the purpose of focusing re- 
 sponsibility for the contents of this book on the 
 author. 
 
 During the final revision of the manuscript the 
 writer was ordered by his physician not to do in- 
 tensive work. Therefore the book is not as well 
 integrated as it would otherwise have been and 
 repetition appears that would have been elimi- 
 nated. It is believed that these defects in the 
 story of the taking of the Canal Zone by the 
 Roosevelt Administration as herein narrated are 
 merely formal, and that they do not impair its 
 scientific value. 
 
 Joseph C. Freehofp. 
 
 Saranac Lake, N. Y. 
 November 15, 19 15 
 
* AMERICA AND THE 
 CANAL TITLE 
 
 Chapter I 
 
 Clear the Enterprise of Every Stain 
 
 Construction of the Panama Canal was com- 
 pleted in the summer of 1914. Slides now and 
 then interrupt transit. Removal of these slides 
 merely adds to the cost of the canal as a commer- 
 cial enterprise. 
 
 ^/Our Government "took" the Canal Zone from 
 Colombia at the point of the bayonet. It was un- 
 willing to pay the price determined by due process 
 of law. Our title is, therefore, stolen. This 
 stain on the enterprise will remain until unstinted 
 reparation has t>een made to the despoiled owner, 
 — Colombia, i- Concerning the construction of the 
 canal and our seizure of the Canal Zone, the New 
 York World said in an editorial in the winter of 
 1912: 
 
 IS 
 
1 6 America and the Canal Title 
 
 It is the greatest feat of construction ever undertaken 
 by any government. The manner in which this work has 
 been done under the direction of Colonel Goethals is one 
 of the engineering triumphs of all history. Every Amer- 
 ican citizen should be proud of it. 
 
 When the canal is thrown open to the commerce of the 
 world there should be no blot on the record. There 
 should be nothing for the American people to explain or 
 to apologize for. . . . 
 
 The full story of . . . [the] Panama transaction is yet 
 to be told — the Washington lobby, the framing of the 
 treaty which Colombia rejected, the organization and 
 financing of a Panama revolution in New York City, the 
 part played by the United States Government in this con- 
 spiracy. . . . 
 
 The seizing of the Canal Zone did more to arouse the 
 hostility of South American republics against the United 
 States than anything else that has happened since they 
 won their independence. While Colombia's demand for 
 justice remains unsatisfied this country will always be 
 an object of suspicion on the part of its South American 
 neighbors. . . . 
 
 The important thing is that this international scandal 
 be disposed of for all time before the canal is opened and 
 that no stain be left on the American title. 
 
 Congress owes it to the country and the country owes 
 it to itself. 
 
 In the enactment of the Panama Canal Act in 
 19 12, Congress placed another stain on the enter- 
 prise. The tolls-exemption provisions of that act 
 scrapped the commercial provisions of the Hay- 
 Pauncefote treaty. Due primarily to the exalted 
 moral purpose of President Wilson, the tolls-ex- 
 emption provisions of the Panama Canal Act were 
 
Clear Enterprise of Every Stain 17 
 
 repealed in 1914, with the result that the Hay- 
 Pauncefote treaty was restored as our guide in 
 the management of the canal. Instead of this 
 treaty being now a scrap of paper, it is a world- 
 view design — snatched from the scrap heap and 
 restored as the vital instrument in canal adminis- 
 tration. It was rescued on the way to the po- 
 litical graveyard in which are interred the remains 
 of our Treaty of 1846, and over which hovers a 
 troubled American conscience. Only reparation 
 to Colombia can bring relief. Ratification of the 
 pending treaty with Colombia by the Senate will 
 restore American honor and remove from our flag 
 an otherwise ineffaceable stain. 
 
 The Hay-Pauncef ote treaty is a solemn engage- 
 ment whose meaning is self-evident. Besides, we 
 have documentary evidence which establishes that 
 meaning beyond a reasonable doubt. Willis 
 Fletcher Johnson, an able newspaper man, inter- 
 viewed Secretary Hay as to the bearing of this 
 treaty on our intercoastal trade. This was before 
 the construction of the treaty became the subject- 
 matter of political controversy. Therefore, the 
 opinion expressed in this interview, if properly 
 corroborated, absolutely establishes its meaning. 
 The interview is published in official documents 
 and reads : 
 
i8 America and the Canal Title 
 
 I asked Colonel Hay plumply if the treaty meant what 
 it appeared to mean on its face, and whether the phrase 
 "vessels of all nations," was intended to include our own 
 shipping, or was to be interpreted as meaning "all other 
 nations." The Secretary smiled, half indulgently, half 
 quizzically, as he replied: 
 
 "All means all. The treaty was not so long that we 
 could not have made room for the word 'other' if we 
 had understood that it belonged there. 'All nations' 
 means all nations, and the United States is certainly a 
 nation." 
 
 That was the understanding between yourself and Lord 
 Pauncefote when you and he made the treaty? I pur- 
 sued. 
 
 "It certainly was," he replied. "It was the under- 
 standing of both Governments, and I have no doubt that 
 the Senate realized that in ratifying the second treaty 
 without such an amendment it was committing us to the 
 principle of giving all friendly nations equal privileges in 
 the canal with ourselves. That is our Golden Rule." 
 
 The views of the then Secretary of State are 
 corroborated by our Ambassador to Great Britain 
 at the time, Joseph H. Choate, who in an address 
 before the Chamber of Commerce of the City of 
 New York on February 13, 1913, said : 
 
 It is true that I had something to do with the negotia- 
 tion of this treaty. In the summer of 1901— you will 
 remember that this treaty was ratified by the Senate in 
 December, 1901— I was in England until October, and 
 was in almost daily contact with Lord Pauncefote, who 
 on his side represented Lord Lansdowne, the foreign sec- 
 retary, and was also in very frequent correspondence with 
 Mr. Hay, our Secretary of State, under whom I was act- 
 ing. As the lips of both of those diplomatists and great 
 
Clear Enterprise of Every Stain 19 
 
 patriots, who were each true to his own country and each 
 regardful of the rights of the other, are sealed in death, 
 I think it is quite proper that I should say what I believe 
 both of them, if they were here, would say to-day — that 
 the clause in the Panama Canal bill exempting coastwise 
 American shipping from payment of tolls is in direct vio- 
 lation of the treaty. 
 
 I venture to say that in the whole course of the nego- 
 tiations of this particular treaty, no claim, no suggestion, 
 was made that there should be any exemption of any- 
 body. 
 
 Even more convincing are the views expressed 
 by the late President McKinley. They are found 
 in a letter from Secretary Hay to Senator Cullom, 
 of which the following is an excerpt : 
 
 The President was not only willing but desirous that 
 "the general principle" of neutralization referred to in 
 the preamble of this treaty should be applicable to this 
 canal now intended to be built, notwithstanding any 
 change of sovereignty or of international relations of the 
 territory through which it should pass. 
 
 The views of President McKinley are "the gen- 
 eral principle" with the meaning that the nego- 
 tiators of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty attached to 
 it. In a letter dated August 20, 1901, Ambassa- 
 dor Choate stated its meaning as it was under- 
 stood at the time the treaty was negotiated. It 
 was in effect — 
 
 That the parties constructing or owning the canal shall 
 impose no other charges or conditions of traffic than are 
 
20 America and the Canal Title 
 
 just and equitable ; and that the same canals or railways,, 
 being open to the citizens and subjects of the United 
 States and Great Britain on equal terms, shall also be 
 open on like terms to the citizens and subjects of every 
 other State. 
 
 The foregoing was corroborated by Henry 
 White, Secretary of our Embassy in Great Britain 
 during the negotiations of the Hay-Pauncefote 
 treaties. Mr. White wrote a letter to Senator 
 McCumber in which he told what Secretary Hay 
 understood the treaty to mean relative to free 
 transit for our intercoastal trade. The vital part 
 of the letter reads : 
 
 ( 1 ) That the exemption of our coastwise shipping from 
 the payment of tolls was never suggested to, nor by, any 
 one connected with the negotiation of the Hay-Paunce- 
 fote treaties in this country or in England; 
 
 (2) That from the day on which I opened the nego- 
 tiations with Lord Salisbury for the abrogation of the 
 Clayton^Bulwer treaty until the ratification of the Hay- 
 Pauncefote treaty, the words "all nations" and "equal 
 terms" were understood to refer to the United States as 
 well as to all other nations, by every one of those, whethef ■ 
 American or British, who had anything to do with the 
 negotiations whereof the treaty last mentioned was the 
 result. 
 
 Henry White had at the date of writing the 
 above a more minute knowledge of the negotia-4 
 tions leading up to the agreement on the Hay-*! 
 Pauncefote treaty than any other person. His 
 
Clear Enterprise of Every Stain 21 
 
 statement is, therefore, final and conclusive as to 
 the meaning of that instrument 
 
 It does not take much erudition to know what 
 the negotiators intended the Hay-Pauncefote 
 treaty to mean — to know what the Hay-Paunce- 
 fote treaty actually does mean. It means what 
 its negotiators intended it to mean. It was clearly 
 the intent of the negotiators that the charge for 
 the commercial use of the Isthmian Canal which 
 was to be constructed should be non-discrimina-^ 
 tory and without distinction of flag. This is con- 
 firmed by the inclusion of this sentence in the 
 Hay-Pauncefote treaty : 
 
 Such conditions and charges of traffic shall be 
 just and equitable. 
 
 Appreciating the fact that the Panama Canal 
 is a public utility, our public vessels are entitled to 
 free transit, because they are either engaged in 
 maintenance or in maneuvers to acquire the effi- 
 ciency required for its protection. The public 
 vessels of the Republic of Panama pass through 
 free as an offset to rent. Similarly, the public 
 vessels of Colombia will pass through free if the 
 treaty with Colombia now pending in the Senate 
 is ratified. This will be part of the compensation 
 incurred to secure a clear title to the Canal Zone. 
 
22 America and the Canal Title 
 
 All the commercial traffic through the canal 
 must pay a non-discriminatory rate. The United 
 States, as the owner of the canal, is entitled to a 
 reasonable return on its investment — a principle 
 that applies in the regulation of national, state, 
 and municipal utilities, that is, domestic utilities. 
 It is empowered to collect this amount from the 
 traffic using the canal, but is compelled to collect 
 it by imposing a reasonable and non-discrimina- 
 tory rate. Realizing that this is what the fore- 
 going sentence of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty 
 means, the careful student of public utilities and 
 of our domestic policy in relation thereto needs 
 only to see this sentence of the Hay-Pauncefote 
 treaty in order to know that free transit for our 
 intercoastal shipping is prohibited by that instru- ' 
 ment. 
 
 It is now clear that a solemn engagement and 
 the nature of the enterprise prohibit free transit 
 to our coastwise shipping. In a state paper 
 worthy of the occasion. President Wilson, there- 
 fore, asked the Congress to repeal the tolls-ex- 
 emption provisions of the Panama Canal Act. 
 We give it in full below : 
 
 Gentlemen of the Congress: I have come to you upon 
 an errand which can be very briefly performed, but I beg 
 that you will not measure its importance by the number 
 
Clear Enterprise of Every Stain 23 
 
 of sentences in which I state it. No communication I 
 have addressed to the Congress carried with it graver 
 or more far-reaching implications as' to the interest of 
 the country, and I come now to speak upon a matter with 
 regard to Tvhich I am charged in a particular degree, by 
 the Constitution itself, with personal responsibility. 
 
 I have come to ask you for the repeal of that provision 
 of the Panama Canal Act of August 24, 1912, which ex- 
 empts vessels engaged in the coastwise trade of the United 
 States from payment of tolls, and to urge upon you the 
 justice, the wisdom, and the large policy of such a repeal 
 with the utmost earnestness of which I am capable. 
 
 In my own judgment, very fully considered and ma- 
 turely formed, that exemption constitutes a mistaken eco- 
 nomic policy from every point of view, and is, moreover, 
 in plain contravention of the treaty with Great Britain 
 concerning the canal concluded on November 18, 1901. 
 But I have not come to urge upon you my personal views. 
 I have come to state to you a fact and a situation. What- 
 ever may be our own differences of opinion concerning 
 this much debated measure, its meaning is not debated 
 outside the United States. Everywhere else the language 
 of the treaty is given but one interpretation, and that in- 
 terpretation precludes the exemption I am asking you 
 to repeal. We consented to the treaty; its language we 
 accepted, if we did not originate it; and we are too big, 
 too powerful, too self-respecting a nation to interpret 
 with a too strained or refined reading the words of our 
 own promises just because we have power enough to give 
 us leave to read them as we please. The large thing to do 
 is the only thing we can afford to do, a voluntary with- 
 drawal from the position everywhere questioned and mis- 
 understood. We ought to reverse our action without rais- 
 ing the question whether we were right or wrong, and 
 so once more deserve our reputation for generosity and 
 for the redemption of every obligation without quibble 
 or hesitation. 
 
 I ask this of you in support of the foreign policy of the 
 
24 America and the Canal Title 
 
 administration. I shall not know how to deal with other 
 matters of even greater delicacy and nearer consequence 
 if you do not grant it to me in ungrudging measure. 
 
 The high moral purpose of this memorable 
 state paper was recognized abroad. Sir Edward 
 Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, comple- 
 mented it in a speech in the House of Commons. 
 In the course of his remarks, he exposed misrep- 
 resentation, and, in so doing, revealed the exalted 
 moral purpose of President Wilson. The fol- 
 lowing excerps from Sir Edward Grey's speech 
 should have the widest circulation : 
 
 It is due to the President of the United States and to 
 ourselves that I should so far as possible clear away that 
 misrepresentation. It was stated in some quarters that 
 the settlement was the result of bargaining or diplomatic 
 pressure. Since President Wilson came into office no 
 correspondence has passed, and it ought to be realized in 
 the United States that any line President Wilson has 
 taken was not because it was our line, but his own. 
 
 President Wilson's attitude was not the result of any 
 diplomatic communication since he has come into power 
 and it must have been the result of papers already pub- 
 lished to all the world. 
 I It has not been done to please us or in the interests ) 
 / of good relations, but I believe from a much greater! 
 I motive — the feeling that a government which is to use its 
 I influence among the nations to make relations better must 
 I never when the occasion arises flinch or quail from inter- 
 I preting treaty rights in a strictly fair spirit. 
 
 President Wilson's attitude toward the tolls- 
 
Clear Enterprise of Every Stain 25 
 
 exemption clause of the Panama Canal Act was 
 reaffirmed in his address at Independence Hall on 
 July 4, 19 14. It is reported as follows : 
 
 I say that it is patriotic sometimes to prefer the honor 
 of the country to its material interest. Would you rather 
 be deemed by all nations of the world incapable of keep- 
 ing your treaty obligations in order that you might have 
 free tolls for American ships ? The treaty under which we 
 gave up that right may have been a mistaken treaty, but 
 there was no mistake about its meaning. 
 
 When I have made a promise as a man I try to keep 
 it, and I know of no other rule permissible to a nation. 
 The most distinguished nation in the world is the nation 
 that can and will keep its promises even to its own hurt. 
 And I want to say, parenthetically, that I do not think 
 anybody was hurt. I cannot be enthusiastic for sub- 
 sidies to a monopoly, but let those who are enthusiastic for 
 subsidies ask themselves whether they prefer subsidies 
 to unsullied honor. 
 
 Our own former "Secretary for Foreign Af- 
 fairs," William Jennings Bryan, speaks in the 
 same tone as did Sir Edward Grey, both viewing 
 the matter from the standpoint of the influence 
 of a nation in international affairs if it keep its 
 i solemn engagements. In a letter dated Septem- 
 iber 4, 1914, quoted elsewhere, Secretary Bryan 
 J wrote: 
 
 The position taken by the President on the tolls ques- 
 tion aroused more opposition at that time than it would 
 arouse to-day, subsequent events having completely vindi- 
 cated the wisdom of his action. 
 
26 America and the Canal Title 
 
 The enviable position which our nation occupies to-day 
 is due, in part, to the fact that it has allowed no doubt to 
 exist as to its purpose to live up to the stipulations of its 
 treaty. . j 
 
 There were economic considerations which weighed, 
 heavily in favor of the repeal of the free tolls law, but 
 these were less important than those which affected the 
 international standing of our nation. 
 
 A government must be above suspicion in the matter 
 of good faith. No pecuniary advantage, even where such 
 an advantage actually exists, can for a moment justify 
 the violation of a treaty obligation, and violation^ must 
 be the more scrupulously avoided if the question is one 
 which is not to be submitted to arbitration. 
 
 In international matters the question is not whether we 
 are ourselves certain of our Government's purpose in the 
 position taken, but whether other nations, also, have con- 
 fidence in our rectitude. 
 
 The President set a high standard, and the support j 
 given to him in the Senate and House was as creditable < 
 to Congress as it was complimentary to .him. The pop- 
 ular approval which is now accorded to both the Presi- 
 dent and Congress on this subject is proof positive that 
 the people can be trusted to pass judgment upon the merit 
 of international, as well as domestic, questions. 
 
 Especially gratifying is any appreciation of our 
 President by Viscount James Bryce. The reason 
 is that he is held in aflfectionate esteem by all well^ 
 informed Americans. Therefore, his views have 
 an importance among us that does not attach to 
 those of any other foreigner. At the Independ- 
 ence Day dinner in London on July 4, 1914, 
 he paid the following tribute to President Wil- 
 son: 
 
Clear Enterprise of Every Stain 27 
 
 Courage is a virtue rare among politicians. What we 
 have all admired in the President is his courage in the 
 matter of the canal tolls. 
 
 Absolutely no pressure was brought to bear by Great 
 Britain to obtain repeal of the tolls-exemption clause of 
 the Panama Canal Act. 
 
 In a letter commenting on a book designed and 
 prepared by the writer and published with another 
 as co-author, Lord Bryce expresses appreciation 
 of President Wilson which supplements the 
 foregoing. The following therefrom is apro- 
 pos: 
 
 Besides the value which your book has for the student 
 as a collection of doctmients bearing upon a significant 
 passage in diplomatic history, it has the further interest 
 of placing on record the admirable example set by Pres- 
 ident Wilson of the spirit in which questions affecting 
 the faith of treaties ought to be handled. No praise can 
 be too high for the rectitude and the courage which he 
 showed on this occasion. Wisdom also he showed and 
 clear foresight. He perceived that one of America's 
 greatest assets is her reputation for righteous dealing and 
 for loyalty to the international obligations she has under- 
 taken. He understood the mind and conscience of the 
 American people, and knew that when an appeal was 
 made to them in the name of good faith they would re- 
 spond. The result vindicated his judgment. 
 
 Your book calls attention to the testimony borne by 
 the British Foreign Secretary and by myself (for I was 
 Ambassador at Washington when Mr. Wilson entered the 
 White House) to the fact that no pressure whatever was 
 exerted by the British Government in the matter. To 
 this I may add that when I reported to my Government 
 the last conversation I had with Mr. Wilson in which the 
 
28 America and the Canal Title 
 
 subject was mentioned, I expressed to them the confident 
 belief that whenever the President had had time to study 
 and master the issues involved he would do whatever he 
 felt to be right, and would not be diverted by any political 
 considerations from what he might hold to be the course 
 that honor prescribed. 
 
 Those of us in England who know America best and 
 love her most rejoiced at the approval which she gave to 
 the President's policy in this matter, not on account of 
 any British interest involved but because it showed that 
 to be true which we had often declared — that no nation 
 in the world has a truer love of peace and good-will or a 
 higher sense of international honor than have the Ameri- 
 can people. 
 
 Especially pertinent at this time is this appre- 
 ciation because of the violation of the Treaty of 
 1839 by Germany and the storm of indignation 
 it aroused in neutral countries. This ought to 
 impel us to remove the stigma attaching to our 
 violation of the Treaty of 1846. American good 
 faith can be restored only by the ratification of 
 the treaty with Colombia now pending in the 
 Senate. 
 
 President Wilson rendered a distinguished 
 public service when he insisted on the repeal of 
 the provision of the Panama Canal Act which ex-, 
 empted our vessels engaged in the coastwise trade 
 from the payment of tolls. He stood for the re- 
 nunciation of an advantage inconsistent with the 
 interpretation put upon the Hay-Pauncefote 
 
Clear Enterprise of Every Stain 29 
 
 treaty by the men who framed it. He had to 
 fight down serious opposition in his own party 
 to square our record with that of honor. 
 
 The repeal of the tolls-exemption provisions of 
 the Panama Canal Act will always stand high on 
 the list of the good works of the President, for the 
 enactment of the repeal bill was due to his great 
 influence, very directly exerted. It was a con- 
 troverted question, but the sound opinion of the 
 country supported the President in his endeavor 
 to get Congress to do its plain duty and to set the 
 record of the country straight. A very great 
 majority of the American people, and practically 
 all of those who were in a position to judge the 
 matter impartially, held that the exemption act 
 was wrong, that the repeal was right, that it was 
 an act of justice to England, and, above all, to 
 ourselves. 
 
 The opinion of all well-informed Americans of 
 high character was voiced by Vice-President 
 Marshall when, at the Panama-Pacific Exposi- 
 tion, San Francisco, on March 24, 1915, he said: 
 
 In justice to the day, Woodrow Wilson should be 
 here. The ofBce and the man would each fittingly grace 
 this occasion. But duty said to him that justice to all 
 the people bade him stay in Washington. You hope for 
 continued peace. Do not forget that he is your greatest 
 peacemaker. May the truth that he seeks your good, 
 
30 America and the Canal Title 
 
 rather than his own or your pleasure, lighten the disap- 
 pointments of this hour. ... 
 
 I am sure that I express the thought of the President 
 and the hope of the American people when I say that 
 our canal was built not alone for glory or great gain, but 
 with a sincere desire to make the whole world kin. There 
 are two gospels now instead of one. The gospel of good 
 will has been supplemented with the gospel of personal 
 contact. The gospel of good will continues to be su- 
 preme, but nothing will help it preach as loudly as those 
 human agencies which eliminate distance, blend languages, 
 and give us sight as well as knowledge each of the other. 
 
 I am quite sure that I am but one of a countless throng 
 in this republic who regret that this altruistic work has a 
 real or seeming defect in the charge of an injustice done 
 a sister republic to the south. Let us not be too much 
 dismayed this day by reason of that fact. The American 
 people are wise, and they know he is not wise who is not 
 just. I look with confidence for the early arrival of that 
 good hour when whatever wrong may have been done 
 shall be righted, and when there will be left no drop of 
 bitter water to flow in that channel which unites the seas. 
 
 The present war vitally concerns the progress 
 of the world's civilization. It marks an epoch 
 in world history comparable only with the Fall of 
 the Roman Empire or the Reformation. Future 
 history will date from it. Ought not the United 
 States to start the new era without a stain on its 
 good name ? 
 
 Due to the high character of President Wilson, 
 the tolls-exemption provisions of the Panama 
 Canal Act are in the scrap-heap. Ratification of 
 the pending treaty with Colombia is as vital to 
 
Clear Enterprise of Every Stain 31 
 
 the restoration of American national honor as 
 was the repeal of tolls-exemption. 
 
 As already stated, the tolls-exemption pro- 
 visions of the Panama Canal Act have been re- 
 pealed. The good work should be completed by 
 making reparation to Colombia. That would 
 clear the canal of its remaining stain. President 
 Wilson and Secretary Bryan have done their part. 
 Let the people of the United States insist that the 
 Senate do its part by demanding that it ratify the 
 pending treaty with Colombia, thus enabling us 
 to start the new era with a chastened conscience 
 and with unsullied honor. 
 
Chapter II 
 
 Roosevelt's Article — "The Panama Blackmail 
 Treaty" 
 
 We shall, in this chapter, subject to a critical 
 examination an article by Roosevelt entitled "The 
 Panama Blackmail Treaty," which appeared in 
 the Metropolitan Magazine for February, 191 5. 
 The article advances an argument against the 
 ratification of the treaty negotiated with Colombia 
 by the Wilson Administration for the purpose of 
 reestablishing friendly relations and of compen- 
 sating that country for loss suffered when the 
 Province of Panama was wrested from her sov- 
 ereignty by the United States. Not only is the 
 article couched in language that is lacking in 
 dignity, but it is positively offensive. Its princi- 
 pal arguments will be answered in this chapter 
 and the remaining ones will be disposed of in 
 other chapters. 
 
 We shall quote excerpts from this article as 
 the discussion proceeds and follow them with an 
 accurate statement of facts and of conclusion| 
 
 32 ^ 
 
The Panama Blackmail Treaty 33 
 
 based on them. The article opens with these 
 paragraphs : 
 
 f'fln 1903 a shameless and sordid attempt was made by 
 the then dictator of Colombia and his subordinate fellow- 
 politicians at Bogota to force the United States by scan- 
 dalously improper tactics to pay a vastly larger sum for 
 the privilege of building the Panama Canal than had been \ 
 agreed upon in a solemn treaty. As President of the \ 
 United States I resisted this attempt, and prevented the 
 United States from being blackmailed. Had I not suc- 
 cessfully resisted the attempt, the Panama Canal would 
 not now be built, and would probably never have been 
 built. The attempt was blackmail then ; and to yield to it 
 now is to yield to blackmail. 
 
 Yet the present Administration now proposes to pay 
 Colombia twenty-five million dollars, and to make what 
 is probably an apology for our conduct in acquiring the 
 right to build the canal. Apparently this is done on the 
 theory of soothing the would-be blackmailers and making 
 them forget the mortification caused them by the failure 
 of their initial attempt to hold up the United States. 
 
 This article and the messages to the Congress 
 as of December 7, 1903 (part devoted to Canal), 
 and of January 4, 1904, are neither fact nor 
 fiction. They are a gallery-playing farce in-^ 
 tended to dazzle instead of to instruct th^ 
 American people. They may sound like truth, 
 but in reality they bear false witness against 
 a sister Republic, retarding the formation of 
 a correct public opinion on the question of our 
 duty to Colombia. They are in reality a plea to 
 
34 America and the Canal Title 
 
 keep our national honor in pawn so that the poli- 
 tical crime of 1903 may not be officially disowned. 
 The charge of "blackmail" is, in reality, nothing 
 more than a pretext to justify the taking of the 
 Canal Zone by force. Realizing that there is no 
 justification that can withstand the scrutiny of 
 historical method, Roosevelt tries to withdraw 
 attention from the real facts by this unwarranted 
 counter charge. What proof has he offered? 
 Or does he act on the principle that if you throw 
 mud some of it will stick — at least in the minds 
 of the unwary? His charge is serious, but 
 searching inquiry shows that it is absolutely with- 
 out foundation. 
 
 ' When it became evident that the compensation 
 for the canal concession could not be satisfactorily 
 arranged by diplomacy, Colorribia suggested that 
 the matter be referred for determination to an 
 arbitral tribunal and offered to enter into an en- 
 gagement which would provide for its determina- 
 tion in this way. This phase of the canal con- 
 troversy is admirably stated in a paragraph of an 
 article in the North American Review for Janu- 
 ary, 1904, by Senor Francisco Escobar, Consul 
 of Colombia in New York: 
 
 \ The money consideration first offered by Secretaryj 
 .Hay was far from satisfactory. Minister Concha was' 
 
The Panama Blackmail Treaty 35 
 
 right when he said that the Secretary was trying to drive 
 a sharp bargain. Yet it was the accepted opinion in the 
 United States that Colombia was the "sharper" ; but the 
 best proof I can adduce to the contrary is that Minister 
 Concha proposed to leave the money consideration to be 
 adjusted by an arbitrator or by The Hague Tribunal. 
 
 Mr. Escobar was asked by the writer to secure 
 confirmation of the foregoing from the then 
 Minister Concha, now the President of the Re- 
 public of Colombia, which was done. It is con- 
 tained in the following cablegram : 
 
 Bogota, August 10, 1915 
 Francisco Escobar, New York: 
 
 By article XXV of the memorandum presented to the 
 Department of State on April 18, 1902, the Colombian 
 Legation proposed to fix by means of arbitration the 
 amount of the annuity to be paid Colombia. On April 
 21, Secretary Hay accepted this proposal and promised 
 to sign a covenant in accordance therewith, but on July 
 18, having changed his mind, proposed an option [$7,000,- 
 000 on final agreement and an annuity of $100,000 or 
 $10,000,000 and an annuity of $10,000] instead of arbi- 
 tration. The memorandum was published with other 
 state papers by said Department. 
 
 Concha 
 
 In article XXV of the memorandum, Colombia 
 proposed a method for determining the value of 
 the canal concession that was scientific. This 
 article contains the following sections : 
 
 As the price or compensation for the right to use the 
 zone granted in this convention by Colombia to the United 
 
36 America and the Canal Title 
 
 States for the construction of a canal, together with the 
 proprietary right over the Panama Railroad, and for the 
 annuity of $250,000 gold, which Colombia ceases to re- 
 ceive from the said railroad, as well as in compensation 
 for other rights, privileges, and exemptions granted to 
 the United States, and in consideration of the increase in 
 the administrative expenses of the department of Panama 
 consequent upon the construction of the said canal, the 
 Government of the United States binds itself to pay Co- 
 lombia the amount of $7,000,000 in American gold on 
 the exchange of the ratification of this convention after 
 its approval by the legislative bodies of both countries, 
 and fourteen years after the date aforesaid a fair and 
 reasonable annuity, that shall be agreed upon by the con- 
 tracting Governments three years before the expiration of 
 the above-mentioned term of fourteen years. 
 
 In fixing this fair and reasonable annuity there shall 
 be taken into consideration the present price of the 
 usufruct of the railway as well as the compensation that 
 is to be stipulated for the use of the zone and for the 
 additional administrative expenses that the construction 
 of the canal will impose upon Colombia; and also the 
 advanced payment of $7,000,000 and the comparative cost 
 and conditions upon which the United States reasonably, 
 could have expected to acquire concessions satisfactory to 
 it in respect of any other canal route. 
 
 Three years before the expiration of each term of one 
 hundred years the annuity for the following term shall 
 be fixed in a similar manner. 
 
 But in the event that the parties are unable to come to 
 an understanding within the periods above referred to as 
 to such fair and reasonable annuity, then before the sec- 
 ond year prior to the termination of the periods above, 
 referred to, the contracting parties shall proceed to con- 
 stitute a high commission, to be composed of five mem- 
 bers, of whom two shall be appointed by Colombia, two 
 by the United States, and the fifth (who shall be the 
 president of such high commission) shall be the presi- 
 
The Panama Blackmail Treaty 37 
 
 dent, for the time being, of the International Peace Tri- 
 bunal of The Hague ; and the determination reached by 
 said commission, by a majority vote, concerning such 
 fair and reasonable annuity that is to be paid to Colom- 
 bia by the United States in conformity with this article, 
 shall be binding upon the contracting parties. 
 
 But no delay nor difference of opinion in fixing such 
 amount shall affect nor interrupt the full operation and 
 effect of this convention in all other respects. 
 
 Minister Concha accompanied the memoran- 
 dum with a letter, which contains the following 
 paragraph : 
 
 Confirming the conclusions reached as the result of the 
 conference held between yourself and Mr. Cromwell, and 
 adopting, as far as practicable, your valuable suggestions, 
 I beg leave to hand you the concessionary convention or 
 treaty (in Spanish and in English) embodying the amend- 
 ments agreed upon in the conference referred to. 
 
 My previous communication of March 31, 1902, pro- 
 posing the concessionary convention or treaty in behalf 
 of my Government, and the expository communications 
 of myself and Mr. Cromwell under the same date, apply 
 equally to the inclosures. 
 
 The following paragraphs are the contents of 
 the letter of Secretary Hay, dated April 21, 1902 : 
 
 I have the honor to acknowledge receipt at your hands 
 of a communication dated the 31st of March, 1902, and 
 another of the i8th of April, inclosing a proposal of the 
 Republic of Colombia for a concessionary convention or 
 treaty between the Republic of Colombia and that of the 
 United States of America respecting the completion, 
 maintenance, operation, control, and protection of an in- 
 ter-oceanic canal over the Isthmus of Panama. 
 
38 'America and the Canal Title 
 
 I am directed by the President to inform you that I 
 shall be ready to sign with you the proposed convention 
 as soon as — 
 
 First. The Congress of the United States shall have 
 authorized the President to enter into such an arrange- 
 ment; and 
 
 Second. As soon as the law officers of this Govern- 
 ment shall have decided upon the question of the title 
 which the New Panama Canal Company is able to give' 
 of all the properties and rights claimed by it and pertain- 
 ing to a canal across the Isthmus and covered by the 
 pending proposal. 
 
 That Secretary Hay rejected Colotnbia's pro- 
 posal of April 18, 1902, for fixing the price of the 
 canal concession by arbitration has already been 
 stated. In January, 1903, Acting Minister Her- 
 ran of Colombia renewed the proposal of his Gov- 
 ernment to have an arbitral tribunal fix the an- 
 nuity to be paid Colombia. Our administration 
 insisted that the annuity should be a fixed amount 
 in perpetuity and that this amount should be 
 stipulated in the treaty, and offered for the canal 
 concession the sum of $7,000,000, and an annuity 
 of $100,000 during the life of the engagement, or, 
 $10,000,000 and an annuity of $10,000. Colom- 
 bia asked $7,000,000 for the concession, and an 
 annuity of $600,000. As there was a decided 
 difference in the amount of the annuity offered 
 and asked, Colombia proposed that it be settled 
 by arbitration, but our Government refused; 
 
The Panama Blackmail Treaty 39 
 
 America, the country which to-day has gone the 
 furthest along lines of international arbitration, 
 refused as recently as 1903 to arbritrate the price 
 of an easement, as is done under similar circum- 
 stances in the exercise of domestic eminent do- 
 main if the matter is not settled by mutual agree- 
 ment. America enforces upon her citizens what 
 she declined to accept as a member of the family 
 of nations. 
 
 The spirit in which Colombia acted during the 
 negotiation of the canal concession is found in 
 the following excerpt from a letter by Minister 
 Concha, dated March 31, 1902: 
 
 The Republic that I represent realizes the importance 
 of the contemplated interoceanic waterway for the civ- 
 ilization and progress of the world, and since nature has 
 placed the shortest and most expeditious route within the 
 territory of the Republic, Colombia widely and generously 
 opens her doors so that the grand work may be achieved 
 within the shortest possible time. 
 
 If the people of the United States evince an earnest 
 desire that their Government apply its energies and treas- 
 ure to the completion of the canal, Colombia not only 
 will not place any obstacle whatever in the way of such 
 a purpose or keep her concessions within the bounds of 
 those previously conceded to private enterprise, but will 
 enlarge those concessions to such an extent as to re- 
 nounce a demand for the ownership after the lapse of a 
 number of years of operation, as stipulated in the French 
 company's contract ; she will grant the use of a much more 
 extensive zone than that originally conceded for the exe- 
 cution of the work; extend facilities in all the ports of 
 
40 America and the Canal Title 
 
 the Republic for cooperation in the work of the enter- 
 prise, relinquish her proprietary and usufructuary rights 
 in the Panama Railway, and lastly, foregoes a fixed par- 
 ticipation in the proceeds of the canal, confining her de- 
 mands to a fee or annuity for the price of the zone, the 
 revenues of the railway, and the heavier expenses put 
 upon the public administration in the Isthmus by the in- 
 crease of population and the traffic consequent to the 
 work on the canal itself. 
 
 Thus does Colombia give fresh evidence of her long 
 standing and cordial sentiments of friendship toward the 
 United States and evinces in a clear and sincere manner 
 the gratification with which she will receive the indus- 
 trious and intelligent citizens of your Republic in her 
 territory. 
 
 Colombia has no lust of unjust gain through the con- 
 struction of the canal in her territory, and a final con- 
 vention on this subject will not be hampered by pe- 
 cuniary considerations. Her pride in the matter is bent 
 on having the neutral waterway between the two oceans, 
 that idea of universal peace and- progress, become a re- > 
 ality on her territory and under the protection of her sov- 
 ereignty. The compensations asked by Colombia have _ 
 special importance only in that they will imply a practicalll 
 and constant recognition of her sovereignty. - 
 
 In the light of the foregoing official documents 
 or of excerpts from documents, whose conduct 
 comes under the dictionary definition of attempted 
 blackmail ? The Standard Dictionary defines this 
 favorite term of Roosevelt's when he is discussing 
 the acquisition of the canal title as "extortion by 
 intimidation; especially, extortion of money by; 
 threats or accusations." 
 
 With this definition as a guide, it would be 
 
The Panama Blackmail Treaty 41 
 
 more truthful to say that the manner in which 
 our Administration secured the signature of 
 Herran to the Hay-Herran treaty, and attempted 
 to secure its ratification by the Colombian Con- 
 gress, savors of blackmail than to say that those in 
 official control of Colombia attempted blackmail. 
 The characterization of their actions by this term 
 is wholly inaccurate, and, as already indicated, 
 is a deliberate attempt to conceal the fact that our 
 Administration was guilty of a political crime. 
 The facts upon which this statement is based are 
 given in detail in chapters which follow. 
 
 Whatsoever evidence of attempted blackmail 
 exists is contained in the gossip of the time. It 
 can be duplicated at any session of our Congress 
 or of the legislature at Albany. The council of 
 the city of New York was shorn of important 
 powers because of this practice. On the day of 
 writing (March 27,, 1915), Hamilton Fish 
 charged in the New York Assembly : 
 
 The Republican Party here represented is acting on 
 this bill in behalf of several men who get retainers from 
 casualty com_panies and who pull down the levers that 
 operate things here at|Albany. You are acting for one or 
 two men who are in the employ of the insurance com- 
 panies. . . . 
 
 I demand an investigation. No one has told who is 
 behind this bill that we rushed through without a hearing. 
 
 I stand pat on my statement that improper influences 
 
42 America and the Canal Title 
 
 put the Direct Settlement bill through this House. You 
 have the investigators named and I'll give the proof." 
 
 Van Benschoten, in the celebrated Barnes- 
 Roosevelt libel suit, said: 
 
 Investigation after investigation had shown the abso- 
 lute rottenness of the condition of many of the depart- 
 ments of the State. Public officials had been indicted 
 and convicted for neglect of duty and for conspiring to 
 defraud the State. Other officials had been removed 
 from office. The newspapers and periodicals were filled 
 with the details of the conditions which had for some 
 time been existing. 
 
 "Blackmail!" Have not some United States 
 Senators and Congressmen been convicted of 
 crime ? Others left inadequate footprints and 
 so the legal evidence was wanting. We have our 
 own "Black Horse Cavalry," and some of them 
 have "done time." It would be a miracle if 
 Colombia were entirely free from them. 
 
 We should not expect a virtue there that we 
 do not ourselves possess. Guilt does not point 
 to the Colombian Congress as a body. It is safe 
 to say that in the history of civilized diplomacy 
 there never was such an unwarranted and im- 
 proper characterization of another nation's mo- 
 tives as is contained in Roosevelt's official and un- 
 official arraignment of Colombia. 
 
 Do not the official documents here presented 
 
The Panama Blackmail Treaty 43 
 
 prove that Roosevelt has wantonly attacked 
 Colombia's national character? Do they not 
 show that he has ruthlessly assailed the charac- 
 ter of her public men in order to conceal the theft 
 of the Canal Zone by his Administration? A 
 critical examination of the diplomatic correspond- 
 ence between the United States and Colombia 
 having a bearing on the Hay-Herran treaty con- 
 vinced the writer that the following from the pen 
 of Ex-Minister Du Bois is a correct estimate of 
 the character of the governing class of Colom- 
 bia: 
 
 An impartial investigation at Bogota, running over a 
 period of two years . . . convinced me that, instead of 
 "blackmailers" and "bandits," the pubHc men of Colom- 
 bia compare well with the public men of other countries 
 in intelligence and respectability, while the social life is 
 as refined and cultured as can be found in any capital in 
 the world. Bogota is called the Athens of South 
 America. 
 
 The New York World is authority for this 
 statement : 
 
 It is noteworthy that of all the amendments introduced 
 into the Colombian Senate, there was not one relating to 
 the compensations, either in money or in any other form, 
 that Colombia was to receive from the United States in 
 exchange for the concessions granted by the former to 
 the latter country. There is not the ghost of a shadow 
 of justification for the oft-repeated falsehood that Colom- 
 bia was trying to hold up the United States for more 
 money. 
 
44 America and the Canal Title 
 
 Calling names does not alter facts. To shout 
 "Blackmail!" from the housetops does not alter 
 the fact that Colombia had vested interests in the 
 Province of Panama for which she is entitled to 
 compensation. If she deserved all the epithets 
 hurled at her by Roosevelt, her infamy would not 
 by a hair's breadth alter our duty. No man has 
 a right to rob a person j-ust because the latter con- 
 templated blackmail. 
 
 The writer is not specially interested in Colom- 
 bia, and has no ties whatever which bind him to 
 her, but he is vitally interested in seeing a great 
 power, in respect to whose policies he, like all 
 citizens, has a right to be heard, deal justly with 
 a small nation regardless of her character. 
 
 We are not aware that Colombia is a black- 
 mailer. We are aware that the United States 
 is in possession of a stolen canal title, which will 
 remain tainted until our Government has made 
 reparation. No amount of rhetoric, or of abuse 
 of Colombia, will alter a single word in the in- 
 dictment against the United States. 
 
 The charge of blackmail is reiterated by Roose- 
 velt in the following: 
 
 In his message of Jtily 21, Minister Beaupre reported 
 that the Colombian Government had sounded both Ger- 
 many and England to see if they could not be persuaded 
 
The Panama Blackmail Treaty 45 
 
 to construct, or aid in the construction of, the canal in 
 place of the United States. The Government of Colom- 
 bia, therefore, not only sought to blackmail us and to 
 blackmail the French company, but endeavored to put 
 one of the great Old World powers on the Isthmus in 
 possession of the canal. And because the then Adminis- 
 tration refused to submit to such infamy on the part of 
 Colombia, the present Administration actually proposes 
 to pay the wrongdoer $25,000,000 of blackmail. 
 
 In short, it was a crime for Colombia to seek ' 
 reasonable terms; it was, however, a virtue fori 
 the United States to do so. And, of course, 
 Roosevelt — and not an impartial arbitral tribunal 
 — was to decide what were proper terms. Asi 
 already stated, Colombia offered to submit the' 
 entire question of compensation to an arbitral 
 tribunal. Therefore, it is nearer the truth to 
 say that the Roosevelt Administration sought 
 through coercion and duress to secure an unduly 
 advantageous bargain. 
 
 As to blackmailing the French company — ^no 
 penetrating student of corporation finance and of 
 stock exchange methods will lose sleep over the 
 spoliation of the innocent investors in the French 
 company; they had already been despoiled. It 
 only remained to determine whether the "Black 
 Horse Cavalry" of finance would get the actual 
 value of the investment or whether Colombia 
 would share it with them as compensation for the 
 
46 America and the Canal Title 
 
 right to transfer title to a sovereign state denied 
 to them by charter. 
 
 It is safe to assume that at the collapse of the 
 French company, the wreckers were "out from 
 under" and that they repurchased the securities 
 for a "song" when these reappeared on the 
 market. "Set the table over again" has become 
 an art in high -finance — an art in which the small 
 and innocent investors ase fleeced. It is, there- 
 fore, not clear why our Administration should 
 have been so much concerned about the holders 
 of the securities of the French company. At its 
 worst, malefactors of great wealth would have 
 been shorn of only a fraction of their ill gotten 
 gains. It was clearly not a case for the Roosevelt 
 Administration to become excited over; and not 
 a case that warranted the applying of epithets to 
 a friendly nation. 
 
 The Roosevelt Administration voluntarily came 
 to the relief of the investors — we call them by 
 that name as a matter of courtesy — in a company 
 chartered by France. It is nearer correct to call 
 them financial buccaneers — who wrecked the pro- 
 ject to despoil bona fide investors — and their poli- 
 tical "pals." This anxious concern of the Ad- 
 ministration does not have a holy look, nor does 
 
The Panama Blackmail Treaty 47 
 
 it appear entirely disinterested. An impartial 
 survey of all attendant facts and circumstances 
 bars the inference that it was prompted by motives 
 that were exalted. 
 
 Instead of there having been an official attempt 
 at blackmail on the part of Colombia, there was 
 ignorance, there was impatience, there was pas- 
 sion on the part of our Government. As for the 
 White House at the time, one could hardly say 
 that patience and calm cold reason were domiciled 
 there. There was, however, no official attempt 
 at blackmail on the part of the United States, any 
 more than on that of Colombia. If Roosevelt 
 insists that there was, we will not strenuously as- 
 sert that his Administration was not guilty. As 
 already stated, Colombia offered to submit the 
 question of compensation to arbitration ; our Ad- 
 ministration rejected arbitration as a solution. 
 Whose conduct looks suspicious? Is it the con- 
 duct of the country that offers to arbitrate the 
 point at issue, or is it the conduct of the country 
 that sidesteps arbitration? 
 
 Roosevelt seems incapable of thinking in terms 
 of accounts, finance and sovereignty. If it were 
 not so he would not inflict upon his readers state- 
 
48 America and the Canal Title 
 
 ments which destroy his prestige among the well- 
 informed. The following is introduced merely 
 as a sample of his reckless utterances : 
 
 A private French compaiiy had attempted to build a 
 canal across the Isthmus of Panama, and had failed after 
 making only a beginning of the work. Various proposi- 
 tions for a trans-Isthmian canal to be undertaken by the 
 United States Government had been made. . . . 
 
 Congress only considered seriously, however, the 
 Panama and Nicaragua routes, and was in much doubt 
 between them. A commission of experts appointed by 
 the President for that purpose had reported" that if we 
 could buy the rights of the French canal company for 
 $40,000,000 we ought to take the Panama route, but that 
 otherwise we should take the Nicaragua route. . . . 
 
 The French had real rights. They had spent hundreds 
 of millions of dollars, and although much of this had 
 been wasted, yet we received at least $40,000,000 worth 
 of property and of accomplished work for the $40,000,000 
 we agreed to pay them. Colombia had no rights that 
 were not of the most shadowy and unsubstantial kind ; and 
 even these shadowy rights existed only because of the ac- 
 tion of the United States. . . . Ten million dollars repre- 
 sented the very outside limit which generosity could fix 
 as a payment to Colombia for rights which she was im- 
 potent to maintain save by our assistance and protection, 
 and for an opportunity which she was utterly unable 
 herself to develop. Nobody of any consequence in the 
 United States, within or without Congress, would at that 
 time for one moment have considered agreeing to pay 
 $25,000,000 or any sum remotely approaching it. 
 
 Sovereignty, the most important consideration, 
 is not mentioned by Roosevelt in the foregoing 
 excerpt. The Hay-Herran treaty provided for 
 
The Panama Blackmail Treaty 49 
 
 the payment of $10,000,000 to Colombia. It 
 must, however, not be forgotten that Colombia] 
 remained the sovereign owner of the whole/ 
 Isthmus of Panama. The offer of $1 0,000,00c 
 and the right to retain the Isthmus were worth 
 more than the $25,000,000 which are now offered. 
 The circumstances of the Hay-Herran treaty, \A 
 virtue of which Colombia was offered the $10,-' 
 000,000 before she lost Panama, were entirely dif- 
 ferent from those which obtain now when she is 
 to be paid $25,000,000, after having lost the 
 Isthmus. 
 
 The $10,000,000 was to be paid for leasehold 
 rights to a Canal Zone in the Province of Panama. 
 The $25,000,000 is intended as part payment for 
 the loss of sovereignty — sovereignty wrested from 
 Colombia by the display of overwhelming force 
 in Isthmian waters. It is part payment for the 
 loss of a province and vested interests there 
 located, such loss being the result of collusion be- 
 tween the Roosevelt Administration and a few 
 separatists on the Isthmus. The Hay-Herran 
 treaty provided payment only for rights to a strip 
 of land. The present treaty provides payment 
 for the loss of ownership of a whole province with 
 its concomitant rights. The two propositions are 
 as far apart as the two poles. 
 
50 America and the Canal Title 
 
 Colombia had other rights in the Province of 
 Panama. One of these was the right stipulated 
 in the contract with the French company to take 
 possession of the partly completed canal if not 
 completed by it. The contract provided specifi- 
 cally that if within a certain time and a generous 
 extension of time, which the Colombian govern- 
 ment granted, the French company failed to con- 
 struct the canal, the whole work should become 
 the property of the Republic of Colombia. By 
 merely waiting the necessary time, the position 
 of Colombia as owner of the work would have 
 become absolutely solid. Colombia, however, did 
 not take advantage of that right. This very im- 
 portant right she had at the time when the United 
 States was negotiating the Hay-Herran treaty: 
 
 Further, in order that the French company 
 might sell its assets to the United States, it was 
 necessary, as already indicated, first to secure the 
 consent of Colombia, because, in the concession 
 granted by Colombia to that company, it was ex- 
 pressly stipulated (art. 21) that such concession 
 could not be transferred to any foreign govern- 
 ment. This was by itself a right, and, therefore, 
 Colombia was entitled to refuse transfer to the 
 United States Government unless a fair price was 
 paid for her consent. 
 
The Panama Blackmail Treaty 51 
 
 In addition to the foregoing rights, Colombia 
 had a reversionary interest in the Panama Rail- 
 road. It was to become the property of Colombia 
 at the end of the period for which the concession 
 was granted. 
 
 In the light of the foregoing, is it not apparent 
 that the $25,000,000 is not blackmail, but only 
 part payment for rights unlawfully wrested from 
 Colombia by our Administration — for vested in- 
 terests taken from her by force when we estab- 
 lished the so-called Republic of Panama as a pro- 
 tectorate of the United States. 
 
 The bland assertion of Roosevelt in the article 
 in question that the rights of Colombia (of thci 
 sovereign) were shadowy and that they existed! 
 only because t)f the protection afforded to her by 
 the United States is interesting, but the vital fact 
 is again omitted, and that is that the .United 
 States received for this protection a liberal quid 
 pro quo. We received valuable commercial con- 
 cessions, including transit across the Isthmus on 
 the Panama Railroad on the same terms as those 
 granted to citizens of Colombia, a concession that 
 Roosevelt wanted to deny to non-nationals in the 
 commercial use of the Panama Canal. The 
 burden assumed by the United States in the 
 Treaty of 1846 was a mere trifle when compared 
 
52 America and the Canal Title 
 
 with the benefits which accrued to Americans un- 
 der that treaty. 
 
 This point is well stated in a communication to 
 our Department of State by the resident Minister 
 of Colombia, dated May 3, 1913, in which, speak- 
 ing of the obligation the United States assumed 
 in the Treaty of 1846, he says : 
 
 And this solemn undertaking, to which the United 
 States pledged its public faith, was not a burdening ob- 
 ligation, nor a gratuitous protection, in favor of the 
 rights of Colombia. On the contrary, the undertaking 
 to guarantee [the sovereignty of Colombia on the 
 Isthmus] was estabhshed in compensation, in payment, 
 of the immense advantages which the United States ob- 
 tained from Colombia by the said treaty. Your Excel- 
 lency knows full well the history of your own country, 
 and therefore, it is not necessary for me to remind you 
 that the great development of California and of all the 
 Pacific coast was principally due to the free and untaxed 
 transit across the Isthmus of Panama which the United 
 States secured under the Treaty of 1846. . . . 
 
 In truth, it is not possible to find any other interna- 
 tional agreement carrying such great advantages and con- 
 cessions to one of the contracting parties as those that 
 the United States obtained, and which were granted to 
 it by Colombia, principally with a view to obtaining an 
 impregnable guarantee of her undeniable rights of sov- 
 ereignty and property over the Isthmus of Panama. 
 Such was, on the part of Colombia, the object she had in 
 mind, the intention with which she entered into the 
 Treaty of 1846. 
 
 While it may be argued that the interests men- 
 tioned belonged to Panama, and that the rights 
 
The Panama Blackmail Treaty 53 
 
 of Colombia became automatically vested in 
 Panama after the establishment of the new Re- 
 public, such an argument is not supported by prec- 
 edent. Colombian sovereignty on the Isthmus, 
 however, was extinguished not by the revolt of 
 Panama, but through the collusion of the Roose- 
 velt Administration before the event, and the dis- 
 play of force before and after the event. This 
 is the very heart of the question. 
 
 It was the solemn duty of the Colombian Con-N 
 gress to reject the Hay-Herran treaty as an un- 
 scientific instrument. The rights of neither party 
 were set forth with sufficient definiteness to fore- 
 shadow harmony in the application of its pro-/ 
 visions in administration. Who but the weaker 
 nation would have had to suffer? Of friction, 
 Colombia had an example in the new construc- 
 tion placed on the Treaty of 1846 in the fall of 
 1902. Simon Creel's statement in the New York 
 Sun on April 3, 1914, is apropos: 
 
 A leetle country never misconstrues a treaty with a ' 
 big one; that is contrary to self-preservation and the 
 law of nations. A leetle country alius construes a treaty 
 with a big one jest the same from fust to last, strictly 
 in accordance with its original meanin' an' intent; but 
 a big nation aint so gol blamed hide-bound ner bigoted, 
 not by a long sight. 
 
 This reflection is suggestive, furnishing the key 
 
54 America and the Canal Title 
 
 which explains Colombia's anxiety — misinter- 
 preted as roguery — during and after the negotia- 
 tion of the canal treaty. 
 
 But the United States benefited enormously by 
 Colombia's rejection as far as concerns its mate- 
 rial interests. In the present treaty with 
 Panama, the United States is the de facto sov- 
 ereign of the Canal Zone, and will, in due course, 
 probably become the de jure sovereign at the re- 
 quest of Panama. We should, therefore, as 
 already stated, be more than willing to pay 
 $25,000,000 additional to the amount stipulated 
 in the Hay-Herran treaty for these additional 
 benefits. 
 
 In the provisions embodied in the present canal 
 treaty, Panama was generous to a fault. It is 
 doubtful if a more one-sided treaty was ever ne- 
 gotiated. Secretary Hay, with the consent of the 
 Junta, gave the United States so much latitude 
 that it is almost equivalent to sovereignty. The 
 United States may use any of the rivers and lakes 
 in the Republic necessary to the canal, and it may 
 acquire additional land outside of the Canal Zone 
 if it is needed for canal purposes. These pro- 
 visions are broad enough to permit the conversion 
 of the Republic into an adjunct of the canal. If 
 Panama cannot preserve order, the United States 
 
The Panama Blackmail Treaty 55 
 
 1 
 may, at its discretion, use its own military forces I 
 
 to maintain it. The foregoing and other pro* ; 
 
 visions make the so-called Republic of Panama a 
 
 protectorate of the United States. 
 
 One would hardly argue that this increment 
 in the value of the rights America finally acquired 
 in the Canal Zone should be paid to Panama if 
 paid at all. Panama was enabled to grant the 
 rights to the Canal Zone and in the canal littoral 
 that she did only because our Administration 
 wrested her from the sovereignty of Colombia. 
 Sovereignty alone has value. Because of the 
 strategic importance of the Canal Zone, the sov- 
 ereignty of the Isthmus has tremendous value. 
 Of this value, the United States despoiled Colom- 
 bia. I repeat, the $25,00x3,000, if paid to Colom- 
 bia, will reimburse that country for only a frac- 
 tion of the value of which she was despoiled. 
 
 This is not all. The $25,000,000 will only in- 
 crease the cost of the canal as a business under- 
 taking. As it is a proper charge to cost, it can 
 be amortized out of revenues. 
 
 Roosevelt argues as though the $25,000,000 
 were a direct charge on the national treasury. 
 It need not, ought not, and will not be if the canal 
 is managed as a business enterprise. As he has 
 only a superficial knowledge of finance, his dis- 
 
56 America and the Canal Title 
 
 cussion of this phase of the problem is especially- 
 weak and deserves serious attention only because 
 of his prestige. An adequate title is a part of 
 cost. The $25,000,000 payment provided for in 
 the pending treaty is necessary to give the United 
 States a clear title to the Canal Zone. It is there- 
 fore a proper charge to investment in the canal 
 and can be amortized through revenues. The 
 burden will then be borne by the commerce that 
 uses the canal and the commerce of the United 
 States will bear only its proportionate share. 
 
 Roosevelt maintains in his article that the 
 $10,000,000 stipulated in the Hay-Herran treaty 
 represented the very outside limit that generosity 
 could fix. This observation presumably applies 
 also to the annuity of $250,000. As the extent 
 of future developements is unknown even to the 
 wisest, it is impossible to say that the amount of- 
 fered was liberal. The arrangement was, to say 
 the least, grossly unscientific. The State is pre- 
 sumed to live forever and so must act on that 
 basis. This fact alone, if properly understood, 
 justified Colombia in considering the compensa- 
 tion stipulated in the Hay-Herran treaty as un- 
 satisfactory. As already indicated, the Colombia 
 Legation in Washington and the Colombian 
 Senate suggested periodic revaluation of the con- 
 
The Panama Blackmail Treaty 57 
 
 cession and adjustment by arbitration if not set- 
 tled by diplomacy. That would have settled the 
 question in harmony with the "square deal," as 
 that expression is understood among experts in 
 public utility finance. 
 
 Colombia was then receiving $250,000 a year 
 from the railroad, which was merely continued 
 in the Hay-Herran treaty. She had a reversion- 
 ary interest in the railroad which would have 
 vested in the United States had the treaty been 
 ratified. Therefore, Colombia was to receive 
 only $10,000,000 for the canal concession and for 
 its reversionary interest in the railroad. This 
 $10,000,000 could have been amortized through 
 revenue so that it would ultimately have cost the 
 United States nothing. The $250,000 would also 
 have been a charge to revenue. Reliable data 
 show that the whole outlay for the canal as a busi- 
 ness enterprise can be amortized in about seventy- 
 five years. Yet the income of Colombia, the 
 sovereign, would have remained at $250,000 
 a year ; that of the United States would have been 
 limited only by the degree of its self respect. 
 
 The situation just described would have been 
 the same as that found in those American munic- 
 ipalities where perpetual franchises have been un- 
 wisely granted, and where hoards of unearned 
 
58 America avid the Canal Title 
 
 wealth are being appropriated by private con- 
 cerns or individuals. Advanced municipalities 
 now grant only indeterminate franchises subject 
 to periodic revaluation, so that the unearned in- 
 crement in the value of the franchise will be 
 secured by the municipality. The aim is to allow 
 only a reasonable return to the investors. The 
 value of the franchise is created by the commu- 
 nity; the return, over and above the reasonable 
 rate on the investment, is therefore appropriated 
 by the municipality. New York City has out- 
 standing franchises of this sort amounting to 
 some half a billion dollars, with reversion at- 
 tached thereto. This city now makes terms with 
 street-railway corporations less liberal than those 
 that Colombia was willing to accept. 
 
 Only a person ignorant of the elementary prin- 
 ciples of finance as related to franchises can fail 
 to see that Colombia's suggestion of periodic 
 revaluation was exactly in line with the methods 
 of modern cities. The United States was en- 
 titled to a reasonable return on the actual invest- 
 ment. Colombia was entitled to reasonable com- 
 pensation for the site and a reasonable annuity 
 in proportion to the increasing value of the site. 
 The remainder belonged to collective civilization 
 — the actual creator of the surplus value. This 
 
The Panama Blackmail Treaty 59 
 
 was the arrangement desired by Colombia, a solu- 
 tion suggested by common sense ; our solution was 
 that of the shot-gun — "Ratify the Hay-Herran 
 treaty or you will regret it." In other words, 
 Colombia was informed that if she did not accept 
 dictated terms, our Administration would take 
 the Canal Zone. 
 
 As already indicated, advanced municipalities 
 grant only indeterminate franchises subject to 
 periodic revaluation so that the imearned incre- 
 ment in the value of the franchise will be secured 
 by the municipality. According to the Hay-Her- 
 ran treaty, the increment in value was to be ap- 
 propriated by the United States in perpetuity. 
 Even Colombia's sovereignty was to be impaired 
 in perpetuity instead of only until she had ad- 
 vanced to stability in administration. She hesi- 
 tated and desired time to think. She is now 
 reviled for having thus attempted to safeguard 
 her just rights. She was weak and so her sov- 
 ereign rights were hurled into the scrap-heap by 
 the use of our gunboats. 
 
 There seems to have been an obstinate and tm- 
 reasoning belief on the part of the Roosevelt Ad- 
 ministration that the terms offered to Colombia 
 were liberal — generous to a fault These it at- 
 tempted to force Colombia to accept. They were 
 
6o America and the Canal Title 
 
 not liberal. They did not take into consideration 
 the possibilities of the future. They ignored the 
 fact that our municipal franchises granted in per- 
 petuity in the past now plague us and that colossal 
 sums of unearned wealth are being appropriated 
 by private interests because of these unwise 
 grants. Colombia was attempting to safeguard 
 her permanent interests against such a blunder 
 as a perpetual grant without periodic revaluation 
 to determine the amount of the annuity to be paid 
 for the said grant. 
 
 Clearly the stand taken by our Administration 
 was highly improper. Colombia's attitude was 
 right — was the only position that an intelligent 
 and self-respecting nation could take. When we 
 view the matter from the policy pursued by ad- 
 vanced municipalities in granting franchises — 
 the emphasis that they place on periodic revalua- 
 tion — we are driven to the conclusion that the 
 Roosevelt Adrninistration, in its attempt to force 
 Colombia to accept terms that our own cities have 
 outlawed, acted as a refined grafter. 
 
 Territory, which belongs to future generations 
 as well as to the present, should never be sur- 
 rendered in perpetuity by any government, for 
 otherwise the dead hand of the past will control 
 the future, which should be left free and be 
 
The Panama Blackmail Treaty 6i 
 
 allowed to make its own arrangements. It ap- 
 pears conclusive that long-period revaluation of 
 the concession was the only equitable arrange- 
 ment. This Colombia proposed and our Govern- 
 ment refused. In the light of the foregoing, who 
 can reasonably be charged with having attempted 
 blackmail ? 
 
 Were a railroad company to do what the Roose- 
 velt Administration perpetrated on the Isthmus, 
 it would be summoned before a court of com- 
 petent jurisdiction. Such a court would disre- 
 gard the amount paid to the partner in crime and 
 would direct that the value of the property taken 
 from the lawful owner be paid to him with lawful 
 interest. This is the way in which our brig- 
 andage on the Isthmus in the fall of 1903 would 
 have been settled if there had been a tribunal with 
 power to determine and enforce justice between 
 sovereign states. 
 
 Ex-Minister Du Bois (to Colombia) is author- 
 ity for the following statement : 
 
 It is a matter of record that Colombia never seriously 
 intended to seize the French company's property, and 
 everybody knows that Colombia wanted the canal dug 
 and wanted the United States to dig it, and had urged 
 it for fifty years. 
 
 Sovereignty adequately safeguarded, and such 
 
62 America and the Canal Title 
 
 compensation as an impartial and competent 
 tribunal would determine, constituted the modest 
 demands of Colombia. 
 
 The charge of blackmail is, I repeat, an un- 
 pardonable slander, trumped up for the purpose 
 of concealing the robbery of a weak nation by one 
 possessing the necessary brute force. The com- 
 pensation provided for in the Hay-Herran treaty 
 was not only not liberal but inadequate. The 
 whole official correspondence shows that Colombia 
 would have accepted financial terms that were 
 less than reasonable, and that she would have 
 been reasonable on the question of sovereignty. 
 The meddling of the Roosevelt Administration in 
 the affairs of Colombia and its concessionary com- 
 panies was as improper as it was reprehensible, 
 and I venture to add that it will always have a 
 suspicious look. 
 
 One might ignore Roosevelt's utterances on the 
 subject if it were not for the fact that our national 
 honor and the interests of a sister Republic are 
 involved. Absurdity reaches its climax in the 
 following excerpt from the article under review : 
 
 Our people should also remember that what we were 
 paying for was the right to expend our own money and 
 our own labor to do a piece of work which if left undone 
 would render the Isthmus of Panama utterly valueless. 
 
The Panama Blackmail Treaty 63 
 
 If we had gone to Nicaragua, or had undertaken to build 
 a canal anywhere else across the Isthmus, then the right 
 which Colombia was so eager to sell for $10,000,000 
 would not have been worth ten cents. The whole value 
 was created by our prospective action; and this action 
 was to be taken wholly at our own expense and without 
 making Colombia or any one else pay a dollar, and this 
 although no power would benefit more by the canal than 
 Colombia, as it would give her waterway communication 
 by a short and almost direct route between her Caribbean 
 and Pacific ports. 
 
 It is difficult to believe that Roosevelt is merely 
 ignorant. Would that it were so! It is a pity 
 that one who has held the high office of President 
 of the United States should use the prestige 
 thereby gained to foist upon the public statements 
 which are absolutely untrue. We will give here 
 only a bird's-eye view of the actual facts, develop- 
 ing them in great detail in several chapters of 
 another work entitled "America and the Canal 
 Tolls." 
 
 In order to think clearly on this subject we 
 must differentiate between the canal as a business 
 enterprise and the canal as an annex to our pro- 
 tective system — military and naval. All outlays 
 for the canal as a business enterprise should be 
 made a liability of the canal and be amortized 
 through its revenues. Therefore, if the United 
 States properly manages the canal, the business 
 end of it will ultimately cost nothing. It is only 
 
64 America and the Canal Title 
 
 a matter of loaning the countr/s credit until the 
 entire cost can be amortized through charges to 
 revenue. The outlay for canal fortifications and 
 other means of protection is more apparent than 
 actual because a given amount of protection with 
 the canal will cost less than the same amount 
 would cost without the canal. 
 
 The outlays of the United States for the canal 
 as a business enterprise are not of the nature of 
 an expenditure, but are an investment to be re- 
 turned at compound interest. The actual outlay 
 of the United States consists of the expenditures 
 for the canal's protection. As the canal will in- 
 crease the efficiency of our navy and therefore 
 make possible a less expenditure for national pro- 
 tection than would otherwise be necessary, it fol- 
 lows that the canal is not a charge to the national 
 treasury if business principles are adopted and 
 maintained in its management. 
 
 As already stated, the United States will have 
 merely loaned its credit to the enterprise, suffer- 
 ing no loss if she manages it properly, becoming, 
 rather, the gainer because as large expenditures 
 for protection as would have had to be incurred 
 will not have to be incurred because of the canal. 
 
 Thus, if one scrutinizes the financial aspect, 
 and substitutes the actual for the apparent, he 
 
The Panama Blackmail Treaty 65 
 
 will obtain a correct view of the relation of the 
 United States Treasury to the canal. Colombia 
 would have furnished the site ; the United States 
 would have furnished the business ability for pay, 
 and have loaned its credit. Our outlay is more 
 apparent than actual. 
 
 To sum up, Roosevelt beclouds fundamental 
 issues when he discusses the benefits that were to 
 accrue to Colombia, but prefers to remain dis- 
 creetly silent as to » the sacrifices Colombia was 
 asked to make, as we have shown. In addition 
 he exaggerates the sacrifices that the United 
 States has made. His statements as to the finan- 
 cial aspects of the negotiations are grotesque, 
 failing even to attain the dignity of half-truths. 
 Colombia merely insisted on the right to control 
 her own actions and her own possessions, subject 
 only to the equal right of every other nation to 
 do the same ; the United States sought to coerce 
 her into granting a concession of her most valu- 
 able possession without adequately safeguarding 
 her permanent interests. 
 
 Even though the United States had proceeded 
 with the construction of the canal by the Nica- 
 ragua route, the concessionary interest of Colom- 
 bia in the railroad would have remained valuable. 
 In addition to this her reversionary interest in it 
 
66 America and the Canal Title 
 
 would have had an increasing actuarial value. 
 The route would have continued to have value as 
 that of a potential canal. The United States is 
 willing to pay a price for all available canal routes, 
 as the pending treaty with Nicaragua shows, and 
 as the effort to secure a concession on the Atrato 
 route proves. Therefore the statement that the 
 Panama route would not have been worth ten 
 cents had the United States constructed the canal 
 elsewhere is merely picturesque. 
 
 Colombia could have voided the Treaty of 1846 
 and then in the course of time, after a marked 
 development, have disposed of the route to a 
 European country. The United States could not 
 have objected with good grace after refusing to 
 pay for the concession the price determined by an 
 arbitral tribunal. 
 
 Calling attention again to the statements of 
 the foregoing excerpt, we will ask which is the 
 more important — the canal site or the capital used 
 in the construction of the canal ? Capital, always 
 subject to depreciation and obsolescence, must be 
 renewed through charges to revenue. The 
 amount invested can be amortized through rev- 
 enue. The site is a permanent ensemble of values, 
 the amount of which will fluctuate with the ebb 
 and flow of commercial progress. As the site 
 
The Panama Blackmail Treaty 67 
 
 did not belong to the United States, it did not 
 have the right to determine the price. To fix the 
 price belonged to the owner, who, however, 
 magnanimously offered to leave it to the arbitra- 
 ment of a neutral third party. 
 
 Roosevelt's argument that our large invest- 
 ment there alone made the site valuable is alto- 
 gether unwarranted. The site made the invest- 
 ment possible and therefore had coordinate im- 
 portance with the capital invested. Our former 
 President may know which blade of a pair of 
 scissors is the more important, but those of us 
 who are not equally gifted can only feel that 
 the two blades are of coordinate importance. 
 
 We prohibited European countries from co- 
 operating in the construction of the canal by the 
 Panama route, thus obligating ourselves to join 
 Colombia in submitting the question of the com- 
 pensation to be paid for the concession to an im- 
 partial tribunal if it could not be arranged by 
 mutual agreement. This our Administration re- 
 fused to do. We actually barred cooperation by 
 France in the construction of the Panama Canal 
 and insisted on sale of the route to us on terms 
 dictated by us. We refused to acquiesce in the 
 terms proposed by Colombia, though they seem 
 reasonable when intelligently scrutinized. What 
 
68 America and the Canal Title 
 
 is our attempt to force our own terms upon 
 Colombia but an unconscious attempt at black- 
 mail? 
 
 ' Not unlike the cry of "Stop thief !" on the part 
 of the actual culprit who seeks to divert attention 
 is the charge of blackmail in this connection. Re- 
 sisting the encroachment of the United States, 
 Colombia sought to preserve her sovereignty over 
 the Isthmus, thus standing for the maintenance 
 of international law and adherence to the funda- 
 mental principles of justice. The United States 
 acted as the Captain Kidd of civilization. Colom- 
 bia sought to safeguard her rights on the Isthmus 
 and requested that our Administration join her 
 in submitting compensation for leasehold rights 
 to the Canal Zone to arbitration. 
 I The solution of our Government was, however, 
 that of the shot-gun — gunboats in Isthmian 
 [waters. Colombia was telegraphed: "Ratify 
 (the treaty [Hay-Herran] or you will regret it." 
 i In other words, Colombia was informed that if 
 [■she did not accept the terms dictated by the 
 ! Roosevelt Administration, the latter would take 
 I the Canal Zone. It was taken. The book now 
 I in the hands of the reader tells, in unvarnished 
 English, the story of how "/ [Roosevelt^ took the 
 \Canal Zone." 
 
The Panama Blackmail Treaty 69 
 
 The financial terms pressed upon Colombia 
 were unscientific. Determination by an impartial 
 tribunal of the amount to be paid her was refused. 
 The political terms insisted upon were humiliat- 
 ing. And these terms were to be in perpetuity, 
 and not subject to periodic reconsideration with 
 provision for arbitration if not mutually arranged. 
 The critical student of institutions finds nothing 
 in the conduct of the Roosevelt Administration 
 to commend; rather does he find much to con- 
 demn. Under a veneer of respectability, it 
 secured title to the Canal Zone, sandbagging 
 Colombia and despoiling her of her choicest pos- 
 session. 
 
 Is Colombia entitled at the present time to com- 
 pensation for the group of values that we have 
 enumerated? We will let Roosevelt furnish the 
 key with which to answer this question. In a 
 speech delivered at the University of California 
 on March 23, 191 1, he said: 
 
 I am interested in the Panama Canal because I started 
 it. If I had followed traditional conservative methods 
 I should have submitted a dignified state paper of prob- 
 ably 200 pages to the Congress, and the debate would 
 have been going on yet. But I took the Canal Zone, 
 and let Congress debate, and while the debate goes on 
 the Canal does also. 
 
 "I took the Canal Zone!" This is the key; 
 
70 America and the Canal Title 
 
 /argument is unnecessary; the political crime is 
 / admitted, leaving nothing to arbitrate, leaving 
 j only damages to be assessed. They should be 
 \ assessed by an impartial tribunal. By paying 
 the amount determined in this way the United 
 States can restore her honor, refusing to be 
 satisfied with paying less than the amount prop- 
 erly determined. Colombia ought not to be 
 compelled to accept less. This is the repara- 
 tion that a man of high character would make 
 to another whom he had injured. Colombia 
 is powerless. She cannot exact justice. Our 
 adjustment of this matter is the measure of our 
 national character. It pays to be just. 
 
 By way of closing our argument on the charge 
 of blackmail, we commend to Roosevelt's prayer- 
 ful attention the following excerpt taken from 
 Shakespeare : 
 
 Who steals my purse steals trash ; 'tis something, nothing; 
 'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands; 
 But he that filches from me my good name 
 Robs me of that which not enriches him 
 And makes me poor indeed. 
 
 The Panama route was merely an alternative 
 one. Roosevelt discusses the provisions in the 
 Spooner law which directed him to construct the 
 canal by the Nicaragua route if he could not 
 
The Panama Blackmail Treaty 71 
 
 secure satisfactory title for the one at Panama. 
 He says : 
 
 I was directed to take the Nicaragua route, but only 
 if within a reasonable time I could not obtain control of 
 the necessary territory of the Republic of Colombia upon 
 reasonable terms; the direction being explicit that if I 
 could not thus get the control within a reasonable time 
 and upon reasonable terms I must go to Nicaragua. 
 Colombia showed by its actions that it was thoroughly 
 acquainted with this fact, and eagerly demanded and 
 entered into a treaty with the United States, the Hay- 
 Herran treaty, under which $10,000,000 was the price 
 stipulated to be paid in exchange for our acquiring the 
 right to the zone on which to build the canal. 
 
 Are the facts concerning the agreement of the 
 representatives of the two countries on the Hay- 
 Herran treaty correctly stated by Roosevelt? 
 What does the letter of Secretary Hay to the 
 charge d'affaires Herran of the Colombian Lega- 
 tion indicate? This letter is dated January 22, 
 1903, and reads : 
 
 I am commanded by the President to say to you that 
 the reasonable time that the statute accords for the con- 
 clusion of negotiations with Colombia for the excavation 
 of a canal on the Isthmus has expired, and he has author- 
 ized me to sign with you the treaty of which I had the 
 honor to give you a draft, with the modification that the 
 sum of $100,000, fixed therein as the annual payment, 
 be increased to $250,000. I am not authorized to con- 
 sider or discuss any other change. 
 
 Was it the United States, or was it Colombia 
 
^2, America and the Canal Title 
 
 who entered eagerly into the agreement known 
 as the Hay-Herran treaty ? All has not yet been 
 said. The New York World is authority for the 
 statement that Cromwell, representative of those 
 interested in the canal company, called on Herran 
 the same day that he received the foregoing note 
 and informed him that if he did not accept the 
 terms offered by the United States, Colombia 
 would lose everything, as the United States had 
 decided to proceed with the construction of the 
 canal by the Nicaragua route. How did Crom- 
 well know? Who told Cromwell of the ultima- 
 tum ? Again, how did he know the day, yea, and 
 the hour, that the ultimatum was dispatched? 
 Can it be that financial buccaneers and our De- 
 partment of State were in collusion to dragoon 
 the representative of Colombia into signing an 
 unsatisfactory treaty? 
 
 Cromwell and Herran called at Secretary 
 Hay's private residence that evening and there 
 signed the Hay-Herran treaty. Three days later 
 Dr. Herran received this telegram from his Gov- 
 ernment : 
 
 Do not sign canal treaty. You will receive instruc- 
 tions in letter of to-day. 
 
 The writer adopts the following comment of 
 the New York World as his own: 
 
The Panama Blackmail Treaty y^ 
 
 The Colombian Government never in any way, shape 
 or form approved the Hay-Herran treaty. It maintained 
 the position it had taken from the first that the canal and 
 railroad companies would have to pay Colombia for the 
 right to transfer their concessions to the United States. 
 
 Through the omnipresent Cromwell it had been 
 ascertained by our Government that the acting 
 Minister of Colombia had instructions from his 
 Government to sign the projected canal treaty if 
 it was accompanied by an ultimatum. The Hay- 
 Herran treaty was signed by Dr. Herran with 
 the reservation that it would be submitted to the 
 Colombian Congress for its untrammeled action. 
 Our Government knew that the instrument when 
 signed was imsatisf actory to the Colombian Gov- 
 ernment and that it would not be ratified by the 
 Colombian Congress without pressure, if at all. 
 
 Roosevelt tells us that as early as August, 1903, 
 he commenced to consider what course to advise 
 the Congress to pursue in view of the fact that 
 ratification of the Hay-Herran treaty seemed then 
 improbable. He felt that several situations might 
 develop. They are stated in his message of Jan- 
 uary 4, 1904. The portion of his statement that 
 proves duplicity reads : 
 
 One was that Colombia would at the last moment see 
 the unwisdom of her position. That there might be noth- 
 ing omitted. Secretary Hay, through the Minister at 
 
74 America and the Canal Title 
 
 Bogota, repeatedly warned Colombia that grave conse- 
 quences might follow from her rejection of the treaty. . . . 
 A second alternative was that by the close of the session 
 on the last day of October, without the ratification of the 
 treaty by Colombia and without any steps taken by 
 Panama, the American Congress on assembling early in 
 December would be confronted with a situation in which 
 there had been a failure to come to terms as to building 
 the canal along the Panama route, and yet there had not 
 been a lapse of a reasonable time — ^using the word reason- 
 able in any proper sense. 
 
 In January, 1903, the reasonable time had ex- 
 pired, and so Dr. Herran had to be overawed and 
 had to be induced to sign a treaty without first 
 consulting his Government, Seven months later 
 the reasonable time had not yet elapsed and would 
 not elapse until the Congress had been consulted. 
 And this slippery method of securing the signa- 
 ture of Herran to the Hay-Herran treaty we are 
 solemnly assured was in harmony with all the ac- 
 cepted canons of ethics ! 
 
 Roosevelt feels indignant that his actions which 
 eventuated in our securing the Canal Zone should 
 be condemned. He gives voice to his feelings in 
 the following: 
 
 There are in every great country a few men whose 
 mental or moral make-up is such that they always try to 
 smirch their own people, and sometimes go to the length 
 of moral treason in the effort to discredit their own 
 
The Panama Blackmail Treaty 75 
 
 national government. A campaign of mendacity was 
 started against this treaty from the outset by certain 
 pubHc men and certain newspapers. One of the favorite 
 assertions of these men and newspapers was that the 
 United States Government had in some way or other in- 
 stigated, and through its agents been privy to, the revolu- 
 tionary movement on the Isthmus. The statement is a 
 deliberate falsehood, and every man who makes it knows 
 that it is a falsehood. . . . 
 
 Even had I desired to foment a revolution — ^which I 
 did not — it would have been wholly unnecessary for me 
 to do so. The Isthmus was seething with revolution. 
 Any interference from me would have had to take the 
 shape of preventing a revolution, not of creating one. 
 All the people residing on the Isthmus ardently desired 
 the revolution. The citizens of Panama desired it. 
 Every municipal council, every governmental body the 
 citizens themselves could elect or control, demanded and 
 supported it. 
 
 Not only does Roosevelt obstruct the restora- 
 tion of national honor by opposing the making 
 of reparation to Colombia, but he prevents the 
 truth about the method employed to secure the 
 Canal Zone from becoming known. Therefore, 
 criticism of him persists. It will persist until our 
 national honor has been taken out of pawn in 
 which he placed it when he "took" the Canal Zone 
 by force. 
 
 In another chapter we will show that no revo- 
 lution on the Isthmus was projected or eventii- 
 ated. The Province of Panama merely estab- 
 lished a government independent of that of Co- 
 
76 America and the Canal Title 
 
 lombia after the details had been arranged. Our 
 Administration used the navy to prevent Colom- 
 bia from exercising the right of sovereignty in 
 this Province after its Declaration of Inde- 
 pendence, and interfered with its exercise before 
 that date. 
 
 Let there be no misunderstanding. There was 
 no revolution on the Isthmus in the fall of 1903. 
 No revolution was projected and none eventu- 
 ated. The Province of Panama seceded from 
 Colombia after assurance from our Administra- 
 tion that it would protect secession within forty- 
 eight hours after the Declaration of Independ- 
 ence. This protection was extended earlier than 
 agreed to — on November 3-5, 1903. Colombia 
 was overawed by the display of overwhelming 
 force. The so-called Republic of Panama was 
 organized as a protectorate of the United States 
 undfer a pretense at revolution. Pretense at 
 revolution, as that term is understood in history, 
 is not revolution. It is the rape of a weak nation 
 by a stronger one. It is international burglary 
 under a veneer of respectability. 
 
 The Isthmus did not seethe with revolution. 
 No real revolution had even been contemplated. 
 Du Bois, our Ex-Minister to Colombia, states: 
 
 I say, and can prove it, that a handful of men, who 
 
The Panama Blackmail Treaty yy 
 
 were to be the direct beneficiaries of the revolution, con- 
 eeived it, and not the hundredth part of the inhabitants 
 of the Isthmus knew of the revolt until an American 
 officer, in the uniform of the United States army, raised 
 the flag of the new republic. 
 
 An excerpt from an American newspaper pub- 
 lished in Colon throws light on the subject. It 
 effectually disposes of Roosevelt's : "The Isthmus 
 was seething with revolution." It reads as fol- 
 lows: 
 
 When the inhabitants awoke in the morning [Novem- 
 ber 4, 1903] after a night of undisturbed slumber, they 
 little dreamt that their tranquillity would be disturbed ere 
 the setting of the sun. But it is the unexpected that 
 often occurs. It was so in the present case. With the 
 assurance of peace in the country there was nothing 
 known yesterday to the public of Colon to have aroused 
 any misapprehension. But the disquieting news which 
 had been flashed across the wire from Panama had leaked 
 out, and in a very short time it had spread throughout 
 the whole town. The news was to the effect that Panama 
 had declared its independence on the afternoon of the 
 3d instant. To one and all the news came like a bolt 
 from a clear sky. No one cared to talk or express an 
 opinion. Such was the gravity of the situation. 
 
 This newspaper clipping is taken from a speech 
 delivered in the Senate by the late Senator Car- 
 mack. His comment in connection therewith siz- 
 zles with irony, an excerpt from which follows : 
 
 That was the condition of the people who were rising 
 there with unexampled unanimity, rising as one man 
 
78 America and the Canal Title, 
 
 against the terrible tyranny of Colombia. The news that 
 they were conducting a revolution came to that people 
 like a bolt from a clear sky. No inhabitant dared to 
 express an opinion about the revolution. They rose as 
 one man . . . but the one man was in the White House. 
 
 Evidence of this character should be cumula- 
 tive. Elsewhere we will give data which match 
 so perfectly with those given here that the con- 
 clusion is irresistible. We will close this line of 
 evidence with the following clipping from the 
 New York Tribune, dated December 28, 1903 : 
 
 The secessionist movement began with three men, and 
 was executed under the supervision of those three and 
 four others, the seven working under the advice and 
 counsel of four Americans. Before the coup d'etat others 
 were, perforce, taken into the secret ; but so closely were 
 the plans guarded that those who were really in the 
 secret and knew definitely the details might be counted 
 on the fingers of the two hands. This brings us to the 
 revolution itself, and introduces the strongest of all con- 
 tradictions discoverable in connection with the birth of 
 this national infant. The uprising took place on the 3d 
 day of November, being initiated by the arr6st of Gen- 
 erals Tovar and Amaya and Governor Obaldia, which 
 took place in the City of Panama. That city knew, of 
 course, what had occurred the moment the arrests were 
 effected, but Colon was kept in ignorance of the secession 
 until the following day. It was on the 4th of the month 
 that the public meeting was held in the cathedral plaza, 
 Panama, the independence of the Republic proclaimed, 
 and the declaration of independence, or manifestation, 
 as they call it here, was signed. 
 
 Bearing in mind the fact that seven men, aided by the 
 soldiers and others whose support to the movement had 
 
The Panama Blackmail Treaty 79 
 
 been purchased with dollars, were alone responsible for 
 the sudden revolution in the political status of Panama, 
 one may wander away down a stretch of not uninterest- 
 ing inquiries. Were the people of other provinces con- 
 sulted as to what it was proposed by the secessionists to 
 do? They were not. Were the people, speaking in gen- 
 eral terms, of the Provinces of Colon and Panama let into 
 the secret? They were not. They knew, by general 
 rumor, that 2. revolution was on the tapis, but they had 
 not been consulted nor their advice asked as to the wisdom 
 or unwisdom of what was contemplated. Was a pro- 
 visional Congress composed of delegates from the several 
 provinces held for the purpose of debating the project 
 and framing a bill of separation? Nothing of the kind 
 was ever thought of. . . . 
 
 The little band of secessionists let the members of the 
 city council of Panama into their secret late in October, 
 when it became evident that a blow would have to be 
 struck very soon or be forever withheld. These city 
 councilmen — eleven in number — were willing to further 
 the project, so that when the public meeting was held in 
 the Cathedral plaza, Panama, on November 4, they were 
 all in attendance. They, too, were the first to sign the 
 declaration of independence, and immediately after that 
 formality they adjourned across the street to the munici- 
 pal building and went into session behind closed doors. 
 Their first act then was to pass the declaration, which 
 had already been engrossed in a book of record, and to 
 append their names to the engrossed copy. This done, 
 the city council appointed the three members of the pro- 
 visional governing junta, authorizing them to take charge 
 of the affairs of the new Republic. The junta assembled 
 at once and named the members of the provisional cabinet, 
 and the new Republic became a fact. On the same day 
 Porfirio Melendez had taken charge of affairs at Colon 
 as provisional governor appointed by the junta ; but out- 
 side of the Cities of Panama and Colon and along the 
 line of the Panama Railroad the people of the new Re- 
 
8o America and the Canal Title 
 
 public were in entire ignorance of the fact that they were 
 ■no longer subjects of Colombia. 
 
 i It seems almost incredible that the municipal council 
 of a city of fewer than 25,000 people should take unto 
 themselves the right to create a Republic out of a terri- 
 tory equal in area to the State of Indiana [population 
 300,000] ; but that was what was actually done in this 
 case. Instead of a provisional congress, the city council 
 of Panama passed the act of independence. Every legis- 
 lative formality incident to the creation of this Republic 
 v/as performed by these city councilmen, no portion of 
 the new Republic, except the City of Panama, having a 
 voice, by representation, in what was done. Nor has 
 any other portion of the new Republic had such a voice 
 to this day. No congress had been called to ratify the 
 secession, nor has any one of the seven provinces been 
 requested to assemble, in council or by mass-meeting, to 
 pass an act of ratification. . . . 
 
 Immediately after the creation of the Republic and the 
 appointment of the junta by the city council of Panama, 
 the junta took steps to this end. Emissaries were sent 
 into the different provinces to proclaim the establishment 
 of the Republic. These emissaries were effective orators 
 — as are nearly all the people of these southern countries. 
 They toured along both coasts, east and west, and stopped 
 at the principal cities. . . . 
 
 In each of these cities the emissary would, upon his 
 arrival, employ the local band of musicians. Taking a 
 stand in the principal plaza he would draw the crowd by 
 the band's efforts, and when a number sufficient for his 
 purposes had assembled, he would read the declaration 
 of independence. Following the reading would come his 
 harangue, the burden of which was that the establishment 
 of the Republic meant the construction of the ship canal 
 by the United States across the Isthmus, and that the 
 construction of this canal meant that the United States 
 would have to pay to the Republic a sum of money suffi- 
 cient to make all of the people rich and prosperous. . . . 
 
The Panama Blackmail Treaty 8i 
 
 He never failed to elicit enthusiastic responses in ap- 
 proval of what had been done. The business of the/ 
 emissary was then to report to the junta that the people/ 
 of that city accepted the Republic and gloried in its crea- 
 tion. 
 
 And all the people resident on the Isthmus ar- 
 dently desired the revolution! We are not told 
 that all included merely all of an inner circle in 
 Panama and a fringe of adventurers. Had not 
 our Administration collaborated with that inner 
 circle through Bunau-Varilla as intermediary 
 there would be no Republic of Panama to-day. 
 
 We now take up arguments of the article re- 
 ferred to in the title to this chapter which are not 
 directly apropos to the main theme of this book, 
 but which are here discussed in order to show 
 more fully that the public statements of Roose- 
 velt concerning the acquisition of the Canal Zone 
 must be discounted. 
 
 Seeking means to discredit the Wilson Admin- 
 istration, Roosevelt takes up, in this article, its 
 policy on the canal tolls. The excerpt which fol- 
 lows is representative of his inaccurate and mis- 
 leading statements : 
 
 The Administration has succeeded in getting Congress 
 to take the position that the United States has no special 
 rights in its own canal. It now proposes by treaty to get 
 
82 America and the Canal Title 
 
 Congress to give to the one nation which conspicuously 
 wronged us in connection with that canal special rights 
 which it would deny to ourselves and to all other countries. 
 President Wilson denies that we have the right to ex- 
 empt our own vessels engaged in peaceful coast commerce 
 from tolls, and yet he now proposes to exempt from tolls 
 the war vessels and transports of Colombia. A year ago 
 I should have deemed it impossible that two such proposi- 
 tions could have been entertained by the same Administra- 
 tion. 
 
 Had the writer been told a year ago that our 
 foremost private citizen was knowingly a pur- 
 veyor of incorrect information he would have 
 spurned the suggestion. But analysis of the 
 foregoing excerpt and of excerpts from the same 
 source which follow, together with comparison 
 of them with the correct information, establish 
 the fact. The writer is aware that Roosevelt has 
 a wider range of superficial information than any 
 other man in the public eye, yet he is constrained 
 to believe that even Roosevelt knows the differ- 
 ence between a public vessel (vessel of war) and 
 a vessel engaged in coastwise trade (vessel of 
 commerce). The foregoing statement is plainly 
 intended to mislead. If it were not, the compari- 
 son would have been made between the public 
 vessels of Colombia and the public vessels of the 
 United States ; between the vessels of citizens of 
 Colombia engaged in the coastwise trade and the 
 
The Panama Blackmail Treaty 83 
 
 vessels of citizens of the United States similarly- 
 engaged. The Wilson Administration merely 
 proposes to give to Colombia the same rights in 
 the use of the Canal for her public vessels that 
 the United States possesses. If the pending 
 treaty with Colombia is ratified, the coastwise 
 trade of Panama, Colombia and the United States 
 using the Canal will be subject to tolls, while 
 their public vessels will be exempt. The United 
 States is the only country that has any special 
 rights in the use of the Canal. That is, in the 
 event of war, she can shut out the enemy and use 
 the canal in her military operations. 
 
 Roosevelt quotes the following from the pend- 
 ing treaty with Colombia : 
 
 The Republic of Colombia shall be at liberty at all times 
 to transport through the interoceanic canal its troops, 
 materials of war, and ships of war, even in case of war 
 between Colombia and another country, without paying 
 any charges to the United States. 
 
 This provision has the same meaning and is 
 the same in purpose as the one in the treaty 
 drafted during the Roosevelt Administration. It 
 grants no privileges whatsoever to the vessels 
 of commerce owned by citizens of Colombia en- 
 gaged in coastwise trade. There has been no 
 change whatsoever in the right of the United 
 States to pass its public vessels through the canal 
 
84 America and the Canal Title 
 
 without charge. Yet Roosevelt comments on 
 this provision in the treaty as follows : 
 
 To grant such a right to both Colombia and Panama 
 was permissible so long as we also insisted on exercising 
 it ourselves, on the grounds set forth by the then Secre- 
 tary of State, Mr. Root, in his note to the British Govern- 
 ment of January 16, 1909. In this note Secretary Root 
 took the ground that the United States had the right to 
 except from "coming within any schedule of tolls which 
 might thereafter be established" the ships of the powers 
 entering into the agreement necessary in order to give 
 title to the land through which the canal was to be built, 
 and to authorize its construction and the necessary juris- 
 diction or control over it when built. These nations were 
 Panama, Colombia and the United States. Since then 
 the present Administration has surrendered the right so 
 far as the United States is concerned; and yet it pro- 
 poses to give to the most envenomed opponent of the 
 building of the canal rights to its use which are denied 
 to the power giving the rights. In other words, the Ad- 
 ministration says that our people who built the canal 
 can give to others rights which they dare not themselves 
 exercise. Such a position is a wicked absurdity. 
 
 The foregoing statement is a distortion of the 
 truth. It is so unutterably false that it staggers 
 belief. In the note of Secretary Root, mentioned 
 by Roosevelt, it is stated : 
 
 The United States has found it necessary to renew 
 the reservation of the specific right of Colombia to send 
 its warships through the canal without the payment of 
 dues, which has been insisted upon by that country in 
 every concession and treaty she has made regarding 
 it. . . . 
 
The Panama Blackmail Treaty 85 
 
 In agreeing to accord to Colombia this reservation, 
 the United States is not dealing with the general subject 
 of canal tolls. It is treating Colombia, for the reasons 
 which I have described, as being in a wholly exceptional 
 position, not subject to the rule of equality of the Hay- 
 Pauncefote treaty and not to come within any schedule 
 of tolls which may hereafter be established, which must, 
 of course, under the treaty, be equal for all nations to 
 whom the rule of equality is properly applicable. 
 
 The Root note and the treaty drafted in con- 
 formity therewith merely designed to exclude the 
 public vessels of Colombia from coming within 
 any schedule of tolls which might hereafter be es- 
 tablished. The public vessels of Panama were al- 
 ready excluded by treaty. Those of the United 
 States were excluded because they are engaged in 
 maintenance and protection. It is thus clear that 
 the Roosevelt Administration proposed to do just 
 what the Wilson Administration proposes to do, 
 that is, grant free transit to the public vessels of 
 Colombia in the use of the canal. 
 
 The foregoing excerpt from the Root note can 
 only be fully understood when examined in con- 
 nection with the subject matter to which it refers. 
 This subject matter was the following paragraph 
 from the draft of a treaty then negotiated with 
 Colombia but not ratified: 
 
 The Republic of Colombia shall have liberty at all times 
 to convey through the ship canal now in course of con- 
 
86 America and the Canal Title 
 
 struction by the United States across the Isthmus of 
 Panama the troops, materials for war, and ships of war 
 of the RepubHc of Colombia, without paying any duty 
 to the United States, even in the case of an international 
 war between Colombia and another country. 
 
 The reply to the Root note by the British Gov- 
 ernment shows conclusively that only the public 
 vessels of Colombia were under consideration, 
 and that Roosevelt's distinguished Secretary of 
 State did not intend to include in the contem- 
 plated exemption any vessels of commerce. In 
 the tolls-exemption repeal, nothing was surren- 
 dered by the United States. It merely restored 
 a treaty that had been made a scrap of paper by 
 the previous Administration, The British note 
 reads : 
 
 His Majesty's Government are content to note that the 
 United States Government hold that the right of the free 
 passage for warships which the present treaty proposes 
 to extend to Colombia is deemed by them to grow out of 
 the entirely special and exceptional position of Colombia 
 toward the canal and the title thereto, and accordingly 
 does not constitute a precedent, and will not hereafter 
 be drawn into a precedent, for the exception of any other 
 nation from the payment of equal dues for the passage 
 of war vessels in accordance with such schedules as shall 
 be hereafter constituted in conformity with the Hay- 
 Pauncefote treaty, or for any other concession of a special 
 nature to Colombia or to any other power. 
 
 I have accordingly the honor of stating to you that His 
 Majesty's Government consider that they can forego the 
 making of such a protest as they had formerly contem- 
 
The Panama Blackmail Treaty 87 
 
 plated, and that they accept the assurance contained in 
 your note. 
 
 Nor is this all. The claim that the public ves- 
 sels of the United States could not pass through 
 the canal free of charge was never put forward 
 by Great Britain. In order to remove all doubt 
 on this point Secretary Knox wrote: 
 
 It is not believed, however, that in the objection now 
 under consideration Great Britain intends to question the 
 right of the United States to exempt from the payment 
 of tolls its vessels of war and other vessels engaged in 
 the service of this Government. Great Britain does not 
 challenge the right of the United States to protect the 
 canal. United States vessels of war and those employed 
 in Government service are a part of our protective system. 
 By the Hay-Pauncefote treaty we assume the sole re- 
 sponsibility for its neutralization. It is inconceivable that 
 this Government should be required to pay canal tolls for 
 the vessels used for protecting the canal, which we alone 
 must protect. The movement of United States vessels 
 in executing governmental policies of protection are not 
 susceptible of explanation or differentiation. The United 
 States could not be called upon to explain what relation 
 the movement of a particular vessel through the canal 
 has to its protection. The British objection, therefore, 
 is understood as having no relation to the use of the canal 
 by vessels in the service of the United States Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 Great Britain assented to this construction of 
 the Hay-Pauncefote treaty. Therefore, the right 
 of the United States to pass its public vessels 
 through the canal free of charge was not even 
 questioned. Vessels engaged in the coastwise 
 
88 America and the Canal Title 
 
 trade are not public vessels, and so do not come 
 within the purview of the Root note. 
 
 The actual canal situation is as follows : The 
 public vessels of the United States and of Panama 
 are exempt from the payment of tolls. It is pro- 
 posed, in the pending treaty, to extend the same 
 right to the public vessels of Colombia. The pub- 
 lic vessels of all other countries must pay the es- 
 tablished rate. The vessels of commerce of all 
 nations are on the same footing in the use of the 
 canal — all privilege is barred. In the event of 
 war, the United States has the exclusive use of 
 the canal for military purposes. The United 
 States is, therefore, the only nation that has spe- 
 cial rights in the use of the canal, that is, during 
 a war in which she is a belligerent. Accordingly 
 the situation is just the opposite from that indi- 
 cated by Roosevelt. 
 
 Equality in the commercial use of the Panama 
 Canal is provided for in two treaties: One, 
 signed, ratified and proclaimed (Hay-Paunce- 
 fote treaty) ; the other, negotiated, signed, rati- 
 fied and proclaimed (Hay-Bunau-Varilla treaty) 
 while Roosevelt was President. Roosevelt is 
 criticizing an Administration which is merely ob- 
 serving the treaties, as they stand, which were 
 entered into during his Administration. 
 
The Panama Blackmail Treaty 89 
 
 The weakness of Roosevelt's contention in the 
 passages so far quoted in this chapter is found in 
 the efifort he has put forth to confuse. Why is 
 not this effort put forth to clear up circumstances 
 that have a suspicious look? For instance, the 
 cablegram to the commander of the Nashville on 
 October 30, 1903, ordering him to proceed to 
 Colon, is missing. What became of it? And 
 what was its relation to the journey of Bunau- 
 Varilla from New York to Washington the previ- 
 ous night ? 
 
 We deal with the contents of some of the fore- 
 going excerpts more fully in other chapters. 
 Space does not permit us to deal with the entire 
 mass of stuff that has been injected into the con- 
 troversy for the purpose of concealing the theft 
 of the Canal Zone. The following from the 
 article is typical : 
 
 The land could not have heen acquired and the canal 
 could not have been built save by taking precisely and ex- 
 actly the action which was taken. Unless the nation is 
 prepared heartily to indorse and stand by this action, it 
 has no right to take any pride in anything that has been 
 done on the Isthmus and it has no right to remain on the 
 Isthmus. If there is a moral justification for paying 
 Colombia $25,000,000, then there is no moral justification 
 for our staying on the Isthmus at all and we should 
 promptly get oflf. If President Wilson and Secretary 
 Bryan are right in their position, then they have no busi- 
 ness to take part in any ceremony connected with open- 
 
90 America and the Canal Title 
 
 ing the canal ; on their theory they would be engaged in 
 the dedication of stolen goods. 
 
 We cannot see that a work of art ceases to be 
 a masterpiece because it was painted on stolen 
 canvas. The painting remains a thing of beauty 
 without regard to the method used in getting the 
 canvas on which it was painted. In praising the 
 work of art we do not condone the act of the bur- 
 glar. It is merely necessary to compensate prop- 
 erly the original owner of the canvas. We are 
 not prevented from admiring the skill of our 
 civil and sanitary engineers because our Admin- 
 istration "took" (did not secure by due process 
 of law) the Canal Zone. It is merely necessary 
 that the owner be compensated for loss suffered. 
 
 We have now examined a number of excerpts 
 from the article under consideration and have 
 shown that they are grossly inaccurate. Simi- 
 larly, the whole article is a collection of garbled, 
 inaccurate and misleading statements. It de- 
 ceives those who believe it to be a truthful ex- 
 amination of a phase of our foreign policy. It 
 conveys a false impression. We will conclude 
 direct consideration of the article by commenting 
 on its closing paragraph : 
 
 As a matter of fact, every action we took was not only 
 open and straightforward, but was rendered absolutely 
 
The Panama Blackmail Treaty 91 
 
 necessary by the misconduct of Colombia. Every action 
 we took was in accordance with the highest principles of 
 national, international, and private morality. The honor 
 of the United States, and the interest not only of the 
 United States but of the world, demanded the building 
 of the canal. The canal could not have been built, it 
 would not now have been begun, had our Government not 
 acted precisely as it did act in 1903. No action ever 
 taken by the Government, in dealing with any foreign 
 power since the days of the Revolution, was more vitally 
 necessary to the well-being of our people, and no action 
 we ever took was taken with a higher regard for the 
 standards of honor, of courage, and of efficiency which 
 should distinguish the attitude of the United States in 
 all its dealings with the rest of the world. 
 
 If the cause of the United States was so just, 
 why did not Roosevelt as President welcome the 
 opportunity to submit it to arbitration ? On De- 
 cember 23, 1903, Colombia proposed that the en- 
 tire matter be submitted to the Arbitration Tri 
 bunal of The Hague. From that date to March 
 4, 1909, Roosevelt had the opportunity to vindi- 
 cate his course by joining Colombia in submitting 
 the matter to an impartial tribunal for adjudica- 
 tion. He refused — refused to submit what he 
 calls a just cause to an arbitral tribunal for de- 
 cision. We are thus warranted in asserting that 
 his protestations lack sincerity. 
 
 The foregoing paragraph from the article un- 
 der review reminds one of an observation made 
 by Samuel Weller concerning veal pie : 
 
 <• 
 
92 America and the Canal Title 
 
 Werry good thing is weal pie, when you know the lady 
 as made it, and is quite sure it ain't kittens. 
 
 Are the protestations of Roosevelt what they 
 profess to be ? What is the value as evidence of 
 statements made by him concerning the opera 
 bouife revolution on the Isthmus? It is one of 
 the purposes of this chapter to answer this ques- 
 tion. We will give further data bearing on the 
 question from his discussion of the Hague conven- 
 tions and the duty of the United States in regard 
 to their enforcement. In the Independent of 
 January 4, 19 15, he writes: 
 
 To violate these conventions, to violate neutrality 
 treaties, as Germany has done in the case of Belgium, is 
 a dreadful thing. It represents the gravest kind of inter- 
 national wrongdoing, but it is really not quite so con- 
 temptible, it does not show such short-sighted and timid in- 
 efficiency, and above all, such selfish indifference to the 
 cause of permanent and righteous peace, as has been 
 shown by the United States (thanks to President Wilson 
 and Secretary Bryan) in refusing to fulfill its solemn ob- 
 ligations by taking whatever action was necessary in order 
 to clear our skirts from the guilt of tame acquiescence in 
 a wrong which we had solemnly undertaken to oppose. 
 
 If I had for one moment supposed that signing these 
 Hague conventions meant literally nothing whatever be- 
 yond the expression of a pious wish which any power 
 was at liberty to disregard with impunity in accordance 
 with the dictation of self-interest I would certainly not 
 have permitted the United States to be a party to such a 
 mischievous farce. President Wilson and Secretary 
 Bryan, however, take the view that when the United 
 
The Panama Blackmail Treaty 93 
 
 States assumes obligations in order to secure small and 
 unoffending neutral nations against hideous wrong, its 
 action is not predicated on any intention to make the 
 guarantee effective. 
 
 They take the view that when we are asked to redeem 
 in the concrete promises we made in the abstract our 
 duty is to disregard our obligations and to preserve ignoble 
 peace for ourselves by regarding with cold-blooded and 
 timid indifference the most frightful ravages of war com- 
 mitted at the expense of a peaceful and unoffending 
 country. This is the cult of cowardice. 
 
 What is the cult of Roosevelt? Does not a 
 shorter word than "cowardice" correctly express 
 it? It is sad that a person of so great prestige 
 should bear false witness on questions of foreign 
 relations. In his book entitled "America and the 
 World War," Roosevelt criticizes President Wil- 
 son as follows : 
 
 In his over anxiety not to offend the powerful who have 
 done wrong, he scrupulously refrains from saying one 
 word on behalf of the weak who have suffered wrong. 
 He makes no allusions to the violation of the Hague Con- 
 ventions at Belgium's expense, although this nation had 
 solemnly undertaken to be a guarantor of those conven- 
 tions. 
 
 What are the facts about the Hague Conven- 
 tions ? What are the obligations assumed by the 
 United States in signing some of them ? We will 
 let William Bayard Hale answer these questions : 
 
 Thus rashly and violently writes Mr. Roosevelt. Igno- 
 rant of the fact that The Hague rules regarding neutral- 
 
94 America and the Canal Title 
 
 ity, . . . regarding everything which troubles Mr. Roose- 
 velt and saddens us all, have never been ratified by Great 
 Britain, nor by France, nor by Belgium, and that by 
 their own provision these articles are binding only if 
 ratified by all belligerents ; ignorant likewise of the fact 
 that the United States, in ratifying certain of The Hague 
 rules, added the express stipulation that the action was 
 not to be taken as involving this Government in any way 
 in an obligation to enforce their observance on other 
 powers. 
 
 Is the United States the guarantor of the 
 Hague Conventions ? Or, is this nation only ob- 
 ligated to observe those it signed? These con- 
 ventions were signed during the Roosevelt Ad- 
 ministration with the understanding that the 
 United States was under no obligation to enforce 
 their observance by others. By observing those 
 it signed the United States complies with every 
 obligation assumed. It is not the guarantor of 
 a single Hague Convention. 
 
 Does not Roosevelt rely on the absence of ac- 
 curate information among his readers and their 
 inability to detect garbled, misleading and false 
 statements in bearing false witness against the 
 present Administration? His arguments in the 
 .article which has just been under consideration 
 rest on as shadowy a foundation as his assertions 
 about the Hague Conventions. His statements 
 and conclusions contained therein are an affront 
 
The Panama Blackmail Treaty 95 
 
 to readers informed on vital facts. Prof. Chan- 
 cellor of the University of Wooster supplements 
 the statement of William Bayard Hale as fol- 
 lows : 
 
 When a nation is a party to a guarantee of neutral- 
 ity, whether explicit or implicit, such participation guar- 
 antees only the action of the nation, and does not bind 
 such a nation to enforce upon other nations the continued 
 . recognition of such neutrality. The independence of na- 
 tions is a more complete and integral independence than 
 that of individuals. If explicitly or implicitly the United 
 States has ever been a party to the guarantee of Belgian 
 neutrality, all that this means is that for ourselves we 
 should recognize that neutrality. It might be conclu- 
 sively shown that we have never guaranteed that Belgian 
 neutrality must be recognized by Germany and Austria 
 and Hungary. Here former President Roosevelt has 
 fallen into pernicious error. Common sense is against 
 any doctrine of international law that should make one na- 
 tion the keeper of the consciences of other nations. The 
 law of nature is against any undertaking by the United 
 States to regulate the morals of Germany, of Mexico, and 
 of such other nations as may from time to time or syn- 
 chronously lose the ability to consider and parley, and in 
 sheer default of thought and talk seize the sword. 
 
 The conference at The Hague, in 1907, elab- 
 orated fifteen Conventions. The delegates of the 
 United States signed only twelve of these. No 
 nation became the guarantor of any of these con- 
 ventions. That was neither the nature nor pur- 
 pose of the conference. The signers merely ob- 
 ligated themselves to obey the Conventions they 
 
96 America and the Canal Title 
 
 signed under the general reservation determined 
 by the conference as stated in the foregoing ex- 
 cerpt by William Bayard Hale. One of these 
 conventions the delegates from the United States 
 signed with the following special reservation : 
 
 Nothing contained in this convention shall be so con- 
 strued as to require the United States of America to de- 
 part from its traditional policy of not intruding upon, 
 interfering with, or entangling itself in the political ques- 
 tions of policy or internal administration of any foreign 
 state ; nor shall anything contained in the said Conven- 
 tion be construed to imply a relinquishment by the United 
 States of its traditional attitude toward purely American 
 questions. 
 
 These are the facts concerning the Hague Con- 
 ventions. Is Roosevelt merely mistaken concern- 
 ing their import? It taxes credulity to believe 
 that observations similar to those of William 
 Bayard Hale and Professor Chancellor entirely 
 escaped his notice. Yet we find in his statement 
 at or near the Military Instruction Camp at 
 Plattsburgh on August 25, 19 15, his false asser- 
 tions about our obligations under The Hague 
 Conventions, reasserted in the following form: 
 
 Let us treat others justly and keep the engagements 
 we have made, such as those in The Hague Conventions, 
 to secure just treatnient for others. . . . 
 
 Under The Hague Convention it was our bounden duty 
 to take whatever action was necessary to prevent and, 
 
The Panama Blackmail Treaty 97 
 
 if not to prevent, then to undo, the hideous wrong that 
 was done to Belgium. We have shirked this duty. . . . 
 For thirteen months America has played an ignoble 
 part among the nations. We have tamely submitted to 
 seeing the weak, whom we had covenanted to protect, 
 wronged. 
 
 In the Metropolitan Magazine for October, 
 191 5, Roosevelt defends his earlier assertions con- 
 cerning The Hague Conventions as follows : 
 
 If no duty had been expressly imposed upon the United 
 States in this matter, we ought nevertheless to have acted 
 in accordance with the generous instincts of humanity. 
 But as a matter of fact such a duty was expressly imposed 
 upon us by the Hague Conventions. The Convention, 
 signed at The Hague October i8th, 1907* [footnote re- 
 fers to pages 133-144 of "The Hague Conventions and 
 Declarations" edited by James Brown Scott], begins by 
 saying that "His Majesty the German Emperor, King 
 of Prussia," and the other signatory powers, including 
 France, Belgium, Russia and the United States, have 
 resolved to con^de a Convention laying down clearly 
 the rights and duties of neutral powers in case of war on 
 land. Article i runs: "The territory of neutral powers 
 is inviolable." Article 5 states that a neutral power 
 "must not allow belligerents to move troops across its 
 territory." Article 10 states t^at "the fact of a neutral 
 power resisting even by force attempts to violate its 
 neutrality cannot be regarded as a hostile act." Article 
 7 states that "a neutral power is not called upon to pre- 
 vent the export or transport on behalf of one or other of 
 the belligerents of arms, munitions of war or in general 
 of anything which could be of use to an army or a fleet." 
 This Convention was ratified by Belgium on August 8th, 
 1910; by France on October 7th, 1910; by Germany, the 
 United States and Russia on November 27th, 1909. . . . 
 
98 America and the Canal Title 
 
 A treaty is a promise. The signing powers make 
 promises each to the others and each to each of the others 
 in such a case as this. Germany had promised France, 
 Belgium, the United States and Russia that it would treat 
 the territory of a neutral power (in this case Belgium) 
 as inviolable. Germany violated this promise. Belgium 
 had promised Germany, the United States, France and 
 Russia that it would not permit such violation of its neu- 
 trality as Germany committed. Belgium kept its promise. 
 Germany had promised that if a neutral power (Belgium) 
 resisted by force such an attempt as it, Germany, made 
 to violate its neutrality, Germany would not regard such 
 an act as hostile. Germany broke this promise. When 
 Germany thus broke her promises, we broke our promise 
 by failing at once to call her to account. The treaty was 
 a joint and several guarantee, and it was the duty of 
 every signer to take action when it was violated ; above 
 all it was the duty of the most powerful neutral, the 
 United States. 
 
 An exact reproduction of those articles of The 
 Hague Conventions which are vital is the best 
 answer to the foregoing excerpt from Roosevelt's 
 article. Therefore, we will reproduce them and 
 print in italics the paragraph of Article 5 which 
 is omitted. This paragraph shows that the in- 
 tent of this Convention (No. 5) is just the op- 
 posite of the foregoing assertion by him. The 
 articles from this Convention which are apropos 
 follow : 
 
 ARTICLE I 
 
 The territory of neutral powers is inviolable. 
 
The Panama Blackmail Treaty 99 
 
 ARTICLE 2 
 
 Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys, 
 whether of munitions of war or of supplies, across the 
 territory of a neutral Power. 
 
 ARTICLE 4 
 
 Corps of combatants must not be formed, nor recruit- 
 ing agencies opened, on the territory of a neutral Power, 
 to assist the belligerents. 
 
 ARTICLE 5 
 
 A neutral Power must not allow any of the acts re- 
 ferred to in Articles 2 and 4 to occur on jts territory. 
 
 It is not called upon to punish acts in violation of the 
 neutrality unless such acts have been committed on its 
 own territory. 
 
 The closing paragraph of Article 5 shows that 
 the United States is not the guarantor of The 
 Hague Conventions as alleged by Roosevelt. 
 Reiteration does not convert false statements into 
 truth whether the false statements are due to 
 error or to sinister political propaganda to dis- 
 credit an official of exalted moral purpose, as is 
 this propaganda against our esteemed President 
 — propaganda buttressed by falsehood of the 
 basest character. The United States is not the 
 guarantor of the Hague Conventions. This is 
 self-evident to a student of American diplomacy. 
 Roosevelt knows something about diplomacy. 
 We are, therefore, warranted in inferring that 
 he is attempting to discredit the Wilson Admin- 
 
loo America and the Canal Title 
 
 istration by statements known to him to be false. 
 His. conduct seems to come under the following 
 condemnation penned by himself : 
 
 There are in every great country a few men whose 
 mental or moral make-up is such that they ... go to the 
 length of moral treason in the effort to discredit their own 
 national government. 
 
 One is not warranted in expecting accuracy 
 from Roosevelt where nothing is recorded, since 
 he makes assertions easily contradicted by docu- 
 mentary evidence. In order to have value as 
 evidence, it is apparent that any statement made 
 by him relative to the part his Administration 
 played in the creation of the so-called Republic 
 of Panama must have substantial corroboration. 
 
 For an individual to tell a falsehood and re- 
 peat it in various ways consistently for any length 
 of time is difficult. It is impossible for a number 
 of individuals to do so. These are facts not 
 sufficiently taken account of by Roosevelt when 
 his Administration cooperated in plaiming the 
 opera houife revolution on the Isthmus. It is 
 the weakness in the armor used to defend his Ad- 
 ministration. There are too many established 
 facts which become consistent only when viewed 
 in the light of an understanding between his Ad- 
 ministration and those sponsor for the secession 
 
The Panama Blackmail Treaty loi 
 
 movement on the Isthmus. The understanding 
 was oral — was not reduced to writing. Oral 
 understandings, however, result in historical 
 facts. The meaning of these facts will be dis- 
 closed by historical research. Historical re- 
 search shows that our Administration in 1903 
 was in collusion with the sepiaratists on the 
 Isthmus to effect the secession of the Province 
 of Panama from Colombia in order to establish 
 it as a protectorate of the United States. 
 
 In this and other chapters of this work, we 
 have applied the method suggested by President 
 Wilson in an address delivered before the United 
 States Chamber of Commerce: 
 
 I agreed with a colleague of mine in the Cabinet the 
 other day that we had never before in our lives attended 
 a school to compare with what we were now attending 
 for the purpose of gaining a liberal education. 
 
 Of course, I learn a great many things that are not 
 so. But the interesting thing about it is this: Things 
 that are not so do not match. If you hear enough of them 
 you see there is no pattern whatever — it is a crazy quilt ; 
 whereas the truth always matches, piece by piece, with 
 other parts of the truth. No man can lie consistently, 
 and he cannot lie about everything if he talks to you 
 long. So that I would guarantee that if enough liars 
 talked to you, you would get the truth, because the parts 
 that they did not invent would match one another, and 
 the parts they did invent would not match one another. 
 If they talked long enough, therefore, and you saw the 
 
102 America and the Canal Title 
 
 connections clearly enough, you could patch together the 
 case as a whole. 
 
 It is the mature judgment of the writer that 
 statements made by Roosevelt concerning the 
 establishment of the so-called Republic of Panama 
 must be corroborated to have value as historical 
 evidence. Statements not corroborated must be 
 discounted or, as statisticians would say, be 
 weighted in order to determine their value. In 
 this work, the writer has given statements of 
 Roosevelt only the importance which analysis, 
 criticism, and weighting attach to them. 
 
 The writer finds substantially his own view ex- 
 pressed by Mark Twain in a letter written to his 
 friend, Rev. Joseph Twichell, and given a place 
 in "Mark Twain, a Biography" by Albert Bige- 
 low Paine : 
 
 Dear Joe, — I knew I had in me somewhere a definite 
 feeling about the President. If I could only find the 
 words to define it with ! Here they are, to a hair — from 
 Leonard Jerome: 
 
 "For twenty years I have loved Roosevelt the man, and 
 hated Roosevelt the statesman and politician." 
 
 It's mighty good. Every time in twenty-five years that 
 I have met Roosevelt the man a wave of welcome has 
 streaked through me with the hand-grip; but whenever 
 (as a rule) I meet Roosevelt the statesman and politician 
 I find him destitute of morals and not respect-worthy. 
 It is plain that where his political self and party self are 
 concerned he has nothing resembling a conscience; that 
 
The Panama Blackmail Treaty 103 
 
 under those inspirations he is naively indifferent to the 
 restraints of duty and even unaware of them; ready to 
 kick the Constitution into the backyard whenever it gets 
 into his way. 
 
 The bearing of false witness against a national 
 administration on vital questions of foreign 
 policy during a world-crisis like the present is 
 as repugnant to a man of exalted moral purpose 
 as is collaboration with separatists of another 
 country to effect the secession of a province. 
 With this conclusion in the foreground we will 
 close the chapter with the following conclusion 
 in the background. If Isthmian events point 
 to collusion between the Roosevelt Administra- 
 tion and the separatists on the Isthmus to effect 
 the secession of the Province of Panama from 
 Colombia, and to establish it as a protectorate of 
 the United States called a Republic, the charac- 
 ter of the President is not a bar to belief in such 
 collaboration. 
 
Chapter III 
 
 President Roosevelt Attempted To Coerce 
 Colombia 
 
 In this chapter, we deal primarily with the 
 method employed to secure the ratification of the 
 Hay-Herran treaty, to which the signature of the 
 charge d'affaires of Colombia was obtained 
 through an ultimatum that should have been ad- 
 dressed to his Government. The method was 
 sui generis. We believe that the following ex- 
 cerpt from the pen of Roosevelt warrants the con- 
 clusion that he was responsible for it : 
 
 ■ When in August, 1903, 1 became convinced that Colom- 
 bia intended to repudiate the treaty made the preceding 
 January, under cover of securing its rejection by the 
 Colombian Legislature, I began carefully to consider 
 what should be done. By my direction, Secretary Hay, 
 personally and through the Minister at Bogota, repeatedly 
 warned Colombia that grave consequences might follow 
 her rejection of the treaty. 
 
 In the ultimatum to Colombia, Secretary Hay 
 
 stated that the President had directed him to say 
 
 what the note contained. Roosevelt admits re- 
 
 104 
 
Roosevelt Attempted to Coerce Colombia 105 
 
 sponsibility for equally formidable notes to 
 Colombia commanding her to ratify the Hay-Her- 
 ran treaty. The ultimatum merely blends with 
 the notes and completes the story of coercion. 
 Here is further corroboration : 
 
 The Congress as well as the Dictator [President Mar- 
 roquin] had ample warning of all the dangers they by 
 their action were inviting. Representatives from Panama 
 warned the Colombian Administration that Panama would 
 revolt if the treaty was rejected; and our Department of 
 State in the gravest manner called their attention to the 
 serious situation their conduct would create. 
 
 It is clear that the coercion of Colombia, from 
 the time that the signature of her acting Minister 
 to the Hay-Herran treaty was secured by a 
 method that is common on the "Bowery" to the 
 rejection of that ill-fated document by the unani- 
 mous vote of the Colombian Senate, was directed 
 by President Roosevelt. 
 
 It would appear that Roosevelt contended that 
 an act forbidden by international law, by a solemn 
 engagement, and by ordinary morality, became 
 honorable provided warning was given. To the 
 connoisseur in ethics, the warning adds to the 
 offense of which it was a forerunner in that it 
 shows premeditation. The warning thus be- 
 comes a part of the offense, proving motive for 
 the a^ct which was threatened. It strengthens the 
 
io6 America and the Canal Title 
 
 evidence which points to collusion between our 
 Administration and the separatists of Panama, 
 as that was the only way in which the threat 
 could be carried into effect. 
 
 Do not the warnings show determination to lay 
 violent hands on Colombia unless she surrendered 
 in perpetuity her choicest possession for a con- 
 sideration that has ceased to be respectable in 
 public utility regulation? Viewed from the 
 standpoint of international law and of correct 
 financiering, these warnings are so base that one 
 is surprised at the moral obtuseness of their 
 author. That he should cite them in exculpation 
 of the rape of Colombia seems incomprehensible 
 to a mind sensitive to ethical principles. 
 
 We will now proceed to a detailed considera- 
 tion of the coercion of Colombia. We will give 
 official documents in their sequence and connect 
 them by stating their apparent meaning, adding 
 general conclusions which we derive from them 
 after the documents have been assembled and cor- 
 related. Their interpretation by the writer will 
 be found in the closing pages of the chapter. 
 
 While the Colombia Congress convened June 
 20, 1903, interference with its freedom of action 
 commenced as early as April. In a note dated 
 April 24, our Minister to Colombia officially in- 
 
Roosevelt Attempted to Coerce Colombia 107 
 
 formed the Colombian Minister for Foreign Af- 
 fairs : 
 
 With reference to the interview I had with your ex- 
 cellency at which were discussed the negotiations for the 
 annulment of the present concessions of the Panama canal 
 and railroad companies and other matters, I have the 
 honor to inform your excellency that I have received in- 
 structions from my Government in that respect. 
 
 I am directed to inform your excellency, if the point 
 should be raised, that everything relative to this matter 
 is included in the convention recently signed between 
 Colombia and the United States on the 22d of January 
 last, and that, furthermore, any modification would be 
 violative of the "Spooner Act, and therefore inadmissible,. 
 
 How negotiations between Colombia and her 
 concessionary corporations could be in violation 
 of the Spooner law is not clear, for, most as- 
 suredly, the American Congress would not pass 
 an act, or presume to have the right to pass an 
 act, which prohibited Colombia from negotiat- 
 ing with concessionary corporations for the can- 
 cellation of concessions granted by her and the 
 surrender of her reversionary interests in these 
 enterprises. Such a prohibition cannot be read 
 into a treaty unless it is clearly stated therein. 
 Save by a construction of the Hay-Herran treaty 
 which violated precedents, it is not found in that 
 instrument, with the most obvious result that 
 Colombia and the United States placed different 
 
io8 America and the Canal Title 
 
 constructions on an article in a projected solemn 
 engagement before ratification. After ratifica- 
 tion, the United States would have enforced its 
 understanding of the treaty — an understanding 
 determined by self-interest. This is not all. No 
 self-respecting government will permit another 
 country to interpose between itself and corpora- 
 tions to whom it has granted concessions; nor 
 will a self-respecting government offer such an 
 affront to a sister republic. The mantle of 
 charity is not large enough to cover the acts of 
 the Roosevelt Administration whereby we secured 
 the Canal Zone. This, however, is merely the 
 beginning of insolence to which Colombia was 
 subjected, for, on June 13, 1913, our Minister 
 handed to the Colombian Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs a memorandum which reads : 
 
 I have received instructions from my Government by 
 cable in the sense that the Government of Colombia to 
 all appearances does not appreciate the gravity of the 
 situation. The Panama Canal negotiations were initiated 
 by Colombia and were earnestly solicited of my Govern- 
 ment for several years. The propositions presented by 
 Colombia with slight alterations were finally accepted by 
 us. By virtue of this agreement our Congress recon- 
 sidered its previous decision and decided in favor of the 
 Panama route. If Colombia now rejects the treaty or 
 unduly delays its ratification, the friendly relations be- 
 tween the two countries would be so seriously compro- 
 mised that our Congress might next winter take steps 
 
Roosevelt Attempted to Coerce Colombia 109 
 
 that every friend of Colombia would regret with 
 sorrow. 
 
 The canal negotiations were initiated by Wil- 
 liam Nelson Cromwell, attorney for the New 
 Panama Canal Company. At first acting only 
 as intermediary, he finally did succeed in creat- 
 ing the situation which resulted in direct negotia- 
 tions between the two governments. To say in 
 substance, as in the excerpt quoted, that Colombia 
 urged upon the United States the construction of 
 an Isthmian Canal by the Panama route, is en- 
 tirely incorrect. 
 
 We will now show that the sentence: "The 
 propositions presented by Colombia with slight 
 alterations were finally accepted by us," is both 
 false and misleading. This can be most effec- 
 tively done by paraphrasing an excerpt from a 
 memorandum of the Colombian Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs addressed to our Government on 
 June 18, 1903. It effectively disposes of Secre- 
 tary Hay's contention that the propositions pre- 
 sented by Colombia, with slight alteration, were 
 finally accepted by the United States. In this- 
 memorandum, the Colombian Minister observes: 
 
 There is a notable difference between some of the prop- 
 ositions presented by Colombia and the modifications in- 
 troduced by the United States. 
 
no America and the Canal Title 
 
 That difference becomes apparent when we compare 
 the memorandum submitted by the Colombian Legation 
 on March 31, 1913, with the propositions of the Secre- 
 tary of State. This is especially true of those provisions 
 which refer to the sovereignty of the Canal Zone, judicial 
 jurisdiction in it, and the compensation to be paid for the 
 > concession. The annuity of $250,000 stipulated in the| 
 Hay-Herran treaty was merely the then income of Colom-i 
 bia from the Railroad, and even payment of this amountj 
 was not to commence until nine years after ratification,^ 
 although the railroad was to become the property of the. 
 United States immediately. In the memorandum of the, 
 legation the establishment of judicial tribunals in the 
 Canal Zone was not mentioned, while the Secretary of 
 State, in the project sent with his note of November 18, 
 1902, proposed them. In this project, they were divided 
 into three classes, namely, Colombian, American, and 
 mixed. 
 
 In the Colombian memorandum, the sum of $7,000,000, 
 American gold, was asked, and an annuity, which was to 
 be fixed by arbitration unless otherwise satisfactorily ar- 
 ranged. The Secretary of State only offered $7,000,000 
 and an annual rental of $100,000, or, if preferred, $10,- 
 000,000, and an annual rental of $10,000. The Colom- 
 bian Government had ordered its legation to accept an 
 annuity of $600,000. The Secretary of State, in a note 
 which had the form of an ultimatum, reduced it to 
 $250,000. The diminution of $350,000 in a period of 
 only one hundred years represents a difference of 
 $35,000,000, and as the convention was to run in per- 
 petuity, it is clear that the difference was not slight, but 
 was very great. 
 
 It is also well to note another item of substantial differ- 
 ence. In the Colombian proposition, the canal and rail- 
 road companies could not transfer their privileges to the 
 United States without the consent of the Colombjan Gov- 
 ernment. 
 
Roosevelt Attempted to Coerce Colombia iii 
 
 In addition to the observations already made 
 in this paraphrase of an excerpt, it should be 
 pointed out that the actuarial value of $250,000 
 at the interest rate of the then Colombian credit 
 for the nine years that Colombia was to be de- 
 prived of the $250,000 was approximately 
 $2,870,000. This amount must be deducted from 
 the apparent figures contained in the proposition 
 of Secretary Hay to get at their actual value. 
 The actuarial (real) value of an annuity of 
 $350,000 (amount mentioned in the paraphrased 
 excerpt) at the end of one hundred years at 3 
 per cent is $212,550,000, at 4 per cent, $433,170,- 
 000, and not $35,000,000, as stated by the Colom- 
 bian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was ap- 
 parently an amateur in finance. Note — the treaty 
 was to be perpetual and not merely for one hun- 
 dred years. 
 
 It is already clear that the propositions sub- 
 mitted by the Colombian legation to the United 
 States were not accepted with "slight altera- 
 tions." Moreover, the Colombian proposition 
 safeguarded her sovereignty. The Hay-Herran 
 treaty impaired her sovereignty to such an ex- 
 tent that the United States would, by construc- 
 tion of the engagement, have become the de facto 
 sovereign in an undefined area of Colombia. The 
 
112 America and the Canal Title 
 
 difference between the propositions was not only 
 "not slight," but vital. Note particularly the fol- 
 lowing : 
 
 Our Congress might next winter take steps that every 
 friend of Colombia would regret with sorrow. 
 
 Congress had provided the Nicaragua route as 
 an alternative one in the Spooner law. So con- 
 struction of the canal elsewhere could not have 
 been meant. Therefore, it could only have had 
 reference to laying hands on Colombia. This is 
 what was actually done. The method could not 
 be disclosed, so the Congress is referred to in 
 order to make the warnings effective. These 
 warnings are merely the forerunner of collusion 
 between the separatists of Panama and our Ad- 
 ministration. We will discuss this in detail in 
 the next chapter. 
 
 On June 13, 1903, our Minister to Colombia 
 sent the following telegram to Secretary Hay : 
 
 I have the honor to advise you that I have had an in- 
 terview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which 
 I communicated to him the substance of my instructions, 
 and also left with him a memorandum containing a sub- 
 stantial copy of said telegram. 
 
 The minister's first question was as to what action by 
 our Congress was contemplated — whether it meant action 
 against Colombia, or the adoption of the Nicaragua route 
 — ^to which I replied that I had received no other in- 
 
Roosevelt Attempted to Coerce Colombia 113 
 
 structions than those contained in the telegram, and that 
 I could not, therefore, aid him in construing it. 
 
 He said, in substance, that it must be understood that 
 no matter what the Government's actions or desires may 
 have been in the prehminary negotiations, a treaty could 
 not be made without the approval of Congress ; that this 
 was true in the United States as well as Colombia; that 
 the Colombian Congress was very soon to meet, and that 
 upon it would devolve the consideration of all these mat- 
 ters. 
 
 Colombia, left in doubt as to the meaning of 
 the note addressed to her, was, in fact, the victim 
 of a veiled threat, as she knew what was expected 
 of her, but did not know what to expect should 
 she act within her constitutional and other legal 
 rights, and, in so doing, offend her powerful 
 neighbor. 
 
 We will conclude this phase of the evidence by 
 stating on the authority of Hannis Taylor and of 
 Ex-Minister DuBois that a cable was sent to 
 Bogota saying: "The treaty must not he m'odi- 
 Aed or amended." In this connection, remember 
 that the signature of the acting Minister of 
 Colombia was secured by strategy. The gentle- 
 men named above also state that this cable was fol- 
 lowed by a mandate saying: "Ratify the treaty 
 or you will regret it." Again, remember that Dr. 
 Herran signed that treaty under pressure. Is it 
 any wonder Colombia refused to ratify the Hay- 
 
114 America and the Canal Title 
 
 Herran treaty? And Roosevelt calls this con- 
 duct classic! Contrast these warnings with the 
 following excerpt from an address delivered by 
 President Wilson : 
 
 For the interesting and inspiring thing about America, 
 gentlemen, is that she asks nothing for herself except 
 what she has a right to ask for humanity itself. We want 
 no nation's property; we wish to question no nation's 
 honor; we wish to stand selfishly in the way of the de- 
 velopment of no nation ; we want nothing that we cannot 
 get by our own legitimate enterprise and by the inspira- 
 tion of our own example, and, standing for these things, 
 it is not pretention on our part to say that we are privi- 
 leged to stand for what every nation would wish to stand 
 for, and speak for those things which all humanity must 
 desire. 
 
 How different are the foregoing inspiring 
 words when compared with the following by 
 Roosevelt : 
 
 I am interested in the Panama Canal because I started 
 it. If I had followed traditional conservative methods 
 I should have submitted a dignified state paper of prob- 
 ably two hundred pages to the Congress and the debate 
 would have been going on yet. But / took the Canal Zone, 
 and let Congress debate, and while the debate goes on the 
 canal does also. 
 
 The excerpt from the address by President Wil- 
 son mirrors the underlying spirit of his Admin- 
 istration and exalts righteousness for its own 
 sake; while the excerpt from the address by 
 
Roosevelt Attempted to Coerce Colombia 115 
 
 Colonel Roosevelt glories in having" taken the 
 Canal Zone by physical and mental prowess. 
 
 This brings the narrative down to June 20, 
 1903, when the Colombian Congress assembled. 
 President Marroquin submitted a dignified state 
 paper to it, which dealt with the ratification of 
 the Hay-Herran treaty, as follows : 
 
 To my Government has been presented this dilemma ; 
 either it lets our sovereignty suffer detriment or renounces 
 certain pecuniary advantages, to which, according to the 
 opinion of many, we have a right. In the first case, to 
 consent to the sacrifice of our sovereignty and not as- 
 piring to great indemnification, the just wishes of the 
 inhabitants of Panama and other Colombians would be 
 satisfied if the canal were opened, but the Government 
 would be exposed to the charge afterwards that it did 
 not defend our sovereignty and that it did not defend the 
 interests of the nation. In the second case, if the canal 
 is not opened by Panama the Government will be accused 
 for not having allowed Colombia that benefit which is 
 regarded as the commencement of our aggrandizement. 
 I have already allowed my wish to be understood that the 
 canal should be opened through our territory. I believe 
 that even at the cost of sacrifices we ought not to put 
 obstacles to such a grand undertaking, because if is an 
 immensely beneficial enterprise for the country, and also 
 because once the canal is opened by the United States 
 our relations will become more intimate and extensive, 
 while our industries, commerce, and our wealth will gain 
 incalculably. I leave the full responsibility the decision 
 of this matter brings with Congress. I do not pretend 
 to make my opinion weigh. When I have given instruc- 
 tions to our representative in Washington it has been 
 coupled with the order that the decision of this important 
 
ii6 America and the Canal Title 
 
 matter must be left with Congress. After years in which 
 the question has been treated in a vague way, without 
 precise conditions, it is now presented in a way to obtain 
 practical and positive results. It has been our indisput- 
 able diplomatic triumph that the Senate and Government 
 of the United States should declare, notwithstanding 
 every effort to the contrary, the superiority of the Colom- 
 bian route. 
 
 Although President Marroquin's motives have 
 been impugned by Roosevelt, we will inquire 
 whether he was sincere in the foregoing com- 
 munication. Advices from our Minister to 
 Colombia will furnish the answers. We read in 
 a letter from him, dated August 30, the follow- 
 ing: 
 
 I am informed authoritatively that to assure the elec- 
 tion of Reyes, Marroquin has already changed the gov- 
 ernors of Bolivar, Magdalena, and Panama, nominating, 
 respectively, Insignares, Barrios, and Senator Obaldia. 
 All pledged to the treaty and to Reyes. 
 
 It is to be noted that General Reyes was the 
 candidate for the presidency of Colombia who 
 succeeded at the election, thus making it evident 
 that President Marroquin was using the power 
 of his office to secure ratification. General Reyes 
 urged ratification of the Hay-Herran treaty. 
 The next day our Minister to Colombia wrote to 
 Secretary Hay: 
 
Roosevelt Attempted to Coerce Colombia 117 
 
 I had an interview with Senator Obaldia to-day. He 
 informed me that he is willing to remain as long as there 
 is hope for the treaty, but he is convinced that there is 
 none. . . . Confirms General Reyes' statement concern- 
 ing presidential candidate, and says that the next Senate 
 was made certain for the treaty; that he bears instruc- 
 tions to Governors Insignares and Barrios concerning the 
 elections which will be held next December; that in ac- 
 cepting governorship of Panama he told the President 
 that in case that the department found it necessary to ' 
 revolt to secure canal, he would stand by Panama; but 
 he added if the Government of the United States will 
 wait for the next session of Congress, canal can be se- 
 cured without a revolution. Senator Campo, from the \ 
 Cauca, is about to leave, thinking the treaty gone. i 
 
 My opinion is that nothing satisfactory can be expected 
 from this Congress. Caro's party has been joined by 
 Velez and Soto and their followers, constituting a de- 
 cisive majority against the treaty. General Reyes seems 
 to still entertain hopes. 
 
 There is a difference in the influence of an 
 incoming and of an outgoing President. Presi- 
 dent Marroquin, an octogenarian, was retiring, 
 and General Reyes was to succeed him. Reyes 
 favored ratification of a treaty that should have 
 been rejected. By the exercise of patience, it is 
 thus evident that agreement on a treaty granting 
 the United States an adequate title to the Canal 
 Zone could have been secured from Colombia, but 
 threats were substituted for restraint. These 
 threats are summarized in a communication, dated 
 August 5, 1903, which our Minister to Colombia 
 
ii8 America and the Canal Title 
 
 sent to the Colombian Minister for Foreign Af- 
 fairs, from which the following is taken : 
 
 I avail myself of this opportunity respectfully to re- 
 peat that which I already stated to your excellency, that 
 if Colombia truly desires to maintain the friendly rela- 
 tions that at present exist between the two countries, and 
 at the same time secure for herself the extraordinary ad- 
 vantages that are to be produced for her by the con- 
 struction of the canal in her territory, in case of its being 
 backed by so intimate an alliance of national interests as 
 that which would supervene with the United States, the 
 present treaty will have to be ratified exactly in its present 
 form without amendment whatsoever. I say this because 
 I am profoundly convinced that my Government will not 
 in any case accept amendments. 
 
 What would any self-respecting Government 
 have done under the circumstances? Would it 
 not have done what Colombia did ? It is properly 
 stated by General Reyes in the following : 
 
 The Congress being unable to accept in its actual word- 
 ing at least one of the stipulations contained in the treaty, 
 because inhibited from doing so by the Constitution, no 
 one will wonder that under the pressure of threats so 
 serious and irritating and in presence of a formal notifi- 
 cation from the party which had authority to serve it that-- 
 no amendment would be accepted, preference was given 
 to disapproval. 
 
 One is automatically reminded of the follow- 
 ing characterization, by Sir Edward Grey, of the 
 note addressed to Servia by Austria: 
 
Roosevelt Attempted to Coerce Colombia 119 
 
 I had never before seen one State address to another in- 
 dependent State a document of so formidable a character. 
 
 It is to be observed that, while there was no 
 stipulation for the absolute cession to the United 
 States o£ the Canal Zone, there was to be per- 
 petual occupancy and jurisdiction, i. e., periods 
 were for one hiuidred years, with the option of 
 renewal by the United States, but no option of 
 rejection by Colombia. The stipulations in- 
 cluded the right to safeguard the canal and 
 granted extensive police and sanitary control. 
 The constitutional authorities in Colombia held 
 that such a grant, although less than absolute 
 cession, was contrary to the nation's organic law. 
 
 What sovereign state would have lightly rati- 
 fied a treaty which impaired its control over the 
 most valuable section of its domain? Would the 
 Senate of the United States have held otherwise 
 in case it had been proposed to grant to a foreign 
 power a similarly endless occupancy and jurisdic- 
 tion of a part of our national domain? Yet it 
 was proposed in the deliberations of the Colom- 
 bian Senate to amend the constitution and thereby 
 remove the legal objection! 
 
 It is unquestionably true that Colombia re- 
 jected the Hay-Herran treaty because it involved 
 an impairment of her de facto sovereignty on the 
 
I20 America and the Canal Title 
 
 Isthmus, and an alienation of national territory 
 in terms believed to have been prohibited by the 
 Colombian constitution. It also entailed an 
 abandonment, by Colombia, of concessionary and 
 reversionary rights in the Panama Railroad and 
 in the projected Isthmian Canal, and made no 
 equitable provision for settlement with Colombia 
 by the canal and railroad companies to secure the 
 release of her concessionary and reversionary in- 
 terests such as were contemplated by the transfer 
 of their rights and property to the United States. 
 When we make a comprehensive survey of 
 Colombia's pecuniary interest in the then exist- 
 ing transit arrangements on the Isthmus, and the 
 strategic value of the Isthmus for further tran- 
 sit development, we are forced to conclude that 
 the United States attempted to secure unduly ad- 
 vantageous terms by duress. 
 
 Colombia's statesmen were looking for a satis- 
 factory solution. They were conciliatory. They 
 wanted the canal built on their territory and were 
 merely endeavoring to secure reasonable terms. 
 They appealed to our Government in terms that 
 would have wilted a heart not made of adamant. 
 On August II, 1903, Minister Rico of the De- 
 partment for Foreign Affairs addressed our Min- 
 ister as follows : 
 
Roosevelt Attempted to Coerce Colombia 121 
 
 The Colombian Government, fully aware that justice 
 and equity govern the course of the United States in its 
 relations with all powers, and that its respect for the 
 autonomy of the Spanish-American countries is a sub- 
 stantial guaranty of the stability and independence of 
 those nations, is confident that the principles which I have 
 adduced in favor of the right which the Colombian Con- 
 gress has, not only to propose modifications to the con- 
 vention for the opening of the canal, but also to refuse 
 its approval, can not but convince your excellency's Gov- 
 ernment that the exercise of that right can not in any 
 manner entail complications, great or small, in the rela- 
 tions of the two countries, which it is to be hoped will 
 continue on the same equal footing and in the same good 
 understanding which has happily existed until now, and 
 that they will facilitate the removal of the difficulties 
 which have retarded the final agreement, the result of 
 which is to accomplish that work, of such great impor- 
 tance to the two high contracting parties and to the 
 world's commerce. 
 
 Why was Colombia so cautious? Was there 
 an}d;hing in our construction of the Treaty of 
 1846 that warranted it? Had we recently read 
 into that solemn engagement something that war- 
 ranted the conclusion that our public men re- 
 garded national honor lightly when it conflicted 
 with national interests? The new construction 
 -that our Adminstration placed on the Treaty of 
 1846 in 1902 is the answer. In a letter dated 
 October 26, 1902, the Colombian Minister at 
 Washington wrote to Secretary Hay : 
 
 I have the honor to address your excellency for the 
 
122 America and the Canal Title 
 
 purpose of informing you that on the 24th instant I re- 
 ceived from my Government supplementary and full in- 
 structions to close the negotiations for the construction of 
 the Panama Canal which have been progressing between 
 Colombia and the United States, and that in said docu- 
 ment are comprised all the points to which your excel- 
 lency adverted as modifications of the memorandum pre- 
 sented by the legation to the Department of State on the 
 2 1st of April last. 
 
 The instructions to which I refer bear date of Bo- 
 gota, September 9, 1902, before the action was taken in 
 the Department of Panama by United States naval offi- 
 cers which implies, on the part of your excellency's Gov- 
 ernment, a new interpretation of the treaty in force be- 
 tween the two countries, an interpretation concerning 
 which I am not now at liberty to express any opinion, for 
 the reason that the Minister for Foreign Relations at 
 , Bogota has undertaken to discuss it directly himself, as 
 your excellency is aware; but which would essentially 
 affect the convention now pending, since article 35 of that 
 treaty is incorporated and developed therein. 
 
 In view of the foregoing, your excellency will recog- 
 nize that it is just now impossible for me to act in pur- 
 suance of the instructions received, in consequence of 
 which I have addressed my Government by cable, stating 
 the circumstances, to the end that it may decide upon 
 what it considers most proper. 
 
 What are the facts in this connection? Our 
 Ajdministratipn had just prohibited the Panama 
 Railroa3"Company from transporting Colombian 
 troops and munitions of war across the Isthmus 
 in its attempt to suppress an insurrection. The 
 railroad company was required to transport them 
 by its charter. Our Administration acted as 
 
Roosevelt Attempted to Coerce Colombia 123 
 
 though the rights of the United States took pre- 
 cedence over those of the actual sovereign. 
 Seward, Hamilton Fish, and Bayard held that the 
 rights of the sovereign were supreme. This 
 phase of the question will be considered in another 
 chapter. Suffice it to say here that this unwar- 
 ranted construction of the Treaty of 1846 caused 
 Colombia to act with extreme caution where im- 
 pairment of her sovereignty was to be affected 
 by the projected treaty. It — it — and not at- 
 tempted blackmail — prevented final agreement 
 with Colombia on a canal concession. 
 
 In order to arrive at correct conclusions in this 
 matter we must distinguish between de jure and 
 de facto sovereignty. The one is nominal sov- 
 ereignty ; the other is actual sovereignty. Nomi- 
 nal sovereignty may be held in suspense while 
 actual sovereignty is being exercised by a foreign 
 power for a consideration. Panama is at pres- 
 ent the de jure sovereign of the Canal Zone. The 
 United States is the actual sovereign as long as 
 she pays the consideration named in the treaty. 
 De jure sovereignty is in suspense — is not ex- 
 ercised. -That Colombian sovereignty was not to 
 be impaired in the Hay-Herran treaty is the as- 
 sertion of Roosevelt. This is true of de jure 
 sovereignty, but is not true of de facto sover- 
 
124 America and the Canal Title 
 
 eignty. Article IV of the Hay-Herran treaty 
 provided : 
 
 The rights and privileges granted to the United States 
 by the terms of this convention shall not afifect the sov- 
 ereignty of the Republic of Colombia over the territory 
 within whose boundaries such rights and privileges are 
 to be exercised. 
 
 The United States freely acknowledges and recognizes 
 this sovereignty and disavows any intention to impair it 
 in any way whatever or to increase its territory at the 
 expense of Colombia or of any of the sister republics in 
 Central or South America, but On the contrary, it desires 
 to strengthen the power of the republics on this continent, 
 and to promote, develop and maintain their prosperity and 
 independence. 
 
 This is not true when we consider de facto or 
 actual sovereignty. That which is the substance 
 of sovereignty was vitally impaired in the pro- 
 jected engagement. We will mention only one 
 of a number of provisions to illustrate the point. 
 We find that section II of Article XIII of the 
 Hay-Herran treaty reads as follows: 
 
 Subject to the general sovereignty of Colombia over 
 said zone, the United States may establish judicial tri- 
 bunals thereon, which shall have jurisdiction of certain 
 controversies hereinafter mentioned to be determined ac- 
 cording to the laws and judicial procedure of the United 
 States. 
 
 Such judicial tribunal or tribunals so established by the 
 United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction in said 
 zone of all controversies between citizens of the United 
 States, and between citizens of the United States and 
 
Roosevelt Attempted to Coerce Colombia 125 
 
 citizens of any foreign nation other than the Republic 
 of Colombia ; and of all controversies in any wise grow- 
 ing out of or relating to the construction, maintenance or 
 operation of the canal, railway and other properties and 
 works. 
 
 The portion printed in italics contains the 
 joker. It is the elastic clause tinder which the 
 permanent interests of Colombia would have suf- 
 fered. 
 
 Because of our altered interpretation of the 
 Treaty of 1846, Colombia decided on a reconsid- 
 eration of the whole matter. Its Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs addressed our Minister in Bogota 
 on August 14, 1903, as follows: 
 
 As your excellency has been pleased to address me va- 
 rious notes relative to the treaty for the opening of the 
 Panama Canal which was signed in Washington the 22d 
 of January last, I inform your excellency that the Senate 
 of the Republic disapproved that pact, by the unanimous 
 vote of the senators present, in the session of the 12th 
 of this month, and the day following approved, also unan- 
 imously, the proposition which I have the honor to com- 
 municate to your excellency, and which is as follows : 
 
 The Senate of the Republic, in view of the disapproval 
 given to the treaty signed in Washington the 22d of Jan- 
 uary of the present year, by the charge d'affaires of Co- 
 lombia and the Secretary of State of the American Union, 
 and taking into account the desire of the Colombian peo- 
 ple to maintain the most cordial relations with the people 
 of the United States of America, and its sentiment that 
 the completion of the interoceanic canal across the Isth- 
 mus of Panama is a work of the greatest importance for 
 
126 America and the Canal Title 
 
 the commerce and advancement of the world, as well as 
 for the development and progress of the American na- 
 tions, resolved: 
 
 I. That a commission of three senators, appointed by 
 the president of the Senate, consulting in every possible 
 way the opinion of the House of Representatives, study 
 the manner of meeting the earnest desire of the Colom- 
 bian people touching the construction of the Panama 
 Canal, in harmony with the national interests and observ- 
 ance of the law by which the Senate was ruled on this 
 solemn occasion. 
 
 In addition the Colombian Senate addressed a 
 communication to our Government wherein it 
 stated : 
 
 A treaty of this nature could only be approved by a 
 national convention or by a reforming act of the Consti- 
 tution. 
 
 Other portions of this appeal are better stated 
 in a communication handed to Secretary Hay by 
 General Reyes, showing how anxious Colombia 
 was to have the canal constructed on her territory, 
 and how desirous she was of finding a formula 
 which would grant to the United States an ad- 
 equate title and yet properly safeguard Colom- 
 bian interests. It is expressed by General Reyes 
 as follows: 
 
 It is proper to observe that under our constitution the 
 Congress is the principal guardian, defender, and inter- 
 preter of our laws. And it can not be denied by any one, 
 I take it, that the Hay-Herran convention provides for the 
 
Roosevelt Attempted to Coerce Colombia 127 
 
 execution of public works on a vast scale and for the 
 occupancy in perpetuity of a portion of the territory of 
 Colombia, the occupant being not a juridical person whose 
 acts were to be governed by the civil law and the Colom- 
 bian code, but rather a sovereign political entity, all of 
 which would have given occasion for frequent conflicts, 
 since there would have been a coexistence in Panama of 
 two public powers, the one national, the other foreign. 
 
 Hence the earnest efforts evinced by the Senate in as- 
 certaining whether the American Government would 
 agree to accept certain amendments tending especially to 
 avoid as far as practicable any restriction in the treaty 
 of the jurisdiction of the nation within its own terri- 
 tory. . . . 
 
 It follows that the Congress of Colombia, which is 
 vested, according to our laws, with the faculty or power 
 to approve or disapprove the treaties concluded by the 
 Government, exercised a perfect right when it disap- 
 proved the Hay-Herran convention. This course did not 
 disqualify the Government for the conclusion of another 
 treaty with the Government of your excellency and it 
 indeed resolved to make a proposition to that effect, and 
 Mr. Herran, whom our Minister for Foreign Affairs in- 
 trusted with that duty by cable, had the honor of bringing 
 this purpose to your excellency's knowledge. Neither did 
 that course imply any slight toward the Government of 
 the United States, and, on the contrary, the Senate, ob- 
 servant of the existing friendly relations, relied on the 
 sentiments of American fraternity, by which it is ani- 
 mated, for the introduction in the new agreement that 
 was to be made of stipulations more consonant with the 
 notion of sovereignty entertained by the people of Co- 
 lombia. 
 
 Standing upon her dignity as a sovereign state, 
 Colombia refused to be coerced, and by the unani- 
 mous vote of her Senate, treated our warnings 
 
128 America and the Canal Title 
 
 ^with the contempt they deserved. Our Senate 
 did not ratify the Hay-Pauncefote treaty of 1900. 
 It was sought by us, discussed at length in the 
 s3enate, and amended by it in vital particulars. 
 We, however, received no warning note from 
 Great Britain. A treaty which we sought and 
 which was agreed to by our Government was not 
 ratified by our Senate. This action was not rep- 
 rehensible, but when the Colombian Senate re- 
 jected a treaty not agreed to by the Colombian 
 Government — wrested from her charge d'affaires 
 by stealth — Roosevelt hurled at Colombia epithets 
 unparalleled in the history of modern diplomacy. 
 The reasons which prompted the adverse ac- 
 tion of the Colombian Senate were properly be- 
 yond our official animadversion or even official 
 discussion. High-minded diplomacy usually 
 holds in courteous respect the motives which may 
 have inspired the legislative act of a sovereign 
 nation. Yet in speaking of Colombia, our Ad- 
 ministration ascribed to her the basest of motives. 
 A comprehensive survey of all trustworthy evi- 
 dence does not disclose a scintilla of evidence that 
 sinister motives prompted Colombia's official ac- 
 tion. In short, the evidence looks like a boom- 
 erang, showing that Colombia stood ready to ac- 
 cept the award of an impartial arbitral tribunal. 
 
Roosevelt Attempted to Coerce Colombia 129 
 
 The United States insisted on dictating terms 
 which history will pronounce unfair. 
 
 Because of our conduct under the Treaty of 
 1846, Colombia acted with caution. Our Gov- 
 ernment at that time (1902) had just read into 
 that treaty a prerogative not contained in it when 
 viewed from the standpoint of its construction 
 up to that time. Up to that time, the United 
 States assisted only in keeping Isthmian transit 
 open at the request of the sovereign and in co- 
 operation with the sovereign. In 1902, as 
 already mentioned, the United States prevented 
 Colombia from using the railroad for the trans- 
 portation of her troops when it was required to 
 furnish this service by charter. Therefore, 
 Colombia rightly scrutinized the Hay-Herran 
 treaty. When we consider that the United States 
 has just attempted to violate the Hay-Paimcefote 
 treaty, we are compelled to conclude that the cau- 
 tion with which Colombia acted was more than 
 justified. 
 
 Impairment of sovereignty was the controlling 
 factor in the consideration of the Hay-Herran 
 treaty by the Colombian Senate, and so the warn- 
 ings sent to Colombia by our Government were 
 as gratuitous as they were ofifensive. They were 
 outside the circle of respectable diplomacy. 
 
130 America arid the Canal Title 
 
 Colombia wanted the canal on her territory; she 
 was merely parleying for reasonable terms. A 
 president favorable thereto was already assured 
 of election. Therefore, only differences re- 
 mained to be ironed out as was the case between 
 the United States and Great Britain when the 
 first Hay-Pauncefote treaty was disapproved by 
 our Senate through amendment. 
 
 In another place, the writer has stated that the 
 reason Great Britain and the United States 
 finally agreed on the second Hay-Pauncefote 
 treaty was the following: 
 
 The United States needed the Panama Canal as a mili- 
 tary and naval asset, and therefore sought the modifica- 
 tion of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty with that end in view. 
 , Great Britain desired the construction of the canal be- 
 cause of its large commercial interests. The one sought 
 ownership and control as a military necessity; the other 
 sought conditions and charges of traffic that would be 
 just and equitable — ^that would be equal for identical 
 units of traffic using the canal. The paramount object 
 desired by the two contracting parties was different. 
 Final agreement was secured by writing into the Hay- 
 Pauncefote treaty the controlling object of each of the 
 two contracting parties. The United States secured 
 thereby its desired military and naval asset. Great 
 Britain secured thereby the assurance of equality in tolls 
 between our nationals and its own subjects. 
 
 In the canal treaty that was being negotiated 
 with the sovereign, Colombia, the interests to be 
 
Roosevelt Attempted to Coerce Colombia 131 
 
 reconciled were abridgement of sovereignty and 
 determination of the proper amount to be paid 
 to the de jure sovereign for the concessions which 
 were to be granted. Both countries needing the 
 canal, the United States was in a stronger posi- 
 tion than Colombia as bargainer, inasmuch as the 
 Nicaragua route was available. Colombia in- 
 dicated willingness to undertake the amendment 
 of her constitution so as to permit impairment of 
 her sovereignty and suggested periodic revalua- 
 tion by an impartial tribunal as the proper method 
 to determine the amount to be paid to her. It is 
 thus evident that pYoper results could have been 
 secured by further negotiations if our Adminis- 
 tration of that time had merely desired proper 
 adjustment of the conflicting interests. 
 
 We have already stated that General Reyes was 
 the most formidable candidate for the Colombian 
 presidency at the election that was to be held in 
 December, 1903. He favored ratification of the 
 Hay-Herran treaty with all of its objectionable 
 features. There was a strong minority in the 
 Colombian Congress in favor of its ratification. 
 Is it not clear that General Reyes, with the power 
 and prestige of an incoming president, could have 
 secured ratification of a treaty granting to the 
 United States an adequate title to the Canal Zone 
 
132 America and the Canal Title 
 
 upon reasonable terms ? The following from our 
 Minister to Colombia, dated November i, 1903, 
 is now apropos : 
 
 Yesterday the Government issued a manifesto to the 
 nation, which has been published and posted on the 
 streets this morning. It severely criticises the action of 
 Congress, and especially that of the Senate, which latter 
 body has wasted its time in attacks on the Executive in- 
 stead of devoting itself to the consideration of measures 
 necessary to the well-being of the country. As regards 
 the canal, it states that the Government has decided to 
 resume negotiations in the hope of being able to come to 
 a fresh agreement which shall meet with the approval of 
 the next Congress, and that the Colombian charge d'af- 
 faires at Washington has been instructed to convey this 
 information to the Government of the United States. 
 
 ' The Hay-Herran treaty was not a satisfactory 
 international compact because : first, the franchise 
 was not subject to revaluation at stated intervals; 
 second, a conflict of jurisdiction within the Canal 
 Zone and the canal littoral was inevitable by 
 reason of the elasticity of some of the provisions 
 contained in it. Who but the weaker nation, 
 Colombia, would have suffered? Therefore, it 
 was her duty to act with caution. She was justi- 
 ^ed in rejecting the Hay-Herran treaty on the 
 grounds that the financial provisions were un- 
 scientific and its administrative provisions were 
 i charged with inevitable conflict in their applica- 
 
Roosevelt Attempted to Coerce Colombia 133 
 
 tion, without including a provision for their ad- 
 judication by an impartial tribunal. 
 
 In view of the foregoing, what are we to think 
 about the threats our Administration sent to 
 Colombia? Let us reason together. An appro- 
 priate analogy is an aid to clear thinking and so 
 we will use the following: If at the time that 
 the United States Senate was considering the first 
 Hay-Pauncefote treaty, Great Britain had sent j 
 us warnings similar to those we sent Colombia, ! 
 what would our Congress have done? The;! 
 Senate would have peremptorily rejected the Hay- 
 Pauncefote treaty, and Congress would have im- 
 mediately abrogated the Clayton-Bulwer treatjj^ 
 Congress would then have proceeded with the 
 Isthmian canal project in complete disregard of 
 Great Britain. Yet our Administration in 1903 
 addressed communications to a friendly nation 
 that we would have treated with scorn if they had 
 been addressed to us. These warnings were rep- 
 rehensible and provocative of the course that 
 Colombia thereafter pursued. No self-respect- 
 ing nation will yield to coercion. 
 
 What did Colombia do ? She declined to ratify 
 the Hay-Herran treaty, after provocation. We 
 declined to ratify the first Hay-Pauncefote treaty. 
 The latter caused delay in entering upon canal 
 
134 America and the Canal Title 
 
 'construction. History shows that our Senate 
 acted with wisdom when it amended the first Hay- 
 Pauncefote treaty. If a treaty is a solemn en- 
 gagement, it is important that all of its provisions 
 should be properly scrutinized — especially if it is 
 to run in perpetuity without any provision for 
 readjustment of its terms. Why this haste on 
 our part? Why? It is now evident that pro- 
 cedure by the orderly processes of public law 
 would have given proper results. Colombia de- 
 sired to do what we did when we amended the 
 first Hay-Pauncefote treaty. Our conduct, of 
 course, was beneficent; that of Colombia was 
 base! Who commissioned Roosevelt to be the 
 mentor of civilization? 
 
 Coercion solidified Colombian sentiment 
 against the ratification of the Hay-Herran treaty. 
 The maintenance of Colombian dignity assumed 
 paramount importance in the deliberations of the 
 Colombian Senate. Both friend and foe of the 
 treaty voted against ratification. A unanimous 
 vote against ratification was the answer of the 
 Colombian Senate to the attempted coercion by 
 our Government. History, while pointing the 
 unmoving finger of scorn at our Administration, 
 will, at the same time, vindicate the action of the 
 Colombian Senate. 
 
Roosevelt Attempted to Coerce Colombia 135 
 
 The Panama Canal, as an actuality, is a monu- 
 ment to the genius of our engineers. Would that 
 it could be said of Roosevelt that he : "Nothing 
 common did or mean, upon that memorable 
 scene," when he took the Canal Zone and let the 
 Congress debate the act after the deed! Would 
 that it could be said that he exercised the patience 
 of Job and displayed the wisdom of Solomon in 
 the negotiations to secure an adequate title to the 
 Canal Zone ! As already stated, an adequate title 
 could have been secured by the proper diplomatic 
 methods as it was in the interest of Colombia to 
 come to an understanding with the United States 
 so that the construction of the most colossal en- 
 terprise ever undertaken by man could be pros- 
 ecuted with vigor. 
 
 It is infinitely better for a nation to forego the 
 construction of a canal on its territory than to 
 lose its hpnor and self-respect by yielding to 
 coercion. Craven cowardice is an unfailing sign 
 of either national decadence or national degen- 
 eracy. A nation that fails to protect its honor, 
 a nation that fails to restore its honor when sul- 
 lied, can not be the important factor in the ad- 
 vancement of mankind that it otherwise would 
 be. Let us hope that the United States, rich and 
 powerful, will take its honor out of pawn by mak- 
 
136 America and the Canal Title 
 
 ing reparation to Colombia. Unless this is done 
 she is likely to remain an Ishmaelite among the 
 nations of the Western Hemisphere. 
 
 The dismemberment of Colombia by the United 
 States was an offense against international law, 
 a violation of a solemn engagement and an embar- 
 rassment to Spanish-America. It is an offense 
 which is not in the slightest degree palliated by 
 the warnings to Colombia. A warning does not 
 excuse an unlawful act; rather does it aggravate 
 the deed ; it is included in the offense. Our warn- 
 ings to Colombia are merely the forerunner of 
 collaboration with the separatists on the Isthmus 
 to effect the secession of the Province of Panama 
 from Colombia. A nation, not unlike an indi- 
 vidual, that resorts to coercion is on dangerous 
 ground. Roosevelt carried it to the point where 
 he could not retreat without humiliation, or pro- 
 ceed without stultifying his Administration. He 
 had to make good according to his ethics. How 
 could he? By an understanding, direct or by 
 proxy, with the separatists on the Isthmus. This 
 was effected through Bunau-Varilla as inter- 
 mediary, the separatists playing the part allotted 
 to them, and our Administration doing the rest. 
 Our gunboats were the means employed to effect 
 the dismemberment of Colombia. It was our 
 
Roosevelt Attempted to Coerce Colombia 137 
 
 navy that made possible the establishment of the 
 so-called Republic of Panama. It was the as-'^ 
 silrance of protection by the United States that 
 caused the separatists to proceed with the pro- 
 jected secession of the Province of Panama from 
 Colombia. These statements will be substanti- 
 ated in the next chapter. They are the fruit of 
 attempted coercion — the last step in the process 
 of using chicane, instead of the method approved 
 by modern diplomacy, to secure the Canal Zone. 
 Try coercion on your neighbor and see how it 
 works. You will then be in a position to under- 
 stand the procedure described in this and the 
 three following chapters which tell how the 
 Roosevelt Administration "took" the Canal Zone. 
 
Chapter IV 
 
 The "Vaudeville" Revolution on the Isthmus 
 
 Was there a real revolution on the Isthmus of 
 Panama in the fall of 1903 ? This is a vital ques- 
 tion. It must be answered before passing judg- 
 ment on the Roosevelt Administration. If, upon 
 a searching examination, it appears that there 
 was only a make-believe revolution and not an 
 actual uprising, the conduct of our Administra- 
 tion at that time becomes brigandage under a 
 veneer of respectability. If it appears that there 
 was no revolution on the Isthmus at the time, the 
 acts of our Administration must be disowned and 
 reparation must be made to Colombia or the act 
 will become for all time the nation's act. We 
 will now show that there was no revolution on 
 the Isthmus at the time. 
 
 ) As already stated, there was no real revolu- 
 tion in the Province of Panama in the fall of 
 1903 when the latter was organized into an in- 
 dependent state under the protection of the 
 
 United States. Those interested in secession es- 
 
 138 
 
The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 139 
 
 tablished a nominal government independent of 
 that of Colombia on November 4, 1903. The 
 independence of the nominal government was 
 recognized by the United States on November 6, 
 1903. This was two days before the Govern- 
 ment of Colombia learned of the secession of its 
 choicest province. The rape of Colombia was 
 completed two days before the Colombian Gov- 
 ernment received information of the occurrences 
 on the Isthmus. American vessels of war were 
 ordered to Isthmian waters before the event to 
 protect secession against attack by Colombia, 
 and to safeguard the establishing of a govern- 
 ment in the Province, which was to be a pro- 
 tectorate of the United States. 
 
 Assurance that the American navy would be 
 used to protect secession and to assure its suc- 
 cess were conveyed to the Separatists of Panama 
 by Bunau-Varilla. We will show that this as- 
 surance was given to him by the Roosevelt Ad- 
 ministration. Had not this assurance been 
 given, the separatists would not have proceeded 
 with the secession of the Province and there 
 would be no so-called "Republic of Panama" tOT 
 day. 
 
 The foregoing statement is a severe indict- 
 ment of our then Government. It is so far- 
 
140 America and the Canal Title 
 
 reaching that it is an unpardonable libel unless 
 it rests on a basis of fact. We will now marshal 
 the facts on which this indictment is based. 
 
 We are dealing only incidentally with the post- 
 secession activities of our then Administration. 
 We are dealing primarily with its ante-secession 
 activities. These were so improper that it sought 
 to conceal them. It is now established that se- 
 cession was predicated on them and was pro- 
 ceeded with only because of the arrival of the 
 Nashville — tangible evidence of assured protec- 
 tion. In short, there was no revolution or inten- 
 tion to promote a revolution. There was to be 
 secession if the United States would guarantee 
 its success. Secession eventuated and the pro- 
 jection was furnished. The so-called Republic 
 of Panama is mute evidence of pre-arrangement 
 (of an adequate understanding) between the 
 Roosevelt Administration and the separatists of 
 Panama. ' 
 
 Some statements crystallize a story — give it 
 objectivity so that it can be seen in a flash. Such 
 a statement is the one made by Roosevelt to the 
 students of the University of California. As re- 
 ported it reads: 
 
 I am interested in the Panama Canal because I started 
 it. If I had followed traditional, conservative methods, 
 
The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 141 
 
 I would have submitted a dignified state paper of prob- 
 ably two hundred pages to Congress, and the debate on 
 it would have been going on yet; but / took the Canal 
 Zone and let Congress debate ; and while the debate goes 
 on the canal does also. 
 
 Another such statement is the following by 
 Roosevelt : 
 
 I did not lift my finger to incite the revolutionists. 
 The right simile to use is totally different. I simply 
 ceased to stamp out the different revolutionary fuses that 
 were already burning. 
 
 These statements are charged with informa- 
 tion that their author did not intend to disclose, 
 but which a mind conversant with Isthmian 
 events of the time automatically supplies. There 
 were no revolutionary fuses on the Isthmus at 
 the time. There was merely effort to secure ad- 
 vance assurance of protection of secession by the^ 
 United States. It succeeded. Therefore, the ob- 
 servation would be correct if it had stated that 
 the separatists were assured that the Ameri- 
 can Administration would prevent Colombia 
 from putting out the fuse — that secession would 
 be protected within forty-eight hours after the 
 Declaration of Independence. 
 
 Bunau-Varilla was in conference with our Ad- 
 ministration on Octobei^ 16, 1903. On October 
 
142 America and the Canal Title 
 
 17, he addressed Doctor Amador, first President 
 ofjhe Republic 6f Panama, as follows: 
 
 I CAN GIVE YOU THE ASSURANCE THAT YOU WILL BE 
 PROTECTED BY THE AMERICAN FORCES FORTY-EIGHT HOURS 
 AFTER YOU HAVE PROCLAIMED THE NEW REPUBLIC ON THE 
 WHOLE ISTHMUS. 
 
 The real story of the opera bouffe revolution 
 on the Isthmus in the fall of 1903 can best be 
 told by commencing with the account of it by 
 Bunau-Varilla. It is found in his book: 
 "Panama, the Creation, Destruction and Resur- 
 rection," pages 289-342. 
 
 When it became apparent that the fate of the 
 Hay-Herran treaty hung in the balance, an inner 
 circle in the city of Panama commenced to con- 
 sider secession. Their first endeavor was to as- 
 certain if the cooperatioh of the United States 
 could be secured. William Nelson Cromwell 
 was consulted. He undertook to arrange 
 it. ' , 
 
 Results were satisfactory. Warning reached 
 him from the seat of government of Colombia. 
 He was counsel for the French company. Their) 
 interests had been placed in jeopardy by his ac- 
 tivities. He had to retire from ostensible con- 
 nection with the venture. So Bunau-Varilla 
 was summoned from France. The continuity 
 
The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 143 
 
 of the movement was not interrupted. Bunau- 
 Varilla started where Cromwell left off. 
 
 What transpired at the conference above men- 
 tioned is not of record. We have the ipse dixit 
 of Roosevelt. Events, however, stand in a causal 
 relation. Actions speak louder than words. 
 The events that followed in precise coordination 
 tell the story as clearly as though a full record 
 had been kept. No revolution could have been 
 planned and carried out with such clockwork pre- 
 cision without a perfect understanding between 
 the parties in interest. The separatists of 
 Panama had foreknowledge of the intentions of 
 the Roosevelt Administration. There was but 
 one person who could have given them that fore- 
 knowledge, and that was the Commander-in- 
 Chief of the Army and Navy. 
 
 On September 23, the Hay-Herran treaty ex- 
 pired. It had been rejected August 12 by the 
 Colombian Senate. This was the psychological^ 
 moment for decisive action. So Bunau-Varilla 
 appears on the scene. Colombia had not yielded 
 to coercion. To coerce her by force would re- 
 quire the cooperation of the Congress. With the 
 Nicaragua route available, Congress would hesi- 
 tate and would probably refuse to concur. 
 Hence, collaboration with the separatists offered 
 
144 America and the Canal Title 
 
 the solution. Bunau-Varilla's presence offered 
 the opportunity. Later events show that this 
 was the method adopted. 
 
 Bunau-Varilla states in the book named, that 
 he inferred what the action of the Roosevelt Ad- 
 ministration would be in the event of an upris- 
 ing in Panama. He gives the facts on which he 
 based the inference. On thorough investigation, 
 the writer finds that the facts are other than as 
 stated by the author named, and would have 
 forced a conclusion other than the one given. 
 The actual facts would have compelled the infer- 
 ence that the United States would expect Colom- 
 bia to maintain free and uninterrupted transit, 
 and that she would be given a free hand to quell 
 any uprising. This is what had transpired there- 
 tofore. Nothing could have been inferred save 
 that the United States would respect Colombia's 
 sovereignty. Therefore he could have got the 
 information which he claims to have possessed 
 only by being told. Only the Commander-in- 
 Chief of the Army and Navy could have told him, 
 either directly or by proxy, that is, the Presi- 
 dent. 
 
 Men do not risk their lives, their property and 
 the welfare of their families in a wild-goose chase 
 after a revolution; nor does an outsider risk prop- 
 
The Vaudeville devolution on Isthmus 145 
 
 erty and all that others hold dear on a mere in- 
 ference not inferable from established facts. 
 The known facts plainly show that there was an 
 understanding between our then Administration 
 and Bunau-Varilla, and that the latter was the 
 intermediary for communicating with the sepa- 
 ratists of Panama. Bunau-Varilla's explana-> 
 tion transforms suspicion into knowledge, and 
 establishes collusion between our Administration 
 and the separatists of Panama. 
 
 The status of secession as of September 22, 
 1903, can be inferred from a conversation be- 
 tween Bimau-Varilla, who had just arrived in 
 New York from France, and an M. Lindo, a 
 merchant of New York and Panama. It is given 
 in Bunau-Varilla's book on Panama. We will 
 reproduce it in the form of a dialogue, preserv- 
 ing the exact words reported : 
 
 Bunau-Varilla — Well, is the rumor true that the peo- 
 ple of Panama are going to make a revolution ? 
 
 M. Lindo — They have no financial means. . . . With- 
 out money a revolution cannot be brought about any 
 more than a war. But if you care to know what the 
 situation really is, I will ask Amador to come and see you. 
 . . . He has come precisely to obtain the means of bring- 
 ing about a revolution. But he has failed, and is sailing 
 for Panama in a few days. He will tell you all. He is 
 in despair. 
 
 This seems to 'show that something resembling 
 
146 America and the Canal Title 
 
 a revolution had been comtemplated, and that it 
 was to be abandoned for lack of assured support 
 from the United States, But the time limit for 
 the ratification of the Hay-Herran treaty expired 
 the next day. Perhaps our Administration would 
 after that give the desired assurance. 
 
 On the following day (September 23), Bunau- 
 Varilla met Doctor Amador in conference. In 
 his book, Bunau-Varilla tells the story that Doc- 
 tor Amador told him. The following is a cor- 
 rect transcript of the narrative as recorded in the 
 section of the book devoted to demonstrating that 
 * he (Bunau-Varilla) and not Roosevelt is the fos- 
 ter-father of the so-called uprising on the Isth- 
 mus: 
 
 Ehiring the past year a group of citizens of the Isth- 
 mus, of whom I was one, have met together to consider 
 the measures to be taken if Colombia rejected the Hay-' 
 Herran treaty. 
 
 We one and all agreed that such a decision would stop 
 s all activity, ruin the inhabitants, and within a few years 
 again transform the Isthmus into a virgin forest. 
 
 Confronted by a decision so despotic, we decided to 
 prepare for an armed combat, rather than submit pas- 
 sively to the tyrant's sentence of death. 
 
 But Colombia was capable of crushing all resistance: 
 as its power is enormously superior to that of th^ Prov- 
 ince of Panama. Consequently we turned our eyes 
 towards the great American Republic. She also had an 
 interest in making an effective protest in the presence of 
 
The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 147 
 
 the extraordinary tide of the Colombian sentiment 
 against the execution of the Canal. 
 
 Why should not this great Republic, so rich, so power- 
 ful, give the necessary cooperation in money and in mili- 
 tary force? 
 
 This idea seemed to us so. reasonable that we decided 
 to entrust with a mission to the United States a certain 
 Beers, more generally known by the name of Captain 
 Beers. 
 
 He was an employee of the Panama Railroad. His 
 mission consisted in visiting the right person in order to 
 learn whether this double support could be obtained. 
 
 The persons whom Beers saw assured him that noth- 
 ing was easier and they promised to obtain all that we 
 asked for. Captain Beers came back to Panama to tell 
 of the happy result of his mission. 
 
 Our friends then decided to delegate two of their num- 
 ber in order to reach a final understanding. I was one 
 of the two delegates. ... As soon as I arrived I was 
 received with open arms by the persons whom Captain 
 Beers had seen. I was to go to Washington to see Mr. 
 Hay, Secretary of State, in order to conclude the final 
 transaction. 
 
 But suddenly the attitude of the person who was to 
 take me to Washington entirely changed. 
 
 Whenever I went to see him strict orders had been 
 given to the effect that he was not in. I had to install 
 myself in the hall, to camp there, and, so to speak, besiege 
 his office. Nothing resulted from it. And there I am. 
 All is lost. At any moment the conspiracy may be dis- 
 covered and my friends judged, sentenced to death, and 
 their property confiscated. I at first decided to return 
 to Panama to share their fate. But I am hesitating. If 
 my friends are shot I prefer to devote my life to aveng- 
 ing them on the man who will have been the cause of 
 their deaths. . . . 
 
 There is to-day only a weak Colombian garrison at 
 
148 America and the Canal Title 
 
 Panama. Moreover, these men who have been living 
 for many years on the Isthmus have ceased to count as 
 foreigners to us. Our emotions, our aspirations, are 
 theirs. Their general, Huertas, a valiant soldier, who 
 has his troops well in hand, is himself shocked at the way 
 Colombia is behaving towards Panama. 
 
 A revolution would to-day meet with no obstacle. 
 But the Colombians have the command of the sea; their 
 ships' crews are loyal. We must first, therefore, acquire 
 a fleet to prevent Colombia from overwhelming with her 
 troops the Province of Panama. 
 
 Besides this we want arms. It was to obtain ships and 
 arms that I have come here. Our first envoy, Captain 
 Beers, had been assured, and the same pledge was re- 
 peated to me when I came, that the United States would 
 give us all the money we needed to buy arms and ships 
 and pay the troops. . . . We need $6,000,000. 
 
 Lfet it be noted that it was September 23, 1903, 
 when Dr. Amador told the story just described. 
 At that time only a few citizens of the Isthmus 
 had considered revolution. No effort had been 
 made to promote discontent on the Isthmus. No 
 effort had been made to promote a general upris- 
 ing. No preparation had yet been made for an 
 organized revolt. Real revolutions are not the 
 product of such methods. An Isthmus "seething 
 with revolution" was not an element of the suc- 
 cess. Protection of secession by an adequate 
 fleet was the only method that was considered. 
 Our navy had such a fleet, and the Canal Zone 
 was in the Province of Panama. The only prep- 
 
The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 149 
 
 aration needed was a bargain — an understanding. 
 Our Administration had what the separatists on 
 the Isthmus needed to succeed (a fleet) and they 
 offered what we wanted (the Canal Zone). 
 
 The secessionists needed warships to control 
 the sea in order to prevent Colombia from land- 
 ing troops on the Isthmus. There was no other 
 way in which Colombia could send troops to 
 maintain her sovereignty. The United States 
 had the warships. The money in the provincial 
 treasury, with the amount to be advanced by 
 Bunau-Varilla ($100,000), was enough to pur- 
 chase official Colombia domiciled on the Isthmus. 
 Therefore, if Colombia could be prevented from 
 landing additional troops on the Isthmus, the suc- 
 cess of secession was assured in advance. This 
 was the program. There was no need of the 
 Isthmus being aflame with revolution to carry it 
 out. It was only necessary that our Administra- 
 tion should be "seething with revolution." 
 
 The foregoing excerpt shows the hopeless con- 
 dition of the so-called revolution on September 
 23. It was predicated on the conditional sup- 
 port of the United States. Seemingly no assur- 
 ance had as yet been secured. Such assurance 
 was necessary to give it vitality. Was it secured ? 
 
 There is unmistakable evidence that Bunau- 
 
ISO America and the Canal Title 
 
 Varilla had foreknowledge of adequate military 
 and naval support. He claims to have played a 
 role similar to that of Sherlock Holmes, and to 
 have found it out without having been told. His 
 narrative, however, supplies the missing links 
 that connect our Administration with the col- 
 laboration in which secession was arranged. 
 
 In the time intervening between September 23 
 and October io,> Bunau-Varilla sounded our Ad- 
 ministration. He tells us in the accounts of his 
 conferences what he wants us to believe and not 
 what actually transpired. We find in his Sher- 
 lock Holmes tale as given in his book the follow- 
 ing: 
 
 I left the private office of the President [October 10, 
 1903] in possession of all the elements necessary for 
 action. 
 
 I had at last the direct confirmation of the inductions 
 which thus far I had drawn solely from pure reasoning: 
 the President of the United States was holding firm for 
 Panama. 
 
 If a revolution were to generate new conditions favor- 
 able to the acquisition of the Canal Zone by the United 
 States, President Roosevelt would immediately seize the 
 opportunity . . . [interesting! interesting!]. 
 
 It remained for me to discover the second unknown 
 quantity. How could a revolution be made successfully 
 at Panama without the financial cooperation of the 
 United States, and without the express promise of her 
 military support? . . . 
 
 The great and apparently unsurmountable obstacle was 
 
The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 151 
 
 the obtaining of a sum of $6,000,000 for the necessary 
 armament. In trying to reduce this demand of Amador, 
 the light suddenly flashed across my mind during my 
 railway journey back to New York. 
 
 What was going to be the use of this $6,000,000, ac- 
 cording to i^onador? To buy ships, which would be 
 equipped for war in order to sink Colombian ships, and 
 to prevent the transportations of troops ! 
 
 But where were these military movements to be 
 feared? Was it in the Isthmus itself? By no means, 
 because the Treaty of 1846 gave the United States the 
 right, and imposed upon her the duty, of turning any bel- 
 ligerents away from the line of transit. 
 
 Bunau-Varilla concluded that the $6,000,000 
 were not needed as the United States under the 
 Treaty of 1846 was obHgated to prohibit fighting 
 within the zone of the railroad, and that that 
 would automatically prevent Colombia from 
 maintaining her sovereignty over the area needed 
 for canal purposes. Is this construction of the 
 Treaty of 1846 correct? Suffice it to say that the 
 construction of this Treaty from its adoption to 
 the assumption of the Presidency by Theodore 
 Roosevelt is contained in a letter addressed to 
 our Minister in Bogota by Secretary of State, 
 Hamilton Fish. It reads : 
 
 By the Treaty of 1846 with New Granada this Gov- 
 ernment has engaged to guarantee the neutrality of the 
 Isthmus of Panama. This engagement, however, has 
 never been acknowledged to embrace the duty of protect- 
 ing the road across it from the violence of local factions ; 
 
152 America and the Canal Title 
 
 but it is regarded as the undoubted duty of the Colombian 
 Government to protect it against attacks from local in- 
 surgents. 
 
 You are consequently requested to address a repre- 
 sentation upon this subject to the Colombian minister for 
 foreign affairs, and to ask that a sufficient force be kept 
 on the Isthmus to deter attacks upon the road. 
 
 Instead of it being the duty of the United 
 States to exclude the sovereign, Colombia, from 
 the line of railroad for military purposes she was, 
 in accordance with the earlier construction of the 
 Treaty of 1846, obligated not to interfere with 
 her in the maintenance of order on the Isthmus. 
 If the guarantee of the United States under the 
 Treaty of 1846 during the fifty-five years that it 
 had then been in force did not lead to independ- 
 ence — especially in 1885 and in 1899-1902, when 
 there were formidable revolts — ^how could it be 
 expected to do so in 1903 without any prepara- 
 tion whatever? Bunau-Varilla nowhere ex- 
 plains. We will again quote from his book: 
 
 I had myself seen the United States, in 1885, perform- 
 ing her duty and preventing any fighting in this zone 
 [between the watersheds of the Chagres and of the Pana- 
 man Rio Grande]. . . . 
 
 It may be remembered that in 1885 a Revolutionary 
 army commanded by General Aizpuru had seized Pan- 
 ama. The town once taken, the American troops had 
 entered Panama to prevent disorder. But when it was 
 seen that the Revolutionary Government was maintain- 
 
The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 153 
 
 ing order, the American forces were withdrawn, and 
 they confined themselves to garrisoning the railroad and 
 its wharf, the sole [interesting with a?] means of com- 
 munication with the Pacific Ocean. 
 
 Some . days later, two ships laden with Government 
 troops tried to land at the wharf. 
 
 General Reyes, who commanded the Colombian troops, 
 was invited to withdraw, and the landing was forbidden 
 by Commander McCalla. 
 
 I had seen with my own eyes, therefore, in 1885, the 
 Revolution protected from the aggression of the Gov- 
 ernment troops by the American military authorities. 
 
 The foregoing is a garbled and grossly inac- 
 curate account of the Isthmian events in the 
 spring of 1885. It shows a deliberate attempt 
 to bear false witness in order to dissipate the 
 suspicion resting on the Roosevelt Administra- 
 tion for complicity in the Isthmian disturbance 
 of 1903. We will let official documents tell the 
 actual story. The first is a telegram from the 
 Secretary of the Navy, Whitney, to Rear Ad- 
 miral Jouett, dated April 3, 1885. It was sent 
 because an American steamship had been seized 
 at Colon, its cargo had been taken from her, and 
 her ofiicers and the American consul had been 
 imprisoned. The parts bearing on the subject 
 matter under consideration read: 
 
 The duty you are called upon to perform calls for the 
 exercise of great discretion. The object of the expedi- 
 tion is the protection by the United States of its citizens, 
 
154 America arid the Canal Title 
 
 to preserve the neutrality and keep open the transit from 
 Colon to Panama, and further to protect the lives and 
 property of American citizens. ... 
 
 You have no part to perform in the political or social 
 disorder of Colombia, and it will be your duty to see that 
 no irritation or unfriendliness shall arise from your pres- 
 ence at the Isthmus. 
 
 Thus events that had transpired were to be 
 adjusted through diplomatic channels. The 
 Rear Admiral was sent to protect American in- 
 terests without offense to the sovereign, Colom- 
 bia. The following telegram from Rear Admiral 
 Jouett to Commander McCalla, dated April 17, 
 1885, cHnches this point: 
 
 In order to preserve the strict neutrality of the Isth- 
 mus of Panama, and to avoid interruption to the transit, 
 you will please prevent any insurgent force from landing 
 or operating in this vicinity. 
 
 The United States clearly recognized that the 
 rights of the sovereign were supreme. Her ef- 
 forts to protect American lives and property 
 and to keep the line of transit open were in co- 
 operation with the sovereign. Only the in- 
 surgents were restrained. This point is reen- 
 f orced in a telegram sent by Rear Admiral Jouett 
 to Secretary Whitney, dated April 17, 1885. In 
 this telegram, the Rear Admiral informed the 
 Secretary of his arrival, and states : 
 
The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 155 
 
 As Colonel Ulloa was the only representative of the 
 Colombian Government in this vicinity, I immediately 
 addressed a letter to him, informing him of my arrival 
 and requesting his permission to land men for the protec- 
 tion of American lives and property and preserving the 
 free transit of the Isthmus. He replied that he could 
 see no objection to landing the men, and that he would 
 forward my letter to the Government at Bogota. 
 
 In 1885 the United States asked permission to 
 land forces on the Isthmus. The rights of the 
 sovereign were respected. In 1903, the sovereign 
 was prohibited from landing forces on the Isth- 
 mus for the maintenance of order. In 1885 the 
 sovereign was accorded every facility to establish 
 order. 
 
 Thus the official documents completely dis- 
 credit Bunau-Var ilia. He had advance informa- 
 tion that the United States would protect seces- 
 sion within forty-eight hours after the event. 
 He is attempting to explain how he came thereby. 
 Therefore, the importance of our discrediting 
 him as the narrative unfolds. It will leave him 
 with advance information — unexplained by him. 
 In a communication to Secretary Whitney, dated 
 April 18, 1885, Rear Admiral Jouett clearly 
 states the spirit of American intervention: 
 
 Panama is still held by the insurgents, and until the 
 Government forces reestablish themselves in that city, 
 serious disorder is likely to occur there at any time. 
 
156 America and the Canal Title 
 
 It is probable that the Government troops who have 
 put down the revolution in the interior will soon come to 
 Panama and take charge. In that event, I would advise 
 the immediate withdrawal of one-half of the force sent 
 by steamer from New York, and afterwards, as circum- 
 stances permit, the gradual reduction of our force to an 
 establishment which can be maintained here without in- 
 termission. 
 
 Order was maintained by our forces until the 
 Government succeeded in reestablishing its 
 authority. This also shows that Bvmau-Varilla 
 is guilty of willful misrepresentation. 
 
 But, General Reyes, who commanded the 
 Colombian troops, was prevented from landing 
 certain troops just arrived. Again an official 
 document will tell the true story. It is by Com- 
 mander McCalla to the Commander-in-Chief of 
 the Colombian forces at Panama, dated April 28, 
 1885, and reads: 
 
 I have the distinguished honor ... to inform you that 
 for the protection of the transit across the Isthmus, and 
 for the protection of Americans and their property, I 
 occupy the railroad station at this place with a United 
 States naval force. 
 
 My lines for this purpose necessarily extend from the 
 railroad wharves to the passenger station at the bridge. 
 
 May I beg leave to request that the national force un- 
 der your command may be directed not to land within 
 my lines. 
 
 I shall take the first opportunity of paying my respects 
 to you ; meanwhile I shall be most happy to place my per- 
 sonal services at your disposition. 
 
The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 157 
 
 The note from which the last quotation is made 
 was transmitted by the agency of Lieutenant 
 Reeder. During the conversation, General 
 Reyes stated to Lieutenant Reeder that he was 
 having the Rio Grande, south of the city, ex- 
 amined with the view of finding out whether he 
 would be able to land his forces in the vicinity. 
 They did land. 
 
 On the following day there was a conference 
 attended by General Reyes for Colombia, General 
 Aizpuru for the insurgents, and Rear Admiral 
 Jouett. The conference resulted in an agree- 
 ment being signed between General Reyes and 
 General Aizpuru by which the latter agreed to 
 surrender. 
 
 This shows that the American military au- 
 thorities did not protect the insurgents. Bunau- 
 Varilla's inference vanishes as the actual facts 
 are stated. 
 
 Our best witness is Grover Cleveland. His 
 word was as good as his bond throughout the 
 length and breadth of the land. His message to 
 the Congress in the following December leaves 
 no doubt as to the course that the United States 
 pursued. It completely disposes of the preten- 
 sions of Bunau-Varilla, and with it vanishes the 
 inference. The section of the message devoted 
 
158 America and the Canal Title 
 
 to our intervention in the uprising on the Isthmus 
 states : 
 
 Emergencies growing out of the civil war in the United 
 States of Colombia demanded of the Government at the 
 beginning of this Administration the employment of 
 armed force to fulfill its guarantee under the thirty-fifth 
 article of the Treaty of 1846, in order to keep the transit 
 open across the Isthmus of Panama. 
 
 Desirous of exercising only the powers expressly re- 
 served to us by the treaty, and mindful of the rights of 
 Colombia, the forces sent to the Isthmus were instructed 
 to confine their action to "positively and efficaciously" 
 preventing the transit and its accessories from being "in- 
 terrupted or embarrassed." 
 
 The execution of this delicate and responsible task nec- 
 essarily involved police control where the local authority 
 was temporarily powerless, but always in aid of the sov- 
 ereignty in Colombia. 
 
 The prompt and successful fulfillment of its duty by 
 this Government was highly appreciated by the Govern- 
 ment of Colombia, and has been followed by expressions 
 of its satisfaction. . . . The restoration of peace on the 
 Isthmus by the reestablishment of the constituted Gov- 
 ernment there being accomplished, the forces of the 
 United States were withdrawn. 
 
 We have now shown that events on the Isth- 
 mus in the spring of 1885 were other than as 
 stated by Bunau-Varilla. This is of controUing 
 importance in our argument. It was the repre- 
 sentations which he made to the separatists that 
 caused secession. These representations indi- 
 cated foreknowledge that the United States 
 
The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 159 
 
 would protect secession. These representations 
 caused those interested in secession to proceed 
 with the project. It is because of this fact that 
 we give his explanation with great detail, and 
 answer it with official documents woven into a 
 narrative. We hope to leave him at the end of 
 our argument securely in possession of the ad- 
 vance information which resulted in the estab- 
 lishment of the so-called Republic of Panama, 
 and with a demolished explanation as to how he 
 came by the information. 
 
 We will now sidestep the story of Bunau- 
 Varilla until we have presented data which point 
 to the correctness of the conclusion we are de- 
 veloping. This done, we will conclude the story 
 of Bunau-Varilla and our interpretation of it. 
 
 We will commence with the statement made 
 by Dr. Amador to General Amaya of Colombia 
 on November 4, found in the report of the latter 
 to the Colombian Minister of War dated Novem- 
 ber 14, 1903: 
 
 Dr. Amador, an old friend of mine, came to see me 
 within a few hours of my being placed in jail, and he said 
 to me textually, " You must understand that we who 
 started this movement are not insane; we fully appreci- 
 ated the fact that in no case could we withstand all the 
 rest of the nation, and in consequence we had to resort 
 
i6o America and the Canal Title 
 
 to means that, although painful, were indispensable. 
 The United States has fully entered into this movement, 
 and the Panamans are not alone, as in every event they 
 will back up our actions. Not another Colombian sol- 
 dier will ever disembark again on any of the coasts of 
 the Isthmus, and our independence is guaranteed by that 
 colossus." He offered me his services and said that he 
 wished to present his respects to my chief, to whom I 
 heard him make similar assertions, which, unfortunately, 
 were corroborated by the increasing number of warships 
 of that power in both seas, and by the disembarkation of 
 its forces to mock our weakness. 
 
 And yet, according to Roosevelt, the Isthmus 
 was "seething with revolution !" We — some ten 
 — who started this movement are not mad! 
 There is no evidence that the Isthmus was 
 "seething with revolution." There is only evi- 
 dence of duplicity. But, truth matches. Those 
 who arranged and carried out secession from 
 Panama to Washington cannot blot out history. 
 The true story of the birth of the so-called Re- 
 public of Panama is being recorded, General 
 Tovar, in his report to the Colombian Minister 
 of War, dated November 20, 1903, states: 
 
 The solitary confinement in which I was kept from the 
 afternoon of the 3d was broken on the evening of the fol- 
 lowing day by the visit which Senor Manuel Amador 
 Guerrero, principal leader of the revolutionary move- 
 ment, paid me in my prison. Dr. Amador, after having 
 spoken with General Amaya, had me brought down from 
 the room I occupied at police headquarters, and informed 
 
The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus i6i 
 
 me that events which had taken place on the previous 
 evening were the result of a plan for a long time con- 
 ceived and discussed at length in Panama and in Wash- 
 ington, and executed under the protection and guaranty 
 of the Government of the United States with which he 
 personally had recently come to an understanding . . . 
 that in consequence it was ridiculous to suppose that the 
 Panamans could have successfully defied the rest of the 
 republic, and for the same reason all resistance on my 
 part would be quite useless; that therefore I ought to 
 order the reembarkation of the battalion Tiradores which 
 remained in Colon, taking advantage for this purpose of 
 the royal mail steam packet Orinoco, then in that port, 
 and thus avoiding in a spirit of humanity the shedding 
 of blood. At the same time he informed me that there 
 were in Colon several American warships which had 
 come to protect the revolutionary movement. I an- 
 swered Seiior Amador that I would take no account of 
 what he had just told me, as my duty and the duty of the 
 army I commanded was sufficiently clear, and that in 
 consequence no human force could drag from me the 
 order that he desired. I considered my conference with 
 him at an end, and turned to be conducted back to my 
 prison, where I learned that a similar proposition had 
 been made to General Amaya, but without success. 
 
 Dr. Porras, one of the loyal Colombians on the 
 Isthmus, was also arrested and confined in the 
 police barracks. General Aizpuru of the muni- 
 cipal council of Panama called on him and told 
 him that the separatists' movement was the work 
 of only a few leaders. This dialogue as re- 
 corded in the hearings before the House Com- 
 mittee on Foreign Relations clinches the story of 
 
i62 America and the Canal Title 
 
 collusion between our Administration and the 
 separatists on the Isthmus. It starts with Gen- 
 eral Aizpuru saying: 
 
 Yes; but the Republic of Panama is an accomplished 
 fact, as you will soon be convinced. 
 
 I cannot believe it [answered Doctor Porras]. Co- 
 lombia will soon call Panama to account for her temerity 
 and ingratitude. 
 
 The Government of Colombia will not be able to do 
 anything in the matter [was Aizpuru's answer]. Pan- 
 ama is under the protection of the United States; if it 
 were not it would have recognized its helplessness and 
 would not have attempted its freedom. 
 
 We are now in a position to see why the newly 
 arrived Colombian soldiers acted as they did. In- 
 stead of the entire Isthmus being aflame with 
 revolution, an inner circle of Panama used with 
 telling effect their assurance of the support of 
 the United States and its tangible evidence — ^the 
 presence of the Nashville and the refusal of the 
 railroad company to transport troops. So Colo- 
 nel Torres decided to reembark his soldiers for 
 the return to Cartagena. The following tele- 
 gram to Secretary Hay, dated November 5, 1903, 
 speaks for itself: 
 
 All Colombian soldiers at Colon now, 7 p. m., going on 
 board Royal Mail steamer returning to Cartagena. Ves- 
 sel, supposed to be Dixie, in sight. 
 
 What was the effect of the presence of the 
 
The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 163 
 
 American marines on the Colombian troops at 
 Colon? The following from an official commu- 
 nication of Commander Hubbard of the Nash- 
 ville, dated November 5, 1903, tells the story: 
 
 I am positive that the determined attitude of our men, 
 their coolness and evident intention of standing their 
 ground, had a most salutary and decisive effect on the 
 immediate situation, and was the initial step in the ulti- 
 mate abandoning of Colon by these troops and their 
 return to Cartagena the following day. 
 
 Does this sound like keeping the line of transit 
 open? It had only been closed to the sovereign 
 up to that time. The Isthmians were not pre- 
 pared for military operations, and, therefore, 
 there was no obstruction to transit threatened or 
 imminent. This was the only time in the history 
 of the Treaty of 1846 that troops of the sovereign 
 were expelled from the Isthmus by our forces. 
 
 Our Administration clearly ordered the Nash- 
 ville to Colon for the unlawful purpose of inter- 
 fering with the sovereign rights of Colombia and 
 of effecting her dismemberment. This is as re- 
 pugnant to morality as collaboration with the 
 separatists of Panama to effect the dismember- 
 ment of Colombia and to establish the so-called 
 Republic of Panama. We will give the telegram 
 to the commander of the Nashville, dated Novem- 
 
164 America and the Canal Title 
 
 ber 2, 1903, because of its significance when sub- 
 jected to careful examination : 
 
 Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interrup- 
 tion threatened by armed force, occupy the line of rail- 
 road. Prevent landing of any armed force with hostile 
 intent, either Government or insurgent, either at Colon, 
 Porto Bello, or other point. Send copy of instructions 
 to the senior officer present at Panama upon arrival of 
 Boston. Have sent copy of instructions and have tele- 
 graphed Dixie to proceed with all possible dispatch from 
 Kingston to Colon. Government force reported ap- 
 proaching the Isthmus in vessels. Prevent their landing 
 if in your judgment this would precipitate a conflict. 
 
 On November 2, 1903, there were no insurgents 
 in the Province of Panama. The Roosevelt Ad- 
 ministration must have known — did know — that 
 the separatists had no ships and so could not 
 project a military movement by water. The 
 order to the commander of the Nashville, there- 
 fore, was designed to prevent Colombia (the 
 sovereign) from landing troops in her own terri- 
 tory. It was an order equivalent to assuring the 
 success of secession before there was secession 
 — before any Isthmians bore arms. The sepa- 
 ratists were not prepared to bear arms. It was 
 not on the program that they should. Secession 
 was to be bloodless. Therefore, our marines 
 were to be the military end of the so-called revo- 
 lution. To hold that collaboration is not the 
 
The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 165 
 
 prelude to the foregoing does violence to reason 
 and to common sense. 
 
 Before dealing with the change in the tradi- 
 tional American Isthmian policy, we will take a 
 backward look, and, in so doing, get our bear- 
 ings. Bunau-Varilla states that he assured the 
 separatists that the United States would protect 
 secession. We learn from those interested in se- 
 cession that they acted on the assurance of 
 Bunau-Varilla when it was supported by tangible 
 evidence — ^the arrival of the Nashville at Colon 
 on November 2, 1903. Dr. Amador, first Presi- 
 dent of the Republic of Panama, stated that they 
 knew that the United States would not allow 
 Colombia to attack them. The history of the 
 United States in relation to the Treaty of 1846 
 shows that she would not intervene to keep the 
 transit open save at the request of Colombia. The 
 traditional American policy shows that Bunau- 
 Varilla could not have inferred that the United 
 States would protect secession, as the evidence 
 points to the opposite conclusion. How did he 
 become informed and who informed him? As 
 already stated, the separatists staked their all oii 
 this knowledge. We know that their request for 
 a man-of-war at Colon caused Bunau-Varilla to 
 
1 66 America and the Canal Title 
 
 hurry to Washington. He went to Washington 
 for a sufficient reason, and not for a breath of 
 Washington ozone. There was domiciled there 
 the person who could order a man-of-war to 
 Colon, and the man-of-war forthwith hastened 
 to Colon with all possible speed. The conclusion 
 is apparent. There was an understanding be- 
 tween Bunau-Varilla and our Administration. 
 That is how he became informed. Isthmian 
 events from November 2, to November 6, 1903, 
 corroborate this conclusion. The military end 
 of secession was on our gunboats, the civil gov- 
 ernment end of it was at Panama. Each party 
 executed its allotted part. 
 
 The separatists at first thought they needed 
 $6,000,000 for an effective revolution. They had 
 to have vessels of war to prevent Colombia from 
 landing her troops on the Isthmus. Resistance 
 was otherwise deemed impossible. This shows 
 a well-thought-out plan — a plan that depended for 
 fulfillment on the cooperation of an adequate 
 navy. Suddenly it was found that a few hun- 
 dred thousand dollars (to pursuade official 
 Colombia on the Isthmus) was all that was 
 needed. Why this change? There is a reason. 
 It is not of record. It is, however, as indelibly 
 written as if it had been committed to parchment. 
 
The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 167 
 
 Comparison of the instructions to our naval offi- 
 cers prior to those of November 2, 1903, with 
 those from and after that date, tell the story as 
 emphatically as any written record could. 
 
 The so-called revolution was designed in 
 Panama. After the Hay-Herran treaty had 
 been rejected by Colombia, the finishing touches 
 were put on the project at Washington. It was 
 coordinated in collaboration with our Adminis- 
 tration. The only discordant note in its smooth 
 execution was the appearance of Colombian 
 troops earlier than expected, on November 3, 
 1903. This compelled such a modification of the 
 plan th^ footprints were left which reveal col- 
 laboration. 
 
 We will now deal with the abandonment of 
 our traditional Isthmian policy under the Treaty 
 of 1846. We have already given the instruc- 
 tions to our naval officers in Isthmian waters dur- 
 ing the administration of Grover Cleveland. 
 They should perhaps^ be reread at this point so 
 that the contrast between them and those' of 
 November 2, 1903, may be clearly seen. During 
 McKinley's Administration the following tele- 
 gram, dated July 25, 1900, was sent to our Consul 
 at Panama: 
 
1 68 America and the Canal Title 
 
 You are directed to protest against any act of hostility 
 which may involve or imperil the safe and peaceful tran- 
 sit of persons or property across the Isthmus of Panama. 
 The bombardment of Panama would have this effect, and 
 the United States must insist upon the neutraUty of the 
 Isthmus as guaranteed by the treaty. 
 
 This was simply a protest in advance of harm. 
 It was merely a request that Colombia pursue a 
 certain course. In it we find no evidence that it 
 was then held that the United States could law- 
 fully prevent Colombia from landing troops on 
 the Isthmus. 
 
 This brings the dispatches to our naval officers 
 in Isthmian waters down to the Roosevelt Ad- 
 ministration. The telegram of November 20, 
 1901, to our Consul at Panama first demands 
 attention-: 
 
 Notify all parties molesting or interfering with free 
 transit across the Isthmus that such interference rnust 
 cease and that the United States will prevent the inter- 
 ruption of traffic upon the railroad. Consult with cap- 
 tain of the Iowa, who will be instructed to land marines, 
 if necessary, for the protection of the railroad, in accord- 
 ance with the treaty rights and obligations of the United 
 States. Desirable to avoid bloodshed, if possible. 
 
 This order merely demanded that interruption 
 of the Isthmian transit cease, and provided the 
 means for the order's enforcement. It clearly 
 recognized the duty of the sovereign to protect 
 
The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 169 
 
 the transit in the first instance. The United 
 States would intervene only in case of necessity. 
 The order sent by Secretary Hay to Com- 
 mander Perry of the Iowa, dated November 20, 
 1 90 1, reads: 
 
 Notify all persons, including leader insurgents, inter- 
 ference with transit must immediately cease, otherwise 
 you will land force and maintain free transit and tele- 
 graphic communications. 
 
 The result of the order last given is shown in 
 a telegram by Commander Perry to Secretary 
 Long, dated November 21, 1901 : 
 
 Everything quiet. No further interference since no- 
 tification. Transit and telegraphic communication open. 
 Shall land force if there should be further interference. 
 Colon in possession of liberals and quiet. 
 
 The truth of the matter is that the contending 
 forces feared the United States to such an extent 
 that battles would halt to permit trains to pass, 
 and be resumed when these were beyond the zone 
 of conflict. Because of this fact, it was found 
 necessary to employ American forces on the Isth- 
 mus only 164 days, from the date of the supersed- 
 ing of the New Granada government by that of 
 Colombia, to November, 1903. During the 164 
 days traffic on the Panama railroad was merely 
 irregular, but not suspended. When this slight 
 
170 America and the Canal Title 
 
 inconvenience is contrasted with the benefits 
 which accrued to the United States under the 
 Treaty of 1846, it is wholly negligible. 
 
 Such was the situation when the formidable 
 telegrams of November 2, 1905, were sent to our 
 naval forces in, or presently to be in, Isthmian 
 waters. Roosevelt's wrath toward Colombia can 
 only be referred to as "Much Ado About Noth- 
 ing." 
 
 The following telegram by Commander Mc- 
 Crea to Secretary Long, dated November 24, 
 1901, is apropos as it occurred during the Roose- 
 velt Administration : 
 
 Gunboat Pinzon here with 600 troops. Have forbid- 
 den bombardment until non-combatants can be removed. 
 Have requested Liberals not to fire on Pinzon without 
 attempted landing. Shall landing with incidental firing 
 be permitted at American wharves? Request instruc- 
 tions. 
 
 He was not instructed to prevent the ves- 
 sel named from landing within fifty miles of 
 Panama! The Roosevelt Administration was 
 not seeking title to the Canal Zone from insur- 
 gents at that time. What a difference! The 
 orders and instructions to the fall of 1902 (we 
 will deal with those of 1902 in another chapter 
 of this book) were in accordance with Colombia's 
 understanding of the Treaty of 1846. They 
 
The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 171 
 
 sought, in authorized ways, to safeguard Isth- 
 mian transit from actual interruption, and con- 
 stituted no assault upon either the supreme juris- 
 diction or the supremely free action of Colombia. 
 The instructions of November 2, 1903, grossly 
 violated each of the foregoing. They had prime 
 reference to a mythical political insurrection 
 against Colombia's territorial integrity and na- 
 tional control, with no reference whatsoever to 
 transit interruption. They laid violent hands on 
 Colombia's sovereignty and forcibly prevented 
 her from taking precautionary measures. Co- 
 lombia was suddenly and peremptorily restrained 
 from making free disposition of her own troops 
 on her own soil. 
 
 The separatists of Panama knew that if they 
 would go through the trifling acts of raising a 
 flag and of adopting a Declaration of Independ- 
 ence, the American Navy would do the rest. 
 Then they could proceed to organize a civil gov- 
 ernment while the American Navy would patrol 
 Isthmian waters and prevent Colombia from in- 
 terfering with the establishment of the so-called 
 Republic of Panama. And this is the Province 
 of Panama that was "seething with Revolution" ! 
 A microscope would have been needed to discover 
 it. 
 
172 America and the Canal Title 
 
 The altered instructions to our men-of-war in 
 Isthmian waters disclose design. The lack of 
 domestic preparation for resistance to Colombia 
 shows that the Junta knew the design. How 
 did they become informed? Who could have in- 
 formed them? There was but one person that 
 could alter the traditional instructions to our 
 naval commanders, and that was the Commander- 
 in-Chief of our Army and Navy — the President. 
 
 The Senate, by a resolution dated January 22, 
 1904, asked the President to inform them as to 
 when the United States forces were used in ful- 
 fillment of the Treaty of 1846, (i) at the request 
 of the sovereign, (2) on its own initiative. The 
 reply was prepared by Acting-Secretary of State 
 Francis B, Loomis. It shows that during the 
 fifty-five years that the treaty was in force, the 
 American forces were used seven times, and that 
 only once were they landed on our own initiative, 
 and even at that time the Colombian Government 
 was duly notified. This was in 1902, that is, dur- 
 ing the Roosevelt Administr5,tion. The Colom- 
 bian official on the Isthmus omptested. This con- 
 struction of the Treaty of 1846 was not acquiesced 
 in by Colombia, and was the controlling reason 
 for its rejection of the Hay-Herran treaty. It, 
 therefore, cannot serve as a precedent for the 
 
The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 173 
 
 action of 1903, which is indeed without a pre- 
 cedent. 
 
 In Senate Document No. 143, Second Session, 
 Fifty-eighth Congress, we find Acting-Secretary 
 Loomis' summary after a detailed answer to the 
 foregoing request of the Senate, It is as fol- 
 lows: 
 
 It appears from the correspondence transmitted here- 
 with that on one occasion United States forces were 
 landed solely on the initiative of the United States — 
 namely, in September, 1902 — when the Panama authori- 
 ties were duly notified of the proposed landing. 
 
 The telegrams of November 2, ^903, are with- 
 out a precedent in American Diplomatic history. 
 For them, American history offers no counter- 
 part and international law no sanction. They 
 are sui generis. They violated the constitution 
 of the United States, international law and the 
 Treaty of 1846. This will be shown in other 
 chapters of this book. 
 
 While the separatists on the Isthmus were still 
 in doubt — were trying to resolve the unknown 
 factor in the situation, that is, the attitude of our 
 Government, the Nashville was speeding to 
 Colon. Sight of it would resolve the doubt and 
 precipitate secession. Before their decision was 
 rendered, the following dispatches were sent to 
 
174 America and the Canal Title 
 
 the Commanders of our men-of-war which were 
 to be in Isthmian waters on and after November 
 2, 1903. To those on the west coast : 
 
 Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interrup- 
 tion is threatened by armed force, occupy the line of rail- 
 road. Prevent landing of any armed force with hostile 
 intent, either Government or insurgent, at any point 
 within 50 miles of Panama. Government force reported 
 approaching the Isthmus in vessels. Prevent their land- 
 ing if, in your judgment, the landing would precipitate 
 a conflict. 
 
 To those on the east coast : 
 
 Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interrup- 
 tion is threatened by armed force, occupy line of rail- 
 road. Prevent landing of any armed force with hostile 
 intent, either government or insurgent, either at Colon, 
 Porto Bello or other point. 
 
 Roosevelt characterizes his course on the Isth- 
 mus at this time as follows : 
 
 Not only was the course followed as regards Panama 
 right in every detail, but there could have been no varia- 
 tion from that course except for the worse. We not 
 only did what was technically justifiable, but we did what 
 was demanded by every ethical consideration, national 
 and international. 
 
 Our counterpart of this characterization is, in 
 the words of Treitschke : 
 
 A thing' that is wholly a sham cannot, in this universe 
 of ours, endure forever. It may endure for a day, but 
 its doom is certain. 
 
The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 175 
 
 The explanations of Isthmian events by Roose- 
 velt and by Bunau-Varilla are wholly a sham. 
 They are contravened by facts. The facts have 
 not suffered ; the explanations have been reduced 
 to historical scrap. 
 
 Bunau-Varilla, Roosevelt, Amador and others 
 interested in Isthmian secession have not profited 
 by the sage advice of one Bill Devery, "When 
 caught with the goods on, say nothing." They 
 have talked too much. As already shown, that 
 which is true matches — the rest is scrap. That 
 which matches is the true story of the rape of 
 Colombia by the United States. 
 
 We will now resume the story of Bunau- 
 Varilla. He was telling how he inferred that 
 the Roosevelt Administration would protect se- 
 cession. We sidestepped his narrative in order 
 to introduce data in support of our contention 
 that his story is an invention. 
 
 Bunau-Varilla knew what the Administration 
 would do in the event of the secession of the 
 Province of Panama. He has told us in his book, 
 and it is independently established. Statements 
 by several of the separatists show that they acted 
 upon his assurance. This is corroborated by the 
 character of Isthmian preparation, which was 
 
176 America and the Canal Title 
 
 preparation for taking over the civil government 
 of the Province of Panama. There was no miU- 
 tary preparation such as we find when a real 
 revolution is projected. The secession of the 
 Province of Panama, was, therefore, due solely 
 to foreknowledge that the Roosevelt Administra- 
 tion would protect secession. 
 
 Bunau-Varilla has told us how he became in- 
 formed. We are showing that he did not become 
 informed in the way he has told us. His state- 
 ments crumble when examined by historical 
 methods. What then is the source of his ad- 
 vance information? Established facts will un- 
 erringly reveal the source. 
 
 The revolution was to be bloodless, we are told ! 
 The uprising was to cover the Canal Zone and 
 the canal littoral — the line of the railroad. 
 Bunau-Varilla is our authority. Ah! The 
 Isthmus wa.s not "seething with revolution." A 
 few men could determine the extent of the terri- 
 tory it would cover. But the whole Isthmus 
 arose as one man ! Roosevelt has told us. These 
 are statements of practical men. The one de- 
 sired to vindicate Roosevelt; the other sought to 
 justify precipitate intervention by showing that 
 an entire population arose and threw off the yoke 
 of oppression. They can't have it both ways. 
 
The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 177 
 
 If the Isthmus was "seething with revolution," 
 Bunau-Varilla did not tell the truth. If the rev- 
 olution could have been confined to the Canal 
 Zone and the canal littoral, Roosevelt did not tell 
 the truth. 
 
 We will let Bunau-Varilla continue his story. 
 We read in his book on Panama : 
 
 In the preceding year of 1902, the same principle had 
 been reenforced at the very moment of the difficult nego- 
 tiations with M. Concha, for the grant of the canal con- 
 cession to the United States. . . . 
 
 How could it be doubted that the American forces 
 would act in the same manner one year later, at a time 
 when Colombia had taken a decidedly hostile attitude ? 
 
 No hesitation was possible. The solution had been 
 found ! The mysterious problem was solved ! The final 
 unknown quantity had been at last discovered and the 
 equation resolved, as the French mathematicians say, in 
 the most elegant manner. 
 
 It was no longer necessary to spend enormous sums for 
 a useless war. 
 
 It was no longer necessary to present the impossible 
 request for protection by American forces. Such a thing 
 was indispensable to an insurrection covering the whole 
 Province of Panama, but it was eliminated entirely if the 
 insurrection was limited to the Isthmus, properly speak- 
 ing. 
 
 If a revolution was started from Colon to Panama, the 
 American forces were automatically, and without any 
 anterior understanding, obliged to intervene. 
 
 The^ intervention would consist in forbidding any 
 armed force to come within gunshot of the line of 
 transit. 
 
178 America and the Canal Title 
 
 All the villages, all the houses, all_ the inhabitants 
 within that zone, would immediately enjoy all necessary 
 protection. 
 
 Once such military protection was secured, the new 
 Republic could wait. 
 
 These statements are grotesque. They hardly 
 need refutation. We will deal with the Isthmian 
 events of 1902 in the next two chapters which 
 follow. Suffice it to say here that Bunau- 
 Varilla's statement of Isthmian events in 1902 is 
 as false as was his statement of those of 1885. 
 There was to be no revolution in the fall of 1903. 
 Therefore, no military preparation was neces- 
 sary. If there was no military force in Colon 
 — there was none — what justification could there 
 be for the United States keeping out Colombian 
 troops! Military preparation was necessary to 
 warrant intervention on the part of the United 
 States, if intervention could be warranted, which 
 we deny. , Uprisings had not eventuated in an 
 independent government for the Isthmus in 1885 
 or 1902. Why now? The explanation of 
 Bunau-Varilla explains altogether too much. It 
 ignores the facts. When there is collision be- 
 tween facts and an explanation, it is the explana- 
 tion which suffers and not the facts. 
 
 It was clearly known to Bunau-Varilla that the 
 actual revolution was to be on the American gun- 
 
The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 179 
 
 boats. He does not tell us who told him — who 
 gave him the assurance. His story is interest- 
 ing — interesting in a way other than it was in- 
 tended to be. Especially interesting is this state- 
 ment to Dr. Amador : 
 
 Doctor Amador, the moment has come to clear the 
 deck for action. Be satisfied with my assertions. There 
 is no more time for discussing their genesis. 
 
 / can give you the assurance that you will be protected 
 by the American forces forty-eight hours after you have 
 proclaimed the new Republic in the whole Isthmus. 
 
 That secession would be protected by American 
 forces was communicated to Dr. Amador, a rep- 
 resentative of the separatists, by Bunau-Varilla, 
 as stated above. This was immediately after one 
 of his trips to Washington. Was secession pro- 
 tected? This question is easily answered. It 
 had been arranged that the Province of Panama 
 was to declare her independence on November 4, 
 1903. This was actually done. The Nashville 
 arrived at Colon on November 2. The Dixie (at 
 Colon) and the Boston (at Panama) arrived a 
 few days later. The telegrams to their comman- 
 ders, dated November 2, 1903, quoted on an 
 earlier page, show that the protection was fur- 
 nished exactly as promised to the separatists by 
 Bunau-Varilla. 
 
i8o America and the Canal Title 
 
 The question at once arises how could Bunau- 
 Varilla have given such an assurance? Events 
 show that it was carried out as given. Who gave 
 him the advance information? It is an estab- 
 lished fact that he had it. He told us in his book 
 that he had it. After giving an account of the 
 movement of American warships, he observes : 
 
 Evidently the movements of Amador had been 
 watched, and his departure for the Isthmus after his 
 conference with me had raised suspicions of an early 
 explosion of the revolution after the Colombian Congress 
 had closed its session. 
 
 The sending of the Dixie to Guantanamo showed the 
 preoccupation of the American Government. It did not 
 disguise its preoccupation in its communications to the 
 press. Does not this simple fact in itself give the lie to 
 the absurd and prejudiced story of a revolution organ- 
 ized by the United States Government? 
 
 They had probably at Washington associated in their 
 minds the departure of Amador and the prediction I had 
 formulated in my interview with President Roosevelt on 
 the 9th of October, and with Mr. Hay on the i6th as to 
 the imminent peril of a revolution. The conclusion 
 which must have been reached was that the departure 
 of Amador after his interviews with me was the begin- 
 ning of revolutionary operations. 
 
 To think of the Government at Washington 
 watching the movements of Amador! Moving 
 men-of-war as Amador moved! What hypoc- 
 risy ! Soldiers and munitions of war were needed 
 for a real revolution. Therefore, watching, if 
 
The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus i8i 
 
 any, would have been on the Isthmus. There 
 was no watching. Facts controvert the supposi- 
 tion. There is no evidence of it. Instead of 
 watching there was a dispatch from the Isthmus 
 calHng for an American man-of-war at Colon, 
 and making compliance a condition of secession. 
 Evidence shows that the Roosevelt Administra- 
 tion came to an understanding with the separa- 
 tists through Bunau-Varilla as intermediary and 
 that it was not engaged in watching the move- 
 ments of anybody. 
 
 Dr. Amador encountered difficulty in persuad- 
 ing the separatists to proceed with secession. He 
 had only oral assurances of protection. They 
 expected documentary evidence. They insisted 
 that tangible evidence of protection by the forces 
 of the United States should precede action. We 
 will let Bunau-Varilla state the situation : 
 
 One of them [separatists] must have arisen and said: 
 "If Bunau-Varilla is so powerful, let him prove it. He 
 says we shall be protected forty-eight hours after estab- 
 lishing the new Republic. Well? We will believe him, 
 if he is capable of sending an American man-of-war to 
 Colon at our request." . . . The whole question of the 
 life and death of the canal was condensed in the follow- 
 ing words: An American man-of-war must be sent to 
 Colon. 
 
 If I succeeded in this task the canal was saved. If I 
 failed, it was lost. . . . 
 
i82 America and the Canal Title 
 
 I could just as well think it over in the train [to Wash- 
 ington] as in my own room. 
 
 On October 29, Bunau-Varilla actually re- 
 ceived a telegram from Dr. Amador to the effect 
 that an American man-of-war must be sent to 
 Colon. The Nashville was ordered to Colon on 
 October 30th. It arrived there on November 2. 
 On October 31, Bunau-Varilla telegraphed Dr. 
 Amador from Baltimore that a man-of-war 
 would arrive at Colon in two-and-a-half days. 
 It arrived at Colon as promised. This is no mere 
 coincidence. It taxes credulity to believe it, but 
 let Bunau-Varilla continue his observations : 
 
 The revolution was made because the connection be- 
 tween the request of a boat to me and the arrival of the 
 boat materialized in the eyes of the confederates the 
 reality of the influence which Amador had asserted to 
 them I possessed over the American Government. 
 
 Evidently they imagined the situation to be quite dif- 
 ferent from what it really was. They believed this influ- 
 ence to be of a direct and material order. They could 
 not understand matters as they really were. They could 
 not imagine that there was no material influence exerted 
 and that I was merely correctly and mathematically cal- 
 culating [correctly and mathematically calculating — what 
 audacity!] the forces at play, among which the main ones 
 were the duty and the interest of the American Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 The arrival of the Nashville corroborated the 
 information communicated to the separatists by 
 
The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 183 
 
 Dr. Amador. They were skeptical until the 
 Nashville appeared. When it appeared as prom- 
 ised they were convinced — in short, they knew. 
 The Colombians also knew. Now it is inefface- 
 able history, with a meaning other than that which 
 Bunau-Varilla would have us believe. He says 
 in his book : 
 
 Every one interpreted the Nashville's arrival as a de- 
 termined intervention of the United States, and the Co- 
 lombians were just as much persuaded of this as were 
 the people of Panama. This carried to such a pitch the 
 enthusiasm of the latter, and the discouragement of the 
 former, that the Colombians decided to withdraw peace- 
 fully. 
 
 Is the so-called Republic of Panama the out- 
 come of mathematically calculating the forces at 
 play? Does a sane man counsel others in such 
 a grave case as glibly as Bunau-Varilla alleges 
 he did? We do not believe his own indictment 
 of himself. If true, it would make him a degen- 
 erate. There is no evidence of degeneracy in his 
 story. We find in it only evidence of calculated 
 duplicity. 
 
 Is it believable that Bunau-Varilla advised the 
 separatists in Panama to proceed with secession 
 with no other assurance of protection by the 
 United States than his inference ? There was at 
 stake for the separatists: their lives, their prop- 
 
184 America and the Canal Title 
 
 erty and the welfare o£ their families ; for Bunau- 
 Varilla, his large holdings of stock in the New 
 Panama Canal Company. His story has none of 
 the earmarks of truthfulness. It is a crude in- 
 vention. It is, however, necessary to conclude 
 that he had the advance information that he com- 
 municated to the separatists, but that he did not 
 come by it as he would have us believe. 
 Swift says : 
 
 As universal a practice as lying is, and as easy a one 
 as it seems, it is astonishing that it has been brought to 
 so little perfection, even by those who are most celebrated 
 in that faculty. 
 
 This is another way of saying that the mind 
 cannot create a substitute for reality. Facts are 
 inexorable. Reason will, in due course, puncture 
 the inconsistency in a pseudo-explanation, and 
 truth will stand revealed because it matches. 
 
 Secession was to be effected on November 4. 
 The United States was to have men-of-war at 
 Colon and at Panama to protect secession within 
 forty-eight hours. But a hitch occurred. It be- 
 came known on October 29 that Colombian forces 
 not expected until November 10 would arrive in 
 about five days. Panama, although "seething 
 with revolution," as Roosevelt would have us be- 
 lieve, was not prepared to deal with an unex- 
 
The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 185 
 
 pected force of some two hundred soldiers. 
 Hence, Dr. Amador telegraphed Bunau-Varilla 
 for aid on October 29 : 
 
 We have news of the arrival of Colombian forces on 
 the Atlantic side within five days; they are mere than 
 two hundred strong; urge warships Colon. 
 
 Upon receipt of this telegram, Bunau-Varilla 
 hurried to Washington. The Nashville arrived 
 at Colon one day before the Colombian troops. 
 Panama called for help seven days before seces- 
 sion, and on the sixth day help was already speed- 
 ing to Colon. But why did Bunau-Varilla has- 
 ten to Washington upon receipt of the above tele- 
 gram ? It would seem that his advance informa- 
 tion was not based on inference after all, that is, 
 upon nice mathematical calculation. Such calcu- 
 lations are best worked out in a quiet room and 
 not in a noisy train to Washington. It would, 
 therefore, seem that our then Administration was 
 the source of his knowledge. 
 
 In the Independent of November 26, 1903, Dr. 
 Amador states that the separatists of Panama be- 
 lieved that the United States would not allow 
 Colombia to suppress secession. He states 
 guardedly: 
 
 Of course, we expected that the United States would 
 not let the Colombian troops attack us, because of the 
 
i86 America and the Canal Title 
 
 effect that war would have in the way of blocking the 
 traffic across the Isthmus, but we had no understanding 
 with the Government here, nor are the people of the 
 United States at all responsible for the revolution. It 
 was our own act. 
 
 This statement is indicative of foreknowledge. 
 It could not have been inferred from previous at- 
 tempts at secession. Therefore, there must have 
 been an understanding with our Administration. 
 Will the latter make good? That was the final 
 unknown quantity in the anxious days preceding 
 secession. Secession was held in abeyance until 
 tangible evidence appeared. It appeared on No- 
 vember 2 — the Nashville. Thereupon Shaler, su- 
 perintendent of the Panama Railroad, gets into 
 communication with Prescott. What transpired 
 is recorded in the following: 
 
 Have just wired you that the Nashville had been 
 sighted. This I presume settles the question. 
 
 It did settle the question. It was to be seces- 
 sion. It also settles another question. It shows 
 that our then Administration was the foster- 
 father of secession — ^gave it form and substance, 
 and became its controlling spirit just before and 
 immediately after the Declaration of Independ- 
 ence. 
 
 t^'rom and after November 2, 1903, the follow- 
 
The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 187 
 
 ing warships appeared in Isthmian waters : The 
 Dixie, Nashville, Atlanta, Maine, and Mayflower, 
 at Colon; the Boston, Marblehead, Concord, and 
 Wyoming, at Panama. This is a larger number 
 than were sent on previous occasions when there 
 was actual revolt. Therefore, their object was 
 different. On all previous occasions our war- 
 ships were ordered to Isthmian waters to protect 
 the lives and property of Americans and to assist 
 the sovereign in maintaining uninterrupted 
 transit. In the fall of 1903, they were sent to 
 protect secession. This is clearly reflected in the 
 telegrams to the Nashville, Dixie and Boston on 
 November 2, 1903. 
 
 These dispatches were not sent for the purpose 
 of protecting Isthmian transit, but for the pur- 
 pose of assuring the peaceful birth of the so- 
 called Republic of Panama, and maintaining it 
 after birth. In short, before the birth of the so- 
 called Republic of Panama, and at a time when 
 Colombia was in undisputed possession of the 
 Isthmus and exercised undisputed sovereignty 
 over it, dispatches were sent to armed vessels of 
 the United States in the Atlantic and Pacific in- 
 structing them to prevent the Government of Co- 
 lombia from landing troops on her Isthmian ter- 
 ritory. 
 
1 88 America and the Canal Title 
 
 We have given complete the telegram to the 
 commander of the Nashville, dated November 2, 
 1903. The vessel named was the first warship to 
 arrive in Isthmian waters on the Atlantic side. 
 The telegram to Rear Admiral Glass of the Bos- 
 ton, dated November 2, 1903, is interesting from 
 the fact that the vessel named was the first man- 
 of-war to arrive in Isthmian waters on the Pa- 
 cific side. It is here reproduced in full : 
 
 Proceed with all possible dispatch to Panama. Tele- 
 graph in cipher your departure. Maintain free and un- 
 interrupted transit. If interruption is threatened by 
 armed force occupy the line of railroad. Prevent land- 
 ing of any armed force, either Government or insurgent, 
 with hostile intent at any point within 50 miles of Pan- 
 ama. If doubtful as to the intention of any armed force, 
 occupy Ancqn Hill strongly with artillery. If the Wy- 
 oming would delay Concord and Marblehead, her dis- 
 position must be left to your discretion. Government 
 force reported approaching the Isthmus in vessels. Pre- 
 vent their landing if in your judgment landing would 
 precipitate a conflict. 
 
 Collaboration in the secession of the Province 
 of Panama is no worse than the foregoing tele- 
 gram. Collaboration is merely the forerunner of 
 such a telegram. The policy embodied therein is a 
 departure from our traditional Isthmian policy. 
 Collaboration matches with this and other tele- 
 grams of the same date. An Administration ca^ 
 
The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 189 
 
 pahle of sending them is capable of collaboration 
 because the two are clearly complementary and 
 stand on the same ethical plane. The collabora- 
 tion planned the dismemberment of a friendly 
 state; the telegrams directed the carrying out of 
 dismemberment. Why balk at the planning, col- 
 laboration, and not balk at the act, which is merely 
 a part of an indivisible whole? The one is a 
 corollary of the other. We know that our then 
 Administration is guilty of the act of dismember- 
 ment. We believe that the known facts warrant 
 the conclusion that it collaborated with Bunau- 
 Varilla in making arrangements for protecting 
 secession. 
 
 Collaboration to effect the dismemberment of 
 Colombia adds no sting to that of dismember- 
 ment which is conceded. In November, 1902, 
 three provinces in revolt for some three years 
 laid down their arms. In November, 1903, we 
 are asked to believe that one of them actually 
 projected a serious uprising. It staggers belief. 
 Facts show that there was no intent of a serious 
 uprising on the part of the inhabitants as a whole. 
 They also show that if advance assurance of the 
 cooperation of the United States could not have 
 been secured, there would have been no secession. 
 As projected, planned and executed, the ma- 
 
190 America and the Canal Title 
 
 chinery of the so-called revolution was to be and 
 actually was on our gunboats. A microscope 
 does not disclose any other preparation. The so- 
 called Republic of Panama is a fact. It is mute 
 evidence of collaboration. 
 
 Colombia hesitated about curtailment of her 
 sovereignty in the Canal Zone. She felt that if 
 curtailment were to be acquiesced in, then the 
 compensation offered was not adequate and so 
 she was seeking a formula along the line of 
 abridged sovereignty, and of enlarged compensa- 
 tion through long period re-valuation of the 
 grant. This was repugnant to our Administra- 
 tion. Panama would grant all that it wanted and 
 ask no questions. Here is an impelling motive 
 for collaboration, and one that was in harmony 
 with the desire to make good the threats made 
 when the Hay-Herran treaty was under consid- 
 eration. 
 ^ We have examined several telegrams dated 
 November 2, 1903. We have seen that they were 
 not designed to protect transit between Colon and 
 Panama, but to protect secession. Plans do not, 
 however, unfold with clockwork precision. The 
 telegram to the Commander of the Nashville was 
 delayed in delivery, and so the landing of the new 
 contingent of Colombian troops already men- 
 
The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 191 
 
 tioned was not prevented. It is shown in the fol- 
 lowing telegram received by Secretary Hay from 
 Colon, dated November 3, 1903 : 
 
 Troops from vessel Cartagena have disembarked; are 
 encamping on Pacific dock awaiting orders to proceed to 
 Panama from commander-in-chief, who went there this 
 morning. No message for Nashville received. 
 
 On the same date (November 3) Commander 
 Hubbard of the Nashville replied to the telegram 
 sent him November 2, as follows : 
 
 Receipt of your telegram of November 2 is acknowl- 
 edged. Prior to receipt this morning about 400 men 
 were landed here by the Government of Colombia from 
 Cartagena. No revolution has been declared on the Isth- 
 mus and no disturbances. Railway company have de- 
 clined to transport these troops except by request of the 
 governor of Panama. Request has not been made. It 
 is possible that movement may be made to-night at Pan- 
 ama to declare independence, in which event I will . . . 
 (message mutilated here) here. Situation is most criti- 
 cal if revolutionary leaders act. 
 
 Message mutilated! The most vital part of 
 the message mutilated so that its contents are to 
 remain forever unknown! And the original 
 message to the Commander of the Nashville or- 
 dering him to proceed with all possible speed to 
 Colon missing! We will not indulge in infer- 
 ence. The reader will know that it is not a co- 
 incidence — that it has a sinister look. In his of- 
 
192 America and the Canal Title 
 
 ficial report. Commander Hubbard tells us why 
 he did not prevent the landing of the Colombian 
 troops which arrived on the Cartagena on No- 
 vember 3 : 
 
 Inasmuch as the Independent party had not acted and 
 the Government of Colombia was at that time in undis- 
 puted control of the Province of Panama, I did not feel, 
 in the absence of instructions, that I was justified in pre- 
 venting the landing of those troops. 
 
 If Commander Hubbard of the Nashville had 
 had the telegram sent him on November 2, the 
 troops and administrative officers on the Carta- 
 gena would not have been allowed to land. In 
 short, Colombia would have been prevented from 
 landing troops on a part of her territory when 
 there was no disturbance whatsoever. And that 
 is called protecting the transit and maintaining 
 order! It is the only interruption of the transit 
 and of the peace that there was. 
 
 As already stated, there was no revolution, 
 there was no uprising. Certain interested per- 
 sons merely volunteered to organize a civil gov- 
 ernment in the Province of Panama, independent 
 of that of Colombia, if assured of protection by 
 the United States. The protection was assured 
 and was given. The purpose was to enable the 
 one to grant and the other to receive title to the 
 
The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 193 
 
 Canal Zone. Colombia was to be barred from 
 interfering by the display of overwhelming force. 
 That is what was planned, and that is what event- 
 uated. 
 
 The military forces of Colombia arrived at 
 Colon in fulfillment of her obligations under the 
 Treaty of 1846 and in the performance of the 
 most elementary duty of a sovereign state. Those 
 of the United States were there to interrupt in its 
 most sacred use. It was the sovereign right of 
 Colombia to secure transit from Colon to Panama 
 for her troops, and the duty of the Railroad, un- 
 der its charter, to supply it. The United States 
 did interfere without a scintilla of right and in 
 violation of the Treaty of 1846. Note the follow- 
 ing telegram to the Commander of the Nashville 
 at Colon, dated November 3, 1903 : 
 
 In the interests of peace make every effort to prevent 
 Government troops at Colon from proceeding to Panama. 
 The transit of the Isthmus must be kept open and order 
 maintained. 
 
 Peace prevailed in the Province of Panama on 
 the date of this telegram. There were no insur- 
 gents. There was no preparation whatsoever for 
 an uprising. We adopt the following from the 
 pen of Leander T. Chamberlain as our own : 
 
 Yet the President issued an order preventing Colom- 
 
194 America and the Canal Title 
 
 bia from moving her own troops, via her own railway, 
 from her own Colon to her own Panama! So far as 
 concerned their freedom to go to the scene of danger, 
 Colombia's troops were reconcentradoed and manacled! 
 Let it still be borne in mind that there was no interrup- 
 tion of transit by either loyalist or insurgent. Let it 
 be taken into account that the President, himself, under 
 the pretense of maintaining peace and order when peace 
 and order perfectly prevailed, violently interrupted free 
 transit, absolutely closing it to the forces of sovereign 
 Colombia, a treaty-bound ally of the United States ! 
 
 There is no direct evidence known to the writer 
 that the Roosevelt Administration collaborated in 
 the ante-secession arrangements to wrest the 
 Province of Panama from Colombia. The 
 known facts, however, point overwhelmingly to 
 collaboration. The evidence is circumstantial, 
 but not a link is missing. The evidence is re- 
 enforced by motive on the part of the Adminis- 
 tration at Washington. Colombia had not yielded 
 to solemn warnings. 
 
 We read on page 564 of Roosevelt's autobi- 
 ography : 
 
 No one connected with the American Government had 
 any part in preparing, inciting, or encouraging the revo- 
 lution, and except for the reports of our military and 
 naval ofificers, which I forwarded to Congress, no one 
 connected with the Government had any previous knowl- 
 edge concerning the proposed revolution, except such as 
 was accessible to any person who read the newspapers 
 and kept abreast of current questions and current af- 
 fairs. 
 
The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 195 
 
 Small provinces, planning a revolution, keep 
 such matters secret so as to enable them to make 
 adequate preparation without interference. The 
 foregoing seems to indicate that there was prepa- 
 ration on the Isthmus, which is contrary to the 
 facts. If it were true, Colombia must have 
 known. Why then did she not have an adequate 
 force on the Isthmus ? 
 
 The separatists of Panama knew what the 
 Roosevelt Administration would do after inde- 
 pendence had been declared. All statements as 
 to how they found out crumble before the search- 
 light of historical method. The sifting process 
 leaves certain established facts from which we 
 can draw our conclusion. The separatists knew 
 what our Government would do and the line of 
 action pursued by our Administration was in 
 accord with what they knew and with what they 
 expected. Tradition forbids inference to be the "•^- 
 source of their enlightenment. The Commander- 
 in-chief of the Army and Navy was the sole and 
 only person who could have communicated to 
 Bunau-Varilla information of so formidable a 
 character as he conveyed to the separatists of 
 Panama. 
 
 The Roosevelt Administration gave form and '^r 
 substance to the arrangements for the secession 
 
196 America and the Canal Title 
 
 of Panama, in short, gave the movement the vi- 
 tality that it possessed. Without collaboration 
 there would have been no secession. An inner 
 circle in Panama were the Alpha and our Admin- 
 istration was the Omega of this vaudeville, with 
 Bunau-Varilla acting as Master of Ceremonies, 
 that is, acting as the coordinating genius who ef- 
 fected the cooperation of those interested in the 
 performance. Had not the vessel Cartagena, 
 with its new contingent of Colombian soldiers, 
 introduced a discordant note by arriving seven 
 days earlier than originally expected, the per- 
 formance would have become history exactly as 
 prearranged. 
 
 The aim of the United States in the negotiation 
 of the Hay-Herran treaty was to secure de facto 
 sovereignty over the Canal Zone, and its equiva- 
 lent over the canal littoral. Colombia desired 
 that the United States should become, as far as 
 concerned the canal, a corporation sole for the 
 purpose of constructing and operating it under 
 her own sovereignty. There was a vital conflict 
 of interests. It could only be adjusted by com- 
 promise. Colombia asked for the reopening of 
 negotiations with the view of finding a workable 
 formula. The Roosevelt Administration cut the 
 Gordian knot by guaranteeing the success of the 
 
The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 197 
 
 secession of the Province of Panama from Co- 
 lombia. 
 
 The quotations given in this chapter from 
 Bunau-Varilla's book on Panama and those from 
 otherwise trustworthy sources point unmistaka- 
 bly to the conclusion drawn by us from them. 
 These have been stated as the narrative pro- 
 gressed. We will now assemble them and give 
 them a setting in arguments not heretofore fully 
 presented. In doing this we aim to show more 
 fully than we have done so far that there was col- 
 lusion between our Administration in 1903 and a 
 few separatists on the Isthmus, and that this con- 
 clusion is not only warranted but inescapable. 
 
 Roosevelt seeks in a variety of forms to convey 
 the impression that conflict was imminent on the 
 Isthmus and that American intervention pre- 
 vented it. The fact is just the opposite. There 
 was no preparation on the Isthmus for physical 
 combat. We hear of a so-called fire department 
 of some four hundred men having a military pur- 
 pose. But what are four hundred undisciplined 
 men against Colombia's more or less trained army 
 of some ten thousand ! 
 
 The unavoidable conclusion is that the Roose- 
 velt Administration collaborated with the sepa- 
 
198 America and the Canal Title 
 
 ratists of Panama through Bunau-Varilla as in- 
 termediary, gave form and substance to seces- 
 sion, and was its controUing spirit just prior to 
 and immediately after the Declaration of In- 
 dependence by the council of the City of Panama 
 on November 4, 1903. Our then Administration 
 and the separatists in the City of Panama — the 
 rest of the province was not consulted — under- 
 stood each other before the Rubicon was crossed. 
 Bunau-Varilla positively asserts that he was in 
 possession of the information that the Roosevelt 
 Administration would protect secession and that 
 the act of secession was based on that assurance 
 and shaped to conform to it. We have shown 
 that the data on which Bunau-Varilla alleged he 
 inferred it are false. With it crumbles inference 
 as a source of his information. He, however, 
 had the information. He said so in his book. 
 Events show that he had it. That proves his 
 statement. He could have gotten it in but one 
 way and that was by collaboration with our Ad- 
 ministration. He has shown the opportunity — 
 conferences with members of our Administration 
 including the President. It is now the province 
 of the student of history to do some inferring and 
 that inference is that our Administration con- 
 veyed to Bunau-Varilla the information that he 
 
The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 199 
 
 says he arrived at in an elegant manner by a nice 
 mathematical calculation. 
 
 The statements of Bunau-Varilla do not ring 
 true. When viewed as a whole, they sound like 
 an attempt to explain events connected with the 
 dismemberment of Colombia so as to disprove ac- 
 tual connection of the Roosevelt Administration 
 with it as far as concerns its planning. In this 
 he has not only failed, but has actually furnished 
 the corroboration needed to establish it. 
 
 When statements — it matters not with what 
 unction they are uttered — conflict with established 
 facts, it is the statements which suffer, the facts 
 are mute evidence that the statements are false. 
 It is impossible for the assurances given by 
 Bunau-Varilla to the separatists of Panama, and 
 subsequent events on the Isthmus, to have been 
 the result of inference. They were the result of 
 information communicated. It is immaterial 
 whether it was conveyed to him in whole or in 
 part, direct or by proxy. Secession and the or- 
 ganization of the so-called Republic of Panama 
 were based on it. 
 
 We may well ask where a man would go who 
 was basing everything on inferences derived from 
 facts. Presumably to a large library where he 
 would have access to the facts on which to rest 
 
200 America and the Canal Title 
 
 the inferences derived by refined mathematical 
 calculations. Possessed of the facts, he would 
 perhaps seek the quiet of a dark room and medi- 
 tate undisturbed by distracting noises present on 
 a train. But Bunau-Varilla went to Washing- 
 ton. Why? There was domiciled the person 
 who could order a warship to Colon. The Nash- 
 ville was ordered to Colon ! 
 
 Isthmian events show such a perfect coordina- 
 tion that they preclude any other conclusion than 
 that of collaboration between the Roosevelt Ad- 
 ministration and the separatists of Panama. The 
 coordination was too perfect to permit of any 
 other conclusion. The discord caused by the ar- 
 rival of 474 Colombian soldiers earlier than orig- 
 inally expected must be eliminated to see the plan 
 as pre-arranged, and this additional item must 
 then be fitted in to give us the true story. 
 
 The original plan provided for the prompt 
 recognition of the de facto government of the 
 new republic by the United States after the 
 Declaration of Independence. The telegrams 
 which pertain to the elimination of the new Co- 
 lombian forces which arrived on November 3 are 
 supplementary thereto. The formidable charac- 
 ter of these telegrams and the sayings and con- 
 duct of the Isthmians during the three stirring 
 
The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 201 
 
 days in which they were eliminated are now mute 
 evidence of pre-arrangement — that a workable 
 understanding existed between Bunau-Varilla 
 and our Administration. 
 
 Every vital statement made by Bunau-^Varilla 
 on which he claims to have based his inference is 
 false. This disposes of the nice mathematical 
 calculations whereby he claims to have arrived at 
 the conclusions on which the separatists acted. 
 There remains, however, the fact that the sep- 
 aratists acted in the confident belief that the 
 United States would protect secession and see the 
 movement through. She did as they believed. 
 The assurance was given to them by Bunau- 
 Varilla. He did not come by the knowledge as 
 he alleges. How did he come by it? How could 
 he have come by it? As it involved a departure 
 from traditional American policy, the knowledge 
 could have been received from but one person — 
 the President. No subordinate could have set in 
 motion the machinery actually set in motion 
 whereby the success of secession was effected. 
 
 All the details of this discreditable and regret- 
 table affair cannot yet be filled in. The salient 
 points alone are known. It is unlikely that the 
 missing details will alter the general conclusion 
 as to how the rape of Colombia was arranged and 
 
202 America and the Canal Title 
 
 effected. It may alter somewhat the connection 
 between Washington and Panama, but it will not 
 sever it at a vital point. 
 
 Tracy Robinson, prominent among the separa- 
 tists and author of a book on Panama, ventures 
 this statement concerning secession: "The de- 
 tails would afford material for a wonder story." 
 Clearly, according to this, all is not recorded, all 
 has not been told. If the course that our then 
 Administration pursued was honorable, there is 
 nothing to conceal. A wonder story would be a 
 good seller. The separatists would figure in it as 
 heroes. They smote the oppressor, threw off the 
 yoke of oppression and founded a Republic dedi- 
 cated to liberty and justice. But the wonder 
 story is not yet written. The fact that it is not 
 written — that those who know the facts have not 
 recorded them — is mute evidence that there are 
 facts connected with the secession of Panama 
 that would not look well in print. We have as- 
 sembled the known facts and matched them so as 
 to reveal the essentials of the story. 
 
 As already indicated, Roosevelt and Bunau- 
 Varilla have attempted to construct a substitute 
 for actual history in their accounts of the seces- 
 sion of Panama. They have attempted the im- 
 possible. Their invented facts do not fit into 
 
The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 203 
 
 their assigned places. They do not match with 
 the actual facts and with one another. This is 
 the weakness of their explanation. It is the rock 
 on which their explanations founder. 
 
 If we take the known facts and arrange them so 
 that they match, the mind automatically supplies 
 any missing link. The missing link in the history 
 of the secession of the Province of Panama from 
 Colombia is the fact that an understanding 
 existed with our then Administration. With 
 that supplied, the story is complete, the record be- 
 comes rational and the events stand in a causal 
 relation. Roosevelt's assertion, "/ took the Canal 
 Zone," is virtually the missing link, that is, it is 
 another way of stating that an understanding 
 existed between our Administration and the sep- 
 aratists on the Isthmus. 
 
 The writer vacillated between suspicion and 
 conviction until he had read Bunau-Varilla's book 
 on Panama. This convinced him that there had 
 been an informal exchange of views between the 
 Roosevelt Administration and Bunau-Varilla, and 
 that the latter was informed that the American 
 navy would be used to prevent the landing of Co- 
 lombian soldiers on the Isthmus if the separatists 
 in Panama would take over the civil government 
 of the province. 
 
204 America and the Canal Title 
 
 That those who sought the secession of the 
 Province of Panama from Colombia made over- 
 tures to our Administration is acknowledged. 
 Secession was for the sole purpose of creating a 
 state capable of granting to the United States the 
 coveted title to the Canal Zone. Naturally, such 
 overtures would be made. It was not necessary 
 to record the understanding arrived at. The 
 Declaration of Independence on November 4, 
 1903, recognition of Panama as a sovereign state 
 on November 6, 1903, and the signing of the Hay- 
 Bunau-Varilla treaty on November 18, 1903 — all 
 in two weeks — tell us that there was an antecedent 
 understanding, regardless of pretensions to the 
 contrary. 
 
 The separatists of Panama spent their time 
 designing political machinery instead of prepar- 
 ing to overthrow Colombian sovereignty by force. 
 They acted differently in 1899-1902 when there 
 was a real revolution. Why this departure from 
 the normal course ? Because coercion of Colom- 
 bia by the United States had failed, and our Ad- 
 ministration had entered into the calculations of 
 the separatists, either direct or by proxy. At 
 first the separatists had apparently looked for 
 money and military preparedness. That was 
 abandoned in the twinkling of an eye. Why! 
 
The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 205 
 
 Because a substitute had been found. The 
 American marines would be there. They would 
 be sufficient. Indeed the known facts connected 
 with the secession of Panama connect our Ad- 
 ministration with the ante-secession arrange- 
 ments as unmistakably as though there were offi- 
 cial documents to prove it. More so because 
 documents can be tampered with, but events can- 
 not. A Persian poet has well said : 
 
 The moving finger writes, and having writ 
 Moves on; nor all your piety nor wit, 
 Shall lure it back to cancel half a line, 
 Nor all your tears wash out one word of it. 
 
 The action of General Huertas of the Colom- 
 bian forces at Panama and of the officials of the 
 Panama railroad in the stirring days prior to the 
 Declaration of Independence show that they had 
 foreknowledge (convincing proof) of what the 
 United States had agreed to do. General Huer- 
 tas committed treason. The railroad officials 
 jeopardized the interests of the stockholders of 
 the property in their care. Are steps with such 
 grave consequences lightly taken? To ask the 
 question is to answer. Pre-arrangement with 
 the United States is writ large over the portal to 
 Isthmian events which resulted in the establish- 
 ment of the so-called Republic of Panama. In- 
 
2o6 America and the Canal Title 
 
 sert pre-arrangement into the ensemble of Isth- 
 mian events and they match. Without it they 
 are bizarre — discordant facts. 
 
 History is not bizarre. Human beings act ac- 
 cording to law. Tradition is their guide unless it 
 is positively and efficaciously set aside by an ante- 
 cedent assurance. Such antecedent assurance 
 Bunau-Varilla gave to those directing the seces- 
 sion movement in Panama. They acted on it. 
 They were not deceived. Bunau-Varilla did not 
 become informed as he states he did. His only 
 source of information could have been the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the 
 United States, either direct or by proxy, and he is 
 believed to have been too shrewd a politician to 
 employ a proxy. 
 
 Bunau-Varilla gave assurance to the separat- 
 ists that the United States would protect seces- 
 sion. It is reported that when the time for action 
 arrived, Dr. Amador cabled to him in New York 
 to verify this assurance of protection. Dr. 
 Amador is reported to have said as he wrote the 
 telegram : 
 
 If this man Varilla can bring an American warship to 
 each side of the Isthmus, then we may proceed. 
 
 The answer to the telegram came : 
 
The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 207 
 
 Go ahead. American warships will be on either side 
 of the Isthmus in forty-eight hours. 
 
 The first arrived on November 2, and the others 
 a little later. They did not arrive as the result of 
 accident. It was not coincidence. The Bunau- 
 Varilla telegram was not based on inference. 
 This is confirmed in a newspaper article of the 
 time. Teague writes in the Washington Post 
 for December 7, 1903 : 
 
 It is an indisputable fact that the conspirators for in- 
 dependence at Panama believed implicitly, before they 
 made a single open move for independence, that advance 
 assurances of support had been given by the Government 
 at Washington. This belief is so fixed that those in the 
 conspiracy do not hesitate to say that the first move 
 would never have been made had it not been believed 
 that Washington had given a promise of support. 
 
 These statements of Teague are abundantly 
 corroborated by other journals. We read in the 
 New York Evening Post of December 8, 1903: 
 
 The Cartagena outfit, civil and military, was landed at 
 Colon. Leaving command to Colonel Torres, the gen- 
 erals (Amaya and Tovar) boarded a train for Panama. 
 This city was in a ferment. The revolutionists thought 
 the jig was up. What should be done? Now, General 
 Huertas, in command of the garrison, had fought under 
 General Herbert O. Jeffries. ... He said to Jeffries : 
 
 "Will you stand by if I deliver the garrison to the 
 revolutionists ?" 
 
 "Sure," answered Jeffries. 
 
 Then Jeffries went to the nonplussed revolutionists 
 and declared, "You have arrived at the time described in 
 
2o8 America and the Canal Title 
 
 an old Spanish proverb saying— You have got to give 
 birth now, or burst." ... A dispatch came from Colon. 
 ... It said that the Panama Railroad had refused to 
 transport the Colombian troops across to Panama. 
 Hearing this, the revolutionists took heart. They would 
 go on. At five o'clock they would serenade the Colom- 
 bian generals. Then after dinner the generals would be 
 seized, and the same band which had welcomed them 
 would sound the tocsin of the revolution. 
 
 On the evening of October 31, 1903, there was a final 
 meeting of the secessionists at the home of Doctor Ama- 
 dor — eight in number. 
 
 They heard that Doctor Amador had telegraphed Va- 
 rilla that everything was now ready for the overturning. 
 They adjourned with the remark that "If Varilla could 
 move some American men-of-war to the Isthmus, he is 
 somebody, and we can go ahead." In the morning [No- 
 vember i] arrived a reply from Varilla, dated October 
 31, saying that American men-of-war would be at the 
 Isthmus immediately to keep transit open. . . . 
 
 November 4 was fixed on as the date for "the move- 
 ment." The work of enlisting the aid of Government 
 officers had progressed. Admiral Varon of the Colom- 
 gian gunboat Twenty-first of November was won over 
 with all his forces. General Huertas, commandant of the 
 garrison, was found easy to approach. ... To rid him- 
 self of officers and men he was not sure would enter the 
 plot to revolt, he pretended to have had a dispatch say- 
 ing that revolutionists were landing at Cocla, down the 
 coast. Then he sent off all the distrusted officers and 
 men to put down Coda's imaginary insurrection. 
 
 Senor Melendez, of Colon, was called to Panama, and 
 asked to be ready to take the governorship of Colon on 
 the 4th. About noon on the 2d the Nashville arrived at 
 Colon. Everything was favorable, except that no Amer- 
 ican warship had yet appeared at Panama. Suddenly 
 that evening, to the consternation of the plotters, the 
 Colombian warship Cartagena steamed into Colon, 
 
The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 209 
 
 bearing some 500 soldiers, 50 clerks and a new gov- 
 ernor. 
 
 Further confirmation of the foregoing is fur- 
 nished by Teague in the Baltimore American for 
 December 12, 1903: 
 
 The promoters of the revolution are compelled by ex- 
 perience to distrust a large proportion of those men upon 
 whom they are now forced to rely. They know that the 
 army and police force were purchased to support the 
 revolution, and knowing that these factors are suscepti- 
 ble to corruption, they do not know to-day whether the 
 military and police officials are true or untrue to the re- 
 public. . . . 
 
 All they [the real revolutionists] hope for is that they 
 can keep things going as they now are until after the 
 Canal treaty is signed by the members of the junta. 
 That act of ratification accomplished, the revolutionists 
 ' will have little interest in the Republic. . . . The revo- 
 lutionists have a bland and childlike faith in the great 
 American Republic. 
 
 It matters not what statements may be made at Wash- 
 ington or what stories may be current in the States, all 
 Panama believes that the revolution was made possible 
 by Washington's foreknowledge of what was proposed, 
 and an expressed determination by the Government at 
 Washington to give moral and physical support to the 
 revolutionists. There is a reason for this belief, for it 
 was not actually decided to attempt the coup which re- 
 sulted in the creation of the Republic until advices were 
 received from the State to the effect that if it should be 
 attempted the United States would back it up. 
 
 These advices were not official, so far as the Adminis- 
 tration was concerned, but they were of such a character 
 ... as to convince the revolutionists that all they had 
 to do was to take the initiative and then rely on the 
 United States to insure the success of the project. 
 
2IO America and the Canal Title 
 
 These excerpts give support to the assertions 
 already made that the Roosevelt Administration 
 expected warships to reach Isthmian waters in 
 time to prevent the landing of any new contingent 
 of Colombian troops, and that the separatists 
 knew that all they needed to do was to persuade 
 ($, $) the Colombian forces then on the Isthmus 
 to acquiesce in secession. They were persuaded. 
 This was the part that the separatists were to play 
 in the rape of Colombia. Our marines were there 
 to do the rest. In short, Isthmian cash and the 
 American navy were to cooperate to effect the 
 success of secession. 
 
 Obviously, the inner circle in Panama could 
 not have proceeded with the extreme measures 
 that it did unless it had made adequate local 
 preparation or had an understanding with our 
 Administration. The absence of local prepara- 
 tion will be discussed in Chapter VI. We hear 
 of nothing but the non-resistence of Colombia's 
 troops in the City of Panama, and their yielding 
 to persuasion of a pecuniary kind. Therefore, it 
 is a probability amounting to a certainty that 
 there was an understanding between the separat- 
 ists and the Big Brother of the north. The Big 
 Brother acted with such clockwork precision in 
 the scheme that doubt is transformed into con- 
 
The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 211 
 
 viction. No reasoning along the ordinary infer- 
 ences of human life can arrive at any other con- 
 clusion. 
 
 It was plainly the understanding that the Prov- 
 ince of Panama should declare her independence 
 of Colombia and simultaneously assume all the 
 functions of civil government. The United 
 States was to recognize the independence of 
 the new republic immediately. Thereafter the 
 Treaty of 1846 was to be construed as in force 
 with the new republic and Colombia would, ipso 
 facto, be like any other foreign country in this 
 respect. American warships were to be there to 
 prevent the landing of any new contingent of 
 Colombian troops on the Isthmus. This was to 
 be done under the pretense of complying with the 
 Treaty of 1846. No additional Colombian troops 
 were expected until the entire coup was com- 
 pleted. Thus, there was an attempt to give to an 
 unlawful act the appearance of regularity and 
 legality. 
 
 Malmros, American Consul at Colon, in his 
 telegram to Secretary Hay, dated November 3, 
 1903, states : 
 
 Revolution imminent. Government force on the Isth- 
 mus about 500 men. Their official promised support 
 revolution. Fire department Panama, 441, are well or- 
 
212 America and the Canal Title 
 
 ganized and favor revolution. Government vessel, Car- 
 tagena, with about 400 men, arrived early to-day with 
 now Gommander-in-chief, Tovar. Was not expected un- 
 til November 10. 
 
 And this is the extent o£ the preparation for 
 military operations in a province that is "seething 
 with revolution" ! A political fire department of 
 some 400 men and some other patriots whose ad- 
 hesion was secured by the cash-nexus. Revolu- 
 tion! Robbing a sister republic of a province 
 under a cloak of respectability. 
 
 The seizure of the Canal Zone, as originally 
 planned, provided for the persuasion ($, $) of 
 the Colombian garrison and officials domiciled on 
 the Isthmus to act with the separatists and for the 
 United States to have an adequate naval force 
 near enough so that it could reach Isthmian 
 waters in time to prevent Colombia from landing 
 troops to reestablish her sovereignty. This plan 
 was frustrated by the earlier arrival of a new con- 
 tingent of Colombian troops. Had these troops 
 not arrived before the plan was ready for execu- 
 tion, Dr. Amador would not have had to make 
 the representations to the Colombian generals that 
 he did make. These representations match with 
 established facts and are, therefore, conclusive as 
 evidence. They point unmistakably to collusion. 
 
The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus 213 
 
 The events connected with the elimination of these 
 Colombian troops tell the story as convincingly as 
 though it were a matter of official record — signed, 
 sealed and delivered. They prove that there was 
 no revolution projected. They prove that none 
 eventuated. They prove that the so-called Re- 
 public of Panama is the product of intrigue be- 
 tween Washington and Panama through the good 
 offices of Bunau-Varilla. 
 
Chapter V 
 Violation of the Treaty of 1846 
 
 In this chapter, we will show that President 
 Roosevelt, in the part that his Administration 
 took in the vaudeville revolution on the Isthmus 
 in the fall of 1903, violated the Treaty of 1846, 
 then in force with Colombia, as well as a univer- 
 sally recognized principle of international law. 
 We will give the provisions of the treaty violated 
 and point out wherein they were violated. We 
 will conclude with an appeal for a more sacred 
 keeping of our solemn engagements than we have 
 done in the case of our Isthmian Canal treaties. 
 
 The foregoing statement of faithlessness on the 
 part of an American Administration is so grave 
 that no self-respecting person would make it 
 lightly. It must be immediately followed by 
 something tangible that will indicate the possibil- 
 ity of its being sustained by evidence. Various 
 utterances of Roosevelt serve the purpose. We 
 will begin with the associated press report of a 
 
 talk by Colonel Goethals before the University 
 
 214 
 
Violation of Treaty of 1846 215 
 
 Club" of Chicago on January 3, 1915. President 
 Roosevelt is reported to have said to Colonel 
 Goethals : 
 
 Colonel, I think I'll abolish that commission and con- 
 centrate all authority in you. An Executive order will 
 do it. 
 
 Colonel Goethals mentioned the foregoing to 
 Secretary of War Taft, who responded: 
 
 Yes, that's the way it ought to be done, but it isn't in 
 accordance with the law. 
 
 Colonel Goethals stated that he reported the 
 observation of Secretary Taft to President Roose- 
 velt, who remarked characteristically : 
 
 I don't care a hang for the law, I WANT THE 
 CANAL BUILT. 
 
 A public official who does not care a hang for 
 statute law probably does not care a hang for a 
 treaty, although it is now generally considered to 
 be a solemn engagement. Roosevelt has practi- 
 cally told us so. Speaking of the peace treaties 
 negotiated by the Wilson Administration, he says : 
 
 There is no likelihood that they will do us any great 
 material harm, because it is absolutely certain that we 
 would not pay the smallest attention to them in the event 
 of their being invoked in any matter where our interests 
 were seriously involved. 
 
2i6 America and the Canal Title 
 
 He, however, observes that the breaking of a 
 treaty would do us harm in other than our ma- 
 terial interests. We, of course, would unerringly 
 pursue our material interests and disregard the 
 moral. He says : 
 
 But it would do us moral harm to break them even 
 though this were the least evil of two evil alternatives. 
 
 The foregoing observations by Roosevelt are 
 vital in this discussion. The Treaty of 1846 and 
 international law stood in the way of our material 
 interests. So he did not "pay the smallest atten- 
 tion to them" as the following shows: "/ took 
 the Canal Zone." His philosophy permitted him 
 to disregard treaties and the law of nations and 
 he did. It is seldom that a man boasts of faith- 
 lessness, and counts it a virtue. Roosevelt has 
 committed himself to the doctrine that a treaty is 
 not binding if our "interests are seriously in- 
 volved." We, therefore, merely charge Roose- 
 velt with having practiced in 1903 what he 
 preached in 1914. Our offset to the foregoing is 
 that our duty to civilization is paramount. This 
 requires that we keep our solemn engagements 
 even though our material interests are seriously 
 involved. 
 
 Roosevelt has told us what the United States 
 
Violation of Treaty of 1846 217 
 
 would do if a situation arose where a treaty seri- 
 ously conflicted with its material interests. In so 
 doing, he has told us what he would do if he were 
 President. In this book we are only telling what 
 he did as President, and it is merely what he told 
 us that he would do if he were President. We 
 have also told how it was done — ^this is not con- 
 firmed by anything that he has said. We are 
 merely applying his philosophy to the most impor- 
 tant event of his Administration, and assert noth- 
 ing except that he put his philosophy into practice 
 in the fall of 1903. 
 
 Speaking of the labor-capital conflict in Col- 
 orado, Roosevelt is reported to have said at Union- 
 town, Pa., on October 28, 1914, according to the 
 New York World: 
 
 It becomes the duty of the United States to remove the 
 injustices that cause that disorder, just as I did in the 
 anthracite coal strike. I finally got them to submit to 
 the judgment of the commission which I appointed. 
 There was a laboring man on that commission, inciden- 
 tally. 
 
 But I then held myself ready if they had refused to 
 have used the army. I would have taken possession of 
 the mines. I would have put a complete stop to all law- 
 lessness and would have seen that the mines were 
 worked; but I would have had a Major-General of the 
 United States run the mines as a receiver. 
 
 This is suggestive. "I would have taken pos- 
 
2i8 America and the Canal Title 
 
 session of the mines." By what authority, hu- 
 man or divine ? We are not told. "I don't care 
 a hang for the law." Enough has been said. 
 We now know that he would not hesitate to vio- 
 late a treaty or to disregard fundamental provi- 
 sions of international law. We will show that he 
 practiced in 1903 what he defended in theory in 
 1914. 
 
 An official who does not care a hang for statute 
 law probably does not care a hang for interna- 
 tional law or a solemn engagement if they delay 
 the beginning of an undertaking which he is de- 
 termined shall appear in the galaxy of great deeds 
 to his credit. Therefore it can not be repugnant 
 to such an official to violate a treaty (say that of 
 1846) if, in so doing, he can expedite the getting 
 of the title to the Canal Zone which is preliminary 
 to entrance upon canal construction. We be- 
 lieve that the philosophy he has expressed in the 
 abstract covers the events on the Isthmus in the 
 fall of 1903 as history is recording them. 
 
 The provisions of the treaty whose violation we 
 allege form our starting point. The spirit of the 
 treaty is found in the preamble and in Article i. 
 It must not be overlooked that the treaty was not 
 negotiated with Colombia, but with the Govern- 
 
Violation of Treaty of 1846 219 
 
 ment which exercised authority over the same ter- 
 ritory, namely, New Granada. It was continued 
 unimpaired with Colombia until the Roosevelt 
 Administration. This treaty was signed Decem- 
 ber 12, 1846, ratified and proclaimed in June, 
 1848. The preamble and Article i follow: 
 
 The Unfted States of North America and the Republic 
 of New Granada in South America, desiring to make 
 lasting and firm the friendship and good understanding 
 which happily exist between both nations, have resolved 
 to fix in a manner clear, distinct, and positive the rules 
 which shall in the future be religiously observed between 
 each other, by means of a treaty or general convention 
 of peace and friendship, commerce and navigation. 
 
 Article I 
 There shall be a perfect, firm, and inviolable peace and 
 sincere friendship between the United States of America 
 and the Republic of New Granada in all the extent of 
 their possessions and territories, and between their 
 citizens respectively without distinction of person or 
 places. 
 
 We claim that Article XXXV of that treaty 
 was violated. We will give this article in full 
 save the portion dealing with the supersession of 
 an earlier treaty. The bracketed insert gives a 
 condensed summary of articles IV, V and VI, 
 referred to in article XXXV. This insert, the 
 preamble and Article I, as already mentioned, 
 give the spirit underlying Article XXXV. The 
 latter reads : 
 
220 America and the Canal Title 
 
 The United States of America and the Republic of 
 New Granada, desiring to make as durable as possible 
 the relations which are to be established between the two 
 parties by virtue of this treaty,- have declared solemnly, 
 and do agree to the following points : 
 
 1st. For the better understanding of the preceding 
 articles, it is and has been stipulated between the high 
 contracting parties, that the citizens, vessels and mer- 
 chandise of the United States shall enjoy in the ports of 
 New Granada, including those of the part of the 
 Granadian territory generally denominated Isthmus of 
 Panama, from its southernmost extremity until the 
 boundary of Costa Rica, all the exemptions, privileges 
 and immunities concerning commerce and navigation, 
 which are now or may hereafter be enjoyed by 
 Granadian citizens, their vessels and merchandise; and 
 that this equality of favors shall be made to extend to 
 the passengers, correspondence and merchandise of the 
 United States, in their transit across the said territory, 
 from one sea to the other. The Government of New 
 Granada guarantees to the Government of the United 
 States that the right of way or transit across the Isthmus 
 of Panama upon any modes of communication that now 
 exist, or that may be hereafter constructed, shall be open 
 and free to the Government and citizens of the United 
 States, and for the transportation of any articles of prod- 
 uce, manufactures or merchandise, of lawful commerce, 
 belonging to the citizens of the United States; that no 
 other tolls or charges shall be levied or collected upon the 
 citizens of the United States, or their said merchandise 
 thus passing over any road or canal that may be made by 
 the Government o,f New Granada, or by the authority of 
 the same, than is, under like circumstances, levied upon 
 and collected from the Granadian citizens; that any 
 lawful produce, manufactures or merchandise, belonging 
 to citizens of the United States, thus passing from one 
 sea to the other, in either direction, for the purpose of 
 exportation to any other foreign country, shall not be 
 
Violation of Treaty of 1846 221 
 
 liable to any import-duties whatever; or, having paid 
 such duties, they shall be entitled to drawback upon their 
 exportation; nor shall the citizens of the United States 
 be liable to any duties, tolls or charges of any kind, to 
 which native citizens are not subjected for thus passing 
 the said Isthmus. And, in order to secure to themselves 
 the tranquil and constant enjoyment of these advantages, 
 and as an especial compensation for the said advantages, 
 and for the favors they have acquired by the 4th, 5th, 
 and 6th [That is, extend to each other the most favored 
 nation commercial advantages in addition to the mutual 
 guarantees contained in this article, XXXV, concerning 
 Isthmian transit] articles of this treaty, the United 
 States guarantee, positively and efficaciously, to New 
 Granada, by the present stipulation, the perfect neutrality 
 of the before-mentioned Isthmus, with the view that the 
 " free transit from the one to the other sea may not be inter- 
 rupted or embarrassed in any future time while this 
 treaty exists ; and, in consequence, 'the United States also 
 guarantee, in the same manner, the rights of sovereignty 
 and property which New Granada has and possesses 
 over the said territory. 
 
 2nd. The present treaty shall remain in full force 
 and vigor for the term of twenty years from the day of 
 the exchange of the ratifications. . . . 
 
 3rd. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if neither party 
 notifies the other of its intention of reforming any of, or 
 all, the articles of this treaty twelve months before the ex- 
 piration of the twenty years stipulated above, the said 
 treaty shall continue binding on both parties beyond the 
 said twenty years, until twelve months from the time 
 that one of the parties notifies its intention of proceeding 
 to a reform. 
 
 4th. If any one or more of the citizens of either party 
 shall infringe any of the articles of this treaty, such 
 citizens shall be held personally responsible for the same, 
 and the harmony and good correspondence between the 
 nations shall not be interrupted thereby; each party en- 
 
222 America and the Canal Title 
 
 gaging in no way to protect the offender, or sanction 
 such violation. 
 
 5th. If unfortunately any of the articles contained in 
 this treaty should be violated or infringed in any way 
 whatever, it is expressly stipulated that neither of the 
 two contracting parties shall ordain or authorize any acts 
 of reprisal, nor shall declare war against the other on 
 complaints of injuries or damages, until the said party 
 considering itself offended shall have laid before the 
 other a statement of such injuries or damages, verified 
 by competent proofs, demanding justice and satisfaction, 
 and the same shall have been denied, in violation of the 
 laws and of international right. 
 
 6th. Any special or remarkable advantage that one or 
 the other power may enjoy from the foregoing stipu- 
 lation, are and ought to be always understood in virtue 
 and as in compensation of the obligations they have just 
 contracted, and which have been specified in the first 
 number of this article. 
 
 This treaty clearly imposed upon the sovereign 
 the duty to keep the transit unobstructed. If the 
 sovereign was unable to do so on account of local 
 disturbances, the United States, its nationals, or 
 both, were entitled to compensation for dam- 
 ages actually sustained. The article provided a 
 method for securing reparation, and it was actu- 
 ally applied in 1857 when damages were collected 
 that resulted from the interruption of transit. 
 The treaty, however, from the preamble to the 
 closing article, does not derogate from the rights 
 of the sovereign and none of the rights that the 
 United States acquired by it supervened those of 
 
Violation of Treaty of 1846 223 
 
 the sovereign or any of the rights of sovereignty. 
 This blends the violation of this treaty with that 
 of the violation of international law, that is, the 
 violation of the rights of sovereignty, under the 
 law of nations. 
 
 What fundamental provision of international 
 law was violated ? In order to point it out clearly, 
 we must define sovereignty. Sovereignty is the 
 sum total of rights which attach to an independent 
 state by virtue of being such. What then is a 
 sovereign state? Stockton defines a sovereign 
 state as follows : 
 
 A sovereign state may be defined in general terms to 
 be a fully independent and civilized community of 
 persons, permanently located within a fixed country, 
 organized under common laws into a body politic for 
 mutual advantage, exercising the rights of government 
 over all persons and things within its territory, and 
 capable of entering into relations and intercourse with 
 other states of the world. 
 
 This is enlarged upon and somewhat amplified 
 in the following: 
 
 All sovereign states within the purview of inter- 
 national law are equal, that is, equal in their rights and 
 in their obligations, equal in their sovereignty, and in 
 their independence. 
 
 From the foregoing it follows that sovereign 
 states have two paramount rights : 
 
224 America and the Canal Title 
 
 , I. The right of self-preservation. 
 . 2. The right of exclusive jurisdiction over their 
 territory. 
 
 Sovereignty is a combination of all power, that 
 is, power to do anything and everything in a state 
 without legal accountability. It is the right of a 
 nation to govern itself independent of any foreign 
 power. This includes, of course, the right to 
 suppress insurrection and to prevent dismember- 
 ment. Colombia had the right to suppress seces- 
 sion without interference from our Government. 
 
 Did New Granada impair or intend to impair 
 in any way whatsoever, either of the foregoing 
 rights when she entered into the Treaty of 1846 
 with the United States? If not, Colombia had 
 the indisputable right to use force to preserve her 
 sovereignty over the Province of Panama. In- 
 terference with that right was in violation of in- 
 ternational law. 
 
 Whether impairment of the sovereignty of New, 
 Granada was intended can be best seen in official 
 documents connected with the negotiation of the 
 treaty, the most important of which is the follow- 
 ing from a message of President Polk : 
 
 The general considerations which have induced me to 
 transmit the treaty to the Senate for their advice may be 
 summed up in the following particulars: 
 
Violation of Treaty of 1846 225 
 
 1. The treaty does not propose to guarantee a terri- 
 tory to a foreign nation in which the United States will 
 have no common interest with that nation. On the con- 
 trary, we are more deeply and directly interested in the 
 subject of this guaranty than New Granada herself, or 
 any other country. 
 
 2. The guaranty does not extend to the territories of 
 New Granada generally, but is confined to the single pro- 
 vince of the Isthmus of Panama, where we shall acquire 
 by the treaty a common, and coextensive right of passage 
 with herself. 
 
 3. It will constitute no alliance for any political object, 
 but for a purely commercial purpose, in which all the 
 navigating nations of the world have a common interest. 
 
 4. In entering into the mutual guarantees proposed by 
 the thirty-fifth article of the treaty, neither the Govern- 
 ment of New Granada nor that of the United States has 
 any narrow or exclusive views. The ultimate object . . . 
 is to secure to all nations the free and equal right of 
 passage over the Isthmus. If the United States, as the 
 chief of the American nations, should first become a 
 party to this guaranty, it cannot be doubted — indeed, it 
 is confidently expected by the Government of New 
 Granada — that similar guarantees will be given to that 
 Republic by Great Britain and France. 
 
 All that the United States secured by this treaty 
 on the Isthmus was a common and coextensive 
 right of transit with the sovereign. As similar 
 rights were to be extended to the other nations, 
 according to the excerpt of the message quoted, 
 in return for the guarantees embodied in Article 
 XXXV, it follows that no impairment of sover- 
 eignty was intended by the negotiators of the 
 
226 America and the Canal Title 
 
 treaty. The guaranteeing powers, according to 
 the intent of the treaty, were to keep transit open 
 against obstruction by foreign powers and to 
 maintain the neutraHty of the Province of Pan- 
 ama under the sovereignty of New Granada. 
 New Granada remained the sole protector of Isth- 
 mian transit against domestic obstruction. Out- 
 side intereference without her consent or request 
 would be in violation of the treaty and of her 
 rights as a sovereign state. 
 
 That the treaty was merely to grant to the 
 United States a common coextensive right of 
 transit with the sovereign on the Isthmus is 
 further shown in the following excerpt from an 
 official communication of Mallarino, at the time 
 Minister of New Granada at Washington: 
 
 On account of these reasons, and for the convenience 
 of not awakening international jealousies by extraor- 
 dinary and special treaties, the guaranty of territorial 
 possession, to be given by the United States, ought to be 
 incidentally introduced in treaties of commerce, as a 
 part of and subordinate to them. . . . 
 
 This end is simply and naturally to be obtained by 
 stipulating, in favor of the United States, the total repeal 
 of the differential duties, as a compensation of the obli- 
 gation they impose upon themselves of guaranteeing the 
 legitimate and complete or integral possession of those 
 portions of territory that the universal mercantile 
 interests require to be free and open to all nations. 
 
 In the course of his argument, Mallarino 
 
Violation of Treaty of 1846 227 
 
 points out that Great Britain would be at a com- 
 mercial disadvantage — 
 
 Unless she invited New Granada to alter upon the 
 same conditions, the British treaty, constituting herself 
 thereby, also, as a guaranteeing power of New Granada 
 sovereignty upon the Isthmus. 
 
 It is clear from this, as well as from the treaty 
 itself, that New Granada sought the guarantee of 
 her sovereignty over the Province of Panama, 
 and was offering as compensation a common and 
 coextensive right of transit over the Isthmus, and 
 the favored nation commercial provision in her 
 entire territory. Under date of February 10, 
 1847, President Polk, in a special message to the 
 Senate, said: 
 
 There does not appear any other effectual means of 
 securing to all nations the advantages of this important 
 passage but through the guarantee of great commercial 
 powers that the Isthmus shall be neutral territory. . . , 
 
 The guarantee of the sovereignty of New Granada 
 over the Isthmus is a natural consequence of this neutral- 
 ity. . . . New Granada would not yield this province that 
 it might become a neutral State ; and if she should, it is 
 not sufficiently populous or wealthy to establish or main- 
 tain an independant sovereignty. But a civil govern- 
 ment must exist there to protect the works which st^all be 
 constructed. New Granada is not a power which will 
 excite the jealousy of any nation. 
 
 The protection of the works to be constructed, 
 canal and railroad, was to be under the exclusive 
 
228 America and the Canal Title 
 
 jurisdiction of the sovereign. There was not 
 only no intent in this treaty to impair any of the 
 then rights of sovereignty of New Granada over 
 the Province of Panama, but there was, on the 
 contrary, a clearly defined intent to safeguard for 
 her that sovereignty in perpetuity. 
 
 The Isthmus has always had strategic value and 
 therefore its possession has been coveted by other 
 powers. The United States was one of them. 
 This country guaranteed the sovereignty of Co- 
 lombia over this territory in the Treaty of 1846. 
 It gave no guarantee, however, against the suc- 
 cess of a domestic insurrection. Therefore the 
 United States was not obligated to keep transit 
 open during a domestic uprising. The Treaty 
 was entirely extra-domestic. The United States 
 could intervene to keep transit open during a do- 
 mestic conflict only at the request of the sovereign. 
 Compensation for loss suffered during an inter- 
 ruption of transit was the only remedy open to 
 the United States under the Treaty of 1846. She 
 was clearly estopped from being the revolution 
 herself under the cloak of a few separatists domi- 
 ciled in the City of Panama. 
 
 One of the reasons advanced for the adoption 
 of the Treaty of 1846 was that it would allay sus- 
 picion in Spanish-America. The argument ad- 
 
Violation of Treaty of 1846 229 
 
 vanced by the Minister of New Granada, Malla- 
 rino, clearly showed that the United States was 
 believed to have territorial designs there. His 
 argument clearly shows that one of the purposes 
 of the Treaty was to secure territorial integrity 
 for New Granada. The following, by the Minis- 
 ter named, is quoted from an official document on 
 record in the State Department : 
 
 Other reasons are relative to the United States' own 
 fame and reputation, as assuredly nothing would so 
 brilliantly vindicate them, nor acquire them greater 
 augmentation of American affection than the fact that 
 they, after having been branded as the oppressors and 
 future conquerors of Spanish American republics should 
 present themselves as the most jealous protectors of the 
 territorial integrity of those very same republics in whose 
 preservation they would appear taking an open and 
 direct interest. 
 
 Did the sovereign surrender, or intend to sur- 
 render, the right of protection of isthmian transit 
 to the United States, or did she contract, by im- 
 plication, for the right to call on this country for 
 assistance in the event that she was unable to 
 afford protection? As already shown, the intent 
 of the negotiators of the Treaty of 1846 was 
 clearly not to derogate from the sovereign rights 
 of New Granada, but to secure their inviolability. 
 
 In the light of the foregoing, read the telegrams 
 
230 America and the Canal Title 
 
 of November 2, 1903, to our naval forces in or 
 soon to arrive in Isthmian waters. They are so 
 vital that we reproduce vital excerpts from them. 
 To the Nashville at Colon : 
 
 Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If inter- 
 ruption threatened by armed force, occupy the line of 
 railroad. Prevent landing of any armed force with 
 hostile intent, either Government or insurgent, either at 
 Colon, Porto Bello or other point. . . . Government force 
 reported approaching the Isthmus in vessels. Prevent 
 their landing if in your judgment this would precipitate 
 a conflict. 
 
 To the Boston at Panama : 
 
 Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If inter- 
 ruption is threatened by armed force, occupy the line of 
 railroad. Prevent landing of any armed force with 
 hostile intent, either Government or insurgent, at any 
 point within 50 miles of Panama. . . . Government force 
 reported approaching the Isthmus in vessels. Prevent 
 their landing if, in your judgment, the landing would 
 precipitate a conflict. 
 
 When these telegrams were sent to our naval 
 commanders, our Government read into a solemn 
 engagement a construction not warranted by its 
 wording or the intent of its negotiators. 
 
 The Treaty of 1846 would, of course, not have 
 been agreed to by New Granada nor would it have 
 been continued by Colombia if it had been believed 
 that the United States would use it as a pretext 
 
Violation of Treaty of 1846 231 
 
 to wrest from its sovereignty the Province of 
 Panama. The construction placed on this treaty 
 by our Government in 1903 gave the United 
 States power equivalent to that of de facto sover- 
 eignty over the line of transit and its littoral. As 
 applied this power took precedence of the rights 
 of the de jure sovereign. This construction of 
 the treaty is without precedent in American di- 
 plomacy and without sanction in international 
 law. 
 
 Contrast the foregoing telegrams with the 
 policy pursued by our Government under the 
 Treaty of 1846 previous to the Roosevelt Ad- 
 ministration. Our earlier policy is well stated in 
 a letter to his Government by Minister Concha, 
 dated October 30, 1902. In this letter he pro- 
 tested against the new construction of the treaty, 
 and clearly states our earlier interpretations. 
 The portion that is to the point reads : 
 
 When for the first time the United States used the 
 right of transit via the Isthmus, which is guaranteed 
 them by the existing treaty, it was with the simple object 
 of sending troops to Oregon and California; that was 
 effected by disembarking them and sending them across 
 the Isthmus without having given any previous notice to 
 the authorities ; for that our Secretary of Foreign Affairs 
 presented a protest in Washington through the legation, 
 and in a conference in September of 1858 between the 
 
232 America and the Canal Title 
 
 Granadian minister. General Herran, and the Secretary of 
 State, General Casey, it was agreed that in future when- 
 ever it was necessary to send American forces through the 
 territory of the Isthmus they would come unarmed and 
 as groups of private individuals "without enjoying the 
 exemptions which are customary when troops pass 
 through foreign territory, but, on the contrary, being 
 subject to the territorial jurisdiction exactly like all other 
 strangers." This agreement was punctually fulfilled 
 during the American war of secession on the occasion 
 when forces of the Government of the United States 
 were sent to the Pacific. To-day, so advanced is the 
 interpretation, that American forces are disembarked in 
 Panama to disarm those of the sovereign of the territory. 
 Whatever more extensive comment might be made on 
 this point would be redundant. 
 
 Comparison of the foregoing excerpts of tele- 
 grams to our naval forces with the previous policy 
 of our Government shows that the Treaty of 1846 
 was scrapped by the Roosevelt Administration in 
 1903. This treaty was negotiated by New Gra- 
 nada and continued by Colombia for the purpose 
 of safeguarding their sovereignty over the Istli- 
 mus. It was violated, and, at the same time, used 
 as a pretext to conceal from the Anierican people 
 the rape of Colombia. 
 
 When the telegrams just quoted from were 
 sent, there was peace on the Isthmus. Yet, the 
 sovereign of the territory was forbidden to land 
 troops there to protect her sovereignty and was 
 barred from the use of the Panama railroad, 
 
Violation of Treaty of 1846 233 
 
 which was obliged by its charter to transport 
 Colombian troops from one side of the Isthmus 
 to the other on demand. 
 
 On November 9, 1865, Secretary Seward sent 
 a communication to our Minister at Bogota which 
 clearly defined the duty of the United States and 
 that of the sovereign state in relation to the pro- 
 tection of Isthmian transit if obstruction was 
 threatened as a result of domestic trouble. It 
 reads : 
 
 The question which has recently arisen under the 
 thirty-fifth article of the treaty with New Granada, as to 
 the obligation of this Government to comply with a req- 
 uisition of the President of the United States of 
 Colombia for a force to protect the Isthmus of Panama 
 from invasion by a body of insurgents of that country 
 has been submitted to the consideration of the Attorney 
 General. His opinion is that neither the text nor 
 the spirit of the stipulation, in that article, by which 
 the United States engages to preserve the neutrality 
 of the Isthmus of Panama, imposes an obligation 
 on this Government to comply with a requisition like 
 that referred to. The purpose of the stipulation was 
 to guarantee the Isthmus against seizure or invasion 
 by a foreign power only. It could not have been con- 
 templated that we were to become a party to any civil 
 war in that country by defending the Isthmus against 
 another party. As it may be presumed, hov/ever, that 
 our object in entering into such a stipulation was to 
 secure the freedom of transit across the Isthmus, if that 
 freedom should be endangered or obstructed, the employ- 
 ment of force on our part to prevent this would be a 
 question of grave expediency to be determined by cir- 
 
234 America and the Canal Title 
 
 cumstances. The department is not aware that there is 
 yet occasion for a decision upon this point. 
 
 For the purpose of comparison with the fore- 
 going telegrams, the following by Secretary 
 Seward is even more to the point : 
 
 THE UNITED STATES DESIRES NOTHING ELSE, NOTHING 
 BETTER, AND NOTHING MORE IN REGARD TO THE STATE OF 
 COLOMBIA THAN THE ENJOYMENT, ON THEIR PART, OF 
 COMPLETE AND ABSOLUTE SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPEND- 
 ENCE. IF THOSE GREAT INTERESTS SHALL EVER BE AS- 
 SAILED BY ANY POWER AT HOME OR ABROAD, THE UNITED 
 STATES WILL BE READY, COOPERATING WITH THE GOVERN- 
 MENT AND THEIR ALLY, TO MAINTAIN AND DEFEND THEM. 
 
 We will now throw into relief, that is, contrast 
 the Roosevelt policy as contained in the telegrams 
 quoted above with the policy of other earlier ad- 
 ministrations. 
 
 Secretary Hamilton Fish declared that it was 
 the duty of the sovereign under the treaty to pro- 
 tect Isthmian transit from domestic interference, 
 and that the United States would insist upon it. 
 It is contained in the following communication 
 addressed to our Minister at Bogota : 
 
 This Government, by the Treaty with New Granada 
 of 1846, has engaged a guaranty of neutrality of the 
 Isthmus of Panama. This engagement, however, has 
 never been acknowledged to embrace the duty of protect- 
 ing the road across it from the violence of local factions. 
 Although such protection was of late efficiently given by 
 
Violation of Treaty of 1846 235 
 
 the force under the command of Admiral Almy, it 
 appears to have been granted with the consent and at the 
 request of the local authorities. It is, however, regarded 
 as the undoubted duty of the Colombian Government to 
 protect the road against attacks from local insurgents. 
 The discharge of this duty will be insisted upon. 
 
 Compliance with the treaty obligated the sov- 
 ereign to keep an adequate force on the Isthmus 
 to maintain order during ordinary times and to 
 send additional forces when needed. As already 
 stated, there is not the slightest suggestion of im- 
 pairment of sovereignty, or of any right of the 
 United States to prevent the sovereign from land- 
 ing troops on any part of the Isthmus, to maintain 
 order or shifting them on the Isthmus as emer- 
 gency arose. 
 
 The telegrams to our naval officers just quoted 
 were sent to obstruct transit in its most sacred 
 use. The sovereign was to be barred from its 
 legitimate use. These telegrams were sent to 
 give assurance to the separatists on the Isthmus 
 that secession would be protected. In a time of 
 profound peace, the sovereign was to be barred 
 from the use of a railroad in his own dominion. 
 This would hearten the separatists — galvanize the 
 movement — and give vitality to secession. 
 
 In an earlier chapter we gave the view of 
 Grover Cleveland. We will now contrast the 
 
236 America and the Canal Title 
 
 telegrams under examination with the following 
 from the pen of his Secretary of State, Bayard : 
 
 On several occasions the Government of the United 
 States, at the instance, and always with the assent of 
 Colombia, has, in times of civil tumult, sent its armed 
 forces to the Isthmus of Panama to preserve American 
 citizens and property along the transit from injuries 
 which the Government of Colombia might at the time be 
 unable to prevent. But, in taking such steps, this 
 Government has always recognized the sovereignty and 
 obligation of Colombia in the premises, and has never 
 acknowledged, but, on the contrary, has expressly dis- 
 claimed the duty of protecting transit against domestic 
 disturbances. 
 
 The policy pursued during the Roosevelt Ad- 
 ministration is without a sustaining precedent. 
 It is sui generis. It stands unique in its isolation. 
 Its offspring is the so-called Republic of Panama. 
 Its heritage is the ill-will of Colombia and of 
 Spanish-America. Its by-product is national dis- 
 honor. Its aftermath is a stain on the Roosevelt 
 Administration which all the waters of the canal 
 can never wash away. 
 
 We have contrasted the action of the Roosevelt 
 Administration in 1903 with that of earlier ad- 
 ministrations. It is now proper to contrast it 
 with that of the Roosevelt Administration in 
 1902, when, hat in hand, it was a suppliant at the 
 feet of Colombia for a title to the Canal Zone. 
 
Violation of Treaty of 1846 237 
 
 We will do so in detail in the next chapter. A 
 bird's-eye view serves our purpose here. The 
 telegram dated October 16, 1902, sent by Secre- 
 tary Hay to our Minister at Bogota reads : 
 
 This Government regrets misunderstanding which has 
 apparently arisen in Panama. No intention to infringe 
 sovereignty or wound dignity of Colombia. American 
 commander was instructed in that sense October 10. 
 
 This telegram concedes that Colombian sover- 
 eignty was not impaired by the Treaty of 1846. 
 Is not that which is conceded in 1902 binding in 
 1903? Therefore, Colombia had the- unques- 
 tioned right in 1903 to dispatch her forces to the 
 Isthmus to maintain order and to protect \her 
 sovereignty over the Province of Panama. It 
 was also her duty to do so under the Treaty of 
 1846. The United States prevented her from 
 performing her duty by the display of overwhelm- 
 ing force. In so doing our Administration vio- 
 lated the Treaty of 1846 and the principle of sov- 
 ereignty as defined in international law. 
 
 In a time of profound peace (November 2, 
 1903), the United States forbade the actual sov- 
 ereign to land troops to keep open the Isthmian 
 transit and obstructed transit herself in its most 
 sacred use, that of preserving territorial integ- 
 rity. In a time of unsettled conditions ( Novem- 
 
238 America and the Canal Title 
 
 ber 6, 1903), the United States ordered the de 
 facto sovereign (Panama) to keep open Isthmian 
 transit. On the latter date Secretary Hay tele- 
 graphed our Consul at Panama : 
 
 When you are satisfied that a de facto government, re- 
 publican in form, and without substantial opposition 
 from its own jKople, has been established in the State of 
 Panama, you will enter into relations with it as the re- 
 sponsible government of the territory and look to it for 
 all due action to protect the persons and property of citi- 
 zens of the United States and to keep open the Isthmian 
 transit in accordance with the obligations of existing 
 treaties governing the relation of the United States to 
 that territory. 
 
 We will now give a summary of the changes 
 {de convenance) in the interpretation of the 
 Treaty of 1846, for which the Roosevelt Adminis- 
 tration is responsible. In 1857, as already seen, 
 the United States informed New Granada, now 
 Colombia, that it was her duty to keep Isthmian 
 transit unobstructed and because she failed to do 
 so, a disinterested tribunal was constituted to 
 assess damages. This construction of the treaty 
 remained in full force until some time after 
 Roosevelt became President. Thereafter its con- 
 struction altered as did the exigencies surround- 
 ing the title to the Canal Zone. 
 
 In 1903, from November 2 to November 6, the 
 United States for the first time held that it was its 
 
Violation of Treaty of 1846 239 
 
 duty to keep the line of transit open and so for- 
 bade Colombia to land soldiers anywhere on the 
 Isthmus to protect her sovereignty over the Prov- 
 ince of Panama. Again in 1903, from Novem- 
 ber 6 and after, as just seen, the United States 
 required Panama to keep the line of transit open. 
 And yet there is no more honorable chapter in 
 American history than this perfidious somer- 
 saulting in the construction of the Treaty of 
 1846! 
 
 If the obligation to keep Isthmian transit open 
 was imposed on the new-born Government of 
 Panama because of its having succeeded to the 
 rights and duties of Colombia under the Treaty of 
 1846, then in the name of all that is sacred how 
 could our Government honestly deny to Colom- 
 bia the right and duty, under the same treaty, to 
 comply with the same obligation? How could 
 she deny to the de jure and the de facto sovereign 
 on November 2, 1903, when peace prevailed on the 
 Isthmus, what she imposed on the de facto Gov- 
 ernment (not sovereign) on November 6, 1903? 
 "Consistency, thou art a jewel!" 
 
 The Treaty of 1857 between the United States 
 ^nd New Granada throws an interesting sidelight 
 on the construction placed on the Treaty of 1846, 
 
240 America and the Canal Title 
 
 when title to the Canal Zone was not a disturbing 
 factor. Transit across the Isthmus was ob- 
 structed in 1856. This treaty was negotiated for 
 the purpose of enabling citizens of the United 
 States to collect damages from New Granada by 
 reason of this obstruction. The damages were 
 demanded by the United States because it held 
 that it was the duty of New Granada and not that 
 of the Uruted States to keep transit open. New 
 Granada admitted that this was the correct con- 
 struction of the Treaty of 1846. Article I of the 
 Treaty of 1857 reads : 
 
 All claims on the part of . . . citizens of the United 
 States upon the Government of New Granada . . . and 
 especially those for damages which were caused by the 
 riot at Panama on the 15th of April, 1856, for which 
 the said Government of New Granada acknowledges its 
 liability arising out of its privileges and obligation to 
 preserve peace and order along the transit route. 
 
 It thus clearly appears from this treaty that it 
 was held to be the duty of the sovereign to pre- 
 serve peace and order along the line of transit ; 
 and because in this instance the sovereign was un- 
 able to preserve it as it had guaranteed to do, 
 United States citizens claimed and collected dam- 
 ages. Could there have been a more solemn 
 recognition by one country of the duty of another 
 to keep open the latter's own line of transit ? 
 
Violation of Treaty of 1846 241 
 
 Section 5 of Article XXXV of the Treaty of 
 1846 is so important that we quote it again. It 
 reads : 
 
 If, unfortunately, any of the articles contained in this 
 treaty should be violated or infringed in any way what- 
 ever, it is expressly stipulated that neither of the two 
 contracting parties shall ordain or authorize any acts of 
 reprisal, nor shall declare war against the other in com- 
 plaints of injuries or damages, until the said party con- 
 sidering itself offended shall have laid before the other a 
 statement of such injuries or damages, verified by com- 
 petent proofs, demanding justice and satisfaction, and 
 the same shall have been denied, in violation of the laws 
 and of international right. 
 
 It required the aggrieved party to notify the 
 other party of its grievance before using force. 
 On November 2, 1903, when the Roosevelt Ad- 
 ministration entered upon the dismemberment of 
 Colombia, the United States had not notified Co- 
 lombia of any fault or delinquency on her part in 
 observing her treaty obligations. This omission 
 in itself would have been a violation of this solemn 
 compact, even though there had existed a bona Me 
 grievance. But, as already stated, none worthy 
 of mention existed. Our intervention in the 
 secession of the Province of Panama rests on 
 some other ground than grievance under the 
 Treaty of 1846. 
 
 The de jure and de facto sovereign of the Isth- 
 
242 America and the Canal Title 
 
 mus had maintained, with almost negligible ex- 
 ceptions, unobstructed transit across the Isthmus 
 for fifty-five years, the then lifetime of the Treaty 
 of 1846. International law does not permit the 
 destruction of sovereignty in order to prevent 
 temporary interruption of transit. The Treaty 
 of 1846 provided a method for its adjustment in 
 case of interruption. More important, however, 
 is the fact that civilization will suffer more from 
 the violation of a treaty than from an interrup- 
 tion of traffic only temporary in character. The 
 controlling fact, however, is that in 1903 there 
 was no intention anywhere to interfere with Isth- 
 mian transit save at the White House, and that 
 interference was aimed at the sovereign, Colom- 
 bia. This is the contra of what was expected 
 under the treaty. Under it one would have ex- 
 pected that if the weaker nation was temporarily 
 incapable of a perfect fulfillment of its guarantee, 
 the stronger nation would, upon request, lend as- 
 sistance. 
 
 By the law of nations and the terms of the 
 Treaty of 1846, Colombia, as the lawful successor 
 of New Granada, was the sovereign peer of the 
 United States. This being so the following 
 from the pen of Leander T. Chamberlain is apro- 
 pos: 
 
Violation of Treaty of 1846 243 
 
 Save for the main purpose of protecting free transit 
 and thus safeguarding her own interests in such transit, 
 the United States might no more land her forces on Co- 
 lombia's soil, or even threaten such landing, than she 
 might land her forces, or threaten to land them, on the 
 soil of Russia or Japan. 
 
 Nor is even this the full measure of the restraint 
 which the Executive of the United States was bound to 
 recognize and respect. It has been conceded that the 
 guaranteed neutrality and sovereignty had reference to 
 foreign powers. But it is to be borne in mind that in 
 guaranteeing Colombia's neutrality and sovereignty as 
 against foreign powers, the United States distinctly de- 
 creed and surpassingly emphasized her own exclusion 
 from acts of invasion. She determinately erected an 
 impassable barrier against her own interference with 
 Colombia's independent authority. And this, in the sim- 
 ple fact that she herself was a "foreign nation"! The 
 treaty inhibition affected her, first of all. She virtually 
 named herself in the guarantee; and the guarantor, be- 
 ing thus included in the inhibition, was, beyond all oth- 
 ers, forbidden to violate its terms. 
 
 Hannis Taylor, an authority on international 
 law^ and the history of diplomacy, makes the fol- 
 lowing observations concerning the Treaty of 
 1846 and its violation in 1903 : 
 
 Thus by the most solemn guarantee known to the fam- 
 ily of nations the United States pledged itself, by express 
 contract, to respect and uphold the sovereignty of New 
 Granada over the Isthmus of Panama, a plain duty al- 
 ready due to New Granada under the general principles 
 of international law. In emergencies other than the dis- 
 turbance of interoceanic transit or peril to the persons 
 and possessions of American citizens, there might be no 
 
244 America and the Canal Title 
 
 intervention in the affairs of New Granada, reestab- 
 lished as the United States of Colombia in 1863. By 
 the terms of the treaty, and by the principles of inter- 
 national law, Colombia, as the successor of New Gra- 
 nada, was the sovereign peer of the United States, which, 
 save for the purpose of protecting free transit, might no 
 more land forces on Colombian soil, or even threaten 
 such landing, than she might land such forces on the 
 shores of France or England. After a careful exam- 
 ination of the subject a competent expert has said that, 
 during the 40 years that intervened between the estab- 
 lishment of Colombia in 1863 and the Panama imbroglio 
 of 1903, United States forces were employed in only 
 seven instances and for a total period of 164 days, and 
 in each instance with Colombia's approval. In no case 
 was there fighting, the mere precautionary measures be- 
 ing sufficient. 
 
 In continuation o£ the foregoing we may ap- 
 propriately observe that Colombia's inherent sov- 
 ereignty, whether guaranteed or not, would have 
 given her a right paramount to the right of even 
 her ally, the United States. In fine, in the emer- 
 gency of self-preservation, the control of Isth- 
 mian transit was completely Colombia's. In that 
 case, the President of the United States was au- 
 thorized to do no more than see to it that Colom- 
 bia's interruption of transit was neither wantonly 
 imposed nor unreasonably prolonged. Only on 
 proof of such wantonness or unreasonableness 
 would there be just cause for offense. To hold 
 otherwise would be to hold that, in our own Civil 
 
Violation of Treaty of 1846 245 
 
 War, foreign nations might have justly com- 
 plained because our blockade of an insurgent coast 
 rendered nugatory, for the time being, their long- 
 standing right to navigate our ports and rivers. 
 
 The neutrality of the Isthmus guaranteed to 
 New Granada by the Treaty of 1846 referred to 
 foreign nations, as already stated. It was 
 against interference by an outside government, 
 interference which might, among other evil re- 
 sults, interrupt the transit from the one to the 
 other sea. Similarly the guarantee of New 
 Granada's rights of sovereignty and property was 
 with reference to an invasion by a foreign power, 
 which might imperil the Isthmian transit. Since 
 the paramount issue in the case of both the neu- 
 trality and sovereignty which the United States 
 guaranteed was the safeguarding of the transit, 
 there was a valid implication that the United 
 States, on due occasion, would give aid to prevent 
 interruption of transit from any source whatever, 
 whether foreign or domestic. This had been the 
 unbroken policy of the United States until Roose- 
 velt became President, when the precedent was 
 scrapped. 
 
 Worst of all is the fact that there was no revo- 
 lution planned or projected on the Isthmus at the 
 time. There was a movement to effect the seces- 
 
246 America and the Canal Title 
 
 sion of the Province of Panama provided the 
 United States would agree to protect it. Without 
 this assurance it was not to be attempted. It is 
 thus clear that there was no need whatsoever of 
 American marines on the Isthmus at that time. 
 They were the revolution by the grace of our then 
 President. 
 
 For the orders sent in the telegrams of Novem- 
 ber 2, 1903, and in those sent immediately there- 
 after, designed to prevent Colombia from landing 
 troops within fifty miles of Panama on the west 
 coast of the Isthmus, from landing troops any- 
 where on the east coast, and from moving the new 
 contingent of troops already at Colon across the 
 Isthmus, American history offers no counterpart 
 and international law no sanction. There is 
 nothing in American history resembling the opera 
 bouffe revblution on the Isthmus in November, 
 1903, and it is to be doubted if there is anything 
 in modern history resembling it. It was a make- 
 believe revolution for the purpose of giving the 
 appearance of respectability to the method em- 
 ployed to secure the Canal Zone. The United 
 States prevented Colombia from doing what she 
 was obligated to do under the Treaty of 1846 and 
 what it had insisted on her doing theretofore. 
 Moorfield Story well says: 
 
Violation of Treaty of 1846 247 
 
 New Granada agreed to protect travelers across the 
 Isthmus against interference, and to pay damages in case 
 she failed. It was clearly her duty, and therefore her 
 right, to use all force necessary for the purpose. In 
 consideration of this, the United States agreed to help 
 New Granada and not to act against her. It is impos- 
 sible to torture language so as to find in the treaty any 
 right on our part to prevent her keeping order and pro- 
 tecting travel on her own territory. 
 
 The rule laid down for the construction of 
 treaties is that unless the treaty is so clearly- 
 drawn that no other conclusion is warranted it 
 shall not be held that any government intended to 
 surrender any control, or cede to another power 
 any right of sovereignty within its jurisdiction. 
 In this connection, the following excerpt from a 
 speech of the late Senator Carmack is apropos: 
 
 We have protected the transit again and again, but 
 never before was the claim made that we had a right to 
 exclude Colombia from her own dominions. Never be- 
 fore was the claim made that we had the right under 
 the Treaty of 1846 to support an insurrection against the 
 authority of Colombia. You do not have to read the 
 Treaty of 1846 to know that it contains no such prepos- 
 terous provision. No nation on earth ever surrendered 
 the right to protect its own soil and the integrity of its 
 own domain with its own troops or surrendered to an- 
 other government the right to prevent or to suppress an 
 insurrection against its authority. No such thing can 
 be found in the Treaty of 1846. 
 
 The language of the treaty speaks for itself. 
 
248 America and the Canal Title 
 
 On its very face it imports an engagement by the 
 sovereign to protect the freedom of transit. It 
 has been so construed by Presidents Polk and 
 Cleveland; also, by Secretaries Seward, Fish, 
 Bayard and Hay ( 1902). It has been twice con- 
 strued by treaties — the Treaty of 1857 and the 
 treaty which grew out of it because of unfinished 
 work. The telegrams of November 2, 1903, and 
 those of like import later reduced the Treaty of 
 1846 to a scrap of paper as ruthlessly as did 
 the conduct of Germany reduce the Treaty of 
 
 1839. 
 
 It is clear that the right and duty of the United 
 States were supplementary to those of the sov- 
 ereign and did not supersede them. Our coun- 
 try's duty commenced only after the sovereign 
 had failed to maintain transit uninterrupted. 
 Then we could act only in cooperation with and 
 at the request of the sovereign. It is clear that 
 in the Treaty of 1846 the sovereign did not abate 
 any of her rights and duties or subordinate any of 
 them to those of the United States. 
 
 The only thing that there was wrong on the 
 Isthmus at the time was the presence of our ma- 
 rines and their exercising military control over 
 it for the purpose of excluding the representatives 
 of the sovereign. That was nothing more and 
 
Violation of Treaty of 1846 249 
 
 nothing less than the conquest of the Isthmus in 
 violation of the Treaty of 1846. 
 
 And yet we are told by the self-appointed apos- 
 tle of righteousness : 
 
 We did harm to no one, save as harm is done to a 
 bandit by a policeman who deprives him of his chance 
 for blackmail. 
 
 What will be the verdict of history? It is our 
 mature judgment that the following from the 
 pen of an author unknown to the writer accurately 
 forecasts it: 
 
 The policeman himself under the guise of friendship, 
 he smote the innocent and plundered the defenseless ! 
 
 What do other nations say of our rape of Co- 
 lombia ? The London Graphic stated at the time : 
 
 We regret exceedingly that President Roosevelt has 
 allowed the fair name of his Administration to be 
 smirched by a transaction so utterly at variance with the 
 most elementary principles of public law and interna- 
 tional morality. We cannot conceive a more lamentable 
 outrage on the public conscience of the civilized world. 
 
 General von Bernhardi defends the rape of Bel- 
 gium by pointing to our seizure of the Canal Zone 
 by the display of overwhelming force. He is 
 quoted by the New York World as saying: 
 
 Your seizure of Panatna was only justifiable on the 
 ground that the future interests of the American people 
 
250 America and the Canal Title 
 
 are higher and greater than the abstract principles of in- 
 ternational law. 
 
 In its editorial on the above, this metropolitan 
 journal appropriately observes : 
 
 Mr. Roosevelt did seize Panama, and by so doing we 
 reduced our treaty with Colombia to a scrap of paper, 
 but there has not been a day since that time when mil- 
 lions of Americans were not in protest, and there is 
 pending at Washington a treaty calculated to right the 
 wrong. . . . 
 
 With General von Bemhardi throwing our wanton 
 aggression at the Isthmus in our faces, how many more 
 sessions of the United States Senate must there be be- 
 fore that body will make the honorable amends that a 
 great power owes to a weak and injured neighbor? 
 
 Baron von Hengelmiiller, Austrian Ambas- 
 sador to the United States in 1903, defends 
 the rape of Belgium by pointing to the seizure 
 of the Canal Zone by the United States. The 
 New York World deals with it in an editorial as 
 follows : 
 
 Nothing that has developed in the European war has 
 stirred Colonel Roosevelt to such indignation as the vio- 
 lation by Germany of the neutral territory of Belgium. 
 He has written and spoken frequently on this subject, 
 always blaming the Administration at Washington for 
 not instantly entering a protest, and sometimes even sug- 
 gesting that the remonstrance should have been accom- 
 panied by shot and shell. 
 
 Let us grieve, therefore, that Baron von Hengelmiiller, 
 once Austrian Ambassador to the United States, now 
 publishing the recollections of his American experience, 
 
Violation of Treaty of 1846 251 
 
 finds in all the annals of nations no such glorious justi- 
 fication of what Germany has done to Belgium as is to- 
 be had in the brief and simple record of what President 
 Roosevelt did to Panama in 1903. He "took" it because 
 he wanted it, and there was no nonsense about treaties 
 or anything else. "The good of the state meant more to 
 him than the letter of the law." 
 
 . . . The hair shirt thus presented to Colonel Roose- 
 velt seems to us to be a snug fit, and we trust that he is 
 having "a bully time" wearing it. 
 
 South American opinion, which we give in an- 
 other chapter, is even more pronounced than the 
 foregoing from the old world. Colombia rightly 
 feels toward the United States as Belgium feels 
 toward Germany. 
 
 Any violation of a treaty is a blot upon the 
 character of the nation that is guilty. Its extent 
 thereof is measured by the importance of the 
 event. It always lowers a nation's plighted word. 
 Ours is below par in Spanish- America because of 
 this incident and will remain at a discount until 
 we disown the act and recompense Colombia for 
 loss of vested interests. 
 
 It is with nations as with men. Let a man go 
 back on his word, and henceforth all men will 
 sidestep when he makes overtures. We can only 
 restore our promises to par by making reparation 
 for past dereliction and by jealously keeping our 
 
252 America and the Canal Title 
 
 solemn engagements in the future. There are 
 some prices which nations as well as individuals 
 cannot afford to pay for success — our violation of 
 the Treaty of 1846 is one of them, 
 
 James Bryce, who, among foreigners, stands 
 foremost in the affection and esteem of the Amer- 
 ican people, wrote to President Thwing: 
 
 The awful calamity of a world-wide war, in which 
 more than half of the human race are involved, compels 
 us to study more earnestly than ever before the means 
 by which war may be averted. Chief among these 
 means are two. One is the maintenance of the faith of 
 treaties as the guarantee of safety to small nations. 
 
 The other means is the setting up of arbitration as the 
 proper method for settling international disputes. Your 
 nation has led the world in this worthy cause; and both 
 America and England have by their resort to this method 
 set many examples and given many proofs of their belief 
 in its value. 
 
 Let there be a revival in the keeping of the 
 plighted word, in the observing of solemn engage- 
 ments. America should lead the way by making 
 reparation to Colombia for the violation of the 
 Treaty of 1846 and for wresting from her her 
 choicest province by the use of force. 
 
 American honor cannot be fully restored until 
 such reparation is made to Colombia as an impar- 
 tial tribunal would impose. Until reparation sat- 
 
Violation of Treaty of 1846 253 
 
 isfactory to Colombia is made we may invoke the 
 solace of the poet who taught us : 
 
 Yea, and though we sinned and our rulers went from 
 
 righteousness ; 
 Deep in all dishonor though we stained our garment's 
 
 hem; 
 Oh, be ye not dismayed. 
 Though we stumbled and we strayed; 
 We were led by evil counselors — the Lord shall deal 
 
 with them. 
 
 The excerpts from the treaty itself, the con- 
 struction placed on this treaty by all Administra- 
 tions called upon to construe it, from Polk to 
 Roosevelt, and the story of the opera bouffe revo- 
 lution on the Isthmus as told in the previous chap- 
 ter, conclusively show that the Treaty of 1846 and 
 international law were ruthlessly violated in the 
 fall of 1903 when our Administration "took" the 
 Canal Zone so that construction of the canal 
 might go on simultaneously with the debate in the 
 Congress. 
 
 Treaties are the contracts of nations. Increase 
 in the number of points of contact due to advanc- 
 ing civilization increases dependence of one na- 
 tion on another. This increase in solidarity is 
 embodied in treaties not enforcible by a sover- 
 eign. Maintenance of these treaties depends on 
 the states which enter into them keeping the 
 
254 America and the Canal Title 
 
 plighted word. Collective well-being is advanced 
 by keeping these solemn engagements and is re- 
 tarded by their violation. We know that domes- 
 tic well-being is enhanced by the maintenance of 
 private contracts. Treaties are as important in 
 inte;;national relations as contracts are in domes- 
 tic. Therefore, they should be maintained in- 
 violate. The United States should make repara- 
 tion to Colombia for violation of the Treaty of 
 1846. 
 
 We have shown conclusively that our Adminis- 
 tration in 1903 deliberately and willfully violated 
 the Treaty of 1846 and the law of nations when 
 it "took" the Canal Zone. In the next chapter 
 we will show in detail that the Canal Zone was 
 taken by force — stolen. The payment of $10,- 
 000,000 to the partner in crime and an annuity 
 of $250,000 in perpetuity to the said partner does 
 not clear the title of its stain. 
 
Chapter VI 
 President Roosevelt "Took" the Canal Zone 
 
 The data of Chapter IV, which show that there 
 was no real revolution on the Isthmus in the fall 
 of 1903, also show that the Roosevelt Administra- 
 tion "took" the Canal Zone by force. The pres- 
 ent chapter must, therefore, be viewed as merely 
 supplementary to the earlier chapter. It views 
 the event from a different standpoint. 
 
 In this chapter we undertake to point out in 
 additional detail that Roosevelt "took" the Canal 
 Zone by force. "Force" carries with it the idea 
 of war. Did Roosevelt wage war against Co- 
 lombia in the fall of 1903 ? If his own conception 
 as to what constitutes war is correct, he did wage 
 war against Colombia. His idea as to what con- 
 stitutes war is found in an article published in the 
 New York Times in the fall of 1914. The por- 
 tion which is apropos reads : 
 
 An astonishing proof of the readiness of many persons 
 to pay heed exclusively to words and not at all to deeds 
 is supplied by the statement of the defenders of this Ad- 
 
 355 
 
256 America and the Canal Title 
 
 ministration that President Wilson has "kept us out of 
 war with Mexico" and has "avoided interference in 
 Mexico." These are the words. 
 
 The deeds have been: first, an unbroken course of 
 more or less furtive meddling in the internal affairs of 
 Mexico carried to a pitch which imposes on this nation a 
 grave responsibility for the wrongdoing of the victorious 
 factions; and, second, the plunging of this country into 
 what was really a futile and inglorious little war with 
 Mexico, a war entered into with no adequate object, and 
 abandoned without the achievement of any object what- 
 ever, adequate or inadequate. 
 
 To say that we did not go to war with Mexico is a 
 mere play upon words. A quarter of the wars of his- 
 tory have been entered into and carried through without 
 any preliminary declaration of war and often without 
 any declaration of war at all. 
 
 The seizure of the leading seaport city of another coun- 
 try, the engagement and defeat of the troops of that coun- 
 try, and the retention of the territory thus occupied for a 
 number of months, constitute war; and denial that it is 
 war can only serve to amuse the type of intellect which 
 would assert, that Germany has not been at war with 
 Belgium because Germany never declared war on Bel- 
 gium. President Wilson's war only resulted in the sac- 
 rifice of a score of American lives and a hundred or two 
 of the lives of Mexicans ; it was entirely purposeless, 
 has served no good object, has achieved nothing, and 
 has been abandoned by President Wilson without obtain- 
 ing the object because of which it was nominally entered 
 into; it can therefore rightly be stigmatized as a pe- 
 culiarly unwise, ignoble and inefficient war; but it is war 
 nevertheless. 
 
 The writer is not in sympathy with the contents 
 of this quotation. It is given merely to justify 
 the statement that the Canal Zone was taken by 
 
Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 257 
 
 force. The foregoing excerpt from the pen of 
 Roosevelt warrants the conclusion that in order- 
 ing five men-of-war to Colon and four to Panama 
 in the fall of 1903 to protect the secession of the 
 Province of Panama he made war on Colombia. 
 He has told us that it was done for the purpose of 
 protecting transit by rail between Colon and Pan- 
 ama. But, as already indicated, he here merely 
 uses words. There were no Isthmians under 
 arms or prepared to bear arms. There was no 
 interruption of transit impending excepting on 
 the part of our marines. 
 
 Senator Newlands introduced a resolution in 
 the Senate at the time which states the views of 
 the writer. The portions of the resolution which 
 are apropos read : 
 
 1. The instructions of the United States to its naval 
 forces not to permit the landing af the Colombian troops 
 on the Isthmus, and the intervention of the armed forces 
 pf the United States to prevent such landing and the use 
 of the Panama Railroa^, and the display of power and 
 force which overawed Colombia and prevented her from 
 defending her sovereignty over the Isthmus, and thus 
 secured the secession of Panama and the dismemberment 
 of Colombia and the creation of a new sovereignty in 
 Colombia's territory, sustained and supported only by 
 the armed forces of the United States, constituted a dec- 
 laration and prosecution of a successful war upon the 
 part of the United States against Colombia. 
 
 2. That such action constituted a breach of the Treaty 
 
258 America and the Canal Title 
 
 of 1846 in this, that it denied Colombia's sovereignty 
 over the Isthmus of Panama, expressly acknowledged 
 by the Treaty of 1846. 
 
 3. That it also violated the provision of the Treaty of 
 1846, which declared that neither of the two contracting 
 parties should ordain or authorize any act of reprisal 
 nor declare war against the other on complaint of in- 
 juries or damages until the party considering itself of- 
 fended should have laid before the other a statement of 
 such injuries or damages verified by competent proofs, 
 demanding justice and satisfaction, and the same should 
 have been denied in violation of the laws and of inter- 
 national right. 
 
 5. That the armed intervention of the United States, 
 as aforesaid, was making war against Colombia upon the 
 part of the President of the United States without the 
 sanction of the Congress of the United States, and was 
 in violation of the provisions of the Constitution which 
 gives to Congress alone the power to declare war. 
 
 The section of the Constitution referred to by 
 the Senator reads : 
 
 Congress shall have power : To declare war . . . and 
 make rules concerning captures on land and water. 
 
 It will be recalled that we stated in Chapter IV 
 that on November 2, 1903, there were no Isth- 
 mians under arms. A new contingent of Colom- 
 bian soldiers was about to arrive in order to as- 
 sist in repelling a mythical invasion to oppose 
 which General Huertas had dispatched the loyal 
 Colombian troops on the Isthmus. The prospec- 
 tive arrival of additional troops created consterna- 
 
Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 259 
 
 tion among the separatists. They wired Bimau- 
 Varillajn New York for help. He hastened to 
 Washington. Our Administration sent the help 
 immediately. 
 
 Our statement that there was no uprising con- 
 templated on the Isthmus is contradicted by an 
 official document. It is claimed certain army of- 
 ficers reported to Lieutenant-General Young what 
 they saw as tourists on the Isthmus. The report 
 is dated October 16, 1903. We are moved to ask 
 if it is mere coincidence that this is the same date 
 on which Bunau-Varilla gave Dr. Amador the as- 
 surance that the United States would protect se- 
 cession within forty-eight hours after the Decla- 
 ration of Independence ? We will give the report 
 of these officers as summarized by Roosevelt in 
 his message to Congress dated January 4, 1904: 
 
 That while on the Isthmus they became satisfied be- 
 yond question that, owing largely to the dissatisfaction 
 because of the failure of Colombia to ratify the Hay- 
 Herran treaty, a revolutionary party was in course of 
 organization having for its object the separation of the 
 State of Panama from Colombia, the leader being Dr. 
 Richard Arango, a former governor of Panama; that 
 when they were on the Isthmus arms and amn^unition 
 were being smuggled into the city of Colon in piano 
 boxes, merchandise crates, etc., the small arms received 
 being principally the Gras French rifle, the Remington, 
 and the Mauser; that nearly every citizen in Panama 
 had some sort of rifle or gun in his possession, with am- 
 
26o America and the Canal Title 
 
 munition therefor; that in the city of Panama there had 
 been organized a fire brigade which was really intended 
 for a revolutionary military organization; that there 
 were representatives of the revolutionary organization 
 at all important points on the Isthmus ; that in Panama, 
 Colon, and the other principal places of the Isthmus po- 
 lice forces had been organized which were in reality revo- 
 lutionary forces ; that the people on the Isthmus seemed 
 to be unanimous in their sentiment against the Bogota 
 Government, and their disgust over the failure of that 
 Government to ratify the treaty providing for the 
 construction of the canal, and that a revolution might be 
 expected immediately upon the adjournment of the Co- 
 lombian Congress without ratification of the treaty. 
 
 This report is intended to prove that the Isth- 
 mus was "seething with revolution." Does it 
 prove it ? Or, is the report an invention ? Let us 
 see ! A report reaches the Isthmus that some two 
 hundred Colombian soldiers will arrive about No- 
 vember 3. It had been planned to declare inde- 
 pendence the following day. Do they prepare to 
 deal with the unwelcome troops on arrival ? No ! 
 The request goes to Washington for help. Help 
 arrives on November 2. The telegram calling for 
 help is of record. It shows that there was not 
 sufficient preparation on the Isthmus to deal with 
 the expected two hundred fresh Colombian 
 troops. Does this confirm the report of the offi- 
 cers just quoted? "Seething with revolution," 
 
Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 261 
 
 yet shrieking for help to deal with a few fresh 
 Colombian soldiers! 
 
 The scheme required that the impression pre- 
 vail throughout the United States that the Isth- 
 mus was "seething with revolution." A so-called 
 report of the two army officers is placed on file 
 for the purpose of showing it. Later events show 
 that these officers could not possibly have seen on 
 the Isthmus what they stated in the report. This 
 at once arouses suspicion as to the source of the 
 report and the purpose of it. It was clearly de- 
 signed for the purpose of justifying the disposi- 
 tion of the fleet. Numerous men-of-war were in 
 striking distance of the Isthmus. Why this dis- 
 position of the fleet ? To prevent Colombia from 
 interfering with the secession movement. 
 
 It is stated in Roosevelt's message of January 4, 
 1904, that these army officers were on the Isthmus 
 as tourists. The files of the war department show 
 that they were on the Isthmus for the purpose of 
 taking a military inventory for the use of our 
 army should the taking of the Canal Zone lead 
 to war. As the occasion for their being on the 
 Isthmus is not correctly stated in the message in 
 question, one is warranted in scrutinizing the 
 foregoing excerpt from it. 
 
262 America and the Canal Title 
 
 If the excerpt correctly stated Isthmian prepa- 
 rations, why did not a motley array of insurgents 
 rush to the assistance of alleged imperilled Amer- 
 icans at Colon on November 4, 1903? Why did 
 not the revolutionary police force of Colon come 
 forward? Was it only a paper organization? 
 Why was not the trained and equipped fire de- 
 partment (441 revolutionists in disguise!) of 
 Panama rushed to Colon to fight for freedom's 
 cause ? Why did not insurgents pour in from the 
 country around as in the days of Bunker Hill? 
 None of these things happened. It was not on 
 the tapis that they should happen. It was, how- 
 ever, the day on which the Isthmus became free 
 from Bogota rule. It was the day on which they 
 are alleged to have declared themselves independ- 
 ent. Yet no one rushed forward to protect the 
 American men, women and children when threat- 
 ened with being killed as described by Roosevelt, 
 though they were innocent of any intent to wrong 
 Colombia. Not one rushed to the side of the 
 forty-two gallant American marines. 
 
 The American marines were on hand for the 
 purpose of protecting secession. The entire revo- 
 lution as planned and executed was on our gun- 
 boats. Had not the White House "seethed with 
 revolution," the ripple on the Isthmus, created by 
 
Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 263 
 
 a handful of financial and political adventurers, 
 would have sunk into a state of innocuous desue- 
 tude without even the sword being drawn in free- 
 dom's cause. The report, summarized in the ex- 
 cerpt, appears to be a frame-up. It does not ring 
 true. It was conceived by amateurs. It is predi- 
 cated on a degree of intelligence on the Isthmus 
 that does not obtain anywhere in the world in a 
 rural community or any other community. It is 
 another striking evidence that history cannot be 
 manufactured. It can only be recorded. 
 
 As already indicated, three provinces did not 
 succeed in the three years' revolution of 1899- 
 1902. Now we are asked to believe that one of 
 them planned a serious uprising less than twelve 
 months thereafter. It carries with it its own 
 refutation. 
 
 Who paid for the munitions of war that were 
 smuggled into Colon, according to the excerpt, for 
 distribution on the Isthmus? Read Bunau-Va- 
 rilla's account. There were none worthy of men- 
 tion received or distributed. We have already 
 shown that no such preparations for an uprising 
 on the Isthmus were made or could have been 
 made. 
 
 We have direct knowledge as to the extent and 
 
264 America and the Canal Title 
 
 character of Isthmian preparedness. It is found 
 in part in the following excerpts from the testi- 
 mony of Mr. Hall before the Committee of For- 
 eign Affairs of the House of Representatives : 
 
 In the cable codes you will find a provision for the 
 sending of 50 revolvers of small caliber which the mem- 
 bers of the fire department were to use in their early 
 morning arrests of any citizens loyal to Colombia. . . . 
 
 The secret cable code between Amador and Bunau- 
 Varilla and Joshua Lindo . . . tends strongly to cor- 
 roborate the testimony of various Panamans that, so far 
 jas they knew, no arms, except 50 revolvers, were bought 
 by Amador or his agent, Bunau-Varilla. 
 
 It is to be noted that the Colombian garrison at 
 Panama under General Huertas transferred its 
 allegiance in a body to the new government, those 
 loyal to Colombia having been dispatched to repel 
 a mythical invasion from the north. This car- 
 ried with it the transfer of the military supplies 
 in the barracks. Rear Admiral Glass speaks of 
 the preparedness of this garrison and of Isthmian 
 preparedness in his report, dated November 16, 
 1903, as follows: 
 
 They are well armed with the Gras 45-caliber rifle, and 
 are believed to have plenty of ammunition. As to the 
 number of troops the Government of Panama could place 
 in the field in the event of hostilities, the information 
 received varies greatly, but it is probable that while be- 
 tween 2,000 and 3,000 men are available, only 600 could 
 at present be furnished with good arms. In this connec- 
 
Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 265 
 
 tion, however, it is understood that a plentiful supply of 
 arms and ammunition has been purchased and is ex- 
 pected to arrive shortly. 
 
 The information contained in the excerpts from 
 official reports already mentioned corroborates 
 and is corroborated by the following: 
 
 The witnesses called to testify in Panama swore that 
 no money was supplied before the revolution, and that 
 the arms on which they depended in the event of being 
 compelled to fight for their independence were none other 
 than those in the barracks belonging to the Colombian 
 Government, and that none were imported. 
 
 It is only necessary to quote in addition to the 
 foregoing excerpts from official reports, a para- 
 graph from an able article by Henry C. Granger 
 which appeared in the Independent on August 17, 
 191 1, in order to dispose of the rubbish contained 
 in the report of the officers. It reads : 
 
 In view of the official telegrams quoted, it is not neces- 
 sary to say either when, or in presence of whom, or 
 what United States navaJ officer at the Isthmus during 
 the "secession" told me that "the Panamanians were a 
 set of sheep; our boys had to do it all." 
 
 The condition of affairs reported to have ex- 
 isted on the Isthmus as of October 16, 1903, by 
 the army officers as described in the quotation 
 from Roosevelt are also contradicted by later 
 events. When words and later events conflict it 
 
266 America and the Canal Title 
 
 is the words and not the events which suffer. 
 The cautious investigator goes back of this report, 
 and ascertains from other sources its truth or 
 falsity. It has earmarks which show that it was 
 invented. The desire for such a report must have 
 been the inspiration and the guide of its authors. 
 
 The report was necessary for home consump- 
 tion. It has been given such extensive publicity 
 that it has created a domestic atmosphere at vari- 
 ance with truth. As has been shown, from the 
 Isthmus came divers creditable newspaper and 
 other reports which are of different import. The 
 utterances of the inner circle of separatists (and 
 they knew the facts) are also of a different tenor. 
 The report is not only not corroborated but is 
 buried under an avalanche of adverse observa- 
 tions. The adverse observations match with es- 
 tablished facts while the report does not. 
 
 The writer rejects the report of the army offi- 
 cers quoted by Roosevelt. When it is compared 
 with the creditable newspaper reports already 
 quoted in this volume and other reliable data, it 
 looks like a crude invention. Roosevelt uses it 
 to defend his Isthmian policy in his article en- 
 titled, "The Panama Blackmail Treaty," from 
 which we take the following: 
 
 After my interview with the army ofificers named, on 
 
Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 267 
 
 October 16 I directed the Navy Department to issue in- 
 structions to send ships to the Isthmus so as to protect 
 American interests and the lives of American citizens if 
 a revolutionary outbreak should occur. Most fortu- 
 nately the United States steamer Nashville, under Com- 
 mander Hubbard, in consequence of these orders, 
 reached the Isthmus just in time to prevent a bloody 
 massacre of American men, women and children. 
 Troops from Bogota had already been landed in Colon 
 on November 3, when the revolution broke out on the 
 same day. On November 4, as Commander Hubbard 
 officially reported, his marines were landed, in view of 
 the fact that the American Consul had been notified by 
 the officer commanding the Colombian troops that he in- 
 tended to open fire on the town of Colon at 2 p. m. and 
 kill every United States citizen in the place. Accord- 
 ingly various men, women and children took refuge first 
 in the shed of the Panama Railway Company, and then 
 on a German steamer and a Panama Railway steamer 
 which were at the dock. Commander Hubbard showed 
 himself loyal to the best traditions of the American 
 Navy. He brought the Nashville close up to the water- 
 front, landed some of his men to garrison the shed of 
 the Panama Railway Company, and although the Co- 
 lombians outnumbered him ten to one, succeeded in pro- 
 tecting the lives of the American citizens who were men- 
 aced. Thanks to the firmness of himself and his men, 
 he so impressed the Colombian commander that next 
 day the latter reembarked and withdrew with his troops 
 to Colombia. So far from there having been too much 
 foresight about the treaty on the part of the American 
 Government, this plain official account by a naval officer 
 of what occurred on November 4 showed that the Amer- 
 ican Government had, if anything, delayed too long its 
 orders for the movement of American warships to Pan- 
 ama, and that it was only the coolness and gallantry of 
 forty-two marines and sailors in the face of ten times 
 their number of armed foes that prevented the carrying 
 
268 America and the Canal Title 
 
 out of the atrocious threat of the Colombian commander. 
 In accordance with our settled principles of conduct we 
 refused to allow the transportation of troops across the 
 Isthmus by either the Colombians or the Panamanians, 
 so as to prevent bloodshed and interference with trafiSc. 
 
 There are ill-defined rumors of things that 
 Dewey threatened to do in Manila Bay under less 
 trying circumstances and under less provocation 
 than those to which Colonel Torres of the Colom- 
 bian expeditionary force was subjected on the oc- 
 casion described in the quotation just given. Col- 
 onel Torres was bluntly informed that the Prov- 
 ince of Panama had seceded from Colombia, and 
 that the United States had guaranteed to protect 
 secession. He was urged to reembark his troops, 
 on the ground that he was confronting over- 
 whelming force. If he did actually threaten 
 Americans in Colon, it was under the greatest of 
 provocations. He was requested to submit to, 
 and acquiesce in, Colombia's dismemberment. 
 
 The information of the threat on the part of 
 Colonel Torres was conveyed to the American 
 consul at Colon by the provisional governor of the 
 province in which Colon is located and was not 
 sent, or intended to be sent, to the consul by the 
 officer commanding the Colombian troops, as 
 Roosevelt asserts in the foregoing quotation. 
 
Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 269 
 
 Teague, a newspaper man, wrote about it at the 
 time: 
 
 It was at this juncture that Governor Melendez exe- 
 cuted a little coup of his own to which American inter- 
 vention is directly traceable. Melendez invited Colonel 
 Torres, the Colombian commander, to meet him in con- 
 ference at the Hotel Washington. . . . 
 
 Employing all his persuasive abilities, Melendez urged 
 Colonel Torres to reembark his troops and sail away, 
 leaving the Isthmus to pursue its own course. This line 
 of argument only increased Torres' bitterness. He be- 
 came more defiant, even bombastic, and at 12 :30 made a 
 vehement threat that if Generals Tovar and Amaya were 
 not given their liberty by 2 o'clock he would turn his 
 battalion loose and slaughter every American in Colon. 
 
 The threat against Americans domiciled in 
 Colon was only a conditional bluff, and warranted 
 under the circumstances. Roosevelt does not cor- 
 rectly state the situation. He seemingly forgets, 
 in season or out of season, that half-truths are 
 more misleading than falsehoods. Colonel Tor- 
 res only demanded the release of the Colombians 
 unlawfully imprisoned at Panama by the local au- 
 thorities with the moral support of the American 
 Government. What more natural than that he 
 should have moved heaven and earth to free his 
 colleagues? Who would not have resorted to a 
 bluff — even such a one as Colonel Torres is 
 charged with? It was an honorable bluff. No 
 
270 America and the Canal Title 
 
 harm was done. The harm that is done consists 
 in the deception of the American people. Scott, 
 in his book entitled "The Americans in Panama" 
 has properly said : 
 
 The Colombian troops on November 4th might have 
 wiped out the American defense in Colon, swept over to 
 Panama and crushed the Junta and street mob there, and 
 so have summarily preserved sovereignty over the terri- 
 tory. And had it done all this, it would have been 
 squarely within its rights as a sovereign nation. But 
 they knew that such a triumph would be transient. 
 They realized it would bring down upon Colombia the 
 whole devastating force of the mighty United States 
 which the Spanish-American War so recently had shown 
 was something truly to be feared. Hence, their with- 
 drawal was prudent, though humiliating. 
 
 As already stated, the presence of the Nashville 
 determined the separatists to proceed with seces- 
 sion. Its presence was for the purpose of giving 
 tangible evidence that the United States had 
 promised to protect secession. Therefore, had 
 the Nashville not been at Colon, there would have 
 been no provisional government or provisional 
 governor at Colon. Its presence could not have 
 been used as evidence that the United States was 
 back of secession and so there would have been 
 no occasion for the threat made by Colonel Tor- 
 res. The Nashville did not prevent the murder 
 of American men, women, and children, as Roose- 
 
Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 271 
 
 velt alleges, but provoked the discord that oc- 
 curred on the Isthmus. The Nashville prevented 
 nothing — it induced secession. It was intended 
 to do so. It was at Colon for that purpose. 
 
 We will now sidestep the consideration o£ the 
 report of the army officers to present a record of 
 what occurred at conferences after the return of 
 Dr. Amador to the Isthmus on October 27, 1903. 
 This record is taken from the testimony of Henry 
 N. Hall of the New York World before the Com- 
 mittee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Repre- 
 sentatives. It shows that the so-called revolu- 
 tion was to be on our gunboats and that the Roose- 
 - velt Administration had determined to take the 
 Canal Zone by force under the pretext of quelling 
 an Isthmian uprising. The portions of the testi- 
 mony that are apropos follow: 
 
 Amador, accompanied by Prescott, immediately went 
 over to Panama. On the way over Amador told Pres- 
 cott that everything was settled and that all the arrange- 
 ments had been completed through Bunau-Varilla, who 
 had promised to have American warships* on hand to 
 protect the revolutionists after they had declared their 
 independence. Amador expressed to Prescott his most 
 implicit confidence in the fulfillment of Bunau-Varilla's 
 promise and did not seem to apprehend any doubts or 
 hesitation on the part of his fellow conspirators. It had 
 been decided that on Amador's arrival in Panama the 
 revolutionary committee should meet the same evening 
 
2^2 America and the Canal Title 
 
 at Federico Boyd's house on the Cathedral Plaza and 
 receive Amador's report. 
 
 The meeting of the conspirators was held at Federico 
 Boyd's house at 7 o'clock on the evening of the 27th. 
 At it there were present all the members of the revolu- 
 tionary committee, with the exception of Espinosa and 
 Obarrio. Mr. Prescott was the only American present. 
 Doctor Amador had outlined to his fellow conspirators 
 the plan agreed upon between Bunau-Varilla and the 
 authorities in Washington, which was to declare inde- 
 pendent only the Canal Zone and the cities of Panama 
 and Colon, and the United States warships and marines 
 would be both at Colon and Panama to prevent the Co- 
 lombian forces from attacking the Panamans, and that 
 as soon as the government could be formed the United 
 States would recognize the independence of Panama, 
 which was to take its place among the nations of the 
 world as the "Republic of the Isthmus." 
 
 Amador then showed his fellow conspirators the flag 
 of the new Republic. It was merely a silk American 
 flag . . . with the jack cut out, and in its place, on a blue 
 silk ground, two white stars joined by a narrow strip of 
 white ribbon, symbolical of the canal. It had been de- 
 signed by Madam Bunau-Varilla. 
 
 When Amador pulled out this flag the impatience and 
 disappointment of his hearers, which had been growing 
 steadily throughout the narration, found vent in disap- 
 proval of the proposed emblem, which was declared to 
 be too much like the American flag. 
 
 These Panamans really thought that Doctor Amador 
 was coming back to them with some secret treaty signed 
 by Mr. Hay or President Roosevelt, and the discussion 
 of the merits of the emblem was interrupted by Ricardo 
 Arias. . . . He made a strong speech in which he ridi- 
 culed and denounced the plan to declare independent only 
 
Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 273 
 
 the narrow strip of land in the vicinity of the canal. He 
 pointed out that he, in common with all the other sub- 
 stantial men of Panama, had large estates and cattle in- 
 terests throughout the entire department, and that they 
 would all be ruined if their property was not protected 
 from the Colombians. His remarks met with unanimous 
 approval, and it was then and there agreed that if the 
 movement were to take place at all, it must extend to the 
 whole State of Panama. 
 
 It was then decided by the conspirators to send men 
 into the interior to initiate the revolutionary propaganda, 
 which until then had been confined solely to those few 
 people in the City of Panama, and was not even known 
 to the men who later led the movement in Colon, and to 
 let the other towns know that a movement was in prog- 
 ress. Amador said that the proposal that he had laid 
 before theni was only what had been urged by Bunau- 
 Varilla. He did not want to tell his fellow conspirators 
 he had agreed to sacrificing their interests. Mr. Bunau- 
 Varilla says that Amador had agreed they should only 
 declare independent the 50-mile strip, but Doctor Ama- 
 dor told his fellow conspirators — and they are all agreed 
 on this .point — that pledges given by the American Gov- 
 ernment in Washington to Mr. Bunau-Varilla were such 
 that no Colombian troops would be allowed to attack the 
 Panamans anywhere after they had once declared their 
 independence, and that the agreement with the American 
 authorities was such as to cover whatever action they 
 might take, if they declared a larger or smaller portion 
 of the Isthmus independent. Thomas Arias and Fede- 
 rico Boyd, two of the Junta, however, voiced the un- 
 easiness of the conspirators, who, with the exception of 
 Prescott, had expected that Amador would bring back 
 with him some secret treaty signed by the United States. 
 They were, on the whole, much disappointed, and said so 
 in unmistakable terms, because Amador had absolutely 
 
274 America and the Canal Title 
 
 nothing to show them in writing from either Mr. Roose- 
 velt or Mr. Hay. 
 
 This quoted testimony further shows that our 
 forces were to be the revolution. Our compensa- 
 tion was to be an untrammeled title to the Canal 
 Zone. Yet we are told that the Isthmians longed 
 to fight for freedom. Note the following from 
 a message of Roosevelt, quoting a native : 
 
 We looked upon the building of the canal as a matter of 
 life or death to us. We wanted that because it meant, 
 with the United States in control of it, peace and pros- 
 perity for us. President Marroquin appointed an Isth- 
 mian to be governor of Panama; and we looked upon 
 that as of happy augury. Soon we heard that the canal 
 treaty was not likely to be approved at Bogota ; next we 
 heard that our Isthmian governor, Obaldia, who had 
 scarcely assumed power, was to be superseded by a sol- 
 dier from Bogota. . . . 
 
 Notwithstanding all that Colombia has drained us of 
 in the way of revenues, she did not bridge for us a single 
 river, nor make a single roadway, nor erect a single col- 
 lege where our children could be educated, nor do any- 
 thing at all to advance our industries. . . . Well, when 
 the new generals came we seized them, arrested them, 
 and the town of Panama was in joy. Not a protest was 
 made, except the shots fired from the Colombian gunboat 
 Bogota, which killed one Chinese lying in his bed. We 
 were willing to encounter the Colombian troops at Colon 
 and fight it out ; but the commander of the United States 
 cruiser Nashville forbade Superintendent Shaler to allow 
 the railroad to transport troops for either party. That 
 is our story. 
 
 So an Isthmian tells us : "We were willing to 
 
Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 275 
 
 encounter the Colombian troops at Colon and fight 
 it out." Is this bemoaning of a cruel fate sin- 
 cere ? Transportation of Colombian soldiers was 
 prevented by the Commander of the Nashville! 
 They could have met the Colombian troops at 
 Colon if they had refrained from sending for 
 help. This help was asked for on October 29, 
 1903, and dispatched to Colon on October 30. At 
 the time help was asked, there was no Nashville 
 at Colon to prevent the transit of troops from 
 Panama to Colon. It arrived on November 2, 
 1903, and was asked for in order to do just what 
 it did. The Isthmians were not prevented from 
 fighting it out with the new contingent of Colom- 
 bian soldiers. They asked for American gun- 
 boats to do it. The Nashville and eight others 
 were sent there for the purpose. When the cry 
 for help reached Bunau-Varilla on October 29, he 
 hastened to Washington. Forthwith help was 
 speeding to Colon. Prevented from fighting it 
 out with the Colombian troops at Colon! Of 
 course we are not expected to see the staging of 
 the play (vaudeville performance) that was acted 
 far from home — on the Isthmus. It was in- 
 tended to hoodwink the American people. Light 
 is, however, dawning and we are seeing the epi- 
 sode as it really was. 
 
276 America and the Canal Title 
 
 Roosevelt has taught us in the excerpt at the 
 beginning of this chapter not to be guided by 
 words, but by deeds. Deeds are the real thing/ 
 We will now follow his instructions, and apply 
 them to his words and deeds as to how he secured 
 the Canal Zone. Of course he did not mean it 
 just that way. We should look at deeds as he 
 describes them where President Wilson is con- 
 cerned, and we should accept Roosevelt's words 
 as a correct representation of his deeds in so far 
 as he is concerned. Unfortunately we have 
 found that his words as to what were his deeds 
 and his deeds do not match, and that his deeds 
 speak for themselves. 
 
 The City of Panama is reported to have had a 
 fire department of 441 men. We do not hear of it 
 in any way except that we are assured that it had 
 a de facto existence. We are not told that it was 
 held in readiness to act when Colombia's new con- 
 tingent of soldiers arrived at Colon. There was 
 ample time for them to have been transported to 
 Colon before the arrival of the Nashville. Forty- 
 two American marines were, however, left to face 
 474 Colombian troops, and that on an Isthmus 
 "seething with revolution !" Does this look like 
 willingness to fight it out with Colombia? 
 
Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 277 
 
 We will let Roosevelt tell us about his instruc- 
 tions to the Navy Department based on the report 
 of the army officers : 
 
 In view of all these facts I directed the Navy Depart- 
 ment to issue instructions such as would insure our hav- 
 ing ships within easy reach of the Isthmus in the event 
 of need arising. Orders were given on October 19 to 
 the Boston to proceed to San Juan del Sur, Nicaragua; 
 to the Dixie to prepare to sail from League Island ; and 
 to the Atlanta to proceed to Guantanamo. On October 
 30 the Nashville was ordered to proceed to Colon. On 
 November 2, when, the Colombian Congress having ad- 
 journed, it was evident that the outbreak was imminent, 
 and when it was announced that both sides were making 
 ready forces whose meeting would mean bloodshed and 
 disorder, the Colombian troops having been embarked on 
 vessels, the following instructions were sent to the com- 
 manders of the Boston, Nashville, and Dixie: 
 
 Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If inter- 
 ruption is threatened by armed force, occupy the line of 
 railroad. Prevent landing of any armed force with hos- 
 tile intent, either government or insurgent, either at 
 Colon, Porto Bello, or other point. Government force 
 reported approaching the Isthmus in vessels. Prevent 
 their landing if in your judgment this would precipitate 
 a conflict. 
 
 It would have been nearer the truth had the 
 foregoing telegram to the Nashville and Dixie 
 and a similar one to the Boston read: Prevent 
 Colombia from landing troops within 50 miles 
 of Panama on the west coast, and at Colon, Porto- 
 
278 America and the Canal Title 
 
 Bello or any other point on the east coast if their 
 landing will interfere with the establishing of a 
 Republic of Panama in the Province of Panama. 
 The essence of the paraphrased telegram is con- 
 tained in the speech delivered by Roosevelt at 
 Berkeley, California, on March 23, 191 1 : 
 
 I am interested in the Panama Canal because I started 
 it.' If I had followed traditional conservative methods I 
 should have submitted a dignified state paper of prob- 
 ably two hundred pages to the Congress, and the debate 
 would have been going on yet. But / took the Canal 
 Zone and let Congress debate, and while the debate goes 
 on, the Canal does also. 
 
 We have shown that Roosevelt waged war 
 against Colombia in the fall of 1903. The war 
 was to be waged solely by our marines. There- 
 fore, there was no need for military preparation 
 on the Isthmus and events as of that time show 
 that there were none. The so-called Republic of 
 Panama, however, is a fact, and we are possessed 
 of a title to the Canal Zone. 
 
 "No Colombian blood must he shed!" By 
 whom? By the American marines. America 
 would not stand for the shedding of Colombian 
 blood to secure the Canal Zone. Therefore, there 
 must be overwhelming force on hand to overawe 
 Colombia, and nine American gimboats were in 
 Isthmian waters. This incidental statement by 
 
Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 279 
 
 Dr. Amador tells the story. It is not invented. 
 It fits in with the events that transpired on the 
 Isthmus. It shows that an understanding existed 
 between the Roosevelt Administration and the 
 separatists on the Isthmus. This understanding 
 provided for the wresting of the Province of 
 Panama from Colombia by force. Even the Ger- 
 man soldier and writer, Von Bernhardi, now 
 taunts us : 
 
 Your seizure of Panama was only justifiable on the 
 ground that the future interests of the American people 
 are higher and greater than the abstract principles of 
 international law. 
 
 What else can this mean than that we secured 
 the Canal Zone by force? Dr. Amador's letter 
 to his son, dated October 18, 1903, about two 
 weeks before the Declaration of Independence, 
 tells the story. The part which is apropos reads : 
 
 I received your telegram that you are not coming, as 
 they have refused you permission. . . . 
 
 The reason for your coming was for you to meet 
 Bunau-Varilla, to whom I have spoken of you. He said 
 that if all turns out well, you shall have a good place on 
 the medical commission, which is the first that will begin 
 work; that my name is in Hay's office and that certainly 
 nothing will be refused you. 
 
 The plan seems to me good. A portion of the Isthmus 
 declares itself independent and that portion the United 
 States will not allow any Colombian forces to attack. 
 An assembly is called and this given authority to a 
 
38o America and the Canal Title 
 
 minister to be appointed by the new Government in order 
 to make a treaty without need of ratification by that 
 assembly. The treaty being approved by both parties, 
 the new Republic remains under the protection of the 
 United States and to it are added the other districts of 
 the Isthmus which do not already form part of the new 
 Republic and these also remain under the protection of 
 the United States. 
 
 The movement will be delayed a few days. We want 
 to have here the minister who is going to be named, so 
 that once the movement is made he can be appointed by 
 cable and take up the treaty. In 30 days everything will 
 be concluded. 
 
 We have some resources on the movement being made, 
 and already this has been arranged with a bank. 
 
 As soon as everything is arranged I will tell B. V. to 
 look out for you. 
 
 He says if you do not wish to go he will look out for a 
 position for you in New York. He is a man of great 
 influence. . . . 
 
 As already seen, a revolution in three provinces 
 in 1899-1902 did not succeed. But in 1903 a 
 revolution in one of these three provinces was to 
 succeed in thirty days. We are told the reason 
 in this letter. Our Government had agreed to 
 protect secession. 
 
 Dr. Amador's talk to the soldiers of Colombia 
 at Panama on November 4, 1904, is further evi- 
 dence that protection was promised by our Gov- 
 ernment. The talk which follows was delivered 
 from written notes, and taken down by an eye wit- 
 ness: 
 
Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 281 
 
 Boys, at last we have carried through our splendid 
 work. The world is astounded at our heroism. Yester- 
 day we were but the slaves of Colombia ; to-day we are 
 free. Have no fears. Here we have the proof [hold- 
 ing up some sheets of paper on which was the American 
 coat of arms] that our agent in the United States, Sefior 
 Bunau-Varilla, gave us. Panama is free. The cup of 
 gold for Bogota has been drained; therefore the United 
 States are aiding us. Here you have proof of their word. 
 President Roosevelt has made good, for there, you know, 
 are the cruisers which defend us and prevent any action 
 by Colombia. They have worked skillfully in order to 
 avoid shedding Colombian blood, for in no other way 
 could the American Government aid us. Free sons of 
 Panama, I salute you. Long live the Republic of 
 Panama! Long live President Roosevelt! Long live 
 the American Government! 
 
 On November 3, 1903, Dr. Amador urged Gen- 
 eral Huertas to stick to the agreement then exist- 
 ing between him and the separatists. It is claimed 
 that the following is a verbatim report of what 
 Dr. Amador said: 
 
 Huertas, what you are to-day you owe to Panama. 
 From Bogota you can hope for nothing. I am old and 
 tired of life ; it is of no importance to me to die. If you 
 will aid us, we shall reach to immortality in the history 
 of the new Republic. Here you will have four American 
 warships. There will be the same number in Colon. 
 [That turned out to be absolutely true.] You and your 
 battalion can accomplish nothing against the superior 
 force of the cruisers, which have their orders. Choose 
 here, glory and riches ; in Bogota, misery and ingratitude. 
 
 Immediately thereafter General Huertas sent a 
 
282 America and the Canal Title 
 
 letter to Commander Leoncio Tascon at Peno- 
 nome. The following excerpt from this letter has 
 a bearing on our argument : 
 
 There having broken out to-day a movement for the 
 independence of the Isthmus, which has been carried into 
 effect without the shedding of a single drop of blood, the 
 Government which now holds sway here has been recog- 
 nized. By necessity, in order to avoid their taking me a 
 prisoner I was obliged to commit to prison some of my 
 superior officers. You must prepare with the men you 
 have with you to come here as soon as you receive this, 
 my order. . . . 
 
 You are hereby appointed chief of the battalion. I re- 
 peat that you are to accept no orders except from me or 
 those sent to you by Dr. Manuel Amador Guerrero. 
 
 In Colon there are two American warships which have 
 disembarked forces, and to-morrow morning two more 
 are to arrive here. Thus this movement is supported to 
 overflowing by the Americans. Any effort would have 
 been a useless sacrifice. Therefore we have decided, 
 after careful consideration, to recognize the Government 
 of the Isthmus. 
 
 General Huertas' statement to his soldiers the 
 following morning shows that he firmly believed 
 that our Government had agreed to protect seces- 
 sion. This statement was preliminary to giving 
 fifty dollars to each soldier. His speech, as re- 
 ported, contained the following : 
 
 We are free ! The cruisers which are here remove all 
 our fears. Colombia may battle with the weak, but she 
 holds her peace in the presence of the United States. 
 
Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 283 
 
 It is now evident that secession was undertaken 
 because the separatists had been assured protec- 
 tion by our Government. To conceal it, publicity- 
 was given to an impending revolution. Excerpts 
 from inspired newspaper articles could be used to 
 explain the presence of American warships within 
 striking distance of Isthmian waters. It was 
 staging, and many were deceived by it, including 
 the writer. Yet it is now clear that our men-of- 
 war would not have been in Isthmian waters in 
 such force if it had not been agreed that we would 
 take the Canal Zone by force. Our Govern- 
 ment had decided to close the canal negotia- 
 tions — 
 
 Upon the simple plan. 
 
 That they should take who have the power, 
 
 And they should keep who can. 
 
 It must not be forgotten that the separatists 
 were guilty of treason from the viewpoint of the 
 sovereign. Under what conditions do men em- 
 bark on such a grave venture? Adequate local 
 preparation, or assurance of protection from a 
 power strong enough to furnish it. There was 
 no local preparation. No evidence of any ap- 
 peared in the strenuous days of November 3-6, 
 1903, on which later date the independence of 
 Panama was recognized. This recognition by the 
 
284 America and the Canal Title 
 
 United States was construed to assure the sep- 
 aratists the protection of the Treaty of 1846. All 
 newspaper reports of the time show that the 
 Isthmians relied on protection from the United 
 States and not on self -protection. Complete ab- 
 sence of local military activity between October 
 29 and November 6 conclusively shows that the 
 separatists had assurance of protection from the 
 United States. It also shows that our Adminis- 
 tration "took" the Canal Zone at the point of the 
 bayonet. It is stolen. 
 
 Maladministration of Panama by Colombia is 
 given by Roosevelt as an excuse for intervention. 
 If it did exist, then there is an ineffaceable stain 
 on his Administration for having interfered with 
 the revolution on the Isthmus twelve months 
 earlier. Unrest is not always the sign of malad- 
 ministration in Spanish-America. If it is, then 
 Panama is now badly governed, and our interven- 
 tion did not result in good government. We read 
 in Scott's "The Americans in Panama" : 
 
 On three occasions already the Americans have pre- 
 vented the disruption of the Republic. In 1904, Gen. 
 Huertas, who had assisted the Junta, became dissatisfied 
 with his rewards, and started to overturn the adminis- 
 tration by force. The American marines had to disarm 
 his small army. In 1908 the United States had to inter- 
 fere to insure a fair election, and in 1912 this writer saw 
 
Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 285 
 
 the presidential campaign reach a point where the 
 American marines and infantry had to be placed at the 
 Panama polls to prevent rioting and fraud. It was ob- 
 vidus that if the United States had not been present in 
 armed force, the usual Central American method of 
 changing Administrations by a revolution would have 
 been einployed. 
 
 Colombia has had stability of administration 
 since the secession of the Province of Panama. 
 Since 1904, the American marines have thrice in- 
 tervened to prevent the forcible overthrow of 
 those in lawful authority in the Republic of Pan- 
 ama. It is thus clear that the earlier Isthmian 
 disturbances were not due to maladministration 
 on the part of Colombia, but to the ambitions of 
 local political and financial adventurers. There- 
 fore, the indictment hurled at Colombia by Roose- 
 velt should have been hurled instead at the Isth- 
 mians. For him to continue reviling Colombia 
 after the crushing disproof of his indictment 
 based on maladministration blends his acts with 
 those we associate with moral cowardice. 
 
 As already stated, unrest in Spanish- America is 
 not always a sign of maladministration, but may 
 be the outward expression of rival ambitions for 
 control. It may even have been inspired by a 
 corporation seeking privilege, and have been 
 financed by it. When Roosevelt alleges malad- 
 
286 America and the Canal Title 
 
 ministration by Colombia, he gives no bill of par- 
 ticulars. 
 
 The United States terminated the revolution 
 in Colombia in 1902 and reestablished Colombian 
 sovereignty on the Isthmus. We were to guaran- 
 tee its sovereignty of the Isthmus in perpetuity in 
 the Hay-Herran treaty. Therefore, the seces- 
 sion of Panama in 1903 and our recognition of its 
 independence two days later cannot have been 
 due to maladministration. The reason for our 
 action was other than misgovernment of Panama 
 by Colombia. It was the refusal of Colombia to 
 ratify the Hay-Herran treaty and that alone. It 
 was for the sole purpose of abridging the time 
 that would be required to secure title to the Canal 
 Zone by the slow process of diplomacy. 
 
 The proof of this consists in our mediation to 
 end the three-year revolution in 1902. Our Min- 
 ister to Colombia sent the following communica- 
 tion to our Department of State, September 11, 
 1902 : 
 
 Minister for foreign affairs desires me to inform you 
 that his Government would appreciate your good offices 
 to bring about peace in the country, especially on the 
 Isthmus, where the revolution is strong. . . . Minister for 
 foreign affairs added: "Not only is the question of 
 humanity involved, but so long as the war lasts Congress 
 will not be convened, and therefore the continuance of 
 
Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 287 
 
 war will delay submission of the Canal matter to the 
 Congress." 
 
 This message indicated that continuance of the 
 revolution would delay action on the treaty. 
 Further, intervention would put Colombia under 
 obligations to us which she would be expected to 
 pay through a canal concession. Therefore, no 
 time was to be lost. On September 16, 1902, the 
 Department of State informed the Secretary of 
 the Navy that mediation had been agreed upon. 
 The communication reads : 
 
 I have received from the President a telegram approv- 
 ing of my suggestion as to intrusting such a mission to 
 the Commander of the Cincinnati. 
 
 The precedents in which our naval commanders have 
 lent their good offices to bring about peace in Central 
 America during the past years will serve to guide Com- 
 mander McLean in the execution of such instructions as 
 you may deem proper to give him in this regard. 
 
 While Isthmian affairs were in this unsettled 
 condition, the United States representatives pro- 
 hibited the use of the Panama railroad for the 
 transportation of contraband of war. This was 
 a departure from the traditional American policy. 
 They, however, did not prohibit the sovereign 
 from landing troops on the Isthmus. That step 
 was reserved for 1903. Until 1902, none of the 
 American acts were predicated on a right that 
 
288 America and the Canal Title 
 
 took precedence over those of the sovereign. Co- 
 lombia promptly protested against the action 
 named, and the order of the United States was 
 modified. Rear-Admiral Casey sent the protest 
 to the Secretary of the Navy, who in turn remitted 
 it to Secretary Hay. The communication is dated 
 October 5, 1902, and reads: 
 
 Governor Salazar returned my call yesterday and 
 strongly protested against any restriction of Colombian 
 Government use of road as an invasion of sovereign 
 and treaty rights, and requested transportation of con- 
 signment arms and ammunition, Colon to Panama, re- 
 ceived by steamer and loaded on cars before my order 
 prohibiting such transportation. 
 
 President Marroquin simultaneously lodged a 
 protest with our Minister to Colombia. As just 
 stated, the order of Rear- Admiral Casey was not 
 in accordance with our settled policy. It was a 
 departure and was resented by Colombia. It bore 
 its natural fruit when the Hay-Herran Treaty 
 was under consideration in the Colombian Con- 
 gress as well as earlier during its negotiation. 
 But the protest was made while the United States 
 was preparing to use its good offices to effect peace 
 on the Isthmus. The state of the revolution at 
 the time is shown in a note of Rear Admiral 
 Casey, dated October 20, 1902, and written only 
 
Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 289 
 
 eight days before the insurgents submitted to 
 American pressure: 
 
 Judging from conditions now existing and from infor- 
 mation I am able to obtain, there seems little prospect 
 of a speedy termination of this strife. Panama and 
 Colon are practically besieged: troops at neither place 
 dare to go beyond their intrenchments. 
 
 I firmly believe if our men were removed from shore, 
 the insurgents would be in Panama in forty-eight hours. 
 I think the Government, therefore, is very willing that 
 they should remain, making occasional mild objections, 
 which really it does not mean shall be taken seriously. 
 
 If Panama was misgoverned by Colombia, the 
 United States was nevertheless willing to con- 
 tribute to its continuance for uninterrupted tran- 
 sit on the Isthmus. In condemning Colombia it 
 condemns itself. But we must proceed with the 
 project for mediation which was to prolong mal- 
 administration in Panama because we had to 
 hasten greater transit convenience — the Canal! 
 Accordingly Rear-Admiral Casey addressed 
 Herrera, chief of the revolutionary forces, as fol- 
 lows: 
 
 I have the honor to inform you that I have been 
 authorized by my Government to offer my friendly serv- 
 ices to the leaders of the contendifig parties in the Re- 
 public of Colombia, with a view to bringing about a 
 friendly meeting between them, and a discussion of their 
 differences, to the end that they mutually agree upon 
 such terms as will put an end to the strife and restore 
 peace and tranquillity in the Republic. . . . 
 
290 America and the Canal Title 
 
 I have the honor and pleasure to offer you my good 
 offices [Governor Salazar had accepted] for a friendly 
 meeting and discussion with Governor Salazar, and 
 would be most pleased to have you meet on board my 
 flagship Wisconsin, at anchor off Panama. 
 
 The final reply of Herrera is dated November 
 3, 1902, and reads: 
 
 I wish to thank you very much for the interest you 
 manifest in the well-being, the peace, and the tranquillity 
 of Colombia, of which you have given undoubted proofs 
 in your former actions and in the contents of your kind 
 communication of October 28, which I have just received. 
 
 In a note dated to-day I express to Gen. Victor M. 
 Salazar my wish to confer on the subject of peace on 
 board the battleship Wisconsin in accordance with the 
 kind invitation you have extended to us, and I am in 
 hopes that he will make the necessary arrangements for 
 my transport to Panama Bay. 
 
 The revolutionists submitted. America's rep- 
 resentatives tendered only their good offices. But 
 both in the background and in the foreground was 
 "the big stick." An apparently interminable con- 
 flict was quelled in a few days by the tendering of 
 good offices. The venerable Senator Morgan 
 later commented on these events as follows: 
 
 On the return of the victorious liberals from Aqua 
 Dulce, fighting occurred on the railroad between Mata- 
 chin and Colon. 
 
 As the trains would pass the battle was suspended. 
 A party of liberals occupied Colon without any disturb- 
 ance of the people. 
 
Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 291 
 
 The French and American naval commanders agreed 
 that they must be removed from Colon, and after con- 
 ferring with General de la Rosa, their commander, and 
 a display of force, he surrendered to General Alban, 
 commanding Marroquin's forces. 
 
 This was the first party that surrendered under the 
 policy adopted by our Government. . . . 
 
 We destroyed the liberal army in Panama in 
 November, 1902, to keep Marroquin in power until the 
 Hay-Herran treaty could be ratified, and failing in that 
 we destroyed Marroquin and Colombia in November, 
 1903, for IJie purpose of getting a canal concession on the 
 Isthmus. i 
 
 If the American policy just described is not 
 getting the Canal Zone by force, what is it? The 
 objective seemingly in all acts of our Administra- 
 tion was the Canal Zone on our own terms and not 
 better government on the Isthmus. In short, the 
 United States was ready to rivet Colombian 
 sovereignty on the Province of Panama in per- 
 petuity for an easement to the Canal Zone. 
 When it failed to secure that easement as rapidly 
 as desired, Colombian government on the Isthmus 
 became simultaneously in the mind of our then 
 chief executive so bad that it had to be destroyed. 
 It would seem that the Roosevelt Administration 
 wrested victory from Herrera in 1902 and sus- 
 tained Marroquin in the hour of defeat in order 
 to make possible the negotiation of the Hay-Her- 
 ran treaty. That there existed such an under- 
 
292 America and the Canal Title 
 
 standing seems to be all but established. When 
 the treaty was later rejected by the Colombian 
 Senate, the sting of ingratitude, pictured by 
 Shakespeare in the immortal King Lear, was felt. 
 If Roosevelt's characterization of misgovern- 
 ment of Panama by Colombia is true, then his in- 
 terference with the course of the 1 899-1 902 x,t\o- 
 lution when it was at the height of its military 
 activity is a political crime so base that one would 
 have to search the English language to find a 
 term sufficiently descriptive to characterize it. If 
 Roosevelt really believed that Panama was as 
 thoroughly misgoverned by Colombia as he al- 
 leges in an excerpt already given, then he com- 
 mitted a political crime in 1902 when he restored 
 Colombia's tottering sovereignty over the three 
 provinces then in formidable revolt. If he did not 
 believe what he asserted, then the dismemberment 
 of Colombia in the following year was a political 
 crime without an extenuating circumstance. The 
 conduct of Roosevelt in the pursuit of the title to 
 the Canal Zone has stained American diplomacy. 
 
 Roosevelt is interesting even though inaccurate. 
 In his article entitled, "The Panama Blackmail 
 Treaty," occurs a paragraph which is now apro- 
 pos: 
 
Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 293 
 
 ''There were . . . various revolutionary movements on 
 foot in the Isthmus, and it was my understanding that 
 thgre was considerable jealousy among the instigators of 
 fnese movements as to which one would come off first 
 and would be effective. On information received after 
 the event, I believed then, and believe now, that the 
 fevolutionary movement which actually succeeded was 
 the one with which Mr. Bunau-Varilla was connected. 
 He was sent by the Government of Panama as Minister 
 to this country as soon as Panama became an independent 
 state, and he then made no secret of the fact that he had 
 been one of those who had organized the successful 
 revolution; precisely as was the case with the President 
 and other officials of the new republic. Neither did Mr. 
 Bunau-Varilla make any secret of the fact that in acting 
 as he did he was influenced both by his indignation as a 
 resident of Panama at the Colombian treatment of 
 Panama, and also by his indignation as a Frenchman at 
 the Colombian proposal to blackmail the company, and 
 if it would not submit to blackmail, then to confiscate its 
 possessions. In view of this double attitude of the 
 Colombian Government, an attitude of tyranny toward 
 Panama and of robbery toward the French company, 
 Mr. Bunau-Varilla conceived it to be his duty to do all 
 he could to aid the natives of Panama in throwing off the 
 yoke of Colombia. I believe his attitude was entirely 
 proper, alike from the standpoint of his duty as a resi- 
 dent of Panama, from the standpoint of his duty as a 
 Frenchman to tte investors and property holders^ of the 
 French company, and from the standpoint of his duty 
 as a citizen of the world. But until after the event I had 
 no knowledge of his activities save the knowledge pos- 
 sessed by all intelligent men who had studied the affairs 
 of the Isthmus. I gave him no aid or encouragement. 
 
 We will let the late Senator Carmack reply to 
 this eulogy of Bunau-Varilla. Carmack's char- 
 
294 America and the Canal Title 
 
 acterization is based on French court records, and 
 reads : 
 
 Bunau-Varilla, now [February 9, 1904] Minister from 
 the State of Panama, but a citizen of France, was one of 
 the earliest and most active supporters of this conspiracy 
 against the integrity of Colombia. This much we know. 
 This man was connected with the old Panama Canal 
 Company, and the ofificial records of his own country, 
 including the reports of the Minister of Justice, show 
 that he was one of the worst of the crew whose thiev- 
 ing operations bankrupted that concern, brought the gray 
 hairs of De Lesseps in shame and sorrow to the grave, 
 and covered the French Government itself with odium 
 and disgrace. 
 
 The views of the writer are in complete accord 
 with those of the quotation as to the real character 
 of Bunau-Varilla. It is as respectable as that of 
 Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, and there exists no evi- 
 dence that there was an attempt on the part of 
 our Administration to deal with the doctor while 
 loathing the mister. In an earlier chapter we 
 have shown that his character is rather like that 
 of one of Dickens' characters known as Uriah 
 Heap. Yet this Ishmaelite among respectable 
 people is accorded a certificate of character by 
 Roosevelt in order to bolster up his tottering de- 
 fense of the rape of Colombia. 
 
 This good and great Frenchman of exalted 
 moral purpose, according to the last excerpt from 
 
Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 295 
 
 Roosevelt, and of the penitentiary crowd accord- 
 ing to French official court records, has told us 
 that he knew that the United States would protect 
 secession within forty-eight hours after the 
 Declaration of Independence by the Province of 
 Panama. And, being good, great and of exalted 
 moral purpose, according to Roosevelt, he must 
 have told the truth ! He informed the separatists 
 that the United States would protect secession and 
 they acted on his information — ^he and they have 
 said so. This assurance enabled the separatists 
 to dispense with preparations for military opera- 
 tions. They were to be on our gunboats. These 
 gunboats were in Isthmian waters in overwhelm- 
 ing force. They overawed Colombia. Roose- 
 velt was accurate when he said: "I took the 
 Canal Zone." 
 
 We are told, however, that there were a num- 
 ber of revolutionary movements on the Isthmus 
 at the time, and that there was rivalry as to who 
 should lead the revolt of the now famous seven 
 with an attenuated and indefinite outer circle of 
 hangers on in a province of some 300,000 people 
 against an armed nation of some 5,000,000. 
 There was, however, only a single movement com- 
 posed of a few financial and political adventurers 
 with Cromwell as their first intermediary. 
 
296 America and the Canal Title 
 
 Warnings from Colombia caused him to seem- 
 ingly sever his connection with the movement. 
 Bunau-Varilla was accordingly summoned to suc- 
 ceed Cromwell as intermediary. Colombia had 
 rejected the Hay-Herran treaty when he arrived 
 on the scene. It was the psychological moment 
 — the time for action. 
 
 It was, however, the same group of separatists 
 with only a new intermediary. Soon after his 
 arrival Bunau-Varilla assured Dr. Amador that 
 the United States would protect secession and 
 urged him to hasten to Panama and clear the deck 
 for action. This assurance and the presence of 
 the Nashville as tangible evidence of good faith 
 set the machinery in motion which created the so- 
 called Republic of Panama for the purpose of 
 transferring to us the Canal Zone. 
 
 On November 6, 1903, our Government recog- 
 nized the independence of its own offspring, the 
 so-called Republic of Panama. This was two 
 days before the news of secession reached Bogota. 
 The following communication was, on November 
 6, addressed to our Minister to Colombia, to be 
 by him officially conveyed to the Government of 
 Colombia : 
 
Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 297 
 
 The people of Panama having by an apparently 
 unanimous movement dissolved their political connection 
 with the Republic of Colombia and resumed their inde- 
 pendence, and having adopted a government of their own, 
 republican in form, with which the Government of the 
 United States of America has entered into relations, the 
 President of the United States in accordance with the 
 ties of friendship which have so long and so happily 
 existed between the respective nations, most earnestly 
 commends to the Governments of Colombia and of 
 Panama the peaceful and equitable settlement of all ques- 
 tions at issue between them. He holds that he is bound, 
 not merely by treaty obligations, but by the interests of 
 civilization, to see that the peaceable traffic of the world 
 across the Isthmus of Panama shall not longer be dis- 
 turbed by a constant succession of unnecessary and 
 wasteful civil wars. 
 
 We have already commented on the statement 
 that it was a "unanimous movement." It would 
 have been nearer the truth if the telegram had 
 said that it was a unitary movement outside of 
 the Province of Panama in collusion with a few 
 financial adventurers on the Isthmus. It is al- 
 most unbelievable that a Washington Administra- 
 tion would stoop to this level for a mess of pottage 
 — abridgment by a few months, or perhaps by a 
 year, of the beginning of the construction of an 
 Isthmian canal. 
 
 Leander T. Chamberlain properly describes the 
 so-called Republic of Panama which was snap- 
 
^9^ America and the Canal Title 
 
 shotted into existence, and then precipitately 
 recognized by the Roosevelt Administration. It 
 is so apropos that we adopt it as our own : 
 
 A popular uprising, at a single point, of less than one- 
 tenth of the population of the Province of Panama; no 
 revolutionary committee representing the other five dis- 
 tricts of the province; no formulated statement of 
 grievances; no congress, no army, no navy, no courts of 
 justice, no financial stability, evidently unable to with- 
 stand the forces of the parent country; yet an admission 
 to the great sisterhood of nations ! Admitted in less time 
 than measures two revolutions of the earth on its axis! 
 It is ample cause for thankfulness that the annals of 
 civilization are sullied by no sustaining precedent. 
 
 The notice quoted above was dispatched to our 
 Minister in Colombia two days before Bogota 
 learned of the secession of the Province of Pan- 
 ama. It was sent to a nation with whom we had 
 a solemn engagement of amity and friendship 
 in the Treaty of 1846. This solemn engagement 
 provided : 
 
 If unfortunately any of the articles contained in this 
 treaty should be violated or infringed in any way what- 
 ever, it is expressly stipulated that neither of the two 
 contracting parties shall ordain or authorize any acts of 
 reprisal, nor shall declare war against the other on com- 
 plaints of injuries or damages, until the said party con- 
 sidering itself offended shall have laid before the other a 
 statement of such injuries or damages, verified by 
 competent proofs, demanding justice and satisfaction, 
 and the same shall have been denied, in violation of the 
 laws and of international right. 
 
Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 299 
 
 The notice was sent to a nation whose sov- 
 ereignty of the Isthmus we had guaranteed in a 
 solemn engagement. By this solemn engagement 
 we were estopped from destroying Colombian 
 sovereignty over the Isthmus. The notice quoted 
 virtually informed Colombia that we had done 
 what the treaty forbade, and that we would de- 
 fend our act by force. It was sent while a treaty 
 gasped and international law averted her aston- 
 ished gaze. Yet Roosevelt asks us to believe 
 that: 
 
 The United States has many honorable chapters in its 
 history, but no more honorable chapter than that which 
 tells of the way in which the right to dig the Panama 
 Canal was secured. 
 
 Honorable! May we be delivered from any 
 more honorable chapters in our history like this ! 
 Such a statement adds hypocrisy to national dis- 
 grace. There is no more unsavory chapter in 
 American diplomatic history than the one which 
 tells how we secured the right to dig the Panama 
 Canal. 
 
 It automatically reminds one of the exclama- 
 tion of the venerable Senator Hoar as re- 
 corded in the Autobiography of the late Senator 
 Cullom : 
 
 I HOPE I MAY NEVER LIVE TO SEE THE DAY WHEN 
 
300 America and the Canal Title 
 
 THE INTERESTS OF MY COUNTRY ARE PLACED ABOVE 
 ITS HONOR. 
 
 The opera houife performance on the Isthmus 
 did not attain the dignity of a made-to-order revo- 
 lution. It was a sham. There was not a scintilla 
 of respectability to it. Financial buccaneers and 
 political adventurers did essay to create a repub- 
 lic out of the Province of Panama so that they 
 might become the venders of a canal title. Uncle 
 Sam granted them the needed protection in the 
 undertaking. This assured the success of the 
 venture, and, because of this assurance, it was 
 undertaken. 
 
 We are clearly warranted in characterizing the 
 foregoing note to Colombia as one of the most 
 untruthful diplomatic documents known to mod- 
 ern history. It is a communication such as 
 Machiavelli and Bismarck were wont to send as 
 occasion arose, but there is not another like it in 
 the files of our Department of State. It is grossly 
 insulting, and stands as a continuing insult to 
 Colombia. It must be disowned in order to re- 
 store our national honor. 
 
 This note was not sent to Colombia for the pur- 
 pose of welcoming into the sisterhood of sover- 
 eign states a people that had thrown off the yoke 
 of oppression, nor of requesting her to acquiesce 
 
Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 301 
 
 in what had been determined by the sword. It 
 was sent for the purpose of protecting the seces- 
 sion that had been abetted by our Government. 
 It virtually informed Colombia that the United 
 States would maintain by force what had been 
 accomplished by the display of force. Its pur- 
 pose was intimidation. Its tone was offensive. 
 It was the crowning act of a political crime. It 
 added insult to injury. Our course on the Isth- 
 mus belongs to the same class, and is of the same 
 character as the rape of Belgium by Germany. 
 Colombia did not resist, and therefore the loss of 
 life and property are not in evidence — thanks to 
 Colombia and not to our Administration. 
 
 Notice of the recognition of the independence 
 of the so-called Republic of Panama to be com- 
 municated to the latter, was sent to our Consul 
 at Panama. It reads : 
 
 The people of Panama have, by an apparently unani- 
 mous movement, dissolved their political connection 
 with the Republic of Colombia and resumed their inde- 
 pendence. When you are satisfied that a de facto 
 government, republican in form, and without substantial 
 opposition from its own people, has been established in 
 the State of Panama, you will enter into relations with it 
 as the responsible government of the territory and look 
 to it for all due action to protect the persons and property 
 of citizens of the United States and to keep open the 
 isthmian transit in accordance with the obligations of 
 
302 'America and the Canal Title 
 
 existing treaties governing the relation of the United 
 States to that territory. 
 
 We ask again, was it such a unanimous move- 
 ment? Let us see! If the whole Isthmus was 
 "seething with revolution," if there was no an- 
 tecedent understanding with our Government, 
 why were there not enough Isthmians bearing 
 arms on November 4, 1903, to deal with the new 
 contingent of a few hundred Colombian soldiers 
 which arrived on the previous day? Only a few 
 marines of the Nashville dealt with them. There 
 was not an Isthmian there to help! There was 
 not an Isthmian prepared to help ! Yet it was the 
 day on which they declared their independence. 
 Shortly thereafter more Colombian soldiers 
 would naturally appear. And yet no military 
 preparation whatsoever was in progress. There 
 was none even in contemplation ! The Isthmian 
 facts show that an understanding existed with 
 the power that supplied the force to protect seces- 
 sion. These are facts — established facts. They 
 cannot be consigned to the scrap basket by unc- 
 tuous statements. It is the unctuous statements 
 which are the scrap. The Isthmians were not 
 fools. Dr. Amador has assured us of that. 
 They knew where help was to come from. They 
 could have known only by having been told. Yet 
 
Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 303 
 
 we are asked to believe that the whole Isthmus 
 was "seething with revolution !" As if they arose 
 as one man against the oppressor ! But, as a mat- 
 ter of fact, not one Isthmian arose in Colon on 
 the day that independence was declared to assist 
 the American marines under trying circum- 
 stances. Does this look like a popular Isthmian 
 uprising? Or, does it look like an event effected 
 by an inner circle in collaboration with our Ad- 
 ministration ? 
 
 We will now offer additional evidence in sup- 
 port of our contention that the Canal Zone was 
 taken by force. This additional evidence is found 
 in the telegrams which were sent to our Gov- 
 ernment by the committee which constituted the 
 executive board of the new republic. The first 
 was sent before independence was declared. It 
 reads : 
 
 We take the liberty of bringing to the knowledge of 
 your Government that on yesterday afternoon, in conse- 
 quence of a popular and spontaneous movement of the 
 people of this city, the independence of the Isthmus was 
 proclaimed and, the Republic of Panama being instituted, 
 its provisional government organized an [executive] 
 board consisting of ourselves, who are assured of the 
 military strength necessary to carry out our determina- 
 tion. 
 
 The second is dated November 6, 1903, and 
 
 reads : 
 
304 America and the Canal Title 
 
 The board of provisional government of the Republic 
 of Panama has appointed Senor Philippe Bunau-Varilla 
 envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary near 
 your Government with full powers to conduct diplomatic 
 and financial negotiations. Deign to receive and heed 
 him. 
 
 No such telegrams or telegrams of a similar 
 nature were sent to our Government at any previ- 
 ous uprising. There was no feeling of the way 
 in these telegrams. The tone of the telegrams is 
 that of foreknowledge as to how they would be 
 received. They are mute evidence that an un- 
 derstanding existed between the separatists of 
 Panama and the Roosevelt Administration. 
 
 The communication of Bunau-Varilla as Min- 
 ister of Panama to Secretary Hay dated Novem- 
 ber 7, 1903, tells the story of a prior understand- 
 ing as clearly as though it had been committed to 
 parchment. No such communication would have 
 been written without its author knowing more 
 than he tells. He did not become enlightened, 
 November 4-7, while reading uncertain press dis- 
 patches from the Isthmus. He had the light 
 from which the events from November 4-7 
 sprang. Therefore, he was in a position to pen 
 the contents of a note from which the following 
 excerpt is taken: 
 
 I congratulate myself, sir, that my first official duty 
 
Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 305 
 
 should be to respectfully request you to convey to His 
 Excellency the President of the United States on behalf 
 of the people of Panama an expression of the grateful 
 sense of their obligation to his Government. In extend- 
 ing her generous hand so spontaneously to her latest born, 
 the Mother of the American Nations is prosecuting her 
 noble mission as the liberator and the educator of the 
 peoples. In spreading her protecting wings over the 
 territory of our Republic the American Eagle has sancti- 
 fied it. It has rescued it from the barbarism of un- 
 necessary and wasteful civil wars to consecrate it to the 
 destiny assigned to it by Providence, the service of 
 humanity, and the progress of civilization. 
 
 The official documents from the fateful tele- 
 grams of November 2, 1903, to and including the 
 communications of the provisional government of 
 Panama were all penned with the antecedent un- 
 derstanding (not of record) in the background, 
 and they unmistakably disclose its existence. 
 They match too perfectly. Those of the pro- 
 visional government are communicated with so 
 much confidence that they tell a story not ex- 
 pressed. They are without a parallel when there 
 were bona fide uprisings. The critical student of 
 history finds in them absolute proof that our Gov- 
 ernment collaborated with some Isthmian adven- 
 turers to effect the dismemberment of Colombia. 
 
 We have seen that there were^no preparations 
 for revolt on the Isthmus and that the charge of 
 maladministration of Panama by Colombia is 
 
3o6 America and the Canal Title 
 
 without merit. We are, therefore, compelled to 
 conclude that brute force was invoked — stood 
 guard while a protectorate of the United States 
 called the Republic of Panama was organized. 
 This is conduct that one would expect of a nation 
 of brigands but not of the United States. Uncle 
 Sam can disavow it and redeem his honor by mak- 
 ing reparation to Colombia, or he can decline to 
 make reparation, leave his honor in pawn and 
 appropriate the advantages which accrue from his 
 stolen canal title. What will he do? Will he 
 make reparation to Colombia and remain faithful 
 to the ideals of civilization, or will he treat with 
 silent contempt the clarion voice of justice ? 
 
 In order to more fully establish the argument 
 that our Government abandoned its traditional 
 policy in order to take the Canal Zone, we will set 
 over against each other two official documents. 
 Both belong to the Roosevelt Administration. 
 Both were penned by members of the Cabinet, one 
 in 1902 ; the other in 1903. They speak for them- 
 selves. They tell whether the wresting of the 
 Province of Panama from Colombia was as cred- 
 itable an act as is recorded in American history, 
 or whether it was a dastardly political crime. 
 The first was addressed by Secretary Hay to 
 
Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 307 
 
 Secretary Moody, and is dated October 10, 
 1902: 
 
 I have the honor to acknowledge tne receipt of your 
 letter of the 6th instant, communicating copy of a 
 telegram^ from Rear-Admiral Casey, dated Panama, 
 October 5, in relation to the protest of the Colombian 
 commander, General Salazar, against any restriction of 
 the use of the Panama Railway by the Government of 
 Colombia for transporting troops and munitions of 
 war. . . . 
 
 Inasmuch as the rights of the United States upon the 
 Isthmus in respect to open and uninterrupted transit 
 are specific and conventional, derived from a treaty be- 
 tween the Governments of the United States and 
 Colombia as principals, I am of the opinion that Admiral 
 Casey should be instructed to refrain from any restric- 
 tion of the right of Colombia to use the road for military 
 transportation up to the point where such use may 
 occasion actual and imminent hostilities on the line of the 
 road, or so nearly adjacent as to cause or immediately 
 threaten interruption of transit. 
 
 According to this communication, only the 
 transit was to be maintained unobstructed. 
 There was to be no unnecessary hampering of 
 the sovereign in restoring order. The Govern- 
 ment was not forbidden to land forces on the 
 Isthmus. No such right was claimed by the 
 Roosevelt Administration in 1902. The use of 
 the railroad for conveying contraband was re- 
 strained only as far as was necessary to main- 
 tain uninterrupted transit. Compare the fore- 
 
3o8 America and the Canal Title 
 
 going with the following telegram of Acting-Sec- 
 retary Darling to the Commander of the Boston, 
 dated November 2, 1903 : 
 
 Proceed with all possible dispatch to Panama. . . . 
 Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interruption 
 is threatened by armed force occupy the line of railroad. 
 Prevent landing of any armed force, either Government 
 or insurgent, with hostile intent at any point within 50 
 miles of Panama. If doubtful as to the intention of any 
 armed force, occupy Ancon Hill strongly with artil- 
 lery. . . . Government force reported approaching the 
 Isthmus in vessels. Prevent their landing if in your 
 judgment landing would precipitate a conflict. 
 
 The first communication was clearly designed 
 to reduce interference with traffic to a minimum. 
 The second and those of similar import were 
 clearly sent for the purpose of protecting seces- 
 sion. The first recognized the superior right of 
 the sovereign. The second disregarded the 
 fundamental right of sovereignty. It and others 
 similar to it dispatched marines to the Isthmus to 
 take the Canal Zone. This conclusion matches 
 with Roosevelt's assertion at Berkeley, California, 
 "/ took the Canal Zone." 
 
 When one country wrests property (territory) 
 from another by force, it has been called conquest, 
 and the actors have been called patriots. The 
 chief actor has been given political preferment 
 
Roosevelt Took the Canal Zone 309 
 
 and has received the adulation of the populace. 
 When an individual wrests property (land) from 
 another, we call it theft, and send the actor to the 
 penitentiary. America ought to lead the way in 
 the development of a tradition which will make 
 the former as abhorrent as the latter. To do so 
 it must clear its title to the Canal Zone of its 
 stain by paying to Colombia an amount deter- 
 mined by due process of law. 
 
Chapter VII 
 
 Acting as the Mandatory of Civilization 
 
 Criticism of the method adopted to secure the 
 Canal Zone has not abated. Accumulation of re- 
 liable data has converted suspicion into convic- 
 tion that it was not in harmony with the Golden 
 Rule. The sifting and weighting of evidence is 
 not yet complete. It has proceeded far enough, 
 however, to show that a perfect understanding 
 existed between the Roosevelt Administration and 
 the separatists of Panama through Bunau-Varilla 
 as the intermediary. We will set over against 
 this conclusion the testimony of Roosevelt. In 
 the Outlook of October 7, 191 1, he writes in de- 
 fense of the course he pursued : 
 
 Not only was the course followed as regards Panama 
 right in every detail and at every point, but there could 
 have been no variation from this course except for the 
 worse. We not only did what was technically justifiable, 
 but we did what was demanded by every ethical con- 
 sideration, national and international. We did our duty 
 by the world, we did our duty by the people of Panama, 
 we did our duty by ourselves. We did harm to no one 
 save as harm is done to a bandit by a policeman who de- 
 
 310 
 
Acting as Mandatory of Civilization 311 
 
 prives him of his chance for blackmail. The United 
 States has many honorable chapters in its history, but no 
 more honorable chapter than that which tells of the way 
 in which our right to dig the Panama Canal was secured. 
 
 Roosevelt felt grieved that the course his Ad- 
 ministration pursued to secure title to the Canal 
 Zone provoked a storm of criticism. He clearly- 
 expected his course to be approved. In this he 
 was disappointed. Consequently, his writings on 
 the subject show an increasing bitterness towards 
 his critics. In his message to Congress on Jan- 
 uary 4, 1904, he voices his resentment as follows : 
 
 I hesitate to refer to the injurious insinuations which 
 have been made of complicity by this Government in the 
 revolutionary movement in Panama. They are as desti- 
 tute of foundation as of propriety. The only excuse for 
 my mentioning them is the fear lest unthinking persons 
 might mistake for acquiescence the silence of mere self- 
 respect. I think proper to say, therefore, that no one 
 connected with this Government had any part in pre- 
 paring, inciting, or encouraging the late revolution on the 
 Isthmus of Panama, and that save from the reports of 
 our military and naval officers, given above, no one con- 
 nected with this Government had any previous knowl- 
 edge of the revolution except such as was accessible to 
 any person of ordinary intelligence who read the news- 
 papers and kept up a current acquaintance with public 
 affairs. 
 
 We know that the Roosevelt Administration 
 was prepared to dismember Colombia before the 
 event and only those who have planned to do a 
 
312 America and the Canal Title 
 
 thing can be prepared to do it. There were 
 several times as many men-of-war in Isthmian 
 waters in November, 1903, as in 1902 when there 
 was a formidable revolt in three provinces. 
 Therefore, we know that his Administration had 
 planned to do what it did. In his speech at Berke- 
 ley, California, he boastfully said: "I took the 
 Canal Zone." He has not told us the antece- 
 dents. They are, however, evident to a critical 
 student of this chapter of American history. 
 
 Can the method employed to secure the Canal 
 Zone be defended if it should appear that our Ad- 
 ministration acted as the mandatory of civiliza- 
 tion ? Is such a defense possible ? The defenses 
 based on this standpoint predicate a system of 
 facts other than those that history is recording 
 with unerring accuracy. Roosevelt boldly claims 
 that his Administration acted as the mandatory 
 of civilization. In his message to the Congress. 
 he expresses it as follows: 
 
 The possession of a territory fraught with such 
 peculiar capacities as the Isthmus in question carries with 
 it obligations to mankind. The course of events has 
 shown that this canal can not be built by private enter- 
 prise, or by any other nation than our own; therefore it 
 must be built by the United States. 
 
 Every effort has been made by the Government of the 
 United States to persuade Colombia to follow a course 
 which was essential not only to our interests and to the 
 
Acting as Mandatory of Civilization 313 
 
 interests of the world, but to the interests of Colombia 
 itself. These efforts have failed; and Colombia, by her 
 persistence jn repulsing the advances that have been 
 made, has forced us, for the sake of our own honor, and 
 of the interest and well-being, not merely of our own 
 people, but of the people of the Isthmus of Panama and 
 the people of the civilized countries of the world, to take 
 decisive steps to bring to an end a condition of affairs 
 which had become intolerable. 
 
 Roosevelt's claim that his Administration acted 
 as the mandatory of civilization is specifically ex- 
 pressed in the following: 
 
 If ever a Government could be said to have received a 
 mandate from civilization to effect an object the accom- 
 plishment of which was demanded in the interest of 
 mankind, the United States holds that position with re- 
 gard to the interoceanic canal. Since our purpose to 
 build the canal was definitely announced, there have 
 come from all quarters assurances of approval and en- 
 couragement, in which even Colombia herself at one time 
 participated; and to general assurances were added 
 specific acts and declarations. In order that no obstacle 
 might stand in our way, Great Britain renounced im- 
 portant rights under the Clayton-Bulwer treaty and 
 agreed to its abrogation, receiving in return nothing but 
 our honorable pledge to build the canal and protect it as 
 an open highway. 
 
 Another observation is now apropos. Our 
 Government took the position that no old-world 
 power should build the Canal. When it was pur- 
 posed in France to come to the aid of the Canal 
 Company, the United States Senate passed the 
 following resolution: 
 
314 America and the Canal Title 
 
 That the Government of the United States will look 
 with serious concern and disapproval upon any connec- 
 tion of any European Government with the construction 
 or control of any ship canal across the Isthmus of Darien 
 or across Central America, and must regard any such 
 connection or control as injurious to the just rights and 
 interests of the United States and as a menace to their 
 welfare. 
 
 This obligated the United States to build the 
 canal. It did not obligate her to secure title to 
 the Canal Zone by force if the orderly processes 
 of diplomacy did not secure it as promptly as she 
 desired. The obligation to build the canal is 
 stated by Roosevelt in the following : 
 
 Under the Hay-Pauncefote treaty it was explicitly 
 provided that the United States should control, police, 
 and protect the canal which was to be built, keeping it 
 open for the vessels of all nations on equal terms. The 
 United States thus assumed the position of guarantor of 
 the canal and of its peaceful use by all the world. The 
 guaranty included as a matter of course the building of 
 the canal. The enterprise was recognized as responding 
 to an international need. 
 
 The Roosevelt Administration "took" the ter- 
 ritory in which the canal is located. We are 
 solemnly told, however, that, in so doing, it acted 
 as the mandatory of civilization. Acting as a 
 mandatory is acting as a trustee. A trustee acts 
 within the circle prescribed by law. Colombia 
 acted as a mandatory of civilization when she of- 
 
Acting as Mandatory of Civilisation 315 
 
 f ered to accept the compensation awarded by civ- 
 ilization. By refusing to accept the award of an 
 arbitral tribunal the Roosevelt Administration 
 violated the rules prescribed by civilization for a 
 mandatory. A peaceful state cannot be disrupted 
 by one acting as the mandatory of civilization as 
 was Colombia. The Canal Zone belonged to 
 Colombia. Civilization could only demand rights 
 therein by paying the price imposed by an impar- 
 tial tribunal. That is all Colombia asked. 
 "Mandatory" cannot be used as a cloak to con- 
 ceal the theft of the Canal Zone. 
 
 Roosevelt attempted to justify his summary 
 procedure on the Isthmus on the theory that civil- 
 ization had the right of transit across this 
 strategic zone on reasonable terms. This is not 
 denied. Colombia has not denied it. In short, 
 Colombia solemnly affirmed it. She merely de- 
 nied the right of Theodore Roosevelt to fix the 
 terms. She was ready — she offered to acquiesce 
 in the terms fixed by an impartial tribunal. Civil- 
 ization had the alleged right but its corollary is 
 the right to fix the terms as in the case of domestic 
 eminent domain. Civilization, howe-\>er, had a 
 right paramount to this and that is to have its 
 treaties obeyed until properly abrogated. This 
 defense has no merit whatsoever. 
 
3i6 America and the Canal Title 
 
 If our then Government had acted as the man- 
 datory of civilization, it would have invoked the 
 aid of civilization to determine the compensation 
 to be paid to Colombia for the right of way. But 
 Colombia proposed that the compensation for the 
 right of way be determined in this way. There- 
 fore, Colombia and not our Government acted as 
 the mandatory of civilization in this instance. If 
 the Roosevelt Administration acted as the manda- 
 tory of civilization in the canal venture, as al- 
 leged, civilization must be given something to 
 say in the fixing of the terms for its use. Those 
 who act as mandatory for a state in the above 
 sense (public service corporations) must con- 
 form to the terms imposed by the state as to rate 
 and service and as to the terms to be paid for the 
 exercise of the right of eminent domain. Colom- 
 bia agreed in advance to accept such terms. 
 Therefore our Administration did not act as the 
 mandatory of civilization. 
 
 If action as the mandatory of civilization is 
 warranted, who is to determine the rights of the 
 nations in interest ? Is it to be determined by the 
 nation that is powerful or by an arbitral tribunal 
 impartially selected? To ask the question is to 
 answer it. Our Government did not act as the 
 mandatory of civilization. The fact that Roose- 
 
Acting as Mandatory of Civilisation 317 
 
 velt supported tolls-exemption for our inter- 
 coastal trade proves it. The tolls-exemption pro- 
 vision of the Panama Canal Act violated the 
 fundamental provision of that trusteeship which 
 acting as the mandatory of civilization predicates, 
 that is, a non-discriminatory rate in the commer- 
 cial use of the canal. In short, our Government 
 essayed to practice in its administration of an in- 
 ternational utility what it has made criminal if 
 practiced in the management of a domestic util- 
 ity. Roosevelt supported a policy in the case of 
 tolls-exemption that is the very antithesis of con- 
 duct that is required of a mandatory of civiliza- 
 tion. 
 
 Acting as the mandatory of civilization! It 
 sounds exalted ! It is exalted if the Administra- 
 tion that makes the pledge is inspired with moral 
 fervor. Such an Administration does not take a 
 Canal Zone by force but obtains it by due process 
 of law. Nor do those who controlled the policy 
 of such an Administration advocate the grant- 
 ing of a rebate or of a rake-off to our inter- 
 coastal shipping in the form of free tolls. Clearly 
 the claim that the then Administration acted as 
 mandatory for civilization is pretense. The 
 method adopted for fixing the price of the privi- 
 lege was not that of a mandatory — had absolutely 
 
3i8 America and the Canal Title 
 
 nothing in common with it. In the Outlook of 
 January i8, 1913, Roosevelt comments on the sub- 
 mission of the tolls-exemption provisions of the 
 Panama Canal Act to arbitration as follows : 
 
 I quite admit that it would be a difficult thing to get an 
 arbitral tribunal which will not have some bias against 
 us. Switzerland is almost the only community which 
 has not some commercial interest in the Panama Canal. 
 
 If in a little country with a little commercial in- 
 terest there is not to be found a citizen who will 
 be just to us in the matter of tolls, how could the 
 author of the foregoing arrogate to himself the 
 capacity to be just when his country had an in- 
 finitely larger interest at stake? In short, it 
 would seem that he held that he was the vicegerent 
 of the Lord — anointed to dispense righteousness 
 — but that in the wide, wide world there was not 
 another like unto him. Therefore, his is the 
 privilege to treat a treaty as a scrap of paper, to 
 kick the Constitution into the backyard, to treat 
 international and statute law as forgotten lore 
 and to consign to the Ananias Club those who 
 differ with him. 
 
 Scott, a critical and impartial writer, says in 
 his book on "The Americans in Panama" : 
 
 We have the admission of the President himself that 
 he abandoned the regular diplomatic methods of securing 
 
Acting as Mandatory of Civilization 319 
 
 the territory needed for building a canal in favor of the 
 primitive method of taking it by force. This leads to 
 the admission that we set up the Republic of Panama 
 merely to make an otherwise bald steal appear to bear 
 some evidence of justification. . . . 
 
 President Roosevelt exerted the full capacity of his 
 versatile mind to cloud the situation, so that the moral 
 sense of the people would not be aroused, until it would 
 be too late to undo his act. 
 
 He pretended that the treatment Panama had received, 
 as a kind of stepchild of Colombia, warranted the same 
 kind of action we took in Cuba. His Secretary of State 
 advanced the strained construction of our solemn treaty 
 with_ Colombia that we were under obligations to main- 
 tain the neutrality of the Panama Railroad, and so pre- 
 vent the soldiers of Colombia from striking down the 
 revolution. The President further recognized the inde- 
 pendence of the Republic, and insisted that it was an act 
 as disinterested, for instance, as our recognition of the 
 new Republic of China. In truth, they bear no similarity 
 of feature. . . . 
 
 In Panama the masses of the people not only did not 
 know about the revolution until it had passed, but no 
 more than an ordinary mob, such as may be aroused on 
 an hour's notice in any city, participated in it. 
 
 It was not necessary that the people of Panama should 
 know about it. The United States had agreed to stand 
 between the clique of Panaman financiers and any offen- 
 sive act Colombia might undertake. Undoubtedly there 
 had been popular uprisings against Colombia in Panama, 
 but the revolution of November 3, 1903, was not one of 
 them. . . . 
 
 The rightful owner of the territory we desired for a 
 canal was Colombia. When we took that territory we 
 took it from Colombia. The way we took it was to 
 participate in a bogus revolution, engineered by a Junta 
 of wealthy Panaman business and professional men. It 
 turned out that the part they played in making the revo- 
 
320 America and the Canal Title 
 
 lution a success was farcical, while the part the United 
 States marines played was vital. . . . 
 
 If any American railroad should desire property for 
 a right of way and, instead of condemning it by due proc- 
 ess of law, should connive with a neighbor to falsely 
 claim possession of the property and then buy the prop- 
 erty from the illegal owner, the action not only would 
 not stand in law, but it would outrage public opinion. 
 That precisely is the course we followed at Panama. 
 President Roosevelt did not dare to take the property out- 
 right from Colombia, the compensation to be fixed by 
 due process afterwards, but connived with a revolu- 
 tionary Junta, through his Secretary of State, to have 
 the property claimed by a Republic to be set up specific- 
 ally for that purpose, which Republic would sell the 
 property to the United States. . . . 
 
 But it ought to be set down as a maxim of canal 
 management, if not of national policy, that no neighbor 
 of the canal should be allowed to remain on bad terms 
 with the Americans. It is not good that a nation so 
 near as Colombia should be in a hostile frame of mind 
 toward the United States. This is true, not so much for 
 what a sense of injustice rankling in the minds of her 
 citizens might precipitate, but because, if anything 
 happened to the canal, Colombia, in the event blame was 
 not promptly fixed, inevitably would have to bear the 
 burden of our suspicion. 
 
 But, ultimately, the question of reparation must rest 
 squarely upon a moral issue. It is not so much the 
 rights of Colombia that should impel us to an act of 
 reparation as a desire to live up to our own best instincts. 
 The American ideal is something far different from law- 
 compelled righteousness; it rises to the grandeur of 
 righteousness for the sake of righteousness. Colombia 
 suffered materially by our act, and an enlightened judg- 
 ment would be that we suffer most. 
 
Acting as Mandatory of Civilisation 321 
 
 Is it compatible with the dignity of a great nation like 
 the United States to reverse its position by making 
 reparation? This question more properly should read, 
 Is it compatible with the pride of a great nation like the 
 United States to make reparation? The answer is: 
 The United States has no dignity to uphold. It may 
 restore its dignity and sense of righteousness only by 
 reversing its willful and headstrong action. We merely 
 play the ostrich in sticking our head in the sand of the 
 Panama revolution and fancy our action is hid. . . . 
 
 Those Americans who balk at the prospect of a large 
 money indemnity to Colombia, for taking Panama, 
 should ask themselves whether any mere love of lucre 
 should stand between us and a clear conscience. The 
 situation in which we are involved may cost dearly to 
 straighten out, but that is the inevitable price, in the 
 individual or national life, of walking in the paths of 
 unrighteousness. The Colombian claim is a call to arms 
 between the forces of good and evil in the American 
 national character. Do we stand at Armageddon, and 
 do we battle for the Lord? 
 
 Our action in the matter of reparation to 
 Colombia will tell where we stand. We may- 
 preach righteousness from the housetops and 
 chant holy — holy, but if we do not repent of the 
 wrong we did Colombia, we do not stand at 
 Armageddon and battle for the Lord. 
 
 American public opinion would have insisted 
 that we secure the Canal Zone by lawful means 
 instead of by warships if it had been consulted. 
 It would now demand that adequate reparation 
 
322 America and the Canal Title 
 
 be made to Colombia if it were informed — ^if it 
 knew that our Administration actually sand- 
 bagged Colombia and wrested the Province of 
 Panama from her by force. 
 
 There are wrongs, however, which cannot be 
 righted. This is one of them. The strategic 
 Isthmus wrested from Colombia by the display of 
 force cannot be restored to her. Too many newly 
 created vested interests forbid. We must, how- 
 ever, atone for the political crime of the Roose- 
 velt Administration by paying the penalty im- 
 posed by an impartial tribunal. 
 
 What we did on the Isthmus cannot be undone. 
 There can be no adequate reparation for the wil- 
 ful dismemberment of another country if the part 
 wrested from her is set up as an independent 
 State. There can, however, be disavowal of the 
 act and compensation for loss suffered. 
 
 If the Roosevelt Administration did not wrong 
 Colombia, why not let an impartial arbitral 
 tribunal record the fact ? That would be conduct 
 becoming a mandatory of civilization. If wrong 
 is done it is nobler to make reparation than to let 
 history record it as an unrequited injury done to 
 a small state by one pretending disinterestedness 
 and exalted moral purpose. We are in full ac- 
 cord with the following excerpt from an editorial 
 
Acting as Mandatory of Civilisation 323 
 
 which appeared in the New York World on Jan- 
 uary 27, 1912: 
 
 If Colombia has no claim to indemnity, that fact will 
 be established by a full and fair investigation. If 
 Colombia has a claim, that claim ought to be satisfied. 
 No other course is compatible with the honor and 
 integrity of the American people. Whether the contro- 
 versy is to be settled by a congressional investigation or 
 referred to The Hague tribunal is a matter of detail. 
 The important thing is that this international scandal be 
 disposed of for all time before the canal is opened, and 
 that no stain be left upon the American title. Congress 
 owes that to the country, and the country owes that to 
 itself. 
 
 Colombia is embittered — is estranged. Sus- 
 picion and coldness are now enthroned where con- 
 fidence dwelt. It is difficult to restore the former 
 cordial relations. It could easily have been main- 
 tained. It merely required that our Government 
 act within the circle prescribed by the law of na- 
 tions to secure the Canal Zone. This it failed to 
 do. It has lowered our standing in the family of 
 nations. 
 
 In the parliament of nations, influence is more 
 and more being determined by character. Char- 
 acter is the product of material and spiritual de- 
 velopment. It is stained by robbing others under 
 the pretext of an opera houife revolution. Our 
 Administration will be held responsible whe;i this 
 
324 America and the Canal Title 
 
 dark chapter of American diplomatic history is 
 fully rec(brded. It behooves such Americans as 
 love truth and justice to demand that we officially 
 disavow this act and make reparation to Colom- 
 bia. 
 
 In 1906, Secretary Root visited Latin- American 
 countries. One of the purposes of this visit was 
 to make: 
 
 A frank avowal of national policy and sentiment in the 
 relations of the United States with the countries of Latin 
 America, to remove the unfavorable impressions at that 
 time widely prevailing and so bring about unity of 
 thought and feeling among all the nations of this 
 continent. 
 
 If this visit had been preceded by an act of jus- 
 tice to Colombia, the reception would not have 
 been dimmed by misgivings. Latin America 
 would have known that the profession of good- 
 will was backed by deeds. As it was, they knew 
 that Uncle Sam could bear the visage of a parson 
 while playing the role of a bandit. We have an 
 observation concerning the visit to the Argentine 
 Republic in the following: 
 
 After his first public utterances in the capital of the 
 Argentine Republic, it became evident that the ex- 
 planation of the presence of the Secretary of State of the 
 United States was to be found in the simple desire of his 
 country to cultivate closer and more friendly intercourse 
 
Acting as Mandatory of Civilisation 325 
 
 with the other independent States of America. It was 
 seen that Secretary Root represented that America of 
 which the Argentine people had seen little and heard less ; 
 the America that thinks on the lines laid down by the Pil- 
 grim Fathers ; the America that is not all push and com- 
 mercial activity but .... a powerful section of the vast 
 population governed by nobler impulses and the higher 
 ranges of thought. An entire revulsion of feeling set in 
 and one of the greatest triumphs of diplomacy of modem 
 times was achieved. 
 
 International good-will cannot be called into 
 being with a magician's wand. Legerdemain 
 cannot create it. Mere professions of a distin- 
 guished visitor cannot blot out an unrepented and 
 unrequited crime. Good-will is the product of 
 just conduct — of square dealing — of actual deeds 
 and not of professions. It is the product of in- 
 sight — of correct conduct based on insight. Only 
 by correct conduct can we restore our prestige in 
 Spanish- America. 
 
 In 1903, our Administration took the Canal 
 Zone by the prerogative of acting outside of the 
 law of nations in order to expedite an enterprise 
 which would be of inestimable benefit to collective 
 civilization, Spanish-America knew it at the 
 time of the Root sojourn among them. They 
 knew that the Administration of which he was 
 then a part had treated an international covenant 
 as a scrap of paper. 
 
326 America and the Canal Title 
 
 We should square our conduct with our profes- 
 sions before proffering friendship to Spanish- 
 America. Until we atone for the rape of Colom- 
 bia, our proffer of friendship is an affront. It 
 retards the growth of public law. Every country- 
 is menaced when obedience to public law is flouted 
 by the strong. It imperils the "age's slow-bought 
 gain." Obedience to public law is not altruism 
 — the world's interest is our interest. Solidarity 
 is a growing fact. Gains therefrom are recipro- 
 cal. The United States ought to practice obedi- 
 ence to public law and solemn engagements. Then 
 she will be in a position to carry the message of 
 good-will to Spanish-America without an affront 
 to its intelligence. 
 
 Never before had an American Administration 
 acted on the principle that its own convenience 
 took precedence of a solemn engagement and of 
 the law of nations. The international situation 
 produced thereby cannot be permitted to become 
 immutable history. To do so is to affirm the prin- 
 ciple that a weak nation has no rights that a strong 
 nation need respect if it contravenes the latter's 
 convenience. It is the negation of the finest fruit 
 of civilization. 
 
 In order that a treaty may be a vital force, it 
 must be conformed to in letter and in spirit. Not 
 
Acting as Mandatory of Civilization 327 
 
 only no way of escape from its plain intent must 
 be sought but the parties in interest must so act 
 that other peoples cannot misconstrue their intent. 
 It is not enough that motives be right. The 
 United States ought to act so that others cannot 
 mistake its righteous purpose. This the United 
 States failed to do in her pursuit of a title to the 
 Canal Zone. It avails her nothing to pretend to 
 be guided by the morals of a parson until she has 
 repented of her conduct as a bandit. 
 
 There can be no doubt in the mind of informed 
 persons that the Roosevelt Administration col- 
 laborated with separatists in Panama to dismem- 
 ber Colombia for the purpose of securing a degree 
 of control over the Canal Zone that Colombia was 
 loath to grant. In this she violated those rules of 
 fairness, reason, and justice which are the crown- 
 ing achievement of modern civilization. It was 
 the act of their agent and not the will of the 
 American people. Unless the act is repudiated 
 and reparation is made to Colombia, it will, how- 
 ever, become their act. 
 
 Sefior S. Perez Triana, in a letter addressed to 
 President Concha of Colombia, published in the 
 New York Times of December 13, 1914, states 
 the position of Spanish-America with clearness 
 and force. We will quote from it at length : 
 
328 America and the Canal Title 
 
 The United States, while preventing the conquest of 
 American territory by European nations, has not been 
 logical nor honest; it has not respected the essential 
 equity of the principle, for it has conquered territory by 
 violating the sovereignty of other American nations. 
 
 In the policy of the White House there has become 
 apparent a marked change regarding Latin America. A 
 good man has come into power, one whose honest 
 conscience makes no compromises with iniquity and re- 
 fuses to bow to the historical and universal doctrine that 
 it is allowable for a nation to do collectively what for an 
 individual would be criminal. 
 
 Mr. Wilson has proclaimed from the lofty position 
 which he occupies that the moral law for a statesman, as 
 for the individual, should be justice, not expediency. 
 The statesman of the entire world, shackled to the Gov- 
 ernmental tradition of all historical epochs and stupefied 
 before such audacity, called him a dreamer, not daring 
 to call him a traitor. 
 
 President Wilson has not confined himself to words; 
 he has passed on to action. He gave proof of this to his 
 fellow-citizens when, appealing to the national honor, he 
 obtained the repeal of the law regarding Panama tolls, 
 which was based on expediency, not justice. And it was 
 the same in Colombia with the treaty of April 6 of this 
 year, which made good the injury done to the Republic 
 of Colombia by the Administration of Roosevelt in so 
 far as it lay within human power so to do. 
 
 The Monroe Doctrine, which has been our defense 
 against European conquest, did not prevent our 
 spoliation. Up to now the United States has not carried 
 this doctrine to its extreme limit of logical development, 
 viz. the prohibition of conquest, which is robbery and 
 spoliation, explicitly as such, no matter who may perpe- 
 trate it — an American republic, a European monarchy, 
 or a European republic. 
 
 Already things are changing. At Mobile, in October 
 of last year, President Wilson declared, in the name of 
 
Acting as Mandatory of Civilisation 329 
 
 the United States, that the latter would not in future 
 acquire territory on the American continent by means of 
 wJir or conquest. Wilson has as good a right to speak 
 in behalf of his country as had Monroe. The value of 
 this promise of Wilson, its transcendental importance, 
 what it means as a victory for the principles of inter- 
 national justice, may be measured, just as temperature 
 is measured by a thermometer, by the hysterical and 
 clamorous rage which it aroused in Roosevelt, the apostle 
 of imperialism, the butcher of Colombia. 
 
 The opportunity which now presents itself is pro- 
 pitious for obtaining from the United States a solemn 
 ratification of the principle laid down by President 
 Wilson at Mobile. If anywhere there is ill-feeling 
 toward the United States on account of the past, to allow 
 it to impair judgment would be an unpardonable mistake, 
 now that Wilson has erased the past. If the personal 
 and historical elements offered by the present time are 
 not utilized a deplorable error, whose results are beyond 
 calculation, will have been committed. 
 
 A Monroe Doctrine carried to the extreme limit of its 
 logical development, which will defend the continent, as 
 it has in the past, against the voracity of Europe, which 
 will tie the hands both of Yankee imperialism and of the 
 shameful and treacherous imperialisms already arising 
 in Latin America — there would be an element of tre- 
 mendous import in achieving peace and progress for all 
 the American Continent. 
 
 This end can be achieved at the Pan-American 
 Congress about to meet at Santiago de Chile; there the 
 necessary agreement between the nations of America 
 should be adopted. Without doubt it will be necessary 
 to ratify this by means of special agreements among the 
 various Governments. Some nations — let us hope not — 
 might oppose the moral guaranteeing of the territorial 
 inviolability of each and all of the American nations by 
 each and all of the rest. This would reveal the existence, 
 in the countries making such opposition, of brands of 
 
330 America and the Canal Title 
 
 greed and cupidity which it would be well at all events 
 to lay bare. 
 
 The personal elements of the present hour are de- 
 cisive; the delegates from the United States to the Pan- 
 American Congress cannot contradict nor fail to support 
 the principles so gallantly proclaimed before the world 
 by President Wilson at Mobile. The ratification of this 
 in the form set forth above would be an obstacle in the 
 path of imperialistic attempts in case the old tendency 
 should again gain the upper hand in the United States 
 under Roosevelt or some other like him. 
 
 The Latin-American nations proclaiming the principle 
 of international justice — ^that the sovereignty of the 
 Latin-American nations cannot be violated by another or 
 others of these nations, nor by the nations of other 
 continents — dignifying thus the Monroe Doctrine and 
 completing its moral integrity would, I hold, do a great 
 work in the cause of justice, liberty, and democracy, so 
 grievously threatened in this black and turbulent hour of 
 war and extermination in Europe. 
 
 I respectfully ask that you raise the banner of this 
 noble idea in order that the delegates from Colombia may 
 present it, in the name of our country, before the coming 
 Pan-American Congress. 
 
 There will be some, and you will hear them, Mr. Presi- 
 dent, who will tell you and the republic that the most that 
 may be attained will be a treaty signed by all the nations 
 of North, Central, and South America, but that this will 
 not benefit us in the least, because, when it may suit the 
 convenience of the strong in the future, that treaty will 
 be torn to bits just as was the treaty between Colombia 
 and the United States. They will tell you that to put 
 faith in written words and in signatures of nations, after 
 Germany has ground under her horses' heels the com- 
 pacts, signed by all Europe, making Luxemburg and 
 Belgium neutral, and called them "scraps of paper," is 
 an unpardonable piece of childishness. They will tell 
 you that the only strength is that of the sword, that the 
 
Acting as Mandatory of Civilisation 331 
 
 only voice to which the world listens is the voice of 
 cannon. To such men I make answer that theirs is the 
 eternal doctrine of Draconians and demagogues for ob- 
 structing the evolution of justice. 
 
 We, the weak, have only right for a shield ; if we our-" 
 selves make haste to discredit right we play into the hands 
 of its violators and show them the road. If right is van- 
 quished, it is not for us to cover it with the mud of vitu- 
 peration and mockery, but to raise it up from the dust 
 high, very high, as the Redeemer raised His Cross, so that 
 it may be a beacon lighting up men's consciences. 
 
 To submit voluntarily and prematurely to deceit and 
 violence is to make ourselves deserving of the yoke of 
 slavery ; it is, moreover, a crime against our native land. 
 We have not the right to be cowards in advance. 
 
 We have neither sword nor cannon; let us then rally 
 to the right, in the firm conviction that right must 
 triumph in the end. 
 
 This shows how Colombia feels. It also shows 
 that the feeling of apprehension on the part of the 
 small Latin-American states is warranted. It 
 can only be allayed by voluntarily making repara- 
 tion to Colombia. Will the people of the United 
 States deny justice to Colombia because they have 
 the physical prowess to resist the promptings of 
 the still small voice within which urges them to 
 repent ? 
 
 The United States should cooperate whole 
 heartedly in carrying out the foregoing sugges- 
 tion that the principles of the Monroe Doctrine 
 be made Pan-American. Our country can not 
 
332 America and the Canal Title 
 
 expect to be as influential as it would be in cre- 
 ating a tradition favoratle to peace and justice in 
 the Western Hemisphere if it insists on exclusive 
 responsibility for the maintenance of the afore- 
 mentioned policy. 
 
 The United States ought to do right because 
 it is right and not because it pays. If to do right 
 also pays, the argument for justice is reenf orced. 
 To grant justice to Colombia will pay. We quote 
 from Granger's article in the Independent, "The 
 Stain of Our Flag" : 
 
 As Mr. Barrett said, settlement with Colombia would 
 be simply bread cast on the waters of Latin-American 
 trade, which would come back to us in short order in the 
 increased commerce that would result from the good feel- 
 ing engendered. 
 
 Since the "secession" Colombia has had as its motto 
 "Peace and Work." Its government is representative of 
 both political parties. Reyes began its regeneration — 
 he doubled the price of Colombia's bonds on the London 
 Exchange, put the army to work on the roads, and paid 
 the salaries of the employees, as well as trebling the 
 number of schools. Gonzales Valencia, who succeeded 
 Reyes, kept up the good work. Now President Restrepo 
 has placed the country's credit higher than ever and 
 shown a most creditable record. 
 
 Colombia's worst drawback is her fiat money, a relic 
 of the days of the civil war (1899-1902) that all agree 
 shall be her last. With this redeemed and the currency 
 on a gold basis, she would soon be prosperous indeed. 
 Colombia is a country of infinite natural resources and 
 
Acting as Mandatory of Civilisation 333 
 
 industrious inhabitants, and a brilliant future awaits her 
 as soon as the curse of valueless paper is removed. The 
 prosperity which resulted in Argentina when the basic 
 element of circulating medium was supplied will follow 
 as surely in Colombia. 
 
 A payment to Colombia of $25,000,000 and a new 
 treaty of friendship and commerce, would be an excellent 
 investment for us, and would completely wipe out the 
 smirch on our honor. 
 
 Granger quotes a New York merchant as fol- 
 lows: 
 
 On account of the feeling against us in Latin America 
 because of the Panama affair we have lost in trade more 
 than the whole canal will cost. 
 
 The views of the writer are clearly expressed 
 in the following taken from a metropolitan daily : 
 
 Our people have not yet appreciated how much we 
 need, and would profit by closer friendship and fuller 
 understanding with the peoples of the other American 
 republics. Every one of the efforts now being made to 
 bring those peoples nearer to us, to understand more 
 completely their point of view, their history, their litera- 
 ture, their institutions, and every effort to break down 
 the barrier of language which separates us, deserves the 
 heartiest support. The relation we seek with them is not 
 a relation in which we are to exercise power, but one in 
 which we and they together are to exercise an influence 
 that is higher and better than mere power, because it is 
 the outgrowth of our common devotion to democratic 
 institutions and our complete and sympathetic under- 
 standing of what the very word "America" typifies and 
 signifies. 
 
334 America and the Canal Title 
 
 Our Government should not leave a word un- 
 said or an act undone that is necessary to make 
 full, complete, and ungrudging reparation to Co- 
 lombia. It would give us that influence in the 
 councils of the Western Hemisphere to which we 
 should aspire. Last and least it would pay in dol- 
 lars and cents. Latin America will soon have a 
 population of 100,000,000. Their growth in pop- 
 ulation will continue. Their respect, esteem, and 
 confidence is worth more than its pecuniary cost. 
 Ex-Minister Du Bois has well said : 
 
 The time is not distant when Latin America will have 
 a hundred million of people, inspired by new conditions 
 of national and commercial life. Those now living feel 
 that the Panama incident is the only real injustice com- 
 mitted by the United States against the Latin-American 
 people. The Treaty will correct that feeling and greatly 
 change the sentiment that is now running heavily against 
 us in all South America, and place this country and 
 Colombia upon that friendly footing so greatly desired 
 by the people of both nations. 
 
 Spanish-America is suspicious of ultimate 
 American intentions. It is not without reason. 
 It is well expressed in the following newspaper 
 clipping which was taken from Eder's book on 
 Colombia : 
 
 Even in this enlightened age every nation seems to 
 have a bugaboo of an impending foreign enemy — 
 England, Germany; the United States, Japan, and so 
 forth. So Colombians dread a Yankee attempt, sooner 
 
Acting as Mandatory of Civilisation 335 
 
 or later, to overpower South America and believe their 
 land to be the outpost which will be first attacked. They 
 have already felt the talon of the Eagle ; they have a hys- 
 terical dread that the voracious bird will again swoop 
 down upon their country. Hysterical is the only word. 
 Suspicion of the designs of the American Government is 
 carried to absurd limits; innocent provisions for coaling 
 rights; a proposed treaty, or steps by American com- 
 panies to acquire tracts of land for timber or mining in 
 ceitain sections, or purely commercial, railroad or bank- 
 ing projects are misconstrued to be an opening wedge; 
 even prospecting American engineers have been suspected 
 of being secret spies. 
 
 And Americans have only themselves to blame. Ever 
 since the annexation of Texas, and the Mexican War, 
 there has been latent fear of Yankee aggression among 
 the Latin-American peoples and a certain dislike of the 
 Gringos. The events of 1903, in the ruthless seizure 
 by President Roosevelt of the coveted Panama Canal 
 strip and Colombia's humiliation at having her protests 
 and demands for redress ignored have carried this fear 
 and this dislike to a high pitch. . . . 
 
 The United States has been almost blind to the disas- 
 trous consequences to itself, both political and commer- 
 cial, of the gross injustice that was committed and the 
 policy of indifference it has since pursued. It is not Co- 
 lombia alone that has been affected ; the shock of the tak- 
 ing of Panama was felt throughout Spanish America; a 
 quiver of indignation ran through the southern conti- 
 nent, causing spasmodic outbursts of anti-American feel- 
 ing which have proved detrimental to the best commer- 
 cial interests of the United States and favorable to Euro- 
 pean trade, and which have hampered American diplo- 
 macy. 
 
 Shall we have an "Italia Irredenta" bordering 
 the canal littoral? Shall we allow an Alsace- 
 
336 America and the Canal Title 
 
 Lorraine revanche festering to the south of this 
 beneficent enterprise ? It is for our Senate to de- 
 termine. We read in the Norfolk Landmark: 
 
 The Republic of Colombia has adopted as an official 
 history a work which accuses the United States of crim- 
 inal intent in procuring the secession of Panama. . . . 
 
 It is said that each child in the Colombian public 
 schools will be required to memorize the chapter dealing 
 with the secession of Panama. This will mean that the 
 republic will foster for years, if not forever, a spirit of 
 antagonism toward the United States. This country 
 cannot afford to have such enmities in South America. 
 Panama itself is hardly worth the price. 
 
 Elsewhere we find the very essence of Colom- 
 bia's indictment of our moral perfidy and how it 
 is propagated. It reads: 
 
 The Colombian Republic was physically unable to pre- 
 vent the success of the conspiracy by which Uncle Sam 
 deprived it of the state of Panama. But it is apparently 
 intelligent enough to understand the modus operandi of 
 the game, and nervy enough to tell about it upon all 
 proper occasions. It has even recently gone to the length 
 of providing its public schools with histories which teach 
 and thoroughly expose the wretched part played by the 
 Washington administration in fomenting a fake rebel- 
 lion on the Isthmus, and in treacherously lending its war- 
 ships to the service of the seceders. Not only this, but 
 in terms and by name do these school books outline the 
 perfidy of Theodore Roosevelt, who, as President, was 
 responsible for the fact, and who outraged the first prin- 
 ciple of international comity, and far exceeded his right- 
 ful jurisdiction by actively exerting himself in aid of the 
 shameless robbery of a sister Republic. 
 
Acting as Mandatory of Civilisation 337 
 
 Colombia's wrongs cry to heaven for redress. 
 They must not be perpetuated. Right should be 
 the unsuUied watchword of the United States. 
 Colombia asks for justice. She does not ask for 
 the impossible. Her people do not blame the peo- 
 ple of the United States. Her statesmen respect 
 our statesmen and admire Woodrow Wilson. 
 They blame Roosevelt. They know that he and 
 not the American people willed Colombia's hu- 
 miliation. They merely ask for justice. If this 
 is granted, they will again extend to us the right 
 hand of fellowship. It is well expressed by one 
 of her great men, Triana. The New York Times 
 of June 6, 191 5, printed portions of an address of 
 his with the following summary of it : 
 
 During the recent Pan-American Conference at Wash- 
 ington Mr. Santiago Peres Triana of Colombia delivered 
 an address on the necessity for Americans, North and 
 South, letting the rest of the world understand plainly 
 that the Western Hemisphere is to be retained by Ameri- 
 cans and is not to be permitted to be made the victim of 
 territory grabbing by European powers — such an exten- 
 sion of the Monroe Doctrine that each South and Cen- 
 tral American republic will adopt that doctrine for itself. 
 
 Excerpts from this noteworthy address which 
 are germane at this point of our discussion read : 
 
 The hour of watchfulness for us Americans of all sec- 
 tions has only just begun, and we would be unworthy of 
 the men who achieved our emancipation and who 
 
338 America and the Canal Title 
 
 founded our nationalities if through neglect or sordid 
 temporizing we were to jeopardize the patrimony of free- 
 dom of the coming generations. The first element for 
 the protection of the continent is universal harmony 
 and efficient cooperation. Financial relationships which 
 signify the lifeblood of industry and commerce are of 
 paramount importance in this connection, but there are 
 other indispensable steps rendered necessary by the reve- 
 lation of the present hour. 
 
 All feelings of fear or of distrust must disappear. It 
 is necessary that all the nations of the continent should 
 declare in a solemn manner that the era of conquest of 
 territory has come to an end on the American continent, 
 alike from outsiders as from other nations on the conti- 
 nent, and that redress whenever it can be accomplished 
 should be carried out; but it is often impossible to re- 
 trace steps of history, and in. such cases bygones will have 
 to be bygones, and the dead past will have to bury its 
 dead. The attempt to straighten the course of history, 
 following the current up the stream toward its source, 
 would be idle and futile. 
 
 It is the future that concerns us. The microbe of im- 
 perialism is one of easy growth. Men assembled in col- 
 lectivities called nations have been accustomed, when 
 occasion has arisen, throughout all history, to accept in- 
 iquity as their guiding principle, and the honest man who, 
 single-handed, would not take an ear of com from his 
 neighbor's field, as soon as he finds himself armed with a 
 collective conscience, will not only take the ear of corn, 
 but the whole field, and the life of his neighbor and of his 
 neighbor's family to boot. And then he will present 
 himself, demanding the crown of patriotism and the halo 
 of glory in recognition from the future generations. 
 
 The microbe must be extirpated from the continent. 
 It has been proclaimed within recent days from the high- 
 est summit of executive power in this land that honesty 
 and justice and not convenience should be the guiding 
 principle of life, alike individual and national. 
 
Acting as Mandatory of Civilisation 339 
 
 That utterance should stand, as it were, as the pennant 
 of our hopes and our endeavors. The inviolability of 
 the continent has been effective for outsiders, but not so 
 for some nations of the continent. I do not speak in a 
 spirit of complaint or of censure; I simply state facts. 
 Thus a spirit of distrust has been created which it is 
 indispensable to eliminate. The atmosphere of cordiality 
 throughout the continent must be diaphanous, without a 
 single shadow on the horizon. 
 
 The disappearance of distrust will permit of the real 
 union in sentiment of all the nations of America, and that 
 union will mean strength for the protection of the con- 
 tinent and of the ideals of liberty and democracy to 
 which it is dedicated. . . . 
 
 It becomes of paramount and vital importance for the 
 nations of America that it should be known that through- 
 out the breadth and length of the continent they are 
 unanimous in sentiment; that the continent will be in- 
 violate from conquest or political colonization; that it is 
 open and free to the wandering and peaceful multitudes, 
 but that it is closed to the conquering flags. 
 
 The feeling in Colombia and to a certain extent 
 the feeling in Spanish-America is indicated in a 
 petition signed by representatives of seventy-six 
 New York importing houses praying that the Co- 
 lombian treaty be ratified. The petition ad- 
 dressed to Chairman Stone of the Committee on 
 Foreign Relations of the Senate reads as follows : 
 
 The enormous opportunities for the expansion of our 
 Latin trade that have been opened to American enter- 
 prise by the European war make it imperative that the 
 antipathy and distrust which have unfortunately grown 
 out of the secession of Panama be removed at once. 
 
 We believe this can be best achieved by the immediate 
 
340 America and the Canal Title 
 
 ratification of the Colombian treaty, which would insure 
 the restoration of the century-old friendship formerly 
 existing between our two countries and virtually give the 
 United States the foreign trade of Colombia. 
 
 The facts that Colombia is the nearest of the South 
 American republics, and the only one having coasts on 
 both oceans; that rapid and direct steamship communi- 
 cations already exist, and that in natural wealth and un- 
 developed resources she surpasses all her neighbors may 
 be mentioned to show that every consideration of expedi- 
 ency and self-interest is added to those of justice and in- 
 ternational good will involved in the final settlement of 
 Colombia's claims. 
 
 With every confidence in the far-seeing statesmanship 
 and true patriotism of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
 Relations, the undersigped merchants doing business with 
 Colombia beg most respectfully to urge the prompt rati- 
 fication of the treaty signed at Bogota on April 6, 1914, 
 between the United States and the Republic of Colombia. 
 
 This done, then the Congress should investi- 
 gate through an expert committee the compensa- 
 tion actually due Colombia and voluntarily grant 
 Colombia the full measure of justice due her. It 
 would exalt the United States in Latin America. 
 It would transform suspicion into confidence. 
 Can the United States, which, from humanitarian 
 motives, returned twelve million dollars to China 
 and spent a hundred million to free Cuba, refuse 
 equitably to compensate Colombia? 
 
 In a memorandum dated May 3, 1913, ad- 
 dressed to Secretary Bryan by the then Minister 
 of Colombia occurs the following: 
 
Acting as Mandatory of Civilisation 341 
 
 Both the People and the Government of Colombia 
 have felt a deep satisfaction on learning of the very noble 
 resolution Your Excellency has formed to cultivate rela- 
 tions of sincere friendship with the Republics of Latin 
 America by means of a high-minded and just policy ; the 
 note in which Your Excellency has already struck in that 
 beautiful thought: — 
 
 "The Lord has made us neighbors; 
 Let Justice make us friends." 
 
 Who can deny that the beginning of a new era of 
 justice should be marked by giving to my country that 
 reparation which is her due? Her cause is eminently 
 just. Colombia asks for the fulfillment of sacred obli- 
 gations entered into by solemn treaty, the Treaty of 1846, 
 and she bases this appeal on a fundamental axiom of the 
 Law of Nations, which declares that all States, great or 
 small, are equal in the family of nations. It can be said 
 that the case of Colombia is a leading case in the inter- 
 national life of the New World; because the manner in 
 which it will be decided will show whether the Great Re- 
 public, in its dealings with the nations of America, in- 
 tends or does not intend to abide by the fundamental 
 principles of international law. 
 
 This simple and direct appeal for justice by 
 Colombia is naturally followed here by an ob- 
 servation of Viscount James Bryce on the present 
 European situation. It is so apropos that it might 
 have been addressed to us : 
 
 In the judgment which history will hereafter pass upon 
 the forty centuries of recorded progress toward civiliza- 
 tion that now lie behind us, what are the tests it will 
 apply to determine the true greatness of a people ? 
 
 Not population, not territory, not wealth, not military 
 
342 America and the Canal Title 
 
 power. Rather will history ask: What examples of 
 lofty character and unselfish devotion to honor and duty 
 has ay people given? What has it done to increase the 
 volume of knowledge? What thoughts and what ideals 
 of permanent value and unexhausted fertility has it be- 
 queathed to mankind? What works has it produced in 
 poetry, music, and the other arts to be an unfailing 
 source of enjoyment to posterity? . . . 
 
 Each- race has something to give, each something to 
 learn; and when their blood is blended the mixed stock 
 may combine the gifts of both. . . . 
 
 The mark of an advancing civilization has been the 
 substitution of friendship for hatred and of peaceful for 
 warlike ideals. That small peoples have done and can 
 do as much for the common good of humanity as large 
 peoples. That Treaties must be observed, for what are 
 they but records of national faith solemnly pledged, and 
 what could bring mankind more surely and swiftly back 
 to that reign of violence and terror from which it has 
 been slowly rising for the last ten centuries than the de- 
 struction of trust in the plighted faith of nations? 
 
 To conciliate Colombia for the loss of Panama 
 the Taft Administration made overtures for a 
 concession of the Atrato canal route and the per- 
 petual lease of certain islands for coaling stations 
 and other purposes and actually offered for them 
 $10,000,000! An offer of a mere pittance for 
 valuable concessions to right a colossal wrong! 
 President Restrepo promptly replied in words that 
 ought to bring the blush of shame to self-respect- 
 ing Americans : 
 
 President Roosevelt took Panama, our richest asset, 
 and now you are sent here to take our islands, and the 
 
Acting as Mandatory of Civilisation 343 
 
 only canal route we have left. Is there anything else 
 that the northern Colossus would like to separate us 
 from? 
 
 Read the foregoing reply by President Restrepo 
 again and then determine for yourself whether 
 the Roosevelt Administration acted as the manda- 
 tory of civilization when it "took" the Canal Zone 
 by force, and, in so doing, rent asunder the Re- 
 public of Colombia, an ally of the United States 
 by the Treaty of 1846. 
 
 This action of the Roosevelt Administration 
 was a challenge to civilization — a determination 
 to secure outside of the methods forged by civil- 
 ization an opportunity to prosecute a great un- 
 dertaking without paying the price that civiliza- 
 tion would impose by due process of law. The act 
 was anti-social. It was the negation of social 
 justice. Professor Johnson of Denison Univer- 
 sity, in his criticism of German lawlessness in the 
 war, has expressed the views that the writer holds 
 concerning the lawless method employed to se- 
 cure the Canal Zone. It reads : 
 
 This is no more nor less than a challenge to civilization 
 itself. Civilization in smaller groups is the habit, or art, 
 of living together as individuals, with such recognition 
 of the interests and welfare of others, such restraint 
 upon the promptings of mere self-interest, as is necessary 
 to make organized society possible, and to conduce to the 
 greatest feasible happiness and prosperity of all who are 
 
344 America and the Canal Title 
 
 willing to recognize the doctrine of mutual rights and 
 obligations. Such a society, of course, requires definite 
 assent to a certain amount of restraint, which must take 
 the form of "law." The man who refuses to live in ac- 
 cordance with this, after it has been duly agreed upon, is 
 an outlaw, and cannot be called "civilized" in any right 
 sense of that term. 
 
 Civilization in the larger group, where the nation or 
 State is the individual, is essentially the same. Human 
 progress had not gone very far when it was clearly real- 
 ized that continued progress was possible only as indi- 
 vidual States would recognize a theory of mutual rights 
 and obligations in their relations with each other. A 
 "jus gentium" began to grow up in the Mediterranean 
 basin, where civilization achieved its earlier growth, and 
 the best moral sentiment in all nations began to condemn 
 as imperfectly civilized, even by the crude standards of 
 that day, any individual nation which deliberately and 
 knowingly violated this "jus gentium," or Law of Na- 
 tions. And from the days of the Greeks and Romans 
 until to-day, that feeling of condemnation has been 
 strongest wherever and whenever the roots of a really 
 sound moral and intelligent civilization have struck deep- 
 est. 
 
 President Wilson undoubtedly expressed the 
 sentiment of the great majority of the American 
 people when he said : 
 
 We want no nation's property; we wish to question 
 no nation's honor; we wish to stand selfishly in the way 
 of the development of no nation ; we want nothing that 
 we cannot get by our own legitimate enterprise and by 
 the inspiration of our own example; and standing for 
 these things, it is not pretension on our part to say that 
 we are privileged to stand for what every nation would 
 
Acting as Mandatory of Civilisation 345 
 
 wish to stand for, and speak for those things which all 
 humanity must desire. 
 
 It is entirely apropos from the lips of our uni- 
 versally esteemed President. He secured the re- 
 peal of the tolls-exemption provisions of the Pan- 
 ama Canal Act and thus restored our plighted 
 word embodied in the Hay-Pauncefote treaty. 
 He has negotiated a treaty with Colombia which 
 makes reparation to that country for a wrong 
 done by a former Administration. He is putting 
 into practice what he, as the spokesman of the 
 American people, preaches as their exalted aim. 
 
 The United States took the Canal Zone by force 
 and, in so doing, despoiled Colombia of her most 
 valuable province. This done, she proceeded to 
 despoil collective civilization of its inherent right 
 to a non-discriminating and reasonable charge 
 for the commercial use of the Panama Canal. 
 In repealing the tolls-exemption provisions of the 
 Panama Canal Act she abandoned the projected 
 spoliation of collective civilization. If the Sen- 
 ate ratifies the pending treaty negotiated with 
 Colombia, our Government will have made some 
 reparation to that Republic for the province our 
 agent wrested from her. 
 
 The voluntary repeal of the tolls-exemption 
 provision of the Panama Canal Act was credit- 
 
346 America and the Canal Title 
 
 able. But Great Britain was strong, Colombia 
 is weak. Reparation to Colombia will be more 
 creditable. It will restore our national honor and 
 will vindicate our claim to be guided by exalted 
 moral purpose. 
 
 When Wilson became President, he found our 
 national honor in pawn — twice pawned. One 
 ticket has been redeemed. The tolls-exemption 
 provision of the Panama Canal Act has been re- 
 pealed. Let us redeem the other ticket. It can 
 be done by making substantial reparation to 
 Colombia. This done, the United States will 
 start the new era of world-history, which will 
 follow the war, with a clean slate. President 
 Wilson has done his part. He is a President 
 whom all Americans of high character delight to 
 honor, to whom the crowned heads of Europe 
 doff their hat, and in whom Spanish- America has 
 reposed confidence. Let us cooperate with him 
 to secure some measure of justice to Colombia by 
 inducing our Senate to ratify the treaty negoti- 
 ated with Colombia, dated Bogota, April 6, 1914. 
 If the American people can be sufficiently inter- 
 ested to inform themselves concerning the manner 
 in which we secured the Canal rights that we pos- 
 sess, they will repudiate the duplicity, cunning and 
 arrogance whereby they were secured and, being 
 
Acting as Mandatory, of Civilization 347 
 
 sound of heart and steadfast of soul, they will 
 make adequate reparation to Colombia. That 
 will be acting as the mandatory of civilization. 
 
 Henry W. Hall, staif correspondent of the New 
 York World, stated in his testimony before the 
 House Committee on Foreign Relations : 
 
 I have seen the whole face of the Isthmus changed by 
 the labor of American Army engineers, who are building 
 the Panama Canal. It is the greatest piece of engineer- 
 ing work ever accomplished anywhere in the world, and 
 it is being done in a manner which reflects the utmost 
 credit upon Colonel Goethals and everybody who is con- 
 nected with it. The Panama Canal, the great American 
 highway through which ships of all nations will soon 
 carry the commerce of the world, stands for all time as 
 a monument to the constructive genius of the American 
 people. It is a thing to be proud of; an achievement 
 wherein the people of this country have succeeded after 
 others have failed. It should be without stain. It 
 should be bom into its usefulness and given to the com- 
 merce of the world without the bar sinister of rape and 
 lawlessness. 
 
 The writer is convinced that whenever the 
 United States is ready to admit the truth, to pro- 
 mulgate the truth, and to deal with Colombia on 
 a basis of truth and law, the differences between 
 the two countries will be satisfactorily composed. 
 In the White House is a just man, an honest man, 
 a truthful man, and a wise man. He has done his 
 duty. The Colombian Government has negoti- 
 ated with his Administration a treaty to compose 
 
348 America and the Canal Title 
 
 their dififerences with us. The Colombian Con- 
 gress has ratified it. It is now only necessary for 
 our Senate to ratify this treaty to reestablish 
 friendly relations with Colombia. Will our Sen- 
 ate do its duty? 
 
 Until it does Spanish-America inaudibly says 
 to us : We will have faith in you only when you 
 yourselves restore to us the lost grounds which 
 made possible such faith. In order to do this you 
 must repent as a nation, and bring forth fruits 
 meet for repentance. 
 
 Ungrudging disavowal of "I took the Canal 
 Zone" is fruit meet for repentance if accompanied 
 by unstinted compensation to Colombia for loss 
 suffered. This done, Spanish-America will re- 
 store to us the legacy of faith-keeping which is 
 the ideal of all Americans of high character. 
 Reparation to Colombia would be an act becoming 
 a mandatory of civilization. 
 
APPENDICES 
 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S MESSAGE 
 TO CONGRESS — DECEMBER 7, 1903 
 
 By the act of June 28, 1902, the Congress authorized 
 the President to enter into treaty with Colombia for the 
 building of the canal across the Isthmus of Panama; it 
 being provided that in the event of failure to secure such 
 treaty after the lapse of a reasonable time, recourse should 
 be had to building a canal through Nicaragua. It has not 
 been necessary to consider this alternative, as I am en- 
 abled to lay before the Senate a treaty providing for the 
 building of the canal across the Isthmus of Panama. 
 This was the route which commended itself to the de- 
 liberate judgment of the Congress, and we can now ac- 
 quire by treaty the right to construct the canal over this 
 route. The question now, therefore, is not by which 
 route the Isthmian Canal shall be built, for that question 
 has been definitely and irrevocably decided. The ques- 
 tion is simply whether or not we shall have an Isthmian 
 Canal. 
 
 When the Congress directed that we should take the 
 Panama route under treaty with Colombia, the essence 
 of the condition, of course, referred not to the govern- 
 ment which controlled that route, but to the route itself ; 
 to the territory across which the route lay, not to the 
 
 351 
 
352 Appendices 
 
 name which for the moment the territory bore on the map. 
 The purpose of the law was to authorize the President 
 to make a treaty with the power in actual control of the 
 Isthmus of Panama. This purpose has been fulfilled. 
 
 In the year 1846 this Government entered into a treaty 
 with New Granada,- the predecessor upon the Isthmus of 
 the Republic of Colombia and of the present Republic 
 of Panama, by which treaty it was provided that the Gov- 
 ernment and citizens of the United States should always 
 have free and open right of way or transit across the 
 Isthmus of Panama by any modes of communication that 
 might be constructed, while in return our Government 
 guaranteed the perfect neutrality of the above-mentioned 
 Isthmus with the view that the free transit from the one 
 to the other sea might not- be interrupted or embarrassed. 
 The treaty vested in the United States a substantial prop- 
 erty right carved out of the rights of sovereignty and 
 property which New Granada then had and possessed 
 over the said territory. The name of New Granada has 
 passed away and its territory has been divided. Its suc- 
 cessor, the Government of Colombia, has ceased to own 
 any property in the Isthmus. A new republic, that of 
 Panama, which was at one time a sovereign state, and at 
 another time a mere department of the successive con- 
 federations known as New Granada and Colombia, has 
 now succeeded to the rights which first one and then the 
 other formerly exercised over the Isthmus. But as long 
 as the Isthmus endures, the mere geographical fact of 
 its existence, and the peculiar interest therein which is 
 required by our position, perpetuate the solemn contract 
 which binds the holders of the territory to respect our 
 
Appendices 353 
 
 right to freedom of transit across it, and binds us in re- 
 turn to safeguard for the Isthmus and the world the ex- 
 ercise of that inestimable privilege. The true interpreta- 
 tion of the obligations upon which the United States 
 entered in this Treaty of 1846 has been given repeatedly 
 in the utterances of Presidents and Secretaries of State. 
 Secretary Cass in 1858 officially stated the position of this 
 Government as follows : 
 
 The progress of events has rendered the inter-oceanic route 
 across the narrow portion of Central America vastly important to 
 the commercial world, and especially to the United States, whose 
 possessions extend along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, and de- 
 mand the speediest and easiest modes of communication. While 
 the rights of sovereignty of the states occupying this region should 
 always be respected, we shall expect that these rights be exercised 
 in a spirit befitting the occasion and the wants and circumstances 
 that have arisen. Sovereignty has its duties as well as its rights, 
 and none of these local governments, even if administered with 
 more regard to the just demands of other nations than they have 
 been, would be permitted, in a spirit of Eastern isolation, to close 
 the gates of intercourse on the great highways of the world, and 
 justify the act by the pretension that these avenues of trade and 
 travel belong to them and that they choose to shut thern, or, what 
 is almost equivalent, to encumber them with such unjust relations 
 as would prevent their general use. 
 
 Seven years later, in 1865, Mr. Seward in different 
 communications took the following position : 
 
 The United States have taken and will take no interest in any 
 question of internal revolution in the State of Panama, or any 
 State of the United States of Colombia, but will maintain a per- 
 fect neutrality in connection with such domestic altercations. The 
 United States will, nevertheless, hold themselves ready to protect 
 the transit trade across the Isthmus against invasion of either 
 domestic or foreign disturbers of the peace of the State of Pan- 
 ama. . . . Neither the text nor the spirit of the stipulation in that 
 article by which the United States engages to preserve the neu^ 
 
354 Appendices 
 
 trality of the Isthmus of Panama imposes an obligation on this 
 Government to comply with the requisition [of the President of 
 the United States of Colombia for a force to protect the Isthmus 
 of Panama from a body of insurgents of that country]. The pur- 
 pose of the stipulation was to guarantee the Isthmus against 
 seizure or invasion by a foreign power only. 
 
 Attorney-General Speed, under date of November 7, 
 1865, advised Secretary Seward as follows: 
 
 From this treaty it cannot be supposed that New Granada in- 
 vited the United States to become a party to the intestine troubles 
 of that government, nor did the United States become bound to 
 take sides in the domestic broils of New Granada. The United 
 States did guarantee New Granada in the sovereignty and prop- 
 erty over the territory. This was as against other and foreign 
 governments. ' 
 
 For four hundred years, ever since shortly after the 
 discovery of this hemisphere, the canal across the Isthmus 
 has been planned. For two score years it has been worked 
 at. When made it is to last for the ages. It is to alter 
 the geography of a continent and the trade routes of the 
 world. We have shown by every treaty we have nego- 
 tiated or attempted to negotiate with the peoples in con- 
 trol of the Isthmus and with foreign nations in reference 
 thereto our consistent good faith in observing our ob- 
 ligations ; on the one hand to the peoples of the Isthmus, 
 and on the other hand to the civilized world whose com- 
 mercial rights we are safeguarding and guaranteeing by 
 our action. We have done our duty to others in letter 
 and in spirit, and we have shown the utmost forbearance 
 in exacting our own rights. 
 
 Last spring, under the act above referred to, a treaty 
 concluded between the representatives of the Republic 
 of Colombia and of our Government was ratified by the 
 
Appendices 355 
 
 Senate. This treaty was entered into at the urgent solici- 
 tation of the people of Colombia and after a body of 
 experts appointed by our Government especially to go into 
 the matter of the routes across the Isthmus had pro- 
 nounced unanimously in favor of the Panama route. In 
 drawing up this treaty every concession was made to the 
 people and to the Government of Colombia. We were 
 more than just in dealing with them. Our generosity 
 was such as to make it a serious question whether we had 
 not gone too far in their interest at the expense of our 
 own ; for in our scrupulous desire to pay all possible heed, 
 not merely to the real but even to the fancied rights of 
 our weaker neighbor, who already owed so much to our 
 protection and forbearance, we yielded in all possible ways 
 to her desires in drawing up the treaty. Nevertheless 
 the Government of Colombia not merely repudiated the 
 treaty, but repudiated it in such manner as to make it 
 evident by the time the Colombian Congress adjourned 
 that not the scantiest hope remained of ever getting a 
 satisfactory treaty from them. The Government of Co- 
 lombia made the treaty, and yet when the Colombian 
 Congress was called to ratify it the vote against ratifica- 
 tion was unanimous. It does not appear that the govern- 
 ment made any real effort to secure ratification. 
 
 Immediately after the adjournment of the Congress a 
 revolution broke out in Panama. The people of Panama 
 had long been discontented with the Republic of Colom- 
 bia, and they had been kept quiet only by the prospect 
 of the conclusion of the treaty, which was to them a 
 matter of vital concern. When it became evident that 
 the treaty was hopelessly lost, the people of Panama rose 
 
356 Appendices 
 
 literally as one man. Not a shot was fired by a single 
 man on the Isthmus in the interest of the Colombian 
 Government. Not a life was lost in the accomplishment 
 of the revolution. The Colombian troops stationed on 
 the Isthmus, who had long been unpaid, made common 
 cause with the people of Panama, and with astonishing 
 unanimity the new republic was started. The duty of 
 the United States in the premises was clear. In strict 
 accordance with the principles laid down by Secretaries 
 Cass and Seward in the official documents above quoted, 
 the United States gave notice that it would permit the 
 landing of no expeditionary force, the arrival of which 
 would mean chaos and destruction along the line of the 
 railroad and of the proposed canal, and an interruption 
 of transit as an inevitable consequence. The de facto 
 Government of Panama was recognized in the following 
 telegram to Mr. Ehrman : 
 
 The people of Panama have, by apparently unanimous move- 
 ment, dissolved their political connection with the Republic of 
 Colombia and resumed their independence. When you are satis- 
 fied that a de facto government, republican in form and without 
 substantial opposition from its own people, has been established in 
 the State of Panama, you will enter into relations with it as the 
 responsible government of the territory and look to it for all due 
 action to protect the persons and property of citizens of the 
 United States and to keep open the Isthmian transit, in accordance 
 with the obligations of existing treaties governing the relations 
 of the United States to that territory. 
 
 The Government of Colombia was notified of our action 
 by the following telegram to Mr. Beaupre: 
 
 The people of Panama having, by an apparently unanimous 
 movement, dissolved their political connection with the Republic 
 of Colombia and resumed their independence, and having adopted 
 
Appendices 357 
 
 a government of their own, republican in form, with which the 
 Government of the United States of America has entered into re- 
 lations, the President of the United States, in accordance with the 
 ties of friendship which have so long and so happily existed be- 
 tween the respective nations, most earnestly commends to the Gov- 
 ernments of Colombia and of Panama the peaceful and equitable 
 settlement of all questions at issue between them. He holds that 
 he is bound not merely by treaty obligations, but by the interests 
 of civilization, to see that the peaceful traffic of the world across 
 the Isthmus of Panama shall not longer be disturbed by a con- 
 stant succession of unnecessary and wasteful wars. 
 
 When these events happened, fifty-seven years had 
 elapsed since the United States had entered into its treaty 
 with New Granada. During that time the Governments 
 of New Granada and of its successor, Colombia, have 
 been in a constant state of flux. The following is a 
 partial list of the disturbances on the Isthmus of Panama 
 during the period in question, as reported to us by our 
 consuls. It is not possible to give a complete list, and 
 some of the reports that speak of "revolutions" must 
 mean unsuccessful revolutions. 
 
 May 22, 1850. — Outbreak; two Americans killed. 
 War vessel demanded to quell outbreak. 
 
 October, 1850. — Revolutionary plot to bring about in- 
 dependence of the Isthmus. 
 
 July 22, 1851. — Revolution in four Southern provinces. 
 
 November 14, 1851. — Outbreak at Qiagres. Man-of- 
 war requested for Chagres. 
 
 June 27, 1853. — Insurrection at Bogota, and consequent 
 disturbance on Isthmus. War vessel demanded. 
 
 May 23, 1854. — Political disturbances; war vessel re- 
 quested. 
 
 June 28, 1854. — ^Attempted revolution. 
 
358 Appendices 
 
 October 24, 1854. — Independence of Isthmus demanded 
 by provincial legislature. 
 
 April, 1856. — Riot, and massacre of Americans. 
 
 May 4, 1856. — Riot. 
 
 May 18, 1856.— Riot. 
 
 June 3, 1856. — Riot. 
 
 October 2, 1856. — Conflict between two native parties. 
 United States forces landed. 
 
 December 18, 1858. — Attempted secession of Panama. 
 
 April, 1859. — Riots. 
 
 September, i860. — Outbreak. 
 
 October 4, i860. — Landing of United States forces in 
 consequence. 
 
 May 23, 1861. — Intervention of the United States forces 
 required, by intendente. 
 
 October 2, 1861. — Insurrection and civil war. 
 
 April 4, 1862. — Measures to prevent rebels crossing 
 Isthmus. 
 
 June 13, 1862. — Mosquera's troops refused admittance 
 to Panama. 
 
 March, 1865. — Revolution, and United States troops 
 landed. \ 
 
 August, 1865. — Riots; unsuccessful attempt to invade 
 Panama. 
 
 March, 1866. — Unsuccessful revolution. 
 
 April, 1867. — ^Attempt to overthrow Government. 
 
 August, 1867. — Attempt at revolution. 
 
 July 5, 1868. — Revolution; provisional government in- 
 augurated. 
 
 August 29, 1868. — Revolution ; provisional government 
 overthrown. 
 
Appendices 359 
 
 April, 1871. — Revolution; followed apparently by 
 counter revolution. 
 
 April, 1873. — Revolution and civil war which lasted 
 to October, 1875. 
 
 August, 1876. — Civil war which lasted until April, 
 1877. 
 
 July, 1878.— Rebellion. 
 
 December, 1878. — Revolt. 
 
 April, 1879. — Revolution. 
 
 June, 1879. — Revolution. 
 
 March, 18^3.— Riot. 
 
 May, 1883.— Riot. 
 
 June, 1884. — Revolutionary attempt. 
 
 December, 1884. — Revolutionary attempt. 
 
 January, 1885. — Revolutionary disturbances. 
 
 March, 1885. — Revolution. 
 
 April, 1887. — Disturbance on Panama Railroad. 
 
 November, 1887. — Disturbance on line of canal. 
 
 January, 1889. — Riot. 
 
 January, 1895. — Revolution which lasted until April. 
 
 March, 1895. — Incendiary attempt. 
 
 October, 1899. — Revolution. 
 
 February, 1900, to July, 1900. — Revolution. 
 
 January, 1901. — Revolution. 
 
 July, 1901. — Revolutionary disturbances. 
 
 September, 1901. — City of Colon taken by rebels. 
 
 March, 1902. — Revolutionary disturbances. 
 
 July, 1902. — Revolution. 
 
 The above is only a partial list of the revolutions, re- 
 bellions, insurrections, riots, and other outbreaks that have 
 occurred during the period in question ; yet they number 
 
360 Appendices 
 
 53 for the 57 years. It will be noted that one of them 
 lasted for nearly three years before it was quelled, another 
 for nearly a year. In short, the experience of over half 
 a century has shown Colombia to be utterly incapable of 
 keeping order on the Isthmus. Only the active inter- 
 ference of the United States has enabled her to preserve 
 so much as a semblance of sovereignty. Had it not been 
 for the exercise by the United States of the police power 
 in her interest, her connection with the Isthmus would 
 have been sundered long ago. In 1856, in i860, in 1873, 
 in 1885, in 1901, and again in 1902, sailors and marines 
 from United States warships were forced to land in order 
 to patrol the Isthmus, to protect life and property, and 
 to see that the transit across the Isthmus was kept open. 
 In 1861, in 1862, in 1885, and in 1900, the Colombian 
 Government asked that the United States Government 
 land troops to protect its interests and maintain order on 
 the Isthmus. Perhaps the most extraordinary request is 
 that which has just been received and which runs as fol- 
 lows: 
 
 Knowing that revolution has already commenced in Panama [an 
 eminent Colombian] says that if the Government of the United 
 States will land troops to preserve Colombian sovereignty, and 
 the transit, if requested by Colombian charge d'affaires, tliis gov- 
 ernment will declare martial law; and, by virtue of vested con- 
 stitutional authority, when public order is disturbed, will approve 
 by decree the ratification of the canal treaty as signed ; or, if the 
 Government of the United States prefers, will call extra session 
 of the Congress — ^with new and friendly members — next May to 
 approve the treaty. [An eminent Colombian] has the perfect con- 
 fidence of vice-president, he says, and if it became necessary will 
 go to the Isthmus or send representative there to adjust matters 
 along above lines to the satisfaction of tlie people there. 
 
 This dispatch is noteworthy from two standpoints. 
 
Appendices 361 
 
 Its offer of immediately guaranteeing the treaty to us 
 is in sharp contrast with the positive and contemptuous 
 refusal of the Congress which has just closed its sessions 
 to consider favorably such a treaty ; it shows that the gov- 
 ernment which made the treaty really had absolute con- 
 trol over the situation, but did not choose to exercise this 
 control. The dispatch further calls on us to restore order 
 and secure Colombian supremacy in the Isthmus from 
 which the Colombian Government has just by its action 
 decided to bar us by preventing the construction of the 
 canal. 
 
 The control, in the interest of the commerce and trafific 
 of the whole civilized world, of the means of undisturbed 
 transit across the Isthmus of Panama has become of 
 transcendent importance to the United States. We have 
 repeatedly exercised this control by intervening in the 
 course of domestic dissension, and by protecting tbe ter- 
 ritory from foreign invasion. In 1853 Mr. Everett as- 
 sured the Peruvian minister that we should not hesitate 
 to maintain the neutrality of the Isthmus in the case of 
 war between Peru and Colombia. In 1864 Colombia, 
 which has always been vigilant to avail itself of its 
 privileges conferred by the treaty, expressed its expecta- 
 tion that in the event of war between Peru and Spain the 
 United States would carry into effect the guarantee of 
 neutrality. There have been few administrations of the 
 State Department in which this treaty has not, either by 
 the one side or the other, been used as a basis of more 
 or less important demands. It was said by Mr. Fish in 
 1871 that the Department of State had reason to believe 
 that an attack upon Colombian sovereignty on the Isthmus 
 
362 Appendices 
 
 had, on several occasions, been averted by vfaming from 
 this Government. In 1886, when Colombia was under the 
 menace of hostilities from Italy in the Cerruti case, Mr. 
 Bayard expressed the serious concern that the United 
 States could not but feel that a European power should 
 resort to force against a sister republic of this hemi- 
 sphere, as to the sovereign and uninterrupted use of a 
 part of whose territory we are guarantors under the 
 solemn faith of a treaty. 
 
 The above recital of facts establishes beyond question : 
 First, that the United States has for over half a century 
 patiently and in good faith carried out its obligations 
 under the Treaty of 1846; second, that when for the first 
 time it became possible for Colombia to do an)rthing in 
 requital of the services thus repeatedly rendered to it 
 for fifty-seven years by the United States, the Colombian 
 Government peremptorily and offensively refused thus to 
 do its part, even though to do so would have been to its 
 advantage and immeasurably to the advantage of the 
 State of Panama, at that time under its jurisdiction; 
 third, that throughout this period revolutions, riots, and 
 factional disturbances of every kind have occurred one 
 after the other in almost uninterrupted succession, some 
 of them lasting for months and even for years, while the 
 central government was unable to put them down or to 
 make peace with the rebels; fourth, that these disturb- 
 ances instead of showing any sign of abating have tended 
 to grow more numerous and more serious in the im- 
 mediate past ; fifth, that the control of Colombia over the 
 Isthmus of Panama could not be maintained without the 
 armed intervention and assistance of the United States. 
 
Appendices 363 
 
 In other words, the Government of Colombia, though 
 wholly unable to maintain order on the Isthmus, has 
 nevertheless declined to ratify a treaty the conclusion of 
 which opened the only chance to secure its own stability 
 and to guarantee permanent peace on, and the construc- 
 tion of a canal across, the Isthmus. 
 
 Under such circumstances, the Government of the 
 United States would have been guilty of folly and weak- 
 ness, amounting in their sum to a crime against the Na- 
 tion, had it acted otherwise than it did when the revolu- 
 tion of November 3 last took place in Panama. This 
 great enterprise of building the interoceanic canal can not 
 be held up to gratify the whims, or out of respect to the 
 governmental impotence, or to the even more sinister and 
 evil political peculiarities, of people who, though they 
 dwell afar off, yet, against the wish of the actual dwellers 
 on the Isthmus, assert an unreal supremacy over the ter- 
 ritory. The possession of a territory fraught with such 
 peculiar capacities as the Isthmus in question carries with 
 it obligations to mankind. The course of events has 
 shown that this canal can not be built by private enter- 
 prise, or by any other nation than our own; therefore it 
 must be built by the United States. 
 
 Every effort has been made by the Government of the 
 United States to persuade Colombia to follow a course 
 which was essential not only to our interests and to the 
 interests of the world, but to the interests of Colombia 
 itself. These efforts have failed; and Colombia, by her 
 persistence in repulsing the advances that have been made, 
 has forced us, for the sake of our own honor, and of the 
 interest and well-being, not merely of our own people, 
 
364 Appendices 
 
 but of the people of the Isthmus of Panama and the 
 people of the civilized countries of the world, to take 
 decisive steps to bring to an end a condition of affairs 
 which had become intolerable. The new Republic of 
 Panama immediately offered to negotiate a treaty with 
 us. This treaty I herewith submit. By it our interests 
 are better safeguarded than in the treaty with Colombia 
 which was ratified by the Senate at its last session. It 
 is better in its terms than the treaties offered to us by the 
 Republics of Nicaragua and Costa Rica. At last the 
 right to begin this great undertaking is made available. 
 Panama has done her part. All that remains is for the 
 American Congress to do its part and forthwith this Re- 
 public will enter upon the execution of a project colossal 
 in its size and of well-nigh incalculable possibilities for 
 the good of this country and the nations of mankind. 
 
 By the provisions of the treaty the United States 
 guarantees and will maintain the independence of the 
 Republic of Panama. There is granted to the United 
 States in .perpetuity the use, occupation, and control of 
 a strip ten miles wide and extending three nautical miles 
 into the sea at either terminal, with all lands lying out- 
 side of the zone necessary for the construction of the 
 canal or for its auxiliary works, and with the islands in 
 the Bay of Panama. The cities of Panama and Colon 
 are not embraced in the canal zone, but the United States 
 assumes their sanitation and, in case of need, the main- 
 tenance of order therein ; the United States enjoys within 
 the granted limits all the rights, power, and authority 
 which it would possess were it the sovereign of the ter- 
 ritory to the exclusion of the exercise of sovereign rights 
 
Appendices 365 
 
 by the republic. All railway and canal property rights 
 belonging to Panama and needed for the canal pass to 
 the United States, including any property of the respec- 
 tive companies in the cities of Panama and Colon; the 
 works, property, and personnel of the canal and railways 
 are exempted from taxation as well in the cities of 
 Panama and Colon as in the canal zone and its depend- 
 encies. Free immigration of the personnel and importa- 
 tion of supplies for the construction and operation of the 
 canal are granted. Provision is made for the use of mili- 
 tary force and the building of fortifications by the United 
 States for the protection of the transit. In other details, 
 particularly as to the acquisition of the interests of the 
 New Panama Canal Company and the Panama Railway 
 by the United States and the condemnation of private 
 property for the uses of the canal, the stipulations of the 
 Hay-Herran treaty are closely followed, while the com- 
 pensation to be given for these enlarged grants remains 
 the same, being ten millions of dollars payable on ex- 
 change of ratifications; and, beginning nine years from 
 that date, an annual payment of $250,000 during the life 
 of the convention. 
 
II ' 
 
 PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S MESSAGE TO THE 
 CONGRESS— JANUARY 4, 1904- 
 
 I lay before the Congress for its information a state- 
 ment of my action up to this time in executing the act 
 entitled "An act to provide for the construction of a canal 
 connecting the waters of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans," 
 approved June 28, 1902. 
 
 By the said act the President was authorized to secure 
 for the United States the property of the Panama Canal 
 Company and the perpetual control of a 'strip six miles 
 wide across the Isthmus of Panama. It was further 
 provided that "should the President be unable to obtain 
 for the United States a satisfactory title to the property 
 of the New Panama Canal Company and the control of 
 the necessary territory of the Republic of Colombia . . . 
 within a reasonable time and upon reasonable terms, then 
 the President" should endeavor to provide for a canal by 
 the Nicaragua route. The language quoted defines with 
 exactness and precision what was to be done, and what as 
 a matter of fact has been done. The President was 
 authorized to go to the Nicaragua route only if within a 
 reasonable time he could not obtain "control of the nec- 
 essary territory of the Republic of Colombia." This con- 
 trol has now been obtained ; the provision of the act has 
 
 366 
 
Appendices 367 
 
 been complied with ; it is no longer possible under exist- 
 ing legislation to go to the Nicaragua route as an alterna- 
 tive. 
 
 This act marked the climax of the effort on the part 
 of the United States to secure, so far as legislation was 
 concerned, an interoceanic canal across the Isthmus. The 
 effort to secure a treaty for this purpose with one of the 
 Central American republics did not stand on the same 
 footing with the effort to secure a treaty under any 
 ordinary conditions. The proper position for the United 
 States to assume in reference to this canal, and there- 
 fore to the governments of the Isthmus, had been clearly 
 set forth by Secretary Cass in 1858. In my Annual Mes- 
 sage I have already quoted what Secretary Cass said ; but 
 I repeat the quotation here, because the principle it states 
 is fundamental: 
 
 While the rights of sovereignty of the States occupying this re- 
 gion (Central America) should always be respected, we shall ex- 
 pect that these rights be exercised in a spirit befitting the oc- 
 casion and the wants and circumstances that have arisen. 
 Sovereignty has its duties as well as its rights, and none. of these 
 local governments, even if administered with more regard to 
 the just demands of other nations than they have been, would be 
 permitted, in a spirit of Eastern isolation, to close the gates of 
 intercourse on the great highways of the world, and justify the 
 act by the pretension that these avenues of trade and travel be- 
 long to them and that they choose to shut ihem, or, what is al- 
 most equivalent, to encumber them with such unjust relations 
 as would prevent their general use. 
 
 The principle thus enunciated by Secretary Cass was 
 sound then and it is sound now. The United States has 
 taken the position that no other government is to build 
 the canal. In 1889, when France proposed to come to the 
 aid of the French Panama Company by guaranteeing their 
 
368 Appendices 
 
 bonds, the Senate of the United States in executive ses- 
 sion, with only some three votes dissenting, passed a reso- 
 lution as follows: 
 
 That the Government of the United States will look with 
 serious concern and disapproval upon any connection of any Euro- 
 pean government with the construction or control of any ship 
 canal across the Isthmus of Darien or across Central America, 
 and must regard any such connection or control as injurious to 
 the just rights and interests of the United States and as a menace 
 to their welfare. 
 
 Under the Hay-Pauncefote treaty it was explicitly 
 provided that the United States should control, police, 
 and protect the canal which was to be built, keeping it 
 open for the vessels of all nations on equal terms. The 
 United States thus assumed the position of guarantor 
 of the canal and of its peaceful use by all the world. 
 The guarantee included as a matter of course the build- 
 ing of the canal. The enterprise was recognized as re- 
 sponding to an international need; and it would be the 
 veriest travesty on right and justice to treat the govern- 
 ments in possession of the Isthmus as having the right, 
 in the language of Mr. Cass, "to close the gates of in- 
 tercourse on the great highways of the world, and justify 
 the act by the pretension that these avenues of trade and 
 travel belong to them and that they choose to shut them." 
 
 When this Government submitted to Colombia the Hay- 
 Herran treaty three things were, therefore, already set- 
 tled. 
 
 One was that the canal should be built. The time for 
 delay, the time for permitting the attempt to be made by 
 private enterprise, the time for permitting any govern- 
 ment of anti-social spirit and of imperfect development 
 
V 
 
 Appendices 369 
 
 to bar the work, was past. The United States had as- 
 sumed in connection with the canal certain responsibilities 
 not only to its own people, but to the civilized world, 
 which imperatively demanded that there should no longer 
 be delay in beginning the work. 
 
 Second. While it was settled that the canal should be 
 built without unnecessary or improper delay, it was no 
 less clearly shown to be our purpose to deal not merely 
 in a spirit of justice but in a spirit of generosity with 
 the people through whose land we might build it. The 
 Hay-Herran treaty, if it erred at all, erred in the direc- 
 tion of an overgenerosity toward the Colombian Govern- 
 ment. In our anxiety to be fair we had gone to the very 
 verge in yielding to a weak nation's demands what that 
 nation was helplessly unable to enforce from us against 
 our will. The only criticisms made upon the Administra- 
 tion for the terms of the Hay-Herran treaty were for 
 having granted too much to Colombia, not for failure to 
 grant enough. Neither in the Congress nor in the public 
 press, at the time that this treaty was formulated, was 
 there complaint that it did not in the fullest and amplest 
 manner guarantee to Colombia everything that she could 
 by any color of title demand. 
 
 Nor is the fact to be lost sight of that the rejected 
 treaty, while generously responding to the pecuniary de- 
 mands of Colombia, in other respects merely provided 
 for the construction of the canal in conformity with the 
 express requirements of the act of the Congress of June 
 28, 1902. By that act, as heretofore quoted, the Presi- 
 dent was authorized to acquire from Colombia, for the 
 purposes of the canal, "perpetual control" of a certain 
 
370 Appendices 
 
 strip of land; and it was expressly required that the 
 "control" thus to be obtained should include "jurisdic- 
 tion" to make police and sanitary regulations and to es- 
 tablish such judicial tribunals as might be agreed on for 
 their enforcement. These were conditions precedent pre- 
 scribed by the Congress ; and for their fulfillment suitable 
 stipulations were embodied in the treaty. It has been 
 stated in public prints that Colombia objected to these 
 stipulations, on the ground that they involved a relinquish- 
 ment of her "sovereignty" ; but in the light of what has 
 taken place, this alleged objection must be considered as 
 an afterthought. In reality, the treaty, instead of re- 
 quiring a cession of Colombia's sovereignty over the canal 
 strip, expressly acknowledged, confirmed, and preserved 
 her sovereignty over it. The treaty in this respect simply 
 proceeded on the lines on which all the negotiations lead- 
 ing up to the present situation have been conducted. In 
 those negotiations the exercise by the United States, sub- 
 ject to the paramount rights of the local sovereign, of a 
 substantial control over the canal and the immediately 
 adjacent territory, has been treated as a fundamental part 
 of any arrangement that might be made. It has formed 
 an essential feature of all our plans, and its necessity is 
 fully recognized in the Hay-Pauncefote treaty. The 
 Congress, in providing that such control should be secured, 
 adopted no new principle, but only incorporated in its 
 legislation a condition the importance and propriety of 
 which were universally recognized. During all the years 
 of negotiation and discussion that preceded the conclusion 
 of the Hay-Herran treaty, Colombia never intimated that 
 the requirement by the United States of control over the 
 
Appendices 371 
 
 canal strip would render unattainable the construction of 
 a canal by way of the Isthmus of Panama ; nor were we 
 advised, during the months when legislation of 1902 was 
 pending before the Congress, that the terms which it 
 embodied would render negotiations with Colombia im- 
 practicable. It is plain that no nation could construct 
 and guarantee the neutrality of the canal with a less 
 degree of control than was stipulated for in the Hay- 
 Herran treaty. A refusal to grant such degree of con- 
 trol was necessarily a refusal to make any practicable 
 treaty at all. Such refusal therefore squarely raised the 
 question whether Colombia was entitled to bar the transit 
 of the world's traffic across the Isthmus. 
 
 That the canal itself was eagerly demanded by the 
 people of the locality through which it was to pass, and 
 that the people of this locality no less eagerly longed for 
 its construction under American control, are shown by 
 the unanimity of action in the new Panama Republic. 
 Furthermore, Colombia, after having rejected the treaty 
 in spite of our protests and warnings when it was in her 
 power to accept it, has since shown the utmost eagerness 
 to accept the same treaty if only the status quo could be 
 restored. One of the men standing highest in the official 
 circles of Colombia, on November 6, addressed the Ameri- 
 can minister at Bogota, saying that if the Government of 
 the United States would land troops to preserve Colom- 
 bian sovereignty and the transit, the Colombian Govern- 
 ment would "declare martial law ; and, by virtue of vested 
 constitutional authority, when public order is disturbed, 
 [would] approve by decree the ratification of the canal 
 treaty as signed; or, if the Government of the United 
 
372 Appendices 
 
 States prefers, [would] call extra session of the Congress 
 — ■'With new and friendly members — next May to approve 
 the treaty." Having these facts in 'view, there is no 
 shadow of question that the Government of the United 
 States proposed a treaty which was not merely just, but 
 generous to Colombia, which our people regarded as 
 erring, if at all, on the side of overgenerosity ; which was 
 hailed with delight by the people of the immediate locality 
 through which the canal was to pass, who were most con- 
 cerned as to the new order of things, and which the 
 Colombian authorities now recognize as being so good 
 that they are willing to promise its unconditional ratifica- 
 tion if only we will desert those who have shown them- 
 selves our friends and restore to those who have shown 
 themselves unfriendly the power to undo what they did. 
 I pass by the question as to what assurance we have that 
 they would now keep their pledge and not again refuse 
 to ratify the treaty if they had the power ; for, of course, 
 I-^ill not for one moment discuss the possibility of the 
 United States committing an act of such baseness as to 
 abahdon the new Republic of Panama. 
 
 Third. Finally the Congress definitely settled where 
 the canal was to be built. It was provided that a treaty 
 should be made for building the canal across the Isthmus 
 of Panama; and if, after reasonable time, it proved im- 
 possible to secure such treaty, that then we should go to 
 Nicaragua. The treaty has been made; for it needs no 
 argument to show that the intent of the Congress was to 
 ensure a canal across Panama, and that whether the re- 
 pubUc granting the title was called New Granada, Colom- 
 bia, or Panama mattered not one whit. As events turned 
 
Appendices 373 
 
 out, the question of "reasonable time" did not enter into 
 the matter at all. Although, as the months went by, it 
 became increasingly improbable that the Colombian Con- 
 gress would ratify the treaty or take steps which would 
 be equivalent thereto, yet all chance for such action on 
 their part did not vanish until the Congress closed at the 
 end of October ; and within three days thereafter the rev- 
 olution in Panama had broken out. Panama became an 
 independent state, and the control of the territory neces- 
 sary for building the canal then became obtainable. The 
 condition under which alone we could have gone to Nica- 
 ragua thereby became impossible of fulfillment. If the 
 pending treaty with Panama should not be ratified by the 
 Senate this would not alter the fact that we could not go 
 to Nicaragua. The Congress has decided the route, and 
 there is no alternative under existing legislation. 
 
 When in August it began to appear probable that the 
 Colombian Legislature would not ratify the treaty, it be- 
 came incumbent upon me to consider well what the situa- 
 tion was and to be ready to advise the Congress as to what 
 were the various alternatives of action open to us. There 
 were several possibilities. One was that Colombia would 
 at the last moment see the unwisdom of her position. 
 That there might be nothing omitted. Secretary Hay, 
 through the minister at Bogota, repeatedly warned Colom- 
 bia that grave consequences might follow from her rejec- 
 tion of the treaty. Although it was a constantly diminish- 
 ing chance, yet the possibility of ratification did not wholly 
 pass away until the close of the session of the Colombian 
 Congress. 
 
 A second alternative was that by the close of the session 
 
374 Appendices 
 
 on the last day of October, without the ratification of the 
 treaty by Colombia and without any steps taken by 
 Panama, the American Congress on assembling early in 
 December would be confronted with a situation in which 
 there had been a failure to come to terms as to building 
 the canal along the Panama route, and yet there had not 
 been a lapse of reasonable time — using the word reason- 
 able in any proper sense — such as would justify the Ad- 
 ministration going to the Nicaragua route. This situa- 
 tion seemed, on the whole the most likely, and as a matter 
 of fact I had made the original draft of my Message to 
 the Congress with a view to its existence. 
 
 It was the opinion of eminent international jurists that 
 in view of the fact that the great design of our guarantee 
 under the treaty of 1846 was to dedicate the Isthmus to 
 the purposes of interoceanic transit, and above all to 
 secure the construction of an interoceanic canal, Colom- 
 bia could not under existing conditions refuse to enter 
 into a proper arrangement with the United States to that 
 end, without violating the spirit and substantially repudiat- 
 ing the obligations of a treaty the full benefits of which 
 she had enjoyed for over fifty years. My intention was 
 to consult the Congress as to whether under such cir- 
 cumstances it would not be proper to announce that the 
 canal was to be dug forthwith; that we would give the 
 terms that we had offered and no others ; and that if such 
 terms were not agreed to we would enter into an arrange- 
 ment with Panama direct, or take what other steps were 
 needful in order to begin the enterprise. 
 
 A third possibility was that the people of the Isthmus, 
 who had formerly constituted an independent state, and 
 
Appendices 375 
 
 who until recently were united to Colombia only by a 
 loose tie of federal relationship, might take the protec- 
 tion of their own vital interests into their own hands, 
 reassert their former rights, declare their independence 
 upon just grounds, and establish a government competent 
 and willing to do its share in this great work for civiliza- 
 tion. This third possibility is what actually occurred. 
 Every one knew that it was a possibility, but it was not 
 until toward the end of October that it appeared to be 
 an imminent probability. Although the Administration, 
 of course, had special means of knowledge, no such means 
 were necessary in order to appreciate the possibility, and 
 toward the end the likelihood, of such a revolutionary 
 outbreak and of its success. It was a matter of common 
 notoriety. Quotations from the daily papers could be 
 indefinitely multiplied to show this state of affairs ; a very 
 few will suffice. From Costa Rica on August 31a special 
 was sent to the Washington Post, running as follows : 
 
 San Jose, Costa Rica, 
 August 31 
 
 Travelers from Panama report the Isthmus alive with fires 
 of a new revolution. It is inspired, it is believed, by men who, 
 in Panama and Colon, have systematically engendered the pro- 
 American feeling to secure the building of the Isthmian Canal 
 by the United States. 
 
 The Indians have risen, and the late followers of Gen. Ben- 
 jamin Herrera are mustering in the mountain villages, prepara- 
 tory to joining in an organized revolt, caused by the rejection 
 of the canal treaty. 
 
 Hundreds of stacks of arms, confiscated by the Colombian Gov- 
 ernment at the close of the late revolution, have reappeared 
 from some mysterious source, and thousands of rifles that look 
 suspiciously like the Mausers the United States captured in Cuba 
 are issuing to the gathering forces from central points of dis- 
 tribution. With the arms goes ammunition, fresh from fac- 
 
2)7^ Appendices 
 
 tories, showing the movement is not spasmodic, but is carefully 
 planned. 
 
 The government forces in Panama and Colon, numbering less 
 than 1,500 men, are reported to be a little more than friendly 
 to the revolutionary spirit. They have been ill paid since the 
 revolution closed, and their only hope of prompt payment is 
 another war. 
 
 General Huertes, commander of the forces, who is ostensibly 
 loyal to the Bogota Government, is said to be secretly friendly 
 to the proposed revolution. At least, all his personal friends are 
 open in denunciation of the Bogota Government and the failure 
 of the Colombian Congress to ratify the canal treaty. 
 
 The consensus of opinion gathered from late arrivals from 
 the Isthmus is that the revolution is coming, and that it will suc- 
 ceed. 
 
 A special dispatch to the Washington Post, under date 
 of New York, September i, runs as follows: 
 
 B. G. Duque, editor and proprietor of the Panama Star and 
 Herald, a resident of the Isthmus during the past twenty-seven 
 years, who arrived to-day in New York, declared that if the canal 
 treaty fell through a revolution would be likely to follow. 
 
 "There is a very strong feeling in Panama," said Mr. Duque, 
 "that Colombia, in negotiating the sale of a canal concession in 
 Panama, is looking for profits that might just as well go to 
 Panama herself. 
 
 "The Colombian Government, only the other day, suppressed a 
 newspaper that dared to speak of independence for Panama. A 
 while ago there was a secret plan afoot to cut loose from Co- 
 lombia and seek the protection of the United States." 
 
 In the New York Herali of September lo the follow- 
 ing statement appeared : 
 
 Representatives of strong interests on the Isthmus of Panama, 
 who make their headquarters in this city, are considering a plan 
 of action to be undertaken in cooperation with men of similar 
 views in Panama and Colon to bring about a revolution and 
 form an independent government in Panama opposed to that in 
 Bogota. 
 
Appendices 377 
 
 There is much indignation on the Isthmus on account of the 
 failure of the canal treaty, which is ascribed to the authorities at 
 Bogota. This opinion is believed to be shared by a majority 
 of the Isthmians of all shades of political belief, and they think 
 it is to their best interest for a new republic to be formed on the 
 Isthmus, which may negotiate directly with the United States a 
 new treaty which will permit the digging of the Panama Canal 
 under favorable conditions. 
 
 In the New York Times, under date of September 13, 
 there appeared from Bogota the following statement : 
 
 A proposal made by Senor Perez y Sotos to ask the Executive 
 to appoint an anti-secessionist governor in Panama has been ap- 
 proved by the Senate. Speakers in the Senate said that Senor 
 Obaldia, who was recently appointed Governor of Panama, and 
 who is favorable to a canal treaty, was a menace to the national 
 integrity. Senator Marroquin protested against the action of the 
 Senate. 
 
 President Marroquin succeeded later in calming the Congress- 
 men. It appears that he was able to give them satisfactory rea- 
 sons for Governor Obaldia's appointment. He appears to realize 
 the imminent peril of the Isthmus of Panama declaring its in- 
 dependence. 
 
 Seiior Deroux, representative for a Panama constituency, re- 
 cently delivered a sensational speech in the House. Among other 
 things he said : 
 
 "In Panama the bishops, governors, magistrates, military chiefs, 
 and their subordinates have been and are foreign to the depart- 
 ment. It seems that the government, with surprising tenacity, 
 wishes to exclude the Isthmus from all participation in public af- 
 fairs. As regards international dangers in the Isthmus, all I can 
 say is that if these dangers exist they are due to the conduct of 
 the national government, which is in the direction of reaction. 
 
 "If the Colombian Government will not take action with a view 
 to preventing disaster, the responsibility will rest with it alone." 
 
 In the New York Herald of October 26 it was reported 
 that a revolutionary expedition of about 70 men had 
 actually landed on the Isthmus. In the Washington 
 Post of October 29 it was reported from Panama that in 
 
37^ Appendices 
 
 view of the impending trouble on the Isthmus the Bogota 
 Government had gathered troops in sufficient numbers to 
 at once put down an attempt at secession. In the New 
 York Herald of October 30 it was announced from 
 Panama that Bogota was hurrying troops to the Isthmus 
 to put down the projected revolt. In the New York 
 Herald of November 2 it was announced that in Bogota 
 the Congress had indorsed the energetic measures taken 
 to meet the situation on the Isthmus and that 6,000 men 
 were about to be sent thither. 
 
 Quotations like the above could be multiplied indefi- 
 nitely. Suffice it to say that it was notorious that revolu- 
 tionary trouble of a serious nature was impending upon 
 the Isthmus. But it was not necessary to rely exclusively 
 upon such general means of information. On October 
 15 Commander Hubbard, of the navy, notified the Navy 
 Department that, though things were quiet on the Isthmus, 
 a revolution had broken out in the State of Cauca. On 
 October 16, at the request of Lieutenant-General Young, 
 I saw Capt. C. B. Humphrey and Lieut. Grayson Mallet- 
 Prevost Murphy, who had just returned from a four 
 months' tour through the northern portions of Venezuela 
 and Colombia. They stopped in Panama on their return 
 in the latter part of September. At the time they were 
 sent down there had been no thought of their going to 
 Panama, and their visit to the Isthmus was but an un- 
 premeditated incident of their return journey; nor had 
 they been spoken to by any one at Washington regarding 
 the possibility of a revolt. Until they landed at Colon 
 they had no knowledge that a revolution was impending, 
 save what they had gained from the newspapers. What 
 
Appendices 379 
 
 they saw in Panama so impressed them that they reported 
 thereon to Lieutenant-/3^eneral Young, according to his 
 memorandum — 
 
 that while on the Isthmus they became satisfied beyond question 
 that, owing largely to the dissatisfaction because of the failure 
 of Colombia to ratify the Hay-Herran treaty, a revolutionary 
 party was in course of organization having for its object the 
 separation of the State of Panama from Colombia, the leader 
 being Dr. Richard Arango, a former governor of Panama; that 
 when they were on the Isthmus arms and ammunition were being 
 smuggled into the city of Colon in piano boxes, merchandise 
 crates, etc., the small arms received being principally the Gras 
 French rifle, the Remington, and the Mauser; that nearly every 
 citizen in Panama had some sort of rifle or gun in his possession, 
 with ammunition therefor ; that in the city of Panama there had 
 been organized a fire brigade which was really intended for a 
 revolutionary military organization; that there were representa- 
 tives of the revolutionary organization at all important points on 
 the Isthmus; that in Panama, Colon, and the other principal 
 places of the Isthmus police forces had been organized which 
 were in reality revolutionary forces ; that the people on the 
 Isthmus seemed to be unanimous in their sentiment against the 
 Bogota Government, and their disgust over the failure of that 
 government to ratify the treaty providing for the construction of 
 the canal, and that a revolution might be expected immediately 
 upon the adjournment of the Colombian Congress without rati- 
 fication of the treaty. 
 
 Lieutenant-General Young regarded their report as of 
 such importance as to make it advisable that I should 
 personally see these officers. They told me what they 
 had already reported to the Lieutenant-General, adding 
 that on the Isthmus the excitement was seething, and that 
 the Colombian troops were reported to be disaffected. 
 In response to a question of mine they informed me that 
 it was the general belief that the revolution might break 
 out at any moment, and if it did not happen before, would 
 
380 Appendices 
 
 doubtless take place immediately after the closing of the 
 Colombian Congress (at the end of October) if the canal 
 treaty were not ratified. They were certain that the revo- 
 lution would occur, and before leaving the Isthmus had 
 made their own reckoning as to the time, which they had 
 set down as being probably from three to four weeks 
 after their leaving. The reason they set this as the prob- 
 able inside limit of time was that they reckoned that it 
 would be at least three or four weeks — say not until 
 October 20 — ^before a sufficient quantity of arms and 
 munitions would have been landed. 
 
 In view of all these facts I directed the Navy Depart- 
 ment to issue instructions such as would ensure our hav- 
 ing ships within easy reach of the Isthmus in the event 
 of need arising. Orders were given on October 19 to 
 the Boston to proceed to San Juan del Sur, Nicaragua; 
 to the Dixie to prepare to sail from League Island; and 
 to the Atlanta to proceed to Guantanamo. On October 
 30 the Nashville was ordered to proceed to Colon. On 
 November 2, when, the Colombian Congress having ad- 
 journed, it was evident that the outbreak was imminent, 
 and when it was announced that both sides were making 
 ready forces whose meeting would mean bloodshed and 
 disorder, the Colombian troops having been embarked on 
 vessels, the following instructions were sent to the com- 
 manders of the Boston, Nashville, and Dixie: 
 
 Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interruption is 
 threatened by armed force, occupy the line of railroad. Prevent 
 landing of any armed force with hostile intent, either government 
 or insurgent, at any point within 50 miles of Panama. Govern- 
 ment force reported approaching the Isthmus in vessels. Pre- 
 vent their landing if, in your judgment, the landing would pre- 
 cipitate a conflict. 
 
Appendices 381 
 
 These orders were delivered in pursuance of the policy 
 on which our Government had repeatedly acted. This 
 policy was exhibited in the following orders, given under 
 somewhat similar circumstances last year, and the year 
 before, and the year before that. The first two tele- 
 grams are from the Department of State to the consul at 
 Panama : 
 
 July 25, igoo 
 You are directed to protest against any act of hostility which 
 may involve or imperil the safe and peaceful transit of persons 
 or property across the Isthmus of Panama. The bombardment 
 of Panama would have this effect, and the United States must 
 insist upon the neutrality of the Isthmus as guaranteed by the 
 treaty. 
 
 November 20, 1901 
 Notify all parties molesting or interfering with free transit 
 across the Isthmus that such interference must cease and that the 
 United States will prevent the interruption of traffic upon the rail- 
 road. Consult with captain of the Iowa, who will be instructed 
 to land marines, if necessary, for the protection of the railroad, 
 in accordance with the treaty rights and obligations of the United 
 States. Desirable to avoid bloodshed, if possible. 
 
 The next three telegrams are from and to the Secre- 
 tary of the Navy: 
 
 September 12, 1902. 
 Ranger, Panama: 
 
 United States guarantees perfect neutrality of Isthmus and that 
 a free transit from sea to sea be not interrupted or embar- 
 rassed. . . . Any transportation of troops which might contravene 
 these provisions of treaty should not be sanctioned by you nor 
 should use of road be permitted which might convert the line of 
 transit into theater of hostility. Moody. 
 
 Colon, September 20, 1902. 
 Secretary Navy, Washington: 
 
 Everything is conceded. The United States guards and guar- 
 antees traffic and the line of transit. To-day I permitted the ex- 
 
382 Appendices 
 
 change of Colombian troops from Panama to Colon, about 1,000 
 men each way, the troops without arms in train guarded by Amer- 
 ican naval force in the same manner as other passengers; arms 
 and ammunition in separate train, guarded also by naval force in 
 the same manner as other freight. 
 
 McLean. 
 
 Panama, October 3, 1902. 
 Secretary Navy, Washington, D. C: 
 
 Have sent this communication to the American consul at Pan- 
 ama: 
 
 Inform Governor while trains running under United States pro- 
 tection I must decline transportation any combatants, ammunition, 
 arms, which might cause interruption traffic or convert line of 
 transit into theater hostilities. 
 
 Casey. 
 
 On November 3 Commander Hubbard responded to 
 the above-quoted telegram of November 2, 1903, saying 
 that before the telegram had been received 400 Colom- 
 bian troops from Cartagena had landed at Colon; that 
 there had been no revolution on the Isthmus, but that the 
 situation was most critical if the revolutionary leaders 
 should act. On this same date the Associated Press in 
 Washington received a bulletin stating that a revolu- 
 tionary outbreak had occurred. When this was brought 
 to the attention of the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. 
 Loomis, he prepared the following cablegram to the con- 
 sul-general at Panama and the consul at Colon: 
 
 Uprising on Isthmus reported. Keep Department promptly 
 and fully informed. 
 
 Before this telegram was sent, however, one was re- 
 ceived from Consul Malmros at Colon, running as fol- 
 lows: 
 
 Revolution imminent. Government force on the Isthmus about 
 500 men. Their official promised support revolution. Fire de- 
 
Appendices 383 
 
 partment, Panama, 441, are well organized and favor revolution. 
 Government vessel, Cartagena, with about 400 men, arrived early 
 to-day with new commander-in-chief, Tobar. Was not expected 
 until November 10. Tobar's arrival is not probable to stop revolu- 
 tion. 
 
 This cablegram was received at 2.35 p. m., and at 3.40 
 p. M. Mr. Loomis sent the telegram which he had already 
 prepared to both Panama and Colon. Apparently, how- 
 ever, the consul-general at Panama had not received the 
 information embodied in the Associated Press bulletin, 
 upon which the Assistant Secretary of State based his 
 dispatch ; for his answer was that there was no uprising, 
 although the situation was critical, this answer being re- 
 ceived at 8.15 p. M. Immediately afterward he sent an- 
 other dispatch, which was received at 9.50 p. m., saying 
 that the uprising had occurred, and had been successful, 
 with no bloodshed. The Colombian gunboat Bogota next 
 day began to shell the city of Panama, with the result of 
 killing one Chinaman. The consul-general was directed 
 to notify her to stop firing. Meanwhile, on November 
 4, Commander Hubbard notified the Department that he 
 had landed a force to protect the lives and property of 
 American citizens against the threats of the Colombian 
 soldiery. 
 
 Before any step whatever had been taken by the United 
 States troops to restore order, the commander of the 
 newly landed Colombian troops had indulged in wanton 
 and violent threats against American citizens, which cre- 
 ated serious apprehension. As Commander Hubbard re- 
 ported in his letter of November 5, this officer and his 
 troops practically began war against the United States, 
 and only the forbearance and coolness of our officers and 
 
384 Appendices 
 
 men prevented bloodshed. The letter of Commander 
 Hubbard is of such interest that it deserves quotation in 
 full, and runs as follows: 
 
 U. S. S. Nashville, Third Rate, 
 Colon, U. S. Colombia, November 5, 1903 
 Sir: Pending a complete report of the occurrences of the last 
 three days in Colon, Colombia, I most respectfully invite the De- 
 partment's attention to those of the date of Wednesday, Novem- 
 ber 4, which amounted to practically the making of war against 
 the United States by the officer in command of the Colombian 
 troops in Colon. At i o'clock p. m. on that date I was summoned 
 on shore by a preconcerted signal, and on landing met the United 
 States consul, vice-consul, and Colonel .ghaler, the general super- 
 intendent of the Panama Railroad. |Thecwi5Bl'"informed me that 
 he had received notice from the officer commanding the Colombian 
 troops. Colonel Torres, through the prefect of Colon, to the effect 
 that if the Colombian officers. Generals Tobal and Amaya, who 
 had been seized in Panama on the evening of the 3d of November 
 by the Independents and held as prisoners, were not released by 
 2 o'clock p. M., he, Torres, would open fire on the town of Colon 
 and kill every United States citizen in the place, and my advice 
 and action were jeguested. I advised that all the United States 
 citizens should take refuge in the shed of the Panama Railroad 
 Company, a stone building susceptible of being put into good state 
 for defense, and that I would immediately land such body of men 
 with extra arms for arming the citizens, as the complement of the 
 ship would permit. This was agreed to, and I immediately re- 
 turned on board, arriving at 1.15 p. m. The order for landing 
 was immediately given, and at 1.30 p. m. the boats left the ship 
 with a party of 42 men under the command of Lieut.-Commander 
 H. M. Witzel, with Midsfiipman J. P. Jackson as second in com- 
 mand. Time being pressing I gave vertal orders to Mr. Witzel to 
 take the building above referred to, to put it into the best state 
 of defense possible, and protect the lives of the citizens assembled 
 there — ^not firing unless fired upon. 'The women and children took 
 refuge on the German steamer Markomania and Panama Railroad 
 steamer City of Washington,\hot'h ready to haul out from dock 
 if necessary. The Nashville I got under way and patrolled with 
 her along the water front close in and ready to use either small- 
 arm or shrapnel fire.VThe Colombians surrounded the building 
 
Appendices 385 
 
 of the railroad company almost immediately after we had taken 
 possession, and for about one and a half hours their attitude was 
 most threatening, it being seettiingly their purpose to provoke an 
 attack. Happily our men were cool and steady, and, while the 
 jtension was very great, no shot was fired-rAt about 3.15 p. m. 
 ^olonel Torres) came into the building for an interview . and ex- 
 pressed himself as most friendly to Americans, claiming that the 
 whole affair was a misapprehension and that he wouldlike to send 
 the alcalde of Colon to Panama to see General Tob^and have 
 him direct the discontinuance of the show of force.^A special 
 train was furnished and safe conduct guaranteed. At about 5.30 
 p. M. Colonel Torres made the proposition of withdrawing his 
 troops to Monkey Hill, if I would withdraw the Nashville's force 
 and leave the town in possession of the police until the return of 
 the alcalde on the morning of the sth. After an interview with 
 the 'United States consul and Colonel Shaler as to the probability 
 of good faith in the matter, I decided to accept the proposition 
 and brought my men on board, the disparity in numbers between 
 my force and that of the Colombians, nearly ten to one, making 
 me desirous of avoiding a conflict so long as the object in view, 
 the protection of American citizens, was not imperiled. 
 
 I am positive that the determined attitude of our men, their 
 coolness and evident intention of standing their ground, had a 
 most salutary and decisive effect on the immediate situation, and 
 was the initial step in the ultimate abandoning of Colon by these 
 troops and their return to Cartagena the following day. Lieu- 
 tenant-Commander Witzel is entitled to much praise for his ad- 
 mirable work in command on the spot. 
 
 I feel that I can not sufficiently strongly represent to the De- 
 partment the grossness of this outrage and the insult to our dig- 
 nity, even apart from the savagery of the threat. 
 Very respectfully, 
 
 John Hubbard, 
 Commander, U. S. Navy, Commanding. 
 The Secretary of the Navy, 
 
 Navy Department, Washington, D. C. 
 
 In his letter of November 8 Commander Hubbard sets 
 forth the facts more in detail : 
 
386 Appendices 
 
 U. S. S. Nashville, Third Rate, 
 Porto Bello, U. S. Colombia, November 8, 1903 
 
 Sir: I. I have the honor to make the following report of the 
 occurrences which took place at Colon and Panama inithe interval 
 between the arrival of the Nashville at Colon on the evening of 
 November 2, 1903, and the evening of November s, 1903, when by 
 the arrival of the U. S. S. Dixie at Colon I was relieved as senior 
 officer by Commander F. H. Delano, U. S. Navy. 
 
 2. At the time of the arrival of the Nashville at Colon at S-30 
 p. M. on November 2, everything on the Isthmus was quiet. There 
 was talk of proclaiming the independence of Panama, but no 
 definite action had been taken and there had been no disturbance 
 of peace and order. I At daylight on the morning of November 3, 
 it was found that a vessel which had come in during the night 
 was the Colombian gunboat Cartagena carrying between 400 and 
 500 troops. I had her boarded and learned that these troops were 
 for the garrison at Panama. Inasmuch as the Independent party 
 had not acted and the Government of Colombia was at the time 
 in undisputed control of the Province of Panama, I did not feel, 
 in the absence of any instructions, that I was justified in pre- 
 venting the landing of these troops, and at 8.30 o'clock they were 
 disembarked. The commanding officers, Generals Amaya and 
 Tobal, with four others, immediately went over to Panama to 
 make arrangements for receiving and quartering their troops, 
 leaving the command in charge of an officer whom I later learned 
 to be Colonel Torres. The Department's message addressed to 
 the care of the United States consul I received at 10.30 a. m. ; it 
 was delivered to one of the ship's boats while I was at the con- 
 sul's and not to the consul as addressed. The message was said 
 to have been received at the cable office at g.30 a. m. Immediately 
 on deciphering the message I went on shore to see what arrange- 
 ments the railroad company had made for the transportation of 
 these troops to Panama, and learned that the company would not 
 transport them except on request of the Governor of Panama, 
 and that the prefect at Colon and the officer left in command of 
 the troops had been so notified by the general superintendent of 
 the Panama Railroad Company. I remained at the company's 
 office until it was sure that no action on my part would be needed 
 to prevent the transportation of the troops that afternoon, when 
 I returned on board and cabled the Department the situation of 
 affairs.; At about S-30 p. m. I again went on shore, and received 
 notice from the general superintendent of the railroad that he 
 
Appendices 387 
 
 had received the request for the transportation of the troops and 
 that they would leave on the 8 a. m. train on the following day,' I 
 immediately went to see the general superintendent, and learned 
 that it had just been announced that a provisional government 
 had been established at Panama— that Generals Amaya and Tobal, 
 the Governor of Panama, and four officers, who had gone to 
 Panama in the morning, had been seized and were held as prison- 
 ers ; that they had an organized force of 1,500 troops and wished 
 the government troops in Colon to be sent over. 1 This I declined 
 to permit, and verbally prohibited the general superintendent from 
 giving transportation to the troops of either party, t 
 
 It being then late in the evening, I sent early in the morning 
 of November 4 written notification to the general superintendent 
 of the Panama Railroad, to the prefect of Colon, and to the officer 
 left in command of the Colombian troops, later ascertained to be 
 Colonel Torres, that I had prohibited the transportation of troops 
 in either direction, in order to preserve the free and uninterrupted 
 transit of the Isthmus. Copies of these letters are hereto ap- 
 pended; also copy of my notification to the consul. Except to a 
 few people, nothing was known in Colon of the proceedings in 
 Panama until the arrival of the train at 10.45 on the morning of 
 the 4th. Some propositions were, I was later told, made to Col- 
 onel Torres by the representatives of the new Government at 
 Colon, with a view to inducing him to reembark in the Cartagena 
 and return to the port of Cartagena, and it was in answer to this 
 proposition that Colonel Torres made the threat and took the ac- 
 tion reported in my letter No. 96, of November 5, 1903. The 
 Cartagena left the port just after the threat was made, and I did 
 not deem it expedient to atterhpt to detain her, as such action 
 would certainly, in the then state of affairs, have precipitated a 
 conflict on shore which I was not prepared to meet. It is my un- 
 derstanding that she returned to Cartagena. ' After the with- 
 drawal of the Colombian troops on the evening of November 4, 
 and the return of the Nashville's force on board, as reported in 
 my letter No. 96, there was no disturbance on shore, and the night 
 [passed quietly. ! On the morning of the 5th I discovered that the 
 commander of the Colombian troops had not withdrawn so far 
 from the town as he had agreed, but was occupying buildings near 
 the outskirts of the town. I immediately inquired into the matter 
 and learned that he had some trivial excuse for not carrying out 
 his agreement, and also that it was his intention to occupy Colon 
 again on the arrival of the alcalde due at 10.45 a. m., unless Gen- 
 
388 Appendices 
 
 eral Tobal sent word by the alcalde that he, Colonel Torres, should 
 withdraw. That General Tobal had declined to give any in- 
 structions I was cognizant of, and the situation at once became 
 quite as serious as on the day previous. I immediately landed an 
 armed force, reoccupied the same building; also landed two i- 
 pounders and mounted them on platform cars behind protection of 
 cotton bales, and then in company with the United States consul 
 had an interview with Colonel Torres, in the course of which I 
 informed him that I had relanded my men because he had not 
 kept his agreement ; that I had no interest in the affairs of either 
 party; that my attitude was strictly neutral; that the troops of 
 neither side should be transported ; that my sole purpose in land- 
 ing was to protect the lives and property of American citizens if 
 threatened, as they had been threatened, and to maintain the free 
 and uninterrupted transit of the Isthmus, and that purpose I 
 should maintain by force if necessary. I also strongly advised 
 that in the interests of peace, and to prevent the possibility of a 
 conflict that could not but be regrettable, he should carry out his 
 agreement of the previous evening and withdraw to Monkey Hill. 
 
 Colonel Torres's only reply was that it was unhealthy at Monkey 
 Hill, a reiteration of his love of Americans, and persistence in 
 his intention to occupy Colon, should General Tobal not give him 
 directions to the contrary. 
 
 On the return of the alcalde at about ii a. m. the Colombian 
 troops marched into Colon, but did not assume the threatening de- 
 meanor of the previous day. The American women and children 
 again went on board the Marcomania and City of Washington, 
 and through the British vice-consul I offered protection to British 
 subjects as directed in the Department's cablegram. A copy of 
 the British vice-consul's acknowledgment is hereto appended. The 
 Nashville I got under way as on the previous day and moved close 
 in to protect the water front. During the afternoon several 
 propositions were made to Colonel Torres by the representatives 
 of the new government, and he was finally persuaded by them to 
 embark on the Royal Mail steamer Orinoco with all his troops and 
 return to Cartagena. \ The Orinoco left her dock with the troops 
 — ^474 all told — at 7.3S p. mJ The Dixie arrived and anchored at 
 7.0s p. M., when I went on board and acquainted the commanding 
 officer with the situation. A portion of the marine battalion was 
 landed and the Nashville's force withdrawn. 
 
 3. On the evening of November 4 Major William M. Black 
 and Lieut. Mark Brooke, Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army, came 
 
Appendices 389 
 
 to Colon from Culebra and volunteered their services, which were 
 accepted, and they rendered very efficient help on the following 
 day. 
 
 4. I beg to assure the Department that I had no part whatever 
 in the negotiations that were carried on between Colonel Torres 
 and the representatives of the provisional government; that I 
 landed an armed force only when the lives of American citizens 
 were threatened, and withdrew this force as soon as there seemed 
 to be no grounds for further apprehension of injury to American 
 lives or property; that I relanded an armed force because of the 
 failure of Colonel Torres to carry out his agreement to withdraw 
 and announced intention of returning, and that my attitude 
 throughout was strictly neutral as between the two parties, my 
 only purpose being to protect the lives and property of American 
 citizens and to preserve the free and uninterrupted transit of the 
 Isthmus. 
 
 Very respectfully, 
 
 (Signed) John Hubbard, 
 
 Commander, U. S. Navy, Commanding. 
 The Secretary of the Navy, 
 
 Bureau of Navigation, 'Navy Department, 
 
 Washington, D. C. 
 
 This plain official account of the occurrences of No- 
 vember 4 shows that, instead of there having been too 
 much prevision by the American Government for the 
 maintenance of order and the protection of life and prop- 
 erty on the Isthmus, the orders for the movement of the 
 American warships had been too long delayed; so long, 
 in fact, that there were but forty-two marines and sailors 
 available to land and protect the lives of American men 
 and women. It was only the coolness and gallantry with 
 which this little band of men wearing the American uni- 
 form faced ten times their number of armed foes, bent 
 on carrying out the atrocious threat of the Colombian 
 commander, that prevented a murderous catastrophe. At 
 Panama, when the revolution broke out, there was no 
 
390 Appendices 
 
 American man-of-war and no American troops or sailors. 
 At Colon, Commander Hubbard acted with entire impar- 
 tiality toward both sides, preventing any movement, 
 whether by the Colombians or the Panamans, which 
 would tend to produce bloodshed. On November 9 he 
 prevented a body of the revolutionists from landing at 
 Colon. Throughout he behaved in the most creditable 
 manner. In the New York Evening Post, under date of 
 Panama, December 8, there is an article from a special 
 correspondent, which sets forth in detail the unbearable 
 oppression of the Colombian Government in Panama. In 
 this article is an interesting interview with a native Pana- 
 man, which runs in part as follows : 
 
 ■ We looked upon the building of the canal as a matter of 
 life or death to us. We wanted that because it meant, with the 
 United States in control of it, peace and prosperity for us. Presi- 
 dent Marroquin appointed an Isthmian to be governor of Panama; 
 and we looked upon that as of happy augury. Soon we heard that 
 the canal treaty was not likely to be approved at Bogota; next we 
 heard that our Isthmian Governor, Obaldia, who had scarcely 
 assumed power, was to be superseded by a soldier from 
 Bogota. . . . 
 
 Notwithstanding all that Colombia has drained us of in the 
 way of revenues, she did not bridge for us a single river, nor 
 
 ■ make a single roadway, nor erect a single college where our 
 children could be educated, nor do anything at all to advance 
 our industries. . . . Well, when the new generals came we seized 
 them, arrested them, and the town of Panama was in joy. Not 
 a protest was made, except the shots fired from the Colombian 
 gunboat Bogota, which killed one Chinese lying in his bed. We 
 were willing to encounter the Colombian troops at Colon and fight 
 it out ; but the commander of the United States cruiser Nashville 
 forbade Superintendent Shaler to allow the railroad to transport 
 troops for either party. That is our story. 
 
 I call especial attention to the concluding portion of 
 this interview, which states the willingness of the Pan- 
 
Appendices 391 
 
 ama people to fight the Colombian troops and the re- 
 fusal of Commander Hubbard to permit them to use the 
 railroad and therefore to get into a position where the 
 fight could take place. It thus clearly appears that the 
 fact that there was no bloodshed on the Isthmus was di- 
 rectly due — and only due — to the prompt and firm en- 
 forcement by the United States of its traditional policy. 
 During the past forty years revolutions and attempts at 
 revolution have succeeded one another with monotonous 
 regularity on the Isthmus, and again and again United 
 States sailors and marines have been landed as they were 
 landed in this instance and under similar instructions to 
 protect the transit. One of these revolutions resulted in 
 three years of warfare; and the aggregate of bloodshed 
 and misery caused by them has been incalculable. The 
 fact that in this last revolution not a life was lost, save 
 that of the man killed by the shells of the Colombian gun- 
 boat, and no property destroyed, was due to the action 
 which I have described. We, in effect, policed the Isth- 
 mus in the interest of its inhabitants and of our own 
 national needs, and for the good of the entire civilized 
 world. Failure to act as the Administration acted would 
 have meant great waste of life, great suffering, great de- 
 struction of property; all of which was avoided by the 
 firmness and prudence with which Commander Hubbard 
 carried out his orders and prevented either party from 
 attacking the other. Our action was for the peace both 
 of Colombia and of Panama. It is earnestly to be hoped 
 that there will be no unwise conduct on our part which 
 may encourage Colombia to embark on a war which can 
 not result in her regaining control of the Isthmus, but 
 which may cause much bloodshed and suffering. 
 
392 Appendices 
 
 I hesitate to refer to the injurious insinuations which 
 have been made of compHcity by this government in the 
 revolutionary movement in Panama. They are as desti- 
 tute of foundation as of propriety. The only excuse for 
 my mentioning them is the fear lest unthinking persons 
 might mistake for acquiescence the silence of mere self- 
 respect. I think proper to say, therefore, that no one 
 connected with this Government had any part in prepar- 
 ing, inciting, or encouraging the late revolution on the 
 Isthmus of Panama, and that save from the reports of 
 our military and naval officers, given above, no one con- 
 nected with this Government had any previous knowledge 
 of the revolution except such as was accessible to any 
 person of ordinary intelligence who read the newspapers 
 and kept up a current acquaintance with public affairs. 
 
 By the unanimous action of its people, without the 
 firing of a shot — with a unanimity hardly before recorded 
 in any similar case — the people of Panama declared them- 
 selves an independent republic. Their recognition by 
 this Government was based upon a state of facts in no 
 way dependent for its justification upon our action in 
 ordinary cases. I have not denied, nor do I wish to deny, 
 either the validity or the propriety of the general rule 
 that a new state should not be recognized as independent 
 till it has shown its ability to maintain its independence. 
 This rule is derived from the principle of non-interven- 
 tion, and as a corollary of that principle has generally 
 been observed by the United States. But, like the princi- 
 ple from which it is deduced, the rule is subject to excep- 
 tions; and there are in my opinion clear and imperative 
 reasons why a departure from it was justified and even 
 
Appendices 393 
 
 required in the present instance. These reasons em- 
 brace, first, our treaty rights ; second, our national inter- 
 ests and safety ; and, third, the interests of collective civ- 
 ilization. 
 
 I have already adverted to the treaty of 1846, by the 
 thirty-fifth article of which the United States secured the 
 right to a free and open transit across the Isthmus of 
 Panama, and to that end agreed to guarantee to New 
 Granada her rights of sovereignty and property over that 
 territory. This article is sometimes discussed as if the 
 latter guarantee constituted its sole object and bound the 
 United States to protect the sovereignty of New Granada 
 against domestic revolution. Nothing, however, could be 
 more erroneous than this supposition. That our wise 
 and patriotic ancestors, with all their dread of entangling 
 alliances^ would have entered into a treaty with New 
 Granada solely or even primarily for the purpose of en- 
 abling that remnant of the original Republic of Colom- 
 bia, then resolved into the States of New Granada, 
 Venezuela, and Ecuador, to continue from Bogota to 
 rule over the Isthmus of Panama, is a conception that 
 would in itself be incredible, even if the contrary did not 
 clearly appear. It is true that since the treaty was made 
 the United States has again and again been obliged forci- 
 bly to intervene for the preservation of order and the 
 maintenance of an open transit, and that this interven- 
 tion has usually operated to the advantage of the titular 
 Government of Colombia, but it is equally true that the 
 United States in intervening with or without Colombia's 
 consent, for the protection of the transit, has disclaimed 
 any duty to defend the Colombian Government against 
 
394 Appendices 
 
 domestic insurrection or against the erection of an inde- 
 pendent government on the Isthmus of Panama. The 
 attacks against which the United States engaged to pro- 
 tect New Granadian sovereignty were those of foreign 
 powers; but this engagement was only a means to the 
 accomplishment of a yet more important end. The great 
 design of the article was to assure the dedication of the 
 Isthmus to the purposes of free and unobstructed inter- 
 oceanic transit, the consummation of which would be 
 found in an interoceanic canal. To the accomplishment 
 of this object the Government of the United States had 
 for years directed its diplomacy. It occupied a place in 
 the instructions to our delegates to the Panama Congress 
 during the Administration of John Quincy Adams. It 
 formed the subject of a resolution of the Senate in 1835, 
 and of the House of Representatives in 1839. I" 1846 
 its importance had become still more apparent by reason 
 of the Mexican war. If the treaty of 1846 did not in 
 terms bind New Granada to grant reasonable concessions , 
 for the construction of means of interoceanic communi- 
 cation, it was only because it was not imagined that such 
 concessions would ever be withheld. As it was expressly 
 agreed that the United States, in consideration of its 
 onerous guarantee of New Granadian sovereignty, should 
 possess the right of free and open transit on any modes 
 of communication that might be constructed, the obvious 
 intent of the treaty rendered it unnecessary, if not super- 
 fluous, in terms to stipulate that permission for the con- 
 struction of such modes of communication should not be 
 denied. 
 Long before the conclusion of the Hay-Herran treaty 
 
Appendices 395 
 
 the course of events had shown that a canal to connect 
 the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans must be built by the 
 United States or not at all. Experience had demonstrated 
 that private enterprise was utterly inadequate for the 
 purpose ; and a fixed policy, declared by the United States 
 on many memorable occasions, and supported by the prac- 
 tically unanimous voice of American opinion, had ren- 
 dered it morally impossible that the work should be un- 
 dertaken by European powers, either singly or in com- 
 bination. Such were the universally recognized condi- 
 tions on which the legislation of the Congress was based, 
 and on which the late negotiations with Colombia were 
 begun and concluded. Nevertheless, when the well-con- 
 sidered agreement was rejected by Colombia and the revo- 
 lution on the Isthmus ensued, one of Colombia's first acts 
 was to invoke the intervention of the United States ; nor 
 does her invitation appear to have been confined to this 
 Government alone. By a telegram from Mr. Beaupre, 
 our minister at Bogota, of the 7th of November last, we 
 were informed that General Reyes would soon leave 
 Panama invested with full powers; that he had tele- 
 graphed the President of Mexico to ask the Government 
 of the United States and all countries represented at the 
 Pan-American Conference "to aid Colombia to preserve 
 her integrity"; and that he had requested that the Gov- 
 ernment of the United States should meanwhile "pre- 
 serve the neutrality and transit of the Isthmus" and 
 should "not recognize the new government." In another 
 telegram from Mr. Beaupre, which was sent later in the 
 day, this Government was asked whether it would take 
 action "to maintain Colombian right and sovereignty on 
 
396 Appendices 
 
 the Isthmus in accordance with article 35 [of] the Treaty 
 of 1846" in case the Colombian Government should be 
 "entirely unable to suppress the secession movement 
 there." Here was a direct solicitation to the United 
 States to intervene for the purpose of suppressing, con- 
 trary to the Treaty of 1846 as this Government has uni- 
 formly construed it, a new revolt against Colombia's au- 
 thority brought about by her own refusal to permit the 
 fulfillment of the great design for which that treaty was 
 made. It was under these circumstances that the United 
 States, instead of using its forces to destroy those who 
 sought to make the engagements of the treaty a reality, 
 recognized them as the proper custodians of the sover- 
 eignty of the Isthmus. 
 
 This recognition was, in the second place, further justi- 
 fied by the highest considerations of our national interests 
 and safety. In all the range of our international rela- 
 tions I do not hesitate to afHrm that there is nothing of 
 greater or more pressing importance than the construc- 
 tion of an interoceanic canal. Long acknowledged to be 
 essential to our commercial development, it has become, 
 as the result of the recent extension of our territorial 
 dominion, more than ever essential to our national self- 
 defense. In transmitting to the Senate the Treaty of 
 1846, President Polk pointed out as the principal reason 
 for its ratification that the passage of the Isthmus, which 
 it was designed to secure, "would relieve us from a long 
 and dangerous navigation of more than 9,000 miles around 
 Cape Horn, and render our communication with our own 
 possessions on the northwest coast of America compar- 
 atively easy and speedy." The events of the past five 
 
Appendices 397 
 
 years have given to this consideration an importance im- 
 measurably greater than it possessed in 1846. In the 
 light of our present situation, the establishment of easy 
 and speedy communication by sea between the Atlantic 
 and the Pacific presents itself not simply as something 
 to be desired, but as an object to be . positively and 
 promptly attained. Reasons of convenience have been 
 superseded by reasons of vital necessity, which do not 
 admit of indefinite delays. 
 
 To such delays the rejection by Colombia of the Hay- 
 Herran treaty directly exposed us. As proof of this 
 fact I need only refer to the program outlined in the 
 report of the majority of the Panama Canal Committee, 
 read in the Colombian Senate on the 14th of October 
 last. In this report, which recommended that the dis- 
 cussion of a law to authorize the government to enter 
 upon new negotiations should be indefinitely postponed, 
 it is proposed that the consideration of the subject should 
 be deferred till October 31, 1904, when the next Colom- 
 bian Congress should have met in ordinary session. By 
 that time, as the report goes on to say, the extension of 
 time granted to the New Panama Canal Company by 
 treaty in 1893 would have expired, and the new Congress 
 would be in a position to take up the question whether 
 the company had not, in spite of further extensions that 
 had been granted by legislative acts, forfeited all its 
 property and rights. "When that time arrives," the re- 
 port significantly declares, "the Republic, without any 
 impediment, will be able to contract, and will be in more 
 clear, more definite, and more advantageous possession, 
 both legally and materially." The naked meaning of this 
 
398 Appendices 
 
 report is that Colombia proposed to wait until, Ky the 
 enforcement of a forfeiture repugnant to the ideas of 
 justice which obtain in every civilized nation, the property 
 and rights of the New Panama Canal Company could be 
 confiscated. 
 
 Such is the scheme to which it was proposed that the 
 United States should be invited to become a party. The 
 construction of the canal was to be relegated to the in- 
 definite future, while Colombia was, by reason of her 
 own delay, to be placed in the "more advantageous" posi- 
 tion of claiming not merely the compensation to be paid 
 by the United States for the privilege of completing the 
 canal, but also the forty millions authorized by the act 
 of 1902 to be paid for the property of the New Panama 
 Canal Company. That the attempt to carry out this 
 scheme would have brought Colombia into conflict with 
 the Government of France can not be doubted ; nor could 
 the United States have counted upon immunity from the 
 consequences of the attempt, even apart from the in- 
 definite delays to which the construction of the canal was 
 to be subjected. On the first appearance of danger to 
 Colombia, this Government would have been summoned 
 to interpose, in order to give eflfect to the guarantees of 
 the Treaty of 1846 ; and all this in support of a plan which, 
 while characterized in its first stage by the wanton dis- 
 regard of our own highest interests, was fitly to end in 
 further injury to the citizens of a friendly nation, whose 
 enormous losses in their generous efforts to pierce the 
 Isthmus have become a matter of history. 
 
 In the third place, I confidently maintain that the rec- 
 ognition of the Republic of Panama was an act justified 
 
Appendices 399 
 
 by the interests of collective civilization. If ever a gov- 
 ernment could be said to have received a mandate from 
 civilization to effect an object the accomplishment of 
 which was demanded in the interest of mankind, the 
 United States holds that position with regard to the in- 
 teroceanic canal. Since our purpose to build the canal 
 was definitely announced, there have come from all 
 quarters assurances of approval and encouragement, in 
 which even Colombia herself at one time participated; 
 and to general assurances were added specific acts and 
 declarations. In order that no obstacle might stand in 
 our way. Great Britain renounced important rights under 
 the Clayton-Bulwer treaty and agreed to its abrogation, 
 receiving in return nothing but our honorable pledge to 
 build the canal and protect it as an open highway. It 
 was in view of this pledge, and of the proposed enactment 
 by the Congress of the United States of legislation to 
 give it immediate effect, that the second Pan-American 
 Conference, at the City of Mexico, on January 22, 1902, 
 adopted the following resolution: 
 
 The Republics assembled at the International Conference of 
 Mexico applaud the purpose of the United States Government to 
 construct an interoceanic canal, and acknowledge that this work 
 will not only be worthy of the greatness of the American people, 
 but also in the highest sense a work of civilization, and to the 
 greatest degree beneficial to the development of commerce be- 
 tween the American States and the other countries of the world. 
 
 Among those who signed this resolution on behalf of 
 their respective governments was General Reyes, the 
 delegate of Colombia. Little could it have been foreseen 
 that two years later the Colombian Government, led 
 astray by false allurements of selfish advantage, and 
 
400 Appendices 
 
 forgetful alike of its international obligations and of the 
 duties and responsibilities of sovereignty, would thwart 
 the efforts of the United States to enter upon and com- 
 plete a work which the nations of America, reechoing 
 the sentiment of the nations of Europe, had pronounced 
 to be not only "worthy of the greatness of the American 
 people," but also "in the highest sense a work of civiliza- 
 tion." 
 
 That our position as the mandatory of civilization has 
 been by no means misconceived is shown by the prompti- 
 tude with which the powers have, one after another, fol- 
 lowed our lead in recognizing Panama as an independent 
 State. Our action in recognizing the new republic has 
 been followed by like recognition on the part of France, 
 Germany, Denmark, Russia, Sweden, and Norway, Nica- 
 ragua, Peru, China, Cuba, Great Britain, Italy, Costa 
 Rica, Japan, and Austria-Hungary. 
 
 In view of the manifold considerations of treaty right 
 and obligation, of national interest and safety, and of 
 collective civilization, by which our Government was con- 
 strained to act, I am at a loss to comprehend the attitude 
 of those who can discern in the recognition of the Re- 
 public of Panama only a general approval of the principle 
 of "revolution" by which a given government is over- 
 turned or one portion of a country separated from 
 another. Only the amplest justification can warrant a 
 revolutionary movement of either kind. But there is no 
 fixed rule which can be applied to all such movements. 
 Each case must be judged on its own merits. There have 
 been many revolutionary movements, many movements 
 for the dismemberment of countries, which were evil. 
 
Appendices 401 
 
 tried by any standard. But in my opinion no disinterested 
 and fair-minded observer acquainted with the circum- 
 stances can fail to feel that Panama had the amplest 
 justification for separation from Colombia under the con- 
 ditions existing, and, moreover, that its action was in the 
 highest degree beneficial to the interests of the entire 
 civilized world by securing the immediate opportunity 
 for the building of the interoceanic canal. It would be 
 well for those who are pessimistic as to our action in 
 peacefully recognizing the Republic of Panama, while 
 we lawfully protected the transit from invasion and dis- 
 turbance, to recall what has been done in Cuba, where 
 we intervened even by force on general grounds of 
 national interest and duty. When we interfered it was 
 freely prophesied that we intended to keep Cuba and ad- 
 minister it for our own interests. The result has dem- 
 onstrated in singularly conclusive fashion the falsity of 
 these prophecies. Cuba is now an independent republic. 
 We governed it in its own interests for a few years, till 
 it was able to stand alone, and then started it upon its 
 career of self-government and independence, granting it 
 all necessary aid. We have received from Cuba a grant 
 of two naval stations, so situated that they in no possible 
 way menace the liberty of the island, and yet serve as 
 important defenses for the Cuban people, as well as for 
 our own people, against possible foreign attack. The 
 people of Cuba have been immeasurably benefited-by our 
 interference in their behalf, and our own gain has been 
 great. So will it be with Panama. The people of the 
 Isthmus, and as I firmly believe of the adjacent parts of 
 Central and South America, will be greatly benefited by 
 
402 Appendices 
 
 the building of the canal and the guarantee of peace and 
 order along its line ; and hand in hand with the benefit to 
 them will go the benefit to us and to mankind. By our 
 prompt and decisive action, not only have our interests 
 and those of the world at large been conserved, but we 
 have forestalled complications which were likely to be 
 fruitful in loss to ourselves, and in bloodshed and suffer- 
 ing to the people of the Isthmus. 
 
 Instead of using our forces, as we were invited by 
 Colombia to do, for the twofold purpose of defeating our 
 own rights and interests and the interests of the civilized 
 world, and of compelling the submission of the people 
 of the Isthmus to those whom they regarded as oppres- 
 sors, we shall, as in duty bound, keep the transit open 
 and prevent its invasion. Meanwhile, the only question 
 now before us is that of the ratification of the treaty. 
 For it is to be remembered that a failure to ratify the 
 treaty will not undo what has been done, will not restore 
 Panama to Colombia, and will not alter our obligation 
 to keep the transit open across the Isthmus, and to pre- 
 vent any outside power from menacing this transit. 
 
 It seems to have been assumed in certain quarters that 
 the proposition that the obligations of article 35 of the 
 treaty of 1846 are to be considered as adhering to and 
 following the sovereignty of the Isthmus, so long as that 
 sovereignty is not absorbed by the United States, rests 
 upon some novel theory. No assumption could be further 
 from the fact. It is by no means true that a state in 
 declaring its independence rids itself of all the treaty ob- 
 ligations entered into by the parent government. It is 
 a mere coincidence that this question was once raised in 
 
Appendices 403 
 
 a case involving the obligations of Colombia as an in- 
 dependent state under a treaty which Spain had made 
 with the United States many years before Spanish-Ameri- 
 can independence. In that case Mr. John Quincy 
 Adams, Secretary of State, in an instruction to Mr. 
 Anderson, our minister to Colombia, of May 27, 1823, 
 said: 
 
 By a treaty between the United States and Spain concluded at 
 a time when Colombia was a part of the Spanish dominions . . . 
 the principle that free ships make free goods was expressly 
 recognized and established. It is asserted that by her declaration 
 of independence Colombia has been entirely released from all the 
 obligations by which, as a part of the Spanish nation, she was 
 bound to other nations. This principle is not tenable. To all the 
 engagements of Spain with other nations, affecting their rights 
 and interests, Colombia, so far as she was affected by them, 
 remains bound in honor and in justice. The stipulation now 
 referred to is of that character. 
 
 The principle thus asserted by Mr. Adams was after- 
 ward sustained by an international commission in respect 
 to the precise stipulation to which he referred; and a 
 similar position was taken by the United States with re- 
 gard to the binding obligation upon the independent State 
 of Texas of commercial stipulations embodied in prior 
 treaties between the United States and Mexico when 
 Texas formed a part of the latter country. But in the 
 present case it is unnecessary to go so far. Even if it 
 be admitted that prior treaties of a political and commer- 
 cial complexion generally do not bind a new state formed 
 by separation, it is undeniable that stipulations having a 
 local application to the territory embraced in the new 
 state continue in force and are binding upon the new 
 sovereign. Thus it is on all hands conceded that treaties 
 
404 Appendices 
 
 relating to boundaries and to rights of navigation con- 
 tinue in force without regard to changes in government 
 or in Sovereignty. This principle obviously applies to 
 that part of the treaty of 1846 which relates to the 
 Isthmus of Panama. 
 
 In conclusion let me repeat that the question actually 
 before this Government is not that of the recognition of 
 Panama as an independent republic. That is already an 
 accomplished fact. The question, and the only question, 
 is whether or not we shall build an Isthmian Canal. 
 
 I transmit herewith copies of the latest notes from the 
 minister of the Republic of Panama to this Government, 
 and of certain notes which have passed between the 
 special envoy of the Republic of Colombia and this Gov- 
 ernment. 
 
 THE END 
 
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